

**From Combatant to Civilian:
The Social Reintegration of ex-Combatants
in Rwanda and the Implications for Social
Capital and Reconciliation**

Richard Bowd

PhD in Post-war Recovery Studies

University of York

Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU),
Department of Politics

September 2008

Abstract

In the reconstruction of war-torn societies, the successful reintegration of combatants into the post-conflict environment is recognised to be a vital component in the peacebuilding effort. In order to achieve and sustain such reintegration Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes are implemented. DDR literature advocates the importance of economic reintegration due to the fact it provides a focus for ex-combatants and thus the possibility of a secure environment. However, as DDR is studied in greater detail, the limitations of such a narrow focus are becoming apparent. Moreover, the identified need for the effective social reintegration of ex-combatants is becoming an increasingly more salient issue; particularly when considering the reconciliation of war-affected communities. Nevertheless, whilst the importance of social reintegration may have been recognised, understanding as to the ways in which ex-combatants socially reintegrate, and the effects such reintegration may have on the reconciliation process and the general peacebuilding effort, is in its relevant infancy.

This research, through fieldwork involving the life history analysis of 50 ex-combatants and 22 civilians, along with ethnographic studies of four rural communities and 26 elite interviews with policy makers/implementers, sought to investigate this hiatus within the context of Rwanda. Specifically, it examined the obstacles faced by ex-combatants in their social reintegration and the mechanisms through which ex-combatants are successful in their endeavours. It then progressed to an elaborate consideration of the effects of the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants on the reconciliation process within the peacebuilding environment. It does this by applying the concept of social capital as a bridge between ex-combatant social reintegration and reconciliation.

The findings from this research identify a number of significant elements that are crucial to the social reintegration of ex-combatants. Additionally, the thesis delineates the importance of such reintegration for the reconciliation and peacebuilding process and thus signifies the need for a significant reconsideration of the way in which DDR programmes are designed and implemented.

Contents

Abstract	i
Contents	ii
List of Illustrations	vi
Acronyms	viii
Preface	x
P1 Defining the Problem	x
P2 The Scope of the Study and the Research Question	xi
P3 Aim and Objectives of the Research	xiii
P4 Research Methodology	xiv
P5 Thesis Structure	xv
Acknowledgements	xix
Declaration	xxii
Chapter One: Reconciliation in the Post-conflict Environment (PCE)	1
1.1 Introduction	1
1.2 Imagining the Post-conflict Environment	2
1.3 Reconciliation Examined	7
1.4 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: What Role for Reconciliation?	12
1.5 Reconciliation Tools	18
1.5.1 Conventional Reconciliation Techniques	18
1.5.2 Indigenous Approaches to Reconciliation	24
1.5.2.1 Tribal or Indigenous Law	26
1.5.2.2 Ritual	28
1.6 Conclusion	31
Chapter Two: The Contribution of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) to Reconciliation in PCEs	33
2.1 Introduction	33
2.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): A Conceptual and Contextual Understanding	34
2.3 Disarmament and Demobilisation: Precursors to Reintegration	37

2.3.1	Disarmament	38
2.3.2	Demobilisation	41
2.4	Reintegration: The Ultimate Goal	43
2.4.1	Economic Reintegration	44
2.4.2	Political Reintegration	47
2.5	Social Reintegration	50
2.6	Social Reintegration and Vulnerable Groups	53
2.6.1	Female Ex-Combatants	53
2.6.2	Child Soldiers	55
2.6.3	Disabled Veterans	56
2.7	The Reconciliatory Benefits of Social Reintegration	58
2.8	Conclusion	64
 Chapter Three: Social Capital: The Link between DDR and Reconciliation?		66
3.1	Introduction	66
3.2	Social Capital: A Conceptualisation	67
3.3	Social Capital and Violent Conflict: A Transformative Relationship	75
3.4	Altering the state of Social Capital: The Rebuilding of Social Ties and the Process of Reconciliation	82
3.5	Measuring Social Capital	87
3.6	Conclusion	93
 Chapter Four: Methodology		95
4.1	Introduction	95
4.2	Theoretical Framework	96
4.3	Methodological Overview	107
4.4	Theoretical Underpinnings	107
4.5	Qualitative Research Methods	110
4.5.1	Why Rwanda? A Justification of Case Study Country	111
4.5.2	Site Selection	113
4.5.3	Choice and Justification of Research Techniques	116
4.5.4	Sampling	121
4.5.5	Data Collection and Analysis	124
4.6	Methodological Issues and Constraints	129
4.6.1	The Research Context: Conducting Research in a PCE	129

4.6.2	Ethical Considerations	131
4.6.3	Research Biases	133
4.6.4	Mitigating Methodological Constraints through Reflexivity and Triangulation	142
4.7	Conclusion	144
Chapter Five: The Rwanda Case Study		146
5.1	Introduction	146
5.2	Rwanda: A Historical Overview	147
5.2.1	The Rwandan Conflict	148
5.2.2	Causes of the Conflict: External Influences	152
5.2.3	Causes of the Conflict: Domestic Influences	155
5.2.4	Causes of the Conflict: Psychosocial Aspects	157
5.3	Rwanda: The Eight Stages of Genocide	158
5.4	Rwanda: The Transformation of Social Capital	170
5.4.1	Social Capital in the pre-1990 Civil War Period	170
5.4.2	Social Capital in the 1990-1994 Civil War and Genocide Period	173
5.5	Conclusion	177
Chapter Six: The Social Reintegration Path: How it Works in Rwanda		179
6.1	Introduction	179
6.2	Problems With and Obstacles to Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration	180
6.2.1	The Starting Position of Ex-Combatants	180
6.2.2	Access to Land and Housing	182
6.2.3	Psychosocial Issues	184
6.2.4	Special Groups	185
6.3	Requirements for Successful Social Reintegration in Rwanda	188
6.3.1	Macro Level Elements	188
6.3.2	Meso Level Elements	194
6.3.3	Micro Level Elements	207
6.4	Conclusion	223
Chapter Seven: The Impacts of Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration on Social Capital and Reconciliation		225
7.1	Introduction	225

7.2	Reconciliation in Rwanda	225
7.3	Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and Social Capital	232
7.3.1	Social Capital in the post-1994 Genocide Period	233
7.3.2	Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and the Balancing and Strengthening of Vertical Social Capital	238
7.3.3	Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and the Renewal of Bridging and Bonding Social Capital	244
7.3.3.1	Bridging Social Capital	244
7.3.3.2	Bridging Social Capital into Bonding Social Capital	248
7.3.3.3	Bonding Social Capital Based on Geographical Area	250
7.4	The Implications of Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration for Reconciliation	252
7.4.1	The Movement Toward Political Reconciliation through Ex-Combatant Reintegration	253
7.4.2	The Development of Social Reconciliation through Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration	255
7.5	Conclusion	259
 Chapter Eight: Conclusions and Thesis Outputs		262
8.1	Introduction	262
8.2	Thesis Summary	263
8.3	Conclusions	265
8.4	Thesis Outputs	272
8.4.1	Thesis Output 1: Methodological Recommendations	272
8.4.2	Thesis Output 2: Theoretical Advancements	274
8.4.3	Thesis Output 3: DDR Recommendations	279
8.5	Future Research	305
 Appendices		283
 Bibliography		315

List of Illustrations

Tables

Table 1. The Four Dimensions of Reconciliation	19
Table 2. Field Interview Composition	123
Table 3. Reconciliatory Community Events	229
Table 4. Ex-Combatant Positions of Responsibility in the Community	242
Table 5. Indicators of Social Capital	283
Table 6. Rwanda Social Capital Indicators	284
Table 7. Eastern Province Social Capital Indicators	285
Table 8. Southern Province Social Capital Indicators	287
Table 9. Northern Province Social Capital Indicators	289
Table 10. Eastern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell – 8 th June 2007)	304
Table 11. Southern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell – 17 th June 2007)	305
Table 12. Western Province Entry Survey (Cell Coordinator – 25 th June 2007)	306
Table 13. Northern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell – 3 rd July 2007)	307
Table 14. Combined Entry Survey for North, East, South & West (June & July 2007)	308
Table 15. Sample RDRC Pre Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP)	310

Figures

Figure 1. Four Paths for Conflict	3
Figure 2. The Place Called Reconciliation	12
Figure 3. A Conceptual Map of Social Capital	72
Figure 4. Relationship between Bridging Social Capital and Governance	78
Figure 5. Social Cohesion: The Integration of Vertical Linking and Horizontal Bridging Social Capital	79
Figure 6. Transformative Social Capital and Conflict	101
Figure 7. DDR and its Impacts on Social Capital and Reconciliation	106
Figure 8. Rwanda Social Reintegration Pyramid	268

Figure 9. Eastern Province Sector Social Network Mapping	292
Figure 10. Eastern Province (Umudugudu 1) Social Network Mapping	293
Figure 11. Eastern Province (Umudugudu 2) Social Network Mapping	294
Figure 12. Eastern Province (Umudugudu 3) Social Network Mapping	295
Figure 13. Southern Province Cell Social Network Mapping	296
Figure 14. Southern Province Cell Social Network Mapping	297
Figure 15. Southern Province (Umudugudu 1) Social Network Mapping	298
Figure 16. Southern Province (Umudugudu 2) Social Network Mapping	299
Figure 17. Northern Province Cell Social Network Mapping	300

Diagram's

Diagram 1. PRA Exercises Photo	126
Diagram 2. Eastern Province Institutional Diagramming	301
Diagram 3. Southern Province Institutional Diagramming	302
Diagram 4. Northern Province Institutional Diagramming	303

Maps

Map 1. Map of Rwanda	114
Map 2. Rwanda after the Genocide	115

Boxes

Box 1. Desirable Properties of Social Capital Indicators	90
--	----

Acronyms

AG	Armed Group
BNK	Basic Needs Kit
CBR	Community Based Reintegration
CDP	Community Development Project
DBC	Development Brigades Corporation
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
DRO	District Reintegration Officer
DRP	Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
ES	Executive Secretary
FAR	Forces Armees Rwandaises
GoR	Government of Rwanda
GP	Presidential Guard
GTZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
ICRS	Information Counselling and Referral Service
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IDDRS	Integrated Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IGA	Income Generating Activity
IJR	Institute for Justice and Reconciliation
IO	International Organisation
IOM	International Organisation of Migration
ISS	Institute for Security Studies
KIST	Kigali Institute for Science and Technology
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army
MBCA	Mutually Beneficial Collective Action
MDR	Democratic Republican Movement
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MINALOC	Ministry of Local Government, Community Development and Social Affairs

MONUC	United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MRND	Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement
MRNDD	Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement et la Democratie
NCDDR	National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
NRA	National Resistance Army
NURC	National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
PARMEHUTU	Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation des Bahutu
PCE	Post-Conflict Environment
PDC	Centrist Democratic Party
PDOP	Pre Discharge Orientation Programme
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
PSD	Social Democratic Party
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTSD	Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
RANU	Rwandese Alliance for National Unity
RDF	Rwanda Defence Force
RDRC	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission
RDRP	Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme
RF	Rwandan Francs
RG	Reintegration Grant
RPA	Rwanda Patriotic Army
RPF	Rwandese Patriotic Front
RSA	Recognition of Service Allowance
RTL	Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines
SSR	Security Sector Reform
TRC	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
VSW	Vulnerable Support Window
WB	World Bank

Preface

P1. Defining the Problem

The central aim of this research is to examine how the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants can promote reconciliation in a Post-Conflict Environment (PCE) through the renewal, and strengthening of social capital. As Paris (2004) highlights, the nature of conflict has changed from that of interstate conflict (that which involves two or more states) to civil conflict (that which involves two or more factions within the same state), with a simultaneous shift in the significant majority of conflict victims from combatants to non-combatants who endure a strategy of warfare based on atrocities such as wanton destruction of property, hostage-taking, mass executions, systematic rape and sexual slavery, ethnic cleansing and genocide. This has had the effect of dramatically increasing the volume of forced displacement and the devastation of social structures. In conjunction with this, the spillover effects of intrastate conflict have ensured a regional element to some conflicts that has contributed to insecurity as armed groups from one country threaten the security of those in another.

The complexity of the conflict dynamics and the way in which conflicts are fought has significant implications for the reconstruction of war-torn societies. The PCE – characterised by high levels of poverty, displacement, physical, economic and social destruction, and drastically diminished social cohesion – represents a melting pot of simmering hatreds, resentments and fears in which the reconciliation of previously conflicting social identity groups presents one of the most vital but difficult achievements in the peacebuilding process. Indeed, “*the typical country reaching the end of a civil war faces around a 44 percent risk of returning to conflict within five years*” (Collier et al, 2003:83), in part due to the unsuccessful resolution of the causes of the conflict and the subsequent inability to reconcile. In spite of this, however, the state of knowledge about reconciliation has received considerably less attention than that of conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2000).

It is into the PCE and the embryonic reconciliation process that the demobilisation of ex-combatants occurs and in order for an effective transition from war to peace it is

argued that the reintegration of ex-combatants is essential (Colletta et al, 1996). It is often posited that this group can be critical to the achieving of sustainable peace due to the potential security threat they represent (Colletta et al, 1996; Kingma, 1997; Dercin & Ayalew, 1998; Mokalobe, 1999: 23; Ozerdem, 2002). Additionally, it is also recognised that the reintegration of ex-combatants has the potential to contribute in a positive way to conflict transformation and peacebuilding (Nubler, 1997; Kingma, 2002; Ginifer, 2003). However, despite the acknowledgment that the reintegration of ex-combatants *can* make positive contributions to the peacebuilding process, little is known as to *how* this may materialise. Indeed, as Gomes Porto et al state,

Recognising this important point (that in the immediate post-war setting, societies may seldom have the ability to effect sustainable reconciliation) points us in the direction of long term reintegration as a critical component of processes of social reconciliation – and the need therefore to conduct deeper research into the underlying and subtle process by which identities affect and are affected by the reintegration process.

(2007: 147)

Given our inchoate understandings of both reconciliation and the positive contributions to peacebuilding of ex-combatant reintegration, in theory and practice, this thesis seeks to investigate the relationship between the two, utilising the concept of social capital, in order to develop our understanding of both these individual concepts (reconciliation and social reintegration) and the way in which they may interact.

P2 The Scope of the Study and the Research Question

Critically, this thesis set out to investigate the main parameters related to the research: reconciliation; Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR); and social capital, in the context of post-genocidal Rwanda. Specifically then, it seeks to establish the impact genocidal conflicts have on social capital, in particular bonding, bridging and vertical social capital, and the implications this may have for reconciliation. It is anticipated that an understanding of the ways in which such conflicts impact on social

capital will facilitate a more comprehensive consideration of how DDR programmes may promote the rebuilding of social capital and the ways in which such programmes may contribute to enhanced reconciliation. In turn such an understanding may augment our understanding as to how DDR policy can best be designed and implemented in order to achieve effective reconciliation.

The concept of social capital is utilised within this research rather than other concepts or theories for a number of reasons. The key tenets of social capital, those of communication, cooperation, coordination and trust¹, coalesce in various ways so as to explain the ways in which groups within communities, groups between communities and the community and the state interrelate. As such the use of social capital is particularly expedient as the linking concept between social reintegration and reconciliation. Although other concepts such as kinship systems or clientelism could have been utilised, it was felt that social capital went beyond what other concepts could offer, providing an ideal way through which we can better understand social reintegration itself, and the links it has with reconciliation. Social reintegration, and for that matter reconciliation, entails far more than the patronage relationships between those in power and those not, or kinship networks between nuclear or extended families. The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants relies on more than just those in power or the family, although these are both important, and this is where social capital can provide a more focussed lens through which we can observe social reintegration. Not only does the concept introduce indicators for measurement, thus making it more practical for use, it also crucially enables an understanding of the various interactions that have an impact on social reintegration. Understanding how communities collectively function at all levels, and how they establish social cohesion, is important in explaining the detrimental effects of violent conflict and how such effects can be ameliorated, in this case through the social reintegration of ex-combatants. For these reasons social capital is the concept of choice in this research.

The successes of DDR programmes to date have generally been evaluated in terms of economic reintegration with indicators such as levels of employment or enrolment on training courses. This research is critical of such an approach, as it does not place a high enough emphasis on the issue of social reintegration, which is, arguably, vital for

¹ These issues will be addressed fully in chapter three.

effective reconciliation and, therefore, sustainable peace. Consequently, this research aims to offer an alternative perspective from which to view the process of reintegration that addresses the impact of genocidal conflict on social capital, and considers the ways in which DDR policy may create and develop social capital and promote effective reconciliation, rather than focusing on conventional commitments to economic indicators. It will therefore offer policy recommendations that aim to maximise the potential and effectiveness of reintegration policy, with specific focus on social reintegration.

As a result of the above, this thesis is based on the answering of the following research question:

In what ways can the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment, and what are the implications of such a promotion for reconciliation?

P3 Aim and Objectives of the Research

The aim of this research is to offer an alternative perspective from which to view the process of ex-combatant reintegration that relies less on conventional measures of reintegration such as economic indicators, instead assessing the impact of conflict on social capital and exploring ways in which the effective social reintegration of ex-combatants may facilitate the restoration of stocks and quality of social capital damaged throughout the course of the conflict, and promote the achievement of sustainable reconciliation. Thus, this research aims to develop our understanding of social capital dynamics and propose recommendations for the effective design and implementation of DDR programmes that fully respond to the changing dynamics of social capital as a result of conflict, and generate functional conclusions that develop our understanding of the reconciliation process and how this process can be augmented.

The objectives of this research are thus:

1. To investigate ways in which genocidal conflict transforms social capital and how the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants may restore stocks and quality of social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment.

2. To identify and utilise concepts through an extensive literature review that enables the development of a theoretical framework, through which we can develop a more comprehensive understanding of the linkages between conflict, social capital, social reintegration and reconciliation.
3. To develop an effective methodology for the understanding of social capital transformations in a conflict and post-conflict environment, the social reintegration of ex-combatants and the attainment of reconciliation, along with the way in which these three issues interrelate.
4. To explore the linkages between the three concepts through the analysis of data gained from the Rwanda case study and compare them to linkages identified within the literature, thus testing the theoretical framework developed.

P4 Research Methodology

The issues central to this research are of a very complex and dynamic nature and as such it utilises a ‘composite approach’ (Barakat et al, 2002) in order to enable an in-depth and focused understanding of the key issues and the factors affecting social capital, social reintegration and reconciliation. By employing a range of different research techniques, based around ethnographical methods, it was possible to not only generate a richer understanding of the various concepts and their interactions, but also to triangulate the results thus increasing their credibility.

Three main research methods were engaged within the study: 1) an extensive literature review, 2) fieldwork in Rwanda, and 3) conferences, training courses and workshops. The reasoning for an extensive literature review lay behind the need to further develop personal understanding of the central issues within this research – conflict, reconciliation, DDR, social capital, the Rwandan context and relevant research methodologies, the emphasis being to enable the formulation of a theoretical framework that could provide a structure through which it was possible to answer the research question.

The **fieldwork in Rwanda** represented the central aspect of the practical research in this study. Despite the various limitations encountered in the fieldwork phase, as discussed in chapter five, the flexibility afforded to me through the composite nature of the data collection methods, and my approach to the research, ensured results both rich in detail and highly relevant to the research question and the theoretical framework.

During the course of the PhD I attended **conferences, training courses and workshops** related to the research in order to augment my understanding of the key issues. Preliminary findings have been presented at an ISS (Institute for Security Study) International Conference on Peace and Security in Africa in Addis Ababa (Bowd, 2008). I undertook courses at the University of York in Post-war Recovery and was a participant and syndicate leader at the African Disarmament, Demobilisation & Reintegration (DDR) course, a pan-African training course on DDR in the African context run by GTZ in Rwanda. These were all useful in developing my knowledge of these issues and assisted in the development of the research project.

P5 Thesis Structure

The research commences in **Chapter 1**, which addresses the literature associated with the concept of reconciliation. Starting by providing a contextualisation of the PCE, which is crucial to the effective understanding of the challenges that face the reconciliation effort, the chapter then progresses to examine the meaning of reconciliation. Processes of reconciliation have been evident for centuries; however, with the changing nature of conflict so, too, have these processes changed. It is therefore important to consider these changes, particularly in the context of conflict transformation and peacebuilding, as it is these areas the thesis is concerned with. Essentially this entails an appreciation of the more contentious questions associated with the concept, namely whether or not reconciliation is desirable or indeed, achievable. A detailed examination of these issues augments a richer understanding of the concept as a whole and therefore enables a more accurate understanding of the ways in which reconciliation may be achievable. Having established a robust consideration of reconciliation, the chapter then advances to examine how such an endeavour may be

achieved. This begins by appraising conventional techniques before going on to consider indigenous methods utilised in the pursuit of reconciliation.

Having examined the issues of reconciliation in the context of peacebuilding, **Chapter 2** is concerned with assessing the potential for the reintegration of ex-combatants to contribute to reconciliation. Thus the chapter begins by constructing an understanding of what DDR policy is, what it aims to do and what it consists of. It then examines in greater detail the reintegration component and its constituent parts: economic, political and social reintegration, with particular focus on social reintegration. This primarily concerns itself with an understanding of the reconciliatory benefits of social reintegration and the difficulties associated with achieving this. Chapter two is particularly important as it indicates how the social reintegration of ex-combatants can have positive implication for reconciliation and thus underlines the potential of this thesis of going some way to fill the identified knowledge gap.

Chapter 3 introduces the final concept to be utilised in this research, that of social capital. Beginning by developing a comprehension of what social capital is and where it originated from, this section considers the different approaches to the understanding of social capital so as to provide a clear picture of this theory. The chapter then moves on to an analysis of the transformation of social capital through violent conflict. This part of the chapter is particularly significant as it essentially offers a technique through which we can better conduct a conflict analysis, which potentially could translate into more effective policy. Once an understanding of how violent conflict transforms social capital has been established, it is then necessary to consider ways in which social capital that is decimated through conflict can be restored through the rebuilding of social ties. This, in effect, expands our understanding as to how social development may occur in a PCE and, although explicit linkages are not created at this time, alludes to the connections between the three concepts. The final section of this chapter is concerned with the way in which social capital is measured. Due to the contestation surrounding the definition of social capital issues of measurement are also the subject of debate, much more so when we attempt to apply the concept in the context of the developing world.

Having examined the three relevant concepts through relevant literature in the previous three chapters, **chapter 4** builds on this knowledge by developing a theoretical framework that explains the ways in which the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants may promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment and the implications such a promotion may have for reconciliation. Essentially this theoretical framework consists of an analysis by the author that develops our understanding of the three concepts and the way in which they interrelate. The chapter then progresses to a discussion of the ontological and epistemological positions taken in the context of this research and then provides a detailed consideration and justification of the methodology adopted with this in mind. The next section of this chapter will be concerned with the logistics of the study. It will examine fieldwork phases, sampling, translations, data recording and any other such issues. The final section of this chapter will address the methodological problems encountered throughout the study.

The final review of literature is found in **chapter 5**, which presents a conflict analysis of the Rwandan case, necessary in order to fully comprehend what happened in Rwanda, and the subsequent effects of these events, in order to be in a more advantageous position from which to understand what can be done. The chapter initially presents a historical overview of the Rwandan conflict from the point of colonisation then addressing the key causes of the conflict concentrating firstly on the external influences then on domestic factors before concluding with psychosocial aspects. The next section provides an in-depth analysis of the Rwandan Genocide through the application of Stanton's (1998) 'The Eight Stages of Genocide' model. The final substantive section of this chapter introduces primary data into the thesis for the first time by charting the transformation of social capital through the conflict in Rwanda considering two distinct phases: the pre 1990 civil war period and the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide period.

Chapter 6 presents the first substantial analysis of the data from fieldwork conducted as part of this research. The primary function of this chapter is to develop our understanding of social reintegration and provide a foundation from which it will be possible to appreciate the impact social reintegration may have on the restoration of social capital and reconciliation. The chapter is divided into two main parts: the first builds a picture of the environment faced by ex-combatants when they return to their

communities as it is necessary to comprehend this in order to understand how ex-combatants socially reintegrate; the second part examines what is necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda. It is subdivided into three categories: macro level elements, meso level elements and micro level elements.

Building on the analysis in the previous chapter, **chapter 7** assesses the contribution of ex-combatant social reintegration to social capital renewal and reconciliation. In this sense this chapter provides the analysis that is crucial to the answering of the research question. The chapter begins with a consideration of the general position of reconciliation in Rwanda so as to set the scene for understanding how ex-combatant reintegration has influenced this process. Moving on to a consideration of the effects of ex-combatant reintegration on social capital the chapter first considers the transformation of social capital in the post-genocide period before examining vertical, bonding and bridging social capital and the interrelatedness of the three within the context of ex-combatant reintegration. After identifying these effects, the chapter moves on to an analysis of ex-combatant social reintegration and its effects on reconciliation. In this part of the chapter, reconciliation is divided into political and social reconciliation.

Having detailed how ex-combatants successfully socially reintegrate in chapter 6 and the impacts this has on social capital and reconciliation in chapter 7, **chapter 8** seeks to provide a conclusion to the thesis and is therefore separated into two parts. The first part draws together the argument running through the thesis and, relating the results back to the theories discussed in the literature review chapters (chapters 1-3) and the theoretical framework (chapter 4), provides an answer the research question. The second part concerns itself with the thesis outputs that result from the overall research project. This begins by outlining theoretical advancements as a result of the research (DDR, social capital and reconciliation), before moving on to examine potential improvements for methodological aspects of conducting research in a PCE. The chapter then makes recommendations for the design and implementation of future DDR programmes that maximise the potential for effective social reintegration of ex-combatants and the creation and development of social capital in PCE in order to augment the reconciliation process. The final section of the chapter identifies potential future research areas arising from this research.

Acknowledgements

In submitting this thesis I wish to acknowledge the following whose support and assistance were invaluable in the conducting of this research.

To the people of Rwanda, in particular all those I interviewed including ex-combatants and civilians I offer my thanks. Had it not been for these people who allowed me access to highly sensitive and personal areas of their life this research would not have been possible and I owe them a debt I may never be able to repay.

My thanks and appreciation also goes to the staff of the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) who facilitated my work wherever necessary and gave up their time to answer my questions. Specifically, I would like to thank the RDRC Chairman, Jean Sayinzoga, the RDRC Coordinator, Faustin Rwigema, and the RDRC Public Relations and Information Office, John Rusimbi, who, in one way or another, made my research experience easier, more successful and more enjoyable.

Along with the RDRC, staff at the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (MDRP) from the World Bank were extremely accommodating. In particular, Gregory 'Gromo' Alex, my first point of contact in Rwanda, was invaluable and my deepest thanks go to him and his family who welcomed me into their home. Additionally, Georgina Yates who originally put me in contact with Gromo is deserving of thanks.

To my two translators, Chris and Gakuba, who accompanied me through the whole of my research across Rwanda and into Eastern DRC offering me an insight into Rwandan culture that would have been impossible without them, I extend my sincere gratitude and appreciation, along with my apologies for my impatience and grumpiness when things did not go to plan. The journey I shared with both Chris and Gakuba was a significant one, the memories of which will always remain with me, as, I hope, will their friendship.

My home in Kigali was in the area of Nyamirambo in a small house that I shared with a school teacher named Abdul, the brother of Safari who was one of my masters' students at the University of York. My thanks go to both of these men who opened their home to me and offered me their friendship throughout my time in Rwanda and the UK. Living with Abdul was an experience I will never forget and it was through this I was able to share a part of Rwandan culture. Thank you for giving me that opportunity.

To my friends and family who, throughout the last three years and beyond, have supported and encouraged me in all I have done, my thanks seem inadequate. At the University of York I would like thank the following who have enriched my research and my life in various ways: (in no particular order) Veronique Barbelet, Adewale Osofisan, Umut Bozkurt, Monica Clua Losada, Simon Robins, Craig Wirt, Matt Crane, Steve Zyck and Fiona Aspinal. To my family who have continually supported me during my academic journey and life in general I am appreciative and love you all. In particular, to my mother, Lesley Silvester, who proofread my entire thesis I wish to express my thanks.

To the relevant staff in the Post-conflict Reconstruction and Development Unit (PRDU) and the Department of Politics at the University of York I am grateful. To Sally Carter, Lisa Webster and Caroline Carfrae for all your administrative assistance. To Richard Jones, Mark Evans, Adrian Leftwich, Sultan Barakat and John Parkinson for all your comments, teaching or general help. To the department as a whole for giving me the departmental University Research Studentship, without which I would not have been able to enrol on this PhD. To my back-up supervisor, Roger MacGinty, for all his helpful comments regarding my work.

And last but by no mean least, my supervisor Alp Ozerdem. During my time at York Alp has been a great supervisor helping me develop as an academic and as a person. My sincerest thanks go to Alp who has undoubtedly helped make this work what it is through his guidance, support and encouragement, and who has demonstrated his confidence in me by working with me on numerous projects external to my PhD. I hope this friendship and professional working relationship continues well into the future.

To all those mentioned, and all those not mentioned but who influenced in some way this PhD, I again offer my deepest thanks. I am grateful for all you have done for me whether or not I expressed it at the time.

Declaration

I declare that this thesis is entirely my own work. Various presentations have been given using the results of this research and have been referenced where appropriate.

Chapter One:

Reconciliation in the Post-conflict Environment (PCE)

1.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the issue of reconciliation in the post-conflict environment. Reconciliation is a particularly significant concept as it represents something of a paradox within post-conflict reconstruction. At the end of violent conflict, reconciliation represents one of the key goals or objectives of the overall reconstruction effort. So too, however, does it represent the greatest of challenges in this effort. The building of a peaceful, cohesive society in which previously conflicting factions co-exist in harmony and the initial causes of conflict are eliminated is, on the one hand, the point at which one can claim success. On the other hand, however, is the difficulty in following a process of reconciliation as will become apparent.

In order to understand the process of reconciliation it is vital that one has an accurate comprehension of challenges such a process faces. For this reason the chapter begins by examining the immediate post-conflict environment. The chapter then moves on to consider reconciliation as a contested concept with different approaches and perspectives. It is here that the chapter introduces a number of these into a discussion of the definition of reconciliation. This provides the basis from which the development of our understanding of reconciliation and its role in conflict transformation and peacebuilding can take place. The next section considers the more contentious questions that the pursuit of reconciliation may give rise to, specifically examining whether or not reconciliation is a desirable and/or possible achievement. This is important as it enhances our understanding of the process as a whole. After deliberating on what reconciliation is, the chapter then turns its attention to how it can be achieved. This discussion begins by firstly considering conventional approaches to reconciliation such as truth commission, tribunals and reparations. It then moves on to contemplate indigenous approaches to reconciliation.

1.2 Imagining the Post-conflict Environment

Prior to the end of colonialism in the 1950s and 60s, the twentieth century was characterised by interstate conflict. However, in the 1960s, intrastate conflict outnumbered interstate conflict by more than 2-to-1, with this ratio rising to 5-to-1 by 1990 (Long & Brecke, 2003). The post-Colonial and post-Cold war era, along with the collapse of the USSR and Yugoslavia, has become synonymous with a period of increased intrastate conflict and tension, in which traditional diplomatic and reconciliatory activities have found themselves lacking. Indeed, between 1989 and 2006 there were 122 armed conflicts in the world, of which 115 were intrastate conflicts (Harbom & Wallensteen, 2007). As a result of these conflicts the problem of refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) has also grown with an estimated 16m refugees and 26m IDPs around the world in 2007 (UNHCR, 2008). This compounds the problems faced by those engaging in reconstruction efforts, as these groups must also be addressed. With the changing nature of conflict has come the increased need to address these conflicts, and the consequential situations, in a more robust and dynamic fashion taking account of the vast difference between intrastate and interstate conflicts in terms of their effects. Indeed, as Charles W. Kegley Jr. states when paraphrasing John F. Kennedy, "*the end of the Cold war competition changes all the answers and all the questions*" (1993: 141). The design and implementation of reconstruction activities in the PCE is therefore heavily dependent on an accurate understanding of the challenges facing that environment and for that reason it is necessary to develop such an understanding.

To begin, what then is the cause of intrastate conflict? Intrastate conflicts emerge due to a complex variety of reasons. At a theoretical level social change of some sort occurs and leads to the emergence of conflict. Conflict is, however, not necessarily a negative phenomena and what is important here is the way in which the society responds to the emerging conflict. Should the society be defined by dominant or coercive relationships the likelihood exists that structural conflict would emerge². If polarisation and/or violent political mobilisation are evident violent conflict would result. Where these emerging conflicts can be accommodated society would be a mix of conflict and

² Structural conflict arises due to Structural violence, a term Galtung utilised to refer to the violence caused by unregulated societal structures which effectively allow the strong to victimise the weak who are unable to protect themselves (Galtung, 1969).

cooperation with underlying or latent tensions and, in the case that emerging conflicts can undergo transformation, peaceful change can ensue. This can be seen in the diagram below developed.




Figure 1 – Four Paths for Conflict: Miall (2007: 13)

What will determine the result of the social change and emergent conflict is a combination of societal capacity and conflict triggers. If society has the capacity to manage the conflict then at least a situation of cooperation amidst latent tension can arise and, if societal capacity is greater and conflict management can lead to conflict transformation³ then an environment of peace is possible. However, should societal capacity not be adequate to at least manage the conflict and various conflict triggers are discharged then violent conflict will materialise. Conflict triggers are those characteristics of conflict that light the touch paper resulting in the descent into violent conflict. Such triggers are highly context specific and an accurate understanding of any violent conflict must be preceded by a comprehensive conflict analysis of the given

³ Conflict transformation refers to the “*deep transformation in the institutions and discourses that reproduce violence, as well as in the conflict parties themselves and their relationships*” (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 29). It therefore represents “*a change in the goals, structure, parties, or context of the conflict, which removes or changes the contradiction or incompatibility at its heart*” (Miall, 2007: 14). Conflict transformation goes further than conflict containment, management and resolution to include the structural and cultural elements of the peace building process. For further reading on conflict transformation see, among others, Galtung (1969 & 1996), Lederach (1995), Wallensteen (2007).

conflict. Nevertheless, there are several prominent characteristics contributing to the outbreak of intrastate conflict that are shared by most cases. These are:

- *Ethnic groups seeking greater autonomy or striving to create an independent state for themselves*
- *Internal battles fought to gain control of an existing state*
- *“Failed States” where the authority of a national government has collapsed and armed struggle has broken out between the competing ethnic militias, warlords or criminal organisations seeking to obtain power and establish control of the state*
- *Impoverished states where there exists a situation of individual hardship or severe dissatisfaction with one’s situation and the absence of any non-violent means for change (Walter, 2004)*

(Kegley & Wittkopf, 2005: 420)

Understanding the specific causes behind a given intrastate conflict is crucial to the effective reconstruction of the post-conflict environment. So too however, is an appreciation of said environment, that is, the impacts of the conflict on the society in question. Indeed, it is only through an accurate comprehension of the challenges that face the reconstruction effort, and the threats to such efforts, that any durable restoration can take place. As with the causes of conflict, the impacts of conflict are context specific; however comparisons can be drawn from a consideration of intrastate conflicts.

Violent conflict of any nature results in explicit material and human costs to a society and this is certainly the case in intrastate conflicts. In terms of physical infrastructure roads, bridges, schools, hospitals and administrative buildings are destroyed and very often mines are laid making it difficult to engage in infrastructural reconstruction. Resources such as diamonds, gold, oil and other minerals, along with cash crops and land are destroyed or appropriated by conflicting factions to enable the continuation of their war efforts, thus reducing the prospects for economic revival in the post-conflict period. Watercourses and wells may be poisoned or polluted, either deliberately or as a consequence of dead bodies, mass migrations of people or military discharge, resulting in mid to long-term water supply and associated developmental problems. The physical devastation of conflict has disastrous effects on economic development through reduced

production, falling exports, increased debt and decreased social expenditure (Stewart & Fitzgerald, 2001). In fact, *“the typical civil war puts development into reverse, reducing pre-war incomes in directly affected countries by 15 percent on average, and reducing growth in neighbouring countries on average by 0.5 percent per annum”* (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 73 citing Collier et al, 2003: 2). Although both infrastructure and economy are shattered by conflict it is the human and social costs of conflict that are so devastating, both directly and indirectly.

As the nature of conflict has changed from interstate to intrastate so too has its toll on human life. Throughout the 20th Century the World has been witness to increasing proportions of civilian deaths in conflict with approximately 90 percent of war victims being soldiers at the beginning of the 20th Century compared to 90 percent of conflict casualties being civilians in the 1990s (Cairns, 1997). In addition to this *“attacks and atrocities against non-combatants became widely employed as deliberate strategies of warfare – including such tactics as systematic rape, mass executions, ethnic cleansing, and even genocide”* (Paris, 2004: 1). The human and social cost of conflict does not end here. Mass migrations within and between countries reduce human security through environmental degradation, inadequate sanitation, increased health problems, lack of access to food and physical insecurity, thus giving rise to further humanitarian emergencies. The physical costs of war contribute to human and social costs through damage to hospitals, schools, roads and bridges, vital in the provision of necessary services and access to markets (if they are functioning), which make reconstruction efforts all the more complex. The destruction and mining of farmland and roads reduce the chances for economic revival, presenting further challenges to the survivors of the conflict who cannot resurrect a sustainable livelihood and the lingering threat to physical security reduces the changes for those who can.

The direct and indirect results of intrastate conflict leave a complex lasting legacy that is difficult to erase. Economies need to be stabilised and developed, infrastructure needs to be rebuilt and institutional renewal or replacement needs to take place. However, arguably the greatest challenge in the removal of the legacy of violent conflict and the reconstruction of the country is the re-establishment of society. Indeed,

Societies emerging from war face a range of urgent, interconnected problems on all fronts, not too dissimilar to situations of natural

disasters. However, it is the destruction of relationships, including the loss of trust, dignity, confidence and faith in others that proves the most far reaching, potent and destructive problem and the most difficult to address. It has the potential to undermine possible solutions to a wide range of other issues.

(Barakat, 2005: 10)

Education systems are adversely affected by the war, health systems are unable to cope with increasing demands and social institutions become dilapidated or non-existent. However, the challenge of rebuilding these institutions and systems beset by extreme destruction becomes all the more daunting when one takes into account that *“intimate exposure to brutality and subsequent displacement and civil disorder leave individuals psychologically scarred and the intricate network of social interaction deeply torn”* (McDonald, 2002: 4). As trust is diminished, cooperation and communication reduce and fear increases resulting in the stagnation of societal activity and development. In the absence of communication further fractionalisation of society first becomes possible and is then exacerbated as when such division is *“linked with acute social uncertainty, a history of conflict and, indeed, fear of what the future may bring; it emerges as one of the major fault lines along which [society] fractures”* (Newland, 1993:191). It is dialogue that is necessary to stabilise and sustain societal relations as *“dialogue is the first step in providing a sense of belonging, for by communication and listening we take the first step toward recognizing our own commonality”* (Aboulmagd et al, 2001: 37) however constructive dialogue in such an environment is difficult to achieve.

The impact of intrastate conflict on social interactions and systems is evident with community dislocation across many levels being the result. Individual suffering is significant and this has intrinsic implications for the survival of the family, which represents the nucleus of the community. Individuals struggle to rebuild their lives and communities whilst faced with the uncertainty of the future and fear of the past. With everything around them broken, and the causes of the conflict very often remaining, albeit in a latent form, the potential for societal renewal is depleted. Weak social capacity to manage social change and emergent conflict (as evident by the fact that violent conflict broke out) is further undermined and the society’s capacity to manage future conflicts in a peaceful way is lessened (Miall, 2001). The result of this is a reduced ability to recover from intrastate conflict and an increased probability of

conflict renewal. This creates an altogether problematic paradox when one considers the words of Sultan Barakat, “*post-war reconstruction begins in the hearts and minds of those who suffer the horrors of war and want to change societies so that there is no return to mass violence*” (2005: 1). How then do war-torn communities with reduced capacity set about their reconstruction? The reconciliation of conflicting factions evidently is necessary, not only in its own right as a outcome of post-conflict reconstruction efforts, but also as a means of achieving other outcomes in such efforts. It is, therefore, necessary to examine in more depth the concept of reconciliation, which will then enable a consideration of the ways in which the reconciliation process may impact on conflict transformation and peacebuilding⁴.

1.3 Reconciliation Examined

The notion of reconciliation has been one that has received interest since ancient times and has, it can be argued, been pivotal to the survival of human society. From the ancient Greeks and Romans to Medieval English literature and beyond, the concept of reconciliation has been applied in attempts to comprehend human behaviour and develop coping systems for conflict. Indeed, the Old Testament of the Bible bears witness to struggles of reconciliation. However, one could claim that prior to the 1950s and 60s our understanding of reconciliation was very much in its infancy as it was not until the end of colonialism (and later, the end of the Cold War) that the need for reconciliation was so vital.

Despite the notion of reconciliation being a concept of increasing importance and interest there is, at present, no clear consensus as to its definition. A very simple definition is provided by Ramsbotham et al who state that, “*reconciliation – restoring broken relationships and learning to live non-violently with radical differences – can be seen as the ultimate goal of conflict resolution*” (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 231). Although this classification does not present a comprehensive understanding of reconciliation, and indeed one could not expect the term to be defined in such a short

⁴ Peacebuilding is the term used to define the actions taken at the end of a civil conflict that have the aim of consolidating the peace in order to ensure it is sustainable and a reoccurrence of the violence will not eventuate. In the words of Kofi Annan, the aim of peacebuilding is “*to create the conditions necessary for sustainable peace that would endure long after the departure of the peacebuilders themselves*” (Annan, 1999: para. 101). For further discussion on peacebuilding see, among others, Lederach (1997), Maiese (2003), Paris (2004) and Richmond (2005).

statement, it does pave the way for a deeper understanding. The assertion made by Ramsbotham et al introduces the issue of reconciliation as being a goal and certainly simplistic understanding of reconciliation may also tend towards this view. However reconciliation is in fact both a goal, that is, something to achieve, and a process, that is, a way of achieving that goal (Bloomfield et al, 2003).

On viewing reconciliation as a goal one may claim that it is an aspiration for the future; an ideal state to which conflicting factions should seek in which disparate groups are bound together into a genuine society. When considering what such an ideal state may resemble, Whittaker advocates *“a reconciled community assimilates rather than discriminates, promulgates humane and legal rights, does its best to dissolve alienation and fear, encourages people to share values and develop congenial relationships, and promotes a hope that material benefits will accrue as a product of peaceful transactions and independence”* (1999: 8). It is however relatively clear that in order to arrive at such an ideal it is necessary to engage in a *process* of reconciliation and it is this process that most authors concentrate on. For Bloomfield et al (2003),

Reconciliation is an over-arching process, which involves the search for truth, justice, forgiveness, healing and so on. At its simplest it means finding a way to live alongside former enemies – not necessarily to love them, or forgive them, or forget the past in any way, but to coexist with them, to develop the degree of cooperation necessary to share our society with them, so that we will all have better lives together than we had separately.

(2003: 12)

The above quote reiterates the procedural nature of reconciliation. At its base level reconciliation entails the acceptance of what is not an ideal outcome and takes place at all levels of difference and throughout the conflict spectrum – difference, contradiction, polarisation, violence, war, ceasefire, agreement, normalisation, reconciliation⁵. Pursuing reconciliation is, however, most difficult after violent conflict as during the process of conflict *“too much has happened, too many relations have been severed, too many norms violated, too many identities distorted, too many traumas endured. To reach the transformation levels of bridging differences and restoring trust requires a*

⁵ For an analysis of the conflict spectrum see Figures 1.2 & 1.3 Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 11/12.

capacity for innovation and creative renewal likely to be beyond the capacity of many societies in the aftermath of violence" (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 233). When we consider the societal effects of violent conflict, as asserted here and in the previous section, it is evident that the process of reconciliation will be a long and arduous journey. Violent conflict exacerbates previously existent social cleavages but it also adds an emotional element to the situation, which further intensifies division between groups.

Reconciliation can therefore be seen as "*part of a process of forgiveness, transforming certain emotions (moving from anger to affinity) and transcending certain beliefs about oneself and the other, that opens the possibility of new, beneficial relations*" (Long & Brecke, 2003: 23). The course of forgiveness however does not run smoothly. Forgiveness, particularly between collectivities, takes time and effort to consummate and is a highly complex process. There is no guarantee that all members of opposing sides will be willing to actively engage in a process of forgiveness. It is because of this that Whittaker asserts "*the further stage of securing an integrated community rather than a fractured one depends on individual and group preparedness to make concessions for the sake of tolerance and civilised behaviour*" (1999: 7). The issue of forgiveness is inextricable with the pursuit of reconciliation; however Rigby makes an important distinction between the two: forgiveness relates to forgiving the past whereas reconciliation is concerned with building the future. That said however, forgiveness and a willingness to accept and engage in a shared future are necessities for successful reconciliation to take place (Rigby, 2001).

When considering the importance of forgiveness and reconciliation it is important to make clear distinctions in the transformation from conflict to peace, in particular, notions of negative and positive peace, as this will, invariably, dictate the nature of the reconciliation process pursued. Negative peace can be seen as the absence of war and has been the conventional pursuit of those operating in traditional diplomatic activities. According to this view peace is therefore found whenever war or other direct forms of conflict and violence are not present. However, due to the causes attributed to recent intrastate conflicts, the ferocity of these conflicts, and the impact they have on an increasingly globalised world, the desire for what has been termed positive peace has been prevalent. In the words of Betty Reardon, "*the concept of positive peace emerges from the belief that mere intervals between outbreaks of warfare do not constitute the*

true opposite of war or violence, and that a second, more permanent approach to peace is therefore essential" (1990:4).

The positive peace premise rests on the principle that "*peace is more than the mere absence of war or even the absence of interstate violence*" (Barash & Webel, 2002: 6); this due to the recognition that of the existence of three types of violence: direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence (Galtung, 1985, Brand-Jacobsen, 2002). Direct violence is exemplified by physical acts of violence that may occur during violent conflict. Structural violence is "*violence built into the very social, political and economic systems that govern societies, states and the world. It is the different allocation of goods, resources, opportunities, between different groups, classes, genders, nationalities, etc., because of the structure governing their relationship*" (Brand-Jacobsen, 2002: 17). Cultural violence can be expressed on two levels: first, the way in which a culture may legitimise or accept violence as an acceptable means through which to deal with conflict. Second, the way in which communities or individuals "*view themselves in relation to themselves, to 'others', to their community, to the world, and how this may affect out responses to conflict*" (Brand-Jacobsen, 2002: 18).

Taking into account these three forms of violence it becomes apparent that 'true' peace cannot be only the absence of physical violence and thus positive peace should be pursued. Such positive peace is sought through the promotion of social justice, economic development, and participatory political processes and as such, "*positive peace focuses on peace building, the establishment of nonexploitative social structures,, and a determination to work towards that goal even when war is not ongoing or imminent*" which calls for "*cooperation, harmony, equity, justice and love*" (Barash & Webel, 2002: 8/9). One can claim then, that the process of reconciliation encompasses the transition from negative to positive peace as the development of an inclusive, equitable, just and harmonious society after a violent conflict must entail the process of reconciliation to some degree.

The final classification of reconciliation I consider comes from the eminent John Paul Lederach whose seminal publication *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* breaks new ground in our understanding of reconciliation. Lederach introduces the concept of reconciliation as both a process and a place which he argues,

enables a more innovative approach that is needed when applied to contemporary intrastate conflict (Lederach, 1997). This is particularly the case because:

The nature of contemporary settings of armed conflict – where neighbour fears neighbour and sometimes family member fears family member, and where each shed blood – makes the emotive, perceptual, social-psychological, and spiritual dimensions core, not peripheral, concerns. The immediacy of hatred and prejudice, of racism and xenophobia, as primary factors and motivators of the conflict means that its transformation must be rooted in social-psychological and spiritual dimensions that traditionally have been seen as either irrelevant or outside the competency of international diplomacy. Reconciliation, seen as a process of encounter and social space, points us in that direction.

(Lederach, 1997: 29)

The notion of reconciliation as a process and a place that Lederach presents comes from a Spanish translation of Psalm 85 in which it reads, “*Truth and mercy have meet together, peace and justice have kissed*”⁶. This represents the place in which conflicting groups come together and work through the process of reconciliation. That process includes: *truth* which can be seen as the acknowledgement of wrongdoing, pain and suffering; *mercy* which is the need for acceptance, forgiveness and the search for a new beginning; *justice* which represents individual and group rights, social restructuring and restitution; and *peace* which emphasises the need for interdependence, well-being and security (Lederach, 1997). The place called reconciliation in which this process takes place is exemplified in the following diagram.

⁶ Psalm 85: 10 cited in Lederach, 1997: 28.




Figure 2 – The Place Called Reconciliation: Lederach (1997: 30)

Lederach's model of reconciliation offers something new to the field as it brings emphasis to the specific challenges of reconciliation after contemporary, intrastate conflict; however it also complements other theorists who advocate the need for similar outcomes of the reconciliation process as considered above. Having examined the concept of reconciliation further how then does it facilitate conflict transformation and the peacebuilding process?

1.4 Conflict Transformation and Peacebuilding: What Role for Reconciliation?

When considering reconciliation many questions arise as to the benefits of certain aspects of the reconciliation process. For instance, *is there a trade off between making peace and pursuing justice? Does the truth heal? Is a reconciled society possible or desirable after divisive conflict?* In exploring these questions, and others, it becomes apparent as to how the pursuit of reconciliation aids conflict transformation and peacebuilding and indeed, is an integral part of it. At the very least, it engenders a deeper understanding of the complexities and challenges posed by the reconciliation process.

A recurrent problem faced by scholars and practitioners of reconciliation is the potential for a perceived trade off between peace and justice. This comes to pass due to the apparent need to forgo some degree of justice in order to achieve peace. As Baker states:

Should peace be sought at any price to end the bloodshed, even if power-sharing arrangements fail to uphold basic human rights and democratic principles? Or should the objective be a democratic peace that respects human rights, a goal that might prolong the fighting and risk more atrocities in the time that it takes to reach a negotiated solution?

(1996: 564)

The dilemma with this conundrum lays not so much in the moral or ethical questions that may arise out of the situation but in the pragmatic veracity that if a political settlement is considered unjust it will not be supported. Therefore, if the pursuit of justice is considered by the perpetrators to be too dogmatic there may be little incentive for them to enter or remain in negotiations. Conversely, if the victims deem the degree of justice sought insufficient their ability to accept the settlement will diminish. Is it possible for individual and communities to engage in collective amnesia? Is it a realistic assumption that individuals and community can forgo the natural desire for vengeance?

Addressing the later question Shriver Jr. places emphasis on the need for the restoration of civil society in order to break the cycle of revenge; “*When murder is massive, as in state-sponsored violence, the case against revenge hinges on strategies for the rescue of civil society. Nothing eats away at the ‘glue’ of civic order so surely as cycles of escalating revenge and counterrevenge. The question often is: Which side will take a first step to interrupt the cycle?*” (1999: 212). Whilst the strengthening of civil society is indeed important in order to break the cycle of revenge and counterrevenge it is arguable that this is not a sufficient condition. Individuals and communities may be able to quell their desire for vengeance but can they be expected not to seek justice? Smith argues that retributive justice, that is, justice that is based on retaliation for the crime, is in effect another form of vengeance and that there is a distinct need for restorative justice which, “*in contrast to conventional forms of retaliation or retributive*

justice, seeks to rectify not only violations of law perpetrated by offenders against their victims, but also the larger social relations that are impaired by such violations" (Smith, 2005: 35). The importance of restorative justice is also accentuated by Shriver Jr. when he argues that a balance must be struck between the punishment of perpetrators and, "*a justice that promises a new measure of peace*" (2001: 31).

Restorative justice appears to offer a balance between seeking a dogmatic, retributive justice and allowing perpetrators to 'get away with' their crimes that will be more likely to lead to a mutually acceptable political and social settlement that will engage both sides of the conflict. A vital component of this settlement is the process of truth telling and, as such, the issue of amnesia becomes redundant, as this is incongruent to restorative justice. However, although it is apparent that truth is instrumental to the establishment of justice, it is not as apparent that truth actually heals. In fact, "*in the process of national reconciliation it is those who have suffered most, the victims, who are usually asked to make the greatest efforts to reconcile. It is their forgiveness that puts the past to rest. Victims are asked to exchange the recognition of their pain, and its origins, for their rights to justice*" (Humphrey, 2002: 107/8)⁷.

While some claim that 'revealing is healing' and that the process of truth-telling throughout the judicial procedure does as much for the victims in terms of their individual healing process as it does for the establishment of justice (Rigby, 2001; Ramsbotham et al, 2005) the contrary argument highlights the fact that the process of truth-telling is inherently painful and problematic. As Hayes states; "*Just revealing is not just healing. It depends on how we reveal, the context of the revealing, and what it is we are revealing*" (1998: 43). There is therefore, a need to contextualise the process of truth-telling within the social, political and cultural environments in which the conflict took place but also in which the reconciliation process is situated (Hamber, 2001).

The issues highlighted above are such to focus our attention to the intrinsic difficulties in achieving reconciliation in that they challenge the notion of reconciliation being beneficial. The third question which asked, '*Is a reconciled society possible or desirable after divisive conflict?*' shall be addressed after the following section which will state the case for reconciliation.

⁷ This quotation is taken from Humphrey who is paraphrasing Jacobs (2007) and Minow (2000).

One can argue that reconciliation is both necessary and possible for a simple reason; without some degree of reconciliation the human race cannot survive and prosper. Within social groups conflict is inevitable; however it is the ability to forgive and the process of reconciliation that enables us to explicate ourselves from this recurrent dilemma. Without such mechanisms "*our capacity to act would as it were, be confined to one single deed [conflict] from which we would never recover; we would remain the victims of its consequences for ever, not unlike the sorcerer's apprentice who lacked the magic formula to break the spell*" (Arendt, 1989: 237). By pursuing an agenda of reconciliation and peace the likelihood of future violence diminishes and social development can be facilitated. Herein lies the role reconciliation plays in the conflict transformation process.

Reconciliation brings with it several forms of peace: individual peace, community peace, national peace and regional peace. Although, as highlighted above, the telling of truths can be severely distressing and traumatic for the victims of conflict, "*such reflection on the past is as necessary as it is painful because a divided society can only build its shared future out of its divided past*" (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 15). Therefore if community peace is to be restored it is necessary for individuals to engage in the process of truth-telling and if this process is managed effectively, taking into account the social, political and cultural context, it can provide an avenue through which individuals can establish peace within themselves. Having a platform from which one can engage in the truth-telling process can "*help to make victims whole again, both individually and as a group, and give them a sense of personal vindication*" (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 126). In effect, therefore, activities aimed at facilitating reconciliation contribute significantly to the deconstruction of the institutions, structures and discourses that promote division and incompatibility and replacing them with conventions and dialogue that encourage tolerance, interdependence and affinity, thus transforming the conflict and paving the way for peacebuilding measures.

With the establishment of individual and community peace, the conditions for regional peace are more favourable, which is particularly significant considering contemporary conflict has increasingly taken a regional dimension. Taking the case of Africa, the Great Lakes region has seen conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi, Uganda and Rwanda, all of which have been linked and have had significant negative

effects for the security and development of the area. Similarly in southern Africa conflict has arisen in South Africa, Namibia, Mozambique, Angola and Zimbabwe. In West Africa, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Nigeria and Cote D'Ivoire have all experienced conflict in the post-independence period. In East/Horn of Africa conflict has been waged in Ethiopia/Eritrea, Somalia and Kenya. North Africa has experienced conflict in Sudan, Chad, Niger and Algeria. Barely any country in Africa has been free from conflict, either through active participation or the ensuing security and refugee problems, and the importance of effective reconciliation has never been more important. The need for reconciliation in these areas is, and has been, great not only due to the scale of the conflict but also their complexities. Reconciliatory measures are, and have been, essential to the successful transformations of these conflicts and the prevention of further escalation, along with the building of peace in individual, war-torn countries and the regions of which they are a part.

A further significant argument for the benefit of reconciliation is the importance it has in establishing democracy and good governance. This is because "*reconciliation underpins democracy by developing working relationships necessary for its successful implementation*" (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 11). Without reconciliation after a conflict it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to build an effective democracy as the proclivity for social cleavages to translate into exclusionary policies would be increased. Similarly, for good governance to be in existence it is particularly necessary for formal and informal institutions to be cultivated (Leftwich, 2004). The norms, values and beliefs that underpin formal and informal institutions need to be shared in principal if those institutions are to be successful; they also need to be 'positive' if such institutions are to be beneficial for societal development. The reconciliation process provides an avenue through which past differences can be resolved or at least dealt with in a constructive way and through this process there is opportunity to generate shared norms, values and beliefs that can aid democracy and good governance. In the PCE this represents the peacebuilding process in which the necessary conditions for consolidating sustainable peace can be developed.

Reconciliation therefore epitomises a fundamental aspect of the post-conflict reconstruction process and it can be argued that the goal of reconciliation should be sought through the process of reconciliation. However, in thinking about the difficulty in achieving reconciliation we will always return to the same question: *Is a reconciled*

society possible or desirable after divisive conflict? When considering Northern Ireland, Porter reflects on obstacles the peace process has had to face and poses the following: “*Perhaps, then, since the quest for peace is hard enough and apparently cannot be won without concessions from all sides, the more exacting requirements of reconciliation should be set aside for another time, if not dropped altogether. Perhaps to insist upon them is to unduly burden the peace process*” (2003: 39). This, Porter argues, is the case for a number of reasons but three in particular: indifference, fear and bitterness.

Indifference may arise when political apathy is apparent in conjunction with proportions of the population experiencing relatively limited affects of the conflict. This may lead to a cost-benefit analysis in which it is believed that “*peace, minimally defined⁸, is to be valued if for no other reason than that violence and the security measures necessary to counteract it are irritating inconveniences; but reconciliation has no comparable value since, if taken seriously, it promises only unwelcome intrusions into more or less settled lifestyles*” (Porter, 2003: 40). Fear, on the other hand, promotes political engagement as it represents deep commitment to a way of life that is deemed to be under threat. “*Fear of losing one’s identity through too many concessions being granted to one’s opponents, perhaps fear of losing power, influence and position of dominance*” (Porter, 2003: 41) encourages opposition to the reconciliation process and acts as a barrier to a harmonious future. Bitterness is perhaps the most enduring obstacle the reconciliation process faces as reconciliation requires forgiveness and this is often perceived as being “*too exacting as it demands more than the emotional and moral resources many victims are capable of mustering and because it seems to set an impossibly high standard of virtue*” (Porter, 2003: 43).

The argument put forward by Porter is an important one as it highlights the key impasses encountered in the planning for, and process of, reconciliation. Without a doubt reconciliation is problematic: it is faced with ‘spoilers’⁹; it is painful; it is protracted; it is infinitely complex; and it is fragile. However, it is necessary. Unless a society experiencing conflict can be effectively partitioned¹⁰, then the citizens of that

⁸ That is the absence of violent conflict, or presence of negative peace.

⁹ ‘Spoilers’ are those individuals or groups who engage in spoiling behaviour that obstruct or undermine conflict settlements and peacebuilding efforts for whatever reasons. For more on this see Newman & Richmond (Eds) (2006).

¹⁰ Effective participation after civil war can be extremely problematic either if any of the conflicting parties does not agree with the partition or the underlying causes of the conflict are not addressed. Partitioning may result in renewed conflict over territory or take on an increased international dimension

society face two options: find a way to co-exist and eventually reconcile their differences or continue in violent conflict until one side dominates. Throughout the analysis of reconciliation it is increasingly evident that the process is a highly complex, problematic and arduous one. It requires enormous commitment, willingness and sacrifice from all sides and there can be no guarantees the process will be successful. However, peace without reconciliation represents negative peace and with it an acceptance to live within a divided society. It is for this reason that the process of full reconciliation should be pursued despite its inherent difficulties. The subsequent section of this chapter examines the tools available for the pursuit of reconciliation whilst taking into account the problems identified with this process and addresses the measures taken to resolve these issues.

1.5 Reconciliation Tools

1.5.1 Conventional Reconciliation Techniques

When examining the process of reconciliation it is useful to consider the four dimensions of reconciliation described by Ramsbotham et al. Essentially reconciliation begins through acquiescence of what is not yet an ideal outcome – ‘I am reconciled to my fate’. It then moves into the reconciling of accounts, the comparison and correlation of stories to the point where they are no longer fatally incompatible. The third is ‘reconciling opposites’ or bridging differences, enabling the possibility of mutual change in order for mutual benefit. The final type is ‘reconciliation between former enemies’ where past antagonisms are set aside and new relationships are forged within the resultant emotional space (Ramsbotham et al, 2005). This is a linear process; it is not possible to get to the fourth stage without passing through each of the three previous stages despite them not constituting full reconciliation. *“For reconciliation to be possible there usually needs to be sufficient acceptance by former enemies of the legitimacy of post-war rule of law, sufficient correlation of accounts to allow truth commissions and trials to diffuse issues of rectificatory justice, and sufficient bridging of differences through compensation, reparation or structural adjustments to deliver*

as each faction seeks support from sympathetic states. Examples of this can be seen in Israel-Palestine, Kosovo-Serbia, Northern Ireland, and more recently Georgia-South Ossetia.

adequate prospects of improved distributive justice in future” (Ramsbotham et al, 2005: 236). These dimensions are captured in the following table.

Aspects of Reconciliation	Stages of Conflict De-escalation
1. Accepting the status quo	Ending violence
2. Correlating accounts	Overcoming polarisation
3. Bridging opposites	Managing contradiction
4. Reconstituting relations	Celebrating difference

Table 1 – The Four Dimensions of Reconciliation: Ramsbotham et al (2005: 232)

- The process of reconciliation put forward by Ramsbotham et al is also supported to some extent by Bloomfield et al (2003) who demarcates three stages of reconciliation. The first stage is the replacing of fear with non-violent coexistence representing an initial step away from hostility and requiring, at a minimum, a search for alternatives to revenge. *“The move towards such coexistence requires first of all that victims and perpetrators be freed from the paralysing isolation and all-consuming self-pity in which they often live. This involves the building or renewal of communication inside the communities of victims and offenders and between them”* (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 20). When coexistence is established the second stage of reconciliation can be entered in which fear no longer rules and confidence and trust can be fostered. In order to achieve this each party needs to develop a renewed confidence in him/herself and the ‘other’ and acknowledge their respective humanity. Part of this stage is the individualisation of guilt so that whole communities are not held responsible. The final stage is the movement towards empathy, which *“comes with the victims’ willingness to listen to the reasons for the hatred of those who caused their pain and with the offenders’ understanding of the anger and bitterness of those who suffered”* (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 21). By creating an understanding of each other’s suffering it is possible to share a common identity.

Within the processes proposed by both Ramsbotham et al and Bloomfield et al, for effective reconciliation to occur there is a need to acknowledge the past and deal with it so as to prepare the ground for the building of a shared future (Lederach, 1997). Societies therefore, will be situated at some point on the spectrum of amnesia ranging from a policy of ‘forgive and forget’ to the pursuit of vengeance; truth commissions and

public trials lie in between these two. The path a society takes is dependant on its ability to forgive. Ramsbotham et al (2005) offer six policy choices a society may take in order to achieve reconciliation, which also correspond with much of Bloomfield et al.'s (2003) writing:

1) Official Amnesia – 'letting go of the past'.

Various conflicts ended with a collective commitment to leave the past in the past, for example, the Spanish civil war and Cambodia. However, as previously observed, a policy of forgetting can be problematic to follow and can impede true reconciliation.

2) Truth Commissions – 'honouring the past'.

Truth commissions lie somewhere between the 'Nuremberg [trials] and national amnesia' (Tutu, 1999). The aim of a truth commission is to enable societal reconciliation through avoiding calls for vengeance on one hand and disregard for wrongdoing and suffering on the other. Public disclosure of atrocities and attempts to harmonise conflicting versions of the past, in addition to generating acknowledgement of responsibility and regret, can enable the creation of emotional space in which forgiveness, accommodation and assimilation can take place. In this sense the truth commission facilitates truth telling and provides historical justice. Although they do not guarantee retributive justice they provide a public platform for victims to establish the truth regarding the past and promote accountability of atrocities. This helps to promote individual healing and social reconciliation whilst also consolidating a democratic transition (Bloomfield et al, 2003). Truth commissions can however foster and promote unrealistic expectations among victims, which may result in frustrations and further distress and antagonisms. In particular, it is vital that truth commissioners remain unbiased otherwise the ability for commission to make an objective and complete account of the past would be fatally flawed.

3) Trials – 'bringing the past before the tribunal of the present'.

Some view national or international tribunals as an alternative to truth commissions, however they can also be highly complementary (Ramsbotham et al, 2005) as "*without establishing a culture or law and order, and without satisfying the very deep need of*

victims for acknowledgement and retribution, there is little hope of escaping future cyclical outbreaks of violence" (Goldstone, 1997: 107). Justice is significant for the reconciliation process and can be sought on several levels. Retributive justice based on prosecution of perpetrators may satisfy the victim's desire for atonement and it certainly has a place in the reconciliation process, usually in the form of national and international tribunals. There are critics to such tribunals, namely those indicated or supporters of those indicated who claim tribunals to be a political tool of their enemies. Despite such resistance it appears evident that criminal tribunals have their place in the reconciliation process as exemplified in the Balkans (the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – ICTY) and Rwanda (the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda – ICTR). The success of retributive justice in facilitating reconciliation is, however, difficult in cases such as Rwanda¹¹ and it is in such situations that only the most serious perpetrators are tried before national and international tribunals. Restorative justice, which seeks to place the victim at the centre of importance and to restore community relations, is often pursued through mediation and is increasingly used as a tool for grassroots reconciliation within close-knit communities.

4) *Reparations – 'future compensation for the past'*.

Compensation offered to survivors and families of victims is widely recognised as a form of justice and has constituted a part of truth commissions. Although in theory the idea of compensation seems commendable, in practice victims rarely receive much and the distribution of compensation appears to be conducted in an arbitrary fashion. Reparations are used as a means of redressing past wrongs and follow a number of guises. Restitution is the re-establishment of the situation prior to wrongdoing and has traditionally been the favoured form of reparation "*as it relates to essential 'belongings', such as the return of property, the restoration of liberty, citizenship and other legal rights, the return to place of residence and the restoration of employment*" (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 145). Compensation is the payment of money in recognition of past wrongdoing. Rehabilitation is the restoration of one's physical and psychological health, which very often involves a state sponsored medical and psychological programme. Satisfaction applies to those methods of redress that do not address

¹¹ This is because of the large number of genocide perpetrators, known and unknown, which make it very difficult to pursue retributive justice with each.

individual losses or harm, for example, the verification of the facts and disclosure of the truth, an apology, sanctions against wrongdoers and commemorations and tributes to victims (Bloomfield et al, 2003). Although reparations may not appear significantly beneficial to the reconciliation process they do signal an important commitment on the part of the State to uphold the rule of law and guarantee individual rights. By demonstrating an acknowledgement of the suffering of victims, and making attempts to redress such suffering, through reparations it is possible for individuals and communities to move on from the past.

5) Ritual healing – ‘exorcising the past’.

The role of traditional healers and lineage leaders as a method of reconciliation has been acknowledged with increasing respect in the social reconstruction of countries such as Mozambique and Somaliland and is regarded as a significant contribution to grassroots peacebuilding. In many countries violence is attributed to being possessed by bad spirits and as such reconciliation can be facilitated through public cleansing ceremonies. Indigenous techniques such as these have enormous potential to reconcile communities at the grassroots level at which the deepest suffering has been experienced (Gastrow, 1995).

6) Retaliation – ‘cleaning the slate by avenging the past’.

Counter to the previous five policy opportunities a policy of retaliation perpetuates the violence for at least another cycle and carries the danger of protracted conflict. Some societies are characterised by clan-based reprisal and vendetta, for example the Balkans, in which conflicts can only be resolved and relations reformed when the balance of justice is restored through reprisal. Such beliefs centre on an approach along the lines of ‘an eye for an eye’ and are seen by many as the only way in which conflicts can be resolved. This, of course, goes against the grain of conflict resolution theory and the pursuit of reconciliation but in instances in which hatred and bitterness is so great it seems unlikely that reconciliation may be possible.

While Ramsbotham et al delineate six methods through which reconciliation can be sought, the way in which Bloomfield et al propose war-torn communities can foster reconciliation (through healing, truth-telling, justice and reparation) has one important

difference. Bloomfield et al place a more explicit emphasis on healing, identifying it as a crucial reconciliation tool that has its own focus but is also part of all other tools. The need for healing results from the trauma that is experienced throughout the conflict and in order for such healing to take place the process needs time and space but also needs to address the underlying causes of the conflict. *“In its essence, trauma is the destruction of individual and/or collective structures of a society. In this sense, it is not only important to help people deal with the impact of the conflict on them – to help them through, for example, a grieving process in a constructive way – it is also essential to deal with the cause of the distress and the symptoms”* (Bloomfield et al, 2003: 78). The healing process that is so important to reconciliation is extremely complex and difficult to achieve. The final aspect of this section on conventional reconciliation tools examines how healing can be accomplished through forgiveness.

The ‘Forgiveness Model’, presented by Long & Brecke (2003), is a further method of achieving reconciliation in which it is apparent that *“forgiveness and reconciliation have a clear social function – restoring a neutral or more positive relationship after a transgression and re-establishing membership or affiliation in a larger society – that could occur between individuals, between an individual and a group and between groups”* (Long & Brecke, 2003: 29). The Forgiveness Model incorporates four phases: first, parties to a conflict need to recognise and acknowledge the effects of the conflict on other, for example, shame, anger, injustice and injury. *“Forgiveness does not remove the fact or event of wrongdoing but relies¹² upon the recognition of wrong having been committed in order for the process of forgiveness to be made possible”* (North, 1998: 17).

Second, there must be a changed understanding of oneself and the ‘other’ because anger is closely correlated with both the desire for vengeance and the acknowledgement of the pain of the injury, that is, emotions such as sadness, fear, and damage to one’s self-esteem or identity (Fitzgibbons, 1998). Forgiveness is therefore a process of transformation in which the party sees itself as something other than a victim and accomplishes a more complete and balanced identity. An important aspect of forgiveness is that it involves the reconstruction of a new identity of the ‘other’, the enemy. Through reframing the other there is a separation of the *“wrongdoer from the wrong which has been committed... reframing does not do away with the wrong itself,*

¹² Author’s emphasis.

nor does it deny the wrongdoer's responsibility for it but it allows us to regard the wrongdoer in a more complete, more detailed, more rounded way" (North, 1998: 26).

Third, all parties must undertake not to attempt to extract revenge, however natural this desire may be. This does not indicate the need to abandon versions of punishment or methods to rectify wrongdoing and realise justice, only a willingness to break the cycle of injury and counter injury (Shriver Jr., 1995).

Finally, there must be a credible call for a new relationship made by one or more parties that results in contact between conflicting groups and a public expression of forgiveness such as a reconciliation event that re-establishes mutual affiliation, coexistence, and mutual tolerance or respect at a minimum. However, this does not mean that future relationships are beneficial but that they are based on mutual respect in order to maintain stability.

Although there exists no generic reconciliation model that can be applied to all cases it seems apparent that, at a minimum, reconciliation efforts must include the following: a clear commitment to refrain from violence; an acknowledgment of past wrongs and the effects of those wrongs by all parties; the pursuit of a justice acceptable to the situation; a changed understanding oneself and the 'other'; and a commitment to the creation of a new relationship. It is however, imperative to state that the reconciliation model applied in any given case must take into account the social, political and cultural context into which it is to be applied during its design and implementation.


1.5.2 Indigenous Approaches to Reconciliation

The reconciliation methods analysed above can be said to be primarily of a Western design and perspective and thus it can be argued that they are both ethnocentric in their design and state-centric in their application (Jackson, 2001). Western-centric conceptualisations of reconciliation tend to be of a top-down nature and certainly have their place in the reconciliation apparatus. However, the grassroots nature of indigenous methods of reconciliation represents a bottom-up approach which is particularly important given the different effects conflict may have at the national, and community level. As van der Merwe argues, "*National political conflicts give rise to localised conflict dynamics that can take on a life of their own and that have repercussions for*

the local political culture. In these situations, national political solutions and reconciliation processes are likely to have only a limited impact on local reconciliation" (2001: 85). It therefore seems highly logical for societies emerging from violent conflict to engage in indigenous grassroots reconciliation processes in tandem with national processes. Moreover, it can be argued that such a policy should be actively promoted in order for community to take ownership of the reconciliation of their environment.

Indigenous reconciliation processes prioritise the reconstruction of local social networks for which an understanding of the specific local dynamics and interpersonal relationships is paramount. This is converse to the top-down approach, which sees national reconciliation processes as vital to community reconciliation as it provides fast results and a broad impact. Those most affected by the reconciliation process, that is community members seem to favour grassroots reconciliation as illustrated by van der Merwe through interviews with ex-combatants and community leaders in South Africa. *"The TRC failed to reach real victims. Reconciliation is not about important individuals, but the common people need to reconcile... People themselves will prescribe the formula for their own reconciliation"* (Community leader, Duduza, 1997, in van der Merwe, 2001: 98/99). This was explained by an ex-combatant who stated, *"the reconciliation process must be regional or local. A process that is national creates problems: There is a lack of sufficient interest in the local events. Local people do not think their stories are seen as relevant"* (Ex-combatant, Katorus, 1997 in van der Merwe, 2001: 98).

Further support for the argument that conflict affected societies very often favour a grassroots approach can be seen from an analysis of indigenous institutions in which it is apparent that, throughout history, institutions in Africa were build in order to manage and resolve conflict within communities and based on the community. *"Such institutions and procedures were set out by Africans because they placed great emphasis on peaceful resolution of disputes which was always aimed at restoring social harmony; while at the same time, upholding the principles of fairness, equity and justice as engraved in their customs and traditions.... Emphasis was not on punishment but on reconciliation and restoration of social harmony among the parties in conflict"* (Nwolise, 2004: 59/60). The remainder of this sub-section shall consider different indigenous approaches to reconciliation.



1.5.2.1 Tribal or Indigenous Law

At a grassroots level indigenous law has an important role to play in the reconciliation process. Indigenous law, practiced at the village level, has for centuries been used to arbitrate disputes on various issues at a micro level of conflict. What makes indigenous law so influential in the reconciliation process is a combination of village involvement in settlements (Richland, 2005) and the fact it is predicated on traditional custom (Stewart, 1987).

Within tribally based society there has typically existed a process of dispute settlement conducted by elders or accepted influential 'big men' who manage the process of arbitration and negotiation with an emphasis on conciliation (Cotran, 1969). Such systems are often still pervasive in today's society working in parallel with systems put in place by colonial overlords or amalgamating the two to create a hybrid legal system. A particular benefit of such 'tribal' courts regarding reconciliation is their public nature as Schapera notes when writing on the Ngwato, "*all trials are held in public, and any member of the tribe has the right to attend and take part in the proceedings, no matter in what court they are held...the judge then throws the matter open for general discussion, and the merits of the case are publicly argued by those wishing to do so*" (1962: 64). In conducting public trials or settlements a communal focus is given to the process thus facilitating the reconciliation process as, in cases involving the community, such involvement can enable the community to heal together. The use of such courts in a PCE may represent a way in which reconciliation can be aided.

