# Three

## Civil Politics and the Holy Spirit

The challenge of balancing authority and spirit was widely recognized by observers of Anglican and nonconformist religious practices and was most conspicuous in Restoration debates about civil politics. All participants in controversies over the nature of the spirit, whether enthusiastic or sober, were agreed on the indispensability of the concept to the Christian religion. As in chapters one and two, where the ecclesiastical and nonconformist features of this dynamic were examined respectively, here the varied conceptions of the holy spirit and how they relate to ideas of political structures and practices will be examined. As in matters concerning ecclesiology and piety, a range of views will be discerned which roughly correspond to the major political and religious cleavages within the Restoration polity. All were united in coming to terms with whether, and if so, to what extent, the holy spirit may be understood to intervene in political affairs. As Anglican divines were tireless in pointing out, there must necessarily be means of securing the political order from enthusiasts seeking to overturn it for godly purposes. Although those deemed enthusiasts were quick to point to the holy spirit as an active, unpredictable, and compelling force in their spiritual lives, conservatives could no more dismiss the significance of the holy spirit in their own political and religious thinking than they could abandon Christianity itself.

What each of the following individuals had in common was an acute sense of how concepts normally employed for ordering private religious beliefs might also shape both overt and covert political objectives. This tension found expression on many occasions in late seventeenth-century England, including during the periodic political crises to which Restoration historians are typically drawn. But here the matter will be limited only to the question of whether the holy spirit could be understood to provide justification for challenging or overthrowing the basis of civil authority. Dominique Colas's wide-ranging *Civil Society and Fanaticism* provides a helpful framework for understanding the scope of the question. Colas summarized the early modern definition of fanaticism as extreme

iconoclasm 'in the literal sense of the word', entailing the 'destruction of icons and images' as well as the rejection of institutions of mediation and representation, including those of civil society in favour of those of the City of God.[1]

This is an apt point of departure to the debates that will be examined below. Like Colas's study, the following will range widely. Politically it will cross from staunch nonconformity to severe high church Anglicanism. Put another way, it will cover a spectrum that can be described as approximately left-wing, moderate, and right-wing. It will range generically in the literature consulted, encompassing primarily religious, literary, and philosophical printed works. Finally, it will span a period consisting of the late-seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. Again, like that of Colas, this study will be synchronic in its orientation and the evidence will not be put to any question but the one at hand. Unlike Colas, however, whose analysis of detail is limited by sheer geographical and chronological scale, the arguments and ideas of specifically English attempts to address the problem will be examined.

The range of responses to these tensions will be explored by identifying those who advertised the political significance of the holy spirit and by scrutinizing the language, images, and devices that they used to refer to it. In particular, here John Bunyan, John Locke, Edward Stillingfleet, and Samuel Parker, all of whom identified it as an urgent issue and sought to address it, will be examined. Their contributions reveal the contours of the problem but are also suggestive of the wider political and religious dimensions of Restoration England. Bunyan, a steadfast nonconformist, endured long-term incarceration for his convictions and defined a role for the holy spirit that made it the foremost factor in personal piety. Locke's conception of its role in personal piety can be likened to that of Bunyan to the extent that both judged the inward transactions of the spirit as beyond the reach of civil power. Bunyan especially imagined scenarios in which the holy spirit might find occasion to influence political affairs. Stillingfleet and Parker, who represented the orthodox contingent of the Restoration Church, in contrast, were alert to the efforts by nonconformists and their defenders to disrupt the church and state as established by law. Whether by

[1] Dominique Colas, *Civil Society and Fanaticism: Conjoined Histories*, tr. Amy Jacobs (Stanford, 1997), pp. xvi, xviii, 5-9.

outright rebellion or by more covert means - toleration, conscience, self-preservation, even the Reformation itself - Stillingfleet and Parker perceived little but the promise of disorder in a politically active holy spirit.

## I

Although John Bunyan has rarely been found by historians to yield a great deal of insight into political affairs, or even to have thought much about them, his allegorical works - especially, for the present purposes, *The Holy War* - reveal him to have considered carefully the role of the holy spirit in political affairs.[2] Bunyan's interests were typical of those who defined their theological convictions as loosely Calvinist. These consisted of the calling, the regenerative process, the religion of the heart, and the rigorous application of godliness in one's affairs. There is, however, significant overlap of these concerns with a broader set of political issues. Here the holy spirit, which appears as the Lord Secretary in *The Holy War*, will be shown to occupy actual power in the government of the city of Mansoul. Bunyan dramatized its involvement in the city's affairs by invoking, first, the political language of petition, and second, the horrific consequences of ignoring or deceiving it. It is possible to read in *The Holy War* a vivid fantasy in which a political power that forces individuals to choose between, on the one hand, the 'false peace' of bad faith and, on the other, scrupulously honest commitment to the holy spirit and one's conscience, receives its comeuppance.

Published in 1682, *The Holy War* was Bunyan's attempt to reproduce the allegorical model and the success of *Pilgrim's Progress*. Whereas the earlier allegory was rooted in the psychology of its main character, Christian, *The Holy War* takes place on a much grander scale. The citizens of the holy city of Mansoul, who once enjoyed the peaceful reign of King Shaddai had, by a series of relapses and retreats from godliness, fallen to

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[2] Christopher Hill, *A Tinker and a Poor Man: John Bunyan and His Church* (New York, 1988), p. 250. Like Hill, Forrest and Sharrock suggest that *The Holy War* reflects changes in local Bedfordshire politics in the late 1670s and 1680s. See James F. Forrest and Roger Sharrock, 'Introduction', in John Bunyan, *The Holy War*, ed. James F. Forrest and Roger Sharrock (Oxford, 1980), p. xxi (hereafter *HW*). Sharon Achinstein also argues that Bunyan's use of the allegory itself performs political work. See 'Honey From the Lion's Carcass: Bunyan, Allegory and the Samsonian Moment', in David Gay, James R. Randall and Arlette Zinck (eds.), *Awakening Words: John Bunyan and the Language of Community* (Newark, 2000), 68-80.

external usurpations, led by Diabolus. The first of Diabolus's sieges represents the original Fall of mankind, as towns-folk, 'taken with the forbidden fruit', ate it and 'opened the Gates' and 'let in *Diabolus* with all his bands, quite forgetting their good *Shaddai*'.[3] As Emanuel, the son of King Shaddai, relieves the city of Diabolonian occupation, the allegory enters the Christian era. As Sharrock and Forrest suggest, the second and third lapses of Mansoul are more difficult to fit into a cosmic or biblical scheme. The second lapse almost certainly represents the betrayal of the primitive Church, a favoured theme of seventeenth-century puritans; the second relief then represents the Reformation. The third lapse possibly represents local and specific threats to Christianity in the early modern period.[4]

For Richard Greaves, the allegory's 'political allusions and military imagery combine in an unmistakable indictment of Charles II's government during the bitter conclusion to the exclusion crisis'.[5] Greaves drew attention, however, to Bunyan's extreme care in distancing himself from the Rye House Plotters and his insistence on an ethic of quiet suffering. But the allegory permits multiple readings, the most basic of which, Greaves noted, is the soteriology of an individual soul. The interpretation that follows is grounded in this reading, and references to the relationships between politics, political structures and actors, and the individual's peace with the holy spirit are understood as details, obstacles, and objectives, in the trials of salvation. On a soteriological level, Bunyan's fantasies of revenge dramatized these relationships and drew attention to proper and improper arrangements between them. On a different level, perhaps, they reflect no more than his attempt to 'placate his readers by promising that at some point God would avenge himself on persecutors'.[6]

The significance of Emanuel's first relief of the city, analogous to Christ's redemption of fallen sinners, is for the present purposes the character installed by Emanuel as the town's Lord Chief Secretary, Bunyan's stand-in for the holy spirit. Relative to its corresponding role in *Pilgrim's Progress*, the role of the holy spirit is here enlarged. There the holy spirit,

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3 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 17.
4 Forrest and Sharrock, *HW*, p. xxviii.
5 Richard L. Greaves, 'Amid the Holy War: Bunyan and the Ethic of Suffering', in Anne Laurence, W. R. Owen and Stuart Sim (eds.), *John Bunyan and His England, 1628-1688* (London, 1990), p. 67.
6 Greaves, 'Amid the Holy War', pp. 67, 69, 75.

or the Interpreter, guides the pilgrims through his house, each room of which contains a specific puzzle, and explains each in turn to the pilgrims.[7] There is a similar episode in *The Holy War*. Following the victory feast, '*Emanuel* was for entertaining the Town of Mansoul with some curious riddles of secrets drawn up by his Father's Secretary, by the skill and wisdom of *Shaddai*'.[8]

This is expected of Bunyan's holy spirit which edified believers and encouraged their spiritual growth with puzzles and riddles.[9] However, the Lord Secretary in *Holy War* is designated a formal position in civil power, and unlike the Interpreter is obliged to undertake a greater role in Mansoul's subsequent turmoil. Emanuel entreats the townspeople for obedience to their teachers and elders, the most supreme of whom is the Lord Secretary, who is 'and always has been the chief dictator of all my Father's Laws'.[10] Emanuel continues:

> This teacher therefore must of necessity have the preheminence (both in your affections and judgment) before your other Teachers; his personal dignity, the excellency of his teaching, also the great dexterity that he hath to help you to make and draw up Petitions to my Father for your help, and to his pleasing, must lay obligations upon you to love him, fear him, and to take heed that you grieve him not.[11]

This passage conveys two significant ideas for Bunyan. First is the matter of drawing up 'petitions', which affixes a political language to the relationship between the Shaddai, the Lord Secretary, and the citizens of Mansoul. Second is the seriousness of interacting with the holy spirit and the implications of offending it.

The first of these is developed between the second and third sieges during which time the Secretary is introduced, is alienated by the citizens of Mansoul, and finally returns again to save them. Emanuel informs his subjects that the Secretary will help them fulfil their religious duties and put 'life and vigor' into their hearts. He can 'make Seers of you, and can make

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7 John Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress*, ed. N. H. Keeble (Oxford, 1984), pp. 185-208.
8 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 116.
9 Forrest and Sharrock observe Bunyan's 'love of similitudes'. See *HW*, p. 264. Achinstein has read additional layers into Bunyan's fondness for riddles and wordplay. See Sharon Achinstein, *Literature and Dissent in Milton's England* (Cambridge, 2003), chapter four especially.
10 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 139.
11 Bunyan, *HW*, pp. 139-40.

you tell what shall be hereafter'. It is to him they must frame all their 'Petitions to my Father and me; and without his advice and counsel first obtained, let nothing enter into the Town or Castle of *Mansoul*'.[12] This arrangement allowed Bunyan to elaborate on the religious and political functions of the holy spirit. A petition may be understood as a witness of the spirit, in the conventional sense, whereby a regenerate individual collaborates with God in justification and sanctification. But Bunyan also described a careful process for initiating engagement of the holy spirit in civil affairs. The first requirement is a demonstration of sincerity and devotion to his teachings: 'If you harken unto him, and shall love him; if you shall devote yourselves to his teaching, and shall seek to have his converse, and to maintain Communion with him, you shall find him ten times better than is the whole world to any'.[13] Though Emanuel appoints Mr Conscience, the Recorder, to an elevated position in the town's hierarchy - an individual 'well skilled in the Law and Government of the town of *Mansoul* and also well spoken' who could 'pertinently deliver to them his Masters will in all terrene' matters - his power is carefully circumscribed to domestic and secular affairs.[14] He must limit his authority to the teaching of 'Moral Vertue, to Civil and Natural Duties' and resist ever seeming to reveal 'those high and supernatural Mysteries that are kept close in the bosome of *Shaddai* my Father: for those things know no man, nor can any reveal them but my Fathers *Secretary* only'.[15] Captain Credence, 'a well spoken man', is later appointed to the task of delivering a petition to Emanuel.

The manner in which the petition is composed suggests Bunyan's vision of how the holy spirit might be animated in the civil realm. It is clear that the Secretary does not convey information widely, extravagantly, or even explicitly, not even to Conscience and Credence. There follows a debate among the citizens of how, by petition, they might properly request the Secretary's counsel. Here Bunyan introduces a striking device for

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[12] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 140. The medieval and hierarchical origins of the language of petition are evinced in the imbalance of power Bunyan envisions between the lowly human being and the elevated holy spirit: 'Petitioning implies a belief in a natural order of society protecting the interests of rich and poor alike, which the authorities can be expected to enforce once the misdeeds of individuals are brought to their notice'. See David Underdown, *Revel, Riot, and Rebellion: Popular Politics and Culture in England, 1603-60* (Oxford, 1987), p. 118.

[13] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 140.

[14] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 140.

[15] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 140.

illustrating the procedure for procuring such guidance and the extreme meticulousness by which it must be carried out:

> Mr *Godlyfear* answered again, that he knew also that the Lord *Secretary* would not set his hand to any Petition that himself had not an hand in composing and drawing up; and besides, said he, the Prince doth know my Lord *Secretaries* hand from all the hands in the world; wherefore he cannot be deceived by any pretence whatever.[16]

The compromise at which the Secretary and the citizens arrive involves collaborating in a literal way:

> *Well*, said the Lord *Secretary, I will draw up a Petition for you, and will also set my hand thereto.* Then said they, But when shall we call for it at the hands of our Lord? But he answered, *Your selves must be present at the doing of it. Yea, you must put your desires to it. True, the hand and pen shall be mine, but the ink and paper must be yours, else how can you say it is your petition?*[17]

The Secretary requests that they be present at the composition, are honest in their intentions, and like Credence and Conscience they cannot assume to be the creative source of knowledge conferred by the holy spirit.

