

From Cultural Development to Culture for Development

The Music Industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana

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The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

Several parts of this dissertation have been previously published. Parts of Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 9, and 10 were published in *Developing Cultural Industries: Learning from the Palimpsest of Practice* by the European Cultural Foundation (De Beukelaer, 2015), as part of the *Cultural Policy Research Award*. Chapter 3 is a revised version of a paper published in *Cultural Trends* (De Beukelaer, 2014a). And parts of Chapter 4 were published as a 'policy review' in *Cultural Trends* (De Beukelaer, 2013).

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Abstract

The creative economy discourse now informs both cultural and development policies around the world. Virtually every country now uses the concept in politics, policy, advocacy, and practice. My aim is to show what this uptake means in conceptual and empirical terms. Through an ethnography of the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana I explore the changing meaning and position of 'culture' in cultural and development policies in both countries. How does the creative economy discourse help the pursuit human development, if at all? What does this discourse mean precisely? And, most importantly, what should it mean to develop cultural industries?

Overall, my dissertation frames this issue broadly *and* narrowly. The narrow focus is on the situation in Ouagadougou and Accra, capital cities of respectively Burkina Faso and Ghana. The particularities of these countries serve as examples to simultaneously build and illustrate the argument. Yet, the scope extends well beyond this: the aim at large is to ask questions that can be asked beyond these countries. Even though they may yield different answers around the world, I hope they will help to critically understand and use the hegemonic creative economy discourse.

The originality of my dissertation work is threefold. First, I link cultural policy studies with critical development studies. I do this by connecting cultural industries to the human development approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum by exploring the link with 'capabilities.' Second, I provide empirical insight in the particularities of the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana, as both countries are nearly absent from the literature. Third, I provide a theoretical framework to rethink the way cultural and creative industries can be inscribed in cultural policies and development plans by including the cultural and historical palimpsest of existing practices that both enables and limits change.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States
APEIC	Agence de Promotion des Entreprises et Industries Culturelles
APRODEM	l'Association des Producteurs, Distributeurs et Éditeurs de Musique.
ARPEM	Appui au Réseau ouest-africain de Pépinières d'Entreprises de la filière de la Musique
ARPIC	Programme d'Appui au Renforcement des Politiques et Industries Culturelles
AU	African Union
BBDA	Bureau Burkinabè du Droit d'Auteur
BBEAC	Bureau Burkinabè d'Etudes et D'Appui-Conseils
BC	British Council
CCI	Cultural and Creative Industries
CDIS	Culture and Development Indicator Suite
CEDEAO	Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (See ECOWAS)
CIGF	Guarantee Fund for Cultural Industries
CMOs	Collective Management Organisations
COSGA	Collective Management Societies of Ghana
CPRA	Cultural Policy Research Award
DCCD/CKU	Danish Center for Culture and Development
ECF	European Cultural Foundation
ECOWAS	Economic Community Of West African States (See CEDEAO)
ENCATC	European Network of Cultural Administration Training Centers
EU	European Union
FCFA	Franc de la Communauté Française d'Afrique
FGIC	Fonds de Garantie des Industries Culturelles
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GHAMRO	Ghana Music Rights Organization
GTRA	Ghana Tape Recordists Association
HDCA	Human Development and Capabilities Approach
HDI	Human Development Indicator
HDR	Human Development Report
IFPI	International Federation of the Phonographic Industry

IMD	Institute for Music and Development
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INAFAC	Institut National de Formation Artistique et Culturelle
J2C	Journalistes et Communicateurs pour la Culture
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MCT	Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme
MCTC	Ministère de la Culture, du Tourisme et de la Communication
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MUSIGA	Musicians' Union Of Ghana
NCC	National Commission on Culture
NDPC	National Development Planning Commission
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIF	Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
RTB	Radiodiffusion Télévision du Burkina
SAPs	Structural Adjustment Programs
TED	Technology, Entertainment, Design
UEMOA	Union Economique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
WB	World Bank
WCCD	World Commission on Culture and Development
WCED	World Commission on Environment and Development
WOMEX	World Music Expo
WTO	World Trade Organization

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Preface

This dissertation contains several chapters that have been published previously in their entirety or partially, in a slightly amended or thoroughly revised version. Paragraph 7.4.6 of the University of Leeds Research Student Handbook requires the submission of hardcopies of any and all publications for examination, which I have duly included.

Throughout the dissertation as a whole, I build on a paper published in *The Journal of Arts Management, Law, and Society* (De Beukelaer, 2014b) and a policy review published in *Cultural Trends* (De Beukelaer, 2013).

Chapter 2 is a slightly revised version of Chapter 2 of the research report *Developing Cultural Industries* which I published with the European Cultural Foundation in the context of the 2012 Cultural Policy Research Award (De Beukelaer, 2015). Chapter 3 is a revised version of an article I published in *Cultural Trends* (De Beukelaer, 2014a). Chapter 5 derives partly from Chapter 3 of *Developing Cultural Industries* and is a revised version of the paper I gave at the 2014 International Conference on Cultural Policy Research. Chapter 6 derives partly from Chapter 3 of *Developing Cultural Industries*. Chapter 8 is a revised version of Chapter 4 of *Developing Cultural Industries*. Chapter 9 is a revised version of Chapter 5 of *Developing Cultural Industries*. Chapter 10 is a revised version of Chapter 6 of *Developing Cultural Industries*.

1. The Music Industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana: Between Global Discourse and Local Initiatives

The discourse of the creative economy is global. Virtually every country around the world now uses the concept (or one of its variants) in politics, policy, advocacy, and practice (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 53–85). This persuasive discourse does not only entice countries with historically strong cultural industries (USA, UK, Japan, France, Germany), and countries who saw their share of this global market increase in the last decades (China, South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, and so on). Countries with less established cultural industries also increasingly embrace the creative economy discourse. This goes for most countries in Africa as well, as the following excerpt from the magazine *African Business* illustrates:

The global creative industry,¹ which encompasses films, TV, literature, and a host of other activities is enormous and growing larger. Even when the global economy contracted, the creative industry continued to grow, especially in China and other Asian countries. Africa's contribution to this vast industry, unfortunately, is negligible. While the continent has a deep pool of talent, it lacks the infrastructure and capacity to commercialise its creative talent and reap the vast fortunes that are lying in wait. (African Business 2014, 15)

The fact that the African creative economy gets a cover story in a major Africa-focused business magazine is telling. But, their argument remains cautious: the share of Africa is currently negligible and there is a lack of both infrastructure and capacity to transform the potential of the creative talent of the continent into realization. The transition from potential to realization, or the process of developing cultural industries, is the key theme of my dissertation.

1.1. The Creative Economy Discourse of Disparate Concepts

The starting point of my research is the global spread of what I call the 'creative economy discourse.' Thereby I mean the varied use of terms like cultural and creative industries around the world. The very fact that the term 'creative economy discourse' lacks conceptual precision is the reason that I use it here. The current use of the 'creative economy' in UN reports (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010;

¹ Wherever I cite written sources and interviewees, I stick to the terms they use. Yet, in the following section I explain which terms I favor and why.

UNESCO and UNDP, 2013) builds more on catchiness and 'brand recognition' than conceptual or theoretical robustness. It is precisely the lack of rigour that makes the 'creative economy' a moving target that needs close engagement.

Several authors (e.g. Wang, 2004; Cunningham, 2009b; Prince, 2010) have discussed the slippery and versatile notion of the 'creative industries' as it travels around the world. This discourse, Prince (2010 p. 135) argues, forms an instrument of the "trans-national community of experts" that promotes and implements the creative economy policy agenda. The way I use the term 'creative economy discourse' is precisely by seeing it as a tool or instrument to understand how the policies in Burkina Faso and Ghana bridge terms and ideas that travel globally to local stakeholder debates and aspirations.

The process that transforms cultural and creative potential into cultural industries is layered. At a policy level, the aims of previously disparate domains become increasingly intertwined. The two major elements of the discourse in Burkina Faso and Ghana, which serve as guiding examples of this study, are national development plans and cultural policies. These documents form a normative basis for social, political, and economic change and a practical approach towards the execution of such change, like anywhere else in the world. For development plans, this means that culture, albeit reduced to cultural and creative industries, now takes a more central position as a driver of the development of the national economy. Cultural ministries and their cultural policies increasingly focus on the economic potential of the cultural sector. This resembles the evolution across Europe, where ministries of culture increasingly focus on the economic return of culture in order to make a case for budgetary allocation to the arts and heritage. In the European case, this discourse is driven by the need to defend such allocations, resulting in claims about social, economic, and innovatory spill over of the cultural sector (Gray, 2007). At the same time, it is also driven by cultural businesses looking for ways to reinforce copyright protection. In Burkina Faso and Ghana the current focus is rather similar, but the trajectory towards it somewhat different. Culture is included in development plans precisely because of economic claims connected to the creative economy discourse (as is the case elsewhere), while much of the arguments continue to build on claims about the role of culture in society that derives from development anthropology. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, there is no meaningful public spending on culture to be defended. Rather, the aim of stakeholders in the cultural sector, from government officials, to entrepreneurs, and artists in adopting the creative economy discourse is both to convince the central government to allocate greater budget to the culture ministry and to create an environment conducive to private enterprise in the cultural sector.

The policy discourse at UN level, which drives much policy around the world, remains configured by a contrast between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries. I show at length that it makes more sense to look at the similarities than the differences across this out-dated division of countries. The challenges are similar, and the particularity lies in the fact that every country has its own lengthy and contradictory path-dependent practices and policies that are often intertwined with neighbours far and near. That particularity cannot be captured in the simplistic division of the world in ‘developed’ and ‘developing’; in ‘north’ and ‘south’; in ‘centre’ and ‘periphery’; or ‘first’ and ‘third’ worlds.

Throughout my dissertation, ‘cultural industries’ refers to the formal and informal production, distribution, and consumption of symbolic texts, since it maintains insight in the historical contradictions culture as artistic expression and as a way of life, while ‘creative economy’ refers to the more general discourse. There are, however, multiple terms in use across the creative economy discourse: cultural industries (e.g. Hesmondhalgh, 2013a; Oakley and O’Connor, 2015; Fitzgerald, 2011), creative industries (e.g. DCMS, 1998; Smith, 1998; Caves, 2000; Hartley, 2005; Lovink and Rossiter, 2007; Keane, 2013; Flew, 2013; O’Brien, 2014), creative economy (e.g. Howkins, 2002; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010; UNESCO and UNDP, 2013; Fonseca Reis, 2008a), cultural economy (e.g. Anheier and Isar, 2008; Gibson and Kong, 2005), and so on. This multitude of concepts means two things that are crucial here. First it highlights that there is little agreement on the terms (Garnham, 2005; Mato, 2009; Miller, 2009), and what they mean as they travel (Cunningham, 2009b; Wang, 2004; Pratt, 2009). Second, it highlights that in this policy-driven discourse (which through the ‘creative economy reports’ favours a particular approach) the complexity of the overlapping yet contradicting concepts does not allow for sufficient conceptual clarity and – as a result – empirical precision. In Ghana the term ‘creative (arts) industry’ is most common, while in Burkina Faso ‘industries culturelles’ (or ‘cultural industries’) is most widely used. See Table 1-1 below for an overview of the ways I use these concepts throughout this dissertation.

Table 1-1 - Cultural and Creative Industries: A glossary of terms used

<i>Term</i>	<i>Use</i>
Cultural Industries	The formal and informal production, distribution, and consumption of symbolic texts
Creative Economy (Discourse)	(Global) Policy Discourse
Creative (Arts) Industry	The CCIs concept as it is most commonly used in Ghana
<i>Industries Culturelles</i>	The CCIs concept as it is most commonly used in Burkina Faso

The discourse builds on four overlapping (yet contrasting) claims by advocates of creative economy perspectives. First, cultural industries serve to maintain cultural diversity. For example, UNESCO (2005b) links the cultural industries to development in its *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions*. The rationale here is that the global circulation of cultural expressions occurs through the cultural industries. In order to “protect and promote” (following the terms of the Convention) a level of diversity in this global flow, all countries must have sufficiently strong cultural industries, to make sure that their internal market can withstand the influx of imported films, music, and books.

