

Divergence from Within: An Investigation into Regional
Variations of Public Opinion Towards European
Integration

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Abstract

Over the past decade, several European Union (EU) member-states have expanded the process of decentralisation by granting further autonomy to subnational regions. This recent push for devolution is described by Michael Keating (1998) as *new regionalism*, the subnational answer to globalisation. Regions around Europe are now more accessible to one another to share commonalities across trans-national networks which in turn can help foster a greater sense and desire for autonomy (Keating 1998: 89). Furthermore, sub-state nationalism can consequently affect a region's desire for integration within Europe. Traditionally, European integration public opinion studies have remained focused at the national and individual levels, rarely taking the regional level into account. This dissertation attempts to break this mould and demonstrate that public opinion towards European integration can vary as much within member-states as it does between them. Through the use of quantitative investigations of public opinion data, this study reveals that several factors which contribute to 'new regionalism' also contribute to variations in regional EU support. These factors include regional contrasts within the realms of economy, politics and identity. In addition, this research notes that individuals may perceive certain national evaluations from within the regional context. Furthermore, the relationship between regional assertiveness and European integration is also analysed. While it is demonstrated that most regional political parties tend to favour European integration, this is not often the case amongst the public of these assertive regions. Regions where assertion is high and identity is stronger will less likely support European integration. The results of this research demonstrate that the nature of public opinion in Europe is possibly more complex than initially thought. Moreover, it builds on previous research of public opinion towards European integration by adapting to the continuous change in the multilevel structure of Europe taking into account the contextual dynamics of which Europeans shape their opinion.

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List of Acronyms

ANOVA	Analysis of Variance
BES	British Election Study
BHPS	British Household Panel Survey
BSA	British Social Attitudes Survey
CMP	Comparative Manifestos Project
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EES	European Election Study
ESS	European Social Survey
EU	European Union
EU15	First 15 European Union Members (joined prior to 2004)
EVS	European Values Study
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
OLS	Ordinary Least Squares Regression
PSU	Primary Sampling Points
SEA	Single European Act
TEU	Treaty on European Union

Political Party Acronyms

BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc (Spain)
CC	Canarian Coalition (Spain)
CiU	Convergence and Unity (Spain)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (UK)
EA	Basque Solidarity (Spain)
EFA	European Free Alliance (European parliament)
ERC	Catalan Republican Left (Spain)
FDF	Francophone Democratic Front (Belgium)
LN	Northern League (Italy)
PA	Andalusian Party (Spain)
PAR	Aragonese Regionalist Party (Spain)
PNV-EAJ	Basque Nationalist Party (Spain)
PP	Partido Popular (Spain)
RKP-SFP	Swedish People's Party (Finland)
SF	Sinn Fein (UK)
SNP	Scottish National Party (UK)
UKIP	United Kingdom Independence Party (UK)
UUP	Ulster Unionist Party (UK)
VU	People's Party (Belgium)
VU ID-21	People's Union (Belgium)

Chapter 1

Introduction


The European Union (EU) is one of the largest experiments with democracy the modern world has yet seen. Its uniqueness lies in the reallocation of national sovereignty in certain areas of policy to a new and higher level of governance. The history of the European Union began as an economic venture by six countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) to merge the industries of coal and steel in the 1950s and has slowly progressed into a 27 member-state free market zone as well as residing over many social and cohesion policies. What began as an elite project soon evolved to include the participatory role of the European public through direct elections to the European Parliament from 1979. European citizens are now in even greater control of the integration process through means of both direct action, such as European parliamentary elections and referendums, and indirect action in how the public correlates the issue of integration with the approval of their national government. Additionally, European issues can be seen having an impact on national politics in many realms including the Europeanisation of the balance of power within political parties (Poguntke, Aylott, Ladrech and Luther 2007), influencing positions of political parties within manifestos to incorporate integration (Pennings 2006) and even shaping national elections (Kriesi 2007). The importance of public evaluations on the question of integration has led to a substantial amount of research on how Europeans assess the European Union. Why do individuals support or oppose European integration? This dissertation aims to answer this question by accounting for the multilevel context in which the citizens of Europe evaluate integration. Specifically this research focuses on regional-based explanations to investigate European integration support.

Over the past few decades, several EU member-states have expanded the process of decentralising the national government by granting additional autonomy to subnational regions. This recent push for devolution has been described by Michael Keating (1998) as *new regionalism*, the subnational answer to globalisation. The globalising world creates a unique situation never before presented where the common market constructs a

new environment for Europe’s regions. Regions around Europe are economically and politically pitted against one another while simultaneously being more accessible to share commonalities across trans-national networks which in turn can help foster a greater sense and desire for autonomy (Keating 1998: 89). New regionalism recognises the importance of the central-state, thus autonomous demands are more likely to call for a strengthening of regional governance stopping short of full independence. These demands are made in the form of *regional assertiveness*, defined by Pieter Van Houten (2000: 2) as when “regional political actors demand changes in the distribution of competencies between the national and regional level of government, in favour of the regional level”. A new subnational level of governance is contributing to a multilevel structure where autonomy is being pulled from the nation-state from above as well as below. This dynamic is often recognised in the European integration process where the phrase a “Europe of the regions” is frequently used to describe the aspiration of a Europe without national boundaries.

Attitudes towards European integration vary widely between countries, something that has been broadly discussed within academic literature. Figure 1.1 illustrates the working concept of this research; regions within countries can vary as much as between countries. The graph on the left of Figure 1.1 displays the percentage of individuals sampled within each of the first 15 EU member-states seeing national EU membership as a “good thing”. The variation ranges from the most pro-EU countries of

Figure 1.1: National vs. Regional EU Support levels




Note: Data is taken from 2005 Eurobarometer Survey 63.4 (explained in greater detail in Chapter 4). Other possible responses are “bad thing” and “neither good nor bad thing”.

Luxembourg and the Netherlands where just under 80% of those surveyed view membership as a “good thing” to the least supportive countries, the United Kingdom and Austria, where less than 40% of those questioned view membership positively. In comparison, the right section of the graph observes the variation of EU support within the regions of a single member-state, Spain. Here the autonomous communities of Madrid and Valencia display higher levels of EU support where just under 80% of those questioned observe Spanish membership as a “good thing” while under 50% of those surveyed in Galicia stated EU membership as a “good thing”. This graph demonstrates that opinions can vary as much between the regions of a country as they do between countries. Figure 1.2 takes the example of the Spanish autonomous communities a step further, observing temporal variation in addition to spatial variation. It is evident that aggregate support levels amongst the selected communities do not remain similar over time. While the overall trends are roughly comparable from 1986-2005 variation levels of EU support are only minimal in the early 1990s and 2000s indicating that regional variations have been evident for the past two decades yet are frequently overlooked. As the role of governance changes within the European Union, individuals are likely to evaluate the political world based on the multileveled political space around them. The multileveled theme of analysis addressed in this dissertation and the consideration of regional explanations will present an onset for future investigations of public opinion towards European integration.

Does the phenomenon of new regionalism have any impact on the way the European public evaluates integration? Should we expect, for example, the Catalans and the Basque of Spain or the Welsh and the Scottish of the United Kingdom to share the same reasons for supporting or opposing EU membership? Regions within a single country can have as many, or more, differing characteristics as countries have between each other. Some may be wealthier than others, some may have more political autonomy and some may even speak a different language. Many explanatory variables explored at the individual and national aggregated levels such as political, economic and cultural indicators also contribute to the rise of new regionalism and regional assertiveness. This gives an incentive to understanding how these variables may affect opinion towards integration at an additional level below that of the nation-state.

Figure 1.2: Regional EU Support Levels in Spain 1986-2005



Note: Data is taken from Manheim Eurobarometer Survey in addition to Eurobarometer Surveys 60.1 (2003), 62.0 (2004) and 63.4 (2005). Other possible responses are "bad thing" and "neither good nor bad thing". Spain mean includes all 17 autonomous communities.

This dissertation will build on the works of previous researchers. A great deal of these earlier studies established many of the fundamental explanatory variables commonly used when explaining support for European integration. I believe that the impacts of these variables are more complex than utilised in previous research. Much of the existing literature has ignored the nested structure in which the public may formulate their evaluations. Individuals generate evaluations based on the context of their surroundings. This may come in the form of the opinions of others in his/her community or observations gathered from the environment of the territorial region or country in which he/she lives. A single variable can have different effects at different contextual levels.

In addition to expanding public opinion research into a multilevel context including the subnational region, I will also evaluate new regionalism's role in influencing EU support. It is possible that new regionalism is generating a new sense of identity at the subnational level. As elites introduce the issue of further autonomy at the regional level individuals may be beginning to recognise the regional distinctions that foster their demands. If the public starts to create evaluations at the regional level, what

implications does this have on EU support? Are demands for devolution or independence within a region an obstruction to European integration? The dynamic of new regionalism may present a new dimension to understanding opinion towards the European Union.

Defining the Region

The definition of region can mean various things. It can range from the simplest of geographical areas such as a valley in the Alps or expand to greater geographical vicinities such as a continent. When observing regions in the context of new regionalism the region is more clearly defined as a territorial unit below that of the nation-state. Like most territorial units what defines the region's boundaries can be complex. In some instances the natural world can create the beginning and end of a region's boundaries with a clear line of separation from other territories in the form of a river, mountain or perhaps valley. In other areas the boundaries of the region are much more complex. Culture can play a significant role in defining the region. Language, religion and ethnicity are all common attributes that define a commonality between peoples of a specific area. In some cases however the cultural region can be different from that of the physical region.

An additional definition of region serves more of a political and/or administrative purpose. While these regions may be bound to geographical and/or cultural boundaries they are recognised by the national and European levels of government for reasons of administrative functionality. In Europe, there is no true standard for defining regions within the member-states. The European Union established the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) system to provide a consistent classification of territorial units for the production of regional statistics. The three levels of the NUTS system range from the lower localities (NUTS III) to larger grouped collections of these localities (NUTS I) which are the largest EU administrative units below the nation-state. These units however are still ambiguous as they do not necessarily comply with each member-state's administrative regions.¹

¹ Not all countries are classified in each of the NUTS categories. In addition, there are some countries, such as Luxembourg and Ireland, that are entirely categorised as a NUTS I region.

For the purposes of this dissertation I will base my classification of the region beginning with Van Houten's (Van Houten 2003: 124) definition where the region is the "administrative level immediately below the national state". Van Houten's work provides an excellent basis for the definition as it explores the reasons behind regional assertiveness, a theme explored in this dissertation and a reaction to new regionalism that runs parallel with Keating's (1998) work. This definition works unambiguously in federal states like the Länder in Germany or even the Autonomous Communities of Spain. Here the region is properly administered by a body of governance residing over the localised policies of the region and is clearly the highest government authority below the central-state. This definition however is unclear in non-federal states such as the United Kingdom where the territory of England is divided into nine separate administrative regions in addition to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. Initially created by the UK government to serve statistical purposes it may seem that assertiveness can be documented within some of the English regions. In 2000 the region of Greater London became the first and only English region to have an elected body of governance. In 2004 a referendum on devolution occurred in the region of the North East. Though the referendum failed, its occurrence did demonstrate the possibility of devolution within English regions.

In order to capture the elements of new regionalism I will therefore also include existing administrative units where no elected assembly exists. Therefore, the region will be defined meeting one of three classifications:

1. The highest directly elected administrative region below the nation-state
2. Or, if no elected regional body exists, the highest level regional authority below the nation-state. These regions may have authorities appointed by local or national governments.
3. Or, if neither of the two above classifications fit, the highest levelled administrative region below the nation-state as defined by the EU NUTS system.

The imperfection of the above definition can be accredited to the asymmetrical context of subnational regionalism that exists throughout Europe. Even more complex, regional authoritative powers can be asymmetrical within the same country. The United

Kingdom again displays a perfect example of this in the British process of devolution. Scotland enjoys its own parliament with a number of taxation and devolved powers, Northern Ireland maintains an assembly with certain devolved powers while Wales has a lesser autonomous assembly and most English regions have no autonomy or elected body of regional governance. This uneven balance of autonomy exists in other countries such as Spain where Catalonia and the Basque Country have additional powers compared to most other autonomous communities. This imbalance of subnational governance can give a better understanding of the role multilevel governance plays in formulating public opinion towards European integration. Will the public in those regions where regional politics is stronger be more inclined to support a new European level of governance?

Explaining Public Opinion towards European Integration

The explanations for public opinion towards European integration can be divided into four fundamental themes of analysis designed to extend our understanding of public opinion into a regional context. These themes are the effects of regional political parties, regional economic and political indicators, identity and lastly regional assertiveness. I will give a brief explanation of each theme, leaving a detailed review for the following two chapters. This section will outline a more general understanding of determinates of EU attitudes from previous literature and how a number of these factors are intimately linked with regional differences, where this research will expand the prior literature.

Regional Political Parties

The multilevel governance structure created by the European Union presents a series of new channels of access for subnational actors to participate in policy making at the European level of governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye 2002). As integration deepens, regional elites find themselves playing a larger role in not only the policy making process but also implementing European policy at the regional level (Keating 1998). This interaction also allows for regional political actors to take credit for bringing European policy and structural funding to assist regional development (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). Regional political parties can often be regarded as “single issue” parties where ideology does not bind the regional political family but rather the commonality is the push for regional autonomy (Hix and Lord

1997). Regional party acceptance of European integration is one of the key elements of the new regionalism (Keating 1998).

Previous research has indicated that the effects of party positions towards European integration can have a strong influence over the public (Ray 2003b; Hooghe and Marks 2005). Leonard Ray (2003b), for example, demonstrated that the cueing effect can be stronger when the national level variation of EU support amongst political parties increases. In addition, the closer one feels towards his/her party the more likely he/she will be affected by the party's European position. As regional political parties increase support, due to the extension of multilevel governance discussed above, it is reasonable to investigate the positions of both the parties and their supporters on integration support. Within the European Union regional parties and their influence undoubtedly vary in terms of influence and strength of support. In addition most regions have no regional specific party at all. Where these parties do however exist it is possible that the inclusion of these parties in regional, national and European politics contributes to an overall strengthening of the regional context when individuals evaluate European integration.

Regional Economic and Political Indicators

Utilitarian and economic explanations of support have been a primary basis for analysis of EU public opinion studies. Some scholars, such as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993: 512), examined the EU support influence of objective macroeconomic indicators such as national GDP and employment figures, attempting to capture a nation's economic well-being. Though most of their variables did not display statistical significance they did indicate the possibility that individuals in stronger economies are more likely to support EU integration. Others scholars, such as Gabel and Whitten (1997), found that it was the "subjective" economy, an individual's perception, rather than the "objective" economy that best explains support for integration. They found that positive perceptions of the economy led to higher levels of EU support. Regional economies tend to vary in terms of wealth not only across Europe but also within countries. In addition, it is realistic to expect individuals to evaluate their perceptions of the economy within the context closest to them.² As the region is the closer community to the

² Anderson (2006) found that multilevel governance minimises the effects of national economic conditions when voting contributing to this concept.

individual, he/she may develop more awareness of the employment circumstances and regional growth observed on a first-hand basis at the regional level rather than at the national level.

Anderson (1998) states that subjective evaluations of national democracy largely contribute to one's perception of integration while similarly Kritzing (2003: 226) displayed that political judgment of the nation-state can lead to diverse evaluations of the EU where support can be a symbolic protest against the "dominant values of the nation-state". As will be noted throughout this dissertation, strengths of regional governance are asymmetrical throughout the EU. Some regions have higher levels of autonomy while other regions, in some instances even within the same country, have fewer capabilities of self-governance. Therefore, this regional variation likely contributes to an individual's perception of democracy and the acceptance of a multilevel governance system thus affecting European support levels.

Identity

The relationship between how individuals perceive themselves and support for the European Union is frequently discussed in the previous literature. Paasi (1991) stated that regions are first formed out of territorial space then progress through political motivation to create regional institutions. At this point symbols take shape to fuse the members of the region together. Subsequently a creation of a regional culture develops, or is emphasised, assisting in creating a recognisable identity of those within the region's borders. Identity can thus come in the form of historical identity through language and culture or simply a political identity through attachment to territory and/or political institutions.

Previous research has demonstrated that identity can have varying effects on integration support. Some assert the existence of multiple identities while others claim European identity comes at the cost of losing national identity (Münch 1996). The effects of regional identity on levels of European support however have yet to be fully developed on a European-wide basis. Cultural and political history varies greatly within the regions of the European Union. Levels of identity and attachment to the regions are also likely to vary and have differing effects on public support of the EU. This dissertation will build upon the preceding EU public opinion literature by expanding on the effects of regional identities. Overall, it is expected that stronger regional identities

will likely lead to higher levels of EU support however in some regions the EU may be perceived as a threat to the regional identity.

Regional Assertiveness

The previous three themes are each components to what can contribute to eventual regional assertiveness. Where Keating (1998) notes the key difference between the new regionalism with regionalism of the past is that the majority of regionalist movements stop short of demanding full independence. Levels of assertiveness can vary across Europe from regions which still demand an independent nation-state to regions which have no demand for any degree of autonomy. Movements for regional autonomy can have a profound effect on the regional public and their support for European integration.

This dissertation attempts to begin where previous literature on EU public opinion has overlooked. The levels of support in these assertive regions can give insight to the public's support of a multilevel governance system. Individuals within regions of high assertiveness can see European integration positively as a means of achieving autonomy through the weakening of the nation-state. In contrast it is possible that these individuals see integration as yet another level of governance threatening the autonomy of the region. As regional assertiveness is on the rise and decentralisation occurs within the member-states of the EU, the consequences that regional assertiveness and decentralisation have on public evaluations of integration becomes more eminent.

Data and Methods of Analysis

The research conducted in this dissertation will attempt to make wider generalisations about regional variation and support of European integration across the EU. Much of the previous literature when attempting to gain a regional understanding of variation of EU support tends to carry out the analyses on a case study basis observing the regions of only a few selected countries. While these studies are useful for gaining knowledge of EU support within the sample populations analysed, it is difficult to gain a sense of the regional effects on integration support across the wider population of the European Union. Many of these studies employ qualitative investigations through such methods as free-flowing interviews and focus groups. These methods provide excellent insight into why individuals may or may not support European integration. However, given the

small sample size of such interviews and the likelihood that each is unique makes it problematical for comparison and making generalisations about the wider EU population. The research in this dissertation will seek to overcome the issues of using large samples, where the effects of the relatively few assertive regions can be weakened, and small samples which fail to identify the primary differences between regions and countries. In this section, I will briefly describe both the sample populations chosen for the analysis in addition to the quantitative methodologies and data used to reach conclusions about regional explanations of EU support.

Dynamic public opinion studies of the European Union can offer unique challenges due to the continued enlargement of its membership. What began as a six state organisation soon merged to include three additional members in the 1970s. The 1980s and mid-1990s eventually saw the addition of six more member-states bringing the total to 15. The turn of the new millennium saw a further 12 states join, mostly comprising of the newly democratic Central and Eastern European countries, bringing membership to its current total of 27 states. This demonstrates the complexity of public opinion studies as the target of comparison is continually changing.

This dissertation will examine public opinion towards European integration using the original 15 member-states referred to as the EU15.³ These countries include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. There are two main advantages when selecting the EU15 over the current 27 state population. The first consideration reflects upon the amount of data available for a full investigation. Part of the analysis looks into the effect of regional political parties over a 30 year time frame. Party data for the newly Central and Eastern European member-states is severely limited with little or no data available. Furthermore, the unique political history of the new member-states will likely contribute to an abundance of conclusions that may not be comparable to Western Europe. This exceptional account of regionalism in the new member-states merits its own analysis. The findings of this dissertation can perhaps become a stepping stone for a further investigation to include all of the 27 European Union members.

³ Those that joined prior to 2004.

The EU15 contains a high number of subnational regions creating a large sample size to account for regional variation of EU support amongst the population. This will allow greater ease of understanding the effects regional differences have on influencing European integration opinion. For example, are individuals within regions with higher levels of regional identity more likely to support EU integration? Another example asks whether individuals within wealthier regions are more likely to support integration? The effects of federal versus centralised systems of governance on integration opinion will also be examined at the national level.

The large cross-national population dealt with in this dissertation demands sufficient data to produce inferences on individuals within regions of the 15 member-states. To achieve this, quantitative methodologies were chosen as the most applicable approach to reaching conclusions on regional effects on public opinion towards European integration. The quantitative tools involved include OLS regression, ordered logistic regression, as well as multilevel modelling. One of the key features of this dissertation is the use of the multilevel models which take into account the nested, contextual structure of the data. An additional feature is the utilisation of the wide range of data to reach conclusions on public attitudes towards integration. The data involved in the analysis of the European public is the Eurobarometer survey, a cross-national biannual survey consisting of a sample size adequate for representing the national and regional populations of the European Union. The case study analysis of the United Kingdom, explained below, will investigate data taken from the 2005 British Election Study (BES). Data on the regional political parties will be based on both the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Comparative Manifestos Project. Lastly, all economic data used in the analysis was made available by Eurostat. Further descriptions of the methods and data used will be outlined in Chapter 4.

Structure of the Dissertation

The dissertation is structured into 9 chapters, this introduction being the first.

The second chapter presents the relevant literature and academic debates on explaining public opinion towards European integration. The chapter will highlight the various explanatory themes including the use of economic, political and cultural indicators. What will be noted is that the primary units of analysis in previous public opinion

research remain at the individual and nationally aggregated levels while a very limited amount of work has included the regional level. Furthermore, while the majority of public opinion research is quantitative based, where most regional level analyses have been investigated, qualitative methodologies have been applied on a regional case study basis. The lack of a cross-national regional contextual analysis still remains prevalent in European public opinion research.

The third chapter will develop a theoretical approach to explaining the differences between regions and furthermore discussing the relevance of European subnational regions in the modern era. Michael Keating's (1998) new regionalism will be introduced explaining the reasons why many of Europe's regions are pushing for further autonomy from the nation-state. Multilevel governance is also a key theme in the chapter where regions find themselves becoming involved in the policy making process of the European Union. Lastly, the chapter discusses where both new regionalism and multilevel governance can influence the public's perception of European integration.

The fourth chapter introduces the methodological tools of the dissertation. The chapter will discuss the relevance of qualitative and quantitative methodologies in public opinion research and present the reasons the statistical methods applied were chosen for the course of this investigation. A description of the statistical methods of OLS regression, ordered logistic regression and multilevel modelling will be included. The various data sources used to measure public attitudes in addition to regional political party positions on European integration will also be described.

The analytical chapters of the dissertation are chapters 5 through 8. They are designed to address the themes outlined above of regional political parties, economic and political indicators, identity and regional assertiveness. While many of the concepts involved in these chapters have been investigated previously within the national and individual contexts, these chapters uniquely expand public opinion research by considering the regional dimension of these explanatory variables. Furthermore these chapters recognise the components of new regionalism, exploring the effects regional distinction in terms of politics, economy and identity has on the public's support of the European Union.

The analysis begins with Chapter 5 investigating regional political parties. The chapter will examine the regional party family and seek to assess their position towards European integration in relation to the other major party families. The chapter will then go on to investigate the relationship between decentralisation, cultural identity and integration support. Lastly, regional party positions will be compared with the positions of their supporters to determine if the European issue is as significant to the party supporters as it is the parties.

Chapter 6 will present a cross-national analysis of the EU15 using the multilevel random intercept model in order to account for the nested, contextual structure in which individuals evaluate European integration. The chapter will focus primarily on economic and political indicators at both the national and regional levels. Furthermore, economic and political evaluations will be analysed within a multilevel context to determine at which level evaluations that influence integration support are generated.

The seventh chapter will further the analysis relating to the strengths of identity and regional assertiveness. The variables of national and regional attachment will be tested using a random slopes multilevel model. This will allow the possibility of analysing the effects of both attachment variables on a regional basis. This multilevel model will present the complex effects of identity on European integration and its variation within regions of the same country. Lastly regional assertiveness will be explored to determine if regional demands for autonomy present a roadblock to the public's acceptance of European integration.

Chapter 8 will attempt to tie the themes investigated within the previous three chapters into a case study investigation of the United Kingdom. An ordered logistic regression model will compare the effects of economic, political and identity indicators within Scotland, Wales and England. This chapter will give insight to not only the complicated nature of British attitudes but in addition contribute to understanding how evaluations of devolution have influenced EU support.

Lastly, Chapter 9 will form a broad discussion summarising the conclusions of the dissertation.

Chapter 2

European Integration and Public Opinion: A Review of the Literature

Introduction

The central aim of this dissertation is to investigate the multilevel contextual structure in which individuals formulate their evaluations of European integration. It will build upon previous research to gain a stronger sense of why individuals either support or not support the European Union. This chapter is a review of the prominent literature addressing explanations of public attitudes towards European integration.

Studies of European public attitudes evolve nearly as much as the European Union itself. As the nature of the European Union moved from a more elitist project of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) to the institutional structure of today, public attitudes increased in importance as European citizens were included in the integration process through direct elections of the European Parliament in addition to national referendums on integration in several member-states. Indirectly governments must answer to their domestic public for positions in the European arena. As public awareness of Europe increased so did research into explaining citizen attitudes towards integration.

This literature review will evaluate the prominent research written on explaining public attitudes towards European integration. It will provide a background on what research has already explained and where gaps still remain to be filled. No single model for explaining public support of European integration exists. The unique feature of EU public opinion studies is that research quite often snowballs from the works of earlier literature, each researcher finding new ways to build upon and assess the public's evaluation of the European Union. Themes of explanation have varied from economic indicators to levels of cultural identity. While the themes of the previous literature may seem to already answer the question 'why do individuals support or not support European integration', much of this literature overlooks the multileveled contextual

environment in which individuals evaluate the European Union. This is where the research of this dissertation builds upon the literature reviewed in this chapter.

The chapter begins with a discussion of the more conventional theories of explanations of public support towards European integration. As mentioned above, European integration began with what was regarded as an elitist project while the public remained mostly detached from the process. Most of these established theories examine the means in which national elites pressed integration through the roles of the Community's institutions. Such theories include functionalism, neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism. I then go on to discuss theories of public attitudes towards integration, starting with what is known as *affective support* including Ronald Inglehart's theories of *post-materialism* and *cognitive mobilisation*. Next the chapter moves on to *utilitarian explanations* focusing on economic costs and benefits analysis. Following I consider the effects of *domestic political explanations*. Lastly I review the influence of *cultural explanations* towards integration.

Conventional Theories of Integration

The study of European integration has been conducted by political scientists even prior to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). Following the Second World War, *realism*, a theory progressed by E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau in the first half of the 20th century, became the leading concept and the predominant explanation of international relations. The emergence of realism pushed the study of European integration to diverge into different directions. The two main standpoints that developed were neofunctionalism (Haas 1958) and intergovernmentalism (Hoffmann 1964). It is important to take into account that in the beginning of the evolutionary process of integration, it was primarily seen as an elitist project. Public attitudes were less likely to be considered. Although neither theory concentrates on the question of public attitudes, it is essential to recognise these theories which created the foundations of how researchers explain integration. Starting with these foundation theories facilitates the ability to comprehend the progression of European integration studies through the past half century.

Neofunctionalism is derived out of its preceding theory of functionalism. The concept of functionalism had been fashioned by one of the originators of European integration

thought, David Mitrany (1943). The great irony of Mitrany is that he was not a theorist of European integration but primarily concerned with the arrangement of international order. After the failure of the League of Nations scholars debated the cause of its breakdown and how to create a world order system that would not fail. Mitrany's response was proposed in his distinguished pamphlet, *a Working Peace System* (1943). Mitrany described that states would surrender a certain amount of sovereignty to international organisations when faced with the inability to solve particular problems. Each international organisation would take control over the authority of a specific area of interest. Functionalist theory goes on to explain that the realms of welfare are maximised through international cooperation, thus "the domain of legitimised politics gradually expands while that of power politics gradually contracts" (Groom 1975: 95). States would one day find themselves entangled within a matrix of international organisations, thus relying on one another in a system of peace. According to functionalism however, the states would remain as the primary actors in negotiating and bargaining at this quasi-international level. Functionalism therefore strengthens the conception that integration is an elitist affair to be left out of the hands of the public. Although this approach was not intended to explain European integration it is not difficult to recognise the qualities it possesses that do make functionalism a useful tool for explanation.

The functionalist approach can be seen as a pragmatic method in political studies due to its flexibility in that it was never established for any particular organisation. This could lead to a limitless number of spheres in the world that could be structured at the international level. Functionalism maintains that there is no need for a preset constitution because the framework of the organisation will be modified as its function evolves over time (Groom 1975). This approach can also be seen as utopian where functionalism may be successful in administering areas such as the railways but would be less successful in managing systems of production such as finance and trade, where it would be required to alter the fundamental logic of these areas (Rosamond 2000). Because European integration mostly deals with organising production systems, functionalism would need to be altered.

Starting with the work of Ernst Haas (1958), neofunctionalism soon became the dominant theory in explaining the initial success of the ECSC. This revision of

functionalism demonstrated that states were not the only actors in the international arena, a contrast to the realist theories of the time. Elites within states would be needed to promote integration for pragmatic rather than altruistic reasons (Rosamond 2000). Pressure would thus be placed upon political leaders by these elites on behalf of one or several interest groups. This demonstrates that the concept of the 'state' is more complex than originally suggested by realists. Haas (1958) formed his approach on the foundation of two key concepts: *spillover* and *supranationalism*. Leon Lindberg, another notable contributor to neofunctionalism, described spillover as "a situation in which a given action, related to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth" (Lindberg 1963: 10). Integration would begin in technical areas, particularly certain sections of the economy such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and eventually progress to a further spillover, such as a common monetary policy. Essentially, the integration of one sector would require the integration of other sectors in order for the first sector to achieve its total goal (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). In order to maintain the order of these sectors a new supranational level of management would be needed to assume the former responsibilities of the independent states. The Commission therefore became the supranational authoritative body that neofunctionalists expected interest groups to then bargain with against national governments (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). Although neofunctionalists concentrate a great deal on actors below and above the nation-state level, they were more interested in understanding reasoning of these collective actors than that of the masses (Rosamond 2005). While neofunctionalism seemed to be useful in explaining the success of the ECSC in the 1950s, notably due to the dedicated High Authority President Jean Monnet and his thrust for integration at the new supranational level, the 1960s would bring forth a competing approach to integration in the form of intergovernmentalism.

The 'empty-chair' crisis of 1965-1966 left European scholars in doubt of which direction European integration would take. Haas (1975) himself observed that regional integration theory was becoming obsolete for explaining Western Europe. However, it could still potentially be used for explaining other regions. The counter argument to neofunctionalism, known as *intergovernmentalism*, was shaped by Stanley Hoffmann (1964; 1966). Intergovernmentalists took on a more realist approach to European

integration. Contrary to the supranational direction of neofunctionalists, intergovernmentalists share the notion that it is the national governments of the member-states that control the character and pace of integration. While Hoffmann (1964: 93) argued that national governments could be pressured by interest groups, governments often made integration decisions that these groups were opposed to based on political calculations that were driven by domestic concerns. Supranational institutions would only increase if state governments believed it to be in their best national interest, thus governments have much more autonomy than given in the neofunctionalist viewpoint. In recollection of the success of the Single European Act, Andrew Moravcsik (1993) took intergovernmentalism a step further in conceiving *liberal intergovernmentalism*. Moravcsik called upon the idea that states were playing what Robert Putnam (1988) called *two-level games*. In the first stage, there is a demand for EU policies from different domestic and social actors. Each of these actors has economic interests and depends on the national governments to promote these interests in EU policy-making. In the second stage, EU policies are then supplied to these domestic actors through intergovernmental bargains, which can be reflected in treaties or budget agreements (Moravcsik 1993). Fundamental to the liberal intergovernmentalist approach is that the position of the national government is based on a balanced standpoint of economic interests from within the state. This meaning that the national government's single position in an international bargain attempts to reflect each of the multiple interests within the state. These subnational interests can come from an array of actors including that of regional authorities and elites. Opinions of the mass public are largely left out of both intergovernmentalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Moravcsik (1998) did later conclude that public opinion, in well organised economic interest groups in particular industries such as farmers, may be influenced by political actors. Nonetheless, the intergovernmentalist approaches focus little on the public's influence in the direction of European integration. The lack of public attention within integration theory would however soon change.

Early theories of European integration focused very little on public opinion, as demonstrated by the leading approaches of functionalism and intergovernmentalism. Conceivably the key reason why theorists tended to shy away from including public attitudes in their approaches was within the nature of early integration itself. It was widely viewed that integration was an elite driven process. Decisions were made with

little publicity, behind closed doors and by individuals that did not hold accountability to elected representatives thus making it an “elitist game” (Middlemas 1995: 612). This disconnection of the public from the European decision making process compelled scholars to take public attitudes for granted. This analysis is what Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) referred to as the “permissive consensus”. Haas (1958: 16) went as far to state that it was as “impracticable as it is unnecessary” to include public opinion and attitude surveys in integration research.

While it can be easily said that the early integration process of Europe was elite driven, by the post Maastricht era it would be much harder to omit public attitudes from one’s approach. The Treaty on European Union in 1992 brought with it a series of referendums to the member-states. The public was able to demonstrate its attitude towards a union with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ vote. The opposition shown in a defeat in Denmark and a marginal victory in France displayed that perhaps the public was not as willing to go along with a project that was once solely in the hands of the elites. More recently with the first rejection of the Nice Treaty in 2001 by the Irish and the rejection of the European constitutional treaty in 2005 by the French and Dutch show that the public has the ability to determine the speed and to what extent integration can progress. These direct demonstrations of the variance of public attitudes throughout Europe have supplemented the reasoning for a new direction of study that takes public opinion into account. Fritz Scharpf (1997) explains that the public can be used to establish a point of legitimacy for the EU. Scharpf demonstrates that through the use of democratically elected officials and consultation of the public over public policy matters, the public can be shown as a form of input legitimacy. Furthermore, meeting public needs and assuring that policy tracks public opinion and attitude can be seen as a form of output legitimacy (Scharpf 1997). Although public opinion had not vastly influenced the research of scholars until the 1990s, there are a limited number of studies completed prior to the post-Maastricht era.¹ The remainder of this chapter will focus on previous studies of public opinion and European integration. I will begin by exploring the primary works on integration and public opinion by discussing affective support for European integration, mostly contributed by Ronald Inglehart. Subsequently I will explain utilitarian explanations, domestic political explanations and lastly describing cultural explanations.

¹ Most notably the works of Karl Deutsch et al. (1967) and Ronald Inglehart (1967; 1970a; 1970b)

Affective Explanations of Public Opinion

Due to the permissive consensus it was not until the late 1960s that scholars notably began examining public opinion in relation to the European Union. Researchers needed a starting point in explaining basic theories of public support and found David Easton's (1965: 175) model of citizen support to be valuable. Easton argues that at the core of a democracy's legitimacy is the strength of which citizens trust the government to make the right decisions for its population. This trust comes in the form of citizenry support, Easton argues, and can be categorised into two forms of support: *diffuse* and *specific support*. Diffuse support refers to an individual's previously established outlook; where the individual evaluates an item for what it is or represents to him/her and not by the item's output. Therefore a less desirable outcome will not alter the individual's standpoint because the individual's political emotion is multifaceted. In contrast to diffuse support reflecting on the individual's fundamental nature of political sentiment, specific support reflects solely on the citizen's reflection of the system's output. This support is based on the direct functioning of the government and can be short-term dependent upon the government's output. Soon after, adopting Easton's concepts of public support, Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) formed two new terms of support that were specified to the explanation of public opinion and European integration. Their terms of *affective* and *utilitarian support* look rather similar to the works of Easton and have been used by European integration scholars through the subsequent years. Affective support can particularly be understood through works of Ronald Inglehart (1970b; 1971; 1977; Inglehart and Rabier 1980; 1990) in formulating *cognitive mobilisation* and *post-materialism*.

Prior to public opinion studies within European integration the permissive consensus was the dominating understanding of European mobilisation. The shift from an elite driven project towards a project conducted within the public sphere was something that simply did not happen in a short time-span. Ronald Inglehart (1970b) developed the theory of *cognitive mobilisation* which explains the process of citizens gaining political resources and skills that prepare them to deal with the complexities of politics and develop their own decisions (Dalton 2005). Inglehart explains that mass support comes in the form of a two-step process, the first step being cognitive mobilisation itself. Here, the individual's capability in political comprehension is increased in order to "receive and interpret messages relating to a remote political community. As such, cognitive mobilisation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for development of

support for a European Community” (Inglehart 1970a: 47). Inglehart then goes on to explain that in order to make any sense of commitment towards integration, one must simply become aware of it (Inglehart 1970a: 47). The second step to mass support is the internationalisation of values. It has been shown that elites are more likely to favour the idea of European Integration (Inglehart 1970a; Gabel 1998a). According to Inglehart, it is the elite leaders and media that individuals will gain their knowledge of integration from and because the leaders and media have a favourable opinion, this sentiment will therefore be reflected in the opinion of the public. Thus not only will more educated groups be more likely to hold an opinion on integration, their opinion will most likely be a favourable attitude towards integration as well (Inglehart 1970a). Furthermore, Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel (1998c) employed the concept of participation in political discussion. They discovered that those who participate more frequently in political discussion are more likely to have a favourable attitude towards integration. Inversely those who discuss politics less frequently are more likely to have a more pessimistic view of integration. The more frequent an individual discusses politics, the more likely he/she will gain cognitive skills to develop a better understanding of the integration process.

Using Eurobarometer surveys to display the relationship between voter turnout and several different variables, Inglehart and Rabier (Inglehart and Rabier 1980) were able to explain the differences between *cognitive* and *political mobilisation*. They added that cognitive mobilisation is related to an individual’s predisposition to understand politics. Possessing cognitive skills leads to the ability to process information about remote political objects. Political mobilisation however refers to external influences, such as political parties or political campaigns, which can help motivate an individual to act politically. Furthermore they found in their study that those who demonstrate higher levels of cognitive skills were more likely to favour a common market (Inglehart and Rabier 1980).

Inglehart’s second focus on public attitude variations focused on the importance of values and emotional attachments in what he referred to as *post-materialism* (Inglehart 1970a; 1977; 1990). Inglehart concluded that an individual’s attitude towards European integration is largely reflective on his/her political values as opposed to the policies in which the European project promotes. These political values are shaped throughout the

individual's life by means of their socio-economic environment. Inglehart goes on to explain that the public can be divided into two categories: *materialists* and *post-materialists* (Inglehart 1971; 1977; 1990). Those who are more concerned with economic well-being and security would fall under the materialist definition. Older generations, those who were more likely to have undergone periods of economic instability and war are more likely to be labelled under this social group. Since the Second World War, however, Western Europe has seen an era of further economic development and stability as well as peace. Therefore younger generations, who are more likely to be within this post-materialists group, are searching for more of a sense of belonging moving beyond materialistic needs.

Post-materialists are more likely to have a "cosmopolitan" identity when evaluating European integration (Inglehart 1977: 322). As Janssen (1991) describes Inglehart's post-material individual, "their contempt for the nation-state drive post-materialists to a preoccupation with the sub- or supra-national levels of government" (Janssen 1991: 445). The issue of European integration can be seen as a decisive issue between materialists and post-materialists. Materialists primarily see the nation-state as the principal provider of their needs. Therefore materialists recognise European integration as a threat. Post-materialists however, as mentioned above in Janssen's statement, will more easily identify integration as a means for achieving their post-materialistic goals. Post-materialists view the cooperation of the member-states in relation to integration as promoting the idea of a community that upholds post-materialist values.

Inglehart (1977) argued that this post-materialist shift in values will also lead to higher political participation by the public in Western democracies. This participation may not necessarily take place in the voting process but the public will more likely demand a stronger role in the decision making process. In turn this will develop a nation with higher political skills, thus fulfilling the prerequisite for further political participation. Inglehart (1977) furthers his participation argument explaining that with the assistance of the advent of technological media, individuals are better able to gain higher educational levels.

