# The Governance of Natural Resource Management in Zimbabwe: Unravelling the Relationships between Conservation and Development

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# Abstract

Zimbabwe's national community-based natural resource management initiative, the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), is a multi-level programme implemented in a complex system. CAMPFIRE aimed to change the governance of wildlife, seeking to integrate local communities into the wildlife and natural resource management governance system.

This thesis aims to advance understanding of CAMPFIRE's impacts and outcomes through a multilevel assessment of its governing processes and structures. The thesis uses data collected through multiple qualitative methods from four study villages to assess the rural livelihood impacts of the programme and to document the local governance structure that has evolved around CAMPFIRE projects. It then places these sub-national assessments within the national governing context in which CAMPFIRE operates. In bringing together the concepts of environmental entitlements and sustainable livelihoods, with a qualitative research approach, this thesis provides unique insights into the conceptual underpinnings and practical implementations of Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM). Produced through thematic and content coding analysis, the findings from CAMPFIRE are relevant to other natural resource management initiatives based on the community-based approach.

The findings point to a deep set lack of good governance within the Zimbabwean natural resource management system which renders devolutionary programmes inappropriate to context. For devolutionary programmes to function in such a system, this thesis argues that there needs to be a transformation in the governance of natural resource management away from the expected supplied devolution to demanded devolution. This requires more focus on rural socio-economic and political development to achieve a suitable level of capacity for conservation to be successfully adopted. The thesis puts forward recommendations on how this transformation of governance can be achieved and the role CBNRM projects can play in this. Lessons can be learnt for enhancing the participatory natural resource management movement in practice.

# Table of Contents

# List of Tables

# List of Figures

# List of Abbreviations

| | |
|---|---|
| AA | Appropriate Authority |
| ADMADE | Administrative Management Design |
| CAMPFIRE | Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources |
| CASS | Centre for Applied Social Sciences |
| CBC | Community-Based Conservation |
| CBNRM | Community-Based Natural Resource Management |
| CBPES | Community-Based Payment for Ecosystem Services |
| CCD | Climate Compatible Development |
| CCG | CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group |
| CITES | Convention for the Illegal Trade of Endangered Species |
| DNPWM | Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management |
| EEF | Environmental Entitlements Framework |
| EMA | Environmental Management Act |
| ES | Ecosystem Services |
| ESAP | Economic Structural Adjustment Programme |
| ESC | Environmental Sub-Committees |
| FAO | Food and Agricultural Organisation |
| FTLRP | Fast Track Land Reform Programme |
| FZS | Frankfurt Zoological Society |
| GLG | Good Local Governance |
| GLTFA | Great Limpopo Transfrontier Area |
| GMA | Game Management Areas |
| JFM | Joint Forest Management |
| LEAP | Local Environmental Action Plans |
| MEWC | Ministry of Environment, Water, and Climate |
| MTP | Medium Term Plan |
| NGO | Non-Governmental Organisation |
| NTFP | Non-Timber Forest Product |
| PES | Payment for Ecosystem Services |

| | |
|---|---|
| PLAAS | Institute of Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies |
| PWMA | Parks and Wildlife Management Agency |
| RDC | Rural District Councils |
| REDD+ | Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation |
| SLEEF | Sustainable Livelihoods and Environmental Entitlements Framework |
| SLF | Sustainable Livelihoods Framework |
| TFCA | Transfrontier Conservation Area |
| UDI | Unilaterally Declared Independence |
| UNCHE | United Nations Conference on the Human Environment |
| UNDP | United Nations Development Programme |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| USFWS | United States Fish and Wildlife Service |
| VIDCO | Village Development Committee |
| VSO | Voluntary Services Overseas |
| WADCO | Ward Development Committee |
| WFP | World Food Programme |
| WILD | Wildlife Integration for Livelihood Diversification |
| WINDFALL | Wildlife Industries New Development for All |
| WWF | World Wildlife Fund |
| ZANU-PF | Zimbabwe African National Union - Patriotic Front |

# Chapter 1:   Introduction

## 1.1     Introduction to Chapter 1

This thesis provides a detailed multi-level governance assessment of participatory natural resource management in Zimbabwe. It does so by bringing together the concepts of environmental entitlements and sustainable livelihoods, along with their respective frameworks, with a qualitative research approach that appreciates the multi-level, complex nature of the governance context. The thesis provides unique insights into the conceptual underpinnings and practical implementations of participatory and community-based, natural resource management. This chapter outlines the research problem and situates the thesis in broader conservation, natural resource management, and participatory debates. It also outlines the specific aim and objectives of the thesis, before explaining the importance of the research and its ultimate contributions to academic and practical debates.

## 1.2     Research Problem

After thirty years as the dominant conservation regime in southern Africa, Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is being advanced by updated natural resource management initiatives. These newer initiatives are more aligned to the globalisation of environmental issues such as climate change, neoliberal and market-based approaches to mitigation, and perceived benefits of transboundary movements, such as Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) and Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) (Dressler et al., 2010). PES and TFCAs are viewed as the next generation of CBNRM, especially in the context of Armitage (2005)'s overall description of CBNRM as any intervention that addresses conservation and social or development goals, engages local communities as active stakeholders, and devolves control over natural resources.

PES has been advocated strongly throughout the 2000s as an effective means of conservation through sustainable commercial use of natural resources, especially in the context of climate change mitigation (Dressler et al., 2010; Frost and Bond, 2008). The project level of PES is, as with CBNRM, focussed on the local, where communities work

to sustainably manage the natural resources and who receive financial payments from the revenue generated by these natural resources (Bond et al., 2010). Communities are placed at the centre of the approach and play a fundamental role (Leventon et al., 2014). Many PES initiatives have explicitly used principles of CBNRM (Frost and Bond, 2008).

Many have argued that TFCA and PES should learn from the depth and history of CBNRM experiences in southern Africa given that the approaches all adopt similar community empowerment guiding principles. Roe and Nelson (2009) and Gomera et al. (2010) state that lessons from such participatory natural resource management can be vital for the emerging PES discourse, and that the issues being faced by CBNRM in southern Africa over the last few decades can be of use to numerous PES initiatives pending implementation in the region. Factors such as the level of community involvement, sustainable use of natural resources, and the impact of such processes on local people are pertinent to both CBNRM and PES.

However, it is the contention of this thesis that CBNRM in southern Africa, and Zimbabwe in particular, is still not properly understood. Little variety of case study research analyses exist, especially in terms of those conducted recently, to provide in-depth, contemporary knowledge of how CBNRM is conceptualised and implemented, and of its impacts, in reality. This is particularly true of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), the flagship CBNRM initiative in the region. Many studies focus on the two most famous cases of CAMPFIRE – Masoka and Mahenye (Alexander and McGregor, 2000; Matzke and Nabane, 1996; Murombedzi, 1997) and even then only on specific elements of each project.

A major ongoing criticism has been the disconnect between CAMPFIRE policy (what is planned on paper) and CAMPFIRE practice (what actually occurs in implementation) with little understanding of why this disconnect occurs (Dressler et al., 2010; Kellert et al., 2000; Leach et al., 1999). Additionally, multiple specific weaknesses in project implementation and their subsequent outcomes have been commonly stated in the literature on CAMPFIRE (Balint and Mashinya, 2008a; Child, 1996a; Conyers, 2002; Dressler et al., 2010; Dzingirai, 2014; Frost and Bond, 2008; Jones, 2009; Mandondo, 2000). However, these statements are usually made with virtually no complementary,

in-depth investigation into the reasons for these issues. For example, critics have noted the lack of participation, empowerment, and practical emphasis on the role of local communities in the management of the local natural resource base (Dressler et al., 2010). Others have noted the oversimplification of complex local systems in project design and implementation (Measham and Lumbasi, 2013), and a lack of consideration of the complexity and diversity of people, interests and needs at the local level (Armitage, 2005; Ribot, 2003). Yet, despite acknowledging these shortcomings, no studies have taken the investigations to the depths required to fully understand the causes of the shortcomings and thus what is required to overcome the shortcomings in impact and outcome.

These missing factors are frequently shown to be imperative for the successful engagement of local communities, and thus, for the sustainable management of natural resources (Armitage, 2005; Ribot, 2003; Shackleton and Campbell, 2001). Furthermore, decentralisation of both the management and benefits of CAMPFIRE in practice through project implementation has caused significant controversy and complications. Yet, decentralisation has continued to be put forward as a way of overcoming some of CAMPFIRE's ongoing issues, with seemingly limited understanding of why these issues are occurring in the first place and what actually needs to be done to resolve them (Blaikie, 2006; Mapedza and Bond, 2006; Murphree, 2005).

Before learning lessons from CAMPFIRE for future CBNRM and PES projects, it is necessary to first fully understand the strengths and weaknesses of CAMPFIRE itself. There are four noticeable and highly interrelated gaps in this understanding:

1. The level of progress CAMPFIRE has made against its specified social aims,
2. The voices and perspectives of the local people partaking in these processes,
3. A comprehensive and holistic multi-level approach to analysing CAMPFIRE, and
4. Appreciation of the governing context in which CAMPFIRE operates.

Filling these gaps using the analyses presented in this thesis will help to unravel and understand *why* CBNRM has the impacts it has, rather than just what the impacts and outputs can be.

## 1.3    Aim and Objectives

The aim of this study is to advance understanding of and provide explanations for CAMPFIRE's impacts and outcomes, achieved through a multi-level assessment of CAMPFIRE's governing processes and structures, and CAMPFIRE's subsequent impacts on household livelihoods.

To achieve this aim, the research has three main objectives, which are further broken down into specific research goals:

**Objective 1**: Assess CAMPFIRE against its objective of promoting rural livelihoods, from the perspective of the local people involved in these projects:

> 1a.  Identify key household livelihood activities in selected CAMPFIRE communities,
>
> 1b.  Analyse different household livelihood capitals to identify key livelihood assets and their use,
>
> 1c. Identify and explain household access to, and command over, the key natural resources used by local households.

**Objective 2**: Unravel the multi-level, multi-stakeholder governance structure of CAMPFIRE projects:

> 2a. Outline and explain the processes and structures, and the local perspectives on these processes and structures, within the sub-district natural resource management governance system,
>
> 2b. Critically evaluate these sub-district natural resource management systems against internationally recognised principles for good local governance.

**Objective 3**: Identify the national governing context in which CAMPFIRE operates and the influences this has on the design, implementation, and management of the programme:

> 3a. Identify the key themes that typify a CAMPFIRE project,

3b. Assess how these align with the principles of good governance,

3c. Analyse the influences of the wider multi-level multi-stakeholder governing system on CAMPFIRE overall.

## 1.4 Thesis Contributions

In addressing this aim and objectives, this research contributes to both debates on applied CBNRM project planning and implementation, and to the academic discourse surrounding participatory natural resource management and its evolution in debates around PES.

In terms of applied contributions, the research overall provides constructive and applicable options on how to progress CBNRM in southern Africa to overcome inherent weaknesses highlighted within the CAMPFIRE case study. It focuses on understanding *why* CAMPFIRE has experienced the outcomes and impacts identified throughout its history, thus taking a step away from the more evaluative approach of the past studies. Whereas previous studies have provided a large evidence base of what CAMPFIRE impacts and outcomes have been at specific levels, none have delved further to understand *why* such project impacts and outcomes have occurred, and how the phenomena at specific levels interlink into the wider governance system.

By linking locally applied project level analysis with the multi-level, multi-actor system at play, the findings presented here create a more in-depth understanding of the programme's strengths and weaknesses as well as the root causes of these. Understanding these underlying factors means solutions can be more easily identified, dealing with the initial causes rather than the symptoms. The multi-level contextual understanding also provides future projects with the opportunity to be designed and implemented with the wider context in mind.

As well as looking across levels, the thesis has also ensured the inclusion and the provision of a central space for local voices and perceptions into the evidence base. These voices and perceptions were used to drive the findings and thus continually ground the discussion in the local level applied reality. Understanding community perspectives and roles in the sub-district governance system for natural resource

management is imperative for gaining a realistic and grounded view of project impacts and outcomes, especially from frequently marginalised communities whose voices are usually not listened to (Jones, 2004; Nsingo and Kuye, 2005).

In terms of academic contributions, the novel use of an adapted sustainable livelihood and entitlement framework (SLEEF) brings both depth and breadth in the linking of livelihoods to the wider influencing processes and context. It facilitates a more comprehensive focus on the *why* of household level activities while also placing significant emphasis on the interlinking factors that lead to the various impacts and outcomes, transcending scales and governance levels. This detailed analysis is not possible using either of the frameworks separately. De Haan and Zoomers (2005) state that "although transforming structures, mediating processes, institutions and organisations appear in all livelihood frameworks, there is a tendency within livelihood studies to downplay these structural features and to focus on capitals and activities" (p.33). By bringing these two frameworks together, this research avoids downplaying the important structural and wider influencing factors.

The thesis also brings CBNRM and participatory natural resource management into the good governance debate, which underlies a significant amount of conservation and development thinking, yet is not considered explicitly in methods of understanding these projects or relevant processes. The findings also contribute to the conservation-development discourse, in terms of providing novel qualitative case study based evidence that supports the rising 'critical discourse'. This encourages the need for an increase in rights based perspectives in community-based conservation approaches.

Finally, with the stalling of research in Zimbabwe through the political-economic crisis of the early 2000s, there are few academic analyses about the modern system, and thus minimal understanding of how further decentralisation could or should take place. Existing analyses have also failed to establish why recent attempts at decentralisation have not garnered the results expected in terms of local community participation and empowerment. While decentralisation is still put forward as one of the cornerstones of a participatory natural resource management approach, it is important to understand

why the previous attempts have not resulted in the anticipated positive results for both the programme itself and impacts on the ground.

## 1.5 Outline of Thesis Structure

This thesis is divided into eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 provides background context to the research problem and a critical literature review of the key concepts pertinent to this research. It further outlines and provides justification for the main conceptual theories and frameworks that will be drawn upon throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 explains the research design and methods used, starting with explaining why and how the chosen conceptual theories and frameworks are used, followed by detailed information on the choice of CAMPFIRE village case studies and relevant background information on each. A brief summary of the research methods used for each specific objective is also provided at the start of the respective results chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6).

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 are the empirical results chapters that deal with each of the three research objectives respectively. Chapter 4 focuses on Objective 1 and assesses CAMPFIRE against its objectives of promoting rural livelihoods. It does so from the perspective of the local people involved in the projects in the four case study villages, utilising an adapted Sustainable Livelihood and Environmental Entitlements Framework (SLEEF) to understand household livelihood activities, livelihood capitals, and household entitlements to key natural resources. Chapter 5 focuses on Objective 2. It considers the complexity of the sub-district governance system in attempting to understand some of the wider processes influencing the impact of CAMPFIRE on local livelihoods. It does so through utilising local people's understanding of the governing structures and processes to determine the extent of good local governance. It also examines the ongoing influence these structures and processes have had on essential aspects of CAMPFIRE, such as participation and representation. Chapter 6 focuses on Objective 3 and takes the analysis of CAMPFIRE to a broader scale and the wider context of Zimbabwe's national natural resource management governance system through an exploration into how the structures, processes, rules and traditions interact within this wider system.

Chapter 7 brings together the findings from the previous three results chapters and highlights the new understanding they have generated about the impacts of CAMPFIRE. It also provides explanations for these impacts. Through the development of this deeper, multi-level understanding of the CAMPFIRE governance process, key lessons and options are put forward suggesting what is needed in order to learn from and progress the participatory natural resource management regime in Zimbabwe. The generalisability of these recommendations to the wider southern African region is also discussed, especially in terms of implications for PES and TFCA. In discussing the relevance of the research findings and how each objective has been met, this chapter also highlights and summarises the contribution of this thesis to both the applied and academic debates about CBNRM. Chapter 8 provides a summary of the main conclusions and contributions of the research, as well as putting forward suggestions for future research.

## 1.6    Summary of Chapter 1

This chapter has outlined the research problem upon which this thesis focuses and has provided justification for its importance. It has set out the research aim and objectives, as well as the structure of the overall thesis.

## Chapter 2:   Literature Review

## 2.1     Introduction to Chapter 2

This chapter begins by discussing the evolution of the conservation paradigm in general and provides a history of the conservation movement in Zimbabwe. It then critically examines the key practical and conceptual issues with CBNRM and CAMPFIRE highlighted in the literature which are pertinent to understanding the complexities of the research, and which informed the research aim and objectives. It provides an overview of the theoretical frameworks used in this thesis and finishes by outlining the justifications for the research being undertaken.

## 2.2     Evolution of the Conservation Paradigm

### 2.2.1      From 'fortress' to community-based conservation

The historical paradigm of 'fortress conservation', also known as the protectionist regime or fence-and-fine approach, was a colonial and neo-colonial construct popularly used across Africa in the early to mid-twentieth century, and in some cases is still being used today (Derman, 1995; Hulme and Murphree, 1999; Roe and Nelson, 2009). The underlying belief of the protectionist regime was that in order to preserve the environment and its resources, it should be kept separate from human activity (Cox et al., 2010). This approach resulted in the creation of national parks and protected areas kept strictly separate from the local communities and other human activity.

With the independence of many African countries in the middle of the twentieth century, and the simultaneous shift by many towards the recognition that people and nature could, and needed to, live together to survive, the weaknesses and criticisms of protectionist conservation began to emerge (Derman, 1995). In many respects, the promulgation of the 'Sustainable Development' concept following the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE) held in Stockholm in 1972 generated this paradigm shift in conservation thinking towards one that appreciated the interconnectedness of human development and nature conservation (Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Leach et al., 1999; Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014), at least theoretically.

This realisation of the linkages between people and nature took the form of two strands. First, there was a moral awakening and the realisation of the need to rectify the past colonial injustices that had occurred through the era of 'fortress conservation' when nature and people were separated (Dressler et al., 2010; Hulme and Murphree, 1999). Rural indigenous communities who had traditionally managed and lived with their surrounding ecosystems were, in most cases, restricted from accessing vital resources by the colonial powers. Especially in the case of wildlife, the resources were instead available for colonial trophy hunting on private reserves and yet hunting for food was illegal on communal lands. Thus 'conservation' came to symbolise a 'white man's luxury' (Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014). This separation has contributed to the poverty and struggles for survival commonly associated with many of the rural natural-resource dependent communities (Derman, 1995; Ludwig, 2001).

Second, the important role played by local communities in conservation efforts was formally recognised in the mainstreaming of the 'subsidiarity principle' (that social problems should be dealt with at the most immediate (or local) level consistent with their solution) in Principles 10 and 22 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development that emerged from the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in 1992 (United Nations, 1992).  Thus in the case of natural resources, the subsidiarity principle holds that they are best managed by those who use the resources in question for their everyday survival (Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Armitage, 2005; Larson and Ribot, 2005; Ribot, 2003; Turner, 2004).

Local communities are argued to play an important role in two respects. Cleaver (1999) distinguishes between the 'efficiency' argument and the 'equity and empowerment' argument. The efficiency argument, which sees participation as a means to an end, is that through the participation of local people in natural resource management and conservation, they will provide local technical and environmental knowledge, including about the values and local needs that will better inform the policy and decision making processes (Hulme and Murphree, 1999). Additionally, community participation contributes local understandings of which social benefits are more suitable for the livelihood and local context. This contribution to the policy and/or decision making

process is argued by proponents to thus achieve better policy outcomes (Berkes, 2004; Blom et al., 2010; Duffy, 2009; Koch, 2004).

The equity and empowerment argument takes participation to be an end in itself, enhancing the capacity of those participating and encouraging social change. This then contributes to the ability of local communities to successfully undertake management and decision-making responsibilities, and aligns closely with Fiorino (1990)'s normative description of participation being about democratic values. The empowerment and equity encouraged through participation is also argued to increase the support of local people to the project, reducing the risk of anti-project behaviour that could undermine the outcomes (Blom et al., 2010; Dressler et al., 2010; Roe and Nelson, 2009; Sunderlin and Atmadja, 2009). Local communities are the traditional custodians and main users of their local natural resources. As such, they are in a key position to undo any conservation efforts by undermining any processes put in place i.e. by using the resources in a way which prevents their wider conservation. There are also important arguments to be made on why local people may not want to participate at all including participation fatigue, previous bad experiences, and conflicts with social norms (Botes and van Rensburg, 2000; Cleaver, 1999).

From this shift in perceptions towards the role and capacities of local communities rose the counter-narrative of 'new conservation' (Hulme and Murphree, 1999) and concept of community-based conservation (CBC) (Adams and Hulme, 2001b). This new conservation advocates the shifting of conservation away from state-centrism to local society, but also involves an increased role of the market, and 'redefines the content of conservation itself' from preservation to the notion of sustainable use (Virtanen, 2003, p.278). Adams and Hulme (2001a) refer to this new conceptualisation of conservation approaches as 'community conservation' which encompasses, "those principles and practices that argue that conservation goals should be pursued by strategies that emphasise the role of local residents in decision-making about natural resources" (p.13). The new conservation approach consists of two elements: first, local participation in the management of the conservation of resources, and second, the linking of conservation objectives with local development needs, along the lines of what is referred to as economic instrumentalism (Virtanen, 2003, p.181).

Over time there has been a proliferation of a number of strands of CBC, each with varying degrees of community involvement, control, and thus outcomes. These include approaches known as 'integrated conservation and development projects', 'social and community forestry', 'community wildlife management', 'cooperative or co-management', 'buffer zone management', 'participatory multipurpose community projects', 'community-based natural resource management', and 'gestion de terriors' amongst others (Adams and Hulme, 2001a; Batterbury, 1998; Brosius et al., 1998; Kellert et al., 2000; Roe and Jack, 2001).

Adams and Hulme (2001b) present a continuum of different community-based conservation approaches. An adapted version of this can be seen in Figure 2-1. At one end of the continuum they place 'Protected Area Outreach' where the focus is mostly on conservation and only lip service is paid to community involvement. At the other end they place CBNRM which aims to achieve rural development through the use of natural resources in unprotected areas (p.5). This continuum is combined with Hulme and Murphree (1999)'s distinction that at the Protected Area Outreach end communities are not the proprietors of the conservation programme or of the natural resources under conservation. Instead they are seen as 'good neighbours' and are supported by 'conservation fundamentalists' who argue that utilisation must not threaten any species' existence. At the CBNRM end, however, there is a "radical conceptualisation of a totally community-centred approach to conservation which transfers all management responsibilities and full property rights over natural resources to communities at the local level" (p.278). This works on the principles of 'sustainable utilisation' and 'use it or lose it' which are both driven by neoliberal economic thinking (see also Jones, 2004). This continuum has been adapted into Figure 2-1. Discussion on the integration of conservation and development is expanded upon in Section 2.3 .

| Initiatives to support national parks and conservation objectives (after the establishment of the parks to solve long standing disputes). For example, Protected Area Outreach. | Collaborative management between state and local communities (and sometimes private). Many forms that include eclectic and evolving characteristics of pluralism, partnerships etc. | Achieve rural development through use of wildlife/natural resources in unprotected areas. For example, CBNRM. |
|---|---|---|

CONSERVATION FOCUS                                                                                    LOCAL DEVELOPMENT FOCUS

Figure 2-1: **Community conservation continuum (adapted from Adam and Hulme, 2001b)**

## 2.2.2    Community-based natural resource management

One way in which conservation and local development have been reconciled is through a range of approaches under the umbrella of CBNRM. This range of approaches has contributed to the difficulties in fully understanding what CBNRM is, how it operates, and thus lessons to be learned (Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Blaikie, 2006; Kellert et al., 2000). Rather than being seen as two separate processes that frequently clash with each other, CBNRM tries to see environmental protection and socio-economic development as interlinked processes that can have synergistic benefits for each other if undertaken in a suitable way (Brosius et al., 1998). While there is no consensus on a single definition of CBNRM there is a general agreement on its fundamental and underlying principles (Armitage, 2005; Brosius et al., 1998; Mearns et al., 2000; Measham and Lumbasi, 2013). As Kellert et al. (2000) explain, despite the differences between the various manifestations of CBNRM, they all share certain characteristics (p.706):

- A commitment to involve community members and local institutions in the management and conservation of natural resources;
- An interest in devolving power and authority from central state government to more local and often indigenous institutions and peoples;
- A desire to link and reconcile the objectives of socio-economic development and environmental conservation and protection;
- A tendency to defend and legitimise local and/or indigenous resource and property rights;

- A belief in the desirability of including traditional values and ecological knowledge in modern resource management.

There is no single approach to designing or implementing CBNRM programmes. Conceptually, the CBNRM approach is based on the argument that through the integral involvement of local communities in the management of natural resources, as well as appreciation of their knowledge and needs, more equitable and sustainable resource management practices and outcomes will occur (Armitage, 2005; Berkes, 2004; Turner, 2004). The focus, therefore, is on devolution to local communities of rights over use, management, and decision making, as well as the factors necessary for the capacity to utilise these rights, and on providing economic incentives for sustainable use (Measham and Lumbasi, 2013; Roe and Nelson, 2009). The approach is typically linked to the concepts of 'collective proprietorship' and 'common property regimes', whereby groups of local people jointly manage the process with joint rights, and the ability to make their own rules and sanctions over natural resources and natural resource use (Brosius et al., 1998; Jones, 2004; Measham and Lumbasi, 2013; Roe and Nelson, 2009). Thus, they collectively manage natural resources within a defined jurisdiction.

CBNRM is also founded upon the idea of creating an economic value for certain natural resources that enhances the desire to conserve them, and with financial benefits from their sustainable use flowing to local communities who, being on the frontline, are those who are doing the conserving. However, linking these two areas together within CBNRM creates a complex system that Jones (2009) refers to as a 'wicked problem' – unable to separate the practical process from issues of 'value, equity, and social justice', further complicating not only implementation but also any attempts to monitor and evaluate the projects.

### 2.2.3    Payment for ecosystem services and looking forward

In the last ten to fifteen years, driven in large part by the increase in importance of climate change mitigation and the focus on neoliberalisation within a more globalised world, efforts towards conservation that aligns environmental protection and socio-economic development have begun to build upon the concept of CBNRM (Child and Barnes, 2010). These more modern approaches more explicitly commodify natural

resources (and neoliberalisation) and have shifted the focus to managing the environment through more global and direct payment for ecosystem services (PES) systems.

Furthermore, the ongoing shift in international policy towards climate change mitigation has increased emphasis on natural resource management for terrestrial carbon storage (Dougill et al., 2012). With the realisation in southern Africa of a) the value of carbon stocks in drylands, and b) the availability of money for participating countries in carbon schemes, a 'new generation' of participatory natural resource management initiatives has emerged (Stringer et al., 2012). These have been largely focused upon the forestry and land use sectors with initiatives such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), Community-Based Payment for Ecosystem Services (CBPES), and Joint Forest Management (JFM) to name just a few. The potential for this new generation of participatory natural resource management initiatives to learn from the extensive experiences of many African countries' sub-national CBNRM programmes has been widely purported over the last decade (e.g. Roe and Nelson, 2009).

The PES approach has become an 'investment-' or 'market'-based instrument for environmental policy (Jack et al., 2008). Its underlying principles stem from neoclassical economics which claims that markets will lead to the most efficient allocation of resources (Gomez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; McAfee, 1999). Its most popular definition is that given by Wunder (2005) who establishes five criteria to describe the PES principle (p.3, italics in original):

1. A *voluntary* transaction where
2. A *well-defined* ES [ecosystem service] (or a land use likely to secure that service)
3. Is being 'bought' by a (minimum one) ES *buyer*
4. From a (minimum one) ES *provider*
5. If and only if the ES provider secures ES provision (*conditionality*).

Neoclassical environmental economics views state that environmental degradation is caused by "the chronic failure of markets to internalise environmental externalities and the free-riding induced by the public good nature of ES" (Van Hecken and Bastiaensen, 2010, p.785). Therefore, the idea behind PES is that if the right incentives are given,

natural resource managers (from subsistence farmers to commercial logging companies) will conserve rather than use the natural resources under their custody. The approach works in theory to change incentives rather than to enforce rules (Jack et al., 2008). As noted by Roe and Nelson (2009) in the context of forest conservation, "for such interventions to effectively reverse deforestation trends they will need to create incentives at the local level for communities to invest in forest conservation" (p.12).

The concepts of REDD+, CBPES and JFM are just some of the more popular labels given to a variety of projects implemented within this the 'new generation' of CBNRM projects (Dougill et al., 2012). Influenced by the increased emphasis on participatory and community-based processes in the wider development discourse, and further encouraged by the recent establishment of the Climate Compatible Development (CCD) discourse, these projects are encouraged to learn from and adopt principles and ideas from the region's past extensive experiences with CBNRM concept (Child and Barnes, 2010; Gomera et al., 2010; Roe and Nelson, 2009).

## 2.3    The Conservation-Development Discourse

While the historical evolution of the conservation-development discourse can be synthesised into the three distinct paradigms discussed above, the reality is far more complex (Hutton et al., 2005). The contemporary conservation-development discourse consists of varied combinations of all three ways of thinking, as well as two major strands of counter-arguments towards joint conservation and development approaches (Adams and Hulme, 2001b). The first of these counter-arguments is known as 'back to the barriers' (Hutton et al., 2005) which finds community-based approaches have failed to reach their conservation aims and advocates a strict return to protectionist conservation methods. The second is known as 'critical discourse' (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010) which finds community-based approaches have failed for development and poverty alleviation, and advocates for the approaches to more strongly implement social justice, material well-being, and environmental integrity (Dressler et al., 2010). The conservation-development discourse is thus plagued with conflicts and disconnects that arise from the multitude of perspectives, approaches and values imbued in each paradigm and argument. For example, while overall discussions are driven strongly by community-based ideals, evidence suggests a dominance of fortress conservation and

the back to the barriers movement, despite community-based proponents' best efforts (Büscher and Dietz, 2005). Even during the period considered to be the apex of community-based conservation, Murphree (2000) stated that CBNRM (as a form of community-based conservation) had "not been tried and found wanting but been found difficult and rarely tried" (p.12). This is also supported by Hughes and Flintan (2001). Büscher and Dietz (2005) have since asked if there has ever been an actual shift to community-based conservation in externally driven projects, beyond the talk. Thus, the dominance of any of the paradigms at any given time or place is driven by multiple factors and influences, the explorations of which are integral to not only understanding the complexity of the discourse itself and thus the context in which this thesis is placed, but also how the thesis findings contribute to unravelling and resolving this complexity.

The disconnect between what is dominantly discussed and what is implemented is a major and fundamental issue in the conservation and development discourse. This disconnect is driven largely by numerous conflicts within the discourse, including between quantitative and qualitative science and the understandings of situations these produce, between the ways in which scientific data are and should be used, between the arenas of conservation and development themselves and the increasing argument for their decoupling, and between different ways and scales of governing (Adams and Hutton, 2007). These are now discussed in more detail.

The conflict between quantitative and qualitative science is essentially a conflict between different ways of knowing and understanding, in other words, different ontological and epistemological perspectives (Raymond et al., 2010). Quantitative science, usually considered synonymously to natural sciences such as biology and ecology in the conservation-development discourse, has historically been seen as the 'real science'. This perception still dominates a lot of conservation thinking today (Adams and Sandbrook, 2013; Hughes and Flintan, 2001; Hutton et al., 2005; Raymond et al., 2010). It is seen as reliable, viable and trustworthy, and overrides other types of knowledge through the power that this perception brings. However, it is also criticised for being reductionist, linear, and technical (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Adams and Sandbrook, 2013; Newmark and Hough, 2000), which does not match onto the dynamic and messy reality usually in play, reducing the complexity for easy understanding and

problem solving. It is increasingly argued that policy interventions from decisions based on this type of information and understanding are unlikely to be followed through to tangible successful outcomes, as policy making is far more complex and political (Adams and Sandbrook, 2013).

Qualitative science, usually considered synonymously to social science such as development studies and anthropology, has historically been seen as unscientific. This holds especially when related to the inclusion of indigenous knowledge and the concept of social construction despite the perception of something as 'good science' is in itself a social construction (Adams and Sandbrook, 2013).

The issue of this conflict in the conservation-development discourse is reflected in the clear divide between protectionist forms of conservation (including the back to the barriers movement) driven mostly by quantitative natural science, and community-based conservation approaches (including the critical discourse) driven mostly by qualitative social science. The longer history of quantitative science and its production of more simplified outcomes has enabled it to remain the dominant way of knowing in the conservation-development discourse, catalysed in part by the globalisation of the discourse itself and the quantitative emphasis of the main global actors (Adams and Hutton, 2007). Its dominance is indicative of a lack of successful 'knowledge integration' which could have more fruitfully brought together the conservation and development arenas (Raymond et al., 2010). Instead, social science driven theories and understandings behind community-based conservation have led to it being described as an "abandonment of clear scientific analysis in favour of 'unscientific post-modernist influences" (Attwell and Cotterill 2000 in Hutton et al., 2005, p.348). There is little communication or cooperation between the two ways of knowing, and the continuing dominance of the former has intensified the conflict, both in discussions as well as between conservation and development impacts and outcomes on the ground. Adams and Hutton (2007) explicitly state that there is a "disciplinary gulf between natural science trained conservation planners and social science trained conservation critics" (p.148). Increasingly, the weaknesses of quantitative science and the strengths of qualitative science are being recognised and discussed. Yet, the former still dominates with little practical space for including knowledge that is politicised and unravelling of

the social aspects of the situation (Virtanen, 2003). Many of the global debates about conservation and development are driven by powerful international organisations (i.e. WWF, UN) which in turn are driven by this narrow focus on one scientific way of knowing, reducing the complexity and uncertainty for easy understanding and problem solving. Critics of this approach argue that this "runs this risk of disguising the politics of decision making in a fog of apparently technical issues" (Adams and Sandbrook, 2013, p.332; also Newmark and Hough, 2000).

Buscher (2010) in Evans and Adams (2016) relate this to anti-politics which provide technical solutions to problems that are fundamentally political as a necessity to 'make things happen' (p.216). Büscher and Dietz (2005) relate this to Integrated Conservation and Development Programmes (ICDPs), designed and implemented as a form of community-based conservation, and suggest that "ICDPs have overtly technical design and emphasis on sustainable use not realistic in a context that is incredibly political and managerial" (p.4). Dressler et al. (2010) also argue along these technical lines about the implementation of CBNRM (again as a form of community-based conservation), stating that "while CBNRM may be treated as a technical problem-solving exercise, namely how to conserve wildlife/habitat in rural landscapes, it must also be analysed critically in order to understand what happens to these well laid plans and good intentions in practice" (p.6). Dressler et al. (2010) are here implying the need for more contextual and political assessments of the conservation-development policies and practices.

Proponents of social science thus advocate for a more political and social understanding of the context in which the conservation-development discourse is operating as well as for better appreciating and understanding the complexities of the on-the-ground realities. Qualitative research allows power and knowledge to be more easily examined, and the need for more social science based work to understand conservation as a social and political process has been recognised but rarely actioned (Adams and Hutton, 2007). Instead, complex context-specific situations and processes are reduced to technical exercises with specific expected outcomes. Even those concerted efforts to bring together conservation and development with social and environmental justice at the centre, get caught up in "bureaucratic entanglements, discourses, and local complexities (Quarles van Ufford et al 2003)" (Dressler et al., 2010, p.12). It is this entanglement that

qualitative social science can unravel and thus better resolve. However, there is a paucity of case studies within the conservation-development discourse that include multiple stakeholder views, perceptions, and research approaches. This thesis is in a prime position to contribute to this gap through its qualitative, local case study approach.

Globalisation and the increase in the amount of external influences on state based conservation projects has changed the power dynamics of conservation and development overall. Globalisation and the governance shift - from centralised government to decentralised governance that took place during the latter part of the twentieth century – has moved power upwards in the conservation arena especially with the prominence of biodiversity protection in global agreements and international commitments (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Virtanen, 2003). Dressler et al. (2010) think that in the 1980s and 1990s there was a "scaling up, institutionalising, and merging of community and conservation concerns in a political-administrative framework that some consider a 'global biodiversity conservation regime' i.e. the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 1992" (p.7). Global actors (i.e. by international conservation NGOs) have subsequently become more powerful than the state and national level non-state actors in many cases, with their access to conservation targeted finances and resources, and connections to the international decision making organisations and processes. Those involved in driving the global level discussions on conservation and development can frequently be driven by different beliefs and values to those of the state, the implementing bodies, and or what is needed on the ground (Virtanen, 2003). To some, this is indicative of the power imbalance and conflict between rich (Western) and poor (developing, local) interests within global society in general and in conservation in particular (Adams and Hutton (2007). This power at the international level is exacerbated where there is a 'hollow state' in the country in question (i.e. Zimbabwe, where there is limited state involvement on the ground), although states are frequently encouraged to align themselves to the prevailing global discourse so as to access resources (Büscher and Dietz, 2005). Not only do these issues with the globalisation of the conservation-development discourse result in the simplifying of a multitude of equally important needs, values and interests, but they also exacerbate the

power division between decision makers and those experiencing the phenomena on the ground.

It is from this stand point that the critical discourse has arisen. It takes a human rights or rights-based perspective and argues that community-based conservation has become merely a façade. Adams and Hulme (2001a) explain that the critical discourse "detects in community conservation a shallow and perhaps even deceitful façade designed to hide old style preservation, with its harsh colonial legacy of policing, evicting and misanthropy… it is but a shallow imitation of a genuinely democratic conservation strategy" (p.193). The morphing of the community-based conservation strategy back into a protectionist approach can be largely explained by the dominance of the quantitative evidence based decision making processes of the more powerful actors, as discussed above. In this sense, the critical discourse is asking two things: whether community-based conservation has ever been fully implemented, and how the original aims of community-based conservation – social and environmental justice – can begin to infiltrate the dominant technical and reductionist approach. To some, development has failed the poor (Sanderson and Redford, 2003 in Adams and Hutton, 2007) and there is ample room for conservation organisations to work with poor communities on the 'ecological frontiers' but for this to be more successful than it has been to date, there needs to be dynamism and a context specificity that reflects social and political factors, and issues of geography and scale (Adams and Hutton, 2007; Kepe et al., 2004). Not only does this highlight once again the need to better integrate qualitative social science research into the conservation-development discourse, it also brings the debate back to the compatibility of conservation and development, the feasibility of win-win strategies (Adams and Hutton, 2007), and thus to another controversial aspect of the conservation-development discourse, decoupling.

To many, conservation and development are still considered to be disparate areas of focus unable to be successfully linked together to form win-win scenarios (Adams and Hutton, 2007). It is thus argued that they should be decoupled and followed independently of each other. This is partly because of the different perspectives and approaches driving the two areas and the political issues this brings in negotiating power dynamics and trade-offs, as well as the belief that they have inherent contradictions

preventing them from aligning at any point (Newmark and Hough, 2000). Some supporters of this view still see the value each of the areas brings to the other, yet it is felt that the successful coupling of conservation and development may only be feasible in very specific "institutional, ecological, and developmental conditions" (Adams et al., 2004, p.1147). They thus suggest that the two areas work separately but in parallel to each other with tightly linked interventions. However, given the historical lack of cooperation between the two areas when working from within the same project, critics are highly vocal about the unlikelihood of two projects being able to maintain the linkage necessary to produce synergistic results (Hutton et al., 2005, p.363).

Another argument for the decoupling of conservation and development comes from the complexity in the division of responsibility across the two areas: "Some argue conservation and poverty are very different things and Protected Areas, and those who manage them, cannot be held responsible for tackling the human challenge of poverty. Brandon (1998) suggests that Parks were unfairly made responsible for curing structural problems such as poverty, unequal land and resource allocation, corruption, injustice and market failure" (Adams and Hutton, 2007, p.164). Thus the argument is that by decoupling conservation and development, and producing simultaneous projects in each area, the projects will be managed by those best able to do so.

The qualitative case study approach of this thesis (see Chapter 3) and its prioritisation of multiple voices, especially in linking those at the local level to the situation at the national level, provides new evidence on the social and political aspects of the conservation-development discourse from the CBNRM context. This thesis therefore helps to bridge the gap in a number of these areas of conflict and disconnect, and provides additional evidence upon which to inform the conservation-development decision making process.

## 2.4    Background to Conservation and Development in Zimbabwe

### 2.4.1    History of conservation in Zimbabwe

Zimbabwe has had a dynamic and turbulent socio-economic and political history: from tribal wars in the 1700s to direct colonialism under Britain from 1888-1965 followed by a state of Unilaterally Declared Independence (UDI) under Ian Smith until independence in 1980. This was followed by Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes (ESAPs) in the 1990s (Campbell et al., 2001), and the turmoil of the land reform and indigenisation processes which led to the political and economic crises of the late 2000s and from which the country is still recovering (Mandondo, 2000; Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007; Taylor, 2009). The evolution of conservation in Zimbabwe has been driven significantly by the dominant ideologies of these distinct periods of socio-economic and political history, as well as changes in key international narratives. Indeed, so have the livelihood dynamics and strategies of rural Zimbabweans.

These periods have been split in multiple different ways by a number of scholars from the simple three way split of 'pre-colonial', 'colonial', and 'post-colonial' (Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014) to more complex differentiations (Mandondo, 2000; Rihoy and sMaguranyanga, 2007; Taylor, 2009). For the purpose of this discussion, Zimbabwe's socio-economic and political history is split into the following distinct periods: pre-colonialism (pre-1890), colonialism (1890-1980), early independence (1980-1990), neoliberalisation (1991-1997), the 'lost decade' (1998-2008) and current (2008-today).

In order to explain the medley of conservation practices adopted in Zimbabwe today, it is necessary to briefly discuss each of these periods in Zimbabwe's history, covering the main socio-economic and political drivers at the time, and the main conservation narratives and paradigms including key legislation and government policy. A large part of conservation over Zimbabwe's history has focused around issues of land tenure, use rights, and racial segregation, which are in turn inextricably linked to broader issues of equity, democracy, and good governance (Martin, 2009a; Rihoy, 1998; Wolmer and Ashley, 2003; Virtanen, 2003). These are included in the discussion below.

### 2.4.1.1    Pre-colonial times

During pre-colonial times, the indigenous population of what was to become Zimbabwe lived a subsistence and tribal existence, farming pastorally and hunting for food. The population density was low and the nature-human relationship was one of co-existence with people having little footprint on the environment (Murphree, 1990). The two main tribal groups were the Shonas and Ndebeles, each one governed by traditional rules and societal norms, which also dictated land and natural resource use. There was no concept of private land ownership but rather all natural resources were used as the commons (Murombedzi, 1997). The Shonas shared 'ownership' collectively with resources distributed and managed by the Chief for each 'community'. Families were given adequate plots and livestock grazing areas were used communally. For the Ndebele, natural resources (including land) were managed by the King, distributed to the Chiefs, who in turn distributed to families on need and merit of how good a warrior the man of the household had been in younger years in the 'amabutho' (Dore, 2001). This status also determined the number of cattle given to each household. There was no overarching government or centralised system (Kayambazinthu et al., 2003).