Second, the creative economy is a driver of economic growth. This is the bottom line of the UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010). In many countries, the creative economy is now growing faster than the economy as a whole, but also provides an avenue of export diversification for countries with a primary focus on primary goods exports. This claim is in line with the mandate of UNCTAD, which aims to help countries diversify their exports to reduce dependence on raw material exports. The initial two reports were published by UNCTAD (2008; 2010) and focused primarily on international trade in the sector.

Third, the creative economy is linked to human development goals. This focus featured in the initial UNCTAD creative economy reports, but became more explicit in the UNESCO edition of the report that focuses on “widening development pathways” (2013). This means that not only economic, but also social, cultural, and emotional aspects of development are part of the goals the creative economy should help attain. The 2013 report is strong as a conceptual introduction to the discourse, as a source of examples, and as a basis to set policy agendas. However, it neither provides a systematic link between human development and cultural industries, nor does it provide a way to link the creative economy discourse to culture as a way of life, that proposes a holistic understanding of culture that does not collapse under its own weight. The current efforts to develop a Culture and Development Indicator Suite (CDIS) provide an ambitious (perhaps even too ambitious) way forward that may strengthen the weak link. Yet, there is little explicit policy attention for human development goals, as the debate remains largely framed in economic terms.

Fourth, the cultural industries are a means of expressing ‘voice’ in two distinct ways. On the one hand, ‘voice’ is a way of cultural expression in order to tell stories, share dreams, and cherish shared heritage. This articulation focuses primarily on the continuous (re-)creation of stories that make up and maintain diverse cultural communities, which Anderson calls ‘imagined’ (1983). On the other hand, ‘voice’ is a political necessity as a way to imagine society and our experience within it (Couldry, 2010). Bar-

rowclough and Kozul-Wright make the argument that the creative economy discourse ideally connects these two understandings in order to rethink the priorities of cultural policy by linking engagement with cultural diversity, social welfare, and economic opportunity (2008b p. 31).

In sum, thinking about the 'creative economy for development' is largely presented as the logical continuation of earlier (and present) 'culture and development' debates. Yet this overlooks that the former is a 'fast' policy, "an ad-hoc neologism which ... has captured the policy imagination of countries and cities around the globe" whereas the latter is rather 'slow' policy, that emerged "out of a long process of practical and critical work across different national and international bodies" (De Beukelaer and O'Connor, forthcoming). More importantly, the creative economy discourse remains a predominantly Western affair, particularly given the limited engagement of non-Western countries with the underlying practical complexity. The main drivers of the global creative economy discourse are policies and reports from international organizations, which in turn draw on the work of 'creative' consultancies that travel the world to "do a Florida thing" (McGuigan, 2009), after the influential but flawed work of Richard Florida. At the same time, the technical support from international organizations like UNESCO, the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF), and the *British Council* (BC), also work primarily within their respective logic when advising ministries and NGOs on the adoption and implementation of the creative economy discourse. Moreover, the implicit (and often explicit) claims about the economic viability should not overshadow the fact that much (if not most) cultural activity is not economically viable.

The risk of the current discourse is that the policies and frameworks proposed by the above reports and agencies are adopted with insufficiently critical understanding. A Ghanaian stakeholder comments:²

The creative industry has been around not too long; I wonder how many people really understand the concept. It's been a very short time. When we say culture industry, whose culture industry are we talking about? The whole world is talking about UNCTAD, but is that our cultural industry? We must think about what we call culture industry and where they are. In the north, there's this village, Yindi, and in Europe, this could be called the creative city of weaving. But we're in Africa, and it's just a place where people are weaving, you see? So, we have to define, in our own terms, this is our creative industry. When we define [it] ourselves and we are willing to defend it, that's when I think we'll understand this whole concept. Again, now this is something

² I list the interviewees by occupation and city with reference to a unique number that helps locate them on the lists with interviewees in appendix A.

that has been imposed, even in the government sectors, where they were going to re-name the ministry of tourism; they call it creative arts. Creative arts, because it's business as usual. Until we discover our own [understanding of the concept], what we call our own creative industry, and until we say we want to protect it, and have policies to protect it, and make sure we can compete with the rest of the world and not what somebody from the embassies says, you have to collaborate in exchange for a grant; the British Council, Alliance Française, Goethe Institut, and so on. This deforms the view of Ghanaian production, it's perhaps not what we think is Ghanaian. We have to discover ourselves, what our creative industry is. (Cultural Activist, Accra #2)

This comment addresses an important reservation about the role of the 'creative industry.' It signals discontent with the imposition of the terminology through international organizations. Simultaneously, the need to come up with a Ghanaian understanding of the global discourse is equally strong. This critical engagement with the concept is however exceptional. Commonly, the term is used for advocacy, rather than critically to understand existing processes. If advocacy is based on the uncritical adoption of the terminology, policies and 'solutions' are likely to be transferred without sufficient attention to the culturally contingent context where this policy is implemented. Since there is evidence that policy transfer around the world across different conceptual variations and policy contexts is ineffective (Pratt, 2009), such exchange needs caution. This does not mean that there can be no global exchange of ideas, concepts, and policies, but it means that learning from such exchange should build on a critical reflexive understanding of what this globalized debate means in particular contexts.

The creative economy as a globalized discourse can, however, be seen as a Rorschach blot (Cunningham, 2009b), since it is a concept that can be read in a variety of ways. This adds to the confusing tension between the global discourse (embodied in the Creative Economy Reports) and the variety of terms that different governmental and non-governmental bodies use to drive their respective agenda. This does not only influence the terms in use, but also the underlying concepts and models. While a Rorschach blot may in theory be a useful metaphor, when a foreign consultant or donor is hinting what there is to see, it loses significance because it undermines the ability to have a more varied reading of the concept and makes it difficult to develop your own culturally contingent understanding. In this context, the influence of France in Burkina Faso (through the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie*), and of Britain in Ghana (through the *British Council*) is clear.

The paradox is that while there are cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana because of the discursive shifts and policy interventions, they remain cultural industries in development. This development is simultaneously a discursive, normative, and practi-

cal project. The question is not: should there be cultural industries? The question is: what kind of cultural industries should be supported, for whom, and by whom? This study dissects that globalized project towards developing cultural industries as a process. The 'creative economy for development' discourse is largely presented as the logical continuation of earlier (and present) 'culture and development' thinking. This is not entirely correct. The creative economy discourse remains a predominantly Western affair, particularly given the limited engagement of non-Western countries with the underlying practical complexity.

1.2. Fragmented Literatures about a Common Theme

The creative economy discourse continues to evolve across different disciplines. In this section I sketch an overview of the different fields and disciplines that directly and indirectly contribute to the creative economy discourse. In the next chapter, I provide a more detailed engagement with the literature in order to locate my argument.

The current academic literature on the role of cultural industries for development is not a mono-disciplinary matter. It is an issue that many disciplines engage with in critically supportive ways. Due to this fragmentation, the connection between critical academic research and policy-making is even weaker than in most fields, as consultant-academics engaged in policy development are unable to both follow and reflect the full breadth of the literatures across disciplines. The underlying reasons for this are time constraints and the incommensurability of different disciplinary perspectives.

Policy-oriented dialogue is not necessarily problematic. But, while policy has gone global, critical research is lagging behind, particularly beyond Europe, Australia, North America, and increasingly also China. There is some literature, however, that links cultural industries to development but this remains dispersed across disciplines and is overall limited. The book *Creative Industries in Developing Countries* edited by Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright (2008a) is the most explicit engagement with the topic to date. Yet the overall optimistic editorial line of these two UNCTAD staff members phrases the discourse in terms of potential and opportunities, much in line with the first *Creative Economy Report* (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008). The volume on the *Global Cultural Economy* Edited by Anheier and Isar (2008), provides ample insight in the different regional perspectives on cultural production. Yet this volume does not engage very explicitly with the shifting policy agenda, where the cultural and creative industries become increasingly prominent around the world. Alongside these two books, several articles and chapters have addressed the place and role of culture and cultural industries in relation to 'development' in the past decade (Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006; Da Costa, 2010; Stupples, 2014; Pratt, 2014). The existing critical engagement with the

link between culture, policy, and development can advance our understanding of the creative economy discourse significantly. Particularly the link between cultural industries and human development merits attention. The following paragraphs outline the ways different disciplines and fields explicitly and implicitly focus on the cultural industries.

Cultural policy studies has emerged in the 1990s as a pragmatic response to the strong tradition of social criticism in cultural studies since the second half of the 20th century by Raymond Williams and Stuart Hall, among others. While cultural studies focuses more on providing critique cultural policy studies engages more explicitly with the policy implications, be it in a Foucauldian (Bennett, 1998) or Habermasian (McGuigan, 1996) approach. This shift gave way to a range of voices in the way this could be done (e.g. McGuigan, 2003; Lewis and Miller, 2003; Miller and Yúdice, 2002). There are different approaches within cultural policy studies ranging from social (Belfiore and Bennett, 2008), economic (Throsby, 2010), and political (O'Brien, 2014; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2014) angles. This remains, however, a discipline with a strong focus on the contexts in Western Europe and Australia.

Culture and development studies respond to the need to take culture seriously in development thinking and practice. This 'cultural turn' in developing thinking calls to take into account culturally contingent practices such as traditions, frames of thought, and sociocultural organization and to pay explicit attention to culture for development (Kovács, 2008 p. 99). This is a challenge that seems to remain as big today as in when the World Commission on Culture and Development (1996) launched their key report at the end of the UN decade for culture and development (1988-1997). The scholarly engagement with the culture, however, remains marginal to mainstream development studies even important titles have been written since (Stupples and Teaiwa, 2015; Clammer, 2012; Nederveen Pieterse, 2010; Radcliffe, 2006a; Rao and Walton, 2004a; Schech and Haggis, 2000). Yet, this sub-field at the crossroads of development studies and development anthropology remained largely focused on 'developing' countries. In this context, culture is most often understood in the anthropological sense, and not as creative artistic expression. This framework is thus useful to understand initiatives in cultural industries, even though it does not engage with them explicitly.

The cultural and creative industries gained increasing academic attention since the late 1970s, when the 1940s radical critique against the 'culture industry' as mass deception (Adorno, 2001) formed a basis for 'cultural industries' (in the plural) as a less pessimistic, less elitist, and altogether more pragmatic empirical engagement with the politics of cultural production. Pioneering scholars considered the politics and economics of cultural production without dismissing critique, or embracing the concept as unproblematic

(Miège, 1987; Miège, 1979; Girard, 1982). This allowed for a greater focus on the problems and challenges within the realm of cultural production, rather than merely criticising the politics of commercial culture (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a). Since the 1990s, however, a celebratory twist changed the discourse once more. The shift from cultural to creative industries opened up the range of activities counted as part of this sector (Garnham, 2005; Tremblay, 2011) that allowed for far grander claims concerning the role of culture and creativity in post-industrial societies (Landry, 2000; Howkins, 2002; Florida, 2002). The vast body of research that has emerged since the late 1990s provides rich insight in a variety of aspects of the cultural industries even if it focuses primarily on Western countries. The global discourse builds more on recent optimism than on earlier critical scholarship, that did not dismiss potential, but addressed challenges in a constructive way. In spite of policies and reports concerning the cultural industries in 'developing countries' empirical engagement with these regions, and African countries in particular, remains scarce.

Human development and capabilities is an approach within development studies that rejects economic growth and average income as the sole indicator of 'development.' The argument is that, while the economy is important, the more crucial quest in development is increasing the capability of people to expand their "real freedoms" (Sen, 1999 p. 3) and responding to the questions: "What are people actually able to do and be? What opportunities are available to them?" (Nussbaum, 2011 p. x). The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) builds on this rationale to develop its Human Development Indicators. They include health and education in their indicators, which gently forces countries to adapt their policies, because these issues do not necessarily improve through economic growth (Nussbaum, 2011 p. ix). But, overall, the human development approach shows little explicit engagement with culture, and barely any engagement with cultural expressions. And where UNDP explicitly engages with culture (UNDP, 2004), it does so largely in a ethnocentric way, as it remains rooted in a liberalist and individualist understanding (Nederveen Pieterse, 2005; Telleria, 2015). While the creative economy reports explicitly refer to human development (e.g. UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008 p. 4; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010 p. 10; UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 11), there is hardly any engagement with cultural expressions in general, or cultural industries in particular, in human development debates.

