

**URBAN PLANNING AND POST-WAR RECONSTRUCTION  
UNDER TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIONS:  
THE CASE OF MOSTAR**



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## Abstract

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This thesis investigates the role of urban planning in the reconstruction of war-torn cities, particularly under the aegis of international transitional administrations, and the impact of the approaches adopted on long-term development, sustainability and reconciliation between communities. Post-war reconstruction initiatives at the city level have been examined previously in only a handful of cases, and mostly from an architectural and urban conservation point of view. Mostar, which is the main case study for this research, has also been studied in the past from these perspectives. This thesis, however, attempts to shed light on the role urban planning has played in Mostar over the past fifteen years, and how it has been understood and used by local interest groups and various international actors, especially the international administration – the European Union Administration of Mostar.

This research straddles the worlds of urban planning, state-building, governance, post-war reconstruction and peace building. Based on an in-depth review of literature in these areas, and an extensive qualitative field study, it concludes that although urban planning has historically played an important role in urban (and indeed, national) recovery after conflicts, it has been marginalised in more recent post-war reconstruction efforts due to the overarching emphasis on building a liberal peace, in particular, the efforts of the international community on less state- and more market-oriented approaches; and the unwillingness to acknowledge that post-war reconstruction is a long-term effort which requires thinking beyond one's own mandate.

Busting the myth that Mostar was the ideal multi-ethnic Yugoslav city prior to 1992, this study demonstrates that a thorough understanding of the context is vital in order to establish (and achieve) realistic post-war reconstruction goals. It suggests that in post-war environments, incremental efforts at reforming institutions, from the bottom-up, can have a greater impact than radical, one-size fits all prescriptions for reform. In this process, urban planning can play a significant role, both as a lens to understand the historical socio-economic, institutional and political context, fissures and fault-lines, and as an instrument to effect change and begin to 're-envision' a more positive future for war-ravaged cities and countries. Yet, so often, it remains 'the road not taken', as 'short-termist', humanitarian approaches continue drive reconstruction processes all over the world.

This research contributes to the literature on post-war reconstruction, transitional administrations as well as urban planning. It also provides food for thought for policy-makers and practitioners undertaking the reconstruction of war-torn cities in the future. Finally, it is also hoped that this work will in some way contribute to post-war recovery, development and reconciliation, if not perfect reunification, in the city of Mostar.

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## **Acronyms and Abbreviations**

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ABiH - Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina  
AKTC- Aga Khan Trust for Culture  
BCD - Beirut Central District  
BiH/Bosnia – Bosnia and Herzegovina  
BISA - British International Studies Association  
BSA - British Sociological Association  
CDS - City Development Strategies  
CFSP - Common Foreign and Security Policy  
CPA – Coalition Provisional Authority (Iraq)  
DPA – Dayton Peace Agreement  
DRC – Danish Refugee Council  
EBRD - European Bank for Reconstruction and Development  
EC- European Commission  
ECHO - European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office  
EIA - Environmental Impact Assessment  
EPM - Environmental Planning and Management  
ESI – European Stability Initiative  
EUAM – European Union Administration of Mostar  
EULEX – European Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo)  
FBiH – Bosnian-Croat Federation  
GCUG - Global Campaign on Urban Governance  
HDZBiH - Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina  
HDZ - Croatian Democratic Union  
HVO - Croatian Defence Council  
HZHB, or Herceg-Bosna - Croat Community of Herzeg-Bosnia  
ICG – International Crisis Group  
ICOMOS – International Council on Monuments and Sites  
ICRC - International Committee of the Red Cross  
IDMC – International Displacement Monitoring Centre  
IDP- Internally Displaced Person  
IDPIn – Integrated Development Plan  
IEBL - Inter-Entity Boundary Line  
IFOR - Implementation Force (Bosnia), later christened Stabilisation Force, or SFOR  
IFRC – International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies  
IHL - International Humanitarian Law  
IMF – International Monetary Fund  
IOM- International Organisation for Migration  
JNA - Yugoslav National Army  
KLA - Kosovo Liberation Army  
LDA – Local Democracy Agency



LDK - Democratic League of Kosovo  
MIU – Mostar Implementation Unit  
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding  
NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council  
OGC - Oslo Governance Centre  
OHR – Office of the High Representative (Bosnia)  
ORHA - Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (Iraq)  
OSCE – Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe  
OSEM – Office of the Special Envoy for Mostar  
PIC - Peace Implementation Council (Bosnia)  
PRSP - Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper  
PSA - Political Studies Association  
RRTF - Reconstruction and Returns Task Force  
RS – Republika Srpska  
SDA - Party of Democratic Action (Bosnia)  
SEIA - Socio-Economic Impact Assessment  
SFOR – Stabilisation Force (Bosnia)  
SRSG - Special Representative of the Secretary General  
TA – Transitional Administration  
THW - Technisches Hilfswerk, or Technical Relief Agency  
TUGI - The Urban Governance Initiative  
UCDP - Uppsala Conflict Data Program  
UNAMA - United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan  
UNDP – United Nations Development Programme  
UNEP - United Nations Environment Programme  
UNESCO – United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation  
UN-HABITAT – United Nations Human Settlements Programme  
UNMIK – United Nations Mission in Kosovo  
UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees  
UN-HCHR - United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights  
UN-OCHA – United Nations – Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs  
UNTAC - United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia  
UNTAET – United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor  
UNTAES - United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia  
USAID – United States Agency for International Development  
WB – World Bank  
WMF – World Monuments Fund

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When I first arrived in the PRDU, armed with a background in urban planning, a decade of experience with the United Nations, and admittedly, a pretty set view of what I wanted to do in York, I had little idea as to how these three years would transform my thinking and worldview. For this, I owe a debt of gratitude to my supervisor, Prof. Sultan Barakat, who allowed me the opportunity to engage in a truly inter-disciplinary process of exploration. His confidence and good humour kept me going in my darkest moments. I'm also extremely grateful to Dr. Simon Parker, my backup supervisor, whose friendly and patient guidance opened my mind to many new areas and ideas.

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## Author's Declaration

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Except where otherwise referenced, this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been submitted previously as such at the University of York or any other university.

In the course of writing this thesis, conference papers were presented at various fora. A paper written jointly with Dr. Sultan Barakat titled "*War, Cities and Planning: Making a case for urban planning in conflict-affected cities*" has been included in an edited volume "*Responses to Crises in Urban Spaces*", being published by HumanitarianNet later this year.

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## **SECTION I:**

### **UNDERSTANDING THE CONTEXT AND ISSUES**

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## **CHAPTER 1**

---

### **Research introduction and methodology**

## **1.0 Introduction**

This research study is set in the context of renewed interest in the mutuality of cities and conflict, growing awareness of issues of post-war reconstruction, closer scrutiny of the role of international administrations in post-war situations, and the revival of urban planning, both in literature and practice. This opening chapter provides a summary of the research context, the justification for this work, the main research question and the hypotheses being proposed. It then goes on to elaborate the methodological approach and techniques adopted, before summarising the thesis structure.

### **1.1 Research context**

#### ***1.1.1 Cities, war, destruction and reconstruction***

Conflict, cities and planning have had an intimate relationship throughout history, one that has been explored by many authors. For instance, in his seminal work "The City in History" (1961), Lewis Mumford argues that war has played a major role in shaping both the physical form and institutional structure of the city. Graham (2004) also suggests that throughout history, capture of strategic and politically important cities, as well as their deliberate destruction, has remained the ultimate symbol of conquest. Other literature on the history of urban development and urban planning also reinforces the argument that cities have always provided more than just a backdrop for war, and have in fact significantly influenced, and been influenced by, the nature of warfare. As cities developed, the strategies and tactics to conquer them also evolved. The advancements in the technology of warfare, in turn, led to further development in the art of fortification – stronger, higher walls, deeper and wider moats, ramparts and other such features emerged, changed and evolved in order to better protect cities from outside aggression.

At the same time, it has also been argued that the city – ever since it came into existence – is characterised by as many struggles *within* as outside. Cities of the developing as well as developed world today bear witness to a ‘thousand little wars’ (Mumford 1961: 66). The slums and informal settlements rubbing shoulders with the posh residential districts in cities such as Mumbai and Rio, the run down inner-city areas abutting rich business districts in American and European cities, the black neighbourhoods of New Orleans and the *banlieus* in France, signify important socio-economic divisions within cities. The growing social polarisation, due to various factors, combined with the end of the Cold War and transition to a unipolar world, have clearly had an important bearing on cities, and have all served to exacerbate violent urban conflict (Graham 2004). The Serb-Albanian divide in Mitrovica, the political and national divisions in Nicosia, the Shia-Sunni enclaves in Iraq, the Muslim-Christian divide in East and West Beirut, all illustrate the most obvious ethnic/nationalist/religious fault lines along which cities are divided. Disasters – whether natural or man-made – often serve as a magnifying glass, bringing a variety of urban fault lines to the surface and into the open.

Harbom and Wallensteen (2007) report that there has been a steady decline in the occurrence of conflict since the end of the Cold War, with 32 armed conflicts in 23 locations reported in 2006. However, many countries are affected by more than one conflict, and the range of countries affected has expanded to touch virtually every continent, in recent years. Some authors refer to more recent conflicts as ‘new wars’ – wars that are caused by different factors, have different goals, different methods, and are financed in different ways, than the ‘old wars’, defined by Clausewitz as being between states and for a definite political end – protection of state interest (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2005). Other authors, however, choose to emphasise the differences rather than the similarities between these ‘new wars’, arguing that each is a product of different

circumstances and thus needs to be treated differently (Barakat 1998; Luckham 2004).

An important common feature of the recent wars, however, is that distinction between a conflict and post-conflict situation is increasingly blurred. The formal end of conflict is usually anything but, and many of the conflicts that are said to be terminated never actually achieve complete closure (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998; Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004; Barakat 2005a; Junne and Verkoren 2005b). Still, as the number of conflicts goes down, more and more 'post-conflict' situations emerge – this has led to a renewed focus on the importance of post-conflict reconstruction. Indeed, the emergence of post-conflict reconstruction as a specialised area of study and application is the result of a growing recognition that reconstruction of war-torn societies is an extremely complex process, which needs to address not only issues of physical destruction but also an institutional/governance fragility and "...the destruction of relationships, including the loss of trust, dignity, confidence and faith in others..." (Barakat 2005a: 10). A number of different approaches have been applied towards reconstruction of cities, destroyed either by wars or natural disasters. In post-war reconstruction, particularly, there are many lessons to be learnt from the nationally-directed reconstruction of European cities following the Second World War. Reconstruction in the aftermath of the Vietnam war comprised small-scale, individual efforts. *Solidere* in Beirut provides an example of private-sector led reconstruction. Other recent examples of reconstruction, whether in Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo or Afghanistan, have brought to the fore the role of external actors – the UN, EU, occupying powers and others – in the absence of state sovereignty.

### *1.1.2 The role of urban planning in post-war reconstruction*

The modern urban planning profession was founded in order to address the deteriorating physical, environmental and public health condition of newly industrialised cities in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The

utopian visions of Ebenezer Howard and Daniel Burnham, the integration of social and physical planning by Patrick Geddes, and the explanations of Master Planning by Edward Bassett were all significant milestones in the development of the planning profession. It received its biggest boost, however, only in the aftermath of the world wars, particularly the Second World War, thanks to the widespread destruction of cities across Europe. In fact, in most European countries, reconstruction planning began in the early 1940s, before the war was over, and the mood was decidedly pro-planning. Ideas such as zoning and pedestrianisation of city centres gained currency. The balance between conservation and modernisation generated widespread debate and discussion. Indeed, the decades following the Second World War witnessed what is termed by Ward as “...the widespread political triumphs of the planning idea” (Ward 2002: 81).

The last two decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, however, witnessed a decline in urban planning as it failed to address the new and varied problems faced by cities. Comprehensive, expensive and un-implementable masterplans, prepared by planners in their ‘ivory towers’, particularly contributed to the disenchantment with planning. Planning was unable to respond to new challenges of increased urbanisation of poverty and exclusion, deterioration of the environment and natural resources, and natural and man-made disasters. Sectoral programmes and projects became more popular, and land use was left as the most important (sometimes the sole) instrument in the hands of planners. Urban management, and subsequently, urban governance, soon became the new catch-phrases, virtually supplanting urban planning in the dictionary of local governments. The decline of planning was also undoubtedly accelerated by the end of communism and the centralised planning (economic and physical) which it had encouraged.

The role of planners and planning in post-war reconstruction efforts also followed a similar course. While planners played a prominent and indeed visionary role in the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, in



many post-Cold War conflicts they have been marginalised as the emphasis on relief and recovery, and a short-termist approach (advocated by many international agencies), gained currency. Traditional planning requires a strong body of baseline information – in the aftermath of conflict, such information and data is hard to obtain, and takes time to generate afresh. Therefore, planning is labelled as being too ‘time-consuming’, and piecemeal interventions are undertaken in the short-term, often with little consideration for their long-term impact. The emphasis on building a ‘liberal peace’ (Paris 2004; Richmond 2006) in the aftermath of war, comprising standard prescriptions of democratisation, free markets and neo-liberal development – less state and more market – has also contributed to the neglect of planning, traditionally associated with a strong state, in post-conflict interventions.

Meanwhile, there has been a revival of interest in planning more generally over the last decade, led largely by Western European cities where innovative strategic planning approaches have come to the fore, integrating the spatial and the sectoral. Among developing countries, South Africa has shown the way with the introduction of Integrated Development Plans (IDPln) which aim to transform the divided cities that were a legacy of *apartheid*, by focusing on service backlogs and inequalities (Boraine 2004). Many argue that the new planning is a tool for good governance, with its focus increasingly on citizen participation in decision-making, transparency and accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of development and investments.

There is also a slow but growing realisation in the international development community that planning can be a tool for sustainable recovery and development after disasters, both natural and man-made, as it can facilitate a smooth transition from relief to development stages. Even so, the emphasis continues to be on *ad hoc* interventions - shelter delivery, reconstruction of symbolic buildings, and patching up of physical infrastructure, rather than on planned city-scale initiatives. This is seen particularly in cases where post-war reconstruction is led

by external actors, such as international transitional administrations<sup>1</sup>. The key questions being asked in this study relate to whether planning can in fact help in furthering the agendas of inclusive governance, sustainable development, community empowerment and ethnic reconciliation in cities affected by conflict; whether international transitional administrations should deploy urban planning as an essential instrument in their post-conflict reconstruction efforts; and what, if any, are the negative impacts of the neglect of urban planning in post-conflict environments.

## 1.2 Objectives and contribution of the present study

This is not a research study on conflicts, peacebuilding or even state-building, subjects that are best left to scholars who focus on those areas. This is a study that focuses on the role of urban planning in post-reconstruction efforts, and in particular, the approach adopted by international transitional administrations and other external actors in this regard. It will explore the case of Mostar in depth, with the aim of making a contribution to:

- the literature on the reconstruction of conflict-affected cities and societies, particularly focusing on the use (or not) of urban planning
- the approaches and interventions of the international community, especially transitional administrations, towards reconstruction in other post-war cities
- the ongoing process of reunification of Mostar.

The main purpose of this research is to formulate and test the hypotheses listed in Section 1.5 below, in the city of Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that some lessons can be drawn and guidelines proposed for future reconstruction efforts in war-affected cities. The specific objectives, which would help in testing the hypotheses, are:

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<sup>1</sup> Transitional administrations are defined in Section 1.6 on Preliminary Conceptualisation.

- a. To explore how political, economic and social changes over the pre-war decades have left their imprint on urban development, spatial organisation and built form in Mostar;
- b. To explore the significance accorded to urban planning in pre-war Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the degree to which it shaped the urban spatial and social patterns;
- c. To examine the reconstruction approach that was adopted in Mostar immediately after the conflict, including:
  - the stage at which urban planning was introduced in the reconstruction process,
  - the main characteristics of the planning process,
  - the entities responsible and the stakeholders involved in reconstruction and planning,
  - the content of the plans developed;
- d. To assess how the reconstruction and planning approaches influenced the settlement pattern, economy, local governance and ethnic polarisation in the city;
- e. To review the impact of statutory reunification of Mostar municipality in terms of planning, socio-economic development and ethnic reconciliation; and
- f. To draw lessons that could be useful in using urban planning as a instrument for post-conflict recovery and ethnic reconciliation in other cities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in South Eastern Europe, as well as other post-conflict situations in general.

### 1.3 Why urban planning under transitional administrations?

In any given context, whether in the developed or the developing world, whether in situations of conflict or peace, urban planning is a key tool in the hands of local politicians and policymakers. As briefly discussed in the beginning of this chapter, its significance has waxed and waned in the past fifty or so years, but it is now increasingly being seen as an instrument to promote sustainable and equitable development. Rapid urbanisation, urban poverty, the growth of slums and the increasing frequency and intensity of environmental crises have also refocused global attention on planning in recent decades (UN-HABITAT *in press*). Yet, in post-conflict reconstruction, it is rarely used to achieve the broader goals of equity, sustainability, inclusion and reconciliation, or even short- to medium-term objectives such as reconstruction and recovery. In fact, the discourse on post-conflict governance and reconstruction approaches is also fairly recent and still evolving. The debate on the role and form of urban planning in the aftermath of a conflict, if at all it exists, is still in its infancy. Post-war reconstruction initiatives in a number of cities have been examined by various scholars - from a political and state-building perspective (for example, see volumes edited by Barakat (2005a), Junne and Verkoren (2005b)), as well as an urban design and/or architectural conservation point of view (e.g. Khalaf and Khoury (1993), Barakat and Wilson (1997), Makdisi (1997b), Charlesworth (2003), Calame (2005), Warren (2008) and many other authors who have explored this area in the context of the Second World War). However, not many scholars or practitioners have explored the dimension of urban policy and planning in detail, especially in the context of the absence of state sovereignty.

Along with post-war reconstruction, the discussion on Transitional Administrations (TAs) is also fairly recent. It is only over the past decade that transitional administrations have emerged as a popular theme for research within the broad area of international governance. The role of the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the UN Transitional Administration in East Timor

(UNTAET) are, in particular, much-studied in recent literature. Comparative studies are also gaining prominence, for instance by Chesterman (2001; 2004), Chopra (2002), Berdal and Caplan (2004), Caplan (2005a; 2005b). The most recent addition to the literature on transitional administrations has been made by Stahn (2008), who has comprehensively reviewed the evolution of the legal basis, mandates, structure and functions of transitional administrations, beginning with the administration of the Saar territory (1920-35) and the free city of Danzig (1920-39) by the League of Nations, and concluding with the recent war in Iraq. However, despite the broad mandates assigned to TAs, which invariably include post-war recovery through the rebuilding of the economy, institutions of governance and a society fragmented by war, post-war reconstruction under TAs is paid very little attention by Stahn and the other authors mentioned earlier.

Finally, a lot has been written on the Bosnian war, the Dayton Agreement and its implications, and the rebuilding of the Bosnian state in the years following Dayton, for instance by Kumar (1997), Chandler (1999; 2005; 2006a), Bose (2002; 2006), Schuman (2004), and Solioz (2007), among others. Mostar, too, has also been the focus of numerous articles, a few books and some research studies, focusing predominantly on aspects of urban form, architectural conservation, and cultural identity (see, for example, contributions by Adams 1993; Klemencic and Schofield 1996; Plunz, Baratloo et al. 1998; Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 1999; ICG 2000; Bing 2001; Bose 2003; Charlesworth 2003; ICG 2003; Pašić 2004; Bieber 2005; Pašić 2005; Bollens 2006; Calame and Pašić 2006; Makaš 2006).

However, the politics of urban planning in Mostar, its *de facto* division and the impact of post-war reconstruction approaches on ethnic relations, the role of the European Union Administration of Mostar, and the impact of the 2004 statute aiming to reunify the city – and the elements of planning in all these themes – have not been examined in great detail. In a recent article, Bollens (2006) attempts to explore the relationship between urban policies and peace-building,

using Mostar as one of the case studies. Urbanism and urban governance, he argues, have been manipulated over the past ten years to serve political interests of different nationalist groups, and have reinforced nationalist divisions in the urban area. He concludes that Mostar was a 'missed opportunity' to introduce urban strategies that could bring communities together. He does not, however, adequately analyse the role of the international transitional administrations in Mostar and in Bosnia, nor does he explore the constraints faced by planners and planning after the conflict – the transition from a highly centralised to a highly decentralised system, for instance, resulting in new demands being placed on local planners, which they might not have been equipped or willing to respond to; the environment of deep mistrust between communities; the gaps in the national legal and policy framework; and the political and institutional breakdown at the city level. He also fails to dig deep enough into the seemingly contradictory efforts of the international community – promoting a multi-ethnic, unified city on the one hand, while taking steps that reinforced divisions (such as permitting the establishment of separate service delivery systems, schools, hospitals etc. in the different zones), on the other – and the reasons behind these. The fact remains that given the new generation of wars ('new wars') and the absence of state sovereignty in the immediate aftermath of these, early post-war reconstruction interventions are increasingly being undertaken or coordinated by transitional administrations. Exploring the impact of pre-war planning systems and post-war planning interventions (or the lack thereof) on long-term sustainability and reconciliation between divided communities in the city of Mostar, from 1994 till date, and extracting some lessons for the future role of international transitional administrations, is the niche that this study aims to occupy.

## 1.4 Case Study selection and the potential for generalisation

*“...when case studies are properly undertaken, they should not only fit the specific individual, group or event studied but also generally provide understanding about similar individuals, groups or events.”*

(Berg 2004: 259)

The selection of Mostar as a case study for this research has emerged after numerous levels of analysis. As the emphasis is on urban planning efforts under transitional administrations, the examples of UN transitional administrations in Kosovo and East Timor, the EU-led Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq were considered as potential cases. Of these, Iraq is still a conflict zone even though the transitional authority has handed over power to an elected national government. East Timor and Kosovo are relatively recent examples of international administration – the UN missions in both territories were established in 1999. The former, which gained independence in 2002, has a largely Christian population (90%) with approximately 5% Muslims and the rest of the population made up other smaller minorities - there are no prominent examples of multi-religious, multi-ethnic cities in East Timor. Kosovo, on the other hand, only declared independence from Serbia in February 2008, and the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is gradually handing over to a European Rule of Law Mission (EULEX). Approximately 88% of the population of Kosovo is Kosovar Albanian, with the remainder largely made up of Serbs (6-7%) and smaller groups including Bosniacs, Roma etc. The municipalities of Mitrovica, Strpce and Novo Brdo are multi-ethnic, while the remainder are largely mono-ethnic with some minority populations. Of the three, Mitrovica is the most urbanised and physically divided as it straddles the border between the Albanian and Serb-dominated areas in Kosovo. While Kosovo has been recognised by a number of countries as an independent state, the status of Mitrovica and the other northern municipalities inhabited by the Serbs remains uncertain.



In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international administration has been active for nearly fifteen years (since 1994 in Mostar and since 1995 at the country level following the signing of the Dayton Accords), which is a reasonable length of time to be able to assess its impact. The Bosnian war of 1992 was triggered by the collapse of the formal structures of (Tito's) Yugoslavia. It lasted from 1992 to 1995 and was formally concluded by the Dayton Peace Agreement in November 1995. The Dayton Peace Agreement established an international administration in the form of the Office of the High Representative, which is, till date, the highest decision-making authority on major political issues.

Mostar is the second most prominent city in the Bosnian-Croat Federation (FBiH), after Sarajevo, the national capital. Lying at the heart of one of the two mixed cantons in the Federation, straddling the Neretva river, the city was battered by the conflict. Pre-1992, while the Croat and Muslim populations did live largely separately, Croats and Muslims were found on both sides of the river. Over a period of eighteen months, however, the city was clearly and indelibly divided into two - Muslims were driven out of the Croat-majority areas and vice versa - and the central avenue, the *Bulevar*, became the frontline. In November 1993, the destruction of the old bridge of Mostar - the *Stari Most* - by an artillery unit from the Croatian side, marked the complete and (at the time) irreversible breakdown of relations between the two communities. By the time the fighting ended in 1995, the city was (and continues to be, to a great extent, certainly *de facto* if not *de jure*) partitioned into Croat and Bosniac enclaves, the former occupying the west bank and the latter the east bank of the Neretva river (Yarwood 1999; Bose 2002; Grodach 2002; Charlesworth 2003; Ignatieff 2003).

Mostar first came under international administration in 1994 when the European Union Administration of Mostar - EUAM - was established in the city with a view to initiate and supervise the reconstruction of the city and the reintegration of its communities. Although many rounds of local elections have been held subsequently, a measure of control is still exercised by the Office of the High

Representative over the city and the entire country. Mostar has been selected as the main case study for this research due to its particular multi-ethnic characteristics, the spatial reflection of the social divisions in the city, and the assumption that fifteen years of international intervention is a reasonable duration for its impact to be visible<sup>2</sup>.

Some might suggest that the case of Mostar is unique and lessons learnt from it (and indeed, any one case study) cannot be applied elsewhere. On the contrary, it is argued here that an in-depth analysis of urban planning and reconstruction efforts in Mostar can lead to a number of lessons for other divided cities, as well as for transitional administrations and other international actors active in other post-conflict situations. Burnham *et al.* (2004) suggest that in order to ensure that the case study has a wider impact, there must be a clearly defined hypothesis that is put to test in the case study, and generalisations drawn from the result. Schnabel (2001) emphasises that to have an impact on policy, the research must combine knowledge about the general (i.e. in this case the broader context of conflict, transitional administrations as an emerging form of post-conflict governance, and emerging approaches towards post-war reconstruction), as well as the particular (specific to the situation or case study being examined, which in this case is Mostar). He asserts that in order to be effective, research must be policy-oriented and potentially lead to improved responses to conflict and division. Barakat and Ellis (1996) also suggest that while research on conflict or post-conflict situations cannot directly influence the outcome of a conflict, it can certainly assist in the process of recovery and reconstruction following war.

This is also the ultimate goal of the current research project. The ambition is that this study is conducted, analysed and written in such a fashion that it can be generalised and can eventually be utilised to influence policy. It is hoped that the

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<sup>2</sup> Barakat, Chard *et al.* (2008) assert that there is no such thing as a 'standard length of time' when assessing the impact of post-war reconstruction, even though it may clearly be too early to undertake such assessments in Kosovo, Afghanistan or Iraq at the present moment.

outcomes of this research will assist international administrations as well as donors active in other war-affected cities and countries (Iraq, for example) in learning from the mistakes made in Mostar, and in ensuring that in future, the permanent divisions of cities along ethnic lines, though often a post-war reality, are prevented, and sustainable, inclusive development, achieved.<sup>3</sup>

## 1.5 Research Questions and Hypothesis

Given the context as discussed briefly in the previous section, the main research question that this study seeks to answer, is as follows.

*How is urban planning viewed in the process of reconstruction of war-torn cities, and to what extent is it used as an instrument by the international community, particularly transitional administrations, for socio-economic recovery and development, community empowerment, and ethnic reconciliation?*

The hypotheses being proposed are:

1. The role of urban planning in reconstruction of post-war cities, as a tool to support the development or peacebuilding goals of reconstruction, is neither well-defined nor clearly understood by the organisations undertaking these efforts in the aftermath of war.
2. In the immediate aftermath of conflict, local actors often use urban planning tools to 'continue war by other means', reinforce the results of ethnic cleansing, appropriate or mark territory, and establish symbolic and actual control over contested and/or profitable areas, institutions and assets.
3. 'Short-termist' humanitarian and reconstruction interventions undertaken by international actors after the war are often based on limited understanding of the context and with little involvement of local stakeholders. This can further

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<sup>3</sup> For example, in Baghdad, where the recently erected wall between Shia and Sunni dominated areas is being portrayed as a short-term measure to keep the peace, but can in fact divide the city permanently along ethnic lines.

polarise ethnic groups and make the eventual reunification of cities and reconciliation of communities, more difficult.

These three hypotheses can be pulled together into one unifying hypothesis, which is proposed below.

*Urban planning has been neglected by the international community, particularly transitional administrations, as a tool for the analysis of, and as an instrument for the promotion of, urban social change, despite its use and abuse by local political actors as a mechanism to establish control or advance particular ethnic interests. This may have had a negative impact on both the long-term development of the city as well as ethnic reconciliation efforts.*

## 1.6 Preliminary Conceptualisation

It is important at this stage to define the main concepts and terms used in this research study. To begin with, 'planning' and 'urban planning' are two terms that have been used interchangeably in this study. Planning, its evolution and its various forms, its theory and practice, have been discussed by a number of thinkers and writers, ranging from John Friedmann and Andreas Faludi (since the late 1960s), to Peter Hall's classic text on urban and regional planning and his subsequent works (since the 1970s), Healey (since the late 1980s), Forester (1988), and many others. Yet, it is not easy to find precise definitions of planning, or urban planning. In fact, the exact definition of planning has always been a contentious issue, and most theorists have advanced its conceptualisation by adding qualifiers such as 'rational', 'normative', 'functional', 'comprehensive', 'strategic' or 'collaborative', among others, to planning. Essentially, the 'planning movement', which was born as a response to the social problems of newly industrialised Britain just over a century ago, aimed to address issues of overcrowding, poor quality housing and the low levels of sanitation which accompanied it, and eventually improve, broadly, the quality of life in cities. The

activity, and the profession, emerged from engineering, architecture, and urban design, but today has its own niche in 'city forming processes' (Friedmann 1998).

One of the definitions of planning provided by Friedmann (1998) describes it as "*the conscious intervention of collective actors, roughly speaking state, capital and organized civil society in the production of urban space, so that outcomes may be turned to one or the other's favour*" (p. 251). Hall (2002) describes planning today as 'joined-up thinking', although its traditional remit focused almost entirely on the development and management of land, and was quite distinct from social and economic planning. UN-HABITAT defines urban, city or town planning as "*...as a self-conscious collective (societal) effort to imagine or re-imagine a town, city, urban region or wider territory and to translate the result into priorities for area investment, conservation measures, new and upgraded areas of settlement, strategic infrastructure investments and principles of land use regulation*" (UN-HABITAT *in press*: 31).

In this study, 'urban planning' refers to a set of inter-related activities and processes which determine the form, structure and function of a city, that is, which deal not only with housing, infrastructure and land use, but also with economic and social development, environmental sustainability, poverty alleviation and social inclusion. Urban planning as described here addresses and integrates the widest possible range of urban development issues. The term 'urban planning' is used interchangeably with 'planning' throughout this thesis.

Post-war or post-conflict reconstruction is also a term used repeatedly in this study. Post-war reconstruction has been defined in recent literature as including a range of inter-related activities designed to not only end violence, but also reactivate economic and social development, and at the same time create a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence (Barakat 2005a; Ramsbotham, Woodhouse et al. 2005). Defined in this way, it extends beyond simply reverting to *status quo ante*, or 're'creating what existed before the war, to include strategic choices which would pave the way for a better future (Kreimer,

Eriksson et al. 1998; Barakat 2005a). This is the formulation which is applied in the present study.

A third key concept used in this research is that of Transitional Administrations (TA). Transitional administrations can be defined as administrative systems installed in a war-affected territory which act as an interim government for the territory. As discussed briefly in preceding sections, the UN administrations in Kosovo and East Timor and the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq are much-touted recent examples. Transitional administrations have become increasingly common over the last two decades because of the growing number of fragile and failed states, and the complexity of administering these territories, mitigating conflict and preparing for the settlement of their eventual territorial status. Transitional administrations are “...distinct in important respects from complex peacekeeping and peacebuilding [...] International territorial administration is in fundamental ways a political enterprise” (Caplan 2005a: 12).




Figure 1: Conceptualisation of the present study

A few other concepts or terms that are used throughout this thesis also need brief explanation. Key among these are the terms ‘ethnic’, ‘national’, or ‘ethno-

national' (groups/ conflict), which have been used interchangeably in this thesis. Kaufman defines ethnic groups as "...a large aggregate of people who have a self-defined name, believe they share a common descent, have common historical memories and elements of a shared culture [...] and have an attachment [...] to a specific territory" (Kaufman 2001, as cited in Oberschall 2007: 3). According to Esman (2004), ethnicity or ethnic identity is an expression of identification of oneself within a group, and necessarily in relation to 'other' group(s). It can have a 'primordial' basis (rooted in history), an 'instrumentalist' basis (created by individuals or elites to achieve their selfish objectives), or it can be a 'social construct' (imagined and contingent on changing circumstances) (Esman 2004: pp. 30-35). Nationalism is based on the concept of nation-state and the sense of belonging, loyalty or duty of citizens to this nation-state. The two concepts – ethnicity and nationality – overlap (Oberschall 2007). Ethno-nationalism is defined as "...the belief that any people that aspires to political self-determination and self-rule is a nation and as such is entitled to independent statehood" (Esman 2004: 41). Based on this conceptualisation, the war in Bosnia can be described as an ethno-national conflict, and the warring communities – ethno-national groups.

Clearly, the concepts are not necessarily synonymous, but as they form the backdrop rather than the focus of this study, and they do overlap, the least unwieldy term – "ethnic groups" – will be used consistently to describe the different communities in Bosnia – Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs. The term *Bosniac* implies a Bosnian Muslim, whereas *Bosnian* is used to denote all citizens of Bosnia, regardless of their ethnicity/ nationality.

Finally, the Dayton Accords established a multi-layered, confederal system of governance in Bosnia. This is discussed in detail elsewhere in the thesis, but it might be useful to explain here that the term "State" in this context refers to the country level, "Entities" are the Bosnian-Croat Federation (FBiH) and the Republika Srpska (RS), and Cantons are the decentralised units of administration



within the Federation only. Municipalities are the lowest formal unit of government.

## 1.7 Research methodology

Undertaking research on a topic which cuts across a number of disciplines – in this case, conflict, reconstruction, urban planning, governance and state-building, among others – poses a large number of challenges. The most important of these, of course, is defining the scope, as the literature and theoretical base can be extremely expansive. Integrating the different strands into a coherent analysis can also be complicated. In this thesis, therefore, the methodology is discussed in detail at the outset of the project.

This section begins with a brief discussion on the theoretical underpinnings to this research. Subsequently, the appropriate data collection techniques, and the relative advantages of the chosen options, are elaborated. The preliminary interview questions and selection of respondents are also discussed in this section, but the details of these elements are included in the Appendices. The framework for analysis, challenges and constraints faced during field research, and ethical issues are also addressed in this section.

### 1.7.1 *Theoretical underpinnings*

The social sciences, including the disciplines of anthropology, psychology, political science and sociology, involve the study of people and the interactions between them (Berg 2004). Although they are sometimes referred to as the 'soft sciences', they are as logical, systematic, rigorous and empirical as the natural sciences, and involve both quantitative and qualitative approaches. Thomas Kuhn's stance, for instance, that the fundamental unit of scientific achievement is not simply new empirical laws and their application but the paradigm – a much richer body of accepted principles, models, rules and "*...indeed a distinctive way of 'seeing' all the phenomena of its domain*" (Cutting 1980: 12) –

is particularly supportive of, and attractive to, social scientists (Kuhn 1970; Cutting 1980).

Based on their epistemological stance, two broad 'schools' of social science can be identified – the positivist, and the interpretive. Positivism, or the positivist tradition, follows the style of natural scientists and aims to develop causal relationships or predictive models by testing correlations between variables (Silverman 1993; Marsh and Stoker 2002). According to this definition, positivism clearly relies much more on *empiricism* (the belief that experience is the ultimate basis of knowledge), and on deductive logic, i.e. reasoning from the general to the particular. Quantitative data and quantitative approaches to data collection and analysis form the mainstay of a positivist approach.

The interpretive tradition, on the other hand, argues that the world is socially constructed, and that “...*social phenomena do not exist independent of our interpretation of them*” (Silverman 1993: 26). Interpretivists, therefore, are more concerned with observation and description, and inductive reasoning (potentially moving from the particular to the general), rather than establishing direct and strong causal relationships. Leaning towards *rationalism* (which emphasises that there are significant ways in which our concepts and knowledge are gained independently of sensory experience), they rely to a greater extent on qualitative data and analysis.

Social science research can be broadly divided into three types – exploratory, descriptive and explanatory (Chomsky 1965)<sup>4</sup>. The first of these – observational (or exploratory) research – requires a rich enough database to be able to justify the inferences. The second, descriptive research, includes development of models which can help describe the observations as well as describe all possible/

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<sup>4</sup> In the field of linguistics, Chomsky (1965) proposed these as three key parameters of adequacy against which any 'grammar' may be evaluated. Chomsky's later theories and models, 'principles and parameters theory' (1979 and 1993), 'Government and Binding', and 'minimalist approaches/programmes/models' (1995) today form the basis of not only social science research but also that in physical sciences and life sciences.

potential data. The third, explanatory or evaluative research, suggests that these models should be able to establish causality between different variables, provide valid explanations for real and potential data, and predict ('generate') as well as evaluate potential data.

A certain measure of each of these three dimensions exists in every research effort. While the first and second are more empirical and usually form the preliminary stages of a research project, the third explains many things not visible to the eye. Theories and models are generated through this third stage of explanatory research.

The current research project leans much more towards an interpretive approach, that is, it aims to explore, describe and draw some general conclusions from the study of one particular case. It aspires to establish a strong empirical basis for such conclusions through the detailed examination of a single case study of a post-war city (Mostar). Perfectly predictive models cannot be established, given the unpredictable nature of each conflict and its impact on cities. However, lessons can be drawn from the case study in order to influence the course of future situations of a similar nature.

### *1.7.2 Selecting appropriate data elicitation techniques*

Given the inductive, interpretive nature of this research project, it became clear that a predominantly qualitative approach would be appropriate for this study, relying in large measure on field research.

Field research for this thesis was conducted in two phases. In December 2006, a two-week reconnaissance mission was undertaken to Mostar, with the objectives of building an understanding of the context, exploring major sources of information, identifying challenges and constraints, making preliminary contacts and identifying 'gatekeepers'<sup>5</sup>. In addition, this visit provided a valuable

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<sup>5</sup> See discussion on gatekeepers in Section 1.7.6.

opportunity to observe the ongoing attempts of the OHR to reunify the city, and get a flavour of the political ramifications of this process.

The main body of the field research was undertaken over a period of six weeks during August-September 2008. Historical documentation and records which describe the growth of Mostar and the evolution of its socio-spatial structure, as well as archival information relating to urban plans and planning processes in Mostar, including (but not restricted to) land use, zoning and detailed plans, provided a significant amount of data and information. The planning legislation and systems in Bosnia and Herzegovina, both past and present, were also examined. This necessitated spending some time in Sarajevo, in the University library as well as the offices of the Cantonal Planning Institute. Information thus collected was supplemented by what Neuman calls 'soft data', i.e., descriptions, reflections, impressions, photographs and other such material, elicited through observation and interviews (Neuman 2003).

Silverman (1993) identifies the major techniques used by researchers undertaking field research as observation, textual analysis, interviews and transcripts, noting that most research efforts combine one or more of these methods. Other authors also include focus group interviews or discussions, participant observation, photographic techniques (including videotaping), historical analysis (historiography), ethnographic research and a number of unobtrusive techniques (e.g. archival/ document/ textual analysis) in this list (Berg 2004; Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004). Most authors suggest that a combination of methods be used to examine the problem from different perspectives, so that the information collected can be *triangulated*, that is, its various elements cross-checked and verified.

The main data-gathering techniques considered for this study included (a) archival (including mainly document or textual) analysis; (b) historiography; and (c) interviews. These were supplemented by observation and photography. Participant observation can also be an extremely useful technique for social

research, but in a post-conflict setting, where political sensitivities are high and there are number of practical constraints such as access and language, it is unlikely to be effective or as productive as the other methods enumerated above. Thus it was not deployed as a research technique. The main features, strengths and weaknesses of the three selected techniques are described below.

### Archival analysis

According to Berg (2004), archival records include (a) *public archival records* (usually prepared for the express purpose of examination by others, and are therefore more or less standardised and arranged systematically) and (b) *private archival records* (typically intended for private audiences, so may not be equally well-structured or organised as public archival records).

For the purpose of this study, data was collected predominantly from public archives, for instance, libraries of the University of Sarajevo (faculty of architecture and planning; the World Bank and UN archives; and the Cantonal Planning Institute in Sarajevo), city council records, maps, plans, meeting minutes, internal documents of the OHR and the EU Administration, etc. Berg (2004) lists three categories of public archives – (a) *Commercial media accounts* – anything written, drawn, recorded, intended for mass consumption (e.g. newspapers, books, magazines, videotapes, maps, plans etc); (b) *Actuarial records* – produced for a special or limited audience and available to the public under certain circumstances (e.g. birth and death records, records of marriages and divorces; title, land and deed information (cadastre); demographic records etc.); (c) *Official documentary records* – originally produced for special, limited audiences, which may or may not eventually find their way into public domain (e.g. Court transcripts, minutes of meetings, police records, inter-office memos, organisational newsletters etc.). These, however, were not as systematically organised in Bosnia as hoped for. Private archives such as autobiographies, memoirs, diaries and letters etc. were examined only on an *ad hoc* basis, wherever available and offered, as part of this study.

Archival analysis, traditionally used by historians more often than social scientists, can provide invaluable data and evidence, particularly where societies and communities have gone through a major socio-political transformation. It can lead to interesting insights not just into what happened and when, but why certain events happened the way they did, what were the decision-making processes, who were the key actors involved (visible as well as behind the scenes) and what roles they played. Lowe (1997) asserts that public records provide “...greater contextualisation and balance, enabling the researcher to gain greater empathy with the past and therefore make a decisive contribution to understanding change over time” (see Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004: 177). In this sense, archival analysis is intricately connected with historiography, which is discussed in greater detail below.

#### Historiography or historical analysis

Marshall and Rossman (1999) define historiography as “...a method for discovering, from records and accounts, what happened during some past period” (see Berg 2004: 233). Historiography attempts to develop a descriptive account of the past and present a story that does not simply report facts, but pieces together events, symbols, characters, ideas and meanings in a manner which is “...flowing, revealing, vibrant and alive!” (Berg 2004: 233)

Historiography is, as stated before, closely linked with archival analysis. It relies on primary as well as secondary sources of data. Primary sources are described as oral or written testimony of eyewitnesses, or any evidence that was part of the event under study (including original artefacts, documents, photographs, recordings, journals, diaries, drawings etc). Secondary sources include material circulated after the event, including oral or written testimonies of people not immediately present at the time of a given event, e.g. oral histories, newspaper articles, periodicals, reports, textbooks, encyclopaedias etc. (Berg 2004; Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004). Some authors also distinguish between secondary and tertiary sources, defining the latter as those materials which offer a

reconstruction or interpretation of the events in question, but this is a fine distinction which is not applied in the present study.

Historical analysis emerged as an extremely important data-gathering technique in the present study. The growth of the city of Mostar prior to the Yugoslav era and then as part of the Yugoslav Federation, the process of urban planning adopted under the socialist system, and the developments after the conflict in 1995, particularly under the transitional administration and other international actors, were systematically traced using books, articles, maps, plans, documents and photographic evidence (wherever available). Masterplans and other plan-related documents, town planning laws and regulations, national development plans, conservation plans prepared by the authorities as well as by external actors, and other such documentation has been used as a key source of information for piecing together the history of development and division of the city. The role played by international actors since 1994 has been examined using official documentation, notes of meetings, press releases, newspaper and other articles. The information thus obtained has been triangulated using individual interviews, which are described below. The major constraints in this process were those of access to government and EU documentation, and language (as all government documents are usually available only in Bosnian<sup>6</sup>). A professional translator-interpreter was engaged to overcome the latter handicap. EUAM archives remained inaccessible despite several attempts to trace them in Brussels, and in their absence, personal interviews with a number of key personalities involved with the work of the EUAM were a critical source of information.

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<sup>6</sup> The language spoken by the major communities (Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs) in Bosnia and Herzegovina is essentially the same (originally known as Serbo-Croat) but is variously labelled as Bosnian, Serbo-Croatian or Serbian after the war, depending on who one is speaking to. Since the war, the 'Bosnian' language has seen the addition of new terminologies with increased emphasis on Islamic expressions. For the purpose of clarity, the term Bosnian will be used to describe the local language throughout this research study.

## **Interviews**

An interview is defined by Berg (2004) as “...a conversation with a purpose. Specifically, the purpose is to gather information” (p. 75). Interviews can be of three types – standardised, semi-standardised and unstandardised.

*Standardised interviews* are rigid and formally structured, with no deviation permitted from the set order, content or wording of questions. Very similar to a pencil-and-paper survey, they do not permit any additional questions, probes or clarifications.

*Unstandardised interviews*, on the other hand, are positioned at the other extreme. Completely unstructured, they have no set order or wording of questions. The level of language may be adjusted according to the respondent's needs, the interviewer can make clarifications and may also add or delete questions between interviews.

*Semi-standardised interviews* lie between these two poles. They are more or less structured, with flexibility in wording and order of questions as well as level of language used by the interviewer. The interviewer also has freedom to digress, answer questions and make clarifications, as well as to add or delete probes between successive interviews.

For the purpose of this study, semi-standardised interviews were used to elicit data from key respondents identified through archival and historical analysis as well as snowball sampling methods (see section on selection of respondents below). This allowed in-depth exploration of issues related to planning processes, decision-making structures, extent of political influence and public participation in planning, and other such aspects.

The use of Focus Groups to precede interviews was also considered in the initial stages of development of the research methodology. Focus Groups could have been used after the historical analysis (which could help generate the major questions or topics for group discussions), and before individual interviews



(which could then be used to tease out the details of issues raised by key respondents in the Focus Group discussions). However, due to constraints of language and time, as well as the fact that Focus Groups might be difficult to conduct smoothly when a topic is highly controversial, or if there is fundamental disagreement among the participants<sup>7</sup>, this technique was not considered appropriate for the present study.

### *1.7.3 Preliminary interview questions*

The interview schedule was developed on the basis of the literature review as well as the other data-elicitation methods listed above and is included in Appendix 1. A few key themes explored through interviews are listed below.

- How did planning, decision-making and local governance (broadly) function in Mostar and Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the war? What was the extent of political influence and public participation in planning, under the socialist system?
- Was the city truly 'united' before the war? Did the local communities want a unified city after the war? Do they still want a unified city?
- What was the thinking behind the international community's push for the reunification of Mostar, and the strategy and tools adopted by the EUAM towards achieving this goal? What were the instruments used by other actors, particularly the OHR, in subsequent years?
- What role did other international actors such as bilateral and multilateral donors and lending agencies play in the reconstruction of Mostar (setting of priorities, funding, implementation etc.?) How did their activities influence the reunification agenda? Were projects selected on the basis of reconciliation and reunification goals?

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<sup>7</sup> This issue is particularly important in the case of Mostar, where the division and reunification of the city, and the role of urban planning in furthering ethnic agendas, are sensitive issues that lie at the heart of the conflict.

- Did the local stakeholders have any role in determining reconstruction priorities and projects? To what extent were activities undertaken by transitional administrations and the other international actors responsive to the 'real' priorities of the local communities? How was this ensured?
- Have any reconstruction projects undertaken by the EUAM and other actors contributed directly to reconciliation between the communities and reunification of the city?
- How did the transitional administration, and other agencies responsible for reconstruction, approach urban planning? Did transitional administrations understand the significance of urban planning – its positive implications for economic recovery, reunification and reconciliation; or its potential negative impact in terms of control of one community over another, lack of an economic base, and perpetuation of ethnic divisions, etc.?
- Why did initial efforts towards urban planning under the EUAM fail? Was there a lack on international donor commitment (political or financial) to support the planning efforts?
- What role could a joint strategic vision and framework for development play in reunifying the city? Would people from both communities buy into such a vision or development strategy? What would be the preconditions for it to succeed?

#### ***1.7.4 Selecting respondents***

The respondents for the field research were selected on the basis of the literature review and the historical analysis. The respondents for this study can be classified into two main groups – those that were *targeted*, through an analysis of the literature, preliminary documentation, archives etc, and those who were *recommended*, by the targeted respondents. In other words, once a few key respondents were identified, the *snowball sampling* method (Berg 2004) was

applied, asking them to recommend other subjects who have played similar (or indeed, different) roles in the post-war reconstruction of Mostar.

The main categories of respondents included:

- Political decision-makers, international (OHR, OSCE, other international actors) as well as national (Mayor, councillors etc.) This category also included officials (both international and local) involved with the EUAM between 1994-96;
- Urban planners and other municipal staff and officials (for instance those of the Spatial Planning Institute) involved in urban planning for Mostar, before and during the war, as part of the transitional administration, and at present;
- NGOs, civil society organisations active in Mostar;
- Staff at the Faculty of Architecture at the University of Sarajevo, as well as other architects, urbanists and planners in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
- Staff of other international agencies involved in reconstruction and development efforts, for instance, the World Bank, UNDP and UNHCR; and
- Urban residents/ returnees (individuals or households) from different communities.

Thirty-seven interviews were conducted during the course of this research, in Mostar and Sarajevo in BiH, as well as in the U.K. The full list of respondents is provided in Appendix 2.

The broad framework for data collection, including types and sources of data, is presented in Table 1 on the next page.

Table 1: Framework for data collection, including types and sources of data

Purpose	Type of data	Sources
To establish the pattern of growth and development of the city of Mostar during the Ottoman era and then as part of the Yugoslav Federation - as an assimilated, polarised, segmented or divided city (Boal 1999: see discussion in Chapter 4 and 5)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Information on land use ownership patterns, residential patterns, development of the urban structure and morphology</li> <li>• Information on rural-urban migration, economic development, industrial development etc</li> <li>• Maps and old planning documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secondary information from books and journal articles on urbanism, architectural history, social development of Mostar, Bosnia or Yugoslavia</li> <li>• Spatial planning institute</li> <li>• Urbanism department within the municipality</li> <li>• Interviews with urban residents, planners, architects, urbanists</li> </ul>
To determine the main elements of the urban planning process under the socialist system, including the governance dimension	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Legal and policy documents</li> <li>• Successive master plans, conservation plans</li> <li>• Other planning documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatial planning institute</li> <li>• Urbanism department in the municipality</li> <li>• Interviews with planners</li> </ul>
To determine how the city changed during the conflict – both in governance and spatial terms	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Secondary information from books</li> <li>• EUAM, OHR documents and maps</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agency Archives – EUAM, OHR, UNHCR, other organisations</li> <li>• Interviews with urban residents, mediapersons, planners, NGO representatives</li> <li>• Interviews with other individuals involved with EUAM, OHR etc</li> </ul>
To trace the process of reconstruction and urban planning under EUAM 1994-96, OHR 1997 onwards	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• EUAM documents, archives</li> <li>• Official documents, reports on overall reconstruction progress or specific projects</li> <li>• Maps and plans showing areas of reconstruction and investment</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agency Archives – EUAM, OHR, other organisations</li> <li>• Interviews with planners, NGO representatives</li> <li>• 'Elite interviews' – EUAM, RRTF, OHR officials, Council President</li> </ul>
To assess the process of adoption and pursuit of reunification as an avowed goal (since 1994 till date)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Washington agreement</li> <li>• Geneva MoU</li> <li>• EUAM documents and statements</li> <li>• OHR documents and statements</li> <li>• Report of the Commission for Reunification</li> <li>• Minutes of meetings</li> <li>• Other international agency documents</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 'Elite interviews' – EUAM, RRTF, OHR officials, Council President</li> </ul>
To assess the impact of planning and reconstruction decisions taken by transitional administrations (and other international agencies), on reunification and reconciliation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Testimonies from individuals – planners, local community, international agency representatives</li> <li>• Maps</li> <li>• Photographs</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Before/after photographs</li> <li>• Interviews with planners, community representatives, Mayor, international agency representatives</li> </ul>

### 1.7.5 Developing an appropriate framework for analysis

A key concern in qualitative research is that data takes various shapes and forms that are often incomparable, on the surface at least. Data analysis, therefore, involves a complex process of sorting, categorising and evaluating data. Neuman defines data analysis as “...a search for patterns in data – recurrent behaviours, objects, or a body of knowledge” (Neuman 2003: 447), whereas Berg (2004) highlights its main components as:

- Data reduction, which aims to make raw data more accessible and understandable. This involves simplifying and transforming raw data into a more manageable form.
- Data display, which aims to present data in an organised and easily understandable format from which conclusions can be drawn.
- Conclusions and verification, which involves drawing of more firm conclusions than what the researcher has been leaning towards during the data collection stages, and in the end verifying both the path adopted to reach those conclusions, as well as ensuring that the processes adopted have been clearly articulated.

It is important to note here that all the steps described above are integral to the process of analysing data rather than mechanically reducing it, coding it or applying labels. Furthermore, most authors concur that qualitative data analysis, unlike quantitative data analysis, begins early in the research process, often while the data is still being collected, and usually informs the ongoing process of data collection (Neuman 2003; Berg 2004).

According to Neuman (2003), most qualitative research measures are often *ad hoc* and specific to the individual setting. Thus it is not always possible to apply a ready-made analytical framework to a body of qualitative data. For the present research project, the analytical framework was derived from the two main conceptual pillars of this study, namely, urban planning and its role in post-war

reconstruction, and transitional administrations (their role, strengths and weaknesses vis-à-vis reconstruction). These are discussed in greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3. An additional layer of analysis provided by the Bosnian context, which was examined in terms of the opportunities it offered and the threats it posed to effective post-war reconstruction and realisation of the TA's goals. This is discussed in Chapter 4.

#### *1.7.6 Field research experience, challenges and constraints*

A field researcher is likely to face a number of constraints and challenges in the process of data elicitation. In this case, contacts established in the field through my past work with UN-HABITAT in the Balkans (2002-03), as well as through the reconnaissance visit (December 2006), were extremely useful in facilitating my research. Yet, a number of challenges and constraints remained. These are discussed briefly below.

- *Access* – In any field-based research, data as well as respondents may not always be easily accessible to researchers. Reasons for these can be both practical as well as political. In the latter case, one is liable to be confronted by *gatekeepers*, who control access to organizations, information as well as potential interviewees. Many authors mention the important role played by gatekeepers, including Barakat and Ellis (1996), Neuman (2003), Burnham et al. (2004) and Berg (2004). Barakat and Ellis (1996) propose that the researcher should try and enter into a partnership with a local counterpart, who could facilitate access to organisations, respondents and information. Neuman points out that while negotiation and bargaining with gatekeepers might be necessary to gain access, the researcher must at the same time “...set non-negotiable limits to protect research integrity” (Neuman 2003: 372).

In Bosnia, government documents, especially those containing demographic data at the cantonal or municipal level, proved almost impossible to obtain. Gaining access to Yugoslav-era planning laws and regulations (especially old

laws which are no longer applied), maps and plans, also proved difficult. To access some of the older documents, links were forged with the Spatial Planning Institutes in Sarajevo and Mostar. My association with UN-HABITAT during previous visits to Mostar and Sarajevo, and the network of contacts established during those visits, was extremely useful in gaining access to the limited archives, as well as respondents.

- *Language* – All government documentation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is in Bosnian, with the exception of documents issued by the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and other international agencies, which is available in English as well. Many of the respondents for this research only spoke Bosnian. To overcome this key constraint, a translator/interpreter was engaged to translate the documentation and provide interpretation during interviews.
- *Sensitivity* – Planning is not simply a technical or a value-neutral subject, especially in a city such as Mostar, torn apart by war, where different communities are still struggling to gain control over land and other resources. Land is often at the heart of conflict, which makes land governance, and planning, extremely important in the post-war period. In Mostar, the establishment of the Spatial Planning Institute was at the centre of a prolonged and bitter struggle between the main political parties until very recently. It was finally resolved, on paper, by an OHR decree, but the issue is by no means settled<sup>8</sup>. Some respondents, therefore, were unwilling to provide frank opinions on this subject. In some cases, 'off the record' or confidential discussions with anonymous reporting of responses was offered, but was not always taken up. The ethical issues related to anonymity and confidentiality are addressed in the section on ethics below.

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<sup>8</sup> This is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.

- *Bias* – There are many dimensions to the problem of bias. In conflict situations, issues such as ease of access (to settlements, communities), and availability of pre-processed data (for instance, that collected by other researchers and for project interventions), might guide the researcher to focus on more easily accessible subjects and areas. This would naturally introduce a bias in the study. Furthermore, the sensitivity of the subject and the politically-charged environment within which planning and development is currently taking place in Mostar, respondents might not provide unbiased responses to the questions. Different actors might provide starkly different accounts of the same processes and events. In some cases, one might end up dealing with only the more articulate or vocal members of the community, inadvertently ignoring the concerns of the more quiet ones (Barakat and Ellis 1996). While these issues are more pronounced during conflicts, they can be equally important factors while conducting research in post-conflict situations.

Furthermore, the researcher has to guard against becoming a pawn in the hands of rival political players seeking to further their own agendas. In such a situation, triangulation holds the key to arriving at an accurate description of the process or the problem, and producing an objective analysis.

Finally, the issue of the researcher's own bias(es) is equally important. As a practitioner, I worked for nearly ten years with the United Nations, including two years in Kosovo, and was also involved in the conceptualisation of a potential UN-HABITAT<sup>9</sup> project in Mostar. As a researcher, now, it is difficult for me to stay objective and to prevent the practical experience of my work in the field from creeping into the analysis. In addition, my association with UN-HABITAT also initially generated certain expectations

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<sup>9</sup> UN-HABITAT, or the United Nations Human Settlements Programme, is the UN agency that addresses human settlements and planning issues. For more information see [www.unhabitat.org](http://www.unhabitat.org).



among my respondents, although I attempted to unambiguously declare my position as a researcher rather than as an ex-UN staff member.