Further examinations of post-materialism have been made by connecting the theory with traditional political ideology. Inglehart (1984) attempted to link the post-

materialist debate with previous works investigating public opinion and political ideology made by Inglehart and Klingemann (1976), where it is sought that most individuals within Western democracies can willingly place themselves on a left-right political ideology scale. Inglehart (1984) claimed that the very idea of left-right political ideology examined previously was progressively changing over time. The definitions of what constitute left or right ideology for the greater public were evolving to include the elements of post-materialist values. Van Deth and Guerts (1989) conducted an analysis attempting to link the post-materialist debate with voting behaviour through an examination of political party preferences within the Netherlands. The models they produced showed little strength in post-materialist values affecting one's party preference while the dominating factor remained one's placement within the traditional left-right ideological scale. They did however conclude that one's placement on the traditional scale was largely dependent upon one's materialist or post-materialist values thus Inglehart's concept still has important consequences on voting behaviour. When examining public support of European integration, the effect of one's placement on the traditional ideology scale may be extremely complex. Post-materialist values such as culture and identity, which contribute to the growth of new regionalism, may give a better explanation to public support of integration than the traditional ideological scale and will be explained further in the chapter.

The definition of post-materialism when applied to European integration has been contended notably by Joseph Janssen (1989; 1991). Janssen heavily criticised Inglehart's theories over the nature that both the nation-state and EU take when being evaluated by the public. Inglehart (1977) maintained that post-materialists reflect on the nation-state as a source of material output while the European Union was in contrast seen as moving beyond materialistic goals. Janssen (1989) argued the contrary in that the nation-state can be seen as being fostered around non-economic goals while the very essence of the European Union is focused on purely economic means. Consequently Janssen (1991) suggests that Inglehart wrongly identifies the nation-state as materialistic and the European Union as post-materialistic. In addition he questioned Inglehart's post-materialism by critiquing the definition of "integration". Janssen (1991) revealed that the very meaning of "integration" changes overtime and attitudes towards integration are often too vague to interpret. Through his study he attempts to explain cross-national differences and the formation of individual attitudes. He argued that

distinctive national attributes are an important determinate in integration support showing a wide general support of the EU in most member-states with the exception of Great Britain. Testing Inglehart's theories, Janssen's (1991) model, controlling for education levels, displayed very little evidence that post-materialist values contribute to public evaluations of the European integration process. This doubt over post-materialism's influence on public EU support may have encouraged scholars to examine variations of public EU attitudes in more utilitarian and elite influenced variables which will be reviewed in the subsequent sections. It is however quite possible that the concept of post-materialism still has much to contribute in explaining variations of EU public support. The process of new regionalism may contribute to post-materialism's influence on European integration evaluations. Janssen's (1991) study focused on aggregate support at the national level, the level in which Inglehart explained maintains the materialistic values for the individual. Post-materialist values however may be stronger in regions where individuals are looking beyond the nation-state and towards a subnational level of government, a concept Janssen may have overlooked by investigating aggregate variations of support at only the national level. In regions where there is higher support of a multileveled governance system, where individuals are looking beyond the nation-state through support of both regional and European levelled governance, post-materialist values may be a stronger contributor into explaining variations of EU public support. If Janssen claims the meaning of integration is changing over time, the growth of new regionalism and the expansion of multilevel governance may redefine the meaning of integration on a regional basis.

Utilitarian Explanations of Public Opinion

It is of no surprise that economics is considered to be one of the largest factors in the public's decision for support of European integration. After all, the EU is a development rooted to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) which began to link the coal and steel markets of Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries. By observing treaties and other EU agreements a great number of these progressive movements in European integration have been made in terms of economics. Such examples include the ECSC Treaty of 1951, The EEC Treaty of 1957, the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 and the Treaty on European Union in 1992. These large advancements in integration, that are perhaps most recognisable by the public, assist the EU citizenry to reflect on the integration process in economic terms. With the

scepticism of post-material values affecting European support, scholars began to study the influence of utilitarian expectations in explaining public attitudes towards European Integration. This section of the chapter will focus on utilitarian support and what Gabel (1998b) describes as *cost-benefit explanations*. Utilitarian support can be described as an individual's perception of direct costs and benefits of membership of a certain community (1998b).

After the signing of the Treaty on European Union at Maastricht in 1992, and subsequent to the uncertainty of the role of post-materialist values affecting public opinion towards integration, utilitarian explanations took the forefront of integration public opinion studies. One of the first to pioneer this model of study was Eichenberg and Dalton (1993). Eichenberg and Dalton shaped their theoretical framework from theories of economic voting. Their theory explains that the economic conditions and goals of the nation-state as well as evaluations of the national government in turn affect public opinion towards the process of integration at the supranational level. They focus on the following macroeconomic objective variables adapted from the work of Michael Lewis-Beck (1988): Gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rates and inflation (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 512). Lewis-Beck (1988) previously demonstrated through a comparative study of five European nations that personal economic conditions have no effect on an individual's voting behaviour. However, Lewis-Beck (1988) did reveal that macroeconomic conditions, in regards to the nation-state as a whole, did contribute to one's voting behaviour considering politicians being responsible for the economic management of the nation-state. With respect to Lewis-Beck's macroeconomic explanations, Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) tested a similar model. GDP measures the overall wealth of a country and should positively affect support for integration the larger a state's GDP. Unemployment and inflation measure economic difficulties of a country and should therefore reflect a negative relation on support as these figures increase. They found that the effects of both GDP and unemployment were in the hypothesised direction, however, were weaker in statistical significance than the inflation rate. They also took a step further in examining net returns from the EC budget however this failed to show statistical significance. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) concluded that the political economy, including international export variables, is the most significant factor in predicting support for European integration. In contrast McLaren (2006) demonstrated the aggregate effect of

member-states having a large positive budget balance, that is countries that receive more from the EU than pay in, on levels of EU support. She found that individuals living in countries with a high positive budget balance were more likely to have more favourable evaluations of the European Union.

In contrast to Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) several works have been developed that focus on micro- rather than macro-economic variables (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998c). These variables, as Gabel and Palmer (1995) explain, are where different EU citizens from different socio-economic circumstances become subjected to different costs and benefits from integration policy. Microeconomic variables focus on issues such as income, occupational skills and education. Economic liberalisation and the free-movement of goods and services affect different occupations at different levels in an international system such as the European Union (Gabel and Palmer 1995; Anderson and Reichert 1996; Gabel 1998c). Gabel and Palmer (1995) hypothesised that citizens will weigh the costs of economic benefits promoted by the European Union in accordance with occupational, wealth and intra-EU trade levels. Thus, the citizens of the EU will determine their support for integration depending upon their calculation of their own personal cost benefits analysis. In obvious terms, if the costs outweigh the benefits one is to receive as a result of integration, one is less likely to give their support.

Gabel and Whitten (1997) later completed a study that contradicts Gabel and Palmer's (1995) claim. Through a statistical study using ordinary least squares regression (OLS), Gabel and Whitten (1997) demonstrated that it is the "subjective" economy, as perceived by the EU citizens, and not the "objective" economy as measured by economic indicators that influences support for integration (Gabel and Whitten 1997: 92). Consequently, EU support draws on the public's perception of their personal and national economic welfare. Both Gabel and Palmer (1995) and Gabel and Whitten (1997) consent that it is the economy that drives levels of support for EU integration but differ on the measurement of the economy. Rohrschneider (2002) and Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) both further explored this argument and concluded that individuals conduct rational calculations of either their own personal economic benefits or their country's economic benefits to determine support for integration. They stressed that

positive evaluations of the costs and benefits analysis would increase support for integration.

Gabel (1998c) argues that national competitive advantages wither away as a result of integration. Integration allows the flow of goods, capital and labour to move easily across borders. As a result, the support of different occupational skills groups will vary dependent upon their ability of competing with labour from the various members of the EU as well as weighing their benefits from the economic integration process. Gabel (1998c) explains his theory through the human capital hypothesis. Therefore, skilled workers should be more likely to show support for integration as their skills and education levels are more effective in an international market compared to those of unskilled labourers. Referendums on entry to the European Union have also been observed (Jenssen 1998). Jenssen, Pesonen and Gilljam (1998) noted that individual characteristics, such as education or skill levels as mentioned by Gabel (1998c), are strong predictors on how an individual evaluates the economic costs of being a member of the European Union. The conclusion of this evaluation can then be used as a predictor for support on the referendum.

Utilitarian support may seem sensible to use in explaining support for European integration however the results of these studies vary widely therefore making the strength of utilitarian support inconclusive. Much of this variation may be explained in the choice of control variables used with the analyses. These theories also stop short in explaining the variation of integration support over time. It is stated that since the Maastricht Treaty support for European integration has declined (Çiftçi 2005; Eichenberg and Dalton 2007) thus utilitarian variables may lack explanation of this phenomenon. Most utilitarian studies also hold a nation-state bias, meaning they rarely take into account any economic disparities that may occur throughout an individual member-state. Duch and Taylor (1997) argue that micro-economic variables can be misleading in understating the comparative advantage level at the regional level. They go on to explain that economic variations within a nation-state may be much more significant than at the international level. Anderson (1998) examined political variables, such as evaluations of national and supranational institutions, in addition to economic variables through a multivariate analysis. He discovered that economic variables were interceded by political variables, thus political variables should be taken

into account to better explain integration support. Regional disparities and economic evaluations have lacked in much of the previous literature. While the effect of regional economic well-being on integration support should be investigated it may be possible that individuals base their national economic evaluations within the context closest to them, the region. The research of this dissertation attempts to investigate this possibility.

Domestic and Political Explanations of Public Opinion

As mentioned throughout this chapter, scholars debate where and how citizens gather information to help determine their position on European integration. Information on the European Union is mostly provided by domestic sources, such as the media or through national politics, and can lead to a void in enough sufficient information for individuals to make an independent evaluation. Anderson (1998) describes the process of filling this information void as using “proxies”. Anderson continues to explain that domestic political evaluations act as proxies to evaluate integration. Examples of domestic political evaluations are national government support, appraisal of government institutions, the media and party influence. Some researchers may disagree with this statement and assume that government support has no relation to support of the EU, rather support is a trend driven by the political elites (Duch and Taylor 1997). However, Anderson (1998) argues that countries that have positive evaluations of national institutions and government will more likely lead to a positive evaluation of European integration.

The European Union may still not be familiar to many of its citizens. Its institutions, policies and powers are still not commonly known to a large amount of the public (Anderson 1998). Because EU citizens may find the integration process too complicated and too distant they may be unable to form independent attitudes towards the EU (Janssen 1991). This may be due to the lack of information provided by the EU to its citizens. Without a fundamental source of promotion the public will obviously be less aware of the functions of the Union. As a result, citizens will then form opinions based on what knowledge they have previously become familiar with. Anderson (1998) reveals that individuals use proxies in helping shape opinions about European integration. One such proxy would be domestic government support because citizens are more familiar with the political structure of their state as opposed to that of the EU.

Anderson builds his national-proxies model using political-institutional variables such as party support and party cue and concludes that they are notably effective in explaining variation in EU support. Anderson (1998: 576) would expect one to “construe a picture of the EU by using information about political parties, the domestic political system and those who govern it” all within their national context.

Anderson (1998) concludes that in countries that have positive evaluations of national institutions and government will most likely lead to a positive evaluation of European integration. In contradiction, by examining public support towards EU institutions, Sánchez-Cuenca (2000) found that EU support is highest when citizens view EU institutions positively and their national institutions poorly. This approach can be viewed as a political costs and benefits analysis. If a national government seems to perform negatively while the EU institutions meet a citizen’s satisfaction, then the cost of moving authority to the EU will not exceed the benefits. Kritzinger demonstrated that support for the EU can be a symbolic protest against “the dominant values of the nation-state” (Kritzinger 2003: 226). For Kritzinger, the concept of individual support is based upon two approaches. The first is that individuals who have fewer ties to the national political order have less commitment to politics of the nation-state and are more likely to take chances with political forms at different levels (Kronhauser 1959). The second is that those with stronger ties to the national political system have a greater psychological limit that must be overcome before protesting against the national political institutions (Rohrschneider 1990). Therefore a positive evaluation of the EU and a negative evaluation of the political nation-state can occur simultaneously. In addition, McLaren (2007) found that it is perceptions of EU institutions rather than national institutions that can lead to euroskepticism, although perceptions of EU institutions may be influenced by national institution perceptions.

Kritzinger (2003) statistically compared national government perceptions with attitudes towards EU integration in four EU member-states: France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. In all four member-states negative perceptions of the national government were associated with positive attitudes towards EU integration. When evaluating the national economic factor however, France and the United Kingdom showed higher support for EU integration in stronger economic conditions whereas Germany and Italy showed negative support for EU integration (Kritzinger 2003).

Although this factor appears to be an economic indicator it can in fact still be regarded as a political indicator where the opinion can be seen as a sign of trust in economic management. The French and British are more likely to trust their national governments to manage the economy during periods of weak economic performance whereas Germany and Italy are more likely to trust the EU. Therefore it can be argued that “support for the EU depends strongly on the performance of the nation-state” (Kritzinger 2003: 236).

Several studies have also examined the influence of political parties influencing integration support (Inglehart and Klingemann 1976; Franklin, Marsh and McLaren 1994; Franklin, Van Der Eijk and Marsh 1995; Ray 1999; Marks and Steenbergen 2002; Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002; Ray 2003a; Dalton 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Hooghe 2007; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). Franklin, Marsh and McLaren (1994) examined the influence of opposition parties affecting integration support. They noted that opposition parties may be less enthusiastic about supporting the government’s position in a European referendum when mobilising against the government gives the chance of an embarrassing defeat if the electorate chooses to take the position of the opposition. Ray (2003b) tested the strength political parties and their position on European integration have on influencing support for the European Union. Ray found that political party support did have a statistically significant effect on support of integration however this effect varies by individual. Issue importance and an individual’s attachment level to a party were shown to influence the strength of the correlation between the party’s and supporter’s European position. Gabel and Scheve (2007) found that intra-party dissent within a political party can lead to variation on support of European integration amongst party supporters. This effect held true even in highly pro-European parties. This perhaps suggests that party supporters do not necessarily take cue from the overall party position but rather from particular party elites. Through his analysis of party positions towards integration, Jolly (2007) demonstrated that regional parties can be just as pro-European as the major parties thus do not act like the “fringe” party family which some may consider them as. Further analysis should be taken to investigate the regional party voter. This dissertation will attempt to investigate if regional party supporters are as aligned with their party’s position towards integration as the major party supporters.

The concept of *socialisation* has also contributed to the examination of public attitudes towards European integration. The notion behind socialisation reflects upon the time of entry an individual's country became a member-state of the EU. Individuals within countries that have been member-states for a longer time period are more likely to have become familiar with the conception of integration. The more time one has had to evaluate the benefits of EU membership, the more likely he/she is to positively evaluate European integration (Inglehart 1977). The effects of socialisation were tested by Bosch and Newton (1995) in a temporal analysis where they found that for each additional year an individual's country has been a member-state the likelihood of that individual's support for the EU slightly increases. Anderson and Kaltenthaler (1996) re-examined this effect by arguing that time of entry into the European Union reveals a country's political history and enthusiasm for membership which overall influences public attitudes towards integration. Their analysis focused on comparing levels of public EU attitudes when grouping countries by era of becoming a member-state. Public attitudes within the original six member-states displayed high levels of EU support as these countries began the integration process while individuals within these countries have had the longest amount of time to reflect on membership benefits. Individuals within the countries which joined in the 1970s (Denmark, Ireland and the UK) display lower levels of EU support as governments of these countries were more reluctant to initially join the integration process. Individuals within those countries that joined in the 1980s (Greece, Portugal and Spain) showed high levels of EU support as membership represented democratic stability. In addition, Kaltenthaler and Anderson (2001) found further evidence of the strength of socialisation with similar results when applying their concept to support of the common currency.

Lastly, the influence of the media on public support for integration has also been examined. Carey and Burton (2004) found through an investigation of the 2001 British Election Study that the United Kingdom's highly biased media does influence British public attitudes towards the European Union though much of this effect is conditional on partisan preferences. Where an individual receives strong EU positional messages from their media source and preferable political party, the effect was strongest. In comparison the effect was partial on individuals receiving mixed messages from both media source and party. Schuck and de Vreese (2006) examined the effects media coverage has on public evaluations of EU enlargement in Germany. They found news

coverage to be balanced in terms of risk and opportunities of enlargement and furthermore that individuals were influenced by the positions of the news article they read. This effect however was found to be modified by political knowledge, where media influence was strongest on those individuals that were less knowledgeable. Furthermore de Vreese and Boomgarden (2006) found that media sources need to be consistent in both their tone and amount of coverage to influence public opinion. When exposed to consistent positive or negative reports of enlargement, individuals are likely to follow similar positions. When individuals are exposed to less frequent coverage with mixed stances they are less likely to be influenced.

Domestic political explanations hold a convincing argument in rationalising public support for integration however most theories fail to take regional politics into account. With the gradual shift towards decentralisation in several member-states over the past decade regional politics has greater reason to be included in the model for political explanations of public support for integration. While domestic political explanations may seem favourable to some, more recently scholars have moved to explore to a deeper emotional analysis in cultural explanations.

Cultural Explanations of Public Opinion

The trend of cultural analysis in explaining public support for integration has seen an incline in studies in recent years. While economic integration may seem favourable to some it still does not affect one's deep or emotional commitment to his/her identity. Moving from an economic based alliance to a more full-bodied union can prove complicated to some through policies such as open borders. In some cases, identity can prove to show more significance than economic factors in determining support for EU integration (Hooghe and Marks 2004). For nationalists, "the nation is the sole criterion for legitimate government and of political community" (Smith 1992: 61). In recent decades a peak of nationalism can be seen in Europe through the rise of far-right nationalist parties including Le Front National in France and the British National Party (BNP) in Britain. Nationalist parties, not all being far-right, have also played significant roles within nation-states at the subnational level. Subnational parties have been created within member-state regions to promote their cultural identity and seek further autonomy within their region.

European identity, or the lack of, is another issue scholars have examined in relation to its influence on public support of integration. Some scholars write that the problem of creating a common European identity is that Europe as a whole lacks key elements such as a common language, symbols and political history that all citizens can identify with (Milward 1992; Smith 1992). At the same time, nation-states themselves have a collection of history and cultural links that citizens will more easily identify. Nationalistic movements within member-states makes integration progression seem bleak. Europeans will have to be able to recognise a dual-identity in order for integration to continue. As Van Kersbergen (2000: 9) states "European integration depends on a 'double allegiance', consisting of a primary allegiance to the nation-state and its political elite and a secondary or derived allegiance to the EC or EU". Smith (1992) writes on the concept of having dual loyalties. He divides the concept of 'identity' into two categories: the *individual* and the *collective*. Individual identity is situational, depending upon the situation that the individual is being identified, for example if one goes abroad (Okamura 1981). Collective identity is tied to the examples of national and religious identity. They are "not subject to rapid changes and remain durable even when large numbers of individuals no longer feel their power" (Smith 1992: 59-60). The collective identity seems to be the more persistent of the two. It is the collective that most Europeans live amongst and the collective that is more likely to influence one's ideologies. Marks (1999) however has written that it is possible for some to have different identities at the same time, while Diez Medrano and Gutierrez (2001) demonstrate this idea in the example of a Catalonian feeling both Catalonian and Spanish. This idea should theoretically be able to be carried over into a European identity. Inglehart and Rabier (1980) add that individuals with higher levels of cognitive and political mobilisation are more likely to express stronger levels of European identity. These levels of stronger European identity remain consistent when compared to national or regional identity.

Cinnirella (1997) completed a study to observe the relationship between national and European identity. To do this he compared survey data taken by British and Italian University students. Amongst the British students he found a negative correlation between British and European identity. The more British one feels then the less like he/she will express a European identity. British identity was also higher than European identity. Amongst the Italian students Cinnirella found a positive correlation between

Italian and European Identity. In addition, Italian students were more likely to display a dual identity than their British counterparts in expressing both Italian and European identities.

Deflem and Pampel (1996) conducted a study using Eurobarometer surveys testing the hypothesis of persistent national differences against socio-demographic factors, such as occupation and income, and ideological factors, such as political ideology. They found that national differences were more significant than socio-demographic and ideological factors. In other terms, they believed that the differences in support for European unification are created by the countries themselves. This study however does not account for minority, regional or subnational identification that is suppressed by the nation-state variables as a whole. Huici, et al (1997), used a self-developed questionnaire to compare identifications with one's region, nation-state and Europe in relation to European integration. The survey was distributed to students in Scotland and Andalucia and concluded that only for Andalucian students was European identification positively correlated with national (British or Spanish) identification although there was no negative relationship for Scottish students. Although the survey does not represent the regional populations as a whole it still demonstrates that EU support relating to identification can vary in different regions of different member-states. The sample population of university students can also lead to biased results given that Inglehart's theory of cognitive mobilisation, further education being a large contributor to this, leads to greater EU support.

Not many scholars have been able to conclude a negative link with national identity and EU support on the individual level. Münch (1996) wrote that European identity is being created at the expense of national identity. Münch also predicts that as integration intensifies in the future, national identity will intensify as well. Carey (2002) however was able to demonstrate a negative link using Eurobarometer survey data and testing a three-level hypothesis model of national identity. The first hypothesis is the measurement of intensity that one has to his/her nation. Here, the "stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics" (2002: 391). The second concept is the terminal community hypothesis (Peters 1991). The terminal community is the highest level of governance that one will form his/her allegiance to.

In the example of the Catalonian, he/she may find Catalonia, Spain or the European Union as the terminal community. The individual will therefore consider a balance of government authority depending on their notion of terminal community. As Carey (2002: 392) states “people who believe in a shared European identity see the EU as the terminal community and are more likely to recognise the authority of the EU to make public policy”. In contrast those that feel no European identity will regard either the nation-state or the region as their terminal community, therefore more likely not supporting EU integration.

The third concept is the cultural threat hypothesis. Much of this concept can be attributed to McLaren’s (2002) argument that EU opposition may also be related to the fear and hostility of a perceived threat from other cultures. This can be demonstrated in the rise of ultra-right wing political parties as mentioned above. While these parties focus on a fascist-like ideology, other political parties in regions have been created to preserve national identity from within the nation-state. While most are not fundamentally like the ultra right-wing parties, these parties attempt to either accomplish more self autonomy or preserve their identity, such an example would be Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales). As Carey (2002) explains, those who fear “their language being used less, or their national identity and culture becoming less distinct, are expected to hold a more negative view of the European Union” (2002: 392).

Although more likely to contain regional factors than other models of explanation of integration support, the majority of cultural/identity studies hold a nation-state bias. Carey (2002) included in his study an examination of the sub-nations of the United Kingdom. He finds that as English identity increases, support for integration decreases. Conversely, as Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities increase, support for integration increases as well. This demonstrates the complex nature of cultural explanations and suggests that nation-states are not homogeneous in opinion.

Conclusion

This chapter has laid out various core models of explanation for public support of European integration. I have demonstrated that like the European Union itself, integration studies have evolved in order to adapt to the Union’s changing nature. In the initial years of the Union’s existence, primarily from the 1950s through the early 1970s,

integration analyses followed the permissive consensus. As the public began to take a greater role in the integration process, studies began to include perceptions of the general public. However, as mentioned throughout the chapter, the consideration of regional variation in European integration public opinion is rarely taken into account.

Many of the themes already investigated on European public opinion can be examined keeping the regional context in mind. This can be demonstrated for example through regional considerations of both objective and subjective economic indicators. Regional disparities of wealth and employment may have a considerable effect on an individual's evaluation of integration. Furthermore, an individual's evaluation of the economy may not necessarily be reflective of the nation-state as a whole. It is possible that an individual assesses these evaluations within the closer contextual surrounding in which he/she lives. These regional evaluations of the subjective economy may then be used to interpret the costs and benefits of European integration. Regional contextual considerations can also be expanded towards political and cultural indicators. Each of these themes will be investigated further in the dissertation.

This literature review has brought us one step closer to understanding why individuals may or may not support the European Union. While the literature provides a great foundation to understanding the research question further analysis can be made accounting for the multileveled structure in which European citizens live. Over the past decades, several of the European Union's member-states are becoming increasingly decentralised. In addition, regional elites are promoting this progression through what Michael Keating (1998) calls *new regionalism*. A multileveled system of governance is extending through the EU member-states allowing for regions to not only gain competences of self-government but take part in the European integration process as well. Do the public and elites of these regions attempting to gain autonomy view the European Union as a friend or foe to their cause? The following chapter will outline the fundamentals of both *new regionalism* and *multilevel governance*.

Chapter 3

Looking Beyond the Nation-State: Regional Mobilisation within the European Union

Introduction

The previous chapter observed how, and to what extent, public attitudes have been examined within the research of European integration. I demonstrated that as the European Union evolved from an elitist project to incorporating the public the methodology of integration studies also evolved. Moreover, the primary variables chosen to explain public support changed as the Union integrated further. Most researchers however maintained their level of analysis at either the individual or national aggregated level, neglecting what perhaps can be seen as Europe's other great phenomenon, the rise in political mobilisation of the 'third-level' (the region).

While Europe has been slowly integrating over the past 50 years, numerous regions within member-states have mobilised for greater autonomy. Michael Keating (1998) labels the most recent of these trends *new regionalism*, where regional mobilisation, the process in which regional demands are made for further autonomy, began in the late 1960s and 1970s but fully realised in the 1990s with the escalating amount of decentralisation taking place in many EU member-states. It is the regional reaction to modernity and globalisation, where regions are confronting the international market as the role of the state is alleviated by the first-level of the EU (Keating 1997; 1998). While previous regional movements in the centuries prior demanded full independence from the state, the modern regional mobilisation of the latter half of the 20th century aims for greater autonomy without separation acknowledging that the nation-state is still important in performing certain economic and political functions that protect and foster their particular regional societies (Tierney 2005: 171). Furthermore decentralisation throughout the EU member-states has been an asymmetrical process. Whether it is devolution in the United Kingdom in Scotland and Wales or the creation of autonomous communities in Spain, there is no systematic procedure of decentralisation within Europe thus creating uneven powers of autonomy from region to region.

This chapter will concentrate on the significance of subnational movements of autonomy and the creation of a multilevel system of governance in the European Union. It will begin with an historical look at the waves of regional mobilisation from the post-war era to the most current wave of new regionalism in the 1990s. It will examine the concept of the region through such aspects of territory and identity. Furthermore this chapter will address the multilevel structure of governance created within the EU and its effects on expanding regional participation in policy making at both the European and national levels. This chapter will provide a clearer understanding of the significance of subnational regions in modern political life and how this may ultimately contribute to public evaluations of European integration.

The Contemporary Progression of Regionalism

Issues of regionalism and subnational pursuits for higher levels of autonomy have occurred since the creation of the nation-state system with the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. The centuries thereafter were witness to the long process of European states attempting to realign their boundaries in a more advantageous form, whether it was with regions of common culture or similar economies in adjacent territories. By the late 19th century, as the nation-state became more centralised, Europe faced a significant surge in the number of subnational regions attempting to regain the autonomy they once possessed. These movements were largely politically mobilised on the basis of language and culture where many of the European nation-states found themselves relinquishing minimal amounts of autonomy for appeasement. After the First World War a second wave of regionalism took place mainly in Eastern and Central Europe as old empires began to collapse and former subnations were seeking to find their territorial space within the new European system. The occupation of Nazi Germany and the outbreak of the Second World War however allowed little advancement for these regionalist movements. By the end of the Second World War Europe found itself once again trying to rebuild itself from the ashes of devastation.

The destruction of Europe as a result of the war left the European governments in a state of despair as they sought out methods of rebuilding. The central state would be required to play a larger role than previously in managing the restoration of its territory. The state took responsibility in directing and planning the course of public and private

investment from the economically sound regions to the poorer and more underdeveloped regions (Keating 2001: 217). Keating (2001) goes further into describing that following World War II, the governments of Western Europe's policies were aimed at exploiting the under-utilised resources of the poorer and declining regions by integrating them into the national economic, social and political systems. Celia Applegate (1999) illustrates how modernization theory dominated the historical discourse in explaining the disappearance of regions after the Second World War in three realms, economics, politics and culture. Regions were doomed to disappear as they became engaged into nationally based markets and regulated by the central-state and became homogenised from the effects of labour and capital mobility. National political institutions grasped more control of territorial divisions in the nation-state where national parties would gain more influence. A collective culture was also born through a common language and educational and artistic institutions creating a national culture thus giving a rise to nationalism of the nation-state (Applegate 1999: 1163).

The post-war modernisation policies of the Western European states were impasse in regards to territorial politics. The aim was to create an economically vibrant state throughout the national territory even if it requires disregarding the political and social objectives of its subnations. This consequently generated greater resentment on behalf of the subnational territories fostering them to convey their demands within the context of a territorial framework (Keating 1998; 2001). The late 1960s and 1970s saw rise to cultural revivals of many regions and minority nationalities in Western Europe, similar to those experienced in the late 19th century. The origins of this next wave of regionalism are complex but a common theory derives that it was initiated by several groups of the educated youth rejecting the newly formed mass commercial culture and "cultural imperialism" of the United States. This in turn can cause strong links to rediscovering a community based on political organisation against the imperialistic centralised government with regional languages and culture seen as the centrepiece (Keating 1988: 170-171). Moving from the cultural to the political however proved more difficult as attempting to establish strong regional governance lead to an imbalance of regional autonomy across Western Europe. The central governments did concede a limited amount of autonomy notably in Belgium and Spain (post-Franco) and to a lesser extent in France and Italy. While these regionalist movements did achieve a limited amount of autonomy they failed to establish a strong base for mobilisation as

much of the regionalist themes were being employed by the social democratic left, particularly in Italy (Keating 2001). By the 1980s, as decentralisation slowed down, regional governance across Western Europe differed accordingly to the institutional and cultural attributes of each state. By the 1990s the European circumstances would alter incredibly due to the ongoing steps of integration. The Single European Act (SEA) and Treaty on European Union (TEU) facilitated incredible changes to the dynamics of the market and state. In response to these radical changes a new wave of regionalism would emerge reflecting this new European circumstance.

The New Regionalism

Recent decades have presented yet another challenge to the states and subnations of Europe in globalisation. The confrontation of globalisation tends to imply the decline in significance of borders and territory, where even the foresight of a borderless global economy can exist (Ohmae 1995). Multinational corporations, rather than the state, are seen as playing the fundamental role in the globalised world, dictating the direction of capital with minor limitations of borders and territory. Anderson and O'Dowd (1999) label this thesis as the "strong" version of globalisation demonstrating that it places its primary emphasis on economics and technology and secondary emphasis on culture. "Weak" versions of globalisation incorporate "inter-nationalisation" where state governments still maintain a pivotal role in internationalised governance and the direction of the markets (Anderson and O'Dowd 1999: 599). By the late 1980s with the SEA in place, Europe was taking a large step towards a borderless Europe while creating a stronger supranational government, demonstrating elements of both strong and weak globalisation. The social and economic definition of territory was once again changing not just within the framework of the state but from the context of the European Union level as well.

The new wave of regionalism, which had been inaugurated by this time, could no longer be contained by the state through minimal decentralisation as it was in the past. "Globalisation, with the single European market, diluted state government abilities to manage their spatial economies. The state is losing its ability to control investors in investing in a preferred developing region. If the Transnational corporation finds the available region for investment unfavourable, they now have the ability to leave the

country altogether for a more favourable region (Keating 2001: 217). The state is losing power and authority from three directions. As Keating (1998: 73) summarises:

[First] from above by internationalization; [second] from below by regional and local assertion; and latterly by the advance of the market and civil society, eroding its capacities in economic management, in social solidarity, in culture and identity formation, as well as its institutional configurations. This has produced a *new regionalism* marked by two linked features: it is not contained within the framework of the nation-state; and it pits regions against each other in a competitive mode, rather than providing complementary roles for them in a national division of labour.

It is important to stress that the state is not becoming irrelevant in new regionalism but merely losing its monopoly on managing the functional space within its territory. The state continues to perform important political and economical duties which subnational movements of new regionalism acknowledge (Tierney 2005: 171). This is what distinguishes subnational movements of new regionalism from regionalism of the past. The new environment introduced by the European Union is creating a new role for subnational actors in administering development and modernisation within their territories, as well as beyond the nation-state, which does not necessarily include separation from the nation-state. As Schmitt-Egner (2002: 188) defines it, “new regionalism pursues a range of policy changes (e.g., increased decentralisation, federalism) to enhance the autonomy and stature of the region without destabilising the state”. The new regional element is not to challenge the state’s power but rather exploit the new global and European situation by redistributing the state’s managerial abilities from within. While independence movements do exist in several regions, public opinion within these regions tends to veer towards enhanced autonomy and representation within the state over secession (Tierney 2005: 172-176). This reasoning enhances the significance of the central state. As Tierney (2005: 177) adds, even if secession was possible, it would be essential to maintain good relations with the larger state due to its previous economic and social association with the region. Furthermore historical ties of identity and loyalty may exist between state and region.

Recent examples of decentralisation in new regionalism include the Scottish parliament and Welsh Assembly in the United Kingdom as well as higher degrees of autonomy granted to the regional governments of Catalonia, Galicia and the Basque Country in Spain. In these few examples policy is increasingly taking shape within the framework

of the subnational territory. Defining the functional territory in which this shift in power takes place is a crucial task in new regionalism. As Keating (1998) notes, the elements of new and old regionalism still coexist. While the state's power is being redistributed within, as a reaction to the new global and European markets, elements of subnationalism, similar to those in the late 19th century as well as the late 1960s and 70s, help circumscribe the regional territory. The above mentioned examples each contain a subnational culture that assists in defining the regional territory for not only those within the region, but for those outside it. Furthermore, although these particular subnational movements may have roots in an ethnic culture, ethnicity is not what altogether defines culture. The following will define what is meant by region through the creation of identity within a territorial space.

Defining the Region within the New Regionalism

Defining the region is a complex process of confining territorial space and political components into a single meaning. The obvious starting element is the concept of territorial space. In Keating's (1998: 79) words, "a region is constituted from a territory, whose significance is given by its functional and political content. It is also an institutional system, in the form of a regional government, or a set of administrative institutions operating in the territory". Furthermore, this territorial space is shaped by the patterns of political meaning fostered by regional mobilisation and the functions that the region is to perform (Keating 1998: 80). More than simply a physical territory, the region is established by institutions providing specific functions over a given territory, a functional space. The size of this functional space is still ambiguous however. There is no distinction from an urban locality, such as a city like Barcelona, and a larger regional community, such as Catalonia.

Peter Schmitt-Egner (2002: 181-182) defines region accounting for the size of a functional space. As he explains, a region is "a spatial partial unit of medium size and intermediary character whose material substratum is based on territory". Furthermore, Schmitt-Egner carefully explains the components of the definition. *Space* signifies that it is a determined physical territory defining its inner and outer boundaries. It is described as *medium-sized*, indicating that units exist that are larger and smaller. Lastly, *function* describes that the region serves an intermediary between the larger and smaller units. Subsequently, Schmitt-Egner (2002: 182) explains that this territory is beyond

the notion of space. It is dependent on time and the people that occupy it through political and social interactions, thus it is a historical conception that separates it from simply being space-oriented. In addition Paasi (1991) explains that regions are first formed out of territorial space however once there is a regional consortium within the territory that has the political motivation to create institutions, symbols take form to fuse its members. Subsequently a creation of a regional culture develops assisting in creating a recognisable identity of those within the region's borders.

Identity plays a crucial role in the construction of the region. Karl Deutsch (1953) explained that identities are created within a given territory through common culture and experiences that are reflective of the social and economic contact amongst individuals within its society. It defines the individuals who are a part of the society to those who are excluded. Regional identities are not pre-given phenomena but rather evolve in relation to patterns of social-economic development. This identity can be developed through cultural and political institutions, social mobilisation and the progression of governance (Painter 2002). Anderson (1983) argues that community identity is an illusion created by human imagination. Most community members, whether in a community the size of a small town or that of a large country, never have full social communication with each member. Therefore, an imagined identity is created to enable a social or political association of the community as a whole. In the minds of each member is an imagined community which one identifies with. Furthermore, Anderson argues, communities are distinct not by the accuracy of this imagined identity, but by the style in which it is imagined.

Identity arguably can be categorised within two definitions, *cultural identity* and *civic identity*. Michael Bruter (2005) examined the concept of an evolving European identity. Although his examination was restricted to identity creation at the European level, several similarities can be observed to the creation of identity at the regional level. Through the analysis of survey data Bruter claimed that Europeans are identifying with the concept of a mass European civic identity more so than that of a cultural identity. This can be seen as a result of the cultural barriers that exist between the nation-states that make up the European Union. For Bruter (2005: 12), cultural identity is "the sense of belonging an individual feels towards a particular political group". In contrast, civic identity is "the identification of citizens with a political structure, such as a State, which

can be defined as the set of institutions, rights and rules that preside over the political life of the community”.

Language, religion and ethnicity are each common forms of an ethos that helps distinguish a cultural identity within a community. As noted earlier, a majority of subnational movements in the late 19th century based their mobilisation on cultural identities such as these. By the late 1960s and 1970s, with the beginning of decentralisation, these cultural identities were revived as a politically mobilised group able to exploit the new functions of policy making at the regional level. While ethnicity is mentioned as a component of cultural identity, it is dangerous to build an identity purely on ethnicity. As Keating (1997) notes a purely ethnic identity has the potential to prevent social cooperation and solidarity. It prevents social integration of individuals who are not part of the ethnicity yet live within the region. A cultural identity however allows minority individuals within the region, as well as those who immigrate into the region, to assimilate into the culture. An example can be seen in the case of Catalonia and the Catalan language. While Castilian is the official language of Spain, and Catalan is a high-status language, students in Catalonia are required to have knowledge of both Castilian and Catalan. This is to allow the inclusiveness of the large number of Southern Spaniards who have immigrated to the region while Catalonians are still able to function with their own language (Keating 1997). Schrijver (2004) sites the case of Wales when demonstrating how culture may not necessarily define a region's territory until after regionalism. Cultural identity in Wales is vastly split between those who use Welsh as their primary language in the North and those who speak only English in the South. Welsh regionalism however encouraged the inclusion of Welsh symbols for inhabitants to identify with, including road signs in both Welsh and English, in addition to the regional political party Plaid Cymru.

Giving the region functional power fosters priorities to be set. It allows a political role in which the region is part of the political process contributing to the formation of policy from its own regional viewpoint (Keating 1998: 82). The creation of institutions to influence policy fosters a civic identity. Through examining the autonomous communities of the Basque Country, Catalonia and Galicia, Martinez-Herrera (2002) demonstrates that through the process of decentralisation and regional state building, citizens are identifying more with their respective region than previous years. This

indicates that decentralisation and the creation of regional institutions do foster a political identity with the region. Furthermore, this does not necessarily imply an identity rejection of the central-state as it still performs essential functions that the regions rely on. In turn it is possible that a multi-political identity may be created with both the central and regional states. Gary Marks (1999: 85) argues that regional attachment can be measured by the patterns of institutional competencies that exist within the subnational regions. Higher levels of regional attachment are noticeable in nation-states that have a more federal-like system in regards to its regions. However, higher levels of national attachment were measured in nation-states that have a more unitary structure. This demonstrates that civic identity can correlate with identifying with the region.

When carrying out a quantitative analysis on public opinion it is difficult to bring all the above pieces of what makes a region into creating a unit of analysis. Therefore, I must first simply define the region on grounds of a more territorial aspect then examine the effects of the above mentioned definitions such as identity to see how they relate to supporting the European integration process. To do this, I build my definition on the work of Pieter Van Houten (2003) as simply the administrative territory below that of the nation-state. As I explained in Chapter 1, such a simple definition can still remain complex. The example within the United Kingdom is noted where England is broken into nine regions which have no elected body of government, with the exception of Greater London, but are done purely for administrative purposes. As the European Commission recognises these as regions I will also do so. Therefore, the definition of “administrative region” is very important in that the territory does not necessarily require an elected assembly of government. Subnational actors however can still exist and in all regions can play a vital role in the multilevel governance structure of the European Union.

The Region and Multilevel Governance in Europe

Hooghe and Marks (2001) argue that national governments no longer monopolise EU-level policy. Therefore a new ‘multilevel’ model of governance may be a better alternative to view the decision making process which includes three characteristics. First, the decision making powers are shared by several actors at different levels of governance rather than at the national level. For example while national governments

still do remain as actors, the Commission, Council of Ministers and European Court of Justice act as independent supranational institutions. Second, collective decision making amongst states loses a significant amount of control for individual national governments where most decisions are a zero-sum character. Third, the multilevel governance model rejects the belief that subnational actors are nested within national arenas exclusively. Rather, subnational actors operate in both national and supranational arenas thus creating trans-national associations (Hooghe and Marks 2001: 3-4).