### 2.4.1.2    Colonial times

In 1890, John Cecil Rhodes colonised the area of land now known as Zimbabwe and named it (South) Rhodesia. With colonialism came the implementation of a Western form of government with centralised systems including for the management of land and natural resources (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006). The 90 years of colonial rule (including the 15 years of Unilaterally Declared Independence from 1965-1980) impacted considerably upon the natural resource base of Zimbabwe and provided a platform for multiple stages of conservation policy which cannot be divorced from the politics of race, power, and oppression. These all play a role in the complex and fragmented conservation policies in Zimbabwe today, and help to explain the perceptions of local people and different stakeholders to the various different methods of natural resource management and conservation.

The conservation regime in Zimbabwe is inextricably linked to land tenure and use rights (Rihoy, 1998). Very quickly the colonial government established a dual and unequal system of land tenure – one for the European settlers, and one for the indigenous

African population manifest most explicitly in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006; Dore, 2001; Helmsing, 1990). The land allocated for the settlers was the most agriculturally viable, located in the areas with good rainfall and more fertile soils (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006; Matzke and Nabane, 1996). Over half of the country's land was set aside eventually for the colonialists who in 1930 made up less than 2% of the population, while just one third was allocated to the indigenous farmers despite making 98.2% of the total population. The land allocated for the indigenous population was less agriculturally viable (Campbell et al., 2002). These areas received less and more variable rainfall, with lower soil fertility, and were more plagued by diseases and animals being located in the lower lying areas (Campbell et al., 2002; Derman, 1995; Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014). The Native Reserve Commission of 1914 labelled these areas as Native Reserves, and they would come to be known as Tribal Trust Lands in 1967 before becoming the 'communal lands' they are known as today (Matzke and Nabane, 1996). Figure 2-2 and Figure 2-3 show the variations in the agricultural viability of the land and the subsequent allocation of the land on racial grounds, respectively.

**Figure 2-2: Map of Zimbabwe showing the relief of the country to compare to areas given to indigenous populations and those kept by the colonial settlers (from http://exploringafrica.matrix.msu.edu/teachers/curriculum/m30/activity3.php).**



**Figure 2-3: Map of Zimbabwe showing the land apportionment as of 1930 (image found on google with no accreditation and with creative commons licensing)**

Another relevant land tenure type during this period was called 'National Land' which was land set aside for national parks and protected areas. Constituting most of the remaining land available in Zimbabwe, and usually in prime agricultural spaces, these nature reserves were seen by the indigenous populations as an indication that animals were valued higher than them. Whilst local people were forced to live in extremely overpopulated and overused Native Reserves, wildlife was given space. All wildlife was state 'property' legally categorised as *res nullius* (Child, 1996c; Matzke and Nabane, 1996). The notion of unequal value was further exacerbated when hunting for food on communal lands was made illegal whilst trophy hunting by the colonial settlers in the national parks and protected areas was allowed (Child, 1996c).

The delineation of land for national parks and protected areas was driven by the London Convention of 1933, itself driven by the depreciation of animal populations over the initial colonial period when animals were considered pests and hunted widely (Child, 1996c; Child and Barnes, 2010). The perception that cattle and game do not go well together resulted in 'game elimination' drives to the total effect of approximately 680,000 game animals between 1919 and 1960. As such, conservation in Zimbabwe came to be mostly about the preservation of key mega fauna and their associated habitat – whether for sport hunting or conversely driven by the conservationist alarmism narrative of strict protection.

The Natural Resources Act of 1944 is an example of key policy driven by the narrative of conservationist alarmism which purported protecting nature from the degradation of human activity and maintaining the wilderness (Alexander and McGregor, 2000; Martin, 2009a). This protectionist approach mainly consisted of command-and-control type activities and simple restricted access. Some of these are still seen today (Dressler et al., 2010; Mandondo, 2000). At the same time, however, an appreciation for trophy hunting and the economic benefits to be derived from such a sport remained (Dressler et al., 2010). With the path laid out by the Wildlife Conservation Act of 1960, sustainable use became the main regime with the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 which afforded use rights over mega fauna to private landowners (Child, 1996c; Matzke and Nabane, 1996).

Many see this Act as the first step towards Zimbabwe appreciating the need for varying degrees of community involvement in conservation efforts, not only for the benefit of conservation but also for economic development (Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014). However, as most of these landowners were colonialists (despite apparently previous attempts to include communal farmers (Child, 1996c)), this Act enforced the image of trophy hunting being a 'white man's sport' and contributed to the local perception of conservation as a negative and racial activity. There is still a hangover of this today. The subsequent attempt of the Wildlife Industries New Development for All (WINDFALL) programme in 1978 to transfer rights to the local communities around the issue of soil degradation also failed because local people were not really included in the process; nor did it sufficiently include wildlife from communal lands. Instead, more inequalities were apparently created (Matzke and Nabane, 1996). These processes further exacerbated the land tenure and property rights segregation between colonialists and indigenous populations.

### 2.4.1.3   Early independence

With independence came a drastic (approximately 90%) increase in the amount of poaching (Hill, 1991). People located in the Native Reserves who had been restricted from hunting for their livelihoods saw hunting (seen as poaching in the eyes of the government) as a rebellion against the colonial rule and a celebration of having power back (Wolmer and Ashley, 2003). One of the first efforts made by the newly independent government was to implement ways to de-racialise the process of governing land and natural resources. With restrictions in place by the Lancaster House Agreement on what could be done with colonial farms, the government began a slow resettlement regime through the 'willing-seller willing-buyer' scheme (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006). This included the amalgamation of district councils (previously for governing the colonial population) and the rural councils (for governing the indigenous population), and created the Rural District Councils (RDCs) which aimed to democratise local government procedures. This included the creation of Ward Development Committees (WADCOs) and Village Development Committees (VIDCOs) through the Prime Minister's Directive of 1984 (Matzke and Nabane, 1996).

Influenced significantly by the World Conservation Strategy of 1980, the government implemented the Zimbabwe Conservation Strategy in 1987 (Mlinaric, 1994). The World Conservation Strategy advocates the 'use it or lose it' approach in line with the discourse of sustainable development. While the Zimbabwe Conservation Strategy mainly just outlines the country's environmental problems, it openly follows the sustainable use approach towards, especially, elephant conservation (Hill, 1991). In line with this and more global shifts in thinking towards sustainable development and the potential synergistic relationship between environment and development processes, the 1982 amendment to the Parks and Wildlife Act of 1975 adjusted the provision of use rights to communal lands as well as private. This was further encouraged by the need to deracialise natural resource use (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). In doing so, the RDCs, as the lowest legally recognised level of government, could be granted the Appropriate Authority (AA) to manage and control the communal lands under their jurisdiction, including the wildlife found upon it (Frost and Bond, 2008; Mandondo, 2000). This is discussed in more detail in Section 2.4.2.

This attempt at decentralisation was influenced by global processes at the time including a national opening up of the state to more laissez faire models of economy and market-based processes. The ESAPs implemented in the early 1990s demanded a more decentralised governing system (discussed further in Section 2.5.3). At the same time, shifts were occurring in conservation thinking towards Hulme and Murphree (1999)'s 'new ecology' and 'new conservation' as discussed above, as well as the realisation that environmental imperialism was embodied in the previous approaches to conservation by the colonial government.

Zimbabwe's national conservation programme, CAMPFIRE, was designed on the back of these changes to the political economy of Zimbabwe. It was seen as a way of overcoming some of the imbalances of past conservation by providing a new economic opportunity for many people living on marginal lands (Derman, 1995; Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014). Through numerous amendments made during the signing process in government, the version of CAMPFIRE ultimately implemented in 1989 was not as originally designed and passed responsibility to the RDCs rather than to the communities themselves. This immediately reduced the level of control gained by the communities in this process

(Dressler et al., 2010; Matzke and Nabane, 1996). This is discussed further in Section 2.4.2. As CAMPFIRE quickly spread across the country, it became the main national conservation strategy. The focus of CAMPFIRE initially was on a number of natural resources, but wildlife soon came to be seen as the most economically viable and lucrative, and all attention was focused upon the sustainable use of the country's mega fauna (Frost and Bond, 2008).

### 2.4.1.4 The "Lost decade"

There were numerous culminating factors in the political and economic crises experienced by Zimbabwe from the late 1990s to late 2000s, referred to in Zimbabwe's Mid Term Plan (MTP) as the lost decade (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011). A financial crisis that was sparked in part by the failure of the ESAPs to boost the economy, led to significant distrust of the public towards the government (Frost and Bond, 2008). This was exacerbated by the ongoing conflict over land and colonial commercial farmers. With a resounding rejection of ZANU-PF's constitutional referendum and numerous other electoral defeats in the early 2000s, Mugabe decided to use the land issue as a means of rallying the rural population back behind his political party (Murombedzi, 1997). The government's previous efforts to resettle the black rural population onto white commercial farms during the 'willing-buyer willing-seller' programme had limited success and with the Lancaster House Agreement then finished, Mugabe began the Fast Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP) (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006). The violence and oppression that came with the FTLRP resulted in international sanctions placed on the country for human rights abuses, further exacerbating the economic and political crises. By 2008, inflation was at a global high with a monthly recorded rate as 79,600,000,000 % in mid-November 2008 (Hanke, 2009). This lasted until the country dollarized in 2009 (Chimhowu and Hulme, 2006).

Environmentally, this lost decade was devastating. With few economic opportunities in urban areas and the cost of food unmanageable, many moved back to their rural homesteads. This resulted in dramatically increased land pressure and degradation through agricultural expansion which took human populations even further into wildlife territory and their habitat, increasing in turn the human-wildlife conflicts and local hunting. Furthermore, the governance of natural resource management was

recentralised making the state the ultimate custodian of any natural resources (Frost and Bond, 2008). With little money being passed to the RDCs by the central government, local government entities had to generate their own revenue streams, which in many cases involved keeping a larger proportion of the CAMPFIRE revenue (Martin, 2009a; Virtanen, 2003). This not only reduced the amount of benefits local communities saw coming from conservation efforts, but "weakened people's sense of ownership" (Frost and Bond, 2008, p.786). CAMPFIRE itself also struggled. With the international sanctions on Zimbabwe, and its negative reputation around the world, the tourism industry on which CAMPFIRE relied was severely affected (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007; Virtanen, 2003).

The general socio-economic conditions of the country's infrastructure and service provisions were also severely affected. Chimhowu et al. (2010) established that "on current evidence it is clear that the majority of Zimbabweans are emerging from this crisis poorer and with fewer assets and capabilities than they have endured at any time since independence" (p.2). Overall, two million of more than 2.1 million people in need of food aid were (at the time of publication in 2010) still based in rural areas, with a majority of those deriving their livelihoods from small-holder farms in communal lands (Chimhowu et al., 2010). The increased poverty levels of the vast majority of the rural population increases the barriers to their involvement in conservation programmes like CAMPFIRE, as food provision and survival become their main focus. Without absolute gains from such programmes, buy-in from the local population suffered (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007) (discussed more in Section 2.5.1).

### 2.4.1.5    Current era

Throughout the 2000s, the focus in Zimbabwe's environmental arena has been increasingly on climate change and climate change mitigation. Along with this has come to prominence the concept of carbon sequestration through various PES mechanisms (as discussed above). Zimbabwe has started to realise the potential of these mechanisms for conservation of key habitats and as access to vital international funding sources through climate finance. As a result, the conservation focus in Zimbabwe has begun to shift from animals to their habitats that can sequester carbon i.e. large areas of forest.

This change in focus, as well as the disruption caused by the 'lost decade', has resulted in a confused and complex environmental agenda in Zimbabwe which has little meaning in practice (Virtanen, 2003). There is now no lack of national environmental legislation but it is fragmented and difficult to enforce. Likewise, there is a large number of Ministries and Departments responsible for enforcing environmental legislation but no umbrella organisation (UNFCCC, n.d.). Additionally, there is no environmental emphasis in the constitution. This has created confusion in all aspects of environmental governance, especially in the structure of the government in terms of which Ministries, Agencies, and Departments have been created, who has control over what aspect of the environment or environmental management, and the hierarchy of this governance. There is also subsequent confusion about the policies in place in Zimbabwe, with many different actors from international to local scales attempting a plethora of different activities that frequently conflict, overlap or duplicate each other.

This confusion is best shown at the district level, where RDCs are given AA by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM). However, the RDCs are actually under the responsibility of the Ministry of Local Government, Urban and Rural Development (MLGURD). The MLGURD overall audits and supervises local authorities and approves physical plans including tourist leases. It also advises and assists the District Authorities on policies and practices as they apply to CAMPFIRE. There is then the CAMPFIRE Association which, as the elected organisation to promote and serve local interests at the national level, links activities of national entities to those of its community members.

The Environmental Management Act (Chap 20:27) was passed in Parliament in 2002 and came into force in 2003. It is deemed to have been inspired by the United National Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) which took place in 2002. To emerge from the Act was the Environment Management Agency (EMA) which is the lead agency for coordinating the National Conservation Strategy and which accepted CAMPFIRE as the leading policy for managing communal lands. Both embrace most principles of sustainable development but implementation has been slow and weak due to a lack of financial and human resources, and commitment. The national economic development document, the Medium Term Plan 2011-2015, is a comprehensive

economic blueprint outcome of the inclusive government and outlines national priorities (Government of Zimbabwe, 2011). It has just one objective concerning the promotion of climate mitigation and adaptation strategies in social and economic development. This has translated into some attention being paid to it in different sectors but not enough for mitigation and adaptation to be considered mainstreamed. The recent MTP, however, does state that people have not just the right to use environmental goods and services for their benefit but also that they have a responsibility to look after the environment to ensure inter-generational equity. Environmental issues and activities are seen as cross-cutting but are not given their own significance. The government is thus seen to lack a comprehensive climate change policy.

Overall today, Zimbabwean environmental emphasis is shifting from natural resource management and conservation of wildlife for which it is seen as a world leader (Rio+20 Report), to climate change mitigation and carbon sequestration. Yet in undertaking this shift few lessons are being heeded from the country's past environmental experiences. There are important lessons to be learnt from the history of environmental efforts in Zimbabwe that can play an important role in progressing its sustainability agenda. As the first country in southern Africa to implement and drive CBNRM, Zimbabwe has a substantial history and database of both academic and policy studies, as well as significant human memories from which to piece together the social story of CBNRM across temporal and spatial scales. There is talk of a National Climate Change and Development Strategy to be formed in the context of the MTP, which itself is formed in the context of the MDGs and will target the recently adopted SDGs. There has also been the recent establishment of the National Task Team on Climate Change which works with the Office of the President and Cabinet, and is led by the Secretary of Special Affairs. It is hoped that these will begin the process of streamlining and propelling current efforts on climate change in Zimbabwe (Practitioner 3, 2015, pers. comm.).

### 2.4.2 The Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources

Within the CBNRM discourse, Zimbabwe and its national CBNRM initiative – CAMPFIRE – has become one of the most internationally high-profile examples (Derman, 1995; Roe and Nelson, 2009). Frost and Bond (2008) refer to it as "the flagship community-based

natural resource management programme in southern Africa" (p.778). Established officially in 1989, CAMPFIRE was designed to encourage farmers in communally managed (semi) arid areas to sustainably use wildlife mega-fauna as an alternative and more sustainable land use compared with cattle farming (Derman, 1995; Martin, 1986; Murphree, 1990). It was thought that CAMPFIRE would foster 'accumulation' in rural households through more productive use of the land (Murombedzi, 1999). As Frost and Bond (2008) clearly explain:

> *"CAMPFIRE was therefore designed specifically to stimulate the long-term development, management, and sustainable use of natural resources in Zimbabwe's communal farming areas. It aimed to align land use more closely with the natural opportunities and constraints of these agriculturally marginal areas"* (p.777).

A positive conservation outcome expected through the programme was the conservation of the key species such as elephants (*Loxodonta africana*), lions (*Panther leo*), and buffalo (*Syncerus caffer*) (Frost and Bond, 2008; Martin, 2012). Through placing an economic value on these species and encouraging sustainable hunting and photographic safaris on the communal lands, CAMPFIRE aimed to provide an alternative income source to agriculture (Hulme and Murphree, 1999). This was supported by amendments to various key pieces of national legislation which promoted wildlife conservation as a land use option (Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014 and as discussed previously). Using the words of the original governing document (Martin, 1986), the four main objectives of CAMPFIRE were to:

1. Obtain the voluntary participation of communities in a flexible programme which incorporates long term solutions to resource problems,
2. Introduce a system of group ownership with defined rights of access to natural resources for the communities resident in the target areas,
3. Provide the appropriate institutions under which resources can be legitimately managed and exploited by resident communities for their own direct benefit, and

4. Provide technical and financial assistance to communities which join the programme to enable them to realise these objectives.

Over time these objectives have been distilled to the following three by the national CAMPFIRE Association (Zimbabwe National CBNRM Forum, n.d.):

1. the enhancement of rural livelihoods,
2. rural development, and
3. the conservation of biodiversity and the rich natural heritage of Zimbabwe through effective participation of communities and the generation of income for them.

CAMPFIRE functions through the decentralisation of management responsibilities of local wildlife to the lowest legally recognised government level, which in Zimbabwe is the RDC. This responsibility is called the Appropriate Authority (AA) and means the RDC has been given custody over and responsibility for managing wildlife resources and the right to benefit directly from their use (Frost and Bond, 2008, p.777). The RDC then markets the use rights to photographic and hunting safari operators who bid for use of concession areas. The winning bidder(s) then have the concession rights for a pre-arranged period of time during which they can generate revenue from safaris on the concession areas. The revenue generated from these safaris (whether hunting or non) is then split 50:50 between the operators and the RDCs. While not legally binding, it is then generally accepted that at least 50% of the revenue given to the RDC is passed to the local communities involved in CAMPFIRE in the RDC's area; 35% goes to wildlife management costs in general (nationally); and 15% to the RDCs as an administrative levy. The way RDCs and communities distribute the revenue and how it is spent is ideally decided by the local communities (Frost and Bond, 2008). There is no accessible central reporting of revenue generated through CAMPFIRE or reports on the proportions to be distributed. A number of studies provide some figures, although these tend to be inconsistent with each other (Child, 1996b; Frost and Bond, 2008; Logan and Moseley, 2002; Matzke and Nabane, 1996). Figure 2-4 shows the CAMPFIRE structure and process, including for the generation and distribution of revenue.

Fig. 1 – General structure of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. Financial transfers — bold lines. Resource offtake — dotted line. Services (incl. by CCG) — dashed lines. Note: Financial assistance from donors to communities administered by the CCG has been omitted. The percentage values represent the recommended allocation of income from concession and trophy fees received by the RDC.

**Figure 2-4: The structure and processes of CAMPFIRE (Frost and Bond, 2008, p.779)**
**NB: CCG no longer exists as an entity. The process is now managed mainly by the CAMPFIRE Association with legislation coming from DNPWLM.**

One of the central tenants of CAMPFIRE is the key role given to local communities in managing and owning the projects and in having responsibility over the revenue and development opportunities arising from them. This focus aligns with the subsidiarity principle (Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Armitage, 2005; Larson, 2005; Ribot, 2003; Turner, 2004), and was considered particularly important in CAMPFIRE's design given the limited livelihood options otherwise available to rural populations, especially in drier areas. Child (2003) explains clearly that CAMPFIRE's design had, at its core, "the empowerment of community members at village level to control wildlife and its revenues, the internalisation of costs and benefits at this level, and an underlying belief that wildlife was the most suitable land use option in many of these remote areas" (p.6). Logan and Moseley (2002) go further to explain the three fundamental principles guiding CAMPFIRE: "1) wildlife is an agricultural resource and game management may be perceived as a form of agriculture; 2) tensions should not exist between arable agriculture and game management since scarce resources are being allocated to the best economic alternative; 3) game management can be a complement to arable agriculture and vice versa, ipso facto, there should be no conflict between the economic survival of agricultural communities and the foraging needs of wildlife" (p.2). Thus, the income from sustainably using wildlife was aimed to provide an incentive for local residents to limit wildlife losses from poaching and habitat degradation through providing an alternative to agriculture (Hackel, 1999). However, as already mentioned, this ideal of community ownership as originally planned was given to RDCs during the approval process by the government in the mid-1980s (which stalled over a number of years). Thus the devolutionary element of the programme which planned to pass responsibility and authority to the local communities directly was rejected (Mandondo, 2000). Instead the Attorney General's office decided that as the lowest legally recognised level of government and as representatives of the communities, the RDCs should be the ones to gain AA (Child and Barnes, 2010; Martin, 2009a).

Despite this, after initial implementation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, CAMPFIRE soon gained a reputation of success (Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Conyers, 2002; Logan and Moseley, 2002). Neighbouring countries followed Zimbabwe's lead. Zambia implemented the Administrative Management Design (ADMADE) for Game

Management Areas (GMAs) programme, Namibia implemented the Wildlife Integration for Livelihood Diversification (WILD) programme, and Controlled Hunting Areas were established in Botswana (BotswanaCBNRM, n.d.; Brosius et al., 1998; Jones, 2004; Twyman, 2000; Twyman, 2001). By 2009, 57 of Zimbabwe's 59 districts were participating in CAMPFIRE (Zimbabwe National CBNRM Forum, n.d.). Over its lifetime, CAMPFIRE has been frequently hailed as a CBNRM success story in ameliorating the conflict between conservation and development (Derman, 1995; Frost and Bond, 2008; Roe and Nelson, 2009).

After the initial explosion of success, criticisms of CAMPFIRE specifically and CBNRM generally began to emerge over the 2000s (Alexander and McGregor, 2000; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; Gandiwa et al., 2013; Measham and Lumbasi, 2013; Ribot, 2003; Shackleton et al., 2002; Zulu, 2012). CBNRM as an approach has been criticised as being used as a 'blue print design' which overlooks consideration of the individual contexts in which each project is implemented (Dressler et al., 2010; Virtanen, 2003). Other critiques note that there has been a lack of consideration for the local reality by clumping local people together under the heading of 'communities'. Communities are subsequently treated as 'passive recipients' of CAMPFIRE and seen as 'homogenous entities'. Failure to provide benefits to local communities and to successfully devolve management are further challenges that have been identified (Blaikie, 2006; Shackleton et al., 2002). Table 2-1 lists some of the key criticisms prevalent in discussions about CAMPFIRE.

**Table 2-1: Specific criticisms of Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE programme within the literature**

| Criticism | References |
|---|---|
| Decentralisation of Appropriate Authority to RDCs rather than to the local communities | Average and Desmond (2007), Conyers (2002), Mapedza and Bond (2006), Murphree (2005), Wolmer and Ashley (2003) |
| Processes that are decentralised tend to be those that incur costs to the devolved authority rather than also the benefits (i.e. monitoring and enforcement) | Conyers (2002), Ribot (2003) |
| Oversimplification of complex local governance systems (Measham and Lumbasi, 2013) resulting in a lack of understanding and acknowledgement of the hindrances to facilitating local empowerment | Blaikie (2006), Brosius et al. (1998), Dzingirai (2003), Shackleton and Campbell (2001) |
| Incomplete consideration of the complexity and diversity of local communities including the treatment of community as a homogeneous unit | Agrawal and Gibson (1999), Armitage (2005), Brosius et al. (1998), Logan and Moseley (2002), Ribot (2003) |
| Insufficient recognition of the interactions between different components of the natural system | Balint and Mashinya (2006) |
| Insufficient action to tackling problems of elite-capture of resources and wildlife-based tourist revenues within RDCs | Mapedza and Bond (2006), Nelson and Agrawal (2008), Whande et al. (2003) |

The majority of these critical studies raise important and valid fundamental issues with the programme. However, the main focus of many studies to date is placed on highlighting the programme's weaknesses and describing how they have impacted the programme's outcomes. Very few studies take the further step of delving into the reasons behind these weaknesses, nor do they provide in-depth explanations of what causes the issues in the first place. Even less work has been done to identify constructive recommendations on how to resolve these issues going forward. Measham and Lumbasi

(2013) go some way by outlining four deeper issue areas they perceive to have caused failure in CBNRM programmes across the world – 1) top-down project initiation, 2) lack of economic incentives, 3) lack of autonomy, and 4) incompatible livelihoods and opportunity costs. Again, however, their study does not extend to how these can be resolved for more successful project design and implementation. As Blaikie (2006) has argued, what is needed is for a more discursive and political view which evaluates what happens, why it happens, what should happen, and to learn from experiences on the ground of what did not work and thus, how it can (also supported by Adger et al., 2000). This thesis has taken this research need as its starting point.

### 2.4.3        Conservation outcomes on wildlife populations in Zimbabwe

It is recognised that while there is no systematic way of measuring wildlife in Zimbabwe numerous surveys are carried out periodically using Monitoring of Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) standards (Martin, 2014). Aerial surveys have been conducted since 1980 by the Parks and Wildlife Management Agency (PWMA), often in partnership with international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) such as the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Frankfurt Zoological Society (FZS) until 2009 (Dunham, 2012). These consider multiple species from key game such as elephants and buffalo to all types of antelopes and warthogs. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a comprehensive analysis of wildlife populations over time. However, it is important to note the perceived conservation outcomes for various species through the country's conservation efforts – specifically through CAMPFIRE as the main programme. Ecologically, the conservation aims of CAMPFIRE have been relatively successful according to a number of studies (Gandiwa et al., 2014).

The worst drought in "living memory" occurred between 1992 and 1993, and reduced most wildlife populations across the southern African region (Dunham, 2012). However, since then a number of studies report that there has been an overall increase in key species populations, and many remained stable even through the political economic crisis (Crosmary et al., 2015; Dunham, 2012; Gandiwa et al., 2014). Elephant numbers have increased to the point that they are now deemed to be well above the carrying capacity of Zimbabwe's ranges (Gandiwa et al., 2014; Martin, 2014; Taylor, 2009). This is in part due to the Convention for the Illegal Trade of Endangered Species (CITES) ivory

ban (Gandiwa et al., 2014). Martin (2014) even states that the main cause of elephant mortality in Zimbabwe is not poaching but overpopulation of the species itself.

The populations of buffalo (*Syncerus caffer*), eland (*Taurotragus oryx*), kudu (*Tragelaphus strepsiceros*), nyala (*Tragelaphus angasii*), waterbuck (*Kobus ellipsiprymnus*), wildebeest (*Connochaestes*), and zebra (*Equus quagga*) have all reportedly increased (Crosmary et al., 2015; Dunham, 2012; Taylor, 2009). Rhinoceros (*Diceros bicornis*) have been subjected to ongoing high levels of cross-border poaching, especially during the late 1980s and early 1990s, and again during the 2000s. Despite this, the overall population of rhinoceros in Zimbabwe has not changed and they remain critically endangered (Gandiwa et al., 2014). Lion and leopard numbers are also reported to be stable (Taylor, 2009).

However, the quality of the individual animals within these populations have declined. This has been partly attributed to the government's quota setting objectives being based on profit maximisation up until 1996. Since then, there has been a more sustainable approach (Taylor, 2009).

Wildlife still faces increasing challenges. According to a survey provided by Conybeare (1998), human-driven habitat loss slowed during the 1990s and early 2000s but elephant population increases are predicted to result in more animal-driven habitat loss (Crosmary et al., 2015). This was exacerbated with rural human population growth during the 2000s' crises. Water is also becoming a more significant problem in sustaining wildlife populations, with more frequent droughts affecting national park water basins, as well as a lack of money to maintain them (African Wildlife Foundation 2011).

Overall, however, animal populations seem to have benefitted from, or at least not been detrimentally affected by, CAMPFIRE activities. This provides the space for a more social investigation of the natural resource management processes.

## 2.5    Key Concepts

Unpacking the key concepts used in these conservation debates, such as "community" and "devolution", is necessary for two reasons: for gaining a more realistic understanding of policy impacts and the situation on the ground, and also their meaning

within the literature that evaluates and analyses the policies post implementation. Campbell et al. (2001) discuss the issue of why much of the literature about Common Property Resources (CPR) and CBNRM is optimistic, despite empirical evidence and case studies to the contrary (see also Jones, 2004). They conclude that this phenomenon occurs because the literature focuses on formal rule based systems and norms, which allow a simplification of reality such that it is removed from the reality sufficiently enough to remain optimistic. In most high level literature discussing the success of CBNRM projects, the systems actually in place (local culture, local norms and traditions) are infrequently considered (Campbell et al., 2001, p.596). As discussed in Section 2.3, when analyses or policies avoid an in depth understanding of the processes and concepts involved it is easy to oversimplify reality and contribute to the policy-practice disconnect.

## 2.5.1    Use of the term 'community'

Defining the term 'community' is vital. Not only does it depict how CBNRM is assumed and used, but it has implications for decentralisation processes that encourage 'going local' (Meynen and Doornbos, 2005). Assumptions are often made about <u>what</u> constitutes a community, <u>who</u> a community consists of, and <u>how</u> it functions geographically, in resource use and socially (Blaikie, 2006; Logan and Moseley, 2002). Without careful attention to defining community appropriately, these assumptions can result in overviews that relate in no clear way to reality on the ground (Campbell et al., 2001; Mearns et al., 2000). Blaikie (2006) describes these assumptions as creating communities which have "tight spatial boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibilities", "distinct and integrated social structure and common interests" (p.1942) and, "as a spatial unit, as a distinct social structure, and as a set of shared norms" (p.1944). Cleaver (1999) refers to this assumption as that of the 'unitary community' (p.603). In reality, communities can contain multiple overlapping identifications and have communities within communities. People being located together physically does not mean they are together socially, and likewise, community members not being present geographically, or temporally, does not mean they are not part of the social 'together' (Logan and Moseley, 2002). There are also multiple different types of community as Fraser (2005) outlines, such as geographic communities where members are based in one region,

virtual communities where members' main contact is through electronic media, as well as communities of circumstance and communities of interest.

Logan and Moseley (2002) suggest the need to relax the geographic focus and allow a self-definition of what 'community' means by the members of the particular 'community'. This reinforces the idea that the term needs to be flexible and adaptable. Logan and Moseley (2002) further give the example of Chapoto Ward in Zimbabwe to show the problematic nature of community projects in this light. Here, an established local committee is unrepresentative of the ethnic and social diversity of the village it is supposed to be representing, and thus makes decisions on behalf of the community that alienate some of the households. Ashley (2000) reaches the same outcome in her analysis of natural resource management schemes using livelihood analysis techniques. The case study of Caprivi in Namibia highlights how essential it is to "combine livelihood analysis with disaggregation of stakeholder groups" (p.20). However, there is still the unavoidable categorisation of community at some point in a study or discussion of a group of people during which it needs to be decided who is included and who is not. Usually this is considered on the basis of a geographical location with varying degrees of attention paid to heterogeneity within this. How community is defined in this thesis is outlined in Chapter 3, Section 3.2.4.

CBNRM does not necessarily distinguish or define what is meant by "community", and the term "community based" is frequently used as a buzzword with an assumed meaning. The actual practice of making the project or process under question community-based is invariably ignored or un-investigated, with the CBNRM label thus allowing automatic classification based upon the assumptions and view point of those implementing a CBNRM project. In the case of CAMPFIRE, for example, 'community-based' means that control has been devolved (to varying degrees) to the RDCs - the local government. This is not the same as being community-based as originally designed whereby the main assumption that the community members themselves have control over decision making. Instead, communities are the target beneficiaries, or focal points of the project, but are frequently treated as passive recipients rather than as integral actors with agency (Blaikie, 2006; Shackleton et al., 2002). In many cases this has contributed towards dissatisfaction, problems and challenges. Ultimately, the failure to adequately

define 'community' has impacted the success and potential of the CAMPFIRE programme.

## 2.5.2    Governance

Traditionally, nation states have been seen as discrete entities. In each state the role of the respective central government has been one of overarching, but democratic (in most cases), control over the sovereign state. The conventional depiction of the nation state is one of partaking in what are known as the *steering* and the *rowing* functions of society – steering being the setting of goals, and rowing being the guiding force behind how these goals should be accomplished (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992 in Jordan et al., 2005, p.480). This form of rule is typically quantified in terms of regulation whereby "regulation is the quintessence of government" (Jordan et al., 2005, p.477).

However, since the move towards laissez-faire state models with the rise of neo-liberalism in the 1960s, structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 1990s across the world, and the consequential opening of economies to the increasingly globalised market, this Westphalian convention was challenged (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). These changes created widespread discussions over the 1980s and 1990s about the general role of the state and the potential need to downsize its authority. This became especially pertinent in discussions on poverty alleviation in developing countries, with the rise in populist and public choice theories, resulting in the 'new development rhetoric' (Derman, 1995, p.201). The outcome of these changes has been the increase in the diffusion of political authority both upwards to international institutions as well as downwards to sub-national institutions, including regional and local levels (Hooghe and Marks, 2001). This diffusion and shift away from the central state is referred to as 'governance', as compared to 'government'.

Governance is defined as the interactions between formal and informal structures, processes, rules, traditions, laws, regulations, discursive debates, and negotiations. These interactions take place across multiple levels and scales and determine how people in societies make decisions, share power, responsibility, accountability and management through both individual and collective action (Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Hurlbert and Gupta, 2015; Lebel et al., 2006; Lockwood et al., 2010).

In the area of conservation and development relevant to this research, the shift to governance can be manifest in the shift from state-controlled or centre-periphery conservation, to community based wildlife approaches where communities and civil society play a more central role (Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014).

### 2.5.2.1    Multilevel governance

Governance, by its nature, is a multi-level and multi-actor phenomenon having spread the role and power of governing away from the central nation state to many different actors involved in different aspects of society. This diffusion of responsibilities and roles upwards, downwards, and outwards requires consideration of how they all link together and interplay.  This is linked to hierarchy theory and more recently, the idea of complex systems and 'panarchy', which appreciate that each level in the multi-level process is influenced by the processes occurring at the level above and level below (Cash and Moser, 2000; Lebel et al., 2006; Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001). This is what Cash and Moser (2000) describe as – "the synergistic result of both the smaller/faster dynamics of system components at the next lower scale and the constraints imposed by the generally slower/larger system dynamics at the next higher scale" (p.113, see also Jones, 2009 for discussions on this related to CBNRM in Zimbabwe specifically). Thus a central part to understanding governance is to understand the multiple levels and multiple actors involved, how they interplay, and thus how the governance system as a whole operates. Bixler (2014) goes as far as to say that, "policy solutions to environmental problems will continue to be burdened by inefficiencies and unnecessary obstacles if the multi-scale nature of ecological and social systems, and the interactions between them across levels, are not consciously and systematically addressed" (p.156).

The theory of networked governance takes this further by highlighting not just the processes occurring at the levels above and below each level but at all nodes of the wider 'networked' multi-level multi-actor system. Taking a networked governance approach is said to be more useful in resolving 'wicked problems' such as climate change (Parker, 2007). The governance of such problems are also likely to include nested governance systems that deal with different temporal and spatial scales, as well as networked and hierarchical, each dealing with overlapping and/or constituent parts of

the complex phenomena in a globalised world (Wyborn and Bixler, 2013). This is all encompassed in the notion of multilevel governance.

### 2.5.2.2    Good governance

For governance to be effective and democratic, the structures and processes in place need to be conducted in a certain way to ensure that civil society has an active role in setting governing principles and priorities (Graham et al., 2003); and are designed to "create lasting and positive changes" (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006, p.1853). It is not enough to just diffuse, or decentralise, power. This does not guarantee effective governance. It is thus important to ensure that "effective rules, transparency, and accountability mechanisms are in place" (Oviedo et al., n.d., p.2). While there is no real consensus or singular definition of what constitutes good governance, there are a number of principles and attributes that appear across all discussions forming the essential elements of good governance.

Put simply, "good governance promotes equity, participation, pluralism, transparency, accountability and the rule of law in a manner that is effective, efficient, and enduring" (United Nations, n.d.). These attributes (and more) of good governance have been put into many frameworks or 'design principles' by numerous governance scholars and practitioners. Most common among these are Ostrom (1990)'s '8 Design Principles' and Lockwood et al. (2010)'s 8 codes of good governance. Graham et al. (2003) also outline 5 principles of good governance that have been mainstreamed into UN work, while the UNDP (2014) discusses the mechanisms, processes, and outcomes for good governance. Together, the principles can be brought together as per Table 2-2 (in no particular order and with summaries compiled from the discussions of the above listed authors):

**Table 2-2: The principles of good governance**

| Principle | Definition |
|---|---|
| 1. Legitimacy | • All institutions, organisations, and stakeholders should be democratically elected through free and fair elections, and be fully representative of the people they serve |
| 2. Accountability and transparency | • Being both upwardly and downwardly answerable with accessible and open flows of information, made available to all concerned, in fair, timely manner, and used in decision-making process.<br>• Fair and equitable exercise of authority.<br>• Distribution of costs and benefits of decisions considered.<br>• Prevent corruption.<br>• Informed citizens. |
| 3. Participation and inclusivity | • Opportunity for and quality of participation by all stakeholders, especially including the usually marginalised and vulnerable, necessary to ensure priorities are based on broad consensus and voices are heard. |
| 4. Fairness | • Equity and providing the opportunity to improve or maintain wellbeing.<br>• Respect and pay attention to all stakeholder views and needs.<br>• Fair and equitable exercising of authority.<br>• Unbiased decision-making. |
| 5. Rule of Law | • Public awareness on the rules and regulations governing their society, including capacity building or reform of relevant institutions. |
| 6. Voice and consensus oriented | • All stakeholders have a voice and full engagement in decision-making as key stakeholders and active participants. |
| 7. Subsidiarity | • Power resting where it is most appropriately exercised in an unbiased and objective sense. |
| 8. Human rights | • Satisfaction of basic needs and basic human rights, with opportunity to continually improve wellbeing. |
| 9. Representation | • High levels of consultation, collaboration, and empowerment of the local level by those democratically or legitimately chosen to act as local representatives.<br>• Broadens the range of interests and issues to be considered by decision-makers.<br>• Provides indirect route for voices to be heard and people to participate. |

The practice of good governance aims to achieve "…peaceful, stable and resilient societies where services are delivered and reflect the needs of communities including voices of most vulnerable and marginalised" (UNDP, 2014). Accountability and social justice run through and underpin the achievement of good governance (Lebel et al., 2006).

It has been asked, in the context of development, whether: "the institutions of governance are effectively guaranteeing the right to health, adequate housing, sufficient food, quality of education, fair justice, and personal security" (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.). In development, good governance is considered as an essential means for creating the right conditions for institutions to respond effectively to societal needs (UNDP, 2013). This applies as much to conditions for natural resource management as for livelihood needs, both of which need processes that are democratic and focus on equity (Oviedo et al., n.d.). Good governance promotes freedom from violence, fear and crime, and peaceful and secure societies that provide the stability needed for development investments to be sustainable (UNDP, 2014). However, although the governance principles discussed so far have been developed generally, their availability for sustainable natural resource governance is so far limited (Lockwood et al., 2010, p.986; and also supported by Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). Importantly, member states to the United Nations (UN) reaffirmed good governance as a foundation for development in July 2012 in the General Assembly Resolution (66/288) (UNDP, 2014).

Many critics are now increasingly commenting on the discourse of 'good' governance and the weaknesses prevalent within the concept. Batterbury and Fernando (2006), for example, have argued that good governance is far more than just adhering to the few principles established elsewhere. The process and the outcomes are far more complex than the principles allow and can lead to detrimental impacts for the system and the stakeholders involved. They expand later to say, "'good governance' offers a clearly framed set of normative ideals for society and government. The concept is 'broad enough to comprise public management as well as political dimensions, while at the same time vague enough to allow a fair measure of discretion and flexibility in interpretation as to what 'good governance' would or would not condone" (Batterbury

and Fernando, 2006, p.1860). Through the involvement of more actors across multiple scales with competing interests and values, the shift to governance has complicated both the implementation of conservation-development projects and their assessment especially in the lack of research conducted on the political aspects of governance to better understand how it all fits together (Büscher and Dietz, 2005).

Thus, a more practical manifestation of the critiques of the good governance debate is that of 'good enough governance' (Grindle, 2004). Good enough governance realises the impossibility of tracing the concept of good governance onto a situation in reality, and argues that in trying to do so, little is achieved. Instead, good enough governance attempts to work with the contextual realities of each situation to prioritise areas for reform over others, and which are short or long term goals amongst other factors (Grindle, 2004). It is thus far more a practical policy or decision making tool for specific context than the overall concept of good governance. Even then, the creator of the good enough governance approach continues to be critical of its practical value (Grindle, 2007). The concept of good governance is used in this thesis as a more holistic method for a thorough assessment of the governing system surrounding CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe (an approach also supported by Hardt, 2012). Good enough governance can be used to make sense of this complex picture and inform the decision making process on what is feasible.

This consideration of good governance has also been taken even further to the local level, outlining local level specific criteria for good governance (UNDP, 2004) (Table 2-3). The UNDP (2013)'s key considerations for good local governance are: decentralisation, relationships between subnational and national governments, capacity development for subnational institutions, predictable resource regime for subnational groups, subnational groups delivering special services, and local revenue mobilisation. These are all important considerations for participatory natural resource management programmes trying to implement local level initiatives based on good governance.