The predication of 'tribal' courts on traditional custom is also a benefit. This is particularly the case because the political and social institutions – the rules of the game – that are so crucial in reducing uncertainty (Leftwich, 2004) have invariably been decimated throughout the course of violent conflict (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). The employ of 'tribal' courts therefore, provides an opportunity for such traditions and customs to be reaffirmed within society and thus represents a reinforcing of political and social institutions. A return to the norms and values of pre-conflict society may be desirable and as Vicenti states, "*the real battle for the preservation of traditional ways of life will be fought for the bold promontory of guiding human values. It is in this battle that tribal courts will become indispensable*" (1995: 137). Indeed, in the

aftermath of conflict the reconciliation process holds instrumental influence in the return to the guiding values of society. Tradition and custom therefore have their own role to play in the reconciliation process and in this the role of 'tribal' courts can be critical to the reinstatement of such norms and values.

In terms of the benefits for reconciliation it then follows that a re-establishment of societal rules, norms and values via 'tribal' courts provides an avenue through which the reconciliation process can build a foundation. As Connolly states, "*particularly in a post-conflict environment, the formal state system may be entirely incapacitated, either in terms of infrastructure or lack of personnel, or both*" (2005: 240) and therefore indigenous systems that share "*similar characteristics: voluntary participation, reliance on social pressure to ensure attendance and participation, informal process, basis in restorative justice, decisions based in compromise rather than rule of law, and the central role of the disputants and community in the process*" (2005: 241) may be most effective in "*restoring social cohesion within the community by promoting reconciliation between conflicting parties*" (Penal Reform International, 2000: 9). The very fact such traditional courts are based on restorative, rather than retributive justice serves to aid the post-conflict reconciliation process. Indeed, as Allot importantly asserts, "*at the heart of [traditional] African adjudication lies the notion of reconciliation or the restoration of harmony. The job of a court or an arbitrator is less to find the facts, state the rules of law, and apply them to the facts than to set right a wrong in such a way as to restore harmony within the disturbed community*" (1968: 145).

The use of 'tribal' or traditional courts in PCEs is not widely practiced despite the potential benefits for reconciliation, particularly at the community level. However, arguably the most well known of traditional or community courts in a PCE are the Gacaca^{13 14} courts of Rwanda. The Gacaca court represents a traditional, informal legal system in which local, participatory restorative justice is sought within the process of reconciliation (Fullerton, 2003; Oomen, 2005) and therefore offers a potential solution to the legal problems faced by Rwanda. Although the traditional Gacaca courts have

¹³ Gacaca translates from Kinyarwanda, the Rwandan language, to 'justice on the grass'.

¹⁴ For a more detailed discussion of the Gacaca court system than is possible here see, among others, Gourevitch (2000), Moussalli (2000), Longman (2001), Fullerton (2003), Corey & Joireman (2004), Des Forges & Longman (2004), Karakezi et al (2004), Longman et al (2004), Molenaar (2004), Zorbas (2004), Oomen (2005), Bowd (2008).

been adapted to accommodate the demands of trying perpetrators of the genocide, it maintains its community focus through being based on local participation with full access to anyone in the community and thus it is hoped that the Gacaca can offer a significant tool through which the process of reconciliation can be facilitated. Indeed, as Molenaar states,

Gacaca, as a blend between tradition and modernity, takes away justice from the hands of professionals in courtrooms and gives it to the communities that have experienced the violence and must live with its consequences. Gacaca offers the people at the grassroots level a mechanism to deal with this legacy themselves, without much interference from outsiders. In this way, a new chapter in thinking about conflict resolution is being written.

(2004: 99)

The Gacaca system is not without its critics¹⁵. However, given the situation faced by Rwanda it not only provides a way in which pressure on the national prison system can be relieved but also presents an opportunity to pursue a reconciliation agenda. As Fullerton importantly highlights, “*Gacaca is presented to the Rwandan population as a mechanism for justice and reconciliation; to meet its expectations, it must have concerted and sincere participation by Rwandan people*” (2003: 8). In stating this, Fullerton not only draws to our attention that for the Gacaca system to be effective and meet its objectives it needs to be ‘owned’ by the Rwandan population, that is, the proclivity for reconciliation is in the hands of Rwandans and not something that can be imposed by the international community, but also to the fact that indigenous legal systems have potential to play a significant role in the recovery of communities shattered by violent conflict.

1.5.2.2 Ritual

Another significant contribution made by indigenous approaches to reconciliation is that of ritual and almost certainly this area deserves greater cognisance within academic endeavour than it presently enjoys. Ritual, particularly in African society, has been used for a multitude of different issues including: to resolve the emotional conflict of

¹⁵ *ibid*

death (Malinowski, 1954), to reaffirm key social values and relationships (Radcliffe-Brown, 1939, 1945), to cure illness and related social conflict (Horton, 1967) and to enable community members to behave in normally prohibited ways in order to maintain longer term social stability (Gluckman, 1956). Although the various uses of ritual may not be directly linked to conflict many serve as an important function in conflict resolution and reconciliation. In many African societies there is the widely held recognition that the use of ritual could “*ensure transparency in people’s dealings with one another, ensure that people live in accordance with customs and tradition, and to promote confidence building between and within groups and individuals*” and therefore “*ritual treaties were used to remove fear and mistrust, bind families and villages, and avoid war*” (Nwolise, 2004: 68).

The use of ritual as a reconciliation tool very often involved a form of exchange. One such example of this is the Kpelle moot in Liberia in which debate is instigated with the aim of achieving conciliation. An important aspect of the Kpelle moot is its underpinnings in ritual. The conflict in Liberia has generated a need for reconciliation and this is, to an extent, achieved through conciliatory ritual in which gestures of supplication, forgiveness and incorporation are offered such as “holding the foot”, ritual purifications or a collective meal (Richards et al, 2005). Such an exchange-based ritual provides an avenue to pursue cooperative action and lays the foundations for a deeper, societal reconciliation. Similarly, among the Igbo of Nigeria, the process of reconciliation after conflict is practised through exchange in which “*the designated elders from both parties met, killed a goat or cow, mixed the meat with blood got from their (elders) veins, cooked with the meat and ate. A tree is planted for remembering the event*” (Nwolise, 2004: 68). Such a ritual offers an environment conducive to mutual exchange and cooperation. Moreover, the planting of a tree provides a symbolic account of the process, which serves to reinforce it.

A further way in which ritual can facilitate reconciliation after micro-level conflict is through healing processes. As Schmidt states, “*arguably, looking at healing of memories of violence which led to death is crucial, specific cases are a lens which focuses the more general trauma of war through an apparently clear distinction between legitimate and illegitimate violence*” (1997: 303). In Zimbabwe there exists a widely held belief that the *Ngozi*, the aggravated spirit of a person who was murdered or not buried properly, can afflict and even possess members of the lineage of the person

responsible. The only way the *Ngozi* can be appeased is through the appropriate healing ritual. Traditionally such healing may take place through the identification of the guilty party and the drawing out of the spirit through a system of spiralling movement of drawing circles. However, the nature of the guerrilla war of liberation in Zimbabwe meant that all members of the community were involved and as such the appeasing of *Ngozi* became altogether more complex. Although combatants' violence in war was not as a result of *Ngozi*, the cleansing of the entire community is required and as such a mass exorcism of *Ngozi* through negotiation between the living and the dead is necessary.

Ritual healing in this sense lays the foundations for a re-ordering of society after violent conflict and enables "*the reconciliation of different experiences and memories and a process of re-establishing collectivity. This important meaning of healing in the aftermath of war is reflected in its special social practice. More generally, spiritual healing provides an arena in which local histories are made, at time subverting the national grand narrative*" (Schmidt, 1997: 310). Reconciliation then, can be facilitated through ritual healing after conflict and offers a valuable tool for such a process, particularly at the village or community level.

The role of ritual in the reconciliation process is thus clearly significant and in communities in which such rituals are practiced should be promoted. It is however, important to highlight the need for such rituals or ceremonies to be conducted in public with full participation in order to enable community wide reconciliation. Also key is that "*internal crisis whether political or religious must be managed with a minimum application of force so as to make reconciliation and early return to peace possible*" (Oguntomisin, 2002: 90). Indigenous approaches to reconciliation, therefore, have an invaluable role to play in grass roots reconciliation and, as a result, to national reconciliation also, as reconciliation at the community level provide the foundations from which to build national reconciliation. The study of indigenous approaches to reconciliation is however, limited and as such I would advocate the necessity for further research in this area.

1.6 Conclusion

The concept of reconciliation offers an alternative lens through which we can observe the post-conflict reconstruction effort. Rather than concerning itself with short-term approaches or those that yield tangible results, the pursuit of reconciliation is akin to the wider goals of conflict transformation and peacebuilding; the securing of positive peace. The need for reconciliatory activities has never been greater over the last 40 years with the changing nature of conflict; however, with the change in the way in which conflict is waged (from interstate to intrastate) so too have we been witness to change in the emphasis and methodology of reconciliation; rather than reconciling two or more states at the cessation of hostilities, reconciliation today is required to contend with numerous different identity groups in the same territorial area. The challenge of reconciliation has thus become more intense and with it the need to enhance our understanding of the process has increased.

One way in which it is possible to augment our understanding is to engage in a thorough conflict analysis as it is only through a full comprehension of how the conflict emerged, that is, what broke in society, that we can expect to be able to design and implement effective reconciliation initiatives, that is, how we fix it. When we approach a conflict in a holistic manner, acknowledging the multifaceted complexity of this social phenomenon, it is then possible to identify solutions. The importance, then, of context cannot be understated. Whilst appreciating the lessons learned from previous conflicts and solutions to these conflicts, it is necessary to recognise the inimitable identity of individual conflicts in order to ascertain the most suitable response to it.

That said, however, the nature of the majority of violent conflict in today's world indicates the need for an evolution in the way in which reconciliation is approached. Much of our understanding of reconciliation originates from the West and thus the policies that are utilised to achieve reconciliation have their genesis in such an understanding. Such Western centric, State centric approaches do not necessarily capitalise on the positive attributes other approaches can bring to the table, nor do they always result in the most positive outcomes, indeed they can actually be detrimental. By considering indigenous approaches to reconciliation, both in terms of definition and methodology, we can develop our understanding of the process, thus making it more

possible to design and implement reconciliation initiatives that translate into more meaningful outcomes.

This chapter offers a problematisation of the post-conflict environment and the way in which, at a theoretical level, the pursuit of reconciliation is instrumental in the transforming of conflict and the building of peace. In doing this not only is it apparent that reconciliation is a pivotal aspect of post-conflict reconstruction but that also it is an achievement that is difficult to attain, in part due to the shortcomings of the various approaches to reconciliation and its limited focus given in post-conflict reconstruction programmes. The next chapter introduces the issues of ex-combatants and examines how their social reintegration into society, through DDR programmes, may contribute to the reconciliation process in a meaningful way. In doing this the subsequent chapter will develop a more elaborate understanding of the social reintegration of ex-combatants through the construction of the implicit linkages between social reintegration and reconciliation.

Chapter Two:

The Contribution of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) to Reconciliation in PCEs

2.1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of DDR and examines the potential way in which the social reintegration of ex-combatants can facilitate the reconciliation process through conflict transformation and peacebuilding. As is apparent from the previous chapter, the challenge of reconciling the post-conflict environment is great and there are weaknesses in the way reconciliation is currently pursued, at least at the macro level and in terms of funding. As ex-combatants constitute an influence on whether or not the transformation of the conflict, and the construction of a positive peace, will be possible it is necessary to consider them within this picture. With that in mind this chapter seeks to introduce the concept of DDR in more general terms before focusing on the social reintegration of ex-combatants and how such reintegration can contribute to the reconciliation process and peacebuilding as a whole.

The chapter begins by providing a conceptual and contextual understanding of DDR, which defines the component parts of DDR and explicates their function. By first analysing the technical aspects of DDR it is easier to comprehend the ways in which DDR impacts on other aspects of society. The chapter then moves on to consider how disarmament and demobilisation influence reintegration. In doing this the complexity of DDR, and its interrelatedness, is better understood and this enables a fuller appreciation of the reintegration component of DDR. The section then leads on a discussion of reintegration addressing the key concerns of this component. This includes the three types of reintegration: economic, political and social. Because social reintegration is the focus of this research the next three sections are particularly important. Section 2.5 consists of an in-depth analysis of the social reintegration component of DDR while section 2.6 considers the challenges of social reintegration faced by vulnerable groups. Section 2.7 examines the reconciliatory benefits of social

reintegration. Sections 2.5 and 2.7 in particular provide a key contribution to the structure of this research as they situate the issue of DDR within the aspect of the challenges of reconciliation discussed in the previous chapter.

2.2 Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR): A Conceptual and Contextual Understanding

DDR programmes have, over the past few decades, been utilised to an increasing degree in attempts to secure sustainable peace following violent conflict. DDR programmes typically designed in the later stages of resolution negotiations provide a pathway for the transformation of combatants to civilians and are seen as vital as part of the war-to-peace transition (Colletta et al, 1996).

The anatomy of a DDR programme is essentially the same for each conflict with combatants progressing through stages of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration, however conceptual and sequential differences may exist. For example, demobilisation may be thought to occur prior to disarmament and reintegration may be termed reinsertion or rehabilitation. For this study however, the term DDR will refer to the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants and these terms shall now be explored.

Utilising definitions provided by United Nations Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) (2006) disarmament can be seen as *“the collection, documentation, control and the disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population”* while demobilisation is *“the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from armed forces or other armed groups. The first stage of demobilization may extend from the processing of individual combatants in temporary centres to the massing of troops in camps designated for this purpose (cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks). The second stage of demobilization encompasses the support package provided to the demobilized, which is called reinsertion”* (UN, 2006: 2). As is evident the processes of disarmament and demobilisation are characterised by tangible results and follow a relatively clearly defined path; combatants surrender their weapons and engage in a process of discharge from military life.

The reintegration component of DDR programmes is however more complex and less tangible results are achieved. Indeed, as Thusi and Meek state *“technically speaking, the first two components of the process (demobilisation and disarmament) are finite, while reintegration is ongoing, complex and its success dependant on a number of interconnected issues that go beyond the formal end of the war”* (2003: 23). The reintegration of ex-combatants is increasingly viewed as the most important aspect of DDR programmes (McGovern, 2005) and can be defined as *“the process by which ex-combatants acquire civilian status and gain sustainable employment and income. Reintegration is essentially a social and economic process with an open time-frame, primarily taking place in communities at the local level. It is part of the general development of a country and a national responsibility, and often necessitates long-term external assistance”* (UN, 2006: 2).

The design and implementation of DDR programmes is conducted by a host of different bodies however it is generally the case that the government of the country in question will have some influence in this process. Indeed in some cases it may be the government itself that designs and implements the DDR programme as exemplified in Ethiopia through the Commission for the Rehabilitation of Members of Former Army and Disabled War Veterans in 1991 (Dercon & Ayalew, 1998). In other cases an International Organisation (IO) such as the United Nations (UN) or World Bank (WB) may be responsible for the DDR programme as in the case of Afghanistan, Nicaragua, El Salvador and Congo (all UN) or Rwanda, Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda (all WB). Intergovernmental organisations also contribute to DDR programmes with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) involved in the Kosovo DDR programme.

The immediate short-term goal of a DDR programme is to identify the section of the combatant population who is to progress through the DDR process. Traditionally, a proportion of ex-combatants remains in the peacetime military force or is incorporated into a newly created national army. Those who are in the population to be demobilised are usually taken to an assembly area at which point they are disarmed and have their details recorded in order to facilitate official demobilisation and enable the effective design of the reintegration component of the programme. They then undergo a post-conflict/pre-civilian life briefing, perhaps with some training and various livelihood

provisory measures before being reinserted in civilian life and entering the reintegration stage. The reintegration of the newly disarmed and demobilised combatants is the final section of the DDR programme, and perhaps the most important as the success of the entire DDR programme, and thus peace itself, is determined by the degree to which ex-combatants truly become ex-combatants. Taken together the three aspects of DDR programmes – disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration – are seen as a key component of conflict resolution and post-conflict reconstruction and “*could potentially create significant opportunities for sustainable peace and human development*” (Kingma, 2002:181). This statement by Kingma partially explains the importance of DDR programmes in the PCE however if we look more closely at the objectives of DDR programmes the importance of these programmes becomes evident to a much greater degree.

The aims or objectives of DDR programmes differ according to the underpinning philosophy of the programme which “*can be viewed on a continuum: from a minimalist (improving security) to a maximalist (as an opportunity for development and reconstruction) perspective*” (Muggah, 2004: 27) and each DDR programme is vitally important in its own right. From a minimalist perspective DDR programmes are particularly important as “*frustrated ex-combatants may jeopardize the peace and development process*” (Kingma, 1997:151) and therefore “*for every country that embarks on a demobilisation and reintegration process, the foremost aim is to avoid or minimise the security threat posed by ex-combatants*” (Mokalobe, 1999: 23), a view which is echoed by many writers such as Colletta et al (1996), Ozerdem (2002) and Dercon & Ayalew (1998). Farther along the spectrum exists the general view that “*in the aftermath of a civil war, the “soundness” of policies can be ascertained only in the light of the political economy of the peace process*” (Boyce, 1995:2069). In this sense “*the ultimate objective of all demobilisation and reintegration efforts should be to improve the welfare of people*” (Nubler, 1997:3). A more maximalist view would be along the lines of the DDR programme operating in Sierra Leone in which the aim has been “*to support social acceptance through information dissemination measures; social reconciliation, and sensitisation processes*” (Ginifer, 2003: 41). It can, however, be argued that those DDR programmes situated nearer the maximalist position on the spectrum will be more influential in terms of facilitating reconciliation.

With the importance of DDR programmes evident it is necessary to consider what a successful DDR programme may look like. Colletta describes a successful DDR programme as:

several integrated actions: (a) classifying ex-combatants according to need, skill level, and their desired mode of subsistence, (b) offering a basic transitional assistance package (safety net), (c) finding a way to deliver assistance simply, minimising transaction costs while maximising benefits to ex-combatants, (d) sensitising communities and building on existing social capital, (e) coordinating centrally yet decentralising implementation authorities to districts and (f) connecting the DRP¹⁶ to ongoing development efforts by retargeting and restructuring existing portfolios.

(1996: XV)

The above definition of a successful DDR programme seems comprehensive and does indeed address many of the issues that arise in discussions surrounding DDR programmes. Each stage of the process is vital, however, as previously noted the disarmament and demobilisation components of the process are finite and produce tangible outcomes (Thusi & Meek, 2003) while the reintegration component is altogether more complex and can be viewed as the most difficult aspect of a DDR programme (Humphreys & Weinstein, 2004).

2.3 Disarmament and Demobilisation: Precursors to Reintegration

Whilst I have made the argument that reintegration is the most important aspect of a DDR programme, an argument I shall expand on in greater depth, both disarmament and demobilisation also have a crucial role to play and, despite the tangible and less complex outcomes, should not be underestimated as they provide the critical foundations from which reintegration is made possible. DDR has its genesis in hostile environments characterised by tension and distrust, indeed disarmament and demobilisation within a DDR context is part of the transition from war to peace rather than a peacetime activity and in effect “*does not enjoy the luxury of a crisis-free*

¹⁶ DRP equals Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme.

environment and takes a more urgent approach, symptomatic with emergency relief operations" (Ngoma, 2004: 82). Do to its precarious origins it is important to consider the D & D elements of DDR impact on the R.

2.3.1 Disarmament

The process of disarmament is of vital importance to DDR programmes but also in the conflict transformation and peacebuilding process. Within the conflict and post-conflict environments the proliferation of small arms is significant and has deep implications for peace. Not only do the ready availability of small arms represent tangible threats to the newly secured peace, but with it there is the indication of a culture of violence in which *"it is becoming more common for people to think of guns as the first solution to problems"* (Janz, 2000: 39). Effective disarmament is necessary therefore to not only remove the tangible threat or method of conflict but to also engender trust between previously competing factions and within civilians. The absence of a disarmament process contributes to increasing levels of organised crime and banditry, drug and arms trafficking and mercenary engagement whilst simultaneously reducing border control, and domestic and regional stability, thus severely curtailing the prospects for reconciliation and development (Potgieter, 1999; Kingma, 1997). Disarmament therefore serves as a crucial confidence building measure that provides the foundations for the effective transition for war to peace.

The disarmament process can take several forms but generally follows a path similar to that of the programme in Sierra Leone run by the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) in which combatants moved through a five-phase programme.

- 1) **Assembly:** Organising the arrival of combatants, and their orientation to the disarmament process.
- 2) **Interview:** The collection of personal identification, information, registration, and the verification of weapons or ordnance delivered by the ex-combatants.
- 3) **Weapons collection:** The tagging of all weapons or ordnance, and temporary disabling and storing of the weapons prior to their transportation to the final storage and disposal centres.

- 4) Eligibility certification: Verification and authorisation of the ex-combatants by the UN Observers for their inclusion as beneficiaries of the DDR programme.
- 5) Transportation: The assembly and organisation of screened and disarmed combatants and finally their transportation to demobilisation centres.

(Thusi & Meek, 2003: 26/7)

Each of these stages represents a key aspect of a successful disarmament element of the DDR programme. Assembling combatants enables the swifter processing of combatants through the DDR, which is important as *“this diminishes possible security risks and prompts the immediate start of reintegration measures”* (Koth, 2005: 30). The gathering of combatant information permits those conducting DDR design to plan more effectively and it also reduces the prospects for fraudulent claims of combatant status in order to benefit from the DDR programme. It also provides an opportunity to collate a more accurate breakdown of numbers of weapons and ordnance although, as Kingma notes, it is conceivable that combatants have more than one weapon and may cache additional weapons and armaments thus presenting the potential for future security concerns (Kingma, 1997). The collection, tagging, storage and disabling of weapons represent the crucial element of the disarmament process. It is particularly important that transparency is forthcoming within this stage in order to build trust among previously conflicting factions and between combatants and civilians. It is for this reason that observers are very often used and weapons are stored in areas separate to the combatants (Kingma & Sayers, 1995).

The phase of eligibility certification links into that of information gathering and in some DDR programmes may represent just one stage. It is however a vital stage as it ensures all those registered on the DDR programme are indeed combatants. It also enables programme implementers to accurately enforce the criteria that combatants must fulfil in order to register on the DDR programme. This is particularly important as the criteria for combatant status determines the size of the caseload. If the criteria is too rigid it will exclude particular groups, if it is too lenient the caseload will be larger than first expected. This will then have consequences for the demobilisation and reintegration phases as ex-combatants not included in the programme may be aggrieved and more likely to pick up arms whilst an excessive caseload poses numerous logistical and resource complications. The final stage of transportation is important as it completes the process of disarmament and enables the demobilisation process to begin.

The way in which surplus weapons are dealt with may differ according to the individual DDR programme, as there are a number of options open to the designers of DDR programmes. Suppliers may buy back the weapons in a weapon buy-back programme which is an attractive option as it rids society of surplus weapons and generates much needed capital from the sale. There is however the possibility of such weapons being re-sold in other conflicts and supplier willingness to engage in such a scheme is limited (Kingma, 1997). Decommissioned weapons may have a civilian use, in particular, the use of small arms for policing or removing weapons mounted on trucks or jeeps and using these vehicles for relief or other transportation (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). Potentially, this method is useful in utilising weapons and ordnance in a more productive manner, however the transfer of weaponry to police services carries a risk if such services are not efficient and corruption-free (Preston, 1997).

Very often weapons are scrapped in a public destruction ceremony. This is a particularly advantageous method as it facilitates the development of trust between stakeholders (Janz, 2000) however it can be costly to conduct and wastes the opportunity for capital generation through weapons buy-back schemes. One alternative to scrapping weapons is mothballing them; however, as with weapons scrapping, this can be costly plus there is the very real threat of re-circulation of these weapons and *“given the low capacity, lenient discipline and low salaries of police and soldiers, it is not surprising”* (Janz, 2000: 42). This presents not only a significant security risk as these re-circulated weapons end up in the hands of disillusioned ex-combatants and organised crime rings but also serves to heighten civilian concern and reinforce the culture of the gun. For these reasons, many argue that for disarmament to be successful it must involve the public destruction of weapons. A further option for DDR designers is to take away the weapons to decay and rust away and this is very often the case due to limited resources in the DDR programme. However, this is not a desirable solution as not only does it waste resources and have negative environmental implications, but it also presents the danger of these weapons being stolen and re-circulated, either within the country or into other conflicts. As is evident each method utilised to deal with surplus weapons has its pros and its cons. I would argue that, despite the relative costliness, the most effective method would be a public destruction of all surplus weapons as this has the potential to go a long way in the restoration of trust after

conflict. Therefore, the costs of such an endeavour should factor into the design of the DDR programme.

2.3.2 Demobilisation

Demobilisation, the release of combatants from military duty and their return to society, can be seen as a temporary process including regular soldiers serving in the military, paramilitary members, and combatants from irregular forces such as guerrilla or militia movements. Demobilisation is a vital component of Security Sector Reform (SSR) and has significant implications for the reintegration of ex-combatants. If the demobilisation is not well planned not only will the reintegration of ex-combatants face greater challenges in terms of adequate design and implementation, but it may also trigger a return to arms which, given the possibility of ex-combatants caching arms, represents a credible and serious threat to security. For these reasons the effective planning of the demobilisation process, taking into account time, resource and logistical limitations, is critical to the success of not only the demobilisation element of DDR but also the reintegration process as effective planning enables the design of a reintegration component that will sufficiently address the needs of the combatants from a given conflict (Kingma & Sayers, 1995; Mehreteab, 2002; Alden, 2002).

The first phase of the demobilisation stage typically leads on from the last stage of disarmament in that combatants are transported to a demobilisation centre¹⁷. In these centres ex-combatants receive basic necessities and are “*prepared to enter civilian life through the implementation of orientation activities such as trauma healing and psycho-social counselling, information and sensitisation seminars, and civic education*” (Thusi & Meek, 2003: 27). In this way demobilisation provides a key link to community reintegration. It is however, vitally important that the resources in these demobilisation centres are adequate, providing ex-combatants with what they immediately need, for example sufficient food, shelter, medical care etcetera. They must also afford satisfactory security for all groups of disarmed combatants along with observers to ensure no groups or individuals are marginalised and that the results of trauma to individuals as a result of the conflict are minimised as far as possible. Demobilisation centres should only be in existence for as long as necessary however it is important that

¹⁷ ‘Demobilisation centres’ are synonymous with ‘encampment sites’, ‘cantonment sites’, ‘discharge sites’, ‘transition areas’, and ‘assembly areas’. See DPKO (1996: 6).

due care is taken in the decision to resettle ex-combatants into the civilian population. If combatants remain in the centres for too long there is the risk they may become frustrated and feel imprisoned thus potentially presenting a danger for future security. This is particularly the case if resources in the sites are inadequate (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). However, should combatants not remain in demobilisation sites for the necessary amount of time there is the risk that they will not have received sufficient levels of trauma counselling, sensitisation and civic education thus rendering the prospect of a successful reintegration less likely. The degree of time spent in the demobilisation centres will of course be dependant on a number of factors, some of which will be examined now.

Instrumental to a successful demobilisation is, as previously mentioned, planning. Therefore, when ex-combatants arrive at a demobilisation centre they undergo a process of registration thus enabling an effective needs assessment that is invaluable for the reintegration process. The registration process makes possible the collection of a number of demographic variables regarding the ex-combatants such as age structure, gender structure, marital status, number of dependants, area of residence, length of military service, educational level, and level of professional or vocational training (Ozerdem, 2003). The knowledge of such variables, and others, enables DDR planners to more effectively design the reintegration phase of the DDR, as they are able to conduct a needs assessment that will inform the level of provision ex-combatants require in order to effectively make the transition from combatant to civilian.

The key function the registration and needs assessment process serves is that it provides DDR planners with the necessary information to design demobilisation packages¹⁸. Such packages provide ex-combatants with a package of benefits aimed at ameliorating the process of transformation from combatant to civilian. Initially, at the point of reinsertion into the community, ex-combatants may lack provision of basic necessities such as food, shelter and clothing. Demobilisation packages may therefore include access to food rations for a specified period of time as in Ethiopia, civilian clothing as in Mozambique or iron sheets for roofing as in Uganda (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). Different DDR programmes will provide a different set of benefits in accordance to the resources available and the requirements of the combatants passing through program.

¹⁸ Demobilisation packages are also referred to as resettlement or reinsertion packages.

Basic provisions for immediate reinsertion are vital however such provisions are finite in their longevity; for this reason other measures are also taken to enable a smoother reintegration process. Frequently cash payments or monthly subsidies are made, the amount often determined by military rank and length of service, in order to provide a safety net for ex-combatants for a limited time, and to dissuade a return to arms as a basic level of living could be achieved. In addition to a financial element of demobilisation packages they may also include household effects (Mehreteab, 2002) or, as in the case of Mozambique, agricultural kits to enable ex-combatants to return to rural agricultural communities (Alden, 2002). A further reason for providing ex-combatants with demobilisation packages is that it is believed that reintegration and reconciliation will be more difficult if ex-combatants return to their communities empty handed (Ngoma, 2004).

Prior to transportation to their communities or chosen places of residence if they choose to start again somewhere else, ex-combatants undergo a discharge orientation designed to ameliorate the immediate difficulties associated with a return from conflict. This may include trauma counselling, sensitisation techniques, health screening, basic education and other services. As Kingma notes when talking of Uganda, “*ex-soldiers and their dependants went through pre-discharge briefings, providing them details on how to open a bank account, how to start income generating activities, environmental and legal issues, family planning and AIDS prevention*” (1997: 154). This serves to endow ex-combatants with some of the skills necessary to complete the transition from combatant to civilian. Once combatants have passed through the registration process and have been allocated demobilisation packages and received a discharge briefing or orientation they are then transported to their community or to the location they have decided to reside in. They then enter the arduous process of reintegration into these communities. This shall now be discussed.

2.4 Reintegration: The Ultimate Goal

The way reintegration of ex-combatants is viewed will depend to a great degree on the philosophy underpinning the DDR programme and this will, to some extent, influence the way in which they are designed as well as the perceived success of such programmes. Essentially reintegration can be seen as “*the process whereby former*

combatants and their families and other displaced persons are assimilated into the social and economic life of (civilian) communities" (Ozerdem, 2002: 962). In order to achieve such reintegration the DDR programme must identify the most effective portfolio of activities with which to address the needs of the society. There will generally be some overlap with the demobilisation phase of the DDR programme in that the registration and needs assessment process during demobilisation will inform reintegration planning. Additionally, the 'reorientation' or 'reinsertion' package administered during demobilisation will be of significant value in the reintegration stage, together with a form of counselling and job referral service that is very often put in place to facilitate reintegration. Counselling and job referral services may include a varying array of services. For example, in Mozambique ex-combatants were provided with access to health care, training and social activities (Kingma & Sayers, 1995) while in Ukraine (re)educational programmes and language tuition was provided to reintegrating combatants (Heinemann-Gruder, 2002). The range of activities or services built into each DDR programme differs in each case however, as Kingma notes, there exists a clear distinction between the different components of ex-combatants reintegration: economic, political and social (Kingma, 2002).

2.4.1 Economic Reintegration

Economic reintegration is seen as a way in which "*to equip former fighters with productive skills and employment so that they can return to civilian life*" (Ginifer, 2003: 43) and is viewed as important for the short, medium and long-term objectives of the DDR process (Ozerdem, 2003). Returning combatants have a primary need to provide for themselves and their dependants and as such DDR programmes must address this need in order to reduce the incentive for ex-combatants to return to arms (Last et al, 1997).

Taking the case of Kosovo the importance of the effective economic reintegration of ex-combatants is evident as the 25,723 Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) combatants who registered for the IOM administered DDR programme supported over 200,000 dependants of which 35,424 were children and 164,803 were other dependants (Ozerdem, 2003). If we consider that ex-combatants need to support dependants in other conflicts also we can envisage the encompassing effects a DDR programme has. For example, the programme in Ethiopia saw the DDR of almost 500,000 combatants,

which, if we take the Kosovo average of each combatant having around 8 dependants, would indicate a dependant total of around four million. This is of course a speculative figure but it is indicative of the importance of effective economic reintegration. This is the case not only because ex-combatants have these basic human security needs but they very often also need to feel recognised and recompensed for their sacrifices and achievements (Preston, 1997). A further rationale for the importance of successful economic reintegration is that ex-combatants who are actively contributing to the community are more readily accepted into that community (Ginifer, 2003 & Ngoma, 2004).

Economic reintegration is facilitated in a number of ways. In terms of immediate needs the demobilisation package ex-combatants receive includes a number of measures to aid economic reintegration in the short term from food rations or cash allowances to agricultural kits. However, for long-term economic reintegration this is not sufficient and so other measures need to be put into place. Generally, most DDR programmes will include a form of financial benefit. In some cases this may be a lump sum issued after demobilisation; however the danger with this is that ex-combatants may, for various reasons, spend the money very quickly and not use it for education or income generating activities etcetera (Kingma & Suyaers, 1995). In order to counter the risk of this and to provide ex-combatants with a safety net, DDR programmes increasingly provide a monthly subsidy for a set period of time. An important reason for this is that it,

Would presumably both keep former combatants from being seen by host communities as parasites and allow sufficient time for the establishment (or re-establishment) of social networks that might provide employment networks. At the same time, it was felt that requiring ex-combatants to claim their subsidy payment at a particular bank would enhance reintegration by encouraging (though not obligating) them to establish a fixed domicile within a given community.

(Alden, 2002: 344)

The amount and length of subsidy is decided on during the planning stage and is frequently linked to the military rank of the ex-combatants along with their length of

service. This is due to these factors often being perceived as influencing the ease with which ex-combatants can reintegrate with middle rank officers and those with long service being seen as the most problematic in terms of reintegration and posing a security threat (Kingma & Sayers, 1995).

A further method - and arguably one with greater potential for long-term gain - through which economic reintegration can be facilitated is the provision of information, counselling, training and referral services. Ex-combatants returning to civilian life often suffer from a lack of information regarding the real economic situation that will confront them when they return to their community (Ngoma, 2004) and as such require the necessary information and counselling. In terms of economic reintegration however, the most critical element of the DDR is provision of training and referral which aims at *“endowing ex-combatants with relevant skills, knowledge and information so that they will be able to find productive employment or start and manage successfully a micro-enterprise or a small farm”* (Nubler, 1997: 17). In order for such training to be effectively designed it is therefore necessary to identify through rigorous methodological enquiry, the existing portfolio of skills, qualifications and capabilities ex-combatants hold and distinguish within these between vocational/technical, managerial and entrepreneurial skills and competencies (Nubler, 1997). This will enable a clearer understanding of the present position of ex-combatants but will also facilitate the identification of educational and training needs of ex-combatants attempting to enter formal sector employment (Koth, 2005). Therefore, with an identification of ex-combatants capabilities and needs is also the necessity on the part of DDR planners to effectively comprehend the emerging needs of the labour market (Ginifer, 2003). The services that are then developed from this knowledge may include the establishment of vocational training courses in areas such as mechanics, electrical installation, plumbing and others, as was the case in the Information Counselling and Referral Service (ICRS) in Kosovo or in areas such as agriculture and construction as in Namibia. The type of training programs designed will depend on four primary criteria: (1) the funding available within the DDR programme; (2) the needs of the ex-combatants; (3) the requirements the community, and (4) the degree to which the DDR programme is a minimalist or maximalist endeavour.

Whilst the need for, and importance of, economic reintegration is evident the process is not without its problems. As previously observed the economic reintegration of ex-

combatants may involve a 'reorientation' or 'reinsertion' package, educational and vocational training and/or a job referral service. This presents a potential problem of providing preferential treatment for ex-combatants. Writers such as Last (1999) advocate the need to target ex-combatants as a special group and to design programmes accordingly. The reasoning for this is manifold: firstly, if ex-combatants have no productive role in the post-war society, or no perceived productive role, there is an increased likelihood of them turning to crime or a return to arms, thus posing a clear threat to security and stability within the society and potentially within the region as a whole as has been the case in the DRC. Secondly, ex-combatants can be seen as a vulnerable group that experience great difficulty in coping in the post-war economy and society due, for example, to poor educational levels or war trauma. Thirdly, bringing their constituents into the peace process can be a timely, costly and risky endeavour for military leaders and as such a targeted DDR programme can be seen as political payback for these efforts. Finally, the productive potential of ex-combatants can be harnessed through targeted programmes thus acting as an investment into the reconstruction effort.

On the other side of this coin is the premise that "*the targeting of former combatants may be considered special treatment by other war-affected communities, causing destabilising resentment*" (Ozerdem, 2002: 968). Within the PCE fall several categories of populations. Ex-combatants, internally displaced persons, refugees and those who remained throughout the conflict all coexist in the same environment and face similar challenges as each other. By privileging one group above another, resentment can develop with the potential of the exacerbation of social cleavages and, ultimately, conflict. It is this dilemma that policy makers face and striking the right balance is a challenge of all DDR programmes.

2.4.2 Political Reintegration

The political reintegration of ex-combatants is also significant as "*the presence of a functioning state and legal system is one of the central requirements for peacebuilding*" and as such "*the strengthening of state capacity and law and order, and the development of processes of democratic decision making and non-violent conflict resolution, are therefore necessary to prevent slipping back into war and the demobilisation falling apart*" (Kingma, 2002: 188). Political reintegration, "*the process*

through which the ex-combatant and his or her family become a full part of decision-making processes" (Kingma, 2000: 28), thus forms an important component of the reintegration and peacebuilding process. Ex-combatants very often become involved with a military group because they identify with the politics of that group and oppose the politics of the government (Gomes Porto et al, 2007). Their effective political reintegration in the PCE is therefore instrumental in the stability and security of that environment, as such reintegration should ensure they do not become a marginalised group and thus feel the need to return to arms.

Political reintegration can be facilitated through various practices. Following a process of SSR will aid the political reintegration of ex-combatants through the creation of an environment which is conducive to peaceful conflict transformation. By effectively establishing a professional military with those combatants not entering the DDR process, and placing this military institution under civilian control the possibility of maintaining national security is greatly increased. It is however important to note that the creation of a professional military, involving the assimilation of previously antagonistic forces and with a passive political role within a civil society and accountable to a civilian and democratically-elected government, is a daunting task to say the least and will not be possible without strong political commitment and the realisation of military personnel at all levels of their role within society (Last et al, 1997). Coupled to the creation of a professional military is the formation of a functioning, effective and corrupt-free police force. *"Like armies, police are committed to the maintenance of stability.... since the purpose of police forces is crime prevention and the maintenance of law and order, effective policing, more than effective military operations, assumes good day-to-day relationships with the communities they serve"* (Preston, 1997: 461) and as such political reintegration in this manner can be seen to have positive impacts on peacebuilding.

The development of democratic, accountable systems at all levels of the political system can also help facilitate political reintegration. Democratic institutions shaped according to the individual contexts and needs of the countries themselves are more able to undertake peacebuilding and reconciliatory measures that will more readily adapt to the demands faced by post-conflict societies. The incorporation of ex-combatants into these institutions according to the same criteria as any other civilian is vital in symbolising the inclusiveness of the government and maintaining security. As Hartzell

& Hoddie note, "*former combatants require assurances that no single group will be able to use the power of the state to secure what they failed to win on the battlefield, and perhaps threaten the very survival of rivals*" (2003: 319). In this sense then, the inclusion of ex-combatants in the political system does much to allay these fears providing such inclusion is genuine. It would be expected that at the cessation of conflict and the instillation of a transitional government based on the outcome of a peace negotiation, a number of government positions would be taken up by previous military leaders as agreed during negotiations. The concern at this point, however, is that "*soldiers have a tendency to militarise the social environment, and this generally does not contribute to self-reliance, sustainability and peacebuilding*" (Kingma, 2002: 195). Successful political reintegration of ex-combatants therefore not only includes the premise that they are free to participate in political life as both voters and representatives, but also that they do not overwhelm the political landscape.

Intrinsic to the development of democratic institutions is the establishment and preservation of human rights. Violent conflict very often brings with it a violation of human rights and for societies emerging from conflict it is necessary to address this issue by safeguarding human rights and effectively confronting past violations. This can be achieved in part through the police force and the newly emerging democratic institutions but must involve the participation of civil society (Last et al, 1997 & Kingma, 2002). The successful political reintegration of ex-combatants therefore relies on the creation of a strong civil society and the role of education in this cannot be overstated. "*Education needs to specifically focus on social responsibility, ethics and government accountability. The free development of associations must be encouraged, institutions which preserve, uphold and defend democratic principles must be nurtured: trade unions; commercial associations; a free and impartial media; youth and community organisations*" (Last et al, 1997: 40). The creation of a strong civil society enables governments to be held accountable and provides a pathway through which post-conflict societies can progress forward towards a state of peace. Ex-combatants should be encouraged, and certainly not obstructed, to enter civil society in a meaningful manner. By engaging with civil society and becoming a part of the peacebuilding process in the PCE, ex-combatants can be seen as positively contributing to conflict transformation and represents a form of political reintegration. Political reintegration does not only consist of participation in political life through voting and

representing, but also through working with government through other mediums, that is, civil society.

Evidently both the economic and political reintegration of ex-combatants is vital to the success of DDR programmes and the facilitation of post-conflict reconstruction. However, the third component of reintegration, that of social reintegration, is perhaps of greater significance to the long-term success of the DDR effort and for this reason the issue of social reintegration shall be addressed in the subsequent section.

2.5 Social Reintegration

Effective social reintegration of ex-combatants is so vital to the success of DDR programmes and the greater post-conflict reconstruction effort for a multitude of reasons. Upon returning to their home communities, ex-combatants are faced with a dramatically changed and changing social landscape, one defined by violence and destruction, and it is in this environment that their reintegration takes place. This issue is ever more salient for ex-combatants creating homes in new communities. When writing on Mozambique, Nordstrom provides a cultural definition of violence as being “*the destruction of home and humanity, of hope and future, of valued traditions and the integrity of the community*” (1997: 123). Such an environment presents a hostile picture and it is clear of the need for the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

The need for effective social reintegration becomes increasingly more apparent when one considers the fact that the identity of the ex-combatants and the community in relation to each other has undergone a transformation as a result of the conflict (Veale and Stavrou, 2003). Tensions between the conflict-generated identities of ex-combatants and civilian identities of the community very often serve to retard the enabling of successful social reintegration (Gear, 2002a). Ginifer further demonstrates this issue,

A major challenge has been to repair relations between ex-combatants and their communities. Ex-combatants have frequently had to overcome the resentment of communities recalling crimes committed during the war, and this has undermined efforts at social

reconciliation. Furthermore... the provision of targeted assistance to ex-combatants has often been perceived as rewarding the perpetrators of the violence, and not as investment of peace and security

(2003: 42)

Ex-combatants find it hard to adjust their attitudes and expectations (Kingma, 1997) and very often suffer from psychosocial problems as a result of the conflict which negatively impact on their ability to operate in civilian life. Even when former combatants can find work they often find the top-down approach to military organisational management frustrates their attempts to reintegrate into civilian economic life.

Ex-combatants frequently describe community perceptions of them as negative and indeed may experience stigmatisation. In studies of ex-combatants in South Africa, Gear (2002b) draws attention to how ex-combatants experience ongoing stigmatisation and stereotyping in their post-military lives. These experiences make it increasingly more difficult for ex-combatants to successfully socially reintegrate into the community and this is further exacerbated by the feelings of betrayal ex-combatants often face. Former combatants commonly express anger towards the government, former military superiors, community leaders and the community in general, and, in some cases, their own families. These feelings arise due to the perception of inadequate provision for ex-combatants returning home, resentment at having been 'sold down the river' by former military superiors and political bodies and a general feeling of being "*discarded, neglected and forgotten by those for whom they fought*" (Gear, 2002b: 16). Fundamentally these perceptions serve to marginalise ex-combatants from the community and produce a volatile, angry and frustrated, socially excluded population who pose a credible threat to the immediate security of society and must be regarded as of paramount importance to the success of the post-conflict reconstruction effort and integral to any ambitions of a successful transformation of conflict to a reconciled society.

Despite the evident importance of, and explicit need for, the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants there seems to be a limited appreciation of this within the design and implementation of DDR programmes. It is apparent that the primary aim

of the reintegration component of DDR programmes is to assimilate ex-combatants into the economy and facilitate their role into productive civilian life. While this aim is indeed important and necessary, placing such an emphasis on this may lead to the dangerous position of neglecting the social reintegration of ex-combatants and this is reflected in DDR design. DDR programmes across the world accentuate a focus on the tangible benefits of economic reintegration, often to the detriment of social reintegration. This is also demonstrated in evaluations of DDR programmes by policy makers and academics. Such a focus is arguably problematic at best and dangerous at worst. Despite the relative lack of attention placed on the social reintegration of ex-combatants in DDR programmes there is evidence in some writings that there do exist methods through which successful social reintegration can be achieved.

Of particular importance to the success of social reintegration is the degree to which receiving communities are willing and able to accept ex-combatants and the efforts they expend in making this a realistic possibility. Community sensitisation exercises can be influential in preparing a community for reintegration and should be promoted. Education and support at this stage is vital to the development and fostering of trust between communities and ex-combatants (Ginifer, 2003). Herein lies a problem: ex-combatants returning to a changed environment require community efforts to facilitate their reintegration however; communities may be intrinsically and understandably fearful, resentful and apprehensive of ex-combatants. One way to combat this dilemma has been demonstrated by the NCDDR in Sierra Leone who disseminated "*the message to communities that they will benefit, directly and indirectly, from the fact that ex-combatants are engaged in rehabilitating damaged societies, and that they will become independent and less likely to commit acts less inimical to society*" (Ginifer, 2003: 47). A further way this may be facilitated is the promotion of community development in which the community is united in order to define their needs and problems and mobilise the necessary resources to address these issues (Veale & Stavrou, 2003). A similar system to this has been in operation in Rwanda in which ex-combatants work together with non-combatants on community development issues. This provides a combination of economic and social reintegration and facilitates a wider understanding and acceptance of ex-combatants (Verwimp & Verpoorten, 2004).

In order for the above techniques to be successful ex-combatants need to engage in the process also. Within the DDR process in Sierra Leone ex-combatants have been

encouraged to participate in projects that are beneficial to the community “*such as civil works, street cleaning, and helping rehabilitate shelter. It has also supported adult education programmes, civic and peace education, music, sports groups, and other projects that help to rebuild social capital*” (Ginifer, 2003: 46). Ex-combatants have also been encouraged to realise that wrongful acts were committed during the course of the conflict and to show remorse for these (Ginifer, 2003). When ex-combatants make a concerted effort to socially reintegrate, such an eventuality is more likely and if other factors are in place, such as accommodating local leaders, measures aimed at promoting collaborative working relationship between ex-combatants and civilians, and general reconstruction in the community, then the changes of a successful ex-combatant social reintegration are increased.

2.6 Social Reintegration and Vulnerable Groups

The social reintegration of ex-combatants can thus be considered as critical to the post-conflict reconstruction effort; however there are a number of groups of ex-combatants within society that are particularly vulnerable within this process and who face specific challenges in their social reintegration. These are: female ex-combatants, child soldiers and disabled veterans. The following examines the respective ordeals each group face and the measures put in place to reduce this as much as possible.

2.6.1 Female Ex-Combatants

Social reintegration, by its very nature, implies a need to reconcile all members of the society however it is frequently the case that reintegration planning for female combatants is at best inadequate and at worst non-existent (Mazurana, 2004). However, the reintegration needs of female combatants differ, sometimes considerably, to those of male combatants and it is argued that DDR programmes should reflect this need in their design (Bouta, 2005). Planning is often limited for the reintegration of female because, as a group they generally constitute a much lower proportion of combatants than men (Kingma & Sayers, 1995). Moreover, even when female combatants do comprise a larger proportion of total combatants it has been the case that,

One of the main obstacles for women's and girl's participation in DDR is that national and international male policy makers and officials too often do not recognise women and girls as integral members of fighting forces...Women and girls associated with fighting forces are frequently categorised as 'camp followers' and 'dependants' by military, government and aid official, who would rather not be responsible for them.

(Makurana, 2004: 61/2)

A further reason female fighters do not receive adequate reintegration support is the expectation that, with the conclusion of the conflict, women should return to their traditional roles within the family (Kingma, 2001). This expectation presents serious difficulties for women for a number of reasons: first, female fighters have developed new skills during conflict and very often wish to apply these in the labour market and contribute to the family income; however the expectation to return to traditional roles can cause tensions within the household. Second, marriages that women return to, or marriages that were borne out of the conflict may become fractious due to the radically changed environment into which they return. Pressures to return to their traditional way of life often culminate in divorce or separation with 18.3% of female combatants being divorced compared with 3.2% of men, and 8.5% separated compared to 0.6% in Eritrea (Bruchhaus & Mehreteab, 2000). Third, female fighters often face stigmatisation and are ostracised and marginalised by society due to their involvement in what is perceived as masculine activity, that is: war (Farr, 2002).

The multifarious problems female combatants face when attempting to reintegrate into society are manifest within economic reintegration but, perhaps more importantly, also in social reintegration. In particular, the demands placed on female combatants by the community regarding traditional behaviour give rise to an increased need for effective psychosocial healing which has been identified as *"a priority for a number of women...This included coping with a loss of identity and lost years of education and alternative career development. For those women in armed opposition groups preparing to disarm, there were also concerns about rejection and stigma within their communities since women had broken traditional gender barriers by becoming members of an armed group"* (Mazurana, 2004: 67). More specifically, female combatants are faced with higher unemployment than their male counterparts and this,

in conjunction with strained family relationships and the non-acceptance of host communities, demonstrates the significant need for DDR programme design to acknowledge female combatants as a vulnerable group and reflect the distinct needs that such a group has when undergoing reintegration and in particular, social reintegration (Veale, 2003).

2.6.2 Child Soldiers

Child soldiers are widely used in many conflicts and also represent a vulnerable group within DDR programmes. In many African conflicts such as Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Sudan, along with countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia and Cambodia, the use of child soldiers is prevalent and in some cases, forced. Child soldiers, defined as *“any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, but not limited to children, boys, and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only refer to a child who is taken or has taken a direct part in hostilities”* (Paris Principles, 2007: 7), are particularly vulnerable due to the fact they face an altogether different environment than other combatants upon the conclusion of conflict. The impact of conflict on child soldiers can be claimed to be of more significance because it is against the backdrop of often-brutal conflict that child soldiers' social and emotional development takes place (Kingma, 2002: 193). Child soldiers, particularly those recruited at ages below 10, are socialised into a military environment and become traumatised by *“the brutal experiences they have undergone and the violent acts they themselves have committed...If their reintegration fails they may well contribute to ‘new cycles of violence’”* (Kingma, 2001: 36). This makes social reintegration highly problematic, as child soldiers need to relearn, or indeed learn for the first time, the social values, norms and practices of civil society (Nubler, 2000).

A further issue faced by child soldiers is the degree to which the receiving community is able and/or willing to accept them. Communities decimated by conflict lack the provision of services such as education and healthcare thus making the reintegration process difficult for all those returning to the community. Child soldiers however, are faced with the very real prospect of having to be self-reliant as a legacy of conflict is an increased number of orphans. Social reintegration therefore becomes all the more important as the community may take on an increased role in the care of ex-child

soldiers. For this reason community-based approaches to reintegration are viewed as critical as they “*strengthen the communities that absorb former underage soldiers*” (Chrobok, 2005: 34). Linked to this is the issue of whether communities are willing to accept former child soldiers. In some communities such acceptance is not forthcoming and it can be extremely difficult for child soldiers to carve out some form of existence. In other societies the performance of public cleansing rituals provides a crucial process through which former child soldiers can pass and receive acceptance into the community (Veale & Stavrou, 2003; Zack-Williams, 2006). Additionally, the use of psychosocial counselling can be beneficial in helping former child soldiers relearn social and cultural value, norms and traditions and are important in “*re-orienting the child’s mind*” (Interview quotation in Veale & Stavrou, 2003: 39).

It is thus evident that former child soldiers constitute an extremely vulnerable group within the reintegration process and special consideration must take place in the design of DDR programmes to reflect this fact. The failure to successfully reintegrate former child soldiers potentially poses a more significant threat to the fragile peace that is established at the conclusion of violent conflict. Not only is there a greater risk of these militarily socialised and war traumatised combatants returning to arms if they feel they have no other purpose but, without the necessary guidance and care from the community, it will be very difficult for such combatants to successfully recover from the legacy of their conflict and develop into productive members of society. With those aged under 15 in many African societies constituting more than 40% in 2005, the highest of any region in the world (UN, 2004), the importance in harnessing this potential for future development is evident.

6.2.3 Disabled Veterans

The final group I shall consider is that of disabled veterans as they represent a vulnerable group but in a very different way from female ex-combatants and former child soldiers in that, dependant on the degree of their disability, they are reliant on the community for their survival but do not constitute as serious a security threat as the other two groups. The issue of disabled veterans is so significant partially due to the prevalence of landmines used in conflict and in terms of proportions; figures of 10% of ex-combatants being disabled seem common (Preston, 1997; Koth, 2005). The degree of assistance required by disabled veterans is dependant on the severity of their

disability and this will dictate the relative ease with which they are able to reintegrate. The DDR programme in Ethiopia used three categories of disability and the assistance received from each group differed accordingly. Less severely disabled veterans (20,000) received the necessary medical and paramedical rehabilitation and then entered the mainstream reintegration programme. Moderately disabled veterans (15,208) received medical care, vocational training and materials to establish their own self-supporting activities along with pension allocations. Severely disabled veterans (2328) received initial institutional care and then were repatriated to their families and received the same benefits as those in the moderate group (Ayalew & Dercon, 2000).

Another important factor in the successful social reintegration of disabled veterans is the provision of psychosocial counselling. Disabled veterans face similar problems as mainstream ex-combatants however they also may require help in overcoming high levels of mental stress and disorder associated with their injuries (Preston, 1997). Whilst they may for a short period of time be hailed as "*a hero who has sacrificed fitness for the cause*" (Preston, 1997: 468), this is very soon forgotten and they are faced with life thereafter as a disabled person but with the scars of war that able-bodied veterans also have. While these veterans can look to the future and focus on re-building their lives the future for disabled veterans is altogether bleaker. For this group therefore, the adequate provision of aid packages is more pertinent. Pensions, training and more practical products such as prostheses become vital, not only for the survival of these veterans, but also for their ability to reintegrate socially as they afford them the ability to remain mobile and thus avoid social exclusion. In cases where such needs were not met, disabled veterans faced the daunting prospects of a life in relative isolation or living in converted former demobilisation centres with other disabled veterans away from their families and communities. In response to such predicaments it is not uncommon for disabled veterans to demonstrate in an effort to draw attention to their specific needs and problems (Lundin et al, 2000).

Disabled veterans constitute a vulnerable ex-combatants group who require care and attention from their community. Although they may not pose as serious a potential security threat as female ex-combatants and former child soldiers, they have made sacrifices for the conflict and do represent a probable burden on society. It therefore seems plausible that this group should receive specifically tailored training and assistance programmes in order to ensure their financial independence as far as is

possible and to provide them with a role in society and reduce the prospects of social exclusion.

2.7 The Reconciliatory Benefits of Social Reintegration

Reintegration has been shown to be a critical factor in the transition from war to peace and, within the component of reintegration, social reintegration is arguably the most important. This section will examine the reconciliatory benefits of social reintegration thus further demonstrating its importance.

During the conflict period combatants construct a military identity through their training and experience (Fischer, 2005; Gear, 2002a). This identity can be particularly problematic as it leads to the tendency for the social environment to be militarised by ex-combatants and can be pervasive for a considerable period of time (Kingma, 2002). Indeed, *“only if and when a veteran is successful in establishing an independent civilian identity will the distinction between ‘veteran’ and ‘civilian’ vanish”* (Colletta et al, 1996: 277). Even in the case where employment is forthcoming such a military identity can retard full reintegration. Research indicates that social reintegration can facilitate the reconstruction of identity from combatant to civilian as this involves *“reinsertion in the family and community, and the mental elimination of the perception of being (member of) a specific group [that is, a combatant]”* (Brito & Mussanhane, 1997: 3). Effective social reintegration therefore indicates towards the forgiveness and acceptance of ex-combatants on the part of the community, and the mechanisms utilised to achieve this enable ex-combatants to *“overcome his acquired identity as ‘a killing machine’ and regain a civilian identity after which he ‘becomes a person again’”* (Lundin, 1998: 112). In the process of conflict transformation and peacebuilding such an identity cannot be understated, as it is this very transformation of identity that allows reconciliation to take place. However, the way in which social reintegration is achieved, and the benefits that can be accrued, are not fully understood as yet. It is therefore important to examine this phenomenon in greater detail, particularly in the context of reconciliation and peacebuilding; something this research seeks to do.

A further potential benefit of social reintegration is the way in which it can ameliorate the effects of war trauma. During conflict, numerous atrocities occur leaving both

combatants and communities suffering from the debilitating effects of war trauma and this is arguably the gravest of legacies in the post-conflict society; roads and bridges can be rebuilt but hearts and minds possibly cannot. Measures to promote social reintegration, such as psychosocial counselling and indigenous healing techniques can aid in the transition from a socialised military identity (combatant), through a transition phase between conflict and peace (ex-combatant) to that of a civilian. Generally psychosocial counselling is provided by the DDR programme or by other provisions put in place by NGOs and will only include the former combatant and perhaps his or her family. Such counselling can be particularly useful in enabling ex-combatants to relearn patterns of thought and emotion synonymous with being a civilian and can provide mechanisms through which ex-combatants can cope with the trauma of conflict such as violent rages, nightmares, low self-esteem and confidence, depression and reliance on alcohol or drugs. However, although this is limited to the individual and perhaps his or her family it can contribute to community reconciliation due to knock-on effects.

Conversely, indigenous healing techniques offer an invaluable healing process for both ex-combatants and the communities they return to and they are generally public ceremonies or rituals and engage the whole community. Lundin, writing about Mozambique, states,

Rituals of (re)integration in the various places where ex-soldiers chose to settle were conducted by the communities as part of the reception extended to these individuals. These rituals sought to reconcile the individual in three stages: first, with him/herself, to purge the spirit of war and aggression from the heart and soul of the ex-soldier, a kind of exorcism to reorient the former combatants socially and psychologically; second, with the community and community life; and third, with his/her former enemies.

(1998: 107)

One particular cleansing ritual that ex-combatants underwent on their return to the communities after the conflict in Mozambique is as follows: the ritual, conducted by the community in public, begins with a reorientation of identity from combatant to civilian through a cleansing ceremony involving a steam bath and washing in water fortified

with herbs. The process then advances to a second stage in which the ex-combatant is reconciled with the community through the appeasement of the spirits. This involves announcing to dead relatives that the 'lost sheep' is back home and giving thanks for his safe return. The final stage of the ritual reconciles the ex-combatant with the spirits of the dead killed by him. In this stage forgiveness is requested and remorse is shown through token compensation. In some cases a communal meal may be served in which the community eats together as a symbol of reconciliation (Lundin, 1998).

The cleansing rituals passed through by ex-combatants, and particularly their collective nature, provide a crucial reconciliation tool due to the way in which they sustain the social order of the communities in which they are carried out and are particularly powerful due to their public tradition: ex-combatants go through a public process of absolution and acceptance and the community unites in the collective to enable such a process to take place. Indeed, such rituals can have further implications for general reconciliation as in Uganda where "*the assumption is that all clans and sub-clans are both victims and perpetrators, thus acknowledging it is not just individual returnees that have to be reintegrated within the community, but relations between families, sub-clans and clans are integrally tied up in the reintegration and reconciliation process*" (Veale & Stavrou, 2003: 44); the collective nature of indigenous healing rituals can facilitate the re-forging of such relations. Because not only the ex-combatant but also the community are engaged in these rituals, their role becomes critical in "*sustaining the social order of rural communities where people live in close proximity and in relations of dependence on the spiritual world*" (Lundin, 1998: 112). When social order, which may have been damaged during the conflict, is restored and community relations are reaffirmed the process of reconciliation takes root and ex-combatants can be influential in this process through their social reintegration into society.

Effective social reintegration has further benefits for reconciliation when considering economic reintegration. Pervasive within most reintegration processes is the importance placed on economic reintegration. Whilst economic reintegration is indeed an essential aspect of normalisation after conflict it can be argued that the likelihood of successful economic reintegration is lower if ex-combatants are not successfully socially reintegrated into the community. This is partially because social reintegration enables the re-establishment of social networks and the "*assistance provided by a well-connected relative may be the only alternative to breaking into the formal sector (public*

or private)” (Lundin, 1998: 110). Additionally, effective social reintegration facilitates the fostering and development of trust within communities as “*trust arises when a community shares a set of moral values in such a way as to create expectations of regular and honest behaviour*” (Fukuyama, 1995: 153). Acceptance back into the community – social reintegration – implies the existence of a set of shared values, at least in some degree, and therefore trust is developed. Trust is vital for economic prosperity and therefore it is evident effective social reintegration can have beneficial effects for economic reintegration. Indeed, it is possible to go so far as to claim the prospects for economic reintegration and economic prosperity would be severely depreciated in the absence of social reintegration. This demonstrates not only the importance of social reintegration for economic reintegration, but also the way in which both contribute to the rebuilding of trust and other measures associated with reconciliation.

Linked to the above line of reasoning is the fact that ex-combatants may have, or develop during the course of the conflict, skills and capabilities that are transferable to civilian life and would be valuable for the post-conflict reconstruction effort (Nubler, 1997). However, if social reintegration is not forthcoming the ability for communities to work together effectively is diminished and the capabilities of ex-combatants are not fully realised, thus representing a loss of developmental potential. If ex-combatants successfully reintegrate socially then the subsequent fostering of trust and strengthening of social cohesion enables an environment in which the community can more effectively work together thus harnessing the potential of ex-combatants *and* further strengthening social reintegration and social cohesion as the community experience the benefits of accepting the ex-combatants back into the community (Ginifer, 2003). Evidence of this point comes from Rwanda where former combatants and non-combatants have worked together on public works projects which has facilitated social reintegration and demonstrated the benefits of combining economic activity with social reintegration (Verwimp & Verpoorten, 2004). Thus the effective social reintegration of ex-combatants has significant potential not only for social cohesion but also for economic prosperity in a number of ways. Moreover, ex-combatants can, through the skills they develop during their conflict experience, become positive catalysts for peacebuilding through their own actions, which provide a role model for the community. Indeed, ex-combatants have shown themselves to be instrumental in the social and economic development of their communities, in ensuring security and crime reduction and support

for conflict mediation process. As NiZA importantly assert, “*a commitment to social justice, transformation and economic rights that motivates people to join armed formations can also drive efforts to promote social change...ex-combatants are far more than simply fighters; they are often social activists with a strong understanding of the nature and causes of social injustice. They are often the carriers of a social memory of struggle, taking on the role of preserving the history of the struggle against injustice*” (2006:14/15).

One of the most widely cited advantages of the reintegration of ex-combatants is the reduced internal security threat¹⁹. Immediately after conflict there exists a fragile climate of peace in which there is a deep-rooted state of insecurity and mistrust within the psyche of both ex-combatants and civilians. This situation can be exacerbated if ex-combatants are not effectively reintegrated and may culminate in a return to violent conflict with ex-combatants taking up arms. Indeed, in the case of Namibia there was no reintegration planning after the demobilisation stage as it was believed combatants would just return to their former lives (Preston, 1997). This lack of foresight proved to be costly as the hastily constructed Development Brigades Corporation (DBC) - a government attempt to pacify ex-combatants and provide them with vocational training - resulted in reinforcing “*the military structure of the war by reassembling large groups of former fighters and placing them in centres that were difficult to manage and even more difficult to disband. This contributed to instability, as many of the protests about reintegration grew out of these centres*” (McMullin, 2005: 196).

Similarly, ineffective reintegration attempts in Haiti have left ex-combatants on the periphery of society with the need for psychological adjustment being disregarded, “*the result of which ten years later has been the existence of groups calling them selves the armed forces of Haiti and acting as law enforcement agents, powerbrokers and political actors*” (Mobekk, 2005: 221). The case of Haiti also highlights the fact that, even when employed as part of the new police force, ex-combatants may still pose a threat to security and stability. Thus marginalised ex-combatants represent a significant security threat even if they have found employment; those who do not find employment and are also marginalised are potentially even more dangerous. This, taken in conjunction with the previous argument of the importance of social reintegration for economic reintegration serves to reinforce the significance of social reintegration. The successful

¹⁹ This is also relevant for regional security.

social reintegration of ex-combatants may alleviate such a security threat as not only is the prospect of economic reintegration more probable, but the likelihood of ex-combatants becoming marginalised is diminished and the social safety net that is developed enables ex-combatant to better cope with war trauma and feelings of frustration (Lundin, 1998).

Perhaps the overarching reason why the social reintegration of ex-combatants is so important is the fact that economic reintegration by itself can be said to be the achievement of negative peace while a combination of economic, political and social reintegration represents positive peace. The conventional reintegration measurements utilised by the international community, that of the employment of ex-combatants and the maintenance of internal security, are in their own right important however, *“reintegration from this perspective [is] akin to achieving ‘negative peace’ or the absence of outright conflict”* whereas the outlook of community leaders in war-torn Mozambique *“reflected a deeper understanding of the meaning of reintegration, one which embraced the normative requirements of ‘social peace’ as well as concerns for political representativity and stability. The obvious point to be made is that the achievement of these aims can only be realised through long-term development”* (Alden, 2002:351). This represents two significant problems associated with current attitudes towards the way in which DDR programmes are planned and implemented: first, the divergence between how the international community and community leaders view ex-combatant reintegration represents a differing of agendas between the two groups which may translate into a loss of, or a disregard of, indigenous knowledge, and a limited working relationship between the two. Second, the clear commitment to, and appreciation of, the need for effective social reintegration of ex-combatants by community leaders is not fully capitalised on thus allowing the potential loss of programme impact which could result negatively on the depth of conflict transformation.

The above argument is particularly important as it emphasises a significant disjuncture in what DDR programmes attempt to achieve, the way in which they are designed and implemented, and the result they could have. As demonstrated, the social reintegration of ex-combatants can potentially have significant effects not only in the attainment of negative peace, but can also contribute greatly to conflict transformation in the PCE through the reconciliatory nature of the process. The social reintegration of ex-combatants can supplement the repairing of social cleavages thus reducing the potential

for future conflict and establishing an environment for development through the renewal or strengthening of social cohesion. Current approaches to DDR do not adequately exploit the potential reconciliatory benefits of social reintegration, instead concentrating on economic reintegration. The effect of this is the creation of a space between what *does* occur and what *could* occur, which this research seeks to contribute toward filling. Specifically, it aims to develop our understanding of the social reintegration process on the principle that this will enrich our appreciation of the implications the social reintegration of ex-combatants has for reconciliation and peacebuilding.

2.8 Conclusion

As is evident DDR programmes have the potential to play a vital role in the peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction effort. The first two components of DDR programmes, those of disarmament and demobilisation, produce tangible results which make important contributions to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants through performing the role of a confidence building measure and enabling the gathering of information of ex-combatants that is so vital for the effective planning of the reintegration phase.

It is, however, in the reintegration stage that current approaches to DDR are left wanting. Both economic and political reintegration make significant contributions to the overall reintegration of ex-combatants and cannot be ignored. However, the aspect of social reintegration is often neglected, with DDR programmes focusing primarily on economic reintegration. Current design and implementation of DDR programmes, and the way in which they are evaluated, follow a generally minimalist philosophy and does not place enough consideration on the importance of social reintegration, thus failing to capitalise on the full potential of such programmes to contribute to conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes through their positive impacts on reconciliation.

By focusing on social reintegration this research hopes to further our comprehension of this aspect of DDR and how it functions within the mechanism of DDR as a whole. This then enables us to develop an understanding of the implications DDR has for other aspects of post-conflict reconstruction. In doing so DDR itself evolves from being the stand-alone *ad hoc* policy that it began as, to the design and implementation of

programmes that significantly contribute to conflict transformation and peacebuilding and therefore impact even more on the reconciliation process. To this end then we consider the ultimate goal of reintegration from a maximalist perspective, arriving at the conclusion that not only can we only truly claim reintegration has been successful when ex-combatants are socially reintegrated, but also that such social reintegration has beneficial consequences for other aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction process as discussed in the chapter.

The purpose of this chapter was to provide an analysis of DDR literature that not only charts the development of DDR programmes but that also draws attention to their weaknesses as it is only scrutinising such weakness that we can develop programmes that can maximise their potential. By developing a more elaborate understanding of social reintegration it is possible to progress our understanding of DDR as a complete process and therefore enable improvements in DDR design and implementation; improvements that can have impacts in the transformation of conflict and the peacebuilding process.

The following chapter introduces the concept of social capital in order to provide an alternative lens through which to view the DDR challenge as delineated in this chapter. In doing this I attempt to draw together DDR and social capital in such a way that DDR programmes can better respond to the reconciliation challenges faced by societies emerging from violent conflict.

Chapter Three:

Social Capital: The Link between DDR and Reconciliation?

3.1 Introduction

Chapter three introduces the final concept utilised within this research, that of social capital. Social capital is critical to the construction of the theoretical framework that is used within this study and serves to link the latter part of the previous chapter regarding social reintegration with the challenges associated with achieving reconciliation. Although the connections between social reintegration and social capital are not made explicit in this chapter, they are implicit and combine to deliver a platform from which we can engage with the other two concepts of reconciliation and social reintegration through the theoretical framework.

The chapter begins by examining social capital literature which is essentially broken down to consist of the origins of the term social capital, the key components and definitions of social capital and ways in which social capital is derived. This section presents a conceptualisation of social capital, which serves as a basis from which to further develop our understanding. The chapter then moves on to analyse the transformation of social capital through violent conflict. This is a crucial aspect of this research as it enables a greater understanding of the environment into which ex-combatants return when they are demobilised, and thus the challenges associated with social reintegration and reconciliation. Additionally, by examining this issue we develop the way in which we approach conflict analysis by adding a further dimension from which we can view conflict and its effects. The next section of the chapter considers the ways in which the social fabric that is so badly damaged through violent conflict can be restored through the rebuilding of social ties. Essentially then, this section concerns itself with developing a deeper understanding of social capital that goes beyond explaining what social capital is and how it can be damaged by violent conflict, to explicating how social capital trauma can be reversed and the social fabric strengthened; a key component of the conflict transformation process and peacebuilding effort.

Having examined the concept of social capital and how it is affected, both negatively and positively, by human behaviour, it is important to investigate the ways in which social capital is measured. This is so important for a number of reasons: first, whilst social capital may be a theory it also has distinct empirical implications and, due its relative infancy, the system through which this theory can effectively be observed is essentially a work in progress. Therefore, this research, and other research engaging with social capital can potentially contribute to this system. Second, the application of social capital has, to date, been very much confined to the West and is only relatively recently extending to the developing world. The methods used to observe social capital in the Western context may not be transferable to the developing world context. Because this research is concerned with a PCE context it is necessary to examine methods of observing social capital in more detail.

3.2 Social Capital: A Conceptualisation

The term 'Social Capital' has been in existence for almost 100 years however it has not been until the last three decades that it has been the subject of increasing academic research and has developed as a concept. Writing in 1916, L. J. Hanifan, the state supervisor for rural schools in West Virginia, applied the term to explain the importance of community involvement for successful schools. According to Hanifan social capital is,

Those tangible substances [that] count for most in the daily lives of people: namely good will, fellowship, sympathy, and social intercourse among the individuals and families who make up a social unit... The individual is helpless socially, if left to himself... If he comes into contact with his neighbour, and they with other neighbours, there will be an accumulation of social capital, which may immediately satisfy his social needs and which may bear a social potentiality sufficient to the substantial improvement of living conditions in the whole community. The community as a whole will benefit by the cooperation of all its parts, while the individual will

find in his associations the advantages of the help, sympathy, and the fellowship of his neighbours.

(1916: 130)

Subsequent to Hanifan's writings on social capital the term seemingly received marginal attention and it was not until the 1970s and 1980s that it began to be researched and conceptualised on any significant scale. The debate following the 1970/80s was centred primarily on its definition and has included interpretation from the economic, sociological, political and anthropological fields. However, in recent years the concept has grown in importance and is increasingly utilised across these fields.

Perhaps the most well known academic writing on social capital is Robert D. Putnam who, in his seminal work defines social capital as consisting of "*the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit*" (1993a: 36). Throughout his work Putnam essentially argues that social interaction enables the formation of civic networks that facilitate and reinforce social norms of reciprocity and thus construct an environment of trust. It is through this environment of trust, embedded in social norms of reciprocity, that effective cooperation and coordination is expedited leading to economic prosperity, political stability and social cohesion (Putnam, 1993a, 1993b, 2000, 2002). Although this argument may seem simplistic and general it is in fact the product of a highly complex analysis of the multifarious aspects of social organisation presented in a cogent manner to which most academics concur. The work of Putnam provides an 'umbrella' understanding of social capital which is used by many academics as the foundation from which to base their studies and advances into our understanding of social capital. Indeed, a contemporary analysis of social capital could not be considered complete without an examination of Putnam's work although this is not to say that other authors do not provide value-added to the debate.

One scholar whose work has been highly influential to our understanding of social capital is Mark S. Granovetter (1973) who, although not explicitly writing on the concept of social capital, provides a fundamental element of social capital theory through his analysis of social ties in his paper *The Strength of Weak Ties*. For Granovetter, understanding interpersonal ties is crucial for our appreciation of

sociological macro phenomena such as diffusion, social mobility, political organisation and social cohesion (Granovetter, 1973). Essentially interpersonal ties exist between family, friends and associates and can be roughly categorised as strong, weak or absent. The strength of an interpersonal tie is a “(probably linear) combination of the amount of time, the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding), and the reciprocal services which characterise the tie” (1973: 1361). According to this definition of the strength of a tie it is evident that more frequent and protracted interaction between individuals will result in a stronger friendship (Homans, 1950).

Interpersonal ties are developed between various individuals and with varying strengths. Those ties that are strong create dense networks with familiarity, reciprocity and trust permeating between members of the networks. Such networks “form the primary building blocks of society, uniting nuclear and extended family members and neighbours. These relations, predominately based on kinship, ethnicity, and religion, are largely protectionist, defence mechanisms that form a safety net for basic survival” (Colletta & Cullen, 2000: 6). Weak ties, in comparison, create less dense networks that are characterised by their networked and associational nature, for example, civic associations.

It is Granovetter’s premise that weak ties between individuals represent bridges between those dense networks that are characterised by strong ties. This is the case because two such networks can only be connected by an individual (A) within each network who has a weak tie to another individual (B) in the other network, the logic of this being that should A and B have a strong tie then the two networks would be bridged by other individuals within the networks due to familiarity, proximity and the amount of time spent with those with whom they have strong ties. Following this argument one can recognise the importance that weak ties have in providing bridges between networks and, as the process grows, between communities.

