THE SOCIOLOGY OF BLACK NATIONALISM:
IDENTITY, PROTEST AND THE CONCEPT OF 'BLACK POWER'
AMONG WEST INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN BRITAIN

A Thesis

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by

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We are coming from a group of countries which agitated

for Independence, which agitated for the overthrow of

the Commonwealth, which agitated for the removal of

colonialism; and therefore there is this fundamental

difference between us and the workers coming from Europe

<div style="text-align: right">

--Member of the Black Panther
Party, London, 1971.

</div>

Abstract

Since the end of the Second World War, thousands of Black people, mainly from once British-colonised territories, have settled in Britain, West Indians being a distinctive group among these new minorities. This thesis is an inquiry into the socio-historical linkage between Black West Indians and British society, and an exploration into aspects of protest and social conflict among West Indian immigrants (Black Nationalism) resulting from the relationship. The method of participant observation was utilized to study a number of Black communities and to establish what sorts of social institutions and mechanisms have been developed among the immigrants to cope with their new social experience. Utilizing a social-structural mode of conceptualization, the thesis explicates some of the crucial processes which characterize the Black and White relationship in Britain, and relates race relations to the total British society. One central postulate is that Black immigrants are socially and ideationally rejected in British society, due, largely, to the nature of the recent history of Anglo-West Indian relationship, of which white racism as a belief system was an outcome. The social rejection of Blacks in Britain has given rise to the structural outcome of social and cultural pluralism, pluralism

being a form of "voluntary" separation due to the social distancing of Blacks. The new reality of Black and White relations in Britain is therefore not "integration" or "assimilation", but a situation in which Blacks now want to be left alone as much as possible to pursue their own, often vaguely-defined, cultural and social practices and interests. Two current social institutions of the Black West Indians are Black Power and the Black Church; and these neither mix nor combine with their analogues in the wider British society. Both are variations on a theme of Black Nationalism.

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Vincent, Dominica and Montserratt. West Indian immigrants also come from Guyana. Strictly speaking, Guyana is part of the geography of South America, but it has conventionally been grouped with the islands to form what has been known as "the British West Indies." We shall adhere to this particular convention in this thesis.

Sixty per-cent of all West Indians in Britain are from Jamaica. For this and other historical reasons, Jamaica is discussed in this thesis somewhat more extensively than the other islands.

Now, this seemingly ordinary case of human migration has had many complex social and cultural implications.

Sociologically, the incidence of migration from the West Indies demonstrated that West Indians were consciously breaking away from the narrow confines (socio-culturally speaking) of their society, and out of the comparatively slow pattern of social mobility that characterize West Indian social structure. Furthermore, many West Indians have always had a genuine urge to travel and discover what sort of experiences lay outside their own society in which a handful of white Anglo-Europeans occupied the top

of the social hierarchy by reason of ascription.

Culturally, West Indians have been socialised
into regarding Britain as the "Mother Country".
Thus, they come from a colonial culture which is
British, and where people have internalised British
values. In the long run, this makes for a pro-
British orientation, including, clearly, a high
expectation to be regarded as British and treated
as British. This is a perfectly legitimate set of
expectations. All West Indians, up to 1962, came
to Britain on <u>British</u> passports.

In Economic terms, the migration from the West
Indies was a response to the "push" factor of
economic deprivation in the West Indies, and to the
"pull" factor of economic expansion in a period of
Britain's post-War reconstruction.

The migration, in socio-political terms,
presented a sharp paradox. For the movement of
West Indians to Britain got under way in earnest
at a time when, in the West Indies, there was a
general enthusiasm about federating the scattered
West Indian territories as a prelude to political
independence from British colonial rule.[2]

In another dimension there was a socio-historical

implication. For in real terms, West Indians were
utilizing a long-standing immigration privilege,
in that, as colonial subjects, they were entitled
to freely emigrate to and settle in Mother Country
Britain. This relationship between Mother Country
and her far-flung colonies, we have termed an
organic linkage, because the colonies were tied
so closely to the life of the metropolitan country,
as though by an umbilical cord. At best, they were
helpless orphans of a dying Empire. Above all, the
linkage highlighted the sorts of social expectations
that the Black immigrants were bound to have, by
reason of history, (and built-in as it were) about
life in Mother Country.

As it turned out, the transition from colonial
societies in the West Indies, with a long history of
Anglo-European slavery, to a metropolitan society
with a long history of imperialism and colonial
dominance, presented Black West Indians with a
traumatic and shattering experience. On arriving
on the British scene, the first and most urgent
task is that of drastically revising many of the
old ideas about Mother Country Britain, and unlearn-
ing many others. As Black colonials, they find that
they are not socially accepted. They are thus faced

with a different social and cultural reality from
that normally existing in their thinking about
British society.

This thesis, then, comprises variations on a
very simple theme, namely, that the central problem
facing Black immigrants in Britain is that of social
rejection by British society. What Blacks in Britain
do, and to a large extent, what they have to say as
a result of this experience, may be summed up as a
complex of "coping mechanisms". From this basic and
incontestable fact, the thesis develops with several
theoretical tentacles aimed at explaining the
peculiarities of the West Indian Dilemma. West
Indians in Britain, in the face of apparent social
rejection, (or what is the same thing, a non-
acceptance of what they thought they were) are
forced to re-examine themselves, their identity,
their beliefs and their own culture, in the service
of constructing what may be called a "clarity map"
of their experiences.

In re-formulating their new life-situations,
Blacks in Britain face the unpleasant realisation
that the designation given to them as members of
"minority group", or as "strangers", or as "aliens"
is tied up with other problems of stratification,

power-relations and belief systems. Thus they face
the problem of coping with a graded status system
(they being at the lowest end of the hierarchy) and
they face the problem of accepting a low market-
position as well as a position divested of power.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, there is the
problem of facing racist theories and dogmas, many
of which have clearly outlived their original use-
fulness, but which have somehow been able to persist
under their own inertia, as it were. The thesis
rests on the premise that the Black man's perception
of the world, and the ideas he utilizes to describe
himself in relation to it, are the products of history.
In this light, Black Nationalism is examined as a re-
action to long-standing ideational systems which
came to life in the period of Anglo-Saxon slavery.[3]

By Black Nationalism we mean group consciousness,
among West Indians in Britain, fostered by ethnic
identification. As such, it operates at religious,
political (or quasi-political) as well as cultural
levels. The concept as used here implies the pro-
jection of a social, cultural and political identity
among Black people.

Black Nationalism is directly linked to white
racism. The primary intervening variables for any

understanding of the processes at work are the definition of the situation and power-relations. The definition of the situation implies how the two parties - Black and White - collectively and intersubjectively interpret each other's values, symbols and actions. This is the symbolic interactionist approach, an approach which recognizes that human beings interpret or define each others' actions instead of merely reacting to those actions. As Herbert Blumer points out, the distinctive characteristic of this approach is that it maintains that responses in social behaviour are not made directly to the actions of one another, but instead are based on the meanings which are attached to such actions. The definition of the situation is really what determines the outcome of the social processes involving ethnic groups. Hence, we gain the clearest view of Black Nationalism when we understand it as a dependent variable. The definition of the situation, together with power-relations, then become crucial intervening variables in the analysis. The simplified paradigm below serves to illustrate these ideas:

```
.....................                                                    
:HISTORY OF :         INDEPENDENT                DEPENDENT
:ANGLO-SAXON:------->VARIABLE<------------VARIABLE
:  SLAVERY  :        (White Racism)-------->(Black Nationalism
.....................                                and Black Power)
```

INTERVENING VARIABLES
(a) Definition of the Situation
(b) Power-Relations

This is the basic starting point. As the thesis develops, it becomes clear that several other variables are necessary for constructing an explanatory model of Black Nationalism. These are brought together in chapter nine below, after they have been introduced in their proper contexts and discussed at length.

It will be useful to explain the significance of the terms dependent and independent variables. By independent variable is meant the variable which is assumed to be causing or influencing change. By dependent variable is meant the variable assumed to be caused by, or influenced by, changes or variations in the independent variable. The presumed causal or independent variable occurs prior in time to the presumed effect or dependent variable. Thus the historical approach to power and race-relations adopted in this thesis has the merit of isolating the variables along a sequence in which the temporality can be detected, and so need not rest heavily on speculation.

A word of warning. Because the thesis spreads many theoretical tentacles in its effort to explore and probe the many theoretical, philosophical and moral traditions for insights, discussions on many

of the segments may be misconstrued as "digressions"
or "off-tract." This author feels, however, that
any adequate explanation or understanding of West
Indians in Britain must first of all be rooted in
historical material. But, furthermore, it is vital
to pull in many different concepts, even inter-
disciplinary concepts, to help us construct a total
picture. Only when we have done this can we be
reasonably certain that our explanations are grounded
in a theory of man in society.

In this thesis then, the areas of sociological
analysis that illuminate the dynamics of Black and
White relations are examined. Thus we examine class,
race, stratification problems, power-relations,
ideology and social movement theory and integrate
these into a causal verbal model. The problem of
Black Nationalism is approached against a background
of colonial social history and racism. Both of
these concepts are closely bound up with Black
Nationalism. By carefully analysing the relationship
between these variables, new meaning is given to
Black and White racial tension and conflict in
Britain. It is in this mode of analysis that we
conceptualise Black Nationalism as a dependent
variable in the structure of social relations

between Black and White in Britain. Clearly, in the
British context, the relation between Black and
White is first and foremost a relation between super-
ordinate and sub-ordinate groups. The implications
of this relationship, for social theory, are carefully
discussed and evaluated in the main body of this
thesis.

Utilising a paradigm of congruent and incongruent
orientations toward varying trends of social adjust-
ment, allows us to focus attention on both super-
ordinates and sub-ordinates simultaneously, thus
enabling us to grasp their reciprocal interactions
in terms of definitions of the situation . This
"stereoscopic" approach facilitates the getting away
from a likely one-sided preoccupation with the
minority's reactions considered by itself.

Having thus outlined the problem in its broadest
fashion, our next task is to make it clear what some
of the aims of the thesis are. To this task we now
turn.

Aims of the Study

This is an inquiry into the socio-historical linkage between the Black West Indians and British society, and an exploration into aspects of protest and social conflict among the West Indian immigrants (Black Nationalism) resulting from the relationship.

It is a basic contention of this thesis that, in sociology, before we can go on to discover "associations" and "correlations" and to capture measured attitudes of the human social world, we must recognise that the expression of attitudes and feelings is the product of human intercourse at all levels of human action.

The first aim of this thesis, then, may be described as an attempt to grasp the interconnectedness between man and history, and to inject into the discussions of Blacks in Britain the badly needed historical perspective. If we can demonstrate some of the socio-historical sides of the Black West Indian, we will have filled a distinct gap in the discussions about the theoretically important linkage between West Indians and Mother Country Britain. One fundamental issue here, of course, is that we too easily forget that Mother country is a product of the European Enlightenment philosophy, a philosophy

which embodied the great idea of Reason, Egalitarianism and Libertarianism, but which also simultaneously nurtured a sub-philosophy of white superiority. A careful teasing-out of history will shed much light on this problem and its implications for Black people in the Western world.

The second aim ties in with the first: primarily to utilise a distinctly social-structural mode of conceptualisation to explicate some of the crucial processes which characterise the Black and White relationship in Britain, in a way which can relate race relations to the total British society. This distinctly sociological perspective makes optimum demands on sociological theory, but it also aspires to add basic new insights into minority relations to take account of nuances (such as colour) which are obviously important in multi-ethnic relations. In emphasising the way the riot of ideas incubate in social-structural contexts, the thesis, in a small way, contributes to the general crucial field of the sociology of knowledge.

The third aim is to glean first-hand data on the many aspects of the West Indians' experiences in order, first of all, to probe for social uniformities in the way of socio-cultural continuities;

and second, to do this in as natural a setting as possible. The study, then, approached the West Indians in Britain from a "grass-roots" perspective; and this is a very important orientation for a meaningfully adequate level of understanding (Weber) of the problems of Black people in a White society. Modern sociology tends to shy away from the "unquantifiable" types of human behaviour, but clearly, subjective understanding is precisely what provides sociological analysis with its distinct character. West Indians in Britain have had to live in a society in which racial mythologies built around differences in skin colour and physical features die hard. These mythologies are a crucial element in the indigeneous population's belief system, and were some of the main tools of power used in the process of racial slavery and colonialism in the eras of Western empire-building. Very little effort has been made in Britain, up to now, to find out or to explore what Black people in Britain are saying as a result of having to live at close quarters with racism, or even how they are saying what they think is significant, or why they are saying what they say. By getting at some of these questions, this thesis develops a theoretical base for the study of racial relations in the special

context where the colour of the skin of one set of actors appears to be all-important in the many dimensions of social relations. In scrutinizing these problems, one can come to understand important properties of social (purposive) action. It would seem, indeed, that one of the drawbacks of the "race-relations" approach to Blacks in Britain is precisely that there has been too much talking on the part of those who say they want to "help", and not enough listening to the actors who presumably need the help.

Finally, the fourth aim. This may be construed as that of "advocating" an interdisciplinary approach to ethnic relations; indeed, to social phenomena generally. This is a sociological work, but it turns on an axis of historical data sociologically interpreted and applied. In addition, it frequently raises themes and issues both in other fields of the social science, as well as in philosophy, religion and even literature. The approach largely derives from the author's intellectual conviction that sociology is a futile endeavour if practised apart from the myriad social, political, moral, philosophical and historical contingencies in which it is enmeshed, and which gave birth to it.

In the next section, some of the theoretical and empirical significance of the thesis is touched on; after that, the chapter ends with a brief note on the scope and plan of the thesis.

Theoretical and Empirical Observations summarised

This thesis highlights vital sociological problems in the general areas of race relations, sociological theory and conceptual analysis. In this section we do no more than introduce those problems. Henceforth they are moulded into the thesis and inform it at the different levels discussed.

The observations of the thesis regarding Black Nationalism in Britain are conducive to the formulation of theoretical propositions concerning varied contexts of ethnic and minority-group relations. Thus our project highlighted the sociological problem raised long ago by Georg Simmel entailing that group consciousness tends to increase with conflicts with out-groups, especially where the out-group appears to have a hi her degree of already-established consciousness. As illustrated by the Black communities in Britain, certain situations of ethnic contact are more conducive to the acceleration and re-hearsing of cultural practices within groups, than to change or modification of those practices. In such cases, as this research has revealed, what is taken as social conflict may lead not to any form of social change or cultural adaptation, but to the development of "plural" systems in which the different ethnic groups seek to be left alone to practice their

own cultural forms.

The concept of social and/or cultural pluralism
is therefore of first importance in this study,
since what we are dealing with is a situation in
which ethnic groups (Black and White) on contact
veer away, at least cultural-ideationally, in a sort
of centrifugal fashion. The present orientation of
the Black communities in Britain is one toward
securing independence of the dominant values of
the society in which they live, but to which they
do not see themselves as "belonging". This striving
currently takes a social-protest perspective rather
than a political-action perspective.

But pluralism could be a disastrously misleading
concept, for it can imply institutionalisation of
processes such as racism, and in this way may be a
self-justifying and distorting way of talking about
ethnic contact. The first question, therefore, that
one should ask in any situation defined as pluralist
is "what are the factors that give rise to the par-
ticular incidence of pluralism?" Are those factors
connected with power-competition, political coercion,
social rejection, or voluntary isolation - voluntary
separatism? As we stated above, the central problem
of the Black West Indian in Britain is that of

social rejection by British society. This forces
West Indians as a group into a defensive position,
a marginal situation, in which position they deem it
necessary, even desirable, to display a system of
cultural practices and life-styles markedly different
from that of the indigenous population. The difference
is keenly stressed in all the social activities of
West Indians. In this crucial sense, they see
themselves in British society, but not of it. If
social rejection is isolated as the determinant of
a plural situation, we have to look for structural
criteria of rejection, and this poses other vital
questions of conceptualisation. For, as a sort of
peaceful co-existence, pluralism implies equality
of the plural units, but rejection is unmistakably
(in our case) the answer to the intransigence of
belief systems that conceive physical differences
as important in human relations. In this sense,
the concept necessarily implies power-competition,
and power is often used to impose political coercion
of dominants over minorities.

For the concept to be meaningful, then, there
must be at least two essential qualifications.
First, complete pluralism in the sense of perfectly
autonomous units is not an empirical reality; it
would be better to speak of quasi-pluralism. Even

in the ideal-type case of South Africa, separation
is never complete at all levels. It may be at the
cultural level, but at other levels (e.g. economic),
other societal connections operate to ensure inter-
ethnic social relations.

In the case of West Indians in Britain, these
problems apply, with the added element that the
question of a separate territorial base for West
Indians in Britain is not entertained by the
immigrants.

The second qualification is that pluralism is
only meaningful if we think of it in terms of power
and power-relations. One group often has power
while another has no power or a proportionately
small degree of power. Uninhibited use of power
(legitimate or illegitimate) to implement force,
can be a crucial element of pluralistic structures;
thus force can be used as a mechanism for the main-
taining and justification of a status quo.

Power and power-relations are therefore vital
in discussions of ethnic relations. Here, surely,
is where we have the explanation of why colonial
societies have been and are the forms of pluralist
societies par excellence. These societies are
characterised by a high degree of compulsion or

constraint – what we have called political coercion.
And racism in these societies is a means of maintain-
ing and justifying, indeed perpetuating, inter-
sectional relations, and for maintaining differential
balance of power. In colonial societies racism
operates via regulatory measures, administrative
decisions or legal conventions and enactments, in
order to contain the system. Pluralist arrangements,
then, are a source of both stability and conflict,
but they are not a necessary and sufficient condition
for these processes. Cultural differentiation,
paradoxically, is a form of socio-cultural integration,
but the relationships are not easy to grasp. In any
particular case we must spell out and explicate the
different dimensions of intergroup sequence and the
level at which these sequences obtain. We must also
explore how power is used.

There seems to be a case, of course, for making
an analytic distinction between pluralism due to
coercion, where one party can easily use its power
to maintain divisionism, as in South Africa;
pluralism due to voluntary isolation, such as the
Chinese in Jamaica; and pluralism springing out
of a situation of voluntary migration but in which
there is an element of social rejection by one, or
both parties, of the other, as is the case of Blacks

in Britain. Voluntary migration (as opposed to forced migration such as slavery) will not normally lead to the establishment of a plural situation unless there is an element of social rejection of one party by another. Similarly, a pariah group is only possible because one party rejects another.

Yet another analytic distinction must be made between social pluralism and cultural pluralism. People may be "integrated" at one level, but differentiated at another. This sort of situation is well illustrated in America where, for all intents and purposes Black Americans are "solid" Americans at the cultural level: they can take part in all the cultural sports of their country and compete for and represent their country in international tournaments. But at the social (or social-relational) level it is a different matter. These same Americans will be socially distinguished at this level, and become the victims of both formal and informal segregation imposed by whites. They will not be allowed to live in certain "white" areas at home in America.

In this latter case we say that racism is vertical at the social level. Here, social pluralism is not modified by cultural homogeneity. This problem raises another crucial distinction which we

call the distinction between minimal racism and
maximal racism. This distinction is the one most
often practised in day to day social relations
between Black and White, and is largely the
distinction between the stipulative and the non-
stipulative interaction response. This distinction
is frequently referred to in sociology textbooks as
the difference between primary and secondary
relations, what Gunnar Myrdal calls the "rank-
order of discrimination," or the cognitive
construction of a hierarchy of social situations in
which racist beliefs serve to insulate different
levels of social relations. Thus, if a white
employer who claims that he "believes in" something
called "equality of opportunity" as a means of social
levelling, acts, nonetheless, in a way hostile to
any social arrangements which would bring an
intimate or personalised type of social relation
with Blacks, his behaviour is bordering on the
stipulative type. "We will employ Blacks, but only
if they work in the basement." Modern sociology
calls this predisposition "social distance", but
it is clear that in some cases of distancing the
distance is effected and maintained not by what
transpires in the social context, but by beliefs
and ideologies rooted at the cultural level.

Finally, we can speak of the cluster of rationalisations and folk explanations in race-relations as a second-order racism. Colour plays a central role in this complex. Acting as a base on which false premises are erected, colour differentiation can be made to appear real, and a dominant group can, and very often does, use its power and privilege to restrict the minority's access to, say, opportunity structures. This is clearly a start to self-fulfilling prophecy. When minority group relations are viewed in this way, a power or conflict theory becomes central to social explanation. We may supplement this frame, but not displace it, if we must grasp the essence of social processes.

Clearly, if one group of men in society will often have the power to impose its definition of the situation upon others and thus shape their lives accordingly, sociologists must explain the processes that generate structures of social organisation in which the definitions are manifested. One of our major premises is that the greater part of the West Indian protest in Britain can be explained by facts of West Indian and Anglo-West

Indian history. We have set out then to document and illustrate the complexity of this assumption, and here we found a well-directed study of history of great assistance. We have not attempted to rewrite the history of Anglo-Saxon slavery to account for contemporary West Indian protest, but neither have we wished away the by-products of this system as experienced by West Indians. Instead, we have attempted to utilise history as an aid to the understanding of some vital group processes and identity problems of Blacks in the Western world. We have, in so doing, pointed the way to reasons why the search for a new Black identity takes the form it does. We have identified clues to the possible outcome of this search, and already the West Indian's withdrawal into his own partially self-contained community can be construed as one defence in a long line of possible defences.

Scope of the Study

In a study of this kind, in which the research methodology does not untilize conventional "survey" techniques, the scope of the study and the typicality of the unit of analysis are important methodological problems.

As we shall see, in this study it was important not to create hypothetical situations by asking people how they think they would behave in situations. Rather, patterns of behaviour were studied in actual intergroup situations by the method of participant observation. This posed its own set of problems. While much research in contemporary sociology is inadequately designed to provide basic information, there is usually also the problem of determining the temporal sequence of variables. Information gathered at one single point in time may thus provide only few clues as to whether key variables occurred in this or that temporal sequence.

But while this problem might be overcome by utilizing a well-directed study of history, there is the more fundamental difficulty of arriving at a manageable unit of analysis. In this research,

it was necessary to select for study certain areas
in Britain where the population of West Indians was
considered "large" in relation to the indigenous
population. While this selection did not involve
"statistical sampling" as in survey research, it
reflected a cross-section of British cities in which
a proportionately large number of West Indians were
settled. These cities were roughly divided into
those in the North of England, those in the Midlands
and those in the South. In this way, we arrived at
some measure of typicality of the population. The
randomisation is not statistical in the conventional
sense, since the choice of the areas of study was
based on what must be called "pragmatic" considera-
tions, that is, the researcher had to select areas
where there were opportunities to observe the social
life of West Indian communities.

The practical problems encountered in the
selection of research sites have helped to focus
the present study on a macro-sociological plane.
In order not to arrive at pre-mature closure, both
conceptually and methodologically, the generalisa-
tions of this work are based on a macro-level.
Whether or not this study can be a basis for
extensive sociological generalisations depends on
how systematically we define our central problems and

on how carefully we evaluate those problems for
analytic significance and merit. As a thesis
which did not assume a theory of minority group
relations, but which developed its own set of
indicators for the study of ethnic relations,
it can serve as a basis for examination of a
wide range of problems involving ethnic relations.

From a sociological point of view, the
historical mapping of West Indians and their
relations to the metropolitan society may have
wide applicability in other contexts of colonial
and neo-colonial organic linkage.

In the next section we bring the chapter to
a close by setting out the plan of the thesis.
With that accomplished, we move on to consider
some problems of methodology and research design.

Plan of the Thesis

In the next chapter, some problems of
methodology are raised, with discussions of
the technique of participant observation and
of the notion of subjective understanding in
social research.

Chapter three spells out some of the
theoretical issues of Black Nationalism, after

first illuminating some conceptual and
definitional problems of the concept. Chapter
four is on the linkage between Racism and Black
Nationalism. In that chapter, the structural
locus of racism is explored, and suggestions
presented for an outline of the idea of the
cultural perception of race.

In chapter five, more theoretical issues
are discussed, while chapter six deals with the
dynamics of Black Nationalism, tracing the idea
of Black Nationalism through Black slavery and anti-
colonial rebellions in the West Indies.

Chapter seven continues the socio-historical
exploration of Black rebellion which was begun in
chapter six, examining the context of West Indian
Nationalism from 1834 up to 1966. Chapter eight
examines perspectives of Black Power in Britain;
but it takes brief excursions into the related
problems of ideology and operating strategy. This
chapter also highlights some fundamental structural
problems of Black Power in Britain.

Chapter nine focuses on Black Nationalism in
the context of race relations in Britain. The
idea is advanced that Blacks in Britain have

formed a new "scapegoat class", and in this
chapter the conceptual model of the thesis is
brought to a head in an explanatory frame-
work of Black Nationalism in Britain.

Chapter ten gives an account of the form
and content of Black Protest in Britain among
West Indians. It is suggested that Black Churches
in Britain, as well as Black Power groups are
responses to the same underlying structural
problem of White racism and social rejection
of Blacks. These phenomena are simply at
different ends of one continuum.

Chapter eleven turns on the predictive
outlook of Black and White relations in Britain.
It is strongly suggested that the path which Black
protest in Britain takes in the future depends to
a large extent on the response of the White society
to Blacks, especially the second generation Blacks.
The activities of the agents of social control in
this respect are crucial.

The thesis concludes in chapter twelve, where
some problems of theory and method in sociology
are summed up as the West Indian Dilemma - cum -
the Sociologist Dilemma.

CHAPTER 11

METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN

> -- The purpose of taking a
> measurement is to use it
> to do something.
> The object of taking data
> is to provide a basis for
> action.
> -- W. Edward Deming

The Methodology and Research Design

In sociological research, what is defined as
the problem, i.e. that which is to be explained,
can normally be studied from several points of
view and can be analysed by different techniques
at the disposal of the sociologist. In this study
we utilized the method of investigation which it
was estimated would yield the greatest amount of
information about Blacks in Britain.

Before we describe this method, it is useful
to point out what is meant by methodology in this
context. The meaning given to methodology in this
thesis is the one suggested by Abraham Kaplan.
Kaplan defines methodology as "the study - the
description, the explanation, and the justification -
of methods, and not the methods themselves." In
other words, the aim of methodology is to help us
understand, in the broadest possible terms, not

the products of scientific inquiry but the process itself.[1] This chapter is devoted to a discussion of methodology in these terms.

Clearly, the fact that the social analyst has a choice of more than one technique for the study of social phenomena, raises important questions. It means, among other things, that even though the process of scientific inquiry may or may not be formalised in sociology, the researcher is constantly faced with the important question of deciding what kind of problem is best studied by what method. In the end, the criteria of relevance for choosing one particular orientation over another are often determined by the value premises or standpoint from which the researcher starts. That there are these "sliding scales of rules" seems important in sociology, given the variability in the patterns of human action. It seems clear that if one were to demand that every piece of information obtained should be by means of probability sample, say, this could serve to completely destroy the whole conception of a social situation. And such a demand could, conceivably, lead to grossly inefficient procedures if the fundamental differences among different kinds of information were ignored.[2]

In this study, we sought the meaning of Black
Nationalism by utilizing the research method of
participant observation. As a method for assessing
the "acting-out" of groups, and as a technique for
discovering human meanings and culture which are
accounted for in the linguistic and extra-linguistic
and in symbolically-represented relations with the
object world, it is well-suited for the discovery
of latent phenomena in social life. The process
can be operationally defined as the selection,
recording, and encoding of social behaviour as it
transpires in a natural setting. The method is
typically used to watch persons in situations where
they spend most of their time, or in situations
that are at least familiar to them.[3] This means
that it studies human meanings as they are revealed
in the context of society. Observation of broad
behaviour patterns in "natural" contexts make valid
indicators of social as well as psychological
processes, and this in turn assists the researcher
in making fewer demands on inference, a practice
which often lends itself to great precision and
consistency with empirical aims.[4]

During the early stages of this research,
while the author was engaged in preliminary probings

and field explorations as to what kind of research method could best tap the Black organizations, it became clear that formal interviewing would be an unfruitful approach. A Black researcher is viewed with grave suspicion. The reason is quite simply that members of the Black communities generally feel that any Black student capable of undertaking research should grasp the opportunity offered by the research assignment to expose the white society's "injustices to Black people," not to pry into their goings-on.

This is a very important problem in terms of the prospects for the future of social research in Black communities. The indications are that it will become increasingly difficult to get any sort of information from Black communities, unless some sort of commitment of the researcher can be demonstrated beyond doubt. It must be said that among the more militant members of the Black communities, there seems to be a strong element of anti-intellectualism, and although this stance is never explicitly presented, it acts in a subtle way, nevertheless, to ensure the "drying up" of information and effectively inhibits co-operation with the field worker. On the other hand, many

Black militants made it clear to this author that they "could not relate to you in anything abstract", which is simply one way of hinting that formal questions or interview-type approach would not normally be met with co-operation. From this, it would be easy to suggest that Black respondents do not always appreciate the necessity for many types of social research, or that they do not always respect the latent merits of research. But that would be too naive a viewpoint to take. The immigrants feel, and rightly it may be argued, that they are forever giving information to researchers, without any obvious results in their favour or to the community where they live.

Given these initial problems, then, and given severe restraints on resources and time limitations, it would have been overly pretentious to carry on activities in the research settings with the hope of interviewing a genuine statistical sample. It became clear that the information desired had to be obtained by methods other than by formal questionnaires or formal interview. Participant observation was therefore chosen as the method of investigation, and in the event, to gather information that otherwise could not have been obtained, at least not at the same level of meaning.[5]

Two paradoxes sprang out of this experience.
The first is that the chosen method created
absolutely no problem in terms of access. Thus
while on the one hand it was not possible to elicit
basic information from the Black organizations, on
the other it was perfectly possible and feasible
for the author to identify completely with the
culture he was studying, and so gained access to
all the activities of the groups. As we shall see
below, this bears directly on the crucial problem
of identity, where the basic requirement for
participating in Black activities is to be Black.
Also, of course, lack of a formal structure of
Black organizations facilitates access.

The second paradox was that the chosen method
of getting information provided access to a wide
range of "grass-roots" literature - pamphlets,
books, newspapers and magazines - which were not
usually available or obtainable outside the
research setting. This material, representing as
it does the programmatic world-view of Black
people in Britain, has been carefully scrutinized
for insights into the collective symbols of Black
groups (see Appendix). Participation _is_ symbolic
identification. This is why a wealth of

sociological information can be gained from the
less obvious sites in social research (provided
the researcher's presence does not stick out like
a sore thumb) - in places such as coffee bars,
barber shops, pool rooms and discoteques. In
these settings, one can usually socialise while
sensing the sociology of the general milieu.

In participant observation, the social role
of the researcher demands the use of what is known
as "sensitizing concepts", as opposed to formal
concepts, to give clarification to social and
cultural values of the culture one is studying,
and also to enhance sensitive understanding of
these values. In this study, Racism, Black
Nationalism and Black Power may be taken as
sensitizing concepts in the way Herbert Blumer
used the concept in its original formulation to
refer to concepts which give a sense of reference
as well as a general orientation (as opposed to a
formalistic definition of the phenomenon under
study).[6]

The use of such sensitizing concepts, as
concepts not "operationalised" or "measured" in
the formalistic sense, provides a way of arriving
at data necessary to build theoretical forms.

By viewing goals and interests of the people being
studied in the same way that the people themselves
see them, and by seeing people in the concrete
reality in which they present themselves in daily
experiences (and not as abstractions), the partici-
pant observer does two things at once. First, he
obtains descriptions of a people acting freely
within the scope allowed in a given situation,
and thus of social meanings that are relevant to
the speakers-as-actors. Secondly, since data are
whatever happens, whenever it happens, his
reportage constitutes what may be called analytic
description of a complex social situation. This
description, by utilizing the sensitizing concepts
(almost as a kind of content analysis), is of first
importance in the research using the method of
participant observation.

In the case of research on Black Nationalism,
analytic description necessarily becomes vital,
since the Black Power groups, as social organisations,
have consequences that are latent in the sense that
long-term consequences might not be easily
describable (without analysis) by either observer
or the actual members of the groups. The descrip-
tions given must involve analysis, so that one can

penetrate outer form to gain inner meaning.

Analytic description, then, employs concepts
and propositions as well as empirical generalisations
as guidelines in analysis. The approach serves to
generate new empirical generalisations based on
field data, provided the data were systematically
collected and reported. The next task is to say
some more about data collection.

The 'Population' of West Indians in the Study

In this study, the data were systematically
collected and reported, and were gathered independ-
ently of a pre-constructed theoretical framework.
The theoretical framework which the thesis utilises
emerged from the data of the research.

For the research on Black Nationalism, the
author defined his research interests in broad terms
and made no special attempt to stress anonymity.
This is a vital precondition for most types of
research, but it is particularly important in
participant observation. Frankness helps to build
up trust (though, of course, it might conceivably
prevent research). In this case, frankness paid
off, inspite of initial suspicion mentioned above.
A tape recorder was employed in most stages of the

research, so that the extracts quoted throughout the
thesis are _verbatim_ reportage. More on this later
when we discuss role-playing in participant
observation.

We have now to give a brief outline of the
West Indians who are the subject of this study.
Estimates made from figures collected by the Survey
of Race Relations up to 1969 showed that half of
the West Indian population in Britain is settled
in the Greater London Area. The Race Relations
data are the most accurate available, and the data
from the 1971 Census will not be published in time
to be used in this work. Using figures from the
Race Relations Survey, we list below the cities
in which research was carried out for this thesis:

The North	Estimated West Indian Population in 1971
Leeds	8,000
Bradford	3,500
Manchester	8,500
Huddersfield	4,000
The Midlands:	
Birmingham	47,000
Sheffield	4,000
Nottingham	11,000

Leicester	2,000

The South:

London	235,000
Bristol	5,000

It was in these cities that the author sought the experiences of a cross-section of West Indians in Britain. It is well to remind the reader that six out of every ten West Indians in Britain are Jamaicans. This fact is at once a social commentary on Jamaican society as it is a caveat that Jamaicans are somewhat over-represented everytime we speak of "West Indians".

The West Indians in Britain, and who form the subject matter of this study, are not, generally speaking, who we might call the ambassadors of their countries. That is to say, apart from special groups such as students and professionals, the bulk of them are from those segments of West Indian society that never had steady employment. Many were never normally employed, and in essence this was one of the fundamental reasons for their emigration to Britain in the first place. Quite frequently, among West Indians, these trans-Atlantic trips are made on separate pools of

borrowed funds.[7] In the main, the West Indians who have settled in Britain's industrial cities are not the Black intellectuals of West Indian society, although in the Black Power groups in Britain professionals could be found, mainly in advisory capacities. The bulk are the most ruralised peasants of West Indian society. In Britain, they have become skilled or semi-skilled industrial workmen with a "job", a family, and maybe even a family car. The bearers of Black Nationalism in Britain, therefore, are certainly not the "drop-outs" of society (at least not British society). Even if they were not completely committed to all the dominant values of British society, they more or less adhered to the work ethic, and generally conformed to the normative values of the dominant (British) society, while at the same time rebelling and protesting about various types of defined injustices. Of course, not all West Indians in Britain were unemployed prior to coming to Britain. Many left secured employment and a comfortable standard of life in favour of the uncertainties of British society and culture. Severe disappointments springing out of this transition provide <u>one</u> basis for much of contemporary Black rebellion.

The West Indians we have described above, are
the West Indians analysed in this study. They
meet in groups, in houses, basements and attics
to discuss general problems of the Black population
and, crucially, to lay down new definitions of
themselves and of the society in which they live.
The groups tend to move up and down the country,
familiarising themselves with the particular problems
of different Black communities. In terms of field
research, this involved the author in travelling
up and down Britain with these groups, following
in the trail of their "conferences" and "workshops"
as they move from city to city.[8]

Number of participants in these conferences
varied enormously, depending partly on the issue
or issues that were to be dealt with at any given
time. It is difficult to arrive at reliable figures
of the genuine following of these Black
organisations. There is no formalised structure
of the organisations and it is sometimes impossible
to say who are leaders and who are followers, or who
are simply sympathisers. The lowest number of
participants at any one meeting or discussion or
"cultural evening" that this author has recorded
was thirty. Here the subjects for discussion or

evaluation, or the activities to be undertaken, were distinctly local in nature. On the other hand, the highest number recorded was well over two thousand, as at the National Conference on the Rights of Black People held in London in May 1971, (discussed in chapter 8). These figures form the two extremes. Estimates on the basis of regular turnouts to meetings and activities range from one hundred to two hundred and fifty, at any one venue. The mean age of participants was twenty-eight years, and there were usually roughly equal numbers of men and women.

On the basis of the total Black West Indian population in Britain, one could conclude that the demonstrable numerical strength of specifically Black consciousness is not very significant. But this conclusion can only be granted if we accept the notion that genuine interest in Black identity and consciousness is to be measured in terms of a participation index. The Black Power groups in Britain may not seem to have the numerical support that they might. But the reasons are not simply a question of lack of support. Many of the older Black immigrants (the first generation) while fully backing Black Power groups, do not normally attend

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the activities. Interests in Black goings-on is
always there, but it will require more directed
leadership to exploit the situation. Sustained
support of Black Power comes more clearly from the
young Black men and women born in Britain. The
support of the "young blood" (as the youths are
affectionately called) in Black Power organisations
is a rough index of the future strength and growth
potential of Black protest in Britain.

Finally on West Indians. In this thesis a
distinction is made between the ordinary supporter
of a cause such as Black identity, and the Opinion
Leader. By Opinion Leaders is meant those West
Indians who hold special community status, and who
use the status to act as spokesmen for the Black
community. They need not be the regular spokesmen.
Their distinctive feature is that they demonstrate
considerable knowledge of community problems as
well as national problems. Black Community Relations
Officers, Black Teachers and Black Lawyers, if
practising in Black communities, play this role.

Role-playing, of course, is a highly important
concept in sociology, anthropology and social
psychology. In sociological research, it is tied
up with the notion of symbolic interaction which

we mentioned in the Introduction. The strategy
of role-playing has its merits and demerits. The
consideration of some of these is our next concern.

Role-Playing and Participant Observation

Although it can be stated that participant
observation is a reasonably reliable way of
obtaining descriptions and sociological datum, it
has drawbacks and demerits which the sociologist
should constantly keep in mind.

For instance, there is the constant risk of
over-involvement with the community being studied.
The dangers are more or less, according to the type
of commitment established. In many cases, the only
safeguard the researcher has against this completely
destroying his objectivity, is to "honestly" and
explicitly state his value premises so that readers
can judge the relative merit of the research.

But take again the problem of successfully
breaking off one's relationship with the community
or communities at the end of the research. This
sounds simple enough. But it is a post-research
problem which has landed countless sociologists,
this author included, in moral dilemma.

By far the most fundamental criticism often

brought against participant observation and role-
playing, however, concerns the presumed lack of
replication of studies utilizing this method. It
is often argued that this lack of replication makes
interpretation of research merely the "subjective"
interpretation of the researcher. We shall discuss
the validity of this criticism shortly when we take
up the problem of intersubjective understanding.
The happy medium between symbolic identification
and the scientific standards of reseach is an ideal
which has long been discussed by sociologists.
Clearly, while it might not be possible to achieve
this happy state in all situations and in each
research endeavour, the onus is on the sociologist
to seek for this deal in the task of explaining the
essence of "the everyday life." And this might
mean fully and completely "taking the role of the
other".

In the field research for this thesis, carried
out between September 1970 and October 1971, the
author succeeded in grasping a social situation
firmly and intersubjectively, yet objectively.
The author's experience as a participant observer
was fruitful precisely because he was able to
identify with his subjects. His experiences in

Britain in immigrant communities were really the
crux of the success. Having himself lived in
Britain for ten years by the period of the research,
it was relatively easy to "melt into" the symbolic
life of the West Indians with a sensitive awareness
of many of their current problems. The author
having himself experienced many of the problems
of racism, housing and employment problems, and
the socialisation problems with which the immigrants
were so concerned, it was not difficult to grasp
Max Weber's notion that human social action _is_
also behaviour in the vital sense of having a
kernel of subjective meaning.

And with all this, it can be said that there
was no "Hawthorne effect". Members of the communi-
ties did not become conscious of this author's
presence as a researcher and so adjust their
behaviour to match it. Neither were there other
clandestine activities of the groups over and above
those observed in _situ_. In any case, it can be
argued that when all is said and done, we observe
people as they are subjected to all the structural
constraints of everyday life. It is not to be
supposed that they can mould their actions so
easily to please the observer-researcher.

The contention that this author's unobtrusiveness and inconspicuous presence did not lead people to suppress facts and feelings is partly explained by two sets of facts. One, in addition to being Black, the author has had great facility in West Indian Creole language. And Creole language, long tabooed in the West Indies as not being "proper English", is now being projected more and more among Blacks in Britain as a cultural heritage uniquely West Indian. Creole language is now given the important status of an element of cultural Nationalism. To have been able to converse in this language was clearly advantageous from a research point of view. It helped to establish rapport, confidence and trust between researcher and the researched.

Two, in the very early stages of the research the author had "joined" one Black organization in his local area. This was vital as far as the rest of organisations in the network were concerned. If one were to be a true "Brother", one had to prove oneself. The test came when the author was proved willing to give talks to members of the Black community on Black History and Culture. The ease of understanding of the issues which the author showed, and his being able to formulate the varied

problems for and on behalf of the Black community were clearly positively assessed. These exercises cleared the way for acceptance by other Black groups in other parts of the country.[9]

Finally, the present author's participation in several street protest demonstrations (protests about various issues from "Stop the Immigration Bill" to "Down with Police Brutality of Black People") was seen as a willingness to do the things that everybody else was doing.

The first period of the field research was particularly fruitful in bringing the author in close communication with Black people's activities and grassroot projects. One could hardly have wished for a better time to study the modus operandi of Black Nationalism in Britain. The impending 1971 Immigration Bill, (then on its way through Parliament) was a crucial factor in mobilsing the Black population in Britain (against the Bill). The Bill provided a concrete issue on which to focus Black discontent, and was the key point of extensive discussion and evaluation among Blacks in Britain.

The data gathered at meetings, street demonstrations, conferences and discussion groups, were

particularly fruitful for the formation of
hypotheses about Black Nationalism in Britain.
As an original piece of research, this thesis
differs somewhat from the usual sociological
endeavours, insofar as a search for explanatory
theories of causal relationships and uniformities
of social behaviour, led to an examination of some
of the more subtle areas of behaviour that would
probably be missed by the interview-type of
investigation.

The author, having lived the experiences that
were coming up for analysis, but having moved out
from the heart of the experiences, as it were, was
really applying the concept of _verstehen_ in its
intellectual sphere.

In the next section the notion of the
researcher's identification with the human actors
of his research is discussed. This also involves
the key concept of verstehen, as it is embodied in
this methodological principle of identification.

On the Concept of Verstehen in Social Research

The participant observer must know experientially
the values of those he studies in order to adequately
grasp the roots of the social situation studied.

This is what subjective identification can accomplish in social research.

In this particular research, the author's ethnicity and cultural background were the advantage as well as the danger. He had to be involved as well as detached.

The methodological foundation for the notion of subjective understanding, in which the social analyst interprets the social meanings contained in the culture he investigates, was laid by Max Weber in his discussion of <u>verstehen</u> as part of the scientific enterprise in social sciences.[10] Weber's verstehen, as interpreted by Talcott Parsons, refers to observations and theoretical interpretation of subjective "states of mind" of actors and meaning that is thought of in some way "intended", by a mind or intelligent being of some sort. Of course, Weber never really, as far as we know, discussed at any length how verstehen should be practised in actual social research. But we have enough insight from the idea to sensitise us to the fact that it involves identification of the researcher with the researched in sociological work.

In assigning meaning to the interactive

meanings of the people studied, attention is drawn
to the fact that all social reality is humanly
meaningful, if precarious.[11] And Sociology is
nothing if it is not the interpretive understanding
of social interaction in order to arrive at 'casually
adequate' explanation. In attempting, in this study,
to explain part of the symbolic universe of a seg-
ment of the Black immigrants, we have developed a
perspective which is one of many possible
perspectives. And the fact that this particular
perspective may not be exactly replicated is certain-
ly not sufficient grounds to invalidate it. On the
basis of insights provided by Weber, we have
utilised participant observation to facilitate a
useful grasp and understanding of the emotional
context in which social action takes place. We
have not lost sight of the complex philosophical
and epistomological problems inherent in any adequate
understanding of the nature of man. But we have
used a 'structure of experience' to explore, in a
preliminary way, the culture and social organisation
of Black immigrants, and this is one of the indices
of subjective adequacy. Indeed, to be objective
about man, we must understand the subjective world
of meanings. Or as Schutz would put it, social
reality is from the very start, an intersubjective

world, as experienced by what he calls the common-
sense thinking of men in their daily interactions
with their fellow men.[12]

If, as Schutz maintains, commonsense knowledge
of everyday life is sufficient for coming to terms
with our fellow men, and with the cultural objects
of all social reality, then this can only be so
because we take verstehen for granted and use it
as a technique for dealing with human affairs.
Ideally, of course, the categorisation of social
phenomena requires the development of a general
social theory. But in sociology, too little time
has been spent in generating substantive theory.
Generally, as a substitute, a set of more practical
procedures that begin with a set of general questions
asked by the researcher on specific substantive
issues are used. But in practice, the use of some
of these procedures, e.g. formal questionnaires in
a social situation, could be disastrously mis-
leading if it means that questions are asked of
a situation of which one has no prior "working
knowledge". Clearly, if one does not have some
partial knowledge of a situation, one does not
know how to frame questions to obtain valid
sociological results. In an ideal situation,

a combination of observation and interviewing
might produce optimum results, but, on a more
practical note, one might simply not be able to
do both - it depends on the degree of rapport and
goodwill that exists between researcher and the
researched.[13]

Putting Weber and Schutz together, it seems
that in social research we cannot really afford
to ignore the media of language, cultural meanings,
and symbolic forms. These, together with measure-
ment systems/operationally translate observable
properties of objects and events into theoretically
relevant (commonsense) thinking. Every method-
ological decision presupposes some form of verstehen,
just as every measurement in sociology presupposes
a bounded network of shared meanings - that is to
say - measurement presupposes a theory of culture.
The measurement of social facts often assume that
certain covert behavioural value, or ideological
attribute, is operative. With this consideration,
it might be stated that the realities of measurement
in sociology can be more appropriately catalogued
as observation, classification and labelling.
Somehow these properties are largely rooted in
the common body of understanding we call the

language of the everyday.