- *Going in 'cold'* – A final challenge in the context of this particular research effort relates to the fact that the researcher is a complete outsider. I am not a Bosnian, not even a European. My exposure to the Balkans has been through my work with the UN, both within the region as well as at headquarters. This was invaluable, but not sufficient to make me an insider. When a researcher doesn't belong to the community he or she researches, acquiring an in-depth understanding of the context and building trust with the respondents are two prerequisites, both of which need time and effort. This was always going to be an important challenge to be overcome in the present research, but one that I believe has been adequately addressed.

### 1.7.7 Ethical issues

*"Political research cannot be properly conducted in a moral vacuum. It has consequences for those who participate in the research and those who are influenced by it."* (Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004: 250)

The issue of ethics and ethical practices in research has gained considerable prominence in the past few decades, having originated in the context of biomedical research. The problem is that ethical considerations, in any research, but particularly in social sciences, are a subjective issue. Concerns of voluntary participation, informed consent, avoidance of deception, confidentiality and the overarching principle of 'doing no harm', and if possible achieving beneficial results for those being studied, are cited by many as the main ethical considerations in any research (Smyth and Robinson 2001; Berg 2004; Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004).

- *Participation and consent:* The foremost ethical issue to be addressed by researchers is the participation and consent of those being studied. Interviewees and other respondents must be clearly informed about the objectives of the research and must voluntarily agree to participate in the

process. In this research, consent was taken on tape, as most interviews were recorded.

- *Avoidance of deception:* Unless there is a case for covert research, the researcher should attempt to be as honest as possible about his identity, research objectives and potential use or impact of the research. As mentioned earlier, I played down my association with UN-HABITAT, and consistently and consciously emphasised my identity as a researcher, during the field research.
- *Anonymity and confidentiality:* While anonymity is possible in quantitative research, it is hard to maintain in qualitative research where the respondents are known to the researcher. The right of respondents to control the use of information about themselves must be protected, particularly in conflict or post-conflict situations where revelation of identity of the respondents could put them in physical danger or otherwise at risk (Berg 2004; Burnham, Gilland et al. 2004). Various professional associations such as the Political Studies Association (PSA), British International Studies Association (BISA) and the British Sociological Association (BSA) provide guidelines in this regard<sup>10</sup>.

Anonymity, however, is harder to justify, especially in cases where the participants are not particularly vulnerable or 'at risk.' In the case of this particular research, only two requests for anonymity were made, and only relating to specific information about ongoing planning projects which may have been granted permission illegally. Five respondents (of a total of thirty-seven)

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<sup>10</sup> The BSA guidelines are most explicit and state that: "*Research participants should understand how far they will be afforded anonymity and confidentiality and should be able to reject the use of data-gathering devices such as tape recorders and video cameras. Sociologists should be careful, on the one hand, not to give unrealistic guarantees of confidentiality and, on the other, not to permit communication of research films or records to audiences other than those to which the research participants have agreed.*" (British Sociological Association)

refused permission to record the interview, although they consented to being cited and quoted by name.

## **1.8 Structure of the thesis**

This study is divided into three substantive sections. The first section comprises, first of all, the present introduction including the research methodology. The next chapter sets the research questions in context, exploring the mutuality of cities and war in history, the nature of recent conflicts and their impact of cities, and the rise and fall (and rise again) of urban planning. Chapter Three discusses in greater detail the role of urban planning in post-war reconstruction efforts, especially under the aegis of transitional administrations. Chapter Four, the final chapter in this literature review trilogy, provides a historical overview of urban planning traditions and approaches in Bosnia, before as well as during the conflict, and the governance, reconstruction and planning scenarios which emerged as a result of the war.

The second section of the thesis presents and discusses the field research and findings. The discussion in this section is organised in three chapters. Chapter Five narrates the story of Mostar, its destruction during the war, the post-war reconstruction initiatives, and its situation today. Chapter Six explores the strategies adopted by EUAM for post-war reconstruction, examining in particular detail, the approach towards urban planning. It also discusses how other actors, local and international, used urban planning to promote their own goals in Mostar. Chapter Seven brings together the literature and the field research, revisiting the themes of post-war reconstruction, transitional administrations and urban planning, and begins to point towards some conclusions.

The final section, comprising a single chapter (Chapter Eight), presents the conclusions of this thesis, including the extent to which the research objectives have been met, and suggests some directions for future research.

## **CHAPTER 2**

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### **Context (Part I)**

#### **Cities and war, governance and planning**

## 2.0 Introduction

While the emphasis of this research effort is on urban planning in post-conflict reconstruction, the role of the international community and the effectiveness of their interventions in cities, particularly vis-à-vis reconciliation between divided populations and their socio-economic recovery, it is important to understand some of these underlying concepts. This chapter explores the mutuality of cities and war in history and the nature of recent conflicts and their impact on cities. The rise and fall of urban planning over the past century, its replacement by concepts such as urban management and urban governance, and its recent revival as an effective instrument of public policy, are also discussed in this chapter.

### 2.1 Conflicts and cities: an intimate relationship through history

*"No matter how many valuable functions the city has furthered, it has also served, throughout most of its history, as a container of organized violence and a transmitter of war."* (Mumford 1961: 59)

#### 2.1.1 Shaped by war: The urban response to conflict

No author has described the evolution of cities as eloquently as Lewis Mumford (1895-1990). The relationship between cities and wars is a recurrent theme in Mumford's work, as he describes the evolution of a temporary settlement of hunter-gatherers into a village, then into a stronghold, a citadel ('little city'), a walled city, and eventually into the contemporary city we identify today. He argues that urbanisation was less the result of a revolution, or an explosion of power as described by V. Gordon Childe, but more an implosion, whereby many diverse elements of a community were brought together "...under pressure, behind the massive walls of the city" (Mumford 1961: 46). Since the beginning of the urban implosion, war shaped both the physical form and institutional structure of the city. As centres of wealth and power, and symbols of armed might, cities became an attractive target for aggressors. At the same time,

Mumford argues, the very nature of war also changed once cities came into the picture – from aiming to capture a few sacrificial victims from the opposing side, aggression now meant “...*mass extermination and mass destruction*” (Mumford 1961: 55). This in turn led to further development in the art of fortification, and more broadly, in the urban pattern. Medieval towns adopted a radial layout, with a series of fortifications in the form of concentric walls. However, cities that formed part of the powerful Ottoman empire between the 16<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> Centuries, such as Cairo, Tunis or Damascus, and which were “...*relatively well-protected from outside aggression*” (Raymond 1984: 2) due to the security offered by a powerful state, did not construct any major fortifications to protect themselves from aggressors. All these phenomena are reflective of the historical relationship between cities and conflict (Unwin 1911; Abercrombie 1959).

Some authors argue that the development of the modern city is equally defined by the change in the nature, strategies and tools of warfare, which have, along with the advancements in communications, transportation systems and construction techniques, significantly influenced settlement patterns as well as the shape and form of the city in the last century. A case in point is the ‘dispersal movement’ which emerged in the United States in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Even though American cities had not been directly affected by the war, Light (2003) describes how the idea of ‘defensive dispersal’, or deliberate dispersal of population and industries to reduce the vulnerability of cities to a nuclear attack, gained currency in the 1940s and 1950s. The concept was championed by a wide range of professionals, including atomic scientists, defence strategists, and prominent urban planners. The latter, in particular, saw this as an opportunity to strengthen, consolidate and expand the influence of urban planning profession. Light (2003) and Farish (2003) indicate in their analyses that while the dispersal movement did not achieve much success in terms of actual implementation (due to both resource and enforcement constraints), it did establish a collaborative relationship between urban planners

and the defence establishment, including scientists and strategists, for many years to come.

Others assert, however, that the suburbanisation that eventually occurred in America was actually a product of many other factors, and cannot be attributed to the dispersal movement. The increasing motorisation of the American society, improvement of highways networks and the policies of the Federal Highways Agency, federal housing policies of the time, and private developers who were more interested in investing in suburbia as opposed to inner-city redevelopment, all played an important role in promoting suburban housing. Middle-class white citizens who could afford to do so, moved out from inner-city areas to suburbs, and were replaced by poorer, black populations. Industries, too, were already decentralising prior to the emergence of the dispersal movement (Ward 2002; Farish 2003; Beauregard 2006)<sup>11</sup>.

In the United Kingdom, the first wave of New Towns in the aftermath of World War-II are also said to be a result not only of spatial planning concerns, but also of the strategic objective of dispersal of national industries and the urban population. Defence planning against terrorism further became a reality in the 1990s when a 'ring of steel' was systematically and effectively erected around the City of London (or simply, the City) as a response to the IRA bombings. Coaffee (2004) provides an interesting and eloquent description of the combination of physical changes (initially temporary but subsequently permanent), traffic management measures, security and surveillance measures, and other restrictions that formed the 'ring of steel', which cordoned off the City to protect it from terrorist attack. Interestingly, turning the City into a "*...medieval-style walled enclave [...] a walled city-approach [...] with access through a number of small 'gates'*" is said to have been an explicit objective of the policymakers of the time

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<sup>11</sup> Beauregard's concept of *parasitic urbanisation* suggests that post-war urbanisation in America was 'parasitic' in the sense that it siphoned households out of older industrial centres, attracted urban retailers and manufacturing firms, and absorbed capital which might have been used for urban redevelopment (Beauregard 2006).

(see Coaffee 2004: 281). Following the September 11 attack in the United States, the ring was revived and strengthened, and today aims to serve as not only a deterrent for terrorists but also to criminals in general. Thus, the shape and form of the City has evolved and changed permanently over the last fifteen years, not just because of growth and economic development and changes in city function, but also thanks to the changing modes of urban warfare.

### 2.1.2 *A thousand little wars within: (In)visible urban fault lines*

*“...a thousand little wars were fought in the market-place, in the law courts, in the ball game or the arena.”* (Mumford 1961: 66)

It has also been argued that the city – since it came into existence – has been characterised by as many struggles *within* as outside. Segmentation of cities according to race, ethnicity or class is nothing new. In industrial societies, the working class was clearly segregated from the upper echelons of society, and planning was in fact the major tool of public policy used to ameliorate the living conditions of the working class. The post-industrial, and in many countries, post-colonial, society has seen an increase and intensification, not reduction, of the ‘thousand little wars’ described by Mumford, with many more cleavages in today’s cities than ever seen before.

Beall *et al.* (2002) argue that cities can be divided along a range of axes, including, among others, class, race, ethnicity, gender and length of residence. In most cities of the developing as well as developed world, class fault lines are clearer than religious, ethnic or national ones, and are reflected in the spatial pattern. Friedrich Engels pointed out in 1845 in the context of industrial Manchester that *“...the working-people’s quarters are sharply separated from the sections of the city reserved for the middle class”* (see LeGates and Stout 2000a: 49). This remains true even today, in fact, most cities are divided by different occupation and income groups, *“...the very rich; the affluent professionals; the suburban middle class; the unskilled workers; the informal workers; and the*



*residual or marginalized underclass*" (UN-HABITAT 2003a: 2). In 2003, nearly one third of the world's urban residents lived in slums<sup>12</sup>, which represent an extreme physical and spatial manifestation of intra-city inequalities in many developing-country cities (UN-HABITAT 2003a).

The Chinese city of Nanjing provides an interesting example of income and class divisions generated due to the economic transition and rapid growth, in a hitherto 'classless' urban spatial structure. Urban poverty has become a significant problem in China since the transition to the market in the early 1990s, and the spatial reflection of urban poverty is now beginning to emerge. According to Liu and Wu (2006), neighbourhoods of similar income or status have appeared in most Chinese cities. In Nanjing, the urban poor are concentrated in specific areas of the city where housing is affordable, though usually severely run-down. These include mainly three types of neighbourhoods – inner-city dilapidated residences, workers enclaves and rural migrants' enclaves.

In developed country cities, too, similar fault lines exist, though often just beneath the surface. A 2007 report on Indices of Deprivation observed that despite being one of the richest cities in the world, London is home to 4 out of the 8 most deprived local authorities' areas in England (Government Office for London 2007)<sup>13</sup>. *Banlieues* (suburbs) containing France's most distressed public housing projects can be found on the outskirts of most major French cities and are said to exemplify the country's most prominent social disparities. Home to marginalised communities of first and second generation immigrants, and characterised by lifeless architecture, poor accessibility, high unemployment and

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<sup>12</sup> The word slum first appeared in the 1820s in London, and was used loosely to define poorest quality housing and unsanitary living conditions, a refuge for, and source of, crime, 'vice' and disease. Today it simply refers to low-quality or informal housing, often overcrowded and poorly served by basic services and infrastructure. (For a more rigorous conceptual discussion on slums, see UN-HABITAT 2003)

<sup>13</sup> The Index is based on various indicators combined under seven categories – Income, Employment, Health Deprivation and Disability, Education, Skills and Training, Barriers to Housing and Services, Crime, Living Environment (Government Office for London 2007).

crime rates, these poor urban areas of France made world headlines in November 2005 when their disenfranchised young residents took to the streets in a month-long orgy of night-time rioting and violence (Simpson 2006). According to Balbo and Tuts (2006), as international migrants head to cities, not just in France but in many other countries, they prefer to settle among their 'own' people, who can provide them with initial support and guidance, something that is not always forthcoming from local institutions or authorities. This segregated pattern of settlement leads to a fragmentation of the urban fabric, with the implication that any urban conflict can lead to a *de facto* division of the city.

In their exploration of how the phenomenon of globalisation has affected cities, their spatial structure and form, Marcuse and van Kempen (2000) also find that although there is no standardised 'new spatial order' resulting from globalisation, cities ranging from New York to Calcutta to Brussels and others have witnessed growing polarisation, segmentation and exclusion as spatial patterns are brought about by policies and developments which are not solely spatial or local. They argue, nevertheless, that "...Spatial policies can have a dramatic effect on the divisions of the city" (p. 273), effect which can be either positive or negative. Land use and social housing policies can reduce divisions caused or exacerbated by globalisation, for example in Singapore and the Netherlands, or reinforce them, as in the United States. In terms of ethnic concentration, land use and economic development policies can either encourage or hinder the solidification of ethnic enclaves.

The manner in which a combination of racial segregation and class inequality can physically divide a city is exemplified in the case of Johannesburg. Johannesburg has been described as the quintessential apartheid city, and has been at the centre of the struggle against apartheid, racial segregation and job reservations. However, Beall et al. (2002) assert that Johannesburg's divisions, particularly in the post-apartheid era, are a consequence of the changed political economy, and the resultant inequalities – of income, of economic opportunity,

and of access to housing and services. Even in New York, which is almost universally labelled as a “global city”, despite the increasing mobility of the better-off individuals and families belonging to almost all different racial/ethnic groups, “...*there remains a hierarchy of racial and ethnic groups such that, for example, affluent whites and Asians live in the most attractive neighbourhoods, followed by comparable white Hispanics, and with blacks (both Hispanic and non-Hispanic) in significantly lower status communities*” (Logan 2000: 183). Indeed, across North America, urban economic and spatial inequities are far more pronounced than other developed regions of the world, with race/ethnicity “...*an important determinant of socio-economic status [...] Non-Whites, especially those of African ancestry, tend to live in squalid, dilapidated, functionally obsolescent and segregated neighbourhoods*” (UN-HABITAT *in press*: 70).

The existence and significance of ethnic and religious fault lines is one of the emerging areas of concern in urban studies, and has been examined in considerable detail in many ‘obviously’ divided cities, such as Jerusalem, Belfast, Mitrovica or Beirut. However, these cracks also exist, often just beneath the surface, in many seemingly ‘normal’ or ‘cosmopolitan’ cities, for instance in the Indian city of Mumbai (Bombay). Mumbai had witnessed occasional sectarian violence between Hindus and Muslims prior to 1992-93, but it was in that year that the communal tensions in the city reached the scale of a full-fledged conflagration. Nearly 1000 people were killed in the riots. The demographics of the city of Mumbai have changed significantly since then, as a large number of Hindus migrated from Muslim majority areas to Hindu majority areas in the city, and vice versa. According to Subramaniam (1999):

*“In the enormous movement of people after the riots, an open and subtle coercion worked alongside reactive fears, which resulted in Hindus fleeing to largely Hindu neighbourhoods and Muslims moving to predominantly Muslim areas.”* (p. 105)

Thus while religious, ethnic, racial and socio-economic cleavages in many cities may not take the shape of walls and barbed wire, they are often nevertheless clearly etched in the minds of the community, and reflected in the spatial structure of the city. In these contexts, the role of public policy, and indeed that of urban planning as one of its key instruments, can be determined keeping in mind the argument below.

*"In principle, there is no reason why public policy should interfere with enclave formation, as long as it is truly voluntary, that is, that anyone resident in an enclave has the realistic possibility of moving out. [...] Yet, the dangers of real ghetto formation must also be of concern."* (Marcuse and Van Kempen 2000: 274)

### **2.1.3 The changing nature (or not?) of conflict**

*"[wars today are] fought not in trenches and fields, but in living rooms, schools and supermarkets."* (Barakat 1998: 11)

The nature of war has undoubtedly changed over the past century. While there has been a steady decline in the occurrence of conflict since the end of the Cold War<sup>14</sup>, many countries are affected by more than one conflict, and the range of countries affected has expanded to touch virtually every continent, in recent years. Moreover, most conflicts are internal: only seven interstate armed conflicts have been recorded in the period 1989–2003 (Eriksson and Wallensteen 2004).

While Machiavelli and Clausewitz have historically been key contributors to the definition of war/ conflict, there have also been many attempts in recent years to describe the new forms of conflict. The World Bank identifies a "conflict country" as one that has recently experienced widespread violence, or where a main preoccupation of the state is armed warfare, where the state has failed, or where a significant part of the population is engaged in armed struggle with the

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<sup>14</sup> According to Harbom and Wallensteen (2007), 122 conflicts in 80 locations have been recorded in the post Cold War period. Shortly after the end of the Cold War, i.e. in 1989, 54 conflicts were active. There has been a steep, but not constant, decline in the number since 1992, and in 2006, there were 32 armed conflicts in 23 locations. This figure has remained constant for three years.

state (see Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998). Peter Wallensteen and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP), which he leads at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Sweden, have defined armed conflict as “...a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both, where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a year. Of these two parties, at least one has to be the government of a state” (Wallensteen 2002; Harbom and Wallensteen 2007)<sup>15</sup>.

Kaldor (1999) describes the post-Cold War conflicts as ‘new wars’ – wars that are caused by different factors, have different goals, different methods, and are financed in different ways, as compared to the ‘old wars’, defined by Clausewitz as being between states and for a definite political end – protection of state interest. Andersen refers to these as ‘civilian-based civil wars’ (Andersen 1999). A number of other authors have also touched upon the characteristics of recent/contemporary conflicts as part of broader discussions on aid, peace building or post-conflict reconstruction. The common features of post-Cold War conflicts identified by a number of authors include:

- *Genesis and goals:* New wars are not simply conflicts to defend ‘state interest’, nor do they always have justified ends. These wars are often driven by a combination of proximate causes and greed, manipulation and personal ambitions of a handful of people, who mobilise communities on the basis of identity (ethnicity, religion, nationality, etc.), in order to achieve their objectives (Andersen 1999; Kaldor 1999). Münkler (2005) lists some of the causes of the new wars as inequality and uneven distribution of wealth; ethnic, cultural, nationalist or religious differences; historic fault lines, colonial and pre-colonial era disputes; control, appropriation and distribution of resources. While none of these factors is sufficient in itself to lead to violent conflict or war, they often combine to

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<sup>15</sup> The UCDP defines war as a conflict with at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a year (Harbom and Wallensteen 2007).

create an explosive cocktail. Conflicts generated by these mixed motivations are much more difficult to end – there is no single root cause which, if dealt with, would bring the conflict to a close.

- ***Techniques:*** Kaldor describes the ‘new wars’ as a combination of guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency techniques, fought by highly decentralised units. According to UN-HABITAT, recent wars have been waged by largely amateur militia in cities and villages, “...driven by long-simmering ethnic and religious ideologies and fuelled by a struggle for political and economic control” (UN-HABITAT 2004b). As claiming power on basis of identity is their overarching goal, they focus on control of populations, and expulsion of those that cannot be controlled (Kaldor 1999; Münkler 2005).
- ***Ferocity:*** “The new wars are, in a sense, a mixture of war, crime and human rights violations” (Kaldor 1999: 11). Recent wars have indeed been characterised by greater ferocity of the conflict than ever before. Brutal and unjust methods are used regularly and widely, and the lawlessness and chaos gives rise to opportunistic criminal gangs. As a result, new vulnerable groups have come to the fore, such as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), ex-combatants, women-headed households and children. Their return and reintegration into their former homes and communities are issues that currently preoccupy most international agencies, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN-HCHR).
- ***Resources:*** While inter-state conflicts of the past were funded largely from within the warring nations, recent conflicts have been financed by a variety of sources, many of them external, a phenomenon Münkler labels ‘shadow globalisation’ (Münkler 2005). Foreign assistance has come from

states backing particular nationalist groups or militias (e.g. in the Bosnian war, from Serbia and Croatia), or from diaspora, either indirectly (remittances sent to individuals and households which are then 'channelled' into the 'movement', for instance in Kosovo), or directly to movements (also in Kosovo, for example, the remittances to Ibrahim Rugova's LDK or Democratic League of Kosovo, which were later redirected to KLA, or the Kosovo Liberation Army). This is supported by the sale of drilling or prospecting rights by militia who control certain regions; drugs and human trafficking; local predation, including looting and extortion; theft and diversion of humanitarian aid. The diversity of resources (and, consequently, interests) fuelling the new wars is yet another factor that makes these wars extremely difficult to end.

- *Civilian involvement:* As these 'new wars' are mostly fought within state borders and often in civic spaces, they are characterised by heavy involvement of civilians, both as combatants as and as targets. Civilians are no longer 'caught in the crossfire' but deliberate targets. Perpetrators are also victims – as illustrated by the case of child soldiers. According to UN-OCHA, one of the characteristics of the changing nature of conflict is that civilians are actively and deliberately targeted, and the dividing line between civilians and combatants is frequently blurred (see OCHA website – <http://ochaonline.un.org>). Combatant and non-combatant, soldier, policeman and criminal – it is hard to distinguish one from the other.

One critique of the 'new wars' thesis is based on its inadequate emphasis on the role of conventional state military forces, on interstate wars, and on the genocidal nature of the new wars. Shaw (2000), states that:

*"Kaldor restricts the significance of new wars by over-emphasising their separation from continuing inter-state war, and by*

*understating how far genocidal tendencies have come to dominate in contemporary war as a whole.” (p. 179)*

Indeed, the dual nature of war is evident throughout history – inter-state and intra-state conflicts have always co-existed. In the 1990s, the break-up of former Yugoslavia and the conflict in Rwanda were intra-state conflicts that grabbed the headlines, but the protracted Iran-Iraq conflict, the first Gulf War, and the international interventions in Kosovo and Haiti also occurred around the same time. Azerbaijan and Armenia; Ethiopia and Eritrea fought bitter inter-state wars. The ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are also wars of aggression on the part of the United States and a small coalition against these two countries. Inter- and intra-state wars can also take place at the same time, in the same place, as was illustrated by the Ethiopian attack on Somali Islamist groups at the end of 2006.

A more important perspective on the new conflicts is offered by authors and international agencies who suggest that it is less important to distinguish between old and new wars, than it is to differentiate between the different types of contemporary wars. In 1995, the World Bank acknowledged that not all conflict situations are the same, and that different types of conflicts warrant different types of post-conflict intervention. It identified five categories of ‘socio-political emergencies’ as:

- Stable states with disorderly transfers of power but with bureaucratic/governance continuity
- Peaceful dissolution into successor states
- State failure due to predatory or ineffectual governance
- State erosion or failure due to ethnic/regional conflict
- State failure due to ideological conflict (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998).

Many others have also argued that while the ‘new wars’ certainly share some key characteristics, they also differ in significant ways, and that these differences



significantly impact the way post-conflict reconstruction needs to be approached. According to Luckham (2004), the manner in which states are called into question can be:

- State collapse, where state administrations have effectively ceased, which can in fact precede or follow conflict
- A challenge to authoritarian states by predatory groups wishing to control the state and appropriate its resources
- A challenge to authoritarian states by popular revolts, due to their non-inclusive policies or marginalisation of certain groups
- Wars of national identity, which challenge the territorial integrity of the state
- Conflict at the margins of the state, which is not very different from the wars of national identity, except in degree, i.e. they don't challenge the existence of the state itself but paralyse certain geographical areas within it
- Regionalised conflicts, where the causes as well as consequences of the conflicts are regional rather than restricted to national boundaries
- Collapse caused by external intervention, including military invasion or regime change.

Luckham emphasises that the historical evolution of the conflict and its manifestation needs to be well-understood before any post-conflict intervention is planned, and that peacebuilding and reconstruction approaches, strategies and priorities, as well as the role played by international actors, would necessarily be different for each of the categories mentioned above. Berdal (2003), while echoing the importance of understanding the conflict from all perspectives, emphasises that the political economy of civil wars must be a crucial element of such an analysis. He focuses on three sets of issues: (a) the degree and nature of

state weakness and fragmentation, and an understanding of historical fault lines; (b) the nature and patterns of local and regional economic activity, formal as well as informal; and (c) mechanisms that support the continuation of war, including ease of access to, and integration into, international markets and actors. On the other hand, Kaufmann (1996) is of the view that a focus on causes of conflict takes away attention from the changes that take place during the conflict, and can lead to misguided solutions. He asserts that peace makers must concern themselves with the outcome of the conflict, rather than what existed before.

One of the themes being explored in this research is that the understanding of the pre-war context, as well as the changes that take place during the conflict, is central to establishing post-war reconstruction objectives, priorities and strategies which are realistic and achievable. Whether restoration of *status quo ante* is a desirable or achievable objective, is a different issue altogether. Both these aspects will be explored further in the context of Bosnia and Mostar.

Barakat (1998) divides the post-Cold war conflicts into three broad categories:

- Conflicts of a religious or ethnic nature
- Conflicts of a civilian character
- Conflicts between the 'haves' and 'have-nots', including an anti-urban discontent among rural and small-town communities

Prodanovic (2002) and Shaw (2004a) develop the last idea further, the latter arguing that all new wars share an anti-urban and anti-civic element. They suggest that cities are attacked by ethno-nationalists because of a combination of "...archetypal feelings of hostility on part of the rural society toward the rise of cities" (Prodanovic 2002: 141), and the pluralist, multi-ethnic, democratic politics that cities have to offer. Educated 'elites' within cities are specifically targeted because they represent a cosmopolitan culture alien to those coming from rural backgrounds.

### ***2.1.4 Killing the urban: The impact of recent conflicts on cities***

Over the last few decades, broader political struggles and conflicts are increasingly being articulated through attacks on strategic urban sites and their inhabitants. The complexity of the modern urban system, its infrastructure and communication networks, its reliance on technology and services, the concentration of large populations within its boundaries, and its multi-layered governance arrangements, renders it particularly vulnerable to conflict and its impact (Luke 2004). This was demonstrated in the not-too-distant history by the 9/11 strike on the twin towers in the United States, the Madrid train bombings, and the 7/7 bombing of the London underground. Conversely, the urban setting also suits the nature of the new wars, which are characterised by the use of light weapons, bombs, and which focus on spreading terror.

Indeed, Mumford's words on cities as targets of war find resonance in many later works on urbanism, urban planning, urban sociology, conflict and peace studies. Graham (2004) suggests that the capture of strategic and politically important cities, as well as their deliberate destruction – 'city annihilation' – in many cases, still remains the ultimate symbol of conquest. The targeting of cities appears to be one aspect of warfare that has not changed fundamentally through history, though its significance has waxed and waned. This is despite the clear injunction in international humanitarian law, issued over a hundred years ago as part of the Hague Conventions of 1907, that towns, villages, cities (or any areas with concentration of civilian population) must not be subject to attack or bombardment in any form<sup>16</sup>.

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<sup>16</sup> International humanitarian law (IHL), also known as the law of war, the laws and customs of war or the law of armed conflict, is the legal corpus that comprises the Geneva Conventions and the Hague Conventions, as well as subsequent treaties, case law, and customary international law. It defines the conduct and responsibilities of all key actors engaged in warfare, including 'belligerent nations, neutral nations and individuals engaged in warfare', in relation to each other and to protected persons (usually meaning civilians). The fourth Hague Convention (Hague IV) of 1907, which entered into force in January 1910, deals with the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and its Article 25 expressly prohibits "the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended." Article 27 of the same

Hills (2004) also states that:

*“...urban war has probably changed less than most other forms of war. It remains a brutal and exhausting matter, involving significant ‘collateral damage’ and military and civilian casualties, and is the closest the West comes to pre-industrial forms of conflict.”* (Hills 2004: 237)

The bombing of German and Japanese cities and civilians in the second World War<sup>17</sup>; the systematic destruction of Warsaw by the Nazi forces<sup>18</sup>; the demolition of many historic urban sites during the break-up of former Yugoslavia; the urban warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq, are all examples of deliberate targeting of cities as part of inter- and intra-state conflicts during and after the Second World War. Some authors also label the deliberate targeting of cities and what they represent, as ‘urbicide’.

The term ‘urbicide’ first came into circulation in 1992, when a group of architects from Mostar documented the destruction of buildings and the urban fabric in Mostar in a publication titled *Mostar ‘92 – Urbicid*. This was an attempt to demonstrate that the devastation of the urban environment was a deliberate effort to destroy the very identity of the city, and that the destruction of public and private buildings and infrastructure was more than simple collateral damage. The Mayor of Belgrade is also reported to have used the term to describe “...the

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Convention also insists that historic monuments and buildings dedicated to religion, art, science etc., as well as hospitals and other places where the sick and wounded are collected, be spared.

<sup>17</sup> For example, Dresden, the historic capital of the old kingdom of Saxony and a famous cultural centre. It was one of the few German cities which had remained undamaged for most of the war, until February 1945, in fact, when it was flattened by an Anglo-American bombing raid. The official reason for attacking Dresden was that it was a major communications centre, close behind Germany’s eastern frontier, which the Red Army was about to cross in its final offensive from Poland towards Berlin. The raid was intended to disrupt the German defence and to lend support to the Russians, who were about to cross over from Poland into Germany in their final offensive (Keegan 2005). However, critics go as far as to say that the bombing of Dresden was a ‘war crime’ – it was essentially a civilian target, and the all-out attack destroyed the city and killed nearly 35,000 people, mostly civilians.

<sup>18</sup> The destruction of Warsaw by the Nazis during the war clearly demonstrated an attempt to not only destroy the city and its citizens, but also wipe out the culture it represented (STOLICA 1954; Jankowski 1990; Crowley 1997).

*intentional, planned destruction and disintegration of an entire way of life in the city through the killing of its citizens as well as its culture of civility and diversity”* (Prodanovic 2002: 139)<sup>19</sup>. In a more recent publication, Coward (2004) proposes the following definition of urbicide:

*“The destruction of buildings and urban fabric as elements of urbanity. Buildings are destroyed because they are the condition of possibility of urbanity. Since urbanity is constituted by heterogeneity, urbicide comprises the destruction of the conditions of possibility of heterogeneity.”*(p.167)

He argues that the destruction of the urban environment in Bosnia was neither collateral damage nor military necessity, nor can it be explained away as attempts to destroy heritage, or targeting of cultural sites as signs representing particular ethnic/religious concepts or values. It was a vicious and deliberate assault by the ethno-nationalists on the plural and heterogeneous culture of Bosnia, in order to destroy both the symbols of co-existence between various ethnic/national groups, as well as the places and spaces where they lived their collective lives. Prodanovic (2002) lists Dubrovnik and Vukovar in Croatia, as well as Sarajevo and Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as notable examples of urbicide in the Balkans.

Conflicts also have a significant economic impact on cities, not just in terms of the collapse of all major pre-war economic activity, but also in the changed nature of the economy. Skilled labour often migrates out of the city during a conflict (as is currently being seen in Iraq), along with capital. Trade and production are interrupted. At the same time, rural populations make their way into the city, driven by fighting in the countryside and drawn by the possibility of accessing relief goods as well as employment and shelter, in urban areas (Barakat 1998; Kamphuis 2005). At the national level, war generates a ‘conflict economy’, which may need many years of peace to dismantle and transform.

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<sup>19</sup> Also see Adams (1993) and Coward (2001).

According to Kamphuis, a ‘conflict economy’ is characterised by the destruction of physical capital and the means of production and trade, as well as capital flight, along with the breakdown of social and political institutions. This is accompanied by the establishment of “...*alternative structures of power and exchange, mostly outside the formal economy*” (Kamphuis 2005: 185)<sup>20</sup>. It is often in the interests of economic and political elites to maintain a conflict or post-conflict situation in order to siphon off national and international resources, or to impose their own *de facto* authority on the ground.

The impact of conflict on cities thus includes, but extends beyond, physical destruction and economic devastation, often resulting in extreme social polarisation along lines of religion, ethnicity or nationality, and the *de facto* re-drawing of city boundaries, external as well as within.

## 2.2 After the conflict

### 2.2.1 ‘Post-conflict’ – is there any such thing?

*“Inter-state wars in Europe from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth century..... had a precise definition in time, beginning with the declaration of war and ending with the peace settlement.”*  
(Münkler 2005: 11)

In recent conflicts, this traditional distinction between a conflict and post-conflict situation has become, to say the least, blurred. Peace accords signed after conflicts can either (a) fully resolve a conflict, or (b) regulate or partially resolve the conflict, or (c) decide on a process towards achieving a resolution to the conflict. The military and political provisions of these accords vary greatly (Harbom, Hogbladh et al. 2006).

According to a number of authors, conflicts may become more or less violent, but they seldom achieve complete closure or resolution. Oberschall states that there can be several phases in the transition from conflict to peace, ranging from “...*conventional politics, militant politics, armed confrontation, [...] talk/fight,*

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<sup>20</sup> See full discussion on pages 64-65.

*ceasefire, peace agreement (contested to varying degrees), and implementation, with a lot of reversing and recycling over these phases until a stable, self-sustaining peace or some other outcome is achieved”* (Oberschall 2007: 28).

There could be prolonged periods when a conflict lies dormant, but it can be re-ignited by events or actions of the adversaries. According to Harbom and Wallensteen (2007), out of the 32 armed conflicts reported in 2006, nearly 21 had been going on for over ten years, experiencing a lull for a year or two, only to restart again. While four of the conflicts which had been reported as ‘active’ in 2005 were ‘no longer active’ in 2006, four others were restarted in 2006, either by the same parties that were involved before, or by new actors.

In their discussion on post-conflict development, Junne and Verkoren (2005c) use the term ‘post-conflict’ as *“shorthand for conflict situations, in which open warfare has come to an end”* (p.1). International organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank, too, find it hard to draw a line between conflict and post-conflict. A report on the World Bank’s experience in post-conflict reconstruction points out that:

*“The apparent closure points to conflict, such as peace agreements or elections, rarely signal the clear beginning of a definable post-conflict reconstruction period. Rather, there is a period of transition where peace must still be consolidated and ground laid before sustainable recovery can begin.”* (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998: 9 - original emphasis)

However incongruent it may seem, despite the lack of an accepted definition of ‘post-conflict’, there seems to be consensus among academics and researchers that the number of post-conflict situations is on the rise. It is this understanding that has led to an increasing emphasis on post-conflict recovery, reconstruction and development initiatives.

### ***2.2.2 Peace settlements and cities: New actors, new governance systems***

Some authors believe that inadequate attention is paid to cities in high level peace settlements, even though territorial claims often lie the heart of the

conflict. Bollens (2000; 2006) argues that cities have the potential and capacity to transform conflict, yet few peace accords have made full use of this capacity. He highlights the case of Sarajevo, where lifting of the siege of Sarajevo was an important element of the peace deal, and where initial discussions on the agreement included a provision to place Sarajevo under international administration. This did not materialise, however, and Sarajevo, though officially the capital of the whole of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was physically included under the Bosnian-Croat Federation. This discouraged the displaced Serbian population from returning to Sarajevo, and in fact led to more Serbs moving out of Sarajevo in the immediate aftermath of the Dayton Accords<sup>21</sup>.

Caplan (2005a) describes the different governance arrangements that have been devised following recent conflicts – in Cambodia; Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium; East Timor; Kosovo; and other war zones. While they vary between ‘poles of supervision and direct governance’ (Caplan 2005a: 20), international administrations in these situations nevertheless take on a wide range of responsibilities that go beyond traditional peacekeeping and include maintenance of public order and security, protection of refugees and displaced persons, civic administration and political institution-building, and economic recovery and reconstruction.

It is the last aspect, in particular, that has a direct bearing on cities. Even if a city is not placed under direct international administration in the aftermath of the conflict, the influence of the international community, including the multitude

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<sup>21</sup> In my view, however, this case illustrates that international mediators are not unaware of the role of cities and the significance accorded to control of particular cities by warring parties. Whether they get the solution right (if indeed there is any ‘right’ solution) is open to debate. The case of Mostar, which is the main case study for this research, is also another example of the attention paid to cities in peace agreements. The destruction and division of Mostar was so extreme that the Washington Agreement of 1994 devised an entirely novel arrangement (the EU Administration of Mostar) for its administration and reconstruction. An Interim Statute for the governance of the city was adopted in 1996, and a final city statute formally reunifying the city, in 2004. Even today, the international community sees Mostar as a reflection of the complex reality of Bosnian-Croat Federation, and efforts to resolve the impasse in Mostar and reunify the city are seen as attempts to find a lasting solution for the Federation as a whole.



of UN agencies, international donors and lending organisations, as well as international NGOs, is often clearly visible. Reconstruction priorities are usually defined by the international community. Even if local elections are held, international administrators and/or advisers are placed in municipalities, who have the final word on the important issues. This co-administrative or 'dual desk' model was applied (albeit with limited success) in Kosovo (Caplan 2005a).

One of the important fallouts of peace, thus, is the emergence of new and powerful external actors 'governing' cities (and indeed, entire territories or countries), and driving reconstruction and development – actors who are not accountable to local communities. The vision and priorities for reconstruction of cities thus emerge from the ideas and (often) preconceived agendas of these actors<sup>22</sup>. The new forms of participatory planning and governance (see Section 2.3) that have emerged in the past fifteen years have not yet been adapted effectively to post-conflict situations, despite the urgent need to ensure engagement, participation and inclusion of minorities and marginalised groups in the decision-making process. How participation can be promoted in situations of extreme conflict, and whether it is desirable or possible at all in these contexts, are also aspects which are yet to be fully explored.

### *2.2.3 New economic structures*

New governance arrangements are also usually accompanied by new economic structures, especially in (but not limited to) urban areas. According to Kamphuis (2005), four different types of economies, co-existing and closely intertwined, can be seen in typical post-conflict situations:

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<sup>22</sup> Whether this is the right approach or not, or the merits and demerits of introducing democratic governance (and at which stage) in post-conflict societies, is not the issue under discussion here. The point being made is that a number of new actors often emerge in post-conflict contexts, and have a significant role to play in recovery and reconstruction. These roles need to be acknowledged and factored into the analysis of post-conflict reconstruction approaches. This will be discussed further in Chapter 3.

- the international aid economy, led by aid organisations and their international staff who need housing, offices and services;
- the criminal economy, including a broad range of criminal and paracriminal activities;
- the informal economy, where informal systems of cash and goods exchange prevail; and
- the formal economy, which occupies a very small fraction of the total.

Urban areas, in particular, witness an economic explosion in response to the first of the reasons listed above – the presence of a large community of international organisations and workers, requiring not just housing and office space but also services of local professional and administrative staff, the latter including translators, drivers, secretaries, telephone operators and various others. Pioneering research on local staff of international organisations – the *lokalci* – by Barakat and Kapisazovic (2003) highlights that the presence of the international community in Bosnia has led to the emergence of this new social class, and that little has been done to ensure their capacity development or reintegration into the local economy once the international operations wind down. Outside these organisations, cafés and restaurants, numerous supermarkets and car-wash facilities, abound – in Kosovo, these can be found even in the smallest of settlements. Many local households choose to rent out their homes to expatriates, and live in overcrowded conditions themselves. The danger, of course, is the excessive reliance of the government as well as the local community on this arm of the economy, and the potential for another economic collapse, when the international operations are phased out.

The informal economy also becomes predominant in the aftermath of war because of influx of refugees and displaced persons who may not be able to find jobs; and the destruction of public assets and production facilities, for example in former Yugoslavia, which employed large numbers of people before the conflict.

The collapse of the state leads to the collapse of the state-run economy, and high unemployment is usually an immediate consequence.

At the same time, the post-conflict environment also presents an opportunity to address systemic problems in the economy, at both micro and macro levels. Donors are often not only willing but keen to support the legislative and policy reform, public administration reform, restructuring of the public finance system and rationalisation of taxes. This is also seen as a time to support strengthening of local government structures and introduce modern revenue collection and expenditure accounting systems at the local level.

### *2.2.3 New boundaries – Partition, unification, enclaves, extensions*

Another important impact of war, and peace, on cities is the redrawing of their borders. Nicosia, for example, was partitioned in 1958 when Greek and Turkish Cypriots turned on each other, after Turkish soldiers forced the Greek population from one of the mixed suburbs of the city. Although Cyprus gained independence from British colonial rule in 1960, neither side was satisfied – the Greek Cypriots wanted unification with Greece, while the Turkish Cypriots demanded division of the island. The island was formally partitioned in 1974 and remains so till date, as does the city of Nicosia (Charlesworth 2003).

The city of Mitrovica in northern Kosovo, too, remains firmly divided between Serbs and Albanians, despite many years of international administration and many attempts to unify the two parts. Encouraging returns of displaced persons of either community to their original dwellings on 'the other side' has been a key element of the reunification strategy, but one that has not achieved much success. Mostar in Bosnia and Herzegovina, too, was divided by the war between Croat and Bosniac-controlled areas, and the division was even more firmly entrenched by the measures undertaken in the name of peace. There have been strenuous efforts over the last few years, however, to reunify the city.

Heavily-guarded mono-ethnic enclaves – mini-cities within cities – are yet another feature of many post-war situations. In Kosovo, for example, UNHCR points out that the majority of Serb returns have been to all-Serb communities (enclaves) within villages, larger communities and municipalities, which have minimal interaction with ethnic Albanians. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) notes that the patterns of returns and resettlement “...do not indicate real progress towards a multi-ethnic Kosovo, since returnees live almost separately from the rest of Kosovo’s society and institutional framework” (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2005). A similar spatial segregation is also seen vis-à-vis the Roma and other minority communities in Kosovo.

In Beirut, the end of the fifteen-year war in 1990 brought with it the possibility of reunifying a city that had been divided into two distinct territories, East and West Beirut, by the Green Line. However, as the two areas had developed independent of each other over the past decades, it was no mean task. War had also brought with it many extensions to the city’s suburbs, which were used at the beginning of the war for the resettlements of refugees from various parts of the country. Post-1990, these irregular settlements were officially sanctioned by special planning measures, thus allowing their consolidation and inclusion in the city boundaries. Boundaries within the city were also redrawn, with the development of a new central business district, where the *souks* once stood, and narrow winding streets made their way<sup>23</sup> (Davie 1993; Stewart 1996; Verdeil 2005).

It might be useful here to briefly discuss the broader theoretical arguments for and against partition (usually implying national or regional, rather than local) in the aftermath of ethnic conflicts. Between 1996-99, Chaim Kaufmann published

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<sup>23</sup> The approach adopted for the reconstruction of Beirut, led by the private sector and supported by the political leadership of the country, has its supporters as well as critics. It was undoubtedly a novel approach, but not one without flaws. It will be examined in greater detail in the next chapter.

a series of provocative papers suggesting that partition or strict separation of warring ethnic groups into defensible territories might be an effective way to end civil wars and purchase "*lasting security*", instead of an unrealistic "*imperfect peace*" (Kaufmann 1996: 151). He also suggested that unless majority-versus-minority claims on the same territory are removed, ethnic cleansing would either continue, or resume at some point in the future. He proposed, finally, that the alternatives to separation are either equally undesirable (e.g. suppression), unrealistic (e.g. reconstruction of identities), have proved to be ineffective, or have many constraints (as in the case of power-sharing arrangements or state-building). On the other hand, demographic separation and considerable local autonomy could replace the need for (and calls for) secession or sovereignty.

This argument has been supported by a handful of others, for example Deutscher (2001), who uses the case of Switzerland to assert that strong, autonomous cantons, established on the basis of linguistic homogeneity, have proved to be an effective arrangement to prevent inter-group hostility and conflict. Downes (2006) takes up the examples of Bosnia and Kosovo and argues that in both cases, partition along (now-)established ethnic lines might be a more effective and lasting solution to the conflict than the emphasis on minority returns and state-building efforts to (re)construct a multi-ethnic state (and in the case of Bosnia, the complex power-sharing arrangements instituted by Dayton).

The "Chaim Kaufmann Argument", as it has been labelled by Licklider and Bloom (2006) in a recent volume on the subject, also has its critics. Sambanis (2006) uses the Doyle-Sambanis dataset of 145 post-1945 civil wars to assert that although partition is likely in ethnic/ religious civil wars which have witnessed high levels of violence, there is no evidence to support that it makes war less likely to resume, or results in lower levels of residual conflict. Laitin (2006) also challenges Kaufmann's argument that renewed civil war is less likely to take place when warring communities are separated, rather than when they are intermingled.

Simonsen (2005) has argued that to effectively address divisions in societies ravaged by ethnic conflict, it is important to reduce the salience of ethnicity. Kaufmann (1996; 1998), Deutscher (2001) and Downes (2006) are of the opinion that this can be done by separating the groups into defensible, homogeneous enclaves, which would reduce the power of the nationalists and reduce any need for military action against the ethnic 'other.' Simonsen, however, suggests that the salience of ethnicity can be diminished by (a) sharpening the focus on other cross-cutting cleavages in society, and (b) developing flexible institutional structures which are responsive to the needs of the various groups. Local political autonomy and decision-making power over local issues are seen by many authors as central to resolving ethnic conflict.

Taken to its logical extreme, Kaufmann's argument would mean that all states which have ever experienced ethnic conflict are inherently unstable and must be made mono-ethnic or clearly segregated at some stage. The present research asserts that such a situation is undesirable, unrealistic, and an extreme viewpoint. However, what can be usefully extracted from the argument is that the international community must establish a realistic set of goals or aspirations for different phases in the aftermath of conflict. Segregation or partition is often a reality in the aftermath of conflict, especially at the city or regional level, as illustrated by the examples of Nicosia, Mitrovica, Serb enclaves in Kosovo, cited above, as well as other cities such as Mostar (discussed in later chapters), and Belfast (not discussed here). The strategies to deal with ethnic 'un-mixing' should be context-specific and flexible, rather than one-size-fits-all, prescriptive solutions. The case of Mostar, as we will see later in this thesis, suggests that in the early stages, it may be unrealistic to try to impose ethnic re-mixing in places where an extremely violent form of un-mixing or cleansing has taken place, and a focus on incremental normalisation might stand a better chance of success than forced reunification.

## 2.3 The rise, demise and resurrection of urban planning

To build an understanding of the crisis of identity and relevance faced by urban planning today – especially in disaster- and conflict-affected cities where, ironically, it is needed the most – the rise and fall of urban planning over the last fifty years has been briefly reviewed in this section. From a means of defending the city, to a tool of socio-political organisation and an instrument to demonstrate power, planning evolved into a mechanism for improving the quality of life in cities and towns, especially after the industrial revolution. Slowly, however, it became simply another bureaucratic exercise, and lost its significance in urban and national governance, except in cases where it was used for not-so-positive objectives, which are discussed in Chapter 3.

### 2.3.1 *Planning in the ancient world*

The ancient city of Hotep Sesostris (Kahun) in modern-day Egypt, the city of Ur located near the Euphrates and Tigris rivers in modern-day Iraq, and Harappa and Mohenjodaro in the Indus Valley in modern-day Pakistan are some of the earliest known towns based on a definite plan. All were built between the Fourth and Third Millennia B.C. Hotep Sesostris, now called Kahun, is one of the better-preserved urban sites of the ancient world. According to Lampl (1968):

*“...within a rectangular mud-brick enclosure, the city was constructed according to a preconceived plan providing maximal occupancy on a minimal area and zoned according to its different types of buildings.” (p. 26)*

The city of Ur in Mesopotamia, too, was surrounded by a mud-brick rampart, with a walled ‘temenos’ (a sacred site or official precinct) just off the centre of the city serving as its administrative centre. In Egypt, a small acropolis was situated on higher ground, large and smaller dwellings were separated, which was perhaps an ancient form of zoning. Excavated ruins of other ancient cities also point towards a grid pattern, with a hierarchy of streets (commercial boulevards to small residential alleyways), a separation of uses, and well-

developed drainage and sanitation systems. Excavated ruins of Megiddo in the Levant (now Syria, in broad terms) show signs of an “...*ambitious town planning scheme*” that included a series of level terraces with well-planned streets, square houses, a sanctuary and a large, probably public, building (Lampl 1968: 35). To a limited extent, thus, planning seems to have existed ever since the city itself came into existence, has apparently been an exercise undertaken by some form of planning authority, and used to reflect the socio-political structure of societies in spatial terms.

The Greek ‘planner’ Hippodamus, who is said to have designed early Greek cities such as Miletus, Piraeus (the new port of Athens), and a Panhellenic colony in southern Italy around 443 B.C., is considered the ‘father’ of city planning. Straight, wide and paved streets, often edged with stately colonnades, separate groupings of dwellings and public buildings, the rectangular open spaces of the forums and agoras, and the monumental public buildings, and the centrality of the market reflected the socio-political organization and economic structures of the Greek ‘polis’. Many new cities built around this time in Italy, Sicily and North Africa are also said to have followed similar principles. While the Greek ‘polis’ had an important influence on Roman cities, the latter were laid much more along a regular grid-iron pattern, with two main roads running at right angles (Unwin 1911; Abercrombie 1959; Kennedy 1985). Early Islamic cities were said to follow principles such as interdependence and privacy, with clear guidelines on requirements for public and private spaces. These principles remained valid until much later, with Arab cities of the 17<sup>th</sup> and 18<sup>th</sup> centuries also demonstrating pronounced distinctions between public and private spaces, commercial and residential districts, and a prominent role for the market and the Great Mosque (Raymond 1984; Hakim 1986).

### ***2.3.2 Planning during the Renaissance***

Town planning emerged as an art form during the Renaissance period in Europe, with magnificent buildings and beautifully designed open spaces. The city as a



whole was considered a “...*monument or a work of art*” (Abercrombie 1959: 54). Large planning schemes were undertaken at this time, and new capitals built as symbols of power and pride – the most notable among these being Versailles, which was developed on the instruction of Louis XIV in the late 1660s (Borsay 1989)<sup>24</sup>. Planning in England, however, lagged much further behind its European counterpart during the Renaissance. The turning point came when the Great Fire of London destroyed large parts of the city in 1666, and Christopher Wren’s famous plans for rebuilding London were developed and implemented (though only partially)<sup>25</sup>. Thus the revival of planning in Britain is closely linked to the objective of reconstruction rather than the establishment of new settlements.

### ***2.3.3 Planning as the tool for equitable development***

In the mid-eighteenth and early nineteenth century, the industrial revolution generated unprecedented growth and densification of cities across Britain, the rest of Europe and North America. This in turn led to the emergence of an industrial working class and a distinct urban underclass. The contrast between the advances in technology and industry and the disorder and squalor in cities was striking (LeGates and Stout 2000b). In the late 19<sup>th</sup> century, Friedrich Engels described the state of industrial towns in England, the collapse of urban

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<sup>24</sup> This was also the case much later in the capitals of countries governed by, or newly independent of, colonial powers. New Delhi, Chandigarh, Islamabad and Harare were all built as symbols of power.

<sup>25</sup> London’s reconstruction efforts served as one of the models for the rebuilding of Lisbon after the earthquake of 1755, which measured 8.5-9.0 on the Richter scale, and triggered a tsunami as well as a series of fires across the city. Between 10,000 – 15,000 people are said to have perished, and one-third of the city destroyed. It was rebuilt on the basis of completely different principles as compared to the old, with a rejection of the former opulent and grand style in favour of a more utilitarian and modern plan. While the planners of the new Lisbon drew inspiration from the rebuilding of London, in many ways the reconstruction of Lisbon was far more radical and comprehensive than that of London. This is attributed mainly to the inability of London’s planners and politicians, unlike their Portuguese counterparts, to break away from the old street patterns, property lines and ownership rights. Another key factor behind the successful implementation of Lisbon’s reconstruction plan was the role played by Marquês de Pombal, a powerful figure in the King’s cabinet, who took charge of the reconstruction process (Maxwell 2002).

infrastructure and the desperate living conditions of the urban poor. Writing about the Old Town of Manchester, for instance, he pointed out:

*“...the filth, ruin, and uninhabitableness, the defiance of all considerations and cleanliness, ventilation and health which emphasizes the construction of this single district, containing at least twenty to thirty thousand inhabitants.”* (see LeGates and Stout 2000a: 53)

He also described how particular planning interventions physically and psychologically separate the privileged classes from the poor, going on to observe that

*“The dwellings of the workers are everywhere badly planned, badly built, kept in the worst condition, badly ventilated and unwholesome.”* (see LeGates and Stout 2000a: 54)

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, urban or town planning emerged as the tool to address these physical, environmental and social ills of nineteenth-century industrial cities, aiming to restore order and health, address overcrowding and ensure safety. Public hygiene goals combined with a focus on decongestion, housing reform and developing city ‘lungs’ or green spaces, and *“...professional, comprehensive planning practice that we are familiar with today began to arise first in Germany, England and the United States; later everywhere in the world”* (LeGates and Stout 2000b: 299).

This was a period when planners had a free hand to design and execute utopian urban development schemes. Hausmann’s replanning of Paris between 1856–70 brought in wide boulevards and large green spaces, improved circulation and connectivity, produced impressive and innovative vistas. In Abercrombie’s words, it was *“...the best example of clear-headed logic in town modernization”* (Abercrombie 1959: 91). Around the same time, the parks movement led by landscape architects saw the development of open spaces, squares and gardens in London, Paris, New York and many other cities. Planning for public hygiene

concerns was highlighted by Benjamin Ward Richardson, a physician, in his publication "Hygeia, City of Health", published in 1876.

Ebenezer Howard's Garden City sought to integrate the rural with the urban and provide city-dwellers with a good quality of life along with economic opportunity, in one self-sufficient unit. Letchworth, the world's first garden city, was built in 1904. On the other side of the Atlantic, the 'City Beautiful' movement began to gain ground, exemplified by Daniel Burnham's Chicago Plan of 1909, emphasizing urban planning as a comprehensive process. Patrick Geddes took the discussion a step further and addressed issues of physical planning and social development together. He also introduced what we today assume is a prerequisite to plan preparation – a survey of the city, its environment and surrounding eco-systems, its history and growth. Geddes' ideas were taken forward by Lewis Mumford, who also helped popularise them in America. All these were significant milestones in the development of the planning profession, and examples of planning for urban renewal.

The shape and form of the Master Plan, as we know it today, was first articulated by Edward Bassett in *The Master Plan* (1935). He described it as a general, flexible document, containing both map and text, having a certain visionary quality but emphasising physical land use planning (see LeGates and Stout 2000b). Patrick Abercrombie's Greater London Plan of 1944 was considered the pinnacle of master planning in the aftermath of the Second World War. It laid out a comprehensive set of proposals for the reconstruction of London and creation of new towns outside London, which was to be ring-fenced by a substantial green belt. It also provided the basis for the post-War urban development policy in Britain, one that remained intact until the 1980s. Overall, the local planning system in Britain changed and evolved throughout the 1950s and 1960s, with a renewed emphasis on slum clearance and redevelopment for public housing, the modernisation of urban centres, and restructuring of urban

roads. The New Towns, of course, were a much-admired British planning achievement of this era (Cherry 1982; Ward 2002).

At the same time, the post-War period saw a new system of development in America as well, with mixed-use neighbourhoods replaced by a rigorous separation of uses. After a “...*brief flirtation with a broad-based, European-style subsidized social housing policy*” (Ward 2002: 187), private house building boomed, federal highway-building was initiated and suburbanisation gained momentum. This was resisted by some urban dwellers, who fought to retain the lifestyle, vibrancy and vitality offered by inner-city neighbourhoods. Jane Jacobs led the charge, with her scathing critique of modernist planning policies that she claimed were destroying many existing inner-city communities (Jacobs 1961). As a result, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the emergence of a number of urban renewal and inner-city redevelopment initiatives. The New Urbanism movement also developed at this time, aiming to provide an alternative to the urban sprawl that was rapidly becoming the defining characteristic of American cities.