Lastly, ethnographic approaches to cultural practice in 'developing' countries often engage explicitly with the tension between culture and economy in artistic and creative production (e.g. Shipley, 2013; Plageman, 2012; Charry, 2012; Perullo, 2011; Boateng, 2011; Larkin, 2008; Collins, 1996; Wallis and Malm, 1984). This field engages with the link between cultural industries and development in greatest detail. The approach, however, provides greater socio-cultural understanding of these processes than insight

into policy implications. Ethnomusicology, as such, resembles cultural studies as discussed above: it is rich in empirical detail, analysis, and critique, but falls short in linking this to pragmatic policy debates. Though through its richness, it allows others to build on ethnographic work to inform more policy-oriented research as it engages with the implications of older policies and politics (e.g. Perullo, 2011) or with contemporary processes of entrepreneurship and value creation (e.g. Shipley, 2013).

The problem with the existing literature that engages with the cultural industries for development is dispersed across different academic disciplines that do not sufficiently interact, which is a general challenge in cultural policy studies (Gray, 2010). Each field provides valuable contributions to the overall understanding of the creative economy discourse, but the limited interaction between these approaches limits exchange and interaction. While the different theoretical stances, conceptual foci, and methodological approaches highlighted above yield a variety of outlooks on the cultural industries, these fundamental differences make it difficult to pretend they all talk about the same thing, because they do not. Particularly because beyond the disciplinary differences the different approaches to the creative economy discourse also differ along ideological lines:

We are seeing two very different approaches to policy development for the cultural industries. One is very strongly focused on economic growth under what one might call the current growth model; the other stresses the limits of economic growth as the goal of cultural or indeed any public policy. (Bell and Oakley, 2015 p. 34)

In this context, my dissertation explores the limits of economic growth as a policy objective by engaging explicitly with a different paradigm: 'human development.'

My aim with this dissertation is threefold. First, to advance the conceptual understanding of the link between cultural industries and development. Second, to provide empirical insight in the policies and practices in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian music industries. And third, to advance the mutual understanding between engagement with the role of culture (and cultural industries) in development and the notion of human development in the creative economy discourse.

1.3. Research Questions

The specific gap in the literature I try to deal with is twofold. On a topical level, I try to forge a link between the CCI discourse and the *Human Development and Capabilities Approach*. These two topics are (implicitly) linked in policy texts, but the academic literature in the CCIs barely addresses capabilities, and the human development literature hardly addresses the CCIs. On a more structural level, I try to connect the creative

economy discourse in general and music industries in particular to development studies and the anthropologically inspired culture and development framework. In doing that, I aim not to merely turn 'development policy' into 'cultural policy', as Korsou (1976) once argued, but to advance the critical exchange between development policy (that is always implicitly cultural) and cultural policy (that is now aiming to 'develop' societies).

The central questions that arise from this aim are as follows:

How does the creative economy discourse influence the relation between culture and (human) development in Burkina³ and Ghanaian Cultural Policies and Development Plans? Is this discourse a continuation of earlier 'culture and development' thinking? Do the cultural industries really drive human development? How does the creative economy discourse feed into Burkina and Ghanaian policies, and is this helping people to 'make money from music'? How can cultural industries better connect to human development and capabilities, and what are the policy implications of such a link?

I explore this question by looking at concepts, policies, stakeholder experiences, data, and politics.

First, I explore the conceptual link between cultural industries and development. The shift from 'cultural development' to 'culture for development' counts as a pragmatic response to culture and development thinking. Precisely because the inclusion of culture in development thinking is not straightforward, such attempts have largely remained an abstract and theoretical contemplation, particularly in mainstream development thinking. The current creative economy discourse allegedly merges these trends (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010; UNESCO and UNDP, 2013) and has the merit of providing an economic justification to engage culture in development. But, how do the cultural industries fit in the historical link between culture and development, which dates back at least to the 18th century? What does the general uptake of the creative economy discourse mean for culture and development?

Second, at the level of cultural practice, I explore the disjuncture between the use and understanding of the creative economy discourse, as the quote of the Ghanaian stake-

³ 'Burkinabè' is the noun denoting the inhabitant of the country and the adjective denoting something of the country of Burkina Faso. It is a fixed form that, unlike French words, does not change with gender or singular/plural form. This is because the term derives from *Burkina*, which means 'upright' or 'integrity' in Mooré and *Bè*, which means 'people' in Fulfuldé. The term *Faso* is a Dioula term that translates as 'the country'. The name of Burkina Faso is thus a meaningful reflection of the cultural politics of Thomas Sankara, who changed the name from the colonial 'Upper Volta' in 1984, incorporating the languages of three big ethnic groups of the country: the Mossi (who speak Mooré), the Dioula, and the Peuhl (who speak Fulfuldé).

holder above illustrates. What does it mean that the discourse is used so widely, but that many stakeholders see existing practice as merely 'embryonic' or 'emerging' (as I explain in Chapter 5)? What particular difficulties does this pose for the use of the creative economy discourse in policy and practice?

Third, existing interventions to support the developing cultural industries mostly build on a superficial understanding of existing practices, and implicitly aim to change those practices according to an orthodox (i.e. Western) notion of what the cultural industries should be. How can supporting initiatives retain an openness to learn from the global discourse, without dismissing the practices that do actually work? And, how can these initiatives actively aim for human development goals instead of seeing them as a by-product of economic growth?

Finally, while cultural industries exist in Burkina Faso and Ghana, they remain largely 'in the making' in terms of conceptual understanding (what are the cultural industries?), in terms of normative basis (what should the cultural industries be?), and in terms of pragmatic intervention (how can the cultural industries be supported or developed?). When it comes to policy, the question remains: how can these different considerations be reconciled? And, what kind of a policy approach can take into account the complex history of cultural practice through the existing (and future) academic approaches that explore how culture and development can be linked?

The competing historical, conceptual, normative and practical considerations need to be considered together, because: "development is too complex to allow partial approaches to have their way – although these lend themselves to technical finesse and managerial intervention, the managerial fiction of knowledge and mastery itself is part of the problem" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. xvii). Developing cultural industries is a process, with human development as its ultimate goal, cultural policy as a framework, with culture and development as a guiding principle. Only when these different layers find each other, can the cultural industries be a basis for a socially inclusive project that helps articulating voice in an economically viable way.

1.4. Research Design & Methodology

My approach critically links the global creative economy discourse to policies, initiatives, and practices at a national level. The global side primarily builds on the recent creative economy reports (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010; UNESCO and UNDP, 2013) but also brings in earlier policy documents (UNESCO, 1982a; OAU and UNESCO, 1992; African Union, 2005; UNESCO, 2005b) and scholarly debate (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2008a; Hesmondhalgh, 2013a; Flew, 2013). Chapter 2 critically engages with the tensions and lacunae in the links between

culture and development, while chapter 3 challenges the dominant UNCTAD reading of creative economy statistics around the world. In order to connect the global discourse with its uptake in policy, this study engages explicitly with the Burkinabè and Ghanaian contexts. Their national policies include development plans (SCADD, 2010; NDPC, 2010) and cultural policies (MCTC, 2008; NCC, 2004), which form the basis for policy analysis in chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 provide a detailed account of my ethnographic work and interviews with stakeholders throughout the sector. Chapters 8 and 9 build on the previous empirical chapters to explore the abstract and theoretical implications of my findings.




Figure 1-1 - Research focus: Levels of policy and implementation

The starting points of my empirical engagement are mechanisms that aim to support music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana (Figure 1-1: “CCI Support Programmes”). On Figure 1-1, the black areas highlight the levels and areas I focus on explicitly, while the black arrows highlight the relations between these fields I explore in detail. At the policy level, I start from the global creative economy discourse and link them to the national level. At the implementation level, I start from the CCI support programmes.

The conceptual focus is on the cultural and creative industries as a discourse, but the empirical engagement builds on the music industries, spanning the formal and the informal, the commercial and the not-for-profit, the big and the small. The focus here is on music industries in the plural (Williamson and Cloonan, 2007; Sterne, 2014), because the scope is much broader than the recording industry.

The locus of research is restricted to the capital cities: Ouagadougou and Accra. This reflects the shifts away from predominantly national interventions to an increasingly urban focus (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 33). Yet, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, policies remain largely national in focus, in spite of some existing local initiatives.



Figure 1-2 - ARPIC Meeting Room and Workspace for Entrepreneurs in 1200 Logements, Ouagadougou

In Ouagadougou, two linked projects serve as a departure. On the one hand ARPEM, a music industries support programme, between the Burkinabè Ministry of Culture and Tourism (in 2009 Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Communication), the French NGO *Culture et Développement*, and *ACPCultures*, the EU-ACP support programme for cultural industries in ACP (African, Caribbean, and Pacific) countries (Figure 1-1: “Funding”). The municipality of Ouagadougou has been a driver of Reemdoogo, the Garden of Music in the popular neighbourhood Gounghin. This initiative houses a 400-seat open-air stage, music rehearsal spaces, and a conference facility. The ARPEM programme grew out of the realization that this space, while popular and useful, did not respond to the economic needs of the music industries in the city. It ran from 2009 to 2012 and provided training for 60 entrepreneurs, created a documentation centre, and mapped musical activity in Ouagadougou (Ouédraogo, 2012 p. 19). ARPIC (see Figure 1-2) is formally a different project, since the *Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie* (OIF) now funds it. The project, however, continued the work that started under ARPEM with the same team, on the same location, and with largely the same aims. The major difference is that ARPIC also focuses on book publishing, performing arts, and audio-visual production. This project ran from 2012 until 2015 and served as an embedded research basis for ethnographic work.

In Accra, the initiative under scrutiny is the collaboration between MUSIGA (the musicians union, see Figure 1-3) and the British Council. They jointly organized training sessions for (aspiring) music professionals. The Ghanaian initiative is not as structured, long, and formalized as those in Burkina Faso, but equally provides insight in the

ways emerging music industries are supported through local initiatives with international partners.

In terms of practices, this study explores the work, challenges, and aims of aspiring and more established music industries workers and entrepreneurs. The focus is on the space between the symbolic and the economic. The stress is on the processes engagement to develop music industries over the symbolic messages and socio-economic impact of these industries.



Figure 1-3 - Panel Direction to the MUSIGA National Head Office in Cantonments, Accra

The method combines a close reading of policy documents with an ethnographic approach: Textual analysis helps in understanding the link between global discourse and national policies, by connecting these policies to initiatives and practices through participant observation, and providing a clear overview of existing practices and obstacles through semi-structured interviews with stakeholders in the sector. I then connect the analysis of policy documents with the accounts of music workers. My observations as a participant in the process of 'developing cultural industries' helps connecting these two approaches to make sense of the disjuncture between what is written and what is done. I do not try to impose an understanding of what the CCIs *should* mean in Burkina Faso or Ghana, as a part of my conceptual framework or theoretical approach, but aim to make sense of the shifts in discourse and concomitant shift in praxis as an attempt to take the social context of music production seriously. This study thus explicitly links

a concern with cultural policy and culture as forms of life in order to explore ways to change “the social within the social” (Willis and Trondman, 2002 p. 398).

My engagement with policy documents serves to detect the emergence of the creative economy discourse in cultural and development policy, to understand the aims and goals of policy texts. My aim is thus to sketch a contextual and contextualised understanding of the uptake of this globally itinerant discourse in two countries, rather than simply providing an ideological critique of the underlying neoliberal doxa.

The ethnographic engagement with the translation of these practices is more central to my enquiry than ideology. While I do engage with the political implications of shifting policy discourse throughout my analysis, this emerges from my empirical engagement and not from a predefined approach to the CCIs. While I do not take this discourse for granted, I accept that it is now central to policy and practice, and that – much like other development discourse – it is hard to ignore. The ethnographic element to my research serves to expose the tensions between the ostentatious use of this discourse in policy texts and the simultaneous adoption and contestation of the terms by a variety of music workers. Yet, my work is neither an ethnomusicological study of the music industries (see e.g. Cottrell, 2010) nor an ethnography of popular music (see e.g. Cohen, 1993) in Ouagadougou and Accra (see e.g. Collins, 1992; Collins, 1996; Plageman, 2012; Shipley, 2013). It is a study that explores the ‘development of cultural industries’ at a conceptual, policy, and empirical level.