To grasp the relevance and the meaning of the cultural symbols around which the culture of Black Nationalism in Britain is organised, and to explain the foundations (symbolically and socially) upon which people have built their lives, sociology's distinctive offering is sociological theory. Without constantly examining and re-examining the structure of our theories so that our observations, descriptions and social events have some literal correspondence to what we believe to be the structure of social reality, we might end up with what is called measurement by fiat. The emphasis of this thesis to discover theoretical forms and catagories from data and the process of research, contrasts with other customary approaches which use formalistic theory generated from logical assumptions or from normative social theory.[14]

Our focusing on the generation of theory from data emphasises how men in society do behave rather than on how we think they ought to behave. In conceptualising subjective meanings, it becomes clear that verstehen is a complex principle, the full explication of which inevitably leads into the arena of the sociology of knowledge. And although

this thesis, taken as a whole, is a modest contribution to the sociology of knowledge, this area will not be explored here.[15]

The task of the next chapter is to conceptually scrutinize key problems of Black Nationalism. That will be the beginning of a model for the study of race and ethnic relations.

CHAPTER 111

ON THE THEORETICAL ISSUES OF BLACK NATIONALISM(i)

> -- There is no such thing as a
> logical method of having new
> ideas.
> -- Karl Popper

Definitional and Analytical Problems of Black Nationalism.

Nationalism is perhaps today one of the most dynamic forces of the twentieth century. Yet, it is not easy to define. Its essence is many-sided, and immediately it is mentioned it begs the question of what constitutes a Nation and raises the question of whether in fact Nationalism involves a conception of "national interest" or "nation state".[1]

Strictly speaking, (in conventional terms) Nationalism might be thought of as necessarily embodying the concept of the "Nation" as an objectively concrete entity, with objectively definable territorial parameters. But these criteria need not be the most important aspects of modern Nationalism; they need not be short term objectives.

In this thesis Nationalism is defined as group consciousness or <u>consciousness of kind</u>, among West Indians in Britain. This definition does not entail that every manifestation of group consciousness among

minority ethnic groups can be construed as National-
ism. That would be to render the concept meaningless.
The definition given here is <u>derived</u> from field
experience in West Indian social, cultural and poli-
tical activities. The derived definition avoids the
trap of "starting with a definition of nationalism
<u>in general</u>, sticking the word "Black" in front of it,
and think the work is done."[2]

The definition we have given to Nationalism is
consistent with that given by Malcolm X, one of the
most dynamic and articulate Black Nationalists of re-
cent times. He summed it up as:

> ... the tendency for Black people...
> to unite as a group, as a people, into
> a movement of their own to fight for
> freedom, justice and equality. Animated
> by the desire of an oppressed minority
> to decide its own destiny, this tendency
> holds that Black people must control
> their own movement and the political
> economic and social institutions of the
> black community. Its characteristics
> include racial pride, group conscious-
> ness, hatred of white supremacy, a striv-
> ing for independence from white control,
> and identification with black and non-
> white oppressed groups in other parts of
> the world.[3]

This seminal definition embodies a number of ideas
crucial to the thrust of this thesis. First, that
Black people's common historical experience is that
of an oppressed group; secondly, that Nationalism

is a response to this oppression; thirdly, that the notion of nation-state autonomy is secondary to the aspiration of autonomy in the Black community, and fourthly, that Black Nationalism takes the same form in different parts of the world where Blacks have had similar experiences of racism and white oppression.

Undoubtedly, then, the political philosophy of Black Nationalism must embody the idea of political and ecomomic autonomy within the Black community. This is an urge, a desire, a striving of all oppressed Black peoples; and without hope of self-determination, Nationalism is meaningless. This stance is perfectly logical, and perfectly understandable in the light of the recent history of Black peoples. Writing on Black Nationalism in the United States, George Breitman contends that:

> black nationalism is a natural outgrowth
> of the 350-year subject status of Afro-
> Americans and a revolutionary response to
> the humiliations and injustices they
> suffer under the white supremacist domin-
> ation of monopoly capitalism. As other
> alternatives have been shut off, national-
> ism popularised in the slogan of "black
> power" and "black control of the black
> community" has opened out as the most
> effective channel through which Afro-
> Americans could assert their dignity as
> human beings and determine their own
> destiny.[4]

Now, West Indians in Britain conceptualise their experience in similar fashion and verbalise their life-situation (first in the West Indies, and now in Britain) in strikingly similar terms. The conclusion to be

drawn from these similarities in outlook, is that
all variants of Black Nationalism are united by the
common aspiration of self-determination. This was
the whole essence of the so-called "Back-To-Africa
movements" among Black Americans and West Indians
in the early part of this century. Back-To-Africa
was a _wish_ for self-determination.[5]

From this analytic standpoint, we may infer
that Black Nationalism in Britain does not involve
the immediate issue of replacing White political power
for Black political power. Nor does it even imply
immediate revolutionary change in the political system,
although revolutionary change is a long-term possibility.
There are more basic issues at stake, and to understand
these issues we have to "go back to history". From
the fifteenth century onwards, West Indian society
was founded on violence, bloodshed and war. This was
Thomas Hobbes' "state of nature". At the heart of this
society was the institution of Anglo-European slavery
of Black peoples. African slaves were torn from their
cultural moorings by European imperialists, were taken
to the West Indies, separated and atomized into a mass
of individual units and lacking a centre of social
identity (like language, religion or kinship), were
subordinated and subjected to the most extreme forms
of coercion. Out of this historical experience, Black
people in the West Indies, as descendants of those

slaves, have forged a unique species of Nationalism,
developed directly as a response to the external
forces that made them an aggregate, "things" rather
than people.

This Nationalism can only be understood against
this background. In West Indian terms, Black people
were dehumanized and annexed, completely cut off from
the possibility of being a nation within a territory
of their own with Black political autonomy. Black
Nationalism must therefore be seen as a body of ideas
primarily aimed at forging some semblance of a Black
identity and a unity based on the consciousness of
the common past. It aims first and foremost at inject-
ing some form of social, cultural and political aware-
ness in Black people, and aims to mobilize them for
unification into an independent movement for the fight
for national liberation.

Black Nationalism aims at recreating the Black
man's shattered identity. The forging and reappraisal
of this identity can and must take place within the
confines of a nation-state essentially alien to Black
people. For the West Indians in Britain (as for the
Blacks in the United States), the question of a separate
nation-state as an over-riding prerequisite for
Nationalism fades into an incidental position at this
moment in history. The more pressing problem of foster-
ing Black identity and Black awareness or Black con-

sciousness, is what is vital.

We need not accept the basic premise that the key to Nationalism is ethnic "groupness", unless that Nationalism is understood as an ethnic group movement in which distinctive characteristics of a people are strongly emphasised and appraised, indeed, given full expression on the basis of some unique quality. (cf. the Ibos in Biafra, and the French in Canada).

Because the cultural dispossession experienced by Blacks in the West Indies was so complete, an important component of contemporary Black Nationalism is the profound reappraisal of Black History. A proud history must be reconstructed, for this is essential for the self-respect and inspiration of present troubles. Thus, among contemporary Black Nationalists, Toussaint L' Ouverture, the hero of a successful slave revolution in French Haiti between 1791 and 1804, stands in high honour. This is because L'Ouverture, a slave from birth to age 45, dared to repudiate white rule and culture and set the Blacks' own definitions and values while imperialist hegemony was yet at its peak.[6]

Black West Indians see important lessons to be learnt from the Haitian revolution. For one, it showed how an oppressed people, given directed leadership, can take their destiny into their own hands and create their own self-image. For another, it demon-

strated how spontaneous awareness of a people's dignity
and worth may be harnessed to revolutionary ends.

Quite crucially, Black Nationalism revolves on
an axis of Black identity, consciousness of kind and
Black protest. These features have led some writers
to make distinctions between different kinds of National-
isms. Thus, for some, the preoccupation with identity
problems is cultural nationalism, as distinct from
political nationalism in which, presumably, the idea
of the separate nation-state would take primacy. Others
have even suggested two other categories: religious
nationalism and economic nationalism.[7] The truth is,
Nationalism is first and foremost a political concept.
The finer distinctions are only meaningful in an analy-
tic sense. They become quite unnecessary and perhaps
even meaningless in empirical terms, for what constit-
utes cultural Nationalism is intrinsically and simult-
aneously political and religious (religious i;e. in the
sense of being an invoked and "worshipable" principle).
This is the point that the British Black Power leader
Obi Egbuna makes so neatly in his book. In grappling
with the problem of the meaning of Black Power in
Britain he concluded that "Black Power is not just an
idea we advocate ... It is a very personal thing like
religion and begins with a deep personal conviction."[8]

Black Nationalism, as we have chosen to define it,

has at various stages in its growth taken one or other of these dimensions. In the West Indies, (and to a large extent in the United States) it is ordinarily political and cultural, in the sense of demanding self-determination and autonomy within definable boundaries, (the Black community). In Africa, Black Nationalism has always been political. The real sociological significance of the alternative foci is that Black people have consistently used religious symbolism and religious rhetoric to (successfully) harness group identification and social cohesiveness. (cf. Durkheim's 'The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life') Usually, underneath the religious trappings lies secular and political objectives, a striving for the coming to terms with this-worldly rather than other-worldly problems and pleasures.[9]

In sum, Black Nationalism pulls together varied ingredients that contribute to the complex concept of Nationalism: language, religion, history, natural resources, defined geographical boundary and other cultural elements. But all of these do not usually coincide. And even when they did, these do not necessarily make for Nationalism. The idea of a nation-state seems to be logically inherent in some definitions of Nationalism. In the case of Black West Indians, however, this idea resides in the background, and may appear later after emancipation from the burdensome socio-psychological legacy of slavery and colonialism has been success-

fully dealt with. This problem of "the Land Question"
has always remained a theme in the ideology of the Black
Muslims in the United States. It was also a central
idea in other Black protest movements in the New World,
notable the Garvey Movement and the National Associa-
tion For the Advancement of Coloured People.

Black Nationalism qua Black protest have found
expression in different spheres of life: in political,
economic, religious, social and cultural spheres. In
this way, it is not to be confused with other forms of
Nationalism such as the Volkgeist European Nationalism
which was distinctly centred on language, history and
geography, or Israeli Nationalism which was centred
primarily on religion and history.

From this focused discussion on Black Nationalism,
we turn next to a more general discussion of this vital
concept.

Nationalism: Fads and Foibles

In this section, Black Nationalism is discussed
in the context of the more conventional notions of
Nationalism. What is offered here is a series of
ideas aimed at effecting an escape from the usual
myopic preoccupation with White Nationalism as the
Nationalism.

Various analytical distortions are common in the

discussions on Nationalism. For instance, it is often claimed that the first manifestation of Nationalism was the French Revolution. It is said that "Nationalism is the child of the French Revolution."[10] Again, it is argued that as a doctrine Nationalism was "invented" in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century.

Both these standpoints are disastrously myopic and narrow. If Nationalism is to be related to the French Revolution, then the most that can be said is that the Revolution was a catalytic agent in a process which began in Greek city states and persisted through Machiavelli to "European inventions".

Another oft-repeated notion found in discussions on Nationalism is that "Nationalism is a state of mind". This is the position taken by Hans Kohn. Kohn also says, in the same breath, that Nationalism is a consciousness, inconceivable without the ideas of popular sovereignty preceding it, without a competent revision of the position of ruler and ruled, of class and caste.[11]

But Kohn does not explain himself well. Two things must be said about his perspective. The first is this: the presupposition that Nationalism demands a nation-state (territory) exclusively its own, and a centralised form of government, is not the real crux of some modern Nationalism. Nor indeed are the ideas

of class or caste _per se_ the major keys for explaining Nationalism, although the elements of ethnicity and race often direct a thought-pattern or consciousness necessary for nationalism to establish itself. The second point about Kohn is that his "state of mind" hypothesis is dangerous orthodoxy. Not only does it leave the real sources of Nationalistic thought and action uncharted, but it carries the implication that the "state of mind" might conceivably be wiped out by force of pursuasion: then the way toward lasting and harmonious world order would be free. Besides, Kohn's idea confounds the sociological with the psychological levels of explanation. In Nationalism, as in most forms of collective behaviour, what usually possesses people is not individual demons, but the social system of which they are a part.

The Nationalism that springs from the colonial experience, is, in the final analysis, a social reaction to racism that is inseparable from colonial practice, past as well as present. And when in fact we turn to a consideration of what is generally referred to as Nationalism in the Third World, (of which Black National-ism in Britain is an "imported" element) it becomes abundantly clear that we are confronted with a phenomenon quite different from European-type Nationalism. We cannot apply European criteria right across the board. The type of movement with which Third World Nationalism

is concerned is the anti-colonialist nationalism, and
this is not necessarily predicated on the idea of a
nation, not even cultural or ideological unities from
which nations could easily be forged. What unity
there is, is usually based on a negative and common
opposition to the devaluation of an identity structure
of a colonial people who are also caught in the criss-
cross complexities of a stratification system. Anti-
colonial Nationalism must be understood as a "wholesale"
opposition to colonialism, including a colonial economic
status.[12]

As we shall see below, West Indian Nationalism
has, over centuries rather than decades, been anti-
colonialist Nationalism. It was born out of a desire
to rid the West Indies of foreign domination. Surely,
this does not make this type of Nationalism any less
legitimate than others springing out of other causes.
On this score, Anthony Smith's disputation as to whether
we can, in fact, talk of anti-colonialism as nationalism
is riddled with the European bias. He falls into the
trap of assigning nationalism only to nations, which is a
back-to-front argument. He falls in this trap because
he entertains the misleading conception (as we have
shown) that "the nation-state is the main object of
individual loyalties, the chief definer of man's identity."[13]
This may be so. But to insist that there is no National-
ism without a nation-state, is to fundamentally narrow

the concept and divest it of its dynamism.

All Nationalisms pay allegiance to some body
or collectivity. It may be an ethnic group, a tribe,
a disgruntled segment of a nation, or it may be the
"state". All Nationalisms, furthermore, have some
desire at some stage of their ideological development
to rid their select collectivity of a mode of thought
defined by that collectivity to be undesirable. It
is on this level that all nationalisms resemble each
other in some respects.

We postulate, then, that basically all forms of
Nationalism have characteristics in common. On a
broad general level they can be categorised into (1)
those of majority or dominant groups, and (2) those
of minority or subject peoples.

Majority Nationalism is three-pronged, and the
elaboration of these types does not concern us here.
They are capably dealt with by Louis Wirth in his
discussion of types of Nationalism.[14] This type of
Nationalism usually holds political power in a
territory defined as a realm.

Minority Nationalism characteristically strives
for political and cultural emancipation. This type
is our main concern. It is this type which sometimes
includes political minorities (i.e. groups which are
majorities in their respective societies) but who find

themselves in a position of minority in a new socio-cultural environment. Or, what is a more common experience, political minorities who are indigenous to a country but are in the minority position (e.g. Blacks in Rhodesia). More will be said in chapter 5 about the minority-majority dichotomy when we discuss power.

Obviously, quite different forces produce the two Nationalisms. But the differences are not reasons for rejecting the idea that we can construct a theory of Nationalism. If science proceeds by successive approximations, (Pareto) it also proceeds by differences. And the difference between the forces that produce the ideal-type Nationalisms we have been discussing lies in the first type drawing on loyalty from an already existing state and government, whereas the second type tries to create new and independent states and government and/ or loyalty where there was none before.

The typology which we present below attempts to give conceptual clarity to the points raised so far in this section. Nationalism is here represented as a series of social and cultural expressions with quite different aims. First, then, type (a). Militant National-ism, inspite of its interesting probability of outcome, is not congruent with the aspirations of Black National-ism. It seeks domination over the majority (i.e. not necessarily the numerical majority, but the dominant

group with the most power). (See diagram below).

TYPES OF NATIONALISM

Majority Nationalism   Minority Nationalism
                            (e.g.Anti-colonialism)

Hegemonic   Particularistic   Marginal
Nationalism   Nationalism   Nationalism

(a)   (b)   (c)   (d)
Militant   Pluralistic   Seccessionist   Assimila-
Nationalism   Nationalism   Nationalism   tionist
                                                       Nationalism

                 Black Nation-
                 alism in Britain

This type implies structural features, in that there is
the requirement that the social system be structurally
compartmentalised into duplicatory, but culturally alike,
sets of institutions. Militant Nationalism seeks the
replacement of one group of power-holders by another,
with, as Wirth put it, "support from aggressive co-nation-
als from across the border." Militant Nationalism in this
sense, is not the immediate concern of Black Nationalism
in Britain.

Black Nationalism in Britain fits type (b) of this
typology - Pluralistic Nationalism. This type emphasises
the definition of the situation in terms of setting up
and maintaining some degree of(Black) cultural autonomy.
It aims at achieving basic unity and self-direction among
its (in this case ethnic) collectivity. Furthermore, it
seeks and advocates full civil and moral equality for

its members, within "somebody else's country". In this way it differs from type (c) which concentrates on the goal of total separation. When the aspiration for cultural autonomy and civil equality are met, there is cultural pluralism in the embryo. Where these aspirations fail or are definitely denied, then secession must follow.

Secessionist Nationalism is geared to the preservation of cultural identity, but it does not worry about full equality for its members on the criteria applied by the dominant members. For the members are not really part of somebody else's country. To a certain extent, the Black Muslims in the United States are advocating this type of Nationalism.[15] Clearly, they face severe structural problems, and their aspirations imply structural features as applied to Militant Nationalism mentioned above.

Finally, there is not much one can say about Assimilationist Nationalism, type (d). In fact, we could eliminate this from our present discussion, for if it were adopted by a whole minority group this would lead to its disappearance anyway. It is by its very nature a short-lived proposal if it succeeds at all.

We have come, then, to see how the concept of pluralism may be applied to the study of Nationalism and to the study of ethnic groups generally. The

pluralism reported here involves cultural dimensions in its analysis, based as it is on the cultural difference of ethnic or other social groups. Where pluralism exists, any difference in cultural tradition is allowed _full_ rein and expression.

There is, of course, the danger that ideological factors may operate to complicate the notion of pluralism, and to translate relative separatism into absolute separatism. If this happens, separation (which is really cultural pluralism) may come to mean "separate and not equal."

It would probably not be trivial to say that when we examine the concept of pluralism along the analytic dimensions outlined above, all class societies are in some sense pluralistic - more or less according to the intensity of ideological conviction of the presumed rationality of stratification principles. In this sense, M. G. Smith's thesis of the plural framework in the West Indies is important but certainly not profound, especially since it is meant to demonstrate that West Indian society is uniquely pluralistic. In fact, Smith's denial that advanced industrial societies like the United States are pluralistic, fundamentally contradicts his own thesis. For all his bench-marks of pluralism: racism, religious escapism and religious fragmentation, charismatic leadership, social and political dissent and social instability, are endemic in

American social structure.[16]

Surely, the crux of pluralism is not whether a society is of mixed ethnic groups or not, but rather, bears on what sort of stratification principles exist in a particular society, and on what sort of power-relations exist. A specific type of power-relations will create pluralism even of an ethnically homogeneous group.

We will now consider how, if at all, sociological theory may come into its own to throw light on our understanding of Black Nationalism.

Black Nationalism and Sociological Theory

We can successfully approach the problem of social behaviour through the careful study of the forms which impel the actions of people. That is to say, we can examine how, as a preliminary to any socially-conditioned act of behaviour, there is always a stage of examination and assessment - a dynamic assessment of the situation.[17]

In minority-group relations, we lack a logically interrelated system of propositions as well as any substantive theory of even the lowest order. And while much has been written about minority groups in general, very little effort has been made in Britain to synthesise theoretical formulations into a scientific framework sufficiently close to the operational level to be direct-

ly or indirectly testable. This thesis attempts such a task.

The material in this thesis is constantly related to theoretically relevant concepts, and in this way it facilitates the "growing up" of sociology and a strengthening of sociological analysis in explaining minority situations.

Sociology must break away from its preoccupation with reified concepts like integration, assimilation, discrimination and adaptation and add new elucidative elements to the understanding of minority group relations. But it can only do this when it has grasped the roots of the problem from the point of view of cultural belief systems and cultural socialisation. In addition to rejecting the pseudo-functionalist stance which tries to explain social phenomena largely in terms of "value commitment" and "social control", we do not accept the particular Marxist standpoint which insists that all the societal conflicts in the urban community are ultimately traceable to, and explicable in terms of, conflicts between capital and labour.

Rather, we postulate the conflict in terms of racism, which as an independent variable exists largely uninfluenced by the particular narrow economic life histories of the individuals within the society. Ethnic relations are conceptualised as a distinctive form of

stratification which raises unique theoretical issues that cannot be resolved through an application of the conventionalised stratification theories. Conflicts between Black and White in Britain are based on differential accessibility to structural opportunities, power, influence, rewards and privileges. But they are also based quite convincingly on ethnic groupmembership **per** **se.** This makes the conflicts between the two groups one element of ethnic stratification which neither a simple old-fashioned Marxist class conflict nor so-called "culture conflict" can explain. Both may be present; but what is more important from a sociological point of view is the nature of racist popular beliefs about Black people. These beliefs, as cultural categories, (social-structurally grounded) operate to give a delicate balance between economic and racial conflict. Racism becomes highly contingent with "economic" stratification and power relations.

When minority group relations are conceptualised in this way, the phenomenon of Black Nationalism is seen to be not the central factor in explaining "race relations" - in the sense that it is not an independent but a dependent variable. The emergence of Black Nationalism is explicable in terms of White belief systems and in terms of the dynamics of the social-relational context in which the beliefs are manifested in concrete behaviour. The belief system of the British (concerning

Black people) contains negative definitions, fabricated and normalised during Anglo-Saxon slavery of Blacks and in the process of colonial domination of Blacks. The white racism which is derived from this experience determines the programmatic orientations of the Blacks living in Britain, and in order to explain white prejudice in contemporary Britain we must explore beyond the now-situations to the structural and historical conditions that engendered Black and White contact and praxis.

If sociology is to offer theoretical guidelines and insights for the understanding of minority group relations, it must be cognizant of the fact that theory always surrounds a practical kernel. it must therefore undertake conceptualisations which depict social relations that are capable of being brought into correspondence with the experiences they define. To achieve this end, sociology might have to resist the temptation to gather a bewildering number of facts, if these facts show an absence of explicit theoretical generalisations or tentative propositions. In the short run, it might even have to minimise the importance of the narrow historicity of behaviour (or the metaphysics of human life), and focus on the broader macro-sociological forces of the human condition.

Having established the outlines of the relations sought in this thesis, it now remains to build a model (structural-processual) of Black Nationalism. By speci-

fying how a number of sociological variables are in fact related, both in space and time, we arrive (in chapter 9) at a sociological explanation of Black Nationalism in Britain. The next task, however, is an elaboration of a structural-processual model.

A Structural-Processual Approach to Black Nationalism

This thesis utilises what can be termed a structural-processual model of society. By explicating the social-structural locus of human behaviour, the model illuminates the essence of the man-made aspects of the arrangements of social systems such as labour-wage arrangement and class-status relations.

Structure, as used in sociology, implies the institutional (i.e. long-lasting) bases of ideas and action in society. And social structure is used to define not only the patterns of social relations, but also the belief systems and ideological construct-ions that are interwoven with them - what Gunnar Myrdal calls "popular theories".

Processual is used here to indicate that the theories or beliefs which one set of actors has of another, come into play in the process of social interaction. They are acted out in this context.

Now, it is important to insist on the analytic distinction between structure and process. Process is a concept very close in meaning to culture, but it

is not identical with it. Although culture is commonly
used as a "rubber" concept in sociology, and is readily
stretched to conform to various analytic requirements,
it has rather specific meanings. We mean by culture
the ways of action learned over time; ways based on
norms and values in a society, and geared to guiding
standards of behaviour. Culture therefore has to do
with standards, while structure has to do with the
clustering of men in patterned ways which, incidentally,
may or may not be underpinned by norms and values.[18]
The patterned behaviour not underpinned by normative
standards constitutes the problem area in sociology
known as non-conforming or "deviant" behaviour.

Conceptually, it could be a dangerous business
to assign patterns of behaviour as cultural simply
because they are "old" or well-established. For if
this is done, there is the accompanying implication
that any traits or behaviour so labelled are normative
and hence "natural" (like the supposed xenophobia of
the British people) and therefore somehow desirable.
Such arguments could conceivably be used to suggest
that racism is a cultural norm, in the sense of being
a ready-made set of definitions of outgroup peoples,
as well as a blueprint for action. Frankly, this
would not be problematic (or at least not to the same
extent) if people were prepared to accept racism in
Britain as indeed a cultural norm, and also accept the

implications for social structure. But because racism
is denied, we are left with problematics - struggling
to explain why people who presumably are not racists
behave nontheless strangely like they were.

It is easy enough to strip racism from its
structural-socio-logical locus. This thesis aims to
locate the structural concepts bearing on Black National-
ism, and racism is one such variable. Sociologically,
this nationalism is a conflict group, and the conflict
must be explained in the process of social relations.
Social conflict, which is ubiquitous and inevitable in
social life, is a _process_ which is continuously taking
shape in social structure. It is useful to stipulate
this, since it is ordinarily treated by sociologists
as a "condition", (as Galtung has done) or as a devia-
tion from normative value orientations.[19] The process
approach used here is consistent with that of Lewis
Coser who defines social conflict in process terms,
defining it as a struggle over values and claims to
scarce status, power and resources.[20]

Conflict and competition spring out of the scarcity
of resources, including power, of social life. As such,
they are properties of social collectivities, and here
form one ingredient in a sociology of minority group
relations. "Race relations" or minority group relations
may thus be conveniently viewed as inter-group power
conteats, or as power struggles harnessed to the his-

torical process. And any purposive social action contains assessment of the control of resources, including power and ideological institutions. The rationale for designating this theoretical sketch structural-processual is that social conflict as an element in ethnic social relations implies inter-action between groups whose raison d'être is structurally grounded, as opposed to being the psychological con-dition of isolable individuals.

The term structural-processual seems to sum up sufficiently tersely the ramifications of social action.

We make sociological inroads in the understanding of Black Nationalism when we grasp the situational con-text of conflict and competition over the use and control of scarce resources, including such resources as pri-vilege, status and opportunity structures. In this connection, the relations posited several years ago by Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, and which have been imbibed by countless sociologists, fail miserably. Park and Burgess postulated that situations of ethnic contact gave rise to a cycle of competition, conflict, accommodation and assimilation.[21] They posit conflict as a "stage" in ethnic assimilation, and underplay power and racism as variables worth considering. This stance, in the light of the present analysis, is clearly empirically jejune. The exercise of, and the differential access to, social power generates

opposition and consequently social conflict. This
conflict becomes the lubricating process of social
relations, not a soon-to-be-passed "stage". Conflict
promotes the formation of groups generally,(and the
unification of Black groups in this case) making for
contra-cultures or subcultures. (cf. Georg Simmel)

Contra-cultures arising from social isolation
and defined shared fates on the one hand, and racism
perpetuating and justifying superordinate/subordinate
power relations on the other, constitute prerequisites
for participation in social movement by the minority
group.[22] In the light of these considerations, this
model could alternatively be designated as a power-
conflict model, having a central principle the idea
that social structures are products of social constraints.
That is, they are authority structures with higher and
lower echelons,,and power structures with more or less
echelons.

When racism is used to maintain a specific power-
relations, and is applied to guarantee minority or
Black inferiority (and this, really, is part of the
definition of racism) then ethnic assimilation in the
Park and Burgess sense is a non-starter. What happens
in such situations, is that each distinct population
(Black immigrant and White Britons, say) seeks to main-
tain the political, economic and social conditions that

are at least compatible with the institutions existing before contact. In such situations of social conflict, the social institutions and culture of the parties to the conflict must be understood and explained in terms of what John Rex calls the "institutions of the truce". Each party musters what resources it can and mobilises compliance with its values and interests that are vested in the interaction situation. This truce situation is obviously a harnessing of social conflict so as to prevent it from erupting into bloody violence and revolution. The groups are sharing the same eco-system, but they do not completely share in the overall ideals of that order or system.

The truce situation is distinctly a prologue to a pluralist rather than an assimilationist outcome. Race relations in such situations (Blacks in Britain) is not how to get people to conform to some overall set of norms, but how to keep relations congenial enough to allow meaningful interaction to obtain. It becomes a question of how best to balance the relations between those who have a premium on social power (including economic power or what Max Weber calls "market power") and those who are powerless or have the smallest amount of the overall power allocation. Race-relations become, essentially, power relations.

In chapter 5 the problem of power relations and its relation with social stratification is discussed.

Before that, however, the relations between racism
and Black Nationalism must be spelled out. To this
task we now turn.

CHAPTER 1V

RACISM AND BLACK NATIONALISM IN PERSPECTIVE

> — It is not possible to enslave men
> without logically making them
> inferior through and through. And
> racism is only the emotional,
> affective, sometimes intellectual
> explanation of this inferiorization.
>
> — Frantz Fanon

'Economic Man' Racism, and Counter Racism:Dialectics

We have analysed some of the basic theoretical
issues facing a sociology of Black Nationalism, and
we have described basic outlines of a structural
model, and some of the key variables related to it.
Throughout, we have insisted that the phenomenon of
Black Nationalism (and Black protest in the New World
generally) is a function of social-structural white
racism, rather than a reaction to minority status per se.

In this chapter we shall attempt to show first,
how racism has come to be endemic in the culture and
social institutions and the belief system of British
society, and secondly, why this reality has important
bearing on the pattern of race relations in Britain.
Thirdly, it will be shown why white racism is the most
important single social indicator of Black Nationalism.

By the term racism we mean the peculiar manner in
which a racial group systematically enslave or colonial-
ise or subject to a high degree of exploitation another

racial group, on the basis of superiority/inferiority criteria, whatever these are. An operational definition of racism can thus be summed up as a system of beliefs or ideology which asserts that certain groups of human beings are "naturally" or congenitally inferior to another group. As a set of beliefs without truth claims, racism maintains that differentiated ethnic groups possess differential potential with respect to occupying different statuses.[1]

In the Western world (and in the world of European Enlightenment which is so bound up with Black history in the West) white racism appears in the lives of Black people as the stepchild of slavery. As it appears in Western civilisations today, it is the product of relatively recent encounters in the movement of people, (slavery, colonialism, etc.) and was sown in the practice of dominance-superordinate _versus_ dominated-subordinate situations. Oliver C. Cox emphasises in his gigantic work that racism emanates from European Nationalism and capitalism when capitalism arose to serve the interests of the Europeans in three basic ways:

1. By viewing another people as inferior, mentally, morally and physically, made Jim Crow and Colonialism appear plausible.

2. Being financially advantageous, the capitalists as a class paid minimum wages to those they colonised (mainly Blacks) thus realising enormous profits from their labours.

3. Racism served surreptitiously to pit the
   colonised segments against themselves,
   while the colonisers drained any discontent
   away from themselves, applying the strategy
   of "divide and conquer".[2]

As we shall go on to show later on in this
chapter, the roots of Anglo-Saxon racism were the
enslavement of Black peoples which lasted for centuries.
Quite crucially, the major rationale for enslavement was
economic. There was enormous gain to be made by the
white slave owners. But as Eric Williams so brilliantly
documented, slavery was not born of racism; rather
racism was the consequence of slavery. A racist twist
was given to what was basically an economic phenomenon,
viz. slavery.[3] Because the system of slavery had to be
justified, racist dogmas were evolved, primarily as a
means to excuse and sanction the institution in general,
and the economic exploitation of slaves in particular.[4]

The dominance of Europeans over non-Europeans (we
are not too concerned with the actual mechanics of this)
was focused on colour, which became the basis for the
imputation of inferiority. Colour, as a symbol of
status and cultural difference was reinforced by bio-
logical arguments which themselves came into prominence
to validate slavery. So basically, imputation of infer-
iority sprang out of economic structures; an economic
pursuit became surrounded with a belief system and
ideological scaffolding which sanctioned that pursuit.
And as Ashley Montagu rightly points out, the short

step between the physical difference and social status given to the slaves was soon taken to include biological difference, thus completing the search for reasons to justify conduct.[5]

Racism, of course, had other antecedents besides slavery and colonization, as for example pariah groups, isolates and/or annexation practices. The ideological positions that one group of people is condemned by nature to inferiority and another destined to superiority, are old enough ideas - they were central in Plato's concept of a Republic. But for our analysis the focus seemed to have been sharpened and the elaborations refined in close association in time with the advent and development of Black slavery. The theoretical views of racial superiority, as they are applied to Black people in the West, are a product of recent history, and are relatively recent constructions (since the Enlightenment) clearly based on colour and physical appearance. The characterisations have been institutionalised and normalised since the seventeenth century rather than over a millenium. Racism as an idea-system emerged from slavery, solidified in colonialism and capitalism and has been given varied levels of application in contemporary times.

It is well to remember that as a nation Britain was the dean of slavery and colonialism in the period of European hegemony. This is too easily forgotten

when analysis of racial discrimination and Black and
White encounters in Western society are undertaken.
Slavery played the major role in making racial lines
rigid: it was, by definition a caste-structure. Not
only was the whole regime deliberately and consciously
geared to ensure that the slave should never at any
time be the equal of his master, but it sought all the
"blessings" it could get to rationalise the structure.
So, in support of the basic economic arguments for
slavery came theological justifications, on the grounds
that the "Negro" was a heathen and a barbarian, a des-
cendant of Noah's son Ham, cursed by God and doomed
to be a servant for ever as the price.[6] Racism is not
a psychological quirk.

When slavery ended, the caste-like structures
remained, wherever Black and White were in interaction.
The targets of racism were clearly defined, and once
that was done, it is not difficult to imagine how
social, political and cultural factors were invoked
to serve to intensify and escalate what has come to be
called the "racial struggle". It is this struggle
which political leaders often seize to manipulate,
thereby encouraging additional cleavage defined as
racial, or encouraging ethnic stratification. In
practice, the real roots of the conflicts are never
explored or understood. Hence, it is not uncommon
for "racial" battles to be fought over what are

ostensibly the non-issues of an ethnic group situation.

What is problematic about racism in Britain (as we hinted above) is that the British, (including many students of society) see themselves as a non-racist and tolerant people. But, as should have been clear by now, the British as a nation had no choice but to be racist. Slavery and colonialism were racist-producing processes. Racism as an ideology accompanied and rationalised a dominant power position in which contrasts between upper and lower statuses were unmistakably clear. The ideology that emerged from an Empire "on which the sun never sets" was a highly reassuring ideology, because it convinced members of the dominant group (Britishers) that their ascendancy was no historical accident, but was part of a natural cosmic and divine order.

Crucially, Britain has always invoked elements of a racist theory to justify its patronage of Black colonials, many of whom are now in Britain. In Britain the underlying racist belief system must be applied. Its application forces the Black immigrants into the role and status of a pariah group and secondly establishes them as convenient scapegoats who in time of crisis are sitting targets for racially-toned accusations. The indication of the Black immigrant as a scapegoat is a <u>social</u> mechanism of the white society, and not purely a psychological phenomenon. It cannot be said that White attitudes to Blacks are neutral, nor can it

be supposed that if the Black immigrant "adopts some
of British middle class values, he will be accepted
(as Professor Kenneth Little believes), that "if
West Indian immigrants want middle class people as
neighbours they must adopt middle class ways them-
selves."[7] This, surely, is a profoundly naive per-
ception of the reality. It is racism which deter-
mines the way Blacks in Britain are treated, and it is
racism which influences the White behavioural predis-
position to Blacks. This racism can be minimal or
maximal, of first-order or second-order, but it is
still racism.

To try to explain the structure and dynamics of
Black and White relations in Britain in terms of the
"stranger" hypothesis, or in terms of "newcomer" syn-
dromes, or in terms of immigrant-host frame of refer-
ence is sorely inadequate, if taken by themselves. It
is not even the similarity of ethos, (or what Schermer-
horn calls cultural congruence) or consensus of views
that are the factors of importance in the explanation,
but the fact of racism. If cultural congruence were the
essence, the West Indian, being the most Anglicised of
all colonial immigrants in Britain should have no problem
"integrating." But we know differently; we know that the
West Indian faces the severest problems of acceptance in
Britain, inspite of his Anglo-Saxon (or Afro-Saxon) out-
look.[8] His values are more Anglo-Saxon by far than say
the Jews, the Italians or the Poles. But in reality

he is what Michael Banton calls the "archetypal stranger".

White attitudes are not everywhere "making concess-
ions" for the Black Britons, as Banton supposes. Students
of society have not really come to grips with the problem
of racism, and they have tended to overlook the fact
that the tide of racism continues to flow long after it
has started. Indeed, given structural conduciveness it
will not ebb at all unless action is taken at the level
of ideas, at the structural level.

Thus, like the American situation, the principal
obstacles to "good" race relations in Britain lie on the
white side of the colour line. Here, Gunnar Myrdal's
observations of the American dilemma are instructive,
as we shall see later. Myrdal's major hypothesis, arrived
at nearly thirty years ago, was that despite major econ-
omic, social and political factors, at bottom the "race
issue" was an ideological question.[9] So too is the British
situation.

Black Nationalism in the Western world is the dia-
lectical response to intransigent white racism. It is
counter-racism, an antidote to the marginal status-
positioning and open exploitation of Blacks in recent
history. It invariably involves the reappraisal of the
historiography of Black people in the search for a suit-
able context of identity. In addition to forcefully
asserting the uniqueness of the Black experience, it

stands as an urgent reminder that the race variable is of first importance. in the theoretical appraisal of the complexity of contemporary cosmopolitan life. As a derivation of a heritage of anger, misery and frustration of Black people as a whole, it manifests an all-round state of high tension, with a generalised tendency to aggression or even violence. But what really makes it likely that racial violence will occur in Britain in the future is not the preaching of the advocates of Black Power, or the visit to Britain of "two Americans preaching Black violence." It is the denial of racism and the complacency of those who make crucial decisions affecting Black people that will trigger off violence.

To understand the dynamics of Black Nationalism, we must first understand the heritage of Black debasement. In this light Black protest takes the shape of a rejuvenating force, assisting Blacks to vent their fury over the mutilations of the past. And Black Power is the actual medium of expression of Blackness, and of new definitions, a reordering of the world according to the subjectively meaningful typifications of everyday life. It is therefore not possible to grasp the activities and aspirations of Blacks unless we categorise those activities and aspirations relative to those of the wider social system in which behaviour transpires. It is to facilitate this categorisation that certain kinds of variables have been selected

(such as <u>racism</u> and <u>power-relations</u>) as highly signifi-
cant, and as components of a theory of Black Nationalism.

Although we postulate that Black Nationalism is
a function of white racism, and although we have <u>speci-
fied</u> this function, in order to be able to predict out-
comes from the relationship, we must utilise variables
which happen to be exogenous to the frame-work. Thus,
the history of racial slavery is exogenous in the sense
of having no <u>direct</u> relation with the other variables.
It is a"given" in the sense that it cannot be explained
by the model in hand. The type of explanations which
have been suggested here might be called "field theory",
because the universe of societal configuration (as for
example belief systems) <u>qua</u> cultural elements, are primary
essences of the total society, located in the cultural
framework. The structural model is one in which it is
possible to use a limited amount of information to derive
general propositions by means of contingent propositions.
In this sense, then, the approach favours the macro-
dynamic analysis of social systems. The following
sections will aim to show how ideas have biographies
of their own.

Group Boundaries and the Cultural Perception of Race

Our analysis now presents the notion that it is
impossible to understand group differentation and inter-
group linkages, (in Britain at any rate) without the
consideration of <u>social identity</u>, by which we mean the

social categories, groups and roles to which individuals see themselves as belonging. This identity must be clearly distinguished from identities that are derived from personal attributes. Identity, as we use the concept here, requires sociological, as opposed to psychological explorations and explanations - even though groups, roles, and **status** categories are as much psychological concepts as they are sociological. As we shall see below, the two levels invariably interlace.

In detecting and evaluating the life-complex of Blacks in contemporary Britain, it is easy to misunderstand the reality of the Black community and its relationship to the white community. And this for a number of reasons, some of which will be the subject of this section. We may summarily state the following to comprise the core of the present problem.

First, Blacks in the western world have historically been defined in stereotypic terms. Second, consensus on these definitions have never really been lacking, inspite of new social realities which invalidate the theoretical views about Blacks. Third, it has become increasingly clear that the roles and status-positioning of Blacks in Britain have multi-faceted rationalisations in Western philosophy, theology, ethics, economics, biology and history.

In the sociology of literature is to be found some of the firmest roots of Black caricature, mortised

with the history of slavery of which we spoke above.
Discussants on race relations in Britain frequently
ignore belief systems, or they fail to spell out what
beliefs (particularly those about out-groups) are and
how they might have been crystallised. In the beginning
of Anglo-Saxon slavery, as now, the Englishman's ethno-
centricism has severely distorted his perception of
African culture. As Winthrop Jordan has reminded us,
the crucial factor in this distortion was decided on
the basis that no matter how great the actual and
observed differences were among "Negroes", none of
these Black men seemed to live like Englishmen.[10]

Thus, although the Englishmen could, in the period
up to the sixteenth century, legally enslave one another,
they did not do so in any serious way. In addition to
the fact that Englishmen generally were anxious to avoid
this status, there was the very important idea that common
brotherhood in Christ, which presumably all Englishmen
had, imparted a special quality of exemption. In order
to make the concept of Slavery applicable to real human
beings, it was developed and institutionalised and demon-
strated on an "ideal" group of people - the Blacks. The
African was latched unto as the answer, and it was in
this context that the idea arose that so long as there
were ample supplies of these demonstrably strange and
different creatures, unquestionable heathens who could
play slave roles, then Britons never, never, shall be

slaves.

In England, perhaps more than in any other European country, the concept of "Blackness" was loaded with intense meaning. This was not only important if Britons were not to enslave one another: it established several disciplines on a pseudo-intellectual plane from whence they could be invoked to attest to the desirability or goodness of the system. So it was that in the period of Anglo-Saxon slavery after 1550, "Blackness" was given its position in the English vocabulary and in the Englishman's conception of the world. Learned men in Britain presented the English public with a Black caricature which was to remain embedded in the minds and value system of the British to contemporary times. The descriptions which started out as "mere" justifications for slavery reached the English reading public in a matter-of-fact way, being taken (as indeed they were intended to be) as universal natural characteristics of the African. Surveys of British attitudes in recent years show clearly that the British have unmistakable (stereotypic) ideas and popular theories about Blacks, even though quite unable to say precisely how or where these ideas were acquired.

From a sociological perspective, this is a key point. For the transmission of ideas in society (ideas as cultural categories) does not automatically imply transmutation of these ideas. Many make several gene-

rational transitions without obvious revision or quali-
fication.

On, then, to locate some more idea sources.[11] In
eighteenth century Britain, the widely-read Gentleman's
Magazine of London suggested that "the Negro is possessed
of passions not only strong but ungovernable... [he is]
warlike and unmerciful, selfish and deceitful, at best a
terrible husband, a harsh father and a precarious friend."
This Magazine, perhaps the most widely read periodical
of its time, was effective in disseminating fictional
ideas about the "Negro". But it was not alone. From
the sixteenth to the nineteenth century, Blacks in the
Englishman's universe of discourse, were described, ex-
plained and generally misinterpreted by several genera-
tions. The end result has been (in contemporary times)
a garbled, confused, distorted and often fictional
account of the African and Black people. The African,
it was said, "are very greedie eaters and noless drinkers
... very lecherous and theevish and much addicted to
uncleanliness... they are beastly in their living."
Bryan Edwards, the Jamaican planter and English politician
was one of a long line of influential men who saw it as
their responsibility to "intellectualise" the descriptions
of Blacks. Another such man was his friend Edward Long,
historian, planter and politician, who went out of his
way to equate the "Negro" with the animal kingdom. This
can be extended to include other standard figures in the

annals of English history and literature: George Best,
David Hume, Anthony Trollope, Charles Kingsley, John
Ruskin, Thomas Carlyle, and of course Shakespeare is
well known for throwing in the spicing of sexual imagery
in his portrayal of Blacks, and Rudyard Kipling's notion
of the "lesser breeds" is equally well known.