#### ***2.3.4 The (f)utility of master planning***

For much of the world, however, both developed and developing, Master Plans continued to be the predominant model of planning in the twentieth century, as they remain to this day. It is ironic, however, that although Master Plans retained most of the characteristics originally ascribed to them by Bassett, they failed to remain true what was perhaps the most important of all the features he proposed, and one that held the key to their successful implementation – flexibility. Indeed, comprehensive, inflexible and un-implementable masterplans characterised planning in most countries towards the end of the twentieth century. Too much attention was paid to plan making and too little to the financial implications of planning proposals, and consequently, plan implementation. Plans failed to bring together sectoral and spatial strategies for development, and planning went from being seen as the “...*embodiment of the dream of the brave new world*” (Taylor 2004: 4), the means by government could

deliver equitable and efficient development, to an expensive, long-drawn, unrealistic exercise wound up in red tape. It also proved unable to respond to new challenges of increased urbanisation of poverty and exclusion, deterioration of the environment and natural resources, and natural and man-made disasters (Clarke 1994; Taylor 2004).

As sectoral programmes and projects became more popular, land use became the most important (sometimes the sole) instrument in the hands of planners. In North America, even this was lost as policies designed to roll-back the state and allow a greater role for the market came to the fore, which considerably weakened planning. However, two decades of *laissez-faire* and market-led development, not only in North America but in many other parts of the world, have clearly made cities less sustainable, habitable and equitable. It is argued that letting private interests control resources such as land and housing, infrastructure and transportation, without adequate guidance, has exacerbated inequity and exclusion (Narang and Reutersward 2006).

While urban planning faded into insignificance, sustainable urban development emerged as an important issue in the international development debate. A large number of international declarations and agreements have been adopted over the last fifteen years, most notably, *Agenda 21*, an unprecedented global plan of action for sustainable development adopted at the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio; *the Habitat Agenda*, the main outcome of the Habitat II conference in Istanbul in 1996; and the more recent *Johannesburg Plan of Implementation*, adopted at the World Summit for Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. All have called upon national and local governments to look for ways to ensure the sustainability of rapidly expanding cities and towns. The understanding of sustainable development seems to have been especially broadened and strengthened as a result of the Johannesburg Summit, particularly in respect of the important linkages between poverty, the environment, and the use of natural resources.

Interestingly, while they focused on issues of social, economic and environmental sustainability; shelter and housing; the need for enablement and participation; the role of public and private sectors, all these international agendas failed to place any emphasis on the role of planning and planners. Mechanisms to ensure sustainable development included new environmental planning and management approaches, the use of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) and Socio-Economic Impact Assessments (SEIA). Urban planning, however, scarcely received a mention as a possible means of ensuring sustainable development. Indeed, over the last twenty years, urban planning was slowly upstaged by urban management, which in turn gave way to the concept of urban governance, these new catch-phrases virtually supplanting urban planning in the dictionary of local governments (Narang and Reutersward 2006).

### *2.3.5 Planning as an instrument of urban governance*

In the 1980s, the concept of urban management was introduced with a view to making cities more productive and efficient. It was in fact a rejection of the increasingly physical, land-use orientation of planning, a response to its inability to deal with new challenges of increased urbanisation of poverty and exclusion, deterioration of the environment and natural resources, and natural and man-made disasters. Urban management soon came to be seen as a panacea for these problems (Biau 2005; Mehta 2005).

Over the last two decades, however, the term 'urban governance' has slowly replaced 'urban management' in the international development lexicon. Kearns and Paddison (2000) argue that several changes in the urban context have led to this shift, including economic globalisation, which has led to greater inter-urban competition as well as a 'loss of control' on urban economies on the part of urban governments; changing urban-regional-national relationships; increasing political decentralisation and the growing complexity of urban social life. Indeed, over the last decade or so, there has been a growing interest in the concept of governance in general, and urban governance in particular. Governance is

defined in many ways, but all definitions focus on the relationships between the State, civil society and private sectors. The key aspects to be noted are that (a) governance is not government, a crucial distinction between the two being the notion of civil society; and (b) governance emphasises the processes of decision-making, as much as, or even more than, the decisions themselves or their outcomes (see Harpham and Boateng 1997; UN-HABITAT 2002a; ODI 2006).

UN-HABITAT's Global Campaign on Urban Governance (GCUG) puts forth the following definition of urban governance:

*“Urban governance is the sum of the many ways individuals and institutions, public and private, plan and manage the common affairs of the city. It is a continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be accommodated and cooperative action can be taken. It includes formal institutions as well as informal arrangements and the social capital of citizens.” (UN-HABITAT 2002a: 9)*

The Campaign also takes a normative stand and proposes seven principles of good urban governance. These are also supported by other international actors including The Urban Governance Initiative (UNDP-TUGI) and the Oslo Governance Centre. The seven principles are:

- Sustainability – Balancing the social, economic and environmental needs of present and future generations
- Subsidiarity – Assigning responsibilities and resources to the closest appropriate level
- Equity of access to decision-making processes and the basic necessities of urban life
- Efficiency in delivery of public services and in promoting local economic development
- Transparency and Accountability of decision-makers and all stakeholders

- Civic Engagement and Citizenship – Recognising that people are the principal wealth of cities, and both the object and the means of sustainable human development
- Security of individuals and their living environment (UN-HABITAT 2002b).

The discussion on governance has evolved and matured over the last fifteen or so years, and new tools and techniques to encourage participation, transparency and accountability have come to the fore. Examples include participatory budgeting, an innovative practice widely applied in Latin America as well as parts of Western Europe; City Consultations; Urban Pacts; and other similar approaches designed to promote civic engagement. There is a growing focus on issues of exclusion and inclusion, and their spatial manifestation in cities across the developing as well as developed world. Some attempts have been made to link planning and governance through approaches such as participatory planning, community development planning, Environmental Planning and Management (EPM) and City Development Strategies (CDS), but these are few and far between. Some of these approaches are discussed briefly in the following sections.

### *2.3.6 New goals, new approaches (I): Planning for sustainability and inclusion*

The recent revival of planning has been led largely by Western European cities where innovative strategic planning approaches have come to the fore, integrating the spatial and the sectoral. Strategic Plans, or Strategic Structure Plans, have derived from, and in turn revived, Europe's 'strong state' traditions (Albrechts, Healey et al. 2003). The Strategic Structure Plan for the Flanders Region, in particular, is an example of a shift from traditional regulatory land use planning towards a more strategic framework, emphasising principles such as sustainability and participation. Similar strategic structure plans have also been adopted for other cities as well as regions in continental Europe.



Some of the innovation in this period has also come from developing countries. Many Latin American cities have adopted a strategic urban planning approach, for instance, Buenos Aires in Argentina, Santiago de Chile in Chile, La Paz in Bolivia and Havana in Cuba. In this part of the world, key elements of strategic planning include, *inter alia*, formulation of a long term vision and strategy for the city, focusing on critical issues, establishing action-oriented participatory processes, and flexible decision-making (UN-HABITAT 2004a). In Africa, South Africa has introduced Integrated Development Plans which aim to transform the divided cities that were a legacy of *apartheid*, by focusing on service backlogs and inequalities, while at the same time aiming for efficiency and competitiveness (Boraine 2004; UN-HABITAT 2004a). City Development Strategies (CDS) are yet another tool, though not spatial-focused, which have been used in a number of cities to move towards inclusive and well-governed cities, linking development priorities with investments, while retaining a pro-poor focus (Mehta 2004).

The growing realisation that a renewed planning can be a key force for addressing the sustainability agenda and balancing the three pillars – environmental, economic and social sustainability – which are often competing, has provided policymakers, practitioners and thinkers with the opportunity to redefine and re-establish the planning agenda (Lovering 2004; Narang 2006). Many also argue that the revived planning is (or, has the potential to be) a tool for realizing good governance, with its focus increasingly on citizen participation in decision-making, transparency and accountability, efficiency and effectiveness of development and investments. Since it offers citizens and communities to participate in something “tangible” that impacts their lives directly and has the potential to improve their immediate living environment, it may be a more effective approach towards civic engagement, as compared to promoting democratic participation in general terms (Carley, Jenkins et al. 2001). Van den Broeck (2006) and others take the discussion further, arguing that it is not just participation in planning, but a ‘co-production’ of visions, concepts, policy and

decision making and implementation, that holds the key to successful planning and plan implementation.

### ***2.3.7 New goals, new approaches (II): Planning for disasters, before and after disasters***

In 1978, Ian Davis discussed issues related to shelter and housing, particularly emergency shelter, in the aftermath of natural disasters, noting that (a) the pre-disaster context had an important bearing on the impact of the disaster as well as the post-disaster situation; and (b) that decisions taken in the immediate aftermath of the disaster (i.e. during the relief phase), can have important implications in the longer term (Davis 1978). A seminar at the University of Trondheim in 1987 brought together a number of experiences on reconstruction after natural disasters as well as wars. Subsequently, an international workshop held at the University of York in 1991 proposed some guiding principles for reconstruction after wars (Barakat and Cockburn 1991). However, the gap between theory and practice persisted, and these were rarely applied in reality.

Over the last few years, there has once again been a renewed emphasis on planning for disasters, both natural and man-made. Hurricane Katrina, the Kashmir earthquake, and the Indian Ocean Tsunami have once again demonstrated the dire need to reduce vulnerability of urban areas and their residents, especially the poorest and most vulnerable, to natural disasters. At the same time, planning is also emerging as a critical element (and often a crucial gap) in post-disaster recovery. Ingram *et al.* (2006) argue that hastily devised, reactive policies often fail to address the root causes of vulnerability and, in the long term, may even exacerbate the social, economic and environmental weaknesses that turn natural hazards into large-scale disasters. They propose that redevelopment policies should be carefully developed, on the basis of comprehensive, site-based assessments of risk and vulnerability, and in consultation with all stakeholders.

There is also a growing acceptance among practitioners as well, that sustainable recovery and development warrants a swift and smooth transition from relief to development stages, with the application of a combination of crisis mitigation, response, recovery, economic development and sustainability strategies (UN-HABITAT 2004b). Planning is also increasingly being seen as an important part of the armoury of potential solutions that can facilitate such a transition and lead to sustainable development.

New Urban Planning, an approach recently put forth by a group of planners from across the world, is being promoted as a mechanism to ensure that a long-term perspective is retained even while emergency needs of the communities affected by conflict and disaster are being addressed. Planned reconstruction and a governance approach that emphasises inclusiveness and partnership, can nurture social and civic capital in the aftermath of a disaster or conflict. Plans can provide a framework for different interests to work together in a common purpose, and a transparent and accountable arena for negotiation of conflicts over development, both within civil society and between private and public interests (Farmer, Frojmovic et al. 2006).

## **2.4 Conclusion**

Cities and war, destruction and reconstruction have always gone hand in hand, as cities have always been important targets in any conflict, whether ancient or modern. While the nature of wars has undoubtedly changed in the post-Cold War era, cities, city-dwellers and the urban way of life continue to be seen as strategic targets, a phenomenon some authors label as 'urbicide'.

Planning has historically been a multifaceted instrument which has been applied to protect cities from outside aggression, organise the socio-political structure within cities, facilitate economic activity and improve the quality of life of citizens. Since the 1950s, urban planning has witnessed a tumultuous cycle of rise, fall and resurrection. The 1950s are viewed by many as 'the golden age' of

planning, an era when planning was seen as positive, progressive force, the means by which government could deliver equitable and efficient development, and contribute to the greater public good (Hall 1988; Cherry 1994). In the 1970s, however, it came to be viewed as long-drawn and futile exercise. As urbanisation progressed at a pace that seemed impossible to plan for, urban management, and later urban governance, emerged as alternatives to urban planning. Yet, planning never really vanished completely. New forms of planning have emerged in the last two decades to tackle the new challenges of poverty, exclusion, deterioration of the environment, and disasters, both natural and man-made. In some cases, planning has also been used to further the not-so noble objectives of the division of cities and communities, and the suppression and exclusion of certain populations.

The role of planners and planning in post-war reconstruction efforts has also varied considerably since the end of the Second World War. Planners played a prominent and indeed visionary role in the reconstruction of Germany, Britain and other European countries after the Second World War. However, in many post-Cold War conflicts, they have been marginalised as the emphasis on immediate relief and recovery gained currency. The emphasis in recent decades has largely been on *ad hoc* interventions – shelter delivery, reconstruction of symbolic buildings, and rehabilitation of physical infrastructure, rather than on undertaking systematic, strategic urban planning with a long term development vision, aiming to enhance inclusion, sustainability, peacebuilding and/or conflict-resolution<sup>26</sup>. In some cases, the private sector took over the task of planning and rebuilding destroyed urban sites or even entire cities. While there have been a limited number of cases, for example in Kosovo, Somalia and Afghanistan, where new forms of planning have been (or are being) introduced to rebuild conflict-

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<sup>26</sup> This is despite evidence, both from practice and literature, that planning can be a force for social change, positive as well as negative. Bollens (1998) argues that urban planning can be an important factor in ameliorating or intensifying ethnic conflict in polarised cities, as planners play neutral, partisan, equity-oriented or conflict-resolving roles.

destroyed cities and territories in a systematic manner, these are few and far-between. The different approaches adopted towards post-war reconstruction in the period following the Second World War, and the role of planning in each of these, are examined in detail in the next chapter.

## **CHAPTER 3**

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### **Context (Part II)**

**Post-war reconstruction,  
urban planning and  
transitional administrations**

### **3.0 Introduction**

The previous chapter described how planning, cities, war and reconstruction have always gone hand-in-hand. However, in recent reconstruction efforts, planning, and planners, have largely been marginalised – mostly because planning is viewed as a long-term, development-oriented activity, whereas ‘relief’ and ‘reconstruction’ have a sense of urgency about them. A range of examples have been used in this chapter to build an appreciation of the roles played by urban planning in conflict-affected cities. The responsibilities of transitional administrations, one of the modalities used by the international community for the governance of war-affected states and territories, particularly vis-à-vis post-war reconstruction, are also reviewed in this chapter.

The first part of this chapter reviews the theory and practice of contemporary post-war reconstruction. The second part explores how planning has been used – or not used, or worse, abused – in past reconstruction initiatives, and the impact of the different approaches adopted. The third section discusses the role of transitional administrations, and how they have approached post-war reconstruction in general, and urban planning in particular. The last section brings it all together and highlights key aspects that need to be explored in greater detail as part of the field research.

### **3.1 The major elements of post-war reconstruction**

Reconstruction of war-torn societies is an extremely complex process, which needs to address not only issues of physical destruction but also aspects of social and economic recovery as well as peace building. These are complicated further by the lack of institutions and the fragile social fabric that often emerges after a conflict (Kreimer, Eriksson et al. 1998; Barakat 2005a). Barakat defines post-conflict or post-war reconstruction as a range of inter-related activities designed to reactivate economic and social development, while at the same time creating a peaceful environment that will prevent a relapse into violence (Barakat 2005a).

Defined in this way, it extends beyond simply reverting to *status quo ante*, or 're'creating what existed before the war, to include strategic choices which would pave the way for a better future<sup>27</sup>.

The limited, but rapidly expanding, body of literature on post-war reconstruction and development is only just beginning to combine conceptual understanding with lessons from practice. In this process, a few broad principles of post-war reconstruction and recovery have started to emerge. There is a growing emphasis on the importance of post-conflict development which goes beyond simply reconstruction or rebuilding to encompass the establishment of 'a new social contract', and which is closely related to the context and causes of the conflict (Junne and Verkoren 2005a). Barakat (2005b) proposes seven 'pillars' that form the basis for sustainable recovery and reconstruction, including:

- *A clear and collective vision* for post-war recovery, at least for the medium-term, if not for the long-term future;
- Early and broad-based *participation*, involving all stakeholders, towards the development of national vision for recovery;
- Restoration of a *secure environment* and the rule of law;
- *Reconciliation*, restoration of trust, and re-establishment of a *justice* system;
- *Equity* in the distribution of the benefits of reconstruction and peace, and the relative importance accorded to the needs of different groups, sectors and geographical areas;

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<sup>27</sup> Some organisations have even begun to favour the term 'recovery' over 'reconstruction' in post-war contexts, on the basis that 're' construction suggests a return to *status quo ante*, or that it can be too restrictive in its focus (mainly emphasising rebuilding of physical assets, housing and infrastructure (Barakat and Zyck 2009). In this study, however, the terms post-war 'reconstruction' and 'recovery' are used interchangeably, and are aligned closely with the definition proposed by Barakat in the previous paragraph.



- *Reconstruction and development*, including physical, economic as well as social aspects, using a range of interconnected strategies at different levels (national, regional and local); and
- Assessing and developing *capacities* for recovery from conflict.

While the importance of physical reconstruction is underscored by a large number of authors as well as practitioners, most point out that it should go hand-in-hand with economic reconstruction, aim to tackle inequity in society, should be a means to reform governance structures, and should ultimately serve to connect rather than further divide previously warring communities (Brown 2005; Junne and Verkoren 2005b; Zetter 2005). Zetter, in particular, emphasises that physical reconstruction should not be treated as simply an end in itself – it is, rather, a means and an integral component of reconstructing and reviving societies devastated by conflict. Housing and landed property, for instance, are not simply a physical requirement for survival and safety, but an important economic asset, an instrument to rebuild livelihoods, and an “...*important social and cultural commodity*” (Zetter 2005: 156). Similarly, Brown (2005) suggests that infrastructure can be a tool bring communities together, stimulate the economy and sustain livelihoods, and assist in consolidation of peace. Sustainable infrastructure, as defined by Brown, encompasses “...*physical assets that provide net benefits to a community, its neighbors, and the environment on a long-term basis*” (Brown 2005: 104).

Zetter, Brown and others highlight the importance of a strategic vision and strategic framework to guide reconstruction and development, as well as the enablement and empowerment of communities in the process. Zetter (2005) also proposes two more essential preconditions for sustainable physical reconstruction programmes – linking relief and rehabilitation to recovery and development, and rebuilding institutional capacity – which are also being increasingly recognised as key issues by international agencies involved in post-conflict reconstruction efforts such as UNDP, UN-OCHA, UN-HABITAT, IOM

etc. Brown, on the other hand, suggests that relief and development must be seen as separate but concurrent processes, neither sequential nor overlapping, and one should not dilute the other (Brown 2005).

Both literature as well as lessons from the field point towards the importance of balancing short-term reconstruction priorities with a long-term vision for development, and ensuring that “...in the rush to reconstruct after conflict, long-term sustainability is not compromised” (Brown 2005: 102). Like other forms of aid, housing, infrastructure and other elements of physical reconstruction can serve as connectors or dividers (Andersen 1999; Brown 2005), particularly in divided communities, and this aspects must be carefully considered while developing a strategic framework or plan for reconstruction. “*The importance of getting it right the first time cannot be overstated*” (Brown 2005: 103).

## 3.2 Urban planning in post-war reconstruction

### 3.2.1 *Planning for reconstruction after the World Wars*

The First World War (1914-18), surprisingly, spared most major European cities. Only the cities directly involved in the fighting (for instance, Lille and Liege) suffered noticeable damage. Thus the period after the war was dedicated more to the construction of public housing and expansion of industrial areas, rather than planning of new settlements. In Britain, planning for reconstruction started in 1916, and housing was clearly the immediate priority. A strong push was made for state provision of housing through local authorities, which led to the ‘homes for heroes’ campaign. Recommendations on density, site planning and house design were also adopted, though town planning legislation was most definitely ‘an appendage of housing’ (Cherry 1982: 23). The powers for town planning were eventually vested in the Ministry of Health, created in 1919. In Germany, the preparation of the first city-wide, comprehensive urban development plan – for

the city of Hamburg – was a significant innovation. In other parts of Europe – France, for instance – the influence of modernists like Le Corbusier increased<sup>28</sup>.

World War-II (1939-45), on the other hand, had a devastating impact on cities across Europe, as well as in Japan. The period after the War was marked by a rise in the profile of planners and the significance of planning in national recovery efforts in various European countries (*inter alia*, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Poland). A large number of planners and decision-makers viewed the destruction of cities during the War as an opportunity to address the ills that existed earlier and ‘build back better’. Planning for towns and cities was clearly an integral part of national recovery efforts as a large number of cities were completely or partially destroyed. The widespread destruction provided the space (physical as well as political) to rebuild on a large scale, and reform the entire planning system, at national, local and even international levels. It is as a result of some of the new approaches adopted after the War that ideas such as extensive land acquisition, zoning, density control and pedestrianisation of city centres came to the fore (Diefendorf 1989; Cherry 1990; Jankowski 1990; 1993; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002).

In Britain, bold approaches to rebuilding were encouraged in the immediate aftermath of the war, with a vision of a new and sustainable future. There was consensus on the need for improved circulation, open spaces, and a better quality of the living environment for rich and poor alike. The Coalition cabinet seemed in favour of radical reconstruction. Lord Reith’s famous exhortation to ‘plan

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<sup>28</sup> The Athens Charter, an outcome of CIAM IV held in 1933, promulgated what it claimed were collectively agreed guiding principles for modern urban planning. However, the version that appeared in print in 1943 was under Le Corbusier’s own name, and largely reflected his personal thinking and approach, focusing on high-rise residential blocks, strict zoning, the separation of residential areas and transportation arteries, and the preservation of historic districts and buildings (Ward 2002). For many years, these principles were adhered to by most European countries, albeit to different degrees. The United Nations in 1976 criticised it on the basis that it “...degrades the town to a mere machine and neglects social and sociological implications. The strict separation of places of work and residence has led to the creation of dormitory towns and also to high costs both for individuals and governments for home-to-work travel” (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe 1976: 7).

boldly and comprehensively' echoed in every city planner's ears as planning, and planners, enjoyed unprecedented political and community support (Cherry 1990; Diefendorf 1990; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002; Larkham 2004). Plans were developed quickly and considerable progress made in their implementation even as the war went on. There was a surge of interest in town planning as media campaigns were launched soon after the bombing raids to engage the citizens in developing a new vision for the cities. Larkham (2004) also points out that as many plans were prepared in-house by local authorities as by external actors or consultants, and there was often little qualitative difference between the outputs. The shape and form the plan took was always an inherently political and negotiated, rather than merely 'scientific', exercise (Larkham 2004: 30). Indeed, although planners had powerful visions about how their cities should be rebuilt, their efforts were often undermined by the broader political and economic context, the rising costs, as well as the changing perceptions of the decision-makers and community alike. As resources dwindled, the same Coalition government in Britain seemed to have retreated from its commitments, and was no longer prepared to support any radical efforts – whether in the area of legislation, policy, plans or resources - until the war ended. Some concluded that *"...the real purpose of the ideas proposed in the dark days of 1940 and 1941 was simply to raise morale. Once they had served their purpose, they could be quietly killed off"* (Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002: 6, emphasis original). At the local government level, too, a similar trend was observed, and was further reinforced by the disenchantment of the private sector with the government's extensive involvement in reconstruction. Property owners and developers, as well as retailers and other traders, resisted any suggestions of radical changes in urban layout and form, and in some cases agitated for restoration of *status quo ante*. Public enthusiasm for reconstruction flagged and the very necessity of town planning began to be questioned, for example, in cities such as Plymouth (Powers 2002). The repair and provision of homes seemed to be the top priority –

indeed, sometimes it appeared to be the only priority – of the people. Planning slowly became synonymous with housing.

In the long-term, it can be said that the post-war period gave an enormous fillip to planning in Britain, eventually providing direction to future growth and development, both physical and sectoral. Since the war, till date, there has been a continuous reinvention of planning in post-war Britain. New Towns, in particular, are a key innovation, and 32 of these have been created in the UK since 1946 (Hall 1974; Department of Planning Oxford Brookes University 2006).

In West Germany, too, although a number of radical and utopian approaches were mooted to rebuild the bombed cities, in the end, however, most cities and planners adopted a pragmatic approach to planning. The focus was on modernising cities using the opportunities afforded by the bombing, such as the complete destruction of inner city slums. In many cities, plans prepared under the Nazi regime (which was strongly pro-planning) were applied wholeheartedly without realizing that they failed to respond to changed realities. Fischer (1990) and Diefendorf (1993) assert that there were strong continuities in planning ideas, approaches and activities after the war with those developed before Hitler's 12-year Reich, as well as during the Nazi period. Nazi planning had generated not only "...*megalomaniac monumental buildings*" (Fischer 1990: 132), but also technocratic, modern town plans, as the regime was willing to support planning with the necessary legal backing and financial resources. Urban renewal programmes, creation of new residential suburbs and new industrial cities, regional planning, and redesign of 23 large cities, were all activities carried out during the Third Reich (Fischer 1990; Diefendorf 1993)<sup>29</sup>. To a large extent, these pre-war planning models helped shape post-war planning interventions.

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<sup>29</sup> The most far-reaching of all the planning activities during the Third Reich was the nationwide program for redesign (*Neugestaltung*) of a large number of existing cities. The implementation of this programme required the acquisition of large tracts of land – either through purchase or by force – as well as large-scale demolition and clearing of areas that were to be redeveloped. These proved to be an immensely valuable asset after the war and facilitated enormous the task of post-war reconstruction.

The final shape and form of most West German cities, including Munich, Bonn, Frankfurt and Kiel, was determined by an over-arching emphasis on modernisation and functionality.

Grebler (1956) notes that the rebuilding of cities in Western Europe after World War-II exhibited a distinct pattern of continuity and persistence with the pre-war approaches to urban planning. Despite the *tabula rasa* opportunity offered to many cities by the war, most didn't choose to rebuild in a manner that was radically different from the pre-war city, whether in terms of location of the cities and distribution of population, or new land use patterns and physical improvements in the urban environment. Nor were any efforts made to create "*...a new urban pattern designed for protection against future war*" (Grebler 1956: 463). Others also suggest that there were strong continuities in the planning approaches adopted before, during and after World War-II, and that many European countries, had in fact a head start as "*...radical urban reconstruction was in the air*" even during the inter-war period (Cherry 1990: 210, emphasis original; Fischer 1990; Diefendorf 1993). Davis (1987) proposes that the potential for bringing about radical change in urban plans and city development after conflicts is rather over-estimated in most situations, and the opportunities to introduce radical/ utopian planning schemes can be quite limited, thanks to factors such as previous investments in services and the complex patterns of land ownership. This theme will be explored in greater detail within the context of Mostar in later chapters.

In Eastern Europe, planning systems after 1945 were largely modelled on the Soviet approach, with an emphasis on centrally-directed planned economic development, and a focus on sectoral, rather than physical planning, especially in the years immediately after the War. Spatial/physical planning was subservient to economic planning, and was mainly seen a technical tool to help realise the objectives of economic plans, ensure rational allocation of resources and

distribution of economic activities in order to promote equitable development (Dawson 1987; Nedović-Budić 2001).

Although both Germany and Japan fell under occupying powers/transitional administrations after the war, urban planning never gained the popularity or the support in Japan that it had garnered in Germany or the rest of western Europe. This was despite the fact that over 100 cities and towns across Japan were classified as 'war-damaged'. Planning for reconstruction was initiated very soon after the war ended, with the fundamental aim of preventing the uncontrolled expansion of large cities and conurbations and promotion of growth of small and medium-sized provincial towns (Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). However, this initiative eventually failed because both architects and businessmen wanted big cities to remain dominant. The reconstruction of Tokyo was the other main preoccupation of leading political figures as well as architects and planners. Once again, although 28% of the city was destroyed in the War, planning finally played a much smaller role in the rebuilding of Tokyo than was envisaged, mainly due to the lack of support from the Metropolitan and national governments, and the prevarication of local officials. The rapid and uncontrolled growth of the city, financial constraints and an orthodox financial approach, too, played their part, as did the American disapproval of "*...such idealism in a defeated and shamed country*" (Ward 2002: 214).

In the United States, of course, the planning ideal didn't receive such condemnation. In fact, the period after World War-II witnessed an increasingly closer link between urban planning and national defence strategies. This is reflected in, for example, the idea of 'defensive dispersal' in America which, as discussed in the previous chapter, gained currency in the 1940s and 1950s, and supported the deliberate dispersal of population and industries to reduce the vulnerability of cities to a nuclear attack (Farish 2003; Light 2003).

The problem with the widely-accepted perspective of urban planning history until the Second World War, is that it assumes that societies were homogeneous

and the basic objectives of planning were purely technical, and/or positive – public good, improvement of living environments, provision of housing and basic urban services to all, green cities, were the overarching goals. This discussion often ignores the class divisions promoted by Hausmann's remodelling of Paris, Hitler and Speer's implicit Nazi ambitions that were played out through urban planning and housing policies between 1933-45 (Jaskot 1996), or the exclusionary, racist objectives of planning in South Africa, Zimbabwe and many other colonial outposts (Mabin and Smit 1997). In the post-World War-II analysis as well, these negative dimensions of planning often take a backseat and the focus firmly remains on urban planning as a predominantly technical tool for managing socio-economic development and ensuring environmental sustainability, rather than an instrument of oppression and division, in its intents as well as methods (Yiftachel 2000; Kamete 2007).

### ***3.2.2 Urban planning in contemporary post-war reconstruction***

*"The greatest challenge is to use the reconstruction process [in Beirut] to weld the divergent sectors of the multireligious society and to create, along with economic prosperity, a stronger sense of national unity. Yet reconstruction also has the potential to aggravate old tensions between groups and to renew internal strife."*  
(Stewart 1996: 487)

In the post-World War-II world, planning hasn't disappeared entirely from the arena of post-war reconstruction, but it has certainly become fragmented and used selectively. Its use as a prominent tool of post-war reconstruction has come mainly in situations of strong central control, whether under an occupying power, or a strong national government. In Jerusalem, for instance, since the six-day war of 1967, Israel has used various instruments of urban planning to reinforce its occupation of the Palestinian Territories<sup>30</sup>. In Beirut, Lebanon, the plans and the process of reconstruction after the civil war ended in 1990 were

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<sup>30</sup> These include, for instance, the expanding Jewish settlements; building permissions, zoning and built form regulations; the roads cutting through the West Bank; and most recently, installation of green spaces by removing Arab settlements in Jerusalem.



pushed through by powerful elites without sufficient consultation with the local stakeholders. The free hand given to the private sector in planning for reconstruction has been widely criticised as divisive and exclusionary. Another example of the use of urban planning for assertion of power, but with little positive impact on the lives of those affected by the conflict, is that of the reconstruction of Fao after the Iran-Iraq war that lasted between 1980-88. The explicit aims of the reconstruction 'campaign' (as it was called), were to restore peace, and to attract displaced families back to their original settlements. The implicit objectives, however, were to establish the cities of Basrah and Fao as icons of resistance to the Iranian forces, as symbols of Iraqi pride, a declaration of Iraq's ability and self-sufficiency to rebuild itself, and to establish the President as a "*...hero of war and defence as well as of peace and reconstruction*" (see Barakat 1993: 20).

In the following sub-sections, some of these examples are discussed in greater detail. It is important to understand the predominant objective and envisaged outcomes of the planning process (which may not always be positive), the tools utilised, the timing of plan preparation (if at all), and the extent of involvement of various stakeholders, in order to be able to appreciate the importance of planning for conflict-affected societies.

#### Planning to restore pride and consolidate power

In many cases, especially after 'liberation' of any sort, reconstruction of symbolic structures and sites emerges as top priority for the nationalist powers and becomes a key goal of planning. There are many examples of the use of planning for restoring national pride and asserting power, including Warsaw (Poland) after the second World War, Fao (Iraq) after the Iran-Iraq war, and Beirut, after the end of the civil war in 1990. In each of these cases, planning was also used by the regime in power to consolidate their position after a devastating conflict. The examples of Fao and Beirut are discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs.

A pioneering study by Barakat (1993) illustrates the use of urban planning in Basrah and Fao in southern Iraq as a mechanism for restoring national pride. While demonstrating the importance of a strong (though dictatorial, in this case) state for the development and implementation of town plans, it highlights equally, the futile symbolism and ineffectiveness of planning when it is done without any involvement of the local people.

The reconstruction of Basrah and Fao was the only planned effort undertaken by the Iraqi government following the end of the war with Iran, which lasted from 1980 until 1988. The reconstruction process was led by the Supreme Committee for the Reconstruction of Basrah and Fao (SCRBF). This Committee was established by a Presidential Decree, headed by the President himself, and involved senior members of the Cabinet and the bureaucracy, including the Prime Minister. The major policy decisions taken included the rebuilding of Basrah and Fao within a short period of 3 months each, the engagement of only local experts and deployment of local skills and resources, and a heavy reliance on the government's own construction capabilities.

While the reconstruction efforts in Basrah were limited to infrastructure repair and city beautification, the city of Fao was rebuilt from scratch according to a new plan, as it had been utterly devastated by the war. In December 1988, the Ministry of Local Government announced a design competition for a new plan of Fao. The competition was limited to its own planners, and five proposals were produced within six weeks. Later, the government also asked private architectural offices to contribute to the rebuilding of Fao by proposing designs free of cost. The emphasis of the winning plan was on a large central open space, several monuments representing the Iraqi victory, and a number of residential districts. When the city was officially opened by the President in October 1989, all the symbolic squares and monuments planned had been constructed, as well as most of the political and administrative buildings, but only a few facilities such

as schools and hospitals, and a handful of houses for government officials (Barakat 1993).

The planning process in Fao was hasty, piecemeal and top-down, as was the implementation of the plan. Local communities were neither consulted during the plan preparation, nor involved in the actual reconstruction of the city. Large-scale acquisition of land by the government freed it from speculation and reinforced central control, allowing the authorities a free hand in plan implementation. The overarching emphasis was on symbolism and 'monumentalism in architecture and town planning' (Barakat 1993: 49), rather than any short- or long-term needs of the citizens of Fao, and it was in the end an ineffective bureaucratic exercise with little positive impact on the lives of the people affected by the conflict.

Another recent instance of the application of planning to assert power is the reconstruction of Beirut downtown (*Centre Ville*) following the war in Lebanon which lasted between 1975 and 1990. The conflict converted the city into a battleground, and witnessed the creation of the "Green line", a demarcation zone between the main warring militias. The city centre was part of this zone, and was closed off and virtually emptied out. Businesses, offices and residents all moved out towards the suburbs. Between 1975-90, Beirut's infrastructure was shattered, about 180,000 housing units destroyed and a similar number damaged. The destruction left between 300,000-500,000 people homeless or displaced (Davie 1993; Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Tabet 1993; Stewart 1996).

Numerous plans were also developed during this period specifically for the redevelopment of Beirut city centre, first in 1977, then in 1983, and again in 1991. The last of these formed part of a broader programme for the reconstruction of Lebanon, titled *Horizon 2000*. It was also proposed at this time that a single (private) real estate firm expropriate all the land in the centre and take over the rebuilding process. Law 117 of 7 December 1991 provided the legal basis for the creation of such a company, known by its French acronym *Solidere*.

Billionaire businessman and then Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri was the single largest shareholder in this company, and those who had their properties expropriated were also given shares. When completed, the Beirut Central District (BCD) would house 40,000 people and host 100,000 daytime workers within 4.5 million square metres of mixed-use space, including offices, retail, government buildings, leisure and cultural facilities (Stewart 1996; Makdisi 1997a; Charlesworth 2003).

While the planning and reconstruction of Beirut is largely seen as a positive and forward-looking exercise, critics of the process believe that the reconstruction of the *Centre Ville* in line with the vision of one man (Prime Minister Hariri) has simply served to reinforce the power of the political and financial elites. Conceived and implemented without any public participation and/or accountability, the process of redevelopment of BCD deepened the divisions in Lebanese society rather than promoting or facilitating reconciliation. It exacerbated social polarisation by creating islands of prosperity and privilege for the rich while excluding the poor entirely (Stewart 1996; Charlesworth 2003).

*“The failure to thoroughly address the needs of the poor is perhaps the most risky aspect of Beirut’s reconstruction.... Violence rooted in poor urban areas, where groups such as Hezbollah and Amal operate, could squash economic recovery before it even takes root.”*  
(Stewart 1996: 502)

### **Planning for control and division**

*“... in the West Bank planning is war carried out by other means.”*  
(Coon 1992: 210)

According to Yiftachel (1995; 2000), the negative roles of urban planning have rarely been considered by prominent thinkers and writers in this field, who have chosen instead to focus on its role as a positive force and an instrument for reform. However, there are a number of examples where urban planning has been used by one community to subjugate, control or marginalise another.

Examples include Kosovo, Israel, Palestine and South Africa, where planning has been used by powerful actors to assert the dominance of an occupying power, or that of one community over another. In these cases, the planning process is punitive rather than supportive, and relies heavily on what is often selective interpretation of existing laws, regulations and plans. Planning is used as a tool to displace 'undesirable' segments of the population (usually another community), and in extreme situations, becomes a means for ethnic cleansing. This was seen in Israel in the 1950s, when 'development towns' were built to house the less desirable (and less influential) members of the Jewish community, namely the Mizrahi Jews (Yiftachel 2000); in Kosovo during the period of Serb domination, especially between 1989 and 1999; and in South Africa during the era of *apartheid*.

A more extreme example of the use of planning for furthering the goals of occupation and control is that of Jerusalem and the West Bank. It has been argued that although town planning may appear to be an insignificant aspect of a rather more complex political and military situation in occupied Palestine, it has in fact proved to be one of the foremost tools to sustain the Israeli occupation (Coon 1992; Weizman 2007). The Israeli approach to planning in Jerusalem has been described as 'partisan planning', which blatantly serves the interests of one community over another (Bollens 1998; 2000).

Indeed, Israel's goal as well as strategy in Jerusalem has been to expand Jewish neighbourhoods to such an extent, and in such a manner, that physical division of the city becomes impossible. Thus the Old city and the Palestinian areas have been surrounded with Jewish population, which would make it impossible to return to the pre-1967 status<sup>31</sup>. As Jerusalem is governed under Israeli law, the local government is allowed to expropriate up to 40 percent of private land

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<sup>31</sup> The UN resolution of 1947 proposed the creation of an international zone around Jerusalem. However, Israel took control of West Jerusalem in 1948, and East Jerusalem in 1967, subsequently merging both to form the Jerusalem municipality which is administered under Israeli law.

without compensation while preparing a detailed plan, as well as to reparcel land in any way it chooses<sup>32</sup>. Other national government agencies also have extensive powers to expropriate land for developmental purposes (Coon 1992; Bollens 2000). Interestingly, there is no statutory planning framework for Jerusalem – the last statutory plan for West Jerusalem was prepared in 1959 and no outline plan has ever been prepared for the areas annexed in 1967. Development is guided by the selective application of zoning and other regulations to the different parts of the city.

Partisan planning by Israel is by no means restricted to Jerusalem alone. While Jerusalem is administered under Israeli law (however questionable this may be), the remaining area of the West Bank should, in theory, be governed under the Jordanian laws prevailing in 1967. However, Israel has used ‘security enactments’ or military orders that ostensibly concern security issues, to supersede all previous laws, including the Jordanian Planning Law. The development of the Palestinian villages and towns has been restricted through the deployment of planning tools such as built area restrictions, density and zoning regulations. Furthermore, no development plans of any sort have been prepared for most of the Arab areas, which has meant that the Palestinians cannot apply for any building permits at all, and thus cannot undertake any construction on their own land. This has had a direct impact on the lives of the Palestinian people, their livelihoods, living conditions and national aspirations (Coon 1992; Bollens 1998; 2000).

At the same time, the development of Jewish settlements has been promoted and supported, and efficient road infrastructure constructed across the West Bank, to serve the dual goals of connecting the Jewish settlements and slicing Palestinian settlements and agricultural lands into unviable and disjointed parts. Pullan *et al.* argue that while much has been made of the separation barrier that Israel has

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<sup>32</sup> These powers are based on The Planning and Building Law. The land expropriated is supposed to be designated for public use only, but this is seldom the case on the ground.

erected in recent years, the road system developed by the Israelis in Jerusalem and the West Bank is in fact a far more important and permanent feature “...*designed to segregate and dominate the Palestinian movement in order to ensure the continuity and safety of Israeli passage*” (Pullan, Misselwitz et al. 2007: 175).

The examples above illustrate how urban planning has been used as an instrument of post-war reconstruction since the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. After the Second World War, urban and economic planning were applied in tandem to catalyse national recovery, and to instil a new hope for the future in war-affected societies. However, in the second half of the century, urban planning featured mainly in situations of strong national government control, used either with the objective of restoring lost national pride, or for building a power base for the post-war government. In these cases, it has done little to encourage reconciliation or build a widely-accepted or endorsed vision for the future.

In situations where strong national governments are not in charge, however, the role of planning, and the importance accorded to it, has been rather different. Recent conflicts have witnessed the emergence of new governance arrangements in the aftermath of conflict, in the form of international transitional administrations. The approaches adopted by these administrations towards post-war reconstruction in general, and urban planning in particular, are discussed in the following section.

### **3.3 The role of Transitional Administrations in post-war reconstruction**

#### ***3.3.1 Introducing transitional administrations***

International intervention in conflicts can range from, and quite often evolves from, preventive diplomacy to armed intervention, to peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement and peacebuilding after conflict. These roles

have transformed over the years in response to the changing nature of conflict and the growing complexity of post-conflict situations. Peacebuilding, in particular, is a term of more recent origin and includes activities that can serve to *“...reassemble the foundations of peace and provide the tools for building on those foundations something that is more than just the absence of war”* (United Nations 2000: 3). The UN Panel on Peace Operations suggests that peacebuilding includes activities such as the strengthening of the rule of law, reintegration of former combatants into society, improving respect for human rights, supporting democratic development, and promoting conflict resolution and reconciliation. Many of these responsibilities, if not all, rest with international administrations set up in the aftermath of conflict (United Nations 2000)<sup>33</sup>.

This section focuses on the role played by international administrations, sometimes also referred to as ‘transitional administrations’, ‘international territorial administrations’, or ‘international civilian administrations’, in war-affected territories. It reviews the different conceptualisations and types of transitional administrations discussed in literature. Further, it examines the mandates and functioning of a few selected transitional administrations in the post-Cold War era, and their role in the post-war reconstruction effort. An attempt has been made to include not just UN administrations but also those operating under the authority of regional powers such as the European Union (e.g. in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and other occupying powers (e.g. in Iraq)<sup>34</sup>.

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<sup>33</sup> According to Stahn (2008), despite the increasing significance of the role of transitional administrations, the Brahimi Report on UN Peace Operations (2000) devoted only “a few paragraphs” to the subject of transitional administrations (p.3). Subsequent UN documents such as the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (2004), and the Outcome Document of the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly (2005), which recommended the establishment of the Peacebuilding Commission, also failed to specify the role of TAs as part of peacebuilding activity.

<sup>34</sup> The approaches adopted by other international agencies such as the World Bank and other specialised UN agencies such as UNDP, UNHCR etc. are not discussed here as this is beyond the scope of this thesis, which focuses mainly on the role played by Transitional Administrations in post-war reconstruction and recovery.



“International administration” is neither a formally defined practice, nor an institution, under any international law, code or norm. It is therefore often *ad hoc* in the form it takes, usually a loosely bound political arrangement that borrows from imperialist and colonial practices, mandates and trusteeship systems (Wilde 2001; Baskin 2003; Chesterman 2004; Mortimer 2004; Caplan 2005a; Stahn 2008). Caplan (2005a) uses the term synonymously with ‘UN administration’, which is not the case with many other authors who adopt a broader perspective to include administrations that do not derive their authority from the United Nations. However, most authors agree that international administration constitutes a practice distinct from complex peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, as well as from state-building, which is defined in literature as encompassing efforts to reconstruct, or in some cases establish *ab initio*, institutions and structures of effective governance, thus going beyond traditional peacekeeping or peacebuilding activities (Chesterman 2004; Caplan 2005a).

State-building is seen as one of the responsibilities of an international administration, whose scope can extend from making and enforcing laws to exercising total fiscal management of a territory, civil administration, running of customs, restoring law and order, establishing police and judicial systems, and political institution-building. It may also include wide-ranging social, economic and political reform, including instituting a regime of human rights. Physical reconstruction and rehabilitation of the territory, including provision and maintenance of schools, health facilities and other services and public utilities, may also be included as a responsibility of international administrations (Jackson 2004; Caplan 2005a).

There is, of course, a ‘territorial’ basis for international administration, that is, it implies control over a territory, which could either be a country (for instance post World War-II Germany), or a part of it (for example, Kosovo) (Stahn 2008). However, in establishing international administrations, there is also an implicit

assumption of their temporary nature, that is, “...*that once the territory has been pacified and politically reorganised, self-government shall be restored*” (Jackson 2004: 23). The non-permanence of international administrations and their (non-sovereign) territorial jurisdiction is seen as a defining characteristic, even if there is no end-date specified (as in the case of Kosovo). The label of ‘transitional’ is thus very often applied to international administrations<sup>35</sup>. Chopra (2002) and Chesterman (2004) define transitional administrations as operations where all powers of the state are assumed by an international authority or an occupying power, on a temporary basis:

*“the total but temporary governorship of a territory and its population ... applicable when the reigning polity [has] disintegrated (in places like Somalia), the sovereign [has been] forced out (as from Kosovo), or the occupying power [is] transferring the authority to another sovereign (as [in] Eastern Slavonia or the Brcko Corridor.”*(Chopra 2002: 980)

Based on this definition, and in order to emphasise the non-permanent nature of the international administrations being studied, the term ‘transitional administration’ will be used consistently throughout this and subsequent chapters.

### ***3.3.2 The evolution of transitional administrations***

International administration of war-affected territories is not an entirely new or post-Cold War era trend, even though it has (re)gained prominence over the past two decades. Many authors point to examples such as the Free City of Danzig and the German Saar Basin (or, the Saar), which were administered by the League of Nations in the 1920s and 1930s; the Allied occupation and administration of post-war Germany and Austria; as well as the UN’s various

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<sup>35</sup> The terms ‘interim’ or ‘provisional’ on the other hand are used to denote local or national governments which are installed immediately after the conflict, often pending a national election. For example, in Kosovo, pending resolution of the status of the territory, the name given to the governmental structure was “Provisional Institutions of Self-Government.” In Afghanistan, an “Interim Government” was established in 2001-02, soon after the war ended. The same terminology was applied in Iraq.

initiatives in the 1960s, for example in Congo, West Irian, South West Africa (later Namibia), as precursors to the more recent international administration initiatives. They also point out that the imperial administration of non-sovereign states is a centuries-old phenomenon (Wilde 2001; Chesterman 2004; Mortimer 2004; Stahn 2008).

Since the 1990s, transitional administrations of different shapes and form have been seen in Cambodia (United Nations Transitional Administration in Cambodia, or UNTAC, 1991-92); the former Yugoslavia (including UN administrations in Eastern Slavonia – 1996-98, and Kosovo – 1999-present; EU-led administrations in Mostar – 1994-96, as well as at the country level in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1995-present); East Timor (United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, or UNTAET, 1999-2002); Afghanistan (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, or UNAMA, 2002-till date); and Iraq (the Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, 2003-04). These have derived their authority from different sources, based on widely variable mandates, and have performed a variety of functions<sup>36</sup>. Stahn (2008) points out that these have largely been piecemeal approaches, one experiment following another “...without a systematic analysis of the flaws and benefits of each engagement” (p.3).

Historically, according to Wilde, international transitional administration (or international territorial administration, ITA, as he prefers to label it) has been used to respond to two types of problems – the ‘sovereignty problem’, or the ‘governance problem’, or a mix of the two (Wilde 2001). In the former, the dispute is about who exercises control, and/or the status of the territory. This was the case, for example, in Saar, where the League of Nations was asked to administer the territory for fifteen years after the First World War, with neither

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<sup>36</sup> Chesterman (2004) provides a useful historical account of transitional administrations during as well as before the UN era, focusing on five key aspects - peace and security, the role of the United Nations as government, establishing the rule of law, economic reconstruction, and exit strategies. Stahn’s account of TAs (2008) is extremely comprehensive and covers every form of TA since the administration of the Saar Territory by the League of Nations (1920-35). It, however, focuses mainly on the dimensions of international law and how it influences the practice of TAs.

Germany nor France in control (though German sovereignty was formally preserved during this period), eventually concluding with a plebiscite. Similarly, in Eastern Slavonia, the United Nations Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) was established in 1995 to ensure a smooth handover of the territory from 'local Croatian Serb Authorities' to the Government of Croatia.

A 'governance problem', in this context, is when the problem is not the identity of the local actors in control of a territory, but the quality of governance they can or are expected to ensure. They may either be incapable of any governance at all, or be unable to provide 'good governance' that is, there may be a perceived risk that governance under their authority will "...*conflict with certain policy objectives*" (Wilde 2001: 592). Examples include, for instance, the United Nations Missions in Kosovo and East Timor, which followed a complete collapse of the state in both these territories and the resulting governance vacuum. In Mostar, the EUAM was set up in response to both a sovereignty problem (the failure of local actors to govern the city jointly), as well as a governance problem (the opposition to reunification which was an avowed goal of the international community).

Caplan (2005a) distinguishes contemporary transitional administrations based on factors such as the degree of authority assumed by the administration (ranging from supervision only to direct governance), the purpose or the envisaged end-state (which might be clearly defined or ambiguous), and the range of actors involved. Alternatively, transitional administrations could be discussed according to the broad aims of the administration, such as decolonisation, pending peaceful transfer of control to an existing government, pending holding of elections, administration as part of an ongoing peace process, or responsibility of maintaining law and order in the absence of a (legitimate) governing authority (Chesterman 2004). Irrespective of the typology, it is important to understand the problem that the transitional administration is set up to address, its mandate

and the scope of its functions, as all these would have a bearing on any assessment of its performance in post-war reconstruction.

### *3.3.3 Mandate, accountability and activities*

The mandate of transitional administrations can range from simply the holding of elections (and maintenance of law and order in the meantime); preparing a territory for merger with a state, or for independence; support to, and/or coordination of, physical and economic reconstruction; to complete control in political, administrative and military terms, for a definite, or in some cases, an indefinite period of time. In Afghanistan, following the fall of the Taliban in November 2001, a “light footprint” approach was adopted, whereby it was agreed that any UN assistance should “...*first and foremost, bolster Afghan capacity – both official and non-governmental – and rely on as limited international presence and as many Afghan staff as possible*” (Chesterman 2004: 89). As Afghanistan did not face a ‘sovereignty problem’, “...*forms of Afghan sovereignty [were] carefully preserved*” (Mortimer 2004: 9), and the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) was established with an extremely limited mandate – to support civilian administration and the process of rebuilding and national reconciliation. UNAMA’s mandate is renewed (and reviewed) annually. In 2006, it included support to the peace process; assistance to the implementation of the Afghanistan Compact; promotion of human rights; and continued management of all UN humanitarian relief, recovery, reconstruction and development activities in coordination with the government (UNAMA 2007).

In Eastern Slavonia, following the signature of the Erdut Treaty between the Croat and Serbian authorities in November 1995, the UNTAES was established in order to facilitate the transfer of the territory from one state to another, i.e. from Serb control to Croatia. UNTAES, which included a civilian as well as a military component, had a clear objective, which was to “...*reintegrate the region, demilitarised and secure, into the legal and constitutional system of the Republic of Croatia*” (Reichel 2000: 9). Its mandate and time frame were equally well-

defined. The military component included demilitarisation of the region, monitoring the safe return of refugees and displaced persons, and maintenance of peace and security. The civilian component included responsibilities pertaining to civil administration and functioning of public services, the establishment of a temporary police force, facilitating refugee and IDP return, organising elections, and assisting in physical and economic reconstruction. All these were to be achieved within a maximum of two years. While the powers of the administrator were fairly extensive, legislative authority, administration of justice, as well as 'developmental' activities such as the revival of agriculture, industry, trade and other sectors of the economy, banking and financial services were excluded from the mission's mandate (Reichel 2000; Stahn 2001; Chesterman 2004).

In Mostar, the EUAM was established in 1994 in order to bring the city under a unified command, when the warring parties could not agree on its status or its governance structure. EUAM was set up to *"...temporarily solve the sovereignty problem caused by the failure of local factions to agree on governing the city jointly. It also responded to a governance problem by replacing governments in West and East Mostar opposed to unification with a (single) government supporting unification"* (Wilde 2001: 593). The EUAM derived its mandate from the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), which was signed between the EU, the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Mayors of West and East Mostar, and other key political leaders from both sides. As per the MoU, the EUAM was expected to facilitate the development and stabilisation of a single, multi-ethnic city of Mostar, ensure freedom of movement across the front line, contribute to the holding of democratic elections, assist in ensuring the protection of human rights, facilitate the return of displaced populations, and support the physical and economic reconstruction of the city (EUAM 1998). The establishment of the EUAM also had an important symbolic connotation – through it, the international community was signalling its commitment to a united and multiethnic Bosnia and Herzegovina, and its unambiguous refusal to condone a

partition of the country. While the mandate was fairly broad, it was agreed that the European Union (EU) would administer the city for a maximum of two years. The ultimate objective was the establishment of a single, functional, city administration.

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the other hand, was essentially a 'supervisory operation', with a weak but open-ended mandate – that of supervising and ensuring the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement (Caplan 2004). The official OHR website describes it as *"...an ad hoc international institution responsible for overseeing implementation of civilian aspects of the accord ending the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina"* (Office of the High Representative 2007). The Dayton Peace Agreement mandated the OHR to undertake a wide variety of tasks ranging from monitoring the implementation of the peace settlement; coordinate the activities of civilian organisations and agencies in this regard, including providing 'general guidance' and facilitating the resolution any difficulties that arise in connection with civilian implementation of the peace settlement; and basically ensure that the various state and entity-level institutions function effectively and *"...in a responsible manner"* (Office of the High Representative 2007). However, the High Representative had no regulatory or enforcement powers (Stahn 2008).

Over time, the broad and 'vague powers' of the OHR were reinterpreted to *"...encompass various governmental acts, including the passing of laws and the dismissal of elected officials"* (Wilde 2001: 584). It is indeed true that, faced with unwillingness of local politicians to comply with Dayton, the OHR has acquired increasingly wide-ranging and binding powers. A watershed in this regard was the Bonn Conference, held in December 1997, where the Peace Implementation Council (PIC) authorised the OHR to remove from office public officials who undermined or violated the terms of the Dayton Peace Agreement in any way, and to impose laws as he saw fit, if the state and entity-level legislative bodies failed to do so (Caplan 2004; Chandler 2006b; Office of the High Representative

2007; Stahn 2008). Since then, the OHR acted as the highest executive authority in BiH, ruling on issues as wide-ranging as stalled legislation and amendments to constitutions of the two entities, removal of elected officials from office, the Inter-Entity Boundary Line in Sarajevo, etc. (Stahn 2008). Since 2002, however, there has been a steady, sometimes even sharp, annual reduction in the number of times the 'Bonn Powers' are used by the High Representatives (Ashdown 2007)<sup>37</sup>.

In Kosovo, the mandate of UNMIK laid out by the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 (1999) was much more extensive, and has been described by various authors as 'unprecedented', 'exceptional', and a 'novelty' (Matheson 2001; Stahn 2001; Yannis 2004). It was also paradoxical, as the UN avoided taking a position on the final status of Kosovo, and Resolution 1244 was worded in a way which seemed to satisfy Kosovo's aspirations as well as Serbia's sovereignty, a phenomenon described at the time as 'virginity and motherhood combined' (see Chesterman 2004: 80). Yet, the international administration replaced the Yugoslav authorities, assuming full administrative responsibility, which encompassed "*...all legislative and executive authority [...] including the administration of the judiciary*" (see Yannis 2004: 69). It was responsible for the establishment of a functioning interim civil administration, including the maintenance of law and order; promoting the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government, including the holding of elections; and facilitating a political process to determine Kosovo's final status (Matheson 2001; Yannis 2004). KFOR was asked to facilitate demilitarisation and generally provide a secure environment for these tasks.

Only a few months after the adoption of Resolution 1244 on Kosovo, the Security Council also decided to establish a similar transitional administration in East Timor (UNTAET), which was once again endowed with wide-ranging

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<sup>37</sup> For a critical evaluation of the work of OHR and more broadly, the international community, in BiH, see Bose (2006) and Chandler (2006b).



powers and responsibilities, including 'all legislative and executive authority' and the administration of justice (Stahn 2001). In both Kosovo and East Timor, the United Nations acted as an interim government for the territory. In the latter case, however, the end-state was clearly specified – the independence of East Timor, which was achieved in May 2002. UNTAET's mandate was to facilitate the transition to independence, including the holding of democratic elections and the adoption of a constitution, and, in the meantime, to administer the territory as the *de facto* government.

