


KAILONDO'S LUAWA

AND

BRITISH RULE

WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD

1880 - 1930



KAILONDO, RULER OF LUAWA c.1880 - c.1896

KAILONDO'S LUAWA AND BRITISH RULE  
WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE PERIOD 1880 - 1930

VOLUME ONE

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In January 1970, the present writer visited Dambara, a little village situated near the banks of the River Moa, and only a few minutes' walk by bush-path from the Kailahun to Mano-Sewalu motor road. As he wandered through the village, a feeling which had been growing in him for a long time suddenly crystallized. This village, in its material culture and human activities, bore a striking resemblance to the sort of villages which were described by British travellers in the area during the 1890s. There was very little to be seen in Dambara which could be described as an innovation or development resulting from colonial rule. Eighty years of contact with Europeans had apparently made little impression on the everyday life of ordinary village people. Moreover, Dambara was not exceptional: most human settlements in the Luawa area were similar. These thoughts provided the genesis of this thesis.

Perhaps the greatest difficulty for the reader will be the lack of standardized spelling for the names of people and places in Luawa. As a result, when quotations are used in the text, a number of different spellings are liable to creep in. For example, Kailondo's name will appear spelt variously as "Ki Londo", "Kai Lundu", and "Kailundu". Kailahun is also spelt "Kanre Lahun" and "Kiloun". It is hoped that the reader will use his common-sense in relating a curious spelling in a quotation to the different spelling of the same name which will usually be found in the main body of the text surrounding the quotation. Quotations from material which is being used as a primary source are distinguished by being enclosed within double inverted commas. For other quotations (and in other places where inverted commas are required) single inverted commas are used. Whether to use English translations of Mende terms or whether to use the original Mende terms was a difficult decision to make. In the end, the latter course was chosen, and a fairly full Glossary is provided immediately after this Preface in an attempt to minimize the problems facing the English reader who has no knowledge of the Mende language. In notes and references, the expressions 'p. \_\_\_ above', or 'p. \_\_\_ below' are often employed. 'Above' and 'below' are here used in relation to the point at which the number of the note or reference appears in the text of the chapter (not in relation to the number of the page on which the note or reference itself is to be found).

So many people have contributed generously and graciously of their time and energy in helping to produce this thesis that it is impossible to list everyone's name. In Sierra Leone, thanks must go to all the people who gave interviews, and especially to Mr. T.M. Tengbe (Principal of the Methodist School, Kailahun), who arranged accommodation for my wife, daughter and myself in Kailahun in 1972. Mr. Tengbe gave a lot of valuable time to travelling round the Chiefdoms with me, not only acting as interpreter, but also allaying suspicion which village elders may have felt towards a puumoi who had such a lot of questions to ask. Without exception, all the District and Chiefdom officials gave utmost cooperation during my field-work in 1972. The help of the District Commissioner was much appreciated, as was the information provided by the Paramount Chiefs and ex-Paramount Chiefs of Luawa and the three Kissi Chiefdoms (whose names are noted in the list of interviews in the Bibliography and Table of Resources. Paramount Chief K.S.L. Kangoma Pambu V of Malema has always been a 'father' to me ever since

I arrived in Kailahun in 1965 (when he was Headmaster of the Methodist Primary School there). Too much stress can hardly be laid on the value of the information provided by Maada James Kailondo (son of the great Kailondo, and brother of Paramount Chief Momoh Banya), who freely gave two long interviews in 1972, as well as much real help to my wife and myself during the time when we were teachers living in Kailahun between 1967 and 1970. In Fourah Bay College, Mr. J.G. Edowu Hyde (of the Institute of African Studies) and the College Librarians gave much assistance. My wife and I will never be able to repay the love and loyalty which we have received from our 'son' and 'brother', James Kailondo (son of Maada James) and Moiwo A. Lahai.

In the United Kingdom, the encouragement and support of my supervisor, Mr. H.S. Wilson (Department of History, University of York) has meant a great deal to me: so has the kind advice of Mr. C. Fyfe (Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh). Mr. A. Abraham and Mr. E. Mashingaidze were both working on their own doctoral theses in African history at the same time as myself, and both provided me with constructive criticism and valued friendship. The librarians at the Royal Commonwealth Society Library, and the staff of the West Room in the Land Registry Building of the Public Records Office have always been most kind and helpful. The librarians at York University Library have shown great forbearance in their treatment of innumerable requests for obscure books and articles to be obtained through the Inter-Library Loan Service. It has been a privilege for my wife and myself to count among our friends Mr. and Mrs. J.S. Fenton, and Rev. and Mrs. W.R.E. Clarke, all of whom gave much more than simply information about Sierra Leone. For almost a year, until near the time of his death, Mr. Clarke gave one morning a week to helping me with the Mende language. Among other literature we read Hindoveli, the story of Mende village life in the early decades of the twentieth century, and probably the longest piece of creative writing ever produced in the Mende language. We also read Mark's Gospel in Mende, and I caught a glimpse of why the Mende people nicknamed Mr. Clarke, "Ngewo lato" ("Praise God"). Revs. Kenneth Crosby, Roger Smith and Leslie Wallace were among other Methodist missionaries who provided valuable help with this thesis work. Another British citizen who knew Kailahun District well, and who generously shared his knowledge, was Mr. N.C. Hollins, very sprightly at 85 years old. Mr. J.M. Malcolm also kindly gave an interview.

Miss Mary Preston began typing this thesis (starting with the Appendices) early in 1973, and continued steadily in her spare-time until early 1974. When she was compelled by circumstances to give up the work, Mrs. Anne Nield kindly took over, and was responsible for typing all the chapters, except Chapter 3 and the first part of Chapter 4. Without sacrificial kindness on the part of the typists, this thesis would never have been completed.

Words fail me in trying to describe the inspiration which the members of my family have provided. My parents-in-law, Mr. and Mrs. W.A. Holburn, have allowed their daily routine to be completely upset when we have visited them in order that I might continue my work uninterrupted. Through my own parents, Mr. and Mrs. W.J. McCall, I first gained an interest and love for West Africa. No one will ever know the full extent of their share in this thesis. My father was responsible for many of the photographs (which were kindly mounted by Miss Linda Wright). I have been grateful, too, for

the indulgence of my daughter, Joy (nearly three years old when this thesis was presented), who sweetly accepted that daddy needed to spend a lot of time 'drawing' in his study rather than playing with her. My precious wife Janet is truly "a blessing from the Lord" (Prov.18.22). Her devoted love is matched by her practical help; and it would require a book far longer than this thesis to describe even a fraction of either. Her help with the thesis was the more valuable because she herself lived in Kailahun for three years from September 1967 till July 1970, teaching at the Methodist Secondary School there. She has shared in those experiences the fruit of which is this thesis. She did all the thesis indexing, most of the map-work, and has proof-read every sentence of the thesis chapters at least twice, using her linguistic skills to clarify my imperfectly-expressed ideas. Errors and confusions which remain are mine and not the responsibility of either herself or the army of friends who have made the production of this thesis possible.

York, U.K.

April 1974.

GLOSSARYOF FOREIGN AND TECHNICAL TERMS: AND SPECIAL ABBREVIATIONS AND USAGES.

(Unless it is specifically stated as otherwise, all the underlined words in the Glossary are taken from the Mende language).

- Ag. = acting
- Baffi = temporary, open-sided shelter
- Barri = permanent, open-sided meeting-place or shelter
- Brushing = cutting down the undergrowth in a bushy or forested area as the first stage in making a rice farm: 'mowing' grass with a machet, round a house or at the sides of a road or path.
- Cassada = alternative spelling of cassava
- C.C.P. = Commissioner of Central Province (1919-1931), Sierra Leone Protectorate
- C.M.F. = Court Messenger Force of the Sierra Leone Protectorate
- CMs. = Court Messengers.
- C.M.S. = Church Missionary Society (Anglican Society active in Sierra Leone)
- C.O. (or CO) = the British Colonial in London
- D.C. = District Commissioner
- Fakai (pl. fakaisia) = hamlet
- F.O. = the British Foreign Office in London
- F.P. = the Frontier Police Force, used in the hinterland of the Sierra Leone Colony between 1890 and 1901.
- Guinea (when spelt with a capital 'G') = the Republic of Guinea, formerly French Guinea.
- Hotei (pl. hoteisia) = stranger, foreigner
- K.D.O.A. = Kailahun District Office Archives
- Kenci = title of respect, used when greeting or referring to a mature man
- Kissia (pl.) = the title used by the Kissi people in their own language, when referring to themselves
- Kobangai = open meeting-space, situated near a town

Komahsi = war-leader, commander of the armed forces

Ko-Mende, Koo-Mende = North-Eastern or 'Upper' Mendeland

Kpakoisia (pl.; sing. kpako, kpakoi) = the local 'big men' or important people.

Krio = the language of the Freetown Creoles.

Kugba (pl., kogugbanga) = member of a polity's armed force, experienced fighter.

Lavale = Speaker, the Chief's leading counsellor and assistant

Maada = title of respect, used when addressing or referring to a senior and important man.

Mahawai (pl. Mahawaisia) = supreme ruler, overlord, important Chief

Mahayei = chieftaincy, sovereignty

Mahsi (indef. sing. maha; pl. mahangaisia) = Chief, ruler

Manja = the manja farm was a rice farm made for the Chief by the free labour of the Chiefdom people, out of which the Chief entertained strangers and fed destitute persons, etc.

Mende = Mendeland and Mende culture

Mendebleisia, Mendebla = the title used by the Mende people in their own language, when referring to themselves

Mendeyisi = the Mende language

Miles = when mileages are given, the reference is to the distance travelled on the ground by road, rail, or path, not to the distance 'as the crow flies'.

min. = minute

M.M.S. = Methodist Missionary Society

M.O. = Medical Officer

Molimo (pl. molibla) = a Moslem

Money = cash is recorded in the old British system of pounds, shillings and pence.

N.A. = Native Administration (and also Native Authority, the body which was responsible for Native Administration in any particular Chiefdom)

N.A.D.L. = Native Affairs' Department Letterbook



- N.A.M.P. = Native affairs' Minute Paper
- n.d. = no date provided
- Ndoomahɛi (pl. Ndoohangɛisia) = Paramount Chief (see Note on Political Terminology, pp.42-43 below)
- Ndɔwei = weekly market
- Njɔpɔwai = daily market
- n.s. = new series
- o.s. = old series
- Pa = Creole title of respect, used when greeting or referring to a mature man, and now often employed by Mende and Kissi people.
- Palaver = trouble, unrest, disagreement, difficulty, or legal dispute. This Krio word had become almost 'standard English' in Sierra Leone even before 1896, so that even Governors and senior British officials used it freely in official correspondence.
- Patimahɛi (pl. patimahangɛisia) = subordinate ruler, under the Paramount Chief, of a pati or 'section' of the Chiefdom.
- P.C. = Paramount Chief
- P.R.O. = Public Records Office, London
- Puumɔi (pl. puubleisia) = whiteman, European, British person (also trans., anyone adopting a European life-style)
- P.W.D. = Public Works Department of the Sierra Leone Government.
- R.C.S. = Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London
- R.H. = Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
- S.L.G.A. = Sierra Leone Government Archives, which are located in the Library of Fourah Bay College, Freetown.
- S.L.P.M.B. = Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board.
- T.A. = Tribal Authority
- Tamahɛi (pl. tamahangɛisia) = town chief
- Univ. = university
- W.A.F.F. = West African Frontier Force (constituted in Sierra Leone in 1901; received the title 'Royal' in 1928, hence the abbreviation R.W.A.F.F.)

## CONTENTS

### VOLUME ONE

Preface and acknowledgements .....	iii
Glossary of foreign and technical terms; and special abbreviations and usages .....	vi

### CHAPTER ONE

#### THE LUAWA AREA IN THE GENERATION BEFORE KAILONDO, C.1840 TO 1880: AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY

1. The geographical background, c.1880 .....	4
2. The origins of the Mendeleisia and Kissia in the Luawa area .....	13
3. Social, political and economic organization in Luawa, c.1840-1880 .....	22
4. The Kpove War and Kailondo's accession .....	31
(A Note on Political Terminology .....	42)

### CHAPTER TWO

#### KAILONDO'S LUAWA, 1880 TO 1896 : EXTERNAL SECURITY

1. The aftermath of the Kpove War .....	74
2. The penetration of Samori's <u>Sofas</u> .....	84
3. The arrival of the British .....	94
4. Kafula's rebellion in Wunde, 1890-1896 .....	111
5. Kailondo and Cardew, 1895-1896 .....	119

### CHAPTER THREE

#### KAILONDO'S LUAWA, 1880 TO 1896 : INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT

1. Towns and social change .....	177
2. Agriculture and manufactures .....	190
3. Markets, trade and communications .....	196
4. Political organization .....	209

### CHAPTER FOUR

#### FABUNDEH AND EUROPEAN 'PACIFICATION' OF THE LUAWA AREA, 1896 TO 1912

1. Local opposition to Fabundeh, and his relations with the British, 1896-1899 .....	254
2. Kafula and Fabundeh: the French and the British, 1896-1911..	264
3. Luawa and new international boundaries .....	281
4. Fabundeh's winning of the political initiative: the Liberians and the British, 1907-1911 .....	290
5. An example of British 'pacification', 1909 .....	308

VOLUME TWO

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF BRITISH LOCAL ADMINISTRATION ON LUAWA c.1908 TO c.1931.

1. Fabundeh's loss of sovereignty .....	376
2. The railway to Pendembu .....	387
3. "Government of strangers", c.1911 - c.1936 .....	396
4. The roads to Kailahun, and socio-economic development, 1912-1931 .....	411
5. 'Divide and rule', 1912-1924 .....	433

CHAPTER SIX

THE SECOND GENERATION OF BRITISH RULE, c.1931 TO c.1961 : A SURVEY

1. Local politics, 1924-1942: the era of P.C. Momoh Banya .....	502
2. British local administration, 1942-1961: the changing attitude of colonial officials and ordinary people .....	514
3. New cash crops and economic development, c.1931-c.1961 .....	528
4. Social change and the ordinary people, c.1931-c.1961 .....	541
5. KAILONDO'S LUAWA AND BRITISH RULE, c.1850 TO c.1961 : CONCLUSIONS .....	556

Bibliography and table of resources .....	596
---	-----

APPENDICES

1. A note on Poro and other Secret Societies .....	
2. Table of British Commissioners and officials, Paramount Chiefs, and House Tax statistics for the Luawa area for the years 1890 - 1930 .....	
3. Extracts from files in the Kailahun District Office Archives.	
4. <u>A History of the Kulu-Banya Family of Luawa</u> .....	
5. <u>The Foundation of the Luawa Chiefdom (to the death of Kailundu)</u> .....	
6. Extracts from The Combey Manuscript .....	
7. Interview 19 .....	
8. Interview 20 .....	
9. Interview 21 .....	
10. Interview 22 .....	
Index .....	

(NOTE: Maps and photographs have not been given a page number. They are referred to by using, in each case, the number of the page which precedes them.)


CHAPTER ONE

THE LUAWA AREA IN THE GENERATION BEFORE KAILONDO.

C. 1840 TO 1880:

AN INTRODUCTORY SURVEY.

MAP ONE



MAP ONE

SIERRA LEONE AND THE LUAWA AREA

SCALE 1 : 2,000,000

KEY

- = Present-day international boundaries
- = The enclosed area is enlarged on subsequent maps  
in this thesis to the scale of 1 : 400,000

The people of Luawa came together into a single political unit about the year 1880 (1). The ruler of this new polity (2) was Kailondo, a local Kissi-man who was born about 1845 (3). After acquiring fame as a kogugba (4) fighting in other parts of Mendeland, Kailondo returned to his own country with wealth and a substantial body of followers, and established the town of Mofindor (5). His diplomacy and military skill encouraged the leaders of the area, when they met in conference at the village of Gbondou (6), to give him the mahavei (7): and this same conference created the new Luawa.

During the forty years following Kailondo's accession, the name 'Luawa' was used in a number of different ways. Governor Cardew took 'Luawa' to mean a tiny area of territory in the immediate vicinity of Kailahun town (8), whereas other British travellers considered that the name referred to the whole region over which Kailondo exerted any political influence (9). From the proclamation of the British Protectorate in 1896, until 1911, Luawa was officially split by an international boundary into 'British Luawa' and 'Liberian Luawa', though in practice little attention was paid to this division (10). From 1914 onwards, when the Kissi people were given a Chiefdom (11) of their own, British officials applied the name 'Luawa Chiefdom' only to the western part of Kailondo's polity (12).

The present writer has tried to use 'Luawa' in the way the mahangeisia (13) at the Gbondou Conference might have used it. They came largely from the present-day Chiefdoms of Luawa, Kissi Kama, Kissi Teng and Kissi Tungi (all of which are now in the Republic of Sierra Leone [14]), and the area covered by these four Chiefdoms seems to have been the territory which they loosely referred to as 'Luawa' (15). It was the heartland of Kailondo's 'kingdom'. The convention of including the three

present-day Kissi Chiefdoms of Kama, Teng, and Tungi within the definition of Luawa, which is accepted in this thesis, was also often followed by British officials during the first twenty years of colonial rule. Between 1880 and 1890, Kailondo vastly increased the number of people who owed him allegiance, creating a 'Greater Luawa' centred on his capital town of Kailahun (16), but he also consolidated his hold on the Luawa heartland so that its people came to feel a special allegiance to him (17). This Luawa heartland is the primary concern of the present study.

It might be argued that Wunde in the present-day Republic of Guinea, and Kissi-Tengea in Liberia should be included in this heartland, since representatives from both these areas attended the Gbondou Conference. Mr. N.C. Hollins, for example, recorded that as a result of the promises made by the mahangisia at the Gbondou Conference, Kailondo took control not only within the four present-day Chiefdoms of the 'Kailahun salient', but also further afield in the Wunde, Mafessa and Kama Chiefdoms in Guinea, and Kissi Tengea in Liberia (18). It is probable, however, that Kailondo's control was not really established and accepted in these outlying areas at the time of his accession, but rather in developments during the first few years of his reign (19). Moreover, by 1896 the Wunde people had ceased to recognize the authority of Luawa's ruler over them. In the same year the British, the new political power in Luawa, accepted that Tengea was in Liberia, and they thereafter adhered to this principle even though the Liberian Government exercised no real control in the area for several years (20). For these reasons, Wunde, Tengea, and the 'countries' (21) beyond, were excluded from this study of Kailondo's heartland.

Various explanations have been given for the meaning



of the name Luawa: significantly, all the explanations seek for the name's derivation in the Mende language, rather than in the Kissi language or some other. Rev. W.R.E. Clarke was told that Luawa comes from the words lo (to stand) and wa (firmly), giving the meaning, "Stand firm!": when people came to this area they liked it and decided to stay (22). Mr. B.N. Combey's explanation was that the Luawa people were much feared by their neighbours: Luwa means fear, and wa means greatly. Mr. Kulu-Banya noted that the name was a modified form of Lauwa, the name of the stream which flows through Kailahun town (23). Maada James Kailondo (24) derived the name from a corruption of the Mende words for the expression, "When you go, you must come back" - an offer of hospitality to visitors (25). Several of these explanations imply that at some stage the present inhabitants of Luawa took possession of the land by immigration. This possibility will be more fully explored later (26).

1. THE GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND, C.1880 (27).

Kailondo's polity lay in a region of transition with regard both to relief, vegetation, and climate. The land rises to the north and east in a slow climb, up to the massif of the Guinea Highlands (28): the north-east of Luawa is about 800 feet higher above sea-level than the south-west (29). As one climbs inland, north-eastwards, rainfall (30) rapidly diminishes, and the vegetation thins from secondary tropical forest into farm bush and grass (31). There is, especially in the south-west of Luawa, thick tropical bush (32); but the north-east of Kailondo's heartland, south of the Moa-Mafessa confluence is now mainly thicketed grassland (33). Probably the extent of the grassland increased during the twentieth century as a result of increasingly intensive shift-cultivation, and there was a complementary south-westward retreat of the limits of the thick tropical bush; yet even in 1880 the north-east of Luawa probably had considerable areas under grass (34).

The watershed in the Guinea Highlands is less than a hundred miles from Kailahun town, and beyond that watershed rise the headwaters of the River Niger, flowing north-eastwards (35). On the other side of the watershed, nearer to Luawa, a number of relatively small rivers take their rise and flow swiftly down the Guinea Highlands towards the Atlantic Ocean. One of these rivers is the Moa, Luawa's main river. With its tributaries reaching towards Kissidougou and north of Macenta, it drains a larger area than most of its south-westward flowing neighbours. As it passes by Luawa, the Moa is joined by the Meli, one of its largest tributaries: both rivers are in their middle course, and navigation is impeded by rocks in the river-bed and by rapids (36), as well as by a dramatic fall in water-level during the dry season from November to February (37). The distance down the Moa

valley from the confluence with the Meli to the estuary is about 120 miles. After passing Luawa, the Moa descends about 500 feet until, some 20 miles before entering the sea it reaches the limit of navigation on the edge of the coastal plain (38).

In terms of travelling distances, then, Luawa is only about a week's journey by foot from both the Atlantic coast and the heart of the Guinea Highlands (39).

The annual rainfall of just over 100 inches experienced in most of Luawa (40) is less than on the Atlantic coast, but more than in the Sudanic savanna to the north (41). More significant than the amount of rain is the fact that the rainfall is mainly confined within the months of March to November (42). It is not only the division of the year into a rainy season and a dry season which affects human activities, but also the unpredictability of the beginning and end of the rains (43). Since virtually all the people of Kailondo's Luawa were (and still are [44]) upland-rice farmers, the time when the rains 'set in' each year was of crucial importance to them. In a year when the rains came early, the farmer could start preparing his farm in January and work steadily from then onwards; but if he waited to make the farm after February, it would produce only a poor yield. However, when the rains came late, it would be possible to prepare a successful farm starting as late as April (45). Only a major political event could distract the ordinary people's attention in the early months of the year from the overriding question of when to prepare the farm and plant the rice-seed (46). Similarly, between September and November, everyone would be preoccupied with the rice-harvest.

Temperatures in Luawa show only a small annual range (about 10 degrees Fahrenheit) with a mean around 80 degrees (47), but that does

not mean there is blazing sunshine day after day all the year round. For much of July, August, and September at least part of most days is cloudy, and this brings a consequent fall in temperature, though humidity may rise to almost 100% (48). Throughout the year, the diurnal temperature range is greater than the annual range. In the months of December, January, and February this range may be as great as 30 degrees Fahrenheit, the cold harmattan winds from the north-east sometimes making everyone feel uncomfortably cold late in the evenings and early in the mornings - with a mean daily minimum for January of little more than 60 degrees Fahrenheit (49). At this time of the year, too, early-morning mist may add to the discomfort. Also at the beginning and end of the rainy season, the evening line-squall storms bring sudden and violent drops in temperature for a few hours (50).

Turning to the details of Luawa's physical features, the southern boundary of Kailondo's 'kingdom' was largely marked by the Magowi River, a tributary of the Mauwa, which in turn flows into the Moa (51). Another tributary of the Mauwa, the River Keya, runs through the middle of Luawa. In Kissi country (52), the valley of the Keya provides a trade and communication route between the hilly and heavily forested country to its south and the Kissi Mountains to the north. T.J. Alldridge, the first European visitor to Luawa, described the difficulties of travelling through this area in 1891. He was using the Nyandehun-Gbandewulo-Yandahun road south of the Keya River, in "very mountainous country. It seemed like a succession of ranges. We were incessantly going up one side and down the other .... Going on [from Dambalu] through all kinds of dense vegetation, with the ground so hilly that I was unable to use any description of hammock, I was compelled to walk all the distance". From Gbandewulo to Yandahun, some

of the mountains were "very precipitous; it seemed to be a series of scrambling up and down them for a great part of the way.

The very rude bush tracks were narrow cuttings and lanes, through vegetation so dense as to be almost impenetrable ..." (53).

To the north, the Kissi Mountains reach a height of about 2,700 feet at their highest, and stretch northwards towards the Moa valley (54). They not only provide an obstacle to communication but also considerably reduce the amount of vegetation (55), and crops will grow only on the lower slopes. In 1924 F.W.H. Migeod, whilst staying at Kangama (56), noted the appearance of Jawi, one of the largest mountains of the group: "Its steep sides are partly bare rock. Some oil palms grow a good way up on the right and a solitary palm stood at the top. I was told the hill had always been rocky: God made it so" (57). Such a description would almost equally fit any of the Kissi Mountains, and was probably as accurate half a century before Migeod visited the area as it was half a century later.







Apart from the Kissi Mountains, the outstanding relief feature in Luawa is Mount Mamba, just south of the Keya River near the town of Nyandehun. Alldridge described it in his 1891 visit: "This mountain rose very abruptly and appeared to be of rock formation entirely barren in many parts with here and there a few bushy looking trees studded about, especially upon the summit, where they stood out in relief against the sky" (58). The flat-topped mountain, about 2,400 feet high (59), is clearly visible from places 8 or 9 miles away.

Mamba and the Kissi Mountains are noticeable because they rise above the surrounding land-mass, but since Luawa is set in the foothills of the Guinea Highlands, almost the whole country is hilly. Roads

LUAWA'S RELIEF AND VEGETATION



**KEY**

-  = Simplified contours shown at 500-foot intervals
-  = Forested hills
-  = Farm bush
-  = Thicketted grassland
-  = Rapids
-  = Direction of flow of rivers

and paths, typically, present to the traveller a long series of pronounced undulations, with the occasional really steep hill and, more rarely, with a stretch of fairly level ground lasting for between a hundred yards and half a mile (60).

Surprisingly, the division between the two main peoples (61) of the area, the Kissia and the Mendebleisia (62), is not clearly marked by any geographical feature (63) - a reminder of the difficulties of differentiating between 'peoples', and of defining them satisfactorily (64). In the case of the Mende and Kissi people, each of the two groups distinguished itself from the other in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries (65): but the criteria used to make the distinction are not obvious - not even, perhaps, to the people themselves. Differences in 'physical characteristics' and in 'ethnic origin' do not establish any clear division between the two peoples. A linguistically-based criterion seems most helpful, since the Kissia and Mendebleisia speak languages which are quite unlike each other (66), and it is possible to mark quite definitely on a present-day map those places in which the Mende language is predominant, and those places where the Kissi language is the more common (67). Throughout our period, the Kissi people predominated numerically in the 'eastern third' of Kailondo's Luawa, the Mende people in the 'western two-thirds' (68). This linguistic boundary is not, however, entirely acceptable as a dividing line between the two peoples. Some men, in the 1970s, would call themselves Kissia although they are more proficient in the Mende language than the Kissi language (69). A century earlier, Kailondo himself, though he was usually associated with the Mendebleisia and must have spoken the Mende language with complete fluency, was recognized as a Kissi-man by the people of Luawa (70): this

might point towards intermingling between the two peoples even before Kailondo's reign, and although there is little evidence of Mende people living in Kissi country before 1880, groups of Kissi people were living in present-day Luawa. For example, the towns of Mano-Sewalu and Yibema were populated entirely by Kissia, together with the surrounding villages of Komalu (where Kailondo's mother lived), Kpengalu, Tundufulu and Mamutu (71).


Population figures for about the year 1880 cannot even be approximated, either for the different peoples as a whole or for Kailondo's Luawa in particular, but undoubtedly the Mendebleisia altogether were a much larger group than the Kissia. In the mid-twentieth century, the Mende people were numerically about five times larger than the Kissi people (72), and there is little evidence that the relative size of the two peoples was significantly different seventy years earlier (73).

The peoples who lived nearest to the Mendebleisia and Kissia of Luawa were the Kono, Gola, and Gbande. The southern and eastern boundaries of the Kono people, at least by the 1890s, coincided roughly with the present boundary of Kono District in Sierra Leone (74). North of the Moa and east of the Meli lived Kissia, while Mendebla predominated in the lands west and south-west of Luawa (75). Due south of Luawa, in present-day Liberia, was a heavily-forested, sparsely-populated area inhabited by the Gola people (76). To the east and south-east of Luawa, beyond Kissi country, lived the Gbande people (77).







A long and fairly complete list of the mahangsisia who attended the Gbondou Conference can be compiled (78), and this list should indicate with some precision the places which gave Kailondo support, and which together made up 'Kailondo's Luawa' (79). Oral tradition places



THE GBONDOU CONFERENCE c.1880



**KEY**

	Rivers		Dia	Predominantly Kissi-speaking towns and villages represented at the Gbondou Conference
	Present-day eastern boundaries of Sierra Leone. (The Meli, Moa and Magowi Rivers, shown on the map, form the rest of the boundary)		Dodo	Predominantly Mende-speaking towns and villages represented at the Gbondou Conference
	Present-day names and boundaries of Chiefdoms (see Note on Political Terminology)		Mende	Other towns and villages in existence by c. 1880

the emphasis on the people who first gave Kailondo their allegiance rather than the area over which Kailondo's rule first extended, and in mapping Luawa before the colonial period it must be remembered that the Luawa peoples had a personal rather than a territorial concept of the mahayai (80).

Bundu, the leading figure among the mahangeisia at the Gbondou Conference (81), controlled the village of Uanyahun, and also had influence in Talia, Bandajuma, and possibly Mofindor (82) - all villages within 5 miles radius of present-day Kailahun town, except for Talia. Other kpakoisia (83) from within that same area were Mbowa from Yandohun, a village near the present Kailahun barracks (84); Ngobeh Kahunla, later to be P.C. of Luawa (85), whose home was associated with a site near the centre of Kailahun (86); and Sagba, who came from Bobobu (87). There were at least three representatives from Bombali country: Mano Boko came from Nyandehun, the centre of Bombali, Bongo Wudja from Fandu, and Kabatundu from Konjo (88). Each of the main villages of Gbeila country sent a kpako: Mbapu and Koliwa came from Sandialu, Tangbu Landa from Dodo-Cotuma, and Ba from Gbalahun (89). Other kpakoisia from villages in present-day Luawa Chiefdom were Fagbandi Fakoeh from Yibema (near Mano-Sewalu), Jimor from Ngiehun, and Kpawo Bundu from Giema (90). There were leaders from each of the three present-day Kissi Chiefdoms: from Kissi Kama, Koma of Dokosu and Bondo Foryoh of Dia; from Kissi Teng, Segbeba of Petema and Ngombu Hiteh of Senehun; from Kissi Tungi, Ngegba of Buedu and Kaikai of Gbandewulo (91). Two mahangeisia came from north of the Moa, from Wunde country: Katewe of Sakona (a village a few miles north-east of Mofindor), and Bauwa of Yamandu (in the centre of Wunde, some 25 miles north-east of present-day Kailahun [92]). Toweï from

Foya, Ndawua from Konosu (93), and Vama Howura from Konia (94) attended the Conference from Kissi Tengea country in present-day Liberia. At that time, Toweï was mahai of Tengea (95), and Foya was the chief town of that mahawui, about 25 miles east of Kailahun.

Noticeable by absence from the list of representatives are mahanga from Gau country in the south-west of Luawa, including the villages of Bewabu, Sengema, Batwoma, and Jengballu. A partial explanation may be that some people in Gau and even in Giema and Ngiehun (96), were not ready to support Kailondo's accession. Manjakewa and Jobo of Giema joined Ndawa, Kailondo's main protagonist in 1880 (97), as did Fagbandi of Sakabu and Kpawo of Mende (98). Kailondo's military victory against Ndawa's forces confirmed the decision of the Gbondou Conference that Kailondo should be ruler of the whole area. However, Ndawa briefly returned to Luawa soon after his initial defeat "at the invitation of the Ngiyema people" (99) and harried places as far into Luawa as Talia. In reprisal, Kailondo burnt the town of Giema, and before long Ndawa finally left Luawa in peace. Later again, Jobo, Manjakewa and Fagbandi were involved in yet another rebellion against Kailondo which cost them their lives (100). There are indications that this lack of support from the Mende-speaking Gau and Giema areas towards the new rulers of Luawa continued after Kailondo's death and played a part in local politics during the colonial period (101).

Although Alldridge and other British officials regarded Kailondo as a Mende Chief (102), Kailondo himself was a Kissi-man (103), and seems to have received much of his support from Kissi country: about half the mahangcisia at the Gbondou meeting seem to have been of Kissi origin (104) and represented a much wider spread of territory than did

those of Mende origin. To the first British travellers, Kailondo's Luawa gave the impression of being predominantly Mende because in east-west distance, about two-thirds of the polity was Mende-speaking. But the Kissi-speaking constituent had a longer north-south distance, and was slightly larger in total area than the Mende constituent. The three present-day Kissi Chiefdoms, which represent the Kissi part of Kailondo's heartland, occupy 210 square miles, compared with 180 square miles for Luawa Chiefdom, which roughly represents the Mende part (105).

## 2. THE ORIGINS OF THE MENDEBLEISIA AND KISSIA IN THE LUAWA AREA.

'Where did the Mendebleisia and their neighbours come from?' is a question which has aroused considerable discussion since the publication in 1920 of Northcote Thomas' article, 'Who were the Manes?' (106). Perhaps questions like these encourage unsatisfactory discussion because they foster the illusion that there is sufficient evidence to reach clear conclusions. A more suitable question, in relation to the subject of this present thesis, might be, 'What scraps of information can be discovered about the people of Luawa before 1880?' - recognizing that little information exists. In the absence of written and archaeological evidence, the present writer had to rely solely on oral tradition for pre-1880 events (107): but oral tradition concerning events before Kailondo's rule consists largely of lists of rulers and genealogies. The longest genealogy discovered was, not surprisingly, that of Kailondo himself, going back five generations (108). Many genealogies and lists of rulers do not go back further than one generation before Kailondo's time. The best that can be done is to relate useful evidence found in Luawa's oral traditions to the wider discussion of Mende-Kissi origins.

Modern historians agree that the Kissia almost certainly settled in their present homeland (109) before the Mendebleisia arrived. Dr. Walter Rodney, writing of the situation in the twelfth century A.D., notes: "The Kissis at that time occupied most of the eastern portion of the present Republic of Guinea and the region along the present Sierra Leone - Liberia frontier" (110). M. Person agrees that the Kissia, at least by the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, occupied almost their present boundaries; though he thinks it is an exaggeration to state that they formerly occupied the main part of eastern Republic of Guinea (111).

The Mendebleisia, by contrast, are not mentioned at all by European writers in the sixteenth century, which may imply that they arrived in the area after that date (112). Ogildby, writing in 1670, was the first person to mention the Mendebleisia, by which time the Kissia were quite well known (113). Between the late seventeenth and early nineteenth centuries little reference was made to the Mendebleisia or their country. By 1843, however, Dr. Robert Clarke, referring to them by the now pejorative title of 'Kussoh', could outline fairly accurately the area which they occupied: "The Kussoh country appears to lie between the parallels of 7° and 8° 15' north latitude and in a south east direction, between the degrees of 10° 30' and 12° west longitude" (114). This eastern frontier of longitude 10° 30' west is of interest because it passes through the heart of Luawa, and over a century later is still approximated to the linguistic boundary between the Mendebleisia and the Kissia.

The advent of the Mendebleisia in the area has usually been related to the Mane invasion which European observers reported in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (115). Dr. P.E.H. Hair has usefully suggested that "the invasion was probably only a war of political conquest, and not a mass migration, as the sources suggest" (116). Dr. Peter Kup, in a rather involved argument, suggests a date of just after the mid-sixteenth century for the Mane invasion (117), but believes that the Mende people in a related movement were still migrating into present-day Sierra Leone during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (118). Rodney, taking a different view, seeks to establish that the Manes arrived "in about twenty years after 1545" (119). He explains the absence of reference to the Mende people in written sources

until another whole century had passed, and lack of frequent reference before the mid-nineteenth century, by trying to draw "a careful distinction between the arrival of the conquering forces and the formation of new tribal entities" (120). During this period of silence, the Mende people were formed by "the Mane fusion with the Bulloms and the Kissis" (121): the Mendebleisia are "clearly the product of an intermixture on a Bullom base, and with an upper strata showing distinct Mande traits" (122). Elsewhere, Rodney has added that the Manes "overran all of the Sherbro Bulloms, but their greatest impact was made around the Gallinas and Cape Mount, and at some distance inland" - a description which would probably include Luawa itself (123). "Here, therefore, the Mende 'tribe' can be said to have emerged, moving deeper into Sierra Leone proper during the eighteenth century" (124). M. Person has agreed that this is an accurate assessment of Mende origins, and has suggested that the term 'Mende' developed after the Mane newcomers "bestowed their name, Mane, to the Mel-speaking autochtones, borrowing their language (Mandenyi)" (125). After assimilation of "the autochthonous Bulom or Kisi", the Mende people began "pushing toward the coast during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (126).

When applied to Luawa, the Rodney-Person theory appears inadequate in several ways. Dr. Rodney gives only one example of intermixing and cultural fusion - "the presence of both matrilineal and patrilineal features of inheritance" (127) - and notes that "Mende tradition distinguishes between the earliest settlers and invaders who came from the north" (128): but tradition in the Luawa area does not distinguish in this way (129). Granted that the Mendebleisia represent considerable intermixing of various cultural and linguistic groups, there seems little evidence that this intermixing took place simply between the Manes, Bulloms

and Kissi people, or that it occurred between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries. Many of the cultural features which are common to Kissi, Mende, and Sherbro (Bullom) people, such as Secret Societies (130), are shared by many other peoples of Upper Guinea (131), and it is improbable that these common social and cultural features originated through interchange only between the Manes, Kissia and Bullom people. The popular idea of two distinct 'physical types' among the Mendebleisia, which Dr. Rodney also adduces as evidence supporting his theory, seems to have originated in some comments by F.W.H. Migeod in Chapter 16 of A View of Sierra Leone (132) - a chapter containing so much doubtful material, including an excursion into the pseudo-science of phrenology (133), that suspicion is cast on the value of its conclusions in general.

A more serious objection to Rodney's theory is that if the Mendebleisia are partly the product of a fusion of Manes and Kissia, how is it possible still to draw a clear boundary between the Mende and Kissi people? In 1896, for example, Governor Cardew indicated that Guabu was a Mende village, but moving eastwards from Guabu one entered Kissi country: Buedu, little more than two miles further east, was a Kissi village (134). Does this mean, according to Dr. Rodney's theory, that at some stage the Kissia from Guabu westwards fused with the Manes to become the Mendebleisia, whilst the contiguous Kissia from Buedu eastwards never fused in this way? This may have been the case, but sufficient evidence does not exist to prove it. Inadequate evidence is a sad limitation, but at least for Luawa it is better explicitly to admit the limitation rather than to build tenuous arguments about Mende-Kissi origins.

The present writer would accept Dr. Hair's judgement on the problem of Mende origins. The Mende people probably reached the Atlantic coast in the late eighteenth century, but, wrote Dr. Hair,



"the accounts of the interior of this area are so thin and so difficult to interpret that the possibility that this Mende people, like the Susu, in earlier centuries occupied the immediate hinterland cannot be ruled out. But we cannot identify the Mende, decisively, in the early sources" (135).

In recent studies, Mr. Arthur Abraham has developed two points concerning the advent of the Mendebleisia in Koo-Mende (North-Eastern Mendeland [136] ) during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (137). First, there is little evidence that the emergence of the Mendebleisia and their states involved war and conquest. "Early Mende states came into being through movements of migrant people(s), not through waves of invaders". Secondly, perhaps the most significant factor in the emergence of the Mende people and their polities was the infiltration into the present Mende homeland of Mende settlers from the north. "Many oral traditions seem to be in general agreement on the introduction of the Mende factor, as they recall their ancestors coming from 'Koh' i.e. 'up-country' [139]. This would seem to refer to the country around Futa Jallon and beyond. The tradition also seems to imply that there were small, if somewhat detached, people roaming the country, who would come and settle in an area that begins to grow in fame under some leader" (140).