Multilevel governance has been classified into two categories by Hooghe and Marks (2003; 2004), Types I and II. Type I multilevel governance is based on the foundations of federalism, where power sharing amongst governments is operated at only a few levels and is primarily concerned with the relationship between the central-government and the non-intersecting tiers of government either below or above it. The unit of analysis within Type I multilevel governance is the individual government rather than individual policy. More specifically Type I jurisdictions are highlighted by non-intersecting memberships which are typically territorial units such as the nation-state, region or locality. In Type II multilevel governance jurisdictions are not limited to a few levels but rather can operate across levels as they are not territorial specific. Jurisdictions are task specific focusing on the policy rather than government. Actors can be both public and private and can collaborate or compete in multiple policy making arenas (Marks and Hooghe 2004: 17-22). This dissertation will be primarily concerned with the role Type I multilevel governance has on public perceptions of European integration. This is not to undermine the importance Type II multilevel governance has on policy making but derives from the concept of new regionalism where regional actors have called for further autonomy in regional governance. This research concentrates on the public's recognition of the decentralisation process and how they correlate this with the European integration process. Type I multilevel governance deals specifically with territorial units which can foster identification with the region. Although Type II multilevel governance may deal with regional issues, its complex nature may not advance the public's identification with the region as strongly as Type I.

Stephen George (George 2004: 115) explains that multilevel governance is distinguished once national governments surrender authority to supranational agents

which in turn shifts the governmental balance of resources. This inevitably affects subnational actors as they may find their resources they once used to gain autonomy from the central-state have dissolved. George goes on to explain that subnational actors will amend this balance through a number of strategies demonstrated by Hooghe and Marks (Hooghe and Marks 2001). These entail taking a more direct participatory role in EU policy making including, setting up their own offices in Brussels, forming direct links with Commission officials, participating in the Committee of the Regions and demanding formal channels of access to representatives within the EU. These responses thus create a dynamic that pulls authority away from the central-state (George 2004). In this depiction of multilevel governance the European Union encourages a top-down approach by creating channels of access to regional actors. Charlie Jeffery (2000) however criticises the top-down model of multilevel governance within the European policy arena. Jeffery explains that the multilevel model may not be as much of a top-down flow of Europeanisation as explained above. Through the example of Germany, Jeffery describes how the German Länder have been at the forefront of influencing German European policy. The Länder have taken into consideration that European policy lays within the domestic sphere of policy rather than the international sphere. Furthermore in accordance with Rhodes (1997) the increase of decentralisation within European member-states increases the role subnational actors will play in the national arena in influencing European policy.

In both explanations of top-down and bottom-up multilevel governance subnational actors have gained significance in the policy making process. Sutcliffe (2002) examined the role subnational actors in Scotland played in influencing European structural funding in two periods. The first was in the mid-1990s when several Scottish regions were under Objective 1 status and the second from 2000-2006 when the regions were in a transitional status coming out of Objective 1 status.¹ He found that subnational actors were involved in the decision making process of receiving structural funding though they had only marginal participation. Sutcliffe however found that where Scottish subnational actors had a greater role was in the process of implementation of the policy created. This example shows though still limited in the

¹ Objective 1 regions are those within the European Union most in need of EU regional policy and are generally recipients of EU structural funding. To qualify for objective 1 status the regional GDP per capita must be below 75% of the EU average.

policy making process subnational actors have a significant function in the multilevel governance system.

Implementation of regional policy may have a significant role in the public's evaluation of European integration. It is the point at which the public can witness on first hand account the benefits of which the European Union may provide for them and their region. Multilevel governance has created a unique position for regional actors. Conceivably as the public takes note of the role their regional actors are playing in the European integration process and their ability to bring benefits to the region, the regional public may be more inclined to support the integration process. Regional political parties are one of the primary beneficiaries from multilevel governance where they have found new resources within Europe and the multileveled system of governance to influence policy. The European integration process has been recognised by some regional nationalists as an alternative to secession (Llamazares and Marks 2006). Regional political parties can use the multilevel system to strengthen political influence and promote themselves to the regional public.

Regional Political Parties

Political parties can be a strong factor influencing public opinion towards European integration (Ray 2003b; Hooghe 2007; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). This is understandable as the intergovernmental nature of the integration process is controlled by the opinions of political parties that make up the national governments. Therefore the integration issue is often used as a political debate within member-states between parties of the government and parties of the opposition. The dynamics of regional parties however take their own unique place in the integration process.

Traditionally opposed to a united Europe, regional parties often resented the concept of a third-tier of governance. This is hardly surprising as regional parties are normally founded upon the concept of granting more autonomy, or independence, to the region. The idea of supporting an additional level of government can be seen as counterproductive to the party cause. This was the mainstream viewpoint of most regional parties through the 1970s. By the mid-1980s however many regional parties began to change their position on Europe. The EU became realised as a means to promote self autonomy for many regional party actors. European integration

transformed from a negative notion into a recognition that the EU and multilevel governance could benefit the region both economically and culturally while simultaneously moving policy making powers away from that of the nation-state (Keating 1998: 163).

The development of multilevel governance explained above has allowed regional actors to play a vital role in the European policy arena. The most prominent area of European-regional cooperation lies within the process of implementation in which the European Commission relies heavily on regional actors (Keating 1998). This interplay of multilevel governance allows for regional actors to present their interests to Europe and the region as well as taking credit for bringing EU subsidies to help economic development of the regions (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). The European Union also provides an additional election battle ground for regional parties to compete as well as additional resources provided to the parties assisting their domestic and regional capabilities (Lynch 1996). Decentralisation however holds its limits on regional political parties. Jolly (2007: 24) found that regional political parties were less likely to compete in the more highly decentralised regions. Here, beyond a certain threshold of decentralisation, the nation-state may actually meet the demands of autonomy-oriented regional citizens. Regional parties are strongest where ground is still yet to be gained in terms autonomy. Within these regions, regional political parties are likely to promote European integration as advantageous for the region. Regional political parties therefore may play a highly instrumental role in determining public EU support.

Regional political parties are shown to be one of the largest beneficiaries from European integration. The European Union and multilevel governance have transformed the political stage on which regional parties participate. Convincing the regional public to support the development of European integration has now become a crucial strategy to assure the party's endurance and policies are met. In addition, different parties seek different stances on the regional position in Europe. Some seek full independence, some a more federal-system within the nation-state, while others seek to simply protect their regional institutional rights as in the German Länder (Keating 1998). This variation between regional political parties can perhaps create variation in support levels amongst the European regional public.

Conclusion

This chapter has described the dynamic change in the nature of the European policy making structure over the past few decades. Both the European Union and new regionalism have created a significant challenge to the traditional supremacy of the nation-state. New regionalism describes the challenges regions are facing in the new globalised and competitive world. Economic and political needs can vary greatly within a country by region. Additionally, in order to remain competitive in the globalised world policy decisions are more widely becoming made by actors at the level closest to understanding the needs of the region. In many regions elites are requesting additional autonomy as the answer to this challenge. The European Union also helps foster this notion through the enhancement of the multilevel governance structure.

New regionalism has developed on the recognition of variation between regions. Each region may have a different economy, employment situation, cultural history, historical language, etc. All these variables can contribute to predicting levels of regional autonomy demands (Van Houten 2003). Although the variation in these factors may lead to certain levels of regional assertiveness it may also be likely that each region will view the European Union differently. Some regions where unemployment may be higher when compared to the rest of the nation may see it as a means of increasing labour production where the central-state has failed. Cultural minority regions may see Europe as a means of protecting their identity which is constantly pitted against the majority culture of the nation-state.

Multilevel governance has created a unique situation for both the elites and the public within Europe's subnational regions. Regional elites are gaining more access to the policy making arena. The European Union provides them with new channels in which they can partake at the European level of decision making in addition to gaining greater influence on national positions on Europe. This increase in participation may be seen as fostering regional demands for greater autonomy from the nation-state causing an increase in decentralisation throughout the EU. New regionalism and multilevel governance are facilitating a new recognition of the regional level in politics, economy and identity.

As these changes occur within the multilevel composition of the European Union limited research has been made to account for regional variations of public attitudes

towards European integration. Most investigations into regional public attitudes towards the European Union have been conducted on a case study basis within only a few countries. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) however attempted to include the regional level within their EU-wide investigation of Euroskepticism using a multilevel model. They found that although the variation at the regional level was limited, it still contributed to a better overall model fit into explaining Euroskepticism. For Lubbers and Schēepers the region was only used as a level of analysis included in the multilevel model. They did not attempt to explain regional variation but only accounted for it within their model.

Individuals may no longer be using the contexts of their country as a means of evaluating the European Union but looking upon the costs and benefits of integration at a level much closer to them. New regionalism can bestow the public recognition of regional distinctiveness in terms of politics, economic differences and identity. Multilevel governance can demonstrate the significance the region plays in politics and authority as well as increasing the role of regional political parties in modern political times. The transformation of regional politics occurring within the European Union provides an incentive to explore regional variations of public attitudes towards integration. This dissertation will attempt to explore the concepts presented in this chapter and their impact on public evaluations of European integration.

Chapter 4

Approaching the Public: Exploring Data and Methodologies

Introduction

Choice of methodology can be the most imperative for any researcher. The strength of one's conclusions rests on whether the best methodological tools for analysis were applied. In this chapter I intend to explain my methodological choices and defend the case that I have chosen the best possible methods for exploring my questions of public support of European integration at the regional level. As will be explained, the selected methodology for my research is quantitative based, using large datasets exploring both the opinions of the European public as well as surveys designed to capture the positions of regional political parties.

The analytical chapters of this dissertation each vary in terms of the statistical method used to explore the research questions at the subnational level. Due to this variance, the research may also be viewed as an exploration of various statistical methods contributing to public opinion research. This chapter is divided into three main sections. I begin by reintroducing the research and explain why quantitative methods were chosen over other qualitative approaches. I then go on to describe the different datasets used including Eurobarometer and the British Election Study. Thereafter, I will give a brief description of the chosen statistical methods, such as logistic regression and multilevel modelling, and briefly explain how each is utilised in the dissertation.

Qualitative vs. Quantitative Methods and Data

This research asks the question if public opinion towards European integration varies as much within countries as it does amongst them. I use the region as the subnational territorial unit below that of the nation-state and attempt to produce a broader generalisation on the dynamics of regional public opinion towards integration

throughout the European Union.¹ In addition I attempt to gain a better understanding of public opinion where regional assertiveness towards further subnational autonomy exists. Selecting the proper methodology to make these conclusions takes careful deliberation of both the questions being asked and the data available. In simple terms, data can frequently be grouped into the two categories of qualitative and quantitative.

As noted in Chapter 2, public opinion research in politics is a rather new area of research conceivably becoming most reputable from the late 1960s through the works of David Easton (1965) and Ronald Inglehart (1970b; 1970a; 1971; 1977). The timing of the development of public opinion research and its evolution thereafter came when the advancement of statistical methods was reaching new heights. Statistical methodology allowed the examination of more observations through the use of survey data thus better enabled researchers to make wider generalisations of a larger public. Furthermore, advancements in data collection allowed for the possibility to gather larger and more accurate population samples.

Chapter 2 highlighted that the vast majority of EU public opinion research is quantitative based. There are however instances where qualitative methodologies have been used to gain insights into the public's support of European integration. Menendez-Alarcon (2000) examined Spanish interpretations of the integration process through the extensive use of individual interviews concluding that the EU has not surpassed the importance of the nation-state in Spanish opinion. Diez-Medrano (2003) combined the use of both qualitative and quantitative methodologies in his research analysing EU public opinion in Germany, Spain and the United Kingdom. Diez-Medrano primarily used qualitative data such as interviews and analyses of prominent newspapers to capture media interpretations. While qualitative in nature, he presented several of his data findings in quantitative form. In addition to qualitative sources Diez-Medrano also presented additional statistical findings from the Eurobarometer survey within the respective countries of research.

¹ While a study of all 27 EU member-states was considered, I have decided to limit this research to the original EU15. The historical context of the new member states is extremely different both in terms of regional mobilisation and Europeanisation. This variation, when compared to the original 15, may produce an abundance of unique conclusions that warrants a separate continuation of this dissertation research.

The above examples of EU public opinion research are fruitful in their conclusions and contribute to the overall discipline. However they display one shortcoming from the use of these data. Menendez-Alarcon (2000) and Diez-Medrano (2003) were limited to the number of case studies examined in order to remain practical. While qualitative methods have demonstrated their usefulness in explaining opinion in Spain in addition to Germany and the United Kingdom, a wider generalisation cannot be made about the dynamics of the general European public. Surveys conducted European wide such as Eurobarometer have given researchers the ability to draw conclusions on the European Union public as a whole. Qualitative and quantitative methods have both strengths and weaknesses. The research question at task and the population to be investigated are the starting points when making the decision on methodological approaches.

I have chosen to use quantitative methods for the research within this dissertation. An argument can be made for a qualitative aspect within the data used for this analysis. Each survey can be considered to be a quasi-interview where a respondent is asked a series of questions relating to his/her opinion on a range of topics. This qualitative element however cannot be expanded as the respondent is not often given the opportunity to elaborate on his/her opinions in order to maintain a standardised set of responses for comparison across a larger sample population. At this point the quantification of the responses becomes more vital allowing for the observation of opinion trends across a given population.

There are several sample populations that I intend to work with to get a better understanding of regional public opinion. Chapter 5 analyses the effects of regional party politics within the EU15. Chapter 6 investigates the dynamics of regional political and economic evaluations amongst the EU15. In Chapter 7, the sample population is restricted to member-states which contain elements of regionalism so to not dilute the effects in which regional assertion may have upon public EU support.² Finally Chapter 8 deals with an individual case study and deeper analysis of regional public opinion towards integration within the United Kingdom. Given the size of the sample populations analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 qualitative data and methods would be slightly more problematic when making conclusions for larger population sizes. Chapter 8 is potentially the only chapter within this dissertation in which qualitative

² These countries are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. More detail on the selection of these countries is explained in Chapter 7.

methods and data would be practical in addition to the quantitative analysis of survey data. Focus groups and/or interviews of members of the public and party elites may give further insight to the dynamics of regionalised British public attitudes towards the EU. I however believe that I have found adequate and sufficient data in the British Election Study which captures an accurate image of British public opinion thus qualitative methods for this section of my research will not be necessary.

Selecting the Appropriate Datasets

Creating or searching for the best datasets for any quantitative based research can be a long and complicated process. In some instances it may be practical for the researcher to conduct his/her own survey thus containing questions specific to the research of interest. Self-conducted questionnaires however are noticeably easier to carry out when dealing with smaller sample populations. When dealing with larger populations, such as the European Union, researchers will less likely have the financial means and time to be able to carry out a large survey. Fortunately a number of large surveys produced by European research organisations exist to help alleviate the difficulties of carrying out such a large task. The largest shortcoming however analysing large surveys is that the researcher may discover it difficult to find specific questions relating to his/her topic of interest. The perfect survey rarely exists and as a consequence the researcher must seek out the survey which best works in accordance with the population and questions to be analysed. In this dissertation I use surveys to observe the opinions of two population types. First and most important are the surveys relating to the opinions of the public. Second, I use surveys relating to political party positions on integration.

Observing the Regional Public

There are three principal sample populations that will be analysed in this research. First is the overall population of the EU15, second the population of six countries where regional assertiveness exists and third the population of the United Kingdom. The basic criteria of which I selected the chosen surveys are as follows:

- Inclusion of question(s) measuring support for the European Union and/or European integration³

³ The most critical question(s) from the survey which will act as the dependent variable within the analysis.

- Survey accounts for proper subnational territorial units
- Inclusion of additional questions measuring several explanatory variables⁴

After reviewing the European Values Study (EVS), the European Social Survey (ESS), the European Election Study (EES) and Eurobarometer, it was determined that Eurobarometer best matched the above criteria thus was the best survey to represent the opinions of the European public in Chapters 5, 6 and 7.

Eurobarometer is a series of surveys first launched in 1973 on behalf of the European Commission initially led and administered by Ronald Inglehart and Jacques-René Rabier. All survey results are published by the Public Opinion Analysis Sector of the Commission. Eurobarometer contributes to two types of surveys, the Flash and Standard surveys. The Flash survey is ad hoc and is conducted upon request of the EU institutions and typically targeted at specific populations on specific topics. The Standard Eurobarometer is conducted biannually in the autumn and spring of each year. The Standard Eurobarometer allows for observing trend dynamics by the inclusion of reoccurring themes such as opinions towards integration, identity and economic evaluations over the course of time. In addition, Eurobarometer also produced the Mannheim Trend File, a single file combining each of the most important trend questions of the surveys conducted between 1970 and 2002.⁵

The sampling method for Eurobarometer is based on a multistage random probability. First primary sampling points (PSU) are selected from a stratification of distribution of the national resident population in terms of metropolitan, urban and rural areas. These PSUs are proportional to the national population size as well as population density and are selected from each administrative region within the country. Next, a cluster of addresses are selected at random from each PSU. All interviews are conducted identically and face-to-face in the respondent's home.⁶ In this dissertation the Mannheim Trend File and Eurobarometer 63.4, conducted in the spring of 2005, will be

⁴ These variables include measurements of democratic satisfaction, economic evaluations, national / regional identities, etc. The explanatory variables will be explained in more depth per chapter.

⁵ All public opinion survey data including Eurobarometer and the British Election Study were obtained online from the UK Data Archive at www.data-archive.ac.uk.

⁶ For more details on Eurobarometer and the sampling procedure please see www.gesis.org/en/data_service/eurobarometer/standard_eb/fieldwork.htm

the two leading surveys of which the data for cross-national European public opinion will be derived.

The harmonisation of the Eurobarometer survey questions allows for a cross-national comparison of regional attitudes towards European integration and the large sample size understandably makes Eurobarometer the most widely used survey for quantitative analyses on European public opinion. This makes Eurobarometer the best fit survey for analysing public opinion towards integration in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. This cross-national harmonisation does have a setback in that it leaves no room for country specific questions. While Eurobarometer could give interesting insights for Chapter 8 on the United Kingdom, I felt it sensible to search for a more “British” specific survey to capture the country’s regional uniqueness.

Several British public opinion surveys were considered for the research including the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the British Social Attitudes Survey (BSA) and the British Election Study (BES). The major shortcoming when using any of the above surveys is that Northern Ireland is either not included or conducted in a separate survey. This is likely due to the unique situation of Northern Ireland’s historical context which does merit its own analysis. Due to this complication Northern Ireland will not be included in Chapter 8 but only the regions of Great Britain. After review of the possible surveys to analyse the British public, I found the best fit survey for the study to be the BES survey taken after the 2005 election.

Inaugurated in 1963 under the direction of David Butler and Donald Stokes, the BES survey sought out to record the opinion of the British public at the time of or shortly after each national election. Since, the study has been under the management of a number of academics and institutions. The sampling procedure for the BES is a stratified random cluster sample. 128 constituencies across Britain are selected at random using stratification based upon election results, geographical location and population density. To improve the samples, constituencies in Scotland and Wales in addition to English marginal constituencies were over-sampled. Within each constituency addresses were selected at random from two wards. For each ward 24 addresses were selected in England and 27 in Scotland and Wales. The survey is then conducted face-to-face at the interviewee’s home. The BES includes a pre- and post-

election survey although all the data for this research are from the post-election section only.⁷

The BES includes a wide array of regional specific questions that make it valuable for British regional analyses. Such questions that are unique include Scottish/Welsh/English vs. British identity questions in addition to questions relating to devolution and independence in Scotland and Wales. The question on devolution, which is not included in Eurobarometer, allows for the comparison of EU support levels between individuals who support devolution, support separatism or support a centralised UK government. Furthermore the timing of the survey taken after a national election is beneficial as the respondent is more likely to have reflected on several of the survey topic issues as opposed to a non-election period.

Measuring Party Positions

The influence of political parties has been noted to make a significant contribution to influencing public opinion towards European integration (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002; Hooghe and Marks 2005; Gabel and Scheve 2007; Hooghe 2007; Ray 2003a; Steenbergen, Edwards and de Vries 2007). New regionalism brings a unique dynamic to the examination of political parties and their influence on public opinion towards integration. Chapter 5 discusses regional party positions towards European integration and determining their influence on regional public attitudes. Reaching conclusions on regional party/public effects requires the use of datasets on both the party and public. Measuring party positions however is not as straightforward as observing the public. Political parties consist of a much smaller population than the general public and accessibility to party elites can be a daunting task to attempt any party survey. Two datasets have however been established attempting to properly measure political party positions towards Europe: the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Comparative Manifestos Project (CMP). Both datasets use completely different techniques and there are advantages and disadvantages depending on the information the researcher is attempting to gain. In this research I attempt to utilise both datasets when analysing the regional party/public dynamic.

⁷ For more details on the 2005 BES and the sampling procedure please see www.essex.ac.uk/bes/2005

The Chapel Hill expert survey is a project carried out at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. The survey is distributed to a number of country and party expert scholars questioning them on particular political parties and their position towards European integration. The survey asks the experts to evaluate the parties at the given time of the survey. The original survey was designed and conducted by Leonard Ray (1999) covering the years 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 and subsequently the survey was expanded and carried out to include several new variables by Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) in 1999 and 2002.

The benefit of the expert survey is that it uses a structure of “reputational measures” in using a considerable number of experts to draw comparisons of party opinions identifying any outliers whose estimation lies away from the mean. Furthermore the consistency of measurements between experts helps validate the reliability of the data (Ray 2007: 14). A critique of using expert surveys however is the considerations of what information experts use to evaluate their judgement. This can range from manifestos, voting behaviour or party ideology all raising issue to the validity of the measurement (Ray 2007: 15).

The Chapel Hill survey data are subjectively measured in accordance with the opinions of the party experts. This allows for the possibility of measuring party actions as opposed to concrete ideological stances. In addition, the survey can account for the saliency of political issues over time. It would be expected that certain issues, such as European integration, take precedent over other issues dependent of the year examined. This can make party positions difficult to compare as they might not be replicable. To overcome this, objective data on party positions should be examined in addition to the subjective data of the Chapel Hill Survey. Objective data can be based on written party documentation on party positions, the best example being found in party manifestos. They are records of party stances, as opposed to party actions, allowing for the comparison between competing party positions (Laver and Garry 2000). The objective data chosen for this research are from the Comparative Manifesto Project.

The Comparative Manifesto Project evaluates party positioning in a much different approach. Initially started by the Manifesto Research Group, the project entails coding the text of party manifestos since 1945 into a classification scheme of 54 broad

categories grouped into 7 policy areas (Volkens 2001: 98). A percentage score for each issue is then obtained calculated as the percent of sentences related to the specific issue within the population of all sentences within the manifesto. A score of 3 for example would mean that the given policy consists of 3% of the total party manifesto. Originally not suited for analysing regional parties due to the lack of regional party manifestos a second dataset measuring manifestos from 1990-2003 including a larger number of regional parties has been introduced.⁸

Examining manifestos is useful because they are issued by the actors that are being analysed and are comparable because the actors that produce them participate in the political process (Pennings 2002: 63). As Budge (2001: 82) states, measuring the emphases of issues by party is the only way to determine their policy differences which can be achieved by evaluating the saliency of these issues within the parties' manifestos. Furthermore manifestos provide what the party's "best thinking" is as well as their perception of policy priorities and government strategy (Pennings and Keman 2002: 76).

This is not to say the Comparative Manifestos Project does not come without its limitations. First, the manifestos are coded according to national election years. This makes it difficult to capture a party family within one particular year as elections throughout Europe are not concurrent with each other. Second, a manifesto may be examined as a form of advertising. They may be subject to unrealistic promises, commitments and an exaggeration of policy differences thus as a result of advertising, policy preferences may not necessarily be the same as policy outcome (Ray 2007). This in turn can make the manifesto data more of a measure of saliency and not necessarily party position. These issues must be taken into account when attempting to measure what the party *wants* versus what the party *does*.

Additional Data

In addition to the primary datasets described above other forms of data will be used within the analyses to strengthen the models. Such data include macro economic data such as national and regional GDP and unemployment figures. These data were made

⁸ See Kilngemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald (2006)

available from Eurostat, the official statistical office of the European Commission.⁹ All economic figures used in the models of research are statistics from the year prior to that of the survey of analysis. These data present the economic indicators of a full annual term. As the Eurobarometer survey is conducted in the spring of 2005, the economic data from 2005 would not represent the state of the economy prior to the time the survey was conducted. Therefore the last annual data produced before the Eurobarometer survey was conducted is used.

Variables from previous research will also be used such as a language difference score developed by James Fearon and Pieter Van Houten (1998; 2000) and a regional assertiveness score created in additional work by Pieter Van Houten (2003). As these variables were created by previous researchers and are not derived from the primary datasets of this research they will be described in further detail in the respective chapters of use.

Techniques in Statistical Modelling

Selecting the best fit statistical test requires as much consideration as does the right dataset. Choosing the best technique is dependent upon the structure of the data being used and the question being asked. In the section above I described a number of datasets that will be used for the research. Each chapter of this dissertation attempts to analyse a different segment to understanding regional attitudes towards European integration thus a mixture of data and statistical methods will be used dependent upon the question of analysis. I will be utilising an array of statistical tests ranging from regression analyses, including ordinary least squares (OLS) regression and logistic regression, as well as more recently employed techniques in multilevel modelling. The below descriptions will summarise these techniques and will be explained in further detail within the chapters they are applied.

Applying Regression

In basic model form, this research is observing the relationship between an *outcome variable* (also known as a dependent variable) and the effects that several *explanatory variables* (also known as independent variables) have on that outcome variable. In the

⁹ Made available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.

behavioural sciences, one of the most common tools of statistical analysis for observing the effects explanatory variables have on the outcome variable is multiple regression (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken 2003). The basic regression formula is as follows:

$$y = bx + c$$

Here y is equal to the outcome variable, x represents the value of the explanatory value, b represents the increase in the outcome variable as the explanatory variable increases by 1 and c represents the intercept (the predicted value of the outcome variable if the value of the explanatory is 0).¹⁰ For the purposes of this research what we are most interested in is the value of b , also known as the regression coefficient. A *regression coefficient* is produced for each explanatory variable in the model and tells us much about the effect the explanatory variable has on the outcome variable. First, the direction of the coefficient is of importance. If the coefficient is a negative value it tells us that the explanatory variable has a negative effect while if it is a positive value it is a positive effect. Second, the size of the coefficient is of importance. Larger values have stronger effects although this remains dependent on the scale of the explanatory value. In addition to the regression coefficient it is important to know whether or not we can draw any firm conclusions from the model results. A significance test for each variable is conducted producing a *p-value*. The p-value is a value between 0 and 1 and significance is accepted if the p-value is equal to or smaller than the significance level. Social scientists generally prefer to be 95% sure that the results would be the same if the test were to be carried out again. Thus, the confidence level for significance would be 5% $(1-0.95)*100$. Therefore, if the p-value is equal to or below 0.05 the result would deem significant. In this research, while I maintain that p-values below 0.05 are highly significant I feel that those between 0.05 and 0.10 (or 90% confidence level) should not be overlooked. Therefore those variables within this range will not be ignored but noted with caution.

Quite often the researcher must decide which type of regression he/she will use depending upon the structure of the data and questions being examined. In this dissertation two forms of regression will be used. The first is known as Ordinary Least

¹⁰ This notation is taken from Miles and Shelvin's (2001) *Applying Regression & Correlation*.

Squares (OLS) regression and the second Ordered Logistic Regression. OLS regression is simply linear regression as explained above. Its purpose is to identify the linear relationship between an outcome variable and one or more explanatory variables. The outcome variable however must be a quantitative continuous measurement of some condition or behaviour. Furthermore it is assumed that the outcome variable is normally distributed, that is the values of the variable when plotted on a frequency graph will produce what looks like a bell-curve. OLS will work with some of the data that will be used in this dissertation, such as the Comparative Manifestos Project data where the outcome variable is the ratio of sentences in a manifesto devoted to EU integration. Other datasets however such as Eurobarometer use categorical variables to measure public opinion.

It is often the case the outcome variable is not a measurement in continuous form. Surveys such as Eurobarometer often ask questions where the response categories are, for example, strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree and strongly disagree. It is not safe to assume that the distances between the categories are of equal space although they may be in consecutive order thus analysing this variable with linear regression can lead to incorrect conclusions (Long and Freese 2006). It is unlikely that the outcome variable will have a normal distribution thus the variable needs to be transformed into its logit form to continue the analysis (Miles and Shevlin 2001). The logit transformation first takes the odds ratios of the probability of each outcome category then takes the natural logarithm of each odds ratio giving the logit. By transforming the dependent variable into a logit variable, logistic regression demonstrates the maximum likelihood, or odds ratio, of a certain event occurring. The logistic regression coefficient of the explanatory variables can still be explained similarly to the OLS regression coefficient; the amount of change in the outcome variable given the change in one unit of the explanatory variable. However it may better be explained as a multiplier of the odds ratio given the increase of one unit in the explanatory variable (Miles and Shevlin 2001: 161).

The form of logistic regression applied in this dissertation is ordered logistic regression. Like logistic regression, ordered logistic regression transforms the dependent variable into a logit variable utilising the maximum likelihood method. Ordered logistic regression however takes into account that the response categories for the dependent

variable fall within a hierarchical order. It is based upon the proportional odds assumption where the coefficients produced to describe the relationship between one response category of the dependent variable and all higher responses is the same as those that describe the relationship between the next lowest category and all categories higher.

OLS and logistic regression are two of the most frequent form of statistical analyses in political science. I use both OLS and ordered logistic regression in this research to analyse smaller populations such as political parties and single regions. However, when analysing larger populations such as multiple countries the nested structure of the data should be taken into account which requires a different statistical method.

Multilevel Modelling

In political quantitative research we measure a sample of a population and make inferences on the relationship of particular variables and attempt to generalise our results to the wider population. Most often however researchers treat each observation measured as an independent occurrence when reality in the political and social world may be more complex than this. Data political researchers frequently use are measured at multiple levels where individual level surveys and other demographic data can be seen as containing a multiple level structure. A perfect example of this can be seen in the Eurobarometer survey. The survey is conducted at the individual level however these individual respondents are nested within a multileveled structure. The respondent lives within a city, which is part of a region, which is part of a country, which is then part of the European Union. In general, multilevel structures exist when a group of analysis is a subgroup of another.

Ignoring multilevel data structures can come at some costs such as incorrect standard errors or inflated type I errors (accepting the hypothesis of interest when the results can be attributed to chance) (Snijders and Bosker 1999). This is due to treating all observations in the sample as independent observations, which is misleading. If individuals are influenced by contextual factors (the environment they exist in) then the individuals within a common context share common influences thus they are not truly independent. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) wrote an extensive piece on multilevel modelling applied to the research of politics. For them there are three substantial

reasons for using multilevel analysis. First, it allows researchers to combine multiple levels of analysis into a single comprehensive model. When the model itself includes variables on multiple levels, it is less likely to endure from misspecification of single level models. Second, it allows the researcher to examine what is known as casual heterogeneity. When specifying the cross-level interactions it is possible to determine if the casual effect of a lower-level predictor is conditioned by a higher level variable. Third, it allows a test of the generalisability of the findings due to the ability of exploring casual heterogeneity. This allows the researcher to decipher if what occurs in one group also applies to other groups (Steenbergen and Jones 2002: 219).

There are two multilevel model types that will be used in this research. The first is the random intercept model and the second is the hierarchical linear model (also known as the random slopes model). The random intercept model takes into account that different groups have a different mean for the outcome variable. In the example of this research, some regions have a high mean of EU support while other regions have a low mean. The random effects model takes this into account estimating a separate regression coefficient for each group. From this, one can observe the within-group as well as between-group effects. In this research it will be possible, for example, to examine if regional EU opinion varies as much within countries as it does between countries. The random intercept model however keeps the effects of the explanatory variables uniform meaning the effect of the explanatory variable will cause the same amount of change on the outcome variable in all groups. To explore the effects of the explanatory variables the hierarchical linear model will be applied.

The effects of different explanatory variables may differ by group. For example, the effect of regional identity on EU opinion may have a positive effect in some regions while a negative effect in others. The hierarchical linear model makes it possible to observe this phenomenon. It takes the random intercept model a step further by allowing the effect of the explanatory variable to vary by group as well as the outcome variable. By doing so, one can observe the strength and direction of various explanatory variables. This will make it possible to see if individuals within regions truly act different from one another within the same country. Both the random intercept and the hierarchical linear models will be described in greater detail within the context of the chapter each is applied.

What is unique about the application of multilevel modelling in this dissertation is that it is a rather new technique in political science. Traditionally used in areas of other social sciences such as education, multilevel modelling has only been utilised in the study of politics for the past two decades and is still sparsely used. Early multilevel modelling research can be observed in works such as Jones, Johnston and Pattie (1992) in the early 1990s while Steenbergen and Jones (2002) wrote an article promoting its uses in political research a decade later. In the realm of public attitudes towards European integration research Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005) have made a considerable contribution to the use of multilevel modelling. Hooghe and Marks however typically use country and political party as their levels of analytical choice. In this research I hope to contribute to the use of multilevel modelling by not only accounting for the regional level into explaining EU support, but by attempting to explain regional variation of public attitudes as well.

Utilising the Data and Statistical Methods

This research includes an assortment of appropriate data and statistical techniques to explore public attitudes towards the European Union within the context of the region. The described data and methods above have each been chosen to examine the questions of each analytical chapter in the dissertation.

Chapter 5 focuses on the dynamics of regional party politics. It will explore the question of whether regional parties are just as pro-European as the major party families. In addition the chapter investigates if regional party supporters are aligned with their party's position on Europe. This chapter requires a range of data. First to evaluate party positioning OLS regression will be applied to the Comparative Manifestos Project data. The analysis should demonstrate that regional parties are indeed just as pro-European as their larger party counterparts. The Chapel Hill expert survey will give insight into the change of regional party positioning from 1984 through 2002. Furthermore, the positions of the regional party family along with the other party families will be compared to that of their electorate demonstrating that regional party voters remain constant with their party as opposed to other smaller 'fringe' party families of the greens, far left and far right. This will be achieved by comparing mean

evaluation scores over time from both the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File.

Chapter 6 investigates the role of economic and political indicators in determining public support of the EU. The analysis uses the data for the EU15 from the Eurobarometer 63.4 survey conducted in 2005. This chapter uses the multilevel random intercept model to account for the variance between countries as well as between regions within the same country. The random intercept model will show that while effects of the political indicators remain within the context of the national level, certain economic evaluations show their strongest effect at the regional level. The conclusions drawn from this chapter would only be possible by accounting for the multileveled structure of the data.

Chapter 7 deepens the analysis of multilevel modelling by investigating the effects of regional assertiveness. Regional assertiveness exists in only a handful of countries therefore the analysis is limited to a selection of six member-states. Using the same dataset in Chapter 6, Eurobarometer 63.4, this chapter applies the hierarchical linear model (or random slopes model). The hierarchical linear model will allow for the possibility to allow the effects of regional and national identity to vary by region. This will show that the role of identity is much more complex than initially thought. The way individuals view themselves in terms of regional and national identity can have varying effects even within the same country. In addition, while the overall trend demonstrates that regional identity will have a negative effect on EU support, national identity will have a positive effect overall. Furthermore, the regions which have differing effects from the overall trends will be noted. The hierarchical linear model will allow the possibility to find these regions that oppose the trend.

Chapter 8 takes an in-depth look at public attitudes towards integration in the United Kingdom. The Eurobarometer surveys were designed for a cross-national comparison and therefore do not ask any questions that are country specific. To capture a better understanding of the British experience the British Election Study is used to conduct the investigation. The outcome variable measuring EU support in the BES survey is a 5-point ordered categorical response question therefore the chosen statistical methodology is an ordered logistic regression analysis. A regression analysis is carried out for

England, Scotland and Wales revealing identity again can vary within the same country. In addition, the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Mannheim Eurobarometer trend file will also be used to compare the major political parties' EU position with that of the regional public's.

This dissertation is foremost an investigation on public attitudes towards European integration and the contextual effects of the region. However given the wide array of methods and data used it also contributes to an exploration of quantitative methodology. Using this wide variety of statistical methods as well as applying the latest statistical technique in multilevel modelling this research hopes to offer further insight to the complex nature of public support for the European Union.

Chapter 5

Regional Political Parties, the Public and their Support for European Integration

Introduction

This dissertation explores the dynamic of public opinion towards European integration within the context of Europe's subnational regions. As explained in Chapter 3 multilevel governance creates channels of access for subnational actors to participate in the political process at the European level (Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye 2002). In turn these political actors become highly important in facilitating the climate for mobilisation within the region and can be highly influential in providing information to the regional public. Examining the positions that party elites take on European integration provides a better comprehension of regional mobilisation and the role of multilevel governance in each region. This chapter intends to explore regional political parties and their position on integration in addition to comparing public support for integration amongst regional party voters with those of other political parties. In addition, the chapter serves as a starting point into understanding the link between regional assertiveness and support for the European Union. It will reveal that regional parties are likely to support European integration, in addition to their supporters, so that we can compare their positions with those of the entire regional public in the subsequent chapters. By doing so, conclusions can then be drawn in the final chapter to determine if regional assertiveness serves as a deterrent or stimulus to public support of European integration.

Investigating political parties is valuable when examining public attitudes towards European integration. In Chapter 2 it was explained that European integration is rarely a salient issue thus the public looks for cues, or proxies as Anderson (1998) explains, to help establish their position towards the European Union. Party labels are one of the most commonly used predictors for estimating voter positions on nearly all political issues. Political party positions vary significantly throughout the European Union. The

EU presents domestic political parties with a new political structure that can potentially be seen as threat or opportunity, having to organise themselves to enable participation at the European level of policy making. Determining how to confront this new political structure will lead to varying positions towards integration not only between different political parties but at times within them (Hix and Lord 1997: 5-6). As party supporters often reflect the positions of their party as a cue for integration support, it would be expected to observe variation within the public based upon party support.

Regional parties are very unique when compared to other political parties. Unlike the mainstream parties, those that fit within the regional party family do not typically find shared identity within the traditional political ideology spectrum. Instead they find their common identity in the appeal of restructuring the domestic political system around the regional territory in which each party operates (Hix and Lord 1997: 44). Additionally this objective of autonomy can further vary by regional party ranging from substantial decentralisation of the nation-state to complete independence. At first glance it would be easy to assume that regional parties would be against the concept of a European level of governance. The idea of supporting another level of authority that threatens the autonomous objective of the regional party seems contradictory. Furthermore regional parties are seen as “single issue” parties, devoting their efforts to the goal of regional autonomy leaving European integration as only a secondary issue. According to Paul Taggart (1998) because these fringe or “single issue” parties are less likely to partake in governmental office, they are unlikely to take a significant position on or influence EU policy making as it is largely an intergovernmental process.

In this chapter I intend to demonstrate that the European issue is just as important to regional parties as it is to the other mainstream national parties. The primary hypothesis to be tested in this chapter is that regional parties are as likely to be as “pro-European” as the main party families, while the other single issue party families of the greens, far left and far right will be more Euroskeptic. I will build upon the previous literature and re-establish that first, party family is a strong predictor of a party’s position on integration and second, the regional party family is just as Pro-EU as the larger mainstream parties. I will go on to correlate other party characteristics with integration position such as political ideology, cultural variation in language difference and decentralisation policy. Lastly I will compare party stance and voter preferences by

party family to demonstrate that regional party voters are just as inline with their party's European integration position as the other mainstream parties.

Regional Parties and Europe

In historical terms the issue of European integration has been a transforming one from the early days of the ECSC. In the preliminary years the public was detached from the process thus Europe never gained momentum in becoming a political issue within the domestic political parties. The direct election of the European Parliament in 1979 however can be seen as forcing the political party structure to take a position on Europe as the parties' candidates were being directly elected by the public to serve at the European level. Despite this change however, Peter Mair (2000) finds that Europe is still a non-election issue in terms of domestic politics, as Europe limits national government authority consequently reducing policy competition as the number of policy alternatives would be reduced. This then creates a mainstream consensus amongst national parties within each political system. Kriesi (2007) argues that it is more likely for the European issue to be introduced during election terms in states that are more Euroskeptic such as the United Kingdom. In addition, within these states, issues of European integration are more likely to be mobilised by the conservative parties or new populist right.