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**Table 2-3**: **The six building blocks of good local governance**

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| Building Block | Definitions from Data | Key References |
|---|---|---|
| 1. **Citizen Participation** | The meaning of citizen participation here relates mostly to the involvement of local citizens in decision-making processes and information/knowledge exchanges. This corresponds well to the many similar definitions employed by other studies in the academic literature. | Arnstein (1969) Dyer et al. (2014) FAO (n.d.) Poulton et al. (2006) Rhodes (1997) Ribot (2003) |
| 2. **Partnerships between key local actors** | Here a partnership symbolises a reciprocal, constructive, and respecting relationship between actors whereby they work successfully together for mutual benefit. | Balint and Mashinya (2006) Foxon et al. (2009) GoZ (2002) Sanyal (2006) |
| 3. **Capacity of local actors** | Capacity in this sense refers to the actor's ability to fulfil its defined and expected role. | Dzingirai (2003) Ribot (2003) Sanyal (2006) |
| 4. **Multidirectional flows of information** | Amended to multidirectional as this is more than just a flow in each direction but the mutual sharing of information for the benefit of both actors. Multidirectional flows are needed in order to build knowledge, skills, participation and accountability. | Cash and Moser (2000) FAO (n.d.) Pahl-Wostl (2009) |
| 5. **Institutions of accountability** | Accountability brings together the previous building blocks. To hold an actor to account requires capacity, information, and participation, especially to form a well-meaning partnership. Accountability discussions tend to focus on the lower level actors within a system and their abilities to hold higher levels to account. Lower levels are also held accountable by the upper levels, more so than the other way around, taking the form of taxes, law enforcement, and convoluted decision-making processes. | Gandiwa et al. (2013) GoZ (2001) Mapedza and Bond (2006) Ribot (2002) Ribot (2003) Tsai (2007) |
| 6. **Pro-poor orientation** | It is very difficult to measure and/or ascertain the pro-poor orientation in these cases where the key actors are part of the 'poor' themselves. Thus, we felt it appropriate to exclude this element from our analysis. | Hackel (1999) Jütting et al. (2005) Poulton et al. (2006) |

### 2.5.3 The Decentralisation Debate

In the shift to multi-level, multi-actor governance, the increase in appreciation for the subsidiarity principle, and the rise of community-based approaches to conservation and development, the concept and practice of decentralisation plays a central role (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006; Gaventa, 2006). Decentralisation is the overarching term used to refer to the transferring of political and/or economic powers to others lower down the governance levels. It especially focuses on the transfer of powers from the central government to people and organisations at the local level, and brings into play a new 'emancipatory language of democracy, pluralism, and rights' whereby citizens are more in control of their own decisions and lives (Dressler et al., 2010; Larson and Ribot, 2005). In this sense, decentralisation is essentially about the relationship between the subnational and the national governing processes (UNDP, 2013).

There is widespread consensus on the desirability of decentralisation because of the commonly held idea that passing powers from the centre to lower political and administrative levels may facilitate people's participation in development and resource management. As the UNDP (2013) states: "decentralisation policies (or lack thereof) determine the nature, structures, and quality of local governance and its ability to implement development processes and achieve positive outcomes. Promoting fiscal, political and administrative decentralisation may be a key condition for the effective implementation of local governance and local representation" (p.5). However, interpretations diverge on what decentralisation actually means, how best it is implemented, and for what end (Meynen and Doornbos, 2005, p.238). One of the main differentiations is on the extent to which powers are actually transferred and, to whom. Whether both the benefits and costs of the responsibilities are decentralised varies significantly from case to case, and provides a continuum of other terms used to describe the differences in extent. Despite these differences, the terms used to denote variations of decentralisation are frequently used interchangeably and usually without an indication of what is meant by the specific term. As will be shown, it is easy for the idea of decentralisation in its more democratic and participatory sense to provide a façade for less participatory and disempowering processes to continue behind the scenes.

At one end of the continuum is the term 'deconcentration' which describes the process whereby powers are delegated to local branches of the central state, which are still working to a central mandate and thus bringing the government and its processes closer to the population (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; Baumann, 2000; Ribot, 1999). This is also known simply as 'decentralisation'. At the other end of the spectrum is the process of 'devolution' where central government relinquishes its public functions to a wide range of actors best placed to manage the responsibilities which are outside of its direct control and have their own autonomy (Baumann, 2000; Ribot, 1999). These include non-profit voluntary organisations, community groups, and private organisations (e.g. Miraftab, 2004). In the original design of CAMPFIRE, the emphasis was on devolution in this sense (Martin, 2015).

For successful devolution it is important that the organisations, groups, and institutions to which the powers are transferred have the managerial capacity to deal with these processes – whether to begin with or to adaptively develop the capacity with the responsibilities (Child, 1996b). In between these two extremes are several other variations of decentralisation and extent to which the central government transfers powers and to whom. Examples of these include, administrative decentralisation (Baumann, 2000), democratic decentralisation (Larson and Ribot, 2005), and political decentralisation. One of the main distinguishing factors between these variations of decentralisation is the factor of accountability and whether it is primarily upwards from those to whom responsibilities have been devolved (more administrative decentralisation/deconcentration) or downwards (more devolution/democratic decentralisation) (Ribot, 2003; Taylor, 2009).

On this line, it is important to note that one of the main assumptions that come with the idea of decentralisation in its broad sense is that of an implied level of democracy. This is a dangerous assumption as it can lead to the implementation of far from democratic practices under the guise of devolution and good governance. Oyono (2005) argues that "decentralisation does not lead to automatic benefits but must be implemented in such a way that reinforces the democratic practices and social responsibilities". Without this, a decentralisation process can easily result in situations whereby responsibilities and costs have been decentralised without the requisite accompanying capacity or benefits,

or while it appears power has been devolved to local communities and representative stakeholders, in reality it is frequently found to be a case of 'deconcentration' (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). Downward accountability is thus of central importance to this process.

This is also linked to the issue of 'blindly' supporting an approach based on the subsidiarity principle. It cannot be assumed that lower levels have the capacity to deal with the increased power and responsibility, or that the requisite processes and infrastructure are in place to support them. Thus, higher organisations/entities are not absolved from their management and overseeing responsibilities. This is rarely appreciated, however, with many cases in Southern Africa of central governments backing away from state responsibilities under the guise of decentralisation and community-based approaches. Many examples show that the decentralisation process has resulted, in reality, in more of a form of deconcentration than devolution whereby the central government has transferred the responsibilities to lower level institutions without the necessary decision making authority or capacity (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Balint and Mashinya, 2006; Blaikie, 2006; Campbell et al., 2001; Child, 1996b; Dodman and Mitlin, 2014; Dore, 2001; Duffy, 2009; Frost and Bond, 2008; Helmsing, 1990; Mukamuri et al., 2008; Ribot, 2001). This is argued to be seen as a way of freeing governments from financial and administrative responsibilities and was especially encouraged during the ESAPs in the early 1990s. West Africa provides another example of these controversies surrounding decentralisation (Meynen and Doornbos, 2005, p.242).

### 2.5.3.1   The decentralisation debate in Zimbabwe

Decentralisation formed a large part of the newly independent government's strategy for democratising and deracialising Zimbabwe's governing system especially with regard to rural development (Mandondo, 2000; Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). RDCs were amalgamated from the two separate District Councils (white and urban) and Rural Councils (black and rural) with the implementation of the Rural District Councils Act of 1988, and created a decentralised legally recognised entity at the 'local' level. A number of key pieces of government legislation subsequently decentralised various responsibilities to the RDCs. This included the Parks and Wildlife Act amendment of 1982

passing responsibilities over wildlife, the Natural Resources Act of 1949 passing responsibility for the environment, Communal Lands Act of 1982 decentralising allocation rights over communal land use, and the RDC Act of 1988 itself giving the councils responsibility for the delivery of development and provision of public services in their districts.

The allocation of AA to RDCs that came with the Parks and Wildlife Act amendment referred mostly to the implementation and management of CAMPFIRE. As aforementioned, CAMPFIRE aims to bring in and integrate local rural communities into the wider wildlife and natural resource management governance system. The main governance shift in the process of CAMPFIRE is the aimed for devolution of ownership, and the passing of control and use rights to the local level and communities (Brosius et al., 1998). This is indicative of the shift towards good governance that underlies current conservation and development thinking especially in CBNRM and the shift away from fortress conservation to more democratic approaches to natural resource management (Larson and Ribot, 2005). In reality, the CAMPFIRE decentralisation process is one of what Murphree (1997) has referred to as 'CAMPFIRE's compromises': the rejection of *de jure* devolution of wildlife management and revenue rights to *de facto* (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). This immediately restricted the programme's devolution potential and is argued by many to have been a way to ensure the reach of the state into more remote and rural areas of the country i.e. deconcentration rather than devolution (Ribot, 2003; Virtanen, 2003).

While there was an agreement for RDCs to devolve further this was not a legally binding requirement, and the high value of the wildlife revenues along with the lack of capacity in most RDCs to fully involve communities has meant that the CAMPFIRE process is, at best, decentralisation (Child, 1996b; Lockwood et al., 2010; Muboko and Murindagomo, 2014; Murombedzi, 1999). This has had profound impacts on the participation of local communities in the programme, their empowerment, and their access to more democratic processes in general. Even so, it cannot be automatically assumed that successful devolution would result in democratisation or empowerment (Lockwood et al., 2010). As Rihoy and Maguranyanga (2007) point out, "decentralisation – the context within which CAMPFIRE is set – is a highly politicised and complicated arena" (p.25).

Instead of devolving full responsibilities and authority to the local level, CAMPFIRE committees are established in each village involved in a CAMPFIRE project. Members of the village are elected as Chairman, Secretary, and Treasurer along with a number of other general members. The committee is designed to act as the village representatives and local contact point for the RDCs.

One of the major causes of this reluctance by both the national government to devolve CAMPFIRE to the local communities, and of the RDCs to devolve responsibilities and involvement further after obtaining AA, is the high value of wildlife as an economically viable natural resource (Derman, 1995). This has further exacerbated the local environment as a space of conflict beyond any tenure issues (Larson and Ribot, 2005). Unfortunately, the same process has occurred most recently with the development of the Environmental Management Act of 2000. The first draft, written by an independent consultant, advocated for AA to be devolved to user defined groups at the sub-district level. However, upon the second draft emerging from the Attorney General's office all democratic elements such as this has been reversed with the Minister or President holding most authority and a reiteration of the status quo in terms of the role of RDCs (Mandondo, 2000).

To some in the early days, CAMPFIRE provided a successful example of decentralisation (Child, 1996c; Matzke and Nabane, 1996) whereas today there is general consensus amongst most CAMPFIRE commentators that decentralisation is a contentious issue, often lacking in practice, but still a favoured method of improving the impacts and outcomes of CBNRM programmes (Jones, 2004; Jones and Murphree, 2004; Larson and Ribot, 2005). This is despite limited evidence of decentralisation approaches being successfully implemented in this way or investigations as to how it could work. This thesis begins to meet this need.

### 2.5.4     Livelihoods

The livelihoods of local households involved in CAMPFIRE projects are key in linking together the environment and development debates in natural resource management. Simply, a livelihood is a means of making a living whether financial or otherwise. A livelihood comprises "the capabilities, assets (including both material and social

resources), and activities required for a means of living" and a livelihood is sustainable when it can "cope with and recover from stresses and shocks, maintain or enhance their capabilities and assets, while not undermining the natural resource base" (Scoones, 1998, no page numbers). The combination of capabilities, activities, and assets utilised by each household is known as their 'livelihood strategy' (Sallu et al., 2010; also see De Haan and Zoomers, 2005 for a more in-depth discussion about four structured livelihood strategies). The livelihood strategies of most rural households rely heavily on the local natural resource base therefore being simultaneously integral to the management of natural resources as well as a threat to their conservation (Dressler et al., 2010; Oviedo et al., n.d.).

Livelihood assets are frequently broken down into five capitals – human, social, financial, physical, and natural. Each consist of both tangible assets such as resources and stores, and intangible assets such as claims and access (Chambers and Conway, 1992). A livelihood is therefore more complicated than just the availability of certain assets. Rather it is a combination of which assets people have the capability to use, the risks involved in different ways of managing the assets, management of skills and relationships, as well as the wider context in which these activities take place (De Haan and Zoomers, 2005; Ellis and Allison, 2004). However, understanding the assets available to individuals or households and their interlinkages is fundamental to understanding their livelihood strategies, trajectories, and in the context of this research, the impact of CAMPFIRE. Bebbington (1999) even stresses that these assets are not just a means for people to make a living but that they are also give meaning to the world for those concerned. Table 2-4 provides a description of the five assets commonly used in discussions about sustainable livelihoods (DFID, 1999).

**Table 2-4: Description of the 5 capital assets from the SLF derived from DFID (1999)**

| Capital | Criteria |
|---|---|
| Human | Skills, education and knowledge, ability to labour, good health i.e. amount and quality of labour available in a household (see also Ellis, 1999). |
| Social | Networks and connectedness (vertical or horizontal), relationships of trust, membership of formal groups, reciprocity and exchanges, with links to collective action (see Cundill and Fabricius, 2010). |
| Physical | Basic infrastructure, changes to physical environment that help basic needs and productivity, producer goods i.e. tools and equipment, water and sanitation, information access |
| Financial | Stocks i.e. livestock and savings, and flows i.e. remittances and piece jobs |
| Natural | Quality and quantity of natural resources and ecosystem services |

## 2.6    Theoretical Frameworks

CBNRM and PES projects, including CAMPFIRE, are highly complex programmes involving multiple actors of differing characteristics, institutions (both formal and informal), processes, and scales ranging from the international to the household and even individual level. The interactions and relationships between these factors determine the shaping and framing of CBNRM projects' design, impact, and outcomes. This multi-stakeholder, multi-level interplay is rarely appreciated within the literature and analysis surrounding such projects especially in the depth needed to fully understand the workings of the system as a whole (Blom et al., 2010; Cerbu et al., 2011; Folke et al., 2007; Frost and Bond, 2008). As such, this research is based upon the frameworks of environmental entitlements and sustainable livelihoods which together appreciate the interrelations, interdependencies, and causal links between social, economic, and environmental factors both at and across levels.

The Environmental Entitlements framework of Leach et al. (1999) combined with elements of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) of Scoones (1998) together provide the conceptual structure in which this research sits.

The following section explains these frameworks. The rationale, and explanation, for their use is explained in Chapter 3.

## 2.6.1     Environmental Entitlements Framework

The Environmental Entitlements (EE) framework (Figure 2-5Figure 2-5) builds on Amartya Sen's (1981) entitlements work which considered why people still experience famine even when there is no shortage of food. Leach et al. (1999) adapted Sen's approach to the environmental realm, focusing on institutional aspects, across levels from micro to macro, that affect people's access to (endowments), control over (entitlements), and ability to use (capabilities) environmental goods and services, and the outcomes this creates for different social actors. The EE approach prides itself on appreciating the heterogeneity of different social groupings, power relations between and amongst different actors, and the need to understand the complexities and dynamisms involved in both intra- and inter-relationships: "the environmental entitlements framework therefore links both the macro and micro levels of concern. It situates 'disaggregated' (or 'micro') analysis of the distinctive positions and vulnerabilities of particular [social actors] in relation to the 'macro' structural conditions of the prevalent political economy" (Leach et al., 1999, p.234). The EE approach is more practically described as a set of analytical tools to assist in unravelling actors' access to, use of, and transformation of environmental goods and services; and as a guide for the external analyst (Leach et al., 1999). It is used in this thesis for all of these reasons.

**Figure 2-5**: **Environmental entitlements framework (Leach et al., 1999)**

The EE framework was developed on the basis that in order to treat social and ecological phenomena as the dynamic and complex processes that they are, rather than as a snap shot (as originally proposed by Sen), it is necessary to focus not on the individual components of endowments, entitlements, and capabilities, but rather to focus on the 'dynamic mapping processes' shaped by the institutions operating across the micro to macro scales. Focusing on the institutional aspects aids in understanding the links between 'differentiated environments' and 'differentiated communities', and provides

a unique approach to analysing community-based projects where many institutions have formally been ignored or misrepresented (Forsyth et al., 1998). Subsequently, as local institutional arrangements are underpinned by power relations, and are shaped, in turn, by interactions with regional, national, and global-level processes (both environmental and political-economic) it is necessary to adopt a multi-level, multi-actor approach to this research. Chapter 3 discusses this in more depth.

Indeed, more practically, the EE framework highlights the relationships between and among institutions, both horizontally and vertically. These relationships are of central importance in affecting which social actors gain access to and control over local resources i.e. endowments and entitlements. They also affect how the social actors use the resources they have access to and/or control over (i.e. capabilities), and how the social actors using the resources affect the institutions simultaneously (Leach et al., 1999). It is these interactions that determine the entitlements, endowments, and capabilities that result in the reality on the ground for the different social actors. Through focusing on the relationships, over time, between and among institutions and governance structures, especially those across different scales (Ostrom, 1990; Young, 2002), the EE framework links together the macro picture of the phenomena i.e. the political and economic context, with the micro reality on the ground for the local actors (Mearns et al., 2000).

## 2.6.2    Sustainable Livelihoods Framework

The SLF (Figure 2-6) enables an understanding of the livelihoods of local communities being studied, what assets they have, and what they do/can do with these assets (Yaro, 2004). It gives emphasis to the role of local people's needs and the two-way relationships between their livelihoods and, in the case of this study, CBNRM projects. The livelihoods approach allows analysis of CAMPFIRE's success against its aim to promote rural livelihoods and it also identifies the impacts natural resource management has in areas dependent upon their natural resource base (Farrington et al., 1999). While this connection has been studied elsewhere (e.g. see Ashley, 2000 for Kenya and Namibia; and Ellis and Allison, 2004 for Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, and Kenya), CAMPFIRE project communities have yet to undergo such specific local level analysis in

the context of the broader programme. Hulme and Murphree (2001) broadly touch upon elements of this but not as one comprehensive study.



**Figure 2-6: The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (Scoones, 1998)**

The central part of the SLF is the Asset Pentagon seen in Figure 2-6 labelled as 'livelihood assets' (Krantz, 2001). This mixture of assets is the fundamental basis from which people construct their living, and includes both tangible (resources and stores) and intangible (claims and access) factors (Chambers and Conway, 1992). The different assets are segregated into five different capital groups – human capital (H), natural capital (N), financial capital (F), physical capital (P), and social capital (S) (DFID, 1999). By disaggregating livelihood assets into these five capitals, it is possible to focus on one capital and examine the influences and relationships it has with the other capitals, as well as determining the wider structures and processes affecting each one (Baumann, 2000, p.19). This generates the opportunity to examine the variety of ways that the wider CAMPFIRE process may impact livelihoods on the ground.

There are weaknesses and criticisms of the SLF that need to be taken into consideration if it is to be used as an analytical tool to make sense of complex livelihoods. Of importance is the critique that the SLF does not explicitly recognise the aspects of

administrative scale or the multiple levels of governance within the complexity of local livelihoods (Yaro, 2004). While the transforming structures and processes section of the framework does point to the examination of the wider influencing processes, it does not provide a structured tool for doing so and thus is easily done superficially or not at all. Yaro (2004) explains that the framework conflates levels and micro-realities into the "policies, institutions, and processes" grey box (p.28). When considering the impact of a wider initiative that is instigated at the national level, scale and the ability to discern the wider influencing process involved are very important. Scoones (2009) states that it is necessary "to develop livelihood analyses which examine networks, linkages, connections, flows and chains across scales, but remain firmly rooted in place and context" (p.188). However, the household level understanding of livelihood activities is not enough to understand *why* these practices occur, hence its consideration here alongside the EE approach.

## 2.7 Justifications

As the literature review has shown in this chapter, there are significant gaps in understanding CAMPFIRE and CBNRM. CAMPFIRE, while studied frequently over its 30 year lifetime, has not yet undergone a rigorous analysis of its progress against its stated aims, especially those related to livelihoods. As an initiative designed specifically to provide an alternative livelihood opportunity for rural populations, this understanding is vital to ascertaining just how successful the programme has been, and thus how much other similar initiatives should follow and learn from it. Objective 1 undertakes this challenge.

Integral to this are the missing voices from the rural populations that CAMPFIRE was designed to help. Understanding the processes and outcomes of CAMPFIRE from multiple stakeholders' perspectives is important but has tended to be more technical and politically oriented, providing outsiders' takes on local impacts. To fully comprehend CAMPFIRE impacts, it is necessary to hear and take into account local stories, experiences, and perspectives of the impacts on their livelihoods. Additionally, as discussed above, the level of involvement of the local communities and their interpretation of this involvement is indicative of CAMPFIRE's level of implementation

as a CBNRM programme. Objectives 1 and 2 place the perceptions of the local community members at the centre of analysis.

The importance and relevance of understanding the entire multilevel system of CAMPFRE was highlighted in Section 2.4.2.1. Objectives 1, 2 and 3 deal with different levels of this multilevel system. Related to this is the need to consider the programme within the wider governing context to fully appreciate the wider influences and processes impacting upon the programme itself and its subsequent effects on the ground. This also shows to what extent the programme was designed with this wider context in mind. Objective 3 considers this wider context for CAMPFIRE and Zimbabwe's natural resource management governance system.

## 2.8    Summary of Chapter 2

This chapter has outlined the background to the research topics and provided explanations of the main concepts being used. In doing so, it has highlighted gaps in understandings of CAMPFIRE that are pertinent for learning comprehensive lessons for CBNRM. It also outlined how these are addressed within this thesis.

## Chapter 3:   Research Design and Methods

## 3.1      Introduction to Chapter 3

The first part of this chapter (Section 3.2) begins by discussing the research design and the research philosophy adopted in this thesis. It discusses in more detail the theoretical and conceptual frameworks outlined previously in Section 2.5 and highlights how they are used within this study. The chapter then explains the case study approach undertaken and provides a contextual background to Zimbabwe, the case study districts, and the case study villages alongside the methods used for their selection. The second part of this chapter (Section 3.3) provides detailed information on the data collection process, specifying which methods were used, why and how. It gives an overview of the amount of data collected using each method and explains the analysis process before continuing to outline the key considerations that have affected the research process. These include: positionality, ethics, and working as a research team and their implications for data validity.

## 3.2      Research Design

The research design refers to the approaches taken in the research that inform the formulation of research questions and the data collection process (Creswell et al., 2007). In this case, the research investigates the governance processes of a complex multi-level, multi-actor programme. As such, it takes a qualitative approach with a multiple case study strategy (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Ormston et al., 2013; Yin, 2003). An interpretive constructivist perspective underlies the research (Patton, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). Environmental entitlements (Leach et al., 1999) and sustainable livelihoods (Ashley, 2000; Krantz, 2001; Scoones, 1998) provide the frameworks for the research and are utilised at different parts of the study. After discussing these, this section goes on to provide a background of Zimbabwe and in doing so highlights the justification for choosing Zimbabwe as a case study country. The section also provides details on the choices of case study districts and villages for data collection.

### 3.2.1       Qualitative approach

The objectives of this research require an understanding of participant perceptions, opinions and experiences as well as of social and political processes and wider context.

As such, this thesis took a qualitative approach (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005; Ormston et al., 2013). Qualitative research, as described by Winchester and Rofe (2010), is usually used to tackle two research question types – one regarding social structures and the other focusing on individual experiences. Both of these types are present in this thesis.

As highlighted in Chapter 2, significant research gaps have been identified in the overall understanding of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. One is the lack of inclusion of local level knowledge and voices in the evaluation and analysis of CAMPFIRE projects on the ground. Adopting a qualitative approach as opposed to quantitative, according to Ormston et al. (2013), uses the accounts of research participants as a starting point and is concerned with exploring a phenomena from the 'interior' (p.3). The relatively inductive nature of the research enhances the opportunity to put participants' perspectives at the forefront of the research by enabling the emergence of concepts from the data rather than framing questions and results in predetermined theories (Creswell et al., 2007; Ormston et al., 2013).

Another research gap is caused by the previously restricted consideration of governance processes to particular levels rather than as an entire complex governance system. A qualitative approach to researching this multi-level, multi-actor phenomena allows the emergence of multiple perspectives and experiences that contribute to building a comprehensive picture of the interlinkages, interrelationships, and interdependencies within and between levels and actors in the complex system. Through building and grounding emerging theory in realities found empirically in the case studies, opportunities arise to bring together the multiple realities of the multi-level multi-actor project, within their real life contexts and within the governance processes that underlie the CAMPFIRE system (Patton, 2002).

This qualitative and bottom-up approach fits well with the research philosophy guiding this study as is now discussed (see also Blaikie, 2009 for a more in depth discussion on the biases within induction/deduction).

### 3.2.2    Research philosophy

The research philosophy driving this study is derived from both the ontological and epistemological inclinations of the researcher, as well as appreciation for an appropriate

type of philosophy to gain the richness and depth of data needed to successfully answer the research questions.

Due to the multi-level, multi-actor nature of this research, alongside the desire to ascertain the perspectives of multiple stakeholders that impact, and are impacted by, the design, implementation, management and outcomes of CAMPFIRE projects, an interpretive constructivist perspective has been adopted (Patton, 2002; Saunders et al., 2009). It is important here to distinguish between constructivism and social constructionism.  As Crotty (1998) distinguishes, constructivism is about the equal value of each individuals' way of making sense of the world, whereas social constructionism argues that culture and society are the driving forces determining individuals' perspectives. While social constructionism plays an important role in the development of people's understandings, this research requires gaining each household's perspective of the different aspects of the CAMPFIRE system in order to accumulate the local communities' experiences. Thus constructivism is the better fit. By adopting an interpretive constructivist approach, new voices, views, and knowledge are drawn out.

### 3.2.3     Using the theoretical frameworks

The conceptual framings used in this thesis – Sustainable Livelihoods and Environmental Entitlements – have been introduced in Chapter 2. These frameworks were chosen for their fit with the focus of the research objectives and questions, and with the interpretive qualitative research design. This section explores how these frameworks are used.

The sustainable livelihoods approach allows analysis of CAMPFIRE's success against its aim to promote rural livelihoods and identified the impacts of natural resource management on the natural resource base (Farrington et al., 1999). While this connection has been studied elsewhere (Ashley, 2000; Ellis and Allison, 2004), CAMPFIRE project communities have yet to undergo detailed analysis. However, a household level understanding of livelihood activities is not enough to understand *why* any changes in livelihood practices may occur. The environmental entitlements framework (Leach et al., 1999) on the other hand is useful for reflexively analysing CAMPFIRE, resulting in contextualised understandings that span multiple governance

levels and institutional dynamics. Utilising a framework that understands the dynamic processes that are driving components of and relationships between, the social actors, ecological factors and the wider context, fits well with the objectives of this study.

The environmental entitlements framework helps to understand why impacts and outcomes occur, by enabling consideration of the wider influences and how they contribute to livelihoods. The environmental entitlements framework brings entitlement work (Sen, 1981) into the environmental realm focusing on institutional aspects, across scales, from micro to macro, that affect people's endowments (access to), entitlements (control over), and capabilities (ability to use) environmental goods and services. By using the environmental entitlements framework to assess and analyse household relations with natural resources, it is possible to identify the influencing institutions at and across various scales/levels, how CBNRM/CAMPFIRE processes influence these and how these processes and institutions are affecting the livelihoods of the rural communities. By melding aspects of the two frameworks together this study facilitates a more comprehensive focus on why households do what they do, and places greater emphasis on the interlinking factors that lead to the various impacts on livelihoods, many of which transcend scales and governance levels. This new framework – the SLEEF – is illustrated in Figure 3-1.Figure 3-1

This SLEEF adds four new considerations into the process. First, it takes each natural resource as an integrated whole rather than breaking each down into their individual components as done by Leach et al. (1999). This allows for a broader scale of analysis and perspectives of natural resource management influencing factors and their role within livelihoods, as well as analysis of links with the programmatic scale of evaluation. Second, it deals explicitly with multiple levels through the environmental entitlements framework analysis of institutions. Such a multi-level approach is paramount to understanding the complex structures and processes involved in natural resource management. Third, the framework appreciates, and allows assessment of, the role the other assets play in shaping endowments, entitlements, and capabilities of households and villages to certain natural resources. Finally, the iterative loop created by linking the asset pentagon with environmental entitlement capabilities and livelihood strategies makes explicit the interrelationships and connections between each part of the process.

**Figure 3-1: Combined SLF and EEF (SLEEF) framework for understanding household livelihood strategies given the context of CAMPFIRE (drawing on elements from Carney (1998) and Leach et al. (1999))**

### 3.2.4        Use of the term 'community' in this thesis

On the basis of information gathered through the analysis of published materials (secondary and grey literature), and in line with discussions with key informants at all levels, this thesis considers each of the case study villages as an individual community. There is limited heterogeneity between the people and social groups within each of the villages. The main differentiation can be found in the type of livelihood activities undertaken by each household. This is factored into the sampling strategy as discussed in Section 3.3.1.2 below. When each respondent was asked what constitutes their community, most people did not feel there was a social type of 'community' on the basis of shared characteristics beyond geographic location. Furthermore, intra-household heterogeneity is appreciated but is beyond the scope of this study. This is recognised as an important next step in continuing this research further to deeper levels of detail. In this thesis, the first priority was to assess the overall impacts of CAMPFIRE on peoples' livelihoods, empowerment, and development at the community level. By ensuring the voices and perspectives of each respondent drove the progress of the research, any discrepancies or issues arising from this classification will be made clear.

### 3.2.5        Case study approach and selection

A case study approach is usually chosen when the research requires in-depth contextual understandings of a case. The case, or cases, are used as a means to explore and understand a wider issue, especially when the research is interested in the 'contextual conditions' surrounding a phenomena (Creswell et al., 2007; Yin, 2003). Case studies examine experiences and phenomena in real life contexts by seeking in-depth understandings of interpretations and meanings, and practical experiences (Crotty, 1998). Furthermore, the approach places the research in the perspective of the people being researched, and is very useful when the subject matter is subjective. It thus fits very well with the objectives of this study.

The case studies chosen for this study are geographically nested. Zimbabwe was chosen as the case study country, followed by two districts, and then within those, four villages

were selected for the concentrated data collection at the household level. The rationale behind each of these choices is discussed below.

While CBNRM is a global phenomenon and has been around in various forms for a long time, CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe set the stage for the formal wildlife based CBNRM as it is known in southern Africa today (Derman, 1995). To make sense of the mixed critiques of CBNRM generally in the region and especially in light of a regrowth in emphasis on community based processes in the environment/conservation realm, it made sense to go back to the country of origin. Zimbabwe has over thirty years of experience with CBNRM and is looked to as a quintessential example of successfully managing natural resources through local communities. As such, not only does Zimbabwe have a lot to offer in terms of lessons, but it is paramount that the critiques and often ignored issues are understood and resolved before the discourse is progressed further.

A scoping study was conducted in May and June 2012. Through information gathered from key informants, followed up in subsequent email communication and secondary literature, the two administrative districts of Binga (northwest) and Chiredzi (southeast) were chosen as case study areas for reasons outlined in Section 3.2.5.1 (Figure 3-2). This secondary information was relied upon as it was not feasible at the time of the scoping study to visit the rural areas of Zimbabwe due to changes in immigration procedures.

**Figure 3-2: Location of Binga District and Chiredzi District in Zimbabwe (source: Google Earth, October 2015)**

First, the districts were chosen because despite sharing many of the same contextual characteristics (Table 3-1)), they are considered to have historically contrasting CAMPFIRE outcomes. This makes for an interesting comparison. Chiredzi District is broadly perceived to be an area of 'successful' CAMPFIRE whilst Binga District has been an area of 'less successful' outcomes (Conyers, 2002; Dzingirai, 2003; Matondi, 2012). Binga District's comparative lack of success is anecdotally reported and there is a notable absence of positive evidence with the secondary and grey literature compared to Chiredzi District. Drawing from the literature (e.g. Conyers, 2002) and personal communication with professionals involved in CAMPFIRE (Dzingirai, 2012; Matondi, 2012), Binga District is described to have had a natural resource base with high

CAMPFIRE potential but this potential was not realised. While this conclusion is reached for many CAMPFIRE projects in districts across Zimbabwe, and of the CAMPFIRE programme as a whole, Binga District is often singled out.

As the nature of this research was to focus on the more subtle elements of the CAMPFIRE projects' governance structures and processes (including institutional dynamics) having case study districts with similar characteristics (thus variables held as constant as possible) yet differing outcomes, allowed variations in these more subtle elements, and their impacts on the projects' outcomes to become more discernible. Considering a case that has been 'successful' and one that has not creates the opportunity to discover why this is so, in terms of the intricate dynamics underlying the projects.

73

**Table 3-1: Comparison of characteristics for selection of case study districts**

| CHARACTERISTIC | INFORMATION | RELEVANCE | REFERENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Granted Appropriate Authority in same year** | 1989/90 | • Substantial period of implementation and thus good amount of history and potential information to access. | Conyers (2002)<br>Davis et al. (2009)<br>Dzingirai (1996)<br>Dzingirai (2003)<br>Frost and Bond (2008)<br>Matondi (2012) |
| **Isolated and rural locations** | Accessible only by rough roads, which are virtually impassable in wet season. A 4x4 vehicle is essential. | • Experience same difficulties in accessing wider infrastructure and economy, affecting their ability to develop independently from local resources.<br>• Difficult access for tourism. | Conyers (2002)<br>Davis et al. (2009)<br>Dzingirai (1996)<br>Dzingirai (2003)<br>Frost and Bond (2008)<br>Matondi (2012)<br>Ungaani (2012) |

| CHARACTERISTIC | INFORMATION | RELEVANCE | REFERENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Levels of tourism** | • No recent valid data is available on tourist numbers– both consumptive (hunting) and non-consumptive (photography/viewing).<br>• Both have limited tourism infrastructure, and only have 2-3 lodges to receive CAMPFIRE revenues from.<br>• National political and economic crises resulted in declining tourism levels. | • Amount of revenue potential<br>• Robustness of alternative economy/how much the project can supplement other livelihoods. | Jones (2006)<br>Matondi (2012)<br>Ungaani (2012) |
| **Reputation of true wilderness** | • High wildlife populations relative to elsewhere in the country (comparable to Hwange National Park).<br>• Part of the 12 districts with potential to establish viable alternative economies. | • Similar levels of attraction and potential. | Dzingirai (1996)<br>Dzingirai (2003)<br>Murray (2010)<br>Zim Parks (2012) |

75

| CHARACTERISTIC | INFORMATION | RELEVANCE | REFERENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| | • Rely on reputation of being true wilderness area to encourage tourists. | | |
| **Climatic and agro-ecological conditions** | Agro-ecological Zone V with erratic rainfall.<br><500mm per annum, poor soil fertility and frequent droughts. | • Agriculture limited to livestock grazing increasing land use conflict with wildlife.<br>• Crops grown are thus of higher value and result in greater loss if damaged by wildlife.<br>• Vulnerable livelihoods. | Conyers (2002)<br>Dzingirai (1996)<br>Dzingirai (2003)<br>Frost and Bond (2008)<br>Mugandani et al. (2012)<br>Vincent and Thomas (1960) |
| **Development and poverty levels** | Described as underdeveloped and poor, with a lack of infrastructure. | People likely to be more reliant on CAMPFIRE revenue and/or livelihoods in more direct conflict with CAMPFIRE over land use opportunities taken by projects. | Conyers (2002)<br>Dzingirai (1996)<br>Dzingirai (2003)<br>Global Eye (2009)<br>Muchapondwa (n.d.)<br>Murray (2010) |

| CHARACTERISTIC | INFORMATION | RELEVANCE | REFERENCES |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Displacement history** | Shangaan minority ethnic group was evicted from Gonarezhou National Park (Chiredzi), and the Tonga were displaced from the Zambezi Valley with the creation of Lake Kariba (Binga). | • Both populations are ethnic minorities which have negative perceptions within Zimbabwe (see Dzingirai, 2003).<br>• Both populations are suffering from a reduction in livelihood potential through being moved to less fertile, more drought prone land. | Balint and Mashinya (2006)<br>Chirozva (2009)<br>Conyers (2002)<br>Dzingirai (1996)<br>Dzingirai (2003)<br>Murray (2010) |
| **Park Problem History** | Both Gonarezhou National Park (Chiredzi) and Chizarira National Park (Binga) experienced very high elephant poaching levels during colonialism and early independence resulting, in wildlife, especially elephants, being more aggressive and wary. | Populations in both districts are likely to have similar issues with regard to aggressiveness of wildlife towards humans both as part of the wildlife-human conflict ("problem animal control" (PAC)), and for tourism. | Matondi (2012)<br>Ungaani (2012) |
| **Recent poaching levels** | Experiencing current high levels of poaching both from locals and outsiders. | Similar political issues to contend with in terms of dealing with poachers and with the expectations poachers create within communities. | Frost and Bond (2008)<br>Matondi (2012)<br>Murray (2010) |

A second consideration when choosing the case study districts was logistical. Both districts were more politically stable than others that were also suitable for study (e.g. Masoka); key informants could act as gatekeepers to these districts; and while not over studied (e.g. Mahenye), there would have been enough secondary data/literature to continue the study if political instability had arisen in the lead up to the national elections occurring during the fieldwork season in 2013.

### 3.2.5.1 Background to the case study districts: Binga and Chiredzi

Binga District is located in Matabeleland North in the Zambezi Escarpment in western Zimbabwe. The District borders the Chizarira National Park to its east, Lake Kariba to its west, and a number of Forest Reserves and Safari Areas to the North and South (Binga RDC, 2010). Chizarira National Park is Zimbabwe's third largest National Park. The District is considered to be one of the poorest in Zimbabwe (Muchapondwa, n.d.), frequently described as underdeveloped with high levels of poverty and limited infrastructure (Global Eye, 2009; Muchapondwa, n.d.; Murray, 2010). This is, in part, caused by the District's vulnerable climatic and ecological conditions which are outlined below. There are 21 wards in Binga District, consisting of an average of 3-4 villages per ward, and which overall had an estimated population of over 100,000 people in 2001, consisting mainly of the indigenous, ethnic minority, Tonga (also known as Batonga) tribe, and with some influxes of migrants in the extreme east and southwest (Conyers, 2002; Dzingirai, 1996; Dzingirai, 2003). The district is not listed in the 2012 Zimbabwe Statistic report on the census data (Government of Zimbabwe, 2012b), hence the 2001 data are the most up to date that could be found. The Tonga were displaced from the fertile Zambezi Valley, which they had inhabited for generations, by the construction of the Kariba Dam and the subsequent flooding of the valley to create Lake Kariba between 1954 and 1960. Their displacement meant a move to the conditions of Binga District in agro-ecological Zone V (Murray, 2010).

In agro-ecological Zone V, rainfall is low and erratic (<500mm per annum), soils have very little fertility, and temperatures are hot, which combined with the low rainfall results in a high frequency of droughts (Mugandani et al., 2012). This has an impact on livelihood options in the area as rainfall is too low and erratic for the reliable production of even drought resistant fodder and grain crops, and farming is based on grazing natural

pasture. These conditions have impacted significantly upon the Tonga's livelihoods which were traditionally fishing and subsistence farming prior to their displacement.

These poor conditions have been exacerbated further by the higher incidences of wildlife conflict found in the District compared to the rest of the Zambezi Valley (Murray, 2010). Binga District is classified as one of the twelve districts in Zimbabwe with "consistently marketable quota of wildlife for hunting or some other sellable natural attraction" (Frost and Bond, 2008, p.778). This has manifested in *all* communal land in the district being made into hunting concessions and highlights the proximity of human settlements to wildlife habitats and thus the high potential for wildlife-human conflicts (Conyers, 2002).

Chiredzi District is located in Masvingo Province in the south east of Zimbabwe. The district borders both Gonarezhou National Park and Mozambique to the east, and South Africa to the south. Gonarezhou National Park is the second largest park in Zimbabwe and covers approximate 95% of the district's area (about 5053 $km^2$). It is world famous due to it being part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Area, the largest wildlife sanctuary in the world. Additionally, the district also boasts wildlife conservancies such as the Malilalangwe Conservancy (about 54000ha), the Save Valley Conservancy (76000ha) and Chiredzi River Conservancies. The district also hosts the giant sugar plantations of Hippo Valley, Triangle, and Mkwasine Estates (Gandiwa et al., 2013; Murray, 2010).

The district consists of 22 Wards with an approximate population of 275,759 which averages at 4 people per household (Government of Zimbabwe, 2012b). The people of the district, mainly Shangaanis, were relocated from the Mozambique border with the creation of Gonarezhou National Park in 1975 (Murray, 2010). Traditionally cattle ranchers and pastoralists, the Shangaani way of life has been negatively affected by droughts, lack of space for grazing, and the spread of diseases. With little means of recovery from these stresses, they have come to rely more on sedentary crop farming, albeit relatively unsuitable in agroecological zone V where rainfall is little and unreliable, and soils are not very fertile (Mugandani et al., 2012; Vincent and Thomas, 1960).

### 3.2.5.2    Case study village selection and background

Two villages from each of the case study districts were chosen for data collection in order to provide cross-case comparison within districts as well as between them (Baxter, 2010). At the request of the RDCs and in line with ethical procedures, the names of the villages have been kept anonymous.

Criteria were developed to guide in the choice of villages and help was attained from key informants such as academics and practitioners who had previously worked in these districts (e.g. Centre for Applied Social Sciences, Environment Africa) and the RDCs. The criteria are laid out in Table 3-2 which also shows how the villages complement each other between districts.

The household level was chosen as the unit of study for this research as it is deemed to be the unit of basic production and consumption in rural Zimbabwe (Murphree, 1990) and CAMPFIRE procedures also focus on households. The definition of household used by this study builds on the local definition of the household unit in rural Zimbabwe, the '*umuzi*', which refers to a homestead of people who all 'feed from the same pot'.

**Table 3-2**: **Criteria for the selection of case study villages**

|  | Binga District | | Chiredzi District | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Criteria | Village 1 | Village 2 | Village 3 | Village 4 |
| 1. No. of households <150 | 100 | 89 | 91 | 81 |
| 2. Varying distance from political and economic centre | 160 km from Binga Town and RDC | 35 km from Binga Town | 150 km from Chiredzi Town and RDC | 40 km from Chiredzi Town and RDC |
| 3. Villages existed pre-CAMPFIRE implementation | Residents relocated from Zambezi Valley in 1957 | Yes | Yes, although many residents relocated from Mozambique in 1950s | Yes |
| 4. Accessible politically and logistically | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| 5. Other relevant information | Considered the "business centre" of the area | - | Considered the "business centre" of the area | - |

Prior to starting data collection, permission was gained from the relevant district officials (District Administrator, Chief Executive Officer of the RDC, Office of the President, Police) and village authorities (Chief).

The rest of this section provides a brief background to each of the four chosen villages.

Village 1 is located approximately 160 km north of the main town in the district (Binga town). The ward in which the village is located is very isolated, located approximately 35 km from the main road along a very poor road. The village is known as the ward business centre because it is the central village for all ward activities. The ward is overseen by the Chief who resides approximately 3 km from the centre of the village.

The village fulfilled the selection criteria and additionally had the added component of being involved in both CAMPFIRE and a nascent REDD+ project being implemented in the area at the time of selection. By selecting a business centre instead of a more remote village, the impacts of the political and institutional factors were thought to be likely to

be more obvious, with the assumption made that these would become weaker further from the centre.