The present writer's evidence from Luawa (mainly for the nineteenth century) would tend to support Mr. Abraham's conclusions. References in oral tradition to the decades before 1880 suggest that Mandingo people (141) and other 'strangers' from the north, were coming peaceably into Luawa, settling in the area, and intermarrying with the local people. Jimoh, who founded Giema perhaps a generation before the

accession of Kailondo, came from Kono (142). A few Muslim Mandingo and Susu people settled in Mano-Sewalu, praying for the mahgi (143), converting some of the people, and working as farmers (144). Mandingo traders from present-day Guinea settled in Kissi Kama and introduced Islam there. They intermarried with the Kissia and became part of the local community to such an extent that their children did not know where their fathers came from (145): these children were fluent only in the Kissi language and knew little of the mother tongue of their fathers. The numbers of these settlers may not have been large, but neither, perhaps, was the local population (146).

Research in Luawa has suggested a further point concerning the movement of peoples in this area during the century before Kailondo's accession: groups of Kissia were migrating over fairly small distances in a generally south-west direction. Kissia settlers may first have come into the Luawa area at a time when there were few other inhabitants, though it is impossible to discover how long before the accession of Kailondo this original influx of Kissia occurred. "The first known settlements were said to be founded by a great warrior named 'GBANGON' who came from the north-east, likely Kissi Kenema (now in French Guinea), accompanied by brothers, war-boys, wives, children and many other people. This party, on crossing the Moa River ..., built a little town on its banks and called it Yebema" (147). There was some fighting between these Kissia and the Mendebleisia who were already living in the area (148). Wotay, the son of Gbangon, succeeded his father, and during his reign, "intermarriage began and the Kissi people learnt to talk the Mendi tongue and the Mendis to speak the Kissi language" (149). Kailondo's own father was a Kissi-man from Wunde who migrated south of the Moa to live with his wife's family near Mano-Sewalu (150). Pweka, chief of Koindu in the early


1920s, had a great-grandfather named Kuliberi who had come from the north and built the town (151). Similarly, in Kissi Kama the great-grandfather of Chief Jabba (Chiefdom Speaker of Kissi Kama, 1955 - ) of Dia came from Wunde, just north of the Moa: in fact all the people of Kissi Kama may originally have been immigrants from Guinea (152). Ex-P.C. Kaitungi of Kissi Tungi made the same point about Kissia migration: "We the Kissis of course, we migrated from Guinea about the seventeenth century. We migrated from Guinea and came towards this way by war. A batch of Kissis went to Liberia, a batch of them came here" (153).

W.D. Bowden, Central Province Commissioner in 1929, noted this same migration of the Kissia, and suggested it may have been matched by an earlier (though possibly less forceful) eastward movement of the Mendeblaisia. Bowden was trying to discover which Chiefdom should be given control of several villages on the Mende - Kissi border (154), but the arguments of the different factions "left it very doubtful whether the villages spread eastwards by Mendi influence or westwards by Kissi influence. I rather inclined to the latter view, though Bela section of Luawa Chiefdom [155] was or is undoubtedly a remnant of an old Mendi chiefdom just as the old Bendehun chiefdom was a Mendi one but is now Kissi Tongi-Tingi having been overrun by Kissis or rather Komendis" (156). This change of name from Kpendehun to Tungi-Tingi (indicating a change of ownership from Mende to Kissi people) is also mentioned in oral tradition (157). Further, it is claimed that many of the names of streams and hills in this area are of Gbande origin (158), which might point to a still earlier Gbande occupation before the Mendeblaisia established the mahawui (159) of Kpendehun. The largest town in Tungi-Tingi at the beginning of the colonial period was probably Gbandewulo, which in the

MAP FOUR

SOME POLITICAL FEATURES OF THE

LUAWA AREA c. 1870



Mende language means literally 'Little Gbande', perhaps with the sense 'Satellite of Gbande country' (160).

A further indication of eastward expansion by the Mende people (which preceded westward expansion by the Kissia) is to be found in evidence discovered by Arthur Abraham: parts of the country just east of the Moa River which, by the colonial period, were known as part of Mende country, had once been Gola territory, and had been called Dola (161). The distribution of villages named 'Mendekelema', meaning 'The end (or limit) of the Mende people', provides another clue to earlier limits of Mende country; and these limits in the Luawa area seem consistently west of those of the present-day (162).

The evidence from Luawa, then, points to a steady and largely peaceful process of south-westward migration by groups of Kissia, following an earlier eastward movement by groups of Mendebleisia (163). These limited migrations had not ceased by the nineteenth century: Kissia were, in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries, continuing to travel comparatively short distances, enter Luawa, and settle there, intermingling and intermarrying. Although a fairly clear linguistic boundary was fixed between the Mendebleisia and Kissia by the mid-nineteenth century at the latest (164), small group movements went on right through the colonial period (165). Some Mendebleisia began moving back into Kissi country, while Kissia continued to move south-westwards into Mende country.

Such movements did not involve the mass migration of one particular people, but rather concerned individuals and small groups from a number of different peoples, with Mende and Kissi people predominating; neither did these group movements turn on one invasion or one 'period of infiltration', but stretched over several centuries. This

conclusion accords well with the modified views of Yves Person on the subject of folk movements in Upper Guinea at large. "If heavy displacements and substitutions of population were rare", he wrote in 1971, "parties were nevertheless continuously on the move for economic or political reasons; the result is the modification of population through intermarriage, the transformation of social structures, and the expansion or regression of languages" (166). Unspectacular and not easily pin-pointed, this continuing infiltration was probably a more significant long-term factor in Luawa's history than a single dramatic invasion by the Manes or any other group, either in the distant or the comparatively recent past.

### 3. SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION IN LUAWA,

c. 1840 - 1880.

The earliest written reference to Luawa dates from as late as 1890, when T.J. Alldridge, a Travelling Commissioner of the Sierra Leone colonial government, reached the area (167). It is tempting to extrapolate from the situation described by Alldridge in the early 1890s back into the past to explain what society - its politics and economics - 'must have been like' a decade or two earlier: but such methods have done serious violence to Mende history (168). Since wood, thatch and wattle were probably the main building materials, and since most artifacts were made from materials like sun-baked clay and wood (which quickly perish in a tropical climate), archaeology provides little help. The only substantial piece of pre-nineteenth century archaeological evidence in this area are the stone nomoliisia (in the Mende and Bullom languages: the Kissia call them nomdo). These are small figurines, usually less than a foot high, carved in soapstone. Recent research into their origins and significance has emphasized the almost insuperable problems of interpreting a single archaeological 'clue' when little else is known about the Society (169). Likewise, local oral traditions, which are very thin until Kailondo's accession (170), give almost no help on economic and social matters.

Even what little evidence does exist for the decades before 1880 may not be a very helpful pointer to the nature of 'traditional society' in the Luawa area, because by the second half of the nineteenth century Luawa had probably experienced a succession of socially disruptive experiences spread over the previous three hundred years or so. First, as both Kup and Rodney agree, the coastal forest belt of Upper Guinea

(on the northern edge of which lay Luawa) was "a retreat for those who, uprooted elsewhere amidst the clash of imperial armies, sought sanctuary" (171). Some of the settlers in Luawa from the sixteenth century onwards, including the Manes themselves, may have been fleeing southwards from conquering rulers in the Sudan; or, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, from the ijahds of Muslim leaders (172). Even though most of the settlers came peaceably, many probably came as disorganized refugees, and their movement into Luawa would make for fluid and unsettled social relationships. Second, the arrival of molibla (173), or Muslims, in the community would tend to increase the possibilities of social conflict, even if the Muslims were few in number and were ready to accommodate 'pagan' practices within their allegiance to Islam (174). Third and possibly most important, illegal trans-Atlantic slave-trading continued from Sulima, the town at the end of the shortest route from Luawa to the sea, until the mid-nineteenth century (175). The destruction of the 'factories' at Sulima by the British navy in 1849 symbolized the end of a terrible era for the hinterland (176). The amount of slave-trading which went on in the area in the late nineteenth century might suggest that in Luawa, as in many other territories comparatively near the coast, from the seventeenth century until the first decades of the nineteenth century, social, political and economic life was organized to produce "a steady flow of slaves for ships anchored along the coast" (177) - and the influence of the trans-Saharan slave-trade may also have affected the area (178).

A discussion of life in Luawa before 1880 would have to take account of these disruptive factors which probably continued to produce an abnormal state of affairs in the area as late as the 1870s. The likely conclusion to be drawn from any such discussion would be that,



as regards Luawa, 'traditional society' is a fictitious stereotype: there was no settled, static social order which had remained unchanged for centuries. It is not impossible that Luawan society experienced more radical changes during the hundred years up to 1880 than it did in the subsequent hundred years.

Slavery as a local institution and slave-trading as an element in commerce both continued in the Luawa area into the late nineteenth century: to what extent this situation represented an outworking of conditions which had been created earlier by the Atlantic and Saharan trades is difficult to judge. Yves Person's opinion is that domestic slavery "knew a rapid spread during the Sudanese Middle Ages, but the part it played among stateless societies, especially along the Guinea coast, was quite marginal. Its place was enlarged through the harmful influence of the European slave trade, but this does not lead to a denial of its previous existence" (179). One of the main prizes of war in Luawa during the 1880s was the number of slaves gained. For example, after his defeat of Ndawa, "Kai [180] distributed twenty slaves and spoils of war amongst the chiefs, and each returned to his own country well satisfied" (181). Slaves were also used as payment: for instance, a dowry might be made up of a cow, some country cloth, and one or two slaves (182). If the main economic activity in Luawa was upland-rice farming, then presumably slaves would be employed mainly as farm labourers (183). Slaves had, however, limited opportunities to improve their social position. Ndawa, Kailondo's adversary, had been a slave but his ability as a kogugba had won him both his freedom and later the status of a komaha (184) with a substantial following (185). Ndawa was an exception: most slaves would not be able to achieve so much, but under a good master a slave might feel part of the household to such an extent that, even if he was given

the opportunity of independence, he might opt to stay in the same position under the same master (186).

Politically, there was no single superior ruler in authority over the whole of Luawa in the decades before Kailondo's accession (187): many petty mahanga (188) each ruled a few square miles of the countryside. "A town of about 150 houses in those days would be considered very large", noted Rev. W.R.E. Clarke, "and it seems that the majority of 'chief' towns were well under the 100. Each town would have its own chief, who would, perhaps, rule over a few outlying villages, and whose position depended upon his own prowess or the prowess of his warriors.

As in these days, Farming was the chief occupation, together with Hunting and Fishing, and the spasmodic gathering of Palm Kernels for the making of soap or the crushing of the oil nuts for Palm oil" (189). This correlates with the description given by Maada James Kailondo: "There had always been the tamahei [190]. The person who built the town was the tamahei: when he died, then his children or his descendants became the tamahei .... The founders of towns and those whose towns became the largest were the owners of the country .... Somebody founded a town, then this town expanded over a very large area. People from this town founded villages themselves, and this area was naturally under the founder of the bigger town. Therefore the area was under him, and was named after him" (191). For example, the area round Mano village in Luawa was named 'Sewalu' after Kengi Sewa (192) who built up the town of Mano (193); and Sewalu was one of many tiny, independent polities existing in the area at the time of Kailondo's accession (194). These independent polities became the patisia or 'sections' of Kailondo's new, larger political unit; Kailondo's Luawa (195).

In a sensitive study of Mende socio-political organization, Rev. A.C. Lamb, writing in the colonial period (196), commented on the anthropological significance of this development of the pati or 'section'. "The life of the Mende centres round two foci: the family and the chiefdom. To take one of these first, the family, does not imply that the chiefdom, especially in its modern form, is a natural outgrowth of Mende life due to the coalescence of various families. In fact it is highly probable that the 'section' is the natural unit formed from the development of the family" (197). In the Luawa area, the patiisia probably grew 'organically' out of the extended family (198): the mahawui of Luawa, by contrast, was created partly in response to new political pressures and partly through the politico-military actions of one man - Kailondo.

Many of Luawa's largest human settlements (199) were well-established before 1880, having developed as 'headquarters towns' of the many tiny independent polities of the area. Representatives attended the Gbondou Conference from the towns of Ngiehun, Giema, Nyandehun, Dodo-Cotuma, Sandialu, Gbalahun, Buedu and Dia (200). Oral tradition indicates that Batwoma (201), Mano-Sewalu, Yibema, and Gbandewulo (202) were among the other large villages in the area. This list shows, somewhat surprisingly, that of the nine largest towns in Luawa at the end of the colonial period (203), at least five were already in existence even before Kailondo's accession. The extent and number of fakaisia (204) controlled by the mahangaisia of these towns no doubt depended partly on the size of the central town, and partly on the power and prestige of the individual maheli.

Upland-rice farming was, from the time of Kailondo onwards, the basic economic activity, necessary for subsistence and involving virtually the whole community for much of the year (205). There is little evidence as regards Luawa itself to indicate whether this was also the situation before Kailondo's reign: but a crop which was clearly the staple food of Luawa by the 1890s is likely to have been widely grown for at least decades, if not centuries, before that date. Certain species of rice are indigenous in this part of West Africa, and may have been cultivated for several thousand years (206). Most British officials who visited Luawa in the 1890s presumed that arable farming could only have been introduced on a wide scale since the recent arrival of the 'pax Britannica': before that, people must have been too busy fighting to be serious cultivators (207). But this was pure conjecture based on the presumed beneficial results of British rule: since no British official had ever been to Luawa or even heard of the name before Alldridge's visit (208), they could not have had any first-hand knowledge of conditions there before 1890.

That rice was commonly grown in Luawa before 1880 is suggested by the symbolic gifts offered to Kailondo when he was granted the mahayei: these gifts included some rice which almost certainly represented the staple food of the people (209). One tradition about the founding of Giema in Luawa is that Jimoh established the town on the site of a rice farm he made for his wife perhaps a generation before Kailondo's accession (210), and Mr. Kulu-Banya's History indicates that rice farming was the main activity of the people of Luawa by the end of the eighteenth century (211). In 1786, Lieutenant Matthews wrote from Bunce Island in the Sierra Leone River that the "customary food of the natives is rice, which they always boil quite dry, and either eat it with palm-oil poured over it, or a very strong gravy made of fish, flesh, or fowl, and vegetables


boiled together, highly seasoned with pepper and spices, and palm oil" (212). If this was also the typical diet of the people in Luawa in the succeeding century, then agricultural activities there must have included not only the planting of rice, but also the harvesting of palm produce (in order to make palm oil), and the growing of vegetables.

As regards commerce before 1880, weekly markets were established at least in Gbande country. Alldridge noted in 1891 the existence of one such market outside the town of Popalahun (east of Luawa in Gbande country), and there was every sign that this was a well-established market of long-standing (213), though neither Alldridge nor any other written or oral record gives any indication of when these markets first developed. According to oral tradition, they were fairly common in Gbande country before the British arrived (214). A colonial official writing in 1906 stated that Bomaru (in present-day Dia Chiefdom, near the southernmost tip of Luawa) had been "the market place since time immemorial for the Bandi, Gola Gidzi [Kissi] and Mendi tribes", the market being held every Wednesday (215). Presumably Alldridge was referring to this when he noted that weekly markets did not seem to exist "in localities that can be supplied from the Coast; the nearest being at Bai-wara [near Bomaru]" (216). These markets only existed in areas far from the coast not simply because there was a greater need for interchange of locally-made goods in up-country areas, beyond the range of European manufactures. Another reason, probably, was that petty trade wars between rulers near the coast had prevented the development of sufficient political stability to allow weekly markets to function (217). But beyond the coastal fringe, rulers like Kailondo achieved a degree of law and order which allowed weekly markets to be carried on. According to certain oral traditions, weekly markets existed within Kailondo's

Luawa, at least in Kissi country, before the British arrived: for example at Kpuya (near Koindu), Yeballu (near Sandia), and Vuahun (near Buedu) (218).

The presence of such markets in the Luawa area is the best proof of the existence of organized local trading before 1880. In his comments on warfare before the time of Kailondo, Rev. Clarke mentions the exchange of slaves, country cloths, cattle, guns and salt (219). These were probably the staple items of commerce in a weekly market before Kailondo's time, together with locally-grown foodstuffs. Oral traditions record the existence, in addition to these weekly markets, of trade between the coast and Luawa, and though they give no indication of when this trade began, they suggest that the staples used in this long-distance trade were similar to those in local markets. Kissi and Mende people would go to buy salt and guns, together with tobacco, at Sulima, Mano Salija and Bonthe, in exchange for country cloths and cattle (220).

An indigenous local currency was in widespread use, at least in Kissi country, before 1880 and consisted of a twisted strip of iron about one-eighth of an inch wide, with a 'T' shape at one end and a flat 'lobe' at the other. In 1891, Alldridge noted the length as about 2 feet 6 inches (221), but later examples were typically about one foot long (222); the first European visitors called these strips of iron 'Kissi pennies' or 'Kissi irons'. Alldridge remarked of the market at Popalahun that the "local currency was Iron and Salt. The iron which was all of native manufacture was always of one shape somewhat resembling a long T hing [sic], and was valued at one leaf or two short leaves of American tobacco of this description, one bundle of salt [about 7 pounds weight] being valued at 20 Irons" (223). Alldridge suggested that one Kissi penny was the equivalent of one English



"KISSI PENNIES"

(These are in the possession of the present writer.)

penny (224). "In the bush I met several native women who were going to this market, with their purses under their arms, in the shape of a mat, containing perhaps a couple of dozen of these pieces of iron" (225). These Kissi pennies were apparently manufactured up-country in present-day Guinea and Liberia (226), and were a currency of considerable antiquity. Mr. Tamba Ngendu of Dokosu in Kissi Kama, an elder whose age in 1972 was estimated at over 90 years, said, "Even my great-grandfather used to sell people to get these irons, because without them you were nowhere". They were sometimes obtained in exchange for children known to be from an illegitimate union (227). Kissi pennies, then, were established as a form of currency at least by the end of the eighteenth century.

Little can be said about the 'quality' of the daily life of the ordinary people around the year 1880. It has been suggested that at this time tropical Africa in general was "still largely unexplored, unadministered and unannexed at a moment that probably marked its lowest depth of disorder and misery" (228). However, the few details which have been uncovered about the Luawa area just before Kailondo's accession clearly demonstrate that this area was sufficiently well administered and ordered to prevent the ordinary people from collectively experiencing serious, long-lasting misery.



4. THE KPOVE WAR AND KAILONDO'S ACCESSION, c. 1880.

The accession of Kailondo marks a turning point in oral tradition concerning political events in Luawa. Stories about his accession and events thereafter are numerous, clear and precise, in contrast with the vague and scanty information on earlier years (229).

About the year 1830 there began the Kpove War (230), which was to affect large areas of Mendeland including Luawa. It appeared to start with the raids of Mahei Banyia of Blama (231) against his neighbours, and the consequent counter-campaign against him by the Kugbei (232) Ndawa. (The latter was born near Segbwema [233], but spent most of his early manhood round the Tikonko area, before building the town of Wende [234].) The Kpove War then developed into a series of separate campaigns, raids and disturbances lasting a number of years (235). Some accounts even suggest that the Kpove War had already begun before Ndawa launched his campaign: certainly the aftermath of the war was felt long after Ndawa's defeat. This is illustrated for the Luawa area in a history of Kailondo's reign which was provided by his son, P.C. Momoh Banyia. "The Pove Wars were attacks or raids led by Mendigra and Bobone who crossed the Guma country on the south-eastern borders invaded and plundered the towns of Normor, Gaura, Dama, Nongowa, Jaluahun, Jawi, Malema, Dia, Mando, Upper Bambarra and part of the Gau country [236] where Kai-Lundu with his sub-warriors met them and heedlessly with might and main as far as Wandoh .... Next followed another pove War led by Dawa, the whole of the Guma country [237], Upper Bambarra, despoilt and burnt everybody fled for their lives - Kailundu took up arms against Dawa, defeated him, and drove him out of that country .... Later another war broke out led by Manyia, a Konno Warrior, he invaded the towns of the northern territories,

burnt every town he met and invaded the Wunde Chiefdom . . . . our great warrior with his sub-warriors followed him defeated him as far as Kamayiende in Konno" (238). Although the chronology of this account may be confused it clearly shows that the effects of the Kpove War were felt all through Kc-Mende and beyond - from Bandajuma near Pujehun (239) in the south, to Kono country in the north (240); from the Sewa River in the west (241), to Luawa, Malema (242), and Koya (243) countries in the east. Its repercussions were felt as far east as Kpelle country (in present-day Liberia) whither Kailondo chased Mbawulomsh, one of Ndawa's lieutenants (244).

In the late 1880s, the confusion created by the Kpove War was still being felt in eastern Mendeland, and British officials took this to indicate that war had been part of the people's way of life from 'time immemorial' (245). However, the very fact that the Kpove War was so well-remembered in local folklore, and that it produced such a remarkable reaction among the mahangsisia at the Gbondou Conference (246) suggests that it was altogether exceptional, not part of the usual state of affairs. Ndawa, a kogugba with few responsibilities and only a weak territorial base (247), was free to wage war with a recklessness and ferocity which the people of Luawa had not known before (248): possibly for the first time they experienced 'total war', very different from the occasional raid of one irate maha against a village belonging to another. Probably, the Kpove War was an unprecedentedly terrible experience for the people of eastern Mendeland.

British officials 'on the spot' up-country in Mendeland were ready to typify the disturbances of the Kpove War period as the normal condition in Mende country because they were concerned with the extension of British control in the area, and they insisted that such

an extension was of enormous benefit to the indigenous people themselves. The greater the contrast between the wildness of conditions before the British arrived and the improvement which took place afterwards, the more justification there was for the activities of Alldridge, Garrett and the others who enlarged British territory (249). Writers who later discussed this period tended to draw the contrast even more sharply than the first officials. Professor Little, writing about the whole of Mendeland before the colonial period, stated that warfare was "the principal form of activity and institution" (250). Dr. Wylie, dealing with the Luawa area just before the colonial period, noted that, although war was no more 'natural' to the people of eastern Mendeland than to Europeans, yet society was "organized around war", that war "became an essential part of the life of the people, and it is evident from traditions that war largely dictated even the emerging politics" (251). Mr. J.M. Malcolm took a similar view (252).

There may be a small element of truth in these estimates concerning the role of war in Luawa, though war stories are dramatic enough to lend themselves to being retold, and therefore generally play a large part in oral tradition, whether or not war was the main activity of the society (253). Colonial officials were certainly correct to emphasize the large amount of fighting which took place during the second half of the nineteenth century in the immediate hinterland of Freetown and Sherbro (254), but that does not prove anything about the situation further inland in a polity like Luawa. The warfare which did occur further inland was probably on a small scale and far from continual: one or two villages might be captured and burnt in a single raid, a handful of people killed on both sides (255) - a serious matter, but nothing like the 'total war' of the 1880s, and bearing no comparison in

destructive potential with 'set-piece' battles between large armies ranging over a wide area.

Alldrige himself implies a distinction between different types of warfare by noting that wars (i.e. limited wars) had been carried on "from time immemorial" in Mende country (256), but when he set out on his travels in 1890 the people of Mendeland had just reached the end of a particularly long and serious war (i.e. the Kpove 'total' War) which had "depopulated and devastated much of the country" (257). Before the Kpove War, according to another careful writer, the interior "seems to have been relatively peaceful until about 1874" (258); even limited war was apparently uncommon in Luawa in the decades before 1880. Rev. Clarke's opinion was that farming provided the chief occupation: "War served as a sort of interlude .... On the whole there does not seem to have been much fighting between the Luawa chiefs themselves, although one or two instances are on record" (259). The present writer found that oral traditions concerning events occurring before 1880 lacked records of serious fighting in the area before the Kpove War (260). There would probably have been some unrecorded fighting, but it would seem a serious misrepresentation to go as far as to suggest that society in Luawa before 1880 (or afterwards) was organized round war.

There are different accounts of how Luawa came to be affected by the Kpove War. The fullest account, recorded by Rev. Clarke, suggests that Ndawa first entered the area in pursuit of Banya of Blama, who fled north to Kono country. Kailondo joined Ndawa in the pursuit, but a quarrel between them caused Kailondo to return home. This annoyed Ndawa who left following Banya and instead turned his kogugbanga against

Kailondo and Luawa (261). Other accounts simply show Ndawa entering Luawa on a marauding expedition, against which the local mahangcisia had to take some immediate action (262). Whichever account is most accurate, the fact is that Luawa was almost bound to be affected eventually by the Kpove War; and if there was a quarrel between Ndawa and Kailondo, it acted as an occasion for Ndawa's attack rather than its real cause.

The Luawa mahangcisia reacted to the Kpove War crisis by meeting at the village of Gbondou (263). Some accounts suggest that Bundu of Qanyahun called this conference (264) and was the chief supporter of Kailondo (265): he certainly acted as the spokesman or representative (266) of the assembled mahangcisia. After a chequered career he had settled in the country of his birth, Luawa, at the village of Qanyahun (near present-day Kailahun) and achieved a position of some prestige and influence in the area, developing his birthplace, Talia, together with Bandajuma and Qanyahun (267). If he acted as ad hoc leader of the Gbondou assembly, it is likely that he was also the most powerful political figure in the Luawa area during the years before Kailondo's accession.

Another account of the conference suggests that it was Kailondo who took the initiative. "When Ndawa of Bandajuma raided and ravaged the country, burning Giema, Nyandehun, etc. Chiefs Masa, Pauwo Bundu, Bowa, Jimmi, Sagba, and Bundeh met with Kailondo to discuss what should be done. Kahunla, Fa Bundeh's Chief Santiggi [268] was present at the meeting. Kailondo asked the others what they would give him if he defeated Ndawa, and they all swore to make him Chief of the whole country" (269). Yet another record has been provided by Mr. Kulu-Banya. Although his story cannot easily be reconciled with the Clarke

account (270), it does give an insight into the way decisions may have been reached at the conference. According to Mr. Kulu-Banya, Ndawa sent a message to Kailondo, inviting him to join forces in a common campaign, and at almost the same time, the 'big men' (271) of Luawa called Kailondo to meet them. Before Kailondo's arrival, "a great meeting was held to determine a spokesman and what they should tell him on his arrival. By this time the messenger sent by Dawa ... had also arrived, and when asked the course Dawa wished to take, the inhabitants of SARKABU [272] and other neighbouring towns who were already gathered there were informed that Dawa had sent him to ask Kailundu to join him, and if he failed to do so he would lay waste all the lands and kill everyone of them. When Kailundu arrived he was met by the spokesman, Bundor of Nganyahun ... who narrated to him the reason he was called and the fear they entertained towards Dawa. The messenger of Dawa too delivered his message at the same time. Bundor seeing that Kailundu was more inclined to fight Dawa as an enemy, promised that if Kailundu succeeded in driving him away, they would make him chief of SARKABU and all the neighbouring towns and villages, and confirmed his words by calling all the big men of the country who swore loyalty and allegiance to him.

Kailundu having the support of all the people about him, sent word to Dawa that he would on no account join him ...." (273). This account suggests that Kailondo himself recognized the Gbondou Conference as a crucial point in his own career, and "wasted no time in exploiting the doubts and fears of the Luawa lords to his best advantage" (274).

Apparently there was no great difficulty either in assembling a considerable number of mahanga from a fairly wide area, or in getting them to accept Kailondo's leadership, and this was surprising,

since a recognition of Kailondo as Mahawai (275) would inevitably result in a reduction of their own political independence and power. The main reason for their acceptance was probably the serious disturbance generated in the area by the Kpove War. The decision of the Gbondou Conference to give Kailondo sovereignty over the whole area created a novel situation in Luawa: but that decision was a response to a possibly unprecedented condition of 'total war' in the area (276). Kailondo, the outstanding warrior of the country, was the only hope for the Luawa mahangeisia. They could not individually resist Ndawa, nor maintain their independence in the turmoil of the Kpove War. Ndawa's character and previous actions (277) indicated that whether or not they submitted to him, he would ravage their country. Only collective resistance could save them from destruction; and Kailondo seemed the kogugbei most likely to lead them to success in this. If he was successful, he would naturally keep in his own hands the political power he had won: but the only alternative seemed to be certain destruction (278). Even so, at least some of the mahangeisia promised sovereignty to Kailondo if he defeated Ndawa "not without some degree of reluctance; a reluctance growing out of the known relationship existing between the two warriors" (279) earlier in the Kpove War. Some people objected, "This Kissi man is too proud, saying he will go to Ngishun and catch that other man and kill him. He is very vain", to which Bundu replied, "you say that this man Kai is too proud, let us wait and see what he can do" (280).

No doubt some of the mahangeisia accepted Kailondo because the influential Bundu encouraged them to do so. A deeper factor making for political unity was the social cohesion already existing among the people of the Luawa area before Kailondo's accession: the common languages of Mende and Kissi; the same social institutions; geographical

proximity; overlapping kinship ties between the people of the different towns which resulted in a complex of interlocking loyalties - for example, Kailondo's mother Kefui, was the sister of Bundu of Uanyahun (281). The people of Luawa had much in common before 1880, they almost certainly possessed a 'sense of belonging' to each other, and all this provided a firm base on which to build the new polity.

The creation of this comparatively large political unit under Kailondo was not a unique development, isolated from what was happening in other parts of present-day Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. Although the points of comparison between Kailondo's Luawa and Samori Touré's Empire are few (282), yet traders coming into Luawa must have brought stories of the great empire which had developed further north. Such stories may have affected the political thinking of the Luawa mahangsisia. Also, proximity to the activities of Samori's sofas may have encouraged the leaders at the Gbondou Conference to think of uniting to resist not only Ndawa but also this ultimately more fearsome threat from the north. Almost certainly, fear of the sofas among the Luawa mahangsisia played at least a part in Kailondo's consolidation of power in Luawa, if not in his accession (283).

A more direct comparison may be made between Kailondo's achievement of power in Luawa and the development of similar nearby polities like Nyagua's Lower Bambara (284) and Mendegla's Gaura (285). Also in the second half of the nineteenth century, Madam Yoko's Kpa-Mende confederacy developed some 150 miles west of Luawa (286), and Boatswain's Boporu confederacy grew up some 100 miles south of Luawa (287). There may have been other similar polities developing for which little or no documentation exists: for instance, there was possibly a small polity just east of Kailondo's Greater Luawa, centred on Kpandeme (288). These



developments were paralleled by the development of Kailondo's Luawa, which was one of the most powerful of the new polities. The almost simultaneous creation of these polities is not easy to explain, but possibly during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, migration into the area (289) created such political unsettlement that state-building was impossible. A re-emergence of political stability occurred in the nineteenth century and hence new polities could develop; but this stability had been barely achieved when the European partition began to affect the area.

If some of the mahangisia at the Gbondou Conference had been half-hearted in accepting Kailondo, his clear military victory over Ndawa gave him a virtually impregnable position as ruler of Luawa. The details of Kailondo's campaign have been told too often to require further description (290). Kailondo countered Ndawa's attempts at an outflanking movement (291): he successfully stormed Ngiehun where Ndawa had established himself and defeated Ndawa in single combat (292): the Luawa forces twice routed Ndawa's kogugbanga as they retreated from Ngiehun and Ndawa's band was driven across the Moa River, away from Luawa (293). This was a remarkable achievement since it represented Ndawa's first defeat in the Kpove War, and of all the leaders involved in that war, Ndawa was possibly the most able and the most feared (294).

Descriptions of Kailondo's war against Ndawa have generally concentrated on the excitement of the single combat between the two leaders, and have given insufficient prominence to Kailondo's military strategy which produced the success of the whole campaign. Similarly, preoccupation with warfare has obscured the significant part

which diplomacy and ritual played in Kailondo's accession. The records agree that Kailondo became Mahai of Luawa not simply through a successful display of military force. Though his accession was partly dependent on prowess in war, it was not, as previous writers have asserted (295), due solely to that prowess. Central to his receiving the mahavei were two similar ceremonies, one taking place at the Gbondou Conference and the other in Ngiehun after Ndawa had been driven away. The common elements in these two ceremonies were the gift to Kailundu by Bundu of Uanyahun of a white cloth containing a little earth - a symbolic offering of the country (296); and on both occasions the mahangeisia promised on oath to be faithful to Kailondo, while he also promised to be faithful to them and not to remain idle if there was any fighting to be done. At Gbondou Kailondo was also given a goat and some rice (297), while at Ngiehun he was given a gun (298) and a young girl (299). The ceremony with the earth and the white cloth was the customary way of indicating submission to an overlord (300). For example, when Ngevau was made mahai of Jojoima in the same period, a presentation of a white cloth and a young woman was made to him (301). Similarly, Faba, who was father of Nyagua and ruler of Dodo, gave some soil wrapped in a white cloth to anyone who required permission to build a village in the area (302). Presumably the ceremony at Gbondou was in anticipation of Kailondo's success against Ndawa; and the similar ceremony at Ngiehun after Kailondo's victory confirmed the decision of the mahangeisia.

At the end of the Gbondou Conference, the gift of the mahavei was confirmed by semi-religious rites in which traditional religion and Islam combined. Everyone concerned swore on 'medecine' to keep his promises - a traditional form of oath-taking (303). Then several molibla spent some time in isolation to consider and pray about the coming war (304):

when they emerged they said the war should be called the 'Kanga War' or 'War of Rebellion' (305). After a final ceremony involving everyone's touching a snake, Kailondo set out against Ndawa (306).

The molibla were apparently for the most-part Muslim Mandingo people from the north who had come into the area either as itinerant teachers or traders, or as settlers (307). Early British writers, translating the Mende-language molibla as 'Morie-men', mythologized them as a highly sinister and seditious 'caste' of wandering semi-Muslim magicians, quite separate from the local community (308). Molibla, however, simply means 'Muslims' in the Mende language (309), and there is little evidence that they were sharply differentiated from other sections of the community. People applied to them for medicine or advice, and possibly through these Muslims, vague stories had spread into Luawa about the eighteenth century ijihad in the Fouta Djallon, the ijhads around the Upper Niger basin in the first half of the nineteenth century (310), as well as about the development of Samori's Mandinka Empire (311). The calling in of Muslims, and their designation of the campaign as the 'War of Rebellion', might have represented a faint and distorted echo of a ijihad against pagans.

Kailondo won the mahavei of Luawa not only by military success but also by means of certain civil ceremonies, reinforced by semi-religious sanctions, in which the local mahangeisia shared. But more than that, Kailondo secured the mahavei for himself in the decade after 1880 by his striking success 'at home and abroad'. The next two chapters of the thesis are devoted to an analysis of that success.

## A NOTE ON POLITICAL TERMINOLOGY

For reasons which are discussed in the main body of the thesis (312), the present writer has tried to maintain a clear distinction between the political vocabulary used in Kailondo's day and that which became common under British influence during the colonial period.

### (a) Political terms in use before the arrival of the British in Luawa

\*Mahawai = overlord, a ruler who possessed considerably more political power than most surrounding rulers; supreme political ruler, who was given personal allegiance by a number of lesser political rulers and their subjects. In English, the word is usually translated as 'chief'. But the word 'chief' (like 'tribe' and 'race') is vague in meaning and possesses many connotations in English which are inappropriate to the Luawa situation. 'Chief' has therefore been avoided (together with 'chieftom' and 'chieftaincy') except where referring specifically to the post-1896, alien (and often artificial) British creations. A mahawa would commonly be called 'Mahai'; and in this thesis the terms mahawai and Mahai (with a capital 'M') are used interchangeably.

\*mahai (with a small 'm') = lesser political ruler, who received the personal allegiance of people scattered over several towns or villages. His subjects might be numbered in thousands, or only in hundreds.

\*ta-mahai = ruler of a single town.

\*fula-mahai = ruler of a single village.

\*komahai = war-leader; the commander of armed forces. He might be a mahawai or a mahai, but he might be neither. For example, the komahai Ndawa, during long stretches of his career, did not rule over any groups of settled people: his political power was based solely on his position as leader of a group of fighting men or kogugbanga.

\*mahawai = the groups of people, collectively, over whom the mahawai or mahai ruled; the polity governed by a mahawai or mahai.

\*mahawai = overlordship, sovereignty; an abstract noun referring to the power possessed by a mahawai or mahai.

### (b) Political terms used during the colonial period. These terms continued in general use after the end of British rule in 1961.

\*Paramount Chief (often abbreviated to P.C.) = a British-created local government official (though the British thought they were merely institutionalising existing political organization in Mendeland). The P.C. possessed, under the British, political control in a given amount of territory: he represented the senior indigenous 'traditional' local government official. From 1920 onwards, in Pendembu District (later Kailahun District) there were between 12 and 15 P.C.s, under one British District Commissioner.

\*Ndolomahai (generally shortened to Ndomahai) = Masa-koleiyo in the Kissi language = an attempted translation into the Mende and Kissi languages of the British concept of 'Paramount Chief'. The term Ndolomahai was commonly used among the Mendebleisia from the early twentieth century onwards.

\*chiefdom = the territory allotted by the British to one particular P.C., to be ruled by him in matters of 'native law and custom' which were outside British interests.

\*chieftaincy = a collection of disparate (and changing) British ideas about the nature of a P.C.'s rule.

\*chief = a British-recognized lesser ruler, subordinate to the P.C. in British local administration; a 'sub-chief'. In this thesis, chief with a small 'c' refers to a lesser ruler subordinate to the P.C., while Chief with a capital 'C' refers to a P.C. (313).

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER ONE

1. 1880 is the date generally accepted for the uniting of the people of Luawa under Kailondo. See:-
  - (a) Clarke, W.R.E., The Foundation of the Luawa Chiefdom (to the death of Kailondo) [Albert Academy Press (Freetown), 1933] p.6. This booklet provided the basis for Rev. Clarke's more widely known article, "The Foundation of the Luawa Chiefdom (the story of Kailondo and Ndawa)" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.8 (June 1957). The booklet, however, contains a somewhat fuller account than the article. Kailondo kee Ndawa [n.a., The Story of Kailondo and Ndawa in the Mende language (Bunumbu Press, Bo, Sierra Leone, 1953, revised and extended ed. 1959)] is, up to its account of Kailondo's death, an exact translation of Rev. Clarke's 1933 booklet.
  - (b) Hollins, N.C., "A Short History of Luawa Chiefdom" in Sierra Leone Studies (o.s.) No.14 (1929), p.12.
  - (c) Gorvie, M., Our Peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate (Africa's Own Library No.6, Lutterworth, London, 1944) p.42.
  - (d) Wylie, K.C., "Innovation and Change in Mende Chieftaincy 1880-1896" in The Journal of African History, X, 2 (1969), p.301.
  - (e) Abraham, A., The Rise of Traditional Leadership among the Mende: a study in the acquisition of political power (unpub. M.A. thesis, Univ. of Sierra Leone, 1971), p.63 ff.

None of these writers give their reasons for choosing 1880, and it is extremely unlikely that the date was provided in the oral traditions. All the writers link Kailondo's accession with the Kpove War, and since 1880 is the date most widely given for its outbreak, the present writer has accepted 1880 as the year in which the new polity was created. There has, however, been some disagreement on when the Kpove War began. Innes, G., A Mende-English Dictionary (C.U.P., 1969), p.61, gives 1885. Fenton, J.S., Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone (Govt. Printer, Freetown, 1948) p.1, suggests 1874, though he does not mention the Kpove War by name.