By the early nineteenth century, the English took
it for granted that, among all the other things they
had heard of Blacks, they were promiscuous, strongly
sexed, indolent and lazy, lethargic and full of rhythm.
By the 1840s when Thomas Carlyle wrote his infamous
Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question, Black was
firmly rooted in the English mind as a negative concept.
This was a cultural gain. White and Black connoted
social and cultural opposites: purity and filth, virgin-
ity and sin, virtue and baseness, beauty and ugliness,
beneficence and evil, god and the devil.[12] All the
sharpness of the Black caricature were subsequently
raised to the level of acceptable political debate
(cf. p.148 and footnote 13, chapter 6).

What is crucial here, of course, is not the simple
fact that one group of people said unkind things about
another. This is commonplace enough. What is terribly
vital is that the descriptions and caricatures with
which we are concerned were forged as a justificatory
deux ex machina.

In this very vital sense, the descriptions were impervious to new ideas and new experiences. Thus, the presence in Britain since 1945 of 2½ million Blacks has done no more than to tap hidden springs of English racism which had long remained invisible and inoperable. White perception of Black colonial or ex-colonial immigrants has revived boundaries of race rather than created them anew. The immigration did not create the perceptions; it took them out of cold storage.

Finally, to conclude this brief discussion, it must be remarked that the psychological dimension of race relations helps to make certain kinds of social uniformities more clearly apparent and comprehensible. Certain psychological assumptions might even contribute to the simplification of theory. The definition of the situation notion, for instance, includes the perception of race as a social category, and this implies that in the long run, we are incorporating in our model both social-psychological (definition of the situation) and societal variables. This is not to suggest that Black Nationalism is a phenomenon to be explained in terms of psychology. The hypotheses derivable from this study of Black Nationalism are only psychological in-so-far as social action which it describes incorporates the dynamics of human motivation. The next section explores some motives of racism.

The Biography of Ideas on Race: Meanings, Motives, and Remedies

Far more important than crude psychologism for the understanding of Black Nationalism is the logic of social situations - the dialectics of meanings.

There is a generally-held notion in Britain that the main reason why the Black immigrant is rejected is because he is strange and alien, and that in any case, the Blacks are quite "touchy" on matters of race and so like to "stick together". Most of these arguments are notorious for putting the cart before the horse (more on this in chapter 9). As we have shown above, there are ideas about Blacks depicting them as amoral and subsocial; and this is the crux of all their rejection, not the "stranger" hypothesis or the presumed myopia of cultural intolerance created by xenophobia.

What is often overlooked is that racism in Britain is always denied or camauflaged. Because of the complex nature of social stigma and social rejection of Blacks in Britain, we shall utilize a dichotomous distinction between <u>maximal racism</u> and <u>minimal racism</u> to throw light on the problem. The crux of the distinction depends on whether the criteria of racial distinction are absolute or not (i.e. <u>deemed</u> absolute).

Where the distinction is reckoned to be absolute

or extreme, that is, where the distinction between the
subordinates and superordinates is one of kind and not
of degree, we can speak of maximal racism. A situation
of maximal racism exists in South Africa and Rhodesia,
to name two contemporary examples. Britain's historical
record of slavery and colonialism, on the other hand,
presents a rather peculiar case of maximal racism. For
out of this experience arose ideas on the inherent
superiority of people with lighter colour together with
its obverse, the inherent inferiority of people with
dark colour. And in Britain this notion has been in-
tellectualised to convey the meaning that this state of
affairs is not arbitrary, but is the natural working
out of vaguely conceived biological forces that bestow
intelligence and moral qualities unevenly on different
racial aggregations.[13]

Minimal racism, theoretically, defines darker people
as backward, or "less evolved", different in degree but
not in kind from their masters (past or present),
thereby capable, with training and education, to rise
from their lowly position to a status of equality with
the ruling group.[14] Although this current is typified
in Britain (mainly on the political Left), it must
necessarily face ideological pitched-battles with that
current of British history of slave rapacities which
placed Black people in the great mass of "lower races".
In Britain then, there is a sort of tug-of-war between

an application of maximal and minimal racism. Colour
distinctions tend to blot out all other distinctions,
and maximal racist themes monopolise the defining per-
ceptions of the social field. Blacks are defined as
inferior, but through no fault of their own; rather,
through "accidents" of history which make some men
rulers and other slaves and servants.

All this means, in practical terms, that however
much the West Indian, say, becomes middle-class (accor-
ding to British criteria), he is still, in terms of the
overall ideational structure, an outsider, a marginalist.
Thus, arguments like that of Kenneth Little's referred
to above, can only be regarded as sociological mediocrity.
Even incidents of occasional exogamy (which usually
come under heavy attack and is regarded with aversion
by Whites) do not alter the general thrust of the ob-
servations made here. Exogamy, as a form of social
interaction, does not bridge the gulf between men of
different colour where racist beliefs are in play.

The outcome of the tug-of-war which was mentioned
above gives rise to another conceptual distinction which
can be called the distinction between <u>first-order racism</u>
and <u>second-order racism</u>. The practical consequences of
Britain's slave relationships of the past are only now
fully revealed as Britain must face up to the task of
treating the descendants of their former slaves as full

and equal citizens. The confrontation of this problem creates the British Dilemma. But, unlike Gunnar Myrdal's notion of the American Dilemma which he said was a moral Dilemma, making for moral uneasiness, we postulate that the British Dilemma is not a moral thing.

For the British, Blacks (and the treatment of Blacks) were never problematic in any moral sense. Slavery as a system had no sentiment. Slaves were an aggregate of humanity, a blank which was to be filled in by ascriptions attributed to the most salient features of the "difference" namely, to colour and to the traits displayed in slave relationships.[15]   For Myrdal, Americans apparently suffered from a basic ambivalence because they embraced, on the one hand, the Christian democratic tenets of the "American Creed", and on the other continuously and consistently engaged in unChristian and undemocratic valuations in defining relations between Black and White. In Britain, we see no reason to suggest that there is any moral twinge.

Second-order racism operates as a belief system about Blacks in such a way as to neutralise any valuation inconsistencies. These beliefs operate at societal levels and are invoked from what is regarded as a "natural" frame of reference. Justifications for racist ideas become verbalised with an air of spurious plausibility. Second-order racism can be shown hypothetically

as follows:

Proposition A: (Of Black immigrant)	It is not because of his race or colour why we do not employ him/her, etc. It is because his/her qualifications are inadequate.
But, Proposition B:	In the first place his/her (inadequate) qualifications were a function of his/her race in that they were the products of racism.
Thus,	Race is the dominant factor in Proposition A; And Proposition B is derived from Proposition A,
Therefore, <u>a fortiori</u>,	The rejection in the first place is clearly based on racist reasons. But it is made to appear innocently neutral.

As soon as the Black immigrant is identified, various excuses are given by the white society for his unworthiness – from those given about his being irredeemably subsocial, to the contention that if Blacks want to be accepted they must conform and become more English.

But, as we have clearly shown, the Black is "English" enough, yet he is not accepted. So that is not the remedy. And the problem of rejection does not consist of, or have close relation to, the various social trends in the socio-political or narrow economic arena. People practising racism actually perceive one set of reality, but believe another (cultural-objective versus cultural-ideational perception). The Black immigrant becomes a stranger because, being placed outside the White cultural group, yet confronting it, he invariably resorts to creative efforts to relate one set of reality with the other. It is the dynamics of the ensuing unstable relationship (between Black and White) which propels the Whites to what E. J. B. Rose and his associates call a predisposition toward rejection.

Clearly, the predisposition springs from idea-systems. If changes are to occur in the life history of the relationship, then they must occur in people's beliefs and valuations, quite apart from any purely social trends which may be in motion. If sequences of definitions are adhered to over several generations, they become self-reinforcing - they become "natural" to the degree that premises are built on them without question. From falsely based premises, false conclusions are worked out or made to come true.[16]

In the general area of race and ethnic relations,

false premises built on differences in life chances,
colour, or even language, could become visible symbol-
isation of inferred debased statuses. When all of these
differences are focused on a single minority group, and
behaviour toward them determined by the inferred rele-
vance of these differences, we are in the province of
racism rather than in the province of the "strange
neighbour". The task of the next chapter will be to
spell out some theoretical issues which are of pointed
relevance to these distinctly societal processes.

CHAPTER V

ON THE THEORETICAL ISSUES OF BLACK NATIONALISM (ii)

> -- Theories are nets cast to
> catch what we call 'the world':
> to rationalise, to explain,
> and to master it. We endea-
> vour to make the mesh ever
> finer and finer.
>
> --Karl Popper

Social Stratification and Power Relations in the Analysis of Black Nationalism

In this chapter careful consideration is given to some important theoretical issues additional to those analysed in chapter 3.

Certain key concepts are isolated for specification, since specification of concepts (which can be expressed as variables) is an important necessary condition for the development of theory. In the conceptual model as a whole, the concepts which are used are not new. What is new is the observed relationships between them. To arrive at a causal theory of Black Nationalism, we have put the everyday typifications of actors into a deduct-ive system, (chapter 9) and this exercise assists the formalisation of the verbal theory of Black Nationalism.

First, then, stratification and power. As we have had occasion to point out above, West Indians in Britain

are immigrants from colonial or ex-colonial territories.
This is important to remember, in view of certain
statements made earlier in this thesis about slavery,
colonialism and racist beliefs. The degree of accept-
ance accorded to the Black immigrant is not, cannot be,
understood in pure class terms. Because the value system
of British society includes the notion of the inferiority
of Black people, Blacks are described and allocated roles
according to criteria rooted in deterministic racist be-
lief systems. Their past colonial status puts them in a
pariah caste or underclass, and in terms of the conven-
tional stratification structure in Britain, they are below
and outside the lower reaches of the structure.

Location of Blacks in a sub-class depends on the
kind of role which members of the "host" society normally
assign to the colonial worker. And the roles normally
assigned the colonial worker is a function of racist be-
liefs. Thus the possibility of Blacks entering the
stratification system of the metropolitan society rests
on the strength of the popularly-held beliefs about Blacks.
We cannot hope to grasp the complexity of the problems
that the colonial man faces regarding his relation to
the stratified set of positions in British society,
until we analyse the underlying fact of racism. The
simple Marxist position which insists that the position
of the Black people is explicable in terms of their
relation to the means of production, is clearly inadequate.

Because their location within the stratification system is determined by non-economic criteria, (colour and racism) the Marxist deduction is rendered non sequitur.

Racism, then, remains a concept of first importance in studies of ethnic and minority group relations. For the Black people, it places them on the periphery of white society, in a sort of underclass position. If they are granted acceptance at all, it comes grudgingly, and by and large they live and die in the socio-cultural world of the "immigrant". Clearly, as Rex rightly points out, the structure of social relations of production and of social process in Britain make for a self-contained system of stratification in which Black and White relationship cannot logically be explained by reference to that system alone. What is worse, is that Black people in Britain cannot expect with confidence that their children or grand children will have been accepted in the stratification system.[1]

A stratification complex gives rise to differential power relations. But where ethnic groups are included for analysis in the overall complex, the problem becomes multi-faceted.

Power can be defined relationally as the decision-making capacity of one person or group of persons to produce intended effects.[2] Power relations presuppose specified evaluations in the sense that the recipient

of a "power decision" is obliged to subscribe to the
value practices obtaining, on pain of negative sanctions
and hence deprivation of one or more desirable end.

Social power is by its very nature a scarce value.
In the service of stratification principles, or in
structural linkage with stratification systems, power
(including market power) is often used to maintain
privileged positions and statuses. Where the stratifi-
cation involves <u>ethnic</u> stratification we have a high
ascriptive basis of role allocation and power is used
by the dominant group to maintain socio-economic domin-
ance. Also, however, a dominant power position may be
used to establish and maintain racist belief systems.
Where such a situation obtains, the dominant group can
manipulate (or at any rate has the wherewithal to man-
ipulate) the opportunity and status structures of the
minority, and can thus deny the minority access to those
structures.

Power , therefore, is a most important ingredient
in minority-dominant relationship. There are two im-
portant observations worth noting. First, it can be
argued that it is usually a minority among the dominant
group who exercises effective power. And, it is often
plain (in Western societies at any rate) that this
'minority' gives direction to the overall attitudes
in the (dominant) society. The second observation is
that, strictly speaking, the opposite of minority is

dominant, _not_ majority. By minority is meant the group with less power, or with no power at all, regardless of how numerically big this group is. In arguing this way, Blacks in Rhodesia are the _minority_ (even though they are several-fold greater in number than the Whites); because whites have the power they are the _dominant_ group.

In accounting for the Black immigrants' minority position we must utilize a power axis. Superordination and subordination can then be brought to bear on the analysis. These ideas can be diagrammed thus:

	INDIGENOUS GROUP		IMMIGRANT GROUP	
	Super-ordination	Sub-ordination	Super-ordination	Sub-ordination
Dominant (majority)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	←------P------------O------W----------E--------R----→			
Minority	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)

An examination of this diagram reveals that both immigrant and indigenous populations can be dominant or minority groups, depending on whether they have more or less power. If we focus on Britain's Black immigrants vis-a-vis the indigenous population (with power as the intervening variable), the idigenous population occupies Box (1) : a _numerical_ majority.in superordinate position due to the fact of having more power than the immigrant population. The immigrant population, on the other hand,

occupies Box (8): a _numerical_ minority who are also in a subordinate position because of having less power (or no power at all).

Many other theoretical and empirical possibilities exist that can be accounted for in this paradigm. For instance, colonial plantation system would occupy Boxes (3) and (6): a few outsiders (immigrant planters) numerically small, but having all the power would take Box (3) and form the dominants. The indigenous unfortunates, numerically big but with no power, would occupy Box (6) and form the minority.

From the point of view of Black immigrants in Britain, the understanding and articulating of power-relations is of first importance. The sentiments of Black Nationalists (as expressed in their activities and political discussions) reveal that, as a party to a power contest, they define their situation not in terms of the numerical strength which they migh acquire, but, _crucially_, in terms of the rules operating outside the contest _per se_ - in terms of British attitudes to their share of power (including economic or market power). Black immigrants' evaluation of the use of power by the dominant group forms a sort of driving force of Black protest and Black rebellion in Britain.

This is because Blacks in Britain (particularly West Indians) view White Power as illegitimate, not

because it is white, but because in historical perspect-
ive it is seen as having been acquired by "illegitimate"
means - by slavery of Blacks and by Empire-building on
Black labour.

Postulating that legitimacy/illegitimacy are key
perspectives in minority group power relations, and pos-
tulating that this definition of the situation is what
can be termed the incongruent perspectives of race re-
lations, many logical possibilities appear. Putting
legitimacy, power, and dominance together (with their
opposites) we arrive at a nine-fold paradigm in which we
can locate many empirical examples of power relations.
These possibilities are shown in the diagram below.

In view of what has been conceptualised about
Blacks in Britain, they occupy the position shown in
cell (2) where:

(a) while the dominant group (White) regards its power
     as legitimate,
(b) the subordinate group (Blacks) regard the power of
     the dominant group as only partly legitimate.

Power is never constant. It is always diversified, and
ranges from legitimate to illegitimate forms, thus caus-
ing conflict to be built into all power relations. They
are therefore inherently unstable. In Britain, power
relations between Black and White seem guaranteed to
remain unstable so long as ideas on the question of
legitimacy remains incongruent. The range of possibility
open to those actors who regard a particular power sit-

PARADIGM OF SOCIAL DOMINATION AND LIGITIMACY PERSPECTIVES

L - L (1)

1. Dominant group regards its power as legitimate

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as legitimate

L - PL (2)

1. Dominant group regards its power as legitimate

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as only partly legitimate.

L- I (3)

1. Dominant group regards its power as legitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as illegitimate.

PL - L (4)

1. Dominant group regards its power as partly legitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as legitimate.

PL - PL (5)

1. Dominant group regards its power as partly legitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as only partly legitimate.

PL - I (6)

1. Dominant group regards its power as partly legitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as illegitimate.

I - L (7)

1. Dominant group regards its power as illegitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as legitimate.

I - PL (8)

1. Dominant group regards its power as illegitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as only partly legitimate.

I - I (9)

1. Dominant group regards its power as illegitimate.

2. Subordinate group regards power of dominant group as illegitimate.

L = Definition of superordination as legitimate
PL= " " " " partly legitimate
I = " " " " illegitimate

First letter = Self-definition of superordinate

Second letter= Other definition of subordinate

Source: Schermerhorn, 1970, p. 70

uation as illegitimate are enormous, and span the
continuum of conflict situations, form peaceful
bargaining in the market place to open violence
and bloody revolution. Unfortunately, the analysis
of these possibilities does not concern us here.

That there is never an equal share of power among
all contestants in a given situation, or among the
parties concerned, is a complex issue on which many
scholarly treatises have been written.[3] At the very
elementary level, however, we may state that, in
practice, the majority group is often the locus of
power; and that it is the power of this group which
sets the normative standards.

This is the position taken by Robert Bierstedt.
But it is a misleading conclusion, for it does not
make the distinction between a _numerical_ majority and
a dominant group (a numerical minority maybe) in the
way described above. Bierstedt's conclusions do not
help us to come to terms with the deviant cases where
the numerical minority have the power over the majority.

What is missing from such an analysis, is the ref-
erence to a sociology of belief systems. In Britain,
power resides with the dominant white group, not with
the immigrants; and because of this, the "ought" of
social interaction with Black immigrants becomes in
essence social control proscription on the immigrants.

From this perspective, there is on the part of the in-
digenes, an implicit call from the immigrants to limit
their activities to those that do not overly threaten
the indigenous group's loss of socio-political and
economic control.

Understandably, there are other very important theo-
retical issues that bear directly on this problem. The
next section seeks to consider some of these.

Class, Deprivation and Ideational Structures

We have tried to show that the presence of the
Black colonial man in British Society poses severe
problems for conventional sociological theory. And
we have suggested that a simple Marxian class-conflict
model is quite inadequate as an analytic tool for coping
with these problems. In this section we will expand these
propositions by reference to Class, Deprivation and
Ideational structures.

The thrust of the analysis is that we cannot, (as
Marx did) define class purely in terms of economic
differentiation. Rather, class, if defined in more
broadly structural terms, relates to an aggregation of
people in a society who stand in a similar position on
the axis of power and privilege or status position. Who
occupies what position or is accorded this or that status
is not determined by economics but by idea-systems.

Marx had, of course, at different times, grappled with the problem of the interlacing of economic power and its concomitant prestige and ideational power. His treatment is clear and radical in the German Ideology:

> the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: that is the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force... the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it (the ruling class). The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant relationship grasped as ideas.[5]

True, in any stratified society, one set of people have the power to control the ideological institutions and the market and/or political power capable of commanding the behaviour of others. This is good insight, but quite profoundly, ethnicity and race complicates the matter.

If we are to analyse Blacks in Britain in terms of conventional class models, then we have to make place for them at the bottom of the hierarchy, even inspite of their acquiring "the mental means of production." They cannot be accounted for in the old class structure. Or, if they are to be accounted for in that structure, they would have to be termed lower-class working-class or the under-class. This is because by reason of racism, Blacks are not qualified for admission to any other class. It is precisely because of this fact why traditionally they have been employed in Britain to fill the positions at

bottom of the least-valued jobs. This is the now-familiar pattern of job down-grading for Black workers (see the P. E. P. Report, <u>Racial Discrimination in England</u>, 1967). The notion which permeates this state of affairs, and which implies "keeping the Blacks in <u>their place</u>," is a racist notion which rests on ideas and beliefs about the lesser place of Blacks in British society.

The racist nature of social-distancing of Blacks in Britain approximates a caste system insofar as Blacks are not included in the class system, let alone being mobile within it. Thus the colour-class hypothesis of Kenneth Little which suggests that Blacks are rejected because they have low socio-economic status, is quite clearly, false and ridiculous. If it were correct, then there would be less colour prejudice among the low socio-economic echelons, and a wealthy, educated, articulate and well dressed Black should experience no difficulty in securing complete acceptance. But we know this is not the case. (Again, see the P.E.P. Report, among much else). The crux is that it is not a question of Black people having a low socio-economic status in the British system of social stratification, but of their not fitting into it at all.

This, really, is at the root of complaints against or objections to mixed (Black and White) marriages in a country like Britain. For underlying all such object-

ions is the covert set of beliefs that proclaim that
the white party is, unquestionably, "marrying down".
This also explains why (after mixed marriages) it is
the white party, moreso than the Black, which is in-
variably ostracised by members of his or her immediate
kin and ingroup generally. At the heart of Black and
white relations in Britain, is the British cultural
notion that as a "race" apart, Blacks are deemed to
be inferior and somehow, sub-social. In this way, even
the lowest Briton sees the Blacks as necessarily below
him and the presence of Blacks in Britain, has given
British lower class a vicariously elevated status.
The Black immigrant in Britain, therefore, suffers
from economic as well as status deprivation - his exist-
ential problems are complex.

As the immigrants perceive various ill-defined
new poor roles waiting for them, certain possibilities
present themselves. These include a veering to social
movement activities and a mobilisation of influence for
effecting social change; militant advocacy for social
and/or physical disassociation from the mainstream of
the environing society. It is in this context that
Black Nationalism and Black Power are to be understood
as general reappraisals of the immigrants' social
identity and the bolstering of a secure psychological
base from which to come to terms with the rest of
society. Herein lies the essence of on-going social

movements such as the Black Muslims in the United States and the Ras-Tafarians in Jamaica. These important themes are discussed in later chapters of this thesis.

With the denial explained away in racist terms, albeit covertly, the Black experience is an experience perforated with a complex of Deprivation. At one level,

> ...the issue of the presence of large numbers of coloured children in schools might be represented as a threat to the education of the native white children and the reason given for this is that coloured children are unable to speak the language in which instruction is normally given. When it is pointed out that the West Indian coloured children speak English, whereas many Cypriot or Italian children do not, either we are told that West Indian children do not speak English properly, or the ground of the argument shifts, and we are told it isn't only a question of language.[6]

The Deprivation which the Black immigrant experiences thus turns out to be Absolute rather than Relative. Relative Deprivation is the perceived discrepancy between Value-expectations and Value-capabilities, that is the discrepancy between the "ought" and "is" of social life. The Value-expectations represent the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled, and Value-capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping.[7]

For the West Indian in Britain, the gap between legitimate expectations and denial of the expectations

is widened and complicated by what can be called group
denial or ethnic discredit. The basis of the discredit
rests on beliefs and perceptions rather than Reference
Group comparison per se. The West Indians buy big cars,
or they central-heat their homes; or they buy their
homes outright for cash or have the best-kept garden
in the neighbourhood. But these do not do much for
their status in the eyes of the British.

In the crucial sense, it would be more nearly
appropriate to speak of Absolute rather than Relative
Deprivation. The Deprivation is status Deprivation,
and the Blacks' point of reference is the past and con-
tinuing history of colonial modes of thinking among
Whites. In other words, in this sort of Deprivation
the value standards are not set by a Reference Group
with which the incumbents of Deprivation are thought
to identify. Status Deprivation can only be explained
by reference to belief-systems.

In sociological terms, the cognitive discrepancy
between group expectation and group goal-attainment
shifts from the purely behavioural level to the struct-
ural level. In other words, the underlying institutional
problems of analysis are distinctly sociological, not
psychological. Consequently, the implications for
social change also shift from personality "adjustments"
of individual actors, to changes at the structural or

cultural level. The structural approach to the study
of minority group relations certainly provides a frame
of reference for the understanding of racial conflicts
at all levels of interaction.   The model is quite con-
sistent with the empirical observations of Black Nation-
alism in Britain.

Having shown how the operation of racist beliefs
in human affairs add substantially to the complexity
of stratification theory, and having shown how the
factors of role ascription and stereotyping according
to observable characteristics add something new to the
"race-relations" situation, it is now clear that patterns
of social interaction (where race is important) are not
determined by the elements of the concrete situation.
In such situations, the germ of the interaction derives
from the subjective indicators external to the actual
situation. In the case of Black West Indians in Britain,
the historical fact of their past colonial roles somehow
marks their past indelibly, and ties in that past with
contemporary class system via racism.

Denial of the Black Immigrant's admission to the
political and stratificational systems is determined
by the value system of British society which carries
the notion of the inferiority of Black people. The
desire or the expediency of an already stably stratified
society to place a minority group in terms of social-
structural images of say, occupation or power structures,

make for the Deprivation. The sources of this Depri-
vation are social and cultural, not psychological.

To the average Britisher, of course, the immigrant
imagines rather than experiences these problems. Thus,
for instance, it is often repeated in offical circles
in Britain that it is the mechanism of the market
which is respnsible for Black people being charged
higher car insurance rates, or for their paying inordin-
ately high prices for houses or flats.

The findings of this thesis, however, point to
other conclusions. That Blacks are made to pay these
"colour tax" and "foreigners' levy" in these services
must be understood in terms of racism coated with
economic exploitation. We have already shown how
historical processes can be unearthed to account for
the values responsible for perpetuating these practices.
It is at the level of ideas that analyses of race-
relations must be pitched, if we are to understand the
complex and often camouflaged nature of ideological
constructions and speech reactions (What Pareto called
Derivations).

From this problem of ideational constructions
we turn now to explore how racism might lead to
collective defensive mechanism such as Social Movement.

Racism and the Rise of Social Movement

In this final section of this chapter we pose the
question whether we may usefully conceptualise Black
Nationalism in Britain as constituting a stage in the
development of social movement. Or whether we can,
on the basis of present conceptual analysis, predict
conditional outcomes of Black social organisations
such as Black Power.

As has been demonstrated above, the results of
racial discrimination takes place outside the confines
of conventional stratification structures. It is con-
ceivable, therefore, that Blacks might come to react
to rejection by rejection. Black people in Britain
might come to reject totally the white stratification
and the moral order on which it rests and agitate for
Black Separatism. If this were to happen, it would
have to be said that racism was the central factor
producing this orientation. Discontent and social
unrest would develop into a social movement, not only
aimed at some form of national liberation from alien
customs and cultural expressions, but also aimed at
redefining and changing the existing power-relations
and status allocation.

From what has been observed of Black Nationalism
in Britain, it already shows the qualities of a social
process by which individuals in their group-associations

seek either to induce changes or respond to cultural
trends already in motion. Black agitation in Britain,
qua Black protest, shows clearly that collective
behaviour has an appeal to the Black masses. But also,
there is the very important feature of the unpredicta-
bility and unreliance of this mass, which makes for
problematics. Precisely because of these features,
The Black Power movement in Britain is not assured
even when the movement commands an unqualified support
from the groups which it claims to represent. These
features are essential characteristics of social move-
ment.

Black Nationalism in Britain, then, has qualities
of social movement. It manifests itself as an incipi-
ent social movement in Herbert Blumer's most general
sense of a collectivity characterised by a "we conscious-
ness".[8] But furthermore, it shows the social movement
characteristic of hetergeneous motives of participants.
Already, a shared definition of the outgroup constitute
a norm of the movement. And there is a set of shared
generalised values (or rather counter-values) and be-
liefs which defines British society as racist. These
beliefs, Black Nationalists are successfully disseminating
among the masses, as a prelude to harnessing and co-
ordinating affects of the community.

The harnessing of generalised beliefs into action

has a potential for violence, but only the definition of the situation is charged with what might be called Deprivation Push. Generalised beliefs among Blacks about social threat in British society will be translated into collective action of a change-producing nature if perception of threat is intensified, and if there is pronounced "harrassment" of Blacks from the official agents of social control.[9] On the basis of current actions of the agents of social control, Blacks in Britain may conceivably be heading for a prolonged, sustained conflict with the society which they define as racist. It is in the day to day spheres of activities that Blacks define racism most poignantly as can be illustrated in the following extract from a Black Power pamphlet, May, 1970:

> ... the cultural and the educational system
> are filled with the ingredients of racism.
> The fact that in this country most black
> people live in slums and in fact associate
> such conditions with black people, is racism.
> The fact that when a black man goes into the
> saloon bar of a public house, the landlord
> says to him "please use the public bar sir"
> is racism. The fact that the police in
> Notting Hill put a black man's head down a
> toilet and then flushed it, is racism and
> that is what Black Power is shouting about.

Blacks in Britain, not unnaturally, are living in a state of high tension, because of a condition similar to what Neil Smelser means by structural strain. If racial disturbances were to occur in Britain in 1972, one interpretation would have to be that it is because

of the underlying dynamics of the polarisation of a
collectivity (Blacks) to the point where violence would
be seen to function as a spontaneously shared defense
against anxieties. And though the anxieties would be
experienced by individuals, they would be experienced
by those individuals as members of an easily identified
group association that was never really accepted in Brit-
ish society. The collectively sanctioned defense against
demoralisation, and the group's mobilisation of senti-
ment and affect to support and maintain social solidarity,
would have to be regarded as reflecting social and not
individual unrest. The problem would be structural,
while the actions of the members of the aggrieved group
would have to be interpreted as direct-action tactic
designed to assert certain norms against established
authority's hegemony.

With Black Power in Britain approximating the pheno-
menon of social movement, it seems likely that collect-
ive behaviour, (as described by Smelser) among Blacks in
Britain is simply a matter of time. This is a crucial
statement to make, since as Smelser points out, once
the underlying conditions are present, the factors that
precipitate overt action need not be new. They could
for instance take the form of a redefinition or re-
appraisal of a past situation. Or, collective behaviour
may be sparked off by knowledge of a successful protest
by people in similar problem situations, or by actions
of the agents of social control. Additionally, of course,

greater formalisation and role differentiation, or the emergence and growth of charisma among leadership of Blacks could be crucial in transforming the distinct _value_ orientation of Black Power to a _power_ orientation. All these, together or in varied combinations, could clearly help to solidify generalised unrest into fully-fledged revolutionary social movement.

The reference to charisma is not meant to suggest that it is a quality which is the be-all and end-all of leadership in complex industrial society, or among ethnic minority groups. All that is intended here, is the suggestion that charisma might be an effective attribute for the channelling of Black leadership which up to now has tended to be non-directive and informal.

Because in complex industrial societies there is a strong probability that technical demands in social affairs will hamper charismatic gains, it is not surprising that there is no formal leadership in the Black movement. At the current stage of the development of the movement, the most important requirements is not leadership _per se,_ but a socio-psychological preparation of the group to accept a common culture and a common definition of the outgroup. From within this context leadership and collective action can be co-ordinated. Thus, although social movements rarely gain much ground without facing the fundamental issue of a closely

organised core of leadership (to date, absent from
the Black movement), for leaders to lead, the situation
they represent must at least be clearly defined. When
the definition has been made, the appearance of leader-
ship will be seen as necessary to create or assemble
the definition of the situation into collective response.
Blacks in Britain are at the stage of definition rather
than at the stage of action.

As soon as a clear leadership-followership
structure can be distinguished, and as soon as explicit
promotion of values develop, the social movement will
have truly arrived.[10] Perhaps in the long-run leader-
ship and organisational structure are tied up with
ideology and function. Perhaps then, for leadership
to be effective there must be an ideological base plus
a stabilisation of functions from the omnibus "cultural"
and "political" function to more sharply defined object-
ives. In Weber's term institutionalisation must set in.

That might or might not be an end-state of Black
protest in Britain. What we can hypothesise, on the
basis of the available evidence, is that when a social
movement develops among Blacks in Britain as power-
oriented activity which aim to reconstruct a new socio-
cultural environment, racism will have been an essential
independent or causal variable.

MODEL OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS e.g. BLACK POWER

Requisite Conditions	Process Characteristics	Output Dynamics
1. Degree of visibility and of definition of the situation re: differences in status of Blacks vis-a-vis Britishers	1. Degree of visibility of/ among the dissatisfied	1. Degree of re-organisation of status hierarchies and ranks within Black Power
2. Degree of differences in status assigned to other ethnics according to British criteria	2. Degree of communication of/among dissatisfied at levels of internal solidarity and regime-hostility	2. Degree of mass social mobilisation effected by Social Movement
3. Degree of defined structural ambiguity re: place or rank of Blacks (structural conduciveness)	3. Degree of ethnic or national distinctiveness among the dissatisfied	3. Degree of Charisma among leadership of Social Movement
4. Degree of defined inevitability of assigned status levels and ranks within social categories	4. Degree of historically-shared experience and definition of absence of available/viable alternatives to programmatic change in power relations	4. Degree of scope supplied by new Weltanschauung of Social Movement

(thus)   (thus)   (thus)

High conditions of visible racist stratification (Absolute Deprivation) ⟹ Structural-processual process of conflicts. High conditions for group loyalties based on real or supposed common origins and ties ⟹ High conditions for social control agents' undermining Black leadership

(yields)   (yields)   (yields)

Protest and dissatisfaction with that portion of the political culture which provides basis for proletarianization and outcast roles

Organisational definition on the form and content of the goals of Social Movement and specification of means to achieve such goals

Sustained conflict with Social Movement, or Social Movement stabilisation or both, or elimination of Social Movement (societal desideratum)

Ethnic Relations dynamics

FEEDBACK TO NEW CONDITIONS as definitions change.

The conjecturing about the relationships of the different variables discussed is undertaken because of confidence in the well known principle in social science that we come to discover "facts" and uniformities as we conjecture about them. Every application of science is based on an inference from scientific hypotheses, and conjecturing assists hypothesis construction and eventually theory building.

In attempting to arrive at a testable theory of Black Nationalism, we selected a number of concepts for careful analysis. The selection clearly excludes many other possible concepts, but those chosen, we feel, are imaginative in that they contain an explanatory "gut" quite consistent with our empirical observations. In sociological terms, they help us to find a frame of reference suitable for the examination of the problem area under study. Essentially, we use the system of concepts to make interpretative connections between the empirical world and theoretical formulations.

In the next three chapters the stormy path of Black Nationalism will be traced, and finally located in the British context. After that, the conceptual schema will come to a head, when all the major concepts isolated so far will be constructed into a theory or rather a theory-sketch, of Black Nationalism.

CHAPTER VI

THE DYNAMICS OF BLACK NATIONALISM:
FROM HISTORY TO SOCIOLOGY

> -- History is the land-mark by which
> we are directed into the true
> course of life
>
> -- Marcus Garvey
>
> -- History is the basic science, the
> key to everything
>
> -- Eric Williams

History, Social Process and Social Structure

A major contention of this thesis is that Black
Nationalism is the product of racism, segregation and
social rejection which were an integral part of capit-
alist civilisation, and which are inseparable from
the capitalist-racist ideology of European Enlighten-
ment of which we spoke earlier.

This and the following chapter embark on an his-
torical exploration in search of the sources of West
Indian Nationalism, and in search of the relationship
between Black Nationalism and Black Power on the one
hand, and slavery, capitalism and racism on the other.
In the analysis, power relations and definition of
the situation remain as key intervening variables.

The Nationalism among Blacks in Britain is a
Nationalism of minority alienation taken two stages:

one, the historical experience of a culturally uprooted
people undergone a tortuous past which left ambivalence
and identity problems; two, of minority reaction
against the real threat of second class status in a
society to which they feel they have legitimate claim.
Hence, much of the misunderstanding that permeates "race
relations" and the appreciation of Black Nationalism in
Britain, could be eliminated if the latter were set in
a wider historical perspective than that normally given.
The a-historical nature of the conventional approaches
to race in Britain has frequently meant that the social
activities of Black militants were seen in total isola-
tion from their socio-historical underpinnings. But
just as it would be a serious mistake to minimise the
effects of racist ideologies on the psyche of the Black
man in the past, so it is equally misleading to ignore
or minimise the longer-lasting ramifications of that
experience, which, in the words of Frantz Fanon, per-
formed psychological emasculation of the Black man.
The problem of racism as an underlying current in the
collective Black psyche, keeps Black Nationalism "under
steam." As one Black militant expresses it:

> we experience racial and social deprivation,
> economic exploitation; Black people are de-
> humanised, Black people are defeminised, Black
> people are depersonalised. Black people are
> depersonalised by White society. When we talk
> about racism, that is what we mean.

A similar theme has been raised by American Scholars.

Le Roi Jones assessed the problem in this way:

> The price the black immigrants paid to get
> in America was that they had to become
> Americans. The black man <u>cannot</u> become an
> American (unless we get a different set of
> <u>rules)</u> because he is black.[1]

Jones' observations summarise accurately the crux
of the structural contradiction which Black men in the
West face. Another American, George Breitman, suggests
that if racism **was** completely eliminated (say by
revolutionary change) then the reasons for the existence
of Black Nationalism would disappear.[2]

Gunnar Myrdal's sharp observations made several
years ago, are also relevant here. Myrdal's contention
was that it was the white majority group that naturally
determined the Black man's place. "All our attempts to
reach scientific explanations of why the Negroes are
what they are and why they live as they do regularly
led to determinants on the white side of the race line."[3]

The British context requires exactly the same set
of pronouncements. For the Black American's experience
is a logically connected counterpart of the Black West
Indian's experience of slavery, colonialism and racism.
The general pitch of thinking of Blacks in Britain on
this subject is well reflected in these two extracts
from speeches of Blacks in Britain. A Black Opinion
Leader:

The first thing to see is how imperialism
(which is the common experience of those under-
developed countries of Asia, Africa and Latin
America) has led not only to the development
of prosperity in the industrialised countries,
but how it has also led simultaneously to the
growing impoverishment of these countries (un-
derdeveloped countries). This underdevelopment
means in fact that the existence of structures
in the countries of Asia and Africa enables
the political and economic and ideological and
cultural forms of imperialist domination to
continue. I think it is very important to
understand that this underdevelopment is not
merely economic, though economic underdevelop-
ment is the most obvious.

This underdevelopment means in fact that
the existence of structures in the countries
of Asia and Africa enable the political and
economic and ideological and cultural forms
of imperialist domination to continue.
It's very important to understand
therefore that the achievement of indepen-
dence is essentially a peripheral thing.
Independence makes very little difference
to the pattern of relationship of imperial-
ism and underdevelopment in these countries.
In most cases we find that the new ruling
classes - the indigenous ruling classes -
largely continue the policies of the imperial-
ists - the previous rulers before independence.
And this is often referred to, rather
crudely as <u>neo-colonialism</u>.

This illustrates very clearly the way Black Opinion

Leaders go about defining the situation for the Black

masses. In this particular instance, the speaker was

addressing a Black protest meeting in Sheffield. The

protest was against the impending Immigration Bill of

1971 which aimed at drawing the line, once and for all,

between White Commonwealth immigrants and Black Common-

wealth immigrants. Quite autonomically, the definition

drew on historical analyses of imperialism, colonialism,

neo-colonialism and White racism.

It is impossible to escape the conclusion that the historical experience of European pillage of the Third World has released forces which help to shape the contemporary thinking of Black Nationalists. It is well nigh impossible to understand the Black experience without penetrating deep into the historical past of Black people. Black Nationalism, in all its various guises and expressions, operates responsively to the historical forces that reach back to slavery. And racism in contemporary society is an accomplice of the slave experience.

It is in complexity of the slave-master relationship (which meant Black versus White) that Black Nationalism has its latent (and often inarticulated) force and tendency. Like millenarianism, it arises in social conditions where oppression is perceived, and where immediate effective means for ending it do not appear. It is a force and a sentiment of all Blacks, not simply those who find themselves in lower socio-economic status positions as defined by the parameters of ethnic stratification in Western society. As Robert Allen puts it, "Like an unsatisfied need or a nagging conscience, Black Nationalism is an insistent motif that wends it way through Black History."[4]

Sociologically speaking, it is quite impossible to

grasp the interconnectedness between man and society
without a well-directed study of history. Whether Black
Nationalism finds verbal or political expression is not
the main issue, but that it finds some form of expression.
Black Nationalism, in fact, has always been poignantly
expressed in <u>Jazz</u>, <u>Soul Music</u>, <u>Negro Spirituals</u>, <u>Blues</u>,
and in more recent times Black Poetry and <u>Reggae</u>.

A structural approach to Black Nationalism helps us
to understand it not only in terms of the more easily
identifiable "Black Power rabble-rouser", but in terms
of other subtly revolutionary forms. White people say
that they understand Jazz, or that they "go for" Blues
and Negro Spirituals. But few realise the socio-histori-
cal implications of the dominant themes of this music,
and few are aware of the structural conditions that gave
rise to these creative adjustive mechanisms. Clearly,
when one weighs up the different annals of world history,
it is not at all surprising that Europeans did not invent
Jazz. Theirs is a more vivacious music; and so it should
be. For they were masters and enslavers of men for cen-
turies. The next task in hand is to explore sources
of Black protest and Nationalism.

Black Nationalism, History, Social Theory and Sources of West Indian Nationalism: Anti-slavery and anti-colonial Nationalism

For the understanding of Black Nationalism among

West Indians in Britain, it is instructive to make the
very important social, economic and cultural-historical
connection between the West Indies and Britain.

It is not considered far-fetched to include slave
revolts in this analysis of Nationalism, since by the
latter we mean Black protest and Black reaction to
White super-ordination. This stance necessarily in-
corporates slave revolts, peasant wars, struggles between
White capitalist exploiters and shanty-town dwellers in
the West Indies. This approach is justifiable, in so
far as the racism which is under investigation had its
incubation in precisely these sorts of confrontations.
It was a favourite belief among the slave owners in the
West Indies that it was suicidal to educate the Blacks,
and they openly attributed slave revolts to the tendency
to permit the slaves to enter occupations from which
they should have been excluded. Thus, one key variable
which helped to determine the pattern of race relations
during slavery in the West Indies was the fear of slave
rebellion and revolt.[5] What the slaves did in this
respect, or thought, or were capable of doing, influenced
the masters tremendously. The manner in which the slaves
were forced to react to the harsh prescriptions imposed
on them, is congruent with our definition of Nationalism.

The Nationalism among West Indians which this in-
quiry locates, can be viewed in three stages: first,

that which can be called anti-slavery Nationalism, in-
volving the period from about 1500 to 1834 (in the British
West Indies).

Second, the period of anti-colonial Nationalism,
dating from about 1834 to 1962, the latter date being
that when the first two West Indian territories were
granted "independence." By 1962, most of the British
islands had experienced more than a century of tutelage,
an experience which produced a hodge-podge of politico-
constitutional arrangements which benefitted few in the
mass of West Indian society.

Third, the period that spans from the mid 1950s,
when Black immigration to Britain started in ernest, to
the present.

It is highly significant that West Indian history
since the early sixteenth century is perforated with
revolts and rebellions of one set of people against
another, of slaves against masters, of the poor and dis-
possessed against the affluent and the prosperous, of
Blacks against Whites. And the high incidence of mini-
wars and sophisticated guerrilla activities which charact-
erised West Indian slave society, is a clear index of
the determination with which the slaves constantly resist-
ed the total power assumed by the masters over them.[6]
If they rose to resist the terms of their life-conditions,
in a structure that was geared to keep them passive,

this spirit of rebellion was unquestionably a form of Nationalist assertion, especially so because there was a widespread myth among the masters that the slaves were conscientiously passive, and in any case did not mind being enslaved.

Slave revolts, which began as early as 1518, only a few years after the first slaves arrived in the West Indies (1502), were ostensibly revolutionary and Nationalistic in spirit (here, cf. footnote 4). For they invoked a value of freedom and determination clearly based on the desire to forge a national identity. From the very start, of course, West Indian society was the epitomy of Thomas Hobbes' "state of nature": war and bloodshed were endemic in the system of slavery and colonialism. As classic Marxist theory was to identify later, the state existed for the express purpose of maintaining property relationship. As an organ of plantocracy, the state was indeed the enemy of the people. As we shall shortly see, the "Assemblies" of West Indian colonial period, as nothing more than reactionary Planters' Clubs, did everything they could to see that the property relationship extant in slavery remained for as long as was humanly possible. Small wonder, then, that these territories were (in the period under review) in a state of permanent revolution.

The first Blacks arrived in the West Indies in 1502 (they were landed mainly in Hispaniola). Some

time just before 1517 they started to arrive in Jamaica,
at which time there were slaves already in Puerto Rico,
Cuba, and on the South American mainland territories.
By 1532, rebellions had broken out in Puerto Rico, and
in 1548 in Honduras, while in the Providence Island
they occurred in 1639.

A later period saw several more rebellions, a
picture of which (excluding Jamaica which is discussed
separately) is presented in the following citation
given by Patterson.[7] The following shows the place
and dates of the rebellions:

Antigua	1736, 1831
Barbados	1649, 1692, 1816
Berbice	1763
Martinique	1822, 1824, 1833
British Guiana (now Guyana)	1808, 1823
Surinam	1772
Tortula	1790

In assessing this account, it must be remembered that
the picture here deals only with the particular years
involved. In many instances, there were several inci-
dents in any one year.

The Jamaican picture merits its own separate treat-
ment. Jamaica had twenty nine slave rebellions in 150
years. In the period from 1655 to 1832, Jamaica ex-
perienced more continuous nad intensive servile revolts
than any other slave society in the New World, excepting

perhaps, Brazil. The summary of the most important
rebellions, given below, reflects quite convincingly
not only how unstable the society as a whole was, but
also the intractable and stubborn refusal of the slaves
to accept the status of slave. The rebellious spirit
of the slaves, and their insistence on some minimum
rights, cannot be overlooked in any constructive apprais-
al of Black Nationalism in the West Indies.