Village 2 is an isolated village 6 km off the main road and 36 km from Binga Town. It borders the boundary of Chizarira National Park. The village was chosen as a suitable contrast to Village 1 as it is located closer to Binga Town thus providing an opportunity to explore potential changes in governance processes and impacts due to geographical location. It also fulfils all other village selection criteria, and is a similar size in terms of households as Village 1. The village is overseen by the Chief who resides approximately 18 km away in another town.

Village 3 is located adjacent to the southern edge of Gonarezhou National Park near the Malipati Safari Area. Like Village 1 it is considered to be the business centre of the area. The village was chosen as it fulfilled all the selection criteria and was a suitable comparison to Village 1 – located over 150 km from the main district town and the RDC, being a business centre, and having a similar number of households. However, the village is overseen by a Chief who resides over 100 km away in another ward of the district.

Village 4 is located approximately 40 km from Chiredzi town also alongside Gonarezhou National Park. This village was chosen due to its similarities to Village 2, being closer to the administrative centre of the district as well as not being a business centre. It also fulfils all other village selection criteria as outlined in Table 3-2. The village is overseen by the same Chief as Village 3 who resides even further away from Village 4.

## 3.3    Methods

This section outlines the methods used for data collection, explains why and how they were used, and the quantity of data collected.

### 3.3.1    Data collection and methods

A mixed methods approach was used for primary data collection as shown in Table 3-3. Data collection consisted of a household survey, followed by semi-structured household interviews. Both of these were conducted with the head of each household whether male or female. Village workshops were also conducted with both men and women,

which included participatory methods such as Chrice Matrices (FAO, n.d.; VSO, n.d.) and Stakeholder Mapping (Aligica, 2006). Key informant interviews were conducted with local leaders, and national level organisations and government departments. Each of these methods will now be discussed in turn.

**Table 3-3**: **Methods used for data collection and amount collected**

|  | Surveys/Total Households | Interviews/ Total Households | Focus Groups | Key Village Informants |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Village 1** | 97/100 = 97% | 23/100 = 23% | Total: 3 2 x women (1x12, 1x30) 1 x men (1x8) | Chief Councillor Ex-CAMPFIRE Committee (Secretary) |
| **Village 2** | 78/89 = 88% | 18/89 = 21% | Total: 4 2 x women (1x35, 1x21) 2 x men (1x5, 1x11) | Chief Ex-CAMPFIRE Committee (Member) Primary School Head Teacher Chief's messenger |
| **Village 3** | 43/83 = 52% | 30/83 = 36% | None | Councillor CAMPFIRE Committee (Chairman and Secretary) Clerk at CBO |
| **Village 4** | 41/81 = 51% | 33/81 = 40% | None | CAMPFIRE Committee (Chairman) Village Heads |

### 3.3.1.1 Surveys

Social science surveys can collect both quantitative and qualitative data. They are primarily used to collect easily measurable data through questioning a sample of a population (Fowler, 2013). A semi-structured questionnaire survey (Simon, 2006) was used to collect initial household data from all village households on demographics, livelihood activities, natural resource use, and to gain household understandings of the governance processes surrounding these factors. A questionnaire survey was considered to be the best means of collecting this baseline data which could then be used to inform more in-depth interviews and village workshops (discussed below). Conducting the survey with as many households as possible ensured the data collected

painted as accurate a picture as possible of the local context and that it was driven by the perceptions and experiences of the local people. This form of survey is commonly referred to as a census survey (Fowler, 2013), although the data being collected in this case was not used to inform the census of Zimbabwe. As the aim was to survey every household in each village no sampling method was created prior to fieldwork. However, due to numerous factors that affected the research process in Villages 3 and 4 a sampling method was subsequently generated for the survey at the start of each respective section of the fieldwork process (see Section 3.3.1.2).

The survey asked a mixture of closed and open ended questions which created space for local realities to emerge from the data. This was important to build local context and understanding. The initially designed survey was piloted in Village 1 at the start of the fieldwork process resulting in a few changes and covered a number of different aspects of local life (Simon, 2006) (an English language copy of the survey can be found in Appendix A).

In Villages 1 and 2, surveys were conducted with every household present at the time of data collection, and then used to inform the sampling strategy for the household interviews (Table 3-4). Upcoming national elections meant it was not possible to spend as much time in Village 3 and 4, and so the data collection process had to be streamlined. This is discussed in more detail below.

**Table 3-4**: Total number of survey responses collected per village

|  | Village 1 | Village 2 | Village 3 | Village 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **No. of households** | 100 | 89 | 83 | 81 |
| **No. households surveyed** | 93 | 80 | 43 | 41 |
| **% households surveyed** | 93% | 90% | 52% | 51% |

Given the lack of literacy and the open ended nature of the questions, the surveys were conducted verbally, face-to-face by a research team consisting of two research assistants and, two local translators in each village (Fowler, 2013). Many of the respondents were apprehensive about talking to a 'white outsider' and so after observing the progress of the first six surveys done by each research assistant, I stepped away from the process, instead monitoring the quality of the surveys as they were completed. The survey was originally written in English and translated into the two main Zimbabwean languages – Ndebele and Shona – by the research assistants. In conducting the survey, the questions were further translated into the local languages of Tonga (in Villages 1 and 2) and Shangaani (in Villages 3 and 4) by the locally-employed translators. Further information on the process of translation can be found in Section 3.5.3.

### 3.3.1.2 Sampling strategy

At the end of each survey, participants were asked to state whether they would be willing to be interviewed in more depth if their household was selected. This contributed further towards ensuring informed consent. The purpose of the research was re-explained and it was also made clear that the selection process of households to be interviewed would be random and not biased (Willis, 2006). Before including each surveyed household into the sampling strategy, those who had stated they were not willing to participate further were removed. Only a few people in each village opted out, usually due to sickness.

Overall, a stratified sampling method was used to identify the sample for the semi-structured interviews in Villages 1 and 2 (Simon, 2006) whereas a mixture of stratified and opportunistic sampling was used in Villages 3 and 4 (Patton, 2002).

The stratified sampling method in Villages 1 and 2 was informed and guided by the survey results based upon the main livelihood categories of the households and the age group of the household head. It emerged that the main difference between household was whether their main livelihood activity was agriculturally subsistent, subsistent based upon another activity than agriculture, or based on cash income from various activities such as selling Non-Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), crafts, or produce. Thus the three categories of '(subsistent) AGRICULTURE', 'OTHER (subsistent)' or 'CASH (income)' were identified as suitable groupings to split the survey respondents. Each had been asked to identify the activity they classified as the main one in their household and whether this was for subsistence or cash.

Age was another important factor as it determined respondents' perspectives towards, and memories of, CAMPFIRE, considering the three decade lifespan of the programme. As part of the initial demographic questions, respondents were asked to give their age. These were then split into another three categories: under 35 years old (young), 35 to 55 years old (mid), and over 55 years old (senior). The assumption behind these age categories was that those under 35 years old would have little, or no, memory of pre-CAMPFIRE village life. Those between 35 and 55 years old would have had some experience of life pre-CAMPFIRE to varying degrees, and those over 55 years old would have been at working age at the time of CAMPFIRE inception and were thus much more likely to have been able to make a comparison between time before CAMPFIRE and the varying stages of the project itself.

The age categories were combined with the livelihood categories to produce the final sampling groups: agriculture young, agriculture mid, agriculture senior; other young, other mid, other senior; and cash young, cash mid, and cash senior.

Gender of the main respondent was not an important consideration during the sampling strategy. Most respondents in all villages were female either due to a significant number of female headed households or due to the absence of men in each village. It is unclear

as to where many of the men were at the time of data collection, and this differed in each village. The reasons given ranged from men being at beer holes to migration to high male death rates due to dangerous types of employment (e.g. tobacco). Additionally, male respondents tended to enlist the help of the women of the household in answering questions. For more information on the gendered effects of CAMPFIRE (see Meynen and Doornbos, 2005; and Nabane and Matzke, 1997).

By classifying the village members on the basis of these categories, the sample is automatically stratified. Within these categories the choosing of households was done randomly to ensure as few biases as possible. An equal number of interviews were conducted in each category (where possible) to ensure each group's voice was equally represented in the data and findings. This allowed for the environmental entitlements processes, and related governance structures and processes, to be suitably mapped and identified. If a household was not available to be interviewed, another household in the same group was chosen instead.

The amount of time available to complete data collection in Villages 3 and 4 was much shorter than in Villages 1 and 2. As a consequence, the structure of the data collection process had to change including reducing the number of surveys. Instead of sampling every household in the village, the strategy shifted to sampling as many as possible within the time allocated for data collection. This meant that the data from these villages is not as comprehensively triangulated against such a depth of understanding of local context provided by the census surveys in Villages 1 and 2. However, the level of similarity in responses given across the surveys in each village provides a level of confidence in the data collected nonetheless.

To save time, interviews were also conducted on the same visit to each household as the survey, rather than being undertaken as a second stage of data collection. It was thus not possible to use a sampling strategy identical to that in Villages 1 and 2. A different sampling strategy was adopted for these circumstances.

Information from initial key informants and village gatekeepers told us that the majority of households in both Villages 3 and 4 were agriculturally subsistent, and thus splitting households up by main livelihood activity became somewhat redundant. Upon hiring

local translators in each village, a village map was drawn to identify each household in the village. These were numbered and placed in the same age categories as used previously, drawing on the translators' inherent knowledge of all village members. The households were then selected randomly within each age group prior to data collection. This generated an order in which the households should be surveyed and interviewed. Some households were not interviewed after completion of the survey for a number of reasons. First, the participant may have not have wanted or been able to continue. Second, if the research assistant felt the participant was unable to respond with any more detail than that collected in the survey, they did not continue. After each survey was completed we checked the predetermined category with the data given.

### 3.3.1.3 Semi-structured interviews

Semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to enter into the interviewee's personal perspective (Patton, 2002). The exploratory nature of semi-structured interviews fits with the interpretive philosophy and epistemology of this research. The interviews provide a rich and detailed set of data that enables the unravelling of complex and dynamic phenomena through providing opportunities to delve into certain areas whilst building a picture of the context within which the action or situation occurs (Saunders et al., 2009). In addition, semi-structured interviews provide the researcher with the opportunity to build rapport and trust with the interviewee through having a more conversational approach than structured interviews or surveys. This also places some power and control with the interviewee through the potential for two-way conservations thereby increasing the validity of the data gained.

The interviews conducted for this thesis followed an interview guide framed around four interview themes. These themes were devised based upon the overall aim and objectives of this thesis: the role and impact of CAMPFIRE on the livelihoods of the households interviewed (objective 1) and the role of the local communities within the project process (objectives 1 and 2). An interview guide is an important element of semi-structured qualitative interviews as it allows a degree of consistency in the type of information collected whilst simultaneously allowing for a more conversational and fluid exploration of the issues under discussion (Patton, 2002). The interview guide can be found in Appendix B.

Each interview lasted between 45 minutes and 2 hours depending on the willingness of the respondent to elaborate on answers and the amount of information available. Part of the reason for the long length of the interviews was the language barrier and the need to translate each question and answer across three different languages. This is further discussed in section 3.5.3. Interviews were, for the most part, conducted inside people's homesteads upon their invitation. Others were conducted in respondents' fields. Most interviews were conducted by the research assistants working with the local translators after I had again monitored the first five. To ensure the research complied with ethical standards all interviewees were explained in full the aim of the research and the role they would be playing within it (the full ethical form completed for this research can be found in Appendix F). Expectations were managed about the limited outcomes of the research for the village itself. It was also explained that all interviews would be kept anonymous at all times (Willis, 2006). Interviewing in people's homesteads sometimes affected the validity of the data collected as numerous people were around to contribute to the answers rather than just the head of household. However, this gave more depth to the data through the ensuing discussion and contributed to the more contextual understanding of familial relationships. Recording interviews was also made harder within homesteads due to the noise of livestock.

It was intended that 4-5 interviews were conducted in each livelihood/age group per village, and that this consisted of approximately 25% of households in each village. This was to ensure not only equal representation between all groups but also a depth of data within each one. The total number of interviews conducted in each village is laid out in Table 3-5. Splitting the respondents into the sampling categories helped to ensure a representative overview of perspectives across livelihood priorities and age dependent experiences.

**Table 3-5: Number of interviews conducted in each village**

|  | Village 1 | Village 2 | Village 3 | Village 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **No. of households** | 100 | 89 | 83 | 81 |
| **No. households interviewed** | 23 | 18 | 30 | 33 |
| **% households interviewed** | 23% | 21% | 36% | 40% |

### 3.3.1.4 Village workshops

Village workshops, like larger structured focus groups, allowed for the investigation of key themes that arise from other research methods i.e. the household semi-structured interview. As aforementioned, village workshops were not conducted in Villages 3 and 4. In Village 3 people had been involved in similar workshops just before we arrived and gatekeepers thought it would not be suitable to ask village members to partake in more. In Village 4 the run up to elections meant that large gatherings of people were not permitted. This meant that information collected in Villages 3 and 4 is not quite as in-depth as it could have been, and collective views were not noted. Also, the data collected through the surveys and interviews were not triangulated so clearly by the village participants as in Villages 1 and 2 where a number of workshops were held (Table 3-6).

**Table 3-6: Number of village workshops conducted in each village**

|  | Village 1 | Village 2 | Village 3 | Village 4 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **No. of village workshops** | 3 | 4 | 0 | 0 |
| **Number of participants** | 1 x 12 women<br>1 x 30 women<br>1 x 8 men | 1 x 35 women<br>1 x 21 women<br>1 x 5 men<br>1 x 11 men | 0 | 0 |

On the advice of the village gatekeepers in both Villages 1 and 2, all adult members from the village were invited to attend the workshops. In both villages, the gatekeepers did not think it suitable to restrict the participation to a few village members. Males and females were invited to separate workshops, again on the advice from key informants who believed women would be less likely to speak if men were present. The outcomes of the workshops did not significantly differ between genders.

In Village 1, multiple workshops were held with women due to a misunderstanding between the research team and the village gatekeeper. We had asked for him to send out word about the workshop for the following week whereas the message was relayed that the workshop for women was the next day. We used the opportunity to discuss village and community life with the women, including village mapping exercises (Barker, 2006), and to gain more background to the local context. The second workshop was more structured and followed the same planned activities as the male group.

In Village 2, two workshops were held with each gender. The village stretched along a 3 km section of road. In order to prevent some people having to walk a long distance to reach one workshop and thus risk biasing the data by having more representation from one part of the village, we held one workshop per gender on both sides of the village. At all workshops, participants were informed about the research aim and objectives, the role they were playing within the research, and the intended outputs. This was to ensure all participants were fully informed about the purpose of the research as not all had been involved in other data collection methods at this point. They were also told that all data would be held anonymously and that by attending they were giving consent for their participation.

During each structured workshop, the participatory methods of Chrice matrices (FAO, n.d.; VSO, 2004) and Stakeholder mapping (Aligica, 2006) were undertaken. The Chrice matrix was developed by Voluntary Services Overseas (VSO) and is one of the favoured methods put forward for exploration into the reasons behind a phenomenon (VSO, 2004; and has been subsequently used by FAO, n.d.). In the case of this research, it was used to explore initial reasons behind people's opinions towards CAMPFIRE and natural resource management. Participants were asked to discuss why they thought CAMPFIRE

was good and give reasons for each point made. They were then asked to discuss reasons why CAMPFIRE was bad and give reasons for each. In Village 1, this was also done for the REDD+ project. For this exercise, participants were split into age groups to a) manage numbers, and b) keep the results aligned with the categories developed in sampling. A literate member of each group was asked to write down the discussions in a table (Figure 3-3).



Figure 3-3: A women's group completing a Chrice matrix on CAMPFIRE during a village workshop in Village 1

Stakeholder mapping was used to explore the participants' perception of local level governance, representation, and participatory processes within natural resource management (Aligica, 2006). Initially, participants were asked to brainstorm all stakeholders involved in governing the local community and its natural resources. These were written down by the research assistants and cut out. Second, the groups in each workshop placed these stakeholder cards into a hierarchy of authority. They were then given arrows with which to link the stakeholders depending on which direction(s) authority flowed and which direction(s) representation and participation flowed. The flows of authority and participation were discussed with the participants as they

debated and decided where to put each stakeholder and what arrow should go between each. These discussions were noted and played a specific role in Objective 2 of this research (Figure 3-4).



**Figure 3-4: Participants doing the stakeholder mapping exercise during the men's village workshop in Village 1**

### 3.3.1.5 Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews are pervasive throughout the research design. Key informers are people who are either heavily involved in key aspects of the project or phenomenon, or have a lot of expertise in the area i.e. government officials and academics etc. Key informers provide the opportunity to gather initial contextual information prior to village level data collection, specifics on various elements of the research topics that may otherwise be unavailable, and a chance to triangulate findings and emerging conclusions.

Prior to data collection, a list of relevant key informant stakeholder groups was compiled with the aim of gathering data from each group to provide an all rounded view (Table 3-7). A few key contacts were established during the scoping trip, and from there snowball

sampling was used to contact and interview other key informants throughout the fieldwork period (Willis, 2006). Due to the anonymity promised to each informant, it is not possible to list the specific key informant stakeholders interviewed.

Table 3-7: List of relevant key informant stakeholder groups to the research

| Stakeholder Group | Governance Level | Specific stakeholders within group | Number of interviews conducted |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Community** | Local | Community-based organisations, local clubs | 2 |
| **Government** | Local | Village Development Committee (VIDCO) Ward Development Committee (WADCO) Village Wildlife Committee (VWC) Ward Wildlife Committee (WWC) Councillors Agricultural extension workers | 6 |
| | District | Rural District Councils (RDCs) District Development Committee District Administrator | 3 |
| | National | Government Departments | 3 |
| **Private Sector** | Local | Tourist lodges Private local businesses | 0 |
| | District | Safari companies | 0 |
| | National | National companies related to wildlife and tourism | 0 |
| | International | Private donors | 0 |
| **CAMPFIRE project** | Local | Local committees, staff | 2 |
| | District | National Park employees Park wardens District CAMPFIRE Office | 4 |
| | National | CAMPFIRE Association CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group Members | 2 |
| | International | Donors i.e. USAID, WWF | 1 |
| **Public sector** | All | Local and national NGOs, development and environment agencies | 3 |
| **Other** | | Academics, ecologists, specialists | 5 |

### 3.3.1.6 Multi-level workshop

In May 2014, a multi-level workshop was held in Harare in collaboration with the Centre of Applied Social Sciences (CASS) at the University of Zimbabwe. The workshop, titled "*Progressing CBNRM in Zimbabwe*" invited key participants from across the stakeholder spectrum to discuss the initial findings of this thesis and debate the way forward for CBNRM in Zimbabwe (Harrison et al., 2015).

Participants were selected based upon a list of contacts established during the fieldwork period as well as based on suggestions from CASS. They were selected from both the national and district level and across the spread of expertise. Participants were invited from the categories of national and district government, academic research, non-academic research, practical organisations including those directly linked to CAMPFIRE, non-governmental organisations, and independent consultants. These categories of stakeholders were decided an appropriate mix for giving a range of informed opinions from different perspectives.

The aim of the workshop was to move debates beyond the current impasse to find forward looking solutions for CBNRM in Zimbabwe. Through these discussions, numerous lessons and recommendations emerged that were followed up by this researcher with four of the participants and published as a Policy Brief through the University of Western Cape's Institute of Poverty, Land, and Agrarian Studies (PLAAS) policy brief series (Harrison et al., 2015). This can be seen in Appendix C. Due to ongoing separate collaborative research with PLAAS and their history of involvement with CBNRM and CAMPFIRE, their policy brief series was an obvious location for publication.

### 3.3.1.7 Systematic literature review

A systematic review of the CAMPFIRE literature was conducted to provide an overview of the strengths and weaknesses of CAMPFIRE as identified by the main peer reviewed studies over time. This systematic literature review was conducted specifically for Objective 3. The literature used throughout the thesis is from a wider ranging selection of literature.

The systematic review was conducted in two phases. The first phase involved identification of all possible relevant articles. A number of keyword searches were

conducted in both Web of Knowledge and Science Direct as the two main depositories of academic journals, with slight differences in results. The searches were restricted to post-1986 as the year CAMPFIRE was designed and initiated. The results of these searches can be seen below in Table 3-8.

**Table 3-8: Keyword searches and number of returns for both Web of Knowledge and Science Direct**

| Keyword Search | Number of Results Web of Knowledge | Number of Results Science Direct |
|---|---|---|
| "CAMPFIRE" AND "Zimbabwe" | 43 | 106 |
| "CBNRM" AND "Zimbabwe" | 13 | 46 |
| "Community based natural resource management" AND "Zimbabwe" | 20 | 0 |

The abstract and title of each article were reviewed against chosen characteristics for immediate inclusion or exclusion (Table 3-9), including removing any duplications across the two depositories. At the end of Phase 1, there were 32 journal articles to take into Phase 2. Phase 2 involved reading each of the 32 journal articles and considering in detail their appropriateness for inclusion in the review based upon further characteristics as listed in the third column in Table 3-9. This resulted in a final sample of 16 articles for inclusion in the systematic review.

**Table 3-9: Characteristics for inclusion and exclusion of articles in the systematic review**

| Inclusion | Exclusion Phase 1 | Exclusion Phase 2 |
|---|---|---|
| • Written in English<br>• Peer reviewed<br>• "CAMPFIRE" included in title<br>• CAMPFIRE main study of paper<br>• Considers process of CAMPFIRE system<br>• 6 mentions of "CAMPFIRE" within text<br>• Post-1986 publication date and/or focus | • Not written in English<br>• Focus on other studies and only brief mention to CAMPFIRE<br>• Pre-1986 publication date | • Focused on a geographical not area that is not Zimbabwe<br>• A topic not directly related to workings of CAMPFIRE<br>• Focused on period before 1986<br>• Inaccessible to University of Leeds journal subscriptions<br>• Only a singular or superficial mention of CAMPFIRE within article rather than it being central topic |

The 16 articles were then analysed. They were coded initially into the categories of positive (strengths) and negative (weaknesses) comments regarding CAMPFIRE processes and outcomes. The categories were then further coded on the basis of the key themes prevalent within them: 1) decentralisation vs devolution, 2) local governance, 3) participation, 4) representation and information, 5) transparency and accountability, 6) external influences, and 7) capacity. This systematic literature review and the resultant themes are used in Chapter 6. A list of the final 16 articles can be found in Appendix D.

## 3.4    Analysis

Analysis of data from all methods was undertaken with the same interpretive approach as the data was collected, balancing descriptive findings with interpretation (Zhang and Whildemuth, n.d.). An interpretative approach aids in making sense of participants' accounts and interpreting a meaning from these accounts (Ritchie et al., 2013; Welsh, 2002). In this vein, the analytical strategy adopted was to identify the main issues within the data, especially within each of the case studies, and then conduct cross-case comparisons (Baxter, 2010), as well as identify common themes across the cases that lend themselves to more generalizable lessons (Creswell et al., 2007; Yin, 2003). In order

to identify themes in the data, an iterative process of coding was undertaken both manually and electronically. Both of these coding methods are argued to bring something different to the analysis (Welsh, 2002). To code electronically, data from all methods was input into NVivo computer software from transcribed interviews from voice recordings, typed up interview and workshop notes, and typed up surveys (Bazeley, 2007). Using NVivo is said to enhance the "quality, rigour, and trustworthiness" of the research (Welsh, 2002, p.6).

Once inputted into NVivo the data went through a cyclical process of analysis and coding. Initial stage coding was conducted to identify any emerging codes within the wider predetermined foci of the research objectives i.e. livelihoods, entitlements, and natural resource use; local governance processes, structures and stakeholders, wider governance influences and institutions, and views towards CAMPFIRE and other forms of CBNRM. By initially amalgamating the data in this way, it was broken down from individual participant responses and grouped together across cases and sources under key relevant areas (Bazeley, 2007). Following this initial coding, themes were identified within each of the key areas which were then analysed through more focused interpretive coding (Saldaña, 2012). This second stage of coding, done multiple times, developed meaning to the data and provided specific but contextually linked understandings of different elements of the research (Bazeley, 2013). These were then compared explicitly across cases to identify not only case specific phenomenon but also those that transcended the spatial differentiation of the case study villages.

Basic quantitative analysis was undertaken using Microsoft Excel to determine the descriptive statistics such as the number of households involved in different livelihood activities and household demographics.

## 3.5 Considerations

When conducting research, it is necessary to consider a number of vital factors in the research design and data collection process, as well as analysis. From the researcher's positionality and the power dynamics between researcher and participants, to ethical procedures to ensuring validity of the research, these considerations are essential to ensuring reliable and trustworthy research outcomes. These are discussed below.

### 3.5.1     Positionality

Positionality refers to the relationship between the researcher and the researched in terms of power, perceptions and biases, how these affect the research process and how it is managed. Understanding positionality requires a significant degree of reflexivity of oneself as a researcher and of one's research process (England, 1994; Mansvelt and Berg, 2010; Newton and Parfitt, 2011). Conducting this reflection and unravelling positionality is especially important to consider in cross-cultural research (Twyman et al., 1999).

Being outsiders in rural villages immediately put the research team in a simultaneous position of power and scepticism. Educated outsiders are perceived (by the local people) to be more clever and more knowledgeable than local people which tipped the power dynamic further towards us. At the same time, outsiders are also scary and to be considered with caution. In one village we were seen as 'pagans' whilst in another as 'Satan's helpers'. These perceptions took time to undo to the detriment of data collection but ultimately doing so helped to build trust and relationships with the local participants creating a more viable environment for valid data collection (Newton and Parfitt, 2011). To most it was assumed we worked for the government which was another preconception we had to work hard to disprove so as not to encourage participants' fears of giving "wrong" answers or getting into trouble. This was also important in managing the expectations of participants that we were not connected to the government or international organisations who would ultimately be bringing food aid or development projects. Managing expectations in these ways is a crucial part of ensuring informed consent on the part of the participant, as well as ensuring the data collected is as reliable as possible and not influenced by unrealistic expectations (Apentiik and Parpart, 2006).

To reduce this division between local and outsider, the research team lived in tents in each village, and tried to adopt as much of the local lifestyles as possible (Momsen, 2006). This included collecting water from boreholes, cooking on open fires, learning greetings and pleasantries in the local languages, dressing appropriately and making ourselves accessible to anyone who wanted to talk. As a white woman I was frequently seen as 'scary' so I took a step back from much of the direct data collection processes and interactions with participants. While this meant it was harder for me to ensure

quality and consistency of the data collection, it provided opportunities for initial analysis of each stage, more participant observation, and the chance to interact informally with those who approached me.

A major element of positionality considerations is for the researcher and research team to be continually reflective on these elements of power and preconceptions on the part of the participants and how it may be affecting the data (Mansvelt and Berg, 2010). It is also important to consider the perceptions and biases that may be brought by us as the researchers (Brydon, 2006; Harrison, 2006; Mayoux, 2006). By taking a step back from data collection, I was provided with the space to reflect on the entire process in each village, and have a more objective view towards relationships, important topics and issues.

### 3.5.2    Ethics

Ethical considerations are hugely important when undertaking cross-cultural research (Howitt and Stevens, 2010). Not only does this link to the positionality of the research team, but also to the impact the research and research process can have on the participants (Dowling, 2010). Together this contributes towards the validity and reliability of the data collected and the subsequent research findings (Brydon, 2006). The University of Leeds has a strict ethical clearance procedure through which this research was granted ethical approval (AREA 11-141 dated 29th August 2012). A copy of the ethics application and approval can be found in Appendix E and F.

Harrison (2006) outlines five ethical guidelines that are useful for structuring a discussion on the ethics of this research. These are cultural sensitivity, privacy, informed consent, harm, and exploitation (p.63). Each of these is now discussed in turn.

To ensure the research team were culturally sensitive, prior research was conducted about the specific local cultures we would be working in and their associated practices, including thinking through any potential expectations local people may have of us (Howitt and Stevens, 2010). The employment of Zimbabwean research assistants helped but the case study sites were located in tribal areas which required extra investigation through key informants prior to arriving in the villages. In doing so we established the local expectations of us in terms of gaining permission from the Chiefs to conduct

research in their area, as well as processes for introducing ourselves to the villagers (Dzingirai, 2012; Matondi, 2012). I was also made aware of the patriarchal nature of the local societies and as such I employed a male and a female research assistant to ensure the gender division could be bridged. Finally, women had specific dress codes in each location which we were able to adhere to, making sure we did not cause any offense (Momsen, 2006). The employment of local translators once in the villages created accessible gatekeepers for us and proved to be an incredibly useful source of continuous information on local norms around which we could conduct ourselves.

To ensure privacy for the participants in the research, the data collection process was designed not to require people's names (Dowling, 2010; Obara and Robinson, 2010). All data was kept anonymous and confidential through an elaborate coding system to identify specific households (Brydon, 2006). In addition, all data was stored in a locked car at all times unless in the immediate possession of the research team. Upon return to the UK, the data was kept locked in an office drawer only accessible to the researcher.

The research team worked hard to ensure all participants were fully informed about who we were, and the aim, objectives, process and potential outcomes of the research prior to giving consent to be involved (Brydon, 2006; Dowling, 2010; Enticott, 2010). This information was offered in full at the start of every separate method i.e. survey, interview, and focus group. It was also offered to anyone even if they were not direct participants in any of the methods. After the situation had been explained, participants were given the opportunity to ask questions or request clarification on anything to ensure they understood what was being done and their role within it. It was stressed that any involvement was voluntary and that anyone could withdraw at any point (Momsen, 2006; Enticott, 2010). Consent was then asked for and given verbally, recorded on a dictaphone and noted on paper. Expectation management was a significant part of ensuring that people were accurately informed (Apentiik and Parpart, 2006). This included ensuring people understood the sampling process for the interviews: that it was random, and was not an indication that they had done anything wrong, or that we were working with any biases.

The topic of the research and the methods being used was not considered to put any participants at risk of any form of harm (Dowling, 2010). The biggest concern was ensuring that people's participation did not impinge on their daily activities and responsibilities. As such, all participants were given at least two days warning before being involved in any data collection, and a suitable time for the visit was agreed in advance. Likewise, surveys and interviews were conducted in the participants' homestead or field to ensure they did not have to travel out of their way. The village workshops were held in the most central place, and as in the case of Village 2, were held in two different locations.

To prevent any exploitation of the participants, the data collection process was made as transparent and participatory as possible. It was hoped that through this, the participants would have an opportunity to learn and share their views in a formal environment. At the end of each survey or interview, the research team briefly fed back any overarching thoughts and conclusions gained from the data collected to make sure the respondent was happy with their understanding. Survey responses were also followed up in interviews with those houses selected in the sample, and the village workshop brought some of the main topics to emerge from the surveys and interviews into a group discussion where people had the chance to feedback any misunderstandings and discrepancies. The translators were also valuable sounding boards for talking through elements of village society that were proving difficult to understand. In the future it is hoped that there will be opportunity to return to the villages to present the findings in more depth.

### 3.5.3 Research team

Two research assistants were hired to assist with the data collection part of this research because of language and time restrictions. Both were graduates from the National University of Science and Technology in a discipline closely related to the focus of this thesis. They were employed on the basis of their language skills (both English and of the two main languages in Zimbabwe, Ndebele and Shona), their flexibility towards the fieldwork process, and willingness to undertake up to six months of research in the rural areas of the country.

The research assistants were a vital and central part of the research process. Thorough training was given on the background to, plus aim and objectives of the research, how to conduct each of the methods to be used, and wider considerations of conducting social science research as discussed above (FAO, n.d.). Both assistants were fully capable of conducting the data collection and successfully trained and managed the translators in each village on their responsibilities and role in ensuring accurate and objective translation of each piece of data.

Prior to starting data collection, the survey had been written in English and needed to be translated into the local languages. This process provided the research team the opportunity to discuss the key concepts, aim of the questions, and reach a consensus on meanings, focus, and terminology.

Due to the villages speaking tribal languages, translators were employed in each. The process of choosing appropriate translators required a number of considerations. While the translators could act as useful gatekeepers into the village society and act as a balance against the perception of the research team as 'outsiders' (Simon, 2006) they can also be hindrances if they are perceived either too positively or too negatively by the village members (Brydon, 2006). To minimise this we chose those who had good language skills but who were not directly related to anyone in a position of power within the village, nor were they obvious gatekeepers from the outset i.e. someone recommended by the Chief. It was hoped that this would not coerce respondents to behave in certain ways.

## 3.6    Summary of Chapter 3

This chapter has explained the research process, from the research philosophy driving the choice of research design to the amount and type of data collected. It has also outlined the framework and other concepts that will be utilised throughout the thesis, as well as a providing reflexive discussion on the considerations of ethics, positionality, language barriers and validity of the research.

# Chapter 4:   Impacts of natural resource management programmes on rural livelihoods – the ongoing legacies of CAMPFIRE

## Abstract

Rural populations in Zimbabwe are heavily dependent on the local natural resource base. Thus, natural resource management programmes can directly affect their livelihood strategies and food security. CAMPFIRE aimed to use key mega fauna such as lions (*Panther leo*), elephants (*Loxodonta africana*) and buffalo (*Syncerus caffer*) as a valuable natural resource to provide marginal rural communities with an alternative land use option to agriculture. It is seen as a form of CBNRM that aims to create an economic value for wildlife conservation that subsequently enhances rural livelihoods, rural development, and biodiversity conservation. While numerous studies have considered different elements of CAMPFIRE there has been little analysis of the influence of the wider project processes on the local households involved and whether the project achieved its aim of enhancing rural livelihoods. This chapter determines household access, rights, and ability to use different capital assets to give a more holistic perspective on the factors playing a role in rural livelihoods that are subsumed within a natural resource management programme. It assesses the factors affecting rural household access to natural resources and the context of the institutional landscape, using data collected from four rural villages in Zimbabwe. It highlights the impacts the CAMPFIRE process has had on rural livelihoods, finding that CBNRM on the ground in Zimbabwe has reinforced the protectionist conservation regime it was trying to counter, resulting in limited benefits to rural livelihoods. The results bring into question the role of wider influencing processes on both the CAMPFIRE process and rural livelihoods in general, and inform the emphases of chapters 5 and 6.

## 4.1     Introduction

As the majority of rural livelihoods in Zimbabwe depend upon the local natural resource base (Frost et al., 2007), natural resource management programmes and their corresponding processes drastically affect household livelihoods (Government of Zimbabwe, 2012a). Understanding the impacts of CBNRM programmes on the

livelihoods and development of rural populations is paramount to evaluating the success of these programmes. Despite CAMPFIRE having been studied over the thirty years since its inception, very little research has been conducted on how the natural resources imperative to local rural livelihoods have been impacted by CAMPFIRE processes and the relevant wider system (see Mutandwa and Gadzirayi, 2007 for a short overview).

This chapter addresses Objective 1 of the thesis: to assess CAMPFIRE against its objectives of promoting rural livelihoods, from the perspective of the local people involved in these projects. This objective is broken down further into three sub-objectives, being to:

a. Identify key household livelihood activities in CAMPFIRE communities,
b. Analyse different household livelihood capitals to identify key livelihood assets and their use,
c. Identify and explain household rights to, and command over, the key natural resources to emerge from study for the above two objectives.

To achieve Objective 1 this chapter utilises the SLEEF (Chapter 3 Figure 3-1) which brings together parts of two seminal frameworks in a new way: first, the Sustainable Livelihood Framework (SLF) which focuses on the specific assets and livelihood factors; and second the Environmental Entitlement Framework (EEF) which focuses on the wider influencing institutions across scales from the micro (local) to the macro (global).

The research focus on livelihoods at the household level and placing these within the connected and interrelated multi-level context provides a previously unused framework to study CAMPFIRE. Rather than solely identifying the impacts of CAMPFIRE on natural resource management and/or livelihoods, this study enables an understanding of why and how these impacts have come about through the process of implementing and managing a CBNRM project. This chapter uses data collected from local respondents through semi-structured surveys, semi-structured interviews and village workshops (as described in Chapter 3, Section 3.3.1.1, 3.3.1.3, and 3.3.1.4). The surveys provided data on the diversity of livelihood activities undertaken by each household as well as identifying those considered to be key. It also provided baseline information on natural resources used, and availability and accessibility of these to the households. This

information acted as a starting point upon which to begin interviewing for more in-depth information on endowments, entitlements, and capabilities over time, and the ensuing livelihood strategies and outcomes.

## 4.2    Results for Objective 1: Livelihood Impacts

Results are now presented and structured to follow the three sub-objectives of Objective 1. These are followed by a broader integrating discussion.

### 4.2.1    Identify key household livelihood activities in CAMPFIRE project communities

Households in the four case study villages undertake multiple livelihood activities, largely restricted to subsistence activities (Table 4-1)Table 4-1. The range of livelihood activities is relatively consistent across the study villages, with a few nuances determined by differences in some assets (e.g. access to fishing in Village 1, and access to the National Park Headquarters in Village 4), as shown in Table 4-1.

**Table 4-1: Percentage of households per village undertaking each livelihood activity, and average across the four villages. Data taken from questionnaire surveys.**

| LIVELIHOOD ACTIVITY | USE | % OF SAMPLED HOUSEHOLDS | | | | MEAN % ACROSS 4 VILLAGES |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Village 1 | Village 2 | Village 3 | Village 4 | |
| Agricultural subsistence | SU, B (if excess) | 85 | 98 | 63 | 71 | 79 |
| Gardens | SU, B (if excess) | 44 | 30 | 19 | 49 | 40 |
| Collection of non-timber forest products (NTFPs) | SU, B | 41[1] | 23 | 5 | 2 | 18 |
| Piece jobs | B, C | 31[2] | 11 | 14 | 12 | 17 |
| Crafts | B, C | 23[3] | 6 | 7 | 23[4] | 15 |
| Livestock | SU, B, C | 1 | 14 | 21 | 20 | 14 |
| Employment | C | 13[5] | 2.5 | 2 | 20[5] | 9 |
| Fishing | B, C | 31[6] | 0 | 0 | 0 | 8 |
| Remittances | SU | 3 | 7.5[7] | 7 | 7 | 6 |
| Beer making | B | 5 | 2.5 | 0 | 12 | 5 |
| Help/donations | SU | 2 | 2.5 | 9 | 5 | 5 |
| Commercial agriculture | C | 1 | 2.5 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| | N surveys = | 93 | 80 | 43 | 41 | |

**Key: SU = Self use, B = Barter, C = Sell for cash**

[1] Village 1 has higher reliance on fruits from the bush to sustain households during hungry months, especially as they are also more accessible compared to other villages (Village 2 has elephants preventing access, and Villages 3 & 4 have fences) and more need to diversify activities.

[2] In Village 1, piece jobs (odd jobs) were considered to include helping each other during harvest seasons and being given shares of each other's' crops rather than specific paid jobs. This explains the higher numbers.

[3] As with NTFPs in Village 1, materials for crafts (all sourced from NTFPs) are more accessible.

[4] As less than a year had passed at the time of data collection since the electric fence was erected, people were still referring to pre-fence access. This figure is now likely to have reduced significantly.

[5] Employment in Village 1 is particularly high due to the presence of staff from the District Development Fund (DDF) who reside in the village; Village 4 has a high employment rate because of proximity to the National Park Headquarters though the employment is less permanent than in Village 1. Village 2 has low employment because of its isolation, and the Village 3 employment opportunities are taken by outsiders and/or villagers leave to work in South Africa or Mozambique.

[6] Fishing camps are located in the same area as Village 1 (short drive or long walk) and so revenue generating opportunities are more easily utilised during fishing season. The other villages do not have access to water sources as these are located in the restricted areas.

[7] Remittances are higher in Villages 2, 3 and 4 due to their proximity to Bulawayo (Village 2) and South Africa/Mozambique (Villages 3 and 4) and thus a high number of family members migrate to find employment.

Most households derive their livelihoods from subsistence and natural resource base activities supported in some cases by piece jobs (mainly working for food). Few households undertook income generating activities (i.e. commercial agriculture) and employment figures are misleading because of the differing array of activities and permanence that were perceived as employment (see footnote 5 in Table 4-1).

Characteristics of wealth were discussed during village workshop discussions in Village 1 and Village 2 and with key informants in Villages 3 and 4. In all but one workshop in Village 1 there was consensus that the number of cattle owned by a household determined that household's wealth. In the second women's workshop in Village 1, numerous factors that contributed to wealth were put forward such as owning cars, having large harvests that people buy, having an education, and being able to employ people. However, all participants agreed that the number of cattle was the most important wealth indicator. It was claimed that no households in the villages were classified as wealthy on any of these characteristics. Thus, socio-economic differentiation along the lines of wealth was considered to be negligible in terms of its effect on livelihood activities. When asked if anyone was wealthy in Village 1, for example, one village workshop attendee said that, *"5 cows means you can do all these things [be wealthy], but no one here has 5 cows"* (Women's workshop, Village 1, 2013). This was supported by a member of the men's group who said, *"maybe the Chief because he has a car… but I don't really think there are any"* (Men's workshop, Village 1, 2013).

The results showed that the majority of respondents undertake subsistent activities that rely heavily on natural resources and that people are not considered wealthy based on these activities, according to locally-defined wealth indicators. The asset pentagon of the SLEEF is now utilised to discern what livelihood capitals are available to, accessible to, and used by these households. This information is used to understand in more detail the underlying factors and processes influencing and determining their livelihoods and livelihood strategies.

**4.2.2** **Analyse the different household livelihood capitals to identify the key livelihood assets and their use**

The SLEEF asset categories outlined in Figure 4-1 shows that the physical, social, financial and human capital assets are relatively weak in their ability to contribute to household livelihoods, even when considering the flows and links between them. It reiterates that there is a high dependency on natural capital as the main contributor to subsistence livelihoods and supports villagers' perspectives that no one in the village is considered wealthy.

**Figure 4-1: State of household capitals across four case study villages showing obvious relationships and flows including environmental goods and services. Words highlighted in green are those elements of each capital assets most or directly related to natural capital**

As Figure 4-1 shows, there are multiple explanations for the high dependency on natural capital, which together minimise the opportunities for rural households to break away from the reliance on subsistence agriculture and natural products. Financial capital is minimal due to a lack of markets and there is only limited cash for people to use at any markets that are accessible. One respondent stated that, *"locally people do not have money to buy… we would love to sell outside [the village] but there is no transport to take us there"* (Female, Other mid, Village 1, 2013) and another said, *"we get little money as there is no market"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013). In order to have their own food, households must produce it themselves. There are, however, limits to what can be achieved with subsistence agriculture. A lack of cattle for ploughing is a major hindrance to agricultural production as people then can only plough with their own manual labour, making it difficult to cover large areas. This was explained by a number of respondents: *"we don't have anything to plough… the land is fertile, just that I am using my hands to plough"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013)*, "Some have cattle and they use them to plough; we use our hands"* (Female, Agriculture young, Village 2, 2013).

