From Combat to Community: a Study of how Community-based Approach to Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) can Contribute More Effectively to Peacebuilding: The Case of Sierra Leone

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Abstract

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants is one of the vital elements of peacebuilding with the objective of reconciling ex-combatants into communities and reducing the likelihood of renewed violence. However, whilst the use of DDR continues to grow, it has been criticised for its focus on ex-combatants rather than communities; thus, sometimes it creates divisions among community members and strains the entire peacebuilding process. In view of this limited approach to DDR, academics and practitioners alike are increasingly arguing for a community-based (CB) approach, especially during the reintegration process, as a way of addressing resentment among community members, which impedes more effective peacebuilding. Despite its popularity, it is not clear what the CB approach to reintegration means, so this thesis sets out to explore that approach.

Exploring how CB reintegration programmes can facilitate more effective peacebuilding; this research identified the fact that most programmes, that claimed to be CB, thereby involving communities in the planning and implementation process, were instead only community-located (CL). These critical insights emerged from empirical research carried out in Sierra Leone, by drawing on Bartle's (2007) argument that for a programme to be CB it must be chosen, selected and/or controlled by the community. Thus, an outside agency's programme, which is merely located in a community and has some level of community participation, cannot claim CB status, but rather it is CL. The research, therefore, compares CB and CL reintegration programmes to establish which of these programmes facilitates more effective peacebuilding, so that a comprehensive approach to planning and implementation of CB programmes can be developed.

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Acronyms

ADRC	Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission
AfD	Arms for Development Programme
AFRC	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
AMODER	Mozambican Association for Rural Development
ANBP	Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme
ANC	African National Congress
APC	All People's Party
ARMM	Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
ASFP	Social Fund for Peace and Development
CACD	Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme
CARD-SL	Community Action for Rural Development, Sierra Leone
CDCs	Community Development Committees
CDD	Community Driven Development
CDF	Civil Defence Forces
CEI	Comision Especial de Incorporaciones
CEIP	Community Education Investment Programme
CEP	Community Empowerment Project
CICs	Community Improvement Councils
CPVD	Committee for the Prevention of Violence and Development
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	United Kingdom Department for International Development
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Commission of the West African States
EOD	Explosives Ordinance Device
FAB)	Burundian Armed Forces
FAS	Social Action Fund
FDN	National Defence Forces
FRELIMO	Liberation Front of Mozambique
GGEM	Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement
GOPA	Association for Organization, Planning and Training
GoSL	Government of Sierra Leone
IDA	International Development Assistance
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards
IDP	Internal Displaced Persons
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
ISS	Institute of Security Studies
KCDA	Koya Community Development Association
KDP	Kecamatan Development Programme
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

LRRD	Linking, Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme
MDTF	Multi-donors Trust Fund
MILF	Moro Islamic Liberation Front
MINUSTAH	UN Stabilization Force
MNLF	Moro National Liberation Front
MONUC	United Nations Mission in DR Congo
NaCSA	National Commission for Social Action
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
NGOs	Non-governmental organisations
OLF	Oromo Liberation Front
PMPA	Parties of Armed Political Movement
POJ	Joint Operations Plan
PTSD	Post-traumatic Stress Disorder
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
RESPECT	Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SLA	Sierra Leone Army
SLOIC	Sierra Leone Opportunities Industrialization Centre
SLPP	Sierra Leone People's Party
TEP	Training and Employment Programme
TEP	Transitional Employment Project
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Committee
UNAMSIL	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDKOP	United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNITA	Total Independence of Angola
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNOSOM	United Nations Operation in Somalia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UPHR	United for the Protection of Human Rights
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WCP	Weapons Collection Point
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO	World Health Organisation
YAI	Youth Action International
YES	Youth Education for Life Skills

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work. It is submitted for the degree of Master of Philosophy at the University of York and has not been submitted for a degree of examination at any other university. Various presentations have been given using the results of this research and these have been referenced in the bibliography.

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Preface

It is important to begin this research by explaining the need, and identifying the problems facing the extant disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in post-conflict environments. I will then highlight the scope of the study and the research question. Subsequently, the aim and objectives of the research will be highlighted and a brief outline of the methodology used for the study will be presented. Finally, the preface outlines the structure of the thesis as a guide to the thesis.

West Africa is one of the sub-regions in the world that is plagued with conflict. For the past 20 years, the sub-region has experienced conflicts in Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Ivory Coast. These conflicts inevitably caused loss of life and, in response; the United Nations (UN) and the sub-regional body, the Economic Commission of the West African States (ECOWAS) intervened with numerous peacekeeping missions and subsequent peace-building initiatives to prevent the recurrence of these conflicts. These peace initiatives aimed at 'going to the roots of the conflict and help build a long-term foundation for a stable' and peaceful society (Doyle, 1998:6). One such peacebuilding effort is the DDR of ex-combatants.

DDR is considered by many international policy makers to be one of the most vital elements in peace-building. According to the UN Security Council (2000), it can stabilize a post-conflict situation, reduce the likelihood of renewed violence, facilitate a society's transition from conflict to normalcy and development, strengthen confidence between former factions and enhance the momentum towards stability. Colletta, et al (1996), argue that a successful DDR programme is the key to an effective transition from war to peace, as it fosters political stability and social and economic recovery. Since DDR aims at removing the means of violence and fostering political, social and economic stability in a post-conflict environment, it could have been expected that the West African sub-region would be experiencing sustained peace. However, despite the initiation of numerous DDR programmes, sustainable peace seems far from within reach because of renewed violence in the sub-region. As a former Ghanaian army officer, who served twice with the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and also with the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in the sub-region, in addition to other conflict areas such as

Lebanon, these past experiences provided me with the opportunity to witness how lack of sustainable reintegration of ex-combatants resulted in further conflict leading to displacement, physical disability, and loss of human lives.

The question that may be posed therefore is: 'Is DDR primarily a western centric approach to peace-building which does not work well in many war torn societies, especially the West African sub-region? Or, is the DDR programme not comprehensive enough to ensure effective peacebuilding? Boutros-Ghali (1995:32) observed that for peacebuilding programmes to be 'truly successful, they must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace.' Also, Özerdem (2009:9) posits that 'peacebuilding is a process, rather than a goal, and should not be considered from the perspective of only a negative peace, which would simply indicate the ending of armed conflict, but rather a positive and sustainable peace, which can ensure security as well as socio-economic, structural, political and cultural stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of relapse into or the continuation of violence'. This means that sustainable peace can only be achieved if a peacebuilding process, such as DDR, is approached holistically to encompass security as well as development. It is, therefore, argued that the extant DDR process, which focuses only on ex-combatants, should go beyond that to target communities for more effective peacebuilding.

P1   Defining the Problem

The central question for this research is: 'How can community-based reintegration programmes contribute to more effective peacebuilding?' The current reintegration programmes, in many post-conflict environments, have focussed more on ex-combatants rather than other groups in communities, such as victims, internally displaced persons and refugees, because of the security threat ex-combatants are believed to pose to peace processes. The limited focus on ex-combatants has created resentment in many post-conflict communities and affected the already fragile security situation, as well as opportunities for development (Galama and van Tangereen, 2002).

There have been some criticisms of the existing disarmament and demobilization processes, which affect the reintegration process, as well. First, the eligibility criteria

of the current DDR has been criticised for excluding other ex-combatants who did not hold conventional weapons. In Sierra Leone, for instance, the eligibility criteria for the first and second phases of the disarmament process stated clearly that an adult had to be a member of a fighting force and present a serviceable weapon, a group weapon or ammunition in order to qualify as an ex-combatant. Here, serviceable weapons excluded non-conventional weapons, such as locally made weapons or shot guns. This form of entry criteria prevented many ex-combatants, who used non-conventional types of weapons, from benefiting from the disarmament process and it affected the reintegration process as well. According to Solomon (2007), about 1,999 (or 45%) of the total number in the Donso militia group - a faction of the Civic Defence Forces (CDF) - were excluded from the DDR programme in Kono (Sierra Leone) because their shot guns did not meet the required entry criteria. Such exclusion created instability in some parts of the country and affected the reintegration process.

Apart from those who did not hold conventional weapons, the DDR programme has also excluded vulnerable groups, such as women and children who were used as sex slaves and porters during the conflict, or those who did not hold weapons at all. In Sierra Leone, it was estimated that between 20% and 30% of all ex-combatants were women and young girls, whereas of 6,845 child soldiers demobilized, only 506 were girls, forming about 7%. The low percentage of women in the DDR process has been attributed to the decisions made by the predominantly male DDR policy makers, who, erroneously, considered women and girls as camp followers and dependants rather than integral members of the fighting force (Makurana, 2004:61). The exclusion of vulnerable groups, such as women and children from the DDR programme, created resentment and affected effective peacebuilding in the country.

Critics have also argued that communities coming out of war are badly affected by the devastation of their area's or country's infrastructure and have fewer opportunities to generate income to be focussed more on individual ex-combatants instead of the entire community (Makurana, 2004, USAID, 2005). It is argued that many communities in post-conflict contexts have been so badly affected that by focusing mainly on ex-combatants' immediate needs, leave various communities with insufficient economic development to facilitate the reintegration process. Since community development is vital for the reintegration of ex-combatants, it is important

for DDR programmes to go beyond individuals to offer help to communities, especially during the reintegration process, for more effective peacebuilding (Kingma, 2002; Pouligny, 2004; Panos, 2006; Özerdem, 2009). It means that the reintegration process is to be approached in a more holistic manner in order to target all groups in communities.

Such a more holistic approach will establish social links and connections between ex-combatants and non-combatants for social reconstruction, it will encourage community participation in decision making processes, it will strengthen community capacity for subsequent programmes in communities, and it will address issues of resentment among community members. According to Berdal (1996), the importance of community programmes is that they are more sensitive to local needs, more flexible, and are geared towards integrating both ex-combatants and non-combatants into communities. Therefore, a community approach will address the problem of exclusion of some groups, such as ex-combatants who did not hold weapons during the conflict, victims of the conflict, IDPs, refugees, and other vulnerable groups from the reintegration process in order to facilitate more effective peacebuilding in various communities.

P2   Scope of the Study and the Research Question

The literature emphasizes that the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration process cannot be viewed as a single sequence of events because each of its elements overlaps with one another and the success of a process is dependent on the success of each of its steps (UNSG Report, 2000). This interdependence between the DDR phases has been stressed by Berdal (1996:39), who suggests that demobilisation and reintegration activities do not only overlap, but that they should be 'recognised and incorporated into the funding and implementation plan', which is vital for long term success. Notwithstanding this, the research could not focus on the entire DDR process so, whilst the literature explores the whole DDR process, the empirical study will only focus on the reintegration phase.

Whilst this research focuses on community reintegration programmes, it questions whether these programmes, which include ex-combatants as well as non-combatants and have some level of community participation, can be classified as CB or CL

programmes[1]. These terms will be explored later in Chapter Three to show that most programmes that are referred to by implementation actors as CB, are in fact CL programmes, which restrict community participation in the planning and implementation process. The study will compare CB and CL programmes to establish which of these sets of programmes facilitates more effective peacebuilding. The thesis asserts that a more participatory approach to planning and implementation of community programmes will facilitate more effective peacebuilding (Pouligny, 2004; Panos, 2006; Bartle, 2007).

Also, using a 'programmatic' approach, the current DDR processes have a limited time frame, that is, there is a start and an end date. In other words, DDR is seen as a 'programme' rather than a 'process', and most of these programmes are short term so that the implementing partners can finish within the stipulated time and bring DDR to an end. The question is what happens after the specified time frame has elapsed without all the ex-combatants going through the DDR programme. Will such a situation provide sustainable security and development in a post-conflict environment? Watson (2010) emphasises that there is still some debate between practitioners, who believe that DDR should be short-term so that it can focus purely on the immediate security concerns of ex-combatants and practitioners who emphasise the need for a long-term sustainable approach, which will involve individuals as well as communities. It is important to note that if DDR achieves security without sustained development to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants, there could be further conflicts.

In 2002 in Sierra Leone, the National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) announced officially that DDR was over, not because all ex-combatants had been 'reintegrated' into their communities, but because that was the official date set by the international community to bring the DDR programme to an end. In spite of the fact that the official-DDR process excluded a large number of ex-combatants from the reintegration process, and failed to respond to all those who were demobilised, it can be argued that the mere provision of some vocational training courses or income generating activities for ex-combatants alone cannot be considered as 'reintegration'.

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[11] This research defines community-based reintegration programmes as programmes identified, planned and implemented by communities, whilst community-located reintegration programmes are defined as programmes planned and implemented by NGOs with some level of community participation.

Reintegration therefore involves active participation of all groups in communities, not only ex-combatants, and should be a long-term process. This research argues that, to ensure effective peacebuilding, reintegration programmes need to go beyond the official reintegration date set by the international community, which is normally short-term, and need to cover medium and long term phases. Therefore, a distinction is made between the 'official-DDR' undertaking, and the reintegration in the period afterwards, which can be termed the 'post-DDR' phase. These terms will be explored further.

Furthermore, this research studies how CB reintegration programmes of ex-combatants can contribute to more effective peacebuilding. It explores the concepts of community and community participation in relation to DDR and peacebuilding in the context of Sierra Leone; thus, it is based on answering the following research question: *How can community-based reintegration programmes for ex-combatants contribute more effectively to peacebuilding? The research hypothesizes that, if post-conflict communities were actively involved in the planning and implementation of reintegration programmes, they would contribute more effectively to peacebuilding.*

P3   Aim and Objectives of the Research

The aim of this research is to identify and explore factors that are critical for the planning and implementation of CB reintegration programmes for effective peacebuilding.

The objectives of this research are as follows:

1.   To review the available literature in order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the challenges faced by the current DDR approach, and identify the need to explore CB reintegration programmes for effective peacebuilding.

2.   To explore the understanding of community and community participation theories within the context of challenges faced by war-torn communities.

3.   To identify critical and contextual factors for planning and implementation of CB reintegration programmes through an investigation of secondary case studies.

4.   To compare several CB and CL programmes, in the context of Sierra Leone, through community participation framework (identified in the theoretical conceptualisation) in order to establish which of these sets of programmes facilitates a more effective peacebuilding.

P4   Research Methodology

The research uses participatory research methods for an in-depth study to gain an understanding of a community approach to reintegration. A number of participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods, such as observation, focus groups, interviews and preference ranking, will be used to enable communities to identify and analyse critical elements affecting them (Bar-On and Prinsen, 1999), and also to ensure triangulation.

Apart from making an extensive review of literature on DDR, community and community participation, peacebuilding, and secondary cases of community reintegration programmes in post-conflict environments, in order to develop a theoretical framework, other methods were engaged in this study to gather information from: conferences, training courses, workshops and an empirical study in Sierra Leone. I attended series of conferences[2] and presented papers on some aspects of my research. Also, I participated in a workshop on 'An Expansive Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 2010' at the Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Studies in Monterey, California, USA. In addition, I undertook several courses at the Post-war Reconciliation and Development Unit at the University of York, United Kingdom, as well as other research methodology courses.

As already indicated above, prior to going to Sierra Leone as a researcher, I served with UNAMSIL for a period of ten months there so I was somewhat familiar with the country. My fieldwork took me to all the four provinces – Western, Eastern, Southern, and Northern. However, current and past CB and CL reintegration programmes were selected from different towns within a specific chiefdom in each province, the criteria for selection of which are explained in detail in the methodology chapter. My first exposure as a peacekeeper in Sierra Leone, coupled with

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[2] Some of these conferences include: (1) Field Research and Ethics in Post-conflict Environments - New York, 2008; (2) Politics and Knowledge - Nottingham, 2010; (3) Political Science Association - Edinburgh, 2010; and Canadian Association of African Studies (CAAS) - Carlton University, Ottawa, Canada.

conferences, workshops, courses and fieldwork, provided me with in-depth knowledge of the project.

P5   Dissertation Structure

The research commences with Chapter One questioning the sustainability of the current DDR process. The chapter explores the concept of DDR in the context of the definition of the Liberal Peace Thesis, which observes political and economic stability as preconditions for international peace. The chapter stands on the premise that if DDR aims at contributing to security and development in post conflict environments, then it serves two main purposes: the peace and the recovery process. However, if peace is achieved through the phases of disarmament and demobilisation process, which normally take a short period of time to complete, how is the recovery process undertaken? Does it take as short a period of time as the DD process or does it require medium to long term activity; and, more importantly, should DDR programmes target only ex-combatants or entire communities for effective peacebuilding? The chapter explores what disarmament, demobilization and reintegration mean, separately and in detail. The reintegration process is explored under economic, political and social aspects. The final part of the chapter highlights the problems facing the current DDR process, such as the exclusion of some groups and the need to explore this issue through a community approach to reintegration, in order to facilitate more effective peacebuilding.

Having identified, in Chapter One, the fact that a community approach to reintegration is important, Chapter Two explores community and community participation theories in post-conflict contexts to see how they can support community reintegration programmes. The chapter begins by understanding what community means, such as locality/boundaries, attachment/shared identity, norms and habits, and creating value for its inhabitants. It then examines how groups' influence decision making processes through community participation as stakeholders, the pluralist community theory, and also looks at the interactions of groups through bonding, bridging and linking, which is the concept of social capital. The influence and interaction of groups enables us to understand community capacity - whether strong or weak, integrated or diverse - which affect programmes which are planned and implemented by communities. The final section of the chapter discusses community

participation by highlighting opportunities and challenges that will help to identify some critical planning and implementation factors that can be explored further in the next chapter.

Chapter Three uses the critical factors, identified in Chapter Two, to investigate several secondary cases of community reintegration programmes in post-conflict environments with the aim of developing a comprehensive theoretical framework for fieldwork. The chapter begins by defining the terms CB and CL programmes to avoid any ambiguity. Then, it discusses some prevailing conditions necessary for success or failure of community reintegration programmes using secondary case studies, and continues to explore some planning and implementation factors, which it is necessary to incorporate in community reintegration programmes. The concluding discussion develops a comprehensive theoretical framework for empirical study in Sierra Leone.

Having examined the concepts through literature in the previous chapters, Chapter Four discusses the field research methodology. The chapter begins by exploring philosophical issues and research debates, such as abstract and concrete knowledge, epistemological and ontological considerations, quantitative and qualitative research, and emic and etic approaches; and it justifies the choices made by this research. The next section examines the methodological overview, giving the research design, justification of Sierra Leone as a case study, the study of the communities, research methods used, and criteria for evaluation. The final section of the methodology chapter discusses methodological and ethical problems encountered during the study, and how these constraints were addressed.

Chapter Five is the final review of the literature studied, which presents conflict analysis and DDR in the context of Sierra Leone. The chapter enables the understanding of the conflict in Sierra Leone, and a number of the peace processes that were initiated and ushered in the DDR process, with all its challenges. The first section of the chapter presents a historical overview of the Sierra Leone conflict from the era of independence in 1961 through 1991, when the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) started rebel activities in the north of the country, to 1999 when the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established to initiate the DDR process as part of peacebuilding efforts. The analysis is based on the greed and

grievance thesis proposed by Collier and Hoeffler (1998). The second section explores the DDR process in Sierra Leone, through all the three phases, identifying the challenges encountered, especially during the reintegration phase in order to support the argument of the necessity of a community approach.

Chapter Six presents the first analysis of the data from the fieldwork and revisits the issue of 'CB and CL' and 'official-DDR' and 'post-DDR'. The chapter develops an understanding of contextual factors that affect programmes. First, the chapter explores the willingness of the government of Sierra Leone, NGOs and communities to support reintegration programmes, and argues that without much commitment from these groups of people and institutions, community reintegration would not be successful. Second, the discussion concentrates on community dynamics, which are rural and urban, by identifying some community systems such as community ties: shared identity, exchange of resources, and community networks which support and facilitate the success of community reintegration programmes. Third, the chapter discusses the availability of socio-economic factors such as infrastructure, land, and having a competent labour market, which can support community reintegration programmes. The final section of the chapter discusses how security situations can affect community reintegration programmes.

Chapter Seven compares CB and CL programmes using the planning and implementation factors (programme design and implementation, objectives, target beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, actions and procedures) to establish which of these sets of programmes facilitate more effective peacebuilding. The chapter identifies certain peacebuilding characteristics, for instance: long-term sustainable programmes, long-term employment opportunities, equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, community cohesion, capacity building, elimination of tension and fear, and an enabling security environment, which are associated mostly with CB programmes.

Chapter Eight argues that CB reintegration programmes for ex-combatants facilitate more effective peacebuilding. The chapter regroups the peacebuilding characteristics, identified in the previous analysis chapters for discussion purposes under four main

headings: improved livelihood, enhanced social reconstruction, enhanced good governance, and improved human security.

The final chapter presents conclusions and recommendations. First, the chapter begins with a summary of the thesis by including all areas covered in the previous chapters. It then progresses to draw conclusions in order to answer the research question and also to establish whether it agrees with the hypothesis or not. Afterwards, it explains theoretical advancements in DDR, community and community participation, CB and CL reintegration programmes, and research methodology. The chapter then develops an approach to CB reintegration programmes by making recommendations of planning and implementation factors. The final section highlights other areas for future research.

Chapter One

The Current DDR: How effective is it?

1.1   Introduction

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) has become a familiar acronym in post-conflict environments (PCEs) around the world. Its popularity is not centred on people living in those countries alone but, also in key agencies, such as, the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), the World Bank, and other non-governmental organisations (NGOs). In 2005, over a million people participated, in one way or another, in some of the DDR programmes in about 20 countries (Caramés, 2006).

Since 1990, when the DDR acronym became popular with the UNDPKO, most of the DDR process has followed the conventional or the textbook approach of the one-man-one-weapon system, which means a weapon is taken away from an ex-combatant by giving him/her a one-off cash payment incentive and skills training and being expected to reintegrate into a community. This one-man-one-weapon approach to DDR has been criticised for excluding individuals, groups, or even communities that are supposed to receive those ex-combatants (Colletta, et al., 1996; Galama and Tongereen, 2002; Faltas, 2004). Such exclusions have caused resentment among community members, and eventually affected the already fragile security situation in some PCEs. The research therefore questions whether or not there is the need for a more comprehensive approach to DDR.

The concept of DDR is aimed at contributing to security and development in PCEs, however, more often than not, the international community tends to favour short-term disarmament and demobilization programmes, which target security rather than long-term reintegration programmes that foster development and create employment opportunities for ex-combatants. Even in situations where reintegration programmes are initiated, they are often only short-term. This short-term approach to the DDR process has been criticised by its practitioners, and by academics, owing to the limited perspectives engendered by it (Colletta, et al., 1996; Galama and Tongereen, 2002; Özerdem, 2009; Watson, 2010). According to Özerdem (2009:9), peacebuilding is a

process, and should not focus only on ending conflict, 'but rather a positive and sustainable peace, which can ensure security as well as socio-economic, structural political and cultural stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of relapse into or the continuation of violence.' This means that to achieve more effective peacebuilding, DDR needs to be approached in a more holistic manner targeting communities rather than individual ex-combatants, initiating short-term as well as long-term projects, and integrating both security and developmental projects. The current DDR, however, is perceived as a programme (which normally takes a short-term period to complete) rather than a process (which requires a more long-term approach) in order to achieve more effective peacebuilding. The question is what happens to ex-combatants and non-combatants after the official DDR is completed by the international community? Or, how effective is the current DDR in peacebuilding? With these questions in mind, this Chapter seeks to explore the concept of the current DDR by identifying its challenges, and how a community-based approach, especially in the reintegration phase, can contribute to more effective peacebuilding.

The Chapter begins by exploring the concept of DDR in the context of a liberal peace thesis, where DDR is considered to be an element of peacebuilding (security, political and economic); and, subsequently, it defines disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. It continues to explore why DDR is important by discussing two important debates: security (minimalist); and development (maximalist) perspectives (Muggah, 2004). The Chapter then moves on to discuss various components of DDR. The concluding section highlights a number of shortcomings identified within the current DDR process, which this research aims to address, whilst needing to explore a community approach to reintegration.

1.2   Concept of DDR in Liberal Peace Theory

DDR of ex-combatants is considered by many international policy-makers to be one of the most vital elements of peacebuilding (Özerdem (2009). Peacebuilding has different dimensions to include: (1) security, which includes DDR of ex-combatants[3]

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[3] The IDDRS (2006) defines ex-combatants as including the following: individuals, who were part of the armed forces or groups working in a supporting capacity, as well as those involved in active combat. This means that cooks and porters, messengers, administrators, 'war wives' and sex slaves also qualify for combatant status. There are also civilian dependants, who may not have played a role in the armed forces or supporting groups, but have relied upon a combatant member of his/her family for support.

and security sector reform; (2) political, which includes organising elections and ensuring the rule of law; and (3) economic, which focuses on developmental issues (UNSC, 2000). Ideally, international approaches to peacebuilding will be grounded in liberal peace theories.

Liberal peace theory views political and economic stability as preconditions for international peace (Paris, 2004:41). Thus, securing the rights of ordinary people through democratic means and promoting constitutionalism, the rule of law, good governance and neo-liberal economics have become part and parcel of the international peacebuilding strategy (Tschirgi, 2004:5). Questions, however, have been raised about the international dimension of liberal peace theory promoting a normative agenda, which contrasts with the principle of peacebuilding as a non-violent political means of guiding the reconstruction process. Its proponents criticise this paradigm as external, elite driven process, or imposition of external norms, which may be less successful in facilitating peacebuilding process (Paris, 2004; Mac Ginty, 2004. Mitchell (2010) however argues that some of the problems that are being raised by these critics may relate more directly to the processual logic in which they are embodied than the functionality of norms. Though some the processual logic of the liberal peace theory may be at odds with the attainment of peacebuilding, the values of the theory such as political and economic stability cannot be overemphasized. Since DDR as part of peacebuilding aims at security, political, social and economic dimensions, it could be argued that it is grounded in the liberal peace theory, which views political and economic stability as preconditions for international peace.

This research takes the liberal peace to the practice in PCEs whereby NGOs promote theri version of the liberal peace through community reintegration programmes. According to Mac Ginty (2008), the liberal peace is a mechanism for the transmission of Western-specific ideas and practices, and that it has managed to engage the services of NGOs to support the Western ideals rather than providing an alternative approach that will bring more effective peacebuilding. When applied to community-based reintegration programmes, the liberal peace template has come to include programmes initiated by NGOs with minimum level of community participation; thus overlooking communities' approach to reintegration that can transform entire communities. This standardised form of community reintegration programmes which

are initiated by NGOs restricts the level of CP to the detriment of effective peacebuilding.

DDR is aimed at contributing to security and stability in PCEs; hence, a successful DDR programme is designed to reduce renewed violence and to create an enabling environment in which recovery and development can begin. DDR, in the transition from war to peace, serves two main purposes: creation of peace, followed by recovery processes. The DD processes normally focus on how to achieve 'peace' by targeting ex-combatants through the collection of their weapons and demobilising those ex-combatants so that they return to civilian status. On the other hand, the recovery process, as part of the reintegration phase involves national bodies, the international community, NGOs and other actors, and that process requires a holistic approach to achieve success.

DDR has been defined by many international organisations, agencies and academics and the resultant definitions sometimes conflict with one another. The Security Council document S/2000/101, for instance, defines disarmament as the collection of small arms, light and heavy weapons within conflict zones and includes the assembly and cantonment of combatants.[4] However, some definitions, such as the one from the UNDPKO, include instead the assembly and cantonment of combatants in the demobilization process, with which this research concurs. The definitions of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration for this research are taken from the peacekeeping manual, as follows:

> '*Disarmament* is the collection, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. It includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.

> '*Demobilization* is the process by which armed forces (government and/or opposition or factional forces) either downsize or completely disband, as part of a broader transformation from war to peace. Typically, demobilization involves the assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge

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[4]S/2000/101 11 February 2000

of former combatants, who may receive some form of compensation and other
assistance to encourage their transition to civilian life.

'Reintegration *programmes are assistance measures provided to former*
combatants that would increase the potential for them and their families'
economic and social reintegration into civil society. Reintegration
programmes could include cash assistance or compensation in kind, as well as
vocational training and income generating activities.'

(UNDPKO, 2000:23).

There are two issues to be raised before discussing the process of DDR separately; and these are: (1) the coordination of actors involve in the DDR process; and (2) how long it takes to complete each phase of the DDR process. First, the coordination of actors is crucial in the DDR process. These actors include military personnel, international donors and agencies, government officials, and community members. Over the years, the involvement of these actors depends on each stage of the DDR process. For example, the disarmament and demobilization phases are normally implemented by military personnel, whilst the reintegration phase is done primarily by civilian staff. These distinct roles, which are played by military and civilian actors, sometimes affect the planning and implementation of DDR programmes, for example, Gleichmann, et al (2004), posit that the military has input, but the decisions to implement programmes are the responsibility of the government. Even when there is coordination between the military and the government, frequently community members are excluded from the planning and implementation processes. Coordination among various actors, such as the government, international community and local communities, is vital in PCEs because the lack of it will result in the duplication of programmes, and will impact upon the limited funds available for DDR programmes. The Brahimi Report (2000:24) makes recommendations for an effective focal point to facilitate the coordination of all actors involved in the different activities that peacebuilding entails.

Another issue of concern is the length of time it takes to complete each of the DDR processes. The disarmament and demobilization phases, for example, are normally completed fairly quickly, when compared with the reintegration phase which takes a

much longer period of time to complete. Hitchcock (2004:34) observes that the short time span that it takes to complete the disarmament and demobilization phases is due to the limited number of actors involved. Apart from that, a deadline has to be met for the completion of the disarmament and demobilization phases, so that the long-term reintegration process can commence. This means that the DDR process can be complex and, according to Knight (2001), quoted in Özerdem (2002:963), the complexity can be increased with time (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. DDR programme: complexity and time.
Source: Adapted from Knight, 2001.

As shown in Figure 1, DDR programmes increase in terms of complexity from those relating to disarmament, which is basically the removal and destruction of weapons, leading to a series of programmes used in the reintegration process. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the process of disarmament is more than just the removal and destruction of ex-combatants' weapons, as represented diagrammatically by Knight, since it could include the reduction of the flow of arms, civilian disarmament, the development of responsible arms management programmes and land-mine removal (Colletta, et al., 2004:170). However, the diagram shows that DDR is a process, which can only be completed in the long-term. The question however is, does the

international community consider DDR a long-term process, or has a short-term date been set, as is normally the case?

1.3   Why is DDR Important?

The concept of DDR is very important in any PCE. President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah of Sierra Leone, in his opening remarks at the Conference on DDR and Stability in Africa, states 'all post-conflict programmes – be they political, social or economic – depend on DDR and how people judge its success' (Harsch, 2005:3). The presence of arms, immediately after war, affects the security situation and hinders any form of development; and, according to Kingma (2002), increased security and stability would lead to progress in human development, which is a prerequisite for sustainable peacebuilding. DDR can, therefore, be classified as being a success if security and development become long-lasting and sustainable. However, these issues have been of major concern. Some people consider security as being more important than development; whilst others hold the contrary view (Muggah, 2004; Willibald, 2006). According to Willibald (2006:319), the UN leans towards a minimalist understanding of DDR as a means of improving security.

Muggah (2004:27) classified the improvement of security as 'minimalist' whilst the opportunity for development and reconstruction was defined as 'maximalist'. This is because security without development would culminate in renewed violence. Muggah's classification is debatable because development and reconstruction cannot commence or proceed without adequate security. Over the years, many conflicts have destroyed long-standing infrastructure. Also, focussing on immediate security and stability may result in sacrificing communities' expectations regarding development, thus attempting to address long-term security and development matters should be important aspects of DDR. Özerdem (2009:47) posits that often, short-term and ad-hoc DDR objectives, which focus on security are opted for by the international community and national actors, instead of developmental perspectives which require long-term involvement; and he warns that adopting a purely security based perspective to DDR could be 'dangerous for the sustainability of the peacebuilding process'.

Based on the minimalist and maximalist perspectives, the importance of DDR can be discussed under the headings of security and development. First, it must be understood that DDR can help to ensure stable security situations in PCEs. It is widely argued that a successful DDR programme prevents further conflict and ensures sustainable peace (Özerdem, 2009; UNDPKO, 2000). When demobilized ex-combatants are provided with a comprehensive DDR strategy, it is assumed that they will not return to conflict. Also, DDR programmes can separate ex-combatants from their commanders and make it difficult for them to be remobilized for further conflict. Besides, Knight (2008:33) posits that DDR can 'provide a face-saving process for rebel groups to lay down their arms without being seen as losers'. Furthermore, a long-term reintegration process that fulfils ex-combatants' needs will, for instance, reduce 'armed criminality' because ex-combatants will have other means of making a living (UNDPKO, 2000:24). Though DDR programmes facilitate the peace process, it is not axiomatic that peace will be guaranteed or sustained (Knight, 2008:33). Those outcomes will depend on how the programmes are planned and implemented and also on the effective involvement and commitment of all participating groups.

DDR can also improve development in PCEs, where DDR goes beyond the collection of ex-combatants' weapons in attempting to measure up to long-term developmental programmes pertaining to: infrastructure, training, and the provision of grants for projects chosen by communities. Multiple actors' cooperation would be required for the effective coordination of such projects. Ollek (2007:14) states that, as DDR programmes assume a greater role in providing long-term developmental projects, their operational level in terms of fulfilling responsibilities and mobilising resources, so that the programmes are supported, has been questioned. Undoubtedly, DDR improves development but, for it to meet with success, effort is needed to coordinate the multiple actors and programmes.

1.4 Disarmament and Demobilization: The Short-term Business
1.4.1 Disarmament

Disarmament is classified as an important component of peacebuilding because the presence of small arms and light weapons in conflict environments poses a security threat and hinders any form of development. There is a growing literature about some of the shortcomings of the current disarmament process, such as the exclusion of

some ex-combatants (child soldiers, women, and the disabled); and locals living in communities (Thusi, 2004; Özerdem, 2009), and some of these shortcomings will be identified later in this Chapter. For the purpose of this Chapter, disarmament refers to the comprehensive removal of weapons from both ex-combatants and non-combatants.

Disarmament can be implemented either by coercion or consent. Coercive disarmament can be initiated by peacekeepers (working as a third party) without the consent of the warring factions, where mandates have been issued to address security. An example of coercive disarmament is 'the failed attempt by the UN in Somalia in 1993' (Thusi, 2004:20), in which disarmament was forcefully attempted. During the second UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II), the US led a multinational task force (known as 'Operation Restore Hope') with which they hoped to seize weapons and ensure access for humanitarian relief. However, that operation failed, and not many weapons were seized. According to reports, the US seized only 900 weapons (including crew-served anti-tank and small arms weapons) during 'Operation Restore Hope' which was described by Berdal (1996:26) as 'patchy in scope, poorly organised and confused in implementation'.

As already illustrated, when disarmament is attempted by coercion, warring factions may be forced to surrender their weapons, which requires sufficient troops to conduct the disarmament programme simultaneously in all areas, and at the same time prevent any possibility of attacks by any armed groups. Sahnoun (1994:12) states that the decision to disarm one clan, but not all clans at the same time, creates a lack of trust and makes the likelihood of civil war almost inevitable. Lack of trust led to a lack of confidence, in Somalia, which contributed to the failure of the US-led 'Operation Restore Hope.

Consent based approach to disarmament, by contrast, differs from coercion in that the warring factions surrender their weapons freely to the party or the force conducting the disarmament process – an approach that normally forms part of peacebuilding, which depends highly on the commitment of the parties involved. The UN operations in Namibia, El Salvador, Cambodia, and Mozambique are examples of consent-based approaches being used (Thusi, 2004:19).

When warring factions consent to the disarmament process, incentives in the form of cash or materials are provided as a way of enticing the ex-combatants to reduce the quantity of arms in circulation. In El Salvador, Haiti and Liberia, buy-back programmes[5] were used to encourage the surrendering of weapons, which had probably been widely dispersed in the population (Özerdem, 2002:996). That process has been criticised, by some academics, on the basis that 'while some short-term benefits undoubtedly accrued from these initiatives, their medium – to long-term effects on improving security are most uncertain, not least because large numbers of weapons remain hidden' (Berdal, 1996:33). The World Bank study of African cases also stressed that the weapons buy-back programmes had limited medium-term impact in reducing the number of weapons circulating in those countries, which had porous borders and lacked the capacity to enforce regulations on carrying and using weapons.[6]

During the consent-based disarmament process, the focus is normally on the warring factions because: (1) they are considered to be an immediate threat; (2) they are involved in the signing of peace agreements; and (3) they are given cash incentives, which create some form of restriction as to who qualifies for the disarmament process. The focus on warring factions normally excludes civilians who fought for self-defence; such people might not find themselves in assembly areas for any formal disarmament but may continue to hold a sizeable number of weapons. For instance, it is noted that the FRELIMO government of Mozambique is believed to have distributed more than 1 million AK-47 rifles to civilian self-defence units in the 1980s (Berdal, 1996:36). The process of disarmament, however, needs to be comprehensive if it is to address issues of exclusion, which could jeopardize the whole DDR process.

The disarmament component of DDR programmes consists of four phases: operational planning; weapons collection or retrieval operations; stockpile management; and destruction. Firstly, operational planning is comprised of many factors, for example: eligibility criteria, timing, team selection and structure, survey of weapons, and risk assessment. However, the discussion will be centred on eligibility criteria and timing of the stages of the disarmament programme.

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[5] The buy-back programme is where ex-combatants exchange their conventional weapons for cash.
[6] The World Bank Study of Africa; 'Demobilization and Reintegration in Africa', para. 177.

Regarding eligibility criteria, there is always the need to identify the categories of people to be disarmed. Normally the focus is on the main warring factions; government forces, and irregular armed groups, because these groups are considered to pose immediate threats. However, other groups which might possess arms are sometimes forgotten or, at best, included 'in a follow-up national arms collection programme because they may be judged to be of less threat' (Thusi, 2004:24). Gleichmann, et al (2004), posit that the planning of disarmament must include all groups which have armed themselves with small arms and light weapons (SALW) for the purposes of those conflicts. Also, lessons learned from previous programmes indicated that disarmament processes had focussed more on ex-combatant/weapon-holders than non-weapon-holders (individuals who supported combatants, such as children and females). These groups of people are sometimes neglected in the disarmament phase, which affects them during the demobilization and reintegration phases. The IDDRS, however, has a policy of 'inclusivity' in eligibility criteria; that is, individual combatants should not be discriminated against on the basis of sex, race, culture and nationality. However, more often than not this 'inclusivity' policy is far from being within reach because many disarmament programmes only focus on adult male ex-combatants, especially those who have used conventional weapons and, by so doing, attention is shifted from other ex-combatants.

Another factor, which needs consideration in operational planning, is the timing of the stages of the disarmament programme. When there is a delay regarding the timing of the stages of the disarmament programme, it can cause a renewal of conflict, thereby jeopardising the whole peace process. As could be observed in the Congolese DDR process, ex-combatants, who were eager to hand in their weapons waited for weeks to do so, and those restless ex-combatants robbed, raped and inflicted other atrocities in the nearby communities (Swarbrick, 2007:20). Whilst such delays can be managed by the inclusion of specific time period of the stages of disarmament in the peace process, Thusi (2004:22) argues that, before the cessation of hostilities, any peace negotiation, even DDR itself, is subject to the prevailing political situation so cannot be seen to be an exception.

The second component of disarmament is the weapons collection phase. Here, the focus is on the types of weapon to be collected, which may help planners to recruit

staff to handle weapons and to carry out any logistical support that is necessary. Also, it enables the collection team to be aware of weapons that qualify under the disarmament programme. Özerdem posits that 'during weapons collection it is necessary that registration and verification methods are transparent as this is imperative for maintaining a certain level of trust between belligerent groups' (2009:17). Transparency is vital for the success of the disarmament process.

In most disarmament programmes, the method that is commonly adopted by the UN is the 'one-man one-weapon' approach. According to Özerdem (2009:14), the 'one-man-one-weapon' perspective of the UN approach to the DDR process creates categorization of ex-combatants and dependants, which could affect the reintegration process. Women and child soldiers, are often, excluded from the one-man-one-weapon approach to DDR during the disarmament process, if they did not hold weapons during the conflict, and to present the weapons during the disarmament phase. Frequently, they are registered as dependants or camp followers rather than ex-combatants, and that create resentment because they do not benefit from the buy-back programme.

Another constraint, associated with the weapons collection phase, is whether or not to accept non-conventional weapons in the buy-back programme. These weapons have been used in many conflict areas, such as Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda; mostly, DDR programmes have excluded them from the 'one-man one-weapon' buy-back scheme. The Civil Defence Forces (CDF), for example, when fighting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)/Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) during the conflict in Sierra Leone (Kai-Kai, 2001:121), used non-conventional weapons, which later they discovered were excluded from the buy-back programme - owing to not meeting the eligibility criteria used in the classification of ex-combatants' weapons - under the disarmament rules. Those rules excluded these unconventional weapons during the first and second phases of the disarmament process, which led to disturbances amongst some of those warring factions, who were excluded from the disarmament process. When weapons are excluded from the buy-back programmes, they could be used to destabilise the peace agreement. The weapons collection phase normally poses a problem for the DDR process because of the exclusion of other groups from the disarmament process, as identified above.

Weapons stockpile management is the third phase of disarmament. The management of stockpile weapons is necessary because it enables the immediate destruction of the weapons that have been collected; otherwise, they are redistributed to the national army or the police. To effectively manage the stockpiled arms requires technicians to establish secure and safe storage facilities for the weapons and ammunitions. Gleichmann, et al (2004:36), posit that 'safety is vital where the storage of ammunition and explosives is concerned'. Weapons collected should be properly secured in order to prevent the possibility of being captured by a faction in the conflict and used against their opponents. For instance, keys for armouries could be handled by all the warring factions. Also, during the stockpile management phase, careful planning is necessary in order to efficiently arrange the disposal of weapons and ammunition, thereby keeping any form of security risk to a minimum, which is likely to engender and increase trust (IDDRS, 2006). According to the UNDPKO (1999:44), a comprehensive weapons-management programme needs to target both regular and irregular armed groups and individuals.

Many of the techniques and their effects, regarding stockpiling and disposal apply to the phase during which destruction of weapons takes place. This is the last part of the process of disarmament. Its quick execution assists in the process of allaying fears regarding the possible use of weapons against opponents. Thus, confidence is likely to be rebuilt, especially if the destruction is carried out openly in front of the public. The destruction of ammunition is carried out according to the advice of an Explosives Ordinance Device (EOD) technician in a specially designated area owing to the lethal nature of ammunition (IDDRS, 2006).

Lessons learnt from previous disarmament programmes revealed that sometimes stockpiles of ammunition are only partially destroyed. The partial destruction of weapons could be detrimental to the peace process because any that remain could get into either ex-combatants or even civilians hands, thereby possibly fuelling conflict. According to Faltas, et al (2001:29), in 1999, in Cambodia, only a fraction of the weapons collected were destroyed, that led to the remaining weapons being diverted and re-circulated in that country and caused the Cambodian Security Forces' failure to uphold internal security and the rule of law.

Governments have instituted 'community weapons collection', and 'weapons for development' programmes in order to rid communities of the remaining armaments, as their total removal had previously been prevented owing to the problems which had faced the disarmament process (Caramés, 2006). For instance, in Sierra Leone, the UNDP worked with the Government and the Police in order to declare areas 'free of arms' and then an amount of $20,000 was awarded for communities to spend on developmental projects (UNDP, 2006:33). Some ex-combatants' and civilians' weapons were collected under this programme, which showed that the inclusion of communities, not just ex-combatants, was important in the process of the removal of arms.

1.4.2 Demobilization

Ex-combatants go through registration, monitoring, and subsequent discharge with identification documents for registration during the second stage of DDR; demobilisation. The objective of demobilization according to Gleichmann, et al (2004:45) 'is to reduce or completely disband armed forces and other armed elements' to prevent them taking part in a conflict, therefore demobilization takes place during a limited time span and at a stipulated place, within or without camp. Returning from military to civilian status is a very important phase in the peace process, because it lays the foundation for ex-combatants' long-term reintegration.

Demobilization requires civilian support owing to the fact that it does not just relate to physical aspects involving the military in separating armed elements from their command or groups, but includes the necessity to offer: counselling, personal profiling and monitoring, domestic and general support, through which civilian specialist agencies prepare ex-combatants for reintegration (IDDRS, 2006). The following paragraphs discuss the phases of demobilization: encampment, registration, pre-discharge orientation and discharge. Likewise in this research, the peacekeeping manual definition of demobilization has been adopted because there is no consensus among authors' approaches to disarmament: some included it in the process (Tanner, 1996; Colletta, 1996), whilst others excluded it from it (IDDRS, 2006).

For the purpose of this thesis, the terms: encampment sites, cantonment sites, and assembly areas, used in defining disarmament, and demobilization locations will be

used interchangeably, but it is worth noting that the first component of demobilization is encampment. Encampment sites are designated areas where ex-combatants assemble for demobilization, the aim being to destroy the warring factions' tactical strength, which is a vital part of demobilization. The period of stay at assembly sites should be kept to the minimum, as long stays can become security threats, owing to familiarity with the environment. In Mozambique, when the 'cantonment period went far beyond the tolerance level of the ex-combatants, they reverted to taking UN camp personnel hostages, blocking roads and commandeering vehicles to get out' (Colletta, et al., 2004:173).

In addition, in Cambodia, when disarmed ex-combatants refused to leave camps in order to harvest their crops, they were officially allowed to take agricultural leave, which became known as 'banditry leave' due to the way they spent that time (Swarbrick, 2007:30). Moreover, families of ex-combatants are attracted to find living places close to cantonment sites and this could cause serious administrative problems, when transporting ex-combatants to communities in which they wish to settle. In Angola, during the demobilization process of the former National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), about '28,000 family members' gathered around family reception areas, which caused programme implementers to experience more financial and administrative problems (Özerdem, 2009:29). The cantonment led to ex-combatants' isolation from, rather than reintegration into communities (Özerdem, 2009), but operational opportunities as: registration and health screening, pre-discharge orientation sessions, and the demonstrating of factions' willingness to demobilize (Knight and Özerdem, 2004:507), are the rationale for ex-combatants being kept at cantonment sites. Ex-combatants' specific needs can be ascertained during cantonment.

Reported inaccuracies in the calculation of ex-combatant populations held at cantonment sites have led to criticism about the lack of provision of resources for those ex-combatants. It has been realised that the actual numbers of ex-combatants who go through the demobilization process far exceeds total estimates, thus putting more pressure on the limited facilities in the camps. In Angola for instance, there was a discrepancy between the initial declared figure of 50,000, as against the final figure of 85,585 of UNITA ex-combatants quartered there (Porto and Parsons, 2006:39).

Also encampment sites have been criticised for being places where diseases, such as AIDS and syphilis, can be spread. In Uganda, a profiling exercise revealed that about 17% of the ex-combatants had symptoms related to AIDS (Colletta, et al., 2004:174). Besides, periods of encampment create fertile ground for renewal of conflict when distrustful rival parties are brought together. Mozambique's experience showed that warring factions disagreed strongly about the selection and location of camps, thereby delaying the encampment process, owing to the fact that neither of the adversarial factions would concede to the other (Özerdem and Babiker, 2003). The strain family members are put under during encampment, owing to the limited availability of resources at camp sites, and the ensuing boredom, should engagement programmes not be initiated, may aggravate security situations, which are already fragile, and may undermine the peace process (Knight and Özerdem, 2004).

Registration of ex-combatants is the next phase of demobilization. During that phase DDR personnel gather ex-combatants' vital personal information to facilitate reintegration on the basis of the knowledge, already gleaned, which enables ex-combatants' individual needs to be met. Such personal details need to be correct because any misinformation could affect further planning. Upon successful registration, ex-combatants are issued with identity documents. These documents serve as eligibility criteria for further participation in the DDR process; though 'different identity card formats could lead to subsequent discrimination' (Srivastava, 1994:6). Ex-combatants need assurance that any personal information they have given will be treated confidentially. In order to encourage more ex-combatants to register, in Namibia and South Africa, laws were passed granting certain groups freedom from prosecution under certain circumstances to enhance the repatriation and demobilization agreements (Gleichmann, et al., 2004:55). The co-operation of ex-combatants in the registration process is vital to the success of DDR.

As illustrated earlier, numerical inaccuracies can occur in the registration of ex-combatants. Özerdem (2009:19) identifies two scenarios that are likely to produce misleading information concerning the number of people who register for demobilization. First, where ex-combatants are fearful of registering due to having perpetrated atrocities that led to community resentment and, second, false registration of some civilians may happen if they wished to benefit from the reintegration system.

The issue of over-registration, as in Angola, where 85,000 UNITA ex-combatants registered against the original figure of 50,000, put more administrative pressure on programme implementers.

The next component of demobilization is pre-discharge orientation. Pre-discharge orientation is designed to educate ex-combatants about their rights, services and the options available to prepare them for civilian life. According to Gleichmann, et al (2004:56), pre-discharge orientation aims at reducing 'the likelihood of remobilization' by gathering information including that which relates to individual circumstances: economic, political, legal, social, health, crisis prevention and reconciliation, and accommodation. Economic information such as micro-economic projects for ex-combatants, their families and the community, as well as vocational and skills training, should be available. In Uganda for example, ex-combatants and their dependants were provided with details about opening bank accounts (Kingma, 1996:4), which aimed to help them to save their reinsertion allowance to minimise misuse and theft. Regarding political and legal issues, ex-combatants are briefed on their rights and responsibilities as citizens, for example, their rights to form a political party, register as voters, and vote during elections. In addition, ex-combatants are issued with information about basic healthcare and about HIV/AIDS, the use of drugs and prevention measures pertaining to other diseases. Other pre-discharge information, for example, lectures on crisis prevention, counselling, and conflict management, can also help to build trust and confidence during the healing process.

Given that all the above pre-discharge information has been supplied, at the cantonment sites, to ex-combatants before they are transported to their reintegration communities, some of that information may seem to be superficial and irrelevant, as it may not be applicable to them when they reach their destination. When such misinformation has been provided, it can result in provoking conflict. It could, therefore, be argued that if feasible, post-discharge orientation, which focuses on social support and economic opportunities should be given in communities where ex-combatants are expected to settle (Colletta, et al., 2004:174). However, the question is, can DDR programme implementers have a sufficient number of trained personnel to do that, considering the fact that ex-combatants resettle in various towns across the whole country.

Discharge is the final stage of the demobilization process; here, ex-combatants leave the assembly areas to return to their home regions. Discharge documents are provided to the ex-combatants to enable them register for the reintegration programme. During the discharge process, transportation is provided for ex-combatants who live quite a distance from the assembly area. Also, ex-combatants are supplied with reinsertion packages containing: food, clothing, medical supplies, tools and transitional cash safety allowances. These packages differ from one DDR programme to another. For example, ex-combatants were paid the following transitional safety allowances: Rwanda: - $330 in two instalments; Liberia: – $300 for primary needs in two instalments; Afghanistan: - $3 or $4 daily for two to four months; Cote d'lvoire:- $924 in three instalments; and Columbia: - $155 per monthly subsidy for a year and a half (Caramés, et al., 2006:23). Entitlement packages, according to Colletta (1997:5) should reflect the needs of ex-combatants and their families in different socio-economic environments.

Knight and Özerdem (2004) have criticised such high transitional safety-net allowances as being forms of encouragement used to entice people to join fighting forces. Such allowances generally impair 'the process of reintegration into communities, where the general sentiment is that children are rewarded for fighting' (UNSG Report, 2006:13). According to the critics, even where monetary incentives are considered necessary, they should only be given in small amounts, over a period of time, to avoid any resentment from the community members. Rather, the provision of material resources, which could benefit communities, should be provided instead of monetary incentives. Özerdem (2009) suggests that funds could be channelled through existing structures to benefit communities as a whole, by paying the school fees of the children of ex-combatants, and/or giving vouchers for books or uniforms.

Proponents of cash payment have argued that it can be used for purchasing items for household consumption or for investment (Humphreys and Weinstein 2005, Knight and Özerdem 2004). Cash payments have helped ex-combatants to meet their basic needs in their different circumstances, however. For example in Sierra Leone, ex-combatants spent their cash payment on food, clothing, house-building small businesses and education (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2005:31). Knight and Özerdem (2004:510) also compared cash for material assistance and established some

advantages associated with cash, such as not having to pay expenses relating to warehousing and distribution. Furthermore, they argued that if a banking system is operational, cash can be paid directly into recipients' bank accounts. But, in many post-conflict areas in Africa, banking systems have been non-operational. In post-conflict Liberia, for instance, banking systems were only operational in Monrovia, the capital. Though money could be channelled through the UN peacekeeping force as a substitute, the absence of banks could lead to ex-combatants spending money that they had received (within a short period of time) for fear of loss or theft. Colletta (1997:5) posits that the capacity of the banking system or alternative payment systems, especially in rural areas, must be evaluated before any transfer begins.

1.5   Reintegration: The Difficult Road Home

The reintegration process is the most complex part of DDR which, according to some academics and practitioners, requires both short and long-term programmes. The short-term reintegration is termed reinsertion; it 'comprises the initial period when an ex-combatant arrives in their former home or goes to a new community' (Body, 2005:3). According to this thesis, reinsertion programmes form part of the discharge package in the demobilization process, which has already been discussed above. The long-term process is where an ex-combatant is incorporated into civilian society to attain independence. In theory, it is a lengthy and complex process 'that does not appear to have any clear conclusion'; and could, in the long run, 'result in some loss of vibrancy and enthusiasm' (Ngoma, 2004:83). However in practice, the international community responsible for the reintegration process favours short-term projects which can be easily initiated and evaluated. Most often we hear statements that claim that DDR is completed after a year or two into the reintegration phase, which means that DDR is considered to have a start and an end date. This poses debate between 'practitioners who believe that reintegration should be short-term and focus purely on the immediate security concerns posed by ex-combatants, and practitioners who emphasise the need for a long-term sustainable approach to reintegration involving activities that support communities as well as individuals' (Watson, 2010: 11). The question is, are these short-term reintegration programmes enough to achieve sustainable peacebuilding?

According to Specker (2007), the UN definition suggests that long-term reintegration is not part of the DDR process. However, it is yet to identify ways in which longer term reintegration support of ex-combatants, and their dependants, can be effected to assist incorporation into communities. It is important to note that a failure of reintegration of ex-combatants can lead to renewal of conflict in communities. To avoid these situations, there is the need to consider what happens to beneficiaries in the medium to long-term phases of the reintegration process. This brings us back to the term 'post-DDR reintegration' programmes which consider programmes, which run for longer periods of time. Nubler (1997:3) posits that the long-term objective of reintegration is to 'enhance economic and human development and to foster and sustain political stability, security and peace'.

The reintegration phase requires different actors from different organisations and countries, with diverse backgrounds. According to Kingma (2001:407), reintegration 'consists of thousands of micro stories, with individual and group efforts'. These individuals or actors normally lack coordination among themselves, and that often hinders the progress of reintegration. Some countries have set up commissions to coordinate these actors' activities, however due to their weak state, or to the excessive demands of donors, sometimes they are unable to coordinate activities properly. At best, they comply with the demands of donor countries in terms of specific projects and the different lengths of time required for the implementation of the projects.

The central objective of reintegration programmes, according to Gleichmann, et al (2004:65), is to support ex-combatants in their efforts to gain social and economic reintegration into civilian society' and this does not include political reintegration. However, Kingma and Gebrewold's (1998) paper on demilitarisation, reintegration and conflict prevention, in the horn of Africa, considered the term 'full reintegration' to address social, political and economic needs of ex-combatants'. They define economic, political and social reintegration as follows:

> *'Economic reintegration is the process which the refugees' and ex-combatants' households use to establish their livelihoods, through production and/or other types of gainful employment.*

'Political reintegration refers to the process through which the returnees, or the ex-combatants and their families, become full participants in the decision-making processes.

Social reintegration is the process through which the returnee or ex-combatant and his or her family feel part of and are accepted by the community.

Kingma and Gebrewold (1998:1)

1.5.1   Economic Reintegration

The economic reintegration is to enable both ex-combatants and non-combatants to be economically independent in order to prevent them from resorting to violent crime, theft and other criminal activities, in other words to make a living. Ngoma (2004:83) termed economic reintegration, the 'engine' of reintegration, because it provides some aspects that determine the structure and direction of that process. Economic reintegration provides academic and vocational training for ex-combatants, creates employment to enhance their livelihoods, and facilitates the prevailing security situation. Therefore, economic reintegration will be discussed under the headings pertaining to education and employment factors.

With regard to education, programmes such as vocational, apprenticeships, and life skills training are often offered to enable individuals in communities to be more independent. However, most DDR programmes, for example, those offering training in hairdressing, tailoring, carpentry, shoe repair, driving, and masonry skills, are not economically sustainable in communities just coming out of war, and according to Watson (2010), attention needs to be shifted from these traditional skills programmes to emerging growth areas, such as repairing mobile phones. In arguing against such traditional reintegration programmes, Hendricks and Kisiangani (2007:1) posit that 'one only has to look at the spectrum of courses offered to know that the conceptualisation of the programme is flawed'. This means that the reintegration programmes should be selected for application in the different labour markets so that they can function viably.

The lack of sustainable markets for ex-combatants after they have completed vocational training normally drives some graduates to trade off their reinsertion kits for quick money, leaving them to turn to farming as the easy option, and one that may not require many specialised skills. Alusala (2007) uses a UNMIL assessment study to expand his argument, that stated that: when the demobilized ex-combatants were asked to identify their training preferences, in February 2005, 40% chose formal education, 14% auto mechanics, 11% generic skills training, 7% driving training, 7% tailoring, 4% agriculture and 3% chose masonry skills. However, he argues that these figures contrast with the findings of a survey conducted in December 2006 before UNMIL's reintegration, rehabilitation and recovery programme (RRRP), which revealed that farming was the most common occupation adopted by ex-combatants (23%). That means the majority of people, who had had education and other skills training, then became part of the agricultural workforce, which was not their preferred option. The problem about skills training is that ex-combatants are trained to become part of communities, but they may lack the necessary infrastructure to accommodate them, so that the work they can offer may not necessarily be economically sustainable. Specht (2009) argues that unless there is investment in the areas of skills training, which the labour market demands, so that it achieves the appropriate creation of jobs that will lead to people's absorption into communities, reintegration alone will not be sustainable.

Economic reintegration also facilitates the creation of employment for individuals living in communities. It is argued that the unemployment of ex-combatants can strain the peace making process. Assefa (1992:40) notes that if termination of a conflict means facing severe unemployment, or grave difficulties in resuming normal life, the enthusiasm among combatants for pursuing the peace process would be likely to be greatly reduced. Economic reintegration, therefore, considers several livelihood and income generation methods for ex-combatants: public works and public sector job creation; private sector and business development services employment in existing enterprises; and small business start-ups (IDDRS, 2006). The problems facing these income generating programmes in particular, however, are the tailored-made approaches to all beneficiaries, which do not necessarily meet their specific needs. Despite the fact that the need to 'disaggregate DDR programmes in order to provide specialised support to specific groups, such as ex-combatants, former child soldiers

and the disabled' has become increasingly prominent (Lamb and Dye, 2009:2), many contemporary reintegration programmes still use the one-size-fits-all approach to ex-combatants from different educational backgrounds and from different age groups. It is important to note that both ex-combatants and non-combatants have specific needs because they vary in terms of age, gender, disability, ethnicity and education.

Lack of funds in PCEs normally affects the initiation of economic programmes. Most often monies pledged by the international communities are not met, for one reason or another. For example, in June 2006, the 21st Report of the UN Secretary General on MONUC highlighted the fact that some of the pledges of US$200 million by the World Bank (50%) and the donor community (50%), under the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) framework, towards the civilian component of the national DDR programme, were not received[7]. This problem caused a delay in some demobilized ex-combatants starting the reintegration programme. According to Ginifer (2003:2), in Sierra Leone, the NCDDR targeted short-term reintegration programmes, due to limited funds. Lack of funds in conflict areas has led to some people arguing that focusing first on ex-combatants usually leaves virtually no funds to support communities, which are supposed to absorb those ex-combatants (Mazurana, 2004; USAID, 2005).

1.5.2 Political Reintegration

Political participation of ex-combatants is important in any sustainable peacebuilding. The lack of political commitment of both internal and external actors, can affect the success of reintegration. Özerdem (2009:23) compared the success of DDR in Angola to that of Mozambique and posited that one of the reasons why the DDR process failed in Angola, in 1993, was the lack of commitment from political leaders and warring factions in that country; whilst, in Mozambique, the highly political will of the international community and of the participating belligerents, following the 1992 General Peace Agreement in Rome, facilitated the reintegration process. This means that beyond a commitment to demilitarisation and an end to the use of violent means in the resolution of disputes, a deeper commitment by all, at the political level, is needed if post-war societies are to sustain the peace (Porto, et al., 2007:89). According to the Institute of Security Studies in South Africa (ISS), political

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[7] The UN Secretary General's 21st Report on MONUC, June 2006.

reintegration enables ex-combatants to participate in the political life of their communities, through interacting with, and/or participating in CB structures, processes and organisations. Examples include, amongst others, local councils, schools committees, social committees, churches, trade and industry bodies and neighbourhood watches (ISS).[8]

Political reintegration is often difficult to achieve, owing to the perception that some people have of ex-combatants, because of the atrocities they had committed during the conflict. Also, the level of political participation of most ex-combatants is very low, due to the fact that non-combatants often find spaces for political activism through community groups or students and youth associations (Honwana, 2006). Notwithstanding that, some combatants have participated well in political processes. An example is that of combatants who fought during the apartheid era in South Africa, many of whom, subsequently, became members of the ANC government.

Political reintegration is necessary in post-conflict communities and it should be encouraged so that ex-combatants will feel part of the local neighbourhood. Lundgren (2004:23) argues that 'political reintegration is important, as excluding the ex-combatants from political participation can create or renew tensions', which can lead to further violence. UNITA soldiers were interviewed for a survey relating to ex-combatants, which revealed that they were interested in political issues. Porto, et al (2007:91-97) surveyed UNITA soldiers on political issues and realised the following: 97% knew that elections were important to consolidate peace; 70% had voted in the 1992 elections; 97% acknowledged that they would vote in subsequent elections; 91.2% knew about political parties; and, in order to participate in electoral events, 21.7% would like to stand as candidates; 18.4% expressed their desire to be involved in organising events, 21.4% wished to participate in events, and 2.3% wanted to be involved in other ways. This survey shows how important it is to consider political issues in reintegration programmes. In order to avoid renewed tension and violence, due to exclusion of ex-combatants from political reintegration, there is the need to facilitate approaches in communities to such matters as forgiveness, cleansing and

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[8] Institute of Security Studies: Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration (DDR)
http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=25&link_type=12&tmpl_id=2

reconciliation, so that the negative perceptions that communities might have of ex-combatants could be eradicated, gradually.

1.5.3   Social Reintegration

Social reintegration is the acceptance of ex-combatants and their families into the receiving communities; the degree of the ex-combatants' participation in community social life; and the frequency of interaction (Body, 2005:3). Acceptance of ex-combatants into communities is likely to depend on the roles they had performed during the conflict. Ex-combatants who fought for popular causes are normally more willingly accepted by the host communities than those who fought for their own personal gain and perpetrated many atrocities on people in communities. Colletta, et al (1996:80) pointed out that the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) ex-combatants, in Ethiopia, were not welcome outside their native area because they had fought for an unpopular cause. However, the liberation forces in Eritrea generally had better relations with the population because they were perceived as liberators (Kingma, 2000: 220). In contemporary DDR programmes, ex-combatants are given incentives; for example, they may be given cash, tools, or basic equipment, regardless of whether communities perceive them as liberators or oppressors. In this regard, how will communities perceive ex-combatants who have caused them much pain and, at the same time, been rewarded at the expense of other community members. According to Ginifer (2003:6), 'in community sensitisation sessions and radio 'phone-ins', it has been common place to hear comments such as those who have ruined us are being given the chance to become better persons financially, academically and skills-wise'. When communities become aggrieved, due to many privileges being given to ex-combatants in spite of all the atrocities they have committed, accepting them into communities can be difficult.