Maada James Kailondo estimated that Kailondo's accession was 18 years before the coming of the Europeans - presumably in the sense of their coming as rulers in 1896 (Int. 19). A date of 1878 would be supported by a comment in Rev. Clarke's later history of Kailondo's reign in which he states that Kailondo, born c.1845, would have been "just over thirty" at the time of the Kpove War [ Kailondo: the story of a warrior of Sierra Leone (unpub. MS, 1960, in possession of the present writer) ]

2. Luawa was a 'new polity' in 1880 in the sense that what little evidence exists on the pre-1880 political situation indicates that there had been no comparable political unit in the area during the previous century. But this does not necessarily mean that there had never been any organized

polity in the area in earlier centuries - though many writers have wrongly inferred this. By contrast, Dr. Rodney (basing his conclusions on the writing of Alvares) suggests that shortly after the Mane invasion, the whole of present-day Sierra Leone was part of a single political unit, or at least of a single Confederacy: "The Mane generals and captains, on the basis of a clan system, had apportioned Sierra Leone among themselves, and proclaimed themselves 'kings'. There were four principal kingdoms .... Within each of these kingdoms there were subdivisions .... Strictly speaking, a number of the petty rulers called 'kings' by the Europeans should really be regarded as 'chiefs'. It was a pyramidal structure of government: the chiefs owed allegiance to the local kings, who themselves supposedly paid deference to the kings of the 'metropolis' at Cape Mount, who in turn paid tribute to an overlord who remained behind" [Rodney, W., "A Reconsideration of the Mane invasions of Sierra Leone" in The Journal of African History, VIII, 2 (1967), p.227]

3. Kailondo was born in the village of Komalu, near Mano-Sewalu, close by the Moa River, See:- Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.5; Hollins, "Short History", pp.59-60; Wylie, "Innovation and Change", p.300. In these accounts also will be found full descriptions of the early life and activities of Kailondo. The present writer has not repeated these descriptions, since they are in the main clear, uncontroversial, and easily available. More important, they do not add greatly to an understanding of either Kailondo as a ruler or the nature of his polity, which are the concerns of this thesis.
4. Kogugba (pl. kogugbanga) is a Mende term which may be roughly translated into English as 'leading warrior' or 'experienced fighter'. Kogugba is often shortened in conversation to kugba, though Innes, Dictionary, p.67 gives kugbe.
5. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.6
6. Gbondou, sometimes spelt Gbondo or Bondo, was a small village about 6½ miles east of Kailahun.
7. Mahayei is a Mende term which may best be interpreted by such English words as 'sovereignty', 'rule', or 'leadership'; though none of these words are really adequate. See 'Note on Political Terminology' appended to this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1.
8. Cardew in 1896 defined Luawa as the area north of the Keya River and Upper Bambara country, east and south of the Moa River, stretching no further west than Sandialu and Guabu (CO267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96).
9. This confusion of British officials is understandable in view of the fact that Kailondo and his people probably did not themselves possess any clear territorial definition of Luawa. (See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, p. 10 below.)
10. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp233-4below.
11. For the meaning of the term 'Chiefdom' see 'Note on Political terminology'

12. In 1974, the term 'Luawa Chiefdom' was still used in this way.
13. Mahangsisia (pl.) is a Mende term meaning 'political leaders', 'rulers', 'landowners'. See 'Note on Political Terminology'.
14. See map opp. p. 9 in this thesis.
15. Bundu of Ŋanyahun used the word 'Luawa' in handing over the country to Kailondo, according to Maada James (Int.19), but there is no indication of what Bundu himself meant by the word. The ordinary people of Luawa in 1880, however, probably thought of the mahavei in terms of personal allegiance to Kailondo himself rather than in terms of a strictly-defined geographical area. Specific evidence for the mahavei as a personal rather than a territorial concept is difficult to find, but is suggested by the general tenor of oral tradition concerning Kailondo's reign.
16. See Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.74-78 below, for an estimate of the size of 'Greater Luawa'. See also *ibid.*, p.106.
17. Even in the early 1940s, the Kissi Chiefdoms still paid an extra tax of 6d. per head to the Paramount Chief in Kailahun as a sign of their continuing loyalty to Kailondo and his successors (Int.19: see also Chap.6 of this thesis, pp.504, 514 below).
18. Hollins, 'Short History', pp.15-16.
19. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp.74-83 below.
20. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, *passim*, for a full discussion of Liberia's claims to Luawa, 1896-1911. For Luawa and Wunde, see Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.111-118 below, and Chap. 4, pp.264-280 below.
21. 'Countries' as used in the writings of Alldridge and the other early European visitors to Luawa is a useful but rather indefinite term generally used to describe a 'polity' governed by one ruler. It was often a unit of less than 100 square miles in area.
22. Int.1.
23. The Combey and Kulu-Banya MSS have been of great interest to the present writer in that they are the first histories of Luawa to be written by local people. Both Mr. Combey and Mr. Kulu-Banya were residents of Kailahun, and they were among the first young people of Luawa to receive an 'English-type' education up to 'secondary' level. Both wrote their histories at a time when there were many people still living in Luawa who personally remembered the period of Kailondo's reign. Both accounts, which are reproduced in substance in Vol.2 of this thesis, contain clear inaccuracies, but they also provide some corroborative details which are not to be found elsewhere. References to the two MSS are as follows:-
  - (a) Combey, B.N., History of Luawa (unpub. MS, 1948, in possession of the present writer).
  - (b) Kulu-Banya, S.K.II, A History of the Kulu-Banya Family of Luawa (unpub. MS, 1940, in possession of the present writer).



24. Insofar as oral tradition could be checked against accurate written facts, the traditions provided by Maada James proved in almost every instance to be correct.
25. Int.19.
26. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.17-21 below.
27. The description of Luawa's geography is based largely on the following books:-
- (a) Clarke, J.I., Sierra Leone in Maps (Univ. of London Press, London, 2nd ed. 1969).
  - (b) Church, R.J.H., West Africa: a study of the environment and man's use of it (Longmans, London, 6th ed. 1968).
  - (c) Morgan, W.B., and Pugh, J.C., West Africa (Methuen, London 1969).
  - (d) Cran, M.I. (ed.), Nelson's Sierra Leone Atlas (Nelson, London, 1966).

Between 1965 and 1970, and again in 1972, the present writer visited almost every major human settlement in Luawa, so his description also draws on personal observation - though it is recognised that, especially as regards vegetation, the situation in the late 1960s may have been very different from that in the 1880s. Considerable space has been devoted in this and several other chapters of the thesis to geographical factors, because these factors so controlled human existence in Luawa that by comparison such matters as particular forms of social organization seem of secondary importance.

28. Clarke, J.I., op. cit., p.13.
29. On the present Pendembu-Kailahun road up to about Mile 5, the land remains below the 650 foot contour: but a spot height on the edge of Koindu town gives a reading of 1428 feet [ see Contour Map of Sierra Leone, pub. Directorate of Overseas Surveys (U.K.) for the Government of Sierra Leone, D.O.419 (series 9742), Edition 2 - D.O.S. (1969), scale 1 : 50,000. Sheets 70-72, 82-84, 93-94 cover Luawa and the surrounding area, and are hereafter referred to in this thesis by the short title, 1969 Contour Map ].
30. Mean annual rainfall is being referred to here. See Clarke, J.I., op. cit., p.21.
31. Ibid., p.25. Speaking of Wunde, just north of Luawa, Pa Langama noted (Int.20) that at the beginning of the twentieth century the bush "was not very big there, so it was easy to set fire to it".
32. 'Bush' is the word generally used by Mende and Kissi people, when they are speaking in English, to refer to what an Englishman might call 'forest' or 'jungle'. The Mende word is ndogbo. 'Forest' or 'jungle' in English has the connotation of an extensive area of dense virgin

woodland which has scarcely been penetrated by man. However, the "continued existence of original high forest anywhere in West Africa is doubted. Probably the whole of the present forest area has been cultivated at some stage, with secondary growth over farm clearings" (Morgan and Pugh, op.cit., p.215). For this reason, the term 'bush' is preferred to 'forest' or 'jungle'.

33. This statement is based on personal observation travelling, for example, along the Pendembu-Kailahun-Buedu-Koindu-Ningowa road (the main arterial road in the Luawa area). It is reflected in the vegetation map in Clarke, J.I., op.cit., p.25, and in the description of vegetation on the 1969 Contour Map. Strangely, however, most authorities still place the whole of Luawa in the 'forest zone' (e.g. Morgan and Pugh, op.cit., p.209). Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", p.295 noted: "Luawa sat in the middle of dense-forest land .... The roads linking the towns might aptly be described as tunnels through the green canopy". The present writer, while walking through thicketed grassland in the north-east of Luawa and sweating profusely under a blazing midday sun, often longed for the shady cool of a green canopy, but rarely found it.
34. As early as 1924, F.W.H. Migeod, writing about a visit to Kissi country, noted at Koindu: "All about the town is old farm land with very small growth on it and some grass, but even small trees seem absent. There are, however, oil palms dotted about. The old Chief said when he was young [c.1860?] there was a lot of bush about, but it had all been cut down" [A View of Sierra Leone (Kegan Paul, London, 1926) p.107]. This would suggest either a growing population, or fairly recent settlement, or both.
35. See Clarke, J.I., op.cit., p.13, for the Moa River and its relationship to the Niger. Ibid., p.16, it is stated that the Sewa basin is larger than that of the Moa, but these figures are limited to drainage within Sierra Leone. Almost half the Moa basin lies outside Sierra Leone's boundaries - mainly in Guinea, but partly also in Liberia.
36. Perhaps the most spectacular of these rapids are about 3 miles from Kailahun, at the point where the river is nearest the town. This place is called Yigindi [see Abraham, A., and Isaac, B., "A Further Note on the History of Luawa Chieftdom" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.24 (Jan.1969) p.72]. Yigindi is the setting for Sarif Easmon's short story "Bindeh's Gift" in African Writing Today [Mphahlele, E. (ed.), Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1967, pp.69-79].
37. Clarke, J.I., op.cit., p.16, suggests "river levels may vary by 50 to 60 ft". From rough observations taken at the Manowa Ferry through 5 years, the present writer would estimate the seasonal fluctuation of the Moa in the Luawa area is about a quarter of these figures.
38. Ibid., pp.17 and 27.
39. An average day's journey is here reckoned as 15 miles. Some men from Luawa might have been able to double that average.

40. Ibid., p.21. Cf. Nelson's Sierra Leone Atlas, p.3, to indicate how, as a result of inadequate statistical information, serious discrepancies may occur in the plotting of isohyets. Such discrepancies are not, of course, confined to rainfall maps. The present writer has largely followed the maps provided in Clarke's Sierra Leone in Maps. The only map (in the books under consideration) to indicate that rainfall in the south-west of Luawa is significantly greater than in the north-east of the Kissi Chiefdoms is to be found in Church, op.cit., p.323. But the fact of the difference in rainfall may be established by noting the failure of cocoa or coffee to do well in Kissi country. Cf. Clarke, J.I., op.cit., pp.80-81: "The cocoa belt is delimited by the 100 in. isohyet in the north-east".
41. Ibid., p.21. See also Church, op. cit., pp.50-51.
42. Clarke, J.I., op. cit., p.21.
43. Church, op. cit., p.43. This comment is also based on the present writer's personal observation.
44. From personal observation in the late 1960s, it was clear that over 90% of the male working population of the Luawa area was primarily engaged in rice-farming.
45. The great problem for the Luawa farmer is when to begin his shift-cultivation farming by clearing the chosen area of its undergrowth and most of its trees. This 'brushing' must not be done too early, otherwise the bush will not have dried out enough since the previous rainy season; but it must not be left too late, otherwise the new rainy season may already be setting in. The point of having the bush as dry as possible is that the whole farm area must be burnt of its undergrowth, and if the burning is not done effectively it is virtually impossible to raise a good rice-harvest. Fluctuations in the time when the rainy season begins from year to year introduces a relatively serious element of risk into annual farming activities.
46. For the importance of the rice-farm, see Little, K.L., The Mende of Sierra Leone (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, revd. ed. 1967) pp.77-82.
47. Clarke, J.I., op. cit., pp.22-23.
48. Ibid.
49. Ibid. See also Church, op. cit., p.24.
50. Ibid., p.25. See also Morgan and Pugh, op. cit., p.183.
51. See map opp. p. 7 of this thesis.
52. 'Kissi country' within present-day Sierra Leone may roughly be defined as the three Kissi Chiefdoms of Kailahun District; though the area round Mano-Sewalu and Yibema, together with the villages down the Mano-Sewalu to Kailahun road, is predominantly Kissi-speaking.

53. Alldridge, T.J., The Sherbro and its Hinterland (Macmillan, London, 1901) pp.207-210.
54. See the map opp. p. 7 of this thesis.
55. In a rare error in Clarke's Sierra Leone in Maps, the Kissi Mountains are mis-named the 'Jojoima Hills' (pp.14-15). The mistake presumably arose by confusing the name of Jojoima, a village in near-by Malema Chiefdom, with Jojina, the name of the highest Kissi mountain (2803 feet according to the 1969 Contour Map, 2792 feet according to Nelson's Sierra Leone Atlas).
56. Kangama was then, and still is, the Chiefdom headquarters town of Kissi Teng.
57. Migeod, op. cit., p.106.
58. C0267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91; enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe. See photo opp. p.202 of this thesis.
59. 2304 feet is the height of Mamba according to the Sierra Leone Wall Map, pub. D. Survey, Ministry of Defence, U.K. (1968), series G442 [GSGS 3921], Edition 7 - GSGS, Sheet Sierra Leone, scale 1:500,000, hereafter referred to in this thesis by the short title, 1968 Wall Map.
60. This description would fit any of the present-day main roads in the area: the Pendembu-Kailahun-Buedu-Koindu-Nongowa road; the Kailahun-Mofindor-Sambalu road; the branch roads to Baoma, Mende, Mano-Sewalu, Sandialu, Bewabu, Nyandehun, Dawa and Sandia.
61. The present writer has avoided the term 'tribe', since it has no agreed definition, it encourages the oversimplification of tremendously complex socio-political issues in the Luawa area, and it has perjorative overtones for the contemporary African and European reader. These points are all illustrated by definition 3 under 'Tribe' in The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 3rd ed. 1944): "A race of people; now applied esp. to a primary aggregate of people in a primitive or barbarous condition under a headman or chief". See also Colson, E., "African Society at the time of the scramble" in Gann, L.H., and Duignan, P. (eds.), Colonialism in Africa 1870-1960, Vol.I: The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914 (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1969) pp.28-31.
62. Mendeblaisia is the term by which Mende people would refer to themselves in their own language: this is the definite plural, the indefinite plural being Mendebla - though the distinction between the two plural forms appears to be slowly disappearing. See Innes, G., A Mende Grammar (Macmillan, London, 1962) p.26. Kissia is the term by which Kissi people would refer to themselves in their own language. There is no such word in the Mende language as 'Mendes' or 'Mendis' (see Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.ix). The indiscriminate adding of 's' to words in order to produce an anglicized plural has produced similar results to the indiscriminate use of the word 'tribe' (see Note 61 above).

The only possible definition of the 'Mendis' (as the term was used by the first colonial officials) is 'that group of people to whom British officials chose to apply the word "Mendi" with an "s" added to it'. The adding of 's' to produce plurals also led British officials to create non-existent 'tribes'. For example, several early officials invented the term 'Luawas' to refer to Kailondo's 'tribe', and used the term with apparently no sense of incongruity.

63. There is no river, mountain range, or vegetational boundary separating the Mendebleisia and Kissia.
64. The term 'peoples' suffers in the same way as 'tribe' from lack of clear and agreed definition. It is used here simply as the best available word, being preferred to such alternatives as 'nations' or 'groups'.
65. In 1896, Cardew (presumably with the help of the local people) was able to mark out quite clearly the boundary between the Mendebleisia and Kissia so that it could be mapped (CO267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96). That he marked out a real boundary, and was not just drawing a boundary existing in his own imagination, is indicated by the fact that his boundary line even in the 1960s represented fairly accurately the division between predominantly Mende-speaking villages and predominantly Kissi-speaking villages [see map by Dalby, T.D.P., "Language Distribution in Sierra Leone" in The Sierra Leone Language Review, No.1 (1962)].
66. See the map inside the front cover of Ajayi, J.F.A., and Espie, I., A Thousand Years of West African History (Ibadan Univ. Press and Nelson, London, 1965). Mende is one of the Mande group of languages, whereas Kissi is among the West Atlantic group.
67. See map opp. p.9 of this thesis.
68. The terms 'one-third' and 'two-thirds' are placed in inverted commas because they refer to east-west linear distance, and not to area. The situation as regards language-distribution which is described here is roughly the same as that suggested by Cardew's map of 1896. Cardew's proposed new boundary line had, he stated, "the great advantage that it follows ... tribal boundaries", and the limits of Mende-speaking Luawa and Bombali were decided "by actually perambulating the roads forming those limits on the Kissi side" (CO267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96). The 1931 Census reported what seems a very similar situation: there were estimated to be 3,965 Kissi people in Luawa Chiefdom, and 530 "stranger tribes" in the Kissi Chiefdoms [ Sierra Leone Report of Census 1931 (Govt. Printer, Freetown, n.d. 1931 ?), p.154]. The situation had not changed much by 1963, when there were just over 6,000 Kissia living in Luawa Chiefdom, and about 680 Mendebla living in the Kissi Chiefdoms [ 1963 Population Census of Sierra Leone, Vol.I: Number of Inhabitants (Central Statistics Office, Freetown, 1965), p.14]. See also Clarke, J.I., op. cit., p.37.
69. For example, at least some of the Banya family in Kailahun in 1972 would have described themselves as 'Kissii people', though they spoke only the Mende language, and knew only a few words of the Kissi language.

70. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.6; Gorvie, op. cit., p.40; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.59. Rev. Clarke, in Kailondo: the story of a warrior of Sierra Leone, p.5, noted that Kailondo's father was "Dowi Komei a Kissi of Lukono in the Wunde country in Guinea, and his mother was Kafue Mambe of Komalu".
71. Int.15. This piece of evidence may be used in two different ways either to indicate a westward movement of groups of Kissia or to show that for a considerable time the Kissia had formed a wedge on the southern side of the Moa valley stretching into Mendeland.
72. Murdock, G.P., Africa: its peoples and their culture history (McGraw-Hill, New York, 1959), pp.260-261. Murdock's figures of almost one million for the Mendebleisia and 200,000 for the Kissia seem to be over-estimates. Clarke, J.I., op. cit., p.37, suggests a Mende population within Sierra Leone of 672,831 and a Kissi population of 48,954. The heart of Kissi country lies in Guinea, and some Kissia also live in Liberia. The present writer has not been able to find accurate population figures for the peoples of Guinea and Liberia, but would estimate the total number of Mendebleisia and Kissia respectively may be 750,000 and 150,000 around the year 1970.
73. The only known factor which may have affected the relative size of the two peoples was the possibly greater incidence of trypanosomiasis (sleeping sickness) - a fatal disease - among the Kissia than among the Mendebleisia (see Chap.6 of this thesis, pp.55-3 below).
74. See map opp. p.19 of this thesis.
75. Cardew noted that in 1894 Nyagua's Mende polity "extends on the East as far as Taninahun [near present-day Gandorhun] and on the South joins that of Chief KAILUNDU" (C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima). Northwards from there, at least as far as Waima, Cardew implies that the country belongs to the "Saua Konnos". Gandorhun is still on the administrative boundary of southern Kono District. Cardew also noted that "Kai Lundu is in a state of chronic war with KAFFARA of upper GESE". In many reports over the next 15 years, Kafula's country was defined as being north of the Moa and east of the Meli, centred on the town of Kissi Kenema. See Chaps.2 and 4 of this thesis, passim.
76. See Unwin, A.H., Report on the forests and forestry problems in Sierra Leone (Waterlow and Sono, London, 1909), p.23: "Strictly speaking the Gola is the name of a distinct tribe, who originally inhabited the land on the left bank of the Morro river and from there to the Mano, and beyond into Liberia .... Many years ago, from all accounts, the Mendis attacked the Gola people, and drove them back across the Mano, so that now only the old foundation of the houses, and the Cola trees they planted, mark the sites of their towns, which must have been quite numerous". The 1969 Contour Map marks the Gola Forest extending so far north as to cover the eastern edges of Malema Chiefdom.
77. Alldridge, writing in 1891 of Yandahun, some 6 miles south-east of Gbandewulo, noted that "BANDE being the next country, a great many

persons from there were to be seen at this town and the Bante language was freely spoken" (CO267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bontho). Cf. Rodney, W., A History of the Upper Guinea Coast 1545 to 1800 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970) p.57, where the Gbante people are misnamed the 'Grandes'; and Gann and Duignan, The History and Politics of Colonialism 1870-1914, map opp. p.26, where they are misnamed the 'Goandes'. Such mistakes have introduced some confusion into the complex subject of the definition and distribution of the various peoples of the area. For example, McCulloch, M., Peoples of Sierra Leone (Ethnographic Survey of Africa, International African Institute, London, 1950), p.101, noted the three Kissi Chiefdoms as 'Koranko Chiefdoms' in 'Tonkolili District'; and on the map at the back of the book, the whole of the Gbante people, together with an inexplicably detached group of Kissi people, are misplaced far to the south of their actual homeland.

78. See map opp. p.9 of this thesis. Hollins, "Short History", p.13, gave the fullest list of representatives at the Gbondou Conference, and Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8, added several more. Other sources are indicated in Notes 81 to 95 below.
79. The possibility must be faced that this list, anachronistically, indicates the people who later became mahangeisia, kegugbanga and kpakoisia under Kailondo (and the places he later closely controlled) rather than providing an accurate statement of the people who were really present at Gbondou. Insofar as the list is accurate, presumably it was virtually the same group of leaders who confirmed Kailondo as ruler a few weeks later in Ngiehun.
80. See Note 15 above.
81. Gorvie, op.cit., p.42, mentions only the name of Bundu (he spells it 'Gbondo') among all those leaders who attended the conference, as does Clarke, "Foundation of Luawa", p.248.
82. Int.19. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67, says Bundu came from Mofindor, and it is likely that Bundu had influence there, since Mofindor and Qanyahun are in the same 'section', and are less than 2 miles apart.
83. It is difficult to find an English synonym for the Mende word kpakoisia, which has the general meaning of 'the important people of the area'. The title kpako would be given to any rich man or landowner, or to a person who by one means or another had gained a position of respect. Sometimes, too, it could be used to distinguish a man of maturity and dignity from 'youngsters'. In many situations the words kpakoisia and mahangeisia could be used interchangeably, as general titles of respect, but the latter carries a strong element of political leadership in its meaning which is not necessarily the case with the former.
84. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8. Hollins, "Short History", p.13, records the name of Boa of Ganduhun, who was presumably the same person (in the Mende language 'ng' mutating to 'y').
85. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79. Ngobeh was FC of Luawa between 1916 and 1923.

86. Int. 28.
87. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79. Sagba was one of Kailondo's "sub-chiefs" who made his mark as a witness on the 1890 Treaty with the British: "Saagbah of BORBORBOO" (CO267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Treaty made at CANRAY LAHOON). Maada James Kailondo put Sagba first among the counsellors of Kailondo after Fabundeh (Int.19). It is likely that the most influential counsellors and closest confidants of Kailondo were Bundu, Fabundeh, Ngobeh Kahunla, and Sagba.
88. Hollins, "Short History", p.13.
89. Ibid. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8, noted that Mbapu came from Sandialu, and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67, agreed with this, but Hollins gave the name of Koliwa as the representative from Sandialu. Quite possibly both Mbapu and Koliwa attended the meeting from Sandialu - there seems to have been no formal arrangement that each town should be represented by only one person.
90. For Kpawo Bundu, see Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79, and Hollins, "Short History", pp.12-13.
91. Ibid. See also Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8, and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67: both refer to Bondo Foryoh of Dia, but Hollins does not mention him. Hollins spelt Ngegba as 'Gegbo'; but 'Gegbo' is not a Kissi name, whereas Ngegba is quite common. On p.19 of his "Short History", Mr. Hollins referred to apparently the same person as 'Gegba'.
92. Hollins, "Short History", p.13. Yamandu is marked on many of the maps accompanying British officials' reports in the 1890s and early 1900s.
93. Ibid. p.13. See also Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8, and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67.
94. Konia is the only one of all the villages, mentioned in the list of Gbondou Conference representatives, which cannot be traced on either old or present-day maps.
95. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79 ff. Pa Langama (Int.20) believed that Ndawua of Konosu was mahei of Tengea at that time.
96. Possibly Ndawa made Ngiehun his headquarters because he had some support there.
97. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8. Cf. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.66, where Manjakewa and Jobo are spoken of as coming from Ngiehun. Kpawo died before the end of the war.
98. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.10; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.71.
99. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12.
100. See Chap. 2 of this thesis, pp. 78-79 below.



101. See, for example, Chap. 5 of this thesis, pp. 442-3 below.
102. See Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.199, where Kailondo's burial is related to what 'almost all Mendis' believe.
103. See Note 70 above.
104. The present writer estimated about 11 of the mahangeisia were of Kissi origin, and 13 were of Mende origin.
105. 1963 Population Census, Vol.1, p.4.
106. Thomas, N.W., "Who were the Manes?" in The Journal of the Royal African Society, XIX (1920), pp.176-188.
107. For a fuller discussion of sources of evidence for this period, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.22,3; below. Dr. P.E.H. Hair has suggested that enthusiasm for "source-material other than European written records" has arisen partly because the wealth of material in European written records is not appreciated. But Luawa must be far from the only area where no written records exist for earlier than the late nineteenth century; and it is therefore a matter of using oral traditions or nothing [Hair, P.E.H., "Ethnolinguistic Continuity on the Guinea Coast" in The Journal of African History, VIII, 2 (1967), p.268]
108. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.112, and Hollins, "Short History", p.11, both agree that Kailondo's ancestors in order from the earliest known ancestor were:- Fawisi, Fakpala, Bauwe, and Ndowe Komeh who was Kailondo's father. Hollins inserts the additional name of Faiyinda between Fawisi and Fakpala. Cf. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.28: "Of all the traditions collected by the author, the longest genealogies do not exceed five generations". This would mean that genealogies start, at the earliest, in the late eighteenth century. Cf. Person, Y., "Ethnic Movements and Acculturation in Upper Guinea since the Fifteenth Century" in African Historical Studies, IV, 3 (1971), p.669: "Oral traditions seldom go back beyond the eighteenth century among stateless societies". Even so, oral traditions in the Luawa area indicate nearly 200 years of continuous settlement and are not at all "sagas of unrelenting migration", "relieved only by lists of rival units exterminated en route" (Hair, "Ethnolinguistic Continuity", p.247)
109. The Kissi 'homeland' in the 1970s might be described as the three Kissi Chiefdoms of Sierra Leone, a small area in the north-west of Liberia [see Liebenow, J.G., Liberia: the Evolution of Privilege (Cornell Univ. Press, Ithaca, USA, 1969), pp.31-32; and Gnielinski, S.von (ed.), Liberia in Maps (Univ. of London Press, London, 1972), pp.38-41] and the old French cercles of Kissidougou and Gueckedou in the Republic of Guinea [see Paulme, D., Les Gens du riz: Kissi de Haute - Guinée Française (Librairie Plon, Paris, 1954), map on pp.40-41].

110. Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast, p.9. See also Kup, P., A History of Sierra Leone 1400-1787 (Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1962), rather confused maps on pp.136 (for c.1600) and 137 (for c.1800).
111. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p.673.
112. Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast, pp.50-51.
113. Kup, op. cit., p.152.
114. Quoted *ibid.*, p.157.
115. Most writers on the subject of Mende origins, from Migeod and Thomas to Rodney, seem to the present writer to rely too much on the reports of early European travellers had the limitations of (i) observing events from coastal 'factories' (ii) being unacquainted with local languages and culture (iii) being centrally interested in the commercial possibilities of the area, not its history and politics.
116. Hair, "Ethnolinguistic Continuity", pp.275-276.
117. Kup, op. cit., p.130: "It was, in fact, about 1564 that the Mani invasion began in earnest". See also *ibid.*, pp.146, 153.
118. *Ibid.*, p.156: "Major Laing ... in his map of 1824 clearly marks the area at present occupied by the northern Mendes as being part of Koranko country, so that the latter nation must have preceded the Mendes as settlers in Sierra Leone".
119. Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast, p.53.
120. *Ibid.*, p.59. See also the map on p.57, which seems to suggest a different conclusion: namely, that the Mendebleisia were already living just east of their present homeland around 1545.
121. *Ibid.*, p.60.
122. *Ibid.*, p.58.
123. Whether or not this description includes Luawa depends on the precise mileage which is understood in Rodney's phrase "at some distance inland".
124. Rodney, "A Reconsideration of the Mane invasions", p.237.
125. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p.685.
126. The present writer has found no evidence to indicate that in those days the Kissi and Bullom people spoke the Mandenya language. M. Person does not give his sources for his comment. Murdock, op. cit., p.265, noted the Mandenya people as part of the Baga, "linguistic cousins" to the 'West Atlantic' peoples of Sierra Leone, among whom are included the Kissi and Bullom (Sherbro) peoples.

127. Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast, p.58.
128. Ibid., pp.58-59. The basis for this statement seems to be Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.28; but Prof. Little gives no documentation for his assertion.
129. Cf. Abraham, A., "Some suggestions on the origins of Mende Chiefdoms" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.25 (July 1969) p.36: "'The arrival of warriors from the north' ... is a theory that leaves much to be desired. The only northern factor known to me is the mori-man factor".
130. See "A Note on the Secret Societies" in Vol.2 of this thesis, pp.617-619.
131. D'Azevedo, W.L., "Some Historical problems in the Delineation of a Central West Atlantic Region" in The Annals of the New York Academy of Science, 96 (Jan.1962), map on p.513.
132. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, pp.203-211
133. Ibid., p.211.
134. See map enc. C0267/425/Conf.22; Cardew; 7.4.96. Cardew does not express himself precisely in these words, but he set down on the map the boundary between 'Luawa proper' and Kissi country. He found that Guabu was the easternmost Mende village, and eastwards from there was Kissi country.
135. Hair, "Ethnolinguistic Continuity", p.256.
136. Koo or Ko in the Mende language can mean north or east, or 'up-country', depending on the context. It should be noted, however, that there is a clear distinction between Koo-Mende and Komende (see Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.114; cf. McCulloch, op.cit., p.4 esp. Note 3; and Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.76).
137. Mr. Abraham nowhere stated precisely what period his conclusions referred to, but his note that genealogies only go back five generations at the most would suggest he is referring largely to the century before the beginning of the colonial period (see Note 108).
138. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.22. Cf. Prof. Little's views on "the invasion of Mende country by conquering peoples from the north", probably before the sixteenth century: "all tradition agrees that these invaders forced their way into the country and waged war against anyone opposing their right to settle there" (The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.28). Prof. Little does not, however, give any reference as to where or from whom this tradition was collected. As regards Luawa, the scraps of tradition which exist for the centuries before the nineteenth would not all agree that such an invasion from the north ever took place.
139. See Note 136 above.
140. Abraham, "Origins of Mende Chiefdoms", p.32.

141. British colonial officials in the Luawa area during the 1890s often referred to 'Susu traders' in Luawa: but possibly these might more accurately have been described as Mandingo people. Officials, Creole clerks, and Frontier Police officers seemed easily confused about 'tribal labels'.
142. Int.14.
143. Mahai is the def. sing. of mahangeisia (see Note 13 above).
144. Int. 15.
145. Int. 10.
146. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.113: "There was formerly only a very small population in this country, which began to develop after Kailundu came into what was really Mende country". See also Hollins, "Short History", p.12: in Luawa, just before Kailondo's day, the population "was not as great as now. Towns were therefore set more widely apart".
147. Kulu-Banya, op.cit., pp.1-2.
148. Ibid., p.3.
149. Ibid., p.4. Wotay was the great-grandfather of Jue Siangay, one of the favourite wives of Momoh Banya, son of Kailondo.
150. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.5: "Kailundu (or Kai as the people mostly call him) was the son of Dowi Komsi of Lukono in the Wunde country across the River Moa, and Kefue Mamba of Komalu, near Mano Sewalu. Dowi Komsi had left his birthplace Lukono and had settled down with his wife's people at Komalu". Governor Cardew noted that Kailondo's "grandfather SERI was a native of Bombali, but his father DUKONE left that district and settled in Kissi where Kai Lundu was born of one of his wives, named KAFUE, a native of MANO in Luawa; Kai Lundu resided in Kissi till his father having been murdered he went over to Luawa" (C0267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun). See also Report of Blakeney and Atkins concerning trouble between Luawa and Wunde, in which they state that Kailondo "was a Kissi by birth" (C0267/445/10; Cardew; 16.1.99, enc. Blakeney and Atkins). See also Int.19.
151. Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.108.
152. Int.10.
153. Int.22.
154. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 87/1920: Subject; Claim to villages of Baiama, Tangobu, Petema, + Yabaina. Kissi Teng, Kissi Kama, and Luawa all claimed Tangobu: concerning the other villages, the dispute was between Kissi Teng and Luawa.

155. The administrative divisions or 'sections' (patlisia in the Mende language) of Luawa during the colonial period were apparently similar to the divisions which Kailondo adopted in ruling Luawa. These 'sections' may have been largely the same as the various small areas controlled by the different petty mahangaisia who ruled in the area before Kailondo's accession. Gbeila section was one of the largest divisions: it contained the large villages of Gbalahun and Sandialu, and its headquarters town was Dodo-Cotuma (Int.16).
156. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 87/1920, enc. min. Bowden, 17-20.3.29, Petema Camp. Bowden's opinion is to be respected, because the elders of Luawa in 1972 seemed to remember him as the colonial official who best understood the area, and who gained more knowledge of it than perhaps any other European. By 1929 he had over 20 years experience of Koo-Mende.
157. Int.22.
158. Joanna, T.E. relative of P.C. Ganawa of Kissi Teng, in conversation at Kangama, April 1972.
159. Mahawui in the Mende language has no exact synonym in English, although during the colonial period, and since, it was used to translate the English term 'Chiefdom'. Mahawui may best be understood as the area occupied by people who have given their allegiance to one particular maha; or, more generally, polity, country, or political unit.
160. Kulo in the Mende language means little ('k' mutating to 'w' in the Mende language).
161. Abraham, "Origins of Mende Chiefdoms", p.32.
162. See map opp. p.19 in this thesis. There are four villages in Kailahun District called Mendেকেlema.
163. Morgan and Pugh, op.cit., pp.178-179: "Many West African peoples ... have a tradition of movement towards the south-west".
164. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, p.16 above. In a recent paper Dr. Hair suggests that "the geographical distribution of languages along the coast has remained, in the main, unchanged in the documented centuries" - that is, since 1450 (Hair, P.E.H., "The Contribution of Early Linguistic Material to the History of West Africa" in Dalby, D. (ed.), Language and History in Africa (Cass, London, 1970), p.55). It is possible that the Mende-Kissi linguistic boundary was established in approximately its present geographical position far earlier than the mid-nineteenth century, and we may suspect as inadequate and sometimes inaccurate "the writing up of moderately recent West African history in terms largely of distant 'tribal origins' and Völkerwanderung" (ibid). But this does not invalidate the conclusion that in the Luawa area, in the late eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth, there was considerable movement of small groups of peoples (often of those already settled in the area) over short distances.

165. For example, Sgt. Major Bangali Jibateh of the Kailahun Court Messenger Force migrated from Bamako to Kailahun in 1907, and returned again to Bamako in 1945 (Ints.13 and 21).
166. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p.674. In the paper referred to in Note 164 above, Dr. Hair was fairly clearly criticizing the work, among others, of M. Person. In his article on "Ethnic Movements", M. Person replied to some of these criticisms.
167. Commenting on one of Alldridge's 1890 despatches from Koo-Mende, Governor Hay regretted that "on none of the maps can I find any of the countries in question [ Luawa, Mando, Bambara, Dama ], but that, I take it, is not extraordinary as they have probably never been visited before [ i.e. by Europeans ] " (CO267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90). Descriptions of pre-1880 Mende society, such as that in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp.25-30, are largely undocumented. Dr. Wylie believes that the arrival in Luawa of the first inhabitants "is not hard to imagine" [ Wylie, K.C., The Politics of Transformation: Indirect Rule in Mendeland and Abuja (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Michigan State Univ., U.S.A., 1967), p.77 ] : but there is little in oral tradition and nothing, virtually, in written records about that arrival.
168. One such extrapolation, which has seriously impeded an understanding of Luawa's history in the nineteenth century, may be cited as an example. Most writers on the history of the area have assumed that since the area beyond Luawa's northern and eastern boundaries was in considerable turmoil in the late nineteenth century, therefore war had been throughout the area 'from time immemorial' an essential part of the peoples' way of life. This deduction seemed to be strengthened by the fact that on the coastal plain nearest to Luawa, in Sherbro and the Gallinas, 'trade wars' disturbed the peace throughout much of the nineteenth century. Yet there is not a shred of clear, specific evidence to demonstrate that in the area later ruled by Kailondo there was much warfare between c.1800 and c.1880, and the little evidence collected by the present writer rather points in the opposite direction.
- Historical extrapolations in the history of Koo-Mende during the earlier nineteenth century have, moreover, often used the generalised testimonies of the first British visitors as their starting point. But these first British officials may be unreliable witnesses, because they were so preoccupied with extending the area occupied by the Freetown Government, and with a 'civilising mission'. Also, most of them were ignorant of the Mende language, and many were experiencing for the first time the 'culture shock' of meeting a society with an organization and set of values different from their own. Even T.J. Alldridge, who was relatively detached and objective in his writings, on occasion made serious factual mistakes in his reports (see Chap.2 of this thesis, pp. 101-103 below).
169. Atherton, J.H., and Kalous, M., "Nomoli" in The Journal of African History, XI, 3 (1970), pp.303-317. The footnotes refer to most of the previously published articles on the subject, although the co-authors tend to treat the comments of observers like Thompson, Alldridge, Beatty and Anderson as unquestionably accurate.

170. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.13,31 above.
171. Kup, op. cit., p.122.
172. Mr. Kup quotes a number of sources on this point (ibid., pp.154-156). See also Trimingham, J.S., A History of Islam in West Africa (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1970), pp.166-169, for the ijihad in the Futa Djallon in the eighteenth century. Ibid., pp.177-186, for the development of Muslim states in the Upper Niger basin in the nineteenth century.
173. Molibla is the name used in the Mende language to describe Muslims in general. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.40-41 below.
174. Kola-nuts and alcoholic drinks were widely used as stimulants in Luawa by the time of Alldridge; there is little evidence that Muslim teachers seriously objected to these habits, although they contradicted koranic teaching.
175. Fyfe, C., Sierra Leone Inheritance (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1964), pp.161-162. "Gallinas" was used to describe the area round the estuary of the Moa River, and the river itself was on occasion given the same name.
176. Ibid., pp.162-165.
177. Rodney, History of the Upper Guinea Coast, p.259, quoting Atkins. Dr. Hair has argued that the considerable ethnolinguistic continuity on the Guinea Coast, for at least the last three or four centuries, contrasts with the impression which is often given that the 'Slave Trade' and 'Imperialism' produced "wholesale disturbance" in the area ("Ethnolinguistic Continuity", p.247). But Dr. Hair's views seem to presuppose that 'continuity' and 'disturbance' are antonyms, which in the context does not seem to be the case to the present writer.
178. In 1894, Cardew noticed slaves being taken north-westwards from the Luawa area. "The chief market is the SUSU country", he wrote, but he did not indicate whether the slaves remained in Susu country or were later transported elsewhere (CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima).
179. Person, "Ethnic Movements", p.687.
180. Kai is an affectionate diminutive of the name Kailondo.
181. Clarke, "Foundation of Luawa", p.250.
182. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 87/1920.
183. In an interesting article, Dr. Crosby argued that there was a close link between the institutions of polygamy and slavery in the economics of upland-rice farming [Crosby, K.H., "Polygamy in Mende Country" in Africa, X, 3 (July 1937), pp.249-264].