In Iraq, state building was not the primary goal of the US-led invasion in 2003. The intervention "*...was meant to be a limited exercise in regime change and then state reform [...] It was this neoliberal model of limited state reform that guided policy development aimed at stabilising post-war Iraq*" (Dodge 2008: 143). The post-war reality, however, turned out to be quite different and rather more complex than what was envisaged by those who had planned the intervention. As the United States and Britain, rather than the United Nations, took charge of post-war governance of the country, the responsibility for overseeing reconstruction in post-conflict Iraq initially fell to the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), established in early 2003 under the aegis of the Pentagon. However, it came to be seen as a failure and was quite soon replaced by the Coalition Provisional Authority, or the CPA (Dodge 2008). The Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) recognised the Coalition Provisional Authority (including the United States and Britain), as the occupying power in Iraq (Chesterman 2004). As pre-war illusions about 'limited reform' dissolved, the CPA, like its UN counterparts in Kosovo and East Timor, was also endowed with a sweeping mandate:

*"To restore conditions of security and stability, to create conditions in which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political future, (including by advancing efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative governance) and facilitating*

*economic recovery, sustainable reconstruction and development.*" (see Halchin 2005: 1)

A key issue facing contemporary international administrations, and one closely linked to where they derive their mandate and legitimacy from, is that of accountability. International administrations, particularly those put in place by the United Nations or a coalition of countries, can have many masters. Each of the UNMIK pillars in Kosovo was led by a different organisation (OSCE, UNHCR, EAR), which was obliged to follow its own line of accountability. The Transitional Administrators are accountable to the body that appoints them. Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG) in Kosovo and East Timor were accountable to the UN Security Council. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the High Representative is directly accountable to the Peace Implementation Council, and is also obliged to report periodically to the European Union, the United States, Russia, and other interested governments or parties, including the United Nations. In Caplan's words:

*"There is, then, a fundamental contradiction that lies at the heart of these initiatives: while international administrations seek to promote democracy, among other objectives, they are on many ways undemocratic in the manner in which they function. There is no separation of powers: executive, legislative and judicial authority are vested in a single individual [...] whose decisions cannot be challenged by the local population, whose actions are not always transparent, and who cannot be removed from power by the community in whose interests he or she exercises authority ostensibly."* (Caplan 2005a: 196)

Within the context of this research, the discussion on responsiveness and accountability of transitional administrations has an important bearing on the activities undertaken and prioritised by these administrations. As there is little evidence of 'downward' vertical accountability of international administrations, i.e. accountability to the local communities and local elected leaders, it is possible that the activities they undertake may respond to the perceived rather

than the 'real' priorities of the local communities. This is certainly one of the questions to be explored in greater depth during the field research on Mostar.

Caplan (2005a) classifies the major types of activities that are undertaken by international (transitional) administrations under five headings: public order and security, refugees and IDPs, civil administration, political institution-building, and economic reconstruction and development. Clearly, these are not mutually exclusive, and often impact one another significantly. Capacity-building of local officials and communities remains a common theme that cuts across all these categories. Depending on their mandate and capacity, different transitional administrations may have different areas of emphasis, but they all undertake at least some activities in all the categories listed above.

Establishing public order and security is one of the most important as well as urgent tasks of any international administration established in the aftermath of a conflict. The activities undertaken can range from local law-enforcement to establishment and training of the local police force, investigation of human rights abuses by local forces, and establishment of the judicial and penal system.

The return of refugees and IDPs to their place of origin depends in great measure, of course, on the security situation. At the same time, returnees also look for availability of employment, housing and basic services, as well as the legal infrastructure to ensure the restoration and upholding of their rights. International administrations often aim towards *status quo ante*, or "...re-establishing, where appropriate, the mixed communities that existed prior to the war" (Caplan 2005a: 81). The degree to which this is desirable or achievable has been questioned by many, especially in the context of Bosnia where majority returns in early years led to significant ethnic consolidation, the later (and continuing) emphasis on minority returns has meant that many displaced persons do not receive help for reintegration when they are unable or unwilling to move back to their pre-war communities, and the economic and social condition of many minority returnees remains precarious (Heimerl 2006).

Regardless, return and reintegration are still seen as an extremely important benchmarks and indicators of the level of security, the prevailing humanitarian conditions, and the overall success of any transitional administration.

The civil administration role of international administrations is perhaps the most widely recognised, and is closely linked to political institution-building and local capacity-building. Most transitional administrations ultimately aim to establish effective public administrative structures, institutions and practices, and train local individuals who could sustain these after the withdrawal of the transitional administration. The challenge faced by the international authorities – both in the task of civil administration but also political institution building, see below – is achieving a balance between efficient administration in the short term, and strengthening local capacities in the long term.

Capacity-building requires a phased approach. In Eastern Slavonia, the civil administration arrangements progressed from sole UN administration to co-administration to complete self-administration fairly smoothly (Reichel 2000). In Kosovo, the ‘dual desk model’ was applied – with limited success, it must be said – whereby each administrative department was co-directed by a Kosovar and an international staff member before an eventual handover (Chesterman 2001; Caplan 2005a).

Political institution-building is closely linked to civil administration which inevitably involves making political decisions. It also witnesses a difficult trade-off between efficiency goals and local capacity-building objectives. Total control and limited transfer of power to local institutions or individuals can result in low local capacities when the eventual handover happens, and frustration among the locals in the meantime. Too rapid a transfer, on the other hand, can reinforce the power of divisive elements, and thus perpetuate the divisions within the community. The key aspects of political institution-building include the design of the political structure and definition of the key principles underpinning this, the potential clash of new institutions with old (pre-war) institutions, and the

decision-making process, i.e. who actually determines all these aspects. An important aspect that deserves mention here is the promotion of norms such as democratisation, as part of the political institution-building process. Democracy is now viewed as a settled norm, but internationally-led (or imposed) democracy always has a sub-text, which could include aims such as the defeat of nationalist elements and parties, the promotion of women in politics, and the guaranteeing of minority rights. Local populations are rarely allowed to choose the form of democracy they want or need (Caplan 2005a; Chandler 2006b). Stahn notes that international territorial administrations can be seen, not without reason, as instruments promoting the agenda of liberal peace, i.e. peace through political and economic liberalisation, and installing practices of democracy, good governance and the rule of law, based on the assumption that the *"...establishment of a liberal democratic polity constitutes the best means to ensure stable peace"* (Stahn 2008: 19).

Similarly, economic reconstruction and development in the aftermath of conflict has also, over the past two decades, been guided by norms such as economic liberalisation and structural adjustment, based on the 'Washington Consensus' developed in the 1980s (Paris 2004; Dodge 2008). Economic regeneration is widely accepted as being critical to avoid a resurgence of conflict and establish peace in the long-term. In the aftermath of conflict, most international agencies, particularly the World Bank but also other organisations and donor countries, prescribe a formula for economic recovery which combines physical reconstruction, economic development, and structural transformation (Bojčić-Dzelilović 2002; Caplan 2005a). However, Paris (2004) argues strongly for a review of the strategy adopted to transform war-affected states into liberal market democracies, suggesting that 'Institutionalisation Before Liberalisation', or IBL, should be the preferred approach of transitional administrations, focusing initially on political stability and effective administration, in order to build a sustainable peace.

### ***3.3.4 Transitional Administrations and physical reconstruction after conflict***

As discussed briefly above, physical reconstruction of the war-affected territory is one of the immediate responsibilities of most transitional administrations. Providing emergency shelter, restoring public services such as electricity, water supply and sanitation, rebuilding major roads and public buildings are all tasks undertaken either by Transitional Administrations themselves, or by other international organisations, under the overall stewardship of TAs.

In Eastern Slavonia, however, physical reconstruction was not the top-most priority of UNTAES, which was focusing on demilitarisation and preparing the region for reintegration into Croatia. The direct costs of repairing war damage, estimated at \$1.2 billion, remained beyond the immediate resources of the Government or the Transitional Administration. Reconstruction was promoted through the establishment of fully functioning local municipalities, but these were constrained by lack of resources and capacities. No plans were drawn up for physical and economic reconstruction, and while the main objectives of UNTAES were achieved, the economy remained stagnant, and unemployment soared (United Nations 1997).

In Mostar, on the other hand, reconstruction of the city formed a very prominent part of the objective of EUAM to reunify the city. This is in fact one of the few cases where the transitional administration took the task of managing the reconstruction process entirely upon itself. According to a report by the International Crisis Group, between 1994-2000, the international community invested hundreds of millions of dollars in Mostar, with the EU alone spending approximately 200 million ECU (Euros) (ICG 2000). Rebuilding of infrastructure and housing repair were key priorities for the EUAM. Public services were restored by mid-1995, when the city once more had access to water and electricity. Small enterprises were supported through loans and grants in order to bolster employment and revive economic activity. Although a fair amount of Mostar's infrastructure, some public buildings, and some housing was rebuilt by

the EUAM, this was undertaken in a piecemeal fashion, without any overall plan, with limited thought to the future (Yarwood 1999). ICG suggests that in terms of actually achieving reunification of this divided city, international community and EU efforts have failed.

*“After six years of international community assistance and supervision, the administration, economy, infrastructure, education, police and legal systems of Mostar remain sharply divided along ethnic lines.”* (ICG 2000: 1)

In fact, most international organizations (especially NGOs) involved in reconstruction across Bosnia have done so without any planning framework, and without any involvement of planners (Skotte 2003). This has resulted in reconstruction that is *ad hoc*, piecemeal, and often bitterly contested, and recovery that is, at best, partial, fourteen years after the conflict ended.

In Kosovo, where a complex administration was established with four lead partners (the United Nations, OSCE, UNHCR and the European Union), the EU was assigned the responsibility for economic as well as physical reconstruction. Rebuilding of economic and social systems, including the development of a market-based economy and the resolution of trade and banking matters, were included in this brief. Reconstruction and economic recovery was to occur in *“...three overlapping phases, encompassing immediate humanitarian relief, reconstruction and rehabilitation of essential services (power, water, sanitation, health, education), and the creation of a viable market economy and social system”* (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001: 110; Matheson 2001). An assessment conducted by a joint UNEP/UNCHS<sup>38</sup> Balkans Task Force in May 1999 reported widespread destruction of housing, public buildings and infrastructure facilities, leading to complete disruption of services such as water, sanitation and power, across Kosovo. Ethnically mixed towns such as Peja and Mitrovica sustained massive damage. Various assessments reported that nearly 120,000 houses were

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<sup>38</sup> United Nations Centre for Human Settlements – now known as United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)

destroyed or damaged by the conflict in 29 municipalities of the province, with most of the damage caused by fire, but also by gunfire and artillery. Major infrastructure was also heavily damaged, and public utilities, already suffering from years of neglect and under-investment, all but collapsed. The economy was in disarray as both capital and human resources flowed out of Kosovo. Public administrative and service structures – the municipalities – became largely inoperable due to factors such as neglect, war damage and departure of trained staff. The mass exodus of Serbs, who had held key positions in all the municipalities and other public institutions prior to the war, left enormous skill gaps (UNEP/UNCHS 1999; Department of Reconstruction (UNMIK) 2000; Leurdijk and Zandee 2001; Minervini 2002; Kosovar Stability Initiative (IKS) 2007).

As a result of the humanitarian assistance provided by KFOR and UNMIK immediately after the war, before the winter of 1999, 95% of the planned 'winterisation' programme had been completed, and most Kosovars had access to shelter during the winter season (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001: 115). It was announced that the humanitarian programme would be phased out by mid-2000 to make way for rebuilding and reconstruction, particularly shelter, housing, infrastructure and social services (Leurdijk and Zandee 2001). Urban and/or regional planning, however, didn't receive any mention in either the reconstruction mandate of the international administration in Kosovo, or the strategies that were developed subsequently by the leading international players<sup>39</sup>. This was despite the fact that the general and detailed urban plans in all the municipalities, prepared by centralised institutions at least two decades ago,

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<sup>39</sup> UN-HABITAT's Urban Planning and Management Programme in Kosovo, initiated in 2002, was the first intervention by any international agency that focused on issues of urban planning. This was a comprehensive capacity-building programme focusing on strategic planning, covering all 30 municipalities and involving nearly 100 local urban planners. The programme trained local urban planners to develop plans that were strategic in nature, responsive to local needs and priorities, and prepared in consultation with all stakeholders. The programme did not, however, force the pace of plan preparation, which did not begin until 2004 in most municipalities.



were outdated and un-implementable. The municipalities had limited capacity in respect of the preparation and implementation of development plans. Urban planners were dispirited and focused on routine administrative tasks, rather than on developing a new vision or new development strategies (Narang and Reutersward 2006).

In Pristina, due to the absence of any spatial or urban plans, illegal and irregular construction is widespread. In September 2000, Rexhep Luci, the city's leading urban planner, was shot dead within days of issuing instructions to demolish three of the most blatant illegal structures. A new regulation on construction, promulgated soon after, was named after him (UN-HABITAT 2003b; ESI 2006). Despite the new regulation, however, there were estimated to be about 15,000 illegal constructions in Kosovo in 2003, most situated in Pristina. Unplanned housing and commercial developments encroach on open spaces and place major strain on infrastructure, leading to frequent water and power cuts, deteriorating road networks and sewage systems. Rooftop construction, another major problem found in Pristina, has both legal (ownership) and safety implications. Illegally constructed petrol stations on agricultural land, located all along the main roads leading out of the city, are a serious threat to the environment (UN-HABITAT 2003b).

Towards the end of 2003, the municipality signed a contract with an international consortium, led by a Pristina-based company, for the preparation of a new strategic plan for the city - 'Strategy 2020'. The plan was prepared rapidly, based on limited and often inaccurate data, weak situation assessments and virtually no public consultation. It was adopted by the Municipal Assembly in July 2004 - till date, however, it remains un-implemented. Meanwhile, reconstruction in Pristina, and across Kosovo, proceeds without a plan (ESI 2006).

*"[In Pristina] illegal construction is rampant. Buildings are constructed without regard to safety standards, and unplanned housing settlements*

*and commercial developments place major strain on infrastructure. The city's historical centre has been filled with new, high-rise construction. Buildings listed as national historical heritage have been neglected, some even destroyed. Infrastructure is deteriorating: water cuts are frequent, the road network is barely maintained, and the sewage system is deteriorating. Public spaces, parks and markets are falling into disrepair. Municipal services are unreliable.” (ESI 2006: 1)*

In East Timor, when the UNTAET was established, nearly 80% of the buildings in the country had been damaged or destroyed, including private, public and government buildings. More than half of the population had fled or had been forced out. This left huge capacity gaps, with hardly any working civil servants, teachers or policemen left in the territory (Galbraith 2002). By the end of the mission, most refugees had returned home and started to rebuild their lives. According to the World Bank, bottom-up, community-based reconstruction programmes were fairly successful, as demonstrated by the Community Empowerment and Local Governance Project (Rohland and Cliffe 2002). However, at independence, East Timor was ranked among the lowest in the world in terms of human development indicators, with over 40% of its population living below the poverty line. Land and property issues were deferred by UNTAET to the future East Timorese government, local economic development was minimal, re-establishment of services such as water supply, electricity and telecommunications was limited at best, and transportation continued to be a ‘disaster’ (Reis 2002).

The above examples illustrate how physical reconstruction undertaken by TAs has yielded very mixed results. Questions relating to why this has been the case, why reconstruction has seldom had the desired impact on economic recovery under transitional administrations, and whether (the absence of) planning has played any role in this process, merit careful examination as part of the field study in Mostar.

### **3.4 Role of other international agencies in physical reconstruction**

Apart from transitional administrations, there are also many other international players dealing with issues of reconstruction in post-conflict situations. These include multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the European Union and European Commission, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and various regional development banks; specialised UN agencies such as OCHA, UNDP, UNHCR, UNICEF, FAO, UN-HABITAT and others; international NGOs, such as the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), ICRC and IFRC, various voluntary aid organisations, etc.; regional networks and initiatives, e.g. the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe; as well as bilateral donors, usually operating through their international aid divisions. The work of all these diverse actors cannot be comprehensively reviewed or summarised here, and extends beyond the scope of this research. However, these are important actors in the arena of post-war reconstruction, and can complement, reinforce or undermine the work of transitional administrations. In order to understand and review without bias the work of the Transitional Administration in post-war reconstruction in Mostar, part of the field analysis will be devoted to assessing its relationships with other local and international actors operating in the arena of post-war reconstruction.

### **3.5 Conclusion: Urban planning in post-war reconstruction efforts, under the aegis of transitional administrations**

Traditionally, reconstruction after wars and disasters was seen as an opportunity to introduce extensive physical improvement measures as well as policy change. This was a time when planning, and planners, occupied centre-stage, as a *tabula rasa* was presented to them. It was inevitably an extremely political process, yet, some results were achieved. Today's reconstruction processes, however, seem to offer but an illusion of possibilities of real change. The sheer complexity of actors

and approaches in post-conflict situations, and the repeated application of 'segmented project efforts' (Hasić 2006: 15), often undermines any attempts to use physical reconstruction for achieving long-term goals such as development, sustainability, peace and reconciliation.

This research comes at a time when we are witnessing the revival of urban planning as an instrument of sustainability, good governance and inclusion. Yet, as far as international transitional administrations are concerned, planning still plays a marginal (if any) role in the reconstruction of cities and towns after a conflict. The approach of transitional administrations towards reconstruction seems to be guided by the overarching agenda of economic liberalisation. The unquestioned dominance of the liberal market economic paradigm could be one of the reasons for the marginalisation of planning (physical – regional or urban – as well as economic), which is traditionally associated with a strong state.

Historical experience has demonstrated, however, that urban planning is a vital ingredient in the process of national recovery after wars. It has an important role to play in the continuum between relief and development, and in achieving a balance between short-term priorities of the people and a long-term perspective for local and national development, as well as between the demand for historic reconstruction and the pressure for modernisation (Diefendorf 1990; Zetter 1996; Tiratsoo, Hasegawa et al. 2002). As Zetter states:

*"Too often in post-conflict recovery programmes, 'disaster as a development opportunity' [...] is sacrificed to short-term priorities. Yet it is the longer term developmental outcomes and priorities which are much more likely to secure lasting peace and reconciliation."* (Zetter 2005: 162)

Berdal and Caplan (2004) believe that as transitional administrations try and broaden the international support for their mandate in order to enhance their legitimacy, and augment their resources, this can in fact severely compromise their ability to administer effectively. Thus, while large sums of money are

poured into reviving the economy and private sector development, this is quite often done without any strategic plan or vision for the future. The same seems to be the case in housing reconstruction and restoration of public services.

While mandates and activities may vary from one situation to another, post-war transitional administrations seem to be here to stay. It is also a fact that these administrations have a pivotal role to play in post-conflict reconstruction, whether through direct execution (e.g. EUAM in Mostar, CPA in Iraq), setting priorities (e.g. UNMIK in Kosovo), and/or overall coordination (e.g. OHR in Bosnia and Herzegovina). Most authors who have reflected on the work of transitional administrations agree that the contribution of these structures to post-conflict recovery and conflict mitigation, if not transformation, has generally been positive (Chesterman 2004; Mortimer 2004; Caplan 2005a). However, lessons drawn from past experiences point to the importance of a clear and time-bound mandate with (preferably) a specific end-state to aim for; an appropriate level of military, financial and human resource allocation; an appropriate level of decentralisation between the international masters (UN, EU, coalition partners, as appropriate), national/central leadership of the transitional administration, and local actors; and the willingness and ability to work with a wide range of domestic interlocutors, as critical factors for success (Chesterman 2001; Schoups 2001; Chopra 2002; Baskin 2003; Rathmell 2005). Baskin also points towards the “...gap between unlimited formal international authority and limited international operations capacity” as a common problem with recent transitional administrations, especially in the Balkans (Baskin 2004: 129).

Clearly, the presence of the international community in general, and transitional administrations in particular, can be both a challenge and opportunity for planning. These actors bring to the table their own political agendas and reconstruction approaches, the latter quite often sectoral and short-termist in character. Institutional structures in the immediate aftermath of conflict are often weak or non-existent, legislation and policy fuzzy at best. Involvement of a

third party, an external actor, leads to increased complexity in the governance system. At the same time, however, it also offers an opportunity to take decisions in a systematic yet swift and effective, if less democratic, manner. Unfortunately, while planning has been used and abused by local political interests as a mechanism to establish control or advance particular ethnic and/or national interests, the international community, and particularly Transitional Administrations, have been slow to embrace urban planning as a critical element in its own relief and recovery approaches. There are no clear answers as to why this is the case. It could be a question of whether it is actually appropriate or legitimate for transitional administrations to take a long-term view on behalf of the places and people under their jurisdiction. Caplan (2005a) suggests that international administrators often deliberately defer longer-term or sensitive decisions to a future domestic authority or institutions, in order to emphasise their own 'interim' nature, and bring to the forefront the end goal of transferring responsibility to the local authorities.

Alternatively, the neglect of urban planning (and other such 'long-term' tasks) could be attributed simply to the inefficiency of large international operations, and their unwillingness to do more than absolutely necessary. A final possibility, of course, is that transitional administrations underestimate the importance of planning for the future, failing to understand that all short-term decisions have long-term impacts, that urban planning can help in building economically self-reliant and sustainable communities and societies from the bottom-up, and that the lack of a shared vision for the future can exacerbate and perpetuate conflict, thus undermining goals of reconciliation and a durable peace.

This chapter, thus, raises a few unanswered questions that will be examined more carefully while studying the case of Mostar, which is the focus of this research. The first set of questions deals with the conceptual understanding of TAs and other external actors in post-war environments - in the case of EUAM, whether the Administration understood the pre-war context in Bosnia and

Mostar adequately, and whether they used this understanding to inform their decisions on strategies, interventions and partners. The second set of questions addresses programming issues - how were priorities for physical reconstruction determined by the EU Administration, and what role was played by local actors and stakeholders in this process. The third set deals with the ability of the administration to anticipate the political complexity of the task at hand, and the structural barriers that they might be faced with, in addressing this task. A final set of questions deals with how the Administration, and other agencies responsible for reconstruction, viewed and approached urban planning, and to what extent their views were 'in sync' with those of local political and technical actors. These aspects are explored in greater detail in the next chapter on Bosnia, as well as in the field analysis.

## **CHAPTER 4**

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### **Context (Part III)**

#### **Urban planning in pre- and post-war Bosnia and Herzegovina: A historical overview**



## **4.0 Introduction**

This chapter focuses on urban development patterns and planning approaches in Bosnia and Herzegovina before, during and immediately after the conflict that lasted from 1992-95. The major pre-war phases that are discussed include the Ottoman era (1463-1878), the rule of the Austro-Hungarians (1878-1918), the inter-war period, and Yugoslav era following the Second World War, until the collapse of Yugoslavia. The purpose of this analysis is to establish the historical context of the study, and determine whether the roots of the conflict in Bosnia can somehow be traced back to historical development patterns, governance arrangements and socio-economic differences between the different ethnic groups. However, it must be stated at the outset that the body of literature available in English, addressing issues of urbanisation and planning in the Balkans under the Ottoman empire, and subsequently under Austro-Hungarian rule, is extremely limited.

The first part of the chapter provides a historical overview of urban development and planning in Bosnia and Herzegovina, prior to the conflict that broke out in 1992. The second part looks at the conflict itself, its causes and manifestations, particularly the destruction of cities and what some authors have called 'urbicide.' The third section looks at the main elements of post-war reconstruction in Bosnia. The final section draws some conclusions about the relationship between urbanisation, planning and conflict in Bosnia.

### **4.1 Urban development and planning in pre-1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina**

As most cities and towns that exist in Bosnia and Herzegovina today were first established by the Ottomans, this account of the urban history of the country starts in the fifteenth century, when Bosnia became a province of the Ottoman empire. The discussion is organised according to the four major phases in this period – four hundred years of Ottoman rule from the middle of the fifteenth

century (1463) until almost the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century (1878); the Austro-Hungarian era which lasted about forty years from 1878 until the end of the first world war in 1918; the inter-war period, 1918-1945; and the post-war era, from 1945 until the collapse of Yugoslavia in 1992.

#### *4.1.1 The urban history of Bosnia and Herzegovina - A glimpse into the Ottoman era*

Four hundred years of Ottoman rule significantly influenced the social, political and economic landscape of the Balkans, including modern-day Bosnia and Herzegovina. Vucinich (1962) provides a comprehensive account of Balkan society under the Ottomans, touching upon issues of feudalism (closely related to land tenure), social and economic development, the differentiation between Muslim and Christian societies, and the relative power of urban and rural settlements and their respective citizens. He highlights that while adoption of Islam was not compulsory and non-Muslims were allowed to practice their own religions, society was clearly segregated between Muslims and non-Muslims, and this distinction manifested itself in many ways – for instance, in terms of income, taxes and property laws. While the non-Muslims paid higher taxes, they were exempt from serving in the army or to pay *Zakat* (or alms, proportionate to one's savings), which was compulsory for Muslims. Many authors assert that non-Muslims were distinctly inferior to Muslims and that this was also reflected in the territorial organization of the city (Yerolympos 1993; Todorova 1996; Grodach 2002; Malcolm 2002). A more balanced understanding, however, would suggest that the obligations of citizenship were simply different for Muslims and non-Muslims, and that the Ottomans maintained, to a large extent, the church and other institutions which had existed in the Balkans prior to their conquest (Inalcik 1996).

Broadly, the population of the Ottoman empire was organised in “non-territorial ecclesiastical communities” (Toynbee 1955: 122), each called a *millet*. The *millet* did not occupy a particular geographical area – these confessional-based

communities intermingled and were spread all across the Empire (Vucinich 1965; Goodwin 1971). At the same time, the *millet* was also not ethnically homogeneous. According to Vucinich, "...It consisted of communities isolated from each other, enjoying different social, political and economic privileges and weakly linked through an ecclesiastical administration" (Vucinich 1965: 61). There was, however, a certain extent of (vertical) social mobility among all groups, as well as 'ethnic and cultural fusion' (Vucinich 1962: 612), particularly in frontier regions, where religious rituals and social customs of various groups gradually began to influence each other, and eventually "...popular Islam in the Balkans became quite different from the conservative urban Islam found in the old Muslim world" (Inalcik 1996: 24).

In terms of urban development, the Ottomans played an important role both in the renovation of old cities and the building of new ones, as well as construction of strategic structures such as fortifications, roads and bridges (Bublin 1999). The road network was a primary concern, and was maintained diligently across the empire. The urban centres (*imârets*) came up initially along the main road networks, through the system of *Vakuf* (charitable endowment for public welfare, also referred to as *Wakf*, *Vakfiye*, *Vakif* by different authors). These *imârets*, built at regular intervals along major highways and usually comprising a mosque, hospital, travellers' inn, water installations, roads and bridges, provided the nucleus for most major cities across the Ottoman Empire. The state granted estates to the *Vakufs* and controlled them to a large extent, but the planning of the *imârets* was left to the founders of the *Vakufs*. The city of Sarajevo, for instance, grew around the *imâret* endowed by Isâ Bey (Inalcik 1973).

Through this system, gradually, all cities in the Balkans began to demonstrate distinct Ottoman characteristics, such as the centrality of mosques and mosque complexes (*külliye*), clustering of houses into self-contained neighbourhoods with central open spaces or courtyards (*mahallas*), the inns (*hans*) and public baths (*hammams*), a clear demarcation of residential and business districts, and of

public, semi-public and private spaces (Goodwin 1971; Puljić 1992; Bublin 1999; Malcolm 2002). Socio-religious traditions such as the *Vakuf* ensured that these institutions and public amenities were maintained (Goodwin 1971). Traditional Ottoman towns are described as “*intimate... [where] each neighbourhood retained its identity*” (Goodwin 1971: 451). While there were no hard divisions by class, “*...in nearly all cities the Christians, Jews, and Gypsies [...] lived in their own quarters.*” (Vucinich 1965: 54; Inalcik 1973)

However, in the eighteenth century, as Slavs began to move to the cities in larger numbers, the ethnic and social structure of the Balkan cities began to change. The *Čaršija* (the district where the commercial and artisan shops were located, and which also functioned as the social and cultural heart of the city) and *kahvehane* (local tea-houses and gathering places) still played a central role, but churches emerged as new foci together with mosques, and Christian guilds of craftsmen and merchants began to gain prominence alongside their Muslim counterparts. Ottoman authorities encouraged the creation of Christian churches, both Catholic and Orthodox (Vucinich 1962; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 1999). In 1839, the Sultan signed the Tanzimat Charter, which facilitated a transformation of the old socio-political system and granted equal rights to all Ottoman subjects, both Muslim and non-Muslim (Yerolympos 1993; Malcolm 2002). Despite this, Balkan cities throughout the 19<sup>th</sup> Century remained segregated to a large extent, with “*...a polyethnic population living in separate residential quarters each with an introverted, strictly supervised communal life of its own.*” (Yerolympos 1993: 236)

While most contemporary authors emphasise the multiethnic fabric and multicultural character of major Bosnian cities (especially Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka) under the Ottomans (in fact, until 1992) (Plunz, Baratloo et al. 1998; Kron 2000; Bose 2002; Pašić 2004), Vucinich (1965) offers an important insight into the historical divisions between the Muslims and the Christians, stating that:

*“Both the Muslim and Christian sectors of Ottoman society were divided into two basic parts – rural and urban. But since the Balkan city population was predominantly Muslim and the Balkan rural population was predominantly Christian, the city symbolized the place of the Muslim ruler, tax collector, and security agent. Conversely, the village symbolized the home of the oppressed and exploited Christian peasant, taxpayer, and food-producer. The two societal components came to represent a struggle between two ways of life, which deepened and expanded as time went on. The protracted separation of village from city with hardly any interchange between them led to a dichotomy of mores, habits and customs [...] After the Ottoman Empire expired, the village-city conflict continued, even though the city lost its Turkish character. This unabridged chasm is one of the major present-day problems.”*  
(p.603)

#### **4.1.2 Developments under the Austro-Hungarian empire (1878-1918)**

In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin, Austria-Hungary gained administrative responsibility for the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Austria-Hungary’s principal objectives in the Balkans were (a) as Turkish power receded, to fill the vacuum and become the dominant political and cultural force in the region; (b) to serve as the bridge between east and west; Christianity and Islam; and (c) to keep Russian influence and pan-Slavism at bay. Russia and Austria-Hungary initially avoided confrontation by carving up their respective spheres of influence. However, in 1908-09, Austria-Hungary moved to formally ‘annex’ Bosnia and Herzegovina, which brought it to the brink of war with Serbia, and consequently, Russia (Williamson 1991).

Bosnia and Herzegovina witnessed a number of socio-economic changes under the brief reign of the Austro-Hungarians. The population of the two provinces almost doubled between 1878 and 1910 (from 1 million to nearly 1.9 million) – this was mainly attributed to better medical and sanitation facilities. Industrialisation gained momentum, and metallurgy, forestry, mining and textiles emerged as key sectors of the economy. Concessions were awarded to private entrepreneurs to start profitable industrial operations. Kallay, the Austrian administrator of Bosnia between 1882-1903, firmly believed that

economic development and prosperity was the best way of ensuring continued Austrian control of the province (Pinson 1993). Tax collection mechanisms were improved as Hungary, in particular, didn't want the provinces to be a burden on the Empire and was staunchly against investing its own resources into the region (Taylor 1981; Williamson 1991; Pinson 1993). The expanding bureaucracy, mostly comprising foreign public officials, also resulted in the development of the service economy, especially around Sarajevo (ESI 2004).

Literacy, land reforms and agriculture, however, were put on the backburner, even though the imperial authorities had cited the "unresolved agrarian question" as one of the causes of under-development, and consequently, instability, in the province (ESI 2004: 8). The reasons were partly political. As discussed in the previous section, land ownership patterns under the Ottomans were based on religious groupings, with predominantly Muslim landlords and mainly Christian serfs. Land reforms would have upset the Muslim landlords and benefited predominantly the Orthodox Christians (Serbs), which was not desirable as taxes on land made up a significant chunk of the revenue of the Austrian administration in Bosnia. Furthermore, such reforms could have potentially strengthened the pan-Slav movement. For these reasons, land reforms were avoided by the Austrians, despite the expectations from especially the Christian *kmets* (bonded peasants) that a Christian administration would free them (Williamson 1991; Pinson 1993). This was also the reason for not tackling the problem of illiteracy. Although new political and administrative systems were introduced from 1910 onwards, Catholics and Muslims retained the upper hand politically over Orthodox Serbs (Williamson 1991).

While agriculture was neglected, industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded apace. The occupying forces were accompanied by a motley collection of administrative staff, road-builders, archaeologists, merchants and businessmen, craftsmen and other settlers from all parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire (Taylor 1981; Bublin 1999). This greatly influenced the urbanisation process as

well as the character of Bosnian cities. The Austro-Hungarians built an extensive network of roads and railways (the railway network expanded from 290 km in 1880 to nearly 1510 km in 1910), waterworks and power stations, and refurbished and extended urban centres across Bosnia and Herzegovina. New legislation and regulations relating to construction were issued, and new European-style neighbourhoods with wide streets on grid-iron patterns, a mix of high rise apartment blocks and villas, soon began to appear in most major cities. A number of military structures, prisons, barracks and military hospitals were also built in this period, as were key administrative and public buildings, public libraries, and schools (Taylor 1981; Williamson 1991; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 1999; Pašić 2004). The bureaucracy administering all this development expanded as the years went by – and most of the new officials were non-Muslim, and non-Bosnian (Pinson 1993).

The Austro-Hungarians did not, however, destroy the Ottoman quarters, unlike other cities in newly-independent Balkan states (including Greece, Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria), where the focus of city planning was to obliterate all signs of Ottoman rule (Yerolympos 1993). In Mostar, the Austro-Hungarian developments did not interfere with the old city but created entirely new quarters to the west, predominantly for the occupying forces and administrators. Whether such a marked demographic distinction between the new and old parts of the city persisted throughout the Austro-Hungarian period as well as afterwards is explored further in the next chapter.

The planning of all these developments was controlled by the Austrian administrator and the Ministry of Finance, and executed by the military or professionals from the Empire – in other words, it was highly centralised, and had little involvement of the local population (Pinson 1993).

### ***4.1.3 Bosnia and Herzegovina in the inter-war period***

There is very little literature tracking the development of Bosnian cities in the inter-war period, i.e., between 1918-1945. Those authors who do examine this phase note that this was overall a time of decline and stagnation with respect to economic and urban development, as well as architecture (Bublin 1999; Yarwood 1999). This is not surprising, as this was also the time when the Great Depression started in the United States (1929) and spread across the world, and Yugoslavia was no exception. Furthermore, Yugoslavia was mired in a constant tussle between the various nationalist groups during this period. The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, formed on December 1, 1918 following the end of the First World War, was transformed into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in 1929 by King Alexander. Political and territorial reorganisation within the Kingdom continued until the Second World War (Malcolm 2002; Schuman 2004). Bosnia in particular, seems to have become “...an economic backwater within the new Kingdom of Yugoslavia” (ESI 2004: 9). Three-quarters of its population depended on subsistence agriculture in the decade prior to the Second World War (ESI 2004: 9).

The limited urban development and planning which took place in this phase seems to have been influenced by the ‘City Beautiful’ movement in the United States, the Garden City movement in Britain and Beaux-Arts in Paris. An important planning ‘achievement’ of this period was the passing of the Building Act in 1931, which made the Regulatory Plan the key instrument of urban development. This act focused on physical planning issues and regulated aspects of zoning, densities, land use, building heights, buffer zones etc. However, it did not strictly define the format of planning documents or the process of plan preparation (Nedović-Budić and Cavrić 2006).

### ***4.1.4 Urban development and planning in socialist Yugoslavia***

After the end of the War, Yugoslavia evolved into a federal socialist state, and an era of intense industrialisation and urbanisation set in across the country. In all



the countries of East Central Europe (including Yugoslavia) where communist governments came to power after World War-II, Soviet-style socialism was adopted as the predominant economic model. Immediately after the war, only economic, sectoral planning was practiced. Spatial planning was clearly subordinate to economic planning, and in fact mainly a tool to ensure that economic goals such as rational allocation and/or redistribution of resources were met. It was only in the late 1950s and 1960s that comprehensive regional and urban plans were introduced. These too, were centrally-driven. *“Central planning authorities decided the location of the various forms of infrastructural development, and the local authorities were simply expected to execute them”* (Enyedi 1996: 111).

Urban development and planning in the classical Soviet model reflected the communist ideology of nationalised means of production and property, rejection of the market, and a general priority of public and collective interests over individual or private ones. The goals of planning were to correct the ills of the capitalist society and to develop new settlement as well as urban patterns that reflected a classless society (Nedović-Budić 2001). Urbanisation under socialism was thus based on two principles – (a) egalitarianism (equalisation of living conditions, both between and within settlements, which meant adoption of strict standards and norms for per capita space and provision of services, as well as uniformity in design and layout of apartments, apartment blocks and neighbourhoods), and (b) planned urbanisation (i.e. central allocation of development funds/investment resources and a strict hierarchy of settlements in order to reduce regional inequalities and increase efficiency). Due to the emphasis on public interest, the state was naturally the most powerful actor in planning – not only as the main decision and policy-maker, but also the chief land developer and provider of housing. The development strategies were developed by experts, politicians and bureaucrats, focusing on ‘political, economic and strictly professional issues’ (Enyedi 1996: 113). The citizens were

not consulted, except for the exhibitions of city plans where they had the opportunity to leave written comments (Enyedi 1996; Nedović-Budić 2001).

Yugoslavia was slightly different from other communist states of eastern and central Europe in that the communist group which took control of the country after the War was more or less 'indigenous'. Their leader, Josip Broz 'Tito' was keen to retain a degree of independence from the Soviet Union, which controlled the other Eastern European countries<sup>40</sup>. As Yugoslavia was composed of a diverse range of nationalities with a history of conflict, a strong federal structure was gradually adopted in order to keep the country together, with devolution of a considerable amount of power to the constituent republics and autonomous provinces. Furthermore, the country had been among the poorest in the region before the war, had suffered extensive wartime damage, and demonstrated significant inequalities between the different republics and provinces. The northern republics of Croatia and Slovenia, due to their proximity to the Austro-Hungarians, were considerably more developed than the central and southern regions comprising Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. The Soviet model thus had to adapt to the specific circumstances of Yugoslavia, and a form of 'market socialism' was introduced in the mid-1960s (Dawson 1987).

According to Vujošević and Nedović-Budić (2004), urban planning in former Yugoslavia witnessed three distinct phases since the end of the Second World War – central command planning (1947-65), political decentralisation and societal self-management planning (1965-1989), and 'democratic' planning (1989-present)<sup>41</sup>. Each of these phases had different political, economic and governance characteristics, which significantly influenced the planning system.

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<sup>40</sup> In 1948, Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform (the Soviet-dominated network of communist parties from across Eastern Europe).

<sup>41</sup> The paper cited deals particularly with present-day Serbia, hence the third category is defined by the authors as a continuum stretching from the fall of communism in 1989 until the present day.

In the first phase, the communist ideology was extremely strong, a clear priority was accorded to collective interests over private ones, and the state owned and distributed the means of production and property, which were nationalised. Urban land was nationalised and monopolised by the national government (although there was no collective ownership of rural land). This was the phase when urbanisation and industrialisation were rapid, a high level of investment was made in the construction of high-rise, multi-apartment housing for workers moving to urban areas, and urban planning was seen mainly as the means to achieve economic goals – national and regional growth objectives, reduction in inequalities and a classless society (Dawson 1987; Nedović-Budić and Vujošević 2004; Vujošević and Nedović-Budić 2006).

In the second phase, between 1965 and 1989, there was a movement towards political decentralisation, and decision-making was shared between central, republican and commune levels of government (Fisher 1965)<sup>42</sup>. The economic system also evolved, as 'self-management' of enterprises by their employees became the norm. Market-oriented reforms related to banking and foreign investments were initiated. Yet, urban land continued to be allocated through non-market mechanisms.

Just like land, socially-owned housing, provided by the state or its enterprises to their employees, was the predominant housing model in the urban areas. Rural housing was largely self-built and privately owned. Early in this phase, the responsibility for provision of urban housing was shifted from the state to socially-owned enterprises (Petrović 2001). In the 1980s, another shift took place as the enterprises moved away from providing flats, towards granting housing loans to employees so that they could choose their own housing strategies. More flats built by socially-owned construction firms, affordable but not of very high quality, also appeared on the market (Petrović 2001; Tsenkova 2005). The

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<sup>42</sup> A commune, or 'komuna', was conceptualised as a well-defined socio-economic community, not just an administrative unit of local governance ('opština') (Fisher 1965).

distribution of socially-owned flats, however, created 'a new type of social inequality' (Petrović 2001: 213), one based on in-kind rather than cash income, as flats were allocated mainly to the elite, professional or otherwise qualified workers. Others relied on self-built construction, often illegal, in the suburbs and rural areas, a practice which continues to this day. Housing thus reflected the broader political and economic situation as well as changes that took place in the different phases of the Yugoslav era.

During this period (1965-92), plans for different levels also proliferated suddenly, and by end of the 1980s, the country had one of the most decentralised systems of planning, including spatial planning. New planning acts were passed in each of the republics in the 1960s, and again after the adoption of the new Federal constitution in 1974. Integrated planning approaches were adopted, and the Acts were accompanied by comprehensive guides and manuals, covering aspects of socio-economic, environmental and physical development (Nedović-Budić and Cavrić 2006). The communes were designated as the main planning and implementation authorities, and regional plans were also prepared for the republics and provinces, but none at the federal level (Nedović-Budić and Vujošević 2004). While major infrastructure projects (in other words, decisions on the location of large investments) remained the responsibility of the central government, spatial and urban policy and planning was largely the domain of the sub-national authorities.

A large number of planning documents were produced during this phase, including long-term socio-economic and spatial plans, long and medium-term urban plans, short-term plans for specific sites or development projects, as well as plans for rural settlements, though regional plans were not very popular. Furthermore, the planning process was carried out by multi-disciplinary teams, and is described as being "*...over-loaded with various types of individual, group*

and general public participation” (Nedović-Budić and Vujošević 2004: 14)<sup>43</sup>. Yet, planning in this phase failed to achieve the key goal of reducing the development gap between the different republics, and even between regions within the republics (for example, Kosovo in relation to the Vojvodina and the rest of Serbia).

Bosnian cities and planning were not untouched by the different phases witnessed across the rest of Yugoslavia. Bosnia had large mineral deposits, and in the initial years of the socialist era emerged as the industrial heartland of Yugoslavia (Gregory 1973)<sup>44</sup>. Central Bosnia, a remote, inaccessible region surrounded by mountains, emerged as the hub of military industries in the former Yugoslavia, precisely because of its unfriendly locational attributes. In the 1950s, enormous investments were made in “...defence-related projects across the mountainous centre, building the impressive network of roads, bridges and tunnels which still form the core of Bosnia’s transport infrastructure [...] military industries became the driving force behind industrialization” (ESI 2004: 10)<sup>45</sup>. Prior to its collapse, over fifty per cent of Yugoslavia’s defence industry was located in Bosnia and Herzegovina (ESI 2004).

Industrialisation brought with it rapid urbanisation, and urban settlements, small and large, with variable levels of services and infrastructure, developed across the republic. Besides Sarajevo, the key urban centres were Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla,

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<sup>43</sup> Interestingly, Fisher (1965) points out that although there is evidence of plans being changed on the basis of objections raised by the citizens, this took place only when the changes involved were not seen to affect the fundamental concept of the plan. When the concept or underlying principles of the plan were challenged, the comments were usually ignored. Of course, any public discussion only took place after the plan had been fully drafted, rather than in the early stages of the process, which continues to be a characteristic feature of the planning system in Bosnia even today.

<sup>44</sup> This situation later changed as it didn’t have a diversified economic base and continued to rely on basic industries, and soon lost its comparative advantage vis-à-vis the other republics (Gregory 1973).

<sup>45</sup> The Soko aircraft factory was set up in Mostar during this period, and other towns such as Novi Travnik, Sarajevo, Gorazde etc became hosts to other factories producing armaments. The defence industry not only supplied the Yugoslav army but also exported extensively to other ‘non-aligned’ countries (ESI 2004).

Zenica, Doboj and Bihac. A polycentric urban system implied that there was a clear hierarchy of settlements, with regional and sub-regional centres as well as smaller settlements, playing distinct roles. An extensive road network was created and airports built in Sarajevo, Mostar, Banja Luka, Tuzla and Bihac (Bublin 1999).



Figure 2: Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2005. (Source: UNESCO Old City nomination file, courtesy S. Demirović, urban planner, Grad Mostar)

The pinnacle of Bosnia's industrial development was reached in the 1970s, when investments in industry finally started to show impact on the development of local populations. Standards of living and education rose. Universities were established in Banja Luka, Tuzla and Mostar, focusing on "...technical subjects such as engineering and metallurgy" (ESI 2004: 13). The number of people engaged in white-collar (managerial and technical) jobs increased. Yet, even at its peak, work-force participation (percentage of working-age population in

employment) in Bosnia never exceeded 35 per cent, extremely low by modern standards (ESI 2004).

All through this period, agriculture was clearly neglected (Gregory 1973; ESI 2004). Agricultural policy in Bosnia focused mainly on co-operatives or agrom-combines, which held a mere 10% of agricultural land. The rest was held privately in small holdings by subsistence farmers (ESI 2004). These *seljaci* (peasants) were viewed by the authorities as “...*backward and ideologically suspect, prone to religious sentiment. They were long excluded from social benefits such as pensions and health insurance [and] were also poorly represented in political structures*” (ESI 2004: 30).

As mentioned above, new planning acts were passed in each of the republics, first in the 1960s, and again in the 1970s, accompanied by detailed guidelines. The urban form of this period was fairly standardised and strictly regulated, across Yugoslavia. However, as Bosnian life had been influenced by different religions and empires over the past five hundred years or so, it had a rich and varied cultural heritage. To some, Bosnia, with its “...*ethnic mix and history of multicultural coexistence*” was a symbol of a united Yugoslavia (Ali and Gusheh 1999: 12). Yet, Bosnia claimed a unique cultural heritage of its own, articulated in particular through its urban fabric and built form – a combination of the Turkish-oriental and Austro-Hungarian styles. It appeared difficult to reconcile the legacy of the Ottomans with Serb and Croat nationalism, as well as with Yugoslav secularism. The *Baščaršija* in Sarajevo, which was organised according to Ottoman urban principles but at the same time contained all of Bosnia's religious institutions, as well as prominent Austro-Hungarian structures, clearly symbolised this paradox (Ali and Gusheh 1999).

Initially the Federal Government's response to this dilemma was the massive demolition of the *Baščaršija*. This was also in line with the communist agenda of the suppression of all aspects of religion, ethnicity or culture. In the 1960s, however, changes in political circumstances led Tito and the government to

abandon the unitarist approach in favour of a “...*Yugoslav commonwealth in which all ethnic groups were given home rule and the right to full national and cultural affirmation*” (Doder 1993: 12) The Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a ‘nation.’ Areas such as the *Baščaršija* were now seen as historic districts to be preserved. The view of Bosnia’s cities, and Bosnia as a whole, as a melting pot, and thus a fitting representative of a multi-national, harmonious Yugoslavia, has been actively promoted ever since.

Eventually, conservation plans were drawn up for historical areas such as *Baščaršija* in Sarajevo and the *Čaršija* and *Stari Grad* in Mostar. In 1986, Mostar received the Aga Khan Award for Architecture for its effective preservation of the old town, in an economically sustainable manner (Pašić 2004)<sup>46</sup>. At the same time, however, high rise residential towers appeared in Bosnian cities, an unmistakable sign of the socialist state, and illegally built housing clusters emerged in the suburbs (Hasić and Roberts 2000; ESI 2004).

In the 1980s, Yugoslavia witnessed a number of tumultuous changes that led to its rapid descent into war. The period after Tito’s death in 1980 had witnessed growing nationalism in all the republics, and a number of attempts by the richer ones (Croatia and Slovenia) to gain more autonomy. The economic decline had also started in the beginning of the 1980s as large scale industrial projects proved to be technically or economically inefficient (ESI 2004). Although the Communist party retained its hold on Yugoslavia throughout the 1980s, in 1989, with the fall of the Berlin wall, communism lost its footing all across Eastern Europe. In Yugoslavia, it deepened the divide between the republics – the League of Communists of Yugoslavia broke up in January 1990, and three months later, the communists were ousted from power in Slovenia and Croatia. On the other hand, Communists remained in power in Serbia and Montenegro. This led to a further polarisation of Yugoslavia, which already reeling under the impact of the

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<sup>46</sup> See footnote 83 in Chapter 6 for details.



rise and increasingly aggressive manifestation of Serbian nationalism under Slobodan Milošević.

The post-communist, pre-war period between 1989-92 was marked on the one hand by increasing democratisation and the emergence of a civil society, while on the other, it witnessed a re-centralisation of power, growing ethnic and regional conflicts, economic and social collapse, and eventually, the violent break-up of the country. According to Bennett (1995), “...communism had helped to hold Yugoslav society together for almost forty-five years, and its demise made a major reorganisation of the state unavoidable” (p.12).

Planning, too, was affected by these changes. This was the third phase of planning in the former Yugoslavia, also described by Vujošević and Nedović-Budić (2004) as ‘democratic’ planning. It was, in fact, far from democratic, as the policy of re-centralisation took away planning powers from lower levels as the republics assumed the key role in socio-economic as well as spatial/urban planning. “By the end of the 1980s, both the system and the practice of socio-economic and spatial planning in Yugoslavia was dysfunctional” (Vujošević and Nedović-Budić 2006: 279). New market-oriented approaches to planning were now being explored.

Table 2 on the following page provides a comparative assessment of the socio-political structure, economic activities and key elements of spatial/urban development in the four major phases of Bosnian history discussed above.

Table 2: Bosnia before 1992: An overview of socio-political, economic and spatial/urban development characteristics

	<i>Ottoman rule (1463 – 1878)</i>	<i>Austro-Hungarian Rule (1878 – 1918)</i>	<i>Inter-war period (1918 – 1945)</i>	<i>Post World War –II until the collapse of Yugoslavia (1945 – 1992)</i>
<i>Socio-political characteristics</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Most important influence on Bosnian history, culture, social structure, urbanisation pattern.</li> <li>• Adoption of Islam not compulsory and non-Muslims were allowed to practice their own religions</li> <li>• Yet, society clearly segregated between Muslims and non-Muslims – e.g. in terms of income, taxes and property laws. Source of perceived historical divide between Muslims and Christians, urban and rural.</li> <li>• ‘Millet’ system a key characteristic – non-geographical, non-ethnic but loosely confessional-based groups enjoying different social, political, economic rights.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Largely a continuation of Ottoman policies, but with streamlined administration and improved taxation.</li> <li>• Dominance of Muslims and Catholics over Orthodox Christians (mainly Serbs).</li> <li>• Induction of large numbers of public officials from other parts of the Austro-Hungarian empire to administer Bosnia</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Constant political and territorial reorganisation.</li> <li>• Tussle for power between various nationalist groups.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Principles of egalitarianism (between regions and nationalities), planned development, and a form of ‘market socialism’.</li> <li>• Cross-subsidisation between republics.</li> </ul>
<i>Economic base</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mainly agriculture, with largely Muslim land-owners and Christian serfs.</li> <li>• Urban economies based mainly on trade, guilds of craftsmen and merchants emerged in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> century.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Development of primary industries such as metallurgy, forestry etc.</li> <li>• Unsuccessful attempts to encourage private investment, particularly from within Bosnia, concessions awarded to foreign entrepreneurs.</li> <li>• Neglect of agriculture and failure to address land reform.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Three-quarters of the population depended on subsistence agriculture.</li> <li>• Period of general stagnation.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bosnia emerged as the centre of the military industry, considered one of the better-off republics due to its strong industrial base. Increasing migration to Bosnia from other republics.</li> <li>• Limited investments in social sectors.</li> <li>• Per capita income just 35 percent of Yugoslav average in 1971.</li> </ul>

		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expanding bureaucracy also led to development of local service economy in key towns.</li> </ul>		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• New universities with focus on technical education established in 1970s; rise of white-collar jobs in industry.</li> <li>• By late 1980s, inefficiency of investments – industrial decline of Bosnia.</li> <li>• Neglect of agriculture throughout the socialist era – only 10% agricultural land held by co-operatives, rest in small holdings by subsistence farmers.</li> </ul>
<p><i>Spatial/ urban development pattern</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Responsible for the initiation of the 'urbanisation' process and development of towns and cities.</li> <li>• Largely based on Islamic principles of city planning, centrality of the mosque and the marketplace, segregation of public and private spaces.</li> <li>• Reflection of the social systems (<i>vakuf, millets</i>) in spatial pattern</li> <li>• Different communities led independent lives in clearly segregated quarters.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Expansion of road and railway networks, industrial units, waterworks and power stations, barracks and garrisons</li> <li>• Expansion and "Europeanisation" of cities and towns, improvements in infrastructure, water supply and sanitation.</li> <li>• Construction of imposing public buildings, wide roads, squares and plazas</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Limited urban development, influenced by City Beautiful movement in the US, Garden city and Beaux-Arts.</li> <li>• Building Act of 1931 made the Regulatory Plan the key instrument of urban development.</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Spatial planning subordinate to economic planning, tool to realise goals such as redistribution of resources and egalitarianism.</li> <li>• Comprehensive, top-down regional and spatial planning introduced in 1950s and early 1960s.</li> <li>• Development of polycentric urban system.</li> <li>• Heavy reliance on experts and expert institutions for planning.</li> <li>• Central command planning slowly gave way to self-management planning, to finally some form of 'democratic' planning.</li> <li>• Formalistic, overly complex systems of public participation.</li> <li>• End of 1980s, planning system bureaucratic, 'dysfunctional'.</li> </ul>

## 4.2 Cities, plans and planning in times of collapse: Bosnia 1992-95

### 4.2.1 *The collapse of Yugoslavia and Bosnia's descent into war*

*"Bosnia resembled the Yugoslav Federation uniquely among Yugoslav republics in its mix of nationalities, lack of an absolute ethnic majority, and intricate power-sharing formulas for managing ethnicity."*(Cousens and Cater 2001: 19)

Indeed, these were the main features that set Bosnia and Herzegovina apart from the other Yugoslav republics. In the early 1990s, when the break-up of Yugoslavia began to gather momentum, the population of Bosnia-Herzegovina comprised 44 percent Muslims, 31 percent Serbs, about 17 percent Croats and 8 percent who described themselves as Yugoslav or 'other' (1991 census data, available on [www.fzs.ba](http://www.fzs.ba)). While Bosnian Muslims were recognised as a 'nation' at par with other constituent nations of Yugoslavia (Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians and Montenegrins) in the 1960s and named as such in the new Yugoslav constitution adopted in 1974, this was never accepted by the Serb and Croat leaders, who continually advocated that the Bosnian Muslims were in fact Serbs or Croats of Islamic faith. Croatian President Tudjman's views that the Bosnian 'nation' was an artificial creation and had no historic legitimacy, were well-known (Silber and Little 1996; Kumar 1997; Bose 2002).

The documentation, analysis or reinterpretation of the Bosnian conflict is not the mission of this research. It has been adequately covered by numerous historical accounts<sup>47</sup>. However, as the conflict forms the backdrop and the basis for this project, it is important to review some salient aspects, especially the causes of the conflict, which is interpreted by some as the war between the rural and the urban. Undoubtedly, the destruction of the major cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and widespread ethnic cleansing of populations to establish

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<sup>47</sup> For comprehensive coverage and discussion of the causes and trajectory of the Bosnian conflict and the Dayton Accords, see accounts by Silber and Little (1996), Kumar (1997), Holbrooke (1999), Bose (2002), Malcolm (2002), Schuman (2004).

ethnically homogeneous territories, was a key feature of the conflict (Coward 2004). This is discussed in the next section on 'urbicide.'

In terms of simple historical facts, the conflict was triggered by the collapse of the formal structures of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Slovenia and Croatia were the first to secede, declaring independence in June 1991. They were awarded international recognition in January 1992. Bosnia was caught between the ambitions of Presidents Tudjman & Milošević of Croatia and Serbia respectively, who wanted to carve up the territory to create Greater Croatia and Greater Serbia, leaving a rump and almost certainly unviable Muslim state. While desperately attempting to protect the territorial integrity and the multi-ethnic, multi-religious character of their republic, which was being threatened by Serbian and Croatian nationalism, the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina conducted a referendum on independence in March 1992. Bolstered by the overwhelming vote in favour of independence (there was a 63% turnout – mostly comprising Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats – and 99.4% of those who voted were in favour), the Bosnian government declared independence on 5 April 1992. It was recognised as an independent state by the EC and the United States on 6 and 7 April, respectively (du Pont 2002; Malcolm 2002). By then, the siege of Sarajevo had already been initiated, with Serb artillery moving into positions surrounding the town. It became effective within days of the declaration, lasting for over 3 years. In July 1992, the Bosnian Croats proclaimed their own quasi-state (or 'statelet', as it is referred to by some) – the 'Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia' (*Hrvatska Zajednica Herceg-Bosna*), hereinafter referred to as Herceg-Bosna, with Mostar as its capital. By 1993, this had led to a breakdown in Muslim-Croat relations, and precipitated heavy fighting not just for the control of Mostar but also the mixed areas around it (Bose 2002; du Pont 2002)<sup>48</sup>.

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<sup>48</sup> Whether the war was primarily a case of internal conflict or 'civil war' among Bosnians, or that of 'aggression' of Serbia (and later Croatia) against Bosnia is still being debated amongst academics and analysts. Malcolm (2002) holds the view that throughout the history of Bosnia, "...leaving aside the economic conflict between landowners and peasants, the 'national' animosities within

According to various assessments, approximately 250,000 people (nearly 6% of the pre-war population of 4.3 million people) are estimated to have been killed and about 50% of the pre-war population was forcibly displaced during the war in Bosnia (UNDP BiH 2007). Almost all the major Bosnian cities lay in ruins at the end of the conflict.