A look, then, at the Jamaican picture:

1655 - 1670	Maroons under Juan DeBolas waged intensive guerrilla warfare against the Planters.
1673	A year of serious rebellions. Several hundred slaves fled to the hills of central Jamaica to set up guerrilla camps.
1678	Revolt occurred on one of the large sugar plantations in the parish of St. Catherine.
1685 - 1686	There were several rebellions in these years, probably linked. The rebellions seemed to have been led by the so-called Madagascar slaves.
1690	Revolts occurred in the parishes of St. Catherine and St. Elizabeth. The rebels eventually fled to the hills to join the other existing guerrilla forces.
1700 - 1722	In this period, hardly a year passed without a rebellion. In this period, the 'Gold Coast slaves' were mostly involved.
1725 - 1740	For these fifteen years, the White planters were held in a state of siege. The activities of the Maroons, which the planters were unable to contain, led eventually to a Peace Treaty with the rebels in 1793. In

the Treaty, the Maroons were given
the freedom and right to 15,000 acres
of land. Jamaican Maroons retain
this independence to this very day.

1765 - 1784   On seventeen sugar estates, planned
revolts broke out, led by Gold Coast
slaves.

1784 - 1832   This period saw the second major
Maroon war. This occurred in 1795.
But the most ambitious rebellions of
all occurred in 1831, and involved
20,000 slaves. The damage to prop-
erty ran into millions of Pounds (£)
and thousands of Pounds were spent
in trying to suppress the revolt.
The 1831 revolt was one of the crucial
factors which helped to bankrupt the
slave system as a whole.[8]

In 1833/34, slavery was abolished in the British

Empire. But most historians fail to link the abolition

and the slave rebellions. The conventional arguments

claim that it was Queen Victoria's good, Christian and

humanitarian qualities which eventually guaranteed the

freedom of the slaves. But this sort of explanation is

clearly unacceptable, for, as C. L. R. James put it,

"those who see in abolition the gradually awakening

conscience of mankind should spend a few minutes asking

themselves why it is man's conscience, which had slept

peacefully for so many centuries, should awake just at

the time that men began to see the unprofitableness of

slavery as a method of production in the West Indian col-

onies."[9a]   More to the point, it was the unprofitable-

ness of the system (after repeated wars and expensive

repressive counter-measures) which finally bankrupt

the system. Conscience did not have anything to do
with the freeing of the slaves.

Despite the lack of programmatic ideological orien-
tation in slave rebellions, they can still be concept-
ualised as Nationalistic. As the most widespread mechan-
ism to counteract slavery, revolts inflicted fantastic
damage to lives, and to the property of the White
masters. They undoubtedly shook-up both the material
base of the regime, as well as the morale of the Whites.
One planter, writing home to England in 1733, complained:
"we are in terrible Circumstances in respect to the
rebellious Negroes, they get the better of all our
partys and our Men are quite dispirited and dare not
look them in the face in Open ground or in Equal Num-
bers."[9]

As specific responses to immediate social con-
ditions, all forms of Black Nationalism have their roots
in historical forces and social conditions that can be
precisely located. History and social theory help to
arrest these conditions and put them up for careful
scrutiny and evaluation. It is seen that during slavery
the desire for emigration and separatism increased with
the growing conviction that slavery would never end.
Mass suicide was an alternative frequently chosen. But
by far the most realistic instrument adopted was the
spirit of revolutionary protest and rebellion - what
Patterson calls "collective violence."

All in all, collective violence and later, religious revivals, seemed to have comprised the dominant forms of protest in West Indian society during the nineteenth century.

In the twentieth century, protest is expressed most typically in the form of labour movements, political party movements, anti-colonial (or independence) movements and separatist or pluralistic Nati_onalism.[10] The main concern here is with anti-colonial Nationalism. To examine this topic, we shall take a peep, in turn, into the dynamics of anti-colonial protest in four West Indian territorities (the independent ones). We start with Jamaica.

Anti-colonial Nationalism: Jamaica, 1834-1934

What the year 1834 did in West Indian history, was to remove the gross features of the slave system, without basically upsetting the underlying racist stratification or power relations. During this period, the West Indies all had some form of tutelage democracy. But for a whole century and a quarter after 1834, the new free labour society "marked time", developing along lines set by Victorian modes of thought, while at the same time incubating proletarian national consciousness.

From 1834, and up to 1944 (when universal adult suffrage was introduced) the lower classes in Jamaica were constantly engaged in various collective protests. These

often took the form of millenarian movements, social banditry, or direct outburst of violence, ranging from spontaneous venting of accumulated grievances to cunning insistence on basic human rights.

Beginning with the Morant Bay Rebellion in 1865, through to the twentieth century and up to the 1960s, Jamaican history is punctured with a series of mini-revolutions. With the formal abolition of slavery in 1834, some 300,000 slaves in Jamaica, once mere chatels, were transformed into human beings. But from the time Parliament in London had decreed slavery illegal, up to 1864, the Jamaican Assembly (comprising a small and racist band of planters) stubbornly refused to accept the conditions and the new reality of the freed slaves. They deliberately failed to pass any of the new legislation that they were supposed to, in order to improve the conditions of the masses. They firmly acted as a handful of oligarchs, refusing even to perform their normal duties in the Assembly.[11]

It is not surprising, then, that the masses became restless and rebellious. The Morant Bay Rebellion in Jamaica was a peasant outburst which sprang purely and simply out of the peasants' need for food. The post-emancipation hungry masses, faced with starvation, due largely to the indifference of the old masters, petitioned the then "good" Queen Victoria for land (Colonial land!) so that they could put in some subsistence crops.

This seemed a reasonable enough request to the peasants, and they had given the Queen their assurance that the land would be cultivated on a co-operative basis, i.e. that the White landowner's rent would be forthcoming. But the Queen replied that: "the prosperity of the labouring classes in Jamaica and elsewhere depends on their working for wages, for so long as their labour was wanted, not from any schemes that were suggested to them."[12]

In other words, the masses should work hard and grow rich. From this blatant denial of land-use, sprang riots, fights and civil disturbance. Ensuing violence led to several deaths, and after the then Colonial Governor, Edward Eyre, had ordered out the militia, martial law was declared. The supposed ring-leaders of the rebellion were hurriedly executed, five hundred were shot, and six hundred publicly flogged.

Such was the scale of colonialism, duly reinforced with racist explanations. The Governor, in irrational haste, summoned George William Gordon, a British planter who was known to hold sympathetic views regarding the masses, and who had openly advocated a better deal for them. All the history books say that at the time of the violence Gordon was ill in bed at his home thirty miles away in Kingston. He was brought to the scene of the violence, hurriedly tried, and executed. This one event (presumably because it did involve, reputedly, one plan-ter's son, Gordon) completely overshadowed the entire

rebellion. A Royal Commission set up later to investigate the uprising, found no proof of Gordon's complicity in the rebellion. And the governor was never in fact condemned for the atrocities. On the contrary, all the court cases had the fantastic effect of making him a racist hero, with well known intellectuals in Britain taking sides according to the intensity of their ideologies. Among those in England whom the governor had on his side was Thomas Carlyle, whose article Occasional Discourse upon the Nigger Question, first published in Fraser's Magazine in 1849, had sought to demonstrate that the "Negro" race was inferior to the White race and that mastership and servantship presented a natural way of life. His Discourse was simply a defense of slavery.

In the end, the case against governor Eyre for the murder of Gordon (never mind the Blacks) was dismissed. And, regarding the Blacks, the governor said in defense that it was necessary to strike terror in the Jamaican Blacks, and that they could not be treated like European peasantry. Also, he said, he had saved a noble colony from anarchy and ruin, and that the "intelligent" portions of the community agreed with his actions.[13]

Racism in Jamaica was British racism. Eric Williams has written that the Morant Bay Rebellion became a cause célèbre in Britain. But in Jamaica it was a climacteric of Black revolt and resistance. Since this

bloodbath in Jamaica was in the post-slavery period, it stirred the revolutionary consciousness of the masses like nothing before it. From 1865 up to 1944 (during which time Jamaica had what was called a Crown Colony system of government) there were numerous peasant revolts. Perhaps the most important aspect of this period, however, was the willingness of the masses to participate in social movements. Politico-religious movements and purely religious cults came into being, the most dramatic ones being the so-called Great Revival of 1866, the Bedward Movement of the 1920s (Bedwardites were religious fanatics who hoped to "ascend to heaven like Elijah in a chariot of fire")[14] and finally the Garvey Movement together with the Ras-Tafarian Movement of 1914 to the present.

The latter have been the most successful in terms of coming to grips with the underlying issues of Black identity and Nationalistic Black consciousness. The true merit of the Garvey movement lay in the massive psychological reconstruction which it deployed to wipe out the inferiority complex and facelessness of Black people in the White world. Garvey openly challenged the reigning false standards of racial values, and he became extremely militant and influential in his short career from 1914 to the beginning of the 1930s, when, in addition to many organizational problems of the movement, the Great Depression sapped effective support.[15]

By this time the Great Depression was underway in 1929, however, the rural as well as the urban masses of Jamaica were already monitored for revolt of one kind or another. It is to the sequence of these that we next turn.

1930 and After: The Forging of Revolutionary Conscious-
ness in the West Indies. Jamaican anti-colonial Nationalism,
1934-1962

In two waves between 1934 and 1939, peasant revolts
broke out in Trinidad, St. Kitts, Jamaica, British Guiana,
Barbados,and in other non-British West Indian territories
as well. The pattern of revolt was similar in all cases,
and can be depicted as social unrest originating on
sugar estates, but spreading rapidly to villages, towns,
and to the urban centres. In classic Marxist terms,
revolutionary consciousness was forged in praxis, i.e.
in the fact of struggle. It was out of these rebellions
that the modern independence and anti-colonial National-
ist movements in the West Indies derived.

In Jamaica, the Nationalist spirit reached a new
peak on the crest of the Labour movement in 1938. By
this time, poverty, discontent, work-stoppages and high
unemployment, were common experiences. On May 2, 1938,
the underlying discontent came to a head in Kingston (the
capital city of Jamaica) when riots started among a crowd
of striking dock-labourers on Kingston's waterfront.
The trouble soon spread throughout the city, and in
a few days after, the rural areas "inherited" the unrest.
In the rural districts, mobs of strikers(as well as the
unemployed) roamed the streets and sugar estates armed
with various weapons, disrupting work, burning crops
and buildings, damaging bridges, and generally obstructing

traffic. Workers on the Frome sugar estates in the
western section of Jamaica (owned by the British firm
of Tate and Lyle) set about assaulting their bosses.
When the police opened fire on the assailants, pande-
monium broke out, and eight people were killed while
one hundred and seventy one were wounded. There were
altogether seven hundred and forty five arrests, and
four hundred and eighty were convicted.[16]

The important thing about these disturbances was
that they occurred so spontaneously. The targets were
also unmistakable. Eric Williams sums up the experiences
by saying: "the Nationalist movement is everywhere in
the saddle."

> The road to revolution had been marked out. The
> revolution broke out in the years 1935-1938.
> Consider the following chronology of these fateful
> years. A sugar strike in St.Kitts, 1935; a revolt
> against an increase of customs duties in St.Vincent,
> 1935; a coal strike in St. Lucia, 1935; labour
> disputes on the sugar plantations of British Guiana,
> 1935; an oil strike, which became a general strike,
> in Trinidad, 1937; a sympathetic strike in Barbados,
> 1937; a revolt on the sugar plantations in British
> Guiana, 1937; a sugar strike in St. Lucia, 1937;
> sugar troubles in Jamaica, 1937; a dockers' strike
> in Jamaica, 1938.
>
> Every British governor calls for warships,
> marines and aeroplanes. The Nationalist movement
> was on the march.[17]

Out of this chronicle of events, West Indian National-
ism came into its own. First, a look at the Jamaican
experience.

In Jamaica, the many peasant revolts and violent

protests succeeded in producing Black political
leaders who were to dominate the political life of
the country for three decades and more. Two unparall-
eled notables were Norman Manley and Alexander
Bustamante.

In the heat of the rebellions in 1938, Bustamante
had stepped forward to accept the challenge that he
could restore order and get the Jamaican rebels back
to work without further bloodshed. He succeeded, and
for the first time since Marcus Garvey's attempt to
revolutionize the Jamaican masses in the 1920s, the
peasants of Jamaica were united behind a leader who
directed their energies. Bustamante (or "Busta" as
he affectionately came to be called) gradually became
a flambouyant and charismatic leader, and when he was
thrown into prison for calling a strike in the already
troubled years, the strikers made his release the
first condition for any return to work.

The strikers had their way, and in the following
year, 1939, Busta decreed another general strike. This
time, 50,000 workers walked out at his bidding. The
then colonial governor of Jamaica, A. F. Richards,
declared martial law, and when Busta founded a Trade
Union by "converting" his 50,000 followers into the
Bustamante Industrial Trade Union, the latter was
interned for sedition.

In the turbulent years, Busta's cousin Manley (a Rhodes-scholar and Oxford-trained barrister) had founded another mass-based organisation - the Peoples National Party, in September 1938. This Party was, in terms of the general political climate in Jamaica at the time, quite radical. Manley, of course, had played the "caretaker" role of the BITU while Busta was in prison, and he was also an important mediator and key negotiator between the strikers and the "Establishment". But besides, he was on friendly terms with Busta, and had been successful on several occasions in obtaining Busta's release from prison.

The harmony between these two emergent Nationalist leaders turned out to be short-lived. An eventual split in the Labour movement occurred after Busta's release from prison in 1942. This split ensured the life of the two-party political system that is in Jamaica today.

On this very important score, it can hardly be said that the two-party system there was contrived by the British political pundits, although many generations of Jamaicans have come to regard it as an importation from London's "Whitehall".

In 1942, Busta's BITU became a political party: the Jamaica Labour Party. In the General Election held in 1944, (the first under Universal Adult Suffrage, granted the same year) Manley's PNP was landed a stunning

defeat. Under a "new" Constitution of 1944, the
tutelage democracy of Jamaica limped willy-nilly
through the end of the Second World War, and on to
the General Election in 1949. This time, Busta was
returned to power, but with a whittled down majority.

As if seeking revenge, the PNP founded a rival
Trade Union: the National Workers Union. In the
General Election of 1954, the PNP tasted victory at
last, and in the 1959 elections were returned to office.
But something crucial happened in the interim between
the 1959 election and the projected 1964 elections.
In 1962, a Referandum was held in the entire West
Indies to decide the fate of the West Indian Federation,
an idea which was promoted by the Colonial Office in
London in 1958, with the hope of uniting all the
scattered islands. In the Referandum, Jamaica seceded.
Manley, as Chief Minister of a then anti-Federation
country, had very little choice but to continue in the
spirit of the earlier years and advocate for Jamaica's
independence.[18]

The importance of the Federation in the appraisal
of West Indian Nationalism is discussed below. Suffice
it to say at this point that, after the Referandum in
1962, the ageing Busta campaigned vigorously, and took
the JLP back to office in the same year that the Feder-
ation had failed. In 1966, the JLP were again returned

to office.   They are still in office in 1972.

The two-party system in Jamaica has all the out-ward appearances of the British political system.   But they had different origins;   they came into being and took the shape they did for opposite reasons.   In con-temporary Jamaica, the people at grass-roots, for whom the present political parties were born, remain quite alienated.   The present-day leaders have betrayed the revolutionary spirit of peasant rebellion, and have adopted the classical role of neo-colonialists as Frantz Fanon describes:

> The bourgeois caste draws its strength after independence chiefly from agreements reached with the former colonial power... No true bourgeoisie exists;   there is only a sort of little greedy caste, avid and voracious, with the mind of a huckster only too glad to accept the dividends that the former colonial power hands out to it...
> The peasant who goes on scratching out a liv-ing from the soil, and the unemployed man who never finds employment do not manage, in spite of public holidays and flags, new and brightly coloured though they may be, to convince themselves that anything has really changed in their lives.

This then, is the present situation in Jamaica. Clearly, it would be a mistake to suppose that Jamaica had passed from colonialism to independance. Rather, it has moved from colonialism to neo-colonialism.

The importance of the above lies in the fact that Black Nationalists in Britain do not blame the

Black "greedy caste" for the present situation. The
entire blame rests on colonialism and the subsequent
growth of a colonial mentality among Black potential
leaders.

From the point of Black West Indians in Britain,
one cannot talk meaningfully about modern Black
Nationalism without taking into account the anti-
colonial Nationalist movements that are in the annals
of West Indian history. Therefore, in the next chapter
we extend this most important historical exploration,
in an effort to locate common themes in the process
of West Indian Nationalism.

CHAPTER V11

CONTINUITIES IN THE STUDY OF BLACK NATIONALISM:

THEORY AND PRACTICE IN WEST INDIAN NATIONALISM

> -- Men make their own history, but
> they do not make it just as they
> please; they do not make it under
> circumstances chosen by themselves,
> but under circumstances directly
> encountered, given and transmitted
> from the past
>
> -- Karl Marx

Anti-colonial Nationalism in Trinidad, 1834-1962

In this chapter, the main features of West Indian

Nationalism and West Indian consciousness are sketched.

The chapter deals with the independent territories;

Trinidad, which became independent in 1962; Guyana,

which became independent in 1966, and Barbados which

also became independent in 1966. It is not necessary

to follow up the recent histories of the other tiny

poverty-stricken Caribbean islands in the same way as

the independent islands. The description of the latter

illustrates admirably our theme of colonial oppression

and the anti-colonial Nationalism that sprang out of this.

To continue the exploration, then, a look at Trini-

dad. The general ferment that was evident in Jamaica

in the period under review, also affected the other

West Indian territories, as we have seen.

In Trinidad, after 1834, the freed slaves set about

colonising the interior of the country, so as to avoid
falling back into the clutches of the White planters.
They simply refused to work for the old masters. The
masters' answer to this problem was to import indentured
labour from Europe and India, an experience which later
created sever problems for the development of revolu-
tionary consciousness.

To all intents and purposes, Trinidad after 1834,
and for the rest of the nineteenth century, still re-
mained a slave colony. This was true of all the other
islands. ᵗhe truth is that for decade after decade after
emanicipation, no great changes occurred in the lives
or prospects of the masses. In Trinidad, it was not
until 1919 that social unrest became evident in concrete
action. In that year, the dockers of Port of Spain
(Trinidad's capital city) called a general strike.
Although leadership for the masses was long in coming
(unlike the experience in Jamaica) it did come. To
crystalize the social unrest, Uriah Butler, a self-
educated agitator from Grenada, took the leader role.

Although Butler's orientation had a religious twist,
it was nevertheless effective. In February 1935, after
a labour sit-down by oil workers (Trinidad is the world's
largest source of asphalt; it also has large oil resources)
Butler led a hunger march on Port of Spain. Together
with the other prominent leader of the workers' move-
ment, Andrew Cipriani, a Corsican by birth, he laid

some of the earliest foundations for socio-political protest in Trinidad. Cipriani had successfully identified with the interests of the Black masses, but he was a reformer rather than a revolutionary. Butler, on the other hand, agitated for militant industrial action. At first they belonged to the same movement, but Butler's radical views led to his expulsion from the party headed by Cipriani.

Just before the Second World War, in June 1937, Butler, as an ex-member of Cipriani's party, once more stirred the peasant crowds of Trinidad. While addressing a crowd of oil-field workers who had staged a sit-down strike, the police ordered the arrest of Butler. Obviously, the Establishment did not see why the workers should have struck for better wages. The policeman who was ordered to make the arrest, was set upon by the crowd, and murdered (oil was poured on him, and he was burned to death). Then, the police who tried to arrest the assailants were themselves beaten back with stones. In the ensuing confrontation, one police official was killed.

Labour conflicts in Trinidad became built-in in the oil industry. In 1947 striking workers set fire to one of the largest oil wells in Trinidad, and the disturbance which followed this incident forced the colonial Governor to declare a state of emergency, and to impose a curfew.

The totality of these incidents are crucially important in terms of the sociology of politics in Trinidad. On the basis of experiences in Trinidad and elsewhere in the Caribbean, Blacks in Britain explicitly claim how reassuring it is that they are the descendants of"a fighting people". Present day West Indians draw on the history of these peasant revolts for inspiration, courage and determination. In a sense, too, these earlier incidents gave working class West Indians their first real taste of the "class war".

The pattern of confrontation politics described above, continued in Trinidad throughout the 1940s and into the late 1950s. It was in the latter period that Eric Williams, Oxford-trained historian and Nationalist, rose to power. On surveying the colonial situation of his country after the period of severe unrest, Williams had hoped to provide some degree of organizational stability, to put an end to what he called "misgovernment", (by "abolishing" racism) to rid the country of unemployment and slums and to integrate the different ethnic segments of his plural society.

One of his first tasks, however, was to campaign militantly for the withdrawal of the American Forces from their naval base at Chaguaramas in northern Trinidad. Williams' major contention was that the base had been leased by the British to the Americans against the wishes of the people of Trinidad. To proclaim his

programme of anti-colonialism, Williams founded his "University of Woodford Square". This "University" meant simply choosing one of the bigger public squares in Port of Spain from which to deliver a series of lectures on the necessary steps to be taken toward the political and economic modernization of Trinidad and the West Indies.[1]

Williams, having convinced his people that he was a Deliverer and a "Doctor" to all the evils of Trinidad, won the General Elections of September 1956. The day to day developments in the politics of Trinidad since 1956, need not be entered into here. Suffice it to say that, after fifteen years, Williams has remained in power in Trinidad, having been returned to Office as recently as May 1971. In close resemblance to the Jamaican case discussed earlier, Williams has skillfully played the despot game. Since the granting of Universal Adult Suffrage to Trinidad in 1946 the masses have had little to rejoice about. And since Trinidad's independence in 1962, Trinidad has illustrated another classic example of neo-colonialism.

Blacks in Britain perceive the neo-colonialism in the West Indies as directly inherited from the British. To show how West Indians in Britain respond and relate to the state of politics in the West Indies, here is a part of an address given by a Black Power militant to a Black Power meeting in London in May 1971:

It is vital for us to know in detail what is going on in Trinidad today, not only because it is of relevance to our struggles here in Britain, but also because we shall all have to prepare ourselves to play our part here in Britain when the final showdown comes in Trinidad.

Trinidad today is in the throes of the gravest political crisis the English-speaking Caribbean has ever faced. After nine years of independence, and fifteen years of Dr.Williams, the whole society (like the other islands in the West Indies) is still exactly where it was five centuries ago. The entire economy of the country is still owned and controlled by the imperialist powers of the Western world. All the major sources of wealth in the country are divided between three countries: Oil is owned by the Americans, sugar by the British, and the banks and insurance companies by Canadians.

The whole class system of the society is based, as it was five centuries ago, on the principle of white superiority and black inferiority.

Over the past nine years, some Blacks have managed to escape into the administrative and professional areas of middle class society, but this trend has not altered the basic class structure of the society.

Culturally, moreover, the values of the society encourage the denigration of Blackness, and continue to encourage the whole society to aspire to being nothing more than carbon copies of the white man.

At the height of the nationalist movement which brought him to power in 1956, Williams promised the people to free them from economic, political and cultural enslavement. Today, fifteen years after-wards, the position is still exactly the same, and in many aspects, it is even worse. Williams has refused to reply on the great energies of the people in reconstructing the economy, and has chosen to rely instead on the goodwill of the foreign investor.

The result has been that he has completely mortgaged the economy to the imperialists. His efforts in the political sphere have been even more disastrous: instead of opening up the political system to allow for genuine mass par-ticipation and involvement in the decision-making process, he has chosen instead to systematically shut them out. The task of nation-building, as far as he was concerned, was to be just a private affair between himself and the foreign capitalists.

Nothing need be added to this sharp analysis.
This is a <u>typical</u> kind of assessment and socio-
historical stock-taking made by Black West Indian
exiles in Britain. They continuously seek to operate
on two fronts simultaneously: cataloguing all the
latest political developments at home in the West Indies,
while seeking linkages to these developments on the
British front.

But the linkages sought are real ones. As the
speaker went on to point out, the situations of social
unrest that obtain in the West Indies are not isolable
from the ones faced by Blacks in Britain. In both
cases, the blame goes on white racism, and West Indians
had not escaped the implications of imbibing European
values, by residing in Britain. In fact, they had come
to see more clearly than before, why West Indians as a
whole suffered from severe identity problems. Being
marginal to European society, and European socio-
cultural values, and at the same time not completely
integrated into their own societies at home, the problem
which seems most obvious (and which certainly is
threatening) is the general European devaluation of
Black culture and Black values. It is this threat
which leads to the cultural expression of Black Power
- the search for a Black identity.

In the next sections, Guyana and Barbados are
looked at; after this brief survey is completed, we

can state a central hypothesis.

Anti-colonial Nationalism in Guyana, 1834-1966

Guyana, which until its independence in 1966 was known as British Guiana, was (unlike Barbados which remained British for over 340 years) shuttled back and forth from ownership of one colonial power to another. In the earliest years of colonialism it was owned by Spain, then it changed hands with the Dutch, the British, then the Dutch again, and the British from 1803 to 1966.

As happened in the rest of the Caribbean colonial society, the planters of Guyana were forced to import indentured labour after slave emancipation, since the newly-freed slaves simply refused to work for their former masters. To accord with the British planter class's concept of economics, thousands of Indians, Chinese, Madeirans and Portuguese were brought in as cheap labour to keep the sugar and other plantations going. The somewhat uneasy mixture of these different ethnic groups has ever since characterised West Indian social structure.

Immigration from these far-flung places to the West Indian plantations lasted from 1838 to 1917 in the case of Guyana. During this time, thousands of the "coolie" indentured labourers were continually becoming redundant. Or rather, they simply became

vagrants when employers refused to renew their five-year contracts.

In the 1880s, what was known as "protective legislation" was passed, presumably to ease the burden of the vagrants on the public purse. But this did not prevent conflicts. From 1872 up to 1924, there were many episodes of rioting among the Indian labourers on the sugar estates. And as early as the 1840s, riots had become the chief form of social protest among the few African workers who were in fact on the estates in Guyana. The Africans, quite understandably, were bitterly against the idea of the importation of indentured labour; this was seen as a threat to any marginal advantage which the Africans might have gained after slavery.

In 1856, Guyana experienced a severe riot - the so-called "Angel Gabriel" riots, instigated by John Sayers Orr. Orr, who believed that the source of all social ills was the Roman Catholic Church, openly denounced "the abuses of Popery." The Portuguese in Guyana, who were (with very few exceptions) Catholic, had to bear the brunt of this agitation. When Orr was arrested for holding an unlawful assembly, things took a different turn. His followers and supporters took exception to the arrest, and when Orr was brought to trial, "the Portuguese had disappeared from the streets." What at first seemed a simple case of social tension between different ethnic groups, developed to resemble civil

war. Georgetown, the capital city of Guyana, became
a city torn apart by inter-ethnic riot.[2]

It bears repeating that in all the different
riots in the different islands, there was a basic
underlying syndrome. Hatred and violence was focused
primarily on the colonial administrators, or their allies.
When Blacks got in the way, they were made to pay for
their intervention. The futility of life-chances weighed
heavily on the poor and starving masses. The rural pro-
letariat found themselves in an economic squeeze that
threatened to alienate them further from the sources
of power, and thereby render their lives more unbearable
than ever. In distress, they revolted.[3]

The real importance of The "Gabriel" riots in Guyana,
like so many others in the West Indies during the post-
slavery period, lies not so much in what they won. Their
importance rests on the sociological fact that the condi-
tions in which riots and bloody civil disturbances could
have been easily instigated, had existed, and were charged
with tension. This situation, clearly, was a contingency
of the colonial oppressive regime, where power was imposed
by the planter oligarchy. This oligarchy was highly
thought of and sanctioned by the Colonial Office in
London. Regarding this particular riot in Guyana,
the CO had strongly praised the planters for the "vigour
and decision" which they had used to suppress "the
barbarous and despicable outrages" of the poor peasants.[4]

It might be said that between 1803 when the British capitulated Guyana from the Dutch, until 1928 when the British Parliament provided the country with a new constitution "elevating" it to the status of Crown Colony, many changes occurred and yet nothing happened.

This is an interesting paradox. Fundamentally, the changes which occurred were of importance to the Governor and the planters. From time to time, the constitution was modified, or the franchise extended, but none of these changes altered the basic structure of the colonial status quo in any significant way. While a number of protest associations were formed, and although there were labour disputes on the sugar plantations in this period, the most intensive disputes were yet to come.

In 1935, 1937, and again in 1942, there were various kinds of disputes. In 1942 alone, a total of 20,000 working days were lost due to strikes on the sugar estates.

After the second World War, things began to warm up in Nationalist terms in Guyana. In 1944, the British Guiana Labour Union put forth demands for Universal Adult Suffrage, Dominion Status for the country, and for Federation. But no heed was given. The crunch came in 1948 when workers on a sugar estate (owned by

the British firm of Booker) held a strike for better wages and improved living conditions. The colonial Governor put down the protest with his characteristic "vigour".

Out of this confrontation emerged the first comprehensive Nationalist movement, and the first grass roots organisation with real political party credentials in Guyana. The movement presented itself as the Peoples Progressive Party, a radical labour movement organised by Cheddi Jagan (an East Indian) and Forbes Burnham (an Afro-Guyanese), and aimed at bringing all the different ethnic groups into a united socialist state. By 1953, there were elections, and the PPP won an overwhelming victory over the other two right-winged parties. As a comprehensive Nationalist movement, the PPP's strength extended well beyond its ability to win elections; it successfully practised the politics of dissent in a relatively static colonial society, and provided an ideological stance which transcended ethnic or particularistic interests.[5]

But an advocacy for full independence from Britain (which the PPP pursued) was seen by the Colonialists as being too bold a demand. Besides, it angered the United States government who felt uneasy that "communism" was imminent in Guyana. The United States used moral suasion to have Britain suspend the Guyanese

constitution. This done, the British government set up a Commission (1953) which, in "worry and apprehension as to what might happen at any time", set out to track down the most prominent leaders of the PPP, notably Cheddi Jagan and his wife Janet. These two, the Commission said, "unreservedly accepted the classical communist doctrines of Marx and Lenin and were supporters of most modern communist movements."[6]

The salient features and factors of Guyana's socio-political problems, the charge of "communism" in the 1950s, to the achieving of independence in 1966, are well documented in the literature and need not detain us here. Suffice it to point out that the accusations of the British Commission, replete as they were, not with evidence, but with the dubious theory of tendency, succeeded in infusing the PPP with rumour, suspicion among the rank and file, and an eventual split in the leadership during the interim period while the constitution was suspended. During the "marking time" period which the Commission had recommended, Jagan and Burnham (now leading competing political factions) had to face a third political party, the United Democratic Party, which had emerged in the interim period expressly to take advantage of the split between Jagan and Burnham. In any event, the major competition was between the two factions of the PPP, and in the 1957 elections, Jagan won the elections. The result, of course, pleased

neither Washington nor London, and no doubt the sentiment of Lord Soper, the British "socialist" who made a flying trip to Guyana at the time, was shared by other British and Americans not-so-socialist as Soper. Soper was convinced that "these simple Africans and kindly Indians" were being misled by "Marxist agitators."[7]

All told, the period from 1957 to 1962 is perhaps one of the most turbulent periods in the recent history of Guyana. With Nationalist politics steered more and more into sectionalist politics, social tensions, conflict, and suspicion marked the course of events in this period. Jagan's fiscal policies, hampered as they were by his inability to raise loans on the international money market, were unpopular. Strikes, protests, and open violence in 1962, necessitated the calling in of British troops to restore order, in what came more and more to be perceived as distinctly inter-ethnic hostilities. In October 1962, and again in 1963, the Colonial Office in London convened "Independence Conferences" with the leaders of Guyana's three major political parties. When carefully examined, it can be seen that these gestures were nothing more than window dressings, for in the end, the Colonial Office decided to impose its own solutions anyway.

The Colonial Office recommended that new elections should be held in Guyana, before the granting of independence, and that the elections be based on the system

of proportional representation rather than on the
system of first-past-the-post.[8]   Then, the elections
scheduled for December 1964 were prefaced by a new
wave of violence, and these were seen to be based on
inter-ethnic rivalries. As it turned out, Jagan lost
the elections, but he had to be forcibly removed from
the Prime Minister's office to make way for the new
coalition government headed by Burnham, the lesser
evil among the "communists".

With the atmosphere yet charged with social
tension, the Colonial Office planned Guyana's independ-
ence after convening a final conference in November
1965 (Jagan boycotted this conference in protest against
the outcome of the election the previous year). May
26, 1966 was set as the day for Guyana's independence.
In the above account, we have not pretended to give
infinite detail of the complex development of Guyanese
society. What we have done is to provide sufficient
data to illustrate the sources and nature of West
Indian Nationalism.

An anti-colonial Nationalism throughout, West Indian
Nationalism cannot be understood apart from colonialism.
This type of Nationalism is inherently revolutionary, and
demonstrates a dynamic form of cultural assertiveness.
And, it is because colonialism still exists in the count-
ries of the West Indies, that we believe this background
knowledge of Black West Indians in Britain is so import-
ant in this thesis.

From this knowledge, attempts can be made to generate
a wide range of propositions about Black Nationalism.

Anti-colonial Nationalism in Barbados, 1834-1966

Among Caribbean colonial countries, Barbados
was the one that remained exclusively British during
the whole period of European imperialism in the West
Indies.

Barbados was taken by the British in 1625, and
remained a colonial outpost of Britain until 30 November
1966 when it became independent - and one of the tiniest
independent countries in the world. After 1834, com-
paratively more slaves continued to work on the planta-
tions than they did in the other islands. Being a mere
one hundred and sixty six square miles, and without
mountains in which to escape (as was common in Jamaica,
Guyana and Surinam), the Blacks, by force of circumstance,
were obliged to work the plantations. Besides, there was
not much hope of alternative employment. For Barbados
had in every sense a mono-culture economy - it was sugar
or nothing. Barbados planters, then, had no need to im-
port indentured labour.

But the absence of imported labour did not make the
level of social unrest and discontent any lower than in
the other territories, which goes to illustrate that
the real source of the unrest was not in the ethnic

contacts, (as was widely believed) but rather in the nature of the imposed power structure.

> For almost three hundred years the ruling economic group controlled the government under a franchise law which limited voting to less than 4 per cent of the people. As late as 1943 the white predominated in the only elected assembly in an island where the coloured population outnumbered them more than nine to one.[9]

Relative to the other territories, Barbados was a quiet colony. For its size and population, it was not.

As early as 1876, there were bloody riots in Barbados. But there was a period of relative quiet lasting for more than fifty years. In the 1930s, it shared in the general unrest of her neighbours. In 1937, while the level of social unrest was at a peak in the West Indies, Barbados had to move with the current. The inhabitants attempted to effect social change there by attacking what they defined as the source of their oppression.

In 1937, riots sprang out of a confrontation with the Establishment. Clement Payne, a friend of Uriah Butler (whom we mentioned above) was in Barbados addressing a rally of plantation peasant workers when the colonial Governor gave an order to deport him to Trinidad. Followers of Payne took exception to this, so they marched on the courthouse where he was being held, and demanded his release. In the exchanges

between the peasant and the powers that be, cars were pushed into the sea, shops were stoned, and policemen were assaulted. "In vain the local Riot act was read to the rioters, with approved British punctilio, but it was too late for rational conduct."[10] Which was not surprising, since the Black workers who rioted were hungry and indignant, in an island where the tiny handful of whites had all the privileges. Blacks did most of the useful work, while white "ate very well without conspicuous perspiration".

Social conflict in colonial societies is always suppressed conflict, easily erupted at the slightest provocation. Thus it was that the West Indies as a whole was able to wage such intense and sustained conflict in the midst of colonial administration.

Out of the rebellions of the period under review, Nationalist politics in Barbados developed into the characteristic anti-colonial Nationalism we have been considering. In the 1937/38 period, Grantley Adams, as a young Black barrister, came into the limelight, mainly in the process of defending Payne through the legal maze following the latter's arrest. Adams soon became a public figure. And, before long, he was joined by Hope Stevens in the Founding of Barbados Progressive League, in 1938. The politics of this new party was a mild brand of socialism, yet as such it enjoyed only a limited support of the Black workers

of Barbados. Support was limited simply because the
Black masses of Barbados were still excluded from the
polls by reason of disfranchisement.

In 1941, the Barbados Workers' Union was founded
by Hugh Springer. By this time the BPL had transformed
itself into the Barbados Labour Party, with Adams its
President. As President of both the BLP and BWU,
Adams gradually acquired more and more power in local
politics, until in 1944 he and Springer joined forces
with another socialist group, the National Congress
Party, against the right-winged Electors' Association.
Nationalist politics was then becoming more and more
broadly based. In 1945, after yet more riots over the
low wages paid to sugar-cane cutters, several thousand
tons of sugar were destroyed. After that, political
changes seemed to have come quickly. By the time
Universal Adult Suffrage came in 1950, Barbados politi-
cal structure had changed considerably from the one
which engendered the riots of the 1930s. Institutional
changes included the setting up of a Ministerial system
of government, and the abolition of property qualifica-
tions for membership of the House of Assembly.[11] In
the first elections under Universal adult Suffrage in
1951, the BLP gained sixteen out of twenty-four seats
in the House of Assembly, and Grantley Adams became
Barbados' first Premier. Barbados was slowly changing
from being a White colony to being a mixed colony.

The Crown-appointed Legislative Council (nearly all white) had now to reckon with the new House of Assembly (Nearly all Black). And although the former saw the granting of Adult Suffrage as a retrograde step, the fact was that they had to face a new social reality in Barbadian society. With 85% of the labour force consisting of landless peasants and field hands in 1946, but without the vote, the White could simply manipulate them to suit their best interests. By 1966, however, Barbados was in the process of shaking off formal colonial rule. By the time the country was granted independence in 1966, white power had diminished substantially. Then, Barbados had a Black Prime Minister as well as a Black Cabinet.

To sum up this survey of West Indian Nationalism, it must be said that part of the process of transition from colonialism to independence (or to neo-colonialism) involved West Indians (in an indirect way) in emigration to Britain. As was pointed out in the introduction to this thesis, emigration from the West Indies to Britain reached a peak at precisely the time when there was a tremendous enthusiasm in the West Indies, concerning the prospects of independence and self-determination. Why then should West Indians want to leave their about-to-be-emancipated islands, and why did they?

The crux of this paradox seemed to have been that West Indian society was not capable of making a success

of independence unless some pressure was removed from the resources. In other words, with more and more of "the common people" becoming eligible for full participation in their country's affairs, problems of resource-allocation came to the fore much more than was the case under the old colonial regime. Once this problem of <u>rising</u> <u>expectations</u> became internalised, emigration to Britain provided one avenue of escape, and relaxed the pressure on resources.

Rising Expectations could not be met in the West Indies. But, as we shall have occasion to note, emigration to Britain created its own set of problems for the Black West Indians. Yet, it is in the flux of these processes that Black Nationalism among West Indians in Britain is to be understood.

Of special interest to the understanding of the period of West Indian emigration to Britain is the West Indian Federation that failed. We now examine that experience, while bearing in mind some of the latent social and political implications that one could normally have expected to inhere in a federated and integrated colonial society. Did Britain, really, sincerely believed that a unification of the scattered islands was the answer to poverty, unemployment and conflict in the West Indies? Or was the gesture aimed at maximizing administrative convenience?

The West Indian Federation That Never Was, 1947-1962

The crucial fact that so much of the history of the West Indies has been a reflection of the struggles between rival overseas powers for the massive profits of slavery and sugar, has tended to obscure or overshadow the graver socio-psychological consequences of the essence of West Indian Nationalism. This critique highlights some of the salient implications of that history.

In a way, one of the greatest of the misfortunes that beset the West Indies today, is the absence of an integrated identity. There is no linguistic unity, or any cohesive force from which West Indians as a people can derive some **raison d'être**, some common base on which to build Nationalism. The very most that the West Indies have in common is that they have all been exploited and oppressed; this is what gives them their driving force.

Inspite of the apparent similarity between the islands, they are hopelessly divided (or were) in out-look and manner. This was due, quite simply, to centuries -old insularities and isolation rooted in the historical development of their economy, trade and so on under the dictates of colonialism.[12] As late as the 1930s, for instance, mail (i.e. letters, etc.) **between** the islands passed through London.

West Indian society is therefore somewhat paralysed by the stigmata of slavery. In the course of their his-

torical development, the islands have been separately
enslaved by different European states. These states,
having successfully destroyed any kinship ties or other
social values which the Africans might have had, have
severally imposed their own alien language, culture,
religion, and all their customs and affectations.
They have saddled the "natives" with their economics,
political systems and laws so that the people in the
West Indies are variously, bastardised Frenchmen,
Englishmen, Dutchmen, Spaniards, Portuguese, rather
than Africans or Afro-Caribbeanas. And there is no
common customs union between and among the islands,
no free geographical mobility, no basic economic inte-
gration. With their different imperial Governors,
they always have been duplicating and inward-looking
wards of a European or the British Empire.

For these reasons, then, the notion of a unified
cultural identity was never fostered among West Indian
islands. They have always been segmented, isolated,
and even suspicious of each other. For these reasons,
Federation was bound to fail without extensive prepara-
tory work being done.

Federation for the West Indies was proposed by the
British just after the Second World War, in 1947. As
was noted above, the whole idea collapsed fifteen years
later when a Referandum disclosed that some islands had
no wish to federate with any other island. In retrospect,

it seems clear that insofar as the idea of a federation
was actually put forward, it was a Colonial Office
exercise aimed at maximising colonial administrative
convenience.[13]   On the other hand, it can be argued
that the federation was designed to fail. For if
federation were successful, that could only have meant
an increase in national consciousness among West Indians,
and possibly a growth of revolutionary movements.

As it turned out, the federation failed because
the peculiar history of the area ensured that the
colonial-bred Black politicians were not prepared
to break up the old colonial system in favour of an
uncertain unity. The crux of the matter was that
although the idea of federation seemed theoretically
desirable to Black Nationalists, they had to reckon
with mass populations who were not predisposed to think
in Federal terms. Also, Federation might have meant
a set-back to many of the changes that individual
islands had advocated for years.

The West Indian people did not simply throw out
the idea of Federation because they feared they would
have departed from Enlightenment values. This interpret-
ation of West Indian Nationalism is shortsighted, but
is precisely the interpretation given by some observers
of West Indian society. Here, it is appropriate to
mention the works of Wendell Bell[14] and Charles Moskos[15]

It is the colossal weakness of these studies that they go to confused lengths to <u>prove</u> (or seek to prove) that West Indian elites are unreservedly committed to "Enlightenment" values of liberalism, and egalitarianism in the constitutional sense. They are not at all concerned with the positive social and cultural implications of this general ideology (See Chapter I of this thesis). Thus, they define West Indian Nationalism as:

> Turning upon the question of the desire for political independence, rather than upon size of the unit for which independence was desired... [and] a manifestation of the desire to transform West Indian society into one which conformed more closely than before <u>to</u> some basic values of western civilization as symbolised by the Enlightenment.[16]

Moskos and Bell claimed to have discovered or identified three basic types of West Indian Nationalist <u>Leaders</u>. First, there were those whom they call <u>Colonialist</u>, i.e. those who opposed independence "now and in the future", and who favoured indefinite colonial rule. These expressed their sentiments in secrecy, [sic] and saw independence as a disastrous development even if inevitable. These Colonialist Nationalists were well-to-do planters and merchants, white or near-white in terms of pecking-order, and they had Anglo-European life-styles.

Then secondly, they identified what they termed <u>Acquiescing</u> Nationalists, subdivided into (a) reluctant Nationalists, (b) dutiful Nationalists, and (c) opportunistic Nationalists. The latter's political orientation

was described as ambivalent and confused, some category of "marginalists" in terms of socio-economic status ratings.[17]

Finally, Moskos and Bell found the True Nationalists. These were Black, but not wealthy, and they were leaders of mass-based organisations, with West Indian life-styles. This lot favoured immediate political independence (in the early 1960s).

But why call the first type Nationalists? Surely, these "leaders" were the very epitomy of what gives rise to type three. So they cannot reasonably be called the same thing. To call Colonialist (as defined by Bell and Moskos) one type of West Indian Nationalism is a contradiction in terms. It is clear enough that these authors do not grasp the essence of genuine West Indian Nationalism. To show that these authors were confused, they went on to suggest that: "it was only with lower class support that the imprint of nationalism was able to transform older notions of the legitimacy of the imperial order into a belief of the sovereignty of the West Indian people." We might reasonably ask: what Nationalism?

The overriding desire of these authors to show a strong correlation between Enlightenment (in the politico-constitutional sense) and Nationalism, led them to the confused conclusion as follows:-

% of West Indian Leaders who were:

%	Colonialist Nat.	Acquiescing Nat.	True Nat.
3 * 29	0	0	100
2 18	0	22	78
1 25	71	71	4
0 41	83	17	0

*3 = Most Enlightened

 1 = Least Enlightened

Source: Moskos and Bell, p. 19.

All this, presumably, goes to show that the so-called True (i.e. Black Nationalists) are 100% geared to getting the West Indies looking more like "Enlightment Europe".

In the light of the present thesis, such a conclusion is misleading and misguided. Clearly, if Nationalism among West Indians means anything at all, it means a desire to transform West Indian society from the basic Enlightenment values so-called, not to make that society more blatantly a carbon copy of European society.[18] These authors have not really located the sources of West Indian Nationalism. Thus Moskos is forced to contradict himself even more by

saying that "there did not seem to be any attempt on
the part of the nationalist leaders to consciously
West Indianise their life-styles." Why should they
indeed. If they were West Indian Nationalists, they
would have had West Indian life-styles.