European integration can be regarded as a relatively new issue within the political arena. Although a new issue, this is not to say that parties will calculate their position based upon electorate and constituency positions. On the contrary Marks and Wilson (2000: 434) argue that parties are instead guided by their long standing historically rooted orientations that in turn "guide" them to their supposed positions on new issues. In addition political parties are bounded to predetermined ideologies and party leaders' opinions which are difficult to alter. Based heavily on the previous works of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) and Inglehart (1990), Marks and Wilson (2000) believe that this "cleavage hypothesis" can help distinguish a party and party family's position towards European integration.

As mentioned above it is almost contradictory for a regional party to support European integration as strengthening the authority of a European level government would in turn limit the amount of autonomy granted to the regional level. Scheinman (1977) noted

that the intergovernmental nature and the capitalistic characteristic of the European Union can be a drawback in protecting regional economic and cultural identity. This reaction was common with regional party elites in the 1970s, however, by the mid 1980s this position transformed into a positive commitment towards Europe using it to benefit the region both economically and culturally even if simply acting against the centralised government of the nation-state (Keating 1998: 163).

There are several ways that regional parties can use integration to their advantage. Europe can strengthen the functionality of regional party representatives. As the European Union invests significant amounts of funding into regional policy and economic support, the European Commission relies on regional actors to be involved in the process of regional policy making, one of the outcomes of new regionalism (Keating 1998). This interplay of multilevel governance allows regional actors to represent their interests at the European and regional levels, furthermore allowing regional politicians to take credit for introducing EU subsidies to the region (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002). The European Parliament also gives regional parties many advantages, not only by giving regional parties another level to compete in but by also providing organisational and financial resources which assist the party in its domestic and regional capabilities (Lynch 1996). Furthermore, as Hix and Lord (1997: 44) explain, most regional parties favour the concept of a "Europe of regions" where the nation-state will be replaced by a European-wide political system in which smaller territories will be the crux of representation at the European level. From the late 1970s through the 1980s regional parties can be seen shifting to a more positive integration position. An excellent example of this is the change in the Scottish National Party (SNP), which was previously Euroskeptic in the 1970s, altered its outlook on Europe by the mid-1980s, calling for "independence within Europe" by 1990s (Lynch 1996; Dardanelli 2005).

Through the use of interviews, De Winter and Cachafeiro (2002) find that ethno-regional party members of the European Parliament view European elections as a way to gain political visibility and legitimacy at the European level. They find that political ideologies are still the most important and distinctive feature of all political parties. However, while ethno-regionalist parties may ally with their ideological party families on many issues within the European Parliament, their regionalist presence in the form of the European Free Alliance (EFA) party group within the European Parliament gives

visibility to the new issues or 'alternative politics' such as regional mobilisation towards further autonomy (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002: 496).

Given the above discussion the following hypotheses have been developed to investigate regional party and electorate positions towards European integration:

Hypothesis 5.1: Regional parties are as likely to be as "pro-European" as the main party families, while the other single issue party families of the greens, far left and far right will be more Euroskeptic.

As described, most regional parties have shifted their positions towards European integration in the past few decades. As the EU provides several benefits to regional parties, including an additional level to compete in elections as well as taking credit for EU subsidies, regional parties should view the EU positively and maintain its importance within the party platform. The greens, far left and far right however gain less from integration as it does not favour their party goals thus will not favour integration as positively.

Hypothesis 5.2: Traditional left/right political ideology of the regional parties will not determine EU support levels.

As regional parties are not formed on the basis of left/right ideology they may include members from all sides of the political spectrum. Because of this, they are likely to take a more centrist position on the traditional political spectrum however maintain high levels of EU support.

Hypothesis 5.3: Regional parties within regions of greater cultural difference from the primary culture of the nation-state will be more inclined to support the European Union.

As described in Chapter 3 cultural identity is a large contributor to new regionalism and mobilisation for further regional autonomy. The European Union may be seen by some cultures as a means of protecting the regional culture from the dominate culture of the nation-state. Therefore, regional parties which represent regions with a larger cultural difference from that of the nation-state will have higher levels of EU support.

Hypothesis 5.4: Regional parties supporting higher levels of decentralisation will be more inclined to support the European Union.

As the European Union contributes to the multilevel governance system and pulls authority from the central-state, those regional parties more in favour of decentralisation will likely have higher levels of European support.

Hypothesis 5.5: EU support levels between the regional parties and their electorate will be similar.

The issue of integration is significant for regional parties in progressing towards regional autonomy. As regional parties have promoted the benefits of European integration their electorate may be likely to take cue from their party's position. While regional parties have been characterised as fringe parties, displaying similar party and electorate levels of EU support may show that regional party supporters do identify with the positions of their regional party and are not simply protest votes.

Predicting Party Family Positions on Integration

The framework for predicting party position relies heavily on the left/right ideological structure. Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) find, through the use of the Chapel Hill expert survey on party positioning towards EU integration, that parties towards the peripheral of the left and right are more likely to be Euroskeptic than the parties closer to the centre of the spectrum. Furthermore they find that party support and ideology are linearly related, however, this linear relationship is strongest on policies that can be clearly identified between neoliberal and European regulated capitalism.¹ Other policies, or new political issues such as environmentalism and cohesion policies, constrict positions according to party location on the left/right political spectrum. In addition they explain that social democratic parties can be seen shifting in favour of integration from the early 1980s as the EU's focus changes from largely neoliberal economic goals to including more social policies (Hooghe, Marks and Wilson 2002: 975). This creates a new political spectrum examining these new political issues, environmentalism for example is an issue on the left side of the spectrum and cultural protection issues such as immigration are on the right, can have a profound effect on

¹ Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) use two different ideological scales for this study. Here, the results are based on the traditional left/right scale resulting in an inverted U-shaped curve, which the peak is the highest level of support for the EU, from left to right.

integration positions.² Parties that stand on the right of the new political spectrum are more likely to be Euroskeptic while those on the left are more likely to be pro-European.

Using the Chapel Hill Expert Survey and running a multivariate OLS analysis, Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) find that the most influential variable on predicting a party's support for European integration that they test is classification of party family. National location, the country in which the party contends, does not seem to have as strong of an influence in predicting party positioning on EU support. In addition, they found that there is a relationship between party position and the position of the median party voter although it is unclear to which direction this effect takes, the voter influencing the party or the party influencing the voter.

Seth Jolly's (2007) research builds upon the cleavage hypothesis of Marks and Wilson (2000) within a regional context. According to Marks, Wilson and Ray's (2002: 587) further research into the cleavage hypothesis, regional parties belong to the centre-periphery cleavage. Here the regional party should be expected to be moderately to strongly in favour of European integration. Economic integration is seen positively as Europe provides the economic framework for regional autonomy while political integration weakens the nation-state's authority through the replacement of a plural European level of governance. Jolly (2007) demonstrates through a multivariate OLS analysis of the Chapel Hill expert survey that regional parties are as pro-European as other main stream parties.

I intend to build upon the findings of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002), Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007). Just as these works have demonstrated high EU support within the regional party family through the use of the Chapel Hill expert survey, I will further demonstrate this relationship with the use of an additional dataset that gauges party positioning focusing on the policy preferences within party manifestos as a comparison to the expert survey. I will then observe within the regional party family correlations between ideology, cultural differences and decentralisation policy versus EU policy. Lastly through the use of the Chapel Hill expert survey and the

² Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) label this second ideological spectrum the GAL/TAN scale. GAL (Green / Alternative / Libertarian) is on the left side of the scale while TAN (Traditional / Authoritarian / Nationalist) is on the right side of the scale.

Eurobarometer survey I will compare the EU positions of all party family elites versus the party family electorate.

The Data

This chapter uses three different datasets to analyse party support for European integration. The principal datasets are the Chapel Hill expert survey on party positioning towards EU integration and the Comparative Manifestos Project data. In addition, the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File will also briefly be used to compare EU positions of the electorate with party family elites.³ Each dataset has its advantages and disadvantages when analysing party policy preferences.

The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, carried out at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, is based upon a questionnaire distributed to a number of party expert scholars asking them to evaluate particular political parties on their position towards European integration at a given time. The original survey was designed and first conducted by Leonard Ray (1999) in 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996, then later expanded and carried out to include several new variables by Marks, Wilson and Ray (2002) in 1999 and 2002. The combined dataset from the years survey years between 1984 and 1999 include observations of 188 European parties. The benefit from using the expert survey is that it gives a dynamic impression of the change in party positioning over two decades. This variation over time can then be compared to the variation of public opinion thus helping determine if regional party supporters are consistent over time with their party's position towards European integration.

The Comparative Manifesto Project evaluates party positioning in a much different approach. Initially started by the Manifesto Research Group, the project codes the text of party manifestos into a classification scheme of 54 broad categories grouped into 7 policy areas (Volkens 2001: 98). The ratio of each given policy with the overall manifesto is then calculated into a percentage score. The score equals the total percent that the given policy makes up of the total manifesto. The Comparative Manifestos Project dataset that will be used in this chapter is from the second series covering manifestos from elections between 1990 and 2003 including a number of regional

³ The Chapel Hill Expert Survey, Comparative Manifestos Project and Eurobarometer surveys are explained in more explicit detail in Chapter 4.

political parties.⁴ The Comparative Manifestos Project data differ from the Chapel Hill expert survey in that the data are more objective, records of party stances, as opposed to party actions, allowing for the comparison between competing party positions (Laver and Garry 2000). The Chapel Hill expert survey data are subjective where they are recorded evaluations of party experts measuring each party's position towards Europe.⁵ As both datasets are used in this dissertation there will be no need to defend either position of the debate between utilising subjective or objective party data.

I will use the expert survey to gain a dynamic representation of party positioning from 1984-2002. Furthermore I use it to compare party elite positions with the party electorate data from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File using the same corresponding years.⁶ I use the Comparative Manifestos Project to run an OLS regression analysis in comparison to the works of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007) already done with the expert survey. In addition, the manifestos data will also be used to compare party EU support with positions of other policies including decentralisation which will not be possible with the Chapel Hill survey. I believe that the policy preferences within the manifestos should demonstrate that the parties' "best thinking" is comparable to what was concluded with previous works on the expert survey. I also use the Comparative Manifestos Project data to measure EU policy against ideology, cultural differences and decentralisation policy of regional parties. Lastly I use the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File with the expert survey to compare EU positions of the electorate with party family elites.

Party Family Preferences towards the European Union

In order to demonstrate the first hypothesis that the regional party family is just as pro-European as the other mainstream parties I perform a means comparison of both the Chapel Hill expert survey and Comparative Manifestos Project. The means comparison will help determine the validity of using both datasets for the chapter analysis. The strength of the two datasets is slightly difficult to compare over time due to the time structure of the data. The expert survey will be used first so that a temporal comparison of party positions can be made. Observations are each conducted at identical time

⁴ See Kilngemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge and McDonald (2006)

⁵ Please refer to Chapter 4 section *Measuring Party Positions* for more detail on the debate between utilising the Chapel Hill expert survey and the Comparative Manifestos Project data.

⁶ Please refer to Chapter 4 for an in depth description of the Eurobarometer surveys.

intervals for all parties in the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996 and 2002. The manifestos however are evaluated during national elections for each country between the years 1990 and 2003. Party observations therefore can be more frequent depending on the number of times a country has held elections within the given time range. To avoid the conflict I have averaged each party's position over the thirteen year period, thus the evaluations using the manifestos will be an analysis of the 1990-2003 time period only. Nevertheless both datasets provide interesting findings to investigate. Lastly, the parties that constitute each party family are defined by the party family classifications according to Hix and Lord (Hix and Lord 1997: 21-53). For Hix and Lord Hix, the European-wide party families are defined by political parties sharing "ideological identities and the interests of social groups of which they emerged to represent". The party families which will be compared in this chapter are the Christian Democrats, the Conservatives, the Liberals, the Socialists, the Greens, the Radical Left, the Radical Right and the Regionalists.⁷


Observing Figure 5.1 we can analyse regional party EU positions compared to the other party families over time using the expert survey. The scale for EU position, originally coded from 1 (least favourable) to 7 (most favourable), has been normalised by recoding to a simple scale of 0 to 1.⁸ As Figure 5.1 shows, the mean EU position of regional parties is not only as pro-European as the other mainstream party families, but this attitude also remains consistent between 1984 and 1996 in which a slight positive slope can be observed. After 1996 however a decline back to the 1984 level is seen with attitudes once again climbing from 1999 to 2002. This slight drop in EU support can perhaps be attributed to the number of Spanish regional parties that exist in the sample. After the 1996 Spanish election the Partido Popular (PP), Spain's conservative party, did not have enough seats to form a government therefore having to find other parties to form a coalition. In doing so, the PP courted the regional parties of Catalonia, the Basque Country and the Canary Islands to form a minority government in exchange for

⁷ As noted by Hix and Lord (1997: 25), the Agrarian family has not been included as this party family has almost disappeared as these parties have been absorbed into the other party families. The few parties originally coded as Agrarian in the data have been recoded accordingly with Hix and Lord (1997: 29-49). Also not included were the anti-European family as limited data were available.

⁸ The formula to normalise a variable outcome to a range of 0 to 1 is as follows:

$$Z_i = \frac{Y_i - \text{lower bound of } Y}{\text{upper bound of } Y - \text{lower bound of } Y}$$

Figure 5.1: Party Family EU Positions 1984-2002



Note: Data is from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey 1984-2002.

By comparing party family means of both datasets, consistency has been demonstrated


that regional parties were pro-European as the mainstream families and not that the pact agreements including policy issues specified to the autonomous communities (Heller 2002). Participating in this conservative coalition may have convinced the party experts of a slight temporary deterioration of the EU agenda for the regional parties at this time. Although this small decline in EU support exists, the regional party mean never goes as low as the other fringe parties of the radical left, radical right and greens.

Data

Next, I will determine if this pro-European sentiment within regional parties runs consistent with the Comparative Manifestos Project data. EU positions within the manifesto data are calculated based upon the difference between two policy score values. In other terms, the EU position score is the value of the manifesto percentage of Positive EU coded statements minus the percentage of negative EU statements. Observing Figure 5.2 we can gain an overall sense of EU policy preferences within the manifestos by party family for the time period of 1990 to 2003. Here we can see that the regional parties score remains as pro-European as the other four mainstream party families, while the other fringe parties either show negative European statements, as seen with the radical right and left, or very few positive statements, as with the greens.

will be explained further in the chapter

Figure 5.2 1990-2003 Mean Manifesto EU Positions



Note: Data is taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project.

By comparing party family means of both datasets, consistency has been demonstrated that regional parties are as pro-European as the mainstream families and not similar to the other fringe parties on the European issue thus giving evidence to support Hypothesis 5.1.

Regression Analysis of the Comparative Manifestos Project Data

The means comparison only explains either the relationship between EU position and time as in Figure 5.1 or the overall EU position summarised over a larger time period as in Figure 5.2. To further my comparison with earlier studies I test an OLS regression model accounting for the strength of party family positioning on EU support. As the dependent variable is continuous, OLS regression will not only demonstrate the effect of each of the independent variables but will also be useful in obtaining the predicted value of the dependent variable given set values of the independent variable.⁹ However unlike the mentioned researchers who run their models based on the expert survey data, I attempt to make a comparable model using the Comparative Manifesto Project data.

⁹ The dependent variable being EU manifesto score and independent variable being party family. This will be explained further in the chapter.

Comparing the results of both datasets will either strengthen or weaken the claims of predicting EU position based on party family as well as determining if regional parties are as consistent as mainstream on the European issue. In addition by using the manifestos data, it will be possible to measure the effects which other policies have on party EU support. This is not possible with the Chapel Hill survey as European integration is the sole policy area in which the survey focuses on.

The dependent variable used in the analysis will be the value of the difference between positive and negative EU statements, as used in the above means comparison. The party positions within the data set vary greatly from the most pro-European party, the Danish V Liberals with a score of 25.7, to the most anti-European party, the Danish People's Party with a score of -13.7.¹⁰

The primary independent variables used in the model are based on each party family. A dummy variable is assigned to each manifesto observation assigning a value of 1 if it belongs to the party family and 0 if it does not. The reference category provided for the party families is the far left family. Choosing a party family likely to be Euroskeptical will present a series of positive values for comparison, increasing the more positive the party family evaluates integration when compared to the far left parties. Dummy variables for member-states are also included to account for national contexts. Here, Denmark has been used as the reference category. In accordance with Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002) Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007), I expect party family to be the strongest predictors in the model. In addition, I estimate that the party family positions will look similar to those in Figure 5.2. This test will moreover determine the strength of the regional party family's pro-European position. A significant and larger regression coefficient than the other so called "fringe" parties will demonstrate that regional parties remain consistent towards their pro-European stance. A dichotomous variable for election year was also included in the model but not presented in the below table due to lack of space. The regression coefficients for year are available in the appendix in Table 5.4.

¹⁰ As Denmark contains both the most pro-EU as well as anti-EU parties, it serves as a good candidate to stand as the reference category for the country dummies which will be included in the model.

A number of other independent variables have also been included in the model. *Left/right ideology* is a variable score coding the difference of the sum of several right emphasised policies minus left emphasised policies (Budge and Klingemann 2001: 19-24). As Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) have demonstrated political ideology to have a positive effect the closer a party is to the centre I would expect this variable to have a minimal effect. I have also included *Free Market Economy* evaluating the number of statements a manifesto has positively mentioned the issues of an open economy.¹¹ This variable is included to capture the economic aspects of European integration. The more positive a party is to the free market, the more positive it should evaluate the EU. In consideration of a party's electorate, I have included demographic variables. *Labour Class +*, *Farmers +* and *Middle Class +* are all scores based on positive statements for each of these economic groups. I would expect farmer and middle class support to be positively correlated with EU support as both groups gain a number of benefits from EU integration.¹² I would expect labour groups to be less favourable towards a free market economy due to national protectionism thus less likely to support integration. *Multiculturalism* and *National Patriotism* have also been included. Parties positively mentioning non-economic groups and multiculturalism should have a positive relationship with integration while national patriotism should have a negative relationship. *Decentralisation* has also been included in the model as one of the key variables of interest. I would expect parties supporting higher levels of decentralisation to more likely favour the multilevel structure of governance of the European Union thus having a positive relationship with integration support. *Parliamentary Seat Percentage* represents the percent of seats a party has in the national parliament. I would expect for parties that have little or no seats in parliament to be more favourable to integration as Europe provides another level of participation in policy making. Larger parties that have the possibility of forming the national government at some point in time are expected to see Europe as a threat of authority. Lastly to account for parties that are adapted to the multilevel governance structure I have included Hooghe and Marks' (2001: 191-206) regional governance variable. The variable is a combination of various scores relating to constitutional federalism, special territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government and regional elections

¹¹ A correlation matrix was assessed after the OLS test in order to check multi-collinearity between *Free Market Economy* and *left/right position*. The correlation coefficient between the two variables was -0.45, far enough from -1 not to raise any serious collinearity issues.

¹² Various benefits for the middle class may include investment opportunities while farmers may receive subsidies which would encourage a favourable opinion of the EU.

accumulating to a total score based on 0 to 12 scale.¹³ The *Regional Governance* variable will account for parties which compete in countries with higher or lower levels of multilevel governance. I would expect that parties within a stronger multilevel governance state will be more inclined to view the European Union positively as these parties are more accustomed to the multiple tier system of authority.

Table 5.1 displays the strengths of the predictor variables from the OLS regression test. It can be seen that the party family variables are amongst the strongest predictors of positive EU evaluations. Each main stream party family displays statistical significance while the other fringe parties do not. The exception to this however is within the Regionalists party family which displays statistical significance while maintaining a higher regression coefficient than the Socialists and the Christian Democrats, giving further support for Hypothesis 5.1. Amongst the national dummy variables only Austria displays any statistical significance. Few of the remaining independent variables displayed significance. While *Left/Right Ideology* showed no statistical significance *Free Market Economy* did so perhaps displaying the strength of economic ideology when evaluating economic integration as opposed to the other social elements that contribute to political ideology. This component may contribute to why the Conservative party family obtained the highest regression coefficient among the party families. A further investigation of conservative parties within their national locations may give insight to this phenomenon. Both *Labour* and *Farmers* displayed a negative relationship. This may be attributed to Juan Diez Medrano's (2001: 45) research of public opinion towards European integration in Spain where he found that within farming regions, where the EU may provide benefits such as subsidies, quotas presented a larger cost to the individuals within these regions. Quotas add direct competition with other farming regions around the EU thus breaking down the local agricultural tradition within certain regions. Interestingly *Internationalism* displays a negative relationship with EU position. This may be due to parties insisting that foreign affairs should remain at the state level as opposed to a higher level of governance. Unsurprisingly,

¹³ Hooghe and Marks (2001: 191-206) attempt to account for changes in subnational governance over time by observing each state's subnational governance in ten year intervals. For this study I have used the scores given at 1990 and 2000 only. For any changes in scores between these two years I carefully evaluated the year any significant change took place and adjusted the score accordingly. Furthermore Hooghe and Marks have not included Luxembourg in their evaluation thus it has also been left out of below model.

Table 5.1: OLS Regression of Party Manifesto EU Policy

Independent Variable	β	(S.E.)
<i>Party Family</i>		
Socialists	2.771**	(0.704)
Liberals	3.195**	(0.811)
Christian Democrats	2.825**	(0.784)
Conservatives	3.116**	(0.979)
Greens	0.979	(0.732)
Far Right	-0.389	(1.051)
Regionalists	2.941**	(0.973)
<i>Member State</i>		
Sweden	-0.913	(1.051)
Finland	-0.994	(1.189)
Belgium	-5.595	(4.150)
Netherlands	-0.897	(1.488)
France	0.003	(2.401)
Italy	-1.058	(2.092)
Spain	-2.835	(4.081)
Greece	-1.654	(1.286)
Portugal	-1.146	(1.421)
Germany	-3.337	(4.962)
Austria	-7.329 ⁺	(3.922)
Great Britain	0.424	(1.256)
Ireland	-0.159	(1.253)
Parliamentary Seat %	1.422	(1.535)
Left/Right Ideology	-0.026	(0.017)
Free Market Economy	0.165**	(0.051)
Labour Class +	-0.200*	(0.085)
Farmers +	-0.207**	(0.075)
Middle Class +	-0.287	(0.219)
Internationalism	-0.201 ⁺	(0.144)
Multiculturalism	0.143 ⁺	(0.074)
National Patriotism	-0.077 ⁺	(0.092)
Decentralisation	-0.014	(0.059)
Regional Governance	0.866 ⁺	(0.522)
R ²	0.374	
Adj R ²	0.291	
N	375	


⁺ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Note: Far Left and Denmark used as reference categories. Dummies provided for manifesto year not included in table are available in Appendix Table 5.3.

National Patriotism displayed a negative relationship while *Multiculturalism* showed a statistically significant positive relationship.

The Hooghe and Marks *Regional Governance* variable also displayed a statistically significant positive relationship strengthening the argument that regionalism within states may contribute to a more favourable opinion of the European level of governance

Figure 5.3: Multilevel Governance Predicted Manifesto EU Support Score



Note: Predicted Values obtained from OLS model presented in Table 5.1.

amongst parties. Although the Multilevel governance variable is not specific to regional parties alone, it does emphasise the strength regional level politics may play in relation to supporting a further European level of governance. The relationship between levels of governance in a state and party support of the European Union can be further emphasised when observing the high angle of the slope in Figure 5.3.

As levels of multilevel governance increase in a state, so does a party's likelihood of supporting the EU. While *Multilevel Governance* displayed significance *Decentralisation* showed no significance. The high number of insignificant variables may be responsible for the lack of explanatory power of the full model as displayed in the adjusted R^2 value. Nevertheless the strengths of the party family variables should not be overlooked and remain comparable to the previous models using the expert survey.

To further investigate the strength of party family as a predictor of party integration support, Table 5.2 includes the party family predicted value of the dependent variable based on the regression model. The predicted value is calculated based on the results of the OLS model for each party family while the rest of the independent variables are kept at their mean value. The results show that while the Liberals now have the highest

Table 5.2: Predicted Values of EU Position by Party Family

Party Family	Predicted Value of EU Position
Liberals	3.02
Conservatives	2.94
<i>Regionalists</i>	<i>2.77</i>
Christian Democrats	2.65
Socialist	2.60
Greens	0.81
Far Left	-0.17
Far Right	-0.56

value, the Regionalists remain the third highest family thus further demonstrating that Regional parties are likely to be pro-European.


Explaining Regional Party Support for Integration

For a more in depth examination of regional parties I have included a bivariate analysis of EU support versus left/right ideology, cultural differences and decentralisation policy. The analysis will be made using the means of the policy preferences for each party within the 1990-2003 time period from the Comparative Manifestos Project data. Again the manifestos data is used as it provides the ability to observe other party policy positions. By analysing these relationships we can see where each regional party within the dataset stands on particular issues. This analysis will not necessarily give us the strengths of the variables but instead help us map policy preferences by party basis.

As mentioned earlier in the chapter the regional party family is unlike any other as the parties that constitute the regional family are not bound by traditional left/right ideologies but rather by the goal of reforming their domestic political structure around the region of which they function (Hix and Lord 1997: 44). As neither decentralisation nor independence is conventionally placed on the left/right scale, the parties within the regional family are ideologically divided. Therefore it would be of interest to determine if left/right ideology has any linear relationship with EU support. In support of Hypothesis 5.2, I would expect to see a minimal relationship amongst the parties.


Figure 5.4 displays the left/right positioning of the regional parties for the Comparative Manifesto Project data. When observing the mean line, it has a slight positive slope as the left/right score becomes more conservative. This effect is similar in comparing with the conservative parties which were the most pro-European family in both the means comparison and regression model. As we can see however, most regional parties are

Figure 5.4: Regional Party EU Policy vs. Political Ideology¹⁴



Note: All data taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project


Figure 5.5: Regional Party EU Policy vs. Language Difference Score



Note: EU policy score is taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project. Language difference score is based on index developed by Fearon and Van Houten (1998) and examined further by Van Houten (2000).

¹⁴ Please refer to Table 5.3 in the appendix or the acronyms list in the beginning of the dissertation for full party names for Figures 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 in the appendix.

Figure 5.6: Regional Party EU Policy vs. Decentralisation Policy



Note: All data taken from the Comparative Manifestos Project

gathered around the centre/left of the ideological spectrum. This supports Hypothesis 5.2 showing the centrism of the party family of which Hix and Lord (Hix and Lord 1997: 44) suggest is formed as many regional parties consist of members from the left and right thus forming a centrist position. The most noticeable outliers are that of the Galician National Bloc (BNG) and the Basque National Party (PNV-EAJ). While centre-left, the BNG does contain many Marxist/leftist members causing the party to be highly suspicious of integration claiming the adverse effects Europe has had on Galician agriculture and ship-building. The PNV on the other hand favours all aspects of integration and has used Europe to its benefit decreasing their claims for full independence in exchange for Basque independence within a federal Europe (Keating 2000).

While ideology may be a weaker explanation, cultural differences may contribute to understating regional party support for European integration. As noted in Chapter 3 many regionalists movements have been based upon cultural identity and the region's historic cultural differences from the nation-state which contribute to regional mobilisation for autonomy. For a cultural difference comparison I measured EU support against the language difference score developed by Fearon and Van Houten (1998) and examined further by Van Houten (2000). It is based on comparing regional language families to the language family spoken in the nation-state's capital. While the regional language does not necessarily have to be spoken throughout the region, the

variable is designed to capture a sense of historic cultural differences of which regions within a given member-state may possess. Based on a 0 to 1 scale, those languages closer to 1 will be more distinct to the primary language of the region's member-state.¹⁵

By observing the mean line in Figure 5.5 we can see a positive slope between language difference and EU support giving evidence of Hypothesis 5.3, that regional parties in culturally different regions will be more inclined to support integration. The parties with the languages most different from their member-state are within the Basque Country of Spain and the Swedish speaking regions of Finland. Towards the centre lie the parties of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Flanders while the parties within regions that speak languages closer to their member-state are from Catalonia, The Canary Islands, Andalusia, Aragon and the regions of Northern Italy represented by the Northern League. This figure gives some support to the notion that regions can find solace in the idea of a Europe of the cultures, where Europe can help protect the minority cultures and languages of larger nation-states (Keating 1998: 163-164). This is strongly demonstrated with both Basque parties of the Basque National Party (PNV-EAJ) and Eusko Alkartasuna (EA). Referring back to Figure 5.4 both these parties differ vastly on the ideology scale with the PNV-EAJ being centrist and the EA on the far left. Both however display high levels of EU policy preference albeit the PNV-EAJ is much higher.

Lastly, EU policy preferences will be compared to decentralisation preferences. As noted earlier, several parties have used EU integration as a means to promote decentralisation within their nation-states; the Scottish National Party and the Basque National Party are key examples (Keating 2000; Dardanelli 2005). As Keating notes, there have been two types of reactions towards Europe by the regional parties, the first

¹⁵ The values for each language are based on language families as defined by Grimes (1996) in Fearon and Van Houten (Fearon and Van Houten 1998) and Van Houten (2000). Each language is classified by sub-groups, for example Castilian Spanish is categorised as "Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian" and Catalan is categorised as "Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, East Iberian". A value is assigned at the level the regional language splits from the language spoken in the capital. In this example Catalan splits from Castilian (as Castilian is the language spoken in Madrid) after "Ibero-Romance" or the 8th level, thus Catalan receives a language family score of 8. Those regions that speak the same language as that in the capital receive a value of 10, the highest level of sub categories. The language family score is then inversed to create a score between 0.1 and 1 measuring language difference. In the above example Catalonia would receive a *Language Difference* score of 0.125 (1 divided by 8) and Madrid a score of 0.1 (1 divided by 10). Another example would be Basque, a language so unique that it splits at the first level. The language family score for Basque would then be 1 and its *Language Difference* score would also be 1 (1 divided by 1).

is opposition to integration as a European level of governance may hinder democratic control of the region, and the second a more pro-European stance as Europe can be seen as a mechanism to gain autonomy from the nation-state (Keating 1998: 163). While the prior of the two positions decreased by the end of the 1970s skepticism still remains within a few regional parties. I would expect, as stated in Hypothesis 5.4, to see higher aspirations of decentralisation to increase support for integration as regional parties have demonstrated their strength as a pro-European family.

The mean line of Figure 5.6 shows a slightly positive slope demonstrating a small positive relationship between higher levels of decentralisation policy leading to higher levels of EU support, giving some evidence to support Hypothesis 5.4. It is of no surprise that the values for decentralisation policies are much higher than those of EU policy as this is the primary issue for regionalist parties. The parties that have the highest levels of decentralisation are all from Spanish regions. Again the two largest outliers are the BNG, as mentioned above include a high level of Euroskeptics within the party, and the PNV-EAJ, which has been fruitful in using the EU to its advantage. The Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) posses the highest decentralisation policy level however remains below the mean line. This may be attributed to the ERC primarily being founded as a leftist party. As the ERC may be closer to the far left peripheral of the cleavage hypothesis, it may be less supportive of EU integration (Marks, Wilson and Ray 2002).

Party Positions and Public Opinion towards EU Support


Lastly I will make a comparison of party positions with those of the party electorate in order to test the Hypothesis 5.5 that regional party voters are as inline with their party's position on integration as are the mainstream parties. Here, I simply define the party electorate as those individuals that would vote for any given party if there were to be an upcoming election, as stated within the Eurobarometer surveys. Leonard Ray (2003a) found that party positions influence voter opinions on European integration through a 2-stage least squares model. Ray found several key factors on party influence; first, parties are more persuasive when the given issue is of higher importance. Second, parties are more persuasive when the party demonstrates unity on the issue, and third the closer an individual feels to the party the more likely the party will affect his/her opinion (Ray 2003a: 988). While this may help explain party and electorate positions

for mainstream parties this may not however help explain positions within regional parties. The regional party electorate may not be seen as pro-EU as the regional party they vote for. This might be due to the European issue not being of critical importance to the voters or the regional party elites are not able to define European positions of the party clearly (De Winter and Cachafeiro 2002: 492). I predict however that as the regional party positions remained consistent with the mainstream parties on EU position in the prior analyses, the regional party electorate will demonstrate similar positions as well. In examining this I use the expert survey on party positions along with the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File from the corresponding years of the expert survey. As this analysis is attempting to capture a trend over time, it is necessary to revert back to the Chapel Hill survey as the manifesto data is collected at various intervals depending upon the timing of a member state's election. Furthermore, the Eurobarometer score for EU evaluation is based on a limited scale while the manifesto score has no upper or lower bound limit making it problematic to achieve an accurate comparison. I then take the responses from each data set observing EU position and normalise them on a 0 to 1 scale for comparison. I then compare the means between party and voter for each party family over time.¹⁶

Figure 5.7 displays each party family's party and electorate position. Comparable to positions of the mainstream party families, regional parties and their electorate appear to be closely aligned with one another giving support to Hypothesis 5.5. When observing the other minor parties of the far left, far right and greens, their electorate does not appear to be as inline with the party position. Furthermore, the party elites of the regional parties seem to run slightly higher than that of the electorate up until 1999. This perhaps demonstrates the enthusiasm of regional party leaders using Europe as a mechanism in obtaining their regional policy goals. While this simple graph cannot account for issues such as protest voting it does demonstrate that regional voters are likely to share similar positions as their party on European integration.

¹⁶ Although the Chapel Hill expert survey includes data for 2002, Eurobarometer unfortunately does not ask for vote preference. I have attempted to examine other datasets including the European Values Study and the European Social Survey to include 2002, however none provide adequate responses to continue the analysis past 1999.

Figure 5.7: Party Position vs. Voter Preference



Note: Means normalised from Chapel Hill expert survey on party positioning and Mannheim Eurobarometer Trend File.

Conclusions

The dynamics of regional parties are very complex when compared to that of mainstream and other minor parties. Unlike other party families which largely base their commonalities on political ideologies, regional parties find their common identity on the aspiration to change the domestic political structure in favour of a more autonomous regional level. Therefore this allows the regional family to contain parties, and members, on both ends of the left/right political spectrum. Despite these strong ideological differences however, this seems to have little effect on regional party support towards European integration.

This chapter sought to demonstrate that regional parties are just as pro-European as other mainstream parties. The OLS analysis reiterated the findings of Hooghe, Marks and Wilson (2002), Marks, Wilson and Ray (2000) and Jolly (2007) with the use of the Comparative Manifestos Project data. Here we found party family to be the convincing predictor towards EU integration support. Furthermore, in support of Hypothesis 5.1,

the regional party family had a strong and statistically significant effect comparable to most mainstream parties. The issue of integration remains salient for most regional parties as they gain advantages from the multilevel governance system which Europe provides. When exploring reasons for regional party integration, traditional political ideology as expected showed little correlation with EU support levels supporting Hypothesis 5.2. As regional parties may consist of members from all political ideologies they must formulate their support of integration through other motives. One such motive may be cultural which showed a positive relationship supporting Hypothesis 5.3. This gives some evidence that regional parties may see Europe as a means of protecting regional culture. Decentralisation policy also showed a minimal positive relationship indicating that regional parties view Europe as a means to achieving autonomy within their nation-state. However, when observing the manifesto ratios between European and decentralisation policies it is noticed that European integration still remains a comparatively minor issue for regional parties. Nevertheless there is evidence that European integration may be seen by regional parties as an instrument in achieving regional autonomy. Lastly, through a comparison of party elite and electorate EU positions, it was demonstrated that the regional party electorate is not far adrift from their regional party's position on European integration, supporting Hypothesis 5.5. This can have greater implications on replacing the notion of the regional party as a fringe or protest vote party. The issue of integration is as important to the regional party voter as it is to the party itself.

Understanding regional political parties and their positions towards integration serves as an excellent starting point for understanding regional variations of public opinion towards integration. Regional parties are at the forefront of mobilisation for autonomy as well as representing the needs of the region at both the national and European levels of government. Regional parties encapsulate the characteristics of the region from economy to culture. They help provide an identity which the public can recognise at the regional territorial level. The final analysis within this chapter demonstrated that for regional party supporters European integration can be seen as favourable, benefiting both party and region. But does this sentiment hold up against the wider public and not just regional party supporters? Do Europeans evaluate integration within the regional context in which some of these parties help construct? The following chapters will

attempt to provide explanations of regional variations in integration support amongst the wider European public.

Chapter 6

Regional Economic and Political Indicators of Public Opinion: The Random Intercept Model Approach

Introduction

The previous chapter examined regional party attitudes towards integration and correlated them with the opinion of the regional party supporters. It was demonstrated that regional party supporters share similar opinions on European integration to their party. Chapters 6 and 7 will expand the investigation from regional parties and supporters to an examination of the entire regional public to bring further conclusions as to whether the public and elites look upon Europe similarly. As noted in previous chapters, the vast majority of the literature on public attitudes towards integration overlooks several contexts by which individuals may base their evaluation for integration. In addition, most research focuses on individual and national level indicators to explain support for European integration using OLS and logistic regression as the preferred statistical methods of choice. Described in Chapter 4, multilevel modelling allows the possibility to account for the nested contextual structure in which most survey data lies, however, has been infrequently applied to public opinion research. Chapters 6 and 7 will apply multilevel modelling analysis to account for regional variation within European public opinion.

The purpose of the research in Chapters 6 and 7 is to capture variance among regional level variables in terms of regional economic, political and cultural identity indicators. I predict individuals of regions that are economically, politically and culturally distinct will be more inclined to evaluate the EU positively as it advances autonomy away from the nation-state. The basis of this argument relies on the concept of 'new regionalism' as regions are splintering away from the nation-state in terms of autonomy. The process of decentralisation allows regions to take a more self-determined role confronting globalisation thus fostering regional economic, political and, in some instances, cultural identity.

The following two chapters utilise multilevel modelling techniques to explain regional European integration support. This chapter focuses on a sample from the EU15 and explores the role of individual, regional and country level indicators and variations as well as a further analysis of democratic satisfaction, economic expectations and employment expectations within group level contexts. Chapter 7 will explore subnational assertiveness as well as regional level variations on territorial attachments within a sample of six member-states.

This chapter will focus on economic and political indicators at the national, regional and individual levels. I will examine the strength of regional and national level economic and political indicators in a multilevel analysis and demonstrate that the regional level does contribute to group level variation and helps strengthen the explanatory power of the model. I will also focus on three individual level variables, democratic satisfaction, economic expectations and employment expectations, and show that each influences EU opinion differently when examined in the contextual levels. The chapter will begin with a brief description of previous research using similar variables to those chosen for the statistical models in this chapter. It will follow with an explanation of the methodology including a description of the random intercept model as well as an overview of the datasets. Lastly the results of the models will be presented followed by the chapter conclusions.

Economic Indicators and Public Support for European Integration

Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the literature on public attitudes towards European integration. The following two sections recount some of the previous works utilising economic and political indicators which will be applied within the models of this chapter. Many scholars have attempted to analyse the link between public economic outlook and its influence on EU support. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) shaped their theoretical framework from theories of economic voting. Their theory stated that current economic conditions in the nation-state would in turn influence one's view of governing institutions at both the national and supranational level. They conceptualised that European integration remains part of the domestic political debate thus any benefits that would arise from integration are promoted as advantages it would

provide the nation. Eichenberg and Dalton (1993: 512) focus on gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rates and inflation. GDP measures the overall wealth of a country and should positively affect support for integration the larger a state's GDP. Unemployment and inflation measure economic hardship of a country and should therefore reflect a negative relation on support as these figures increase. As a result of their study, they found limited evidence that economic conditions actually influence EU support. Only inflation displayed any level of statistical significance in their outcome.