Since the publication of Granovetter’s ‘*The Strength of Weak Ties*’ his notion of weak and strong ties, and what such ties represent for the network of which they are a part, has been developed by various authors writing on social capital to enable a more sophisticated understanding of social organisation. The strong and weak ties developed by Granovetter have been reconstituted into what is known as bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital is present within dense networks characterised by

strong ties, the ties that bind - kinship, ethnicity, religion and profession, among others – and is “*by choice or necessity, inward looking and tend[s] to reinforce exclusive identities and homogenous groups*” (Putnam, 2000: 22) while bridging social capital is characterised by weak ties - the bridges between networks, associations and communities (Narayan, 1999) – and is “*outward looking and encompass[es] people across diverse social cleavages*”. As such, “*bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue, whereas bridging social capital provides a sociological WD-40*” (Putnam, 2000: 23). Woolcock (1998) also makes the distinction between bonding and bridging social capital although the terms he uses for each are different with intra-community ties being classified as ‘*integration*’ (i.e. bonding) and extra-community networks as ‘*linkages*’ (i.e. bridging).

The importance of both bonding and bridging social capital to the creation, development and sustainability of ‘successful’ society cannot be understated. Bonding social capital provides a social safety net that enables all those within the network to ‘*get by*’ while bridging social capital endows individuals to ‘*get ahead*’ and communities to ‘*get along*’. Whilst their benefits are apparent bonding and bridging social capital can also present communities with problems. Where bonding social capital is particularly strong the powerful networks that ensue can restrict access to opportunities and individual freedoms and place excessive demands on successful community members whilst presenting possibilities for corruption and cronyism (Narayan, 1999). If in parallel bridging social capital is particularly weak, or absent, ties outside the primary network are ineffective or nonexistent which can limit opportunities for advancement and societal cohesion.

Bonding and bridging social capital, so important for Putnam’s analysis of social capital, can be said to reflect on the nature of horizontal relation; between individuals and between communities. Social capital however, is also represented through the vertical relations between state and civil society. The ways in which state and civil society offset and complement each other have important implications for the economic prosperity, political stability and social cohesion of a given society. In the writings of Woolcock (1998) and Woolcock & Narayan (2000) it is apparent that what they refer to as ‘*institutional integrity*’ has role to play in state-community interaction. Organisational integrity encapsulates state institutions and their effectiveness and ability to function, along with the legal environment and social norms. The legal environment

in a given society, and social norms that characterise that society, potentially operate as an influential mechanism through which to achieve and maintain social control (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). The degree of organisational integrity a state demonstrates will have implications as to whether the actions of civil society are '*complementary*' to those of the state, and indeed enhance such actions, or if they '*substitute*' for state services and functions (Colletta & Cullen, 2000:14).

Woolcock & Narayan (2000) combine the principles of bonding and bridging social capital with complementarity and substitution into what they term as the '*synergy*' view in which they recognise a number of factors: first, governments, firms and civil society all have a variable impact on the achieving of collective goals; second, neither states, firms or communities possess the necessary resources to promote sustainable development and therefore complementarities and forged partnerships within and across these sectors are required; and third, that the State's role in facilitating positive developmental outcomes is the most important and problematic as the State is the ultimate provider of public goods and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law, as well as being the actor most able to facilitate enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion. However, communities and firms also have an important role to play in creating the conditions that produce, recognise, and reward good governance (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000: 236). Essentially the *synergy* approach examines the ways in which leaders and government institutions engage and interact with the community.

The conceptual dimensions of social capital discussed above present us with a highly complex picture of social capital. In order to enable a more concise but comprehensive understanding of the notion of social capital Halpern (2005) introduces the following diagram from which it is possible to interconnect the three major cross-cutting dimensions of social capital that he identifies: components – networks, norms, sanctions; levels or domain of analysis – individual, group, community, nation etc.; character or function – bonding, bridging, linking.




Figure 3 – A Conceptual Map of Social Capital: Halpern (2005: 27)

Halpern's conceptual map provides us with the necessary clarity when approaching a concept as capacious, multifarious and dynamic as that of social capital.

Although it is now apparent what social capital is and what it comprises it is still necessary to examine in greater detail the sources of social capital. As previously stated, social capital consists of “*the features of social organisation, such as networks, norms and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit*” (Putnam, 1993: 36). While this statement may summarise what social capital is it does not provide any indication of how it is created. For Portes (1998) there are two sources of social capital: the ‘*consummatory*’ source in which social capital is derived from the socialisation processes attached to families, kinship networks, class and occupational groups and the ‘*instrumental*’ source which arises from purposive exchanges based on expectations of reciprocity. Adding to this discussion, Narayan makes the claim those consummatory sources of social capital can be seen as being associated with the ‘*endowment*’ of social capital whilst instrumental sources are examples of the

'*constructability*' of social capital (1999). It would therefore follow that intra-community ties, the ties that bind, enable the consummation or endowment of social capital between members of a dense network characterised by strong ties of kinship, ethnicity and religion whilst also facilitating the development of social capital through instrumental sources based on exchange and reciprocity.

Uphoff goes further in explaining what social capital is and how it is created and accrued. "*Social capital is an accumulation of various types of social, psychological, cultural, cognitive, institutional, and related assets that increase the amount (or probability) of mutually beneficial cooperative behaviour [MBCA]*" (Uphoff, 2000: 216). In order to provide a more concise understanding of how social capital develops Uphoff distinguishes between two interrelated categories: cognitive and structural. "*The cognitive category derives from mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that contribute cooperative behaviour and MBCA*" (Uphoff, 2000: 218). Cognitive processes therefore enable the creation, fostering and development of MBCA, leading to social capital, as people predisposed to collective norms, values, attitudes and beliefs through their kin, culture, ideology or religion are more likely to accept these norms etc. as widely, shared, rational and acceptable. "*The structural category is associated with various forms of social organisation, particularly roles, rules, precedents and procedures as well as a wide variety of networks that contribute to cooperation, and specifically to MBCA*" (Uphoff, 2000:218). In this way the structural elements of social organisation facilitate MBCA, and therefore social capital, through previously established patterns of interaction thus making the productive outcomes from cooperation more predictable and beneficial.

Uphoff's thesis is potentially very influential to our understanding of social capital as he emphasises the fact that both the social and political environment shapes social interaction. This conceptualisation provides us with a stronger foundation from which to understand the idea of synergy presented by Woolcock & Narayan (2000) as it indicates that sources of social capital are derived from both the social and political environment and therefore both have a role to play in facilitating MBCA; synergy between society and the state will thus enable the cognitive aspects of norms, values, attitudes and beliefs to become embedded in society at every level through the

generation of structural forms of social organisation such as roles, rules, precedents, procedures and networks.

The final source of social capital I shall consider is that of trust which is elaborately examined by Fukuyama (1995) in his book *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*.

Social capital is a capability that arises from the prevalence of trust in a society or in certain parts of it. It can be embodied in the smallest and most basic social group, the family, as well as the largest of all groups, the nation, and in all the other groups in between... Trust is the expectation that arises within a community of regular, honest, and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part of other members of that community. Those norms can be about deep "value" questions like the nature of God or justice, but they also encompass secular norms like professional standards and codes of behaviour.

(1995: 26)

The proclivity for trust to be established between individuals, within social groups and across networks is embedded in the set of moral and ethical values those individuals, groups and networks share, and the acquisition and emanation of social virtues such as honesty, loyalty and dependability. In the absence of such shared virtues interaction can only take place within a system of formal rules and regulations. Not only is the process of constructing this system time-consuming and costly, it functions as a substitute for generalised trust based on communities of shared ethics. This may have implications for the effectiveness of the social group. Reciprocal trust, and with it social capital and a thriving civil society, can only develop unabated if such virtues are existent and nurtured. Uphoff's (2000) dichotomy of cognitive and structural elements of social capital, together with the synergy view presented by Woolcock & Narayan (2000), perhaps provide the ideal foundation from which social virtues may be fostered and cultivated in order to enable the culmination of a high trust society in which mutually beneficial collective action (MBCA) is the norm and the notion of social capital is firmly embedded deep within the structures of society.

3.3 Social Capital and Violent Conflict: A Transformative Relationship

In the previous sub-section I have presented a conceptualisation of social capital based on current theoretical and empirical literature. When we apply this conceptualisation to the analysis of violent conflict essentially social capital can be seen to contribute to both the cause and emergence of violent conflict and to the restoration of peace. This sub-section will examine, through the use of theoretical and empirical evidence, the transformation of social capital throughout violent conflict and highlight the role social capital may have in contributing to conflict in either positive or negative ways.

Social capital has the potential to play a significant role in the emergence of violent conflict due to the way in which it contributes to the cohesiveness of society. As Berkman and Kawachi (2000) state,

Social capital forms a subset of the notion of social cohesion. Social cohesion refers to two broader intertwined features of society: (1) the absence of latent conflict whether in the form of income/wealth inequality, racial/ethnic tensions, disparities in political participation, or other forms of polarisation and (2) the presence of strong social bonds – measured by levels of trust and norms of reciprocity, the abundance of associations that bridge social divisions (civic society), and the presence of institutions of conflict management, e.g. responsive democracy, and independent judiciary, and an independent media

(2000: 175)

As is evident from the above statement bonding and bridging social capital perform a pivotal function in the creation, development and maintenance of social cohesion. The inward looking ties that bind – bonding social capital – provide the primary building blocks of society while the outward looking ties that link – bridging social capital – provide cross-cutting relations across often disparate social groups. It is in the discussion of social cohesion that we may be reminded of Putnam's alluding to bonding social capital as 'sociological superglue' and bridging social capital as a 'sociological WD40'. However the appropriate balance between bonding and bridging social capital

is imperative when considering its impact on social cohesion. When bonding social capital is particularly strong it can be detrimental to other groups or communities within the society in terms of promoting inequality between, exclusion of and intolerance towards other groups (Putnam, 2000).

Strong bonding social capital, despite being a necessity, is not sufficient for the breakdown of social cohesion and the descent into violent conflict; bridging social capital too plays its part. The absence of cross-cutting ties between groups and communities – bridging social capital – poses a greater threat to social cohesion than that strong bonding social capital as the lack of such ties can serve to magnify the strength of bonding social capital through limited interactions between groups as well as reducing the opportunity for societal conflict resolution mechanisms to evolve. *“For societal well being or the collective good, a transition has to occur from exclusive loyalty to primary groups to networks of secondary associations whose most important characteristic is that they bring together people who in some ways are different from the self. Social relations underlie all societal institutions and in turn feed back and reinforce the organisation and functioning of a country’s formal and informal institutions”* (Narayan, 2000: 12). Taking this point further Narayan emphasises the importance of inter-ethnic networks as symbolising ‘agents of peace’ due to the role they play in building bridges, and managing tensions that arise, between communities. If these interconnections are nonexistent or ethereal the likelihood of ethnic violence is increased (Narayan, 2000).

The above analysis of how bonding and bridging social capital may impact on social cohesion provides an account of the dynamics in the bonding-bridging balance within a ‘natural’ environment, that is, one that has not been manipulated. However, when a society is characterised by very strong bonding social capital and very weak or absent bridging social capital the potential, and perhaps incentive, for the perversion of social capital in order to attenuate social cohesion and polarise society for individual and group gain can be significant (Colletta & Cullen, 2000). Putnam also touches on this observation in a slightly different way stating, *“social capital is often most easily created in opposition²⁰ to something or someone else. Fraternity²¹ is most natural*

²⁰ Original emphasis.

²¹ Fraternity was one of the three ideal of the French Revolution – liberty, equality and fraternity – and is another term for what Putnam identifies as social capital.

within socially homogenous groups.... Social divisiveness is the central normative issue raised by communitarianism. Does the exaltation of social capital and community solidarity lead inevitably to the murderous hatreds of Bosnia and Kosovo?" (Putnam, 2000: 361).

The recognition that social capital can indeed be manipulated and contribute to violent conflict gives emphasis to the need for a closer examination of what Woolcock & Narayan (2000) term *synergy*. When synergy is apparent between the state and community social capital can be developed in a positive manner leading to public benefit (Evans, 1996, Woolcock, 1998, Narayan, 1999; Woolcock & Narayan, 2000). When synergy is absent however, the potential for the perversion of social capital is greater. If an authoritarian or totalitarian state penetrates society this not only has implications for civil society as the space necessary for healthy civic engagement is not available but, if the intentions of the state are malevolent, it can result in the distortion of bonding social capital culminating in violent conflict if bridging social capital is not extant in order to offset it (Colletta & Cullen, 2000).

When synergy is also absent the proclivity for such a breakdown in social cohesion may further increase. The state, within its role as the provider of public goods and arbiter and enforcer of law (Woolcock & Narayan, 2000), has the capability to discriminate against certain groups in favour of others and if it chooses to do so the absence of synergy between state and community will lead to civil society, in its limited form, to substitute for government. Woolcock and Narayan (2000) provide a diagram depicting what may happen in the absence of synergy and high levels of bridging social capital.




Figure 4 – Relationship between Bridging Social Capital and Governance: Woolcock & Narayan (2000: 237)

Note: Complementarity refers to the optimal interaction of government and markets in civil society; substitution is the replacement by informal organizations (families, networks, and so on) of services ordinarily provided by governments and institutions.

As we can see when levels of bridging social capital are low this leads to latent conflict when states are well functioning. This latent conflict then progresses into conflict if states are or become dysfunctional. In a diagram similar to this Colletta and Cullen (2000) include bonding social capital to demonstrate how social cohesion is affected by bonding and bridging social capital.




Figure 5 – Social Cohesion: The Integration of Vertical Linking and Horizontal Bridging Social Capital: Colletta & Cullen (2000: 14)

Combining both these diagrams it is evident that horizontal and vertical social capital and synergy between state and community have enormous potential to both contribute to and obviate the emergence of violent conflict. Where the emergence of violent conflict does occur it is highly probable that the society is characterised by high levels of bonding social capital, low or nonexistent levels of bridging social capital, and a lack of synergy between state and community. A community, society or country in this situation could be found in the lower left quadrant in both Woolcock and Narayan (2000) and Colletta and Cullen's (2000) diagrams.

A micro level examination of the above discussions of how social capital may contribute to the emergence of violent conflict can be conducted utilising Fukuyama's

notion of 'trust'. As stated above, a society with the proclivity for violent conflict is characterised by high levels of bonding social capital, low or nonexistent levels of bridging social capital, and a lack of synergy between state and community (weak vertical social capital). In such an environment trust is of paramount importance and has a high degree of influence as to whether that society will descend into violent conflict or not. When bonding social capital is high and bridging social capital low trust may be relatively high between members within the different homogenous groups whereas the level of trust between these homogenous groups may be relatively low. This in itself increases the propensity for violent conflict, as social cohesion is low and fragmentation high. However, when coupled with low levels of trust between state and society, a consequence of the lack of synergy, the potential for violent conflict is amplified. As Colletta and Cullen (2000) state,

Vertical relations plagued by inequality and an unequal distribution of power and opportunity (often accompanied by exclusion and indignity) can instigate violent conflict. The absence of horizontal relations – of cross-cutting ties between unlike groups in a multicultural society – can erupt into hostilities if one group is seen as monopolising resources and power to the disadvantage of the others. And if, within these groups, high levels of bonding social capital link only like members, difference in access to resources and power may further aggravate relations and heighten tensions between those in control and those excluded. Thus, violent conflict is triggered by the presence of strong exclusionary bonds and disempowerment combined with a lack of horizontal and vertical linking social capital.

(2000: 16)

Trust therefore has a pivotal role to play in the emergence of violent conflict. However, trust is also a central concept when considering the effects of violent conflict on social capital. As Colletta & Cullen importantly emphasise, trust is “*a grossly depleted commodity during warfare*” (2000: 11). Trust becomes such a depleted commodity for a multitude of reasons. Within a conflict environment identity has a tendency to form along increasingly narrow lines based on units of identity such as clan, ethnicity, religion, and others, in order for those within these groups to maintain some degree of

security (Lederach, 1997). The cause of this fragmentation of identities is due to the “*roots [of conflict] in long-standing distrust, fear, and paranoia, which are reinforced by the immediate experience of violence, division, and atrocities. This experience, in turn, further exacerbates the hatred and fear that are fuelling the conflict*” (Lederach, 1997: 13).

The lack of trust that is endemic within the conflict environment enables the perversion of bonding social capital thus leading to the increased breakdown in social cohesion. “*Where there is deep, long-term fear and direct experiences of violence that sustain an image of the enemy, people are extremely vulnerable and easily manipulated. The fears in sub-group identities are often created, reinforced and used by leaders to solidify their position and the internal cohesion of the groups behind them. Deep polarisation and sharp divisions are, in fact, functional for increasing cohesion, reducing ambiguity, and decreasing internal criticisms of leaders*” (Lederach, 1997: 15). The impact this has for the bonding-bridging dynamic is that bonding social capital within these sub-groups is strengthened and indeed polluted due to this fear and distrust whilst bridging social capital, necessary for social cohesion, is reduced thus furthering the strengthening of negative bonding social capital. The effect for the conflict is to create greater polarisation and deeper social cleavages, which conspire to reinforce sub-group identity and potentially turn hostilities into a protracted conflict.

The development of distrust, fear, and paranoia illustrated by Lederach can be better understood using Uphoff’s notion of cognitive and structural social capital. As previously stated, “*cognitive [social capital] derives from mental processes and resulting ideas, reinforced by culture and ideology, specifically norms, values, attitudes, and beliefs that contribute to cooperative behaviour and MBCA*” (Uphoff, 2000: 218). Whilst this view may seem agreeable it can be argued that MBCA will only eventuate if the mental processes and resulting ideas are positive. In the event that the norms, values, attitudes and beliefs within a culture, community or group are those of distrust, fear, animosity and paranoia it is likely that the cognitive processes that are reinforced by such norms are also negative. Effectually this will serve to reinforce and rationalise the distrust and fear that is pervasive within the community and to fuel the conflict further leading to the potential for protracted conflict. Similarly, when the structural element of social capital is also embedded within notions of distrust and fear it increases the propensity for patterns of social interaction to be of a negative disposition. The

roles, rules, precedents and procedures that direct interaction become based on widely shared and accepted negative assumptions and associations and thus represent the notion of distrust and fear. They reinforce the protectionist nature of bonding social capital while severing those crosscutting ties that are so crucial social cohesion.

The above discussions have provided an analysis of the way in which violent conflict transforms social capital. As stated, both bonding and bridging social capital play significant roles in the emergence and continuation of conflict and are transformed throughout the conflict. That said however, social capital is also important for conflict transformation. As Colletta & Cullen note, "*social capital can be constructive and support social cohesion and the mitigation of conflict*" (2000: 16). This is particularly the case because as Putnam claims, social capital is "*a resource whose supply increases rather than decreases through use and which (as contrasted to physical capital) becomes depleted if not used*" (Putnam, 1993b: 37/38). To this end it is important to fully consider the ways in which social capital can aid conflict transformation and the reconstruction of a PCE.

3.4 Altering the state of Social Capital: The Rebuilding of Social Ties and the Process of Reconciliation

As the previous sub-section demonstrates, social capital can play an important role in the emergence and continuation of violent conflict. However, it can also mitigate conflict and strengthen social cohesion. This sub-section examines the ways in which social capital can be affected in positive ways in order to rebuild social ties and reconcile social cleavages.

Rotberg states, "*the accumulation of reciprocal trust...helps to build social capital and contributes to effective government*" (1999: 339) however as Colletta and Cullen observe, trust is "*a grossly depleted commodity during warfare*" (2000: 11). As I have previously argued, a conflict and/or post-conflict environment is one likely to be characterised by three interdependent factors: first, high levels of bonding social capital; second, low or non-existent levels of bridging social capital and; third, low or non-existent levels of vertical social capital between the state and civilians. These combined will have implications for the level of trust pervasive within society. However, before

we can consider ways in which social capital can be altered to reach a state of social cohesion it is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of the dynamics of each of these different forms of social capital in a conflict or post-conflict environment.

Bonding social capital – the ties that bond – can be both beneficial and detrimental for social cohesion. During conflict it is usual for bonding social capital within groups to strengthen as hardened images of other political or ethnic groups are reinforced, encouraging an escalation of violence and hatred (Kostorova-Unkovska & Pankovska, 1992). Such strong inward looking bonds can generate a ‘them’ and ‘us’ mentality in which distance is placed between conflicting groups. Trust between groups then reduces and this can be manipulated by ‘ethnic’ or ‘conflict entrepreneurs’ to further solidify the existing hatreds and social cleavages (Widner & Mundt, 1998; Goodhand et al, 2000). However, strong bonding social capital within groups can facilitate their survival during conflict. In the case of the genocide in Rwanda it was strong bonding social capital among the Tutsi that proved so crucial to survival and indeed, in some instances, led to courageous attempts to save lives or rescue those in danger (Gourevitch, 2000; Grootaert & van Bastelaer, 2001). Bonding social capital is thus strengthened, in its positive or negative form, throughout violent conflict however this is not always the case as *“bonding social capital may represent a powerful social glue when there is a clearly defined enemy, but when conflict becomes protracted, the fault lines become less clear and bonding may break down”* (Goodhand et al, 2000: 402). This indicates that the longer a conflict runs, the greater the damage to social capital and thus the more difficult post-conflict social reconstruction will be.

Bridging social capital, on the other hand, is generally always depleted during the course of violent conflict. The strengthening of bonding social capital and the onset of the ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality can only occur if bridging social capital is weak, non-existent or depleted (most likely by conflict entrepreneurs). This is the case because *“where there are high levels of interpersonal trust across sub-group boundaries, information may flow more easily”* (Widner & Mundt, 1998: 5) and thus the propagandistic methods of conflict entrepreneurs may be thwarted due to the presence of bridging social capital. As bonding social capital strengthens in a conflict environment it is in a negative correlation with bridging social capital and it is the weakening of bridging social capital more than anything that enables the continuance and escalation of the conflict. The survival of bridging social capital is seen as vital to

a harmonious society in general terms (Putnam, 2000) and more so in cases of societal stresses such as violent conflict. It is only through the restoration and strengthening of cross-community links that conflict can be mitigated and social cohesion (re)established (Colletta & Cullen, 2000).

Synergy, or vertical social capital, is also an important consideration for two main reasons: First, the absence of synergy enables, and perhaps indicates, the presence of conflict entrepreneurs who may manipulate underlying tensions for personal agendas. Second, the presence of synergy can mitigate conflict through the provision of societal conflict resolution methods. However synergy can occur between the state and various sections of society to the exclusion of others and this can be problematic. Indeed, it is unusual for no synergy to exist whatsoever, more likely is a lack of synergy between the state and particular groups in society while synergy exists, and may flourish, between the state and certain factions in society. In such situations the likelihood of conflict is greater and thus the unbalanced nature of synergy is likely to increase further. This can be said to be the case (among others) in Rwanda where the Hutu political elite favoured the Hutu and in particular, those who ascribed to Hutu Power (Gourevitch, 2000), in Sri Lanka where the Sri Lankan government promoted the Sinhalese over the Tamil (Nithiyanandam, 2000), in Darfur where the Sudanese government have been accused of supporting the Arab-African militia, the Janjaweed, with state-sponsored against the black African farmers of Darfur (Patrick, 2005) and in Kosovo where the Serb government pursued a policy of ethnic cleansing against the ethnic Albanian inhabitants (Ogden, 2000).

From the above discussions of bonding, bridging and vertical (synergy) social capital it is evident that the *“relationship between conflict and social capital is a dialectical one, each having an influence on the other”* (Goodhand et al, 2000: 402). It is therefore important to examine the ways in which social capital can be restored in positive forms to aid the conflict transformation and peacebuilding processes.

Going back to Uphoff’s thesis on the sources of social capital we can see this is particularly useful when considering how social capital can be restored in a PCE. The cognitive processes that enable the creation, fostering and development of social capital – norms, values, attitudes and beliefs – are crucial to the ability of society to recover after violent conflict however such norms, values, attitudes and beliefs have often been

radically perverted by conflict entrepreneurs during the course of the conflict. Therefore action must be taken by a number of agents to re-socialise the war-traumatised society. This may be through citizenship and human rights educational programmes (Ager et al, 2005) or by increasing communication and creating shared interests among those from differing back ground through heterogeneous civic associations (Varshney, 2002). Essentially links need to be built between previously conflicting factions and between the civilian groups affected by the conflict. This will strengthen bridging social capital and mitigate for the overly strong bonding social capital that was extant during the conflict. The effort required to take on this formidable task will be colossal and a great deal of commitment will be required by all actors involved including the state, civil society, the donors but in particular, the community itself. Indeed, for development of the cognitive process Uphoff outlines, we owe a lot to our families and kinship networks (Portes, 1998). However there is no simple solution to this as civilians face a multitude of difficulties at the conclusion of a conflict. Speaking about Bosnia, Pickering highlights some of these, "*Bosnians interested in forming bridging ties struggled with raw wartime memories, propaganda, impoverishment, an influx of rural Bosniaks, an outflow of intellectuals, and nationalist rule*" (2006: 87).

In order to aid the re-socialisation of society through cognitive processes and strengthen bridging social capital further it is important that the structural elements of society, that is, the rules, roles, precedents, procedures and networks that facilitate cooperation, also play a part (Uphoff, 2000). In this the state plays a key role, as it is responsible for the reform process. The state needs to embed within society institutions whose membership are diverse, that promote acquaintance-based ties rather than friend-based, and that allow for interethnic cooperation as well as "*promoting repeated, mutually dependant interaction between individuals from different groups*" (Pickering, 2006: 81). This not only provides an arena for the reconstruction of bridging social capital directly but also indirectly through creating an enabling environment for social capital formation

Vertical social capital (synergy) is of particular importance in the restoration of bridging social capital as "*more extensive and durable bridging social capital requires an interactive process in which grass roots initiatives build strength and compel domestic elites to support them, provide opportunity and develop institutions such as schools, a judiciary, and police that reward merit regardless of background*"

(Pickering, 2006: 97). The link between civil society and the state can therefore prove to be crucial and it is important that efforts are made to restore or establish this link and to make it far reaching between the state and all factions of society so that no sections of civil society are excluded.

In this endeavour the donor community can potentially play a role. Grootaert, from the World Bank, has identified five areas for action, which the donor community should acknowledge: first, *Do Your Homework, Do No Harm*, in which the dynamic of existing social capital within a country should be understood before policy development and as part of policy design. This would reduce the chances of programmes weakening existing positive social capital and recommend ways in which it could be strengthened. Second, *Use Local-level Social Capital to Deliver Projects* through existing associations and organisations in order to improve beneficiary targeting, reduce project costs, and increase ‘ownership’ and thus the projects sustainability. This also further strengthens social capital through local institutional involvement. Third, *Create Enabling Environments* that are characterised by: good governance, property rights, independent judiciary, a competent and transparent bureaucracy, and mechanisms to promote dialogue and resolve conflict. Four, *Invest in Social Capital* through direct support to existing and emerging organisations, which aids the enhancement of participatory processes at the local level. Five, *Promote Research and Learning* both in terms of social capital in general and specifically to the most appropriate strategies for working with local organisations (Grootaert, 1998: 19). However, while these recommendations may seem useful it is important to note that donor policies can be damaging to social capital (Pickering, 2006) and so it is paramount that any donor involvement is heavily associated with local activity.

A further avenue through which social capital can be restored after violent conflict is the workplace in which it is “*necessary, at least initially, to develop ideals of professionalism, which can then facilitate interethnic cooperation at work and even among colleagues in other social venues*” (Pickering, 2006: 92). The workplace is also important because it is unavoidable. It is often the case after violent conflict that those in the majority group do not have as strong an incentive for inter-ethnic cooperation (Pickering, 2006) and therefore much of this effort may come from minority groups. However, in a PCE there is a need for employment among all sectors of the society and therefore an inability to avoid proximity with those from other groups. By promoting

mixed workplaces the government, civil society and the business community can support the restoration of bridging social capital. Indeed, while there is the danger of donor assistance to NGOs creating new ‘haves’ (local NGO employees) and ‘have nots’ (Mertus, 2001), local employment in donor funded NGOs may provide an ideal opportunity to foster an environment in which cooperation between different groups may occur thus strengthening bridging social capital. One such example of this can be found in Rwanda where ex-combatants and non-combatants worked together on public urban development projects (Verwimp & Verpoorten, 2004). The workplace thus presents an ideal arena in which the foundations of cross-community bridging social capital can be laid, with repeated interaction between those from different background consequently promoting mutual interdependence and leading to the potential for the development of these linkages through contact and activity outside of the workplace.

The renewal of social capital in the PCE is crucial to the re-establishment of social cohesion and has a significant role to play in conflict transformation and reconciliation processes. The opportunities outlined above indicate some of the possibilities for social capital renewal however these are not exhaustive. The theoretical framework developed in the next chapter explicitly examines the ways in which DDR can facilitate the restoration of social capital. It is there that the three concepts introduced in the thesis thus far will combine to produce a framework that enhances our understanding of how the social reintegration of ex-combatants may contribute to reconciliation. However, before we move on to this section it is necessary to consider the way in which social capital is measured.

3.5 Measuring Social Capital

Social Capital is a relatively new phenomenon in terms of its acceptance and application by the academic and policy community. It is therefore in its infancy both in reaching a clear and agreeable definition of what social capital is and how it can and should be measured. As discussed in section 3.1 there is a lack of a clear definition of what social capital is and “*this makes it inherently difficult to propose a list of indicators for social capital. They will have to evolve as the conceptual definition and, more important, the operational definition of social capital are developed*” (Grootaert, 1998: 10). Other forms of capital – natural, physical and human – have, throughout their existence,

developed a number of proxies and measurement tools, however such development has taken place over a period of time involving years of education and work experience and have been rigorously tested in their application. At the present time there is no such consensus on what constitutes social capital and how it may be measured or what proxies can be used; the search for such a consensus continues (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2001).

Various empirical studies into social capital have, over the years, contributed to the plethora of different proxy indicators of social capital and with them the debate as to which proxies are most effective and acceptable has raged. Although it is important that the proxy indicators utilised within empirical research are accurate and do in fact furnish us with information pertaining to the level of social capital evident within a group, community, society or nation, it seems a futile exercise to attempt to achieve a generic list of indicators that be applied to empirical research into social capital. There are a number of reasons I make this claim.

First, it is imperative to acknowledge that indicators of social capital are proxy indicators; they provide us with a somewhat superficial alternative of the phenomena we are investigating. As Jackman and Miller assert, "*trust is clearly not isomorphic with group membership*" (1998: 62). In stating this Jackman and Miller are not negating the use of trust in understanding social capital, rather they are drawing to our attention that group membership does not necessarily translate into trust or vice versa. In terms of how this impacts on our understanding and measurement of social capital it does not denote that the use of proxy indicators is ineffective but that it is important to recognise the fact that proxy indicators provide a tangible substitute for what is a social phenomena that is exceptionally difficult to quantify. Furthermore that due to this fact it is imperative that throughout our empirical research into social capital we employ triangulation techniques wherever possible. As Putnam emphasises, "*No single source of data is flawless, but the more numerous and diverse the sources, the less likely that they could all be influenced by the same flaw*" (2000: 415).

Second, the fact that social capital indicators are proxy measures is further highlighted when we consider the type of social capital we are investigating as this will direct the indicators we identify. As I have established in section 3.2 there are various different types of social capital and these types will influence the measurement tool we seek to

employ. Studies examining horizontal and vertical social capital will differ in their indicators according to their focus. Horizontal social capital may use a variety of indicators that are dependant on whether bonding or bridging social capital is being examined. In order to observe bonding social capital one may look at indicators such as levels of community trust; types of and reliance on community support systems; old-age dependency ratios; levels of crime; and kinship networks. Alternatively, proxies for bridging social capital may include the number and types of associations; membership of associations; ethnic homogeneity of membership; community ethno-linguistic fragmentation; and social mobility rates. Vertical social capital, the link between state and civil society, may be exemplified through trust in government; trade union membership; percentage of population facing political or economic discrimination; measure of political stability; voter turnout; and strength of democratic institutions.²²

Differences in the indicators chosen will also differ depending on whether cognitive/structural or consummatory/instrumental social capital is the focus of the research. One may, however, anticipate that cognitive and consummatory indicators would be similar to those employed when examining bonding social capital while structural and instrumental indicators would be similar to those used for bridging and vertical social capital. Although it is evident that the variety of proxy indicators is extensive it can be claimed that it is necessary for such a wide variety and it is the manifestation of social capital that will dictate those proxy variables utilised (Grootaert & Bastelaer, 2001).

Third, the nature of the research phenomenon itself will influence the choice of proxies used. For example, economic research into social capital may include indicators such as percentage of household income from remittances, old-age dependency ratios, an index of intensity of economic discrimination and indicators of social mobility. A study into levels of social capital within education may comprise variables such as parental attendance at school meetings, Parent Teacher Association (PTA) membership and activity, level of cooperation between teachers and the interaction between school and state. The nature of the research phenomenon will direct the indicators employed in terms of those most applicable to and representative of social capital in the given area. When examining social capital within trading systems it would not be beneficial to

²² Various indicators used are taken from Grootaert (1998). See appendix 1.

incorporate variables such as homicide rates or illegitimacy rates however these variables may be of use in research into inner-city social capital.

Finally, the indicators chosen for a study, as well as being dependant on the type of social capital being examined and the nature of the research phenomenon will be reliant on the geographical area. Research into social capital, in its present understanding, originated from the United States and as such the proxies used in these studies were of relevance to the society in which they were applied. However, the proxies used in the U.S. studies may not be applicable in other areas of the world even if the research is examining the same type of social capital or the same phenomenon. This is particularly true for countries in the developing world where the use of ‘Western’ proxies of social capital may result in quite different, and often inaccurate, research findings. As Krishna stresses, “*even though the concept of outside an Italian setting²³, its empirical referents will vary as different cultures manifest social capital differently*” (2002: 56). It is therefore vital for the effectiveness and accuracy of social capital research to include proxies that pertain to the community, society or culture being investigated.

Although, as I have demonstrated, the generation of a generic list of social capital indicators is not conducive to the accurate investigation of social capital, it is important that those indicators chosen do conform to standard guidelines in terms of how they are chosen. Grootaert has developed a list of properties social capital indicators should possess, which clearly calls for careful consideration to be made when generating social capital indicators.

The following is a non-exhaustive list of properties that indicators should possess.

Indicators must:

- Be developed within an agreed conceptual and operational framework
- Be clearly defined and easy to understand
- Be subject to aggregation (from household to community, from community to nation)
- Be objective (be independent from the data collector)
- Have reasonable data requirements – either available data or data that can be collected at limited cost within the capacity of the country’s statistical apparatus
- Have “ownership” by users
- Be limited in number
- Reflect input, process, or outcome (or, as used in the environment literature, pressure, state, response).

Box 1 - Desirable Properties of Social Capital Indicators: Grootaert, 1998:10

²³ This is a reference to the fact that Putnam’s original study into social capital in 1993 was an examination into civic traditions in Italy.

The measurement of social capital in the conflict context is clearly one such example of where careful consideration should be taken. Although the concept of social capital has been applied to the context of conflict much research has dealt with this subject in a superficial way only making reference to the fact conflict has an impact on social capital and vice versa with no real attempt to examine the dynamics between social capital and conflict. Arguably the most comprehensive research into social capital in the conflict context is the World Bank publication '*Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*' written by Colletta and Cullen (2000). As the title suggests, this study centres on the dynamic between conflict and social capital in four different conflict-affected countries. In each of these countries a different portfolio of social capital proxies are employed. These indicators are largely dependant of the definition of social capital used.

In the Cambodia study the type of social capital examined was horizontal and vertical social capital along with structural and cognitive. The following five proxies were used to identify the level of existent social capital: community events, informal networks, associations, village leadership and links with external agencies. Within each of these five proxies certain variables were thought to best exemplify the proxy. Community events included those that increased feelings of solidarity, improved communication and promoted civic-mindedness and altruistic behaviour, among others. Informal networks examined informal exchanges of information and resource exchanges as well as what shapes these exchanges. When looking at associations the researchers looked at the structures, roles, and rules within associations and the ways in which they nurture self-help, mutual help, solidarity and cooperation. Examinations into village leadership centred on looking at types of leadership and how leaders played key roles in political, social, religious and welfare activities and how they shaped networks within, and between communities. Finally, the external links investigated were external community links between the community and government, NGOs and the private sector (Colletta & Cullen, 2000).

The proxies used in the Rwandan study were specifically related to the issue of trust and social cohesion. They included:

- Channels and mechanisms for exchange of information

- Existence and nature of associations and the reason for their creation (whether based on shared interests or on prescribed commonality, such as familial relations) intermarriage and extended family relations
- Intercommunity relations and mechanisms for conflict resolution
- Functioning of infrastructure, types, nature, and organisation of exchange and interdependence
- Nature and organisation of assistance, mutual aid, and cooperation (including sharing of basic necessities such as water, firewood and salt)
- Social protection and welfare
- Collective responsibility

(Colletta & Cullen, 2000: 35)

The analysis of social capital in Guatemala and Somalia was conducted by an Italian organisation called CERFE who established a single framework and methodology for both countries. Within these studies the aspect of social capital focused on was civil society's protective provision of basic survival needs and the creation of conditions for sustainable economic growth and development. For the study this was essentially divided into social responsibility and social initiative. Social responsibility was characterised by civil society's ability to provide "*social protection or welfare in the face of threats such as health crises, illiteracy, unemployment, lack of access to higher education, geographic isolation and conflict*". Social initiative was viewed as "*civil society's engagement in efforts towards economic growth and development*" (Colletta & Cullen, 2000: 53/54).

As is evident from the four countries in this one study the potential range of social capital proxies in the conflict context are numerous. In order to obtain the most accurate data it is important to select the variables that will best enable this. Thus in order to achieve this, following the approach laid out by Grootaert (1998) as seen in Box 1 would seem advisable. As with any study into social capital research into social capital in the conflict context requires a careful consideration of the possibilities. By following the method advocated by Grootaert it appears more likely that one will arrive at the variables most conducive to the effective study of social capital within a given context.

Throughout this section it has become apparent that social capital is indeed a complex concept but one of significant importance to a more elaborate understanding of so many spheres of social life; this is particularly applicable to understanding the dynamics of conflict. Although the concept is in its relative infancy it nevertheless offers enormous potential for academic endeavour. In the area of post-conflict reconstruction social capital has the capability to enable a far more comprehensive understanding of conflict and the process of reconstruction.

3.6 Conclusion

Despite being a relatively young concept social capital contributes an extremely important way of looking at violent conflict and post-conflict reconstruction. When we examine in detail the definitions of social capital and apply them within a conflict analysis it enables a richer understanding of how violent conflict can occur and its affect on social cohesion. The result of this is twofold: first, by enhancing our understanding of how violent conflict can occur we are more able to develop conflict prevention strategies and mechanisms that can not only diminish the likelihood of conflict advancing to violent conflict, but also utilise available networks and associations that promote social cohesion. Second, when we develop our understanding of the effect of violent conflict on social cohesion we are better able to design and implement post-conflict reconstruction endeavours that result in more meaningful impacts for those affected by the conflict.

Although the concept of social capital was developed in the West it is evident that it holds applicability in the developing world. Indeed, should appropriate measurements of social capital in these contexts be developed, the concept of social capital could in fact explain society in these contexts better than in the Western context due to the communitarian nature of many of these environments. The importance then of a robust consideration of the various methods that can be utilised for the measurement of social capital cannot be underestimated, for it is through such a consideration that we develop our ability to improve our knowledge of social capital.

Throughout this discussion of social capital, and its application as a concept through which violent conflict can be better understood, implicit linkages have been made to the

reintegration of ex-combatants, in particular social reintegration. The notion of trust represents a central theme to both social reintegration and social capital, along with communication, cooperation and coordination, and it is through observing these themes from the differing perspectives of ex-combatant reintegration and social capital that we can develop our understanding of them in isolation and the way in which they may combine to contribute to the reconciliation and peacebuilding processes. The next chapter introduces the methodology employed within this research, beginning with the development of a theoretical framework which articulates the interaction between the three concepts that form the basis of this thesis, that of reconciliation, DDR and social capital.

Chapter Four: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

This chapter explains the methodological design, research strategy and implementation of this field study. It is divided into two main parts, the first being the theoretical framework and the second being the methodological component of the study. The theoretical framework draws together my understanding of the three main concepts and theories within this research – reconciliation, DDR and social capital – with the purpose of developing an analysis of the way in which these three concepts may interact and thus providing a testable theory. This main section concludes with the research question that this study attempts to answer.

Moving into the methodological component of the chapter we begin with a methodological overview, outlining the main points of the methodology. Next comes a discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of the research which is important in understanding certain methodological choices and identification of potential constraints and biases. The main part of this section is the qualitative research methods section, which justifies the choice of Rwanda as a case country and explains the reasons for the choice of sites within Rwanda. It then covers issues of the particular research techniques employed, sampling, and data collection and analysis. Within this part, justification is given for the use of particular methods and the benefits derived from these methods. The final section covers methodological issues and constraints and discusses the research context and problems associated with that, ethical considerations made and research biases, concluding with the identification of two techniques used to mitigate such constraints, namely reflexivity and triangulation.

Overall the chapter examines the technical aspects associated with the way in which this research was conducted providing justifications for particular decisions made and documenting the challenges encountered.

4.2 Theoretical Framework

This section provides a theoretical framework to guide this study. It is informed by a detailed examination of the relevant literature and includes my own analysis of how the three concepts of reconciliation, social reintegration and social capital interact with, and influence, each other in the sphere of post-conflict reconstruction.

As identified by numerous authors, the interaction between violent conflict and social capital is highly complex and somewhat ambiguous. This research proposes that there exists a dynamic, dichotomous relationship between the two. Firstly, social capital can contribute to the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict. Secondly, violent conflict transforms social capital. It is this relationship that makes social capital such an important concept when examining the PCE and this is particularly true for the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Social capital can contribute to the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict in three main forms: strong bonding social capital, weak/non-existent bridging social capital and weak/non-existent or discriminatory vertical social capital. Strong bonding social capital, in particular, excessively strong, within groups can contribute to the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict as the strong interpersonal ties that exist within groups can be of an exclusionary nature. Indeed, these ties that bond are inward looking and tend to reinforce exclusive identities thus homogenising the group; each member of the group has a strong bond with other members of the group and this bond, and the identity it represents, serves to set apart the members of one group from another. When these bonds are excessively strong there is a potential for intolerance towards other groups in society. The inward looking nature of these ties and networks provides a highly efficient social safety net that enables all those within the network to '*get by*'. However, when these ties and networks are particularly strong and inward looking there is the possibility that an 'us and them' attitude may develop and exacerbate the inevitable dormant benign social cleavages between social groups.

If we imagine the society in which we live, a significant characteristic of that society is difference; I am different to you and you are different to me. It is natural for me to form

bonds with people who are similar to me, for example, those who like the same football team or enjoy the same genre of music, and for you to form bonds with people similar to you²⁴. However, when such difference becomes significant, and is based around important identity distinguishers, and the strength of the bonds between 'us' and 'you' become excessive such differences are emphasised and amplified. If an antagonistic relationship between 'us' and 'you' develops, the strong bonds that exist within each groups reinforces the prospect of intolerance between 'us' and 'you'. This provides the foundation for the outbreak of violent conflict.

However, even in an environment in which strong bonding social capital exists, the likelihood of an outbreak of violent conflict is highly dependant on the nature of bridging social capital within the environment. If bridging social capital is evident and relatively strong the prospects for strong bonding social capital to result in the outbreak of violent conflict is likely to diminish. This is because the potential for an 'us and them' attitude to develop is subdued. Bridging social capital represents the bridges between networks, associations and communities and, as such, unites society. Such ties are outward looking and provide a link between diverse groups and across social cleavages. Although the bridging ties are relatively weaker than bonding ties, they are vital for social cohesion within society; they enable societies to '*get along*'. If bridging social capital is evident and of enough strength, the menace of strong bonding social is, to some extent, offset. However, if bridging social capital is too weak or non-existent there is no mechanism to offset the threat of overly strong bonding social capital. If the crosscutting ties between groups and communities are ineffective or nonexistent this can serve to magnify the strength of bonding social capital through limited interactions between groups as well as reducing the opportunity for societal conflict resolution mechanisms to evolve. Bridging social capital is instrumental, indeed essential, for the management of tensions that arise between communities if these communities are to be an active part of the same society. If such social capital is non-existent, in parallel with overly strong bonding social capital between antagonistic groups, the proclivity for violent conflict is increased.

Vertical social capital evident between leaders and government institutions and the community (synergy), also plays a part in the outbreak and intensification of violent

²⁴ This explanation is written in the first person to emphasise the personal nature of how the creation and strengthening of group identity can lead to conflict.

conflict. When vertical social capital is apparent and equal this can enable the fostering and development of social capital within society. However, the absence of vertical social capital can provide the opportunity for the manipulation of social capital resulting in negative consequences for society. Civil society may not be granted the space in which it needs to operate and both bonding and bridging social capital may be distorted for private gain. Indeed, policies of discrimination toward one group while favouring another may lead to the strengthening of bonding social capital within the two groups, as social capital in the discriminated group strengthens in order to cope with such discrimination and provide a safety net to members of the group, while social capital in the favoured group strengthens to protect their advantage. In tandem with this, bridging social capital between the two groups diminishes as a result of such discrimination. Thus bonding social capital is strengthened, bridging social capital is weakened and vertical social capital is strengthened between the state and the favoured group and weakened between the state and the discriminated group. In the event of government propaganda bonding social capital is further strengthened, bridging social capital is weakened and vertical social capital between the state and the affected group or community is reduced. Thus social capital, in the three forms identified, has the potential to contribute to the outbreak and intensification of conflict.

Social capital, as well as contributing to the outbreak of violent conflict, undergoes a transformation throughout the process of violent conflict in three main ways: bonding social capital within groups is either strengthened or weakened, bridging social capital between groups is weakened, and vertical social capital (synergy) is either weakened between the state and civil society or strengthened between the state and particular groups within civil society. Violent conflict can strengthen bonding social capital within particular groups involved in violent conflict, in particular, rebel groups, militias and the military. This is due to the fact members of these groups have a common aim that unites them and reinforces their identity; emphasising the 'us and them' attitude. In an environment of violent conflict the inward looking ties that bind are strengthened in order to provide the cohesion, discipline and security necessary for success.

Bonding social capital may also strengthen among the civilian groups supporting rebel forces due to the need to 'pull together' and provide a group safety net for its members. It may be the case that civilian communities are relatively unaffected by the conflict either due to proximity or to protection from the rebel forces, and thus may be able to

go about their lives comparatively normally with bonding social capital maybe strengthening but not transforming radically. In a case in which the civilian population is affected by the conflict one may expect people to pull together and look after each other and indeed, this does occur in some instances. However, in an environment defined by uncertainty and insecurity, bonding social capital is generally weakened within civilian communities as such an environment is not conducive to the establishment or existence of trust. Although there is the need to provide for family members and members of close group members this is a particularly difficult task in a conflict environment and the uncertainty and insecurity of such an environment leads to the breakdown of bonding social capital. A further factor that weakens bonding social capital, particularly within civilian groups is that violent conflict increasingly results in civilian deaths thus leaving large numbers of orphans who trust no one or families with a large number of dependants which adds to the pressures faced by those who survived. This contributes to the decimation of social networks within society as such orphans are left vulnerable. The resulting impact on bonding social capital therefore, is to strengthen bonding social capital within conflicting groups and either weaken, strengthen or not affect bonding social capital within civilian groups, depending on their proximity to the conflict and the effects of the conflict on them.

The main effect of violent conflict on social capital is on bridging social capital, which, except in isolated, individual cases, is inevitably drastically weakened if not destroyed all together. The level of the damage to bridging social capital will have serious implications for the ability for communities to reconcile in a PCE. At the outbreak of violent conflict, bridging social capital has already undergone a weakening process, as it is this weakening that ultimately permits the outbreak of violent conflict. During the course of the conflict bridging social capital is further weakened for several reasons: first, the strengthening of bonding social capital within conflicting factions serves to deepen social cleavages existing between these groups and their supporters due to a reinforcing of the 'us and them' attitude. Second, in the cases where bonding social capital is weakened one may assume this will provide the capacity for bridging social capital to develop; however this is generally not the case. When bonding social capital is weakened during the course of violent conflict previously affiliated groups fragment and disperse, undergoing a reductionist process that results in isolated units of family members and only the most trusted of contacts. In this sense bridging social capital transforms to a micro scale with isolated family units being linked by these contacts.

This is due to the dearth of trust in a conflict environment; trust is no more prevalent within groups and is either almost non-existent or completely absent between groups. Third, when government policy has been oppressive or discriminatory, the ability to maintain or forge bridges between groups has been impeded. When such practices result in, and are maintained in, violent conflict it becomes almost impossible to maintain any existing linkages or forge new ones. Generally, if discriminatory policies have been practiced prior to a violent conflict, thus contributing to the conflict, they will at least be maintained during the conflict, if not intensified. This leads to the further weakening of bridging social capital and can, in some instances, damage these bridges to such an extent that reconciliation is made highly difficult and unlikely, if not impossible.

The final way in which violent conflict transforms social capital is through vertical social capital. Where vertical social capital is weak, non-existent or discriminatory prior to the outbreak of violent conflict, it will generally be the case that such a pattern continues, though at a more intense level. It is often the case that the nature of civil conflict pits the state army against a rebel forces. In these instances vertical social capital between the state and the rebel group, and its civilian supporters, breaks down; although it may strengthen between the state and rebel militias who support the state. This is particularly the case when state-sponsored violence is apparent, as vertical social capital is weakened between the state and the group persecuted by the state, and strengthened between the state and the group conducting the violence. The weakening of vertical social capital can have deep running implications for the successful resolution of the conflict, as trust between the state and rebel factions is not a common resource in the negotiation process. At the conclusion of violent conflict it can be extremely problematic to engage in post-conflict reconstruction practices as the ability for the state and civil society to communicate, cooperate and coordinate is diminished through the weakening of vertical social capital. However, the dynamic of vertical social capital may change at the cessation of hostilities if the state which had previously engaged in discriminatory practices is replaced by the political wing of a rebel force, or other entity, if it is in receipt of popular support. Strengthening vertical social capital, as much as strengthening bridging social capital and offsetting overly strong bonding social capital is essential in the post-conflict reconstruction period if society is to recover and reconcile.

The diagram below demonstrates the potential transformative relationship between the various types of social capital and conflict indicating how, through the outbreak and intensification of violent conflict, social capital transforms, thus making conflict management and peacebuilding particularly problematic in the PCE.




Figure 6 – Transformative Social Capital and Conflict: Author

As we can see, in phase one groups A and B share relatively strong bridging social capital between each other and vertical social capital between government and bonding social capital, represented by the thickness of the colouring, is not too strong.

When a form of social change occurs that results in the government privileging Group A over Group B and the society as a whole does not have the necessary capacity with which to manage it, we move toward phase two and conflict intensifies. As a consequence, vertical social capital between government and Group A strengthens (represented by a thicker connecting line and a closer distance) while vertical social capital between government and Group B weakens (thinner connecting line and farther distance). Subsequently bonding social capital in both groups gets stronger (the colouring thickens) as Group A attempts to protect its position of privilege and Group B attempts to mitigate against its disempowerment. Bridging social capital between Groups A and B weakens (thinner connecting line and farther distance) as a result and

the emergence of an 'us and them' mentality intensifies conflict more. Consequently, intolerance between the two groups develops further as Group A's bonding social capital strengthens further still and Group B's bonding social capital strengthens but in a loose form, based around only the most trust of members (represented by the thicker colouring and the fragmentary lines). By this point trust between Groups A and B has weakened considerably, if not broken completely (thinner, fragmented linkage line) while vertical social capital between the government and Group A increases strength and between Group B reduces significantly. Conflict intensifies more and more as we move into phase three.

DDR programmes have a potentially critical role to play in the restoration of social capital in a PCE. Disarmament and demobilisation play an important function in confidence-building through demonstrating a commitment to the resolution of the conflict and the creation of peace. When effective they can contribute to the putting in place of the foundations of trust without which it would be exceptionally difficult to move forward in the attempt to restore social capital. This, however, is not guaranteed and much will depend on the aims and design of the programme. The main value D & D have in building the foundations of trust is that they provide the necessary tangible commitment to peace; if combatants were not willing, and seen to be willing, to lay down their arms, how could other combatant factions, civilians or the state trust in their commitment to the peace process? While D & D can be seen as necessary for the restoration of social capital they are not sufficient; reintegration too plays a significant role.

The economic reintegration of ex-combatants is particularly important as it provides a basis from which social networks can be re-established. Social capital is often examined through the lens of economics and it is apparent that economic interaction of a repeated nature enables the creation and strengthening of social capital through the generation and maintenance of a reciprocal relationship based on trust. Economic reintegration enables weak bridging social capital to strengthen through the ensuing networks and linkages that are established, as well as by reinforcing vertical social capital through the communication, cooperation, coordination and commitment expressed between the state and civil society. It therefore follows that the economic reintegration of ex-combatants is crucial to the restoration of social capital. Similarly, political reintegration is also important to the restoration of social capital as the

inclusion of ex-combatants in political processes enables synergy between the state and civil society to be augmented. Indeed, it is invariably the case that in order to achieve a sustainable peace process it is necessary to include members of the competing factions hierarchy into the newly formed government after a conflict. Increasingly we are witness to the involvement of former combatants in all levels of the State from being local level leaders to Prime Ministers and Presidents. Political reintegration can often be seen as necessary to the peace process through, in a perhaps superficial form, its pacificatory nature. It can also aid the transition from conflict to peace if all conflicting parties are committed to a power-sharing agreement in which each faction has a role to play in the social, political and economic reconstruction effort.

The social reintegration of ex-combatants is, however the most crucial element of reintegration to the restoration of social capital. The effective social reintegration of ex-combatants can restore and strengthen bridging social capital between previously conflicting groups or factions. Returning or resettling ex-combatants represent one group of a complex organism that constitutes a PCE. Into this environment, coalesce ex-combatants from previously conflicting factions, refugees traumatised by conflicts in neighbouring countries with perhaps alien requests and demands, IDPs traumatised by the conflict and forced to leave their homes relocating to other areas in the country, and those who remained throughout the conflict and faced the destruction of their community. Social reintegration enables the (re)establishing of networks and linkages between these groups that is essential for bridging social capital. When ex-combatants can claim to have successfully socially reintegrated they have been accepted into the society and this entails the acceptance of all groups, thereby ensuring linkages have been forged, at least in a loose form.

Effective social reintegration can also restore, strengthen and balance vertical social capital between the state and all groups within civil society. When groups in communities and societies are effectively socially reintegrated and cooperate together they create a space in which civil society can operate. Through creating this space they demonstrate a commitment to civil society and can build the foundations for the restoration and strengthening of vertical social capital between the state and civil society. Where vertical social capital has previously been strong between the state and certain groups within civil society and weak between the state and others, social reintegration can serve to balance and equalise synergy between the state and all groups

in civil society. This occurs primarily due to the strengthening of bridging social capital due to the linkages between groups and the subsequent strengthening of civil society.

The restoration and strengthening of bridging social capital between previously conflicting groups or factions and vertical social capital between the state and all groups within civil society offsets very strong bonding social capital within groups with previously antagonistic relations with other groups. When bridging social capital is relatively strong it can suppress the effects of overly strong bonding social capital by reducing the propensity for an 'us and them' attitude to develop or be maintained. Equally, balanced synergy between the state and all groups within civil society promotes equalised relations between groups as neither are advantaged or disadvantaged by the state, or at least not to the degree that may result in violent conflict. Although this may not directly affect bonding social capital, by having equal vertical social capital between the state and all groups in civil society, bridging social capital can be developed between groups, resulting in the benefits previously explained. Thus the beneficial effects of social reintegration on bridging and vertical social capital also have positive knock-on effects for bonding social capital. It can be claimed therefore, that social reintegration can transform social capital in a positive manner in a PCE.

The effective social reintegration of ex-combatants, and the subsequent positive transformations in social capital, has beneficial implications for the reconciliation process. The social reintegration of ex-combatants and the transformations in social capital that ensue from such a process promote an environment conducive to the facilitation of the reconciliation process. Social reintegration and social capital restoration imply the creation and fostering of trust in some degree. If trust can be established and expanded in a PCE it builds strong foundations for a reconciliation process. Although this may occur at a micro scale, if social reintegration is effective countrywide this also implies that the development of trust, albeit within small communities, is also occurring countrywide. The key to a successful reconciliation process is linking these micro successes to generate trust throughout the country at a more macro level. This may be partially facilitated through the restoration and balancing of vertical social capital, which again is a product of the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants. Implicit within social reintegration and social capital are the ideas of communication, cooperation, coordination and commitment. If these

are forthcoming, the environment they produce is one in which the foundations of reconciliation can be established.

A further implication the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants has for the reconciliation process is that it facilitates the development of the relevant skills, capabilities and commitment necessary for the reconciliation process. Successful social reintegration requires a great deal of commitment on behalf of all groups in the society and such a commitment will follow through into the reconciliation process. Additionally, the skills and capabilities ex-combatants and community members acquire throughout the reintegration process – for example, negotiation skills, the development of tools to aid forgiveness and healing and skills of cooperation – are skills that will be necessary for successful reconciliation. In light of this it can be strongly argued that the social reintegration of ex-combatants constitutes an essential element of reconciliation, at least at the micro or grass roots level.

Whilst the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants and the positive transformation of social capital that arises from such reintegration have positive implications for the reconciliation process, this is a reciprocal relationship. A positive reconciliation process also reinforces both the effective social reintegration of ex-combatants and the beneficial transformation of social capital. As the pervasiveness of trust increases within society throughout the reconciliation process this in turn feeds back into the effectiveness of social reintegration and the strengthening of social capital. This is the case as social reintegration can be seen as an element of reconciliation and, as social reintegration serves to strengthen social capital the same can be said of reconciliation. In this way we can see the interlinking nature between social reintegration, social capital and reconciliation that is so crucial to the peacebuilding process. The diagram below attempts to capture the discussion regarding the way in which DDR may impact on social capital and reconciliation, and the reciprocal nature of that relationship.




Figure 7 – DDR and its Impacts on Social Capital and Reconciliation: Author

Having delineated the theoretical framework that guides this thesis it now seems appropriate to include the main research question that will lead the remainder of this study, which is as follows:

In what ways can the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment, and what are the implications of such a promotion for reconciliation?

4.3 Methodological Overview

This research was conducted using a combination of qualitative research methods including ethnographic methods, life histories and elite interviews in order to best determine the ways in which the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants may promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment and to identify the implications of such a promotion for reconciliation. The fieldwork research took place over two phases, the first being a period of three months in Rwanda during which semi-structured interviews were conducted with policy designers and implementers concerned with the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Programme (RDRP), government officials and life history analysis of a sample of ex-combatants and civilians based in Kigali. The life history analysis involved life history interviews of approximately 45-120 minutes in order for the process to yield the most beneficial results. The data was transcribed then coded and analysed, allowing me to identify the areas most important to the reintegration process and restoration of social capital. During the first phase I also identified a number of potential sites for the ethnographical study in the second phase of fieldwork.

The second phase involved a three-month period again in Rwanda. For the first period of this phase, approximately two weeks, I addressed issues arising from the first phase of the research and put in place logistical arrangements pertinent to the ethnographical study. The second period of this phase, approximately two months, included four ethnographical studies of approximately one week in each of the chosen sites. The final period of around two weeks enabled me to finalise and conclude my fieldwork research and tie up any loose ends.

4.4 Theoretical Underpinnings

This sub-section is concerned with the theoretical underpinnings of this research. It is particularly important to examine these prior to designing a research methodology as such underpinnings influence not only the way in which one locates a researchable topic but also the research methods chosen. As Archer states, "*the practical analyst of society needs to know not only what social reality is, but also how to begin to explain it, before addressing the particular problem under investigation*" (Archer, 1995: 5). To

this end I shall discuss my ontological and epistemological positions that influence this research, along with other considerations that need to be made.

Ontological questions address the nature of 'being' or 'existence', and essentially surround the issue of whether or not there exists a 'real' world 'out there' that is independent of our knowledge of it (Marsh & Furlong, 2002). Fundamentally, this question involves the issue of whether it is possible to consider social entities as objective entities that have a reality external to social actors, or whether such social entities can be considered social constructions created from the perceptions and actions of social actors (Bryman, 2001). The two main ontological positions that are debated are those of objectivism and constructionism (or constructivism). Objectivism asserts "*social phenomena and their meaning have an existence that is independent of social actors. It implies that social phenomena and the categories we use in everyday discourse have an existence that is independent or separate from actors*" while constructionism asserts, "*social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social actors. It implies that social phenomena and categories are not only produced through social interaction but that they are in a constant state of revision*" (Bryman, 2001: 17/18).

The ontological position I maintain within this research is that of a constructionist position. This is because I believe that the social world and its meaning are not independent of social actors and in fact gain such meaning from the interpretations and interactions of social actors. Conflict, from the way in which it is created, waged and resolved, is implicitly constructed through interactions, language and understanding that are continually being established and revised; it does not exist independently or separate to actors. As Potter states, "*the world...is constituted in one way or another as people talk it, write it and argue it*" (1996: 68). Not only is conflict itself a social construct but so too is the way in which it interacts with other social phenomena such as social capital. It is evident that social capital is a social construct as it is recognised to be certain features of social organisation such as networks, norms and trust. The interaction between conflict and social capital cannot therefore be independent from social actors, as it is social actors that provide meaning and understanding to these concepts. Reintegration and reconciliation are also both socially constructed in that they are both particular to given cultures and times. What is conceived of as reintegration or reconciliation in one culture may differ radically in another. Similarly, such meanings

may change over time. This ontological position may also be termed as anti-foundationalist.

An epistemology is a theory of knowledge and as such examines what we *can* know about the world and *how* we can know it. As with ontological positions, there appear to be two main positions in the epistemological debate, those of positivists and constructivists. Positivists advocate the use of scientific research methods in the researching of social reality whereas constructivists recognise the difference between people and the objects of natural science and therefore utilise methods that enable the understanding of subjective meaning of social action. Essentially, positivists “*seek a convergence, if not consensus, among investigators on observations made and interpretations offered*” while “*based on the assumption that the world is understood through actors’ perceptions, constructivists prefer to rely on reflections, perceptions, and stated beliefs of the actors themselves. By attempting to capture the relatively unique experiences of actors, constructivists attempt to illuminate the context of experience or the idea of ‘multiple realities’*” (Druckman, 2005: 5/6). The constructivist epistemological position is also known as interpretivism.

The ontological position maintained in this research will influence, although not determine, the epistemological position taken. As my ontological position is constructionist or anti-foundationalist it then follows that the epistemological position I take is that of constructivist or interpretivist. This is the case because an interpretivist position enables the understanding of human behaviour. If it is the case that conflict is a socially constructed phenomenon then in order to be able to as fully as possible understand it, it is necessary to engage the reflections and perceptions of those who have constructed this phenomenon. Moreover, an interpretivist epistemological position is taken in this research because I also hold to the belief that “*no observer can be ‘objective’ because they live in the social world and are affected by the social constructions of ‘reality’*” (Marsh & Furlong, 2002: 19). This is a significantly important line of reasoning as the implications this may have for research are crucial. The way in which such a lack of objectivity affects research is through the double hermeneutic in which the world is interpreted by the actors (one hermeneutic level) and their interpretations are interpreted by the observer (second hermeneutic level).

A further consideration to take when reflecting on the theoretical underpinnings of this research is debate about comparative research. An emic approach sees conflict as a unique event, which must be understood in its own context and thus case studies are imperative in which the subjective probes of actors are essential in determining intentions. In an etic approach it is the type of conflict – sources, dynamics and influences – that are of interest and as such research is usually of a comparative nature (Druckman, 2005). This research does not hold a specific position in terms of an emic or etic approach, instead utilising aspects of each. While this research may be directed more by the emic tradition it is nevertheless important to note the role of the etic. As this research utilises qualitative research methods within the case country of Rwanda one may claim this follows the emic approach to research. However, it is also making a comparison between four sites and therefore holds some etic principles. Additionally, this study looks at the broader societal consequences of conflict in terms of social capital and reconciliation and as such follows etic tradition. This is, however a strength of the research rather than a weakness. As Seligman notes, *“in a way emic and etic approaches also entail differences in the scope and locus of data and the kind of lens one is using – fish eye, telephoto, single lens reflex, the use of satellite or videotape. Are the data longitudinal or do they form a constellation of a single movement? Close-up or overarching?”* (2005: 249). The dual activities of interpretation and translation allow for the bridging between the emic and etic, thus enabling the presentation of research that is methodologically rigorous and understandable to others.

The theoretical underpinnings of this research thus lie in the constructivist ontological position and the interpretivist epistemological position utilising both emic and etic approaches to research. This will have important implications for the choice of research methods and this shall be discussed now.

4.5 Qualitative Research Methods

The purpose of this section of the chapter is to detail the practical conducting of this research. It first begins with a justification of choice of case country, which is important as several parameters for this choice are identified and alternative case countries considered. Site selection for the research is covered also. The section then moves on to examine the research methods utilised in this study and justifies the choices

made. Questions of sampling are then addressed and finally the section considers data collection and analysis approaches involved. These issues are important and require due consideration as they will ultimately determine the robustness of this research.

4.5.1 Why Rwanda? A Justification of Case Study Country

This research is concerned with genocide as it is possible to strongly argue the case that the social fabric of a society that has experienced genocide is damaged to a far greater extent than other forms of violent civil conflict, unless that genocide is entirely successful. Therefore, the challenge faced by such societies in the post-conflict reconstruction effort after a genocide is more complex and, as such, appropriate measures need to be put in place. Genocide is defined as “*any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious groups, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group*” (Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 1948: Article II). Genocide differs to ethnic cleansing through intent. The intention in genocide is to exterminate the ethnic, racial or religious group that has been targeted however ethnic cleansing is primarily concerned with the removal of a group from a particular area. In that sense, as Petrovic claims, “*ethnic cleansing is a well-defined policy of a particular group of persons to systematically eliminate another group from a given territory on the basis of religious, ethnic or national origin. Such a policy involves violence and is very often connected with military operations. It is to be achieved by all possible means, from discrimination to extermination, and entails violations of human rights and international humanitarian law*” (1994: 11). Although there are similarities between the two, and indeed a policy of ethnic cleansing may include what could be classified as genocidal activities, it is the difference in intention that influences the focus of this research. It is not the aim of this research to argue that ethnic cleansing or other forms of civil conflict do not have enormous negative repercussions for the society involved. However, it is the view of this author that the damage to society through genocide is greater and more complex and therefore, more challenging to repair if, indeed, that is a possible outcome. This

research will examine the effects of genocidal conflict on social capital within a society and the potential for reconciliation.

When considering suitable case studies for this research several factors need to be taken into account. Firstly, as mentioned above, it is a requirement of this research that it examines a conflict of a genocidal nature. Secondly, it is necessary that a sufficient period of time has elapsed between the end of the genocide and the time of this research so as to ensure it is possible to identify and examine any changes in social capital during that period and to assess the reconciliation process over that time. It would therefore make sense to consider genocides that took place within the last 20 years. Thirdly, it is necessary that a DDR programme was put in place after the conflict. It is therefore highly likely that the genocide would be a result of a civil conflict in which military, paramilitary and rebel forces were active.

When considering conflicts that fall into the timeframe identified in this research, and those which have utilised a DDR programme only East Timor, Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo could be considered. Arguably, however, both East Timor and Kosovo were examples of ethnic cleansing and therefore cannot be considered. Bosnia too was an example of ethnic cleansing although it could be argued that it experienced genocidal activity, for example, the approximately 8,000 Bosniak men and boys slaughtered in Srebrenica.

Rwanda presents itself as an ideal case study in which it is possible to examine all the concepts relevant to this research. The conflict in Rwanda culminated in 1994 with a genocide which left an estimated 800,000 dead, 130,000 detainees in the national prison system, 2,000,000 Rwandan refugees, 700,000 returning Rwandan expatriates and 650,000 alleged participants in the genocide (Marks, 2001). As a consequence of such devastation, the social fabric of Rwandan society was decimated; social capital was all but destroyed and reconciliation seemed impossible²⁵. The nature of the conflict and genocide in Rwanda affected all the major forms of social capital: bonding, bridging and vertical, which have had subsequent effects on the reconciliation process. This, in conjunction with the amount of time that has past since 1994, makes it the only genocidal case that would be suitable. The amount of time that has past is an important factor to take into account as the three concepts of social reintegration; social capital

²⁵ This will be discussed in detail in the following case study chapter.

and reconciliation all take time to re-establish. Therefore, it is necessary to take this into consideration when deciding on the case study. Rwanda has also undergone two DDR programmes since 1997 with the first phase designed and implemented by UNDP between 1997 and 2001 and the second phase from 2001 to 2008, which was designed by the Multi-country Demobilisation and Reintegration Program (MDRP) and Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) and implemented by the RDRC. The process has been ongoing until recently due to the return of Hutu militias from the DRC who were involved in the conflict or recruited after the conflict to engage in ongoing paramilitary activity since 1994.

Rwanda also holds a personal interest for me in that the news coverage of the genocide was a major catalyst for my interest in world politics and international relations. I was in my mid-teens at the time and the reporting of the genocide was one of the first significant events that held my interest in politics, so much so that it led to my working as a volunteer tutor for asylum seekers and refugees from conflict zones in my years as an undergraduate student. I then went on to study a masters degree in International Development with a focus on Africa and conflict and this has progressed in my PhD study. Throughout my studies my interest in African society and politics has increased and been heavily influenced by the fact I have many African friends. It therefore seems logical to conduct this research in Rwanda as I have a personal interest in the country and region and Rwanda meets the needs of this research.


4.5.2 Site Selection

A total of five sites were selected from which to collect data for this research. The first site was that of the capital city, Kigali. It was necessary to conduct some of the research in Kigali due to the fact that the RDRC and MDRP, as well as other organisations that fell into category three of the sample (officials), are situated in Kigali. Whilst based in Kigali I also conducted life history interviews with ex-combatants and civilians. This was done so as to provide me with a sub-sample of urban interviews through which I could draw comparisons with rural areas. In the rural areas four sites were selected, one from each of the provinces: in the Northern Province a village near Busogo, in the Eastern Province a village near Ngenda, in the Southern Province a village near Ruramba and in the Western Province a village near Nyundo. The map below indicates each of the four places mentioned.



Map 1 – Map of Rwanda: United Nations Cartographic Section (2008)

The map on the next page is a satellite image of Rwanda taken in 1995 and shows the positioning of mass graves (the blue dots), genocide memorials (red dots) and sites of resistance (green dots), the national border is white. Using both maps it is apparent that the areas in which I conducted research were either adjacent to or relatively close to mass graves thus indicating an intensive level of killing during the genocide.



Map 2 – Rwanda after the Genocide: Genocide Studies Program, Yale University (2008)

The two main factors that directed site selection in the rural areas were: presence of ex-combatants and access. Prior to undertaking phase two of the research I obtained from the RDRC details of ex-combatant settlement patterns and identified a number of potential sites that contained enough ex-combatants from all three groups²⁶. Ex-Rwanda Defence Force (RDF) combatants are much more numerous and so could essentially be found in most locations however, those from Forces Armées Rwandaises (FAR) and the Armed Groups (AGs) were situated mostly in the North and Northwest of the country, therefore it was not expected that I would find equal number in each site. Additionally, the number of ex-FAR and AGs to be interviewed was lower than ex-RDF due to the fact they represent a smaller proportion of all ex-combatants who entered the DDR programme. Having identified potential sites I then went on site visits to ascertain those most suitable for this research. In doing this I met with the District Reintegration Officer (DRO) of the area to conduct an interview and discuss potential sites. The DRO

²⁶ The ex-FAR are those who demobilised at the end of the genocide in 1994 and did not enter any other armed force. The AGs are those who joined any armed group in the DRC after fleeing Rwanda. The RDF is the reformed RPA and includes original RPA, those from FAR who wished to join after 1994 and AGs who wish to join after their repatriation to Rwanda.

then took me to sites we had decided upon and we met with the sector executive secretary to discuss the research and to assess the suitability of the particular site.

The four sites²⁷ decided upon fulfilled the two main criteria of presence of ex-combatants and the granting of access. They also enabled a degree of comparison thus enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the situation in Rwanda. Two of the four sites (North and West) were located on one of the major tarmac roads with good transport and communication links. The other two (East and South) were located away from a major road artery, requiring a minimum of one hour's travel on unmade roads by motorbike or Matatu²⁸.

4.5.3 Choice and Justification of Research Techniques

Ethnographic Methods: Theory

Ethnography can be seen as a combination of research methods that aim to decipher social meanings and behaviours of those in a given field or setting primarily through the observation of such behaviour. Ethnography then, *“is the study of people in naturally occurring settings or ‘fields’ by means of methods which capture their social meanings and ordinary activities, involving the researcher participating directly in the setting, if not also the activities, in order to collect data in a systematic manner but without meaning being imposed on them externally”* (Brewer, 2000: 10). The use of ethnography in a study of this nature will allow a deeper, more unique understanding of the three conceptual processes examined within this research: social reintegration, social capital and reconciliation.

As highlighted in the three literature review chapters, the dominant literature on each of these concepts is of a ‘western’ construction and measurement. By using ethnographic methods it was anticipated that this study would result in a fuller understanding of the concepts and their interlinking dynamic as it would enable an examination of these concepts in their relevant application in the natural setting (Hammersley, 1998). Moreover, this enabled me to develop an understanding of how Rwandan society define and measure the three concepts and the processes through which each process evolves,

²⁷ See Appendix 5.4 for more details on the four sites.

²⁸ A Matatu is a shared taxi.

as well as the way in which they interlink. An effect of this was to facilitate an understanding of the concepts that was not bound by ethnocentrism or state-centric approaches.

An ethnographic approach is particularly relevant due to the nature of the phenomena examined and the theoretical underpinnings of this research. Relating to the latter, this study is neither strictly inductive nor deductive, instead occupying a middle ground albeit with strong inductive tendencies. Ethnographic methods enable the development of theory that is situated between inductive and deductive theory in that it is guided by previous research and literature, and thus a rudimentary understanding of the concepts is attained prior to fieldwork, but the strength of the study comes not from theory testing in the field, but from inductive reasoning and application to previous research through the knowledge obtained in the field (Seligman, 2005). Important to this is the fact that the ethnographer is *“a learner among the more knowledgeable, and should tackle the research project with the humility appropriate to being in an inferior position to those being researched”* (Payne & Payne, 2004: 73). The nature of the research phenomena also provides justification for the use of ethnographical methods. As Brewer states, *“where fully fledged theories are developed from ethnographic data, they are never ‘general theories’ but ‘theories of the middle range’. That is, they do not explain society or social action on a grand scale but some more limited aspect thereof (like deviance), and do not have universal applicability”* (2000: 149). Although the locus of this study is relatively broad through the examination of the three concepts and their interconnectivity, it does not seek to elucidate theory on a grand scale and is indeed relatively focused even within the field of post-conflict reconstruction. Ethnographic methods afford me the tools through which I can *“engage in theoretically informed practice”* (Seligman, 2005: 230) and develop theory enlightened by local knowledge and understanding.