In conclusion, it must be emphasised that Black
Nationalism in the West Indies has always been the
prerogative of the oppressed, and the disprivileged
masses. From time to time, leaders have arisen from
among this mass to direct their energies. Some of
these leaders have later turned renegades (often
through no fault of their own), but all the same they
grew from the soil of repression and racism as practised
by Anglo-Europeans.[19] Black Nationalism is not the
same as "Colonialist" Nationalism as described above;
indeed, the two are at opposite poles.

Just as the Anglo-Europeans in the Caribbean hated
the coming of independence, so too they hated the impli-
cations of a federated West Indies. It was in their
best interests that federation did not succeed. West
Indian society has always had these two variants. On
the one hand there is to be found the Afro-based
culture: revitalizing, protesting, volatile and nation-
alistic. On the other hand there is the European-
oriented cultural system: aimed at keeping alive some
vague "Enlightenment" values, reactionary, arrogant
and racist. This latter segment was never Nationalistic

in the sense in which we have used the concept in this thesis.

The two variants are the underlying antagonistic elements of West Indian social structure. Black Nationalism derives from the former element.

Summation of the Historical Underpinnings of West Indian Nationalism

We have briefly sketched the background of the West Indian trajectory of social protest, and we have isolated the four independent West Indian territories for illustrating this pattern. The pattern was in fact repeated in all the smaller islands as well.

The documentation aimed at pinpointing the Black West Indian's reaction to the odds of colonial rule. This background information (at times seemingly dramatic) throws into sharp relief the nature and historiography of contemporary Black protest in Britain. But at the same time, it also outlines the parameters of the organic linkage between Britain and Black West Indian immigrants.

From the brief outline of the events that have helped to shape West Indian Nationalism, and which have formed the bed-rock of West Indian protest, certain un-mistakable characteristics are in evidence. First, it can be seen how seemingly trivial some of the events that triggered off riots were. Secondly, participants

in the rebellions were invariably the workers on the plantations - underpaid, underfed and overworked, yet those who did most of the useful work on the islands. Thirdly, the severity of the counter-measures adopted by the colonial administration. It was the combination of these forces which gave West Indian Nationalism its distinct anti-colonial characteristics. These anti-colonial sentiments are expressed in contemporary times both in the West Indies and among the West Indian immigrants in Britain.

In explaining the complex and stormy path of West Indian Nationalism, the social analyst is faced with a paramount question which can be posed in the following fashion: Given that in the 1930s the West Indian peasantry had faced at least a century of poverty, hunger and misery as "free" men, why did it take all this time for them to rise up against their white oppressors?

Obviously, there are many sides to this question, many of which we will probably never completely decipher. One answer, however, lies in the theory of Need Satisfaction and rebellion. In this theory, it is suggested that if a prolonged period of rising living standards is followed by a sharp decline in social and economic levels, then the resulting gap between the actors' expectations of Need Satisfaction and the actual level of these needs (whatever they are) will come to be

perceived as an intolerable gap. This perception amounts
to revolutionary consciousness which will instigate re-
volutionary activities or rebellions.[20]

This theory of Need Satisfaction explains the rise

A THEORY OF NEED SATISFACTION AND REVOLUTION (or
REBELLION) Adapted from Davies, 1962

of revolutionary consciousness in the West Indies in
the 1930s, and especially so, if violent civil distur-
bances which have a broad popular base of support are
included in the conceptual definition of revolution.

In the West Indian case it must be said that
although the colonial regime was harsh and oppresive,
it was seen to be an improvement on the open slave
system of three generations earlier. Life-expectations
were improving, very slowly, but improving nonetheless.
Then came the great international crisis known as the

Great Depression (1929-1933) of which the West Indies as one-crop Primary producers, took a severe pounding. This seemed to have been interpreted as a drastic reversal of life-chances, and the rise of militant protest in the West Indies became pronounced. In other words, then, during this period of sharp reversal of expectations, the effect on the minds of the peasant people was a mental state of anxiety and frustration. Manifest reality had broken away from anticipated reality. In desperation, the peasants rebelled - their social distress was intensified (refer to diagram above).

This theory has been used to explain Dorr's Rebellion of 1842, the Russian Revolution of 1917, and the Egyptian Revolution of 1952, as well as other major civil disturbances in history.[21] For this theory to be accepted, it must be shown on theoretical grounds (in each instance where it is used to explain revolution) why such gaps that exist should be perceived as intolerable only after a period of increasing satisfaction. Dissatisfaction in living standards is no doubt an aspect of the rise of revolutionary consciousness, but presumably, it is not simply any gap which produces the consciousness, but one of a certain magnitude. And how do we measure this magnitude?

This question is the first and most important one which renders this theory so problematic. The other

very important question has to do with the belief in the changeability of institutional structures. If there is a belief among the oppressed (as there was among the West Indian peasants discussed) that the intolerable conditions can in fact be terminated in a new social order, then rebellions might be conceived as only a precursor to that order. Here, a third problem arises; for in order to answer the first two questions, one must apply some social-psychological theory of human motivation.

The whole point about human action, of course, which is motivational behaviour, is that human beings typify situations as real, and orient their responses on the basis of the typificatory framework. Sociologists cannot hope to offer adequate explanations of action unless they interpret behaviour in terms of the meaning context in which behaviour transpires. In a crucial sense, sociological understanding necessitates the interpretive penetration of outer forms of action in order to gain inner meaning; and such understanding involves a grasp of motivational understanding from observational understanding.

The basic sketch that could assist the sociological understanding of Black West Indians has been suggested. The task of the next section will be to use this background information to seek understanding of the West Indians and their problems, on the British scene.

West Indian Nationalism comes to Britain

Now that we have firmly established the linkage between West Indian society and British society, and now that the West Indian immigrant has been placed in some kind of historical perspective, the analysis turns on a sociological interpretation of West Indian experiences in Britain.

If the Moskos-Bell thesis (see p.182 above) were correct, then one would expect West Indian immigrants in Britain to face far fewer **"settling-in"** problems, and far greater social acceptance than they in fact experience. The reception of West Indians in Britain has been considerably less than cordial, and the "Enlightenment thesis" does not tell us why. West Indians in Britain are characteristically depicted as "outsiders", "strangers" and "aliens", and this simply means that these designations are meant to draw out and amplify every modicum of physical dissimilarity between Black and White. From here, the presumed differences are socio-culturally assessed and evaluated according to some overall criteria of the definers. This is part of the germ of social rejection by White society. This is the seat of the West Indian Dilemma.

Needless to say, West Indians find it difficult to reconcile the reality of social rejection in

Britain, with the tenets of their early socialisation in the West Indies. This socialisation had taught them that they <u>were</u> British, and ought to be proud of it. On arriving on the British scene, however, the tune changes. The immigrants seek their Eldorado in dear old Mother Country, but they are made to feel un- wanted and rejected - there is a denial of what they thought they were, and the situation becomes <u>anomic</u> in the Mertonian sense. A new awareness develops, and for many West Indians the experience is an invita- tion to have their first political baptism in <u>praxis</u>, i.e. in the fact of politicization. Black Power affords one such experience.

Obi Egbuna explains why:

> The Black man (in Britain) is a victim of the biggest and most publicised myth in the world: that there is very little racialism in Britain. I have studied and experienced the White Man's attitudes toward me as a Black Man...Without equivocation racialism in England is far worse (than in America). [23]

This is a typical sentiment echoed throughout the Black Communities in Britain. One of the things that infuri- ate Blacks most, is the fact that many British people admit to not having had anything to do with Black people directly, until very recently. Yet they seem to have had hardened ideas and theories about Black people.

Black immigrants in Britain are therefore forced

to re-examine and **redefine** their invidious relation
with Britain. A Black Panther Party member in Bradford
explains.

> In the 1950s after the War, British capitalism
> was in a position where it could be expanded -
> expanded on cheap labour. We are not going to
> make the mistake of comparing ourselves with
> immigrants in Europe as a whole. We must under-
> stand our situation in the context of British
> capitalism over the past 400 years.
> The working of capitalism is not accidental,
> and we must be clear about that. Now (1971) the
> situation for Blacks is the reverse of 1951.
> The British ruling class is saying "We want
> these Niggers out! We want them beaten up as
> much as possible." So we are laid open for any
> kind of attack - on the streets - individual
> Racism.
> But we are not so concerned with individual
> Racism. We are concerned about organisation of
> capital, the way in which racism is used by cap-
> italism, the way it has always been used, and the
> way that has become central to our struggle in
> Britain.

The discontent among Blacks in Britain is based
on a profound definition of the situation by the Blacks.
Because the British denial of the West Indian's past
works to literally tear the ground from under their
feet, several coping mechanisms must be hurriedly con-
structed to help come to terms with the new social reality.

These mechanisms range on a wide continuum, from
total physical and social withdrawal on the one hand,
to total social and political involvement on the other.
Within the former, the Black Church in Britain is to
be explained; so too must the many exclusively West
Indian Clubs. At the other end of the spectrum, the

involvement of the bulk of West Indians in the Communist Party in the early stages of Black immigration, must be accounted for. Black Power is also located in the involvement end of the spectrum. The intermediary reactions or coping acts include psychiatric morbidity among West Indian immigrants, and mental breakdown among the immigrants.[24]

The presence of Black colonials in Britain means that for the first time in her history, Britain is faced with the prospect of being the Mother Country in reality. The West Indians had always regarded themselves as British, "which indeed they emphatically are by culture."[25] In Britain, they define the situation in terms of history, as a Black Power leader articulates in London:

> We are not here as guests. We are here because
> of the colonial history that we have, and we are
> going to stay here until we are ready to go.
> We have arrived; and we are going to decide
> what's good for us, because the White guy is no
> longer deciding for us. Black Power is here, and it
> is going to stay; and we must become involved in
> a programme of rehabilitation. The Black Man has
> to re-educate himself in his own particular situation.

What West Indians face in Britain, then, is not a "culture-shock" in the traditional sense in which this concept is often used in sociology. It was not the difference in culture which gave the shock, but the denial of the cultural congruence between white British and Afro-Saxons.[26]

Black Nationalism in Britain is therefore a clarion of Black Protest. What Black West Indians in Britain do to assert themselves as a people, cannot be understood as an a-historical pattern of behaviour. The enormous background to the current protest is never lost sight of by the immigrants in their dynamic assessment and definition of the situation. In large measure, the protest is not very different in kind from that which their ancestors in the West Indies exhibited in the recent past in the face of the same defined enemy – British colonialism and White racism. It is from the perspective of history that Black West Indians in Britain like to speak of their relatives and kinsmen (in the West Indies, and in the Third World generally) as "catching the same hell."

There is now a central hypothesis which has emerged from the study of Black Nationalism so far discussed. It can be summarily stated as follows:

The European principle of White superiority and its converse of Black inferiority translated in the West Indian psyche, is the reality to which Black Power and Black Nationalism in Britain (and the West Indies) are a reaction.

In the next chapter, Black Power is examined. After that discussion, the thesis embarks on integrating all the theoretical bits and pieces into a theory sketch of Black Nationalism.

CHAPTER VIII

BLACK NATIONALISM IN BRITAIN: THE CASE OF BLACK POWER

> - History has taught us that while
> you may not judge a revolutionary
> movement by what the minority is
> saying, you must judge it by how
> the majority is reacting to what
> the minority is saying
>
> - Obi Egbuna

Black Power and the Concept of Ideology

In this chapter, the two basic process problems of ideology and strategy are examined. The preliminary discussions on these themes form a prelude to a sociological appraisal of Black Power which comprises the rest of the chapter.

First, then, ideology. It must be said that Black Power in Britain is still very loosely defined; but this is due in part to the fact that as a Weltanschauung of Blacks in Britain, it does not have a formal programmatic platform. At the same time, it has an ideological orientation - a set of ideas evolved to give Blacks in Britain a framework for relating themselves to others (especially out-groups). These ideas tell them about the history, as well as the structure and process of the society in which they operate, and about the goals, values and belief system of the society.[1]

Ideology, as a definitional technique among Black

people, becomes, in this context, counter-ideology, in
the sense that it is a response to another set of ideas
(or ideology) which spacio-temporally, antedates the
Black ideology.[2]   As belief systems, both Black Power
and White Racism are ideologies. But each is invested
with quite different degrees of power, and power is
necessary to translate beliefs into social action.
Racism as an ideology forms a belief system that accom-
panied and rationalised a dominant power position, where
contrasts between lower and upper statuses (in terms
of ethnic stratification) were clear and unmistakable.
Black Power, on the other hand is an ideology (or
counter-ideology) the purpose of which is to dilute
the power position and to minimise the contrasts between
echelons of statuses.

The definition of the situation (including social-
isation principles) together with power relations serve
as the crucial intervening variables connecting White
racism and Black Power.

Whether the power relations and the social defini-
tions change appreciably over time, is partly a function
of the effectiveness of Black Power rhetoric and/or
strategies, and partly a function of the flexibility
of the power-holders.

The system of thought which Black people in Britain
hold, provide a more or less coherent organisation

for the experiences directly related to the actions of men in society. In this sense, Black Power is an intellectual foundation, or group solidarity, which serves to crystalise ideas about the social environment into a common belief system - a sort of social Gestalt or "clarity map". These ideas help Blacks to understand the social order and the world around them, and, by defining the situation as real, set in motion definitions and descriptions which are real from a specific viewpoint.

What is essential in appraising ideology is to know the problem or problems it is designed to help to answer.[3] As a creative attempt to come to grips with the world, an ideology need not necessarily satisfy "truth" criteria. It may be either false or unverifiable, but still serve to justify and direct the actions of men. It is on this score, of course, that the crude Marxist standpoint holds that all ideology is partial knowledge. But, insistence on this can only lead to epistomological problems; and these, more often than not, confuse the validity of knowledge with its circumstances.[4]

In fact, we would strongly argue that what makes the ideologies (as systems of belief) important, has nothing to do with their epistomological status, in the sense that we do not necessarily attach truth-claims

to them.

But this is not to disclaim their logical status
and functional utility. For those who would argue that
formal logic tends to something called truth, there is
another answer, which is this.   The circumstances in
which we arrive at our theory or explanation of the
world, do not determine the nature of the theory, or
its validity as knowledge.

This raises fundamental problems between the con-
text of discovery, and the context of validation.
These are, however, methodological rather than episto-
mological problems. Thus, the scientist, in proposing
a new theory, is not required by scientific standards
to detail his thought-processes and feelings. Nor is
he required to specify the social influence which may
have entered the discovery or development of the theory.
The distinction between the two contexts turns out then
to be this. The way in which the sociologist comes to
a given idea or hypothesis, is not relevant to the
justification or the empirical claims that he makes
regarding this product. Whereas, on the other hand,
the issue of whether the hypotheses are sound and well-
established, is highly pertinent to the context of
justification. On the one hand, the issue is a logical
one; on the other, it is an empirical one.[5]

All the complexities of the sociology of knowledge,

and all the ramifications of methodological principles, do not detract from the fact that ideologies are "clarity maps" of problematic social reality, creative responses to real problems.

In this context, the ideology of Black Power is a short-run <u>raison d'être</u> of Black Nationalist orientation. As such, it cannot be understood outside the context of a consideration of culture, which itself is a product of the matrix between man and history. Hence, ideology cannot be treated as an a-historical phenomenon. It is rooted in the conflictful arena of associational life, in the existence of social groups. With belief systems, men manipulate the social world, change definitions, and relate to each other. Whether or not the construction of an ideological system will serve long-run requirements, seems less important than the answering or clarifying of on-going structures of relations for which ideologies are constructed.

In sum, then, an ideology is an element of group dynamics, not an individual thing. Even, so, however, it cannot be assumed that the meanings of the ideological statements are the common property of all members of a group or collectivity. Thus, one of the major tasks of Black Power in Britain in 1972, is the construction of ideological forms out of shared sentiments and shared definitions among Blacks in Britain. Simultaneously as these are constructed, they are disseminated to as

many Blacks as are willing to listen.

To effect this, the Black Power movement is faced with the on-going problem of strategy. We now consider this problem.

Black Power and the Problem of Strategy.

The on-going problem of operating strategy hinges on two major issues or concerns. The first has to do with leadership within the Black movement; the second, with formalisation (or routinisation in the Weberian sense).

In the Black Power movement in Britain, leadership problems may be said to be latent, in the sense that the "spokesmen" of the movement do not regard inadequate leadership as problematic. Leadership and leadership roles are played down or minimised in an effort to present an element of anonymity of "unidentity" to the outgroups, (and especially to the agents of social control) who have been known to harrass Black Power movements in Britain, in an effort to nip leadership in the bud, especially where the potential leadership seems militant. By playing down the role of leaders, the key members of the Black Power movement hope that they will make better headway in terms of organisation and strategy. By keeping the more influential from the front (hence more vulnerable) positions vis-a-vis outgroup's power influence, the movement hopes that this might cushion

the social realities of contending with social control
agents.

The way the situation is usually rationalised,
can be seen from a statement from one of the early
Black Power leaders in London:

> We fight and argue like hell (among ourselves),
> but this fighting and arguing is where we get
> most of our thinking done. If Brother Sawh
> needs to get off and flex his muscles, found
> a new organisation, well he must go. To a
> European's eyes we may look fragmented – that's
> good; he won't take us too seriously. But we
> know where everybody is at.[6]

This typical reply to any queries of leadership, has a
spurious air of plausibility. But it is not the whole
truth. Diffusing leadership and leadership-roles is a
deliberate exercise crucial to the very life of the
movement, since much of what the movement does in
Britain is influenced greatly by the negative sanctions
of social control. In Britain, Black people's political
activities are carefully monitored by the police, ever
since the visit of the Black American, Stokeley Carmichael
to Britain in 1967. And it would not be an exaggeration
to say that the British police authorities are surreptit-
iously engaged in a campaign to stamp out Black Power in
Britain.

Leadership, then, is problematic for the Black
Power movement in Britain. It is clear that excessive
social control activity against the Black Power organis-

ation might drive leadership underground, where it could conceivably become a dangerous motive force, harnessed to revolution and sabotage. Sociologists. strongly suspect, in certain cases of social action, that it is social control which leads to deviance, rather than the other way round.

Since there is no overt leadership, it is also difficult to detect overt followship, as we shall see shortly. In this atmosphere of largely unco-ordinated protest, Black attitudes to the White society tend to become somewhat ambivalent. One germane task of Black Power in such a context, is to sustain, for its supporters, a sufficiently clear and specific definition of the situation. On the empirical level, it is the reality of this ambivalence which contributes to the fragmentation of Black Power groups. As groups rise and fall, each transient group defines a specific or generalised situation, en passant.

From this experience, sociologists might well ponder whether there is not a new case to be made for leadership phenomenon in the study of group dynamics. It is quite possible that leadership only presents itself when the situation has been sufficiently defined and prepared for mass mobilisation of group goals. (cf. p.129 above). Understanding the problems of Black Power might indeed reveal particular hiatuses in social theory.

So far, the concern of this chapter has been
with the ideological problem of Black Power, and with
issues in leadership and social control. It is now
time to consider the other problem of strategy - that
of formalisation.

Black Power in Britain does not demonstrate a
formalised structure or set of activities. In a way,
again, lack of formalisation is not seen to be debili-
tating to the aspirations of the movement. Formalisa-
tion is regarded as an invitation to suicide, in the
sense that it is feared that that would give rise to
rule-book adherence to a given design, which could only
serve to alienate support. This position is in direct
opposition to conventional sociological theory which
maintains that for any social movement to be moderately
successful, it must develop and employ some organisation-
al structure to focus human action in line with the
conceptions of the situation in which it operates.

Clearly, for Black Power at its present stage of
development in Britain, the most important task is the
symbolic harnessing of discontent, as well as the
dissemination of a shared definition of the situation.
These activities do not necessarily require a unified
structure. Fellowship (or followship) implies no more
than a passive or incomplete appreciation of the
existential problems of Black minorities everywhere.

And the test of membership for (or the criterion for participation in) Black Power activities, is the individual participant's perception of himself as a member of the in-group - Black. The simple test of Blackness may or may not be supplemented with the acceptance of the movement's basic values on the broadest plane. To be a supporter of the cause of Black Nationalism, rather than a "member" in the formal sense, all that the "true believer" needs to do is to acknowledge the existence of, and the con- tinuing necessity for, a Black identity.

Ideology and strategy, then, form two sets of current theoretical issues in the analysis of Black Power in Britain. Precisely because it is impossible to identify leadership, it also becomes difficult to delineate effective membership of the movement. The informal nature of the present structure lends itself to a diffused support. The movement is _free_ for all Blacks. But since not all Blacks are sufficiently motivated to become participatory supporters, there is at any one time in any one group, a number of members, supporters and sympathisers. They need not all be true believers.

On the other hand, it seems accurate to postulate that in Britain the Black Power movement is "constrained" to operate within the traditionalised socio-cultural framework of British society. Until, and unless the

members become full-time revolutionaries, measured
"success" of the movement lies primarily in instilling
a sense of identification with and among the dis-
satisfied Black minority within the wider social
setting.

Perspectives on Black Power: Britain, 1971.

From the thesis so far, it is easy to see that
to try to understand Black Power as an isolated self-
contained body of thought, is like trying to under-
stand the fourth chapter of a book, of which one has
not read the first three chapters.

Chapter one is slavery, chapter two is colonialism
in consort with capitalism; and chapter three is White
racism (the cumulative product of the first two).
Chapter four is Black Power.

Black Power expresses sentiments of Black National-
ism. As such, it is a historical concept, rooted in the
contexts of slavery and its aftermath, and it must be
understood as a response to historical oppression,
self-effacement and cultural dispossession of Blacks.
It is therefore not geared so much to social change as
to the repetition of Black cultural processes which
can be seen to crystallise "we-consciousness" among
Blacks in Britain. To speak of Black Power then, is
to speak of an emotional framework, constructed by

Blacks for Blacks for the promotion of Black Identity and Black pride.

It is the continuing phenomenon of Black protest which we dealt with above (see chapters 6 and 7) which now calls itself Black Power. As such, its authenticity must find its locus in the history of Black revolt, including slave revolts.

Material from both field-work experience and from the written word illustrate admirably the essence of Black Power in the above terms. Take the following set of definitions:

> Black power is not the slogan of dissent of Blacks. Black Power does not even mean Black domination of the world. Black Power simply reflects a New Stage in the revolutionary con-sciousness of the Black Man.[7]

Or again,

> Black Power means simply that Black people must decide their destiny, their political and econo-mic position in the world - take control of your political position.[8]

Finally,

> Black Power means Black people moving from the bottom rung of the ladder acquiring the skills that will place them in a position in the society where they will have a say in formulating the policies that affect their lives.[9]

These are good examples of the way Black Power is currently being defined in Britain. They illustrate

that the Black Power movement is much concerned with identity, as well as with less precise themes such as "self-respect" or "dignity".

A National Conference On the Rights of Black People, held in London in May of 1971 took up all these themes. This conference was (up to that time) the largest single gathering of Black people ever seen in Britain. It was a useful occasion to get large numbers of Black people together to discuss the issues that bore on their lives. But there was no realistic programme that could have formed the basis for a political platform.

The basic themes of that conference are worth noting, since they serve to illustrate that Black Power is currently concentrating on everything but Black political power.[10] The general themes of the Conference were these:

> (i) The theme of the historicity of the Black Experience, with special tribute being paid to past Black heroes such as Marcus Garvey, Kwame Nkrumah, or any Black leader who at some time in the past had openly challenged colonialism.

> (ii) The theme of "internationalising the Black struggle", i.e. that the Black Power movement in Britain should "hook-up" with similar aspirations in the Third World.

> (iii) The explication of the Deprivation of Black people, and explanations of the lack of working class solidarity in Britain. Black people were seen to be "on their own", in the sense of having no trusted allies in

Britain. Recent legislation on Immigration
and on Industrial relations were interpreted
as instruments which would aid working class
fragmentation; while also serving as mechanisms
for the deflection of working class hostility
from a defined "real enemy" to the Blacks.

(iv) The expression of Black cultural symbols
through the medium of Black Arts Workshops.

(v) The analysis of imperialism and its strategies
in contemporary times; Britain came under
special examination on this theme.

(vi) Examination of the actual life-situations
of Black workers in Britain. Detailed
case-histories served to concretise the
problems, many participants at the Conference
having used their own experiences to illus-
trate the main issues.

(vii) Finally, there was a general call for the
mass mobilisation of all Black people.
This, more than any of the other issues, formed
the central theme of the entire Conference.

Quite ccucially, Black Nationalism (which Black
Power expresses) takes issue with a long tradition of
racism and ethnocentricism. As such, Black Nationalism
in practice is constantly engaged in the examination and
re-examination of Black History and Culture; it hopes
ultimately to use the knowledge of these categories to
enhance ethnic pride.

In Britain, the layman's conception of Black Power
tends to be synonymous with predetermined acts of violence.
There hardly has been, in recent years, a mention of
Black Power, which did not also implicitly equate the
concept with violence, or gave the impression thus.
The popular press certainly helps to convey this impression,

and one Member of the British Parliament once referred to Black Power as "a small group of Black racialists deciding to stir up trouble."[11] Others have said that Black Americans (notably Malcolm X and Stokeley Carmichael) are responsible for "stirring up trouble and preaching racial hatred" among Black people in Britain.[12]

But on the basis of the structural analysis which has been proposed in this thesis, it is clear that Black protest and Black agitation against white racism does not require "outside" forces to set them off. "Charismatic verbalisers" such as Carmichael act only as what has been called accelerators of dysfunction;[13] that is to say as catalysts which simply intensify the rebellion among Blacks in Britain. They do not "cause" it.

In sum, Black Power in Britain is yet not a formalised movement. But some of the reasons why it is not, are to be sought in structural constraints. Since Black Power was first mentioned in Britain in 1967, the concept has been applied to sharpen the atmosphere of social and political unrest among Blacks, and to redefine Black identity. It is therefore not primarily concerned with the transfer of political power, but with solidifying group identification and cultural cohesiveness.

"Political" and "Power" are terms used loosely and indiscriminately by Black groups often to refer to cultural symbols.

The next section reviews very briefly some process problems Black Power in Britain has faced.

The British Black Power in Action: Analytic Fact & Fiction

The history of Black Power in Britain is the history of social conflict in the broken-down urban "twilight zones" of the big cities.

The first set of truly Black peoples' meetings sprang out of the so-called "race riots" which occurred in London's Notting Hill, and in Nottingham, in 1958. Following these incidents, Blacks in these areas met, in basements, attics, kitchens and barber shops, to discuss how best they could defend themselves against physical attacks in the streets. But although the first meetings were in the areas that actually experienced the riots, they were not confined to these areas. Soon, similar "get-togethers" were afoot in Birmingham's Handsworth, Leed's Chapel Town, Manchester's Moss Side, and other areas where fairly large numbers of Blacks resided.

There was nothing in these meetings about Black Power; the term was simply not used then.

The first Black people's organisation to use the

rhetoric of Black Power, was the Racial Adjustment Action Society (RAAS), founded by Michael Malik (or Michael X) in 1965, and based in his London flat. This was after Malcolm X's visit to Britain in the summer of the same year. Initially, there was scepticism from the more liberal elements of the Black population, notably the Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) which was modelled after the late Martin Luther King's Southern Leadership Conference (SCLC). CARD, as a pacifist-type Organisation, reacted coldly to the founding of RAAS which it described as "irresponsible."

Furthermore, RAAS had an unkind press reception, having been insistently described as the Black counterpart of the Ku Klux Klan. In actual fact, there was no hint of violence in RAAS. And although its "manifesto" of 1965 was different from that of CARD (see Chapter 10), the difference is more in terms of semantics rather than objectives. RAAS was more business-oriented than CARD, but it was no less concerned with the problem of racial discrimination. Its way of promoting Black pride was seen to be the establishment of Black businesses.

RAAS gained publicity because of two specific incidents. First, in 1967 Michael X was imprisoned on a charge of racist incitement. Second, in 1969 he established the Black House in London, a Black company set up to run shops and supermarkets. This venture

failed in 1970 when Michael X was arrested on charges
of blackmail. In the summer of 1970, before the case
was brought to court, Michael left Britain for his home
country Trinidad. As far as is known in 1972, he is
still out of Britain, reluctant to return to Britain.
After this very short existence, RAAS is now a defunct
group. Between 1965 and 1967, it was seen as one mani-
festation of Black Power in Britain.[14]

In August 1967, soon after Stokeley Carmichael's
visit to Britain, the Universal Coloured People's
Association (UCPA) was founded in London. The very
first meeting of the UCPA was called specifically to
protest the inordinate police harrassment of Black
spokesmen in London, following the visit of Carmichael
a few weeks earlier. Like the other Black movements
before it, the UCPA produced a "manifesto" (see chapter
10) and took the latest claim of being "Black Power
in Britain", and of being a revolutionary movement
aimed at rejecting all co-operations with Whites.
But the UCPA ran into severe ideological battles,[15]
which made it difficult or impossible to reach coherent
decisions. In the throes of the ideological battles
no real revolutionary consciousness could have been
forged. As it turned out, the days of the UCPA (as
one group which had "adopted the Black Power thesis")
were numbered. In April of 1968, the Chairman and
Founder-Member, Obi Egbuna, resigned to form the Black

Panther movement in Britain.[16]

Meanwhile, two other UCPAs had splintered from the original core. In July of 1968, Egbuna and two other members of his newly-formed Black Panther movement were gaoled. It was claimed that Egbuna was "masterminding a plot to murder White policemen in cold blood."

Egbuna, apparently, hoped to have run the Black Panther movement along lines that would have ensured ideological solidarity. But these plans never materialised. And six months after its founding, (when Egbuna was released from gaol) the movement had apparently undergone a fantastic metamorphosis:

> One or two 'ultra-militants'... out of the blue made their way to the very centre of the core, and had goaded the boys into reversing the very ideological beliefs which had been the cornerstone of the Panther magic. Everything was upside down... The sanctity of the core, even the very concept of probational membership had been ruled out, and anybody could stroll in at will.[17]

Simultaneously, the Panther's main political organ Black Power Speaks, folded. Currently, in 1972 there is a Black Panther movement in London, but apparently it is nothing near to the original conception of Egbuna's.

The aims of the current Black Panther organisation (reputedly the most radical of the Black groups in Britain) are similar to those of the Black Panthers in America. (see chapter 10 and cf. Appendix 5). No

theoretical contribution has been made by the British
Panthers over and above the general ten-point demands
made by their counterparts in America. This ten-point
strategy is more a statement of grievances and concess-
ions demanded from the White power structure, than it
is a programme to mobilise Black people for revolutionary
activities.

These were the most radical Black organisations
that have existed in Britain since 1965; they might
be called the Left Nationalists. But quite apart from
the earlier groups which seem to have had all the pub-
licity, there are several card-carrying Black organisations
up and down Britain.

The interesting thing about these groups is that
they all claim to adhere to the Black Power ideology,
but at the same time they are most eager to disclaim
any intention of being political.[18] Among these purely
local groups, the clarion is for Black Unity, and their
activities are centred on cultural socialisation; the
significance of Black Poetry, Black Music or Black
History. Among these local Black Groups the most im-
portant ones are: the Black Unity and Freedom Party
(London); The Black Eagles (London); The Black
Liberation Front (London). Black People's Alliance
(Birmingham); Black People's Liberation Party
(Leicester).

Finally, it is useful to consider CARD. CARD is not an exclusively Black organisation, but a multi-racial coalition of "left intellectuals". It is interesting to briefly mention this organisation, because, as an organisation which had a potential for national influence (with branches as far flung as Glasgow and London) it nonetheless experienced many of the organisational problems of the other (non-intellectual) groups.

Leadership, for instance, has posed one of the gravest organisational problems for CARD. Although the organisation has had the semblance of a formal hierarchical structure, it suffered from severe factionalism and intense acrimony between members of the Executive Committee. Doctrinal battles, division-ism, rhetorical dichotomies, and simply personal clashes, created splits between the "realists" (i.e. the intellectuals) on the one hand, and the "romantics" who want to stir up the masses, on the other. Dis-agreements have been recorded between pragmatic "ideal-ists and impractical ideologues; between the "militants" and the "moderates"; between those who favoured the mass approach and the elitists; between anti-colonial-ists and paternalistic neo-colonialists."[19]

All this is revealing. For the final result of these on-going forces means that CARD has not been able

to mobilise grassroot sentiments for concerted political action. Nor have they been able to sink organisational roots in the Black communities. In short, CARD has not been able to get the grassroot support which one would have assumed would come about with a semi-formalised operational structure. Clearly, organisation (in the sense of formalisation) is not the be all and end all of grassroots' politicisation.

It can be argued from this, that at least the explicitly Black Power groups are well on the way to mobilising the Black masses. At least, the Black Power groups deliberately foster pride in Black Culture and Black symbols. This, conceivably, could be the stuff on which Black consciousness will later come to be crystallised.

In conclusion, the crux of Black Power in Britain is the fostering of Black pride. The overall focus is the forging of a Black identity (since there is not a ready-made one) and the strengthening of Black solidarity. The social unrest among Blacks in Britain will probably crystallise into pre-revolutionary social movement at the stage where effective leadership coincides with a unified ideological system.[20]

It seems obvious, however, that the stage of full-fledged social movement is dependent on other developments, notably (a) a shift in the current Black Power

orientation from purely "cultural" concerns, to
"political" - a shift from protest to politics;
(b) a redefinition of the situation to take account
of the theoretical sides to ethnic relations.

As a subject for social analysis, and as an area
for critical appraisal, Black Power is a slippery con-
cept. It cannot be understood in isolation from its
structural contingents: slavery, colonialism and
White racism.

In Britain, current definitions of Black Power
(as proposed by the Black people at grassroots) are
unwieldly, and its implications are uncertain. In
this thesis, some basic outlines for a systematic
study of Black Power have been pointed out, and a
dynamic theoretical framework for evaluating this
phenomenon suggested. Clearly, Black Power does not
constitute a <u>movement</u> in the technical sense (although
we have persistently referred to it as such in this
thesis), since it lacks the formal aspects normally
associated with the technical definition of movements.
Nor is Black Power a monolithic and stable phenomenon.
Because of the informal and fluid nature of Black
Power in Britain, it would be more appropriate to
refer to it as a minority protest, striving to establish
Black identity, and having a diffused and unqualified
Black support.[21]

In the next chapter, Black Nationalism will be examined in the British race-relations context. In that chapter, too, the theoretical bits and pieces mentioned so far will be brought into a single inter-connected model of Black Nationalism.

CHAPTER IX

BLACK NATIONALISM AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRITAIN

> --White people - we like to call
> them White progressives - go
> around talking about "Black and
> White unite," talking about
> Marxism, talking about class
> struggle. Nobody is talking
> about racism.
>
> -- Member of the Black
> Panthers, London, 1971

The Race-Relations Relations: Doctrines and Counter-Doctrines

Writing in her book, <u>Dark Strangers</u>, Sheila Patterson remarked that the West Indian in Britain has a chip on his shoulders; and that he comes to explain every cool answer (given by a White person) of refusal of accommodation, leg-pull by his workmates, and refusal and loss of employment, as due simply and solely to the (not unimportant fact) that he is coloured. In a word, the West Indian is simply "too touchy;" he never forgets that he is coloured!

This observation, or assessment, shared by many students of society in Britain, raises complex conceptual problems, and highlights a key issue in the sociology of race relations. For, in order to explain, in sociological terms the typifications that men make in their daily lives, we must come to grips with specifying the cultural and social variables that are in play in the matrix of social action. And, systematic mapping of

historical configurations (after the tradition laid down by Max Weber) to explain the dynamics of social structure, is, clearly, highly desirable.

Part of that explanation involves exploring the dynamics of beliefs as <u>cultural categories,</u> and as they are mortised with, and explicable in terms of, <u>social categories</u> such as class, or stratification, or social organisation.

This chapter attempts to ferret out the assumptions made in previous chapters about beliefs as meaning-complexes, as well as those proferred about the historical continuity of structural processes.

While culture **as** meaning-complexes have been neglected in the sociology of race-relations in Britain, this neglect occurs only at one level - the level of social relations. At another level - that of social definition - cultural assumptions are part of the stock-in-trade of analysts, and operate to forge a perspective on race-relations that can only be described as insular.

Now, if "every cool answer" is not to be explained in terms of colour prejudice, there is the need for indicators which can demarcate the "innocent" aspects of social relations from the "racist" aspects. To this end, it is often necessary to ignore many kinds of discriminatory behaviour, because of the difficulty of distinguishing the causal inter-relations. But

certain others <u>must</u> be typified as generically racist, depending on the consequences they have for social relations, and on the number and types of assumptions built-into the behavioural responses. The conceptual difficulties that revolve around this level of analysis raise further questions as to whether we have clearly demarcated indicators to measure racism.

To operationalise racism, all that is necessary is to specify that certain discriminatory acts against an ethnic minority are rooted in racist beliefs. A lynching, or a case of job discrimination may or may not be a racist act. It is not the overt act per se which is important, but the under-pinning matrix of values and steriotypic assumptions which can crystallise a mere construct into a real entity for a belief to be acted on. The values transform elementary beliefs about race into complex patterns of cultural responses.

Discriminatory behaviours are often linked in a causal chain. Thus, one act of discrimination (say the denial of equal access to educational opportunities) may be designed to facilitate another type of discrimination, such as social exclusion or endogamy, or other facets of social distancing. If the ideas that serve to facilitate these types of discrimination against an ethnic group are held at the culutral level by the dominant group, we would be justified in saying that the behaviours were based on racist premises. By beliefs

being held at the cultural level, is meant that they are
shared by the group, without being necessarily "tested"
for accuracy or source or practicality.

If a minority practises discriminatory behaviour
against a dominant group, this may or may not be a
racist situation; it depends on whether the level of
ideas about the dominants is linked in a causal model
to the historical and cultural framework of beliefs
about those dominants.[1] Obviously, to measure racism,
one must utilise a mode of interpretation, together
with concrete procedural "tests" of discrimination.
All these together, can be taken as indices of racism,
if the theoretical linkage between ideas and practices
are carefully specified.

In Britain, there are old doctrines on the notion
of White superiority, and doctrines on the doctrines.
People generally are reluctant to designate specific
behaviour patterns as "racist", because, it is often
said, you cannot "prove" racism. No one seems to worry
that in racist behaviour, it is not the concrete situ-
ation which is problematic, but the beliefs held at the
cultural level. These give direction and meaning to
the "cool answers" Patterson mentions.

The merit of the structural approach is that it
helps us to demarcate the cultural (and hence shared)
configurations, from the purely local aspects of

behaviour. This approach is also conducive to the use of historical data in establishing causal linkages and temporal sequence among variables. Thus, the understanding of Blacks in British society is greatly enhanced by the historical fact that racism as a belief system can be located as a long-standing British tradition. Without fully grasping the institutional dimensions of this belief system, and its relations to the total configurations of Black and White relationships, we will have fallen short of our intellectual task of explaining race-relations in Britain.

Institutional dimensions, then, must be taken up for analysis, if one is to comprehend a sociology of race-relations. There are specific criteria for establishing a race-relations situation; at no time can we satisfactorily grasp the essence of a race-relations situation without the specification of racism as a core variable.

> We shall speak of a race-relations structure or problem, insofar as the inequalities and differentiation inherent in a social structure are related to physical and cultural criteria of an ascriptive kind and are rationalised in terms of deterministic belief systems of which the most usual in recent years has made reference to biological science.[2]

It is clearly obvious that many problems known as "race problems", are not clearly specified analytic areas, but rather instances where easily identifiable

physiological features are bases for the allocation of symbolic status and roles. In this way, the situation may be termed a race-relations situation when in fact it is only a small part of a race-relations problem as a whole. No adequate or complete account can be given of a truly race-relations situation, without reference to the fact of certain kinds of belief systems (cf. Appendix 111).

Race-relations situations are explicable in terms of of racism, power-relations and stratification elements. These serve as preconditions for the emergence of such a problem; and to attempt to explain the structure and dynamics of race-relations in terms of the strangeness of the newcomer to the situation (cf. Blacks in Britain) or in terms of "culture shock" or in terms of "chip on the shoulders", is inadquate and distorting.

Thus, in a situation where someone says of a Black immigrant (Harry) that he is not against Harry living in his neighbourhood simply because Harry is a Black man, but ...., sociologists really cannot say that this is a race-relations situation, until and unless that vast territory of "popular theories" succeeding the but is carefully explored. If this is not done, it is almost certain that racist beliefs might be made to appear as harmless pragmatism.

This brings us to the very important point raised

earlier concerning the existence of cultural assumptions, at the level of social definitions of the Black immigrant in British society.

The conventional intellectual stance on the subject of race in Britain, is still welded to overworked concepts such as "assimilation", "integration", "adaptation", and so on. Implicit in the use of these concepts is the notion that once the Black immigrant conforms, (presumably to a set of unspecified norms) then there will be no social conflict. There is, in short, in the approach to race-relations in Britain, value assumptions which constantly pose the question of: how to get these people from overseas to conform to British ways (cf. p. 90 above). The general overall tendency of analysts of race-relations has been to centre attention on the functions one ethnic group performs for the entire social system. Accordingly, ethnic groups are traditionally viewed as a subsystem which will gradually "fit into" the entire society by a series of adaptive adjustments, regulated by the norms and values of the wider society's socio-cultural institutions. Eventually, according to this perspective, each ethnic group will internalise the norms and values of the wider society, and be like everybody else.

Assumptions such as these are jejune and short-sighted. Yet, much of the standard works on race in

Britain have used these assumptions. Indeed, the Park and Burgess' cyclical model of race-relations, which postulates the sequences of conflict, competition, accommodation and assimilation, is still quite popular.[3]

This thesis has shown how and why such an approach simply cannot be used to explain the position of Blacks in Britain. Because of racist ideas held in Britain about Blacks, Blacks are like no other ethnic groups, when it comes to conformity and integration prospects (see chapter 4 above).

With social rejection by White society being the paramount problem of being Black in Britain, Blacks are more concerned with gaining a minimum of tolerance from the dominant group to enable them to pursue an independent existence, with as little interchanges with the dominant society as possible. Blacks therefore have no wish to be "integrated" into a society that does not even accept them. The sociological implications, then, do not bear on the old dogma of integration or assimilation, but on pluralism. More realistically, one must view the Black ethnic group in Britain as being in an embattled position vis-a-vis the dominant group, aspiring for its identity, for a minimum of prestige and status, and for cultural autonomy.

In these aspirations, the Black group is subject to perpetual constraints which threaten its survival

and its destiny, its life-chances and its spontaneity.
And conflicts which then become built-in to the
plural situation need not lead to societal social
change. On the contrary, conflicts help to buttress
cultural values within ethnic groups.

From this conceptual perspective, Black National-
ism in Britain (in whatever form it takes) is a mechan-
ism for perpetuating the social institutions and culture
of a people whose ethnicity pre-determines their
marginality in British society. The preservation of
traditional ways of life (i.e. pre-emigration way of
life) among Blacks, and the old ways of comprehending
the world, are dictated by a number of complex factors,
but among them is the long-term possibility of re-
living the old values in full, if and when a return
to the homeland is effected. Also, of course, because
their situation is a marginal situation in British
society, perpetuation of the old values enhances positive
group identification. It is thus that Black National-
ism in Britain (Nationalism without a nation-state)
serves as a medium for the expression of Black conscious-
ness.

Among Blacks in Britain, therefore, "assimilation"
into the patchwork of the dominant society is not on.
It is not seen to be necessary or desirable. What is
important for the Black group as a whole, is that ·customs,

beliefs, and cultural practices indigenous to the immigrants, are preserved (even at the risk of perpetual conflict with the wider society). It is in this sense that pluralism can be said to be nothing more than a special case of conflict situation.

Conflict cannot be excluded from social life. We may change its means, its objects or its fundamental direction; but we cannot automatically move from conflict to assimilation in the Park and Burgess' sense. At least, it must be recognised that ethnic relations involve the postulate of a stressful balance between compartmentalised ethnic traditions, with their structural analogues.

As indicated above (pp. 69 - 71) Black Nationalism in Britain is not separatist Nationalism nor assimilationist Nationalism, but pluralist Nationalism. This type of Nationalism is tending toward integration, only in the wide sense of wanting to preserve their own customs and identity - what has sometimes been termed a "centrifugal aim."[4]It is not separatist because the "land question" is not a paramount concern among Blacks.

In short, the tendency in Britain is toward some form of cultural pluralism. If both sides decide to "live and let live", at the very least, then this would present a form of integration - a "centrifugal tendency" - in which there would be an institution of the truce.

Such a situation is inherently unstable, in that a slight revision of the definition of the situation could make for overt conflict. If, for instance, the dominants changed their views of the minority in the direction of limiting the latter's autonomy, or force assimilation of the minority, the situation would become de facto a conflict situation in the most unco-operative sense.[5]

In Britain, no doctrine on the relations between Black and White can be accepted, unless such a doctrine faces up to the fact that seemingly "neutral" concepts and behavioural responses from the White side are often grounded in racist beliefs. As we shall see, it is this fact of racism which gives Black Nationalism its force and direction.

Perspectives on Racism: Rationalisation or Operationalism?

Black Nationalism is a function of White Racism. Anglo-Saxon Racism is a product of the Racial slavery of Blacks. White Racism in Britain has given rise to the social rejection of Black immigrants.