Bunyan has then posited that there are select individuals uniquely qualified for interrogating the holy spirit and interpreting its mysteries. If this initially seems a somewhat undemocratic reading of the holy spirit for a puritan nonconformist and enemy of the Church of England's authoritarian structure, Bunyan is equally careful to indicate where the authority of such elevated individuals ends and where the liberties of regular citizens begin. Although Credence and Conscience were 'loved' by the holy spirit and given 'good bits' of food from his table,[18] Emanuel's description of the Recorder's duties suggest that neither character, when put in broader perspective, has much more power or authority than their fellow citizens. Reiterating the rule that only the Secretary may be seen as the revealer of the 'high mysteries' of divinity, Emanuel notes that the Recorder may 'talk of them' and 'so may the rest of the Town of *Mansoul*':

> yea; and may as occasion give them opportunity, press them upon

[16] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 207.
[17] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 208.
[18] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 214.

> each other for the benefit of the whole. These things therefore I would have you observe and do, for it is for your life, and the lengthening of your days.[19]

Bunyan has here written in the margin 'A licence to *Mansoul*'. In a passage Isabel Rivers described as Bunyan at his satirical best,[20] Mr Diligence relates his apparent discovery of a gathering of plotters while on the stand at the trial of Mr Evil-questioning:

> *I chanced to hear a muttering within this gentleman's house; then thought I, what's to do here? so I went up close, but very softly to the side of the house to listen, thinking, as indeed it fell out, that there I might light upon some* Diabolonian *Conventicle ... now hearing such language in such a tottering cottage as this old Gentleman dwelt in, I clapt mine ear to a hole in the window, and there heard them talk*.[21]

As Christopher Hill observed, Bunyan appears to parody the methods of informers empowered by the Conventicle Acts for turning in nonconformists.[22] Mansoul's licence for talking of the holy spirit's mysteries, 'mutterings' perhaps in the judgment of some, points to the holy spirit's presence among all of the citizens. Conscience is an exemplary preacher, but he is a 'scholar' of the holy spirit as well as 'a learner, even as the rest of *Mansoul* are'.[23]

Bunyan's frequent warnings about grieving the Secretary emphasize the wide implications, in both spiritual and political life, of their desertion of him. The second fall of Mansoul was caused by the townspeople's indifference to the Secretary, Emanuel, and a general relaxing of devotional intensity. For having grown 'assured of themselves', the Secretary 'would not admit them to a conference', nor would 'admit them to his Royal place of abode'.[24] Bunyan here arrived at the one towering anxiety that repeatedly surfaces in his own relationship to the holy spirit. One of the most striking features of *Grace Abounding* (1666), his account of his conversion and justification, and the one that has most puzzled scholars, is his fear of having sinned against the holy spirit. The story of Esau and the selling of his birthright for a 'mess of pottage' (Heb. 12:16-17) haunted Bunyan, who

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[19] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 142.
[20] Cited in Hill, *Tinker*, p. 248.
[21] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 239.
[22] Hill, *Tinker*, p. 248.
[23] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 141.
[24] Bunyan, *HW*, p. 157.

worried of having committed a comparable sin.[25] It is not an exaggeration to say the matter obsessed him. He worried, for example, of the ultimate temptation to 'sell Christ',[26] the unpardonable sin,[27] of having 'come nearer to Judas than either to David or Peter'.[28] The thought repeatedly threw his election into doubt.[29]

The theme has occupied scholars because it is not immediately apparent how Bunyan believed himself to have transgressed the holy spirit in the manner of Esau. Jack Lindsay linked the obsession to his family's sale of land in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.[30] Hill and Richard Greaves drew less literal readings of selling. 'The birthright which Bunyan was tempted to sell', Hill wrote, 'was access to salvation'.[31] Greaves linked the tale of Esau to major depressive episodes in Bunyan's life, periods when psychological and spiritual crises compounded in his mind and disordered his emotions and reasoning. The truth of his grace and the fate of Esau were like 'a pair of scales' in his mind, each oscillating in their hold over his imagination.[32] Vera Camden identified the temptation of a 'mercenary transaction', when Bunyan perceived himself to have finally succumbed and bartered away 'his place in Christ's family'.[33]

There is an additional signification for Bunyan's obsession with Esau and his birthright. The Lord Secretary's indifference to the citizens of Mansoul for capitulating to Diabolus is analogous to the holy spirit's abandonment of Esau for his transaction. An extension of this sin, for Bunyan, was collaboration or compliance with a godless political order. Bunyan famously spent nearly one-third of his adult life in prison following the Restoration for refusing to refrain from preaching.[34] Were Bunyan to

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[25] The full passage from Hebrews: 'Lest there be any fornicator, or profane person, as Esau, who for one morsel of meat sold his birthright. For ye know how that afterward, when he would have inherited his blessing, he was rejected: for he found no place of repentance, though he sought it carefully with tears.'

[26] John Bunyan, 'Grace Abounding', in *Grace Abounding with Other Spiritual Autobiographies*, ed. John Stachniewski and Anita Pacheco (Oxford, 1998), p. 38.

[27] Bunyan, 'Grace Abounding', p. 47.

[28] Bunyan, 'Grace Abounding', p. 43.

[29] Bunyan, 'Grace Abounding', pp. 43-44.

[30] Jack Lindsay, *John Bunyan: Maker of Myths* (Port Washington, 1969), especially chapters eight and nine.

[31] Hill, *Tinker*, p. 70.

[32] Greaves, *Glimpses*, pp. 51-44.

[33] Vera Camden, '"That of Esau": The Place of Hebrews xii. 16, 17 in Grace Abounding', in N. H. Keeble and James Francis (eds.), *John Bunyan: Reading Dissenting Writing* (Oxford, 2002), pp. 143-44.

[34] For his account of his imprisonment, see John Bunyan, 'A Relation of the Imprisonment of Mr. John Bunyan', in *Grace Abounding with Other Spiritual*, ed. John Stachniewski

ignore the responsibilities of his calling he would sin in the manner of Esau or the townspeople, so easily led astray by 'carnal security'. The townspeople, having learned the reason for the Secretary's silence were informed that they '*must as yet partake of their own devices*'.[35] In the margin Bunyan noted the 'sad straights of *Mansoul*', the full import of which 'fell like a milstone upon them; yea it crushed them so that they could not tell what to do'.[36] Along with the dereliction of the holy spirit goes a good deal of severe language as to the consequences, which at an earlier point in the narrative are described by Emanuel:

> Take heed, I say, that you do not grieve this Minister, for if you do, he may fight against you; and ... that will distress you more than if twelve legions should from my Fathers Court be sent to make war upon you.[37]

As an extension perhaps of a morbidly masochistic streak, Bunyan had specific ideas about the sort of individual it is who grieves the holy spirit and what the punishment might entail.

The vengeance Bunyan chose to visit upon the unequivocally evil - Mr Carnal Security, for example, who deliberately designed to lead the people astray and who is burnt alive in his house[38] - is not unexpected. What is more surprising is the grim fate that awaits those neither self-consciously evil, nor those who exercised actual power in Diabolus's government. The life and trial of Mr False-peace illustrates the full meaning, for Bunyan, of ignoring the holy spirit. False-peace is charged with helping to '*keep the Town of Mansoul, both in her apostacie, and her hellish rebellion, in a false, groundless peace, and damnable security, to the dishonour of the King, the transgression of His Law, and the great damage of the Town of Mansoul*'.[39] In his own defence, he describes himself as a 'man of so vertuous a temper' and a 'peace maker':

> I was always a man that loved to live at quiet, and what I loved myself, that I thought others might love also. Wherefore when I saw any of my neighbours to labour under a disquieted mind, I

and Anita Pacheco (Oxford, 1998), 95-132.

35 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 191.
36 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 191.
37 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 140.
38 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 157.
39 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 125.

> endeavoured to help them what I could, and instances of this good temper of mine, many I could give.[40]

False-peace goes on to relate instances of his interventions into the lives of 'disquieted' individuals and his ensuing determination to 'make them quiet again, and to cause them to act without molestation'.[41] A witness testified to False-peace having once exclaimed, '[c]ome, come let us fly from all trouble, on ground soever it comes, and let us be for a quiet and peaceable life'. At the trial's conclusion he is informed by the Court that 'peace that is not a companion of truth and holiness, but that which is without this foundation, is grounded upon a lye, and is both deceitful and damnable'.[42] False-peace is subsequently found guilty and sentenced to death. Even Mr Moderate, a man not known for passing 'judgment with rashness', remarks that '*that man must be wilfully blind who saith the prisoners ought not to die*'.[43]

Bunyan was not a man for compromise or negotiation. His unwillingness to resist preaching after he discovered his calling to do so in the 1650s is made clear in *Grace Abounding*. Once stirred to exercise the calling, he emphatically believed that the holy spirit did not intend that one with the gift of edifying souls should 'bury it in the earth'.[44] During Bunyan's trial in 1661, Justice Keelin reminded him that as long as he continued to preach he would be judged to be a 'breaker of the peace'.[45] This trial resulted in a three month prison sentence followed by twelve years of intermittent incarceration. Greaves remarked that Bunyan's various conscious decisions to disobey statutory law did briefly cause him to fear the gallows, but in the long term he showed 'no remorse for his defiance', the punishment even reinforcing 'his resolve to stand firm for his right to preach'.[46] He is reported to have told Keelin that 'we all may prophecy', and every man with a gift may exercise it.[47]

Bunyan's decision to resist the Clarendon Code was an expression of his commitment to the holy spirit and his obligation to preach. It was

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40 Bunyan, *HW*, pp. 125-26.
41 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 126.
42 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 128.
43 Bunyan, *HW*, p. 132.
44 Bunyan, 'Grace Abounding', p. 76.
45 Bunyan, 'Imprisonment', p. 121.
46 Richard L. Greaves, *John Bunyan and English Nonconformity* (London, 1992), pp. 107-8.
47 Bunyan, 'Imprisonment', p. 111.

also, however, a rejection of any political arrangement that marginalized the presence and efficacy of the holy spirit in the people over which it exercised power. False-peace is designed as a hypocrite as as well as an irreligious apostate, a type familiar in Bunyan's narratives, entirely analogous with Mr By-Ends in *Pilgrim's Progress* and the titular character in *The Life and Death of Mr Badman*. All three were adept at affecting religiosity when it suited worldly ends.[48] Hill observed that in *The Holy War*, with its successive turnovers in government, Bunyan did not appear interested in envisioning innovative ways of fashioning civil power.[49] This is true, and Bunyan was not a political thinker. His interest in politics extended no further than its implications for the holy spirit. Effective government left its operations undiminished, and allowed individuals to pursue their higher duties to God unfettered. Its anti-Christian counterpart preferred 'groundless' quiet and spurious peace. The predicament came about as a result of active collaboration with the offending regime - even indifference to it - and indifference to the seriousness of disdaining responsibilities to the holy spirit.

It is often claimed by new historicists and poststructuralists that scrutiny of sources shows that the conventional model of authority can not be sustained as analytically useful or helpful .[50] Such scholars prefer Foucauldian assumptions about the nature of power as relational and productive rather than as strictly institutional and prohibitive. This basic idea is reflected in a large body of early modern scholarship, shaped to a significant extent by Stephen Greenblatt and designated new historicist, in which political, religious and social power is reconceptualized as shared, negotiated, and circulatory.[51] 'I suggest', Tamsin Spargo wrote in one such recent study, 'that authority does not inhere in any figure, whether that figure

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[48] See, for example, Bunyan, *Pilgrim's Progress*, p. 83; John Bunyan, *The Life and Death of Mr. Badman*, ed. James F. Forrest and Roger Sharrock (Oxford, 1988), p. 163.

[49] Hill, *Tinker*, p. 250.

[50] There have been a number of post-modernist literary scholars since the 1970s who have consciously distanced themselves from the 'traditional' approaches ascribed to Hill and Greaves. For example, Stanley Fish, *Self-Consuming Artefacts: The Experience of Seventeenth-Century Literature* (Berkeley, 1972); Thomas Luxon, *Literaal Figures: Puritan Allegory and the Reformation Crisis in Representation* (Chicago, 1995); Tamsin Spargo, *The Writings of John Bunyan* (Vermont, 1997); Tamsin Spargo, 'The Purloined Postcard: Waiting For Bunyan', *Textual Practices*, 8 (1984), 79-96.

[51] The idea of power as a circulatory kind of 'social energy' is developed by Stephen Greenblatt in *Shakespearean Negotiation: The Circulation of Social Energy in Renaissance England* (Berkeley, 1989); Stephen Greenblatt, *Renaissance Self-Fashioning: From More to Shakespeare* (Chicago, 1983).

is God, the State or the individual human subject'. The 'conventional model of power', she continued, 'opposes the powerful and powerless, the authorized and unauthorized' and is 'inadequate to the task of exploring the multiple relations which are the conditions for the production of claims to authority'.[52]

But the conventional model influenced Bunyan's own sense of power. He was conscious, above all, of its institutional dimensions, whereby individuals who possessed power deprived or frustrated the liberty of others who do not. This is evident in *The Holy War*, where the fortunes of the citizens shift with each turnover of institutional power. Additionally, in no meaningful sense was Bunyan's imprisonment, or the Clarendon Code itself, the result of compromise or negotiation. Nor should Bunyan's commitment to the holy spirit be understood as 'constructed' by power, whether institutional or relational. Rather it formed part of his means for resisting attempts to construct and prohibit him. For Bunyan, whose attempts to defend his responsibilities to the holy spirit on legal grounds were unsuccessful, these were coercive acts. He consequently attempted to expose what he perceived to be abuses of power by bringing the holy spirit to bear not only on the guilty parties, but also on the slumbering masses who might be stirred by its potency.