Participant observation in the music industries in Ouagadougou and Accra during eight months (see details below) aimed to “describe what happens, how the people involved see and talk about their own actions and those of others, the contexts in which the action takes place, and what follows from it” (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2010 p. 7). The monthly overview of activities in the urban contexts I have studied.

January 2013

From 9-12 January, I was in Grenoble to visit the offices of the French NGO *Culture et Développement*, where I met with Francisco d’Almeida, Bernard Miège, and Baptiste Fuchs. This was to get details of the ARPEM programme which they were involved in, and which I used as a starting point for my research. On 22 January, I travelled to Ouagadougou. On 31 January and 2 February, I took part in a training at ARPIC on the ‘Spirit of Enterprise’ (Esprit d’Entreprise). At the same time, I started conversations at ARPIC and with stakeholders in the cultural sector in general. On 31 January, I attended the final presentation of the ‘Je Danse Donc Je Suis’ (I Dance therefor I am) programme at the Centre for Choreographic Development (CDC) in Ouagadougou.

February 2013

In February, I started conducting interviews in a more formal manner. Gaston Eugène Hounhouenou acted as my research assistant who arranged interviews to take place based on the participant list of the ARPEM training sessions throughout 2010 and 2011. His help was crucial, as his connections in the sector greatly facilitated contacts. I attended concerts at the *Institut Français*, the *Goethe Institut*, and *Reemdoogo*, where I was also 'hanging around' to talk to musicians who were passing by. Finally, I organised a brief workshop on international music trade fairs at ARPIC. This was meant to ensure my active participation and visibility within the structure – and to share my insights on the subject matter. I attended many film screenings and concerts in the context of FESPACO between 23 February and 2 March.

March 2013

I continued my interviews throughout Ouagadougou. I attended a presentation on the progress on the Burkinabè development plan (SCADD, 2010) at the Ministry of Economic Affairs. I attended a visit of Belgian NGO/Donor Africalia at ARPIC. I organised an info session on microfinance with Zidisha country responsible Mien De Greave. I participated in a training session at ARPIC. And I attended concerts at *Reemdoogo* and the *Institut Français*.

April 2013

I continued my interviews throughout Ouagadougou. I participated in the assessment of business plans of ARPIC-supported entrepreneurs. I went to concerts throughout the city, including the concert by Floby at the SIAO. I went to Rome 7-15 April for a COST Action meeting and spent a few days in Istanbul on the way there. I arranged my journey to, visa for, and prepared my fieldwork in Ghana.

May 2013

I left for Accra by bus on 8 May – and arrived 36 hours later. I started interviews shortly after arriving. John Owoo acted as my research assistant by arranging interviews. Selorm Yao Ani-Frimpong arranged for me to stay at his parental house in Ogbojo, a northern suburb of Accra. I went to concerts at the *Alliance Française* and +233.

June 2013

I continued interviews in Accra. I attended the *Odadao* ceremony in James Town, Accra on 6 June. This ceremony signals the end of a 6-week ban on drumming among the Ga people, ahead of the *Ga Homowo* Festival. I went to Coimbra and Lisbon 16-29 June for the Lisbon Consortium Summer School for the Study of Culture and European

Conference on African Studies at the Lisbon University Institute – which provided a way to share some initial reflections on fieldwork.

July 2013

I continued interviews in Accra. I travelled to Tamale in the north of Ghana for the New Ghana Music Festival on 12 July, where I was part of the jury that assessed the quality and potential of music bands from the region and took part in a roundtable on strategies for the music industries in the region. I travelled to Winneba, along the coast, for an interview. I visited the Goethe Institut in Cantonments, Accra, where I also attended a concert. I finalised and submitted article to *Cultural Trends* (now published as: De Beukelaer, 2014a, and used as a basis for Chapter 3 of this dissertation).

August 2013

On 5 August, I returned to Ouagadougou by bus – the trip only took 25 hours this time, where I continued conducting some final interviews. From 9-15 August I went to Niamey (Niger) – to interview people at APEIC. And, I attended a wedding of two friends on 24-25 August, where I was able experience music beyond the context of formal concerts.

September 2013

From 1-5 September, I travelled to Skopje COST Action meeting. Upon my return, I finalised interviews and prepared departure. On 22 September, after 8 months, I returned to Leeds.

My period of fieldwork yielded over 75 semi-structured interviews and several notebooks with observations that provide detailed insight in the strategic adoption and contestation of the creative economy discourse. The number of conducted interviews was perhaps too high, as my understanding reached a point of saturation well before finalising all interviews. I had however determined the number of interviewees a priori, as I aimed to talk to the entire population of training participants in Ouagadougou and Accra, and not merely a sample. Following Mason's (2010) observation that PhD interview samples are often too large, I limited the number of interviews I have analysed is limited to 44, that is 21 in Accra (see Table A-1) and 22 in Ouagadougou (see Table A-2) and one International (see Table A-3). After an initial analysis, but prior to starting the thematic coding, I have selected this sample based on participant occupation, to allow for a diversity of voices throughout the analysis. I have also left out several interviews that provided similar but less detailed information than other interviews.

The reason that I continued conducting interviews beyond the point of saturation was both practical and strategic. On a practical level, this allowed me to further explore the contexts in which music workers operate, as I would interview them where they work. This allowed for participation in festivals, rehearsals, studio visits, debates, training sessions, formal meetings, and most of all, informal encounters. On a more strategic level, several interviews were necessary to ensure that more senior stakeholders in the sector were both aware of my work and felt heard in the process. Even though my main aim was to engage with aspiring music workers who have received training and support as part of efforts to implement CCI support programmes, the more senior stakeholders I interviewed after saturation was reached helped providing a greater contextual understanding of the interviewees' claims and observations.

The main indicator of saturation related to the interviewees' perception of the influence of history on the current state of the CCIs. While their perceptions did not generally differ significantly, they contained ample nuance and minor differences at first. The point of saturation became very clear when interviewees' accounts of history (see chapters 6 and 7) did not add any further nuance or information. It was the point where I had heard the very same story over and over again. While this historical account is merely one elements of my focus and analysis, it provided a basis to both determine saturation and to help understand the position of the interviewee.

In accordance with University of Leeds Ethical Approval (Reference PVAR 11-087), my interviews and observations throughout the ethnographic work are anonymised, since they reflect critical evaluations of the initiatives in which interviewees participated. The anonymity allowed respondents to be more open and critical, without compromising their position in the sector or future participation in similar initiatives, which often help build symbolic capital, network opportunities, and economic advantages (both in *per diems* and business opportunities). While some interviewees explicitly stated that they would not mind being cited by name, I kept the entire analysis anonymous. This allows a greater focus on the roles and stances in the music industries, beyond the personal histories of the music workers.

1.5. Scope

Overall, this study thinks broadly and narrowly. The narrow focus is on the situation in Ouagadougou and Accra. The particularities of the capital cities of Burkina Faso and Ghana serve as examples to simultaneously build and illustrate the argument. Yet, I hope the questions I ask regarding the links between cultural industries and human development can be asked elsewhere too. While they will obviously yield different an-

swers around the world, they could help to understand and use the hegemonic creative economy discourse usefully, yet critically.

At times, examples from other African countries help illustrating the argument. This is because there is insufficient literature to build the argument exclusively on the particular cases of Burkina Faso and Ghana, and, similar tendencies can be identified across the continent. But this does not mean that this study is about 'Africa.' The focus on two African countries, which makes it by definition African, but these findings do not necessarily count for the rest of the continent; at least not any more than a study of Portugal and Spain would count for all of Europe.

A key trope that emerged from interviews is the perceived difference between Franco-phone and Anglophone countries across Africa. The recurring remarks that things are 'very different' across the linguistic divide is one of the reasons I opted to shift the focus from Niger to Ghana, alongside Burkina Faso. Even though I take the perceptions of my interviewees on this seriously, I do not accept them at face value. In chapter 7 I show that while there are some differences, the challenge is to engage in more substantial dialogue across linguistic realms (and thus across former colonial ties) to better explore known challenges and solutions.

Moreover, while Burkina Faso and Ghana are generally referred to as 'developing' countries, the focus here is not cultural industries in 'developing' countries. This has three main reasons. First, the division has become out-dated, if not useless; since 'developing' countries that do well are now called 'emerging,' 'developed' countries are in 'crisis,' and 'Africa' is 'rising.' Second, a simple dichotomy undermines the empirical approach that sees both Burkina Faso and Ghana as just two countries with particular policies and initiatives embedded in culturally contingent histories. And, third, such a division negates that all countries are in fact developing. Yet, the quest for fulfilling lives is nowhere near finished anywhere:

Development knowledge is increasingly relevant also in the north. The conventional distinction between developed and developing societies is less and less relevant – the 'south' is in the 'north' and vice versa. With the decline of welfare economies there is an increasing polarization of within countries on account of shrinking public services. Social inclusion is nowadays a problem that is common to north and south, east and west (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 4).

As such, two competing approaches must be rejected. On the one hand, developing countries are not special cases that deserve a different treatment. If only they were being treated more equally. On the other hand, there is also not a universal economic logic that will solve the issues at hand. The argument advanced here is that history matters, and so does culture. But the categorical divide of countries in two groups is not

useful, which is why I follow the UNDP classification that focuses on different 'levels' of Human Development, and not on a strict divide between two extremes. This is mainly because it might be easy to agree on the extremes of this polar spectrum – i.e. which countries are most or least developed? Though it is far more difficult to draw the line in the middle: When does a 'developing' country become 'developed'? What is the threshold? Moreover, it is sensible to argue that all countries should aspire to 'develop' and acknowledge that they are 'developing' (Neuwirth, 2013). That is why I use 'development' as process; in the way I use 'developing cultural industries.'

My dissertation reflects and asks questions about the globalized creative economy discourse; it aims to be a guideline to unpack the contradictions and challenges of this term in relation to thinking about culture and development. The message is reflexive and exploratory and is not intended to prescribe certain choices or actions. It is a work that links a number of large questions in the discourse and is necessarily driven by theories and conceptual debates. Yet it should not be a luxury to think and reflect on what is going on and what should be done. This does not mean that reflection and abstract engagement needs to be an esoteric activity (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 48), but rather that research is a human right that should be widely practiced (Appadurai, 2013). The aim here is to facilitate the process of making choices about what the cultural industries should be and what kind of development they are meant to foster.

1.6. Chapter Outline

In this brief introductory chapter, I have sketched the contours of the problem I address: How does the cultural and creative industries discourse influence the relation between culture and (human) development in Burkina Faso and Ghanaian Cultural Policies and Development Plans?

The remainder of this dissertation is organised in eight chapters and a conclusion.

Chapter 2 focuses on the conceptual basis of my dissertation. I ask if the shift in the use of 'culture' signals a break with, or a continuation of its relation to 'development.' The argument is that CCIs are more and less linked to development than is commonly asserted in the literature. This is because the equation of industry to development precedes the use of the latter as it became commonplace in the wake of post-colonialism after WWII. Yet, culture was connected to development even earlier, as both terms initially denoted processes of change and growth (in nature and society). At the same time, the cultural industries are not a straightforward continuation of the critical school of 'culture and development' thinking, because the latter has been more concerned with 'ways of life' than with 'creative expressions' (Clammer, 2012). While this chapter

is mostly a review of the literature, its originality lies in including the 'culture industry' and its transformations in the conceptual history of culture and development. It shows that 'cultural development' is not the same as 'culture for development.'

Chapter 3 asks if there is an evidence base for the link between CCIs and human development that exists in policy texts. I argue that these data as a basis for evidence-based policy-making are limited at best; they rather serve policy-based evidence-making, a process Belfiore and Bennett (2010 p. 136) argue occurs when "evidence is produced to support and legitimize policies that would have been implemented anyway because of political will, irrespective of evidence." In the creative economy discourse this process occurs because, in UNCTAD data, the balance between 'developed' and 'developing' countries is skewed. As a result, the UNCTAD CERs incorrectly claim that the relative share of 'developing' countries is rising significantly (while the primary reason of that increase is China). Moreover, the data fail to provide conclusive evidence that the CCIs are driving economic development, which would be necessary, since historical evidence suggests that the opposite is the case. In closing, I provide an overview of the (scarcely) available data on the CCIs in Burkina Faso and Ghana as a frame of reference for the rest of the dissertation. The originality of this chapter lies in the critical reconfiguration of the UNCTAD classifications and in challenging the presumed causality of CCIs and (economic) development.