Social rejection of Blacks in Britain has tradit-ionally been explained away in terms of the cultural xenophobia of the British people, and in terms of the "foreignness" of Blacks. But neither of these explana-tions are valid. The xenophobia thesis would probably have been an acceptable one, if there were not other

major indicators of social rejection of Blacks.
Similarly, the stranger-hypothesis is clearly overstated
in analyses of the social rejection of <u>West Indians</u>.
For, as we have shown, the organic linkage between
the West Indians and the British is forged at the
level of cultural values and institutions. In other
words, the West Indian is not <u>that</u> strange, and there
must be something more to his rejection besides his
reputed "strange-ness". Indeed, in many parts of the
world where Europeans are few, indigenous ways prevail.
Not so in the West Indies. In the West Indies, there
are practically no indigenes; the circumstances of
slavery allowed little African culture to survive.
And thus many West Indians recognise no tradition other
than the European's. "Most of the area (West Indies)
remains linked to London, Paris and Amsterdam by
political, economic, cultural and emotional bonds."[6]

For Blacks in Britain, therefore, "foreign-ness"
<u>per se</u> is never the major criterion of social rejection.
To grasp the dynamics of this rationalisation, racist
beliefs about Black people, and ideational construct-
ions, (<u>qua</u> cultural categories) must be analysed and
explored, with the same thoroughness that is normally
given to social categories such as class or strati-
fication.

Some sociologists, of course, argue that even if

discrimination is proven, no certain inference can be made about possible motives underlying the actual discriminatory behaviour.[7] This may be so; but the camouflaged values of social life need not even be evident in speech reactions for the sociological imagination to grasp the nature of racist belief system underlying certain types of concrete social behaviour. As sociologists, we have to decide at some stage, which set of behaviour patterns are real in their consequences for the actors involved.

The tragedy of academic approaches to race-relations in Britain, is that the decision to designate certain actions as being premised on racist beliefs is often pushed aside. The argument is often put forward that we cannot infer accurately what underlies an act of discrimination. It is often said, too, that the social rejection which the Black immigrant in Britain experiences, is a function of the immigrant's unfamiliarity with the "unspoken language of British life."[8] There is the implication here, of course, that the Black immigrant does not understand the esoteric norms of British life.

The problem of racist belief systems is never carefully brought up for analysis. The most that is claimed is that the British do not like strangers, and will therefore make it difficult for them to gain accept-

ance, except in the lower social categories. And, crucially, in these lower categories reserved for strangers, the Black immigrant is relegated to the far nether end, because, being a <u>dark-skinned stranger,</u> he is twice relegated, and ends up being the archetypal stranger - so strange that "a few points are subtracted from his claim to social rank."[9]

In underplaying belief systems in Black and White relations in Britain, some sociologists consistently insist that "the situation of West Indians in Britain is not basically a colour or race situation", however much it may appear so to many colour conscious migrants, it is an immigrant situation."[10] On the same plane, government policies on race relations since 1962 have tended to focus on "immigration" as <u>the problem</u>, while evading the issue of social attitudes and community responses to the presence of Blacks. As we shall see, failure to recognise the plight of immigrants in the context of the discriminatory practices meted out to them, has severely narrowed the intellectual perspective on race in Britain.

Racial discrimination, working via the allocational systems in housing, employment and social services, (the very stuff of modern community life) has given rise to community conflicts which approximate what has been called "urban riot".

The central problem of the social rejection of Blacks thus effectively forces them (via the systems mentioned) to live in ghetto-like communities. They are forced by discriminatory practices to stay locked in the decaying and broken-down "zones of stagnation" in British cities. They are shunted into these zones, not by choice, but by racial discrimination. Rationalisations are then usually made to explain that "Blacks like to stick together" - in ghettos.

To argue this away, however, is to put the cart before the horse. But it is a key argument for the British people. For once this is accepted, it is a short step to a self-fulfilling prophecy. The stagnation zones are traditionally characterised by a high rate of crime and delinquency; and once the idea is generally accepted that Blacks like to stick together in these areas, then they can be easily stigmatised, scapegoated, and generally blamed for all that is amiss in these areas.[11]

Clearly, structural variables must be at the heart of any adequate causal explanations of race-relations in Britain. This is the hallmark of the present thesis.

The racist ideas which have dictated the behavioral practices toward Blacks in Britain, did not come into being simply with the coming of Blacks to Britain.

More precisely, they have long been latent in the
value system of British society, and have been
invoked and brought to bear on actual interaction
situations. Indeed, Kenneth Little found, as
early as 1948, that in Black and White relations
in Britain, there was what he called a "closed
circle." In other words, Black children were
categorised and treated as second-class human beings,
and found it impossible to break through the "closed
circle", to employment, social acceptance and mobility,
or be afforded the life-chances enjoyed by whites.[12]
And many of those Blacks were born and brought up
in the very areas in which they were rejected.
Twenty years later, the children of those rejected
Blacks (themselves rejected by British society) join
forces with "new" Blacks from the West Indies to talk
of Black Power and Black dignity. The reasons why,
are almost self-evident. (cf. Chapter X).

The fact that racism can be a matter of beliefs
and/or institutional practices, has made sociologists
shy away from the concept. In this thesis, sufficient
conceptual clarity has been given to racism as a be-
lief, to enable us to detect its manifestation at
the level of social rejection. If a particular act
is established as a manifestation of racism, then a
small element of social interaction will have been
explained. If there is disagreement that the behaviour

in question is not based on racist beliefs, then the behaviour would have to be termed as exploitation of man by man. Either way, it will have been seen that Blacks, in one way or another, are the victims of White society.

The examples which follow will illustrate. They are findings from empirical works on the Black worker in British society:

West Indians are accepted by management as inferior, unskilled, stop-gap labour. (untested assumptions) [13]

Discrimination against coloured immigrants occurred in over 80% more instances than a white alien "tester" in a strategic survey on racial discrimination in England. It was often mentioned that staff and customers might not like the coloured workers; but also, it was said that coloured people were lazy, lacked skill, had high job turn-over. (untested assumptions). [14]

Employers took coloured workers, so long as they kept out of sight. [15]

Management was not keen on employing coloured labour in certain areas. [16]

In house purchase, discrimination was "explained" by reference to the fact that (a) vendors would not sell to coloured people; (b) coloured people found difficulty in obtaining mortgages. [17]

In the Greater London area, only 11% of advertisements for privately rented property did not specifically exclude coloured people. [18]
(Note the number of Blacks in the Greater London area; see pp. 38-39 above)

At the level of Local Authority administration, officials assumed that coloured people are less eligible for the best accommodation. [19]

Practices of these kinds could be cited several-
fold. But the above suffice to bring out the thrust
of the thesis that racism manifests itself in practices
and concrete social behaviour, but is denied or
rationalised. The disabilities of the immigrants
are often seen to be "inherent". Rationalisations of
discrimination against Blacks are certainly too bizarre
to be "innocent". Throughout the complexities of
social relations in Britain, the Blacks are seen to
be objectionable human beings, as devalued workers,
and are invariably cast in the role of a pariah.[20]
There is the received notion that Black pigmentation
connotes low status and low potential.

Now, the fact that West Indians in Britain live
at such close quarters with White racism, even though
they have more or less absorbed the culture of their
European dominants over centuries, contributes to a
number of Problems which the West Indians face in
real life.

For one thing, they live in the midst of a great
paradox, in that, although pseudo-British, they are
not accorded a higher status in British society, than
are the other "ordinary" strangers. West Indians
therefore suffer from a "status dilemma", or from
what sociologists call "confused social identity."[21]

For another thing, because of social rejection
by White society, Blacks live in a <u>marginal situation.</u>
The concept of marginality is used here in its distinct
sociological sense. We are interested in the sociolog-
ical end of the marginality conception, not to be con-
fused with the psychological end. The sociological
meaning, links group structure and process to stratifi-
cation theory, and to power-relations.

At the core of the marginal situation, is the
notion of social rejection, conceptualised as one ele-
ment of racism. This type of marginality has nothing
to do with the narrowly-conceived psychological values.
Rather the situation is a sort of half-way station
between social rejection and a Plural situation, i.e.
a quest for cultural autonomy as a prelude to separation.
We can diagram the situation as follows:

$$(a) \quad SR$$
$$\searrow MS \longrightarrow P$$
$$(b) \quad PC \nearrow$$

SR Social Rejection of Ethnic or Minority Group

PC Political Coercion of Ethnic or Minority
                                        Group
MS Marginal Situation of Ethnic or Minority
                                    Group
P Plural situation in the making

The mention of Political coercion simply means that since
the dominants have all the power over the Minority, they
are at will to use political coercion to maintain strati-

fication and status hierarchies - the dominants need not
consult the minority to find out what they (the minority)
think of the existing set-up.

EXPLANATORY CAUSAL MODEL OF BLACK NATIONALISM

RS   Racial Slavery: White over Black
R   White Racism: Belief system of White superiority
SR   Social Rejection of Ethnic or Minority Group
PC   Political Coercion of Ethnic or Minority Group
MS   Marginal Situation of Ethnic or Minority Group
ds   definition of the situation
pr   Power-Relations between Minority and Dominants
BN/BP Black Nationalism and Black Power
p   Tendency toward a Plural situation
sm   Tendency toward Social Movement among Ethnic
         or Minority Group

The crux of the matter, then, is that social re-
jection of Blacks (rejection arising from racism) forces
Blacks into a Marginal situation, in which they are in
British society,but not of it for there is a distinct

discrepancy in the ranking of status hierarchy which
involves them. Blacks therefore define that situation
as putatively racist, and consequently seek and advocate
Black Power and Black Nationalism, in an effort to
lessen the number of inter-changes with White society.
This tendency contributes toward pluralism, as a form
of separation, and social movement activities might
then become important to help this process along (see
model).

A central hypothesis of minority group relations
now suggests itself, namely that:

> Cultural Pluralism, as a quest for specific elements
> of autonomy of an ethnic or minority group, often
> is directly related to the social rejection
> of that ethnic or minority group.

If a minority group is accepted by the dominant group,
then a marginal situation need not occur, and a pluralist
orientation need not set in. There is, of course, a
rare exception which must be mentioned, namely, that
an ethnic group could conceivably encourage pluralism
by practising voluntary isolation.

Some other very important points must also be men-
tioned at this stage. The first is that the original
formulations of the marginal theory covered both being
in a marginal situation, and also having a marginal

personality.[22] As used in this thesis, however, it implies that the incumbents of a marginal situation (a group) need not develop the traits of psychological marginality.[23]

The second important comment is that so-called "culture-conflict" which was claimed to be at the root of every marginal situation, is certainly not a necessary and sufficient cause of marginality.[24] In real life, a marginal situation occurs without the condition of culture conflict. If culture conflict is deemed necessary for explaining a marginal situation, then it must be subsumed under social rejection.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that sometimes a marginal group may fare better with absolute rejection, than with a state of being granted a grudging and un-certain acceptance by the dominant group.[25] In this light, a Black subculture or anti-British or contra-British cultural and historical orientation, may well create a more satisfying reality (for those who sub-scribe to it) than they would have had from a grudging, paternalistic acceptance.[26]

In fact, as things currently stand in 1972, Black immigrants want to live in Britain, (as they think they have a right to) but at the same time, the social world they seek to foster, is an autonomous one - as autonomous as possible. Concepts such as integration,

assimilation, _accommodation_, become meaningless.
With the experience of social rejection, and with the
full knowledge of racist ideas and practices, Blacks
militantly pose the vital question: "Integration into
what kind of society?"

The one problem here is that cultural autonomy
does not mean functional autonomy. Thus, operating
as they do at the level of socio-cultural integration,
(based on social relations between cultural units of
unequal status and power) power-competition becomes
important for Blacks. If their life-chances are to
be enhanced, while their cultural identities remain,
Blacks must face the political reality which brings
them face to face with various social and political
institutions of White society. The reciprocity of
social life forces economic, social and political
relations between Black and White.

It is at these transactional levels, that the
racist philosophy of "keeping the Blacks in their
place" contributes to pluralist tendency (see p. 238)
in British society. It could well be, that in the
long run, what Blacks achieve in British society,
will come to depend on the degree of actual power
and influence that their group members hold in the
power structure of British society. Unless, of course,
we entertain the idea of Blacks having their own piece

of territory in Britain, with their own administration and government. And this is profoundly unrealistic, at least in the short run.

The above analysis illustrates clearly that the roots of the Black Man's problem in Britain are to be found in the social rejection which he experiences. This fact, literally, explains a multitude of other facts and experiences.

In the next section, the notion of scapegoating is looked at as one of these subordinate experiences.

Black Immigration to Britain and the Concept of a Scapegoat Class

"Give a dog a bad name and hang it," is an old figure of speech well-known in English. Its implication is that once the wretched creature has committed an un-doglike act, (or is reputed to have committed one) then there is not much in its favour any more.

There is a direct analogy between the above notion and the presence of Black people in Britain. Because Blacks are neither wanted nor welcomed in Britain, there is very little they can do that will please the British.

Racist assumptions have operated, over the years, to establish that the Black immigrants are, by definition,

a problem group. And public stereotypes of Black people have consistently nurtured the idea that Black people are less desirable as neighbours and as fellow citizens. At best, they are conceived as a pariah group, draining the natural resources by "willingly dipping their fingers" into the National Fund, to which they are said to contribute nothing.[27]

From a purely sociological point of view, the gravest tragedy of race-relations in Britain is that the official political machinery has given great impetus (or imprimatur) to the negative stereotypes of Blacks. Indeed, all the Immigration measures adopted by Britain since 1962, and crowned by the Immigration Act to end all Acts - the 1971 Immigration Act - can be seen as measures aimed at spelling out that the mere presence of Blacks in Britain was a serious problem (see Appendix). The official definers have established the "fact" that Black immigration is the problem of twentieth century Britain.[28] And the answer, as seen from the definers' point of view, is to stop all Blacks coming in, and send home as many as will want to go.

Black Immigration to Britain has now become a respectable political issue, and a vote-stealing subject in British Politics.[29] Both major political parties in England have capitalised on the subject of

race (and more specifically Black Immigration).

> In 1964 the Labour Party refused to be drawn into
> the racial debate at the hustings. This did not
> look like a party which would do other than main-
> tain the principle of equality of legal, social
> and economic rights for all men regardless of
> race. Yet less than four years later the same
> Party has agreed to a distinction between two
> different kinds of passports on what are in
> effect plain racial grounds; dockers, the hard-
> core of the organised labour movement march in
> support of a racist speech... And any serious
> attempt to speak up publicly for the principle
> of racial equality has come to be considered
> electorally dangerous.[30]

A Black Opinion Leader, on very much the same theme, told an anti-Immigration Bill rally at Leeds in Spring of 1971 that the politics of Immigration over the last ten to fifteen years was responsible for the hardening of White attitudes against Blacks. Of the recent mammoth British study of White attitudes in Colour and Citizenship, he questioned its optimistic conclusions:

> When I look at that bit of research, and I add it
> up against my own experience, I find myself coming
> down to the view that this was a most misleading
> bit of information to put to the community, be-
> cause it conveyed the impression that there was
> not much prejudice to worry about in this society.
>   And when you then examine the fact that prior
> to that, you had the P.E.P. Report which clearly
> established that there was a substantial amount
> of racial discrimination in Britain, you ask the
> question : "how could they come down with this
> finding?"

This Black Opinion Leader, who was also a Commu-
nity Relations officer in one of the "Black" Boroughs

in the Greater London area, went on to explain some

of the more obvious implications of injecting the

issue of Black Immigration into British national

politics: He went on:

> Let us go back as recent as to the Last General
> Election, (1970) because it was on the basis of
> the last General Election that we now have the
> 1971 Immigration Bill.
>   It was interesting to note that all the
> politicians, barring Enoch Powell, and to a
> lesser extent Anthony Wedgewood-Benn, were
> afraid of looking at the question of immig-
> ration and Black people living in the society.
> They all felt that it was too controversial an
> issue to put before the public. They all felt,
> that in some respects, if they did do this, and
> raise the issue, it would cost them votes.
>   But Powell was convinced he should raise
> the issue; and indeed, it didn't lose Powell
> votes (nor indeed the Party votes). It got
> them votes.
>
> The implication to me therein, is that in
> effect it is another example to show clearly
> that there is a substantial amount of prejudice
> in the society.

Now, most of the studies on race-relations in Britain

have been, (or have tended to be) of the "fact-finding"

nature, a-theoretical and a-historical. But it seems

perfectly clear that the real issue is never an

empirical one. Black and White relations in Britain

raise rather complex theoretical questions of race

and racism, and of racist cultural socialisation.

This thesis has gone a long way to isolating some

of these theoretical issues, and in so doing has drawn

attention to the fact that racism will remain deep-

rooted in the culture of British society, so long as anti-racist programmes continue to prowl around the margins of the theoretical issues.

New generations of White Britishers are being socialised (via "consensus politics", among other mechanisms) to regard Blacks as scapegoats, second class citizens, and "noble savages."[31] A cultural definition of the situation (the place of Blacks in British society) is bound to guarantee and reinforce a social definition of the situation (conflictful day-to-day patterns of interactions between Black and White).

And for those who are generally optimistic that "familiarity" with Blacks will make them more acceptable, and so help to reduce social tensions, let them look at the American experience once more. Reduction of racial discrimination is in no way an automatic process ensured by generational transitions and "famiarity" with Blacks. If it were, there would have been no racial problems in the United States.

Racism is not appeased by the fact that a Black immigrant's children were born in Birmingham, and educated in London and Sheffield. If these children are Black (as they are bound to be) then, by the ruling standards and criteria of ethnic stratification in Britain, they rightly belong to a new British class — a scapegoat class. (cf. quotation at beginning of

chapter XI).

In the final section, the notion of the scapegoat class is concluded with a brief glance of some possibilities of the out-come of living with this status.

Social Rejection, Black Nationalism and the Concept of a Scapegoat Class

This section is based largely on what the Black immigrants themselves have said about their position in British society.

A feeling of social rejection experienced by Blacks in Britain has had the effect of raising their level of social consciousness. Not only have they come to distrust the motives of the White society, but they have come to reassess the subtlety of the racist assumptions that exist in Britain. The assumptions might not be explicit, but they are still important to the Blacks, even if they are made at the level of grunts, winks and hints.

As we noted above, discrimination forces immigrants to live in the decaying areas of the big cities. As such they are more or less surrounded by the high rates of deviant behaviour patterns which characterise these areas anyway. They are thus exposed to what seems an inordinate surveillance by the official agents of social control, even though the evidence suggests that the

immigrants are not themselves involved in the deviant activities.[32]

A number of important social implications are inherent in this sort of situation. And they show that the _labelling_ of a scapegoat class is a _social_ process. A number of Black immigrant groups have verbalised the complexity of the process in their own characteristic styles. The following are good examples:

A Black grassroots pamphlet, published in London:

The non-white people in Britain, live, move and have their beings in the midst of a peculiar paradox.
  On the one hand, in every sphere of life, they are exposed to all the inadequacies and inequalities of the capitalist system: unemployment, job insecurity, severe shortage of housing...

  On the other hand, when the irreconcilable contradictions of the capitalist system tend to assume the dimensions of a crisis, the agencies of the ruling class blame the immigrant working people, with the purpose of deceiving the indigenous working people as to the actual source of all the problems afflicting them, namely, the profit and property of a system which maintains the powers and privileges of the capitalist class.
  Thus, by a demonic logic of a curiously inverted character, the people who are invariably subjected to the worse consequences of all the chronic and acute problems, are blamed as the cause of those very problems.[33]

This Marxist paper attempted to define the situation for and on behalf of the Blacks in Britain. Such attempts, clearly, are of first importance in sharpening the atmosphere of discontent, especially

because the Black immigrants are assigned to roles and statuses largely on the basis of their having filled colonial roles in the past.

It is in this light that it is justifiable to suggest that Blacks in Britain are seen by the Whites to be suitable only to deprived industrial roles, and as residents of deprived neighbourhoods (see pp. 108, 117-8, 235-6 above).

Yet more and more paradoxes facing the Blacks come up for analysis or explication by the immigrants. A young woman, (a Black Panther) told a meeting of Black people in Bradford that they might as well cease thinking of themselves as British, and think more in terms of Black Power.

> Black people were indoctrinated to see Britain as "Land of Hope and Glory", "Mother of the Free", and so on. And we learnt all the songs to go with it. Black people were taught that we were citizens of Britain, had equal rights, just like everybody else - under the Crown. This situation started in the 18th century, but it didn't have any practical realisation.
>
> The British government only realised that this theory that all Black people in all parts of the world were citizens of Britain, could be applied. This theory only came into practice in the 1950s and 1960s (and of course during the war)
>
> It took one hundred and fifty years for this theory to be put into practice. Now, they are saying: "We want these niggers out!"
>
> Many of us like to talk about British working class trying to raise their standard of living. But let us remember that when the working class had an increased standard of living at home i.e. in this country, it is at the expense of Black people.

Black consciousness, and Black Power militancy,
are forged out of the Black's definition of the situ-
ation. As far as the Black masses in Britain are
concerned, their most urgent task is the forging of
a scapegoat class into a "resistant" class, for, as
it is often put by the verbalisers, "We are not going
to play Jews; we can't afford to die like Jews."

The development of Black Nationalist sentiments
is therefore highly dependent on the experience of
social stigma. The militants conceive of a situation
in which future conflicts will be racial rather than
class conflicts. A Black Panther in London explains:

> We believe that in the end it will be a class
> struggle; but we can't determine whether it
> will be a class struggle or a race struggle,
> because the White workers in this country have
> been associated too much with the oppressor
> that they become part of the oppressive system.
> And wherever Black oppressed peoples move
> against the system, people can't start to gen-
> eralise, and start talking about it's going to
> be a class struggle.
> When they do that, they are undermining the
> importance of racism that we are subject to as
> Black people. We are talking about RACISM.

In sum, the racism which manifests itself in
Britain is one of the key explanatory variables in
Black Nationalism. Racism promotes scapegoating of
Blacks, and Blacks are scapegoated because they are
socially unacceptable to the British.

The fact of being blamed for all that is wrong

with the society, motivates Blacks to stick together
and advocate Black Power and cultural autonomy.
Black Nationalism is thus essentially we-consciousness,
or group identification. Social rejection of Blacks
is at the heart of Black Nationalism.

The next chapter examines the basic form and
content of this Nationalism.

CHAPTER X

BLACK MANIFESTOS OF IDENTITY AND THE SOCIOLOGY OF PROTEST

> -- Identity is not something that can
> be found; it must be created.
>
> -- Charles Silberman

The Form and Content of Black Protest in Britain.

Perhaps one of the most important "resources" of
Blacks in Britain is their generalised beliefs about
the extent of racism in Britain, and about the status
and prospects for Blacks in Britain.

The collective definition of the situation in terms
of generalised beliefs is an important necessary condition
for the mobilisation of people for collective action.
But it is also the ideological germ of a new social and
cultural entity, and a base for the development of social
movement activity and crowd behaviour.

In this section, what have been termed "manifestos
of identity" of Black protest groups in Britain are pre-
sented. In sociological terms, these manifestos are
identity tags. They represent a good cross section of
the content of Black protest in Britain, and can be
understood as expiatory demands for the redistribution
of status and privilege, rather than for the redistri-
bution of power. In a nutshell, they constitute the
broadest aspirations of the more prominent Black groups

currently or lately operating in Britain. In some
cases they form guidelines for action. The manifestos
speak for themselves.

MANIFESTO 1.

BLACK PANTHER MOVEMENT, 1971.

WHAT WE WANT.

1)   We want an immediate end to the racist immigration
policies of the British government, whether Labour or
Conservative. We want an end to the constant harassment
at the airport and unwarrented detention in prison of
black people by the racist immigration officials. Black
people in our different homelands, and in this country
have built up Britain, therefore we have every right to
be here. We will decide for ourselves, whether we want
to leave or not.

2)   We want an end to racism and exploitation in em-
ployment. Black people must be given employment as well
as full pay in keeping with their skill, and experience.
We want all black workers to organise themselves, whether
or not they are in Trade Unions to demand their rights,
since British Trade Unions do not function in the interest
of black people.

3)   We want an end to racism and exploitation in hous-
ing, operated against black people by the British govern-
ment, and local councils. We want an immediate end to the
racket and intimidation, practised by greedy landlords
and estate agents against black people. We demand decent
housing for black people, instead of the present rat-in-
fested sub-standard houses in the slums of Britain. Black
people have a right to make these demands and it is the
responsibility of the government and the local councils,
to provide us with decent housing. Therefore, we black
people, must organise ourselves into effective Associa-
tions to see that these demands are met.

4)   We demand an end to the brainwashing of our child-
ren in British schools and through the mass media. We
demand an end to the dumping of our children in Britain's
backward schools, and discrimination in education at all
levels. We demand proper education for all black people
which will equip us with a true understanding of our-
selves, and which will expose the decadence of this white
racist society. We want our people to learn the true
history of black people which exposes the savage nature

of colonial exploitation, since British education has
purposely distorted our history, and has "glorified"
the brutaility of white explóiters, who plundered our
lands.

5)   We demand an immediate end to police <u>brutality</u>
and persecution of black people - on the streets and
in our homes. We want an end to false arrest, and un-
just imprisonment of black people. We want an end to
the constant beating up, physical as well as mental
torture of black people by prison officers.

We maintain that a government which fails to
meet these basic demands has no right whatever to claim
or even expect our allegience. And since the British
government with the entire capitalist establishment,
has failed to meet these demands but, is directly re-
sponsible for the mounting racism, exploitation, brutal-
ity and degradation which black people suffer daily, then
we have no alternative but to reject, the entire capita-
list establishment of Britain.

This means in practice, firstly, that we must
stop building our hopes for a better future as Black
People on the empty and hypocritical policies, of the
British government, whether Labour or Conservative.
Secondly, we ourselves, must bring about the change
in our present oppressive situation, right here in
Britain. We must unite and get organised in order
to defend ourselves in a racist and hostile society;
and we must join with all oppressed people, and revolu-
tionary forces in Britain to fight for the complete
overthrow of the oppressive capitalist system for our
liberation, and that of all oppressed people.

(London)

MANIFESTO 2

THE BLACK UNITY AND FREEDOM PARTY, 1971.

A. LONG TERM PROGRAMME

1) We recognise the class nature of this society.

2)   We recognise the necessity for class strugle and
the absolute necessity for the seizure of state power
by the working class and the bringing about of socialism.

3)   We recognise that imperialism has been able to
inject its racist ideology into every section of society.
However, since the white working class is also exploited
under capitalism/imperialism, we recognise the contra-
diction between the white working class and the ruling
class to be a fundamental one.

4)   The contradiction between between the black
people and the ruling class is therefore a principal
contradiction, and the contradiction between the black
people and the white working class is only secondary.

5)   Therefore, whilst we recognise the necessity to
struggle against racism in general, it is essential to
treat the contradiction between ourselves and the work-
ing class as a contradiction among the people, whilst
the contradiction between ourselves and the ruling
class is a contradiction between the people and the
enemy.

6)   The general programme of the party is therefore
aimed at the complete overthrowing of capitalism/imper-
ialism and towards bringing to an end the exploitation
of man by man. The party, therefore, upholds the right
of the oppressed and the exploited everywhere to use
any means necessary to free themselves from the yoke
of capitalism/imperialism. We shall unite and fight
with them to overthrow capitalism/imperialism.

B.   SHORT TERM AIMS

WE DEMAND

1) We demand an immediate public enquiry into the
brutal racist activities of the police against black
people.

2)   We demand an immediate end to the harassment of
black people at the ports of entry.by racist immigration
officers.

3)   We demand an immediate repeal of the Race
Relations Act, since it is a tool to be used against
black people.

4)   We demand the scrapping of the Race Relations Board.

5)   We demand that all money paid into the various National Insurance and superannuation schemes be re-funded to black people returning to their home-lands.

6)   We demand full employment.

7)   We demand trial by our peers, i.e. black magistrates, judges and juries.

8)   We demand the immediate release of all black prisoners, since they have not had a fair trial.

9)   We demand an end to the racist education that is being dished out to our children. Black children must be taught their true history and culture by trained black people. Black parents must also have a greater control over their children's education. Therefore, in all schools where there are black children, there must be a representative number of black people on the governing boards.

10)   We demand decent housing.

11)   We demand the right to work, housing, education, peace and social justice for all men.

                        (London)

                    MANIFESTO 3

        BLACK PEOPLE'S LIBERATION PARTY (BPLP) 1971
                  AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

1.   To re-educate black people on politics so that
        they can see clearly just what politics is doing
        to them.

2.   The Organisation will whenever possible give
        practical and ideological aid to other black
        people in other parts of the world, fighting
        for the freedom of black people.

3. To fight for the rights of black people in England for economic and social justice, and to defend these rights by the most effective means at its disposal.

4. To raise funds by all legitimate means; to advance the aims and objectives of the Party.

5. To demand that African history and culture be added to the educational programmes, to all black children so they too can be proud of their ancestry, and also see the reason for migrations.

6. To establish Community Advice Centres.

7. To form Community Self-help Organisations.

8. To co-operate with Organisations, Group or Parties whose aims and objectives are similar to ours.

9. The Organisation will insist upon discipline of all members. The disciplinary measures for activities against the Organisation will be enforced after discussion.

10. The Organisation will have an official party journal to be published... to propogate its views and to win other members for the Organisation.

11. All major decisions will be made by a simple majority of the members providing at least two thirds are present, and all members are required to carry out these decisions.

(Leicester)

MANIFESTO 4

MANIFESTO OF THE UNIVERSAL COLOURED PEOPLE'S ASSOCIATION (UCPA) 1967

Aims and Objectives:

a. To set up advice bureaux to investigate and act upon problems affecting our people.

b.   To take immediate action for the establishment
     of nurseries for coloured children, and to
     encourage coloured people to participate in
     the administration and uses of this facility;
     and for voluntary help in the transport of
     these children.

c.   To introduce organisation, education, and clear-
     ance of the Ghettos of our people.

d.   To undertake all such activities which will pro-
     mote the emancipation of our sisters all over
     the world.

e.   To provide legal aid to all coloured people who
     find themselves oppressed by the racial persecu-
     tion of Anglo-Saxon society.

f.   The establishment of study groups for our people
     to recognise their racial interest.

g.   To establish co-operatives in pursuit of econom-
     ical and social interests of our people.

h.   The training of coloured people, by education and
     practical discipline, to be representatives of
     our people.

i.   To provide protection, guidance and discipline
     to our people who suffer because of their colour,
     faith, or unwarranted racial disturbances.

j.   To propagate solution of our problems on inter-
     national levels.

                                        (London)

                    MANIFESTO 5

MANIFESTO OF THE RACIAL ADJUSTMENT ACTION SOCIETY (RAAS)
                                                   1965

Preamble:

Black men unite we have nothing to lose but our fears

     RAAS is an active group. We are calling on all
Black Brothers and Sisters to participate in this move-

ment to redress the balance of insecurity, fear and disunity in which we live. We ask of you nothing but discipline and an end to petty quarrels amongst ourselves. We must make a supreme effort to assert our rights to freedom and our full human dignity.

We all pledge ourselves to:

1. Guarantee by all means possible the human rights of all coloured people in Britain.

2. Re-examine the whole question of our dignity as Black.

3. Protest our religious, cultural and social hereitage.

4. Help promote trades and industries in order to establish and consolidate a strong economic base.

5. Establish centres for physical, educational, social and cultural activities.

6. Create Co-operative housing projects, so that every man's right to decent accommodation can be assured.

7. Strengthen our links with the Afro-Asian Caribbean peoples in our common fight for the freedom and dignity of man.

(London)

MANIFESTO 6

MANIFESTO OF THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST RACIAL DISCRIMINATION (CARD) 1964

Aims and Objectives:

1. To struggle for the elimination of all racial discrimination against coloured people in the United Kingdom.

2. To struggle for the elimination of all forms of discrimination against minority groups in the United Kingdom.

3.   To use all means in our power to combat racial
        prejudice.

4.   To oppose all forms of discrimination on the entry
        of Commonwealth citizens into the United Kingdom.

5.   To oppose all legislation that is racially dis-
        criminatory or inspired by racial prejudice.

6a.   To seek to co-ordinate the work of organisations
        already in the field, and to act as a clearing
        house for information about the fight against dis-
        crimination in Britain.

6b.   To establish and maintain links with organisations
        outside the United Kingdom having aims and objects
        broadly similar to those of CARD

                                                (London)

MANIFESTO 7

"PHILOSOPHY" OF THE BLACK LIBERATION FRONT (BLF) 1971

Preamble:

Our philosophy is simple. We believe that Black people
have to survive in Britain and in the world today.
Survive, not just to exist. To do so, to free our
people, we must be prepared to use any means necessary.

Our programme in Britain says:

1.   We want decent housing, full employment, proper
        education for our children, an end to police
        brutality and of legal victimisation.

2.   We want the repeal of all racist immigration laws.

3.   We set up a number of projects that can serve the
        community and make it more aware of the problems
        today-
        Youth club, history classes, employment programme,
        advice centre, bookshop and library.

4.   We do not believe in employing tactics that are

self-defeating e.g. demonstrations, pickets, etc.

5. We do not believe that 100-200 people parading down the streets with placards, shouting their heads off about what they are going to do to the pigs at the same time giving them the opportunity to arrest militant brothers and sisters, anway furthers our cause.

6. The only demonstration we will take part in must be at least 5,000 or 10,000 strong and with a definite purpose.

(London)

The above set of manifestos have been reproduced in the styles in which they were presented by their authors - Black protest groups. This writer has not altered their structure, or the sequence of the "demands"; but he has imposed some punctuation, primarily in order to facilitate a more intelligent reading of the manifestos.

There are a number of important points to note about these Manifestos, and the following should be emphasised.

First, they all have objectives or aims of the same genre, namely, an over-riding concern with things "cultural" or symbolic, not with things "political".

Secondly, each group operates on a purely local basis, not nationally. Thus, their permanancy is at best precarious. They are fluid and changeable, even transitory, and duplication of aims and objectives in any one area usually lead to the disappearance of one or more groups.

Thirdly, self-accredited "militancy" among these groups means the linguistic force with which collective denunciation of white racism is effected.

Finally, for those who use the term Black Power, as among those who do not, the important orientation is the search for a Black Identity (cf. diagram, p. 267 below). Thus, like the phenomenon of the Black Church in Britain,[1] they are Nationalistic in the sense of being first and foremost expressions of protest, or a token of rejection in response to a society which rejects them.[2]

The following section broadens the protest spectrum to include religious sects among Blacks in Britain.

The continua of politics and religion in West Indian Communities.

By the continua of politics and religion is meant that among Black immigrants in Britain there are two distinct axes of protest.

The first comprises the political (or more precisely quasi-political) axis, of which the Black Power groups are representative. The second axis comprises the religious sects among Black immigrants - the Black Church in Britain.[3]

The thrust of this section is the observation that in the overall context of racial discrimination and social rejection, the religion and the politics of the

immigrants are alternative forms of adjustment.
Religion and politics provide for their adherents much
more than primary mechanisms of adjustments to a new
environment; they provide emotional cocoons for the
immigrants for as long as they face the White society.
The fact of social rejection, plus all the other prob-
lems of living in a complex society, requires the Black
immigrants to build and maintain a cluster of defences
which far outlive any "adjustment" to the initial shock
of a new environment.[4]

Initial rejection of Blacks has forced them to con-
struct their own coping mechanisms, over and above the
stock of mechanisms normally available to the wider
society, (e.g. escapism into T.V. world).

For the Black Church, (they are mainly of the Penta-
costal group) the solution to racism is esoteric. The
Black West Indian's disappointment in the British concept
of Brotherly love, has led them not only to charge that
British Christianity is no different from the rest of the
British public, but to form their own sects. These sects,
in outer form, resemble conventional sects of their kind,
but their "theology" is anything but conventional. As
movements of religious protests, in the sense of seeking
to separate themselves from other men in respect of their
religious beliefs and practices, plus the fact that
their members are victims of racism, the Black Churches
are independent of the White Pentacostal churches.

The primary concern of the Black Church, in this context, is to answer the "Who am I" question, rather than to espouse orthodox religious principles.

It has been suggested that racism and status deprivation experienced by Blacks in Britain have given rise to a fantastic increase in the membership in Pentacostalism among West Indians in Britain. This is shown in the graph below. The notion is clearly consistent with the thrust of this thesis that racism and absolute deprivation foster group identification and consolidate social and cultural consciousness. A pariah group and a scapegoat class is nurtured into a resistant class.[5]

The idea of perpetuating the Black Church as a peculiarly West Indian institution serves to dramatise the "Black Experience" in Britain. The eschatological aspects of the "true believers" also function to cushion the problem of status deprivation; and in a therapeutic sense, softens the impact of the social tensions and frustrations, built up in the process of living in an unfriendly society.

But the key sociological question here is not answered. The question is this: How soon, and under what conditions, will the trend in the growing adherence to religious sectarianism be stabilised or reversed?

Until we know the processes built into social phenomena, and until we know the nature of the characteristics of outcomes to which those processes move, no accurate prediction is possible. In this thesis, enough inform-

GROWTH PATTERN OF MEMBERSHIP IN BLACK NEW TESTAMENT (PENTECOSTAL) CHURCH OF GOD IN BRITAIN

Source: Hill, 1971b

Total membership including adher- ents in regular attendance

20,000
17,500
15,000
12,500
10,000
.7,500
5,000
2,500

1950 1955 1960 1965 1970

Y E A R

Source: Hill, 1971b

ation has been assembled and analysed to suggest that second generation Blacks in Britain will not be prepared to adopt the religious experience as an answer to racism and deprivation. Because the reference groups of the British-born Blacks will be white counter- parts, their perception of deprivation will almost certainly be sharper than that of the first generation Blacks. Second-generation Blacks would therefore be

more inclined to manipulate their environment (by
various means, including violence if necessary) to
accord with some ideal concept of society. Second-
generation Blacks will reverse the trend shown in the
graph.

In sum, then, at the level of social structure,
all West Indians in Britain share the same set of
frustrations, and to a large extent the same set of
aspirations. The frustrations are derived from the
social rejection of Blacks; while the aspirations
may be conveniently summed up as a quest for a meaning-
ful cultural and social identity.

In this way, both Black Power and the Black Church
function as collective processes in search of meaning,
and as probes for the location of a more satisfying
culture. The two foci among Black protesters in Britain
may therefore be conceptualised as two continua, which
over time may become one continuum of protest, having
more, or less, militency.

The idea of the continua is shown overleaf in
diagram (a). Over time, the two continua will collapse
into a single protest continuum, with the Black Power
groups occupying the most militant end of that continuum,
and the Black Church the (marginally) less militant end,
as shown in diagram (b) (cf. also Appendix 11).

THE CONTINUA OF POLITICS AND RELIGION IN BLACK POWER

(West Indians)

(a)

(High on Militancy
Potential)

RELIGIOUS

BLACK CHURCH:
"Religious" & Cultural
Nationalism

High on
Militancy } POLITICAL —————————— CULTURAL { Low on
Potential   Militancy
                                                 Potential

BLACK POWER:
"Political" & Cultural
Nationalism

CULTURAL

(Low on Militancy
Potential)

(b)   THE BLACK PROTEST CONTINUUM IN BRITAIN

(West Indians)

High on   Low on
Militancy +   – Militancy

P R O T E S T   C O N T I N U U M

BLACK   BUFP BPLP UCPA RAAS BLF CARD BLACK CHURCH
PANTHERS

There are several intermediate Black organisations which are not depicted in the above continuum. But they are not sufficiently distinctive to make for other possibilities than those suggested here. It must be assumed that in time they will come to join forces with the larger, more established Black groups shown in the diagram.

To be able to move from the description of facts to the causal level, and from one level of abstraction to another, sociological analysis must always seek to go from the possible to the plausible and finally to the probable, by presenting explanations with a predictive gut. To assist such predictions, the next section briefly examines the essence of two concepts: Rejection and Black Identity.

On the Concept of Social Rejection

It might be said that the first principle of human organisation, as social relations, is the acceptance of one group of people by another, or of one individual by another. From this, all types of interactions, and all sorts of social expectations are worked out and established.

But where social rejection underlies human contact, one can reasonably expect that distrust, hostility, and conflict will be built into the situation.[6]

The position of Blacks in Britain illustrates this.
Initial social rejection, predicated on racism, has led
to a vicious circle of race-relations. Rejection of
Black immigrants has led them to defensively develop
their own community life. This in turn reduces contact
with the indigenous population, which in turn increases
the chances of mistrust, misunderstanding and consequent-
ly social conflict.

There is therefore every reason to expect conflict
in Black and White relations in Britain. And the situ-
ation would probably not have been as tense as it is, if
West Indians were not so Anglicised at the value level.
In effect, they are thoroughly Anglicised at the value
level, but rejected, and hence frustrated at the personal-
ity and social-relational levels. They are therefore,
among Blacks in Britain, the most sensitive – much more
so than the Asians or the Africans. Thus, too, they are
more apt to <u>innovate</u>. Improvisation must go on continu-
ously in the cultural sphere, in the task of creating a
more satisfying reality.

One other point. On the basis of the concept of
social rejection, we would expect the relations between
Blacks and the official agents of social control to be
characterised by conflict. For, if Blacks are really
rejected, and have fully defined the situation as such,
then one could hardly expect them to ritualistically

subscribe to all the normative values of the society around them.

Just what specific shape a "deviant" subculture might take among Britain's Blacks is difficult to predict, and there is little evidence that conventional patterns of deviancy are acceptable to Blacks in Britain. Innovation is the key principle.

Here, then, sociologists of deviance might well consider the notion that deviant behaviour in complex industrial societies may often be a creative attempt at self-preservation. Deviation from normative expectations is clearly a social rather than a psychological phenomenon.[7]

It is in this complex of human problems that Identity-crisis, as a socio-psychological search for inner as well as outer cognitive "balance" becomes crucial. Hence, Identity is next considered.

On the Concept of Black Identity

By identity is meant a socio-psychological state of being (or a social perception) in which social groups see themselves as belonging to a particular social category, or fulfilling particular roles in society.

Thus conceptualised, Black identity problems among West Indians in Britain involves the stock-taking of

history or a diagnostic assessment of their historically
subject status in Western society. It is a struggle
for ethnic "discovery", and/or the pre-occupation with
the localisation and reappraisal of the Black Experience.

The sociological basis for the forging of collect-
ive Black identity is the common thread of historical
experience, including the experience of rejection in
British society. For Blacks, racial oppression plus
alienation from conventional White society motivates
the search for an unmistakable identity of "peoplehood"-
for West Indians, a search for the emancipation from
remnants of colonial patterns of thought. Black Ident-
ity, then, is a correlative of Black Nationalism. And
growing attachment to Black identity, including the
reappraisal of Black symbols, must be understood as
one of the bases for organising Blacks into a cohesive
and hence a politically more significant force.

As a sort of socio-cultural leverage for the
transformation of Black self-perception from one of
impotence and dependence on White patronage, to one
of self-determination and autonomy, Black identity is
a cohesive media for Blacks.[8] It is this media which
forms the core of Black Nationalism as the concept is
used in this thesis.

CHAPTER XI

FROM GENERATION TO GENERATION TO SOCIOLOGY

> -- In recent years, a new wave of immi-
> gration has come from the West Indies,
> Pakistan, India and parts of Africa.
> This wave of immigration is coloured.
> This has often made these people the
> object of prejudice and rejection. They
> have been held up as scapegoats for
> many social problems...
> If the truth be told, these people
> are not the cause of the social prob-
> lems; the reasons for these are to be
> sought elsewhere
>
> --From the Pastoral Letter
> of the Bishops of the Leeds
> Diocese, October 1971

The Whole Truth, and Nothing but the Truth

This observation from the Pastoral Letter is
highly significant. Indeed, the entire Letter was an
honest humanitarian message which pointed out that
"good" Christians ought to have acknowledged the
multi-racial nature of British society, and thus
should have ceased their social rejection of Blacks.
Coolly, the Letter warned, social rejection of Blacks
could only mean "a divided nation" in which there
could never be "peace and harmony" among Black and
White in Britain.

The real importance of this Letter for this re-
search, however, is this. The Diocese had commissioned
that the Letter be read at all masses (on a particular

Sunday) within its jurisdiction. When this was carried out, there was widespread dissent within the church, and many vexed souls. Because the church was exposing White racism, the Bishops were told: "If this is the church, then we don't want to know"[1]

As sociologists, we might be called on to explain the intransigence of negative White attitudes to Blacks. But, clearly, until sociologists come to terms with the elusive, and complex theoretical problems of the structure of beliefs from which the hostility to Blacks derive, they will not have added anything to the understanding of race-relations. Most of this thesis has been concerned with explicating many of these issues, in an effort to come to sociological explanations of race and racism.

To tell the whole truth (if that were possible), the political debates over the last decade or so on the question of race in Britain, may be summed up as an education in racism for the British public. If anything, White attitudes have hardened precisely because official social definers have set the pattern. To take the most recent and obvious example, the 1971 Immigration Act came as close as it could to spelling out that the Black immigrants in Britain were a serious problem, and certainly did not belong to British society. (See Appendix 1V; also see previous Debates on Black immigration, fn. 28, Chapter IX).

Not only did this piece of legislation make for first and second-class Commonwealth immigrants,(and guess who are the second-class!) but it monitored the agents of social control into treating one class of immigrants "more equal" than others.

This research project has sensitized the author to the implications of social control and race-relations. What has come to be known in Britain as "an immigrant problem" refers to anything the Blacks do which does not please the Whites. These "problems" have been used as convenient excuses to "over control" the immigrants and their communities.