Social cohesion within villages is limited, and a poor sense of community means there are few support networks to draw upon during hard times. One respondent explained that *"what separates people is that some people are not able to talk politely to others… some people also get jealous"* (Female, Agriculture senior, Village 1, 2013) while others think of community just as *"the place where people stay"* (Men's workshop, Village 1, 2013)*, "some households"* (Female, Agriculture young, Village 3, 2013)*,* and as *"only more poor people"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 4, 2013). The lack of social cohesion and support networks exacerbates the lack of capacity people have to effect change, or demand such from those in a position to do so. This poor sense of community also reflects academic debates on what constitutes a community and relates back to the discussion on the use of the term community in Section 2.5.1 in Chapter 2.

Table 4-2 distils the data further to show how the livelihood activities undertaken by the households in this study are reliant on three fundamental natural resources – land, grass, and trees.

**Table 4-2: Explanation of how each livelihood activity falls into one of the three main resources**

| Resource | Livelihood Activities |
|----------|----------------------|
| Land | Upon which all other natural resources that support livelihood activities grow. Activities pursued are subsistence agriculture and commercial agriculture, NTFPs, crafts, employment, gardens, livestock, piece jobs, beer making. |
| Trees | NTFPs, crafts, piece jobs |
| Grass | Livestock, NTFPs |

Each of these natural resources plays a central role in wildlife conservation and the CAMPFIRE process. Land is a key resource of contestation between environmental conservation and socio-economic development/agricultural expansion. Trees and grass are key natural resources for the habitat of wildlife yet as shown above, also key for the livelihoods of local households.

The next section will focus on understanding households' access to and control over each of these three resources, and the impacts this has for their livelihoods.

### 4.2.3    Household rights to, and command over, key natural resources

Through endowment, entitlement, and capability mapping, the chapter now examines the multiple influences on household access to and control over land, grass, and trees, to establish an understanding of household livelihood activities and the impacts CAMPFIRE has had on the overall livelihood strategies.

This section is structured in line with the main themes to have arisen through primary data analysis: 1) the role of boundaries, 2) the perceived increase in problem animal populations, 3) the unsuitability of benefits received from CAMPFIRE, and 4) the ongoing legacies felt today with the emergence of new natural resource management projects. It is structured over time to account for the different stages in village NRM – pre-CAMPFIRE (until approximately 1990), during CAMPFIRE (approximately 1990-2002), and post-CAMPFIRE (from approximately 2002, though this differs slightly per village). A timeline of CAMPFIRE related events in the four case study villages is shown in Figure 4-2.

**Figure 4-2: Timeline of CAMPFIRE related events in 4 case study villages (all dates approximated from data)**

**4.2.3.1     The role of boundaries**

The boundaries put in place by the creation of National Parks and concession areas for use by private safari companies as part of CAMPFIRE have had a major impact on the livelihoods of rural households living nearby, exacerbating insecurity around tenure. In three of the villages, electric fences were erected as a means of keeping wild animals away from villages. However, many respondents, and especially those in Village 1, felt as though the fences were actually trying to reduce the impact of the village on wild animals and their habitats. One respondent claimed that *"the truth… is that the fence was not closing the animals from us, it was closing us in"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 1, 2013). During the consultation process between local government and the community before the fence was erected, Village 1 requested it be put at least seven kilometres away from the village to allow for expansion of farmland. Instead, the fence was erected around the perimeter of the village. Reasons for this decision remain unclear.

The situation is similar in Village 3. The fence, erected with the start of CAMPFIRE, has become a significant barrier to increasing agricultural and livestock production, in line with village needs. This is not to suggest that small scale agricultural production is the answer for all the challenges facing rural communities in Zimbabwe, but in the short term, given the lack of food availability and alternative options, this is an important factor in local livelihoods. A number of respondents expanded on this: *"the fence should be pushed further back"* and *"the fence is too close… it reduces pastures"* (Male, Agriculture old, Village 3, 2013)*.* When asked if they could go somewhere else and start a new field, a respondent answered that, *"We can't. There is no more land. The land that is here is for pastures for livestock"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 3, 2013). These boundaries have, according to respondents, restricted grazing land for cattle and possibilities for farmland expansion, decreased soil fertility, and decreased yields: *"it would be very useful for us to be able to use that land especially as the farming areas here are no longer productive and fertile"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 3, 2013)*.* The lack of grazing land in Villages 1, 3 and 4 has resulted in livestock eating crops instead of grass, reducing harvests for household use. The decline in grass availability for thatching has affected household ability to secure suitable shelter and limits barter trade

opportunities, eroding livelihood security. As the Chief in Village 1 stressed, *"The area for farming is too small because there are too many people for this area of land. We also share the land with safari operators. This is communal land so it is not a place for farmers"* (Chief, Village 1, 2013)*.

The decrease in available land and restricted access to areas of communal land has also had cultural implications that have contributed to reduced livelihood capabilities. In Village 1, with no new land available, fathers are now splitting their land between their sons. Each household thus has less land on which to try and produce more food as the population grows. In Village 3, the effects have been on the tradition of hunting with many complaining about the loss of their rights. One respondent explained, *"yes, I am a hunter. If I want to go to the bush to get animals… the law will limit me"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 3, 2013). When CAMPFIRE started, control over hunting was given to CAMPFIRE and National Parks limiting a practice from which men traditionally gain status and prestige, and removed a vital source of meat and protein.

In Village 2, the fence again divided people from the land: *"At a certain point in time there was a fence that surrounded people and there was a division between the land that was allowed for villagers to stay in and CAMPFIRE land, there was a big demarcation"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 2, 2013)*. The fence, however, was inadequate at keeping animals out of farmland. Households have often secured plots of land closer to the village where they could better protect them (and scope to do this further is limited), directly affecting their land entitlements by reducing the amount of communal land available to use. The land closer to the village is less fertile and thus households have been suffering from lower yields, overused and limited land, and continued animal problems. As a respondent explained, *"how can you put elephants here and put a fence around near… where there are homesteads… which means obviously elephants can step over the fence"* (Male, Agriculture old, Village 2, 2013). The limited space means farmers in Village 2 have also reduced their practice of agricultural rotation resulting in reduced soil quality:

> *"Because of the elephant problem we have moved from having our fields far away from our homesteads… [to] closer … but that is not enough and it'll*

*make someone have less land to farm on… we cannot move to other areas*

*and we are exhausting the land… I have been farming on this land for a very*

*long time and I am afraid to shift to a new area because it would have more*

*elephant attacks, so because of that my harvest is less because the land*

*becomes less fertile if I keep farming here"* (Male, Agriculture old, Village 2,

2013).

When asked their thoughts on the National Park, one respondent replied, *"we would like to have the land to farm on it"* (Female, Agriculture young, Village 2, 2013)*.* In each village, people suggested that the most fertile land lay on the other side of the boundaries, usually on previously communal land now taken privately through the leasing of concession areas, which are now inaccessible to them.

Prior to 2012, Village 4 had access to a *de facto* buffer zone from which they were able to get many of the necessary resources for their subsistence. The land was also used by private safari companies partnered with CAMPFIRE. In November 2012, a large electric fence was erected less than 1 km from the village by the Frankfurt Zoological Society (FSZ) in partnership with the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWM) as part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Area (GLTFA). Despite apparently promising the village there would be gateways in the fence so that cattle could graze inside the Park, these gateways have not been implemented. As a consequence, the majority of cattle are said to have died of starvation within the first six months after the erection of the fence as there was insufficient pasture within the village.

One respondent claimed, *"It is killing our livestock"* (Male, Agriculture old, Village 4, 2013); another that *"They have enclosed the pastures. Pastures have gone and livestock have died. We are left only with chickens"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013). Small-stock such as goats and sheep remaining in the village are surviving by eating crops and vegetables growing in village fields and gardens. These do not provide enough food for the people of the village and having livestock eat them is causing more problems with human hunger. Mostly, livestock would break into fields and gardens, whereas some households made the decision to feed their livestock in the hope of a chance to sell them for money. The fence is also heavily guarded, with penalties if people are

caught inside the boundary. One lady said that, *"if they find us inside they beat us up. I was once arrested. They promised to fire my husband [a temporary worker in the National Park]"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013).

As well as the effects on agricultural land and livestock grazing, the enforcement of the boundaries has directly impacted a number of other livelihood activities. Paramount is the restriction on collecting wild fruit, a coping mechanism employed by almost all households in times of hunger. A respondent explained that these food sources, *"are very important, we use them as relish… they help us to survive"* (Female, Other senior, Village 1, 2013). However, the restricted access areas of the communal land mean that, *"inside the Park there is a lot of fruit, but now we can't get them"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 4, 2013). These restrictions, the threat of dangerous wildlife, or of arrest and punishment for going beyond the boundary, have all eroded the diets of these communities. Likewise, access to NTFPs for crafts such as baskets, mats, and sticks for stirring food has been restricted. NTFPs are becoming increasingly scarce in communal land around the villages as more people diversify their livelihood activities to cushion the problems being experienced with agriculture. In addition, those NTFPs found in the communal areas have all the aforementioned risks and restrictions.

These fences and enforced boundaries also have indirect effects on many livelihood activities that subsequently impact on the availability of other assets to households. This affects important overall capital flows and links. For example, poor health resulting from poor diets reduces the human and social capital in a household, which has the potential to negatively affect their financial capital. A lack of education caused by all household members having to contribute to household survival over the short term again reduces the human and financial capitals available over the long term. Some of these key relationships are outlined previously in Figure 4-1. Thus the impacts of boundaries on natural capital are further undermining the limited capitals and weak capacity of the households in all four villages.

### 4.2.3.2 Perceived increase in animal problems

There is a perception in both Villages 2 and 3 that problem animal populations have increased (especially issues with elephants, lions, and hyenas) over the duration of

CAMPFIRE. The evidence presented in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.3 on the stability of most wildlife populations and the increase in elephant numbers supports this perception. The establishment of CAMPFIRE meant a change from the relatively immediate killing of problem animals by the National Park (culling) to CAMPFIRE 'merely' chasing the animals away. A respondent in Village 2 said that *"when there was culling we used to farm well. But now the elephants terrorise"* (Female, Other mid, Village 2, 2013) while another stated, *"elephants were less in 1990 but now we have more elephants, and they don't kill them anymore so it was better before"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 2, 2013). Many respondents directly blame CAMPFIRE for this and their continued problems. As another respondent explained, *"CAMPFIRE doesn't really help us. They are making elephants come into people's fields and near people's homesteads but the white people never did that"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 2, 2013). The term 'white people' is used to explain the time before independence when most safari hunters and people involved in the National Parks were white. The perceived increase in problem animals has had a significant impact on household entitlements. People no longer use areas of land for farming or collecting wood and NTFPs due to the perception of high risk. Access has thus become 'voluntarily' restricted through reduced control over the outcomes of using the land.

In Village 3, hyenas (*Hyaenidae*) have caused problems attacking livestock. As people are unable to hunt problem animals, they feel helpless. There is very little demand for hyena in safari hunting and they have a very small economic value in CAMPFIRE (US$200 compared to US$20,000 for an elephant), so even if they were hunted the revenue generated would be particularly minimal. The lack of information available to the villagers is clear in their limited understanding about the connection between animals and CAMPFIRE revenue. Only one person in Village 3 explicitly linked tourism, hunting, and the money received from CAMPFIRE when asked to explain CAMPFIRE. However, appreciation for this process was detached from the reality of living alongside the project and its associated problems. More commonly, respondents said: *"I have heard the name before [CAMPFIRE] but I don't know what they do or how it functions. I really don't know anything about it, just the name"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 2, 2013) or *"I don't have much information about CAMPFIRE"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 3,

2013) or more broadly, *"Some things start and end at the District level, it doesn't get down to the village"* (Men Focus Group, Village 1, 2013). This suggests that the communication of information through the natural resource management governance system and the role of local people in decision-making are both limited.

Overall, problem animal issues and limited understanding of how CAMPFIRE works has contributed to negative perceptions towards the programme as a whole. Many respondents see CAMPFIRE merely as a means for the Committees and/or the RDCs to make money for themselves, and the overarching valuation of wildlife above human survival. One respondent claimed that, *"we didn't receive anything… so that project was for the committee, not for the community"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 3, 2013)*.* Many others made similar points.

### 4.2.3.3 Unsuitable benefits from CAMPFIRE

According to the respondents in this study, the benefits provided by CAMPFIRE during the course of its implementation have been of variable suitability and success. The main benefit received by Village 1 was the CAMPFIRE Office built in the middle of the village. The building made CAMPFIRE a tangible entity but very few benefits have actually been derived from the office by the villagers. Similarly, the CAMPFIRE revenue given to Village 2 in the early 2000s was used to build a tuck shop (a small local shop) to reduce the distance necessary to travel to buy staple goods. However, the running costs meant that the shop was never fully functional and it is now derelict: *"we are many people in the village so the shop was not enough to compensate each and every household. The only thing we want is to plough, to grow our crops"* (Male, Agriculture old, Village 2, 2013)*.*

Villages 3 and 4 both had mills built to reduce the distance people had to walk to grind grain: "one thing that was good of it [CAMPFIRE] was the grinding mill because we were not travelling long distances. We were just going here" (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013). However, in both cases the mills broke after just a couple of years. The small fee charged for using the mill was meant to be allocated to the maintenance of the mill as well as distributed annually to the village households but the lack of distributed funding ultimately raised concerns of corruption towards the managing committees. In Village 4, a project to turn elephant dung into paper was also established. However, it

needed electricity and did not have the required revenue to fund the generators. The project did not run for long enough for people to see any benefits from it but they at least felt that something constructive was being done. One respondent stated that, *"in the past it was good because the money from CAMPFIRE was helping us but now it doesn't help us because even the grinding mill is broken down… I would like to see that they grow up [develop] like electricity so that those mechanisms like paper making were there and it would be simple"* (Female, Agriculture senior, Village 4, 2013)*.*

Decisions about how the revenue received from CAMPFIRE was to be distributed or used were meant to be made by the community themselves facilitated by the CAMPFIRE Committee. However, many complained that the committees were either dominating decisions or pre-determining a few select options for the community to then choose from. There were also complaints about the community not being given enough information to make a suitably informed decision, especially about the costs, benefits, and viability of the options available. The tuck shop in Village 2 is a good example of this.

The CAMPFIRE revenue was sometimes distributed as 'cash-to-hand' (also known as 'dividends'). This has been criticised by respondents on numerous grounds including the amount, distribution, and frequency. A respondent summarised this: *"About CAMPFIRE I have no comment… how can I say CAMPFIRE is good? If you look at the money it is too little, so there is nothing for me to say it is fine"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 3, 2013). It is difficult to ascertain the amount of money given to households at particular times because most distributions occurred before the dollarization of the national currency and were too sporadic for households to remember the details.  Furthermore, the distribution of the revenue amongst the village households is a point of contestation. Some felt as though all the money should go to those most affected by problem animals and others complained that having to wait five years after marriage before receiving money is too long.

One aspect respondents were unanimously clear on was that the amount received through CAMPFIRE was always small, with amounts quoted at US$25, US$10, and US$5 but with infrequent distributions. It is unclear as to whether households were promised certain amounts, but all argued that the amount received was not enough to cover the

opportunity costs incurred by living with the project: *"We got $25 as compensation. It's a joke. We want $500 a month per household"* (Female, Agriculture senior, Village 3, 2013); *"I have no idea when money was given last"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 2, 2013). Even when households did receive dividends, the minimal cash economy in the villages meant that cash did little to support livelihoods, especially in resolving some of the food insecurity caused by CAMPFIRE's associated impacts. For example, US$25 annually does not provide a suitable livelihood alternative for crops lost to elephants as it is not enough to buy food for an average family for a month, let alone a year. An average person consumes approximately 10kg of mealie-meal (the local starch) per month averaging a cost of $6. This alone is not covered by the US$25 and does not include vegetables and other sources of nutrition. Thus the small amounts do not outweigh the opportunity costs associated with damaged harvests from living with wildlife. There is also limited spending capacity and purchasing power, and there is no specific market from which to purchase alternatives. As a respondent explained in Village 1, *"if I want to sell a goat right now I can't because there is no market. Who will buy it? At the next house it is the same. Everyone has hunger"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 1, 2013).

People rely more on producing the food: *"even if they gave me some thousands or millions [of dollars] it is helpless if the animals are going through my crops or eating my livestock. So even if you gave me so much money I can't say I am happy to have the animals"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 3, 2013). Contrastingly, a younger member of the village was more positive and claimed that, *"long back CAMPFIRE was so effective buying a grinding mill and we used to share the money… in those years it was effective and played a special role in our households"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 3, 2013). However, this positivity has been tainted by perceived corruption within the Committees and a lack of accountability, transparency, and democracy: *"CAMPFIRE has done nothing in this area. They are just robbing us and giving this small bit every year. They are just playing with our minds"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 3, 2013).

The revenue and benefits from CAMPFIRE have been viewed as compensation for the losses caused by wildlife conservation. Rather than CAMPFIRE being a means through which rural households could use wildlife as an alternative land use to cattle ranching

and agriculture, it became perceived as a development programme with expectations that it would solve the villagers' wider problems: *"We wish that at least we can have other activities like fixing roads and people can be paid, then people can have an alternative form of income then they can maybe help their kids by helping to pay school fees and can also buy food"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 2, 2013). Respondents felt that activities like these would have improved their social, financial, and human capital capacities to better strengthen household livelihood sustainability more than small amounts of money. Indicative within this outcome is that for numerous reasons, CAMPFIRE has been unable to achieve its original goal of providing a new socio-economic opportunity for the rural poor.

### 4.2.3.4    Legacies

The overall outcome of these impacts – boundaries, increased animal problems, and unsuitable benefits – have contributed to a situation today in which food insecurity is a major problem (also supported by Logan and Moseley, 2002). The majority of households involved in this research rely to varying extents on the food aid provided by either the World Food Programme (WFP) or Save the Children, particularly from January to March each year. A respondent in Village 1 claimed that, *"the biggest problem that everyone has is hunger"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 1, 2013). This is supported by many respondents in all four villages: *"Since I came here there has been hunger every year. There has been no year without hunger"* (Male, Cash senior, Village 2, 2013). Yet the amount of food aid received is still not enough for most families, nor does it reach everyone in need.

Of immediate and additional concern at the time of this study in 2013, was that two new CBNRM projects were being implemented in Villages 1 and 4, and were following the same pathway set by CAMPFIRE as highlighted above. A REDD+ project was implemented in Village 1 in 2010. This project has taken over the previous CAMPFIRE concession area. As the Chief explained: *"we still can't use the land because [the REDD+ company] is now using the place where there used to be safaris"* (Chief, Village 1, 2013). In doing so, it has reinforced the restricted boundary and set newer, more stringent rules about natural resource use, especially use of trees found within the concession area that are now being used for carbon sequestration. Previously, people had used this area as a

place for firewood and NTFPs. This has added to the pressures in the village by further removing entitlements to firewood and building materials that are relied upon by households. A respondent explained that *"… [the REDD+ company] people do not really understand. They want to protect vegetation whereas most of the community have problems with starvation"* (Male Focus Group, Village 1, 2013).

The company running the REDD+ project claims to have planned to bring in alternatives for the natural resources now inaccessible, especially to substitute firewood. However, at the time of the fieldwork these had not materialised and the restrictions were negatively affecting household livelihoods. There is little local capacity to 'wait and see what happens'. One respondent explained that, *"Instead of cutting down trees for expanding gardens, I heard that [they] were going to give us fencing wires. This doesn't help as the wires do not do small jobs in the household that wood can do. It is not enough to compensate for wood. No compensation. Just wire"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 1, 2013). Revenue from sales of future carbon credits has been promised in much the same way as with CAMPFIRE revenue from hunting and yet some people in the village think the trees are being conserved to provide oxygen. This shows that there is a continued misunderstanding in that projects are not providing complete information or ensuring full local understanding. Respondents claimed that one village meeting was held by the company to explain what they were going to do, but that it was unclear and gave no chance for discussion or further representation. The REDD+ company agreed with the RDC that it would take over the concession area with little consultation with village residents and many still do not know what the project is trying to achieve. Respondents explained that, *"CAMPFIRE and [the REDD+ company] don't respect us. They don't even know us. Everything they do they do with Binga Council and they don't even come and find out things from us. They came to tell us but gave no details of how they will operate or how procedures are done. I would have loved to have got information on deeper aims"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 1, 2013)*"* and that *"CAMPFIRE came from the District Council. [The REDD+ company] also comes from the District Council"* (Female, Agriculture senior, Village 1, 2013). The lack of effective representation and accountability in the RDCs is an ongoing complaint amongst respondents from all four villages, and begins to indicate issues with the local

governance context in relation to the principles of good governance (as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2.2).

Village 4 has similarly been impacted by a new project. The GLTFA is described as building on the successes of the CBNRM approach (Duffy, 2008·Peace Parks, 2015 #398), yet erected an impenetrable electric fence removing access to many livelihood resources. One respondent summed up the situation in Village 4: *"The presence of the fence affected me very badly... if I was fishing I get relish or I sell to someone else and get a little money. Now I look like a slave. I just sit at home"* (Male, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013). Another complained that, *"It is near our village. We used to get fruits and now we can't any more. And trees, fish, rabbits, grass for thatching and repairing..."* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013). Additionally, CAMPFIRE can no longer function in the area as the fence eradicates the issue of problem animals. By preventing the movement of game from the park into the communal areas where the CAMPFIRE hunting concessions are located, there are no longer any viable animals to be hunted. The decision to erect the fence was made at the national and international levels with no opportunity for the RDC to represent the local people. The RDC was clear that the decision had been made above them and that there was nothing they could do from their position. Respondents were asked who put up the fence, and the majority did not know: *"I don't know. I just saw"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 4, 2013) and *"I don't know, I just saw the wire coming"* (Female, Agriculture senior, Village 4, 2013).

To summarise, the boundaries put in place by CAMPFIRE and subsequent projects, have had, and continue to have, serious detrimental impacts on household livelihoods through restrictions placed on access to the natural capital. The perceived increase in problem animals and animal-related problems, especially in Villages 2 and 3, has added further pressure to already low capabilities, and has reduced entitlements to those resources. Unsuitable benefits from CAMPFIRE (and now REDD+ and the GLTFA) have failed to adequately compensate for the associated opportunity costs, and combined with the lack of capacity of other capitals' resources due to high poverty levels, livelihood insecurity has been exacerbated. What can be learnt and ascertained from these experiences is important in order to align future projects aims and outputs with the livelihood needs of the local people affected.

## 4.3 Discussion

Through application of the SLEEF, the results presented above have shown how CAMPFIRE has influenced/impacted upon household access to and control over natural resources, and the resulting (reduction in) household capabilities. This goes some way towards explaining livelihood strategies and outcomes, and thus how livelihood security has been perceived to have decreased over CAMPFIRE's lifetime. In the following discussion, the chapter will begin to explore the wider institutional factors contributing to these impacts on rural livelihoods focusing especially on the environmental entitlements part of the SLEEF (Figure 3-1).

At the micro scale (local level), the lack of financial, social, human and physical capitals mean that people have limited ability to engage with the more powerful external organisations, people, and processes. An overall lack of education and infrastructure, and the need to focus on day-to-day survival, hinders the ability of local people to question and play a role in the decisions made in their village. CAMPFIRE was not designed to be a development programme to provide basic needs and complex infrastructural development but rather as simply a process of shifting land use from cattle ranching to sustainable game ranching (Child, 2003; Frost and Bond, 2008; Jones, 2004; Martin, 2015; Murphree, 1990). However, piecemeal benefits do not make a substantive positive difference to the livelihoods of the households, nor provide adequate compensation for the opportunity costs experienced by rural communities. The emphasis on cash distribution (and the low amounts provided) implies a lack of understanding of the needs and situation in the rural villages involved (Shackleton et al., 2002). This relates back to the criticism presented in Chapter 2, that projects designed at the national level pay insufficient attention to the local context (Boyd and Banzhaf, 2007; Mhlanga, 2009; Mitchell and Maxwell, 2010; O'Connor, 2008; Roe and Nelson, 2009). The ongoing weakening of traditional representation in the governance system has made it increasingly hard for people in the study villages to gain any recognition in the wider governing processes. Thus information on the reality of the processes and impacts on the ground does not reach and inform decision-makers. The lack of inclusion of rural communities within this process also prevents them from holding other actors to account (Mhlanga, 2009). The threat of arrest and/or punishment for accessing the

prohibited, but needed, resources has caused distress amongst many households who feel trapped. These challenges point towards issues in the wider governing system beyond the processes occurring directly on-the-ground.

There is a disconnect between the meso-scale (district/regional level) and the local level, particularly in terms of understanding the needs of those in the villages in relation to competing priorities for limited resources. The decentralisation process within Zimbabwe has resulted in multiple financial pressures on district level stakeholders without the necessary capacity to enact their responsibilities or reap any benefits (Conyers, 2002; Mapedza, 2008; Ribot, 2003; Shackleton et al., 2002). This has resulted in the apparent prioritisation of revenue generating projects that satisfy the needs of private safari companies and the REDD+ project, over the basic needs of rural households. The lack of resources has also meant that for organisations such as CAMPFIRE Offices at the district level, there are limits to what they can achieve in protecting villages from problem animals; limits to response times to resolve live problems, and limited provision of benefits and compensation to those affected. The restrictions on controlling problem animals alongside the inability to provide benefits for the local communities has resulted in an overall feeling that wildlife has a greater value than human life (see also Logan and Moseley, 2002).

The aforementioned challenges are all influenced by the governance and institutional context at the national/international level where a complex medley of socio-politico-economic factors and narratives has resulted in a fragmented approach to natural resource management, conservation, and rural development (Backstrand and Lovbrand, 2006; Gomera et al., 2010; Keeley and Scoones, 2000; Mhlanga, 2009). The power of the conservation discourse is clearly apparent. This has been encouraged by the international shift toward neoliberal approaches to natural resource management (Duffy, 2009; Gomez-Baggethun et al., 2010; Kanninen et al., 2007; Kosoy and Corbera, 2010; McAfee, 1999), where financial gains form a large reason behind projects such as REDD+. Reliance on financial gains to resolve development issues at the local level has been ineffective in the study villages. CAMPFIRE was based upon the tourism economy that crashed due to the negative reputation Zimbabwe received internationally during the 2000s as a result of the socio-economic and political crises and from which the

governance system was badly affected through a recentralisation of processes and a return to strictly top-down government (see Chapter 2 Section 2.3.1). As such, there have been minimal financial inputs into the sector and the rural communities reliant upon this promise of revenues have been detrimentally affected (Ashley and Wolmer, 2003). Furthermore, wildlife has not become an alternative resource or land use for rural communities on marginal lands. It is clear from the evidence presented here that the original design of CAMPFIRE has been co-opted by numerous processes that have left little room for the devolution and bottom up inclusion that was intended, and which is needed.

The lack of flexibility in the processes implemented by CAMPFIRE and now the new natural resource management projects has meant that people do not have the opportunity to adapt their livelihoods in a way to deal with these uncontrollable external factors. Rather, their livelihood opportunities have been restricted to such an extent that food aid has become the survival mechanism of many. New natural resource management programmes need to take into consideration this context when designing projects that may restrict the endowments and entitlements of local people, and how this may affect household capabilities and thus livelihoods of those reliant on the resources in question (Brockington, 2004). This should be the starting point to determine whether such restrictions are necessary and suitable, and to identify the benefits required to counteract these detriments (Ashley and Wolmer, 2003).

By drawing aspects of the SLF and EEF together to create the SLEEF, this chapter has been able to link the micro detail of household level livelihood activities to the wider processes affecting their entitlements and capabilities, explaining why households undertake the livelihood activities they do, and highlighting the other factors affecting their livelihoods. In doing so, the chapter has identified the ongoing impacts CAMPFIRE has had on the four case study villages. It has shown how it is imperative to understand the wider influences on CAMPFIRE (particularly linked to the national political and economic context), and the wider factors shaping households' capitals, as well as their relationships with each other. The data presented here shows a void in the application of principles such as decentralisation, accountability, and representation in CAMPFIRE project villages. Linking the micro situation of specific livelihood activities to the assets

available to households, and connecting these over time and governance levels to discern wider issues, provides vital information from which to identify lessons to inform future CBNRM projects (Gomera et al., 2010). It also raises a number of pertinent questions for further research, specifically about where 'community' fits within the CBNRM process and what is actually meant by 'community-based' natural resource management.

## 4.4    Summary of Chapter 4

This chapter shows that in the four study villages, CAMPFIRE has generally failed at achieving its objective to promote rural livelihoods. Livelihoods of the households studied have in a few cases benefitted marginally from some CAMPFIRE outputs. More widely, however, the programme, through its implementation and governance, has contributed towards decreased livelihood sustainability and food insecurity. These problems have largely resulted from restrictions on households' endowments and entitlements over key natural resources, unsuitable compensation (both in type and quantity), a perceived overall increase in problem animals due to an unreliable management programme, and an overall lack of capital assets needed for a sustainable livelihood. It is also clear from the evidence presented here that the original objective of CAMPFIRE to generate an alternative land use opportunity has been co-opted by numerous processes that have left little room for the devolution and bottom up inclusion that was intended, and which is needed. These wider influences on the CAMPFIRE process have led to the failed implementation of the programme as an alternative land use for socio-economic development of rural communities living on marginal lands. They have also changed CAMPFIRE away from an emphasis on devolution and community control to become an externally designed and implemented conservation project that resembles more the previous protectionist paradigm than CBNRM.

The emergence of new CBNRM-type projects conducting similar activities on the back of CAMPFIRE's purported success, and already showing to have similar impacts as highlighted in this chapter, begs an exploration into the wider processes behind such project designs and their subsequent implementation. Future research should take on the questions raised here and progress to analyse the governing structure surrounding

these projects, and what this has meant for community participation and involvement, including evaluating the 'community-based' aspect of CBNRM and CAMPFIRE.

The SLEEF framework allowed the disconnect between the micro household details and the more macro governance processes to be bridged and linked. This has produced a more comprehensive understanding not only of what the impacts are for individuals but also begins to pinpoint wider structural and procedural issues in the broader context in which CAMPFIRE has been operating.

Overall, this chapter has highlighted the multiple issues experienced by local households in accessing, being able to use, and thus benefiting from, natural capital. Many of these issues have been caused by, or exacerbated by, the implementation of CAMPFIRE in a way that has compounded the issues experienced with protectionist conservation as discussed in Chapter 2. The findings bring into question the role of wider influencing processes on both the CAMPFIRE process and rural livelihoods in general, and inform the emphases of the following two chapters.

# Chapter 5:   The importance of the sub-district level of community-based natural resource management in rural Zimbabwe

## Abstract

Past research on CAMPFIRE has mainly considered the district level as the 'local' level, with RDCs being the lowest legally recognised body in the governance system. These studies ignore the complex and important sub-district system of natural resource management governance between the district level and the local communities. This chapter analyses natural resource management using semi-structured survey, semi-structured interview, and village workshop data from the four study villages. It also uses data collected through key informant interviews from across the local to national governance levels. Through qualitative assessment of the sub-district natural resource management governance system, the chapter unravels past and present, and formal and informal, governance structures and processes. Governance gaps are identified and the implications these have for the involvement of local communities and actors in natural resource management is discussed. The findings stress the need to identify routes to bridge current local level governance gaps and prevent new gaps from forming, such that local knowledge and community empowerment are afforded a more central role in the planning and implementation of CAMPFIRE and other CBNRM initiatives.

## 5.1    Introduction

Underlying many of the issues with CAMPFIRE (as discussed in Chapter 2), has been an oversimplification of complex systems in project design and implementation, especially local systems (Measham and Lumbasi, 2013), and a lack of consideration of the complexity and diversity of institutions at the local level (Armitage, 2005; Ribot, 2003). These missing factors have been frequently shown by others to be imperative for successful engagement of local communities (Blaikie, 2006; Ribot, 2003; Shackleton and Campbell, 2001). Furthermore, devolution of both the management and the benefits of CAMPFIRE beyond the RDC and district level is invariably put forward as a way of overcoming some of CAMPFIRE's issues (Blaikie, 2006; Mapedza and Bond, 2006; Murphree, 2005). Yet, this suggestion is not matched with viable recommendations on how it can be achieved. Even where there is appreciation of the complexity of the sub-

district system, there is a lack of understanding of the structures and processes at this scale, and a lack of sub-district (local level) research that attempts to understand the realities of managing and governing natural resources, both currently and as it would be in a further devolved system (Ribot, 2003).

This chapter addresses this research gap through Objective 2 of the thesis: to unravel the local governance structure of CAMPFIRE. Objective 2 is further broken down into two sub-objectives, being to:

a. Outline and explain the processes and structures, and the local perspectives of these, within the sub-district natural resource management governance system,

b. Critically evaluate these sub-district natural resource management systems against principles for good local governance.

This chapter provides a unique up-to-date analysis of the sub-district governance system in Zimbabwe through which CAMPFIRE has been operating. Unlike many other studies on CBNRM, it places the perspectives of local communities at the forefront of analysis. Specifically, this chapter unravels the local governance structure of natural resource management in Zimbabwe and evaluates it against the UNDP (2004) building blocks for 'good local governance' (GLG). The concept of GLG is widely considered to cover the key aspects required for (more) successful democratic decentralisation or devolution, and the participation of local communities – all of which are also central components of CBNRM design themselves (Larson and Ribot, 2004; Nsingo and Kuye, 2005; Ribot, 2003) (this was discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2.2). Through this evaluation, the chapter illuminates understanding of the problems within the current sub-district governance system of natural resource management and why these may have transpired, providing key lessons from which future projects can learn.

## 5.2      Results for Objective 2: Sub-district Governance

This section addresses each of the aforementioned research sub-objectives in turn.

### 5.2.1      Processes, structures and local perspectives within the sub-district natural resource management governance system

Figure 5-1 shows the sub-district natural resource management governance systems in each of the case study villages, revealed during the analysis and triangulation of data from respondents' surveys, interviews and village workshop responses.

**Figure 5-1: The sub-district natural resource management system as determined through primary empirical data collected through surveys, interviews, and village workshops with local households, and key informant interviews at numerous governance levels**

Four main perceptions emerged across the four villages: 1) the Chief has limited capacity to resolve village problems and to represent his citizens at the district governance level, 2) the Councillor (the elected and nominated sub-district representative of the RDC) has a limited role in the village and governance system as a whole, 3) the RDC is ineffective in resolving natural resource management issues, and 4) there is an overall lack of knowledge on the part of the villages' citizens about their rights, a lack of capacity to enforce these rights, and a sense of apathy or acceptance of their situations.

Each of these themes is now discussed, and evidenced, in turn.

### 5.2.1.1    Chief's limited capacity

There is the perception that the Chief has limited capacity – in the sense of a lack of finances, political power, and a general lack of enabling infrastructure i.e. roads, car, fuel etc. – to both resolve village problems and to represent his citizens at the district governance level. In Village 1, where the Chief resides in the village and is thus present in everyday society, this perception is mainly focused on his lack of voice at the district level and his inability to effect any changes in the actions undertaken by external actors such as NGOs and development organisations. The Chiefs in Villages 2, 3, and 4 reside at varying distances from the villages and so each community's perceptions of their Chief's incapacities relate not only to the Chief's voice at the district level but also to his everyday relationship with, and accessibility to, villagers. With limited transport available to access all the villages under their jurisdiction, RDC meetings and other relevant events to which they may be invited, it is very difficult for the Chiefs to be accessible to their citizens, aware of the problems experienced in their communities and to take these to the required authorities. The result is that Chiefs are not in a position to realistically represent those reliant upon them. One respondent said: *"the Chief does not have power for a lot of issues so he does not solve any of them"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 2, May 2013). Another stated that *"we failed to get a proper leader who would tell us what to do because all these Chiefs were just looking and no one was doing or saying anything"* (Male, Agriculture senior, Village 1, March 2013).

## 5.2.1.2    Councillors' limited role

Councillors are perceived as having a limited role in the village governance as a whole. This is the case in all four villages, but especially in Village 4 where there is no Councillor in post. Across all villages, the role of the Councillor is not fully understood by respondents. The Councillor is either seen as a messenger between the RDC and the Chief (and thus of no importance to the every-day lives of citizens), or as a political actor there to represent the district level in the village. In all but Village 3, there is a very limited relationship between the village citizens and their Councillor. One respondent, for example, claimed that, *"He does not come; normally people who have problems are the ones who go to Binga as the Councillor does not come"* (Female, Other senior, Village 2, May 2013). In Village 3, the Councillor resides in the village and thus is more accessible and plays more of a role in the day-to-day activities of the village.

The reasons behind the Councillors being perceived as having a limited role in the villages and local governance system are multiple. These are partly to do with the actions – or lack of – by the Councillors, as well as their roles being politically loaded and unclear in what they entail (see Zinyama and Shumba, 2013). These factors combine to ostracise the Councillors from the local governance system. There is scepticism amongst the respondents about national and district politics in general. The knowledge that Councillors are political representatives of the RDC and main national ruling party does not help affiliate them to the local communities. Interestingly, that citizens have a role in electing the Councillor was only recognised in Village 4. Overall, the Councillors are not seen as having any power of their own, but as messengers, a perception supported by the Councillor himself in Village 3: *"Councillors are given problems and take them to the RDC as a messenger"*. These factors together mean that the Councillors are not seen as representatives of the people in their constituencies.

The size of the area over which both the Chiefs and Councillors preside is another important factor in explaining the local perceptions towards these two roles. In all but Village 1, the Chiefs and/or Councillors have jurisdictions which spread their capacity and authority widely. In Village 1, both the Chief and Councillor reside within the village. Villagers' perceptions were less negative about them and it was suggested that there is more of a substantive relationship between them and the villages than is the case

elsewhere. Thus, having a smaller area to preside over for each Chief and Councillor such as the Chief in Village 1 – or conversely more capacity to move around to reach those villages further away – may help them to represent their citizens.

### 5.2.1.3    The RDC is ineffective

The perception of the RDCs as being ineffective in solving problems stems mainly from their limited role in resolving ongoing conflicts people are having with wildlife, and in controlling the actions of external organisations. The RDCs' capacities are limited in many respects but specifically in their lack of financial and human resources. The main complaint targeted towards the RDCs from all case study villages is the lack of assistance when a problem occurs, related mostly to human-wildlife conflicts (supported by Conyers, 2002), but also in terms of the general socio-economic conditions of the villages. Corruption and political favours were also mentioned (see also Balint and Mashinya, 2006; Blaikie, 2006). As one respondent commented, *"the RDC does not come. We often go to them and report… they do not assist us in any way"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 2, May 2013).

Key informant interviews with RDC staff show that this lack of assistance to the villages does not come primarily through apathy or ignorance, but due to the lack of resources available to elicit help. Having few resources, such as finances or human capital, results in an overall reduction in the level of power or influence that can be exerted by the RDC. This is especially shown in the RDCs' inability to hold external actors to account, and is exemplified through the REDD+ project in Village 1 and the fence in Village 4. The REDD+ project is widely perceived to be reinforcing the negative impacts on the village that resulted from CAMPFIRE (see Chapter 4), and the RDC is viewed as having few options but to allow these actions to take place. Likewise in Village 4, the lack of action being taken by the RDC to prevent the erection of the fence or to minimise its impacts is perceived as ineffectiveness by the local people.

### 5.2.1.4    Lack of knowledge about rights

The fourth theme to emerge in all four villages is the lack of knowledge on the part of local citizens, not only about their rights, but about information regarding the integral happenings in their villages. There is a sense of apathy and acceptance amongst the

respondents in all villages, and a feeling of helplessness that they are unable to change their circumstances. The lack of knowledge about their rights is compounded by their daily preoccupation with ensuring enough to eat, meaning that they rarely hold their leaders to account or pro-actively push for changes in their society. A major issue underlying this is the recognised lack of education which has instilled in them a sense of worthlessness. Respondents explained that, *"[We] don't feel like we have the right to know or input… who are we at the bottom level to deny them?"* (Male, Agriculture young, Village 1, March 2013), and that *"In our community there is only more poor people. No rich people. Only very poor people. Most of them have no mat to even sleep on… I just see this poverty. That is all I see… I don't see anyone who comes to help me. I just sit at my home. I don't know anyone who comes to teach me"* (Female, Agriculture senior, Village 4, July 2013).

A lack of education combined with little downward flow of relevant information and lack of capacity to access such information elsewhere, contributes to this lack of knowledge about holding leaders to account and the cycle of disempowerment (Gandiwa et al., 2013). The few respondents who are aware of the issues in the governance system, however, want to do something about it but do not have the capacity to do so. They have little constructive representation, finances, or fiscal power; no platforms from which they can 'raise their voices to the right ears' (a common phrase used by respondents); and limited access to those actors who do have the capacity to effect change. Therefore, there is a deep sense of despondency. One respondent explained that *"people here are not educated and so won't know how to do the things the organisations want"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 1, March 2013). Another felt that *"we can't understand it, what is going on"* (Female, Agriculture mid, Village 3, June 2013).

The issues and weaknesses highlighted above within the sub-district natural resource management system can be analysed alongside the building blocks of good local governance (GLG) in order to categorise the key problem areas and identify where actions should be taken to improve governance at this level. The following section evaluates the findings against these building blocks to assess the state of GLG in the rural Zimbabwean natural resource management.

**5.2.2    Evaluating the sub-district natural resource management governance systems against the criteria of good local governance**

This section uses five of the UNDP (2004)'s six building blocks of GLG (discussed in Chapter 2 Table 2-3) as a framework to test local governance in the case study villages. This enables the identification of areas where actions need to be taken to improve the local governance of natural resource management and thus CAMPFIRE processes. The sixth building block of 'pro-poor orientation' is not considered here as it is very difficult to measure and/or ascertain in cases where the key actors are all classed as 'poor' themselves (see discussion on wealth in Chapter 3 Section 3.3.1.2).

Figure 5-2 provides an overview of the GLG situation in each village. The rest of the section discusses the findings for each building block in turn utilising data from the semi-structured surveys and interviews, village workshops and key informants, as well as secondary literature to support the evidence.