#### *4.2.2 Urbicide, mono-ethnic cities, divided cities*

Many authors support the contention of Vucinich (1962) that a 'chasm' had historically existed between the rural and the urban way of life in the Balkans. Prodanovic (2002) suggests that anti-urban sentiment 'traceable to biblical times' (p. 141), fuelled by ethnonationalist propaganda from latter-day politicians seeking to expand their personal fiefdoms, and a thorough manipulation of the media to achieve this objective, was the key cause behind the destruction of all Balkan cities. Indeed, the Bosnian war is considered by many as 'a war of the city' (Shaw 2004b: 145), drawing on rural and small-town hatred of the city and its cosmopolitan and inclusive culture, and manifest in the destruction of symbols of that culture (Coward 2004; Shaw 2004b; Radovic 2005). Radovic introduces the concept of *palanka* (small town; also used as a synonym for provincial, or, depending on the context, provincialism) to account for the social and physical destruction of Yugoslavia. He proposes that "*...the Yugoslav wars have begun as wars of xenophobic, exclusive palanka against the pluralism and inclusiveness of Yugoslav cities*" (Radovic 2005: 149), and suggests that the conflict between the two ways of life (*palanka* versus city) started long before the outbreak of war.

At the same time, other authors warn against such oversimplification of the nature of the conflict in the Balkans, as one between the cosmopolitan towns, the peaceful plains and the quarrelsome mountain folk (Bougarel 1999), or stereotyping the rural-urban divide as one between primitivism and modernity,

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*the country have reached the point of inter-ethnic violence only as a result of pressures coming from outside Bosnia's borders*" (p. 234).

or xenophobia and inclusiveness (Bougarel 1999; Grodach 2002)<sup>49</sup>. Bougarel goes on to propose the following explanation for the destruction of Sarajevo and Mostar:

*“Forty years of accelerated modernization and urbanisation have shifted the traditional antagonisms between town and countryside into the towns themselves, endangered the balance of the urban social system and broken down the structures of the rural one. This is probably the reason why towns like Sarajevo and Mostar were at the centre of the war between 1992 and 1995, whereas they remained relatively untouched by the fighting of World War II.”* (Bougarel 1999: 165)

An interesting perspective is offered by Abazović (2002), who uses Boal's classification of various scenarios and dynamics of ethnic relations, to reflect on the destruction of Sarajevo. Boal proposes that five scenarios – *Assimilation, Pluralism, Segmentation, Polarisation and Cleansing* – can be used to describe ethnic relations in cities, and that these are reflected equally in the urban fabric (Boal 1999). He suggests further that these scenarios form a circle rather than a linear progression, as cities demonstrating characteristics of Assimilation (undivided) move gradually (or rapidly, as the case may be) towards Cleansing (also undivided), or vice versa, with the intensity of division increasing from Pluralism to Segmentation and further to Polarisation (Boal 1999). Abazović, using Boal's framework, describes how Sarajevo had always been pluralist rather than fully assimilated, how signs of segmentation emerged around the time when the Constitution of SFRY was adopted (1974), and how, during the war, segmentation changed almost overnight to polarisation (Abazović 2002)<sup>50</sup>. This also supports the hypothesis made by Bougarel above that the destruction of Sarajevo and Mostar was a consequence of the growing imbalance within urban

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<sup>49</sup> Taking this perspective into account, Coward (2006) later refines his previous argument and contends that the destruction of the built environment is significant in its own right, as a distinct form of political violence, rather than violence against a 'perceived cultural characteristic of the lives lived in amongst these buildings.' (Coward 2006: 425)

<sup>50</sup> I have also used Boal's framework to discuss the division of Mostar in the next chapter.

society, rather than an attack on 'urbanity' by 'primitive rural forces', which in turn was brought on by the socialist policy of urbanisation and modernisation within a short span of time.

Bublin (1999) and Prodanovic (2002) provide evocative descriptions of the siege of Sarajevo, the slow strangulation of 'Sarajevan' life, and the obliteration of the city's landmarks – the *Baščaršija*, major mosques, churches and other structures from the Ottoman era; the City Hall, from the Austro-Hungarian period; houses and apartments, schools, hospitals and public buildings. The city faced mortar fire, grenade attacks, as well as sniper fire. As most buildings from the Ottoman era were made of wood, many of the damaged structures were pulled down and used for firewood during the siege, contributing further to the destruction of historic Sarajevo. 60% of the city's buildings were destroyed<sup>51</sup>. Before the war, Sarajevo had a mixed ethnic population of 50% Muslims, 30% Serbs (Orthodox) and less than 8% Croats (Catholic); in all it was home to more than 23 different religious or national population groups (Abazović 2002). The Serbs who remained in the city after the conflict were either forcibly evicted by Serb militia, or fled fearing reprisal. Muslim refugees from Republika Srpska took their place. Sarajevo is now 80% Muslim, and has been described variously as a frontier city, an urban interstice, a traumatized and dislocated city (Rowland 1995; Bollens 2006). Mainly, it is a largely mono-ethnic city, with few signs of its return to multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism.

Other Bosnian cities and villages, including Banja Luka, Brcko, Gorazde, Tuzla, Pocitelj and Srebrenica, just to name a few, also witnessed widespread destruction and ethnic cleansing. The destruction and division of Mostar – another city symbolic of heterogeneous and multicultural Bosnia – captured international attention like no other city in the Balkans. A comprehensive

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<sup>51</sup> Powerful depictions of the siege of Sarajevo were also conveyed through the multimedia exhibition created by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Association of Architects in 1992-93, titled 'Warchitecture-Sarajevo: A Wounded City'. Some of the images are reproduced in Lang (1995).



account of the destruction, division and reconstruction of Mostar, and the debates surrounding the latter process in particular, follows in the next chapter.

Urban destruction during the war also included the destruction or removal of cadastral and property records, plans and maps. According to the World Bank, systems for the registration of property rights in BiH have been disorganised since the Second World War, during which a large proportion of records were damaged or destroyed. During the socialist period, changes in ownership were often not registered due to the high transaction costs and taxes. During the war (1992-95), more records were lost as many public buildings were bombed. Tsenkova (2005) suggests that in about 20% of the Bosnian towns and cities, no land books exist because of the destruction caused by the war. This destruction of records and archives, displacement of large numbers of people, and the breakdown in institutional capacity in the aftermath of the war has led to a situation wherein legal records (where they exist) no longer match the situation on the ground. In most cities, urban plans and maps have also either been destroyed or are out of date, and no longer reflect the *de facto* boundaries, land use or occupancy (World Bank 2006a).

#### ***4.2.3 Overall economic and social impact of the war***

Of course, the destruction of housing and infrastructure was not confined to urban areas alone. Estimates of housing destruction vary. The World Bank estimates that 412,000 housing units across the country were destroyed or significantly damaged (World Bank 2000, as cited in ESI 2004: 15). According to the European Commission, across the country, over 80,000 houses were completely destroyed, while about 270,000 were significantly damaged (20%-70%), out of a total housing stock of 1.3 million units (ECHO 2000). Electricity generating units and transmission lines were destroyed, as were water and sanitation systems. 70% of school buildings and nearly 40% of health facilities were damaged or destroyed. Industrial production capacity was more or less wiped out as 45% of the industrial plants were destroyed – at the end of 1995

industrial output was estimated to be between 5 – 10 per cent of the pre-war level, according to different estimates. Bosnia had always been one of the poorer republics in the former Yugoslavia – its per capita GDP in 1990 was less than one-third of that of Slovenia (US\$1900 in comparison to US\$6500 in Slovenia) (World Bank 1996)<sup>52</sup>. During the war, this fell by about 80 per cent. The direct material and economic damage caused by the war has been estimated at US\$50-60 billion, leading to widespread unemployment and poverty (World Bank 1996; ECHO 2000; World Bank 2004).

Along with the disastrous economic consequences, the social impact of the war has also been devastating. According to latest estimates, nearly 18% of the population of BiH was below the general poverty line in 2004. Gross unemployment was 30% in 2006 and was mostly long-term in character, with the unemployed, in particular men, at a high risk of falling below the poverty line (UNDP BiH 2007).

UNDP's latest Human Development Report also highlights long term and widespread social exclusion as a key impact of the ethnic division resulting from the war. Ethnic division facilitates and exacerbates social exclusion in many ways, but its effects are felt particularly in the returns process:

*“As a consequence of poorly integrated return to pre-war residences, national minorities are one of the most distinctly socially excluded groups. This is reflected not only in their limited political participation and access to service provisions, but also in terms of alienation from regular social processes in the areas where they live.”*  
(UNDP BiH 2007: 10)

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<sup>52</sup> As explained in an ESI report, high levels of industrial investment in Bosnia meant that it was officially treated “...as a ‘developed republic’ and denied the civilian investments channeled into Serbia, Macedonia and Montenegro, even though it remained objectively one of the poorest parts of Yugoslavia [...] In 1953, it had a per capita income of 74 percent of the Yugoslav average; by 1971 this had fallen to 35 percent” (ESI 2004: 11).

### 4.3 Post-war reconstruction and recovery

The political context for post-war recovery of Bosnia and Herzegovina was provided by Washington Agreement between Bosniacs (Muslims) and Croats, establishing the Muslim-Croat Federation, signed in March 1994; and the Dayton Accords, concluded in November 1995.

#### *4.3.1 Washington and Dayton*

The Washington Agreement, signed by the Bosnian Prime Minister, Croatian Foreign Minister and a representative of the Bosnian Croats, sought to end the conflict between the Bosniacs and the Croats. It provided a framework for establishing the Federation and established a Transitional Committee to develop the Constitution of the Federation, an agreement on military arrangements and governmental structures, and a Preliminary Agreement of the Confederation between the Republic of Croatia and the Federation. It laid out the structure of the central government and the cantons, the broad division of responsibilities between these levels, and the responsibilities of the legislative, executive and judicial arms of the government. It also provided for a unified military. The exercise of local self-governance was to be through the municipalities<sup>53</sup>. An important exception, however, was the city of Mostar which had been divided by the war and which was claimed by the Croats as the capital of Herceg-Bosna. The Washington Agreement established that Mostar would be governed by an EU Administrator for up to two years (Washington Agreement 1994; ICG 2000).

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, better-known as the Dayton Accords or the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), was signed in November 1995, and formally concluded the conflict in Bosnia<sup>54</sup>. The Agreement, along with its 11 Annexes (one of which – Annex 4 – included a

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<sup>53</sup> The establishment of all-powerful Cantons, however, has undermined the last tier of government, namely the municipalities. See discussion below.

<sup>54</sup> The Dayton Peace Agreement was sealed after much arm-twisting on the part of the United States and other Western powers. For an 'eyewitness' account of the process and the negotiations, see Holbrooke (1999).

new constitution), provided the basis for establishing a consociational system of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina<sup>55</sup>. The Agreement asserted that the boundaries of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina were inviolable, but at the same time facilitated an internal territorial division through the formation of two entities - the Bosnian-Croat Federation, or FBiH (controlling 51% of the territory of the country) and Republika Srpska, RS (controlling 49%), which were (and continue to be) largely independent.

#### *4.3.2 Bosnia's multiple transitions*

Since the 1990s, Bosnia has experienced a variety of 'transitions.' The first, of course, has been the transition from war to peace, which has been largely accomplished. The stabilisation of the security situation by NATO's Implementation Force (IFOR, later christened Stabilisation Force, or SFOR) was achieved through rapid deployment along ceasefire lines, separation of the three armies and other militia working in tandem with them, and their subsequent demobilisation. This process was successful in bringing down the risk of renewed armed conflict (Cox 2001). NATO concluded its mission in 2004. Since then, the EU maintains a military operation (Operation EUFOR-Althea) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, comprising 6,300 troops, with the objective of ensuring continued compliance with the Dayton Accords (EUFOR 2008).

Another indicator of the transition to peace is the level of minority returns. According to UNHCR, by the end of September 2007, 446,215 former refugees and 577,750 IDPs had exercised their right to return, out of an estimated 2.2 million persons who were forcibly displaced during the war (UNHCR 2007). The returns have followed a cyclical pattern, beginning after the signing of the

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<sup>55</sup> Consociationalism is a model of government developed by the political scientist Arend Lijphart particularly for plural and divided societies. It is based on consensual and broad-based decision-making across groups, rather than a majoritarian approach which is usually deployed in democratic states. Consociationalism and confederalism (strong self-rule of federal units) is built into all levels of the Bosnian state established by Dayton. For a full discussion on the structure of the Dayton state, and the characteristics, advantages and criticisms of the consociational system, see Bose (2002; 2005).

Dayton Accords, declining in subsequent years, rising again in 2002, and declining again since 2003. These cycles have coincided with factors such as property repossession rates and the availability of funds for reconstruction. However, minority returns (defined as returns to an area where the returnees would now be in a minority) remain an area of concern and a major political issue, and repossession and reconstruction have not always resulted in the permanent return of the minorities to their pre-war homes (UNHCR 2007).

The second transition is that from being a 'constituent republic' in a federal state, Bosnia and Herzegovina is now a federal state in itself, with a weak centre and two strong ethnically-based constituent Entities. The Dayton Accords provided for the establishment of an entirely new system of 'consociational confederal government' (group-based power-sharing), and one where the *"...federating units, rather than the federal government, are the dominant layer of government"* (Bose 2006: 20), the merits of which are still being debated. In a nutshell, the country is governed by the constitution of the common state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the constitutions of Republika Srpska (RS) and the Bosnian-Croat Federation (FBiH). The presidency comprises three members, a Serb, a Bosniac and a Croat, who assume power by rotation every eight months. The joint presidency's major mandate is foreign policy, and a limited range of inter-entity matters, while it is the Entities that hold most of the real decision-making power for the territories under their control (Cox 2001; Bose 2002). One of the major differences between the Entities is that FBiH is divided into ten cantons, with devolution of decision-making powers as well as resources, while there is no such intermediate level of decentralisation in RS. The municipalities in FBiH play a relatively weak role as a result of the cantons' primacy – *"The canton is clearly the decisive layer in this multi-tiered framework of government"* (Bose 2002: 79). However, special constitutional provisions have been made for the two mixed cantons – central Bosnia and Herzegovina-Neretva – and it is mandatory for them to devolve their powers in the field of education,

culture, radio and television, local business and tourism to municipal governments (Bose 2002).

The third transition that Bosnia has faced, since 1989, has been from socialism to a market-led economy, which is yet to yield results in terms of sustainable economic growth. Between 1989-92, after the collapse of communism, other countries in Central and Eastern Europe began their economic and social transformation while Bosnia was slowly dragged into a war. After the signing of the Dayton Accords, in 1996, the World Bank opened a mission in Sarajevo and established a \$150 million Trust Fund for Bosnia and Herzegovina. Supporting Bosnia and Herzegovina's transition from a socialist to a market economy, as well as facilitating post-war reconstruction and economic recovery, were key priorities for the Bank (World Bank 2004). Its brief included establishing and maintaining macro-economic stability, development of modern customs and tax systems, the privatisation of industry and service sectors, establishment of a central bank and a common currency (which was particularly problematic), and clarification of fiscal relations between the State and the Entities. In Bosnia the last of these tasks was especially complicated because of the weak state government and the all-powerful Entities, who were keen to retain as much control over their own affairs as possible. Being stronger financially (in comparison to the State) considerably bolstered the political strength of the Cantons and Entities. Furthermore, the fiscal arrangements followed the pattern of decentralisation in the two entities, which meant that the internal taxation of structure of each Entity was necessarily different (in the Federation significant taxing and spending powers were devolved to the cantons, while in the Republika Srpska there was a much more centralised system), and therefore had to be addressed differently (World Bank 1996; World Bank 2004).

The other key element of the economic reform agenda in Bosnia was the privatisation of pre-war industry, which can at best be described as unsatisfactory, at worst, a complete failure. Many observers point out that most

Bosnian policy makers as well as the international community assumed that once the war was over, the Bosnian economy would make a quick and painless transition to a market-oriented system, and that privatisation would be the panacea for the failing public sector enterprises and utility companies (Pugh 2002; ESI 2004; Gallagher 2005). This was based on a shallow understanding of the pre-war economy in Bosnia, described as “...*relatively diversified, a well developed industrial base, ranking among the leaders of the region, and a highly educated labour force*” (World Bank 2002, cited in ESI 2004: 15). This assessment failed to take into account, however, that Bosnia’s pre-war industry was riddled with problems, such as outdated technology, huge workforces and large volumes of enterprise debt. It also underestimated the socio-economic impact of the war and the need for social protection for large sections of the population, at least in the short- to medium-term, as well as the interests of the nationalist elites in controlling the economy. The latter phenomenon has in particular been extremely damaging, as “ethnic privatisation” (Papić, as quoted in Pugh 2002: 474) has taken root, and nationalist elites have taken over most of the pre-war enterprises and siphoned off their assets. Unsurprisingly, the number of serious investors willing to take on these enterprises has been few and far-between (ESI 2004).

The International Crisis Group has pointed out at regular intervals that while the flow of international aid to BiH is diminishing, a viable private sector is yet to emerge and there is little private investment – foreign or domestic (ICG 1999; ICG 2001). This was confirmed in an evaluation conducted by the Bank’s Operations Evaluations Department (OED) in 2004, which reported that the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the promotion of private-sector involvement in general, has been ‘largely unsatisfactory’ between 1996 and 2004 (World Bank 2004). Other (clearly more independent) reflections are considerably more critical of the privatisation effort which was led by USAID, describing it as misguided and wholly unsuited to the context, a technical rather

than a political exercise, and more concerned with the fact of privatisation rather than the outcome (Donais 2002; Pugh 2002; Gallagher 2005). Gallagher states that:

*“... a deeply inappropriate form of privatisation was imposed from 1998 onwards. [...] Under a firmly neo-liberal economic agenda, it was assumed that privatisation would stimulate the economy and create accelerating social benefits. [...] The USAID plan allowed for no less than twelve privatisation agencies, one for the RS, one for the Federation and another for each of its cantons. Besides the opportunities for corruption, this unwieldy approach offered politicians the chance to confirm the effects of ethnic cleansing by means of ethnically exclusive privatisations. [...] A parasitic leadership grew even richer than it had been in wartime and acquired private title to much of the formerly socially owned economy.”* (Gallagher 2005: 139-140)

The ESI report cited earlier reinforces this assessment and points out that the privatisation process had no benefits for the citizens:

*“The privatisation process turned into a costly charade [...] Granting citizens the right to acquire shares in companies which in many cases had negative asset value was a purely notional compensation. No effort was made to restructure companies in advance of the sale, and no system of privatisation through liquidation was established. Voucher privatisation attracted neither new managers nor new capital to change the trajectory of the companies.”* (ESI 2004: 17)

The result is that local economies, to date, remain under the control of the major ethnic group in each area, unemployment is still high, and industrial output remains much lower than pre-war levels. The various assessments cited above point out that the neoliberal agenda promoted in Bosnia has failed to alleviate an already grim post-war socio-economic situation for the majority of the population, and has further concentrated power and wealth in the hands of nationalist elites. Effective economic transition and sustainable growth, thus, remain elusive ambitions for Bosnia and Herzegovina.



Another important piece of the jigsaw in the transition from socialism to market economy is housing. Although the housing model of former Yugoslavia (discussed earlier) has collapsed, it is yet to be replaced by an effective or even functional housing strategy for the post-socialist states. Across the region, there has been an “...overwhelming emphasis on access to homeownership through privatisation with legislative action to ensure private property rights in housing and other real estate” (Tsenkova 2005: 40). The same trend is also seen in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The *Law on Privatisation of Apartments with Existing Tenure Rights* was passed at the end of 1997, but it is vague in a number of respects and has proved difficult to implement. The privatisation of socially-owned apartments in urban areas has been restricted to sale of these flats to sitting tenants, which in fact has replicated the pre-war inequalities in terms of housing access (Petrović 2001).

The land and property registration system, though reformed by the *Law on Land Registry* of 2002, remains inadequate, and more than 40% of the country is estimated to lack a functional titling system (Tsenkova 2005: 42). New construction is hampered by the absence of plans, coupled with a range of systemic problems such as the lack of a functioning property registration system, a cumbersome building permit process, and the absence of transparent and consistent procedures for the auctioning of building land (Tsenkova 2005)<sup>56</sup>. As a result, illegal construction remains widespread, especially on the periphery of urban areas<sup>57</sup>. Furthermore, undeveloped municipal land is yet to be denationalised, which means that municipalities and cantons have the right to

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<sup>56</sup> This is also borne out by field interview data, as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6.

<sup>57</sup> Sarajevo is estimated to have about 20,000 illegal buildings, mainly due to the absence of master plans, which “...contributes to corrupt practices and ad hoc decision-making in the development permit approval process” (Tsenkova 2005: 70).

allocate land through multiple means (lease, auction, outright sale), which would convert to ownership once construction has been completed (Tsenkova 2005)<sup>58</sup>.

In Bosnia, the transition from a centralised and subsidised housing system to one which is based on private ownership and cost recovery has been further complicated by the effects of the war, including destruction of housing and property records, the large numbers of displaced persons, the weak and increasingly corrupt local institutions, the absence of plans, and, most importantly, the weak political will to address these problems.

#### *4.3.4 The emergence of new (international) actors*

The Bosnian post-war context is further complicated by the emergence of multiple external actors with powerful roles. Key among these is the Office of the High Representative, a position that was established under the Dayton Accords. Annex 10 of the Accords laid down the role of the High Representative (HR). As discussed briefly in the previous chapter, the major responsibilities of the HR were to monitor and ensure compliance with the Dayton Accords, and coordinate the activities of the civilian organisations and agencies in BiH in the areas of humanitarian assistance; the rehabilitation of infrastructure and economic reconstruction; the establishment of political and constitutional institutions in BiH; promotion of respect for human rights and the return of displaced persons and refugees; and the holding of elections (General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina 1995).

As previously noted, over time, the Dayton-assigned mandate was reinterpreted to strengthen the position of the OHR in order to ensure compliance with the Accords. However, the last few years have also seen a steady decline in the number of decisions adopted by the High Representative (or the number of times the so-called Bonn Powers have been applied), with a gradual shift towards

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<sup>58</sup> This is also one of the reasons why municipalities have been able to allocate extensive tracts of land to displaced persons without any oversight. This is discussed in greater detail in the context of Mostar in Chapters 6 and 7.

decisions which mainly follow-up on policies agreed earlier (Ashdown 2007; Solioz 2007).

The High Representative reports to the Peace Implementation Council (PIC), which comprises all the key actors (countries as well as international organisations – 55 in all) who helped, in small or large measure, to bring peace to Bosnia through participation in the Dayton process. The international organisations involved in the PIC include, *inter alia*, the UN, NATO, UNHCR, OSCE, the World Bank, IMF, the European Commission and European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The European Union clearly has a critical role in this structure, not least because of Bosnia's aspirations to join the EU. In 2002, the EU took on a stronger role in coordination of international efforts in Bosnia, as the chair of a new 'Board of Principals' established in Sarajevo to address day-to-day matters (Chandler 2006a). Since Paddy Ashdown's term, the High Representative also acts as EU Special Representative to Bosnia and Herzegovina. A report on donor support to BiH between 1996-2002 points out that the European Union was the largest donor at the State level during this period, contributing over 50% of the total sum approved (UNDP BiH 2002), and in 2003, it provided half of OHR's operating budget (Chandler 2006a: 39).

Apart from the High Representative, a number of other external actors also assumed important roles in the immediate aftermath of the war. Due to the high number of people displaced by the conflict and the ethnic cleansing accompanying it, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) was in the forefront of relief efforts. Between 1992-95, operating under extremely difficult and often dangerous conditions, UNHCR managed to deliver some 950,000 metric tonnes of humanitarian assistance to some 2.7 million beneficiaries in Bosnia. It was UNHCR's largest humanitarian operation ever (Cutts 1999). In the aftermath of the war, UNHCR was tasked with the implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton Accords addressing issues relating to return of refugees and displaced persons. The agency's current mandate in BiH is

to support the Government in providing protection for refugees and IDPs, and to facilitate their return and reintegration in their places of origin. While in the initial days after the war UNHCR undertook the task of housing repair and reconstruction to support the returns process, in 1999 the strategy of large-scale reconstruction and rehabilitation was abandoned in favour of capacity-building of local institutions to carry out these tasks (UNHCR 1999).

Another important player in the reconstruction sector, particularly in the rural areas, was the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). In the initial phases after the conflict, ECHO was responsible for supporting the return and rehabilitation process led by UNHCR, as well as providing health and social services. It supported the distribution of food aid and funded public kitchens; distributed medical supplies and implemented social health programmes; and rehabilitated primary schools, health facilities and basic infrastructure such as water supply and gas in rural areas, in support of the returns process (ECHO 2000).

The political institution-building process, especially elections, was led by the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The Dayton Accords assigned the OSCE responsibilities relating to elections, human rights and regional military stabilisation. Democracy-building was added subsequently. While its work on elections has been phased out with the successful establishment of the BiH Election Commission, the OSCE continues to play a leading role in the areas of democratisation, education, human rights and security co-operation (OSCE 2008).

Other important actors following the war included the World Bank and the IMF, which, along with USAID, spearheaded the economic reform and privatisation process, and subsequently, the production of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the country. Bilateral aid was mostly directed at the Entity level, with the US as the leading donor to both FBiH and RS, followed by Japan.

Some of the large European donors such as the Netherlands concentrated their assistance in the Federation (UNDP BiH 2002).

As the emergency phase gave way to recovery and development, agencies such as the UNDP also came to play an important role, as did international and local NGOs. In the year 2000, 173 international and 365 local NGOs were reported to be operating in BiH (du Pont 2002). The European Commission also diversified its support through the OBNOVA programme and other modalities. There is, however, little evidence of coordination, nor a vision or a strategy for planned intervention among these different actors (Skotte 2003; Hasić 2006).

Clearly, the presence of such a wide range of actors, with diverse mandates and operational structures, required a high degree of coordination. In 2002, the coordinating mechanism of the international community in Bosnia and Herzegovina was revamped with a view to eliminate overlap and increase effectiveness. As mentioned above, a 'Board of Principals' was established to serve as the main coordinating body of International Community activity in BiH. The Board meets once a week in Sarajevo, and its permanent members are OHR, EUFOR, NATO HQ Sarajevo, OSCE, UNHCR, the European Union Police Mission in BiH (EUPM) and the European Commission. International financial institutions such as the World Bank, the IMF and the UNDP are also regular participants at the Board of Principals (Office of the High Representative 2007).

While rehabilitation of housing and infrastructure has clearly been a priority for the international community in BiH, urban development and planning have hardly featured at all, even in the recovery and development phases. Between 1996-2002, the sectors to receive highest assistance (donation and credit) at the Entity level were industry and social sectors in the Federation (housing came a distant fifth, and no mention was made of planning (or even local governance). In the Republika Srpska, the maximum assistance was directed to the areas of finance, followed by transport and communications in (urban planning did receive a mention, though it was clubbed with housing and environment and

about eighth in the list of priorities as indicated by available funding) (UNDP BiH 2002).

#### 4.4 Conclusion: Urbanisation, planning and conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina

It is clear that the seeds of conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina were sown in different phases of the region's history, and that it was not simply 'ancient hatreds' but a combination of historical and contemporary factors that led to the war. The Ottoman empire is generally accepted as being tolerant, and its *millet* system did not encourage territorial-based claims from the different confessional groups. Yet, their differential treatment of Muslims and non-Muslims contributed to keeping the communities apart, and for a while this also led to an impression that cities were largely Muslim, islands of urbanity and home to educated elites and officials, while rural areas were occupied by Christian peasants only too happy to wage war on their urban oppressors. However, as more and more Christian Slavs moved to cities, and the Ottoman rulers encouraged the construction of public and religious buildings for different faiths, this perception gradually changed. At the same time, the cities came to acquire a distinct character which can be described as 'plural yet segmented'. This is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5 where I use Boal's framework to assess the level of assimilation, segmentation or polarisation in pre-war Mostar.

The Austro-Hungarians, while allowing the Ottoman settlements to retain their defining characteristics, imposed their own planning systems and introduced grid iron layouts, wide roads and prominent public buildings in a combination of styles. They usually created separate zones to house their own military as well civilian administrators. The Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman towns existed side by side, but overlapped in places. Combined with the (admittedly few) imposing modern buildings added during the inter-war period, these gave Bosnian cities such as Sarajevo and Mostar a unique character.

Following the Second World War, the initial years of the Yugoslav era were characterised by a rejection (and often destruction) of any symbols or religious or ethnic affiliation. The rapid urbanisation, combined with the emphasis on egalitarianism, imposed a very communist, undiversified landscape on cities. In the wider regional context, industrialisation generated population shifts between rural and urban areas, as well as between republics. Although the strategy of industrialisation and planned urbanisation had aimed for reduction in inter-regional inequalities, this goal was not achieved. Slovenia and Croatia grew richer, while Bosnia and other southern republics remained poor – as the gap widened, it fuelled resentment, particularly in the rich republics who felt they were subsidising their poor compatriots. Growing economic nationalism, in turn, fed ethnic nationalism.

Some authors have argued that the process of rapid urbanisation destabilised both rural and urban societies, and ultimately when the war broke out, the various types and levels of divisions (inter-regional, intra-regional, inter-city, intra-city, and of course, inter-ethnic) simply came out into the open. In effect, this implies that cities were not only attacked from outside, they also imploded from within. This study views Mostar, which is touted by most as the model multicultural, multi-ethnic city in Bosnia, as reflective of this phenomenon.

The plethora of international actors that took charge of Bosnia after the Dayton Accords clearly agreed on the immediate priorities of the international community in the aftermath of the war – stabilisation of the security situation, repair and reconstruction of housing and infrastructure, and the return and rehabilitation of displaced persons, were on top of the agenda. As if by consensus, they all discarded the Yugoslav era structures, institutions and policies as irrelevant and unsuited for the new Bosnian context, creating parallel structures to carry out assessments, disburse aid and manage the reconstruction process. Repairing and rebuilding housing for returnees was a clearly a priority, but most international organisations that addressed this issue did not even have separate

(and professional) units dealing with the housing sector. Furthermore, most of these activities were carried out with little consideration for their impact in the medium- or long-term. An emergency state of mind prevailed for long after the emergency phase.

The revival of the economy, a key element of recovery efforts, hinged on a rather misguided privatisation programme that was driven by an external agenda rather than local circumstances. Once again, a contextually-relevant and locally-owned strategic vision was absent. Nowhere is this clearer than in the handling of public institutions (for example the planning and cadastral institutes), or the larger socially-owned industrial units, both of which could have been used (albeit with reform) as instruments to support economic recovery and facilitate reconciliation, but were instead deemed to be socialist-era relics with no relevance to the changed circumstances.

Although many billions of dollars have been spent on post-war reconstruction in Bosnia, the international community clearly failed to do its homework, and therefore failed to address some of the fundamental causes of the conflict. Without an understanding of the interplay between economic development, the patterns of urbanisation, planning and conflict, the strategy for reconstruction, recovery and reconciliation cannot but be flawed. The analysis of the situation in Mostar in the following chapters aims to discuss this proposition further and draw some lessons.



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## **SECTION II:**

### **FIELD RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS**

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## **CHAPTER 5**

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### **The destruction and reconstruction of Mostar: myths, facts and interpretations**

## **5.0 Introduction**

This chapter narrates the story of Mostar, its evolution from a small town to a busy industrial centre, its destruction during the war, as well as attempts made towards its reconstruction and reunification. Based on published articles, unpublished reports and communications, data and statistics as well as field interviews, it also attempts to draw up a picture of the complex political scenario and governance arrangements before, during and after the conflict, before finally examining where Mostar stands to today. In conclusion, Boal's framework is applied to assess whether Mostar was truly an 'assimilated' community before the war, how it has been changed by the war, and whether the mythical pre-war cosmopolitanism of Mostar was only confined to a small urban core, which could not have possibly survived when encircled by nationalist forces on all sides.

### **5.1 A small town on the Neretva**

Much has been written about Mostar during and after the end of the conflict in 1994. Prior to the war, however, this model multi-cultural microcosm of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina only received limited attention from historians, researchers, even architects and planners. Malcom's history of Bosnia, first published in 1994, mentions Mostar as a centre of resistance between the late 18<sup>th</sup> to early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries, a town "fiercely guarding" its political independence against the rule of the vizier (Malcolm 2002: 91), and a hub for later skirmishes as well.

According to Pašić (2004; 2005), the development of the settlement of Mostar coincided with the arrival of the Ottomans in the Balkans - the document that first mentions Mostar is dated 1474. A number of authors describe the development of Mostar from a minor rural hamlet to a thriving urban settlement and the major city in the county of Herzegovina, within a few decades, emphasizing its culture of religious tolerance and its functioning as a multicultural entity (Puljić 1992; Yarwood 1999; Pašić 2004). The urban form

was characteristically Ottoman, with a clear division of business (*'bazaar'*) and residential districts (*'mahalla'*). The main street ran parallel to the Neretva, with winding narrow streets perpendicular to it leading down to the river. The *bazaar* in Mostar was the centre of manufacturing, commercial and social activity during the Ottoman period, and it is estimated that it attained its peak in the mid-sixteenth century. The old bridge or the *Stari Most*, the best-known symbol of Mostar today, was also built at this time (1566). There are said to be eleven craft-guilds in Mostar in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, with the leather guild the most prominent and successful of these. The residential neighbourhoods extended across both banks of the Neretva, and along the Radobolje, at this time (Čadra 1992).

By the eighteenth century, however, the town had begun to decline, mirroring perhaps the decline of the Ottoman empire as a whole. The Austro-Hungarians, who occupied the city in 1878, initiated its revival by establishing military zones to the north and south of the city, west of the old city, the *Stari Grad*. This restricted development along the river in the North and South directions. Mountains on the east created a natural boundary. Hence the town could grow only towards the north-west, which was originally agricultural land (see Figure 3).

The Austro-Hungarians also revived the economic fortunes of the town by initiating industrial production in Mostar (Ćupina, Dugalić et al. 1992). Industrial zones were created to the north-west of the city, and a new railway line connected the inner city to these (IRCICA 1997; Yarwood 1999; Pašić 2004). Along with timber and coal, attention was also paid to development of vineyards and the tobacco factory. In 1911, the construction of a power plant brought electricity to the city. In Austro-Hungarian times the present-day *Bulevar* was the line of the railroad tracks leading to the station. According to Plunz et al. (1998), "*The tracks separated the city from the new garden extension to the west*

that was the province of the Austrians”(p.14). 10,000 Austrian officials formed a new social group in the city.




Figure 3: Map showing the development of Mostar in 1878 (Source: UNESCO Old City nomination file, courtesy S. Demirović, urban planner, Grad Mostar)

During the rule of the Austro-Hungarians, Mostar also became the seat of the Diocese, and a number of prominent Catholic religious buildings came up. In

1866, the Church of St. Peter and Paul was built, followed by the construction of the monastery which was completed six years later. Other Catholic churches were also constructed subsequently. The new town was laid out according to European principles, with wide streets and boulevards, and single-family villas. The Rondo, the most prominent traffic hub on the western side, is an enduring example of the trend at the time. Six tree-lined streets emerge radially from the Rondo, and it is today a busy social and cultural nucleus for this part of the city.

With all the development activity taking place outside the historic core, and new infrastructure and public facilities located in the new city centre on the western bank of the river, the flourishing old town began to die a natural death in the nineteenth century. It was only after 1977 that concerted efforts were initiated to restore, protect and revitalize the rich architectural heritage found in the historic core of the city (Čadra 1992).

While the inter-war period was generally characterised by stagnation in urban and industrial development, bauxite mining became a prominent activity in Herzegovina during this period. After the end of the Second World War, in the Yugoslav era, industrial development proceeded apace with the establishment of a variety of industries in and around Mostar, including lumber, tobacco, cotton, the aluminium smelter '*Aluminij*', automobile and aircraft manufacturing company '*Soko*', Hercegovina auto, wine-making, and others. The Mostar region was home to a large proportion of the vineyards in BiH, which occupied an area of about 5000 hectares along the Neretva river. 40 per cent of this area was controlled by HEPOK, an agro-combine which produced about 96 percent of commercial wine, and remaining area was composed of small private vineyards (ESI 2004). A number of hydro-electric power plants were also established on the Neretva during this period. Housing for the employees of various enterprises, public and semi-public, was provided by the employers. The 1970s and 1980s also saw a building boom and significant foreign investment in the urban core (Pašić 2005).



Figure 4 illustrates the different phases of development of Mostar since the Ottoman era, until 1997.





Figure 4: Historical development of Mostar since the Ottoman period, until 1997 (Source: Grad Mostar, courtesy Z. Bosnjak, urban planner)

As discussed in the previous chapter, Bosnia, and within the republic the area around Mostar, was also an important military centre. Not only did it house the aircraft factory *Soko*, but was also home to the Secondary/Academy school



'Vazduhoplovna Gimnazija Josip Marsal Tito', based in the southern part of the city. Young boys who wanted to attend military school were trained in this Gymnasium. JNA garrisons also existed to the north and south of the city (Božić, interview)<sup>59</sup>.

During the Yugoslav era, because of the aforementioned factors, migration to the municipality of Mostar from surrounding rural areas increased considerably. According to the 1991 census, the municipality had 126,668 residents, of which 75865 lived within the urban core. According to Yarwood (1999), just before the war, there were 43866 workers in the city, of whom nearly 40 per cent were employed in industry (See Figures 5-7).



**Figure 5: Boundaries of Mostar municipality and the total population of various settlements within, 1991** (Source: Grad Mostar, courtesy Z. Bosnjak, urban planner)

<sup>59</sup> This was the reason why lots of military-educated Serbs lived in Mostar. It also partly explains the presence of JNA troops in such large numbers in and around Mostar when the war broke out (Božić, interview).



Figure 6: Population growth of Mostar, 1948-91 (Source: FZS 2008)




Figure 7: Pre-war employment breakdown in Mostar, 1991 (Source: City of Mostar 2003)



## 5.2 Destruction and Division

As per the 1991 census, of the pre-war population of 126,668 in Mostar, 34 percent were Muslim, 29 percent Croat, 19 percent Serb, with the remaining population identifying themselves as 'Yugoslav' or others (Yarwood 1999)<sup>60</sup>. Most authors observe that prior to 1992, while the Serb, Croat and Muslim populations did live largely separately, all three communities were found on both sides of the river, and "there were no ethnic ghettos in the city" (Yarwood 1999: 3), especially within the urban core. The east bank's 30,000 residents included 6,000 Croats. The west bank's population of over 45,000 included about 15,000 Bosniacs (Bose 2002). However, in the Donja Mahala and Luka II communities, east of the river, the Muslims constituted over 60 percent of the inhabitants, and over 50% Croats were resident in Zahum and Rudnik, to the west (Yarwood 1999). Figure 8 shows the distribution of different national groups within the urban core. One of the key reasons for the mixed population of this area was the provision of housing by the employers:

*"[In this period], the organisation/enterprises where [people] were working gave them an opportunity to get an apartment. So they got it from the enterprise where they worked. They moved from here [east] to there [west] because that area was used at that time for urbanisation. So it was all mixed."* (Demirović, interview)

Figure 9 illustrates the distribution of national groups over the total area of the municipality. The outlying rural communities were quite clearly dominated by one ethnic group or another. This pattern seems to be reflective of that observed all over BiH. According to an OHR official:

*"In this country, during the war, the proponents of BiH spent an awful lot of time and emotion talking about what a wonderful multi-cultural, multi-national, multi-, multi- state it had been, but actually*

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<sup>60</sup> However, a recent document of the International Crisis Group suggests that "...the bulk of those who refused to identify themselves [in the 1991 census], up to 12 per cent, would today self-identify as Bosniaks. If true, this means that Bosniaks outnumbered Croats by about four to three before the war." (ICG 2009: 2)

it was true only of the cities. Because barring a few exceptions, the countryside was always homogeneous, one confession-based. We really didn't have very many villages or small towns which were mixed."(Wheeler, interview)




Figure 8: National distribution of population in the urban core of Mostar. *Hrvati* – Croats; *Bošnjaci* – Bosniacs; *Srbi* – Serbs; *Jugosloveni* – Yugoslavs; *Ostali* – Others. (Source: Grad Mostar, courtesy Z. Bosnjak, urban planner)

Conflict, nationalist or otherwise, did not come to Mostar all of a sudden in 1992. As mentioned in the previous chapter, Malcolm's history points towards Mostar as a centre of resistance to Bosnian viziers as well as the Austro-Hungarians, and a hub of conflict between various religious groupings, since the 18<sup>th</sup> century. During the Second World War, hundreds of Serbs are said to have been arrested by the Ustaša (Croatian nationalist forces) in Mostar and shot before being thrown in the river Neretva (Malcolm 2002). The Muslims were not directly targeted by the Croatian forces in the war, but were disillusioned at their populations not being protected as promised. However, acts of violence by the Serbs against Muslims also didn't permit these forces to join hands against the Croats. "A terrible system of mutually-fuelled enmities was now at work" (Malcolm 2002: 188).




Figure 9: National distribution of population across Mostar municipality, 1981 and 1991. *Hrvata – Croats; Bosnjaka – Bosniacs; Srba – Serbs; Jugoslovena – Yugoslavs; Ostalih – Others.* (Source: Grad Mostar, courtesy Z. Bosnjak, urban planner)

In 1992, a group of Bosniac and Croat architects and planners put together a publication titled *'Mostar'92 - Urbicid'*, which documents in some detail the historic evolution and characteristics of the city, as well as the damage sustained in the early stages of the war. In recognition of its unique architectural heritage in 1986, the old city of Mostar had been conferred the Aga Khan Award, which was a source of great pride for all Mostarian architects. They labelled the destruction of Mostar in the war as *'urbicid'*, which became a precursor to the concept of urbicide – the deliberate destruction of the urban and what it symbolises – diversity and cosmopolitanism (Prodanovic 2002; Coward 2004)<sup>61</sup>. Indeed, over a period of eighteen months between 1992 and 1994, Mostar seemed to have witnessed an extreme form of urbicide. Historic monuments, religious buildings and cultural symbols were apparently deliberately targeted. 2000 persons had been killed, 26,000 displaced, over 5,000 buildings damaged or ruined, all 10 bridges destroyed (nine by the Serbs, and the *Stari Most* by the Croats) and the urban infrastructure shattered (EC 1998; Yarwood 1999).

Lying at the heart of one of the two mixed Cantons in Bosnia and Herzegovina, straddling the Neretva river, the city of Mostar was battered by the conflict. The Serb-led Yugoslav National Army (JNA) started shelling Mostar in May and June 1992, but soon after the Serbs were expelled by a Muslim-Croat alliance, the former allies turned on each other. The Croats aimed to cleanse the city of the Muslims and establish it as the capital of Herceg-Bosna (Bose 2002). As the Muslims resisted, they were driven out of west Mostar into the areas east of the *Bulevar*, which became the frontline between the Croats and Muslims (see Figure 10). East Mostar suffered the greatest destruction due to the two offensives, along with the central core of the city – the area around the *Bulevar*. The city was clearly divided into two – Muslims were driven from western Mostar and Croats from the east. The Serbs fled the town entirely. In November 1993, an event occurred that symbolised this complete and (at the time)

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<sup>61</sup> A more comprehensive discussion on urbicide appears in Chapter 1.



irreversible breakdown of relations between the two communities, and captured the attention of the world. The old bridge of Mostar – the *Stari Most*, built in 1566 – was brought down by an artillery unit from the Croatian side.

*“In a war in which multi-ethnicity was itself the enemy, the destruction of the bridge appeared to mirror that of the multi-ethnic ideal of Bosnia – a place almost defined by bridge building- between communities, between nationalities, between faiths.”* (Silber and Little 1996: 291)




Figure 10: 1994 map of Mostar showing the division of the city along the river and the *Bulevar* (Source: Grad Mostar, courtesy Z. Bosnjak, urban planner)

The division of Mostar into Croat and Bosniac enclaves, to the west and the east of the river, respectively, was seen by many as the most significant outcome of the war in Herzegovina. Prior to 1991, Mostar had a mixed population, the highest number of mixed marriages in former Yugoslavia<sup>62</sup>, and the three

<sup>62</sup> Botev (1994), however, suggests that intermarriage was not such a widespread phenomenon in Yugoslavia, and had seen a decline in Bosnia between 1962 and 1989. Also, throughout this

communities shared a common social and cultural life. Richard Plunz recalls that during his first visit to Mostar, in 1969, he found “...an orderly, well-functioning and integrated urban entity in which three religions with all their traditions and symbols co-existed side-by-side” (Plunz 1998: 7). In fact, most authors, usually relying on secondary information or on their own pre-war impressions of Mostar, weave a similarly idyllic picture of the city, and end it with a metaphorical shake of the head, conveying an inability to understand the tragic destiny of this model Yugoslav city. As the tone indicates, clearly, since its division, the city seems to have lost much of its “multi-” character – it is apparently no longer multi-ethnic, multi-religious, multi-cultural in the way that it was before the war (Yarwood 1999; Bose 2002; Coward 2004). The international community’s push for the reunification of Mostar seems to be based on this superficial understanding of the conflict, its origins, manifestations and impact.

Mostar has also found its place in the discourse on divided cities, which has become increasingly fashionable in recent years. Many authors have attempted to address the nature and impact of divisions in cities such as Johannesburg, Nicosia, Beirut, Jerusalem as well as Mostar, drawing comparisons, and proposing urban policy as well as design tools to reunify them (see Davie 1993; Khalaf and Khoury 1993; Yiftachel 1995; Makdisi 1997b; Bollens 2000; Yiftachel 2000; Beall, Crankshaw et al. 2002; Charlesworth 2003; Bollens 2006; Makaš 2006; Pullan, Misselwitz et al. 2007).

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period, the percentage of intermarriage in BiH consistently remained lower than the national (Yugoslav) average (11.9 percent in BiH against 13.0 percent for Yugoslavia, during the last reported period of 1987-89 – p.469). Botev’s model also suggests that in BiH, both Croats and Serbs are more endogamous than they are in other republics. Muslims are less so, but even then, he claims that “...the three communities now at war have remained very much closed (endogamous) during the period under study.” (p.475) He views large urban centres such as Sarajevo and Mostar as aberrations. He also questions the usefulness of exogamy as an indicator of social integration, pointing out that if this was indeed so, Yugoslavia (and indeed BiH and Mostar) would not have disintegrated so quickly.

Bollens' and Charlesworth's work on divided cities, and on Mostar in particular, merits some elaboration. Bollens suggests in his work on Belfast, Johannesburg and Jerusalem that planners can play neutral, partisan, equity-oriented or conflict-resolving roles in divided cities (Bollens 1998; 2000). In his more recent research, focusing on Sarajevo and Mostar, he suggests that cities can play a "peace-constitutive role" (Bollens 2006: 68), that is, contribute to reconciliation and peace-building at national levels, and that urbanism can somehow overcome the fault-lines that emerge and become entrenched in the aftermath of ethnic conflict. He also proposes that urban planning and policymaking, along with design of the urban built environment, can "...create physical and psychological city spaces conducive to inter-group co-existence" (p. 74). This is certainly a laudable aspiration. The present research supports Bollens' argument that the international community missed the initial window of opportunity to use urban policy-making to sow the seeds of peace in Mostar, as a result of which the city remains divided and its communities, polarised (Bollens 2006). However, his limited emphasis on (a) past urban planning approaches, legal and institutional systems, and the possible constraints of 'path dependency'; (b) the limitations of the international community (conceptual as well as programmatic, as well as international *realpolitik*); and (c) the determination of local elites to wrest and retain control of the planning function, only serve to highlight the superficial nature of the 'peace-constitutive' goal he ascribes to cities, and the suggested strategies that accompany it, including, for instance, flexibility and porosity of the urban form, equity planning, sensitivity to urban ethnic homelands, and diffusion of grassroots peacebuilding (p. 135).

Like Bollens, Charlesworth too places architects at the core of her recent research on divided cities (Charlesworth 2003), which seems unrealistic as architects are not the only solution-providers, or even the only "mediators", in a post-war reconstruction process. She fails to examine the governance context adequately in each of the cities examined in her research (Beirut, Nicosia and

Mostar) - the legal-political-institutional basis for planning in the divided cities; the legislation formulated in the aftermath of the war and (particularly in case of Mostar) following the transition from a socialist to a market economy; or the role of local governments in developing and implementing plans, enforcing zoning regulations and building bylaws, and allocating land and other public resources. Although she touches upon the issue of divided local governments (especially in the case of Mostar and Nicosia), this is all too brief, avoiding any discussion on the impact this has on the city's administration, economy, planning and reconstruction process, etc. The present study, with its focus on transitional administrations, and their approach to post-war reconstruction and urban planning, thus differs significantly from the work of these two prominent contributors in the area of 'divided cities'.

### **5.3 Pre- and post-war politics and governance**

#### ***5.3.1 Local governance systems in former Yugoslavia***

As touched upon briefly in the chapter on planning, the governance and economic systems went through three distinct phases in post World War-II Yugoslavia. The first phase, between 1947-65, was characterised by a distinct communist ideology (despite Yugoslavia's break with Stalinism as early as 1948) and heavily centralised decision-making. Land development and provision of housing were also state functions (Nedović-Budić and Vujošević 2004). From 1963 onwards, however, a series of reforms were introduced, and firmly established through constitutional amendments and changes to party statutes, and eventually, a new constitution in 1974 (Woodward 1989). There are many different views as to what were the factors that triggered these reforms, including an intention to democratise or federalise, or to separate the party from state institutions, to end Serb domination, or counteract the economic slowdown that was facing the country through a process of liberalisation (Carter 1982, Burg 1983, Cohen and Warwick 1983, Estrin 1983, Banac 1984 - all cited in



Woodward 1989). Discussing these factors in detail is neither the aim nor within the scope of this thesis. However, the ultimate impact of these reforms is relevant – they led to the transfer of significant degrees of authority from the state to the lower levels, i.e. to the republics and communes. Each republic built up its own system and institutions, including, for instance, a central bank, educational system, judiciary and police (Cousens and Cater 2001). The significantly decentralised decision-making was also reflected in the planning arena – social, economic as well as spatial planning were now firmly controlled by the republics and local communities. The Federal level still determined the broad policy parameters, but the details were left to the lower levels, and greater participation of the population was envisaged in the process (Vujošević and Nedović-Budić 2006). Another round of economic reforms was once again undertaken in the early 1980s. By the end of that decade, however, the reforms had failed, the economic and political differences between the republics had vastly increased, and the spatio-economic planning system was largely dysfunctional, trapped in the long and complicated procedures designed to ensure coherence among the different levels of plans and to encourage individual and group participation at all levels and stages.

This was also a time of political turmoil, as discussed in Chapter 3, as the economic and national differences between the Republics, which dated from the pre-Yugoslav era, became increasingly prominent. Calls for increased democratisation had led to brutal crackdowns by the communist party on the opposition, and questions of national interest were raised again and again, eventually resulting in the break-up of the country.

Against this troubled backdrop, the first multi-party elections were held in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1990. At the national level, a coalition of Muslim, Croatian and Serb nationalist parties came to power after beating the communists. At the city level, in Mostar, the Croatian Democratic Community of Bosnia-Herzegovina (HDZBiH) won a majority and Milivoje Gagro was

appointed as the Mayor. The HDZBiH ruled in a coalition with the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which was later to become the main 'Bosniac' party. It was only towards the end of 1991 that the Croat Community of Herceg-Bosna (HZHB) was proclaimed as a 'political, cultural, economic and territorial union' of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia Report 1996), later to be transformed into a virtual statelet 'Herceg-Bosna', comprising of western Herzegovina and central Bosnia, with eventual plans of secession and annexation to Croatia.

Towards the end of 1992, the Croatian Defence Council (HVO), which was organised and controlled by the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and which in the war against the Serbs had comprised both Bosniacs and Croats, purged Bosniacs from its ranks. At this stage the assorted Bosniac militia units as well as the expelled Bosniac fighters joined hands to form the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina (ABiH). The HVO and the ABiH eventually became the main protagonists in the Croat-Muslim war, which left the city indelibly divided.

### *5.3.2 Governance and politics in Mostar during the war (1992-94)*

During the war between the Croats and Muslims, along with the physical divide, the city administration also split into two. Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999) provide a fascinating account of the 'politico-military connection' during the war years which made this division brutal and complete. In the early days, a heterogeneous political group, loyal to the BiH government in Sarajevo, was established around the municipal government's crisis headquarters (in the east). However, this formation, led by the SDA, did not survive for long. As the conflict progressed, the original population of Mostar left in large numbers, and were replaced by refugees from the surrounding areas who were fleeing ethnic cleansing, and who, guided largely by their nationalist leaders, converged in areas where their community was in a majority (Heimerl 2006)<sup>63</sup>.

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<sup>63</sup> This was reinforced in many field interviews, for example by Behram, Božić and Omanović.

As part of this process, the municipalities of west and east Mostar were established, with a Croat (Mijo Brajković) and a Bosniac Mayor (Safet Oručević), respectively. All institutions, political or social, as well as economic enterprises on the west, were physically captured by the Croats, and purged of Bosniacs. The HVO created its own police force, and rather quickly began to assume all characteristics and responsibilities of the state. Even when a ceasefire was eventually agreed in 1994, and the Washington Agreement was negotiated, the HVO continued to insist that the EU protectorate be established only for east Mostar, and that the western part of the city be designated as the capital of Herceg-Bosna (Božić, interview). And although it signed the Washington Agreement and all subsequent agreements, it continued to obstruct their implementation and block any moves that could lead to the reunification of the city (Bosnia Report 1996; Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999).

### *5.3.3 Post-war governance, 1994-till date*

#### EUAM and the Interim Statute

As briefly touched upon in the discussion on transitional administrations, the Washington Agreement included a provision for the administration of Mostar by an EU Administrator, for a period of up to two years. On 24 March 1994, the German politician Hans Koschnik, a former Mayor of Bremen from the Social-Democrat Party, was appointed the European Union's Administrator for Mostar. The next agreement followed in July 1994 in Geneva, when a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed to empower the European Union (EU) to administer Mostar until the parties themselves could agree to a more permanent solution. This MoU was concluded between the Member States of the European Union, Member States of the Western European Union, the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Local Administration of Mostar East and the Local Administration of Mostar West and Bosnian Croats (Stahn 2008).

The EU's motivation for intervening in the Bosnian crisis stemmed mainly from its political interest in testing its newly-fashioned Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which the European Community nations had extremely high expectations (Reichel 2000; Juncos 2005)<sup>64</sup>. It was the first 'joint action' by the EU members states under the framework of the CFSP, but was based on an MoU because the EU lacked the legal capacity to conclude any formal agreements (Stahn 2008)<sup>65</sup>.

Many of the principles set forth in the Washington and Geneva documents formed the basis for later agreements, in particular the Rome Agreement and the Interim Statute for Mostar (February 1996), whose provisions superseded those of the Geneva MoU. A report by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2000) provides the complete list of all agreements relating to Mostar. The main goal, which was reaffirmed in each of these documents, was the establishment of a multi-ethnic, unified Mostar. A video documentary on the work of the EUAM describes the objectives of the Administration as (a) providing a unified administration for the city, (b) starting the process of reconstruction and returns, and (c) bringing life back to normal in the city (EC year unknown). To what extent each of these goals were achieved, is discussed in detail in the next chapter.

The Administration had a complex structure. As per the provisions of the MoU, the Administrator was obliged to comply with domestic law, and to operate in consultation with local parties. Thus the Administrator had three principal

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<sup>64</sup> Juncos describes how the EC initially adopted a high profile in the Yugoslav conflict, leading the international response and successfully negotiating a ceasefire in Slovenia. In the case of BiH, however, which was far more complex, "...*The inability to act and even agree on a common line during the first stages of the crisis [...] showed the limitations of the newly created CFSP. As the conflict intensified, the EC was progressively marginalised by the intervention of other international actors, primarily the UN*" (Juncos 2005: 95). However, the EC continued to provide diplomatic and humanitarian support with the framework of the UN, and also took on the responsibility for administering Mostar, with mixed results.

<sup>65</sup> Around the same time, checkpoints between east and west Mostar became functional, and residents of the two sides were permitted to meet at the demarcation line and talk for two hours. Even this permission was granted only to 50 civilians per day (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999).

advisers who counselled him virtually on a daily basis – these were the Mayor of West Mostar, the Mayor of East Mostar, and a Serb. In addition, he also had eight other advisers who guided him on major issues such as refugees, military affairs, press and media etc. There were eight departments, viz., city administration, finance and taxes, reconstruction, economic and transport infrastructure, education and culture, health and social services, public order, and cultural life, youth and sports (formed later). Each departmental head had been seconded by an EU country, and he/she had two co-heads, a Bosniac and a Croat (EUAM 1998). In effect, it meant that each departmental head came from a different context, was often a political appointee, and had to manage many bosses, which didn't augur well for consistency or coherence in policy-making and implementation (Yarwood, interview)<sup>66</sup>.

While the Administration worked with representatives of both east and west Mostar, there were attempts to use the reconstruction process as both a carrot and stick towards reunification. In 1996, in an attempt to soften the 'bipolar division' of the city (Vetters 2007), the Administration proposed that the territory of the former municipality of Mostar, including the town and the hinterland surrounding it, be divided into six units of local self-government, or "City-Municipalities" (three each with Croat and Bosniac majority), and one central zone (under the control of a 'neutral' central city administration). The size of the central zone was initially substantial (covering a significant portion of the urban core of the municipality on the west as well as the east), but was later drastically reduced under Croatian pressure<sup>67</sup>. This concept was incorporated in the Interim Statute for the City of Mostar, devised by EUAM and heavily negotiated among all parties, which was published in February 1996.

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<sup>66</sup> For a full description of the institutional structure of EUAM, its politico-legal basis and political constraints, see Stahn (2008), pp. 301-308.