Ethnographic Methods: Life Histories

The use of narrative research has, according to Priest et al (2002), become increasingly popular in recent years. The primary narrative research method utilised is that of biographic methods such as life histories. When examining concepts such as DDR, social capital and reconciliation, such methods offer not only an insight into what the individual feels about the conflict, and their role in the conflict in relation to their own

lives, which therefore feeds into the personality of the ex-combatant, and how he subjectively constructs his own identity, but equally into how this individual's reality may add to our understanding of this issue at a societal level, thus enabling us to construct policy more effectively.

Life histories, as Bell writes, provide “*culturally shared images and conventions to present and interpret experience, as well as to draw connections between individual and society*” (2004: 49). Similarly, Goodson makes the claim that life histories “*have the potential to make a far-reaching contribution to the problem of understanding the links between ‘personal troubles’ and ‘public issues’*” (1983, cited in Cohen & Manion, 1994: 59). This, I argue, augments the development of a comprehensive understanding of how the individual experience throughout the conflict and the reintegration process influences social capital and the implications this has for reconciliation. A life history approach also enables the gathering of richer data from informants than could be achieved through structured or semi-structured interviews, due to the highly personal, subjective and sensitive nature of conflict and reintegration. It is for these reasons that life histories are to be employed as a primary data collection and analysis tool.

The types of life histories taken were retrospective, as the informants reconstruct the past events in their life using present feelings and interpretations. The mode of presentation adopted in this research is a combination of thematically-edited and interpreted and edited, with more emphasis on the thematically-edited mode (Hitchcock & Hughes, 1995)²⁹. Themes were identified throughout the course of the life history and then became the guiding principles for the interpretation and editing process. This is due to the interpretivist tradition directing the methodological choices taken in this research, which aims to construct theories via the understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation, in this case, the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

²⁹ Hitchcock & Hughes (1995) present an analysis of the three possible different types of modes of presentation of a life history: naturalistic, in which the life history is told as a life story largely in the words of the participant; thematically-edited, in which the informants' words are preserved intact but presented by the researcher in a series of themes, topics or headings; and interpreted and edited, in which the researcher has sifted through the data and edited and interpreted accordingly.

Ethnographic Methods: Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA)

PRA is a collection of techniques developed to enable the researcher to quickly ascertain certain features of local communities primarily in order to identify the needs of communities as expressed by those communities themselves so as to be able to design appropriate development programme to meet those needs (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003). PRA is a particularly effective technique as it empowers those being researched and challenges the dominance and power of the researcher thus giving more prominence to the voices of the researched (Gueye, 1999). The primary reason for using this technique is to be able to obtain a reasonably fast comprehension of the situation in the community prior to the use of other ethnographic methods whilst building the trust necessary for an effective ethnography. PRA also provided me with an opportunity to get to know those in the community to some extent before I engaged in a full ethnography as well as enabling me to assess the overall dynamic in the community which, although somewhat superficial, provided me with a foundation from which I could build the bulk of my research.

The specific PRA techniques I used were: Landscape mapping, institutional diagramming and analysis, social network mapping, and social capital indicators. Landscape mapping is invariably used as a tool to derive similar information that one would achieve from an aerial map (Rocheleau & Ross, 1995). Essentially it involves constructing a physical map of the community, which may include farming plots, water provision, schools, or whatever the mapping group decide is relevant. In terms of this study the use of landscape mapping did not result in concrete data; however this was not the intention in using such a technique. The primary motive of using landscape mapping was to introduce me to the community and engender their trust and this proved a useful method through which to do so. It also enabled me to observe the ways in which community members interacted with each other during the mapping process, which was useful for understanding community dynamics.

Institutional diagramming and analysis enables the researcher to “*understand the roles of local organisations and the perceptions that people have about them*” as “*it clarifies which institutions are the most important, which have the respect and confidence and*

women and men, and who participates in and is represented by which ones"³⁰ (Slocum et al, 1995: 127). This is a particularly useful technique for better understanding how vertical social capital is embedded within society and how such vertical social capital may contribute to the development of bridging social capital. It is also a particularly useful technique, as not only does it contribute to an indigenous measure of social capital, but also provides an understanding of the local institutions which inform further ethnographic study.

Social network mapping facilitates the identification of the complex economic, social and cultural relationships that exist within a community and how they are manifest within that community (Weller-Molongua & Knapp, 1995: 186). In particular it examines the way in which exchange takes place within the community focusing on the types of exchange and the direction of exchange, which provides indications of social inclusion and exclusion. This is significant as it enables a deeper understanding of social capital and how, and between whom, it is constructed. It also helps to determine how ex-combatants have undergone reintegration and the degree of reconciliation prevalent in the community.

The final PRA technique used was social capital indicators. This is a technique developed by the author, which facilitates a comprehensive understanding of social capital through the identification of proxies and proxy variables for social capital. These proxies are then discussed with community members who identify particular community events, formal and informal networks and associations, among others, that contribute to social capital in the community³¹. This technique is particularly useful in deciphering ways in which social capital formulation occurs within the context of a developing country and thus builds on our understanding of the measurement of social capital.

Ethnographic Methods: Elite Interviews

Elite interviews are particularly important to this study because they provide us with an alternative view of the world from communities. The divergence between the elite and non-elite is increasing globally in terms of relative power and as such understanding

³⁰ Adapted by editors from Thomas-Slayter et al, 1993.

³¹ See Appendix 2.0 – Rwanda Social Capital Indicators

what drives the elite is essential (Cormode & Hughes, 1999). Additionally, in tandem with this divergence in power there has been a divergence in opinion between elites and non-elites as to how politics and development should be pursued (Mullings, 1999). These two points combined are very important as, if one applies dependency and structuralist worldviews, one could argue that the elite and non-elite are two sides of the same coin and therefore, “*for coherent representations we need to understand both sides*” (Scheyvens, Scheyvens & Murray, 2003: 183).

Essentially, “*elite interviewing can be used when it is appropriate to treat a respondent as an expert about the topic in hand*” (Leech, 2002: 663). In the course of this research interviews were conducted with various elites who can be considered experts in their given field. These included: World Bank officials based with the MDRP; programme designers and implementers from the RDRC; government officials based in the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC); officials from various UNDP units; and International NGO representatives, among others. Essentially, “*elite interviewing may lead to good (topical, interesting, incisive) writing about political themes*” (Burnham et al, 2004: 218) and this is of particular use to this research as it enables the identification of the justifications for programme design and policy and to compare the views of elites and none-elites on matters such as social reintegration and reconciliation.

4.5.4 Sampling

The sampling method used for this research was a combination of quota and purposive sampling. The sample was divided into three main groups: ex-combatants, community members and policy makers/implementers and officials. I have chosen these three groups for particular reasons. Ex-combatants have been included as they lie at the centre of this research. Without including them in the sample I cannot claim with validity to understand the reintegration process from the viewpoint of ex-combatants. Community members are a section of the sample group, as I believe it is of vital importance when researching ex-combatant reintegration to examine the communities into with they are reintegrating. This is the case because it can be argued that the views of ex-combatants and community members over how successful or unsuccessful ex-combatant reintegration has been may diverge. Therefore, by examining the views and experiences of both groups I would argue that a balance between the two could be met. This, I believe, provided me with an ideal sample group from which to glean

information crucial to this research. Policy makers/implementers and officials have also been included in the sample as I feel this will enable me to make considerations as to any differences between official views as to how reintegration has occurred and views from the community itself (the community including ex-combatants).

The ex-combatant sample group comprised ex-combatants from the ex-FAR, the RDF, and ex-AGs repatriating from the DRC. Life history interviews in Kigali during the first phase numbered 8, all of which were former members of the RDF. In the communities during the second phase ex-combatants from each group were interviewed with 24 ex-RDF, 7 ex-FAR and 11 ex-AGs being interviewed. When considering official demobilisation and reintegration figures for Rwanda it is apparent that 66% were ex-RDF, 22% ex-FAR and 12% ex-AG³². In terms of the composition of total interviews conducted 64% were ex-RDF, 14% ex-FAR and 22% ex-AGs. Although the figures do not entirely match it is possible to claim a reasonably high level of representativeness. The ex-combatant sample also include two women ex-combatants which represents 4% of the total (more than the number of female ex-combatants in the programme which was less than 1%), one ex-child soldier which represents 2% of the total (less than the 10% of ex-child soldiers in the programme) and 25 disabled veterans which is 50% of the total.

The second sample group, that of community members, included several sub-groups: returning refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), genocide survivors, those who remained during the conflict, and community leaders. This was to ensure a representative cross-section of society. In terms of number, 22 civilians in total were interviewed across the research sites of Kigali, Northern Province, Eastern Province, Southern Province and Western Province. The below table indicates the composition of ex-combatant and civilian interviews conducted over phase one and two of the research.

³² Based on figures provided by the Rwanda Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission (RDRC) Coordinator in October 2006 of: 38,731 ex-RDF, 13,000 ex-FAR and 6,200 ex-AGs with a total caseload of 57,931.

	Ex-RDF	Ex-FAR	Ex-AG	Civilians	Total
Northern	1	3	2	5	11
Eastern	11	1	2	5	19
Southern	8	2	1	3	14
Western	4	1	6	3	14
Kigali	8	0	0	6	14
Total	32	7	11	22	72

Table 2 - Field Interview Composition, Rwanda 2006-7: Author

It was intended that 12 ex-combatants and 8 civilians would be interviewed in each site thus providing a total of 100 interviews with a representative number of men and women among the civilians and female ex-combatants, child soldiers and disabled veterans. This, however, was not possible to achieve primarily due to the understandable unwillingness of some to give up a significant amount of their day for unpaid work³³ and to those who committed to being interviewed but did not turn up at the arranged time. Those included in the sample for these two groups were selected through negotiation with a gatekeeper. In Kigali ex-combatants were identified and called for interview by the DRO in one of the districts and civilians were identified through my translator and through UN Habitat who took me on a field visit to one of their housing projects. In the communities my first port of call was the Executive Secretary in charge of the sector in order to introduce myself and notify him/her of my presence, the research I was conducting and the support I had from the RDRC for this. We would then meet with the President of the Demobs³⁴ to discuss the research and what I was looking for in terms of sample composition and an interview venue. We then arranged a time to meet a number of ex-combatants to brief them on the research and allocate interview times for those who were willing to be interviewed. Civilians for the PRA exercises and interview were identified by the Executive Secretary or one of his/her subordinates.

Whilst such a method of sampling is not ideal and issues of sample bias may have arisen as a result³⁵ it was, nevertheless, the only way I could conduct the research. First, the existence of 'gatekeepers' is a very real issue for social research of almost any

³³ This issue will be addressed during the discussion of research problems.

³⁴ The President of the Demobs is an ex-combatant who is elected by other ex-combatants to represent them in the area in which they reside.

³⁵ The issue of Sample Bias will be discussed in section 4.6.3

nature; in Rwanda this proved to be an even bigger issue. Although I had obtained permission by the Chairman of the RDRC to conduct this research I had to also obtain permission from local leaders as they essentially controlled my access to the ex-combatants and the population as a whole. Second, there existed no sample frameworks for either the ex-combatant sample group or the community member group; therefore my ability to use probability sampling was restricted. Third, because there were a number of sub-groups within each sample group, each needed to be chosen based on their representing a certain type or group that is conceptually important (Miller, 2000). In order to effectively achieve this, the use of selective sampling took precedence over that of probability sampling and as noted this was carried out through the identification of key gatekeepers in each research site.

The final sample group of policy makers/implementers and officials numbered 26 and included World Bank officials based with the MDRP; programme designers and implementers of the RDRP from the RDRC; government officials based in the NURC; officials from various UNDP units; and International NGO representatives, among others. The obtaining of these elite interviews was enabled using snowball sampling based on preliminary interviews with two key gatekeepers: the Coordinator of the RDRC and the MDRP Coordinator. In terms of whom I interviewed in this category, choices were highly selective as it was necessary to concentrate on particular individuals in particular roles and to discount others.

4.5.5 Data Collection and Analysis

Important to the effectiveness of ethnographic methods is the role the ethnographer takes on. Gold classifies a continuum of participant observer roles ranging from complete participant to complete observer. A complete participant is a fully functioning member of the social setting with his or her true identity being concealed. A participant-as-observer is essentially the same as a complete participant however members of the social setting are aware of the researcher status. An observer-as-participant is generally an interviewer with some observation but little participation. The complete observer does not interact with people and purely observes them (Gold, 1958). For this research I took on the role of observer-as-participant.

The life history data for this research was collected during one life history interview per interviewee with each lasting from between 5 and 120 minutes. All interviews were audio recorded with permission of the interviewee³⁶ and notes were taken during the interviews. Although initially I planned to carry out three life history interviews with each interviewee as I hoped this would engender trust between the interviewee and myself, as well as providing me with an opportunity to focus the latter interviews on pertinent issues and unanswered questions, this proved difficult to do. First, to conduct three interviews with each interviewee required a significant time commitment on their behalf; this was something I could, understandably, not gain. Second, due to time constraints of my own I would have been forced to sacrifice breadth in favour of depth to some degree. In order to maintain interviewee commitment and to strike a balance between breadth and depth I chose to opt for a single round of interviews. However, though using PRA techniques prior to starting life history analysis, I was able to introduce both myself and my research to the community prior to interviews thus gaining a degree of trust that was built upon in the interview process. Additionally, this enabled me to attract suitable interviewees who would commit to the time necessary for such interviews to take place as those who volunteered to be interviewed were generally interested in the work and were willing to be interviewed further.

The PRA techniques were conducted in three of the four³⁷ community sites over two days prior to interviewing. Sessions were open to all members of the community however as the composition of these sessions was constructed by local leaders this would suggest that not all civilians had an equal chance of attending. The time during the PRA techniques served as an introduction period to the community, as well as providing me with vital data concerning the physical and social constitution of the community and community dynamics. The picture below is me with members of a PRA group after the exercises.

³⁶ Excluding two interviewees who would not give their permission for audio recording. Instead I took detailed notes of these interviews.

³⁷ In the Western Province I could not get people to attend the PRA sessions as it meant giving up a significant amount of their time which they would not agree to.



Diagram 1 – PRA Exercises Photo: Author©

In terms of analysis this research is guided by the interpretivist tradition in that it aims to construct theory via the understanding and interpretation of the phenomenon under investigation. Due to this the analysis of the data collected in this study follows the realist approach in which “*the key point is that of constantly evaluating the developing concepts in light of concrete data – hence ‘grounding’ the theory in data*” (Miller, 2000:114). The first phase of this research enabled me to identify areas that required particular attention, both in terms of interview technique and issues addressed, and as such provided me with a period of reflexive time in which I could further develop the methodology in order to be most productive in the second phase. In the first phase the life history interviews followed a loose form, thus allowing the informant to provide his/her account through monologue as much as possible within the constraints of the study. This, in turn, enabled me to identify pragmatic categories throughout the account, which would provide the foundations for analysis. A strict following of the realist approach would involve the development of these categories through several readings of the transcripts after all interviews were conducted. The method employed in this research differs however in that the initial coding of the transcripts taken from the first phase, and the subsequent identification of the categories imbedded within the data, was then followed by a second period of reading and coding from the second fieldwork phase. This revealed issues that required further exploration in the second phase and enabled the development of a frame with which to guide these interviews. The transcripts of interviews from the second phase were then read and coded using the previously identified categories, and any others identified. In this way, although

positively contributing to data in their own right, the interviews conducted in phase one acted as a pilot study through which it was possible to refine my methodology for the second phase. Finally, transcripts from the first and second phase for all interviewees were analysed and coded for a second time in light of the findings from each separate analysis. This, I believe, enabled the facilitation of the coordinated codification of the identified categories. Essentially, this process provided a skeleton, via the first phase, on which to affix the flesh of the second phase.

As with any methodology, qualitative or quantitative, issues of validity, reliability and generalisability are of significant importance in the generation, analysis and presentation of data. These issues are particularly pertinent to life history research as the credibility of such methodology is often brought into question by the positivist, deductive school (Cohen & Manion, 1994 & Plummer, 1983).

Questions of validity are “*concerned with assessing whether what actually is being measured corresponds to some external reality*” (Scott & Alwin, 1998:123). In order to address these issues Plummer (1983) identified the following checks:

- 1) The subject of the life history may present an auto critique of it, having read the entire product.
- 2) A comparison may be made with similar written sources by way of identifying points of major divergence or similarity.
- 3) A comparison may be made with official records by way of imposing accuracy checks on the life history.
- 4) A comparison may be made by interviewing other respondents.

This research directly follows as many of the recommendations Plummer has made as much as possible. Numerous interviews were recorded enabling comparison interviewees. Available official records and written documents were also examined. This will be done to ensure claims of validity are justified. In terms of Internal Validity it can be claimed that although the research meet with problems in the field, it was designed and executed in such a way as to enable causal conclusions. Similarly, External Validity can be claimed, as it is possible for the results of this research, at least in part, to be generalised to a macro level within the conceptual boundaries of this research. Finally, Construct Validity has been achieved when we take into account the

theoretical framework at the beginning of this chapter and the way in which the methodology serves to operationalise such a framework.

Reliability centres round “*reference to the consistency of measurement...over multiple attempts to measure the same thing using the same methods*” (Scott & Alwin, 1998:123). In order to increase reliability in life history research it is necessary to identify sources of bias and apply techniques to reduce them. Such bias can appear in various fashions. For instance, bias on the part of the informant may occur through evasion, appeasement, deception or self-deception, and on the part of the researcher through their attitudes, demeanour and expectancy. Additionally, the interaction between informant and researcher may be a source of bias via the physical setting of the interview, non-verbal communication or vocal behaviour (Cohen & Manion, 1994). In order to minimise the potential or actual levels of bias within this study several practices were followed³⁸

The issue of generalisability results from claims that the scope of the findings of qualitative research is restricted. It is often argued that due to the use of participant observation or unstructured interviews with a small sample size it is impossible to generalise the findings of such research to the whole population (Bryman, 2001). This research can, however, claim to be generalisable. First, this research does not seek to provide findings or theory to be applied to the general population. It specifically seeks to provide findings and/or theory regarding the social reintegration of ex-combatants and its subsequent impact on social capital and reconciliation in Rwanda and in this sense it achieves its goal. Additionally, some of the conclusions and recommendations resulting from this research may also be applicable to other contexts. Second, the use of qualitative methods in this research, despite their arguable faults, provides richer data than could be gathered in the confines of quantitative research. This ensures that, while the issue of generalisability to a macro level in terms of ex-combatants worldwide may be contested, the issue of validity cannot.

³⁸ See sections 4.6.3 and 4.6.4

4.6 Methodological Issues and Constraints

4.6.1 The Research Context: Conducting Research in a PCE

Social research of any nature has its generic difficulties and problems; however research in PCEs is affected all the more by these difficulties and presents us with a number of other problems of an altogether different disposition.

Generally all social researchers face the issue of access; however this can be more prevalent and complex in PCEs if the nature of such research is sensitive. It may be the case that access is not forthcoming with restrictions being put in place by officials or community members themselves. In order to gain access it is often sagacious for a researcher to approach individuals in a position of power or respect as this not only enables initial access to the physical setting but also acceptance by the local population which is key for the quality of data collected. It therefore seems evident that two forms of access apply in the PCE: official access and emotional access.

Official access may be difficult to obtain and will generally be dependant on the nature of the research itself and the agenda of those providing access (Lee, 1995). The gaining of this access may involve careful inspection of their background and research agenda; however this is not to say it cannot be achieved. Emotional access may be more difficult to achieve. By emotional access I am referring to the ability of the researcher to gain social acceptance within the community and gain access to the rich data that the respondents themselves hold. Even with official access it does not necessarily follow that emotional access is forthcoming. PCEs are characterised by a lack of trust and this may severely limit the ability of a researcher to gain the required data due to intense suspicion of the nature of the research and the 'outsider' status of the researcher. The gaining of emotional access is an arduous process made ever more difficult by the intensity and duration of the conflict and may be strongly influenced by decisions made by the researchers regarding the way in which they interact with officials and community members (Lee, 1995; Druckman, 2005). Identifying and engaging a gatekeeper is crucial in enabling access as this can open doors otherwise closed to an 'outsider'. However this can also present problems in that affiliation with a particular gatekeeper may close certain doors that would otherwise be open either through deliberate manipulation on the part of the gatekeeper, or distrust of the gatekeeper from

the community. The key to achieving access is to identify potential effective gatekeepers prior to the fieldwork and then to evaluate the situation on the ground when on location.

Researching in a PCE also presents the very real issue of personal safety. While the conflict may have officially ended the transition period between war and peace is very often punctuated by intermittent and sporadic skirmishes and battles. The physical dangers faced in the research process have been divided into two: 'anonymous' and 'presentational' (Yancey & Rainwater, 1970), where "*the former is present in any situation in which the researcher is more than ordinarily vulnerable to threat from a stranger. The latter arises when the researcher's presence or behaviour triggers a hostile response*" (Feenan, 2002: 157). Anonymous danger, therefore, could be found in many research settings and are not necessarily synonymous only with research in a PCE. Presentational danger however, is a danger that is particularly relevant to such an environment. Such dangers can, however, "*be mediated through foresight, planning, and skilful manoeuvre*" (Sluka, 1995: 277) and especially important to the mediation of such dangers is the establishment of a rapport with local informants. Additionally, a positive outcome of such dangers is that in learning to cope, through the acquiring of local knowledge, a deeper understanding of the culture in which one is operating is facilitated; this can be instrumental to analysis.

The issue of emotions play a role in all types of social research involving fieldwork with researchers facing the dilemma of developing close enough ties with those they study but at the same time retaining some distance, "*some social and intellectual 'distance'. For it is in the 'space' created by this distance that the analytical work of the ethnographer gets done*" (Hammersley & Atkinson, 1983: 102). However, research in PCEs, particularly of the nature of this study, presents much greater problems for researchers. One such problem researchers may face is feelings of sympathy or empathy for those who we perceive to have committed immoral acts. In a study of this nature it is the norm to communicate with respondents who have committed war crimes, particularly of a genocidal character. "*Typically, fieldworkers put themselves in these positions so that they can understand the phenomenon well enough to stop it. But developing cognitive empathy (understanding why people think, feel, and as they do) can generate feelings of sympathy in the researcher. These feelings make the researcher uncomfortable*" (Kleinman & Copp, 1993: 38). This creates a dual problem

in that researchers are more able to recognise the social or structural elements that result in immoral acts but also there is the issue of how to behave toward respondents and to what extent one engages in behaviour he or she believes to be immoral.

A further, and arguably more significant emotional issue faced by researchers is that of the collection of sensitive data and the way in which it affects us. As Chaitin states, “*carrying out qualitative research in conflict-ridden contexts, in which people have experienced much social trauma in their lives is a difficult task...they [life history interviews] are rich in detail, emotionally touching, and, at times, emotionally difficult. I do not always hear things that I would like to hear, and at times, I wished I had not asked the question*” (2003: 1146/1151). In this sense we can see that sensitive research may affect not only the respondent, as commonly acknowledged, but also the researcher. Field research can be a highly isolated endeavour and it is somewhat natural for those in such circumstances to engage more rigorously in their work. Engaging at an intense level in in-depth interviews and ethnography brings the researcher into close proximity to the traumas experienced by the respondents and this can be increasingly difficult for the researcher to cope with emotionally. When researchers are absorbed in copious amounts of interviews and narratives the demands and challenges placed on them can be great. In addition to this the nature of the interviews can be highly charged emotionally (Johnson & Clarke, 2003). Although it may be difficult, some degree of detachment needs to take place in order to be able to maintain the frame of mind conducive to effective research.

4.6.2 Ethical Considerations

Issues of ethics are of particular importance for two main reasons in this research. First, ethnography and life history research, by their very nature, are invasive. They seek to uncover aspects of one’s life that may have been suppressed for some time and may cause the respondent distress to recall and talk about. The issues that arise in a life history interview and throughout ethnography can also have ramifications for present life as noted by Roberts, “*the recollection of past events is inextricably connected with people’s current life and its place in the group and wider community*” (2002:104). Second, any research of a psychosocial nature in a PCE such as Rwanda will also give rise to a situation in which the content of the interviews may be disturbing for the respondent, and indeed for the interviewer. There is, therefore, a need for sensitivity

throughout the research process. Indeed, as Smyth notes, “*conducting research in a manner that uses people as objects without due regard for their subjectivity, needs and the impact of research on their situation is ethically questionable. This becomes particularly apparent in psychological terms, since respondents may be at a stage of denial in relation to the horrors that have happened to them*” (2001: 5). The combination of life history research and ethnography in a PCE presents a potentially volatile situation in which ethical considerations must be a significant priority in the planning of the research and must permeate throughout the research period. Research in Post-Conflict Reconstruction is not, as yet, constrained by an ethics board; however there exists a moral obligation and research benefit to adhere to certain ethical practices. Therefore this research is guided by ethical considerations taken by researchers in this and other fields.

The issue of informed consent is one that is continuously of great importance when considering ethics in social science research. In life history research the dynamics of power regarding informed consent can be very different from other research methods. On one hand the respondent holds a great deal of power in that they control the degree and depth of information given to the researcher. This not only places them in a more comfortable position, but also ensures the researcher behaves in such a way so as to gain access to the information he or she requires. On the other hand, the use of deception regarding the purpose of the research can swing the pendulum of power back to the researcher. In either case, informed consent needs to be acquired through the briefing and debriefing of each respondent prior to and concluding each session. Respondents were asked if they understood what the research was about and what was to be asked of them and were informed they were free to withdraw at any time.

Anonymity is another ethical factor taken into consideration when designing this research and was guaranteed to each respondent. The one group that do not receive anonymity is those in the elite interviews. This is because, although their opinions are no more significant than community members, they form a group that may provide potentially very influential data and it is difficult to substantiate this data if their names and positions are not revealed, particularly the more ‘elite’ they are in the elite group. Additionally, “*many institutions and public figures are almost impossible to hide, and if they cooperate in research they may have to accept a considerable measure of exposure, particularly if the media picks up on the research*” (Punch, 1986: 46). Data

derived from this group, when directly used in the write-up, is referenced by organisation and position with their personal names being omitted.

The guarantee of anonymity to those who will receive it (ex-combatants and civilians) is necessary for three main reasons: First, it is more difficult to attain a sample of informants if they believe statements attributed to them may be made public knowledge. Second, the quality of the material collected is better if the respondent trusts the researcher; the guarantee of anonymity is a good foundation on which to build a relationship of trust between researcher and informant. As Hermansson et al state, *“interviews about painful experiences require adequate time and a relationship of trust”* (2003:144). Third, and most importantly, to protect informants from any danger the information they provide may place them in.

The reasons identified for the need for anonymity are indicative of the need to be sensitive throughout the interviews. Crucial to the collection of life histories is sensitiveness, empathy and non-possessive warmth on the part of the interviewer (Plummer, 1983). Without these attributes not only will the interview fail to yield the rich data required for a study of this nature but, more importantly, may result in distress and trauma for the respondent. Although sensitivity is critical to life history research, the very nature of the unstructured/semi-structured interview enhances such sensitivity. By allowing the respondent to recall events throughout their life over a period of time and in a relationship of trust the interviewee need only divulge information he or she feels comfortable with. If the researcher lessens the degree of direction he or she places on the interview the informant feels more at ease and is more likely to provide richer data.

4.6.3 Research Biases

One of the most problematic issues confronting a researcher is the various biases he or she may face. Research bias affects the validity of research and as such due consideration must be forthcoming. The initial stage of bias mitigation is the identification of potential or actual bias; in terms of this research three potential biases need to be addressed.

Sample Bias: Refers to bias within the sample population. As previously noted, the sample population for this research included three groups and in total 98 interviews were conducted (ex-combatants = 50, civilians = 22, policymakers/implementers and officials = 26). Within the ex-combatant group ex-RDF, ex-FAR and ex-AGs were interviewed (32, 7 and 11 respectively) which roughly represents the proportions within the demobilised population however, it should be noted the proportions for ex-FAR and ex-AGs in this research have effectively been reversed. This does not represent a significant bias in the research, as proportional differences do not exceed more than 10%.

What does, however, require consideration is the way in which ex-combatants were selected. Ex-combatants were identified by the President of Demobs and the Executive Secretary in the area; in this sense both these individuals held the position of gatekeepers and this is a potential source of bias. In research of this nature, gatekeepers can be an issue as *“even the most friendly and co-operative gatekeepers or sponsors will shape the conduct and development of research. To one degree or another, the ethnographer will be channelled in line with existing networks of friendships and enmity, territory, and equivalent boundaries”* (Hammersely & Atkinson, 1983: 73). During the research the majority of ex-combatants were positive regarding the efforts of the RDRC and the government, which gave rise to some suggestions that ex-combatants may have been selected based on such support. Indeed, there were two instances in which direct obstruction was evident. In the first instance one DRO was insistent I conducted research in a sector in which the executive secretary was a close personal friend and also wished to accompany me during the site period. This issue was resolved when we met with the district executive secretary who overruled the DRO and gave me free access to the site I wished and furnished me with a letter of introduction for the sector executive secretary. In the second instance one of the local leaders assisting with the identification of ex-combatants for interview excluded certain individuals. This came to my attention when by chance an ex-combatant heard about my research and approached me in this regard. Indeed, during the interview this particular individual proved to be relatively critical of local leaders.

This demonstrated the need to be vigilant during the selection process and address potential concerns within the interviews themselves through appropriate questions and probing. Additionally, my translator was important in determining ways in which the

sample may have been compromised and mitigating for such eventualities. Similarly, civilian respondents were also selected by local gatekeepers and so the same issues and mitigation strategies for ex-combatants applied. Whilst biases may have occurred within the selection process the presence of gatekeepers left me with little option but to work with them; a feature of the majority of social research, particularly of this nature. Without engaging with these gatekeepers the establishment of a sample would have been virtually impossible. It is, however, necessary to take these potential biases into consideration during the analysis stage of the research project.

Those interviewed as part of the policymakers/implementers and official sample group were selected using purposive sampling and a process of snowballing. Because of their importance to this research by virtue of their position certain individuals were included in this sample group and bias in such selection is evident. This does, however, represent a somewhat moot point, as it was necessary to interview officials engaged in the relevant policies and programmes that this research is concerned with. Within the RDRC, the RDRP Coordinator held the role of gatekeeper; however he was in no way obstructive and gave me access to interview any employee of the RDRC that I wished and to a number of documents not privy to the general population. Similarly, those holding gatekeeper roles in organisations such as the World Bank gave me full access and made recommendations as to who else may be suitable for interview. This was further supplemented by my own research, which identified a number of potentially useful interviews.

Whilst sample bias is an important consideration as it can have important and devastating consequences for the integrity and validity of research results it was not found to be significantly detrimental to this research. In the few isolated incidents in which it was evident, measures were taken to mitigate for such bias. Reflexivity and triangulation³⁹ proved important in this process, as did having a suitably trained and briefed translator. Ultimately, while the negative impact of sample bias should not be ignored or underestimated, it needs to be recognised that in research of this nature a certain element of such bias will exist and that, if the research is to be conducted, the only way forward is to mitigate for such bias as best as possible. I feel the design of this research, and a reflexive research process, allows for this.

³⁹ These issues will be discussed later in the section.

Person Bias: Chambers (1983) identifies person bias as the bias against poorer people within the rural setting. Although specifically focusing on rural development Chambers' theory also relates to this research; to which two of the four person biases identified by Chambers apply: elite bias and male bias. Elite bias refers to the favouring of the less poor and more influential within the village, in this case, in the research. It is the elite within the village who contribute to activities that involve development practitioners, local-level officials and researchers, whereas the "*the poor are often inconspicuous, inarticulate and unorganised. Their voices may not be heard at public meetings in the communities where it is customary for only the big men to put their views*" (Devitt, 1977: 23). Due to this, research that favours the elite within the village will be skewed and thus cannot claim to be credible.

Because the majority of the life history interviews (58 of 72) and all the PRA exercises took place in rural areas the issue of elite bias is a pertinent one. Although the majority of the rural population are subsistence farmers and endure levels of poverty they are generally in a similar position as their neighbours. Having said that there are cases of abject poverty and life is very much more difficult for those in female and child-headed households, of which there are relatively many. Although respondents were identified by gatekeepers in their given communities the sample population did include people from different groups in the community. Among ex-combatants most of those interviewed, as expected, were subsistence farmers. This sample did, however, include individuals with HIV/AIDs and from disability as well as single-headed households and victims of homelessness. A number had also applied from the Vulnerable Support Window (VSW), a support package from the RDRC, thus indicating the sample included the poor.

Interviews with civilians were perhaps where elite bias was most evident as it was more difficult to attract civilians to the research, as many believed it was only for the benefit of ex-combatants and would not help them. The sample did include the subsistence poor however it was dominated by those holding positions of authority in the community (local-level leaders, teachers, religious leaders) who represented 10 of 16 in the rural sample. This indeed is problematic as it does not give much scope for the voice of the poorest who may have a different experience of ex-combatant reintegration and reconciliation, or who may not be able to effectively articulate such a voice, particularly in the context of Rwanda where society is very hierarchical and respect for

those in authority is high. The PRA exercises did, however, provide the opportunity for poorer members of the community to be more involved. These were conducted prior to interviews and as such perhaps contributed to why poorer members of the community were not willing to be interviewed as they had already given up some of their time and could not afford more. During the PRA there were more of the poor in attendance and they were heavily involved. Indeed, at one point when one man, a teacher, was dominating proceedings two female farmers interjected with their own opinions. What was important here was that in examining social capital and reconciliation at the community level through such techniques it is necessary to allow societal processes to occur as naturally as possible in order to accurately observe community dynamics.

Male bias relates to gender bias within the sample and within the research team. Because both my translator and I are men there is an obvious gender bias in terms of the research team. The only way this could have been overcome would have been the use of a female translator; however the technical university (KIST⁴⁰) I approached only recommended male translators. In spite of this obvious gender bias there did not seem to be any problem with the actual conducting of the research.

In total 6 of the 22 civilians, 2 of the 50 ex-combatants⁴¹ and 9 of the 26 policy makers/implementers and officials were women. Although it represents only 17.3% much of this is due to the low numbers of female ex-combatants. As stated before, local leaders selected civilians so this may have had an effect on who was selected. In terms of the policy group whether or not an individual was included in this group was solely a matter of their position not their gender. Although it may be fair to argue that women are unequally represented in positions of power and authority, it is not the mandate of this research to discuss this. Within the PRA exercises the proportion of women's involvement was higher with 45% of those being involved being women. This was particularly important, as it was the PRA exercises that presented an arena for the observation of community dynamics. During these exercises the debate and negotiations that took place provided vital information regarding social capital and reconciliation. The involvement of women in these exercises was therefore important and illustrated their importance in the community. Although perhaps less numerous in

⁴⁰ Kigali Institute of Science and Technology

⁴¹ Although 2 out of 50 ex-combatants interviewed is a small number it represents more than 4 times the proportion of female ex-combatants in Rwanda.

this research the voice of women was heard and any male bias within the sample was due to the nature of the research; one may reasonably argue that research into the reintegration of ex-combatants will generally concentrate on men more than women. In terms of the quality of interviews with women and the consideration given to women there was a gender balance within the study.

Researcher Bias: Refers to the biases a researcher brings into, and develops in, the research process. Researcher bias is particularly important as it represents a significant problem in achieving validity and credibility within a research project. Where researcher bias is evident it can have negative consequences for a research project at every stage; the design process may be flawed from the beginning, meaning the implementation stage will be flawed and the analysis process will be biased. As noted in section 4.4, objectivity, whilst being something to strive for, is not an attribute that social researchers are privy to. Our experiences as individuals shape us and cause us to have subjective impressions of the way the world is; the very reason we focus our individual research on particular issues is due to this subjectivity. Whilst it is important to make attempts to mitigate for this subjectivity in the research process it is also important to acknowledge it, as it is through such acknowledgement that we, as researchers, can effectively reflect on our research practices and improve the way we do things.

Researcher bias can manifest itself in a number of ways however it is essentially the holding of preconceived beliefs or attitudes towards a particular phenomenon that influence the way in which we observe it. In order to minimise the potential impact of such bias it is important to mitigate for it as much as possible through being reflexive⁴² at every stage of the research process. In terms of this research, it was born out of an interest in the way in which ex-combatants attempt to normalise within a community after the construction of a combatant identity and conduct synonymous with being a combatant (along with behaviour considered out with the combatant remit). In this sense my bias as a researcher is toward ex-combatants and so whilst conducting this research my emphasis lies more with ex-combatants than with other sections of the community. Additionally, my choice of Rwanda as a case country was, in part, led by the impact the news coverage in 1994 had on me. From such coverage was derived an

⁴² The issue of reflexivity will be discussed in section 4.6.4

empathy toward the Tutsi population in Rwanda which may have biased my initial thought processes when in the first stages of the research design process.

Whilst my subjective attitudes towards ex-combatant reintegration and the Rwandan genocide in general may have initially led to some degree of researcher bias, so too did my subjective experiences of conflict enable me to mitigate against such bias. My experiences of conflict come from extensive reading of international and civil conflicts, observing news coverage of conflicts, teaching of asylum seekers displaced through conflict, the conducting of field research in Kosovo and having an older sister and younger brother with whom I would be in regular 'conflict'. Due to the fact that in the first of these instances I have been an outsider to the conflict I have been able to retain some distance and, whilst I may have had leanings towards one side or another, I have been able to logically view a given conflict. This, coupled with my own personal experience of conflict, has enabled an understanding that there are at least two stories to every conflict and if one wishes to accurately understand and analyse a conflict then each story must be taken into account. In terms of this research this was achieved in two main ways: first, by including in the research civilians from different sub groups in the community, the voices of ex-combatants are not the sole voices in the research and both social groups are able to voice their opinion of how ex-combatant reintegration is taking place. Second, active listening to the opinions of those in the Hutu social groups, despite these opinions not necessarily coinciding with my own, and non-inflammatory questioning of both groups was necessary to build an accurate picture of the conflict. Linked to this also is the way in which a researcher related to both groups. It is fundamental to the success of social research of this nature to treat each group with the same levels of respect and access. Access is not a one-way event and researchers grant access to their respondents through the way in which they relate to them, through acknowledging their views and attitudes as important even if we, as individuals, do not agree with them. Research of this nature often results in the researcher being told things they do not particularly like to hear and the way we react to that will dictate how respondents, as individuals and as part of a social group, react to us. Throughout this research I made conscious attempts to generate as much objectivity I could and absorb both stories as equally as possible.

Translation Bias: Is associated with the bias that may arise when using a translator to translate between the interviewer and the respondent. During the fieldwork two

translators⁴³ were used. Both translators were male, in their early twenties, university educated, urban, spoke a number of languages fluently including: English, French, Kinyarwanda and Swahili, and they were both Tutsi. All interviews concerning either translator were conducted in English-Kinyarwanda and as such involved all but one ex-combatants, all but 4 civilians and four of the policy officials, or in other words, 72 of the 98 (73%) interviewed in the process of both phases.

Because of my interpretivist epistemological stance it is apparent that "*translators must also form part of the process of knowledge production. There is no neutral position from which to translate and the power relationships within research need to be acknowledged*" (Temple & Young, 2004: 164). In this case then a number of issues relating to the choice of translator allude to the potential of translator biases in this work: first, both translators were male which may lead to problems when interviewing female respondents; second, they were young thus possibly causing problems when interviewing older respondents; third, they were university educated which for the majority of interviews made them considerably more educated than the respondent; and fourth, they were both from urban areas which may have caused issues when in rural areas; and, fifth, they were both Tutsi which could potentially be a problem when interviewing Hutus. There is, of course, the general issue of using any translator.

In order to mitigate for any potential translator bias a number of measures were taken. Prior to the translators being employed, I had a general conversation with them to gauge their level of English and whether or not I felt we could have a good working relationship. I then spoke in detail about my research telling them what I was researching, how I intended to go about it and what sort of research techniques I would be using. During this conversation the guidelines regarding how I expected the translation to progress were established which both translators were happy with. When the first phase in Kigali began, and again when the second translator was used, I initially encountered a problem in that the translator did not translate word for word, instead summarising their main points. This issue was soon rectified when I explained the importance of knowing exactly what they had said. From then on both translators took great care to translate as regularly as possible in the interview process and, in cases where the respondent did not understand the question, would relay this to me rather than

⁴³ This was the case because my original translator was not always available, and so he put me in contact with someone else who could help, rather than him not being suitable.

changing the question himself. Over the period of the fieldwork we spent a lot of time together and got to know each other well which I feel was useful in developing a good working relationship and at no point did I feel that either translator was deceiving or misleading me regarding the responses given in interviews.

In terms of the specific issues that may have caused translator bias I felt these had a minimal affect, if at all, on the quality of interviews. The fact they were male did not seem to have any effect when interviewing women, indeed the women interviewed seemed perfectly willing to engage in the interview and generally gave a good interview with plenty of rich information. Their age also seemed to play a minimal role in the quality of interviews with many ex-combatants and civilians being of a similar age. Those who were older responded through the translators to me and so it became less of an issue anyway. The fact they were both educated and from urban areas had no impact when alongside less literate people in rural areas, as evident by the way they could joke with them before and after interviews. The biggest potential bias, that of them being Tutsi, also never seemed to materialise. Those from the ex-AGs, ex-FAR and who identified themselves as Hutu seemingly had no issue talking through a Tutsi translator and many Hutus in this fieldwork gave very strong interviews. Only at one point did one female respondent get upset when talking about how she felt she was treated by the Tutsi; however she continued and gave a very insightful interview. Additionally, the way the translator responded to the outburst indicated to me that he himself harboured no biases within this research.

Of the five potential causes of translator bias the first four of the characteristics identified were also shared with me. Whilst it is important to be vigilant and look for any signs of bias, it is also important to acknowledge that some bias may exist and that this does not necessarily invalidate the results. Sometimes research can only be conducted via translation and therefore we, as researchers, need to expect a certain degree of bias whilst attempting to mitigate it as much as possible. The next section looks at the issues of reflexivity and triangulation as attempts at mitigating for bias and other methodological constraints.

4.6.4 Mitigating Methodological Constraints through Reflexivity and Triangulation

The issue of being reflexive within the research process is crucial as it feeds into the validity debate. *“Reflexivity is the practice of researchers being self-aware of their own beliefs, values and attitudes, and their personal effects on the setting they have studied, and self-critical about their research methods and how they have been applied, so that evaluation and understanding of their research findings, both by themselves and their audience, may be facilitated and enhanced”* (Payne & Payne, 2004: 191). The need to be reflexive is highly important if claims of validity are to stand. One’s own ontology may influence the way in which research is designed, conducted and analysed and, as such, it is necessary to be reflexive of those personal biases, belief, views etcetera, in order to be able stand up to criticism. However, as Brockington and Sullivan note, it is important not to take such reflexivity too far as this will deviate from the research topic itself. *“Extreme reflexivity regarding one’s own position as a researcher, while important can also render the production of ethnography as something more akin to individual psycho-analysis than as a means of enabling alternative perspectives on the ‘real world’ to gain public space”* (Brockington & Sullivan, 2003: 66/7). Taking this into account I will now consider ways in which this research has been reflexive.

This research was specifically designed in such a way as to maximise the opportunities for reflexivity whilst retaining focus on the conducting of the research project. In the initial stages of research design the need to be adaptable was recognised and in order to ensure this the fieldwork period was divided up over two phases. By conducting policy interviews and identifying potential ethnographic sites in the first (pilot) phase, I was afforded the opportunity to be reflexive in my approach. After returning from the field following the first phase and transcribing the 8 ex-combatant and 6 civilian interviews completed in Kigali, I was able to identify a number of weaknesses in my interview technique which I was able to eradicate for the second phase. This was my first time conducting interviews using a translator, which brought with it some problems and as such these issues required addressing. My previous interview experience in Kosovo and the UK had involved interviews in English with relatively competent speakers of English and this had perhaps shaped my expectations regarding my research in Rwanda. Due to the language barrier there was a need to be more patient, not only with the translator himself but also the respondents. In doing this it was necessary to ask

questions in a more simplistic manner and probe appropriately. By being reflexive according to my experiences in the first phase I was able to make the necessary adaptations to improve the quality of my research.

In terms of the analysis of data gathered in the field it is important to take note of the biases I, as a subjective researcher, brought to the research. As discussed above, I made several efforts to mitigate for such bias. This was particularly relevant due to the ontological (constructionist) and epistemological (interpretivist) positions taken in this research. Because I hold the view that the social world and its meaning is not independent of social actors and that the world is understood through social actors perceptions, whilst appreciating the effects of the double hermeneutic, the possibility for researcher bias in the analysis process is evident. This is because the interpretation of data will be dictated, at least in some part, by the meanings we attach to certain aspects of the social world and therefore our analysis can be skewed as a result of our experiences throughout our lives. Being reflexive regarding our ontological and epistemological positions and the ways in which our history affects our interpretations is as important as reflexivity during the data collection period as these positions will affect the way in we construct research and analyse data.

Methodological constraints can also be mitigated through the use of triangulation. Triangulation refers to *“the idea that looking at something from multiple points of view improves accuracy”* (Neuman, 2006: 149) and is derived from navigation and measurement techniques to pinpoint accurate locations. In terms of social research there are four types of triangulation: triangulation of measure, triangulation of observers, triangulation of theory and triangulation of method. Within this research triangulation of measure – the use of multiple measures of the same incident – was achieved through the use of three different samples groups, which permitted an understanding of ex-combatant reintegration from three different perspectives. Triangulation of observers – the introduction of different observers in order to provide alternative perspectives – was not possible in this research due to funding constraints, which meant I could not employ other researchers in the research project. Triangulation of theory – the use of multiple theoretical perspectives during research design and interpretation – has been accomplished to some degree through the use of social capital theory and reconciliation theory, along with concepts pertinent to DDR. Triangulation of method – the mixing of data collection methods – is the most evident form of

triangulation in this study and has clearly been obtained using life history interviews, elite interviews and PRA techniques.

The methods of triangulation utilised in this research have ensured that I am best able to view the issue of ex-combatant social reintegration. By collecting data from three sample sub-groups using three data generation techniques it was possible to corroborate different stories and identify different perspectives regarding the same events. The use of multiple methods also increases claims of validity as not only is it possible to derive a clearer understanding of the way in which ex-combatant social reintegration occurs and the implications for social capital and reconciliation, but biases can be better managed throughout the process providing reflexivity is apparent.

The use of reflexivity and triangulation are perhaps the best ways of mitigating against methodological constraints but this does not discount the fact that it may not be possible to mitigate against some constraints such as financing and time. However, these two techniques are extremely valuable in ameliorating those constraints that can be and should be used to reduce potential biases and obstacles as much as possible.

4.7 Conclusion

This chapter has made an attempt to traverse the difficult area of the research methods utilised within research. By first providing an analysis of the ways in which the three concepts introduced in the preceding chapters may interrelate and interact, the discussion of the methodological design of this study is more logical thus enabling the reader to engage better with this chapter. The theoretical framework provides a lens through which it is possible to not only better comprehend the social reintegration of ex-combatants, but also to understand the ways in which the social reintegration of ex-combatants impact on the post-conflict reconstruction effort.

The conducting of this research, as to be expected, threw up some challenges and obstacles that perhaps had not been expected and as such, necessary changes were made throughout. By conducting two phases of fieldwork it was possible to identify changes and adjustments that needed to be made and incorporate them into the second phase. However, such changes were relatively small and the basic structure of the research

methodology remained unchanged. The adaptability necessary within this research is, however, important and it is throughout the research process that such skills are developed. By being reflexive and triangulating research methods within this study it was possible to mitigate against the biases that have been discussed previously and are a feature of most social research. This is particularly important as it is only through being reflexive that one can design methodology as robustly as possible and adapt it when necessary.

Chapter Five:

The Rwanda Case Study

Understanding why they died is the best and most fitting memorial we can raise for the victims. Letting their deaths go unrecorded, or distorted by propaganda, or misunderstood through simple clichés, would in fact bring the last touch to the killers' work in completing the victims' dehumanisation

(Prunier, 1995: xii)

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide an analysis to the Rwanda case. This begins with section 5.2, which provides a historical overview of Rwanda that addresses the conflict and its causes. Within this section we firstly analyse the Rwandan conflict beginning with the transition from colonialism to independence and then considering the period of Hutu rule from the 1960s to the 1990s before investigating the 1990-1994 civil war and the events that led to the 1994 Genocide. We then move on to explore the causes of the conflict concentrating firstly on the external influences such as colonialism and economic factors, then on domestic factors such as political fragmentation and demographic issues before concluding with psychosocial aspects such as the nature of Rwandan society.

Section 5.3 provides an in-depth analysis of the Rwandan Genocide through the application of Stanton's (1998) 'The Eight Stages of Genocide' model. The eight stages are as follows: classification, symbolisation, dehumanisation, organisation, polarisation, identification, extermination, and denial. Essentially this section considers each stage of the model theoretically and then applies each stage to the Rwandan genocide providing examples in order articulate such an application.

The penultimate section introduces primary data for the first time in the thesis in an examination of the transformation of social capital in Rwanda. This draws on life

history analysis conducted with ex-combatants from all three groups and civilians, along with PRA exercises with civilians in rural areas and elite interviews with policy officials. The purpose of this section is to explicate the transformation of social capital from pre-1990, through to the period of the civil war and genocide.

The final section offers a conclusion that draws together all of the previous section of this chapter in an attempt to construct the foundations upon which the proceeding analysis chapters shall be built.

5.2 Rwanda: A Historical Overview

This section of the chapter is concerned with an historical overview of the conflict in Rwanda. Its aim is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the causes of the conflict and the subsequent genocide; rather it aims to provide the foundations from which an analysis of the transformation of social capital can be made. Specifically, it will consider the Colonial period from which the period of Independence, and the conflict years, can be better understood. From this point this section will examine the years 1990-1994 with a sharper focus and this will then lead on to an in-depth analysis of the stages of genocide in the following section.

To the uninitiated the mention of Rwanda will invariably conjure up thoughts and images of the genocide of 1994; however, in order to understand how and why such a genocide occurred, and the subsequent effects for Rwandan society, it is necessary to investigate the roots of the conflict and genocide. Such roots are highly complex however, as Hintjens notes, *“three broad types of explanation can be identified... (i) a focus on external influences, both colonial and neo-colonial; (ii) a focus on domestic causes, including demographic factors and ‘ethnic’ conflict; and (iii) a psychosocial account based on the presumed social conformism and obedience of Rwandans”* (1999: 243). The remainder of this section shall examine the causes of the Rwandan conflict and genocide using these three categories; however, prior to this shall be a brief overview of the history of the conflict.

5.2.1 The Rwandan Conflict

Throughout the 20th Century Rwanda experienced periods of what has been termed as 'ethnic' conflict. Specifically, the 1959-62 Revolution, during which Rwanda made the transition from Belgian colonial rule to independence, was the first significant occurrence of violence between Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda. Within this period "*an estimated 10,000 Tutsi⁴⁴ had been killed and ten times that number had been forced to flee the country*" (Hintjens, 1999: 248), in addition to the overthrow of Tutsi aristocratic rule through the Mwami (king). In late 1963 Tutsi exiles staged an offensive from Burundi attacking Bugesera in the southeast. This led to the killing of an estimated 10,000 Tutsi between December 1963 and January 1964 and the execution of all surviving Tutsi politicians in Rwanda (Prunier, 1995).

Between October 1972 and February 1973 President Kayibanda, the Hutu *evolue*⁴⁵ who had come to power in 1961, in a desperate attempt to cling onto power, had instigated a hate campaign against the Tutsis involving the creation of vigilante committees tasked with the enforcement of the ethnic quota policy⁴⁶. The result of this campaign triggered a further mass exodus of Tutsis out of Rwanda in this year (Prunier, 1995). Later on in 1973 Major-General Juvenal Habyarimana swept to power in a bloodless coup which received public support nationwide, including from the Tutsi. Throughout the early period of Habyarimana's regime, peace was the norm; however this came at a price of a one-party state, the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement (MRND), and the institutional discrimination of the Tutsi. In the 1980s however, the environment changed. Consecutive poor harvests (Guillebaud, 2002), land pressures due to high population density (Pottier, 2002), and the collapse of world coffee prices (Prunier, 1995; Hiltjens, 1999) conspired to destabilise the already precarious situation in Rwanda leading to political conflict between Hutu and Tutsi and the Northern Hutu elites and Hutus from the South. It was against this backdrop that Tutsi exiles in Uganda formed the Rwandese Alliance for National Unity (RANU) in 1980. In 1987 RANU became the Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF), "*an offensive political organisation dedicated to the return of exiles to Rwanda, by force if necessary*" (Prunier, 1995: 73),

⁴⁴ This figure is placed at 20,000 by Destexhe, 1995.

⁴⁵ Evolue is a French term used in the colonial period to describe an indigenous African who had 'evolved' through education or assimilation and accepted European values and patterns of behaviour.

⁴⁶ See Jean-Pierre Chretien (1985), *Hutu et Tutsi au Rwanda et au Burundi*, in Amselle & E'Bokolo (1985) (Eds), *Au Coeur de l'ethnie*, Paris: La Decouverte, pp. 129-66 for a more in-depth discussion.

which held connections with Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA) in Uganda due to many of its hierarchy fighting Obote, the then incumbent ruler of Uganda, alongside the NRA. From 1987 to 1990, those in the RPF made preparations for an invasion of Rwanda.

On 1st October 1990 the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), the military wing of the RPF, led by Major-General Fred Rwigyema, attacked a Rwandese border post at Kagitumba in Northern Rwanda and began the civil war between the Tutsi dominated RPA and the Hutu dominated government FAR. Over the period October 1990 to April 1994 the civil war was waged, with French intervention on behalf of the Rwandan government (Scherrer, 2002). In March 1991 a ceasefire was signed in N'Sele, Zaire agreeing to "*an immediate end to hostilities, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the establishment of a neutral military observer group to monitor adherence to the ceasefire, the opening of political dialogue within fifteen days, and an end to hostile media propaganda by both sides*" (African Rights, 1995: 29). The ceasefire was not to hold and after a series of skirmishes the war escalated with a number of attacks on Tutsi communities in the Northwest between December 1992 and January 1993. The RPA responded with an assault on Kigali in February 1993, which was only halted with the support of French troops (African Rights, 1995).

The breaking of the N'Sele ceasefire came during a period of peace negotiations between the Government of Rwanda (GoR) and the RPF. In June 1992 the Arusha peace process began in Arusha, Tanzania. Arusha represented an ambitious, sophisticated attempt to merge conflict resolution and management practices with the democratisation process and a complex power sharing agreement. Both the GoR and the RPF sent delegates however, with so much to gain from the Arusha talks, the RPF sent a strong, disciplined and effective negotiating team; in contrast to the weak, divided, undisciplined and ineffective team representing the GoR (Jones, 2001), perhaps indicating the level of commitment of the government to a peace process that would result in a reduction of power and, as history has now shown us, would lead to a political backlash from the angered Hutu extremists in Rwanda.

The Arusha peace negotiations began with a ceasefire; a clear signal of commitment to the process. The ceasefire was supported by a monitoring body formed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). On 18th August 1992 the *Protocol on the Rule of*

Law was signed in which the main sources of the conflict were identified and the principles, structures and processes necessary for the establishment of a new political order in Rwanda were defined. These were based on national unity, reconciliation, democracy, pluralism and respect for human rights (Mpungwe, 1999). Five months later, on 9th January 1993, the *Protocol on Power Sharing* was signed. This protocol “identified and created organs of state with their respective powers to be proportionately shared by the main political forces during the transitional period. These organs were the presidency; the broad-based transitional government; the transitional National Assembly and the judiciary” (Mpungwe, 1999: 2). This followed by the signing of the *Protocol on the Repatriation of Refugees and Resettlement of Displaced Persons* on 9th June 1993 which provided for the mechanisms of voluntary repatriation of the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees scattered around Africa and, to a lesser degree, Europe, and their resettlement in their choice of location in Rwanda. The 3rd August 1993 saw the conclusion of the Arusha peace negotiations with the signing of the *Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces* and the *Protocol on Miscellaneous Matters and Financial Provisions*. The *Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces* was, along with the *Protocol on Power Sharing*, the most difficult to pass. It paved the way for the integration of the FAR and RPA into a national army with specific consideration of the composition and division of command and control positions and the proportional composition of the rank and file (Jones, 1999). The *Protocol on Miscellaneous Matters and Financial Provisions* dealt with the additional aspects of duration of the transitional period, timetable for implementation, the relationship between the peace agreement and the National Constitution and the development of indictment procedures with respect to the President in case of agreement violations (Mpungwe, 1999). The Arusha Peace Agreement was finally signed on 4th August 1993 by President Habyarimana and Colonel Alexis Kanyarwenge, the then chairman of the RPF.

Although the lengthy negotiation process yielded a successful outcome in terms of the Arusha Peace Agreement viewed as “Africa’s most strategic and successful response to an African conflict to date” (Mpungwe, 1999: 3), the implementation of the agreement proved altogether more problematic. The GoR negotiating team had ceded much power to the RPF in the form of concessions on military composition, equal representation for

the MRND(D)⁴⁷ and the RPF in the twenty-one member transitional Council of Ministers (with five members each, the other eleven going to five of the smaller parties that had been established since 1991 when Rwanda became a multi-party state), and unequivocal right of return for refugees and exiles (Clapham, 1998). This loss of power to the *Inyenzi*⁴⁸ was unacceptable to the Hutu Power extremists who tapped “*deep currents of popular feeling...to justify and entrench their position...It was a strategy for obstructing the peace and democracy process*” (African Rights, 1995: 37). Support for President Habyarimana from Hutu extremist elements waned and it was, arguably, only the presence of the *Akazu*⁴⁹ that saved Habyarimana, although it is also argued that the President was manipulated by the *Akazu* (Prunier, 1995). President Habyarimana, caught between the derision and anger of Hutu extremists and pressure from both the RPF and the International Community to comply with the Arusha agreement, stalled the implementation process in a desperate attempt to retain power.

On 6th April 1994 President Habyarimana flew to Dar-es-Salaam for a meeting with the Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, George Saitoti, the Vice-President of Kenya, President Ntaryamira of Burundi and President Museveni of Uganda. The agenda on the table was regional with specific focus on events in Burundi; however Habyarimana was met with an onslaught of criticism from all present over his refusal to implement the Arusha Agreement. Habyarimana succumbed to the pressure and reaffirmed his commitment to Arusha (Prunier, 1995; Jones, 2001). Later that day Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira boarded Habyarimana’s presidential jet to fly back to Kigali and then on to Bujumbura to deliver President Ntaryamira. At around 8.30 p.m., as the jet was coming in to land at Kigali airport it received a direct hit from two missiles fired from the airport perimeter. All those on board were killed.

The events of 6th April 1994 are commonly attributed as the catalyst for the genocide that was to sweep through Rwanda over the next ninety days (Kuperman, 2001). RPF rebels were blamed for killing the president in an attempt to re-launch their offensive, while Hutu extremists were blamed due to their anger at the ‘liberal’ concessions

⁴⁷ On 5th July 1991 the MRND, under international pressure to engage in the democratisation process, added a second D to its name to become the Mouvement Revolutionnaire National pour le Developpement et la Democratie.

⁴⁸ A Rwandan word meaning Cockroaches used as a label for Tutsis by Hutus.

⁴⁹ The *Akazu*, or Clan de Madame, was the nickname given to the inner core of the Habyarimana regime which centred around Habyarimana’s wife, Agathe Habyarimana, and her powerful brothers (Prunier, 1995).

Habyarimana had made in Arusha and as the death of Habyarimana mobilised the population and triggered the genocide, the 'final solution', which suited the extremists. Mystery still shrouds the identity of who was behind the assassination of President Habyarimana; however, what is clear is that the preparation of the genocide had been ongoing from late 1990 onwards.

Over the period of the civil war the FAR had expanded from 5,000 at the time of the RPA invasion in 1990 to 35,000 by 1994; the Presidential Guard (GP), formed in 1990 from the Hutu Power heartland of the Northwest, later played a key role in the genocide; the Gendarmerie were politicised and also held a key role in the genocide; a civilian militia named *Interahamwe*⁵⁰ was created under the banner of the 'MRND Youth Movement' and first engaged in massacres of Tutsis in 1992 later becoming the main perpetrator of the genocide; political death squads patrolled the country killing opposition politicians and Tutsis reported to them by the *Interahamwe*; arms and training were provided by the French, with Egypt and South Africa also supplying weaponry; hate propaganda was distributed throughout the country primarily via the extremist newspaper *Kangura* and the Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM) (African Rights, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Clapham, 1998; Callamard, 2000; Dallaire, 2004; Human Rights Watch, 2006). These factors, and others, contributed to the planning of what came to be the most efficient genocide of the twentieth century – “*In one hundred days up to one million people were hacked, shot, strangled, clubbed and burnt to death*” (Keane, 1995: 29).

5.2.2 Causes of the Conflict: External Influences

The main external influence in the outbreak of conflict and genocide in Rwanda can be argued to be the colonial era. Prior to the colonisation of Rwanda, Hutus, Tutsis and the Twa (the three social groups to be found in Rwanda) lived side by side in relative harmony. The Hutus, who constituted roughly 85% of the population, were agriculturalists who worked the land. The pastoralist Tutsi made up 14% of the population with the traditional hunter-gather Twa completing the population with 1%. Generally, it is accepted that the Twa were the first inhabitants of what is now known as Rwanda with the Bantu Hutu coming from Central Africa and settling sometime later, several centuries prior to the arrival of the Tutsi from the North during the 15th and 16th

⁵⁰ A Kinyarwanda word meaning 'Those who work together'.

century (Prunier, 1995; African Rights, 1995; Uvin, 1997; Hintjens, 1999). The social relationships between these three groups had their complexities with the country being a highly organised political system, the head of which was the Tutsi Mwami (King) presiding over the predominately Tutsi court. Debate exists surrounding the nature of the relationship between Hutu and Tutsi with claims made that, historically, the Tutsi aristocracy considered themselves to be superior to the Hutu and, as such, these prejudices manifested in the feudal system (Hintjens, 1999). Conversely, counterclaims stating that relations between Hutu and Tutsi were symbiotic rather than antagonistic (Prunier, 1995) are also made. What is clear however, is that despite the differing heritages of the three groups they spoke the same language, share the same culture and practice the same religion and as such *“the Rwandans are basically a single ethnic group, with the differences between Hutu and Tutsi reflecting socio-economic divisions”* (Uvin, 1997: 93).

With the introduction of colonialism, first by Germany between 1897 and 1919 and then the Belgians between 1919 and 1962, social relationships within Rwanda underwent fundamental changes that contributed to the outbreak of civil war in 1990 and the genocide in 1994. During German control of Rwanda few changes to the existing structures were made; however, it was in this period that the seeds of change were sowed. German explorers and anthropologists who first encountered the Rwandan people, returned to Europe as proponents of what was known as the Hamitic thesis. *“Rooted in racist understandings of the inherent superiority of white European races, the Hamitic thesis attempted to explain Europe’s encounter of sophisticated tribal kingdoms and peoples in their various incursions in to Africa”* (Jones, 2001: 17). Essentially the Hamitic thesis argued that the Tutsi were originally from the Hamitic (Nilotic) race which had spread from the Northeast of Africa throughout Africa taking with them their sophisticated culture. The Tutsi, who were generally taller, lighter skinned and more regal looking than their Hutu counterparts, and as such closer to Europe races than the Bantu Hutu, had imposed their natural superiority over the Hutu and dominated the political arena as a result of this superiority. This was, however, a simplification of the social situation in Rwanda. Intermarriage between Hutu and Tutsi over centuries had mixed original bloodlines and the initial categories of Hutu and Tutsi were fluid rather than fixed with mobility between the social-economic classes being possible; Hutu could become Tutsi and vice versa dependant on factors such as wealth, military prowess and family (Jones, 2001).

With control of Rwanda passing from Germany to Belgium as a result of World War I, a more oppressive system of rule was put into place. The Belgians introduced a system of divide and rule favouring the 'ethnically superior' Tutsi over that of the Hutu. Further measures were taken to racialise the difference between Hutu and Tutsi during the 1933-34 official census. During this period Rwandans were classified as Hutu or Tutsi based on cattle ownership: if a man owned ten or more head of cattle he, and his children, were classified as ethnic Tutsi; those owning less than ten head of cattle were classified as ethnic Hutu (Mamdani, 2001). Despite the existing debate over the nature of the relationship between the Hutu and Tutsi prior to colonialism, and the fact that the classifications of Hutu and Tutsi existed in this time, the Belgian policies pursued at this time served to bastardise Rwanda's social system, redefining social-economic difference as ethnic and creating a system based on discrimination "*which allowed the Tutsi privileged access to the state, to jobs, and to the church*" (Jones, 2001: 19). Essentially, this created an ethnic hierarchy, at the head of which the Tutsi would sit. In the future this perversion of ethnicity would remain embedded within Rwandan consciousness and have disastrous results for Rwanda.

With the 'winds of change' that swept across Africa in the 1950s and 1960s Rwanda began to avail herself to the idea of decolonisation. This led to the Belgian colonial rulers to switch their allegiance from the Tutsi to the Hutu in an attempt to retain some influence within Rwanda in the era of African independence that was to come. The main effects of this change in policy were twofold: first, the minority, and now unsupported Tutsi, pushed "*even harder to obtain independence while they still retained political dominance. In their quest, the Tutsi obtained support from international communist sources, which only reinforced Belgium's shift*" (Kuperman, 2001: 6); and second, the Hutu began to build their own political and nationalist movement as a response to the oppression of the Tutsi under the colonial Belgians. This movement was known as the Parti du Mouvement et de l'Emancipation des Bahutu (PARMEHUTU), that is, the Hutu Emancipation Party, and held the platform that the emancipation of the Hutu was necessary from not only from the Belgians but, more importantly, the Tutsi invaders from the North (Kuperman, 2001). It was against this backdrop that significant violence broke out between the Hutu and Tutsi for the first time in 1959, as the Hutu made a concerted challenge for power which resulted in the deaths of over 10,000 Tutsi and the migration of 100,000 to surrounding countries.

From this point on Hutu policy toward the Tutsi was aggressive and, in a reversal of roles, the Tutsi found themselves oppressed by the majority Hutu who enjoyed the support of Belgium. In the mid-1960s, mid-1970s and mid to late-1980s violence between Hutu and Tutsi erupted again, eventually embroiling the country in civil war between 1990-1994 and culminating in the genocide of 1994.

A further external influence in the outbreak of civil war was the change in the economic situation of Rwanda. Prior to the mid-1980s the economy of Rwanda had been relatively well-managed; for the 90% of Rwandans living in rural areas access to drinking water, electricity, primary education, and basic healthcare was impressive when compared to other African states. The economy was stable with low inflation, foreign debt and corruption (Waller, 1996). This was, however, not to last. In 1986-7 global coffee prices fell which was to have catastrophic effects for the economy, which was heavily dependant on the cash crop. Rwandan receipts for coffee fell from 14 billion to 5 billion Rwandan Francs (Rf) in one year (ACR, 1989). External debt rose as a result of the economic shock rather than domestic mismanagement and this had consequential negative effects for the rest of the economy. Pressure on the existing redistributive mechanisms and welfare policies increased and the blame for the economic crisis was passed by Habyarimana to the 'parasitic' traders and 'misguided' intellectuals who conspired to exploit the working man and undermine social cohesion (Newbury, 1992). Essentially, blame for the economic crisis was placed on those professions in which the Tutsi tended to specialise, the result of which was to further damage the already fragile relationship between Hutu and Tutsi.

5.2.3 Causes of the Conflict: Domestic Influences

The primary domestic influence into the outbreak of the civil war and subsequent genocide is strongly linked to the manipulation of ethnicity undertaken by the Belgians. Under Belgian control and influence first the Tutsi held positions of power and privilege and then the Hutu held this power. However, within the country during the 1980s and into the 1990s political fragmentation between the Hutu took place. The tribal, or clan, politics system that resulted from patrimonialism in Rwanda, and the colonial and neo-colonial influence, ensured that Habyarimana, in order to retain power, rewarded his supporters as they represented the foundations of his power-base. As previously discussed, the 'inner house', or the *Akazu*, supporters, and influencers, of President

Habyarimana from his homeland in the Northwest held positions of power and privilege such that it caused division between Hutus from the North and those from the South. In an attempt to move away from this problem, in the late 1980s and early 1990s “*ethnicity was used as a tool to foster mistrust of the minority, and to conceal divisions within the majority – in order that a tiny elite might retain its power and privileges*” (MacKintosh, 1997: 471). The pursuit of political power, and the riches that could be derived from such power, seduced the political elite who, in the political game of *winner-takes-all*, engaged in a policy of fragmentation; a policy which would result in the deepening of social cleavages between not only the Hutu and Tutsi, but also Hutu and Hutu. The *Akazu*, in their attempt to maintain power, faced threats from all sides through the push for democratisation and the RPF issue (Reyntjens, 1996) and as a result increased their extremism, which they focused with increased rancour toward the Tutsi. The effect of this was to exacerbate relations not only between Hutu and Tutsi but also between extremist Hutus and moderate Hutus, an effect that was to have severe consequences for moderates who were targeted in the period 1990-1994 and to a high degree in the genocide itself.

A further commonly cited domestic influence on the outbreak of war and genocide was the demography of Rwanda. At the beginning of the civil war Rwanda, with a population of slightly over 7.1 million, had the highest population density of all African states standing at 380 per square kilometre of arable land in 1989 (Nduwayezu, 1990). Such a high population density, although not independently and out rightly causing the conflict and subsequent genocide, was undoubtedly used by the Habyarimana regime as a tool with which the blame for Rwanda’s ails could be directed toward the Tutsi. Indeed, the ‘overpopulation’ argument was utilised to great effect by Habyarimana, the result of which was to attract international aid and to provide a counter-argument to the demands made by the RPF regarding the repatriation of Tutsi refugees (African Rights, 1995). During the genocide itself radio broadcasts were made to the Hutu masses warning of the Tutsi threat of “*re-imposing feudalism, wiping out all the Hutus and taking their land*” (Berkeley, 2002: 111). Additionally, the motivation of many genocidaires to engage in the genocide was the promise of their victims’ land (Prunier, 1995). Thus, despite the ‘overpopulation’ argument being somewhat of a myth, it was influential in directing the heads and minds of the Hutu population towards greater ‘ethnic’ division.

5.2.4 Causes of the Conflict: Psychosocial Aspects

Linked to both colonial and neo-colonial issues and the pervasiveness of the State within Rwandan society is the third influence in the outbreak of conflict and genocide: that of the psychosocial nature of Rwandan society. Prior to colonisation, Rwandan society had been highly stratified and as such hierarchical. This had resulted in a high level of obedience within the population. During the colonial period levels of obedience remained high and this continued in the post-independence era. At this time the Habyarimana regime deepened the social structures that enabled such obedience through *“a top-down network of control rooted in the precolonial kingdom, codified by the colonisers, and preserved after independence...Rwanda is a nation of followers, people who “must obey the rules,” and do”* (Berkeley, 2002: 108 & 106). The conformity of the population and the dominance of the state in almost all aspects of social and commercial life combined to produce an environment in which orders travelled efficiently from top to bottom and were followed just as efficiently. *“The result was a highly efficient machinery of government that enabled the implementation of a complex genocide plan in a short period of time, using highly effective propaganda techniques and with a high degree of military preparedness”* (Hintjens, 1999: 271).

The respect for authority, however legitimate or illegitimate, held by the Rwandan population is generally seen as a key factor in the genocide that resulted from the 1990-1994 civil war. Not only is this specific for the case of Rwanda but as Stanley Milgram has proposed, respect for authority can lead individuals to inflict pain and even death on others with no feelings of guilt or responsibility (Milgram, 1974).

The complex combination of external, domestic and psychosocial influences contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Rwanda and the genocide that followed. The following section applies Stanton's (1998) Eight Stages of Genocide model to Rwanda and provides examples of occurrences in Rwanda that contributed to the completion of each stage.

5.3 Rwanda: The Eight Stages of Genocide

Stanton's (1998) Eight Stages of Genocide model presents a useful tool with which one can examine the process of the genocide in such a way as to provide the foundations for a deeper understanding of how such a phenomenon may affect social capital in a genocidal and post-genocidal environment. The remainder of this section will apply Stanton's model to Rwanda and will provide examples and analysis of each of the eight stages: classification, symbolisation, dehumanisation, organisation, polarisation, identification, extermination, and denial.

a) Classification

Classification is the creation of categories that distinguish people between 'us' and 'them' and is a feature of all societies and cultures. Such classification is not necessarily negative however; if systems through which ethnic or racial divisions can be transcended are not put into place then the likelihood for bipolar societies lacking mixed categories to descend into genocide is increased (Stanton, 1998).

In Rwanda systems of classification have been used throughout all of recorded history; however, it was not until the colonial period that such classifications became malevolent. Prior to colonialism the classification between Hutu and Tutsi was one of socio-economic status with mobility between the two classifications being possible. Relative harmony between the two groups was a feature of this time and social relations were, on the whole, strong. Intermarriage occurred, and indeed thrived, with beneficial effects for Hutu and Tutsi alike. Whilst there may have been antagonisms due to wealth and power distributions this generally did not manifest into antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi. In fact, it was that case that some Hutu could be rich and powerful and likewise, some Tutsi were poor with no power (Prunier, 1995; African Rights 1995; Destexhe, 1995; Scherrer, 2002).

Classifications between Hutu and Tutsi altered and became deeper, with a negative subtext, as a result of the colonisation process and the colonial policies implemented during this time. The Belgian policies of privileging the Tutsi and the perversion of 'ethnicity' served to engender a society of distrust, hatred and antagonism. In this simmering cauldron of discontent the classification between Hutu and Tutsi became

rigid and embodied a process of fragmentation and division with no system in place through which tolerance and reasoning could be promoted. The Catholic Church in Rwanda, an institution which one would think could transcend the division between Hutu and Tutsi, not only failed in this endeavour but actually exacerbated the already complex situation. In the colonial period the Catholic Church was Tutsi dominated. However, when independence occurred the church, in the same way as the Belgians, transferred allegiances to the Hutu. Throughout these periods it became “*a legitimising factor, a banner, a source of profit, a way of becoming educated, a club, a matrimonial agency and even at times a religion. But since it was all things to all men, it could not have any real healing power when faced with the deepening ethnic gap which the Belgian authorities kept absentmindedly digging*” (Prunier, 1995: 34). The unimpeded (re)classification process in Rwanda was to provide the foundations on which the genocide was to take place and served as a destructive influence on the social fabric of Rwandan society; an influence that will resonate through time and may prove to be a destabilising effect on the reconciliation process.

b) Symbolisation

Symbolisation did not take place in Rwanda in the same way as it did in Nazi Germany where Jews were made to wear the yellow star to identify them as Jews, or in Khmer Rouge Cambodia where those from the Eastern Zone were forced to wear a blue scarf. Indeed, symbols of difference that were used were more tacit in their nature and were used both in the colonial period to symbolise the assumed superiority of the Tutsi over the Hutu, and in the independence era to symbolise Hutu supremacy over the Tutsi.