One of the key issues in social reintegration is land distribution or property rights. When ex-combatants are demobilized and sent to their communities for reintegration, they expect to gain access to land in order to start some form of farming as a means of earning income to sustain their families economically. Meanwhile, some of them had 'never had land or it had been taken away by those who stayed behind' (Colletta, et al., 1996:277). Also, in some PCE's, ex-combatants were promised access to land during the reintegration process but, in the interim, that promise was not honoured. In

Nicaragua, for instance, the provision of land that had been promised was delayed or never realised; and also the problem of landmines, planted during the conflict, made maximum utilisation difficult (Spencer, 1997; Özerdem, 2009). Moreover, in some communities where women are not allowed to inherit land, female ex-combatants have been excluded from gaining access to land. The lack of availability of land for resettlement has led some ex-combatants, who have been trained as farmers, to lower their ambitions, settling for jobs such as being agricultural day labourers or unpaid family workers (Colletta, et al., 1996:277). This has been an obstacle to implementing a successful social reintegration process in many PCEs.

To address land issues, in Uganda for example, District Veterans Advisory Committees were formed to facilitate and mediate, among others, cases of difficulties in getting access to arable land (Kazoora, 1998). These committees were formed by communities to help to address land issues. However, in countries where governments are the custodians of land and property rights, such efforts at the community level could be opposed by those governments if they are not proceeded with in consultation with the line ministry, which is responsible. A more holistic approach is, therefore, needed to address issues concerning land and property rights in PCEs. It is important to note that all efforts to address land issues must also support female ex-combatants and other groups who might not have rights pertaining to traditional land inheritance.

Another issue relating to social reintegration is the psychosocial impact war can have on both ex-combatants and non-combatants. This problem can take the form of multiple traumas, such as rape, sexual abuse, massacres and tortures. Also, strange diseases and severe hunger can add to the traumas already being experienced in conflict areas. These forms of psychosocial traumas cause stress and when they persist over a period of time, they will almost certainly lead to post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which requires professional assistance. However, psychosocial support and counselling have been overlooked, so they have not become components of DDR (IDDRS, 2006). Even if psychosocial components are included in reintegration programmes, the focus is always on the ex-combatants. The UNDP presentation of a Psychosocial Support Project Workshop in Kenya, Nairobi for example, stressed that as long as ex-combatants remained traumatized, their productivity and self-esteem, and their commitment to self-help and recovery

remained extremely limited and they continued to threaten peacebuilding, stability and recovery (UNDP, 2002:1).

Many studies have, however, revealed that it is not even only ex-combatants who are affected psychologically due to conflict situations, but those who witness the atrocities, as well (UNRISD, 1995:17). In contemporary conflict, in fact due to its intra-state nature, atrocities committed are witnessed by both combatants and non-combatants. Since combatants are trained to 'contain' some of these traumas, it would have been expected that much attention (where these havocs had happened) would be focussed on non-combatants rather than so much being focussed on ex-combatants, but this is not the case in the application of the current psychosocial components. Summerfield (1991:171) advocates that 'war-related mental trauma should not be viewed as an injury sustained by an individual, but rather a process or processes impinging on social and cultural organisation at various levels: family, community and society'.

1.6   Conclusion

The review of the literature has identified a number of inadequacies facing the current DDR programmes. First, the issue is that ex-combatants are given preferential treatment over the entire community (Colletta, et al., 1996:8). Here, the literature stated that much effort is focussed on ex-combatants rather than non-combatants or entire communities in PCEs. This is because ex-combatants are considered to threaten security in peacebuilding processes. According to Last (1999), ex-combatants may turn to banditry if they do not see a role for themselves in the post-war process. Therefore, disarming ex-combatants, rather than communities, is often seen to be the best option for the commencement of any peace process.

Moreover, the theory identified that, even amongst ex-combatants, not all of them received equal treatment during the DDR process; for example, some groups, such as females, the disabled, pensioners and child soldiers, have been neglected in DDR programmes (Galama and van Tongereen, 2002:220). Lessons learned from many disarmament programmes indicated that the disarmament process focussed exclusively on ex-combatants with conventional weapons. The eligibility criteria for disarmament had been a major issue of concern due to the cash incentives associated

with the relinquishing of those armaments. The IDDRS policy of 'inclusivity' in eligibility criteria (non-discriminatory in terms of sex, race culture and nationality) was however inapplicable most of the time.

The problem of exclusion can be traced to the definition of demobilization which involves 'assembly, quartering, disarmament, administration and discharge' (UNDPKO, 1999:15). The demobilization process signifies that, to be disarmed, ex-combatants need to be assembled, and then quartered. This process calls for strict screening of those who qualify for the demobilization process and those who do not, thereby restricting some people from going through that process. Besides, according to Faltas (2004), some ex-combatants who were eager to stop fighting, in order to pursue their livelihoods, refused to take part in the demobilization process because they resisted confinement. However, it is important to note that there are advantages to assembling ex-combatants in an encampment site: facilitating the ease of provision of services, gaining better control and supervision, and aiding social reintegration. But if the former causes the exclusion of some groups from taking part in the DDR process, then alternative approaches are worth considering in eliminating such exclusion.

Also, ex-combatants are provided with tailor-made reintegration programmes, regardless of differences in age, gender, disability, and education. According to Özerdem (2009:37), in socio-economic reintegration, 'female combatants would have different needs and expectations from male combatants'; hence, reintegration options should include vocational skills that are relevant to female combatants. Initiating one-size-fits-all training programmes could produce skills that might not be very useful in the labour market. Also, some programmes might not be relevant, due to lack of community involvement in the planning and implementation processes and that could affect effective peacebuilding in PCEs.

Furthermore, it is argued that communities coming out of war situations are so devastated by the damaged to the infrastructure in their community neighbourhoods, and have fewer opportunities to generate income, to be focussed more on individual ex-combatants, instead of focusing adequately on the entire community (Mazurana, 2004). The lack of funds in PCEs leads some ex-combatants to trade off their

reinsertion kits in order to make quick money. According to the USAID (2005:8), most discussions on ex-combatants concentrate on how they will 'return to civilian life'; meanwhile, in most conflict contexts, the social and economic fabrics have been badly affected, leaving ex-combatants without communities that can sustain their reintegration process. Kingma (2000:225) argues that support programmes need to strike a balance between dealing with the specific needs of ex-combatants, and not creating discontent among the rest of their communities.

Although focusing on ex-combatants might be a good starting point, by so doing non-combatants (such as civilians, refugees and internally displaced persons), who have suffered atrocities in the hands of those ex-combatants, are often neglected. According to Kingma (2000:225) 'in countries such as Mozambique they were the ones that created all the havoc and made development and life impossible for others', so why should they be given special treatment that is not available to the many other groups of people who have also suffered those same types of atrocities, and needed to re-establish their livelihoods, as well. Focusing more on ex-combatants rather than communities creates resentment between these groups, and that can affect the reintegration process necessary in effective peacebuilding.

The shortcomings enumerated above indicate that the conventional approaches to DDR have failed to achieve sustainable peacebuilding in many PCEs. According to Özerdem (2009:39), a 'DDR process that focuses on taking arms from former combatants without its objectives to a wider peacebuilding framework being met is bound to be short lived'. This research, therefore, suggests that a community approach to reintegration is essential where (1) ex-combatants, as part of communities, rather than ex-combatants on their own, are likely to be focussed on; (2) communities would be involved in the planning and implementation process, since they are in a better position to identify their needs, (3) medium to long-term projects would be initiated to ensure sustainability, and (4) all groups within communities would be targeted to avoid any exclusion and thereby also avoid resentment. Having identified the need for a community approach to reintegration, the next Chapter will explore what community means, and how concentration upon it can facilitate the reintegration process in PCEs.

Chapter Two

Community and Community Participation

2.1   Introduction

The issue of conflict is of prime concern to communities and societies because it affects social, political and economic activities. Conflict occurs when people come in contact with one another to form groups to pursue a common goal. When individuals within groups dislike others, or do not agree on certain issues and fail to resolve them amicably, conflict could arise. Barker, et al (1987) identified conditions that are necessary for conflict to exist as follows: (1) that there are individuals coming together as groups (families, religious belief, organisations, communities); (2) that there are interactions among the members because, without contact, there will be no conflict; (3) that there are different levels within positions occupied by the members; and (4) that there may be dissatisfaction among members concerning scarcity of desired resources. It must be noted, however, that the formation of groups does not always lead to conflict, but competition, which could stimulate group members into action for development, or betterment, or to achieve a common goal. Competition among group members, in this sense, will not be seen as conflict, but a method of motivating group members into taking action.

Conflict does not always serve negative functions, but may serve positive ones, as well. According to Putnam (1993), conflict can unite members within groups by strengthening their networks when working towards a common purpose. Also, it can bring people from diverse backgrounds together by helping to create social or economic bonding among them. However, conflict may destroy groups through the power struggles that develop, leading to the powerful members of the groups becoming stronger and ultimately exterminating the weaker groups, or not interacting with certain other group members. Besides, differences in personalities emerge and, when those reach breaking point or beyond, arguments and quarrels cannot be contained any longer, then ultimately, if the matters are not resolved and they worsen, could lead to war. In PCEs, conflict can also cause some groups, for instance ex-combatants, gain much recognition in communities, and this can create resentment among other groups such as internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees, for example. These forms of differences among groups can affect the post-war

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reconstruction process, thus there is the need to bring all groups and/or individuals, which have been separated by war, together in the planning, implementation and managing of activities to address any form of resentment. Community participation in decision-making processes is, therefore, key to bringing people and groups together for a common goal.

The quest for community participation in programme design and its implementation has been the focus of previous debates. The main issue, or the bone of contention, is that programmes, which involve communities in planning and implementation, receive higher levels of patronage than programmes without community participation. It is argued that community programmes without participation from the user groups are top-down in approach; and such programmes can be neglected by communities despite the amount of money spent to initiate and implement them. Thus, to avoid wasting resources, community participation in the decision-making processes is required (Reid, 2000; Botterill and Fisher, 2002; Krishna, 2004). Whilst the need for community participation in programme design and implementation is being argued about, communities are often considered to be made up of lay people without technical know-how with which to support programmes. Opponents of community participation argue that the involvement of the community, in project planning and implementation, hinders or disrupts decision-making processes; hence, any attempt to exclude participating community members is seen as being for the better (Cary and Webb, 2001; Marwell and Oliver, 1993). In spite of the fact that this argument can be substantiated in some communities, most often, community participation is associated with benefits. According to Gilchrist (2004) community participation facilitates empowerment, which is crucial in post-conflict peacebuilding. Studies have shown that the reintegration process, as part of peacebuilding activities, thrives in communities with higher rates of participation but, in those with less participation, the reintegration process tends to be less effective (Özerdem, 2009). Also, community participation facilitates the allocation of resources, and it is likely to enable checks regarding accountability in order to attempt to keep misuse and other forms of corrupt behaviour under control. Community participation is invaluable, so it would be wise to explore how best to take advantage of that in relation to community reintegration programmes in PCEs. This Chapter uses community participation theory in an attempt to put this research into perspective.

This Chapter begins by defining community and looks at how different communities can be approached. It then explores pluralist community theory and community as stakeholding to identify how groups influence power and decision-making in communities. In addition, the concepts of social network theory and social capital are considered to investigate how groups interact amongst themselves. The Chapter then enters into discussion about community participation and highlights opportunities and challenges that are critical for the success or failure of community reintegration. The concluding discussion summarises the literature, through the use of a simple diagram known as 'Steps of an Approach to Community Participation'.

2.2   Community: What is it?

The term 'community' lacks precise focus or definition because there are diverse writings that have defined the word to suit a particular area of study. Some people have defined community as a locality or boundary; some as a series of social networks or shared identity; some as norms and values; and others as an expression of attachment. Popple (1995:3) posits that the definitions of communities are 'elusive, imprecise, contradictory and controversial'. Pereira (1997:5), referring to Jocelyn Cornwell's work on Health and Illness in East London, also describes community as a 'ubiquitous term which has been used in personal, political, cultural, geographical, historical, national and international settings'. In many different contexts, the word community is expressed differently, which restricts the possibility of finding a precise definition.

Despite the problems and criticisms involved in defining 'community', some academics have ventured to give their own definitions, enabling them to be reviewed. In 1915, Galpin formulated the first sociological definition of community, which related to 'delineating rural communities in terms of trade and service areas surrounding a central village' (Smith, 2001:1). Since Galpin's sociological definition of 'community', some competing definitions have been devised, which focussed on communities as geographical areas; as groups of people living in particular places; and as areas where common life were conducted. Young (1955) stated in Young and Willmont (1957) defines community simply as a sense of solidarity with people sharing a common territory but, when he developed the idea of community with

Willmont, they saw community as a collective life lived on the streets and in public places. Also, Hillery (1955) in his classic trawl through definitions of community did not consider community as a geographical area, or a group of people living in a particular place, or people with a common life; but identified a core feature of regular, cooperative interactions among a set of people over time. Agrawal and Gibson (1999) argue that people in a community with the same values and norms, and also the same culture and traditions could be defined as community. It is assumed that people with same values and norms can solve problems among themselves better than people with different values can.

Community exhibit three basic assumptions: (1) comprising a group of people who share broad developmental goals; (2) governing social behaviour and relationships by social norms; and (3) excluding those who do not belong to that community (OED, 2005:76). These assumptions buttress the point that community can be discriminatory, and could be detrimental to peacebuilding in PCEs. Nevertheless, this research considers positive aspects of community, where individuals interact with one another and have some form of common characteristics and bonding which creates trust, support, loyalty, and empowerment in post-conflict peacebuilding. For the purpose of this research, the word community will not be defined at present, but will be defined subsequently when approaches to communities are explored.

2.2.1 Approaches to Communities

Communities can be approached in several ways: being a locality/boundary; having developed social networks; sharing identity/attachment; having common norms and habits; thus creating value within the community. Though these approaches could be considered separately, it is important to note that they overlap in some respects. For example, shared identity or social networks can be located within a specific locality and can span different localities. The subsequent paragraphs explore approaches to communities.

First, community can be considered as locality/boundary. A locality is a geographical area where people have something in common. This area has its own boundaries clearly demarcated and easily identifiable. Boundaries are marked on a map; they can also be features such as roads, rivers, line of trees, or even pillars that have been built

physically. Cohen (1985:12), however, posits that boundaries 'may be thought of as existing in the minds of the beholders'; meaning, in areas where borders are not clearly demarcated or not visible, they could be pictured in the minds of the people living in that geographical area. Arguably, even in very remote areas where land marks are not clearly visible, something, such as an ant hill, can be used as a reference point and this may be known and referred to by many people. Neighbourhoods, suburbs, villages and towns are examples of localities. Locality is very important to people's identity and sense of belonging because, in such geographical areas people are likely to cooperate more with one another in their day-to-day activities. Normally, people living in the same locality see themselves as a group and work towards the development of that community. Besides, localities often offer something which binds people together, such as a festival or even a common language and this commonality is what distinguishes them from other groups. Nonetheless, this sense of belonging and solidarity is sometimes lost in some localities, when conflicts become rife.

However, the idea of a boundary could be considered as discriminatory because it excludes people who do not belong to that group. It establishes a 'we' and 'them' attitude which could fuel conflicts in war affected countries. Conflicts in Sudan, Liberia and Sierra Leone attest to this fact. However, Smith (2001:3) argues that, community boundaries may be seen in very different ways, 'not only by people on either side but also by people on the same side', who can work together for the betterment of communities. When people see themselves as one, they cooperate with one another in various activities including decision-making process.

Second, communities are approached as social networks which extend beyond geographical boundaries, and these could be made up of families, friends, organisations, associations, cultures and churches. Such social networks bind people together, in a way that mere localities cannot. According to Smith (2001:3), the most significant aspects of community are the nature of the relationships that exist between people and the social networks to which they belong. Bott (1957:99) uses the examples of families, which are disperse throughout urban areas as a way of illustrating that the networks they maintain are what constitute a community. Even in rural communities people from the same locality, who belong to a particular religion or sect, can form a community. Allan (1996:125-126) when referring to Wenger's

(1995) work on networks for older people, identified five types of support networks (family-dependent; living locally; local self-contained; wider community-focussed; private restricted) that she had highlighted, and used these criteria to describe the changing composition of networks from close kin, to friends and neighbours, and finally to community groups that people form.

As argued when speaking of a community as a locality, the formation of groups through networks also leads to exclusion of people who do not appear to belong to those groups. According to Gilchrist (2004:3), community networks reinforce community boundaries, and become 'badges of belonging' which identify 'friends' and 'allies'. Also, the formation of groups through networks creates power structures in which the powerful groups (and groups within groups) normally dominate. For instance females and child ex-combatants, in PCEs, are not accorded the same attention as the adult male ex-combatants are, owing to being less powerful and less influential minorities within the groups. However, it must be noted that the formation of groups does not always lead to power struggles, as already noted. Where trust and commitment exist between groups, they might work together to achieve favourable results (USAID, 2005).

Furthermore, community is approached as an attachment which can be a place, organisation, group or idea; for example, as in the thinking that is express in the phrase: 'the Christian communion of saints' (Smith, 2001:2). These ways of approaching community overlap with other approaches, because people who belong to a place or a religion may find themselves in different organisations, too. Meanwhile, people can live in a specific geographical location but will have no shared identity. These forms of identity are unrestricted and cut across one variable to another. This approach to community generates people's sense of belonging, which results in committing themselves to common causes. That may eliminate the problems relating to race, gender and age within groups. Individual members of groups normally work together on projects to achieve success. In Mindanao, Philippines the Muslim rebel group, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) identified themselves as a group, despite the fact that they were living in different locations and they signed a peace deal with the Government when it initiated training and economic activities in that region. However, like most groups, it excluded those who did not

appear to belong. The problems or shortcomings associated with groups have already been discussed in other approaches that were mentioned earlier regarding location and shared identity.

Community can also be considered in terms of norms and habits. People's norms and habits influence their behaviour and stem from the choices made in different societies. The formation of groups happens when people find that they want to associate with people, with whom they have things in common from which understanding develops, for example behaviour and interests. Elster (1989:1&2) identifies such matters as social and moral characteristics, and such things as legal and private concerns, as matters that need to be shared with others, therefore she posits that it is the sharing that makes the norms social in nature. Smith (2001:5&6) proposes: 'tolerance (Walzer, 1997); reciprocity (Putnam, 2000); and trust (Coleman, 1990), has been the three qualities of community norms and habits. These qualities, according to Smith, can bring significant benefits to societies. Norms or habits which express reciprocity, for example, are signs of friendship where people, in response to favours received from others, return the compliment. Such signs of friendship amongst individuals within groups ensure cooperation which may lead to the promotion of development and the necessary ensuing cooperation. Tolerance and trust are also important qualities needed in communities, especially in PCEs where a lack of trust may have caused mortality and economic destruction. Communities, which do not share the same norms and habits, might have different opinions and resultant practices which may lead to the obliteration of values already created in communities if that distrustfulness is not addresses and controlled.

By contrast, norms could also be detrimental to cooperation and development. Norms of retribution, for example, which enjoin people to retaliate could lead to violent behaviour that would harm others and possibly result in further harm to themselves, thereby making communities fearful which may in turn, restrict all aspects of performance (Elster, 1989:2). Boehm (1984:88), on the other hand, posits that norms of retribution could help reduce quarrels in societies if regulated by codes of honour. He argues that people, who in other circumstances are willing to be law breakers, may be more likely to be law abiding if they know that others might retaliate to whatever

they do. This form of law abiding is a type of coercion and it could impedes development in society.

The approaches, as discussed above, revealed how locality, social networks, attachment, and norms and habits can bring people and groups together in communities for a common goal. Williams (1976:65) notes that community remains a warmly persuasive word that never seems to be used unfavourably. However, there are critics who argue that contemporary communities are weakened by urbanisation, some inadequate extended family systems and limited social networks, which often relate to the wider dispersal of people resulting in or ease of contact; rampant individualism in contemporary communities may lead to more obvious division, whereas, in the past, blood relations lived within smaller neighbourhoods and did not generally become widely dispersed (likewise, friends did not generally speaking, move far from their home areas) so that it was easier for people who had formed close relationship, to live and work together (Smith, 2001; Gilchrist, 2004).

Considering the many definitions the word community has evoked with reference to approaches to communities, it could be argued that those definitions lack precision, or they may be considered contradictory. Based on this imprecise way of defining community, this research encompasses all the approaches together by defining community as; a group of people living in the same or different localities and enjoying the presence of a variety of social networks, based on shared identity, norms and habits, in order to create value. Some elements which represent that value may be: solidarity, commitment, mutuality, cooperation, trust and fellowship (Frazer, 2000). In a post-conflict context, communities should include ex-combatants (men, women, children and disabled members of different warring groups), and non-combatants (internally displaced persons -IDPs, refugees, victims of violence, and locals), but, often, reintegration programmes exclude some groups in communities. The following sections therefore explore how groups exert power and influence through pluralist community theory and through perceiving community as stakeholding.

2.3   Pluralist Community Theory

Pluralist theory has been strongly influenced by Schumpeter (1976) and Weber (1978). They hold the view that political power in society does not lie with the

electorate but is distributed between a wide numbers of groups. These groups may be trade unions, interest groups, business organisations and any of a multitude of formal and informal coalitions. Pluralism takes various forms such as that of the early English, classical, elite and that of neo-pluralists, with their associated assumptions and tenets of behaviour. Though some of these tenets may differ from one form of pluralism to another, there is at least one assumption that is associated with all - and that is the role of groups. These groups limit the power of the state, which means power is dispersed and any group may be able to influence the outcome of an issue. These competing interest groups are 'vital to democracy and stability because they divide power and prevent any one group or class exerting an exclusive influence' (Popple, 1995:32). 'Fundamental to all pluralists and pluralist thought, is the notion that diversity is a social good that prevents the dominance of one particular idea, and that power should be dispersed and not allowed to accumulate in the state' (Smith, 2006:22). One of the three main tenets of English pluralism regarded 'groups' as 'persons' (Nichols, 1975:5). In the United States, as was the case with English pluralists, individuals were seen as existing through groups and their identity was an expression of group members.

In the post-war period, Bentley (1967:211-212) posits that pluralists have adopted classical pluralism, which laid emphasis on the role of groups in politics and the need to contain the power and competence of the state. For Bentley, groups are no different from individuals. Classical pluralists emphasized the 'degree of consensus underlying the political process (Smith, 2006:26). Elite pluralists, on the other hand, analysed how power had been distributed in the post-war era (Merelman, 2003:18). They argued that groups needed a high level of resources and the support of patrons in order to contend, influentially. Immediately after World War II, resources were limited and power and influence were based on the ability to provide adequate resources to rebuild industries that had collapsed. Neo-pluralists also attributed primacy to the competition between interest groups in the policy process but recognised the disproportionate influence business interest had on policy processes (Lindblom, 1977:175).

The pluralist concept of groups exists in communities. Groups such as the elite, chiefs, ex-combatants and IDPs could be identified in post-conflict communities. The

role of these groups in this paradigm is that power is dispersed and not accumulated in communities. The continual bargaining between groups in communities indicates the impact they have on policy and decision-making processes. This continual bargaining between groups encourages participation in communities.

The pluralist concept also divulges the reasons why some groups in communities are more powerful than others. The power and influence groups exert in communities depend on how well they are organised and the way they lobby. In the DDR process much attention is focussed on the adult male ex-combatants, because they are considered to have become more dominant than other groups in decision-making processes, such as women and children who played subsidiary roles. This male dominance could be due to the formation of regular military set-ups, where fighting units take precedence over supply units. However, it is important to note that this might not always be the case because other socio-economic or demographic factors, for example: class, ethnicity or education, could restrict male dominance in societies. When male ex-combatants are given preferential treatment due to the power and influence they wield in communities, other groups might be neglected and this can create resentment amongst them. The formation of groups associated with the pluralist concept reinforces community networks.

2.4   Community as Stakeholding

Another way to explore how groups influence power in communities is by examining the concept of stakeholding. The term stakeholding refers broadly to shareholders, employers, suppliers, and customers in an organisation. This reflects a much broader sphere of an organisation than either shareholders or stockholders can do. In the social sphere, according to Blair (1994) quoted in Fitzpatrick (2005:59), stakeholding could imply a 'one nation' form of social identity through which people identify with and recognise a duty to contribute to the common good, regardless of social background. This definition, by Blair, considers a nation as an organisation where employers, suppliers, customers, shareholders or stockholders 'supposedly' work together for a common good. Fitzpatrick (2005:60) posits that 'stakeholding seems to place the emphasis upon consensus rather than conflict, upon what connects rather than what separates.' Considering Blair's definition of stakeholding in the social sphere and Fitzpatrick's emphasis on the consensus of stakeholders, it could be argued that

stakeholding encourages the various groups in an organisation to influence the decision-making process. The existence of groups in an organisation demonstrates the fact that power is dispersed and not accumulated in an organisation.

On the other hand, one could argue against the fact that stakeholders in an organisation work together for the common good. In some cases, employers do exploit employees to make huge profits. Managers, often offer good remuneration packages that suit themselves and neglect the ordinary staff on the shop floor. Customers could be exploited through the imposition of high prices leading to high profit margins. These profits are shared with staff as bonuses and also serve as dividends to shareholders. The question, therefore, is where does consensus lie when other groups are being exploited? As in all organisations, the powerful groups dominate in all respects, be they decision-making or planning and implementation.

So, stakeholding can be compared to groups in communities whose continual bargaining power also has an impact on policy and decision-making processes. Groups, such as adult male ex-combatants, chiefs and opinion leaders will have much more influence than weaker groups (female, disabled and child ex-combatants). As shown in Figure 2 below, disparity in influence depends on how active or passive these groups are, in PCEs, and they could be regrouped as Level 1 or 2, depending on their levels of influence. Also the levels of influence could be considered as primary or secondary, depending on how much the community depends on them. In PCEs, the level of influence of adult male-combatants or community leaders could be considered primary because any decision, in terms of security or development, will involve them. Meanwhile, communities will not depend much on pensioners or disabled combatants so they could be classified as secondary. It is assumed that refugees, who have had the opportunity to educate themselves or to be gainfully employed whilst in foreign countries, will have influence in communities hence they are classified as Level 1; but, at the same time, those who did not have that opportunity in terms of education or gaining wealth may be classified as Level 2, owing to their dependency on others in communities. It is important to note that power differentials exist within groups in post-conflict communities; and the contributions these groups make towards decision-making processes depends on the power and influence they have. Having considered the role groups play in pluralist

and stakeholding theories, this research considers the links that hold individuals and groups together in communities through the concept of social network theory.

Figure 2: Levels of Influence in Post-conflict Environments

Level 1
Chiefs,
Refugees
Opinion leaders
Male combatants
Community leaders
Government officials

Level 2
IDPs
Disabled
Refugees
Pensioners
Child soldiers
Community members
Female ex-combatants

 Source: Author

2.5   Social Network Theory

The concept of social network theory plays a critical role in determining how individuals or groups are formed, run and operated in relation to achieving success through networking. The origin of social networks has been discussed by many social theorists and, according to Lopez and Scott (2000:1) the concept originates from social structure: the institutional, the relational and the embodied.

> 'Institutional structure comprises cultural patterns of expectations that agents hold about each other's behaviour and that organize their relations with each other.

> 'The relational structure is the social relations, the interconnection and interdependence among agents and their actions, as well as the positions they occupy.

'The embodied structure is the habits and skills that are inscribed in human bodies and minds, which allow them to produce, reproduce and transform institutional structures and relational structures.'

Lopez and Scott (2000:3-5)

Based on the definitions of these three concepts of social structure, they argued that the relational, which deals with social relations of agents and the patterns produced, is usually referred to as being a social network. According to Boudouries (2004:3) social networks are related to what is usually identified as relational aspects of social structure. They are made up of agents or nodes that are linked with specific types of interdependency, such as friendship, conflict, or trade relations. Research has shown that these agents can be individuals, families, groups, communities, towns or nations depending on their links with one another.

Social networking is useful in determining how new ideas and opportunities are introduced to members; and this is done through developing relational ties between people. Ties can either be weak to strong, depending on the quantity, quality or frequency of the exchanges between the actors (Boudouries, 2004:5). It is argued that weak ties help to integrate social systems more than strong ties do, because members have access to other individuals outside their main networks, which makes them have contact with a wider range of informants (Granovetter, 1982).

There have been arguments to support the fact that social networking can support collective action (Boudouries, 2004; Oliver and Marwell, 2001; Kim and Bearman, 1997). Proponents are of the view that people normally form their opinions based on information from individual discussions and these are controlled by social networking. Boudouries (2004) posits that collective action can be achieved when actors are highly closely connected and when they are highly interested in participating in public process; others, who are less interested in being involved in such process, may not be willing to participate at all.

According to the rational choice theory what defines collective action should be the provision of collective good. Oslon (1982) argues that rational, self-interested

individuals will not act to meet the interests of the group or achieve common good, unless coercion is used, or some other intervention occurs: the state enacting laws or the government initiating incentive schemes to make individuals act in their common interest. Oslon stresses the fact that actors make decisions independently, and for that matter, they will be motivated by their own self-interest, rather than the interests of the group/group(s). This means that rational self-interested people would not cooperate with others in order to achieve the collective good. However, non-rational motives: norms, values, ideology and culture, have been used to argue in favour of collective actions, so that their impact overcomes their individual rationality (see van Houton, 2001), but Houton argues that, if values or cultures are important to the rationality of an individual, this would falsify the economic approach to rational choice argument.

Other social theorists: (Oliver and Marwell, 2001; Kim and Bearman, 1997) point to the fact that collective action may be formed and sustained less by the attention paid to the collective good than by mechanisms of formation and diffusion of public opinion (Boudouries, 2004:10). Marwell and Oliver (1993) posit that people's interconnectivity through communication networks increases their willingness to support the collective good; this illustrates that collective action can be made possible through social networking.

2.5.1 Social Networking and Social Capital

Social network can also be used to determine the social capital of individual or group actors. It refers to the networking positions of the objects (individuals or groups) and how they utilize the resources of those members within the network. Here, the focus is not on the individual or group but the ability to use the network effectively. According to Ethier (2004:1) the more mapping a person has in the social network and the more mappings other people have in the same social network, the more knowledge, influence and power the original person has to use in controlling others within that contexts.

Many scholars, such as Burt and Lin, have defined the term social capital; and Putnam (2000:19) describes social capital as the 'connections among individuals – social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them'. It

means that a society with individuals who are embedded in networking could be considered as being rich in social capital and that it would be able to reinforce social norms. According to Gilchrist (2004), Putnam acknowledges that social capital is closely related to community, which reflects levels of general trust and inter-connectivity within society. Social capital, an aspect of community, has emerged as one of the most popular exports from the sociological realm into a wide range of sectors, such as post-war recovery studies (Barnes, et al., 2006:26). It is very useful in PCEs because of the way it addresses various aspects of social connection.

Many social theorists have used different approaches to social capital, and Putnam (2000) uses the liberal approach where the relationship and trust of individuals, or groups, can bring significant benefits to communities. Trust is developed by people using their ability to work together to achieve common goals in groups or communities. Woolcock (2001) uses bonding, bridging, and linking to explain social capital. Bonding is the enduring, multi-faceted relationships formed between similar people with strong mutual commitments, such as among friends, family and other close-knit groups: bridging is the connection between people who have less in common, but may have overlapping interests, for example, those bridging connections developed between neighbours, colleagues, or different groups within a community: and linking is the contact between people or organisations which exist beyond peer boundaries, cutting across different statuses enabling people to exert influence and reach resources outside their normal circles. Though all these approaches are very important for community cohesion, Gilchrist (2004:6&7) emphasizes bridging and linking for forming and enhancing community development: bridging because it can be seen as important for managing diversity and maintaining community cohesion; and linking because it is needed for empowerment and enabling partnerships to work.

Though Gilchrist argues about the importance of bridging and linking in developmental issues, in PCEs, bonding is also important in exploiting social capital for protection and support in areas where the social fabric has been devastated. According to Barnes, et al (2006:26), bonding strategies build trust and cooperation among individuals and within communities. Ager, et al (2005:164) argue that social bonding can be seen as a key element in enhancing wellbeing and security whilst social bridges are required for economic and political development. In PCEs, where

war has eroded the trust of families and communities, social bonding as well as bridging is very important in bringing people together for development.

Despite the strengths identified in the networking of social capital in communities, it is also essential to recognise the fact that social capital can hinder community cohesion, when the interaction of groups excludes other groups from decision-making processes or when some groups dominate due to their power and influence. Bourdieu (1983:249), who was the architect of this view, considers social capital as 'the aggregate of the actual or potential resources, which are linked to possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintances and recognition'. Bourdieu's notion of social capital is the formation of a class society where the elites always dominate in terms of money and power. Gilchrist (2004:5) also uses Hall's (2000) definition of social capital in Britain to acknowledge that there is a class factor, with middle class people being more likely to be members of voluntary or civic associations, while working-class households enjoy higher levels of informal sociability. This class distinction could exist is PCEs, where the elites and male ex-combatants wield more power than female ex-combatants, child soldiers, and the disabled. Such dominance or differences among groups, if not controlled, could provide an opportunity for an outbreak of conflict.

Despite the above limitations, this research agrees with Richards, et al (2005:33) that, whichever way one perceives social capital, at least the concept covers both the legacy of organisations and the ability to mobilize collectively. The subsequent sections of this Chapter, therefore, explore how individuals and groups participate in community activities.

2.6 Community Participation: Opportunities and Challenges

Community participation is one of the key ingredients of an empowered community. Reid (2000:3) describes participation as 'the heart that pumps the community's life blood - its citizens – into the community's business.' Participation is therefore very important to community success. Community participation models, according to Botterill and Fisher (2002:5), have emerged 'offering alternative, "bottom up" solutions to policy problems'. This makes it possible for people within communities (whether rich or poor) to take decisions amongst themselves rather than having them

imposed upon them. An important feature of community programmes is the participatory nature of the residents, themselves, in planning and implementing the programmes. Many people associate communities with the poor and Levites (1998) notes that in public policy discussions, people rarely hear about middle-class communities.

Community participation became very 'popular in the late 1960s and the early 1970s' (Foley and Martin, 2000:479). During this period, community participation activists argued that rather than helping poor communities to improve their social and environmental circumstances, these communities should have being made to take direct actions to ensure changes and improvements that would last for a period of time (Midgley, et al., 1986:20). Smith (2006:2) identifies two key arguments about community participation: first, the justification of decision-making processes through collective action; and second, the educational value through participation. According to Smith, the UN interest in community participation became formalized in a number of United Nations reports, including Popular Participation in Development (1971) and Popular Participation in Decision Making for Development (1975). Since then community participation has been very popular with other international organisations, such as the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) for developmental projects in communities.

The UN (1981:5) defines community participation as 'the creation of opportunities to enable all members of a community to actively contribute to and influence the development process and to share equitably in the fruits of development'. Nevertheless, Midgley, et al (1986) differentiate community participation from popular participation: the former deals with ordinary people's direct involvement in local affairs, whilst the latter concerns broad issues of social development and the creation of opportunities for the involvement of people in the political, economic and social life of a nation. With reference to Midgley's, et al., definition of community participation which dealt with the direct involvement of local people in the planning, delivering, monitoring, and evaluating of projects, one could argue that governments or NGOs projects, in partnership with communities, are also classified as community participatory projects; however the level of community participation differs.

2.6.1 Levels of Community Participation

There are different levels of community participation in programmes. Arnstein (1969) used an 'eight-rung ladder' to describe levels of participation. These are: manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control (see Figure 3, left diagram). As shown on the left side of Figure 3, Arnstein regrouped the rungs into non-participation, tokenism and citizen power. Using the levels of community participation to illustrate programmes, non-participation can be described as programmes planned and implemented by NGOs without community participation; tokenism is where communities are consulted without allowing them to undertake active participation in decision-making processes; whilst citizen power is exercised when citizens control their own programmes. Though partnership is considered to be citizen power, one could argue that partnership is different from citizen power or ownership.

Figure 3: Levels of Participation

As shown on the right side in Figure 3, the UNDP describes the hierarchical form of participation as passive participation, increasing involvement, active participation, and ownership (Clayton, et al., 1997). This hierarchical form of participation is slightly different from Arnstein's rungs marking citizens' participation. Here, active participation could be described as what Arnstein termed as partnership, and it is

different from ownership or citizen power. With the other levels of participation, passive participation can be described as consulting or informing communities about programmes; increasing involvement is where communities are contacted and begin to take active parts in programmes; and ownership is where beneficiaries develop their own initiatives to begin a project.

Regardless of the levels of participation, programmes that are planned by government or by NGOs, with some level of community participation, are normally considered to be viable and credible. However, it is known that governments or NGOs speak different languages from communities. NGOs or programme implementers see themselves as experts and often describe people living in communities as lay people. These experts consider themselves as being able to look at matters objectively and rationally, based on their facts and theories, whilst they perceive lay people as being merely irrational. For communication between these two groups of people to reach a compromise in relation to projects could be very difficult sometimes - hence, the dialogue between these groups (experts and lay people) assumes greater importance, and that is what risk communication theory is about. The concept of risk communication encourages discussion between experts and local people so that agreement can be reached on issues regarding projects, because public opinion has relevance in community programmes if developers are to be able to effectively negotiate design and its application with users in those communities. Therefore, Krishna (2004:2) posits that 'an appropriate design will need to be evolved that brings forth public consent in the degree required and that is also technically well suited for undertaking the task in question'. The concept of community participation reveals a couple of factors that are critical for success or failure of CB DDR and these will be discussed below.

2.6.2 Opportunities and Challenges

First, community participation facilitates the democratic process for the achievement of good governance. In many communities, individuals have opportunities to discuss and influence public policies and services, and all factors affecting the conditions of their lives (Communities and Local Government, 2007:17). This is normally done through community participation where programmes are selected, and prioritised

through majority decision-making processes. Goss (2001:21) states that 'the creation and use of public value requires public consent'.

Also, community participation increases the voice of the poor and vulnerable, and those who otherwise may lack opportunities to be heard. This leads to community representation where men, women and children may be selected through democratic processes. According to the Security Council (1998:16) 'democratization gives people a stake in society. Its importance cannot be overstated, for unless people feel that they have a true stake in society lasting peace will not be possible and sustainable development will not be achieved'. When all groups are represented in community decision-making processes, exclusion will be addressed and an enabling security environment will be created for the reintegration process. In Rwanda, community members were engaged in the selection of some development programmes for reintegration 'based on an assessment showing that poor governance was the root cause of the genocide' (The World Bank, 2006:9).

In addition, community participation enhances good governance through the formation of local committees, such as management and advisory committees. These committees are normally formed through democratic process, and they represent the community in managing community programmes and activities. In the DRC, management committees were democratically formed by the locals, during the USAID 6-month programme, so that they could select community members for small grant projects and also manage their own programmes. This was done on the assumption that communities are in a better position to decide on projects that are very important to them. In Kosovo, Community Improvement Councils (CICs) were composed through democratic process, with each committee comprising of 12 members, who helped to identify community needs, prioritise them and solicit for funds from the OTI (OTI, 2005:1). The formation of these committees demonstrates the willingness of the community members to support the reintegration process, which is vital for the success of community reintegration programmes.

Second, community participation improves security in communities because it eliminates fear (which is a core element of insecurity) and facilitates community cohesion. Community participation in programmes brings different groups of people

together, and it is likely to build cooperation and trust, which could improve moral and social values. In many post-conflict countries (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Uganda), reintegration programmes have excluded other community groups due to the lack of active community participation; thus, the involvement of community members in community programmes will help address issues of exclusion, and bring about relative peace in PCEs.

In addition, community participation can address insecurity though the creation of employment opportunities in communities. The effect of idleness or unemployment should not be underestimated, as it can translate into human insecurity. Programmes, which encourage community participation, could enable community members to identify their basic needs, and mobilize and manage resources such as labour, funds and equipment to address those needs. In East Timor for example, community participation in reintegration programmes made them to identify specific skills training programmes, which were needed in communities, and they were financially assisted by OTI, to initiate those programmes. The programmes provided employment opportunities to the locals; thereby the problem of unemployment with its resultant high crime rates, were addressed (OTI, 2001:17). Also, in Timor-Leste, the commitment and participation of communities in the RESPECT programme (Recovery, Employment and Stability Programme for Ex-combatants and Communities in Timor-Leste) initiated by the UNDP promoted sustainable employment opportunities for the most vulnerable groups: ex-combatants, widows, disabled and others, in order to facilitate the peace process (Peake, 2008:33).

Furthermore, community participation enhances livelihood prospects. Communities' involvement in reintegration projects can help to identify local facilitators, mobilise resources, and coordinate activities, which can be used in PCEs to improve livelihoods. The use of local facilitators, as already mentioned above, can create employment opportunities for beneficiaries of the scheme, thereby assisting them towards economic reintegration. In the Eastern DRC, the use of locals for the Linking, Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD) projects, such as micro-finance initiatives, designed to facilitate members of vulnerable communities in an attempt to bring about rural development, and to create job opportunities in those communities (Thompson and Bell, 2007).

Thompson and Bell (2007:24) posits that people's livelihoods 'represent a diversity of strategies and activities that have been, and continue to be affected by conflict'. In many PCEs for example, the destruction of infrastructure, and the impairment of economic activities, have adversely affected individual livelihood opportunities. Long-term reintegration programmes therefore aim at rebuilding communities, for sustainable peace. The use of locals in community reintegration programmes can help develop skills and competencies that could be used in subsequent projects.

Another opportunity for community participation is social reconstruction. Violent conflict destroys the social fabric of societies, and therefore rebuilding social relations such as trust is vital in PCEs. It is assumed that participation in community programmes will encourage dialogues and cooperation that will facilitate social reconstruction. According to Haida (2009:11), the creation of community organisation and 'inclusive interaction for planning and decision-making at the local level have contributed social capital and bringing together former enemies in conflict affected and fragile contexts'. Involving all groups (males and females, ex-combatants, child soldiers, disabled persons, IDPs, refugees, and locals) in community reintegration programmes in the decision-making processes will address issues of exclusion in communities. Notably, activities that will bring community groups together will serve as a platform where social reintegration can be facilitated.

Based on the opportunities stated above, this research argues that community participation can be beneficial to both individuals and communities. At the individual level, community brings people together and facilitates social interaction. This form of social interaction reduces isolation and alienation and helps to address community problems relating to people's need to earn an income. It is argued that ex-combatants reintegrate much more easily into communities, where networking exists, than they do where it does not exist. It can be seen that communities help 'people to see they have common concerns about local or other public issues and they could benefit from working on together' (Communities and Local Government, 2006:17).

In terms of community gains, community participation may lead to the provision of responsive public services because local ownership and accountability may have been

developed; second, there may be flexibility in shaping decisions and policies that have been made by the communities, themselves; and third, community participation builds social networks which enhance neighbourliness and bring communities together (Skidmore, et al., 2006:3). This research agrees with Skidmore, et al., because communities gain through community participation, it is probable that community ownership, community decision-making and community support will have become vital to the development projects in war affected areas. Such projects are likely to secure funding from the international community, perhaps the World Bank and UNDP, due to local participation being evident.

Despite the virtues mentioned above, community participation is not without its critics (Gilchrist, 2004; Cary and Webb, 2001). Critics have argued that communities do not have the necessary skills to make an impact in programme design and its implementation. These skills can be technical, professional or even the physical fitness and stamina required at a specific time. In many small communities, it is difficult to get people with technical know-how to participate in community activities. Many of the young ones leave their communities at the inception of conflicts and do not return immediately afterwards. In the absence of the young people, the elderly participate more, although their output may be far less than that which is required. In addition, the scale and magnitude of some problems and the cost of finding solutions may well be beyond the skills and capacity of a collective action based programme (Cary and Webb, 2001:277). Such problems may require specialist skills so that they may be able to be addressed effectively. Critics argued that problems that require specialist skills, when left in the hands of community participants, could jeopardise the whole programme.

Another problem is lack of participation. Participation may only involve a small group of interested people. Many people, especially the youth who are physically fit, 'often have other work and family commitments which prevent them giving the time needed to participate effectively in these activities' (Batterill and Fisher, 2002:8). Marwell and Oliver (1993:2) state that, in most instances, collective action is produced by a relatively small cadre of highly interested and resourceful individuals rather than by the efforts of the 'average' group members. Those individuals might be those who have time at their disposal and who show readiness to participate.

Although, in situations where most members of a community have considered the relevant decisions, it may be that they have been made by only a handful of people, but they might still be considered to be community-based; alternatively, they might well lack the credibility of the entire community.

Also, community participation can create negative networks which could hinder progress. These negative networks might take the form of: a gang of criminals, a gang of bullies, or a paedophile ring. Normally, individuals within such groups justify their activities by comparing themselves 'to other network members, rather than against the wider social norms' (Gilchrist, 2004:9). These negative networks, according to Gilchrist, often contain pockets of power that are difficult to unmask or challenge due to the closed nature of their operations. Negative networks, such as those, affect community progress because much effort is needed to track down their activities.

Finally, community participation can create strong ties and exclude some individuals or groups from the decision-making process. In culturally diverse communities, minorities often find themselves discriminated against due to their low numbers in relation to the overall population in any decision-making process where votes are cast. Though such decisions could be considered as being participatory, these minorities are often marginalized because of their minority status in the population. In many African communities where diverse tribes exist, most decisions made tend to favour the dominant tribes because voting is often done on tribal lines.

Community participation, as discussed above, has highlighted some critical factors that can contribute to the success or failure of community reintegration. Though, spending time on a community approach might seem time wasting when addressing issues that require prompt attention, community approach to reintegration programmes will facilitate a long-term sustainable approach to peacebuilding. According to a USAID (2005:8), 'DDR is often approached solely from a short-term security perspective focusing on containing violence'. According to that report, such a short-term approach does not help a country to establish viable security networks and long-term developmental and political stability, which could create conditions for social and economic recovery. Community participation is therefore important in community reintegration programmes for effective peacebuilding in PCEs.

2.7   Conclusion

The discussions above can be summed up in the form of a simple diagram known as 'Steps in an Approach to Community Participation', as shown in Figure 4 as follows: (1) the definition of community, using the approaches discussed; (2) the formation of groups and their influence in decision-making processes (community as stakeholders and pluralist community theory), and also group interaction through usage of the social network theory and social capital (bonding, bridging and linking); and (3) community participation by highlighting the inherent opportunities and constraints.

Figure 4: Steps of an Approach to Community Participation

Source: Author

As observed in the literature, the research defined community as being a group of people living in the same or groups living in different localities and enjoying varied social networks, based on shared identity, norms and habits in order to create value. A community consists of both individuals and groups and these people, normally, restrict the power of the community. However, the power and influence, which these groups of people exert in communities depends on the way in which they are formed or organised.

Pluralist theory identifies existing groups, and demonstrates that the level of power and influence groups have depends on the way they are organised, or the way they lobby. This was noticed in the case of neo-pluralism, where business groups had disproportionate influence on policy processes in the post-war era. The research argues that this pluralist concept of groups also exists in post-conflict communities, where groups such as ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, chiefs and community leaders, elites, and ordinary citizens are identified, but elites and male ex-combatants have more power in decision-making processes owing to thier influence. The research, however, observed that the power these male ex-combatants exert in communities might not always be as strong in certain cases because of other socio-economic or demographic factors which could limit their dominance.

Community, as stakeholders, also highlights the role of groups in organisations. The following groups, within organisations (shareholders, employers, suppliers, managers and customers) were identified. Those groups of people work together for the common good, which means that power is not only held by one group, but is dispersed among groups, and those groups influenced decision-making processes. However, it is realised that groups do not exert equal power and influence in organisations, and some groups, such as managerss are more powerful than customers. The stakeholding concept also enables this research to understand how groups influence decision-making processes in communities.

Having looked at the way groups are formed, the research considered social network theory and social capital in relation to groups' interactions. Social capital theory identifies various individuals and groups (nodes) and the links that tie them together. Regarding social networking and collective action, the research identifies collective action as being based on a perception of public good, and being based on the premise that rational agents, who are economically oriented, will not act irrationally, unless coerced, when striving to foster the attainment of desirable outcomes for the groups. The research however realised that other non-rational motives, for example, those pertaining to culture or ideology, could make collective action possible without coercion, as has been argued by some rational choice theorists. Some social theorists pointed to the fact that collective action could be formed and sustained by other mechanisms or the formation, for instance, of social networks.

In relation to social capital, the research looks at links rather than individuals, and how those links can be effectively utilized in communities. The concept of social capital identified various types – bonding, bridging and linking. Here, though the literature emphasizes bridging and linking within groups, in order to understand the way groups interact in communities, this research argues that bonding is also necessary because it helps in building trust and cooperation among those individuals and groups. In PCEs, where lack of trust could cause further conflict situations, the importance of bonding cannot be overemphasised. The concept of social network theory and social capital is, therefore, relevant to understanding how individuals and groups interact in communities, and the links that bind them together.

Community participation identifies the fact that, it is important for communities to encourage members to contribute their quotas in decision-making processes. It empowers local communities to take bottom-up rather than top-down approach in decision-making. The literature reveals that community empowerment depends on how well the members participate in decision-making processes. For instance, when participation is done by only a small group of people in a community, it may fail to represent the community's voice. Hence, the entire community participation in programme design and implementation is vital for community reintegration programmes.

The discussion on community and community participation has identified some critical factors (willingness to support programmes, local ownership, targeting all groups, socio-economic factors, cooperation and coordination of activities, transparent and horizontal communication among community members, resource mobilisation and management, and simplification of administrative procedures) that can be explored further in the next Chapter.

Chapter 3

Secondary Cases of Community Reintegration Initiatives: Critical Factors

3.1. Introduction

Over the past two decades, community programmes have become the preferred option in many community developments and as a means of providing humanitarian assistance in PCEs, and these approaches are gradually being advocated for the reintegration of ex-combatants. Many income generating programmes for reintegration are aimed at addressing the root causes of conflict and ensuring sustainable peacebuilding. Contemporary programmes have, therefore, focussed on community approaches to 'build participatory and inclusive decision-making structures, to change social dynamics, to kick start economic activity, and to rebuild frayed social ties, thus mitigating chances of future conflict' (USAID, 2007:3). Notably, the discussion in Chapter 2 identified some critical factors: willingness to support programmes, local ownership, target groups, socio-economic factors, appropriate times and places, clear objectives and expected results, transparent communication, resource mobilisation and management, partnership and collaboration, and simplifying administrative procedures. These factors can be regrouped under two broad sections: (1) the prevailing conditions necessary for community reintegration programmes; and (2) planning and implementation factors.

Using the critical factors identified in the previous Chapter, this Chapter draws on some community programmes (secondary cases[9]) that had been initiated by the World Bank, USAID/OTI, UNDP and other donors in order to discuss those factors further, so that a comprehensive theoretical framework can be developed at the end of this Chapter to serve as a guide for field study in Sierra Leone. The selection criteria were based on the regional and thematic diversity of different programmes viewed over a period of eight years (2000-8) in different PCEs: Indonesia-Aceh, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, DRC, Haiti, Kosovo, Liberia, Philippines, Rwanda, and Timor-Leste. It is important to note that, though some programmes started before the year 2000, they were included in the case studies because the development phase extended

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[9] The secondary cases were studied using information, which were documented by the implementing agencies; hence, most the examples given in this chapter reflects their views.

into that year and beyond. A summary of each case can be found in Appendix 1 of this thesis. Other examples, which were not part of the 11 secondary cases, are important, too, and they will be used to support discussion in this Chapter.

First, the Chapter defines community-based (CB) and community-located (CL) by identifying differences that exist between these terms in relation to the levels of community participation. However, it states clearly that the discussion in this Chapter will not consider the differences between CB and CL, but these differences will be explored in subsequent chapters. Second, using the 11 secondary cases identified and other examples in PCEs, the Chapter discusses some prevailing conditions necessary for the success of community reintegration programmes; and then it continues to explore some essential planning and implementation factors. The concluding discussion develops a model of study variables based on the discussions in Chapters 2 and 3, to serve as a guide for fieldwork in Sierra Leone.

3.2   Community-based and Community-located Programmes Defined

This Chapter focuses on community programmes, which are (1) programmes initiated by NGOs with some level of community participation; (2) programmes started by NGOs in partnership with local communities; and (3) community programmes initiated by CB organisations (CBOs) with support from the international community or other governmental organisations. All these programmes are classified as CB programmes in the secondary cases, so they will be referred to as such without specific distinction. However, as stated earlier, subsequent chapters will clearly differentiate between CB and CL programmes.

The study defines CB programmes as approaches that empower people within communities to identify, plan and implement programmes through active participation in decision-making processes, with support from governments or international agencies. The defining characteristic of this approach is that the programme takes place at the community level and includes community participation in decision-making processes. It is assumed that communities could organise themselves better, if they had gathered the required information and had acquired the necessary resources for planning and implementing their own programmes. That approach is similar to the USAID community-driven development (CDD) programme, which is community

oriented without experiencing much influence from donors (World Bank, 2006). The concept of CB programmes supports Cheetham's collective action theory about participation, where local people set up agendas and mobilise themselves when carrying out these activities and only utilising outsiders' assistance when needed (Cheetham, 2002). It is, therefore, a concept of maximizing community empowerment and ownership of all projects through community participation. CB programmes comprise of many stakeholders: community-groups, community committees, NGOs, and government institutions, however the community plans and implements projects and solicits assistance or support when necessary. According to Strand, et al (2003), the main feature in CB reintegration would be having a bilateral relationship between demand-responsive institutions, as providers of financial and material support, and local organisations, capable of articulating their demands and making use of the support offered.

On the other hand, CL programmes are programmes that are initiated in communities by donor agencies, with some level of community participation, such as 'consultation or informing[10]. That approach is more similar to USAID community-based development (CBD) which is donor driven than it is to a community driven approach (World Bank, 2006:6). The differences between CB and CL are based on Bartle's (2007)[11] argument that there is a distinction between CB and CL programmes, and that an outside agency's programme which is located in a community cannot rightly claim CB status; also consulting with community members does not make it CB, but rather it remains CL. This definition by Bartle, however, can be interpreted to mean that various activities have been pre-selected for a community to select from, thus, even the term CB (ownership) is questionable. Notwithstanding, Bartle's definition clearly identified two sets of community programmes: CB and CL. It is important to note that all these sets of programmes have some level of community participation, but the levels differ[12]. Meanwhile, the beneficiaries of both CB and CL programmes are community members (ex-combatants and non-combatants); unlike in other reintegration programmes, which focus exclusively on ex-combatants. As stated above, this distinction will be explored in the analysis chapters. Having identified

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[10] Arnstein (1969) used an 8-rung ladder diagram to describe the levels of participation as: citizens' control, delegated power, partnership, placation, consultation, informing, therapy, and manipulation.
[11] http://www.scn.org/cmp/key/key-c.htm
[12] The Levels differs from ownership to manipulation as identified to Arnstein (1969).

various secondary cases for this study, the following section explores the prevailing conditions necessary for planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes.

3.3 Prevailing Conditions Necessary for Community Reintegration Programmes

3.3.1 Security Situation

First, there is the need for a stable security situation, not just within local communities but the entire country. The need to consider the overall security situation in countries arises when attempting to avoid the spreading of conflict situations from unstable communities to peaceful communities, where community programmes have already commenced. This form of instability could cause projects to be delayed or abandoned completely. In Mindanao for instance (Appendix 1, CP 9), the conflict between the Government forces and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) affected the existing community programmes (agricultural and fishery programmes), which targeted the rebel Moro National Liberation Front (MNFL) and their families. The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was forced to respond to the changing circumstances by providing special reconciliation grants to civil society groups to try to promote tolerance, understanding, and the use of negotiation to resolve the conflict situation (OTI, 2005). It is important to note that, in PCEs, targeting a specific group can affect others and can result in conflict.

PCEs are fragile, thus peaceful situations might not exist before commencement of reintegration programmes. In Burundi for example (Appendix 1, CP 4), the USAID CB programme, that was launched in 2004 to promote reintegration and reconciliation, included a conflict resolution module as part of the one-month training programme aimed to prepare leaders to manage conflict situations in their respective communities (USAID, 2005). In fragile communities, some form of security risk assessment is necessary to discern which types of programmes could be initiated to avoid wasting funds. Some governments have focussed on short-term programmes to address issues of insecurity in post-conflict-environments rather than implementing long-term development programmes.

The quest for relative peace[13] is the responsibility of the government, organisations, communities and individuals. Governments can focus on national security, but organisations and communities, which work at a local level, must try to ensure protection of their reintegration programmes. Many communities have formed community policing strategies to protect reintegration programmes. In DRC, a community police force was formed to protect the USAID CB programme that was launched in the eastern part of the country, in a desire to provide social and technical skills through which local people could improve their security situation (Appendix 1, CP 5). Therefore, it is the responsibility of communities to contribute their quota towards a stable security environment. Notably, a favourable PCE, with no conflict situation, can contribute to long-term reintegration programmes.

3.3.2   Willingness to Support Programmes

The willingness of various actors such as governments, NGOs and communities to support reintegration programmes can contribute to success. Many governments have supported various reintegration programmes in communities by forming commissions to manage the processes involved. Unlike the disarmament and demobilization phases, which depend on peacekeeping funding, reintegration involves various donors. Some of these donors provide funds directly to these commissions to ensure national ownership of the reintegration process. In Rwanda, the Government formed a commission, Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (RDRC), in 1997, to manage and implement the Rwanda Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (RDRP). The RDRC worked with NGOs and communities to initiate many programmes to facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants and non-combatants. National ownership of the reintegration programmes encourages the long-term commitment to programmes, beyond their apparent durations.

As part of the willingness to support reintegration programmes, governments can enter into a partnership with organisations to initiate programmes for communities. In Haiti (Appendix 1, CP 6) the Government, in conjunction with the UNDP established a CB programme aimed at reducing violence in communities through the use of information campaigns, conflict resolution support, and micro-projects, which offered

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[13] A relative peace is a stable environment (without conflict) where CBDDR could be conducted successfully.

assistance to communities in an attempt to support the reintegration process (UNDP, 2006). Such a programme can give credibility to a government in a PCE, as frequently they are unable to provide enough funds to support programmes.

Whilst arguing in favour of various governments' willingness to support reintegration programmes, it is important to state that over protection (from commissions responsible for reintegration programmes) can hinder a community's willingness to use their own initiative. If commissions are over protective, communities are likely to take instructions from the commissions rather than identify their own needs before setting up programmes through community initiatives, and they may rely on commissions for the planning and implementation of them, with financial support coming from those commissions. Equally, one could also argue that since those commissions are responsible for the provision of funds to the communities, they have a duty to monitor how the funds are disbursed by setting up financial procedures for communities. Despite the fact that the commissions might be seen as interfering in activities within communities, the willingness of governments to support the reintegration process is essential for the coordination of activities.

International organisations willingness to support reintegration programmes can also lead to success, as was identified in the secondary cases. Many of the programmes were initiated by the World Bank, USAID, and UNDP. In 2005 in Indonesia, Aceh (Appendix 1, CP 1) as instanced when the World Bank financed the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) aimed at fighting poverty within local communities in that region. In that case, the main objectives were to reduce poverty and improve local governance in rural areas, institutionalize participatory processes in local government, provide cost-effective basic social and economic infrastructure, and strengthen the capacity of the microfinance institutions (The World Bank, 2006). Also in Liberia, (Appendix 1, CP 8) a 3-month, 6-hour a week CB reintegration programme, Youth Education for Life Skills (YES), was launched by the USAID for ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees and locals to facilitate the reintegration process to 'advance an inclusive, peaceful political transition' to address issues of exclusion when people were trying to bring about lasting peace in Liberia (USAID, 2005:16). These and other programmes, which were launched by international organisations to assist communities, demonstrate international organisations' willingness to support

these programmes. International organisations may have specific interests about supporting reintegration programmes, in PCEs, and that is worth noting; thereby, international community's may try to coerce local communities to accept certain programmes, which they might not be attracted, to or see as being beneficial in the longer term. Notwithstanding the former, the international community willingness to support reintegration programmes is vital for PCEs where there is lack of funds, because money may then be donated to support the planning and implementation of the programmes. Obviously, adequate funding will ensure continuity of programmes, and create employment opportunities for locals.

The willingness of communities to participate in community programmes is also very important. In many communities, community management committees were formed to manage community programmes. In Kosovo (Appendix 1, CP 7), for instance, Community Improvement Councils (CICs), were formed by communities with support from the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). Each CIC comprised of 12-15 members elected from various groups and backgrounds - representing political, social and intellectual diversity (OTI, 2005). The CICs formed by representatives from various communities, who were able to help to identify community needs. The OTI, together with the CICs, implemented more than 375 community improvement projects, including the reconstruction of roads, schools and community centres. In Rwanda (Appendix 1, CP 10), Community Development Committees (CDCs) were formed to meet with communities to identify problems, prioritise them, and plan and implement the selected programmes to meet community needs. Members of CDCs were trained in various planning and financial management techniques and procedures, to enable them to undertake their responsibilities more effectively.

The formation of management committees alone is not enough to ensure participation, but the willingness of community members to participate in decision-making processes is required, as well. In communities where the poor and the uneducated exclude themselves from decision-making processes, decisions that affect communities are taken by only a handful of people (mostly elites). In Timor-Leste (Appendix 1, CP 11), the composition of CDCs, owing to lacking representation of the uneducated; given the low literacy rate (about 50% of the entire population) of the country, that is understandable, but regrettable (Brown, et al., 2002). It could be

argued that the willingness of community members to participate actively in community programmes addresses problems of exclusion and facilitates the success of programmes, but it still remains difficult to encourage disadvantage people to participate. According to IDDRS (2006), an inclusive local framework is central to programmes being successful.

The willingness of communities to support community reintegration programmes encourages local ownership. Local ownership, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, is the highest rung of Arnstein's eight-rung ladder of participation (Arnstein, 1969). Local ownership is necessary in project planning and implementation because through it communities make their own decisions. In Liberia (Appendix 1, CP 8) and DRC (Appendix1, CP 5), communities were responsible for the USAID CB training programmes. Each community was allowed to design its own training schedules as long as they finished each module within a three-week timeframe. Also, according to the UNDP, one of the key aims of Kosovo's OTI CB initiative programmes was to transfer ownership and responsibility to the local communities, though other literatures have argued that those were the aspects they failed to achieve (Özerdem, 2009). Notably, transferring some aspects of a programme to a community does not mean that local ownership of the programme will automatically follow, because the NGO responsible still maintains control of the programme. Community ownership of a programme should mean that the identification, planning and implementation will be carried out by community members.

When communities use local ownership, it empowers them to participate actively in identifying the programmes that could facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants into their communities. Communities can identify support packages, such as reconciliation programmes and trauma counselling to facilitate the reintegration process (ICCO, 2006). These packages can be prioritised by the communities through a participatory decision-making process, but it is important to note that donor-funded programmes sometimes restrict community activities. The willingness of communities to support reintegration programmes encourages local ownership, which may eliminate tension and fear in those communities and help to ensure a safer environment for future development programmes.