## II

Certain features of Bunyan's political theology, including the theme of the holy spirit's engagement in the spiritual and political lives of individuals, surface in other quarters of the Restoration polity. John Locke's contributions to the period's religious and political controversies constituted only one of the five main strains of Restoration tolerationism identified by Gary De Krey,[53] but it would be folly to ignore the range and insight of his ideas. This is particularly true given the present task of determining how contemporaries sought to reconcile essential Christian beliefs with a state empowered to protect religion as well as secure civil society. Locke accorded this problem an emphasis in his substantial works, from the

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[52] Spargo, *John Bunyan*, pp. 2-3.

[53] Gary De Krey, 'Rethinking the Restoration: Dissenting Cases For Conscience, 1667-1672', *Historical Journal*, 38 (1995), 53-83.

unpublished manuscripts of the early 1660s to the *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, which was first published in 1690 and which he continued to revise until his death in 1704. The legitimation of civil authority, the grand theme of his two *Treatises of Government*, is also interlaced with the problem of securing Christianity on grounds which could accommodate its apparently inevitable diversity with reason and a peaceful social order. Locke rejected extravagant and unreasonable beliefs, associating them epistemologically with innate ideas, and found them among certain sects. It is difficult to determine with precision Locke's actual beliefs on finer points. But he did affirm, on behalf of nonconformists and other advocates of a reasonable Christianity, the importance of the holy spirit for those who wished to turn to it in their private devotions. Additionally, his famously cryptic appeal to heaven can be read as a revolutionary recourse for those who have found their practice frustrated and their conscience disturbed by a repressive civil power.

Before proceeding it must be stressed that the matter of piecing together Locke's personally held religious beliefs will not, indeed cannot, be pursued here. Rather than entering into this fraught territory, a more limited approach will be undertaken.[54] Principally, this will involve a nonconformist reading of his work, which will meet the objective of understanding him in light of the religious and political controversies that that occupied him and his contemporaries, and are central to this study. The question, then, is not whether Locke privately believed in one or various conceptions of the holy spirit that were current among nonconformists or liberal Anglicans. Rather the question is to what extent, and in what ways, Locke's work, his public pronouncements, can be taken as supporting the nonconformist ambition to believe and act in ways that were consistent with their beliefs and claims to conscience. Certainly his more accessible works, especially the letters on toleration, can be read as straightforward ripostes to

[54] The literature devoted to determining Locke's exact religious beliefs is extensive. Recent notable entries are David Wootton, 'John Locke: Socinian or Natural Law Theorist?', in James E. Crimmins (ed.), *Religion, Secularization and Political Thought: Thomas Hobbes to J. S. Mill* (London, 1989), 39-67; John Marshall, *John Locke: Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* (Cambridge, 1994); John Marshall, 'Locke, Socinianism, "Socinianism"', and Unitarianism', in M. A. Stewart (ed.), *English Philosophy in the Age of Locke* (Oxford, 2000), 111-83; Victor Nuovo, 'Locke's Theology, 1694-1704', in M. A. Stewart (ed.), *English Philosophy in the Age of Locke* (Oxford, 2000), 183-217; Mark Goldie, 'John Locke, Jonas Proast and Religious Toleration', in John Walsh, Colin Haydon and Stephen Taylor (eds.), *The Church of England, c. 1689-1833* (Cambridge, 2002), 143-71.

supporters of religious persecution. His political writings, however, also point back to religious controversies in significant ways. This is particularly true of the *Second Treatise*, which built a case for political revolution on grounds shared by the radical whig critics of the Stuart government. But at points it also met nonconformist critics of church and state on their own grounds. Those who prioritized their own conceptions of conscience and the holy spirit and valued their freedom to exercise those beliefs in a manner of their choosing could find, in Locke, justification for denouncing an authority that would frustrate such a practice.

Locke's comments on innate ideas in the *Essay* at times resembled those of Anglican divines who, since 1660, had been expressing concerns about the implications of multiple sources of religious authority. Although this aspect of the *Essay* is a critical feature of Locke's theory of knowledge acquisition - that sense perception alone equips the mind with knowledge - the issue also assumes political and social, rather than merely epistemological, significance. As in Anglican critiques of Roman Catholics and Protestant sectarians, Locke observed that the concept of innate ideas is a 'short cut to infallibility'.[55] 'If different men of different sects should go about to give us a List of those innate Principles', he wrote, 'they would set down only such as suited their distinct Hypotheses, and were fit to support the doctrines of their particular Schools or Churches'.[56] The imprinting of ideas 'on the Minds of Men by the Hand of God', whereby any man may be an infallible judge of his own conduct, was the very definition of enthusiasm developed by Anglicans in this period. A civil war context for these remarks is evident when Locke additionally worried about those who worship 'the Idols that have been set up in their Minds' and become inclined to 'fight, and die' in defence of them.[57] Even in scenarios less dire than this, he expressed concern about the socially distorting effects of empowered masters and teachers taking their followers 'off the use of reason'.[58] This is an echo of the early Locke who, immediately following the Restoration, despised Quakers as 'mad, hot, jugglers' occupying the wrong side of the struggle for

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[55] John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. Peter H. Nidditch (Oxford, 1975), p.80.
[56] Locke, *Essay*, p. 76.
[57] Locke, *Essay*, p. 83.
[58] Locke, *Essay*, pp. 101-02.

truth and reason against passion and fancy.[59] Whereas Locke could write in 1661 that 'few men enjoy the privilege of being sober', once again sounding like an orthodox advocate of a uniform Church of England,[60] by the *Essay* his standards for determining appropriate expectations of sober conduct had evolved beyond the conventional binaries that characterized the Anglican critique of enthusiasm.[61]

It is clear, certainly, that over the course of the Restoration Locke gradually left the camp of Anglican orthodoxy, and it is worth indicating just how far, according to some of his critics, he went. His public quarrel with Edward Stillingfleet, then bishop of Worcester, following the publication of the *Essay* is a reminder of how unconventional Locke's utterances had seemingly become, and also sheds some light on why his own statements on the holy spirit seem to lack the kind of drama that was typical for some nonconformists and their defenders. The crux of Stillingfleet's attack on Locke's epistemology was that the latter had, by arguing that 'substance' is something that can be known neither by sensation or reflection, discarded it 'out of the reasonable part of the world'.[62] Without the concept of substance Stillingfleet did not believe the trinity was intelligible:

> [The] Divine Essence is that alone which makes God, that can be but One, and therefore there can be no more Gods than one. But because the same Scripture, which assures us of the Unity of the Divine Essence, doth likewise joyn the Son and Holy Ghost in the same Attributes, Operations and Worship, therefore as to the mutual Relations, we may reckon Three, but as to the Divine Essence, there can be no more than One.[63]

But if substantial and essential qualities cannot be '*intromitted by the Senses*' nor reliably drawn from '*Operations of the Mind*', substance must become, as Hobbes put it, a 'substance incorporeal', two words which 'destroy one another'.[64] Locke's replies to Stillingfleet totaled nearly five hundred pages, the entire volume IV of his edited *Works*, spanned two years, and concluded

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59 John Locke, *Essays on the Law of Nature*, ed. W. Von Leydon (Oxford, 1954), pp. 16-17.
60 Locke, *Law of Nature*, p. 17.
61 Achinstein, *Literature and Dissent*, p. 155.
62 Edward Stillingfleet, *A Discourse in Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity* (London, 1697), p. 234; Robert Todd Carroll, *The Common-sense Philosophy of Religion of Bishop Edward Stillingfleet* (The Hague, 1975), p. 90.
63 Stillingfleet, *Vindication*, p. 64.
64 Stillingfleet, *Vindication*, p. 234.

only upon the death of Stillingfleet in 1699. Throughout he insisted that no insight into the 'secret nature' of substance can be obtained with human faculties.[65] Epistemologically it is not comparable to a 'figure clearly seen or a sound distinctly heard'.[66] He denied that the limitations of human knowledge were damaging to the fundamental mysteries of Christianity, which were above reason and incomprehensible.[67] As John Yolton argued, there there were two 'worlds' evident in the works of Locke. One is an 'intellectual' world relevant to knowledge and 'investigations into the nature and extent' of the material world, and the second, which Yolton termed ontological, is 'a non-material domain', which contrasts with the material world.[68] Hence Locke affirmed that substance exists in the world, indeed all simple ideas carry with them 'a supposition of a substratum to exist in'.[69] But we can nevertheless obtain only an 'obscure and confused' idea of it.[70]

Stillingfleet rejected on principle Locke's belief that '*[f]aith stands still upon its own Basis*' and is '*not at all alter'd*' by the obscurity of its mysteries, or for that matter, any of the intellectual upheavals of the period.[71] Instead, Stillingfleet desired to keep Christianity and its mysteries within the ambit of a 'common-sense' philosophy of probability that encompassed a variety of evidentiary data - divine, metaphysical, mathematical, rational, sensory - all of which were weighed and evaluated on the same scale. Stillingfleet thus preferred to judge the trinity and other mysteries according to their respective degrees of moral certainty, not according to the clarity and distinctness with which they are apprehended.[72] To show he was eager to find common ground with the new science, he turned to Isaac Newton and the theory of gravity as proof that there is more in nature than merely what is sensed.[73] Stillingfleet feared that segregating

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[65] John Locke, *The Works of John Locke in Ten Volumes: Vol. IV* (10 vols., London, 1823, rep. 1963), p. 6.
[66] Locke, *Works, Vol. IV*, p. 25.
[67] Carroll, *Common-sense*, pp. 2, 99.
[68] John Yolton, *The Two Intellectual Worlds of John Locke: Man, Person, and Spirits in the 'Essay'* (Ithaca, 2004), p. 64.
[69] Locke, *Works, Vol. IV*, p. 7.
[70] Locke, *Works, Vol. IV*, p. 236.
[71] Edward Stillingfleet, *The Bishop of Worcester's Answer to Mr. Locke's Second Letter* (1698), p. 22.
[72] Carroll, *Common-sense*, pp. 58-60.
[73] Richard Popkin, 'The Philosophy of Bishop Stillingfleet', *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 9 (1973), pp, 310, 318. Popkin writes that Stillingfleet was a critic of English empiricism at the moment of its birth and the common-sense philosophy was later adopted by Thomas Reid more or less in the state that Stillingfleet left it in.

key religious claims from the usual procedures of truth judgments would clear the way for materialists to dismiss them in due time and to join with Spinoza, who described them as 'meer fictions in men's minds'.[74]

Locke's seeming avoidance of affirming a belief in the trinity as well as his declaration that 'three persons in one nature' is not a biblical idea made him a target for accusations of Socinianism.[75] But although he may have suggested, for example, that Jesus Christ and the holy spirit were never actually referred to as God,[76] the holy spirit itself features throughout Locke's works, albeit in elementary terms, and certainly more so than the trinity. Whether or not Locke himself was truly a Socinian or even an atheist - again, satisfactory examinations of such questions are not within the purview of the present objectives - there is sufficient evidence that he accorded a significance to the holy spirit, even if it might have had, as far as he was concerned, a kind of decorative function, helpful for advancing larger designs concerning the relationship between the state and its Christian citizens.

It was, in short, helpful for enlarging a nonconformist reading of his work. This itself entailed certain problems which seemed to be clear to Locke. One such problem, the distinction between ordinary and divine compulsions, was explicitly addressed in Chapter XIX of the *Essay*, 'Of Enthusiasm', which was added to the fourth edition in 1700.[77] Here some of the usual remarks on melancholy and 'over-weening brains' are balanced against God's undeniable ability 'to enlighten the Understanding by a Ray darted into the Mind immediately from the Fountain of Light'.[78] Such rays of light must be critically examined before claims may be made on behalf of them. But the excitation of the mind in this way requires the least evidence

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[74] Carroll, *Common-sense*, p. 96.

[75] Locke, *Works, Vol. IV*, p. 457. See also Wootton, 'John Locke', p. 47. Stillingfleet was himself accused of Socinianism by the Roman Catholic, Serenus Cressy. Cressy alleged that Stillingfleet's rejection of transubstantiation as a popish absurdity could not be squared with his belief in the trinity which, as some men of ideas had suggested, might be deemed illogical on the same grounds. Are all mysteries absurd, Cressy asks, or merely the convenient ones? Cressy blamed the Great Tew circle for having polluted Stillingfleet's thinking with rationalistic habits of mind. See Carroll, *Common-sense*, pp. 53-54; Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Religious Origins of the Enlightenment', in *Religion, the Reformation, and Social Change* (London, 1967), p. 217. On the individuals and ideas associated with the Great Tew, see Hugh Trevor-Roper, 'The Great Tew Circle', in *Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans: Seventeenth Century Essays* (Chicago, 1987), 166-231.

[76] Marshall, 'Socinianism', p. 173.

[77] Locke, *Essay*, p. 14.