Only the immigrants who are at the receiving end of social control machinery which is tailor-made for them, know the extent of the tensions suffered. If the truth be told, the Black communities of Britain get more than their fair share of vigilance, especially from the police. As one Black Opinion Leader put it: "The Black Community is constantly being watched; Blacks are constantly being annoyed. Since the visit of Stokeley Carmichael, there has been a highly organised system of oppression (a vast background which we never hear about) which find ways and means of controlling Black people, to stem any sign of militancy or organisation."[2]

For reasons like these, it is possible to postulate

that Black Nationalism is not a passing fad. It is
fed and propelled along by both increasing despair
and rising hopes; and until there is more general
realisation of the types of problems that Blacks
face, Black Nationalism and Black Power will be a new
social force in Britain.

On the understanding of the relations between
Blacks and Whites in Britain, the sociologist can
add new insight. He can carefully and systematically
delineate the basic parameters of the contexts in
which behaviour transpires; and he can demonstrate
the relevance of patterns of minority group behaviour.
But the sociologist (even with his handbook of conflict
resolution) like the rest of us, might be blown up,
if the politicians miscalculate.

When all is said and done, when the truth be told,
it is the politicians and not the sociologists who
hold the trump cards on race-relations. It is the
politicians, as prestigious and powerful public
definers and attitude-senders who perpetuate racism
from one generation to another. Clearly, somebody
knows, but nobody tells.

Kids, Cops and Violence: It Can't Happen Here?

It follows from what was said in the last section,
that the greatest long-term danger in Black and White

relations in Britain rests on the current complacency
of decision-makers and policy-makers, not with the
immigrants. Very little has been done in recent
years to even question the existence of racism in
Britain, let alone change it.

Now, without appreciable change in White attiti-
tudes to Blacks, second-generation Blacks need not
entertain any great hopes of being accepted in British
society. They might in fact be in for a turbulent
future in Britain. What is more, for the second
generation Blacks the struggle for acceptance and
tolerance might be different in kind from that of
their parents. For they might very well re-assess
the entire situation differently, for a number of
reasons.

First, it is conceivable that any perception of
deprivation will be judged against a different index
than that used by the first generation Blacks. The
reference of the British born Blacks will most
certainly be White counterparts, with whom they went
to school, rather than, say, other islanders from
the West Indies. This means that the motivation to
rebel, in such cases, would be somewhat nearer to
Relative Deprivation than to Absolute Deprivation,
as was proposed above (see pp. 116-23). It was easier
for first generation Blacks to rationalise their

apparent "failure" in Britain, than it will be for
Blacks born in Britain.

Secondly, second generation Blacks will have had
a sharper understanding of British social structure.
Hence, any deprivation will be perceived against a
background of the real sources of "failure". In
other words, the British-born Blacks will probably
have a set of higher aspirations than their parents.
Aspirational Deprivation and goal-displacement, if
experienced among them, is likely to be more dramatic
and more amplified, because the legitimate expectations
will have been sharper. Blockage will therefore be
more sharply perceived, and the belief in blockage
will be a belief in structural blockage. As such,
structural solutions will almost certainly be sought.

Thirdly, British-born Blacks are poised, as it
were, to see a different angle to racism in Britain,
than their parents saw. The young Blacks have had
anticipatory socialisation in the politicising of
discontent, and they have been more or less "sharpened"
into minority group consciousness. It is therefore
probable that discontent and deprivation among them
will have a greater potential for being transformed
into collective behaviour, including violence.
Fusion between social being and consciousness will
come more and more to be based on praxis, i.e. on the

fact of struggle.

If, then, racial violence were to occur in
Britain in the coming decades, it would be sociologically
competent to depict it as the production, simultaneously,
of material and ideological confrontation, (between sub-
and super-ordinates) and the political translation
(via power-relations) into consciousness.

The potential for collective behaviour, of course,
(including violent behaviour) among Blacks in Britain
is not an autonomic thing. That potential is a function
of many factors, the most important ones, perhaps, being
the following:

First, the extent and intensity of shared discon-
tent among members of the Black community. Secondly,
the degree of politicization of discontent and depri-
vation among members of the Black community. Thirdly,
the degree of the dissemination of generalised beliefs
about actual deprivation and racism; and fourthly,
the behaviour of the agents of social control (cf. p. 130
above).

Precisely where the collective action is focused,
depends, futhermore, on which element of the overall
social system the discontent is blamed. In any case,
one thing is certain; we can rule out the probability
that British-born Blacks will adopt passive-like
solutions to racism. They are going to demand struct-

ural solutions, given the high probability that they will have perceived aspirational blockage in structural terms. And here, clearly, there is no comfort in the increasingly popular layman's argument that cockney-speaking Blacks or Brummie-speaking Blacks won't have things quite so difficult as their parents. As should be perfectly clear by now, linguistic conformity _per se_ will do nothing to enhance the acceptance of Blacks, so long as racist beliefs are still intact.

Finally, it must be said that Britain's agents of social control, notably the police, are fast going the American way in harassing Black movements to the point of driving them underground. In recent months, (1971-72) several incidents have occurred to confirm the Black community's suspicion that the police are fully determined to silence, in one way or another, the active and articulate members of the Black community.[3]

In these cases, Blacks are brought up to answer "law and order" charges, when in fact the underlying issues have to do with the political beliefs and conviction of the Black leaders. Those responsible for "law and order" have insisted (inspite of much evidence to the contrary) that Black people imagined many of the issues, for, it is claimed, British police have always behaved with impeccable propriety.

One Black Leader who himself charged (falsely) and

later acquitted (see note 3 of this chapter) summed
up some of the real problems neatly. He complained:

> We complained to the police about the police and
> nothing has been done; we complained to the
> council about the council and nothing has been
> done; we complained to the politicians about the
> politicians and nothing has been done; we have
> got to take the matter into our own hands.

This is really the crux of the matter. Until the
plight of Blacks in Britain is understood against
a background of White racist attitudes, Blacks will
be inclined to take several matters into their own
hands. But because the charges made by the Blacks
are denied, there is not much willingness to listen
to them; and it all seems curiously like fiddling
while Rome burns, or prepares to burn. In doing
research on Blacks in Britain, one cannot help but
be reminded of the Black American and his experiences
in that society. There, ghetto riots are symptoms
of the urgency and magnitudes of far deeper problems
that the riots themselves portray. In Britain, the
roots of the current unrest and tensions among Black
West Indians penetrate into the basic economic, poli-
tical, educational and social structure of the society;
the sooner this is recognised, the greater the chances
of averting probable unpleasant consequences of racial
discrimination in British society.

From Generation to Generation and Now

Finally, to argue that racism is a cultural heri-

tage of British society, is not to argue that it cannot
be eliminated or that its consequences cannot be mini-
mised. What must be recognised is that any measure or
measures which are not directed at the structural con-
figuration of the society will not necessarily influence
beliefs and values. Thus, in the area of race relations,
formal education might not strike at the roots of the
problem of racism if the institutional set-up perpetuates
a continuity based on the old stratificational complex,
differential power-relations, race and colour social
distancing and so on.

In Britain, the general tendency to deny that the
society has any prejudiced values need worrying about,
has helped to lessen critical thinking on this problem.
This stance also makes for easier transmission of the
racist ideas that do exist from one generation to
another. One Black Opinion Leader put the matter this
way:

> The Institute of Race Relations' Colour and
> Citizenship conveys the impression that there
> was not much prejudice to worry about in this
> society. When you then examine the fact that
> prior to that you had the P. E. P. Report
> which clearly established that there was a large
> amount of racial discrimination in Britain, you
> ask yourself the question of how they could
> come down with this finding...
> For the very reason I suggest, that the P. E. P.
> Report clearly showed that there was a substan-
> tial amount of racial discrimination; indeed
> far more so than the so-called sensitive over-
> active black people were complaining about.
> The conclusion was misleading, and meant to
> lead people into concluding that the outlook
> for the society was on the whole a happy one.

This statement clearly highlights the concern which
Blacks entertain about the way the indigenous popu-
lation neatly normalises the values of the society and
sets about absolutizing their moral claims to goodness
and tolerance.   In reality, the empirical facts and
findings negate the claims to tolerance, justice or
goodwill toward Blacks.

In the face of these contradictions, Black West
Indians in Britain come more and more to utilize
strategies and tactics which can create a partially
secure psychological base from which to confront the
White society. These strategies necessarily operate
on a dissident plane, their chief aim being the har-
nessing of group identification and the positive evalu-
ation of Blackness as a symbol of respect and dignity -
not one of shame or devalued status. Blacks in Britain
now see the way to social change having much to do with
their development of social consciousness. For, as a
Black Power spokesman pointed out to a group of young
Blacks:

> We are a people with a high political sensitivity
> and creativity. We have a high level of under-
> standing of capitalism. We have experienced
> racialism for 400 years and we are not going to
> allow it to re-emerge again. Racism has torn
> our personalities apart;' it has dehumanised us.
> But the youth are saying that they will not in-
> herit the order that their parents had. Thus
> the capitalists have created a new class and a
> new social grouping that is potentially as danger-
> ous as the working class. We are talking about
> the mobilization of Black people; we must begin

to capitalize on consciousness of that certain
group of young people who get together and talk
about Black Power.

Just what the exact outcome of a new Black consciousness

confronting a rigid belief system in Britain will be,

is difficult to predict on present data. But it should

be clear that any sociological explanation and/or pre-

diction of such outcomes must be rooted in a causal

model of social behaviour. Such explanations cannot

rely on the psycho-dynamic pressures on individuals as

such. For although such theories may have some degree

of plausibility within limited contexts, they invariably

fall short of social explanations, and so more often

than not, underplay the implications for system change.

Besides, psycho-dynamic theories soft-pedals the macro

principles of society in order to show that individual

actors are "deviant". At that level, in order to find

out what events are likely to emanate from a certain

structure, we would have to psychoanalyse everybody

in the society.[3] Men are enmeshed in societal processes,

and far more important than mere psychologism is the

dialectics of (in our case) social-ethnic ideas:

those that the colonial immigrant has of the British;

and those that the British have of the colonial immi-

grant. Both sides, obviously, might have stereotypic

ideas of each other; but in the final analysis those

held by the minority are not the real motive force of

the interaction situation, because the minority group
does not have the power to make reality out of its
(perhaps stereotypic) beliefs. The logic of power
relations is the kernel of minority group relations.

In short, then, the understanding of how ideas
about men in society are transmitted from one genera-
tion to the next is bound up with the very understanding
of why men live in society. Racism, our main concern
here, is a system of social relations which feeds, as
it were, on symbolic behaviour while giving out symbolic
responses to part of the social environment- a Black
social group. It is in the complexity of the symbolic
universe that Black people in Britain have learned,
through experience, to understand the subtleties of
certain types of "race" relations. Commenting on the
1971 Immigration Bill while it was on its way through
the British Parliament early in 1971, one Black discuss-
ant pointed out how the odds were against the Blacks in
Britain:

> The Bill is there to make us second class
> citizens. The society make you a racist,
> because the very ethos of the society is
> permeated by racism; it practises racism.
> We are in a racist society, and therefore I
> think to a large extent the white youth don't
> even understand their racist situation, because
> they started from the basic assumption of white
> supremacy, which is not understandable to them.

Continuing, he pointed out that the Blacks in Britain
were tense, and were generally feeling insecured on

account of the Bill's provisions for "voluntary"

repatriation of Blacks:

> ... Repatriation is already here. They are
> sending home Black people right how. Black
> people all over the world must realise that
> they have absolutely no choice but to fight.
> We are not going to play Jews; we're going
> to fight to the death; we can't afford to
> die like Jews...
> When Black people just talk about Black Power,
> everybody hit the roof - you know; they have
> hiccup. They don't see anything yet, but they
> have hiccups. But Whites are afraid that Black
> people will have power.

Where intolerance is seen to come from the official

legitimizers (e.g. the politicians) these legitimizers

also play the role of setting up cultural assumptions

and cultural definitions, plus the fact that they

possess the power to make the definitions effective.

Here, of course, it is instructive to note the

analytic distinction which needs to be made between

cultural intolerance and racism. Oliver Cox seems to

have grasped the importance of the distinction; hence

he writes that:

> Anti-Semitism, to begin with, is clearly a form of
> social intolerance, which attitude may be defined
> as an unwillingness on the part of the dominant
> group to tolerate the beliefs or practices of a
> subordinate group because it considers these
> beliefs and practices to be either inimical to
> group solidarity or a threat to the continuity
> of the status quo. Race prejudice, on the other
> hand, (racism) is a social attitude propagated
> among the public by an exploiting class for the
> purpose of stigmatizing some group as inferior so
> that the exploitation of either the group itself
> or its resources or both may be justified...Race

prejudice is the socio-attitudinal facilitation
of a particular type of labour exploitation.[5]

No one can now doubt that White attitudes to Blacks in
Britain are derived from the British cultural tradition
of defining Blacks as inferior while they were simult-
aneously being dehumanized in a process of economic
exploitation. But for the social scientist or the
student of society, the more crucial question is why
the basic set of ideas have lived, under their own
steam as it were, and have formed part and parcel of
contemporary on-going processes in modern society.

The complex reasons have to do with socialization
principles, and the general thesis of self-fulfilling
prophecy is of sociological importance here (cf. pp.22,
104, and 233 above). Start out on the assumption or
premise that Blacks are inferior; use this as the
reason for stigmatizing and treating them as second-
class citizens - assigning them to poor neighbourhoods,
poor jobs, poor schools and poor opportunities - and a
process of self-sustaining ideas is made to 'come true'.
The premises create the very qualities expected.[6]

The problem of racism, then, is part of the problem
of cultural socialisation. It is at the level of social-
isation that social scients will have to focus attention
in their plans for a change in attitudes; for it is at
this level that social stereotyping and social distance

criteria are applied to minority groups. But the criteria also become symbolic responses rooted in social-structural and social-psychological life. We will not say, like some well known psychologists, that racism is inborn. Rather, it must be recognised as a response learned and internalised in the process of social living. Now that Blacks are in Britain to stay, it is the task of students of society to recast and re-evaluate the conceptions of socialisation which, in Black and White confrontation, make for conflict and tension rather than for stability and peaceful coexistence. Surely, it is not possible to eliminate conflict from social life, but at the same time, if the conflict is to be tolerable, it might be well to bring into question the contents of socialization about Black and Black people,[7] and it is unquestionably one of the tasks of the sociologist to spell out not only why an action has taken place, but also why certain patterns of behaviour go on, from generation to generation to now, and beyond.[8]

CHAPTEX XII

CONCLUSION: THE WEST INDIAN DILEMMA 1972

> -- Man's inhumanity to man
> Makes countless thousands mourn
>
> -- Robert Burns

This conclusion is not a substitute for reading the text; it is not a summation of "findings" to be read in isolation from the important and complex theoretical and historical factors which from the gut of the thesis. Having said that, on to the brief epilogue.

The central dilemma of the West Indian immigrant in Britain is the dilemma of his social rejection by British society. The rejection is rooted in White racism, which in turn is rooted in the social-structural level of human thought and action, and in particular (rejection) is rooted in racist assumptions about Black people generally. To grasp the dynamics of the societal processes at work in this context, it was recognised that empirical social theory (as opposed to normative social theory) was of first importance; and that it was imperative to utilize sociological theory to explain how men in society do act, not to explain how they should act.

In attempting to formulate the basic ingredients

of social action into some sort of explanatory schema,
different theoretical concepts or "tentacles" have
had to be arrested and brought into focus within a
substantive historical perspective. Needless to say,
elements of sociology, history and philosophy became
interlaced in a way which pointed to a macrosociologi-
cal orientation rather than to the narrow historicity
of human life. It was suggested that certain social-
relational and social-structural variables are absolu-
tely indispensable in any sociological understanding
of the life - processes of Blacks in Britain (their
"life-styles", values, beliefs and weltanschauung).
Some of the major concepts for any such understanding
are: the values, rationale and historicity of the
British stratification system; White racism; power-
relations; the definition of the situation and cult-
ural socialization of the British and Blacks; status
situation; deprivation (relative and absolute) as
well as the historical facts of racial slavery and
colonialism. All these varied aspects of a Black and
White relationship in Britain were sketched to throw
light on the central fact of social rejection. It is
now a well established and incontestable fact that in
one way or another the fine and intricate interplay
of these elements of social structure have shaped the
form and outcome of Black and White social relation-
ship. Thus, for example, racism plays a not insignif-
icant role in evaluating whether Blacks can "fit into"

or be "accommodated" within the boundaries of the British stratification system. We have argued that, by definition, (of the White society) the Black colonial can at best be lower-class working-class in British society, if he is to be reckoned within the conventional system at all. And the reasons are not hard to find.

Racial slavery and the cultural dispossession of Blacks is the seedbed of White racism in the Western world, and Britain, historically, was the dean of this system. Among other things, it required that Blacks were placed in a category designated as "the lower races", and Blacks had to been seen to be inferior, through no fault of their own (it was claimed) but through an "accident of history". Crucially, the accident has never been repaired, for what were transmitted out of the slave experience on Britain's behalf were ideational structures and value systems (transmitted and intellectualized) which insisted on the inferiority of Black people. So there are good historical reasons why Blacks in Britain face social rejection, and we have tried to formulate the conditions which appear to have favoured the values and assumptions which lead to such a rejection. There is no mystique in that. The history which has forged the Black West Indian's link to Britain was not a history which was predisposed to accept Black people as equals; and

this is absolutely important to grasp, for one of the
most disturbing elements in the study of race in Brit-
ain is the large amount of time and energy spent denying
the fact of racism. Throughout, we have used the con-
cept of racism as a key independent variable. It is to
be clearly distinguished from ethnocentricism.
Ethnocentricism does not necessarily imply racism;
most people (i.e. nations) have manifested elements
of ethnocentricism, but relatively few have had long
and dominating psycho-social control over others - the
very seedbed for racism. (See chapter IV for defini-
tion, historical locus and explication of racism).

To put all of the last paragraph,then, in a nut-
shell: to deny White racism is to deny history; and
to deny history is to deny sociology. And to deny
sociology is tantamount to eulogizing the absolute
goodness of man, which is simply ridiculous. Otherwise
the Blacks would certainly not be in the Western world,
at least not on the same conditions as they now are.
Contrariwise, self-criticism by those who practice
sociology, and a greater willingness to admit the link-
age between the sociology of knowledge and racism,
could probably deepen understanding of much of human
motivation and action.

This thesis has not, and will not, put forward yet
more recipes for "social policy" concerning Blacks in
Britain. Instead it carries into its conclusion the

strong suggestion that current policies on race re-
lations in Britain tend to fail because they go ahead
without sufficient working knowledge, or interest, in
the dynamics of the social situation they are supposed
to influence. In a word, too many applied studies
have been conducted in the absence of theory or
theoretically-rooted understanding. The major
emphasis and implications of this thesis points,
rather, in another direction - to the direction of
theory-building and conceptualization. The importance
of this cannot be overstressed, in view of the fact
that for Blacks in Britain the situation is exactly as
it was for Afro-Americans when Gunnar Myrdal wrote in
1944 that "The Negro's entire life, and, consequently,
also his opinions on the Negro problem, are, in the
main, to be considered as secondary reactions to more
primary pressures from the side of the dominant white
society." (emphasis mine). What is required in this
area of sociology (in Britain at any rate) are struct-
ural analyses which can show how race and ethnicity
serve as "markers" of social groups for political coer-
cion and/or economic exploitation. No amount of form-
alistic sociology can grasp the problem of Blacks in
Britain without recourse to some theoretical under-
pinnings which seek to clarify the nature of society
and the set of values which make that society possible.
It is in the service of this conviction (and intellectual

goal) that this thesis developed along lines which are more or less conducive to the construction of a framework for description, explanation and prediction. The values which guided the research highlighted the very crucial link that exist between social inquiry and social theory,[1] while at the same time bringing home a certain amount of awareness as to how important experimental theorizing can be in the task of gaining sociological knowledge.

It is the experimental theorizing which highlights the crucial fact that the reason why the Blacks are rejected in Britain is not because they are "archetypal strangers" per se, nor indeed because the British suffer from something called xenophobia. Indeed, it can be strongly argued that the Black West Indian is very British in many ways which should normally negate his reputed "strangeness", as we have tried to show above. The rejection, rather, is premised on racist ideational structures which define and distance Blacks as slightly inferior, slightly subsocial, and in many cases to be pitied. Yet these same "explanations" of "strangeness", of xenophobia and of the "colour-conscious migrant" are used to structure the response of the White Society to the presence of Blacks. Emphasis on this sort of explanation means: it could happen to anyone.

But we have been at pains to show that Blacks in

Britain are many things besides a minority group with-
out power or status. Fundamentally, they are victims
of an historical past in which they could not have had
much to say; hence they have clearly not inherited
the "goodies" of the civilisation in which they have
been enmeshed for hundreds of years. Clearly,
sociologists must come to grips with the theoretical
complexities of this historical reality, so that the
reality of the Black Experience and of the West Indian
dilemma can shed its air of mysticism; so that the
"antics" of the Black, (and perhaps other minorities
as well) may come into focus.

It is because of the peculiar nature of these
experiences of the Black West Indian why there remains
the long-standing problem of Black identity. It is not
at all possible to speak of Blacks in the New world
(and this includes Blacks in Britain) without being
made aware of the complex identity problems which
Blacks must try to cope with. Most of what they do in
the different spheres of their life-complexes, involves,
first and foremost, the search for the essence of their
social being which they believe their past colonial
histories have either camouflaged or destroyed. It
is toward the aid of this search that the positive
stereotypes and attitudes toward Black history and
culture, held by West Indians, are directed. This

relatively new orientation among West Indians attest
to the burgeoning of racial pride which can only "make
sense" if related to, or is seen to relate to, other
societal forces. The social rejection of which we
spoke, for instance, generates withdrawal, encourages
defense or coping mechanisms, and place West Indians
generally in a marginal situation. The socio-structural
outcome of these processes must be understood by refer-
ence to some plural model of society, rather than to
some "consensus" or "integrationist" model. And it
must be understood that because Black people as a
group are rejected, any reference to deprivation must
mean status deprivation and privilege deprivation which
cannot be reckoned in crude economic terms.

The shared feeling and experience of rejection
among Blacks gives rise to Black Nationalism which is
not premised on land; that is, the question of a piece
of territory for Black is not a major concern. The
unending search for a meaningful context of existence
and for identity promotes Black Nationalism which is
essentially protest, or short term answers (clarity
maps) to the problem of being, as it were, structurally
out of gear. This Nationalism is identity-searching,
and the crux of it lies in group identification, in-
group solidarity and "we-consciousness" as group
processes necessary to face the inherited shattered
and confused social and cultural identity. In Britain,

this Nationalism is illustrated in the Black Power
movement as well as in the Black Church; these cultural
institutions of the Black immigrants mix to a certain
extent, but do not combine, with their analogues in the
wider society. Historians, who hithertofore have had
the main responsibility of theorising about Nationalism,
have tended to dismiss this type of Nationalism (and
anti-Colonial Nationalism generally) as "archaic forms
of xenophobic defence of the old order", and to re-
strict the concept to the "organized movements of
resistance led by Westernised middle class." Essentially,
of course, this stance is largely to be explained by the
fact that most historians have shown, anyway, tremendous
handicap in dealing analytically with Nationalism. Not
only have they been unable to cope with the difficulties
of conceptualisation, but their predisposition to refer
to Nationalism as a "state of mind" rather than a social
movement has tended to overlook the important social-
structural contexts in which Nationalism comes to life.
Clearly, if we are to understand a given Nationalism,
then the important thing to remember is the fact that
they are action groups, geared to the attainment of
certain existential objectives. The other factor is
less important: the fact that Nationalism in any one
context is frequently a contending system of philosophy
which could replace the dominant one in all its aspects
if conditions were conducive to do so.

Black Nationalism, then, must be understood as a
process geared to satisfy certain, rather basic, aspir-
ations of Black people. Among them, there is still the
urgent task to "dewhitenize" their social being, and to
de-colonize their psyche. Black Nationalism among
West Indian immigrants in Britain, in the form we have
chosen to define it, helps these tasks along. In
sociological terms; it is clear that a structural mode
of analysis gives a lot of mileage toward a fuller
understanding of Black immigrants in Britain, in all the
ramifications of their alienated existence. Perhaps too,
such a mode of analysis can offer numerous insights into
various aspects of minority group relations generally.
A structural approach, it seems, has much to offer in
our search for uniformities in the conduct and appraisal
of human affairs.[2]

Turning now to a different sphere of this conclusion
- to the methodological - cum - philosophical.

Methodologically, certain problems came to aware-
ness, as one set about analysing the factors and forces
that shape the lives of people - factors which are often
more latent than manifest. The features which seemed
especially crucial may be summed up as those having to
do with evaluative standards which one (a researcher,
say,) considers relevant to the articulation of general
problems of sociological work. The core of the problem

has three interrelated parts, having to do with (a) the nature of explanation; (b) the significance of theoretical concepts; and (c) the confirmation of hypotheses. In order to engage in any intellectual activity of a general nature, it seems important to parcel out these various core problems for the analytic treatment of sociological issues.

And three key issues seemed to have borne with special force on the intellectual task of the thesis. The first was the manner in which the various components of the general overall problem were delineated and interrelated. For this, specification of each key component was desirable (chapter 3 through 5: delineations; chapters 8 and 9: interrelation).

Secondly, there was the problem of justifying or vindicating particular analytic distinctions made in the analysis (e.g. that between maximal and minimal racism, or that between cultural and political aspects of Black protest). The insistence on these distinctions highlighted the fact that arbitrariness of analytic framework in any research, is relevant to assessing whether or not one has resolved the issues at stake and whether what questions one posed and answered were "significant".

Thirdly, there was the problem of evaluative criteria. In addressing the questions that came to

the fore, in this problem area of sociology, it was important not to beg the answers to fundamental questions that arose, as an easy way out. Here the use of the historical perspective greatly assisted in delineating the boundaries if certain types of social action, while keeping the temporal sequence of such action under close scrutiny in order to understand causality. A set of theoretical formulations was accepted over other competing ones, because the set accepted provided an analytic framework within which it was possible to say at least all that one wished to say, regarding the general issues under consideration. This seemed highly desirable, in view of the fact that when we come right down to brass tacks, we never actually _know_ anything in the social world, since all our theories are conjectures - of greater or lesser "plausibility". All social knowledge tends to be nothing more than an element of uncertainty, or, what is almost the same thing, commonsense writ large. In social research, we endeavour to make the element of uncertainty smaller and smaller. As Weber said, every interpretation strives to achieve utmost verifiability, but even the most verifiable interpretation cannot claim the character of being causally valid. It will remain only a particular plausible hypothesis.

The very nature of the social world makes it impossible to arrive at some "best" way of carrying

out sociological work. In this study the strategy of
"multiple triangulation", i.e. the use of multiple
theoretical perspectives and multiple sources of data
to gain as many insights as possible, and to probe the
subjective side of human conduct, seemed particularly
useful. Given the general theoretical orientation,
the strategy of triangulation facilitated the appreci-
ation of the distinctions between everyday conceptions
of reality and scientific conceptions of that reality.
The former was interpreted from the standpoint of
sociological theory; while the latter required imag-
inative ability as well as a sort of intellectual tol-
erance with the commonalities of "the everyday" for
their sociological appraisal. The two levels of this
conclusion to the thesis carry the implication that the
West Indian dilemma is also the sociologist dilemma,
and the sociologist is fully implicated, however much
he might think he is not. No amount of "trading in
definitions" or treading of the sociological tightrope
can obviate this, provided of course that the practising
sociologist takes his science seriously. Even though
there are, today, sociologists and sociologists, there
are also sociologists who still believe that one of
their major tasks is to explain the meaning of behaviour
in the context of meaning within which actual behaviour
transpires. Those of the latter category will readily
grasp how important it is to probe the why and wherefore

of any given social behaviour. Just what processes of social behaviour are necessary for an <u>adequate</u> understanding, in order to explain the phenomenon of Black Nationalism, remains the germane challenge of the sociologists of race. It remains a challenge because what Black West Indians experience in the everyday of associational life, and what other minorities experience in the welter of man-made institutions and norms, must be explained and "tamed" by the sociologist.

In doing these, the sociologist stands to gain; in the process, he might even bring men back into his arena of discourse and concern; he might, indeed, point a way to move from the more extreme practices of man's inhumanity to man.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1.

1. Statistics on Commonwealth Immigration to the
   United Kingdom are fraught with problems because
   of confusion as to who should be classified as
   immigrant. Even today the term includes people
   born in Britain "of immigrant parents".
   Even the Official Census, unfortunately, does not
   clarify problems of definition. The statistics
   cited here are computed from a number of Offical
   sources including Census material and Government
   Reports.

2. The sociological relevance of this paradox is, of
   course a complex business, tied up with the sociol-
   ogy of imperialism and colonialism. When West
   Indian society entered the years of the 1960s with
   its Independence fever, it was already super-exploited
   by British colonial practice; and had become what
   Lloyd George once called the "slums of the British
   Empire", and what Tom Driberg described as a tropical
   slum of matchless beauty (Hansard, 4 February 1949,
   Col. 2018)

   But super-exploitation of colonial countries has
   come to mean, in modern times, "Under-development"
    of those countries. In any case, West Indians
   took to Europe in hordes; they had known the ways
   of colonial social structure; they had assessed
   the prospects for the post-independence period and
   it is obvious that they did not hold out much hope
   for tangible changes.

   During the first decade of "independence" in the
   West Indies, to boot, (1962-1972 for Trinidad and
   Jamaica) "the Black ruling elite have taken over
   the task of bullying the masses; and because they
   know the masses much more intimately than the old
   colonial masters, they are quite able to tighten
   up all the psychological screws to hold the masses
   in control."   (Watson, British Journal of Sociology
   (forthcoming).

3. One must necessarily clearly distinguish between what
   is commonly called a "problem", and what we mean by
   a sociological problem. In this study, the over-
   riding problem is not racial discrimination as such,

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CHAPTER 1 (continued)

but racially tuned beliefs and racially defined stratification. The stratification which is examined here is much more than a complex of power relations, because the basic set-up is compounded by <u>ethnic stratification</u> in which it is easy to identify the targets of the racist definitions - Blacks.

Notes

CHAPTER 2

1. Kaplan, 1964, pp. 18, 23. (emphasis Kaplan's)

2. cf. Zelditch, 1962, pp. 566-576.

3. See Bruyn, 1966, pp. 15-16
    cf. Weick, 1968, pp. 360-362.

4. Riley, 1963, p. 996.

5. Participant observation, of course, is not a new
    approach in social research. It has conventionally
    been the hallmark of Anthropological field work,
    and was the method used by such Founding Fathers
    of Sociology as Bronislaw Malinowski. In Sociology,
    the method is well established, and many Sociologi-
    cal classics have been based on the use of this
    method, for example, W. F. Whyte's Street Corner
    Society, one of the first important sociological
    studies to emphasise the method. Social scientists
    have utilised the method in various social situa-
    tions: Robert and Helen Lynd, Howard S. Becker,
    Robert Redfield, Everett Hughes, Alvin Gouldner,
    Melville Dalton, among others, have used this method
    extensively and successfully.

6. Blumer, 1954, p. 9.

7. Until fairly recently, it was almost impossible to
    convince West Indians that it was not feasible to
    make a fortune in Britain (by hard work and thrift)
    after 10 to 15 years, pay off one's debts, and live
    "independently" thereafter.

    Much of the complex pattern of financial loaning
    and sponsorship that characterised the economics of
    West Indian migration to Britain in the 1950s and
    early 1960s was firmly based on this assumption.

8. The crucial problem that no observer can be every-
    where at the same time, is clearly important in
    studies of this sort. Although the answer to this
    problem is to have "informants" in the different
    settings, the fact is that in this study that was
    not so important.

    Lack of formalisation in the Black movement, and
    the similarity of focus of the different local groups,
    resulted in what amounted to a "rotation strategy".
    That is to say, at different venue up and down the
    country, the same theme, the same speakers or dis-
    cussants, and often the same audience met, on a rot-
    ating basis. In this way, one was able to keep up

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CHAPTER 2 (continued)

and in touch with the most important activities.

9. See the feature on the author's contribution: "The Black Man Has his Trafalgar Too," The Yorkshire Post, 18 March, 1971.

   With only about six hour's notice, the author accepted a request from members of the Black community in his local area to be a discussant in a B.B.C. Television feature on the immigrants' reaction to the impending 1971 Immigration Bill. Such a request was clearly made on the basis of the author's known understanding and appreciation of the subjective feelings of the immigrants – plus his ability to express them for and on behalf of the West Indians. (Social Behaviour as Exchange). The telecast was screened on Saturday 23 October, 1971.

10. See Weber, 1947, pp. 87ff.

11. See Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 96ff.

12. Schutz, 1962, p. 53. A crucial sociological-cum-philosophical problem with "reality", of course, is that in a purely verbal sense it is very easy to misdescribe one's experiences. Thus, even when one lives an experience, a purely verbal account of such an experience could possibly be misleading. Only in this sense does it seem legitimate to speak of "false consciousness". The importance of grasping "reality" involves the Weberian notion of understanding, the essentially subjective nature of providing clues to the observation and theoretical interpretation of the states of minds of individuals whose behaviour is being examined.

   "Understanding reality" implies therefore a subjective, yet objective probe of the why and wherefore of any given course of social behaviour.

13. This is not to suggest that the author dealt with some so-called "value-free" social situation, for it is a monumental illusion to suppose that there is, or can be, a "value-free sociology". That this author was sufficiently motivated to select this particular research problem from a host of others known to exist, is a value standpoint; and one which suggests that the author's sympathy was with the immigrant communities. This does not, in the least, render the research any less credible or significant. The essence of the standpoint comes close

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CHAPTER 2 (continued)

to the description which Marx and Engels gave of
social existence: "This method of approach is
not devoid of premises. It starts out from the
real premises and does not abandon them for a
moment. Its premises are men, not in any fan-
tastic isolation or abstract definition , but
in their actual, empirically perceptible process
of development under definite conditions."(Marx
and Engels, 1947, p. 15; see also ibid. p.7;
pp. 15-78; Cf. Myrdal, 1944, pp. 1027-1064;
Kaplan, 1964, pp. 370-410).
These "premises" can thus be verified in a purely
empirical way.

14. Many social scientists have made reference to the
fact that in the study of human behaviour, the
basic research orientation of the analyst will
tend to lead to one type of result rather than
another. No one is quibbling with this. The
major assumption here is that best there are only
two major perspectives open to the social analyst
(what Bruyn calls "polarities"). Analytic out-
comes, it is argued, are different because each
polarity starts out with different assumptions,
different unit of analysis, different philosophi-
cal foundations, and so on; with the result that
derivations from these different perspectives tend
to differ in terms of commitment and comprehensive-
ness.

For those analysts who direct their attention
to the analysis of scarce means in society, using
the individual in his group association as the
unit of analysis, the implications for the inter-
pretation of social structure are different from
those whose major analytic concern is with the
society as a whole as the unit of analysis. The
difference in the two schema does not lie in their
empirical observations, but in the assumptions that
inform the interpretation.

Thus, in this context, one could conceivably
conceptualise Black protest in Britain as
"dysfunctional" for the social system"; or one
could alternatively summarise the phenomenon as
"Instrumental" for Blacks in achieving minority
group goals, depending on whether one holds one
set of assumptions or the other about man in society.

For further discussion on this important problem,
see Bruyn, 1966, Chapter 2; Gamson, 1968, Chapter 1;
Schermerhorn, 1971, Chapter 1.

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CHAPTER 2 (continued)

15.   The riot of ideas always incubate in societal
        context - in social structure - in the matrix
        of men with material forces. Insofar as one
        aim of this thesis is to illustrate the way ideas
        as well as men are historically located, it can
        be taken as a contribution to the sociology of
        knowledge, which concerns the social and cultural
        location of ideas and men in society.
        See, Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 2-13, for
        further thoughts on this matter.

Notes

CHAPTER 3

1. Cf. Draper, 1969, p. 90.

2. Breitman, 1970, p. 55; Cf. also Draper, op. cit., chapters 4 and 5. Traditional conceptions of Nationalism have always been implied or embodied the notion of a territory as a vital precondition to "nationhood". Malcolm X's concise 1963 definition expresses this idea: "When you want a nation, that's called nationalism." (Quoted in Draper, op. cit., p. 90).

3. ibid. pp. 55-56 See also Malcolm X Speaks, 1965, p.212.

4. Breitman and Novack, 1968, p. 3.

5. Cf. Watson, British Journal of Sociology (forthcoming).

6. See James, 1963; Also Alexis, 1949.

7. Blake, 1969, pp. 15-25; Brotz, 1964, p. 101. In this connection, cf. also Lincoln, 1961: Bracey, et al., 1970; Boggs, 1970; Egbuna, 1971; Nettleford, 1970.

8. Egbuna, op. cit., p. 49.

9. Cf. Weber, 1948. See also Draper, op. cit., p.85; and Watson, op. cit.

10. Gooch, 1931, p. 217; Hayes, 1926, p. 29.

11. Kohn, 1958, pp. 2-20; also Kohn, 1955.

12. Cf. Kautsky, 1962, pp. 30-44.

13. See Smith, 1971, pp. 2, 65-85. Smith's discussion of Anti-colonialism missed many crucial points. Not only has his analysis failed to grasp the dovetailing of "capitalism", imperialism and colonialism, but he has grossly miscalculated the context of meaning in which the actual course of Nationalism (as human behaviour) occurs. He says that "if we must have a monocausal theory of nationalism, then science and its technological applications remain a more acceptable candidate than 'capitalism'" (p.80).

Notes.

CHAPTER 3 (continued)

As far as Blacks are concerned, this stance
amounts to straight-forward nonsense. It is
difficult to see how one can let "capitalism"
off the hook (as Smith seems to be suggesting).
Western capitalism, in all its crudest, pernicious
and dehumanizing aspects has been responsible
for the pillage of the Third World in ways that
sociologists are not too willing to admit. The
process of capitalism transformed Black human
beings into things, into "private property";
made certain countries "under-developed" and
others "developed"; and has given birth to
special types of Nationalism. To deny the
importance of Capitalism as a process as it
affected say, Black people in the West, and to
naively suggest that science and its technological
application is the cause of (anti-colonial)
nationalism, is to play the historical grasshopper
in a pitiable way. Cf. footnote 6, chapter 4 below.

14.   Wirth, 1936, pp. 723-737. It can be suggested that
       there are literally 'infinite' ways of typologizing
       Nationalism, and the impression one normally gets
       from the literature on the subject is that there are
       as many types of Nationalism as there are types of
       countries. Without careful and rigorous thinking,
       however, it is easy to see how typologies can lose
       their heuristic potential and become useless ends in
       themselves. For this research, the typology of
       Nationalism which has been suggested seems to offer
       an important "middle-range" device for linking man,
       history and social-structure.

15.   Watson, op. cit.

16.   See Smith, 1965. Also see Rubin, (ed.) 1960.

17.   cf. McIver, 1942.

18.   Sociology textbooks are noted for insisting that
       the benchmarks of "culture" are: that it is, or
       is capable of being learnt; that it is shared by
       people in any one collectivity or society; that
       it is transmitted, or transmittable, from one
       generation to another.

              Clearly, there are highly important implications
       bearing on these qualities. Thus, we cannot explain
       the patterns of human behaviour in terms of inherited
       "instincts" or "natural tendencies" but in terms of

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CHAPTER 3 (continued)

man-made devices and creativity. Men make gods
after their own image; and they <u>make culture</u>
after their own passions, desires and values.
If culture is to be sociologically meaningful,
one must include in its definition all that is
learnt by individuals as members of society.
It is much more than the arts and crafts of a
people; it is a way of life, a mode of thinking,
acting, feeling; and is a complex whole which
includes knowledge of conceptions of the desirable.
Because it involves language systems as well as
customs and beliefs, it is clearly <u>ideational</u>,
which makes it part of existential reality, not
simply a logical construct.

19. See Galtung, 1965.

20. Coser, 1956, p. 8.

21. Park and Burgess, 1921, pp. 504-784. Cf. also
Lieberson, 1961.

22. See Geschwender, 1968, pp. 127-135.

Notes

CHAPTER 4

1. See Benedict, 1940, pp.232-238. Cf. also Graeber,
    1953, pp. 268, 281; van den Berghe, 1967, p. 11.
    The emphasis of Graeber's approach to racism is
    on the nature of racist rationalisations; but he
    has also earmarked the important point that a phen-
    omenon such as "dislike of the Irish or Italian in
    the United States ... is not racial, for each group
    is heterogeneous in physical type...Anti-Semitism
    is not really a phenomenon of racial hostility."
    (p.268). Clearly, then, as Weber pointed out long
    ago, a science purporting to deal with the true
    meaning of behaviour, requires explanations which
    grasp the context of meaning within which the
    actual course of social action occurs (Cf. Cox,
    1948, Chap. 18).

2. Cox, 1948, pp. 334-393.

3. Williams, 1961, pp. 7-19. van den Berghe believes
    that racism cannot be accounted for purely as a con-
    sequence of slavery and colonialism. But he also
    concedes how, in looking for rationalisations of
    slavery, the "New Darwinism" stipulated that Negroes
    were slaves as a result of natural selection which
    had found the best place for them (p. 17). If van
    den Berghe cannot accept that, for Black people at
    any rate, racism arose out of slavery, then the onus
    is on him to locate the factors which engendered
    racism against Blacks in the Western world. He does
    not supply these factors. It can be argued of course
    that the connection between slavery and racism has
    always been a dialectical one, with one factor re-
    inforcing the other; but the overwhelming evidence
    for Black slavery in the Western world suggest that
    the dialetic was less complete in this instance than
    in other historical instances.

4. See Davis, 1966, especially part 1.

5. Montagu, 1945, pp. 19-20.

6. For sources of the historical roots of these values,
    See, among much else: Jenkins, 1935, pp. 18-19;
    Tannenbaum, 1947; Davis, op. cit., pp. 38-200; Elkins,
    1959; Sio, 1965. It should never be lost sight of
    that the slave was subject to disabilities in addit-
    ion to those connected with the legal categorization
    of him as economic property; and that these disa-
    bilities continued to define his status as a "freed-
    man". Caste law as well as slave law governed the
    status of Blacks in the slave-master relation, and

Notes

CHAPTER 4 (continued)

the crux of the matter came when (formally) the slave was legally no longer an object of property right. He then became, simply, legally and socially, a member of a lower caste, with his life chances held in narrow limits - in fact, if one can speak of life chances at all, they were like a multiplication of zeroes. The "reality" that slavery was by definition a caste system, was based on the doctrine of white superiority and the institutionalised inferiority of Blacks. And the basic conception of English law in relation to the slave was not only that he was an inferior kind of animal, but that he was also a special kind of property. See Sio, op. cit.

7. Little, 1968, p. 247. In a recent experience in a British city, this author encountered the situation where White social workers, on having to describe a Black senior psychiatric matron on an official memorandum, wrote that the Black matron had acquired "superior working class standards". This is illuminating. For it brings out the critical fact that all Blacks are by definition either lower-class working class in terms of British society, or simply form an under-class below and outside the confines of conventional British society. The reasons why, are to be found in racism, and inspite of Blacks acquiring the paraphernalia of British middle classness - including prolonged formal training and higher education - in the way the British see the world, Blacks will forever be, at best, Blacks with superior working class standards!

8. Cf. P. E. P. Report, 1967; and for work depicting the actual life conditions of Blacks in Britain and their manifold relations to the larger British society, see inter alia: Rex and Moore, 1967; Hepple, 1968; Wright, 1968; McPherson and Gaitskell, 1969.

9. Myrdal, 1944, p. xlvii. The lasting merit of Myrdal's work is its emphasis on structural analysis for understanding and dissecting of "the doctrines and ideologies, valuations and beliefs, embedded in the minds of Americans." Similarly, in Britain, a structural approach to race (such as is suggested by this thesis) is bound to shed much light on the varied concepts and mechanisms which must be a part of any adequate sociological approach to the problem.

10. Jordan, 1968.

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CHAPTER 4 (continued)

11. The author gratefully acknowledges on the insights suggested here by Dr. James Walvin of the History Department at York. Many of the points raised in the remainder of this section are dealt with in Walvin's forthcoming book: <u>Black and White: The Negro in English Society, 1555-1945</u>. This author had the privilege of consulting this work in manuscript form.

12. See Jordan, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>.

13. Cf. some of the recent stuff written by British psychologists. See the recent rendition by Eysenck, 1971.

14. Cf. Schemerhorn, 1970, p. 73; Also see Davis, <u>op</u>. <u>cit</u>., chp. 9.

15. Jordan, 1968; Cf. Golightly, 1947, p. 132.

16. Cf. Jordan, 1968, p. 56. Jordan notes that Englishmen did not enslave one another, even though they did possess a concept of slavery, "formed by the clustering of several rough but not illogical equations." Thus, for instance:
"In 1547, shortly after the death of Henry VIII, a parliamentary statute provided that any able-bodied person adjudged a vagabond upon presentment to two justices of the peace should be branded with a "V" on his chest and made a "slave" for two years to the presenter who was urged to give "the saide Slave breade and water or small dryncke and such refuse of meate as he shall thincke mete (and) cause the said Slave to worke by beating cheyninge or otherwise in such worke and Labor how vyle so ever it be." Furthermore, of course, Masters could "putt a rynge of Iron about his Necke Arme or his legge for a more knowledge and suretie of the keepinge of him". A runaway "slave" convicted by a court was to be branded on the cheek or forehead and adjudge "to be the saide Masters Slave for ever." (<u>The Statutes of the Realm</u>, 11 vols. (London, 1810-28), 1 Edw. VI, c.3; 3 and 4 Edw. VI. c. 16, cited in Jordan, <u>ibid</u>.).