Chapter 4 asks how the shift from culture to CCIs has influenced the use and meaning of culture in cultural policies and development plans in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Is this shift a sign of policy convergence, or merely of narrowing aims? I argue that it is both. On the one hand, cultural policies aim to incorporate developmental goals more explicitly, while development plans integrate a focus on culture. This reflects a similar tendency elsewhere in the world, where CCIs policies are increasingly part of urban, regional, or economic policies, and cultural policy incorporates elements economic and social policy. The result of such convergence is the narrowing of the notion of culture, as policy focus is mostly on the areas where culture is most expedient (often in strict economic terms). The originality of this chapter derives from the way I provide insight in the particular use of the "global script" (Pinheiro and Hauge, 2014) in two countries that have, as of yet, received barely any attention in the CCI literature.

Chapter 5 engages with stakeholders in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian CCIs to explore how they understand and use the terminology. Throughout this chapter, I aim to understand if the adoption of this discourse since around 2005 has influenced the praxis and politics of the sector. I also explore to what extent it makes sense to speak of a neoliberal turn in cultural policy. The most common response of stakeholders in both countries is that the CCIs are 'emerging' or 'embryonic,' which signals a clear reluctance to

fully embrace the imported discourse to describe the existing practices. I argue that this conceals a discrepancy between what these stakeholders perceive as the orthodoxy of the discourse *and* the inadequacy of their own practices in the light of that discourse. This chapter forms the basis of a point I make throughout the dissertation, and theorise in Chapter 9: contrary to the perception of many stakeholders, there *are* in fact CCIs in Burkina Faso and Ghana. In order to deal with this, I argue that practice should inform discourse more than the other way around.

Chapter 6 addresses the struggle of artists, managers, producers, and event organisers to make money from music. Often, one and the same person does all these tasks. The guiding question is twofold. What strategies are used to generate income in informal economies, plagued by piracy and hampered by limited spending power? Is the CCI discourse helpful in providing avenues to increase income and on a personal level and on a social level? The strategy of most music workers is to focus on live events, which creates challenges that will be addressed in the next chapter. The CCI discourse *does* provide a better framework for the statute and status of people working in music. But that discourse also provides, what many stakeholders implicitly perceive as a, sturdy framework for solutions. Practically, this means that piracy is framed in a dualistic manner, where pirates are bad and law enforcement is good. But this orthodox approach overlooks that there are more fundamental problems with copyright, in the sense that it “does not work here” (Boateng, 2011), but also that there is in fact not a single or simple solution to digital piracy, especially in a context where legal sales of MP3s is strongly limited. The originality of this chapter lies in the empirical evidence I present, and my detailed engagement with the struggle of music workers to earn a living in Burkina Faso and Ghana.

Chapter 7 addresses three issues that emerge from the previous chapter. First, the increased reliance on live music for income creates greater demand for better concert venues. Second, the demand for venues and the need for investment fuel a debate concerning the balance between public funding and private investment. Third, most stakeholders think the grass is always greener elsewhere. I take their interest in practices elsewhere seriously, but argue that their perceptions largely build on incomplete (if not false) information. My argument that connects the above three issues is that history matters. The selective historiography that lies at the basis of several myths of success and failure distract both discourse and policy from engagement with past problems. Yet, it is precisely in being more aware about *why* things have changed and people have failed that the central challenges of the CCIs can be confronted. By this I mean that a reflexive understanding of history is needed that moves beyond selective popular memory, which reduces a complex range of events to a single event or person. In closing, I locate the contradictory politics of infrastructure in the music industries,

which oscillate between hope as despair in the popular discourse on 'Africa' as a continent caught between "Afro-pessimism" and "Afro-optimism" (Nothias, 2014). The originality of this chapter is that I debunk several popular myths, and provide a framework to move beyond the simplified narrative that plagues understanding of the music industries' past.

Chapter 8 reflects on the role and place of human development and capabilities in the policies and initiatives meant to strengthen the CCIs. In what way do they focus on capabilities? How can the link between capabilities and CCIs be strengthened? Building on the capabilities approaches of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum (their approaches do indeed differ), I explore to what extent the existing practices focus on non-economic elements. In doing so, I use the work of William Jackson (2005) who opens up the capabilities approach beyond the individual level by incorporating social and institutional capabilities. The originality of this chapter lies in the explicit link between CCIs and the human development and capabilities approach.

Chapter 9 opens up the empirical observations towards a more theoretical reflection of the place of the CCIs in (human) development thinking and practice. I ask whether the CCI discourse can be reconciled with the critical language of "culture and development" (Schech and Haggis, 2000; Radcliffe, 2006a). I propose to rethink the basis on which we include the CCIs in the "standard [development] concoction" (Apthorpe, 2005) in a way that reframes change as circular in stead of linear. This chapter highlights where it is and where it isn't possible to provide such a critical link between CCIs and human development. In closing, I reflect on the implications for policy.

In conclusion (Chapter 10), I argue that there is a risk that the creative economy discourse becomes a "single story," building on the literary critique of Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie (2009). She eloquently and convincingly warns against the risk of a single story when it comes to literature. Adichie does not mean that there would be literally one story, but rather that the adherence to a single, hegemonic narrative blinds people to rich diversity of viewpoints. I build on this critique to claim that policy discourse can also be a single story. In order to avoid this pitfall, we should pay greater attention to history, conceptual diversity and contestation, and the need for mutual learning based on mutual respect. This means three things. First, there have always been CCIs in some form or another, and those histories should drive policies more than a grand narrative. Second, the difference between cultural industries and culture is big, and this should be better reflected in policies in order to avoid confusion. Third, the creative economy discourse has empirically remained focused primarily the global north with little attention to the global south. Before we can really speak of a global discourse, it should be influenced by concepts and theories from around the globe, not simply illustrated.

2. Culture and Development: A History of Intertwined Concepts

Some concepts have long and troubled histories. Often, such histories are simplified to better make an argument. While doing so, much of the historical and spatial complexities and contradictions are lost in translation. In this chapter I make the case that both 'development' and 'culture' are such concepts and argue that their history extends well beyond existing introductions to cultural industries in relation to development.

The aim of this chapter is to show that the link between cultural industries and human development is not self-evident. This goes against popular claims in creative economy reports:

The "creative economy" is an evolving concept based on creative assets potentially generating economic growth and development. ... It can foster income generation, job creation and export earnings while promoting social inclusion, cultural diversity and human development. (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008 p. 4; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010 p. 1 emphasis added)

At a time when countries are striving to reach the Millennium Development Goals and the world is shaping a new post-2015 global development agenda, we must recognize the importance and power of the cultural and creative sectors as engines of sustainable human development. (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 11, in the foreword by UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova and UNDP Administrator Helen Clark)

The claims about the human development potential are more modest and better informed in the UNESCO special edition of the report in 2013 than in the UNCTAD editions in 2008 and 2010. Though there is little systematic engagement with what this presumed link means in theoretical and practical terms. Much like the link between culture and human development, the connection between culture and commerce in the creative industries approaches is often seen "not in any sort of historical tension or dynamic but ... happily joined" (Bell and Oakley, 2015 p. 33). In contrast, I show how the long historical links and contradictions between culture and development (which at times overlap with culture and commerce) result in the need for a thorough and careful engagement with these terms, particularly when used in conjunction.

The path dependency⁴ of thinking about culture and development should be more explicit, because of continuous historical shifts in the use of these terms transformed their meaning. Culture has been instrumentalised in development thinking in multiple ways throughout history (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 76). The creative economy discourse is not a break with this, but a clear continuation in the form of a strategic reconfiguration that builds on the existing discourse with a different meaning. This chapter stresses that a detailed historical understanding of culture and development forms the basis to understanding the current relationship between cultural industries and human development. The current meaning of development (i.e. socio-economic 'progress') has its origins in its use after WWII. Prior to this, the term had a different meaning and it was used in different contexts. I show that locating the link between culture and development in a broader historical perspective helps to understand how the place of the creative economy discourse. Hence the questions: how do the cultural industries fit in the historical link between culture and development, which dates back at least to the 18th century? What does the general uptake of the creative economy discourse mean for the continuity in thinking about culture and development?

It may seem contradictory that a call for a path-dependent understanding of culture and development in Burkina Faso and Ghana is located in the Western intellectual genealogy of these terms. Yet the aim of this chapter is to illustrate how the history of these concepts has influenced their contemporary understanding and illustrates the need for greater interaction between cultural policy studies and development studies.

2.1. The Long Histories of Development and Culture

The table below provides an overview of general tendencies discussed in this chapter. The aim is to illustrate historical changes and shifts rather than to highlight linkages. The chapter discusses in greater detail these linkages.

⁴ Path dependency refers to the complex influence of history on contemporary issues and debates without being deterministic about the way the past influences the future.

Table 2-1 - Culture and Development: A historical Overview of Uses

	CULTURE	DEVELOPMENT
18th Century	Civilization (Eurocentric Teleology)	Entwicklung (Moser)
19th Century	Romanticism	Evolutionism (Social Darwinism)
1850s	Culture as Racial Hierarchy	Colonial Economics (Trusteeship)
1890s-1930s		Catching Up (Classical Political Economy)
1940s	Culture Industry (Adorno and Horkheimer)	Development Thinking (Truman)
1950s		Modernization
1960s	Post-Colonial Nation-Building	Dependency (Neo-Marxism)
1970s	Industries Culturelles (Miège, Huet, Morin, etc.)	Alternative Development (Basic Needs Approach)
Early 1980s	Cultural Industries and Policies (UNESCO)	Structural Adjustment (Neoliberalism)
Late 1980s	Culture and Development (WCCD)	Human Development (Sen, UNDP) Sustainable Development (Brundlandt)
1990s	Creative Industries (Australia, UK)	Post-Development (Escobar, etc.)
2000s	Creative City, Economy, and Class (Landry, Howkins, Florida)	MDGs (United Nations)
2005	Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO Convention)	
2008-10	Creative Economy: International Trade (UNCTAD)	
2013	Creative Economy: Humanistic (UNESCO)	
2015	<i>Culture in Sustainable Development Goals?</i> (United Nations – post-2015 Development Agenda)	

Source: De Beukelaer (2015 p. 39) the section on ‘development’ partly builds on Nederveen Pieterse (2010).

2.2. Industrialisation, Enlightenment, and Romanticism

Gustavo Esteva, alongside other critical development scholars, argues that development generally means the unfolding of the inherent potential of a thing or an organism towards its full form. This goes through three stages: an insufficient initial state, a state where the actual development takes place, and the final stage where development is attained, and the object has become developed. In the 18th century, this term was mostly used to refer to biological processes. Yet, throughout the late 18th and early 19th centuries, this term transformed in meaning continuously. In the work of social historian Justus Moser, *Entwicklung* (German for 'development') referred to processes of social change. Johann Gottlieb Herder advanced this thinking later that century by providing a link between historical changes and theories of nature: "Historical development was the continuation of natural development, according to him; and both were just variants of the homogeneous development of the cosmos, created by God" (Esteva, 2010 p. 4).

Development gained a more reflexive use around 1800. Over the course of several centuries, the pre-eminence of religion faded in philosophical and practical thought. This, in turn, created the philosophical possibility for human self-determination. Development was the term that was used to stress that change is the result of human intervention, which replaced a religious understanding of the world. This approach culminated in the work of Karl Marx, who bridged the "Hegelian concept of history and the Darwinist concept of evolution" (Esteva, 2010 p. 4). The term soon became commonplace in political thinking, and "the industrial mode of production [...] became the definition of the terminal stage of a uni-linear way of social evolution" (Esteva, 2010 p. 4). Industrialization and development have thus been intertwined from the early history of the concept development onwards, particularly since development was meant as a reaction, or solution, to the ills of industrialization. In the 19th century, the term can be equated with the idea of progress and catching up (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 7). This resulted in a conceptualization of time as progress, of progress as linear change, and of linear change as the way towards modernity (see e.g. Dussel, 1993; Quijano, 2007).