184. Komaha in the Mende language means war-leader, or Commander-in-Chief.
185. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.6.
186. From a number of the interviews and conversations which the present writer had in the Luawa area, it seems that in 1927, when the British proclaimed the freeing of all slaves in the Protectorate, about half the freed slaves opted to stay with their former masters. If this was true in 1927, there is little reason why it should have been less so half a century earlier.
187. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.3; Hollins, "Short History", p.12; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.59-60.
188. Mahanga is the indef. pl. of mahangeisia (see Note 13 above).
189. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.3.
190. Tamahai in the Mende language means ruler or leader of a town. See 'Note on Political Terminology', pp.42-43 below.
191. Int.19. Regarding the way in which towns were established and villages expanded outwards into the surrounding countryside in Mendeland, see Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, ps.26-27: his account accords well with Maada James Kailondo's description of what happened in Luawa. Yet another similar account is given in Fenton, Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone, p.3.
192. Kensi in the Mende language is roughly equivalent to the English 'Mr.', though in some contexts it would better be translated as 'Sir'. It is a term of respect used in speaking to a mature man.
193. Sewa, F., in conversation at Mano-Sewalu, April 1972.
194. Int.15.
195. For a more detailed description of this development, see Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.212-5 below.
196. Rev. Lamb was apparently a Methodist missionary at Tikonko near Bo in the two decades before the Second World War.
197. Lamb, A.C., An Anthropological Survey of the Mende People of Sierra Leone, with special reference to their social structure and material culture: and their relation to the geographical environment (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Leeds, 1946), p.71.
198. This is clearly the inference to be drawn from the comments of Rev. Clarke and Maada James Kailondo (see Notes 189 and 191 above).
199. 'Largest human settlements' refers here to size of population (see Note 203 below).



200. Hollins, "Short History", p.14. Of the towns mentioned in this list, only Gbalahun and Sandialu were not recognized later as 'headquarters towns' of a pati or 'section'.
201. Int.14.
202. Int.15. See also KDOA, loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. in Kissi Tungi, 1942, "Kai Tungi's claim", concerning the founding of Gbandewulo.
203. The four 'missing' towns are Kailahun itself, Koindu, Baoma, and Bewabu. The other five towns were Buedu, Sandialu, Gbalahun, Ngiehun and Nyandehun. These nine towns all had over 1,000 inhabitants in 1963 (1963 Census, Vol.1, p.16 - Nyandehun is misspelt and misplaced on the attached map).
204. Fakaisia in the Mende language means hamlets or small villages.
205. For example, the 1931 Census recorded for Kailahun District that farming "occupies almost the whole population. A number of other occupations are shown, but are of little importance" (p.155).
206. Church, op. cit., p.99. See also Fyfe, C., "Peoples of the Winward Coast A.D.1000-1800" in Ajayi and Espie, A Thousand Years of West African History.
207. See Chap.2 of this thesis, p. below.
208. See Note 167 above.
209. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8.
210. Int.14.
211. Kulu-Banya, op. cit., pp.4-5.
212. quoted Kup, op. cit., p.182.
213. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun.
214. Int.16.
215. SLGA, Panguma/Bandajuma Districts: Information about various Chiefdoms and Towns, 1906, p.46.
216. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.215.
217. See Note 254 below.
218. Int.15. Perhaps significantly, all these places were in Kissi country.
219. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.3.
220. Ints. 14, 15, and 19.

221. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun.
222. The present writer was given several examples of Kissi pennies by various elders in Luawa, but they were rarely more than 12 inches long.
223. C0267/389/239; Crooks (ag.Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthé.
224. Alldridge noted the value of a single seven-pound package of salt as being "twenty irons, equal to ls. 8d. in English money" (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.217). However, since English currency had not been seen in the area up to that time, there was no established 'rate of exchange', and the Travelling Commissioner's estimate must have been fairly notional.
225. *Ibid.*, p.216.
226. C0267/389/239; Crooks (Ag.Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthé: "I was informed and so far as I could gather correctly that the Iron which forms the currency far inland was procured and smelted in KAWMENDE and brought down" (pp.55-56).
227. Int.10.
228. Perham, M., Lugard: The Years of Adventure 1858-1898 (Collins, London, 1956), p.75.
229. See Note 1 above.
230. Various interpretations have been given to the word 'Kpove'. Rev. Clarke noted that the "word 'Kpovegi' is derived from the words 'Kpo' 've' and 'go' meaning 'War of the dung pot', for into this cowardly warriors were wont to be cast" (Foundation of Luawa, p.6). Combey, *op. cit.*, p.9, agreed with this, as did Hollins, "Short History", p.12. Kulu-Banya suggested the name was given because frightened warriors tried to hide themselves in large earthen pots (*op. cit.*, p.14). Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.63, largely accepts Clarke's explanation, but notes the possibility that cowardly warriors were forced to carry the dung-pots on their heads (Note 19, p.88). Another suggestion is that the cowardly warriors were smeared with excrement [Simpson, D., "A Preliminary Political History of the Kenema Area" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.21 (July 1967), p.56]
231. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.6; Gorvie, *op. cit.*, p.42; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.63-64.
232. Kugbei is the def. sing. form of kogugba (see Note 4 above).
233. See Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.6 and Hollins, "Short History", p.15. The fullest description of Ndawa's early life is to be found in Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.61-64. See also Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp.75-76.

234. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.63; Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.75; Gorvie, op.cit., p.50; Hollins, "Short History", p.15.
235. Simpson, op.cit., considered that the war lasted at least 6 years, and possibly a decade or more altogether.
236. Gau is a 'section' in present-day Luawa Chiefdom, and contains the villages of Sengema, Jengballu, and Batwoma. The headquarters town of the section is Bewabu (see Note 155 above).
237. Guma country lay south of the Magowi River, south of Gau in Luawa. Its chief town was Bomalu in present-day Dia Chiefdom (see Information about various Chiefdoms and Towns, 1906, p.46: "Bomaru. Capital of Guma Chiefdom")
238. KDOA, Pendembu District 128/1927; Subject: Transfer of Pendembu District H.Q. to Kailahun, enc. Petition from P.C. Momoh Banyu to His Excellency the Governor - re. the moving of District Headquarters to Kailahun.
239. Simpson, op.cit., Note, p.55: "Accounts of Darwah's war at Bandajuma may be found in Colonial Office Despatches 205 and 331 (1886)".
240. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.7: "... they set out to drive Gbenya from Lowoma in Kono, burning and ravaging the whole of the country".
241. Many traditions suggest that Benya of Blama raided the territory of Makavoray of Tikonko, just west of the Sewa, and that this prompted Ndawa to begin the Kpove War by replying in kind (Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.64; Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.75).
242. Kailondo kee Ndawa, p.30, for Ndawa's fight against Ngevau of Malema.
243. Int.19.
244. See Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.78-81 below.
245. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.182. Alldridge was considerably less extravagant in his opinions than some of his contemporaries. Cf. Wallis, C.B., The Advance of our West African Empire (Unwin, London, 1903), passim.
246. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.36-37 below.
247. The written records and oral traditions suggest that Ndawa's only fixed base was the town of Wende (or Wunde) west-south-west of Tikonko, and north-east of Bandajuma, close to the Waanje River (see Note 234 above). This was presumably the same town which was destroyed by Garrett in 1889 [see Fyfe, C., A History of Sierra Leone, (Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford, 1962), pp.483-484]
248. Simpson, op.cit., pp.55-56, indicates that the Kpove War was by far the worst war of all those remembered in oral tradition in the Kenema area.

249. For a fuller discussion of the presuppositions of the British officials who visited the Luawa area in the 1890s, see Chap.2 of this thesis, pp.95-100 below. Whatever reasons were officially given in London and Freetown for the extension of British control in the Sierra Leone hinterland, the men on the spot who actually made the Treaties with the mahangaisia and established the Protectorate saw their own efforts as part of a civilising mission.
250. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.28.
251. Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", p.297.
252. Malcolm, J.M., "Mende Warfare" in Sierra Leone Studies (o.s.) No.21 (Jan. 1939).
253. Cf. the disproportionately large part which memories of the Two World Wars played in the storytelling of older Euro-American men in the 1950s and 1960s.
254. For extracts from officials' reports, and some comment on the situation, see Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, Chap.12, "The Era of the Trade Wars", pp.226-252.
255. This is the sort of 'traditional' warfare described by Rev. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp.4-5, and by Mr. Malcolm, "Mende Warfare".
256. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.182.
257. Ibid., p.166.
258. Fenton, Outline of Native Law in Sierra Leone, p.1.
259. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.3.
260. Admittedly oral traditions concerning events before 1880 are very scanty about all subjects, but presumably a serious war would at least have received a mention.
261. Ibid., p.7. See also Gorvie, op.cit., p.42; and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.65-66.
262. Hollins, "Short History", p.12; Int.19. Some of the differences between the Clarke account and the Hollins account are mentioned by Abraham, A. and Isaac, B., "A Further Note on the History of Luawa Chiefdom" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.24 (Jan. 1969), pp.69-74.
263. So many narrative accounts of Kailondo's accession have been published that the present writer felt it was unnecessary to add to them, but has concentrated rather on an analysis of the reasons for Kailondo's accession, and the manner by which he came to power: these points have not previously been considered.
264. Gorvie, op.cit., p.42, suggests (though he does not precisely state) that the initiative for the whole conference came from Bundu.

265. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.11: "Kai's great friend, Bondo, the spokesman of the other chiefs at Gbondo and Ngiyehun". See also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67.
266. Gorvie, op.cit., p.42.
267. Int.19.
268. Fabundeh succeeded Kailondo as Mahawai of Luawa with British approval in March 1896. Santiggi is not a Mende word at all, but comes from the Temne language [ see Alldridge, A Transformed Colony (Seeley, London, 1910), p.191; and Migeod, A View of Sierra Leone, p.26 ]. Santiggi referred to the Mahai's chief adviser and deputy and is represented in the Mende language by the word Lavale. Presumably Santiggi was introduced into the Luawaarea by British officials who had previously worked in Temneland (see 'Note on Political Terminology'). Ngobeh Kahunla himself became Paramount Chief of Luawa in 1916.
269. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79. Hollins, "Short History", p.12, agrees that the initiative in calling the meeting came entirely from Kailondo. The various accounts of how the Gbondou meeting came to be called are summarized by Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67.
270. The present writer would, in general, take the Clarke account as the most accurate of all the written records.
271. The natural word in the Mende language to use at this point would be kpakoisia, meaning 'the important people of the area'. Unfortunately, kpakoisia has no accurate synonym in English (see Note 83 below).
272. Sakabu was the village which stood on the site of present-day Kailahun (see Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.10).
273. Kulu-Banya, op.cit., p.12.
274. Combey, op.cit., p.10.
275. Mahawai in the Mende language may be translated in English by such words as overlord, supreme ruler, great leader. Wa in the Mende language means large or great (see 'Note on Political Terminology'). Dr. Wylie noted that Bundu of Uanyahun was a ndoomaha, and that Kailondo was the ndoomahai of Luawa ("Mende Chieftaincy", pp.303-304). This is a serious anachronism. The present writer could find no evidence in either written records or oral tradition that ndoomahai was used as a title before the colonial period. Maada James Kailondo, in conversation with his own son James and with Moiwo Lahai, noted that the term ndoomahai was not employed before the colonial period (letter to the present writer from Lahai, M.A., 19.9.81, Freetown). Rev. Clarke also agreed that this term was not in use in Luawa before the arrival of the British (Int.1).
276. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.32-34 above.

277. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.75; and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.61-63.
278. In a reconstruction such as this, there is bound to be a degree of conjecture, and a number of unanswered questions. For instance, was there any other warrior in and around Luawa who would have been willing and able to lead the combined forces of the area against Ndawa? But the interpretation given here seems reasonable, and is consistent with the known facts.
279. Combey, op.cit., p.10. The Combey MS is at many points, probably, unreliable, but at this point it 'rings true'. See Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.7, for previous connections between Ndawa and Kailondo.
280. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67, quoting the late Pa Gbimottor.
281. Int.19.
282. Dr. Wylie has attempted a direct comparison between Samori's Empire and Kailondo's Luawa ("Mende Chieftaincy", pp.303,307). But Samori's Empire was much larger, with a far more highly organized bureaucracy, than Kailondo's Luawa. The two polities were also in different geographical natural regions. Samori placed considerable reliance on his mounted sofas, whereas the vegetation of Luawa limited the usefulness of horsemen, and the area was unsuitable for horses since sleeping-sickness was endemic. For a brief outline of Samori's career and his Empire, see Person, Y., "Guinea-Samori" in Crowder, M. (ed), West African Resistance: the military response to colonial occupation (Hutchinson, London, 1971), pp.111-143.
283. For examples of how close the sofas came to Luawa, and their possible influence on events in Luawa, see Chap.2 of this thesis, ps. below.
284. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, pp.177-180, for some details about Nyagua. See also Vivian, W., Mendiland Memories, Reflections and Anticipations (United Meth. Pub. Ho., London, n.d.), pp.14-15; and Simpson, op.cit., pp.54-58. The best account so far of Nyagua's Panguma is to be found in Abraham, Traditional Leadership, Chap. V, pp.92-118.
285. The great influence of Mendegla was noted by Alldridge (C0806/325/248; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90; quoted in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp.246-248).
286. Easmon, M.C.F., "Madam Yoko, Ruler of the Mende Confederacy" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.11 (Dec.1958). The best account of Madam Yoko's polity is to be found in Abraham, Traditional Leadership, Chap. 6, pp.119-163.
287. Edward Blyden once visited Bopolu and wrote a full description of the polity.
288. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.227-234.

289. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 1, pp. 14-21 above.
290. See Note 263 above, and also Note 1 above.
291. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. 8-9; Hollins, "Short History", p. 14, Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 68.
293. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 10; Hollins, "Short History", p. 15; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp. 70-71. Dr. Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", pp. 301-302, introduced one or two erroneous details: Ngiehun, which he spells as 'Geihun', is not now known as Mende; the latter is a village about 4 miles east of Ngiehun. Ndawa's forces were driven back to Folu, near the River Moa, not to Baoma: the details of the manoeuvres make it unlikely that they reached Baoma. Concerning the details of Ndawa's retreat, the Clarke and Hollins accounts again differ slightly. Rev. Clarke believed Ndawa was driven across the Moa River near Manowa, not near Folu, and also noted that Ndawa later returned and there was more fighting before Ndawa begged from Kailondo his wife and son who had been held as hostages. Mr. Hollins made no mention of this further fighting, but says "Dawa then went back to Wunde, south of Blama and troubled Luawa no more" after he had made a request for Kailondo to return his wife and child, to which Kailondo agreed.
294. Gorvie, op.cit., p. 50: "he was ... more spoken of in the Kpove Goi than any other warrior". Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p. 61, quoting Kallon, Y.B., an informant, stated: "Ndawa was again greater than Nyagua". Nyagua on his own never achieved his desire of destroying Ndawa's stronghold at Wende.
295. See, for example, Wylie, Politics of Transformation, p. 95, where he stated that Kailondo "was ruler of Luawa because he was a military leader".
296. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. 8, 10; Hollins, "Short History", p. 15, mentioned only the ceremony at Ngiehun, but noted that oaths of allegiance were sworn at Gbondou. Gorvie, op.cit., pp. 42-44; Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp. 69-71. Maada James Kailondo (Int. 19) believed the second meeting was held at Nyandehun, and not Ngiehun.
297. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p. 8.
298. Hollins, "Short History", p. 15.
299. Kulu-Banya, op.cit., p. 7.
300. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp. 3-4; Int. 1. See also C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kailahun: Momo Babawo and Kailondo settled a dispute by shaking hands "together in front of me over a piece of white cloth, country-fashion". While being aware of the danger of far-fetched parallels, it seems worth comparing this use of white cloth with a custom of the Mane invaders during the third quarter of the sixteenth century: "when the Manes appeared before a given village, they would send an embassy bearing cloth and arms. To accept was to recognize Mane suzerainty" (Rodney, "A Reconsideration of the Mane invasions", p. 225).

301. Kailondo kee Ndawa, p.30.
302. Simpson, op.cit., p.56.
303. Combey, op.cit., p.10; Hollins, "Short History", p.14.
304. Mr. Hollins (ibid.) noted that they were shut up in a house for seven days, but Rev. Clarke (Foundation of Luawa, p.8) mentioned seven Muslims for an indefinite period. This suggests an error of translation in one of the accounts. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67, follows Hollins.
305. Kanga-goi in the Mende language has also been translated as 'the war of those who refused' i.e. those who refused to swear allegiance to Ndawa (Hollins, "Short History", p.14). Kanga can mean 'rebellion' or 'refusal to obey'.
306. Mr. Hollins (ibid.) noted it was the Muslims who made the ceremony with the snake, which suggests syncretism between Islam and traditional religion. See also Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.8; and Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.67.
307. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.1, pp.17-18 above.
308. See, for example, Alldridge, "Wanderings in the Hinterland of Sierra Leone" in The Geographical Journal, IV (1894), pp.136-137; and The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.103-105. See also Wallis, The Advance of our West African Empire, p.232.
309. See Innes, Mende-English Dictionary, p.87; also Int.1.
310. See Note 172 above.
311. See Note 282 above. Bisandugu, the first capital of Samori's Empire was only about 200 miles north of Luawa.
312. See Chap.5 of this thesis, pp.381-384 below.
313. The information summarized in this Note on Political Terminology came from a large variety of sources, but particularly helpful were the interviews with Rev. W.R.E. Clarke (Int.1) and with Meada James Kailondo (Int.19).



CHAPTER TWO

KAILONDO'S LUAWA, 1880 TO 1896:

EXTERNAL SECURITY.


Luawa's peace, integrity and prosperity were threatened several times during Kailondo's reign by external forces. In his response to these threats, far from indulging mindlessly in warfare "for its own sake" (1), Kailondo consistently sought the welfare of his own people. The Luawa people were affected between 1880 and 1896 by four main external sources of tension. In roughly chronological order these were: disturbances following the Kpove War; penetration of the area by Samori Touré's sofas; the arrival of Europeans, both French and British; and Kafula's rebellion in Wunde. Of these four threats, the last three began to affect Luawa almost simultaneously about the year 1890 (2).

Kailondo's handling of 'external affairs' during his fifteen-year reign suggest that he worked on two fairly fixed principles, possessing a definite external policy. These two principles were: a determination to maintain peace within the borders of his own polity (3); and a desire to develop alliances with strong surrounding polities. While almost any territorial ruler would make the first principle a point of external policy, Kailondo seems to have pursued his objective with more than ordinary tenacity. In an oath taken at Ngiehun at the time of his accession, he had promised not to remain idle while war was near the people of Luawa (4), and he kept this promise with great seriousness. The second principle was not always easy to apply, because at different times during his reign, Kailondo had to face provocative behaviour from the rulers of Gaura, Upper Bambara and Mando (5). If Kailondo had been intent on purposeless, continual warfare, these polities would have suffered the brunt of his raids: they were easily within striking distance; they gave him good cause to attack them; and also they presented him with no great military problem. He was more

militarily powerful than any other leader in Ko-Mende, with the possible exception of Nyagua (6); Upper Bambara and Mando, if not Gaura, were puny by comparison (7). One of the best proofs that Kailondo did not wage war indiscriminately, and that warfare was not his "principal form of activity and institution" (8) is to be seen in Kailondo's virtual refusal to direct his forces against Upper Bambara or Mando (9). If he did fight against Mendegla of Gaura, the peace treaty which was soon agreed between them was never broken thereafter (10).

Kailondo sometimes took a necessary diplomatic initiative (11), undertook a war of conquest (12), or engaged in a prophylactic raid (13). On the one hand, it would be incongruous to consider such actions as part of some 'master plan' which Kailondo had evolved concerning external affairs (14); but on the other hand these were not simply purposeless acts of a ruler who engaged in war for its own sake, nor were they mere reactions to external pressures. If he deliberately involved his people in any fighting, he generally had clear, limited, attainable objectives, and his actions squared with the two considerations which underlay his external policy.

MAP FIVE



KALLONDO'S LUAWA c.1890




SCALE 1:500,000

MAP FIVE

KAILONDO'S LUAWA, c.1890

SCALE 1 : 500,000

KEY

-  = 'Kailondo's Luawa'; the heartland of Kailondo's polity
-  = 'Greater Luawa'; other areas under the control of Kailondo
-  = Expeditions undertaken by Kailondo
- Kailahun. = Headquarter towns of powerful rulers
- GAU = Names of small polities; and 'sections' of Kailondo's Luawa

## 1. THE AFTERMATH OF THE KPOVE WAR

The crisis produced by the Kpove War in the Luawa area had brought Kailondo to power and he had to consolidate his position within Luawa during the aftermath of that war. In the disturbed post-war period, there was a connection between external threats from various Kpove War leaders and attempts at rebellion by some minor Luawa kpakoisia. This connection was most clearly seen in the Gbande War which by all accounts was the most serious and wide-ranging war fought by Kailondo (15). Unfortunately the chronology for this period is uncertain: Rev. Clarke suggested that the Gbande War took place only a matter of months after Kailondo's accession (16), but Mr. Hollins gave a date of c.1889 (17). The present writer has largely followed the Hollins chronology (18).

Mr. Hollins indicated that the first serious incident involving Kailondo after his accession was a war between Upper Bambara, and the people of Mando and Gaura (19). Pendembu, the headquarters town of Bambara, was burnt and many of its people were carried off by Mendegla and Bubu, the Gaura leaders (20). Mahai Momo Babahu of Bambara appealed to Kailondo for help, and the latter advised Mendegla to return the captives, which he did. This diplomatic victory of Kailondo meant there was no fighting, and he returned to Kailahun (21). A different account, given by P.C. Momoh Banya, clearly stated that this whole incident was part of the Kpove War, and suggested Mendegla only withdrew after fighting with Kailondo (22). Yet another account showed Mendegla and Kailondo acted as allies in later years, although it stated that there had formerly been a dispute between them: Kabba Sei, Mahai of Mando, had peacefully settled this dispute (23). Whether the help Kailondo rendered Momo Babahu was

purely diplomatic, or was military as well, the Mahei of Upper Bambara was so grateful that he gave Kailondo his daughter as wife (24). From then on, until after the death of Kailondo, Upper Bambara was virtually a satellite of Luawa (25). Momo Babahu was pleased to have the protection of Kailondo, and gained concessions from his powerful neighbour such as permission to cross the Keya River and build towns on land which had previously belonged to Luawa (26).

This incident shows how the ruler of Luawa used the disturbances of the post-Kpove War period skilfully to build up the strength of his polity. By giving help to a weak neighbour, Kailondo placed him in a position of moral obligation. A marriage alliance (27) and a grant of land sealed the friendship; but from Momo Babahu's viewpoint, the relationship was more one of vassalage than friendship. Quite possibly, all this was achieved without Kailondo involving himself in any war. On other occasions, too, he extended his power and influence in this way without recourse to warfare. For example, Kai Kai, who was a maha with influence in present-day Kissi Tungi, and lived at Gbandewulo (28), came peacefully to the Luawa Mahei and "agreed to sit down under him" (29). On numerous occasions, Kailondo was called into neighbouring countries as an arbiter to settle disputes between two mahanga, because he was such a respected and powerful leader that both sides would accept his advice (30). Presumably in the aftermath of the Kpove War there was much need for such a figure, and his role as arbiter would naturally give him considerable influence in the territory concerned.

Kailondo did not extend his authority by peaceful means alone. He made war on Toweï of Tengea, and compelled that country to recognize his suzerainty, which it continued to do until his death (31).

Towel had attended the Gbondou Conference (32) but had, it seems, subsequently refused to accept Kailondo's overlordship, thus provoking the latter to wage war on him. Likewise, Kailondo's influence in southern Kono was established by means of a war which started as a raid against mahsi Manye of Walihun. Presumably this was fairly early in the former's reign, since both Clarke and Hollins mentioned it as one of his first wars (33): according to P.C. Momoh Banya's account, this was in fact one of the Kpove Wars (34). Whether Manye first provoked Kailondo or vice versa is not clear (35), but in either case Kailondo seemed ready to take a military offensive. He drove Manye out of his own country, and soon after, the latter died. Kailondo later saw the opportunity to extend his control over a large portion of the southern Kono people (36): he captured Manye's successor, Kapeta, and held him prisoner at Bobobu near Kailahun (37). Kapeta remained a prisoner for more than four years, and was only released in mid-1895 (38) after Governor Cardew had pressed Kailondo to do so (39). Soon after Kapeta's capture, Nyagua and Kailondo met "at Beru in the Bane Chiefdom and the two divided Kono country between them as far north as the Bafi River" (40).

Kailondo's actions in Kono country provide a good example of how he combined war and diplomacy in a fairly careful and disciplined way. In the war against Manye and the capture of Kapeta he achieved a definite, self-imposed and limited goal: he established his military supremacy in south-east Kono, thus decreasing the possibility of Luawa being disturbed by aggression from that direction. But this created a new political situation in which there was increased possibility of conflict with Nyagua, whose influence was supreme in south-west Kono (41). He therefore reached agreement with Nyagua on 'spheres of influence'



in the area, and thus initiated a period of fruitful co-operation with the other most powerful leader in Ko-Mende (42). Likewise, before the war began Kailondo had made sure that friendly relations existed between himself and mahei Gobe of Peje (43). Peje lay just west of Luawa, and a surprise flank-attack could easily have been launched from there against Kailondo while he was preoccupied with the war against Manye.

The co-operation between Kailondo, Nyagua and the other established rulers of Ko-Mende lasted not only through the post-Kpove War period, but to the end of Kailondo's reign (44). There were occasional disagreements between Kailondo and Nyagua, as in 1892 (45); and by about 1895 relations between them had grown somewhat cold (46). But right up to the time of Kailondo's death the alliance was not broken (47), and Nyagua may have attended Kailondo's funeral ceremonies (48). "Up to the time of the Treaty [with the British in 1890], the three important chiefs of the Upper Mendes were Nyagua, Kabba Sei, and Kailondo. The general desire to acquire new lands and extend their influence bred ill-feeling among them at one time or another. They never, however, came into actual conflict with each other, and the differences between them were easily settled and did not develop into feuds" (49). Such would seem to be an accurate description of political relationships, except that the next most powerful Mahei in the area after Nyagua and Kailondo was probably not Kabba Sei but Mendegla of Gaura [who was succeeded in 1891 by Kpate Kaka (50)]. The peace and good order which Mendegla attempted to introduce in 1890 into the land lying between his territory of Gaura and the Atlantic coast (51) were already established between himself and the other principal rulers of Ko-Mende.

In the mid-1880s (52), the good effect of these

peaceful relations between the established rulers of the area (53) began to be felt, and, as the Kpove War disturbances began to subside, the ordinary people were able to return to a more settled way of life. This is illustrated by the return of mahai Fabe (54) to his own country. He was mahai of Lingo-Bengo country (55) - sometimes known as Upper Koundou (56) - north of Wunde (57), but had fled to the area round the Mafissa River when Ndawa and Kailondo invaded Kono country early in the Kpove War (58). The Mafissa people objected to the presence of Fabe, and some of his followers were enslaved. So he appealed for help to Kailondo, who came and burned the towns of Mafissa country, forcing the inhabitants to flee eastwards across the Mafissa River (59). Possibly this alliance between Fabe and Kailondo, and the return of the former to his homeland, was associated with simultaneous fighting between Kailondo and the people of Wunde Tungi [which was sometimes called Upper Wunde (60)]. Kailondo and Fabe, having driven their enemies across the Mafissa River, followed them as far as a place called Yarokuru before returning to their homes (61). Fabe, once again established in Lingo-Bengo, "presented Kai with many gifts" (62), suggesting that he recognized Kailondo as overlord (63).

Ultimately, then, the outworking of the Kpove Wars produced the conditions for settled peace in Ko-Mende: several organized polities developed (notably Nyagua's Panguma and Kailondo's Luawa), and their leaders were ready to co-operate with each other in the maintenance of law and order throughout the area. Unfortunately, for a number of years their attention had to be directed mainly towards resisting external aggression. One main aggressor was Mbawulomeh (64), who had entered the country as one of Ndawa's warriors in 1880 (65). Thereafter he settled at


Ngiehun in Guma, south of the River Magowi (66), and from that place caused considerable trouble, taking advantage of disturbed conditions east and south of Luawa (67). Therefore, the war which Kailondo and his neighbours had to wage against him may be considered an extension of the Kpove War disturbances. This war against Mbawulomeh was generally remembered as the Gbande War (or occasionally as the Mbawulomeh War). It began when, about 1889 (68), Mbawulomeh entered the Gau area of Luawa, burning among other places Gondama (69), Talia (70), and Nyandehun (71). At Nyandehun he killed Bundu of Janyahun, who had been spokesman at the Gbondou Conference (72). This was the only time between the accession of Kailondo and his death in 1896 that there was serious fighting within Luawa (73). Mbawulomeh was invited to enter Luawa by Manjakewa and Jobo of Giema, and Fagbandi of Sakabu, who in 1880 had sided with Ndawa against Kailondo, and had apparently never been entirely reconciled to Kailondo's rule (74). Kailondo had these traitors executed (75), whereafter he set off in pursuit of Mbawulomeh.

Before setting out after Mbawulomeh, Kailondo made sure he had the support, or at least the neutrality, of those rulers whose mahawuisia were closest to Mbawulomeh's town of Ngiehun - the rulers of Dia, Malema, Mando and Upper Bambara (76). The Luawa Mahei was assured that they would not oppose him, and in fact Mahangsisia Pambu and Ngevau even joined Kailondo in his attack on Mbawulomeh (77). Mendegla of Gaura may also have given some support (78). This provides another illustration of Kailondo's attitude to warfare: far from being a haphazard affair, easily and frequently embarked upon, war involved careful calculations. His response to Mbawulomeh's assault on Gau was to drive the raider out of the area - and if he could have caught Mbawulomeh he would no doubt have killed him - because, like his former master Ndawa, Mbawulomeh lacked a strong territorial base (79),

and seemed ready at any time to engage irresponsibly in raids for the plunder he might gain. There seemed only one way to deal with such a freebooter. Yet how could Kailondo be sure of not antagonizing neighbouring rulers ? His answer was to concert his own actions with theirs.

When Kailondo destroyed Ngiehun, Mbawulomeh fled through Vahun in Guma to Gbande-speaking Vassa country, where mahsi Teye of Kamatahun gave him shelter (80). When Teye refused to hand over Mbawulomeh, Kailondo attacked and conquered Vassa. Mbawulomeh and Teye then fled to mahsi Fobewuru of Jene. Fobewuru also refused to give up Mbawulomeh, so he in turn was attacked, and was himself killed in the fighting (81). "Having buried Fobewuru, Kailundu set out yet further on his chase and crossed the rivers Loffa and Langwa (St. Paul's ?) and so reached Lanbumbu in the Gbele country, where the people were cannibals. Bau-wuru-me fled again to the Peje country, where the people too ate human flesh. Then Bau-wuru-me gained the Buyama country in the heart of Liberia and here the long hunt ended since all further trace of Bau-wuru-me was lost" (82).

On his homeward way, a number of Gbande mahangeisia gave some sort of allegiance to Kailondo (83), and he "made Fabanna Farra Chief over Vassa, Kelfa over Popalahun and Molifo over Botemba" (84). In the mahawuisia immediately south and east of 'Greater Luawa' the Gbande War gave Kailondo virtually direct control. For example, in 1892 Alldridge noted that Jenagure of Kambahun in Mando Javaiana (85) was, as a result of the Gbande War, "indebted to Ki Lundu for his position in the country today" (86). For some time after the War, Jenagure acknowledged Kailondo as overlord, and these two, together with Jama Poto of Upper Gola "had sworn not to put war on each other" (87). Since the Luawa Mahsi had just



FABANNA FARA, RULER OF VASSA IN THE EARLY 1890s.

proved his military supremacy in the area, the oath was taken, presumably, at his own initiative. Thus Kailondo used his victory to secure the adoption of a limited 'peace treaty' (88) aimed at preventing future war.

In summary, then, the Gbande War led to greater hopes of peace in the area east and south of Luawa (89), because the disturbing presence of Mbawulomeh had been removed, and Kailondo's peaceable political influence had been extended. The latter also materially increased his possessions, gaining "wives, slaves, cattle, many cloths and a carronade" (90). On this expedition, Kailondo travelled further afield than on any other, and not surprisingly it is better remembered in oral tradition than any other incident of Kailondo's reign before the arrival of the Europeans (91). The fact that he could move in war a hundred miles from his base (92) demonstrated his military power; it also indicated the stability he had built up within Luawa in the decade since his accession and the security of his relations with neighbouring rulers. Military strength, internal stability and external security were closely linked. Internal stability largely arose from the Luawa peoples' awareness that they would not be attacked by surrounding rulers, and that those rulers would not support rebellion within Luawa. But surrounding rulers respected and avoided attacking Kailondo's Luawa partly because of his military strength. Hence Luawa knew peace; and even though in the immediate hinterland of Freetown and Bonthe "the country at large" was "in a very disturbed state" (93), that description was not true of Kailondo's Luawa.

Two years after the Gbande War (94), around 1891, Kissi Tengea was invaded by mahai Sungba of Luangkoli, a mahawui east of

Luawa. Toweï of Foya, maheï of Kissi Tengea (95), and Ngegba of Buedu (96) asked Kailondo for help. He defeated and killed Sungba, with the result that the people of Luangkoli (97) accepted Kailondo's overlordship, and their land became part of 'Greater Luawa' (98). It would seem likely that this war was related to the disturbances caused by Mbawulomeh, because the war occurred at roughly the same time and in the same area as other fighting provoked by Mbawulomeh after the Gbande War (99). By this time, too, any fighting to the east of Luawa would probably involve the Kpandeme 'sofas' (100), and there were also in the area several komahanga who were operating independently of both Luawa and Kpandeme (101).

Although Mbawulomeh had been defeated and deprived of a territorial base in the Gbande War, he was still at large in the hinterland of Monrovia. He never again crossed Luawa's borders during Kailondo's reign, but the Luawa Maheï was involved in a number of minor wars - raids might be a better description (102) - beyond Luawa's boundaries which occurred partly because of Mbawulomeh's activities. The 'Gbolo' people (103), at Mbawulomeh's instigation, carried war into Gbande country, planning to go on to Luawa; but the Gbande maheï Fagbalfa received Kailondo's help in driving the Gbolo people away. Many people were killed in this war, possibly because much of the fighting "was done with guns" (104). It would be tempting to read into this last comment a reference to the spread of firearms in this area, with all the socio-economic implications that might follow. But one isolated comment, unsubstantiated by other evidence, is an inadequate base for extensive theorizing.

The Kissi and Gbande people reported to Kailondo that the Gbolo people had been helped by the 'Ndama' and 'Jeweïehu' peoples. So the Luawa armed forces raided both these areas and subjugated

them, though at the cost of numbers of Kailondo's own men (105). The subjugation of Ndama was not, however, permanent. Kailondo left some of his own kpakoisia there, including Langama, Koi Bundor and Bundor Foryoh (106). Before long the people of Ndama prepared a counter-attack in which the small detachment of Kailondo's men was driven out and had to flee for their lives (107). This illustrates the difficulties of developing a large proto-state in this area without a fairly strong bureaucracy. Lines of communication with places more than about thirty miles from the centre were almost inevitably inadequate for the ruler to deal personally with a sudden military or political emergency (108). The disturbances beyond Luawa's eastern boundaries continued for a number of years (109), but by 1894 Kailondo was beginning to suffer from some serious sickness (110), and was unable to go on the raid against Jewelehu, which may have occurred late in 1895 (111): he probably died in the early months of 1896 (112).


Right to the end of his reign, then, Kailondo had to remain on guard against the disturbing aftermath of the Kpove War. These disturbances involved Kailondo in a considerable amount of fighting, in order that he should maintain the peace of Luawa. He was, in fact, successful in keeping his polity at peace and outside the influence of these disturbances, except for one brief incursion by Mbawulomeh in 1889 (113). Because of Kailondo's vigilance, and his good relationships with surrounding strong rulers, the people of Luawa experienced a settled peace within their territory which freed them to concentrate on the development of agriculture and trade (114).



## 2. THE PENETRATION OF SAMORI'S SOFAS.

Around 1890, Kailondo began to feel pressure from three powerful new military forces: Samori's sofas, the French with their tirailleurs (115), and the British with their Frontier Police Force (116). In discussing the influence of Samori's sofas on Luawa, the historian has to depend largely on the reports of the first British officials in the area. 'Sofas' was a term generally applied to members of Samori's cavalry; and there were some sofas stationed to the east and north-east of Luawa in the early 1890s (117). But up to the death of Kailondo, the sole British official to travel far east of Luawa was T.J. Alldridge, and he only did so once, in 1891 (118). Despatches from Freetown concerning the sofas and their activities east of Luawa were therefore based on vague, second-hand information. Also, the term 'sofas' was used by British officials and Frontier Force NCOs (119) without any clear definition. C.B. Wallis, one-time District Commissioner in the Sierra Leone Protectorate (120), wrote in 1910: "Sofa is a native word meaning a collection of different peoples" (121) ! Any disturbance to the east or north-east of Luawa in the 1890s was liable to be labelled a 'sofa war' - especially if any horsemen were involved.

The leading authority on Samori has noted that the Mandinka ruler possessed "essentially an infantry army, even though its members bore the paradoxical name of sofa ('horse father') .... There were bands of cavalry in his army by 1881, at the siege of Kankan, and their number increased steadily up to the great crisis of 1888. Afterwards, when Samori completely altered his military methods, he diminished their part in the army in favour of an infantry based on European models" (122).



ONE OF SAMORI'S SOFAS

British officials, however, applied the name sofa not so much to members of Samori's army as to any armed force east of Luawa containing one or two horsemen, whether or not connected with Samori's Empire. In particular, the armed forces of the town of Kpandeme and its surrounding district were all considered to be 'sofas' (123). If the people of Kpandeme were ever part of Samori's Empire (124), their links with him must have become increasingly tenuous as his contracting Empire moved westwards after 1888 (125). Cardew, more precise than most of his colleagues, may have got near the truth when he described the sofas operating to the east of Luawa as "Former adherents of SAMADU [i.e. Samori] who have settled in the Bandemeh district in Liberian territory and are constantly raiding on adjacent tribes" (126). No doubt the distinction between sofas settled in Kpandeme and the Kpandeme people themselves quickly disappeared. Yet even in the early years of the twentieth century, after Samori's Empire had been destroyed and he himself had died, some British officials were still referring to 'sofa' activity east of Luawa (127).