In the search for more convenient targets on whom Englishmen could apply the above principles, it can hardly be said that it was an "accident" that in 1555, the Englishman John Lok became the first English Trader to bring a group of African slaves to England; and that a few years later in

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CHAPTER 4 (continued)

1562-1563, Master John Hawkins, later to become the most daring English slave trader, "got into his possession, partly by the sworde, and partly by other meanes, to the number of 300. Negros at the least, besides other merchandises which that country (Africa) yeeldeth." The Englishman had found, as it were, his perfect answer to slavery, bondage and super-ordination, far more easily than expected. For Hawkins, nothing seemed problematic. "With his praye hee sayled over the Ocean sea", and slavery became inseparable from the evil in men. As Jordan puts it: "Enslavement was captivity, the loser's lot in a contest of power. Slaves were infidels or heathens. On every count, Negroes qualified."

Given the complex background of Black slavery, it can hardly surprise anyone that in Britain, Blacks face the greatest degree of social rejection, over and above all other minority groups. (See Rose, et al., 1969, pp. 570, 601.)

Notes.

CHAPTER 5.

1. Rex, 1970b, especially chapters 4, 6.

2. Lasswell and Kaplan, 1950; Also see Gamson, 1968, p. 12.

3. We need not go into discussion on this vastly complex concept; but see Parsons, 1963. Here Parons conceives of power as a "circulating medium" within what he calls the political system. He also agrees that power is a zero-sum phenomenon, in the sense that one party to a power contest always gains at the expense of the other party or parties; he adds, of course, that this condition holds only under some, and not all circumstances.

4. Bierstedt, 1948, pp. 700-710.

5. Marx and Engels, 1947, p. 39 (emphasis added). Granted, this was brilliant insight,and it showed Marx's tremendous insistence to conceive of society as a whole, with men in their multiple inter-actions, not as isolated "crippled monstrosity". It was from this perspective that Marx came to develop a theory of how society (any society) functions; and how it was likely to change. In this way he sought his explanation in a rudimentary sociological sketch in order to account for the hitherto apparently incomprehensible phenomena of religion, class division, state, and we might now add, race; and to grasp them in their historical and social-relational character and perspective. The great merit of the Marxian world-view, clearly, is that it is rooted in an awareness of cultural-ideational systems, and in __structural__ understanding.

6. Rex, 1970b, p. 148 (emphasis added). One of the most mortiferous aspects of racial discrimination, from the point of view of the recipient of the racially-motivated action, is the fact that in any given situation there seems to be an infinite number of rationalisations at the disposal of the discriminator. These "derivations", as Pareto called them, vary in degree in any race relations situation from those applied by state machinery(as in South Africa and Rhodesia) to those used by an individual actor in a narrow dyadic interaction situation.

7. Gurr, 1970, pp. 21, 24.

8. See Blumer, 1946; and cf. Toch, 1965; Cameron, 1967.

Notes.

CHAPTER 5 (continued)

9. Smelser, 1962, pp. 96-120.

10. Cf. Killian, 1964, p. 440. Some sociologists, it
    seems, always assume that where there is a movement,
    there is a leader, for as two writers put it: "unless
    we are able to distinguish between the core group and
    a larger mass of supporters not formally joined, we
    are not dealing with a social movement." (Kurt Lang
    and Gladys Lang, Collective Dynamics, New York:
    Crowell, 1961, p. 497). But clearly, a social
    movement need not dramatise leadership, if for
    instance, the central concern turns out to be with
    norms and cultural values rather than with power.
    There is no a priori reason why a Black social move-
    ment operating in a white world should pass through
    the sociologists' neat little "phases" or "stages"
    whether organizationally or in terms of leadership
    styles. Indeed, given the present highly-charged
    atmosphere of Black and White relations at community
    level, and given the now-familiar situation where
    every type of social activity engaged in by Blacks
    is carefully scrutinized (or over-scrutinized) by
    the agent of social control, it is perhaps expedient
    that the groups do not maintain fixed addresses.
    This pattern has certainly evolved among West Indians
    in Britain in recent years, and it is this "rotating
    strategy" which makes generalisation about formal
    leadership problematic.

Notes

CHAPTER 6

1. cited in Blake, 1969, p. 16 (emphasis in original)

2. Breitman, 1970, p. 56n.

3. Myrdal, 1944, p. 11 (p. lxxv in the 1962 Anniversary edition).

4. Allen, 1970, p. 75. Part of the process of "knock-ing" the Blacks in contemporary Western society is that of confounding revolutionary Black protest with passive acceptance of the status quo. To give one perfectly familiar example:
    The now-famous Negro Spiritual:

    > Steal away, steal away,
    > Steal away home to Jesus;
    > Steal away, steal away,
    > I 'aint got long to stay here...

    was meant to be a positively revolutionary cry. For, the "Negroes" chanting this on the plantation in Georgia or Jamaica were not thinking of a Jesus "up in heaven". There is no reason why they should have, for most of the African slaves landed in the New World were Muslims, animists, etc., not Christians; therefore the concept of the transcendental Jesus was quite alien to them. The more accurate meaning involved in the Negro Spiritual is this: The name of the slave ship which brought thousands of Blacks to the New World was called the Good Ship Jesus. Their song was a revolutionary cry to get hold of this ship (perhaps felling the slave master if he got in their way), and to steal way in it back to Africa. But by substituting in for to in the modern rendition of this Spiritual, a revolutionary song has been shorn of its deeper meaning, and rendered a passive, defeatist and quasi-religious, even resigned "Negro rhythm". There is a world of difference between stealing away in and stealing away to!

5. Patterson, 1967, chapter 9.

6. ibid. Also cf. Aptheker, 1943.

7. Patterson, op. cit., pp. 273-283. Cf. Williams,1961, pp. 194-208; idem., 1970, pp. 193-200, 321-327.

8. Patterson, op. cit. 9a. James, 1938b, P.311.

9. cited in ibid. p. 270.

Notes.

CHAPTER 6. (continued).

10. Cf. Despres, 1969, p. 22.

11. See Blanshard, 1947.

12. Williams, 1970, p. 345.

13. ibid., pp.400-402. Also see Semmel, 1962. Williams
     writes that in England the governor had on his side
     men such as Thomas Carlyle, Lord Tennyson, Charles
     Kingsley, Dickens, Ruskin among the writers and
     Tyndall, Murchison and Hooker among the scientists.
     Opposing the actions of the governor were John Stuart
     Mill, Dicey, T. H. Green, Thomas Hughes, Darwin,
     Huxley, Spencer, John Bright, Edward Foster and
     Edward Beales.

14. Watson, 1970, p. 61.

15. ibid., pp. 55-63. Even in the 1970s, Garvey remains
     one of the most successful, if not the most success-
     ful, Black Nationalist to have operated in the New
     World. C. L. R. James refers to him as "the only
     Negro who has succeeded in building a mass movement
     among American Negroes," while some social scientists
     have summarily dismissed Garvey's period of operation
     in the West Indies as tragic escapism and social
     withdrawal; but to do so is to really miss the
     long term significance of Garveyism. True, one of
     Garvey's main concerns was that all right-minded
     Blacks should seek to return to Africa, but this
     should not be taken at face value, since his crucial
     nationalist objective was the redemption of "Africa
     for the Africans; those at home and those abroad."
     Garvey's aspirations and ideals must be interpreted
     and evaluated in terms of his openly challenging the
     ruling racial values of his time. This stance more
     than anything else in his career has ensured that
     his name is revered wherever contemporary Black Power
     militants operate. And the ideological pillars which
     he contributed, and which were later to be acclaimed
     by Black Nationalists throughout the Black Third
     World, were racial self-respect on the one hand,
     and organised politicization of the Black masses
     on the other. Both these contributions are liber-
     ating forces for Blacks, and these clearly counter-
     vail the theoretical weaknesses which his programme
     as a whole had.

16. See Blanshard, op. cit., pp. 21-27. Also see James,
     1938a, pp. 72-85.

Notes

CHAPTER 6 (continued)

17. Williams, 1970, pp. 473-474.

18. On the historical bases of the political parties
     in Jamaica, see Phelps, 1960; Bradley, 1960.

19. Fanon, 1963, pp. 136, 141-142.

Notes.

CHAPTER 7.

1. For an informative study of the rise of Black
    Nationalism in Trinidad, see Oxaal, 1968.

2. Useful background material on the development of
    Nationalism in Guyana can be found in Despres,
    1967; and in Chan, 1970.

3. See Despres, 1969, p. 25.

4. C. O. 111-309 Woodhouse's Dispatches, no.16,
    February 24, 1856, (London).

5. Despres, 1967, pp. 4-5. cf. Blanshard, 1947, p. 26.

6. See the Report of the British Guiana Constitution
    Commission, Sir James Robertson, Chairman, (London:
    Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Cmnd. 9274, 1954).

7. cited in Lewis, 1968, p. 274.
    On the development of Guyana's political scene
    since the 1960s, see: Reno, 1964; Halperin, 1964;
    Wallace, 1964.
    Also see Report of a Commision of Enquiry into
    Disturbances in British Guiana in February 1962,
    (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, Col. no.
    354, 1962).

8. Despres, 1967, p. 9.

9. Blanshard, op. cit., p. 151

10. ibid., pp. 25-26.

11. See Sires, 1957 for sketches of governmental pract-
    ices in the West Indies in colonial times.

12. See Williams, 1964, pp. 331-340. cf. James, Party
    Politics...

13. cf. Proctor, 1956.

14. Bell, 1965, 1967.

15. Moskos, 1967.

16. Moskos and Bell, 1964, pp. 16-18 (emphasis added)

17. Mau, 1968. See also Bell, 1967.

18. cf. Oxaal, op. cit. Oxaal nowhere defined Nationalism,
    so we cannot be sure what he meant by "Creole Nation-
    alism."

CHAPTER 7.   (continued)

19.   cf. Lincoln, 1961, p. 34.

20.   See Davies, 1962. In a crucial sociological sense
       (Durkheimian) it is necessary to designate the
       rebellions as _anomic_, in the sense of the peasants
       being faced with conditions in which they had to
       suddenly reorientate their circumstances, including
       expectations, and future hope for a better life.

21.   _ibid_.

22.   See Rose, 1967, p. 18.

23.   Egbuna, 1970, pp. 140-141.

24.   See Kiev, 1964a; 1964b; Cf. Hemsi, 1967.

25.   The _Economist_ Editorial, 21 August, 1965, p. 674.

26.   _Afro-Saxon_ indeed! Sample, for instance the
       socialization implication of the following poem
       being internalized by Primary school children of
       this author's generation in Jamaica:

>   Children of the Empire, we are brothers all
>   Children of the Empire answer to your call
>   Let your voices mingle, lift your heads and
>   sing
>   God save Dear Old Britain, and God save
>   Britain's King.
>
>   Children of the Empire, clasp hands across
>   the Main
>   And glory in your Brotherhood again and yet again
>   Uphold your noble heritage, O never let it fall!
>   And love the land that bore you, but the Empire
>   best of all.

       This illustrates the type of indoctrination which
       West Indian children, as colonials, received, only
       to arrive in Britain to find that it was not meant
       to be taken seriously, and, worse, could not be
       applied to Blacks. With their "heritage" neatly
       obliterated, and Dear Old Britain not the least bit
       concerned, what were West Indians to make of their
       presence in a milieu which denied any Brotherhood?
       Certainly not to accept it and sing praises to the
       Queen. What gripes West Indians in Britain so much
       is that most of what they were taught under colonial
       conditions they actually _believed_. Now, part of their
       protest directly involves a process of _unlearning_ much
       of their colonial "education".

Notes.

CHAPTER 8

1. See Harris, 1968, p. 5; Lichtheim, 1967, pp.21-22.
   cf. Mannheim, 1936; Geertz, 1964; Johnson 1968.

2. On the criteria for establishing causality, see
   Selltiz, et al. 1960, chapter 4.

3. cf. Harris, op. cit. p. 53.

4. In this connection, see Plamenatz, 1970, 23, 30.
   Plamenatz shows acute misunderstanding of the subtler
   aspects of beliefs: "the beliefs of primitive people
   described by social anthropologists is uninfluenced
   by theory... Illiterate groups are incapable of con-
   structing theories."
        Plamenatz fails to see that when the thought-
   process of so-called "primitive" peoples are logically
   untwined (cf. Durkheim's "primitive" religionists)
   primitive man comes close to being proto-philosopher.

5. cf. Ogles, 1961, p. 54.

6. Michael X, Daily Telegraph Magazine, 23 May 1969
   (Brother Sawh referred to was another Black leader
   in London).

7. "Black Power in Britain: A Special Statement,"
   issued by the Universal Coloured People's Association,
   (London, n.d.) pp. 5, 10.

8. A Black Power speaker in Leeds, 21 March, 1971.

9. A Black Power Leader in London, 20 May, 1971.

10. cf. Boggs, 1970, p. 60.

11. David Ennals, The Times (London) 3 November 1967

12. See The Times (London) and the Daily Telegraph
    (London) 10 -24 August, 1967.

13. Johnson, 1964, pp. 12-13.

14. See The Times News Team, 1968, pp. 140-174.
    cf. The Times (London) 3 April, 1969

15. See Egbuna, 1970, pp. 19-20 for a detailed account
    of the problems involved. As he put it: "Our
    first shock was to discover that we were too much
    of a mixed bag to constitute one political move-
    ment. Within that one single organisation there
    were members who believed that the answer to the

CHAPTER 8 (continued)

> Black man's problems lay in the overthrow of the
> capitalist system.. while some wanted us to be-
> come an underground movement and fight for what
> we want "by any means necessary', others thought
> this was too extreme, and preferred to see us as
> a Left-wing non-violent organisation...
>
> ... It became all too clear that what we had was
> not one movement, but movements within a movement.
> We did not all belong to one organisation."

16. ibid., p. 21.

17. ibid., pp. 22-23.

18. In London, in the Spring of 1971, a Black political
     candidate was nominated to stand as a councillor in
     the Borough of Hackney. The Black Voice, one of
     the most radical and influential Black newspapers
     responded in a not atypical fashion:

> "Why is he getting involved in such an organ-
> isation? Perhaps he is himself inspiring to be a
> rotten cog in the system. If we vote for him, we
> will strengthen the hands of the racists. We must
> therefore stay away from the polls."

19. See Heineman, 1967 especially pp. 53 ff.

20. cf. Buckman, 1970.

21. Yet, if Black Power is to mean action, and if the
     movement is to truly politicize the Black masses
     in Britain whom it claims to represent, it is
     clear that adjustments will have to be made to
     link Black political theory with political practice.
     In Britain, there is currently only a weak theo-
     retical core in the movement; There is a series
     of ad hoc (and short term) "demands" or "what we
     want" manifestos which are supposed to tell the
     world what the problems of Black people are. "Black
     nationalism is and has been progressive because
     it has bound Black people together and given them
     strength, but... black people will have to go beyond
     the stage of black nationalism into the stage of
     black revolutionary nationalism if they are going
     to resolve the real problems of black people...
     Black nationalism has created a united black con-
     sciousness (in the United States), but a black
     consciousness which does not develop into a real
     and realistic attack on the causes of black

Notes

CHAPTER 8 (Continued)

oppression can only become a false consciousness."
(Boggs, 1970, p. 172).

It seems pertinent to suggest that, in Britain,
in the period up to 1972, the ideological labour
of Black Power is spent on the cultivation of uni-
fication and consciousness at the level of community
group associations.

Notes

CHAPTER 9

1. The crux of racism is not the manifestation of
    prejudice <u>per se</u>, but the generating and sustain-
    ing of structures which spring from the assumptions
    we make about the world, ourselves and others,
    from the patterns of our social activities.

    It is therefore misleading to call the Ras-
    Tafarians of Jamaica "Black racists" (as Moskos
    has done). Ras-Tafarians do   openly denounce
    the White in Jamaica as "inferior", but their
    ideas are at the level of folk culture, not at
    the level of social institutions and culture of
    Jamaican society. Theirs is a spontaneous ejacu-
    lation to counteract their indoctrination of Black
    inferiority.

2. Rex, 1970a, p. 39.

3. See Patterson, 1963, cf. Banton, 1955; Little, 1947.

4. Schermerhorn, 1970, chapter 2.

5. cf. Desai, 1963, p. 145; Jackson, 1963, p. 161;
    Krausz, 1963, 135-161.

    Krausz's view is that Jews in Leeds were not
    being structurally absorbed into the wider society,
    although they were giving up a good deal of their
    cultural distinctiveness, and adopting to external
    cultural aspects of the wider (British) society.

6. See Lowenthal, 1967.

7. Banton, 1967.

8. <u>ibid.</u>, pp. 368-393.

9. <u>ibid.</u>

10. Patterson, 1963, pp. 6-7 cf.Patterson, 1969,p.150.

11. G.Llewellyn Watson, in <u>The Observer</u> (London) 12
    December, 1971. cf. Rex and Moore, 1967, chapter 1;
    Rex, 1970a, p. 45.

12. Little, 1947.

13. Patterson, 1963.

14. See the P. E. P., 1967.

15. Patterson, 1969.

Notes

CHAPTER 9 (continued)

16.   Wright, 1968. cf.Hepple, 1970; McPherson and
        Gaitskell, 1969.

17.   P. E. P., 1967. The disturbing aspect of this
        Report's findings is that as immigrants acquire
        higher expectations and high qualifications, so
        they experience more personal and direct discrim-
        ination. (ibid. pp. 32-33),

18.   The Milner-Holland Report, 1965.

19.   P.E.P., 1967; Burney, 1967; cf. Rex and Moore,
        1967; Jowell, 1970: Radin, 1966; Leach, 1967.

20.   cf. the P. E. P. Report, 1967. In this classic
        study of racial discrimination in England the
        level of the racist rationalisations are well
        illustrated.

        One motor insurance broker refused the Black
        "Tester" in the survey a policy on the ground
        that: "I'm afraid we don't deal with people who
        are taking out their first policy." A few minutes
        later, the same broker was only too willing to
        insure the Hungarian and English "Testers" on
        their first policy.

21.   cf. Hughes and Hughes, 1952, p. 190.

22.   Park, 1928; Stonequist, 1938.

23.   cf. Goldberg, 1941; Green, 1944; Antonovsky, 1956;
        Golovensky, 1952.

24.   See Dickie-Clarke, 1966.

25.   See Lewin, 1948, pp. 145ff.

26.   cf. Wallace, 1956.

27.   See the speech of a well-known trade unionist,
        Sir William Carron, on the occasion of his re-
        tirement, in The Guardian, 25 April, 1967. Sir
        William spoke of the "ever-growing number of
        individuals who are not born in this country...
        etc., He avoided the term "immigrant!" His might
        be called the official (or de jure) line.

        For a local view, see Israel, 1964, p. 98.

Notes

CHAPTER 9 (continued)

28.   cf. Immigration from the Commonwealth, 1965
        (The Wilson White Paper). In Harold Wilson's
        Election speech delivered in Birmingham on May
        5, 1964 (reported in all the national news
        media) Wilson's general concern was to tell
        the electorate that the immigrant areas were
        to be given special attention, the reasoning
        being that the problems that existed in those
        areas were due, quite simply, to the presence
        of the Black immigrants.

        cf.also the House of Lords Debates on the
        1968 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. (see Cols.917-
        32, 961-66; but esp. Cols. 925, 1078, 1115-1116.
        (29 February 1968). Also House of Commons Debates,
        12 December, 1967, Cols. 1513-1536; 27 February,
        1968, Cols. 1241-1368; and 28 February 1968 Cols.
        1421-1542; 1543-1695; 1696-1714. Exit the Bill,
        Royal Assent, 1 March 1968, Col. 1917.

29.   See, Foot, 1965; Deakin, 1970; Marshall, 1968;
        Bindman, 1971.
        As recently as February 1971 the Sunday Times
        Editorial pointed out how Britain has been
        obsessed with the notion that "this country
        (was) being flooded with Black immigrants."
        The Sunday Times editorial realised that what
        it called a Big Lie had become a self-sustaining
        fact.
        (Sunday Times,(London), 28 February, 1971).

30.   Rex, 1968, p. 70.

31.   Israel, 1964, pp. 90-92

32.   Lambert, 1970; Pryce, 1969. Pryce's dissertation
        is particularly instructive, since it deals exten-
        sively with all three major Black groups: West
        Indians, Indians and Pakistanis.

32.   The Racial Problem: A Socialist Analysis.
        (London: Indian-Marxist-Leninist Association,
        n.d., issued late Spring, 1971)

CHAPTER 10

1. K. N. Pryce's unpublished work on immigrants in Bristol has rich sociological insights and hypotheses on the phenomenon of the Black Church. Pryce's research is perhaps the most comprehensively sociological work on the life-styles of Blacks in Britain.

2. cf. in this connection, Hill, 1971b

3. Pryce, op. cit.

4. It has been suggested, too, that race prejudice in Britain has led to great mental stress among West Indians in Britain; and to more West Indian's in Britain being treated in mental institutions, more cases than in all the Caribbean territories put together. (The Guardian, 30 December 1971)

   While this author has no evidence on this, the idea is perfectly consistent with the main theme of this thesis that racism and social rejection practised against Blacks tend to lead to great mental stress among them.

5. cf. the Kerner Commission in the United States. The Commission clearly cited White racism as the major cause of ghetto riots in the United States.

6. Often, of course, there is a cultural component in the patterns of rejection; and certain forms of prejudice are part and parcel of the cultural expectations of the members of the society in which the rejection is practised. (cf.South Africa)

7. Pryce, 1969, suggests that innovative types of deviance among Blacks might be particularly popular in Britain. For, in the ghettos, Blacks are somewhat artificially protected, by virtue of their isolation from the wider society.

8. That the question of Black identity is inextricably bound up with Black Power generally, and with Black Nationalism in Britain, is clear from a close reading of the "manifestos" of the Black organisations. Thus, in Britain, it is a common general practice for bright young Blacks to spend hours and hours worrying how to speak Swahili - "a Black man's language", - rather than how to gain Ordinary Level English Language; even when the latter could conceivably enhance their job opportunities, whereas the former will not, at least not yet in Britain.

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CHAPTER 10 (continued)

Part of the identity struggle is the tremendous
desire to be able to express oneself (particularly
whilst living in a White society) in a language system
other than the "alien" one inherited. Black Power
comes to mean, then, among other "cultural" things,
being able to handle a Black heritage, like a Black
man's language. In this context it is possible,
(but only just) that some Black children born in
Britain of West Indian parents might be caught in the
"cross-fire" of this new renaissance; that is, in
the no-man's land between West Indian English (tainted
with Creole), standard 'classroom English' and a vague
notion of say, Swahili. This is not a point to be
overstated, however, for a so-called "normal" child
will be able to cope quite satisfactorily with all
these ingredients : speaking Swahili to his Black
peers in the playfield at school, standard 'classroom
English' to his teacher, and West Indian English and/
or any of the combinations possible, to his parents.

Here, of course, the sociologists of Education
should take note. For the standard IQ tests which are
given to Black children in British schools, with all
their cultural biases, all too often show up what the
White teacher expects to find: a low score. Often,
the Black child's weltanschauung is richer than the
teacher's, but all the same such a view when finally
expressed by the child often clashes with middle class
values of the teacher.

It is currently a sore point among West Indian
parents that an inordinate number of their children
end up (mistakenly) in schools for the Educationally
Subnormal, which schools are designed to assist each
child therein to realize his assumed low potential
and capabilities. Clearly, there is a lot of work
to be done in this area of sociology. For it is
possible that a whole series of self-fulfilling prophes-
ies could operate to produce a permanent Black sub-
proletarian class in Britain. (cf. pp. 22, 231-233
above). It is mandarin rubbish to suppose that the
presumed benefits of modern industrial society have
converted us (Black and white alike) into people unable
to differentiate between status situations which are
rooted in cultural traditions.

Notes

CHAPTER 11

1. Personal communication with one of the authors of
the Pastoral Letter, November 1971.

2. Whatever statements are made in this thesis con-
cerning the tension that currently exists between
the West Indian immigrants in Britain and British
police are based on the level of empirical evidence
as at the time of writing. As the topic of social
control is not an immediate concern of this thesis,
only passing reference will be made to the type of
"over-control" which this author has in mind; the
account is typical; other cases are known to the
writer.

At the time of writing (Spring 1972) the
following report appeared in one of Britain's more
respectable Journals on race. In a Birmingham dis-
trict with a sizable Black population, the police,
together with the local Town Councillors were said
to be "worried" because Black teachers were using
the medium of a Saturday supplementary school for
Black children to "indoctrinate" these children in
Black supremacy.

One of the teachers concerned pointed out how
"nobody ever makes reference to the other subjects
we teach, like Maths, English and Biology. It's
always about our teaching culturally - relevant
history ... whether the authorities want to interpret
(historical fact) as Black Power, that's up to them."

The real importance of these experiences, of
course, lie in the tendency for the agents of social
control to use them as a basis for "activity." In
this case in question, the police had duly paid
several visits to the homes of some of the Black
parents whose children attended the classes, and
attempted to pursuade them to withdraw their children
from the supplementary school. The contention of
the police was that, according to the headmistress
of the school who had reported the matter to them,
the Blacks were inciting Black Power in her school.

Many different ethnic groups have undertaken
precisely the same type of exercise in Saturday
school, but in no other case has there been so much
official questioning and resentment. It does appear
that Black people in Britain are unable to do any-
thing that would completely satisfy the neighbours
and the police alike! Because West Indians are said
to be "over-reactive" to official authority, no one,
it seems, will care to at least listen to some of
the genuine grievances they have about their treat-
ment in British society. (For a recent inquiry on this,

Notes

CHAPTER 11 (continued)

See Jim Bergman and Bernard Coard, "Trials and Tribulations of a Self-Help Group," Race Today, Vol. 4. no. 4, (April) 1972, pp. 112-114).

3. The now infamous case of the Mangrove Nine is a case in point.

    (New Society, 23 December, 1971; West Indian World, 24 December, 1971 and 31 December, 1971; 7 Days, 24 December - 4 January, 1971/2).

    The Mangrove Trial involved nine Black militants in London, who, after a street demonstration in August of 1970, were arrested and charged with various offences - the major one being that the demonstration was "pre-planned" violence.

    In fact, the demonstration started out as a peaceful protest by Blacks about undue police harassment of the Black-owned Mangrove Restaurant in Notting Hill. The police insisted that the restaurant was "a den of iniquity"; hence, they were always looking for drugs.

    The Crown submitted a total of 31 charges - vague, unsubstantiated political charges. Not only did it take more than one year for the cases to be brought to trial, but after one of the longest trails in the history of the Old Bailey (the trial lasted eleven weeks) five of the supposed "Black Power Leaders" were acquitted, while four were given suspended sentences.

    The outcome of this particular trial has served as a clear critique of the oppression of Blacks under British law. Most of the defendants conducted their own defense.

4. Johnson, 1964, pp. 22-26.

5. Cox, 1948, p. 393. cf. Graeber, 1953, pp. 268-280.

6. Cf. Myrdal, 1944, pp. 75-78.

7. For more on the crucial notion of culture, see footnote 18, chapter 3.

8. A recent publication on minorities in Britain by a British sociologist has highlighted some of the key issues raised in this thesis. For instance, it was suggested that: "According to valuations of the

Notes

CHAPTER 11 (continued)

host (i.e. British) society, the marginality of first-generation (Black) immigrants may be similar for all groups, <u>differing only in degree</u>. If, however, color is defined as a characteristic for differentiation, color then has the potential of permanency and so becomes a <u>difference of kind</u>. The situation in Britain must be assessed in the light of this possibility." (emphasis mine). See Sheila Allen, <u>New Minorities, Old Conflicts: Asian and West Indian Migrants in Britain</u>, New York: Random House, 1971, pp. 3-24.
Cf. the discussion above (Chapter 4) on the cultural perception of race, and on the biography of ideas on race.

Notes

CHAPTER 12.

1.   For convenience, the relation between social inquiry to Social Theory can be isolated by delineating three methodological orientations in contemporary sociology: (a) descriptive explicationists, (b) reconstructionists and (c) conceptual analysts, each preferring a particular method for addressing and evaluating research work.

First, the reconstructionists. The protagonists of this mode of analysis tend to employ formal, constructed or symbolic systems for the interpretation and evaluation of scientific products, as expressed in "ordinary" language. The favoured approach is to reconstruct social theory into axiomatic form, and so give scientific work formal representation. But the practice tends to be logically problematic if one wants to build into one's conceptualization of science the "commonsense" changes of daily interaction. Notable protagonists of this school are Abraham Kaplan, Hubert Blalock, Hans Reichenbach, Carl Hempel and Richard Rudner.

Second, the descriptive explicationists. This school claims that all that they do is to explicate the scientific work, i.e. they "codify" scientific work, not reconstruct it. Furthermore, they believe they make explicit what are taken to be implicit standards of research (i.e. "good" research). This approach is discernible in the work of Paul Lazarsfeld (cf. his concern with the explication of research techniques in Robert Merton et al.eds., Sociology Today, New York: Basic Books, 1959), but is also characteristic of the works of Robert Merton and Hanz Zetterberg. Apparently, James Coleman is a sort of "sympathiser" of this approach, although he more naturally belongs to the reconstructionists. Coleman is a veiled explicationist, as can be conjectured from a recent statement of his: "the value (of a paper of his on the Properties of Collectivities) for me has derived from its adherence to the goal that Lazarsfeld posed: that it be an explication de texte, aimed at discovering what other authors were doing, and deriving its value from a juxtaposition of their similarities and differences." (James Coleman, et al., Macrosociology: Research and Theory, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1970, p. 4).

Third, there seems to be another position

CHAPTER 12 (continued)

which may be termed that of the <u>conceptual analysts</u>. This is a sparsely-populated "camp". The central idea here seems to be the construal of evaluative criteria to clarify what aspects of research can and cannot be formulated and analysed within a given context. There is in this stance the idea that what one takes as a science is determined by one's methodological proposal, i.e. "evaluative tests"; it thus poses the basic question of what criteria can be used to address a particular problem or set of problems. Gunnar Myrdal and the "Grounded Theory" school are probably of this strain. The difference between the first two and the latter analytic approach seems sufficiently clear to this author: it clearly hinges on whether or not one admits to evaluative criteria in addressing phenomena of <u>sociological</u> significance. Put simply, the first two seem to want to draw on knowledge about the development of "science" or social understanding, but are somehow logically prohibited, since there is the implicit claim that it is, or might be, "unscientific" to hold or put forward evaluative assertions about the supposed development of the "science".

The third perspective, on the other hand, accepts that because sociology is a rudimentary science, and indeed deals with real human beings and not inanimate objects, when problems come up for analysis, they are judged or <u>evaluated</u> for theoretical significance according to whether or not basic "why" questions of the human condition are answered.

The fact that the explicationists and the reconstructionists tend to deny the significance of evaluative criteria in sociological work, can be termed sociological dishonesty; but it also obscures the fundamental philosophical and theoretical problems which are interwoven with sociological practice and which must be grappled with if sociology is to remain concerned about man in society.

2. One should clearly note that this concern is not confined to the sociologists of race relations alone. This vital issue bears close relation to similar points stressed by sociologists who analyse and interpret religious phenomena. Thus, sociologists discussing the limited scope of "personality systems" in explaining religious

Notes

CHAPTER 12 (continued)

commitment, have emphasised that a structural
approach to such phenomenon is of first importance:
"what is ideally needed... in sociological terms
is an account of the conditions under which re-
ligious beliefs (or racist beliefs in our case)
and values are sustained by groups of individuals,
and the ways in which they are transmitted and
modified." (See Roland Robertson, The Sociological
Interpretation of Religion, Oxford: Blackwell, 1970,
p. 59); and for a good grasp of the same concern
in the area of the sociology of deviance, see
Laurie Taylor, Deviance and Society, London:
Michael Joseph, 1971. Taylor argues persuasively
for an integration of structural and processual
approaches to the understanding of deviance or
"rule-breaking"in society.

This stance, applied in the various sub-fields
of sociology, is implicitly an advocacy for more
structural sociology, sociology which grasps the
problems of man in society by the roots of man him-
self in terms of the matrix of human relationships
and cognition.

APPENDIX II

THE CONTINUA OF POLITICS AND RELIGION AMONG WEST INDIANS

IN BRITAIN: APPROACHES TO A SOCIAL PROFILE

A ————————————————————————————————————— 1502←

SLAVERY OF BLACK AFRICANS
(European Super-ordination)

SHATTERED IDENTITY
(Post-Slavery)

COLONIAL LEAGUES
(Divisionism)

FEDERATION ATTEMPT
(Colonialists' Idea)

FEDERATION FAILURE
(Clarity not enhanced for Blacks;
instead, Alienation, Anomie,
Search for Meaning)

MIGRATION TO BRITAIN 1955-1971

T
H
E

A
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C
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S

B ————————————————————————————————————— 1955←

THE UNITED KINGDOM
(The Promised Land)

GREAT ATTEMPT AT SOCIAL CLARITY
(Existential - Phenomenological)

| POLITICAL AGITATION (Perceived as Instrumental for achieving group goals) | MILD PROTEST | RELIGIOUS ESCHATOLOGY (Therapeutic) |

SELF-HATERS
(Reject- A-B)
'Integrationists'
or (View A-B with
sense of shame)

IDENTITY SECURED
(Partly-Achieved
Gestalt)
View A-B in Revolu-
tionary Perspective

IDENTITY SECURED
(Partly-Achieved
Gestalt)
Uncertain or Ambi-
valent on A-B

C ————————————————————————————————————— 1971←

POLITICAL AND CULTURAL
NATIONALISTS ←------------→
(Black Power)

RELIGIOUS AND CULTURAL
NATIONALISTS
(Black Church)

APPENDIX III

A MODEL OF SOCIAL CONFLICT, AND ITS RELATION WITH
POWER AND STRATIFICATION COMPLEXES AND SOCIAL MOVE-
MENT SUCH AS BLACK POWER.

On-going Society depicted
as SOCIAL STRUCTURE

VALUE SYSTEM ← → STRATIFICATION ← → ECO SYSTEM
SYSTEM

Belief System
(Dominant)

Conflict of Values
Set up by contrast-
ing ideational con-
structions embedded
in the stratification
system
(Dissensus)

POWER

Conflict of Interest
Set up by differential
control by different
groups of men of mater-
ial facilities
(Vested Interests)

CONSTRAINT

Necessary but not
Sufficient
for

Necessary and
Sufficient
for

Necessary but not
Sufficient
for

→Race-Relations problems and←
the development of Contra-
Culture e.g. 'Black Power'(Emanates
from social isolation and shared fates)*

Popularly-defined SOCIAL CONFLICT

Change-In-Process
Nationalism a Conflict Group

Through law and the appli-
cation of norms to established
facts, (Presupposes that the
conflict be handled as dissens-
us over facts and norms)

Through bargaining
and compromise.(pre-
supposes that the con-
flict is handled as
conflict of interests)

→Preparatory conditions for social
movement activities:

definition

beliefs
mobilisation
conduciveness of social structure
action for social change

(Feedback to STRATIFICATION and POWER levels)

APPENDIX III (continued)

* A minority group, defined by its access to, and con-
  trol of power, is by its very nature a conflict group
  vis-a-vis the dominant group or society; and the
  interaction between the two groups is a <u>process</u> of
  conflict.

In this conflict, the aspirations, hopes and
longings of the minority will inevitably criss-cross
those of the dominant group at crucial points; and
the latter's vested interests and values (including
beliefs about a minority) will be protected and re-
inforced by legal, political, social and economic
mechanisms.

But while the dominant group seeks to use what
power it has to consolidate its special status, the
minority will be forced to use, by and large, a series
of "coping mechanisms", including violence if necessary,
to gain some measure of the scarce resources of society,
including institutional resources such as power.

The relations between a minority and a dominant
group becomes a race relations situation when, and
only when, one of the key variables in the conflict
is a <u>belief system</u>. And although both groups will
have such a system, in the final analysis the beliefs
held by the minority are of less importance, since
that group will not normally possess the power to im-
plement its beliefs. So we are thrown back on the
vital concept of power relations as the very kernel
of minority group relations.

ENTRY, SETTLEMENT AND CONTROL PROVISIONS FOR THE MAIN CATEGORIES OF IMMIGRANTS
TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

Category of Immigrant	Entry Requirements		Whether admitted for Settlement		Control After Entry	
	Up to 1971	New requirement as of 1971	Up to 1971	New requirement as of 1971	Up to 1971	New requirement as of 1971
Commonwealth Workers	Must have (1)Entry certificate (2)Voucher (strictly limited by quota)	Must have (1)Entry certificate (2)Work-permit	Absolute right of settlement	No right of settlement; may be allowed to settle after four years on conditions	None	Must register and report changes of address to police;* permit valid for one job only
Alien Workers	Work-permit	Work-permit	No right of settlement; may be allowed to settle after four years	No right of settlement; may be allowed to settle after four years	Must register and report changes of address to the police; permit valid for one job only	Must register and report changes of address to the police; permit valid for one job only
Commonwealth Dependent Wives	Entry certificate (issued in territory of origin after strict tests of eligibility)	Entry certificate; proof that husband can support her	Absolute right to join husband, to take job,etc	No right of settlement; may be admitted temporarily for same period as husband. No right to work	None	Same as husband
Alien Dependent Wives	Proof of marriage to permit-holder	Proof of marriage to permit-holder; proof of husband's ability to support	No right of settlement;may be admitted temporarily for same period as husband.No right to work	No right of settlement may be admitted temporarily for same period as husband. No right to work	Same as husband	Same as husband

Common-wealth Dependent Children	Entry certificate (issued in territory of origin after strict tests of eligibility)	Entry certificate; proof that they will not be a charge on public funds	Absolute for children under 16; otherwise discretionary	No rights; conditional residence may be granted to children up to 18 if joining both parents; up to 21 only in exceptional circumstances	None	Same parent
Alien Dependent Children	Proof of relationship to parents	Proof of relationship; proof that they will not be a charge on public funds	Up to 18 admitted conditionally; up to 21 after four years' conditional residence		Same as father	Same as father
Other Common-wealth Dependents	Entry certificate (issued in territory of origin after strict tests of eligibility)	Entry certificate (issued in territory of origin after strict tests of eligibility)	Parents admitted to settle over 65; other dependents in specified circumstances	No admittance until head of family is resident	None	-
Other Alien Dependents	Proof of relationship	Proof of relationship	Parents over 60 and any 'distressed' dependent allowed if head of family resident for 4 years		Same as head of family	-

APPENDIX IV (continued)

* The information in the above Appendix is from the
1971 Immigration Act, passed by the British Parlia-
ment on 28 October 1971. Two minor amendments were
made toward the latter stages of the Bill's passage
through Parliament:

(i) The clause allowing for registration with the
     police was changed to registration with the
     Department of Employment and Productivity.
     But Registration still remains.

(ii) The notorious "Patrial" or "Grandfather clause"
     in the original Bill was amended, to read
     "right of abode", which is the same thing as
     "Patrial".

The Patrial Clause in this Act is aimed at removing

altogether from control, anyone who is able to prove

parental or grandparental links with the United King-

dom (most Black immigrants simply cannot).

    The Immigration Act 1971 is defined as "An Act
to amend and replace the present immigration law, to
make certain related charges in the citizenship law
and enable help to be given to those wishing to re-
turn abroad, and for purposes connected therewith."

In addition, however, the Act has introduced for

Commonwealth immigrants, a system of regulation based

on that which had always been in force for aliens.

Thus as of 1971, "New Commonwealth" immigrants (if

they are not Patrials) are required to register with

the DEP; and this involves notifying any changes of

address or status, in much the same way that aliens

APPENDIX IV (Continued)

have always had to. Also, "New Commonwealth" immigrants
are now allowed entry on a one year visa, renewable
annually for five years, but also subject to good be-
haviour" (no Trade Union or political activity?). During
this 'cold storage' period, these immigrants may change
jobs only with government permission. The category of
non-patrial citizens which the Act introduced, will be
subjected to Deportation and voluntary repatriation.
They form a new category of insecure people in Britain
who Enoch Powell has termed the "alien wedge".

APPENDIX V

<u>THE DEMANDS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY (U.S.A.)</u>

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the
    destiny of our <u>Black community.</u>

2. We want full employment for our people.

3. We want an end to the capitalist exploitation of
    our Black community.

4. We want decent housing fit for the shelter of
    human beings.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the
    true nature of this decadent society. We want edu-
    cation that teaches us our true history and our
    role in the present day society.

6. We want all Black men to be exempt from military
    service.

7. We want an immediate end to <u>Police Brutality and
    Murder</u> of Black people.

8. We want freedom for all Black men held in federal,
    state, county and city prisons and jails.

9. We want all Black people when brought to trial to
    be tried by a jury of their peer group or people
    from their Black communities as defined by the Con-
    stitution of the United States.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing,
    justice and peace, and as our major political ob-
    jestive, a United Nations- supervised plebiscite
    to be held throughout the Black colony in which only
    Black colonial subjects will be allowed to parti-
    cipate for the purpose of determining the will of
    the Black people.

APPENDIX VI

ATTITUDES HELD BY BLACK MILITANTS IN THE U.S.A.

The attitudes held by militant Blacks in the U.S.A. have
been expressed, perhaps best of all, through a floor mo-
tion placed at the Newark Convention on Black Power:*
It read:

Whereas the Black people in America have been system-
atically oppressed by their white fellow countrymen;

Whereas there is little prospect that this oppress-
ion can be terminated, peacefully or otherwise, within
the foreseeable future;

Whereas the Black people do not wish to be absorbed
into larger white communities;

Whereas the Black people in America find their
interests are in contradiction with White America;

Whereas the Black people in America are psychologi-
cally handicapped by virtue of their having no national
homeland;

Whereas the physical moral ethical and aesthetic
standards of white American society are not those of
Black society and indeed do violence to the self-image
of the Black man;

Whereas Black people are among the earliest immi-
grants to America, having been ruthlessly separated from
their fatherland and have made a major contribution to

APPENDIX VI (continued)

America's development, most of this contribution having been uncompensated, and

Recognizing that efforts are already well advanced for the convening of a Constitutional convention for the purpose of the revising of the Constitution of the U.S. for the first time since America's inception, then

Be it resolved that the Black Power Conference initiate a National dialogue on the desirability of partitioning the U.S. into two separate and independent nations, one to be a homeland for white and the other to be a homeland for Black Americans.

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* Robert Brown, _Ramparts_, 29 June, 1968.

APPENDIX VII

The following are some of the "grassroots" literature
which the author found to be in wide circulation in
Black communities at the time of the research. P=
Pamphlet; NP= Newspaper; M=Magazine; B=Bulletin.

Tri-Continental Outpost (P) London

Black Peoples News Service, Black Panther Party News-
papers (NP) London

Black Voice, Black Unity and Freedom Party, (NP), Lon-
don & Manchester

Flambeau, Action Committee, London (NP), merged with
BPNS

Black Peoples Alliance, (B) Birmingham

Black Dwarf (NP) London

The Crusader (P) London and Peking

Grassroots (NP) London

Black Chat (P) Leicester

Afro-Asian Solidarity (P) London

The Brotherhood (P) Leeds

Afro-News (P) Bradford

Cogito (M) London

West Indian World (NP) London

National and International News Bulletin (B) London

Information News Sheet (B) Algeria

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   alism and Socialism</u>, New York: Merit Publishers.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

> -- The problem of the
> twentieth century is the
> problem of the colour-
> line, the relation of
> the darker to the lighter
> races of men in Asia and
> Africa, in America and
> the islands of the sea.
>
> -- W.E.B. DuBois

The Problem Defined

Since the Second World War, immigration from
the British Commonwealth to the United Kingdom has
steadily increased, and in 1971 there are $2\frac{1}{2}$ million
Commonwealth immigrants living in Britain. In
Britain, however, it is customary (officially)
to distinguish between what is known as Old Common-
wealth (i.e. the white Commonwealth of Australia,
Canada and New Zealand), and the New Commonwealth
(i.e. the 'Coloured' Commonwealth or the Third World
Commonwealth).[1]

Of the estimated $1\frac{1}{2}$ million Blacks from the
Third World now residing in Britain, in 1971, some
270,000 to 500,000 are West Indians who came to
Britain from a number of islands in the Caribbean
(see map in Appendix): from Jamaica, Trinidad and
Tobago, Barbados, St. Kitts, Nevis, Grenada, St.

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THE CARIBBEAN

TRINIDAD
1:1,250,000

TOBAGO
1:1,250,000

JAMAICA
1:1,250,000

GUADELOUPE
1:1,250,000

MARTINIQUE
1:1,250,000

ST. KITTS

ANTIGUA

GRENADA

CURAÇAO
1:1,250,000

ARUBA
1:1,250,000

MONTSERRAT
1:1,250,000

VENEZUELA

COLOMBIA

HONDURAS

NICARAGUA

CUBA

JAMAICA

HAITI

HISPANIOLA

PUERTO RICO

GREATER ANTILLES

LESSER ANTILLES

LEEWARD ISLANDS

WINDWARD ISLANDS

CARIBBEAN SEA

PACIFIC OCEAN

GUYANA

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

1:5,500,000