[78] Locke, *Essay*, p. 699.

and makes the most modest of claims. In such instances, the mind was enlightened to 'certain Truths' or excited to carry out 'Good Actions by the immediate influence and assistance of the Holy Spirit, without any extraordinary Signs accompanying it'. He continued,

> Where the truth imbraced is consonant to the *Revelation* in the written word of GOD; or the action conformable to the dictates of right *Reason* of Holy Writ, we may be assured that we run no risk in entertaining it as such, because though perhaps it be not an immediate Revelation from GOD, extraordinarily operating on our Minds, yet we are sure it is warranted by that Revelation which he has given us of Truth.[79]

When Locke wrote that it was arrogant to believe one could teach more effectively than the holy spirit,[80] he was assailing the pretensions of bishops but also affirming the reality of the spirit's transactions in the minds of the hopeful and pious. He assumed reasonable individuals will critically consider the possibility that those excitations or motions, carrying with them no obvious demonstrations of God's presence, and which may be termed innocuous, were not necessarily divine in origin. But even in such cases there is little cost in privately making such a divine attribution for those who wished to do so.

But the holy men of old, he observed, always had more than internal persuasion:

> *Moses* saw the Bush burn without being consumed, and heard a voice out of it. This was something besides finding an impulse upon his Mind ... he thought not this enough to authorise him to go with that Message, till GOD by another Miracle, of his Rod turned into a Serpent, had assured him of a Power to testify his Mission.[81]

This passage functioned as a reminder to sectarian enthusiasts that dramatic manifestations of the holy spirit, in contrast to those innocuous private appearances, took place in public in a ways that leave powerful impressions 'on the minds and belief' of 'all sorts and degrees of people'.[82] But unlike many of his contemporaries, Locke exhibited little concern about false

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[79] Locke, *Essay*, pp. 705-06.
[80] John Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', in *Two Treatises of Government* and *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, 2003), p. 253.
[81] Locke, *Essay*, p. 705.
[82] John Locke, *The Reasonableness of Christianity with A Discourse on Miracles and a Part of A Third Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. I. T. Ramsey (London, 1958), p. 86.

prophets or enthusiasts turning the world upside down. In the *Second Treatise*, which makes a case for legitimate resistance against unjust government, he confidently asserted that 'the people' were at all times 'steady', and were 'not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are apt to suggest'.[83] There is a kind of fundamental conservative disposition of the people, 'a slowness and aversion [in them] ... to quit their old constitutions', and even in revolutions 'seen in this kingdom' they were at all times brought back again to 'our old legislative of kings, lords, and commons'.[84]

There was, then, a modest form of religious practice, private and pious, that did not need to draw reprisal from suspicious civil and ecclesiastical authorities. Because Locke did not, unlike the persecuting authorities, sever freedom of conscience from freedom of worship,[85] there remained an underlying question about what conditions would justify taking action against a sovereign that punished such reasonable religious practice. This was partly the point of the *Second Treatise*, and although the presence or function of the holy spirit was not there explicitly described, a positive conception of its charge can be parsed there for those who would be inclined to look for it. Like Bunyan and most nonconformists, Locke remarks that the holy spirit tought a simple spiritual means of exercising piety and arriving at salvation, one rooted in personal belief and conduct. Because 'no sect can easily arrive at the madness of undermining society',[86] owing to the aforementioned generally conservative temper of people, nonconformists ought to have license to practice their own means of convening with the holy spirit. There must of course be some exceptions to such license in order to disallow those practices not permitted in the ordinary course of life and among private individuals.[87] Though Locke expressed scorn for sects of exclusive practices who 'to the constant din of their party' embraced 'unnatural' ideas that are irreconcilable and unsociable,[88] the more pressing error was the coercive pretenses of authoritarian civil and religious powers.

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83 John Locke, 'The Second Treatise', in *Two Treatises of Government* and *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, 2003) p. 198.

84 Locke, 'The Second Treatise', p. 199.

85 John Dunn, 'The Claim to Freedom of Conscience: Freedom of Speech, Freedom of Thought, Freedom of Worship?' in Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel and Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford, 1991), p. 174.

86 Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 244.

87 Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 236.

88 Locke, *Essay*, pp. 400-01.

Whatever enthusiasms the vulgar might conjure, they were not the only, and perhaps not even the most important, source of political and social disruption. As David Wootton has written of the evolution in Locke's thought over a twenty-year period, '[i]n the early 1660s Locke was convinced that the greatest threat to society came from the unruly mob; in the 1680s, by contrast, he would come to think the mob more trustworthy than the government'.[89]

In *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, Locke expressed slight regard for the claims of the Church's apostolic tradition,[90] and his opinion of its methods of exercising its power was even lower. The practice of Christ, whose method of propagating his ministry was the 'Gospel of Peace', suggested that coercion, penalties, and imprisonment were improper means of 'convinc[ing] the mind'.[91] Drawing on a traditional Protestant demand for freedom for continued Reformation, Locke asserted that 'all the assistance, the true religion needs from authority, is only a liberty for it'.[92] Echoing the standard critique of the Roman Church and espousing the kind of empirical attitude to truth and knowledge that had become common among seventeenth-century puritans, Locke noted the poor state of those

> who live in Places where Care is taken to propagate Truth, without Knowledge; where Men are forced, at a venture, to be of the Religion of the Country; and must therefore swallow down Opinions, as silly People do Empiricks Pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work.[93]

Even more miserable were those 'not at liberty to refuse swallowing'.[94] Reversing the usual language of anti-puritanism, Locke described the persecutors as 'warmed', 'inflamed' and incapable of tempering their 'fiery zeal' for God.[95]

The twin themes of religion distorted by persecution and politics disfigured by abusive sovereignty converge in the *Second Treatise*. Force without legitimacy, it is there argued, may be justifiably and even violently

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89 David Wootton, 'Introduction', in John Locke, *Political Writings*, ed. David Wootton (Indianapolis, 2003), p. 30.
90 Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 221.
91 Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', pp. 216-21.
92 Locke, *Reasonableness*, p. 94.
93 Locke, *Essay*, p. 709.
94 Locke, *Essay*, p. 709.
95 Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', pp. 225, 227.

resisted.[96] Moderate governments, in contrast, 'are every where quiet, every where safe'.[97] Locke here offered several cryptic statements about the role of religion in confronting immoderate authority in the *Second Treatise*. Chief among these were his remarks concerning a ruler's abuse of prerogative. When a 'power that was never put in the hands' of the sovereign was employed to 'do that which they have not a right to do', and which confounded the legislative authority of the people, the recourse involved an invitation to God to interfere:

> [W]here the body of the people, or any single man, is deprived of their right, or under the exercise of power without right, and have no appeal on earth, then they have a liberty to appeal to heaven, whenever they judge the cause of sufficient moment.[98]

As noted above, Locke indicated a firm confidence in the people's general slowness to affect the kind of traumatic change that Anglicans and, by the mid 1670s, tories saw as threats to the social order.[99] This allowed him to dismiss the threat of the disorder which some said would attend toleration. But there is a kind of turning point suggested in Locke's comments on 'the people' affecting large-scale change. Although isolated 'turbulent spirits' cannot make much mischief because 'the greater part of the people will not stir until discontent is general', God may be trusted to give his subjects 'courage and opportunity' to 'have their yoke cast off'.[100] Citing 2 Kings 18, in which Hezekiah turns on his ruler, Locke observed 'notwithstanding whatever title the kings of Assyria had over Judah, by the sword, God assisted Hezekiah to throw off the dominion of that conquering empire'. 'Whence it is plain', he continued, 'that shaking off a power, which force, and not right, hath set over anyone, though it hath the name of rebellion, yet is no offense before God, but is that which he allows and countenances'.[101] The implications of such an utterance were obvious enough, and Locke

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96 Locke, 'The Second Treatise', pp. 169, 205.
97 Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 247.
98 Locke, 'The Second Treatise', p. 175.
99 Tim Harris, *London Crowds in the Reign of Charles II: Propaganda and Politics From the Restoration Until the Exclusion Crisis* (Cambridge, 1990), pp. 91-92; Tim Harris, *Politics Under the Later Stuarts: Party Conflict in a Divided Society, 1660-1715* (London, 1993), p. 62. On these conflicts generally, see Tim Harris, *Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdom* (London, 2005); Mark Knights, *Representation and Misrepresentation in Later Stuart Britain: Partisanship and Political Culture* (Oxford, 2006).
100 Locke, 'The Second Treatise', p. 187.
101 Locke, 'The Second Treatise', p. 187.

preempted the expected objection: 'Nor let anyone think this lays a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates not till the inconveniency is so great that the majority feel it, and are wary of it, and find a necessity to have it amended.'[102] There were thus two factors mitigating the possibility of perpetual disorder. The first was the natural conservatism of the people. The second was the extreme and unusual nature of that intolerable condition, one described in great detail by nonconformists of the period, of living under the inconveniences of unjust power.[103]

Nevertheless, for Locke, this was the sort of commotion that tyrannical governments risked generating, trouble that 'proceed[s] not from any peculiar temper of this or that church or religious society; but from the common disposition of all mankind, who, when they groan under any heavy burthen, endeavor naturally to shake off the yoke that galls their necks'.[104] Power in its institutionalized forms, and not Protestantism piously and variously practiced, possessed the means of rupturing social harmony. The magistrate's authority consisted in outward force, 'but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind'.[105] People can neither forfeit the care of their own souls to anyone else, even by consent, nor can they conform to religious practices without being convinced of their truth without committing hypocrisy.[106]

Locke thus illustrated a scenario which emphasized how the conscientious believer can be forced into hypocrisy by the authorities. Like

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[102] Locke, 'The Second Treatise', p. 175.

[103] Once again, it is not the place to argue here that Locke himself took the appeal to heaven as a literal providential scheme of religious and political change or as a description of how a mass movement might generate its impetus. Ian Shapiro and Ross Harrison, like David Hume before them, take the remark as an implied threat of violence. J. G. A. Pocock emphasizes that the key feature of Locke's use of the phrase is that it is meant to be affixed to a people incorporated. In this way it differs from earlier appeal procedures whereby individuals, in a state of war or conflict, take their stand on conscience and await God's judgment of their actions. Locke's appeal in contrast 'is an appeal to the sword, but it is lodged by a people, not by a congeries of individual consciences'. Under certain circumstances, for example, the dissolution of government, the individual gains a private right of appeal to heaven (e.g. tyrannicide). See Ian Shapiro, 'John Locke's Democratic Theory', in John Locke, *Two Treatises of Government* and *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. Ian Shapiro (New Haven, 2003), p. 325; Ross Harrison, *Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion's Masterpiece: An Examination of Seventeenth-Century Political Philosophy* (Cambridge, 2003), pp. 217-18; Hume equated it with 'war and violence', quoted in Kiyoshi Shimokawa, 'Locke's Concept of Justice', in Peter R. Anstey (ed.), *The Philosophy of John Locke: New Perspectives* (London, 2003), p. 76; J. G. A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton, 2003), pp. 366-67.

[104] Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 247.

[105] Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 219.

[106] Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 219.

nonconformists who pointed to the sanctity of following one's conscience in religious matters, Locke elevated the state of hypocrisy as an unfortunate one, particularly when imposed upon such believers:

> For in this manner, instead of expatiating other sins by the exercise of religion, I say, in offering thus unto God Almighty such as worship as we esteem to be displeasing unto him, we add unto the number of our other sins, those of hypocrisy, and contempt of his Divine Majesty.[107]

An extended comparison between Locke and Bunyan would be strained indeed, but it is not too great a claim to detect the same displeasure with those who would prefer to remain in peaceful hypocrisy to undertaking the difficult task of changing the situation.

All these factors meet in Locke's appeal to heaven. Even a conservative people, when deprived of consensual and effective government, and dispossessed of the means to care for their own souls, may be expected to mount a resistance to correct the situation. Among these will be individuals who cannot tolerate offending the holy spirit and who, if arranged in numbers sufficient for action, might expect the favour of God in the manner of Hezekiah, or indeed Captain Credence. If Locke did not personally believe that living under the burden of intolerable institutional power is, in a sense, to wait upon the intervention of the holy spirit, there is little doubt those who did could take heart from his writings.

## III

Edward Stillingfleet's immense work of natural theology, *Origines Sacrae, or, A Rational Account of the Grounds of Christian Faith* (1662), published during his tenure as rector of Sutton in Bedfordshire, drew him into the centre of Restoration intellectual life and he remained there until his death in 1699.[108] Understanding the Church of England itself during this period requires coming to terms with Stillingfleet's contributions to it, particularly his endorsement of a *via media* model that allowed Anglican

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[107] Locke, 'A Letter Concerning Toleration', p. 210.

[108] Edward Stillingfleet, *Origines Sacrae* (London, 1662). *Origines* went into five editions before 1680 and made Stillingfleet 'known to the world'. An overview is provided by Barry Till, 'Stillingfleet, Edward (1635-1699)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), online edn. (24 August 2010).

intellectuals to define their traditions against those of Roman Catholics and radical Protestants. As a defender of Anglican orthodoxy, Stillingfleet was constantly engaged in disputes with his critics, and most of these touched upon the relationship between church unity and political stability. He allowed himself to repeat the usual tropes against Protestant enthusiasts and Roman papists, but he enhanced them with examinations of why claims to power are advanced by enemies of the church and how such claims are concealed by illusions of religious purity. For Stillingfleet, the holy spirit's providential function in the created realm ensured the safety of the social order, not its disturbance, and its function in personal witness was given its fullest and most pious expression within the forms of the Anglican Church. He imagined no scenario in which appeals to the holy spirit might be made to reform or undermine the Restoration polity, but he was keen to identify those who were inclined to make such claims. What follows is an examination of Stillingfleet's uses of the holy spirit and his critique of claims made on behalf of it. First, I discuss his version of the Anglican holy spirit, which is guided by the church and historical practice, and is respectful of sovereignty. Second, I examine the role of conscience. This section analyses first Catholics and Protestant enthusiasts who sincerely believed the holy spirit entrusted divine commands in their conscience to destroy civil power, and second those who cynically used the language of conscience and holy spirit to seize power. Stillingfleet pointed to Korah, of the Old Testament, as well as the contemporary proponents of the Good Old Cause, as examples of both. Third I analyse his interpretation of the role of providence, which illustrates the point that, for Stillingfleet, the holy spirit was conservative and restorative rather than innovative and destructive of civil power.