**Village 1**

Binga RDC

CAMPFIRE Office

REDD+ Project

Councillor

Chief

Kraal Heads

CAMPFIRE Committee

Kraal Head Secretaries

Agritex Officers

Local Citizens

**(a) Village 1, Binga District**

**Village 2**

Binga RDC

CAMPFIRE Office

Councillor

Chief

Village Heads

CAMPFIRE Committee

Agritex Officers

Local Citizens

**(b) Village 2, Binga District**

**Village 3**

Chiredzi RDC

CAMPFIRE Office

Councillor

Chief

CAMPFIRE Committee

Village Heads

Agritex Officers

Veterinary Office

Local Citizens

**(c) Village 3, Chiredzi District**

**Village 4**

Chiredzi RDC

CAMPFIRE Office

National Park

Conservation Project

Councillor

Chief

CAMPFIRE Committee

Village Heads

Agritex Officers

Veterinary Office

Local Citizens

**(d) Village 4, Chiredzi District**

**Key: Citizen Participation** – the width of the linking arrows; the wider the arrow, the more citizens are participating in this part of the governance system.
**Partnerships between key local actors** –the presence of a joining line or arrow between two actors. **Capacity of local actors –**the width of the line outlining each actor; the wider the line, the more capacity such actor has. **Multidirectional flows of information** – as shown by the direction of the arrows linking the actors.
**Institutions of accountability** – as shown by the various types of dotted lines outlining each actor; the wider the space between the dots, the less accountable they are to the other actors. (Non-boxed text means actors not included in data from respondents).

**Figure 5-2**: **Overview of the sub-district natural resource governance system in terms of the building blocks of good local governance in each village**

## 5.2.2.1    Citizen participation

Citizen participation is one of the essential elements, yet biggest sticking points, of CAMPFIRE. As a community-based programme, citizen participation should form a major part in the functioning of the governance system. However, in all four villages, the only constructive citizen participation taking place is in the lower levels of the traditional system i.e. between citizens and village heads who are responsible for 6-8 households each and are accountable to the Chief. This has little constructive benefit for the communities. The lack of upward flows of information and citizen roles within the rest of the system gives little meaning to the notion of citizen participation in natural resource management and its governance.

CAMPFIRE's design provides a good example of how community participation was given a central role within the 'community-based' part of the CBNRM concept (Child, 2003; Logan and Moseley, 2002; Mapedza and Bond, 2006). However, the reality that emerged from its implementation was very different, and the term 'community-based' is now considered mainly to be rhetoric (e.g. Armitage, 2005; Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). From key informant interviews with CAMPFIRE committee members, CAMPFIRE Offices, and through the review of secondary literature, it can be discerned that a CAMPFIRE project is considered to be community-based if it has:

1) Established a committee at the village level,
2) Communication between the committee and the community, and
3) Given citizens a voice in choosing how the revenue from CAMPFIRE should be spent in the local area.

These are all important requirements but overall are vague and easily construed to fit numerous agendas or implemented superficially, and do not of themselves result directly in citizen participation.

The multiple issues in the local natural resource management governance system discussed in the previous section have drastically impacted citizen participation. The systems in Village 1 and 4 have been overridden by the power of the external actors active in these villages, further diminishing the potential for citizen participation by

undermining the functioning of the governance system overall. In Village 2 a new channel of participation has been created by the community in the presence of a governance vacuum at the sub-district level. This participation, consisting of a channel of unheard/unresolved complaints that by-passes the local leaders and directly contacts the RDC, is tenuous at best, especially as few positive results have come of it. Village 3 is the only village for which it could be argued that there is slightly better citizen participation (relative to the other villages). With the resident Councillor and a new mobile telephone network, it is easier for village citizens to communicate with each other and the rest of the country, and thus gather information relevant to the governance of natural resources. People here still lack a platform for involvement in the governance system, but increased awareness at least provides a stepping stone to participation and empowerment.

### 5.2.2.2    Partnerships between key local actors for natural resource management

Partnerships (as defined in Table 2-3) in the case study villages are rare. As shown in Figure 5-2, several arrows link some actors to others. However, it is only the multi-directional relationship of the arrows that symbolise some form of partnership. The only partnerships found are those between actors in the 'traditional' part of the system. Even then, these are only fully functional in Village 1 where the village heads are a well-integrated part of the community. The close proximity of the Chief and his smaller jurisdiction in Village 1 compared to the chiefs in the other three villages could be an encouraging factor in the establishment of partnerships between the traditional actors.

The most noticeable lack of partnerships is between the RDC and the sub-district actors with whom the RDC should be working closely e.g. the Councillors and Chiefs. The absence of partnerships between these actors significantly erodes the effective functioning of the governance system by putting further distance between the RDC and the communities. This causes serious issues in the communication and functioning of CAMPFIRE at this level of operations. Furthermore, going forward, the top-down role of external actors such as the REDD+ project, and to some extent CAMPFIRE itself, is likely to be a consequence of these lack of partnerships, as well as the RDCs' lack of capacity.

### 5.2.2.3 Capacity of local actors

The capacity of an actor seems to increase the higher up they are placed within the governance hierarchy. This symbolises the lack of successful devolution within the system, despite that being one of the major aims of CAMPFIRE. It has been noted elsewhere that only some aspects of the governing process have been devolved to the district level – such as monitoring and enforcement roles – without the devolution of the required fiscal resources or autonomy (Average and Desmond, 2007; Conyers, 2002; Mapedza and Bond, 2006; Murphree, 2005; Ribot, 2003; Roe, 1995; Wolmer and Ashley, 2003). Very little has been further passed to sub-district actors, significantly compromising the capacity of actors in the sub-district system. One explanatory factor that contributes to this lack of capacity is the issue of communities not knowing their rights or having relevant knowledge to hold actors to account and to increase their proactivity to enforce change as discussed previously (Conyers, 2002; Logan and Moseley, 2002). Coupled with their struggle for day-to-day survival which also compromises their capacity, the system is very constrained.

### 5.2.2.4 Multiple (multidirectional) flows of information

The primary data from the villages and key informants show many situations in which multiple flows of information are present but these can be unidirectional and thus not conducive to good governance of natural resource management. As can be seen from **Error! Reference source not found.**, there are limited cases where the flow of nformation is multidirectional. In most cases the downward flow of information involves the reiteration or enforcement of rules and regulations about the use of natural resources (both through CAMPFIRE and now REDD+) rather than information that can aid in empowering and updating the lower level actors. Upward flows of information tend to stall at the district level or just before. The closest examples of multidirectional flows of information between actors that are informative and representative are those within the traditional system in Village 1 as can be seen in the top left box in Figure 5-2. One of the main enablers of this is again likely to be the proximity of the Chief to the village citizens.

### 5.2.3 Institutions of accountability

In all the case study villages, the unequal distribution of capacity – as the crux of knowledge, skills, finances, and power underlying all other elements – has resulted in inequitable institutions of accountability in the CAMPFIRE system. Figure 5-2 shows that the higher up the system, the less accountability the actor has to those below and vice versa. Likewise, as an actor increases in capacity, the level of citizen participation decreases; as do the number of partnerships and multidirectional flows of information. This makes the actor less accountable, and more powerful e.g. RDCs, safari operators, the CAMPFIRE Association. The cases of the external actors in Villages 1 and 4 provide good examples. Through their power – generated from having much higher financial and political capacity than the other actors in the system – the external actors in these two villages can bypass the RDC and make autonomous decisions, further undermining the community-based element of natural resource governance. This points to issues in decentralisation as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.3.

## 5.3 Discussion

The findings presented in this chapter show numerous challenges within the sub-district natural resource management governance system in rural Zimbabwe. These result in failings of the governance system for community involvement and empowerment, and subsequently, result in the rhetorical use of the term CBNRM. These issues can be defined as governance gaps: the lack of active and responsible actors or processes within the governing system that elicit the necessary qualities to contribute to good local governance. This process of highlighting the key governance gaps in the sub-district natural resource management governing system (Figure 5-3) helps to understand and visualise where attention and concern are needed, and where there is potential leverage to create an enabling environment for the development of good local governance.

KEY: **Citizen Participation** – the width of the linking arrows; the wider the arrow, the more citizens are participating in this part of the governance system. **Partnerships between key local actors** –the presence of a joining line or arrow between two actors. **Capacity of local actors** –the width of the line outlining each actor; the wider the line, the more capacity such actor has. **Multidirectional flows of information** – as shown by the direction of the arrows linking the actors. **Institutions of accountability** – as shown by the various types of dotted lines outlining each actor; the wider the space between the dots, the less accountable they are to the other actors. Empty circles represent missing governance processes thus a governance gap. Empty squares representing missing actors thus a governance gap. Empty dotted circles represent new governance structures.

**Figure 5-3**: **Overview of the sub-district natural resource governance system in terms of the building blocks of good local governance, with governance gaps highlighted with circles**

One of the biggest issues caused by these governance gaps is the lack of platform for the Chief and Councillor at the district level. This has resulted in little representation of the multiple sub-district actors and perspectives reaching the RDC, and thus, little understanding of village and community circumstances. It is therefore difficult for the RDC to help, not only with aspects of the functioning of wider society, but also in setting suitable by-laws or ensuring appropriate processes are in place. This shows the need for new CBNRM projects to be aware of the disconnection between the local citizens (as their key stakeholders) and what the RDC may believe and be happy to approve (Child, 1996b; Logan and Moseley, 2002; Mapedza and Bond, 2006). Working more directly with communities in designing new projects may be a fruitful lesson for prospective initiatives, especially when RDCs have been shown to be so weak.

The lack of processes between the Chief and the Councillor is another important governance gap. This affects the representative information available to district leaders and external actors who tend to use these positions of leadership as gateways to the wider community. The lack of formal communication channels, or indeed a minimal relationship between these two actors, also appears to create confusion about the correct channels for other actors to communicate with the sub-district system and where within this system an external actor or project can sit. As the concession or agreement for the establishment of CBNRM projects is made with the RDC, the Councillor is the actor most relevant for formal channels of communication with the wider community and ensuring official requirements are met on both sides. For communication with the wider community and to garner participation and support amongst village citizens, it would appear best to do this through the Chief, and the respected and institutionalised traditional system. However, while these channels are relatively clear-cut when considering who should have these roles, the major disconnect between these actors is, according to the evidence presented here, due to the physical distance between their residences and their citizens. To overcome this, the evidence suggests that there needs to be an adjustment to the governing system whereby there are more Chiefs and Councillors appointed to preside over smaller areas/populations, and/or more capacity – in terms of financial and infrastructural resources – needs to be devolved to these actors, so that it is possible for them to transcend these distances and

fulfil their obligations to their citizens. Additionally, local people need to be in a position to be able to demand such changes (e.g. Larson, 2005; Mandondo, 2000; Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007, and see also Chapter 2 Section 2.4.3.1).

The issue of physical distance between actors seems to be a prominent factor behind the presence of governance gaps in Villages 2, 3 and 4, and reduces the level and potential for representation at the district level once again. When external actors or projects consult with the Chief and/or Councillor as the leaders of an area and representatives of their communities, this disconnect can increase the risk of misconstrued or misinterpreted portrayals of village circumstances and citizens' opinions. This is thus important to consider when implementing a CBNRM project and trying to encourage participation and buy-in from local communities. Currently, external actors are by-passing or ignoring some of the sub-district governance system due to these weaknesses and lack of clarity. To ensure a level of community participation that is required for successful CBNRM projects, it may be that external actors need to put significant emphasis on establishing trustworthy channels of communication and representation. They could also use the resources at their disposal to encourage reciprocal and respectful relationships between the actors and processes within the sub-district natural resource management governance system, especially those between citizens and their local leaders.

New processes have emerged within the governance system to compensate for these governance gaps. In Village 1, the communication channels from the REDD+ project direct to the village citizens, by-passes both the Councillor and the traditional system, undermining their roles. In Village 2, the citizens are taking their problems directly to the RDC, to overcome the gap created through the incapacity of the Chief and Councillor in the governance system. This further exacerbates the leaders' lack of capacity and reduces the importance of their roles within the system.

This study shows how important it is that CBNRM projects, especially those developed by external actors, are designed and implemented with a thorough understanding of the context in which they are placed. The evidence present here already suggests that the new REDD+ project in Binga District is already making similar mistakes by not

understanding or appreciating the complex governance structure and context within which it is attempting to operate.

The apparent lack of understanding and attention paid to the sub-district governance system for natural resource management has meant that project implementation has negatively affected the system as a whole, including the people within it, as well as the project outcomes. This is not just the case in Zimbabwe. Blaikie (2006) explains that there is growing interference in, and resulting dissolution of, the traditional system in both Botswana and Malawi in the context of natural resource management (see also Jones, 2004; Mapedza, 2007; Zulu, 2012).

## 5.4    Summary of Chapter 5

By unravelling and understanding the sub-district natural resource management governance system and structure in four case study villages it has been possible to identify governance gaps that are hampering GLG. This provides the opportunity to subsequently identify constructive and positive ways to progress with future CBNRM projects in rural Zimbabwe. The lack of GLG processes between the sub-district actors and the RDCs is preventing successful representation of local citizens at the decision-making level of governance and is hindering the flow of information and knowledge on natural resource management and socio-political-economic factors affecting rural society more generally. The conflict and governance gap between the traditional system and the modern system, as embodied by the relationship between Chiefs and Councillors, has created confusion and disconnect over the specific roles undertaken by each in governing natural resource management, and in terms of the appropriate channels of representation and participation. The physical distance between the key actors within the system exacerbates this.

The findings of this study are useful for CBNRM project design and implementation. CAMPFIRE has continued to try and operate in a system it increasingly did not understand and thus its structures did not map appropriately onto those operating at the sub-district level. As a partial result of this, the programme has largely collapsed in many parts of the country (Mapedza and Bond, 2006), including in the four case study villages. The benefits experienced by the communities involved over the projects'

lifespans have been negligible (as also shown in Chapter 4). Now, new actors are implementing projects without taking into consideration the structure and gaps within the prevailing governance system. The sub-district level remains an often ignored yet essential part of the governance system when it comes to natural resource management. It contains the key actors responsible for the everyday management of resources, for enacting any requirements and support for CBNRM projects, and is impacted most heavily by the outcomes. Unravelling and understanding such a system, its strengths and weaknesses, and the impact of the subsequently identified governance gaps is imperative to constructively consider ways to move CBNRM forward in southern Africa.

This chapter has conducted a unique exploration into the complex sub-district natural resource management governance system in rural Zimbabwe. This not only contributes something new to the understanding of Zimbabwe's governance system at this more local level, but it also provides valuable contextual information about the system in which CAMPFIRE has, and is, operating in and the influences this has had on its implementation, management, and outcomes. Again, the findings raise questions about the broader governance influences on Zimbabwe's natural resource management system and thus CAMPFIRE. This is explored in the following chapter.

# Chapter 6: Good governance and an 'arena for change' in Zimbabwean natural resource management

## Abstract

Although formed of multiple projects at the local level, CAMPFIRE operates within Zimbabwe's national natural resource management governance system and context. Thus, in order to understand the complexities of the programme, its processes and impacts, it is necessary to also understand the governance context in which it is situated. This chapter looks at the criticisms of, and praise for, CAMPFIRE over time through a systematic analysis of the academic literature and evaluates how these have changed by analysing data from key informant interviews and a multi-level workshop. In doing so, it identifies seven key factors for consideration in the macro natural resource management system in which CAMPFIRE operates and which act as indicators for good governance. Analysis of these indicators shows a lack of good governance within the wider natural resource management system. The subsequent framework developed shows the interlinked system of good governance and highlights a central 'arena of change' within the wider system. This arena is where projects such as CAMPFIRE can focus their efforts in order to generate the context in which the impacts of their actions can be more beneficial and successful.

## 6.1    Introduction to Chapter 6

This chapter addresses Objective 3 of the thesis: to identify the national governing context in which CAMPFIRE operates. In addition to the methods outlined in Chapter 3, the main themes to emerge from the literature and workshop were compiled and sent to key informants to comment upon, based on their experiences of the reasons behind these issue areas and to elicit their knowledge of the current situation. Of the 20 key informants asked to comment on the themes, 11 responded across 5 stakeholder groups (Table 6-1).

Table 6-1: Key informant respondents to the key themes (email and interview)

| Practitioner | Researcher | National Government | Local Government | Private sector |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5 respondents | 2 respondents | 1 respondent | 2 respondents | 1 respondent |

## 6.2    Results for Objective 3: Good Governance in the Wider Context

The systematic literature review (see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.1.7) led to the identification of seven interrelated key themes that have been continually discussed within the CAMPFIRE discourse:

1) Devolution - the passing of decision-making and management authority to the lowest possible level of governance;
2) Local government  - the role of RDCs and other local actors;
3) Representation and upward flows of information - the extent that information about local community opinions and the local situation reaches decision-makers;
4) Participation - the involvement of local citizens in the decision-making process;
5) Transparency, accountability and corruption - the openness and level of democracy in the governance process;
6) External influences  – the extent to which factors outside of the immediate natural resource management system affect the governing processes, and
7) Capacity – to meet individual socio-economic needs and political agency at household level, and capacity within the natural resource management governance system.

These were corroborated and validated by the key informants at the national workshop and in subsequent interviews. Indeed, the policy brief to emerge from the workshop conducted in May 2014 (see Chapter 3 Section 3.3.1.6 and Appendix C) outlined the following recommendations:

1. Emphasis needs to shift from decentralisation towards full devolution beyond the RDCs. This needs to be accompanied with an increase in capacity of local level institutions (including RDCs) to fulfil their original roles and obligations.
2. Transparency of CBNRM processes is needed, including a rebalancing of power between the institutions of accountability and investors involved.
3. Partnerships between central government, local government, communities, and investors are needed to ensure suitable and equitable communication is received by all parties.

4. It is vital to increase CBNRM projects' emphasis on alleviating poverty and reducing the need for communities to focus solely on their daily survival so that they can be fully involved.

Findings are now presented according to the seven themes identified, integrating all data sources.

## 6.2.1     Devolution

The ongoing discussion around devolution amongst key informants focused upon the contention that devolution, as originally planned by CAMPFIRE, has not happened (Government of Zimbabwe Official 1, 2015, Local Government Official 1, 2013, Practitioner 1, 2015), although there are some cases where management 'seems quite decentralised' (Practitioner 3, 2015). During the passing of the CAMPFIRE proposal through government in the 1980s, the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management (DNPWLM), put control over land and wildlife into the hands of the general population, by making RDCs the legal bodies that could apply for AA (Harare Workshop, 2014). This was done with the (non-legally binding) agreement that the RDCs who were granted AA would then devolve responsibilities and benefits to the local producer communities.

The subsequent decentralisation processes are deemed to have functioned more successfully pre-1996, with more management authority passed beyond the RDCs. In 1994, legislation was drafted to officially take the devolution process to wildlife producer wards in communal areas, but it was never finalised. Instead, in 1998, community authority over wildlife was withdrawn through a Statutory Instrument increasing the role of the RDCs in the management process (Practitioner 1, 2015).

In order to progress more constructively, it was emphasised by those at the Harare Workshop (2014) that the government needed to get the devolution of wildlife management right. Legislative acts such as the Rural District Councils Act of 2002 (Chapter 29:13), the Communal Lands Act of 2002 (Chapter 20:04), and the Traditional Leaders Act of 2001 (Chapter 29:17), need revising to allow lower level entities to make decisions and implement the programme without RDC intervention (Local Government Official 1, 2013). Furthermore, the CAMPFIRE guidelines have not been updated since

1992 (Government of Zimbabwe Official 1, 2015). It is felt that the 'ivory tower' of decision making – where decisions are made at higher governance levels disconnected from the reality of events on the ground – should be removed. Instead there should be a move to co-management, a coming together across scales, and empowering and giving authority to local people. This is predicted to bring some pleasant surprises based upon past experiences (Practitioner 1, 2015). A challenge here however may be the unwillingness of communities to get involved in these processes based on negative past experiences. There is also a worry that wards, as an administrative level, are even more fragmented than RDCs and open to more miscommunication, corruption, and governance issues in natural resource management  than the current situation (Private Actor 1, 2015). Creation of Local Environmental Action Plans (LEAPs) and Environmental Sub-Committees (ESCs) through the Environmental Management Act of 2002 (Chapter 20:27) has the potential to catalyse further devolution to local communities, but there is uncertainty as to whether the Environmental Management Agency has had the resources to implement LEAPs yet (2015). Furthermore, LEAPs still have to contend with the authority given to RDCs who are unwilling to relinquish control of the benefits they derive from CAMPFIRE (Harare Workshop, 2014, Practitioner 2, 2015). There is a review of CAMPFIRE ongoing through 2015 by the CAMPFIRE Association, concentrating on strengthening the regulatory and institutional framework and enhancing economic incentives for communities from conservation and sustainable use of wildlife (Government of Zimbabwe Official 1, 2015). Nothing has yet been released about this. It will be interesting to see how the issues related to an insufficient tourism industry and revenue generation, as well as weaknesses in the decentralisation system, will be dealt with in this review.

## 6.2.2    Local government

Giving AA to RDCs has caused some of the main issues for CAMPFIRE, but the reasons given for these issues by key informants are more nuanced than those identified previously in the literature. Criticisms about RDCs included them having 'hijacked the CAMPFIRE process' (Practitioner 1, 2015), to not having had 'financial support from the government but rather having to accrue their own from utilisation of [natural] resources' (Local Government Official 1, 2013). They are also claimed to be 'unapproachable to

constituents' (Researcher 1, 2014), and to have had problems in recent years implementing CAMPFIRE against changing needs and context (Harare Workshop, 2014). The hyperinflation of the late 2000s contributed to fragmentation of the roles and responsibilities given to different actors (i.e. National Parks set quotas, RDCs manage concessions, and communities manage resources). Also, since dollarization of the country's currency in 2009, communities have not been able to have their own bank accounts and have thus relied more heavily on RDCs (Practitioner 3, 2015). This is compounded by RDCs frequently considering communities to be passive bystanders in these processes rather than as assets or partners with something to contribute. This has exacerbated the power discrepancies and governance hierarchy (Harare Workshop, 2014).

There has also been a shift in the issues of elite capture, corruption, and co-option of benefits away from the RDC to the ward level. It is thus argued that the RDCs need to do a better job at holding wards to account about the leakages of finances and authority (Private Actor 1, 2015). The Harare Workshop (2014) identified that a re-evaluation is needed to see if communities' needs are being met by the RDCs. Evidence in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest not. If community needs can be better met it could help the relationship between the two. Overall, it appears that whilst the complaints about RDCs in CAMPFIRE are not necessarily unfounded, the situation and reasoning behind these negative outcomes has been far more complex than previous discussions in policy and the literature (Practitioner 1, 2015).

### 6.2.3    Representation and upward flows of information

There is ample evidence in the literature and from key informants in this study to argue that the official governing structure of CAMPFIRE, designed to provide local communities with the opportunities to be represented at higher levels of decision-making and responsibility, does not happen in practice (as shown in the above discussion about devolution as well as in Chapters 2 and 5).

Typically, communities have not been put at the centre of the natural resource management governance process (Harare Workshop, 2014). While communities do have official processes and channels to use for their representation, they are not always

aware of them and/or the channels are not functioning as effectively as they should (Practitioner 4, 2015) (as also shown in Chapter 5). Councillors play a significant role in the representation of communities at the RDC level, but often they are not democratically elected, have diminished legitimacy, and their political affiliation exacerbates communities' political scepticism. Thus Councillors frequently do not end up representing the communities they are supposed to serve (Practitioner 1, 2015).

With no functioning Councillor linking the local and district, the capacity for communities to learn about official representation channels or to gain the necessary knowledge to push for better representation is reduced further, as also shown in Chapter 5. Part of the issue with this is also the lack of continuity and knowledge retention in local CAMPFIRE Committees as people leave to take work elsewhere (Local Government Official 1, 2013).

Given the context in which RDCs have been operating, their actions have frequently reinforced the top-down management structure (as discussed in Section 6.2.16.2.1 ) and have generated a disconnect in representation and information flows between sub-national level actors (Harare Workshop, 2015). Again, this issue was also prevalent in the results of Chapter 5. The lack of relevant information that comes from the representation of local communities, the ongoing marginalisation of traditional leaders (Local Government Official 1, 2013, Practitioner 2, 2015), exacerbated by inaccessibility to remote areas, means there are low levels of understanding amongst those on the ground and an often unrealistic understanding of the situation on the part of those involved in decision making. The CAMPFIRE Association set up as a national level 'union' for local communities was co-opted by aid agencies and their funding. Instead of being a representative of producer communities at the national level, the Association became an 'empire in liaison with RDCs' and reneged on its purpose (Practitioner 1, 2015, Practitioner 4, 2015).

The lack of communication, and differing priorities of the multiple stakeholders involved, was evident in the discussions at the Harare Workshop (2014). On the one hand, it was argued that communities say CAMPFIRE has not worked because it has not alleviated their poverty, whilst on the other, it was also felt that the government sees CAMPFIRE

as having been a successful conservation and development programme. This can be imagined as a continuum of perceptions from 'has not worked' to 'has worked' with different stakeholders placed at different points along it. As one workshop participant pointed out, "it is important to understand from what perspective advocates and critics are coming– usually advocates tend to have a more ecological background and see CAMPFIRE as successful for conservation, and critics are those working on the social development side".

### 6.2.4 Participation

The experiences of the key informants highlight that the participation of local communities in CAMPFIRE projects has been wanting. Participation has been referred to as 'simply co-option by the local elites' (Practitioner 1, 2015) and as 'merely superficial' and although legislated, local people are seen not to be at the centre of decision making (Harare Workshop, 2014).

When initially designed CAMPFIRE proposed that communities should choose their own groups, as cooperatives, to join the programme. However, as already discussed, this option was taken away with the designation of RDCs as AAs and the extension of the central government system through WADCOs and VIDCOs (Practitioner 1, 2015). Decisions thus continued to be made in a top-down manner and communities were brought into the projects once the decisions had been made (Practitioner 1, 2015).

Another sign of a lack of participation is the limited understanding of the system and processes by the local people (as previously shown in Chapters 4 and 5). Relevant communities do not take part in the negotiation of leases, and have little engagement by RDCs as partners in wildlife resource management in the communal areas thus minimising their knowledge and experiences of the wider processes in which projects are run (Local Government Official 1, 2013). In some cases, communities have been referred to as 'sleeping partners' (Researcher 1, 2014) or rather as employees to the project (Practitioner 1, 2015) (See Chapter 5).

One often overlooked but important factor hindering local participation is the lack of will on the part of the local communities. Benefits promised frequently have not emerged from CAMPFIRE and so people have ended up not wanting to get involved. As

one participant asked at the Harare Workshop (2014), "are people going to want to be involved when their livelihoods are under threat and the project doesn't help them?". Project fatigue could be a significant issue going forward, especially if new projects create the same problems.

### 6.2.5    Transparency, accountability, and corruption

The decline in money available for the management of natural resources in Zimbabwe as a whole has played a huge role in corruption, and subsequent lack of transparency and accountability, in the CAMPFIRE system (Harare Workshop, 2014). This is especially the case in terms of the lack of funding available for RDCs from the central government. While the guidelines for benefit sharing are clearly laid out (Practitioner 3, 2015), they are not legally binding and there has been no proper monitoring since the early 2000s (Researcher 1, 2014).

Currently it appears that misappropriation of funds is also occurring at the ward level, driven by illiteracy and power struggles, and a lack of properly elected committees for local communities to hold to account (Private Actor 1, 2015). The capacity for the ward to deal with the financial responsibility needs to build through help from RDCs and higher levels of government (Local Government Official 1, 2013). Again, lack of knowledge on the part of the local communities to hold actors to account hinders the process of accountability and transparency throughout the system, enabling upward accountability rather than the requisite downward accountability (Harare Workshop, 2014).

### 6.2.6    External processes

Those designing CAMPFIRE in the 1980s did not want donor involvement but rather a simpler process of adding wildlife ranching, also known as 'Game Farms', on communal lands as an alternative livelihood for local communities. Donors, such as USAID and WWF, came in the early 1990s and brought with them large sums of money that were paid to inappropriate entities such as private actors and national level NGOs with limited local understanding and activities. This led to a co-option of the process by the CAMPFIRE Association and other government ministries (Government of Zimbabwe Official 1, 2015). Subsidies distorted the income and expenditure of producer

communities and RDCs, leaving the programme unsustainable when the donors left in the early 2000s (Practitioner 1, 2015).

There is no doubt that the political economic crisis in Zimbabwe in the 2000s has affected the programme and its governance. The reduction in tourism and hunting visitors negatively affected the financial potential of the wildlife market, and likewise the markets for local produce have also declined significantly (Harare Workshop, 2014). The continued in-fighting amongst many of the key ministries and departments in the Zimbabwean government needs to be addressed and focus needs to be more on service delivery (Private Actor 1, 2015).

International bans on trophy hunting and ivory such as those from CITES and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS) are also having a huge impact on the viability of CAMPFIRE, causing the loss of over 60% of CAMPFIRE revenue (Practitioner 1, 2015, Practitioner 3, 2015). Likewise, the shift back towards fortress style conservation that is happening in many areas (such as the large electric fence built along the border of Gonarezhou National Park by the FZS (see Chapter 4) is further restricting the benefits received by local communities (Harare Workshop, 2014).

### 6.2.7 Capacity

There is a lack of capacity in multiple areas for multiple reasons. Historically, there are cases which have seen a big shift in the ability and drive of communities given AA (Practitioner 1, 2015). However, national malaise has permeated every aspect of society in Zimbabwe (Private Actor 1, 2015) and the country is described as 'brow beaten' (Practitioner 1, 2015). Political issues have been preventing the training of communities, information and skills are lost through the frequent changing of relevant committees (Local Government Official 1, 2013), plus centralised decision making has given local actors limited reasons to build their own capacity (Harare Workshop, 2014). Ecosystem services approaches and adaptive management, as ways of helping to build capacity, are argued to need researching and simplifying in the context of communal use, and traditional knowledge needs to be well accepted and integrated (Practitioner 2, 2015). As part of this, emphasis needs to be placed on helping communities develop aside from CAMPFIRE.

## 6.2.8        Beyond the key themes

Two main views came out of the Harare Workshop (2014) and these were largely dependent upon the background of each participant: ecologically, CAMPFIRE is still seen as positive and functioning; developmentally, CAMPFIRE is negatively perceived and no longer bringing many benefits. Overall it was agreed that CAMPFIRE has shown some resilience over time but is not the panacea portrayed in the international media and purported by aid agencies. It is now causing problems rather than solving them. To some it is 'working, but not how it should be' (Government of Zimbabwe Official 1, 2015).

CAMPFIRE needs to not be seen as a static quantity but rather recognition of the need for dynamism and evolution is required within its management and governance (Harare Workshop, 2014). The revenue generated from CAMPFIRE, and seen as compensation, is not enough, and benefits can accrue at the community level while costs are experienced at the household level (Harare Workshop, 2014). Its inability to properly compensate 'could be the death of CAMPFIRE' (Local Government Official 2, 2013). Three groups of people involved in CAMPFIRE were identified in the interviews with the local government representatives: satisfied, unsatisfied, and neutral. It is likely that the satisfied group are those who benefit and are unlikely to be those from local communities (Local Government Official 1, 2013).

The Ministry of Environment, Water, and Climate (MEWC) needs to give its parastatal, the Parks and Wildlife Management Authority (PWMA, formerly the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, DNPWLM), more money and permits but, in the eyes of the public and workshop participants, the Government is officially 'broke' and the wildlife industry (including CAMPFIRE) relies on its own revenue to function (Harare Workshop, 2014). However, according to many workshop attendees, wildlife may no longer be feasible: there is not enough land to ranch wildlife properly for good revenue, and this is exacerbated by population growth of both humans and wildlife; there is an urgent need to promote wildlife habitat on any remaining/allocated land; and while wildlife is a big issue in areas close to national parks, there are many areas that have signed up for CAMPFIRE without the required levels of animal populations to be economically viable. Here there needs to be emphasis on moving into other areas of natural resource management such as those adopted through other CBNRM

programmes elsewhere and as beginning to be implemented through REDD+ projects in Zimbabwe (Harare Workshop, 2014).

A major part of the issue is that CAMPFIRE was never meant to answer development needs. It was only supposed to be a 'sweetener' for the local communities, not the whole solution (Martin, 1986; Martin, 2015; Practitioner 1, 2015; Practitioner 2, 2015). It thus needs to become a broader based programme with less reliance on one area of natural resources, and needs to evolve spontaneously from within local groups (Practitioner 1, 2015).

## 6.3     Discussion

The seven themes identified and discussed above make up the system of governance of natural resource management (and beyond) in Zimbabwe. The combination of the key issue areas determines how structures, processes, rules and traditions interact, in this case around the management of wildlife in particular and thus demonstrates how the different stakeholders can make decisions, and manage their power, responsibility, and accountability. These seven key themes can be combined to provide an encompassing framework for piecing together the complexity of the CAMPFIRE system (Figure 6-1). The framework also helps to identify the most important issues that need to be addressed going forward, not just in CAMPFIRE but in any natural resource management project that is building on the community-based model.

**Figure 6-1: Key themes/issue areas in CAMPFIRE natural resource management governance system and how all link together**

While there is no consensus as to what exactly the principles of good governance are in general (as discussed in Chapter 2 Section 2.4.2.2), there are a number of themes that appear across all discussions of CAMPFIRE. By combining the first five themes identified in this chapter with principles of good governance identified in the literature, this section shows that the data indicates a lack of good governance necessary for development, human rights, and especially a devolutionary programme to function effectively (Table 6-2). External influences are not included in this discussion as these are beyond the direct scope of the natural resource management system and are not easily measurable in this context. Capacity is also not included as this is more of an outcome of good governance than a principle.

**Table 6-2: Good governance principles**

| THEMES | Devolution | Local government | Representation | Participation | Transparency, accountability & corruption |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **PRINCIPLES** | • Legitimacy<br>• Subsidiarity<br>• Integration<br>• Inclusiveness<br>• Relationship between centre and local<br>• Resource regimes<br>• Democratic institutions | • Legitimacy<br>• Fairness<br>• Integrity & commitment<br>• Equity, including costs and benefits<br>• Integration<br>• Democratic institutions<br>• Unimplemented decentralisation<br>• Resource regimes<br>• Local revenue mobilisation<br>• Service delivery<br>• Rule of Law | • Legitimacy and voice<br>• Direction<br>• Strategic vision<br>• Performance<br>• Consensus oriented<br>• Responsive<br>• Inclusive<br>• Informed citizens<br>• Democratic institutions<br>• Fairness<br>• Representation<br>• Participation and voice | • Legitimacy<br>• Voice<br>• Inclusion<br>• Democratic institutions<br>• Service delivery<br>• Deliberation<br>• Anti-corruption<br>• Fairness | • Mechanisms<br>• Processes<br>• Information<br>• Democratic institutions<br>• Administration<br>• Fairness<br>• Integration<br>• Openness<br>• Access<br>• Anti-corruption<br>• Trust |

In the context of human rights, the key question asked of good governance is whether "the institutions of governance are effectively guaranteeing the right to health, adequate housing, sufficient food, quality of education, justice and personal security" (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.). In the context of development, good governance is considered as an essential means for creating the right conditions: "The potential for subnational institutions to respond effectively to hunger, inequality, and a sustainable environment is enormous and remains central to the implementation of any new development agenda. But the *appropriate conditions* must be in place if this opportunity is to be grasped and expanded" (UNDP, 2013, p.5, italics added). In the context of natural resource management, "environmental outcomes not only require effective governance structures, but also ones that are more democratic and equity oriented" (Oviedo et al., n.d.).

Each of the 5 themes identified in the data is now discussed in turn in relation to the good governance principles listed in Table 6-2.

### 6.3.1 Devolution

In the context of sustainable development, the 'local level' is the space where the balance of "economic demand, social satisfaction, and environmental resources" is implemented and manifest. The maintenance of this depends on local governance and local development arrangements, driven by the relationship between the centre and this local space (UNDP, 2013, p.2). Importantly, the performance of local government determines the rights of citizens (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d., UNDP, 2013). Devolution (fiscal, political, and administrative) is the means by which to determine the nature, structure, and quality of this local governance and thus achieve positive outcomes (UNDP, 2013).

Subsidiarity in the sense of 'power resting where most appropriately exercised' or, at the lowest level closest to where people live (Oviedo et al., n.d.), has not been successfully implemented in the Zimbabwean natural resource management context. Devolution has been 'truncated' (Balint and Mashinya, 2008a). Various factors have led to what Murphree (2005) refers to as generating just another bureaucratic layer, including: the strategic political compromise that gave AA to RDCs rather than

cooperatives of producer communities; limited resources being devolved to local institutions to fulfil responsibilities and unsuitable resource regimes for subnational governments (UNDP, 2013); and the non-legally binding agreement for RDCs to further devolve responsibility and benefits to communities. Rather, decentralisation in the sense of passing responsibilities to lower levels of government most appropriately explains the situation. This bureaucratic layer has significantly impeded the democratic institutions that create opportunities for the participation of stakeholders in the governing and decision making processes around natural resource management (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.), by restricting the capacity and resources of participatory processes, including restrictions in information and political agency. The lack of a 'predictable resource regime for RDCs and subnational government' (UNDP, 2013) further diminishes these opportunities.

Whether 'democratically gained, earned, or outputs based' (Lockwood et al., 2010, p.992) legitimacy is limited. Civil society does not have trust in the governance system to represent their best interests (as in Chapter 5) or to deliver their needs (as in Chapter 4). In that respect, communities do not consider those who exercise authority to be doing so with 'integrity' (Lockwood et al., 2010). This connects significantly to the issues discussed later regarding local governance (section 6.3.2), representation (section 6.3.3) and accountability and transparency (section 6.3.5).

## 6.3.2    Local government

RDCs have had a difficult job at the centre of CAMPFIRE's natural resource management governance process. The decentralisation process created through AA (Parks and Wildlife Act of 1991 Chapter 20:14) and various other clauses in legislation (Rural District Councils Act of 2002 Chapter 29:13, Communal Lands Act of 2002 Chapter 20:04, Traditional Leaders Act of 2001 Chapter 29:17) have passed many responsibilities to the RDCs in terms of local governance. However, the required resources to fulfil these roles were not simultaneously awarded. The lack of 'predictable resource regime for subnational government bodies' (UNDP, 2013) has meant RDCs must find their own sources of income, made even harder since the weakening of the national economy through the ESAP of the 1990s and the economic crises throughout the 2000s (Local Government Official 1, 2013).

CAMPFIRE revenues have thus formed a significant part of RDC income generation (Campbell et al., 2001). However, doing so has meant a noticeable lack of 'local revenue mobilisation' (UNDP, 2013) and a significant hindrance to RDC 'legitimacy' with civil society. The original agreement that RDCs should devolve at least 50% of their annual CAMPFIRE revenue to the wards and villages involved is argued not to have occurred by multiple key informants as well as numerous commentators in the literature (see Chapters 2, 4 and previously in this chapter). The results in Chapter 4 show that very little revenue has been passed to local communities over the life time of CAMPFIRE and that which was given was inadequate to cover the opportunity costs of alternative land and resource use in the study villages. Local people are aware of the capturing of CAMPFIRE revenue and benefits at the District level (Practitioner 1, 2015, Practitioner 3, 2015), bringing into question fairness and equity (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d., Oviedo et al., n.d.) in the local governance process (Chapters 4 and 5).

Exacerbating this are two related factors: 1) the lack of democratic institutions (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d., UNDP, 2014), including RDCs themselves, through which civil society can participate and be represented (see sections 6.3.3 and 6.3.4), and with which to hold accountable decision making, policy implementation, and subsequent outcomes/impacts; and 2) an ongoing lack of service delivery (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.) to local areas, despite the retention of revenue from CAMPFIRE (Harare Workshop, 2014). Specifically, as shown in Chapter 4, the responsibility to provide public goods and services that protect the rights of local people, such as food, education, and health, has frequently gone unfulfilled. This has detrimentally affected livelihood security and highlights failings in the good governance principles of fairness and equity. As specified by the IUCN's work on good governance around Protected Areas, governance should do no harm, and "should ensure local populations will not find themselves more vulnerable or poorer" because of it (Oviedo et al., n.d., p.3). However, the 'integrity' and 'commitment' (Oviedo et al., n.d.) of RDCs and associated local government institutions, to the good governance of natural resource management, has been consistently called into question.

There have been inequitable distributions of CAMPFIRE costs and benefits and few functioning democratic procedures for representation and participation.

### 6.3.3 Representation (and upward flows of information)

The structure of representation in Zimbabwe's governing Acts is quite comprehensive. However, ample evidence suggests that the processes officially designed and stated on paper have not successfully transitioned into practice (as shown to be the case at the sub-district level in Chapter 5). The fundamental issue with representation in natural resource management governance in Zimbabwe, as raised at the Harare Workshop (2014) and in the discussions above, is that local communities (as the key stakeholder) have not been at the centre of these processes. This has made channels of, and institutions for, representation much harder to achieve, exacerbated by the questionable level of democracy throughout.

There are, crudely, three administrative levels of institutions involved in the process of representation within this governance system, with issues at each one. At the local sub-district level VIDCOs, WADCOs (as determined by the Rural District Council Act of 2002 Chapter 29:13), and traditional leaders (as determined by the Traditional Leaders Act of 2001 Chapter 29:17) are designed as the institutions of representation for local community voices. However, the lack of legitimacy of many of the Councillors on the committees – because they were appointed rather than elected, perceived to only bring messages from top down not bottom up (see Chapter 5 for more), or are inaccessible to those they are meant to speak to – immediately undermines further the formal governance channels of representation. Additionally, the conflicting roles of the councillors and traditional leaders in function and legitimacy (the latter having more legitimacy with civil society but less with the district entities) causes confusion in the voices heard and information shared. In many cases, despite the legitimacy, traditional leaders are marginalised from the process, restricting their opportunities to represent their communities. This means that very little grounded information is ultimately passed upwards to decision makers for informed 'deliberations' and 'considerations'.