3.3.3   Socio-economic Factors

The socio-economic factors in a community can determine the type of programmes to be implemented. Some of these factors may relate to levels of unemployment or the state of the local infrastructure. Conflict may destroy the existing infrastructure, and as a result, affect the return of ex-combatants and non-combatants into their communities. Local infrastructure, when badly damaged or destroyed can impede the reintegration of ex-combatants because, funds for reintegration would be channelled towards the development of such infrastructure, rather than its use for more economic reintegration programmes (provision of skills training for employment), which can improve their immediate livelihoods. In Liberia (Appendix 1, CP 8), lack of infrastructure prompted the YES programme to award small grants averaging $5,000 for projects, such as, schools, health and community centres, and basic renovations in support of the skills training programme (USAID, 2005).

Moreover, in areas where provision of skills for ex-combatants are focussed, socio-economic factors such as unemployment in communities can lead to the channelling of resources to target a particular group of people. In DRC (Appendix 1, CP 5), the USAID CB programme, which aimed at creating employment skills in communities in order to enhance ex-combatants reintegration process, targeted young people due to the high percentage of youth unemployment in the country. Also, in the Philippines (Appendix1, CP 9), the OTI CB programme for the Moro National Liberation Front (MNFL) aimed at creating employment opportunities in agriculture and fishing for Muslim ex-combatants in Mindanao (OTI, 2005).

3.3.4   Linking Community Programmes with National Objectives

Finally, the community reintegration programmes need to support wider development objectives, and should not be implemented in isolation. These reintegration programmes are medium to long-term developmental projects; therefore, they must support wider national programmes. It is important to note that the root causes of most conflicts are not local in nature but regional, national or even international, which means local intervention alone is not likely to find a lasting solution to the problems. The USAID (2007) posits that without identifying the changes needed at regional and national levels to provide an environment that is conducive to problem solving, it is unlikely that local solutions, which may have a lasting impact, will be

found. Since sustainable results often depend on changes beyond the local level, the partnership of communities with the government will pave the way for programmes to be linked to the country's broader strategic goals.

According to the IDDRS (2006), the success of reintegration programmes depends on there being strong linkage with a national recovery programme, which provides for political and economic development as well as the restructuring and reforming of the state's security sector. Many reintegration programmes have been criticised in the past for not linking to the overall reconstruction and peacebuilding activities. In Afghanistan for example, it has been argued that the transfer of ownership and responsibilities relating to reintegration programmes in communities in Afghanistan's New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) left hardly any room for the Afghan government to take an active role in the DDR process, and according to the 'Afghan Demobilization and Reintegration Commission (ADRC), it was felt that their incorporation in the process was sidelined, to a large extent, since the main decision-making mechanism was the ANBP' (Özerdem, 2009:166).

3.4 Planning and Implementation Factors

Once the contextual factors have been identified, the planning and implementation process can begin. Some planning and implementation factors, which can be explored using the secondary case studies are as follows: the user community, objectives and expected results, time and place, target group, resource mobilisation and management, partnership and collaboration, transparent communication, and simplifying administrative procedures.

3.4.1 User Community

First, planning and implementation of community reintegration should define the user 'community'. The user community could either be a village or a town with a defined boundary or social networks which extend beyond the locality, for example: families, friends, groups and associations. It is asserted that reintegration in rural areas is more successful than in urban areas due to strong societal networks in the rural areas (Kingma, 2000). This societal support in the rural areas is often non-existent in urban areas due to the diversity of social and economic backgrounds of the urban population. In Ethiopia, for example, Ayalew and Dercon (2000) pointed out that

social reintegration was more successful in the rural areas due to the acceptance and support of families, as well as communities. Notwithstanding, it is important to note that in PCEs, community reintegration programmes are likely to encounter divided communities, where existing ethnic, social or economic division may have created fear and mistrust between and within groups in those communities (Slaymaker, et al., 2005). This means that the romantic notion of homogenous communities with shared interests (Ostrom, 1990) frequently does not exist, and that programme managers should be careful when planning and implementing community programmes.

The entire user community normally will not be used to plan and implement programmes, but CBOs or community management committees will be tasked to manage the programme. The committee or organisation could be in existence, or new ones could be established. Existing management committees might not have the credibility required to make decisions if an undemocratic approach was used when the committee was formed, and issues may have arisen leading to power imbalances in communities. These committees might be dominated by elites whose decisions might not favour the masses in communities. Such undemocratic processes might call for the creation of new committees that represent the community when decisions are made on behalf of community members. Slaymaker, et al (2005:16), posit that 'establishing new structures is costly and time consuming but may be preferred to funding or reforming structures which are already inequitable or exclusive'. In Rwanda for example, prior to the commencement of the Community Reintegration and Development Project CRDP) [Appendix 1, CP 10)], a community council, which included members from all strata of the society, was formed and functioned without friction (Cliffe, et al., 2003:7). Also in Kosovo (Appendix 1, CP 7), the OTI assisted the various communities to establish Community Improvement Councils (CICs) to represent them through participatory elections (OTI, 2005:1)[14]. These councils were formed to identify the needs of the community members (such as ex-combatant), and it asked the OTI to provide assistance in term of funds and material resources for the projects.

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[14] http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/focus/comma...

3.4.2   Objectives and Expected Results

Programme objectives and expected results should be clear to all parties. As identified in Chapter 1, the overall objective of community reintegration programmes is to assist all groups in communities to find new and peaceful roles in communities to enhance security, as well as development. However, due to various programmes that are planned in support of reintegration programmes, various objectives are likely to be identified. In Rwanda (Appendix 1, CP 10) for example, the Community Reintegration and Development Programme (CRDP), that was initiated by the World Bank aimed at assisting returnees and vulnerable groups through CB reintegration and development, and through strengthening the capacity of local communities. That programme was designed to address the problem of centralisation of authority. The programme focussed on three indicators: (1) decentralization – or transfer of decision-making to communities; (2) participation between local government and the local population in identifying needs, and planning and implementation of programmes; (3) social capital or building of trust between communities and local government (World Bank, 2003).   In addition in Liberia (Appendix 1, CP 8), the CB reintegration programme, Youth Education for Life Skills (YES) that was launched by USAID for ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees and locals, aimed at facilitating the reintegration process to 'advance an inclusive, peaceful political transition' to address issues of exclusion from attempting to develop lasting peace in Liberia (USAID, 2005:16). It was a 3-month, 6-hour a week programme started in 37 communities and it targeted 633 communities. The expected result (targeting 633 communities) was evaluated at the end of the programme to ascertain whether or not the programme achieved its intended target.

3.4.3   Appropriate Time and Place

Time and place for community reintegration programmes should be appropriate. This is because programmes that are initiated at the right time and at the right place are likely to be more successful. In Burundi (Appendix 1, case 4), the USAID launched a CB programme in early 2004, aimed at promoting CB reintegration and reconciliation, the programme received a small grant, after the previous stand-alone programme has been unsuccessful (USAID, 2005:12). Two large towns (Gitega and Ruyigi) from two provinces were selected for the programme. In DRC (Appendix 1, CP 5), the times and places for the USAID training programmes were said to be more

appropriate because of exclusion of some groups in other DDR programmes, which had created resentment (USAID, 2005). Nonetheless, it could be argued that initiating programmes at the right time and place alone, does not guarantee success, as it requires other factors (community support for the programme, a good prevailing security situation at the time, and the willingness of the donors to even continue to support the programme) in order to achieve that goal for the benefit of the intended user community.

Reintegration programmes can be short or long-term, depending on their intended objectives. Short-term programmes are conducted to address the immediate needs of ex-combatants and, often, address security issues in communities; whilst long-term projects concentrate on developmental works. Getting the planning right (either short or long-term) is important because of other factors such as the prevailing security situation at the time. In a fragile security environment, for example, short-term programmes may be preferred; whilst long-term programmes can be initiated in relatively secure and stable environments. Long-term programme can therefore create employment opportunities for community members for more financially rewarding jobs.

3.4.4   Target Group

Another stage in the planning and implementation process is considering the needs of target group. In communities, the size and composition of the target groups are very important pieces of information which is required before starting the reintegration programmes. However, that information might not be available within the legal framework, but could, nevertheless, be obtained from various groups in communities. In situations where that information is difficult to obtain, CB organizations could be useful sources of information about the groups.[15]   Community reintegration programmes will focus on ex-combatants and non-combatants: male and female ex-combatants, child soldiers, dependants of combatants, IDPs, refugees, and locals within the communities. It is argued that the focus on communities rather than ex-combatants could improve human security, eliminate fear, increase the voice of the poor and vulnerable, facilitate community cohesion, and enhance developmental projects in communities. Targeting communities is important in post-conflict

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[15] http://www.unddr.org/tool_docs/DDR_technical_assessment_mission_guidelines.pdf

reconstruction because, when emphasis is placed on ex-combatants, they continue to identify themselves as belonging to a specific group instead of the wider communities (UNDP, 2006:34). In Aceh (Appendix 1, CP 1), the KDP programme targeted communities by giving them (communities) $600 for each ex-combatant, who returned to settle in a community. In Burundi (Appendix 1, CP 4), the vocational skills training (VST) programme targeted entire communities - 'youth, returned refugees, IDPs, ex-combatants, child soldiers, and women and children who were heads of households' (USAID, 2005:21).

In spite of the fact that community reintegration programmes are aimed at focussing on communities, they face some challenges. Sometimes programmes will be earmarked to target only some groups or individuals in communities. This is because conflict affects individuals and groups differently within communities, hence, the unfortunate ones could be given priority in the disbursement of developmental funds. The rationale for 'such intra-community targeting' is to make resources available to the disadvantaged groups (The World Bank, 2006:27). Targeting such individuals or groups could be based on the selection of beneficiaries through the community participation process. Community participation improves decision-making processes and, ideally, addresses issues through the use of the ballot box. The selection process of individuals or groups should be transparent and unambiguous to minimize the perception that some groups are being favoured or victimized (UNDP, 2006:33). In DRC (Appendix 1, CP 5), the communities decided that the USAID CB training programmes should target the youth (about 80%) to assist them to be economically independent, so that they would not resort to using force as a means of enabling their economic survival.

Another challenge, in terms of targeting, is to decide which communities benefit from the programmes on offer. Experience has shown that 'the perception of bias in the allocation of resources can be damaging and even risky, particularly in violence prone areas' (The World Bank, 2006:28). Community or geographical targeting requires careful planning because once a programme is initiated in an area, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to relocate it to another area. According to USAID (2005:20), 'program designers must carefully assess the environment to ensure that the areas they target are the most critical'. With CB programmes, the decision to

target a specific community would be made through participatory decision-making processes.

The DRC programme targeted the war-torn communities in the east, whilst the programme in Liberia initially targeted the whole country, due to that country being small in size. Targeting the whole of Liberia created logistical challenges, such as securing partners and funding for projects, and awarding smaller amounts of grants to community members. Moreover, in Mindanao, Philippines (Appendix 1, case 9), the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Social Fund for Peace and Development (ASFP) programme targeted the central and southern parts of the island due to conflicts in those particular areas (OTI, 2005).

It is important to note that targeting communities could address the problem of excluding some groups from the reintegration process. As identified in the literature, the current DDR process only focuses on some groups, such as male ex-combatants, without any allowance being made for communities. The position of women and children is often neglected due to the auxiliary roles that they have played during the conflict. Often, they are not registered during the disarmament and demobilization process and sometimes they do not benefit from reintegration assistance. Community programmes, where all groups (both combatants and non-combatants) are targeted could facilitate the reintegration process. Even in situations where some groups are completely focussed on the programme, the decisions should be made by the entire community in order to try to eliminate resentment.

3.4.5   Resource Mobilisation and Management

Resource mobilisation and management are other factors that need to be considered at the planning and implementation stages. Resources comprise personnel, equipment or finance. With regard to personnel, the literature on community theory highlighted some community characteristics: community councils, community organisations, and voluntary organisations, which can support the mobilisation of personnel. Programme implementers for community reintegration need to consider these characteristics in communities when looking for local personnel for community programmes. In emergencies, these organisations can be used to assist the process of selecting representatives for committees made up of members of the community (Cliffe, et al.,

2003), but effort should be made to use democratic processes when planning long-term programmes to avoid further conflict. It is important to note that democratic processes, alone, do not automatically lead to fair representation because some groups might absent themselves from the democratic process. In Timor-Leste (Appendix, 1, case 11), for instance, the Community Empowerment Project (CEP) encouraged the use of the democratic process in the formation of the community development committee (CDC) but, some people who were poor excluded themselves from the committee owing to feelings of inadequacy relating to lack of education . Such people can be encouraged to seek representation by requiring them to fill a specified number of places on the committee.

Actors within community programmes, drawn from the local community, can be mobilised after being given management training. In situations where communities lack qualified personnel such as trainers, they could quickly train their own personnel by organising courses for them and, afterwards, they could pass on their knowledge to others. In both Liberia and the DRC, a group of 'master trainers' received training which was passed on to community-level 'learning facilitators', or local facilitators, who duplicated the training at the community level (USAID, 2005:10). In addition in Burundi (Appendix 1, CP 4), the USAID CB programme, in early 2004, organised a one-month CB leadership training package to prepare leaders to conduct basic management practices, effective communication and conflict resolution, thereby equipping them with the necessary skills to manage the programme. Communities' capacities are enhanced by having mastered management training skills, which they can subsequently apply to further programmes.

Apart from the local facilitators, communities can try to engage external facilitators with technical expertise, who could initiate complex projects. In Timor-Leste (Appendix 1, CP 11) for example, the CEP could not use local facilitators to run the training programmes due to their low level of literacy, but they were able to use external facilitators to support the formulation of programmes. That could only be done with the consent of the community, because it could otherwise have created further conflict, if community members felt that the external facilitators were taking the limited jobs that were available, so it is vital to try to maintain a unified approach to programmes.

Equipment can also be procured by the local community or the organisations (NGOs) working in that community. Where communities are given the responsibility to procure equipment for projects, the procedures should be transparent to avoid the possibility of aggravating community members. In Afghanistan for instance, experience showed that the three quotation systems (where the cheapest option was selected) was much more effective for procurement process, and also provided a high level of transparency and accountability. This system, according to Özerdem (2009:160), 'provided a greater sense of ownership of the processes and allowed former combatants to gain experience in how to source and procure the best available items for their businesses'. This is different from where an NGO, for example, procures all resources for a community project

Finance is another resource that needs to be secured to assist the implementation process. It requires taking into account all the resources available, but does not necessitate the imposition of a stipulation that there should be only one donor. In Afghanistan, a number of countries contributed towards the total budget of ANBP for the DDR process, with a total budget of $141 million, Japan provided over $91 million, UK $19 million, Canada 16 million, the US $9 million, and the Netherlands $4 million (ANBP, 2006). In the DRC, some reintegration programmes were financed by the World Bank and other donor countries.[16] According to Caramés, et al (2007:4), these countries have provided $18 million for a special programme rehabilitation and education of child soldiers.

Timely and sustained funding for community programmes may ensure the continuity and success of those programmes. In Burundi (Appendix 1, CP 4), for instance, USAID financed the vocational skills training programme and ensured the continuity of funds throughout the whole programme. As part of the programme, small grants were offered to assist in the refurbishment of infrastructure and to foster cooperation when rehabilitation among community members was in progress (USAID, 2005:13). Nonetheless, financial difficulties, in PCEs, can impede the smooth running of community reintegration programmes. In Liberia (Appendix 1, CP 8), for example, the YES programme was rushed through as a result of the spiralling running and

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[16] Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway Sweden and the United Kingdom.

management costs. Obviously, securing enough funds to undertake programmes is essential, knowing that the potential constraint of resources could hinder the progress of programmes, and sometimes lead to renewal of violence in a PCE where security is already fragile.

Delays in transferring funds that have been pledged by donors can cause funding gaps. These funding gaps are of concern to planners because they destabilise the ongoing peace process. In the DRC, the Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) estimated that $90,000 million would be needed for reintegration programmes, but the actual amount received amounted to $47,043 million (MDRP, 2008). The subsequent delay in securing additional funds resulted in setting back the reintegration programmes. Though, it is argued that in the event of funding gaps, peacekeeping mission budgets could be used to support programmes when they take place within peacekeeping areas; in fact, not all reintegration programmes benefit from this fund (UNDP, 2006:28). Notably, funding gaps create competition for the available funds for reintegration programmes, which may lead to conflict among community members.

Having mobilised resources for community reintegration programmes, managing them is equally important. Proper management can be a means of trying to avoid misappropriation and trying to ensure transparency and accountability. Some communities themselves, or NGOs, have initiated basic management courses to train committees within communities to empower them in the discharge of their duties. In Rwanda, through the CRDP initiative, the CDCs members were trained in financial and resource management techniques so that they could undertake their responsibilities effectively (Appendix 1, CP 10). Effective mobilisation and management of resources can ensure long-term programmes and can create employment opportunities for community members.

3.4.6   Partnership and Coordination

Partnership and coordination also need to be considered in planning and implementation. During conflict, infrastructure (roads, schools, hospitals, homes) is destroyed; hence the reconstruction process is no mean task. Community reintegration programmes even go beyond infrastructure development to include training

programmes. The magnitude and diversity of problems faced by PCEs is more than what any single entity could address (CHDCS, 2003:7). Reconstruction processes require multiple actors (both internal as well as external actors) in order to work towards the success of programmes. In Afghanistan, for example during the 'implementation of reintegration packages, the ANBP worked with 31 implementing partners, including a wide range of international and national NGOs' (Özerdem, 2009:159). In Liberia, the reintegration process involved the local communities, the government and international organisations.

Some community organisations work in partnership with government and other international agencies when attempting to bring lasting peace to communities. The Monrovia-based Centre for Democratic Empowerment (CDE), in partnership with the government, actively campaigned for and supported the reintegration process (CHDCS, 2003). In Mozambique, the Mozambican Association for Rural Development (AMODER), a CB organisation, worked in partnership with the government and the private sectors to improve the living conditions of the rural communities by providing some credit facilities to enhance the reintegration process and increase the level of food security.

The activities of various actors need to be coordinated for the effective use of resources and to prevent duplication. In PCEs where the government still exists and is involved in reintegration programmes, overall coordination of activities is done by a government organisation. In Guatemala, in 1997, the Comision Especial de Incorporaciones (CEI) was established by the government to monitor and coordinate DDR policies and programmes (UNDP, 2006:26). In Sierra Leone, the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was established by the government to coordinate all activities of the DDR. However, in failed states, international organisations, such as the UN, can take an active role in assisting the coordination of other agencies. In Haiti (Appendix 1, CP 6), the UNDP 'worked closely with DPKO to establish an integrated DDR section and programme within the UN Stabilization Force (MINUSTAH) in April 2004' (UNDP, 2006:27).

In both failed and non-failed states, communities must be encouraged to take up coordinating activities locally to gain ownership of their programmes. When

communities take responsibility for coordinating activities, they will have first hand information on issues affecting the implementation of programmes. It is assumed that, should funds for projects dwindle, that will not be a sudden occurrence. In situations where bottlenecks exist in relation to the pledges made by donors, the problem will be known to the communities in advance. By making communities aware of problems relating to the programmes they are participating in, ignorance is broken down, leaving members of those communities with a better understanding of the problems. When communities work cooperatively to achieve a high level of coordination, security within those communities is likely to be improved.

3.4.7   Transparent Communication

Transparent communication is an important factor for planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes. The need for an enabling environment where people can express themselves freely is vital for CB activities. Community decision-making forums are places where people can exchange and develop ideas that can facilitate community development. Such forums also give voice to the poor and vulnerable. Communication is therefore a 'powerful instrument for mobilizing communities and equipping them with information, knowledge and the capacity they need to participate in development' projects (The World Bank, 2006:44).

Transparent communication reduces conflict in CB programmes. When people understand how decisions are made regarding the awarding of contracts or availability of funds they will have more realistic expectations than when they are uninformed. Transparent communication, therefore, builds confidence with communities and encourages them to support projects. Besides, transparent communication helps in reducing the power imbalances that might exist in communities, because information will become accessible to all and not remain under the control of the elites, only. Such transparent communication (which is horizontal in nature) among stakeholders allows them to develop a sense of trust and consensus (Inagaki, 2007). Making information available to communities will empower them through usage of participatory decision-making processes. USAID states that it used the media to provide citizens with timely and accurate information. In the DRC, USAID supported media activities such as Radio Okapi (a UN local radio station), provided internet centres, provided civic education materials about elections in order to make information accessible (USAID,

2005:25). This will help the poor and the uneducated to have access to information and to be able to express their views.

3.4.8   Simplified Administrative Procedures

Simplification of administrative procedures is also important in the planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes. Excessive administrative bureaucracy can hinder the initiation and progress of programmes. However, simple administrative procedures, such as streamlining registration procedures, reducing the reporting and authorization requirements, minimizing steps in reviews, and satisfactory monitoring and implementation of activities, can address some of these problems (OED, 2005). Simplifying administrative procedures, which encourages community participation, can contribute to community empowerment and the success of community projects. According to the World Bank (2006:25), the community driven projects, in Liberia and Sierra Leone, specifically linked the likelihood of success to the simplicity of the designed projects; and also, in Aceh, the 80 page project document of the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP) was reduced to a two-page abstract of a simplified version to enable community members to understand. In Angola, the Third Social Action programme, which aimed at greater involvement of communities, concluded that the simpler the project documentation, the greater the level of community participation (Ibid). Simplifying procedures such as disbursement of funds is a necessity for CB projects.

3.5   Conclusion

Having discussed some prevailing conditions (the security situation, willingness of governments, NGOs and communities to support programmes, socio-economic factors, and linking community programmes with national programmes) necessary for success of community reintegration programmes, using secondary cases in PCEs; and some planning and implementation factors (defining user community, programme objectives and expected results, appropriate time and place, resource mobilisation, partnership and coordination, transparent communication, and simplified administrative procedures) for community reintegration programmes, this concluding section develops a comprehensive model of study variables based on Chapters 2 and 3, thereby serving as a guide for empirical study in Sierra Leone. The framework, as shown in Figure 5 is divided into two, that is independent and dependent variables.

The independent variables are sub-divided into two groups, contextual and programme specific factors.

Figure 5: Model of Study Variables

Independent Variables

Critical factors for reintegration

Context

1. Political factors
2. Community dynamics
3. Socio-economic factors
4. Security situation

Programme Specific

5. Programme design and implementation
6. Objectives
7. Target beneficiaries
8. Resource mobilisation
9. Actions and procedures

Dependent Variables

Effective Peacebuilding

•Improved human security
•Improved livelihood
•Enhanced social reconstruction
•Enhanced good governance

 Source: Author

3.5.1   Independent Variables

Contextual Factors

A comprehensive study of a programme will require consideration of contextual, as well as programme specific factors. Contexts are factors that can contribute to the success or failure of community reintegration programmes and the diagram identified the following: willingness to support programmes, community dynamics, socio-economic factors, and the security situation. The willingness of governments, NGOs and communities to support programmes is important in the implementation of community reintegration programmes. A government can set up a commission responsible for reintegration to support management teams (whether NGOs or community management committees), provide adequate and uninterrupted fund for a smooth implementation of programmes, and possibly create an environment that is conducive to supporting reintegration programmes. Apart from these supports, it can address issues of corruption and malpractices which can affect the continuity of programmes. It is, however, important to note that excessive control by governments could restrict community initiatives and affect community ownership of programmes.

The willingness of NGOs to support community reintegration programmes is also essential, during planning and implementation process, because of the use of their expertise, and the provision of funds. However, total exclusion of community members in NGO programmes can create resentment in communities. It is worthy of being noted that the final users of these programmes are communities; hence their involvement from the commencement of the programme is vital for continuity and sustainability. Apart from continuity, communities' involvement in NGO programmes brings ex-combatants, as well as non-combatants, together to facilitate the reintegration process in PCEs. The involvement of communities in NGO programmes depends on their (the NGOs) willingness to do so. Also, the willingness of communities to support reintegration programmes is necessary for success. It was identified, in the literature, that reintegration requires community participation; thus, without community support, there will be no community reintegration programmes. Community support following the identification, planning and implementation phases is very important for the success of programmes. Also, the willingness of community members to support community reintegration programmes can lead to long-term, sustainable programmes for effective peacebuilding.

The next contextual factor is community dynamics. The literature identified some community activities (community works, christenings, religious activities, and other social gatherings) that can bring people together. Even in smaller areas, occupations such as farming or fishing, inter-household marriages, and parents' and teachers' associations (PTAs) are other ways of meeting in communities. These gatherings can demonstrate ties or relationships that exist in communities to support reintegration programmes. It means that these groups can come together to decide on issues affecting them and attempt to find local solutions to address them. In addition, social networking (such as bonding, bridging and linking) that exists in communities can be explored to see how that can affect community reintegration programmes. These community dynamics can contribute to the success, or otherwise, of community reintegration programmes and they were explored in rural as well as urban communities in the field.

Socio-economic factors, such as infrastructure, access to land, the labour market and transitional justice system, were other contextual factors that were explored. From the theory, it was evident that lack of land, for instance, affected agricultural programmes in Sierra Leone, which meant that ex-combatants, who opted for agricultural programmes as part of the reintegration process, were affected. Without adequate land for cultivation, initiating agricultural programmes for ex-combatants, only, will not create a pattern of sustainable employment that will improve their livelihoods. Since post-conflict economic environments are extremely challenging, programme managers should have a clear understanding of facilities or services available, and make good use of them. Successful agricultural reintegration programmes depend on the availability of land. Also, the literature revealed that many programmes used the available infrastructure as classroom blocks during the reintegration programmes. This means that locations of many programmes were based on the availability of infrastructure but were not necessarily suitably located for all participants, due to the urgent need experienced in some of the programmes. Obviously, using the available infrastructure that is distant from participants can result in low rates of attendance and sometimes people's complete withdrawal from the programmes. Early assessment and planning to consider these socio-economic factors is particularly important.

Security is the final contextual factor that was considered. The literature revealed unexpected suspension of some community reintegration programmes due to unstable security situations in communities. That means that the continuity and success of programmes depends on providing security environments that are conducive to the smooth running of programmes. In PCEs, security situations can change frequently, and that is normally beyond the control of programme managers. Therefore, it is essential for programme managers to conduct a detailed risk assessment so that measures can be put in place to address that issue. The use of community policing, private security guards or other security equipment can help in the provision of safe environments. It will be entirely the responsibility of NGOs or communities to identify the appropriate security measures needed to support their programmes, apart from national security which is the responsibility of the government.

The contextual factors, discussed above, demonstrate that programme managers need to take these factors into consideration in planning reintegration programmes because

the success, or otherwise, depends on them. For example, it would be imprudent to plan long-term programmes in communities with unstable security situations. These factors were explored in Sierra Leone during the fieldwork of this research.

Programme Specific Factors

The second section of the independent variables is programme specific factors: programme design and implementation, objectives, target beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, and actions and procedures (see Figure 5). Once the contextual factors have been considered, the programme can begin. The design of programmes has a broad focus, but this research considered the duration of programmes. Community reintegration can be short or long-term depending on the situation in the community. For example, short-term programmes could be initiated to address the immediate needs of ex-combatants; whilst long-term programmes can be earmarked for community development. Besides, appropriate timing for programmes is necessary to meet community needs, because it will be unbeneficial to implement agricultural programmes that depend solely on weather conditions, in the middle or at the end of a rainy season. Design and implementation factors, such as those relating to the duration or appropriate timing of the commencement of programmes, can contribute to the continuity of programmes and employment creation in communities.

Programme objectives are other factors that were explored in the field. The secondary community programmes identified different objectives such as these relating to: facilitating the reintegration process, promoting social cohesion and reconciliation, creating employment opportunities, and strengthening local capacity. The objectives of the programmes should be made known to communities from the beginning of the projects, and they should be expressed simply, without any ambiguity. Whilst making programme objectives known, it will be necessary for the community to be informed about the expected outcomes, so that they can deduce whether the objectives have been achieved or not. Making programme objectives and expected results known to participants, as well as communities, will address issues of mistrust and facilitate social reintegration.

Another programme specific factor is the target beneficiaries. The participation of all groups (ex-combatants, refugees, IDPs, and other community members) in

reintegration programmes is essential to their success, as that will provide a basis for effective dialogue among all the groups involved. Community reintegration programmes are designed to give an all inclusive approach, in order to address issues of exclusion and resentment. Programmes need to target ex-combatants as well as non-combatants. Also, there should be gender balance in the recruitment process. It was evident in the previous chapters that many DDR programmes have excluded female ex-combatants, due to male dominance in the planning and implementation processes, thus affecting their social and economic reintegration in communities. Maintaining gender balance, in the recruitment process or setting up a quota system, will encourage female participation. Moreover, in addressing target beneficiaries, vulnerable groups: orphans, widows, girls who are mothers, and early school leavers, should not be forgotten. All these people are to be targeted, so that their needs can be met. In situation, where some specific groups need to be focussed on, the decisions should be made by the community and not just by some individuals.

Furthermore, mobilising resources such as human, financial and physical resources was also important for consideration. Community reintegration programmes are diverse and involve many actors (local, as well as external actors). Whether local actors or external actors are used depends on the ownership of the programme. For example, community owned programmes may use local actors and only employ the services of external actors, when the local actors lack the required expertise, whilst NGOs may decide to use their own facilitators. The use of local actors in NGO programmes is necessary to facilitate community participation and continuity. Also, financial resources normally depend on voluntary contributions from donors, and the literature identified a lack of timely and sustained funding for the secondary programmes. Adequate funds need to be available at the start of programmes to prevent delays or suspensions that could undermine programme credibility. Resource mobilisation focuses on physical resources such as the equipment needed for the programme. The encouragement of the use of equipment, that is manufactured locally, can create employment opportunities to enhance livelihoods.

Finally, actions and procedures were explored under the programme specific factors. DDR, as already stated, involved various actors and agencies at the same time and, therefore, lacked standardised actions and procedures. Administrative procedures can

be simple, or be bogged down by bureaucracy, depending on the programme, the organisation responsible, and donor requirements. These administrative procedures can cause delays in obtaining funds for reintegration programmes, which can result in conflict, subsequently, if the issues are not resolved. Additionally, coordination of activities can be difficult owing to the numerous actors involved. Effective coordination should be one of the guiding principles from the start of the programme and should continue throughout all the implementation processes.

3.5.2   Dependent Variables

The dependent variables, as identified in the diagram, will be based on the following broad peacebuilding principles: improved livelihood; enhanced good governance; enhanced social reconstruction; and improved security. The discussion on the dependent variables will be based on some peacebuilding characteristics that will be associated with the independent variables. The discussion on the secondary cases identified the following peacebuilding characteristics: providing long-term sustainable programmes, building community capacities to initiate and continue new programmes, creating employment opportunities for community members, providing equity and all-inclusive approaches to programmes, transparency and accountability, respecting human rights, giving an enabling security environment for reintegration, eliminating tension and fear in the community, using an integrated approach to programmes, maintaining horizontal communication among various groups, and having local ownership. In the analysis chapters, where CB and CL programmes will be compared, to establish which of these programmes facilitate more effective peacebuilding, most of the above peacebuilding characteristics will be identified in our discussion. Having identified these peacebuilding factors, they will be regrouped under the four broad peacebuilding headings (livelihood, good governance, social reconstruction, and human security) for discussion purposes, so that the research question can be answered. It is important to note that a change of independent variables will lead to the change of dependent variables. For instance, the willingness of a community to support a reintegration programme can ensure sustainability, which will create employment opportunities for locals, and thus improve their livelihoods.

This Chapter has discussed the critical factors identified in Chapter 2, by using secondary cases of community reintegration programmes, to identify a model of study

variables that were used for empirical study in Sierra Leone. These study variables served as a guide during interview process in the field because the research did not use structured questionnaires. The next Chapter, which presents the methodology, delineates how the fieldwork was conducted by justifying any action taken.

Chapter 4
METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This Chapter discusses the methods employed in gaining perspective for the research. First, the discussion centres on philosophical issues and research debates to understand methodological choices. These include abstract and general knowledge approaches, and cover epistemological and ontological issues, quantitative and qualitative methods, as well as etic and emic considerations. Second, research design (comparative), strategies (qualitative method, sampling, use of fixers and 'door knocking'), and methods (semi-structured interviews, focus groups, social network mapping, preference ranking, observations, and documents) will be discussed. Triangulation, the use of multiple methods for research validity is also considered. Third, the chapter discusses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) as a technique for data analysis. Moreover, the Chapter discusses methodological and ethical constraints and how they were mitigated. The final section covers various criteria used for evaluating the research, such as validity, reliability and objectivity.

4.2 Philosophical Issues and Research Debates

Critical examination and analysis are utilized as ways of underlining methodology. Every methodology 'rests on the nature of knowledge and of knowing' (Corbin and Strauss, 2008:1). Knowledge can be abstract (general) or concrete (specific). The term 'abstract' refers to knowledge obtained from large amount of data or multiple cases, whilst 'specific' refers to knowledge obtained from a single case study which may be an individual, group, organisation or nation (Druckman, 2005:4). When a researcher studies multiple conflict areas, whether in the same country or different countries, he/she is obtaining general knowledge; however, when the researcher focuses on a specific conflict area, he/she is obtaining specific knowledge. The former investigation seeks to generalize findings 'in order to contribute to theory', whilst the later 'seeks understanding in order to contribute to a satisfactory resolution' (Ibid).

The idea of generalizing multiple studies has received a lot of criticism from the 'situated learning group'[17], in the form of questioning the transfer value of an abstract concept. In conflict situations, where each case is considered unique, generalizing knowledge will be inappropriate. However, Druckman (2005:4) emphasized that though situations are unique, that 'does not negate the importance of transferring learning from one situation to another' because studies of conflicts, in PCEs, have helped practitioners to plan and implement certain programmes in other conflict areas. This means that the importance of studies conducted in other PCEs cannot be overemphasized. This research uses both concrete and abstract knowledge in relation to the multiple case studies. The study of a single case provides concrete knowledge and, by comparing two or more cases, abstract knowledge is maintained.

When debating knowledge, epistemological and ontological considerations have to be taken into account. According to Bryman (2004:11), epistemological issues concern what is regarded as 'acceptable knowledge' in any discipline and how that knowledge is known. Epistemology relates to methodology because it addresses how we come to know what we know, whereas methodology identifies the particular practices used to attain the knowledge (Krauss, 2005). Equally important is the consideration of the relationship between the knower and what is known. Positivism is an epistemological position of the natural sciences to the study of social reality and beyond. In the positivist paradigm the knower is independent of the known; hence the knower displays facts objectively. Opponents to positivism however, argue that positivists see the world as 'one way', but, in the real world, they need to participate, to some extent, in order to understand and express its emergent properties and features (Healy and Perry, 2000). Interpretivism, on the other hand, is the opposite of positivism, which shares the view that the study of the social world requires a different logic from that used in research procedures, one that reflects the distinctiveness of humans as against the natural order (Bryman, 2004).

Ontology involves the philosophy of reality but, mostly, theories formulated by scientists are revised over a period of time. Realism is a philosophical position that claims to offer an account of the nature of science, and Bryman (2004:543) defines it

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[17] A group of educators who have been arguing against the value of transfer of knowledge, claiming that effective learning takes place in specific contexts.

as an 'epistemological position that acknowledges a reality independent of the senses that is accessible to the researcher's tools and theoretical speculations'. It implies that scientists refer to real objects in the natural sciences without considering other factors available to them. By contrast, constructivists hold the view that the knower needs to interact with the known in the collection of data. Bryman (2004:17) defines constructionism as an ontological position that asserts that social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision.

In choosing a paradigm (Bryman, 2004), this research holds an ontological position of constructionism (social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors) and an epistemological position of interpretivism (social scientists grasping the subjective meaning of social actions). The constructionism position of ontology is maintained because, in conflict situations, the social world is not independent of social actors; hence any outcome of a study conducted should reflect the interaction of both the knower and the known. The epistemological and ontological positions normally translate into different methodological strategies and, according to Druckman (2005:8), though there is evidence from previous works that 'positivists generally prefer quantitative analysis whereas constructivists mostly perform qualitative analyses', there is nothing inherent in the epistemologies that suggests a preference for either quantitative or qualitative analysis.

The above argument leads to another research debate, which is about quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitative and qualitative are the two broad approaches to a variety of research designs. Both methods according to Sidani and Sechrest (1996:293) 'are likely to differ on several grounds: theoretical perspective, research purpose and design, and methods for data collection and analysis'. Though these methods differ in various ways, and are used differently, some authors such as Krauss (2005), Baum (2006), and Tashakkori and Teddlie (2006) have argued that these two methodologies could be mixed when collecting data.

Bryman (2004:543) defines quantitative by stating that that type of 'research usually emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of data'. According to Bryman, as a research strategy, 'it is deductivist, objectivist and incorporates a natural science model of the research process; but does not always subscribe to all the three features'. The notion that quantitative research is objective, however, has been criticised for disregarding the fact that many human (subjective) decisions are made throughout the research processes and that researchers are members of various social circles, through which they are influenced. It is argued that: the research problems or what is being studied, developing instruments to measure the researchers' views, choosing the specific tests and items for measurement, making score interpretations, and drawing conclusions, are all examples of subjectivism in quantitative research; thus classifying quantitative research as 'fully objective' is a myth' (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie, 2006:29).

Qualitative research methods are relevant to the study of social relations, owing to the fact of pluralisation of lifestyles (Flick, 1998). Flick argues that social change is so new to social researchers that their traditional deductive methodologies are failing in the differentiation of objects. Thus, researchers are increasingly making use of inductive strategies (which emphasise that models should emerge from data itself), instead of starting from new theories and then testing them. Qualitative research argues for the following: (1) favouring multiple realities in conducting research; (2) supporting the need to investigate and understand phenomenon in the view of its context; (3) helping researchers understand people, as well as the social and cultural contexts within which they live (Kaplan and Maxwell, 1994); and (4) emphasising the use of words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data for a more in-depth understanding of the phenomena. Based on the above, this research fits into the qualitative approach.

This research further presents emic and etic approaches as useful typology of methodologies. The emic approach sees conflict as a unique event which must be understood in its own context; whilst the etic approach focuses on sources, dynamics and influences and, thus, favours using a comparative approach to a number of cases (Druckman, 2005). The main challenges associated with these approaches according to Druckman (2005) are (1) whether an emic approach to social phenomena can be

understood without collecting data from participants or archival materials; and (2) whether an etic approach to large-scale social phenomena, including inter-group conflicts, can be understood without invoking intentionally. This research agrees with Druckman that even when using an etic approach, specific cases must be studied in detail before using them in a comparative approach.

An emic approach to conflict could be compared with concrete knowledge because it deals with a single case study; whilst etic is compared with abstract knowledge due to the multiple case studies it analyses. Nevertheless, many studies in conflict environments use both approaches because the study of single cases (emic) serves as a base for analysing multiple cases in the etic tradition. Despite the fact that multiple cases can lead to generalisation of findings, there is the need to state that every conflict is unique and must be considered as such. This research uses both emic and etic approaches, which means that specific cases are studied in detail and then compared with other cases (etic approach) in order to draw conclusions.

4.3   Methodological Overview
4.3.1   Qualitative Research Methodology

The research methodology, as discussed above, uses qualitative approaches to promote a deeper understanding of CB and CL programmes, for the following reasons: that they are primarily concerned with the process (planning and implementation) rather than outcomes; that they are interested in meaning (how CB and CL programmes can facilitate more effective peacebuilding); and that the primary instrument for data collection and analysis, and the involvement of fieldwork, are mostly descriptive (Merriam, 1988)[18].

4.3.2   Justification of Sierra Leone as a Case Study

The reasons for choosing Sierra Leone, as a case study will be discussed, following their enumeration: (1) the impact of the war; (2) CB activities; (3) contextual characteristics; and (4) the use of previous experience. First, Sierra Leone has been selected due to the peculiar nature of atrocities caused during the conflict. Many atrocities (the amputation of limbs, ears and lips with machetes; gang rape of women and children; and other human rights abuses) were widespread during the conflict in

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[18] http://www.gifted.uconn.edu/siegle/research/qualquan.htm accessed 15 December 2007

Sierra Leone. Unconfirmed reports put the death toll between 30,000 and 75,000 war-related deaths (Smith, 2000:3). Although, Sierra Leone is not the only war affected country where the death toll has been high, what makes Sierra Leone important to this study is how perpetrators of war crimes and their victims live in the same community, during the reintegration process.

Second, in Sierra Leone, a number of CB activities have been implemented and the best practices are being used in other post-conflict countries, such as Liberia and Ivory Coast. These best practices could be adopted in other PCEs but their real impact on the user community can only be determined after a period of time, on completion of the project. In Sierra Leone, a number of years have elapsed since some of the CB programmes were completed; thus, it is an appropriate time to study the impact of these programmes on the communities.

Also, Sierra Leone has been selected in order to reduce biases from translators. In his discussion about choosing a field site, Druckman (2005:236) observes how the use of translators in field research could bias one's research considerably due to rephrasing 'questions and responses'; and he states that researchers can learn one of the languages of their research areas in order to avoid relying on translators. Whilst this could be possible in long-term research, it is difficult in academic research due to its time limitation; thus, researchers use interpreters or translators. To avoid concentrating entirely on translators, I narrowed down my research to two English speaking West-African countries that have experienced armed conflict. However, I selected Sierra Leone in preference to Liberia, due to the study period (covering 10 years) in which it is necessary to assess the impact of completed programmes on communities and ongoing projects.

Furthermore, Sierra Leone holds a personal interest for me because I served as a UN peacekeeper and participated actively in the DDR process there. Similarly, though I served as a peacekeeper in Liberia, I did not take part in the DDR process in that country at the time. The vast experience gained from actively participating in the DDR process, in Sierra Leone, facilitated my research greatly and helped when trying to gain access to ex-combatants and programme managers. Considering the above discussions, Sierra Leone presents an appropriate post-conflict context, in West

Africa, in which to explore how community reintegration can facilitate more effective peacebuilding. The study will reveal certain current patterns that hold lessons for future studies in post-conflict contexts. The commitment to learning from successes and failures of programmes has been stressed in the Brahimi Report 2000[19].

4.3.3   Selection of Districts and Programmes

Justification of Selection Procedure

Geographically, 4 districts, one from each province, were selected from the 13 districts in the country. The selection procedure was based on districts with high populations of ex-combatant settlements on the assumption that community reintegration programmes, in those areas, would include that category of subjects. Map 1 shows the number of registred ex-combatants for reintegration process.

Map 1: Ex-Combatants' Population Registered with NCDDR for Reintegration

Source: Author

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[19] UN General Assembly and Security Council, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operation*s, A/55/305-S/2000/809, 21 August 2000.

Once I established the number of ex-combatants in the various districts - see Table 1(d), I considered the total population of those districts – see Table 1(e), and divided the population of ex-combatants by the total population of the districts in order to arrive at ratios of ex-combatants in the total population - see Table 1(f). I then selected the first 6 districts from those with very high ex-combatant populations. The 6 districts with high ex-combatant populations, as shown in red in Table 1 are: (Port Loko (northern); Kenema and Kailahun (eastern); Bo and Moyamba (southern); and Freetown (western area). Map 2 depicts the location of these districts in the 4 regions.

Table 1: Total Population in Districts: 2004 Census

District	Capital	Province	Number of ex-combatants registered for reintegration	Total population based on 2004 census	Ratios of ex-combatants in the population
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
Bombali	Makeni	**Northern**	2930	408,390	1:139.38
Koinadugu	Kabala		880	265,758	1:301.99
Port Loko	Port Loko		6468	453,746	1:70.15
Tonkolili	Magburaka		1961	347,197	1:177.05
Kambia	Kambia		957	270,462	1:282.61
Kenema	Kenema	**Eastern**	5572	497,948	1:89.36
Kono	Koidu Town		3627	335,401	1:92.47
Kailahun	Kailahun		8307	358,190	1:43.11
Bo	Bo	**Southern**	5238	463,668	1:88.5
Moyamba	Moyamba		3098	260,910	1:84.21
Pujehun	Gandorhun		2316	228,392	1:98.61
Bonthe	Bonthe		1054	129,947	1:123.28
Western Area	Freetown	**Western**	13,943	947,122	1:67.92

Source: Author

Having identified the 6 districts in the 4 regions, I selected 4 districts (see the blue shaded areas in Map 2), 1 district in each province was chosen, based on the following criteria: (1) geographical – Port Loko and Freetown were selected in the northern and western provinces, respectively, because they were the only districts in those two provinces. However, Kenema and Bo districts were selected over Kailahun and Moyamba, respectively, due to accessibility and the availability of programmes; (2) urban/rural dynamics – I considered two urban districts (Freetown and Bo) as well as two rural districts (Kenema and Port Loko) during the selection process; and

(3) ethnicity – Sierra Leone consists of 16 ethnic groups, but the main ethnic groups are the Mendes (south) and Temnes (north), which form about 30% each of the total population; and also the Creoles who form about 5.8%. The Temnes and Mendes because they are predominantly Muslims and Christians, respectively, which satisfies the religious element, needed for this study, as well as the north-south divide, and also the Creoles are included because they control politics and government ministries.

Map 2: Map of Sierra Leone Showing the 4 Districts Selected in the 4 Provinces

Source: Author

Justification for the Selection of Programmes

Reintegration of ex-combatants is a complex process in PCEs and could be broadly divided into political, economic and social. Economic reintegration programmes, for instance, range from offering vocational and skills training (masonry, carpentry, hairdressing, tailoring, computing), through to microfinance programmes, to developmental programmes (construction of community or social centres for reintegration purposes). These programmes can be classified as short, medium or long-term depending on the duration of their implementation.

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The complexity of reintegration programmes made the selection of cases difficult. For example, comparing skills training (economic) with construction of a community centre (developmental), or human rights awareness programmes (social) was difficult, if not impossible. Nevertheless, the selection of the cases was based on reintegration programmes implemented by communities - CB and those implemented by other organisations with some level of community involvement - CL. This distinction was based on Bartle's (2007)[20] argument about CB and CL programmes, as discussed in the previous chapters. He posits that for a programme to be correctly designated CB, it must be chosen and controlled by the community. Bartle argues that an outside agency's programme, which is located in a community, cannot rightly claim CB status; also consulting with community members does not make it CB, but rather it remain CL.

Having distinguished between these groups of programmes (CB and CL programmes), I considered the target group that would be appropriate for the study, and focussed more on programmes for the youth (aged between 14-35). One could argue that, concentrating more on youth programmes, defeats the idea of 'a community' because it eliminates some groups. Whilst this could be true in that sense, it was evident that the youth reintegration programmes were very popular, due to the security risk those young people posed. The following arguments are made in support of youth programmes.

First, according to the World Health Organisation (WHO) 2009, the life expectancy rate in Sierra Leone was 39 years for men, and 42 years for women, with healthy life expectancy rate of 34 years for men and 37 years for women. The above figures given on life and health life expectancy rates support the need to focus on the youth, who are the most active and healthy group in the country. Also, considering the fact that most youth programmes focussed on the age group of 15-35 year olds, it means that many people were considered (for a country whose life expectancy rate is 39 and 42 for men and women, respectively).

Second, youth reintegration programmes were more in demand due to the high unemployment rate. In Sierra Leone, the youth population was about 33.3% of the

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[20] http://www.scn.org/cmp/key/key-c.htm

entire population, with an unemployment rate of over 60% representing one of the highest youth unemployment rates in the world. This was due to lack of education during the 11-year civil conflict. According to the Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2005-2007, the poverty level of household heads with no form of education was 75% compared with 17.2% of households with university education[21]. Low literacy rates and high unemployment, associated with the youth, necessitated the Government of Sierra Leone and other donors focusing more on youth programmes.

Third, according to the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC), marginalisation and disfranchisement of youth was one of the causes of the conflict, hence the need to target the youth (both ex-combatants and non-combatants) in reintegration programmes cannot be overemphasized. Besides, the conflict exposed them (the youth) to other social vices, such as the use of drugs, alcohol abuse, prostitution, and crime; hence, many DDR implementing agencies focussed more on the youth to make them economically independent to avoid forms of re-recruitment which could destabilise the already fragile security situation.

Based on the discussion above, 14 cases were selected covering social and economic reintegration programmes (education, agriculture, and infrastructure development). The selection was based on the criteria that the programme should be: (1) a reintegration programme or it should facilitate reintegration process; (2) include both ex-combatants and non-combatants; (3) within the selected districts; and (4) planned and implemented by either a recognised NGO with some level of community participation (partnership, consultation etc); or a community.

In all, 5 CB and 9 CL programmes were selected. The disparity in numbers was due to the fact that: (1) CB programmes were only initiated in the rural areas with none at all in the Western Urban or Freetown area; (2) most programmes were implemented by NGOs rather than communities, resulting in the selection of more CL programmes; and (3) most CB programmes were developmental programmes, such as construction of schools and health centres, which could not be classified as part of reintegration programmes for the study. Despite the gap that was created in the selection of programmes (unequal numbers of CL as against CB programmes), that did not

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[21] Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2005-2007, p 42.

invalidate the study, however, it enriched data collection and enabled the research to use more examples to support discussion of the planning and implementation factors. Though the analysis chapters compared CB and CL programmes, to establish which of these sets of programmes facilitated more sustainable peacebuilding, the conclusion revealed that an approach had been developed (planning and implementation) for effective CB reintegration. Table 2 depicts the 14 cases with various sections such as CB or CL programmes, main donors, duration of the programme, and whether the programme was initiated during the DDR or 'post-DDR' phase. The 5 CB cases are depicted in blue colour. Also, Table 3 shows the timetable of the cases from 2000-9.

Table 2: Selected Cases of Community-based (CB) and Community-located (CL)

Provinces	Cases	CB/CB Implementing Partners	Donors	Duration	Official-DDR/Post-DDR Completed/Ongoing
Western Urban	1. Wellington Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	CL GGEM	NaCSA/UNDP	2 weeks (Mar 01)	Official-DDR Completed
	2. Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown	CL YAI	The Hear Foundation	1 year (Sep 08- Sep 09)	Post-DDR Ongoing
Western Rural	1. Rokel Community Centre	CB Rokel Community	NaCSA/WB, Rokel	2007-2008	Post-DDR Completed
	2. Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	CL GOPA	BMZ	3 years (Nov 07- Nov 10)	Post-DDR Ongoing
Eastern	1. Women's Vegetable Production for Income Generation in Fonikoh Kenema	CL CARITAS	NaCSA	6 months (Feb – Jul 00)	Official-DDR Completed
	2. Konia Skills Training Programme Dama	CB Dama Community	NaCSA/WB, Konia	1 year (Apr 07 – Apr 08)	Post-DDR Completed
	3. Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, KENEMA	CL CARITAS	Manos Unidas CARITAS	2 years (Apr 08 – Mar 10)	Post-DDR Ongoing
Southern	1. Vocational Training Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	CL SLOIC	NaCSA	2 mths (Sep – Dec 00)	Official-DDR Completed
	2. Youth Vocational Training, Bo	CL CARD	UNDP	1 year (Nov 08 – Nov 09)	Post-DDR Ongoing
	3. Sign Language Project, New York, Bo	CB NY, Bo	NaCSA, WB NY Community	6 mths (Aug 07- Jan 08)	Post-DDR Completed
Northern	1. Masiaka Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	CL GGEM	NaCSA	Apr 02	Official-DDR Completed
	2. Human Rights and Civil Education	CB UPHR- Masiaka	UNAMSIL	1 month (Aug – Sep 04)	Official-DDR Completed
	Agricultural Support for Women Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section	CB KCDA- Masiaka	CARE	6 months (May- Oct 03)	Official-DDR Completed
	4 Arms for Development in Massimera Chiefdom (Port Loko),	CL UNDP	UNDP	4 years (05-08)	Post-DDR Completed

Source: Author

Table 3: Timetable of the Cases from 2000-9

Cases	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Women's Vegetable Prod Recovery for Income Generation in Fornikoh	▭									
Vocational Training Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe		▭								
Wellington Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills			▭							
Masiaka Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills			▭							
Agricultural Support to Women Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section				▭						
Human Rights and Civic Education					▭					
Arms for Development in Massimera Chiefdom (Port Loko)						▭	▭	▭		
Rokel Community Centre								▭		
Konia Skills Training Programme, Dama									▭	
Sign Language Project New York, Bo								▭		
Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo								▭	▭	
Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, KENEMA									▭	
Youth Vocational Training, Bo									▭	
Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown									▭	

Source: Author

4.4. Research Design, Strategies, Methods and Data Analysis

4.4.1 Research Design

The research design takes a comparative approach because it involves the study of two groups of contrasting cases (CB and CL programmes) using more or less identical methods. It embodies the logic of comparison because it implies that we can understand community reintegration programmes better when they are compared with CB and CL programmes. In comparative design, the emphasis is on using contrasts between cases to further the understanding of what is being studied (Ragin, 1994). It seeks explanations about similarities and differences, and also gains a deeper understanding of community reintegration programmes. Comparisons do not only uncover similarities and differences, but reveal unique aspects of programmes that would be virtually impossible to detect otherwise (Ragin, 1994). They enable generalisation of key findings, which is the main limitation of single-case studies.

Comparative design like any other research design is not without its critics. Dyer and Wilkins (1991) argue that researchers tend to focus more on how to compare multiple cases, rather than paying attention to specific contexts. Whilst the need to forge comparisons is important, efforts were made to study individual programmes in detail before comparing them. Having identified the research design as being comparative, we can now consider the strategies employed during the data collection process.

Sampling

I used snowballing (non-probability sampling) to collect data. The lack of population statistics or inaccuracies in a PCE affect research processes that rely 'on a fixed sampling frame for the purpose of selecting a random sampling', thus, most researchers use non-probability sampling in such areas (Barakat, et al., 2002:992). Snowballing was used because I had to rely upon social contacts between individuals and groups to trace additional respondents (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992). Using snowballing, in this research, was highly beneficial because it revealed the social capital (links and interactions within groups) in communities. It was a useful tool with which to identify links among individuals in various groups, because well-connected groups were much easier to contact.

Bearing in mind that concentrating on a particular group, rather than all groups, can lead to under-representation, and thus produce a biased sampling, I used 'positional criteria[22] to identify desirable respondents' (Tansey, 2007:13); that is, ex-combatants (male and female ex-combatants, disabled people, the aged, and children); community members (programme beneficiaries and local population); and policy-makers/implementers (community leaders, government officials, DDR officials, and NGOs); to ensure a fair representation of each type of group. In all, I interviewed about 145 respondents, made up of the following groups: (1) elites (community leaders, DDR policy-makers, programme managers and government officials) – 50; (2) ex-combatants (male and female soldiers, child and disabled soldiers) – 35; and (3) community (programme beneficiaries and other community members) – 60. These three groups of people were selected based on: (1) elites being responsible for the planning and implementation of the community reintegration programmes; (2) ex-combatants served as direct beneficiaries[23] of the programmes; and (3) the community also served as direct and indirect beneficiaries[24] of the programmes.

The Use of a 'Fixer'

A 'fixer'[25] assisted me in gaining access to respondents and, also, served as a translator where necessary. Having in mind that a 'fixer' could lead a researcher to groups that s/he is more familiar with, which could lead to research bias, the identification of various groups (as mentioned above) prior to the research process made me to ask for gatekeepers[26] from various groups in order to gain access to all groups. Moreover, it has been argued that the use of translators can result in inaccuracies in questions and answers because some local languages do not have the same meanings for some words as others do and, as a result, an attempt to substitute similar words in their place could change the whole meaning or the understanding of that sentence (Druckman, 2005). I addressed these inaccuracies by asking the same questions, in different forms, to confirm whether the same answers were given

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[22] A positional criterion identifies all groups needed for a particular piece of research.

[23] Direct beneficiaries are trainees who participated in the programmes.

[24] Indirect beneficiaries are the rest of community members who did not participate in programmes but also benefited through other means.

[25] A 'fixer' is someone who helps a researcher to gain access to communities. S/he introduces the researcher to gatekeepers and also helps him/her to find his/her way around in the research area.

[26] Gatekeepers are locals, who assist researchers to contact other respondents within the same group, based on the links they have with one another

consistently. In spite of the fact that I used my fixer as a translator at some point during field work, it was on very rare occasions because of my familiarity with Creole, a local language spoken by the majority of Sierra Leoneans.

Door Knocking

'Door knocking[27]' is another process that I used to gain access to respondents. It is a familiarisation technique, where the researcher immerses himself in a community to gain trust in order to obtain the necessary information (Asiedu, 2010). I used a couple of days and weeks to familiarise myself with communities. As part of the 'door knocking' process, I took part in community work, sports and games, funeral ceremonies and religious activities to win the hearts and minds of the locals, especially, the communities that I was visiting for the first time. According to Asiedu (2010), door knocking facilitates collection of data through the building of trust between the researcher and the researched. Also, it helps researchers to conduct repeated interviews, or use other PRA methods, to cross-check information that has been obtained from respondents; thus, it is likely to enhance research validity. Moreover, door knocking enables researchers to choose competent fixers and translators, and it also identifies various groups in communities, which helps to reduce bias in research. These benefits are further highlighted when addressing methodological and ethical constraints.

4.4.2   Research Methods

Qualitative research methods such as participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods, observation, and documents were used in the process of collecting data. PRA methods such as semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, social network mapping, and preference rankings were applied. According to Bar-On and Prinsen (1999), PRA methods enable communities to meet with researchers to identify and analyse critical elements affecting them, using their own idioms. This form of assembly ensures team work with people from diverse backgrounds and with differing knowledge. PRA uses

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[27] 'Door knocking' is a term used in some African countries, where serious suitors (those ready for marriage) announce their relationships formally to their partners' parents with a bottle of spirits (preferably whisky). That enables suitors to familiarize themselves with their partners' parents so that they can set up a date to perform the actual marriage rites. It is assumed that PCEs are characterised by lack of trust and this may limit researchers' ability to gain emotional access, and thereby gain the required data needed for the research. The researcher, therefore, uses the 'door knocking' technique to familiarise himself with respondents and to gain access (both physical and emotional) to them.

group animation and exercises to facilitate information sharing, analysis, and action among stakeholders (World Bank, 2004). Since this research is about community reintegration programmes, PRA methods which involved active participation of locals were preferred. Participation, as discussed in Chapter 2, improves the quality, effectiveness and sustainability of projects.

Semi-structured interviews were conducted to allow interactive processes between the respondents and the researcher. First, I asked general questions about how the programme was planned and implemented. Then, I used the independent variables[28], as identified in Chapter 3, to explore possible relationships between them and the dependent variables[29]. Most of the questions I asked were not pre-determined but were formulated during the interview process to assist further probing. As the interviews progressed, interviewees themselves raised complementary issues, which became an integral part of the research findings (Beardsworth and Keil, 1992). The theoretical framework (made up of independent and dependent variables), however, provided a guide for the interview process. I used between 30-45minutes for each interview session.

Focus group discussions formed another PRA method, which I used. Bryman (2004:539) defines focus group discussions as 'a form of group interview in which: there are several participants (in addition to the moderator/facilitator), there is an emphasis in the questioning on a particular fairly tightly defined topic; and the emphasis is upon interaction within the group and the joint construction of meaning'. This is similar to the semi-structured interview but, the discussion here raises awareness of concerns and different viewpoints, within the group, regarding the topic, and provides a platform for them to iron out their differences. It enables respondents to ask questions about each other's views and bring to fore important issues from different perspectives. I used focus group discussion with NGO programme designers/implementers and community members to get first-hand information regarding how planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes

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[28] The independent variables identified in Chapter 2 were: (1) Context – political, community dynamics, socio-economic, security; and (2) programme specifics – objectives, targets, resource mobilisation, actions and procedures).

[29] Dependent variables are as follows: improved human security, improved livelihood opportunities, enhanced social reconstruction, and enhanced good governance.

were conducted. Each group consisted of at least four participants, and each session took approximately 45 minutes, including the introduction and concluding remarks. The focus group discussions enhanced the building of trust and cooperation amongst community members, thereby facilitating social reconstruction. According to Bryman (2004), focus group discussions offer the researcher the opportunity to study the way individuals collectively make sense of a phenomenon and construct meanings around it.

Some limitations were identified during the focus group discussions, for example, some participants spoke more than their colleagues and some dominated the discussions. However, taking control of proceedings and suggesting to the dominant participants that other people's views also needed to be heard helped in mitigating that problem.

Social networking mapping was another PRA method employed in this research. This form of mapping identifies ties that exist among individuals and groups in communities. According to Weller-Molongua and Knapp (1995), mapping out relationships in communities reveals the links that connect one family to another. Using social network mapping during the field study enabled this research to identify the relationships that existed in many communities in Sierra Leone. For example, in many rural communities, households were of the same tribe, faith, status, and exchange resources and other facilities; however, in the urban centres these links were not identified (see Appendix 4 for examples of social network mappings in Konia, Dama and Peter Lane, Freetown). Social network mapping facilitated a deeper understanding of social capital (linking) and how it was constructed. Moreover, it helped to identify ties within various communities, which were favourable for community reintegration programmes.

The final PRA method used was preference ranking. Preference ranking is a participatory tool used to identify respondents' choices and priorities with respect to community reintegration programmes. I selected six programmes of possible priorities and asked community members during interviews to arrange those priorities listed according to their own sense of importance. This process was used to determine whether the programme that was selected by the community was the one needed by

them or whether they were making their selection based on the influence of donors. Preference ranking is highly flexible, and it helps in understanding rural people's priorities and choice in matters of their basic needs.

The next qualitative research method used to collect data was observation. Gorman and Clayton (2005:40) define observation as 'systematic recording of observable phenomena or behaviour in a natural setting'. Other authors have defined observation within the broader contexts of ethnography, or given a narrower definition of it as being observation of participation (Baker, 2006). However, this research focuses more on direct observation. A direct observer, unlike a participant observer, has a more detached perspective of the subject of observation, and also concentrates on what is being researched, rather than immersing him or herself in the context. As a direct observer, I had first-hand information about ongoing and completed programmes without being influenced by programme implementers. Though programme managers sometimes took me to successful projects, so that my report would be favourable, I requested to see other projects of my choice in order to enable a balanced assessment.

Lastly, official documents such as those pertaining to the state, and NGO documents which were not in the public domain (project documents, project progress reports, minutes of meetings, and memos) were also used. Gaining access to most of these documents did not pose much of a problem because programme managers made documents available. In addition, state documents were obtained from commission libraries, such as NaCSA's library. Using such documents called for caution, in the sense that documents are produced to convey an impression that is favourable to authors. This means that organisations might not be objective in their reports. With that in mind, I assessed all documents according to their origin and credibility and linked the main documents to other documents, which lent background information to that main document to ascertain its validity. Documents were interpreted using qualitative content analysis by searching for underlying themes in the materials being analysed (Bryman, 2008).

4.4.3   Triangulation – The Reason for Different Methods

Research in any war-affected environment, as in any other research, is prone to problems associated with data collection and processing. The research used various

methods (semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions, preference ranking, observation, and reference to documents) in the study so that findings can be 'cross-checked' (Bryman, 2004:545). Denzin (1989:237) described and differentiated between 'methodological triangulation' into two subtypes; 'within-methods' and 'between-methods'. Within-method triangulation is the use of different subscales for measuring an item in a questionnaire, whereas between-method triangulation is the combination of dissimilar methods to measure the same unit. These differentiations of methodological triangulation are associated more with quantitative method due to the measuring of unit. However, in qualitative methods, 'within methods' can be applied using different types of questions to ascertain the reliability of information; and also 'between methods' can be applied using different qualitative methods to arrive at the same findings. Both methods were used in this research for triangulation purposes. According to Denzin (1970), each method has its own special strengths and weaknesses and no single method is superior, so it is appropriate to approach problems with all the relevant and appropriate methods at the researcher's disposal.