British reports, although confused and exaggerated, were, however, undoubtedly correct in referring to some sofa activity east of Luawa in the early 1890s. The famous 1893 'Waima incident', which occurred when both French and British forces were in touch with a party of sofas led by Porekere (128), took place only about forty miles north-north-west of Kailahun (129). Porekere's stronghold at this time was Tekuyema in southern Kono, little more than thirty miles from Kailahun (130). Porekere was probably operating under the loose control of Kemo Bilalé, one of Samori's 'generals' (131). The latter had lost Heremanko early in 1893 (132), and as a result his Heremanko-Falaba-Port Loko trade route to Freetown had been cut (133). A trade route to Freetown was a necessity

since that entrepot was the source of Bilalé's arms supply (134). The serious sofa advance into Kissi and Kono country in 1893 represented an attempt to open a new road to the Sierra Leone Colony through Koranko and Kunike, and, possibly, the town of Senehun (135).

Both oral traditions (136) and written records (137) suggest that the sofas first entered the Luawa area three years earlier, almost simultaneously with Alldridge (138). The British official described [probably with exaggeration (139)] the effect of cavalry on the people of the Luawa area: "The people from beyond who rode upon horses' - so they were described - were naturally dreaded by those who had scarcely ever seen a horse. The quickness with which they passed from place to place, to people who had never heard of cavalry, seemed almost supernatural" (140). The sofas were first in evidence in Wunde, north of the Moa, in 1890. This sofa intrusion into Wunde cannot be discussed without reference to one of the most difficult historical questions of Kailondo's reign. Did the sofas enter Wunde at the invitation of Kafula, mahsi of Wunde, having allied themselves with him against Kailondo? Or did the sofas invade Wunde, with the result that Kafula sent for help from Kailondo in order to drive them away? There is evidence to support both propositions (141). However, whether the sofas helped or opposed Kafula is of little significance for their influence in the Luawa area, because by 1895 they had ceased to be a serious factor in Wunde, and the attacks the sofas mounted against Kailondo came from the Gbande east, not the Kissi north. Despite the Waima disaster, the British expedition in late 1893 (142) together with similar French action (143), prevented the sofas from permanently occupying Kono and Wunde. The Battle of Tungea, in which Forekere was killed, was the decisive engagement (144). If Kafula allied

with anyone against Kailondo in the last years of the latter's reign, it was with the French rather than the sofas (145).

Aggressive sofa activity due east of Luawa, centring on the town of Kpandeme in "Bunde country" (146) presented a much more permanent and serious threat than a few wandering bands of horsemen in Wunde. It is not clear whether this sofa aggression from Kpandeme was linked with the 1893 attempt by Bilalé to find a new trade route to Freetown (147); but the Kpandeme threat to Luawa began before 1893, and lasted for a number of years after that. Possibly the people of Kpandeme were ruled by sofas in the 1880s: certainly there were units of Samori's army operating in the area at that time (148). The Kpandeme warriors may have learnt new techniques of war - especially the use of horses - from the sofas, and thus possessed a military advantage which enabled them to challenge surrounding polities like Kailondo's Luawa. Since there was a strong connection between the people of Kpandeme and the sofas, the Kpandeme threat to Luawa will now be treated as an incident in the sofa penetration of the area (149).

There is no evidence as to whether the sofas at Kpandeme had presented a threat to Kailondo before 1891, but in Gbande country by the end of that year they were causing disturbances of which Kailondo had to take account. In November 1891, the sofas took the town of Kolahun, where Ngombu Yese was mahéi (150). The Gbande mahangéisia (151) requested that Kailondo should "go and settle the matter for them so the SOFA war will return" (152). In other words, they asked the Luawa Mahéi to act as peacemaker so that the sofas would cease to make war and would go back to Kpandeme. By January 1892, the situation was becoming increasingly complicated and dangerous: Kabba Sei of Mando, Fabanna of

Vassa, Pambu of Malema, Yanga Fema of Guma, Gande of Baiwala (Dia) and other mahangeisia had formed a military alliance to wage war on Jama Poto, ruler of Upper Gola. During the fighting, the allies also turned their forces against Quauma of Lukasso and Jenagure of Kambahun in Mando Javaiama, with the result that the war spread to Gbande country, just west of sofa territory. Jama Poto called for help from the sofas, apparently supported by Jenagure. Fabanna of Vassa got himself involved in double-dealing with both sides in the conflict, which so annoyed his Vassa subjects that they turned him out of the mahawui (153).

In accordance with the principles of his essentially peaceful external policy, Kailondo took no part in all this fighting (154), and advised the surrounding rulers not to go to war either (155): but he was unable to stop the sofa war, and the surrounding rulers ignored his advice (156). Their refusal to accept Kailondo's advice was presumably partly the result of a disagreement between Kailondo and Kabba Sei, the latter being one of the war-leaders (157): the Luawa Mahei reported to the British Governor that Kabba Sei was encouraging the mahangeisia in Gbande country to forsake their allegiance to him (158). Inevitably the war soon began to affect Luawa. On 21 January 1892, the sofas were fighting at Gbandewulo (159) in the extreme south-east of Kailondo's polity. Later, Sembe Fawundu, mahei of Tungi, who lived at Gbandewulo, explained that he had no quarrel with the sofas, but they had raided his land, "burning up many of his fackais [160], and much rice which was stored in them" (161). This was just part of a general sofa offensive against Kabba Sei and the others. The sofas, possessing large numbers of guns (162), were able to drive the war-leaders on both sides out of Gbande country and back down to Baiwala in the present-day Dia Chiefdom (163).

In April 1892 T.J. Alldridge, knowing about the sofa menace, made his third visit to Luawa. Far from being able to create that pax Britannica which elsewhere he emphasized as the main benefit of British rule (164), he simply suggested that Kailondo should take the initiative in using force to drive out the sofa invaders (165). The British official held a large meeting at Pendembu in Upper Bambara mahawui, where he met, among other mahangeisia, Kailondo, Nyagua, Kabba Sei and Momo Babahu (166). Altogether there were between 800 and 1,000 people present, and Alldridge tried to find out the cause of the sofa war. Nearly two decades later he described it in A Transformed Colony as "one of the most memorable up-country meetings. This meeting extended over three days and was convened in a great open space, known as the Korbanjai, between the three fenced towns, in front of a large and curiously shaped cotton-tree ....

The occasion was one of vital importance to these people, much of whose country had been destroyed by constant wars, and who were even then in perpetual dread of a sofa invasion on a larger scale than ever" (167). This later account of conditions in the area contrasts rather strikingly with the report, written by Alldridge near the time of the meeting, that "with the exception of this most unfortunate Sofa war, there is, I think no doubt as to the prosperous condition of this part of the country" (168). In his book, the Travelling Commissioner infers that the meeting played a large part in the establishment of "peacable conditions" (169) in the area. In fact, he did little more than endorse Kailondo's suggestion that the Luawa Mahej "in conjunction with Nyagua might go against the Sofas and endeavour to drive them out of the country" (170). Alldridge agreed with Kailondo and Nyagua's estimate that they could muster the necessary military

strength, and when he left, they were about to meet together to plan operations (171). In the abstract, it was easy for Alldridge and his colleagues to generalize about how the extension of British rule was "pacifying the various tribes" (172), and how the colonial government was taking measures against "the sofa invasion" for "the securing of peace" (173). But when faced with the realities of a specific situation involving the sofas, the British official could do no more than agree with the views of the local mahangesia, and leave them to get on with the job of ejecting the invaders. 'Pacification' was undertaken by Nyagua and Kailondo, not by the British Commissioner, and this they were already prepared to do in any case (174). The presence of Alldridge was coincidental, and hardly helped at all.

Quayle-Jones, the temporary Administrator of the Colony, and J.C.E. Parkes, Superintendent of the Department of Native Affairs, were the two Freetown officials most concerned with Alldridge's reports in early 1892. They did not approve of the way Alldridge had encouraged Nyagua and Kailondo to fight the sofas (175); but neither did they seem very disturbed by the prospect of severe fighting in the area. Presumably they, too, could offer no alternative solution. In reply to Alldridge's request for three more constables to be stationed at Kailahun, Parkes calmly noted that "it would not be prudent to expose such a small force of police to a possible attack which they will not be able to resist the more so as now Kie Ludo [sic.] and the other chiefs have been advised to get the Sofas out of the country as soon as possible they will boldly enter into war and their towns may not be able to hold out against the Sofa's advance" (176).

Through united action by their armed forces, Kailondo



and Nyagua did in fact drive the sofas out of Vassa and Gbande countries in 1892 (177), but were either unready or unable to launch an attack on the town of Kpandeme itself (178). Governor Cardew later suggested that Kpandeme remained untaken because Nyagua failed to give "sufficient assistance" to Kailondo (179). Possibly as a result of Nyagua's failure, some disagreement developed between the two mahangeisia (180). Kailondo requested help from Freetown, but in August, Parkes wrote to Kailondo stating that "this Government cannot give you any armed support to drive the Sofas from BANDEME but that endeavours are being made to restrain your antagonists by moral influence" (181). It is hard to imagine that the Government could in fact exert any influence in the country east of Luawa. When Alldridge visited Kailondo early in 1893, the latter was still at war with the sofas: "moral influence" was obviously not working (182).

The next recorded incursion of the Kpandeme 'sofas' westwards towards Luawa came almost simultaneously with Cardew's first visit to the area. In mid-March 1894, the sofas advanced on Kailondo's Greater Luawa, burning down several towns and killing three of Kailondo's sub-chiefs (183). Cardew, while at Waima, received a report of this through Fabundeh, Kailondo's right-hand man, in April. The Governor acted with his usual firmness, in support of the Luawa Mahai: "I have given orders for the Police post at Kanre Lahun to be reinforced to 20 men, + also to give him material as well as moral support" (184). However, he directed Fabundeh to tell Kailondo to remain strictly on the defensive. The extra police no doubt strengthened Kailondo's hand, but did not prevent the people of Kpandeme from troubling him: in January 1895, Kailondo sent his emissary Ngobeh Kahunla (185) all the way to Freetown, partly to

report that Foya in Kissi Tengea had been attacked three times and though the attacks had been repulsed, he was begging for further Government assistance (186). The Government apparently did nothing, and in March Kailondo reported to Cardew (who was visiting Kailahun on his second up-country tour) that the Kpandeme people had "within the last three months taken and destroyed three of his towns named respectively KONDEHWALLA, TINDON, and SUNGLIANA which were situated to the Eastward of FUYA and the farthest town of which was only a day's march from BAWDEMEH" (187).

The Governor's estimate was that by this time "the opposing factions in this war" had become "very mixed" (188). The main protagonists were Momo Dukori, Mahei of Kpandeme, and Kailondo of Luawa (189), but there were a number of other semi-independent komahanga (190) making war to the east of Luawa: these latter, who had no fixed political allegiances, included Mbawulomeh and "MOMO BAHOMI, the chief of BANDEH" (191). As a result of his 1895 visit, Cardew decided to place four constables in each of the towns of Balla, Nyandehun and Sandialu (192); but on his return to Freetown he realized these places were all probably in Liberian territory, and so he withdrew his order (193). Late in March 1895, after Cardew had left Kailahun, Kailondo's town of Foya was attacked, and though the invasion failed, Kailondo was eager to be sent still more Frontier Police (194). However, the situation was probably not as serious as Kailondo seemed to believe, for Samori's control of the lands immediately north and east of Luawa had been broken. The 'sofas' of Kpandeme were probably making in 1894 and early 1895 a last all-out effort to break Kailondo's power (195); but it was an effort which came nowhere near to success (196). After March 1895, no further reports were made about serious 'sofa' activity from Kpandeme against 'Greater Luawa'. Kailondo

had achieved a limited victory in keeping the sofas out of his heartland, and that was his own achievement. Although he was clearly grateful for the 'moral support' of Frontier Police in Kailahun, the 'constables' had not taken part in any of the fighting and the Freetown Government had done very little to help him (197).

In 1896, at the time of his death (as in 1892) there was "no doubt as to the prosperous condition" of Kailondo's Luawa (198), despite the sofa war. There had been some fighting as close to the Luawa heartland as Tengea and Wunde countries, and on one occasion the war had affected the Tungi border; but in general the Luawa Mahej had maintained peace in his heartland despite the serious disturbances, caused by his aggressive neighbours, immediately to the east of 'Greater Luawa'.

### 3. THE ARRIVAL OF THE BRITISH.

In 1890 (199) T.J. Alldridge became the first European ever to visit Luawa (200); and until Cardew's 1895 visit Alldridge was probably the only European to enter Kailondo's territory (201), making visits in 1891 (202), 1892 (203) and 1893 (204). He accompanied Cardew on the Governor's first tour in 1894, when the party got as far east as Bandajuma Yawei, Gandorhun and Waima (205), but did not enter Luawa. Alldridge was not a member of the Governor's 1895 and 1896 expeditions (206) which did reach Kailahun, and in fact it seems that Alldridge did not visit Luawa between 1893 and 1905. (In the years between 1905 and 1908 he made at least one visit to Luawa during which he collected some of the material for A Transformed Colony [207].) Before Kailondo's death possibly the only other British officials to visit Luawa were Captains Tarbet and Fairtlough of the Frontier Police (the former being Inspector General), and they both entered Luawa only after Cardew's visit (208). It seems that no Freetown Creoles penetrated as far up-country as Luawa in the time of Kailondo (209), so that until 1895 Kailondo and his people obtained experience of the British only through a single representative - Travelling Commissioner Alldridge, whose attitudes and behaviour were therefore crucial.

Alldridge arrived in Sierra Leone in 1871 and worked in the Sherbro area as an agent for one of the Firms (210). He transferred to Government service only in 1890, when he was appointed a Travelling Commissioner to "Upper Mendi" (211), his job being to "enter into treaties ... with the paramount chiefs" (212). However, Alldridge's understanding of what he was doing, and why, did not coincide with his Freetown employers' understanding. Governor Hay stated that the object of Alldridge's travels was "mainly to prevent any Foreign Power from further surrounding and hemming



T. J. ALLDRIDGE

in the Colony, and that the sphere of British influence should be extended as far as possible consistently with the due observance of the Anglo-French agreement", and with respect for the rights of Liberia (213). The only 'Foreign Power' which was threatening further to hem in the Colony was France. But Alldridge, both in his despatches and his two books, hardly mentions the French 'threat'. In his second book he spends two whole chapters on developments which led to the creation of a Protectorate (214), but in this space he only once mentions the French, and there only briefly, (215). Elsewhere Alldridge frequently insists that the expansion of British rule in the Sierra Leone hinterland was essentially a civilizing mission and a trading venture: "it became very apparent that in the interests of the people, and for the development of the country's bountiful indigenous wealth, the Government must take definite steps towards pacifying the various tribes and establishing a new state of things in which, under British protection, the people would be able to enjoy life and be free from that shocking terrorism which was the perpetual condition of their existence until the creation of the Protectorate in 1896" (216).

There was a real difference between the concerns of Alldridge 'on the spot' up-country, and the Government officials in Freetown. This difference was accentuated by the rare degree of freedom from central government control which Alldridge enjoyed when he was in Upper Mendeland, thanks to poor, over-extended communications. The result on at least one occasion was disapproval in Freetown of Alldridge's actions in the Luawa area (217). In 1892 Alldridge advised Kailondo to "get the Sofas out of the country as soon as possible" by the use of force (218). This seemed to the British official the only way to rid Luawa of a serious

menace to the development of trade and the spread of 'civilization'. But Quayle-Jones and J.C.E. Parkes in Freetown were much more worried by the thought of armed clashes in the British-protected area, and possible collision with the French. They therefore favoured a 'peace at any price' policy, and disapproved of Alldridge's advice to Kailondo (219). Yet Kailondo and the people of Luawa never heard about that disapproval: as far as they were concerned in 1892, the Travelling Commissioner (and in later years the local Frontier Police Officer, the W.A.F.F. Officer, or District Commissioner) was the official and absolute voice of British power. It follows that, in studying local history (220), only limited value is to be derived from analysing the attitudes, policies and actions of officials in the European capital or in the West African coastal capital. The officials to whom attention must be paid are those 'on the spot', up-country (221); but, as yet, little detailed work has been done on the behaviour of local British officials in Sierra Leone (222).

Alldridge, whom the Mende people nicknamed "Bolowa" or "Big Neck" (223), displayed a curious ambivalence in his attitude towards them. He was favourably impressed by a number of his experiences of life in the Luawa area; for example, by the orderly way in which large political meetings were held in the town's kobangai (224), and it struck him that "many a lesson might be gathered from the dignity, the courtesy and the general friendliness which these tribes showed, - not only towards a 'stranger' but in their every-day life towards each other" (225). The Gbande markets made him reflect that "these up-country people are not at all in the wretched condition often pictured by the European imagination" (226).

The Travelling Commissioner, in summary, found Ko-Mende in a "state of tranquility", with the people concentrating on "extensive farming operations" (227).

In other sections of his writings, however, he presented a picture of up-country Mendeland which is almost the complete opposite of a "state of tranquility". It may be significant that this opposite picture is to be found mainly in his two published books, in which he was generalizing about the Protectorate area, and making out a case in favour of British rule (228). Often, his favourable reflections, contained in his official reports, sprang from immediate reactions to specific data (like those noted above), whereas his published comments on the miserable life of the people before 1896 tended to be deductions, made after the lapse of a decade or so, from the principle that British rule inevitably meant improvement.

This deductive method may best be seen in Chapter 30 of A Transformed Colony, entitled "The Need for a Protectorate". In this chapter he deals with the question of a "sneerer": "What land was ever annexed by England except for that land's good?" (229). In trying to refute this accusation, he refers to the "terror" (230) inspired in up-country territories by the sofas and to the "traffic in human beings" which affected the area because in Samori's land "was the market of the slave-dealer" (231). He then makes the unsubstantiated statement that this traffic in human beings "lay at the root of most of the misery among the natives of the Hinterland" (232). This statement also enlarges the area in which "war was always going on" (233) to include, presumably, all the country later known as the Protectorate - although his own despatches from Luawa in the early 1890s clearly depict a state of peace and prosperity



in the area ruled directly by Kailondo (234). Alldridge's description of the terrible devastation caused by a slave-raiding expedition (which follows next in his Chapter 30) is probably accurate, but instead of giving specific dates and places, he implies this was the condition of the entire "Hinterland", and that it had been "going on from time immemorial; there was no security of life or property" (235), since the rulers of the country "were simply preying upon each other and upon their people" (236). This statement does not tally with his earlier remark that the sofas - who had certainly not been operating "from time immemorial" - were the main cause of the war, terror, and slave-trading. The Travelling Commissioner concludes Chapter 30 by noting that by 1890 the up-country peoples were "in worse disorder than ever" (237), and so steps were taken which led to the establishment of a Protectorate.

This description of the rulers and their peoples is clearly in conflict with Alldridge's own assessment of Kailondo and Mendegla in 1890: "from what I have seen myself of the way they govern the extensive territories under their jurisdiction, I gladly endorse the high opinions which I am convinced the masses generally entertain towards the Chieftains" (238).

Alldridge himself did not apparently notice any dichotomy in his writings between two irreconcilable viewpoints. He did not seem to see the incongruity of the fact that at one time he censured "the European imagination" for believing the up-country people live in a "wretched condition" (239), while at another time he himself wrote of the "shocking terrorism which was the perpetual condition of their existence" (240). His 'shocking terrorism' style of writing about pre-1896 conditions is mainly found in his later, second book (241), which was written after

the impact of the 1898 Hut Tax War had been felt, and after he had perhaps experienced anti-imperial criticism in England (242): his earlier writing gives a generally more favourable estimate of the state of things before the Protectorate was declared (243). Therefore, this explanation of the dichotomy in Alldridge's writing implies that his later view is less spontaneously authentic, and less reliable, than the earlier view.

Whatever his later views, Alldridge's own descriptions of his relations with both the mahangeisia and the ordinary people of Upper Mendeland suggest that he had considerable respect for their way of life and their political organization. He maintained a proper decorum even towards Nyagua of Panguma who obviously irritated him (244). He clearly looked upon Kailondo with admiration, writing of him as "every inch a chief, with immense power and influence" (245), and he was genuinely proud that Kailondo was always "a true friend" (246). Kailondo was allowed to satisfy his curiosity about the British official's possessions such as a compass (247) and a teapot (248); and the Mahai returned this respect by paying frequent "complementary visits" (249) to Alldridge while the latter was in Kailahun, and giving him a large number of valuable presents (250). In his relations with other rulers, too, the Travelling Commissioner showed much patience in situations where many Europeans might have lost their temper (251). When, for example, some of the mahangeisia in 1893 were making all sorts of excuses for not journeying to Badasuma to meet the Governor, Alldridge realized that it was "no use getting out of temper; it was no use doing anything more than offering one's sympathy and hoping that the start would be made the next day" (252). He also treated the ordinary people with good humour; when the people of Luawa were eager to come in large numbers to look at him, he made arrangements for them to 'view' him (253). By such

a gentle, dignified and understanding approach, the British official was able to encourage rulers like Kailondo to sign a Treaty of Friendship with the Freetown Government.

The ruler of Luawa, for his own part, was apparently quick to see the advantages to be gained from friendly relations with the Freetown Government and a European power. For example, Alldridge could act as an impartial arbiter to whom disputes could be referred for settlement, just as Kailondo himself was used to arbitrating in disputes between surrounding mahangisia (254). In this way a fair settlement could be arrived at without costly war and without loss of prestige for anyone. A common, customary way of deciding intractable disputes was to call on the help of a disinterested third party. For Kailondo to do this meant, no doubt, that he was accepting the presence of considerable British influence in Luawa; but almost certainly the Luawa Mahei did not feel he was in any way subjecting himself to Alldridge or British power by asking for the Travelling Commissioner's services in this way.

The first dispute in which Kailondo asked for Alldridge's arbitration was with Momo Babahu of Upper Dambara. The dispute was reaching a crisis at the time Alldridge first entered the area in March 1890; it was caused by a "combination of grievances" (255), though ostensibly arising out of the action of Kai Woni, a kogugba of Momo Babahu at Pendembu. Kai Woni, about the year 1886 (256), had seized several people and various precious ornaments belonging to Kailondo (257). The seizure may have included several of Kailondo's wives, and even of his head-wife, Golei (258). Although Momo Babahu had reason to be grateful for previous assistance given to him by Kailondo (259), and although his polity was militarily far inferior to Luawa (260), yet apparently the

Bambara mahei took the side of Kai Woni, and behaved in such a way that Kailondo at length decided to wage war on him. When Alldridge first reached Kailahun on 3 April 1890 (261), he found "Kie Lundu's town was packed with his war boys, whom, the Chief informed me, but for my timely arrival, would have carried war to Bahbahoo in three day's time" (262).

Alldridge's descriptions of how he became involved in the dispute suggest some far-reaching conclusions. Writing less than two weeks after the signing of the Treaty with Kailondo (263), Alldridge explained how he heard of the dispute. "Nothing of this matter had been mentioned to me by Bahbahoo, and until I saw Kie Lundu I was in entire ignorance that any dispute existed between the Bambara and Luawa people" (264). In a despatch a few weeks later, the Travelling Commissioner explained how Kailondo, "before signing the treaty and taking upon himself the obligations contained therein" (265), had told Alldridge of his grievance against Upper Bambara. Kailondo apparently realized that according to the terms of the Treaty, he would be forbidden from going to war with Momo Babahu. The British official promised to place the grievance before the Governor, and the Luawa Mahei promised that meanwhile "all warlike operations should cease until at all events the next dry season" (266). This first account by Alldridge portrays Kailondo taking wise diplomatic initiatives: although Luawa's ruler probably possessed the power to destroy Momo Babahu (267), he deliberately sacrificed this opportunity in favour of developing real friendship between himself and Alldridge (268). Kailondo referred the whole matter to the Travelling Commissioner, and by this act demonstrated the genuineness and seriousness of his commitment to the British official's Treaty. This was not the behaviour of a ruler who was planning war because he "liked it for its own sake" (269).

When Alldridge published an account of this 1890 incident in his first book, however, the details were so altered as to give the whole affair a different complexion (270). Probably he did not introduce deliberate falsification: possibly he was confusing the events of this 1890 visit with a subsequent visit (271). According to the published account, Momo Babahu took the initiative at the time the 1890 Treaty was signed in Kangama (272) in telling Alldridge of the dispute between himself and Kailondo. "He said how very glad he would be", Alldridge wrote in his book, "if I could intercede and act as a mediator between them .... I left the town of Kangama with the full intention of finding a peaceful solution to the difficulty" (273). Kailondo, after signing his Treaty in Kailahun, stated that he would not now go to war against Momo Babahu, and would disperse his own kogugbanga (274). "I mentioned to him that Chief Momo Babahu had asked me to intercede on his behalf to try to settle their long-standing dispute in an amicable way. I talked the matter over with him, and finally arranged to act as arbitrator between them, when I next visited the country" (275). A year later, in 1891, Alldridge held a meeting with the two mahaneisia in the kebangai at Ngiehun, and there "the whole matter was threshed out, before a vast number of people from both countries; with the result that an amicable arrangement was come to. The old friendship between the chiefs was re-established, their people fraternising as they had not done for many years" (276).

This published description of the 1891 meeting accords closely with Alldridge's official 1891 despatch on the subject (277). But for events in 1890, it is impossible to reconcile his despatches with his later published (and hence more widely-read) account. In his despatches he showed that Kailondo took the initiative, whereas in his book Alldridge

himself takes the centre of the stage and the impression is given that the British official was mainly responsible for settling the dispute. By implication, Alldridge presents himself in his book as the determined defender of the weaker Momo Babahu against Luawa's ruler. The Travelling Commissioner describes how he wisely restrained the powerful Kailondo who had been preparing for war. The readers of the book might be led to think that Kailondo was eager for a bloody fight; never to guess that (according to Alldridge's original despatches) it was Kailondo who took the first steps to ensure that there was no fighting (278).

In many ways the Kailondo-Momo Babahu dispute is a fairly minor matter, but considerable space has been spent indicating the discrepancies between Alldridge's two accounts because those discrepancies have serious implications. Alldridge's writings are the only documents on Luawa penned before 1895, and are thus bound to form a substantial part of the evidence on which historical statements are based. His books have been taken as 'standard works' on Mendeland in the 1890s; successive writers have uncritically accepted his comments as 'fact' (279). And certainly by comparison with such writers as Blakeney, Fairtlough, d'Arcy Anderson and Wallis (280), his writing shows a high degree of careful observation, factual detail, and little distorting prejudice or highly-charged emotive comment. Yet in the above instance, Alldridge is inconsistent on quite basic matters of 'fact' (281).

Securing Alldridge's arbitration to settle an involved dispute was one immediate advantage Kailondo gained by welcoming and establishing good relations with the British official. Another advantage was having Frontier Police stationed in Kailahun. The Frontier Police Force

had only been established in January 1890. The officers (none of whom was ever stationed permanently at Kailahun, though there was one permanently at Panguma from 1895 onwards) were Europeans or Creoles: the NCOs stationed at Kailahun were, it seems, mainly literate Creoles (282); the 'constables' were either Creoles or up-country people, at least some of the latter being Mende-men (283). The Force was originally 280 strong, and its primary duty was to keep the peace within the British-protected area in the hinterland of Sherbro and the Colony of Sierra Leone (284). By 1894, there were 563 Officers and men, and the 'constables' were becoming increasingly involved in the administration of the protected area (285). The Force was set up on military lines and was armed, so that it could play a semi-military role in peace-keeping; but slowly the duties of the 'constables' proliferated to include almost anything an up-country Government official might require to have done (286). In 1894 the largest Police Company, with 104 Officers and men, was stationed at Mongheri (287), and this was the nearest Company headquarters to Luawa; but in 1895, this Company headquarters was transferred even nearer, to Panguma, which was only about 50 miles west of Kailahun (288).

In his first encounter with the Travelling Commissioner, the Luawa Mahci expressed the wish that the Governor "would be pleased to station some constables at Carray Lahoon" (289). He was, noted Alldridge, "the first up-country chief to ask the Government through me that Frontier Police might be stationed in his town" (290). Kailondo may have heard from Nyagua of Panguma about the Colony policemen who accompanied Garrett on his Wende expedition early in 1889 (291); or he may have heard of the 'constables' from some other Mahci nearer the coast than himself, like Mendegla of Gaura. Possibly though, Kailondo's request was simply a result of the good impression

which the uniformed constables in Alldridge's 1890 party made on him, with their blue serge uniform, shining buttons, red fez, waterbottle and brown blankets (292); but most impressive to Kailondo perhaps, this was an armed force (293). He was serious about his request for police, for the messenger he sent with Alldridge to convey his greetings to the Governor was instructed to say that ruler of Luawa "would like to have police at his town" (294).

The Governor's first reaction was negative, as he was concerned not to over-extend the responsibilities of his new force: "for the present at least, I think we must confine ourselves to an occasional police visit" (295). In his reports on his second, 1891 visit to Luawa, Alldridge did not mention Frontier Police for Kailahun; but he did report on the threatening activities of Kafula of Wunde against Kailondo (296). This led to a Government order that "3 reliable constables who could speak the MENDI language" (297) should be stationed there, because their presence "would no doubt have a good moral effect upon any of the neighbouring smaller chiefs" (298). This was presumably just the sort of advantage Kailondo had expected to receive from his 'alliance' with the British, and by November 1891 he had constructed - it seems quite eagerly - two houses for the constables (299). From then onwards these houses were occupied as the permanent 'barracks' of a Kailahun Frontier Police detachment (300). The Mahgi built these houses or barracks at his own expense (301) in the Kailahun kobangai, following the advice of the NCO in charge (302), on the site of the present-day N.A. Court Barri and Office (303).

The disadvantages of alliance with the British were not immediately apparent to Kailondo, partly because of Alldridge's caution and diplomacy, partly because it was only in 1895 that the British began to



exercise any real authority in Luawa (304). However, by 1891 the first signs were appearing of those political changes which, though they did not much affect the everyday life of ordinary people, were radically to alter the position of the Mahai. For instance, Kailondo signed the 1890 Treaty with the British on behalf of "LUAWAH PKOMBAL GISSI and BANDI countries" (305), but when Alldridge met "the Paramount Chief of BANDE chief BONGOI" in the following year at Kolahun, the latter asserted that Kailondo "was not the Chief of BANDE and that he had no permission to have so signed - that some time ago KILUNDU had been called in with reference to some war disturbance but that beyond the assistance which he then rendered he had nothing to do with the BANDE country" (306). Probably in the presence of Kailondo, Gbongoi would have been less vehement in his assertion; but leaving aside such a probability, Gbongoi's argument about sovereignty in Gbande country turns on the sense given to the word 'chief'. The fact that Kailondo had been "called in" is virtually an admission that he held some influence in the area; and the presents which were customarily given in return for such assistance could easily be termed 'tribute'. Yet almost inevitably, Kailondo's authority around Kolahun was less than around Kailahun at the heart of Luawa; and on the peripheries of his polity there was a gradual diminution of his authority until one could better speak of Kailondo's 'considerable influence' rather than his 'direct control'. Gbande country was probably part of this periphery to the east, as was southern Kono to the north, and Guma to the south (307). Only in the west was there a fairly distinct boundary to 'Greater Luawa', the Moa and Meli Rivers acting as a divide between Nyagua's and Kailondo's spheres of influence (308).

Until the advent of the British, disputes about the

nature of the authority of different mahangisia within one particular area were probably rare. Possibly both Gbongoi and Kailondo were content with a situation in Gbande country in which each recognized that the other possessed his own degree of influence. The extent of their individual influence was probably indefinite, and they may have differed in their opinions of how much authority the other possessed in the area. Such a situation did not produce conflict because political power was a matter of personal allegiance, not of territorial possession: the ~~sovereignty~~ sovereignty of a piece of land cannot easily be shared, but it is quite possible to offer a degree of allegiance to several different individuals at the same time. Since the power of a maha might vary from year to year, depending on such factors as the number of kogugbanga he could muster, so also the extent of his influence would vary. The political situation was therefore very fluid (309). One particular mahai would be involved at any one time in a complex of allegiances (some of which might even be conflicting) and the success of any minor mahai would depend partly on his ability to judge accurately where his supreme political allegiance should lie at a particular moment.

A British official like Alldridge, used to the idea of fixed geographical boundaries demarcating ~~sovereignty~~ sovereignty, was interested only in where ultimate ~~sovereignty~~ sovereignty lay in a particular area, and his insistence that the local ruler should make his mark on a Treaty with the British presented the mahangisia with a previously unknown problem. It is possible that Kailondo was right to sign the Treaty as 'overlord' of Gbande country, while Gbongoi was right to insist that, if Alldridge required the mark of the 'chief' of Gbande country, he alone was in a position to do so. The confusion in this case may have been created - there were other cases in which such confusion certainly was created (310) - not because of disagreement between Gbongoi and Kailondo, but because of Alldridge's introduction

of alien and inapplicable political concepts into the situation.

This confusion also no doubt led the British official to sign a Treaty in 1891 at Gbandewulo (311) with mahej Sembe Fawundu of Tungi (312), son and successor of Kai Kai (313). There seems little doubt that Kailondo was 'overlord-with-direct-control' in Tungi country, and in 1890 he had in fact signed for this country as his own under the heading 'Gissi' (314). Alldridge thought that Fawundu was one of the largely independent "paramount chiefs" (315). Kailondo, for his own part, may have thought Alldridge was eager to make a Treaty with the mahej of Tungi simply because Fawundu was a local ruler, even though he was not independent but recognized Kailondo as overlord. This latter suggestion is given support by the fact that Kailondo may have actually encouraged Sembe Fawundu to sign a separate Treaty with Alldridge (316). If Kailondo had understood that the British traveller believed each 'treaty chief' was an independent ruler he would surely never have given such encouragement to a mahej who was under his own authority.

It is also noteworthy that at first Alldridge suggested to the Governor that Sembe Fawundu be paid £7 annually, whereas £10 was paid to Kailondo and others - an indication that Alldridge himself realized that Fawundu was not in the same category as the Luawa Mahej. Later, however, Alldridge revised his judgement, and suggested that Fawundu be placed "on the same footing as all paramount chiefs in the MENDE country and that he should receive a yearly stipend of Ten pounds" (317). The reason for this alteration was largely that Fawundu had showed "so much desire to become more closely allied to the Government" (318). One sees here the beginning of a set of political values which, within a decade, was to become firmly established among British officials. A Chief was not judged on merit, on

'traditional' status, or on the number of people he controlled, but rather on his attitude to the Government. If his attitude pleased the officials, he might be rewarded by being given greater political recognition, and since the British were steadily gaining ultimate ~~sovereignty~~ sovereignty in the area, this really meant greater political power for the Chief who was favoured. If his attitude displeased the officials, he was in danger of having his power reduced, as in the case of Kabba Sei of Mando (319), or even of being altogether deprived, as in the case of Nyagua of Panguma (320). So no Chief could afford to ignore this new criterion by which his rule was to be judged.

Yet it was only in later years that these deeper consequences of the Treaty with the British became apparent to the Mahangaisia: even as late as 1896, at the time of his death, Kailondo may not have been aware of the full implications. Alldridge's pre-printed Treaty form of 1890 contained nothing to which a ruler of Kailondo's stamp would take exception. "I was always extremely particular that the obligations should be clearly understood", wrote Alldridge, explaining what happened at meetings between himself and a Maha who was about to sign a Treaty, "and I was satisfied in going through the country afterwards, that every chief thoroughly knew exactly what these obligations were from the remarks that they made to me" (321). There is no need to doubt Alldridge's word as far as Luawa was concerned, for there was nothing objectionable to Kailondo in the Treaty, nor anything which he wanted to abrogate. The Treaty stated that:

1. there should be peace between the people of Luawa and British subjects who should be allowed free access into Luawa provided that they kept the laws of the land
2. these rights "guaranteed to British subjects" should not be extended to any other people without the consent of the Governor

3. peace should be maintained within Luawa by the reference of any serious dispute between Kailondo and his "Headmen" to arbitration by the Governor
4. Kailondo should "not enter into any war or commit any act of aggression on any of the Chiefs bordering on Sierra Leone"
5. the roads in the area should be kept in good repair

(322)

For Kailondo, to accept this Treaty was merely to continue existing 'external policy'. Internal peace for Luawa had always been Kailondo's first aim. Usually, he had as far as possible avoided war with other powerful mahangsisia, preferring to enter into alliance with them; and at the time he signed the Treaty, Kailondo voluntarily referred to Alldridge a dispute between himself and a subordinate mahei (323). The Luawa Mahei was already on friendly terms with the two most powerful rulers in his area - Mendegla of Gaura and Nyagua of Panguma - who were willing to accept alliance with him for mutual defence and well-being. If Alldridge did no more than make sure Kailondo "thoroughly knew exactly" what was in the Treaty, but said little about its wider implications, then quite likely the ruler of Luawa did not see this 'alliance' as any different in kind from his alliances with surrounding mahangsisia, except that Alldridge was a puumoi (324), and represented a much greater political power. For Kailondo, the 1890 Treaty must simply have marked an extension of the same 'external policy' which he had been following for the previous decade.

#### 4. KAFULA'S REBELLION IN WUNDE, 1890 - 1896

Before Kailondo had time properly to explore the implications of the new political dimension introduced in the person of Alldridge, he was caught up in the affairs of the area known as Wunde, just north of Luawa across the Moa River (325). Up to about 1890, Kafula, the Kissi mahsi of Wunde, ruling in succession to his father, was subordinate to Kailondo (326). There are two different and apparently irreconcilable accounts of what happened next. Rev. Clarke's story is that Wunde was invaded by the sofas, and Kafula naturally called upon Kailondo for help (327). The subsequent fighting was fairly inconclusive, since Kailondo's men had no experience of dealing with cavalry, but the sofas were unable to use their horses to advantage in the dense undergrowth of the area. Eventually the sofas retired and re-directed their attack against the Kono people (328). Kafula was grateful for Kailondo's help, and was a loyal maha to the end of Kailondo's reign. When the latter died early in 1896 (329), Kafula played a large part with Fabundeh, Kailondo's right-hand man, in the burial ceremonies (330). Kafula tried to make sure that Kailondo was buried in Wunde, his father's homeland, though in the end the body was brought back to Luawa by Fabundeh's people (331). Much oral tradition supports this account (332), and records that only after the death of Kailondo did disagreement arise between Luawa and Wunde (333).

However, events as recorded in British officials' despatches appear very different. "KILUNDU has very recently been attacked by one of his sub-chiefs", reported Alldridge in February 1891, "named KAFARA KENAMA of WUNDE, in GESE, who inveigled him up there under the pretence of assisting in a war in the interior [334], and who according

to KILUNDU'S statement, deceived him, placed his war-boys in the pathway and killed many of KILUNDU'S people, very few escaping - KILUNDU hid himself and managed to get back to his town" (335). Later, Kailondo explained that it was the "SUSUWALA poeple" who attacked him in Wunde (336). Nyagua of Panguma also lost some people at the same time, and met Kailondo so that they could "combine and carry war back to SUSUWALA country" (337). Possibly the Susuwala and the sofas were one and the same (338): almost certainly this was the beginning of the disturbances which culminated in the Waima incident and the Battle of Tungea (339). It is difficult to see how these reports can be reconciled with Rev. Clarke's account of Kafula's actions - difficult, but not impossible. Before suggesting a solution, however, it is best to complete the story of Kafula's relations with Kailondo.