This meaning transformed further under the full colonial expansion at the turn of the 20th century. Yet, only "when the British government transformed its Law of Development of the Colonies into the Law of Development and Welfare of the Colonies in 1939" (Esteva, 2010 p. 5) did the magnitude of the shift during the 1920-30s interbellum become apparent. From this time onwards, the development of the territories should not only serve exports and trade, but also the general well-being of the 'natives'. The term, however, remained forward-looking and continued to echo the optimistic spirit of modernity, without the explicit negation (under-development) that would be-

come more common after WWII. It does, however, encompass a paternalistic tone that both claims cultural superiority and scientific domination over the colonized subjects. Not only colonial thinking, but also economic thinking had a lasting impact beyond independence: “industrialization was not a part of colonial economics, because the comparative advantage of the colonies was held to be the export of raw materials for the industries in metropolitan countries” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 6). Development provided a frame of thought and action in response to the social ills that resulted from industrialization and was thus rather uncritically transferred to colonial (and later post-colonial) contexts. The social ills under colonialism, however, lay not in rapid industrialization and the concomitant social transformation, but in exploitation, slavery, racism, and the naive arrogance enshrined in the “white man’s burden” (Easterly, 2006).⁵

The use of the term ‘culture’ dates back much further than the term ‘development’; it has been described as “one of the two or three most difficult words in the English language” by Raymond Williams (1976 p. 87). This is both because of its historical transformation across European languages and its multiple meanings in a variety of ways and contexts today. In Williams’ account, culture primarily referred to cultivation or tending, as described in the works of Cicero. Later, it referred to honour and worship in medieval times. By the early 15th century, the term had come to mean “husbandry, the tending of natural growth” (1976 p. 87). Throughout its early uses, culture referred to processes of looking after animals or crops. This gradually “extended to a process of human development” (1976 p. 87) alongside earlier uses. In the early 17th century, culture found its use as a metaphor for growth in thoughts and minds through the works of More, Hobbes, and Bacon. The transformation of the term into an independent noun did not gain importance until the late 18th and early 19th century. The French use of the term remained in conjunction with the cultivation of something until the 18th century, when the term started to be used more or less interchangeably with civilization.

In the 18th century this period *Kultur* made its way into the German language (Williams, 1976 pp. 88–89), and “became the name of the Romantic, pre-Marxist critique of early industrial capitalism” (Eagleton, 2000 p. 10). Herder, moreover, “attacked the assumption of the universal histories that ‘civilization’ or ‘culture’ – the historical self-development of humanity – was what we would now call a uni-linear process, leading to the high and dominant point on 18th century European culture” (Williams, 1976 p. 89). In contrast to this evolution, Herder called for the use of culture in the plural: na-

⁵ The ‘White Man’s Burden’ refers to a poem with that name by Rudyard Kipling from 1899, in which he discusses the burden of the White colonizer or imperialist to ‘help’ poor and colored colonized. While this aphorism was key to the late 19th century Zeitgeist, it is now seen as an illustration of the arrogance and ignorance enshrined in racial hierarchy.

tional cultures, historical cultures, and cultures of different social groups. This Romantic pluralism also served as a basis for a cultural hierarchy (Eagleton, 2000 p. 26), which European countries used to justify colonialism (Belfiore and Bennett, 2008 p. 193). Culture counted as the social equivalent of biological evolution; a determinist approach to (re)assert the alleged hierarchy of human races within colonialism and slave trade (Schech and Haggis, 2000 p. 18). The colonial enterprise thus built on the hierarchical view of different civilizations, which served as a means to justify rather than criticize their actions (see Herder). The use of demeaning terms like savages, barbarians, primitives, and so on, also derive from the same notion of culture as a civilization. Yet culture and 'racial' difference also fuelled intra-African animosity and conquest (Reid, 2009 p. 140). At the same time, culture was also tied into the "romantic anti-colonialist penchant for suppressed 'exotic' societies" (Eagleton, 2000 p. 12).

As much as culture can refer to the rich diversity of peoples around the world, the very same term has long been abused to perpetuate artificial inequality. In that regard, culture has much in common with the way the term 'development' evolved in the middle of the 20th century. That term too, semantically divided the world in two unequal halves: the rich and the poor; the developed and the under-developed.

A crucial transformation of the term culture remains. Williams (1976 p. 90) distinguishes three meanings of culture throughout the late 19th century and into the 20th century: first, the human process of "intellectual, spiritual, and artistic development"; second, a certain way of life or constellation of "a people, a period, a group, or humanity in general"; and third, the result of intellectual and artistic pursuits, in the form of creative arts like music, literature, poetry, sculpture, and so on (Williams, 1976 p. 90). This distinction will become increasingly important throughout the rest of this chapter. Particularly the contrast between the second and the third definitions are important: in development studies, culture usually means the former, while in cultural studies (and, by extension industries) it means the latter (De Beukelaer, 2012 p. 21). By that time, culture had also become more a "capacity for new forms of thought, feeling, and behaviour" than a "governmental strategy [aimed] at exacting popular obedience to a sovereign authority" (Bennett, 1992 p. 402).

Throughout Africa in the late 19th and early 20th century, the value of "the custom of the country" (not to say 'tradition') lost currency in favour of a future-oriented "modern cultural development" (Soyinka, 1985 p. 554). At the same time, the creation of endogenous cultural expressions suffered from the influx of goods from early colonial trade onwards (Soyinka, 1985 p. 540). The "variety and output of the arts had shrunk by 1935, due to competition from cheap manufactured imports and to a loss of buying power as well as a loss of status by the traditional elites" (Vansina, 1999 p. 586). This

influenced the (cultural) education in schools geared towards future civil servants. The early 20th century was also characterized by the imposition of metropolitan languages and Western cultural and societal standards, which strongly influenced the cultural outlook of 'assimilated' local elites: "the dilemma of the product of the colonial policy of cultural substitution [...] created a wrench in the creative personality of educated Africans" (Soyinka, 1985 p. 563). This resulted in a movement of resistance, *négritude*, largely led by Césaire, Senghor, and Damas, even though this was in fact more the result of interaction with Parisian 'salons' than with the discontentment of Africans who were not educated in the Western image (Soyinka, 1985 p. 564).

Development seen as industrialization was in fact a cultural evolution. It signalled the emergence of a *new* way of life that soon pervaded an ever-increasing realm of human life and society. Yet, culture was also synonymous with romantic longing for another kind of society in response to the disruptive forces of rapid industrialization and later, as a reaction to colonialism in post-colonial (African) states. From the perspective of culture, development as industrialization referred to merely one *way of life*, to which many (romanticized) alternatives were imaginable. The link between culture and development is thus neither straightforward nor uncontested. It is clear that seeing culture as the result of industrial processes is, up until the early 20th century, a contradiction in terms. Culture is not yet industrialized, but the Romantic contrast between culture and industry (or development) provides a fertile ground for pessimistic views such as those that Adorno and Horkheimer articulate later.

2.3. Modernity: Makeability and Popular Culture

The wide embracing of development as a guiding principle in global relations after WWII was meant as a discursive break from colonialism. The change was successful to the extent that the discourse changed very rapidly indeed. The inaugural speech of Harry S. Truman in 1949, serving his second term as president of the USA, was optimistic about the potential to transfer skills and knowledge in order to improve livelihoods around the world. This modernist thinking phrased problem, process, and solution in one magical word: development (Truman, 1949). Yet this story does not account for the fact that this discourse created a problem in many ways. Colonies became 'developing' countries, and its colonized populations 'underdeveloped' citizens in need of linear progress towards modernity using the Western image. Countries were not 'underdeveloped' before they needed to be 'developed'. This does not mean that there was no poverty; it means that the division is rather a political construct than a claim based on empirical data. Moreover, in 1949, Europe and Japan were still in recovering from WWII and malaria was still endemic in parts of the USA (Esteva et al., 2013 pp.

5–6). More strikingly, in that period, the USA was a segregated society, where the civil liberties and the social opportunities of African-Americans were actively neglected (Myrdal, 1944; in Schech and Haggis, 2000 pp. 9–10). The discourse thus mainly served to consolidate the alleged superiority of the former colonial powers and, in particular, the United States (itself a settler colony that had become an imperial power). If anything is to blame for shortcomings in 'the rest of the world,' it is the disruptive effect of colonialism, slavery, and racism that made some parts of the world 'developed'.

The idea that "all societies used to be poor" (Collier, 2007 p. 5) became, and remains, commonly accepted. The common historical assertion builds on a very narrow understanding of poverty and provides a strong teleological outlook on progress: economic growth is the solution. The strongest subtext of development thus became economic, in spite of anthropological contestation from authors such as Sahlins (1968) who argues that the so-called 'poor' and 'primitive' people are the "original affluent society". Economization of development thinking is not devoid of ideology. In light of the Cold War, there was a need to stress the possibility to attain the same wealth and comfort as the USA. In this context Hollywood served as a vehicle to spread the American dream as a global objective. Accounting systems standardised this economic focus that allowed for a universal indicator: gross domestic product. Simon Kuznets developed the indicator in the 1930s for the US Department of Commerce. And by the early 1950s, the accounting method was used across the world to measure development. This economic approach culminated in teleological and technocratic approaches to development, where several stages should be followed, if only to contain communism (Rostow, 1960).

The break Truman instigated was however primarily discursive. The world did not change overnight, even though the focus in education and administration rapidly shifted from colonial civil servants to 'development' practitioners, both from the newly independent nations around the world and for "missionaries, mercenaries, and misfits" (Stirrat, 2008) from (formerly) colonial powers. Moreover, people previously engaged in colonial administration often became teachers at 'development' programmes at universities established in the middle of the 20th century (Kothari, 2005 p. 57). Initially these departments grew out of institutes for colonial administration. While development thinking constitutes a continuation of colonial processes through people, institutions, and power relations, there was a shift towards a greater diversity of actors (Kothari, 2005 p. 63), and this diversity has only increased in the past decades. The study of development, as a scholarly endeavour, remains a field to which theories of other fields like sociology, political science, and particularly economics are applied, whereas the field rarely influences other social sciences in return. Development studies remains a field that does not have a very high status in the academic pecking order, given its en-

agement with the practical implications of the work done (Clammer, 2012 p. 4; Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 2). Parallel to the rise of development as an academic discipline, scholarly interest in and beyond post-colonial states in local affairs and languages increased steadily (Sow and Abdulaziz, 1999 p. 549).

Since the 1950s, “development implies intentional social change in accordance with societal objectives” (Hettne, 2008 p. 6). This understanding is no less ambiguous than it is crucial. It presumes that ‘developed’ nations hold the solution to ‘develop’ the ‘under-developed’ countries through technical cooperation. The normative implications of this understanding were initially not questioned, and its contestation remains beyond the mainstream. Yet, three major characteristics of early development thinking are no longer common: first, the “essentialism of the ‘Third World’ and its inhabitants as homogenous entities;” second, the unconditional belief in the concept of progress and the “*makeability* of society;” and third, “the importance of the (nation-)state as an analytical frame of reference” and as a central force to generate change (Schuurman, 2000 p. 8).

Similar to the change in thinking about “development” and the concomitant narrowing of the concept to an expedient and politicized notion, culture also took on another meaning in the second half of the 20th century. Building on the existing opposition between development-as-industrialization and culture as a romantic and elitist counter-narrative, Adorno and Horkheimer (2008) advanced a strong critique of the rise of ‘mass’ culture in society, by introducing the term ‘culture industry’ in 1947. This term, in the singular, served as a radical critique on the colonizing logic of capitalism that had rapidly influenced the practice and understanding of cultural production. In this context, culture was no longer the antipode to industrialization and development, or simply a divisive factor between the colonizer and the colonized. Culture also became increasingly subsumed into the industrializing logic it formerly set out to counter in response to the industrial revolution. At the level of cultural critique, this argument held up for several decades. The next section addresses the fundamental oversight of this critique.

In mid-20th century, Europe saw the rise of social-democratic cultural policies with Britain and France leading the way towards the elevation of the general public through engagement with high culture. These policies did not engage with the cultural industries as such, as they were explicitly devised to allow access to “high culture” by the masses that had previously been excluded, in social and economic terms, from the aesthetic accomplishments of their societies (Girard, 1982 pp. 24–25).