Symbolisation in Rwanda generally took place in the form of policy. During the colonial period race education played an important role in symbolising the classification differences of Hutu and Tutsi. Tutsi privilege in both the school system and local administration provided the symbols of difference (Mamdani, 2001). The school system represented the “*womb of racial ideology*” (Mamdani, 2001: 89) through which the ethnic hierarchy was justified and expanded. Throughout the colonial period, and in particular, in the 1930s, the schools system crystallised the notion of such a hierarchy with admission restricted mainly to Tutsi (particularly to upper schools) and the quality of education received by the Tutsi being superior to that of the Hutu. Such discrimination not only passed through to the administrative system, but also aided this

transfer. The discriminatory school system dictated the future for most Rwandese, with the Tutsi progressing into positions of wealth, power and privilege whilst the Hutu were groomed for a life of manual labour, discrimination and oppression. In the administrative system this translated to a more ordered form of discrimination. The restructuring of local government focused power into Tutsi hands, which served to reinforce the ideology of Tutsi racial superiority. *“The new Tutsi chiefs were the products of schools for the sons of Tutsi chiefs. Nourished on a diet of Hamitic supremacy, they were appointed chiefs as if by birthright”* (Mamdani, 2001: 91). The systems of privilege constructed in Rwanda represented symbols of superiority that deepened social cleavages and provided fertile ground in which the seeds of genocide were planted.

As Belgian allegiance transferred from Tutsi to Hutu throughout the 1950s the symbols of classification that existed in Rwanda remained the same; however, in the same way as the Belgians, these symbols too switched their allegiance from Tutsi to Hutu. After independence, privilege was bestowed on the now ruling Hutu. In the same way as the Tutsi had discriminated against the Hutu, the Hutu now discriminated against the Tutsi. The symbols of classification remained the same but ownership of these classifications changed hands. The Tutsi, from occupying the top of the ethnic hierarchy in the pre-colonial and colonial periods, now occupied a place at the bottom of the hierarchy and were now identified as an alien race. The social cleavages that had developed through the discriminatory practices of the colonisers deepened further as a result of discrimination against the Tutsi and the Tutsi grievance that ensued.

c) Dehumanisation

Key to the progression of the genocide in Rwanda was the dehumanisation process that took place in the 1980s and 1990s. The dehumanisation process occurs when the humanity of one group is denied by the other group and as a result *“overcomes the normal human revulsion against murder”* (Stanton, 1998: 1). In Rwanda the dehumanisation process was a highly organised and extremely effective endeavour characterised by a climate of fear and distrust.

The common term used to describe Tutsi in Rwanda after the 1959 Revolution was *Inyenzi* meaning cockroach. Over the course of time the frequency of use of the term

increased and with the degree of dehumanisation of the Tutsi. In schools teachers required Tutsi children to stand up and confirm themselves as *Inyenzi*, they were then separated from the Hutus and ridiculed for their 'ethnicity' (Prunier, 1995; Gourevitch, 1998). In 1990 the process of dehumanisation gathered speed and, spurred on by the Arusha Peace Agreement, became imbedded within daily life in Rwanda. At this time the leading proponent of the dehumanisation message was the bimonthly magazine *Kangura*, which regularly disseminated messages of hate. Indeed, *Kangura* was "denounced by the International Commission of Jurists for its vicious incitement of racial hatred" (La Brosse, 1995 cited in Chalk, 2000: 95). The messages *Kangura* spread had a second, important impact on the decline into genocide. In the early 1990s, as the democratisation process was occurring, moderate Hutus who made attempts to build a society in which Hutu and Tutsi could live together, founded parties in opposition to the MRNDD. The newspaper *Kangura*, with its influence derived from senior extremist members of the military and intelligence services, was able to silence the voices of moderate Hutus who attempted to diffuse the volatile situation as well as admonish Hutus who rejected its divisive tendencies (African Rights, 1995). In doing so *Kangura* served to negate opposition to the increase in racial hatred and provided an avenue through which the architects of the genocide could gain the necessary public participation for the genocide to take place.

The racist propaganda machine gathered increased momentum with the creation of the radio station RTLM in September 1993. For rural Africa the radio serves as the primary tool through which to disseminate information. In Rwanda RTLM's function was to destabilise opposition to the forthcoming genocide through the incitement of violence between Tutsi and moderate Hutus as well as stoking the fires of ethnic hatred through its vitriolic messages of hate targeted towards the Tutsi (Chalk, 2000). RTLM went on to crystallise such messages of hate throughout the genocide and represented a crucial tool for the mechanisms of genocide to dehumanise its intended victims and polarise the two groups.

d) Organisation

In 90 days the genocide claimed the lives of approximately 800,000, primarily through the use of rudimentary weapons such as machetes, *masus*⁵¹, spears, knives and bow and arrows as well as more conventional weaponry such as automatic rifles, mortars and grenades (African Rights, 1995). This represented “*within three months, the most intense period of slaughter at any time in the twentieth century anywhere in the world, with more people killed per day than even during the Nazi Holocaust*” (Huband, 2001: 184). In order for such an effective killing machine to operate, organisation of the genocidal system was a prerequisite and it is argued by many that such organisation took place over a number of years prior to the outbreak of genocide (African Rights, 1995; Prunier, 1995; Mamdani, 2001; Scherrer, 2002). The organisation of the genocide was so crucial due to the need for Hutu Power extremists to mobilise the sentiments of the masses. As Mamdani notes, “*if we are to understand the context of the mass killings that together constituted the hundred-days genocide, we need to move away from an assumption of the genocide as simply a conspiracy from above to an understanding of how perceptions could radically shift in response to an equally radical change in forces and circumstances – by making the genocide thinkable*” (2001: 195).

The organisation of the genocide had many facets. Perhaps the most obvious of these was military organisation and this included not only the organisation of the government-controlled military but also the creation and training of militias, the flow and stockpiling of weaponry and the financing of the genocide. Attributed with the overall role of organising the genocide is Colonel Theoneste Bagosora, the Director of Services in the Ministry of Defence, however the organisation of the government-controlled military was essentially overseen by the Defence Minister, Major-General Augustin Bizimana “*who oversaw the logistics and also influenced the reluctant elements in the FAR so they would not stand in the way*” (Prunier, 1995: 240). He was aided in this work by the commander of the paratroopers, Colonel Aloys Ntabakuze, and Lieut. – Colonel Protias Mpiranya, Head of the Presidential Guard (GP). Between the RPA invasion in October 1990 and start of the genocide the size of the army had expanded from 5,000 men with limited combat experience to approximately 35,000. Throughout the genocide the primary role played by the military was that of organising, training and arming the militias, which was critical in terms of the effectiveness of the genocide. As African

⁵¹ The *masus* is a club studded with nails.

Rights argue, “such a large number of people would never have died in Rwanda if it was not for the role played by the army” (1995: 48). Although this was the primary role of the military, there were many incidents of direct massacres by the military as well as the military providing reinforcements when required by the *Interahamwe*. The GP were particularly active particularly in terms of political assassinations, perhaps due to their allegiance to the President and the *Akazu*.

Key then to the instigation and development of the genocide was the creation of militias. The most active of the militias were the *Interahamwe* who, from 1992, carried out sporadic attacks on the Tutsi populations and then, from April to June 1994, conducted the genocide in earnest. The *Interahamwe* began as the MRNDD youth wing developing into a fully operational killing machine with the introduction of new members and training by the GP and French military advisors. The ranks of the *Interahamwe* were filled with young unemployed and disenfranchised men seduced by the promise of beer, money and looting potential (African Rights, 1995). It is this militia that is attributed as the worst of those involved in the genocide. Another group involved in the genocide were attached to the *Interahamwe* and were made up from refugees from Burundi and Zaire (DRC). In particular, the Burundian refugees had a reputation for extreme brutality and were involved in massacres in Gitarama, Bugesera, Nyamirambo, Butare, Cyangugu and Gisenyi. The third faction or militia that played a significant role was that of the Death Squads coordinated by “Network Zero”. The Death Squads worked between the GP and the *Interahamwe* and were responsible for targeted assassinations of those named by the *Interahamwe*.

The role of the militias was reliant on the supply of arms, which took place via several channels. The supply of machetes was ubiquitous due to its prevalence as a farming tool. However, in the years preceding the genocide, machetes were imported *en masse*, from China in particular, and other sources. The supply of more sophisticated weaponry primarily came from France, Egypt and South Africa. Although the supply of arms to the military and the militias proved to have devastating consequences throughout the course of the genocide, arguably the most influential factor was the training provided to the military and the militias, in particular by the French. Military intelligence gathering and training of the FAR, Gendarmerie and the GP was undertaken by the French throughout the period 1990-1994. The GP then went on to train the *Interahamwe* under the noses of the French. Whilst the argument could be made that

French policy in Rwanda was a response to an ‘external’ invasion, the level of political violence within the country between 1990 and 1994 would suggest either a degree of naivety on the part of the French, or a distinct involvement. As Callamard notes “*the appointment of French advisers within the highest ranks of Rwandese military and political authority, the presence of French soldiers manning checkpoints, and France’s contribution to the rapid expansion of the armed forces and the Presidential Guard are sufficient in and by themselves to raise very serious concerns regarding French military ethics in particular and French policy more generally*” (2000: 167).

The organisation of the genocide did not, in this case, represent a distinct and separate stage of the genocide as in Stanton’s model. Because the genocide was planned and orchestrated by the higher echelons of the Hutu Power extremists the organisation stage of the genocide can be seen as being more fluid, taking place within each of the other stages and because of the other stages. That is, the classification, symbolisation, dehumanisation, polarisation, identification and extermination of the Tutsi by the Hutu required organisation but also each stage contributed to the overall organisation of the genocidal process. Therefore, much of the organisational aspects of the process are discussed in each of the stages.

e) Polarisation

Polarisation between Hutu and Tutsi was an ongoing process throughout the colonial and post-colonial periods however it was not until the RPA invasion of 1990 that this process really gathered speed. Perhaps the most influential tool used in the polarisation process was the Hutu Ten Commandments published in 1990 by the *Kangura* newspaper. The Hutu Ten Commandments captured the Hutu extremist ideology that was being developed and disseminated at this time. They included:

- 1) Every Hutu should know that a Tutsi woman, wherever she is, works for the interest of her Tutsi ethnic group. As a result, we shall consider a traitor any Hutu who:
 - Marries a Tutsi woman;
 - Befriends a Tutsi woman;
 - Employs a Tutsi woman as a secretary or concubine.

- 2) Every Hutu should know that our Hutu daughters are more suitable and conscientious in their role as woman, wife and more of the family. Are they not beautiful, good secretaries and more honest?
- 3) Hutu women, be vigilant and try to bring your husbands, brothers and sons back to reason.
- 4) Every Hutu should know that every Tutsi is dishonest in business. His only aim is the supremacy of his ethnic group. As a result, any Hutu who does the following is a traitor:
 - Makes a partnership with Tutsi in business;
 - Invests his money or the government's money in a Tutsi enterprise;
 - Lends or borrows money from a Tutsi;
 - Gives favours to Tutsi in business (obtaining import licences, bank loans, constructions sites, public markets...).
- 5) All strategic positions, political, administrative, economic, military and security should be entrusted to Hutu.
- 6) The education sector (school pupils, students, teachers) must be majority Hutu.
- 7) The Rwandese Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. The experience of the October [1990] war has taught us a lesson. No member of the military shall marry a Tutsi⁵².
- 8) The Hutu should stop having mercy on the Tutsi.
- 9) The Hutu, wherever they are, must have unity and solidarity, and be concerned with the fate of their Hutu brothers.
 - The Hutu inside and outside Rwanda must constantly look for friends and allies for the Hutu cause, starting with their Bantu brother;
 - They must constantly counteract the Tutsi propaganda;
 - The Hutu must be firm and vigilant against their common Tutsi enemy.
- 10) The Social Revolution of 1959, the Referendum of 1961, and the Hutu Ideology, must be widely taught to every Hutu at every level. Every Hutu

⁵² From before 1990 no member of FAR could marry a Tutsi without official permission.

must spread this ideology widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his brother Hutu for having read, spread and taught this ideology is a traitor.

Published in *Kangura*, 10 December 1990.

The Hutu Ten Commandments set the standard for what was expected of the Hutu in terms of how they related to the Tutsi and this proved to be pivotal in the mobilisation of the Hutu masses. Essentially, they played “*on simplistic notions of “majority rule” and the homogenous nation-state, equating these with democracy. In the hands of clever journalists, academics and diplomats, this was a highly effective component of the ideology, appealing to Rwandese and westerners alike*” (African Rights, 1995: 43). However, the Ten Commandments alone could not polarise Hutu and Tutsi to the degree necessary for the outbreak of the genocide. The role of the media in reinforcing the process was crucial. Both *Kangura* and RTLM made regular statements subjecting the Tutsi to hateful propaganda including; explicit and regular citations to mass murder, verbal attacks, the publishing of lists of Tutsis to be killed and threats to the families of Tutsis (Chretien, 1991; Centre Nord-Sud, 1994). Such propaganda continued throughout the genocide with perhaps the best-known broadcast from RTLM, “*You have missed some of the enemies. You must go back there and finish them off. The graves are not yet full!*”⁵³.

The broadcasts promoting the genocide that were made by the Rwanda media were all the more powerful due to the fear that had developed over the late 1980s and the 1990s preceding the genocide. This had begun with the government creating a climate of ambiguity through the Arusha Peace Process and had evolved into a climate of fear by the outbreak of the genocide. Commands to engage in “bush clearing”⁵⁴ and “pulling out the roots of the bad weeds”⁵⁵ were heard widely and fear was placed in the hearts of the Hutu masses of the Tutsi invasion in which Rwanda would be re-colonised by the Tutsi. On particular speech that strongly influenced the genocidal wave was from the leading Hutu Power politician Leon Mugesera, “*They [the Tutsi] belong in Ethiopia and we are going to find them a shortcut to get there by throwing them in the Nyabarongo River [which flows north]. I must insist on this point. We have to act. We have to wipe them all out!*” (Mugesera, cited in Prunier, 1995: 172). Two years later the genocide

⁵³ RTLM, Kigali, Rwanda, 1994.

⁵⁴ Bush clearing was the term, used by the media and political figures, for chopping up men

⁵⁵ Pulling out the roots of the bad weeds, used by the media and political figures, was the term used for the slaughtering of women and children.

began. Tens of thousands of mostly Tutsi bodies floated down the Nyaborongo River and washed up on the shores of Lake Victoria in Uganda. This indicates the strong effect the rhetoric of leaders in Rwanda had. The climate of fear that had developed was enabled by the structured nature of Rwandan society, which had fostered a culture of obedience. The commands issued to the masses by the media and by local and national level politicians were followed. The obedient nature of Rwandan society thus had enormous implications for the polarisation of Hutu and Tutsi and the subsequent genocide.

f) Identification

In the conducting of genocide the identification of its victims is a vital part of the process and is connected with its organisation. The identification of the victims in Rwanda was made much easier again because of the hierarchical nature of Rwanda society. Death lists of Tutsis and moderate Hutus were drawn up by local *Interahamwe* members and passed onto their leaders and the Death Squads and GP. Throughout the genocide itself much of the identification of victims was conducted through the use of roadblocks and checks on identity cards, which stated the carriers' ethnic group. The tool used by the Belgian colonials to aid divide-and-rule thereby became the most useful weapon in the extremists' arsenal. Marauding *Interahamwe* were directed to people hidden by relatives or neighbours via radio reports (Article 19, 1996: 101) or by civilians, both Hutu and Tutsi, attempting to secure their own survival. Massacres occurred where people congregated for security, in places such as churches and schools, as those people were adjudged to be enemies of the Hutu

g) Extermination

The genocide began on the evening of the 6th April 1994 after President Habyarimana's aircraft was shot down over Kigali airport. The first on the death lists to be killed were moderate Hutu opposition members who were targeted by the GP. These included the President of the Constitutional Court, Joseph Kavaruganda, and Minister of Information, Faustin Rucogoza and then, on the morning of 7th April, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingimana. These assassinations were crucial in what was proving to be a Coup d'Etat against the backdrop of genocide. The President of the Constitutional Court held influence in the swearing in of senior politicians while the Minister of Information had

authority over Radio Rwanda. All three were members of the Hutu opposition. As word of the President's death spread, so too did the call to arms as the Hutu masses were mobilised to join the slaughter of the Tutsi.

The violence spread out from Kigali across the country. Neighbours killed neighbours, teachers killed pupils, and husbands killed wives (Destexhe, 1995). At road check points the *Interahamwe* slaughtered all Tutsi, and some Hutu who were perceived to look like a Tutsi. Tutsis fled their homes looking for refuge. Some were hidden by neighbours or relatives. Others sought the sanctuary of churches; however, in some cases, this proved to be a devastating strategy. In Kibuye parish over 4,000 Tutsi were killed as they sought refuge in the church, in Nyarubuye over 3,000 and in Ntarama there were so many dead it was impossible to count, "*it was impossible to enter the church because bodies were piled so high at the entrance. This made it very difficult to estimate the death toll; but looking through the window, every inch of the inside of the church was taken up by corpses which were piled on top of each other*" (African Rights, 1995: 261-2). In cases such as this the killing often took place over a number of days and would involve the use of grenades and mortars frequently with military reinforcements. "*The killers did not spare women, old people, children or even babies*" (Prunier, 1995: 248).

Other hiding places were in the roof cavities of buildings, in banana groves, car wrecks, pit latrines, swamps, anywhere that was hoped to provide some degree of cover. The *Interahamwe* routinely searched such places and killed anyone they found there. Neighbours would inform on the whereabouts of their neighbours through fear of reprisal. The killings went on for 90 days until the RPA gained control of the country. Some two million Rwandan refugees fled into Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and the DRC, the majority of them Hutu peasants forced to flee by the retreating deposed government and the FAR who used the refugees as a human shield. Over the course of the genocide the widely quoted figure of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu were killed.

h) Denial

Denial was, and still is, a key feature of the Rwandan genocide. Throughout the genocide itself the government cut domestic communication channels and engaged in a strategy of misleading the international press. By following such strategies and denying

the genocide the government was able to conceal the truth for three weeks, which proved instrumental in the effectiveness of the genocide. It was in the first three weeks that most people were killed. Although this has something to do with the fact that the killings slowed due to it being more difficult to find the victims as many of them had been killed, the three-week period of unrelenting killing was enabled through a combination of the denials of the government and the naivety of the international press and governments.

Denials of the genocide or roles within the genocide are made to this day from all levels of the genocidal organisation. At the highest level of the justice process, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), denials that it was a genocide that took place or denials of specific roles within the genocide take place (Berkeley, 2001). This serves to not only absorb revenue that could be more effectively used in the reconstruction effort but more importantly, prolongs the suffering of the victims and damages the reconciliation process. Denial from the top also takes place outside of the ICTR. Agathe Habyarimana, the wife of President Habyarimana and the centre of the powerful *Akazu*, is to this day living in France and denies any role in the genocide (BBC, 2007). Further down the hierarchy of genocidal organisation denial still occurs. Many *genocidaires* remain in Eastern DRC where they have engaged in insurgencies into the North West of Rwanda. The denial of these people threatened the future of Rwanda and may serve to destabilise relations between Hutu and Tutsi (African Rights, 1998).

Associated to denials of the genocide is the blame that is sometimes attached to the victims. Indeed, this can be a highly dangerous phenomenon. The culture of blame arises as a perverse justification for the crime. As Moore states, "*for injustice to be acceptable evidently it must resemble justice*" (1978: 55), therefore extremist movements such as the Hutu Power movement seek to rationalise and justify exclusionary practices. To this end, "*the party which seeks to take power by instituting and legalising exclusion, expulsion, segregation and [even] extermination, claims to be a victim itself*" (Guillaumin, 1990: 9). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s the Tutsi were made into a scapegoat for the evils of the colonial period and problems since independence. In order to maintain their grip on power Habyarimana and the *Akazu* invested in this culture of blame, particularly through the Bahima conspiracy in which it was argued that the Tutsi were making plans to engage in a political genocide by slaughtering enough Hutu to ensure an electoral majority (Lemarchand, 1996). This

would result in, at a minimum; the re-colonisation of the Hutu by the Tutsi (Chretien, 1995; Thibon, 1995) and, as such, drastic preventative methods needed be put in place. This essentially enabled the Hutu elite to generate a climate of fear, which provided the foundation from which the organisation of the genocide could be built. *“In this allegorical account of events, the RPF ceased to be a nationalist military force based on Rwanda exiles, with a socialist political orientation. Instead, it was depicted as a royalist army of pastoralist raiders, intent on restoring feudalism across the entire Great Lakes region”* (Chretiens, 1995: 253 cited in Hintjens, 1999: 264). The blame culture that was developed within Rwanda has influenced the degree of genocide denial, which, as previously noted, has subsequent negative effects on reconciliation.

5.4 Rwanda: The Transformation of Social Capital

The previous section has provided an in-depth, secondary account of how the Rwandan Genocide was made possible. This section introduces primary data for the first time in this thesis and intends to put forward an analysis build from data collected over two periods in the field, which addresses the transformation of social capital in Rwanda. It will draw on the results of life histories taken from ex-combatants and civilians, PRA exercises with rural civilians, and elite interviews with policy officials. The section is divided into two sub-sections: social capital in the pre-1990 civil war period and social capital in the 1990-1994 civil war and genocide period. Social capital in the post-1994 Genocide period will be discussed as part of chapter seven.

5.4.1 Social Capital in the pre-1990 Civil War Period

As previously established, Rwanda experienced relative harmony in the pre-colonial period with Hutu, Tutsi and Twa living together in a community. During this time bonding social capital was more the social capital of a geographical community, that is, a village. Villages had bonds that tied them together and aided the functioning as a community. Bridging social capital was the social capital between geographical communities, that is, it was the bridge between different village communities. Vertical social capital, or synergy, was the social capital between the state, as it was in that period, and all communities. Whilst the Tutsi monarchy dominated in this period and

society was somewhat decentralised in terms of zones of influence, relative peace prevailed.

With the coming of colonialisation all types of social capital were transformed. Due to Belgian ethnicisation of Hutu and Tutsi, and the elevation of the latter, social capital became based around constructed ethnicities. Vertical social capital became discriminatory with the Tutsi being favoured at the expense of the Hutu. This had the effect of strengthening bonding social capital between Hutu as they attempted to cope with and overcome the discrimination they experienced. Similarly, bonding social capital between Tutsi was also strengthened in order to maintain their position of privilege. Combined, the transformation of vertical and bonding social capital had the effect of weakening bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi. However, perhaps due to the presence of the colonial power, this weakening of bridging social capital was never permitted to reach the point at which it would lead to serious conflict; rather it was kept at a level that ensured Hutu and Tutsi could not cooperate together to undermine Belgian dominion.

At the onset of independence, social capital in Rwanda transformed again and continued to do so up to the period of the conflict in 1990. With the shift in power from Tutsi to Hutu a change in the relations within vertical social capital also occurred. Vertical social capital between the State and the Hutu strengthened with Hutu being elevated into favour whilst vertical social capital between the State and the Tutsi weakened due to State persecution in retaliation for Tutsi discrimination in the colonial period. Over time, in the period before the 1990 civil war, as Hutu discrimination towards Tutsi increased, bonding social capital between Tutsi strengthened in response. As one civilian noted, *“if people are facing the same problem it becomes a basis for them to feel understanding better than before in good times so they become much closer than before because they were being oppressed together in the same way”*⁵⁶. During this time bonding social capital between Hutu remained relatively strong. In some instances it may have increased, particularly in geographical areas with a high proportion of Hutu extremists (predominately in the Northwest) who sought to capitalise on the weak vertical social capital between the State and Tutsis, or a relatively high proportion of Tutsi (predominately the East and South) in which they felt somewhat under threat. In other areas it may have remained unaltered.

⁵⁶ Interview with CIV20, October 2006.

Bridging social capital at the local level depended to a large degree on geographical location. In the East there was a weakening of bridging social capital due to segregation developing between Hutu and Tutsi children with Tutsis being denied continued access to school⁵⁷. However, in the South there was more contestation with some, both Hutu and Tutsi, stating there were no problems between the groups whilst others differed with one in particular stating that, as early as 1960, “*because it was coming from high authority all children were pressed to know where they came from. That’s when hatred started in a bad way, deep hatred between people*”⁵⁸.

Rwandans in the West pre-1990 seemed to be more cohesive than in any other part of the country. Of the eleven ex-combatants and three civilians interviewed in the West all believed relations between Hutu and Tutsi to be relatively good and it was not until 1990 that these relations really changed. According to one ex-combatant who joined the RPF in 1993 it was not until the RPF started in 1990 that “confusion” started between Hutu and Tutsi⁵⁹. Up to that point “*Rwandans lived well, they had weddings, intermarriage, and they were visiting each other as neighbours. There was not this kind of lacking of trust [...] for me according to what I know things started changing in 1990. That’s when Hutus started killing Tutsis*”⁶⁰. In the North too, relations were considered to be relatively good. Interestingly, two Hutu civilians from this area reported that they either had a godfather who was a Tutsi⁶¹ or acted as a godfather to a Tutsi family⁶². Ex-combatants in this area also attested to good relations between Hutu and Tutsi, again making reference to intermarriage and reciprocal exchange between the two groups.

Bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi in Kigali in the pre-1990 period suffered mostly due to the proximity to the discriminatory vertical social capital that targeted Tutsi. Of those civilians interviewed in Kigali, 50% of them all drew attention to their experience of their segregation as children in schools, stating that their teachers routinely separated pupils into three groups according to ethnic group. The divisive practices of the government had the effect of amplifying the supposed difference between Hutu and Tutsi through strengthening the bonding social capital of these two

⁵⁷ Interviews with XCRDF4 and XCRDF5, June 2007.

⁵⁸ Interview with CIV6, June 2007.

⁵⁹ Interview with XCRDF21, June 2007.

⁶⁰ Interview with XCAG6, June 2007.

⁶¹ Interview with CIV14, July 2007.

⁶² Interview with CIV15, July 2007.

groups as the following quote demonstrates: *“The only problem was at school because they used to ask us which ethnic group we belonged to and when you were a Tutsi there was a problem and when you were a Hutu there were so many you felt like a king, to be a Hutu was a privilege”*⁶³.

Geographical differences influenced the effects of bonding social capital on bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi. In those areas in which bonding social capital became much more based on ethnic bonds and was relatively strong this translated into relatively weak bridging social capital. This was particularly the case in Kigali and in the East and South. Perhaps not surprisingly, these areas suffered heavy human losses in the genocide. The three forms of social capital (vertical, bonding and bridging) continued to transform in the pre-civil war period. However, as the civil war approached, the negative connotations attached to such transformation became increasingly evident. The next section considers the ways in which social capital transformed throughout the civil war and genocide period.

5.4.2 Social Capital in the 1990-1994 Civil War and Genocide Period

Literature addressing the Rwandan genocide places a high degree of culpability with the extremist Hutu government and this view is supported by those interviewed, Hutu and Tutsi alike. In the immediate period leading up to the civil war, relations between Hutu and Tutsi were suffering as a result of discriminatory vertical social capital practised by the Hutu government towards the Tutsi. With the invasion of the RPA and the outbreak of civil war in October 1990 the persecution of the Tutsi by the government increased and so, whilst *“Hutu and Tutsi interacted somehow, the problem was the implementation of politics by the government which taught one group [Hutu] to hate another [Tutsi] and to see how they can use one group to destroy and eliminate the other, and from that there some signals from the instruction given to the Hutu against the Tutsi”*⁶⁴. According to one ex-combatants the reason for this was a struggle for power in which the people were manipulated by a bad leadership who deliberately orchestrated division between Hutu and Tutsi in order to meet its own objectives; *“What people argue for is power [...] you find that lower leaders say, ‘if I remove that big man I will have a better life, I will drive a nice car, I will have a big house. Before he*

⁶³ Interview with CIV16, October 2006.

⁶⁴ Interview with CIV20, October 2006.

*removes him he will first go through villagers and the population to divide them so he goes through the population and brings a darkness in the population, it is only through bad leadership that things changed*⁶⁵.

The government became solely a government for the Hutu and engaged in propaganda that served to alienate the Tutsi from society. Tutsis were called *Inyenzi* and snake and were frequently accused of being spies for the RPA. Government policies of exclusion and discrimination translated to a complete breakdown of vertical social capital between the State and Tutsis with a corresponding strengthening of vertical social capital between the State and Hutus; a process that continued and indeed intensified the more protracted the conflict became. Such a transformation of vertical social capital had important implications for both bonding and bridging social capital.

The strengthening of vertical social capital between the State and Hutus served to privilege Hutus over Tutsis and thus crystallise the notion of group bonds being established and reinforced along ethnic lines. The creation of political parties weakened the position of the Tutsi and propaganda such as the Hutu Ten Commandments and newspapers dehumanised the Tutsi and foretold of a Tutsi attempt to gain power and kill Hutus. A climate of fear was created in which the Hutu were sensitised to believe that they were surrounded by Tutsi spies⁶⁶. Rumour, lies and speculation regarding the RPA was spread in order to mystify their presence and create distrust among the population. This was ratcheted up to reach a level whereby, upon the death of President Habyarimana, orders were passed down the hierarchy to eliminate the Tutsi, *“we kept hearing on the radio, we were hearing a journalist called Kantonoe saying stand on the roadblocks, don't let anyone survive”*⁶⁷.

Over this period, bonding social capital between Hutus strengthened in the face of perceived threat and the promise of land. Perhaps the most chilling example of such overly strong bonding social capital between Hutus came from the genocide itself. To kill 800,000 people over the course of 100 days using such rudimentary weapons as machetes, spears and clubs takes a great deal of unity and cooperation. Whilst the genocide may have been planned and orchestrated by the ruling elite, it was put into

⁶⁵ Interview with XCFAR5, July 2007.

⁶⁶ Interview with CIV14, July 2007.

⁶⁷ Interview with CIV18, October 2006.

practice by the population. This not only indicates the degree of control the State had over the population, but also the bonds between Hutu. Although on the whole bonding social capital between Hutus strengthened at this time there were those who resisted the State and helped the RPA and members of the Tutsi population targeted by the *Interahamwe*. Seemingly such behaviour was based on the ties that had previously bound certain people together. In one surprising interview a Tutsi civilian gave testimony of how he was rescued in the genocide by the local president of the *Interahamwe* who he knew from childhood:

*Where I used to live I was near the president of the Interahamwe. Because we were neighbours and we studied at the same school we knew each other. He is the one who hid me and my three children. He hid us in his house for two and a half months. [...] He said if you want to live please you and your children come in my house, I will protect you. I had to trust him, it was a relationship we had since we were children, when we were children we were very good friends.*⁶⁸

This, perhaps, provides an indication that those original bonds between people had not been entirely destroyed and that with strong vertical social capital between the State and *all* groups in society reconciliation may be possible.

Bonding social capital between Tutsis in this period was more complex. At a macro level, bonding social capital between Tutsis also strengthened due to their identical position. Tutsis naturally grouped together in an attempt to find a solution to their predicament and in this way “*were interacting in the way of seeing how they can live in the society because the society had rejected them, they were not seeing themselves in the society so they were planning how they can live in the society*”⁶⁹. In some cases those who had fled their homes and taken refuge in other areas were assisted with money, food and clothing by Tutsis in those areas⁷⁰. However, whilst at the macro level, Tutsi bonding social capital strengthened in response to their situation and through mutual assistance, at the micro level, bonding social capital became increasingly under threat due to the distrust that became a pervasive feature of the conflict and genocide

⁶⁸ Interview with CIV1, June 2007

⁶⁹ Interview with CIV21, October 2006.

⁷⁰ Interview with XCRDF22, June 2007.

environment. *“There was a big fear of grouping together. If you were said to be a spy you would be jailed and even killed”*⁷¹. This led to the fragmentation of Tutsi groups in which trust was progressively based around smaller units.

The Tutsi were politically very weak and, as the conflict and genocide increased, and with it the threat from Hutu extremism, so too did distrust between these newly emerging micro units of Tutsi. Communication broke down between many Tutsi partially due to the extreme insecurity and the lack of freedom of movement, and also because they could not necessarily be sure that their position was not given away by fellow Tutsi in an attempt to secure their own safety. *“Everything started stopping at that time, we started living on our own, each person in his house [...] there was no more visiting between neighbours and at that time of political parties being created, you couldn't trust anyone because you didn't know what party he was in”*⁷². In such an extreme climate of distrust and uncertainty that results from conflict and genocide, it is perhaps understandable that those being persecuted chose only to trust those closest to them, reserving judgement towards others to a time when they had no other option. However, even among family units one might not be able to guarantee his or her survival. It was often the case that family members were responsible for the killings of other family members either because they were forced into such actions or because they were Hutus operating on the instructions of the government and *Interahamwe* killing husbands, wives and children because they were Tutsi⁷³. In such an environment the levels of trust are drastically diminished and with them ties that bind people together.

The effects of discriminatory vertical social capital and the transformations of bonding social capital were devastating for bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi. The discriminatory practices of vertical social capital that privileged Hutu above Tutsi served to drive a wedge between the two groups despite the fact they had previously been neighbours. As Hutu persecution of the Tutsi increased in the years between 1990-1994 so too did the distance between both groups. The government created and exacerbated Hutu fear of the RPF claiming among other things that the *“RPF were splitting wives and they remove the children [from the womb] and they peel them and make the mother of that child eat them, but they were lying to make us afraid of them”*⁷⁴.

⁷¹ Interview with CIV21, October 2006.

⁷² Interview with CIV1, June 2007.

⁷³ Interview with NURC Executive Secretary, July 2007.

⁷⁴ Interview with CIV18, October 2006.

Additionally, the government promised Tutsi land and property to the Hutu when the genocide was finished and this, in a country with severe land pressure, acted as a motivation to engage in such persecution⁷⁵. In face of this threat the Tutsi withdrew further from society and the bridges between the two communities grew ever weaker. At this point *“you could see people were not fine. In the war people couldn’t talk to each other and there were divisions”*⁷⁶. Relationships between neighbours and family members deteriorated to the point where trust was practically nonexistent and within the family *“you could say to your wife you are a snake or a cockroach, why did I marry you? You start abusing him or her, that was one of the signs of division between groups”*⁷⁷. This continued with more intensity as time went on until the point came where, *“when you are Hutu you talk to Hutus who share your ideas, when you are Tutsi you talk with Tutsis. No one trusted each other”*⁷⁸. At the conclusion of the genocide, when the RPF took control of the country, the bridges between Hutu and Tutsi had been almost completely burnt and with it the social fabric of society decimated. In the post-1994 Genocide period the new RPF government was faced with the task of rebuilding social capital throughout the country and building the foundations of the reconciliation process.

5.5 Conclusion

Rwanda offers an extremely complex case through which to view ethnic conflict and genocide. Whilst the external influences behind the conflict draw parallels with other sub-Saharan African states, internal influences and psychosocial aspects bring their own intricacies to the equation. Political fragmentation, a feature of most conflict-ridden countries, when connected to demographic pressures unlike anywhere else in Africa, coalesced to produce an environment in which distrust was rife and when psychosocial aspects of hierarchy and authority were exploited the environment exploded. Ultimately, such influences brought Rwanda along a specific path that resulted in conflict and genocide and created or exacerbated cleavages in society that will take generations to heal.

⁷⁵ Interview with CIV20, October 2006.

⁷⁶ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

⁷⁷ Interview with CIV21, October 2006.

⁷⁸ Interview with CIV1, June 2007.

The use of Stanton's Eight Stages of Genocide model supplies an ideal structure through which an understanding of the genocide process is made easier. What is important in this regard is the development of our ability to effectively analyse a specific genocide in order to ascertain its lifespan and identify the ways in which recovery can be pursued, as well as understanding its causes to ensure it does not reoccur. In the case of Rwanda the application of this model adds a further dimension to the analysis of the genocide, one that as yet has not been forthcoming. By approaching such an analysis in a structured way our understanding is developed.

The final section of this chapter brings with it the first analysis in this thesis that results from primary data collected by the author. In order to lay claims regarding the effect of ex-combatant social reintegration on social capital, it is important to consider the ways in which social capital transformed as a result of the conflict, before then examining how the social reintegration of ex-combatants may have altered it in the post-genocide environment. To this end this section provides an analysis of social capital over two distinct time periods: pre-1990 and 1990-1994. This enables a comprehension of the transforms in social capital within Rwanda, providing us with further understanding of the effects of the conflict. Essentially this data demonstrates the level of social destruction Rwanda experienced as a result of decades of political mismanagement, civil war and genocide.

Chapter Six:

The Social Reintegration Path: How it Works in Rwanda

6.1 Introduction

As apparent from the literature addressed in Chapter Two, the social reintegration of ex-combatants is particularly difficult to evaluate due to its intangible nature. As such, much literature and evaluation of DDR programmes concentrates on economic reintegration resulting in a somewhat exiguous comprehension of how social reintegration occurs and to what effect. This chapter seeks to fill this evident hiatus in our understanding and provide a foundation from which it will be possible to appreciate the impact social reintegration may have on the restoration of social capital and reconciliation.

The chapter is divided into two parts: The first part sets the scene for understanding how ex-combatants successfully socially reintegrate in Rwanda because, in order to do this, it is necessary to first comprehend the changed environment into which ex-combatants reintegrate. This part therefore details the key problems faced by ex-combatants in Rwanda. The second part of the chapter logically follows on from an analysis of the key problems by examining what is necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda. It is subdivided into three categories: macro level elements, meso level elements and micro level elements. The structure of this chapter is designed in such a manner due to the difficulty in representing the complexity of the ex-combatant social reintegration in an accurate and lucid form. Because it is not possible to explain the complete mechanism of ex-combatant reintegration, and the interrelatedness of all the component parts, as one may see it with the naked eye, it is necessary to use a linear structure that is as logical a possible. For this reason we begin by building an understanding of the immediate environment ex-combatants encounter and the potentially detrimental issues they themselves bring, usually indirectly, through psychosocial trauma or status as a member of a vulnerable group. This will provide the foundations from which we can most effectively understand how ex-combatants successfully socially reintegrate in Rwanda leaving the chapter at an ideal point from

which to examine the implications of such successes for social capital and reconciliation. Due to the interrelatedness of all the components of ex-combatants reintegration it will be necessary to highlight how these relations work together as and when the time arises in order to build the complete picture. Additionally, structuring the chapter in this way ensures a logical flow from the final section of the previous chapter through developing our understanding of the context in Rwanda at that time. The analysis in this chapter was derived from life histories taken from ex-combatants and civilians and from elite interviews with policy makers.

6.2 Problems With and Obstacles to Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration

This section addresses key issues that are problematic in the social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda. The first two are concerned with issues that influence the environment in which ex-combatants find themselves when returning to the community, while the second two relate to the potentially detrimental aspects introduced by ex-combatants themselves.

6.2.1 The Starting Position of Ex-Combatants

Arguably the greatest, and overarching, obstacle to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants is the position from which they start such reintegration. A recurrent theme among ex-combatants when asked about the problems they had experienced in their reintegration was that they returned to their communities (or indeed settled in new communities) with nothing. Invariably ex-combatants would have a low level of education, little or no training other than military and limited capacity, which, when coupled with scarce resources, familial responsibilities and possible disadvantages such as disability or psychosocial trauma, provided an unenviable position from which to start their reintegration. Despite the training they had been given during Ingando⁷⁹ and the benefits they received by way of their Basic Needs Kit (BNK), Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA) and Reintegration Grant (RG), many ex-combatants expressed a feeling of returning to nothing and having to start from zero.

⁷⁹ The concept of Ingando will be introduced in the meso level elements discussed in the next section.

In a PCE this is not at all uncommon and such was the economic, infrastructural and social damage that resulted from the civil war and genocide that most of the population in Rwanda found itself in a similar position. Ex-combatants were not alone in returning to zero with little hope of reconstructing a country. However what differentiates ex-combatants from ordinary civilians is the aspect of time. Ex-combatants who demobilised a number of years after the genocide, articulated a feeling of having been left behind; whilst they were fighting in the Northwest and in the DRC (either as members of the RDF or AGs) civilians were slowly engaging in the reconstruction of the country and developing themselves and their communities. This is succinctly encapsulated in the following quote:

When for example someone who has the same age as me and the same health we start together. When me I was fighting 15 years before he was building his own life, he was studying or something so he has reached somewhere I have not yet reached because I was doing something else and for me to reach that level he has got today it is not easy to reach where they are especially when we have low means and have no capacity⁸⁰

This is an extremely important point as although the capacity of those in rural areas may not necessarily be much higher than ex-combatants, and civilians have experienced similar degrees of destruction and devastation as ex-combatants, a difference does exist due to the time element. Ex-combatants from this study have a collective average service time of 8.2 years (7.6 years for RDF, 7.8 years for AGs and 11.4 years for FAR) thus demonstrating the relative disadvantage they may be at when they return. This problem is not so relative for ex-FAR due to the fact they either stayed in Rwanda after the genocide or returned with their families, and so began from the same point as them in terms of reconstruction and were generally relatively well educated and trained. Those in the RDF and the AGs were most affected. Ex-AGs in particular have a very low level of education, completing just a year or two of primary school, and were poorly trained militarily, which reduced the chance of them possessing transferable skills they could utilise in the community.

⁸⁰ Interview with XCRDF30, November 2006.

The fact ex-combatants return to the community in a situation that is behind that of civilians clearly puts them at a disadvantage in terms of their reintegration. Socially this can have an impact in terms of the burden ex-combatants may place on their families and the community as a whole. It can also influence the motivation⁸¹ of ex-combatants and their ability to transform their identity from that of a combatant to a civilian. For this reason adequate training of ex-combatants is vital and as such training in Ingando, associations and Community Based Reintegration (CBR)⁸² can prove to be a valuable resource and should be encouraged and promoted. If well managed, and this will include the cooperation of the community and local leaders, ex-combatants can initially piggyback on the activities of the community in order to elevate their starting position and build some capacity that will allow them to reduce their burden on the community and begin to actively contribute to it, thus increasing their acceptance.

6.2.2 Access to Land and Housing

Linked to the problem of ex-combatants starting position is the issue of access to land and housing. Rwanda suffers from immense land and population pressure and many ex-combatants do not have access to land, which reduces not only their chances of economic reintegration but also their ability to reintegrate socially. In rural areas, access to land usually equates to access to a livelihood. When access to land is not forthcoming or is dependent on securing employment cultivating others' land a sustainable livelihood is difficult to attain. This increases the burden of ex-combatants on their families and the community. It makes starting a new life problematic as their livelihood, and indeed their survival, is dependent on others. When ex-combatants do not have control of their economic reintegration it introduces problems to their social reintegration. In situations where land is unavailable the provision of adequate training may provide an alternative that will aid their economic reintegration and thus connect to their social reintegration.

Similarly, access to housing can also be problematic for ex-combatants. Many returned to homes that had been destroyed or were occupied by others. The reconstruction of destroyed houses has, in some instances, facilitated the beginnings of reconciliation as,

⁸¹ The issue of ex-combatant reintegration is addressed under the micro level elements discussed in the next section.

⁸² CBR will be discussed further in the micro level elements analysed in the next section.

for example, ex-combatants are sometimes helped by the community to build their house. By working together for a common goal and spending time together, trust begins to be established and this also indicates a willingness to accommodate ex-combatants in the community. However, not having access to a property can also reduce the possibility for access to the community. Part of community acceptance of ex-combatants is derived from their ability to contribute to the community and those without their own home are not considered stable; *“I am not stable for them, they see me as someone who can change his mind and move from this place to another place. Until I get a house that is when they can accept me. Those who have got how to build houses they have been accepted because they say anyhow he is going to live here for a while, we do not need to reject him so they start to live well with him”*⁸³. A lack of property also makes it impossible to access lines of credit and can prove to be a barrier to association membership particularly if the association is based around microcredit activities. Effectively then, the owning of a house symbolises stability and being a stakeholder in the community, a homeowner is therefore more worthy of trust than one who does not own his or her house.

Access to land and property is considered vital by ex-combatants and the community alike. Land provides a livelihood and a house provides a base; without these it is much more difficult for an ex-combatant to normalise and fully reintegrate a civilian. There also exists a danger that such a lack of access may result in a return to arms, particularly among the AGs, as one ex-FAR explains, *“someone who doesn’t have a house and where to cultivate he will become a thief in the future. When you don’t have a roof you will steal a roof, I think they should support us in those main things and then we will be ok, we will be safe, someone who cannot see the benefit of living in society he may go back and fight in the bush”*⁸⁴. The provision of access to land and property evidently has direct implications for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants but furthermore, it is also important to the sustainability of stability and security in Rwanda and the Great Lakes region, as such access will diminish the likelihood of ex-combatants returning to arms.

⁸³ Interview with XCRDF22, June 2007.

⁸⁴ Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007.

6.2.3 Psychosocial Issues

Interviews at the RDRC indicated some ex-combatants suffer from psychosocial trauma⁸⁵ and this, given the nature of conflict in general but the Rwandan conflict in particular, is to be expected. According to the RDRC Reintegration Officer around 10% of the ex-combatant community require psychosocial support⁸⁶ however the data from this research suggests this figure to be just over 25% (13 out of 50 ex-combatants). Psychosocial issues faced by ex-combatants included nightmares, anxiety, extreme paranoia and feelings of hopelessness, which resulted in anti-social and isolationist behaviour, heavy drinking and violence. Proportionately, these figures translate to 36.3% (4 of 11) of ex-AGs, 14.3% (1 of 7) of ex-FAR and 25% (8 of 32) ex-RDF being affected by psychosocial issues, which suggests the conflict and living conditions in the DRC had a significant affect on those from the AGs. This was perhaps due to the lower average age of entry in the AGs (17.7 years old as compared to 19.5 and 23 for ex-FAR and ex-RDF, respectively) and the length of active service in poor conditions with very low morale⁸⁷.

Ex-combatants suffering from psychosocial problems face an enormous struggle to reintegrate into social life: *“if someone has problems with the trauma of being a soldier it is very rare they are going to concentrate on something and progress on it, it is very rare that they are going to maintain the trust they have for the community, it is very rare that they are going to stabilise in what they are doing”*⁸⁸. However, despite the apparent difficulties faced by ex-combatants in terms of psychosocial issues, it has been recognised by the RDRC that there is a problem with the identification of such ex-combatants. Given the conflicting figures for the proportions of ex-combatants with psychosocial problems between the RDRC and this research it would appear that such recognition is accurate and, when coupled with the negative effects of such problems on social reintegration, it is apparent that the mechanisms in place for dealing with such issues need to be reformed. There exists a very need for better planned, financed and

⁸⁵ This research does not claim to make medical evaluations of ex-combatants. Rather, when discussing psychosocial trauma, I am referring to symptoms that can be expected to be known, and therefore identified, by someone who has read at a rudimentary level on the subject such as nightmares, anxiety, instability of mood, heavy drinking, violence, and paranoia, among others. Any judgement made in this regard is based on themes brought up in the life history interviews.

⁸⁶ Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006.

⁸⁷ Although the average length of service for the ex-FAR was the longest almost 50% of this was in peacetime compared to ex-AG and ex-RDF who experienced longer periods of conflict.

⁸⁸ Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006.

implemented psycho-social provision to be in place which operates for the individual and the community as all other efforts can be undermined without adequate provision within this area.

6.2.4 Special Groups

Most literature utilises the term ‘vulnerable groups’ to refer to female ex-combatants, child soldiers and disabled veterans; however the RDRC view all ex-combatants as being vulnerable and hence use the term ‘special groups’ to refer to these categories.

Female ex-combatants are generally considered to be especially vulnerable when they return to their villages, facing greater stigma than their male counterparts and being forced to return to previous roles after having fought, and in some cases led, on the frontline. In Rwanda female ex-combatants accounted for just less than 1% of those demobilised, in this study they comprised 4% of those interviewed. The RDRP recognises the vulnerability of female ex-combatants and, as such, positively discriminates in their favour in all activities including for example, special facilities during demobilisation and easier access to the VSW⁸⁹.

Neither of the two female ex-combatants interviewed (one from the RDF and one from the AGs) expressed serious social reintegration problems when they returned, although there was some difference between the two. XCRDF32 demobilised in 1997, at the very start of the first DDR phase, and was at first viewed somewhat awkwardly, partially due to the fact the community were not yet used to ex-combatants, and partially because she is a woman; *“It was very tough at that time because people were not used to seeing us and especially for me, a lady, they used to think I am not like other ladies and they were a little bit scared of me. For example working in groups like other civilian ladies it was very tough for them to accept me. And for example my way of understanding things as a soldier it was not the same as other ladies who were civilians. Now I got used even them they have seen that I am like them. Firstly something that helped me was because I was humble at that time, I used to approach them and talk to them and whenever someone was requested for a service I was able to*

⁸⁹ The VSW is a financial aid package provided to ex-combatants who are particularly vulnerable to assist in their engagement in an Income Generating Activity (IGA).

serve, I was always ready to serve"⁹⁰. As is evident, some issues did arise due to her being female; however these were not serious and, due to her effort and motivation to reintegrate, she was successful. For XCAG9 who demobilised in 2006 things were easier because the community was much more used to ex-combatant returning home and in addition, the area she lived in was rather remote and thus gave rise to perhaps a greater level of interdependence than other areas may have; this aided in her social reintegration through the need for mutual self-help.

From figures provided by the RDRC in November 2006 it is evident that 10% of ex-combatants demobilised were child soldiers. The data collected in this research suggests only 2% (1) of ex-combatants interviewed were child soldiers⁹¹. This is not to disprove the figures provided by the RDRC; rather it may indicate the sample was not fully representative according to quota. This makes it difficult to make any judgements regarding the reintegration of child soldiers in Rwanda. However, from the one interview that was conducted, psychosocial trauma was not evident, either in the answers to questions put to the individual or in his general demeanour. What was apparent was desire to keep his combatant life a secret because, *"for example when you are studying somewhere, even when I was studying secondary, when they find out you used to be a soldier other students used to be scared of you, they don't like to approach you, they feel like they have to put you there like someone who is special"*⁹². Evidently, child ex-combatants, at least as far as can be claimed by this interview, potentially face levels of fear among their peer group that may be higher than that faced by their adult counterparts.

This can have serious consequences for their reintegration, especially when we consider that, *"due to physical and mental immaturity the effects [of conflict] on children are greater [than for adults]. They require specialised attention and support during reintegration due to the trauma they face. Such trauma is beginning to translate into PTSD. All they know is bloodshed, stealing, and forest life. Nothing of community or development...[It is, therefore,] very vital to let children socialise in terms of sports, in terms of cultural activities, in terms of interaction with surrounding community. This facilitates social reintegration in terms of acceptance"*⁹³. One of the biggest challenges

⁹⁰ Interview with XCRDF32, November 2006.

⁹¹ See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the sampling methods used in this research.

⁹² Interview with XCRDF26, November 2006.

⁹³ Interview with RDRC Child Protection and Liaison Officer, November 2006.

in terms of reintegrating child soldiers then, is an adequate response to the needs a child soldier has in order to counter the isolation they experience, both through their own actions and the actions of other children⁹⁴.

In terms of disabled veterans 50% of those interviewed defined themselves as having some form of disability, most of which were the result of being shot or having shrapnel in their body. The extent of the disability varied with a range of between 30% and 100% as defined by the RDRC medical staff. Whilst being a disabled veteran had significant affect on economic reintegration, as in some cases employment was impossible, it did not seem to have any significant affect on their social reintegration other than through their problems with economic reintegration.

As will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, economic reintegration has derived benefits for social reintegration and indeed, social reintegration is made much more difficult if economic reintegration is not achieved. However, this does not seem to be the case for disabled veterans. Where such ex-combatants are unable to work they are supported primarily by their family and secondarily by their neighbours. Of the 25 ex-combatants who defined themselves as handicapped, 12 held a position of responsibility in the community thus indicating they have been accepted by the community and are seen as useful. Only 1 of the 25 indicated any serious implications for his social reintegration due to his disability. This particular ex-combatant had been shot on the penis, a result of which is that he no longer viewed himself as a man as he was unable to leave behind a family (on his death). Clearly this individual was suffering from deep trauma due to his injury and had been unsuccessful both in economic and social reintegration⁹⁵. He was unemployed, had no land or a house and as a result *"I feel like I don't want to stay with them but what can I do, I feel like I don't have anything else I can do, I have to live with that problem"*⁹⁶. Disability, in general, does not necessarily hinder an ex-combatants social reintegration in Rwanda. Although we might expect social reintegration to be more difficult due to problems with economic reintegration, this is not the case because even though disabled veterans may be a burden to their family and the community, in the sense that they have to care for them, it is a burden they are willing to carry.

⁹⁴ Interview with Save the Children Rwanda Child Protection Officer, July 2006.

⁹⁵ Interview with XCRDF28, November 2006.

⁹⁶ Interview with XCRDF29, November 2006.

Ex-combatants predictably do face some problems with their social reintegration. Most of these arise as a result of problems in achieving the necessary elements of social reintegration. These are problems that are inevitable for a proportion of ex-combatants regardless of country; however they do affect those in Rwanda particularly acutely. Attempts to remedy these problems will involve the RDRC but must also engage other actors in the process if they are to be overcome and social reintegration is to be achieved. The following section examines the factors that are necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda.

6.3 Requirements for Successful Social Reintegration in Rwanda

Of the three levels alluded to in the introduction to this chapter the first, the macro level, examines those elements from the political level that contributes to the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants. This includes political will and security and stability. The meso level considers elements of a middle order⁹⁷ nature that include demobilisation camps, community sensitisation and acceptance, and local leaders. The final level, the micro level, contemplates elements from the grassroots level such as ex-combatant motivation and behaviour, family, association membership, and economic reintegration. Each of the three levels, and the factors within each level, combine to comprise the conditions necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants. However, it is necessary to note that each level is as important to the social reintegration process as the others although certain elements within each level may play a more significant role than others.

6.3.1 Macro Level Elements

Political Will

The macro level is vital to the success of social reintegration as it invariably provides the foundation from which such an endeavour is made possible. Arguably, one of the

⁹⁷ By middle order I am simply referring to those elements that occur in between the macro, or political, level and the micro, or grassroots, level.

most essential factors from all three levels is that of political will. Political commitment to, and government support of, the reintegration of ex-combatants has been crucial to the success of the programme and also demonstrates to the population the intentions of the government. In the aftermath of the civil war and genocide, trust in the government was very low with the traumatised population understandably suspicious of government after decades of manipulation culminating in civil war and genocide. In order to achieve peace the government was required to restore the population's trust in government and thus build vertical social capital in such a way that it was not discriminatory but instead promoted the re-establishment of bridging social capital. Commitment to the successful reintegration of all three ex-combatant groups delivers a strong message not only to the ex-combatants themselves, but also to the population regarding the political will of the government to achieve unity and reconciliation.

The creation of the RDRC to design, implement and maintain the RDRP perhaps best exemplifies the government's commitment to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. It is the RDRC that supports the reintegration process and, as such, the effectiveness of such an organisation can be said to be direct indication of political will. If political will is not forthcoming it can be expected that such an organisation would be relatively ineffective, however this is not the case in Rwanda according to the MDRP Task Team Leader, "*In terms of the organisation I think the RDRC is, in the context, a relatively robust implementing mechanism. Serious political will on the side of the government and a fairly robust staffing of the national commission which is partly a translation of that political will [...] it is one of the better national commissions I've seen*"⁹⁸. Additionally, the establishment of complimentary institutions such as the NURC and the Community Development Project (CDP)⁹⁹ serves to reinforce the activities of the RDRC through the sensitisation of communities, the establishment of community-based reintegration and development activities, and a general commitment to development and unity and reconciliation. Such supplementary assistance to the reintegration of ex-combatants further demonstrates the political will of the government.

However, what is important here is how those who are affected by it view such actions of the government. In terms of the ex-combatants themselves most recognition of

⁹⁸ Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007.

⁹⁹ The CDP is a project run in conjunction with the Decentralisation programme by the Ministry of Local Administration, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs (MINALOC)

political will on behalf of the government came from former members of FAR and the armed groups who registered their surprise that the RPF government took care of them considering they had fought against them. Indeed, as one ex-FAR stated when referring to the BNK and the RSA, *“We were given that money, some people would use it to buy land, to buy a house, to buy clothes, just to start a new life and I really wondered why they gave us that money, I was really surprised. When we were given that money we were not expecting it because we were their enemies, because we were fighting against them”*¹⁰⁰. By including ex-FAR and ex-AGs into the DDR programme and providing for all three groups, the government signalled their intent in terms of the future. They have invested large financial resources¹⁰¹ into the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and have put into place additional support systems to aid this process. This places ex-combatants on an equal footing and shows them they are not being deserted thus helping to restore their trust in government.

However, although most ex-combatants communicated appreciation for the political will of the government, some expressed a belief that there was a difference between how ex-RDF and ex-FAR are treated by the government arguing that *“the government I worked for don’t recognise me as someone who used to work for them, and the government that is here now they cannot appreciate me for what I did in the past [...] You know, these people from the RDF, they have worked and now they are being paid but us, the people we used to work for are no longer here so we don’t have someone to lean on”*¹⁰². Whilst this view is that of a small minority it is nevertheless important as it represents a failure in the process that needs to be addressed. Even the presence of a minority to think or feel in this way can prove detrimental to the reintegration process and the reconciliation process as a whole. It is, however, important to note that most ex-combatants exhibit a form of gratitude towards the government, believing it is not only due to the government that they are receiving some financial help, but also that they are being accepted into the community and are secure in those communities.

Civilians too accredit the successful reintegration of ex-combatants to the government, highlighting the fact that when ex-combatants, in particular those from the AGs

¹⁰⁰ Interview with EXFAR1, June 2007.

¹⁰¹ The GoR contributed \$10 million out of the \$19 million that the first DDR programme ran by UNDP received and \$2.7 million of \$65.5 million of the second DDR programme run by the MRDP-World Bank.

¹⁰² Interview with EXFAR3, June 2007.

returning from the DRC, return to the communities it is not easy for the population to immediately trust them. The establishment of trust between ex-combatants and the communities is derived from the fact that the government has demonstrated trust in them, and that they have been assisted with a DDR programme. Indeed, it is this programme that is viewed as the most influential tool in terms of ex-combatant reintegration; *“The most effective thing I see is the government programme. They go in training, they are given money, those who want to keep studying they keep studying. I think that is the most helpful thing they are getting”*¹⁰³. The importance of the RDRP for civilians as an indication of government support for ex-combatants is evident¹⁰⁴ and this send a message of unity and reconciliation to the community that is received and put into practice, at least at a level that one may expect 14 years after a genocide.

Government support has been paramount to the success of social reintegration and to the generation of equitable vertical social capital¹⁰⁵, and has demonstrated a commitment to ex-combatants, communities and the larger objective of unity and reconciliation. This represents a crucial foundation to the success of the RDRP and the creation and enhancement of social capital by (re)establishing the trust between civilians (including ex-combatants) and government that had been destroyed during the period of conflict. Without this reintegration, social capital creation and reconciliation could not occur¹⁰⁶ and without strong political will, exhibited through government support, such reintegration would be extremely difficult to achieve. If we imagine the problems ex-combatants would encounter should the government be disinterested or unsupportive of ex-combatants and their reintegration, this point is surely evident. Whilst it is important to acknowledge the GoR’s commitment to successful reintegration of ex-combatants, it is also important to recognise that more could be done. These ideas will be discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter, and indeed the following chapter, and the importance of political will shall be enunciated further.

¹⁰³ Interview with CIV6, June 2007.

¹⁰⁴ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

¹⁰⁵ This idea will be explored in greater detail in the following chapter.

¹⁰⁶ This idea will be developed further in the following chapter.

Security and Stability

Whilst difficult to achieve in a PCE, the establishment of security and stability can be crucial in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants. Firstly, because in an insecure environment a combatant will be less willing to disarm and demobilise and ex-combatants become more likely to return to arms if they feel under threat. Secondly, because the community are likely to be more suspicious of an ex-combatant when in an insecure environment and thus the ex-combatant may find him/herself excluded from society.

It is perhaps a paradox to aspire towards security and stability in the conflict to post-conflict transition; it is, after all, the conflict that has led to insecurity and instability. However, in situations such as that in Rwanda where combatants may be disarming and demobilising whilst conflict (whether violent or political) is ongoing (AGs returning from the DRC and political suppression within Rwanda¹⁰⁷) then security is still an issue and the likelihood of this occurring is reduced if those combatants fear for their safety. Most ex-combatants from the AGs expressed a fear of returning to Rwanda, due to their military leaders in the DRC manipulating their lack of information to suit their own ends and informing rank and file combatants that they would be killed by the RDF if they returned¹⁰⁸. As security in Rwanda was established after the insurgency in the Northwest, and as word got to those still fighting in the DRC, combatants more readily disarmed and demobilised. This was due to sensitisation exercises conducted by the RDRC and MONUC aimed at informing them of the security status in Rwanda. Thus, in the case of Rwanda, it was first necessary to establish some degree of security to be able to encourage combatants in the DRC to return as the following quote indicates; *“In the country [Rwanda] the killing had stopped, courts had started, there were no longer disappearances of people and people were travelling all around the country wherever they wanted to go, that’s why I came back into the country”*¹⁰⁹. The importance of this for civilians is also evident as the return of AGs from the DRC increases the security of the country, yet without some security being established the rate of this return was low. This then indicates the paradox alluded to at the start of this section.

¹⁰⁷ See for example Corey & Joireman (2004)

¹⁰⁸ Interview with XCAG3, June 2007.

¹⁰⁹ Interview with XCAG6, June 2007.

Security and stability also enhances the likelihood of ex-combatants remaining as ex-combatants and not returning to arms. In most African countries, and Rwanda is no exception especially considering its porous borders with the DRC and Burundi, small arms proliferation is high and the possibilities to return to arms, either internally or in a regional conflict, are numerous. Ensuring security and stability, at least to the extent this is possible in a PCE, goes a long way in enabling ex-combatants to begin the reintegration process. It is by no means sufficient for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants but it is necessary. Security provides a certain amount of space in which people can think about development and cooperation can be fostered. It is in this space that ex-combatants start to rebuild their lives and actively contribute to community development, thus ingratiating them with the local community. Establishment and maintenance of the rule of law enables freedom of movement and essentially "*the fact that people don't have to worry or be concerned about being killed or dragged off for no reason*"¹¹⁰ enables ex-combatants to commit to the reintegration process.

Civilians in Rwanda also have a vested interest in security and stability as the catastrophic effects of the civil war and genocide were felt most heavily by the communities. One of the critical aspects of the social reintegration of ex-combatants, that of community acceptance¹¹¹, has been made possible in Rwanda due in part to the level of security and stability there. Communities, in essence, hold the key to social reintegration; if the community does not accept ex-combatants then it will prove impossible for them to reintegrate socially, politically or economically. The Rwandan government have introduced a number of confidence building measures¹¹² that assist in the gaining of community acceptance, however the importance of security and stability in the eyes of the community cannot be understated. When ex-combatants in Rwanda return to their communities or settle in new ones there is a period of transition of around five or six months in which the individual and the community become familiar with each other¹¹³. Particularly during this period relations can be somewhat fragile and trust is not immediately forthcoming from either party; ex-combatants are viewed with fear and suspicion by many in the community and indeed, ex-combatants may themselves be

¹¹⁰ Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007.

¹¹¹ Community acceptance will be discussed in the next subsection.

¹¹² These will be introduced in the next subsection

¹¹³ Based on interviews with DROs, ex-combatants and civilians.

fearful¹¹⁴. If this stage is not successfully negotiated there is a high risk that ex-combatants will become marginalised from society, resulting in a number of issues that threaten social cohesion such as increased psychosocial trauma, arming oneself, heavily drinking and violence. Establishing security and stability is one of the necessary measures in ensuring the potential for such marginalisation is reduced as much as possible.

In order to overcome these issues the government and the security apparatus have worked hard to ensure security and stability and, whilst they have been subject to criticism for being overly autocratic and suppressive, they have been relatively successful in this endeavour. General security has enabled AG members to disarm, demobilise and repatriate back to Rwanda and enter into the reintegration process. Likewise it has supported the reintegration of ex-combatants already in the country and has provided communities with the confidence to accept these ex-combatants back into the community. Stability of the government has also supported such reintegration and has fostered an environment of development in which the ex-combatants can engage, thus further enabling their social reintegration. Additionally, government stability sends a strong message to the population that normalisation and unity and reconciliation is possible: *“When the government is stable or when they are living well even the people live well together”*¹¹⁵. This is not to say that the GoR have got everything right or cannot be legitimately criticised and that their actions in other spheres have not undermined the reconciliation effort. However, in terms of their commitment to the reintegration of ex-combatants and establishment of stability and security¹¹⁶, the GoR has been relatively successful.

6.3.2 Meso Level Elements

The meso level elements that are necessary for the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants are those that contribute to the creation of an environment in which the ex-combatant can work towards his or her reintegration. They include the demobilisation camps, community sensitisation and acceptance, and local leaders.

¹¹⁴ This issue will be addressed in greater detail in section 7.2.2

¹¹⁵ Interview with XCRDF30, November 2006.

¹¹⁶ The importance of stability and security for development in general and ex-combatant reintegration specifically has been attested to by ex-combatants, civilians and policy maker alike.

Demobilisation Camps

Upon disarmament all combatants in the programme are taken to Ingando, demobilisation camps,¹¹⁷ to be discharged and prepared for civilian life. In the first DDR programme, run from 1998 to 2001 by UNDP, those demobilised were all from the RDF. Adult soldiers were taken to a demobilisation camp at Musenyi in the Eastern Province where they remained for two weeks, while child soldiers¹¹⁸ were taken to a Kadogo school near Butare in the Southern Province for a three-month period. The second DDR programme, run by the RDRC with the MDRP between 2001 and 2008, included combatants from the RDF and AGs from the DRC. RDF soldiers were taken to a demobilisation in Muhazi in the Eastern Province while combatants from the AGs were taken to Mutobo demobilisation centre in the Northern Province. Child soldiers from the AGs¹¹⁹ were identified at Mutobo and transferred to Gitagata where they received a three-month demobilisation and reintegration programme. Ex-FAR soldiers intermittently entered demobilisation for a two-week period throughout both stages.

Once at the demobilisation camps combatants undergo identification and verification¹²⁰ before a socio-economic profile is taken. Ex-combatants are also medically screened and, if they choose, screened and counselled for HIV/AIDs. After this the ex-combatants enter into the Pre Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP). Those from the RDF complete a short, two-week version of the course while ex-AGs take the full two month course, the logic being that those in the RDF have been in the country and are aware of much of what is taught and they do not have the ideology that many in the AGs may have¹²¹. The DPOP includes, among others, teachings on the history of Rwanda and the reasons for the genocide, unity and reconciliation, entrepreneurial

¹¹⁷ In Rwanda demobilisation camps are routinely referred to as Ingando. Ingando are solidarity camps based on a traditional practice in which the issues pertaining to the well-being of the community are discussed in an open forum. In the post-genocide environment this practice has been revived, initially to aid the reintegration of Tutsi returnees, and has been extended across the country to include post-secondary/pre-university students, politicians, released genocidaires, church leaders, community leaders, Gacaca court judges, Women's groups and ex-combatants.

¹¹⁸ This section will not cover the issue of child soldiers in demobilisation camps in any detail as this has already been covered in the preceding section.

¹¹⁹ There were no child soldiers from the RDF as they had all been demobilised in 1997/8.

¹²⁰ For the purposes of this thesis it is not necessary to discuss this process further.

¹²¹ This is the case regardless of whether the ex-RDF combatant was original RPA, ex-FAR then RDF, ex-AG then RDF or new RDF as those who joined the RDF from FAR or AGs were obliged to attend Ingando before they joined the RDF.

skills, government programmes in Rwanda and civic rights and duties¹²². The difference in Ingando length between ex-FAR and RDF and ex-AGs is both understandable and problematic. Ingando for ex-combatants is slightly different than for civilians in that it re-educates ex-combatants in preparation for their civilian life. Because of this it is possible to argue that those coming from the AGs need more time in the camps as they have spend long periods of time out of the country after the genocide and have been seen by many as a security threat. Communities, if they are to accept returning ex-AGs, need to feel comfortable with this and it is clear, as will be demonstrated, that the symbolism of such camps is not lost on the communities or the ex-combatants themselves. Problems arise when there is a difference in the way ex-combatants are treated by the government. The criticisms levelled at Ingando, as discussed later on, are not substantiated by this research; however, where criticism may be applicable is in this differing treatment of ex-combatant groups. Whilst the reasons for this may seem logical to many, to the ex-combatants experiencing this differing treatment, and to the communities who see it, a message is received. In order to ameliorate this potential problem it may be better for the minimum length of stay necessary for any one ex-combatant group to be applied to all groups. This would further demonstrate the government commitment to equality and reconciliation.

On the whole, however, Ingando has shown itself to of vital importance to the reintegration process. The socio-economic profiling conducted in Ingando is a valuable planning and monitoring and evaluation (M & E) tool through the collating of information such as demographic characteristics including age, gender, and marital status, number of children, number of dependants, educational level, health status and wealth. It also considers the perceived needs and aspirations of the ex-combatants themselves which is valuable as this provides a deeper understanding of what will be necessary in order to achieve successful reintegration. This information is also important to obtain as it enables the planning of a reintegration stage that can be most responsive to the needs of the ex-combatants.

The reintegration stage of a DDR programme is the most unpredictable and the more information that feeds into the planning of this stage, the more likely it is to be able to respond to changes in the social, economic and political environment that will affect ex-combatants. As the RDRC Reintegration Officer notes, "*the importance of this survey*

¹²² For a sample of the PDOP conducted at Mutobo Ingando please see Appendix 6.

so far is that from the study we have conducted we are trying to relate the profile after two or three years to what has happened to this person, you base yourself from that information to try and track the trend of the reintegration of that person and try to generalise to the larger group"¹²³. The profile provides a baseline analysis of all ex-combatants coming through the programme thus enabling the RDRC, and other institutions connected with the reintegration of ex-combatants, to utilise this information and adjust the reintegration component to manage any challenges it faces or to make evaluations as to its success.

Evidently, the PDOP is viewed one of the most crucial aspects of the reintegration process by ex-combatants and civilians alike. The teachings ex-combatants receive in this programme are aimed to provide them with the necessary preparation for their return to civilian life, *"in this programme they are given insights ahead of returning to the communities, about government programmes in the communities, the roles and expectations of them in the community. We are preparing them for the transition from military life to life in the community"*¹²⁴. The vast majority of ex-combatants interviewed indicated to the influence of Ingando in their reintegration, with 44% of them being highly positive about the process. Many attribute their success in reintegrating as being due to the trainings they received, *"I was taught about how to behave [in the community], they taught me about the conflicts, about unity and reconciliation. They taught us about the whole history of this country, the government programmes also. So why shouldn't I live well in the population after those teachings? There was division before and I tried to compare what was done before in this country with what we were being told by the new government"*¹²⁵. Seemingly, the aspect of the programme that proved fundamental to the ex-combatants was the teachings on what the expectations of the community were and how to behave when they returned. Ex-combatants were encouraged to live like the other civilians, to be humble and disciplined and provide a role model for the community, to engage with the community and involve themselves in community events, associations and local leadership.

Ingando also receives support from the community who consider it important in ensuring that ex-combatants return to their communities (or settle in new ones) with

¹²³ Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006.

¹²⁴ Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006.

¹²⁵ Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007.

necessary frame of mind to settle peacefully. In the transitional period ex-combatants need to win the trust of the community and they do that through exhibiting signs that they have successfully transformed their identity from that of ex-combatant to civilian¹²⁶; the PDOP is seen as contributing to such a transformation. *“I think those guys are peaceful and live well, they are hardworking men and they are prepared before they return home. They are taught about politics, they are taught about how to behave in the population. I think this is the main thing that helps them fit into the population and be peaceful”*¹²⁷. Another reason why civilians are appreciative of the PDOP is the space it provides between leaving the armed forces or an AG, and returning to the community; this is particularly relevant for ex-AGs. Because ex-combatants spend time in Ingando and are prepared for their return, during which time their family and members of the community can visit them in the camp and they can attend day visits to their communities, it creates a confidence in ex-combatants themselves and a confidence in the society¹²⁸. Indeed, not one person interviewed from all three sample groups spoke negatively of Ingando with a large majority relating to Ingando in positive terms. The only criticism that was made was that the amount of time ex-combatants spend in Ingando was not long enough¹²⁹.

The PDOP has been criticised by some for being a process of political indoctrination utilised by the RPF government to secure its position (See for example Mgbako, 2005). However, much of this criticism seems to ignore the voices of those who pass through Ingando, assuming them to have no agency in their lives and disregarding components of the programme such as training in personal hygiene, entrepreneurial skills, designing and managing development projects and IGAs, directing criticism around the historical teachings of Ingando. Whilst there may be some legitimacy in the criticisms of Ingando it is nevertheless evident that the reorientation of mentality from combatant or soldier to that of civilian has been critical to reintegration success. Indeed, the sensitisation/socialisation education ex-combatants receive in Ingando have proven crucial in shaping their ability and desire to effectively reintegrate through the provision and development of skills to facilitate the effective negotiation of the civilian environment.

¹²⁶ This issue will be covered in more detail in subsequent sections of this chapter and in the next chapter.

¹²⁷ Interview with CIV10, June 2007.

¹²⁸ Interview with UNDP Head of Justice, Gender & HIV/AIDs Unit, November 2006.

¹²⁹ Interview with CIV21, October 2006.

Community Sensitisation and Acceptance

The preparation of the community to receive returning ex-combatants has been instrumental to their acceptance and compliments the work done with ex-combatants during Ingando. The RDRC focus a lot of attention on the sensitisation of communities with much of this work being conducted by the RDRC Commissioners who represent each of the five provinces (Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern and Kigali) and by the DROs¹³⁰, along with the RDRC Public Relations and Information Officer. The Commissioners operate at the local level in conjunction with the DROs moving around their district holding community meetings in which they sensitise the community about the activities of the RDRC and the government programme for the reintegration of ex-combatants. They also hold meetings with local leaders and *opinion leaders*¹³¹ in the community such as NGOs, microfinance organisations, leaders of ex-combatants associations and others “to tell them about our [the RDRC] programme and their role as community actors to facilitate the ex-combatants to reintegrate fully”¹³². During such meetings the community are encouraged to welcome returning ex-combatants and to accommodate them into the community. This includes involving them in community activities and not excluding them from any programmes of support that may be introduced by local government or NGOs. Specifically, it draws attention to the benefit that ex-combatants can bring to the community and delivers a message of “*forgiveness, to welcome people as civilians who are going back to their civilian lives. To work together, to create activities together, not to stigmatise, not to marginalise. It’s more a message of forgiveness, tolerance and reconciliation*”¹³³. The DROs, in their daily activities with ex-combatants and the communities, reinforce this message mediating between ex-combatants and the community as and when the need arises.

Additional to this, other bodies are incorporated into the sensitisation process through their strategic position within either the political structure or the communities. The NURC works with the community and those in authority such as local leaders, teachers, religious leaders, local NGOs and businesses in a general sensitisation exercise in an attempt to foster unity and reconciliation. Whilst the NURC does not differentiate

¹³⁰ The DROs are RDRC staff in each district charged with coordinating the RDRP at the district level. They work with the ex-combatants to promote their reintegration into society and sensitise the community to accept returning ex-combatants.

¹³¹ This was a term used by the RDRC Public Relation and Information Officer.

¹³² Interview with RDRC Public Relations & Information Officer, October 2006.