At the district level, RDCs are the key actors for representation with councillors on the ground, access to traditional leaders, and AA. The evidence, however, suggests that

most processes conducted by, or through, the RDC, have been done in a top-down manner; messages flow downwards to communities but there is little platform for councillors and traditional leaders to report upwards. Limited resources (e.g. restricted transport, infrastructure, communication services, main power, and money) further hinder this process. Limited information received from the ground restricts opportunities for RDCs to have 'responsive direction' and 'strategic vision' (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d., Oviedo et al., n.d.). This in turn affects their ability to build consensus amongst stakeholders interests, whereby all voices, including the poorest and most vulnerable, are heard and mediated for the best interest of the community as a whole (Graham et al., 2003, Oviedo et al., n.d., UNDP, 2014). Unable to understand the context through an overall lack of information means RDCs are ultimately 'unresponsive' (Graham et al., 2003) and 'underperforming' (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d., Oviedo et al., n.d.) in meeting the needs and service delivery for their constituent communities and stakeholders (see also chapter 4). This further diminishes local governments' fairness and legitimacy.

Nationally, the issue with the CAMPFIRE Association (Practitioner 1, 2015) has prevented producer communities and local stakeholders from being represented and having a voice at the centre of natural resource management policy and decision making. The process cannot be deemed inclusive if many of the main stakeholders are not involved and heard, and the decision making process cannot successfully respond with constructive positive performance if relevant information is not reaching decision makers.

### 6.3.4    Participation

Participation of stakeholders in the natural resource management governance/decision making process is affected heavily by the factors discussed above: the level of devolution (especially the level of democracy within that), the space created by local government and governance processes, and the functioning of channels and processes for representation. As the results across all three results chapters show, local participation has been found wanting on a number of fronts. As already mentioned, a likely contributing factor is that many local stakeholders are not aware of any available processes for participation (Sibanda, 1995, Chapter 5). This indicates further the lack of

engagement, democratic institutions for involvement (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.), and voice (Graham et al., 2003, Oviedo et al., n.d.).

Official procedures put in place for participation (Lockwood et al., 2010) such as the committees designated through legislation (Rural District Councils Act of 2002 Chapter 29:13, Traditional Leaders Act of 2001 Chapter 29:17), and the roles given to Councillors and traditional leaders as representatives to then participate, have been undermined. This undermining comes from: a lack of 'fairness' – respect and attention to stakeholder views, unbiased decision making, fair and equitable exercise of authority (Lockwood et al., 2010) – a lack of inclusion, and a lack of deliberation through open communication, discussion, and reflection of all stakeholder needs and views. This brings into question the overall 'democracy' (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.) and 'equity' (Lockwood et al., 2010) of decision making and authority in the Zimbabwe natural resource management governance processes.

Combined, this has a significant impact on the 'service delivery' achievable by those with the authority (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.). Limited knowledge and information of the context in which processes are taking place and decisions being made, and a lack of understanding of multiple and varied perspectives, needs and interests, mean decisions and policies are unlikely to have been made in the best interest of all stakeholders, especially those of the poorest and most vulnerable. This is supported by the results in Chapters 4 and 5. Consensus and deliberation of information are required for better and more equitable sustainable development (UNDP, 2014) and in the provision of basic human rights (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, n.d.).

The failure to deliver promised, or expected, services and rights has in some cases created project or political fatigue (Harare Workshop, 2014). This is problematic as good governance relies on democratic and equitable participation to shape effective outcomes, including the fair and equal distribution of costs and benefits. Without achieving this, the governance process continues to lack legitimacy and trust (Graham et al., 2003, Oviedo et al., n.d.).

Opportunities for participation in decision making, policy making, and overall governance have been reduced by a number of factors: the lack of decision making responsibilities devolved to key stakeholders below the national and district levels (Oviedo et al., n.d.); the lack of 'suitable democratic' and 'legitimate' institutions for representation to equally involve the voices of all stakeholders in such decisions; and the marginalisation of the traditional leadership who have local legitimacy.

### 6.3.5    Transparency, accountability and corruption

Given the lack of involvement most local stakeholders have in the natural resource management governance process, their ability to hold actors and processes accountable is limited (Harare Workshop, 2014, Lebel et al., 2006). As Ribot (2002) in Lebel et al. (2006) says "accountability downwards is often weak in natural resource management". Yet it is downward accountability that makes the governance processes democratic, uncorrupted, fair, and legitimate. There is ample evidence to suggest the ongoing misappropriation of CAMPFIRE revenue by central government and RDCs, and a lack of transparency and accountability in the governance process as a whole. The key factor underpinning accountability and transparency is information, and subsequently the means with which to use that information to ensure fair and equitable governance processes. There are accountability and transparency provisions in Zimbabwean legislation for making information available to local communities but the provisions are inappropriate for the local context. Putting adverts and notices in the local newspapers or displaying them on noticeboards at the council offices only makes them available to people living in close proximity to the council, those who can access newspapers, and then those who can read. Usually the notices are in English which makes them even less accessible. Achieving accountability and transparency, and thus reducing corruption and providing conditions to create the potential for citizens to claim their basic rights, is in many ways dependent upon all of the factors discussed above. Yet, as Larson (2005) note, not all communities are able to demand or enforce downward accountability from their leaders (p.15).

### 6.3.6    The 'Arena of Change'

Results show that there is an underlying lack of good governance in the CAMPFIRE natural resource management process in Zimbabwe. Lack of good governance

throughout the system has ultimately led to detrimental effects on local communities and the ultimate failure to meet CAMPFIRE's aims. The seven key areas discussed here arise time and again, in different contexts and different studies. By bringing these factors together in the good governance framework (Figure 6-1), the interrelations of each area becomes clearer. Through the lack of full devolution to the local level, the process has opened itself up to increased RDC and elite capture of the process and benefits. Exacerbating this is the lack of information flows (both upwards and downwards) to create understandings of situations at different levels, for different actors and of different needs. Corruption, the lack of transparency, and generally upward accountability means that there has been very limited role for local communities against the original aim of CAMPFIRE.

Importantly, the wider context in Zimbabwe does not garner good governance through which local communities can receive devolved powers, empowerment, and livelihood development through the sustainable management of key natural resources. Arguments central in the debates around devolution and democratic decentralisation suggest that full devolution to local communities is enough for them to fulfil their management requirements, so long as it is done over time in an adaptive and evolutionary manner, as still advocated by some of those integral to designing CAMPFIRE in the first place (Practitioner 1, 2015). For this to be achieved, there needs to be a context in which the system as a whole works on the principles of good governance which a) allows full devolution, b) makes space for the authority to be given to local communities with true downward accountability, representation, and participation of all stakeholders in decisions and processes undertaken at all levels, and c) full information and communication disclosure channels linking micro and macro levels. These factors have not, and do not, exist in Zimbabwe.

The governing system that is inherently hierarchical and power driven, undemocratic, and unwilling to relinquish control of financial revenue streams, needs to change to do just that. The good governance framework points to the central space surrounding 'capacity' as the key area for achieving this. This area, called here the 'arena of change' and highlighted in Figure 6-2, encapsulates those aspects of the governance system that can be more easily influenced by CBNRM projects and play a more direct role in the

capacity of local people and institutions. This need to change and the opportunities presented by the 'arena of change', form the basis of the discussion in Chapter 7.

**Figure 6-2: Key issue areas in CAMPFIRE governance system leading to continued undermining of local socio-economic and political capacity. Factors included in the 'arena of change' provide a leverage point for future efforts to operate CBNRM in necessary system of good governance**

## 6.4      Summary of Chapter 6

The results presented in this chapter show that there is an underlying lack of good governance in the natural resource management process in Zimbabwe. CAMPFIRE and the CBNRM concept are predicated on the notion of good governance for devolution to be implemented effectively. This lack of good governance throughout the system has ultimately led to an ongoing disempowerment of local communities and the negative influences on CAMPFIRE's ability to achieve its aims. The wider governance issues presented in this chapter provide an encompassing good governance framework for simply piecing together the complexity of the CAMPFIRE system and identifying the most important areas for consideration in resolving the weaknesses in the CAMPFIRE process and their negative outcomes. These considerations will be vital to take into account in any project being designed or implemented on the basis of the CBNRM concept.

This chapter has highlighted the importance of the wider governance and political context in the implementation and management of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. Through an exploration of the wider natural resource governance system, it has shown that a lack of good governance can result in more negative than positive impacts for devolutionary programmes such as CAMPFIRE and CBNRM more generally. The lack of good governance adhered to within the wider system has affected key elements of the CAMPFIRE process and begins to explain the influence that this wider system has on the programme impacts and outcomes at the district and local level.

# Chapter 7: Discussion – Transformations in the governance of natural resource management in Zimbabwe

## 7.1 Introduction to Chapter 7

The multi-level governance analysis of CAMPFIRE presented in this thesis provides new information on CBNRM, helping to explain some of the key criticisms of the approach. The research took a qualitative, participatory approach to allow concern with context (especially local), and an inductive research approach was adopted to enable concepts to emerge from the data (see Chapter 3).

The aim of the research was to advance understanding of the reasons behind and factors influencing CAMPFIRE's impacts and outcomes, and in doing so to explore a number of identified research gaps within the CBNRM discourse. The first research gap was the lack of voice from the local communities and understanding of their perspectives on the impact of CAMPFIRE on their lives, livelihoods, and rural development (Chapter 4). The second research gap was the limited understanding and concern for the sub-district governance system (occurring between the district level institutions and those of local households) (Chapter 5). The third research gap was the lack of consideration of the wider governance system surrounding CAMPFIRE and the role system plays in project design, implementation, management, and thus in shaping its on-the-ground impacts (Chapter 6). Finally, the fourth research gap was the lack of multi-level governance approaches to exploring, understanding, and evaluating such a complex multi-level, multi-actor phenomenon (as shown by the thesis overall).

Together, the multi-level analysis presented in this thesis points to a deep-set lack of good governance within the Zimbabwean natural resource management system, which renders devolutionary programmes like CAMPFIRE inappropriate to the context even prior to their implementation. For devolutionary programmes to function in a system with little evidence of good governance, it is the contention of this thesis that the process of devolution has to stem from the bottom up. It requires devolution of natural resource management to be demanded, rather than waiting for devolution to be supplied (as was the case in the CAMPFIRE programme). However, in the Zimbabwean

context, the lack of a functioning civil society, combined with low levels of socio-economic and political capacity in rural communities means that the necessary environment for the bottom up momentum required for CBNRM to develop in this way does not exist. This suggests that the focus of CBNRM needs to flip from viewing development as a conservation problem, to considering conservation as a development problem. It is important to note here that the following discussion of these points has led to normative recommendations rather than practical advice on how to realistically change the system (Hardt, 2012). The recommendations presented are driven by the findings of this study and what they imply is needed to progress CBNRM in Zimbabwe. This normative discussion in turn generates the platform upon which to catalyse further more practical discussions amongst specialists of political science, policy makers, and other more applied disciplines which together can shed light on the implementation of what is being recommended here. Approaches such as 'good enough governance' which reduces some of the complexity in the wider good governance debates for more realistic implementation would be useful considerations going forward (Grindle, 2004; Grindle, 2007). Review of the research findings

### 7.1.1    Summary of Chapter 4

**Impacts of natural resource management programmes on rural livelihoods – ongoing legacies of CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe**

Chapter 4 addressed Objective 1 to assess CAMPFIRE against its objectives of promoting rural livelihoods from the perspective of the local people involved in these projects. This chapter combined and adapted two frameworks to make the Sustainable Livelihoods and Environmental Entitlements Framework (SLEEF), in order to determine household access, rights, and ability to use different capital assets. It used this insight to present a holistic understanding of the factors playing a role in rural livelihoods subsumed within a natural resource management programme. It showed that in practice the CBNRM discourse in Zimbabwe has reinforced the protectionist conservation regime it was trying to counter.

The impacts of this on local household livelihoods have been significantly detrimental and the chapter shows that CAMPFIRE has failed to enhance livelihoods in the four case study villages. In general, the implementation of the programme has contributed to

decreased livelihood sustainability and food security (also found in Logan and Moseley, 2002). These problems have largely resulted from restrictions on households' endowments and entitlements over key natural resources, unsuitable compensation (both in type and quantity), a perceived overall increase in problem animals due to an inappropriate management programme, and an overall lack of capital assets needed for a sustainable livelihood. Results from Chapter 4 also point to the notion that the original objective of CAMPFIRE (to generate an alternative land use opportunity) has been morphed by numerous processes that have left little room for the devolution and bottom up inclusion that was intended. These wider influences on the CAMPFIRE process have led to the failure of the programme as an alternative land use for socio-economic development for rural households living on marginalised lands. Wider influences have also moved CAMPFIRE away from devolution and community control towards an externally designed and implemented conservation project. CAMPFIRE on the ground therefore more closely resembles the previous protectionist paradigm than it does CBNRM. Findings from Chapter 4 raised wider questions about the governance of natural resources beyond wildlife in the localities.

## 7.1.2 Summary of Chapter 5

**The importance of the sub-district level of CBNRM in rural Zimbabwe**

Chapter 5 builds on the findings from Chapter 4 and addresses Objective 2: to unravel the local governance structure of CAMPFIRE. Due to the central role of local communities in the design of CBNRM programmes, how the system devolves – or decentralises – the decision-making, management, and ownership of natural resources to the local communities is vital in shaping local outcomes. However, there is little understanding of the impacts and intricacies of not only project implementation in this context, but also of the structures and processes involved in the sub-district governance system. Chapter 5 enhances understanding of these more micro-level, and integral, realities of managing and governing natural resources. Through combining local household perspectives of the local governance system with the requirements of good local governance, the chapter identified numerous challenges within the sub-district natural resource management governance system. These contribute to the failing of the system with regard to democratic practices for community involvement and

enhancement of their livelihoods. The main cause of these challenges is the presence of governance gaps, which have been defined here as the lack of an active and responsible actor or process within the governance system that elicits the necessary qualities to contribute to good local governance. Identifying these governance gaps has helped to understand and visualise where attention and concern are needed, as well as where there is potential leverage to create an enabling environment for the development of good local governance. Unravelling and understanding such a system, its strengths and weaknesses, and the impact of the subsequently identified governance gaps is imperative to constructively consider ways to move CBNRM forward, both in Zimbabwe, and beyond.

### 7.1.3        Summary of Chapter 6

**Good governance and an 'arena for change' in Zimbabwean natural resource management**

Through the study of the sub-district level in Chapter 5, it was evident that many of the issues playing out locally are due to the actions, processes, and structures within the wider governance system of national level natural resource management. Chapter 6 considered this wider context by addressing Objective 3: to identify the national governing context in which CAMPFIRE operates and explore the ways in which this context influences the programme's processes and outcomes. The key themes explored in this chapter paint a more holistic picture of the natural resource management governance system in Zimbabwe and highlight that there is an overarching and deep-seated lack of application of good governance principles and processes within the system. Rather, the governance process in place heavily influenced the design of CAMPFIRE, and significantly influenced the implementation and management of the programme across scales. Understanding the nuances and operating processes of the governance system and how the different aspects of governance fit together in the Zimbabwean context led to the formulation of the good governance framework, which visually highlights a central area for focus to improve CAMPFIRE and CBNRM programmes moving forward. This area has been called the 'arena of change', and forms the basis for the ensuing discussion.

## 7.2    Importance of Good Governance

The results from this research have shown the importance of a good governance context for CBNRM projects to be successfully implemented in a way that generates a balance of impacts and benefits for both conservation and development (Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). The central finding to emerge from the data is that for devolutionary programmes to function effectively (empowering local communities with responsibilities and ownership) they must be situated in a wider context of good governance principles which enables devolution, participation, representation, downward accountability and transparency, information accessibility, and multi-stakeholder partnerships between and across levels (Larson, 2005). When there is little (or a lack of) a good governance context, as in Zimbabwe, the programme can have negative impacts on local communities instead (Derman, 1995; Balint and Mashinya, 2008b).

The wider socio-politico-economic context in Zimbabwe does not garner good governance through which local communities receive devolved powers, empowerment, and livelihood development through the sustainable management of key natural resources (Balint and Mashinya, 2008b; Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). Arguments central to the debates around devolution and democratic decentralisation (see Section 2.5.3 in Chapter 2) suggest that full devolution to local communities is enough for them to fulfil their management requirements so long as it is done over time in an adaptive and evolving manner (e.g. Larson, 2005). This is still advocated by some of those integral to designing CAMPFIRE in the 1980s. However, as shown in Chapter 6, for this to be achieved there needs to be a context in which the system as a whole works on the principles of good governance. Such a system needs to: a) allow full devolution, b) make space for authority to be given to local communities with true downward accountability, representation, and participation of all stakeholders in decisions and processes undertaken at all levels, and c) provide full information and communication disclosure channels linking the micro (local) level to the macro (national and global) levels (Jones, 2004; Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001; Batterbury and Fernando, 2006). Others agree that giving full devolution to local communities is not enough to ensure benefits will arise from this process (as discussed in Chapters 5 and 6). Instead, the way in which it is done

must reinforce democratic practices and ensure social representation (Oyono, 2005). These practices do not exist in Zimbabwe at present.

The key issue overall becomes that of understanding how a governance system that is highly hierarchical and power driven, undemocratic and unwilling to relinquish control of financial revenue streams, can reorient along a more democratic and devolved trajectory. As Ruitenbeek and Cartier (2001) argue: "what is needed is rather to change the political formulations and power relations of those involved in these negotiations over resources – effectively to change the make-up of the 'state' so that people can demand rights and governance processes will be more accountable. In other words we are highly unlikely to have devolution without more democracy" (p.44 in Martin, 2009a). However, as Gaventa (2006) warns, this change cannot just come from the bottom. It also is unlikely to be straightforward. The rest of this chapter presents recommendations of how to reformulate the natural resource management processes and ultimately lead to a more conducive governance system for CBNRM type programmes to function with both local communities and natural resource conservation at the centre of attention. It also argues for a more central role for externally implemented CBNRM projects in developing strategies for conservation and development to align and work together in the face of pressures and drivers from dominant narratives and global powers. This argument is supportive to some extent of the critical discourse outlined in Section 2.3 advocating for a more thorough integration of social and environmental justice, as will be seen in the discussion below.

## 7.3 Demanding Devolution

Understanding how CAMPFIRE fits into the wider governance context and the role this plays in the on-the-ground impacts of the programme also provides an opportunity to identify how change can be effected in reverse, i.e. how CBNRM programmes can be designed and implemented in a way that brings positive change to the governance system. This opportunity also expands on the previous focus in the academic literature which has been almost solely on the devolution aspect of CBNRM, to instead show the interlinkages, importance, and knock-on effects with the other principles of good governance. This has relevance to other environment and development issues beyond conservation and poverty alleviation. This thesis thus argues that, in the context where

there is a lack of good governance, there needs to be a more transformational systemic change in the governance of natural resources. This includes firstly a shift in focus on the processes of devolution.

In the current situation, devolution is expected to be supplied from the top down, which as Chapters 5 and 6 show, has only resulted in superficial decentralisation at best. Instead, findings in this thesis suggest that devolution needs to instead be demanded from below. This builds on the arguments of Mandondo (2000) who discusses 'demand-driven decentralisation', Rihoy and Maguranyanga (2007) who discuss 'demand-driven CBNRM', and Larson (2005) who argues for decentralisation 'from below' on the basis that 'formal decentralisation needs grassroots demand to overcome central resistance'. As discussed, the high value characteristic of most natural resources is one of the main reasons for the lack of devolution of rights and control to the local level. To overcome this resistance, one way is to exercise power by demanding that decentralisation processes take place. In theory, demanded devolution can generate sufficient political momentum and pressure on the central government to change the governance system. In demanding this change, people are pushing for more effective processes of participation and representation, accountability and transparency and, access to information, as well as more equitable sharing of costs and benefits (Murphree and Martin, n.d.).

The need for an overall bottom up movement has been advocated a number of times in the natural resource management debate (Berkes, 2004; Child and Barnes, 2010; Ribot and Larson, 2005). However, there has been no empirically based and tangible recommendations on how to achieve demanded devolution, little reflection upon the role of CBNRM in doing so, and what the wider implications would be for the governing system as a whole (Ribot, 2003; Rihoy, 2009). As Larson and Ribot (2005) argue, "further research is needed to understand how local people come to demand representation and services" (p.19). The research and findings presented in this thesis contribute to this further research request in the context of the multi-level governance of natural resource management. The rest of this chapter brings these factors into discussion.

### 7.3.1      Steps for demanding devolution

Before devolution can be effectively demanded from local communities, the empirical evidence shown in this thesis has indicated a number of vital steps that should to be taken to achieve this. These steps all centre on the socio-economic and political capacity (also known as the 'capacity to act') of the local communities involved (see also Cundill and Fabricius, 2010 for a similar argument in the South African context) and as highlighted at the centre of the Arena for Change (Figure 6-2).

The results have highlighted the lack of both socioeconomic and political capacity of local households and villages. Exacerbated by the villages' isolated geographical location and the subsequent lack of integration into Zimbabwean society, the weak capital assets and an overreliance on restricted natural capital have limited household endowments, entitlements, and overall capabilities in the CAMPFIRE process. Many households therefore rely on food aid for some of the year and struggle to meet their basic household needs. Village infrastructure to meet basic needs is also missing. Together with unsuitable CAMPFIRE benefits to compensate for associated opportunity costs, households in the study villages experience high levels of poverty and thus have marginal-to-no socioeconomic capacity. Political capacity is minimal and exacerbated by low levels of education and awareness of basic human rights, the governance process, and processes and channels of representation and accountability. This has also been noted by Dressler et al. (2010) who state that, "conversely CBNRM has produced devolved approaches that have, by privileging  conservation, facilitated community disempowerment and impoverishment" (p.11).

Additionally, the remote location of the villages and subsequent lack of civil society organisations present in their vicinity increases the level of political incapacity (Derman, 1995). The governance gaps identified in the sub-district system in Chapter 5 have significantly restricted local household involvement in the governing of natural resources. The gaps also point to more chronic issues in terms of the lack of political capacity of those with a formal governing role. The socioeconomic capacity of these actors – RDCs, Councillors, Chiefs – is also limited to the extent that they cannot fulfil their roles (see Chapters 5 and 6). This further undermines the overall capacity of local communities (Rihoy and Maguranyanga, 2007). While it is clear that demanding

devolution from the central government is a suitable process to undertake, it is vital to appreciate that many communities do not have the capacity to hold leaders downwardly accountable, let alone demand significant changes to the governing process (Folke et al., 2005; Larson, 2005).

Thus, for demanded devolution, there needs to be an active civil society. To have an active civil society, the communities need to have the capacity to become active. To have the capacity to act, communities need to have their basic needs met, as well as have political agency (Dressler et al., 2010). To meet their basic needs, communities need to have socioeconomic and political development. Or to put it the other way around: socio-economic and political development is needed to meet basic needs in order to generate the capacity for communities to develop into an active civil society which can demand devolution and their rights and responsibilities from central government (Figure 7-1). Rather than focusing on the end goal of devolution, programmes need to start looking at the socioeconomic and political development of local communities (Derman, 1995; Dressler et al., 2010; Gaventa, 2006).



**Figure 7-1: Necessary requirements to achieve the ability to demand devolution and thus good governance**

In this sense the governance system requires transformational change. Previous shifts in emphasis have been more evolutionary or about incremental transitions (Adams and Hulme, 2001b) such as from protectionist to community-based conservation and from a strong central state to neoliberalism to governance (Olsson et al 2006). The change required of the Zimbabwe governance system to generate a context of good governance needs to be quicker and more radical. The use of practical approaches to understand what is feasible in changing the governing system in this way, such as good enough governance (Grindle, 2004), would be a fruitful next step to this research. Advocating

demanded devolution and the capacity building of local communities runs the risk of generating a political movement which brings with it risks of uprisings and conflict (Hutton et al., 2005). Thus working across the stakeholder groups with a moral imperative to support social justice and human rights is vital to try and avoid such scenarios as local communities gain power. Good enough governance is one way of providing an understanding of how the factors of governance can be fitted together in reality to help with this.

## 7.4 Bringing Back in the State and Co-Management

While the process proposed so far here has been focused on catalysing an active civil society which can then begin to effect change from the bottom up, there is equally a need to match this bottom up effort with top down willingness (Child and Barnes, 2010; Larson, 2005). This top down willingness is not only in terms of listening to and working with the bottom up demands, but also playing a role in generating the required capacity and enabling environment (Cornwall and Coelho, 2007; Martin, 2009b; Ribot, 2003; Stringer et al., 2014). It is the responsibility of the central government to provide service delivery and infrastructure in the rural areas in Zimbabwe, as well as encourage and enact the decentralisation process in the first place (Larson and Ribot, 2005). The lack of services and infrastructure is currently a significant cause of households' weak capacity (as recognised early on in the evaluation of CAMPFIRE (Child, 1996c)). In Zimbabwe the case studies have shown that instead of devolution or even decentralisation taking place through the transferal of responsibilities, the central government actually withdrew from the process, backing away from its ongoing responsibilities that continue despite decentralisation (Larson, 2005). In many ways it seems that the Government of Zimbabwe has been hiding behind the facade of the notion of community-based management and ownership, and assuming that devolution means a reduced role for the state. In many respects, the argument laid out above in favour of demanding devolution, is also the process of demanding the state be more present and play a more active role itself. This can have far reaching implications for Zimbabwe's reintegration into the international community it retreated from in the 2000s. If the state can show it is willing to change towards more democratic processes, with that comes the potential for more aid resources to reinvigorate the economy's ability to provide public services

and progress development. It also reduces the risk of Zimbabwe becoming a fully 'hollow state' in this context (Milward and Provan, 2000), and opens up possibilities for the Zimbabwean state to regain some of its power from more powerful actors and agendas in the international conservation-development discourse.

The concept of the local and the state working together towards shared goals is not new (Meynen and Doornbos, 2005). CBNRM itself has previously been described as co-management (also known as collaborative management) where various stakeholders work together towards a common aim (Adams and Hulme, 2001b; Berkes, 2004). On paper, CAMPFIRE also reads as a co-management programme consisting of partnerships between safari operators, the CAMPFIRE Association, and the RDCs working together to manage wildlife. There are two issues with this conceptualisation of CAMPFIRE as a co-management programme: the first is that it does not specify the role of communities within the co-management, nor second, does it account for changes in wider governing system (Fortmann et al., 2001). Participatory co-management and adaptive co-management have spawned from these two critiques, and placing much heavier emphasis on reflexive learning and flexible adaptation to changing and evolving circumstances over time, as well as managing complex systems across multiple-scales (Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Ruitenbeek and Cartier, 2001). However, they are themselves criticised for many of the issues that have been explored in this thesis (Armitage et al., 2008; Plummer and Fennell, 2009; Schultz et al., 2011). These approaches are all influenced by the ongoing disconnects and conflicts with the conservation-development discourse, and as the findings in this thesis have shown, there is a need for more qualitative social science based contributions that draw out the social and political elements of the discourse and subsequent outcomes.

As such, the research findings presented in this thesis suggest that it is somewhat futile trying to conceptually find an appropriate theory or approach to recommend as a good way forward, but rather, it is more important to emphasise the main elements that would make a viable and effective approach, and concentrate on getting them right. In this regard, it requires building from the positive too. It is too easy for the name of the theory or approach to act as a narrative and create a self-fulfilling cycle of advocacy (as some say occurred with CAMPFIRE e.g. Blaikie, 2006) rather than attention being

necessarily paid to the tangible actions and constituent parts that make up the approach. This is especially pertinent given the complex nature of society and nature today, not just as arenas in themselves but in their relationships and interactions (Berkes, 2004; Shackleton et al., 2010).

## 7.5    Role of CBNRM Institutions

CBNRM projects like CAMPFIRE could be in a useful position to contribute to creating the enabling environment needed for the above processes to take place, as highlighted by the Arena of Change (Figure 6-2). However, in order to do so, it requires CBNRM to change its approach. Larson and Ribot (2005) make the important differentiation between the model CBNRM project and the wider context, stating that, "when factors outside of these models dominate outcomes, it is time to rethink those models or to systematically locate them in a broader political economy" (p.7). As this thesis has shown, both the model and the context are important for understanding the processes and impacts of CBNRM programmes and for adapting the model to better fit the context. In the case of Zimbabwe and other nations that have a lack of good governance, the CBNRM approach and model need to move away from their primary focus on conservation (and recently more directly focused on market-based payment for ecosystem services for carbon storage) to concentrate on what the evidence presented here recommends as the first step of socio-economic and political local development, as the conservation-development critical discourse also argues (Benjaminsen and Svarstad, 2010). There are four reasons why this shift in the focus of CBNRM projects is proposed as both necessary and beneficial to the approach itself, and to the impacts it will have on the ground.

First, CBNRM's success is premised on devolution. Without successful devolution such programmes in the future run the risk of having the same weaknesses as CAMPFIRE. Thus it is argued here that it is in a CBNRM programme's interest that devolution be successfully and fully implemented.

Second, a programme based on the management of natural resources is in a special position to influence the wider situation. Larson and Ribot (2005) argue that natural resources provide a sharp optic lens for insights into decentralisation writ large, and that

as valued capital for both local livelihoods (subsistence and income generation) and for governments and private actors they are usually a 'point of struggle between rural people and the elites' (p.4). This puts natural resource management programmes in a critical position to have bargaining power and influence negotiation.

Third, livelihoods are directly tied to natural resource management activities such that the designers and implementers of CBNRM programmes can be seen to have a moral responsibility to ensure their activities have positive impacts but also have an interest in ensuring household livelihoods are sufficient and sustainable. In this way, communities may then have the capacity to play the role they are designed to play in CBNRM.

Finally, as externally generated programmes, those running CBNRM projects are in a good position to act as boundary organisations within political development (Cash and Moser, 2000), campaigning, and ensuring democracy and transparency throughout the process (Balint and Mashinya, 2006). Within this is the important job of bringing the state back into the CBNRM and development process. As already discussed, CBNRM initiatives have an interest in ensuring a rebalancing of power between different stakeholders and in reducing local community marginalisation so that they can meet their goals. REDD+ and TFCA projects that are drawing on the CBNRM discourse in southern Africa tend to be funded by private companies or large financially stable NGOs. This provides them with the opportunity of suitable funding and time to ensure the required capacity is built and the local level drives the process.

Despite ongoing advocation for full devolution, the evidence presented here shows that (and as Martin (2009a) also alludes to) there is a need for a change in the power dynamics within the governance system, an increase in the capital capacity of concerned local communities, and the necessary role of external interventions. What is required is a 'transformation' of the governance system, shifting the power balance between the central state and local communities who – in the case of the case study villages – are marginalised, vulnerable, and inactive.

In cognisance of the above implications and on the basis of the original concept of community-based conservation (Dressler et al., 2010), CBNRM projects are well placed. The organisations involved can: access trustworthy and relevant information and deliver

it appropriately at the suitable level of governance and, act as mediator in conflict resolution between multiple actors and interests. They can provide rule enforcement mechanisms, checks and balances, and legitimacy, as well as generate revenue from international funding streams to provide sufficient infrastructure to enable an immediate increase in local capacity i.e. technology, and provide education and mobilisation for local communities on the processes, structures, and rationales for change (Cundill and Fabricius, 2010; Dietz et al., 2003; Folke et al., 2005). However, for CBNRM projects to take this stance and role, there needs to be a transformative change in how CBNRM as a concept is approached and delivered. This sentiment is also supported by Dressler et al. (2010).

There are three implications to arise from the recommended change in governance for CBNRM. First, practically, benefits from the projects need to come first and restrictions later once capacity has been built up. Second, conceptually, conservation has to be viewed as a development problem rather than development being seen a conservation problem, as is currently the case in southern Africa. Third, philosophically, the management of natural resources depended upon by so many needs to integrate more moral and normative aspects to its design, implementation, and evaluation. Jones (2009) advocates a more political approach to understanding and resolving issues in CBNRM as the planning and policy problems posed by its complex nature means that it cannot be overcome by science alone. The conceptual implication of viewing conservation as a development problem is key to helping to ensure the more practical and philosophical implications for CBNRM.

## 7.6    Conservation Becomes a Development Problem

The evidence from rural Zimbabwe generates the argument that conservation needs to be reframed as a development problem rather than the original focus on conservation for development (also advocated for by Martin, 2009a). Development in this context is referring to the basic socio-economic and political development of local households. Emphasis should be placed on ensuring basic needs and livelihood security are gained, such that households have the capacity to spend time and energy on other aspects of society including the achievement of conservation goals. Rather than focusing first on achieving the conservation of the resource in question and using the conservation

outcomes to benefit local communities, the initial focus needs to be on ensuring local communities, as an active civil society, have the necessary capacity. Capacity is vital to enforce the conservation processes needed for adequate sustainability and CBNRM project goals, as well as being able to stand at the centre of the wider governance context in which the project is operating. This argument is far more in line with the original thinking behind the concept of CBNRM, which Jones (2004) explains to be "situations where local communities have sufficient authority to take their own decisions regarding natural resource management with minimal state regulation" (p.2). Dressler et al. (2010) are also advocates of putting social and environmental justice (such as individual and communal rights) above the neoliberal logic that has largely driven conservation so far.

It is important to note that this thesis is not arguing for conservation and development to be delinked or decoupled as many advocate for in the conservation-development discourse. Despite advocating a switch in emphasis, the evidence does suggest that conservation can bring development benefits to rural communities. It is just that there are a number of factors to be dealt with beforehand in order to ensure these benefits are appropriate and reach the intended stakeholders on the ground. Rather than decoupling conservation and development and have them operate independently but in parallel (see Section 2.3), this thesis is arguing for a more sequential process of basic development first followed by conservation when more feasible for the local communities and their livelihoods. An important future research question will be to assess what a suitable level of basic development is before it becomes contradictory to the aims of the programme.

## 7.7    Implications of Research Findings and Summary

Despite the numerous problems highlighted throughout this thesis, there are also lots of opportunities for CBNRM institutions to play a role in changing the natural resource management governance system to be more democratic, sustainable, and in line with what the approach needs to function effectively for both conservation and development. This requires a large shift, or indeed a flip, of focus, when initially designing and implementing CBNRM projects, as well as more effort being placed on understanding, and ensuring fit, with the wider context. In this way, steps can be taken in ensuring the

wider context does not impact, or take control of, the CBNRM process, as has happened with CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe. A quote from Dressler et al. (2010) sums this up nicely: "the prospect of local people sustaining CBNRM for social justice, livelihood security, and conservation needs is centred on how well programmes are embedded in sociocultural relations, politics, resource needs and uses, and landscape changes" (p.13).

The lack of good governance in Zimbabwe's natural resource management system means devolution is not being supplied as expected, giving even more relevance to the need for it to be demanded (Mandondo 2000, Rihoy and Maguranyanga 2007). The emphasis thus shifts to local communities' capacity as a civil society to effect change from the bottom up, in order to demand changes within the governing context to create a more enabling environment for their participation in natural resource management. Demanded devolution, however, is not enough. There is a need for the state to play a role in projects such as CBNRM to be suitably placed to facilitate this transformation in natural resource management governance. Natural resource management, or conservation, in this sense becomes a development problem.

## Chapter 8:   Conclusion

This chapter presents the conclusions of this thesis and briefly reiterates the practical and policy recommendations that have emerged from the research. It then continues to highlight priorities for future research.

## 8.1   General summary

This thesis set out to advance understanding of, and provide explanation for, CAMPFIRE's impacts and outcomes in practice through a multi-level assessment of its governing processes and structures. It did so by using multiple qualitative methods to achieve three objectives: i) assessing CAMPFIRE against its objective of promoting rural livelihoods, ii) unravelling the multi-level multi-stakeholder governance structure of CAMPFIRE projects, and iii) identifying the national governing context in which CAMPFIRE operates including the influences this has had on the design, implementation, and management of the programme.

The SLEEF, which brought together elements of the SLF and EEF, combined with the multi-level analysis of good governance allowed simultaneous exploration and interlinking of the detailed micro-level of household experiences and perspectives with wider influencing structures and processes. This has successfully provided new analysis of the CAMPFIRE system in its entirety, including a deeper understanding not just of what impacts it has had but also why these impacts have occurred. These findings are relevant and useful as lessons to inform the development of new CBNRM type initiatives across southern Africa as called for by (Roe and Nelson, 2009) and (Gomera et al., 2010). In this assessment, the thesis has shown that good governance is an essential element for the successful functioning of CBNRM.

This new evidence helped to advance understanding of practical recommendations of how to progress CBNRM. The findings point to a deep-set lack of good governance within the Zimbabwean natural resource management system which renders devolutionary programmes like CAMPFIRE inappropriate to context, even before their implementation. For CBNRM programmes to function in a system with little good governance, this thesis argues that there is a need for transformation in the governance of natural resource management in Zimbabwe away from the expected supplied devolution to demanded

devolution from the local communities involved as an active civil society. It also requires focus on rural socio-economic and political development to achieve a suitable level of capacity for conservation methods to be successfully adopted. Rather than viewing development as a conservation problem, conservation needs to be formulated as a development problem. The thesis puts forward recommendations on how this transformation of governance can be achieved and the role that CBNRM projects such as CAMPFIRE can play in this. First of all, devolution needs to be demanded from the bottom. In doing so, the local level is putting pressure on the central system to adhere more strongly to the principles of good governance. In demanding this change, people are pushing for more effective processes of participation and representation, accountability and transparency and, access to information, as well as more equitable sharing of costs and benefits. Second, the state needs to be brought back into the process to provide the space and suitable environment for devolutionary practices to occur democratically and effectively. In demanding devolution, civil society is in effect also demanding the state to be more present in the governance system. Third, by focusing efforts on an identified 'arena of change', CBNRM projects are usefully located in the governance system to generate the local capacity necessary for bottom up demand as well as act as a boundary organisation mediating the co-management processes between the local and state levels.

The story of CBNRM in Zimbabwe is thus a story of governance and development, and of the need to flip the processes currently in place; emphasise development for conservation rather than conservation for development, move from supplied devolution to demanded devolution, from top down to bottom up, and from project focused actions to partnerships and processes.

## 8.2    Research priorities and opportunities

The explorations and findings of this thesis have highlighted a number of further research gaps that need investigation. These include:

1)    Identifying the tipping point between the necessary socio-economic development for basic needs and human rights, when communities have

built enough capacity to function as an active civil society, and when it may become ecologically unsustainable.

2) Exploration of intra-household dynamics of gender, age, and family roles. While this thesis looked at inter-household dynamics based on the main livelihood activities and age categories, intra-household differences break down the household unit further to understand the situation on the basis of the individual. In this way a more nuanced assessment of winners and losers from CBNRM and other conservation approaches may be usefully understood.

3) Related to the above, a number of pertinent questions for further research have been raised specifically about where 'community' fits within the CBNRM process and what is actually meant by 'community-based' natural resource management.

4) Exploring what possibilities there are for including natural resources other than wildlife into CBNRM projects. This is especially important given the unreliability of the tourism industry that provides the majority of the revenue for wildlife based CBNRM projects like CAMPFIRE. This is especially so given the increasing attention being paid to the trophy hunting industry through international incidences such as 'Cecil the Lion'. There are numerous discussions about the future economic viability of wildlife on its own (Harrison et al., 2015; Stringer et al., 2014; Sandhu and Sandhu, 2014; Jeke, 2014; Dodman and Mitlin, 2014; Measham and Lumbasi, 2013) and as has been shown throughout this thesis, the local benefits derived from wildlife have not been enough to compensate for the problems caused by wildlife in rural areas.

5) Understanding the role of subsistence agriculture within the livelihood options of rural households involved in CBNRM projects, given the inherent conflict between agriculture and wildlife, and conflict over the use of space for the two. The need to question this emphasis on subsistence agriculture as the main livelihood encouraged through CBNRM has become evident throughout the thesis discussion.

6) Applying and evaluating the utility of the SLEEF for understanding and analysing other complex socio-ecological systems. The SLEEF is useful for studying multi-level phenomena whilst keeping a significant level of detail at the local level. Linking levels in a comprehensive framework is especially pertinent for initiatives such as PES and TFCAs that transcend even more complex multi-level systems than CBNRM.

7) Comparing other national CBNRM programmes in different southern African countries in order to establish a more solid regional understanding of what is meant by CBNRM, how it functions in different contexts, and more general strengths and weaknesses, as well as being able to distinguish country-specific effects and influences.

These issues for further research are both urgent and important. As the focus of CBNRM evolves into PES and TFCA across the southern African region, lessons from long standing projects such as CAMPFIRE will be increasingly sought. Without a solid and reliable understanding of how CBNRM has, and has not, functioned in the past and *why* this has been so is vital to ensuring the lessons learnt are constructive and progressive. This thesis has contributed significantly to this understanding of CBNRM through its case study of CAMPFIRE, the programme that has historically been considered the quintessential example. The findings across governance levels and from multiple stakeholder voices and perspectives have led to a sequence of recommendations for altering the CBNRM process within a context of little good governance, including for the use of the concept of 'good enough governance' to more practically apply these findings to the political situation in Zimbabwe. While these recommendations are normative, they provide a useful platform to catalyse discussions amongst political scientists, policy makers, and practitioners on the reality and feasibility of the recommendations given the specific context. Simultaneously, the findings in the thesis also contribute significantly to the conservation-development discourse by providing qualitative case study evidence that clearly highlights the need for more integral integration of social and political approaches to knowing and understanding. The thesis also provides a new approach to joining conservation and development together, in support of the 'critical

discourse' that suggests community-based conservation has not really been tried, and that the discourse needs a more rights based approach overall.

195

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# Appendices

**Appendix A.        Semi-Structured Survey**


**Verbal Participant Consent to be acquired**

The following section should be read to all participating in the survey before any questions have been asked. After reading it, please ensure that all participants fully understand what you have just said and ask them to verbally give their consent. The whole process should be recorded on the Dictaphone.

**This is a quick survey as part of a PhD research project which hopes to learn from your experiences of using and managing natural resources and how we can learn from your experiences for future projects. The survey is collecting brief anonymous information on your household structure and your household livelihood strategies/income strategies. The information will not be used for any other purpose than for the PhD and your name will be recorded nor given to anyone else. This research is not connected to any organisation other than the UK University. You may, at any point, decide not to continue.**

**Do you consent to taking part in this survey?**

| | |
|---|---|
| Household Number | |
| Role of participant in HH | |
| Date | |
| Research Team Member sign | |
| Suitable for interview (tick = yes; cross = no) | |

## The Survey

**A      Household Structure**

1      Please complete the following table for all members of your household (please **do not** give names):

| Household Member | Gender | Relation to Respondent | Age | Occupation |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | | | | |
| 2 | | | | |
| 3 | | | | |
| 4 | | | | |
| 5 | | | | |
| 6 | | | | |
| 7 | | | | |
| 8 | | | | |
| 9 | | | | |
| 10 | | | | |

**Please continue below if there are more than 10 members.**

**B      Livelihoods and Income Generation**

1. What are the main livelihood activities in your household and are they for subsistence use or cash income?

| Livelihood activity | Subsistence use or cash income |
|---|---|
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

2      Which of the livelihood activities listed above do you consider to be the most important for your household, and what makes it so important?