<sup>67</sup> One of the fallouts of this was extensive rioting by the Croats, and the resignation of Hans Koschnik, who felt his position had become untenable due to the lack of support from his political masters (Yarwood 1999).

The Interim Statute of 1996 charged the (overarching) city administration with land allocation and development functions throughout the city, including exclusive competence for urban planning and preventing unregulated construction and reconstruction, as well as other functions such as finance and tax policy, infrastructure, economic policy, public transport and the Mostar airport (Interim Statute of the City of Mostar 1996). The City-Municipalities were to be responsible for all other issues which fell within municipal competence. The result, however, was the six ethnically-based City-Municipalities became powerful entities in themselves, and when it suited them, the three city-municipalities on the Croat side and the three on the Bosniac side joined hands along the same lines as the former west and east Mostar.

*“The lawyer from Germany [who was facilitating the discussion] said, lets form “Diestadt” which is the City, and then lets form the ‘city-areas’ - but city-municipalities is something completely different. They had this executive level, legislative level, they were like small kingdoms within the city... they simply turned into six big city administrations. Each of these city-municipalities had its own head, the head had its own administration, they had their own budget... De facto, the city had two parts, the situation continued [as before], but we had a bigger administration.” (Božić, interview)*

The statute remained unchanged until 2004, during which time the city-municipalities established cumbersome and expensive administrations, ignoring the City government and its prerogatives. Under such circumstances, even all the elements of the Interim Statute could not be implemented.

Indeed, between 1997 and 2003, Mostar seems to have dropped off the international radar. Richard Williams, former head of the Mostar Implementation Unit, offers the following explanation:

*“These things are very personality-dependent. In OHR, not much happened until Paddy Ashdown came along. That power and drive were crucial. Similarly in Mostar, all these guys [heads of OHR-South] who came after Martin Garrod were extremely weak [...] When an appointment came up, names were floated by different*

*countries. So they were not appointed based on competence, but because their country felt they could be appointed. And there was also the element of 'whose turn is it this time?'"* (Williams, interview)

During these seven years, while the OHR-South office failed to act, the six City-Municipalities took over key functions of the City of Mostar, in particular those relating to urban planning, handing out building permits and making land use changes at will, allowing construction in contravention of the old spatial plan provisions, supporting the construction of controversial religious structures, or simply selling off public land to private investors. The City-Municipalities also made encroachments into the central zone, often ignoring the existing master plan regulations. Each of the six City-Municipalities had established their own urbanism departments, and were supported 'technically' by two Spatial Planning Institutes – *Urbing* on the west side, and *Urbanisticki Zavod* on the east. These aspects are discussed in detail in the next chapter.

An internal memo of the OHR-South office observed in 2004 that the biggest problems in the City of Mostar were the illegal appropriation of land and illegal constructions, which had resulted in huge revenue losses to the city as well as a significant deterioration of the urban environment (OHR-South 2004). However, the OHR's lack of understanding of the political nature of planning was reflected in a column written in February 2007 by then OHR Christian Schwarz-Schilling:

*"The only viable future for Mostar is as a unified city, with a modern and efficient administration capable of keeping the peace, running competitive services, and attracting investment that will create jobs and eliminate poverty. Yet the City Council has failed to nominate members to the Commission that issues Professional Assessments, even though the work of this body is predominantly technical and aimed at improving Mostar's urban-planning process[...]. I do not believe anyone seriously believes that the urban-planning process is a matter of 'national interest'."* (Schwarz-Schilling 2007, emphasis added)<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>68</sup> 'National interest' is a very specific term used in the consociational system applied in Bosnia, whereby political representatives of the different national groups can veto any decision (at local, entity or state level) citing negative implications for their 'national interest.'

### Elections and local politics

The post-Dayton federal system in Bosnia is complex and multi-layered. The Federation, which is of primary concern to this thesis, is divided into ten cantons. There are a total of seventy-three municipalities under these ten cantons. The entity-level government has very little direct dealing with the municipalities, as defined by the Federal Law on Local Self-Government. Each Canton has defined its own local government regulations, including those relating to local government functions, financing, municipal administrative organs, municipal property, local taxes etc (Jokay 2001). In Mostar, however, these have been further defined by the successive Statutes of 1996 and 2004.

The first local election was held in Mostar in June 1996, under the auspices of the EUAM. The Interim Statute had drawn up the complex electoral system and local governance arrangements for the City of Mostar and the City-Municipalities, based on proportional representation, with the aim of preventing dominance of any single group, and encouraging cross-national cooperation in the Councils. However, the international community's hopes that early elections would establish local 'democracy' proved to be misplaced, as the nationalist parties from both sides (HDZ and SDA) won 95 percent of the vote. Twenty one seats went to the SDA coalition, and sixteen to the HDZ. The HDZ refused to accept the results, citing irregularities in the election. In a compromise solution, the HDZ was offered the post of the Mayor. Elections to the six City-Municipalities also produced similar controversial results, and the formation of governments in the three western City-Municipalities was blocked by the HDZ until 1997. In September 1997, local elections were once again held in Mostar, along with similar elections across BiH. Once again, the results were along predictable national fault lines (Klemencic and Schofield 1996; Bose 2002; Bose 2003). This trend continued until the 2004 Statute came into force<sup>69</sup>, which

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<sup>69</sup> See pages 195-196 for a discussion on how the 2004 Statute came to be passed.



stipulated that 17 councillors would be elected on a city-wide list, and three from each of the six electoral districts (erstwhile city-municipalities). The Mayor would be elected indirectly, from among the elected Councillors, unlike in other municipalities across the country (OHR 2004).

In the latest elections in October 2008, the second to be organised after the imposition of the reunification statute, the SDA emerged as the largest party, increasing its seats from 10 to 12. The HDZBiH won only 7 seats for itself, with the Croat coalition down to 11 seats from the previously held 14. Although it had been agreed prior to the election that the presumptive Croat candidate (Ljubo Bešlić, the outgoing Mayor) would be supported by all parties for a second term<sup>70</sup>, the SDA's powerful showing altered the facts on the ground, and a major power struggle was set in motion, which is till date unresolved (OHR-South 2009).

Unsurprisingly, the politics-business nexus has also played an important role in Mostar since 1996. The leading post-war politician in east Mostar was Safet Oručević, who was a prominent leader of military resistance in east Mostar and rose through the SDA ranks during the war. Prior to the conflict he was a private entrepreneur involved in the 'slot machine and pool hall business' (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 96). However, as he was 'originally' from Mostar and had remained there during the conflict, taking over as Mayor when the city administration split, he had earned the respect of the east Mostar community and was voted into power in both the 1996 and 1997 elections. He still retains control of a large number of properties and businesses in Mostar.

*“Oručević had built up a private property empire in the east. He controlled a lot of building construction that went on in the Stari Grad, right from Amir Pašić's time, and also under Koschnik. He was heavily involved in the allocation of building permits on the east side. He made a lot of money and had real power and influence. He has a lot of business interests, protection money and that sort of thing, and*

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<sup>70</sup> The agreement on a Croat mayor in Mostar was part of a wider power-sharing arrangement in the FBiH, in which it has been generally accepted that Bosniaks “get” Sarajevo and Croats “get” Mostar (OHR-South 2009).

*still pulls a lot of strings though he claims to have withdrawn from political life.*" (Williams, interview)

In west Mostar, in contrast, the post-war leaders came from the wider Herzegovina region – they 'did not originate from Mostar and did not represent the interests of the Mostar citizens' (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999: 95), a fact repeatedly and bitterly cited by a number of respondents during the course of this field research. These leaders also exerted direct control on the economy of west Mostar. Mijo Brajković, who held the position of Mayor of West Mostar when the EUAM came to Mostar, took over the company '*Aluminij*' during the war, purged it of Bosniac employees, revived it with Croatian and other foreign capital, and eventually reopened it as a Croat-only company. Other companies such as the Hercegovina Gradnja, Soko, INA-BiH, as well as the Hercegovacka Banka are also controlled by senior HDZ/Croat politicians, as are major telecom and energy providers (ICG 2000; ICG 2001; Donais 2002; Pugh 2002; Bose 2003). 'Irresponsible and questionable' foreign investments have only served to strengthen the hands of powerful elites, particularly in Herzegovina and west Mostar, and served their objectives of keeping the city physically and economically divided (ICG 2000: 3). The rush to privatise, while the ethnic loyalties were extremely strong and assets were controlled by powerful nationalist politicians on either side, obviously benefitted the politician-businessman nexus. As this process was executed along ethnic lines, it has also resulted in growing disparity in employment and economic conditions between the two sides. This aspect is discussed in further detail in Section 7.2 under the theme "Threats to reunification."

#### **Office of the High Representative (OHR) and its instruments**

Following the first post-war municipal elections in Mostar, in September 1996, the EUAM Office was transformed into the Office of the Special Envoy for Mostar (OSEM), which existed until the opening of the Regional Office of the High Representative (OHR-South) in Mostar in January 1997. Between 1997 and

2003, however, Mostar did not feature prominently on the international community's agenda as it struggled to contain Republika Srpska, whose politicians were becoming increasingly belligerent (Wheeler, interview).

In 2002, when Paddy Ashdown took over as the High Representative, Mostar was still *"...a festering wound, ever since the Koschnik days"* (Wheeler, interview). Following the appointment of Ashdown, Mostar reappeared on the OHR's radar. According to Richard Williams:

*"The problem facing Ashdown was that BiH couldn't go into the EU accession process or the NATO partnership (i.e. economic/political and military integration, respectively, with the rest of the world), with niggling problems such as Mostar or Republika Srpska, basically with the country still so badly divided. So, RS had to be brought into line, and Mostar had to be reunified."* (Williams, interview)

In April 2003, Ashdown appointed the 'Mostar Commission' to propose reform of the Interim Statute of Mostar. Members of the Commission were appointed by the Mayor and Deputy Mayor while the OHR and OSCE served as its secretariat. However, this Commission failed to come to any conclusion, and was eventually disbanded. In September 2003, a new body, the "Commission for the Reforming the City of Mostar" was established by the OHR, with the former Mayor of the German city of Ruesselsheim Norbert Winterstein as its chairperson. The aim was to *"...stabilise the situation prior to the municipal elections, to be held in early 2004"* (Information Note: Rapid Reaction Mechanism - Support to Mostar Commission 2003: 1).

With respect to the Interim Statute, the Commission noted that it had never been implemented in the right spirit, and that the six City-Municipalities had become 'virtual fiefdoms' that administered all resources and executed their rights and obligations *"...each solely for the good of their own people"* (Commission for Reforming the City of Mostar 2003: 13).

In December 2003, this Commission proposed a unification statute for the city, which proposed the merger of all City-Municipalities into one, and the establishment of a single city administration and city council. However, the process of adoption of the Statute was derailed by the political wrangling between the two sides in the city council. Eventually, on January 28, 2004, the High Representative issued a series of decisions imposing the reunification of Mostar. The reunified city was to have a single council and a single administration, with six electoral units whose borders would coincide with the erstwhile City-Municipalities.

To ensure the implementation of the Statute, and to address any niggling details or points of conflict among the main protagonists, the Bosniac Party of Democratic Action (SDA) and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), the OHR established the Mostar Implementation Unit (MIU). This was an advisory body with broad discretionary powers, which closely monitored the reform process until the end of 2005, when it was eventually disbanded. The MIU reported directly to the OHR in Sarajevo rather than the OHR-South office (Williams, interview). A number of special teams and committees to manage the reunification process were also set up.

As a result of the lack of progress on several key issues, a Special Envoy (once again, Norbert Winterstein) was appointed by the OHR in September 2006 to negotiate and arbitrate in various cases of reunification of the city's public utility companies. One of the key tasks assigned to him was to ensure the merger of the two spatial planning institutions (*Urbing* and *Urbanisticki Zavod*) into a single entity. Once again, this has been a highly politicised process, which reflects the importance accorded to the control of land by local political actors. Once again, the establishment of the Spatial Development Institute had to be imposed in the form of a Decision of the OHR. The political wrangling over spatial planning is discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

The discussion above illustrates the critical role played by the OHR in the governance of Mostar, but only since 2003. In the words of Anatoly Viktorov, the Deputy High Representative and head of OHR-South office in Mostar:

*“OHR’s role and priority is the de jure reunification of the city. The de facto reunification is the responsibility of other actors.”* (Viktorov, interview)

However, the *de facto* partition of the city created by the war, further cemented by EUAM’s early decisions, the entrenchment of hardline political parties in power, and eight years of application of the divisive Interim Statute without any reform whatsoever, has made the goal of reunification, whether *de facto* or *de jure*, extremely difficult to achieve.

#### **5.4 Reconstruction of the city and society**

Most of the destruction in Mostar took place to the east of the *Bulevar*, thanks to the repeated offensives against Muslim east Mostar and the relatively inferior firepower of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina (ABiH). The cost of repair and reconstruction of the damaged urban core was estimated in 1994 at about Deutsche Marks (DM) 400 million, excluding the new industrial estates, peripheral villages, and historical monuments. If those were included, the cost would have doubled. Measured in terms of repair costs, the east had sustained four-fifths of the damage (Yarwood 1999).

Yarwood points out that in Mostar, the Spatial Planning as well as Cadastral Institutes split into two parts – east and west – as a result of the war, and most technical and office equipment was destroyed. The cadastral records themselves were intact, but in the hands of one side (the Croats) who refused to share them with the Bosniacs (Yarwood 1999)<sup>71</sup>. As a result, urban plans and cadastre

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<sup>71</sup> This was initially done as a deliberate strategic move, as described by an OHR-South official. *“In 1992, the building of the municipality was in east Mostar, I mean, at that time we didn’t make any distinction... all the public books, such as the cadastre, certificates of births and deaths etc etc, were placed in that building, and all those books are originating from Austro-Hungarian times. The JNA were here around the hills, and most of them were surrounding the east part of*

documents which survived the war are also out of date, and no longer reflect the *de facto* boundaries, land use or occupancy (World Bank 2006a).

Similarly, other public institutions and utilities also split into two parts during the war. The water and wastewater utility is one such example. The division of the company and the war damage resulted in substantial inefficiency in the water sector, even though the pre-war (joint) utility had been a profitable enterprise (World Bank 2000). Although the EUAM and other bilateral aid agencies had undertaken repair and partial reconstruction of the water supply system in the years immediately following the war, the system had never been fully rehabilitated, and the two companies operated separately. Since the war, until the completion of the rehabilitation project undertaken by the World Bank, the residents of west Mostar were paying less than half for water as compared to those living in east Mostar (World Bank 2005a).

Apart from the EUAM, the reconstruction of Mostar was also supported by a large number of other external actors. Prominent among these were the European Commission's Humanitarian Office (ECHO)<sup>72</sup>, the Reconstruction and Returns Task Force (RRTF), the World Bank, UNHCR and UNESCO, and a number of other bilateral donors and international NGOs.

#### *5.4.1 Reconstruction under the EUAM*

The EUAM was fully established by July 1994 with the objective of initiating and supervising the reconstruction of the city and the reintegration of its communities. Before its establishment, by mid-March 1994, demarcation maps had been signed, heavy weapons pulled out from the front lines, and new

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*the city, [so] the Bosniacs and Croats agreed together to transfer all these books to the west part, because they would be more safe. And they transferred this in 1992, but when the city split, all those books remained with the Croats. So the Croats had a very good position to blackmail the Bosniacs."* (Božić, interview)

<sup>72</sup> ECHO was active in Bosnia between 1992-2000, working mainly to provide emergency relief and humanitarian supplies, including food, medicines, repair and reconstruction support. It also supported returns in rural areas through the rehabilitation of homes and infrastructure, and support to income-generation projects.

checkpoints – six in all – were being set up. The roads were to be open to the unrestricted movement of civilians, except males of draft age (i.e., 16-60), although this did not actually happen until much later (Bjelakovic and Strazzari 1999).

The mandated duration of the Administration was two years, which was later extended by six months, and the Administrated finally lasted until January 1997. Over the course of its term, the EUAM primarily focused on establishing basic security and freedom of movement across the city, unifying the police force, and the repair and reconstruction of what the Administration saw as the most essential buildings and infrastructure. During this period, it poured in about 144 million ECU (that is, Euros) of donor money into the city, of which nearly 90 percent was spent on reconstruction, and only 10 percent on the police and internal running expenses of the EUAM. The poorer and more damaged east Mostar sector received two-thirds of that assistance (EUAM 1998; Yarwood 1999).

A rapid building damage survey helped to identify structures which had suffered light, medium or heavy damage, and prioritise the repair and reconstruction projects. A large number of individual houses and apartment blocks were repaired, as were bridges, electricity networks and water supply systems. Schools, hospitals and other facilities were also reconstructed. However, any long-term planning process under EUAM did not achieve much success, and the focus of the Administration remained on repairs, rebuilding, winterisation – emergency-type activities<sup>73</sup>. The expenditure of EUAM under different heads as on 31.12.1995 is shown in Table 3.

It is also important to note here that the EUAM's efforts to bring the Croat and Muslim sides together for reconstruction or recovery did not bear fruit, and the Administration was in fact forced to fund and execute independent

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<sup>73</sup> For more details see Yarwood (1999).

reconstruction projects on the two sides. The two sides were unwilling to negotiate and reconcile – a large part in this was played by the diametrically opposite views of the Croat and Bosniac politicians on the status of the city itself. The Croats saw Mostar as a Croat city, the capital of Herzegovina, and a place where they wielded the kind of authority as the Bosniacs in Sarajevo and the Serbs in Banja Luka. They were willing to divide it into two distinct, ethnically pure halves, in order to maintain their hegemony. The Bosniacs identified with the Ottoman heritage of the city, the Stari Grad and the Stari Most, and were unwilling to see the city divided. As a result of the deadlock between the political leaders on the two sides, there was a duplication of a large number of assets, infrastructure and institutions - separate services and infrastructure networks for the Bosniac and Croat zones; segregated schools, hospitals and other facilities. The EUAM's approach was described by the then Mayor of East Mostar, Safet Oručević, as *"...willing to invest in projects which carried the danger of final partition... investing not so much in a united city, as in the status quo"* (Oručević 1996).

A number of criticisms of EUAM's work, its assumptions, strategic choices and outcomes, emerge from field research conducted in Mostar, which are seen by many as having had a significant impact on the shape and form of the city in the long term. These are discussed in detail in the next chapter.



Table 3: Breakdown of EUAM expenditure as on 31.12.1995<sup>74</sup>

Area of intervention	Total expenditure as on 31.12.1995 (million ECU)	% of Total
Public utilities	16.2	22.1
• <i>Water and sanitation</i>	6.8	9.3
• <i>PTT and garbage</i>	4.7	6.4
• <i>Energy</i>	4.7	6.4
Construction sector support and housing repair	14.0	19.0
• <i>Construction sector support</i>	4.5	6.1
• <i>Housing repair</i>	9.5	12.9
Economic sector support	11.8	16.1
Education, culture, sport	9.4	12.9
Running and common costs	6.8	9.2
Municipal administration and unified police	6.6	9.0
• <i>Municipal services</i>	1.9	2.6
• <i>Police</i>	4.7	6.4
Health and social services	3.8	5.2
Transport	3.5	4.8
• <i>Transport infrastructure</i>	2.6	3.6
• <i>Public transport</i>	0.9	1.2
Reintegration of displaced persons	1.2	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>73.3</b>	<b>100</b>

(Source: Special Report concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) 1996)

<sup>74</sup> Final expenditure breakdown of EUAM is part of the archives stored in Brussels. Repeated attempts to get access to the archives during the course of this research failed as EU rules stipulate that the records cannot be made available to the public until 30 years have lapsed (since the end of the Administration).

#### **5.4.2 The World Bank**

The World Bank first got involved in Mostar in 1996 with a diverse emergency portfolio covering a large number of sectors (housing, infrastructure, demobilisation, micro-credit, etc.) There were no Mostar-specific activities in the earliest days, but the city benefitted from a number of multi-city or regional programmes in different sectors. In 1998, the Bank developed a specific portfolio of activities for Mostar. The first project undertaken as part of this was the reconstruction of the Old Bridge, for which the Bank provided a US\$ 4 million credit (Francić, interview). In the year 2000, the Bank initiated the next major project, which was a US\$12 million credit for rehabilitation of the water supply and sanitation system. One of the objectives of the project was to 'promote reconciliation in the water sector' (World Bank 2005a: 5), which was met through the merger of the separate water and wastewater utilities which existed in East and West Mostar. In fact, the project was funded on the precondition that the funding would only be provided for a single merged utility, and that all of the city would be connected to the rehabilitated and extended network (Francić, interview). A single tariff scale was also established and implemented across the entire city (World Bank 2005a).

Subsequently, the Bank has also initiated a solid waste management project for the city, which is ongoing, and which once again involved the establishment of a single company to manage the upgraded landfill site (even though the other functions of waste collection, street cleaning etc are undertaken by two separate companies). In addition, the Bank helped to secure grants for the city from the USTDA and GEF (US\$ 8 million) for background studies on the sewerage system, and for construction of sewage collectors, completing the missing network, and installing a wastewater treatment plant.

Finally, as part of an urban infrastructure and service delivery project, initiated in 2004, the World Bank provided a loan of US\$ 1 million to the city of Mostar to prepare an urban management development plan, and promised them another US\$ 4 million for its implementation. In the words of a World Bank official:

*“This could be a spatial plan, urban plan, whatever – we are flexible. But it will involve a fair amount of baseline data collection, some capacity building for the city, and the preparation of a long-term plan or development strategy for the city.”* (Frančić, interview)

The difference between the reconstruction approach of the World Bank and that of the EUAM is significant. The Bank did not force the issue of reunification through public statements, focusing instead on issues of efficiency and profitability in the core infrastructure sectors, and using their credit leverage to establish unified public utilities across the city. Since they had a long-term perspective, they also showed their determination to ‘wait it out’ while the local actors got their act together and complied with their preconditions. The World Bank has in fact done a lot in Mostar, but has a surprisingly low profile in the city, with many people not even aware of their work.

The EUAM, on the other hand, while promoting reunification of the city publicly and vociferously, had to compromise with actors on both sides in order to be able to get basic services functional again. They were also perhaps in a great hurry to spend their allocated resources within the very short span of two years, which the local actors were quick to spot and exploit.

*“The Koschnik administration talked to all sides separately, designed projects for two separate parts of the city, and eventually the city was split into 6 city-municipalities. The Bank had a different approach [...] [we] did not get involved with the lower levels of administration, we only dealt with them at the city administration level. We never met with the city-municipalities independently, unless they were part of a wider group of stakeholders, or invited together to a meeting. We dealt mostly with the city-level public enterprises, and supported projects which benefitted all citizens and the whole city.”* (Frančić, interview)

### **5.4.3 Other international actors and operations in Mostar**

Various institutions and bodies supporting the reconstruction process across Bosnia were also active in Mostar, though their precise contribution to Mostar municipality is hard to gauge. Key among these are the European Commission's Humanitarian aid Office (ECHO), and the Reconstruction and Returns Task Force (RRTF), a body established by the OHR in 1997 to develop and implement a coordinated approach to return (particularly minority return) and reconstruction. Returning minorities to vacant or rural areas was relatively easier – however, reintegrating minorities within urban centres was a complex process which only gained momentum with the forceful application of the property restitution laws. UNHCR also supported this process through various initiatives.

Many other bilateral donors also financed stand-alone return and/or reconstruction projects in Mostar. Led by UNESCO, Italy, Turkey and a host of other governments others contributed to the Old Bridge and Old City reconstruction. Most others are known by the buildings, monuments or a few public spaces they helped to renovate, for instance, the Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils rebuilt some apartment complexes on Santica street which were destroyed in the war; the Spanish helped develop the 'Spanish' square and the reconstruction of the Gymnasium, etc. However, most donors simply cherry-picked reconstruction projects without much consultation with the local stakeholders or professionals, both during and after the EUAM's tenure. In the absence of any overall plan for reconstruction of the city, and little by way of a vision for its development, this also seems inevitable.

In 2001, the EC facilitated the development of an economic development strategy for Mostar. Reiterating the principles of free market and entrepreneurship accompanied by minimal economic planning, the strategy highlighted urban development, agricultural processing, tourism and infrastructure, among others, as key areas of focus. This strategy, however, remained only on paper. In 2003, another effort was made to develop a Local

Economic Development (LED) strategy for the city. This, too, is yet to be implemented. The absence of an updated, legally binding and widely accepted spatial/ urban plan is seen by many of my respondents (urban planners and citizens) as a major hindrance to any serious or systematic economic development interventions.

## 5.5 Mostar today

For obvious political reasons, there has been no census in Bosnia since the war. This allows local and national politicians from all sides to make irrefutable claims on numbers, majorities and minorities. According to the Federal Statistical Agency, the estimated population of Mostar in June 2007 was 111,198 (see <http://www.fzs.ba/Podaci/ustroj11.htm>). However, since 2001, the statistical agency has stopped publishing population estimates according to ethno-national groups (Vetters 2007). An analysis of the 2008 local election results by the International Crisis Group suggests that 53 per cent of the current population is Croat, 44 per cent Bosniac, and 3 per cent Serb or other (ICG 2009)<sup>75</sup>.

Despite the efforts of OHR and other organizations to promote and support reunification, the city still remains deeply divided. A number of Bosniacs have returned to the western part of town, but there is very little evidence of Croat families returning to the east. Serbs have predominantly returned to rural areas of the municipality, as it is harder for people to find jobs in the city and to adjust to the level of pre-war proximity which existed in the urban core before the war. There are no reliable figures, but most respondents assert that large numbers of people have either exchanged or sold the pre-war properties they owned in areas where they are now in a minority. Even where people have returned, either out of sheer desperation or determination, they have little positive contact with their

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<sup>75</sup> This assumes that *“all voters for the national parties were of the corresponding ethnicity, and that voting for the multinational parties mirrored the voting ratio of the national parties in each electoral district.”* (ICG 2009: 3)

neighbours belonging to 'the other' community. According to a Bosniac returnee to west Mostar:

*"I never really had much time for social or community life even earlier [before the war]. And that building where I live, I had moved there just before the war, so it was not really the time to make any friends. And now, I just see them and say hello sometimes, but I don't want or need to get close to them."* (Omanović<sup>2</sup>, interview)

In terms of *infrastructure and services*, many efforts have been made to unify the separate electricity, water and sanitation, and refuse collection utilities. Although technically the three hydropower-based public utilities in the Mostar area belong to the reunified city as a whole, they are reportedly still controlled by rival national factions. The same is true for water and sewer systems, both of which have been subject to fierce national battles over the past five years. Now, the two water utilities have merged, but they operate two separate teams on the two banks (ICG 2009). A major step forward has been the agreement to set a single unique water tariff all across the city, but whether this has been implemented in practice is not confirmed. The establishment in 2007 of a single company to manage the upgraded landfill site is seen as a major success – yet, waste collection, street cleaning and park maintenance functions are undertaken on the west and east by two separate companies (Bubalo, interview). While this would in itself not be a problem in a 'normal' urban environment, where competition would be encouraged, the fact that these are controlled by national groups indicates that the reunification of the services is far from complete.

Obstructionist tactics from both sides have also plagued the *municipal reorganisation* process since it was initiated in 2004. Veters (2007) takes up the vexed issue of public administration reform in the context of reunification, pointing out that the process is still ongoing and fraught with difficulties. She highlights in particular the issue of public utility companies in Mostar, which are *"...still partitioned according to ethno-national criteria [...] Therefore, the inhabitants of Mostar are still facing divided institutions in the field of*

*communal services (water, waste disposal, and electricity), culture, sport and recreation, and in other sectors are facing badly performing or outright dysfunctional administrative institutions.*" (Vetters 2007: 189)

The *economic base* of the two sides, west and east, also continues to be very different, as the east relies mostly on tourism-related earnings, while the west has the more modern shops and commercial centres, as well as the solitary industrial unit – the aluminium factory – which, as discussed previously, employs only Croats. The pre-war agro-combine HEPOK – possibly the only other potentially profitable enterprise in Mostar – has not yet been privatised or revived. The bloated city administration provides a large proportion of the job opportunities in Mostar, but with the process of rationalisation of the administration almost complete, this is set to change. Of course, lack of economic development and growing unemployment is not a problem of Mostar alone, as the failed first round of privatisation provided a major setback to economic development across the country (Frančić, interview). In fact, Mostar, Sarajevo and other administrative centres of Bosnia are considered more prosperous than the other parts, mainly because they host large numbers of public institutions, both domestic and international, which provide large-scale employment (ESI 2004). However, Mostar was a major industrial hub prior to the war, and the fact that its former production units are unlikely to be revived soon implies a sustained period of unemployment for many. The unemployment level was estimated in 1999 at about 50 per cent (World Bank 1999: 15), and in 2002 at around 37 per cent (City of Mostar 2003). The major sectors of employment in 2002 are shown in Figure 11 below. When compared with Figure 7 on pre-war employment, it is clear that employment in industry, mining, agriculture and fisheries, taken together, is down to less than half of the pre-war level, whereas that in public administration has doubled.




Figure 11: Employment break-down in Mostar, 2002 (Source: City of Mostar 2003)

Reporting on an assessment conducted around the end of 1998 soliciting citizens' views and priorities for reconstruction and development, the World Bank notes that two thirds of the respondents listed industrial development as their top priority (World Bank 2000). Despite this feedback, the efforts of the international community towards economic development have focused predominantly on reviving tourism in Mostar or providing loans for small and medium enterprises. The latter initiative, introduced by USAID, only resulted in boom in the number of cafés, bet-shops and *pansions* in a city which already has too many such establishments, and which are also now finding it hard to sustain themselves (see Figure 12). As mentioned earlier, a few attempts have also been made to develop a local economic development strategy for the city, but none of these could be implemented.

*“Every child on the street knows that after the second world war, Germany made a plan, and they didn’t reconstruct infrastructure, building, schools, at all... no, first thing they reconstructed was the economy, factories, and then the factories reconstructed everything else. Here they went vice versa.”* (Behram, interview)





Figure 12: The economy of east Mostar, in particular relies heavily on tourism-related activities such as *pansions* and internet cafés, and other small businesses such as betting shops, bakeries and restaurants (Source: author, December 2006)

In more recent years, attempts were also made by Paddy Ashdown, the former High Representative, to revive and internationalise Mostar airport (which was another bone of contention between Bosniacs and Croats with each side wanting to control it). In the end, the proposal was reportedly shot down by Croatia which did not (and still does not) want competition for its own international airports in Split and Dubrovnik (Wheeler, interview).

The difference between urban and economic profile of the western and eastern parts of the city continues to be a source of resentment and an impediment in the reunification of the city. The western (Croat) part of the city is generally perceived as having better infrastructure and services, greater employment opportunities and wages, as compared to the eastern (Bosniac) part. A porous border with Croatia, access to international motorways, and a link to the coast, make the Croat side more accessible and attractive to residents and visitors alike. Visually, too, the two sides look very different. The eastern part is older, with

narrow winding streets and older housing, and it also suffered the maximum damage during the war, due to greater firepower of the Serb, and later Croatian, army. The west has wider tree-lined roads, apartment blocks which suffered little damage in the war, and more modern infrastructure. Although reduction of inequalities was an integral aim and strategy of the EUAM, many commentators and most of my Bosniac respondents believe that the administration did not do enough to reduce these disparities between the two sides, although it had the opportunity, financial resources and the political clout to do so.

*“They [EUAM] tried to keep political balance, sharing everything in two. For example, here on this [eastern] side of the Bulevar, you have everything destroyed. On the other [western] side, maybe few per cent destroyed. But for schools they gave 50:50 – so, for 1 million here you can build nothing, for 1 million there you can improve the existing [infrastructure] much. They have on one side Las Vegas, on the west, and the other side Harlem, in the east...” (Pašić, interview)*

While there is complete *freedom of movement* across the city, and a single public transport (bus) system which covers the whole city, those living in the west, particularly, feel very little need to cross over to the east. There are two major *hospitals*, although now there is much more access to the specialty services in the one on the west for all citizens of Mostar. After the war, the Mostar *university* ‘Djemal Bijadic’ was evicted from its premises on the west side, and took up residence in an abandoned military barracks on the east side. Meanwhile a new west-side ‘University of Mostar’ was established in its former home. The main *high school*, the Gymnasium, which is aptly located on the *Bulevar*, is now legally and administratively reunified as well as reconstructed (see Figure 13). In its functioning, however, it is composed of three schools – one teaching the Federation curriculum, one teaching the Croatian curriculum, and one for the International Baccalaureat. According to an OSCE official, the two priority areas for education include the development of common elements of the curriculum, and the rationalisation of the large number of secondary schools:

*“There are 20 secondary schools in Mostar today, mainly because of duplication (two engineering schools, two medical schools, two traffic schools, two building/construction schools, etc.) These have to be rationalised, and that has to be done by the city of Mostar”* (Palmer, interview)



Figure 13: The reconstructed Gymnasium building, 2009 (Source: Aida Omanović)

In terms of *social and cultural life*, young people still fraternise much more within their own groups, because, in the past fifteen years, they have learnt to live separately – *“...they are not used to it [socialising with the others] any more, they have their own lives”* (Hadzizuković, interview). The main cultural centre, situated at the Rondo in the west, has been given a Croat prefix (‘Hrvatski Dom’ Herceg Stjepan Kosače), which is viewed by Bosniacs as deliberately exclusionary (see Figure 14). There are two theatres, and two football clubs, ethnically based, and although they have started playing each other in recent years, the games are held under the shadow of possible violence, and often without the presence of supporters from the visiting side<sup>76</sup>.

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<sup>76</sup> For example, according to a news report dated 28 November 2008 on BalkanInsight.com: *“Ethnic tensions among youths in Mostar soared after a brawl broke out during a local soccer match last week. Throughout the week these tensions triggered a series of smaller incidents and*





Figure 14: The cultural centre in west Mostar. Note the prefix “Hrvatski Dom” added on the top. (Source: author, September 2008)

Finally, the *political environment* in Mostar continues to be poisoned by ethnically divisive politics, postures and statements, till date. The international community was initially taken by surprise by the reversal in roles as it was Bosniac politicians who wanted to retain the ethnic-based administration and electoral systems in 2003, based on the population distribution of 1991, while the Croat parties supported the idea of a unified city. These positions were based on the assumption that Croats outnumbered Bosniacs at that point in time, and formed the majority in the city<sup>77</sup>. In the absence of a census, this is difficult to confirm or refute, and prompts nationalist parties to continue with their hardline positions. The stalemate generated by the latest local elections in Mostar has also intensified calls for revision of the 2004 Statute, particularly by the Croats, who

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*escalated in a major fight on Friday afternoon, which involved a few dozen youths, local media reported over the weekend.*” (Tight Security in Bosnian Town amid Clashes 2008)

<sup>77</sup> The demographic see-saw continues since – recent positions suggest that many Croats have now left the city due to their ability to emigrate, implying that Bosniacs are once again gaining an upper hand in terms of numbers. But this is at the level of guesswork and cannot be verified.

insist that the special status of Mostar be revoked and the principles of 'one man-one vote' as well as direct election of the Mayor, be applied to the city just like all other municipalities in the country (Božić, interview)<sup>78</sup>.

## **5.6 Analysis and conclusions: One city, or two cities in one?**

The aim of the preceding discussion is to demonstrate, first of all, that the city of Mostar did not go from a cosmopolitan ideal to a divided city overnight, that the division was a product of historical fault-lines as well as a complex interplay of political and economic interests that led to the war. I would like to use Boal's framework (1999) to assess pre-war Mostar against the five proposed scenarios – Assimilation, Pluralism, Segmentation, Polarisation and Cleansing – as well as to establish where Mostar stands today on this spectrum.

Boal's proposed scenarios and their characteristic features are depicted in the Table 4 on the following page. He has also depicted the five scenarios as a circle, where a city moves from a state of assimilation (i.e. undivided), to cleansing (also undivided) after passing through various stages of division (pluralism, segmentation and polarisation).

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<sup>78</sup> In fact, the appeal of the Croats to the Constitutional Court, challenging the special status accorded to Mostar by the new Statute, pre-dates these elections.

**Table 4: Boal's scenarios and their applicability to Mostar**

<i>Scenario</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>Mostar during the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian era</i>	<i>Mostar around the Second World War</i>	<i>Mostar under Yugoslavia (1947-90)</i>	<i>Pre-war Mostar (1990-92)</i>	<i>Mostar during the war (1992-94)</i>	<i>Early Post-war Mostar</i>	<i>Mostar today</i>
Assimilation	Inter-group differences disappear	No	No	Limited	No	No	No	No
Pluralism	Considerable social integration but some maintenance of separate ethnic institutions and cultural attributes	Yes	Limited	Yes	Limited	No	No	No
Segmentation	Tendency towards separation with well-developed ethnic institutional structures (parallel or asymmetrical)	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Polarisation	City characterised by severance along ethno-national lines. Severance may be along an international or a latent international boundary.	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Cleansing	No inter-group differences in the urban area because one of the distinctive groups has been driven out or has 'chosen' to exit (polarisation at an inter-regional/inter-state scale).	No	Yes	No	No	Emerging	Yes	Diminishing

*Source: adapted from Boal (1999: 588)*

Unlike other descriptions of Mostar as a melting pot of different groups and cultures, which is also asserted by many respondents, this analysis contends that Mostar was and had more or less been a pluralist city, which moved towards segmentation *before* the war, and eventually became polarised and cleansed, *during* the war, and is only now (fifteen years after the Washington Agreement) *beginning* to emerge from extreme polarisation (this pattern is shown by the shaded boxes in Table 4). Its historic plural character is indicated by the fact that through the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian times, the different communities came to occupy distinct spatial areas in the city, and separate socio-cultural institutions guided their lives, although undoubtedly, they coexisted without overt conflict. As the city grew in numbers and density, social integration increased. The period of the Second World War showed some disturbing signs of polarisation and cleansing, but in the Yugoslav era, national differences were suppressed, not just in Bosnia and Herzegovina but across all the republics and provinces, and the urban core of Mostar (and other cities) began to show signs of assimilation. The multiethnic mix in the urban core of Mostar can in fact be attributed to the housing policies of the socialist era, wherein housing for public sector workers had to be provided by the employer. As Mostar had a large number of public sector enterprises which employed people from all nationalities, housing provided by these enterprises naturally also reflected the same mix (Demirović, interview). Thus, the fact that the different national groups lived side by side in central Mostar should not be seen as the leading indicator of integration or assimilation – the reasons for this lay in the economic structure of the urban core. Over the wider municipal area and in the countryside, different national groups lived in largely homogeneous communities. It can therefore be defined more as pluralism, characterised by *“...retention of a degree of ethnic distinctiveness and the sharing of a wide array of institutions, and a broadly consensual attitude to the existing societal/constitutional framework”* (Boal 1999: 589).

In the years preceding the war, pluralism gave way to segmentation (characterised by Boal as a period of deteriorating interethnic relations, insecurity, mistrust and endemic conflict) as national institutions (political, administrative and socio-cultural) gained prominence and parallel institutional structures were developed. As the conflict grew in scope and scale around Mostar, two ethnically cleansed enclaves were created in east and west Mostar. Maps and data reflecting the situation across the entire municipality (not just the central core) have shown that spatially, there were already clear areas of concentration of different ethnic groups in the decades before the war - during the war the municipality was divided along these pre-existing (though perhaps not prominent) cleavages.

The analysis of Mostar in Table 4 brings out the weaknesses of Boal's model, which appears rather simplistic. Reality is more complex, as the scenarios listed by Boal can co-exist in a single city, at any given point in time. Different areas such as housing, education, employment, social inclusion, show different levels of integration and division in Mostar. A larger degree of assimilation is being seen, for example, in the workplace (especially in public institutions), but segregation at the residential and social level persists. Rural and urban communities within the same municipal area demonstrate different characteristics. The shift from one stage to another is also gradual rather than sharply delineated, and can go back and forth based on the prevailing political environment and various other factors, rather than move in one direction, in a linear fashion.

As far as Mostar is concerned, its population virtually transformed during and immediately after the war. During the field research, a number of respondents mentioned that between 70 - 80% of the pre-war population of Mostar fled the city during the conflict, and most of them have never returned. The influx of migrants from the predominantly rural areas of Western and Eastern



Herzegovina, as well as central Bosnia, considerably changed the complexion of Mostarian society.

*“80% people are not from Mostar, they are from Eastern Herzegovina, Western Herzegovina, etc. They never lived in Mostar as a city, as one. They only see this, this version, only this upgrade of the software, they don’t know anything else. Its perfectly normal for kids in west Mostar – the so-called Croat part of town – to not know that there is a covered swimming pool here [in the east], and they can swim in it in the winter too. They don’t know because their parents, their teachers, no one told them, just because its on the east side, or the Bosniac side.”* (Omanović, interview)

While the figure offered by different respondents varies and cannot be considered reliable data, the point being made is that if a large chunk of the population of the city is made up of displaced persons from small towns or rural areas which are largely mono-ethnic, is it realistic to expect the city to return to its pre-war plural way of life soon after the war? According to Bjelakovic and Strazzari (1999):

*“On the one hand, the strong presence of victims of ethnic cleansing perpetuates intolerance among ethnic groups and radicalizes social relations by advocating revenge and insisting on the impossibility of multiethnic coexistence. On the other hand, the unchallenged power of the ethno-nationalist rural elites that had actively pursued Mostar’s uricide has left citizens who were expelled reluctant to return.”* (p. 92)

This limited interest (or even ability) of post-war populations to revert to the pre-war plural city maintained, and indeed further entrenched, the polarisation in Mostar. The ethnic cleansing worked both ways – the urban population fled previously mixed zones to the safety of ethnically homogeneous areas (or abroad), and the incoming refugee population created ethnically homogeneous enclaves within the urban core, often under the direction of nationalist politicians. The significance of this transformation was never really taken into

account by the international community. In this context, the core objective of the international community to reunify Mostar seems at best rushed, and at worst, completely disconnected with post-war realities of complete polarisation (if Mostar is viewed as one city), or cleansing (if seen as two-cities-in-one).

## **CHAPTER 6**

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### **Urban planning under the EUAM: The road not taken**

## **6.0 Introduction**

Continuing the discussion on EUAM in greater detail, this chapter reviews the Administration's objectives, assumptions, strategy and impact. It also explores how urban planning was proactively used by the six City-Municipalities to assert control and entrench divisions, and by other external actors to reconstruct key symbolic structures such as the Stari Most (old bridge) and the Stari Grad (old city). The conclusion summarises the major reasons why EUAM failed in its limited efforts to introduce urban planning in the reconstruction process.

### **6.1 EUAM's assumptions, strategic choices and their implications**

As described in the previous chapter, the EUAM derived its mandate from the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Geneva in April 1994, which was aimed at ending the conflict between the Bosniacs and Croats, and piecing the Federation together. The Administration's stated objectives were to provide a unified administration for the city, initiate the process of reconstruction, and normalise life in the city.

It appears from literature, data gathered as well as field interviews that the international community broadly, and EUAM in particular, made some major assumptions about the pre-war context which influenced the strategies it deployed towards achieving these goals. The assumptions (such as the importance attached to reunification by Mostar's post-war residents, or the lack of capacity among local communities to undertake planning and reconstruction) could perhaps be the result of the lack of time and commitment to build an adequate understanding of the situation, and the choices (such as further subdividing the city into six City-Municipalities) due to the political exigency of the time and the high levels of mistrust and insecurity. Regardless of the causes, these assumptions and choices have had serious long-term implications for the development of the city, its reunification and reconciliation between its communities, as discussed below. An analysis of these can also provide

significant lessons to other transitional administrations engaged in post-war reconstruction.

### *6.1.1 Multi-ethnicity, multi-culturalism in pre- and post-war Mostar*

As discussed in considerable detail in the previous chapter, most people interviewed for this research stated that before the war they had never thought about national or religious identities, they went to mixed schools, studied a single curriculum, used the same hospitals and health care facilities, worked in similar locations, socialised with all groups, intermarried (to some degree), and lived in mixed neighbourhoods all across the city. This was their definition of integration. This also seems to have been accepted without question by the international community.

The analysis presented at the end of the same chapter, however, also demonstrates that Mostar was historically at best a plural city, with the urban core showing some signs of assimilation during the Yugoslav era. Yet, it was always vulnerable to being segmented or polarised due to the fact that the rural areas within and around the city were ethnically homogeneous, and nationalist forces had started making inroads into these areas (and indeed, all across Yugoslavia) towards the late 1980s. Early in the conflict, it was claimed by Croats as the capital of Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna, despite its large Muslim population. Spatially too, it was not difficult to draw a line through the municipal area, and to a lesser degree, the urban core.

During the war, Mostar's population changed significantly, due to the influx of refugees and displaced persons from the surrounding regions, and the exodus of large numbers of original residents of the city either to ethnically homogeneous areas within Bosnia and Herzegovina, or abroad. The ability of the new immigrants from ethnically homogeneous rural communities to restore the pre-war multiculturalism and pluralism Mostar cannot be gauged, but their interest in multiethnic coexistence, in a dense and interactive urban environment, so

soon after a violent conflict, can be reasonably assumed to be low, and their levels of intolerance and mistrust, along with their vulnerability to manipulation by the national elites, high. In a two-year study of Mostar and Vukovar which started on September 2000 and focused on social reconstruction, Corkalo et al. found that the differences between “us” and “them” were solidified to such a great degree during and after the war that “...it is extraordinarily difficult to reverse this process” (Corkalo, Adjukovic et al. 2004: 146). They also highlight that many of the ‘old Mostarians’ or pre-war inhabitants of the city find that they are unable to relate to or accept the new residents and their way of life, particularly as many of the immigrants come from mono-ethnic, rural areas.

All the factors discussed above made the reunification of Mostar extremely difficult. Ignoring these, and perhaps despite a tacit understanding that this was unlikely to be realised within the mandated duration of the EUAM, the international community made Mostar’s reunification a key goal of the Administration, and an indicator of the Federation’s viability. Unsurprisingly, it only partially realised its objectives, successfully restoring a degree of normal life within the city, but failing to achieve complete political, social, economic and physical reunification.

### *6.1.2 Pre-war institutional structures*

*“Pre-war Mostar had a well-developed planning system, whereas the foreign actors chose to ignore that and impose their own solutions.”*  
(Sead Pintul, former director of urbanism, Mostar, as quoted in Mostar 2004 Symposium. Summary Report: Lessons Learned in Mostar 2004)

Another assumption of the international community, the EUAM in particular, seems to have been that no institutions existed, or were functional, during the war in Yugoslavia, and that any existing (socialist) structures were outdated, bureaucratic and corrupt, and therefore merited dismantling. In fact, there were very strong institutional structures in former Yugoslavia – nowhere is this more

evident than in the area of development planning. The socialist system was extremely strong in this regard, and the whole of former Yugoslavia was covered by economic and spatial plans and planning institutions for different levels (national, republic, cantonal, local). As discussed in Chapter 4 on Bosnia, urban development and planning in Yugoslavia reflected the socialist principles of egalitarianism and planned urbanisation. State institutions (such as the local or cantonal planning institutes) were powerful actors in planning, not only in terms of laying down policy, but also as the chief developers of land and housing.

In Bosnia, the planning tradition in fact pre-dates Yugoslavia, beginning as it did during the Ottoman era. The Ottomans laid the foundations of urbanisation in Bosnia. Cities took on a distinct Turkish character, including in particular the development of self-contained residential neighbourhoods with central open spaces or courtyards, a clear demarcation of residential and business districts, and of public and private spaces (Puljić 1992; Bublin 1999; Malcolm 2002). The Austro-Hungarians, following the Ottomans, brought industrialisation, and further urbanisation followed in its wake. They built an extensive transportation network criss-crossing the region, installed infrastructure, and extended urban centres across Bosnia and Herzegovina with the construction of European-style housing, military structures, factories, administrative and public buildings (Taylor 1981; Williamson 1991; Bublin 1999; Yarwood 1999; Pašić 2004).

It is clear, therefore, that planned urban development was not new to Yugoslav or Bosnian cities. That it needed reform is a different matter. Field research reveals that the capacities for planning existed at various levels even during and after the war. However, these were brushed aside by the EUAM in its reconstruction programmes. The failure to take the old plans, planning systems and capacities into account, and the consequent attempts to start up parallel structures and introduce new forms of planning, didn't meet with much success, and reconstruction remained a piecemeal exercise with no long-term perspective.

### *6.1.3 Division for reunification*

EUAM initiated the discussion on the division of two post-war municipalities (east and west Mostar) into six smaller districts, on the eve of Dayton, assuming that this would help break down the still-persisting hard barriers between the two sides. According to Reichel (2000), the Croat representatives had been adamant about the division of the city right from the beginning of the political dialogue on the future status of Mostar, insisting on two districts in a 'unified city'. It should be noted here that the Bosniacs supported the reunification of the city at this stage (OHR-South 2006)<sup>79</sup>. The May 1995 strategy document prepared by the Administrator mentions the possibility of dividing the city or municipality into smaller boroughs, warning however that strong central authority on key issues must accompany any decentralisation measures (EUAM 1995). In fact, as early as October 1994, an internal document of the EUAM had put forth a proposal to develop Mostar as a two-tier municipality. It was suggested that an equal number of community councils (ethnic-based) be established on each side, which would control matters of local concern, and a City Council on the central level be set up for only addressing 'whole-town matters' (Yarwood 1999; EUAM Year unknown-a). Each community council would send an equal number of its elected members to the City Council, which meant that the ethnic balance would always be equal. Importantly, this document suggested that the 'City President' would be an additional post, preferably an international figure, which implied a permanent or at least long-term international mandate. Clearly, this proposal was never accepted.

The principles for splitting the city into six city-municipalities, operating under the umbrella of an overarching city administration, were outlined and agreed in the Dayton Annex pertaining to the Federation and Mostar, signed on the 10<sup>th</sup> of November 1995. As the key political protagonists could not reach agreement on

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<sup>79</sup> This stance was later reversed (in 2003, when the negotiations were on to formulate the new Statute) as the Bosniacs became unsure of their demographic majority in the city.



the borders of the six City-Municipalities, it was agreed that the Statute for Mostar would address this issue as well as other details of electoral and administrative arrangements. The Interim Statute of Mostar, adopted in February 1996, was based on these principles.

However, the six 'City-Municipalities' became powerful and independent agents, effectively overruling (or at least neutralising) the City of Mostar<sup>80</sup>. As the city-municipalities usurped the powers of the City of Mostar, the international community seemed helpless to enforce the Statute's key provisions. Some believe that to be the cause of the lasting division of Mostar:

*"The Interim Statute had a few integrative elements. The first was urban planning, second, financing, and third, infrastructure. Within the Statute it was said that those three elements belong to the city of Mostar – the city of Mostar is responsible for them. So the moment those three [elements] couldn't live [survive], the next step naturally was that there was no integration."* (Ćorić, interview)

#### **6.1.4 Economic revival based largely on tourism**

The EUAM's weak efforts to revive the economy of the city were based on the assumption that tourism was and would continue to be the mainstay of Mostar's economy. In fact, as discussed in the previous chapter, Mostar was a significant industrial/military centre before the war, with nearly 40 per cent of its workforce employed in industry and less than 5 per cent in tourism (Yarwood 1999). Due to various factors, including the failed privatisation process across Bosnia, inadequate oversight and accountability, and the lack of a coherent economic development strategy, the industrial units in Mostar were never revived (Francić, interview).

The EUAM did make some efforts to revive the local economy and create jobs, but with limited success. Financial support was provided for local enterprises,

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<sup>80</sup> The municipality and citizens of Mostar were also burdened by an excessively complicated (as well as dysfunctional and internationally-manipulated) electoral system, based on proportional representation, of electing members to the 'City-Municipal Councils' and the 'City Council.' (Interim Statute of the City of Mostar 1996; Chandler 1999; Bose 2002)

including small and medium-sized businesses, providing basic services. A 'café culture' rapidly emerged to serve the growing international community. The total amount allocated to supporting these businesses was about DM 8 million. EUAM also initiated an Investment Support Programme for large public companies, including textile, concrete, construction equipment etc (Reichel 2000). However, not many of these enterprises could sustain themselves over time. The city continues to face significant unemployment today – some statistics state that there were 15,574 registered unemployed persons in Mostar at the end of 2007 (FZS 2008: 21), but this only includes those that register with the official employment agency<sup>81</sup>. The city's economy currently relies excessively on tourism-related activities – 220,000 tourist arrivals were recorded in 2004 (World Bank 2005b: 6), and this number has risen to 800,000 in 2008, according to some anecdotal accounts (Francić, interview). The piecemeal reconstruction of housing and infrastructure and limited investment support initiatives, without any coherent economic development strategy, appears to have been one of the major strategic errors on part of the EUAM. Later interventions by the international community, for instance by USAID, also attempted to support small businesses, but the pre-war large-scale employment in the industrial and military sectors could never be matched.

## 6.2 Urban planning: the road not taken

### 6.2.1 Reconstruction planning without urban planning

*"This was a missed opportunity, that we didn't give enough emphasis on planning. Decisions were not based on a strategy, but on compromises. EU was very focused on here and now, and they had some good professionals. But still, I feel all this money spent could have had better results."* (Raspudić, interview)

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<sup>81</sup> The estimated population of the municipality of Mostar in mid-2007 according to the same statistical source was 111,198 persons (FZS 2008: 9). This however cannot be considered perfectly accurate because there has not been any population census in the country since the war.

The main elements of the reconstruction process initiated by the EUAM in Mostar have been comprehensively described by John Yarwood (1999), who was the Director of Reconstruction within the Administration. In September 1994, he proposed a strategy as well as a departmental framework for approval, suggesting that the Reconstruction Department be sub-divided into five groups, viz. building repair (and demolition), infrastructure repair, urban planning, construction sector recovery, and project finance and administration. Of these, the building demolition, repair and reconstruction emerged as the most prominent and visible activity undertaken by the EUAM.

An important role was assigned to external consultants by the Reconstruction Department. THW (Technisches Hilfswerk, or Technical Relief Agency), the German emergency support organisation, partnered with EUAM in surveying and assessing the extent and degree of damage, and undertook the major responsibility for the supply of building materials for repair and reconstruction of individual houses and flats. A specialist Danish consulting organisation prepared the initial demolition plan and programme. A Spanish NGO was engaged to develop a computerised project accounting and management system. GHK International prepared an Infrastructure Strategy and Investment Programme, submitted in November 1994, as well as a specific study on the water sector, which was completed in April 1995. Crown Agents were involved in preparing a background study into the construction industry in Mostar, which also included suggested projects and a list of available contractors in east as well as west Mostar. This was also completed in April 1995. EUAM's internal documents as well as Yarwood's publication clearly indicate that the activities of the Department were meticulously planned and organised, and attempted to make the best use of consultancy expertise available across Europe. Fundamental repairs to infrastructure, including water supply, sewerage systems, electricity, heating, roads and bridges, were carried out swiftly and effectively. Health and primary education facilities were also restored on both sides.

However, the excessive reliance on European consultants and companies neither helped in rebuilding the local economy, nor supported the capacity-building or skill-development of local professionals towards European standards and procedures. It also encouraged the perception (and, consequently, resentment) among the local community that the international actors were merely 'washing the money' in Mostar (Pintul, Puljić, Omanović interview).

At the same time, in this process of demolition, repair and reconstruction, there seems to have been no place for any strategic thinking or planning for the future of Mostar. Yarwood clearly states that the recovery of the planning system was *"...a vital objective for the EUAM and particularly that it was a vehicle to build unification"* (Yarwood 1999: 28). Yet, he and his other colleagues also recall that strategic planning of any sort was seen as a waste of time and resources, and urban planning was pushed to the bottom of the priority list because of the urgency to spend money (Yarwood, Puljić, Raspudić, interviews).

### 6.2.2 Urban planning efforts – too little, too late

*"In their first year, the EU Administration was only interested in repair and reconstruction. In the second year, they started the economic revival through small businesses. In the third year, they thought about planning and set up a joint team from both sides. By then it was too late."* (Puljić, interview)

In fact, it was at the end of 1994, that the proposal was first mooted to establish a local team to work on an All-Mostar Structure Plan, comprising professionals from both sides and the EUAM. A workshop was organised in Hotel Ero (see Figure 13), but the emphasis of the 'planning programme' proposed herein was once again on the survey of damaged buildings, an action programme for building repair, demolition, etc, and an investment strategy for the same. The outline of a Structure Plan was also proposed in this workshop, which was envisaged to include topics such as circulation, land use, key facilities, local plans etc. The budget for urban planning and data management together was a mere

DM 0.6 million, which amounts to approximately 0.2% of the EUAM's total budget (EUAM Year unknown-b). Meanwhile, action preceded planning, often with disastrous consequences.



Figure 15: Mostar planning workshop. The handwritten banner on top mentions the dates - 29.11 - 01.12.1994 (Source: John Yarwood)

As Figure 15 illustrates, an attempt was clearly made to initiate a planning process in December 1994, not long after the EUAM was established. However, the Reconstruction Department of EUAM encountered a number of hurdles in this task. First of all, within the EUAM, there was a driving emphasis on action. According to Yarwood, the fact that Mostar was at the time in the eye of the media and the European politicians created a lot of pressure on the Administrator and his team to deliver clear, brick-and-mortar outputs.