As chapter one demonstrated, Stillingfleet subscribed to a carefully drawn definition of Christian testimony, grounded in his belief that God would not expose his people to the dangers of enthusiasm by introducing new doctrines or revelations by way of private inspiration. There it was pointed out that for Stillingfleet the 'common way' of the spirit's illumination in believers involves '*inlighting* the *faculty*, without the *proposition* of any new *object*, as it is in the *work* of *Grace*'.[109] According

[109] Stillingfleet, *Origines*, p. 144.

to this view the holy spirit was not a spectral presence that could be summoned for arbitrary purposes. In his guidebook for parochial minsters this idea is linked to the nonconformist complaint about the Church of England's prayer 'forms'. The English Reformation had already succeeded in returning the Church's practices to their primitive forms, and so preachers ought to avoid developing a habit of speaking *extempore*.[110] Insisting on the utility of catechism in education and morality, he admitted he 'often wondred how a fixed and stated Liturgy for general Use, should become a matter of Scruple and Dispute among any in a Christian Church, unless there be something in Christianity which makes it unlawful to pray together for things which we all understand beforehand to be the Subject of our prayers'.[111] Doubting that the holy spirit was 'given to dictate new Expressions in Prayers', he suggested that the spirit assisted 'only in exciting the Affections and Motions of the Soul towards the things prayed for'.[112] This was a habit of 'Divine infused faith' contained within the perimeters of historical precedent and wise practice.

John Spurr has argued that after 1660 ministers of the Church of England formulated their appeals to providence in terms of loyalty to the state, and this was certainly true of Stillingfleet.[113] In a sermon delivered in 1666 he indicated that the London fires were a judgment from God for a nation immersed in corruption and hypocrisy.[114] Eschewing his usual elaborate historical arguments in support of his view of providence, he advanced a clear case that God dispensed his justice on account of six years of national ingratitude:

> It is not many years since *God* blessed us with great and undeserved blessings, which we then thought our selves very thankful for; but if we had been really so, we should never have provoked him who bestowed those favours upon us in so great a degree as we have done since. Was this our requital to *him* for restoring our *Soveraign,* to *rebel* the more against Heaven?[115]

[110] Edward Stillingfleet, *Ecclesiastical Cases Relating to the Duties and Rights of the Parochial Clergy* (London, 1698), p. 30.
[111] Stillingfleet, *Ecclesiastical*, pp. 19, 35, 41-42.
[112] Stillingfleet, *Ecclesiastical*, pp. 42-3.
[113] John Spurr, '"Virtue, Religion, and Government": The Anglican Uses of Providence', in Tim Harris, Paul Seaward and Mark Goldie (eds.), *The Politics of Religion in Restoration England* (Oxford, 1990), p. 30.
[114] Edward Stillingfleet, 'Sermon I: At St. Margarets Westminster before the Honourable House of Commons, Octo. 10. 1666', in *Sermons Preached on Several Occasions* (London, 1673), pp. 4-5.
[115] Stillingfleet, 'Octo. 10. 1666', p . 20.

Men had demonstrated their thankfulness to God for 'removing the *disorders* of *Church* and *State*' by busying themselves with business, pleasure, sedition, and faction.[116] Instead, Stillingfleet hoped that God's *extrema medicina* would challenge Londoners to cultivate a 'Habitation of *Holiness* towards *God*, of *Loyalty* towards our *Gratious King* and his *Successors*, of *Justice* and *Righteousness* towards Men, of *Sobriety*, and *Peace*, and *Unity*'.[117]

Elsewhere Stillingfleet is explicit in identifying those who continue to trouble church and state and was clear that the holy spirit did not abet them. Between *Irenicum* (1659) until his death, Stillingfleet spoke in increasingly strong tones about the malign influence of Roman Catholicism, but it did not overtake his displeasure with Protestant dissenters and even before the Popish Plot he was inclined to envision them as twin hazards. All but Quaker and Pope, for example, as he remarked in 1673, required better arguments for the presence of an infallible spirit.[118] Both espoused seditious doctrines, and both have proven their capacity for destruction in recent history. What is most important for the present purposes is Stillingfleet's evaluation of the uses made of the holy spirit, by Roman and Protestant fanatics and others, as a basis for political change.

Like many other Anglicans during this period, Stillingfleet held that the Pope himself was a religious fanatic, and despite Roman boasts of its own 'ways of peace' the tradition was steeped in enthusiasm.[119] According to Stillingfleet, the first true *Ignis fatuus* was introduced in Europe by the Dominican and Franciscan orders in the middle of the twelfth century, just at the moment the Waldensians were 'making use of the Word of God to confute the whole Army of Popish Traditions'. The doctrine of the *evangelium spiritus sancti*, whereby the Word of God itself might be replaced by the writings of '*Abbot Ioachim*, and *Cyrils visions*' ensured that the Roman tradition might always recover its own credit and turn its 'adversaries quite out of the field'.[120] The infallibility the pope claimed for

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[116] Stillingfleet, 'Octo. 10. 1666', pp. 20, 5.
[117] Stillingfleet, 'Octo. 10. 1666', pp. 20-21.
[118] Edward Stillingfleet, 'Sermon II: Preached November V. 1673. At St. Margaret's Westminster', in *Ten Sermons Preached on Several Occasions* (London, 1697), p. 70.
[119] Edward Stillingfleet, *The Mischief of Separation* (London, 1680), p. 3.
[120] Edward Stillingfleet, *Irenicum: A Weapon-Salve for the Churches Wounds* (London, 1660), p. 160.

himself entailed a wide range of attendant privileges. The greatest of all papal pretenses, and the one Stillingfleet alleged has been confirmed repeatedly for six hundred years, was the Pope's power of deposing princes.[121] Unlike the Church of England, which affirmed the rights of princes to exercise power in their respective realms,[122] the Church of Rome allowed for the ongoing possibility of arbitrary fancies to enter 'into the Pope's head', even 'upon some Pique or *Jealousie*', to the ruin of a particular prince or kingdom.[123] Stillingfleet pointed to Gregory VII especially for declaring that the Pope alone has spiritual power on earth.[124]

Unlike many liberal Anglicans and almost all nonconformists of his era, however, Stillingfleet identified conscience as a significant force in destabilizing societies. The role of conscience in personal piety and the powerful pressures it exerted on the views of those who used it as a wedge issue against the established Church was at the root of both Protestant and Catholic sedition. In his analysis of the Gunpowder Plot he sought to prove that the conspiracy consisted in nothing but fanaticism under cover of '*conscience* and *Religion*'. The chief conspirators - Catesby, Peircy, Tresham, Digby - could not, according to Stillingfleet, have been motivated by anything but conscience and their Catholic principles. They enjoyed 'their estates and places', including one at court, and were by no means destitute or desperate. Why, he asked, 'should these men venture lives, estates, honours, families, and all that was dear to them?'[125] 'Not the least tittle of all this was pretended, by the most enraged of them', he remarked, 'nothing but *Zeal for Religion and the Catholick Cause,* was ever pleaded for them'.[126] He noted that Pope Pius V had made no scruple about his desire to destroy Elizabeth, and if it was accepted that the Pope had the power to deprive a prince of her dominion, a Catholic had license to carry out that design, and could do so with on grounds of conscience: 'And there are no Villains in the world like those who are Villains out of conscience'.[127]

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[121] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', p. 99.
[122] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', p. 106.
[123] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', p. 106.
[124] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', p. 95.
[125] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', p. 110. For a recent commentary on the Gunpowder plot, its main players including Robert Catesby, Francis Tresham, and Everard Digby, and its historical legacy, see J.A. Sharpe, *Remember, Remember: A Cultural History of Guy Fawkes Day* (London, 2005).
[126] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', pp. 109-10.
[127] Stillingfleet, 'November V. 1673', pp. 113-14.

Stillingfleet took the same tack when admonishing nonconformist uses of conscience, and in doing so joined with conservative Anglicans in pointing to the weakness and folly of conscience. He insisted that it was the pursuit of greater purity, a 'pretended mighty zeal', which continued to problematize social relations among Protestants and to discredit the Reformation.[128] Like Catholics who turned to authorities empowered by the Roman Church to speak on behalf of the spirit, Protestant innovators 'shelter themselves' under 'some particular persons, to whom their understandings are bound in perpetual slavery'.[129] This practice is 'the last *Asylum* which many run to, when they are beaten off from their imaginary Fancies, by pregnant Testimonies of Scripture and Reason'.[130] One person's *evangelium spiritus sancti* is the other's *seculum spiritus sancti*.[131]

But Stillingfleet's ideas on conscience did not end with these routine arguments against enthusiasm. The belief, among enthusiasts, in the holy spirit's involvement in civil politics provoked him to interpret the conflicts it generated in terms of the motives, hidden as well as stated, of those who claimed to interpret divine directives. His examination of the Gunpowder Plot had the conspirators gathered around the principle of fidelity to conscience, nurtured by assumptions about the certainty of the holy spirit's favour. At bottom, Stillingfleet hoped to throw light on the problems that are likely to follow such assumptions. The Gunpowder conspirators, in his analysis, were driven to act on religious principles alone, deeply flawed, but sincerely espoused. But an equal menace is represented by those who will use the holy spirit in a purely cynical manner for access to power.

Stillingfleet penetrated this variety of religious sedition in a sermon delivered before the king in 1668. The subject of the sermon is a passage from the book of Jude (1:11): 'Woe unto them! for they have gone in the way of of Cain, and ran greedily after the error of Balaam for reward, and perished in the gainsaying of Core.' It is the rebellion of Core (or Korah) and his followers against the rule of Moses and Aaron that is examined and situated in language familiar to his Restoration audience. Stillingfleet's sources for Korah's doomed uprising are standard ones. These include the book of Numbers, the historical commentary of Flavius Josephus, and the

[128] Stillingfleet, *Mischief*, pp. 3, 7.
[129] Stillingfleet, *Irenicum*, p. 384.
[130] Stillingfleet, *Irenicum*, p. 384.
[131] Stillingfleet, *Irenicum*, p. 160.

commentary of Calvin. Stillingfleet followed Josephus closely in his elaboration of the narrative. The account related by Josephus focused on Korah's failure to find advancement in the priesthood and his jealousy of Aaron and his privileges. Additionally, Josephus differs from earlier chroniclers, namely those of Philo, Pseudo-Philo, and the Rabbinic tradition, by portraying the episode as rooted not primarily in specific theological or philosophical quarrels, but as an example of naked political ambition.[132] Josephus recorded that Korah, himself a man of wealth and distinction, 'saw that Moses had very great honor, and was uneasy at it, and envied him on that account'. Consequently Korah came to believe that he, and not Moses, 'deserved that honorable post on account of his great riches, and [being] not inferior to him in his birth'.[133] Korah proceeded to methodically 'raise a clamor' against Moses and Aaron. With the appearance of taking 'care of the public welfare', Korah schemed with speeches and 'plausible words' until he had drawn together 250 men 'eager to have the priesthood taken away from Moses' brother, and to bring him into disgrace'.[134]

Despite the focus on Korah's cynical machinations, Stillingfleet did not follow Josephus to the letter. Like Josephus, Stillingfeet observed the ease by which a people may be turned against their leaders, but he devoted more space to illustrating the point. Knowing the people take a 'strange pleasure' in the faults of their governors, Korah stirred their anger for his ends and encouraged them to 'flatter themselves' into believing they could govern more effectively.[135] Stillingfleet suggested that it was always the weakest part of the people who were the most suspicious of authority.[136] For some, this suspicion developed into a fully comprehensive sense of victimhood that cannot, in any scenario, be redressed or assuaged. In a passage worth quoting at length, Stillingfleet described a mentality both besieged and combative that he assumed his audience at Whitehall would recognize:

> Whatever is done for the necessary maintenance of *Government*, is suspected to be a design meerly to exhaust the people to make them

[132] Louis H. Feldman, *Studies in Josephus' Rewritten Bible* (Boston, 1998), p. 102.
[133] Flavius Josephus, *The New Complete Works of Josephus*, ed. William Whiston and Paul L. Meier (Grand Rapids, 1999), p. 140.
[134] Josephus, *Works*, p. 140.
[135] Edward Stillingfleet, 'Sermon VII: Preached Before the King, January 30. 1668/9', in *Sermons Preached on Several Occasions* (London, 1673), p. 124.
[136] Stillingfleet, 'January 30. 1668/9', p. 125.