Further official reports indicated that Alldridge's 1891 despatches were not mistaken, nor was Kafula's opposition to Kailondo the result of a transitory, if serious misunderstanding between the two rulers. In early 1894, Alldridge wrote that to his own knowledge, Kailondo had been having trouble with Kafula for the previous three years (340). Corporal Wilson of the Kailahun Frontier Police detachment wrote in January 1894 that Kafula had twice before waged war on Kailondo, but the situation was now more dangerous because Kafula was in league with the French who had been seen in Wunde (341). Kailondo, worried lest the French moved into Luawa (342), had asked that Kafula should be captured and exiled (343). Two months later, in another despatch, Wilson warned of a threatened attack from the sofas, and added that Kafula was "directing the Sofas and joined them too" (344). Several of Kailondo's villages north of the Moa had recently been destroyed, presumably by the Wunde mahei (345). Wilson's

letters seem the work of a rather confused and frightened NCO, and Kafula would have had difficulty in maintaining an alliance with the French and the sofas at the same time (346). Yet Cardew, during his first up-country tour in April 1894, confirmed that there was "a state of chronic war" between Kailondo and Kafula (347), and repeated the suggestion that the latter was receiving sofa assistance. Shortly afterwards Kafula was reported to be threatening the Kono people at Waima (348), and Cardew posted 20 Frontier Police constables at Kailahun and another 20 at Daru (349), partly with the object of "supporting the Police post at KANRE LAHUN" (350). These new postings were partly to guard against the sofa menace from Kpandeme, but also partly to strengthen Kailondo's hand against Kafula (351).

Worries about Kafula's alliance with the sofas gradually disappeared from official despatches, but the evidence for his alliance with the French increased. In January 1895, Kailondo sent Ngobeh Kahunla to Freetown with a message for the Governor stating among other information (352) that Kafula was on friendly terms with a French post about six days' journey north of Kailahun (353). Cardew believed the post was Mara, and consisted of a Lieutenant, two sergeants and some local soldiers (354). Later the Governor himself reported that there was also a French post at Kissidougou (355). By March he could state (in a despatch from Kailahun itself) that Kafula was "restrained from attacking KAILUNDU by the French" (356). However, if Kafula's alliance with the French had much reality, it did not on this occasion last very long (357). In late 1896, after Kailondo's death, Captain Fairtlough (Officer Commanding the Frontier Police in Panguma) received information that the French had organized an expedition against the mahsi of Wunde "in consequence of his having turned out the



French soldiers who had up till recently been stationed in his town" of KISSI-KENEMA (358). The attack was made in October 1896 "by the French soldiers and some Sofa friendlies [!] on KENEMA and two other towns in GISSE" (359), and was apparently successful: though that was far from the end of the story of Kafula's relations with the French (360).

A thread of meaning may be found in these confused and conflicting reports (361) if one assumes that Kafula was a person of volatile and explosive temperament. In his relations with the sofas, the French and the British, as well as with Kailondo and Fabundeh (362), he seems to have been far from settled in allegiance. As late as 1908 he was still threatening to "cover his war-drum with the skin of a white man" (363), long after events had proved that an 'exterminate-the-white-man' policy would yield no political profit (364). Kafula was probably an opportunist (365), looking for immediate political advantage, but sometimes allowing his own likes and dislikes to overrule his political judgement: and the situation north of Kailondo's Luawa in the early 1890s provided a rare opportunity for someone of Kafula's disposition. If he was dissatisfied with one ally or overlord, there was a selection of others to choose from, and the urge to play off one against the other may well have been irresistible. If this is accepted as an accurate sketch of Kafula's situation in the early 1890s, then most of the evidence coheres.

About 1890, Kafula may have asked for Kailondo's help against a sofa invasion; but soon afterwards, recognizing sofa power, he turned against Kailondo, and a second request for help was merely a ruse to assassinate him (366). In 1894, Kafula was still associated with the remaining fragments of the sofa force, but was moving towards alliance

with the French who were penetrating the area. By 1895, convinced of French superiority, his alliance with them seemed firm; but early in 1896, despite his previous violent break with Kailondo, he attended the latter's funeral. Perhaps Kafula was moved by genuine sorrow, even remorse, over his previous actions (367); almost certainly he hoped to succeed Kailondo as Mahawai of the whole area (368). Unsettled by this ambition, he quickly came into conflict with his new French 'masters', and before the end of 1896 was fighting against them (369).

There seems little doubt that in late 1890 (370) Kafula did, in fact, turn violently against his overlord Kailondo. Since Kafula's rebellion began only months after Kailondo's Treaty with Alldridge, and since, apparently, relations between the Kissi mahai had been cordial until then, it is tempting to posit cause and effect. Pa Langama of Buedu noted that "when Kailondo brought the white men, Kafula was not pleased. Therefore the agreement between Kafula and Kailondo was spoilt, and Kafula supported the French. Kailondo wanted the English. Because of that the friendship broke down" (371). Presumably, then, Kafula would have preferred armed resistance to the British when Kailondo chose alliance. Later, when the European presence became strongly established beyond hope of successful resistance, Kafula preferred a commitment to the French rather than the British. This was natural because, given that Kailondo was in favour with Alldridge and that the rift between the Luawa Mahai and Kafula was irreparable, the latter's only chance of political gain lay with the French.

Up to the time of Alldridge's first visit to Luawa, Kailondo would almost certainly have dealt quickly and severely with Kafula's rebellion. His success in the Gbande War showed that he had the military power (372), and in 1894, Alldridge believed that there was "no reason

why Kai Lundu and his powerful subchiefs should not be able to deal with" Kafula (373). But by the terms of the 1890 Treaty, Kailondo was forbidden from going to war against his "Headmen" (374); and it seems that Kailondo deliberately took no action against Kafula until he could report the whole matter to Alldridge on his second visit to Luawa in February-March 1891 (375). In his despatches from Luawa in 1891, Alldridge implies that his own attitude to Kailondo's statement about going to war against Kafula was non-committal (376). In general, both in 1891 and 1892, Alldridge seemed less concerned by the thought of Kailondo going to war than was the Luawa Mahei himself. Perhaps partly because of Alldridge's imprecise reaction, Kailondo wrote to the British Governor in mid-August 1891 about going to war. The reply was unequivocal. Kailondo was instructed to remember his promise made when Alldridge was in his country (377) that he would not become involved in any "war palaver. You must know", the reply continued, "that to be at war is to bring misery and trouble on yourself and people and now that Police are in your country there will be no harm done to you as long as you obey the Government orders" (378). In September, still sticking rigidly to the terms of his 1890 agreement with the British, Kailondo requested permission from the Governor to build a war-fence at Kailahun, an essentially defensive measure (379). Permission was refused (380), and in November the NCO in charge of the Kailahun Frontier Police detachment confirmed that Kailondo had complied with the Government's demands and had not rebuilt the fence (381). So with hardly any exception (382) Kailondo carried out the terms of the 1890 Treaty and obeyed Government instructions. He continued faithfully on this course, at least until late 1895 (383); and Kailondo's successor, Fabundeh, consistently followed the same policy throughout his reign (384). But events between 1891 and 1911

proved conclusively how fallacious was the statement that "no harm will be done to you as long as you obey the Government orders" (385).

Even before the death of Kailondo, the strip of Luawa in the Moa valley just south of the river was being disturbed by fears of raids by Kafula's forces, which situation would have been unthinkable in the earlier years of Kailondo's reign (386). The British presence was producing a new peace in the Luawa area only in the imagination of Alldridge and his colleagues (387): near the Moa River, the ordinary people were in fact experiencing a new unrest. As the situation became more serious in 1894 and 1895, so the Government under Cardew became more insistent that Kailondo should remain "strictly on the defensive" and that the police at Kailahun were to be used only "for the defence of the town" (388). Cardew was worried by the fact that neither the Anglo-French (389) nor the Anglo-Liberian (390) frontiers had yet been delimited. He did not want another 'Waima incident', and as late as March 1896 he was not even sure whether Kailahun was officially in the Protectorate or in Liberia (391).

The ordinary people of Luawa living on the left bank of the Moa had to live with constant fear of attack as a result of Cardew's cautious and (as regards the border areas) passive policy; and this new possibility of being attacked was probably for them one of the first appreciable results of the Anglo-French imperial advance in the area and the signing of the 1890 Treaty. "Kai Lundu I believe is quite capable of resisting these attacks on his territory", reported Captain Tarbet in April 1895, "at which he is more annoyed than afraid" (392). Tarbet was referring especially to disturbances on Kailondo's eastern boundary, and these presented a more serious threat than any which materialized from Wunde: Kailondo could have even more easily dealt with Kafula's attacks. Presumably the

Luawa Mahai, faithful to the 1890 Treaty, was being restrained from decisive action by the continual Government advice "not to carry war anywhere" (393).

Kafula, on the right-bank of the Moa, was ultimately even worse off than Kailondo as a result of the European advance. The former rose to power too late to achieve his presumed aim of carving out his own little independent polity. Kailondo had been allowed fifteen years to develop and organize Luawa, and at the time of his death the British Protectorate had still not been officially proclaimed (394). But by the time Kafula was in a position to emulate Kailondo, the British Protectorate had been established in all but name, the French were in Kissi-Kenema (395), and temporarily the time of independent African polities had gone. And Kafula, unlike Fabundeh across the Moa, was temperamentally unsuited to dealing with the complexities of the new post-independence politics (396).

5. KAILONDO AND CARDEW, 1895 - 1896

Until late 1895, Kailondo was remarkably faithful to the letter and the spirit of the 1890 Treaty; and in many ways remained so until his death. Yet from soon after the signing of the Treaty a latent anti-Government, 'anti-white' feeling had been growing among the people of Luawa. Perhaps the most serious source of this feeling was the obnoxious behaviour of the Frontier Police, who pressed hard upon the ordinary people. "One constable in this town would make everybody alarmed", recalled Maada James Kailondo. "He would find you and ask you to give over your wife to him so that he can sleep with her. There was nothing you could do. People used to run away into the bush and leave their wives" (397). Kailondo himself was not disturbed in such ways, presumably because the constables feared his power, but he was obviously concerned for the welfare of his people. The situation was improved when he told the constables that he would provide them with women so they need not disturb his people (398). Probably in Luawa as elsewhere, the Frontier Police interfered with domestic slavery (399), practised extortion, and instituted a limited 'reign of terror' (400). Although people in the Luawa area came from miles to see Alldridge (401), they would run into the bush at the appearance of a constable (402; and these constables were, before the death of Kailondo, the only representatives of British power with whom the ordinary people of Luawa had any close contact (403).

Probably by 1895 Kailondo also had his own misgivings about the value of constables in Kailahun, although as late as April he was requesting reinforcements (404). Possibly this request represented Kailondo's last desperate bid to secure from the Frontier Police that physical help

against his enemies which he had no doubt always expected from them: larger numbers of constables in Kailahun might encourage them finally to take the offensive against the Kpandeme 'sofas'. On several previous occasions he had specifically requested such help for an offensive (405). It had never been forthcoming, nor was it on this last occasion: a few extra men were sent (406), but they were to be used only to defend the country round Kailahun and not in any way to attack Kailondo's enemies (407).


The number of constables in Kailahun slowly increased from three in 1891 (408) to twenty in 1894 (409), but there is no indication that they ever gave positive military help to Kailondo (410). Rather they were a hindrance to him when, for example, they prevented him from rebuilding his war-fence round Kailahun (411) and reported unfavourably on his behaviour (412). The patrols undertaken by Frontier Police round Kailahun (413) may also have been a nuisance to Kailondo in preventing him from taking decisive action against his enemies, for Cardew's specific instructions about the Police were that they should stop "intertribal wars" (414), and that both the Chief and the constables should remain "strictly on the defensive" (415). In practice this meant waiting until enemies had actually penetrated Luawa before taking action against them. This was an idea altogether alien to Kailondo's political principles: up to 1890 he had always tried to take action before an invasion could get under way against Luawa in order to ensure that the polity's internal peace was never disturbed (416).

As the novelty of being in alliance with the white men (417) wore off, a number of other disadvantages, apart from the behaviour of the constables, became increasingly apparent. The demands of the British

slowly increased. They insisted on the constant clearing of roads (418), and tried to stop slave-trading (419). In 1893, Alldridge expected Kailondo to make a hundred-mile journey south to meet the Governor (420). In 1894 Cardew summoned the Luawa Mahai to meet him at Laoma (421), and in 1895 at Vahun (422). Entertaining visiting Europeans must have become rather a burden for Kailondo, as both the number of visits and the size of the parties increased. In 1890 Alldridge's party contained only about forty men (423), but when Cardew visited Luawa in 1895 he had about four hundred and fifty people with him (424). By the terms of the 1890 Treaty Kailondo realized that before taking any major decision it would be necessary to consult the Freetown Government, which meant in many cases sending a special emissary all the way to the Colony and back, with consequent expense, delay and general inconvenience. He sent messengers to Freetown in May 1890 (425), March 1891 (426), April 1894 (427); and January (428), June (429) and August 1895 (430), and perhaps on other occasions too. He also wrote a number of letters to Freetown, using the Frontier Police NCO at Kailahun as his amanuensis (431). It would seem that in every single case except one, Kailondo's requests were not met in the way he wanted or, more frequently, not met at all: the exception was the establishment of a Frontier Police station at Kailahun (432).

Despite all this, Kailondo showed no hint of annoyance with the British until Cardew's visit to Luawa in 1895. Late in 1894 or early in 1895 (433) the French sent a message to Kailondo through Dikeh, a mahai in Gbande country, suggesting he should ally with them (434). Pitifully underestimating Kailondo, they sent him "some tins of beef" along with the message (435), apparently hoping that their present would tempt





GOVERNOR CARDEW

him to break his friendship with the British. Kailondo reacted by seeking first to maintain correct relationships with Freetown. He sent Ngobeh Kahunla to the Colony to report the matter in January 1895 (436). If he had wanted at this stage to turn back on his 1890 alliance, he could have expected material support from the French, for "French soldiers" (437) - presumably Senegalese tirailleurs (438) - were occasionally penetrating into Luawa itself at this period. But it was only after Cardew's visit to Luawa in February-March 1895 that Kailondo showed any resentment against the British and any readiness to renounce his alliance with them. The evidence in the despatches of both Cardew himself and of other Government officials clearly suggests that the Governor's behaviour during his 1895 visit to Kailondo caused a change of attitude towards the British in the latter. Cardew's behaviour virtually forced Kailondo to begin to view the 1890 Treaty in a new and less favourable light (439).

Travelling up from Freetown, Cardew reached Daru in February 1895 (440), and then, instead of taking the direct route to Kailahun, he went to Vahun, south of the Magowi River (441). There he met Momo Bahomi and Mbawulomeh, the latter being the most persistently troublesome of all Kailondo's enemies. Even before consulting Kailondo, Cardew seemed to take a sympathetic view of the position of these disturbers of Luawa's peace (442), and concluded that Kailondo was "not so desirous of peace as they are" (443) - a truly remarkable conclusion in the light of previous events. The Governor promised the mahangeisia at Vahun that he would "restrain KAILUNDU from attacking them" (444), and would favourably consider Mbawulomeh's request to be allowed to "settle in British territory and rebuild the town of GEHUN" (445). This was the town from which

Mbawulomeh had raided Luawa, and from which Kailondo had dislodged him at the beginning of the Gbande War (446). The Governor also sent Kailondo instructions to come to Vahun (447).

According to Mende etiquette, the British official by this behaviour was being deliberately impolite to the ruler of Luawa. By failing to travel directly to Kailahun in order to greet Kailondo, Cardew was disparaging the Mahai's political power: by pronouncing on a dispute without investigating Kailondo's grievances, he was discrediting the latter's side of the argument: by sending for Kailondo to come to Vahun (instead of going to meet the Luawa Mahai at Kailahun), he was implying that Kailondo was in a position of inferiority and subjection. As Alldridge discovered in 1893, a Mahai would not easily leave his own mahawui at the request of anyone except a recognized overlord whose suzerainty had been demonstrated by military conquest (448). Kailondo had no overlord, he was himself the supreme political power in the area, and he did not go to Vahun, pleading sickness: but whether or not he was really sick (449), it was doubtful if he would in any case have obeyed Cardew's summons.

His own official reports suggest that Cardew arrived in Kailahun somewhat predisposed against Kailondo - an attitude which the Luawa Mahai would undoubtedly have quickly sensed (450). In his first interview, the Governor "censured" Kailondo for not "obeying" his "instructions" (451) - the words are Cardew's, and suggest the tone he must have adopted. For the first time, Kailondo saw how the Governor himself interpreted the 1890 Treaty. Alldridge in his attitudes and actions had indicated that the Treaty was an alliance between equals. The British

Commissioner no doubt explained it in this way since he wrote of making "friendly treaties" (452) with the chiefs, and this understanding of the Treaty was reinforced by a personal friendship between the Kissi-man and the Englishman (453). Overbearing behaviour by the constables in Kailahun, or the strangely peremptory tone of some Government letters over the five years after the signing of the Treaty (454) may not have worried Kailondo unduly. But the actions and attitudes of the Governor himself could not be overlooked, and there could be little doubt that he thought of Kailondo as a minor subordinate with only a small margin of political independence. In a later interview Cardew went out of his way to underline the master-servant relationship which he considered to exist between himself and Kailondo. Almost certainly Kailondo had been angered by the way Cardew had behaved at Vahun, and as a result, it seems, had begun to reflect on how little the Government had done to protect him from external aggression. He had started to say that if the Government did not help him fight the Kpandeme people "he would cause the police who are stationed at KANRELAHUN to retire from his country by not allowing them any supplies, and further would hand back his stipends and reclaim his country" (455).

This last remark highlights the extent to which Kailondo's understanding of the situation was different from Cardew's. Kailondo was thinking of himself as a free agent, in a position to withdraw his patronage from the British, and to insist that they should leave his polity if they failed to give him political satisfaction. The Governor, with plans for establishing a Protectorate worked out and in some respects already in operation (456), was thinking in terms of dismissing recalcitrant chiefs who did not show a sufficient degree of obedience. "I pointed out to

him", Cardew recorded, "that if he offended the Government and they in consequence withdrew their protection from him his position would become untenable environed as he was along the border by numerous enemies" (457). This argument probably had little effect upon Kailondo: he had enemies on his borders partly because of British so-called protection which forbade him from driving his enemies away (458). Perhaps realizing that he had made little impression, Cardew resorted to the military-man's argument: Kailondo's position would become especially untenable, he said, "if the Government were to bring the pressure of the Frontier Police to bear against him" (459). For Kailondo, that may have been a moment of truth. Cardew had summarized in one sweep his unconcern with the wishes of the Luawa people, his disregard for their political institutions, and his indifference to the person of their ruler: his primary interest was to achieve submission to British rule and obedience to his own commands.

Kailondo in 1895 was mistaken to believe he could turn out the British at will: he underestimated the strong desire of the puubleisia (460) to be rulers, and the degree of military force they could bring to bear. But Cardew was mistaken too: he underestimated the strength of local resistance among both the mahnogisia and their people to their being forced into a subservient role (461). Within five years he had disqualified himself from further office even in the eyes of his own masters in London (462), and his Protectorate lasted little more than half-a-century.

However, the immediate result of Cardew's talk with Kailondo, according to the former, was that "supplies for my carriers, of which sufficient had not been forthcoming, were readily brought in" (463), and the Governor apparently left Kailahun with no qualms about the situation.

When Captain Tarbet, the Inspector General of Police, went to Kailahun in April 1895, he too was satisfied (464). Kailondo was pleased at least to see Frontier Police reinforcements arriving, and reported to Tarbet that Mbawulomeh was being secretly supported by Kabba Sei of Mando who had given Mbawulomeh the town of Vahun (465). Kailondo requested a meeting with Kabba Sei in front of the Officer Commanding at Panguma, "in order that it might be shown that what he said was true, and with a view to putting an end to these invasions into his territory" (466). Unready to act precipitately, yet annoyed and disappointed by Cardew's obvious lack of sympathy, the suggestion of a meeting at Panguma was perhaps Kailondo's final attempt to get his own point of view considered.

Nothing was done about Kailondo's suggestion (467), though in mid-May Captain Fairtlough, the Officer Commanding at Panguma, made a visit to Kailahun. Fairtlough decided that Kailondo was a liar (468): the Luawa Mahei's statements about Kabba Sei and others were "only a flying report" (469) circulated by Kailondo to draw the Commanding Officer's attention from more important matters. Moreover, reported Fairtlough, "I believe the whole story of his being in a state of war with KISSI is made the pretext for keeping up a large body of armed men for the purpose of making incursions into his neighbour's territories". This British official was noticeably less sympathetic to Kailondo's difficulties than Alldridge or even Cardew. Fairtlough was apparently ignorant of Kafula's rebellion, and seemed very eager to make his own authority felt. He asked, 'Should Kailondo be "allowed to continue this war?" (470)' - and was clearly eager to take action himself against the Luawa Mahei. If the reports of Alldridge, Cardew, Tarbet, and successive Frontier Police NCOs at Kailahun

are accepted as reasonably accurate (471), Fairtlough was standing reality on its head. "The fact of numbers of his [Kailondo's] war-boys moving up and down keep the country in a state of unrest", wrote Fairtlough, "and only provoke reprisals from Chiefs outside the Protectorate" (472).

Actually it was raids (unchecked by the British) from outside mahanga which made it vital for Kailondo to maintain the strength of his kogugbanga.

Yet Fairtlough may have been right to regard Kailondo, shaken by the behaviour of Cardew, as a rather unreliable ally by this time. Certainly Fairtlough's overbearing attitude seemed to be the last straw for both the ruler and his people. Firm evidence is lacking, but it seems likely that Kailondo was by now ready to repudiate his agreement with the British, as he had threatened to do three months earlier (473). Ten days after Fairtlough's visit, the NCO in charge of the Kailahun Frontier Police, M'Cauley, wrote a rather garbled and contradictory report (474) on events in Luawa. It contained the statement that Kailondo "sent 9 heads of money [475] to Chief KEFALLA [476] to ask the French Government to assist him to war, that the English Government make a fool of him" (477). Also, on 22 May a large number of people assembled at Mofindor to drive away the Police from Kailahun, "as they want no Police in their district and the Governor makes them a fool" (478). Such reports need to be treated sceptically: a Frontier Police constable with a personal grievance against a Mahsi could all too easily make a false or exaggerated report against him. But in this case there was almost certainly a kernel of truth in the report that Kailondo was thinking of severing relations with the British. Cardew and the officials of the London Colonial Office apparently accepted M'Cauley's comments as fairly accurate, and indeed themselves sympathized with Kailondo's

predicament: it was natural that when Britain did not adequately protect Luawa, Kailondo should threaten to "throw off all allegiance or connection" (479). Late in 1895 (480) the Luawa Mahsi took a step which was, for him, exceptional: he started a war in Liberia against his external enemies without seeking either the help, advice or permission of British officials (481). This was probably a further sign of his increasing distrust of his British 'friends'. But Kailondo was by this stage a very sick man, and did not himself go on the war (482). Within a few months he died.

The date which has generally been accepted for the death of Kailondo is 7 April 1895 (483), and Mr. Arthur Abraham seems to be the only person who has noted the difficulty concerning this date: "archival records show the Governor writing to Kailondo in the summer of 1895, informing him of His Excellency's proposed visit of 1896" (484). Mr. Abraham believes that "Kai probably died late 1895 or early 1896", and evidence discovered by the present writer supports that conclusion. Kailondo was apparently in reasonably good health when Captain Fairtlough met him in mid-May 1895 (485); and M'Cauley's report, written on 26 May concerning action taken by Kailondo, has already been mentioned (486). In June and August 1895, J.C.E. Parkes in Freetown sent letters to Kailondo in reply to recently-received communications from the Luawa Mahsi (487). On 1 November 1895, Parkes again wrote to Kailondo stating that news had reached Freetown "that you have been fighting on the Liberian side of the country", and advising him "not to carry war anywhere" (488). The earliest possible date for Kailondo's death, therefore, is late 1895.

Between September 1895 and March 1896 there was virtually no reference to Luawa in Government despatches from Sierra Leone (489). The first mention of Kailondo's death was in correspondence from



Cardew during his 1896 Protectorate tour. The Governor reached Kailahun on 5 March, and reported that Fabundeh had been chosen by the people of Luawa as successor to Kailondo, a choice which the Governor confirmed on 10 March (490). Cardew noted that "the customary fiction in West Africa, as probably elsewhere, is that a King never dies, so Kai Lundu is always spoken of as being sick and it is only when his successor is nominated that his funeral obsequies will be held and his absence officially mourned for" (491). No other evidence has been found in written records or oral traditions of the Mendeblaisia or Kissia of Luawa to validate the existence of this "customary fiction" (492). Presumably Cardew himself first heard of Kailondo's death when he reached Kailahun (493), and the "customary fiction" was the Governor's rationalization of his failure to gain earlier information about the death.

Unfortunately, there is no way of discovering the precise date of Kailondo's death. With a variety of external political pressures threatening Luawa in early 1896, it seems doubtful whether the polity would have remained leaderless for longer than was absolutely necessary - perhaps two or three months. Yet the task of completing the funeral ceremonies and arranging a meeting of the leaders and scattered mahangaisia to approve Kailondo's successor must have taken weeks rather than days. Most probably, therefore, Kailondo's death took place between December 1895 and February 1896.

'What would have happened', it is tempting to ask, 'if Kailondo had lived longer? How would he have reacted in 1898 at the time of the Hut Tax War?' But such questions have no place in a historical study. Clearly though, from the time of Cardew's 1895 visit to Luawa,

Kailondo acted increasingly as a ruler who had lost confidence in the good faith of his main ally. Still sure of his own military power and his control over his own people (494), he was disillusioned with his British connection and bewildered by the political changes which were enveloping his polity (495).

NOTES AND REFERENCES FOR CHAPTER TWO

1. Malcolm, J.M., "Mende Warfare" in Sierra Leone Studies (O.S.) No.21 (Jan.1939), p.49: "the willingness with which war was entered upon seems to show that the people liked it for its own sake".
2. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.84,94,111 below.
3. Maada James Kailondo noted, "From the time the country was handed over to Kailondo, there has been no internal war" (Int.19).
4. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.10.
5. Kailondo's relations with neighbouring polities could have formed a separate sub-section in this chapter of the thesis; but since they are so interwoven with events central to the other necessary sub-sections, those relations are considered at various appropriate points throughout the chapter. For Kailondo's early difficulties with Mendegla of Gaura, see pp.74-75 below; for the 1883-1892 dispute with Momo Babahu of Upper Bambara, see pp.100-103 below; for the secretive opposition of Kabba Sei of Mando in the 1890s, see pp. 86,126 below.
6. See Chap.1 of this thesis, Note 294, p.69 above, for an estimate that Ndawa was militarily the superior of Nyagua. Kailondo, of course, defeated Ndawa.
7. Alldridge, for example, commented that the mahci of Upper Bambara was "far less powerful" than Kailondo, though in a war the former "no doubt would have got the assistance of other chiefs" (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.185).
8. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.28.
9. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.88,100-1 below.
10. Ibid., pp.74-5,77 below.
11. For example, the meeting between Nyagua and Kailondo to determine 'spheres of influence' in southern Kono may well have been at the latter's initiative (ibid.,pp.76-7 below).
12. For example, Kailondo's conquest of Vassa country during the Gbande War (ibid., p.80 below).
13. For example, his raid into Kono country against Chief Manye of Walihun (ibid., pp. 76-77 below).
14. One suspects, in any case, that such 'master plans', whoever they are ascribed to, are largely fictions of historians' imaginations.

15. For the date of Kailondo's death, *ibid.*, pp. 128-129 below.
16. See Clarke, Kailondo, p.11: "As the months passed by the Chiefdom grew stronger, but it was not left long in peace. The three chiefs who had sided with Ndawa sent to Mbawulome, one of Ndawa's warriors, to come and rid them of Kai" - which was the beginning of the Gbande War.
17. Hollins, "Short History", p.18.
18. The Hollins chronology has been followed because:-
  - (i) Maada James Kailondo noted, "The Gbande War was about ten years after the war between Kailondo and Ndawa" (Int.19). This remark suggests that Mr. Hollins' date of 1889 is approximately correct.
  - (ii) The wars which, Rev. Clarke implies, took place at Mbawulomeh's instigation fairly soon after his defeat in the Gbande War seem to be those same wars to which British colonial officials, and Kailondo himself, referred in despatches and letters of 1895. Cf. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.76, and this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 81-83 below.
  - (iii) Although Rev. Clarke suggests the Gbande War came at the beginning of Kailondo's reign by placing that war straight after Kailondo's 1880 campaign against Ndawa, yet he does not suggest any definite alternative date to that of Hollins, who gives 1889.
  - (iv) In a despatch in May 1892, Alldridge referred to this same Gbande War as "the last Gbande War" and "the last war" in such a way as to imply that it had taken place not many years before 1892 (C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia, pp.22-23).
19. Hollins, "Short History", p.16.
20. For Bubu, see also Chap.1 of this thesis, p.31 above, where he appeared as 'Bobone'. Little is known about him. He was certainly less significant, politically, than Mendegla, Mahsi of Gaura, who is mentioned frequently both in oral tradition and in the reports of colonial officials like T.J. Alldridge (see Chap.1 of this thesis, Note 285, p. 68 above; also The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.168-170, where Alldridge mentioned "the enormous power and influence that he exercised over the other chiefs in the adjacent localities"). Mendegla's headquarters town was Joru: he died in 1890 or 1891 (*ibid.*, p.244).
21. Hollins, "Short History", p.16. Mr. Hollins used the spelling 'Momo Bobawo', but 'Babahu' is more common and was used by Alldridge.
22. See Chap.1 of this thesis, p.31 above, where there is the relevant extract from KDOA, 128/1927; subject: Transfer of Pendembu District H.Q. to Kailahun enc. Petition from P.C. Momo Banya to His Excellency the Governor - re. moving of District Headquarters to Kailahun.

23. Comber, B. (late Hon. P.C.), The History of the Mando Chiefdom, quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.31.
24. Hollins, "Short History", p.16. See also Kulu-Banya, op. cit., p.13. The daughter of Momo Babawo was called Lumbe Korbali, and became the mother of P.C. Momoh Banya.
25. Isaac, B., Traders in Pendembu: a case study in entrepreneurship (unpub. Ph.D. thesis, Dept. of Anthropology, Univ. of Oregon, 1969), Chap.2, p.14: "After about 1880, Upper Bambara Chiefdom, which can claim no outstanding war leaders for this period, appears to have been overshadowed by her powerful neighbours, and especially by the great Kissi warrior Kailondo".
26. KDOA, NAMP 27/1924; Subject: Luawa-Upper Bambara boundary, min. by Bowden, W.D. (Commissioner, Central Prov.), 11-12.9.25, Ngiehun. Momo Babahu built Gigbwema and two other villages in the area known as Gau Tumbelu, east of Pendembu, south-east of the Keya valley. It was recognized by the local rulers in 1925 that in this way Gau Tumbelu had been ceded from Luawa to Upper Bambara.
27. Since a mahai would receive the daughters of many kpakoisia as wives, 'marriage alliance' does not have the connotations of close connection which it might indicate in European history. But Momo Babahu's daughter apparently became one of Kailondo's favourite wives, and bore him his favourite son, Momoh Banya: so the connection through her between Kailondo and Momo Babahu must have been quite strong. Many of the mahangsisia of the Luawa area were related by blood or marriage. "The Treaty chief of Malema, Duawu Niemy, was first uncle of Kabba Sei [of Mando], and the Treaty chief Momo Babaho of Upper Bambara, was his first cousin" (Comber, op. cit., quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.179).
28. KDOA, loose papers not contained in a covering file, relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, 1942: "Kai Tungi's claims".
29. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79.
30. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.11.
31. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79.
32. See Chap.1 of this thesis, pp.10-11 above.
33. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12; Hollins, "Short History", pp.16-17.
34. See Note 22 above.
35. See Hollins, "Short History", p.16 and Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12. They tell substantially the same story, but Mr. Hollins emphasizes that mahai Manye led an armed band into Kailondo's territory,

thus provoking war; while Rev. Clarke emphasizes that before this happened, Kailondo had refused to return to Manye a wife who had run away, thus making Kai largely responsible for the war. P.C. Momoh Banya's account puts the responsibility wholly on Manye.

36. Cardew called this area "the Saua Konno country" (CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima), but it is difficult to discover whether this title was generally accepted by the people of this area.
37. Hollins, "Short History", p.17.
38. Kailondo's capture of Kapeta did not take place very near the time of the raid against Manye, but perhaps as much as a decade later, around the year 1890. In June 1895, J.C.E. Parkes (Superintendent of the Department of Native Affairs in Freetown) sent a letter to Kailondo, thanking him "for having released Chief GUMBU KEPATA" [SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - 11.5.96) 289/1895; Parkes, 29.6.95].
39. In March 1895, Governor Cardew noted that the area between Bandajuma-Yawei and Waima (near Kainkordu) must have once been "a populous and thriving district", but Kailondo had raided the area, and its mahgi Gumbo Kagbatta had been "taken prisoner by him over four years ago .... I hope to be able to induce KAILUNDU to release him" (CO267/417/Conf.15; Cardew; 7.3.95, at Waima).
40. Hollins, "Short History", p.17.
41. Cardew noted that the territory of Nyagua "extends on the East as far as Taninahun [near present-day Gandorhun on the Segbwema-Sefadu motor road] and on the South joins that of Chief KAILUNDU" (CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima).
42. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.89-91 below.
43. Hollins, "Short History", p.17.
44. See reference in Note 42 to the account of the way Nyagua and Kailondo co-operated in an attack against the people of Kpandeme.
45. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.179. In the 1892 meeting of the Ko-Mende mahangsisia, held to discuss the sofa threat, Nyagua was apparently annoyed by Kabba Sei and Kailondo in some unstated way, and wanted "to fine his two brother chiefs six slaves and one cow each". He hoped Alldridge would enforce these fines, but the British official refused to do so.
46. "At one time Chief NYAGWA appears to have co-operated with KAILUNDU against KAFARA and the Sofas but it is stated that he and Kai Lundu have since fallen out" (CO267/409/165; Cardew; 15.6.94).
47. Even if Kailondo and Nyagua did 'fall out' to some extent, they both apparently realized the political advantages of avoiding conflict.

48. Hollins, "Short History", p.21.
49. Comber, op. cit., quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.179.
50. See Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.244-245.
51. C0267/325/248; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, describing the attempts of Mendegla to establish peace in the coastal districts (quoted in Fyfe, Sierra Leone Inheritance, pp.246-248).
52. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13, noted that the following incident concerning mahci Fabe occurred four or five years after the Ndawa and Kailondo campaign in Kono country; and the latter took place c.1880. Hollins, "Short History", p.17, noted that the Fabe incident took place two years after the Kono War against Manye. Clarke calls the incident the Mafisa-woma-goi (War beyond Mafissa), while Hollins calls it the Wunde War.
53. 'The area' in this case could include virtually the whole of present-day Kailahun and Kenema Districts. Nyagua was supreme over the area now covered by Kenema District north-west of the Moa, while Mendegla was the Mahawai in what is now Kenema District south-east of the Moa. Alldridge thought Mendegla's influence reached as far south as the Moa estuary (see Note 51 above). Kailondo was the most powerful Mahci in present-day Kailahun District (and for some distance to the north and east of it), the next most powerful rulers after him being Kabba Sei of Mando, and Ngevau and Pambu of Malema. By the mid 1880s, relationships between all these mahangeisia were founded on peace and co-operation.
54. Hollins, "Short History", p.17, spells the name 'Fobi'.
55. 'Lingo-Bengo' is the form used by Paulme, Les Gens du Riz, pp.40-41. Hollins, "Short History", p.17, gives the spelling 'Lendo-Bengu'.
56. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13, uses 'Upper Kondo'. Nelson's Sierra Leone Atlas, p.2, gives the name 'Koundou' to the chief town of Lingo-Bengu country which is usually known as Kissi-Kenema. Hollins, "Short History", p.17 calls Fabe 'Chief Fobi Kundu'.
57. See map opp. p. 73 in this thesis.
58. See Chap.1 of this thesis, p.34 above.
59. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13.
60. Hollins, "Short History", p.17. The map in Paulme, op. cit., pp.40-41, shows Tongi country north-west of Wunde, just east of the Mali River, with Fangamandu as its chief town.
61. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13. Cf. Hollins, "Short History", p.17. An interesting detail, which had obviously stuck in the minds of the old warriors who spoke to Mr. Hollins and Rev. Clarke, was that at

Yarokuru, Kailondo's enemies took refuge in a big cave. Kailondo tried to smoke them out, but was unable to do so, and while making this attempt, three of his own men were killed, including Kangbara, Kailondo's full brother. It may be a significant comment on the limited destruction caused by these 'wars' that the death of three men was considered so serious that it was recorded in oral tradition. Maada James Kailondo (Int.19) noted that at the time of this Mafissawoma War, Kailondo also fought with the people of Lokoma, who lived east of the Mafissa River, fairly near to Gbékédu.

62. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13.
63. Possibly Fabe was the father of Kafula of Wunde. Kafula came to rule Wunde Tongi, Lingo-Bengu and Wunde proper, and it was noted that about 1880 "Kafura's father was chief of the Wunde country North of the Moa River" (SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, p.79). At least until 1890, Kafula recognized Kailondo as overlord.
64. Mbawulomeh is made up of the Mende words mba = rice; wulo = little; and me = eat.
65. Hollins, "Short History", p.15; Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.74, noted that Mbawulomeh's invasion of Luawa was organized by his former leader Ndawa, but the present writer has found no evidence of this.
66. Hollins, "Short History", p.15. The town is sometimes called Ngiehun Tomago (Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.31). Maada James Kailondo described the town as Ngiehun Tokweima (Int.19).
67. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 87-88 below.
68. See Note 18 above.
69. KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 27/1924; Subject: Luawa-Upper Bambara boundary, min. Bowden (Commissioner, Central Province), 11-12.9.25, Ngiehun.
70. Int.19.
71. Hollins, "Short History", p.18; Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12.
72. Ibid.
73. Here reference is made to Kailondo's Luawa as defined in Chap.1 of this thesis, pp.1-2 above. There may have been occasional skirmishes on the very borders of Luawa during Kailondo's reign (e.g. in 1892 at Gbandewulo); but such fighting was short-lived, and affected very few of the people of Luawa.
74. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12. The elders of Giema (Int.14) noted how the brother of patimahi Kpawo was killed in Kailondo's time because he invited the Guma people to come and wage war.