Culture was also used as a guiding element in the post-colonial nation building across former colonies (Vansina, 1999 pp. 600–605; Plageman, 2012 pp. 147–182). Leopold Senghor in Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana, and Sékou Touré in Guinea are clear examples of the way cultural expressions served as a way to bridge the multitude of

ethnic groups through a postcolonial national identity (Collins, 2009 p. 94). This often included an explicit appeal to a pan-African identity that linked cultural identity to political aims of African unity, thus serving as a “capacity to aspire” (Appadurai, 2013 pp. 179–195). There was significant state-sponsored patronage for the arts in some – but certainly not all – newly independent states. Orchestras played in nightclubs, bands toured locally and internationally with presidents, and virtually all branches of public service had their own bands.

Towards the end of this era, the work of early cultural studies scholars like Raymond Williams (1957) and Richard Hoggart (1957) addressed the need to take the cultural expressions of the working classes seriously by making links between culture and power more explicit. Yet, in most ‘developing countries’ (including Burkina Faso or Ghana), mass culture did not have the strictly negative connotation it had among the European cultural elites. While ‘academic’ artists, creating a form of African modern art in dialogue with European art theory remained closer to the elites, heads of state like Kwame Nkrumah primarily worked with artists from the newly urbanized ‘intermediary’ class (Collins, 2009 pp. 93–94) as a part of his nation-building efforts. The early cultural industries were thus taken seriously in terms of their symbolic value.

In economic terms, the cultural industries were generating income thanks to the high propensity of live music, with musicians playing numerous concerts in different bands (Plageman, 2012; Collins, 1996). Notwithstanding the relative success of the cultural industries in this era⁶ the term ‘cultural industries’ was not explicitly used. The ideological critique advanced by Adorno and Horkheimer has little to say about (post-) colonial contexts, and has seen little adoption beyond the West.⁷ But artists moved easily between the realms of ‘high’ (or ‘academic’) and ‘low’ popular culture in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Commoditized culture was primarily geared to local elites (in the case of ‘academic’ culture) and tourists (in the case of ‘airport’ art, i.e. mass-produced objects that should pass as ‘traditional’ arts for tourists, see Vansina [1999 pp. 587–92]), leaving little explicit attention to the socio-economic dynamics of cultural production for large local audiences.

Since cultural expressions were primarily conveyed through live performance (mainly music), state-owned media (radio and television), or other expensive supported activities (such as cinema) there was little incentive to engage with copyright legislation and

⁶ For example the success of Ghanaian highlife, Congolese rumba and Soukous, Nigerian Jùjú that travelled the continent (Vansina, 1999 p. 610; Stapleton and May, 1987 p. 3).

⁷ The recent book *The Postcolonial Cultural Industry* (Ponzanesi, 2014) is an overdue engagement with the links between postcolonial theory and the cultural industry.

regulation, all the more because recorded music was not easy to duplicate, and pirating records was not yet the cheap alternative it would become later on. Yet MUSIGA welcomed the adoption of the 1985 copyright law in Ghana, after their insistence that music be regarded as a business (Collins, 1992 pp. 260–261).

The link between culture and development in this era is complex and deeply intertwined with the changing geopolitical reality. Development serves as a versatile concept that both divides the world into developed and underdeveloped, and presents development itself as a way out of this opposition. This discourse is on the surface technocratic, as the solution to the underdevelopment of more than half of the world's population is framed as the transfer of knowledge, skills and practices from the developed world. This discourse also implicitly argued that developing countries should build on 'the dreams of others' as a way forward. The solution thus became coterminous with the export of ideas and practices of capitalist modernity. At the same time, in the West, there was increasing opposition to the extension of economic and rational logics in the realm of cultural production. This critical pessimism did not travel to post-colonial states, where culture, in state-sponsored and market forms, became part of the imagination of national unity and an independent future:

African societies, once again, are the masters of their own destinies, and they find the dreams and metaphors, the arts, which express their complex aspirations. The arts are new, because they mirror the new Africa (Vansina, 1999 p. 632). When culture was explicitly linked to the logic of thinking about development, the term was used as an abstract category and not artistic expression (Clammer, 2012; Arizpe, 2004).

In development thinking, the high-modernist notion of progress was prominent, the culture industry was used as a term to contest the application of that logic to the realm of culture. In the next section I show that this opposition was – although pervasive – largely misguided: both the linear understanding of development as progress, and the pessimistic understanding of culture as industry were at odds with the complex realities these concepts tried to help understand.

2.4. Development and Culture (Industry) in the Plural

Culture and development, as concepts, have continued to evolve. By the end of the 1970s, clear tendencies influenced both concepts in different ways. On the one hand, development became increasingly contested, leading to greater complexity in the understanding of the term and greater ideological struggles over the *kind* of development that should be aimed for. Culture, on the other hand, changed in meaning and importance at two disparate levels. In historical and social sciences, including development studies, a "cultural turn" emerged (Bonnell and Hunt, 1999), signalling the need to

engage more actively and critically with culture in academic pursuits. In cultural studies the pessimistic view of the culture industry that influenced scholarship for decades was debunked, yet its approach remains indebted to the Frankfurt School (Adorno, 1975). This section addresses the details of these evolutions, while addressing the ways they overlap.

In the late 1970s, development shifted from a near-exclusive focus on economic growth as a lever of poverty eradication to the Basic Needs Approach, which aims to alleviate the most basic needs of those most in need. At the same time, UNESCO started promoting the notion of endogenous development. This was built on a thorough critique of the initial technocratic understanding of development, which presupposed that solutions to societal issues could be transferred from one locale to another. The increasing understanding that culture is not a problem that has to be overcome in the face of modernity, but that it is a building block in all societies and for all people, became more or less accepted.

In the 1980s, explicit pro-poor, culturally considerate approaches quickly lost ground as the spirit of structural adjustment changed the donor-driven development agenda. This ideological shift was the increased conditionality of aid packages. Countries with balance-of-trade shortages would only qualify for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) if they would comply with their structural adjustment programs (SAPs). In practical terms, this meant the undoing of hard-fought accomplishments from previous decades (e.g. Federici et al., 2000). Public education, health, infrastructure, and state industries were dismantled or sold to private investors for a pittance. The logic behind this was that 'developing' countries were not considered as a special case; they just needed to get their markets in order and decrease government's share in the national economy. In Ghana, structural reform remained detached from the cultural vision of the country, thus failing to offer future narratives that resonated with the context in which they were applied (Hutchful, 2002 p. 235). Interestingly, the structural reforms in Ghana also prompted a revision of the school curricula, cutting arts and culture from state-sponsored primary and secondary school programs (see section 8.5 on education).

At the same time, the considerations advanced by the Club of Rome in the 1970s prompted concerted engagement with the increasing threat of environmental change. This culminated in the report *Our Common Future*, also known as the Brundlandt report, published by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED, 1987). The key term to emerge from that report and that continues to resonate today, is 'sustainability.' This term initially connoted a normative engagement with the natural environment and intergenerational justice. However, it has now largely become an

empty signifier that is used to denote economic sustainability or 'business as usual' (De Beukelaer and Freitas, 2015).

The 1980s are called the 'lost development decade' because of the negative impact of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) on the livelihoods of people. Yet, in spite of mainstream logic on structural reform that was concerned with the *method* of development, there were ample counter-currents that helped rethink the *aims* of development. The pragmatic focus on gross domestic product (GDP), an easily comprehensible number that went up when things go well and down when things go bad, is however increasingly contested. The ideological foundations lost universal appeal (Hicks and Streeten, 1979; Fioramonti, 2013), yet the linear idea of social and societal progress was hardly called into question. It is not until the 1990s that a major movement of resistance against the very notion of development surfaces. Post-development does exactly that: it questions the ways development has been engineered, it questions the aims of development and it questions the results of decades of development intervention on the lives of those who were to be 'developed' (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). In spite of good intentions, this approach was too strong on critique and too weak on policy engagement to provide a viable alternative.

Human development is arguably the most successful attempt to break the hegemony of economic growth as a guiding principle of development. This principle formed a critique within the mainstream paradigm of development, primarily making comments in the margins, rather than dismissing the project as a whole. The precise meaning of this approach to development is however obfuscated by the difference in its philosophical foundations and its practical application. The basis of this approach derives from the seminal work of Amartya Sen on famines (Sen, 1981). His argument is that during the Bengal food famine of 1943, the biggest issue was not food production, but entitlement. During this famine, food was exported, leaving the undernourished population with a food deficit. While this point does not easily apply to all conditions of famine (de Waal, 1990), a new approach to development thinking emerged from the work of Sen.

The human development and capabilities approach proposes that the solution to limited entitlement among disadvantaged people is to increase their real capabilities (or possibilities) in society. Only when people have the social, economic, and political means to make their choices can they lay claim on the human development they want. Since 1990, this approach also has a practical application: the Human Development Index (HDI), produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). The HDI is an indicator that can be used as an alternative to GDP rankings. It comprises three equally weighted categories: economy (in PPP per capita), education (in a combined measure of adult literacy and primary school enrolment) and health (in life expect-

tancy). As such, there is still a simplified proxy in use to express development, but this UNDP HDI provides a greater incentive to focus on policies that benefit health, school enrolment, and literacy alongside economic aims.

In 1993, UNESCO launched the World Commission on Culture and Development, reiterating their earlier commitment at Mondiacult to the role of culture in development processes (UNESCO, 1982c). This resulted in *Our Creative Diversity* (WCCD, 1996), the Stockholm conference (UNESCO, 1998a), and the World Culture Reports (UNESCO, 1998b; UNESCO, 2000) with the aim of gaining the same attention for culture as the Brundlandt report managed to generate for sustainability. The latter included were among the first documents to explicitly engage with the cultural industries in 'developing' countries.

The pluralism in thinking about development became both more ideological and less preoccupied with Cold War oppositions between capitalism and socialism. Yet, the paradigmatic debates between structural adjustment and basic needs, between human development and post-development, have not yet resolved the problem of development. The initial dualism between developed and developing countries made way for a more layered understanding, where some countries are 'emerging' and many developed countries are in 'crisis' while poverty rates and inequality are on the rise in the West (Therborn, 2013; Standing, 2011). In other words, while the duality of development thinking – which never made much sense – is almost abandoned, the plight of much of the world's population remains a challenge for 'development.'

From the late 1970s onwards, a cultural debate also unfolded. French cultural theorists were the first to challenge the Adornian critique on the perceived negative influence of the industrialization of culture (Miège, 1979; Girard, 1982; Miège, 1987). The realization grew that the 'culture industry' thesis was, in spite of its wide use in policy and academia (O'Connor, 2011 p. 27), too radically pessimistic to build on the empirical understanding of mass culture. The shift to cultural industries in the plural gave way to a more grounded engagement with the positive and negative effects of the spread of commercial culture (O'Connor, 2011 p. 26). The focus shifted from outright critique to critical engagement with the empirical challenges of commercial culture. In this context, "using the term 'cultural industries' signals not only an awareness of the problems of the industrialization of culture, but also a refusal to simplify assessment and explanation" (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 25). UNESCO followed suit and joined the changed belief that cultural industries provided a framework to consider the inherent contradictions of commercial cultural production (UNESCO, 1982a).

Culture and Development, as a school of thought in development studies, remained understood as a way of life at a (sub-national) local level (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p.

67), and cultural expressions remained on a second plane, if they were mentioned at all (Schech and Haggis, 2000). There was however, active and explicit engagement with cultural expressions. The 1972 World Heritage Convention was one of the first global cultural policies that explicitly engaged with the value of culture (UNESCO, 2005a). The Organisation of African Unity subsequently wrote their Charter for Cultural Renaissance (OAU, 1976). The debate shifted to a global level with the Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policy (UNESCO, 1982c). Early engagement with cultural industries (in the plural) fuelled debate throughout Africa as well. This culminated in the Dakar Plan of Action (OAU and UNESCO, 1992), that focuses on the role of cultural industries for development in Africa. It remained more a *plan* than *action*. Throughout the decade spanning the publication of the two documents, several regional meetings were held throughout the continent: Conakry (1985), Harare (1988), Antananarivo (1989), and Nairobi (1990). The main aim of the plan is to provide a new framework for policy and action for culture in Africa. This is framed as a response to trade liberalization around the world, through which the “threat of dumping of hazardous foreign cultural expressions” (OAU and UNESCO, 1992 p. 9) had increased. The plan was part of a larger aim to create a single African economic community, through which intra-African trade would get preferential treatment. In addition, the need for a revision of high tax and relative public subsidy is illustrated. Finally, this document built on the momentum of the World Decade for Culture and Development (1988-97). In spite of the assessment of needs and the explicit plan for action, this document made little difference in reality.