> more unable to resist. If good Laws are made, these are said by factious men to be only intended for snares for the good people, but others may break them and go unpunished. If Government be strict and severe, then it is cruel and tyrannical, if mild and indulgent, then it is remiss and negligent. If Laws be *executed*, then the peoples Liberties be oppressed; if not, then it were better not to make *Laws*, then not to see them executed ... If miscarriages happen (as it is impossible always to prevent them) they charge the form of Government with them.[137]

Feldman emphasized that Josephus's account is marked above all by its political and military language.[138] Stillingfleet additionally equipped his narrative with some of the language of political philosophy that would have been recognized by educated men and women of the Restoration period. Of Korah's demand that he and his followers have more liberty to govern themselves, Stillingfleet retorted that all must part with some power for some security, otherwise a 'state of confusion', which 'some improperly call a state of nature', was the logical outcome.[139] Korah's accusations of abuse of authority, particularly the seeming nepotism that allowed Aaron to rise to power in the priesthood, meant that, in words related by Josephus, 'it was proper for the multitude to punish' such leaders.[140] Stillingfleet took this as analogous to contemporary theories of government by consent, and declared that there can be 'no principle imagined more destructive to civil *societies* ... [f]or it destroys all the obligations of Oaths and Compacts; it makes the solemnest bond of obedience signifie nothing when the people shall think fit to declare it: it makes every prosperous *Rebellion* just'.[141]

Stillingfleet laid greater emphasis than Josephus on the claim of Korah's followers that they, no less than Aaron and Moses, were blessed with a measure of authority by virtue of the spirit's presence among them. Here Stillingfleet bypassed Josephus and referred directly to the biblical narrative: [T]he *Faction* makes a *Remonstrance* asserting the privileges of the *people* against *Moses* and *Aaron*, *Ye take too much upon you, seeing all the Congregation are holy every one of them, and the Lord is among them; Wherefore then lift you up your selves above the Congregation of the Lord*.'[142] Adding his own paraphrase, Stillingfleet wrote:

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[137] Stillingfleet, 'January 30. 1668/9', p. 124.
[138] Feldman, *Studies*, p. 106.
[139] Stillingfleet, 'January 30. 1668/9', p. 130.
[140] Josephus, *Works*, Book 4, p. 140.
[141] Stillingfleet, 'January 30. 1668/9', p. 132.
[142] Stillingfleet, 'January 30. 1668/9', p. 125. The biblical citation is Numbers 16:3.

> As though they had said, we appear only in behalf of the *Fundamental Liberties* of the people both Civil and Spiritual; we only seek to retrench the exorbitances of power, and some late innovations which have been among us; if you are content to lay aside your power which is so dangerous and offensive to *Gods holy people,* we shall then sit down in quietness; for alas it is not for ourselves that we seek these things (what are we?) but the *cause* of *Gods people* is dearer to us than our lives, and we shall willingly sacrifice them in so good a *Cause.*

With this gloss Stillingfleet referred to a litany of religious and political tensions in the Restoration period. He identified a cause, one not unlike the Good Old Cause, whereby the demand made famous by the Levellers for fundamental liberties, was wielded by rebels convinced of a mandate from God to reform the government.[143] This, for Stillingfleet, was a spiritual hubris, inevitably present among those who assumed God's cause as their own, that would easily shift from mere disordered public remonstrating to the actual threat of violence. This was also the 'mighty zeal' Stillingfleet went on to describe in detail in *The Mischief of Separation* (1680).[144] Here Stilingfleet also called upon the highly charged example of Samson's trading his own life for the death of the Philistines, comparing it to the blind destructive zeal of separatists. It will 'transport them, as it did *Sampson*, to pull down the *House* over their *Heads*, [and] they will be sure to perish themselves in the fall of it'.[145] Expressing none of the sympathy for Samson's deed that, for example, John Milton had,[146] Stilllingfleet

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[143] On the association of the Good Old Cause, the Levellers, and the language of fundamental liberties, see Christopher Hill, *The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas During the English Revolution* (London, 1972), pp. 42, 60-61, especially chapter four; Christopher Hill, *Puritanism and Revolution: Studies in Interpretation of the English Revolution of the 17th Century* (London, 1958), pp. 81-87; Blair Worden, 'Harrington's "Oceana": Origins and Aftermath, 1651-1660', in David Wootton (ed.), *Republicanism, Liberty, and Commercial Society, 1659-1776* (Stanford, 1994), pp. 135-36.

[144] Stillingfleet, *Mischief*, p. 7.

[145] Stillingfleet, *Mischief*, p. 53.

[146] The issue of Milton's judgments on Samson's deed has generated its own literature in recent years. John Carey and Feisal Mohamed, among others, have approached Milton's *Samson Agonistes* (1671) with Islamic violence in Western countries in mind, particularly the September 11th attacks in New York. Mohamed takes issue with what he perceives to be a kind of interpretive myopia exhibited by Carey and Stanley Fish. In 'A Work in Support of Terrorism?' Carey registers disapproval of Fish's conclusion that the destructive revenge meted out to the philistines is for Milton, in biblical and contemporary contexts, a virtuous and heroic act. In contrast, Carey argues that a 'subtle-minded' poet such as Milton, indeed anyone with a sense of common humanity, would be repulsed by the actions of Samson and, by extension, the 'Muslim Samsons' who carry out comparable attacks in liberal democratic countries. In Mohamed's view,

emphasized instead the destructive capacities of mistaken and misdirected holy impulses.

Calvin's commentary on the book of Numbers also took special notice of the matter relating to the holiness of the congregation. Calvin preferred not to elaborate at length on the claim that each of Korah's followers had individual access to the holy spirit. Instead, he took issue with the associated claim that that holiness could be used as a weapon against God's appointed governors. He wrote,

> [t]hese ungody and seditious men betray their senselessness as well as their impudence. For by what right do they seek to degrade Moses and Aaron? Because, forsooth, God dwells amongst the people, and all in the congregation are holy! But holiness is neither destructive of subordination, nor does it introduce confusion, not release believers from the obligation to obey the laws.[147]

In Calvin's account, Moses accused Korah's followers of ingratitude for honours God had already bestowed upon them. 'If they had rightly valued

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Carey has misread Fish, and both, in any case, are wrong. First, Mohamed points to a significant body of evidence suggesting Milton's elevation of Samson to the heroic. Second, he argues that Fish has not been unequivocal enough in demonstrating Milton's approval of a religious enthusiasm that could be indiscriminate about its earthly human toll. The real value of *Samson Agonistes* at this stage in history, according to Mohamed, is the manner in which it 'frustrates uncomplicated narratives of the Western tradition'. Mohamed's most recent entry in this controversy, in 2007, elaborates upon the idea that *Samson* must remind the West of the 'barbarisms' of its tradition. Here Mohamed accuses Carey, Michael Mendle, and Joseph Wittreich of trafficking in 'current discourses of domination'. By rejecting the idea that Milton endorsed divinely-inspired slaughter, they, like George W. Bush, advance 'the narrativization of the moral enlightenment of Western liberal humanism', a position that could only be horrifying to one such as Mohamed who, with the use of post-modern cant, absurdly collapses this Western tradition into (and implicates these scholars in) 'American expansionism', 'militarist imposition of freedom', and 'President Bush's second inaugural address'. The barbarism of religious violence, in any case, was anything but news to Stillingfleet, and he condemned it in Milton's imagery in no uncertain terms, even if Mohamed would no doubt lightly dismiss him as one among those marginalizing 'the irrationality of the Other'. To continue in this anachronistic vein, Stillingfleet might have taken this designation as an accurate description of his efforts, though not in a manner that Mohamed or other post-colonial academics would approve of. Concerning the latter, there is a culture of resentment, writes J. G. A. Pocock, 'of those who cannot live without seeing themselves as insurgents and insist upon others who they may see as dominators; a world view which is often true, but must not become a necessity'. For these debates, see Stanley Fish, *How Milton Works* (London, 2001), pp. 18, 36, 59, 77; John Carey, 'A Work in Praise of Terrorism? September 11th and Sampson Agonistes', *Times Literary Supplement*, 6 September 2002, 15-16; Feisal Mohamed, 'Confronting Religious Violence: Milton's Samon Agonistes', *Publications of the Modern Language Association of America*, 120 (2005), 327-40; J. G. A. Pocock, 'The Antipodean Perspective', in *The Discovery of Islands: Essays in British History* (Cambridge, 2005), p. 9; Feisal Mohamed, 'Reading Samson in the New American Century', *Milton Studies*, 46 (2007), 149-64.

[147] John Calvin, *Calvin's Bible Commentaries: Harmony of the Law, Part IV*, trans. John King (Charleston, 2007)

the gifts of God', he wrote, 'each of them would have quietly contented himself with his lot'.[148] More than Stillingfleet, Calvin took care to avoid dismissing the idea that the congregation had a measure of holiness. But both stressed that God's gift of grace to all believers would not, if properly nurtured and appreciated, legitimize challenging the authority of governors.

The disturbance described by Josephus and Stillingfleet was ultimately a mix of blatant political scheming, on Korah's part, and naive though earnest sentiment, on the part of his followers. In a sense, Stillingfleet perceived the religious climate following the Popist Plot within the same framework. In *The Unreasonableness of Separation* (1680) he intensified his scorn for Roman Catholics, accusing them of attempting to smash the Church of England into pieces. He alleged that Protestant separatists from the national Church, for their own part, had drifted from the example of their Elizabethan puritan forebears who, having taken their cue from Theodore Beza, refused to carry their dissent from the Church into complete separation from it.[149] 'New men' of bitter zeal and tender conscience, however, had managed to supply the Roman Church with disillusioned converts, channeling ever-increasing strength to its destructive aims.[150]

The final theological point that Stillingfleet wished to leave with his audience was the significance of providence. As he demonstrated in his sermons following the London fires, Stillingfleet understood providence as a conservative force. He joined here with Josephus who left no doubt that God alone intervened to bring the rebellion to its resolution on its second day. Josephus wrote that as Korah, Aaron, and each of the 250 rebels stood before God to await judgment, 'so great a fire shone out as no one ever saw in any that is made by the hand of man, neither in those eruptions out of the earth that are caused by subterraneous burn-rags' nor those that 'arise of their own accord in the woods'. Very quickly it becomes apparent that 'Aaron alone was preserved, and not at all hurt by the fire, because it was God that sent the fire to burn those only who ought to be burned'.[151] Feldman argued that Josephus stressed the unnatural and unpredicted nature of the fire to

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[148] Calvin, *Commentaries*, p. 112.
[149] Edward Stillingfleet, *The Unreasonableness of Separation* (London, 1680), pp. xxxi, 19-23.
[150] Stillingfleet, *Unreasonableness*, pp. 24-25, lxx, xxviii.
[151] Josephus, *Complete Works*, p. 141.

rebuke the Epicureans among his readership who would be inclined to attribute the event to mechanical causes.[152] Stillingfleet had his own contentions with Epicureanism, which he associated with Hobbism, the atomic hypothesis of motion, and atheism.[153] Consequently he followee Josephus in elaborating on the bare fact of the fire by implying that it was not an event of fortune, nature, or motion, but a fire 'the earth alone could not kindle'.[154] Like the fires of London, it was a restorative act of providence that decisively affirmed the social order.

It seems to have been a tendency of Stillingfleet's mind, perhaps a habit arising out of his constant efforts to define the Anglican tradition against the Roman, that he was conscious of conceding the imperfections of the Church, its laws, and the civil order. He did, however, want dissenters and separatists to appreciate the Church and the institutions of society, those by law established, as repositories of cumulated wisdom. Whatever their flaws, in his view the folly of pursuing the dictates of a reforming zeal or the deceptions of self-proclaimed enthusiasms was much more destructive to church and state. Religious uniformity, as an extension of statecraft, was preferred to toleration, which he famously characterized as a 'trojan horse' of unseen enemies.[155] As a pastoral instrument of edification, coercion made an immediate impression on the will of the wayward individual, and thus occasioned an opportunity to direct the conscience toward a more righteous course. Understood in this way, Stillingfleet and other high churchmen felt confident that Anglican coercion differed from the brute force coercion practiced by the Roman Church.[156] He also insisted that authority itself in the Anglican tradition had a relatively light touch, and in several instances contrasts it favourably to the colonial governments of New England, including those established by Quakers, which, by 1680, were

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[152] Feldman, *Rewritten Bible,* p. 104.

[153] Carroll, *Common-sense Philosophy*, p. 116. Additional commentary on Hobbes and Epicureanism can be found in Noel Malcolm, 'Robert Payne, the Hobbes Manuscripts, and the "Short Tract"', in *Aspects of Hobbes* (Oxford, 2002), 80-145.

[154] Stillingfleet, 'January 30. 1668/9', p. 135.

[155] Stillingfleet, *Mischief*, p. 58. Stillingfleet took part in negotiations for comprehending some nonconformists into the Church in 1680, but his proposed terms were roundly rejected by them. Spurr concludes that despite his humane treatment of individual nonconformists, 'there is scant evidence that Stillingfleet had any sympathy for nonconformity'. See John Spurr, '"Latitudinarianism" and the Restoration Church', *Historical Journal*, 31 (1988), pp. 73-74.

[156] Mark Goldie, 'The Theory of Religious Intolerance', in Ole Peter Grell, Jonathan I. Israel, and Nicholas Tyacke (eds.), *From Persecution to Toleration: The Glorious Revolution and Religion in England* (Oxford, 1991), 332-364.

institutionalizing rules and orders and persecuting accordingly.[157] The difference between the Church of England and Islam is equally stark. The former, in its primitive manifestation, was established peaceably long before Constantine made it an official religion, whereas the latter, from the moment of its birth, made its way 'by force and violence'.[158] For Stillingfleet, the authority seated in church and state was merely useful for defending institutions from those who would, by designs both malign and naive, and always in their own estimation emboldened by the holy spirit, attempt to undo it for godly purposes.