*"[We] were wholly focused on action. There was a politically-driven and to some degree, immediate-driven desire to gain political success via the media. And therefore the real event was not to say through the media 'We've just approved an absolutely brilliant plan.' That just doesn't impress anybody....So Mr. Koschnik was extremely clear from the beginning - 'What I want is action.' He was an extremely practical man. It was a case of 'action, not words', and that whole atmosphere I think diffused very quickly through the organisation." (Yarwood, interview)*

The second hurdle was the establishment and functioning of a joint team of planners from both sides to prepare the plan. In spite of being promised GIS infrastructure (hardware and software), training, and the assurance that they could each build their own databases without being forced to share any data or information, the political leaders stalled the process.

*"We had proposed that you don't share the information if you don't want, but just buy the hardware and software and build your own databases on each side. EUAM will pay for everything as well as the training. Don't exchange information, but at least put everything into a database. So that in future, when Mostar is one unit [city], it will be easy to combine databases. But they didn't agree. So last year [2007] we had to start afresh."* (Raspudić, interview)

It is unclear when the team was finally established, but before the riots of February 1996<sup>82</sup>, which brought the planning activities to a sudden halt (Yarwood 1999), it managed to complete a basic assessment of the situation which formed the precursor to the plan. A building damage data-base was prepared and base mapping was undertaken, which could have served as a basis for the planning process. A few local plans, such as one for the Musala area, were also commissioned by the EUAM in 1995. There is no sign that this has ever been implemented, and in fact it has been impossible to trace this plan in Mostar. No resources were allocated by the EUAM for the preparation of any other local/regulation plans for other parts of the city, including the Stari Grad (old city) and the central zone. It should be mentioned here that eventually, not one but two plans were drawn up for the old city. The first of these was proposed by an Italian architect for UNESCO, and aimed at safeguarding and revitalising the old city and its architectural heritage (Herscher 1998). This proposal, prepared as early as 1997, was never formally adopted by the Mostar – Stari Grad city-

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<sup>82</sup> The riots were caused by the proposals made in the draft interim Statute which suggested that a large area on both sides of the river, including the old town, railway and bus station, major infrastructure installations etc, be incorporated in the neutral 'Central Zone.' This was unacceptable to the Croats, who attacked the EUAM office and the Administrator, Hans Koschnik. For more details, see section 5.3 and footnote 67.

municipality. The second plan was supported by the Aga Khan Trust for Culture. This plan emphasised not only reconstruction but also renovation, i.e. correction of the planning problems faced by the old city in the past. It was adopted as the master plan for the Stari Grad in 2001 (Demirović, interview).

Admittedly, it would have been easier to prepare plans for a part of the city which was only 'claimed' by one community. Also, both plans were prepared by professionals who were largely from outside Mostar. A planning process which engaged both communities, and made use of the existing professional capacity and institutions within Mostar, was clearly on nobody's list of priorities.

The work of the joint planning team from east and west Mostar seems to have continued haltingly, however, under the guidance of the Office of the Special Envoy in Mostar (OSEM). In November 1996, a report titled 'Urban and Structural Plan of Mostar: Survey of Data and Analytical Studies' was issued. This included some basic background information on the themes of cultural and historical heritage, demography and economy, natural environment, water supply, sewerage system and energy, and circulation. This was, however, extremely basic and disjointed, as each chapter was written by a different author or 'expert.' No city-level plan or strategy could thus be prepared in the EUAM or OSEM's tenure, and for long afterwards.

### ***6.2.3 Independent efforts in planning and reconstruction: "Mostar 2004"***

While the post-war reconstruction of Mostar was being undertaken by EUAM and a growing number of other international actors, there were also other efforts which were aimed at developing new ideas and alternatives for the rebuilding of the city. The most prominent of these was the "Mostar 2004" initiative, launched by Mostar architect Amir Pašić who fled to Istanbul during the conflict (Bing 2001). Pašić was the Assistant Director of the Institute for preservation of the old city (Stari-Grad) before the war, and it was under his watch that Mostar had



received the Aga Khan Award for Architecture in 1986 for the conservation and revitalisation of the old city<sup>83</sup>.

As early as 1993, Pašić delivered a series of lectures in various U.S. universities on the reconstruction of the historic core of Mostar. He was ambitious enough to set a date – 2004 (ten years hence) – as the target for completing the reconstruction of the city (Pašić, interview). Perhaps because of his pre-war role, he was concerned predominantly with the restoration, reconstruction and revival of the Stari Grad, and its most emblematic feature, the Stari Most.




Figure 16: A poster of the Mostar 2004 campaign, still visible on the side of a renovated building off the *Bulevar*. (Source: author, September 2008)

<sup>83</sup> Amir Pašić was the Assistant Director of the agency Stari-Grad, which at the time was a semi-autonomous organization supported by the Ministry for the Protection of Monuments and Nature of the Republic of Herzegovina. According to the Aga Khan award website: *“Beginning in 1977, Stari-Grad spent three years documenting the historic centre. Subsequently it has undertaken the restoration of the river embankments, a 16th century Ottoman tower and bridge, a 17th-century clock tower, two mosques, a madrasa, private houses, a tannery and shops that date back to the 18th-and-19th centuries. The jury noted that the rehabilitation of this wide variety of building types ‘has been handled in an exemplary manner[...] nothing is overdone or touristic.’”* (Source: [http://www.akdn.org/akaa\\_award3\\_awards.asp](http://www.akdn.org/akaa_award3_awards.asp))



Herscher (1998), Bing (2001) and others have described how the Mostar 2004 workshops were initiated and conducted in the early years. The first two workshops, in 1994 and 1995, were held in Istanbul, and were mainly attended by American and other foreign students, with little involvement of Bosnians. These were aimed at building an understanding of the social, political and architectural context within which Mostar was situated, and eventually led to an enlargement of the area of focus for subsequent workshops (from only the old city, the expanded scope included key Orthodox and Catholic sites on both sides of the river, and buildings which were not only in the Ottoman style but also Austro-Hungarian and modern structures) (Bing 2001). Later workshops and design studios, some of which were held in Mostar and involved a few local architects and planners, proposed design solutions for the reconstruction and recovery of various parts of the city, for example, the development of the south military site; the redevelopment of the bus and railway station area, which has historically been quite underdeveloped; and different concepts for reconstruction of the 'Front Line', particularly on the west side (where large areas could be densified) (Plunz, Baratloo et al. 1998).

A discussion on the purpose and impact of the "Mostar 2004" workshops is neither the aim nor the focus of this work. It is important, however, to explore the dynamics between this effort and those driven by other international actors such as the EUAM, the World Bank, Danish and Norwegian Refugee Councils, and various other multilateral and bilateral donors. The lack of any communication between Pašić, clearly a key player, and the EUAM, is particularly telling.

As a result of the "Mostar 2004" workshop series and the interventions of UNESCO, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture, the World Bank and other actors, US\$ 12.5 million were raised for the reconstruction of the Old Bridge, and a new master plan was adopted for the Stari Grad, in 2001. The bridge was inaugurated – as Pašić had foreseen, and indeed, planned – in July 2004. However, the bridge,

as noted earlier, is but a much-touted and much-exploited *symbol* of reunification, which in fact does not connect the two divided parts of the city, nor the communities which live within them. In fact, in a fairly frank assessment of the reconstruction approach adopted in Mostar, in which they were key actors, Calame and Pašić (2006) argue that, in hindsight, the reconstruction of the bridge and revitalisation of the historic district were perhaps undertaken too early. Because these initiatives were not accompanied by similar rehabilitation efforts in other parts of the city, the resultant development in Mostar is lopsided and unsustainable, and the bridge itself, “...cold comfort to the residents of Mostar” (Calame and Pašić 2006: 2).

The EUAM was at the time undoubtedly preoccupied with restoring normal life in a city that was destroyed and divided by the conflict, and in this process had to maintain a delicate balance between the major ethnic communities in Mostar. It is surprising, therefore, that the Reconstruction Department did not press upon Pašić and his collaborators, which included a large number international schools of architecture and planning, as well as some students, planners and faculty from within Bosnia and Herzegovina, to include a wider geographical area as well as thematic scope in their planning and design efforts. The Administration in fact seems to have asserted little control over the planning initiatives being undertaken independently, while the city was still under its watch and it had the authority and opportunity to do so. This was indeed a missed opportunity – the processes running in parallel could have in fact been brought together to create some synergy, and planning could have been a tool for a more effective and sustainable reintegration of the divided city, not just for the “*facsimile reconstruction*” of its most emblematic elements (Calame and Pašić 2006: 1).

### 6.3 Planning for division: Strategies and tactics of local actors

*“Politicians don’t want planning because it puts restrictions on them, they like situations where they can negotiate, make deals. That is why we still have no plan.” (Raspudić, interview)*

### 6.3.1 Existing plans and the role of post-war local institutions

The last urban plan of Mostar, prepared by the pre-war spatial planning institute (*Zavod za Prostorno Uredjenje Mostar*) was approved in 1980. A later document was the spatial plan of Mostar, prepared in 1986, with a fifteen-year perspective (it was valid until 2000). Pre-war Mostar had about 57 settlements, urban and rural, and regulation plans existing before the war covered about half of the municipal area.

When the city administration and all its supporting institutions such as the cadastral institute and the spatial planning institute, split into two parts, the records were mostly held in the western part of Mostar. As discussed earlier, the Croats refused to part with them for almost a year (Božić, interview). Two planning institutes were established on each side, which provided advice on revision of plans to the respective city-municipalities (*Urbing* to the three city-municipalities in the west, and *Urbanisticki Zavod* to the three in the east). The two post-war municipalities and their successor city-municipalities consistently exploited the absence of an implementable planning framework or any regulatory system in the aftermath of the conflict. Many changes were made to the regulation plans of Mostar covering the two sides. Most were land use changes were made ostensibly to allow for the construction of housing for refugees and displaced persons (Markić, interview), or for the construction of new facilities such as hospitals (Bubalo, interview). Some green areas within the urban core were also notified as construction land, in this process, for example, near Hotel Bevanda in west Mostar. Some respondents have suggested, on the condition of anonymity, that this particular change was made in order to construct villas for the new, powerful politicians of west Mostar.

It is important to mention here that although the pre-war planning procedures tried to ensure public participation in planning at various levels, there were also ways and means to bypass this consultation process. One of these was the adoption of modifications to regulation plans, which, if approved by the Spatial

Planning Institute, did not require public consultation or review. Another tool was the “expert opinions” – the Institute or department of urbanism could ask for an expert opinion on a particular project (usually *post-facto*), and as long as the expert(s) gave their assent, they didn’t need to take the issue to the wider community (Ćengiđ, Jamaković, Sanković Simčić, Elezović, interviews). This practice continues even today. In Mostar, most changes to the regulation plans in the post-war period were made without any discussion or consultation whatsoever.

*“The Agency Stari Grad takes care of protection of these [heritage] structures, but also gives expert advice. We don’t give permission but expert opinion. Whoever wants to build, they have to ask permission from the Federal Ministry in Sarajevo. If someone wants to make small changes, they apply to the City of Mostar to ask for permission [...] If the object is in the protected zones, they will ask the Agency for advice. This Agency will give expert advice to the Institute of Urbanism, and they give the permission. If it is an important object, they will contact the Federal ministry, and they will give advice.”*  
(Elezović, interview)

Some bigger initiatives were also undertaken by the city-municipalities, such as the preparation of a master plan for the old city, initiated by the ‘Mostar – Stari Grad’ city-municipality in 2001. This was based on the agreement signed between the City of Mostar, the Aga Khan Trust for Culture and the World Monuments Fund. While the agreement was signed at the appropriate level (by the City of Mostar), the decision to adopt and implement the plan was passed in the council of the city-municipality ‘Mostar – Stari Grad’ on 10<sup>th</sup> of May 2001 (Decision about making and implementing the Master Plan of Old Town in Mostar 2001). This decision, which quoted the legislation on spatial planning prevailing before the war, is evidently in violation of the Interim Statute, which had assigned the city planning function to the City of Mostar *only*.

In addition to the land use changes and preparation of a few new plans, the city municipalities, advised by their respective institutes on the east and west, also

permitted the construction of some extremely controversial buildings. According to Wimmen (2004), very early in the reconstruction process, the Croats in particular started *“...claiming and nationalizing public space along the former front line, and turning it into an image of the nation they intended to build. To this end, they started, from the mid-90s onwards, a transparent strategy of claiming national space, by either appropriating existing buildings, or erecting new ones”* (Wimmen 2004: 5). The Franciscan bell tower and the cross on the Hum, are examples of the abuse of urban planning and regulatory power for consolidating national interests (see Figures 17 and 18). Even so-called non-ethnic projects such as the redevelopment of Hotel Ruža are mired in controversy, and the differing opinions reflect a distinct nationalist tone, which makes it yet another divisive element between the Croats and the Bosniacs. A Croat expert involved in the team reviewing the Ruža project stated that:

*“I had a negative opinion about the project because I think, as a professional, it doesn't fit in that area. But they said, she's saying that because she's a Croat. That has nothing to do with my professional opinion. The report sent to UNESCO/ICOMOS presented one point of view – that the hotel should be built... but my opinion was different.”*  
(Sanković Simčić, interview)

One of the Bosniac respondents, however, offered this opinion:

*“The Croats have created Medjugorje as the new tourist hub, whereas in the past Hotel Ruža used to be where all tours to Medjugorje started. Now, a large-capacity hotel such as the one being built would divert the tourist base from Medjugorje, so they are not allowing it to be built.”* (Omanović, interview)



Figure 17: The Franciscan bell tower dominates the Mostar skyline from every viewpoint. The partially constructed Hotel Ruža complex can be seen in the foreground. (Source: author, December 2006)



Figure 18: View of the *Bulevar*, looking south. The Franciscan bell tower and the cross on the Hum are powerful Croatian symbols. The open space seen in the foreground is the proposed site for an Islamic centre and the subject of an ongoing debate on whether it should be allowed. (Source: author, September 2008)



### 6.3.2 Resettlement of refugees and displaced persons

The problem of housing the refugees and displaced persons was not unique to Mostar or its surrounding Canton. Across BiH, the municipal authorities used the one “...freely available resource – parcels of socially-owned land, much of it agricultural land – in order to address this burning problem [of housing the displaced]” (ESI 2004: 42). This strategy was also applied in Mostar. There was, however, one crucial difference. The resettlement of Croat refugees and IDPs in and around Mostar was a well-planned, well-funded initiative by the Croatian government, via the Herceg-Bosna authorities, in order to boost their ethnic strength in the region (ESI 2004). The creation of new settlements around the Mostar airport and in the south of the municipality, are examples of such investment.



Figure 19: IDP resettlement in the south of Mostar municipality, not far from the urban core (Source: author, September 2008)

The pre-war Serb residents of Mostar have returned mainly to the rural areas of the municipality. Approximately 7000 Serbs have returned to the city, most of them to Ortiješ, a Croat-controlled area to the south of the municipality.

According to Vujadin Berberović, a Serb returnee and representative of the Serb community:

*“More people got back into the villages than the town centre. It is more difficult to survive in the city as there are no jobs. It is much easier to find economic activity in the rural area.”* (Berberović, interview)

This is also reinforced by a UNHCR official, Maja Hadzizuković, as well as others, in their interviews. Some fresh attempts are being made, however, to promote Serb returns within the urban core. Republika Srpska is one of the donors, along with the Federation, the Canton and the city, supporting the rebuilding of apartment blocks in and around Santica street and the Bulevar, most of which housed a mix of Serbs, Croats and Bosniacs before the war (Bošković, interview). Authorities hope that the reconstruction of these apartments will encourage the Serbs to return to Mostar – however, whether they actually return or simply repossess and sell their properties, remains to be seen.



Figure 20: Election poster of the main Serb party (SNSD), just prior to the local elections in October 2008. *‘Moja Kuća’* means ‘My Home’. It shows a shift in the Republika Srpska (RS) position whereby Serbs are being encouraged by RS authorities to return to places like Mostar. (Source: author, September 2008)



Bosniacs, on the other hand, have been unwilling to move (return or move afresh) to Mostar, in large measure due to the lack of economic opportunities, but mainly because of the fear of Croat dominance. The demographic changes brought about by resettlement of Croat IDPs and non-return of Bosniacs, the neglect of the Mostar Bosniacs by Sarajevo, and the very real possibility of *"...becoming second-class citizens in a fully-centralised city dominated by their Croat neighbours"* (ICG 2009: 8), were all significant reasons behind the Bosniac parties' active opposition to the reunification statute in 2004.

The Croats, of course, no longer have any incentives to move back to Mostar, especially to the eastern side (Ćatić, Demirovic, Đuliman, interviews). According to Elvir Đuliman, the head of a local NGO:

*"There is no legal obstacle any more for people to go back anywhere, but they are still not ready to do so. Security, employment and the economic situation are the main deterrents. Those who moved abroad don't see a future here, so they don't want to come back."* (Đuliman, interview)

### ***6.3.3 The political struggle to control planning***

The recently-concluded four-year long tussle between the major political actors in Mostar to control the planning function within the unified municipal administration illustrates how much importance is accorded to this issue by the local politicians. Most of this information is derived from internal documents of OHR and UN-HABITAT, as well as field interviews.

Section 5.3 in the previous chapter has already highlighted the problems faced in the administrative reunification of the municipality after the imposition of the Mostar reunification statute by the OHR. The control of the Spatial Planning/Development Institute and definition of its competencies was among the major sticking points in implementing the reunification process. In the Yugoslav era, the Spatial Planning Institute was charged with producing the broad development strategy for the city, as well as spatial, urban plans, and regulation

plans, when asked to do so by the municipal department of urbanism. The reunified administration as proposed by the Winterstein Commission foresaw only an Urban Planning Department, without the previously existing urban planning institutions (*Urbing* and *Urbanisticki Zavod* in the west and east, respectively). However, during the power sharing talks in 2004 between the main political parties (SDA and HDZ), it was agreed that the head of the Urban Planning Department would be a Croat. This prompted the Bosniacs to propose the formation of a new urban planning institution, with a Bosniac director, and instil within it, the authority to approve development plans.

As it was foreseen to control the development and allocation of land, the control of the Spatial Development Institute in divided Mostar became an increasingly contentious issue. The two sides agreed that the Director of the Department of Urbanism with the municipality would be a Croat, who had already been appointed, and the Director of the Spatial Planning Institute would be a Bosniac. The SDA proposed the former mayor of Mostar North municipality as their candidate. In the Council session scheduled for adopting the decision on the Spatial Planning Institute, the SDA proposed an amendment that would give the Institute Director complete authority to approve or reject development applications in those areas of the City that are not covered by a regulatory plan (estimated at 50% of the total municipal area). This move would have given the SDA disproportionate control over the future of development in the city and was thus strongly opposed by the Croat bloc in the Council, resulting in a political impasse that lasted until December 2006 (OHR-South 2006; Curran 2007). The establishment of the Institute was finally imposed in the form of a Decision of the OHR, along the lines of the original pre-blockade proposal, allocating technical responsibilities of planning to the Institute, but also ensuring that the regulatory function stayed with the Department of Urbanism of the city administration (OHR 2006).

## 6.4 Why urban planning failed under the EUAM?

The preceding discussion gives us some insights into the approach to reconstruction and urban planning adopted by the EUAM. The key reasons for the failure of the Administration to produce a plan or institute a new (or modified) planning system are summarised below.

- Little consideration for the old planning system, existing plans, and planners: The EUAM initiated the process to prepare an 'All Mostar Structure Plan' in early 1995. However, there was an existing spatial plan and urban for Mostar, which had been prepared not long before the conflict began (at the end of the 1980s). These plans, although conventional, provided a useful background and basis from which the preparation of a new plan could have been initiated. Undoubtedly, the situation had changed dramatically due to the war, and new emergency priorities had to be addressed. Yet, an understanding of the old plans and planning systems could have cut a lot of the lead-up time for the planning team.

*"Some of the internationals also came with the idea of starting from 'zero point', [as if] nothing had been here before. This approach produced distance between the international team and the local team."*(CengiĆ, interview)

- A new type of planning: The Structure Plan, a very British innovation proposed by John Yarwood, was a new animal for the planners of Mostar, who were experienced and well-versed in the Yugoslav system of spatial plans, urban development plans (master plans), and regulation (local) plans. Admittedly, it may have been a more effective approach towards planning in the post-war environment. However, the preparation of a new type of plan, when the legal framework were unclear, seemed like a waste of time to many professionals. It appears from a number of interviews that despite the efforts put in to develop the Structure Plan,

the planners didn't quite understand the concept. The Italian chief of the urban planning section also seemed convinced that it was a detailed exercise which involved collecting vast amounts of data and information, rather than a broad development 'guide' which the Structure Plan is meant to be (Yarwood, interview). Indeed, the partially completed structure plan, of which I have a copy, appears remarkably like a masterplan - comprehensive and long-winded<sup>84</sup>. Clearly, most of the local planners just did what they knew best, but also felt unable to use the pre-war planning documents because they felt they had to follow the 'new' approach. Others simply *"...played along in order to please the internationals."* (Puljić, interview)

- Lack of an institutional approach: The EUAM tried to do everything themselves, with the involvement of their limited local staff, or by hiring European consulting firms. The local architects or planners hired by the EUAM in different departments worked under European directors who were significantly less informed, and sometimes less qualified, than themselves. As with other institutions, they also failed to acknowledge the existence and capacity of the pre-war planning institute (split into two by the time they arrived), and build on the existing institutional structures. This approach led to weakening of any existing planning capacities, and indeed, a 'de-skilling' of local planning professionals in Mostar. The knowledge and experience of local professionals was put to little use by the EUAM, or for that matter, by the OHR (Božić, Pintul, interview).

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<sup>84</sup> This is also the case with a strategic plan for Sarajevo, prepared in 1994 by a specialist (international) office established at the time. In the words of Skotte, *"...they came to Sarajevo, they not only brought money and know-how, but also strategic planning as a mode of planning. The strategic planning approach (prioritising, action-oriented etc) was applied mainly to infrastructure. But when the strategic plan for Sarajevo was made, it was hopeless. It was not strategic at all, there was no strategy or priorities or choices in it. It was a mode of planning imposed by internationals without being grounded in the way people think or do things here."* (Skotte, interview)

*"They [EUAM] didn't choose the right way of planning, they didn't build up the local institutions. Then it could have also been separated from politics. They just didn't want to do it the right way. If they had put effort and money into rebuilding the Institute and used pre-war planning capacity, and maybe just brought in some experts, it would have been a better way to do things."* (Pintul, interview)

- Misplaced priorities of the urban planning section: The urban planning section within the EUAM's Reconstruction Department also focused its early attentions mainly on developing building databases, mapping and collecting detailed background information, and less on strategic thinking and building a collective vision for the city. The existing spatial and urban plans could have been used to initiate some strategic thinking for future development of Mostar, and the regulation plans could have been useful in order to check illegal construction and appropriation of land, as well as launch some quick impact projects. The large number of consultants being deployed by the Department could have taken care of the detailed inventory and building database. In the end, however, there was no integrated effort to address concerns of economic rehabilitation, employment, housing and planning.
- Laissez-faire rebuilding: In order to ensure planned reconstruction and development in the city, a strict moratorium on random reconstruction, change of land use or ownership should have been imposed across the city. It was assumed that this would be done by the City of Mostar which came into existence after the adoption of the Interim Statute in early 1996. By then, however, it was too late, as the City-Municipalities proceeded apace to approve opportunistic land use changes and building works. According to Zarko Markić, the Director of Urbanism:

*"Each city-municipality made regulation plans and changes to existing plans. They made hundreds of regulation plans over the years. Most of these were light deviations. But today, eighteen years after the war, the*

*question of whether this was supposed to happen is not really useful. It is reality now, it exists on the ground.” (Markić, interview)*

- Prevailing political environment: It is generally felt that the EU Administration was short-sighted, focused too much on visible results, didn't engage adequately with local professionals, failed to establish the rule of law, especially vis-à-vis reconstruction, and was unable to rebuild local institutions. At the same time, a number of respondents also felt that the Administration had an impossible task (Cengiđ, Božić, interviews), given the political situation, the level of mistrust and the complete lack of goodwill between the key protagonists, at the time.

*“Because the old spatial plan lasted until 1998, these guys [the politicians] didn't have any interest to touch it. It was a political problem. Because if you're a Bosniac mayor and you do something which is unacceptable [to the Croats], a bomb will be thrown under your car. So they silently left it to the municipalities.” (Božić, interview)*

*“You need consensus for planning, but it is impossible [at the time]. So I don't blame them (EUAM). You are given a country which is in a war, there are two of three major parties, it's a bloody conflict – and you're asked to work in it... Of course, planning can support division, and reunification as well. But when there is no consensus on having “not divided” society, then what [can planning do]?” (Cengiđ, interview)*

## 6.5 Conclusion

In the post-EUAM years, reaching agreement on a single urban planning institution and a common urban plan for the entire city was seen at different stages by various international organisations and individuals as an important confidence building measure amongst the communities and a mechanism for strengthening local governance (OHR-South 2004). In 1997, the Secretary General of the Aga Khan Award for Architecture, Geneva, Dr. Suha Özkan asserted that *“The preparation for the Master Plan for Greater Mostar is a must.”* (quoted in Mostar 2004 Workshop: Report 1997 1997: 66) Updating pre-war

maps and plans, discouraging an excessive reliance on tourism in the long-run, and the diversification of the economic base of the city, were all issues highlighted in the same workshop in 1997. In 2005, upon the request of the municipality, UN-HABITAT placed an urban planning adviser within the city administration, for a period of two years, and attempted (albeit unsuccessfully) to raise resources from donors for the preparation of a new urban plan for Mostar (Curran 2007). Around the same time, the World Bank approved a project on urban infrastructure for Mostar, which included a loan of KM 1 million for the preparation of an 'urban management development plan' (World Bank 2006b). Yet, fifteen years after the war, little progress has been made in achieving these objectives.

In contrast to the EUAM, OHR and other international agencies, the evidence of other (predominantly local) actors' active interest in urban planning and reconstruction is strewn across the city. On a positive note, the Stari Most has been rebuilt, the Stari Grad revitalised, a plan for the old city formally adopted and currently under implementation. On the other hand, the changes made by the erstwhile city-municipalities to regulation plans and the structures loaded with ethnic symbolism constructed subsequently are also visible for all to see. The strong politician-businessman nexus has led to a large number of illegal land use changes, land grabs and unauthorised constructions<sup>85</sup>, converting public space to private, public enterprises to ethnically-controlled private ones. The ethnic-based tussle for the control of the planning authority continues.

This begs the question whether the EUAM's positive contributions were in fact marginal to the reconstruction of Mostar in the long-term, given that their work seems to have been undertaken not so much within an imbalanced planning context as with total disregard to the planning context and long term goals. More

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<sup>85</sup> At the time of writing (April 2009), the Director of Urbanism of Grad Mostar had been charged with illegally approving land use changes and allowing at least three private supermarkets to be established on public land. An investigation is now being launched.

than its investment in reconstruction, it is the absence of any vision, strategy or regulation on the part of EUAM, which seems to have contributed in a significant manner to the way Mostar is today.



## **CHAPTER 7**

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# **EUAM's legacy: Reconstruction without recovery or reunification**

## 7.0 Introduction

*"The example of Mostar shows that having a lot of money to throw around doesn't buy you everything. Because certainly the EU Administration spent huge, disproportionate sums of money in Mostar, to very little effect."* (Wheeler, interview)

The last two chapters discussed the pre-and post-war situation in Mostar, how the reconstruction of the city was initiated and implemented, and the degree to which urban planning was utilised by the EUAM (and other actors) in this process. Based on this discussion, along with the review of literature and theoretical framing in Section I, the success or failure of early post-war reconstruction efforts in Mostar can be seen as a product of three aspects. The first of these can be described as *endogenous*, as they relate to EUAM itself, its strengths and weaknesses. An assessment of these *vis-à-vis* what are seen in literature as key factors for the success of any Transitional Administration, can lead us to important lessons and perhaps some additional considerations to keep in mind while installing future TAs. This is undertaken in the first section of this chapter.

There were also a number of other, *exogenous*, aspects which influenced the reconstruction process, as well as the possibility of reunification of Mostar. The in-conflict and post-conflict political, social and economic environment across Bosnia and Herzegovina (and within Mostar), high levels of mistrust and insecurity, vested interests of various political players, and how they played out in Mostar, forms the second aspect. This is discussed in the second part of this chapter.

The third aspect relates to *urban planning*. It has been seen in literature that urban planning has both *potentials and limitations* in the post-war reconstruction process. While on the one hand it can help provide a long-term perspective and kickstart economic recovery (for example, seen in post- Second World War Europe), as well support inclusive development (seen in some

developing countries where the urban planning system is being reformed), it can also be used to demonstrate power, to dominate and to divide (e.g. in Jerusalem and the West Bank; Fao in Iraq; Beirut in Lebanon, etc). How this played out in Bosnia and in Mostar, forms the third aspect of this analysis. The fourth and final section attempts to bring it all together, and point us towards some conclusions.




Figure 21: The three strands of analysis

## 7.1 Strengths and Weaknesses of the EUAM, and some lessons for Transitional Administrations

### 7.1.1 Key determining factors for any Transitional Administration's success

As discussed in Chapter Three, there is a growing body of literature focusing on Transitional Administrations, the conditions in which they are established, their widely variable mandates, structures, capacities and resources. The key success factors for any Transitional Administration were summarised in the same chapter as: (a) *a clear and time-bound mandate* with a specific end-state to aim for; (b) an appropriate level of military, financial and human *resources*; (c) appropriate

*decentralisation* of decision-making and implementation powers between the international masters, the TA and the local actors; and, (d) the willingness and ability of the TA to *work with a wide range of domestic interlocutors* (Chesterman 2001; Schoups 2001; Chopra 2002; Baskin 2003; Rathmell 2005).

An attempt can be made to assess the EUAM vis-à-vis these broadly accepted determinants of success. First of all, the Administration had an extremely broad and ambitious *mandate*, and the expected goal – creating the conditions for a unified city – was as vague as it was unrealistic, given the EUAM's time frame. The EUAM identified 'reconstruction of the city and reunification of its police force' as the twin-pronged strategy to achieve this clearly impossible goal.

Second, in terms of *resources*, while the EUAM was provided with a sizeable budget, it was not backed up by "*military muscle*" (Williams, interview), and nor by political support at the highest level in the European Council. Furthermore, its staff members were drawn from different European countries and had little experience in administering fragile, highly contested territories just emerging from devastating ethnic conflict.

*"The main problem is that these internationals, they think they know everything. Even if he [Hans Koschnik] is a (former) Mayor of not a town but a village of 10,000 people in Germany, he [thinks he] knows everything from the first day and doesn't need any advice."* (Pašić, interview)

Third, the EUAM received little *guidance* from its European masters, and equally, had little control over, or accountability to, the local actors responsible for day-to-day governance of the city. It was thus not hard for them to imagine they were working in a vacuum, and invent strategies as they went along.

Finally, the willingness and ability of EUAM to work with local actors, including politicians, professionals, elected representatives, civil society organisations and citizens at large, was severely compromised by the lack of *enforcement* powers,

its limited temporal mandate (two years), and its poor understanding of the pre-war Yugoslav context, institutions and governance arrangements.

*"The EU Administration was not an administration, it was a money dispensing machine. They had no power, no muscle, no political or military backing basically. So both sides just ignored them [...] they made all the right noises but waited out EUAM's phase." (Williams, interview)*

A more detailed assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of EUAM follows below.

### *7.1.2 Strengths of the EUAM*

The signing of the Washington Agreement in 1994 and the placing of Mostar under an external administration provided an extremely important opportunity for the reconstruction and recovery of this war-divided city. A key strength of the EUAM was its early start – it was established in 1994 when the war had not yet ended, and had a head start over reconstruction efforts undertaken in other parts of the country.

An even more important aspect was the Administration's sizeable reconstruction budget, mentioned frequently in this research. Bosnia received some of the largest per capita aid in recent reconstruction history. According to Barakat and Zyck, the annual per capita non-military assistance provided to Bosnia within the first two years after the conflict was US\$679, over five times more than that provided to Germany under the Marshall Plan, and ten times greater than that provided to Afghanistan (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1070). The European Commission's eagerness to test its newly formulated Common Foreign and Security Policy, as discussed already in Chapter 5, also came with a significant commitment of resources, both human and financial, to the Mostar 'project'. In the end, the EUAM spent the equivalent of about 144 million ECU during its term. Other donors, including multilateral and bilateral agencies, as well as

international NGOs - especially those providing humanitarian assistance - quickly followed<sup>86</sup>.

Unfortunately, this large sum of money 'dispensed' by EUAM was not adequately leveraged to establish any basis for the long-term development of the city, or to undo its ethnic partition. Projects were implemented quickly and efficiently, but were often based on compromises made with different nationalist groups. The need for building a thorough understanding of the context and taking a long-term view was severely undermined by the urgency to spend the allocated resources.

*"The EUAM spent a lot of money in Mostar, I believe the equivalent of 150 million Euro, but with very little leverage. It was a very difficult period, but still, the EUAM's resources could have been used more effectively and successfully. The impact should have been much greater... I think this is a problem with short-term administrations - they want results quickly, but working with all the groups needs time. And you cannot split them further just to get results in the short-term, you cannot make distinctions from the beginning - a neutral approach to the problem is critical. Finally, I also think that they had their own preconceived ideas and were not responsive to the locals."* (Francić, interview)

### **7.1.3 Weaknesses of the EUAM**

The EU Administration was clearly constrained by the provisions of the Geneva MoU, as well as the approach of the European Council and each country which contributed staff to the mission. For Europe, Mostar was a first experiment in international administration, a 'learning by doing' experience for which there were no standard operating procedures.

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<sup>86</sup> It appears, however, that there is no consolidated information on how much international aid Mostar has received till date. Most donors operate independently and deal directly with their key interlocutors - the municipality, local and international NGOs, community groups, UN agencies etc. Even the aid received by the municipal administration cannot be verified, as the two municipalities (existing until early 1997), and later, the six city-municipalities (merged only in 2004), have either never maintained or simply not shared their records on donor support (Kamerić, interview).

To begin with, clearly, the main international players – Europe and the United States – were hasty in declaring Mostar to be the lodestone for the Federation, central to its success, integral to the co-existence of Croats and Bosniacs. The international community failed to anticipate the levels of animosity and significantly overestimated the ability and interest of victims, perpetrators, and all those affected by the conflict, to come together again.

Furthermore, the decision to fix the term of the EUAM in advance, to a very short period of two years, was a critical factor which worked against the reunification of the city. Those who opposed reunification either simply refused to cooperate, or made the right noises in public but failed to keep their promises. The Administration had no real political leverage, and even its economic leverage (the huge amounts of reconstruction aid being poured into Mostar) was only limited to one side (the Bosniacs), as the Croatian side really did not need that much assistance and therefore could not be coerced to cooperate on reunification of the city. The inability of the EUAM – and indeed the wider international community – to exert any control on the Croatian government was a major factor inhibiting the systematic reconstruction and reunification of the city.

The Administration also had very little guidance from the Council, and its diverse team drawn from all contributing countries often pulled the EUAM in different directions. The directors of the different departments were not appointed on the basis of their capability or experience, and often reverted to their own capitals when decisions needed to be made (Special Report concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) 1996; Reichel 2000). Furthermore, the over-arching emphasis on the Administration's 'European-ness' meant that the opportunity to employ experienced professionals from other parts of the world, and indeed from within Bosnia itself, was lost.

There were also a number of internal weaknesses of the Administration. No clear strategy was defined early enough to determine how the objectives of the mission would be achieved. There were no standard operating procedures. A report by the Court of Auditors points out that different departments within the EUAM often followed different procedures, ended up paying differential rates to the same contractors, and often simply did not know what their colleagues were doing. There was a *"...lack of appropriate financial and management accounting tools, capable of recording properly the EUAM's financial operations and generating accounts along with meaningful management information"* (Special Report concerning the accounts of the Administrator and the European Union Administration, Mostar (EUAM) 1996: 10). An 'emergency' approach and a rush to spend the allocated funds dominated EUAM's work throughout its mandate. The emphasis on demolition, repair, winterisation and reconstruction of individual structures was not carried out with a long-term strategic view. The reliance on foreign consulting firms for most of these activities, as discussed in the previous chapter, meant that an opportunity was missed to utilise and enhance local capacities, and thus lay the foundations for rebuilding the economy. In sum, EUAM often compromised on its long-term goal of reunification of the city in order to achieve the short-term objectives of rebuilding as much as they could, and through that, spending their allocated budget, within a two-year window. This was not done unknowingly, however, as strategy document of May 1995 makes clear:

*"...under the constraint to spend the allocated funds in Mostar during our remaining presence, we cannot wait until the shape of a future – unified – administration of Mostar is sufficiently defined. We need some guidelines for our actions now and independent of the future constitution of Mostar municipality."* (EUAM 1995: 7, emphasis added)

Finally, very little coordination was seen between the EUAM and other actors who were beginning to establish their activities in Mostar after the Dayton



agreement – for instance, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC), the World Bank, as well as UNESCO, ICOMOS and other international organisations interested in the reconstruction of the Stari Most and Stari Grad. There was an overlap of at least a year between the closure of EUAM and the arrival of the other organisations (an EUAM document dated July 1995 mentions the allocation of DM 1.6 million to a housing repair project of the DRC). Yet, there seems to have been no handover strategy, or discussion on the way forward between the Administration and the incoming actors.

Another factor which hampered the EUAM's effectiveness was the extremely limited understanding of pre-war institutional structures, rules, regulations and procedures, especially vis-à-vis construction, land use allocation, cadastre, and spatial planning. Indeed, the Yugoslav-era systems were cumbersome and inefficient, but understanding them was crucial in order to make the best of the existing professional capacity in these areas. The EUAM, and the international community as a whole, rejected the Yugoslav systems outright, and made little effort to engage with the large number of qualified local professionals or with citizens, which in Mostar created a resentment against the foreign experts and their foreign ideas that lasts till this day. Today, the planning system is virtually a replica of the system which existed in the former Yugoslavia, with a complex system and multiple layers of plans, long and cumbersome procedures, a multitude of institutions, and yet no strategic thinking or true participation. An opportunity to reform the system by taking local professionals into confidence was clearly missed in the early days after the conflict.

Finally, the poor enforcement capacity of the EUAM led to the non-implementation of the 'integrative provisions' of the Interim Statute, namely, the City of Mostar's control on urban planning, infrastructure and finance. These in turn led to a failure to prevent illegal appropriation of land, land use changes and budget allocation at will by the city-municipalities, and private capture of state property, all of which contributed to the deepening of the city's partition.

The above discussion illustrates that the EUAM had several weaknesses, some of which were quite critical in determining its short-term outputs and long-term impact. At the same time, the blame for the failure to reunify Mostar cannot be laid solely at the door of the EUAM. The international community's approach and strategies were responsible to a significant degree for perpetuating the divisions in the city, and many of these lay outside the EUAM's control.

#### *7.1.4 Additional success factors for TAs engaged in reconstruction, recovery and reunification efforts*

The EUAM was a unique experiment in the fact that it was an attempt by a regional organisation (the European Union) to assume the administration of a small territory within a sovereign state (the city of Mostar), but without executive authority (which was retained by the local governments of east and west Mostar), and with weak enforcement powers (further undermined by the inability of the European leaders to back up the EU Administrator and his decisions). The latter two aspects in fact reduced the Administration effectively to a reconstruction agency rather than the umbrella governance institution for the city. The EUAM's major contribution to the city of Mostar is seen as the restoration of essential services and rehabilitation of infrastructure and some housing. The long-term impact of the Administration is measured by many in terms of what it failed to achieve (economic recovery of the city, equalisation of living conditions in the two parts of the city, control of illegal construction, etc.), rather than the immediately-visible outcomes of its work, such as the reconstructed roads and bridges, schools and hospitals.

The experience of EUAM can, however, add some additional success factors to those listed in section 1.1 of this chapter. These are listed below.

- *A thorough understanding of the context*, existing legal and policy framework, local institutions, capacities and path-dependencies. Undoubtedly, such comprehension does not come easily in the short-term, but it is critical in order to devise solutions to the particular

situation, which might have a greater chance of local buy-in and success, as opposed to the standard formula of establishing a liberal peace.

- *A clear definition of what the TA is meant, and not meant, to be.* TAs at the local level should not mistake their prime responsibility as that of providing humanitarian relief or reconstruction assistance. If the TA's mandate is to lay the ground for sustainable and inclusive long-term development, reconciliation and reunification, then its strategies must be tailored accordingly.
- *An operational capacity and time-frame commensurate with goals.* Leaving too early can be as dangerous as staying on too long. An optimum time-period and clear resource allocation is essential for any TA. Staffing arrangements within the TA must include a diverse group of professionals with knowledge and understanding of the context and the complex task at hand.
- *A clear long-term perspective,* including an exit or handover strategy that considers international as well as local actors and their capacities. Donor coordination and partnership-building must be included within the mandate of the TA, and be accepted by key international and local interlocutors. On its part, the TA should plan for its eventual closure by developing a medium- to long-term vision and strategy in consultation with key partners, as well as a clear handover strategy which delineates the responsibilities of other actors at the end of its mandate.

## 7.2 Bosnia/Mostar: Opportunities and Threats

### 7.2.1 Opportunities in early post-war years

Although the city and country had been severely battered during the war, there were also some positive local conditions which had the potential to take EUAM's reconstruction and reunification agenda forward. Many of the citizens of Mostar who had been brought up during the Tito era were committed to the Yugoslav

ideals, and the Yugoslav period was in fact the only time in its history that Mostar achieved a state that can be considered close to assimilation<sup>87</sup>. Some of these people chose to stay back or return to Mostar after the war, and champions could have been found among these groups to support the one-Mostar idea.

In addition, there were also a large number of qualified urban development professionals in the city – architects, planners, conservationists etc – who could have provided knowledge, support and momentum to the reconstruction and reunification process. Further, the city had a pre-existing development strategy and spatial and urban plans – however flawed, these could have been used to initiate the discussion on reconstruction, and build ownership of the process among local professionals.

The growing interest of other international organisations in securing global recognition for a rebuilt Mostar as a symbol of multi-ethnic co-existence, and the increasing number of volunteers – architects, researchers, artists and others – interested in Mostar, was also an important opportunity that could have been used to build the momentum and a campaign for a united Mostar. As discussed in the previous chapter, the “Mostar 2004” campaign, launched in 1993, held workshops every year in different locations with architecture students, researchers, academics and other interested actors, on the reconstruction of Mostar (Kron 2000). This campaign, however, remained separate from the work the international community was doing on the ground. A small but growing number of local professionals willing to collaborate across ethnic lines could have also been brought together to define a joint vision and strategy for the future of the city, but this was initiated only half-heartedly, and thus met with limited success.

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<sup>87</sup> See analysis presented in Chapter 5

### 7.2.2 Threats to reconstruction and reunification

As discussed in earlier chapters on Bosnia and Mostar, historically as well as in the immediate pre-war years, there were faultlines within Mostarian society and physical segmentation within the city, which came to the surface during the war. The pre-Yugoslav pluralism had been 'papered over' during the Yugoslav era by slogans of 'brotherhood and unity'. Questions of national identity were suppressed and swept under the carpet by Tito's personality and policies. After his death, nationalist inclinations began to resurface. The war brought them to a head.

*"National and social segregation could be seen, both in the life and in the picture of the town [of Mostar]. However, in SFRY, 'socialist and multi-national state of equal nations and nationalities', it was forbidden to talk about it."* (Urban and Structural Plan of Mostar: Survey of Data and Analytical Studies (Final Report) 1996: 5)

The conflict in Mostar was one of the most extreme and bloody episodes in the three-year war in Bosnia, and ripped the city apart. The influence of Croatian leaders on the Herzegovinian leaders, the determination to set up the ethnically homogeneous entity of Herceg-Bosna with Mostar as its capital, and the lack of any goodwill whatsoever on the part of the Croats, were all underestimated by those who sought to reunify Mostar<sup>88</sup>. The transformation of the community, with the departure of urban Mostarians and the influx of large number of displaced persons from ethnically homogeneous rural areas, were also important factors which hampered the reconstruction of Mostar, and stalled the progress towards its reunification.

Repercussions of the more general failures of the international community in Bosnia, including the political and territorial separation imposed by the Dayton Peace Agreement, the misguided emphasis on early elections, the failed privatisation process (at least in the first round), and the initial emphasis on

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<sup>88</sup> These aspects have been discussed in detail in Chapters 4 and 5.

majority returns (and neglect of minority returns, especially before 1997), all of which led to territorial consolidation ethnic groups and divisions instead of a return to multi-ethnicity, were also felt in Mostar (Donais 2002; Pugh 2002; Bose 2005; Heimerl 2005; Pugh 2005). The main issues relating to the Dayton Peace Agreement have already been explored in previous chapters. The second was the emphasis on elections. In Mostar, as well as across Bosnia, the first post-war elections merely served to strengthen the positions of hardline nationalists who were overwhelmingly voted into power (Klemencic and Schofield 1996; Bose 2002; Bose 2003). This has also been discussed at length in the previous chapter.

It is important here to explain the remaining two aspects in a little more detail. The failure of privatisation, already discussed in Chapter 4 on Bosnia, can be attributed to the (perhaps naïve) assumption that standardised privatisation programmes applicable to transition countries could be applied to Bosnia as well, and that privatisation (in this manner) would lead to a “...[de-politicisation of] economic life and [...] provide the basis for economic recovery and growth” (Donais 2002: 2), eventually leading to a peaceful co-existence and a return to the pre-war mixed society. It failed, however, on all these counts, turning into “...a corrupt, ethnicized, and protracted struggle for power, which has done little to stimulate economic growth or promote inter-ethnic reconciliation” (Donais 2002: 2). This was also visible in Mostar, where the privatisation of the single revived production unit – the aluminium factory – through what has been described as “...an example of crony capitalism” (Pugh 2005: 451), has actually deepened the ethnic divide over the years.

*“We don't have any factories in this [eastern] part of town, and there, on the other side, there are no jobs for our people. So how can we be 'together'?” (Omanović2, interview)*

Last, but not the least, the returns policy of the international community also affected the situation in Mostar. Heimerl (2005) highlights that the fact that until 1996, the international community concentrated on the safer and more do-able

task of majority returns, that is, the return of refugees and displaced persons to areas which were controlled by their own ethnic group. In 1996, more than 250,000 returns were recorded across the country. Initial decisions relating to housing reconstruction, new housing construction and allocation of housing were left largely to local authorities, who *"...continued demographic engineering, focusing on creating incentives for their own IDPs to settle permanently where it benefited their respective ethnic agendas. Entity, canton and, most often, municipal authorities achieved this through the distribution of building plots, construction materials, business premises and commercial real estate to displaced persons"* (Heimerl 2005: 379). The result, clearly not anticipated by the international community, was significant ethnic consolidation in the early post-war years. This, coupled with the unexpected election results in 1997 and the increasing political power of nationalists, as discussed above, led to a revised returns agenda from 1997 onwards, focusing this time on minority returns. This, too, was unsustainable in the long run, as it failed to *"...take into account the changed social, political and economic circumstances in Bosnia"* (Chandler 2005: 317)<sup>89</sup>.

Mostar had approximately 40,000 displaced persons in 1994 (Yarwood 1999: 4). In 2000, this number had fallen to about 20,000, whereas in 2007, there were only 1274 persons in Mostar recognised as IDPs (Vetters 2007: 206). However, these figures are misleading as they do not reveal the extent of population turnover and transformation during and since the conflict. As discussed in the previous chapter, considerable resettlement of Croat refugees and displaced

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<sup>89</sup> A recent report of the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) observes that many IDPs still face a range of obstacles to return including issues relating to livelihoods and economic opportunities, a feeling of insecurity in areas where they would be in a minority if they returned, access to education, etc., as well as a "limited desire to return." In view of these issues, it concludes that *"...the overwhelming focus on reconstruction is increasingly recognised as an incomplete approach to return, which requires a broader range of sustainability measures, as well as to securing solutions for those who cannot or do not want to return. More than 12 years after the war, it has become evident that the ethnic repartition resulting from the war cannot be completely undone."* (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008: 16)

persons was undertaken with covert support of the Croatian government (although exact numbers are unavailable). That, coupled with the unwillingness of Bosniacs and Serbs to return to Mostar in large numbers, has permanently altered the demographic structure, and consequently, the power equations, in the city.

### ***7.2.3 Lessons for other reconstruction efforts***

An assessment of the context within which EUAM was operating brings out certain key moments or positive developments - windows of opportunity - that could have been used to support the reunification goal, but were unfortunately missed. It also identifies some critical threats – negative developments that occurred around this time – which had a significant impact on the work of EUAM. It might be useful for TAs to be cognizant of some of these elements, so they can be better prepared to manage the risks to their objectives.

- ***Using local resources is not optional.*** Tapping local resources, particularly knowledge, skills and positive attitudes, can be a significant factor contributing to a TA's success. Much has been said and written about involving the local community and beneficiaries, but local professionals in Mostar, particularly architects and planners, were clearly marginalised by the EUAM in the initial reconstruction effort.
- ***Transformation of the city and society is a reality.*** The failure to recognise that the urban community has transformed during the war by the departure of those with high mobility and opportunities, and influx of large numbers of displaced persons, can lead to unrealistic objectives and misplaced priorities. This can significantly undermine the efforts of the TA, as it did in Mostar.
- ***Political elites will necessarily push for their own agendas.*** Establishing the rule of law is as important as establishing security in the aftermath of conflict, especially at the local level where political and financial elites



can closely linked and become all-powerful. In Mostar, the war-time Mayors of both east and west Mostar were also rich investors in their own right. While on the west, Mijo Brajković eventually became the owner of *Aluminij* Mostar, a large number of properties and commercial enterprises on the east side were owned by Safet Oručević. The EUAM for the most part ignored their activities, which led to the capture of important assets by these actors, undermined the rule of law and institutionalised corrupt practices.

- *The big picture is important.* In Mostar, the reunification project of the international community was backed by the Croats only after a change in leadership in Croatia in 2003 (Williams, interview), when the latter sent out a clear message that the 'Herceg-Bosna' project was all but abandoned. The influence of Croatia and its forceful efforts to create the third entity were underestimated by those who sought to reunify Mostar in the early days of the conflict. If better understood, more realistic strategies could have been adopted towards the 'normalisation' of life in Mostar, in the initial days, instead of pushing for 'reunification' which in fact led to the stalling of development.

**Table 5: EU Administration of Mostar: An analysis of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT)**

<i>Endogenous factors (internal to EUAM/IC)</i>	<i>Exogenous factors (external to EUAM/IC)</i>
<p><b>Strengths</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Early start – establishment of the Administration in 1994</li> <li>• High levels of human and financial resources</li> <li>• Presence of international troops</li> </ul>	<p><b>Opportunities</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Bosniac interest in retaining Mostar as a unified city</li> <li>• Pre-war generation showed signs of assimilation, especially within the urban core</li> <li>• Large number of professionals such as architects, planners etc for a small city (high existing capacity)</li> <li>• Willingness of professionals on both sides (who remained or returned) to cooperate, despite political intransigence</li> <li>• Existence of a spatial plan, urban plan and related documentation</li> <li>• Interest of international agencies such as UNESCO, WMF, ICOMOS etc to rebuild the Stari Grad and revive Mostar's world heritage status</li> <li>• Increasing interest of international 'freelancers' (architects, researchers, volunteers) in Mostar</li> </ul>
<p><b>Weaknesses</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Goals and objectives too ambitious, especially for a two-year mandate</li> <li>• Lack of a clear and achievable set of outcomes for EUAM</li> <li>• Focus on details of reconstruction (demolition, winterisation, repair, reconstruction) without broader vision or long-term strategy</li> <li>• Pressure to spend all allocated funds within the two-year time-frame</li> <li>• Limited coordination with other actors (e.g. international NGOs, World Bank, etc)</li> <li>• Limited understanding of pre-war institutional structures for spatial planning, cadastral systems, construction, etc.</li> <li>• Limited participation of local actors (professionals or citizens) in</li> </ul>	<p><b>Threats</b></p> <p><u>A. Social, political and economic environment in BiH and Mostar</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Society divided under the surface (historically), frozen by Yugoslav policies</li> <li>• Spatial development of the city in distinct phases and patterns</li> <li>• Spatial concentration of population according to nationality in rural areas of municipality as well as surrounding region</li> <li>• Hard division of the city into ethnically cleansed areas of east and west Mostar, and Croat insistence on keeping the town divided</li> <li>• Main social and economic assets located on the western side of the Neretva (and thus under Croat control during and after the war)</li> <li>• Exodus of Mostari intellectuals, professionals, prominent citizens – not</li> </ul>

<p>reconstruction efforts</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to implement the unifying provisions of the Interim Statute</li> <li>• Failure to prevent illegal appropriation of land, land use changes, construction, and private capture of state property</li> <li>• No handover strategy</li> </ul>	<p>enough local champions to promote reunification</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Influx of large numbers displaced persons from surrounding areas (predominantly rural settlements or small towns)</li> </ul> <p><u>B. Broader IC strategies and decisions for Bosnia, and their impacts</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Hasty decision to establish Mostar as the lodestone for the Federation</li> <li>• Predetermined and fixed temporal mandate (two years) of EUAM</li> <li>• Limited guidance and unclear chain of command from the Commission to EUAM Division of the EUAM team (staff) along EU country lines (a head of department post for each country).</li> <li>• Pre-Dayton agreement to split the city into six city-municipalities, realised (and cast in stone) through the Interim Statute</li> <li>• Inability of IC to control external (Croatian) influence on West Mostar</li> <li>• Failed privatisation efforts across Bosnia</li> <li>• Undue reliance on early elections (and proportional representation systems) to promote democratisation, throughout Bosnia also in Mostar</li> <li>• Neglect of minority returns in early post-war years, which led to widespread ethnic consolidation</li> </ul>
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## 7.3 Role of urban planning in reconstruction: Potentials and limitations

### *7.3.1 Revisiting the 'pillars' of post-war reconstruction, with reference to urban planning*

As discussed in Chapter 3, a number of authors have in recent years addressed the issue of post-war reconstruction, how it can be made more effective and provide a foundation for sustainable, long-term recovery. Physical reconstruction is seen as an essential complement to economic reconstruction, and the two need to ultimately rebuild the socio-economic fabric of a society divided by conflict (Brown 2005; Junne and Verkoren 2005b; Zetter 2005).

Of Barakat's seven 'pillars' that form the basis for sustainable recovery and reconstruction (2005b), also discussed in Chapter 3, at least three can be potentially achieved at the local (town or city) level, to a significant degree, through the processes of urban planning. These are:

- A *clear and collective vision* for post-war recovery, at least for the medium-term, which is developed through *participatory* processes. The process of plan preparation can help to provide concrete agenda that brings together a range of stakeholders to discuss issues of common concern, such as basic services or the economy, and develop a widely accepted vision for the future. This was seen, for example, in the aftermath of the Second World War in Britain. There was a surge of interest during and immediately after the war, among planners, policy-makers, citizens and the media, in developing the vision of a new and sustainable future and proposing radical changes to correct the pre-war problems of urban environments.<sup>90</sup> A manual for redevelopment of central urban areas was ready as early as October 1941, and planning was

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<sup>90</sup> A more comprehensive discussion on this has been included in Chapter 3.

viewed as an important exercise to correct pre-war urban problems, as well as boost citizens' morale (Larkham 2005).

- *Equity* in the distribution of the benefits of reconstruction and peace, and in terms of the relative importance accorded to the needs of different groups, sectors and geographical areas. Clearly, this requires an assessment of the priorities of different groups; the existing levels, quality and access to services and opportunities; a set of development goals; and clear objective for different sectors. All of these can be put together in a succinct manner in a spatial or urban plan. In the absence of a strategic vision or plan, reconstruction in the aftermath of disasters, both natural and man-made, can be inequitable and/or contentious. This is illustrated, for instance, in the reconstruction of New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 (Hartman and Squires 2006; Kates, Colten et al. 2006)<sup>91</sup>, and the rebuilding of Beirut Central District (BCD) in the 1990s and early 2000s (Stewart 1996; Charlesworth 2003; Hartman and Squires 2006). These are only two of many examples of inequitable development in the aftermath of disasters. The reconstruction of BCD by a privately owned company (Solidere) was aimed at providing an economic boost to the city and country in the aftermath of war, but it failed to anticipate the social implications of the approach being adopted, reinforced the power of political and financial elites, and has over time deepened the social divisions in the city<sup>92</sup>. A collective vision and strategic plan, prepared with broad-based consultation, could perhaps have helped to avoid this situation.
- *Reconstruction and development*, including physical, economic as well as social aspects. Urban planning is seen today as an activity that stretches

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<sup>91</sup> Kates, Colten et al. (2006) note that half of New Orleans residents lived in rental housing before the hurricane, and at the time of writing, most public housing remained unreconstructed. It was decided that four major housing developments would not be rebuilt. Hartman and Squires (2006) also point out that pre-disaster inequities, exacerbated by disaster, can be replicated and even deepened through unthinking reconstruction efforts.

<sup>92</sup> A more comprehensive discussion on Beirut is included in Chapter 3.

beyond simply land use planning or regulation, to encompass a range of activities across sectors which can together build sustainable, viable and inclusive cities and towns. It is also being recognized by many international agencies that urban planning has a role to play in addressing immediate post-disaster needs, but with an eye on the future (UN-HABITAT 2004b).