4.4.4 Data Analysis

The analysis of data for this thesis was based on the Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) technique, and it was guided by the epistemological position of interpretivism (social scientists attempt to grasp the subjective meaning of social action). As discussed in the research design, a comparative approach to research examines patterns of similarities and differences across a moderate number of cases (Ragin, 1994). Comparison of any form is said to be vital for human reasoning and, according to Rihoux and Ragin (2009: xvii), 'even the observation of singular phenomena is empty if we do not engage in a comparison'.

QCA has a concept of multiple conjunctural causation, as follows: (1) a combination of conditions (independent variables) eventually produce a phenomenon – the outcome (dependent variable); (2) several different combinations of conditions may produce the same outcome; (3) depending on the context, on the conjuncture, a given condition may very well have a different impact on the outcome (Rihoux, 2006). This means that by using QCA, different causal paths can lead to the same outcome. The research focuses on a combination of conditions – independent variables (content – political, community dynamics, socio-economic, security, and programmes specifics –

programme design and implementation, objectives, targeting beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, action and procedures) to establish an outcome - dependent variables (effective peacebuilding – improved human security, improved livelihood, enhanced reconstruction, enhanced governance).

QCA embodies some key strengths of the qualitative case oriented approach (Ragin, 1987) because it is a holistic approach, in the sense that each case is considered as a 'whole' that needs to be studied in detail before comparing them. QCA is, therefore, used in the following way: (1) to describe various cases in detail in a structured way; (2) to check coherence within similar cases; (3) to compare contrasting cases; and (4) to establish causes and effects. Some constraints identified by QCA, such as using a case selection unit, level and scale of analysis; construct equivalence; and issues of causality (Mill, et al., 2006) will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

4.5 Responses to Methodological and Ethical Constraints

There are methodological and ethical constraints associated with research in PCEs and this research is not an exception. Constraints such as case selection and units of analysis, access, construct equivalence, generalisation, biases and ethics are discussed under methodological and ethical considerations.

4.5.1 Methodological Considerations

One of the most critical problems identified by the research is case selection. The selection of the cases was deliberate and theory-driven (Ragin 1987), based on a research question: how can community reintegration programmes for ex-combatants contribute more effectively to peacebuilding? Considering the research question, and also the availability of programmes for the study, I favoured more economic reintegration programmes as against political and social ones. Though some political and social programmes were selected, they were few compared with economic programmes because most programmes focussed on skills training in order to provide employment opportunities for ex-combatants. The aim was to make ex-combatants financially independent, so that they will not revert to conflict. The large number of economic programmes, which were selected, resulted in unequal numbers in other social and political reintegration programmes. Moreover, in the metropolis, there was

a dearth of CB programmes, as identified in the justification of the selection of cases, which resulted in unequal numbers in CB and CL programmes.

In addition, the units of analysis – that is whether to focus on a small or a relatively large number of cases – poses selection problems. Concentrating on a small number of cases runs the risk of obtaining only very few examples to support arguments. Alternatively, selecting a large number of cases for analysis leads to 'producing superficial, though potentially statistically sound results (Mills, et al., 2006: 622). Availability and accessibility determined whether or not an appropriate number of programmes were selected

Second, access to areas, respondents, organisations or information was sometimes difficult to achieve. In Sierra Leone, difficulties arose owing to poor road networks. Some villages were only accessible by traversing along footpaths and, at best, motor bikes could be ridden to such remote areas. Remote areas can be 'no go areas' to researchers and that can lead to research biases; thus, to avoid this problem I hired motor bikes to facilitate 'easy' access to such areas. With hindsight, I described travelling to those areas in the company of a bike rider and a fixer (3 adults) on the same bike as being a 'dangerous adventure'. In addition to the difficulty of reaching certain areas, there was the problem of gaining access to respondents, a problem which also occurred in inaccessible areas. During the fieldwork, I had problems accessing some programme managers, who were busy preparing their end of year reports then, so sometimes I had to reschedule appointments.

When trying to meet some respondents, I used door knocking to facilitate access (physical and emotional). In attempting to gain physical access to individuals, it was realised that in spite of a number of researchers who had visited Sierra Leone, some people with vital information still avoided them. A respondent told me '*you are the first person I have spoken to at length concerning this war; and this is because you have been with us through thick and thin*'[30]. In Sierra Leone for example, it proved difficult for a female ex-combatants to divulge their bitter experiences relating to conflict to respondents on first encounter.

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[30] Author's interview with a male ex-combatant in Sierra Leone on 4 November 2008.

With regard to organisations, I found it difficult to gain access to international NGOs due to organisational bureaucracy. During my time in Sierra Leone, I contacted a couple of these organisations, such as Save the Children, Care International, and Catholic Relief Services (CRS) and was unsuccessful in my attempt to gain access. Over a period of time, I realised that these international NGOs were very careful about what researchers write about them, probably because they are dependent on donations, and that they operate like 'secret societies with very tight-lips'. Despite the fact that I encountered difficulties in accessing some INGOs, I managed to get access to GOPA[31] through an insider who was willing to assist me with the research.

Accessing documents was also difficult because some organisations did not have proper filing systems through which old documents could be traced. Besides, some had no records at all or they had lost the documents during previous researchers. It was evident that some organisations had to use the services of commercial printing agencies and, therefore, could not produce enough extra copies to be put on record due to the cost involved. Notwithstanding that, I managed to get at least proposals for projects and their completion reports for all the programmes studied. It took me a great deal of time to gather such materials because in some research areas I visited no photocopying machines were available. Gaining access to areas, respondents and information is very important in data collection in PCEs, because the lack of it is a methodological weakness and results in under-representation[32] of some groups. Under-representation is a form of a research bias, which affects reliability and validity of data.

Third, establishing a construct equivalent is another methodological constraint encountered. The comparative approach to the research aims at searching for similarities and differences in cases, thus there should be equivalent definitions to establish the construct. Many argue that comparisons of cases are only valid when there is construct equivalence (e.g. Harkness, et al., 2003; Moors, 2004; Mills, et al., 2006); meaning there should be same characteristics and traits across cases for comparison. Such construct was difficult to establish because of different

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[31] See description of cases for information about GOPA.
[32] Under-representation means insufficient or inadequately represented

reintegration programmes (agricultural, educational, and developmental) associated with the research. To address the issues of construct equivalence, the study was based on two contrasting community reintegration programmes: (1) programmes planned and implemented by communities themselves - CB; and (2) programmes planned and implemented by NGOs with some level of community participation - CL. Here, the same trait across cases was community involvement in both CB and CL programmes, but relating to different levels of participation.

Another methodological constraint is the identification of a reliable 'fixer' and various gatekeepers for the research process. As already identified, snowballing was used to contact respondents because they could not be identified prior to going to the field. Respondents were contacted by first identifying 'gatekeepers'[33] in each group; and they in-turn gave me contact details about colleagues within the same group. Identification of gatekeepers for various groups was not very easy because in some communities, female ex-combatants for instance could not be easily identified because they did not want to be associated with the title 'ex-combatants'. Also in other communities it was apparent that even the men were not happy to be referred to as 'ex-combatants', due to societal exclusion denoting community members' repugnance regarding the atrocities the ex-combatants had committed. Moreover, in other communities people were afraid to point out the ex-combatants that led to difficulties, which affected the selection of gatekeepers; these matters were addressed through the 'door knocking' process, where familiarization was made in order to identify various groups, such as, female and male ex-combatants in communities. This was important because in snowballing a researcher can be biased towards a particular group in a community and he fails to identify other groups. The exclusion of other groups through snowballing runs a high risk of producing a biased sample (Jacobson and Landau, 2003).

Furthermore, making generalization about the result is seen as another methodological weakness. According to Kacen and Chaitin (2006:217) 'the issue of generalization has been debated among qualitative researchers with there being little consensus concerning whether or not it is possible, or even desirable, to generalize from

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[33] Gatekeepers are locals, who assist researchers to contact other respondents within the same group, based on the links they have with one another.

qualitative research findings'. Every conflict situation is said to be unique so there are no one-size-fits all solutions to conflicts, hence 'generating general hypotheses from case studies becomes extremely difficult' (Barakat, et al., 2002:993). Bryman (2004), however, points out that even when a sample has been selected using probability sampling, any findings can only be generalised in relation to the population from which that sample was taken. Bryman was arguing that, even after completing quantitative research, generalizations cannot easily be made owing to the limitations that apply to that type of research. Generalization in qualitative research requires, firstly, an understanding of the contextual conditions under which the knowledge has been gathered, and, secondly, whether transferring that knowledge to a new setting makes sense, hence generalization becomes an active process of reflection (Greenwood and Levin, 2003).

It must be noted that, although the issue of generalisation of results in qualitative methods is associated with weakness, it is important in the study of PCEs because it offers an opportunity to learn from past experience. In order to generalize about results, qualitative researchers 'gather in-depth data from a relatively small number of cases … so that it can be generalized' within a specific context.'(Druckman, 2005:151). This research used a number of CB and CL programmes to identify similarities and differences and made generalizations about the finding in the context of Sierra Leone.

Matters, which if not carefully handled, may lead to bias are: trust, time constraints in gathering of qualitative information, the use of translators, and respondents' motivation according to their perceptions (Barakat, et al., 2002). Owing to the constraints already mentioned, researchers sometimes take the easier option of working in towns and cities. But before this research was undertaking, an attempt was made to think ahead about obtaining valid and credible information from communities in all types of location.

4.5.2   Ethical Considerations

In PCEs, other ethical issues that need to be considered are informed consent and confidentiality. Participating in social research should be based on consent, either giving verbally or in writing. Everybody has a right to their privacy being respected;

should it be necessary to breach that privacy, consent must be obtained beforehand. Despite having given consent, participants had the right to withdraw from the research process at any stage. Respondents often find that unbearable memories relating to post-conflict situations are evoked by researchers, so research must be sensitive about that.

Confidentiality must be respected at all times, so that nothing is divulged and respect for all parties is shown (Druckman 2005). In post-conflict research, where respondents provide life histories about very unpleasant events, very few people will agree that their names should be published. In such situations, researchers need to be circumspect about confidentiality because, if there is any direct reference to someone or to a particular field of study, then confidentiality is compromised. Berg (1998) however posits that a mere anonymity is insufficient for confidentiality to be safeguarded. Through the door knocking process, I made friends with ex-combatants who could confide in me, and I assured them that under no circumstance would my research points exactly to them; thus, compromising the issue of confidentiality.

Ethical concerns about cultural and political matters were dealt with sensitively in the research carried out in Sierra Leone, and attempts were made not to raise false expectations, or to open up old wounds. Moreover, efforts were made not to further harm these war-affected communities. Druckman (2005:160) posits that 'most surveys are unlikely to harm anyone, but certain topics…are highly sensitive and can cause distress.' He stressed the fact that respondents, in such, surveys should understand that they are free not to answer questions that they find upsetting.

4.6   Criteria for Evaluation

Validity, reliability, and objectivity are the key elements of good quality research. Research validity raises questions of whether the findings are 'really' genuine or not. Are the relationships and research findings, which have been established during information gathering, true or false? The validity of the research may be ensured if appropriate groups are involved, such as: elites, ex-combatants and community

members, and if the saturation point[34] is reached. Information obtained from all the groups was analysed in order to draw conclusions and make recommendations, because community reintegration programmes do not affect only one group. First-hand information about projects (whether on-going or completed, or sustainable or unsustainable) came from visiting a variety of sites. Furthermore, validity can also be claimed because repeated interviews for cross-checking purposes were carried out. Druckman (2005) posits that a research project would benefit from incorporating multiple kinds of validity perspectives.

Reliability can also take various forms. It can be external, where the researcher replicating research needs to adopt a similar social role to the one adopted originally, or internal where 'there is more than one observer, members of the research team agree about what they see and hear' (Bryman, 2004: 273). The use of multiple research methods: interviews, observation, focus groups, and project documents were conducted to try to ensure reliability. Moreover, research biases such as focussing on programmes in cities as opposed to villages, and along roadsides as against remote places, were taken into consideration. Besides, attention was paid to all the four regions in the country and to different ethnic groups.

Many social researchers face problems relating to objectivity. Being objective requires some degree of detachment towards respondents and towards the study being conducted and should produce research findings that will be unbiased. However in PCEs, many social researchers intermingle with respondents as a way of gaining their trust; thereby, becoming integrated in their way of life. Though, this could be seen as 'charitable acts, they create a methodological problem known as reactivity – where the active presence of the researcher potentially influences the behaviour and responses of informants, thereby compromising the research findings' (Jacobson and Landau, 2003:192). To be more objective, there is the need to be reflexive during the research process so researchers must take into account the possible effects of their own beliefs, values and attitudes, which could affect the research findings (Lincoln

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[34] This is where comments and patterns begin to repeat themselves in discussions, with little new material being generated (Livingstone and Lent, 1994:181).

and Guba 2003). The issue of objectivity was thus enhanced through constant self-assessment, and by critically reflecting on the aims and objectives of the research.

4.7   Conclusion

This Chapter has described the processes leading to how the research was conducted. First, it provided analysis of philosophical and research debates, and the position adopted by this research, for example, by using both concrete and abstract knowledge, choosing an ontological position of constructionism and an epistemological position of interpretivism, choosing qualitative research methods as against quantitative, and then using both emic and etic approaches.

Second, the chapter provided justification for the following: (1) selection of Sierra Leone as a case study; (2) choice of districts where community reintegration programmes were selected, and (3) opting for the selection of various cases. In spite of the fact that the cases (both CB and CL) were uneven in number for comparison purposes, the research confirmed that the gap that was identified in the selection process had not invalidated the study. Rather, it enriched data collection as more examples were given as a means of supporting the planning and implementation processes involved in community reintegration programmes.

Regarding research strategy, the Chapter emphasized the importance of using the 'door knocking' process in gaining physical and emotional access to respondents, who otherwise had been obstructive. The research stressed the fact that using research methods alone in PCEs was not enough when trying to obtain information from respondents owing to distrustfulness. Thus, 'door knocking', a technique which engendered familiarisation and the building of trust was vital. Use of door knocking, in this research, helped in addressing some methodological and ethical issues, such as identification of various groups, and also choosing a fixer. Moreover, it facilitated cross checking information for research validity.   Having discussed the research methodology, the next Chapter takes this research to Sierra Leone, the country where the field study was conducted.

Chapter Five

Sierra Leone Case Study

5.1   Introduction

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) is a process that aims at ensuring security in PCEs and then provides a platform where development can thrive. Though DDR is initiated in many PCEs, not all of the programmes have been successful. The Sierra Leone DDR process where a total of 72,490 combatants were disarmed, 71,043 demobilized (including 6,845 child soldier and 4,751 women), and 63,545 ex-combatants participated in the reintegration process[35], has been widely regarded as a 'success' because it led to the end of the conflict and, subsequently, resulted in an elected government. Some CB programmes, which were initiated by USAID, have also been considered as 'successes' and they served as models for other PCEs, in Burundi, DRC and Liberia. Whilst hailing the success story of the Sierra Leone DDR, other criticisms have been raised about such matters as: inadequate preparation made towards some vulnerable groups, for example, women, children and disabled people in the DDR programmes; and exclusion of some ex-combatants from the disarmament process because they would not hand in their weapons or shotguns, which did not meet the eligibility criteria. Therefore, the question one may pose is: 'was DDR in Sierra Leone a real success story as claimed by DDR practitioners?'

According to USAID (2005:7&8), the degree to which a country is successful in DDR is judge by whether or not it makes sufficient effort when fostering political stability and social and economic recovery[36]. Looking back after 9 years, can we say that DDR in Sierra Leone has really created security and set a platform for development? It is possible to claim success by judging DDR only on the restoration of a secure environment, but DDR should go beyond security to include development. Even, using the absence of renewed violence to judge the success of a DDR process sometimes overlooks other challenges or constraints encountered within the process.

The two main section of the Chapter are conflict analysis and DDR. The conflict analysis section explores the background to the conflict in Sierra Leone and some of

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[35] http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60 p. 10
[36] USAID (2005) 'Community-Focussed Reintegration' http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf

the peace agreements signed in support of the peace process. Then, it continues to provide an in-depth analysis of the conflict using the greed and grievance theory of Collier and Hoeffler (1998). The section concludes by supporting Collier and Hoeffler's view that the conflict in Sierra Leone was based on greed (diamond theft owing to the abundance of diamonds and the looting of them) but not grievances, as argued by some scholars such as Murshed and Tadjoeddin (2007), and Abdullah (2004). The second section introduces DDR in Sierra Leone by considering the three main themes; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and discusses special groups such as child soldiers, female combatants and disabled people. Then, the section identifies some challenges encountered during the DDR process, and proposes a CB approach to address them.

5.2   Conflict Analysis

5.2.1   Historic Overview of Sierra Leone

Sierra Leone is a country in West Africa with an area of 71,740 sq km. As shown in Map 3, it borders Liberia to the east, Guinea to the west and the north, and the Atlantic Ocean to the south. It had a population of 4.9 million according to the 2004 census, but it is currently estimated to have a 6.2 million population[37] . The main ethnic groups are Temne, Mende, Koranko, Kono, Limba, Creole, and other tribal groups along with a small Lebanese community, as shown in Map 4. The Creoles are the descendants of freed slaves from Britain, North America and other slaves who were captured in ships on the high seas. The main religions are said to be Muslim 60%, Christian 30%, and animist 10%.[38] Events that took place in Sierra Leone before the conflict situation, during the conflict, and after the conflict, when UNAMSIL was deployed to commence DDR programmes, are discussed. These events are also listed chronologically in Appendix 3.

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[37] https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sl.html
[38] US Department of State Bureau of African Affairs September 2005

Map 3: Map of Sierra Leone and Neighbouring Countries

Source: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/maps/africa/sierra-leone/

Map 4: Map of Ethnic Groups in Sierra Leone

Source: http://www.mapsorama.com/maps/africa/sierra%20leone/Sierra_leone_ethnic_1969.jpg

5.2.2   The Sierra Leone Conflict

The conflict in Sierra Leone started in 1991 when Foday Sankoh formed a rebel group, known as the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in the north of the country. Since independence in 1961, Sierra Leone has been governed by a one party system, the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). The SLPP was led by Sir Milton Margai, who become the first prime minister in 1961 and who won the first general election in May 1962. In 1964, Sir Albert Margai succeeded Sir Milton Margai, after his death. When Sir Albert took over from his brother, he was not popular in the country and did not command international respect, so he attempted to place his SLPP at the centre of the one-party state (Macqueen, 2002:182). The SLPP's distinct ethnic base among the Mendes in the south resulted in the main opposition party, the All People's Party (APC), led by Siaka Stevens, gaining support from the north of the country also, which eventually brought the party to power in March 1967 after a general election.

Unfortunately, the democratic process that brought the APC to power was abandoned by Siaka Stevens, who had become a dictator and had discouraged popular participation, which led the county to become a one-party state. Though, the first opposition party in post colonial Africa to unseat a ruling party, Siaka Stevens remained in office for 17 years and, during that term, he alienated opposition groups. This form of marginalization made some of his close associates break away from the APC to form the United Democratic Party. The UDP had support from 'Freetown and the Northern Province and particularly from the Temne' ethnic group (Alie, 2000:18). Siaka Stevens described the UDP as an ethnic-based party, which wanted to destabilize the country, and therefore, jailed some of its leaders and forced others to flee the country.

In 1985, Siaka Stevens handed over power to the then army commander, Joseph Momoh, after he had become very unpopular. Momoh proved unequal to the challenge involved in resuscitating Sierra Leone and his ineptitude took the country 'further along the path towards violent collapse' (Sawyer, 2004:7). It was during Momoh's reign that the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), led by Foday Sankoh, emerged to challenge the government and he started incursions in the northern towns in early May 1991. The period between 1992 and 1998 saw a couple of military coup

d'états and counter coups, which brought some military and civilian governments[39] to power. In July 1998, the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone was established to monitor the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security.[40]

5.2.3 Ceasefire Agreements

The first peace agreement was the Abidjan Peace Accord, which the SLPP and the RUF signed. Under that agreement, the actors agreed to establish a National Commission for Peace; allow a 700 strong monitoring group to be deployed to monitor the ceasefire; disarm, demobilise, and reintegrate all RUF fighters and grant them amnesty; and ask all foreign mercenaries to leave the country. The Abidjan Peace Agreement, however, did not succeed because of power struggles within the RUF ranks that led to an attempt to overthrow Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader. Apart from the tension in RUF ranks, there was also a coup d'état on 25 May 1997 led by Johnny Paul Koroma, which overthrew the SLPP government that had brought the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) government to power. These political upheavals prevented the deployment of the monitoring group in the country.

In January 1999, the RUF attacked Freetown, which changed the political situation in Sierra Leone, and led to the signing of another peace agreement, this time in Lomé, Togo. The Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) and the RUF, having already met in Lomé, from the 25 May to 7 July under the auspices of the then Chairman of ECOWAS, President Gnassingbe Eyadema, signed the Ceasefire Agreement[41]. This agreement became the operational document for the peace process in Sierra Leone. The terms of agreement for this document called for the cessation of hostilities and for the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to be established (Macqueen, 2002). UNAMSIL was given a mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement and to organize the DDR programme. UNAMSIL's force was increased from 6,000 peacekeepers to 17,500 to replace the ECOMOG troops, who were deployed in the country. The terms and conditions of the Lomé Agreement, however, were violated by the RUF for 'launching attacks on civilians and UN peacekeepers'

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[39] Captain Valentine Strasser's National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) in April, 1992; Brigadier Mada Bio's NPRC in January 1996, Armed Tejan Kabba's Sierra Leone's People's Party (SLPP) in March 1996, Jonny Paul Koroma's Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in May 1997, Armed Tejan Kabba's SLPP in March 1998,
[40] UN document S/RES/1181, 13 July 1998.
[41] http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MHII-5ZSB6A?OpenDocument

(Solomon, 2007:9). In that attack, the RUF took 500 UNAMSIL troops hostage. This led to the increase of international mediation efforts and, eventually, the signing of the Abuja I Ceasefire Agreement on 10 November 2000, which was reconfirmed in May 2001 (Abuja II).

The Abuja II Agreement gave UNAMSIL a clear disarmament mandate leading to the deployment of troops throughout the whole country. The Abuja Agreement resumed the DDR process, which continued until January 2002, when the President, Ahmed Tejan Kabbah declared an end to the 11-year civil war. Alusala and Thusi (2004:2) posit that 'clearly it was Abuja II that provided the breakthrough in the peace process by reviewing progress made on implementation and agreeing on mechanisms for moving the entire process forward, including DDR'. The Sierra Leone DDR process will be discussed later in this Chapter.

5.2.4   Analysing the Conflict in Sierra Leone

When assessing the causes of war, analysts evaluate the different indicators because there is no single cause of a conflict. Causes of conflicts have therefore been discussed within the 'most frequently invoked typology, such as territory, religion, language, ethnicity, and revenge' (Singer, 1996:38). Recent debates have focussed on local actors and local situations to better understand or explain the reasons for armed conflict (Porto 2002; Shehadi and Mills, 1993). These debates are about ethnicity and resources when attempting to explain contemporary social conflicts. In analysing data collected from six books, Porto (2002:2) identified ecological variables as being a factor which was commonly cited in ethnic, religious, weak state or other reasons for conflict. He discovered a relationship between ecology and conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa and posited that 'the access to and control of valuable natural resources, including minerals, oil, timber, productive pastures and farming land, have been crucial factors in the recurrence of violent conflict across the continent' (Ibid). Using four major categories of resources such as the physical one (land, mineral, oil); social (society's capacity to manage complex systems); mental (knowledge information and technology); and human (energy, skills and capacities), the science of economics is much concerned with scarcity of resources, which is associated more with physical resources rather than social, mental and human resources (Porto, 2002).

There have been a couple of studies, since the late 1990s, about the relationship between natural resources and civil wars (Berdal and Melone 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Keen 1998). Whilst some of these cases have established links between natural resources and civil wars (see Collier, et al., 2007; Fearon 2004), others have not (see Ross, 2004). Collier, et al (2007:15) noted that oil provided ample opportunities for rebel finance, whether through 'bunkering' (tapping of pipelines and theft of oil), kidnapping and ransoming of oil workers, or extortion rackets waged against oil companies. Stedman (2001) and Fearon (2004) also revealed that gemstones tended to prolong conflicts in places where these gems could be found, as opposed to places without such resources, because that allowed the rebel groups to finance themselves.

On the contrary, Ross's (2004) study of civil wars in the 1990s that occurred in gemstone producing states such as Afghanistan, Angola, Burma, Cambodia, DRC and Liberia, found that the gemstone trade was unrelated to the initiation of conflicts in those countries. In Angola, UNITA started fighting over 20 years before starting to finance itself selling diamonds illicitly in 1990; and also in Colombia, the civil war existed long before the cocaine boom in the late 1970s (Ganesan and Vines, 2004). Despite these differences between the relationship of natural resources and civil wars, Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler (2002) use the greed theory to demonstrate resource conflict.

5.2.5   Greed-Grievance Debate

According to the greed-grievance theory, conflicts are likely to be caused more by economic opportunities than by grievance. Collier and Hoeffler (1998), the main proponents of the greed thesis, based their arguments on the expected utility theory that war will be conducted by rebels 'if they perceive benefits to outweigh the cost of rebellion'. The authors used statistical regression methods to test four independent variables such as per capita income, natural resource endowment, population size and ethno-linguistic fractionalisation and found out that a higher per capita income reduces the duration of civil war and the probability of its occurrence: making low income countries more prone to civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler, 1998). They argued that factors such as income and asset inequality and ethnic and religious divisions, which might contribute to grievances; do not seem to increase the risk of conflict but

that greed (having access to economic factors such as large exports of primary commodities) does. Collier and Hoeffler (2004), in analysing the cross-country statistics, conclude that the set of variables representing rebel opportunities, or greed akin to loot-seeking, are the main reasons for civil war. In short, the greed thesis simply means the ability to finance a rebellion.

Critics have raised questions about the expected utility theory which is based on the rational-choice model of decision-making (Porto, 2002; Schelling, 1960). Schelling (1996) argued that rationality is an ambiguous concept, something which can be attested in game theory exercises as the prisoners' dilemma, where uncertainty and incomplete information abound. Nicholson (1992) also argued that, though the rationality approach might seem to support violent conflict, violence is considered a cost but one which must be borne reasonably to achieve that end, which is the economic gain. According to Nicholson, as a more general approach to human motivation, violence is ambiguous, ambivalent and complex and it cannot be treated as an unambiguous cost. He posited that the greed thesis uses an econometric model; however, it was not based on optimising behaviour by economic agents; and argues that if economic agents are motivated only by self-interest, there is the need to demonstrate why they chose war over other alternatives. However, this was not made clear by Collier and Hoeffler in their study. Also, according to Tilly (1978), collective action theory involves moving from individuals to collective interest, which needs to be organised and mobilised, and which is always difficult to achieve. Meanwhile, collective action does not rely solely on economic opportunity but other factors such as identity, as well.

The greed thesis has been criticised methodologically owing to its over-simplicity. Over-simplification of data such as non-incorporation of distributional aspects, within the cases analysed by Collier and Hoeffler, led to conclusion that 'higher per capita income reduces the duration of civil war as well as the probability of its occurrence and that as a result civil war is overwhelmingly a phenomenon of low income countries' (Porto, 2002:13). However, excluding distributional aspects in their analyses means that inequalities', between individuals and groups, become a source of grievance that could lead to conflict if completely ignored. This inequality between individuals and groups is explained in the relative deprivation approach (Porto, 2002;

Gurr, 1970). This relative sense of deprivation creates a gap between individual expectations and what comes to fruition, and this could lead to conflict. This relative deprivation will be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs. Though deprivation does not mean groups will, at all costs, pursue violent means to achieve their goals, it provides an additional and plausible explanation with regard to mechanisms that trigger violence (Porto, 2002:13).

Discussions pertaining to grievances will be explored using the headings relative deprivation, polarization and horizontal inequalities. Relative deprivation is considered to be one of the major causes of conflict. It is the gap or disparity between people's aspirations and their achievements (Murshed and Tadjoeddin, 2007). The following notion of relative deprivation was put forward by Gurr (1970); that high levels of relative deprivation within a group can lead to collective violence. This means that a societal class where the commoners feel deprived or in a multi-ethnic society, where one group feels marginalized, for quite a long period of time, collective violence may erupt.

In Sierra Leone, relative deprivation was identified over a considerable time span. During Siaka Steven's term in office, the youth felt deprived and marginalised. Many college graduates were unemployed on completion of their studies. The marginalisation of young people made university students start a series of demonstrations in protest about the situation in the country. In January 1997, during the convocation for the conferment of degrees, students staged a peaceful demonstration against the government of Siaka Stevens' APC party, calling 'among other things for improved social and economic conditions and free and fair elections' (Alie, 2002:32). Apart from those demonstrations, there was a series of other demonstrations by university students calling for major economic reforms in the country, which resulted in the closure of the only university in the country, at the time, and of some other educational institutions, too.

As the gap between the rich and the poor widens, and the unemployment rate among the youth became high, there was a shortage of basic needs, such as food and non-payment of salaries. According to Hirsch (2001), without salaries teachers sought fees from parents to prepare children for their exams and, since only the wealthy could pay

those fees, many children ended up on the street, without education or economic opportunities. The marginalisation and high unemployment rate of the youth started during Siaka Steven's SLPP government in the 1960s, but the rebel incursion started in 1991. Though one could argue that these grievances resulted in the outbreak of the conflict, they were not the immediate causes because the country over the years had experienced such grievances long before the conflict commenced.

The next grievance to consider is polarisation. Polarisation occurs when a society is divided into groups, which have the same intra-group homogeneity and inter-groups heterogeneity (Esteban and Ray 1994). According to Esteban and Ray (1994:820), 'the phenomenon of polarisation is closely linked to the generation of tensions, to the possibilities of articulated rebellion and revolt, and to the existence of social unrest in general. This is especially true if the underlying set of attributes is a variable such as income and wealth'. This definition of polarisation by Esteban and Ray, however, fails to identify groups' identities and also, within groups, their inequalities. But Østby (2007) identifies ethnic polarisation, especially where two or only a few ethnicities exist and argues for the concept of combining identity and economic polarisation.

Pre-dating independence, Sierra Leone has been divided into Creoles (freed slaves who settled in the Western part of Freetown) and other indigenous groups. The Creoles, though only forming a small percentage (about 2%) of the entire population, were better educated, formed the core of political and public service elites, to the discontent of the other ethnic groups (Davis, 2002). This created a political and economic division between the Creoles and the indigenous groups. During the post-independence era, where a majority of votes was needed to form a government, the Creoles managed to form alliances with the southerners, thereby creating a north-south division. The SLPP government, mostly made up Creoles, became associated with the southern part of the country (home to the Mendes, comprising about 30% of the population) and the APC was then associated with people from the north (home of the Temnes, also forming about 30% of the population), and was affiliated to smaller ethnic groups (Davis, 2002). The situation in Sierra Leone was not entirely played out between the Creoles and the other indigenous ethnic groups, or between the north and south divisions; but, the issue of within-group polarisation was also identified. The

inequalities, in terms of income and wealth, had been in existence since independence, but it is easy to argue that it formed the basis of numerous coups and counter-coups, which eventually plunged the country into civil war.

Horizontal inequality between groups, for example, can be an important cause of violent conflict. Stewart (2000) posits that civil wars occur when groups mobilise against each other, as a result of substantial horizontal inequalities through political, economic and social dimensions. He argues that though group mobilizations occur in weak states, strong states also initiate conflict by attacking groups, which pose a threat to them. Regarding Stewart's argument on strong states, it could be argued that, when conflict occurs as a result of attacking rebel groups, their activities would be prevented before they degenerate into civil wars. Horizontal inequalities are discussed under high asset inequality, economic mismanagement and recession and grievances related to resource rent.

Asset inequality, such as that regarding land, can cause grievances in societies and lead to conflict situations. The livelihoods of rural people without access to land, or very limited access, makes them vulnerable to conflict because they will have difficulty in obtaining food and accumulating other assets (Unruh and Turray, 2006). In Sierra Leone, two types of land tenure systems exist, that of communities, and that of family ownership. Community lands are unassigned land, held in trust by the state for the people, where paramount chiefs serve as trustees, whilst family lands are lands cleared for farming, which belong to descent groups and which cannot be sold except if the entire groups agree - a rare occurrence - (Richards and Chauveau, 2007). These land tenure systems had been practised in Sierra Leone for generations, but there has been no major conflict regarding land rights.

A prolonged economic mismanagement and recession could cause groups, especially the underprivileged, to rebel against government that could lead to conflict. In Sierra Leone for example, President Steven's government was accused of economic mismanagement during his 17 years in office. Although his government inherited a sound economy based on diamonds, and on iron mining as well as agriculture, continuous mismanagement plundered the country and led to serious economic difficulties. Coupled with the economic mismanagement, in 1973 the global oil crises

coincided with a decline in diamond and iron ore prices, thereby creating a deficit in Sierra Leone's international balance of payments (Pham, 2005:130). This economic downturn made Stevens resort to borrowing from the central bank and some international governments, leading to high inflation. It is argued that the economic mismanagement created an environment of uneven and unfair distribution of resources which enabled some people to take up arms.

Regarding grievances related to resource rent, Sierra Leone diamonds played a big part in the civil war. Proceeds from diamonds, the main export of the country, were continuously mismanaged by the political elites. This resulted in illicit mining and smuggling by a large group of unemployed youths. It is worth noting that many people, including the RUF field commander, General Mosquito, joined the rebellion expecting to access the illusory diamonds that had lured them to the mining areas (Davis 2002). Davis (2002), pointed out that the RUF exported diamonds, for a number of years, the estimated value of which was set at US$20-70 million per year. Sources of finance for the rebel activities, such as procurement of arms and illicit mining of diamonds, prolonged the conflict situation in Sierra Leone.

5.2.6   Revisiting Greed and Grievance Debate

Based on the greed thesis, which simply means the ability to finance a rebellion, the instrumental cause of civil war is the availability of looting or gaining control of natural resources, such as gold, diamonds, timber, or oil through using the proceeds for rebellions. Sambanis (2004:266), in considering the role resources play at the onset of conflict, posits that they give opportunities for looting that are widely used to sustain insurgency, but not owing to the natural resources per se.

Abdullah (2004) in his paper: 'Beyond Greed: Memo on the Sierra Leone Conflict', argues that the greed concept is reductionist, partly because it limits the understanding of rebellion as a political project. Abdullah (2004:1) posits that by reducing everything to greed, and by labelling rebellion as a criminal enterprise it 'jettisons legitimate struggles that are rooted in the desire to right the wrong of everyday life/yester years'. In his paper, Abdullah uses marginalised youth, political repression due to one-party dictatorship, dwindling revenue from mining and agriculture due to large scale corruption, and exclusivity of decision-making processes, as some of the

causes that initiated the rebel activities. According to Abdullah (2004:4), if the cause of the conflict was greed, the RUF would have targeted the immediate takeover of the diamondiferous areas to support the rebel movement. In June 1996, the RUF leader, instead, wrote to the Libyan Arab People Jamahiriya representative Mohammed Talibi thanking him for the 500,000 USD he donated to them (RUF), and requested more money in order to purchase some materials for continuation of effective and smooth operation. Based on the above, Abdullah argues against the notion of greed as the cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

The question of the timing of the onset of the conflict is crucial in understanding the greed thesis in the Sierra Leone crisis. Some of these grievances enumerated dates back to the 70s but the rebel incursion started in 1991, when Charles Taylor offered the RUF a base for their activities. It cannot be disputed that these two people (Taylor and Sankoh) knew each other because they had met in Libya, in the 1980s, when they underwent guerrilla training. Also, Sankoh helped Taylor in the early stages of Liberia's on-off civil war and probably Taylor was returning a favour he received from Sankoh (Tran, 2007:1). Again, Taylor did not 'support only the rebels in Sierra Leone but also in Guinea and Ivory Coast'; thus, why were diamonds associated with his support in Sierra Leone? (Tran, 2007:1).

Many scholars, like Sawyer (2004:10), have argued that Taylor extended the conflict from Liberia to Sierra Leone and to the forest region of Guinea for natural resources and also to establish a sphere of political control that transcended Liberia through the Mano river basin. On this basis, he supported Gen Guei when he took over power in the Ivory Coast and continued supporting junior officers, after the death of Guei (Global Witness, 2003). Macqueen (2004:182) also argued that Charles Taylor deliberately extended his military campaign across the borders to Sierra Leone, with the aim of controlling the region's diamond resources in order to finance his rebellion. Tran (2007:1) posits that Taylor was rewarded with 'blood diamonds' from Sierra Leone.

It is known that the RUF emerged to challenge Momoh's government due to the corruption practices of political elites of past governments long being practised, and the marginalization of the youth, but the rebel incursion only started when Charles

Taylor offered them a base to operate from. Sawyer (2004:10) posits that while it is true that Sierra Leonean youths, as well as students and graduates from the university, 'were among those preparing violent responses to two decades of injustices, repression and predatory rule, it was the NPFL's invasion from Liberia in April 1991 that ignited the conflict in Sierra Leone'. It could, therefore, be argued that Charles Taylor extended his support to the RUF because of one objective, and that was to control the diamond areas to support his rebel movement in Liberia. So Taylor 'beefed up' the strength of the RUF forces by engaging mercenaries from his NPFL forces. It is not surprising that Taylor is being charged on specific counts, including looting, at the UN special court in The Hague, on the basis of his alleged role as a major backer of the RUF.

In Sierra Leone a lot of grievances were used to gain the support of the rebels. The fact cannot be denied that rebel organisations were involved in illegal mining and exporting of diamonds. To support the fact that leaders saw greed as the cause of the conflict, Collier (2006) posits that, during peace negotiations to end the conflict situation in Sierra Leone, it would have been expected that, by offering the rebel leader the position of Vice President, would have been sufficient to persuade him to accept the peace settlement; however, he demanded to be the Minister of Mining. Once the rebel leader's demand was conceded, a temporary agreement was reached. According to Collier (2006:4) 'cases such as this are at least suggestive that something other than grievance may be going on beneath the surface of the discourse.' This analysis concludes, therefore, that the RUF bore grievances due to corruption and predatory rule in the country but, the onset of the conflict was as a result of greed, used in the process of capturing the diamond areas. Exploration of the DDR process in Sierra Leone, and the challenges associated with it, follows discussion of the causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone.

5.3   Sierra Leone DDR: The Structure

The Sierra Leone DDR programme was implemented and coordinated by the UN and the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR). The NCDDR grew from the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NCRRR), that had overseen the DDR process in various armed groups and provided short-term security for sustainability, over time.

The eligibility criteria for the DDR process required that each adult had to be a member of a fighting force and presented a serviceable weapon, a group weapon or ammunition. The group weapon, as eligibility criteria, was introduced in the third phase of the programme after the first two phases had excluded some groups from the programme, such as those using area weapons, and wives and dependants from the programme. The introduction of the area weapon did not solve the problem of exclusion of wives and dependants from the programme. Children under the age of eighteen, who were child soldiers or participants of the conflict, however, presented themselves to reception centres.

Over the period the disarmament and demobilization phases went through three phases as follows[42]:

      Phase 1: September to December 1998;

      Phase 2: October 1999 to April 2000;

      Phase 3: 18 May 2001 to 6 January 2002

Phase 1 of the programme was designed and implemented by the GoSL, with the assistance of ECOMOG and the UNDP, targeting all armed groups with a total of about 75,000 combatants - 10,000 ex-SLA/AFRC; 55,000 CDF; 7,000 RUF and 3000 child soldiers, as well as 300 disabled people - (Bernath and Nyce, 2002:14). This programme later targeted 45,000 combatants (6,000 SLA; 15,000 RUF, 15,000 CDF, 7,000 AFRC and 2,000 paramilitary elements).

Table 4 shows some differences between the initial and later targets. The significant differences were that child and disabled soldiers were not considered in the later targets and, subsequently, the introduction of paramilitary groups. This review was made after the establishment of the NCDDR. Child soldiers and disabled people were considered as special groups that needed special attention. Also, the paramilitary group was included because it was realised that some locals formed defence forces to protect their communities during the conflict and that such forces possessed weapons

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[42] http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes. php?c=60

such as the AK-47, that were used by DDR officials to determine entry into the programme.

Table 4: Armed Elements Targeted During Phase 1 of Sierra Leone DDR

Armed Elements	Initial Target (75,000)	Target later (45,000)
SLA/AFRC	10,000	13,000 (6,000 SLA, 7,000 AFRC
CDR	55,000	15,000
RUF	7,000	15,000
Child Soldiers	2700	
Disabled	300	
Paramilitary		2,000

During this phase of the programme, about 3,200 combatants were disarmed and they were mostly ex-SLA/AFRC, who surrendered to ECOMOG (2,994 AFRC/SLA; 187 RUF; and 2 CDF). The total number included 189 child soldiers (Zongwe, 2002:2). On 6 January 1999, the process was interrupted following the deterioration in the security situation and a rebel attack on Freetown. The insecurity situation in Sierra Leone, at that time, resulted from an insufficiency of ECOMOG troops required to provide security and also to be deployed across the whole country, thereby ensuring that country wide disarmament happened.

The second phase of the programme was implemented based on the Lomé Peace Agreement signed on 7 July 1999. During this phase, an agreement was reached between the Government and the RUF, for United Nations to deploy Military Observers to monitor ceasefire violations. Also based on the Security Council's resolution 1270 on 22 October 1999, UNAMSIL was formed and mandated to carry out the disarmament of ex-combatants, though the programme was further reviewed and redesigned to represent the multi-agency effort of GoSL, ECOMOG, UNAMSIL, UNICEF, WFP and other agencies and donors. During this phase, some demobilization centres were established at Lungi (ex-AFRC/RUF/SLA), Port-Loko North (CDF), Kenema (CDF) and Daru (RUF); 18,898 ex-combatants were disarmed; and also, ex-combatants received a transitional safety allowance (TSA) of $300 each, payable in two instalments. This phase was interrupted by hostilities in May 2000, which resulted in the taking hostage over 500 peacekeepers by the RUF (Bernath and Nyce, 2002:15).

The resumption of hostilities, during the second phase, was as a result of UNAMSIL being unable to provide security due to inadequate funding, poor equipment and lack of strength to cover the whole country. In the northern part of the country, for instance, the RUF continued to violate the ceasefire agreement. There was a shortage of observers to register ex-combatants, who were going through the demobilization process. Moreover, there was an issue as to whether or not to accept hunting rifles used mainly by the CDF (Zongwe, 2002:2&3). The interruption also had political implications because RUF members were excluded from the government, Foday Sankoh and other senior RUF members were arrested and detained, Issa Sessay replaced Sankoh, and the TSA was suspended. However, a low key disarmament continued, which brought about the disarmament of 2,600 combatants in what is referred to as an interim phase (May 2000 to May 2001).[43]

The third phase was implemented, based on a ceasefire agreement signed in Abuja on 10 November 2000, and an agreement that was reached on 2 May 2001 between the GoSL and the RUF to resume the disarmament process. During this phase, all the parties became committed to the DDR process, after realizing that military victory was not possible. The strength of the UNAMSIL force was beefed up by British troops and 'almost 75,000 people registered as ex-combatants at DDR camps and 60% were processed between May 2001 and January 2002 when the conflict was officially declared over' (Solomon 2007:12).

The programme was centred around three basic themes: (1) the disarmament phase when weapons and ammunition were collected, registered, and destroyed; (2) the demobilization of all armed groups - the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone (AFSL), RUF, CDF and other paramilitary groups; and (3) the reintegration phase where ex-combatants were supported during long-term projects.

5.3.1   Disarmament of Warring Factions

The disarmament phase entailed the collection, registration, disabling and destruction of all conventional weapons and munitions, and this was done at 45 reception centres established throughout the country. In total about 72,490 people were disarmed and

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[43] http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60 p.4

over 30,000 weapons were collected. The difference between the number of people disarmed and the weapons collected indicated that there were arms in circulation and that prompted other disarmament initiatives, such as the Community Arms Collection and Destruction Programme (CACD) and Arms for Development Programme.

The disarmament programme faced the following challenges: firstly, the fighting forces (RUF, CDF) could not submit details of their fighters in terms of their strength, location and weapons used to aid the planning of the disarmament process. This made planning very difficult for the ECOMOG and UNAMSIL DDR planning committee, especially the observer group which was directly responsible for the disarmament process. According to Kai-Kai (2000:121), this information would have assisted in planning the optimal location of both reception and demobilization centres.

Secondly, there was a problem with the eligibility criteria in terms of accepting only conventional weapons for the disarmament programme. Most combatants from the CDF, who fought against the RUF/AFRC, did not qualify for the disarmament programme because they used unconventional weapons, such as home made rifles. That was not surprising because the CDF were mainly local hunters. In Kono for instance, about 1,999 of the total number of Donso militia (CDF), over 45% of them, were excluded from the programme because their shotguns did not meet the required entry criteria (Solomon, 2007:14). Also, the CDF wanted to use hand grenades, rocket propelled grenades and mines, which were classified initially as ammunition under the NCDDR disarmament guidelines, and did not qualify as appropriate weapons for the disarmament programme. This caused disturbances at Gandorhun reception centre in August 2001, which resulted in its closure and consequently delayed the disarmament process (Solomon, 2007:13). The CDF's ineligibility for the disarmament programme initially caused a great deal of confrontation between that organisation and the disarmament officials at the reception centres. The eligibility criteria for the disarmament programme did not cause confrontation only between the CDF and disarmament officials, but also among members of other factions. The criteria for accepting conventional weapons only, in order to qualify for the disarmament programme, made some commanders attempt to disarm their soldiers by giving their weapons to relatives so that they would benefit more from the weapons-buy-back programme.

Another problem the disarmament programme encountered was the lack of trust among factions leading to them withholding weapons. This happened in the initial stages of the programme, because ECOMOG and UNAMSIL were unable to deploy troops throughout the country for the simultaneous surrendering of arms. Combatants from various factions, therefore, thought that surrendering their weapons non-simultaneously would render them incapable of fighting their opponents when conflict recurred. The research argues that the absence of a clear policy and operational framework for eligibility criteria, and the lack of troops to be deployed throughout the whole country for simultaneous disarmament, resulted in insecurity that led to the interruption of the programme and subsequent delays.

5.3.2   The Demobilization Phase

The demobilization phase took place at 16 centres and entailed reception and re-orientation of ex-combatants before the reintegration programme began. During this phase, command structures were dismantled to prevent regrouping, and children were separated from adult, and sent to care centres for reunification with their families. About 71,043 people went through the demobilization process, of which 4,751 were women while 6,845 were children below the age of 18 years[44]. Women and children were considered as special groups in the DDR process and, according to Alusala and Thusi (2004:4), the realisation that Sierra Leone had a significant number of child combatants created momentum within the donor community, when channelling resources towards rehabilitating and reintegrating them. However, these resources did not make much impact and some programme implementers have argued that these special groups were not adequately catered for. In Sierra Leone, ex-combatants spent approximately two weeks at demobilization centres receiving primary healthcare and orientation, and also received transitional safety allowances of $150.

The demobilization phase also faced some problems. First, dependants of ex-combatants were not catered for in the programme. Thus, ex-combatants looked for accommodation for their dependants around demobilization centres, which made some of them, overstay at the camps, so that they could continue to receive demobilization assistance to support their families. The refusal of ex-combatants to

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[44] http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60 p.9

leave camps, after discharge, has been attributed to 'innate fear to return to society and lack of access to their home areas' (Kai-Kai 2000:122).

The demobilization process also encountered lack of funds in some centres. This resulted in the NCDDR failure to deliver entitlements, such as identification and travel allowances to ex-combatants that caused setbacks in the DDR process and increased tensions in the camps. In July and August 2001, there were riots, demonstrations and beatings of NCDDR staff in the demobilization camps in Lunsar and Port Loko, due to the slow release of entitlements (Solomon, 2007:13).

Another demobilization challenge was failure to separate male and female combatants in the centres. During the demobilization male and female combatants were housed together and this resulted in the increase of sexually transmitted diseases and unwanted pregnancies. Solomon (2007:15) attributed this oversight to the fact that most camps were run by men, and they did not understand gender issues that might have been addressed, had women administrators been involved.

Also, the short period of time ex-combatants spent in the camps has been criticised. Some academics, such as Solomon (2007), have argued against the short period of time ex-combatants spent in camps, as that could not break up existing command and control structures amongst the armed factions, which may have effected a substantial and sustained change in their behaviour and attitudes. This argument is debatable because it has been realised that when ex-combatants stay in demobilization camps for a long period of time, they can destabilise the peace through the formation of alliances. Therefore it could be argued that there should be adequate programmes available for ex-combatants during the two-week period to prepare them adequately for the reintegration process.

5.3.3 Reintegration

The reintegration process had registered about 56,700 ex-combatants by December 2002, a year after the completion of the disarmament and demobilization process; and by January 2004, a total of 51,122 had been supported in various categories, such as vocational/apprenticeships (28,901), formal education (12,182), agriculture (9,231),

job placements (444), and others (364).[45] Ex-combatants who did not go through the reintegration process, for various reasons, were given a one-time payment package of $150. The reintegration process is discussed under political, economic and social aspects.

Political reintegration, aimed at assisting warring parties to participate in party politics and, according to Kingma (2000), it is a process through which ex-combatants and their families become part of decision-making processes. Ex-combatants effective political reintegration guarantees a stable political environment where grievances can be addressed. The Lomé Peace Accord marked an official cease-fire between the warring parties, and called on all parties to form a government of national unity, which transformed them into political parties.

The incorporation of ex-combatants into democratic institutions can facilitate political reintegration because it allays fear of exclusion. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003:319) note that ex-combatants require assurances that 'no single group will be able to use the power of the state to secure what they failed to win on the battlefield'. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) report, in part, had highlighted political disengagement of the youth, which had motivated ex-combatants to take up arms. The commission recognised the fact that the young people continued to be excluded from participating in political processes and recommended the creation of a Youth Commission, with a minimum percentage of them being represented as candidates in national and local elections (TRC, 2004:15).

Political reintegration can also be facilitated through the creation of an environment that is conducive to peaceful transformation. As part of transforming the warring factions into political parties, assistance was given to the RUF to facilitate the process. Cook (2003:32) posits that, in late November 2001, the RUF was helped to transform itself into a political party because several of their officials 'underwent Nigerian government-sponsored training in democratic practices and political party management in Abuja'. Also, the Sierra Leone government assisted them to obtain political party offices in Freetown and set up offices in Bo and Makeni.

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[45] http://www.unddr.org/countryprogrammes.php?c=60 p. 11

Despite the RUF having such support from the international community, as well as the government of Sierra Leone, transforming the group from a rebel to a political party (RUF-Party) did not run smoothly, as expected. Prior to the 2002 elections, the RUF felt that it was high time to end marginalisation of the rural people and to give them a sense of belonging to the country. They considered that a change in administration would help address some of the issues of marginalisation. The party observed that many observers from abroad perceived them to be perpetrators of atrocities; hence, they welcomed the work of the TRC to address that wrong perception. Notwithstanding that, the party was unable to secure a single seat in the 2002 elections and, according to Mitton (2008:204), it was 'not only testament to the unsuitability of the RUF for political transformation but also a sign that civil society had, to some extent, successfully undertaken the role of voicing and addressing the concerns of ex-combatants'. Since the RUF was formed to address grievances, such as youth marginalisation and unemployment, economic inequalities and massive corruption and mismanagement, it could have been expected that they would gain the support of the populace, since the elites formed only a small part of the entire population; however, that was not the case.

Also in the 2007 elections, it was realised that former RUF soldiers were used as bodyguards and security officers for politicians and party offices, respectively, which meant that, at times, they were politically intimidated. Though the economic situation drove the ex-combatants to accept such outcome, including them in such acts of political intimidation encouraged them to reconnect to violence. Mitton (2008:214) states that 'rather than demonstrating politics as an effective substitute for violence, violence was treated as an effective means to influence politics'. When ex-combatants are used to intimidate others, it affects other reintegration processes, such as social cohesion, owing to the bad image they create in communities.

Political reintegration is vital to the success of DDR programmes, and this can facilitate, peacebuilding process in PCEs. In Sierra Leone, however, the political reintegration of the RUF encountered difficulties. Probably people's perception of seeing them as perpetrators of violence did not change; as they had hope would be the case following the TRC report. Besides, it could be that they lacked the political will to contest the elections against the main political parties, such as the SLPP and APC,

in Sierra Leone. Though the RUF failed to reintegrate politically, at least the recognition of the TRC report that the previous administration rendered the country vulnerable to conflict through political abuses and, hence, assisting the political reintegration of the RUF was necessary, in a way helped in the peacebuilding processes.

Economic reintegration programmes were initiated to equip ex-combatants with productive skills and employment opportunities, so that they could return to civilian life. One of the reintegration programmes offered was vocational training. Ex-combatants underwent vocational training: carpentry, car mechanics, building construction, plumbing and metalwork, to assist them to become economically independent. Caramés, et al (2006), posit that around 55,000 ex-combatants received aid towards reintegration, including undertaking vocational training programmes in Sierra Leone. However, some of that vocational training had already been criticised for various reasons as follows: (1) the length of the training had been considered inadequate for ex-combatants, who had little or no education and according to WCRWC (2002), in Makeni, a representative of a local NGO told researchers that vocational training was cut down from six to three months due to lack of funds; (2) the training was implemented for people in different age groups, and Last (1999) argued that programme designs should target the needs of specific groups rather than providing skills training for people of all groups with different ages or needs); and (3) the training lacked employment opportunities for those who undertook it, and according to Watson (2010), most vocational training lacked pre-planning and labour market analysis to ensure that the opportunities offered in the reintegration packages met the potential and existing employment and market opportunities.

Regarding social reintegration, the NCDDR started to conduct community sensitisation exercises, prior to the demobilization, to facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants into communities. Community sensitisation was done through campaigns in the media. Also, communities were encouraged to organise cleansing and rituals, as custom demanded, to wash away ex-combatants' sins to achieve peaceful reconciliation with their victims. On behalf of the ex-combatants, the NCDDR encouraged them to undertake tasks that were beneficial to communities,

such as building infrastructure and community activities, like sports, to help rebuild their communities (Ginifer, 2003).

It is argued that ex-combatants are special groups, whose presence poses challenges and causes suspicion and resentment within the population; hence, more psychological support, counselling and initiatives for the reunification of families should be offered (Fusato, 2003). Social reintegration, more often than not, receives less attention than economic reintegration, and Sierra Leone was no exception. Ex-combatants are helped to become financial independent in the short-term to facilitate the reintegration process, which obviously affects social aspects.

Ex-combatants faced a hostile reception from community members owing to the atrocities committed during the war. Most community members found it extremely difficult to forgive ex-combatants for the part they played in the conflict; especially, the RUF's amputation of limbs of ex-combatants and non-combatants. The presence of such disabled peoples in communities was a reminder of the atrocities caused by ex-combatants. It was not surprising therefore to hear comments such as 'we are forgiving the ex-combatants for the sake of God' or 'we are forgiving them because the government says so' (Ginifer, 2003:8). Some community members, therefore, perceived any attempt by the NCDDR, to reconcile ex-combatants with them, as a form of coercion. So, many ex-combatants described the perceptions of community members towards them as being negative, causing a lack of social cohesion.

Notably, ex-combatants were given transitional safety allowances to enable them meet their basic needs during the initial stages of the reintegration phase, thereby dealing with the problems relating to exclusion. However, these allowances were criticised by community members, who said 'those who have ruined us are being given the chance to become better persons financially, academically and skills-wise' (Ginifer, 2003:8). It was even argued that some RUF fighters had the opportunity to join the Sierra Leonean reformed army. Benefits gained by ex-combatants, at the expense of other community members, created resentment and excluded ex-combatants from the reintegration process.

In addition, ex-combatants failed to acknowledge that the atrocities they committed were morally wrong. It has been argued that some RUF boasted as revolutionaries; whilst some CDF also portrayed themselves as liberators. These situations strained ex-combatants relationship with communities, especially victims, of the atrocities committed. This attitude, according to Ginifer (2003:6) made their full reintegration into communities very difficult.

Upon returning to their communities, ex-combatants faced destruction of their properties that had occurred during the conflict. Ginifer (2003:42) posits that the 'major challenge has been to repair the relationship between ex-combatants and their communities'. As a result, many ex-combatants decided to settle in new communities to start life afresh. Fundamentally, the perceptions communities had concerning ex-combatants further isolated them from reintegrating socially, which created a further threat to the fragile security situation.

5.3.4 Vulnerable Groups

The reintegration programme also considered vulnerable groups, such as child soldiers, women and disabled people. In Sierra Leone, some child soldiers were forcibly abducted or recruited and others joined the rebel movement to protect their families from attacks. These child soldiers suffered series of abuses by their commanders during the conflict. Child soldiers were separated from adult ex-combatants and placed in family support centres. Two programmes were initiated: the Training and Employment Programme (TEP), which targeted ex-child soldiers and, the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP), which supported community child education (Ginifer, 2003: 7). Though these and other programmes were initiated for child soldiers to equip them economically, their social reintegration suffered some setbacks. Some communities, or families, became suspicious of receiving those children because of the atrocities they had committed. Even in CDF-controlled areas in the south, some families disowned their own children (Solomon, 2007:26). In addition, communities lacked basic facilities: schools, hospitals and community centres that could have facilitated the reintegration process. Besides, while other communities were organising cleansing and rituals to assist the reintegration process, others were simply not prepared to do so. The difficulties child

soldiers encountered in social reintegration led to some of them suffering further abuse that led them to become social menaces in their own communities.

Additionally, in some communities, girls who were eligible for DDR programmes did not take part in them owing to the stigma attached to being a female ex-combatant. Most of these girls were abused sexually during the conflict, so they preferred to remain anonymous rather than participate in the DDR programmes. In Sierra Leones it was estimated that between 20% and 30% of all ex-combatants were women and young girls, meanwhile of 6,845 child soldiers demobilised, only 506 were girls[46].

The number of women associated with the fighting forces was estimated at 12%, however gender programming was absent and not enough attention was paid to them. It was recognised that female ex-combatants were less focussed because of 'national and international male policy-makers and officials who often recognised women and girls only as camp followers and dependants, but not integral members of the fighting force (Mazurana, 2004:61). Most women were used to serve as wives or sex slaves, hence they were not considered to be ex-combatants, so they did not go through the reintegration process. Some women refused to go through the reintegration process due to the stigma attached to being an ex-combatant, and resorted to 'prostitution to survive in places such as Makeni, Kono, Freetown and Kailahun' (Solomon, 2007:25).

Recently, disabled people have received much recognition by academics internationally. The World Health Organisation (2002) highlighted armed conflict and political violence as leading causes of disability, with over four million people currently affected. Groce and Trasi stressed that violence is a precursor to disability and highlighted the various types of violence such as that caused by: landmines; maiming as acts of aggression; and children being permanently injured whilst serving as child soldiers; and disability as a result of crime and other forms of community violence (2004).

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[46] http://www.escolapau.org/img/programas/desarme/mapa/sierrai.pdf

Disablement, now an international human rights issue, is given attention to ensure that disabled people are non-discriminated against and enjoys all human rights and fundamental freedom, including active participation in society (UN General Assembly, 1993). The 2007 UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities called for states to take appropriate legal measures to promote issues of persons, with disabilities, who become victims of any form of exploitation, violence or abuse.

Despite the recognition by academics and international communities, little interest is still given to the disabled. In Sierra Leone, Gottschalk (2007:31) acknowledged that the lack of statistics relating to disabilities indicates 'how little interest is given to them by the state'. She reiterated that the 2004 Sierra Leone census only reported that war-related physical and visual disabilities account for about 10% of those suffering from disabilities; and also the Association of Amputees and War Wounded pegged their estimates of the survival of amputees between 800 - 1000 though not all disabilities were caused by amputation.

Disabled people frequently have to rely on communities for survival. 'The double hand amputations which are symbolic of the cruelty of Sierra Leone's war render the victims completely helpless and unable to care for themselves' (Gottschalk, 2007:34). Most often, they find it difficult to feed themselves, dress, or even go to toilet without help; hence, they become a burden to a group already struggling for survival (Heeren, 2004).

During social reintegration disabled persons, especially amputees felt rejected by society due to their disability. They anticipated that the government would support them emotionally, physically, and financially to overcome their difficulties and they sensed that the public did not even want to be reminded of their presence, due to the scars they bore, that reminded them of the power of their aggressors (Gottschalk, 2007). Lack of funding and consultation meant that those who were disabled encountered some problems regarding being reintegrated.

Dependency of disabled personnel on the government, NGOs and the international community was determined by the degree of their disability. More often than not,

local initiatives were ignored by international NGOs whose donors had specific projects in mind. Gottschalk (2007:46) posits that 'local initiatives for peace that were proposed by disabled people's organisations were not valued or funded because large donors only wanted to fund peace processes that they have conceived, that they know how to implement and have proven successful in other countries.' The lack of funds restricted the implementation of local initiatives and adversely affected the reintegration process of the disabled.

Moreover, lack of consultation of the disabled, prior to the implementation of projects, also strained the reintegration process. During the truth and reconciliation process, which was aimed at bringing victims and perpetrators of crime together, disabled persons felt that they were not consulted during the project design. A disgruntled disabled person commented 'they invite us to participate in the Truth and Reconciliation thing but nobody asked us to be involved in making the decision to even have it in the first place' (Gottschalk, 2007:40). Participants felt that the project was designed in Geneva without consultation.

5.4   Conclusion

The Sierra Leone case study identifies some grievances, for example: relative deprivation, polarisation, and horizontal inequalities. Though, these grievances contributed to the conflict, none of them triggered the violence. The relative deprivation, for instance, had been a major issue since Sir Albert Margai's SLPP era through to the time of Siaka Steven's APC government. The gap between expectations and achievements resulted in a series of strikes, but conflict did not occur. Polarisation presented problems where inequalities between groups and within groups did not result to conflict. Though authors, such as Esteban and Ray (1994), identified income and wealth as being closely linked to generation of tension, those inequalities had existed since post-independence between the Creoles and the indigenous people, between the north and the south, and even within groups in the south.

Besides, horizontal inequalities in family land tenure systems, in which strangers could not own land, had created a two-class society (landowners and landless people) making it difficult for the landless families to rent farmlands. This system of land

tenure had been practised for a long time due to the matrilineal system of inheritance in the country. Moreover, prolonged economic mismanagement that plundered the country into serious economic difficulties could be traced back to Siaka Steven's 17 years in office, causing groups to strike against the government.

The greed thesis was also criticised for using the rationality principle, which is based on a rational choice model of decision-making. Taking violence as a cost, in order to achieve economic gain, had been questioned in the sense that violence is considered to be an ambiguous cost, which is uncertain in nature. Moreover, individual rationality in collective action does not involve only economic opportunity, but other factors: race, ethnicity, and ethics, as well. Despite these criticisms, the Chapter argued that the Sierra Leone conflict was a result of the availability of diamonds and the rebels' ability to loot the minerals for their personal gains. Though grievances were used to mobilise individuals to join the rebel movement, the leaders had a hidden agenda, and that was the seizing of diamond mines for their personal gain in support of their movement. The Chapter shared the same sentiment as Collier that, if it were not for diamonds, how would a rebel leader (who has been given the position of Vice President, during peace negotiations) have demanded to be the Minister of Mining, and have gained that temporary concession, too.