## IV

Nonconformists broadly imagined a site of transaction between the individual and the holy spirit that was, if undisturbed by civil power, sufficient for cultivating a pious life and arriving at salvation. Compromising the integrity of the dynamic, in a wide and substantive manner, by the intrusions of either Church or state power, entailed offending the holy spirit and inviting the reprisal of the godly. Advocates of the restored Church of England were responsive to the enthusiastic implications embedded in Protestant sectarianism, but perhaps no one was more attuned to the religious, philosophical, and political malleability of arguments arraigned on behalf of nonconformists than Samuel Parker. Parker's near single-minded attention to such sources of religious and religiously-derived disobedience led him to ruthlessly parse all ideas and practices for their complicity in the disorders of the seventeenth century. In this final section I will first examine Parker's habit of conflating conscience, toleration, and Hobbesian self-preservation as a tendency single doctrine that, from his point of view, encouraged the enthusiasm of Protestants, Platonists, and all enemies of the social order. Second I will examine Parker's positive conception of religious practice. This seems to have been based on ethics and materialist beliefs, dismissive of appeals to the spirit, and generally disrespectful of the logic of the Reformation. Parker's ideal polity was anchored by an absolute sovereign and was consequently resistant to the

[157] Stillingfleet, *Unreasonableness*, p. 106; Stillingfleet, *Mischief*, pp. 55-56. Stillingfleet mentions William Mucklow's *Spirit of the Hat* (1673) as proof of a Quaker turn to rule and order; more will be said of this in the following chapter.

[158] Stillingfleet, *Origines Sacrae*, p. 331.

innovative or iconoclastic impulses of religious enthusiasts.

Where nonconformists saw a sacred relationship between the individual and the holy spirit, Parker saw a licence for ungovernable behaviour under the cover of toleration. Parker's views cohered around an elegantly simple conception of the individual's relationship to power. For all Parker seemed to draw from Hobbes, he rejected the basic Hobbesian principle of self-preservation as the basis of social relations. This decision allowed him to reject Platonic philosophy, toleration, nonconformity, and a range of basic Protestant assumptions about Christianity, including a hatred for the Roman Church. This forced him to defend some unpopular views, a task in which, it must be said, Parker seemed to take a grim pleasure. His views have also proven unpopular among historians. Pocock wondered if he might have been a 'brass-knuckled ecclesiastical thug'.[159] For historians accustomed to uncovering traditions of dissent and resistance in England, Parker, like the Church of England between 1662 and 1688, simply occupied the wrong side of history.[160] He is perhaps most well known as the opponent of Andrew Marvell in the 1670s, a conflict contemporaries as well as historians judged him to have miscarried.[161]

But all of these related issues can obscure the intelligibility of Parker's views, even if Marvell was widely perceived as having effectively exposed his excesses. Richard Ashcraft described Parker's technique of linking the appeal to conscience with Hobbesian self-interest as 'simple but not ineffective'.[162] His quarrel was, above all, with the implications of self-preservation as a master concept for conducting politics and religion. He variously associated the principle with self-love, greed, envy, and self-governing autonomy. In the *Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophie* (1666), in which he made a case for experimental science over Platonic idealism, he worried about turning philosophy over to the anarchic and uncertain realm of the imagination. He linked Aristotle's forms with Plato's

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[159] J. G. A. Pocock, 'Thomas Hobbes: Atheist or Enthusiast? His Place in a Restoration Debate', *History of Political Thought*, 11 (1992), p. 742.

[160] He appears in the work of Hill, for example, as an enemy of the 'plebians and mechanics'. See Hill, *World Turned*, p. 295.

[161] Annabel Patterson describes Marvell's efforts as having made him a 'hero over Samuel Parker'. See Annabel Patterson, 'Introduction', in Andrew Marvell, *The Prose Works of Andrew Marvell: Volume I, 1672-1673*, ed. Annabel Patterson, Martin Dzelzainis, N. H. Keeble, and Nicholas von Maltzahn (New Haven, 2003), p. xxi.

[162] Richard Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics and Locke's Two Treatises of Government* (Princeton, 1986), p. 51.

universal ideals,[163] and identified the common error of 'endeavouring to know and define the Notions of abstracted Essences'. 'Meer' essences, the pursuit of 'these pure and Seraphick Intellectualists', were apart from the sensible world, 'too gross and material for their nice curious Faculties'.[164] The mechanical hypothesis, on the contrary, put 'inquisitive men to attain [certainty], whereas the other serves only to obstruct their industry by amusing them with empty and insignificant Notions'.[165]

Pocock paused over Parker's simultaneous anti-Platonism and anti-Hobbism as a curious combination.[166] Hobbes's ruthlessly materialist universe had entirely diminished the use and meaning of forms and essences,[167] and although Parker was assuredly aware of Hobbes's arguments against Aristotle and the Platonists, he kept his distance from them. The frontispiece of *Leviathan* earned the only explicit reference in the *Censure*. The mortal god depicted on the cover, a composite of many faces, was identified by Parker as possessing a resemblance to the confused and extravagant speculations of the Gnostics and other enthusiasts.[168] Pocock determined that the break between Parker and Hobbes was in the former's suspicion of mechanical materialism. In Parker's view, Hobbes's atheism collapsed into a kind of antinomian enthusiasm which dethroned God as the one original and constant causal source of motion and opened the way to replacing the deity with any wild 'fancy'.[169]

There is a missing factor in Pocock's account, and it is Parker's overarching concern with the pernicious consequences of self-interest. When Parker complained of the 'ungrounded' nature of Platonism, he distinguished the mathematical certainties and 'palpable Truths' of mechanical methods from the speculative and untestable results of Platonic methods.[170] Parker characterized Platonic Originals as 'little *Pictures*' of God and his Creatures that have been 'placed in every mans understanding, [and] that by attending to them [man] might direct himself in his

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[163] Samuel Parker, *A Free and Impartial Censure of the Platonick Philosophy* (London, 1666), p. 34.
[164] Parker, *Censure*, pp. 59-60.
[165] Parker, *Censure*, p. 45.
[166] Pocock, 'Hobbes: Atheist or Enthusiast', p. 739.
[167] Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed. Edwin Curley (Cambridge, 1994), chapter xlvi especially: 'Of Darkness from Vain Philosophy and Fabulous Traditions.'
[168] Parker, *Censure*, p. 87.
[169] Pocock, 'Hobbes: Atheist or Enthusiast', pp. 740-42.
[170] Parker, *Censure*, p. 53.

Conceptions and Notions of the things themselves'.[171] This was accurate enough, and the real point for Parker was the danger of turning over the pursuit of truth to the whimsies of individual men's understandings, anchored in self-interest, instead of anchoring it in experiments, mathematics, and reason. He found the variety of Platonic numbers baffling: Divine, substantial, animarie, natural, and mathematical.[172] 'If they are able to frame a conception of any Number besides that which is Mathematical', he wrote, 'they have more faculties than I, who am born but a Man, and live by the use of my Reason, and five Senses'.[173]

Even in a treatise on philosophy, Parker could not resist returning to his enduring obsession, namely the public peace and the 'pestilential' effect enthusiasts had on it. Parker associated enthusiasm with 'opinionative Zeal', and Platonism easily met the standard:

> And if we will but reflect on our own Thoughts, we must confess that we cannot perceive the Ideas of Beings that are not placed within the Horizon of Sense, and those that pretend to a discovery of them, had better to pretend to Oracles, Prophesies, Illapses, and Divinations, then to the sober and steady Maximes of Philosophie. And therefore 'tis not unusual with the *Platonists* to pretend to a kind of Enthusiasme.[174]

At their worst Platonists were typical enthusiasts, sequestering their claims from 'corporeal commerce', pretending to the discovery of absolute truths, and creating unnecessary disputes.[175] The methods and claims of the Platonists were fundamentally mere opinions, isolated from observation and testing.

The *Censure* is Parker's earliest English-language publication and in it his indefatigable suspicion of self-governing conduct is evident. After 1660 the *Leviathan* modified the terms of political and religious debate, and although Parker shared a hatred for the methods of Plato and Aristotle with Hobbes, he perceived the same danger of ungovernable behaviour in the doctrine of self-preservation, from which Hobbes derived his entire system. The *Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie* (1670), which attracted the attention of Marvell, argued for the power of the civil magistrate to control 'the

[171] Parker, *Censure*, p. 54.
[172] Parker, *Censure*, pp. 60-61.
[173] Parker, *Censure*, p. 61.
[174] Parker, *Censure*, p. 83.
[175] Parker, *Censure*, pp. 83, 90.

consciences of subjects in matters of external religion'.[176] The role of Hobbes and Hobbism in this controversy was complicated. Marvell, in the first and second parts of the *Rehearsal Transpros'd* (1672 and 1673, respectively), and Parker in the *Defense and Continuation of the Ecclesiastical Politie* (1671), both traded barbed accusations of Hobbism, but both writers did in fact borrow from Hobbes. Only recently the view that Parker alone was exposed for espousing a brutishly Hobbist form of absolutism has been re-examined.[177] Despite his place in the whig canon as a champion of parliamentary and religious liberty, Marvell, like Parker, advocated the absolute power of the sovereign. But the power Marvell accorded to the sovereign was absolute but unbecoming of a wise prince's practice.[178] For Parker, the absolute power of the sovereign is a communitarian extension of the duties each individual owed to the community, rather than the practical consequence of applied self-preservation in the state of nature.[179] Parker and Hobbes in this respect laid down differing foundations for absolute power.[180]

It is helpful in this, as in Parker's *Censure*, to examine more closely the issue of self-preservation. Although the *Censure* does not consider the matter of toleration and conscience, there is a language and a broad range of concerns that overlap with the *Ecclesiastical Politie*. Where one identified a Platonic philosophy that is derived from the hidden fancies in the minds of men, the other identified an appeal to conscience liberated by the spirit from earthly authority. In Parker's view, both will have corrosive effects on public peace. Philosophy and religion must both be pried away from the vagaries of individual whimsy, and, in the case of religion and politics, firmly anchored in the unassailable authority of a sovereign.

In the *Politie* Parker explicitly made the case that 'the fountain' of all mischief was 'excessive self-love', an extension of self-preservation.[181] All

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[176] Samuel Parker, *A Discourse of Ecclesiastical Politie* (London, 1670), p. 1.
[177] Jon Parkin, 'Liberty Transpros'd: Andrew Marvell and Samuel Parker', in Warren Chernaik and Martin Dzelzainis (eds.), *Marvell and Liberty* (Basingstoke, 1999), 269-89.
[178] Andrew Marvell, 'Rehearsal Transpros'd: The Second Part', in Annabel Patterson, Martin Dzelzainis, N. H. Keeble, and Nicholas von Maltzahn (eds.), *The Prose Works of Andrew Marvell: Volume I, 1672-1673* (New Haven, 2003), pp. 324-35 (hereafter *RT II*).
[179] Parkin, 'Liberty Transpros'd', p. 274.
[180] Parkin, 'Liberty Transpros'd', p. 274.
[181] Parker, *Politie*, pp. 122-23.

sects were 'fierce and unruly to inlarge their own interests'.[182] Parker heaped scorn on Hobbes for giving the sectarians and nonconformists the most effective means of disobedience since the Reformation itself. Conscience of the sort described above with respect to Bunyan, Locke, and nonconformists broadly, was for Parker simply an excuse 'to take up arms'.[183] He perceived a 'competition' between the prerogatives of the prince and the prerogatives of conscience, and feared that the latter would produce 'a state of perfect Anarchy'.[184] Peace was impossible until religion was subject to supreme authority.[185]

Many of Parker's remarks on the inevitable ensuing enthusiasms were typical of other Anglican polemicists of the period. He emphasized the zealous, arrogant, and peevish qualities of sullen nonconformists,[186] and speculated that their melancholic tendencies were a consequence of the 'sad' and 'anxious' manner of their worship.[187] As shown in chapter two, nonconformists were accustomed to these arguments, and Bunyan, Richard Baxter, and John Owen, sought in response to anathematize their Anglican persecutors by suggesting that the Church of England encouraged atheism by relying on reason, virtue, and the goodness of human nature. Parker, too, encountered these accusations. But Parker was perhaps more vulnerable to them than most. While it is difficult to doubt that, for example, Henry Hammond and Stillingfleet were anything but deeply pious, much less covertly atheists or Roman Catholics, Parker invited the wrath and ridicule of Marvell in part because of his deeply provocative statements about the correct practice of worship. Of all the Anglicans accused of unbelief or atheism in this period, Parker projected the strongest signals of having actually abandoned some of the basic principles of Protestant Christianity.