In contrast Gabel and Whitten (1997) demonstrated that it is the 'subjective' economy, as perceived by the EU citizens, and not the 'objective' economy as measured by economic indicators that influences support for integration. Consequently, EU support draws on the public's perception of their personal and national economic welfare. Gabel and Whitten (1997) differ from Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) in the hypotheses of micro and macro-economics but also in modifying the economic voting model to include regional and sub-national economic conditions. Economic conditions are never clearly constant throughout a state. Regions need to be measured separately to show discrepancies of national EU support within economic perceptions. Much of this argument is based on Weatherford's (1983) finding that local unemployment conditions in the United States influenced individual support of the President's economic policies. In turn, when Gabel and Whitten (1997) applied this voting model to their study they were able to achieve a clearer picture of individual perceptions on their personal economic welfare.

Based on the above discussion the following hypotheses have been derived to investigate both objective and subjective economic explanations of regional variation in public attitudes of integration:

Hypothesis 6.1: Individuals within economically stronger regions are more likely to support European integration than individuals within economically weaker regions.

As Eichenberg and Dalton (1993) stated it would be expected that individuals within wealthier countries would be more inclined to support the EU as they may potentially benefit from the free market. This concept may also be applied to wealthier regions. Those within wealthier regions may find the European free market beneficial in

attracting European industry to invest within the region. Higher levels of regional wealth would enable the region to be better suited to compete in the free market while poorer regions may find economic competition unmanageable thus more likely to rely on the nation-state. Economic well-being of a region will be measured by GDP and unemployment rates explained further in the chapter.

Hypothesis 6.2: Individuals will more likely base their overall economic perceptions at the regional level rather than the national level when assessing EU support.

This hypothesis will reevaluate Gabel and Whitten's (1997) investigation of subjective economic evaluations. The effect is expected to be a positive relationship, as positive expectations of the economy and employment levels increase support levels of integration will also increase. The hypothesis however estimates at which level individuals will base their economic evaluations. I predict, as regional economies within a country differ, the public may be more aware of the economic conditions in which they experience in their daily lives. Thus, individuals may be more likely to evaluate economic conditions within a regional context, the closest contextual level in which they are nested, to determine if European integration would be beneficial.

National Political Indicators and Public Support for European Integration

National politics serves as an additional indicator for public evaluations of European integration. Several argue that citizens do not have enough information to make independent evaluations of the EU (Janssen 1991; Anderson 1998). Therefore the public uses what is familiar and evaluates the EU in terms of domestic politics. Anderson (1998) argues that individuals with positive evaluations of the national government and institutions will most likely lead to positive evaluations of European integration. In contradiction, by examining public support towards EU institutions, Sanchez-Cuenca (2000) found that EU support is highest when citizens view EU institutions positively and their national institutions negatively. If a national government seems to perform negatively while the EU institutions meet a citizen's satisfaction, the cost of shifting authority to the EU will not exceed the benefits.

Political judgment of the nation-state can lead to diverse evaluations of the EU. Kritzinger (2003) demonstrated that support for the EU can be a symbolic protest against “the dominant values of the nation-state” (Kritzinger 2003: 226). For Kritzinger, the concept of individual support is based upon two approaches. The first is that individuals who have fewer ties to the national political order have less commitment to the politics of the nation-state and are more likely to take chances with political institutions at different levels (Kronhauser 1959). The second is that those with stronger ties to the national political system have a greater psychological limit that must be overcome before protesting against the national political institutions (Rohrschneider 1990). Therefore a positive evaluation of the EU and a negative evaluation of the political nation-state can occur simultaneously. In Kritzinger’s (2003) research, she statistically compared four EU member-states (France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom) to demonstrate that EU evaluation and support strongly relies on the performance of the nation-state. All four member-states demonstrate that negative perceptions of the national government result in positive attitudes towards EU integration. When evaluating the national government’s economic management, France and the United Kingdom showed higher support for EU integration in stronger economic conditions whereas Germany and Italy showed negative support for EU integration (Kritzinger 2003). The French and British are more likely to trust their respective national governments to manage the economy during lower economic performance whereas Germany and Italy are more likely to trust the EU.

Based upon the above discussion of political evaluations, in addition to the conceptions of multilevel governance described in the previous chapters, the following hypotheses have been developed to examine domestic political indicators and their influence on regional variations of European support:

Hypothesis 6.3: Individuals within countries with stronger levels of regional governance will more likely support European integration than individuals in countries with weaker levels of regional governance.

As described in Chapter 3, the European Union is establishing a multileveled system of governance. As the EU pulls authority from the nation-state from above, regional mobilisation based within the concept of new regionalism is demanding to pull authority from the nation-state from below. In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that

political parties are more likely to favour integration if they already participate within a domestic multilevel system of governance. Does this sentiment hold true for the wider European public? I would predict that individuals residing within countries with higher levels of regional governance will more likely be adapted to a multilevel governance system. Therefore, these individuals will be less hesitant in accepting the transfer of authority to the additional level of the European Union.

Hypothesis 6.4: Individuals will equally base their overall democratic perceptions at the regional and national levels when assessing EU support.

Multilevel governance and decentralisation may have potential impact on the public's evaluation of national democracy. New regionalism and the process of decentralisation differ not only between countries but at times between regions within the same country. The United Kingdom and Spain are both prime examples of where regional mobilisation exists only in certain regions in addition to an imbalance of powers between the different regions. Even in federal countries like Germany higher levels of regional mobilisation still exist in some regions such as Bavaria. Because of this imbalance of either regional mobilisation and/or decentralisation I would expect individuals to evaluate national democracy dependent upon the region in which they live. Those within regions of higher mobilisation levels and/or higher levels of political autonomy may be more inclined to support the multilevel governance nature of the European Union.

The Random Intercept Model

One of the major contributions made in this, and the following chapter, is the use of the multilevel statistical model. Individuals are typically members of nested communities and can be influenced by the contextual settings that surround them. For example, a person may be within a family, within a neighbourhood, within a city, within a country and so on. Each of these clusters has the potentiality of affecting one's outlook on any given subject. The multilevel model takes a given variable and accounts for the group aspect which may contribute to its explanatory power on the dependent variable (Snijders and Bosker 1999).

As noted in Chapter 4 on the methodology of this dissertation, the use of multilevel modelling in the realms of political science has been rather limited. Though used

infrequently in earlier political research, Steenbergen and Jones' (2002) made a strong argument for using multilevel modelling by comparing it with OLS regression in an analysis of public EU support using country, political party and individuals as the nested structure of the data. When compared to the OLS model, they demonstrate that the multilevel model can help avoid inaccurate parameters in the estimation. Other notable research using multilevel modelling includes Rohrschneider's (2002) analysis of EU support and the democratic deficit, Peffley and Rohrschneider's (2003) work on political tolerance, Hooghe and Marks' (2004; 2005) work on explaining EU support through identity and economic calculations, and Duch and Stevenson's (2005) examination of economic voting in elections. In most of the above mentioned research country, and some instances political party, were the chosen clustered groups.

The multilevel model takes these nested structures into account by adding additional error terms (one more per level) into the regression equation (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 38). This chapter deals with the simpler type of multilevel model, the random intercept model, while the following chapter will explore integration support through the hierarchical linear model which includes random slopes. For the purposes of this research, the individual level is level-1, while the region and country levels are level-2 and level-3 respectively. More detail of the nested structure pertaining to this chapter will be explained below.

The random intercept model takes into account that the mean of the dependent variable is different for each group. The following equation for a two-level model reflects that the intercept (β_{0j}) is dependent on the group while the regression coefficient ($\beta_1\chi_{ij}$) for the explanatory variable remains constant:¹

(6.1)

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_1\chi_{ij} + R_{ij}$$

Here, Y_{ij} is the dependent variable for individual i in group j while χ_{ij} is the explanatory variable at the individual level. In addition is R_{ij} , the error at the individual

¹ The following equations and notation that will be used in this and the following chapter are taken from Snijders and Bosker (1999: 38-66)

level (level-1). The intercept (β_{0j}) can then be broken down into the average intercept and group (level-2) deviation shown in equation 6.2

(6.2)

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j}$$

By placing Equation 6.2 in place of the intercept in equation 6.1, equation 6.3 is created stating that the “values U_{0j} are the main effects of the groups: conditional on an individual having a given X -value and being in group j , the Y -value is expected to be U_{0j} higher than in the average group” (Snijders and Bosker 1999: 42):

(6.3)

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}X_{ij} + U_{0j} + R_{ij}$$

While the above two-level equation is a basic notation for the simplest random intercept model, this research involves three levels when explaining European integration support, the individual (level-1), the region (level-2) and country (level-3). Equation 6.4 adds the level-3 (k) terms and deviation to equation 6.3, where V_{00k} represents the main effects of the groups conditional on an individual having a given X -value and being within level-2 group j within the level-3 group k :

(6.4)

$$Y_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{100}X_{ijk} + V_{00k} + U_{0jk} + R_{ijk}$$

This equation will be used in more detail below following the discussion of the selected variables.

The Data

The dataset used for the models in this chapter is the Eurobarometer 63.4 Survey, conducted in 2005 and contains the then 25 total member-states of the European Union, although the additional Central and Eastern European member-states were included in

the dataset I have chosen to analyse only the original first 15 member states.² The basis of this sample was chosen to limit the analysis to member-states with similar historical economic and political experience upon entry into the European Union as well as methodological restraints including properly coding each country's region and gathering regional GDP and unemployment data. The total sample size after removing observations with any missing values is 14,978. The economic indicators for regional/national GDP and unemployment were taken from the European Union's official statistics administration Eurostat.³ The economic figures are for the year 2004 which at the time of this research were the most up to date statistics available (further discussion below).

As explained in Chapter 1, the meaning of region can be quite ambiguous. It can refer to simple geographical boundaries outlined by natural borders or territory defined by the peoples that inhabit it. For the purposes of this dissertation I begin the basis of my definition of region with the work of Pieter Van Houten (2003). Where Van Houten (2003: 124) defines the region simply as "the administrative level immediately below the national state", I go further in allocating these administrative levels regional status through the definition outlined in Chapter 1.⁴ The total number of regions for the analysis in this chapter is 148.

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable is an index scale combining the following three questions from the Eurobarometer survey:

Generally speaking, do you think that [our country's] membership of the European Union is a bad thing, neither good nor bad thing, or a good thing?

² Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

³ Data available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.

⁴ The subnational administrative regions of England are a bit ambiguous as it is divided purely for administrative purposes although several attempts have occurred at creating stronger regional authority, particularly in the Northeast. As the European Commission recognises each English region each will be used in this research. Furthermore, due to the constraints of Eurobarometer's sample coding, some member states' regions are slightly unclear as Eurobarometer does not include coding for all administrative regions. This is the case for Sweden and Denmark in which the historical regions are included in this analysis. Furthermore Eurobarometer combines the Italian regions of the Aosta Valley and Piedmont as well as Molise and Abruzzo. Due to this circumstance these four regions will have to be treated as two combined regions that I identify as "Piedmont and the Aosta Valley" and "Molise and Abruzzo".

In five years time would you like the European Union to play a less important role, the same role, or a more important role in your daily life?

In general, does the European Union conjure up for you a very negative, fairly negative, neutral, fairly positive or very positive image?

The above questions were selected as each measures a different aspect of attitudes towards EU integration. The first asks the respondent to evaluate the EU relating to the benefits his or her country has received from membership, a more overall objective evaluation. The second question is more subjective asking the role the EU should play in his/her life. Lastly the third measures the respondent's overall image of the EU. The basis of this index is similar to that of Hooghe and Marks' (2004) and Steenbergen and Jones' (2002) dependent variable scaled index. The variable is effective because it measures several aspects of what integration support may represent to an individual. The first question relates the EU to one's country, the second relates the EU to the individual on a more personal level and the third question asks an overall perception of the EU. Other researchers such as Gabel and Whitten (1997) have used two questions relating to membership and unification to create an index variable, however, with the addition of a third question the index should gain reliability. The responses for each of the questions were first coded for 1 to equal the most negative response, while adding a value of 1 for each response thereafter in positive categorical order, thus higher values are stronger pro-European responses. As the scales for each variable differ, all three variables were standardised so each has equal weight to a shared scale of 0 to 1 using the following formula:⁵

$$Z_i = \frac{Y_i - \text{lower bound of } Y}{\text{upper bound of } Y - \text{lower bound of } Y}$$

The scores for each respondent were then summed, divided by 3 and multiplied by 10 to create an index scale of 0 to 10. Those with a higher index score are more pro-European while smaller index values are more adverse to integration.

There has been much contention in all realms of statistical survey research on how to treat the 'don't know' responses in the dependent variable. One common practice has

⁵ i = individual respondent, Z = Rescaled variable, Y = original variable

been to remove the 'don't know' responses from the analysis using listwise deletion. When using large data sets such as Eurobarometer listwise deletion can seem to be an understandable approach. However, it is possible that some information will be lost if these observations are removed. In Gabel's (1998c) test he runs his models both including the 'don't knows', coding with the median value as ambivalent, and excluding them using listwise deletion finding little difference in his results. Carey (2002) ran his models using listwise deletion, imputed data, as well as coding the 'don't knows' in the 'neither good nor bad' ambivalent category, finding little variation. Both these studies can be seen as demonstrating that 'don't know' can be seen as an ambivalent response. I tested each of my models using both listwise deletion and recoding the 'don't knows' as the neutral response for each of the above questions and have found the results for both methods to be similar. As a result, I have included the 'don't knows' in the analysis. All respondents with missing values, however, for any used variable, have been left out.

The Explanatory Variables

As noted earlier, the multilevel analysis is divided into two chapters. This chapter evaluates democracy and economic effects on support for European integration while the following chapter examines territorial attachments and regional mobilisation. In order to remain consistent, both chapters use the same variables for the models with the exception of an additional variable on regional assertiveness which will be introduced in the next chapter. The below descriptions will detail the main variables of interest for this chapter only while including a brief description of the control variables. The remaining variables will be described in more depth in the next chapter.

As I have discussed in the above review of the previous literature, a large amount of public opinion research on European integration focuses on economic indicators. As I am attempting to determine the strengths of regional variance, my regional economy model includes macro-economic variables to capture the regional economic situation's influence on integration support. As mentioned throughout the dissertation, much of the previous literature concentrates on macro-economic indicators at the national level (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Duch and Taylor 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Kritzing 2003). I have included several of the same national level indicators used in

previous research as well as additionally including the regional indicator to compare the levelled strengths of the effect.

The first economic variable in the model is *GDP*.⁶ In previous literature measuring public attitudes towards European integration at the aggregated national level, GDP was used as an indicator of economic well-being and an overall global measure of the national living standard (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993: 513). GDP however may take an additional form when investigating new regionalism. As has been stated previously within new regionalism's definition, it is the regional reaction towards globalisation and confronting the global market (Keating 1997; 1998). It has been hypothesised that regions which are better equipped for the competitiveness of the global market, that being economically stronger regions, are more likely to have higher levels of regional assertiveness (Gourevitch 1979: 319). In addition Van Houten (2003) provided evidence within his model that higher levels of regional GDP provide more favourable conditions for higher levels of regional assertiveness. As Chapter 5 established that regional party elites are likely to favour European integration, individuals within economically stronger regions may likely reflect this sentiment as well recognising the region's ability to compete and benefit from the European market. Therefore it is predicted that higher levels of *Regional GDP* will lead to higher levels of EU support. At the national level, in consistency with Eichenberg and Dalton's (1993: 513) hypothesis, countries with a higher standard of living and a stronger economic well-being are more likely to benefit from the European market thus higher levels of *National GDP* are also likely to lead to higher levels of EU support.

In addition to GDP as an indicator of economic well-being, I have also included *Unemployment* for both the regional and national levels.⁷ Although in previous studies national unemployment has been found to be insignificant (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Duch and Taylor 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997), I believe that regional unemployment levels may display stronger significance as unemployment levels vary throughout each member state and individuals may be more likely to evaluate unemployment within the community level closest to them. As the Eurobarometer survey was conducted in 2005, all economic figures are from the year 2004 and were taken from the Eurostat online database. The 2004 data is used as the figures represent

⁶ *GDP* is measured in 'millions of Euros' by Eurostat and then is transformed to natural log.

⁷ *Unemployment* is measured by percent of unemployed persons as a share of the active population.

a full year thus the 2005 data would not represent the point in time in which the survey was conducted. In addition this is also to account for the potential time-lag in which the public use economic stimuli to influence their attitudes.

As displayed by Gabel and Palmer (1995) individuals may evaluate integration in terms of a costs and benefits analysis. Therefore, I would expect those that are able to observe the direct benefits of the EU are more likely to support integration. Many economic benefits of the EU are highlighted at the regional level. For example, I have included a dichotomous variable for *Objective 1 Region* assigning the value of 1 to individuals residing in an Objective 1 region and a value of 0 if they are not.⁸ Regions that are designated Objective 1 are those in most need of the European Union's Regional Policy, which transfers resources from wealthier to poorer regions. Objective 1 qualify as poorer economic status and receive financial benefits from the EU in order to reduce regional economic disparities. I expect individuals residing in an Objective 1 region will more likely see the regional benefits from EU policy. Therefore I expect the variable to have a positive relationship with support of integration.

In addition to objective economic variables I have also included objective political variables in an attempt to measure the political characteristics of the regions and the countries they exist in. The first of which is a national level variable measuring the overall strength of regional governance within the country. The *Regional Governance* variable is taken from Hooghe and Marks' (2001: 191-212) attempt to quantify the level of regional democracy within the EU member-states. They base their overall value for each country on the summed scores of four criteria: Constitutional federalism, special territorial autonomy, role of regions in central government and regional elections. The overall scale is between 0 and 12 where higher scores equal countries with higher levels of regional governance. I would predict that countries with higher levels of regional governance are more likely to be accustomed to a multilevel system of governance. Therefore, individuals within countries with a higher *Regional Governance* score will be more likely to accept transferring authority to a higher level of governance, thus will be more likely to support European integration.

⁸ The Objective 1 regions are referenced according to the European Commission covered for the years 2000-2006. Full list available from the European Commission website: ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/objective1/index_en.htm

The last objective political variable relevant to this chapter is *Regional Party*. Pieter Van Houten (2003) included a similar variable measuring the electoral performance of regional parties within regionally assertive regions. While Van Houten attempted to capture the strength of electoral performance, I simplify the variable to summarise the highest level of governance a regional party has been elected. The three possible outcomes are the regional assembly/parliament, the national parliament or no elected regional party. I have defined regional party according to Hix and Lord (1997: 44) as parties within a subnational territory attempting the goal of reforming their domestic political structure around the region of which they function.⁹ To code the variable, I referred to the previous national and regional (if a regional assembly exists) election results to the time of the Eurobarometer survey.¹⁰ A region where the highest level of governance that a regional party obtained a seat is the regional assembly a value of 1 was designated. A region where the highest level the regional party sits is the national parliament a value of 2 was designated. All other regions where regional parties either do not exist or are not elected to the national or subnational governments are designated 0. In order to obtain a comparable effect of the different regional party governance levels I then transformed the *Regional Party* variable into a dummy variable for each category. In the analysis regions without regional parties elected to any level of governance are the reference category. I would expect to see elected regional parties to both regional and national parliaments to have a positive effect on integration support, as regional elites benefit from the participation in governance and are better able to promote their position towards European integration.

Additionally I will be examining three subjective indicators used to measure an individual's perception of domestic economy and democracy. In order to compare concrete economic figures with the perception of the state of the national economy I have included two variables referring to the overall national economy and employment perception similar to those used by Gabel and Whiten (1997). The two questions are as follows:

What are your expectations for the next twelve months: will the next twelve months be better, worse or the same when it comes to...?

⁹ Refer to Hix and Lord (1997: 46-47) for a complete list of regional parties within the European Union.

¹⁰ The Centre d'Étude de la Vie Politique at the Université Libre de Bruxelles conveniently created a database of regional and national election results from each European state available at dev.ulb.ac.be/cevipol/en/elections.html

1. The economic situation in (our country)
2. The employment situation in (our country)

The responses are coded 1 for “worse”, 2 for “same” and 3 for “better”. Eurobarometer does not include any questions asking the respondent to make any evaluations at the regional level. Although the above questions refer to the national level, additional models will be conducted exploring the multilevel context of these evaluations. These models will include the national and regional means as well as the between country and between regions of the same country variation of the means. The strengths of these coefficients can explain at which of these levels the effect of the variable is strongest giving insight to the context of which individuals generate their evaluations. The state of the economy can vary by region, for example the unemployment rate in Spain in the region of Extremadura is 17.5% while Navarre enjoys a relatively low rate of 5.5%. I would expect the economic perceptions of both these regions to vary significantly. I predict both variables to have a positive significant effect. Furthermore, in the second half of the analysis of this chapter, I expect to view a higher level of significance for both at the regional levels than at the country levels.

In addition to the subjective economy variables I have included one variable measuring *Democratic Satisfaction* using the below question:

On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (our country)?

While Kritzinger’s (2003) analysis attempted to evaluate the perceptions of the current government I attempt to capture the perception of the way democracy works within a country: It is possible this variable goes further than evaluating the present government but rather it is an approval of the democratic norms of the state. As the role of multilevel governance increases in Europe the democratic satisfaction variable should be expected to be significant at both the national and regional levels. Furthermore, where evaluations are made at the national level it is expected those with higher levels of democratic satisfaction will be less likely to transfer authority to a higher level, thus having a negative effect. Conversely, positive evaluations from the regional level will

be made by those conditioned to multilevel governance and more likely to support the European level.

Also included in the model are three variables that will be explored more deeply in the next chapter. The first variable of *opinion leadership* relates to Inglehart's (1970b; 1970a) cognitive mobilisation theory measuring one's interaction in the discussion of politics. It is hypothesised that those with higher levels of *opinion leadership* will view the EU favourably. The second and third variables evaluate territorial attachment at the national and regional level. *Country Attachment* and *Regional Attachment* both are a 4-point scale measuring one's attachment to either territory where higher scores equate to stronger levels of attachment. The predictions and results of these variables are examined in Chapter 7.

Lastly *Age* and *Gender* act as control variables to optimise the effects of the models. According to Deflem and Pampel (1996) age has a significant effect on EU integration. It was hypothesised that older generations' sense of responsibility for the wider community prevail over the younger generations' cosmopolitan ideals. However due to the democratisation of schooling in recent decades, those of a younger generation, who are more likely to have received further education than previous generations, are more likely to support the unification of Europe (Deflem and Pampel 1996). Modern European youth may consider there to be more opportunities with a further integrated Europe thus it is expected that the older one is the less likely he/she is to favour integration. It has been argued that women are more likely to be employed in lower-paid, public sector, part-time or temporary jobs than men. Therefore a downturn in the economy will have a disproportionate affect on men than women, making men more likely to support the EU (Liebert 1999; Nelsen and Guth 2000).

For ease of interpretation it is recommended in multilevel modelling to centre all individual level variables at their group mean, in this case region mean (Snijders and Bosker 1999; Rasbash, Steele, Browne and Prosser 2005).¹¹ This is primarily done for ease of interpretation as the intercept represents the mean value of the explanatory variable.¹² The dependent variable however remains at its 0-10 score.

¹¹ The centred variable is created by subtracting the region mean from the raw score of the respondent.

¹² This is also logistically done to reduce the number of numerical errors that may occur in the MLwiN multilevel modelling software (Rasbash, Steele, Browne and Prosser 2005: 100-101).

The Results

The nested multilevel structure being tested consists of individuals nested within regions, which are nested within countries. In order to test the strength of these levels and validity of the nested structure I have first ran an ANOVA model, also know as an empty model. The ANOVA model is simply a test of the dependent variable ran with only the constant and no explanatory variables, using equation 6.5 below:¹³

(6.5)

$$EU\ SUPPORT_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + V_{00k} + U_{0jk} + R_{ijk}$$

Table 6.1 displays the value of the constant as well as the variance for all three tested levels.¹⁴ Observing the standard errors suggests that all three levels are significant giving evidence that the multilevel structure of the data should be considered. Analysing the ratios of the three level variances will give a better understanding each level plays when observing EU support (Snijders and Bosker 1999). Unsurprisingly the vast majority of variance comes from the individual level where the variance statistic 6.14 makes up nearly 90% of the total variance. The remaining 10% however comes from higher levels that should not be ignored when making conclusions about EU support. The regional level makes up 3% while the remaining 7% is accounted for at the national level. Regional variance accounts for roughly 30% of the group levelled

Table 6.1: EU15 ANOVA

Parameter	Model 1	
	β	(S.E.)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>		
Constant	6.264	(0.192)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
Country-Level var(V_{00k})	0.513	(0.202)
Region-Level var(U_{0jk})	0.173	(0.033)
Individual-Level var(R_{ijk})	6.144	(0.071)
-2 Log Likelihood	69910.610	

¹³ i = individual, j = region and k = country ; γ_{000} = constant

¹⁴ All estimates in this chapter were generated from MLwiN 2.02 software.

variance. The low variance of the regional level may be due to those states that are highly centralised such as Denmark and Ireland. The lack of the regional level interaction in these states perhaps creates a more fluid opinion towards integration. This hypothesis will be explored further in the following chapter examining only devolved EU states. Although these levels are small it would be invalid to ignore them. Furthermore, this analysis does go into further depth by exploring the effect different variables play within the multilevel context.

The second section of this analysis is the inclusion of the chosen explanatory variables into the model. Again, using the random intercept model the equation with the selected variables is as follows:

(6.6)

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU\ SUPPORT_{ijk} = & \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}GDP_k + \gamma_{002}UNEMPLOYMENT_k + \gamma_{003}REGIONAL\ GOV_k + \\
 & \gamma_{010}GDP_{jk} + \gamma_{020}UNEMPLOYMENT_{jk} + \gamma_{030}OBJECTIVE\ 1_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{040}REGIONAL\ PARTY(REG)_{jk} + \gamma_{050}REGIONAL\ PARTY(NAT)_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{060}LANGUAGE\ DIF_{jk} + \gamma_{100}DEMOCRATIC\ SAT_{ijk} + \gamma_{200}ECON\ EXP_{ijk} + \\
 & \gamma_{300}EMPLOYMENT\ EXP_{ijk} + \gamma_{400}COUNTRYATT_{ijk} + \gamma_{500}REGION\ ATT_{ijk} + \\
 & \gamma_{600}OPINIONLEADERSHIP_{ijk} + \gamma_{700}GENDER_{ijk} + \gamma_{800}AGE_{ijk} + V_{00k} + \\
 & U_{0,jk} + R_{ijk}
 \end{aligned}$$

The results are presented in Table 6.2, Model 2.

Observing Model 2 we can see that each of the individual level variables is statistically significant. Clearly *age* and *gender* came out as predicted with older individuals less likely to support integration in addition to males more likely to support the EU. *Opinion leadership* also contains a positive effect while *country attachment* includes a positive effect and *regional attachment* is negative. The effects of these variables will be explored in the next chapter. The subjective variables, *democratic satisfaction*, *economic expectations* and *employment expectations* each are significant and positive as expected. This indicates that positive evaluations of the national political and economic status equate to positive evaluations of EU integration. Do the objective variables hold as strong?

Table 6.2: EU15 Random Intercept Models

Parameter	Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Country Level				
Log GDP	-0.353 ⁺	(0.186)	-0.341 ⁺	(0.184)
Unemployment	0.128	(0.083)	0.129	(0.082)
Regional Governance	0.040	(0.066)	0.035	(0.065)
Region Level				
Log GDP	0.139 [*]	(0.056)	0.131 [*]	(0.053)
Unemployment	0.002	(0.017)	0.001	(0.016)
Objective 1	-0.260 ⁺	(0.138)	-0.282 [*]	(0.130)
Regional Party (R.A.)	0.020	(0.176)	0.092	(0.176)
Regional Party (N.P.)	0.304	(0.193)	0.187	(0.184)
Language Difference	-0.378	(0.400)	-0.206	(0.382)
Individual Level				
Democratic Satisfaction	0.801 ^{**}	(0.027)	0.801 ^{**}	(0.027)
Economic Expectations	0.288 ^{**}	(0.034)	0.288 ^{**}	(0.034)
Employment Expectations	0.247 ^{**}	(0.033)	0.247 ^{**}	(0.033)
Country Attachment	0.112 ^{**}	(0.035)	0.112 ^{**}	(0.035)
Region Attachment	-0.072 [*]	(0.030)	-0.072 [*]	(0.030)
Opinion Leadership	0.278 ^{**}	(0.022)	0.278 ^{**}	(0.022)
Gender	0.227 ^{**}	(0.039)	0.227 ^{**}	(0.039)
Age	-0.008 ^{**}	(0.001)	-0.008 ^{**}	(0.001)
Regional GDP • Economic Expectations			0.120 ^{**}	(0.029)
Constant	8.302 ^{**}	(2.10)	8.227 ^{**}	(2.176)
<i>Variance Components</i>				
Country-Level var(V_{00k})	0.403	(0.160)	0.398	(0.157)
Region-Level var(U_{0jk})	0.156	(0.032)	0.128	(0.028)
Individual-Level var(R_{ijk})	5.448	(0.063)	5.448	(0.063)
-2 Log Likelihood	68108.168		68092.196	
N	14978		14978	

⁺ p < .10, ^{*} p < .05, ^{**} p < .01

We can see that amongst the group level variables GDP is the only economic indicator at both levels to demonstrate significance. Furthermore, it is only strongly significant with a p-value below 0.05 at the regional level while at the national level it only maintains a p-value below 0.10.¹⁵ Most interestingly, the effect of GDP is differing with a negative relationship at the national level and a positive relationship at the regional level. Individuals in wealthier countries are more likely to distrust the EU while those in wealthier regions are more likely to be favourable to integration, supporting Hypothesis 6.1. As demonstrated above, the subjective economic perception variables run positive similar to the regional GDP indicator. Perhaps economic evaluations interact with regional GDP levels. It would be expected that individuals within wealthier regions are more likely to have positive economic evaluations than those in poorer regions. Model 3 includes an interaction term for regional GDP and economic expectations.¹⁶ The coefficient effect is positive and strongly significant demonstrating a likelihood that individuals may in fact base their economic perceptions from the regional level. Here, individuals within high GDP regions who also have high economic expectations are the most likely to support the EU. The statistical significance of the interaction term contributes to both Hypotheses 6.1 and 6.2. Regional GDP, a regional level variable, is having a direct interaction with economic evaluation, an individual level variable, thus reinforcing the importance of the nested structure of the model.

A second interesting factor which relates to this hypothesis lies within the *Objective 1* variable which has a negative effect. This goes against Gabel and Palmer's (1995) suggestion that those who are more likely to observe the benefits of the EU will more likely support it. A possible theory as to why the *Objective 1* variable is negative may simply be again related to the regional GDP indicator and Hypothesis 6.1; wealthier regions are more likely to support integration. Regions that receive objective 1 funding are those that are economically deprived most likely being regions with a low GDP. If the interaction variable explained above is correct, regional wealth conditions one's evaluation of the economy where lower levels of economic satisfaction lead to lower

¹⁵ Traditionally in social sciences, variables are considered significant when the p-value is below 0.05. Values that come close to this value however should still not be overlooked as they still may contribute to the understanding of the model. Therefore, variables with a level of significance between 0.05 and 0.10 will also be considered although with caution. These variables will be denoted with a special cross rather than star on the tables.

¹⁶ An interaction term is created by simply multiplying the two variables.

levels of EU support. Surprisingly, regional wealth has a stronger effect even when those in poorer regions may benefit directly from the European Union's regional policy.

Regarding the political objective indicators, *Regional Governance* displayed a positive effect indicating individuals in a more multilevel governance country are more likely to support the EU, as predicted in Hypothesis 6.3. The result however is not statistically significant thus a firm conclusion cannot be drawn. In addition the role of *regional parties* in government is also positive however neither of the above two variables displayed any statistical significance thus these conclusions can only be considered with caution. The subjective variable *Democratic Satisfaction* was the only political indicator that demonstrated significance. This may support Anderson's (1998) argument that individuals are using familiarity based upon their national government to transfer support onto the European level. Here the evaluations of the functions of democracy within the individual's member state appear to positively affect support towards EU integration.

Given the above results we can see the strong effects of the three chosen subjective indicators. Are these opinions formed in a contextual circumstance? In other words it may not be enough to evaluate these effects at the individual level. Anderson (1996) demonstrated the public reflect on domestic political contexts when evaluating Europe. An individual's perception of the state of the economy or democracy may be dependent on the perceptions of those around him/her. *Democratic Satisfaction*, *Economic Expectations* and *Employment Expectations* will all be analysed at the aggregate levels of region and country to account for the contextual nature these variables may hold.

Model 4 in Table 6.3 contains the region and country level means for *Democratic Satisfaction*, *Economic Expectations* and *Employment Expectations*.¹⁷ In addition, the individual level variables are not region centred but left as raw scores so they can be comparable across each level rather than just the regional level. We can see that the individual level coefficients are the same as those in Model 2 on Table 6.2. *Democratic Satisfaction* is significant at the individual level and country level mean however not significant at the region level. We can conclude that democratic satisfaction plays a role

¹⁷ The test was also completed with each of the variables from model 2. While there were no significant changes to the coefficients, they are not shown for ease of reading the table.

Table 6.3: Grouped Effects of Democratic Satisfaction, Economic Expectations and Employment Expectations

Parameter	Model 4		Model 5	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Democratic Satisfaction (<i>dem</i>)				
Individual level (dem_{ijk})	0.801**	(0.027)		
Within Region ($dem_{ijk} - \overline{dem}_{.jk}$)			0.801**	(0.027)
Region Mean ($\overline{dem}_{.jk}$)	-0.153	(0.238)		
Between Region/Within Country ($\overline{dem}_{.jk} - \overline{\overline{dem}}_{..k}$)			0.648**	(0.236)
Country Mean ($\overline{\overline{dem}}_{..k}$)	-3.43*	(1.346)	-2.785*	(1.325)
Economic Expectations (<i>econ</i>)				
Individual level ($econ_{ijk}$)	0.288**	(0.034)		
Within Region ($econ_{ijk} - \overline{econ}_{.jk}$)			0.288**	(0.034)
Region Mean ($\overline{econ}_{.jk}$)	0.830*	(0.411)		
Between Region/Within Country ($\overline{econ}_{.jk} - \overline{\overline{econ}}_{..k}$)			1.117**	(0.410)
Country Mean ($\overline{\overline{econ}}_{..k}$)	1.410	(3.583)	2.528	(3.556)
Employment Expectations (<i>emp</i>)				
Individual level (emp_{ijk})	0.247**	(0.033)		
Within Region ($emp_{ijk} - \overline{emp}_{.jk}$)			0.247**	(0.033)
Region Mean ($\overline{emp}_{.jk}$)	-0.440	(0.355)		
Between Region/Within Country ($\overline{emp}_{.jk} - \overline{\overline{emp}}_{..k}$)			-0.193	(0.353)
Country Mean ($\overline{\overline{emp}}_{..k}$)	0.351	(2.972)	0.158	(2.948)
Constant	14.365**	(3.967)	14.365**	(3.967)
Variance Components				
Country-Level var(V_{00k})	0.294	(0.119)	0.294	(0.119)
Region-Level var($U_{0,jk}$)	0.117	(0.027)	0.117	(0.027)
Individual-Level var(R_{ijk})	5.447	(0.063)	5.447	(0.063)
N	14978		14978	
-2 Log Likelihood	68080.846		68080.846	

* p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

in influencing EU support at the country level but not at the regional level. Furthermore the country level coefficient is negative. This can be interpreted that individuals who overall have a higher satisfaction with democracy are more likely to support the EU however, individuals in the most overall satisfied countries are less likely to support the EU. Those in highly democratically satisfied countries seem to be unwilling to transcend political authority to a supranational level.

When observing the economic subjective variables, *Economic Expectations* and *Employment Expectations*, we can detect a difference with *Democratic Satisfaction*. *Economic Expectations* demonstrate significance at the regional level and not the country level while *Employment Expectations* demonstrates significance in neither group level. We can conclude that economic expectations play a role in influencing EU support at the regional level but not at the national level, supporting Hypothesis 6.2. Although employment evaluations do not seem to consider national or regional contexts the public does appear to be basing their evaluations of the overall economy situation at the regional level.

To investigate the group aggregates further, Model 5 offers the within-region, between-region/within country and between country coefficients. Here, the group means are replaced with the deviation scores from the mean of each level. Comparably, the within-region coefficients for each variable are equal to the individual raw score coefficients in Model 4. Observing *Democratic Satisfaction*, we see that the within-country and individual level are both equal to 0.801. The between-region/within-country score is 0.648 equal to sum of the individual score (0.801) and region mean (-0.153) in Model 4. We know this difference is not significant however as the region mean was not statistically significant in Model 4 even though the between-region/within-country coefficient is significant. Lastly the country mean (-2.785) in Model 5 is the sum of the individual level (0.801), the region mean (-0.153) and the country mean (-3.43) from Model 4. The results signify that democratic evaluations remain stronger at the national level than at the regional level, contradicting Hypothesis 6.4. The public is yet to evaluate democracy from the regional context.

Economic Expectations presents a different depiction. The between-region/within-country coefficient (1.117) is statistically significant and can be interpreted properly as

the region mean in Model 4 which was also significant. From this we can conclude that regions with higher expectations of the economy are more likely to have higher levels of EU support than those regions with lower expectations within the same country. We cannot make the same conclusion at the country level as the between country mean is statistically insignificant in both Models 4 and 5. This emphasises that individuals' expectations of the economy are affected by the overall perceptions of the economy in the region they live. Furthermore this transcends into a positive evaluation of the EU if their region has higher levels of positive economic expectations. Finally *Employment Expectations* demonstrate a positive within-region effect but conclusions cannot be made at any higher level.

Conclusions

This chapter attempted to examine the role the regional level plays when considering both objective and subjective economic and political indicators. Through the use of the random intercept model, it found the amount of variance at the regional level to account for roughly 30% of the total group level variance verifying the significance of the multilevel structure in the survey data. Upon further investigation of the explanatory variables, GDP was found influential at both the regional and country level. It was demonstrated that those in wealthier countries appeared to be less likely to support the EU while those in wealthier regions were more likely. This result seems to add evidence in support of Hypothesis 6.1, however, the national level GDP effect appears to go against the initial concept of the hypothesis. As a whole, those in wealthier member-states may feel that the country receives less from the European Union as to what they contribute. As it is countries, and not regions, that formally contribute to EU funding, wealth at the regional level produces a different effect. The public within wealthier regions seem to focus more on what there is to gain from integration as opposed to a financial burden, thus the positive effect. This dynamic continues when analysing the interaction between regional wealth and economic perceptions where region GDP seems to condition one's economic perception. In addition, those within Objective 1 funded regions appeared to have less favourable attitudes towards integration. This again may demonstrate that at the regional level those within poorer regions still find the competitive nature of the European free market to be threatening to the economic stability of the region despite receiving subsidies from the European

Union. At the regional level, higher levels of regional wealth appear to have a strong influence on public integration attitudes.

Levels of multilevel governance within a country appeared to have a positive effect, where those within countries with higher levels of regional governance were more likely to favour integration perhaps indicating that multilevel governance within a country helps condition individuals to accept an additional level of authority within the EU. While this appears to support Hypothesis 6.3, the results were not statistically significant thus cannot be concluded. Furthermore, the election of a regional party into the national parliament had a positive effect on support of integration though not statistically significant. While these objective political indicators both follow the predicted direction of support influence, the lack of statistical evidence still demonstrates that the regional public is not yet ready to base political evaluations at the regional level. The investigation into the subjective indicators presented a more in-depth analysis of this possibility.

While none of the objective political indicators showed significance, the subjective variable evaluating national democracy displayed a strong positive effect on integration support in addition to both the subjective economic indicators of economic and employment expectations. When analysing the economic and political perceptions at the aggregate levels, economic perceptions displayed an effect at the regional level rather than the national level supporting Hypothesis 6.2. Employment perceptions however remained statistically significant at only the individual level indicating the personal perception that the variable may hold. Evaluations of national democracy however showed statistical significance at the national level only, contradicting Hypothesis 6.4, indicating that political proxies for integration evaluation remain at the national level.

The central conclusion of this chapter is that regional economics are important in formulating EU support while the political context appears to remain at the national level. This displays that regional political considerations still have ground to gain with the general public as democracy is still evaluated as a national perspective. Individuals however are showing signs that they can construct evaluations on a regional level, at least in terms of economic distinction. Culture and identity may give more insight to

this as they can both be unique on a regional basis. The following chapter will continue this investigation by evaluating identity in addition to the affect of regional mobilisation for further autonomy.