75. Abraham, A. and Isaac, B., "A Further Note on the History of Luawa Chiefdom" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.), No.24 (Jan.1969), pp.72-73. They suggest that this action, and Kailondo's subsequent campaign into Gbande country as an example of "the terror that Kailondo inspired and the ruthlessness with which he dealt with all opponents and personal enemies". But these three mahangeisia had opposed Kailondo by military force at the time of his accession, and had then encouraged this raid by Mbawulomeh, in which Bundu was killed and which was clearly not in the interests of the people of Luawa. It is hard to think that any ruler in any period would have dealt with such treason more leniently. The Gbande mahangeisia were ready to harbour Mbawulomeh after his raid on Nyandehun, and thus to provide him with an excellent base for further attacks on Kailondo's Luawa. Kailondo was bound to take some form of action to prevent this.
76. Hollins, "Short History", p.18. Cf. P.C. Comber's account (quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.31) which suggests that the initiative for action against Mbawulomeh came from Kabba Sei of Mando (P.C. Comber's own father).
77. Hollins, "Short History", p.18.
78. Comber, op. cit., quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.31.
79. Ngiehun Tomago (see Note 66 above) was apparently just a solitary town controlled by Mbawulomeh, while the surrounding area was part of Guma country. In 1892 it seems the ruler of Guma was Yanga Fema.
80. Unfortunately, these details of the Gbande War are to be found only in one source - Hollins, "Short History", pp.18-19. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12, corroborates the fact that Kailondo reached Kpelle country. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.74-75, gives a brief outline of the campaign, as does Wylie, "Mende Chieftaincy", pp.302-303. Dr. Wylie incorrectly states that Mbawulomeh "never bothered Kailundu again" (p.302: cf. this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.82-83 below); that the town Mbawulomeh first took in Luawa was "Nyangahun" (the correct spelling being Nyandehun); and that when Kailondo pursued Mbawulomeh he was countering "rebellion" (whereas in fact he was countering external aggression).
81. Fobewuru is mentioned as "Fobaywulo" in Comber, op. cit., quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.31, and his death recorded. In P.C. Comber's account, "Gbandi" is wrongly described as a town, when in fact it refers to a whole language group. Fobewuru is also mentioned in the account of Luawa under Kailondo in the Fendiambu District Intelligence Book (SLGA), p.79: Kailondo "took the chief Fobewuru prisoner to Kanre Lahun, and killed him there, because he would not agree to sit down to him".
82. Hollins, "Short History", p.18: "Bau-wuru-me" is the same person as Mbawulomeh. As regards Hollins suggested identification of the Langwa River with the St. Paul, cf. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.12,

where it is recorded that Kai reached "the Bele country (seven days journey from Kailahun)". Taking 15 miles as an average day's journey, this would represent just over 100 miles, which is the distance away from Kailahun of the St. Paul River at its nearest point to Luawa. Cf. KDOA, Pendembu District 128/1927; Subject: Transfer of Pendembu District Headquarters to Kailahun, enc. Petition from P.C. Momo Banya to His Excellency the Governor: Luawa in the time of Kailondo was bounded "on the east by the rivers Lanwa, Lumbumba in Bereyela in the Republic of Liberia". A small town called Beliyela may be found on modern maps of Liberia, lying about 40 miles north-east of Bopolu and 20 miles north-west of the St. Paul valley. There is, of course, no clear evidence that this was the route taken by Kailondo. But a route from Vassa through Jene (Fobewuru's town) and Beliyela would be a fairly direct and short route from Luawa to the St. Paul River.

83. Hollins, "Short History", pp.18-19, noted concerning the Gbande people that Kailondo "received the fealty of that tribe, which sent him presents or tribute to Kailahun but was not called upon to work for him". The account of Luawa under Kailondo in the Pendembu District Intelligence Book (SLGA), p.79, agrees with this: "Later he carried war into the Bandi country, and defeated them at Pupelahun near Kamatahun, and made them submit to his rule which they did till his death". However, it is unlikely that Kailondo had direct control of the whole of Gbande country because:-
- (i) there was clearly no single ruler through whom the whole Gbande people could offer submission, but rather (as in the case of the Mendeleisia) a multiplicity of petty rulers, only a few of whom met Kailondo.
  - (ii) when Alldridge visited the area in 1891, there were no very clear signs of Kailondo's overlordship (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.211-234).
84. Hollins, "Short History", p.19. No further reference to Kelfa or Molifo has been found, but Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.212, mentioned Fabanna as "chief of this Vassa country", and signed a Treaty with him (*ibid.*, p.250). On the map of his 1891 tour, at the back of his book, Popalahun is marked mid-way between Yandahu Vassa and Kolahun.
85. In an earlier despatch, Alldridge described Mando Javaiana as lying between Guma and Vassa countries (C0267/394/217; Fleming; 30.5.92, enc. Alldridge, 2.5.92, Sulima), south of the Magowi River.
86. C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge 29.5.92, Dia.
87. *Ibid.*
88. It was a limited 'peace treaty' because it involved only three mahangcisia. A comprehensive treaty covering all the mahawuisia immediately south and east of Luawa would have involved ten or more mahangcisia. As regards the use of the phrase 'peace treaty', it is

recognized that this has strong connotations in European history which may not all be applicable in African history. However, no other phrase could be found to describe an agreement between various rulers at the end of a war, in which the rulers made a collective promise not to fight each other.

89. These hopes were frustrated by the military activities of the Kpandeme 'sofas' in the early 1890s, and later by the behaviour of British and Liberian officials (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 84-93 below, and Chap. 4, pp.264-314 below respectively).
90. Hollins, "Short History", p.19. An interesting sidelight is the note made by Mr. Hollins that Tengbe, who was Lavale of Luawa in the late 1920s, brought back a Kpelle cannibal as a slave, and cured him of his lust for human flesh. Mr. Gorvie attempts to record this same incident, presumably as it was told to him by one of his own informants: when Kailondo was leaving Kpelle country, "one Tengbe a Bele chief was forced to go along and became a member of Kai's household" (op. cit., p.45). An illustration of how easily distortion can creep in to any historical work !
91. As the foregoing Notes show, all the major written sources for Kailondo's reign, as well as most of the oral traditions, mention this Gbande War.
92. See Note 82 above.
93. Wallis, The Advance of our West African Empire, p.39.
94. Hollins, "Short History", p.19, alone among the written accounts records this war, which he says broke out c.1890, two years after the Gbande War.
95. Ibid. Mr. Hollins recorded the name as "Tawe of Foya", but this must surely be the same mahai who came from Foya to the Gbondou Conference (see Chap.1 of this thesis, pp.10-11 above).
96. Hollins, "Short History", p.19, where the name is spelt "Gegba". He was probably present at the Gbondou Conference (see Chap.1 of this thesis, p. 10 above). Mr. Hollins noted that he was the father of P.C. Seku Davowa of Kissi Tungli, who died in 1928.
97. Writing in 1908, Governor Probyn noted that Luangkorli "was formerly 'under' Chief Kie Lundu" (CO267/507/Conf.; Probyn; 16.11.08).
98. See map opp. p. 73 in this thesis.
99. The chronology at this point is not easy to sort out, as neither Mr. Hollins nor Rev. Clarke, nor any other source, gives an adequate number of precise dates.
100. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 84-93 below.
101. Ibid., p. 92 below.

102. The Mende word gai is usually translated as 'war' in English, but as in so many other cases, the translation is liable to misunderstanding, especially when dealing with the pre-1896 period. These 'wars' did not involve 'total war' in the sense that the peoples of Europe experienced in 1939-45, or the peoples of Luawa in the Kpove War c.1880. Most people in Luawa were, probably, hardly affected by most 'wars' during Kailondo's reign (the Gbande War being an exception, with the result that its details were vividly remembered in folk stories). The wars may not have involved large forces on either side, nor protracted campaigns, and the aim was usually to capture enemy towns rather than fight big, bloody pitched battles (see Chap.1 of this thesis, p. 33 above; even in the Gbande War, Kailondo's usual tactic was to capture and destroy enemy towns).
103. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.14, noted that "Gbolo" is "a Mandingo word for the Komende country". But since Luawa was itself the northerly limit of Koo-Mende, and the Gbolo War was clearly fought east of Luawa, it is probable that Rev. Clarke meant Komende rather than Koo-Mende. Migeod (A View of Sierra Leone, p.114) made a clear distinction between Koo-Mende people (the northern and eastern Mende people) and Komende. Two individuals from the latter group visited him in Kailahun in 1924. "I took down some of their language, which I found to be a pure Mandingo dialect. As soon as they said they called themselves Koniaka, I knew who they were. How they came to be called Komendi I was not able to ascertain, but the Creoles have a genius for giving other names and so passing them on to Europeans". McCulloch, Peoples of Sierra Leone, also notes the distinction, though she seems to deal with it rather less satisfactorily than Migeod. The Komende are described as a Mandinka-speaking "tribe" who are nevertheless "of the same group as the Ko-Mende of Sierra Leone" (p.4, Note 3). The Konyanke, in the present-day, live east of Mende and Kissi country, just east of the Loma people (see Murdoch, op. cit., map in back cover; Ajayi and Espie, op. cit., map inside front cover).
104. For the source of these guns, and firearms in general, see Chap.3 of this thesis, pp. 198-199 below.
105. Unfortunately, the details of these wars are recorded only by Rev. Clarke (Foundation of Luawa, pp.14-15), though a number of other sources allude to them (see Notes immediately below). Information is lacking to identify the location of "Gbolo", "Ndama", and "Jewelehu" territories. "Gbolo" country was apparently in Liberia, and Rev. Clarke stated this was also true of "Jewelehu", but that "Ndama" was in French Guinea. Pa Langama (Int.20) confirmed that "Ndama" was in Guinea (though later in the interview he said it was in Liberia; Pa Langama is now an old man, and was getting tired towards the end of the interview).
106. Langama was the father of Pa Langama of Buedu (Int.20), and presumably the son of Langama of Poluma, mahai of Wham in Kailondo's time (ibid.). Bundor Foryoh of Dia was one of the mahangaisia at the Gbondou Conference in 1880 (see Chap.1 of this thesis, p. 10 above). Nothing more is known of Koi Bundu: was he, perhaps, the father of Seikor Bundu of Buedu, Layale under P.C. Kaitungi during the 1940s?

107. Int.20.
108. Most of the places in "Greater Luawa" were less than thirty miles away from Kailahun by footpath.
109. Rev. Clarke made clear that these disturbances occurred after the Gbande war, which Mr. Hollins assigned to the year 1839. They were still going on when Kailondo died in late 1895 or early 1896, as Cardew showed in his despatches from Luawa in March 1895 (C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, at Kanre Lahun) and March 1896 (C0267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96, at Kanre Lahun).
110. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima: "I had invited Kai Lundu ... to meet me on my way up, but it appears that he is really ill and unable to come, so he sent his brother FABUNDEH instead, who met me at Looma". This might, of course, have been a diplomatic illness. Kailondo was still pleading sickness in February 1895 as a reason for not doing what Cardew wanted (C0267/417/61; Cardew, 1.3.95, at Kanre Lahun).
111. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp.14-15. Gorvie, op. cit., pp.46-47, noted that this last war began when "once again Bawulome with a great army of mercenary war-boys invaded some of the possessions of the Luawa chiefdom" - but the 'great army' sounds like an exaggeration. A date late in 1895 is suggested because on 1.11.95, J.C.E. Parkes wrote to Kailondo to say that news had reached Freetown "that you have been fighting on the Liberian side of the country", and to advise him "not to carry war anywhere" (SLGA, NADL 558/1895: cf. Abraham, Treditional Leadership, p.76).
112. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.128-129 below, for a discussion of the date of Kailondo's death.
113. For details of this incursion by Mbawulomeh, *ibid.*, pp. 78-79 above. The only other time at all when there was an armed incursion into the Luawa Heartland during Kailondo's reign was, apparently, in early 1892 when the sofas raided Tungi and attacked Gbandewulo on the borders of Kailondo's heartland, but there is little evidence that this involved serious fighting within Kailondo's heartland.
114. See Chap.3 of this thesis, pp.190-208 below, for the development of agriculture and trade in Luawa during Kailondo's day.
115. As early as the 1860s, tirailleurs sénégalais formed the backbone of the fighting force available to the French Governor in Senegal. "France owed her success in the Western Sudan to the use she made of African troops. The tirailleurs, accustomed to local conditions, able to withstand the effects of the climate, well armed, well trained, and stiffened by European cadres, were by far the most effective fighting force in the area. In relying on local manpower, however, the French were obliged to adopt local methods of warfare. Except for its veneer of European discipline, the whole military machine was modelled

on African lines. Basically there was little difference between a sofa and a tirailleur" [Kanya-Forstner, A.S., The Conquest of the Western Sudan: A Study in French Military Imperialism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969) p.272/].

116. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.103-4 below.
117. Ibid., p.85 below.
118. Alldridge wrote a summary despatch about his 1891 expedition on 24.4.91, from Bonthe, enc. in C0267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91. In his first book, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.202-236, Alldridge wrote at length about his 1891 visit as far as Kpandeme, but, strangely, in this book he conflates the 1891 visit with his first visit in 1890.
119. Evidence from their names and their style of writing would suggest that the Frontier Police NCOs stationed in Kailahun in the 1890s were semi-literate Creoles (or 'creolized' up-country men). The present writer has found no information on the interesting question of how well these NCOs spoke the Mende or Kissi languages; nor on the vital question of whether some of the Frontier Police stationed at Kailahun were of Koo-Mende or Kissi origin.
120. Author of a book and several articles on the Protectorate of Sierra Leone, Wallis later became British Consul in Liberia.
121. Wallis, C.B., "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland" in The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society (March 1910), p.286.
122. Person, Y., "Guinea-Samori" in West African Resistance (ed. Crowder, M., Hutchinson, London, 1971), p.122.
123. In his 1891 reports, Alldridge did not apply the name sofas to the large groups of armed men whom he found in and around Kpandeme; but when he later came to write his first book, he described how Kpandeme in March 1891 was "the residence of the paramount chief" of "the land of the warlike sofas" (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.227). He gives the name of the Mahci as Sosor (ibid., p.231).
124. Person, "Guinea - Samori", p.114, provides a map of Samori's Empire in January 1885 which indicates the Samori's rule extended over Loma (or Toma) country just west of Kpandeme, but did not include Kpandeme itself. However, presumably there were no precise territorial boundaries to Samori's Empire in this area, and, as with Kailondo's Luawa, 'direct rule' no doubt shaded off gradually into 'considerable influence'.
125. Ibid., for a map of Samori's Empire about 1896.
126. C0267/426/Conf.45; Cardew; 12.10.96, enc. Fairtlough, 15.9.96, Panguma. Cardew's comment appeared in the margin as an explanatory note.

127. Wallis, "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland", p.285, wrote in 1910 of Kpandeme as a "large war-town" which "harboured thousands of fighting men known as Sofas". Samori died in 1900 (see Person, "Guinea-Samori", p.140), but his Empire had come to an end two years earlier in 1898 (ibid., p.139).
128. For a readily-available and near-contemporary description of the Waima incident from the French viewpoint, see Arcin, Histoire de la Guinée Française (Challamel, Paris, 1911), pp.528-532. Forekere in 1893 was apparently trying to make "a 'road' to Freetown" [D'Orfond, P.S., "New Light on the Origin of the Waima Affair, 1893" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.11 (Dec.1958), p.129]. Forekere is described as a lieutenant of Samori.
129. Waima was a small village near Kainkordu.
130. Tekuyema is in Gbane Chiefdom about 8 miles west of Gandorhun. Lieutenant Maritz described it in a letter to Captain Valentin, who was in Kissidougou, in the first days of December 1893. "Forequere's base is composed of a central diarsa [wall or fence], which he uses as his private enclosure; a second encircling the first encloses the houses of the Sofas and their wives. A third encloses women captured in the country and guarded by a body of Sofas. Forequere has eight horses and each morning he summons his Sofas and organizes small revictualling expeditions. The rest of his troops stay under arms prepared for any attack from the local warriors" (D'Orfond, "New Light on the Origin of the Waima Affair, 1893", p.130). Early on 5.12.93, Maritz attacked and destroyed Tekuyema, and was given information that there had been 300 sofas in the village altogether.
131. For Kemo Bilalé, see Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.504, 517.
132. Ibid., p.517.
133. Ibid.
134. Ibid.
135. Ibid.
136. For example, oral traditions recorded by Rev. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp.13-14.
137. See especially the despatches of T.J. Alldridge from Luawa in 1891 and 1892 (C0267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91 - though he did not mention the sofas by name in this despatch, C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia).
138. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp.13-14, placed Kailondo's first fight against the sofas just after the arrival of Alldridge in 1890. He suggested that after leaving Wunde, the sofas moved on to Kono, and the devastation they caused there led to French and British action

against them, and thus to the Waima collision in late 1893. Alldridge's 1891 despatches on his expedition east of Luawa (e.g. CO267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun) show that the sofas were strongly entrenched at Kpandeme by then; but no mention was made of them at the time of Kailondo's Gbande War, which might suggest that they gained their commanding position in that area between 1889 and 1891.

139. Although Alldridge made the sofas sound so terrible, and the local people so frightened, yet in 1892 Kailondo and Nyagua were eager to fight them and were confident of possessing the military force to defeat the sofas; and Alldridge agreed with the estimate of the two mahangcisia (CO267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia).
140. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.291.
141. The details of the two alternative theories, and the evidence on which each is based, are discussed in this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 11-13 below.
142. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.517-521.
143. D'Orfond, "New Light on the Origin of the Waima Affair, 1893", pp.131-133.
144. Fyfe, Sierre Leone Inheritance, pp.251-252, quoting CO267/407/12; Fleming; 14.1.94, enc. Report by sub-Inspector of Police Taylor, C.N., 4.1.94.
145. CO267/408/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 10.3.94, enc. Wilson, P.S. (Cpl., NCO i/c F.P. Kailahun), 18.1.94, Kailahun: "Kaffurah in a town KEMEHMAH at the interior Gizzee has now joined with the French to bring war in this country". Crooks, commenting on the rather confusing set of enclosed reports, suggests Kafula still had some connection with the sofas, but by May 1895 all reference to sofas in the Wunde area had ceased, and Cardew was writing of a French post at Kissidougou (CO267/417/Conf.34; Cardew; 8.5.95).
146. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.225. Murdock, op. cit., p.260 relates the 'Bunde people' to the Gbande.
147. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.85-6 above.
148. Person, Y., "Guinea - Samori", p.114, indicates that by 1885 the town of Macenta, some 80 miles east of Luawa, was under Samori's control; and even Voinjama, only 50 miles east of Luawa, might have been under his rule.
149. It is tempting to describe the Kpandeme people as allies of the sofas, but there is insufficient evidence to justify such a statement.
150. CO267/390/434; Crooks (administrator); 22.12.91, enc. Coker, A.W. (L/Cpl i/c F.P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun: the sofas "are stationed in a town named KOKO-LAHOON the Chief of the town named GBUMBOO YESEH". Cf. CO267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91,



Bonthe: Alldridge noted that Gombo was mahai of Tengea (the central town of which was Foya). Towei (see note 95 above) must have either died or been displaced by this time.

151. Mahangaisia is a Mende-language word, and the Gbande people must have had their own word for their leaders. Mahangaisia is used here to describe the Gbande rulers partly because this thesis attempts to look at events from the viewpoint of the Luawa peoples, partly because the Mende concept of mahai is applicable also - as far as can be judged - to the situation in Gbande, Kono and Kissi countries. The English concept of 'chief' is applicable to none. See 'Note on Political Terminology', pp.42-43 above.
152. C0267/390/434; Crooks (administrator); 22.12.91, enc. Coker, A.W. (L/Cpl i/c F.P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun.
153. This account of the situation in January 1892, and its development, has been compiled largely from Alldridge's despatch from Dia, 29.5.92 (enc. in C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92). Some help is also given by a letter from L/Cpl. Coker in Kailahun, 20.11.91 (enc. in C0267/390/434; Crooks (administrator); 22.12.91) - but Coker's information is not clearly presented in his letter. Alldridge himself had earlier noted the impossibility of arriving at the truth about the sofa war, "information at present being very meagre, and statements extremely conflicting" (C0267/393/80; Jones; 12.2.92, enc. Alldridge, 30.1.92, Puabu). Alldridge's report from Dia, 29.5.92, is largely a report of statements made by the different mahangaisia at the Pendembu meeting (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, p.89 below). These statements are sometimes contradictory and the British official was probably uncertain where the truth lay, for he does not try to give a 'true' detailed explanation of the causes and course of the fighting; he merely records the statements which were made to him.
- Many of the mahangaisia are merely names, about which nothing more is known, but Kabba Sei is mentioned at a number of points throughout this chapter. For Pambu of Malema, see Wylie, The Politics of Transformation, pp.256-265; for Fabana of Vassa, see Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.210, 212 (with photo opp.), 250 - Alldridge made a Treaty with him in February 1892. Quaume may perhaps be the same person as "MOMOH BAHOMI, the Chief of BANDEH" who appears in Cardew's despatch from Luawa in 1895 (C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, at Kanre Lahun).
154. Kailondo's second principle was to be in alliance with surrounding rulers, not to fight them, C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, and enc. indicate that Kailondo refused to get involved in the war, and as late as mid-January was possibly hoping to avoid conflict with the sofas.
155. Ibid., enc. Coker, A.W. (L/Cpl. i/c. F.P. Kailahun), 15.1.92. Kailahun.
156. Ibid.

157. Ibid., enc. Kailondo (using Coker as amanuensis), 15.1.92, Kailahun.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid. enc. Coker, A.W. (L/Cpl. i/c. F.P. Kailahun), 21.1.92, Kailahun: "Chief Kie Lundoo told me today that messengers came from Gbandy Woaro, his town, and that the sofa war is fighting there the whole of the day", and so Kailondo set off to defend his town.
160. Fakai means in the Mende language, hamlet, small village.
161. C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92. enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia, pp.20-21.
162. C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, enc. Sawyerr, R. (sub-officer, i/c F.P. Bandasuma), 29.1.92, Bandasuma. Sawyerr took down the statement of Maligy from Gbande country saying that "... the sofas come down with their horses, they did not come with swords but they come with guns and bows and arrows".
163. The official despatches do not clarify all the details, but it would seem that the only mahei whom the sofas did not drive down to Baiwala was Jama Poto - understandably, since he was the one who had called on the sofas for help.
164. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.6. In the 1890s, there was a time of "tribal peace, the result of the Friendly Treaties between the paramount chiefs and the Government" and "it was to the Government, and the Government alone, that the peoples of the Sherbro and its Hinterland owed the security to life and property that they had enjoyed since 1890". This is just a random example: many others are scattered through Alldridge's despatches, articles and two books.
165. C0267/394/170; Jones (administrator); 26.4.92, enc. Alldridge, 8.4.92, Gonoru.
166. C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia Alldridge mentioned this meeting again in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.191 (Kangama being A Transformed Colony, pp.175-179, he gives some details of the "annoyance" which Nyagua caused him at that meeting.
167. Ibid., pp.177-178.
168. C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, enc. Alldridge, 30.1.92, Fuabu. Alldridge made this report less than four months before his meeting with the chiefs at Baiwala.
169. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.175.
170. C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia, p.22. The only creative initiative taken by Alldridge at this time seems to have been his arbitration between Kabba Sei and Kailondo, which achieved a reconciliation of the two mahangeisia. In this, he felt

he was successful, but in fact the ill-feeling between them broke out again several years later. Alldridge tried to discover the origin of the 'sofa war' but could do nothing to stop it.

171. Ibid.
172. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.vii.
173. Ibid., p.294.
174. C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia, p.22: "I yielded to his [i.e. Kailondo's] earnest solicitations that he, in conjunction with Nyagwa might go against the sofas". The plan was clearly formulated without the help of the British official, and Kailondo at least had made some preliminary arrangements before Alldridge was approached.
175. C0267/394/170; Jones; 26.4.92.
176. SLGA, NADL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93), 128/1892; Parkes, J.C.E. (supt. Dept. Native Affairs) to Alldridge, T.J. (Travelling Commr.); 26.4.92.
177. C0267/408/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 10.3.94, enc. Alldridge, 19.2.94, Bonthe.
178. Ibid.
179. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Cardew had interviewed Nyagua.
180. C0267/409/165; Cardew; 15.6.94.
181. SLGA, NADL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93), 226/1892; Parkes, J.C.E. to Chief Kai Lundu; 27.8.92. See also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.75-76.
182. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.254.
183. C0267/408/94; Quayle-Jones (Deputy Gov.); 31.3.94, enc. Wilson (P.S., Cpl. i/c. F.P. Kailahun), 13.3.94, Kailahun.
184. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima.
185. Int.
186. C0267/416/Conf.4; Cardew; 14.1.95, enc. Statement of Kan Hula.
187. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kanre Lahun: "BAWDEMEH" is clearly a mis-spelling of Kpandeme.
188. Ibid.

189. Ibid. Cf. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.231. Describing his 1891 visit, Alldridge noted that the "chief of Pandeme was Sosor". Presumably, between 1891 and 1895 this Mahaj had died, and had been replaced by Dukori. Cf. ibid., p.225, where three mahanga are mentioned as being in alliance: "Kikora, Jasa, and Sosor". Might Dukori and Kikora be the same person?
190. Komahanga in the Mende language means war-leaders, commanders of the armed forces (see Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.5).
191. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kanre Lahun. Possibly Bahomi was the same person Alldridge called "Quaume", who was mahaj of "the Lukasso Country" (C0267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia).
192. Cardew also planned to place 4 constables in one more town, which remained unchosen. C0267/417/Conf.15; Cardew; 7.3.95, from Waima.
193. C0267/417/Conf.20; Cardew; 6.4.95.
194. C0267/417/Conf.26; Cardew; 16.4.95, enc. Tarbet (Insp. Gen. F.P.).
195. The climax of the effort probably came only a few weeks after Cardew left Kailahun, in March 1895 (ibid.).
196. The invaders apparently never reached Kailondo's heartland; and even by 1894, as Samori withdrew eastwards, the 'sofa' pressure against Kailondo was probably decreasing. See, e.g. D'Orfond, op. cit., p.135: "The year 1894 saw the end of sofa domination", at least in the area north of Luawa.
197. This statement is based on the fact that there is no evidence of the Kailahun F.P. or the Freetown Government having taken positive, helpful action to support Kailondo against his main protagonists. If such action had been taken, there would surely have been some record left of it in the official despatches.
198. C0267/393/80; Jones; 17.2.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia.
199. Alldridge made the Treaty with Kailondo in the same year (C0267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. copy of the Treaty). Dr. Wylie in his doctoral thesis (The Politics of Transformation) notes that Alldridge arrived in Luawa in 1890, but consistently gives the date of the Treaty as 1891 (e.g. p.177).
200. Alldridge himself says he was the first European to visit the area: in 1890 he penetrated "into the remote parts where no white man had ever then been seen" The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.165). Governor Hay commented on Alldridge's visit to Luawa and the other polities that "they have probably never been visited before" (C0267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90). No evidence has been found that any literate Muslim had ever before this time written any account of a visit to Luawa, so that Alldridge's 1890 despatches were almost certainly the first written records to be made concerning Luawa.

201. Extraordinarily, Mr. Hollins ("Short History" p.20) gives quite a long and detailed account of a visit to Luawa in 1892 by Governor Sir Francis Fleming. This visit certainly never took place! There is no record of it anywhere else, either in oral traditions, written records, or official documents - and if it did ever take place, it would undoubtedly have been mentioned in official despatches. Mr. Hollins seems to have been confused by a visit Fleming made to Bandasuma, in the lower Moa valley, in March 1893 (CO267/401/113; Fleming; 28.3.93). On this occasion the Governor clearly did not travel north of Bandasuma. The details of Fleming's supposed route to Kailahun, and his calling of Kailondo to meet him in Vahun (which the latter refused to do) are virtually identical with the sequence of events which took place during Cardew's 1895 visit to Kailahun (CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95). It seems that somehow Mr. Hollins confused and partly conflated Fleming's 1893 visit to Bandasuma and Cardew's 1895 visit to Kailahun; but it is impossible to discover where he got the date 1892 from.
202. CO267/389/239; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe.
203. CO267/395/312; Fleming; 26.8.92, enc. Alldridge, 29.5.92, Dia Station.
204. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, Chap. XXIV, "The Governor, Sir Francis Fleming, K.C.M.G., meets the Treaty Chiefs at Bandasuma, 1893," pp.252-264.
205. CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Present-day Gandorhun is very near the site of Taninahun.
206. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun, for the 1895 expedition; and CO267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun for the 1896 expedition. Hollins, "Short History" p.20, notes that Cardew visited Kailahun in "1894 or 1895", and that he "came by sea to Sulima". Cardew in fact travelled overland from Freetown both in 1895 and 1896.
207. Alldridge apparently made at least two later visits to the Protectorate, one in 1907 (A Transformed Colony, p.86), and one in 1908 (*ibid.* p.163). Arriving in Luawa in January 1908 (*ibid.*, p.175), Alldridge noted that it was "fourteen years since my last visit there in the days of my friend the late chief Kai-Lundu" (*ibid.*, p.180). In his paper "Sierra Leone Up to Date" (Proceedings of the Royal Colonial Institute, vol.40, 1908, pp.37-55), he noted that between 1905 and 1908 he twice visited Sierra Leone, the second visit lasting from November 1907 to May 1908. He also noted that he was District Commissioner of Sherbro from 1894 to 1905 (p.38).
208. For Tarbet's visit, see CO267/417/Conf.26; Cardew; 16.4.95. For Fairtlough's visit, see CO267/418/Conf; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. Fairtlough, 30.5.95, Panguma.

209. Neither oral tradition nor written records indicate that Freetown Creoles reached Luawa in Kailondo's reign, and if they had done so it seems certain that some record would have remained. The first Creoles probably reached Luawa fairly early in Fabundeh's reign, around the turn of the century (see Chap.4, of this thesis, Note 615, p.312 below).
210. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.18; Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.486-487.
211. Ibid. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.166.
212. C0879/32/African No.387, Conf.7; Hay; 24.2.90, enc. Instructions Issued to Messrs. Garrett and Alldridge. Cf. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.165: "My mission was to become acquainted with the country and the people, and to extend to the paramount chiefs who then ruled, an invitation to accept the privilege of entering into friendly treaties with the British Government".
213. C0879/32/African No.387, Conf.7; Hay; 24.2.90, enc. Instructions Issued to Messrs. Garrett and Alldridge.
214. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, Chaps. XXIX and XXX, pp.279-395.
215. Ibid., p.293.
216. Ibid., p.vii.
217. This was equally true of later British officials in the Luawa area. In the first decade of the twentieth century, Major Le Mesurier twice initiated quite serious action without the approval of the Governor in Freetown. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp.308-313 below.
218. C0267/394/170; Jones; 26.4.92, enc. Alldridge, 8.4.92, Gonoru in Mando.
219. Ibid., comments on Alldridge's enc. despatch by Parkes and Quayle-Jones.
220. 'Local history' of both areas in West Africa which came under French control and those under British control. At least until the early twentieth century, it seems that local French officials sometimes acted in ways which were not always approved by senior officials on the coast; just as Freetown might sometimes disapprove of the actions of the up-country D.C. See Kanya-Forstner, op. cit., passim.
221. The local up-country D.C., his attitudes and actions, is as yet a largely unstudied character, either in the early colonial period or in later years. For a first attempt in this direction, see Ferraton, H.D., "The Man on the Spot" in The Theory of Imperialism and the European Partition of Africa (Proceedings of a Seminar held at the Centre of African Studies, University of Edinburgh, 3-4.11.67).

222. Perhaps the main reason why the attitudes and actions of local up-country British officials have not been the subject of much study is that, by its nature, such a study can concentrate only on one or two individuals at a time in one specific area. They can only be the subject of intensely detailed local history, relating their own attitudes and actions to the local socio-political situation and to the reactions of individual indigenous rulers and their societies. Such history is much needed, but most historians of West Africa still prefer to deal in generalities involving whole colonies over several decades; or even referring to the entire sub-continent throughout the 'colonial era'. The contention of the present writer is that little of real value will emerge from West African historical studies until the 'broad sweep' approach is dropped in favour of close examination of particular people (African and European) and events within a very limited area and time-period. After perhaps 50 years of such detailed studies there may be enough material available to permit the writing of a 'broad-sweep' synthesis.
223. Hollins, "Short History", p.19; Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.13.
224. kobanga in the Mende language means a cleared space, often at the centre of several separately-walled but immediately adjacent villages, used for public meetings (see Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary).
225. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.107.
226. Ibid., p.215.
227. C0267/32/African No.387, desp. 248/1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima. Alldridge states that these peaceful conditions reflect "the magnitude of your Excellency's work throughout the country". But it is fantastic to think that Hay's forward policy had affected Luawa by 1890, when before then no British official had ever been in contact with anyone in Luawa. It is probable that Kailondo had never even heard of Hay or his policy, let alone being ready to obey his policy. Luawa was in "a state of tranquility" in 1890 simply because that had been the normal condition within the mahawui ever since Kailondo's accession in 1880.
228. In Alldridge's second book, his attempt to make out a case leads to some rather tendentious writing; and even its title - A Transformed Colony - suggests that the book is in the nature of an apology for colonial rule and the writer's life's work.
229. Ibid., p.290.
230. Ibid., p.291.
231. Ibid., p.292.
232. Ibid.

233. Ibid.
234. See Chap.3 of this thesis p . 190 below. The key documents in which Alldridge described his 1890 and 1891 tours are C0879/32/African No.387, desp. 182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru: C0879/32/African No.387, desp.248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima: C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kailahun: C0/267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun: C0267/389/211; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 22.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 30.3.91, Joru; and C0267/389; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 19.5.91, enc. Alldridge, 24.4.91, Bonthe.
235. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.292.
236. Ibid., p.293.
237. Ibid., p.295.
238. C0879/32/African No.387, desp. 248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima, p.115.
239. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.215.
240. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.vii.
241. A Transformed Colony was published in 1910, nine years after The Sherbro and its Hinterland.
242. At the beginning of Chap.XXX in A Transformed Colony, Alldridge notes how in "certain quarters we are continually hearing of the rapacity of Great Britain; the British Lion is represented as incessantly prowling about the world seeking for some new territory to devour" (p.290). For a short summary of some of the British personalities who were critical of imperialism at this time, and some of their criticisms, see Taylor, A.J.P., The Trouble Makers (Panther Books, London, 1969; original ed. 1957) pp.87-101. From whatever 'quarters' Alldridge heard this criticism, he could hardly fail to feel it was personally hurtful, since 'on the ground' in Sierra Leone he had been one of the main agents of British colonial expansion.
243. There are occasions in The Sherbro and its Hinterland when he writes about what he calls "the darker side of native African life". Also, in A Transformed Colony there are passages in which he remembers the old conditions with a good deal of nostalgia (e.g. pp.180-181, on the subject of Kailondo's character). But in general in the later book there is a considerably more liberal peppering of the "shocking terrorism" type of comment than in his earlier writings.
244. A Transformed Colony, pp.177-180. Although the 1892 meeting was help up by lack of cooperation on the part of Nyagua, when he was not feeling well Alldridge sent him medicine in the form of "half-a-dozen pills of a much advertised make".



245. The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.190.

246. Ibid., p.187.

247. Ibid., p.189.

248. Ibid., pp.194-195.

249. Ibid., p.194.

250. Ibid., p.188. There is a slight discrepancy between the list of presents recorded by Alldridge here in his book and the list recorded in his despatch C0879/32/African No.387, desp.248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima. The differences may be tabulated:-

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>BOOK</u>	<u>DESPATCH</u>
Cloth	32 Country cloths 2 Country gowns	41 Country cloths
Ivory	1 small tusk of ivory	1 tusk of ivory, 8½ lbs.weight
Animals	1 Sheep 1 Bullock	2 Sheep 1 Bullock 1 Goat
Rice	-	Rice

251. The present writer would agree with the statement that Europeans in the tropical climate of Sierra Leone, after a few months residence, often find themselves increasingly short-tempered and tending to outbursts of violent anger. This statement has often been made verbally to the present writer by both Africans and Europeans, and has occasionally appeared in print. Edward Blyden once commented, "I do not think the mind of any European can be relied on after a year's continuous residence in that climate" (C0267/444/ - ; 28.7.98, p.26 - quoted by Wylie, Politics of Transformation, p.198). From personal experience, the present writer would agree with Blyden's comment in some cases at least, if not as a general rule. Why some Europeans are unbalanced by residence in Sierra Leone is hard to say; physical conditions of daily life, climate, and psychological factors such as 'culture shock' may be among the reasons.

252. The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.254.

253. Ibid., pp.193-194. Cf. Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp.54-56, where the similar point is made that Alldridge was "at great pains to create a favourable impression".

254. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa p.11: Kailondo's advice "was constantly sought in 'palavers' and his judgements strictly adhered to. Many times he was called upon to give his judgement in 'palavers' of outside chiefs who respected him as much as did his own people".
255. C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun.
256. Ibid. When the dispute was discussed before Alldridge at a meeting in Ngiehun in 1891, it was said that Kai Woni's seizures (Alldridge spells the name KANRE WUNE) were "made nearly five years ago".
257. Ibid.
258. Comber, P.C. Bai, The History of the Mando Chiefdom, quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, p.31. Cf. Alldridge, A Transformed Colony, p.181, where the name is given as 'Guri'. P.C. Comber's History states that Kai Woni's seizure was made while Mendegla and Kailondo were meeting amicably at Kabba Sei's town of Potolu to settle their differences (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.74-75 above).
259. Ibid.
260. The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.185: Alldridge notes that Momo Babahu "in himself" was "far less powerful"; but adds that he might have "got the assistance of other chiefs".
261. C0879/32/African No.387, desp.182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru.
262. Ibid.
263. Ibid. The Treaty with Kailondo was signed on 7.4.90; Alldridge was writing from Joru ten days later.
264. Ibid.
265. C0879/32/African No.387, desp.248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, enc. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulima, p.116.
266. C0879/32/African No.387, desp.182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru.
267. See Note 260 above.
268. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.187, wrote of Kailondo: "He immediately professed great friendship, and I never had any cause to doubt his sincerity. I always found him a true friend". A decade later, when many of his earlier views on 'pre-Protectorate' Mendeland had changed, he was still able to refer to Kailondo as "a very special friend of mine in whom I was able to place implicit confidence" (A Transformed Colony, p.199).
269. Malcolm, "Mende Warfare", p.49.

270. In The Sherbro and its Hinterland, as in his 1890 despatches, Alldridge indicates that it was Kailondo who realised that if he was strictly to fulfil the conditions of the Treaty, he could not wage war against Momo Babahu. But in every other way in the book, Alldridge gives credit to himself and Momo Babahu for taking the initiative, not to Kailondo. Yet in his 1890 despatches, the British official clearly shows that it was Kailondo who took the initiative.
271. In his second visit in 1891 it was Momo Babahu who first brought up "the old grievance between his people and KILUNDU and the LUAWA people .... and he solicited me in open barri, in the presence of his sub-chiefs and people, to use my influence with KILUNDU to re-establish a friendly intercourse between them" (C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun). But in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.184, Alldridge clearly states that Momo Babahu first brought up the subject "at the time the treaty was signed (ibid., p.250), i.e. in 1890, not 1891.
272. Ibid., p.184.
273. Ibid., pp.184-185.
274. Ibid., p.188.
275. Ibid.
276. Ibid., pp.188-189.
277. C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun.
278. It is here supposed that Alldridge's official despatch does in fact better represent the truth than the passage in The Sherbro and its Hinterland, pp.184-189. This seems a fair presupposition because:-  
 (i) the despatch was written only 10 days after the incident, whereas the book was published 11 years later. The account produced closer to the event is taken prima facie as the more reliable.  
 (ii) it is difficult to think of any reason why Alldridge might have subconsciously introduced distortion of the events into his despatch, but there was good reason in the book. The Sherbro and its Hinterland was in one sense an 'apologia pro sua vita' in which he was describing and justifying his own work in the Protectorate to the general public.  
 (iii) very often, as spatial and temporal distance from the scene of an incident increases, so a person's estimate of their own role in the incident seems to grow larger.
279. Rev. Clarke and Mr. Hollins accept Alldridge's statements at face value: so do Messrs. Atherton and Kalous ("Nomoli"), McCulloch (Peoples of Sierra Leone), and Little (The Mende of Sierra Leone). Dr. Wylie believes that nowhere in Alldridge's writing "does the European arrogance so common to many other officers in his day crop up" (Politics of Transformation, p.176). Recently, however, Mr. Arthur Abraham has encouraged a more questioning approach to Alldridge's

writing. See Abraham and Isaac, "A Further Note on the History of Luawa Chiefdom", and Abraham, A., "Nyagua, the British, and the Hut Tax War" in The International Journal of African Historical Studies, V, 1 (1972) pp.94-93.