One of Marvell's angriest tirades in either of his rejoinders to Parker involved some dismissive comments made in the *Politie* about the Reformation. There Parker traced to the Reformation the empowering of 'imperious men ... who, not regarding the Princes Power' took to setting up 'their own *Pedantic Systems and Institutions* ... and wanting, what the other

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[182] Parker, *Politie*, p. 162.
[183] Parker, *Politie*, p. 6.
[184] Parker, *Politie*, pp. 6-7.
[185] Parker, *Politie*, p. 11.
[186] Parker, *Politie*, p. iv.
[187] Parker, *Politie*, pp. xxviii, 149.

had, the Authority of Scripture, they pretended to the Spirit of God'.[188] The underlying problem seems to have been the Reformation itself:

> The effect of all which has been nothing but a Brutish and Fanatick Ignorance, making men to talk of little else but Raptures and Extasies, and filling the World with a buzze and noise of the Divine Spirit; whereby they are only impregnably possess'd with their own wild and extravagant Fansies, become saucy and impudent for religion, confound Order, and despise Government, and will be guided by nothing but the whimsies and humours of an unaccountable Conscience.[189]

Though the Reformation had 'wrought wonderful alterations in the Christian World', it had not mitigated the 'exorbitant Power that some pert and pragmatical Divines have gain'd over the minds' of their followers.[190] This reads like faint praise. It is far removed from the kind of treatment accorded to the Reformation by stridently Protestant controversialists like John Milton who, in *Areopagitica*, grandly envisioned each sect as possessing one of the stones that will rebuild Solomon's Temple.[191]

Marvell, another such Protestant, seized on Parker's remark about the buzz and noise of the divine spirit as a means of questioning his Protestant credentials, describing it as 'horribly irreverent'.[192] He scoffed at the notion that too much knowledge of religion will, in Parker's words, make men 'proud, conceited, and zealous', or will breed '*contempt of Governors ... [setting] them upon headless plots and designs of Reformation, that usually proceed to Rebellion*'.[193] Parker's complaints about the manner in which '*Nonconformist Preachers do spend most of their Pulpit-sweat in making a noise about Communion with God*' is taken by Marvell as a slight against God and holy spirit.[194] 'And lest he should have distinct Communion with

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[188] Parker, *Politie*, p. 57.
[189] Parker, *Politie*, p. 57.
[190] Parker, *Politie*, p. 56.
[191] John Milton, *Areopagitica: A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicensed Printing to the Parliament of England* (London, 1644), p. 32. This sort of ambivalent attitude to the Reformation led Pocock to remark that Parker, in 1688, 'perhaps prudently died on the eve of the Revolution'. See Pocock, 'Hobbes: Atheist or Enthusiast', p. 737. Despite rumours that Parker gravitated towards Roman Catholicism in the last years of his life, shortly before death he was reported to have rejected the ministrations of Roman Catholic priests in favour of those of Anglican ministers. See Jon Parkin, 'Parker, Samuel (1640-1688)', *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography* (Oxford, 2004), online edn. (24 August 2010).
[192] Andrew Marvell, 'Rehearsal Transpros'd', in Annabel Patterson, Martin Dzelzainis, N. H. Keeble, and Nicholas von Maltzahn (eds.), *The Prose Works of Andrew Marvell: Volume I, 1672-1673* (New Haven, 2003), p. 201 (hereafter *RT I*).
[193] Marvell, *RT II*, p. 321.
[194] Marvell, *RT I*, p. 202.

the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost', he continues, '[Parker] hath spoken evil distinctly of the Father, distinctly of the Son, and distinctly of the Holy Ghost'.[195] Marvell's constant references to Parker's 'push-pin divinity'[196] were meant as a mockery of the idea of the state's power over the church. Neither Parker's religion nor his polity, in Marvell's view, could subsist without authoritarian power. 'Ceremonies, Pins of the Church',[197] he continued, cannot be 'plucked out ... but the state immediately shakes and totters'.[198] Parker's belief that it is 'better to err with authority' is, in Marvell's final analysis, simply 'jesuitical'.[199] To characterize the holy spirit as an irritating buzz would naturally cause offense to any nonconformist whose piety has been built on sincere transactions between the individual's conscience and the holy spirit. If the noise of the holy spirit was an extension of the 'unaccountable conscience',[200] it is necessary to inquire what, for Parker, constituted legitimate religious practice. In this, Parker drew upon some of the themes present in Restoration Anglicanism described in chapter one. Rather than a process of regeneration fraught with existential anxieties, Parker's religion was ultimately a serene combination of virtue, humanity, happiness, and good manners.

By no means was Parker above accusing others who exhibited insufficient attachment to some of the categories of orthodox Christianity as atheists.[201] But what is most curious about Parker's remarks on sober religion is how remarkably emptied they were of Christian content. His criticisms of the Platonists have been noted, but the *Censure* also opens with some comments on commendable aspects of their philosophy. In Platonic moral philosophy, he wrote, 'there is nothing but what is calm and cheerful'.[202] In their laws of God, good nature is valued at 'so high a rate', and in the laws there are many injunctions to attaining it.[203] In the *Politie*, when seeking to contrast calm behaviour with enthusiastic zeal, he is even more explicit. 'All that the Scripture intends by the Graces of the Spirit', he

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[195] Marvell, *RT I*, p. 202.
[196] Marvell, *RT I*, pp. 9, 46, 61, 75.
[197] Marvell, *RT I*, p. 166.
[198] Marvell, *RT I*, p. 94.
[199] Marvell, *RT I*, p. 100.
[200] Parker, *Politie*, p. 57.
[201] Justin Champion, *Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture* (Manchester, 2003), p. 179.
[202] Parker, *Censure*, pp. 13-14.
[203] Parker, *Censure*, pp. 23, 18.

continued, 'are only *Vertuous Qualities* of the Soul, that are therefore styled Graces, because they were derived purely from Gods free Grace and Goodness'.[204] These fruits of the spirit were further specified as 'Love, Joy or Cheerfulness, Peaceableness, Patience, Gentleness, Goodness, Faithfulness, Meekness, and Temperance'.[205] In a striking passage, Parker sought to replace 'spiritual divinity', which can be 'made up of nothing else but certain Trains and Schemes of Effeminate Follies and illiterate Enthusiasms', with moral virtue, a form of 'sober Devotion, a more spiritual and intimate way of Communion with God'.[206]

Marvell, of course, was quick to notice that Parker's theology lacked the kind of intensity and rigour supplied by the holy spirit. Marvell jeered at the idea that the gifts of the spirit are 'meer moral virtues'.[207] In Parker's formulation, joy, peace, and faith became 'joyfulness, peaceableness, and faithfulness', blandly practiced conditions, 'as if they were no more than the three Homiletic conversable Virtues, *Veritas*, *Comitas*, and *Urbanitas*'.[208] Using the same concepts as Bunyan in his attacks on Fowler described in chapter two, Marvell complained in his railing style that Parker has

> made the passage to Heaven so easie that one may fly thither without Grace ... he that hath *disintricated* its narrow paths from those *Labyrinths* ... this Overseer of Gods Highwayes, (if I may with reverence speak it) who hath paved broad Causeway with Moral V irtue thorow his Kingdom; he me-thinks should not have made the *process of Loyalty* more difficult than that of *Salvation*.[209]

For Marvell, Parker was also notorious for 'debasing the operations of the Holy Ghost'[210] by advancing some speculations about the mechanical properties of enthusiasm. '*The Philosophy of the Fanatick being as intelligible by the Laws of Mechanism*', Parker writes, '*as the motion of the Heart, and Circulation of the Blood*'.[211] In *An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion* (1667) he enlarges upon this theme. There Parker diagnoses 'undue passion' as the 'irregular motion of blood'.[212] Virtue

[204] Parker, *Politie*, p. 72.
[205] Parker, *Politie*, p. 72.
[206] Parker, *Politie*, p. 74.
[207] Marvell, *RT II*, p. 362.
[208] Marvell, *RT II*, p. 360
[209] Marvell, *RT I*, p. 82.
[210] Marvell, *RT II*, p. 362.
[211] Quoted in Marvell, *RT II*, p. 363.
[212] Samuel Parker, *An Account of the Nature and Extent of the Divine Dominion* (London, 1666), p. 66.

and prudence too are described as purely mechanical in nature, being 'nothing else but a due commerce between the Brain & the Heart'.[213] Parker even has a minor place in the history of anatomy for having explicitly associated the intercostal nerve, 'a peculiar passage for commerce between the Head and the Heart in Man' provided by the 'Providence of nature'[214] and discovered by the anatomist Thomas Willis, as the anatomical basis for the conduct of sober, rational Anglicans.[215] Marvell was unmoved by this sort of show of skill and for him it revealed a confounding of 'the extraordinary influx of God's Spirit' rather than any insight into the biological basis of enthusiasm and human behaviour.[216]

Parker, in his reply to Marvell, published as *A Defense and Continuation of the Ecclesiastical Politie* in 1671, did not retract, but rather restated his initial claims in stronger language. Marvell's accusations of irreverence on Parker's part, which for the former was not only before in evidence in Parker's insult reference to the spirit's buzz, but also concerned his characterization of Christ himself as a sort of Jewish zealot. Throughout the *Continuation* Parker associated negative qualities with such buzzing. Parker insisted that the source of social problems is not human nature itself, but human nature equipped with spiritual pride and a '*naughty Godliness*'.[217] Here Parker was not referring to Roman Catholics:

> Their Faith, their Zeal, their Prayers, their Fastings, their constant Communion with God, their diligent Attendance upon Ordinances, their Love of the Lord Jesus, their hatred of Antichrist, or their spleen against the Pope, are impregnable Fences against all Assaults, and Answers to all Arguments. They are so dotingly enamoured of themselves for these signs of Grace ... that you may more easily induce them to suspect the Truth of all things, than their own Godliness.[218]

Such individuals emerged from 'obscure places, but if they once get wing, all places are immediately filled with their noise and murmur, and all men

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[213] Parker, *Dominion*, p. 67.
[214] Parker, *Dominion*, p. 66.
[215] Rina Koeff, 'The Reins of the Soul: The Centrality of the Intercostal Nerves to the Neurology of Thomas Willis and to Samuel Parker's Theology', *Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences*, 59 (2004), 413-40.
[216] Marvell, *RT II*, p. 363.
[217] Samuel Parker, *A Defence and Continuation of the Ecclesiastical Politie* (1671), pp. 8-11.
[218] Parker, *Continuation*, p. 10.

annoyed with their importunate buzze and tumult'.[219] Continuing in this irreverent tone, he defended his description of Christ as a zealot. The phrases used in the original description that caused Marvell such 'grievous Resentments', specifically '*hot fit of Zeal, seeming Fury, and transport of Passion'* were, in Parker's view, 'abating words'. 'Seeming' has a 'soft and qualified signification'. The truth is that Christ took upon himself 'the Person and the Priviledge of the Jewish zealots' in order to imitate 'their way of proceeding'.[220] Christ, then, assumed the appearance of zealotry with the purpose of advancing a larger claim, but was always well within his faculties. Once again, this has the ring of faint praise.

Parker's ambivalence about the logic of Reformation theology, by which individual men inculcate arbitrary and rebellious principles in their followers, was strong enough that he perceived the standard attacks on the Roman Church as excessive. Nonconformists, according to Parker, tend edto erroneously include 'all restraints upon licentious Practices and Perswasions about Religion under the hated name of Popery'.[221] In doing so, they 'never think themselves far enough from *Rome*, till they are wandred as far as *Munster*'.[222] A 'noise' was often made against popery, but for Parker the term signified 'anything that some men dislike'.[223] The curious implication of this attitude is that, according to Parker, objections to Rome or to legitimate religious authority will tend to follow the model of Munster or the civil wars, as 'every thing any man has a mind to' comes to dominate social relations.[224]

Parker's defense of the sovereign's authority to order the externals of worship without injury to the conscience of believers demonstrated the impossibility of compromise with his critics. For Bunyan, Locke, and conscientious objectors to uniformity in religion, to expose one's spiritual estate to hypocrisy and risk offending the holy spirit was perilous. It was a considerably less serious matter for Parker:

> [A]ll the Magistrates Power of Instituting Significant Ceremonies, amounts to no more than a Power of Determining what shall or shall

[219] Parker, *Continuation*, p. 18.
[220] Parker, *Continuation*, pp. 151-51.
[221] Parker, *Politie*, p. 24.
[222] Parker, *Politie*, p. 24.
[223] Parker, *Politie*, p. 209.
[224] Parker, *Politie*, p. 6.

> not be *Visible Signs of Honour*, and this certainly can be no more Usurpation upon the Consciences of men, than if the Sovereign Authority should take upon it self (as some Princes have done) to define the Signification of words. For as Words do not naturally denote those things which they are used to represent, but have their Import Stampt upon them by consent, and may, if Men would agree to it among themselves, be made Marks of Things quite contrary to what they now signifie.[225]

For Parker, there was no offense made against the holy spirit by participating in authorized worship against one's conscience because the holy spirit simply did not operate in the manner understood by nonconformists. It did not traffic in one's conscience in an independent manner, perhaps did not even reside there. The sacred transactions of the nonconformist's holy spirit were on a par with the incidental and inherently meaningless signification of words, left to the prudential arbitration of the sovereign.

While certain mechanisms in Protestant theology had encouraged religious and political disobedience, Hobbes's principle of self-preservation and self-interest reinforced the problem. Nonconformists 'swallow down' the ideas of Hobbes 'without chewing'.[226] Parker addressed the argument, axiomatic for some by the 1680s,[227] that nonconformists were essential to the wealth of kingdom by virtue of their success in trade, by collapsing it into the larger problem of self-interest. Their economic interests, like their religious orientations, were organized around individual enlargement, and their mastery of finances and trade are rooted in their pursuit of riches.[228]

Parker's solution to the religious and political problems of the kingdom was nothing less than the absolute authority of the sovereign, and he was vigilant against all that challenged or compromised it. The holy spirit, as it was fashioned by nonconformists, seemed to be a definite source of potential rebellion, and perhaps not much more than that. He was, at least, correct in his judgment about its potential for disobedience, as others fashioned a holy spirit that was active in the spiritual lives of individuals; and in especially spiritually or politically grave situations, a holy spirit might be expected to assist the godly in transforming the polity itself.

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[225] Parker, *Politie*, p. 108.
[226] Parker, *Politie*, p. xxv; Parkin, 'Liberty Transpros'd', p. 282.
[227] Ashcraft, *Revolutionary Politics*, p. 104.
[228] Parker, *Continuation*, p. 27.