¹³³ Interview with RDRC/MDRP Communications Consultant, October 2006.

between or focus on specific societal groups this process implicitly includes ex-combatants as the effective “*interaction of the community, of which ex-combatants are a part, is crucial*”¹³⁴. Other community leaders such as religious leaders also engage in the sensitisation of the community on a more general level. The Peace and Justice Commission of the Roman Catholic Church are heavily involved in sensitising communities around messages of human rights, rule of law and unity and reconciliation. By educating the community about their basic legal rights they also promote tolerance and respect¹³⁵. Such sensitisation on a general level has trickle-down effects for ex-combatants as, not only are they less marginalised as a group, but they also receive such sensitisation as a member of the community and this helps in their acceptance within the community.

In general community acceptance of returning ex-combatants has been forthcoming however there are complexities in reaching this conclusion. On the whole the sensitisation of the community, coupled with the fact the ex-combatants had passed through the PDOP, enabled community acceptance of ex-combatants. Community acceptance is based very much around trust and this is rarely given immediately. The degree of trust and acceptance achieved, and the time it takes to achieve this, depends on a number of things. If ex-combatants are returning to their family in their home community then, in the main, they are readily accepted by their family who view them as a lost relative returning home¹³⁶. Many neighbours will also accept them, however this will depend on relations within this micro-community prior to the civil war and genocide and relations between the ex-combatant’s family and the neighbours after the genocide; if these relations have been harmonious the likelihood of acceptance is increased.

Acceptance will also depend on which phase of demobilisation the ex-combatant is on. Those who demobilised in the first phase generally encountered more resistance to community acceptance than those on the second phase, due in part to the relatively shorter time between the end of the conflict and demobilisation but primarily because by the time the second phase of demobilisation began the community had adjusted to the presence of ex-combatants in the community. When asked about this difference it

¹³⁴ Interview with NURC Director of Civic Education, November 2006.

¹³⁵ Interview with CIV11, President of the Peace and Justice Commission, June 2006.

¹³⁶ The issue of family and reintegration will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.

was also highlighted by the MDRP Task Team leader who stated, *“I think the difficulty when you demob right after a war everything is raw. In certain places lots of things would be broken, trust would be low and economic growth doesn’t necessarily pick up and labour opportunities are not necessarily immediately there so there may be challenges around that”*¹³⁷. From the data collected this is certainly the case and this links to the fact that ex-combatants demobilising in the second phase, at least those from the RDF, invariably had wives in the community and took leave to return to their families thus enabling the community to familiarise themselves with their presence over time¹³⁸. However, attention should also be drawn to the fact that those reintegrating in the second phase have, to some degree, been left behind by the community as previously discussed.

The final two issues that influence the community’s ability to accept ex-combatants are those of the combatant group from which the ex-combatant has demobilised and the location of settlement. Both these issues are linked. Community acceptance of those returning from the DRC is highly dependent on the location in which they settle. Ex-AGs predominately settle in the North and West where they account for 14% and 19.5% of the ex-combatant population (in comparison to their general ex-combatant population of 10%) and in particular avoid Kigali (2.2%) and the East (3.7%). This translates into 77.2% of all ex-AGs settling in either the North or the East which not surprising given that the areas they choose to settle in are predominately Hutu areas;¹³⁹ they are returning to their home villages and are welcomed by their families and these areas were less affected by the genocide, partially due to the low proportion of Tutsi but primarily to the fact that the Northwest was held by the RPA. Acceptance of ex-AGs seems to be less forthcoming in Kigali, the East and the South, areas that were particularly affected by the genocide. For example, in the South one ex-combatant reported that there is a problem between ex-AG and the community as *“when you walk on the street you find people calling you mucengezi, mucengezi”*¹⁴⁰ and that hurts you, you say *I am not mucengezi, they are out of the country, me I have come back”*¹⁴¹. Such opposition to

¹³⁷ Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007.

¹³⁸ The issue of family and reintegration will be discussed in detail in the next subsection.

¹³⁹ These areas are also the areas in which Hutu Power had their base and so they are welcomed back as heroes despite having given up the struggle they were engaged in. There are relatively low proportions of Tutsis in these areas, around 10%, and ethnicity is still recognised, as opposed to the South and East (see appendix 5.4) so acceptance is made somewhat easier.

¹⁴⁰ Mucengezi is the Kinyarwanda word for infiltrator and is used to refer to those who fought from the DRC.

¹⁴¹ Interview with XCAG3, June 2007.

returning AGs depends very much on the area to which they are returning and their actions when they do return.

Similarly, ex-FAR also experience some problems with acceptance, however not to the same degree as ex-AGs. This is principally because those who demobilised as ex-FAR did not engage in the conflict in the DRC or the insurgency in the Northwest and are generally presumed not to have participated in the genocide¹⁴². The ex-FAR are generally well dispersed around the country although the West does seem to be their favoured location for demobilisation (27.5%) and the North their least (15%). Only in Kigali it is really noticeable that they are under-represented to any degree where they constitute 18% of all ex-combatants compared to 22.5% at the national level. The ex-RDF experienced the least problems with community acceptance and are, on the whole, well accepted by the community.

Stigmatisation of ex-combatants in the community is however evident. The primary reason for stigmatisation is fear. As one DRO stated, "*they have a problem living with people [when they first return], the population also don't feel like getting close to them, they have another view of them. It used to happen before in the first phase because there were not many demobs around in the villages but now it is happening more the population is used to them*"¹⁴³. Whilst in the immediate stage they were welcomed by their family and their neighbours, the wider community initially view them with fear and in many cases they differentiate between groups at least in the immediate stage. As one civilian from the South stated, "*You see it is a fact that they [civilians] should not trust them on the same level because one he is coming from the government army, there is nothing to be scared of him. But the other one [AG] when they come, because of what he used to do, they were against their [civilians] security or their safety and they always wonder if they have really changed. But those who have come back they have really changed, that is why they start trusting them*"¹⁴⁴. Such fear is understandable and it is only with time and familiarity that it will dissipate and trust can begin to develop. The most important influence in the process of community acceptance is the way in

¹⁴² This is because they either remained in Rwanda after the genocide or returned from the DRC soon after when the refugee camps were destroyed in 1996. Any ex-FAR suspected of participating in the genocide are identified and brought before the Gacaca courts.

¹⁴³ Interview with DRO1, June 2007.

¹⁴⁴ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

which ex-combatants behave in the community¹⁴⁵. That said, although the RDRP engages heavily in community sensitisation it is clear that in some areas the community and ex-combatants could benefit from more intensive sensitisation in order to reduce evident stigmatisation of some ex-combatants, in particular those from the ex-FAR and AGs.

However, whilst stigmatisation is reducing over time, ex-combatants from all groups are regularly marginalised with regard to receiving support from government and NGO programmes that are operating in the community. There is a perception within many communities, held particularly by local leaders, that ex-combatants are supported by the RDRC and they are therefore very often denied access to such support. This can have detrimental effects to not only their economic well-being and livelihood formation, but can also serve to create division in the community. Ex-combatants from all three groups have argued that the assistance they receive from the RDRC is part of the mechanism to facilitate their transition to civilian life; it is there to provide them with a 'soft landing' when they return to the communities as they start from a position of relative disadvantage compared to civilians in the community.

Generally when this occurs it is local leaders that exclude ex-combatants from such programmes and this can cause setbacks to the reintegration process. For one ex-AG, *"problems I am meeting is lacking jobs and in some cases when there is aid or help for civilians they don't include us saying we are different, that the Commission takes care of us so we miss sometimes that help"*¹⁴⁶. Staff at the RDRC has obviously identified this as a problem although they may be reluctant to admit that in reality it is. However, the fact that the Commission repeatedly sensitise the community and local leaders to involve ex-combatants in community development and assistance indicates the potential for this. As the RDRC Public Relations & Information Officer attests there exists a constant need *"to tell them [local leaders] about our programme and their role as community actors to facilitate ex-combatants to reintegrate fully, so they don't look at ex-combatants as another group of people, so they look at them as civilians. And if there is any support at the local level they should not exclude them saying that these people are of the Commission, they should support them as they would any other*

¹⁴⁵ This issue will be developed in the next subsection.

¹⁴⁶ Interview with XCAG10, July 2007.

civilian”¹⁴⁷. Whilst community acceptance in terms of ex-combatant presence in the community is to a great extent evident across all groups, it seems that their exclusion from certain programmes is an indication of the difficulties ex-combatants are faced with in their transition from combatant to ex-combatant to civilian. Arguably it is not until the primary identification of an ex-combatant is that of a civilian that we can state they have been completely socially reintegrated. Community sensitisation, therefore, plays a crucial role in both the preparation of the community to receive ex-combatants, and also an altering of their perceptions towards ex-combatants.

Community sensitisation has proven to be vital to the acceptance of ex-combatants by the community and in general such acceptance has been forthcoming. However, as touched on, it is the behaviour of the ex-combatants themselves that will ultimately dictate whether or not the community will accept them and, to a large degree, whether or not the ex-combatant will successfully reintegrate¹⁴⁸. A further influence as to this success is that of the local leaders who in a sense play a role of intermediary between the community and the ex-combatants. This is the content of the next aspect of this subsection.

Local Leaders

The role of local leaders (such as municipal authorities, Umudugudu leaders, Church leaders and business people) in the social reintegration of ex-combatants can be seen very much as one of an intermediary between the community and ex-combatants. In the initial stages of ex-combatant reintegration they must mediate between the needs of the ex-combatants and the demands of the community. When ex-combatants return they are, in the immediate stage, viewed with fear and suspicion. Additionally, ex-combatants themselves are often fearful when they return to the community as *“they have no confidence in themselves and they are not sure they will have the confidence of the leaders”*¹⁴⁹. Whilst ex-combatants have passed the PDOP at the demobilisation camp and the community has been sensitised to receive ex-combatants, the actions of local leaders can have a significant influence as to the success of these endeavours and ultimately, the success of ex-combatant reintegration.

¹⁴⁷ Interview with RDRC Public Relations & Information Officer, October 2006.

¹⁴⁸ This issue will be expanded in the next subsection.

¹⁴⁹ Interview with DRO3, May 2007

Where local leaders accommodate ex-combatants and assist in their reintegration two results are achieved. Firstly, ex-combatants gain in confidence and are more able to successfully reintegrate, as they have more trust in their environment and the support systems in place and engage with these systems; and secondly, the community are encouraged by the example set by the local leaders and this translates into higher degree of community acceptance and cohesion. Local leaders are the first point of contact for local affairs and, as such, it is necessary that ex-combatants feel they can approach them. By taking active steps to assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants local leaders not only demonstrate approachability and thus increase ex-combatants' trust in the leadership, but they also establish local ownership of the reintegration of ex-combatants which has the effect of generating greater trust, not only within the community as a whole, but also between the population and leaders and ensures the community as a stakeholder in the reintegration process.

Local leaders can play a key role in the successful reintegration of ex-combatants through ensuring that ex-combatants adhere to the lessons learnt during Ingando. As one ex-RDF soldiers states; *"They kept reminding us, you guys you don't have to be proud, you have to live like the other population, yes you have got a different experience other than them but try to be simple and live with them, you know how to behave with them, now you are civilians, behave like civilians. I think that has had a really great impact in me and in the demobs around here"*¹⁵⁰. Local leader commitment to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants demonstrates to the community a sense of equality and when *"the population see how they are being equally considered when they come back that helps their reintegration in to the community"*¹⁵¹. In addition, local leaders are most responsible for the sensitisation of the community to accept ex-combatants as they have the most contact with the community and are in a position to identify issues as and when they arise. This places local leaders in a relatively important position regarding the reintegration of ex-combatants.

As much as local leaders can assist in the reintegration of ex-combatants so too can they obstruct it. The benefits of the PDOP can only be realised if the environment into which ex-combatants return is the one described in those teachings. If ex-combatants

¹⁵⁰ Interview with XCRDF3, June 2007.

¹⁵¹ Interview with CIV5, June 2007.

arrive in a community with the belief that government programmes are inclusive for all groups in the community; that Rwandans are Rwandans first and foremost, Hutu and Tutsi or ex-combatant and civilian in the second instance; and that, although there may be initial difficulties, the community is ready to receive them, and they do not find this to be the case it can have extremely negative effects on their social reintegration. Indeed, as one ex-FAR says “*when you see your neighbours living well, someone who cannot see the benefit of living in a society he may go back and fight in the bush. I know a friend who left; he has gone back in Congo to fight. I don't approve, he was saying he is poor and has no future but I don't agree. People should sit and wait and follow the municipality but we need also to be supported*”¹⁵². Local leaders bear much of the responsibility of the creation of such an environment as they are in effect the grassroots implementers of government policy; members of the community turn to them in the first instance and thus they exert a considerable influence over the community.

When this influence is used in such a way that it excludes ex-combatants from programmes and activities in the community, it can have severe implications for their successful social reintegration. First, it disadvantages them, and the community, as when one of the most vulnerable groups in society is excluded from programmes that may enhance their ability to forge a livelihood and become more successfully reintegrated, self-sufficient and able to meaningfully contribute to society, this places greater burden on their family, and thus the community. Second, it demonstrates to them that the teaching they received in Ingando was not necessarily accurate and society is not completely inclusive; that they are identified as a group separate to civilians. This can result in the disillusionment of ex-combatants, which may translate to a lack of effort on their part and a threat to social cohesion. Third, it sends a signal to the community of segregation and undermines efforts toward establishing unity and reconciliation. The community in Rwanda takes its lead from those in authority and if they exhibit prejudice towards particular groups this will become apparent in the way the community respond to ex-combatants. Combined, this can vastly impede the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants, as one ex-RDF demonstrates; “*When you are demobilised you are not really a civilian. Like the day you talked with the civilians and did the PRA I was also called but they told me no, you used to be a soldier, you are not included. So you wonder yourself, many times you are told no. The man who is in charge of the Umudugudu was the one who told me. When they tell me I*

¹⁵² Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007.

*cannot do things because I used to be a soldier I don't know where to put myself; in which category do I belong?"*¹⁵³. This clearly and succinctly emphasises the influence local leaders can have in the processes of identity transformation and social reintegration. They can either reinforce the process through offering encouragement and support to returning ex-combatants, and mobilising and sensitising the community to also receive and support them, or they can undermine the process by demonstrating prejudice toward them, undermining their ability to effectively reintegrate and creating segregation in the community.

The PDOP, and demobilisation camps in general, and community sensitisation offer complementary structural practices to best prepare both ex-combatants and the community for the reintegration of ex-combatants. They are, in particular, highly influential in establishing social reintegration and thus should be encouraged and where possible, strengthened. Local leaders are particularly well placed to bring together the benefits of the two practices in such a way as to stimulate social reintegration and play a vital role in the creation of an environment that is able to accommodate ex-combatants. However, as acknowledged, local leaders can also threaten and undermine this process and as such it is necessary for the RDRC and MINALOC to coordinate their practices to ensure this does not occur.

6.3.3 Micro Level Elements

Micro level elements are those at the individual level that on a daily basis influence an ex-combatants social reintegration. They include: ex-combatant motivation and behaviour, family, association membership and economic reintegration.

Ex-Combatant Motivation and Behaviour

The motivation ex-combatants have to reintegrate, and the behaviour they engage in when they have returned are arguably the greatest influencing factors that determine the effectiveness of their social reintegration. This is linked strongly to demobilisation camps and the way they are received by the community and in this sense ex-combatant behaviour and community acceptance are mutually reinforcing.

¹⁵³ Interview with XCRDF13, June 2007.

Overcoming the initial period of apprehension and suspicion is a crucial determinant of the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants and is generally dependent on their behaviour in the community (as acknowledged by ex-combatants, civilians and policy makers alike). Many would, upon arrival in the community, present themselves to the community and local leaders asking for assistance in their reintegration as noted in the following; *“When you come back you must come to the population and tell them I used to be a soldier but now I have come back and I want to be with you. I want you to help me get developed, show me what you are doing, what you have already achieved and be humble and follow what they are doing”*¹⁵⁴. When ex-combatants made concerted efforts to get close to the community and reintegrate within it, those efforts are acknowledged by the community and this goes a long way in establishing community trust in them. Ex-combatants who demonstrated most success in their social reintegration, in terms of community acceptance, were proactive in their mentality and their behaviour exhibited this.

The notion of being humble in the community is a reoccurring one across the country and is shared by ex-combatants from all groups. Civilians also draw attention to this, expressing an ability to accept ex-combatants in the community based on such humility and the apparent desire of ex-combatants to settle peacefully. It is only in the course of taking the initiative that ex-combatants are truly successful in their reintegration and what is important is this recognition by ex-combatants themselves. Ex-combatants are returning to a changed environment and as such the onus is on them to manage their reintegration. Among many this message seems to have been internalised as the following denotes, *“I think it is not their job to come and see if they could accept me or not, it is according to how I behave towards them so I think it is my job to behave in a way that they feel free to approach me”*¹⁵⁵. This is, however, a somewhat lengthy process that requires patience on the part of the ex-combatant who is required to continually and consistently demonstrate their commitment to peace and prosperity in the community. Over time, as the community are better able to judge the intentions of ex-combatants and see that they no longer represent a threat to their security, acceptance is greater and trust begins to develop. Related to this point is the way in which ex-

¹⁵⁴ Interview with XCRDF14, June 2007.

¹⁵⁵ Interview with XCRDF30, November 2006.

combatants respond to those who have admitted to or are suspected of killing their family members. A large number of, particularly ex-RDF but also ex-FAR and AGs, returned to their communities to find out members of their family had been killed in the civil war and genocide. Potentially this can, and does, cause severe problems not only for the reintegration of ex-combatants who are obliged to be neighbours with the killers but also, in a derived fashion, to the cohesion of the community. If ex-combatants seek revenge the effects on social cohesion and security could be catastrophic. Whilst it may appear too difficult to expect, and indeed difficult to understand, ex-combatants have seemingly to some extent been able to forgive the killers or, at the very least, co-exist with them and this has been crucial to sustaining peace. When the community sees that ex-combatants are not going to use violence to solve their problems it engenders their acceptance in the community.

Becoming active in the community and contributing to community development aids their reintegration in economic terms but also, perhaps more significantly, in social terms. By being active in the community ex-combatants demonstrate a number of things: first, that they are not a burden on society and are capable of making the adjustment from combatant to civilian; second, that they can in fact be of use in the community and benefit its attempt in development; third, that they have a commitment to the community which is demonstrated through their efforts in its development and their behaviour towards the civilians of that community. In this vein then, ex-combatants who attend municipal meetings, Gacaca and Umuganda, who join associations and generally behave in a disciplined manner, are those who are most likely to be accepted by the community and therefore be successful in their social reintegration.

There are however, some examples of ex-combatants not behaving well in the community and in these instances they are not integrated into the community and can undermine some of the good work done by those ex-combatants who do make positive contributions to the community. If an ex-combatant engages in heavy drinking, crime, begging or violence they are despised and ostracised by the community. The behaviour of ex-combatants is therefore crucial to their acceptance as *“when you behave badly that is how people consider you. When you are not disciplined people will consider you as someone who is not disciplined, that is how the population is here. If you respect yourself they will respect you, if you wish to behave badly they will despise you, when*

you go stealing or you try to not be honest in the society people take you the way you are, the way you behave"¹⁵⁶. While these negative cases do occur they are not regular. However, the fact they do occur gives rise to the notion that more support, either to the individual ex-combatant or the community as a whole, may be needed.

Whilst it is evident that the behaviour in which ex-combatants engage is crucial to their social reintegration, it is also important to consider what motivates such behaviour as this provides us with valuable information as to how the design and implementation of DDR can be improved. The primary source of motivation comes from themselves, particularly among the RDF and AGs. Unless the reason for demobilisation was physical disability in the case of the RDF or capture in the case of AGs, combatants' demobilisation Pre Discharge Orientation Programme occurred as a matter of choice. This has a big influence on the way in which they behave in the community as "*when someone has demobilised he has accepted it. When someone has been demobilised willingly he knows what to do, they come into the community actively. For someone who knows what to do, who has a purpose, it won't be difficult for him*"¹⁵⁷. The fact ex-combatants have chosen to demobilise does seem to indicate a motivation to reintegrate and in a sense, a commitment to disarm represents a commitment to reintegrate. In terms of ex-RDF specifically, one civilian raised a very interesting point which he believed motivated them to reintegrate successfully; "*they are the ones who led the liberation war so I don't think somebody who took the decision to go to the battlefield for peace and the rights of people afterwards will become the one to destroy what he was struggling for*"¹⁵⁸. This is perhaps very relevant for those demobilising from the RDF but does not necessarily follow for those from the AGs, or even the ex-FAR. If it is not evident that members from these two groups will be motivated to contribute to the rebuilding of Rwanda then this surely indicates the importance of Ingando in instilling such a motivation.

Although ex-combatants may internally possess a motivation to reintegrate, this does not necessarily translate to success in the reintegration process. It is often the case that such motivation will need to be supported, nurtured and transformed into capacity. Ex-

¹⁵⁶ Interview with XCFAR2, June 2007.

¹⁵⁷ Interview with DRO2, July 2007.

¹⁵⁸ Interview with CIV20, October 2006.

combatants, whilst having the motivation to reintegrate, do not automatically have the capacity to do so and this is where Ingando comes in. The PDOP that ex-combatants complete during Ingando aims to equip ex-combatants with the required tools to be able to successfully reintegrate, this has the effect of reinforcing their existing motivation as it breeds the confidence to plan for a civilian life, and “*on an individual level he starts now to think and mapping his way, how he will move, what he wishes for his children, for his family and also for himself. When you tell him he is the one who will decide what to do or what not to do now he knows he has that responsibility*”¹⁵⁹. Ingando then plays a key role in sustaining and expanding the motivation to reintegration through preparing ex-combatants with the skills and belief necessary to be able to succeed.

Evidently, the motivations of ex-combatants have a significant effect on how they conduct themselves in the community, which in turn has a significant effect on how they are accepted into the community. This, therefore, highlights the need for existing systems to be strengthened, in order to ensure such motivations are cultivated and ex-combatants are endowed with the necessary skills to facilitate their reintegration. Much of this is based around Ingando and community sensitisation and, as discussed in the previous section, it is necessary to have effective local leaders who are capable and committed to supporting ex-combatants in their reintegration. However, whilst it is important to prepare the ground for ex-combatants, it is crucial to focus on the individuals themselves. This is the case because “*the single greatest method of social reintegration is first of all to sit with the ex-combatant who is to be reintegrated and convince him that he is the agent of his own reintegration*”¹⁶⁰. The importance of this quote cannot be understated. The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants, while being dependent in part on external factors, is ultimately decided by internal factors, that is, themselves. Whilst it is important to create an environment conducive to ex-combatants’ reintegration, and support this process, it is imperative that only a certain level of support is forthcoming or the risk of dependency becomes an issue. It is, at the end of the day, ex-combatants themselves who will be the biggest influence on their reintegration.

¹⁵⁹ Interview with RDRC Monitoring and Evaluation Officer, October 2006.

¹⁶⁰ Interview with DRO4, June 2007.

Family

Also linked to the motivations of ex-combatants to reintegrate is the family. The family provides the beginning of a social network that can be crucial to the success of social reintegration. This occurs through two primary methods: first, the family provides a support network to assist in the reintegration; and second, when the ex-combatant is the head of the home or the main provider the family provide a responsibility to the ex-combatant which may focus him or her in the process of reintegration.

When ex-combatants initially return to their communities they are somewhat vulnerable compared to the rest of the community. Invariably they would return to their family, either their parents or wife and children if they had survived or members of the extended family if they had not. In the case of those demobilising from the RDF who joined from exile, it is often argued that they are most disadvantaged of the three ex-combatant groups because they return to nothing: no land, no family and no network¹⁶¹. However the evidence from this research does not support this. Of the 32 ex-RDF interviewed, 24 (75%) of them were married and of those 16 (50%) had married prior to demobilisation and returned to their wives. Seven of the eight (87.5%) who were married after demobilisation returned to a least one family member and of the 8 (25%) who remained unmarried 4 (50%) of them also returned to at least one family member leaving the remaining four essentially without a network. Therefore, of the 32 ex-RDF combatants interviewed only 5, or 15.6%, of them had no family network in place when they returned. When compared to those from ex-FAR and ex-AGs we can see that a larger percentage (84.4%) of ex-RDF returned to a family network than did ex-FAR (57%) but a slightly smaller percentage than ex-AGs (90%). Additionally, a significantly larger percentage of ex-RDF were married prior to demobilisation than ex-AGs, 50% compared to 18%. This is slightly lower than that of ex-FAR of whom 57% were married prior to demobilisation. Although there are some differences between the three it is not accurate to state that ex-RDF returned to no family network. More ex-RDF had a family network than did ex-FAR and more were married prior to demobilisation than ex-AGs¹⁶².

¹⁶¹ Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2006.

¹⁶² It was not the intention of this research to analyse the composition of ex-combatants with families, however it is apparent that this is an issue. Whilst the numbers of ex-RDF interviewed are relatively

The presence of a family network in place when ex-combatants return to the community can be invaluable to their social reintegration. Those who demobilised from the FAR either remained in the country at the end of the genocide or they returned to Rwanda within a year or two of the genocide, usually with their families. Because in the initial stages there existed no support towards their reintegration from the government or the international community, essentially they just returned home and resumed life as subsistence farmers, which in a sense may have enhanced their reintegration prospects as they were forced to develop social networks and rely on the family networks they did have all the more. For ex-RDF there was a time lag of at least three years between the end of the genocide and demobilisation. In this period the RDF was fighting an insurgency in the Northwest however, many RDF married during this period and established families, which they visited on leave. This has proven to be extremely helpful in their social reintegration as, during these periods of leave, they were able to develop wider societal structures that remained in place when they finally did demobilise. Additionally, and evidently more importantly, the wives who remained in the community played an important role in preparing the ground for their husbands' reintegration¹⁶³. Although the community may not have had much interaction with the ex-RDF prior to their demobilisation, as periods of leave were short and infrequent during the late 1990s when the country was insecure, they did have plenty of contact with their families. When they did return they returned to a family with an established social network, "*people didn't really know me but they knew about me because they knew my family, and my children and they used to see me come on leave and go back again*"¹⁶⁴. Whilst those from the AGs may not have had the opportunity to visit their families or marry prior to their demobilisation 90% of them returned to some form of family.

The family is important in supporting ex-combatants' social reintegration as it provides an entry point into the social network and in this sense "*certainly people going back into areas where they come from and where they have family and social networks would*

high, there were significantly less numbers of ex-FAR and ex-AGs interviewed and this may distort the figures. Therefore further research may be advisable. However the proportions of ex-RDF, ex-FAR and ex-AGs interviewed are relatively accurate when compared to the proportions demobilised.

¹⁶³ Interview with UNDP Rwanda DDR Manager 1998-2001, July 2007.

¹⁶⁴ Interview with XCRDF2, June 2007.

probably find it easier to play a positive role than those who moved into new zones where they are nobodies"¹⁶⁵. This can have important implications for their acceptance in the community and their ability to find employment. Additionally, in the immediate stages where the returning ex-combatant does not have a house or land they are able to share this with their family. If this were not forthcoming the prospects of social reintegration would be considerably lower. The family also offers emotional support as many ex-combatants, in their initial period of return, experience some degree of trauma. It is at this time that they are changing their lives and they have come to discover certain members of their family or their friends have been killed. This period can be one of great turmoil and having the family around can help, through offering comfort and by providing a focus.

As well as assisting in ex-combatants' social reintegration through the methods discussed above, the family functions as a focus or motivation to ex-combatants' reintegration. Where ex-combatants return to their family it is often the case that they are the head of the household or the primary provider and this is certainly the case for married male ex-combatants. Having dependants who rely on them for their survival instils in them a sense of responsibility and a motivation to successfully reintegrate. Indeed, it was for the purpose of returning to take care of their family that inspired a number of ex-combatants to demobilise. For many in the RDF who married in the period between the end of the genocide and their demobilisation, the expansion of their family led to a desire to return. From the interviews in which it was possible to ascertain the number of dependents,¹⁶⁶ it is apparent that the average number of dependents¹⁶⁷ per ex-combatant is 3.5. The figures for ex-RDF, ex-FAR and ex-AG are 3.9, 2.7 and 2.8, respectively. Taking care of these dependents, and others in the wider family such as siblings and parents, is clearly of great importance to ex-combatants and it is often the need to feed, clothe, educate and provide a home for them and the responsibility they felt towards their family that drove them forward in their reintegration. In many instances it was necessary to rebuild family homes destroyed in the war and, when this was carried out with the help of those in the community, it aided

¹⁶⁵ Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007.

¹⁶⁶ I did not ascertain the number of dependents in all interviews due to the life history mode of interviews. Where respondents did not bring up the issue of dependents I did not probe further and these respondents were not included in the calculations. This number accounts for 8 out of 50 respondents. Where it was only apparent that a respondent has a wife and the presence of children was unknown only the wife was counted as a dependent.

¹⁶⁷ Only wives and children were included as dependents in these calculations.

social reintegration, particularly when such actions were reciprocal, through proximity, familiarity and mutual self-help.

Although the family provides assistance in the social reintegration of ex-combatants and can help in their stabilisation there can also be problems associated with this. As with the rest of the population, it is sometimes the case that the family is initially fearful of their returning relatives. Whilst initially they are welcomed as it has often been a long time since the family has seen them, once the first moments have passed the initial elation at having a family member back home is sometimes replaced with apprehension. This is particularly relevant for the ex-AGs who have been out of Rwanda for a long period of time. As one ex-AG explained, "*they wanted to check my thoughts, the way I think, the way I act, the way I walk and they didn't really, even my own family, they didn't really trust me and welcome me. Afterwards we would go and take a drink together and they got used to me and up to now we are fine but at that time they wanted to see how I behave*"¹⁶⁸. This lack of trust or restricted trust, even between family members, is understandable given the climate in which ex-combatants were reintegrating and it takes a period of time and effort on the part of the ex-combatant to demonstrate appropriate behaviour for the family to fully accept them. Additionally, the negatives effects of psychosocial trauma are more acutely felt by the family and this may affect the way in which the family respond to returning ex-combatants.

Ex-combatants also indicated difficulties in association with their families in terms of providing for them. The majority of ex-combatants have a low level of education and obtaining paid employment is particularly difficult for them. Whilst the responsibility of providing for a family can help focus ex-combatants in their reintegration, it can also become a burden due to the difficulties they have individually. Ex-combatants, attempting to negotiate a particularly volatile environment and adjust to civilian life can sometimes find providing for a family a bit too much and this can cause some tension in the family. For example, "*if you are living in your home and you are not earning and living poorly then there is already that tension within the family, if you get work in the family their social life improves*"¹⁶⁹. During such periods the burden that was initially felt by the ex-combatant can be passed onto the family who need to provide for them.

¹⁶⁸ Interview with EXAG1, June 2007.

¹⁶⁹ Interview with RDRC Community-based Reintegration Officer, June 2007.

This is particularly the case for disabled ex-combatants who are unable to work and cannot tap into the benefits of economic reintegration to help enhance their social reintegration.

Generally speaking, the family provide an additional support in the social reintegration of ex-combatants. Despite the existence of some problems associated with the family, on the whole it is crucial to the ability of ex-combatants to make their way in the community. To this end assistance given to families by the Commission and NGOs will undoubtedly aid in the reintegration of ex-combatants.

Association Membership

It is the aim of the GoR to build “*in that direction of promoting social cohesion and not only social cohesion but social cohesion that translates into economic prosperity*”¹⁷⁰ and to this end it has promoted the creation and expansion of associations across the country. During Ingando ex-combatants are encouraged to join civil associations when they return to the community, or to create their own and invite civilians to join. Associations, the government believe, will help solve many of the issues facing Rwanda today:

*The first purpose of these associations is to gather these potential and capital together. For instance when someone has less than the other they put all their resources together and all together they have the power to move forward together. The second purpose is social, it's to help these people who have been in the army to feel comfortable with those ex-combatants and for the ex-combatants to feel secure [...] the second purpose is to help socially, to meet together in harmony and peace and help each other*¹⁷¹

Whilst the primary aim of associations is to improve economic prosperity it is recognised that they contribute in a significant way to the development of social

¹⁷⁰ Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2006.

¹⁷¹ Interview with DRO1, June 2007.

cohesion in the community. Membership of an association enables community interaction in which all members are united in the pursuit of a common goal. Associations, as well as providing a common goal usually of an economic nature, create a space in which debate and dialogue can take place, a space in which negotiation is formulated. The familiarity that breeds from sustained interaction and proximity contributes to the (re)establishment of trust in society which in turn is reinforced through the associations activities; *“It [association membership] breaks, in matters of reconciliation, it breaks down the walls that were built during the genocide, people get close to each other, they are no longer sacred of each other. They have united people, those who have survived and those who have killed”*¹⁷². As members repeatedly work together, support each other, lend money to each other, share experiences and prosper economically together, it helps recreate a time prior to conflict in which the community worked as a collective and helps construct the foundations of reconciliation.

Associations in Rwanda have been created to include many different groups and to serve many different functions. There exist associations of wives of genocide victims and wives of genocide perpetrators, orphans, HIV/AIDs, the disabled, farmer, fisherman and various others. Predominately these associations engage in economic activities such as various forms of agriculture, pasturing, tailoring, environmental cleaning, and security. Many of these associations are either created by or include ex-combatants in their membership and this is attributed as contributing in a significant way to their successful social reintegration. On an individual level *“when you are in an association where there is some earnings you get through the projects you do then you are all together to benefit from those earnings. They are not very good at the highest level but at least you get something. You don’t feel lonely, you are with other people, you meet other people and you get friends. It helps bring people close together”*¹⁷³. Association membership is, evidently, beneficial financially, however the main benefit does seem to be social as such membership serves to generate interdependence and help facilitate the social reintegration of ex-combatants.

Social reintegration is assisted in three main ways through association membership: first, it brings together ex-combatants and civilians and provides a common goal, which

¹⁷² Interview with CIV4, June 2007.

¹⁷³ Interview with XCRDF4, June 2007.

promotes similarity rather than difference. Over time, as ex-combatants and civilians continue to work together and mutually benefit from such work, trust between the two develops and this continues to the point where positive relationships can be constructed and maintained. An example of this comes from an association created by a blind ex-combatant to work for blind people in Kigali; *“We are one, we don’t say you are an XC or not, we just say you are a Rwandan. We have the same aim, as most of them are blind. The association helps to get people from solitude so they are not lonely. There are some people who feel like they are discriminated against because of their blindness and it helps them get out of that loneliness, that’s how it helps”*¹⁷⁴.

Second, by pooling resources members of the association have a greater ability to survive and prosper in the market. They are more flexible and can adjust to market shocks thus ensuring the potential to be sustainable. Additionally, ex-combatants are more accessible to the RDRC when they are in an association, a factor that advantages them as individuals but also the association as a collective, as the benefit from training and support provided to ex-combatants by the RDRC is accrued by the collective¹⁷⁵.

Third, ex-combatant membership in associations contributes to the development of the community and, as such, reduces the burden of ex-combatants on the community thus demonstrating to the community that ex-combatants can be a benefit to the community rather than a burden, threat or nuisance. This is exemplified in the following, *“an ex-combatant who stays here, he has started an association of masonry. Whenever anyone is building a house they are on standby and when they are called they do and help so they are helping the society to build houses and they earn from that so they are useful”*¹⁷⁶.

Ex-combatant membership in associations generally aids their reintegration into society through the economic benefits derived from the associations’ activities in addition to the creation of a space in which dialogue, familiarity and, ultimately, trust can develop. However, that is not to say no problems exist. Local leaders, as well as the level of acceptance of the community, which, as previously identified, is controlled in part by local leaders, can influence ex-combatant membership in associations. In instances in

¹⁷⁴ Interview with XCRDF31, November 2006.

¹⁷⁵ The benefits of economic reintegration for social reintegration will be discussed in the next subsection.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with CIV5, June 2007.

which ex-combatants are excluded from joining, this can have consequential negative effects on the cohesion of the community as it usually points to, and indeed exacerbates, division within society. Additionally, being refused entry into associations effectively contributes to the economic marginalisation of ex-combatants, as they are unable to share in the benefits that accumulate. The effects of this are felt by the community as a whole due the fact ex-combatants are unable to reintegrate effectively, both economically and socially, and therefore become a burden on their families and the community. Effective sensitisation of both local leaders and the community to accept returning ex-combatants is evidently important in such cases and this, if it is carried out effectively, is a reflection of political commitment to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants.

Economic Reintegration

The successful economic reintegration of ex-combatants can have a number of important implications for their social reintegration also: first, economic reintegration decreases the burden that is placed on the receiving community thus reducing the potential for resentment and possible marginalisation. This is partially because economic reintegration reduces tensions within the family. Familial tensions that arise due to the lack of economic reintegration have knock-on implications of social reintegration as *“those who turn to begging they will be despised”*¹⁷⁷. When ex-combatants are successfully economically reintegrated these burdens on the society dissipate to some degree.

Second, economic reintegration demonstrates the productivity and usefulness of ex-combatants, which increases the likelihood of their acceptance in the community as, rather than being a burden on society, they are actively contributing to its development. This can be seen in the following; *“I am living well with the society because I started a project of digging toilets, I can dig a toilet of 20 metres and I get like Rf 20k and out of that money I hire people to work on my land and out of that money I do other small projects, that is how I am living. Even I sometimes buy drinks after and I call other people and we share those drinks”*¹⁷⁸. What this indicates is that ex-combatants who

¹⁷⁷ Interview with CIV11, June 2007.

¹⁷⁸ Interview with XCAG3, June 2007.

are economically productive and useful for the community, in this case through the improvement of sanitation facilities, are also socially accepted, as indicated by the sharing after.

Third, repeated economic relations provides a mechanism through which the (re)establishment of trust is made more possible; if economic reintegration does not occur this avenue cannot be exploited. Fourth, economic reintegration generates networks that assist social reintegration for example, through the provision. Points three and four are relatively strongly connected as the networks generated by economic reintegration can result in increased trust, which then helps social reintegration. This is demonstrated by the following quote from an ex-combatant who works as a tailor in Kigali; *“because I am a tailor when I make clothes for someone and he is glad he goes and tells people and they come, that is a link I have, this one tells another one and he brings another one”*¹⁷⁹.

Fifth, economic reintegration reduces likelihood of a return to arms thus allaying any fears the community may have of ex-combatants. The following quote is a particularly lucid example of the five positive implications of economic reintegration on social reintegration;

*They trust me because they see that I do everything, I am a hardworking man. I have a bike even though it is old and sometimes I go to Goma, I buy this local beer because there is a better quality there, people like it, and I sell and I sell cigarettes at the same place where I sell beer and I have 5 chickens at home and I sell the eggs. So when they see all those activities they trust me, I don't go and steal, I don't do wrong acts, it is a way of them to trust. Through that local beer that I sell at home people like coming and we interact, we share and we give advice*¹⁸⁰.

These points are further exemplified when considering association membership and CBR. Association membership clearly has an influence in the economic reintegration of ex-combatants as well as social reintegration, as demonstrated previously. CBR are

¹⁷⁹ Interview with XCRDF27, November 2007.

¹⁸⁰ Interview with XCRDF22, June 2007.

labour intensive public works projects operating at the district level that run from between six months and a year and comprise 50% ex-combatants and 50% civilians, the aim of which is to bring civilians and ex-combatants together to contribute to the development of the community whilst benefiting economically through job creation. Projects include rural road rehabilitation, bridge building, swamp reclamation, re-forestation, and hill terracing, among others. Members of the project teams are required to save 50% of their wages, which they receive at the end of the project, and all monies are paid into a bank account, the purpose of which is to teach ex-combatants and civilians alike about the banking and saving system. This renders members creditworthy and enables them to access credit, which previously they were unable to do. They also receive on-the-job training in various trades such as masonry and in project design and management. The intended end result is that they (ex-combatants and civilians) pool the savings they have made in order to create associations and cooperatives, utilising the skills and experience they have gained to move into sustainable employment.

CBR is an extremely useful mechanism to combine both economic and social reintegration and create tangible benefits for ex-combatants and the community as a whole. The creation of employment, which is attributed to the presence of ex-combatants in the community¹⁸¹, provides an opportunity for ex-combatants and civilians to adjust to each other's presence and develop positive relationships in much the same way as an association, as the following acknowledges:

Often when ex-combatants return to the villages they feel they are different to the people so they just keep to themselves, and also the population may not be accepting them, they feel they are different. So this brings them together and they get time to change, the perceptions change. They become real civilians, it is a way of helping them become real civilians like the rest of the population then they are accepted¹⁸²

¹⁸¹ Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2007.

¹⁸² Interview with RDRF Community Based Reintegration Officer, June 2007.

This view also seems to be supported by ex-combatants who state that the sharing of work and complaints about the work lead to the sharing of drinks after work and, ultimately, friendships.

The economic reintegration of ex-combatants has clear benefits for their social reintegration through enabling ex-combatants to make positive contributions to the community and develop trust between ex-combatants and civilians. Whilst economic reintegration helps facilitate social reintegration it is necessary to also note that this is a reciprocal relationship as social reintegration makes economic reintegration easier: first, previous social networks, when re-established, may offer economic opportunities that otherwise would not forthcoming. Second, community acceptance may increase economic opportunities through demonstrated trust. Third, social reintegration provides a security net in times of economic difficulty through increased and strengthened networks, particularly family networks. Fourth, social reintegration does more to normalise ex-combatants as civilians thus making them more productive in a civilian environment. It is therefore evident that both economic and social reintegration are mutually reinforcing and whilst the final aim of a DDR programme may be to achieve social reintegration, such an endeavour is inextricably linked with economic reintegration.

Ex-combatants, and indeed the community itself, face many challenges when they return to their communities. While macro and meso level elements are crucial to ex-combatant reintegration through the creation of an environment that can best aid this process, it is ex-combatants themselves who hold the key to their futures. Ex-combatants need to take advantage of the opportunities they are presented with and make the most of them. This is epitomised in the following:

One thing I want to say is that when you really want to do something, when you feel you have the courage to do something, you tell yourself I have to do this for my kids to grow up well so you do it with all of your heart. I can't say that I met with a bad life or a good life, I feel like I am in between [...] the life that I used to have before

*I went in the army that is what life I continue to live in after being reintegrated.*¹⁸³

Arguably this is the very aim of the reintegration process; to return an ex-combatant to the life they had prior to conflict. Any more would be to elevate them above the living standard of the community and any less would be reduce their chances of reintegration and thus run the risk of a return to arms.

6.4 Conclusion

Although the social reintegration of ex-combatants has been relatively successful for the reasons identified above, it is not without its problems and obstacles. It is important to recognise these issues in order to be in a position from which it will be possible to better design and implement DDR programmes. Many of the problems and obstacles to social reintegration are the negatives of the factors identified as necessary for successful reintegration, for example, when community acceptance is not forthcoming and stigmatisation is evident, when local leaders are not supportive instead excluding ex-combatants from activities from which they could benefit and when political commitment is not in place, and have been addressed in the previous section. However, the social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda thus far has been relatively successful.

Social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda can be understood through the analogy of a painting. Macro level elements are akin to the canvas; the combination of political will and security and stability provide the foundations from which social reintegration is made possible. Without these the successful social reintegration cannot be fully realised as all aspects of the process are undermined before they really begin. Meso level elements can be compared to the outline of the painting; together demobilisation camps, community sensitisation and acceptance, and local leaders create and prepare the environment for successful social reintegration to take place. If these elements are not forthcoming there is little direction or structure to social reintegration and any successes that are achieved are partial and leave gaps that could undermine the whole

¹⁸³ Interview with XCRDF27, November 2006.

process. Micro level elements represent the colour; the union of ex-combatant motivation, the family, associations and economic reintegration operate at the grassroots level to negotiate the environment that has been made possible and created by the macro and meso level elements. If any of these aspects are absent the painting will remain incomplete.

The three levels of social reintegration identified and analysed in this chapter are interdependent. For successful social reintegration to occur it is not only necessary that the elements within each level are present, but also that they function together to represent a whole. If one or more of the elements is missing, it will weaken the social reintegration process as a whole. Certain elements - political will, community sensitisation and acceptance and ex-combatant motivation - may be more crucial to the process as a whole and would result in greater damage overall if they were absent. However, the non-existence or susceptibility of other elements from all levels will also undermine the process, to the point that that the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants remains elusive.

Such is the fragility of the whole social reintegration process, certainly in its infancy, that even the presence of the elements identified in this chapter do not entirely ensure social reintegration will be successful. There are a number of isolated problems with, or obstacles to, the successful reintegration of ex-combatants that can conspire to destabilise the process. These obstacles – the starting point of ex-combatants, access to land and housing, psychosocial issues and special groups – can, in part be ameliorated through the achievement of the identified elements. However, in order to effectively manage them it will take the introduction of other actors and stakeholders in the process.

The next chapter presents an analysis of the way in which ex-combatants socially reintegrate in terms of what is necessary to make this process successful. In doing so it provides the foundations from which an analysis of the implications social reintegration has for the restoration of social capital and reconciliation.

Chapter Seven:

The Impacts of Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration on Social Capital and Reconciliation

7.1 Introduction

The previous chapter provided an analysis of the social reintegration of ex-combatants. This is of particular importance as, if one is to understand the effects of social reintegration on social capital and reconciliation it is first necessary to appreciate how such reintegration takes place. As is evident from chapter six, the process of ex-combatant reintegration is multifaceted and therefore the effects of such a process on the restoration of social capital and promotion of reconciliation will be highly complex.

Beginning with a consideration of reconciliation in Rwanda this chapter endeavours'' to assess the contribution of ex-combatant reintegration to this process. By first examining this aspect it is more possible to understand the ways in which ex-combatant reintegration aids the process. The chapter then investigates how ex-combatant social reintegration affects social capital. This consists of a consideration of vertical, bonding and bridging social capital and the interrelatedness of the three. Having identified such affects the chapter moves on to an analysis of ex-combatant social reintegration and its effects on reconciliation. In this part of the chapter, reconciliation is divided into political and social reconciliation. The conclusion will then draw together the key lessons learned from this chapter in order to allow a full consideration of the research question.

7.2 Reconciliation in Rwanda

When considering reconciliation in Rwanda one may be forgiven for questioning whether, after the destruction of the civil war and subsequent genocide, such an achievement is possible. The process of reconciliation begins in a climate of distrust,

suspicion and even hatred. There is often a simplistic assumption that reconciliation entails the bringing together of two or more conflicting groups in order to work through and reconcile their differences. However, as demonstrated in the final section of chapter six, violent conflict has changed the identity of these groups, and the way in which they relate to each other, through its effects on social capital and thus the environment in which reconciliation takes place, and the actors involved in the process have undergone marked transformation. In terms of the literature regarding reconciliation most concentrates on the issue of transitional justice and, in the Rwandan case in particular, the Gacaca process. However, this section considers the way in which reconciliation is pursued at a community level and to this avail it will link very strongly with the previous analysis of the restoration of social capital in the post-genocide period as the indicators for such a restoration are transferable to the reconciliation concept.

Reconciliation has been high on the agenda of RPF government since they took power in 1994 and a number of measures have been introduced in the pursuit of this endeavour. However, in order to accurately evaluate their success it is first necessary to consider the position the government found itself in 1994. As previously noted, bridging social capital had been destroyed throughout the conflict and genocide as a result of years of discriminatory vertical social capital practices. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that reconciliation in Rwanda must not only take place between Hutu and Tutsi; it is an altogether more complex phenomenon. Indeed, as the Executive Secretary of the NURC emphasises:

Reconciliation in Rwanda is looking at different facets; it is not only Hutu/Tutsi. There was a time when you had division between the Hutus, from the South, from the North, from the East. Then you have the aspect of victims and perpetrators of genocide, then you also have people living in the country and returnees. There has been a lot of suspicion even at the family level [...] The genocide was so complicated. Sometimes it was within households or neighbours killing another neighbour. And you know there had been a lot of intermarriages between Rwandese so someone betraying a cousin, so

*complicated to understand. It's not only the Hutus and Tutsis reconciling, it's more than that.*¹⁸⁴

When we take into account this point, it becomes more apparent just how difficult reconciliation in Rwanda is to achieve. Moreover, when we add to this equation the presence of ex-combatants from the three different groups, the return of Hutu refugees from the DRC, IDPs within Rwanda, orphans, widows and the disabled, the complexity of this situation grows all the more. As a result of this complexity the question may arise as to whether or not reconciliation is desirable; however it is evident from the data that in the Rwanda context the answer to this question is a resounding yes. There is a general view that *"whether we like each other or not we have to live together because we are in the same field, the same hill, almost the same house as your neighbour"*¹⁸⁵ and as such *"there was a challenge between survivors and perpetrators and also between people who returned, people had to rebuild their lives and to live together and become one nation"*¹⁸⁶. In response to the need for reconciliation the GoR established the NURC in 1999 with a mandate to promote the unity and reconciliation of the Rwandese people. The NURC engages in civic education, conflict mediation and provision of support to communities¹⁸⁷.

Whilst the NURC is charged with the promotion of unity and reconciliation, it has no legal mandate and as such cannot investigate previous human rights abuses or hold people to account for atrocities either before or during the genocide. Instead, the creation of the ICTR and the Gacaca courts¹⁸⁸, as well as the strengthening of existing national courts, is mandated to carry out these functions. The ICTR and national courts deal with category one cases while Gacaca deal with category two, three and four¹⁸⁹. The implementation of the Gacaca court system was another of the GoR's initiatives to help generation reconciliation. A third major initiative by the GoR was the Decentralisation Programme, which began in 2000 and included Administrative

¹⁸⁴ Interview with NURC Executive Secretary, July 2007.

¹⁸⁵ Interview with RDRC Coordinator

¹⁸⁶ Interview with researchers at the Centre for Conflict Management, National University of Rwanda.

¹⁸⁷ For an in-depth analysis of the activities of the NURC please see the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) Final Report (2005).

¹⁸⁸ See Chapter Three for a discussion on Gacaca Courts.

¹⁸⁹ Category 1 crimes – planners and organiser of the genocide, killings of particular fervour and sexual crimes – are tried by the ICTR and National Courts; Category 2 crimes – Killing or intending to kill under direction of others – are tried by the District-level Gacaca; Category 3 crimes – those involving bodily injury – are tried by the Sector-level Gacaca; and Category 4 crimes – property crimes – are tried by the Cell-level Gacaca.

Territorial Reform. This, in effect enabled greater public participation in the policy making process and overall developmental direction taken by Rwanda and thus helped to foster trust in the government, thus aiding the reconciliation process.

Reconciliation is an extremely unpredictable process that is dependent on a number of interrelated factors. Specific to Rwanda, when one is attempting to evaluate the level of reconciliation¹⁹⁰, two issues in particular should be taken into consideration: first, the nature of the civil war and genocide, as discussed in chapter six, had devastating effects on the society as a whole thus making any attempts of reconciliation all the more difficult. Second, at the time of writing it has only been 14 years since the genocide, which is an exceptionally short period of time when considering what level of reconciliation one might expect in such an environment. Both these issues should be factored in to any analysis of reconciliation in Rwanda today. That said it is important to give full regard to the efforts and progress that has been made to date.

The process of reconciliation in Rwanda has, over the past 14 years, slowly taken shape. In the immediate aftermath of the genocide the returning Tutsi exiles controlled the country and a great number of Hutus had left Rwanda for the DRC. During this time the country was not secure, suffering from insurgency in the Northwest and general insecurity as Hutu extremists within Rwanda and from the refugee camps in the DRC attempted to destabilise the government and take back the country. Fear and distrust were still relatively high and, between the Tutsi, there was a process of normalisation in progress between the returnees and those who remained. The government's primary objectives were to ensure the security of the country and attempt to get the economy functioning again, which meant their focus on reconciliation at this time was, in a sense, minimal. Whilst they advocated for reconciliation to occur this could not be reinforced with effective community initiatives. It was not really until security had been established in the country and the refugees returned to Rwanda that the reconciliation process could really get underway with the full support of the government, however this brought with it a paradox; whilst the security that was necessary for reconciliation to progress had been established, the return of so many refugees added another layer to the PCE thus further complexifying the reconciliation process.

¹⁹⁰ An endeavour which in itself is extremely difficult, due to its particularly subjective nature.

In the communities prior to the refugee return relations differed according to location. In some places cooperation was relatively high with people sharing and helping each other as they needed it. However, over the majority of the country “*after the genocide people no longer trusted each other, right after the genocide, because of what they went through. People were scared that others might kill them, there was no trust. After security kept on being strengthened through police station and the government kept on teaching about unity and reconciliation it kept changing slowly by slowly*”¹⁹¹. Certain places in Rwanda were affected more than others during the genocide and in these places reconciliation has been harder to achieve. In the South and East levels of trust were exceptionally low and communities did not cooperate straight away. As security was established and the government continued with its message of unity and reconciliation the population began functioning more effectively and people cooperated more readily.

With the creation of the NURC in 1999 community initiatives to promote unity and reconciliation really took off and the process gathered pace. Whilst during this time it would not be accurate to claim reconciliation had been achieved one could make a case for some level of co-existence. As Rwandans began to rebuild their communities they turned to traditional practices to aid the process. The table below illustrates the results of PRA exercises aiming to identify community activities that increase feelings of solidarity, improve communication and promote civic mindedness.

Community Event	Effects
<i>Ubukwe</i> (wedding)	Sharing food/drinks, gift giving, dancing, exchange cows; Affects around 300;
<i>Kubatirisha</i> (baptism)	Feast/drinking after church. God-parents give speech and offer gifts and rosary beads/bible, feast again; Around 50 attend
<i>Gusohora Umwana</i> (baby naming ceremony)	On 8 th day after birth people gather to eat, drink and celebrate. Involves everyone there; Medium affect
<i>Kugabirana</i> (communal feast & drinking)	Exchange of cow and continued eating at recipient's house
<i>Kuva Ku Kiriliyo</i> (mourning stage after death - length dependent on age - Young = 7 days, old = 1 month)	A means of support, collection of money to enable activities throughout the period; Affects whole community and beyond
<i>Guhingisha</i> (sharing drinks after working on	Develops unity, cooperation and efficient working; Effect is smaller but very strong within

¹⁹¹ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

others' land)	the group
Umuganda (communal cleaning programme)	Takes place on last Saturday of the month – everyone works together then drinks in the afternoon; Affects the whole community
Gacaca	Promotes Unity & Reconciliation, share information about the past (communication), forgiveness. Maximum affect, whole community and country.

Table 3 – Reconciliatory Community Events: Author.

Additionally, informal networks of exchange (Kugabira¹⁹² and Ubudehe¹⁹³) and various associations¹⁹⁴ indicate a high incidence of behaviour born out of a need for mutual assistance and reciprocity that help foster and reinforce solidarity, cooperation and trust. Such behaviour developed over time and was actively encouraged and supported by the government who implemented various programmes such as Ingando and Gacaca. In terms of the population it was the general perception that things had improved, that people were living well and society was functioning and a lot of this was attributed to the government, which was seen as strong and sincere.

Despite the progress made there are a number of problems. There still exist sectarian mentalities and some degree of social exclusion. One female civilian, a Hutu whose Tutsi husband was killed in the genocide, described how both sides excluded her in her area saying, *“They killed my husband. I don’t understand, I am rejected on both parts, I am rejected by Hutus and Tutsis, how is it that I am living badly?”*. She then became hysterical and directed the following statement at the Tutsi translator, *“You are the one, if I tell you what are you going to do to me? You are one of those people who are hurting me; you are all the same, why are you all hurting me? Why am I living this way? I used to love my husband, why am I being hurt in this way? Ask the government, why are they helping only some?”*¹⁹⁵. This indicates a number of issues: first, there exists some degree of division, at least between some people. This woman believed herself to be rejected by her family for being married to a Tutsi and rejected by Tutsi for being a Hutu. Second, there is, among some, fear of the other group. Third, the very fact that people still talk in “us and them” terms indicates the government policy of being

¹⁹² Kugabira is the cultural exchange of cows that takes place within the community and promotes reciprocity mutual interdependence. For further information please see Gravel (1967).

¹⁹³ Ubudehe is government promoted traditional practice involving collective action in the community to assist the most vulnerable and reduce poverty. For further information please see Joseph (2008).

¹⁹⁴ See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3

¹⁹⁵ Interview with CIV17, October 2006.

Rwandan rather than Hutu or Tutsi has not been fully internalised by all. Four, there is a belief that the government favours Tutsi which thus undermines the reconciliation effort. Whilst these beliefs do not appear to be widespread there is sufficient evidence to suggest that there still remains a problem. This, coupled with the fact that genocide witnesses and survivors often live in fear of death, indeed many have been killed¹⁹⁶ resulting in reprisal attacks and a number of deaths in custody of genocide suspects have taken place¹⁹⁷, indicates the problems that still exist. It is therefore perhaps necessary to ask 'Is this true reconciliation?'

Whilst the problems that are apparent within Rwanda are not widespread it is clear that what is occurring in Rwanda is not 'true' reconciliation. However it is of paramount importance to also state that neither should it be. Reconciliation is a process that takes a significant amount of time and cannot be expected to be completed within 14 years. Given the scale and nature of the death and suffering in Rwanda it would be unreasonable to expect Rwandans to be reconciled at this point in time. However, despite the negatives in the country there has been much progress. A number of expatriots working with the World Bank and United Nations and having lived in Rwanda for a number of years made reference to the Rwandan culture as having made this possible. One in particular stands out,

One of the big positive factors is the generally very strong social fabric in Rwanda even though shattered. That group thinking and not individualistic thinking is a very big advantage. You wouldn't leave out anyone in the community even if you hated that person. It wasn't the case that everyone loved each other in '94, they probably still don't. But the thing is because you are together in one place and because you think you belong you stay in a house next to each other and you still talk to each other.¹⁹⁸

Rwanda is in the process of reconciliation and has made significant gains towards this end but overestimating its success thus far could be dangerous as it obscures the truth. The NURC, created to promote Unity and Reconciliation has been essential in this

¹⁹⁶ For more information on this see Human Rights Watch and African Rights among others.

¹⁹⁷ See following Human Rights Watch report - <http://hrw.org/reports/2007/rwanda0707/6.htm>

¹⁹⁸ Interview with UNDP Rwanda DDR Phase One Manager, July 2007.

endeavour and can arguably claim to have been successful in establishing a significant level of unity thus far. This is important for reconciliation as it builds the foundation for continued reconciliation:

Unity is more about political reconciliation I would say: the reintegration of refugees; the reintegration of ex-combatants; the abolition of identity cards that were so discriminatory; equal access in terms of opportunities for education, for jobs; the civic education programmes; the inclusion; the power-sharing. I think all that has been reached and what needs to be done is to consolidate it. But what also needs to be done is to ensure that communities own it because at the end of the day you want sustainability and sustainability comes from the people not from the government.¹⁹⁹

Political reconciliation can be claimed to have been very successful. There is still more that needs to be done, such as the broadening of the power-sharing government, but significant progress has been made. Likewise significant progress has been made in social reconciliation; however it is this area that is the most problematic due to the devastation of the genocide. Nevertheless, as political reconciliation deepens it acts as a driver for social reconciliation and it is possible to move from a position of co-existence and build even more positive relationships. It is necessary to reiterate an earlier point at this juncture: Experience show that the progress that has been made in Rwanda regarding social reconciliation and reconstruction has, as demonstrated by interviews, PRA exercises and observations in the field, for all its problems and faults been remarkable. The question that remains for this chapter to answer is: ‘What are the implications of ex-combatant social reintegration on social capital and reconciliation?’

7.3 Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and Social Capital

The section begins with a discussion of social capital restoration in the post-genocide period and combines this with the analysis of the macro, meso and micro level elements of ex-combatants’ social reintegration as considered in the previous chapter, to provide a more comprehensive understanding of how the social reintegration of ex-combatants

¹⁹⁹ Interview with NURC Executive Secretary, July 2007

impacts on the restoration vertical social capital. This begins by first examining the transformation in social capital in the post-genocide period and progresses to a consideration of how ex-combatant social reintegration affects vertical social capital before then progressing to an analysis of bonding and bridging social capital.

7.3.1 Social Capital in the post-1994 Genocide Period

In the immediate aftermath of the genocide the restoration of social capital proved to be extremely difficult. Not surprisingly, in a climate of fear, distrust and insecurity, there still existed great division between Hutu and Tutsi. As a result of the civil war and genocide Rwandan society had been fundamentally altered. With up to 800,000 people killed in the genocide, 2 million refugees into neighbouring countries, 130,000 detainees in the national prison system, 700,000 returning Rwandan expatriates and 650,000 alleged participants in the genocide, the challenge facing the RPF government was enormous. Because bridging social capital had been devastated, primarily through the discriminatory vertical social capital practices of the previous regime, the path that the RPF government chose to take would prove vital.

In the years immediately following the genocide Rwanda still experienced a certain degree of insecurity due to the insurgency in the Northwest from the FDLR in the DRC. At this time *“the population, it was not fine. There were troubles because some people were supporting the infiltrators and some people were supporting the RPF”*²⁰⁰. As a result the government concentrated on the securitisation of its borders and crushing the remnants of the genocidal ideology. At this point intercommunal trust was still very low, as one civilian claimed, *“There was no trust, people really feared each other because you could not tell if this one had killed or not killed, you couldn’t tell if this one would kill you or not. When you were returning you couldn’t tell what would happen and people were emotional, you had lost everything, even your relatives, so it was not easy to trust”*²⁰¹. It was apparent that security was an important issue and would define the process of social capital restoration. The suspicion, trauma and distrust among large proportions of the population meant that any efforts to rebuild security would have to take into account the fear of continued killing and revenge killings²⁰².

²⁰⁰ Interview with XCAG5, June 2007.

²⁰¹ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

²⁰² Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

At this point bonding social capital within the two groups was also somewhat weak. Among the Tutsi there were a large number of orphans, widows and disabled who experienced varying degrees of trauma and had very low levels of trust. However, due to the precariousness of their position they were forced to attempt to rebuild their lives with those around them²⁰³. Additionally, a large number of exiled Tutsi returned to Rwanda to find their relatives killed and their property looted or destroyed. Among this group of returnees it was common to see groups being established according to previous networks²⁰⁴. Whilst this may have initially added to the complexity of bonding social capital among the Tutsi, over time these networks became more established and the ties that bound people together, though they may have been based on negative connotations, began to develop. In this same period bonding social capital between Hutu was also problematic. To begin with many Hutu had left the country as the RPF took control and this, coupled with the fact that the Hutu were not really able to have any political say in the country, meant that bonding social capital was weakened²⁰⁵. Additionally, *“on the part of Hutus they were not so strong because those who stayed behind they were still ashamed of what their group did and they could not interact between themselves easily, they still had that shame”*²⁰⁶. The present government, often criticised for being too autocratic, are evidently wary of the risk of further ‘ethnic’ trouble and there is the general feeling that their grip on the security apparatus of the country would not allow conflict to break out again. In this way bonding social capital between the Hutu is unable to develop again to overly strong levels.

As security became increasingly established within Rwanda the government began attempts to foster bridging social capital. Over time, because the government would not tolerate revenge attacks and encouraged the community to live together, trust between the groups increased: *“things kept on changing slowly, slowly, slowly until Tutsis wanted to live well with Hutus. I remember at first Tutsis had that spirit of revenge, that anger. But because the government was not supporting it they kept on changing”*²⁰⁷. Government policies such as the creation of Gacaca courts, focus on association memberships, development programmes, and the establishment of institutions and

²⁰³ Interview with CIV9, June 2007.

²⁰⁴ Interview with CIV21, October 2006.

²⁰⁵ Interview with UNDP Rwanda DDR Manager 1st Phase, July 2007.

²⁰⁶ Interview with CIV21, October 2006.

²⁰⁷ Interview with CIV6, June 2007.

social initiatives aimed at social cohesion have had some effect in developing trust and increasing cooperation and communication. It is, however, apparent that such trust is fragile and there remains a lot to still be done. Whilst the government remain committed to nurturing trust within the community and maintaining security the indication is there that bridging social capital can develop further. However what is crucial to this process is that the government ensure equality in their policies and do not engage in discriminatory vertical social capital, as this will ensure that the foundations for bridging social capital can never truly develop.

As security is maintained and the benefits of government developmental programmes come to fruition for Hutu and Tutsi alike, co-existence is made easier and bonding social capital transforms from being based around ethnic groups back towards geographical communities. The establishment of the *Umudugudu*²⁰⁸ locates the community together around a centre in which “*even the way people are living is helpful, it helps security, the hospital, water, schools, many things are now close*”²⁰⁹. Whilst a return to the period in which bonding social capital was more based around geographical communities and bridging social occurred between those communities is undoubtedly a long way away, it nevertheless appears to be the direction the government are moving in.

During the fieldwork stage of this research PRA exercises were conducted in three rural sites²¹⁰. The exercises relative to this section included social network mapping, institutional diagramming and social capital indicators. From both the output of these exercises and observations made throughout the process it is apparent that in comparison to the situation at the end of the genocide, the restoration of social capital has been somewhat successful. In terms of vertical social capital it would appear that the relationship between the state and the community has strengthened. This is apparent when we consider the results of the Institutional Diagramming in which between 66% and 83% of institutions in the community that were regarded as being of most importance are provided and maintained by the state. These included: hospitals, markets, schools, the municipality, government-run associations, Gacaca courts, the

²⁰⁸ The *Umudugudu* is the lowest level of the municipality – province, district, sector, cell, *Umudugudu* – and ranges from ten to fifty households which would include anywhere up to 500 people. The word *Imidugudu* is also often used and refers to the singular. *Umudugudu* is therefore the plural.

²⁰⁹ Interview with CIV6, June 2007.

²¹⁰ Although the research was conducted in each of the four rural provinces I was unable to conduct PRA activities in the West.

police, a military base, and Mutobo Demobilisation centre²¹¹. As is evident, these institutions provide development, leadership and security. For communities to identify these as the most important institutions to their lives gives an indication as to what is most important to the community and the trust they have in the leadership. This is further reinforced when we take in account the result from the Social Capital Indicators, which clearly reveal that the community trusts both local leaders and the national government and there exists significant support for government programmes²¹². Additionally, within this exercise criticism was levelled towards certain aspects of government programmes and this further demonstrates a trust in government, as community members feel comfortable enough to be able to criticise the government.

Evidence also suggests that bridging social capital is also being re-established. Social Network Mapping indicates that households within, and between, Umudugudus engage in the reciprocal exchange of water, food, information, tools, money, salt, wood, labour and petrol²¹³. This demonstrates a level of trust within the community. Initially such exchange took place out of necessity however, over time, with increased interaction and communication, trust developed and exchange took place based upon the relationships that became established. What made it possible for such relationships to develop was a combination of community events, informal networks and associations that engendered trust, social cohesion and collective responsibility²¹⁴. Community events such as weddings, baptisms, baby naming ceremonies, communal feasts, Umuganda²¹⁵ and Gacaca provide a space in which community members gain familiarity with their peers through proximity and, over time, are able to develop relationships within the community. Similarly, associations based around economic activity and social and sporting activities helps to develop support networks, increase reciprocal exchange and solidarity and cohesion. Ultimately these associations stimulate self-help, mutual-help and interdependence, thus assisting in the establishment of bridging social capital²¹⁶.

Observations made during the PRA exercises further supports these claims. Throughout the process, debate arose as was to be expected and in some instances certain

²¹¹ See appendices 4, 4.1 and 4.2.

²¹² See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3

²¹³ See appendices 3.0, 3.0a, 3.0b, 3.0c, 3.1, 3.1a, 3.1b and 3.2

²¹⁴ See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3

²¹⁵ Umuganda is a communal cleaning programme that takes place on the last Saturday of the month during which the community works together to clean their locality and then shares drinks in the afternoon.

²¹⁶ See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3

individuals dominated the discussion. However, rather than this being based along ethnic lines it seemed that gender and age were the main criteria for authority with older men in the group being more dominant. Nevertheless, as a whole the groups worked well together, supporting each other's understanding until consensus was reached. This indicates not only relatively harmonious relations in the community, but also the effective management of conflicts as and when they arise. Although this cannot be generalised to more serious conflicts, the fact that the group negotiated among itself and came together to reach agreement bodes well for the establishment of social capital and conflict management techniques.

Whilst progress has been made the situation is far from perfect. However, as the following quote from a Hutu priest from the Western province indicates, there is evidence to suggest that the hope for a united Rwanda is not completely misguided:

Among the people there was fear and a lack of trust that had been generated by the war and conflicts that had taken place but after a while, when people saw there was progress they started sharing, they were sharing activities, people were coming from abroad and other regions, people started working together and you saw that things were improving slowly. What I can tell you is that when you see people working together on the hills they help each other without trying to see which group he or she belongs to, I think that is a step towards unity and reconciliation. I cannot say unity and reconciliation is perfect but we have reached somewhere²¹⁷

Social capital in Rwanda has been restored to some degree. Whilst the government can be criticised on certain grounds, the discriminatory vertical social capital so readily practiced by the previous regime does not define state-population relations in Rwanda today. Bonding social capital amongst both Hutu and Tutsi is not so overly strong that it could lead to the re-emergence of the "us and them" mentality that was so damaging to Rwandan society²¹⁸, and it is transforming to become based around ties other than ethnicity. Bridging social capital, the variant of social capital damaged the most

²¹⁷ Interview with CIV10, June 2007.

²¹⁸ Unless discriminatory vertical social capital practices re-emerge resulting in a manipulation of bonding and bridging social capital.

throughout the civil war and genocide, is developing between Hutu and Tutsi but also between newly emerging identity groups. Indeed, the situation is not perfect and the process is not complete but what is important to note is the relatively short time between now and the end of the genocide and the progress that has been made in such a short time, in such dire conditions and from such a devastated starting point. The remainder of this section examines how the social reintegration of ex-combatants has augmented such a transformation in social capital.

7.3.2 Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and the Balancing and Strengthening of Vertical Social Capital

As previously discussed, vertical social capital in Rwanda had been of a discriminatory nature favouring first the Tutsi over the Hutu in the colonial period and then the Hutu over the Tutsi from independence onward. In the independence period the discriminatory nature of vertical social capital led to a complete breakdown in trust between Tutsi and the Hutu government and between Hutu and Tutsi in the population. The loss of organisational integrity within government gave rise to inefficiency within governmental, economic and social systems, and the population as a whole suffered whilst the Tutsi found themselves the scapegoat for such a collapse in society. State-community relations became manipulative toward Hutu and persecutory toward Tutsi.

With the transfer of power to the victorious Tutsi in 1994, vertical social capital transformed again. The Hutu, even if they realised the depth of their manipulation by the previous regime, had a distrust of the Tutsi government fearing reprisal for the genocide. The Tutsi who remained and survived in the country were also initially apprehensive as their experience of government had been negative. With all forms of social capital having become distorted out of all recognition as a result of the genocide, and the hierarchical and obedient nature of Rwandan society, the State, as the ultimate provider of public goods and the final arbiter and enforcer of the rule of law as well as being the actor most able to facilitate enduring alliances across the boundaries of class, ethnicity, race, gender, politics, and religion, clearly became the focal point for any sustainable reconstruction effort. Herein lays the paradox.

The State, critical for the entire reconstruction of Rwanda, lacked credibility and trust among the majority of the population. Social interaction is shaped by both the social

and political environments; however, due to the relative paralysis of the social environment such social interaction had to be driven by the State. In order to be able to function effectively as a government it would be necessary to behave in such a way that it very specifically included all aspects of society in order to gain the trust of the population as a whole, thus rebuilding vertical social capital between the State and all elements of the community, whilst also moving to negate the actions of conflict entrepreneurs or 'spoilers'. The State, therefore, was required to establish organisational integrity based on equity and fairness, whilst providing a secure environment, in order to initiate the renewal of vertical social capital. Conventionally the sources of social capital come from cognitive processes and structural elements;²¹⁹ however, due to the genocide, the cognitive processes that utilise collective norms, values, attitudes and beliefs in order to promote MBCA had been severely undermined and as such the structural elements of roles, rules, precedents and procedures were required to stimulate these cognitive process and the growth of social capital. In this sense social capital in a PCE is constructed rather than endowed and as such the establishment of vertical social capital is vital to this endeavour.

How then does the social reintegration of ex-combatants promote the enhancement of vertical social capital? In Rwanda it is apparent that there exists a dialectical relationship between the macro level elements that support and enable social reintegration and the establishment of vertical social capital with each having an influence on the other. The political commitment to ex-combatant reintegration and the extension of this support to all three combatant groups provides an important signal not only to ex-combatants themselves, but to the population also, as the MDRP Task Team Leader identifies in the following; "*The signal that the government sends in terms of commitment to reconciliation and moving forward by providing support to the ex-FAR and taking the AGs back is symbolically important and politically important. I think that does send a signal into the society and communities*"²²⁰. As identified, previous forms of vertical social capital were exclusionary and persecutory. If the government is truly committed to creating unity and reconciliation it must openly engage in a programme of inclusion and as such, by designing and implementing a DDR programme that encompasses the three conflicting groups, the government contributes to its national message that aims to structure social interaction around inclusion rather

²¹⁹ See Chapter three.

²²⁰ Interview with MDRP Task Team Leader, July 2007.

than exclusion. Ex-combatant reintegration is one of the tools utilised by the government to restore vertical social capital and complements its other endeavours of refugee reintegration, abolition of identity cards, establishment of equal opportunities, civic education and power sharing²²¹. Whilst it is not the only available means to effectuate such a restoration it is perceived to be important as it aids reconciliation. This is the view of civilians and policy makers alike as shown in the following, “*The Commission of the reintegration of ex-combatants takes ex-combatants from RDF, AGs and ex-FAR with all of them getting the same benefits, that’s another way of uniting people. Now people are glad, they appreciate it*”²²². This is because:

*If you take one group only, say take the RDF and only reintegrate them and the AGs they can go to hell, they caused a lot of chaos, now the relatives of these guys they start to say ‘ah this government is also sectarian, they only help one group’. But when you help all groups and see that they are all catered for then it helps reconciliation. So in a way it has created confidence that this is an all embracing government, they have taken all groups into consideration so it has created confidence among the population and shown them an example.*²²³

The notion that being inclusive in terms of ex-combatants sets an example to the population is an important one. Rwandans in post-genocide Rwanda looked to the government for two main reasons: first, as apparent in Rwandan culture, it is normal to look to the government for an indication of how to behave. Second, in the post-genocide climate Rwandans were more questioning of the actions of the government. Therefore, by setting an example of inclusion the GoR was able to both direct the Rwandan population on the path toward reconciliation and demonstrate its own trustworthiness.

By committing itself to the social reintegration of ex-combatants from all three groups the GoR sets out the guidelines by which social interaction should occur (the structural category of social capital formation). Over time, as ex-combatants and the population

²²¹ As identified by NURC Executive Secretary.

²²² Interview with CIV4, June 2007.

²²³ Interview with RDRC Coordinator, November 2006.

see this commitment translated into practice and results this then influences the way in which norms, values, attitudes and beliefs (the cognitive category of social capital formulation) are shaped and established and the notion of inclusion is internalised. The example set by the government therefore influences the way in which it is seen by the population and the way in which the population responds to the language of the government. This is particularly apparent when we consider the effects of community sensitisation before and during ex-combatant reintegration and this serves to reinforce the message of the government. By advocating at all levels of society and politics for the acceptance of ex-combatants, the government further demonstrates its commitment to reintegration; this, in turn, facilitates the construction of vertical social capital as State-Community relations improve not only through the messages that are given and the commitment that is shown, but also by the fact that the government and representatives of the government (the RDRC) are seen to be present and active in the community through their sensitisation practices.