The DDR, in Sierra Leone, aimed at ensuring security and then set a platform for development that had been widely regarded as a 'success' because it led to an end of conflict and, subsequently, an elected government. Nevertheless, many constraints were identified within the DDR process. The eligibility criteria for the disarmament process focussed on the acceptance of conventional weapons only, whilst many ex-combatants of the CDF, who used locally made rifles, were excluded from the process. That exclusion caused a lot of disturbance in some reception centres, which resulted in the delay of the disarmament process.

Furthermore, the demobilization process did not cater for dependants of ex-combatants, leading to ex-combatants seeking nearby accommodation. Living with dependants near the reception centres led to difficulties for some ex-combatants to leaving demobilization camps, even after they were officially discharged. Failure to

make adequate preparations for dependants, such as women and children, was also linked to male dominance.

The reintegration process was also criticised as follows: (1) giving more attention to economic programmes, as against social and political; (2) restricting participation in decision-making processes regarding reintegration programmes, which concerns community wellbeing; (3) allocating short-term period to training programmes that required long-term duration to complete; (4) initiating programmes for people with different age group and academic qualifications; and (5) excluding other groups such as women and children from the reintegration process. Based on the discussions of the above criticisms, it can be questioned whether DDR was a real success story, in Sierra Leone, as had been proclaimed. Successful DDR should be implemented to foster political stability and social and economic recovery[47], which has not been achieved by the current DDR.

Addressing the problems of the current DDR process calls for CB programmes, which target communities rather than individual ex-combatants, during the reintegration process? Such programmes will encourage the active participation of community members, rather than the opposite. CB programmes will have the following benefits: (1) they will include all groups, both ex-combatants and non-combatants) in the decision-making processes, and address forms of resentment due to exclusion; (2) they will help communities to identify specific programmes that will benefit them in supporting the reintegration process for more effective peacebuilding; (3) they will empower communities in gaining skills and competencies, that may be useful when undertaking subsequent programmes; and (4) they will help to build trust and partnership among community members, which is vital for development.

It is noteworthy, that PCEs suffer from shortage of funds, despite the many pledges received from the international community, thus the earlier DDR programme implementers thought about the effects on communities, the better. Focussing first on ex-combatants normally results in them (communities) receiving limited funds. It is argued that, without community support, ex-combatants will not be reintegrated successfully. Therefore, a CB approach to DDR would not only create a secure

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[47] USAID (2005) 'Community-Focussed Reintegration' http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNADF305.pdf

environment, but should ensure development which could improve the livelihoods of individuals.

Chapter 6

Contextual Factors That Shape Planning and Implementation of Community Reintegration Programmes

6.1   Introduction

The aim of this Chapter is to discuss contextual factors that can shape community reintegration programmes. In order to study community reintegration programmes in detail, or to consider them holistically, there is the need to understand contextual as well as programme specific factors. Context is defined, in this Chapter, as factors (political, social, economic, and security) that are critical in determining the success or failure of community reintegration programmes.

In the previous chapters, we identified two sets of community reintegration programmes; and these are CB and CL programmes (Table 5 presents characteristics of CB and CL programmes). Whilst CB programmes are identified, planned and implemented by community members; CL programmes are planned and implemented by NGOs, with some level of community participation in the decision-making processes. These two groups of programmes (CB and CL) share the same aim of involving communities in their decision-making processes and actions; however, they differ in terms of levels of community participation in the planning and implementation processes. These levels of community participation can be informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated powers or local ownership, as discussed in Chapter 2: whilst the levels of participation for CL programmes are informing, consultation, or at best partnership; the levels of participation for CB programmes are considered delegated powers, or local ownership. These differences will be explored during discussions in this Chapter.

The outline of the Chapter is as follows: first, it discusses the willingness of government agencies, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to support reintegration programmes; second, it explores the effects of community dynamics on community reintegration programmes, through the understanding of rural and urban contexts, support from communities, levels of community participation, and community capacity; third, the effects of socio-economic factors (infrastructure,

labour market, access to land, and transitional justice) are also discussed; fourth, it explores the consequences of security regarding the state, and in rural and urban areas; finally, the concluding section highlights the main points raised and introduces Chapter Seven.

Table 5: Characteristics of Community-based and Community-located Programmes

Community-based Programmes	Community-located Programmes
• Community originated programmes • Community run programmes, and used national and international NGOs' support if essential • Community elected management committees • Community participation considered as citizens' power	• NGOs' or other organizations' originated programmes • NGOs' programmes, with some level of community participation • NGOs appointed programme managers • Community participation considered as consultation, informing or, at best, partnership

Source: Author

6.2   Willingness to Support Reintegration Programmes

6.2.1   Government

The willingness of governments to support programmes can shape the planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes. In Sierra Leone, the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) was formed to oversee the DDR process; and, in 2002, a declaration announced the completion of the DDR programme. Despite this announcement by the NCDDR, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) realised that more needed to be done to help ex-combatants and non-combatants, within communities, to consolidate the peace that had been achieved through reintegration. Therefore, GoSL established the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) as a successor to the NCDDR for continuation of reintegration. Since 2002 to date, NaCSA has supported the reintegration process in the country, with programmes such as the Community Driven Programme (CDP) - 600 programmes; the support of HIV/AIDS Response Project (SHARP) - 30 programmes; and Host Community Projects (HCP) - 94 programmes.

The establishment of NaCSA by the government of Sierra Leone to continue the reintegration process signifies the fact that DDR is not a short-term programme only for ex-combatants, as perceived by the international community, but a long-term process which involves communities.

NaCSA, as part of its activities, adopted a strategy to set up decentralised reintegration programmes in all districts. As part of the decentralisation process, Project Approval Committees (PACs)[48] were set up in regional offices to approve sub-projects costing under $25,000. Projects estimated to be priced above $25,000 were, however, approved by the National Project Approval Committee (NPAC)[49]. An interview with an official from NaCSA revealed that, prior to the decentralisation of the approval of contracts; all project proposals took more than six weeks to be approved due to the volume of proposals received from the whole country. He said, *'with the decentralisation process, it takes four weeks for projects which are within the limits of the regional approval committees, that is below $25,000, to be approved; and about six weeks for projects above $25,000 which are referred from the regional offices to the national approval committee for approval.'*[50] The decentralisation of projects has enabled NaCSA to respond quickly to project proposals to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. As evidenced in the research, the delay in incorporating ex-combatants into reintegration programmes resulted in petty crimes and conflict in some communities.

It was realised that the $25,000 limit set up for projects that can be approved by regional committees was too small to facilitate any meaningful community reintegration projects. Thus, all the three community reintegration programmes studied exceeded the $25,000 limit, meaning they were approved by the National Projects Approval Committee. The total cost of the Sign Language Project amounted to $35,979 with NaCSA providing $32,509 and the New York community in Bo

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[48] The PAC was made national, as well as regional, with the following members: (1) NPAC – NaCSA Coordinator, NaCSA Support Service Coordinator; and representatives from the following – Ministry of Development, NaCSA Finance and Procurement Unit, a member of the disabled community, UNOCHS/UNDP, Ministry of Finance (Budget/Economic Affairs Division.

[49] NPAC – Regional Coordinator; NaCSA Headquarters representative; a member from the Line Ministry, a member from the District Recovery Committee; a member from the disabled society; a member from an NGO; and a representative from the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development.

[50] An interview with NaCSA's Communications Officer in Freetown on 10 December 2008.

providing $3,470, and the Skills Training Programme in Konia, Dama, cost $33,839, with NaCSA contributing $27,027 and the community donating $6,812. An interview with the Ward Councillor who took an active part in the latter programme revealed that the initial plan was to identify and budget for a programme that would benefit ex-combatants, as well as community members. This means that communities planned the reintegration programmes without first setting up a financial limit to work with. One could argue that many CB programmes probably exceeded the $25,000 limit, because the programmes targeted ex-combatants as well as non-combatants. Many long-term programmes with higher funding, created employment opportunities, thereby facilitated the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

In order to establish the feasibility of projects, NaCSA employed district and regional officers who conducted field appraisals of all project proposals. District officers from NaCSA worked in conjunction with officers from various line ministries, such as Education, Agriculture, and Youth and Sports to appraise projects. The essence of the field appraisal was to confirm information on the project proposal to ensure that the community was aware of the project; and that it will benefit ex-combatants. A district officer of NaCSA remarked that *'working with officials from various line ministries for the field appraisals reduced the time we spent in the field because these were people with great expertise[51]'*. Saving time during field appraisals owing to the decentralisation of activities, enabled communities to prepare their final project applications with all the amendments on time and submit to the District Coordinator for onward submission to the Regional Coordinator. A regional coordinator stressed the fact that decentralisation of activities improved the process of projects approval because *'the district office submitted all sub-project applications to the regional approval committee not later than seven days on receipt'.[52]* Decentralisation facilitated sub-project applications in all districts, leading to their approval at the regional, or the national level. The fast track approach, through which CB programmes were approved by NaCSA, allowed communities to initiate programmes for ex-combatants, thereby facilitating their reintegration into communities. Besides, it enhanced trust building because programmes, which were identified by community

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[51] An interview with NaCSA's district officer in Bo on 23 April 2009.
[52] An interview with NaCSA's regional officer in Kenema on 5 May, 2009.

members, were not necessarily abandoned due to lack of funds, but were initiated promptly to support ex-combatants' reintegration process in various communities.

Despite NaCSA giving assistance to communities, they had to work within a positive framework of sub-projects to obtain funding[53]. Whilst this was done to guide communities when planning and implementing projects, NaCSA also emphasised that other sub-projects would be considered for eligibility, if they actually emanated from the entire community, thereby contributing to the reintegration of ex-combatants and community members. Importantly, communities were better at identifying local programmes that were of benefit to ex-combatants.

In summary, the formation of NaCSA by the GoSL, to take the reintegration of ex-combatants forward, encouraged the use of regional offices in the decentralisation process that reduced the time taken for programme approval. Besides, the decentralisation process helped communities to initiate programmes without much delay, though previous complex administrative bureaucracies had caused considerable delay. Moreover, the support of the government helped communities to initiate their own programmes that benefited ex-combatants and other community members through the use of community management committees. Based on the discussions above, it can be stated that the willingness of the GoSL, to support community reintegration programmes, facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants and contributed to the success of programmes.

6.2.2 Non-Governmental Organizations

The willingness of NGOs to involve communities in the planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes also contributed to the success of programmes. Community Action for Rural Development, Sierra Leone (CARD-SL), as part of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) national project, which aimed to provide employment and income generating activities for the youth in Sierra Leone, used an approach that effectively incorporated the community through

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[53] Some of the positive list of sub-projects were: primary schools, primary health posts, seed and grain stores, community centres, functional literacy, counselling, wells and water points, feeder roads, drying floors, markets, conflict management, nutrition training, latrines, bridges and culverts, court houses, drainage, trauma healing, project development training, sign language training for the deaf and mute, and organisational development and leadership training.

needs assessment surveys and community meetings/durbars, prior to the commencement of the Apprenticeship Scheme and Business Development Support for Youth Training and Employment in Bo. This enabled community members to identify important programmes for the benefit of participants and the whole community. Through this process, specific programmes that would benefit ex-combatants were identified. A community member remarked that *'the discussions we had with CARD about the need for youth programmes that will benefit ex-combatants were considered, and that helped in addressing unemployment problems facing ex-combatants in our community.'*[54] Frequently, it was difficult for outsiders to identify specific programmes that would benefit community groups, such as ex-combatants, without community support.

Also, the willingness of CARD to involve local artisans to provide apprenticeship opportunities to trainees was important. The use of local artisans, not only facilitated community participation, but also introduced trainees to employers within their field of study. A field supervisor from CARD whilst talking about the benefits of the use of local artisans remarked that *'the use of local artisans facilitated community participation, and also provided ample time for trainees to master their trade for employment opportunities'*[55]. Considering the fact many ex-combatants were uneducated, or had had less education due to being involved in conflict, the use of local artisans subsequently gave them ample time for skills training. The research agrees with Solomon (2007) that short-term apprenticeships are unlikely to be successful, as many apprenticeships demand long training periods.

On the contrary, the unwillingness of NGOs to involve communities adversely affected community reintegration programmes. Using some of the cases selected for the field study, the research identified the lack of community involvement in the planning and implementation of programmes. The Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generation Programme, in Fonikoh, proved to be an example of a case where the community did not participate actively in the programme. CARITAS-Kenema, an NGO, initiated the programme to assist returnee women farmers with tools, seeds,

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[54] An interview with a community member in Bo on 17 April 2009.

[55] An interview with a field supervisor in Bo on 17 April 2009.

fertilisers, materials and technical know-how for vegetable production to generate income, and also facilitate social reintegration. Prior to the war, the main occupation for the women had been vegetable crop production for both nutritive feeding and income generation. However, the war destroyed the agricultural structures, thereby handicapping the women in their attempt to reactivate farming activity immediately after the conflict.

From the outset of the programme, CARITAS-Kenema planned the vegetable rehabilitation programme with the women to benefit from their full engagement. However, the main decisions concerning the start of the programme, the types of vegetables to be planted, and the use of facilitators (such as agricultural extension officers), were made by CARITAS. The lack of community participation in the planning process resulted in low productivity which affected the reintegration process of community members.

Discussions about NGOs' willingness to involve communities in the planning and implementation of reintegration programmes revealed some benefits, such as providing local solutions to address local problems, and also engaging local artisans in reintegration programmes. These benefits are important to community members, especially ex-combatants because they can be targeted specifically in the reintegration process.

6.3 Effects of Community Dynamics on Community Reintegration Programmes

6.3.1 Understanding Community in Rural and Urban Contexts

Community is used to denote a homogenous society or one that is harmonious and cohesive that is enabled to undertake programmes. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, in many cases there were identities, such as ethnicity and religion, which affected the homogenous nature of a community. The research identifies two main communities: rural and urban.

In most rural areas, the term community denotes a culturally homogenous social system. This homogenous social system was identified as being made up of

community ties, exchange of resources, and community works. Community relationships were identified using social network mapping to show the kinds of links shared by households. The study revealed that, in many rural communities, households were of the same tribe, faith and status. Also, inter-tribal marriages seemed to be very common in such areas. For example, in Foredugu Section in Koya Chiefdom, the social network mapping revealed that households were of the same tribe (Temnes); they shared the same faith (Islam) and had the same social status (farming being the main occupation for male adults; and farming, and/or petty trading for female adults). In rural areas, these community relationships contributed to the initiation of CB programmes, which helped ex-combatants as well as community members in the reintegration process.

In addition, various households were linked by the necessity of exchange of agricultural resources, such as tools and seeds, which proved to be a uniting practice. In Konia, Dama, another rural community, the research realised that the sharing of working tools, labour, seeds, information, and credit facilities was very common among households. A community member states '*during planting and harvest seasons, we need the support of our neighbours to get the work done. Without such cooperation among us, farming activities will be difficult.*'[56] The research realised that the sharing of labour and working tools, among others, did not only bring households together for productivity, but facilitated the reintegration process because ex-combatants and non-combatants worked together.

Another activity that guaranteed community ties was community work. Community work: weeding of public graveyards, sweeping of town centres, painting of markets stalls, and clearing blocked drainage, brought community members together. In Konia for example, Monday mornings were used for community work. It was compulsory for community members to attend, and absenteeism was only granted by the sub-chief responsible for community work. Apart from community work, according to the Village Chief, the day allows '*other issues affecting the village to be discussed among community members to find a comprehensive solution to addressing them*[57]'. This meant that at least once a week, community members met to discuss matters of

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[56] An interview with a community member in Konia, Dama on 28 April, 2009.
[57] An interview with the Village Chief in Konia Dama on 29 April, 2009.

importance to the whole community, thus giving ex-combatants chance to voice specific problems.

Furthermore, community gatherings: church services, Muslim prayers, funerals, weddings, christenings, and parent teacher association (PTA) meetings were well attended. In Foredugu Section, for example, the research realised that all farming activities (for Muslims) ended on Friday mornings, so that they could attend the mosque. The commonalities about these villages were that usually they had only one mosque, one church, and sometimes a community centre.   In Dama, Foredugu and Massiaka communities, it was common for most of the men to pray in mosques on Friday afternoons. Also, having one community school in Fonikoh and Dama meant that children in these villages attended the same school, and their parents met at PTA meetings. Such gatherings bring community members together regularly and facilitate the transfer of information. For example, upon my arrival in Dama on Friday morning, I met the village chief to announce my presence and my intention of conducting field study; he used the Friday prayer session to introduce me to the community.

Mapping out these relationships revealed ties among households and community members, and how these ties affected community reintegration programmes. These homogenous systems were found in all the five rural communities where CB programmes were initiated. Though the study was executed in above-mentioned communities, at least it gave an indication of the relationships that existed in rural communities. So by the aforementioned social relationships that emanate from living with people from the same tribe, sharing the same religion and social status, and attending social gatherings, contributed immensely towards social cohesion, which aided the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

In urban communities, however, the 'whole community' concept was not identified. These communities comprised of temporary migrants, and people from different tribes, religions, and social status. Diverse groups of people lived in administrative areas with multiple cultures and traditions. In Peter Lane in Freetown, where social network mapping was conducted due to the location of the Women's Vocational Training Centre, a CL programme initiated by the Youth Action Initiative (YAI),

revealed that of the 10 households studied, 5 different tribes were identified (Temnes, Mendes, Creoles, Sherbros, and Limbas), and 3 religions (Christianity, Islam and Traditional Religion). Moreover, none of the households had ties related to inter-tribal marriages. The Wellington community, in the western urban district, had similar diverse identities within it, but there were at least two households that had links through intermarriage. The research revealed that people in the urban areas were linked through organisations, religious groups and associations. In such areas, group activities, such as church services, linked people together, but not the exchange of activities among households, as was identified in the rural areas. The urban areas had fewer ties than rural areas (as illustrated).

The rural or urban dynamics (discussed above) shaped the planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes because CB programmes were initiated only in the rural areas. The research identified that the GoSL, through the NaCSA programme provided funds for rural communities to plan and implement community reintegration programmes. However, implementing partners, such as NGOs, were used to plan and implement CL programmes in urban and some rural communities. Since none of the CB programmes were initiated in the urban areas, it could be argued that the social networking, which linked people from different localities in the urban areas, was not enough to initiate a programme for a particular locality.

6.3.2   Support from Communities

The willingness of communities to support reintegration programmes is the next point to consider. The CL cases revealed that communities were not obliged to contribute resources towards programmes; though, most communities supported the programmes by serving on community management committees, and also by providing local labour. For example, the Krooby community formed a management committee and provided liaison officers to assist Youth Action International (YAI), the NGO responsible for the Women's Vocational Training (WVT), through the selection of beneficiaries. The WVT was planned and implemented by YAI to provide basic training: computing, tailoring, and hairdressing for women between the ages of 18-30 years, who lacked education, training and employment in Krooby, Freetown. One of the committee members remarked *that 'though we are not paid for our duties, we are*

supporting YAI to provide training for our children so that they can be independent[58]'. Being independent is very important to community members, especially ex-combatants, whose reintegration process depends on getting jobs to sustain them. The time spent by Krooby community in assisting the NGO during the implementation of the programme showed the level of commitment exhibited by them (the community) in support of the programme.

Though, communities contributed their quota towards the implementation of the programmes, it was not quantified in monetary terms. Table 6 shows that, despite the support YAI received from the community, during the Women's Vocational Training Programme in Krooby, Freetown, the total cost of the programme did not include contributions made by community members. Likewise, the support from the local community for the Agricultural Support for Women Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section was not quantified.

However, community contributions for other CL programmes were quantified in monetary terms. The local contribution for the Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme in Bumpe (see Table 6) amounted to $979, through valuing local labour and provision of sticks and sand. The NCDDR contributed $14,569, making the total cost of the programme $15,548. The study revealed that with the CL programmes, NGOs did not make it mandatory for communities to make contributions towards community reintegration programmes; thus, not all programmes received community contributions. This could be one of the reasons why communities did not participate actively in some CL programmes, which affected the reintegration process in some communities. A mandatory contribution would have drawn community member into CL programmes to enhance community cohesion (bringing ex-combatants and other community members together).

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[58] An interview with a member of the CMC in Freetown on 19 May 2009.

Table 6: Community-located Programmes Showing Community Contributions

Programmes	CL	Donor Contribution	Community Contribution	Total Cost
Agricultural Support for Women Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section	CL	Le26,468,000* $9,174		Le26,468,000 $9,174
Women's Vocational Training Programme in Krooby, Freetown	CL	Le99,000,000 $34,315		Le99,000,000 $34,315
Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	CL	Le42,033,075 $14,569	Le2,825,000 $979	Le44,858,075 $15,548

*Le is Sierra Leone currency known as Leones.

Source: Author

On the other hand, communities were mandated to contribute at least 10% of the total cost in the form of construction materials: stones, sand, bush sticks, and voluntary labour to support CB programmes. Table 7 shows community contributions to the programmes: (1) Skills Training Programme in Konia, Dama – total cost $33,839, community contribution $6,812; (2) Sign Language Training in New York Community, Bo – total cost $35,979, community contribution $3,470; and (3) Rokel Community Centre – total cost $48,083, community contribution $4,894 towards the programme.

Table 7: Community-based Programmes Showing Community Contributions

Programmes	CB	Donor Contribution	Community Contribution	Total Cost
Sign Language Project in New York Community, Bo	CB	Le93,790,000 $32,509	Le10,011,650 $3,470	Le103,801,650 $35,979
Skills Training Programme in Konia, Dama	CB	Le77,974,100 $27,027	Le19,651,860 $6,812	Le97,625,960 $33,839
Rokel Community Centre	CB	Le124,600,860 $43,189	Le14,120,640 $4,894	Le138,721,500 $48,083

Source: Author

In spite of the support from the communities, it was realised during the field study that communities' willingness to support programmes diminished over time. The lack of enthusiasm of communities to support community programmes till completion was

stressed by a district coordinator from NaCSA. She remarked that *'the willingness of the PMC dwindled over time, and some members even abandoned the project due to the absence of financial reward'*[59]. She recommended that, apart from the provision of travelling allowances for the committee members, some other forms of allowances would go a long way to boost their interest throughout the implementation process. She emphasized that with CB programmes, success depends on the willingness of the community to support the programmes; hence, any lack of commitment or unwillingness on the part of either communities or the management committee will definitely affect the outcome.

The willingness of communities in support of reintegration programmes contributed to their success, and to sustainability. This was clearly identified in many community reintegration programmes where CMC's planned and implemented programmes for communities. Though they did not receive wages for their services, they saw it as providing service to their communities. Moreover, they saw themselves as leaders in their communities: *'Being elected as a member of a community management committee shows the trust community members have in you as a person and your leadership qualities'*[60]. It is important to note that without community support of reintegration programmes, releasing funds alone to communities will not make reintegration programmes of ex-combatants successful.

6.3.3   Levels of Community Participation

The levels of community participation can affect community reintegration programmes. As identified in Chapter 2, Arnstein (1969) describes levels of participation as follows: non participatory (manipulation, therapy); tokenism (informing, consultation, placation); and citizens power (partnership, delegated power and citizen control). Different levels of community participation affected the success or otherwise of programmes.

Table 8 shows the levels of community participation (in some of the cases) as follows: (1) informing and consultation (the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh, and the Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe); (2)

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[59] Author's interview with NaCSA's District Coordinator in Bo on 16 April 2009.
[60] An interview with a member of CMC in Konia, Dama, on 29 April 2009.

partnership (Women's Vocational Training Programme in Krooby, Freetown, and the Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills); and (3) community ownership (Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section, Human Rights & Civil Education in Masiaka, Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama).

Table 8: Levels of Community Participation

Project Title	Informing	Consultation	Placation	Partnership	Delegated Power	Citizens Control
Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh	X	X				
Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	X	X				
Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	X	X	X	X		
Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section					X	X
Human Rights & Civil Education in Masiaka					X	X
Rokel Community Centre					X	X
Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama					X	X
Women's Vocational Training Programme in Krooby, Freetown	X	X	X	X		

Source: Author

The level of community participation differs in the Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section, and the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh. As already mentioned, the vegetable production in Fornikoh was organised by CARITAS, with limited community involvement. Apart from consulting the community on the availability of land, markets for the products, and preservation of crops after harvest, the rest of the planning and implementation process was done by CARITAS. A beneficiary commented that '*CARITAS did not involve the community in the day to day activities of the programme and this affected crop production*'[61]. Lack of community involvement resulted in late planting of crops,

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[61] Interview with a programme beneficiary at Fornikoh on 8 May 2009.

and this affected crop production because of the changeability of the weather (rainy season); besides, it resulted in the termination of the programme after the funding from the NGO ceased. It has been argued that the lack of continuity of these programmes affected long-term sustainability of employment for ex-combatants, as well as community members for economic reintegration.

However, the vegetable production in Foredugu was locally owned. Using local knowledge about best planting seasons for crops, planting was done at the right time. At the end of the programme, 'a *good harvest was made; crops were sold to generate income for the farmers, and were also consumed locally*'[62]. This programme was more sustainable because, according to the agricultural extension officer who supervised the programme, the women continued with the farming activities when the programme was officially completed. It could be argued that agricultural programmes, which have active participation from the community, are likely to be continued when the financial support for the programme ends, because communities can develop useful skills for the continuity of programmes. In Foredugu Section, continuity of the programme enabled ex-combatants to find employment, thereby supporting their families.

Also, the level of community participation was different, according to who was elected to community management committees (CMCs), for the Rokel Community Centre Project, and the Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills Project. The level of community participation was restricted in the selection of the CMC in Wellington for the leadership and management training that was implemented by the Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement (GGEM), a local NGO. Selection was made from already existing institutions: the Board of Trustees of Wellington Community Centre; Union of Wellington Association or Social Affairs (UWASA); Wellington Area Development Association (WADA); and the Civic Development Unit (CDU). In total, 7 people were selected from each of the 4 existing institutions to make up the number. This selection process was done by some community leaders due to the time limits for commencement of management training.

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[62] An interview with a community member in Foredugu on 8 April 2009.

The lack of community participation in the selection of the committee created resentment among community members, who did not get the opportunity to be nominated; thus, it resulted in divisions among community members and, eventually, the closure of the community centre that was managed by the committee. At the time of the fieldwork, the case was still pending in court. Some argued that fresh elections would have been better for the community. A community member remarked: '*using the existing organisations did not give opportunities for other members within the community to be represented*'[63]. He argued that, over the years, the community had not seen anything meaningful in terms of community development from the already existing community groups. Using already existing institutions excluded some groups, such as ex-combatants who were in fighting camps, when those leaders were selected to manage those organisations; that resulted in conflict, which stalled the reintegration process.

By contrast, the Rokel Community Centre Project was planned and implemented by the community; hence, community members were given the opportunity to be represented through democracy, avoiding resentment. Of the 12 respondents interviewed, about 90% agreed that the election offered an opportunity for all groups (ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees, and other community members) to be represented. Considering the fact that in Sierra Leone, women were often excluded from management committees; a quota system of 25% for women and 15% for the disabled encouraged them to be representatives. An interview with a member of the management committee states: '*the level of community participation in the programme resulted in targeting all groups*[64].' The inclusion of ex-combatants, women and disabled people in the management committee encouraged them to be part of the decision-making body of the community, thus facilitating social reconstruction.

Comparing these two management committees, it became evident that the selection process for the Wellington team was fairly simple, but the undemocratic process utilized created divisions among community members, which resulted in conflict. Ultimately, the conflict situation led to the closure of the only community centre where ex-combatants as well as other community members met to socialise and

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[63] An interview with a community member in Wellington on 6 April 2009.
[64] An interview with a CMC member in Rokel on 19 May 2009.

address problems. By contrast, the level of community participation for electing the management committee in Rokel was local ownership. The committee was democratically elected, and that process facilitated community cohesion. Moreover, the democratic process puts structures in place for subsequent electioneering processes in communities. In post-conflict contexts, democratic processes can be time consuming and very expensive to implement, but if it is necessary to transform a community from a period of conflict to normalcy, where development can thrive in the long-term, then effort should be made to include both ex-combatant and non-combatant groups for more effective peacebuilding. Based on the discussions above, it could be stated that the level of community participation affects the success, or otherwise, of community reintegration programmes.

6.3.4 Community Capacity

Community capacity relates to how a community demonstrates collective competence for the welfare of the community. Demonstrating that competence is not a process but an end, in itself; meaning, it must be obvious through the success of community activities. That means that community capacity only portrays what already exists in communities, such as interconnectivity or cohesiveness (shared responsibility). As discussed in Chapter 2, social capital reflects that shared responsibility through building of trust, social norms, and inter-connectivity within society. Therefore, the strength of community capacity will contribute towards the success or failure of community reintegration programmes. In Sierra Leone, communities were classified as 'strong' or 'weak', depending on their capacities in terms of planning and implementation of projects and decision-making processes.

A community that is considered 'strong', in terms of its capacity, portrays certain indicators, such as: community groups, community work, and voluntary and religious organisations. These groups or organisations are formed based on the cohesiveness that exists in communities. The organisational processes, such as the process of electing group leaders, may be of use in other community programmes. In Masiaka for instance, the research found various organisations (the Koya Community Development Association - KCDA, the United for the Protection of Human Rights - UPHR, Youth Wing, and Women's Empowerment Association) in existence in the community, prior to the election of the community management committee. These

were CB organisations, whose leaders were democratically elected by community members. With such democratic structures in place, it was not difficult to elect the management team for the leadership training programme. A community member remarked that '*the war has made us learn one thing, and that is the democratic process of electing leaders for community activities. Everybody is given the chance to participate in these post-conflict elections, and not just the elites in the community*'[65]. He said that prior to the war community leadership was earmarked only for the elites, whilst other community members were denied that right. It is important to note that the denial of other community members in contributing their quota in decision-making processes, in part, resulted in the outbreak of the war in Sierra Leone; hence, democratic process, which might contribute towards addressing issues of conflict, is vital.

Also, strong communities could manage their own community reintegration programmes without technical support from other organisations, such as NGOs. To do that, communities organised durbars/meetings, to discuss problems affecting their own communities. They prioritised community reintegration needs, selected the most urgent programmes, and wrote project proposals for funding. In Rokel, a village chief stated that '*the community had the capacity to plan and implement their own community reintegration programmes. Apart from our dedicated management team, we had facilitators for skills training programmes, which were run by the community. The strong community capacity contributed to the success of many of our projects because we did not depend on external facilitators.*[66]' Strong community capacity facilitated community reintegration programmes because of the availability of skills that were employed at very short notice.

Conversely, 'weak' communities lacked the necessary expertise to initiate community reintegration programmes. During the official DDR process, assessment surveys conducted by some NGOs for communities revealed that many communities lacked the necessary capacity to plan and implement reintegration programmes.[67] Weak communities therefore relied on NGOs for programme implementation. Some of them

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[65] An interview with a community member in Wellington on 6 April 2009.
[66] An interview with a village chief in Rokel on 19 May 2009.
[67] An interview with a programme officer in Freetown on 10 November 2008.

also depended on NGOs and other agencies to train them from scratch in capacity building programmes. Programmes, such as community needs assessment surveys, training of trainers, gender and development training, participatory monitoring and evaluation, and community reporting procedures, amongst others, were organised for weak communities to build their capacities. Ample time and money was essential to help weak communities develop their ability to build programmes and, in view of lack of funds associated with PCEs, NGOs were employed to initiate community reintegration programmes, and this hindered the development of ex-combatants in various communities.

6.4 Effects of Socio-economic Factors on Community Reintegration Programmes

The state of socio-economic conditions in PCEs can determine the implementation of community reintegration programmes. Theoretically, it has been acknowledged that a successful socio-economic recovery can promote political stability for sustainable peacebuilding (see Chapter 3). It is not possible to focus on all socio-economic factors, so infrastructure, the labour market, access to land, and provision of justice, will be discussed.

6.4.1 Infrastructure

The presence of infrastructure, such as electricity, buildings, telecommunications and roads, or the lack of it, can shape planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes. In Joru in Guara Chiefdom, the absence of electricity resulted in the provision of certain skills training for communities. The Youth Livelihood Development Project, for instance, focussed on masonry, auto-mechanics, photography, hairdressing, cloth weaving, and raffia weaving, not because these were programmes which were identified during the market survey, but because they were considered appropriate. The programme manager revealed that computer programming was very popular but, considering the absence of a power grid, and the cost of running a generator, they excluded it from the training programmes for beneficiaries. A programme beneficiary commented *'I had to settle for photography because I couldn't get the computer course I wanted. I learnt they have that in Kenema but it is too far away from here. Moreover, I have no relative in Kenema, who I can go and live with to learn computing. I am only hoping that one day my*

dream will come true when we get electricity.'[68] The above discussions indicated that not all programmes selected by community members, such as ex-combatants, were initiated by programme implementers, despite the fact that most of them were based on their own preferences. This means that the final selection of reintegration programmes depends on the feasibility or relevance of the programmes to communities. In a farming community such as Joru, computer training as part of community reintegration programmes may not have been available, owing to electricity shortages, and therefore opting for those courses may have been a mistake for ex-combatants, who needed jobs promptly to make a living.

Also in Waterloo, the presence of a Community Centre, contributed to the selection of that location for the Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children. The NGO responsible for the training considered the Waterloo Community Centre to be a suitable place for the programme, because the building had more space and it was later converted into classroom blocks. Meanwhile, considering the fact that the programme was aimed at serving other communities: Pawpaw, Piri Town, Depea Water, Pa Lokko, Cole Town and Makabi; Waterloo was not centrally located for the programme. An interview with an ex-combatant trainee from Pawpaw revealed that he had to travel about 4 km to Waterloo daily to participate in the training programme, but admitted that it was the best location (considering the facilities and access to artisans)[69]. Also, the Principal of the programme remarked that *'we could not think about any other place, apart from this community centre, because of its facilities. Though, it is difficult for students from the surrounding villages to commute daily for classes, it is the only facility readily available to contain all the trainees for the programme.'*[70] In PCEs, the urgency required in initiating programmes for ex-combatants can force implementers to choose a place which is not ideal under normal conditions. Considering the fact that building a classroom block for a training programme requires more time and also funding, which are often limited in PCEs, some implementing agencies focussed on the availability of infrastructure for reintegration programmes. In certain places where existing infrastructure was not immediately identified, classroom blocks were purpose-built for the training

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[68] An interview with a programme beneficiary in Joru on 5 May 2009.
[69] An interview with a trainee from Pawpaw in Waterloo on 21 May 2009.
[70] An interview with the head of the youth programme in Waterloo in 21 May 2009.

programmes. For instance, in Konia, Dama, the community built a structure for training purposes, and to house all the equipment.

It is important to note that the location of infrastructure can affect programmes. The Women's Vocational Training in Krooby was located at Peter Lane, about 3 km away from Krooby, the targeted community, due to lack of a suitable building. Though this could be seen as a short distance in places with good transport systems, in PCEs it can be classified as a long distance because of lack of transport and, more importantly, lack of money for fares. These difficulties encountered by the programme beneficiaries resulted from the location of the programme, which affected their daily attendance. So, some of them even abandoned the programme altogether: *'It is difficult for some students to travel daily to school considering their financial status. These are child-mothers without much financial support from their partners. Commuting daily to school is a difficult task for them[71]',* the programme manager remarked. It could be argued that easy access to facilities contributes to the success of community reintegration programmes.

6.4.2   Labour Market

Also, in considering economic reintegration processes, information about the local labour market needs to be considered. That information is supposed to reveal data about sectors in communities that require labour, availability of jobs within certain areas, and work place employment rates and salaries. However, in many of the places where this research was conducted, such information did not exist. Nonetheless, the study revealed that some NGOs conducted their own local labour market and impact assessment surveys, prior to the selection of skills training programmes.

CARD organised the Youth Vocational Training in Bo by conducting labour market surveys to identify the main economic activities in demand in the Bo Township. They developed questionnaires to identify the availability of jobs within certain areas and the value of qualifications, experience or training. Based on the local market survey, and consultation with the community, CARD selected vocational skills for the training programmes, and according to a CARD Field Supervisor: *'the selection of*

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[71] An interview with a programme manager in Freetown on 18 November 2008.

carpentry, welding, hairdressing, and auto mechanics for the skills training was identified by the communities themselves[72]'. Despite the fact that these skills were highly demanded by the community, it was necessary to consider the availability of those services to avoid excess provision in the community.

Also, CARITAS conducted labour market survey in Joru prior to the initiation of the Youth Empowerment Programme. Apart from job opportunities within certain areas, the survey also offered the opportunity to identify gender inequality within the labour market in terms of employment *'due to early marriages of young women, and also the total dependence on their husbands[73]'*. These forms of early marriages among young women sometimes resulted from lack of education and unemployment among women. According to the programme manager, '*nearly 80% of the rural women were heavily engaged in other activities that required no special skills, such as petty trading and basic agriculture[74]'*. These forms of low income employment opportunities leave women very vulnerable and expose them to other social vices.

After conducting labour market surveys, NGOs or communities focussed on specific age groups for programmes. For instance in Konia, Dama, a survey identified different age groups who were unemployed, and discovered that about 70% of the youth had no jobs. The skills training therefore targeted youth, aged 18-35 years to address youth unemployment. A community member remarked that *'the issue of youth unemployment had been a problem to community leaders before the start of the skills programme because they used to roam about in town and engaged in petty crimes.'*[75] Conducting labour market surveys in Konia, Dama, identified the high rate of youth unemployment and these details assisted community management committees to focus specifically on their needs.

Apart from the organisations, the labour market surveys information enabled community members to make informed decisions about community reintegration programmes that they wanted to embark on. Community members were given the option to select programmes, from a range of skills training programmes, which were

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[72] An interview with CARD field supervisor in Bo on 21 April 2009.
[73] An interview with a programme coordinator in Kenema on 7 May 2009.
[74] An interview with a programme manager in Kenema on 7 May 2009.
[75] An interview with a community member in Konia on 29 April 2009.

in demand. *'I opted for hairdressing because it pays, there aren't many hairdressing salons in this area, so I believe when I finish training and set up my salon, I will get more customers,'*[76] a programme beneficiary remarked. Allowing beneficiaries to select their own programmes heightens their interest in them, but programme managers could only offer a limited number of places.

Evidently, the labour market information helped NGOs and communities to choose vocational skills, which were in demand, and beneficiaries needed to make informed choices regarding training. However, allowing beneficiaries to opt for programmes can increase supply over demand and create unemployment after completion. So, it could be argued that conducting market surveys to select vocational skills does not guarantee employment opportunities for trainees. Past skills training programmes records have shown that, frequently, skills training does not respond to the real demands of the labour market. The research therefore agrees with Specht (2009) that, without investing in the demand side of the labour market such as increasing the absorption of communities, conducting market surveys alone will not make reintegration programmes sustainable. Nevertheless, programme implementers used the market surveys to select programmes for the benefit of participants, such as ex-combatants. The interest shown in attractive programmes contributed to their success.

6.4.3   Access to Land

Access to land is very important in post-conflict contexts because, otherwise, reintegration programmes would be unsuccessful. In Sierra Leone, land is considered common property of which the paramount chiefs are the traditional custodians. They grant access to land to households, to be used for housing or farming activities, and land ownership can be considered on condition that the custodians are paid an agreed sum. A resettlement policy document prepared for NaCSA, revealed the fact that most households had access to family farm plots, which were allocated to family members by the family elders (Johnson, et al., 2002). Under that document, it was claimed that even in the absence of family land, land could be leased to a household for cultivation of food and then revert to the household with the custodial rights after use.

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[76] An interview with a programme beneficiary in Bo on 15 April 2009.

Despite the policy framework document for NaCSA which revealed easy access to farm plots, the research identified that accessing agricultural land was difficult. Lack of access to farmland meant that most ex-combatants opted for other skills training instead of agriculture, which was their main source of income before the war, as in Joru, in Kenema District for instance, of the 10 people interviewed, 7 complained about lack of availability of farmland for agricultural activities, whilst the remaining 3 said they wanted to do something other than what they had engaged in before the war[77]. The high percentage of people, who complained about lack of available farmland in such farming communities (as was the case in Bo, as mentioned in the Youth Vocational Training report), refuted NaCSA's policy framework, which claimed the widespread availability of land.

It was revealed that many trainees decided on other skill training programmes rather than agriculture, due to lack of farmland. A programme beneficiary noted, '*I opted for carpentry, because, from previous training, those who chose agriculture were still struggling to have a sizeable quantity of land for farming activities. Besides in this area, we rely solely on the weather (for rain), which sometimes affects the cultivation of crops*'[78]. The reliance on weather conditions, due to lack of irrigation facilities, affected crop production in many communities. Therefore, this research agrees with Ginifer's (2003) assertion that lack of access to agricultural land in Sierra Leone affects crop production and food security in PCEs.

Prior to embarking on the two vegetable production (The Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme in Fonikoh, Kenema; and The Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups Programme in Foredugu Section), the issue of land was considered. In Fonikoh for example, the Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme was initiated by CARITAS-Kenema, through the provision of tools, seeds, fertilisers, materials and technical assistance for women in vegetable production. Vegetable production had been the main occupation for the women before the war; but the destruction and looting of agricultural inputs during the war, made it difficult for them to renew their

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[77] Interview with some beneficiaries of the Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, Kenema, on 5 May 2009.
[78] An interview with a programme beneficiary in Kenema on 6 May 2009.

activity. The women's leader in Fonikoh remarked that '*during the initial interview with officials from CARITAS, they made it clear to them that the issue of land was not of concern because the village chief was in support of the programme. The land was released to us even before the war to assist us to generate some form of income to support our families.*'[79] The availability of land did not hinder the expansion of farmlands for vegetable production; however, the lack of community participation from the outset of the programme caused the women to discontinue the programme, after it was officially completed by CARITAS.

Given that support was given to the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups' Programme in Foredugu Section[80], KCDA, the chiefdom development umbrella organisation, which initiated the programme, considered the availability of land before writing a proposal for funding from CARE International. KCDA contacted various village leaders to ensure that the lands were not earmarked for other projects, in the near future, to try to guarantee the sustainability of the projects. An agricultural extension officer commented that the availability of land resulted in the sustainability of vegetable production from 2003 to date. It is important to note that adequate food security in post-conflict contexts can prevent ex-combatants from returning to conflict and can facilitate peacebuilding process.

6.4.4 Transitional Justice

Provision of transitional justice is another socio-economic factor that is vital to the success of community reintegration programmes. In Chapter 2, the research highlighted that the UN Secretary General's definition of transitional justice included judicial and non-judicial mechanisms. Non-judicial mechanisms, such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), are set up to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, and provide a forum where victims and perpetrators of human rights violations can tell their stories, in order to facilitate social healing and reconciliation.

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[79] An interview with a Women's Group leader in Fonikoh on 8 May, 2009.
[80] Foredugu Section is comprised of six villages: Malenkie, Rogbom, Kurankoh, Mabuya, Malegbeh, and Romaka.

In Masiaka in Koya Chiefdom for instance, the community, under the management of the United for the Protection of Human Rights (UPHR), a CB organisation, organised a programme to address human rights abuses and facilitated community reintegration processes. The programme aimed at providing a platform for offenders to apologize to their victims for atrocities committed during the war, and sensitised the community so that they could recognise and respect the rule of law, and the rights of others.

As part of the human rights programme, community members were drawn from all five wards[81] of the Koya chiefdom to take part in the programme. Beneficiaries included chiefs and elders, police and other paramilitary organisations, ex-combatants and victims, and non-combatants. Activities for the programme included training workshops for service providers and security services, and sensitisation workshops for the whole community. There were more people than expected in the sensitisation workshop, so after taken the course, reconciliation and reintegration processes were markedly improved. Twelve people were interviewed in Masiaka, of whom 5 were ex-combatants (3 males and 2 females). They expressed gratitude to the organisers of the human rights programme and acknowledged the fact that it facilitated their reintegration process. According to the ex-combatants, it gave them a platform to apologize to their victims for the atrocities they had committed during the armed conflict. An ex-combatant stated that *'when people heard that I was a fighter, they started ignoring me because of what some of our colleagues did to them in this community…the human rights programme gave us (ex-combatants) the opportunity to reconcile with the community, and now I am free and feel like them'*[82]. The victims also accepted the apology from the offenders. They acknowledged the fact that the continued bearing of grudges against offenders would have a negative impact on development of the community. According to some victims, as the war was over, it was time to move on with their lives[83].

The programme empowered community members to learn about their human rights, helped to address differences, and enhanced trust. As was succinctly expressed by one of the programme organisers, *'the programme has shaped my personal character to*

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[81] These five wards are; 194, 195, 196, 197, and 198.
[82] Interview with an ex-combatant in Masiaka on 9 April, 2009.
[83] Author's interview with some war victims in Masiaka on 10 April, 2009.

have more respect for human beings ... and also develop my intellect on human rights concepts'.[84] In PCEs, where forums were promoted, perpetrators of crimes could meet, and that is essential so that they have the opportunity to discuss acts of atrocity together and perhaps to realise that they are accountable to them. When human rights abuses are not addressed in PCEs, trust breaks down and divisions are created in communities. Lack of trust creates tension and hinders community cohesion. More importantly, if reintegration aims at providing stability and preventing ex-combatants from going back to conflict, then the need to address injustices committed during conflicts is even more significant. The institutions that support reconciliation and justice facilitate peaceful coexistence, and assist community reintegration programmes to be successful.

It is important to note that the human rights programme, in Masiaka, opened up other avenues for development in the Koya chiefdom. Community members became more united and approached developmental projects from a community perspective, where everybody contributed his or her quota. Therefore it can be seen that transitional justice in post-conflict communities, where serious atrocities have been committed during wars, can help to reconcile perpetrators and their victims to aid social reconstruction, and facilitate successful community reintegration programmes.

6.5   Effects of Security on Community Reintegration Programmes

Security is another contextual factor that can shape the success or failure of community reintegration programmes. Often, the end of hostilities does not mean a secure environment because post-conflict contexts are associated with the presence of arms, human rights abuses and crime. The insecurity that results from the former threatens the success of community reintegration programmes. The discussion on security is centred on rural and urban areas, and on the state.

6.5.1   Security in Rural Areas

In many rural areas, community policing was used to protect community reintegration programmes. This form of policing was used to support the civil police to address insecurity in communities. In Masiaka in Koya chiefdom, community policing was

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[84] Author's interview with a programme organiser in Masiaka on 8 April, 2009.

used to protect the Human Rights and Civic Educational Programme. According to the Community Secretary, about 150 personnel were employed in conjunction with the civil police to provide security for the programme, especially ex-combatants who caused a series of atrocities. He said '*the community could not rely solely on the police due to lack of personnel and resources. Moreover, considering the fact that the programme aimed at bringing both perpetrators of crime and their victims together, they needed a strong security presence to prevent any form of civic disturbance.*' [85] The employment of these young people to provide security can be easily achieved after conflict, because they are available for work; whereas afterwards, once their role is completed, it can be difficult to continue to support them financially. It should not be forgotten that some ex-combatants had been employed in the community police force and that, if they were not managed properly, they could possibly be re-recruited as rebel groups. In addition, management of them is important because otherwise, in certain circumstances they may commit offences against other members of the community.

In spite of the strong security presence for the Masiaka programme, minor conflicts were recorded. Some victims of physical abuse rained insults on their perpetrators for inflicting harm on them. In one incident '*a victim attacked a known perpetrator by throwing a stone at him during the reconciliation process. The prompt response of the security services in addressing issues of insecurity helped in the success of the programme*'[86], the programme coordinator remarked. In Masiaka, the use of the community policing helped ex-combatants to come into contact with their victims, and contributed to the success of the reintegration process.

In Rokel, community policing was used to protect the community centre during construction. An interview with the head of the village revealed that the community had about 60 militias (men and women) to protect developmental projects from theft and arson attacks. She remarked that '*in a PCE where people are poor and unemployed, petty theft was very common. We had building materials in a warehouse very close to the site; hence there was the need to protect the materials from*

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[85] An interview with Masiaka Community Secretary on 10 April 2009.
[86] An interview with the programme coordinator in Masiaka on 10 May 2009.

burglary.[87] The question one may ask was how effective they were at preventing burglary. Questions could also be asked whether or not they were armed, or was their physical presence a deterrent to armed robbers. An interview with the commander in charge of the community police revealed that their presence deterred burglars from planning attacks on the store. However that did not mean that there was no attempt at all to break in. The commander states that '*on three occasions my men came face to face with burglars. They thought there were only two guards on duty and, for that matter, that they could empower them. However, our men were quick to call for reinforcements from our own personnel (community police), and the civil police to stop the burglars from breaking into the store.*'[88] The discussions above indicate that the burglars were unarmed and that they were probably locals, who wanted to seize that opportunity to benefit from the situation. It is important to note that the use of community police, not only contributed to the success of the programme, but it provided secure environments where ex-combatants and other community members met for social functions such as games, weddings, and community durbars, to facilitate the reintegration process.

The research realised that not all rural community programmes used community policing. For example, the Konia Skills Training, which was initiated at about the same time as the Rokel Community Centre, did not use community policing. Both of these programmes were initiated between 2007 and 2008, about 5 years after the official DDR was completed; thus, it would have expected that a relatively calm atmosphere would have prevailed in both communities. However, Rokel used community policing to provide security for the programme. Considering these two communities, Rokel is a large rural community with a high population due to its proximity to Freetown (about 55 km), whilst Konia is a small village in Kenema District about 420 km from Freetown. Here, the important factor is not the distance to Freetown, but probably, the high security threat, or the high cost of building materials, which were required for protection from burglary.

Community policing personnel depended on tokens from community leaders because, otherwise, they did not receive a regular income. Some of those who were educated

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[87] An interview with the Village Head in Rokel on 19 May 2009.
[88] An interview with the commander of the community police on 18 May 2009.

had high expectations of being recruited into the civil police force, thereby gaining permanent employment. A member of the community police stated that '*for three years I have been trying to be enlisted into the civil police service without getting the opportunity. Every year, I start the recruitment process but I am dropped along the line. I do not know how long I can continue to do this job without a regular income*'[89]. This statement shows that frustration can set in when these guards fail in their attempts to be recruited into the police force. Considering the fact that some of them were ex-combatants who had being part of a command structure, they could possibly be re-recruited by some disgruntled politicians who wanted to destabilise security situations in PCEs. It is important to note that, though the service offered by community police is essential in communities where the presence of civil police is inadequate, there is the need to monitor their activities in order to prevent them from destabilising communities.

6.5.2   Security in Urban Areas

Urban centres, by contrast, relied on private security firms, use of security equipment, and the civil police force for security. The Wellington Leadership and Management Training that was organised by GGEM employed the services of a private security firm. Though the training was done in Wellington, the NGO kept all materials and equipment in their office yard in Freetown and commuted daily to Wellington for the training. In 2001, when the programme was initiated, the security situation was fluid; thus, security was a priority to GGEM. At that time, security was given a 'high alert' in the company. Subsequently, security regulations were relaxed by GGEM due to an improved state of security in the entire country. A programme officer commented that '*we have cut down the number of guards required to protect our facilities, from three to one. We are now in a stable condition unlike the initial stages of the reintegration process where security could not be guaranteed.*'[90] That meant that the high security threat required appropriate measures from the government, otherwise people would turn to private companies for protection. Unlike the rural areas, where community guards could be mobilized for such assistance, in the urban centres private security firms were used to support programmes. The success of these programmes facilitated

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[89] An interview with a member of a community police force in Rokel on 19 May 2009.
[90] An interview with a programme officer in Freetown on 17 November 2008.

the reintegration process because it brought ex-combatants and community members together.

On the other hand, the Women's Vocational Training programme that was initiated by YAI, a local NGO, relied solely on the civil police and security equipment for the protection of their training equipment, without employing the services of a private security firm. An interview with the programme coordinator revealed that *'using metal doors and heavy padlocks was enough to protect the machines and computers in the classrooms. Moreover, the location did not pose much of a security threat and the police patrols were enough to deter burglaries'*[91]. Considering the fact that this programme was initiated in 2009, nine years after the end of the conflict, it was thought that the country would be relatively peaceful so that was why YAI did not employ security firms. An environment that is secure can contribute to the success of community reintegration programmes, and facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

6.5.3 Provision of Security by the State

The need for states to focus on issues of insecurity was also identified. In Sierra Leone, the disarmament programme did not result in complete disarmament of the population, Therefore, many crimes such as armed robbery, sexual violence and violent attacks were committed, during the immediate aftermath of the conflict. To ensure the safety of citizens and to get the reintegration process on track, the government of Sierra Leone in conjunction with the UNDP initiated the Arms for Development (AfD) programme. The AfD programme tried to encourage communities to voluntarily surrender all arms and ammunition in circulation and, instead, offered money for a developmental project of their choice. The programme aimed at enhancing security as well as development in communities to facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

As part of the AfD nationwide programme, the Port Loko District identified five project locations in the following chiefdoms; Rumende, Massimera, Makonteh, BKM, and Safroko. In Massimera Chiefdom, for instance, an eight-member committee was

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[91] An interview with a programme coordinator in Freetown on 20 May 2009.

formed to supervise the collection process. A field assistant was recruited and tasked with educating the locals about the dangers of the prevalence of illicit weapons. Besides, drop-in centre volunteers assisted the field assistant in the collection process. According to a programme coordinator *'in all, Port Loko District realised a total number of 214 weapons collected: 173 non-licensable weapons; and 41 licensable weapons. Most of the non-licensable weapons collected were local/civilian type or unserviceable military weapons abandoned in bushes.'*[92] The Port Loko District arms collection demonstrated that such operations were often ineffective. Moreover, it was stated that during such operations, if any weapons were found in the 'free-of-arms' areas, the programme would be discontinued. Thereafter, following the receipt of government grants, all the development projects were completed, which meant that no weapons had been found in those community locations. A member of a management committee remarked that *'the 12-room school block and an office for the principal were part of the development project we benefited from in the Arms for Development programmes, and that was an indication that the Massimera Chiefdom was a weapon-free community.'*[93] This programme (AfD) benefited entire communities (unlike the disarmament programme that was planned exclusively to aid ex-combatants), thus it addressed issues of resentment and facilitated the peacebuilding process.

In Sierra Leone, the AfD programme was one of the security measures put in place to check insecurity in the country, so that people could trust one another and work among themselves. This process brought ex-combatants as well as community members, together. Though not many weapons were collected during this process, it enhanced long-term community reintegration programmes because programme implementers were more confident when initiating reintegration programmes, due to relative peace. Table 9 shows the duration of the community reintegration programmes studied. It was evident that all the programmes initiated prior to the AfD programme had a short-term duration of six months but, after the AfD programme, which is Case 7 on the Table, almost all the programmes apart from the Sign Language Programme had lasted for at least one year. These long-term programmes were initiated during the 'post-DDR' period. It buttressed the point at which the Arms for Development programmes paved way for long-term programmes, in many

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[92] An interview with a programme coordinator for AfD in Lungi on 24 May, 2009.
[93] An interview with a community member in Massimera on 8 April 2009.

communities, and created employment opportunities for ex-combatants as well as other community members and facilitated the reintegration process. The duration of programmes will be discussed in detail in Chapter 7 (a programme specific chapter).

Table 9: Duration of Community Reintegration Programmes

Cases	Description	Duration
1	Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh	6 months
2	Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	2 months
3	Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	2 weeks
4	Masiaka Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	2 weeks
5	Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section	6 months
6	Human Rights and Civil Education in Masiaka	1 month
7	Arms for Development in Massimera Chiefdom in Port Loko	4 years
8	Rokel Community Centre	2 years
9	Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama	1 year
10	Sign Language Project in New York, Bo	6 months
11	Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	3 years
12	Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, Kenema	2 years
13	Youth Vocational Training in Bo	1 year
14	Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown	1 year

Source: Author

6.6   Conclusion

The discussion above has revealed how contextual factors can affect the success, or otherwise, of community reintegration programmes. The willingness of government, NGOs and communities to support reintegration programmes was considered essential for the success of reintegration programmes. It was evident from the discussion that the willingness of the GoSL to support the reintegration process led to

the formation of NaCSA as a successor to the NCDDR in furthering the reintegration process. NaCSA played a major role in directing NGOs and community organisations in the planning and implementation of reintegration programmes. Though this was seen by some actors as interference, it helped in putting measures in place to check corruption and other malpractices. Probably, without such supervisory roles, many programmes which were initiated by NGOs and community organisations would have been suspended without successful completion. NaCSA performed its role effectively, making sure that funds received by NGOs or communities for reintegration projects were not misappropriated. Additionally, the willingness of NGOs and communities to support community programmes also contributed to their success.

Community dynamics, such as social networking and levels of community participation, affected community reintegration programmes. The research identified the fact that higher levels of community participation in the planning and implementation of programmes facilitated social reintegration of ex-combatants; unlike programmes where community participation was restricted and therefore created resentment among community members, which eventually affected the success of programmes. In spite of the fact that community participation processes, such as the election of community management teams was considered time consuming and very expensive in practice, election offered a long-term sustainable approach in the transformation of communities, from conflict to normalcy. Therefore, community participation helped in building skills and competencies to aid community reintegration. This research reveals that strong communities, in terms of skills availability, are able to manage community reintegration programmes better than weak communities, thereby assisting ex-combatants more.

Moreover, community reintegration programmes are shaped by socio-economic factors such as electricity, telecommunications and road networks. Many reintegration programmes, as discussed above, were sited according to the availability of infrastructure without always considering how that would affect beneficiaries. Community reintegration programmes were sited at very long distances from the target beneficiaries due to lack of funds to secure appropriate infrastructure. Some of these unsuitable locations for beneficiaries resulted in low attendance rates, and lack of interest from beneficiaries, which eventually affected the success of the overall

programmes regarding ex-combatants' reintegration. Besides, lack of appropriate infrastructure forced beneficiaries to accept programmes they did not opt for, and this adversely affected their interest in pursuing such careers. Ease of access to community reintegration programmes contributes to their success.

Moreover, an environment which is conducive to unobtrusive security can also shape community reintegration programmes positively. The research argues that the end of hostilities did not lead to a secure environment for community reintegration programmes. Owing to security threats in rural communities, local leaders formed a community police force to protect reintegration programmes. Apart from using community police to protect community reintegration programmes, they provided security in the local communities, and for ongoing programmes that were implemented by NGOs. In urban areas, however, the services of private security firms were employed owing to lack of social cohesion in those areas. The employment of private security firms was based on apparent security threats but, in areas that seemed to be safer, security equipment such as locks and bars were used. Here the provision of security was focussed on specific programmes rather than entire areas. Also, the government joined the search for security by strengthening the civil police and other security services in the urban areas to protect its citizens. In the rural areas, the GoSL worked in collaboration with UNDP to collect all armaments in circulation through the Arms for Development (AfD) programme. The search for security through various programmes helped in creating a secure environment for the undertaking of community reintegration programmes. Apart from the fact that safe environments contributed to the success of community reintegration programmes, the level of security achieved assisted in launching long-term development programmes that facilitated the reintegration process of ex-combatants for effective peacebuilding.

Having discussed contextual factors (willingness to support reintegration programmes, community dynamics, socio-economic, and security) that can affect programme specific factors (design and implementation, objectives, targets/beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, and actions and procedures), the subsequent Chapter will discuss the specific factors relating to these programmes in detail.

Chapter Seven

Effects of Programme Specific Factors on Community Reintegration Programmes

7.1 Introduction

Having discussed contextual factors in Chapter 6, this Chapter focuses on programme specific factors (design and implementation, objectives, targets/beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, and actions and procedures) to identify characteristics needed for effective peacebuilding. As already mentioned in the previous chapters, aspects of community reintegration programmes can be regrouped under the headings; CB and CL, and this Chapter argues that CB programmes are more effective for peacebuilding in the context of Sierra Leone. To establish this assertion, the Chapter compares the levels of community participation of CB and CL programmes using the programme specific factors. These levels of community participation, as discussed in the previous chapters, are: informing, consultation or partnership for CL programmes, whilst delegated powers or ownership are associated with CB programmes. The discussions of the levels of community participation in the reintegration programmes will identify the factors that would contribute to more effective peacebuilding. Apart from using the levels of participation associated with CB and CL to compare reintegration programmes, comparisons will also be made using 'official-DDR' and 'post-DDR' phases[94].

7.2 Programme Design and Implementation

7.2.1 Duration of Programmes

The duration of programmes (short or long-term) can have an impact on peacebuilding process. This study revealed that most reintegration programmes initiated during the 'official-DDR' phase were short-term, compared with programmes initiated during the 'post-DDR' phase. Table 10 shows that all the programmes initiated from 2000-2004 had less than 6 months duration, except the two

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[94] For the purpose of this Chapter, the 'official-DDR' phase is the period immediately after the conflict - in this case from 2000-2004, and the 'post-DDR' phase as a period from 2005 to date. These distinctions are made solely for this research to highlight the fact that reintegration processes begin with the emergency phase and continue through a period of transition to developmental phases.

agricultural support programmes (Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh – Case 1; and Agricultrual Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section – Case 5), which had 6 months duration.

Table 10: Duration of Programmes Initiated from 2000-2004

Cases	CB/CL	Description	Duration
1	CL	Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh	6 months
2	CL	Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	2 months
3	CL	Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	2 weeks
4	CL	Masiaka Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	2 weeks
5	CB	Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section	6 months
6	CL	Human Rights & Civil Education in Masiaka	1 month

Source: Author

The above Table indicates that more CL programmes were initiated during the official DDR phase. Of the 6 programmes, only 1(representing about 17%) was a CB programme. An interview with an official from NaCSA indicated that, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, many programmes were initiated by NGOs because of the urgent need to establish programmes in many deprived communities. He reiterated that *'the unsettling nature of many communities after the conflict necessitated the NCDDR and NaCSA to use NGOs as implementing partners for most programmes.'*[95] Also, communities lacked the necessary cooperation and leadership structures to initiate, plan and implement community reintegration programmes.

The question to be explored, therefore, is whether the underlying unsettled nature and the lack of cooperation affected all communities in the country, or whether the national commissions (NCDDR and NaCSA) assumed that that was the case, without first attempting to identify communities which could start their own programmes. Considering the fact that the Agricultural Support for Women Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section, a CB programme, was initiated in 2003 ('official-DDR'

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[95] An interview with official from NaCSA on 15 November 2008.

phase), it could be argued that not all communities were so unsettled that they would be unable to commence their own programmes, as stated above by the official from NaCSA. By treating the need for reintegration programmes as a matter of urgency, as is essential in post-war situation, there is insufficient time to identify communities that can plan and implement their own programmes. Whilst it is important to instigate urgent programmes for various communities to facilitate reintegration of ex-combatants, the fact cannot be disputed that the active involvement of ex-combatants in programme design and implementation will contribute towards long-term success of the reintegration process.

Conversely, all the programmes which were initiated from 2005 onwards had a minimum duration of one year, except one (the Sign Language Project in New York, Bo). As represented in Table 11 most 'post-DDR' programmes were long-term, and the Table shows the duration of 8 programmes, from 2005 onwards. Of the 8 programmes studied, 4 (representing 50%) had 2 or more years' duration. That did not mean that beneficiaries had a lengthy period of time for apprenticeships since the programmes were run in phases; however, it showed continuity of such programmes over a period of time. A programme manager pointed out that '*programmes that were initiated for a long period of time improved over the years because at the end of each phase the programmes were reviewed and the necessary adjustments made, thus improving the quality of the programmes, and competence of facilitators.*'[96] This means that when short-term programmes go wrong, programme implementers will not have the opportunity to make amends in the same community, but probably would be able to do so in different communities when running the same types of programmes.