Chapter 7

Identity and Regional Assertiveness: The Hierarchical Linear Model Approach

Introduction

The previous chapter drew a comparison of variation at the individual, regional and national levels of public support for European integration through a multileveled examination of political and economic indicators of the EU15. A comparison of three subjective indicators, democratic satisfaction, expectations of unemployment and economic well-being, found that democratic satisfaction showed most explanation at the national level while economic expectations displayed its strength at the regional level. This indicates that individuals reflect on economic expectations within the regional context while reflections of democracy still remain at the national level. Employment expectations only remain strong within the individual context demonstrating that perhaps individuals reflect on the question from a personal perception. In addition, GDP only displayed any statistical significance at the regional level. The chapter's primary contribution concluded that economic indicators were strongest at the regional level while political indicators still remain a national level trend, indicating that at least in terms of economy individuals are likely to generate their evaluations from a regional context and use this assessment to evaluate European integration.

As noted throughout this dissertation, levels of new regionalism and regional mobilisation vary across the European Union. While the previous chapter contributed to explaining the multileveled effects of economic and political indicators within a sample of all EU15 contributing to a better sense of an EU-wide representation, it stops short in explaining the role regional mobilisation plays in member-states in which regional components have a stronger existence. This difference should be taken into account thus meriting an analysis of member-states in which regional mobilisation is present. This chapter will further analyse factors of new regionalism within movements of regional assertiveness and multileveled identities. The models used in this chapter

will differ from those in Chapter 6, adding a new variable attempting to capture levels of regional mobilisation towards further autonomy. In addition, this chapter will focus on devolved member-states where stronger regional variations exist in an attempt to prevent diluting the effects of regional assertiveness.

I will first present a brief background of the previous literature that helped contribute to the selection of variables used in the chapter. Next, I will give an overview of the hierarchical linear model technique and description of the data and variables. I will then present the findings of the models and their explanation of the effects that both identity and regional assertiveness have on public support of the European Union. To further investigate the effect of regional assertiveness I will test a cross-level interaction of regional assertiveness with Ronald Inglehart's (1970a; 1970b) concept of 'cognitive mobilisation' using the *opinion leadership* variable. This will attempt to capture a relationship between regional level elites and the more politically aware members of the public. Lastly, I will explore the effects of regional and national identity on a region by region basis utilising the functionality of the hierarchical linear model.

The Effects of Regional Assertiveness

As autonomy continued to be transferred from the nation-state to the evolving first-level of EU governance, regional autonomy movements were growing in significance in several member-states by the mid-90s. Michael Keating (1998) labels this movement as *new regionalism*, where mobilisation began in the late 1960s and 1970s peaking in the 1990s with the escalating amount of decentralisation taking place in many EU member-states. It is the regional reaction to modernity and globalisation, where regions are confronting the international market as the role of the state is alleviated by the first level (Keating 1998). While regional movements previously demanded full independence from the state, modern regional mobilisation aims for greater autonomy without separation, acknowledging that the nation-state is still important in performing certain economic and political functions that protect and foster regional societies (Tierney 2005: 171). Moreover regionalism throughout the EU member-states has been an asymmetrical process where there is no systematic procedure of decentralisation within Europe, thus creating uneven powers of autonomy from region to region.

The policy making structure of the European Union can be favourable to regional politicians and elites. The multilevel system of governance that Europe offers allows the chance for regional participation within European-wide legislation (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Keating 2004). Where the region is subjected as a minority interest against the majority of the nation-state, within the European Union the region can be seen as a small group set against many groups where none have the ability to maintain any real dominance (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996). These reasons contribute to overall support of regional parties in favour of European integration highlighted in Chapter 3. Keating (1998: 163) explains that although regional rejectionists to integration existed through the 1970s, by the mid-1980s this sentiment began to turn in favour of integration as regional elites used the concept of Europe to achieve their autonomous goals. This chapter will attempt to investigate the effects regional assertiveness has on public attitudes towards integration. The following hypotheses will be tested:

Hypothesis 7.1: The public within regions of higher levels of regional assertiveness will be more likely to support European integration.

I would expect public support to be higher in regions with higher levels of regional mobilisation. As has been demonstrated in the previous literature and Chapter 5, regional elites and political parties tend to observe the European Union as a means to achieving greater autonomy. Therefore, where debates for greater autonomy exist, arguments in favour of European integration are likely to coexist. As the public within these regions will likely be subjected to more pro-European positions than regions without mobilisation, this sentiment may have an overall influence towards public attitudes on integration. This concept derives heavily from the interaction between both regional elites and the public. To explore this interaction the second hypothesis will be examined:

Hypothesis 7.2: Those with higher levels of cognitive mobilisation within highly assertive regions will be more likely to support European integration.

Ronald Inglehart (1970a; 1970b) theorised that those who pay attention to different forms of political communication and frequently partake in political discussion will be more likely to support the EU as they may be more familiarised with the concept of

integration. In addition, I would expect these individuals to be more familiar with the concept of regional autonomy and the benefits the European Union may provide.

Identity and Public Support for European Integration

Outlined in the literature review of the second chapter, identity is another considerable attribute that has been used to explain public opinion towards integration. In addition, identity is a prime component of the construction of regions in the new regionalism. Carey (2002) demonstrated a negative link using Eurobarometer survey data and testing a three-level hypothesis model of national identity. The first hypothesis is the measurement of intensity that one has to his/her nation. Here, the “stronger the bond that an individual feels towards the nation, the less likely that individual will approve of measures that decrease national influence over economics and politics” (Carey 2002: 391). The second concept is the ‘terminal community’ hypothesis (Peters 1991). The ‘terminal community’ is the highest level of governance that one will form allegiance to. In the example of a Catalanian, he/she may find Catalonia, Spain or the European Union as the ‘terminal community’. The individual will therefore consider a balance of government authority depending on his/her notion of ‘terminal community’. As Carey (2002) states “people who believe in a shared European identity see the EU as the terminal community and are more likely to recognise the authority of the EU to make public policy” (2002: 392). In contrast those that feel no European identity will regard either the nation-state or the region as their ‘terminal community’, therefore more likely not supporting European integration.

The third concept is the ‘cultural threat’ hypothesis. Much of this concept can be attributed to McLaren’s (2002) argument that EU opposition may also be related to the fear and hostility of a perceived threat from other cultures. This can be demonstrated in the rise of ultra right-wing political parties. While these parties focus on a fascist-like ideology, other political parties within subnational regions have been created to preserve national identity from within the nation-state. While most are not fundamentally similar to the ultra right-wing parties, these parties attempt to either accomplish more self autonomy or preserve their identity, such an example would be Plaid Cymru (The Party of Wales). As Carey (2002) explains, those who fear “their language being used less, or their national identity and culture becoming less distinct, are expected to hold a more negative view of the European Union” (2002: 392). Juan Diez-Medrano (2003: 67)

demonstrated through a series of interviews in Spain, Germany and the United Kingdom that non-supporters of European integration would tend to link the European Union to a threat of national identity.

Cultural and identity explanations of public attitudes towards European support have tended to hold a nation-state bias in terms of level of analysis. Carey (2002), however, included in his study an examination of regional identities within the United Kingdom. He found that as English identity increases, support for integration decreases. Conversely, as Scottish, Welsh and Irish identities increase, support for integration increases as well. This demonstrates the complex nature of cultural explanations and suggests that identity influence on public attitudes towards integration is not homogeneous within nation-states.

In addition Hooghe and Marks (2004; 2005) demonstrate through the use of a multilevel model that exclusive national identity decreases one's support for European integration. They carried their investigation further by examining the role national elites play within the relationship of national identity and integration support. In their multilevel models they nested the individual within political parties which are in turn within the state. They found that where national elites were polarised on the European question, the effect of exclusive national identity was stronger and more likely to decrease EU support. In this chapter both national and regional identity will be explored using the hierarchical linear model. The model will allow for the possibility to "randomise" the effects of identity by regions giving way for the opportunity to view the identity effect for each of the given regions independently. The following hypotheses will be used to examine the effects of identity:

Hypothesis 7.3: Overall, stronger levels of regional identity will have a positive effect on EU support.

As Carey (2002), demonstrated with the Scottish, Welsh and Irish it would be expected that regional identity will increase support. This effect can be attributed to the prospect that minority regions may view the EU as a means of protecting regional identity from the dominant identity of the nation-state. While the influence of regional identity remains positive overall, I would also expect the effect to vary between regions of the same country.

Hypothesis 7.4: Overall, stronger levels of national identity will have a negative effect on EU support.

Where the European Union may be seen as protecting regional identity thus having a positive effect, I would expect national identity to have the inverse effect on EU support levels. As the national identity will become a minority in the European Union, individuals with higher levels of national identity will more likely view the EU as a threat. Furthermore as the concept of national identity may vary by region, the effect should demonstrate regional variation within the hierarchical linear model.

The Hierarchical Linear Model

The previous chapter explored economic and political indicators through the use of the random intercept model. Recognising the nested structure in which individuals exist gave insight into the amount of variation at the individual, regional and national levels by allowing the intercepts of each group to vary. This chapter will again use the random intercept model as well as going one step further in the multilevel technique through the use of the hierarchical linear model allowing for group slopes to vary randomly as well as intercepts. The fixed effect of a variable can explain the overall group level effect but does not consider that the effect of a variable may vary between groups. Randomising the slopes of the variable by group will allow for a better understanding of the effect on a group by group basis. In this chapter national and regional identities will be randomised at the regional level. Randomising these variables will provide an understanding into which regions' identity has both a stronger influence as well as the possibility of a contrary effect to other regions within the same country.

The random intercepts model has thus far been the most used multilevel model in European public opinion research. Steenbergen and Jones (2002) however conducted a hierarchical linear model in addition to a random intercept model. Their research involved the examination of a cross-level interaction between party cues and Inglehart's (1970a) *opinion leadership* variable. Traditional *opinion leadership* demonstrated a positive effect on EU support. Steenbergen and Jones however randomised *opinion leadership* at the party level and demonstrated this is not the case for all parties. A

simple example would be a negative effect for opinion leadership for those that support anti-EU or far-right parties.

Both the random intercept model as well as the hierarchical linear model will be used in this chapter to investigate regional assertiveness and identity. The previous chapter gave a brief explanation of the random intercepts model. While this chapter uses the random intercepts model in addition to the hierarchical linear model, only the hierarchical model will be explained in this section.¹

As with the random intercept model the hierarchical linear model takes into consideration that the mean for the dependent variable is different for each group. In addition to the intercepts being group dependent the regression coefficients are also group dependent. This occurrence, known as random slopes, allows the researcher to consider that particular variables can have different effects for individuals within different groups. For better explanation of the functioning of the hierarchical linear model first consider the group specific regression equation for a two-level model with a single level-1 variable.²

(7.1)

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \beta_{1j}x_{ij} + R_{ij}$$

In equation 7.1, Y_{ij} is the dependent variable for individual i in group j while x_{ij} is the explanatory variable at the individual level. In addition R_{ij} is the deviation at the individual level (level-1). Both the intercepts (β_{0j}) and the regression coefficients (β_{1j}) for the variable x_{ij} are dependent upon the group. Together these can be split into the mean coefficient and the group dependent deviation as follows:

(7.2)

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + U_{0j}$$

$$\beta_{1j} = \gamma_{10} + U_{1j}$$

¹ For a more general overview of multilevel modelling and its uses please refer to Chapter 4 on the methodology of the dissertation.

² All formulas, explanation and notations for the hierarchical linear model are adapted from Snijders and Bosker (1999: 67-73)

The above can now be placed into equation 7.1 creating equation 7.3

(7.3)

$$Y_{ij} = \gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}\chi_{ij} + U_{0j} + U_{1j}\chi_{ij} + R_{ij}$$

The above hierarchical linear model equation can be seen as two parts. The first part, represented by $\gamma_{00} + \gamma_{10}\chi_{ij}$, is the fixed-part of the formula while $U_{0j} + U_{1j}\chi_{ij} + R_{ij}$ represents the random-part of the formula. The fixed effect of variable χ can be seen by $\gamma_{10}\chi_{ij}$. Here the slope of variable χ will have group dependent intercepts, however, the slope will remain the same for all groups resulting in parallel regression lines when plotted on a graph. $U_{1j}\chi_{ij}$ is known as the random interaction between the group and the variable χ , meaning that the variable is established on the random effect of both the intercept and the slope. Allowing the intercept as well as the slope to vary allows for the researcher to examine the effect of a particular variable by individual groups.

The Data

The dataset used for this chapter will be the Eurobarometer 63.4 Survey taken in 2005. The variables will be the same as the previous chapter, with the addition of one new variable measuring regional assertiveness. The economic data is taken from Eurostat based on figures from 2004.³ The additional new variable added for regional assertiveness is based on Van Houten's (2003) work and will be discussed further in the chapter.

This chapter is designed to explore the effects of regional mobilisation and identity on public opinion towards European integration within member-states in which elements of regional mobilisation clearly exist. As new regionalism and mobilisation are asymmetrical, as well as specific only to a handful of states within the European Union, not all member-states will be analysed. States that are highly centralised and likely lack any regional dynamic from within will not be included in order to prevent diluting the effects of regional assertion. The focus of study in this chapter reflects more heavily on

³ Data available at epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu.

cross-regional variation as opposed to cross-national. Therefore the member-states included in this analysis will be Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom. While each state does include regions with a degree of assertiveness each is unique in its approach towards both devolution and European integration. The selection of these states corresponds with the research of Van Houten (2003). Each state was selected as the regions within have democratically elected legislatures (with the exception of the English regions in the United Kingdom) and all have experienced regionalist activity in the post-war period, demonstrating that “the territorial structure of the state has more than just administrative significance” (Van Houten 2003: 124). The region is again defined as the administrative region directly below the nation-state either consisting of a directly elected regional assembly or constructed primarily for administrative and planning purposes.⁴ Altogether, 86 total regions from 6 countries will be analysed within the models of this chapter.

Each country in the sample was chosen for both the inclusion of mobilised regions and exceptionality of its multileveled system of governance. Belgium consists of a dual federal system where the regional government authority is parallel to that of the national government’s with no hierarchy existing between the two (Allen 1995). Belgium includes the two cultural and economically distinct regions of the French speaking Wallonia in the South and Flemish-speaking Flanders in the North with the bilingual capital region of Brussels in the centre of the Flemish region.⁵ Regional mobilisation has had a long history within Belgium since it broke away from the Netherlands in 1830. In the mid 19th century Flemish demands for language protection and status had progressed while after the Second World War economic autonomy grew within Wallonia. Today, the awkward partnership amongst the communities poses a unique challenge to European integration.

France remained one of the most centralised states in Western Europe until the Socialist reforms of 1981 when the regions gained further judicial status as well as the inclusion of directly elected regional councils, although these councils did not become fully

⁴ Refer to Chapter 1 for definition of region as the unit of analysis for the dissertation.

⁵ In Belgium the three language communities of French, Flemish and German have different privileges than that of the economic regional governments. In Flanders, the Flemish community has been combined with the regional government of Flanders while the French-speaking community has not combined with the economic regional government of Wallonia as the region also includes a small German-speaking community. For the purposes of this research the regions considered are the economic regions of Flanders, Wallonia and Brussels.

established until 1986. Since the establishment of these regional political institutions some regions have found themselves to become more assertive particular in areas of economic interests. An ideal example would be that of the Rhone-Alps region and its trans-regional relationship with Catalonia, Lombardy and Baden-Württemberg known as the Four-Motor Regions. Mazey (1995) however states that although the regions attempt to orientate themselves towards Europe the central state still places restraints on their ability to do so.

Germany's uniqueness rests in its federal structure with the Länder being the basis for regional government. The Länder not only exercise their autonomy in regional governance but also participate in national governance within the Bundesrat where each Land is delegated a certain amount of votes dependent on population. The Länder also maintain an effective role in European policy where all collaborate to maintain a consensus for the German position within the Council of Ministers (Jeffery 2000). The Länder also vary in levels of assertiveness from the culturally and politically distinct Bavaria to the automotive economy participation of Baden-Württemberg in the Four-Motors Region.

In Italy, the regioni are the regional level administrative bodies of government below the nation-state. While Italy consists of 15 ordinary-regions there are 5 regions that maintain a special stature allowing them to exercise further regional legislation such as tax and regional cultural laws. These regions include Sardinia, Sicily, Trentino-Alto Adige, the Aosta Valley and Friuli-Venezia Giulia.⁶ Not only are the regions of Italy asymmetrical in terms of autonomy there is also a large cultural as well as economic distinction in a heavily problematic divide between the wealthier northern regions and poorer southern regions.

Spain's autonomous communities vary in terms of regional authority with strong cultural and economic variations. Like Italy, Spain's 17 autonomous communities have an asymmetrical balance of autonomy notably with the three historical communities of Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia. The different features of the communities are known as "differentiating factors" and closely reflect the causes for popular request

⁶ Unfortunately due to Eurobarometer's regional coding the Aosta Valley and Piedmont have been coded as the same region. Fortunately levels of regional assertiveness in these regions are the same value. In addition Eurobarometer has coded Abruzzo and Molise as the same region which formally split in 1963.

of further autonomy. Such an example is seen in the case of Catalonia where the status of the Catalan language is used as a justification for regional mobilisation (Aja 2001: 238).

Lastly, the United Kingdom is the final member-state included in the analysis. Remaining highly centralised throughout its recent history it was only in 1997 that the newly elected Labour government enacted legislation beginning the process of devolution allowing for the creation of regional autonomy in both Scotland, creating the Scottish Parliament, and Wales, creating the Welsh assembly. Regional governance in Northern Ireland has been a complicated narration due to its history with its modern day functions created with the Good Friday Agreement in 1998. The Northern Irish Assembly however still ran into further complications only to be suspended from October 2002 to May 2007. Devolution has run more smoothly in Scotland where the Scottish Parliament exercises a considerable amount of devolved powers including taxation, education and health. The Welsh Assembly incorporates fewer devolved powers perhaps reflecting the degree to which the Welsh public was further split on the devolution question than Scotland (Loughlin 2001). In addition the regions of England are a bit more ambiguous. Most currently exist for purely administrative purposes with only the Greater London Assembly being directly elected. Nevertheless they will be included in the sample as mobilisation has occurred in two of these regions: the Northwest and Northeast.

The Dependent Variable

Most of the variables used in the models of this chapter were used in the previous chapter's random intercept models. The dependent variable used in this chapter is the same European integration index variable used in the random intercept models of the preceding chapter. The variable was created by combining three questions relating to support of one's country's membership to the European Union, overall image of the European Union, and the extent to which the European Union should play in the everyday life of its citizens. All questions were weighted equally and combined to create an index score of 0 to 10.⁷ Those with higher index scores have higher support levels of the European Union. Chapter 6 went into depth in exploring political and

⁷ Please refer to Chapter 6 for more details on the creation of the index scale for the dependent variable.

economic indicators while this chapter focuses on regional assertiveness and identity. These variables will be discussed in more depth in the following section as will *opinion leadership* which is based on the works of Ronald Inglehart (1970b; 1970a).

The Explanatory Variables

The first newly introduced variable is the most imperative of the model. As mentioned above, Michael Keating (1998) describes decentralisation as an asymmetrical process amongst EU member-states. Furthermore, various levels of autonomy and mobilisation within regions may influence strength in integration support. To help capture the concept of new regionalism within my research, I have included the variable *Regional Assertiveness*. *Regional Assertiveness* is based upon the research of Van Houten (2003) in which he designed a model to help predict a region's level of assertiveness by including various economic, political and cultural variables. Van Houten's dependent variable was a 4-point category of regional assertiveness. The variable is based from demands for taxing powers made by regional politicians. His concept is that taxing powers would need a significant change to the state structure thus requiring further regional autonomy. To capture regional assertiveness for my models I will apply the variable created by Van Houten (2003: 124-125), using the same 4-point category as an independent variable. The category and value coding of regional assertiveness is as follows:

- High (value 3): Governing politicians demanding taxing powers
- Medium (value 2): Oppositional politicians demanding taxing powers, or governing politicians demanding spending powers
- Low (value 1): Oppositional politicians demanding spending powers
- None (value 0): No autonomy demands

The above values are then assigned in accordance with Van Houten's evaluations for each region that I have included in my model and are displayed in Table 7.1. Those regions that do not appear on the table are regions without any level of assertiveness. As van Houten's research captures levels of regional assertiveness in the mid-1990s, upon further evaluation of the included regions at the time of the Eurobarometer survey very little in terms of assertiveness has changed. While one can argue that after the creation of entities such as the Scottish Parliament such demands have been met I would

however contend that such entities would not exist if it were not for the level of assertiveness that pursued its establishment. In these instances assertiveness has transferred into the success of devolution.

As explained in Hypothesis 7.1, I would expect to observe a positive relationship between regional assertiveness and EU membership approval. Hooghe and Marks (2001) explain that EU policy making is no longer monopolised by the nation-state. Policy and decision making powers are shared by several actors at different levels of governance rather than simply the national level. Therefore regions that are more mobilised and request further autonomy are more likely to involve themselves within the structure of multilevel governance including at the EU level. These mobilised and assertive regions will be more likely to transcend approval onto the public in supporting European integration.

Cultural identity and its protection can be seen in various regional mobilisation movements such as those in Catalonia, Wales and Galicia. The second regional level variable underscored in this chapter, *Language Difference*, is designed to capture cultural differences amongst regions within their respective member states. The variable is identical to previous works by Fearon and Van Houten (1998) and Van Houten (2003) to investigate regional autonomy movements. It is based on comparing regional language families to the language family spoken in the nation-state's capitol.⁸ The larger the value a region scores on *Language Difference*, the more culturally distinct in terms of language it is from the rest of the nation-state. Furthermore it is not necessary for the language to be spoken by the entire regional population. It is a measurement of historical culture that helps facilitate historical identity. Such an

⁸ The values for each language are based on language families as defined by Grimes (1996) in Pieter van Houten and James Fearon's (Fearon and Van Houten 1998; Van Houten 2000) research. Each language is classed by sub groups, for example Castilian Spanish is categorised "Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, West Iberian, Castilian" and Catalan is categorised as "Indo-European, Italic, Romance, Italo-Western, Western, Gallo-Iberian, Ibero-Romance, East Iberian". A value is assigned at the level the regional language splits from the language spoken in the capitol. In this example Catalan splits from Castilian (as Castilian is the language spoken in Madrid) after "Ibero-Romance" or the 8th level, thus Catalan receives a language family score of 8. Those regions that speak the same language as that in the capitol receive a value of 10, the highest level of sub categories. The language family score is then inversed to create a score between 0.1 and 1 measuring language difference. In the above example Catalonia would receive a *Language Difference* score of 0.125 (1 divided by 8) and Madrid a score of 0.1 (1 divided by 10). Another example would be Basque, a language so unique that it splits at the first level. The language family score for Basque would then be 1 and its *Language Difference* score would also be 1 (1 divided by 1).

Table 7.1 – Regions with Regional Assertiveness

Low (value 1)	Medium (value 2)	High (value 3)
Aquitane (Fra)	Wallonia (Bel)	Flanders (Bel)
Brittany (Fra)	Alsace (Fra)	Basque Country (Spa)
Languedoc – Rousillon (Fra)	Corsica (Fra)	Northern Ireland (UK)
Provence – Alpes – Côtes d’Azur (Fra)	Rhône – Alps (Fra)	Scotland (UK)
North Rhine – Westphalia (Ger)	Baden – Württemberg (Ger)	
Sardinia (Ita)	Bavaria (Ger)	
Tuscany (Ita)	Hessen (Ger)	
Balearic Islands (Spa)	Emilia-Romagna (Ita)	
Canary Islands (Spa)	Friuli-Venezia Giulia (Ita)	
Valencia (Spa)	Liguria (Ita)	
North West (UK)	Lombardy (Ita)	
	Piedmont (Ita)	
	Trentino-Alto Adige (Ita)	
	Val d’Aosta (Ita)	
	Veneto (Ita)	
	Catalonia (Spa)	
	Galicia (Spa)	
	Navarre (Spa)	
	Northern (UK)	
	Wales (UK)	

Note: The above table is derived from Van Houten’s (Van Houten 2003: 124-125) work on regional political assertiveness

example can be seen in Wales where only a small percentage of the population uses Welsh. So long as the language is not extinct it is included in the model. A component of new regionalism and European integration is that several regional movements recognise the European Union as an element of cultural protection (Keating 1998). I would expect this hypothesis to exist in regions that culturally differ from the rest of the nation-state thus creating a positive relationship with EU membership evaluation.

National and regional identities are the first individual level variables to be analysed in depth within this chapter. Carey (2002) analysed national, regional and European attachment variables to test the effects of the terminal community hypothesis. Regional mobilisation’s largest obstacle is to overcome the nation-state not only in the constitutional sense but also in building a collective identity of its citizens. If individuals are more likely to identify with the nation rather than the region, the less likely mobilisation will occur. Therefore national and regional attachment will be analysed. The question asked in the Eurobarometer survey to measure these identities is as follows:

People may feel different degrees of attachment to their [region/country]. Please tell me how attached you feel to your [region/country]

The possible response are coded as: 1 for 'not at all attached', 2 for 'not very attached', 3 for 'somewhat attached' and 4 for 'very attached'. If individuals are to follow the perception of new regionalism, I would expect those that maintain higher levels of regional attachment to be more likely to support European integration, as stated in Hypothesis 7.3, while those that maintain higher levels of national attachment less likely to support integration, as stated in Hypothesis 7.4. The notion behind this predication is that individuals attached to their region may see Europe as a means of promoting regional autonomy while those with higher national attachment may see Europe as a threat to national autonomy.

In addition I will briefly examine Ronald Inglehart's (Inglehart 1970b; Inglehart 1970a; Inglehart 1977) concept of *opinion leadership*, an individual's potential for political involvement. This variable relates to Inglehart's concept of cognitive mobilisation which is the process of the individual gaining political awareness. The more an individual discusses politics and creates a political value system the more likely he/she will gain familiarity with and approve of integration (Inglehart 1970a; De Vreese 2004). In addition, Andersen (1998) demonstrated that individuals use domestic politics to evaluate the European Union because it is the political entity of which they are most familiar. The *opinion leadership* index variable created by Eurobarometer is a 4-point scale combining two questions, the first asking a respondent how much he/she discusses political matters with others and the second asking how often they try to persuade others from their views. Those with higher scores will have higher levels of opinion leadership, thus these individuals will be more likely to support European integration. As Anderson (1998) demonstrates, individuals evaluate integration from the contexts of which they are familiar. I would believe this to be reflected at the regional level in which higher levels of assertiveness exist. Therefore opinion leadership effects should remain positive so long as regional assertiveness is positive. This will also be tested with a cross-level interaction variable described in the next section.

In addition to the above variables, several variables from the preceding chapter will be re-evaluated. These include at the national level *GDP*, *unemployment* and *regional governance score*, at the regional level *GDP*, *unemployment*, *objective 1 region* and *regional party*, and at the individual-level *democratic satisfaction*,

economic/employment expectations, gender and age. Furthermore, each region is likely to have different mean levels of each individual level variable. Therefore to maintain a comparable effect each individual level variable is grouped centred at the region mean.⁹ This allows for a regional comparison when observing those who are below and above the regional mean. This is also consistent with the data from the previous chapter.

The Results

I will first be examining the strengths of variance of the different levels in the analysis. The structure remains identical as in Chapter 6 with individuals being the first level, the region as the second level and country as the third level. The ANOVA model tests the dependent variable, EU Support, with only the constant and no explanatory variables. The equation for the empty model is as follows:¹⁰

(7.4)

$$EU\ SUPPORT_{ijk} = \gamma_{000} + V_{00k} + U_{0jk} + R_{ijk}$$

The results for the one-way ANOVA can be observed in Table 7.2

Table 7.2 - ANOVA - Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Spain and UK

Parameter	Model 1	
	β	(S.E.)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>		
Constant	6.338	(0.290)
<i>Variance Components</i>		
Country-Level var(V_{00k})	0.467	(0.290)
Region-Level var(U_{0jk})	0.276	(0.063)
Individual-Level var(R_{ijk})	6.267	(0.109)
-2 Log Likelihood	31166.610	

⁹ The centred variable is created by subtracting the region mean from the raw score of the respondent.

¹⁰ i = individual, j = region and k = country ; γ_{000} = constant

Observing Table 7.2 it is noticed that the country level variance in the above model is statistically insignificant, likely due to the small number of countries included in the analysis. The regional-level variance is larger than the EU15 sample from the preceding chapter. Where the regional variance for the larger sample in Chapter 6 equalled 0.173, the selected country sample in this model is 0.276. When comparing the proportional variance, the individual-level makes up roughly 89% of the accounted variance while nearly 11% comes from higher levels. The regional proportion of the higher level variance is slightly higher than the 30% proportion within the EU15 model. The results of the ANOVA model in this chapter should not necessarily be compared to the results of the model provided in this chapter. Chapter 6 presented a model attempting to explain a full cross-national explanation for the entirety of the EU15. The models in this chapter focus primarily on the effects in states where the regional dimension is progressing. Where Chapter 6 helped discover the overall influence of new regionalism European-wide, this chapter is meant to examine the effects of new regionalism and regional assertiveness where they directly exist. The models in this chapter can potentially expand into a larger sample size as new regionalism continues to develop into the more centralised European Union member states.

The second section of the analysis includes the addition of the explanatory variables explained earlier in the chapter in a random intercept model, including the addition of the *regional assertiveness* variable. The equation used for this model is given below:

(7.5)

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU\ SUPPORT_{ijk} = & \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}GDP_k + \gamma_{002}UNEMPLOYMENT_k + \gamma_{003}REGIONAL\ GOV_k + \\
 & \gamma_{010}REGIONAL\ ASSERTIVENESS_{jk} + \gamma_{020}GDP_{jk} + \gamma_{030}UNEMPLOYMENT_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{040}OBJECTIVE\ 1_{jk} + \gamma_{050}REGIONAL\ PARTY(REG)_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{060}REGIONAL\ PARTY(NAT)_{jk} + \gamma_{070}LANGUAGE\ DIF_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{100}DEMOCRATIC\ SAT_{ijk} + \gamma_{200}ECON\ EXP_{ijk} + \gamma_{300}EMPLOYMENT\ EXP_{ijk} + \\
 & \gamma_{400}COUNTRY\ ATT_{ijk} + \gamma_{500}REGION\ ATT_{ijk} + \gamma_{600}OPINIONLEADERSHIP_{ijk} + \\
 & \gamma_{700}GENDER_{ijk} + \gamma_{800}AGE_{ijk} + V_{00k} + U_{0jk} + R_{ijk}
 \end{aligned}$$

The results are observable in Model 2 in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 – Random Intercept Model Including Regional Assertiveness

Parameter	Model 2		Model 3	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Country Level				
Log GDP	-0.340	(0.296)	-0.340	(0.296)
Unemployment	0.271**	(0.111)	0.271**	(0.111)
Regional Governance	-0.010	(0.098)	-0.010	(0.098)
Region Level				
Regional Assertiveness	-0.207*	(0.099)	-0.207*	(0.099)
Log GDP	0.213*	(0.088)	0.213*	(0.088)
Unemployment	-0.008	(0.024)	-0.008	(0.024)
Objective 1	-0.307	(0.209)	-0.307	(0.209)
Regional Party (R.A.)	0.203	(0.238)	0.203	(0.238)
Regional Party (N.P.)	0.578*	(0.271)	0.578*	(0.272)
Language Difference	-0.124	(0.485)	-0.124	(0.485)
Individual Level				
Democratic Satisfaction	0.835**	(0.039)	0.833**	(0.039)
Economic Expectations	0.284**	(0.051)	0.284**	(0.051)
Employment	0.208**	(0.050)	0.208**	(0.050)
Expectations				
Country Attachment	0.123**	(0.048)	0.123**	(0.048)
Region Attachment	-0.143*	(0.045)	-0.142*	(0.045)
Opinion Leadership	0.356**	(0.032)	0.416**	(0.044)
Gender	0.166**	(0.059)	0.166**	(0.059)
Age	-0.007**	(0.002)	-0.007**	(0.002)
Regional Assertiveness • Opinion Leadership			-0.051 ⁺	(0.027)
Constant	7.368 ⁺	(4.382)	7.368 ⁺	(4.382)
<i>Variance Components</i>				
Country-Level var(V_{00k})	0.122	(0.092)	0.122	(0.092)
Region-Level var($U_{0,jk}$)	0.222	(0.054)	0.222	(0.054)
Individual-Level var(R_{ijk})	5.491	(0.096)	5.491	(0.096)
-2 Log Likelihood	30276.910		30273.410	
N	6642		6642	

⁺ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

The coefficients are very similar to what was displayed in Chapter 6, however, some variables that were briefly addressed in the preceding chapter will be explained in more depth here. First, when observing the *regional assertiveness* variable, the direction of the effect is opposite to that of Hypothesis 7.1. Individuals within regions of higher levels of assertiveness are less likely to support EU integration. The variable maintains a high level of statistical significance with a p-value below 0.05. Do individuals within higher assertive regions view the European Union as a threat? When observing several of the other regional indicators it appears that this may be possible. Interestingly *language difference* is also displaying a negative effect. Although insignificant, thus no hard conclusions can be drawn, it may be feasible that regions with an historic language with a higher degree of difference from the country's primary language may see integration as a possible threat to cultural identity. Furthermore, when observing the two identity variables, regional attachment is indicating a negative effect while national attachment is displaying a positive effect. The results appear to defy the predictions presented by Hypotheses 7.3 and 7.4 respectively. Both variables demonstrate a significant p-value. In addition, regions with elected regional party members in the national parliament are more likely to view the EU positively.

Chapter 4 examined the positions of regional parties and their supporters towards EU integration. The chapter concluded that although in the past regional parties would tend to be Euroskeptic, today they are more likely to use Europe as a means to promote autonomy within the context of Europe. Furthermore as regional parties were displayed to show high levels of support for the European Union their supporters would tend to display the same level of support. This may still be observed in the above model where regions with a regional party within the parliament are more likely to support the EU. This deviates however with assertive regions. While regional parties may be influencing their supporters on their position towards integration, they may not be convincing the overall public. Regional parties may be successful in fostering regional identity for individuals that may even be non-supporters by bringing the issue of autonomy into the public debate. As one starts to identify more with the region, he/she may begin to find integration as a threat to regional identity, as demonstrated in the above negative coefficient for regional attachment. As a variable for party support is no longer available in recent Eurobarometer surveys, this regional party influence dynamic will be explored further in the following chapter on the United Kingdom.

Is the negative effect of regional assertiveness transcending to the public? *Opinion leadership* in the above model demonstrates a significant positive relationship. This direction remains consistent with Ronald Inglehart's (1970b; 1970a; 1977) theory that the more one more participates in political discussion the more likely he/she will view the European Union positively. In order to further investigate the effects of regional assertiveness and opinion leadership I have created a cross-level interaction variable and tested it within the above model. The concept behind this is to determine if individuals with high opinion leadership index scores are conditioned by levels of assertiveness within their region.¹¹ The results are displayed in Model 3 on Table 7.3.

The interaction variable observed in Model 3 in Table 7.3 displays a slight negative effect while the p-value lies between 0.05 and 0.10, indicating although not highly statistically significant it is still possible for the results to be analysed with caution. This shows that opinion leadership may not behave as we traditional expect it. Traditionally, opinion leadership has had a positive effect on EU support, as shown in Model 2. The cross-level interaction variable however is indicating that those with high opinion leadership scores within highly assertive regions are less likely to support the EU. Regional assertiveness may possibly be conditioning the opinions of those that frequently discuss and persuade political opinions. Though the direction of influence contradicts that in Hypothesis 7.2, it has been demonstrated that a relationship does exist between assertiveness and cognitive mobilisation.

Observing country and regional attachment in Models 2 and 3 in Table 7.3 it is noted that both have a differing effect on public opinion towards integration. Whereas the direction goes against the prediction in the hypotheses, the results remain consistent with the other noted variables relating to regionalism within the model. Those that have a higher level of regional attachment within their region are more likely to view European integration negatively while those with higher levels of country attachment are more likely to view integration positively. Perhaps this fixed effect for both variables can be attributed to what Van Kersbergen (2000) explains as double allegiance. His concept derives in individuals basing their opinion of integration on a

¹¹ This cross-level interaction variable is simply created by multiplying the variables of *regional assertion* and *opinion leadership*.

primary allegiance, typically the nation-state. The nation-state gains allegiance from its public in exchange for providing social policy. The public will develop a secondary allegiance, such as the EU, so long as it provides the means for the primary source to continue providing social policy. In other words, if an individual believes that the EU will threaten his/her nation-state from continuing its provision of social welfare then he/she will be less likely to support integration. In the above models, individuals that see the nation-state as their primary allegiance appear to be less likely to view the EU as threatening the nation to conduct its realm of social policy. Conversely however those with higher levels of regional attachment may view Europe as a threat to achieving regional policy. Does this contrary effect of attachment remain consistent for each region of the analysis? Attachment to country and region are likely to vary by region. The hierarchical linear model should offer a better insight of territorial attachment at the regional-level.

The hierarchical linear model will allow for the randomisation of the country and regional attachment variables. This will allow the effect of the variable to become group dependent. Two models will be analysed, the first randomising the country attachment variable and the second randomising the regional attachment variable. Randomising the effect of attachment at the regional level will allow the possibility to observe the individual effect for each of the 86 regions. This will then make regions within the same country comparable to determine if identity has a parallel effect for all regions of a country. The equation below displays the first of the two models (Model 4).

(7.5)

$$\begin{aligned}
 EU\ SUPPORT_{ijk} = & \gamma_{000} + \gamma_{001}GDP_k + \gamma_{002}UNEMPLOYMENT_k + \gamma_{003}REGIONAL\ GOV_k + \\
 & \gamma_{010}REGIONAL\ ASSERTIVENESS_{jk} + \gamma_{020}GDP_{jk} + \gamma_{030}UNEMPLOYMENT_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{040}OBJECTIVE\ 1_{jk} + \gamma_{050}REGIONAL\ PARTY(REG)_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{060}REGIONAL\ PARTY(NAT)_{jk} + \gamma_{070}LANGUAGE\ DIF_{jk} + \\
 & \gamma_{100}DEMOCRATIC\ SAT_{ijk} + \gamma_{200}ECON\ EXP_{ijk} + \gamma_{300}EMPLOYMENT\ EXP_{ijk} + \\
 & \gamma_{400}COUNTRYATT_{ijk} + \gamma_{500}REGION\ ATT_{ijk} + \gamma_{600}OPINIONLEADERSHIP_{ijk} + \\
 & \gamma_{700}GENDER_{ijk} + \gamma_{800}AGE_{ijk} + V_{00k} + U_{0,jk} + U_{1,jk}REGION\ ATT_{ijk} + R_{ijk}
 \end{aligned}$$

Table 7.4 – Hierarchical Linear Models of Belgium, France, Italy, Germany, Spain and UK

Parameter	Model 4		Model 5	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
<i>Fixed Effects</i>				
Country Level				
Log GDP	-0.340	(0.296)	-0.340	(0.296)
Unemployment	0.271*	(0.111)	0.271*	(0.111)
MLG	-0.010	(0.098)	-0.010	(0.098)
Region Level				
Regional Assertiveness	-0.207*	(0.099)	-0.207*	(0.099)
Log GDP	0.213*	(0.088)	0.213*	(0.088)
Unemployment	-0.009	(0.024)	-0.008	(0.024)
Objective 1	-0.306	(0.210)	-0.306	(0.210)
Regional Party (R.A.)	0.202	(0.234)	0.202	(0.234)
Regional Party (N.P.)	0.578*	(0.272)	0.578*	(0.272)
Language Difference	-0.124	(0.485)	-0.125	(0.485)
Individual Level				
Democratic Satisfaction	0.835**	(0.039)	0.837**	(0.039)
Economic Expectations	0.286**	(0.050)	0.292**	(0.050)
Employment Expectations	0.206**	(0.050)	0.202**	(0.050)
Country Attachment	0.114*	(0.048)	0.147*	(0.072)
Region Attachment	-0.145*	(0.057)	-0.161**	(0.046)
Opinion Leadership	0.359**	(0.032)	0.359**	(0.032)
Gender	0.164**	(0.059)	0.174**	(0.059)
Age	-0.007**	(0.002)	-0.007**	(0.002)
<i>Random Effects</i>				
Region Attachment	0.067*	(0.033)		
Country Attachment			0.171*	(0.053)
Constant	7.368 ⁺	(4.382)	7.367 ⁺	(4.388)
<i>Variance Components</i>				
Country-Level var(V_{00k})	0.122	(0.092)	0.122	(0.092)
Region-Level var(U_{0jk})	0.223	(0.054)	0.224	(0.054)
Individual-Level var(R_{ijk})	5.460	(0.096)	5.411	(0.095)
-2 Log Likelihood	30268.420		30215.510	
N	6642		6642	

⁺ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Here, the regional attachment variable is included as both a fixed and random effect. The random portion is represented by $U_{1,jk} REGION ATT_{ijk}$. The results are displayed in Table 7.4.