A further way in which the government demonstrates its commitment to ex-combatant reintegration and provides an example to the community is the fact it does not obstruct ex-combatants being elected into leadership positions or positions of responsibility and indeed actively encourages them to enter such roles. From the table below it is evident that a significant number of ex-combatants have been elected to important leadership positions within the community²²⁴. Overall, 46% of ex-combatants interviewed hold, or at some point held one or more position of responsibility in the community. In terms of composition the following applies: 34.5% of RDF, 45.5% of AGs, 100% of ex-FAR. This firstly indicates the non-obstruction of ex-combatants in such positions, which is important in sending a signal to the population that it is necessary to accept ex-combatants as a group into the community and secondly, that all sub ex-combatants groups are to be treated equally. This is a message not lost on the ex-combatants themselves; *"It has shown me that here is trust in the government and that also the population trust me, that I should be confident and work with them. When you are elected into a position the government doesn't say that person we don't want him, they accept you to be the way you are. I think that's a good thing"*²²⁵. The table below indicates the positions of responsibility or leadership held by ex-combatants interviewed during fieldwork.

²²⁴ The benefits of this for social reconciliation shall be analysed in the following section.

²²⁵ Interview with XCAG11, July 2007.

Combatant	Position of Responsibility/Leadership
XCRDF1	Inyangamugayo ²²⁶ 2000/5, Gacaca Judge 2006+
XCRDF2	Inyangamugayo, Gacaca 2nd Vice President Sector, Spiritual Father ²²⁷ (Church)
XCRDF4	Security (Umudugudu), Association President (x3)
XCRDF7	Umudugudu Leader 2006
XCRDF8	Security (Umudugudu), President of Demobs (sector)
XCRDF11	Cell Leader 2001-6, Sector Council Committee 2004-6, Gacaca Court Cell level 2006, President Gacaca court sector level 2006
XCRDF14	Inyangamugayo, Gacaca Court (8 months), Auditor of Govt run project (Ubudehe)
XCRDF17	Inyangamugayo Gacaca Judge 2006, Nyumbakumi ²²⁸ 2004-6
XCRDF19	Gacaca Court (Cell)
XCRDF21	Gacaca Court 2003-6, Vice President of Umudugudu Leader
XCRDF31	Gacaca Vice President, Development leader in Umudugudu
XCAG5	In Charge of Information in Umudugudu 2006 to present
XCAG7	In charge of Demob Discipline in Umudugudu, last 7 months
XCAG8	Security (Umudugudu) 1 year
XCAG10	Nyumbakumi
XCAG11	Abunzi ²²⁹ & in charge of discipline in Umudugudu
XCFAR1	In charge of security in sector 1998-2002, Sector Councillor 2002-2005
XCFAR2	In charge of development in cell 2001-2005
XCFAR3	Nyumbakumi (10 households) & VP Health Insurance
XCFAR4	Abunzi
XCFAR5	In charge of Security in sector 1997-8, Sector Coordinator 2001-2005, Abunzi 2006-Present
XCFAR6	In Charge of Information in Cell, 1999-2001, Cell leader 2001-Present
XCFAR7	In charge of development in cell 2003-Present, President of Cell Gacaca 2003-Present

Table 4 – Ex-Combatant Positions of Responsibility in the Community: Author.

If vertical social capital is crucial for political stability and social cohesion then the leadership roles ex-combatants engage in are particularly noteworthy, especially in the context of a PCE. By occupying positions within the Gacaca system, security provision and the development of the community ex-combatants are making significant contributions to the post-conflict reconstruction and are operating in potentially very sensitive areas. Such confidence in ex-combatants on the part of the government breeds confidence in the population and has the effect of unifying the community toward the collective goals of unity and reconciliation and development. It also represents recognition by the government that it alone cannot guarantee these goals and as such

²²⁶ Inyangamugayo is a Kinyarwanda word meaning one who is trustworthy or persons of integrity. Upon introduction of the Gacaca Courts the judges were known as Inyangamugayo judges.

²²⁷ Spiritual father is a mentoring role taken in the church to help the spiritual development of a younger parishioner.

²²⁸ Nyumbakumi is the Kinyarwanda name given to the leader of ten households.

²²⁹ Abunzi are community mediators who are trained to resolve disputes within the community.

there is a need to forge effective partnerships with all constituents of the community in order to achieve these collective goals. In doing this the GoR helps to create a collaborative relationship between the State and the population and maximises its role in facilitating and driving positive developmental outcomes, the effect of which is to assist the renewal of vertical social capital.

Successful reintegration of ex-combatants further aids the development of vertical social capital through the establishment of security and stability in the country. Security and stability were identified as necessary elements for the successful reintegration of ex-combatants due to the fact that ex-combatants are more willing to disarm and remain disarmed if security and stability is established, and because in a secure and stable environment the community is more likely to accept ex-combatants. Whilst the successful reintegration of ex-combatants is reliant on these factors it also serves to reinforce security and stability. Ex-combatants who are successfully reintegrated represent a greatly reduced risk to actual and perceived security and as such are accepted even more thus contributing to security and stability. The fact that the government is a driver of this reintegration which helps establish security and stability, contributes to the development of vertical social capital as the government are seen as providing security and stability, factors that are crucial to the development of the country and reconciliation as a whole.

In short, the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants can positively contribute to the renewal of vertical social capital due the fact such success is dependent, in part, on political commitment to the process. Such commitment, exemplified through the establishing and resourcing of the RDRC, equal treatment of the three ex-combatant groups, sensitisation of the community to accept ex-combatants and government tolerance of ex-combatants from all groups holding positions of responsibility in the community, represents one of the measures available to the government to facilitate the development of trust in the government and the forging of a productive, collaborative relationship between the State and society.

7.3.3 Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration and the Renewal of Bridging and Bonding Social Capital

7.3.3.1 Bridging Social Capital

In terms of social capital the social reintegration of ex-combatants has the most significant impact on bridging social capital. When we consider the environment into which ex-combatants return or settle we can see a coalescence of different groups into a complex organism that constitutes the PCE. These groups include: ex-combatants from all three factions, returning refugees, IDPs, victims and perpetrators of the genocide, widows, orphans, disabled and various others. The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants can enable and facilitate the (re)establishing of networks and linkages between these groups that are essential for bridging social capital. When ex-combatants can claim to have successfully socially reintegrated they have been accepted into the society and this entails the acceptance of all groups, thereby ensuring linkages have been forged, at least in a loose form. The process of gaining this acceptance is synonymous with the process of bridging social capital renewal.

One key way in which ex-combatants contribute to the restoration of bridging social capital is through their involvement in the community. The results of this research demonstrate that ex-combatants are heavily involved in the community through a variety of mediums. As previously discussed, ex-combatants hold, or have held, a significant number of leadership positions or roles of responsibility²³⁰. Whilst there may be concern that a disproportionate amount of ex-combatants are community leaders (46%) when we consider that 12 of 25 civilians interviewed (48%) also hold positions of leadership and responsibility in the community this would not seem to be the case. The closeness of these figures, rather than indicating that the environment has been militarised through ex-combatants being over represented in leadership positions, actually indicates that ex-combatants are successfully socially reintegrating as they are accepted as civilians and hence are elected into such positions in the same proportions.

Specifically taking the example of Gacaca, ex-combatant attendance of Gacaca trials aids the establishment of bridging social capital by enabling the community to, over

²³⁰ See Table 4 – Ex-Combatant Positions of Responsibility in the Community

time, adjust to the presence of ex-combatants. It also provides an arena in which ex-combatants can make concerted efforts to be accepted through demonstrating they are trustworthy. This issue is particularly succinctly put in the following, *“when I first reached here there was a fear, people used to be scared of me. It was not easy for them to get close to me but I was showing them although I used to be a soldier I didn’t have any intentions of behaving badly. Through Gacaca people got close together and talk again because before they had no ways of talking together. In a way people now have got close together and there is no more fear now”*²³¹. Gacaca, like many other community activities, enables ex-combatants to demonstrate their ability to live in the community and over time they come to be accepted by the community. Indeed, as this research suggests, a significant number of them are trusted to be more than mere spectators of Gacaca and are elected by the population to sit as Gacaca judges, or Inyangamugayo²³².

The very nature of the position of Inyangamugayo is based on trustworthiness, integrity and honesty and therefore, for an ex-combatant to be elected to such a position by his or her peers, is arguably strongest indication that they have successfully reintegrated. In order to achieve such a position ex-combatants must not only have been accepted by the community but must also have gained its trust. It cannot be stressed enough that the establishment of this trust comes from the actions of the ex-combatants themselves as many ex-combatants and civilian testify to. One particular ex-combatant emphasised this point stating, *“I tried to be honest in the population and they saw how I was behaving, I was responsible and my kids were studying so they trusted me. When Gacaca started I became the Vice President and I was judging well, people were trusting me”*²³³. This view is also held by civilians who argue the role played by ex-combatants in the community engenders their acceptance, *“when they come in the population they live like other civilians, they do some patrols, they go in Gacaca, they go in meetings, they go in Umuganda. You see that they are like other people...you see that trust is being rebuilt firstly because of Gacaca which works on the principle of unity and reconciliation”*²³⁴. Similarly, election to positions of Abunzi, leaders within the Umudugudu or cell, and various others, signifies a level of trust and acceptance

²³¹ Interview with XCRDF17, June 2007

²³² 18% of ex-combatants in this research at some point held the position of Inyangamugayo at various levels.

²³³ Interview with XCRDF31, November 2006.

²³⁴ Interview with CIV7, June 2007.

from the population, especially when the importance of these positions to the reconciliation process is taken into account. When we consider, for example, of all those interviewed who held the position of Abunzi (3), two were held by ex-combatants, one of whom was an ex-AG while the other was ex-FAR, we can see that firstly, ex-combatants are being accepted into the community and secondly, there is no significant difference in the way ex-combatants from the three different groups are treated, at least in terms of election to leadership positions.

Ex-combatants also involve themselves in the community through engaging with community events, such as Umuganda and Ubudehe among others, which contribute to feelings of solidarity, improve communication and promote civic mindedness²³⁵. Whilst ex-combatants may not be leading these events, the fact they attend and participate in them helps not only ex-combatant reintegration but also the process of bridging social capital renewal. An example of this is in the following quote; *“Whenever there are weddings your neighbour feels they are part of it more than your family who are far away but those who are near they come to help you, I have seen it many times, they come and support you”*²³⁶. Such community activities have the effect, over time, of galvanising community spirit and facilitating the development of networks. Weddings affect many people in the community and bring together those from different communities also. Ex-combatants returning to their home communities or settling in new ones are encouraged during Ingando to engage in such communal activities in an effort to reintegrate into the community. Invariably they do and this has shown to be a particularly powerful way of connecting with the community for reasons that will be discussed shortly.

The reintegration of ex-combatants also aids the reconstruction of bridging social capital through the contributions to development that ex-combatants make. Particularly through associations, but also through general daily living and CBR, ex-combatants engage in communal work with civilians, which result in tangible development outcomes and demonstrate the benefits of ex-combatant reintegration to the community. Ex-combatants are believed to have a higher capacity than civilians due to their training and experience. When returning to a community in need of reconstruction this capacity is crucial and ex-combatants who involve themselves in the community are welcomed;

²³⁵ See Table 3: Reconciliatory Community Activities

²³⁶ Interview with RDF3, June 2007.

*“Because of the shattered society, because it forced the people to stick together much more it was then easier for the community to see what types of advantage an ex-combatant can bring. They have been used to a structure, they are very good organisers so while they may not be very skilled in farming they organise farming associations or they organise transport in order to get farming products to the capital. This is not something that maybe a farmer could have done on his own. This is something that was very important for the people to see at that time that these guys had some comparative advantages and they kind of appreciated them”*²³⁷. By engaging in, and initiating, constructive activities in the community they demonstrate firstly that they are not a burden to the community and secondly that they can be of benefit to the community. This is important as the likelihood of them being accepted in the community is greater if they are not a burden to the community, and greater still if they can positively contribute to it.

A number of ex-combatants were responsible for founding associations, beginning work projects that employed others or helping organise communal functions such as security patrols. This is particularly important as it expresses a commitment to the community. Ex-combatants who engage in such undertakings indicate their desire to enter civilian life, living as other civilians and rebuilding the country with them; *“They come like simple people, they come like civilians and they come finding some of their relatives. Like simple people they try like others to rebuild Rwanda, their country”*²³⁸. This quote is important as it recognises not only the need to share Rwanda, but also that the objectives of ex-combatants are the same as those of civilians. This is vital in enabling the community and ex-combatants to live together as social capital becomes based more around those common goals rather than divisive practices. As development in the community takes place it does so in a number of ways. While the community develops according to how one might generally conceptualise development – stimulation of the local economy, provision of basic services such as water, health care, schools, among others, and the rebuilding of infrastructure – it also develops socially as these activities are conducted by the community themselves, and the presence of these common goals helps to build positive relations within the community that are based around and reinforced by the achievement of these goals. Ex-combatants, by contributing to, and

²³⁷ Interview with UNDP DDR Manager 1st Phase, July 2007.

²³⁸ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

indeed organising and leading, community development also assist in the development of these community relations and the renewal of bridging social capital.

The effects of ex-combatant involvement in the community and contribution to community development are significant. First, such activities as discussed above signal the intentions of the ex-combatant to the community. When ex-combatants return to the community and make concerted efforts to involve themselves in the community through Gacaca, leadership positions, the Church, and other mediums, and contribute to development through associations, CBR and other initiatives, they demonstrate a commitment to the community and a willingness to rebuild the country. The fear that the population initially have of ex-combatants, over time, dissipates as their intentions become evident. This enables the creation of an environment in which social capital renewal is possible as collective goals are identified and linkages are developed. Second, such communal activities result in a familiarity between ex-combatants and civilians due to their immediate proximity. The cooperation and coordination that is necessary to achieve collective goals act to reinforce the existence of the collective goal, thus indicating similarity rather than division, and stimulates communication between all groups involved. As this cooperation, coordination and communication continues, patterns of interaction develop. Relationships transform from professional ones to personal ones thus further reinforcing the collective. Trust is cultivated through this interaction and bridges are constructed and strengthened. *“The way it seems to be is when people are working together and have common interests their attachment will be greater because of those common interests. The more they interact as they work together the more it helps, especially in the process of unity and reconciliation”*²³⁹. Ex-combatants generally make positive contributions to this process and can, in many cases, be drivers of the process.

7.3.3.2 Bridging Social Capital into Bonding Social Capital

The elements that lead to bridging social capital do so through their development of trust. Ex-combatants facilitate this process as explained above and in doing so they become role models. This reinforces the notion that ex-combatants contribute to the establishment of social capital. As that trust develops and networks grow stronger

²³⁹ Interview with RDRC Reintegration Officer, November 2006.

social capital transforms further. The bridges that held disparate groups (ex-combatants, civilians, victims, perpetrators, and others) now become bonds between these groups. The geographical community which had become fragmented during the civil war and genocide when bonds were based upon ethnicity and remained fragmented in the immediate post-genocide period based along these group lines now becomes a community held together by bonds rather than bridges with bridging social capital now occurring between geographical communities.

Evidently, the holding of leadership positions or roles of responsibility in the community indicates a level of acceptance of and trust for those individuals involved and such involvement elevates these individuals to a role model status thus encouraging other ex-combatants in their reintegration. By being elected to a leadership position or role of responsibility ex-combatants effectively deliver a message to other ex-combatants of the possibilities should they demonstrate a hardworking and honest character. By positively engaging in community activities and making efforts to fit back in to society ex-combatants are able, in some degree, to influence their future. The election of ex-combatants to leadership positions due to such character demonstrates the way in which ex-combatants may be able to reintegrate and this serves as an assistance and motivation to newly returned ex-combatants in their reintegration.

Within these leadership roles, and in their contribution to community development, ex-combatants also serve as role models to the community. Initially, by working together ex-combatants show the community that collective working is possible, "*when you see people from RDF, ex-FAR and AGs, when they are demobilised and they come and live in a village they do many activities together like agriculture. It's a nice example for the population to see that people who used to fight together now are living well together and working together*"²⁴⁰. The behaviour of ex-combatants is therefore crucial not only in ensuring their own individual acceptance within the community but also in acting as a 'roadmap' for how newly returning ex-combatants can reintegrate. In the overall picture this provides a role model to the community and demonstrates to them the benefits that ex-combatants can bring with them.

By acting a role model in the community ex-combatants help to solidify the bridges that have developed with the community. The message of unity and reconciliation that ex-

²⁴⁰ Interview with CIV8, June 2007.

combatants disseminate through their actions and behaviour has the effect of altering the bonds within the community. With continued cooperation and interaction, bridging social capital strengthens and as this continues and the community develops in unison based around collectively identified goals the bridges that connected them become bonds. Structural procedures that help build social capital then become cognitive processes as the dominant collective norms, values, attitudes and beliefs become based around MBCA rather than ethnicity. This is, however, a process in its relative infancy. Gradually, over time, with support from the government and local leaders, and highly dependent on the equity of benefits, bonds based around collective benefit will continue to take shape and will become more and more the dominant form of bonding social capital. At this stage the strength of these bonds differ between people in the community and sometimes may not exist at all. Bonds that are based on ethnicity still remain and in some areas are very strong and will remain so whilst fear and ignorance remains. Ex-combatants, through their relative positions as role models, are well placed to facilitate the transformation of bridging social capital to that of bonding social capital.

Ex-combatants, when they return, adapt to the community they are returning to but they also adapt the community. What is crucial is the way in which they adapt the community, as this can be either positively or negatively. For this reason the training they receive in Ingando, and the way they are treated by local leaders, is important, as it will, to some extent, direct their behaviour once they return.

7.3.3.3 Bonding Social Capital Based on Geographical Area

As bonding social capital becomes more based on geographical communities rather than ethnicity or divisive politics the issue of the family becomes more important. Although in the immediate aftermath of the genocide, and still now to some extent, trust was not evident in the community and bonding social capital was based around ethnicity, over time this changed; family re-establishment and generation had a lot to do with this. In the complex environment that was Rwanda after the genocide *“generally one of the advantages during that time was that there was almost nobody who had a normal family structure anymore. Families were so decimated and the whole social fabric had been so destroyed that there wasn't anyone left in a village or in any kind of community who*

*would have had what you might call a normal family structure*²⁴¹. The effect of this was instrumental in the social reconstruction of Rwanda. In such an environment normalisation began with the family, the composition of which was somewhat irregular. In such a time of need, and despite a dearth of trust, families were created from survivors, orphans, widows and remarriages. People became bonded together with hardship and need as the focus of that bond rather than ethnicity. Whilst in the immediacy Tutsi families would not generally be created with Hutus the development drive of the community required the whole population of the community to work together. As Hutu refugees returned they also engaged in such familial renewal and the community grew together out of this situation. Over time this has, and will continue to contribute to the development of bonding social capital based around geographical community as the predominant focal point. This is not to say ethnicity is not still relevant and does not play a role in the way in which people bond but that it is gradually becoming less important. As development continues based upon community development the fact the community drive this should ensure this continues.

Ex-combatants have shown to be influential in this process. On average 69% of ex-combatants either married, remarried or adopted orphans after the genocide, either before or after demobilisation (78% of ex-RDF, 57% of ex-FAR²⁴² and 73% of ex-AGs). This rebuilding of families not only helps ex-combatants reintegrate into the community but it also contributes to the transformation of social capital within that community as new familial bonds are created at the same time as networks between families. With the simultaneous creation of bonds they become inextricably linked as bonding social capital becomes based around the geographical community. Ex-combatants can be an integral part of this process.

The social reintegration of ex-combatants in Rwanda has had positive implications of the restoration of social capital. As the process of ex-combatant social reintegration occurs those elements that make such reintegration possible also work to facilitate the establishment of bridging social capital. The interconnected natures of the elements that combine to make social reintegration possible ensure that these elements are mutually reinforcing and it is this that has such an effect on the restoration of bridging social

²⁴¹ Interview with UNDP DDR Manager 1st Phase, July 2007.

²⁴² The lower percentage of ex-FAR who married, remarried or adopted orphans after the genocide, compared to the ex-RDF and ex-AGs, is explained by the fact the remaining 43% were married prior to the conflict meaning 100% of ex-FAR were, at the time of this research, married.

capital. The trust that ex-combatants establish through various means in the social reintegration process translates into bridging social capital through the roles that ex-combatants occupy within the community.

As bridging social capital has been established through various mechanisms it has then transformed, to a degree, bonding social capital so that it is based on geographical area rather than ethnic group. This is not a complete process and is very much in its infancy. Fear regarding the past and the future, economic deprivation, remnants of extremist ideology and the presence of ethnic entrepreneurs combine to ensure this transformation is slow and difficult but rather than bonding social capital occurring between Hutu and between Tutsi as a general rule, it is now starting to take place within the community. Ethnic bonds are gradually being replaced with bonds constructed around collective action based on a geographical area. Therefore, the bridging social capital between Hutu and Tutsi, victim and perpetrator, returnee and those who remain, among others, that is developed initially step by step transforms into bonding social capital within geographical communities and bridging social capital becomes the links between geographical communities. This process is highly complex and is essentially enabled through a dual directional movement from both the top down and the bottom up; indeed, the only way this process could genuinely take place is through the commitment and support from the government whilst being owned and implemented by the community.

7.4 The Implications of Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration for Reconciliation

Referring again to the idea that *“a reconciled community assimilates rather than discriminates, promulgates humane and legal rights, does its best to dissolve alienation and fear, encourages people to share values and develop congenial relationships, and promotes a hope that material benefits will accrue as a product of peaceful transitions and independence”* (Whittaker, 1999: 8), we can see that Rwanda is not yet a reconciled country. However, reconciliation is both a process and a goal and therefore, it is possible to state that Rwanda is genuinely engaged in the process and progress has been made. Moreover, when we take into account the relatively short time since the end of the genocide and the time of writing it is also reasonable to claim that such progress has been substantial given the magnitude of the task at hand. Rwanda, at the conclusion of the genocide, was a country characterised by decades of political violence, ethnic

entrepreneurship, exclusion, conflict and genocide. The task facing the RPF government was daunting. Not only did it have to secure the country, in terms of both its borders and its population, it also had to kick-start a collapsed economy, rebuild decimated infrastructure systems, establish and uphold the rule of law and attempt the seemingly impossible: the reconciliation of a extremely traumatised population, all under the 'watchful' eye of the International Community, who had done nothing to stop the genocide that was unfolding in front of those very 'watchful' eyes yet apparently knew what was best for Rwanda in its aftermath. Whilst not the only mechanism available to the government in the pursuit of reconciliation, the social reintegration of ex-combatants has proved to be one of the most critical.

7.4.1 The Movement Toward Political Reconciliation through Ex-Combatant Reintegration

Due to the fact the previous Rwandan government had, over decades, engaged in political violence and certain elements of the government were responsible for the planning and orchestration of the genocide, coupled with the reality that the current RPF government was initially regarded with apprehension, if not hatred, by a large proportion of the population in Rwanda, the issue of political reconciliation is pertinent. Political reconciliation can be seen as reconciliation between those operating at the political level and reconciliation between the polity and the population. In Rwanda this includes initiatives such as Gacaca, legal reform, power-sharing, the creation of the NURC and Ingando. The reintegration of ex-combatants is also a mechanism through which political reconciliation can be pursued. As previously noted, ex-combatant presence and involvement in the community demonstrates a commitment by the GoR to ex-combatant reintegration by virtue of the fact they are welcomed back into society and not blocked from taking up these positions, and are actively encouraged to enter such engagement. This represents vertical social capital and renews community trust in the government that had been decimated through the conflict and genocide, an important aspect of political reconciliation.

At the end of the genocide the RPF created The Broad Based Government of National Unity comprising the Rwandan Popular Front (RPF), the Democratic Republican Movement (MDR), the Social Democratic Party (PSD), the Liberal Party (PL), and the Centrist Democratic Party (PDC). The MRND was outlawed. Whilst power in this

power-sharing agreement is disproportionate in favour of the RPF, which has been heavily criticised for engaging in authoritarian rule, there have been a number of measures taken to encourage political reconciliation between political actors. The reintegration of ex-combatants can be seen as contributing to this due to the fact that combatants from the three groups are accepted by the government and receive the same benefits²⁴³. This provides an example to the RPF's coalition partners of its intentions regarding unity and reconciliation. If this message is internalised and accepted by these partners it is evident that the reintegration of ex-combatants plays a role in the establishment of political reconciliation between political actors, at least in some degree.

In terms of political reintegration between the polity and the population this is, in part, synonymous with vertical social capital. Vertical social capital represents the linkages between, in this case, the State and the population; such linkages can be positive or negative. If positive vertical social capital is extant then it can be said that there is at least a minimal level of trust between the two entities and they have a productive functioning relationship²⁴⁴. As positive vertical social capital is established and develops it equally follows that the relationship between the State and the population is improving as such social capital is a result of this relational improvement. This relational improvement symbolises political reconciliation between the polity and the population. Therefore, for the very reasons that the social reintegration of ex-combatants contributes to the development of vertical social capital – the establishing and resourcing of the RDRC, equal treatment of the three ex-combatant groups, sensitisation of the community to accept ex-combatants and government tolerance of ex-combatants from all groups holding positions of responsibility in the community – it also contributes to the development of political reconciliation.

Although perhaps not the most significant influence on the establishment of political reconciliation, the reintegration of ex-combatants is however important. Ex-combatant reintegration aids in the foundation and development of political reconciliation, particularly between the polity and the population, via its facilitation of positive vertical social capital.

²⁴³ Other than the ex-AGs who do not receive Recognition of Service Allowance (RSA) as they fought against the country.

²⁴⁴ There will of course be power relations within this relationship but it is not the purpose of this research to provide an analysis of them.

Such political reconciliation is vital for social reconciliation in Rwanda as it promotes individual and group preparedness to engage in the reconciliation process and make concessions for the sake of tolerance and peace. The Government plays a pioneering role in the reconciliation process as it enables the creation of an environment conducive to the reconciliation process and provides an example to this end. The next subsection examines the role ex-combatants reintegration plays in establishing social reconciliation.

7.4.2 The Development of Social Reconciliation through Ex-Combatant Social Reintegration

Social reconciliation can be seen as the ongoing development of functioning relationships at the community level. Similarly to that of political reconciliation, social capital can be utilised in order to better understand how the social reintegration of ex-combatants impacts on social reconciliation. Implicit in the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants is the generation of trust; for an ex-combatant to successfully make the transition from combatant to civilian it takes the acceptance of that ex-combatant by the community, which, in the absence of trust in that individual would not be forthcoming. If such trust can be established and expanded in a PCE it builds strong foundations for a reconciliation process. Although this may occur at a micro scale, if social reintegration is effective countrywide this also implies that the development of trust, albeit within small communities, is also occurring countrywide. The key to a successful reconciliation process is linking these micro successes to generate trust throughout the country at a more macro level.

Implicit within social reintegration are the ideas of communication, cooperation, coordination and commitment. If these are forthcoming the environment they produce is one in which the foundations of reconciliation can be established. Ex-combatant involvement in, and acceptance by the community clearly indicates a trust in them as individuals and this means three things: first, it is, dependant on the behaviour of an ex-combatant, possible to gain the community's trust; second, involvement in the community through election to positions of leadership and roles of responsibility demonstrates a clear trust in that individual and a successful reintegration; and third, the involvement of ex-combatants in the community signals to newly returning ex-combatants that their reintegration is possible and provides them with 'roadmap' as to how they can achieve it. The trust that is demonstrated by electing an ex-combatant to a

position of responsibility thus indicates that a certain level of reconciliation between ex-combatants and their community has been achieved. The behaviour of the ex-combatants and the commitment they demonstrate to the development of the community often elevates them to a role model status, which further demonstrates the process of reconciliation, at least to some extent.

The role that ex-combatants play in the reconciliation process can perhaps best be exemplified through their involvement in Gacaca. As previously stated, it is the intention of Gacaca to augment the reconciliation process in Rwanda and from the results generated in this research it would seem that Gacaca is having the desired affects. In two of the three villages in which PRA exercises were conducted Gacaca was expressed as a key mechanism for engendering trust, forgiveness, collective responsibility, social cohesion and unity and reconciliation. Two exercises utilised during the PRA were Institutional Diagramming²⁴⁵ and Social Capital Indicators²⁴⁶. In one village Institutional Diagramming indicated that Gacaca was a central and crucially important institution in that community. The criteria for this, as defined by the community, were that it had a large range affecting many people, it was vital for survival, it had long-term sustainability, and it was high employer within the community. It was also indicated that Gacaca had strong linkages with local schools, through the education of unity and reconciliation, and the police force, through the establishing of security. Within this same village, in the Social Capital Indicator exercise, Gacaca was identified as a community event that: enables communication through the sharing of information regarding the past, encourages forgiveness, and promotes unity and reconciliation. Additionally, Gacaca helps the development of intercommunity trust and social cohesion through collective responsibility as it had an 80% attendance rate at that site. This was also apparent in the second village.

Interviews with ex-combatants, civilians and policy personnel alike stress the importance of Gacaca in the reconciliation process. Specifically, reconciliation is progressing because *“since Gacaca started, now we are going on another step of unity and reconciliation because these people are knowing who killed their family, they are*

²⁴⁵ Institutional Diagramming is used to generate an understanding of local institutions and the importance attached to them by the community.

²⁴⁶ Social Capital Indicators is an exercise that allows community members to identify and explain indicators of social capital in their community.

knowing the truth and I think it is another step on unity and reconciliation"²⁴⁷. One member of the International Community drew attention to the role Gacaca plays in the reconstruction of Rwanda stating:

*I do think there is a Rwandan culture, its not like these are two groups who have never lived with each other competing over land now, they have lived with each other for hundreds of years so there's a shared history, a shared language, a shared tradition there and that in a sense is what they go back to and try to work through and Gacaca is trying to pull an element of that, to try and deal with the trauma and come up with some kind of local justice. Some of the things they do around community development are similarly inspired by this tradition. I do think that there is a sense of society that exists between the groups, even if they don't completely trust each other they will try and look forward and there are remarkable stories of people trying to move on and doing remarkable things*²⁴⁸.

There are many more examples of these kinds of beliefs coming from ex-combatants, civilians and policy personnel and this indicates the importance that Gacaca has for reconciliation in Rwanda. Ex-combatants, purely by engaging with Gacaca like other civilians therefore bring benefits to reconciliation in Rwanda. They also make more specific contributions, an argument that rests in the notion that ex-combatant involvement in Gacaca is an indication of their successful social reintegration.

Ex-combatant interaction with the community, through the positions of responsibility they hold, the development endeavours they engage in, the renewal and creation of family networks and their general behaviour and motivation, is only possible through the establishment and development of dialogue and communication. From this communication cooperation is made possible and, over time, distrust and fear dissipate creating the space in which collaboration can thrive and trust can develop. This, set against a background of mutual poverty and hardship, ensure that with patience the positive actions of ex-combatants can contribute to the restoration of bridging social capital, which translates into reconciliation. Whilst by no means does this research

²⁴⁷ Interview with XCRDF11, June 2007.

²⁴⁸ Interview with MDRP Rwanda Task Team Leader, July 2007.

make the claim that the social reintegration of ex-combatants has led to the attainment of reconciliation, it does support the premise that such reintegration does positively contribute to the reconciliation process.

A further factor that facilitates the contribution of ex-combatants to the reconciliation process is a by-product of their reintegration. The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants indicates a successful transformation from combatant to civilian and throughout the process of this transformation; ex-combatants develop skills that enable them to operate in civilian life, to eliminate the mental perception of affiliation to a specific combatant group both within their own psyche and that of the community. The skills and capabilities ex-combatants and community members acquire throughout the reintegration process – for example, negotiation skills, the development of tools to aid forgiveness and healing and skills of cooperation – are skills that will be necessary for successful reconciliation. In light of this it can be strongly argued that the social reintegration of ex-combatants constitutes an essential element of reconciliation, and because involvement in the community provides an arena in which such skills can be further developed and disseminated within the community it follows that such involvement has reconciliatory benefits.

The social reintegration of ex-combatants represents a critical component of the social reconciliation process. Through the development of trust that is implicit within social reintegration social capital is renewed, in particular bridging social capital. Indeed, ex-combatant reintegration in Rwanda has contributed to the transformation of bonding social capital from being based on ethnic communities to being based on geographical communities; something crucial to the reconciliation process. When talking about the role of ex-combatant reintegration on the reconciliation process one civilian commented, *“I have a strong belief that the reintegration of ex-combatants, the way they have been reintegrated, it has been very helpful to peace in this country. I do not know how it could have been without this; it has been a really great thing”*²⁴⁹.

²⁴⁹ Interview with CIV10, June 2007.

7.5 Conclusion

The social reintegration of ex-combatants represents a normalisation process that affects not only them as individuals but also their families and the community as a whole. Upon their return ex-combatants attempt to re-enter civilian life and as such “*many of them they have built houses, they have got married, they have children, and they live with their neighbours. They are somehow stable; they are building a Rwandan society which is stable*”²⁵⁰. It is through this process that ex-combatants engender trust and such trust is not specific to them alone. In a PCE trust is a commodity in short supply; however, as ex-combatants build trust within their immediate families, with their neighbours and, over time, with the community as a whole the effects of this restoration of trust resonate through the rest of the community. The building of trust between ex-combatants from different groups and between ex-combatants and the community serve as an indication that trust is achievable. Whilst this may not be immediately forthcoming between certain groups or individuals, it does denote the possibility. It is, however, important to highlight the role of the macro and meso elements of ex-combatant reintegration in the ability of such reintegration to promote reconciliation. The development of vertical social capital through ex-combatant reintegration represents a crucial facet in successful reintegration and subsequent developments of other forms of social capital. The mutual reinforcement each of the aspects of social reintegration offer each other is, therefore, clearly significant.

Evident from this research is the role the social reintegration of ex-combatants plays as a driver for social capital restoration. This is the case because: first, successful social reintegration is made more likely when government commitment is forthcoming and therefore vertical social capital is created through the governmental desire for social reintegration. Second, vertical social capital is enhanced through successful social reintegration due to the fact that as social reintegration successfully develops government support also increases. Third, social reintegration restores, to differing levels, the trust decimated throughout the conflict. This facilitates the strengthening of bridging social capital. Four, successful social reintegration is driven by community involvement and activity; this represents Putnam’s central thesis of social capital, both bonding and bridging. During violent conflict an ‘us and them’ mentality is often developed; in Rwanda this was primarily the case between Hutu and Tutsi but also

²⁵⁰ Interview with CIV4, June 2007.

between combatant and civilian and combatants of different groups. In order to overcome this mentality in the PCE it is necessary to build bridges between such groups and enable them to cooperate with each other, bridging social capital. As bridging social capital is restored and strengthened antagonisms between previously conflicting groups are reduced thus building the foundations for reconciliation to take root and develop.

The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants has clear positive effects of the renewal of social capital in a PCE and indeed the claim can be made that such reintegration promotes the restoration of social capital. With this promotion of social capital restoration we also see the progression of the reconciliation process, particularly at the grassroots level. The trust that is established between ex-combatants and the community during the process of reintegration enables the regeneration of bonds and bridges that represent part of the social capital arrangement. This, in conjunction with the development of trust between civilians (including ex-combatants) and the government, has positive implications for the reconciliation process.

Social reconciliation begins with the establishment of co-existence from which reconciliation can develop. Implicit within this notion of co-existence is the building and spreading of trust. As this occurs and familiarity is evident, the gradual process of reconciliation is deepened. Additionally, the role played by ex-combatants in the community often elevates them to role model status and their behaviour in the community sets an example for the rest of the community. When ex-combatants positively engage with this status they can be extremely effective in promulgating the reconciliation message. As ex-combatants reintegrate into the community and actively contribute to the management and development of that community they also facilitate the generation of trust between the community and government and this has positive implications for political reconciliation. Therefore, when the social reintegration of ex-combatants is successful one can make the claim that this has positive implications for reconciliation, both social and political. In contrast, should the social reintegration of ex-combatants not be successful reconciliation can be made more difficult to achieve. Trust does not develop to the necessary or desired levels and the security and stability of the community is diminished. As this occurs so too do we see a decline in social cohesion. The social reintegration of ex-combatants clearly, then, has important implications for reconciliation. When ex-combatants reintegration is forthcoming an

environment conducive to reconciliation is developed and the probability of this occurring is increased. If such reintegration is not forthcoming the likelihood of building reconciliation is threatened.

Building on the foundations constructed in the previous chapter this chapter has endeavoured to provide an analysis of the ways in which the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promotes enhanced social capital in Rwanda and the implications of such a promotion for the reconciliation process. The following chapter will provide an overall conclusion to the thesis as a whole and will seek to draw together chapters seven and eight to present a comprehensive answer to the research question.

Chapter Eight:

Conclusions and Thesis Outputs

8.1 Introduction

You see when you used to be a soldier for you to come back and live with population it requires a lot of effort to come back and behave like a civilian. We used to be taught that we should not go stealing and doing other wrong acts; that we shall go back and live with them. Civilians, they don't really trust people who have been soldiers; it is not easy for them to trust you. To leave the soldier work and come back changing the climate and starting a new life depending on yourself was not easy.²⁵¹

The above statement made during an interview with an ex-RDF combatant in the Southern Province indicates the key issues faced by ex-combatants when they return. Various concerns such as the need for identity transformation, distrust or low trust towards ex-combatants by civilians, the changed and changing environment to which ex-combatants return, and the need to build one's own life being self-reliant combine to ensure the reintegration process is a difficult one, in particular, social reintegration.

The remainder of this chapter is primarily concerned with crystallising the link between the three concepts as developed in the theoretical framework in order to effectively present an answer to the research question. To begin the chapter consists of a summary of the thesis so as to provide a succinct review of the areas covered. The chapter will then progress to the drawing together of the conclusions of the study and provide an answer to the research question. From here it then moves on to the provision of thesis outputs that: (1) offer recommendations that develop our methodological ability to conduct research of this nature; (2) advance our theoretical understanding of reconciliation and social capital; and, (3) provide recommendations to facilitate our

²⁵¹ Interview with XCRDF13, June 2007

capability of designing and implementing effective DDR programmes. The final section will then examine potential future research in this area.

8.2 Thesis Summary

The key aim of this research was to examine the interrelatedness between the achievement of social reintegration, social capital and reconciliation, with a particular focus on the implications of social reintegration for social capital and reconciliation. This is reflected in the following research question, which was the basis of this study:

In what ways can the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promote enhanced social capital in a post-genocidal conflict environment, and what are the implications of such a promotion for reconciliation?

In order to do this the thesis began with a preface problematising the research subject, justifying its importance as an area of advanced study and stating the aim and objectives of the project. This was important as it provides a rationale for the research and demonstrates not only the originality of the work, but also the advantages it imparts on the topic under investigation. Having set out the purpose and scope of the study, chapter one introduced the issue of reconciliation in the PCE, which provides the overarching theme of this research, beginning with a consideration of the PCE that suitably situates the next section of the chapter; an analysis of reconciliation within the context of post-conflict reconstruction. The chapter then progressed to an examination of reconciliation tools, differentiating between western-centric and state-centric conventional methods and indigenous approaches, before highlighting the apparent need to develop not only our thinking toward reconciliation, but also our pursuit of it.

Chapter two then built on the analysis of the previous chapter by examining the potential role that DDR can have in the reconciliation process through the social reintegration of ex-combatants. The chapter started with a conceptual and contextual exploration of DDR before moving on to consider each of the three stages to DDR: disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Specific focus was targeted towards social reintegration and the reconciliatory benefits of ex-combatant social reintegration. The result of this analysis was the conclusion that whilst the social reintegration of ex-

combatants has significant potential in facilitating the reconciliation process it is, at present, neither sufficiently well enough understood as to how exactly this may transpire, nor taken advantage of in programme design.

Having set out the problems associated with achieving reconciliation in chapter one and a potential solution, in part, to these issues in chapter two, chapter three then sought to provide a link between DDR and reconciliation by utilising the concept of social capital. Commencing with a conceptualisation of social capital the chapter then moved on to consider how social capital can contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict and how conflict transforms social capital, before analysing ways in which social capital can be 'rebuilt' and the process of reconciliation followed.

Chapter four detailed the methodology used within this research beginning with a theoretical framework that built on the first three chapters to provide a synthesised framework of analysis which would guide the remainder of the research. The second part of the chapter entailed a discussion of the research methodology. This included the research techniques that were utilised in the fieldwork phases, followed by a consideration of the logistical demands of the research and finally, problems encountered throughout.

In the next chapter a case study analysis of Rwanda was provided. This began with a historical overview of the Rwandan conflict, paying particular attention to the external, internal and psychosocial causes of the conflict, before then going on to apply Stanton's (1998) 'Eight Stages of Genocide' model to the Rwanda case. The chapter then introduced primary data for the first time through an analysis of the transformation in social capital in the pre-1990 period and the period between the 1990 beginning of the civil war and the end of the genocide in 1994.

Continuing on with the use of primary data chapter six examined the way in which ex-combatants reintegrate into society. This began with a consideration of the problems ex-combatants faced in such reintegration, before going to introduce the factors that contribute to their success. These were divided into macro, meso and micro level factors. Chapter seven then built on the previous chapter by providing an analysis of how the social reintegration of ex-combatants contributes to the balancing and strengthening of vertical social capital and to the re-establishment of bridging social

capital, which when combined help to offset overly strong bonding social capital. The chapter then examined the implications of these transformations in social capital on reconciliation, the purpose of the thesis.

8.3 Conclusions

When considering the question of what contribution the social reintegration of ex-combatants makes to social capital and reconciliation it is first necessary to consider the overall picture in Rwanda in terms of social capital and reconciliation as this represents the environment into which ex-combatants reintegrate.

Decades of political violence prior to the outbreak of civil war in 1990 began the process of undermining social capital in Rwanda. Tutsi domination of the Hutu during the colonial period and the reversal of this power balance in the years of independence led to persecutory vertical social capital between the state and the various groups within the population. The effect of this was to create overly strong bonding social capital within the Hutu group and the Tutsi group whilst bridging social capital became eroded over time. Trust, communication and cooperation became based on ethnic groups and the development of a rigid 'us and them' mentality ensued. With the outbreak of civil war and genocide, social capital transformed still further. Trust became depleted to such a degree communication, cooperation and coordination between Hutu and Tutsi became to all intents and purposes impossible thus rendering bridging social capital effectively nonexistent. Within the Hutu group the bonds that defined the group and held it together grew in strength in the face of the perceived threat from the Tutsi and was reinforced through the sectarian policies and propaganda of the Hutu government. Among the Tutsi bonding social capital became reduced to micro groups based largely around family members as communication was made increasingly more difficult and the uncertainty as to who could be trusted ensured the cohesiveness of this group was diminished.

With the end of the conflict in 1994 the mass exodus of Hutu refugees into neighbouring countries, and the return of Tutsi refugees into Rwanda, led to greater confusion in the country with bridging capital remaining absent and bonding social capital within each group becoming more and more complex. At the same time the

change in government further altered vertical social capital with most Hutu who remained in Rwanda being fearful and distrustful of the new Tutsi government, while much of the Tutsi held a position of apprehension due to the trauma they have experienced. At this point the situation in Rwanda was extremely precarious with the coalescence of a multitude of groups including returnees, refugees, IDP, genocide survivors and perpetrators, orphans, widows, chronically ill or disabled and ex-combatants, among others, into an environment seething with hatred, distrust, fear and trauma. The GoR was faced with transforming a country almost unrecognisable from its former self into one in which reconciliation may be possible.

Since the end of the conflict both social capital and reconciliation have developed to astonishing levels considering the destructiveness of the conflict and subsequent genocide. Whilst there are undoubtedly still significant problems associated with the genocide and there is much remaining to be done, recognition must be given to the extraordinary efforts of the GoR and the Rwandan people in the reconstruction of a country so decimated by conflict and genocide.

Due to the situation Rwanda found itself in at the end of the genocide, and the discriminatory policies of previous regimes, the restoration of non-discriminatory vertical social capital was perhaps one of the most urgent requirements of the country. However, it was also one of the most difficult to achieve. Distrust and apprehension levelled at the government effectively meant the renewal of vertical social capital was initially in the hands of the GoR and much depended on their actions. Through the policies of the GoR and the responsiveness of the Rwandan population vertical social capital gradually transformed so that the discriminatory vertical social capital so readily practiced by the previous regime does not define state-population relations in Rwanda today. Whilst there still exist problems, and the GoR can be criticised on several levels, the general contention is that this relationship has improved.

In terms of bonding and bridging social capital transformations have also occurred. Initially bonding social capital was evident between small, close knit groups invariably based on kinship with bridging social capital being the links between these micro groups. As trust developed via proximity, familiarity and reciprocity that were part and parcel of the effort to survive, so too did the bridges between these groups strengthen. With the reconstruction of the country and the (re)integration of various different

identity groups bonding social capital is gradually becoming based on ties other than ethnicity and bridging social capital therefore occurs between groups other than just Hutu and Tutsi. Such a transformation in the three elements of social capital facilitates the establishment of social cohesion and enhances the probability of reconciliation.

Reconciliation is a long and arduous process that cannot be forced. However, as social capital is restored through the reconstruction effort this has positive implications for reconciliation. The key tenets of social capital, those of communication, cooperation, coordination and trust, can only be realised in tandem with the establishment of co-existence, indeed social capital and co-existence are mutually reinforcing. Co-existence is the prerequisite foundation for the development of reconciliation and in Rwanda has been achieved to a level such that genocide survivors can live in close proximity to genocide perpetrators. Whilst the killing and intimidation of Gacaca witnesses does occur, in the main there exists a relatively sustained level of peace. Given the time period between the end of the genocide and today it would be unreasonable for Rwanda to represent a reconciled country, however much has been done in this endeavour and the ability for Rwandans to co-exist has been achieved. The process of reconciliation that is ongoing is building on these gains made thus far in terms of co-existence and will take time. However, the development of trust through the renewal of social capital, and the subsequent effects on MBCA, serves to demonstrate to the Rwandan population the possibility, and benefits, of reconciliation. As members of communities engage together in activities that facilitate the physical development of the community so too do they cultivate the restoration of the social fabric so devastated throughout the conflict. Reconciliation in Rwanda is in its relative infancy when compared with other contexts; however, over the past 14 years it has made significant advancements when considering its starting point. The social reintegration of ex-combatants has made significant contributions to this advancement.

In order to comprehend the ways in which the reintegration of ex-combatants contributed to social capital restoration and the reconciliation process it is first necessary to understand how such reintegration place. Therefore an appreciation of the situation of ex-combatants upon their return to the community is required. As previously identified, the environment in Rwanda at the end of the genocide was tenuous; however ex-combatants also face other problems in their reintegration. The starting position of ex-combatants is perhaps the most serious of these problems and

linked to this is the issue of lack of access to land and housing as previously detailed. Psychosocial issues and special groups also introduce further problems when considering social reintegration. These are problems that are inevitable for a proportion of ex-combatants regardless of country; however they do affect those in Rwanda particularly acutely. Attempts to remedy these problems will involve the RDRC but must engage other actors in the process if they are to be overcome and social reintegration is to be achieved.

In order for the social reintegration of ex-combatants to be successful there are a number of necessary conditions that must be met. The macro, meso and micro level elements introduced in chapter seven are crucial to the attainment of social reintegration and the interrelated nature of these elements means that they are mutually reinforcing. This can be seen in the diagram below.




Figure 8 – Rwanda Social Reintegration Pyramid. Source: Author

From the diagram the complex interrelatedness of ex-combatant social reintegration is evident. The three levels of macro, meso and micro level elements each comprise a number of elements without which the social reintegration of ex-combatants would be made exceptionally more difficult or unattainable. The pyramid shape represents the positioning of each of the elements according to their political level rather than their relative importance. Therefore, the higher the level on the pyramid the higher the political level. Each level also has an effect on at least one other level. The thick black arrow to the right-hand side of the pyramid represents the overarching effect the macro level has on both the meso and micro level. Within the levels themselves we can see the effects that each element has on the other, with evidently a strong relationship between the meso and micro level. The relationships between the individual elements within the levels are either uni- or bi-relational in terms of the direction of influence; this is indicated by the arrows. The colouring of the arrows refers to the point of origin of the influence, that is, for example, the blue arrows indicate influence from ex-combatant motivation/behaviour on association membership and economic reintegration. The red arrows highlight the bi-relational nature of the two elements.

Clearly, as indicated in the above diagram and chapter seven, the social reintegration of ex-combatants is a difficult achievement and, in order for it to be successful, requires a number of actors to not only commit to it but to actively engage with the process. Despite the complexity involved in the achieving of social reintegration of ex-combatants, when such social reintegration is achieved social capital renewal and reconciliation is facilitated, through both the process and its attainment. This is due to the fact that, as a process, it affects the community as a whole and can only be accomplished with the involvement of the whole community and government. In order for the social reintegration of ex-combatants to be successful the requisite commitment from the government from the endeavour helps restore vertical social capital, which in turn facilitates the renewal of bridging and bonding social capital.

Upon their return to their community, or entry into a new community, the social reintegration of ex-combatants essentially depends on the undertaking of a trust building process that begins with their micro group. As trust is established within the immediate family, it gradually increases to include the neighbour network through sustained exchange that is necessary as a result of poverty-induced interdependence. This takes place over a period of time that on average lasts between five and six months during

which the trust that develops between ex-combatants and their families and neighbour networks expands further still as the community in general becomes used to their presence within the community as a whole and in the various associations and community activities they engage in, in particular. The mutually beneficial nature of exchange, economic reconstruction, community development endeavours, such as *Umuganda*, *Ubudehe* and *Gacaca*, and community events, such as *Ubukwe*, *Kubahirisha*, *Gusohora Umwana* and *Kugabirana*, serve to increase civic mindedness, collective responsibility, solidarity and interdependence between those who involve themselves in these activities. Therefore, the various interactions that occur within the process of ex-combatant social reintegration combine to assist in the rebuilding of trust, communication, cooperation and coordination through the familiarity that develops as a result of the proximity between ex-combatants and civilians when ex-combatants engage in the community.

The indication, therefore, is that the social reintegration of ex-combatants has a significant influence on social capital restoration. When ex-combatants successfully social reintegrate they facilitate the (re)establishment of trust, communication, cooperation and coordination in the community thereby acting as a driver for social capital restoration, in particular vertical and bridging social capital. If, however, ex-combatants are unsuccessful in their social reintegration, the restoration of social capital cannot be said to be inclusive of all groups in society and, as such, bridging social capital will be weak, at least between the community and ex-combatants. This will effectively reduce social cohesion within the community and potentially could lead to instability and insecurity.

If the social reintegration of ex-combatants is successful, how then does the ensuing promotion of social capital renewal implicate on reconciliation? As previously explained, the period of violent conflict in Rwanda, and the years preceding, developed an 'us and them' mentality between Hutu and Tutsi. Additionally to this, a similar position was held between combatant and civilian, and combatants of different groups. In the PCE these attitudes became more complex with the confluence of so many different groups with different needs and traumas. It was necessary, therefore, in post-conflict Rwanda to build bridges between such groups in order to enable them to cooperate; bridging social capital. As such bridging social capital was restored and strengthened, antagonisms between previously conflicting groups were reduced thus building the foundations for reconciliation

to take root and develop. This began with development of the ability for members of communities to co-exist and, through the acknowledgement of the interdependent nature of life in Rwanda, particularly in rural Rwanda, the process of reconciliation has developed.

The successful social reintegration of ex-combatants has had positive implications on political reconciliation as such success has been achieved in large part because of the political commitment of the GoR. Moreover, this success is enabled due to the active contribution of ex-combatants to the management and development of the community to which they return, which facilitates the generation of trust between the community and government as the government does not block ex-combatant involvement in these activities, thus demonstrating inclusiveness. Through the promotion of social capital we can also see the influence social reintegration has on social reconciliation, particularly at the grassroots level. The trust that is established between ex-combatants and the community during the process of their reintegration, enables the regeneration of bridging and bonding social capital and facilitates the gradual deepening of social reconciliation as such trust resonates through the community. The role model status that is often attained by ex-combatants through their positive behaviour in the community enables ex-combatants to take a positive role in the reconciliation process, however such a role could only be taken if their social reintegration is successful. If the social reintegration of ex-combatants is not successful reconciliation is more difficult to achieve as this implies trust has not developed to the necessary or desired levels and the security and stability of the community is diminished. In tandem with this so too do we see a decline in social cohesion. The social reintegration of ex-combatants clearly, then, has important implications for reconciliation.

In summary, the successful social reintegration of ex-combatants promotes enhanced social capital through the trust, communication, cooperation and coordination that must be evident in order for ex-combatants to be successfully social reintegrated. As trust, communication, cooperation and coordination are (re)established, vertical social capital is restored between the community and government while the regeneration of bridging social capital occurs between previously disparate groups in the society. Bonding social capital during this time becomes based around geographical communities rather than ethnicity. Ex-combatants contribute to this enhancement of social capital through the commitment demonstrated by the government and their own actions in their communities. By actively engaging with the community, helping in its development

and taking on roles of responsibility, ex-combatants demonstrate not only trustworthiness, but also the fact that trust between previously conflicting groups is possible. The implications of this promotion of social capital for reconciliation derive from the trust that is developed that enables the coexistence of such conflicting groups and the development of an environment in which positive relations can be built and deepened. The social reintegration of ex-combatants has a significant role to play in the process not only through the beneficial contributions they can make to the community, but also by virtue of the fact that if ex-combatants are not successfully social reintegrated they can threaten this process.

8.4 Thesis Outputs

Leading on from the results and conclusions of this research, this chapter now makes a number of outputs based on these. This is important as these outputs provide part of the justification for this research; if we can learn from this research and apply the results to other areas then the research adds value other than the initial answering of the research question. The section is divided into three sub-sections in which methodological recommendations are made, theoretical advancements are delineated and policy recommendations are proffered.

8.4.1 Thesis Output 1: Methodological Recommendations

In terms of methodological recommendations, the issues encountered whilst conducting this research may serve to develop our methodological ability to conduct such research in the future.

As identified in section 4.6.1, there are a number of issues faced by those conducting research in a PCE. As such, the value of thorough preparation before one enters the field cannot be understated. Although one cannot be 100% knowledgeable of the environment in any given place at any given time and a great deal of flexibility is required in order for researchers to be able to effectively adapt to the environment, it is through detailed preparation that such flexibility can be maximised. By preparing one's field trip as thoroughly as possible, with the awareness that what is being planned, in particular, timetabling and lists of desired interviews, which will almost certainly not

occur in the way planned, researchers are able to be flexible in their approach. For first time researchers in particular a number of precautions can be made when planning research.

In terms of logistics less is definitely not more. Plan for things to go wrong and, as far as the budget will allow, make sure return transport tickets are for a date well after the perceived end of the field period. This will provide a space in which to work should things take longer than planned and tickets can easily be altered if not, or a short holiday at the end is possible. When in the planning phase identify a key gatekeeper (or a number if several key organisations/institutions will be included) a number of months prior to departure and build up a relationship over email. This will enable more accurate planning as you can tap into their local knowledge and will ensure you have some assistance when you arrive. Additionally, it will reduce apprehension immediately prior to departure. Plan on doing very little in the first two weeks, other than orientating oneself to the environment and meeting key people in the area. This will ensure you are not rushed in the adaptation period and thus will be able to respond in a more flexible manner and have a better comprehension of the environment.

If possible, conduct the fieldwork over two or more phases. This provides time to be reflexive regarding your research and to improve where necessary. The time away will also give you space to analyse your findings thus far and identify particular issues or themes that are emerging that can be tapped into. Additionally, when you return to the field after the first phase you will be more confident having already spent time there and this will enhance your working practices. When in the field, depending on the nature and location of the research, try to spend rest and recuperation (R & R) time with locals as well as expatriates and be open about meeting people, this will help in gaining access to areas and people that may have previously been difficult. Above all, be flexible as much as possible as this will help you get the most out of your experience. Be prepared for people turning up late for interviews or cancelling, factor in travel time and be aware that in many countries travel can take what seems to be an exceedingly amount of time. If you are prepared to stay in poor conditions (e.g. no running water or electricity) you can access a very large demographic not available in certain places and your willingness to live in such places will not be lost on such people.

Included in the preparation of fieldwork is the choosing of the methodological techniques that will result in the richest data. In terms of assessing the success of ex-combatant social reintegration, social capital restoration and the reconciliation process, life history interviews have proved to be very useful. By investigating individuals life trajectories one can identify the events and issues most meaningful to them through their experiences; indeed, it is the respondents themselves rather than the researcher who identifies these issues. By triangulating the life histories of a number of respondents within the same groups (e.g. ex-combatants) it is possible to gain a more detailed understanding of issues such as ex-combatant reintegration. Additionally, by comparing the perspective of ex-combatants with civilians it is possible to gain a more nuanced understanding of the same issue. When researching social dynamics, life history interviews demonstrate a particularly beneficial approach to these issues.

A further way in which such issues can be examined with greater clarity is through the use of PRA techniques which, when used in conjunction with other methods, enable further triangulation and comparison through offering an additional perspective from the same respondents. Through their participatory nature PRA techniques enable the creation of an environment in which contestation of perspective is encouraged and the debates that arise through the mapping of a village, for example, provide great insights into the power relations and social relationships within that village. By observing the playing out of these relationships in a cooperative endeavour one is privy to social dynamics that perhaps may not be forthcoming in individual interviews. Such techniques are therefore useful when time is short. In addition to the above benefits of PRA techniques, if used before any other technique they can facilitate the building of a relationship between the researcher and the researched through the relaxed nature of the process and the familiarisation of the research topic.

8.4.2 Thesis Output 2: Theoretical Advancements

Theoretical advancements that can be made as a result of this study can be sub-divided into the two main theoretical concepts that have been utilised in this research. The first to be examined will be advancements that will enhance our understanding of reconciliation followed by social capital. The issue of DDR will be considered in a separate, subsequent section.

Reconciliation Theoretical Advancements

Similarly to social capital literature, the literature that exists on reconciliation is dominated by Western-centric, Christian based literature that understands reconciliation from a certain perspective and applies reconciliatory measures that are, in theory, appropriate to this understanding of reconciliation. However, the linking into this study of the concept of social capital helps to expand our understanding of reconciliation from a different perspective. Whilst much of the reconciliation literature prescribes solutions such as tribunals and TRCs, results from this research indicate that this is not necessarily the most suitable for the communitarian based societies in much of rural Africa. Reconciliation in these contexts is more about social reconciliation than TRCs and Transitional Justice that Western-centric literature bases its discussion on and this is crucial for the way in which reconciliation is approached.

In Rwanda reconciliation initiatives that engage the community at the grassroots and allow them ownership over their own progression are much more influential than the ICTR or other solutions proposed by the international community. Reconciliation between neighbours within communities is a profoundly personal matter and although projects can be developed to promote and assist in this process, ultimately it cannot be forced and has to occur at the speed chosen by those reconciling. By recognising the immense significance of indigenous knowledge and incorporating this into reconciliation literature, the chances of an understanding of the reconciliation process that both reflects experience and has the potential to make a greater difference is increased. The way in which Catholics and Protestants may reconcile in Northern Ireland or the pro and anti Franco factions in Spain differ in themselves but also substantially with the African context; what works for one does not necessarily work for the other and if our true aim is to achieve reconciliation then it is necessary to understand that context and integrate not only indigenous knowledge, but also indigenous ownership into the design and implementation of reconciliation initiatives. This research brings some bearing onto this subject through its examination of community-based reconciliation endeavours.

A further way in which this research augments literature on reconciliation is by its consideration of the different groups involved in the process. Within the review of

reconciliation literature ex-combatants were only referred to in two contexts: first, in a journal article by Van der Merwe (2003) who, during interviews, found an ex-combatant who emphasised the importance of the localisation of reconciliation efforts as, if this takes place at the national level, it misses individual cases, which reinforces the argument made in the previous paragraph. Second, in the writings of Lundin (1998) and Veale and Stavrou (2003) who talk about ex-combatants engaging in indigenous cleansing rituals which contribute to reconciliation in Mozambique and Uganda respectively. Although both these examples are important in their own right they demonstrate the lack of coverage of indigenous approaches to reconciliation and the impact particular groups can make in the reconciliation process.

As much DDR literature recognises that if ex-combatants are not effectively reintegrated they can be detrimental to the achievement of peace. Peace, as understood in terms of positive peace, includes reconciliation and as such, if ex-combatants are not successfully reintegrated the attainment of reconciliation is put under jeopardy. This gives a negative acknowledgement to the importance of ex-combatants to the reconciliation process; however it does not in any way recognise how they may positively contribute to it. The results of this study indicate that when ex-combatants engage in the rebuilding of the community both socially and physically they can have a significant positive influence in the reconciliation process. In terms of reconciliation literature this enhances our understanding of how reconciliation is achieved at the grassroots by acknowledging that those who are part of the problem need to be part of the solution if a solution is to be found. Rather than concentrating on ethnocentric, state-centric approaches to reconciliation; this research is beneficial by way of its contribution to academic understanding of the actors involved in grassroots reconciliation.

This thesis develops our understanding of reconciliation through the following:

- 1) Situating the process of reconciliation in the complexity of the post-conflict environment.
- 2) Highlighting the shortcomings of current reconciliation thinking.
- 3) Expanding on current understanding of indigenous reconciliation techniques through a consideration of community practices in Rwanda and their application to the reconciliation process.

- 4) Linking the concepts of social capital and reconciliation so as to develop a more elaborate understanding of how reconciliation is achieved, and how it can be, in a loose form, measured.
- 5) Introducing a significant actor in the reconciliation process and delineating how the social reintegration of ex-combatants, through social capital renewal, can make important contributions to the reconciliation process and peace building.

Social Capital Theoretical Advancements

There are two main ways in which this research enhances our understanding of social capital and makes recommendations as to how such literature can be developed: through augmenting our comprehension of the link between violent conflict and social capital, and developing the use of the social capital concept in the developing world context through its application to social reintegration and cohesion.

Expanding on the work of Colletta and Cullen (2000) and Nayaran (2000), as well as applying the writings of other authors, this research provides a detailed analysis as to how social capital can contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict and how such violent conflict impacts on social capital before examining ways in which social capital can be restored in the PCE. This is potentially a significant advancement in our understanding of conflict as it not only deepens our appreciation of what leads to violent conflict, which then enables the development of more effective conflict prevention strategies, but it also elucidates the dynamics of the conflict process which aids in our mapping and negotiation of the PCE, thus facilitating the design of more successful practices in post-conflict reconstruction. Additionally, the social capital concept could be used to explain other conflict related social phenomena such as insurgency. Social capital is therefore a concept that can augment our understanding of the conflict context and should be utilised more when attempting to grasp the complexity of these environments.

An increased understanding of conflict is not the only benefit of this research. As stated in chapter three, the concept of social capital was derived in the West in order to explain social organisation in countries such as Italy and the USA. However, due to the relative infancy of the concept its application to the context of the developing world has been

somewhat limited, although this has expanded over recent years with the creation of the Social Capital Initiative as part of the Social Development Department of the World Bank in 1996. This research adds to the application of social capital in the developing world in a number of ways: first, the use of social capital as a mechanism through which to better understand violent conflict and post-conflict reconstruction efforts implicitly adds to this, due to the fact that violent conflict of an intrastate nature predominately occurs within the developing world or in transitional countries. Second, although the application of social capital in this research is focused on the social reintegration of ex-combatants, the very fact ex-combatants are reintegrating into a community implies the involvement of the community in such reintegration. Therefore, this research can develop our understanding of social capital within the context of community development as much of the mechanisms that aid ex-combatant reintegration also contribute to community development, post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. Third, by increasing our understanding of the use of social capital in these contexts it is possible to apply this understanding to specific areas such as IDP and refugee reintegration that are concerned with issues of community cohesion. Fourth, the results of this study proffer a number of indicators²⁵² that enhance our understanding of social capital in these contexts yet are derived from the perspective of those from these contexts, thus increasing the validity of their use. In doing this, the study highlights the relevancy of the use of social capital in these contexts, thus increasing its applicability from contexts other than the West, and strengthens the methodology used to understand social capital.

Specifically, this thesis develops social capital theory through the following:

- 1) Establishing a framework for understanding how bonding, bridging and social capital interrelate to contribute to the outbreak of violent conflict.
- 2) Developing our comprehension of the ways in which violent conflict impact on bonding, bridging and vertical social capital.
- 3) Isolating ways in which the social reintegration of ex-combatants can contribute to the balancing and strengthening of vertical social capital
- 4) Explicating the transformation of bridging and bonding social capital as a result of ex-combatant social reintegration.

²⁵² See appendices 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3

- 5) Linking social capital with post-conflict reconstruction issues such as social reintegration and reconciliation, thus facilitating a deeper conceptualisation of post-conflict reconstruction.
- 6) Contributing to development of a methodology for the measurement of social capital.

8.4.3 Thesis Output 3: DDR Recommendations

The results of this research have highlighted a number of issues that can develop further our understanding of DDR. The focus of this research in terms of DDR lies with that of social reintegration. As explained in the preface and chapter two, the issue of social reintegration is often neglected compared to economic reintegration due to its intangible nature. From this research it is evident that there are possibilities open to us as researchers to examine social reintegration in greater depth. Essentially this research utilises the measurement of social capital as a proxy for determining social reintegration. Whilst this is, perhaps, contestable due to the fact the correct way to measure social capital is not universally agreed upon it does, nevertheless, provide an ideal starting point from which we can work towards designing a more accurate measure of social reintegration. As has been demonstrated by this study, social reintegration is an especially important component of the DDR process as not only does its attainment signify that the reintegration stage is complete, but it also has a significant influence on other vital aspects of post-conflict reconstruction such as community development and reconciliation. This then demonstrates the need to understand more fully the process of social reintegration, what can facilitate it and what can retard it, which this research attempts to do.

Specifically, this research offers a more comprehensive understanding of the process through which ex-combatants socially reintegrate, both in terms of obstacles to, and solutions for, such social reintegration. As a result not only it is possible to better understand how this process can be augmented, but by having an advanced understanding of this it is possible to analyse the impact ex-combatants' social reintegration has on other aspects of society, as this research does. The importance of this is that it illustrates the significance of DDR as more than just a process we must engage with in order to 'keep ex-combatants busy'. Whilst the economic reintegration

of ex-combatants is important as it has an impact on reducing insecurity, by taking a more holistic view of DDR we can see that the effective reintegration of ex-combatants has a significant influence on peacebuilding and reconciliation.

Essentially, the thesis provides robust support for the maximalist perspective of DDR by offering an elaborate mapping of the process of social reintegration and the way in which impacts on reconciliation and post-conflict reconstruction. This is the key way in which this thesis advances DDR policy. At the initial planning stage of a DDR programme it is necessary to first situate it on the spectrum of a minimalist to maximalist programme; that is, DDR planners need to decide whether the purpose of the programme is purely to keep ex-combatants busy (minimalist) or whether it is conceived of as a significant part of the post-conflict reconstruction process that will contribute to reconciliation and development (maximalist), or at a point in between. By taking up a position at this stage it is then possible to plan the demobilisation and reintegration components in such a way that they result in deliverables that meet the assigned position. As this research has demonstrated, the social reintegration of ex-combatants has an important contribution to the reconciliation process and it is therefore arguable that a more maximalist position should be taken. By recognising the way in which social reintegration occurs, and its derivative effects on social capital and reconciliation, DDR programmes can be planned in coordination with the overall post-conflict reconstruction process.

Once the importance of social reintegration is fully acknowledged as a fundamental aspect of DDR and its links to other, critical aspects of the post-conflict reconstruction process are appreciated, then the way in which we understand and approach DDR can develop. Just because something is hard to attain it does not mean we, as academics and practitioners, should not try. This research, if only in a small way, attempts to help bridge the gap between academic and practice by recognising the gaps in the literature and the ways in which programmes are implemented and evaluated.

A major part of bridging this gap is the inclusion of a wider range of stakeholders than previously involved. Community members should be included in the planning stage; these can range from local leaders, religious leaders, teachers, or others with a voice in local communities who can put forward the concerns of the communities and assist in the development of effective community sensitisation measures. NGOs operating in the

community, as well as those who function within areas that are associated in some way with ex-combatant reintegration, should also be incorporated, as should national institutions concerned with social cohesion and reconciliation. The aim of doing this is three-fold: first, by including all relevant stakeholders and opening up the planning process, community ownership of, and participation in, the whole DDR process is enhanced. This is important in ensuring that it is not only successful, but also sustainable. Second, efficient synergy between ex-combatants, the community, the government and complementary organisations in the implementation stage is crucial as it is through such synergy that opportunities to enhance the social reintegration of ex-combatants can be exploited and the absence of such synergy can result in missed opportunities or an unnecessary overlapping of functions. Third, the development of community ownership and participation and synergy at the planning stage enables the development and inclusion of appropriate sub-programmes into the overall programme that will support the renewal and strengthening of social capital; this could include CBR or association promotion, among others.

Specifically it does this through the following in particular:

- 1) Acknowledging the reintegration obstacles unique to ex-combatants
 - a. The starting position of ex-combatants
 - b. Access to land and housing
 - c. Psychosocial issues
 - d. Special groups
- 2) Categorising the key factors contributing to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants at the macro, meso and micro level.
- 3) Highlighting the potential²⁵³ importance of demobilisation camps for preparing ex-combatants for their return to the community and sensitising communities for their return.
- 4) Developing our understanding of the complementary nexus between economic and social reintegration
- 5) Supporting the promotion of association membership and CBR for a more successful social reintegration process

²⁵³ The results of this research cannot necessarily be generalised exactly to other cases, as they are relevant for the Rwanda case. However they do provide a basis for examination and consideration and should be treated as such.

- 6) Isolating potential 'spoilers' to the successful reintegration of ex-combatants and offering possible mitigation methods.
- 7) Enhancing our ability to create meaningful links between social reintegration and other concepts, such as social capital, to augment our understanding.
- 8) Identifying significant impacts social reintegration has on peacebuilding and reconciliation.

8.5 Potential Future Research

The results of this research and the recommendations made indicate a number of key areas in which there is a potential for future research. These are as follows:

- 1) The benefits of CBR were examined as a component of this research; however they are deserving of a more thorough investigation in order to develop CBR as a concept, but also to expand our understanding of the connection it has with other concepts such as ex-combatant reintegration, reconciliation and others.
- 2) As identified in the theoretical recommendation, current literature on reconciliation is somewhat limited and needs to be expanded. Therefore, research examining grassroots reconciliation practices within the DDR process would be beneficial, with a much greater focus on the stakeholders and their agendas in the reconciliation process.
- 3) Due to the recognition that there exists a need to address those who joined as children but demobilised as adults it is also of paramount importance that further research is also conducted on the reintegration of this group. Essentially this may deliver better recommendations as to the challenges faced by this group and how they can be dealt with to better augment their reintegration. This would then contribute to our understanding of how child ex-combatants influence the reconciliation process.
- 4) The final area in which a potential for further research is evident from this study is on the development of research methodologies that help expand our knowledge of social reintegration and social capital. Although this research makes good contributions to this methodology, they can always be developed and research into this would be particularly beneficial, not only for ex-combatant reintegration but also for refugees, IDPs, and other groups in the PCE.

Appendices

Appendix 1:

Table 5 - Indicators of Social Capital: Grootaert (1998:15)

6.3 Indicators of Social Capital

The following indicators have all been used in empirical studies. Indicators of horizontal associations take a microperspective and typically have been collected for analysis within a country. The other sets of indicators have been calculated at the national level and have been used in cross-country research.