Table 11 shows that of the 8 programmes, 3 (representing about 38%) were community based programmes. Here the issue is not to compare CB with CL programmes, since CB programmes represented 5 of the 14 cases studied. However, it can be deduced that there had been an increase in CB programmes from 17%, during the 'official-DDR' phase, to 38% in the 'post-DDR' phase. The increase in CB programmes during the 'post-DDR' phase can be attributed to conducive environment for introducing community programmes and, more importantly, for the communities

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[96][96] An interview with a programme manager in Freetown on 19 November 2008.

to organise themselves to undertake these programmes. A community member remarked that *'I did not believe that we could work together to build this community. Immediately after the conflict, tension was still high and people did not trust each other, despite the fact that the reintegration process had started at the time. Now, the situation has become normal for us to plan and implement programmes for ourselves.'*[97] A 'post-DDR' phase is a period where communities can be assisted to plan and implement their own programmes to help identify specific needs that will help ex-combatants to reintegrate into various communities.

Table 11: Community Programmes Initiated from 2005 Onwards

Cases	CL/CB	Description	Duration
7	CL	Arms for Development in Massimera Chiefdom in Port Loko	4 years
8	CB	Rokel Community Centre	2 years
9	CB	Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama	1 year
10	CB	Sign Language Project in New York, Bo	6 months
11	CL	Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	3 years
12	CL	Youth Livelihoods and Development Project in Joru, Kenema	2 years
13	CL	Youth Vocational Training in Bo	1 year
14	CL	Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown	1 year

Comparing these programmes one could argue that, during the immediate aftermath of conflict, where programmes were needed urgently to address issues of ex-combatants or community members, NGOs were used to plan and implement short-term programmes. During that period most communities were considered to have become too unsettled to plan and implement their own programmes, though the research identified the fact that some communities had the human capacity to do so. By contrast, in the 'post-DDR' phase, communities were more settled and better organised, so they could instigate the planning and implementation of their own long-term programmes to target specific needs of ex-combatants, as well as other

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[97] An interview with a community member in Rokel on 18 April 2009.

community members to facilitate more effective peacebuilding. Unlike the CL programmes which were short-term in nature, the CB programmes created more employment opportunities for ex-combatants to improve upon their earning capacities. Besides, long-term CB programmes are very important in post-conflict contexts because the programmes improve over time, become more sustainable, and unite community groups. This form of cooperation among community members aids social reconstruction in divided communities.

7.2.2 Appropriate Timing of Programmes

The design should also consider appropriate timing for the introduction of programmes in order to meet community needs. Reintegration programmes, which are not well-timed, could be a waste of resources in PCEs. For example, agricultural programmes which depend solely on rainfall should be timed carefully to help to produce a good harvest. In the study of two cases of vegetable production, it was revealed that the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh commenced when the rainy season had already started and that affected crop production. The reason for that delay was the lack of community participation in the planning process. A community member questioned *'how CARITAS could initiate an agricultural activity for the community when the planting season had already started.'*[98] Also, in another argument, the fact was stressed that the agricultural programme was ill-timed; a beneficiary said, '*such lapses do occur when NGOs think more about how much profit they can make out of a project rather than the benefit the community will derive'*[99]. These statements indicate that community members were despondent about the lack of participation in the programme, and emphasizes that they wanted to be part of the decision-making processes, rather than being relegated to the background.

An interview with the programme administrator to establish the reason why community members were excluded from the decision-making process, which had resulted in the delay in the planting of crops, however, highlighted a different story. He stated that there was a delay in the granting of funds due to some errors detected in the financial proposal, hence the programme commenced in July 2000 instead of May 2000, as originally planned. Furthermore, he added that *'the first tranche payment,*

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[98] An interview with a programme beneficiary at Fornikoh on 7 May 2009.
[99] An interview with a programme beneficiary at Fornikoh on 8 May 2009.

which was delayed, caused the late kick-start of the programme. The programme was put on hold temporarily due to errors detected in the financial report, and that eventually caused the duration of the programme to go beyond the stipulated time.' [100] He reiterated that the delay in commencing the programme had nothing to do with lack of community participation: *'After all, we worked in conjunction with the community, we could not have done it alone'*[101], he said. Whilst this explanation could be true, the issue was that the community was uninformed about the turn of events that led to the late kick-start of the programme. Obviously, the delay in starting an agricultural programme, which was dependent on rainfall affected crop production, and it affected the livelihoods of community members, especially ex-combatants who relied solely on the programme as source of income.

In the Vegetable Production in Foredugu Section (Case 16), the complete opposite, in terms of the timing of the programme, was the case. The programme was introduced by KCDA[102], (the Masiaka Chiefdom development umbrella organisation), in six villages[103] and it tried to improve food security through the provision of seeds, tools and expertise for the farmers. As a community organisation, KCDA used local knowledge to plan the cultivation of crops to coincide with the rainy season. The community involvement in the programme resulted in good harvests. An agricultural extension officer remarked that: *'the use of community participation in the planning and implementation of the programmes contributed to food security because KCDA used local knowledge to plant the crops to coincide with the rains. Such local knowledge was necessary for agricultural production that depended solely on weather condition.*[104] Apart from appropriate timing for the cultivation of the crops, community involvement in this programme encouraged them to continue the programme after the funding from CARE International ceased. A community approach to programmes can help in fixing appropriate times for crop cultivation, especially in communities that rely so much on weather conditions.

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[100] An interview with a programme administrator in Kenema on 9 May 2009.
[101] An interview with a programme administrator in Kenema on 9 May 2009.
[102] Koya Community Development Association.
[103] The villages are Malenkie, Rogbom, Kurankoh, Mabuya, Malegbeh, and Romaka.
[104] An interview with an agricultural extension officer in Masiaka on 3 April 2009.

Considering the two agricultural activities discussed above, it was evident that the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh, a CL programme was ill-timed, and that it lacked community participation. Even the community was not informed about the reasons for the delay in commencing the programme, when the first tranche was not made on time. Obviously, the harvest was adversely affected owing to the delay in commencing the programme. However, decision-making processes for the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section (a CB programme) were fully participative. The programme was implemented on time to coincide with the main rainy season and resulted in a good yield. This CB programme facilitated the reintegration process of ex-combatants because it created self-employment for income generation, given food security for families[105].

7.3   Programme Objectives – How appropriate are they?

Reintegration programmes have multiple objectives (based on post-conflict contexts): promoting social cohesion and reconciliation, strengthening local capacity, and creating employment. Specific programme objectives, where individuals rather than communities are targeted, should be familiar to community members, in order to avoid further conflict arising. Programme objectives will be discussed under the relevance of programmes and the expected results.

7.3.1   Relevance of Programmes

The first point to consider, under programme objectives, is relevance of programmes. This research used participatory poverty assessment (PPA) techniques, such as preference ranking and scoring to identify the relevance of programmes to communities (see Chapter 4). 8 programmes were selected from the 14 cases, 4 CL and 4 CB programmes[106]. In all, 10 community members (5 males and 5 females) were selected, at random, and were asked whether or not the programmes, that were instigated at the time, were of relevance to the communities by placing on a 1-5 scale (1 representing least relevant and 5 most relevant). The community members selected

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[105] An interview with a community member in Foredugu on 8 April 2009.

[106] The programmes were Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu (CB); Human Rights and Civic Education in Masiaka (CB); the Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama (CB); the Sign Language Project in New York, Bo (CB); Vocational Training Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe (CL); Masiaka Community Management Team Training (CL); Skills Training for Youth and Marginalized Children in Waterloo (CL); and the Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown (CL).

for this assessment were not direct programme beneficiaries, such as trainees, and were from different age groups. Table 12 presents the average scoring of respondents.

Table 12: **Preference Ranking and Scoring Conducted in 8 Communities of Relevance to Programmes**

Cases	Year	Description	CL/CB	Average males	Average females	Scale average
5	2003	Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups, in Foredugu	CB	5	5	5
6	2004	Human Rights and Civic Education in Masiaka	CB	5	5	5
9	2007	Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama	CB	5	4	4.5
10	2007	Sign Language Project in New York, Bo	CB	5	5	5
2	2000	Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	CL	5	5	5
4	2002	Maisaka Community Management Team Training	CL	5	5	5
11	2007	Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	CL	3	4	3.5
14	2008	Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown	CL	2	4	3

Source: Author

From the Table, it was evident that the lowest scale average that was scored for all the programmes was 3, which indicated that these programmes were relevant to the communities. However, all the programmes (both CL and CB), which were introduced during the initial period of the reintegration process (official DDR), scored 5 (Cases 2, 4, 5, and 6). These programmes were initiated between 2000 and 2004.

On the contrary, programmes which were initiated after the official DDR (Cases 9, 10, 11, 14) scored both high and low average marks. Cases 9 and 10 scored high average marks of 4.5 and 5, respectively; whilst Cases 11 and 14 scored 3.5 and 3, respectively. Despite the fact that these cases were all initiated from 2007 onwards, the research identified that the CB programmes scored high marks (Case 9, scoring 4.5; and 10, scoring 5) as against CL programmes with low scores (Case 11, scoring 3.5; and 14, scoring 3). Considering these differences, it could be argued that the disparity of the scoring between CL and CB was related to the fact that CB

programmes were selected based on prioritisation of programmes by the communities, themselves. Evidently, the two CL programmes: Cases 11 and 14, gained the lowest average scores recorded, 3.5 and 3, respectively. Case 11, for example recorded a score of 3 for males and 4 for females, and this was attributed to the fact that respondents did not consider themselves as marginalised groups and, therefore, did not see much sense in such programmes.

Also, Case 14 had an average score of 2 for males and 4 for females. The programme considered only female participants, so it was unsurprising that it had low scores from males compared with female respondents. However, it is important to note that not all female programmes experienced these low score from men because both females and males scored 5 for the Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu (Case 5). Probably, that meant that the agricultural programme benefited male respondents, also; or because it was a CB programme, meaning the decision to initiate that programme was made by the community.

It was evident from the analysis that most of the community reintegration programmes were relevant. However, communities were in more need of these programmes during the 'official-DDR' phase rather than in 'post-DDR'. Nonetheless, CB reintegration programmes were of relevance to community members, especially ex-combatants, irrespective of the time that they had commenced, because they focussed on specific needs. It is argued that programmes with community ownership do target specific needs of ex-combatants, encourage decision-making processes for their social reintegration, and eliminate mistrust and fear in PCEs.

7.3.2   Expected Results

An expected result is another factor that can be considered under programme objectives. As indicated in the description, all the cases had various objectives: providing employment skills for the youth, giving leadership and management skills training for management committees, assisting women vegetable producer groups, and raising human rights awareness in communities. The discussions in this section explore whether these programme objectives were achieved or not.

The Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme in Bumpe, (Case 2) which was initiated by SLOIC[107], an NGO, which was used to provide employable skills in building construction for the youth to help rebuild their war-ravaged communities, did not achieve the expected results. This is because the programme objectives only focussed on the provision of employable skills for the youth to facilitate the reintegration process, rather than stressing the fact that they needed to help rebuild thier communities. Employable skills, such as carpentry and masonry, were offered to beneficiaries for a period of two months, and recruitment was made on a first-come-first-served basis. According to a programme participant, *'we had to struggle on our own to get access to this programme. It was one of the numerous reintegration programmes planned and implemented for ex-combatants, so why should we be made to use our skills for the development of our community. What about the others who were trained in different programmes?'[108]* The individual recruitment process to the training programme negated the objective of rebuilding the community after training, because some of the beneficiaries did not feel obligated so they did not stay to rebuild their communities. On completion of the training, most of them left Bumpe to look for jobs elsewhere, especially in the cities.

About 80% of respondents indicated that the programme failed to achieve the expected results. An interview with a community member highlighted his frustration: *'upon receiving training, most of the youth left this community to seek greener pastures in the city and left the old folks behind. They did not help in rebuilding the community; instead, they went to use the acquired skills for their personal gain. No one will help us rebuild our community apart from ourselves and that is why the government trained the youth free of charge. In fact, this community did not benefit much from the skill training'[109]*. The dearth of community participation from the outset of the programme contributed to the lack of commitment on the part of beneficiaries to assisting with community rebuilding.

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[107] Sierra Leone Opportunities Industrialization Centre (SLOIC) was formed in 1976 by Ferenke Kargbo to help the youth acquire vocational skills. The Centre engages in skills like carpentry, masonry, home management, auto mechanics, electrical engineering, and general agriculture.
[108] An interview with a programme beneficiary in Bumpe on 14 April 2009.
[109] An interview with a community member in Bumpe on 14 April 2009.

On the contrary, the objective of the Human Rights and Civic Education in Masiaka (Case 6) was aimed at raising awareness of human rights violations in the community by strengthening the capacity of the participants in relation to recognition, respect and protection. This programme offered a form of transitional justice which addresses human rights violations. It was a non-judicial process adopted by the community to recognise victims and to create an environment that is conducive to sustainable reconciliation.

An interview with service providers, beneficiaries and the community revealed the benefits derived from the training: human rights awareness, respect for one another, and the rule of law. A police officer, who participated in the programme, pointed out that the programme, helped him respect the rights of offenders who were placed in custody. He said that prior to the training, he did not know that people suspected of minor offences (assault and stealing) and major offences (treason and murder) were not to be kept in cells for more than 72 hours and 10 days, respectively, prior to being charged and put on trial. Having gained that awareness from the course, he frequently visited inmates to ensure that their human rights were not violated. He added that the course facilitated the creation of a Complaints, Discipline, and Internal Investigations Department (CDIID) in Masiaka Police Station to reassure the community that their human rights issues were being protected[110].

Apart from the direct beneficiaries, an interview with community members also revealed that the programme helped them to respect the rights of their colleagues. It became clear that, prior to the programme, domestic violence existed without the community knowing that their human rights, according to officialdom, should not have been violated. The human rights coordinator remarked: *'the programme helped in creating awareness about human rights abuses and violations, empowered the community to know their rights, and facilitated the reconciliation and reintegration process in the community.'*[111] The respect for human rights was a step forward towards good governance because all state institutions, such as the police and the judiciary, worked towards bringing freedom of speech to the community, and

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[110] An interview with a police officer in Masiaka on 8 April 2009.
[111] An interview with the human rights coordinator in Masiaka on 8 April 2009.

enabling ex-combatants to express their views during community gatherings/durbars, thus facilitating the reintegration process.

Considering the two cases discussed above, the following differences and similarities can be identified: (1) that the Human Rights Programme (Case 6), a CB programme, had clear objective and expected result as against the Bumpe programme (Case 2), which was CL; (2) that Case 2 lacked community participation and commitment compared with Case 6; (3) that Case 6 was more beneficial to the community. Referring to the programmes' objectives, it was evident that beneficiaries were unaware that the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme in Bumpe was aimed at rebuilding their community; thus, they left the community in search of jobs in the cities. A beneficiary commented that '*we thought the programme was meant to provide us with employment as part of the reintegration process.*'[112] Moreover, the programme lacked community participation and commitment because communities were only informed and consulted about the programme. The lack of community participation created divisions among community members, consequently affecting the reintegration process of ex-combatants. On the other hand, the Human Rights and Civic Education Programme in Masiaka had clear objective and achieved the expected result. The programme was planned and implemented by the community, thus the needs of ex-combatants were included. It was locally owned, therefore the community showed much interest in the programme. The participation of various groups: ex-combatants, the civil police and other para-military organisations, health officials, and other community members in the programme facilitated social reconciliation for effective peacebuilding.

7.4   Target/Beneficiaries – The Inclusion and Exclusion Dilemma

The next programme specific factor to consider is the target beneficiaries of the programmes. Community reintegration programmes are aimed at benefiting communities, thus programme strategies should include all groups. However, conflict affects individuals and groups differently within communities; hence, sometimes specific groups are targeted. When specific groups are focussed upon that must be a community decision to try to avoid any form of resentment. The advantage of

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[112] An interview with a programme beneficiary in Bumpe on 14 April 2009.

community reintegration programmes is to identify all groups in decision-making processes so that their needs can be addressed. Targeting is explored under ex-combatants and non-combatants (IDPs, refugees, community members), gender balance, and vulnerable groups. Table 13 below presents how the selected cases targeted various community groups. As shown in the Table, most programmes targeted ex-combatants, non-combatants, youth, and other vulnerable groups.

Table 13: Targeting of Community Groups

Cases	Project Title	Ex-combatants	Non-combatants, IDP/ refugees	Gender	Youth	Other vulnerable groups
1	Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh	X	X		X	X
2	Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	X	X	X	X	X
3	Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	X	X	X	X	X
4	Masiaka Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills	X	X	X	X	X
5	Agricultural Support to Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section	X	X	X	X	X
6	Human Rights & Civil Education in Masiaka	X	X	X	X	X
7	Arms for Development in Massimera Chiefdom in Port Loko		X	X	X	X
8	Rokel Community Centre	X	X	X	X	X
9	Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama	X	X	X	X	X
10	Sign Language Project in New York, Bo	X	X	X	X	X
11	Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	X	X	X	X	X
12	Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, Kenema	X	X	X	X	X
13	Youth Vocational Training in Bo	X	X	X	X	X
14	Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown	X	X		X	X

Source: Author

7.4.1 Ex-combatants and Non-combatants

The programmes for this research focussed on both ex-combatants and non-combatants. However, the study identified the fact that community programmes, which were planned and implemented immediately after the conflict, had more ex-combatant participants than programmes initiated subsequently. These differences are as shown in Table 14.

Table 14: Skills Training with Non-combatant and Ex-combatant Populations

Cases	CB/CL	Skills Training	Year	Non-combatants	Ex-combatants	Total	% of ex-combatants in total
2	CL	Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe	2000	45	15	60	25%
9	CB	Konia Skills Training Programme, Dama	2007	50	10	60	16.6%
11	CL	Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	2007	191	8	196	4%
13	CL	Youth Vocational Training in Bo	2008	285	15	300	5%

Source: Author

Table 14 shows the different statistics in ex-combatant populations in various programmes as being 4% to 25%. Based on the differences associated with ex-combatant populations the discussions will explore factors such as timing, locations and needs in order to make analyses. First, we can explore the timing for the implementation of the programme. The Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe (Case 2), that was implemented in 2000, had an ex-combatant population of 25%, as against the Youth Vocational Training in Bo (Case 13) that was started in 2008 with 5% ex-combatant participants. However, the Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama (Case 9), and the Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo (Case 11), from the same year 2007, had widely different ex-combatant populations of 16.6% and 4%, respectively.

Considering Case 2 (from 2000) and Case 13 (from 2008), the differences in ex-combatant populations in these programmes (25% and 5%) were respectively, attributed to the different programme commencement dates. An interview with some community members in Bumpe revealed that, during the immediate aftermath of the conflict, many community instigated programmes had larger ex-combatant populations. A community member stated: *'in spite of*

the fact that some programmes targeted ex-combatants exclusively, they were also seen in community programmes because of their influence.'[113] The high number of ex-combatants in community reintegration programmes was unsurprising in the sense that, in the immediate aftermath of conflicts, the focus had been mainly on ex-combatants. However, 8 long years after the conflict, most ex-combatants had gone through some form of reintegration programmes. According to a programme manager, '*only few ex-combatants called to register for the programme, despite the fact that it was open to both ex-combatants and non-combatants.*'[114] Based on the above, it is axiomatic that ex-combatants participated more actively in community reintegration programmes that were introduced during the 'official DDR' period rather than 'post-DDR'.

However, comparing two 2007 skills training programmes (Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama, Case 9; and the Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo, Case 11), it was evident that Case 9 (16.6%) had more ex-combatants population than Case 11 (4%). The research demonstrated that Case 9 (CB) made provision for the inclusion of ex-combatants, whereas Case 11 (CL) used the first-come-first-served selection criterion. Likewise, the first-come-first-served selection criterion was applied in the Youth Vocational Training Programme in Bo (Case 13), as illustrated in the research. These selection processes did not target specific groups, resulting in very low ex-combatants participation in programmes.

Arguably, CB programmes had greater ex-combatant populations than CL programmes, due to targeting all groups for involvement, rather than applying the first-come-first-served approach. Division frequently occurred in distrustful post-conflict communities hindering the reintegration programmes, social cohesion and the improvement of security.

7.4.2   Gender Balance

Consideration of gender balance requires an integrated approach. Experience has shown that many women have taken an active part in combat, but have been excluded from reintegration processes (see Thusi, 2004, Chapter 1). Such exclusion of women has had an adverse effect

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[113] An interview with a community member in Bumpe on 15 April 2009.
[114] An interview with a programme manager in Bo on 20 April 2009.

on peacebuilding. A gender-sensitive approach to reintegration programmes is therefore vital to successful peacebuilding.

The Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills (Case 3) and the Masiaka Community Management Training in Leadership and Management Skills (Case 4) both identified gender inequalities. In Wellington for example, only 4 women (13%) were in the 28-member team selected for training. In Masiaka 11 women (about 43%) were in the 28-member management team. The number of female beneficiaries increased from 13% for Case 3 to 43% for Case 4 because the Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement (GGEM), the NGO responsible for both projects, learnt from the Wellington Training Programme that women had been underrepresented. Therefore, the Masiaka community was encouraged to include more women in the programme. A programme officer remarked that: '*on completion of the Wellington management team training, we identified issues of gender inequality within the management team, hence, to address the problem; we encouraged the leaders of Masiaka (Koya Chiefdom) to give more opportunities to women*'[115]. The realisation of gender inequality in the Wellington programme enabled GGEM to raise the issue in the Masiaka programme. Transferring best practices from one community to another can be beneficial in post-conflict contexts.

Addressing gender inequalities in community programmes necessitated some programmes targeting women exclusively, and the research identified three such programmes. These were the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh (Case 1), Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section (Case 5), and the Women's Vocational Training Centre in Krooby, Freetown (Case 14). The study revealed that the women in those communities were marginalised and lacked skills to live independently. Therefore, the communities identified the needs of women and designed programmes to suit them. Needs assessment surveys, conducted by YAI in Krooby community, found that it was critical that women were short of income generating skills, which needed consideration in long-term reintegration process facilitation? According to a programme officer, '*Krooby is a deprived community which has a lot of girl-mothers who have no sources of income...the training is aimed at equipping them with skills that will make them self-reliant.[116]*' In most rural communities, girl-mothers were left to fend for themselves and their children, sometimes

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[115] An interview with a programme officer in Freetown on 12 May 2009.
[116] An interview with programme officer in Freetown on 6 April 2009.

with little or no support from their partners; so empowering them economically was vital to peacebuilding. The Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section by KCDA, for example, included ex-combatants, illiterates, school drop-outs, and girl-mothers, thereby giving more economical independence.

Gender inequality existed in some community reintegration programmes, making comparisons between CB and CL programmes on gender issues difficult, because some programmes were planned and implemented only for women (Cases 1 and 5). Even comparative programmes did not lead to genders equality due to their construction and implementation. Some programmes were more gender specific, for example, skills training for carpentry and masonry had more male participants than females, manliness being seen as controversial. Likewise, skills training such as hairdressing (cosmetology) were considered feminine. In view of the above, management committees were used to assess gender sensitivity in this research to give consideration to that matter. Most programmes formed management teams to plan and implement CB programmes, or played an advisory role in CL programmes. Table 15 shows gender imbalances associated with CMC for programmes initiated after 2007.

Table 15:   Gender Imbalances of CMC in Programmes Initiated after 2007

Cases	Skills Training	CL/CB	Males	Females	Totals	Percentage of Females in Totals
8	Rokel Community Centre	CB	6	4	10	40%
9	Konia Skills Training Programme, Dama	CB	7	3	10	30%
10	Sign Language Project in New York, Bo	CB	6	4	10	40%
11	Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo	CL	7	2	9	22.2%
12	Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, Kenema	CL	8	3	11	27.3%

Source: Author

Table 15 shows that female participation in community management committees was higher in CB programmes (30% and above) than CL programmes (less than 30%). The management

committee for the Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo (Case 11) attracted few women, due to the fact that men monopolized management positions in that community. Membership to the committee was based on positions held, therefore such people as the Head of the Centre (chairman), the District Education Officer, the District Supervisor of Schools, the Councillor, and one trainer from the centre, had been appointed already.

In the ranks of the uneducated, girls predominated. In Sierra Leone, for example, educational inequality meant that fewer girls and women were awarded higher civil service appointments, adding to gender inequality. In Masiaka, a community member acknowledged the fact that women lacked education when asked about the reasons behind fewer women being in management teams. He remarked that the notion about women being responsible for family care and household activities still justified the continuation of their exclusion from paid employment in most communities. As a result, women normally resorted to farming or petty trading to earn a living rather than striving to further their education.[117]

Nevertheless, community management committees formed by the communities gave opportunities to women to be representatives in their teams. The high percentage of women in CB programmes resulted from the application of NaCSA's criteria in the selection of the management committees, which deliberately specified a quota for women. Despite the set criteria (which resulted in considerable representation of women in CB programmes), they lacked active participation due to the influence of cultural norms and having to undertake numerous household chores. Arguably, improved female participation will only occur if representation requires going beyond formal quotas to empower women through education and other capacity building activities. This research agrees with the World Bank (2006) document that states that unless extra measures, such as: initiatives that encourage men to support women, that improve gender training, and that set more appropriate times for meetings to accommodate women's needs and constraints, the quota system alone for women's participation in community reintegration programmes will be insufficient to ensure gender equality.

Gender sensitivity within CB programmes encouraged female ex-combatants to take up management roles. In Konia Skills Training and Rokel Community Centre programmes, for

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[117] An interview with a community member in Masiaka 4 April 2009.

example, female ex-combatants worked as a treasurer and a secretary, respectively. Opportunities given to female ex-combatants in management positions helped them to campaign on behalf of other women, especially female ex-combatants, and that process contributed to targeting their specific needs for more effective peacebuilding.

7.4.3   Vulnerable Groups

Also, an integrated approach to community reintegration programme should target vulnerable groups. Most DDR literature uses the term 'vulnerable groups' to refer to female ex-combatants, child soldiers and disabled veterans; however, this section will expand the term 'vulnerable groups' to include orphans, widows, illiterates, early school leavers, girl-mothers, the handicapped, and commercial sex workers. Most of these vulnerable groups found themselves on the streets and some committed petty crimes. They faced challenges such as lack of basic education and finance with which to support themselves, during any training process that they might wish to engage in. Therefore some NGOs and communities designed programmes specifically to meet their needs.

The Youth Vocational Training in Bo (Case 13), a CL programme, which was initiated by CARD, provided apprenticeship training in carpentry, welding, hairdressing, and auto-mechanics, specifically for marginalised groups: ex-combatants, school drop-outs, girl-mothers, illiterates, and commercial sex workers in Bo, with the aim of providing them with employment or other income generating activities. CARD identified the employment gap through a survey conducted in and around Bo Township and it ran a sensitization programme to educate the community about the problem of employment. Subsequently, CARD wrote a proposal to UNDP requesting funding. On a similar programme, the Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised Children in Waterloo (Case 11), which was run by GOPA (BMZ) also identified these marginalised groups and commenced skills training: auto-mechanics, electrical engineering, hairdressing, building construction and carpentry, and metalwork. According to the head of the institution, though most of the marginalized lacked formal education, they coped very well with the training. The main challenge was how to afford to buy food, and generally support themselves financially. To address the feeding problem, the institution contacted the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) to request assistance with food aid.[118]

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[118] An interview with the head of a school in Waterloo on 21 May 2009.

By contrast, apart from the provision of meals for trainees, the Konia Skills Training Programme – CB programme - (Case 9) made provision for accommodation, and conducted training from Monday to Wednesday weekly so that trainees could use the rest of the week for personal activities such as farming and selling produce to earn some money for their upkeep. These provisions were made possible because communities were able to identify their own problems and find solutions through decision-making. Besides, as a community programme, they had more say in the planning and implementation process, which they would have found difficult to do in CL programmes.

Considering the above discussion, it was evident that both CL and CB programmes identified the lack of financial support as the main challenge that faced the marginalised during training activities. Both the CB and the CL programmes made contact with the FAO requesting provision of food for participants during the training period. However, the CB programme went a step further to arrange accommodation for trainees who had to travel from afar, and also made the timetable more flexible for the trainees to earn to support themselves during the course. To ensure that vulnerable groups, such as ex-combatants, coped with training, efforts were made to include them in the identification of problems, and to give them assistance with their basic needs. .

7.5   Difficulties in Mobilising Resources

Mobilisation of resources can be difficult in PCEs due to lack of funds associated with such environments. To respond to this constraint, post-conflict communities normally depend on external and internal donor, financial institutions, and other governmental organisations for financial support. Governments, therefore, can form commissions to secure resources from individual donors with which to sponsor local projects, such as community reintegration programmes. Frequently, financial resources tend to be the main focus, but human as well as physical resources are equally important for the successful completion of community reintegration programmes.

7.5.1   Human Resources

Local or External Actors

The use of local or external actors is important in community reintegration programmes. In Sierra Leone, the commissions, which were responsible for DDR (NCDDR, and later,

NaCSA) used implementing partners, such as international and local NGOs, for most programmes. Although, local NGOs were used, most communities classified them as external actors because they were not located or based in these communities. For example, the community management team training in leadership and management skills in both Wellington (Case 3) and Masiaka (Case 4) were initiated by GGEM, a local NGO, for these communities. GGEM used its own facilitators, from trainers to cooks, without employing community members. Food was prepared in Freetown and transported to the training centres for the trainees. Despite the fact that all these NGO staff were Sierra Leoneans, an interview with community members revealed their dissatisfaction about the exclusive way GGEM handled the programme without involving the locals in the implementation process. In Wellington, community members acknowledged the benefits they derived from the training such as equipping them with management skills to run the community centre, but stressed the fact that excluding them from the implementation process isolated the management team from the entire community. According to one of the beneficiaries, if GGEM had involved some community members, such as ex-combatants in the training and administrative process, that would have brought the community together and contributed more favourably towards the reintegration process[119]. The exclusion of community members (from management training) led them to believe that the team was selected owing to their political affiliation with the government, which they assumed meant that they could make some financial gain when they managed programmes, but that that was not necessarily serving the interests of the community.

Also in Masiaka, the views of the locals were the same. They criticised GGEM's exclusive approach towards the training. Of the 10 people interviewed, 9 acknowledged the fact that the involvement of community members in the implementation process would have contributed favourably towards social reintegration at the time. When asked whether the Koya Chiefdom was capable of initiating the programme if funds were released by NaCSA to the community, the Chiefdom secretary responded in the affirmative. He said that the community planned and implemented various projects on its own with financial support from donors. He cited programmes: Women's Agricultural Support, Human Rights and Civic Education, and Skills Training, among others[120]. These community programmes were planned by the Koya Chiefdom Development Association (KCDA), a development wing of the chiefdom. The use

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[119] An interview with community member in Wellington on 7 April 2009.
[120] An interview with the community secretary in Masiaka on 8 April, 2009.

of CB organisations, which has ex-combatants as well as other community members, to arrange community programmes can bring these groups of people together and help build trust between them towards social reconciliation.

The Youth Vocational Training in Bo (Case 13), another CL programme, however, was not criticised by the community because of the use of local facilitators. CARD, the NGO, used local artisans to provide apprenticeship skills for the trainees. The artisans were encouraged to apply for positions to use the workshops they had provided for apprenticeship training for beneficiaries. The selection was based on a well-established workshop, basic training tools, good track record, and daily practical jobs for the trainees. The use of local artisans was more beneficial to the community because it created employment for the artisans, as well as the trainees, and facilitated the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

With reference to the above CL programmes, it could be argued that the CARD programme (Case 13) was initiated in the 'post-DDR' period, when it was somehow easy to mobilise local artisans for the implementation of the programmes, unlike the other programmes which were implemented during the 'official-DDR' phase. Whilst this was true, there were other CL programmes, which used only NGO facilitators even during the 'post-DDR' period, such as the Women's Vocational Training in Krooby, Freetown (Case 14). That meant that using local or external facilitators normally depended on the partners' planning and implementation process and not necessarily when the programme was started.

By contrast, the CB programmes for Human Rights and Civic Education (Case 6) and the Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama (Case 9) used local facilitators. The Skills Training Programme in Konia, Dama, was a 12-month community reintegration programme, planned and implemented by the Dama Chiefdom, to provide employable skills: weaving, cotton processing, embroidery, and tailoring, for the youth aged between 18-35 years. The community used local facilitators from the Chiefdom and within the District to train beneficiaries. According to a local committee chairman, *'qualified locals (both ex-combatants and non-combatants) were given the chance to apply for the position of facilitators and this attracted local artisans as well as those from the District.'*[121] The use of ex-combatants, for instance, created employment opportunities and the possibility of

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[121] An interview with a committee chairman in Konia Dama on 28 April 2009.

improving their earning capacity and of developing skills which could be of use to their communities in future developments. Notably, not all CB reintegration programmes used local facilitators at all times. In Rokel for instance, external facilitators were also used in the absence of local facilitators with the required expertise.

Evidently, the use of local as well as external facilitators was necessary for both CL and CB programmes. However, in situations where communities had the capacity to implement their own programmes, the use of external facilitators created a feeling of resentment among community members. Besides, the use of external facilitators' deprives local actors of opportunities to improve upon their skills. The deprivation of ex-combatants, from participating in community programmes due to the use of external actors, can result in further conflict in communities. The use of local facilitators in post-conflict contexts is necessary in creating employment opportunities for locals, especially ex-combatants who need employment in their new environments. Besides, the experience gained empowers community members to manage subsequent programmes.

7.5.2 Financial resources

Financial resources affect planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes in PCEs. Funding for reintegration programmes is largely dependent on voluntary contribution from donors; thus, any financial constraint can have a negative impact on ongoing programmes. The continuity of reintegration programmes, in part, depends on the availability of funds. Financial resources will be discussed under lack of timely and sustained funding, and community involvement in financial management.

Lack of Timely and Sustained Funding

One of the main problems, associated with reintegration programmes, is the lack of timely and sustained funding. As noted above, funding for reintegration programmes depends on donors' voluntary contributions and that requires procedures, such as the submission of a detailed financial statement for all income and expenditure, pertaining to the previous tranche of funds, before subsequent finance can be approved. These strict procedures can result in the delay in approving funds for both CB and CL programmes, when implementing partners fail to meet the required procedures.

In Sierra Leone, some of the CB programmes experienced delays in the approval of budgets due to late submission of financial requests. NaCSA, the government Commission responsible for the disbursement of funds, instituted guidelines for communities to meet in order to obtain funding. According to the guidelines, apart from the first disbursement of 25%, which is given prior to the launching of the project, subsequent disbursements of 40% for the second, 25% for the third, and 10% on completion of the programme, are based on reports relating to 70% of the previous disbursements (NaCSA, 2002). The guidelines did not only affect communities but also affected NGOs which were used as implementing partners by NaCSA.

These set guidelines for the disbursement of funds resulted in the delay in the submission of reports by some management committees and, eventually, affected the completion dates of programmes. The PMC for the Sign Language Programme acknowledged that their third tranche was delayed due to the late submission of the documents for the second disbursement, and that delayed the completion of the programme[122]. Also, the Rokel Community Centre Project experienced delays in releasing funds for the second tranche owing to incomplete documents having been submitted in support of the disbursement of funds for the first tranche. According to the village chief *'the documents we submitted to NaCSA did not include all the receipts of the amounts of money we spent; thus, we were asked to resubmit the document by providing receipts to tally with the expenditure'*[123]. The resubmission of documents due to incomplete receipts resulted in delay in releasing funds for the reintegration programme.

Apart from not meeting the guidelines set by donors, other delays occurred. An interview with the financial manager of an NGO revealed her frustration in securing funds. She lamented that *'we sent out our budget at the beginning of January and our account was credited at the end of March. When such a situation occurs, we work with cash in hand and sometimes cut-down expenses'*[124]. That delay, as explained by the financial manager, was not due to incomplete documents, but was probably due to time-consuming bureaucratic administrative procedures on the part of the donor. The cutting down of expenses as a result of the lack of timely and sustained funding could affect the implementation and quality of

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[122] An interview with a member of the PMC in Bo on 24 April 2009.
[123] An interview with the Village Chief in Rokel on 19 May 2009.
[124] An interview with a financial manager in Freetown on 22 April 2009.

programmes. Also, it can result in putting ex-combatants on waiting lists which can affect the reintegration process and sometimes result in conflict.

The lack of timely and sustained funding affected both CB and CL programmes during the planning and implementation processes. The main argument here was how this information was communicated to the communities. As already indicated in the previous paragraphs in the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh (Case 1), CARITAS did not inform the Fornikoh Community when they experienced difficulty in obtaining funds from the NCDDR; thus, that resulted in lack of trust and, eventually, lack of continuity of the vegetable production. The community felt excluded and that affected the sustainability of the project. Whereas the management committee responsible for the Rokel Community Centre used public gatherings, such as community works and village durbars, to inform community members about the delay in receiving funds for the project. A community member confirmed that *'we were informed about the delay in getting the second tranche from the government. However, we were given assurance that efforts were being made to resubmit the document in order to continue receiving funding for the project.'*[125] By informing the community about the problems facing the committee in securing timely funding, they (the community) were more sympathetic to the course rather than being critical. It could be argued that giving the information in the form of progress report to communities builds trust and facilitates social reintegration in PCEs.

Community Involvement in Financial Management

Community involvement in financial management can impact on the success of community reintegration programmes. In the case studies, especially the CL programmes, it was revealed that NGOs were solely responsible for managing their finances without the community knowing the total amount spent on programmes. The study explored whether communities knew the total cost of programmes. Surprisingly, only one person from Case 4, of the people interviewed from various CL programmes was able to state the total amount spent on the project. Apparently, he had worked closely with the donors. When the others were asked why they did not have knowledge about the money spent on the programme, one respondent commented that *'the NGOs were not made to account to them. They planned the programme without discussing financial matters with us. I don't even know whether the chief is even*

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[125] An interview with a community member in Rokel on 20 May 2009.

aware of how much this project cost. We are all passengers without any say'[126]. Considering the fact that NGO programmes are aimed at specific communities, it is their moral and social obligation to inform the communities about their income and expenditure. Often, this is not the case in NGO programmes, because communities are often excluded from knowing the financial details. Personally, I had to tell some NGOs during my fieldwork that the purpose of the research was not to investigate their financial transactions, but to study how programmes were planned and implemented. This assurance encouraged some people to give further, limited amounts of information, which eventually affected the discussions on financial resources.

By contrast, the CB programmes involved community members in the financial process. The CMC prepared accounts and placed them on community notice–boards to enable community members to clarify transactions, with which they were not familiar (Case 19). A respondent acknowledged that the process where the accounts were presented to the community during monthly meetings, and also placing them on the site's notice-board for concerned citizens to express their views, facilitated transparency and accountability. Also, it enabled the community to familiarize themselves with work in progress.[127] In Konia (Case 9), the PMC briefed community members fortnightly during the construction process. The study revealed that about 75% of community members interviewed were familiar with the financial process, however, they could not state the total amounts of income and expenditure. The remaining 25%, who said they were not familiar with the financial process, were those who did not take an active part in community activities. One of them stated *'I have more family pressing issues to solve than bothering myself with community activities. Besides, they don't bring food to the table.'*[128] Such a comment stresses the fact that not all community members follow community activities closely. Essentially, involving community members, such as ex-combatants in financial processes in community reintegration programmes is done to eliminate doubts or mistrust that can create further conflict in communities. Besides, that can address financial mismanagement and facilitate transparency and accountability.

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[126] An interview with a community member in Waterloo on 22 May 2009.
[127] An interview with the youth chairman in Rokel on 19 May 2009.
[128] An interview with a community member in Konia on 28 May 2009.

7.5.3. Physical Resources

Mobilisation of physical resources can shape planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes in post-conflict contexts. These resources depend on the type of programme being implemented. For example, agricultural programmes require resources such as scythes and hoes, but skills training programmes need training manuals, flip charts, and projectors. Most NGOs provided physical resources needed for the CL programmes. In Masiaka, (Case 4) for instance, GGEM provided all the physical resources needed for the management team training without encouraging the community to do so, or involving them more effectively in the implementation process. This form of exclusion widens the gap among NGOs, programme participants and community members; thereby creating more divisions in communities and affecting the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

Also, the UNDP made available metal collection boxes for weapons and metal canisters for ammunitions at the drop-in centres for the Arms for Development programme (Case 7). Those metal boxes were provided by UNDP and were of a specific quality, designed to avoid destruction to ensure that weapons collected from the community would not easily get into the hands of certain individuals or groups. Moreover, the UNDP awarded contracts to contractors who were registered, rather than dealing with communities. A UNDP programme manager commented that *'to get the job done very quickly, we needed to deal with contractors rather than communities.'* [129] Most of the time, the international organisations want to complete programmes, and get results as soon as possible, and by so doing, overlooks the long-term effects to beneficiaries. Communities could have been used to provide the metal boxes in order to increase their participation in the whole programme and facilitate social reintegration. Obviously, this process of using external contractors, instead of the locals, hinders employment creation in local communities and affects the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

Contrary to the CL programmes, the CB programmes sponsored by NaCSA involved communities contributing 10% of the total cost of the programme. Apart from the NaCSA programmes, communities also contributed their quotas towards other CB programmes. Communities' contributions involved the provision of local resources (stones, sand, sticks and other materials) needed for the projects (Cases 8 and 10). Also, some communities

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[129] An interview with a programme manager of UNDP in Freetown on 5 November 2008.

provided facilitators and advisors to support programmes (Cases 5 and 6). In Konia, Dama (Case 9), although the programme was managed by a committee, community members participated actively throughout the process. According to the village chief, 'a*s part of our contribution towards the project we used the day for our community works to support the contractor of the project.'*[130] In addition to labour, the community contributed sand, stones and sticks as part of their 10% contribution to the total contribution set up by NaCSA. The 10% community contribution might be seen as being inadequate for CB programmes, but at least it facilitated community participation and cohesion in post-conflict contexts, where communities have disintegrated due to lack of trust. More importantly, community participation in programmes ensured local ownership and sustainability, thus creating employment opportunities for ex-combatants to improve their earnings prospects.

The sustainability of programmes in PCEs was a major of concern because many NGO-led programmes ceased abruptly, immediately after completion (Cases 1 and 3). Even skills training programmes, which were implemented for the youth by NGOs that required continuity, were suspended due to lack of community involvement (Case 2). The use of contractors, instead of communities could lead to positive results in the short-term which would be favourable to donors; however, the long-term benefits to the user community could be impaired. Regarding these discussions, it could be stated that the involvement of communities in the implementation of programmes can have a long-term positive effect in improving the livelihoods of ex-combatants as well as non-combatants in communities.

7.6   Actions and procedures

One of the main obstacles to community reintegration programmes is the lack of standardized actions and procedures among various actors. There is no reliable system to streamline actions and procedures due to there being multiple implementing agencies responsible for programmes, and that normally translate into different planning and implementation processes. Actions and procedures will be discussed under administrative procedures, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation.

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[130] An interview with a village chief in Dama on 29 April 2009.

7.6.1 Administrative Procedures

Administrative procedures can be simple or bureaucratic depending on how they are planned. Bureaucratic processes such as: filling of long contract forms, complicated reporting procedures, and multiple approvals of financial requests, can affect the implementation of programmes in post-conflict contexts. According to a training supervisor in Bumpe (Case 2) *'the initial reporting format introduced by NCDDR for the monthly progress report was very complicated. We filled a lot of forms and wrote numerous reports, which were difficult at the time, due to lack of writing facilities.'*[131] The supervisor stressed that by changing the complicated way of reporting, to the filling in of specially designed, simpler forms, assisted managers' concentration in the programme implementation processes.

Similarly, the study revealed that the CARD management team, for the Youth Vocational Training Programme in Bo (Case 13), had to strictly comply with mandatory bidding for small local purchases. According to the accounts officer, these forms of mandatory bidding for small local purchases were somehow cumbersome for urgent items, which were needed for the smooth running of the programme: *'A small amount set aside for miscellaneous expenditure could have made local purchases much easier.'*[132] Whilst this statement sounds convincing, it is however important to note that some of this mandatory bidding for local purchases was instituted to check corruption. There had been instances where funds, which were earmarked for miscellaneous expenses, were misappropriated by programme managers for their own personal use. Such misappropriation not only affects the success of programmes, but can create conflict in communities and suspend the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

On the other hand, basic guidelines for procurement, programme documentation, and reporting can help in achieving transparency when these procedures are well understood by community members. The CB programmes, which were sponsored by NaCSA, for instance, had basic guidelines for procurement as follows: (1) the sub-contractor prepares a list of required items, price and specifications and submits it to the procurement committee; (2) the procurement sub-committee discusses the list with the community and submits a request to the PMC for authorisation for the procurement; (3) money is released by the treasurer to the procurement sub-committee to make purchases. The monitoring sub-committee checks the

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[131] An interview with a training supervisor in Bumpe on 14 April 2009.
[132] An interview with a finance officer in Bo on 20 April, 2009.

items and hands over to the sub-contractor. These procedures *'were put in place for checks and balances for the CB programmes; and they were used by all communities who received funding from the Commission.'[133]* Despite the fact that these basic guidelines were sometimes considered cumbersome due to various stages involved in gaining approval, the process encouraged community participation and ensured transparency and accountability.

Also in Masiaka, (Case 17), the management team responsible for the human rights and civic education designed a programme that was clearly understood by the entire community. The training workshop was conducted partly by using a participatory approach, brainstorming, and discussions which suited the audience; the medium of communication was largely 'krio', the local language. An interview with community members revealed that the use of the local language, as a medium of instruction, encouraged community participation in the whole programme. A community member pointed out that *'there is the need for us (community) to start using a language we all understand. In situations where one has to struggle to understand English language, it affects the interest of participants in the whole programme.'[134]* The use of local language was necessary because it enabled ex-combatants, who had no formal education and therefore could not speak English, to participate actively in the programme.

This research argues that community reintegration programmes could be hindered by a variety of bureaucratic processes, such as complicated formats for reporting, procurement, and the disbursement of funds. These bureaucratic processes were identified in both CL and CB programmes. However, CB programmes used simple processes, for example, simplified accounting procedures to explain income and expenditure to community members and, also, local languages as medium of instruction to enhance community participation in those programmes. In PCEs where communities have disintegrated, these forms of participatory approach to programmes, which brings both ex-combatants and non-combatants together, are vital for social reconstruction.

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[133] An interview with NaCSA's communication officer in Freetown on 3 April 2009.
[134] An interview with a community member in Masiaka on 11 April 2009.

7.6.2 Coordination

Coordination can be discussed under the headings: actors and processes. The study revealed a wide range of differences regarding planning and implementation between NGOs and local actors. Some NGOs facilitators lived outside the location of the programme; hence it was difficult coordinating activities with local actors. In Bumpe (Case 2) for example, the facilitators for SLOIC, the NGO responsible for the vocational training, were based in Bo and commuted daily to Bumpe, a distance of 16 km, for the training. A member of a community management committee remarked that *'we did not have enough time with SLOIC to discuss issues such as feeding and financial constraints which were of concern to participants; and that was the reason why they blamed us (the management committee) for not caring enough for them.'*[135] It can be recalled that the youth who benefited from the Vocational Training for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Programme, in Bumpe (Case 2), did not employ their services to rebuild their war-ravaged communities because of lack of support from the CMC. From the participants' point of view, they were recruited according to their own efforts, and also thought that the programme was one of the numerous skills training programmes that aimed to provide employable skills to beneficiaries.

In Bumpe, the daily travelling to and from the training site made coordination of the programme very difficult for facilitators, trainees, and the community. Sometimes, classes were disrupted when facilitators encountered vehicular breakdowns on their way to Bumpe. Trainees were not only affected by the disruption of classes but they were left, by themselves, without knowing what had gone wrong due to lack of communication. The lack of coordination among various actors, in part, contributed to the participants' notion that the successful completion of the programme was based on their own efforts. Eventually, they left the community to seek employment in nearby cities, rather than staying to rebuild the community, which was the main objective of the programme (Case 2). Leaving Bumpe to seek employment opportunities in neighbouring cities created a poor precedent for ex-combatants because, according to community members, they failed to reconstruct what they had destroyed during the conflict.

Coordination among actors for CB programmes was much easier. The PMCs coordinated all actors for the programmes in the local areas. Most of the actors were locally based; hence, it

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[135] An interview with a member of the management committee in Bumpe on 14 April 2009.

was much easier to contact them. For example, the Sign Language Project in Bo (Case 11), which was planned and implemented exclusively by the locals, was coordinated by the PMC. According to the chairman of the PMC *'coordination among actors was much easier in the community, for example, contacting the committee members for a meeting. They lived very close to each other, thus I walk into their houses and arrange a meeting. Moreover, most of them were self-employed and for that matter I could call on them at very short notice for a meeting.'*[136] Though, these people were not reachable by phone, their proximity (in terms of where they lived) made it easy to rally them for urgent discussions, which contributed to the success of the programme.

Apart from PMCs, some community members were also used to coordinate activities. The Agricultural Support for the Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section (Case 5) was coordinated by a local agricultural extension officer. As a local, *'I was able to reach beneficiaries and the management team with ease, and more importantly they were able to reach me, as well. There was no barrier in terms of getting access to each other. Besides, the use of local knowledge helped in addressing some technical issues.'*[137] In communities where locals had the capacity to implement programmes, the use of local knowledge gave them an added advantage over external actors. Moreover, coordination was better due to the ease of communication among community members, which was always missing in programmes coordinated by NGOs.

Regarding processes, community participation in the planning and implementation of CL programmes was somehow restricted because final decisions were made by NGOs. The power differences associated with NGOs and communities in decision-making processes undermined coordination because they worked on unequal terms. As discussed in Chapter 6, many communities were only informed of decisions already taken by NGOs. Therefore, communities could not suggest issues that were of relevance to NGOs, despite the fact that they (communities) were the programme users. The research realised that NGOs only informed communities for the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh (Case 1) and the Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe (Case 2) about their decisions without community contributions being made. A community member in Bumpe remarked that *'we were totally excluded from any decision-making process. SLOIC, the NGO*

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[136] An interview with a member of a PMC in New York, Bo on 20 April 2009.
[137] An interview with an agricultural extension officer in Masiaka on 11 April 2009.

did not do well in including the community in the programme.'[138] It is important to note that both programmes were initiated in 2000, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, thus it could be argued that communities were too unsettled, at that time, to take an active part in those programmes. Whilst that could be a sound argument, the fact cannot be disputed that the programme was meant for a group of people to enable contributions to decision-making processes. It is argued that a decision-making process that eliminates the user community, such as ex-combatants, creates alienation between them and programme implementers, and that that misunderstanding can affect the success of community reintegration programmes.

On the other hand, community members participated more freely in the CB programmes' decision-making processes. Meetings and durbars were organised for communities, prior to the planning and implementation of the programmes, to deliberate on issues pertaining to them. In Masiaka, a durbar was organised by the paramount chief to discuss the need for the Human Rights and Civil Education: *'We needed the consent of sub-chiefs within the chiefdom before the commencement of the programme'[139]*, the community secretary remarked. The paramount chief could have used his authority to initiate the programme, but he consulted the community groups (such as ex-combatants) through dialogue to ascertain their views, before giving responsibility to the chiefdom's development organisation, the KCDA, to manage the programme. Communication among community members helps in building trust and mutual understanding to aid reconciliation.

Also, CB programmes used democratic processes to elect community management committees to coordinate programmes (Cases 8, 9). In Konia, Dama, the democratic process that was followed in the selection of the management committee united community members: *'We gave everybody the chance to be represented. This was done by sending messages to all village chiefs to inform their community members about the elections. However, what happened was that most of these people, from the nearby villages, did not have the enthusiasm to compete.[140]* Despite the fact that the election was open to everybody in the Dama Section, most of the management team came from Konia (of the 10 members, 8 of them lived in Konia with only 2 living outside). The research realised that some people had to travel about 10 km to visit Konia from villages, such as, Madina and Kortuma and

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[138] An interview with a community member in Bumpe on 15 April 2009.
[139] An interview with a community secretary in Masiaka on 7 April 2009.
[140] An interview with a member of the community management committee in Konia, Dama, on 29 April 2009.

Torkpombu. This long distance from villages without a regular transport system made the democratic processes difficult to embark on. It was not surprising therefore, that the other two committee members, who were not from Konia came from Kangema and Vaama about 1 and 2 km, respectively, from Konia. The short distances from their villages enabled them to walk to attend meetings in Konia. In spite of the fact that people from far away villages could not participate in the electioneering process, the democratic processes enabled ex-combatants to be included in the management team, and also put structures in place in the ward (community) for subsequent elections. It can be argued that a democratic process can ensure the success of programmes, facilitate social reconstruction, and enhance good governance at community level.

7.7   Conclusion

The discussions in the Chapter have drawn comparisons between CB and CL programmes using specific factors (design and implementation, objectives, targets, resource mobilisation, and actions and procedures) to establish the fact that CB programmes contributed more effectively to peacebuilding. From the discussions, the fact was noted that the design of long-term programmes, which occurred more often during the 'post-DDR' stage, rather than the 'official-DDR' phase of community reintegration programmes, facilitated the reintegration process of ex-combatants because it created more job opportunities for them, and also developed their skills and competencies. These long-term reintegration programmes were associated more closely with CB rather than CL programmes because the research established the fact that NGOs were often used to plan and implement community reintegration programmes during the immediate aftermath of conflict or the 'official-DDR' phase, when communities were unsettled or lacked the capacity to plan and implement their own programmes. However, the 'post-DDR' phase saw more long-term CB programmes for more effective peacebuilding in communities.

Regarding programme objectives, the research realised that CB programmes had clear objectives because of the way they originated from communities. Communities identified a couple of reintegration programmes, and selection was made based on the topmost priority. By going through the process of prioritisation, communities became familiar with programme objectives, and the selection was made based on community needs. That meant that communities were even abreast of the objectives right from the inception of the programmes. In the case of CL programmes, it was evident that though some of the programmes initiated

by NGOs had clear objectives, these were unknown to programme beneficiaries as well as community members and that affected the outcomes, or the long-term benefits the programmes set up to achieve. This created division among locals in some communities and adversely affected the reintegration process of ex-combatants, who participated in such programmes.

Furthermore, ex-combatants were better targeted in CB reintegration programmes. It was evident in the research that unlike CL, CB programmes had more ex-combatant participants in both the 'official' and 'post' DDR reintegration phases. Despite the fact that many ex-combatants took part in the reintegration process during the 'official-DDR' phase, the 'post-DDR' phase also saw an increase in numbers, and that high percentage was attributed to the involvement of communities in addressing specific community needs. Unlike CB, CL programmes used the first-come-first-served approach to recruiting beneficiaries for programmes and that approach resulted in the lack of ex-combatants' participation in the reintegration programmes. Apart from ex-combatants, women and other vulnerable groups were given opportunities to participate actively in CB programmes. This all inclusive approach adopted by CB programmes, facilitated community cohesion and social reconstruction of all groups in communities.

Regarding resources, the research identified the fact that, unlike CL programmes which often used external facilitators; CB programmes used local facilitators to plan and implement reintegration programmes and only employed the services of external actors in rare circumstances, where they lacked local skills. This created employment opportunities in many communities where unemployment was very high, and thus improved their economic opportunities. Besides, community involvement in financial resources of CB programmes facilitated transparency and accountability and helped address issues of mistrust, which can create further conflict.

In conclusion, it is important to note that both CL and CB programmes facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants in many PCEs. However, the discussion have revealed that there is the need to encourage more CB reintegration programmes for more effective peacebuilding, because: (1) CB programmes are more participatory, in terms of decision-making processes and, therefore, facilitate community cohesion in such divided communities; (2) they are more accountable to local communities and, thus, address issues of mistrust that

can cause conflict to erupt again in already fragile security environments; and, also, create long-term employment and economic opportunities for locals.

The next Chapter presents an analysis to establish the need for CB programmes as the way forward for effective reintegration of ex-combatants. In doing so, some peacebuilding characteristics: an integrated approach to programmes, local ownership, equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, employment opportunities, capacity building, long-term sustainable programmes, elimination of tension and fear, and creating enabling security environments, which were identified in this Chapter, will be regrouped under four broad peacebuilding headings: human security, livelihood, social reconstruction, and good governance for discussions.

Chapter 8

How can Community-based Reintegration Programmes for Ex-combatants Contribute to more effective peacebuilding?

8.1   Introduction

This Chapter provides analysis to answer the research question 'how can CB reintegration programmes for ex-combatants contribute more effectively to peacebuilding'. As a starting point, it is helpful to note that the definition of an ex-combatant can sometimes be narrowed down to male adults, who actually handled weapons during the period of the conflict; or broadened to include some other groups such as women, children and the disabled. Despite various procedures that could be adopted to target all ex-combatants, some legitimate ones (cooks, porters, and messengers) who were less prominent or recognised might be excluded from reintegration programmes. Though programme implementers, such as, NGOs could involve community members in identifying these groups, more often, their findings are considered less, or completely ignored. The exclusion of some groups, as discussed in the previous chapters, creates resentment among community members, thereby hindering peacebuilding processes. Since reintegration programmes are aimed to promote gainful employment for all ex-combatants, and to facilitate their long-term reconciliation, any form of exclusion needs to be addressed to avoid relapse into conflict.

Whilst CB approaches to reintegration programmes encourage participation of all groups, it is important to note that sometimes participation only happens when implemented by small groups of interested people in communities with sufficient time and resources at their disposal. As pointed out by Batterill and Fisher (2002) in Chapter 2, small groups of interested older people participate in the programmes, because the young ones who are physically fit, often, have other work and family commitments that prevent them from active participation. Nevertheless, the participation of a small group of people, in a CB programme, can be considered credible; in as far as the programme did not restrict participation of some other groups, and offered the opportunity to all groups to be represented.

The discussions, in the previous analysis chapters, identified some peacebuilding characteristics (an integrated approach to programmes, local ownership, equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, employment opportunities, capacity building, long-term

sustainable programmes, elimination of tension and fear, and an enabling security environment) for employing CB, rather than CL, as an approach to community reintegration programmes. The basic premise of the CB approach is that local communities are in a better position to identify, plan and implement reintegration programmes. This means communities can take charge of programmes and work towards long-term sustainability. The involvement of locals in community reintegration programmes enables them to have access to information, be part of the decision-making processes, and become acquainted with the raising and disbursement of funds. These processes contribute to transparency, accountability; and above all, trust building, which are important attributes to a PCE where community members are suspicious of one another. Besides, a programme that is owned by a community is considered 'theirs' and for that matter, it is better protected than one that is planned by an outside agency with limited participation.

The discussions in this analysis chapter will refer to the previous chapters (Chapters 6 and 7); and also specific programmes will be used in different contexts to explain or support these discussions. For example, the programme of the Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section can be used to explain food security (under the heading: human security) and, also to explain the long-term sustainable programmes (under the heading: improved livelihoods). Despite the fact that the same programme is used in the discussions of two different peacebuilding factors, the context however will be different.

This Chapter discusses how CB reintegration programmes can contribute to effective reintegration of ex-combatants, and the following peacebuilding factors will be considered: (1) improved livelihoods; (2) enhanced good governance; (3) improved human security; and (4) enhance social reconstruction. Table 16 presents these peacebuilding factors and characteristics for the discussion.

Table 16: Peacebuilding Factors and Characteristics

Improved livelihood	Improved human security
• Long-term sustainable programmes • Capacity building • Employment opportunities **Enhanced good governance** • Equity and Inclusion • Transparency and accountability • Respect for human rights	• Enabling security environment for reintegration • Elimination of tension and fear • Food security **Enhanced social reconstruction** • Integrated approach to programmes • Local ownership • Horizontal communication

Source: Author

8.2 Improved Livelihood

8.2.1 Long-term Sustainable Programmes

In our previous discussions, it was evident that many reintegration programmes folded-up abruptly in many post-conflict contexts and left beneficiaries with unmet expectations. It was noted that programme implementers focussed their attention on start-ups without much consideration about continuity; and that narrow focus affected the sustainability of programmes. Also, many programmes used short-term stabilization strategies to ensure security without focusing on development for long-term sustainability. Sustainability of programmes is very important because it improves the social, economic and political livelihoods of ex-combatants' reintegration process and addresses likely threats to conflict. The discussion on the sustainability of programmes focuses on the continuity of programmes after they have been officially completed, and the long-term benefits that can be derived from programmes by community members.

CB programmes are more sustainable in PCEs, because it was evident from the research that many of the CB programmes continued beyond the official funding phases, and that was due to the involvement of community members from the inception of the programme. The continuity of CB programmes facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants because they created long-term job opportunities. For example, the women in Foredugu Section, under the auspices of the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Group programme, continued with their farming activities when the funding from CARE international ceased.

Considering that programme, it could be argued that that was the main income earning activity for the women prior to the war; hence, the reason for the continuity after the official completion. Whilst this could be a sound argument in relation to a standalone programme, questions were raised when comparisons were made with similar programmes. The Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh, which was initiated to support women's vegetable production, also aimed at maintaining the income generating activity of the women, prior to the war. This programme was initiated by CARITAS-Sierra Leone with limited community participation (basically consultation) as identified in Chapter 7. This limited form of community participation affected the programme output. A community member remarked that *'the restriction of community participation resulted in very low vegetable production at the end of the season.'*[141] With less community participation in the decision-making processes, the women saw the programme as that of CARITAS and, therefore, discontinued the activity immediately CARITAS funding stopped. Such programmes affected ex-combatants' reintegration owing to their short-term nature and the lack of community participation.

Apart from the levels of community participation in vegetable crop production at the two aforementioned venues, there are other contextual factors (as discussed in Chapter 6) that can contribute to the continuity of these programmes. Firstly, the year the programme was initiated. The Women's Vegetable Production Recovery for Income Generation in Fornikoh was initiated in 2000, whilst the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section was initiated in 2003. In the previous chapters, it was argued that NGOs were used to plan and implement short-term reintegration programmes for communities in the immediate aftermath of the conflict to satisfy their immediate needs. During this same period, many people were in the process of going back to their communities after having taken refuge elsewhere at the time of the conflict. Obviously, such conditions could hinder the sustainability of a programme that was initiated at such a time, unlike in 2003, when at the cessation of conflict, community members returned home. Therefore, it could be argued that in 2003, communities were more settled and in a better position to plan and implement long-term sustainable programmes. Moreover, many community leaders had gone through leadership and management training to acquire skills which could be drawn on, favourably, to initiate community programmes. The Grassroots Gender Empowerment

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[141] An interview with a community member in Fornikoh on 5 May 2009.

Movement (GGEM Services), a local NGO, instigated the Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills in 2001 and the Masiaka Management Team Training in 2002. The Masiaka management team, who went through the training programme, became members of the management team of the local CBO, which planned and implemented the vegetable production in Foredugu Section.

Also, the security situation can have an impact on the sustainability of programmes. Conducive security environments, for instance, can facilitate the continuity of vegetable production. Considering the fact that the NGO programme (The Women's Vegetable Production Recovery for Income Generation in Fornikoh) was initiated in 2000, it could be argued that, as conflict in Sierra Leone ceased during that year, the fragile state of security made the environment too fluid to encourage the sustainability of programmes, unlike the case of the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section, which was initiated at a time of relative calm. A community member states that *'the stable security situation in Foredugu Section at the time of the vegetable crop production contributed to the success of the programme. Though we initiated our own programme, the women were very confident that the war was over, and they needed to engage in serious income earning activity to live an independent life.'*[142] A stable security situation in a PCE can, therefore, promote or contribute to long-term sustainable programmes.