280. Detailed examples of extravagancies in the writings of such British officials would produce more documentation than can be dealt with here. Perhaps the most fanciful and exotic piece of writing by a British official in Sierra Leone during the 1890s and early 1900s was Wallis' The Advance of our West African Empire.
281. Scholars are right to question the reliability of much oral tradition which, apart from Alldridge's writings, forms the only source of information on Kailondo's Luawa before 1895: but the written documents should be treated with a similar healthy scepticism. The conclusion that virtually all the evidence for Luawa before 1895 (and much of it bearing even later dates) is unreliable must reduce the area of 'historical certainty'; but that conclusion is a necessary first step to the writing of an ultimately better history of up-country West Africa.
282. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.487-488. The names of the NCOs, recorded in their despatches from Kailahun, would suggest that they were mainly Creoles, or men who had come under Freetown influence. The standard of writing in some of the despatches would suggest they possessed only a rudimentary literacy.
283. The names of the first constables as remembered by Maada James Kailondo (Int.19) were clearly of Mende origin (e.g. Ngombu); though there is the possibility that these names were in fact nicknames. See Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.487: cf. Hargreaves, J.D., "Frontier Police postings: the growth of a historical legend" in Sierra Leone Studies (n.s.) No.3 (Dec.1954). At all events, at least one of the constables in Kailahun must have been able to speak at least a little of the Mende language, otherwise there could have been no contact between Kailondo and the Frontier Police.
284. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.487. See also Davies, R.P.M., History of the Sierra Leone Battalion of the Royal West Africa Frontier Force, p.19.
285. C0267/417/74; Cardew; 11.4.95, enc. Report on Frontier Police, 1894.
286. See Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.119-120 below.
287. C0267/417/74; Cardew; 11.4.95, enc. Report on Frontier, 1894. Mongheri was about 100 miles west of Kailahun.
288. C0267/417/Conf.15; Cardew; 7.3.95. The Governor told the Officer Commanding Frontier Police to proceed to Panguma "where the headquarters of company in the Mongheri District will in future be stationed".

289. C0879/32/African No.387, desp.182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. Alldridge, 17.4.90, Joru.
290. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.190.
291. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.483-484.
292. Ibid., p.487; and Int.19. Davies, History of the S.L. Btn. of the R.W.A.F.F., p.20: "The uniform consisted of a blue jumper and short knickers, a red fez with a blue cummerband, black leather belt and accoutrements".
293. Ibid. "They were armed with the Snider rifle and sword bayonet". In March 1890, at Gegbwema, south of Joru, Alldridge noted how at the public meeting for the signing of the Treaty his "police escort, fully equipped with rifles and side arms, were drawn up" behind him (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.176). Presumably this was the procedure he also adopted at Kailahun.
294. C0879/32/African No.387; Hay; 14.5.90, enc. J.C.R. Parkes' translation of the message brought by Kailondo's emissary to the Governor.
295. C0879/32/African No.387, desp.182 of 1890; Hay; 3.5.90.
296. SLGA, NADL (12.90 - 9.91), 401/1891, from Lendy, E.A.W. (Ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs) to Ag. Insp. General of Police, 6.6.91.
297. Ibid.
298. Ibid.
299. C0267/390/434; Crooks (Administrator); 22.12.91, enc. Coker, Alfred W. (L/Cpl. i/c Kailahun F.P.), 20.11.91, Kailahun.
300. Ibid. Coker's letter seems to be the earliest indication that a detachment of the F.P. was permanently stationed at Kailahun. The evidence that they were permanent from late 1891 onwards is  
(i) the steady stream of reports from F.P. NCOs which come out of Kailahun from late 1891 onwards.  
(ii) the building of 2 houses as 'barracks' which Kailondo would not, presumably, have been asked to erect if the detachment was not going to be permanent.
301. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.190.
302. Coker's letter 20.11.91 (see Note 299): "I give him the order to build the house in the centre of the three Fenced Towns". Cf. Maada James Kailondo (Int.19): "Kailahun was three towns in those days - Tawoveihun, Giibina, and Tongoyama. In the centre of these three towns there was a sort of open place which called a kobanga".

303. Int.19. Cf. Hollins, "Short History", p.22, where the Frontier Police barracks are stated to have been "on the site of the present Kailahun market place", which is on the other side of the present-day motor road to Mofindor, immediately opposite the N.A. Offices.
304. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.122-128 below.
305. C0267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc.
306. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kailahun, p.11.
307. For Kono, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.76-77 above. As regards Guma, the earliest British records considered it a separate mahawui from Luawa, and no oral tradition discovered by the writer states that Kailondo was ruler there, yet at the time of the Gbande War, Kailondo "drove Barome out of Gau and out of Guma also and himself built a town in Guma .... When peace was once more established, the people from Vahun and Bunumbu [two towns in Gau] returned and built those towns and then sought permission of K. Lundu and Jung-hola [one of the Guma leaders] again built Gundama in Gau and sat down with Kai Lundu" [KDOA, Pendembu District NAMP 27/1924; Subject: Luawa-Upper Bambara boundary. Minute by Bowden, W.D., (Commissioner Central Province), 11-12.9.25, Ngiehun].
308. But Kailondo had some influence west of the Moa, as is shown by his Kono war against Manye of Walihun, and his capture of Kapeta (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.76-77 above).
309. See Chap.1 of this thesis, pp.38-39 above.
310. An outstanding example of the confusion and disruption caused by British officials, trying to re-order the political organization of Mendeland to fit in with their own ideas, is to be found in Kabba Sei's Mando. For details, see Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp.177-179.
311. Gbandewulo was apparently at this time the headquarters town of Kissi Tungi: in the colonial period, Buedu became the headquarters, and has remained so since. Tungi in the 1890s, though may have differed in extent from what it became by the 1920s.
312. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p.3.
313. KDOA, Loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chieftdom, 1942: "Kai Tungi's claim": Sembe Fawundu received his stipend "for two years and then died". See also Alldridge 16.3.91 (Note 312 above), where he says Sembe's father died three years earlier. Sembe Fawundu must therefore have been mahel of Tungi from 1888 to 1893.
314. C0267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc.
315. Alldridge used the expression "paramount chiefs" in C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p.4.

316. KDOA, Loose papers relating to the election of a P.C. for Kissi Tungi Chiefdom, 1942: "Kai Tungi's claim". In details, the story which Kai Tungi records here of Kailondo's begging of Sembe Fawundu to sign a Treaty with Alldridge does not seem accurate. But it almost certainly has a factual basis, since there is no doubt that Fabundeh did later on give Momo Banya's sister, Kutu, to Sembe Fawundu's son Koli Tungi. Cf. Int.22, where Koli Tungi is referred to as Sembe Fawundu's brother.
317. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p.4.
318. Ibid.
319. Comber, The History of the Mando Chiefdom, quoted in Little, The Mende of Sierra Leone, pp.32, 178-179.
320. See Abraham, "Nyagua, the British, and the Hut Tax War".
321. The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.177. Alldridge wrote elsewhere that he did not know much of the Mende language. His slightly naive assumption therefore seems to be that he was consistently well-served by interpreters.
322. C0267/382/182; Hay; 3.5.90, enc. See also Hollins, "Short History", p.19, where it is stated that the Treaty was signed "in the open space where the Kailahun market place now stands", i.e. in the kobangai. But cf. C0879/32/African No.87, desp.248 of 1890; Hay; 6.6.90, end. Alldridge, 12.5.90, Sulymah, where Alldridge writes of "the barrie in which the treaty was made".
323. For the Momo Babahu-Kailondo dispute, see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.100-103 above.
324. puumpi in the Mende language means British person, European, any person of a light-coloured skin pigmentation; also an indigenous person who follows 'European' ways (Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary) moi = man, living person. A perhaps rather fanciful explanation has been given of the prefix 'puu', Many of the first Europeans whom the Mende people met (presumably on or near the coast) were English traders who used Liverpool as their port of entry into Britain. But when they explained where they came from, it was only the distinctive sound of the last syllable of the word that the Mende people remembered - 'pool'.
325. As with the term Luawa, 'Wunde' in this period cannot be easily defined geographically. After c.1896 it seems that Kafula ruled from Kissi-Kenema, and the term Wunde may have been applied to the whole of the south-western quarter of what was later called the 'Cercle de Gueckedou'. But later maps, taken in conjunction with comments in Clarke and Hollins concerning mahawisia surrounding Wunde, might suggest that Wunde proper extended only about 10 to 15 miles north of the Moa. As with Luawa, the essential point may be that the people of the area in those days simply did not formulate the concept of mahayei in territorial terms, but rather as a matter of personal allegiance.

326. SLGA, Pendembu District Intelligence Book, "Luawa Chiefdom", p.79, for note about Kafula's father. Also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.75, Gorvie, Our Peoples of the Sierra Leone Protectorate, p.47, describes Kafula as "a friend and relation of Kai". C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun: Alldridge notes that Kafula was "one of his sub-chiefs", and that WUNDI is one of KILUNDU'S places, and one days walk from here". Since Kafula was still active as late as 1908 [see Wallis, C.B., "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland" in The Journal of the Royal Geographical Society (March 1910)] it may be presumed that his birth date could not have been much earlier than Kailondo's - c.1845. But since he was already a mahci by c.1890, his birth date could hardly have been much later than c.1855, since youth disqualified a person from becoming a Mahci in Mende and Kissi society. The date of Kafula's death is not known; but in 1929, Mr. Hollins noted that Kafula's son Nyandekoi, was then Chief of Wunde (see Hollins, "Short History", p.21).
327. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp.13-14.
328. Ibid. Also Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.75-76.
329. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.128-129 below.
330. Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, pp.14-15.
331. Ibid., p.15.
332. Maada James Kailondo, for example, stressed this point (Int.19): "Kailondo and Kafula did not quarrel. They stayed in the same country, they belonged to the same area".
333. Ibid. See also Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.264-266 below.
334. This was presumably the same war against the sofas as Rev. Clarke mentions (see Note 327 above).
335. C0267/388/133; Hay; 15.3.91, enc. Alldridge, 12.2.91, Kanre Lahun. The Freetown Government took Kafula's threat quite seriously, and as a result established a Frontier Police detachment of 3 constables in Kailahun. It seems that the original intention was to leave the detachment there only for the duration of the emergency, but in fact it became a permanent police post with its own barracks (see Notes 296-303 above).
336. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun.
337. Ibid.
338. The tendency to describe most 'foreigners' from the north, or from 'up-country' as Susus' has already been mentioned. "Wa" means big, large or important (Innes, A Mende-English Dictionary) - repetition of an adjective or adverb in the Mende language gives the force of a



superlative. See Person, Y., "L'aventure de Porekere et la drame de Waima", p.266, for details of an alliance between Porekere and a group called the "Kurua-Wara" in South Kono, presumably early in 1893. Possibly, then, the 'Susuwala' represented a separate group who launched an additional offensive against Nyagua and Kailondo at roughly the same time as Kafula (with sofa help?) was beginning his attacks on Luawa.

339. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.85-86 above.
340. C0267/408/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 10.3.94, enc. Alldridge, 19.2.94, Sherbro.
341. Ibid. enc. Wilson, P.S. (Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 18.1.94, Karray Lahoon. The evidence presented by Wilson for the presence of the French in Wunde is not very strong. Apparently Kailondo sent a spy to Kissi-Kenema, and "as the man reached he noticed Kaffurah give more than 12 heads of country money to the French to assist him to fight". The information is thus third-hand; the spy's story sounds rather improbable, and it is unsubstantiated by any other witness. Nevertheless, subsequent more weighty evidence suggests there need be little doubt that French influence was steadily increasing in Kafula's mahawui at this time.
342. Ibid.: "he is a Treaty Chief with the English now he fears that the French will spoil his country".
343. Ibid. Alldridge did not think it was necessary to give help to Kailondo against Kafula: "there is no reason why Kai Lundu and his powerful subchiefs should not be able to deal with him in accordance with the country laws". This remark reveals how very little the British had affected Luawa politically by 1894, despite the clauses of the 1890 Treaty.
344. C0267/408/94; Quayle-Jones (Dep. Gov.); 31.3.94, enc. Wilson, 13.3.94, Kailahun.
345. Ibid.
346. The French and Samori's sofas had been, and were still, in conflict with each other. Kafula may, of course, have been trying to play them off against each other.
347. C0267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, at Waima.
348. C0267/409/45; Cardew; 9.6.94. Also C0267/409/165; Cardew; 15.6.94.
349. Ibid. The early maps for this area contained in official despatches for the 1890s in C0267 indicate that Yandahu was on or near the present-day site of Daru.
350. Ibid.

351. The Kpandeme menace and Cardew's new postings of F.P. are also noted in this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 91-92 above.
352. C0267/416/Conf.4; Cardew; 14.1.95, enc. Statement of Kan Hula. The other information concerned news of an intrusion of the Kpandeme people who had attacked Fuya, and the French message which had been sent to Kailondo.
353. Ibid.
354. Ibid. Cardew's own comments on the statement.
355. C0267/417/Conf.34; Cardew; 8.5.95.
356. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, at Kailahun. Despite the seriousness of the threat from Kafula, Cardew implied that the threat from the Kpandeme people was much more pressing.
357. The French were undoubtedly penetrating south into the sphere of Kafula's influence. To an agitated NCO in Kailahun, perhaps aware of the superiority of Senegalese tirailleurs over the Frontier Police, the very presence of the French in the Wunde area could easily be misconstrued as a Kafula-French alliance. Likewise Kailondo, committed to the British, and Cardew, fearful of another Waima, might both tend to exaggerate the situation. In March 1897, Fairtlough (Ag. D.C. Panguma) reported how in October 1895, one of his own NCOs met a French detachment of 'native soldiers' at Kundo (just north of the Moa River) who produced "a paper which purported to come from the Commandant at Farana and stated that all Kafura's country and Kundo belonged to the French" (C0267/432/Conf.23; Cardew; 10.4.97, enc. Fairtlough, 16.3.97, Panguma). Fairtlough had also heard that "the French post which was established in Chief Kafura's town of Kenema in Lower Kissi, was owing to disagreements with the Chief, withdrawn some time about September" 1896 (ibid.).
358. C0267/427/Conf.54; Cardew; 26.11.96, enc. Fairtlough, n.d. (around 20.11.96).
359. Ibid. Corporal Clements, who had been patrolling as far north as Kainkordu, reported the French attack. The reference to "sofa friendlies" assisting the French would suggest that the term sofa was being applied very generally to any local armed band containing horsemen.
360. See Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.264-280 below.
361. The hypothesis which follows is tentatively advanced as a possible explanation. The evidence is perhaps insufficient ever to allow this hypothesis to be accepted as 'solid history'.
362. For Kafula's relations with Fabunde, ibid., pp.264-270 below.
363. Wallis, "A Tour in the Liberian Hinterland", p.293.

364. The French defeat of Samori, and the British reaction to the 1898 War in the Protectorate had proved the unprofitability of such a policy to virtually every other local ruler in the area.
365. The evidence on Kafula's career points clearly to the way in which he left one 'ally' for another according to where he considered lay his greatest opportunity for political gain.
366. An alternative possibility is that Kafula only once made a request for Kailondo's help against the sofas. This was, to begin with, a genuine plea for help, but after some initial skirmishing Kafula decided that more was to be gained by opposing Kailondo than by staying in alliance with him. So at that stage the former set an ambush in order to assassinate the latter. If this alternative possibility is accepted, it would mean that Kailondo made only one anti-sofa raid into Wunde, not two.
367. Kafula may have been a distant relation of Kailondo: certainly they were 'related' by both their fathers coming originally from the same mahawui of Wunde. Relevant then to Kafula's position at the death of Kailondo is the following passage describing 'traditional' Mende burial customs: "every member of the extended family should participate in the funeral rites of a relative whether close or distant, by making a contribution, of food or cloth (in modern times, in cash or kind), towards the funeral expenses. Failure to do so breaks the link in the ancestral chain which should be formed with the deceased. It is believed that the deceased will become hostile and seek to cause harm to the defaulter and those near to him within the family circle" [Harris, E.T., and Sawyerr, H., The Springs of Mende Belief and Conduct (S.L. Univ. Press and O.U.P., Freetown, 1968) p.114/].
368. For evidence of this, see Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.264-265 below.
369. For French and British failure completely to subjugate Kafula, see Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.278-279 below. The Europeans never achieved solid victories because Kafula was supported by a substantial proportion of his own Kissi people.
370. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, p.28. Alldridge is quite clear that Kafula's attempt on Kailondo's life took place "towards the latter part of last year", i.e. 1890.
371. Int.20. Strangely, the present writer's two most reliable informants - Maada James Kailondo (Int.19) and Pa Langama (Int.20) - were agreed that Kailondo never fought Kafula. It is possible that there is some truth in this. Although Alldridge (and later Cardew) mention a 'state of war' between the two Kissi rulers, they give no evidence that Kailondo ever took the offensive against Kafula. The latter, on his part, tried to assassinate Kailondo, and his raiding parties had become a serious nuisance in northern Luawa by the time of Kialondo's death; but (probably recognizing his own militarily inferior position) Kafula apparently never attempted a systematic invasion of Luawa.

Maada James Kailondo went even further, however, and said that "Kailondo and Kafula did not quarrel" (Int.19): this is the only point at which Maada James' oral account is in serious conflict with what is virtually indubitable 'fact' in the official despatches.

372. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap. 2, pp.79-81 above.
373. C0267/408/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 10.3.94, enc. Alldridge, 19.2.94, Sherbro.
374. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.109-110 above.
375. C0267/389/202; Hay; 15.4.91, enc. Alldridge, 16.3.91, Kanre Lahun, ps.28-29. Alldridge nowhere reports that Kailondo had definitely waited to discuss the matter with the British official before taking action against Kafula. But the probability that Kailondo did wait in this way is suggested by the facts that (i) Kailondo took no action against Kafula before the arrival of Alldridge, though the Luawa Mahci had had ample time to do so - at least 4 months since Kafula's assassination attempt. (ii) Kailondo made a formal report on the matter to the British official, and was clearly eager to hold a consultation.
376. Ibid., pp.29-30.
377. The letter does not make clear whether the 1890 Treaty is being referred to, or whether Kailondo had made some further (unreported) promise to Alldridge in 1891. Perhaps the writer, Lendy, was himself unsure !
378. SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 495/1891, from Lendy, E.A.W. (Ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs) to Kie Lundu, 16.9.91. Kailondo's letter was dated 16.8.91.
379. SLGA, NADL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93), 563/1891 from Lendy, E.A.W. (ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs) to Ag. Insp. General of Police, 29.10.91. Kailondo's letter was dated 22.9.91.
380. Ibid.
381. C0267/390/434; Crooks (administrator); 22.12.91, enc. Coker, A.W. (L/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun.
382. The Treaty stated that Kailondo should "not enter into any war" with neighbouring Chiefs, and should refer serious disputes with his "Headmen" to the Governor. In general Kailondo kept to these provisions, and after 1890 only involved himself in fighting when it seemed vital (though indeed this had been his policy even before 1890). The main armed clashes in which he was involved after 1890 were - (i) the sofa incursion into Wunde, probably in late 1890, which Kailondo took action against immediately, presumably because it seemed so serious that immediate action was necessary. But when, during the campaign, Kailondo got caught up in Kafula's rebellion,

he waited for Alldridge's next visit and consulted the British official before going to war against his Wunde "Headmen". In this way Kailondo avoided violating the 1890 Treaty.

(ii) in 1892, Kailondo sent reports to Freetown about fighting involving the Kpandeme sofas, and again waited to gain Alldridge's approval of a campaign against Kpandeme. Alldridge consented to this, and the fighting continued intermittently till Kailondo's death. This fighting may have included some raids into Liberia which were linked with the disturbances caused by Mbawulomeh (see this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp. 81-83 above).

383. CO267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. M'Cauley (C.B., I/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun. M'Cauley reported disturbances at Yibema and Mofindor. This report, like several others from 1894-1895, mentions the threat of raids against Luawa by Kafula [see e.g. CO267/408/75; Crooks (Ag. Gov.); 10.3.94, enc. Wilson, P.S. (Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 18.1.94, Kailahun: Kafula "has now joined with the French to bring war into this country" ].
384. See Chap.4 of this thesis, pp254-89 below.
385. Ibid., pp264-80 below.
386. There is no record in the oral tradition of the Mofindor-Mano Sewalu-Dia area of any fighting or disturbance in this area between c.1880 and c.1890, nor do the written records like those of Hollins or Clarke suggest any.
387. In neither of his books does Alldridge so much as mention Kafula. To do so would demonstrate that British 'pacification' was less than complete.
388. CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Kailondo was not well, so he sent Fabundeh to meet Cardew at Laoma: Cardew made these comments to Fabundeh, to be passed on to Kailondo.
389. Ibid.
390. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, at Kanre Lahun.
391. CO267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96, Kanre Lahun, p.10.
392. CO267/417/Conf.26; Cardew; 16.4.95, enc. Report of Capt. Tarbet's journey to Kanre Lahun. Tarbet was Inspector General of the Frontier Police.
393. SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - 11.5.96), 558/1895, from Parkes, J.C.E., to Chief Ki Lundu, 1.11.95.
394. Kailondo died in late 1895 or early 1896. The Protectorate was proclaimed in August 1896.

395. C0267/427/Conf.54; Cardew; 26.11.95, enc. Fairtlough, n.d. (around 20.11.96).
396. See Chap.4 of this thesis, pp.214-80 below.
397. Int.19.
398. Ibid.
399. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, pp.515-516.
400. Ibid., p.553. See also, however, Hargreaves. "Frontier Police postings: the growth of a historical legend".
401. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.194.
402. Int.19.
403. From late 1891 onwards, there were constables permanently situated in Kailahun. The only other contacts of any sort with the British and the Freetown Government before the death of Kailondo were the occasional visits of British officials to Luawa - Alldridge in 1890, 1891, 1892, 1893; and Cardew, Tarbet and Fairtlough in 1895.
404. Kailondo's request was transmitted to the Governor by Capt. Tarbet (Insp. Gen. Fr. Police) in the latter's report on a visit to Kailahun: "he [Kailondo] said he was very glad that Frontiers had come up, and begged that more would be sent" (C0267/417/Conf.26; Cardew; 16.4.95, enc.).
405. For example, SLGA, NADL (16.9.91 - 2.2.93) 226/1892, from Parkes, J.C.E., 27.8.92, to Chief Kie Lundu. Also possible NADL (11.5.95 - 11.5.96), 289/1895 from Parkes, J.C.E., 26.6.95, to Chief Ki Lundu, where Kailondo is simply advised to give his "war news" to "the Officer Commanding the Police at Panguma".
406. See p.126 below, and Note 413 below.
407. From April 1895 onwards, the use of Frontier Police in the Luawa area was governed by Cardew's instruction to the Officer Commanding Frontier Police recorded in C0267/417/Conf.20; Cardew; 6.4.95, enc.: "Patrols may use the road from Vahun to Kanrelahun but they must not go to the eastward of that road". In other words, Frontier Police were forbidden to operate in the Kissi-speaking area of Luawa or to the east of it. But it was precisely against his Kissi-speaking areas that Kailondo knew an attack might be launched. And his whole aim in requesting more Frontier Police seems to have been to launch an attack eastwards into Gbande country and beyond (see also Note 413 below).
408. SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 401/1891, from Lendy, E.A.W. (Ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs), 27.6.91 to Ag. Insp. General of Police.

409. CO267/417/Conf.15; Cardew; 7.3.95, enc. Instructions to the Officer Commanding, Frontier Police, Mongheri District.
410. No such record is to be found in CO267 (where most such actions, even if minor, anywhere in the protected area 1890-1895 are recorded), or in SLGA, or in oral traditions.
411. CO267/390/434; Crooks (Administrator); 22.12.91, enc. Coker, A.W. (L/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 20.11.91, Kailahun.
412. CO267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. M'Cauley, C.B. (L/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun.
413. Cardew specifically instructed that patrols could use the Vahun-Kailahun road (presumably meaning the route he himself used in 1895 through Batema, Nyandehun and Pandobu - CO267/417/Conf.39; Cardew; 13.5.95, enc. part of route map). The patrols were not, however, to travel east of this road (CO267/417/Conf.15; Cardew; 7.3.95, from Waima).
414. CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima.
415. Ibid.
416. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.72-73 above.
417. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, ps.187-199, suggests - probably accurately - that both Kailondo and his people were initially surprised and delighted by the strange appearance of the white man, his possessions, and the power he seemed to represent.
418. SLGA, NADL (2.2.93 - 22.12.94), 498/1893, from Parkes, J.C.E., 2.11.93, to Chief Kei Lundu, in which he was threatened with loss of his stipend for 1893 unless he cleared the roads and repaired the bridges in his district.
419. CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Orders had been given to the Frontier Police for "the suppression of intertribal wars and the slave traffic".
420. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.254. Kailondo sensibly excused himself on the grounds of ill-health, and preoccupation with the war against the sofas.
421. CO267/409/131; Cardew; 17.4.94, from Waima. Kailondo pleaded ill-health, and instead sent Fabundeh to meet Cardew at Laoma.
422. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun, Kailondo did not go to Vahun, pleading ill-health as in 1893 and 1894. Cardew failed to realize that in Mende custom it was undignified and showed disrespect to send messages summoning a Mahsi in this way.
423. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.166.

424. CO267/417/Conf.15; Cardew; 7.3.95, from Waima. Cardew's party left Kailahun for Bandajuma - Jawei on 2.3.95, "with 454 men"
425. CO879/32/African No.387; Hay; 14.5.90.
426. SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 273/1891, from Crooks, J.J. (Administrator), 24.4.91, to Insp. General of Police.
427. SLGA, NADL (22.2.94 - 10.5.95), 197/1894, from Supt. Dept. Native Affairs, 14.4.94, to Chief Kie Lundu.
428. CO267/416/Conf.4; Cardew; 14.1.95, enc. Statement of Kan Hula.
429. SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - 11.5.96), 289/1895, from Parkes, J.C.E. (Supt. Dept. Native Affairs), 29.6.95, to Chief Ki Lundu.
430. Ibid. 390/1895, from Parkes, 23.8.95, to Chief Ki Lundu.
431. For example SLGA, NADL (11.90 - 9.91), 273/1891, 563/1891, and 226/1892 all refer to letters received from Kailondo.
432. Kailondo made the request for Frontier Police in May 1890 (CO879/32/African No.387; Hay; 14.5.90), and 3 constables were sent to Kailahun in mid-1891 [ SLGA, NADL (11.90-9.91), 401/1891, from Lendy, E.A.W. (Ag. Supt. Dept. Native Affairs), 27.6.91, to Ag. Insp. Gen. of Police. ]
433. CO267/416/Conf.4; Cardew; 14.1.95, enc. Statement of Kan Hula.
434. Ibid.
435. Ibid.
436. Ibid.
437. CO267/427/Conf.54; Cardew; 26.11.96, enc. Fairtlough, n.d. (around 20.11.96). One of Fairtlough's constables, Cpl. Clements, had met "fifteen to twenty Sengalese soldiers "at Mendekelema in January 1896. In October 1896, "ten French soldiers" had been seen at Koundou, just north of the Moa near Mofindor.
438. See Note 115 above.
439. The evidence for this is based on the 1895 despatches of Cardew himself and other Government officials. See Notes 440-481 below, *passim*.
440. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. Cardew and his party travelled from Segbwena to "Yandahu". The first maps of the area show Yandahu as being on or near the site of present-day Daru, (see 1895 Map of Sierra Leone). There was another Yandahu in Wunde.
441. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. He first travelled to Vahun "with a view to moving as near as possible to our boundary with Liberia". In fact, Vahun, as well as Kailahun itself, was east of



Longitude 13 degrees West of Paris, which Cardew accepted at that stage as the boundary between Sierra Leone and Liberia. Thus Vahun was in Liberian territory.

442. Ibid. The nature of Cardew's opinions suggest that Momoh Bahomi and Mbawulomeh impressed him with the rightness of their own views in a way which Kailondo never managed to do.
443. Ibid. This was his conclusion after talking with Kailondo in Kailahun.
444. Ibid. He told them this when he met them at Yahun.
445. Ibid. Cardew noted about Mbawulomeh that the "Chiefs in this district with the exception of KAILUNDU have no objection to his return". The Governor proposed writing to the Liberian Government to see whether they had any objection to Mbawulomeh's return; and if not, he apparently intended to allow him to rebuild Ngiehun.
446. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.78-80 above.
447. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun.
448. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, Chap.XXIV, pp.252-264. Alldridge had immense difficulty in persuading the mahangesia to travel down to Badasuma in 1893 to meet Governor Fleming. Alldridge ascribed his difficulties to "Mori fetish workers". But in fact no mahej would easily leave his mahawui, or answer a summons from someone who was not clearly his superior. Even in the 1960s and 1970s, to have a Chief visit someone was a signal honour to the person visited.
449. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. It is quite likely that Kailondo was far from well. As early as 1893 he seems to have been ill (Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.254), and he died in either late 1895 or early 1896, less than a year after Cardew's 1895 visit.
450. The personal experience of the present European writer in the 1960s in Kailahun was that (in general) the local people were much more sensitive to 'attitude' and 'atmosphere' than would be the case with an ordinary group of people in rural England. This is quite unquantifiable, and such an evaluation is highly subjective; but such a factor should not be completely ignored just because it is so elusive.
451. CO267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun.
452. Alldridge, The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.165.
453. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.99-100 above. Unfortunately there is no record of how Alldridge explained to Kailondo (or to any other Mahej) the clauses of the Treaty. However, such passages as that on pp.176-177 of The Sherbro and its Hinterland suggest he emphasized that it was "a friendly treaty with the great English Queen".

454. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2 pp.119-120 above, for the behaviour of the constables. For the peremptory tone of some letters see, for example, SLGA, NADL (16.9.91-2.2.93), 563/1891: the NCO i/c Kailahun F.P. is to "tell KIELUNDU that the Governor forbids him rebuilding his fence".
455. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun. Cardew reported that Kailondo had been saying these things: the remarks of Kailondo were "brought to my notice", but he does not indicate by whom. Presumably it was by constables of the Frontier Police. There is the possibility that these constables were for their own ends, deliberately spreading false rumours and misreporting Kailondo's remarks. But these remarks of Kailondo fit in with other evidence of his attitude from the time of Cardew's visit onwards.
456. See C0267/409/Conf.45; Cardew; 9.6.94. This is a long despatch in which Cardew puts forward a scheme for Protectorate administration in many ways identical with that introduced in 1896. He even suggests a house tax to help pay for the cost of administering a Protectorate, as well as the building of a railway to Kailahun! In C0267/417/74; Cardew; 11.4.95, enc. Report on Frontier Police 1894, the protected area is divided into 4 police districts, with a company of Frontier Police established in a Headquarters town for each district. The company at Mongheri was soon to be moved to Panguma. By mid-1895, the Officer Commanding in each district was apparently already doing some of the work later undertaken by District Commissioners.
457. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun.
458. Kailondo could certainly have taken action against Kafula. Alldridge, Cardew and Tarbet all felt he had the power to defeat Kafula and keep his other enemies at bay. But, faithful to the terms of the Treaty, he apparently tried to avoid war as far as possible.
459. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun.
460. Puubleisia is def. plu. of puumoi (see Note 324 above).
461. C0267/427/Conf.61; Cardew; 14.12.96: "... rumours have reached me that some Chiefs are going to protest against the house-tax, but I attach but little weight to these rumours".
462. Fyfe, A History of Sierra Leone, p.605: "Cardew's five-year term expired towards the end of 1900 .... No post was vacant for a Governor so dangerously endowed. He retired into private life and died in 1921".
463. C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun.
464. C0267/417/Conf.26; Cardew; 16.4.95, enc. Report on Journey to Kanre Lahun.

465. See Chap. 4 of this thesis, pp.254-256 below, for details of the 1896 expedition against Mbawulomeh at Vahun, and the probable involvement of Kabba Sei.
466. C0267/417/Conf.26; Cardew; 16.4.95, enc. Report on Journey to Kanre Lahun. Kailondo again reported in May 1895 that Kabba Sei was one of the disturbers of the peace in the area, and the NCO in charge of the Frontier Police at Kailahun apparently agreed with him [ C0267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. M'Cauley, C.B. (L/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun ].
467. There is no record of any action having been taken. Possibly Fairtlough was sent to Kailahun partly in order to investigate Kailondo's complaints.
468. C0267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. Fairtlough, 30.5.95, Panguma. Captain Fairtlough was at this time o/c Frontier Police, Panguma.
469. Ibid.
470. Ibid.
471. It might just be possible to argue that Fairtlough was right; that Alldridge was completely mistaken about Kailondo, and that the ruler of Luawa was all the time wanting war for its own sake as a reckless aggressor. Cardew's 1895 despatch from Kailahun might add some further evidence to this hypothesis, which Abraham and Isaac in "A Further Note on the History of Luawa Chiefdom" go some way to accepting. Yet the weight of evidence strongly favours the interpretation given in this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, that Kailondo's policy was essentially constructive and pacific, and it seems the more natural interpretation.
472. C0267/418/Conf; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. Fairtlough, 30.5.95, Panguma.
473. In February 1895, just before Cardew arrived in Kailahun, Kailondo had been threatening to break his allegiance with the British. See C0267/417/61; Cardew; 1.3.95, from Kailahun.
474. C0267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc. M'Cauley, C.B. (L/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun. Considering its importance as evidence of a change in Kailondo's attitude, it is a pity that this report is so confused.
475. A "head of money" was not a fixed figure. It represented the amount of money paid for one slave - almost literally for 'one head' ! Alldridge noted in the Luawa area that one 'Kissi iron' was equal to one English penny, and a slave could be bought for 200 irons or seven country cloths (The Sherbro and its Hinterland, p.217). In this case, a 'head of money' would be roughly the equivalent of 25s. in English currency. On p.268 of the same book, Alldridge reported that a slave-trader had bought a man and a woman, each for eight pieces of cloth, "the value of a piece of such cloth being probably three shillings", so that one head of money was equal to about 24s. in English currency.

476. The context indicates this must be Kafula.
477. CO267/418/Conf.; Cardew; 26.6.95, enc., M'Cauley, C.B. (L/Cpl. i/c F.P. Kailahun), 26.5.95, Kailahun.
478. Ibid. This was on 22.5.95. M'Cauley reported that on 23 May the number of people was about 700. Next day, however, M'Cauley and Kailondo were together in Mofindor and drove them away from the area.
479. CO267/421/F.O., 5.9.95, min. by C.O. official. Cardew was on leave in England in July 1895, and attended a conference at the C.O. on the subject of Luawa and the Liberian border (CO267/422/ Individuals, Cardew; 24.7.95). It was presumably Cardew who noted that Kailondo "complains that he is betrayed + deserted + threatens to return his stipend + break off his allegiance to the British Govt." Earlier (CO267/417/Conf.40; Cardew; 13.5.95) Cardew had stated that "the partition of this country by an arbitrary line entails peculiar hardship on Chief Kai Lundu".
480. See This chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, p . 83 above.
481. Between 1890 and 1895, Kailondo seems to have reported, orally or by letter, every disturbance round his borders and each military campaign he was involved in (see Note 382 above). He clearly did not do this in late 1895, because J.C.E. Parkes wrote to Kailondo about news "having reached here that you have been fighting on the Liberian side of the country" [SLGA, NADL (11.5.95 - 11.6.96), 558/1895, Parkes, J.C.E., 1.11.95, to Chief Ki Lundu]. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.76, mistakenly notes that this letter was written in September 1895.
482. Kailondo instead sent Fabundeh to lead his forces. The present writer here presumes that the fighting noted by Parkes in Liberia (see Note 481 above) refers to Kailondo's same campaign as Rev. Clarke (Foundation of Luawa, pp.14-15) mentions as the "Jewehehu-goi (Liberia)". It is also presumed that the death of Kailondo occurred either late in 1895 or early in 1896. These assumptions are also made by Abraham, Traditional Leadership, pp.76-77.
483. 7 April 1895 is given as the date of Kailondo's death by Rev. Clarke in Foundation of Luawa, p.15. Mr. Gorvie also gives April 1895 (op. cit., p.47), and Dr. Wylie simply notes that Kailondo died sometime in 1895 ("Mende Cheiftaincy", p.307). Mr. Abraham (Traditional Leadership p.90, Note 44) reports that Mr. Hollins in "A Short History of Luawa Chiefdom" stated that Kailondo's death occurred on 11 April 1895, but the present writer could nowhere find this reference in Mr. Hollins' article. On p.20 Mr. Hollins noted: "In 1895, Kailundu died at Dukono".
484. Abraham, Traditional Leadership, p.90, Note 44, quoting NADL, 547/95, 227/95.
485. See this chapter of the thesis, Chap.2, pp.126-7 above.
486. Ibid., p. 127 above.

487. SLGA, NADL (11.5.95-11.5.96) 289/1895, from Parkes, J.C.E. (Supt. Dept. Native Affairs), 26.6.95, to Chief Ki Lundu; and 390/1895, from Parkes, 23.8.95, to Chief Ki Lundu.
488. Ibid., 558/1895, from Parkes, 1.11.95, to Chief Ki Lundu.
489. The relevant files are C0267/416-420 for 1895, and 424 for January to March 1896. The lack of reference to Kailondo and Luawa for a period of months, although this was one of the most powerful polities in the British sphere, illustrates the fragmentary nature of information on Luawa which is provided during this period in the British records.
490. C0267/424/Conf.19; Cardew; 10.3.96, from Kailahun.
491. Ibid.
492. All the written accounts suggest that the funeral ceremonies for Kailondo took place immediately after his death (Hollins, "Short History", p.20; Clarke, Foundation of Luawa, p.15; Combey MS, p.15). It is customary to soften the shock of a person's death by first announcing to unsuspecting relatives that he is 'very sick', but no attempt is made to maintain this fiction once the relative has known the truth.
493. Cardew does not state that he only heard of Kailondo's death when he arrived in Kailahun in March 1896, but in no earlier despatch does he mention the death. Cardew's despatch from Kailahun implies that Kailondo's death had not just occurred in the previous few days. Cardew therefore might well have been somewhat annoyed by the fact that no one had previously informed him of Kailondo's death.
494. The fact that he entered into the Jewelehu War in late 1895 is a fair indication of Kailondo's continuing sense of his own military adequacy and ability to control his own subjects. If he had felt militarily weak or unsure of his own position within Luawa at this stage, he would hardly have entered into war at a time when there were several possible aggressors on his borders, and when he may have been on the point of repudiating his agreement with the British who had become his main allies.
495. Cardew and the London Colonial Office were in some ways more sympathetic to Kailondo's problems than Kailondo could have gathered from the interviews with Cardew during the latter's 1895 visit to Kailahun. A C.O. official, presumably briefed by Cardew, minuted in September 1895 that Kailondo was "very naturally utterly unable to comprehend how his territory can be divided between G. Britain + Liberia" (C0267/421/F.O.; 5.9.95, min.).