_____

_____

_____

3      Do you think your household has more or less livelihood activities than other households people in your village, and why?

_____

_____

_____

4      What do you think is the main livelihood activity in the village as a whole?

_____

5      Which livelihood activity is the most successful in the village?

_____

6      Do the livelihood activities your household is currently doing differ from those you did:

a) 10 years ago, and if so, how? _____

_____

b) 20 years ago, and if so, how? _____

_____

c) 30 years ago, and if so, how? _____

_____

## C       Natural Resources

1. What natural resources does your household use and for what purposes?

| Resource | Purpose |
|---|---|
| 1 | |
| 2 | |
| 3 | |
| 4 | |
| 5 | |
| 6 | |

*Please continue below if you use more than 6 resources.*

2. Which of these resources do you access on a daily basis?

_____

_____

_____

3       Do you have to seek permission to use any natural resources, and if so, who do you have to get permission from?

| Resource | Permission needed |
|---|---|
| A | |
| B | |
| C | |
| D | |
| E | |
| F | |

4       Are there any natural resources you would like to have access to that you currently do not have? If so, please complete the table below:

| What resources do you want access? | Who controls this resource and access to it? |
|---|---|
| A | |
| B | |
| C | |
| D | |
| E | |

| F | |
|---|---|
| | |

5      Which natural resource do you think is used the most by the village?

_____

_____

6      How have resource conditions changed over:

a) The last 10 years? _____

_____

b) The last 20 years? _____

_____

c) The last 30 years? _____

_____

**D** **Relationships**

1. Please complete the following table by listing any organisations you are aware of working in your community, what activities they are working on and whether they are active or inactive.

| Organisation Name | Activities | Active or Inactive |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | | |
| 2. | | |
| 3. | | |
| 4. | | |
| 5. | | |
| 6. | | |
| 7. | | |
| 8. | | |

2. Which of these organisations do you have the most contact with, and what is this contact about?

_____

_____

_____

3      Who do you talk to about issues concerning natural resource use?

_____

_____

_____

4      What community groups are there and what are their roles in the community?

_____

_____

_____

5      Who has authority in the community and in what way?

_____

_____

_____

6      Have you heard of CAMPFIRE, and if so, what does it do?

_____

_____

_____

**E        Further research**

Do you have any questions about this research? If so, please write them here and we will try to answer them:

_____

_____

_____

Would you be willing to take part in the near future in a 1-2 hour interview if selected (please tick box)?

Yes                        No    ☐                        ☐

**Please make sure you thank the participants and save the Dictaphone recording. Make sure that you have recorded their consent.**

**Appendix B.        Interview Guide**

| Theme | Rough Questions |
| --- | --- |
| Animals | How often do they cause you problems? |
| | What animals cause you problems? |
| | What do you want to be done about them? |
| | Tell us the history of the problems |
| | What do you think of the animals? |
| | What do you think of the national park? |
| | Who controls the animals? |
| | What happens when you have a problem with the animals? |
| | What problems in general would you need to be solved in order for you to accept the animals? |
| CAMPFIRE | What is CAMPFIRE? |
| | When was it here? |
| | Who runs it and who controls? |
| | Were you involved in CAMPFIRE at any point? |
| | Did you receive any benefits from CAMPFIRE? |
| | How were these chosen? |
| | Who chose them? |
| | What are your opinions about CAMPFIRE? |
| | What would you have suggested if you had been asked? |
| Food | Do you have enough to eat? |
| | Have you ever received food aid? |
| | Would you care so much about animals if you had enough to eat? |
| | What are other factors affecting your harvests besides animals? |
| Governance | Do you have contact with the Chief? |
| | Do you have contact with Agritex? |
| | Do you have contact with Councillor? |
| | Is distance between here and [above stakeholder] a problem? |
| | How would things be different if you lived closer to [above stakeholder]? |
| Other | What is a community? |
| | What is your community? |
| | How has the village developed since you have been here? |
| | How would you like to see it develop in the future? |

# Progressing Community-Based Natural Resource Management in Zimbabwe

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## KEY LESSONS IN PROGRESSING CBNRM IN POLICY, RESEARCH, AND PRACTICE IN ZIMBABWE

**The following lessons emerged from a workshop held in Harare in May 2014:**

a) **Emphasis needs to shift from decentralisation towards full devolution beyond the Rural District Councils (RDCs) alongside the increase in capacity of local level institutions (including RDCs) to fulfil original roles and obligations.**
b) **Transparency of CBNRM processes is needed, including an equalling of power between the institutions of accountability and investors involved.**
c) **Partnerships between central government, local government, communities, and investors are needed to ensure suitable and equitable communication is received by all parties.**
d) **It is vital to increase project emphasis on alleviating poverty and reducing the need for communities to focus solely on their survival so that they can be fully involved.**

## Background

Zimbabwe is ushering a new era of community-based natural resource management (CBNRM). It is moving away from place-based wildlife management initiatives to more internationally linked forestry carbon projects which focus on the sequestration of carbon through conservation of forests and the subsequent trading of carbon credits. Learning lessons from the varied and complex history of Zimbabwe's main CBNRM project – the **Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resource Use** (CAMPFIRE) – is necessary to ensure a successful progression of environmentally and socially just CBNRM in Zimbabwe. As such, the Sustainability Research Institute (University of Leeds with funding from the University of Leeds Sustainable Agricultural Bursary and the ESRC) and the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (University of Zimbabwe with funding from STEPS, IDS Sussex) held a workshop at CASS TRUST, Harare, in May 2014 titled "*Progressing CBNRM in Zimbabwe*". The aim of the workshop was to progress debates from the traditionally observed contradictory literature and analysis

on the successes and failures of CAMPFIRE into ways forward given the new CBNRM context emerging within the country. The workshop was attended by a range of professionals from policy-making, practice (at both local and national level), and research in the CBNRM arena who together discussed how to progress CBNRM, both theoretically and practically, given the rise of international emphasis on climate change mitigation and the emergence of subsequent new CBNRM-based projects (i.e. REDD+, co-management etc.). The workshop ultimately identified multiple lessons, including those listed above. It also flagged related areas of urgent focus.

Occurring in a background of landlessness and poverty, CAMPFIRE aimed at integrating biodiversity conservation and rural development through the commercial use of wildlife resources in former tribal reserves (through the 1982 amendment to the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act) [1, 2]. On paper, CAMPFIRE still remains one of the most innovative CBNRM programmes in the world because of its perceived success in directing policy and rewards to poorer people. However, studies and experiences, as outlined in this brief, **echo a decline in the effectiveness and performance of CAMPFIRE projects.** It is imperative for policy makers and practitioners alike to understand the criticisms of CAMPFIRE and apply these as lessons for improving the CBNRM approaches in Zimbabwe, especially in relation to the new CBNRM projects already being implemented in the country.

**Distilled insights to come from the workshop are as follows:**

1. **Emphasis needs to shift from decentralisation towards full devolution beyond RDCs plus necessary increase in capacity of local level institutions (including RDCs) to fulfil original roles and obligations:**

Since the 1980s, Zimbabwe has decentralised the management of natural resources [3]. The CAMPFIRE program decentralised control over wildlife to Appropriate Authorities (usually the Rural District Councils (RDCs) under existing legislation), with some policy guidelines providing for further devolution to sub-district administrative groups, i.e. wards [9, 10]. However, decentralisation of authority over CAMPFIRE decision-making and control has not been enough [11]. **The lack of further devolution to the village and community limits the achievement of the original CAMPFIRE objectives and threatens its long-term sustainability** [7].

Decentralisation in CAMPFIRE has been partial and conditional in some cases due to limited land tenure security resulting in RDCs and state agencies offloading the costs of natural resources management to local communities while retaining the control of associated benefit streams. Thus, the decentralization process has marginalised communities in management of wildlife projects and enjoyment of benefits. Moving forward, **the emphasis should shift from decentralisation to a devolutionary process which should be intensified.** This should involve the government giving legal status to

groups below the RDCs and for them to be recognised as legal entities capable of gaining Appropriate Authority. This will allow for communities living in communal lands - '*producer communities*' - to be able to obtain user rights to wildlife and fully participate in wildlife management, and likewise for other resources as project focus changes [12]. This will also allow communities to establish community game ranches, communal conservancies and community trusts unto which further devolution of authority can be made.

Moreover, there is need for the establishment of an efficient technical extension services and administrative oversight that allows for good governance and capacity building of the local people in common property management. This point is stressed because there is a significant problem with elite capture of benefits whereby those in positions of power co-opt the benefits destined for the producer communities themselves [11, 13, 14].

**2. Improved transparency of CBNRM processes including an equalling of power between the institutions of accountability and the private actors involved:**

Accountability and transparency are other aspects that can play an important role in improving local attitudes towards conservation. Accountability of stakeholder representatives and of management structures to their constituents is essential for effective local-level natural resource management. The decentralisation process that has occurred thus far in Zimbabwe is such that it has garnered upward rather than downward accountability. **The lack of capabilities at the local level has reduced the need for transparency in governing processes** [15, 16]. Where it occurs, transparency generates trust, and buy-in of CBNRM processes, especially among local people who are used to being excluded from management by local authorities and investors. Going forward, CBNRM will have to apply itself to this ensuring that local people, through their representative leadership, take part in the many negotiations concerning CBNRM projects. **By giving sub-district community entities legal status and official recognition with the CBNRM process – alongside socio-economic development and satisfaction of basic needs – communities will have increasing capacity to hold more powerful actors, from RDCs to investors, to account.** Furthermore, communities themselves will be expected to be transparent, holding each other to account, without fear or favour [5].

It is important to note, however, that transparent collective local governance institutions are highly unlikely to emerge overnight, particularly where institutions are newly created and take time to evolve. They can also be unlikely to emerge where there is a tradition of institutional closeness as is perhaps the case with Zimbabwe's traditional authority systems [5, 17]. An important element in taking CBNRM forward will have to be a long-term outlook, not the expectation of quick wins.

**3. Partnerships are needed to ensure that suitable communication and information**

**are received by all parties on how best to implement and manage projects:**

As Mandondo [18] explains, it is not easy to bring together the variety of different actors involved in natural resource management, yet establishing such partnerships is key to achieving good local governance and providing suitable communication and information exchange. The current disconnect in information and communication between many of the actors involved in natural resource management in Zimbabwe has increased issues in the process of ensuring decision-makers gain a realistic understanding of reality on the ground. This in turn hampers the resolution of key community and programme issues. Partnerships require "reciprocal, constructive, and respecting relationships between actors whereby they [actors] work successfully together for mutual benefit" [5]. However, in Zimbabwe, **recent studies have shown that partnerships are far from being formed resulting in a detrimental lack of shared information and communication key to successful outcomes.**

Causationally, the 'governance gaps' identified by Harrison et al [5] both underlie and cause these lacks of partnerships at the local and district level – there has been the cutting out of traditional actors, lack of RDC capacity and the reduction in central government involvement, lack of relationship between Chiefs and Councillors, overarching power control of private actors, and the continual lack of involvement of local communities. Without these partnerships, unreliable information will continue to misinform project designs and management, inefficiency will continue to plague the implementation process, and there will be few opportunities for people to build knowledge, skills, participation and accountability – all key for good local governance of natural resources management.

4. **Need for increased emphasis on alleviating poverty and reducing the need for communities to focus solely on their survival:**

In Southern Africa most CBNRM programmes have been initiated in areas with high poverty. The need to support rural development and address poverty issues was also a driving force [19]. In Zimbabwe, CAMPFIRE's emphasis was on using natural resource management to drive rural development in areas where conventional agriculture was limited by low rainfall and climatic variability. Murphree [20] described CAMPFIRE as firstly a programme of rural economic development, secondly a programme of community empowerment and democratisation, and thirdly, a conservation programme enhancing sustainable use.

During the phases when it was most people oriented striving to balance people's interests against those of conservation, CBNRM had some buy-in from local people [21]. At some point this balancing of interests changed with a shift to more focus on conservation and resultant frustration on the part of communities. This is where we are now. Going forward, **CBNRM needs to put emphasis on material concerns of people,**

**ensuring that people benefit appropriately in the process. In doing this, CBNRM must avoid making speculative, or easily misinterpreted, promises as was the case with CAMPFIRE.** This leads to unrealistic expectation with negative results. Future projects using the concept of CBNRM in Zimbabwe must ensure that people benefit from the contracts, both financially and in kind. More particularly and for good uptake by local people, future CBNRM deals must protect local livelihoods – whether agriculture, foraging or hunting - than be the basis of their destruction [22].

## Key recommendations

- CBNRM should be a process by which local communities gain access and use rights to, or ownership of, natural resources. Increasing security and clarity of land tenure is necessary.
- Increase the regard of local people as partners in the CBNRM process with their interests to be respected - not as passive victims.
- De-modernise CBNRM with shifts away from domination by bureaucrats to a more equal footing between central government systems and the traditional systems.
- To repair fragmented government policies and sectors, consolidate stakeholder participation in natural resource management and environmental conservation together under umbrella discussions.
- Decriminalise livelihood strategies so that people are free to pursue livelihoods that supplement CBNRM.
- To increase the downward flow of benefits, hold government and local level institutions more accountable to local people.
- Streamline, clarify, and input the required legislation and legal structures necessary for CBNRM to take into account the highlighted recommendations.

**Next step:** get all stakeholders on the same page about what CBNRM means, requires, and results in.

## Acknowledgements

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**Honestly Ndlovu** is an Ecologist (Climate Change and Carbon Sequestration) at SAFIRE, Zimbabwe.

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## Appendix D.    Systematic literature review - Final 16 Articles

The final 16 articles that were included in the systematic literature review used in Chapter 6 are listed below:

Balint, P.J. and Mashinya, J. 2006. The decline of a model community-based conservation project: Governance, capacity, and devolution in Mahenye, Zimbabwe. *Geoforum.* **37**(5), pp.805-815.

Balint, P.J. and Mashinya, J. 2008a. Campfire during Zimbabwe's national crisis: Local impacts and broader implications for community-based wildlife management. *Society and Natural Resources.* **21**(9), pp.783-796.

Balint, P.J. and Mashinya, J. 2008b. CAMPFIRE through the lens of the 'commons' literature: Nyaminyami rural district in post-2000 Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies.* **34**(1), pp.127-143.

Campbell, B., Mandondo, A., Nemarundwe, N., Sithole, B., De JonG, W., Luckert, M. and Matose, F. 2001. Challenges to Proponents of Common Property Recource Systems: Despairing Voices from the Social Forests of Zimbabwe. *World Development.* **29**(4), pp.589-600.

Child, B. 1996b. The practice and principles of community-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe: The CAMPFIRE programme. *Biodiversity and Conservation.* **5**(3), pp.369-398.

Child, G. 1996c. The role of community-based wild resource management in Zimbabwe. *Biodiversity and Conservation.* **5**(3), pp.355-367.

Derman, B. 1995. ENVIRONMENTAL NGOS, DISPOSSESSION, AND THE STATE - THE IDEOLOGY AND PRAXIS OF AFRICAN NATURE AND DEVELOPMENT. *Human Ecology.* **23**(2), pp.199-215.

Frost, P.G.H. and Bond, I. 2008. The CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe: Payments for wildlife services. *Ecological Economics.* **65**(4), pp.776-787.

Logan, B.I. and Moseley, W.G. 2002. The political ecology of poverty alleviation in Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). *Geoforum.* **33**(1), pp.1-14.

Matzke, G.E. and Nabane, N. 1996. Outcomes of a community controlled wildlife utilization program in a Zambezi Valley community. *Human Ecology.* **24**(1), pp.65-85.

Murombedzi, J. 1997. Management of the land and resources of the Masoka community of Dande communal lands, Zimbabwe: The Masoka community, Zimbabwe.

Mutandwa, E. and Gadzirayi, C.T. 2007b. Impact of community-based approaches to wildlife management: case study of the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe. *International Journal of Sustainable Development & World Ecology.* **14**(4), pp.336-344.

Sibanda, B.M.C. 1995. Wildlife, conservation and the Tonga in Omay. *Land Use Policy.* **12**(1), pp.69-85.

Taylor, R. 2009. Community based natural resource management in Zimbabwe: the experience of CAMPFIRE. *Biodiversity and Conservation.* **18**(10), pp.2563-2583.

Virtanen, P. 2003. Local management of global values: Community-based wildlife management in Zimbabwe and Zambia. *Society & Natural Resources.* **16**(3), pp.179-190.

Young, Z., Makoni, G. and Boehmer-Christiansen, S. 2001. Green aid in India and Zimbabwe – conserving whose community? *Geoforum.* **32**(3), pp.299-318.

**Appendix E.      Ethical approval from University of Leeds Ethics Committee**

**UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS**

Elizabeth Harrison
Sustainability Research Institute
University of Leeds
Leeds, LS2 9JT

**AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee**
**University of Leeds**

23 February 2016

Dear Elizabeth

| | |
|---|---|
| **Title of study:** | **Assessing lessons from community based natural resource management projects for the implementation of carbon sequestration schemes in dryland Africa** |
| **Ethics reference:** | **AREA 11-141** |

I am pleased to inform you that the above research application has been reviewed by the ESSL, Environment and LUBS (AREA) Faculty Research Ethics Committee and following receipt of your response to the Committee's initial comments, I can confirm a favourable ethical opinion as of the date of this letter. The following documentation was considered:

| Document | Version | Date |
|---|---|---|
| AREA 11-141 Elizabeth Harrison ethics form April 2012.pdf | 1 | 18/04/12 |
| AREA 11-141 Committee Provisional RESPONSE.doc | 1 | 01/06/12 |

Committee members made the following comments:

*This response addresses the naiveties of the earlier proposal and contains a much more realistic appraisal of the issues. The contacts with well-known Zimbabwean academics working on CBRNM should help considerably - maybe you could also look out Marshall Murphree?*

*For your consideration: The use of local translators and gatekeepers is not a safe, easy option, but contains its own set of problems and things to consider. The gatekeepers and assistants, like anyone, will not be seen neutrally and objectively, but their status will*

*affect how they are viewed by participants, and this will in turn affect how participants see you. This is an unavoidable issue, so it is something to be considered rather than a necessary amendment to the proposal.*

Please notify the committee if you intend to make any amendments to the original research as submitted at date of this approval, including changes to recruitment methodology. All changes must receive ethical approval prior to implementation. The amendment form is available at www.leeds.ac.uk.

Please note: You are expected to keep a record of all your approved documentation, as well as documents such as sample consent forms, and other documents relating to the study. This should be kept in your study file, which should be readily available for audit purposes. You will be given a two week notice period if your project is to be audited.

Yours sincerely

Jennifer Blaikie
Senior Research Ethics Administrator
Research & Innovation Service
On behalf of Prof Anthea Hucklesby
Chair, AREA Faculty Research Ethics Committee


CC: Student's supervisor(s)

## Appendix F.    Ethics application

| UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE APPLICATION FORM [1] |
|---|

Please read each question carefully, taking note of instructions and completing all parts. If a question is not applicable please indicate so. The superscripted numbers refer to sections of the guidance notes, available at www.leeds.ac.uk/ethics. Where a question asks for information which you have previously provided in answer to another question, please just refer to your earlier answer rather than repeating information.

To help us process your application enter the following reference numbers, if known and if applicable:

| Ethics reference number: | |
|---|---|
| Grant reference and/ or student number: | 200662303 |

| PART A: Summary |
|---|

**A.1 Which Faculty Research Ethics Committee would you like to consider this application? [2]**

○ Biological Sciences

○ Mathematics; Physical Sciences; Engineering (MEEC)

○ Medicine and Health (Please specify a subcommittee)

　　○ Healthcare Studies

　　○ Psychological Sciences

　　○ Health Sciences/ LIGHT/ LIMM

　　○ Dentistry

　　○ Medical and Dental Educational Research

● Social Sciences/ Environment/ LUBS (AREA)

○ Arts/ Performance, Visual Arts & Communications (PVAR)

**A.2 Title of the research [3]**

Assessing lessons from community based natural resource management projects for the implementation of carbon sequestration schemes in dryland Africa

**A.3  Principal investigator's contact details [4]**

| Name *(Title, first name, surname)* | Miss Elizabeth Harrison |
|---|---|
| Position | PhD Candidate |
| Department/ School/ Institute | School of Earth and Environment/Sustainability Research Institute |

| Faculty | Environment |
|---|---|
| Work address *(including postcode)* | Room 9.123<br>School of Earth and Environment<br>University of Leeds<br>Leeds<br>LS2 9JT |
| Telephone number | +44(0) 113 34 37966 |
| **University of Leeds** email address | eeeh@leeds.ac.uk |

**A.4 Purpose of the research: [5]** (Tick as appropriate)

☐ Research

☑ Educational qualification: ***Please specify: ____PhD_____***

☐ Educational Research & Evaluation [6]

☐ Medical Audit or Health Service Evaluation [7]

☐ Other

**A.5 Select from the list below to describe your research:** (You may select more than one)

☑ Research on or with human participants

☐ Research with has potential significant environmental impact.[8] If yes, please give details:

_____

☑ Research working with data of human participants

☑ New data collected by questionnaires/interviews

☑ New data collected by qualitative methods

☑ New data collected from observing individuals or populations

☐ Research working with aggregated or population data

☑ Research using already published data or data in the public domain

☐ Research working with human tissue samples [9]

**A.6 Will the research involve any of the following:** [10] (You may select more than one)

*If your research involves any of the following an application must be made to the National Research Ethics Service (NRES) via IRAS www.myresearchproject.org.uk as NHS ethical approval will be required. There is no need to complete any more of this form. Contact **governance-ethics@leeds.ac.uk** for advice.*

☐ Patients and users of the NHS (including NHS patients treated in the private sector) [11]

☐ Individuals identified as potential participants because of their status as relatives or carers of patients and users of the NHS

☐ Research involving adults in Scotland, Wales or England who lack the capacity to consent for themselves [12]

☐ A prison or a young offender institution in England and Wales (and is health related) [14]

☐ Clinical trial of a medicinal product or medical device [15]

☐ Access to data, organs or other bodily material of past and present NHS patients [9]

☐ Use of human tissue (including non-NHS sources) where the collection is not covered by a Human Tissue Authority licence [9]

☐ Foetal material and IVF involving NHS patients

☐ The recently deceased under NHS care

☑ None of the above

**You must inform the Research Ethics Administrator of your NRES number and approval date once approval has been obtained.**

*If the University of Leeds is not the Lead Institution, or approval has been granted elsewhere (e.g. NHS) then you should contact the local Research Ethics Committee for guidance. The UoL Ethics Committee need to be assured that any relevant local ethical issues have been addressed.*

**A.7 Will the research involve NHS staff recruited as potential research participants (by virtue of their professional role) or NHS premises/ facilities?**

☐ Yes ☑ No

*If yes, ethical approval must be sought from the University of Leeds. Please note that NHS R&D approval is needed in addition, and can be applied for concurrently: www.myresearchproject.org.uk. Contact governance-ethics@leeds.ac.uk for advice.*

**A.8 Will the participants be from any of the following groups?** (Tick as appropriate)

☐    Children under 16 [16]

☐    Adults with learning disabilities [12]

☐    Adults with other forms of mental incapacity or mental illness

☐    Adults in emergency situations

☐    Prisoners or young offenders [14]

☐    Those who could be considered to have a particularly dependent relationship with the investigator, e.g. members of staff, students [17]

☐    Other vulnerable groups

☑    No participants from any of the above groups

*Please justify the inclusion of the above groups, explaining why the research cannot be conducted on non vulnerable groups.*

*A Criminal Record Bureau (CRB) check will be needed for researchers working with children or vulnerable adults (see www.crb.gov.uk)*

**A.9 Give a short summary of the research [18]**

*This section must be completed in language comprehensible to the lay person. Do not simply reproduce or refer to the protocol, although the protocol can also be submitted to provide any technical information that you think the ethics committee may require. This section should cover the main parts of the proposal.*

There is growing emphasis within international climate change negotiations on using market based systems such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) to mitigate climate change. While effective for reducing or controlling the causes of climate change, these processes can be both beneficial and detrimental to the local communities involved and their chances to develop and adapt.

This research focuses on Zimbabwe, where there is a long history of community based natural resource management (CBNRM) projects, which have experience in dealing with the multiple and different perspectives of the various stakeholders involved and from which future market based systems can learn. The project aims to identify what those lessons are, and how they can inform and develop the market based systems such that they become more equitable and efficient, and can achieve synergies between the aims of climate change mitigation, adaptation, and development rather than focusing on just one or other. This will be done through studying a number of locations across rural Zimbabwe which have been involved in various types of CBNRM, and assessing these lessons in light of the design of pending market based systems such as REDD in the country. Findings will be contextualised within the literature from across southern Africa as a whole.

**A.10 What are the main ethical issues with the research and how will these be addressed? [19]**

*Indicate any issues on which you would welcome advice from the ethics committee.*

There are no difficult ethical issues to be confronted within this research. The topic discussed is not controversial, all participants will be involved voluntarily, and their full informed consent obtained. Identities at the community level will be anonymised. A representative sample of the communities' demographics will be obtained in order to ensure all stakeholders and marginalised groups are included in the study i.e. gender, class and age specific groups. At the regional and national level, participants will not be anonymised (unless requested at Ethical Consent Form stage at which point the process will continue anonymously) and this will be explained prior to gaining their full consent and participation will only begin if all parties are happy.

No payment, in either monetary or gift form, will be given at all during the course of the fieldwork. There are no environmental or health implications of the research, and there should be no positive nor negative impacts on those involved.

I have experience of working in cultures different to my own and have always ensured I follow and/or respect the practices of the local culture I am in. I will ensure I am aware of those specific to Zimbabwe and to the communities I will be visiting prior to the field work, and will constantly be aware of my actions. Work will be undertaken in collaboration with the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe who have significant experience in the study areas and a long history of collaboration with University of Leeds research and researchers.

I will ensure I am aware of and abide by local protocols and conventions in each of the locations I study (i.e. dress code, gender dynamics).

According to local partners based at the Centre for Applied Social Sciences in Harare, there are currently no ethical review procedures specific for Zimbabwe.

**PART B: About the research team**

**B.1  To be completed by students only [20]**

| Qualification working towards (eg Masters, PhD) | PhD |
|---|---|
| Supervisor's name *(Title, first name, surname)* | Dr Lindsay Stringer |
| Department/ School/ Institute | School of Earth and Environment/Sustainability Research Institute |
| Faculty | Environment |
| Work address *(including postcode)* | Room 9.105<br>School of Earth and Environment<br>University of Leeds<br>Leeds<br>LS2 9JT |
| Supervisor's telephone number | +44 (0) 113 343 7530 |
| Supervisor's email address | l.stringer@leeds.ac.uk |
| Module name and number *(if applicable)* | |

**B.2  Other members of the research team (eg co-investigators, co-supervisors) [21]**

| Name *(Title, first name, surname)* | Professor Andy Dougill |
|---|---|
| Position | Co-supervisor (and Head of School) |
| Department/ School/ Institute | School of Earth and Environment/Sustainability Research Institute |

| Faculty | Environment |
|---|---|
| Work address *(including postcode)* | Room 8.105<br>School of Earth and Environment<br>University of Leeds<br>Leeds<br>LS2 9JT |
| Telephone number | +44(0) 113 34 36782 |
| Email address | a.j.dougill@leeds.ac.uk |

<br>

| Name (Title, first name, surname) | Dr Deborah Sporton |
|---|---|
| Position | Co-supervisor (and Senior Lecturer) |
| Department/ School/ Institute | Department of Geography |
| Faculty | |
| Work address (including postcode) | University of Sheffield<br>Sheffield<br>S10 2TN |
| Telephone number | +44 (0)114 222 7953 |
| Email address | d.sporton@sheffield.ac.uk |

Part C: The Research

**C.1 What are the aims of the study?** [22] (Must be in language comprehensible to a lay person.)

The aim of this field research project is to identify key livelihood lessons from rural Zimbabwe's extensive experiences in community based natural resource management (CBNRM), assessing the potential for these to inform the development of appropriate institutional, governance and partnership structures that can deliver synergies for climate change mitigation, adaptation and development in future climate change mitigation policies and programmes.

**C.2 Describe the design of the research. Qualitative methods as well as quantitative methods should be included.** (Must be in language comprehensible to a lay person.)

*It is important that the study can provide information about the aims that it intends to address. If a study cannot answer the questions / add to the knowledge base that it intends to, due to the way that it is designed, then wasting participants' time could be an ethical issue.*

This research will be conducted in an inductive, qualitative manner involving the approaches of grounded theory and participatory methods. The participatory methods will be likely to include transect walks, scenario mapping, historical story-lines, focus groups, and semi-structured interviews with members of the local communities both involved and not involved in the relevant projects. This will be complemented with participant and community/project observation. In addition, semi- and un-structured interviews will be held with key project officials such as safari guides, hunters, local government officials, and traditional leaders at each project site, and with senior government and CBNRM/REDD officials in Harare and Bulawayo. It is not possible to determine for certain which participatory methods will be utilised in the field as part of the study aims to develop and select the most appropriate methods for the country and site contexts based on the suite of possible methods outlined above. For example, I will assess what is practical given the resources at each site, and what would be suitable for the capacities of the local communities and members involved in terms of time, space, knowledge, and willingness.

At the meta- and meso-levels, discourse, content, stakeholder and institutional analysis will be carried out to identify the institutional, governance and partnership structures and dynamics in each case alongside policy, guideline and standards analysis. Finally, the availability of secondary sources (maps, documents etc) found in country will be utilised i.e. searches of the CAMPFIRE Association's archives.

**C.3 What will participants be asked to do in the study? [23]** *(e.g. number of visits, time, travel required,   interviews etc)*

Participants will be asked to take part in various participatory methods in each community. This will be conducted in the context of semi-structured interviews and focus groups.

One-to-one semi-structured interviews will be held with a representative sample of households within each community (see C.7) and are expected to take up to two hours. This time expectation will be discussed with the participant when organising the interview and a suitable time for them will be agreed so as not to negatively impact on their time.

Focus groups are expected to take approximately one to two hours. Participants may be asked to participate in more than one focus group depending on which demographic groups they fit into (see C.7).

**C.4 Does the research involve an international collaborator or research conducted overseas: [24]**
(Tick as appropriate)

☑ Yes        ☐ No

**If yes, describe any ethical review procedures that you will need to comply with in that country:**

There are no formal ethical procedures to comply with in the country. Advice on this has been sought from the Centre for Applied Social Sciences at the University of Zimbabwe in Harare.

**Describe the measures you have taken to comply with these:**

Include copies of any ethical approval letters/ certificates with your application.

**C.5 Proposed study dates and duration**
PhD start date: 03.10.2011
PhD end date: 30.09.2015

Fieldwork will be conducted in two trips. Dates of this are as follows:
     1) Start date: 12.05.2012 – End date: 30.06.2012
     2) Start date: 07.01.2013 – End date: 30.09.2013

**C.6. Where will the research be undertaken?** (i.e. in the street, on UoL premises, in schools) [25]

Most of the research will take place in local rural Zimbabwean communities. Interviews and participatory exercises are likely to occur either in people's houses or outside in farmers' fields/communal areas. Focus groups will either take place in local community buildings such as a town hall if there is one, or outside in communal areas. An interpreter (an MSc student from CASS) will also be present as participants are unlikely to be able to speak English.

Interviews with district and national officials will occur in their offices.

RECRUITMENT & CONSENT PROCESSES

*How participants are recruited is important to ensure that they are not induced or coerced into participation. The way participants are identified may have a bearing on whether the results can be generalised.* Explain each point and give details for subgroups separately if appropriate.

**C.7 How will potential participants in the study be:**
**(i) identified?**
A purposive snowball sampling method will be used, and will be continually monitored to ensure representativeness of the initial demographic groups identified through preliminary secondary research, and from observations during the scoping study undertaken in May/June 2012. It is expected that this sampling method will have to be augmented at various stages to ensure all groups are represented. See C.9 for explanation of sample sizes.

The demographic groups identified thus far include: Age (young/middle-age/old), gender (male/female), livelihood activities (i.e. farmer/shop keeper etc. – and within this, dependence on natural resources), level of active participation in the project (including non-participants), distance of house from project, distance from house to local government, ethnicity, education level, language spoken at home, religion/beliefs (i.e. traditional/modern) etc.

**(ii) approached?**

Initially, I will introduce myself to the village chief/traditional leader, explain my research, and ask consent to study their village. I will then, with their permission, hold a village meeting in order to introduce myself and the research. I will try to assimilate into the community by socialising in the local places so that the community is aware of me before I approach individual members. I will then approach participants through snowball sampling methods, introducing myself, my interpreter and the research project. Advice on process has been sought from CASS.

**(iii) recruited? [26]**
After explaining who I am, what I am doing and what I need, I will explain the processes and methodologies of the research, what the data will be used for, and the participants' role within the project. I will ensure any false hopes or expected promises are eliminated. I will explain that any participation is entirely voluntary and whether it will be anonymous or not (which for anyone at the community level will be, unless a specific high-level role in the project or community, at which point permission will be ask not to anonymise). I will then ask if the person would be willing to take part and organise a suitable time/place for the interview/focus group to take place.

**C.8 Will you be excluding any groups of people, and if so what is the rationale for that? [27]**

*Excluding certain groups of people, intentionally or unintentionally may be unethical in some circumstances. It may be wholly appropriate to exclude groups of people in other cases.*

Children and the sick will not be asked to participate.

**C.9 How many participants will be recruited and how was the number decided upon? [28]**
*It is important to ensure that enough participants are recruited to be able to answer the aims of the research.*

The number of people to be recruited will be determined by the size of the communities to be studied (as yet unknown) and by the number of people within each relevant demographic group (see C.7). A large enough number of people from within each identified demographic group will need to be recruited to ensure the sample as a whole is representative. Once the suitable groups have been identified, the theory of "saturation" or "sampling to redundancy" will be conducted within each group and for the sample as a whole.

*Remember to include all advertising material (posters, emails etc) as part of your application*

**C.10 Will the research involve any element of deception? [29]** If yes, please describe why this is necessary and whether participants will be informed at the end of the study.

No.

**C.11 Will informed consent be obtained from the research participants?[30]**

☑ Yes    ☐ No

*If yes, give details of how it will be done. Give details of any particular steps to provide information (in addition to a [written] information sheet) e.g. videos, interactive material. If you are not going to be obtaining informed consent you will [need to] justify this.*

Consent will be gained verbally. Upon the advice of CASS at the University of Zimbabwe, written consent will not be reque[sted as] this can arouse suspicion and make the interviewees uncomfortable, especially as many may be illiterate. The verbal cons[ent will] be recorded on a Dictaphone but using an allocated participant number rather than personal details.

*If participants are to be recruited from any of potentially vulnerable groups, give details of extra steps taken to assur[e their] protection. Describe any arrangements to be made for obtaining consent from a legal representative.*

*Copies of any written consent form, written information and all other explanatory material should accompany this appli[cation]. The information sheet should make explicit that participants can withdrawn from the research at any time, if the research [design] permits.*

*Sample information sheets and consent forms are available from the University ethical review webpa[ge]. http://researchsupport.leeds.ac.uk/index.php/academic_staff/good_practice/ethical_review_process/university_ethical_[review_] 1.*

**C.12 Describe whether participants will be able to withdraw from the study, and up to what point (eg if data is to be [anonymised] withdrawal is not possible, explain why not.**

Participants can withdraw from the research at any point.

**C.13 How long will the participant have to decide whether to take part in the research? [31]**

*It may be appropriate to recruit participants on the spot for low risk research; however consideration is usually necessary f[or]*

The research is considered low risk and as such participants do not need very much time to decide whether to take part. [They] will be aware of my endeavour prior to me approaching them through community meetings and my introduction to the chi[ef. So] each participant will be given a day or two of warning between me introducing my research and asking for their parti[cipation in an] interview or focus group being conducted. As I endeavour to be in each community for at least a month, it will be possi[ble to give] participants a little longer to decide should they request it but only for interviews. Focus groups will have a set day and ti[me.]

**C.14 What arrangements have been made for participants who might not adequately understand verbal explana[tions or] information given in English, or who have special communication needs? [32]***(e.g. translation, use of interpreters etc. It [is important that] groups of people are not excluded due to language barriers or disabilities, where assistance can be given.)*

A translator/research assistant will be hired from CASS, University of Zimbabwe.

**C.15 Will individual or group interviews/ questionnaires discuss any topics or issues that might be sensitive, embarrass or upsetting, or is it possible that criminal or other disclosures requiring action could take place during the study (e.g. dur interviews/group discussions, or use of screening tests for drugs)? [33]**

☐ Yes    ☑ No

*If Yes, give details of procedures in place to deal with these issues*

*The information sheet should explain under what circumstances action may be taken*

**C.16 Will individual research participants receive any payments, fees, reimbursement of expenses or any other incenti or benefits for taking part in this research? [34]**

☐ Yes    ☑ No

*If Yes, please describe the amount, number and size of incentives and on what basis this was decided.*

RISKS OF THE STUDY

**C.17 What are the potential benefits and/ or risks for research participants? [35]**

There are no perceived benefits or risks for research participants. All attempts will be made to ensure participating in the research will not negatively impact on the participants' time or daily routine, and benefits may accrue indirectly through the joint learning process involved in the focus groups.

**C.18 Does the research involve any risks to the researchers themselves, or people not directly involved in the research?**
*Eg lone working* [36]

☐ Yes    ☑ No

*If yes, please describe: _____*

**Is a risk assessment necessary for this research?**

☑ Yes ☐ No     If yes, please include a copy of your risk assessment form with your application.

The risk assessment attached is incomplete as I am awaiting the confirmation of travel dates, thus cannot book provide flight or accommodation details. All other information is correct.

Further information on fieldwork risk assessments is available at http://www.leeds.ac.uk/safety/fieldwork/index.htm.

## DATA ISSUES

**C.19 Will the research involve any of the following activities at any stage (including identification of potential research participants)?** (Tick as appropriate)

- ☐ Examination of personal records by those who would not normally have access

- ☐ Access to research data on individuals by people from outside the research team

- ☐ Electronic transfer of data

- ☐ Sharing data with other organisations

- ☐ Exporting data outside the European Union

- ☑ Use of personal addresses, postcodes, faxes, e-mails or telephone numbers

- ☑ Publication of direct quotations from respondents *(non-attributed)*

- ☑ Publication of direct quotations from respondents *(attributed)*

- ☐ Publication of data that might allow identification of individuals to be identified

- ☑ Use of audio/visual recording devices

- ☑ FLASH memory or other portable storage devices

  Storage of personal data on or including any of the following:

  - ☑ Manual files

  - ☑ Home or other personal computers

  - ☐ Private company computers

  - ☑ Laptop computers

**C.20. How will the research team ensure confidentiality and security of personal data? E.g. anonymisation procedures, secure storage and coding of data.** [37]  You may want to refer to the data protection and research webpage.

Anonymous data will be collected and recorded by digital Dictaphone for transcribing at a later date and written notes will also be taken. In addition, focus groups will result in drawn responses such as mind-maps but these will also be anonymous.

The digital recordings will be uploaded at the end of each day onto a personal laptop and encrypted immediately. At a later date they will be transcribed into written documents which will be stored on the personal laptop in a locked folder with a password, and will be backed up onto an external hard drive (also password protected) kept separately from the laptop.

These will be transferred to my work computer upon arrival back to the UK and will continue to be password protected, and encrypted when possible i.e. when not in use.

| |
|---|

**C.21 For how long will data from the study be stored? Please explain why this length of time has been chosen.**[38]

_____3___ years,        _____6__ months  which corresponds to the end of the PhD

*NB: RCUK guidance states that data should normally be preserved and accessible for ten years, but for some projects it may be 20 years or longer.*

**Students: It would be reasonable to retain data for at least 2 years after publication or three years after the end of data collection, whichever is longer**

### CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

**C.22 Will any of the researchers or their institutions receive any other benefits or incentives for taking part in this research over and above normal salary or the costs of undertaking the research?** [39]

☐ Yes   ☑ No

*If yes, indicate how much and on what basis this has been decided _____*

**C.23 Is there scope for any other conflict of interest?** [40] *For example will the research funder have control of publication of research findings?*

☐ Yes   ☑ No   *If yes, please explain _____*

**C.24 Does the research involve external funding?**   (Tick as appropriate)

☑ Yes   ☐ No   *If yes, what is the source of this funding?*

ESRC White Rose Studentship

PART D: Declarations

**Declaration by Chief Investigators**

1. The information in this form is accurate to the best of my knowledge and belief and I take full responsibility for it.
2. I undertake to abide by the University's ethical and health & safety guidelines, and the ethical principles underlying good practice guidelines appropriate to my discipline.
3. If the research is approved I undertake to adhere to the study protocol, the terms of this application and any conditions set out by the Research Ethics Committee.
4. I undertake to seek an ethical opinion from the REC before implementing substantial amendments to the protocol.
5. I undertake to submit progress reports if required.
6. I am aware of my responsibility to be up to date and comply with the requirements of the law and relevant guidelines relating to security and confidentiality of patient or other personal data, including the need to register when necessary with the appropriate Data Protection Officer.
7. I understand that research records/ data may be subject to inspection for audit purposes if required in future.
8. I understand that personal data about me as a researcher in this application will be held by the relevant RECs and that this will be managed according to the principles established in the Data Protection Act.
9. I understand that the Ethics Committee may choose to audit this project at any point after approval.

**Sharing information for training purposes**
*Optional – please tick as appropriate:*

☑ I would be content for members of other Research Ethics Committees to have access to the information in the application in confidence for training purposes. All personal identifiers and references to researchers, funders and research units would be removed.

**Principal Investigator**

Signature of Principal Investigator: .............................................................

Print name: Elizabeth Harrison

Date:    17th April 2012

**Supervisor of student research**

*I have read, edited and agree with the form above.*

Supervisor's signature: ................................................................

Print name: Dr Lindsay Stringer

Date:    17th April 2012

Please submit your form **by email** to J.M.Blaikie@adm.leeds.ac.uk or if you are in the Faculty of Medicine and Health FMHUniEthics@leeds.ac.uk. **Remember to include any supporting material** such as your participant information sheet, consent form, interview questions and recruitment material with your application.

-	End -