The long-term sustainable vegetable crop production in Foredugu Section facilitated the reintegration of female ex-combatants in these areas. Unlike other programmes which were short-term, the Foredugu programme continued for a long period, thus providing employment opportunities for the locals. A female ex-combatant remarked that 'w*ithout this programme, I would have struggled to live in this community after I have participated actively in the conflict and benefited from it. This programme has helped me to earn some form of income for my upkeep all these years. We thank CARE international for assisting us in the initial stages of the programme.'* [143] Another respondent also remarked that *'the community approach to reintegration has helped both ex-combatants and other community members to reintegrate well into the community'.*[144] Unlike the CL programmes, which used short-term strategies, the long-term strategies used in the CB reintegration programmes provided

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[142] An interview with a community member in Masiaka on 10 April 2009.
[143] An interview with a female ex-combatant in Kurankoh on 9 April 2009.
[144] An interview with a programme beneficiary in Kurankoh on 9 April 2009.

sustainable income generating activities for ex-combatants, improved their economic livelihoods, and facilitated their reintegration into communities. That long-term reintegration approach embodies the same principles as the USAID (2007) programme that provided grants for long-term programmes to facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants and community members in Mozambique in 1994, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this research.

Apart from duration, the sustainability of programmes can also be discussed under long-term benefits derived from these programmes by communities. It was evident in Chapter 7 that the Vocational Training for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Project in Bumpe, a CL programme, did not meet the needs of the community. However, beneficiaries deserted the community on completion of the rehabilitative programme to seek greener pastures in the nearby cities, such as Bo and Kenema. As the programme did not achieve its intended objectives, community members complained. *'These people killed our brothers and sisters in this community. They burnt down houses and properties. They were given training to better themselves and to help rebuild this community, but they left without fixing what they had destroyed.'[145]* This statement, by a community member in Bumpe, revealed that he felt disappointed that the rehabilitation programme (run by Sierra Leone Opportunities Industrialization Centre - SLOIC - a local NGO) had not resulted in the long-term benefits anticipated. The objective of the programme, which was to help rebuild the community, was not achieved; and that resulted in strained relationships between the programme beneficiaries and the community.

By contrast, the Konia Skills Training Programme in Dama, a CB programme, achieved its objective of meeting the needs of the community. Many of the beneficiaries managed to set up their own workshops and provided apprenticeship training to other people in the community. A tailoring workshop that was set up by an ex-combatant, who benefited from the programme, became one of the vibrant workshops in terms of attracting customers. *'The identification of programmes such as weaving, cotton processing, embroidery and tailoring by the community, themselves, was our gateway to success. Prior to the training the community lacked artisans with these skills'[146],* the ex-combatant remarked. Such training programmes were more beneficial to the reintegration process of ex-combatants, in that they were better able to fit into the community, within a short time. They became part and parcel

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[145] An interview with a community member in Bumpe on 20 April 2009.
[146] An interview with a

of the community due to the services they provided after training. The identification of programmes by the community, and their active participation in the planning and implementation processes, were of great importance. Unlike the CL programmes, the CB programmes were locally owned, thus community members identified the essential programmes and that facilitated reintegration.

8.2.2   Capacity Building

Ex-combatants managed to improve upon their capacities through CB programmes, individually, and as team members. As discussed in the previous paragraph, local facilitators in Konia, Dama, acquired additional skills whilst still performing their duties, during the Konia Skills Training Programme. The case has been mentioned of the ex-combatant who acquired additional skills for embroidery, whilst serving as a facilitator. The programme offered him an opportunity to add value to his earning capacity, and also to see an increase in the number of customers who visited the shop. The high level of customers obviously increased the rate of turnover, and improved upon his economic livelihood. Additionally, the Konia Skills Training gave local artisans (both ex-combatants and non-combatants) the chance to apply for positions as facilitators, thereby addressing issues of unemployment.

Ex-combatants can also build their capacities by working not just individually, but also within teams. The capacity building of ex-combatants working in teams was identified in the Masiaka Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills. The programme offered them opportunities to improve upon their leadership and management skills, which were employed in subsequent reintegration programmes.

On completion of the training, some of the team members helped in managing the Koya Chiefdom Development Association (KCDA), a chiefdom development umbrella organization, which aimed to improve the socio-economic status of the people of Koya Chiefdom in Port Loko District. Some of the programmes, under the management of KCDA were as follows: the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section in 2003, the Human Rights and Civil Education in Masiaka in 2004, the Survey on Public Perception of a Special Court for Sierra Leone in 2006, and the Construction of a Community Water Well in Masiaka in 2007. *'As a member of KCDA we were given programmes to manage. When you are appointed as a programme manager, you are paid for your services. The unfortunate thing is that we did not get these contracts often*

and, during the gap period, there was no other source of income'[147], an ex-combatant said. In spite of the fact that this source of income was not guaranteed at all times, it gave the programme implementers an income during the period of programme management. Also, the fact that the programmes helped them to improve upon their leadership and management skills for community development, and offered ex-combatants the opportunity to obtain better livelihoods was the factor of greatest significance. This community capacity building was similar to the World Bank (2003) programme (Community Reintegration and Development Programme – CRDP - in Rwanda), which was aimed at strengthening the capacity of ex-combatants, returnees and other vulnerable groups to develop further development programmes in communities, as discussed in Chapter 3 of this research.

8.2.3   Employment Opportunities

As discussed in the selection of programmes in Chapter 4, the high unemployment rate ensured that programme implementers focussed more on economic reintegration programmes, than on those of a social and political nature. 10 of the 14 cases selected related to employment creation opportunities for community members, and many of those programmes focussed largely on skills training. For example, the Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, Kenema, was implemented by CARITAS-SL, after identifying the gap in employment during the official reintegration process. It was revealed that many of the ex-combatants, who registered for the DDR, did not go through the reintegration process; thus, the unemployment gap created called for sustainable employment programmes to be initiated.   In Krooby, Freetown, the lack of earning capacity for young women in the community, for instance, encouraged YAI to offer Women's Vocational Training to nurture basic skills: computing, tailoring, and hairdressing. A needs assessment survey, conducted by YAI in some poor communities around Freetown, identified Krooby as being one of the communities that required employment opportunities. Considering the fact that youth unemployment was one of the facilitating factors that triggered the civil conflict, targeting youth unemployment was vital to enabling more effective peacebuilding.

However, many of the CL programmes (apart from the Apprenticeship Scheme and Business Development Support for Youth Training and Employment in Bo as discussed in Chapter 6) used external facilitators to provide skills training for trainees, and these have been criticised

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[147] An interview with an ex-combatant in Masiaka on 11 April 2010.

by some communities, who had the capacity to do so. For example, in Chapter 7 it was noticed that GGEM, a local NGO, was criticised for using its own facilitators, from trainers to cooks, without employing community members during the Wellington Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills. Community members, however, expressed their dissatisfaction about the exclusive way GGEM handled the programme without involving the communities in the implementation process, and stressed the fact that community involvement would have contributed favourably towards the reintegration process. Meanwhile, GGEM argued that the Wellington Community did not have the skills to do that, and that was identified by Cary and Webb (2001) as mentioned in Chapter 2, that the magnitude of certain programmes is well beyond that encapsulated in the skills or capacities of a collective action-based programme. They posit that such programmes require specialist skills, which might not be immediately available in communities.

Unlike the CL programmes, many CB programmes employed the services of local facilitators. These local facilitators included both ex-combatants and non-combatants. For example, in the Rokel Community Centre Project, ex-combatants were included in the recruitment process for employment in order to offer them the opportunity to work within the community, and also to facilitate their social reconciliation. As instanced in Konia, Dama, a quota was given to ex-combatants during the recruitment of facilitators for the skills training programme. 2 of the 6 facilitators, who managed the programme, were ex-combatants. Though this quota system could be criticised for favouring ex-combatants during the recruitment process, the community realised the need to meet the quota, in order to facilitate their reintegration process. Unlike some of the CL programmes, which provided employment opportunities for all locals on a competitive basis (for example the Apprenticeship Scheme and Business Development Support for Youth Training and Employment in Bo), the CB programme went a step further by including ex-combatants, specifically, in the recruitment process. It is important to note that many ex-combatants were at a disadvantage in competing favourably with other community members, due to the number of years they spent in the bush as fighters, without education or employable skills. Table 17 shows some specific programmes and employment opportunities for ex-combatants and non-combatants.

Table 17: Employment Opportunities for Ex-combatants and Non-combatants

Project Title	CB/CL	Facilitators		Local facilitators with ex-combatants
		External facilitators	Local Facilitators	
The Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru, Kenama	CL	X		
Women's Vocational Training in Krooby, Freetown	CL	X		
Apprenticeship and Business Scheme for Youth Training and Employment in Bo	CL	X	X	
Skills Training Programme in Konia, Dama	CB	X	X	X

Source: Author

When ex-combatants were given the opportunity to work as local facilitators, it offered them a source of income, and improved upon their economic livelihood and, eventually, facilitated the reintegration process in various communities. This meant that, though, many ex-combatants were deprived of the opportunity to gain employable skills during the period of conflict, nonetheless some of them had skills, which were harnessed to help rebuilt post-conflict communities. Ex-combatants, therefore, should not always be seen as liabilities that depend only on aid, but also, need to be recognised as assets in social and economic development in post-conflict reconstruction. It is important to note that, prior to joining a fighting force, some of those ex-combatants had valuable skills; thus, there is the need to identify such people to aid in the process of development. Putting all ex-combatants on an equal footing will prevent the identification of those with valuable skills for use in their communities.

8.3   Enhance Good Governance

8.3.1   Equity and Inclusion

The research demonstrated, in Chapter 7, that many of the CL programmes did not use democratic processes to elect members for the CMC. Some programmes, such as the Wellington Management and Leadership Training, selected the team from existing institutions, and this undemocratic process later affected the development programmes, which were being managed by the management team. Also, it was evident that the undemocratic process adopted to elect the CMC for the Skills Training for Youth and Marginalised

Children in Waterloo, resulted in fewer women representatives in the team. Of the 9 members representing the committee only 2 were women. It could be argued that the management team for the CL programmes was not directly responsible for the programmes, and thus having been appointed through such undemocratic processes would still not have effective impact in the implementation

of the programmes. However, the undemocratic processes created resentment among communities because of lack of all inclusive approach in decision making process.

On the contrary, CB programmes used some democratic processes already existing in communities such as employing existing electioneering structures, and also instituting new ones for subsequent use. In many strong communities, it was noted that some form of democratic structures were already in place for use prior to the introduction of CB programmes. In Masiaka for instance, community organisations such as the Koya Community Development Association (KCDA), the United for the Protection of Human Rights (UPHR), the Youth Wing, and the Women's Empowerment Association, used some form of democratic processes, such as: fair registration, fair campaigning, fair balloting and fair counting to elect leaders. These democratic processes, already in place in various community organisations, facilitated the electioneering process of the community management committee. The community had their own team that was responsible for elections, they used: durbars (the paramount chief's, and local chiefs' durbars) to inform and educate the locals of upcoming elections in the community; and they were abreast with campaigning processes. The democratic awareness, already existing in the Masiaka community, enabled its members to organise themselves fairly easily when electing people to the management team for training.

The election of the management team was done in a free and fair manner. According to a member of the management committee, *'interested personnel were asked to put their names forward for election. Even the uneducated were encouraged to do so. Also specific quotas were given to ex-combatants, women and the disabled in the community for everybody to be represented.'*[148] The CB approach, that was adopted to elect the management team, led the Masiaka community to consider people for possible inclusion in the team from other

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[148] An interview with a member of the community management committee in Masiaka on 6 April 2009.

villages[149] in the chiefdom. Also, all groups such as ex-combatants and members of other vulnerable groups were considered, thus ensuring equity in the community.

However, in some communities, these democratic processes were not identified but other structures were put in place to elect community management committees. Those elections were supervised by the district coordinators of NaCSA and local councils. Unlike other CL programmes, that used already existing institutions, due to lack of existing democratic process, the Konia programme organised new elections to select committee members. That was done because the programme was planned and implemented by the community and its participation was vital for success. Also it was a requirement from NaCSA that programmes should include all groups, such as ex-combatants, rather than just some individuals or specific groups within communities. It was evident in Chapter 7 that many of the committee members were citizens of Konia, and it was difficult for other community members from Kortuma, Madina and Torkpombu to also participate in the work of the management committee, owing to the long distances they had to travel to Konia. Of the 10 members forming the management team, 8 originated from Konia and the other 2 from Kangema and Vaama, a walking distance to Konia. In PCEs, or in very remote places such as Konia, democratic processes are restricted to the involvement of some people from some communities only, due to the lack of good infrastructure such as roads, the poor quality of which can make travelling difficult.

The democratic process employed by the CB programmes aimed to address the root causes of the conflict, provide economic livelihoods and build capacities in local communities. To encourage a local approach to programmes, the GoSL formed local councils in 2004 to facilitate the decentralisation of projects from the central government to local communities. The local councils aimed to incorporate larger sections of the population (who have been excluded from decision-making processes) to be involved in all matters affecting their communities. This process encouraged empowerment, participation, accountability and responsiveness, and also the development and coordination of activities of local actors in their communities. The CB programmes, which were funded by the government, for example, were coordinated by the local councils, in conjunction with line ministries, and the

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[149] These villages were Ward 198 (Mawoma, Matheneh, Rokel), Ward 197 (Fondu, Mahera, Rosal), Ward 196 (Foredugu, Magbeni), Ward 195 (Matheri, Kagbala, Sanda, Gbabai), and Ward 194 (Magbandoma, Futa, Roponka, Benkia, Marifa, Robia, Thumba).

Commission responsible for the funding (NaCSA) at the district level. This form of democratic process, which enables individuals to influence community decisions, unites communities and facilitates community cohesion, despite the fact that it is time consuming and expensive to implement. Besides, it transforms a community from a period of conflict to normalcy where all groups (both ex-combatants and non-combatants) work together for more effective peacebuilding. In Chapter 2, this research agrees with the Communities and Local Government (2007) document that, in many communities, individuals (such as ex-combatants) have opportunities to influence public policies and all other factors affecting their lives.

Having discussed the best practice in relation to democratic processes in CB programmes, there is the need to recognise the fact that community elites can manipulate those democratic processes, owing to the power they hold in their communities. Less dominant groups (such as women, children and the disabled) can be manipulated in any decision-making process, which targets the whole community. This means that much attention should be paid to the interaction of all groups to prevent exclusion and resentment in communities, and also manage the involvement of elites in such CB programmes. In Sierra Leone, NaCSA instituted a policy concerning the involvement of community leaders in community management committees. According to NaCSA's handbook of procedures *'village headmen and other local authorities should not be members of the PMC to avoid undue influence. Instead, the community can constitute an arbitration committee comprising such headmen and local authorities for addressing misunderstandings and effecting sanctions on defaulting members of the PMC and the community'* (Community-Driven Programme, 2002:13). Though this policy excluded some community leaders from the composition of the PMC, it helped to monitor the activities of the PMC by utilising the community leaders or councillors to do that monitoring.

8.3.2 Transparency and Accountability

The design and implementation of programmes using transparent approaches, for example, community participation in decision-making processes, reduced conflict situations within local communities and ensured good governance. The discussions in the previous chapters pointed to the fact that CB programmes were more transparent and accountable than CL programmes. For instance, community members were given the chance to prioritise the programmes they wanted to embark on, unlike CL programmes where NGOs sometimes

made decisions for communities. It was realised that, some decisions taken by NGOs, were not very favourable to communities and this created misunderstanding between them. In Krooby, for instance, Youth Action International (YAI) decided to locate the Women's Vocational Training Centre at Peter Lane, which was not favourable to trainees as well as the rest of the community, owing to the long distance from their homes, which contributed to the high drop-out rate of the trainees. Though YAI justified the reason for opting for the facility in Pater Lane, the community was unhappy about the decision. However, the CB programmes did not anticipate these differences, and their associated difficulties, between the CMC and the community during the planning stages of the programmes.

With regard to the implementation of the programmes, it was stated in Chapter 7 that many NGOs did not want to discuss their financial resources during the field work. Moreover, communities had no idea of total cost of community projects, and how funds were obtained, and subsequently disbursed. Considering the fact that these were community projects, it would have been expected that communities would have kept abreast of the current financial statements, however, that was impossible in many of the CL programmes. NGOs single-handedly managed financial resources without making that known to communities. Though donors monitored the use of resources of NGOs programmes, that was not enough to build trust between NGOs and communities, and it resulted in misunderstanding. It was evident that many CL programmes excluded locals from awareness of financial processes and that that created doubt and mistrust. Essentially, community members should have been made aware that these projects were 'theirs' and that they had a stake in making sure that they were implemented to the required specifications and standards.

On the other hand, CB programmes were more transparent to community members. In Rokel for instance, the management team responsible for the programme prepared account statements for their income and expenditure, and presented them to the community every month when the programme was ongoing, and also placed them on notice boards for the locals to raise any matters arising. *'Putting financial information on community notice board helped to build trust in this community, and provided everybody with chance to be informed about the project. We are not saying that everything should be perfect but communicating this information to community members gave them assurance that the money was in good*

hands, and accountable.'[150] These forms of transparency and accountability were made possible by the setting up of monitoring teams to cross-check all requisitions and quotations for accuracy before funds were released. The monitoring teams were made up of both ex-combatants and other community members to avoid any form of exclusion.

Procurement procedures, too, were transparent in CB programmes. The community received a series of quotations and selected the best quote in terms of price and quality. Basic guidelines for procurement were also followed throughout the programme. Many CB programmes were awarded to sub-contractors, and they prepared price lists of items needed and submitted them to the procurement sub-committee. The procurement committee, comprised of community members, discussed the requisition with the management committee before funds were released. Former combatants were included in the committee and their active participation in these processes brought them face to face with other community members, thus facilitating their reintegration process. It is, however, important to note that in Sierra Leone, NaCSA incorporated some procurement guidelines for CB programmes to stop misappropriation and corruption. Such obvious transparency in accounting procedures and procurement was in accord with the practices adopted in Afghanistan where a 3-quotation system was implemented, and the cheapest option, in terms of materials and equipment, was selected. This research, in Chapter 3, agrees with Özerdem (2009) that the quotation system was much more effective for the procurement process, and also provided a higher level of transparency and accountability.

8.3.3   Respect for Basic Human Rights

Respect for basic human rights can also enhance good governance in post-conflict contexts. Some basic human rights issues such as gender sensitivity, freedom of decision-making processes, and protection of the rights of vulnerable groups are associated with CB reintegration programmes. For the purpose of discussions in this section, the rights of vulnerable groups and issues of gender sensitivity will be discussed. As part of the process of good governance, the rights of vulnerable groups such as disabled people were considered in CB programmes. Many CB programmes gave opportunities to vulnerable groups to be represented in the programmes. In Rokel, for instance, disabled people formed 10% of the CMC. Also in Konia Skills Training Programme, disabled groups were represented on the

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[150] An interview with an ex-combatant in Rokel on 12 May 2009.

CMC. However, other CB programmes such as the Women's Vegetable Crop Production in Foredugu Section did not have disabled people as members of the management committee. The composition of the CMC, as indicated by NaCSA, states that disabled people should constitute 10% of the management committees wherever possible. The influence of ex-combatants meant that they were included in the CMC, in all the CB programmes. The identification and inclusion of vulnerable groups (the disabled, for example), in the management team of the CB reintegration programmes contributed to the success of the reintegration process.

Gender imbalance was identified in many community reintegration programmes, especially CL programmes, as discussed in Chapter 7. As evidenced, however, in the discussion it was apparent that some programmes were specifically devised for women or men, respectively, for example the Women's Vocational Training in Krooby, thus it was difficult to compare male and female participants. Moreover, some programmes were considered as 'manly' (auto-mechanics) or 'feminine' (cosmetology), thus men or female participants dominated in such programmes. However, using the members of the community management committees, in various programmes, made it possible to compare the number of male and female participants. Here, it was identified that the CL programmes incorporated fewer female representatives than males, and that was attributed to lack of girl-child education, fewer women in eminent public organisations or institutions, the use of women for domestic chores, and sometimes less female interest in community programmes.

Despite the handicap of gender imbalances being associated with the management committees of the CL programmes, CB programmes gave specific quotas for female representation. The opportunities given to women encouraged ex-combatants to take part in the management committees. In Masiaka for instance, a female former combatant, who was a member of the management committee, remarked that *'when women are included in management committees, their specific needs are considered.'*[151] She said male programme implementers often fail to address specific needs of women, and sometimes they even forget about them completely. She stressed the fact that taking part as a member of the management team helped her to be an advocate for women, especially female ex-combatants whose needs would differ from those of non-combatants.

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[151] An interview with a female ex-combatant in Masiaka on 11 April 2009.

Encouraging women to take part in community activity is very important for community development. However, women (especially in Africa) are often put in the same category as people with less education, and often it is assumed that they are fully occupied with household, rather than community activities. This stereotype can discourage other women who want to work within communities because they will often be seen as minorities, which would therefore have little impact in any decision-making processes. By going further than been democratic in the election process, a quota recommending the specific number of women, that it would be desirable to have on the management committee as specified in the CB programmes, encouraged ex-combatants to take active roles in community activities for social reintegration.

Evidently, CB programmes encouraged participatory processes for good governance, by putting democratic structures in place, and they afforded more opportunities for dialogue amongst all community members, rather than coercion by conflict. It is important to note that reintegration process should move from short-term approach where the focus has been to get assistance quickly to ex-combatants, to a longer term approach that addresses comprehensive planning and implementation for a more sustainable peacebuilding. In PCEs, CB approaches to reintegration facilitate the rebuilding of relationships that have been destroyed, within communities, as a result of conflict. These forms of social relationships bring ex-combatants and other community members together, and enhance community reintegration. Moreover, CB programmes promote cooperation, equity and inclusion, human rights, and transparency and accountability for good governance.

8.4   Improved Human Security

In the aftermath of conflict, the goal of many post-conflict communities is to stabilize the security situation to avoid relapse into conflict. Many programmes, therefore, focused on the immediate needs of ex-combatants in order to address insecurity, thus they excluded the needs of the wider community. Whilst many efforts are geared towards ex-combatants' needs, a community approach to reintegration addresses both the immediate needs of ex-combatants and facilitates an enabling security environment for development to thrive. It addresses exclusion of groups, which could otherwise restart conflict, by bringing these groups together to participate in the peace process. However, it is important to note that a CB approach might lead to further conflict, when community members struggle for positions on

committees that are set up to manage activities or programmes. The discussions on security will consider the following: creation of an enabling security environment for reintegration, elimination of tension and fear in communities striving for peace and security, and food security.

8.4.1   Enabling Security Environment for Reintegration Process

An enabling security environment was discussed in Chapter 6 as one of the contextual factors that could contribute to the success or failure of community reintegration programmes. Evidently, both CB and CL programmes considered an enabling security environment to be essential to the smooth running of programmes. The Arms for Development (AfD) programme that was initiated by the UNDP, in conjunction with the government of Sierra Leone (GoSL), attempted to rid various communities of all small arms and ammunition that were in circulation. Notwithstanding that, the discussion in the programme specific factors in Chapter 7 revealed that communities criticised UNDP for providing metal boxes for weapons, and also for awarding contracts to some external contractors rather than to the communities, as a whole. Many communities felt excluded from the planning process, despite the fact that they ensured that all arms in circulation were collected: *'How can we be made to do the entire job, without receiving direct benefit? We search all houses and bushes for weapons and ammunition. Meanwhile, monies were given to contractors to build the classroom blocks we opted for, as part of our benefits, when the village was declared free from arms[152].'* This is an indication that some people were not satisfied about the way UNDP recruited contractors, rather than communities, to implement the development programmes. Using locals would have given them employment, improved their livelihoods and mitigated issues of insecurity in communities, especially in situations where ex-combatants were involved. Though awarding contracts to registered contractors, rather than communities, resulted in the completion of projects on time, therefore relieving the UNDP of the burden of monitoring community activities, the long-term gains that would have benefitted communities, such as enhanced livelihood and improved security, were completely overlooked. The short-term approach that was adopted by the UNDP to implement the 'development' projects, adversely affected the long-term process of peacebuilding and security in such areas.

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[152] An interview with a community member in Massimera on 27 May 2009.

On the contrary, CB reintegration programmes created an enabling environment for reintegration and development in communities. Many communities used community policing to protect CB programmes. In Masiaka, the community recognized the need for them to employ the services of a police force to protect ex-combatants during the Human Rights and Civic Education Programme, especially for the 2-day reconciliation workshop that brought both ex-combatants and their victims together. This protection rendered adequate security to ex-combatants, during their attendance at the reconciliation workshop, which facilitated the reintegration process in the community. Also, in Rokel, community policing was used to protect the building materials for the community centre from getting into the hands of burglars. It is important to note that majority of the personnel volunteered to provide security for their communities, without payment for their services; and that is an indication of cooperation among community members in addressing insecurity. Notably, some of the communities had no civil police presence to protect citizens and community programmes, thus community members assumed such responsibility. Using community policing in support of the civil police for these programmes, in a way, guaranteed the safety of ex-combatants, and facilitated the planning and implementation process of development programmes in communities.

8.4.2   Elimination of Tension and Fear

One of the costs of conflict is the loss of trust among community members. Rebuilding relationship of trust in a post-conflict context is one of the main objectives of CB approaches to arranging reintegration programmes, which can be done through community participation in the decision-making processes. However, it was identified in previous discussions, that many of the decisions made by communities in support of CL programmes were ignored by NGOs responsible for the main planning and implementation of such programmes. For example, the Krooby community wanted the Women's Vocational Training Centre to be sited in Krooby, Freetown but it was eventually located in Peter Lane, about 3kms from Krooby, and that decision created misunderstanding among community members owing to the distance participants had to travel daily to the training grounds. By contrast, when the ideas of communities were listened to and implemented in CB programmes, they felt encouraged to participate actively in the programmes. Besides, that built trust among locals and eliminated tension and fear. In Masiaka for instance, community members identified the need for reconciliation to facilitate the reintegration process, thus a 2-day workshop was included in the Human Rights and Civil Education Programme for ex-combatants to meet victims so that

they could apologize for the atrocities caused. That was made possible because of the local ownership of the programme.

Prompt responses to concerns raised by community members also helped to eliminate tension and fear in communities. As discussed in the previous sections, in many of the CB programmes, statements of accounts were prepared and placed on notice boards to enable community members to raise concerns, objections, or just to be kept informed. Such processes used by the community management committees enabled them to address matters, which were raised by community members, promptly, and that prevented likely conflict situations. Addressing matters arising from issues, fairly, encouraged the building of trust among community members and eliminated forms of suspicion among community members.

8.4.3 Food Security

Food insecurity is one of the main causes of conflict, thus it is important to address it in post-conflict communities. In Sierra Leone, the persistent food shortages in various communities, malnutrition, and death from hunger led some NGOs and communities to target agricultural activities as part of the reintegration process in order to make food available to mitigate possible conflict. Some agricultural programmes were initiated for one farming season (6-month duration), whilst others took a long-term approach. In Chapter 7, the matter of food security was identified with the two agricultural programmes (Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh and the Agriculture Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section). Both programmes were planned for one-season, but unlike the agricultural production in Fornikoh, the one in Foredugu section continued in subsequent seasons due to the participation of community members from the start of the programme: *'This programme was started in 2003 and it is still ongoing. We were given the basic skills on how to plant these crops during the start of the programme and we have been putting what we learnt into practice. This is what we rely on to support our families.'*[153] The continuity of the crop production was based on the commitment shown by the women and the support they received from the programme implementers.

The issue about food security is that all people within the community should have access to sufficient food that meets nutritional requirements and is affordable. Though the objective of

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[153] An interview with a community member in Kurankoh in 6 April 2009.

the Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section was to improve nutritional value for the community and also to help the women to generate some form of income, the research could not establish whether or not everybody in those villages had enough food to eat. However, the programme helped individuals to develop skills to grow their own food, and also continued the community approach to the vegetable crop production. The research identified that in Kurankoh, only 6 of the 30 women, who took part in the agricultural programme, were ex-combatants. The skills they acquired during the programme put them in a position to provide food for their families and earn enough money for personal upkeep. Apart from building skills, using a CB approach to agricultural programmes enabled people to meet and develop networks for social reintegration. Alternatively, the CL programme (the Vegetable Crop Production in Fornikoh) used a short-term relief strategy to address immediate food needs in the community, but did not encourage community members to develop skills or competencies, which could be used to continue the programme in the long-term.

However, it is important to note that long-term agricultural production requires the administration of: land ownership, tenancy, transportation and marketing of crops. When comparing the two crop production programmes, it was noticed that neither of the two programmes had experienced a lack of land availability. However, in terms of markets for the vegetables, the Foredugu Section enjoyed ready marketing of its yields, due to there being a large population in the Masiaka Chiefdom and its proximity to Freetown, the capital city. This is one of the contextual factors that can contribute towards the success or failure of programmes.

8.5   Enhanced Social Reconstruction

8.5.1   Integrated Approach to Programmes

The main objective of a community approach to reintegration is to ensure that all groups in PCEs are included in programmes. This includes ex-combatants, refugees, internally displaced persons and other community members. All these groups were affected as a result of the conflict, thus any effort towards peacemaking should make provision for them. This means that reintegration programmes should focus on communities as a whole rather than ex-combatants; thus, all the programmes selected for this research focussed on both ex-combatants and other community members.

In many PCEs however, it was difficult to focus on all groups in communities at every stage during the reintegration process. Practically, many of the reintegration programmes focussed exclusively on either women, men or the youth, depending on the needs of that specific group within the community and, sometimes, upon donors' requests. For example, the Women's Vegetable Production in Fornikoh and the Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Group in Foredugu Section focussed on women, whilst the Skills Training Programme in Waterloo focussed on the youth; that means that not all groups were targeted simultaneously. When decisions to focus on particular groups were taken (without the approval of community members) that could bring about further division and conflict. In Krooby for example, the community needed a skills training programme for men and women, but NGO funding was geared towards women only. A community leader remarked that *'because women are considered as the weaker sex, many NGOs are now focusing on them and ignoring the men. The issue of unemployment is not affecting only women in this community but men as well. When can we get money to decide for ourselves?'*[154] Though this programme focussed on both ex-combatants and non-combatants, some people felt that the decision to concentrate only on women did not come from the community, and this created conflict. To mitigate divisive situations and encourage cooperation among community members, there is the need to include all groups in decision-making processes to address potential conflict situations, prior to the commencement of programmes. The discussions in the previous chapters, however, revealed that most often recommendations made by community members in decision-making processes were overlooked, despite the fact that they were consulted about certain issues, which affected them. Frequently, NGOs have portrayed local communities as if they have been granted the right to participate, without effectively bringing local people in the planning and implementation processes of community reintegration programmes. They only used the concept of community participation to legitimize projects and to secure funding from donors.

Unlike CL reintegration programmes, which were often structured by NGOs with less community participation that they had indicated, the decisions relating to CB programmes were made by communities; thus, that led to greater concentration on the needs of communities. In New York community in Bo, the entire community prioritized the need for a

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[154] An interview with a community leader in Krooby on 23 May 2009.

Sign Language Programme. The need to take the deaf and the dumb off the streets and to offer them educational and earning opportunities was identified as priority, due to the absence of educational establishments in the Eastern and Southern provinces of the country for those people with disabilities. Therefore, the institution of this project was supported by the entire community. It is important to note that the loss of community cohesion is one of the costs of internal conflict; thus, integrated approaches to decision-making are necessary to mitigate conflict situations. In communities where social groups are divided, CB programmes create some form of community cohesion. Cooperation among groups helps them to overcome their differences, possibly leading to a united attitude towards development. So, a CB approach to reintegration programmes encouraged participation in decision-making processes and helped to mitigate potential conflict, thereby aiding development in many PCEs.

8.5.2   Local Ownership

Local ownership of programmes was mentioned in the discussions on the levels of community participation in Chapter 6. The levels of community participation, as discussed, ranged from informing and consultation (which were considered the lowest levels of participation) to ownership (the highest level). The levels of participation for most CL programmes were classified as informing, consultation or at best partnership; whilst that of CB programmes was described as community control or ownership. The lack of ownership associated with CL programmes meant that community participation was restricted, and they did not have complete control of the programmes that related to them. For example, it was apparent in the selection of the team for the Management and Leadership Skills Training in Wellington by the Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement (GGEM), a local NGO, that the level of community participation was restricted. Participants were selected from already existing institutions: the Board of Trustees of Wellington Community Centre; Union of Wellington Association or Social Affairs (UWASA); Wellington Area Development Association (WADA); and the Civic Development Unit (CDU). The selection process was done by some community leaders in conjunction with GGEM without the consent of the community and that created resentment. An ex-combatant remarked that '*using the existing organisations did not give us opportunity to be represented. Many of my colleagues were fighting when the leadership of these organisations was decided upon. We were completely excluded from the committee.*'[155] He stressed the fact that such undemocratic processes

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[155] An interview with a community member in Wellington on 5 April 2009.

created further division, and consequently, affected forms of reconciliation that could be implemented in communities. Evidently, the selection of the Wellington team for the leadership and management training was fairly straightforward, but over a time misunderstanding occurred and, eventually, that led to the closure of the community centre.

Local ownership, however, enables communities to unite in plan and implementing programmes, which facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants. Evidently, in Rokel community necessities: a school block, a health centre, a market complex, and a community centre, were identified as options for the communities to select from, then the community centre project was selected. During my interviews with respondents, it was made known that the project was necessary for the community because they needed a meeting place where both ex-combatants and non-combatants could hold social gatherings. *'This community centre is where people from Yams Farm, Susu Town, Rokel, Fanny Town, Limba Cormer, Gbongbo, Kondoloh, Mauroute, and John Thorpe all come together for gatherings. We use the building for all social activities such as weddings, christening, durbars, and funerals; and the field is use for football and kickball tournaments. This is where we all meet as a community.'*[156] The fact that the community had the opportunity to select their own CB programmes aided reintegration. Bringing both ex-combatants and non-combatants together for social functions addressed misunderstandings, provided avenues for working together and facilitated social reconstruction in PCEs.

Secondly, local ownership of programmes met the specific needs of ex-combatants. The Human Rights and Civic Education Programme in Masiaka was one of the CB programmes that targeted ex-combatants' specific needs. Planned and implemented by the United for the Protection of Human Rights (UPHR), a community-based organisation in Masiaka, with funding from the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), the programme aimed to address human rights violations in the community. As part of the 10-day programme, a 2-day workshop was planned for ex-combatants, so that they could apologize to their victims for the atrocities caused during the armed conflict. The programme was instigated at the time the Maisaka community had disintegrated, due to the protracted conflict experienced by the entire country. Prior to the UPHR programme, the community discerned that distinctions were been made between ex-combatants and other community members:

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[156] An interview with the village chief in Rokel on 10 April 2009.

'The situation at the time was tense; there was no peace between ex-combatants and the community. These people killed, maimed and burnt down houses in this community. How can we live peacefully with them?[157] The statement is an indication of the perception of some community members regarding ex-combatants. Community members saw ex-combatants as perpetrators of violent crimes and did not want to live in the same community with them. Having identified this problem in the community, the UPHR, under the administration of the Masiaka Chiefdom, included a reconciliation workshop in the Human Rights programme to bring both ex-combatants and other community members together. This workshop facilitated social reconstruction and opened other development avenues to the community. It is argued that CB programmes enabled communities to identify ex-combatants' specific needs that required urgent attention. Unlike in CB programmes, often, it was difficult to include community needs in CL programmes, which were planned by external actors with limited community participation in mind. Despite the fact that communities participated in some of these CL programmes, often, their suggestions or contributions towards decision-making processes were restricted.

8.5.3 Horizontal Communication

Another social reconstruction factor identified with regard to CB programmes was horizontal communication among locals. Unlike CB, CL programmes experienced vertical communication between NGOs and communities; and this form of communication was considered to be: an experts/lay people relationship. Though communities were consulted on certain issues pertaining to the implementation of the programmes, frequently NGOs decisions superseded those of the communities. As experts, NGOs sometimes disregarded the advice they received from communities (lay people) by considering other socio-infrastructural issues, and these obviously affected users such as ex-combatants. The concept of risk communication, as discussed in Chapter 2, was designed to encourage experts (in these case NGOs) and locals to make community programmes more relevant and beneficial, especially to the user groups. The research agrees with Krishna (2004) that an appropriate programme design is the one that brings forth the consent of the public in the numbers required and also those technically well suited for the required project.

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[157] An interview with a community member in Masiaka on 11 April 2009.

On the other hand, the research identified horizontal communication in the CB programmes among community members. Most often, communities were abreast of decision-making processes, without thinking that they were being imposed upon them. Horizontal communication among community members helped in problem identification, prioritisation and, eventually, finding solutions. In Rokel for instance, horizontal communication among community members enabled them to prioritise lists of community programmes and to select the construction of the community centre as being essential to assist towards the reconciliation process. The chief and her elders permitted durbars and community meetings to be held as a means of identifying ex-combatants' and non-combatants needs, so that they could be prioritized as part of the community reconciliation programme. *'Everybody in this community was given the chance to identify what the community needed during durbars with the chief. We held series of durbars in order to invite other village heads and their subjects to participate in this process. In the end, we agreed that the community centre project was what the community needed if the whole community was to be reconciled.'*[158] The selection of the community centre was made possible due to horizontal communication among community members, and this form of mutual understanding contributed to assistance being given to the contractor throughout the building process. When the community realized that the contractor would not be able to complete the project on schedule, they used communal labour to speed up the work that was in progress. According to a community facilitator, *'the community engaged in maintenance work, such as electrical wiring, and painting and paving floors, in order to facilitate the completion of the project'.*[159] This form of cooperation contributed effectively to the reconciliatory process of ex-combatants. An ex-combatant remarked that: *'this is where we meet to have fun. In fun making we forget about what we went through during the war. By coming together, our brothers now see us (ex-combatants) as part of this community. Formerly, most of them saw us as outsiders living here. We thank God for this project.'*[160] This statement indicated how horizontal communication facilitated reintegration of ex-combatants in Rokel.

In spite of the fact that the Rokel community decided on the community centre project, it is important to note that the initiation of this project depended on funding. In post-conflict communities, where most communities do not have their own budget allocation, and

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[158] An interview with the village chief in Rokel on 10 April 2009.
[159] An interview with a community facilitator in Rokel on 9 April 2009.
[160] An interview with an ex-combatant in Rokel on 10 April 2009.

therefore, depend on donors, any decision-making should meet the stipulated criteria, set out by donors, in order to qualify for funding. Donors may interfere in CB programmes by defining the types of programmes which can be implemented, or types of specific groups to be focussed on. In Sierra Leone, the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which funded many of the CB programmes, had the construction of a community centre as one of the listed positive projects that could attract funding; thus, the Rokel community was able to secure funding for the project.

Horizontal communication was more common in CB rather than CL programmes. With the CB programmes, though some community members were elected to serve on various sub-committees: management, procurement, or monitoring and evaluation, they saw themselves as part of the community. Therefore, a more participatory approach to the decision-making process to identify some specific problems facing communities and how to address them was utilized. Specifically, they were able to address specific issues affecting ex-combatants, and that facilitated their social reintegration for more effective peacebuilding. This research agrees with Inagiki (2007) in Chapter 3 that horizontal communication among stakeholders allows them to develop a sense of trust, consensus, and social cohesion, and these attributes helped ex-combatants' reintegration process in various communities.

8.6   Conclusion

CB programmes, as discussed, improved livelihoods of ex-combatants through employment creation. Unlike many of the CL programmes, which used external facilitators, CB programmes employed locals (including ex-combatants) to plan and implement reintegration programmes. The use of local facilitators addressed issues of unemployment in many communities and offered regular employment and earning opportunities to beneficiaries. Besides, the employment creation helped ex-combatants to develop the skills, already acquired, for subsequent use. These forms of individual, as well as team building capacities, which resulted from active participation in CB programmes, encouraged communities to initiate more long-term programmes to facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants.

In addition, ex-combatants' livelihoods continued to improve because many CB programmes continued for a long time after funding from donors had ceased. This was made possible due to the active participation of community members during the planning and implementation of the programmes and, also, the acquisition of valuable skills and competencies. Unlike CL

programmes, where NGOs mainly implemented programmes, CB programmes offered community members the opportunity to participate actively in such programmes and to develop various skills. Many ex- combatants used these skills favourably for personal development to increase their individual earning capacity, and for the development of their communities to aid effective peacebuilding.

Moreover, CB programmes enhanced good governance through equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, and respect for basic human rights. Unlike CL, CB programmes encouraged democratic processes, where both ex-combatants and non-combatants were given opportunities to be represented on management committees. The use of the management committee to initiate community owned reintegration programmes empowered them (communities) to participate in these programmes, and facilitated transparency and accountability. It is important to note that corruption and the lack of accountability were some of the root causes of the conflict in Sierra Leone, thus programmes which addressed issues of corruption through transparent bidding for programmes, and the use of monitoring processes, prior to the release of funds, were considered to be more beneficial, and their attributes were found in CB, rather than, CL programmes. These transparent processes not only stopped malpractices, such as corruption, but they were fundamental to attempting to confer basic human rights.

Furthermore, CB programmes enhanced human security by creating an enabling security environment that facilitated the reintegration process, eliminated tension and fear in communities, and ensured food security. The discussion, in this Chapter, stressed the fact that CB programmes employed the services of the community police force to protect basic raw materials, used in the reintegration programmes, from burglary, and ex-combatants from being attacked by their victims. Communities employed these initiatives because the civil police could not protect the citizens from attacks. Unlike CL programmes, where private security was used to protect offices and equipment, the use of community police by CB programmes created an enabling security environment for entire communities, thus facilitating reintegration of ex-combatants. Besides, it brought both ex-combatants and non-combatants together and helped rebuild trusting relationships, which had eluded many communities as a result of the conflict, by paving the way for long-term development programmes. Sustainable food programmes encouraged interaction between ex-combatants and other community members, and promoted cooperation and tolerance. These forms of

interaction addressed issues of tension and mistrust, among community members, and mitigated chances of future conflict in communities.

Using a CB approach to reintegration programmes also enhanced social reconstruction because reintegration programmes focussed on both ex-combatants and non-combatants to address issues of resentment. Practically, it was evident that some programmes targeted specific groups such as the youth, or women, but the decisions to target these groups were not made by programme implementers, such as NGOs, but community members (at community meetings or durbars) made those decisions. Those community durbars provided platforms where problems facing ex-combatants were identified for urgent attention or consideration. Evidently, unlike CL programmes where external actors sometimes restricted community participation in decision-making processes, CB programmes were locally owned, thus specific issues affecting ex-combatants were given prompt attention. These processes of problem identification, through CB reintegration programmes, encouraged horizontal rather than vertical communication. Besides, it facilitated the formation and the activities of the community management committees during the reintegration process. The community approach to decision-making processes encouraged communities to support reintegration programmes, facilitated social cohesion among community groups, and enhanced social reconstruction.

Despite the fact that the research identified some form of restriction on community participation for the CL programmes, this research cannot conclude that all programmes should have local ownership because, in the immediate aftermath of the conflict, many community reintegration programmes were introduced by NGOs with some levels of community participation. During this period, many communities lacked the necessary capacity to initiate their own programmes, and also many donors were more familiar with dealing with recognised NGOs than local communities were. During the immediate aftermath of a conflict, NGOs can initiate programmes with support from communities. However, when people have settled down in communities, they should be encouraged to plan and implement their own reintegration programmes. Considering the timetable of the programmes, which spanned a decade (as shown in Chapter 4), it can be argued that reintegration is a long-term process rather than a programme; thus, there is the need for the international community to reconsider who will plan and implement reintegration programmes during the 'official-DDR' and 'post-DDR' phases. Whilst community reintegration programmes, in the 'official-DDR'

phase, can be commenced by NGOs with some level of community participation, communities should be encouraged to plan and implement reintegration programmes in the 'post-DDR' phase so that local ownership can be achieved (see Figure 6). As shown in Figure 6, whilst the 'official DDR' phase can be short-term, the 'post-DDR' phase should be of medium to long-term duration, with more sustainable programmes designed to improve livelihoods. When communities are assisted to develop their own programmes, they are in a better position to identify programmes that will aid the reintegration of ex-combatants in their communities. Besides, ex-combatants will probably develop valuable skills that can be used for subsequent programmes. It can be argued that CB reintegration programmes, in many post-conflict communities in Sierra Leone, improved livelihoods of ex-combatants and non-combatants, enhanced social reconstruction, enhanced good governance, and improved human security; and these attributes are very fundamental to more effective peacebuilding.

Figure 6 Community Reintegration

'Official DDR'   **'Post DDR'**

NGOs can initiate programmes with community participation

Communities initiate programmes with NGO's support if necessary

Levels of community participation: Tokenism, Partnership

Level of Community Participation: Ownership

Short term   **Medium term**   **Long term**

Source: Author

Building on the foundations laid in the previous chapters, this Chapter has provided an analysis of the ways in which CB reintegration programmes facilitate more effective peacebuilding, in the context of Sierra Leone, and the implications of such promotions for the

reintegration of ex-combatants. The following Chapter will provide an overall conclusion to the thesis.

Chapter Nine

Conclusion and Recommendations

9.1 Introduction

The Chapter begins with a summary of the thesis to include all areas covered in the previous chapters. It then progresses to draw conclusions in order to answer the research question, and also establish whether it agrees with the hypothesis or not. Afterwards, it provides theoretical advancement to DDR, community and community participation, CB and CL reintegration programmes, and methodology; and then makes recommendations for planning and implementation of CB reintegration programmes for ex-combatants. Finally, it highlights other areas for future research.

9.2 Thesis Summary

The aim of this research was to explore how CB reintegration programmes can facilitate more effective peacebuilding; therefore, the research was based on the following research question: 'how can CB reintegration programmes for ex-combatants contribute more effectively to peacebuilding?' The research hypothesizes that 'if communities were actively involved in planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes, it would contribute more effectively to peacebuilding'.

In order to achieve the aim of this thesis, Chapter One introduced conceptual and contextual issues of DDR and then continued to discuss each component - disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, separately. The discussions helped in identifying problems facing the current DDR, such as the one-man-one-weapon approach, which excluded many people from the DDR process, especially the reintegration programmes; and therefore the need to target both ex-combatants and receiving community to facilitate more effective peacebuilding. The Chapter stressed the need for a CB approach to reintegration by highlighting the following benefits: (1) CB reintegration will include all groups in communities rather than focussing only on ex-combatants, which could create resentment and thus result in further conflict; (2) CB reintegration programmes will serve as a platform where different groups of people can come together to iron out their differences when facilitating social reintegration; and (3) CB reintegration will empower local communities to identify the specific needs of ex-

combatants, and also to improve upon their skills and competencies in facilitating the reintegration process.

Having identified the need for a community approach to the reintegration process, Chapter Two explored the terms community and community participation in post-conflict contexts. The Chapter discussed community as a locality, social networks, shared identity/attachment, and norms and habits. It continued to discuss how groups influence power and decision-making processes in communities through the concepts of pluralist community theory, and by community stakeholding; and then how these groups interact among themselves through the concepts of social network and social capital. The Chapter then went on to discuss how community participation can facilitate community reintegration programmes and identified the following critical factors: willingness to support programmes, local ownership, target groups, socio-economic factors, appropriate time and place, clear objectives and expected results, transparent communication, resource mobilisation and management, partnership and collaboration, and simplification of administrative procedures.

Having identified the critical factors that can facilitate community reintegration programmes in the theoretical chapters, Chapter Three used these factors to explore some secondary cases (as illustrated in Appendix 1) in order to develop a comprehensive theoretical framework for field study in Sierra Leone. The proposed theoretical framework was as follows: (1) independent variables comprised of contexts as well as programme specific factors; contexts (political factors, community dynamics, socio-economic factors, security situations) and programme specific factors (programme design and implementation, objectives, target beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, action and procedures); and (2) dependent variables – improved human security, improved livelihood prospects, enhanced social reconstruction, enhanced good governance.

Chapter Four discussed research methodology used in the field work. First, the Chapter discussed philosophical issues and research debates and maintained the following positions: (1) emic as well as etic approaches for studying single cases in detail and comparing them; thus leading to concrete and abstract knowledge; (2) an ontological position of constructionism and an epistemological position of interpretivism, due to the fact that the social world is not independent of social actors, hence any outcome of a study conducted should reflect on the knower, as well as the known; and (3) qualitative methods as research

strategy using a comparative approach. The Chapter justified the selection of Sierra Leone as the case study country, the districts, and the community reintegration programmes for the study. In this Chapter, community reintegration programmes were regrouped into CB and CL. It highlighted the methodological and ethical constraints encountered and how they were mitigated.

Chapter Five provided analysis of the causes, the main actors and dynamics of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Chapter used the greed and grievance thesis as a framework for analysis and argued, in support of the greed thesis, that the conflict in Sierra Leone was caused by the availability and ability to gain control of the diamond areas to finance the RUF rebellion in Sierra Leone and also Charles Taylor's NPFL rebellion in Liberia, and not merely the grievances as argued by some academics. The Chapter also highlighted some peace agreements, such as the Lomé Agreement which mandated UNAMSIL to commence the DDR process, and the Abuja Agreement which helped to end the conflict. The DDR process was then discussed, in detail, highlighting some problems of exclusion in order to support the argument for a CB approach to reintegration.

Chapter Six is the first analysis chapter to make use of primary data and to discuss contextual factors (willingness to support reintegration programmes, community dynamics, socio-economic and security) identified in the theoretical framework. The discussion focussed on how the contextual factors contributed to the success or failure of community reintegration programmes. Here, the Chapter reintroduced the two sets of programmes that were studied during the fieldwork (CB and CL programmes) and highlighted some associated characteristics and differences, in terms of participation in the planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes. It stressed the fact that, both CB and CL programmes, shared the same aim of involving communities in decision-making processes and actions; but, whilst the levels of participation for CL programmes met the objectives pertaining to being, informing, consultative or at best achieving partnership, CB programmes also had the additional strengths of ownership or delegation of power.

Continuing with the use of primary data, Chapter Seven discussed how a change in the independent variables (design and implementation, objectives, targets/beneficiaries, resource mobilisation, and actions and procedures) resulted in a change of the dependent variables, by comparing CB and CL programmes. Also, community reintegration programmes were

compared using the 'official-DDR' and 'post-DDR' phases in order to make analyses. The discussion identified certain peacebuilding characteristics as follows: equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, employment opportunities, capacity building, long-term sustainable programmes, elimination of tension and fear, and enabling security environments. It was concluded that these peacebuilding characteristics were more associated with CB, rather than CL programmes.

Chapter Eight regrouped the peacebuilding characteristics, identified in Chapter Seven, under the dependent variables (improved livelihoods, enhanced good governance, improved human security, and enhanced social reconstruction) for discussion. The Chapter drew on Chapters Six and Seven to explore how CB programmes can facilitate more effective peacebuilding. The discussions pointed out that though there were some forms of restrictions regarding community participation in CL programmes, it would not be possible to argue for CB programmes usage only for community reintegration purposes. It stressed that during the 'official-DDR' phase, where communities were unsettled, NGOs could be used to initiate community programmes with some level of community participation, but the 'post-DDR' phase should focus more on CB programmes to facilitate more effective peacebuilding.

9.3   Conclusion

To answer the question 'how can CB reintegration programmes contribute more effectively to peacebuilding', it will be necessary to revisit the previous analysis chapters to discuss the peacebuilding factors (improved livelihood, enhanced good governance, improved human security, and enhanced social reconstruction). First, CB reintegration improved livelihoods of ex-combatants through long-term sustainable programmes, capacity building, and employment creation. The study revealed that in using CB programmes there was more certainty about the security of programmes, adequate funding facilities, and support from communities, and these factors contributed well to long-term sustainable programmes. Unlike CL programmes, where lack of community participation resulted in termination of many programmes, CB programmes were able to be continued on a long-term basis, due to the skills developed through active participation. Besides, the local contributions made, in support of CB programmes, ensured ownership from the inception of the programmes, and these encouraged communities to continue the programmes after the official funding from donors had ceased. In addition, communities formed various committees to manage CB programmes, and some of these committees were given training opportunities to improve

their capacities. Though, ex-combatants in management committees did not receive basic income for services provided, they were encouraged to develop skills and competencies, which led to job opportunities afterwards. This was evident in Masiaka where many of the committee members, who received training from GGEM, later became programme managers for the Koya Community Development Association and, thereby, earned regular income for the period they managed these programmes.

CB programmes used local facilitators to plan and implement programmes; however, in communities where ex-combatants could not compete favourably with other community members in the recruitment process, those ex-combatants were given a quota to facilitate their inclusion. This opportunity gave ex-combatants the chance to earn their own livelihood, thus facilitating their reintegration process. Besides, they improved upon their skills and capacities so that they could compete favourably with other jobseekers.

Second, CB reintegration programmes enhanced good governance through striving to achieve equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, and respect for human rights. Unlike CL programmes, which used existing undemocratic committees that created conflict in some communities, CB programmes used democratically elected committees that gave everybody, including ex-combatants, the opportunity to be nominated; thus, addressing issues of exclusion facilitated social cohesion. In many communities, where vulnerable groups such as ex-combatants, women, and disabled people could not compete favourably with other community members in elections, efforts were made to enable their representation; thus, the human rights of all people in communities were respected. Though this democratic process of electing management committee members was time consuming and expensive, it was more inclusive, so it addressed the root causes of conflict and provided a much more peaceful environment for development and the reintegration of ex-combatants.

CB programmes showed transparency through using monitoring teams to cross-check all requisitions and quotations for accuracy before releasing funds, by following basic guidelines for procurement procedures. Management committees were more accountable to their respective communities as a result of briefing them periodically on work-in-progress and all matters related to the programmes. These guidelines and monitoring procedures addressed forms of misappropriation and corruption in communities that impeded peaceful co-existence between ex-combatants and other community members. The transparent approach to CB

programmes, which were planned and implemented, by involving all groups such as ex-combatants in decision-making processes, enhanced good governance.

Third, CB reintegration programmes enhanced human security by creating secure environments eliminated issues of tension and fear in communities, and offered food security. Obviously, CB reintegration programmes brought both ex-combatants and other community members together during the planning and implementation of these programmes. Bringing these groups together during decision-making processes in community reintegration programmes helped in addressing their differences and in working towards a common goal. Also, they coped with each other during the entire training period. Whilst CB programmes addressed issues relating to the tension and fear that existed in various communities and encouraged community cohesion, some CL programmes created forms of division among community members due to lack of participation in decision-making processes. For instance, the lack of community participation, in decision-making processes, created conflict among community members in Wellington and led to the closure of the only community centre. CB programmes however encouraged all groups (including ex-combatants) in the planning and implementation processes, which addressed forms of resentment and created an enabling security environment to facilitate the reintegration process.

In addition, CB programmes used community policing to protect personnel and equipment in their communities. For example, community police was used to protect ex-combatants during the Human Rights and Civic Education Programme in Masiaka. In places where CB and CL programmes were implemented concurrently, the use of community police for CB programmes created an environment that was conducive to supporting the CL programmes, as well. The creation of a stable environment for the reintegration of ex-combatants helped in building trust, eliminated tension and fear among community members, and contributed to the reintegration process.

Finally, CB reintegration programmes enhanced social reconstruction through using integrated approaches to programmes, local ownership, and horizontal communication. The research focussed more on the levels of community participation in reintegration programmes. Unlike CL programmes, where community participation took the form of consultation or informing, CB programmes experienced local ownership, and that level of participation encouraged communities to target the specific needs of ex-combatants and

community members to facilitate the reintegration process. Evidently, not all groups were targeted at the same time, but the decision to target specific groups, such as ex-combatants, was made by communities through participatory decision-making processes. This approach to decision-making processes mitigated divisions among community members and lessened the possibility of further conflict.

Furthermore, local ownership of CB programmes facilitated prompt response to problems affecting ex-combatants because communities had to deal directly with the main sponsors, instead of first discussing issues with NGOs. Unlike the former, in the case of CL programmes, problems have to be referred to NGOs first. Besides, CB reintegration programmes encouraged horizontal communication among community members. This form of communication identified with ex-combatants and community members and with various sub-committees such as management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation committees, and with facilitators, who were predominantly local rather than external.   Thus, CB programmes encouraged participation of all groups, and that enhanced social reconstruction and facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants.

When considering discussions (in the analysis chapters and the above statements) concerning how community participation in CB programmes created employment opportunities for ex-combatants and improved their livelihoods, how democratic processes involved in electing community members to manage community programmes offered ex-combatants opportunities to be represented in good governance, how CB programmes created an enabling security environment to facilitate the reintegration process, and how local ownership of CB programmes enabled the specific needs of ex-combatants to be targeted and, thereby, enhanced social reconstruction, the research agrees with the hypothesis that 'if communities are actively involved in planning and implementation of community reintegration programmes, it would contribute more effectively to peacebuilding'. Using peacebuilding factors such as improved livelihood, enhanced good governance, enhanced human security, and improved social reconstruction, the research has answered the question 'how can CB reintegration programmes contribute more effectively to peacebuilding.' This was clearly unpacked in the analysis chapters, where CB reintegration programmes clearly identified these peacebuilding characteristics and factors.

9.4   Thesis Output

Having presented its conclusion, the chapter now elaborates a number of recommendations as part of the justification for this research. Therefore, that section is divided into three sub-sections, and these are: theoretical advancement; methodological recommendations; and policy recommendations.

9.4.1   Theoretical Advancement

Theoretical advancement for this research is sub-divided into four main areas: DDR; community and community participation; CL and CB programmes and, finally, CB programmes. At the end of each sub-division some theoretical advancement were enumerated.

DDR Theoretical Advancement

This research has highlighted various issues for the theoretical advancement of DDR in support of the work of some academics and practitioners working in the field of DDR; notably, the reintegration aspect. Reintegration is a long-term process in which ex-combatants are incorporated into communities to enable them to gain independence and to move freely amongst other community members, without any form of restriction. That is a lengthy and complex process, which requires adequate planning and implementation by policy-makers from the disarmament phase through to the demobilization phase to avoid failure. The international community, therefore, needs to reconsider the specific time frame they normally set for the completion of programme objectives. In fact, DDR should not be seen as a programme, but a process which is vital to ensuring security, as well as development, to achieve more effective peacebuilding in PCEs. So the research situates DDR in the peacebuilding process in agreement with Özerdem's postulation (2009), that peacebuilding is a process and should not be focussed on ending armed conflict only, but rather it should lead to a positive and sustainable peace, which could ensure security as well as socio-economic, structural political and cultural stability, thereby reducing the likelihood of relapse into or the continuation of violence, as stated in Chapter One of this research.

At the beginning of this thesis, the need for community approaches to reintegration was highlighted. It argued that the exclusion of other community members, in the extant reintegration process, has often created resentment among ex-combatants and other community members and did not aid peacebuilding. Whilst reintegration of ex-combatants is

an important aspect of the usage of the DDR process to ensure a smooth transition from combat to community status, a community approach goes beyond just the ex-combatants' angle to ensure the transition into a cohesive community, where security and development can flourish. Essentially, this thesis supports a holistic approach to reintegration and its impact on ex-combatants. Specifically, it agrees with the primary findings of other studies in the DDR field as follows:

- Developing understanding that reintegration implies a community, thus it must be community oriented rather than ex-combatants being focused on achieving more effective peacebuilding.

- Reviewing the norm that the reintegration phase often commences after the DD phases so that DD and R phases can be implemented simultaneously; or, even, that the R phase commences before DD.

- Arguing that disarmament, where a one-man-one-weapon system is used, should not be a prerequisite for entry into the reintegration phase. That is because cash-for-weapons, during the disarmament phase, excludes genuine combatants and other community members from the reintegration process.

- Establishing the fact that exclusion of some groups from the reintegration process creates hatred among community members; targeting only ex-combatants, at the expense of their victims and other community members, will adversely affect the reintegration process.

- Highlighting the fact that, in PCEs, the reintegration phase of the DDR must be well planned, as more effort is normally placed on the DD phase; and maintaining that, without adequate planning, resources and personnel, reintegration might not achieve its intended objectives of security and development.

- Maintaining that reintegration should be planned, by taking the complexity of PCEs into consideration, and should avoid reintegration programmes becoming too ambitious to complete.

- Delineating reinsertion from the reintegration of ex-combatants and maintaining that, during the reinsertion phase, ex-combatants can be focused, but the reintegration phase should target both ex-combatants and other community members.

- Supporting the notion that reintegration programmes should not try to address all groups in communities by using a single programme, because there are differences amongst people, such as: age, gender, disablement and education.

- Supporting the promotion of more community development programmes to facilitate the reintegration process of ex-combatants. Without community support for the reintegration process, ex-combatants will become frustrated and sell their reinsertion kits. Often, the lack of donor funding towards the reintegration process leaves communities with inadequate funds for developmental projects, when more emphasis is placed on ex-combatants.

- Linking the reintegration process with the developmental phase because there is a thin line between where reintegration ends and, where economic development in post-conflict reconstruction begins.

Community and Community Participation Theoretical Advancement

The literature in Chapter Two identified various approaches that could be used in defining communities: localities/boundaries, social networks, shared identities, attachments, and norms and habits; but, communities were more referred to, in this research, as localities or boundaries (villages, towns and chiefdoms). Also, communities were associated more with rural rather than urban areas; thus, it was not surprising that all the CB programmes were selected from rural, with none at all from urban areas The research agrees with Young's (1955) definition of communities which focuses on geographical areas, groups of people living in particular places, and share communal life; that is, a sense of solidarity has developed between people sharing a common territory.

In the rural areas homogeneous social systems, such as community ties, shared identity, exchange of resources and community works were identified; thus, in these contexts, community denotes harmonious societies that undertake reintegration programmes. This research agrees with Kingma's (2000) assertion that reintegration in rural areas is more successful than that in urban areas due to stronger networks being in place. Here, community as 'badges of belonging' which identify 'friends' and 'allies', as argued by Gilchrist (2004), was not clearly seen. This does not mean that the issue of inequality, among groups such as elites and other groups, was not identified in other rural communities. The assertion that reintegration was more successful in rural areas did not mean that all rural communities had

strong capacities with regard to initiating programmes; weak rural communities, which could not plan and implement programmes, were equally evident and they were offered training opportunities to improve their capacities. However, in the urban communities, the 'whole community' concept was not identified because people living in particular places were found to belong to different tribes, religions and of different social status; thus, the social networks or norms and habits, that existed among the urban areas, spanned people living in different areas.

Community participation encouraged all members of a community to actively contribute to and influence community reintegration programmes, meaning that local people were directly involved in identifying, planning and the implementation, and monitoring of reintegration programmes. Community participation, as a decision-making process, was therefore the key to bringing people and groups together for a common goal. This research agrees with Özerdem (2009), in Chapter Two, that the reintegration process as part of peacebuilding activities thrives more in communities with a higher rate of participation, rather than those with a lesser amount. This thesis develops our understanding of community and community reintegration through the following:

- Identifying the fact that the word community is associated with a locality (villages, towns and chiefdoms) rather than social networks, or shared identity in Sierra Leone.
- Acknowledging the notion of homogenous rural communities with a shared interest in community reintegration programmes.
- Recognizing community to include ex-combatants (men, women, children and disabled peoples from different warring factions), and non-combatants (internally displaced persons -IDPs), refugees, victims of violence and locals).
- Identifying communities with weak capacities that are finding it difficult to mobilize voluntary resources, such as personnel for community reintegration programmes. In that case, they need to contract technical support from external sources to plan and implement reintegration programmes.
- Establishing that groups limit the power of various communities, but also that some groups can influence decision-making processes, and explaining these power differences through the pluralist community theory and community as stakeholding.

- Developing two levels of influence in PCEs as follows: (a) Level 1 – chiefs, opinion leaders, refugees, male ex-combatants, community leaders, and government officials – these are groups with lots of influence in communities; (b) Level 2 – IDPs, disabled people, refugees, pensioners, child soldiers, community members, and female ex-combatants – these groups are considered weak, thereby having less influence.