An additional element that can be addressed through planning is that of *Security*, but only if the conceptualisation of security proposed by Barakat is expanded to include issues of human security, i.e., not just “freedom from fear”, but also “freedom from want” (UNDP 1994: 24). Barakat defines security in a narrow way, as the end of violent conflict, which can be achieved by the ceasefire, by effective policing and in the long-term, by creating conditions for peaceful resolution of conflicts among groups (Barakat 2005b: 254). However, if we consider the other elements proposed by UNDP, including economic, health and environmental security, urban planning can play a role in achieving all of these, through provision of opportunities for sustainable livelihoods and income-generation, rational and just allocation of resources for health and education, and protection of the environment <sup>93</sup>.

Linked to this discussion are two other aspects of sustainable physical reconstruction, proposed by Zetter (2005), which can also be realised more effectively with the inclusion of urban planning:

- *Linking relief and rehabilitation to recovery and development.* The application of approaches such as action planning, or strategic planning, can help to prioritise planning interventions at different stages of the post-war recovery process. Once again, some good practices can be drawn from planning approaches adopted in the aftermath of natural disasters, for example in the state of Gujarat, India, after the earthquake in January 2001 (ADRC 2005).

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<sup>93</sup> The seven elements of human security as defined by UNDP are economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community and political security (UNDP 1994: 24).

- *Rebuilding institutional capacity.* Planning is very often a local government function, and can provide an entry point for restoring institutional capacities, though provision of training for staff, equipment, software etc. In addition, planning legislation can be an important (and a not-so-controversial) tool to reform the development decision-making process to make it more inclusive and transparent, especially at the local level. This was done, for example by UN-HABITAT in Kosovo through a series of projects and programmes focusing on local governance, urban and spatial planning<sup>94</sup>.

### *7.3.2 Potentials and limitations of urban planning in post-war Bosnia and Mostar*

During the field research, a question on the role of urban planning in post-war reconstruction was put to various respondents, including planners, urbanists, civil society members and political actors. An analysis of the responses as well as other information obtained from the field leads to the following key potentials and limitations of urban planning in Mostar in the immediate aftermath of the war.

#### Potentials

- *Coordination of reconstruction efforts.* As discussed in earlier chapters, most international agencies simply cherry-picked reconstruction projects in Mostar, depending on the profile they wanted and the budget they were willing to allocate. These included the old city and the old bridge, public squares, educational institutions, apartments, infrastructure rehabilitation etc. None of this was coordinated or aligned to any strategic plan which identified the short-, medium- and long-term priorities of the city. For example, the Gymnasium, which was seen by many as an even more significant symbol of reunification than the Old Bridge, a “...[living institution which] could demonstrate the potential for positive exchange between former rivals”

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<sup>94</sup> See footnote 39 in Chapter 3 for details.

(Calame and Pašić 2006: 8), only received funding for repair and reconstruction from 2004 onwards (Omanović, interview). A city council official observed that “...*Most donor projects are offered to us – its like, take it or leave it. Sometimes they are based on informal discussions [with donors], but there is no formal strategy or priorities*” (Kamerić, interview). A strategic plan for the city could offer a road map for emergency, medium- and long-term development.

- *Economic revival.* Fifteen years after the war ended in Mostar, the city is yet to have a viable economy with a diverse range of economic activities as had existed before the war. Like in post-war Germany and Britain, regional and urban development planning could have been the tool to drive national and local economic revival. In Mostar, most formal employment is currently provided either (a) by the state, within institutions of federal, cantonal or local governance, or in educational and health institutions; or, (b) by the sole surviving industrial unit *Aluminij*, described as “one of the biggest aluminium smelters in the region” (Bosnia Aluminium Smelter Cuts Output, Pay 2008), which is situated in west Mostar and employs only Croats; (c) through self-employment in tourism-related activities, such as *pansions*, cafés, internet cafés, or other service-sector activities, mainly in east Mostar; (d) shops and small commercial establishments; and (e) agriculture, mainly in the rural settlements within the municipality. However, there continues to be high unemployment, especially among the youth, and the weak economic base of the city is a commonly-expressed concern. Furthermore, if, as the analysis in Chapter 4 suggests, economic development had been a key element in the glue holding the Mostar society together before the war, it could potentially have been used as a tool to bring the communities together again. Unfortunately, planning was neither used as a reference point or tool for reading the pre-war urban context, nor as a trigger for post-war urban recovery.



- *Supporting property restitution and facilitating return:* As discussed earlier, urban planning, building and housing policies were used by nationalist politicians in Mostar, and indeed all over BiH, to consolidate war-time ethnic cleansing and prevent the return of refugees and displaced persons, especially 'minority returns' (Heimerl 2005; Tuathail and O'Loughlin 2009). A planning process, initiated in the early post-war years, could have speeded up the replenishment of destroyed or damaged housing stock, supported initiatives focusing on property restitution, prevented *ad hoc* resettlement of displaced persons based on ethnic considerations, and facilitated return.
- *Preventing land grab, land use changes and illegal construction.* The post-war phase in Mostar initially saw two municipalities, then six city-municipalities and one central administration, before the administration was finally reorganised and unified after 2004. As discussed before, the two municipalities and the six city-municipalities took over the planning function and made changes to existing regulatory plans without any consultation, ostensibly to respond to post-war needs (particularly those of the displaced persons), but apparently also to accommodate the demands of the new political elite. Public green spaces were turned into building land, and a number of controversial buildings were sanctioned, including shopping centres, religious buildings, hotels and apartments. An emphasis on some form of urban planning and regulation in the early years, with an emphasis on transparency and the rule of law, could have halted corrupt and illegal practices before they took root.
- *Environmental sustainability.* Many respondents mention the dysfunctional landfill site, and the pollution of the river Neretva, as key environmental problems facing the city. Both the sewerage and the solid waste management systems are currently being upgraded and reformed with the support of the World Bank. Institutional reform and the merger of divided utilities is once again a contentious issue in this process. The discussion on a management

plan for a combined water utility was initiated under the EUAM, but did not make much headway. As a result, decisions on planning, reconstruction or expansion of other municipal services were postponed. While recycling of construction material was a booming business under the EUAM, it was not pursued subsequently as an environmentally-friendly way of rebuilding the city. All these factors have led to a steady deterioration in the urban environmental conditions in the city over the past fifteen years, a condition that could have been prevented by the adoption of a strategic plan for services, infrastructure, and environmental management, along with context-specific, environmentally-friendly, building construction guidelines and codes.

- *Reform of pre-existing planning systems, institutions and capacities.* As highlighted in the previous chapter, the former Yugoslavia had a strong planning tradition and culture. Admittedly, it was top-down, overly bureaucratic, and driven by economic concerns. Spatial planning was seen as a tool to achieve the goals and strategies set out by economic plans. Undoubtedly, the system needed reform, but the post-war environment provided an opportunity to initiate such reform. There were also a large number of professionals – architects and planners – working in the city of Mostar, either in the municipality, or the spatial development institute, or other public sector bodies such as those dealing with the old city, the economy or housing. They could have provided a useful human resource pool to initiate urban planning, and could have been capacitated in the process to think differently about planning in the context of the transition from war to peace, a centralised to a strongly decentralised system of governance, and from a socialist to a market-driven economic system. This opportunity was missed, and today the planning system in Bosnia is but a replica of the pre-war system, albeit with further reduced accountability and participation (see Table 6).

**Table 6: Planning system in BiH as applied to Mostar**

Type/level of plan	Objective	Responsibility for preparation	Responsibility for implementation	Status (as of September 2008)
Spatial plan for the Federation	To define the spatial (regional) strategy for the entire Federation	Federal Ministry of Spatial Planning	Federal Ministry of Spatial Planning	Not prepared after the war
Spatial plan for the Canton	To define the regional strategy for all municipalities the Canton	Cantonal Ministry of Spatial planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cantonal Ministry</li> <li>• Municipalities</li> </ul>	Not prepared after the war
Spatial plan for the Municipality	To provide the development objectives and strategy for entire municipality, including urban and rural settlements	Institute for Spatial Planning for Mostar	Department of Urbanism, City of Mostar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Last pre-war spatial plan prepared in 1986</li> <li>• New spatial plan process initiated through a decision of the Municipality - 2008</li> </ul>
Urban plan (Master plan)	To provide detailed guidelines for development of the urban area, includes zoning, FARs and other building specifications	Institute for Spatial Planning for Mostar	Department of Urbanism, City of Mostar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Last pre-war urban plan prepared in 1980</li> <li>• Not prepared after the war</li> </ul>
Regulation plans (Local plans)	Detailed land use plans and construction guidelines for neighbourhoods, other zones, protected areas, rural settlements within the municipal area, used for making land use changes and granting building permits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institute for Spatial Planning for Mostar</li> <li>• Other specialised bodies such as the Agency Stari Grad</li> </ul>	Department of Urbanism, City of Mostar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• About 50% of the municipal area is covered by pre-war regulation plans.</li> <li>• No details on how many have been revised or made after the war.</li> </ul>

- *Recording and sharing of urban data.* Many professional planners from Mostar point out that politicians of the city have deliberately chosen to put planning on the backburner, because they prefer to have a discretionary system (or rather, no system at all), whereby they can negotiate and 'make deals' with investors and developers, or make false claims about demographics and socio-economic development (Omanović, Puljić, Raspudić, interview). The process of preparation of a spatial or urban plan could have helped in collecting, recording and making public, accurate information about the demographic profile, housing, land use and socio-economic development across the city, and perhaps building accountability and trust at a different level.
- *Increased communication across the ethnic divide.* As discussed in Chapter Six, the EUAM did initiate urban planning in Mostar by establishing a multi-ethnic team of professionals for this task. Although the initiative was short-lived, it provided an opportunity for the planners to engage with their colleagues from 'the other' side in a professional, even friendly manner. This was also seen in later editions of the Mostar 2004 workshops which were held in Mostar. Similar efforts to organise public debates around urban development issues, and engage a wider group of citizens in developing a shared vision of a new Mostar, could have provided a platform for dialogue, consultation and negotiation on issues of common concern, such as the economy or the environment. The urban planning process, even if it did not produce a perfect plan, could have provided important stepping stones in the path to peace in Mostar.

### Limitations

- *Urban planning as a sufficient condition for reunification and peacebuilding.* Clearly, the views and strategies of the opposing groups on reunification of Mostar were derived from the wider political environment, and the positions

of political parties and leaders at higher (cantonal, federal, national) levels. Local level political elites were focused on consolidating their ethnic base, and unwilling to give up their grip on power. In this process, urban planning, even if introduced, could have only played a small role in the bigger picture of reunification. Having said that, planning could certainly have provided the opportunity to understand the pre- and post-war context better, laid the foundations for a more equitable development on the two sides, and provided a platform for citizens and their representatives to engage in a constructive dialogue over day-to-day needs and priorities.

*"Experience has not shown that planning has a major role to play in [building] peace. We have to be slightly humble about the role of planning. It is necessary, [but] planning in contested environments is not going to be visionary, you can use it to put in basic services and infrastructure where agreements can be reached."* (Skotte, interview)

#### 7.4 Urban planning as "the missing link" in the (incomplete) recovery of Mostar

The preceding analysis illustrates how initial post-war reconstruction efforts in Mostar, led by the EUAM, were influenced by internal strengths and weaknesses of the EUAM and the wider international community, as well as external opportunities and threats posed by the post-war context in Mostar and Bosnia. It also attempts to highlight the areas in which urban planning could have played a useful role in achieving the objectives of reconstruction, recovery and reunification, as well as its limitations. This discussion draws on both the literature (reviewed in Chapters 2-4), and the field research findings (discussed in Chapters 5-6).

As expected, the perceptions of the role of the EUAM vary greatly between different stakeholders - the local residents, local professionals who worked with EUAM, those who did not, local politicians from different sides, and the international professionals, including those who were in some way associated

with the EUAM, and those who were not. The singular contribution of the EUAM is recognised as the repair and reconstruction of some public housing, basic infrastructure including schools and hospitals, roads bridges, and the restoration of electricity, water and sewerage facilities, which undoubtedly led to a degree of normalisation of urban life, and laid the foundations for the future. However, most respondents, local and international, agree that the long-term impact of EUAM's work is certainly not commensurate with the amount of money that was spent by the Administration in a relatively short period of two years.

The rational allocation of domestic as well as international resources, a halt on illegal constructions, the development of a coherent vision or development strategy for Mostar in consultation with a wide range of actors and stakeholders, as well as reform and capacity-building of local institutions, could all have been achieved through the timely application of various instruments of urban planning by the EUAM and its successor, the OHR-South office. The long-term structural consequences of short-term actions undertaken by international actors have resulted in further deterioration of the urban fabric and environment in the post-war decades – labelled as *"Urbicid 2"* by Borislav Puljić (interview). Yet, the installation of a planning system and process is prevented by the increasingly powerful elites, entrenchment of corruption, and a deepening mistrust between the major ethnic groups. Despite the nearly complete reunification of the city administration, all these negative impacts are proving extremely difficult to reverse, and a sustainable future for a unified Mostar, based on a process of long-term policy-making, seems a distant dream. As one respondent puts it, Mostar is not divided city any more. Since the war, it has evolved into what can be more aptly described as *"two cities with no soul"* (Destito, interview).

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## **SECTION III:**

### **CONCLUSIONS**

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## **CHAPTER 8**

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### **In Conclusion**

**Reconstruction of war-torn cities  
by transitional administrations: A  
role for urban planning?**

## **8.0 Introduction**

This thesis comes at a time when there is an increasing interest in the role of transitional administrations in post-war settings, on the one hand, and a revival and renewal of urban planning, on the other. The overarching objective of this research effort therefore extends beyond simply an assessment of the performance, successes or failures, of the EU Administration of Mostar. Rather, it is an exploration of the extent to which urban planning could have been a useful tool for the Administration in achieving its goals of reconstruction and reunification of the city, the form it should have taken, and the stage at which it could have been introduced.

The aim of this research project was to test the hypothesis that urban planning can be an instrument both for understanding the pre-war context, as well as developing post-war reconstruction strategies for the short-, medium- and long-term, and that its neglect by international actors can in fact have significant negative implications for a city recovering from conflict. It aspired to contribute to literature, policy and practice, as well as the reunification of Mostar. This chapter explores whether, and the degree to which, these aspirations have been met, and puts forth some propositions for future efforts in the post-war reconstruction of cities.

### **8.1 Developing the argument**

The subject of this thesis in fact lies at the intersection of a number of disciplines –among others, urban planning, history, ethnic conflict, post-war reconstruction, and international governance and state-building. A review of the relevant literature on all these themes was in itself a challenging task, the integration of these different ‘knowledges’ virtually inconceivable at the outset. After establishing the research objectives, research question and hypothesis, and discussing the methodology, I began the literature review by exploring the mutuality of cities and war in history, the nature of recent conflicts and their



impact of cities, and the cyclical rise, fall and revival of urban planning. This is the theme of Chapter Two, which discusses the significance of cities, ancient and modern, as key strategic targets in wars, and the phenomenon of 'urbicide', which has gained prominence in recent years in literature and in real life. The modern urban planning profession found its niche and significance in the aftermath of the Second World War, when it was seen as a tool to reconstruct cities, revive national economies and deliver equitable development. As urbanisation gained momentum, however, urban planning seemed unable to keep up with the new demands of sustainability, inclusion, poverty reduction, and other approaches such as urban management and urban governance took centre-stage. In recent years, it has once again emerged as an important instrument to address these and other contemporary concerns (such as post-disaster recovery, and climate change), but as this chapter concludes, it is still not a favoured tool in post-war reconstruction, where 'short-termist', *ad-hoc* approaches remain popular.

Chapter Three of this thesis looks more closely at the different approaches adopted towards post-war reconstruction in the period following the Second World War, and the role of planning in each of these. A range of examples is used to illustrate the positive as well as the not-so-positive roles and impacts of urban planning in post-war situations. The still-emerging literature on post-war reconstruction and transitional administrations is also discussed in detail here. It appears that while urban planning played a key role in the reconstruction of Europe, in particular, in aftermath of the Second World War, it has been discarded in the wake of more recent conflicts, mainly because of the emphasis on building a liberal peace, which advocates a reduced role of the state, and of which structural adjustment and market reforms are central instruments. Other factors include unwillingness on the part of the occupying powers and transitional administrations to take a long-term view, as well as a lack of understanding of the importance of planning in building economically self-

reliant, sustainable and peaceful societies. The failure of international actors to recognise the importance of planning and its instruments, when the same instruments are used and abused by local political interests as a mechanism to establish control or advance particular economic or ethnic interests, can best be described as 'malign neglect'.

Chapter Four, the last one in the literature review trilogy, discusses the pre- and post-war urban planning approaches and trends in Bosnia and Herzegovina. After careful thought, I decided not to position the war in Bosnia as the centre of this historical chapter, but as a backdrop to the discussion on urbanisation, planning, urban destruction and reconstruction. It emerges from the analysis that historically, since the Ottoman era, the different ethnic communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina led largely separate lives, even though both Ottomans and Austro-Hungarians were tolerant of all faiths and allowed key symbolic structures to co-exist. Cities, in particular, came to acquire a distinct character which I have described as 'plural yet segmented'. The early years of the Yugoslav era witnessed the suppression of national identities, and consequent rejection and destruction of any symbols of such identities. However, the process of rapid urbanisation which took place as a result of industrial development seemed to destabilise both rural and urban societies. Finally, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the various types and levels of divisions in Yugoslavia (inter-regional, intra-regional, inter-city, intra-city, and of course, inter-ethnic) could not be suppressed any longer. When war broke out, cities were not only attacked from outside, they also imploded from within.

This chapter also asserts that the peace settlements agreed at Washington and Dayton, as well as the post-war reconstruction efforts led by the international community, disregarded the existence of the many historical cleavages in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also failed to acknowledge that pre-war Yugoslavia had been a highly institutionalised polity, that the state was a powerful actor which could not simply be wished away or transformed overnight, and that political

and economic liberalisation in war-ravaged Bosnia could not be achieved through radical or prescriptive formulas. The consociational system established in Bosnia, and the frequent elections at local, cantonal, entity and state levels, consistently strengthened the hands of nationalist parties. Privatisation of state-run enterprises merely served to enrich the powerful nationalist elites on all sides without restoring employment or economic productivity. Most reconstruction activities were implemented through external actors and new institutional arrangements established in parallel to existing local, cantonal or entity-level structures, which undermined and weakened the local institutions further. The lack of a clear vision or plan for reconstruction and recovery meant that billions of dollars were spent without commensurate results. The discussion in this chapter brings us to the conclusion that the lack of understanding of the relationship between industrial development, urbanisation, ethnicity and conflict, governance structures, institutions and processes, including those relating to planning, led to a deeply flawed strategy for post-war reconstruction, recovery and reconciliation.

The discussion on Mostar in Chapters Five, Six and Seven, based on field research, takes the above proposition further. Chapter Five examines the socio-economic and spatial development of Mostar through the Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian and Yugoslav years, its destruction during the war, post-war reconstruction efforts, and its situation today. I use Boal's framework to conclude that the view of Mostar as a fully 'assimilated' community before the war was but a myth, and that the pre-war cosmopolitanism of Mostar was only confined to a small urban core. I also demonstrate that the city and the population of Mostar were radically transformed by the war, and the restoration of *status quo ante* was therefore an unrealistic ambition. In doing this, I also demonstrate that Boal's framework is quite simplistic, whereas in reality, polarisation and plurality often co-exist, at different levels, in different spatial and social realms, within any multi-ethnic city.

Although the reunification of Mostar was an avowed goal of the international community, the reconstruction process and the legal-political approach adopted in the early post-war phase under the EUAM only served to divide the city further. Fifteen years after the signing of the Washington Agreement, two statutes, many OHR decisions and several million dollars later, Mostar continues to be divided and its two halves look more and more like two cities rather than one. The economy, education, social and cultural life remain largely separate. The city administration is yet to be fully integrated, and the political institutions are often paralysed by obstructionist tactics from one side or the other. Looking back to 1994, the objective of the international community to reunify Mostar seems at best rushed, and at worst, completely disconnected with post-war realities.

Chapter Six of the thesis brings the role of the EU Administration of Mostar, its mandate, approach, strategies and achievements, under closer scrutiny. Relying predominantly on data collected in the field, I also discuss the urban planning efforts of the EUAM, those of the six City-Municipalities which Mostar was divided into, as well as the initiatives of other external actors involved in the reconstruction of the city. The EUAM paid little attention to urban planning, urban planners or existing plans and planning institutions in its reconstruction work, citing lack of time and the imperative of spending their allocated budget within a short span of two years. In fact, both the EUAM and the OHR viewed planning as a technical, rather than political, activity, and thus not terribly important or urgent. The City-Municipalities, on the other hand, used the absence of international focus on planning as an opportunity to modify and use planning instruments such as regulatory plans and building permits to advance particular economic and/or ethnic agendas. The control of the recently established Spatial Planning Institute was a particularly contentious issue and is discussed in detail here. I conclude this chapter by summarising the major reasons why EUAM failed in its efforts to introduce urban planning in the

reconstruction process. By neglecting planning, the international community, in particular the EUAM and OHR, allowed facts on the ground to be created, the negative consequences of which are proving to be irreversible.

Chapter Seven brings the theoretical strands and the field research together. Three main threads are discussed here. First of all, I explore the endogenous aspects of EUAM – its strengths and weaknesses – and relate these to the discussion on Transitional Administrations in Chapter Three. This points us towards some important lessons and some considerations to keep in mind while installing future TAs. Next, I discuss the exogenous aspects which influenced the reconstruction efforts undertaken by the EUAM, including, for instance, the political, social and economic environment across Bosnia and Herzegovina (and within Mostar) during and immediately after the conflict. Finally, I review how urban planning was undertaken in Mostar, and how this relates to the potentials and limitations of planning in post-war reconstruction processes in general. In the end, an attempt is made to bring it all together and conclude that the international community's goals of economic recovery, institutional reform, and reunification of Mostar (however unrealistic) could have been better served by the application of urban planning – both as a lens for understanding the pre-war urban context, and as an instrument of public policy, to guide urban social change.

## 8.2 Responding to the research question and hypothesis

The main research question that this study sought to answer, is re-stated below for ease of reference.

*How is urban planning viewed in the process of reconstruction of war-torn cities, and to what extent is it used as an instrument by the international community, particularly transitional administrations, for socio-economic recovery and development, community empowerment, and ethnic reconciliation?*

I attempted to respond to this question both through the literature review, which considered a large number of cases and experiences of post-war reconstruction by different actors, and the field research, which focused on the city of Mostar. Urban planning is not a popular area of research among those who address issues of post-war reconstruction, or transitional administrations. Nor is post-conflict reconstruction a popular theme among urbanists and urban planners. Finding precise information relating to post-war planning efforts, especially in the case of more recent conflicts, was therefore, a challenging task. I relied to a great extent on the considerable body of literature on the reconstruction of Europe after the Second World War, which also covers the themes of urban planning and development. As stated earlier in this thesis, urban planning was an important tool to initiate and support national recovery after the War in Britain, Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, and many other countries. In the aftermath of more recent conflicts, especially where international actors rather than national governments have taken a leading role, planning has been relegated to the margins of reconstruction and post-war recovery efforts.

On the other key element of the question posed above – Transitional Administrations – I discovered that the body of literature addressing different aspects of TAs is expanding every day. Recent publications by Stahn (2008) and Chesterman (2004), in particular, helped me build an updated understanding of the evolution of TAs, their legal basis, mandates, activities and achievements. On the other hand, I also discovered that the role of TAs in physical and economic reconstruction after conflicts is not very well-documented. Furthermore, I found that the EUAM is one of the least-researched transitional administrations, perhaps because there are no local archives of the EUAM held in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the EU archives in Brussels are not yet open to the public. The latter proved inaccessible till the very end of my research - to find information on the EUAM I relied mainly on interviews with those who had worked for the Administration, and their limited personal archives.

In Mostar and Sarajevo, I found many urbanists and professional architect-planners interested in the subject and willing to talk about the challenges of planning in a post-war, transition country environment. The following hypothesis was central to my research, and I presented it in different ways, in whole or in part, to my respondents.

*Urban planning has been neglected by the international community, particularly transitional administrations, as a tool for the analysis of, and as an instrument for the promotion of, urban social change, despite its use and abuse by local political actors as a mechanism to establish control or advance particular ethnic interests. This may have had a negative impact on both the long-term development of the city as well as ethnic reconciliation efforts.*

Answers to the question on the role of urban planning in post-war reconstruction varied considerably, based on the perception and understanding of urban planning among different respondents. International actors initially viewed planning as a long-term, technical activity to determine land use – when perceived in this way, it naturally figured at the bottom of their priority list. It was only very recently (2005 onwards) that they began to acknowledge the political significance of urban planning and take steps to reform the planning system. Local planners, on the other hand, have seen planning being used as a political instrument by politicians and policy-makers in the city and canton. However, while they highlighted the significance of planning, at the same time they attempted to downplay their own role, describing themselves as ‘mere’ technical experts. Most local professionals seemed trapped in the Yugoslav-era vision of urban/spatial planning as an important but mainly technical tool to implement the vision of politicians or top-down economic plans, rather than an instrument to define a collective vision for a city, build public participation and accountability in governance, and develop a sustainable, viable and inclusive urban future. Other respondents including NGO representatives and citizens

pointed towards the unplanned reconstruction, the illegal land allocation and land use changes, and the lack of economic activity in the city, as failures of urban planning. Some clearly blamed the international community for allowing such a situation to come to pass.

### **8.3 Methodological reflections**

Conducting research in a post-war environment is not easy, even when the conflict has been over for many years. In this case, fifteen years have elapsed since the Washington Agreement was signed, which ended the war between the Bosniacs and Croats. I began my research on the basis of the assumption that this was a good time-frame to assess the impact of early post-war interventions, and this was reiterated by a number of my respondents as well. However, in some cases it turned out to be a little too late for respondents to recall the details of the reconstruction process and planning efforts in the EUAM era. Some personal archives had already been lost, destroyed by key respondents who had no further use for them. On the other hand it was too early to access the archives of the EU, which are only released to the public thirty years after any event. This, I believe, would be a problem for many researchers seeking to assess the long-term impact of post-conflict reconstruction efforts.

I also had to extend the period of time I was examining, in order to fully understand the context and the various political developments that took place in Mostar and which have affected its development. The focus of this research was mainly the EUAM phase. However, to understand the impact of the EUAM's work and more broadly, the international community's efforts in Mostar, I needed to examine not just the immediate pre-, in- and post-war phases, but delve deeper into history, and also explore later developments which took place, under the OHR, for instance. This process, I believe, has considerably enriched my analysis. One of the conclusions of this thesis, in fact, is that the historical



context has to be properly understood before solutions can be proposed (or imposed, as the case may be) by external actors, in post-war situations.

As discussed in the methodology chapter, other issues such as access to data and respondents, language, sensitivity and bias, were in my view addressed effectively in the field. Although this is not a quantitative study, I succeeded in interviewing thirty-seven respondents, including elites as well as citizens, international agency representatives as well as those representing Bosnian institutions. The snowball sampling method helped to gain access to a number of respondents who I might not have otherwise identified or reached.

It was difficult, however, to identify returnee citizens and families, especially Croats who had returned to the central zone. UNHCR or even local NGOs dealing with IDP, refugee or returnee issues do not have accurate information on how many displaced persons who have re-claimed their pre-war properties have actually returned to occupy them. Thus, for the returnee interviews, I didn't have a finite universe from which a sample could be selected (e.g. beneficiaries of a particular project, a reliable list of returnees, or even basic census information), and snowball sampling was of limited use in this process. Despite the difficulties, however, I succeeded in interviewing three Bosniac, two Serb and one Croat family, who provided important perspectives on the past, present and future of Mostar.

A commonly-heard criticism of qualitative research is that it is based on impressions or does not make use of any hard data. On the contrary, the real strength of the present study lies in its empirical base, including accurate historical data as well as recent statistical information, pre-war planning documents and maps (some of which were extremely difficult to track down), photographic evidence (both historic and current), and thirty-seven field interviews.

## **8.4 Learning from Mostar: A few propositions for future post-war reconstruction efforts**

The EU Administration of Mostar was an experiment in transitional administration at a time when such arrangements were far from common. Within its short mandate of two years, the EUAM undoubtedly achieved significant results in terms of repair and reconstruction of housing, rehabilitation of services and infrastructure, roads and bridges, all of which were urgent and essential for the normalisation of life in the war-ravaged city.

In setting itself the ambitious goal of reunifying Mostar, the EU Administration sought continuity with the pre-war status of the city. However, it failed in its attempts as this goal was sacrificed in the interest of establishing a functional administration in the short-term. On the other hand, in the case of reconstruction and planning, the EUAM attempted to break with the past and establish its own priorities, as well as a new system of planning. Once again, it was not very successful in those efforts. While the latter could be viewed as a strategic mistake, due to a lack of understanding of the Yugoslav context, the former was perhaps a political compromise – an ambitious mandate watered down by ground realities. Both have had a long-term negative impact on the city. It could well be that a reversal of the strategy, i.e. perhaps allowing east and west Mostar to recover from the wounds of war before attempting to force a reunification, but supporting a revival and gradual reform of the old institutional set-up for planning, may have been more successful. This also partially supports the conclusion of Bieber (2005) that territorial fragmentation and formal, complex governance arrangements have hindered the reunification and post-war development of Mostar, and that a more pragmatic approach may have been more successful.

A few conclusions emerge from the case of Mostar which could be relevant for other cities and territories emerging from conflict, in particular where

international transitional administrations play a major role. These are discussed below.

#### ***8.4.1 Building an understanding of the context is vital***

This research demonstrates that humanitarian and reconstruction interventions undertaken by international actors during and after the war are often based on limited understanding of the context. In Mostar, the evolution of the city, its social and spatial structure, economic base and pre-war cleavages, provide important clues to understand the manifestations of the conflict, the reasons behind its intensity, and the factors which caused the city to be divided along certain (physical) lines. In the rush to negotiate a peace deal between the Bosniacs and Croats, the international community failed to build up a complete understanding of the context, and rather misguidedly, placed the reunification of Mostar at the core of the peace agreement. Subsequent efforts by the EUAM and other actors to reconstruct the city were also based on a shallow understanding of the pre-war situation, the transformation of the city during the war, and the power and control exerted by the political actors who took centre-stage during the war.

The key failures of the EUAM which emerge from field interviews include: (a) the Administration's inability to build broad-based consensus on reconstruction issues and bring on board qualified local professionals; (b) its failure to stop the reconstruction of key ethnic buildings that became overpowering symbols of the city; (c) its powerlessness to establish the rule of law and stop the land grab and land use changes by powerful political figures on both sides of the divide; and, (d) its failure to kick-start the economy. Most of these could have been avoided if there had been a better understanding of the context, the 'lay of the land' as it were. Both during as well as after the EUAM's tenure, there was little transparency or accountability, particularly in the allocation of undeveloped municipal land. Discretionary land use changes and extra-legal allocation of land and building permits, mainly with the objectives of bolstering ethnic numbers in

particular areas or supporting investors based their ethnicity, was commonplace. All these developments not only further polarised the ethnic groups and hindered trust-building and reconciliation, but also undermined the existing development plans and made urban and economic development highly politicised. This in turn has made the reunification of the city much more difficult.

***8.4.2 Cities are radically transformed during conflicts, and status quo ante cannot be easily restored, let alone imposed***

Documented experiences from other divided cities, as well as the field research in Mostar shows that reunification of cities divided by conflict is not something which can be imposed by external actors. Most of my local respondents in Mostar felt that although the city may have been partially reconstructed thanks to EUAM and administratively reunified (to an extent) due to the OHR's efforts, spatial reunification of the city and re-integration and its communities are unrealistic objectives set by the international community with little reference to ground realities. The city's population has been radically transformed by the war. A large number of pre-war urban residents have left permanently, and have been replaced by displaced persons from the surrounding region who have now permanently settled in Mostar. A large number of Mostar's citizens have sold or exchanged their pre-war properties and decided to move permanently to areas where they are in a majority, or to settle abroad (though exact numbers are unknown). As discussed in Chapter Five, even today, there are two major hospitals on the east and the west; two primary schools, one high school (Gymnasium) but with three separate curricula (Bosniac, Croat and the International Baccalaureat) taught on three floors; different shopping centres; two (ethnic-based) football clubs, etc. Most people also state that although some young people from both sides sometimes cross over to visit clubs and bars on 'the other side', a large majority chooses to socialise in their own part of town. When asked if they feel safe crossing over to the other part of the city, the response is in

the affirmative, but most respondents confess to feeling a certain level of discomfort in doing so.

*“Now its rather okay, but occasionally you will hear that somebody got beaten up ... there, or there [on either side], because in this way politicians are keeping the ethnic tension. I go over there, I shop, but I try to come back before dark.”* (Behram, interview)

Unsurprisingly, the representatives of international agencies (local and international) put forth a far more positive view on the question of reunification, citing the progress made in terms of freedom of movement, removal of physical barriers which prevented people from crossing over, the common license plates for all cars and the reasonable level of return (at least on paper). The reconstruction of the old bridge, the Mostar Gymnasium (high school), which now has one administration and one principal, though three curricula continue to be taught on three floors, and the city park, which was inaugurated last year, are all cited as examples of progress. The administrative reunification of the city is ongoing, and the Spatial Planning Institute has finally been established. Yet, it is a near-consensus view that the city can never achieve its pre-war status, and that:

*“All we can hope for is the absence of conflict, and that the two sides can live together side-by-side, even if it is on two different banks of the river.”* (Francić, interview)

#### ***8.4.3 Transitional administrations need to take a long-term view***

Despite the fact that most transitional administrations have a short-term or limited mandate, the experience of EUAM demonstrates that they still need to adopt a longer-term perspective in their activities<sup>95</sup>. The absence of a long-term view is reflected, for instance, in the division of the city into six city-

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<sup>95</sup> This also holds true more broadly for the international community, which was unprepared for a lengthy intervention in Bosnia. International actors – individual countries, as well as multilateral bodies including the EU, UN, World Bank and others – assumed that a liberal democracy would be fairly easy to install (predominantly through elections, deregulation and privatisation measures), and would allow them to make an early exit from the country. This, as history has proved, was not to be.

municipalities, which further entrenched the divisions across the city and made reintegration much more difficult in the long run. It is also seen in the reluctance to prepare any kind of reconstruction or development plan for the city, or build up capacities of existing institutions and professionals, which could have significantly altered the way the city looks today. Clearly, the EUAM had no long-term vision or development strategy for the city - it neither formulated one, nor did it attempt to utilise what already existed in the form of development plans at various levels. While trying to ensure that it did no harm to the city or citizens of Mostar, it also failed to do much good in the long term. Unfortunately, the international community wasted their window of opportunity to plan a better future for the whole of Mostar, whereas the local actors used all planning tools at their disposal to further their own agendas.

In taking a long-term view, or at least one that extends beyond their own mandate, it is also imperative that the records or archives of the transitional administration are properly maintained and eventually handed over to local actors, so that subsequent efforts towards reconstruction are incremental and build upon what was achieved in the transitional phase. This was not done in Mostar, and clearly reflected in the field research. Any responses to questions about the EUAM's archives pointed only towards Brussels, and were made with more than a hint of bitterness.

#### ***8.4.4 Urban planning has a role – in division, reunification, sustainable development and peacebuilding***

The role of urban planning in reconstruction of post-war cities, as a tool to support the development or peacebuilding goals of reconstruction, is neither well-defined nor clearly understood by the organisations undertaking these efforts in the aftermath of war. Field research findings from Mostar support the claims made in literature that in the immediate aftermath of conflict, local actors often use urban planning tools to 'continue war by other means'. Local planners in Mostar state that planning has become far more politicised in Mostar since the

six city-municipalities abused their powers and used planning tools to reinforce the results of ethnic cleansing, appropriate or mark territory, and establish symbolic and actual control over contested areas. These are reflected, for example, in the construction of prominent religious symbols such as the bell tower of the Catholic church, or the cross over the Hum, or in the support provided to the activities of developers of a particular nationality, as in the case of Hotel Ruža.

There are diverse views regarding the stage at which planning could have been introduced in the process of reconstruction or the role it could have played in peacebuilding. It was clearly not possible to initiate a full-fledged long-term planning process in the immediate aftermath of the war, given that the level of mistrust between the different groups was extremely high in 1994, and there was evidently no political commitment to sharing even basic data and information, let alone towards planning or reunifying the city. However, many respondents point out that at the very least, the Administration could have enforced a moratorium in the early post-war years on changes to land use and building plans, and on random rebuilding and reconstruction by the city-municipalities, thus gaining control over those agendas and firmly establishing the rule of law. At the same time, re-establishment of the planning institute at the city level, and supporting it to review the old spatial plan and prepare an updated version, could have been an incremental and acceptable way of initiating planning.

There is also a broad agreement among the respondents that the EUAM had the opportunity and resources to prepare some kind of a reconstruction agenda or plan which would extend beyond their mandate, and which could have been used for planned or coordinated interventions towards physical and economic reconstruction. The Administration could also have made better use of existing (pre-war) planning documents and professionals to gather information about past development approaches and trends, land use and socio-economic development

prospects, which could have also served as a point of departure for planning the reconstruction of Mostar.

Finally, the urban planning process, however tentative, could have been used to initiate a dialogue between professionals as well as citizens on all sides of the ethnic divide, on issues of common concern, such as access to urban services or economic recovery and employment. This might have helped in gradually reducing the 'salience of ethnicity' as Simonsen (2005)\* has described it, laid the foundations for the development of a new collective vision for Mostar, and facilitated the building of effective governance structures at the local level.

## **8.5 Meeting the research objectives**

As mentioned earlier, conducting research on a topic such as the one chosen for this study poses enormous challenges in terms of building an understanding of the various disciplines which the central theme touches upon. The same aspect, however, also gives the study its distinct focus and niche.

The broad goal of this research project was to make a contribution to the following three areas:

- the literature on the reconstruction of conflict-affected cities and societies, particularly focusing on the use (or not) of urban planning;
- the approaches and interventions of the international community, especially transitional administrations, towards reconstruction in other post-war cities; and
- the ongoing process of reunification of Mostar.

### ***8.5.1 Contribution to literature***

As summarised in the section 8.1 above, in this thesis I have reviewed the literature on cities and war, urban planning, post-war reconstruction, and transitional administrations, and formulated and tested my hypothesis in the city

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\* See Section 2.2



of Mostar. The conclusions arising from this thesis, I believe, advance the ongoing work on post-war reconstruction, and considerably enhance our knowledge of transitional administrations, their role in physical reconstruction, and the types of public policy tools they choose (or not) to deploy. They also point towards the importance of taking a long-term view, and introducing urban planning in the early stages of post-war reconstruction of cities.

In terms of its contribution to post-war reconstruction literature, first of all, this study questions the international focus on the piecemeal reconstruction of symbolic structures, which became the pre-eminent feature of the post-war rebuilding of Mostar. The findings from field research, especially interviews, support the view of Calame and Pašić (2006), who have questioned the internationally-driven reconstruction approaches that prioritise the rebuilding of symbolic structures over housing, infrastructure, education and health services and other necessities of urban life. Taking that discussion further, this research highlights the importance of urban planning as an instrument to 're-envision' the city in such a manner that enables its citizens to look forward rather than back, to identify and prioritise the actual (rather than perceived) post-war needs of the different segments of the community, and to view and plan for the development the city as a whole, rather than as a sum of its parts.

Second, this study also builds on and adds to the work of Barakat (2005b), by elaborating how urban planning can be a useful instrument in at least three of the seven 'pillars' of post-war reconstruction that he proposes, and expanding the concept of security, also one of the aforementioned pillars. This thesis demonstrates that human security, or 'freedom from want', including economic, health and environmental security, is equally if not more important than 'freedom from fear', and that the former can be achieved by using planning as one of the tools of post-war reconstruction.

The utilisation of planning can also make Zetter's proposals (2005) of linking relief to rehabilitation, recovery and development more effective, and can be a

useful entry point to start rebuilding local institutional and professional capacities. In fact, at the local level, urban planning can be a central tool in what Barakat and Zyck describe as “...an architecture of integrated, directed recovery [involving] centralised planning, the establishment of an overarching recovery framework and the direction of donors, international organisations, NGOs, civil society and others to integrate their activities and contributions within this framework” (Barakat and Zyck 2009: 1081).

At the same time, findings from Mostar indicate that incremental change, for instance, in the existing plans, planning system, institutions and capacities, might have been a more useful and effective approach towards rebuilding the divided city and community, than the attempts which were made either to radically reform the planning system (by introducing the new concept of Structure Planning), or on the other hand, to simply abandon a long-term perspective altogether. Thus, this research reinforces the observation made by Ian Davis over twenty years ago that the potential for bringing about radical change in urban plans and city development after conflicts is rather over-estimated in most situations, and that one has to be realistic rather than utopian in establishing the goals of post-conflict reconstruction (Davis 1987).

Finally, where this research differs from previous and ongoing work is clearly seen vis-à-vis the work on divided cities, in particular that of Scott Bollens (1998; 2000; 2006), and Esther Charlesworth (2003). As discussed in Chapter 5, recent writings by these two authors place urbanists (Bollens 2006) and architects (Charlesworth 2003), respectively, at the centre of their proposals to soften ethnic boundaries in divided cities. The present study demonstrates that this significantly over-estimates the roles of these actors and does not adequately address the political environment within which they operate. This thesis, therefore, shifts the focus to international administrations who deploy (or don't) instruments of architecture/urbanism and urban planning, exploring why this is the case, assessing the impact of (non-) utilisation of urban planning as an

instrument for post-war reconstruction, and suggesting what TAs can do differently based on the lessons from the incomplete recovery and continued division of the city of Mostar.

### *8.5.2 Contribution to policy and practice*

In terms of having an impact on policy and future work of the international community in general and TAs in particular, the findings from this research draw the attention of the international community to a number of aspects. The most important among these is the need to have a comprehensive understanding of the context, in order to be able to design appropriate, customised solutions for post-war reconstruction and recovery. Urban planning can serve as a lens to develop an in-depth understanding of the evolution of the city, society and economy, its historical divisions, governance arrangements and power structures, as well as identify potential areas (spatial and sectoral) for reconstruction, recovery and development. Such an understanding can help avoid costly mistakes, such as the attempts to turn a state-run industrial economy into a market-driven service economy overnight, which were (and in many cases, continue to be) aligned with global agendas rather than local realities. An understanding of the pre-war institutional structures can also help in determining an incremental strategy to reform these institutions without losing support of local elites, professionals and citizens.

Second, the assessment of EUAM also brings to the fore the importance of setting achievable goals and establishing realistic time-frames for TAs. The EUAM was tasked with the reconstruction and reunification of Mostar, but its mandated time frame was only two years. This had two major implications. First, the Administration was in a rush to spend its allocated budgets and demonstrate concrete reconstruction outputs. This also meant that it could not withhold reconstruction resources from either side for too long, and had to release the monies even if the political elites failed to comply with its conditions. Second,

those who opposed the reunification agenda simply waited it out until the EUAM's pre-determined mandate came to an end.

A third policy element pertaining to TAs which emerges from this research on Mostar is the imperative of employing effective strategies and commensurate resources to achieve the TAs goals. The EUAM did not have a clear relationship with its local counterparts, neither any division of labour, nor powers of enforcement. It did not have the appropriate professional capacity to undertake the objectives or activities it had been saddled with. At critical moments, the Administration's decisions were not backed up by its European masters. It did not take a long-term view (not even a medium-term view, or simply look beyond its own mandate), build partnerships with local institutions and professionals, or engage adequately with agencies that came after it. Finally, the EUAM also did not use the opportunity of reconstruction to initiate the discussion on a new vision for post-war Mostar. Clearly, though the international community willed the outcomes, they did not will the means to achieve those outcomes.

Finally, this study suggests that urban planning can be used to not only coordinate physical reconstruction efforts among various international actors, but also negotiate a new vision of the city among its various stakeholders, establish the rule of law and transparent governance, and start rebuilding and reforming institutional and professional capacities. This is clearly a 'what if' scenario and cannot be conclusively proved by the thesis. However, it does emerge from the field investigation that planning was (and still is) seen by local political actors in Mostar as an important instrument to control land and other assets, redistribute populations and resources, and establish control over their respective territories – in sum, as a tool to keep the city divided. The international community either failed to grasp this implication until very late in the day, or turned a blind eye to it, and in the early reconstruction phases viewed planning simply as a time-consuming technical tool to create some grand vision for the future (thus, a non-priority area of intervention or support). By failing to

take control of planning, the EUAM, OSEM and OHR in fact allowed local politicians to drive the planning agenda for their benefit and pursue a divisive and divided development, thus permitting nationalist agendas to not only persist but become more deeply entrenched.

The conclusions of this research clearly bring out the importance of re-politicising planning, that is, bringing it back from its fringe role as a 'technical tool', and re-establishing it as a central, political instrument of public policy, especially at the local level, in post-war situations. This, I believe, has the potential to be the most important contribution of this thesis to future international interventions, in post-war as well as other post-disaster contexts.

### ***8.5.3 Contribution to the reunification and revival of Mostar***

This study suggests that urban planning, if carried out in a strategic, action-oriented and participatory manner, has the potential to initiate dialogue, promote equitable access to opportunities for minorities and majorities to rebuild their lives and homes, and foster inclusion. These, in turn, can provide the foundations for a sustainable urban future, and an enduring peace. In Mostar, even a partial or incremental revival of existing planning instruments, institutions and capacities in early post-war reconstruction efforts would have, in my view, gone a long way towards building a viable future for the city and its communities. As highlighted by various respondents, a combination of short-term priorities with a long-term vision, responsive to community concerns, could have supported socio-economic development, empowered local actors, and served as a catalyst to the process of ethnic reconciliation and peacebuilding. However, it was a call that the international community had to make, and one it did not.

The process of reunifying Mostar is still far from complete. As the conclusions point out, the city looks more and more like two-cities-in-one, rather than a unified whole, owned as such by all of its citizens. The last fifteen years have

seen a hardening of positions and deepening of ethnic-based differences. Still, it is hoped that this study can contribute to finding a happy *modus vivendi* for the city and citizens of Mostar in the not-too-distant future, when urban planning takes its rightful place as a tool for negotiation and accommodation and building a common future, rather than an instrument for corruption, control and domination.

## 8.6 Directions for future research

Reconstruction of war-torn cities is not a new area of research, considering the fact there has been the spate of articles, books and research studies on the rebuilding of European cities, in particular, but also those in Japan, after the Second World War. However, there is very limited information on the reconstruction of cities after more recent conflicts, for instance, the wars in the Balkans, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Iraq. This thesis makes a small contribution to the discussion on the extent to which urban policy and planning work as a tool of governance, and how power relations are reflected in city building processes in complex political environments after conflicts. Mostar is one of many cities destroyed and divided by war. Other cities, both in the Balkans and other parts of the world, may not have received similar attention from donors, policymakers, and indeed, researchers. It is hoped that other researchers would be able build on the present work and expand it in both scale and scope. Some empirical studies on the types of planning approaches being employed by various international actors in contemporary post-conflict situations, for example in Somalia, their effectiveness and replicability, would also be a useful addition to the growing body of literature in this area.

Second, this research asserts that the role of planning in the post-war reconstruction of Mostar was heavily influenced by the prevailing global thinking and the emphasis on building a 'liberal peace.' Fifteen years on, as the constraints of the liberal peace model are becoming more evident and

international actors are growing more circumspect about exporting liberal models of economic and political development, it would be interesting to explore the changing role (if at all) of planning in post-war situations.

Third, the reconstruction of cities affected by widespread and recurrent terrorist attacks, such as have been witnessed in recent months in various cities across Pakistan (only one of many examples), can provide interesting insights on how functioning city administrations deal with, and recover from, intermittent attacks (rather than prolonged conflicts). This is yet another area which could be explored by authors and researchers working in the area of post-war recovery.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, urban literature is also yet to focus its attention on cities and towns which have faced the brunt of conflicts and humanitarian crises in their surrounding regions, and become home to large numbers of temporary and permanent immigrants, refugees as well as IDPs. Such cities can be found, for example, in Sudan (particularly Khartoum, which is home to millions of IDPs fleeing conflicts in different parts of the country); in Jordan and Syria (which continue to host large numbers of Iraqi refugees); and in a number of small towns in the North-West Frontier Province of Pakistan (where displaced persons from the Swat valley have temporarily settled in recent months). How are the crises of insecurity, of returns and displacement, of inter-communal divisions, of housing and infrastructure, addressed in these situations of 'forced urbanisation'? How can they be addressed through urban policymaking and planning? These are all pertinent questions in today's global context which will arise repeatedly, and which urban and post-war reconstruction literature must begin to explore.

### **8.7 Post-script: Mostar - The poster-child that wasn't**

When this research project was conceived, reunification of 'divided cities', through the use of urban planning, seemed to be the central idea to be explored. As the exploration progressed, however, I realised that cities all over the world,

in developed and developing countries, are divided, for a variety of reasons. Most are divided along income or class lines, either due to the dominance of the market, or ineffectiveness on part of the state. Many are divided along racial and/or ethnic lines, and often these divisions go a long way back in time. These themes are explored in detail in Chapter Two. In sum, divided cities are not only a product of war. They may be undesirable, but they cannot simply be wished away, transformed, or (re)unified overnight.

This thesis in fact narrates two intertwined stories – the first is that of Mostar, and the second, that of EUAM. In the first, it concludes that the multi-ethnic ideal view of Mostar which is extensively promoted and widely accepted was but a myth, and thus, the ‘re-establishment’ of this ideal, at least in the short term, was highly unlikely.

In the second story, this thesis suggests that the very goal of the EUAM – that of re-establishing Mostar as the ideal multi-ethnic, unified city representative of a peaceful co-existence in the Muslim-Croat Federation – was flawed. The rhetoric was far too ambitious, and in a sense, the EUAM was set up to fail, or at least only succeed partially. Its vision was clearly not shared by all local actors, and was based on a hasty and shallow understanding of the context. Undoubtedly, a few results were achieved, and urban life slowly limped back to normal thanks to the Administration’s efforts to reconstruct infrastructure and housing, restore public services, and establish security. However, by not taking a longer-term, strategic view, the international community has also missed the opportunity to (re)envision and (re)build Mostar as a city which at least offered decent and affordable housing, infrastructure or services, a good quality living environment, employment opportunities, or any future prospects to its citizens. In my view, this is the final lesson from Mostar. For a war-torn city, rather than aiming to restore *status quo ante*, building an “*inclusive city*” (UN-HABITAT 2002b: 5), where the different communities have the right to access services and opportunities, and co-exist without the threat of violence, might be a more



realistic, more progressive, and infinitely more positive goal. In this process, urban planning may not be a sufficient condition, but it is certainly a necessary one in order to create a new political geography for the war-torn city. Transitional Administrations and other international agencies involved in reconstruction of war-torn cities would do well to keep that in mind, in their future interventions.

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# APPENDICES

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## Appendix 1: Interview Schedule (semi-standardised)

The key dimensions explored through 'elite' interviews are listed below. These emerged from the hypotheses and literature review chapters. The exact interview questions and order of questioning was different for each respondent.

- How did urban planning and local governance broadly function in Mostar and Bosnia and Herzegovina, before the war? Who controlled local development and investment decisions?
- What was the extent of political influence and public participation in planning, under the socialist system?
- What was the geographic distribution of population in Mostar before 1992? Were the major communities fully integrated in terms of their living areas, workspaces, public services etc?
- What was the thinking behind reunification of Mostar, and the strategy and tools adopted by the EUAM towards achieving this goal?
- What were the reasons behind establishment of the six city-municipalities and central zone?
- Did the local communities want a unified city? Do they still want a unified city?
- If the OHR was determined to impose a unified administration on the city of Mostar, what instruments or tools (other than the 2004 statute) were used to ensure that the city was reunified *de facto*, not just *de jure*?
- What role did other international actors such as bilateral and multilateral donors and lending agencies play in the reconstruction of Mostar (setting of priorities, funding, implementation etc.?) How did their activities influence the reunification agenda?

- Did the local stakeholders have any role in determining priorities and projects? To what extent were activities undertaken by transitional administration and the other international actors responsive to the 'real' priorities of the local communities? How was this ensured?
- How did EUAM relate to the former municipal departments? Was there any attempt to use existing information/development plans etc?
- Were projects selected based on reconciliation and reunification goals? To what extent? Who were the key decision-makers? Any specific examples (reconstruction projects or planning decisions) which have had a long-term impact on reunification (positive or negative)?
- What was the extent of local political influence on (or control of) urban planning under the EUAM and OHR?
- How did the EUAM and OHR, and other agencies responsible for reconstruction, approach urban planning?
- Was urban planning viewed by the Administration as a long-term agenda, and deliberately deferred to domestic authorities or local government institutions?
- Did the EU Administration and OHR understand the significance of urban planning or developing a strategic vision or plan for reconstruction, economic recovery or reunification?
- Why did initial efforts towards urban planning under the EUAM fail?
- Was there a lack on international donor commitment (political support or financial resources) to support planning efforts? Why?
- Do you think the reconstruction process could have been used more effectively towards reunification? How? What would you change?
- What is the legacy of EUAM?

- What role could an urban plan play in reunifying the city? Would people from both communities buy into a unified vision or development strategy? What would be the preconditions for it to succeed?

A semi-standardised questionnaire for household interviews was also developed. Questions related to how Mostar was as a city before the war, how it changed during the war, and what it is like now. Living conditions, level of integration, priorities of the community etc. were all explored. The respondents were predominantly returnees and were contacted through various local and international NGOs. However, I didn't succeed in interviewing as many families as I had planned. I believe that this was mainly due to the lack of a strategy on how to select a sample or contact people, from a fairly diffused universe. I went about it in a fairly *ad hoc* manner, and couldn't get very far.

## Appendix 2: List of respondents

Name	Designation/organisation	Interview date
<b><u>International agency representatives (past and present)</u></b>		
1. John Yarwood	Former Director of Reconstruction, EUAM (now based in the U.K.)	06/03/08
2. Anatoly D. Viktorov	Head of Regional office (South), OHR, Mostar	02/09/08
3. Amela Božić	Political officer, OHR, Mostar, ex-EUAM	03/09/08
4. Vesna Frančić	World Bank, Sarajevo	11/09/08
5. Mark Wheeler	Political Adviser, OHR, Sarajevo	11/09/08
6. Kendall Palmer	OSCE, Mostar	24/09/08
7. Maja Hadzizuković	UNHCR, Sarajevo	26/09/08
8. Richard Williams	Former Head, Mostar Implementation Unit (now based in the U.K.)	13/05/09
<b><u>Urban planners, urbanists</u></b>		
9. Said Jamaković	Director, Cantonal Planning Institute, Sarajevo	10/09/08
10. Vjekoslava Sanković Simčić	Urbanist, University of Sarajevo	11/09/08
11. Sead Pintul	Former head of urban planning, east Mostar	03/09/08
12. Salko-Salem Bubalo	Director, Spatial Development Institute, Mostar	04/09/08
13. Senada Demirović	Architect-planner, Department of Urbanism, Grad Mostar	09/09/08
14. Zarko Markić	Director, Department of Urbanism, Grad Mostar	16/09/08

15. Lejla Ćatić	Head of urban planning section, Grad Mostar	18/09/08
16. Zoran Bosnjak	Urban planning section, Grad Mostar	18/09/08
17. Franjo Bošković	Urban reconstruction section, Grad Mostar	19/09/08
18. Borislav Puljić	Architect-planner, ex-EUAM	22/09/08
19. Milada Elezović	Agencija "Stari Grad", Mostar	23/09/08
20. Marica Raspudić	Urban inspections department, Grad Mostar, ex-EUAM	24/09/08
21. Nihad Ćengić	Urbanist, University of Sarajevo	26/09/08
22. Hans Skotte	Associate Professor, Department of Urban Design and Planning, Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), Trondheim ( <i>Interviewed Sarajevo</i> )	26/09/08
23. Amir Pašić	Architect/urbanist, Mostar	29/09/08
<b><u>Other local government officials. Mostar</u></b>		
24. Sanela Kamerić	International affairs officer, Grad Mostar	16/09/08
25. Adnin Hasić	Member of City Council, Mostar	18/09/08
26. Murat Ćorić	President of City Council, Mostar	22/09/08
<b><u>Independent professionals. NGO representatives. Mostar</u></b>		
27. Aida Omanović	RESCATE (NGO), Mostar	02/09/08
28. Elvir Đuliman	Nansen Dialogue Centre (NGO), Mostar	15/09/08
29. Jlenia Destito	Local Democracy Agency (LDA) (NGO), Mostar	23/09/08

30. Mirsad Behram	Journalist, Radio Television Mostar (RTM)	08/09/08
31. Anita Zovko	Journalist, Federal Television Mostar	27/09/08
<b><u>Mostar citizens/Returnees</u></b>		
32. Family Husković	Bosniac returnees, Santića street	09/09/08
33. Family Habibje	Bosniac returnees, Podhum	09/09/08
34. Majda Omanović	Bosniac returnee, west Mostar	19/09/08
35. Klaudija Babić	Croat returnee, Rodoč	24/09/08
36. Vujadin Berberović	Serb returnee, Ortiješ	05/09/08
37. Milan Medan	Serb returnee, Ortiješ	05/09/08



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