In Model 4, the slope standard deviation for *regional attachment* is $0.52 (\sqrt{0.067})$ while the mean slope for *regional attachment* is -0.145 (the fixed regression coefficient). The values of the mean slope +/- two standard deviations creates a range of -0.665 to 0.375 indicating that the effect is not necessarily negative in all regions. This formula also gives us the range of -0.683 to 0.977 for the effect of country attachment in Model 5. The slopes for each region can be observed in Figures 7.1-7.6 sectioned by country.

In Figure 7.1, the two historic regions of Belgium appear to maintain the fixed effect of both variables. Both Wallonia and Flanders show a positive effect for higher levels of country attachment while maintaining a negative effect for regional attachment. In both instances, the region of Brussels enjoys higher levels of integration support as well as positive effects for both country and regional attachment. This may not come as a surprise as Brussels is the capital of the European Union and benefits economically from the abundance of administration that exists within the city-region. Those that feel less Belgian for both Wallonia and Flanders show low levels of integration support while the slopes begin to diverge from each other with Walloons showing a slightly higher level of support than the Flemish. The divergence of these slopes may demonstrate a different concept of Belgian identity as one feels more Belgian. For Walloons, attachment to Belgium has a stronger positive effect than their countrymen in Flanders. Those Flemish with a strong Belgian attachment are still less likely to support integration than Walloons with strong Belgian attachment. In terms of regional attachment however, both region slopes run parallel. Attachment to one's region has a slight negative effect for both Wallonia and Flanders. The fact that both lines run parallel shows those individuals may have a similar concept of regional identity as opposed to Belgian identity.

In France the effects of country and regional attachment are mostly consistent with the fixed effects of the variables with the exception of a few noted regions. Primarily the more one feels attached to France the more likely he/she will support European

Figure 7.1: Belgium Country vs. Regional Attachment




Figure 7.2: France Country vs. Regional Attachment




Figure 7.3: Germany Country vs. Regional Attachment




Figure 7.4: Italy Country vs. Regional Attachment




Figure 7.5: Spain Country vs. Regional Attachment





Figure 7.6: UK Country vs. Regional Attachment



integration. The most notable regions however that do not reflect this effect are Champagne–Ardenne and Languedoc-Roussillon where a stronger French attachment likely results in lower levels of support towards European integration. This differing trend however remains unique only when observing national attachment as their regional attachment slopes are similar to most French regions. In terms of regional attachment only the region of Limousin displays a slight positive effect as one feels more attached to the region. Limousin is both highly agricultural as well as culturally distinct with Occitan as the regional historical language. It is possible that those within this region view the EU as a means of advancing the social issues of the region.

Germany has one of the most dramatic effects of the attachment variables. The difference of the effects can perhaps be attributed to the Länder federal structure of the country. Saxony-Anhalt displays the most extreme effect of positive national attachment while maintaining a positive effect with regional attachment. In the opposite direction Bavarians, one of the most assertive regions of Germany, are less likely to support the EU than those that are less attached to Germany. More extremely, Bavarians that are highly attached to Bavaria are much less likely to support integration than those that are not attached to the region. This shows that for Bavarians, the EU is potentially seen as a threat to both Germany and the Bavarian state. Bavarians that demonstrate higher levels of EU support are less likely to be attached to either Bavaria or Germany.

In Italy a vast range of variation also exists. Quite remarkably, when observing the angle of the slopes, it seems that attachment to Italy has a very strong effect in nearly each of the regions. This shows that for most regions, those with lower levels of attachment to Italy are less likely to support EU integration. Liguria and Piedmonte & the Aoste Valley, two northern regions that border each other, are both showing the most extreme effect of the variable while Emilia – Romagna appears to be the only Italian region where national attachment has a negative effect. In addition Piedmonte & the Aoste Valley is also the only region to have a positive effect from regional attachment showing that multilevel attachment has a positive effect on European integration support within the region. With the exception of Piedmonte & the Aoste Valley and Emilia – Romagna regional attachment seems to have very little effect in the Italian regions.

Regions in Spain appear to hold to the fixed effect of country and regional attachment with the exception of Castile-La Mancha having a negative effect for higher levels of country attachment. Nevertheless we can observe the intensities that the effect holds in a few of the selected regions. Country attachment seems to have a strong positive effect in Catalonia while the effect is slightly less intense in the Basque Country and Galicia. In comparison, regional attachment has a very strong negative effect in Catalonia and to a lesser degree in Galicia. Surprisingly, regional attachment has very little influence in the Basque Country where levels of EU support appear to maintain a steady level. This perhaps demonstrates that the concept of the EU is uniform to the Basque despite their attachment to region and country.

In the United Kingdom, the effect of national attachment acts quite differently than the other six countries. Whereas most regions have demonstrated a positive effect from national attachment, the regions of the UK all nearly display a negative effect with the exception of Scotland and the Euroskeptic region of Yorkshire & Humberside. In Wales there is virtually no effect from national attachment while in Northern Ireland there is a strong negative effect. The differences again are likely due to each region's concept of Britain. History has likely permitted contrasting views of Britain in each of these regions which in turn can affect one's outlook on European integration. This may again be due to Van Kersbergen's (2000) concept of double allegiance. The concept of allegiance to Britain is different for each of these regions. In Northern Ireland for example this concept has been at the forefront of the region's history in the past century and is perhaps contributing to the strong negative effect present in the given figure. The following chapter will examine an in depth analysis of regional effects in the United Kingdom.

The hierarchical linear model allowed for the randomisation of the effects of national and regional attachments acknowledging that national and regional identities can vary by region. It was demonstrated that not all regions share the same effects of the variables. While regional attachment had a less varied effect than national attachment this perhaps reveals that although national identity is more likely to have a larger effect on one's support for integration, the concept of attachment to the nation varies by region. In Germany and Italy country attachment significantly varied while in Spain the

effect remained positive but to a different degree for each region. Regional attachment varied most in Germany possibly deriving from the federalist structure of the German Länder. In Spain however, regional attachment seemed to have no effect for many regions including the Basque Country. The United Kingdom was the only country to display strong negative effects for both national and regional attachment. Regarding national attachment, Scotland and Yorkshire & Humberside were the only regions to display a positive effect while for regional attachment all regions displayed a negative effect.

Conclusions

This chapter investigated the effects regional mobilisation and identity have on public opinion towards the European Union. Regional assertiveness was tested in a sample of six countries. When the hypothesis predicted that assertiveness would have a positive effect on integration support it was concluded to have a negative effect. This also remained consistent with the fixed effect of regional attachment while national attachment produced a positive effect. As demonstrated in Chapter 5 regional political parties demanding more regional autonomy tend to support European integration using it as a means to further their demands. Upon further investigation of regional assertiveness' effect on the public it was concluded that assertiveness is possibly conditioning those with high opinion leadership scores to have a less favourable opinion towards integration. This counteracts the conventional view where opinion leadership has a positive effect on EU opinion demonstrating regional mobilisation's strength in influencing the public's assessment process.

In the analysis of identities it was surprising to discover regional identity to have a negative general effect while national identity remained positive. This result can be seen to coincide with regional assertion's negative effect, both contradicting Hypotheses 7.3 and 7.4. When randomising the effects of regional and national identity it was revealed that although the individual region trends tend to follow the overall effect of both attachment variables several regions within the same country act conversely. More interesting was the wide variation of national attachment indicating that national identity is different to peoples of different regions thus having varying influences on EU support.

This chapter broke away from the European-wide model in an attempt to gain a better understanding of regional mobilisation's direct effect on public opinion towards European integration. When it was expected that regional assertiveness would find a common ally in the European Union, both having the common goal of moving authority away from the nation-state, this was found not to be the case. Instead it seems that those in highly assertive regions or have strong regional identity still see the European Union as a possible threat to regional survival. Unfortunately, Eurobarometer does not provide a survey question examining opinion towards devolution as it is not a European-wide phenomenon. To gain an a better understanding of the devolutionary process and its effect on EU support a case study of a member state where the devolution experience exists would provide additional information. The United Kingdom's history of internal and external relations makes it unique in understanding its citizen's reflections towards European integration. Traditionally Euroskeptic, elements of regional assertiveness and devolution have transformed its regions in terms of politics, economy and identity. The following chapter will present a more in depth case study analysis examining the United Kingdom using conclusions gathered from this and earlier chapters.

Chapter 8

Regional Reflections on Public Support for the European Union: The British Experience

Introduction

This chapter attempts to link the themes of the previous chapters with an in-depth case-study of the United Kingdom. The previous three chapters of this dissertation explored the effects of economic, political and cultural variables on public evaluations of European integration. In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that regional parties, while often being mistaken as fringe party groups, tend to have consistent and pro-European views similar to the mainstream parties. Furthermore, supporters of regional parties tend to share this level of support for European integration unlike the other minor party families including the greens, far right and far left. This suggests that regional party supporters may not necessarily support their regional party merely as a protest vote when it comes to European integration. Chapter 6 explored evaluations of economy and democracy within the regional perspective. It was found that economic evaluations tend to be evaluated within the regional context while evaluations of democracy remain evaluated at the national level. Lastly, Chapter 7 explored the effects of regional assertiveness and national versus regional identity on support levels of the EU. It was concluded, contrary to the predictions of the hypothesis, that high levels of regional assertiveness had a strong and significant negative effect on levels of EU support. Additionally, regional identity also had a negative effect while national identity had a positive effect.

The purpose of this chapter is to apply the findings of the previous models to a case study of the United Kingdom. It will attempt to measure the effects of regional assertiveness in Scotland and Wales to determine if it maintains a negative effect on EU support levels. Furthermore the chapter will be able to provide an analysis on evaluations of devolution. Do individuals that support independence in Scotland and Wales reflect differently on European integration from those that prefer a multilevel

system of governance in devolution? As levels of devolution are asymmetrical across Europe, there is no European-wide survey that evaluates public attitudes towards decentralisation. Therefore, a single case study and country-specific survey can provide a more detailed analysis of the effects measured in the previous chapters in addition to investigating regional opinion towards British devolution. In addition, the British specific survey used in this chapter will provide an extension of the number of cases at the regional level making regional variations easy to compare.

The chapter will begin by briefly explaining why the United Kingdom is the case study chosen in addition to reviewing previous research that has addressed British attitudes towards European integration. The analysis will begin by first investigating aggregated regional support in the British regions from 1973-2002. The public data will also be compared to the major British political parties including the regional parties of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru. Lastly ordered logit regression models for Scotland, Wales and England will be compared exploring the effects on EU support of political party support, British and regional identity, in addition to evaluations of devolution.

Britain, Devolution and the European Union

Britain's relationship with the European Community has been a long and complex history. First opting out of the formation of the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s, then applying for admission of the European Economic Community in the 1960s only to have it vetoed by then French President Charles De Gaulle, and finally joining the European Community in 1973, it is not difficult to observe elements of Euroskepticism in past British policy. Stephen George (1998) has described Britain as the 'awkward partner' in the European Community. The British public can easily be seen reflecting cynicism towards integration. Why study such a Euroskeptic country? First, Britain's "awkward" relationship with the EU provides a unique setting placed upon its public. The United Kingdom is one of three EU15 member states yet to join the Euro currency (the other two being Denmark and Sweden). In each of these countries the question of European integration has a stronger context as integration is likely to mean eliminating the national currency a step other member-states took nearly a decade ago. The issue of integration is therefore likely to take a highly prominent role in political discussion in these countries as the debate has a strong link with losing

national sovereignty. Moreover it has been noted that during the 2001 British general election 'Europe' was the leading policy issue covered by the media (Deacon and Golding 2001). Here, the debate on integration surrounds the public possibly fostering stronger viewpoints than Euro Zone members as the integration question still includes a considerably large step.

Second, new regionalism has played a prominent role in the transformation of governance in the past 20 years. Throughout the duration of British membership to the EU, the United Kingdom has been primarily a highly centralised state. The election of the Labour Government in 1997 however brought forth new policies of devolution granting a parliament to Scotland and an assembly to Wales. The dynamics of governance in Britain is shifting from its once highly centralised form to a quasi-system of multilevel governance. The concept of new regionalism (Keating 1998) is quite strong, particularly in Scotland and Northern Ireland and to a lesser extent in Wales, where regional elites have confronted the issues of globalisation, pushed for further autonomy and to a more than modest degree have achieved it. The United Kingdom maintains components of both multileveled and centralised governance where this asymmetrical balance offers a unique opportunity for comparison within a single member-state. Regional governments and interest groups now play a larger role in European policy making, from influencing policy in Brussels to influencing national European policy positions (Marks, Nielsen, Ray and Salk 1996; Jeffery 2000; Hooghe and Marks 2001; Marks, Haesly and Mbaye 2002; Marks and Hooghe 2003). In Scotland and Wales, the inclusion of the devolved bodies of governments have created a symbolic as well as functional importance bringing interest groups to focus on the subnational framework of politics (Keating and Loughlin 2002). Politically, a culture of multileveled governance with the regions at the bottom and Europe at the top is growing in Britain.

The issue of identity also has a major role in British politics. Issues of Welsh, Scottish, Irish and English identities each confront the notion of British national identity. Figure 7.6 in Chapter 7 demonstrated the variation in EU support accounting for the effects of both regional and British identities. This was noteworthy in Scotland, where British identity had a positive effect towards support for integration differing from the other British regions. In a country where the English contribute to the vast majority of the

British population, concepts of British identity are bound to differ within the minority regions. Identity, along with the process of devolution, permits a deeper investigation of how these concepts are affecting the wider British public.

There are several noteworthy works that have investigated regional British public opinion on European integration. In one such analysis Haesly (2001) uses Q-methodology and factor analysis to provide a better comparison between EU supporters and Euroskeptics within Scotland and Wales. He argues that levels of support for Europe can differ between true Europhiles and instrumental supporters who favour integration for particular motives. Welsh European supporters of Europe tend to obtain a modest level of European pride from distinguishing themselves from the English, whom they perceive as being more Euroskeptical. Approving of the European Union may assist in differentiating themselves from the English of which they see as the dominant group within Britain. Furthermore these Welsh European supporters are less likely to be concerned with Europe's threat over British sovereignty or British culture (Haesly 2001: 96). Scottish European supporters are more likely to support the EU because of the economic benefits they perceive Europe to bring to Britain and Scotland. In addition Haesly (2001: 97) finds that Scottish EU supporters have higher levels of European pride than that of the Welsh and may be accredited for the Scottish observing the European Union for the functions it was designed for rather than as a means of differentiating themselves from the English.

Carmen Huici, *et al*, (1997) devised a questionnaire to compare identifications with one's region, nation-state and Europe in relation to European integration. The survey was distributed to students in Scotland and Andalucia from which they concluded that only for Andalucian students was European identification positively correlated with national identification. Regarding Scotland, they found there to be a negative effect on integration support for both Scottish and British identities although the effects did not reach a statistical level of significance. In addition, they unexpectedly found that European identification was neither negatively related to British identity nor positively related to Scottish identity.

Dardanelli (2005) demonstrated the importance of Europe in his analysis of Scottish assertiveness. He mentions that Scottish elites were able to use European integration as

a method of persuading the public in favour of devolution. The Scottish public feared complete independence however favoured the idea of independence within Europe. As assertiveness continued to increase towards the 1997 referendum on devolution, Scottish elites were sure to emphasise the role and positive implication of EU integration. Furthermore, in contrast to opinions during the 1979 referendum, the Scottish public in 1997 may have been less fearful of the idea of independence because it was within the context of 'Europe' which was seen more positively than 18 years prior (Dardanelli 2005: 129).

Lastly, Carey (2002) conducted a secondary analysis examining British and regional identities and their effect on European integration support within the United Kingdom. Through the use of an ordered logit model using the 2000 British Household Panel Survey he found that the primary identities of Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish had a positive and significant influence on EU support while English identity had a negative effect. In addition, he found that those with British as their primary identity were also more likely to support the European Union.

There is much consideration to take in hand when defining the regions of the United Kingdom. Throughout this dissertation I have defined the region as the first territorial administration level below the nation-state. In the example of the United Kingdom, the regions of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are rather clear to observe within the realms of the definition; however England is much more ambiguous than its other British regions. The definition of "region" stated in Chapter 1 permits for the nine administrative regions of England to be used as separate regions. The ordered logit analysis of this chapter runs a single regression for England accounting for the variation of the nine English regions. As no English region displayed significance each of the analyses in this chapter will refer to England as a single entity for ease of comparison. In addition, due to lack of available data, Northern Ireland will only be analysed in the 1973-2005 time-trend and not in the logistic regression models.

British Regional EU Support 1973-2005

The first analysis of this chapter will evaluate regional EU support over the time period of 1973-2005. This will give an insight to the changes in EU evaluations between the regions of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland by comparing the means of

EU support over time. The data for this analysis is taken from the Eurobarometer Mannheim Trend File 1973-2002 with the addition of Eurobarometer Surveys 60.1 (2003), 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005). The variable used to evaluate EU support is Eurobarometer's standard EU evaluation question used to measure EU support since the early 1970s. The question is as follows:

Generally speaking, do you think that your country's membership of the European Union is a good thing, bad thing, or neither good nor bad?

The variable responses were first coded to fit ordered form assigning the value 3 to 'a good thing', 2 to 'neither a good nor a bad thing' and 1 to 'a bad thing'. All "don't know" responses were coded as 'neither good nor bad' similar to the previous chapters. In order to ease interpretation, I have also standardised the responses into a 0-1 scale.¹ 1 represents the highest level of EU support while 0 represents the lowest. The mean public EU support of each region by year is displayed in Figure 8.1.


All four regions tend to follow a consistent trend with one another however there are instances of differing opinion. The overall trend for each region starts with a decline in support that reaches its lowest point by 1980. Much of this may be attributed to the economic and labour crises of the late 1970s, a point where liberalisation of markets and labour would be highly unpopular. Interestingly, through the 1970s Scotland appears to be the most Euroskeptic of the regions. It can be noted that in Dardanelli's (2005) research Labour and Nationalist party supporters were much more hostile to the concept of Europe at this time. This sentiment appears to be transcending onto the Scottish public as anti-EU sentiment would have likely been strong given the political circumstances of the late 1970s influencing the results displayed.

After 1980 support tends to increase steadily each year until roughly 1991 where it reaches its peak. By the late 1980s, it is notable that England's support becomes lower than Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. While England's support is still increasing

¹ The formula for standardisation into a [0,1] scale is as follows:

$$Z_i = \frac{Y_i - \text{lower bound of } Y}{\text{upper bound of } Y - \text{lower bound of } Y}$$

Figure 8.1: 1973 – 2005 Regional Public Support of EU Membership



Note: Data taken from Eurobarometer Mannheim Trend File 1973-2002 and Eurobarometer Surveys 60.1 (2003), 62 (2004) and 63.4 (2005). EU position variable standardised to a 0-1 scale (1 being highest level of support) from 3-point variable measuring country EU membership approval of 1 “a bad thing”, 2 “neither good nor bad” and 3 “a good thing”.

until 1991, this change is mostly attributed to Scottish and Welsh support increasing at a steeper rate. In Scotland, by the late 1980s the Scottish National Party took a dramatic shift in changing its opposition to Europe in an attempt to produce support for autonomy within the European context. The SNP shift in attitudes towards Europe also came at a time when Labour was reevaluating its stance due to the changing nature of the European project. In Wales, Plaid Cymru had not yet taken a strong European stance and was therefore not engaged in a debate over the issue with the other parties (Mitchell 1998). The effect of Labour changing its stance however, may also explain the Welsh boost as Labour was the majority party of the Welsh constituencies. England still being a Conservative stronghold still had an increase in support but not as strong as in Scotland and Wales.

Maastricht evidently was a treaty too far for most of the British public, as support in England, Scotland and Wales decreases from 1992. Northern Ireland however resists the trend as support remains much higher there than in the other regions. This is likely due to the distinctiveness of the Northern Irish situation and past dilemmas between

nationalists and unionists. The European Union may be seen as a potential mediator in the conflict perhaps accrediting to the possibility of peace in the region. This is speculation however and the uniqueness of Northern Ireland merits further research in its own right. More interesting, after the 1997 election of the Labour government and the establishment of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh Assembly in 1999, support for both Scotland and Wales tends to oscillate while in England it remains more constant, perhaps linking the European and devolution issues. As devolution becomes a reality, the Scottish and Welsh publics are possibly shifting their attention to regional politics pushing European integration to a less significant issue.

The trends shown in Figure 8.1 demonstrate that differences in EU support have existed from 1973 through 2005 between the regions of the United Kingdom. Many of the trends have been attributed to the current debate over the role Britain has played by the political parties, particularly between the SNP and Labour parties in Scotland. The subsequent section will expand the time line in comparing the regional public position to that of the political parties.

Regional Public Support vs. Party Position

The following section will build on the previous analysis by comparing regional public support for European integration with party positions towards integration. Observing the trends of both public and party will determine if any of the political parties reflect the public's sentiment towards integration. Two sources of data will be combined in this section. Public support will again be taken from the Eurobarometer Mannheim Trend File while the party positions will be taken from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey discussed in more detail in Chapters 4 and 5. The Chapel Hill expert survey was chosen over the Comparative Manifestos Project as the inclusion of evaluations of the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru extended into the 1980s as opposed to the Comparative Manifestos Project. The survey evaluates each political party for the years 1984, 1988, 1992, 1996, 1999 and 2002. The Eurobarometer data was also selected for the corresponding years. Unfortunately, due to a lack of data, Northern Ireland will not be included in this analysis.

The variable used to evaluate public support is identical to the variable used in the above 1973-2005 time-series analysis. The variable is once again standardised on a 0-1

scale. The Chapel Hill expert survey asks a number of party experts to estimate the “overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in [given year]” on a 1-7 scale of the following:²

- 1) Strongly opposed to European integration
- 2) Opposed to European integration
- 3) Somewhat opposed to European integration
- 4) Neutral, no stance on the issue of European integration
- 5) Somewhat in favor of European integration
- 6) In favor of European integration
- 7) Strongly in favor of European Integration

In order to make the party results comparable with the public’s the party EU position variable has also been standardised to a 0-1 scale. The results are presented in the figures below for Scotland (Figure 8.2), Wales (Figure 8.3) and England (Figure 8.4).

When comparing the regional public’s aggregate EU position with the political party positions at first glance, it is noticeable that in not any of the three regions does the public align completely with any of the parties. While it would likely be expected that the public will never perfectly match support with that of a particular party, observing the shifts in support is more useful to distinguish if any particular party corresponds to the change in views of the public.

First, observing Scotland in Figure 8.2, the Scottish public lie between the EU support levels of the Labour and Conservative parties throughout the 18 year period. The steadiest increase in public support occurs between 1984 and 1992, the very years it was mentioned above that the SNP brought the European issue to the forefront of Scottish politics. Labour and the SNP also increase their support levels during this period while the Conservatives are perceived to have marginally increased their favourability towards the EU. This possibly supports the hypothesis that the debate and modification of EU support by the parties may have influenced the Scottish public into strengthening integration support. Furthermore, the public seem to follow the trend of the SNP with small a decline in support from 1992 to 1996, to a small increase by 1999 followed a

² Please refer to chapters 4 and 5 for more information on the design of the Chapel Hill Survey.

Figure 8.2: 1984 – 2002 Scottish Public vs. Political Parties




Figure 8.3: 1984 – 2002 Welsh Public vs. Political Parties





Figure 8.4: 1984 – 2002 English Public vs. Political Parties



Note: For Figure 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4, public evaluations are from the Eurobarometer Mannheim Trend File and party evaluations are from the Chapel Hill expert survey. Both variables for EU position for public and party have been standardised to 0-1 scale (1 being highest level of support).

second reasonable decline by 2002. The support shifts of the other parties do not follow the variation in support as strongly as the SNP.

Wales and England however have a slightly different interaction between the public and political parties. In both regions, the public tends to follow the trend of the Labour and Conservative parties with a small increase of support until 1992. After 1992 both regional publics decrease their strength in support much to the trends of both the Labour and Conservative parties though no party truly runs parallel with public support for the latter half of the decade. This displays that through the 1980s and early 1990s English and Welsh opinion were more correlated with party positions while both public and parties begin to deviate from one another by the mid-1990s. In Scotland however Scottish public opinion appears to strongly correlate with the position of the SNP. The direction of causality however is still unclear. It is possible that the SNP is generating the debate on European integration as a means to bolster support for devolution and ultimately independence. Carruba (2001) however suggests that European policy preferences of elites tend to be based on the preferences of the general public. Carruba was able to test this theory by controlling for the party-cueing effect through examining

non-party supporters and their positions towards integration. If this is the case, it may be likely that the SNP as the only regional party of Scotland is better able to correspond with the preferences of the Scottish people. Due to the small sample size of SNP supporters in the Mannheim Trend File an analysis over time investigating party supporters is not possible but will be examined in the ordered logit regression analysis using the 2005 British Election Study in the following section of the chapter.

Approving EU Membership: Ordered Logit Regression Analysis of Scotland, Wales and England

The following section will present ordered logit regression models for Scotland, Wales and England. The models will give insight to the effects of several variables that were explored in the previous chapters of this dissertation and provide models to build estimations of support in the three British regions. More on the use of ordered logit regression will be explained after the variable descriptions.

The Data

The dataset chosen for the analysis is the 2005 British Election Study (BES).³ The BES is a survey conducted before and after each British election since 1964. The face-to-face interviews provide researchers with a substantial amount of information useful for determining the British public's opinion on various issues during the time of each election.

There are several reasons why I chose to use the BES over a number of other surveys including Eurobarometer, which was the primary source of public data in the previous chapters. The chief concern with using Eurobarometer was a sample size issue. The total sample size for the United Kingdom in the Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005) dataset was only 1,318. While the sample seems large, the total for Scotland is only 83 and 26 for Wales, thus eliminating the possibility for developing a reliable multivariate model for either region.⁴ The BES survey is much more competent with a total sample size of 4,791, and 1,213 and 888 for Scotland and Wales respectively. In addition, the BES

³ Data is made available at www.essex.ac.uk/bes.

⁴ While the sample size is too small for an ordered logit regression model it is large enough for a random intercept and hierarchical linear model when part of a larger sample as done in chapters 6 and 7. Due to the lack of nested groups in a single country case study, neither the random intercepts nor hierarchical linear models should be used. Please refer to Snijders and Bosker (1999: 140-154) for more information on multilevel models and sample sizes.

includes many variables that are nearly identical to those used in Eurobarometer making the comparisons with the previous models much easier.⁵

The Dependent Variable

The dependent variable used for the analysis asks the respondent to evaluate British EU membership and is similar to the Eurobarometer variable used to construct the dependent index variable in chapters 6 and 7. The BES question asks:

Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britain's membership in the European Union?

The respondent is then given the option to respond with 1 of 5 possible responses of:

- 1) Strongly Approve
- 2) Approve
- 3) Neither Approve or Disapprove
- 4) Disapprove and
- 5) Strongly Disapprove

The BES does not leave an option for “don’t know” thus all none answers are coded as missing and eliminated from the models. The dependent variable is different from the index variable used in Chapters 6 and 7. The index variable is a combination of three questions, one evaluating country membership similar to the dependent variable used in this chapter. The scores were equally weighted to create a 10-point index scale evaluating an individual’s overall level of EU support that was compatible with using the multileveled models. As multileveled models will not be used in this chapter, the BES variable measuring public EU evaluations will be kept in its original form. The phrasing of the question, however, still measures the same fundamental dynamic of which the additional questions in Eurobarometer measure thus will be valid for this analysis (Deflem and Pampel 1996).

⁵ Other British specific surveys were also considered such as the British Household Panel Survey and British Social Attitudes Survey. While both contained interesting questions regarding devolution and identity, the remainder of the variables were limited when attempting to construct similar models of those in the earlier chapters. In addition, due to lack of data available Northern Ireland will not be included in the analysis.

Table 8.1: Distribution of British Membership Approval by Region

Question: Overall, do you approve or disapprove of Britain's membership in the European Union?

	Total	Percentage of Region
Scotland		
Strongly Approve	67	6.8
Approve	360	36.4
Neither	288	29.2
Disapprove	210	21.3
Strongly Disapprove	63	6.4
Wales		
Strongly Approve	43	5.8
Approve	273	36.5
Neither	214	28.6
Disapprove	151	20.2
Strongly Disapprove	67	8.0
England		
Strongly Approve	146	6.3
Approve	763	32.8
Neither	621	26.8
Disapprove	580	24.0
Strongly Disapprove	211	9.1

Note: Data original source taken from BES 2005 survey. The above results are after recoding from the original form and used for the constructed models for this chapter

The distributions of the dependent variable are shown in Table 8.1, revealing that approval (when observing “approve” and “strongly approve”) of British membership in the EU is higher in Scotland and Wales than in England. Furthermore negative evaluations of British membership are higher in England.

The Explanatory Variables

I have attempted to use several of the same explanatory variables used in the previous models of Chapters 6 and 7. The prior chapters included several macro-indicators in correspondence with the previous literature (Eichenberg and Dalton 1993; Duch and Taylor 1997; Gabel and Whitten 1997; Kritzinger 2003). However, because this case study analysis deals with single regions, the regional and national level indicators have been eliminated. I will however maintain using the subjective indicators referring to the overall national economy perception similar to those used by Gabel and Whitten (1997). In addition, employment expectations were not available in the BES thus I have included personal economic expectations to achieve a subjective evaluation of economy. In addition to the economic evaluations I have also included a variable

evaluating the satisfaction with democracy in Britain. The BES questions for the above variables are as follows:

How do you think the financial situation of your household will change over the next 12 months?

- 1) Get a lot worse
- 2) Get a little worse
- 3) Stay the same
- 4) Get a little better
- 5) Get a lot better

How do you think the general economic situation in this country will develop over the next 12 months?

- 1) Get a lot worse
- 2) Get a little worse
- 3) Stay the same
- 4) Get a little better
- 5) Get a lot better

On the whole, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way that democracy works in this country?

- 1) Very satisfied
- 2) Fairly satisfied
- 3) A little dissatisfied⁶

I would expect the economic evaluation variables to both remain positive as was the case in Chapter 6. In addition, those more satisfied with democracy in Britain are also expected to have positive evaluations of integration. Furthermore, I would also expect democratic satisfaction to have a stronger effect in Scotland and Wales where citizens are more accustomed to multilevel governance.

⁶ While both economic evaluations were left in their original ordered coding, the democratic evaluation variable was recoded with 3 being "Very Satisfied" and 1 "A little dissatisfied" to keep consistency with higher numbered response categories being the more positive outcome.

To further investigate the effects of political parties I have included dummy variables for voters of the Labour, Conservative, Liberal Democrat parties for each region and additionally the Scottish National Party for Scotland, Plaid Cymru for Wales and the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in England. To assess the effects of political party supporters each of the party variables will be tested against non-voters as the reference category. I would expect party supporters to share similar evaluations of EU support with that of their political party of choice. Therefore using the results of party preferences from the analysis above I expect Liberal Democrat voters, followed by Labour voters, in all three regions to maintain the strongest EU support while conversely Conservative voters, and UKIP voters in England, will demonstrate the weakest support. Additionally, SNP and Plaid Cymru voters should also maintain strong positive evaluations of EU support similar to that of Labour voters.

Exploring the effects of regional assertiveness has been one of the prime variables under consideration throughout this dissertation. While Van Houten's (2003) regional assertiveness variable would not be practical in a single case study, the BES does include questions on evaluation of autonomy within Scotland and Wales. The questions considering autonomy are as follows:

Scotland:

Which of the following Statements comes closest to your views?

- 1) Scotland should become independent, separate from the UK
- 2) Scotland should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament that has some taxation powers
- 3) Scotland should be part of the UK, without its own elected parliament

Wales:

Which of the following Statements comes closest to your views?

- 1) Wales should become independent, separate from the UK
- 2) Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly that has some taxation powers
- 3) Wales should remain part of the UK, with its own elected assembly that has no taxation powers

4) Wales should be part of the UK, without its own elected parliament

Options 2 and 3 for Wales have been combined as “maintaining a Welsh Assembly” in order to remain consistent with the Scottish options. A dummy variable was created for each category with option 3, maintaining a parliament at the national level only, used as the reference category as it represents a discontent for devolution and multilevel governance. I would expect those that support independence for both Scotland and Wales are more likely to support the European Union due to cueing from regional parties as they promote independence “within Europe”. Furthermore those that support the devolutionary bodies of government will also be more in favour of European integration than those that believe in a UK centralised government. These individuals are supporting a multilevel governance system within Britain and will therefore be more likely than UK parliament only supporters to accept a third level of government in Europe.

Variables evaluating identity will also be considered. Chapter 7 demonstrated that those with higher levels of regional identity were less likely to support EU integration while those that had higher levels of national identity were more likely to support integration. I have created a set of binary variables representing primary identity from the following BES questions:

Which, if any, of the following best describes how you see yourself?

- 1) [Scottish, Welsh, English] not British
- 2) More [Scottish, Welsh, English] than British
- 3) Equally [Scottish, Welsh, English] and British
- 4) More British than [Scottish, Welsh, English]
- 5) British not [Scottish, Welsh, English]

I first combined options 1 and 2 to create a category referencing Scottish, Welsh, or English as the strongest identity. I then did the same for options 4 and 5 to reference British as the strongest identity. Option 3 remained equal regional and British identity. I then included a dummy variable for Scottish, Welsh, or English in addition to British identity in each respective model. Equal identity was then used as the reference

category to get an understanding of the strengths regional and British identity plays in Britain. I would expect regional identity to display a negative effect and British identity to display a positive effect as it did in Chapter 7.

In both Chapters 6 and 7 I examined Ronald Inglehart's (1970b; 1970a; 1977) concept of *opinion leadership*, an individual's potential for political involvement. The *opinion leadership* index variable created by Eurobarometer is a 4-point scale combining two questions, the first asking a respondent how often one discusses political matters with others and the second asking how often one tries to persuade others from their views. The BES does not include the same variable but does comprise of two similar variables, the first rating an individual's political interest on a 1-5 scale, 1 being the least amount of interest and 5 being the most, and a second variable rating the ability for an individual to persuade how to vote, 1 for least likely through 10 for most likely. I have left both variables in their original form and expect both to hold positive effects.

The next variable to be used is level of education, which indicates at which age level an individual was last considered to be a full time student. Here we would expect that those who discontinued their education at a younger age will be less likely to support EU membership positively. Education contributes to access of information as well as a more broad-based attitude of the world; therefore one who receives a higher level of education should be expected to have a positive attitude on European integration (Kohli 2000).

Lastly *Age* and *Gender* act as control variables to optimise the effects of each model. According to Deflem and Pampel (1996) age has a significant effect on EU integration. This theory derives from democratisation of schooling in recent decades, where those of a younger generations are more likely to have received further education than previous generations and are more likely to support the unification of Europe (Deflem and Pampel 1996). In addition *gender* will be included and is expected to show higher support amongst men than women reflecting previous research (Liebert 1999; Nelsén and Guth 2000).

Explaining British Regional Variation

Ordered logistic regression is used to analyse the above described variables and their effects on the five category variable measuring approval of British EU membership. The previous chapters used regression and multileveled models in order to predict the outcome of support for integration. The given dependent variable in the BES is a five category outcome where the categories are placed in order from least favourable to most favourable EU support levels. The distance between these categories however is unclear and needs to be taken into account when evaluating the effects of the explanatory variables.⁷ The ordered logistic regression model treats each response category of the dependent variable independently when analysing the model. It will also provide the opportunity to predict the probability of a particular category in the dependent variable given the measurement of certain explanatory variables. In other terms, it will be able to give the probabilities of each category of EU membership approval given an observed response of any explanatory variable. For example, it would be possible to predict the probability that an individual will strongly approve of EU membership given he/she has the primary identity of being Scottish.

Table 8.2 displays the ordered logit models for Scotland, Wales and England. Each of the models predicted roughly 40% of the cases correctly.⁸ In addition to the explanatory variables, a dummy variable for each English region was included to account for variation amongst the English regions. As none of the regions displayed significance they were not included on the table due to insufficient space. The coefficients for the English regions are available in the appendix.

In each of the regions personal economic expectations had a positive effect, displaying that the more likely one is to believe he/she will be economically stronger the more likely they will be to support the EU. Although positive for each region, the variable is only significant in Scotland. Furthermore the coefficient is much larger in Scotland showing that personal economic well-being is a much stronger influence for the Scottish than in Wales and England. When observing the general economic expectations for the entirety of the United Kingdom, only England had a positive and statistically significant

⁷ Please refer to Chapter 4 for a detailed description on logistic and ordered logistic regression.

⁸ Though this may seem low, identical models were produced using a recoded three category dependent variable for comparison where the percent predicted correctly were roughly 55%. The reduction of 15% is attributed to the higher number of response categories in the dependent variable. While recoding the variable to three categories increases the percent correctly predicted, doing so may exclude information thus it was decided to leave the variable in its original categorisation.

Table 8.2: Ordered Logit Models for Public Approval of British EU Membership

Independent Variables	Scotland		Wales		England	
	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)	β	(S.E.)
Evaluation Indicators						
Personal Economic Expectations	0.255*	(0.102)	0.158	(0.138)	0.090	(0.060)
General Economic Expectations	-0.071	(0.106)	0.027	(0.130)	0.134*	(0.057)
Democratic Satisfaction	0.463**	(0.127)	0.371*	(0.151)	0.488**	(0.071)
Political Party¹						
Labour	0.323	(0.219)	0.136	(0.282)	0.426**	(0.126)
Conservatives	-0.242	(0.280)	-0.856**	(0.325)	-0.342**	(0.129)
Liberal Democrats	0.560*	(0.270)	-0.019	(0.321)	0.469**	(0.143)
Scottish National Party	-0.282	(0.254)				
Plaid Cymru			0.274	(0.386)		
UKIP					-1.617**	(0.369)
Autonomy²						
Independent Scotland	0.174	(0.261)				
Independent Wales			0.232	(0.385)		
Scottish Parliament	0.338 ⁺	(0.200)				
Welsh Assembly			0.829**	(0.214)		
Identity³						
British	-0.569 ⁺	(0.298)	-0.075	(0.239)	0.172	(0.117)
Scottish	-0.459*	(0.181)				
Welsh			-0.223	(0.222)		
English					-0.446**	(0.100)
Political Interest Variables						
Political Interest	0.221*	(0.091)	0.322**	(0.107)	0.128*	(0.050)
Vote Persuasion	0.054 ⁺	(0.030)	0.052	(0.035)	0.047**	(0.016)
Demographic Variables						
Gender (Male)	0.293 ⁺	(0.157)	0.197	(0.186)	0.341**	(0.088)
Age	-0.019**	(0.006)	-0.010	(0.007)	-0.010**	(0.003)
Age Completed Education ⁴						
16-18	0.045	(0.189)	0.402 ⁺	(0.243)	0.460**	(0.108)
19 or Above	0.784**	(0.249)	1.089**	(0.312)	1.071**	(0.139)
τ^1	-1.094	(0.658)	0.305	(0.790)	-0.016	(0.357)
τ^2	0.971	(0.647)	1.907	(0.787)	1.940	(0.356)
τ^3	2.255	(0.651)	3.284	(0.797)	3.213	(0.360)
τ^4	4.949	(0.682)	6.152	(0.844)	5.909	(0.382)
% Predicted Correctly	42.4%		39.6%		40.6%	
Log Likelihood	-804.518		-544.419		-2522.985	
$\chi^2(d.f.)$	128.35(17)		105.97(17)		434.05(23)	
<i>N</i>	615		419		1904	

⁺ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Reference Categories:

¹: Non-Voters ²: UK Parliament Only ³: Equal Identities ⁴: 15 or Below

Note: Dummy variables for each of the nine English administrative regions were also included however as none were significant they are not included in the above table for concern of space.

effect while in Wales the effect was positive though minimal and insignificant. In Scotland the effect was negative and not statistically significant. The two economic evaluation variables show that the English tend to take account of the United Kingdom as a whole when evaluating the European Union. The Scottish however have a stronger effect when evaluating their personal economic situation while the Welsh tend to take neither personal nor national economic evaluations into account. This indicates that in economic terms, the English are more likely to reflect on the whole of the country while the Scottish and Welsh are less likely to consider the economic evaluations of the entirety of Britain. In addition, the Scottish are more likely to reflect on evaluations closer to the individual level.