- Explaining our understanding of social capital through bonding, bridging and linking and their influence on community cohesion.

- Sensitizing communities to accept ex-combatants, despite the atrocities they committed during the conflict. Without such sensitization, ex-combatants will be ignored by other community members, which will adversely affect the reintegration process.

- Supporting the promotion of the fact that community participation enhances good governance through decision-making processes, improves security situations in PCEs, enhances economic livelihoods, and facilitates social reconstruction.

Community-based and Community-located Theoretical Advancement

Levels of participation were linked with CB and CL programmes. Whilst CB programmes had ownership or citizens' control, the levels of participation in CL programmes led to them becoming informing, consultative and the formation of partnerships. Clearly, the research pointed out that both CL and CB programmes involved communities, but the levels of community participation were different in different situations and circumstances, hence, the use of Arnstein's (1969) eight-rung ladder of levels of participation (manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control) to explain these differences.

Contextual factors, such as willingness to support reintegration programmes, community dynamics, socio-economics, and security can contribute to the success or failure of reintegration programmes. Under the section about the willingness to support reintegration programmes, the research discussed how the Sierra Leone government set up the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) to take the reintegration process forward after the National Commission for DDR (NCDDR) officially announced the completion of the DDR programme in 2002. Also, the willingness of NGOs and communities' to support community programmes contributed to the success of the reintegration process. Other factors, such as

community dynamics, socio-economics (infrastructure, labour market, access to land, and provision of justice) and security were also discussed because they affected the success, or otherwise, of community reintegration programmes.

Regarding programme specific factors, the research discussed the design and implementation, objectives, targets/beneficiaries, resource mobilisation and actions and procedures. Here, the main focus was to compare CL and CB programmes using the factors to identify some peacebuilding characteristics, such as: integrated approach to programmes, local ownership, equity and inclusion, transparency and accountability, employment opportunities, capacity building, long-term sustainable programmes, elimination of tension and fear, and enabling security environments. The discussion about programme specific factors identified community reintegration programmes that facilitated more effective peacebuilding. Also, 'official-DDR' and 'post-DDR' programmes were compared in the discussion. Empirically, this thesis develops our understanding of CB and CL through the following:

- Categorizing the reintegration process into 'official-DDR' and 'post-DDR', with 'official-DDR' describing the immediate aftermath of conflict, and 'post-DDR' meaning the medium to long-term phase after conflict.

- Categorizing community reintegration programmes into CB and CL, with CB as programmes managed by communities themselves, and CL as programmes managed by NGOs, with some level of community participation.

- Maintaining that CB programmes are more participatory than CL due to local ownership.

- Supporting the fact that CB programmes were initiated only in the rural areas, but CL programmes were initiated in rural as well as urban areas.

- Acknowledging the diverse nature of CB and CL programmes (social, economic and development), but more focus being placed on economic programmes to address the problem of unemployment among the youth.

- Maintaining that CB programmes formed community management committees to manage programmes, whilst CL programmes used programme managers to manage programmes, with the support of community management committees.

- Establishing the fact that CL programmes were popular during the 'official-DDR' phase because communities were still settling in and some could not initiate their own

programmes; however, both CL and CB programmes were initiated in the 'post-DDR' phase, but CB programmes saw an increase because, when communities were more settled, they were able to identify, plan and implement their own programmes.

- Maintaining that many reintegration programmes, during the 'official-DDR' were short-term due to the fragile security situation and administrative difficulties, whilst the 'post-DDR' programmes were long-term to achieve more effective peacebuilding.

- Recognizing the fact that NGOs assist weak communities to articulate their needs and formulate programmes to facilitate reintegration programmes, and identifying that the absence of these intermediaries limits programmes that can be planned and implemented in many communities.

- Situating community reintegration programmes in the overall policy framework of a country.

Community-based Programmes

As demonstrated in the research, CB reintegration was a very important aspect of the DDR process, because it facilitated more effective peacebuilding for ex-combatants, as well as other community members. CB approaches to programmes, where communities were supported with resources, helped them to initiate their own programmes and contributed to more effective peacebuilding. This research agrees with Kingma (2000) that reintegration succeeds relatively well, with community support, and stresses the fact that the family, friends and community support are likely to be immense. The support from communities contributed to long-term programmes, thus created employment opportunities for ex-combatants and facilitated their reintegration process in various communities.

CB programmes addressed the needs of all groups (both ex-combatants and non-combatants) in the reintegration process. Vulnerable groups, such as women, disabled people, girl-mothers, and the uneducated, were identified by communities and mostly their needs were considered. It was evident, in the research, that there were many ex-combatants in the population in the CB programmes, more so than in the case of CL programmes, because communities were instrumental in identifying their own needs, which gave them (ex-combatants) opportunities to be represented in reintegration programmes.

Moreover, CB programmes, such as those relating to skills training, were linked to the overall development programmes to foster employment creation, which eventually contributed to successful reintegration of ex-combatants. In Sierra Leone, many of the CB programmes were sponsored by a National Commission (NaCSA) and, for that matter, were fed into national programmes, such as the Security Sector Reform (SSR), to achieve sustainable security, and Millennium Development Goals (MDG) for economic and recovery development. This research agrees with UNDP (2005) in Chapter One that a well designed DDR programme will not only enhance basic security but will also support wider recovery and development programmes. CB programmes contributed to more effective peacebuilding through improved livelihood opportunities, enhanced good governance, improved human security, and enhanced social reconstruction, as already discussed above. This thesis develops our understanding of CB programmes through the following:

- Developing our comprehensive understanding of community approaches to reintegration that includes ex-combatants and non-combatants.
- Identifying the fact that CB programmes can focus on specific groups, such as women and children but, when that happens, the decision is made by the community and not by individuals.
- Linking CB programmes with national recovery programmes, such as the Security Sector Reform (SSR) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
- Introducing the use of local actors in CB programmes, thus creating employment opportunities for ex-combatants to improve their livelihoods and facilitate the reintegration process.
- Establishing that CB programmes create enabling security environments and that they address fear and mistrust among community members.
- Maintaining that CB programmes are long-term, especially during the 'post-DDR' phase of reintegration.
- Identifying the significance of community participation in CB programmes by bringing ex-combatants and non-combatants together to facilitate social reintegration.
- Supporting the promotion of transparency and accountability of financial proceedings, in addressing potential conflict situations in communities.
- Maintaining that simplified administrative procedures, such as accounting and procurement processes, facilitate the implementation process in CB programmes.

- Encouraging community contributions in CB programmes to develop members' interest in the programmes for sustainability.

- Acknowledging the fact that CB programmes are associated with local capacities, resources, and skills.

9.4.2 Methodological Considerations

The following methodological recommendations are made for research in PCEs:

- Field research should be planned in phases, rather than one phase, because it offers opportunity for researchers to be reflexive during each phase and to find appropriate methods or solutions to address issues.

- Researchers need to be flexible in their approach to obtaining information from programme managers because they are likely to encounter numerous disappointments (cancellation of scheduled appointments). This can be at short notice due to other operational commitments. Researchers need patience under such circumstances, and resilience to obtain the necessary information.

- Researchers must place stress on time and place when making appointments with respondents in PCEs. Sometimes, gaining access to respondents who have agreed to interviews can be cumbersome owing to poor time keeping.

- Researchers must familiarize themselves more with respondents, as identified in the 'door knocking' process in the methodology chapter, to obtain the necessary information for research validity.

- Research strategy, such as snowballing, can be beneficial in collecting data as well as identifying the existing social networks in communities. With snowballing, the research was able to establish interconnectivity among community members.

- Researchers can choose 'fixers', who can double as translators, to cut costs and facilitate ease of movement. In PCEs, where researchers sometimes resort to motorbikes for convenience, keeping the research team as small as possible is essential.

- Lack of logistics such as electricity, photocopying machines and road networks, can affect the smooth running of research in PCEs. In Sierra Leone, for instance, making photocopies often took days rather than minutes, hence adequate preparation is needed prior to fieldwork.

- Researchers should choose their own programmes, when there is the need to do so, for observation rather than allowing programme managers to make the selection. Otherwise, managers may choose only successful programmes for observation so that the organisation can retain a good image. Such careful attention to detail helps to address issues of research bias.

9.4.3 Policy Recommendations

Policy recommendations develop approaches to CB reintegration programmes to facilitate more effective peacebuilding. That will be done by considering the planning and then the implementation of programmes. It is important to note that reintegration programmes can be political, economic or social, but these recommendations apply to all, in so far as they are CB activities. Additionally, we assume that communities are settled when they feel enabled to start CB programmes. As argued above, CB reintegration programmes should be encouraged during the medium to long-term phases of the reintegration process when communities are more settled.

Planning

In planning CB reintegration programmes, the main goal is to allow communities to direct the process by identifying these programmes. This identification can be done through community meetings and durbars to assist community members to list reintegration programmes that need consideration before the community chooses from its lists. Having identified a desirable programme through prioritisation, communities should confirm with sponsors whether the programme is positive enough to attract funds for reintegration programmes. In situations where government commissions are responsible for funding of these projects, listing possible programmes, or making them available to communities will assist them in their programme identification process. That having been done, communities should democratically elect a management committee to plan the programme in detail. Election to the committee should be free and fair, and largely based on social merit and acceptability in the eyes of the community and not on a political, religious or kinship basis. This committee should be transparent and accountable to the members of the communities. The essence of the management committee is not to create new structures in communities, but to ensure fair representation of various groups within communities.

The planning committee must involve ex-combatants, female participants, and the disabled, if possible. Engaging ex-combatants in the planning process will help them to identify, for themselves, their specific needs and automatically necessitate their inclusion in the programmes. Community chiefs and elders should not be members of the management committees to avoid undue influence and to facilitate their use as arbitration committees, which could address issues regarding misunderstandings or misappropriation of funds. The basic functions of the management committee should include: (1) initiating the design and planning of reintegration programmes (including writing of project proposals and budgeting); (2) managing or supervising the entire programme, including handling of all funds, from the onset to completion; (3) procuring all goods and services through procurement of sub-committee; (4) contracting labour from the community or contractors, and taking appropriate action about any breach of contract; (5) preparing and submitting work-in-progress reports to the communities as well as donors; and (6) organising projects including launching and commissioning. The committees should be given basic training on project planning and implementation, planning and scheduling of procurement, contracting and procurement rules, proposal and report writing skills, bookkeeping, and basis management and communication skills to improve their capacity to work effectively.

Within the management committees, various sub-committees, such as those for procurement, monitoring and evaluation, and maintenance/continuity, can be formed to do specific tasks. These sub-committees should consist of at least three members (one of whom should be an ex-combatant). The purpose of having these separate functionaries in the management committees is to ensure control and to address issues of misappropriation and corruption. The procurement sub-committees will be tasked with the responsibility of making all purchases for the programme; the monitoring and evaluation sub-committees will monitor the delivery of inputs, the levels of participation, use of financial resources, quality of work and outcomes, and sustainability of programmes; and the maintenance/continuity sub-committees will ensure the long-term process of the programmes through maintenance or other measures. Specific tasks involved in all these sub-projects should be spelt out clearly during the planning and implementation phases of the programmes, to avoid conflict.

As management committees cannot work in isolation, so they need to work with the government line Ministries, such as the Ministries of Education, Finance, Communication, Youth and Sports, and those for Women; the Commission responsible for reintegration of ex-

combatants; and donors. These groups will work hand-in-hand with the management committees to consider the eligibility of the reintegration programmes, make desk and field appraisals to confirm community participation in identifying the reintegration programmes, determine community commitment, and assist in finalising the programmes. In addition, they will help in monitoring the project by giving direction to the management committees, where applicable.

In planning community reintegration programmes, the community should consider the contextual factors, such as the willingness to support the programme, community dynamics, socio-economics, and security. These factors are very important in the planning and implementation of community-reintegration programmes because without the willingness of the government or of the donors to support the programmes, communities will not be in a position to sponsor those programmes. Also, the unwillingness of communities to support these programmes will end in failure because all the planning and implementation processes rest on them. Without community support, there will be no community reintegration programmes. Notably, these contextual factors are not exhaustive, but they will depend on specific post-conflict contexts. The identification of these factors requires community risk assessments in the initial stages of the planning.

Whilst considering contextual factors in the planning stage of the programme, other factors, such as, when to start the planning process, resource mobilisation, monitoring and evaluation, and continuity strategies should be considered. If CB reintegration programmes for ex-combatants are to be continued as long-term development and peacebuilding processes, they need to be linked to national recovery programmes, such as the SSR for security, and MDG for development and recovery. This requires enhancing the strengths of community members, during the planning stages to ensure smooth transitions from security to development.

The design of CB reintegration programme should be kept as simple as possible to enable completion. Simple programmes encourage and develop community members so that their skills and competencies might be able to be used in subsequent programmes. The timeframe should not be too ambitious as post-conflict contexts are notoriously difficult, and an ambitious programme, therefore, which is suspended during the process of execution will not serve communities beneficially; besides, it will be a further waste of limited resources, which has already being associated with PCEs. The avoidance of technically complex projects,

which cannot be managed by community members from the onset of the programmes, is very important. Nonetheless, communities can recruit external facilitators to provide technical support, although they should be in a position to understand the technicalities involved in the programmes and manage them themselves, even in situations where external facilitators are used. As identified in the research, a broader and more holistic approach to reintegration programmes, that included community members, provided better results and facilitated the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Implementation

As indicated in this research, the target groups should include both ex-combatants and other community members. It is, however, important to consider age, education, gender, and other social factors in programme implementation, rather than putting all participants in the same category. Female ex-combatants for example, will have different needs from their male counterparts, and people with more advance levels of education might require different programmes from the uneducated. It is the responsibility of communities to identify such specific needs so that they can be targeted. The research identified the fact that some vulnerable groups have been excluded from many community reintegration programmes, which were planned by NGOs, due to there being a first-come-first-served approach to recruitment processes. The essence of CB programmes is to identify these specific needs, affecting women and other vulnerable groups, to avoid resentment. Giving opportunities to women to participate in CB reintegration programmes opened up avenues for female ex-combatants, and facilitated the reintegration process in communities. Targeting all groups is geared towards facilitating reintegration of ex-combatants into communities so that they will not go back to conflict.

Programme objectives should be known to all community members, and this can be done after the community had taken decisions regarding particular reintegration programmes. Community members need to be informed about the reasons behind selecting potentially beneficial programmes. For example, a decision to train people in carpentry and building construction, so that they can rebuild community housing should be made known during the recruitment stages to avoid subsequent conflict. When such aims and objectives are known to all community members, ex-combatants will be seen as partners in post-conflict reconstruction and this will facilitate their reintegration process into communities. By so doing, ex-combatants will not be seen as liabilities, or people who depend on communities'

limited resources, without offering something beneficial in return. More importantly, the participants will know what is expected of them after the training, rather than deserting their communities for greener pastures in the cities. The aims and objectives of programmes should be clear and simple without any ambiguity to aid both participants' and beneficiaries' understanding.

It is also recommended that the objectives should be clear about the times and places for the reintegration programmes. This should be decided by community members because they are familiar with local situations. Agricultural reintegration programmes that depend on the weather, for instance, require suitable times for the commencement of planting for good harvests. Failure to identify appropriate times for such reintegration programmes will affect crop production and, consequently, will affect the livelihoods of ex-combatants and their reintegration process in communities. Also, an appropriate place for programmes will encourage participants' attendance at work. It is the responsibility of the community to make decisions, based on other factors such as distances to villages the citizens of which will participate in the programmes and to decide what facilities need to be available, at the chosen sites. The place should be suitable and appropriate for the programmes without causing undue problems for other community members.

Resource mobilisation is another factor for consideration. Regarding physical resources, communities are encouraged to contribute labour or local materials in support of the reintegration programmes. Possibly, this should be mandatory and should not exceed 10% of the total cost of the programme so that communities will not be burdened unnecessarily. However, the mandatory community contributions towards the programmes are likely to ensure community participation in the entire programmes, and may bring ex-combatants and non-combatants together for the social reconstruction of the communities. This form of contribution encourages local ownership of programmes for continuity purposes. With regard to physical resources, communities should be encouraged to use local materials, where possible, rather than relying on buying those materials from elsewhere in order to offer job opportunities to locals.

Financial resources are major issues of concern. Community management committees ought to work closely with donors. Letters of interest should be accompanied by budget proposals spelling out prices of items clearly. When funds are released in tranches and communities are

supposed to submit reports on the disbursement of previous funds, before being granted successive tranches, they should present their reports on time to avoid unduly delaying programmes. Notably, communities will open bank accounts for specific programmes, so that all funds can be paid into such accounts. Withdrawals from those accounts should be made by joint signatories who are authorised by those communities. Treasurers of the management committees will be given the task of filling in appropriate forms, backed by receipts for payments made. In places with no banking facilities, the issue of cash management can be difficult. It is likely to require travelling for long distances to access banking services. Efforts should be made not to transport monies over long distances, but rather such monies ought to be spent on purchasing and transporting these items, instead. Facilitators can be paid through bank accounts weekly or monthly rather than their wages being paid in cash daily. The planning and implementation processes need to be considered in relation to these constraints from the onset. In situations where reintegration programmes are sub-contracted, owing to their technical nature, the sub-contract agreements will form part of the financial reports. Periodically, the management committees will submit financial reports to donors as well as communities, as specified.

Obviously, financial procedures will not be the sole responsibility of the management committees, as communities will have responsibilities, too. Competent people with financial knowhow can be employed to crosscheck or inspect reports to make sure that they conform to basic accounting principles. Also, communities have responsibilities to inspect and express their views or concerns about financial reports that will be submitted by the management committees. Financial reports can be put on community notice boards prior to community meetings, so that issues can be raised for further clarification. Given the fact that diffusion of large funds into various communities can be misappropriated, robust financial monitoring is required. Communities can constitute their own internal teams for the provision of auditors to audit their financial accounts pertaining to their programmes. These processes will encourage transparency and accountability of the reintegration programmes; and, more importantly, will address forms of doubt or mistrust that can cause further conflict to arise. Transparent CB programmes, which are more accountable, can, bring ex-combatants and other community members together in terms of social reintegration.

Human resources will be the responsibility of the community. As already indicated, communities will elect a committee to manage reintegration programmes. Where

communities need to recruit trainers, local facilitators should be used to create employment opportunities for them. In some situations, ex-combatants can be part of the training team, and any effort made to include them may facilitate their reintegration. If they cannot compete favourably with other community members in the recruitment process, a quota can be set. Using ex-combatants in more constructive ways will help other community members accept them. Finding skilled facilitators can sometimes be difficult in communities where conflict has eroded educational systems and external facilitators can be employed.

Actions and procedures in the implementation processes are also important. Simple procedures, such as procurement or monitoring and evaluation processes, can be utilized. Basic principles in procurement; economy, efficiency, equal opportunity, and transparency, can be applied through the following steps: (1) on management committees, or in situations where the programme are sub-contracted, contractors prepare lists of required items with prices and submit them to procurement committees for action; (2) procurement committees discuss the lists with community members and submit requests to management committees for authorisation; (3) cash is given to the procurement committees for purchases (withdrawal of cash should be done by the signatories); and (4) goods are purchased by procurement committees, and crosschecked by the management committees, in terms of quantity and quality. It is recommended that management committees should have clear procurement plans to cover management of materials, contracts, and transportation of materials. Transparent procedures for procurement will address issues of likely conflict, and facilitate reintegration of ex-combatants.

Coordination of activities is an important aspect of CB reintegration programmes and committees should be given responsibility for overseeing that, and that needs to start from programme identification and continue throughout all the planning and implementation stages. Management committees should coordinate: local actors, external facilitators (where applicable), sub-contractors, and personnel from various line ministries and donors. Apart from staffing, coordination should also focus on processes, such as a more inclusive approach to programme planning, and horizontal communication among actors. Coordination requires dialogue and collaboration, and consensus-seeking processes are necessary due to wide ranging cultural and implementation differences. It is important to note that coordination of activities will encounter some fundamental barriers, such as lack of common purpose among various actors, and lack of a level playing field during consultation processes; but the

management committees should exhibit good negotiating skills, ensure flexibility of approach, make time for coordination of activities, and have transparent and horizontal relationships with actors.

9.5   Further Research

My research in Sierra Leone has necessitated further research, as illustrated below:

- As identified in the theoretical chapters, the current literature on programmes is still limited and anecdotal, thus more research is needed for monitoring and evaluation purposes in community reintegration programmes

- Transitional justice was examined as a component part of his research; however, further research could explore institutional linkages that exist between transitional justice and DDR for more effective peacebuilding

- This research focused on community reintegration programmes, exclusively in rural areas, because in Sierra Leone CB programmes were initiated only in rural areas with none at all in urban areas. It is important to explore community reintegration programmes in some urban areas in other post-conflict countries

- Comparative approaches involving community reintegration programmes in various post-conflict countries can be studied, so that best practices can be generalized to help policymakers in community approaches to reintegration

- Due to the involvement of government agencies in community reintegration programmes, a study of how local government agencies can help reintegration programmes could be beneficial to the reintegration process

- Many organisations hand out small credit facilities to ex-combatants and other community members to facilitate reintegration processes in communities, which are popularly known as micro-financing. These credit facilities are so small that beneficiaries can sometimes afford to buy small items, such as bags of rice, and start selling cupfuls without initiating long-term programmes. A study exploring the benefits of micro-credit financing of beneficiaries, as well as long-term community development, is very important

In conclusion, the researcher felt that having chosen to study DDR in relation to CB and CL programmes, in Sierra Leone, proved to be a justifiable as has been presented in the research findings.

Appendix 1

Community Programme 1
The World Bank Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP) in Aceh

In 2005 in Indonesia, Aceh, the World Bank financed the Kecamatan Development Programme (KDP), which was designed to fight poverty within local communities in the region. The main objectives were to reduce poverty and to improve local governance in rural areas, to institutionalize participatory processes in local government, to provide cost-effective basic social and economic infrastructure, and to strengthen the capacity of the microfinance institutions (The World Bank, 2006). The programme covered about 70% of the entire region, with a network of 15,000 local facilitators, in order to ensure community participation at the local level and reduce the risk of corruption (Caramés, 2006). The programme aimed at rehabilitation and reintegration in the short and long-terms, respectively.

The KDP targeted communities, however, the programme was confronted with corrupt practices due to lack of transparency in the KDP project cycle. To fight corruption, it was stipulated that all financial transactions should be signed by no fewer than three parties (World Bank, 2006:56). As part of the programme, communities received 600 USD for each ex-combatant, who returned to the community, for infrastructure development 'using funds from the World Bank, the EU and the United States, with a maximum cost of 1.8 million dollars' (Caramés, 2006:7). This form of CB development helped to avoid tension and distinctions between ex-combatants and the locals and thereby facilitated the reintegration process. Caramés (2006:7) posits that the level of acceptance by community members of ex-combatants in this form of CB development was around 90%.

The programme helped in the reconstruction of public infrastructure in Aceh. Getting access to basic services, such as health and education was vital to communities. Apart from the services, the KDP also provided employment opportunities for ex-combatants, as well as community members. In PCEs, any form of income earning projects is necessary because it can prevent ex-combatants from rearming as a way of survival. The importance of CB activities is, therefore, necessary for the reintegration process in PCEs.

Community Programme 2

Afghanistan National Solidarity Programme (NSP)

In 2002, in Afghanistan, the NSP was instituted as a nation-building exercise that emphasized local governance. Under the programme, communities received grants and decided on how to use those grants in community participatory decision-making processes. These processes were instigated by community development councils (CDCs), which were elected by the communities (Lister, 2004). The CDCs produced development plans and prioritised them on behalf of the communities. Overall, they helped to 'legitimate local leadership and strengthened relationships between communities and the local government' (World Bank, 2006:47). A pre-condition of being given grants was that communities were to invest in reconstruction activities. Facilitating partners assisted communities in the election of CDCs, in the planning and implementing of sub-projects, and in building capacity for financial management (Ibid).

The NSP targeted the local communities for projects, so that they would have ownership. Local facilitators were, therefore, used to build local capacities and also to improve upon their livelihoods. Coordination between the communities, and their facilitating partners, was necessary to avoid duplication of projects.

The NSP delivered all resources to community members to enable them to plan and implement programmes, so that they could re-establish ties among community members, and also to re-establish communication between communities and state institutions. This form of local ownership helped communities to take up leadership roles, which facilitated local governance. Also communities chose development programmes, such as improving infrastructure, which were of the utmost priority. The World Bank (2006:48) posited that more than 80% of the sub-projects involved infrastructural work (irrigation, rural roads, electrification and drinking-water supply), which was critical for recovery in PCEs.

As part of the programme, the following lessons were learnt: (1) creation of CDCs, was vital to in enhancing good governance in local communities; (2) infrastructure development was needed to assist the recovery process; and (3) a participatory approach to decision-making processes was essential to facilitate the reintegration process (though women's influence was considered to be too low).

Community Programme 3

Angola Third Social Action Fund (FAS III)

In Angola, the FAS III was initiated to allow decentralization, so that previously inaccessible areas could be reached. FAS III was built on FAS I and II to incorporate a more intensive CB approach to allow for a greater involvement in communities and local government in their decision-making about service delivery (World Bank, 2006:50). FAS III encouraged a culture of accountability and service delivery, at the community level, to assist in the reconciliation throughout the entire country.

The planning and implementation process focussed on transparent resource management, which was intended to build confidence in communities, and to contribute to national reconciliation. The projects, however, were not linked to other development programmes, due to lack of coordination. Linking FAS programmes to the overall development projects of the country could have helped solve some problems such as duplication of projects. Coordination could have also ensured that the different approaches were both sustainable and complementary (World Bank, 2006:51).

The FAS transferred responsibility for project implementation to local government and placed emphasis on building on social capital, at the local level, by establishing inclusive community forums. Programmes were managed by community members and this encouraged transparency and accountability. Besides, it enhanced social cohesion and trust building.

Some of the lessons learned from the FAS III projects were (1) the improvement of infrastructure development, such as, schools, health posts, water and sanitation facilities, roads, and markets, was necessary (World Bank, 2006); (2) the enhancement of participatory decision-making processes, through a 5-member community committee that was elected; (3) the building of trust among community members through community programmes; (4) the need to build local capacity through decentralisation; and (5) the necessity to facilitate developmental programmes to enhance people's livelihoods within the communities.

Community Programme 4

The USAID Community-based Programme in Burundi

In Burundi, the USAID launched a CB programme in early 2004, which aimed to promote CB reintegration and reconciliation. The USAID opted for CB approach in the granting of

loans to community members, after the previous stand-alone programme has been unsuccessful (USAID, 2005:12). Two large towns (Gitega and Ruyigi), from two provinces, were selected for the programme. As part of the programme, CB leadership and vocational skills training were initiated to offer beneficiaries the chance to develop competencies so that they could do further exploration by using the grant to set up small workshops. A 1-month CB leadership training was started to prepare the leaders in basic management processes, effective communication and conflict resolution programmes. The vocational skills training (VST) programme took 4 to 6 months, and trainees were introduced to carpentry, metalwork, tie and dye making, hairdressing and motor mechanics. Also, they were trained in numeracy and literacy skills. According to USAID, by September 2005, approximately 6,200 people had received training in the two provinces.

The planning focussed on communities rather than ex-combatants. According to USAID (2005), one-quarter of the students were women, 55% were from vulnerable groups (who had remained in the communities during the conflict), and the rest were equally divided among ex-combatants from different armed groups, returned refugees and IDPs. Local facilitators (artisans) were also used during the training process because they were given 1-month's leadership training programme in order to prepare them for training others, subsequently.

On completion of the training, communities decided how to use the small grants given to them by USAID. These grants were designed to improve capacity building and community infrastructure, and to foster cooperation among different groups within communities. Communities were able to take decisions about programmes, which they wanted to embark on, without interference from the donors.

The lessons learned from the Burundi programme were as follows: (1) the necessity to build trust through decision-making processes; (2) the desirability of enhancing reintegration and reconciliation through the use of small grants and training activities; (3) the need to promote an all-inclusive approach (ex-combatants and non-combatants) to programmes; and (4) the requirement to build community capacity through leadership programmes to take management roles.

Community Programme 5

USAID Community-based Programmes in DRC

The problems associated with DDR, such as the exclusion of some groups, for example, local militias, disabled people, women and child soldiers, called for a more CB approach to facilitate the reintegration process. USAID launched its CB programme in 2004 in the eastern part of the DRC (USAID, 2005:14). The programme aimed to create the opportunities for people to develop social and technical skills to improve upon the security in that area. A 6-month programme was introduced, incorporating the following modules: (1) health and well-being; (2) reaffirmation of values (including gender and rape sensitization and psychosocial assistance in relation to dealing with war trauma); (3) how to deal with conflict management and leadership; (4) development of agricultural skills, income generation and project management; (5) and how to bring into effect democracy and good governance (USAID, 2005:14). These training programmes were carefully selected to assist participants to adjust to the PCEs, and also to equip them with necessary basic skills to earn incomes. It could be argued that the 6-month duration, allocated for the implementation of the programme was insufficient to equip community members with the right skills. As part of the programme, USAID provided communities with small grants in order to take up projects which would benefit them and 'foster reconciliation among different elements' (USAID, 2005:16). The programme funded about 130 projects, totalling approximately $2.7 million.

The programme targeted the youth, though the aged and children also participated. That was not surprising due to the high percentage of youth who were unemployed in the country. Besides, it encouraged greater independence and discouraged them from re-arming for economic survival. The programme targeted 60 people from each community, the selection being made by the communities, themselves. Also, communities selected their own community management committees. According to USAID (2006:15), most of the participants who were selected were literate, due to the high literacy rate in DRC, and also they had been chosen with a view to their being able to train or teach other community members.

The lessons learnt from the DRC programme were as follows: (1) the programmes benefited communities and fostered reconciliation among community members, despite the fact that only small amounts of money were received as grants; (2) communities were empowered through decision-making processes; (3) communities identified their own programmes, which

were beneficial to them; and (4) it was essential to take account of the willingness of communities to support programmes which would then be likely to result in success.

Community Programme 6

UNDP with MINUSTAH Community-based Programme in Haiti

In 2003 in HAITI, the UNDP worked in conjunction with MINUSTAH DDR section to establish a CB DDR approach. It was based on a totally integrated management structure by both UNDP and MINUSTAH. The programme aimed to reduce violence in communities through the use of information campaigns, conflict resolution support, and micro-project assistance, for community groups, as well as ex-combatants (UNDP, 2006:33). The programme was multi-faceted, based on negotiation, disarmament and reintegration of armed groups (male, female, children, elderly) and people associated with them; community disarmament and conflict prevention; and the control of small arms proliferation through political and legislative structures (Caramés, 2006:5).

The programme targeted the youth, women and men, the elderly, civil society organisations and armed groups. The programme mobilised resources from various countries such as the EU, USA, and Canada. These countries focussed on specific reintegration programmes, for example, Canada provided $10 million for security within communities, and that was possible owing to programmes having been properly coordinated.

As part of the programme, communities formed an organisation called the Committee for the Prevention of Violence and for Community Development (CPVD) to identify potential threats and how to prevent them. The Committee members represented various communities to ensure inclusion of all groups (ex-combatants, refugees, IDPs,) and these members were elected through democratic processes. The CPVD worked with UNDP and MINUSTAH to achieve the overall aim of reducing violence in the country. The success achieved could, in part, be attributed to the contributions made by communities when fighting crime.

Lessons learnt from the CB DDR in Haiti were (1) the formation of the CPVD created institutions for local governance in the country; (2) interactions of community groups encouraged social reintegration; and (3) having an integrated management structure addressed issues of exclusion and resentment and facilitated the building of trust among community members.

Community Programme 7

The OTI Community-based Projects in Kosovo

In Kosovo, the OTI initiated CB programme, Kosovo Transitional Initiatives (KTI) - from 1999-2001 - to empower locals through the participatory decision-making processes to decide on infrastructural development. The programme aimed to bring people together from various groups (ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees) to facilitate the reintegration process. As part of the democratic process, KTI employed the services of the media to ensure that information concerning the programme was available to community members at the right time.

Community Improvement Councils (CICs) were formed by communities with support from OTI. Each CIC comprised of 12-15 members elected from various groups and backgrounds - political, social and intellectual diversity - (OTI, 2005)[161]. The CICs emerged as the embodiment of representatives from various communities and, thus, they were able to assist in identifying their own needs; however, resources (financial and physical) were provided for by OTI. The OTI, together with the CICs, implemented more than 375 community improvement projects including the reconstruction of roads, schools and community centres. The participatory and democratic manner in which the programmes were implemented, demonstrated social cohesion among community members. Mostly, local facilitators were used for planning and implementing the programme, thus they took up the employment opportunities created by the programme.

 Some of the lessons learned from the Kosovo initiative were: (1) the democratic process that caused CICs to be formed, put structures in place for local government elections; (2) the empowerment of management committees, whose members developed valuable skills, which could be utilised in subsequent programmes; and (3) the cooperation that existed between OTI programme organisers and the CICs during the implementation process, that contributed to the success of the programme. It could be argued that, though experts and locals speak different languages and sometimes understand issues differently, they can work equally well together to achieve a common goal, if their differences are managed properly.

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[161] http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/focus/comma...

Community Programme 8

The Liberia Youth Education for Life Skills Programme

In Liberia, a CB reintegration programme, Youth Education for Life Skills (YES) was launched by USAID for ex-combatants, IDPs, refugees and locals to facilitate the reintegration process to 'advance an inclusive, peaceful political transition' to address issues of exclusion relating to lasting peace in Liberia (USAID, 2005:16). YES, a 3-month, 6-hours a week programme started in 37 communities and targeted 633 communities (USAID, 2005:17). The curriculum contained seven modules – 'identity, world of work, health and us, peaceful living, good governance, our environment and next step' (Ibid). In response to urban needs, a 3-month 'Urban YES' programme was designed specifically for the youth in Monrovia, due to the busy lives they lead in the city. Modules for the Urban YES programme were 'conflict transformation, self-awareness, human rights, leadership, HIV/AIDS, and drug education' (USAID, 2005:17). Apart from the training programmes, small grants averaging $5,000 were given for projects such as infrastructure (schools, health centres, community centres) renovations, purchase of communal cassava mills, and training in animal husbandry to facilitate the reintegration process in the communities (USAID, 2005:17).

The YES programme provided life skills training for about 30,000 youth, between the ages of 18 and 30, to be economically responsible after 14 years of violent conflict (USAID, 2007:1). The training programmes were conducted by master trainers and learning facilitators with management committees constituted by each community to provide supervision. Though decisions about the selection and location of projects were made by communities through the voting system, in some cases they led to division among community members. The programme on the whole, achieved its aim of facilitating the reintegration process; however, lack of jobs in rural communities led to beneficiaries migrating to nearby cities for jobs.

The following lessons were learnt: (1) the programme targeted short-term programmes with the aim of meeting the immediate needs of the war-affected population, rather than offering long-term sustainable programmes; (2) the programme encouraged young people to respect each other and to use dialogues to address their differences (Blue and Bruce, 2006) (3) the drop-out rate of participants was high because participants were not given any form of allowance; and (4) the magnitude of the programmes, in terms of cost and management, resulted in rushing through programmes without considering community needs (Blue and Bruce, 2006).

Community Programme 9

The USAID/OTI Community-based programme in Philippines

In the Philippines, when the rebel Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) reached a peace agreement with the government after years of negotiations, the OTI focussed on various activities such as the provision of agricultural and fishing equipment in the Muslim areas of Mindanao in order to demonstrate that by offering a peace dividend incentives were provided for other Muslim insurgents to surrender their arms (OTI, 2005:20). The programme focussed exclusively, on ex-combatants and their families.

The first phase of the programme benefited over 4,000 ex-combatants, and their families, by March 1999: whilst the second phase benefited more than 9,000 ex-combatants and 14,393 families by June 2000[162]. During the implementation process, OTI did not consider a one-size-fits-all approach to all communities; instead it addressed problems on a village-by-village basis. According to OTI (2005:1) that village-by-village programme was successful; and an evaluation of the programme realised that ex-combatants were more optimistic about their future, thus they were less likely to re-arm.

In Spring 2000, OTI was forced to respond to changing circumstances, in Mindanao, when fighting broke out between the Government forces and a second Muslim rebel group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), because they failed to reach a peace agreement with the government. These events increased tension between Christian and Muslim populations, which caused OTI to provide special reconciliation grants to civil society groups to promote tolerance, understanding and use of negotiation to resolve conflict. It is important to note that, in PCEs, targeting one faction in the peace process can create division and lead to further disturbances. The conflict between the Government and the MILF could have been avoided if efforts were made to include them in the programme.

Some of the lessons learnt were as follows: (1) the exclusion of MILF ex-combatants created conflict between them and government forces; (2) the programme only focussed on ex-combatants and their families without considering other community members; and (3) the programme created employment opportunities for the MNLF and facilitated their reintegration in communities.

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[162] http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/transition_initiatives/country

Community Programme 10

Community Reintegration and Development Programme (CRDP) in Rwanda

A Community Reintegration and Development Programme (CRDP) was initiated by the World Bank to assist returnees and vulnerable groups, through CB reintegration and development, and to strengthen the capacity of local communities.[163] This programme was designed to address the problem of the centralisation of authority, which restricted community participation and led to genocide. The programme focussed on three indicators: (1) decentralization – or transfer of decision-making to communities; (2) participation between local government and the local population in identifying needs, and the planning and implementation of programmes; (3) social capital or building of trust between communities and local government (World Bank, 2003:29). The CRDP introduced sub-projects of income generation and capacity building activities such as training, and socio-economic infrastructural development. The programme contributed to institutional development through the planning of training activities and of other programmes. However, recommendations were made to place more emphasis on capacity building at the administrative level.

Prior to the commencement of programmes, Community Development Committees (CDCs) were formed, and they met with communities to identify community problems, prioritised them, and planned and implemented the selected programme to meet community needs. Members of CDCs were trained in various planning and financial management techniques and procedures, to effectively undertake their responsibilities. The CDC operations were, however, hampered by lack of funds mainly due to delays in financial and fiscal decentralisation.

The following were some of the lessons learnt: (1) The CRDP introduced CDCs which planned and implemented programmes for communities; (2) the programmes targeted all groups such as ex-combatants, refugees, IDPs and other community members, and that facilitated social reintegration; (3) the programme encouraged local ownership and

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web.worldbank.org.external/projects/main?pagePK=104231&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=228424&Projectid=PO51931

empowerment; and (4) the programme contributed to partnership between the communities and local government.

Community Programme 11
Timor-Leste Community Empowerment Projects

In Timor-Leste, the World Bank initiated the Community Empowerment Projects (CEP) to strengthen local-level social capital to build institutions, which reduced poverty and supported inclusive patterns of growth (World Bank, 2006). The programme was divided into three main agreements: CEP I, II & III. All these three agreements had the same overall objectives of rebuilding administration, reconciliation of ex-combatants and other community members, and strengthening civil society.

CEP introduced the formation of democratically elected councils, so that they would channel ideas for development projects at the community level. This democratic procedure guaranteed local participation in the reconstruction process and facilitated reconciliation. One of CEPS' goals was to involve men and women equally in these local bodies, which was difficult to achieve in the traditional Timorese communities where the majority of women were uneducated. Communities were provided with grants for the councils so that they could to plan and implement projects, which was done through the use of participatory decision-making processes. Though the programme encouraged participation, this has been questioned by Brown, et al (2002) as the poor and the uneducated were less well represented on the committees.

Local facilitators were used in the implementation of the projects; however, due to low literacy rate, external facilitators were employed to help with design. The dependence on external support affected local ownership, continuity of the programme, and also resulted in conflict situations between the two parties (locals and external facilitators).

The following were some of the lessons learned from the programmes: (1) the design of the project focussed on peacebuilding, development and the support of local governance structures, at the same time; (2) the formation of CDCs to manage community programmes (although that was criticised by some scholars owing to lesser representation of the uneducated); (3) the use of external facilitators created conflict in some communities; and (4)

encouragement needed to be given to women so that they would volunteer to become representatives on committees thereby ensuring gender equality.

Appendix 2

Case Study 1

Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme in Fonikoh,

Kenema

The Vegetable Crop Rehabilitation and Income Generating Programme in Fonikoh, Kenema, was initiated by CARITAS-Kenema through the provision of tools, seeds, fertilisers, materials and technical assistance for women in vegetable production. Vegetable production had been the main occupation for the women before the war, but the destruction and looting of agricultural inputs, during the war, made it difficult for them to reactivate the activity. Realising this gap, CARITAS-Kenema identified these women's groups in Kenema District with the aim of restoring their farming activities. The Malmoateyei Women's Project in Fonikoh Section in Kenema was one of the groups that received assistance from CARITAS. The programme benefited ex-combatants, child mothers, and war widows, among others. Prior to the instigation of the project, CARITAS organised a series of meetings with the women concerning: (1) availability of land; (2) market for the products; and (3) preservation of crops after harvesting. The programme was funding by the NCDDR with a total amount of Le3,500,000.

The project targeted the beneficiaries to recover quickly from the effects of war, so that they could have a sustainable income-generating activity. Physical resources such as seeds (okra, green, 'krain krain', maize, potato vines and groundnuts) were procured from local vendors; however, the procurement of agricultural tools was done by CARITAS. An agricultural extension officer was appointed to coordinate activities. Financial procedures were in line with the standard practices of CARITAS, and a separate project file was maintained for all transactions. Also, all monies were kept at the CARITAS office, due to lack of banking facilities at the time. Management of the programme was done by a project supervisor with four other trained personnel without much involvement from the community. Thus, communication between CARITAS and the community was vertical and hierarchical and this created a sense of mistrust among stakeholders. The lack of community participation affected the sustainability of the programme because beneficiaries did not continue the programme after the official completion.

Case Study 2

Vocational Training for Rehabilitation and Resettlement in Bumpe

The Vocational Training for the Rehabilitation and Resettlement Project in Bumpe was commenced by the Sierra Leone Opportunities Industrialization Centre in Bo (SLOIC) for Bumpe and its surrounding villages. It was NCRRR programme initiated during the reintegration phase of the DDR that aimed to train youth in carpentry and masonry to help rebuild the war-ravaged communities, and to facilitate the reintegration process. At the commencement of the programme, SLOIC conducted sensitization programmes via local radio stations and organised meetings to inform the community about the importance of the programme. Thereafter, interested people were encouraged to register for either carpentry or masonry courses, depending on their personal choice. A first-come-first-served procedure for registration was applied owing to the large number of people who expressed interest in the programme. The total cost for the programme was Le44,858,075.

In all, 60 youth were trained in both masonry and carpentry. 95% of the beneficiaries were men, with women forming only 5%. SLOIC procured all physical resources for the project. Beneficiaries were given start-up kits on completion of the training, such as jacks and smooth planes, chisels, and hammers. The programme, however, did not achieve its intended objectives because, instead of beneficiaries staying to rebuild the community, they left for greener pastures in the cities. The first-come-first-served procedure for registration contributed to the lack of commitment, on the part of beneficiaries, towards the community because they thought they were selected for the programme based merely on their own efforts. A reporting process, introduced by NCDDR at the beginning of the programme, which required the production of written documents, was daunting for SLOIC, due to lack of facilities such as computers, and that adversely affected the progress of the programme. Changing this reporting procedure to requiring only the filling in of already existing forms made reporting easier and facilitated the progress of the programme.

Case Study 3

Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills in Wellington

The post-war era in Sierra Leone experienced the initiation of developmental projects; hence, it became of paramount importance to empower community leaders to manage and steer the

affairs of their own communities. In an effort to empower community leaders to manage developmental programmes in Wellington, and its municipal divisions, the Grassroots Gender Empowerment Movement (GGEM), initiated a 7-day leadership and management training programme. A 28-member team comprised of 7 each was selected from the following already existing groups: the Board of Trustees of Wellington Community Centre; the Union of Wellington Association for Social Affairs; the Wellington Area Development Association; and the Civic Development Unit. This undemocratic process, used in selecting the management team, segregated them from the rest of the community and adversely affected the social reintegration process. Later, it created conflict between the management team and the youth, and this lead to the closure of the Wellington Community Centre (see Picture 1 below).

Picture 1: Wellington Community Centre

Source: Author

All resources such as facilitators, training manuals and funds were provided by GGEM, apart from the classroom, which was offered by the community. The Wellington community was not involved in the planning and implementation of the training process, as everything was done by GGEM. The urgency of the programme led community leaders to select the management team from already existing community groups. This process of selection was, however, criticised owing to it being seen as undemocratic by most community members. It was revealed that ex-combatants and women were not fairly represented on the management

committee due to the selection process. Of the 28 member team, women and ex-combatants formed only 25%.

Case Study 4

Masiaka Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills

The Community Management Team Training in Leadership and Management Skills, in Masiaka was a 7-day programme funded by NaCSA and implemented by GGEM. The training was similar to that conducted in Wellington by the same NGO, GGEM. The programme aimed to empower community leaders in Masiaka in leadership and management skills to take up community projects. Prior to the commencement of the training, GGEM conducted a needs assessment survey (NAS) in Masiaka and its surrounding villages, in the Koya Chiefdom, to ascertain community needs. A 28-member team, comprised of 17 males and 11 females, was appointed from Masiaka and its surrounding villages. Based on the lack of female representation in the Wellington programme, GGEM encouraged the Masiaka community to include more women in the team.

GGEM provided all resources, such as facilitators, training manuals and funds, for the training, apart from accommodation for beneficiaries and a classroom, which was provided by the Masiaka community. There was a programme coordinator to oversee coordination. The training proved beneficial because it developed management skills for members of Koya Community Development Association (KCDA), a local management team, which monitored all projects within the Koya Chiefdom. It became evident that training improved the capacity of KCDA and that it opened a funding window for the entire Chiefdom. It was realised during the research, however, that about 10% of the beneficiaries had died after the 2002 commencement of the programme. The high death rate of beneficiaries was attributed to targeting people of all ages. In Sierra Leone, where the average life expectancy rate is 39 years for men and 42 years for women, losing people who had lived beyond the life expectancy levels happened frequently.

Case Study 5

Agricultural Support for Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups in Foredugu Section

The Agricultural Support for the Women's Vegetable Producers' Groups Programme (see Picture 2) in Foredugu Section was initiated by the Koya Community Development

Association (KCDA), a chiefdom development umbrella organisation, covering six villages (Malenkie, Rogbom, Kurankoh, Mabuya, Malegbeh, and Romaka) in Koya Chiefdom, which helped to improve upon food security through the provision of agricultural inputs including seeds and tools. The women's groups had been engaging in farming activities prior to the war; however, the war disrupted their farming activities and inputs were either consumed or looted. Upon realising the gap in employment, KCDA organised sensitization meetings with members of the local communities to explain the objectives of the project, negotiate the release of land with local authorities, landowners and other community stakeholders, and to form monitoring committees to oversee the programme. The programme focussed on both ex-combatants and non-combatants and was funded by CARE International, Sierra Leone, with a total budget of Le26,468,000.

KCDA procured all agricultural seeds and tools, except for cutlasses and hoes that were procured following standard procedures, which required comparing quotes from three vendors, and contracting the ones of the best quality and prices. An agricultural extension officer was employed to train and assist the women in their activities. Since 2003 the programme has been ongoing, despite the fact that funding from CARE International has ceased. The programme facilitated the reintegration process because it brought women, men and children together, at the time as communities became more divided due to the conflict.

Picture 2: Vegetable Production Farms in Foredugu

Source: Author

Case Study 6

Human Rights and Civic Education in Masiaka

The Human Rights and Civic Education Programme, in Masiaka was instigated by the United for the Protection of Human Rights (UPHR) organisation, which is community based in Masiaka, and is designed to address human rights violations that happened during the conflict, and also, to educate the community to recognise, respect and protect human rights issues. During the planning process, members of the UPHR organised a series of meetings with chiefs and elders, police and other paramilitary organisations, ex-combatants, community stakeholders, and community members to sensitize them about the need to protect human rights issues in order to facilitate reconciliation and reintegration. The programme targeted 150 participants, including service providers, police and paramilitary organisations and community members from the Chiefdom. Activities of the programme included a 4-day training workshop for facilitators and service providers; a 2-day joint workshop for members of the security services; and a 2-day workshop for offenders and their victims, and also sensitising the community to recognise and to respect human rights. The programme was sponsored by the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL).

UPHR appointed a committee to manage the programme, and used local facilitators for the training. Apart from financing the programme, UNAMSIL provided teaching manuals to facilitate the process. The programme was supervised by the Koya Community Development Association (KCDA), a parent organisation of UPHR, in collaboration with UNAMSIL. The programme brought war criminals and other perpetrators of violence and their victims together to address their differences to aid reconciliation.

Case Study 7

Arms for Development in Massimera Chiefdom (Port Loko)

The problems of the illicit use of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW), in Sierra Leone, after the disarmament and demobilization process, posed a threat to human security and the long-term peacebuilding process, and this necessitated the UNDP and the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSL) initiating the Arms for Development (AfD) programme. The programme aimed to encourage communities to voluntarily surrender their weapons, so that funds would be given to them (communities) for developmental projects. Upon successful completion of arms collection and verification, a certificate of arms free status was awarded

to the chiefdom by the police. In Massimera, a 12-room classroom block (with an office) was built.

Picture 3: Metal Boxes for Arms Collection Provided by UNDP

Source: http://www.sl.undp.org/afd.htm

An 8-member management committee, including 2 women and 2 youth was formed to supervise the collection process. A field assistant was recruited to educate the locals about the dangers of the prevalence of illicit weapons in the community. The drop in centre volunteers assisted the field assistant in the collection process. The UNDP provided all the necessary financial and physical resources, such as metal boxes (see picture 3) for the programme. Funds were given to contractors who won contracts for the developmental projects. The PMC, however, was not involved in the financial aspect of the programme, apart from executing an advisory role. Most of the weapons collected were local/civilian types or military unserviceable ones abandoned in bushes. In all, about 214 weapons (41 licensable and 173 non-licensable weapons) and 19 small arms ammunition were collected in the Port Loko District. The AfD encouraged social reintegration among various groups. Unlike the DDR process, which was individually oriented, the AfD programme provided an opportunity for all groups within the Chiefdom to be disarmed, and rewarded the Chiefdom by granting them the development project of their choice.

Case Study 8

Construction of a Community Centre in Rokel

During the long period of conflict in Sierra Leone, some infrastructure such as schools, and community centres, became dilapidated over time, or was burnt down completely. In Rokel and its environs, the absence of a convenient place to host various community activities, and social gatherings, necessitated the community initiating a community centre (see Picture 4). It was a place where various groups (ex-combatants, returnees, and the youth) could come under the same roof, share information and organise income generating activities, in order to enhance their livelihoods. A 10-member management committee, including three women, was elected to design, plan and implement the programme. The CMC wrote a letter of interest to NaCSA through the direct community financing (DFC) project for funding.

Picture 4: Rokel Community Centre

Source: Author

NaCSA provided funds in tranches directly into the bank account of the community. The PMC managed the funds through a system, where withdrawals were signed for by the Chairman, Treasurer and one other person who served as a witness. Moreover, they presented a detailed financial report to the community at monthly meetings and posted the report on the community's notice board at the site where concerned citizens could express their views. This process facilitated transparency and accountability. Regarding physical resources, the

community contributed at least 10% of the total cost of the project through local labour and materials such as stones, sand, and sticks. Simplified administrative procedures were followed throughout the process. A participatory monitoring and evaluation committee was set up to monitor the activities of the projects, such as the procurement of physical resources, financial transactions, guidelines about the quality and quantity of work and project outputs.

Case Study 9

Konia Skills Training Programme, Dama Chiefdom

The Skills Training Programme in Konia, Dama, was a 12-month reintegration programme, planned and implemented by the Chiefdom, designed to provide employable skills such as weaving, cotton processing, embroidery, and tailoring, for the youth aged between 18 and 35 years (Picture 5 shows author, with a number of the community members). The programme targeted 60 beneficiaries: ex-combatants and non-combatants, including some underprivileged and disadvantaged men and women. The programme was implemented in Konia due to Konia's central location, but beneficiaries were selected from Dassama and Upper Dabor Sections. When commencing the programme, the Chiefdom conducted a labour market survey, and organised meetings with community members, to identify programmes that would help to address the high unemployment rate in the Chiefdom. A10-member committee, made up of 75% males and 25% females, was democratically elected to manage the programme on behalf of the Chiefdom. Other sub-committees, such as those for advisory, monitoring, and maintenance aspects, were also elected to assist the management committee to plan and implement the programme. Local facilitators from the Chiefdom, and within the District, were employed. The total value of the project amounted to Le97,625,960 with NaCSA/World Bank contributing Le77,974,100 and the Chiefdom providing Le19,651,860.

NaCSA provided funds, in instalments, directly into the community's bank account, which was specially opened in support of the programme. The management committee was responsible for all the financial transactions. Regarding physical resources, materials and cotton, were purchased by the procurement committee, apart from sewing machines which went through a transparent bidding process. Monthly meetings were planned to review the progress of the training.

Picture 5: Author with a Section of Community Members in Konia

Source: Author

Case Study 10

Sign Language Training Project, New York Section, Bo

The absence of learning institutions for the deaf and dumb in the Eastern and Southern provinces of Sierra Leone before, and after the conflict, compelled these people to roam about in towns without any form of education. The need to take them off the streets and offer them some form of education and livelihood called for the commencement of the Sign Language Project in New York Section in Bo (Picture 6 shows a section of teachers and students of Sign Language). The project was designed in two phases: (1) training in sign language for the deaf and dumb, and the people they came in contact with such as social workers, drivers, and health workers; (2) construction of classroom blocks for the deaf and dumb. A PMC was formed to plan and implement the project. The total cost of the project amounted to Le103,801,650, with NaCSA funding Le93,790,000 and the community contributing Le10,011,650.

The programme targeted 63 beneficiaries, made up of deaf and dumb pupils, tutors, and specific officials such as health workers, bus drivers, social workers and police officers, who came into contact with people with these physically impairments. The community used local

facilitators to train beneficiaries in sign language, and also supported the programme with the provision of local materials such as stones, sand and bush sticks. NaCSA provided funds in tranches to the community and all transactions were made by the PMC. A couple of sub-committees, such as those for maintenance and procurement, were formed to assist the PMC to manage the project. The programme facilitated social interaction between the deaf and dumb, and the hearing community, and also erased the perception of the hearing community that people with impairment were always hostile in their approach. The programme helped in building the capacity of the management committees to undertake other community projects.

Picture 6: Teachers and Students at the Sign Language Training Centre in Bo

Source: Author

Case Study 11

Promotion of the Development Capacity of Youths and Young Adults in Waterloo

The Promotion of the Development Capacity of Youths and Young Adults (PDCYYA) programme in Waterloo was initiated by the Association for Organization, Planning and Training (GOPA), which is an implementing partner for GTZ under the sponsorship of the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ). It was a non-formal programme focussing on the needs of the youths in three sectors: skills training; social counselling; and capacity building. The skills training comprised of technical courses like auto-mechanics, general electrical, cosmetology, building construction and carpentry, and metalwork (Picture 7 shows the author with some students). The social counselling focussed

on emerging issues, such as conflict resolution and trauma, whilst in-service training was organised for facilitators to build their capacities. The training was made up of theory and practice. The theoretical aspects were classroom based teaching, whilst the practical aspects introduced participants to local artisans for apprenticeship training.

GOPA provided all physical and financial resources for the training except for urgently needed materials, which were purchased locally by the Head of the Centre. However, artisans used their own workshops to train beneficiaries and sometimes benefited from materials provided by GOPA, such as steel for metalwork. Coordination of activities in the school was managed by the Head of the Centre. Over 350 students were enrolled at the beginning of the course, however, the student population stood at 196 at the time of the research due to various constraints faced by the participants, such as lack of financial support. Although some students registered as locals, they resided in Freetown and had to travel 20 miles daily for training. The absence of provision of allowances to the PMC members reduced their commitment to the programme.

Picture 7: Author with Trainees at the Youth Training Centre in Waterloo

Source: Author

<div align="center">

Case Study 12

Youth Livelihood Development Project in Joru KENEMA

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The Youth Livelihood Development Project was a two-phased project aimed at addressing poverty and the high unemployment rate among the youth, aged between 18 and 30 years in Joru, in Guara Chiefdom, by 2010. Phase one was structured to train and equip beneficiaries with employable skills in masonry, auto-mechanics, photography, hairdressing, cloth weaving, and raffia weaving (Picture 8 shows a number of trainees in hairdressing class); whilst phase two was designed to engage the beneficiaries in micro-credit schemes for self-employment. Prior to the commencement of the skills training, CARITAS conducted the needs assessment process to identify programmes, which would soon offer employment to beneficiaries. The training concepts were developed by CARITAS, in collaboration with local artisans who were responsible for the training. A 3-day a week training programme was agreed upon to enable beneficiaries to engage in other income generating activities, during their days off in order to raise money for feeding and other basic needs. The total cost of the programme was Le66,823,000 ($23,162), and Manos Unidas contributed Le62,373,000 ($21,620), and the remaining balance of Le4,450,000 ($1,542) was contributed by CARITAS-Kenema.

Picture 8: Trainees in the Hairdressing Class in Joru

Source: Author

CARITAS-Kenema exclusively managed the financial resources and prepared detailed financial statements as requested by Manos Unidas, the donor. They provided equipment such as motor bikes, computers, and materials for the training and appointed a project officer to coordinate the project. The community involvement was restricted to consultation and selection of beneficiaries, and that was done by an appointed committee.

Case Study 13

The Apprenticeship Scheme and Business Development Support for the Youth Training and Employment Programme in Bo, Sierra Leone

Community Action for Rural Development, Sierra Leone (CARD-SL), as part of United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) national project, aimed to provide employment and income generating activities for the youth in Sierra Leone, and initiated a programme known as 'The Apprenticeship Scheme and Business Development Support for Youth Training and Employment'. The programme provided apprenticeship training in carpentry, welding, hairdressing, and auto-mechanics for the marginalised (ex-combatants, school drop-outs, girl mothers, illiterates) in Bo Township for a period of 12 months (Picture 9 shows the author with some trainees in hairdressing in a salon). CARD organised a series of sensitisation workshops to identify the needs of the community, prior to the commencement of the programme. The total budget for the programme was Le531,328,122.

Figure 9: Author with some Trainees in Hair Dressing Salon

Source: Author

The objectives of the programme were: (1) to train 300 youths (180 males and 120 females), aged between 15 and 35 years, through an apprenticeship scheme within 12 months; and (2) to establish 30 business development units, which were to be operational within 3 months after the apprenticeship training. Each of the 3 zones of Bo Township was allocated 100 beneficiaries. The youth were made to register on a first-come-first-served basis and were given the chance to opt for their own choice of skills training.

CARD-SL used its own facilitators to plan and manage the programme. However, implementation of the training programme was carried out by 30 local artisan selected from the area, based on the following: well-established workshop, availability of basic training tools and having practical jobs to offer, and having a very good track record. CARD used already established indicators such as work-plan and time frame to measure progress. The performance of the trainees was monitored by the artisans, with CARD technical staff paying regular visits to check records.

Case Study 14
Women's Vocational Training Programme in Krooby, Freetown

The Women's Vocational Training (WVT) was planned and implemented by Youth Action International (YAI) to provide basic training (computing, tailoring, and hairdressing) for women between the ages of 18 and 30 years, who lacked education, training and employment, owing to the conflict in Krooby, Freetown (Picture 10 shows some students of tailoring). The programme, which was ongoing at the time of the fieldwork, was a 1-year 2-phased programme that commenced in September 2008. The first phase of the programme targeted 80 women in Krooby. The programme was sponsored by Hear Foundation and other individual sponsors around the world. Prior to the commencement of the programme, YAI conducted a needs assessment survey (NAS) to identify the needed skills, which would be of benefit to the community. The first phase of the programme was estimated at US$30,000.

The NGO (YAI) provided facilitators who supervised and managed the programme; and all the equipment such as sewing machines, hairdryers, computers and office machinery for the training programme. YAI followed simplified administrative procedures, for example, all procurement of items used mandatory bidding processes, apart from very small items. To include the community in the programme, an 8-member management committee and 2 community liaison officers (CLOs) were elected to work with YAI; however, their

participation in the programme was restricted to consulting and informing. The programme experienced a high drop-out rate of beneficiaries, owing to lack of motivation, and also financial problems facing the trainees, especially, girl mothers.

Picture 10: Trainees in a Tailoring Class in Peter Lane, Freetown


Source: Author

Appendix 3

Chronologies of Events in Sierra Leone

|	
1787	400 freed slaves settled among the indigenous residents in Freetown
1808	Freetown was made a British colony
1953	British established a new bureaucratic system leading to a wider diffusion of political power among local chiefs (Williamson and Cripe, 2002:17)
Apr 1961	Sierra Leone gained independence from the British and Sir Milton Margai became the first Prime Minister. His party, the Sierra Leone People's Party, won the first general election in May 1962 but his reign was short-lived when he died two years later.
1964	Sir Albert Margai succeeded Sir Milton after his death. The SLPP lost the general election in March 1967 to the opposition.
Mar 1967	All People's Party (APC) led by Siaka Stevens took over from Sir Albert and 'became the first opposition party in post-colonial Africa to oust a ruling party through the ballot box' (Alie, 2000: 18). Siaka remained in office for seventeen years and handed over power to his Army Commander, Joseph Momoh in 1985.
1985	Joseph Momoh took over from Siaka Stevens and ruled under the SLPP
May 1991	Foday Sankoh's RUF rebels started incursions in the northern parts of the country.
Apr 1992	Captain Valentine Strasser took over power through a coup and promised, among other things, to bring a speedy end to the rebel activities and ushered in the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC).
1993	ECOMOG deployed forces in Sierra Leone in support of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).
Mar 1995	Strasser used Executive Outcomes (EO), a mercenary group from South Africa to help ECOMOG drive the rebels away from Freetown, the capital (Macqueen, 2002).
Jan 1996	Brigadier Mada Bio took over power from Strasser through a palace coup and also promised to enter into negotiation with the rebels. Brigadier Mada Bio handed over power to an elected President, Alhaji Armed Tejan Kabba.
Mar 1996	Alhaji Armed Tejan Kabba became the president of Sierra Leone. Kabba used ECOMOG, EO and the Kamajor militia (later CDF) to fight the RUF. The Kamajor militia was formed by the Mende hunters from the South where the SLPP had its power base. In May 1997, amidst a political drift between the government and the rebels, 'Kabba was overthrown in a coup mounted by an army major, Paul Koroma, and he fled to Guinea' (Macqueen, 2002).
Mar 1998	Kabba returned to power after the Paul Koroma junta had been driven away by a mercenary company Sandline, a London-based sister company of the EO.
Jul 1998	The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was established to monitor the role of ECOMOG in the provision of security[164].
Oct 1999	The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was established. It was set up to organize DDR and also to 'establish and control cantonment centres in various parts of the country' (Macqueen, 2002:189).

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[164] UN document S/RES/1181, 13 July 1998.

Figure 7: Social Network Mapping in Konia, Dama

KEY

⎯⎯ (yellow)	Tribe
⎯⎯ (red)	Religion
⎯⎯ (green)	Seed Exchange
⎯⎯ (blue)	Labour Exchange
⎯⎯ (black)	Boundaries

Figure 8: Social Network Mapping in Peter Lane, Freetown

KEY

– – (yellow)	Different Tribes
– – (red)	Different Religion
– – (green)	No Labour Exchange
– – (blue)	No Inter-tribal Marriage
⎯⎯ (black)	Boundary

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