Horizontal associations

Number and type of associations or local institutions	Extent of trust in trade unions
Extent of membership	Perception of extent of community organization
Extent of participatory decisionmaking	Reliance on networks of support
Extent of kin homogeneity within the association	Percentage of household income from remittances
Extent of income and occupation homogeneity within the association	Percentage of household expenditure for gifts and transfers
Extent of trust in village members and households	Old-age dependency ratio
Extent of trust in government	

Civil and political society

Index of civil liberties (Gastil, Freedom House)	Index of democracy
Percentage of population facing political discrimination	Index of corruption
Index of intensity of political discrimination	Index of government inefficiency
Percentage of population facing economic discrimination	Strength of democratic institutions
Index of intensity of economic discrimination	Measure of "human liberty"
Percentage of population involved in separatist movements	Measure of political stability
Gastil's index of political rights	Degree of decentralization of government
Freedom House index of political freedoms	Voter turnout
	Political assassinations
	Constitutional government changes
	Coups

Social Integration

Indicator of social mobility	Other crime rates
Measure of strength of "social tensions"	Prisoners per 100,000 people
Ethnolinguistic fragmentation	Illegitimacy rates
Riots and protest demonstrations	Percentage of single-parent homes
Strikes	Divorce rate
Homicide rates	Youth unemployment rate
Suicide rates	

Legal and governance aspects

Quality of bureaucracy	Repudiation of contracts by government
Independence of court system	Contract enforceability
Expropriation and nationalization risk	Contract-intensive money (currency/ M2)

Appendix 2.0:**Table 6 – Rwanda Social Capital Indicators (adapted from Colletta & Cullen, 2000)**

Proxy	Variable
Bonding & Bridging Social Capital	
Community Events	Increased Feeling of Solidarity Improved Communication Promoted Civic Mindedness
Informal Networks	Informal Exchange of Information Informal Exchange of Resources Factors that Shape Exchange
Trust & Social Cohesion	Channels & mechanisms for exchange of information Existence & nature of associations & reason for creation Intermarriage & extended family relations Intercommunity relations & conflict resolution mechanisms Types, nature and organisation of exchange and interdependence Nature & organisation of assistance, mutual aid and cooperation Collective Responsibility
Associations	Structure, rules and roles of Associations Function: Nurture, self-help, solidarity & cooperation
Vertical Social Capital (Synergy)	
Village Leadership	Types of Leadership Roles in Political, Social, Religious & Welfare activities How they shape networks within & between communities
External Agencies	Community links to Govt, NGOs and Private sector

Appendix 2.1:**Table 7 – Eastern Province Social Capital Indicators: Author**

Community Events	
Ubukwe	Wedding - Fellowship, sharing drinks, dancing, exchange cows, share news; Unites from all areas; Affects many
Kubatirisha	Baptism - Brings different communities together, share news, drink together, joy, fellowship, dancing; Affects many but not as many as a wedding
Gusohora Umwana	Baby Naming Ceremony 8 th day after birth; Drinking, give feast to children, gather to eat, drink and celebrate; Medium affect
Kugabirana	Communal Feast & Drinking; Exchange of cow and continued eating at recipients abode
Kuva Ku Kiriliyo	Mourning stage after death (length dependent on age – Young = 7 days, old = 1 month); Support, collection of money to enable activities throughout the period; Affects whole community and beyond
Umuganda	Communal Cleaning programme on last Saturday of the month – everyone works together then drinks in the afternoon. Affects the whole community
Informal Networks	
Forms of Exchange	Weddings (exchange tools for wedding, beer, money, food, labour, wood) Agriculture (Exchange seeds, labour (when sick) and land) Death/sickness (gathering food, money, visits etc to support family)
Drivers/Shapers of Exchange	Crucial to life – poverty would increase without it. Drivers – Assistance, sickness, mutual assistance/reciprocity, INTERDEPENDENCE Frequency – Everyday life, between neighbours, between Umudugudu's.
Associations	
AIDs Club	Education on AIDs prevention; Nurturing: free HIV test, helps support networks, fights discrimination
Football Teams	Helps mental & physical strength, helps meetings between sectors (bridging) & solidarity within community due to supporting team.
Unity & Reconciliation	Reduces shame of talking, helps to meet those

Association	opposed to U & R, increases cohesion and sharing, creates love in community, helps Gacaca work well, increases learning which goes around the country.
Culture Troupe	Cultural education to children, drama during April - reconciliation
Trust & Social Cohesion	
Intermarriage & Extended Family Relations	Between families, between Hutu and Tutsi in sector or different province – around 40% Help U & R, becoming more accepted
Intercommunity Relations & Conflict Resolution Mechanisms	Case between neighbours/husband & wife – use friends from each side, when still not resolved Umudugudu leader calls others and decision is made, may include compensation. Promotes U & R (money used for feasting & drinking Husband & Wife – call neighbour then family, if not solved taken to municipality for solving or divorce
Collective Responsibility	Umudugudu, Gacaca, U & R meetings, child raising, social protection
Village Leadership	
Types	Umudugudu leader, cell coordinator, Cell E.S, Cell Informational Officer, Security Leader, Cell Secretary, Cell Education Leader, Cell Health Officer, Cell Social Affairs Officer, Cell Women's Pastor, Padre Shape networks – public meetings, talks in churches, surgeries, solve problems, seek assistance, ensure security and wellbeing
Trust in Local Leadership	Very trusted, elected by public, have powers of removal, removal happens at Umudugudu and cell
External Linkages	
Community & National Government	Nat Govt programmes – resources, housing, small projects, poverty alleviation, health, education. Very good links Very high trust – Funds work in Umudugudu level (Himo) tree planting scheme but debate over quality of tress used
Community & NGOs	Not many NGOs (national or international) Weak links
Community & Private Sector	Not good links, do not help only seek own benefit, little investment

Appendix 2.2:**Table 8 – Southern Province Social Capital Indicators: Author**

Community Events	
Ubukwe	Wedding - Fellowship, sharing drinks, dancing, exchange cows, share news; Unites from all areas; Affects many
Kubatarisha	Baptism - Brings different communities together, share news, drink together, joy, fellowship, dancing; Affects many but not as many as a wedding
Gusohora Umwana	Baby Naming Ceremony 8 th day after birth; Drinking, give feast to children, gather to eat, drink and celebrate; Medium affect
Guhingisha	Time of drinking after working on others land; Develops unity, cooperation and efficient working; Affect is smaller but very strong within the group
Gutabara	Period of mourning (7 days); Support, collection of money to enable activities throughout the period; Affects whole community and beyond
Gacaca	Promotes Unity & Reconciliation, share information about the past (communication), forgiveness; Maximum affect, whole community and country.
Informal Networks	
Forms of Exchange	Water, eggs, beans, panga, knife, petrol, cooking utensils, matches, labour, money, livestock
Drivers/Shapers of Exchange	Crucial to life – poverty would increase without it. KUGABIRA – Exchange of cows (cultural- because of love, return and with drinks. Drivers – Assistance, sickness, mutual assistance/reciprocity, INTERDEPENDENCE Frequency – Everyday life, between neighbours, between Umudugudu's.
Associations	
Abateranankuga	Agricultural association founded 2002, 13 members, aids self-help, mutual help and solidarity and cohesion
Agaseka	Association to collect and lend money founded 2003, 130 members, aids self-help, mutual help and solidarity and cohesion

Urubahbyingwe	Honey production association founded 2000, 15 members, aids self-help, mutual help and solidarity and cohesion
Trust & Social Cohesion	
Intermarriage	Between different areas, between Hutu and Tutsi doesn't matter as are mixed
Intercommunity Relations	Family problems (call for family members to resolve), Neighbours (call one relative each and neighbours – may go to municipality), Forgive, warning, compensation. Children fighting, crop destruction by livestock, bar fighting (resolve and drink together) Intercommunity relations very good
Collective Responsibility	Election attendance 100%, Gacaca 80%, Umudugudu 75%, Municipality meetings 70%
Village Leadership	
Types	Executive Committee (Chief of Umudugudu, security, social affairs, information, development) Headmaster – 2 nd school, CFJ, primary.
Trust in Local Leadership	100% (answered by Umudugudu leader, no-one said anything)
External Linkages	
Community & National Government	Provision of health insurance, poverty reduction, school fees. Very good linkages – Trust in National Government is very good (support for govt programmes)
Community & NGOs	AIDs help, provision to vulnerable Not very good linkages
Community & Private Sector	Employment provider Medium to good links

Appendix 2.3:**Table 9 – Northern Province Social Capital Indicators: Author**


Community Events	
Ubukwe	Wedding - Sharing food/drinks, gift giving, dancing, exchange cows; Affects around 300; Affects many
Kubatorisha	Baptism – From Church go home and have feast/drinking. God-parents give speech and offer gifts and rosary beads/bible, feast again. Around 50 attend
Kwita Izina	Baby Naming Ceremony 8 th day after birth; Gather to eat, drink and celebrate, each write a name they wish for the child in a book and the parents chose. Involves everyone there Medium affect
Kuvangiza Ikiliyo	Closing of Mourning Period; Involves around 100; Giving of drinks/crop food, spend time chatting to give comfort, give speeches, may involve giving of cow/goat.
Informal Networks	
Forms of Exchange	Guhana Inka (Giving of cows) – Between relatives and close friends, given out of love/mutual interdependence, After cow is given return to house and share drinks/food. Ubudehe (Giving Labour) – Between neighbours and those dependant e.g. old age/disability, vulnerable; Prepare food/drink, group will come and work then share after
Drivers/Shapers of Exchange	
Associations	
Tailor Association	Formed 1997 – 50 members (XCs & Civs) Started through women, extended to teach others in community. Work together every day plus regular meetings; Self-help: Promoted job opportunity & can tailor own clothes. Mutual-help: Give training/teaching and enable those to then train others. Solidarity & Cooperation: Constantly working together, people from different areas, profit's given to a member on rotation for those who agree
APPEP Association	Environmental cleaning of centre, 6 months old, 36 members (XCs and Civs – Pres of Demob) Does cleaning in centre & will build public toilets for market, meets each month and in special circumstances

	<p>Self-help: Potential for job opportunity/some paid</p> <p>Mutual-help: Cleaner environment, public toilets, bin</p> <p>Solidarity & Cooperation: Brings people together, commitment to community through environment, social responsibility</p>
Trust & Social Cohesion	
Intermarriage & Extended family Relations	<p>Mainly within community, between workers & students, people who have moved, between Hutu and Tutsi but not too much because of high proportion of Hutu.</p> <p>High extended family</p>
Intercommunity Relations & Conflict Resolution Mechanisms	<p>Husband & Wife – Call family to mediate, maybe to Umudugudu if family cannot resolve, at this level usually results in divorce.</p> <p>Land Dispute – Call neighbours to try and resolve, call local leaders if doesn't work: Abunzi (Umudugudu conciliator), Go to sector court (civil court).</p> <p>Financial Disputes – Debt repayment – go to Abunzi, robbery of crops/livestock</p> <p>Relations generally good but land/debt disputes biggest problem.</p>
Collective Responsibility	<p>Municipal meetings (Umudugudu to sector level)</p> <p>Umudugudu: 1 per month, 85% attendance rate</p> <p>Cell: 1 per 3 months, 70% attendance rate</p> <p>Sector: 3 per year, 70% attendance rate</p> <p>Umuganda – Environmental cleaning at sector level, 1 per month (3rd Saturday), 85% attend, flowed by meetings at sector level.</p>
Village Leadership	
Types	<p>Local Govt: Umudugudu: Umudugudu leader, information, security, health, development (elected positions)</p> <p>Cell: Cell coordinator, Cell E.S (nominated not elected), Cell secretary, development, security, gender, health, education, youth, culture and sport</p> <p>Pastor (Restoration Church)- Pastor will attend meetings and can contribute but not lead, meetings called to deal with specific issues</p>
Trust in Local Leadership	Good
External Linkages	
Community & National Government	<p>No precise linkages go through the cell.</p> <p>Ubudehe (microfinance/MINALOC); Health Insurance; Govt intentions for each district.</p> <p>Good linkages</p> <p>Very High trust in Nat Govt</p>
Community & NGOs	One NGO providing access to water

	In between good and bad linkages Water provision was seen as duty of NGOs when offered choice between Govt, NGOs and Private sector
Community & Private Sector	No private sector in cell


Appendix 3.0:

Figure 9 – Eastern Province Sector Social Network Mapping: Author




Legend


Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 3.0a:**Figure 10 – Eastern Province (Umudugudu 1) Social Network Mapping: Author****Legend**

Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol


Appendix 3.0b:**Figure 11 – Eastern Province (Umudugudu 2) Social Network Mapping: Author****Legend**

Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 3.0c:**Figure 12 – Eastern Province (Umudugudu 3) Social Network Mapping: Author**

Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol


Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 3.1:**Figure 13 – Southern Province Cell Social Network Mapping: Author****Legend**

Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol


Appendix 3.1:

Figure 14 – Southern Province Cell Social Network Mapping: Author




Legend


Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 3.1a:**Figure 15 – Southern Province (Umudugudu 1) Social Network Mapping: Author****Legend**

Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 3.1b:**Figure 16 – Southern Province (UmuDugudu 2) Social Network Mapping: Author****Legend**


Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 3.2:**Figure 17 – Northern Province Cell Social Network Mapping: Author****Legend**

Line Colour	Form of Exchange (Arrow indicates direction of exchange)
Black	Water
Blue	Food/Feasts/Drink
Red	Information
Green	Tools
Yellow	Money
Orange	Salt
Brown	Wood
Pink	Cultivating (Labour)
Grey	Petrol

Appendix 4:


Diagram 2 – Eastern Province Institutional Diagramming: Author




Legend		Criteria of Importance			
Internal Institutions		Variable	Size-Large	Size-Medium	Size-Small
1	Church	Range	Affects Many	Affects a lot	Affects Few
2	Hospital	Survival	Vital	Relatively Important	Less Important
3	Market	Sustainability	Long Term	Medium Term	Short Term
4	ATV – Cycle Taxi	Employment Creation	High	Medium	Low
5	Rice Factory				
6	Kindergarten				
7	Unity & Reconciliation Association				
8	Environmental Cleaning Association				
9	Business Cooperative				
10	Ubudehe (microfinance) Association				
External Institutions					
11	World Food Programme				
12	Police				
13	Military Base				
14	Municipality				
15	Schools (Primary & Secondary)				
16	CNLS (Commission against AIDs)				
17	SOGEA (Water & Electricity Repair NGO)				
18	CARITAS				
19	World Vision				
20	Fishing Association				

Appendix 4.1:

Diagram 3 – Southern Province Institutional Diagramming: Author



Legend		Criteria of Importance			
Internal Institutions		Variable	Size-Large	Size-Medium	Size-Small
1	Primary & Secondary Schools	People Affected	High	Medium	Low
2	Market	Development Impact	High	Medium	Low
3	Gacaca	Economic Benefit	High	Medium	Low
4	CFJ - Apprentice School	Employment Creation	High	Medium	Low
5	Beekeeping Association	Sustainability	High	Medium	Low
6	Coopec - Microfinance Cooperative				
7	Adventist Church				
8	AIDs Association				
9	Pharmacy				
External Institutions					
10	Police				
11	FARG - Govt Association				
12	Red Cross				
13	SDA/RIBA (Twa/Poor) Association				
14	CARITAS				
15	Ministry of Local Government				
16	Champ (Association for Poor/Orphans)				
17	CSR (Governmental Social Care)				

Appendix 4.2:**Diagram 4** – Northern Province Institutional Diagramming: Author

Legend		Criteria of Importance			
Internal Institutions		Variable	Size-Large	Size-Medium	Size-Small
1	Market	Usefulness	High	Medium	Low
2	Church	Development Impact	High	Medium	Low
3	Schools (Primary & Secondary)	Sustainability	High	Medium	Low
4	Cell Office	Image Provision	High	Medium	Low
External Institutions		Range of Benefit	High	Medium	Low
5	Police				
6	Municipality				
7	Mutobo Demobilisation Camp				
8	ISAE Busogo (Agricultural College)				
9	Hospital				
10	R.C. Church				
11	CARITAS				

Appendix 5:**Table 10** – Eastern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell – 8th June 2007): Author

1	Population: Under 16 17-35 36-60 61+ Total	1400 400 400 350 2551
2	Male/Female Ratio (%)	46:54
3	No. Unemployed (%)	8
4	No Female-Headed Households (%)	20
5	Ethnic Composition	Cannot Tell
6	Religious Composition	RC 60%, Protestant/Adventist 38%, Muslim 2%
7	Main Source of Income	Business (shops, food-market); Agriculture (rice, beans, banana, maize); Pasturing (cows, goats, chicken)
8	Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness	Majority access clean water (90%-5% homes & rest through public tap (boil)); Electricity (25%-others use petrol lights); Dirt roads
9	Crime Level	Theft (cycles, tools, crops); No violent crime – 6 cases per year
10	Distance & Time to Nearest City	Kigali (70km:1h20m by car); Nymata (30km:45m)
11	Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre	Kigali
12	School Enrolment (Primary:Secondary)	100:35
13	Distance to Nearest School (Primary:Secondary)	400m:800m
14	Main NGOs & Associations Present	Rice Factory; 3 microfinance cooperatives; Caritas (development); JICA (Japanese devp)(Rice production)
15	Govt Presence	Community Leaders; Parliament Deputy/Ministers (visits/meetings; Education; Agricultural training; Initiation of Coffee plantations; Security (military/police/NSS)

Appendix 5.1:**Table 11 – Southern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell – 17th June 2007): Author**

1	Population: Under 16 17-35 36-60 61+ Total	6/700 (4% Orphans) 600 650 150/200 2000
2	Male/Female Ratio (%)	49/51
3	No. Unemployed (%)	4% (6% Formal, 90% Informal, including Subsistence Farming)
4	No Female-Headed Households (%)	30
5	Ethnic Composition	Twa 1% – Cannot determine Hutu and Tutsi as no records
6	Religious Composition	RC 90%, Pentecostal 7%, Adventist 3%
7	Main Source of Income	Agriculture & Pasturing
8	Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness	Market; Municipal Offices; Primary & Secondary School; No Electricity (Generators & Petrol Lamps-Petrol sold in market); Water (Underground-10 Public Taps); Roads Unmade
9	Crime Level	Alcohol induced violence 3-4/month; Theft of crops; Land disputes 1/month; robbery 6/month
10	Distance & Time to Nearest City	Butare: 36km, 1 hour in car
11	Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre	Butare
12	School Enrolment (Primary:Secondary) (%)	90:2
13	Distance to Nearest School (Primary:Secondary)	300m:1km
14	Main NGOs & Associations Present	Caritas; World Vision; SDAIRIBA; ARDENYA (agriculture & crop selection)
15	Govt Presence	UBUDEHE (MINALOC); FARG (MINALOC); RCCP (MINECOFIN); PPML (MINECOM)

Appendix 5.2:**Table 12 – Western Province Entry Survey (Cell Coordinator – 25th June 2007): Author**

1	Population: Under 16 17-35 36-60 61+ Total	1017 (22% Orphans) 714 1124 1907 4762
2	Male/Female Ratio (%)	35:65
3	No. Unemployed (%)	80% (all subsistence farmers)
4	No Female-Headed Households (%)	35%
5	Ethnic Composition	Hutu 87%; Tutsi 13%; Twa 0%
6	Religious Composition	RC 70%; Pentecostal 27%; Muslim 3%
7	Main Source of Income	Agriculture & Pasturing
8	Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness	Water (65%), Electricity (12%); Main Tarmac road (Gisenyi to Ruhuha) & unmade roads; No market; Schools (1 primary & 2 secondary)
9	Crime Level	3 cases rape/3 months; 15 robbery/3 month; 2 hold-ups/3 month
10	Distance & Time to Nearest City	Gisenyi (12km:2h Foot:1.5m Car)
11	Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre	Mahoko (3km:20m Foot:3m Car)
12	School Enrolment (Primary:Secondary)	78:5
13	Distance to Nearest School (Primary:Secondary)	1km:1km
14	Main NGOs & Associations Present	Ouvroir (assoc of artisans); Economat General (assoc carpentry); Caritas; Care International; Red Cross; WFP; Baire (NGO)
15	Govt Presence	No Govt Presence.

Appendix 5.3:**Table 13 – Northern Province Entry Survey (E.S Cell – 3rd July 2007): Author**

1	Population: Under 16 17-35 36-60 61+ Total	500 (7% Orphans) 1762 (combined with 36-60) 2818 5070
2	Male/Female Ratio (%)	15:85
3	No. Unemployed (%)	90% (all engaged in SF)
4	No Female-Headed Households (%)	70%
5	Ethnic Composition	Twa 1.8%. Hutu 87-93%. Tutsi 5-11%
6	Religious Composition	RC 72%. Protestant 23%. Muslim 5%
7	Main Source of Income	Agriculture & Public works (civil servant)
8	Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness	Electricity 25%. Water 7% access to public taps, rest use rivers/rainwaters: petrol & candles (market): roads (unmade-1 made separating cells)
9	Crime Level	Robbery 2/month: fighting
10	Distance & Time to Nearest City	Ruhengeri (5km:30m Car, 1h30m foot)
11	Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre	Byangambo (1km:30m Foot)
12	School Enrolment (Primary:Secondary)	95:60
13	Distance to Nearest School (Primary:Secondary)	800m:1 km
14	Main NGOs & Associations Present	No NGOs – Assocs (12 – tailors, agriculture, pasturing, porters, businessmen)
15	Govt Presence	Schools & MINALOC

Appendix 5.4:

Table 14 – Combined Entry Survey for North, East, South & West (June & July 2007):
Author

	Factor	North	West	South	East
1	Population: Under 16 17-35 36-60 61+ Total	500 (7% Orphans) 1762 (combined with 36-60) 2818 5070	1017 (22% Orphans) 714 1124 1907 4762	6/700 (4% Orphans) 600 650 150/200 2000	1400 400 400 350 2551
2	Male/Female Ratio (%)	15:85	35:65	49/51	46:54
3	No. Unemployed (%)	90% (all engaged in SF)	80% (all subsistence farmers)	4% (6% Formal, 90% Informal, including Subsistence Farming)	8
4	No Female-Headed Households (%)	70%	35%	30	20
5	Ethnic Composition	Twa 1.8%:Hutu 87-93%:Tutsi 5-11%	Hutu 87%; Tutsi 13%; Twa 0%	Twa 1% – Cannot determine Hutu and Tutsi as no records	Cannot Tell
6	Religious Composition	RC 72%:Protestant 23%:Muslim 5%	RC 70%; Pentecostal 27%; Muslim 3%	RC 90%, Pentecostal 7%, Adventist 3%	RC 60%, Protestant/Adventist 38%; Muslim 2%
7	Main Source of Income	Agriculture & Public works (civil servant)	Agriculture & Pasturing	Agriculture & Pasturing	Business (shops, food-market); Agriculture (rice, beans, banana, maize); Pasturing (cows, goats, chicken)
8	Infrastructure Provision & Effectiveness	Electricity 25%:Water 7% access to public taps, rest use rivers/rainwaters:petrol & candles (market):roads (unmade-1 made separating cells)	Water (65%), Electricity (12%); Main Tarmac road (Gisenyi to Ruhuha) & unmade roads; No market; Schools (1 primary & 2 secondary)	Market; Municipal Offices; Primary & Secondary School; No Electricity (Generators & Petrol Lamps-Petrol sold in market); Water (Underground-10 Public Taps); Roads Unmade	Majority access clean water (90%-5% homes & rest through public tap (boil)); Electricity (25%-others use petrol lights); Dirt roads

9	Crime Level	Robbery 2/month:fighting	3 cases rape/3 months; 15 robbery/3 month; 2 hold-ups/3 month	Alcohol induced violence 3-4/month; Theft of crops; Land disputes 1/month; robbery 6/month	Theft (cycles, tools, crops); No violent crime - 6 cases per year)
10	Distance & Time to Nearest City	Ruhengeri (5km:30m Car, 1h30m foot)	Gisenyi (12km:2h Foot:15m Car)	Butare: 36km, 1 hour in car	Kigali (70km:1h20m by car); Nymata (30km:45m)
11	Distance & Time to Nearest Trading Centre	Byangambo (1km:30m Foot)	Mahoko (3km:20m Foot:3m Car)	Butare	Kigali
12	School Enrolment % (Primary:Secondary)	95:60	78:5	90:2	100:35
13	Distance to Nearest School (Primary:Secondary)	800m:1km	1km:1km	300m:1km	400m:800m
14	Main NGOs & Associations Present	No NGOs - Assocs (12 - tailors, agriculture, pasturing, porters, businessmen)	Ouvroir (assoc of artisans); Economat General (assoc carpentry); Caritas; Care International; Red Cross; WFP; Baire (NGO)	Caritas; World Vision; SDAIRIBA; ARDENYA (agriculture & crop selection)	Rice Factory; 3 microfinance cooperatives; Caritas (development); JICA (Japanese devp)(Rice production)
15	Govt Presence	Schools & MINALOC	No Govt Presence.	UBUDEHE (MINALOC); FARG (MINALOC); RCCP (MINECOFIN); PPML (MINECOM)	Community Leaders; Parliament Deputy/Ministers (visits/meetings; Education; Agricultural training; Initiation of Coffee plantations; Security (military/police/NSS)

Appendix 6:**Table 15 – Sample RDRC Pre Discharge Orientation Programme (PDOP)**

DAY/DATE	Main speech	Speaker
Wed. 1/11/06	1. Official starting of demobilisation process	President of the Commission
Afternoon	2. National program of demobilisation	Commissioner
Thu. 2/11/06	3. Introduction to “Good Governance”	Brig. Gen. Jack Nziza; J5
Afternoon	4. Culture of patriotism	
	5. Refugees and consequences	
Fri. 3/11/06	6. Role of population in keeping security	District Police Commander
Afternoon	7. Task and role of national police	
Mon. 6/11/06	8. Rwanda security	2 nd Division CO
Afternoon	9. Reasons of war and consequences	
	10. Wars in the Great Lakes	
Tue. 7/11/06	11. Justice as a source of security and development	Mme Batsinda Aline; Procurer
Afternoon	12. Laws in Rwanda and the new constitution	
Wed. 8/11/06	13. Fighting against corruption, inequality and robbery	Auditor General
Afternoon	14. Decentralisation	General secretary of MINALOC
DAY/DATE	Main speech	Speaker
Thu. 9/11/06	15. Rwanda’s history before colonialism	Mr. Tito Rutaremara; “Umuvunyi Mukuru” (the ombudsman)
Afternoon	16. Rwanda’s history during colonialism	
	17. Rwanda’s history after colonialism	
Fri. 10/11/06	18. Nationality	Vice-pres of human right
Afternoon	19. Human Rights	
Mon. 13/11/06	20. History about the ideology of genocide in Rwanda	Hon. Munyurangabo François; (MP)
Afternoon	21. Habitat, land problems and saving the environment	State minister of land and environment; MINITERE

Tue. 14/11/06 Afternoon	22. Government programmes: achievements and planned tasks	State minister of commerce and finance; MINECOFIN
	23. Poverty situation in Rwanda and government programme to fight against poverty	
Wed. 15/11/06 Afternoon	24. Sources of genocide	Hon. Mpayimana Elie; senator
	25. Culture of tolerance in Rwanda after the horrible genocide.	
Thu. 16/11/06 Afternoon	26. Gender and complementarily	Mme Ingabire Marie immaculée
	27. The role of Rwandan women in developing our country	
	28. Specific problems that female ex-invaders encounter in reintegration	
DAY/DATE	Main speech	Speaker
Fri. 17/11/06 Afternoon	29. Unity and reconciliation	Executive secretary of NURC
	30. Personal hygiene and common hygiene	Capt. Biseruka Richard; Directorate of Medical Services/MOD
Mon. 20/11/06 Afternoon	31. Impact of CDC in development in our country	Mr. Bazatoha Adolphe; coordinator of DCDP/MINAL OC
	32. Programme of investment and tourism in Rwanda	General director of RIEPA
Tue. 21/11/06 Afternoon	33. Government programme on developing cooperatives	Directory of cooperatives in MINICOM
	34. Entrepreneurship course	Secrétaire d'Etat chargé du Développement des Compétences et du Travail
Wed. 22/11/06 Afternoon	35. NEPAD and Regional Integration.	Mr. Gatete Francis; NEPAD Advisor; Office of the President of the Republic of Rwanda
	36. Natural resources of Rwanda and the usefulness of natural resources in Rwanda's economy	Rector of ISAE

Thu. 23/11/06	37. Government programme for small industries and simple ones	Coordinator of PPMER; MINICOM
Afternoon	38. Development project	
Fri. 24/11/06	39. Rural (country) development project	Coordinator of RSSP; MINAGRI
Afternoon	40. Taxes' politics in Rwanda, operating system of Rwanda revenue authority (RRA), achievements and planned actions	
DAY/DATE	Main speech	Speaker
Mon. 27/11/06	41. Relationship between families (1 st part)	Mr. Rutubuka Emmanuel
Afternoon	42. Relationship between families (2 nd part)	
	43. Relationship between families (3 rd part)	
Tue. 28/11/06	44. International law against racism of any kind or form	Mr. Nkongori Laurent, commissioner in the Rwanda human right commission
Afternoon	45. international Law against genocide crime(crimes against human being)	
Wed.29/11/06	46. Education related to the nation	President of election commission
Afternoon	47. Fight against malaria	Coordinator of PNLP
Thu. 30/11/06	48. Trauma and how to help those who are affected	Service de Consultation PSYCHOSOCIAL
Afternoon	49. Life Assurance	General director of "life insurance in Rwanda"
Fri. 01/12/06	50. Programme of fighting against AIDS	Executive coordinator of CNLS
Afternoon	51. Operating of system of "Caisse social du Rwanda"(CSR)	Director General of CSR
Mon.4/12/06	52. AIDS testing and counselling	NRL/TRAC
Tue. 5/12/06	53. Questions and answers on AIDS	NRL/TRAC
DAY/DATE	Main speech	Speaker
Wed. 6/12/06	54. Agriculture in Rwanda	Minister of agricultural and agro forestry
Afternoon	55. Agriculture in Rwanda	
Thu. 7/12/06	56. The role of youth in our country's development	Minister of youths, culture

Afternoon	57. The role of culture in developing our country	and sports
Fri. 8/12/06	58. Gacaca court	Executive secretary in charge of GACACA court
Afternoon	59. The role of other countries in our country's problems	Minister of foreign affairs
Mon. 11/12/06	60. The role of journalism in Rwanda's problems	Director of ORINFOR
Afternoon	61. The role of journalism in Rwanda's problems	
Tue. 12/12/06	62. Government programme about teaching	Minister of Education
Nyuma ya saa sita	63. The government's educational policies	
Wed-Fri. 13-15/12/06	64. Social economic survey, ID photography	DO, MISO
	65. Medical Screening	MRU
Mon. 18/12/06	66. function of banks especially UBPR	Executive manager of UBPR (Union des Banques Populaire au Rwanda)
Nyuma ya saa sita	67. the function of banks especially then CSS	Executive manager of the Social Security Fund
DAY/DATE	Main speech	Speaker
Tue. 19/12/06	68. the role of churches in tackling life issues	Mr. Rutayisire Antoine, vice president of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission
Nyuma ya saa sita	The role of religion in the national development	
Wed.20-24/12/06	69. Entrepreneurship skills by CEFE	4 Resource Persons with CEFE skills
Tue. 26/12/06	70. The necessity of participating in governments' policies	

Wed. 27/12/06	71. conference with the ex-armed group	Commissioner David Munyurangabo Commissioner Maj. Gen Paul Rwarakabije in the RDRC
Thu. 28/12/06 Nyuma ya saa sita	72. Ceremony of demobilising and reintegrating ex-armed group and delivering certificates	President of the commission; commissioners, coordinator
	73. Delivering "Demobilization Id cards" financial support(BNK)	TS/Finance Debts

Bibliography

1. Aboulmagd, A. K. et al, *Crossing the Divide: Dialogue Among Civilisations*, New Jersey: School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Seton Hall University.
2. ACR. (1989), *Africa Contemporary Record*, 21.
3. Adelman, H. & Suhrke, A. (1999) (Eds), *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
4. African Rights (1995), *Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance*, London: African Rights.
5. African Rights (1998), *Rwanda: The Insurgency in the Northwest*, London: African Rights.
6. Ager et al (2005), *Conceptualising Community Development in War-Affected Populations: Illustrations from Tigray*, *Community Development Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 158-168.
7. Alden, C. (2002), *Making Old Soldiers Fade Away: Lessons from the Reintegration of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 33, No. 3, pp. 341-356.
8. Allott (1968), *African Law*, in Derrett, D. M. (1968), *An Introduction to Legal Systems*, Sweet & Maxwell: London.
9. Annan, K. (1999), *Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organisation*, UN Document No. A/51/4 (August 31).
10. Archer, M. S. (1995), *Realist Social Theory*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

11. Arendt, H (1989), *The Human Condition*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
12. Article 19 (1996), *Broadcasting Genocide: Censorship, Propaganda, and State-Sponsored Violence in Rwanda 1990-1994*, October, London: Article 19.
13. Ayalew, D. & Dercon, S (2000), *From the Gun to the Plough: The Macro- and Micro-Level Impact of Demobilisation in Ethiopia*, in Kingma, K. (Ed) (2000), *Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.
14. Baker, P. H. (1996), *Conflict Resolution versus Democratic Governance: Divergent Paths to Peace*, in Crocker, C. A. & Hampson, F. O. (Eds) (1996), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington D.C: United States Institute for Peace Press.
15. Barakat, S, Chard, M, Jacoby, T & Lume, W (2002), *The Composite Approach: Research Design in the Context of War and Armed Conflict*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp. 991-1003.
16. Barakat, S. (2005), *Introduction*, in Barakat, S. (Ed) (2005), *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, London: I.B. Tauris.
17. Barakat, S. (2005), *Post-war Reconstruction and Development*, in Barakat, S. (Ed) (2005), *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, London: I.B. Tauris.
18. Barakat, S. (Ed) (2005), *After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War*, London: I.B. Tauris.
19. Barash, D. P. & Webel, C. (2002), *Peace and Conflict Studies*, Thousand Oaks: CA: Sage Publications.

20. Bar-Tal, D (2000), *From Intractable Conflict through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation: Psychological Analysis*, *Political Psychology*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 351-365.
21. BBC (2007), *Rwandan Widow Loses Refugee Bid*, BBC 15th Feb 2007 accessed at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6364179.stm> accessed on 15th February 2007.
22. Bell, S. E. (2004), *Intensive Performances of Mothering: A Sociological Perspective*, *Qualitative Research*, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 45-75.
23. Brown, A. B. & Poremski, K. (Eds) (2005), *Roads to Reconciliation: Conflict and Dialogue in the Twenty-First Century*, Armonk: NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
24. Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (2005), Section V: Recovering From War: Regeneration and Reconciliation, Accessed at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/general_intro.htm Accessed on 19th May, 2006.
25. Berkeley, B. (2001), *The Graves Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa*, New York: Basic Books.
26. Berkeley, B. (2002), *Road to a Genocide*, in Mills, N. & Brunner, K. (2002) (Eds), *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, New York: Basic Books.
27. Berkman, L. F. & Kawachi, I. (2000), *Social Epidemiology*, New York: Oxford University Press.
28. Biggar, N. (2001), *Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict*, Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.
29. Bloomfield, D. Barnes, T. & Huyse, C. (Eds) (2003), *Reconciliation After Violent Conflict: A Handbook*, Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.

30. Bouta, T. (2005), *Gender and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: Building Blocs for Dutch Policy*, Conflict Research Unit, Netherlands Institute of International Relations: The Hague.
31. Bowd, R. (2008), *When Combatants Become Judges: The Role of Ex-Combatants in Gacaca Courts and its affect on the Reintegration and Reconciliation Processes In Rwanda*, ISS International Conference on Peace and Security in Africa, 20th-23rd February 2008, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
32. Brand-Jacobsen, K. F. (2002), *Peace: The Goal and the Way*, in Galtung, J, Jacobsen, G. G. & Brand-Jacobsen, K. F. (2002), *Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend*, London: Pluto Press.
33. Bratton, M. & Hyden, K. (1992) (Eds), *Governance and Politics in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
34. Brende, J. O. & Parsons, E. R. (1985), *Vietnam Veterans: The Road to Recovery*, New York: Plenum Press.
35. Brewer, J. D. (2000), *Ethnography*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
36. Brockington, D. & Sullivan, S. (2003), *Qualitative Research*, in Scheyvens & Storey (Eds) (2003), *Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
37. Brosse de la, R. & Reporters Sans Frontieres (1995), *Les medias de la haine*, Paris: Editions La Decouverte.
38. Brown, M. E. (1993), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
39. Bruchhaus, E-M. & Mehreteab, A. (2000), *'Leaving the Warm House': The Impact of Demobilisation in Eritrea*, in Kingma, K. (Ed) (2000), *Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.

40. Bryman, A. (2001), *Social Research Methods*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
41. Burnham, P, Grant, W, Gilland, K. et al (2004), *Research Methods in Politics*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
42. Cairns, E. (1997), *A Safer Future: Reducing the Human Costs of War*, Oxford: Oxfam Publications.
43. Callamard, A. (2000), *French Policy in Rwanda*, in Adelman, H. & Suhrke, A. (1999) (Eds), *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
44. Cape Town Principles and Best Practices on the Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on Demobilisation and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa, Cape Town, 27-30 April, 1997.
45. Centre Nord-Sud (1994), *Le Rwanda dans son Contexte Regional: Droits de la personne reconciliation et rehabilitation. Document de synthese prepare pour la conference de La Haye, 16-17 Sept. 1994.* Centre Nord-Sud, Centre European pour l'Interdependance et la Solidarite Mondiales, Conseil de l'Europe, NCOS.
46. Chaitin, J. (2003), "I Wish He Hadn't Told Me That": *Methodological and Ethical Issues in Social Trauma and Conflict Research*, *Qualitative Health Research*, Vol. 13, No. 8, pp. 1145-1154.
47. Chalk, F. (2000), *Hate Radio in Rwanda*, in Adelman, H. & Suhrke, A. (1999) (Eds), *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
48. Chambers, R. (1983), *Rural Development: Putting the Last First*, Harlow, Essex: Longman Group Ltd.

49. Chileshe, G, Chimanse, M, Ngoma, N, Lwando, P, Bwebe, T. (Eds) (2004), *Civil-Military Relations in Zambia: A Review of Zambia's Contemporary CMR History and the Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies.
50. Chretien, J-P. (1991), *Presse Libre et Propagande Raciste au Rwanda*, *Politique Africaine*, 42 (June).
51. Chretien, J-P. (1995), *Rwanda: Les Medias du Genocide*, Paris: Karthala.
52. Chrobok, V. (2005), *Demobilising and Reintegrating Afghanistan's Young Soldiers*, Paper 42, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
53. Clapham, C. (1998), *Rwanda: The Perils of Peacemaking*, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 35, No. 2, pp. 193-210.
54. Cohen, L. & Manion, L. (1994), *Research Methods in Education 4th Ed*, New York: Routledge.
55. Colletta, N. J, Kostner, M, Weidehofer, I. (1996), *Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition: The Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Ethiopia, Namibia, and Uganda*, Washington D.C: The World Bank.
56. Colletta, N. T. & Cullen, M. L. (2000), *Violent Conflict and the Transformation of Social Capital: Lessons from Cambodia, Rwanda, Guatemala, and Somalia*, Washington D.C: The International Bank for Reconstruction, The World Bank.
57. Collier, P, Elliot, V. L, Hegre, H, Hoeffler, A, Reynal-Querol, N, & Sambanis, M. (2003), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, Oxford: World Bank/Oxford University Press.
58. Connolly, B. (2005), *Non-State Justice Systems and the State: Proposals for a Recognition Typology*, *Connecticut Law Review*, Vol. 38, No. 2, pp. 239-294.

59. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9th December, 1948 accessed at <http://un.org/millennium/law/iv-1.htm> accessed on 25th January, 2007.
60. Corey, S. & Joireman, S. (2004), *Retributive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda*, African Affairs, Vol. 103, pp. 73-89.
61. Cormodel, L. & Hughes, A. (1999), *The Economic Geographer as Situated Researcher of Elites*, Special Issue of Geoforum, Vol. 30, pp. 299-300.
62. Cotran, E. (1969), *Tribal Factors in the Establishment of the East African Legal Systems*, in Gulliver, P. (Ed) (1969), *Tradition and Transition in East Africa: Studies of the Tribal Element in the Modern Era*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.
63. Crocker, C. A. & Hampson, F. O. (Eds) (1996), *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*, Washington D.C: United States Institute for Peace Press.
64. Dalliare, R. (2004), *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda*, London: Arrow Books.
65. Dasgupta, P. & Serageldin, I. (Eds) (2000), *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank.
66. Dercon, S & Ayalew, D. (1998), *Where Have All The Soldiers Gone: Demobilisation and Reintegration in Ethiopia*, World Development, Vol. 26, No. 9, pp 1661-1675.
67. Des Forges, A. L. & Longman, T. (2004), *Legal Responses to Genocide in Rwanda*, in Stover, E. & Weinstein, H. M. (2004), *My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

68. Devitt, P. (1977), *Notes on Poverty-orientated Rural Development*, in ODI (1977), *Extension, Planning and the Poor*, Agricultural Administration Unit Occasional Paper 2, ODI, London.
69. Dhanapala, J, Donawaki, M, Rana, S. (Eds) (1999), *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues*, Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
70. DPKO (1999), *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment: Principles and Guidelines, Lessons Learned Unit*, DPKO, UN.
71. Druckman, D. (Ed) (2005), *Doing Research: Methods of Enquiry for Conflict Analysis*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd.
72. Enright, R. D. & North, J. (Eds) (1998), *Exploring Forgiveness*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
73. Evans, P. (1996), *Government Action, Social Capital and Development: Reviewing the Evidence on Synergy*, World Development, Vol. 26, No. 6, pp. 1119-1132.
74. Farr, V. (2002), *Gendering Demilitarisation as a Peacebuilding Tool*, Paper 20, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
75. Feenan, D. (2002), *Researching Paramilitary Violence in Northern Ireland*, Social Research Methodology, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 147-163
76. Fischer, M. (2005), *Recovering From Violent Conflict: Regeneration and (Re)Integration as Elements of Peace Building*, in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (2005), Section V: Recovering From War: Regeneration and Reconciliation, Accessed at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/general_intro.htm Accessed on 19th May, 2006.
77. Fitz-Gerald, M. (Ed) (2005), *From Conflict to Community: A Combatant's Return to Citizenship*, Shrivenham: GFN-SSR.

78. Fitzgibbons, R. (1998), *Anger and the Healing Power of Forgiveness: A Psychiatrist's View*, in Enright, R. D. & North, J. (Eds) (1998), *Exploring Forgiveness*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
79. Fortes, M. & Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (Eds) (1962), *African Political Systems*, Oxford University Press: London.
80. Fukuyama, F. (1995), *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, London: Penguin Book Ltd.
81. Fullerton, P. (2003), *Trying Genocide through Gacaca*, Global Justice Program, Liu Institute for Global Issues, Vancouver, Canada, June 2003.
82. Fusato, M. (2003), *Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants*, Beyond Intractability accessed at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/m/demobilization.jsp> on 14th June, 2006.
83. Galtung, J. (1969), *Violence, Peace and Peace Research*, Journal of Peace Research, Vol.6, No. 3, pp. 167-191.
84. Galtung, J. (1985), *Twenty-Five Years of Peace Research: Ten Challenges and Some Responses*, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 22, No. 2, (June 1985), pp. 141-158.
85. Galtung, J. (1996), *Peace by Peaceful Means: Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilisation*, London: Sage Publications Ltd.
86. Galtung, J, Jacobsen, C. G. & Brand-Jacobsen, F. K. (2002), *Searching for Peace: The Road to Transcend*, London: Pluto Press.
87. Gastrow, P. (1995), *Bargaining for Peace: South Africa and the National Peace Accord*, Washington D.C: United States Institute for Peace.

88. Gear, S. (2002a), *Now That The War Is Over: Ex-combatants Transition And The Question Of Violence: A Literature Review*, Research Report written as part of the Violence and Transition Series 2002, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation. Accessible at <http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papvtp9.htm> accessed on 30th January, 2006.
89. Gear, S. (2002b), *Wishing Us Away: Challenges Facing Ex-Combatants in the 'New' South Africa*, Violence and Transition Series, Vol. 8. Accessible at <http://www.csvr.org.za/papers/papvtp8a.htm> accessed on 30th January, 2006.
90. Giele, J. Z. & Elder, G. H. Jr. (Eds) (1998), *Methods of Life Course Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
91. Gifiner, J. (2003), *Reintegration of Ex-combatants*, in Malan, M. et al (Eds) (2003), *Sierra Leone: Building the Road to Recovery*, ISS Monograph Series 80, March 2003.
92. Gluckman, M. (1956), *Custom and Conflict in Africa*, Basil Blackwell Ltd.
93. Gold, R. (1958), *Roles in Sociological Fieldwork*, Social Forces, Vol. 36, pp. 217-223
94. Goldstone, R. (1997), *War Crimes: A Question of Will*, The World Today, Vol. 53, No. 4, pp. 106-8.
95. Gomes Porto, J. & Parsons, E. (2003), *Sustaining the Peace in Angola. An Overview of Current Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration*. Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Paper 27, March 2003. Also published by the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Monograph Series, No. 83, April 2003.
96. Gomes Porto, J, Parsons, E. & Alden, C. (2007), *From Soldiers to Citizens: The Social, Economic and Political Reintegration of UNITA Ex-Combatants*, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

97. Goodhand, J, Hume, D. & Lewer, N. (2000), *Social Capital and the Political Economy of Violence: A Case Study of Sri Lanka*, *Disasters*, Vol. 24, No. 4, pp. 390-406
98. Goodson, I. (1983), *The Use of Life Histories in the Study of Teaching*, in Hammersley, M. (Ed) (1983), *The Ethnography of Schooling*, Driffield: Nafferton Books.
99. Gourevitch, P. (2000), *We Wish To Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families*, London: Picador
100. Granovetter, M. S. (1973), *The Strength of Weak Ties*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 78, No. 6 (May, 1973), pp. 1360-1380.
101. Gravel, P. B. (1967), *The Transfer of Cows in Gisaka (Rwanda): A Mechanism for Recording Social Relationships*, *American Anthropologist*, New Series, Vol. 69, No. 3/4, (Jun. - Aug., 1967), pp. 322- 331.
102. Grootaert, C. (1998), *Social Capital: The Missing Link?*, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 3, The World Bank.
103. Grootaert, C. & Bastelaer, T. Van. (2001), *Understanding and Measuring Social Capital: A Synthesis of Finding and Recommendations from the Social Capital Initiative*, Social Capital Initiative Working Paper No. 24, The World Bank.
104. Gueye, B. (1999), *Wither Participation? Experience from Francophone West Africa*, Drylands Programme Issue Paper 87, International Institute for Environment and Development, London.
105. Guichaoua, A. (1995), *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-94)*, Paris: Karthala.
106. Guillaumin, C. (1991), *'Race' and Discourse*, in Silverman, M. (1991) (Ed), *Race, Discourse and Power in France*, Aldershot: Avebury.

107. Gulliver, P. (Ed) (1969), *Tradition and Transition in East Africa*, Routledge & Kegan Paul: London.
108. Halpern, D. (2005), *Social Capital*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
109. Hamber, B. (2001), *Does the Truth Heal? A Psychological Perspective on Political Strategies for Dealing with the Legacy of Political Violence*, in Biggar, N. (Ed) (2001), *Burying the Past: Making Peace and Doing Justice after Civil Conflict*, Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.
110. Hammersley, M. & Atkinson, P. (1983), *Ethnography: Principles in Practice*, New York: Tavistock.
111. Hammersley, M. (1998), *Reading Ethnographic Research*, Harlow: Addison Wesley Longman.
112. Hanifan, L. J. (1916), *The Rural School Community Center*, *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 67 (1916), pp. 130-138.
113. Harbom, L. & Wallensteen, P. (2007), *Armed Conflict 1989-2006*, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 5, pp 623-634.
114. Hartzell, C. & Hoddie, M. (2003), *Institutionalising Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management*, *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 47, No.2, pp. 318-332.
115. Hayes, G. (1998), *We Suffer Our Memories: Thinking about the Past, Healing and Reconciliation*, *American Imago*, Vol. 55, No. 1 (Spring 1998).
116. Heinemann-Gruder, A. (2002), *Becoming an Ex-Military Man: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Military Professionals in Eastern Europe*, Brief 26, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.

117. Hermansson, A-C, Timpka, T. & Nyce, J. M. (2003), *Exploration of the Life Histories and Future of War-Wounded Salvadoran and Iranian Kurd Quota Refugees in Sweden: A Qualitative Approach*, *International Journal of Social Welfare*, 2003, 12: 142-153.
118. Hitchcock, G. & Hughes, D. (1995), *Research and the Teacher: A Qualitative Introduction to School-based Research*, London: Routledge.
119. Homans, G. C. (1950), *The Human Group*, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World.
120. Horton, R. (1967), *African Traditional Thought and Western Science*, *Africa*, Vol. 37, pp. 50-71.
121. Huband, M. (2001), *The Skull Beneath the Skin: Africa After the Cold War*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
122. Human Rights Watch (2006), *The Rwandan Genocide: How It Was Prepared*, Human Rights Watch, Briefing Paper No. 1, April 2006.
123. Hume, F. & Sommerfield, D. (1994), *After the War in Nicaragua: A Psychosocial Study of war Wounded Ex-Combatants*, *Medicine and War*, 10, pp 4-25.
124. Humphrey, M. (2002), *The Politics of Atrocity and Reconciliation: From Terror to Trauma*, London: Routledge.
125. Humphreys, M. & Weinstein, J. M. (2004), *What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-combatants in Sierra Leone June-August 2003*, Interim Report, The Earth Institute, Columbia University: NY, USA.
126. *Hutu Ten Commandments*, published in *Kangura Newspaper*, Rwanda, 10th December, 1990.

127. Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (2005), *Evaluation and Impact Assessment of the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission (NURC): Final Report*, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation: Cape Town, South Africa.
128. Jackman, R. W. & Miller, R. A. (1998), *Social Capital and Politics*, Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 47-73.
129. Jacobs, J. M. (1997), *Resisting Reconciliation: The Secret Geographies of (Post) Colonial Australia*, in Pile, S. & Keith, M. (Ed) (1997), *Geographies of Resistance*, London: Routledge.
130. Janz, E. (2000), *Civil Disarmament in Post-Conflict Cambodia*, in Wulf, H. (Ed) (2000), *Practical Disarmament*, Brief 16, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
131. Johnson, B. & Clarke, J. M. (2003), *Collecting Sensitive Data: The Impact on Researchers*, Qualitative Health Research, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 421-434.
132. Jones, B. D. (1999), *The Arusha Peace Process*, in Adelman, H. & Suhrke, A. (1999) (Eds), *The Path of a Genocide: The Rwandan Crisis from Uganda to Zaire*, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
133. Jones, B. D. (2001), *Peacemaking in Rwanda: The Dynamics of Failure*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
134. Joseph, S. (2008), *Ubudehe: Creating Spaces for Citizen Participation in Self-Governance, Poverty Analysis, Local Problem Solving and Sector/District Planning*, accessed at <http://www.cdf.gov.rw/UBUDEHE1/UBUDEHEDOCS/aboutubu/creatingspaces.pdf> accessed on 20th March 2008.
135. Karakezi, U. A, Nshimiyimana, A. & Mutamba, B. (2004), *Localising Justice: Gacaca Courts*, in Stover, E. & Weinstein, H. M. (Eds) (2004), *My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

136. Keane, F. (1995), *Season of Blood: A Rwandan Journey*, London: Penguin Books.
137. Kegley, C. W. Jr. (1993), *The Neoidealist Moment in International Studies: Realist Myths and The New International Studies*, *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (June 1993), pp. 131-146.
138. Kegley, C. W. & Wittkopf, E. R. (2005), *World Politics: Trend and Transformation 10th Edition*, Thomson/Wadsworth: Belmont, CA.
139. Kingma, K. & Sayers, V. (1995), *Demobilisation in the Horn of Africa*, Brief 4, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
140. Kingma, K. (1997), *Demobilization of Combatants after Civil Wars in Africa and their Reintegration into Civilian Life*, *Policy Sciences* 30: 151-165.
141. Kingma, K. (2000a), *Assessing Demobilisation: Conceptual Issues*, in Kingma, K. (Ed) (2000), *Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.
142. Kingma, K. (Ed) (2000b), *Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.
143. Kingma, K. (2001), *Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Post-War and Transition Countries*, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ): Eschborn.
144. Kingma, K. (2002), *Demobilisation and Peacebuilding in Africa*, in Newman & Schnabel (Eds) (2002), *Recovering from Civil Conflict*, London: Frank Cass.
145. Kleinman, S. & Copp, M. (1993), *Emotions and Fieldwork*, *Qualitative Research Methods* Vol. 28, Newbury Park, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd.

146. Kostorova-Unkovska, L. & Pankovska, V. (1992), *Children Hurt By War*, General Children's Consulate of the Republic of Macedonia, Skopje, Macedonia.
147. Koth, M. (2005), *To End a War: Demobilisation and Reintegration of Paramilitaries in Columbia*, Paper 43, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
148. Kriesburg, L. (1998), *Co-existence and the Reconciliation of Communal Conflicts*, in Weiner, E. (Ed) (1998), *The Handbook of Interethnic Co-existence*, New York: Continuum.
149. Krishna, A. (2002), *Active Social Capital: Tracing the Roots of Development and Democracy*, New York: Columbia University Press.
150. Kumar, K. (Ed), *Rapid Appraisal Methods*, Washington D.C: The World Bank. Pp. 176-211.
151. Kuperman, A. J. (2001), *The Limits of Humanitarian Intervention: Genocide in Rwanda*, Washington D.C: The Brookings Institute.
152. Lang, S. (2002), *Sulha Peacemaking and the Politics of Persuasion*, *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 52-66.
153. Last, D, Baxter, L. & Hutton, C. (1997), *Proceedings of a Working Roundtable on Demobilisation and Reintegration: Cornwallis Park, Nova Scotia, 24-26 March 1997*, The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre.
154. Last, D. (1999), *The Human Security Problem – Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, in A Source Book on the State of the Art in Post-Conflict Rehabilitation, unpublished report prepared by PRDU for the Regional Socio-Economic Development Programme for Southern Lebanon. PRDU, University of York.

155. Laurance, E. & Wulf, H. (1995), *Conversion and the Integration of Economic and Security Dimensions*, Report 1, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
156. Laws, S, Harper, C. & Marcus, R. (2003), *Research for Development: A Practical Guide*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
157. Lederach, J. P. (1995), *Preparing for Peace: Conflict Transformation Across Cultures*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
158. Lederach, J. P. (1997), *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington D. C: United States Institute for Peace.
159. Lee, R. M. (1995), *Dangerous Fieldwork*, Thousands Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd.
160. Leech, B. L. (2002), *Interview Methods in Political Science*, Political Science & Politics, Vol. 35, pp. 663-4.
161. Leed, E. (1979), *No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War 1*, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge.
162. Lemarchand, R. (1996), *Burundi: Ethnic Conflict and Genocide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
163. Leftwich, A. (2004), *What is Politics: The Activity and its Study*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
164. Long, W. J. & Brecke, P. (2003), *War and Reconciliation: Reason and Emotion in Conflict Resolution*, Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
165. Longman, T, Pham, P. & Weinstein, H. M. (2004), *Connecting Justice to Human Experience*, in Stover, E. & Weinstein, H. M. (Eds) (2004), *My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

166. Longman, T. (2006), *Justice at the Grassroots? Gacaca Trials in Rwanda*, in Roht-Arriaza, N. & Mariezcurrena, J. (Eds) (2006), *Transitional Justice in the 21st Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
167. Lundin, I. B. (1998), *Mechanisms of Community Reception of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique*, *African Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 3, No. 1, pp 104-118.
168. Lundin, I. B, Chachua, C, Gaspar, A, Guebuza, H. & Mbilana, G. (2000), *Reducing Costs through an Expensive Exercise: The Impact of Demobilisation in Mozambique*, in Kingma, K. (Ed) (2000), *Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.
169. MacKintosh, A. (1997), *Rwanda: Beyond 'Ethnic Conflict'*, *Development in Practice*, Vol. 7, No. 4, pp.464-474.
170. Maiese, M. (2003), *Peacebuilding, Beyond Intractability* accessed at <http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/peacebuilding/> on 15th August 2008.
171. Malan, M. (1999) (Ed), *Wither Peacekeeping in Africa*, ISS Monograph Series 36, April 1999.
172. Malan, M, Meek, S, Thusi, T, Ginifer, J. & Coker, P. (2003), *Sierra Leone: Building the road to recovery*, ISS Monograph Series 80.
173. Malinowski, B. K. (1954), *Magic, Science and Religion*, Doubleday & Co.
174. Mamdani, M. (2001), *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda*, Oxford: James Curry Ltd.
175. Marks, K. (2001), *The Rwanda Tribunal: Justice Delayed*, International Crisis Group, Africa Report No. 30, 7th June, 2001.

176. Marsh, D. & Furlong, P. (2002), *A Skin not a Sweater: Ontology and Epistemology in Political Science*, in Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (2002), *Theory and Methods in Political Science 2nd Edition*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
177. Marsh, D. & Stoker, G. (2002), *Theory and Methods in Political Science 2nd Edition*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
178. Mazurana, D. (2004), *Women In Armed Opposition Groups Speak On War, Protection and Obligations Under International Humanitarian and human Rights Law*, Workshop Report, Geneva Call and the Program for the Study of International Organisations (PSIO), Geneva, August 26-29, 2004.
179. McDonald, L. (2002), *The International Operational Response to the Psychological Wounds of War: Understanding and Improving Psycho-social Interventions*, Feinstein International Famine Centre, Working Paper No. 7.
180. McGovern, M. (2005), *Rebuilding a Failed State: Liberia*, *Development in Practice*, Vol. 15, No. 6, pp. 760-766.
181. McKay, S. (1994), *Development and Conflict: Report NCO Congress'*, Amsterdam February 28, 1994.
182. McMullin, J. (2005), *Far from Spontaneous: Namibia's Long Struggle with Ex-Combatant Reintegration*, in Fitz-Gerald, M. (Ed) (2005), *From Conflict to Community: A Combatant's Return to Citizenship*, Shrivenham: GFN-SSR.
183. Mehreteab, A. (2002), *Veteran Combatants Do Not Fade Away: A Comparative Study on Two Demobilisation and Reintegration Exercises in Eritrea*, Paper 23, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
184. Mertus, J. (2001), *The Impact of Intervention on Local Human Rights Culture: A Kosovo Case Study*, Paper Presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, 2001.

185. Mgbako, C. (2005), *Ingando Solidarity Camps: Reconciliation and Political Indoctrination in Post-Genocide Rwanda*, Harvard Human Rights Journal, Volume 18, Spring 2005.
186. Miall, H. (2001), *Conflict Transformation: A Multi-dimensional Task*, in Berghof Handbook for Conflict Transformation (2005), Section I: Concepts and Cross-cutting Challenges, Accessed at http://www.berghof-handbook.net/uploads/download/miall_handbook.pdf on 12th August, 2008.
187. Miall, H. (2007), *Emergent Conflict and Peaceful Change*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
188. Milgram, S. (1974), *Obedience to Authority*, New York: Harper Row.
189. Miller, R. (2000), *Researching Life Stories and Family Histories*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
190. Mills, N. & Brunner, K. (2002) (Eds), *The New Killing Fields: Massacre and the Politics of Intervention*, New York: Basic Books.
191. Minow, M. (1990), *Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion and American Law*, Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press.
192. Minow, M. (2000), *The Hope for Healing: What can Truth Commission do?*, in Rotberg, R. I. & Thompson, D. (Eds) (2000), *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
193. Mobekk, E. (2005), *Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration in Haiti: Past Negligence, Present Problems, Future Possibilities*, in Fitz-Gerald, M. (Ed) (2005), *From Conflict to Community: A Combatant's Return to Citizenship*, Shrivenham: GFN-SSR.

194. Mokalobe, M. (1999), *Demobilisation and Re-Integration of Ex-combatants in South Africa*, A Defence & Development Project publication. Group for Environmental Monitoring.
195. Molenaar, A. (2004), *Gacaca: Grassroots Justice After Genocide. The Key to Reconciliation in Rwanda?*, Unpublished Thesis, January 2004, University of Amsterdam, accessed at http://www.gtifoundation.org/Conference/Thesis-gacaca_arthurmolenaar-mail.doc on 10th June, 2006.
196. Moore, B. J. Jr. (1978), *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt*, Basingstoke: MacMillian.
197. Moussalli, M. (2000), *Fifty-fifth Session Item 116 (C) of the Provisional Agenda Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special Rapporteurs and Representatives. Situation of human Rights in Rwanda*, United Nations General Assembly, August 4th, 2000, A/55/269 accessed at [http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/4d7718598d25a5f4c125697a0033d8ad/\\$FILE/N0059598.pdf](http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/4d7718598d25a5f4c125697a0033d8ad/$FILE/N0059598.pdf) on 6th June, 2006.
198. Mpungwe, A. R. (1999), *Crises and Response in Rwanda: Reflections on the Arusha Peace Process*, in Malan, M. (1999) (Ed), *Wither Peacekeeping in Africa*, ISS Monograph Series 36, April 1999.
199. Muggah, R. (2004), *The Anatomy of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in the Republic of Congo*, Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 4, Issue: 1, pp. 21-37.
200. Mullings, B. (1999), *Insider or outsider, both or neither: Some dilemmas of interviewing in a cross cultural setting*, Geoforum, Vol. 30. pp. 337-50.
201. Narayan, D. (1999), *Bonds and Bridges: Social Capital and Poverty*, Policy Research Working Paper 2167, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network, World Bank, August 1999.

202. Nduwayezu, J. D. (1990), *Les fondements physiques, humains et économiques di developpement au Rwanda*, Ruhengeri, Rwanda: Editions Universitaires du Rwanda.
203. Neuman, W. L. (2006), *Social Research Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches 6th Edition*, Boston: Pearson Education Inc.
204. Newbury, C. (1992), *Rwanda: Recent Debates over Governance and Rural Development*, in Bratton, M. & Hyden, K. (1992) (Eds), *Governance and Politics in Africa*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
205. Newland, K. (1993), *Ethnic Conflict and Refugees*, in Brown, M. E. (1993), *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
206. Newman, E. & Schnabel, A. (Eds) (2002), *Recovering from Civil Conflict*, London: Frank Cass.
207. Newman, E. & Richmond, O. P. (Eds) (2006), *Challenges to Peacebuilding: Managing Spoilers During Conflict Resolution*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
208. Ngoma, N. (2004), *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Conceptual Discourse*, in 49. Chileshe, G, Chimanse, M, Ngoma, N, Lwando, P, Bwebe, T (Eds) (2004), *Civil-Military Relations in Zambia: A Review of Zambia's Contemporary CMR History and the Challenges of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration*, Johannesburg: Institute for Security Studies.
209. Nithiyanandam, V. (2000), *Ethnic Politics and Third World Development: Some Lessons form Sri Lanka's Experience*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 283-311.
210. NiZA (2006), *Struggles in Peacetime: Working with ex-Combatants in Mozambique: their work, their frustrations and successes*, Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa (NiZA)

Accessed at <http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/militarisation/excombat.pdf> on 24th August 2008.

211. Nordstrom, C. & Robben, A. (Eds) (1995), *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
212. Nordstrom, C. (1997), *A Different Kind of War Story*, Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press.
213. North, J. (1998), *The 'Ideal' of Forgiveness: A Philosopher's Exploration*, in Enright, R. D. & North, J. (Eds) (1998), *Exploring Forgiveness*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
214. Nubler, I. (1997), *Human Resources Development and Utilisation in Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes*, Paper 7, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
215. Nubler, I. (2000), *Human Resources Development and Utilisation in Demobilisation and Reintegration Programmes*, in Kingma, K. (Ed) (2000), *Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Developmental and Security Impacts*, Basingstoke, Hampshire: MacMillan Press Ltd.
216. ODI (1977), *Extension, Planning and the Poor*, Agricultural Administration Unit Occasional Paper 2, ODI, London.
217. Ogden, K. (2000), *Coping Strategies Developed as a Result of Social Structure and Conflict: Kosovo in the 1990's*, *Disasters*, 2000, Vol. 24, No. 2, pp. 117-132.
218. Oguntomisin, O. (2004), *War Prevention and Peacemaking in Pre-Colonial Yorubaland, South-western Nigeria*, *AMANI: Journal of African Peace*, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 81-91.
219. Oomen, B. (2005), *Donor-driven Justice and its Discontents: The Case of Rwanda*, *Development & Change*, Vol. 36, No. 5, pp. 887-910.

220. Ozerdem, A. (2002), *Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Former Combatants in Afghanistan: Lessons Learned from a Cross-cultural Perspective*, *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 23, No. 5, pp 961-975.
221. Ozerdem, A. (2003), *Vocational Training of Former Kosovo Liberation Army Combatants: For What Purpose and End?*, *Conflict, Security & Development*, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp 383-405.
222. Paris, R. (2004), *At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
223. Paris Principles (2007), *The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces and Armed Groups*, accessed at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/Paris_Conference_Principles_English_31_January.pdf on 23rd April 2007.
224. Patrick, E. (2005), *Intent to Destroy: The Genocidal Impact of Forced Migration in Darfur, Sudan*, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 410-429.
225. Payne, G. & Payne, J. (2004), *Key Concepts in Social Research*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
226. Penal Reform International (2000), *Access To Justice In Sub-Saharan Africa: The Role Of Traditional And Informal Justice Systems*, Penal Reform International, accessed at <http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/SSAJ4.pdf> on 8th June, 2006.
227. Petrovic, D. (1994), *Ethnic Cleansing – An Attempt at Methodology*, *European Journal of International Law*, Vol. 3.
228. Pickering, M. (2006), *Generating Social Capital for Bridging Ethnic Division in the Balkans: Case Studies of two Bosniak Cities*, *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 79-103.

229. Pile, S. & Keith, M. (Ed) (1997), *Geographies of Resistance*, London: Routledge.
230. Plummer, J. (1983), *Documents of Life: An Introduction to the Problems and Literature of a Humanistic Method*, London: George Allen & Unwin.
231. Portes, A. (1998), *Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology*, *Annual Review of Sociology*, Vol. 22, pp. 1-24.
232. Porter, N. (2003), *The Elusive Quest: Reconciliation in Northern Ireland*, Belfast: Blackstaff Press Ltd.
233. Porter, E, Robinson, G, Smyth, M, Schnabel, A. & Osaghae, E. (2005) (Eds), *Researching Conflict in Africa: Insights and Experiences*, United Nations University: Tokyo.
234. Potgieter, J. (1999), *Peace Operations, Disarmament and Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, in Dhanapala, J, Donawaki, M, Rana, S. (Eds) (1999), *Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues*, Aldershot, Hants: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
235. Potter, J. (1996), *Representing Reality: Discourse, Rhetoric and Social Construction*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
236. Preston, R. (1997), *Integrating Fighters After War: Reflections on the Namibian Experience, 1989-1993*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 3, pp 453-472.
237. Priest, H., Roberts, P. & Woods, L. (2002), *An overview of three different approaches to the interpretation of qualitative data*, *Nurse Researcher*, Vol. 10, No. 1, pp 30-42.
238. Punch, M. (1986), *The Politics and Ethics of Fieldwork*, *Qualitative Research Methods*, Vol. 3, Beverly Hills, CA: SAGE Publication Ltd.

239. Putnam, R. D. (1993a), *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
240. Putnam, R. D. (1993b), *The Prosperous Community: Social Capital and Public Life*, *American Prospect* 13: 35-42.
241. Putnam, R. D. (2000), *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*, New York: Simon & Schuster
242. Putnam, R. D. (Ed) (2002), *Democracies in Flux: The Evolution of Social Capital in Contemporary Society*, New York: Oxford University Press.
243. Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1939), *Taboo*, (The Frazer Lecture, 1939), Cambridge University Press.
244. Radcliffe-Brown, A. (1945), *Religion and Society*, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, Vol. 75, pp. 33-43.
245. Ramsbotham, O, Woodhouse, T. & Miall, H. (2005), *Contemporary Conflict Resolution 2nd Edition*, Cambridge: Polity Press.
246. Reardon. B. in Five College Program in Peace and World Security Studies, *Guide to Careers, Internships, and Graduate Education in Peace Studies*, Amherst, MA: Peace and World Security Studies, 1990.
247. Reyntjens, F. (1996), *Rwanda: Genocide and Beyond*, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 240-251.
248. Richards, P, Archibald, S, Bruce, B, Modad, W, Mulbah, E, Varpilath, T. & Vincent, J. (2005), *Community Cohesion in Liberia: A Post-War Rapid Social Assessment*, Paper 21, Conflict Prevention & Reconstruction, Social Development Department, The World Bank, Washington D.C.

249. Richland, J. B. (2005), "*What Are You Going to Do with the Village's Knowledge?*" *Talking Tradition, Talking Law in Hopi Tribal Court*, *Law & Society Review*, Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 235-271.
250. Richmond, O. P. (2005), *The Transformation of Peace*, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.
251. Rigby, A. (2001), *Justice and Reconciliation*, Boulder: CO: Lynne Rienner Publisher Inc.
252. Roberts, B. (2002), *Biographical Research*, Buckingham: Open University Press.
253. Rocheleau, D. E. & Ross, L. (1995), *Landscape/Lifescape Mapping*, in Slocum, R, Wichhart, L, Rocheleau, D. E. & Thomas-Slayter, B. (Eds) (1995), *Power, Process and Participation: Tools for Change*, London: ITDG Publishing.
254. Roht-Arriaza, N. & Mariezcurrena, J. (Eds) (2006), *Transitional Justice in the 21st Century*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
255. Rotberg, R. I. (1999), *Social Capital and Political Culture in Africa, America, Australia, and Europe*, *Journal of Interdisciplinary History*, Vol. 29, No. 3, pp. 339-356.
256. Rotberg, R. I. & Thompson, D. (Eds) (2000), *Truth v. Justice: The Morality of Truth Commissions*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
257. Rothstein, R. L. (Ed) (1999), *After The Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Ltd.
258. Schapera, I. (1962), *The Political Organisation of the Ngwato of Bechuanaland Protectorate*, in Fortes, M. & Evans-Pritchard, E. E. (Eds) (1962), *African Political Systems*, Oxford University Press: London.
259. Scheyvens, R, Scheyvens, H. & Murray, W. E. (2003), *Working With Marginalised, Vulnerable or Privileged Groups*, in Scheyvens & Storey (Eds)

(2003), *Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.

260. Scheyvens, R. & Storey, D. (Eds) (2003), *Development Fieldwork: A Practical Guide*, London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
261. Schmidt, H. (1997), *Healing the Wounds of War: Memories of Violence and the Making of History in Zimbabwe's Most Recent Past*, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, Vol. 23, No. 2, Special Issue for Terry Ranger, pp. 301-310.
262. Schneckener, U. & Wolff, S. (Eds) (2004), *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts*, London: C. Hurst & Co (Publishers).
263. Scott, J. & Alwin, D. (1998), *Retrospective Versus Prospective Measurement of Life Histories in Longitudinal Research*, in Giele, J. Z. & Elder, G. H. Jr. (Eds) (1998), *Methods of Life Course Research: Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
264. Seidman, G. (1993), *No Freedom Without Women: Mobilisation and Gender in South Africa, 1970-1992*, *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society*, 18 (winter), pp 292-320
265. Seligman, L. C. (2005), *Ethnographic Methods*, in Druckman, D. (Ed) (2005), *Doing Research: Methods of Enquiry for Conflict Analysis*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications Ltd.
266. Shriver, D. W. Jr. (1995), *An Ethic for Enemies*, New York: Oxford University Press.
267. Shriver, D. W. Jr. (1999), *The Long Road to Reconciliation: Some Moral Stepping-stones*, in Rothstein, R. L. (Ed) (1999), *After The Peace: Resistance and Reconciliation*, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers Ltd.
268. Shriver, D. W. Jr. (2001), *Where and When in Political Life is Justice Served by Forgiveness?*, in Biggar, N. (Ed) (2001), *Burying the Past: Making Peace and*

Doing Justice after Civil Conflict, Washington D.C: Georgetown University Press.

269. Silverman, M. (1991) (Ed), *Race, Discourse and Power in France*, Aldershot: Avebury.
270. Sisk, T. D. (2004), *Peacemaking in Civil Wars*, in Schneckener, U. & Wolff, S. (Eds) (2004), *Managing and Settling Ethnic Conflicts*, London: C. Hurst & Co (Publishers).
271. Slocum, R, Wichhart, L, Rocheleau, D. E. & Thomas-Slayter, B. (Eds) (1995), *Power, Process and Participation: Tools for Change*, London: ITDG Publishing.
272. Sluka, J. (1995), *Reflections on Managing Danger in Fieldwork: Dangerous Anthropology in Belfast*, in Nordstrom, C. & Robben, A. (Eds) (1995), *Fieldwork Under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival*, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
273. Smith, T. (2005), *Vengeance Is Never Enough: Alternative Visions of Justice*, in Brown, A. B. & Poremski, K. (Eds) (2005), *Roads to Reconciliation: Conflict and Dialogue in the Twenty-First Century*, Armonk: NY: M.E. Sharpe, Inc.
274. Smyth, M. (2001), *Introduction*, in Smyth, M. & Robinson, G. (Eds) (2001), *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
275. Smyth, M. & Robinson, G. (Eds) (2001), *Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and Methodological Issues*, Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
276. Somnier, F. E. & Genefke, I. K. (1986), *Psychotherapy for Victim of Torture*, *British Journal of Psychiatry*, 149, pp 323-329.

277. Stanton, G. H. (1998), *The Eight Stages of Genocide*, Genocide Watch Website – accessed at <http://www.genocidewatch.org/eightstages.htm> accessed on 25th January, 2007.
278. Stewart, F. H. (1987), *Tribal Law in the Arab World: A Review of the Literature*, *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 4, pp. 473-490.
279. Stewart, F. & Fitzgerald, V. (2001), *War and Underdevelopment*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
280. Stover, E. & Weinstein, H. M. (Eds) (2004), *My Neighbour, My Enemy: Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
281. Temple, B. & Young, A. (2004), *Qualitative Research and Translation Dilemmas*, *Qualitative Research*, Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 161-178.
282. Thibon, C. (1995), *Les origines historiques de la violence politique au Burundi*, in Guichaoua, A. (1995), *Les crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda (1993-94)*, Paris: Karthala.
283. Thomas-Slayter, B, Barbara, P. & Ford, R. (1993), *Participatory Rural Appraisal: A Study from Kenya*, in Kumar, K. (Ed) (1993), *Rapid Appraisal Methods*, Washington D.C: The World Bank. Pp. 176-211.
284. Thusi, T. & Meek, S. (2003), *Disarmament and Demobilisation*, in Malan, M, Meek, S, Thusi, T, Ginifer, J. & Coker, P. (2003), *Sierra Leone: Building the road to recovery*, ISS Monograph Series 80, March 2003.
285. Tutu, D. (1999), *No Future Without Forgiveness*, London: Rider.
286. Uphoff, N. (2000), *Understanding Social Capital: Learning from the Analysis and Experience of Participation*, in Dasgupta, P. & Serageldin, I. (Eds) (2000), *Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective*, The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The World Bank.

287. UN (2004), *World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision*, UN, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division accessed at <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/WPP2004/wpp2004.htm> on 26th August 2008.
288. UN (2006), *Integrated Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS)*, accessed at <http://www.unddr.org/iddrs/> on 8th September 2006.
289. UNHCR (2008), *2007 Global Trends: Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced and Stateless Persons*, UNHCR, accessed at <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4852366f2.pdf> on 10th August 2008.
290. Uvin, P. (1997), *Prejudice, Crisis, and Genocide in Rwanda*, African Studies Review, Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 91-115.
291. Varshney, A. (2002), *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
292. Veale, A. (2003), *From Child Soldier to Ex Fighter: Female Fighters, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Ethiopia*, ISS Monograph Series 85, July 2003.
293. Veale, A. & Stavrou, A. (2003), *Violence, Reconciliation and Identity: The Reintegration of Lords Resistance Army Abductees in Northern Uganda*, ISS Monograph Series 92, November 2003.
294. Verwimp, P & Verpoorten, M. (2004), 'What are the soldiers going to do?' *Demobilisation, Reintegration and Employment in Rwanda*, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 4, No. 1, April 2004.
295. Vicenti, C. N. (1995), *The Reemergence of Tribal Society and Traditional Justice Systems*, *Judicature*, Vol. 79, No. 3, 134.

296. Wallensteen, P. (2007), *Understanding Conflict Resolution 2nd Edition*, London: Sage Publications Ltd.
297. Waller, D. (1996), *Rwanda: Which Way Now?*, Oxfam Country Profile, original 1993, Oxford: Oxfam.
298. Walter, B. F. (2004), *Does Conflict Beget Conflict? Explaining Reoccurring Civil War*, *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 41, No. 3, pp. 371-388.
299. Weiner, E. (Ed) (1998), *The Handbook of Interethnic Co-existence*, New York: Continuum.
300. Weller-Molongua, C. & Knapp, J. (1995), *Social Network Mapping*, in Slocum, R, Wichhart, L, Rocheleau, D. E. & Thomas-Slayter, B. (Eds) (1995), *Power, Process and Participation: Tools for Change*, London: ITDG Publishing.
301. Whittaker, D. J. (1999), *Conflict and Reconciliation in the Contemporary World*, London: Routledge.
302. Widner, J. & Mundt, A. (1998), *Researching Social Capital in Africa*, *Africa: Journal of the International Africa Institute*, Vol. 68, No. 1 (1998), pp. 1-24.
303. Woolcock, M. (1998), *Social Capital and Economic Development: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework*, *Theory and Society* 27: 151-208.
304. Woolcock, M. & Narayan, D. (2000), *Social Capital: Implications for theory, Research and Policy*, *The World Bank Research Observer*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp 225-249.
305. Wulf, H. (Ed) (2000), *Practical Disarmament*, Brief 16, Bonn International Centre for Conversion: Bonn.
306. Yancey, W. & Rainwater, L. (1970), *Problems in the Ethnography of Urban Underclasses*, in Habenstein (Ed) (1970), *Pathways to Data*, Chicago: Aldine.

307. Zack-Williams, A. B. (2006), *Child Soldiers in Sierra Leone and the Problems of Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration into Society: Some Lessons for Social Workers in War-torn Societies*, *Social Work Education*, Vol. 25, No. 2, March 2006, pp. 119-128.
308. Zorbas, E. (2004), *Towards Justice and Reconciliation in Rwanda: Taking Stock*, *Pambazuka News* 150, 1st April, 2004
accessed at <http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category//21166> on 6th June, 2006.