Democratic satisfaction displays a strong positive and statistically significant relationship for each of the regions. The effect remains strongest in England and Scotland, both comparable to their evaluations of democracy in Britain. In Wales however the effect remains slightly lower though statistically significant. It remains evident for all the British, those who evaluate democracy positively will be more likely to transcend that satisfaction to the approval of an additional level of governance.

The inclusion of the political party variable helps capture the likelihood of EU approval for supporters of each of the parties. Non-voters were used as the reference group for all party supporters to be measured against. Labour supporters were more likely to support integration in each of the three regions although the effect was only statistically significant in England. The Conservatives unsurprisingly had a strong negative and statistically significant effect for each of regions, where the effect was strongest in Wales. Haesly (2001: 94) noted in his research that Euroskeptics in Scotland and Wales tend to highlight the Conservative Party's concern that the EU acts as an institution in which Britain competes rather than acts collectively. The Conservative Party's unease over the EU is likely to be much stronger amongst Welsh Conservatives rather than Scottish or English Conservatives. The Liberal Democrats had the most influence on EU support in Scotland, followed by England, and a minimal and statistically insignificant effect in Wales.

Surprisingly voters of the Scottish National Party had an extremely large negative effect in Scotland, being the party least likely to support EU membership. However, the

results are statistically insignificant thus conclusions can only be approached with caution. This may give an interesting insight to the voters of the SNP. While the SNP promotes independence within Europe, the concept of “within Europe” may not be necessarily important to SNP voters. In Wales, voters of Plaid Cymru show only a modest positive effect towards EU support although statistically insignificant. The negative coefficient in addition to the lack of statistical significance indicates that for both nationalist parties the issue of Europe is not necessarily linked with the goals of autonomy for the party supporters. The slogan of independence “within Europe” appears to more likely be provided for non-party followers to support the ideology of independence rather than the party itself. Lastly, UKIP predictably has a strong and statistically significant negative effect being the only party formed on an anti-European ideology.

In both Scotland and Wales, those supporting independence in addition to those supporting the devolved governments displayed positive effects when compared to those desiring only a central UK government. Support for the devolved governments however maintained a much stronger and statistically significant effect when compared to those that desire independence. This perhaps gives insight to the role devolution and independence plays in evaluating Europe. The positive correlation between devolution and EU support suggests that integration may benefit from individuals who support multilevel governance within their member-state. Independence however is a step away from multilevel governance only creating an additional centralised government. Both supporters of independence and supporters of a UK centralised government may find more in common in terms of European integration than with those supporting devolution. Strong allegiances to single governments appear to deter support away from Europe in both scenarios. For Europe, independence for subnational regions may be a step too far while devolution within the concept of new regionalism may actually promote integration support.

The effects of regional identity ran consistent with the conclusions of Chapter 7. In all three regions, regional identity had a negative effect on approval of EU membership. The effect was only statistically significant however in Scotland and England. In Scotland the effect was strongest though comparable to England. In terms of British identity, England was the only region to remain consistent with the results of Chapter 7

showing that those who perceive themselves as primarily British over English are more likely to support EU membership. In Scotland and Wales, British identity displayed a negative effect though only statistically significant in Scotland. To explore the effects of identity further I have created a probabilities plot for each of the three regions. Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 display the change in the probability of an individual approving of EU membership as identity moves from being equally Scottish/Welsh/English *and* British to being primarily Scottish/Welsh/English *or* British. In other terms, the point on the left of the figure shows the percentage probability of approving EU membership for an individual who maintains a dual identity of both his/her region and Britain. The two points on the right side of the represent the percentage probability of approving EU membership for an individual whom maintains a stronger regional or British identity. The probabilities are calculated accounting for identity while holding all other variables at their means.

The difference in effects amongst the regions shows that the Scottish and the Welsh reflect on identity differently than the English in regards to evaluating the EU. In Scotland, both Scottish and British identities lower the probability of approving of the EU by a large margin. Both identities have a similar effect demonstrating those that maintain a dual identity are much more likely to support the EU. In Wales, Welsh identity has a stronger impact in lowering the probability of approving the EU than does British identity. In England, English identity decreases the probability of approval while British identity increases the likelihood of approving the EU. Perhaps in Scotland and Wales British and regional identities compete more with one another than in England. Due to these conflicting identities Europe may be seen as yet another territorial identity that regional and British identities perceive as a threat. In England, Britishness may be seen as more of a multiple identity including all of the United Kingdom rarely pitted against English identity thus those that see themselves as British are more accepting to the possibility of a European identity. Those that feel any levels of English identity, whether it be equal to British identity or fully English, are more likely to perceive the EU as a threat.

Figure 8.5: Scottish Identity Predicted Probabilities



Figure 8.6: Welsh Identity Predicted Probabilities





Figure 8.7: English Identity Predicted Probabilities



Note: For Figures 8.5, 8.6 and 8.7 probability of approving British EU membership is the combined probability of “Approving” and “Strongly Approving”.

As expected, *political interest* has a positive and statistically significant effect for all three regions. In Scotland and Wales however the effect was stronger than that of England possibly indicating that the issue of European integration is more salient for the Scottish and Welsh. In addition, *vote persuasion* had a minimal and statistically insignificant effect showing that individuals persuading others how to vote were unlikely using Europe as a means of persuasion. Males and higher levels of education displayed a positive effect while Age showed that older generations are less likely to support the EU as was predicted. None of the control variables used contributed any unique explanations that differed from the previous literature.

Conclusion

This chapter was designed to evaluate perceptions of regional public opinion towards European integration through the case study of the United Kingdom. It started by exploring the regional trends of EU support over time from 1973-2005. While the large trends seemed to be parallel amongst the regions, there are instances where some

regions deviate away from the other regions perhaps reflecting the European debate amongst the political parties. This was expanded further by comparing the regional public and the positions of the political parties. In Scotland, the public seemed to shift positions in accordance with the Scottish National Party over time whereas in Wales and England the public appeared more likely to be correlated with the positions of the Labour and Conservative parties. This possibly illustrates the role the SNP plays in Scotland when using Europe in its debate towards independence. The closeness of the SNP and the Scottish public's positions on Europe indicate that a correlation between the two may exist. The causal direction of this relationship however is not clear. The SNP may possibly be shaping the debate in Scottish politics thus convincing the public on supporting Europe. Conversely, the SNP may be taking cues from the public, being the only regional party of Scotland having an advantage of being able to adapt the party position on Europe to represent the general Scottish public. In Wales, Plaid Cymru did not appear to have as comparable positions with the Welsh public. Both the English and Welsh publics appear to have stronger correlations with the Labour and/or Conservative parties.

The ordered logit models gave a cross-regional comparison on how several variables influence EU support differently amongst each of the regions. The most notable indicators were those of political party and identity, particularly where the Scottish National Party maintained a negative effect. This shows that although the SNP may promote the European Union, its supporters still detach themselves from reflecting the same evaluations towards integration. In the party and public comparison, however, the SNP appeared to be the political party that best fits Scottish public attitudes on Europe. This may indicate that the SNP are using the European issue to reach the general Scottish public and attract support for their cause from non-party supporters rather than influence their supporters alone. In Wales, Plaid Cymru showed a positive effect though statistically insignificant. Conservatives, which had a negative effect, were the only party in Wales to show statistical significance. This may demonstrate that in Wales party correlation may be strongest for those that have a Euroskeptic sentiment. In England all parties showed statistical significance including a very strong negative effect from UKIP.

When evaluating the economy, the English appeared to be more likely to evaluate the whole UK when compared to the Scottish and Welsh. The Scottish however had stronger evaluations when reflecting upon their own personal economic expectations as opposed to the British economy. While this is not to say the Scottish are more concerned about themselves than all of Britain, it may demonstrate that the English are more inclined to think nationally when compared to Scotland or Wales. Identity also had differing effects in Scotland and Wales when compared to the English. In Scotland and Wales, British identity showed a different effect than in England possibly revealing the confliction of identities in these minority regions. It appears evident, that British identity has a different meaning for the Scottish and Welsh. For both these regions, British identity may compete with the regional identities thus those that are able to accept both will be more likely to identify with a third European identity. In England, British identity may not be seen as threatening to English identity, as it is in Scotland and Wales, thus those that see themselves as British are more accepting to the possibility of a European identity.

Additionally, desire for independence had a weaker effect on EU membership support when compared to support for the devolutionary governments. This may indicate that public support for independence may offset support for European integration. However, devolution and multilevel governance, including the regional level, demonstrate a strong positive effect on EU support. European support appears to benefit greatly from support of multilevel governance. Independence however can be seen as support for an additional central state where authority may be threatened by European integration. When evaluating the variables that contribute to new regionalism, such as economic perceptions and identity, they each impact EU evaluations differently dependent upon region. As the European question of integration is consistently debated in British politics, and as Scotland, and perhaps someday Wales, moves towards the possibility of holding a referendum on independence, the results of the above models may give insight into the dynamics of what lies ahead in Britain's relationship with the EU.

Chapter 9

Conclusions

Introduction

The investigations of this dissertation attempted to establish explanations of regional variation in public support for the European Union. The results suggest that the reality of EU public opinion is much more complex than much of the previous literature suggests. When observing public opinion data within the multileveled territorial context of European states a more complete representation of public perceptions towards support of European integration can be seen. As previous literature has found concepts of politics, economy and identity all have significant implications on shaping opinion towards European integration. A large extent of this earlier research however failed to address much of the changing dynamics of multilevel governance and regional assertiveness occurring within many of the EU member-states over the past 20 years.

Many of the notions used to explain regional EU support within this research are associated with the theme of Michael Keating's (1998) concept of new regionalism. New regionalism is the subnational reaction to the ongoing globalisation in which the European Union is a large part. Regions are pitted against one another in terms of economic, political and even cultural competition. This in turn gives regions the incentive to have a more direct influence on the management of policies that affect them most thus a plea for further autonomy from the nation-state is made. A crucial feature however is that this course of action is asymmetrical between countries throughout Europe. Some regions have a higher degree of assertiveness, such as in Scotland or the Basque Country, while others have little or no assertiveness. Furthermore each region differs in their reasoning for autonomy. In some regions new regionalism can be seen as contributing to the expansion of the multilevel governance structure in modern Europe. As the regions attempt to pull authority away from the nation-state from below the European Union does the equivalent from above.

Can the region and Europe find a common ground in moving authority from the nation-state? The results of this research suggest that although regional elites may find commonality with the motives of the European Union this sentiment has yet to fully transfer to the regional public. In addition, the various elements which contribute to the growth of new regionalism have varied effects on the regional public's attitude towards European integration. These elements have been summed into four main themes which will be reviewed in this final chapter. I will begin the dissertation conclusion by discussing the contribution this research makes to the literature on public opinion towards European integration. I will go on to re-evaluate the role of regional political parties and their influence on the public. I will then review the investigation of economic and political indicators' influence on integration support followed by the role of identity, all taken within the regional context. Lastly I will look more directly at regional assertiveness and its influence on European support. Thereafter I will conclude by discussing the limitations of this research and how it can be expanded to give further knowledge into understanding regional variations in public opinion towards European integration.

Contribution to European Public Opinion Studies

The research in this dissertation was designed to build upon the works of previous authors rather than discover a new explanatory variable that has astoundingly been overlooked over the past decades of public opinion research. The unique approach this research has taken accounted for the multileveled structure of the data involved. Rather than just hypothesising positive economic evaluations will lead to positive evaluations on EU support, the contextual structure of how economic evaluations are constructed was considered.

Individuals form their opinions on the contextual elements that surround them. Not all regions react to the same variables similarly. This was highlighted in the complicated effect that regional and more specifically national identities play. Accounting for these effects was only possible by using the multilevel modelling approach. While multilevel modelling is a rather new methodology it has been occasionally applied to other studies seeking to explain public opinion towards the EU. Most of this previous research however used country and political party as their chosen levels of analysis. While

political parties may be a logical level it leaves out many of the components that make up one's community that may contribute to shaping his/her opinion.

In addition, the multilevel model approach allowed for the observation of different effects a single variable may have on EU support. While the individual effect of national identity was positive overall, when permitting for the randomisation of the variable per region we get a better glimpse of national identity within a single country. This highlighted that national identity can have opposite effects in different regions within the same country. The multilevel model allows for the examination of both an overall cross-national effect as well as the possibility of examining particular regions. The use of multilevel modelling in this research will hopefully reveal the significance of accounting for the nested structure in which nearly all survey data exist.

Lastly, this research moves public opinion research away from examining countries as homogenous states. It recognises the new direction which governance is taking on the European continent. As new regionalism and devolution progress, the significance of the region as a political actor at both the European and national levels will increase. This role will establish a new political arena in which region specific policies will be debated not only amongst the political elites but the public as well. If the European Union is to ultimately reach its goal of a 'Europe of the regions' then this work is an opening step into understanding the public's relation with this concept.

Regional Political Parties: What Do They Stand for and Are They Influencing the Public?

The regional political parties are unique in terms of ideology when compared to nearly all other political party families. Their commonality with one another lies not on the traditional ideological political spectrum but rather in the shared goal of autonomy for the territories they represent (Hix and Lord 1997: 44). As regional parties are seen primarily as single issue parties they are often considered fringe parties as they rarely partake in government. Some researchers such as Taggart (1998) claimed that as these parties are less likely to participate in government, the European issue is seen as secondary as integration is mostly an intergovernmental process.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that the regionalist parties themselves are just as likely to be as pro-European as most of the mainstream parties while the other fringe party families tend to either be primarily negative towards integration, as in the case with the far left and far right, or minimally in favour of integration, as with the greens. This was demonstrated through the use of comparing party manifestos from the time period of 1990-2003. In addition when observing the Chapel Hill expert surveys, this trend seems to remain consistent with Keating's (1998) theory of new regionalism as regional party support increases from the early 1980s. Furthermore by comparing the manifesto data with the expert survey, regional parties' intentions in addition to their actions towards support for Europe remain reliably positive.

The data also displayed that when regional parties are placed on the traditional political ideology spectrum, the more conservative regional parties tend to favour European integration. This is similar to the comparison of all party families where the conservative parties displayed the highest likelihood of integration support (Chapter 5). It was also shown that when observing cultural protection, classified as a "new political issue", regional parties tend to go against Marks, Hooghe and Wilson's (2002) ideological spectrum on new politics.¹ Those regional parties within culturally differing regions are more likely to support integration than be Euroskeptic possibly seeing the European Union as a means of protecting the minority regional culture (Chapter 5). The above trends display that in terms of European integration regional parties do tend to be consistent with one another and do not necessarily act like a fringe party. How does this fare with regional party supporters?

In Chapter 5 when comparing the mean levels of public support for the EU for both regional parties and their supporters with other party families, regional party supporters do remain consistently pro-EU in line with their party family. This trend can be observed over time from 1984-2002. The other so-called fringe parties and supporters of the far left, far right and greens do not follow the EU integration stance of their parties. In addition, when evaluating member-states which contain regions with higher levels of political assertiveness, the inclusion of regional parties within the national parliament had a positive and significant effect on the public's support of EU

¹ Marks, Hooghe and Wilson (2002) label this second ideological spectrum the GAL/TAN scale. GAL (Green / Alternative / Libertarian) is on the left side of the scale while TAN (Traditional / Authoritarian / Nationalist) is on the right side of the scale.

integration (Chapter 7). This perhaps displays that the participation of regional parties in national government helps reinforce a positive attitude towards multilevel governance for these regions. When conducting a more in depth analysis of the United Kingdom (Chapter 8), Scottish National Party supporters appear to be less likely to support the EU than the other parties while Plaid Cymru displayed more of a positive inclination of support. However, both of these findings were statistically insignificant perhaps showing that the debate in Scotland and Wales on European integration does not necessarily hinge upon party support. More interesting when following the support trends between party and the regional public, Scottish public levels of support tend to be more closely aligned with the SNP than the other parties. While the causal direction of this support is unclear, there does appear to be a relationship between the SNP position and that of the public. The SNP, perhaps having the benefit of being the only regional party, have the ability to both follow the sentiment of the Scottish people and place the European question within the Scottish context thus showing the importance of regional party politics within the European debate. Here, while regional party supporters may not inevitably follow their party's position on Europe the party instead correlates with the wider public. This shows that both European-wide as well as regional specific trends are worthwhile investigating.

Regional Economic and Political Indicators: Does Regional Distinction Influence Public Opinion on European integration?

The research completed in this dissertation carefully took into account the previous works on public opinion towards European integration. It was noted that a large proportion of this work evaluated economic and political factors within the national context in an effort to explain public support of integration. This research applied several of the economic and political indicators used previously. However they were analysed within the regional context in addition to the national context to determine if the variation of these factors is as significant between regions within the same country as they are between countries.

Chapter 6 presented an analysis of all EU15 member-states displaying how regional economic and political indicators influence EU public opinion. It was shown that regional GDP had a stronger as well as positive effect on EU support when compared to national GDP demonstrating that regional wealth may be more likely taken into

consideration by the public when evaluating European integration. Unemployment levels however remained insignificant at both the national and regional levels. To further investigate public perceptions on the economy, evaluations of the economy and employment situation were considered. At first instance both had a positive and strongly significant effect on EU opinion demonstrating that those that perceive the economy and employment situation more positively will more likely support integration. An interaction variable was also created to determine if a cross-level interaction existed between regional GDP and evaluation on the economy. The result shown was a positive and significant interaction showing that high economic perceptions in wealthier regions are more likely to have positive evaluations of the EU. The random intercept model allows for a deeper analysis on how the public may develop such evaluations and connect them to the EU. Each variable had a separate coefficient created to account for variation within regions, between regions/within the same country, between all regions and between countries. Economic evaluations remained strongest at the regional level while employment evaluations only remained strong at the individual level. In other terms, individuals seem to more likely evaluate the economy on the level closest to them, the region, as opposed to the national context while issues of employment remain a personal perception. When observing economic evaluations in the United Kingdom (Chapter 8) two variables were used. The first variable evaluated one's personal economic situation while the second evaluated one's perception of the national economic situation. A striking difference between English and Scottish perceptions was noted. While both evaluation variables had a positive effect for the Scottish the relationship is only significant at the personal level while for the English, the relationship is only significant at the national level. This may demonstrate that at least for the Scottish, economic evaluations are based at levels lower than the overall British level. The English are more likely to evaluate the entirety of the national economic situation perhaps showing that English and Scottish national perceptions differ.

Political indicators were also presented in the research. Multilevel governance has been a recurring theme throughout the research and was tested in the form of a national level variable measuring multilevel governance taken from Hooghe and Marks' (2001: 191-212) attempt to quantify the level of regional democracy within the EU member-states (Chapters 6 and 7). Surprisingly, while this variable had a significant impact amongst

the regional political parties, it seemed to have no significant effect on the public. This does not undermine the effect of multilevel governance at the regional level however. While this multilevel governance variable is a national level indicator the participation of regional parties within the national parliament mentioned above may give better insight to the regional context. Additionally democratic satisfaction was analysed in the multilevel context as were economic and employment evaluations (Chapter 6). Initially democratic satisfaction had the expected positive and significant effect. However when observed within the multilevel context democratic satisfaction only remained significant at the national level. This indicates that political perceptions are still only taken within the national context.

Overall, economic evaluations may be a perception developed within the regional context while political evaluations are still taken from the national context. This demonstrates the importance the region plays in terms of economy. Individuals are likely to interpret economic conditions on the territorial level closest to them. It is possible they may even be aware of the variation of regional economic conditions throughout their country and how the EU may or may not benefit regional growth. In sum, regional economic factors should be taken into account in understanding European public opinion as regional disparities within countries may well have a large contribution into influencing the public.

Identity: Do Regional Variations of Culture and Territorial Attachment Influence EU support?

Regional identity is a major component in recognising the territorial space that makes up the region. Regions can vary in terms of culture, having a different historical language than the rest of the nation-state, or even have a different political history as in the case of Scotland. Cultural identity has been on the rise within the sphere of new regionalism. In many states language protection has been an increasing concern. For some, the European Union can be seen as a champion for minority culture protection. Identity has been an additional explanatory variable in many previous EU public opinion studies. This dissertation attempted to benefit from the use of multilevel modelling to gain a clearer understanding of this unique dynamic.

In order to test the strength of cultural differences within regions a variable was used which measured historical language difference (Chapter 7). While the variable did not necessarily measure a modern spoken language it attempted to account for an historical cultural difference that the region may have with the majority culture present in the nation-state. The larger a regional language scored on the language difference scale, the greater the difference the language has with the national language. The language difference variable displayed a negative effect on EU support levels though not statistically significant. Though the results may be inconclusive they may hint that it is possible regional culture might produce a negative effect on EU support. These results were reinforced when observing regional attachment levels.

Identity was further investigated by observing the strengths of attachment to both the region and country (Chapter 7). Surprisingly, regional identity had a negative effect on EU support while national identity had a positive effect, both statistically significant. When investigated further through the use of the random slopes multilevel model it was shown that both these variables can contrast significantly even for regions within the same country. More interesting was the greater variation for national attachment. It was shown that the concept of national attachment can be very different between regions. This was further emphasised by the example of the United Kingdom (Chapter 8). For the Scottish, English and Welsh, regional identity had a negative effect on EU support. In addition, British identity also has a negative effect in Scotland and Wales when the effect was positive in England. This shows that the concept of British identity is likely to be different for the Welsh and Scottish than for the English. This may be a case where the English closely relate British identity and English identity thus there are less competing identities with the EU. In Scotland and Wales however their regional identities are also strongly competing with a national identity. Those in these regions that see themselves as British as opposed to the identity of their region will more likely see the EU as yet another competing identity. This demonstrates the importance of taking regional variations of identity into account. Not only is regional identity itself significant in shaping EU opinion but the relationship with national identity can be much more complex than initially thought.

Regional Assertiveness: Is Decentralisation an Obstacle to European integration?

The last theme explained is the investigation of the final outcome of new regionalism, the demand for further regional autonomy. Thus far it has been noted that regions that are economically stronger are more likely to support EU integration. In addition regions where regional parties are more likely to participate at the national level are also more likely to support the EU. Regional identity however has a negative effect towards integration perhaps revealing that the regional public is more likely to view the EU positively towards political and economic cohesion but negatively in terms of threatening regional identity. Regional assertiveness was examined as a variable representing the degree to which elites within a region are demanding further autonomy where the highest levels of assertiveness are likely calls for independence. While the reasons for autonomy may be a combination of economic, political and cultural issues, the variable is designed to grasp a sense of how devolutionary demands may affect public attitudes towards integration.

Regional assertiveness showed to have a strong and statistically significant negative effect on EU support (Chapter 7). Furthermore there was also a cross-level interaction with opinion leadership, the degree in which one partakes and influences political discussion. Whereas opinion leadership traditionally has a positive effect on EU support, when interacted with regional assertiveness the effect becomes negative. More simply, those that have a high opinion leadership score within highly assertive regions are less likely to support EU integration. This reiterates the impact regional assertiveness can have on public support of integration. The question of devolution and independence was analysed in Scotland and Wales (Chapter 8). For both the Welsh and Scottish those that support a regional government while remaining a part of the United Kingdom had a higher likelihood of supporting integration than those that want a centralised United Kingdom. Support for independence was also positive though the size of the coefficient was much smaller and insignificant. This may demonstrate that in Scotland and Wales support for devolution may be having a positive effect on integration support while the effect for independence support is minimal and inconclusive. The example of both the multilevel analysis in Chapter 7 and British analysis in Chapter 8 possibly reveal that high levels of assertiveness from regional elites including independence has a negative effect on public EU support. In contrast those members of the public that support an intermediate level of autonomy such as the

devolved governments in Scotland and Wales will be more inclined to support a higher level of governance in the EU.

Is New Regionalism an Advantage for European Integration?

Multilevel governance and new regionalism is creating a unique shift in policy authority within the European Union. Autonomy is being transferred away from the nation state in two directions. First authority is moving above through the integration of the European Union and second from below through the process of devolution and the advancement of new regionalism. It was revealed that many regional parties have begun championing integration as it benefits the region by allowing it to take a deeper role in shifting autonomy from the nation-state. Is this belief however shifting to the public thus fostering greater support for integration?

The results seem to present a twofold answer. There is evidence that the public tends to evaluate the economy from the regional level. This can be very beneficial to the European Union as integration began and is still in many ways seen as an economic experiment. The more economic benefits at the regional level individuals distinguish as being a result of integration will perhaps result in stronger levels of EU support. As regions seem to become wealthier the likelihood of supporting Europe also becomes greater. Regional parties also gain benefits from partaking in the implementation process of EU structural funding thus have much at stake in attempting to convince the public on the European question. As with the evidence of the SNP in Scotland, regional parties have a significant role in raising the debate over European integration within their regions. As regional parties attempt to persuade their public on the EU they are also persuading the public on recognising the exceptionality of the region. This in itself may lead to be counter productive in promoting EU integration.

Both regional assertiveness and regional identity are the foundations of regional parties. In this research it was shown that both can have a negative effect on European integration support. Greater regional distinctiveness in terms of identity and politics could backlash on the European Union. There is some evidence however that multilevel governance does influence integration in a more positive light. This would be multilevel governance in the form of further regional autonomy which stops short of full independence. Devolution but not independence, the foundation of new regionalism,

could be the “happy median” Europe is in search for. The regions have the ability to bring Europe closer to the public.

Limitations and the Future of Regional Public Opinion Studies

Unfortunately, as with any research, there is always a series of drawbacks which limit the analysis from perfection. The most considerable restraint in this work primarily lies within the survey data. As explained in Chapter 4 on methodology, no perfect dataset exists to answer the research questions at hand. The goal is to find the best suitable survey out of many that address the issues pertaining to the research. I believe the datasets used in this dissertation were adequate in attempting to explore the regional dynamics of European public opinion. There is however always room for improvement. Creating a set of uniform questions attempting to capture regional variation can be extremely difficult. As repeatedly mentioned the forces of new regionalism are asymmetrical throughout Europe. Some questions may be suitable for some countries/regions while not so in others. A sequence of questions however relating to individuals' perceptions and evaluations on multilevel governance and devolution would be extremely useful and should be considered by researchers of comparative European public opinion.

In addition, as the European Union expands so should the scope of public opinion research. This dissertation has been limited to the EU15 due to the dynamic nature presented over the past two decades. Data on the 12 newly joined member-states has been limited in the past. This is not to say that regional elements do not exist in the additional central and eastern members. As more data becomes readily available on perceptions of the new member-state public within their regional context, as well as data on regional political parties, this research can continue to expand eastwards. The unique political experiences of the new member-states would also add to an enriching investigation of new regionalism.

The concluded research demonstrated that the emergence of multilevel governance and a sense of political, economical and cultural identities at the regional level are changing the way Europeans evaluate integration. It is still important to consider however that new regionalism is an asymmetrical phenomenon. Each state is unique in its system of multilevel governance, some highly federalised as in Germany and others more

centralised as in Sweden or Ireland. In addition, the emergence of new regionalism can be developed as a response to varying unique regional motives. Due to this, creating cross-national models can become difficult however by applying the multilevel model technique researchers can overcome this challenge.

The future of Europe and integration will continue to progress. The course of devolution will also persist on an unpredictable scale. All levels of government will need to recognise the opinions of their citizens as both these processes persist within the evolution of European democracy. If Europe leans towards further cooperation with regional elites it may find a way in bringing the Union closer to the people. This divergence from within the nation-state can help achieve the goal of establishing a true 'Europe of the regions'.

Appendix

Table 5.3: Party Acronyms for Figures 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6

BNG	Galician Nationalist Bloc (Spa.)	CC	Canarian Coalition (Spa.)
CiU	Convergence and Unity (Spa.)	DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (UK)
EA	Basque Solidarity (Spa.)	ERC	Catalan Republican Left (Spa.)
FDF	Francophone Democratic Front (Bel.)	LN	Northern League (Ita.)
PA	Andalusian Party (Spa.)	PAR	Aragonese Regionalist Party (Spa.)
PNV-EAJ	Basque Nationalist Party (Spa.)	RKP-SFP	Swedish People's Party (Fin.)
SNP	Scottish National Party (UK)	UUP	Ulster Unionist Party (UK)
SF	Sinn Fein (UK)	VU	People's Party (Bel.)
VU ID-21	People's Union (Bel.)		

Table 5.4: OLS Regression of Manifesto Year Dummies

Year	β	(S.E.)
1990	0.400	1.200
1991	1.355	0.977
1992	-0.272	1.324
1993	-2.075	1.451
1994	-0.490	1.005
1995	-0.470	0.943
1996	-1.044	1.325
1997	0.026	1.368
1998	-0.615	1.053
1999	1.276	0.944
2000	-1.416	1.576
2001	-2.232 ⁺	1.336
2002	0.598	0.962

⁺ p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01

Note: 2003 dropped due to collinearity

Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics: Comparative Manifestos Project 1990-2003

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max
EU Position	375	1.95	3.66	-13.70	25.70
Socialists	375	0.19	0.39	0	1
Liberals	375	0.15	0.35	0	1
Christian Democrats	375	0.15	0.36	0	1
Conservatives	375	0.09	0.28	0	1
Greens	375	0.10	0.31	0	1
Far Right	375	0.05	0.22	0	1
Regionalists	375	0.12	0.32	0	1
Sweden	375	0.08	0.27	0	1
Finland	375	0.09	0.29	0	1
Belgium	375	0.10	0.30	0	1
Netherlands	375	0.08	0.27	0	1
France	375	0.05	0.22	0	1
Italy	375	0.12	0.33	0	1

Table 5.6 Continued

Variable	Obs.	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Spain	375	0.08	0.28	0	1
Greece	375	0.05	0.21	0	1
Portugal	375	0.06	0.23	0	1
Germany	375	0.05	0.22	0	1
Austria	375	0.06	0.24	0	1
Great Britain	375	0.05	0.22	0	1
Ireland	375	0.05	0.21	0	1
Parliamentary Seat %	375	0.14	0.15	0	0.64
Left/Right Ideology	375	-1.84	19.99	-45.95	64.71
Free Market Economy	375	3.74	4.94	0	28.64
Labour Class +	375	2.39	2.68	-3.35	13.59
Farmers +	375	2.17	2.67	0	20.26
Middle Class +	375	0.35	0.80	0	9
Internationalism	375	1.34	1.86	0	12.20
Multiculturalism	375	0.41	2.58	-15.07	20.16
National Patriotism	375	0.82	2.47	-4	25
Decentralisation	375	2.94	3.99	-2.44	20.29
Regional Governance	375	3.93	3.33	0	10
1990	375	0.05	0.22	0	1
1991	375	0.09	0.28	0	1
1992	375	0.06	0.24	0	1
1993	375	0.06	0.23	0	1
1994	375	0.11	0.32	0	1
1995	375	0.08	0.27	0	1
1996	375	0.07	0.26	0	1
1997	375	0.05	0.22	0	1
1998	375	0.07	0.26	0	1
1999	375	0.08	0.26	0	1
2000	375	0.04	0.20	0	1
2001	375	0.07	0.26	0	1
2002	375	0.11	0.32	0	1

Table 6.4: Descriptive Statistics for Random Intercept Models, Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
EU Opinion Index Score	14978	6.248	2.596	0	10
National Log GDP	14978	12.962	1.132	10.203	14.607
National Unemployment	14978	7.410	2.338	4.5	11
Regional Governance	14978	4.280	3.377	0	10
Regional Log GDP	14978	10.953	1.030	7.452	13.082
Regional Unemployment	14978	7.557	3.792	2.9	21.6
Objective 1	14978	0.262	0.440	0	1
Regional Party in Gov.					
No Party in Gov.	14978	0.800	0.400	0	1
Regional Assembly	14978	0.062	0.241	0	1
National Parliament	14978	0.138	0.345	0	1
Language Difference	14978	0.161	0.135	0.1	1
Democratic Satisfaction	14978	2.671	0.796	1	4
Democratic Satisfaction (Centred)	14978	0	0.741	-2.323	2
Economic Expectations	14978	1.815	0.712	1	3
Economic Expectations (Centred)	14978	0	0.680	-1.329	1.611
Employment Expectations	14978	1.751	0.738	1	3
Employment Expectations (Centred)	14978	0	0.700	-1.269	1.75

Table 6.4 Continued

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Country Attachment	14978	3.478	0.682	1	4
Country Attachment (Centred)	14978	0	0.642	-2.783	1.25
Region Attachment	14978	3.376	0.753	1	4
Region Attachment (Centred)	14978	0	0.721	-2.814	1.268
Opinion Leadership	14978	2.390	0.926	1	4
Opinion Leadership (Centred)	14978	0	0.888	-2.027	2.154
Gender -	14978	0.464	0.499	0	1
Gender (Centred)	14978	0	0.495	-0.778	0.85
Age	14978	47.216	18.015	15	97
Age (Centred)	14978	0	17.735	-42.85	48.929

Note: All centred variable means are values rounded to zero as the first non-zero integers are beyond seven decimal places.

Table 7.5: Descriptive Statistics for Hierarchical Linear Models, Eurobarometer 63.4 (2005)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
EU Opinion Index Score	6642	6.333	2.622	0	10
National Log GDP	6642	14.008	0.669	12.576	14.607
National Unemployment	6642	8.649	2.121	4.7	11
Regional Assertiveness	6642	1.058	1.149	0	3
Regional Governance	6642	6.877	2.602	3	10
Regional Log GDP	6642	11.576	0.836	8.737	13.082
Regional Unemployment	6642	9.044	4.514	2.9	21.6
Objective 1	6642	0.237	0.425	0	1
Regional Party in Gov.					
No Party in Gov.	6642	0.583	0.493	0	1
Regional Assembly	6642	0.108	0.310	0	1
National Parliament	6642	0.309	0.462	0	1
Language Difference	6642	0.231	0.178	0.1	1
Democratic Satisfaction	6642	2.538	0.795	1	4
Democratic Satisfaction (Centred)	6642	0	0.761	-2.077	2
Economic Expectations	6642	1.781	0.723	1	3
Economic Expectations (Centred)	6642	0	0.704	-1.207	1.611
Employment Expectations	6642	1.731	0.737	1	3
Employment Expectations (Centred)	6642	0	0.709	-1.237	1.75
Country Attachment	6642	3.332	0.739	1	4
Country Attachment (Centred)	6642	0	0.709	-2.68	1.25
Region Attachment	6642	3.339	0.757	1	4
Region Attachment (Centred)	6642	0	0.736	-2.574	1.182
Opinion Leadership	6642	2.336	0.945	1	4
Opinion Leadership (Centred)	6642	0	0.914	-2.027	2.154
Gender	6642	0.463	0.499	0	1
Gender (Centred)	6642	0	0.493	-0.778	0.85
Age	6642	46.887	18.278	15	97
Age (Centred)	6642	0	17.945	-38.846	48.929

Note: All centred variable means are values rounded to zero as the first non-zero integers are beyond seven decimal places.

Table 8.3: England Administrative Regions Dummy Variables

Region	β	(S.E.)
East Midlands	0.286	(0.202)
East of England	0.224	(0.185)
Northeast	0.145	(0.258)
Northwest	0.262	(0.180)
Southeast	-0.051	(0.196)
Southwest	0.117	(0.238)
West Midlands	0.266	(0.198)
Yorkshire and Humberside	0.101	(0.198)

Note: The region of London is used as the reference category

Table 8.4: Descriptive Statistics for Scotland Logit Model, BES (2005)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
EU Membership Approval	615	3.132	1.050	1	5
Personal Economic Expectations	615	3.007	0.848	1	5
General Economic Expectations	615	2.902	0.875	1	5
Democratic Satisfaction	615	2.759	0.644	1	4
Party Voted For					
Labour	615	0.356	0.479	0	1
Conservatives	615	0.145	0.352	0	1
Liberal Democrats	615	0.140	0.347	0	1
Scottish National Party	615	0.158	0.365	0	1
Did Not Vote	615	0.202	0.402	0	1
Scottish Autonomy					
Independent Scotland	615	0.216	0.412	0	1
Scottish Parliament	615	0.561	0.497	0	1
UK Parliament Only	615	0.226	0.419	0	1
Political Interest	615	3.176	0.947	1	5
Vote Persuasion	615	2.111	2.808	0	10
Gender	615	0.444	0.497	0	1
Age	615	53.488	16.399	18	93
Identity	615				
More British	615	0.088	0.283	0	1
Equal	615	0.281	0.450	0	1
More Scottish	615	0.631	0.483	0	1
Age Completed Education	615				
15 or Below	615	0.405	0.491	0	1
16-18	615	0.382	0.486	0	1
19 or Above	615	0.213	0.410	0	1

Table 8.5: Descriptive Statistics for Wales Logit Model, BES (2005)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
EU membership Approval	419	3.124	1.076	1	5
Personal Economic Expectations	419	2.921	0.789	1	5
General Economic Expectations	419	2.826	0.884	1	5
Democratic Satisfaction	419	2.745	0.670	1	4
Party Voted For					
Labour	419	0.353	0.479	0	1

Table 8.5 Continued

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Conservatives	419	0.184	0.388	0	1
Liberal Democrats	419	0.177	0.382	0	1
Plaid Cymru	419	0.103	0.304	0	1
Did Not Vote	419	0.184	0.388	0	1
Welsh Autonomy					
Independent Wales	419	0.086	0.281	0	1
Welsh Assembly	419	0.589	0.493	0	1
UK Parliament Only	419	0.325	0.469	0	1
Political Interest	419	3.136	1.001	1	5
Vote Persuasion	419	2.332	2.980	0	10
Gender	419	0.492	0.501	0	1
Age	419	53.852	16.736	19	91
Identity					
More British	419	0.277	0.448	0	1
Equal	419	0.358	0.480	0	1
More Welsh	419	0.365	0.482	0	1
Age Completed Education					
15 or Below	419	0.317	0.466	0	1
16-18	419	0.449	0.498	0	1
19 or Above	419	0.234	0.424	0	1

Table 8.6: Descriptive Statistics for England Logit Model, BES (2005)

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
EU membership Approval	1904	2.996	1.077	1	5
Personal Economic Expectations	1904	2.889	0.816	1	5
General Economic Expectations	1904	2.789	0.892	1	5
Democratic Satisfaction	1904	2.729	0.662	1	4
Party Voted For					
Labour	1904	0.283	0.450	0	1
Conservatives	1904	0.291	0.454	0	1
Liberal Democrats	1904	0.165	0.372	0	1
UKIP	1904	0.015	0.123	0	1
Did Not Vote	1904	0.246	0.431	0	1
Political Interest	1904	3.134	0.970	1	5
Vote Persuasion	1904	2.303	2.913	0	10
Gender	1904	0.465	0.499	0	1
Age	1904	51.492	17.369	18	97
Identity					
More British	1904	0.196	0.397	0	1
Equal	1904	0.497	0.500	0	1
More English	1904	0.307	0.461	0	1
Age Completed Education					
15 or Below	1904	0.328	0.470	0	1
16-18	1904	0.460	0.498	0	1
19 or Above	1904	0.213	0.409	0	1
East Midlands	1904	0.089	0.284	0	1
East of England	1904	0.145	0.353	0	1
London	1904	0.086	0.281	0	1
Northeast	1904	0.041	0.199	0	1
Northwest	1904	0.134	0.341	0	1
Southeast	1904	0.181	0.385	0	1
Southwest	1904	0.113	0.317	0	1
West Midlands	1904	0.101	0.302	0	1
Yorkshire and Humberside	1904	0.108	0.310	0	1

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