In the period from the 1970s onwards, technocratic approaches were both advanced (under structural adjustments and neoliberalism) and questioned (in a post-development and basic needs approached). At the same time, culture became an important feature in the fringes of the development debate, but failed to make a real impact. In the 70s and 80s, the cultural industries became subject to greater empirical engagement in the West.

2.5. New Paradigms for a New Millennium

The beginning of the 21st century signalled a shift in development thinking. For the first time, a global development agenda was agreed upon by the UN system, providing a practical framework for policy and action across the world. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)⁸ consisted of 8 clear and quantifiable goals:

⁸ At the time of writing, the UN are negotiating the ‘post-2015’ development agenda, which will likely result in new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Cultural organizations like

1. Eradicate extreme hunger and poverty
2. Achieve universal primary education
3. Promote gender equality and empower women
4. Reduce child mortality
5. Improve maternal health
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases
7. Ensure environmental sustainability
8. Global partnership for development

The MDGs build on the human development paradigm, by focussing on increasing opportunities for people by combating the most abject limitations that have long strained education, health, gender relations and the environment. These aims are closely linked to the ten capabilities formulated by Martha Nussbaum (2011). Yet, the MDGs failed to take into account the role culture can play (as a way of life and otherwise) in attaining these goals. Only at a later stage was this omission rectified by the MDG achievement fund (MDG-F), which explicitly focused on culture (Baltà Portolés, 2013). Sadly, the MDG-F hardly makes up for the general lack of attention to culture in mainstream development thinking and organizations (Arizpe, 2004 p. 164).

In 2005, culture re-entered the development debate through the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005b). But the insertion of culture for development was little more than a strategic choice in the negotiations leading to the acceptance of this legally binding convention, that mainly served to provide a legal basis to keep the 'cultural exception' in international trade talks (De Beukelaer and Pyykkönen, 2015). Here, the interests of 'developing' countries comes second to the aim of France and Canada, who aim to uphold the exclusion of culture (that is, audio-visual production) from free trade negotiations at WTO level. In this way, these two countries aim to continue their protectionist measures for culture, against the contention of the USA that culture (i.e. entertainment) is just another group of products and services that should be part of free trade agreements at bi- or multi-lateral levels. While the convention is legally binding, it does not supersede trade agreements (Singh, 2011 p. 85).

In order to gain sufficient support from UNESCO member states for the adoption of the Convention, the link between cultural industries and development is included, and the provision is added to set up the International Fund for Cultural Diversity, to allow voluntary contributions of parties to the convention to fund practical and policy initiatives in 'developing' countries. The fund that is meant to support cultural industries remains under-funded with merely US\$6m disbursed by the end of 2013, and the benefits for 'developing' countries limited overall (De Beukelaer and Freitas, 2015 p. 211).

The influence on cultural policy discourse is substantial. It is primarily this document that has influenced the rise in policy interest in the cultural industries. The UNESCO Convention provides the impetus to balance existing policy objectives with existing contexts of commercially viable cultural production. It is, however, vital to understand that the policy context is historically far more complex than this: much like diminishing funding for culture in Europe, funds from (European) donors for artistic creation and cultural events has diminished due to budget cuts. This means that diminishing funds for development cooperation from European countries has an effect on public funds available for culture in 'developing' countries.

Parallel to UNESCO's influence on the discourse of culture, the African Union agreed on the Nairobi Plan of Action for Cultural Industries in Africa (African Union, 2005). This document built on the Dakar Plan of Action (OAU and UNESCO, 1992) that failed to generate necessary action. This is explicitly mentioned (African Union, 2005 p. 4), but also evident in the continued focus on a common market for the continent, piracy and the combination of high taxes and low subsidies. Moreover, the Nairobi Plan of Action makes no reference to any real advancement on these issues since the Dakar Plan of Action.

The influence of the 2005 UNESCO convention is eclipsed by the *Creative Economy Reports* from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010). These documents set out to provide an evidence basis for policy attention on cultural and creative industries (CCIs). The Reports have been successful at pointing out that the growth of the creative economy occurred at a rate higher than average economic growth, despite the recession that hit the global economy since 2008. They also provided an overview of economic exports worldwide in an attempt to promote trade diversification through the creative economy. While the share of 'developing' countries is exaggerated (see chapter 3), the global overview fuelled a renewed interest, which the UNESCO convention instigated even further. Yet, the impact of the creative economy was once again reduced to economic growth. While non-economic impacts are duly addressed, they remain solely measured through international trade, with economic growth serving as a proxy for human devel-

opment, undermining the basis of that approach. This illustrates that the UNDP was only formally involved in the Creative Economy Reports. The UN Special Unit for South-South Cooperation – which is technically part of UNDP – commissioned the reports, but did not actually contribute to the content.

The publication of a *special edition* of the creative economy report by UNESCO in 2013 signalled a break with the strong economic focus. This report pays greater attention to the intrinsic contradictions of the creative economy discourse, the human development elements and the diversity of practices within the creative economy. This underlined the (hitherto implicit) idea that it is impossible to speak of *the* cultural economy approach because understanding of and initiatives differ across and within countries. Moreover, the global focus of the UNCTAD Reports shifted to an explicit engagement with ‘developing’ countries. The UNESCO Report thus rephrased the argument that culture (and cultural policy) matters for development, which it had been promoting since the 1980s (UNESCO, 1982c; UNESCO, 1998a), in a way that incorporates and builds on the popularity of the creative economy *brand*. This leads to a creative and pragmatic conciliation of previously fragmented agendas: *Cultural Diversity*, following the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005b) and the Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (UNESCO, 2001); *Culture and Development*, building on the work of the World Commission on Culture and Development that published *Our Creative Diversity* under the presidency of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar (WCCD, 1996). Yet this greater alignment of approaches does not eradicate the difference between ‘culture and development’ and ‘creative economy’ discourse.

The shift in discourse is compelling, since the terms ‘cultural industries’, ‘creative industries’, ‘cultural economy’, and ‘creative economy’ are not synonymous. The policy debate implicitly frames the shift from *cultural* to *creative* industries as a continuation of the same idea. The transformation builds on political grounds as it was part of a change in cultural policy focus in Australia and Britain in the 1990s (Smith, 1998; DCMS, 1998). This ties in with an overall tendency towards neoliberal public policy, even though the particular changes in Britain cannot be solely explained by this shift (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2014 p. 7). The discursive shift from cultural to creative industries built on the possibility to include less ‘cultural’ sectors such as software development and design in the mapping of the sector in order to inflate its economic size and potential (Garnham, 2005). Only by doing so was it possible to hold up the claims about economic return (Tremblay, 2011) and increase the appeal of the sector to policymakers and politicians, as they are not that easily convinced by mere cultural virtue (Throsby, 2010 p. 196). The discourse further developed to the ‘creative economy’ (Howkins, 2002). While these evolutions built on convergence of policy recommenda-

tions and predictions about the future, much of the activity, not least that of Florida, Howkins and Landry strongly draws on their personal flair and direct engagement with cities (Gibson and Kong, 2005 pp. 551–552). It is crucial that, while linking cultural industries to development provides a reductionist vision on culture, expanding the scope of the cultural industries to the creative industries or the creative economy provides no intrinsic basis to connect cultural expressions to culture as a way of life. This contradiction is in no way exclusive to the ‘development’ debate, as similar discursive confusions exist in cultural policy (Lysgård, 2012).

Some countries engaged critically with the shift from cultural to creative industries. In China, the term of choice is ‘cultural creative industries’ (Wang, 2004; O’Connor and Gu, 2006), supposedly providing a basis to reconcile tradition and innovation within the same approach. In Latin America, the discourse was initially linked to the notion of hybridity (García Canclini, 1995), but has become more central to policy debates (Fonseca Reis, 2008b; Solanas, 2008; Piedras Fera, 2008) yet a tension remains between commercial and communal approaches to the concept (Delfin, 2014). In France, the shift from cultural to creative industries has long been ignored but is now increasingly part of the academic debate (Bouquillion, 2012; Bouquillion et al., 2013). Yet the connection of France to the UNESCO 2005 Convention provides an incentive to hold on to the *industries culturelles*, which impacts Francophone debates. The next chapter addresses the lack of a contextualized understanding of the discourse in Burkina Faso and Ghana. This is necessary, as few countries have paid attention to the way the terms (whether cultural or creative) relate to the past and present of cultural production. This is evident from the anecdotal engagement with non-Western cultural industries in the literature (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2008a; Flew, 2013; UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). Where reflexive engagement with the sector exists (Lobato, 2010; Larkin, 2004; Larkin, 2008), there is little focus on the conceptual shifts in the creative economy discourse.

To reiterate, I use ‘cultural industries’ as a guiding concept. Yet, when referring to the continuous spread and evolution of the globalized discourse, I use the term ‘creative economy discourse’. This has three intertwined reasons. First, the cultural industries have a more explicit connection with the symbolic meaning of cultural production and maintain a closer link to the contradictions surrounding cultural production (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a; O’Connor, 2011). Second, with the expansion of the sectorial scope of the cultural to the creative industries, the economic claims are inversely proportionate with the attention to arts expression (Oakley, 2009). Contrary to the idea that there is a cultural element in all industries (Mato, 2009), the focus here remains on a more narrow understanding, i.e. the cultural industries as “symbolic creativity” (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 7). Third, the prime interest here is how the relation tightens

between culture and development in the light of the changed language of cultural policy. The cultural industries form a better conceptual and historical grounding to this discourse, linking culture as artistic expression and as a way of life.

2.6. Conclusion: Cultural Industries or Culture for Human Development?

In contrast to the explicit attention to human development in the creative economy discourse, there is little attention to culture in the literature on human development and virtually no attention to cultural industries. Generally, the understanding of culture is much more in line with its 'anthropological' notion (Nussbaum and Glover, 1995; Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011). Yet it is necessary to develop an appreciation for cultural expressions that are linked to human development and capabilities in the broadest possible way, because the understandings of human development by Sen, Nussbaum, and the UNDP focus on are rather different in nature. Sen sees capabilities as a way to live as a citizen in a well-functioning society (1999). Nussbaum focuses more strongly on capabilities as elements individuals require for living "a life worthy of human dignity" (2011 p. 32). The UNDP, on the other hand, uses life expectancy and education as quantifiable proxies of the complex of capabilities (see chapter 8), in order to provide data for comparison and ranking (see UNDP, 2013, or any Human Development Report since the initial 1990 edition).

While the frictions between cultural livelihoods and development aspirations are central in the transcultural basis of the human development and capabilities approach (HDCA), the cultural expressions that may help mediate them remain largely absent. The only explicit engagement with cultural expression in the work of Sen builds on the following understandings:

- Culture as a constitutive part of development
- Economically remunerative cultural activities and objects
- Cultural factors influence economic behaviour
- Culture and political participation
- Social solidarity and association
- Cultural sites and recollection of past heritage
- Cultural influence on value formation and evolution (Sen, 2004b pp. 39–43)

In this list, the cultural industries are by and large what Sen refers to as "economically remunerative cultural activities and objects" (*ibid.*). Apart from heritage, which is often classified as one of the cultural industries, all further references to culture relate to 'ways of life' rather than cultural expressions, even if such a contrast can never be that

cleat-cut. As “the word culture, which is supposed to designate a kind of society, is in fact a normative way of imagining that society” (Eagleton, 2000 p. 25), often through artistic and cultural expressions.

Sen acknowledges that “the sun does not set on the empire of Coca-Cola or MTV” (Sen, 1999 p. 240), but he doesn’t explore the implications of these kingdoms on the ability of people to choose the kind of lives they “have reason to value” (Sen, 1992 p. 5). The mere fact that the logic of Coca-Cola (MTV no longer is what it was in the 1990s) pervaded virtually every corner of the world has – at least to some extent – compromised the ability of people to decide what they value. The process of preference formation that flows from modern distribution of economic power is the very opposite of the public discussion, argument and open communication that Sen considers consistent with enhanced capability. Even a highly rational citizenry, fully capable of assessing what it has reason to value, still depends on access to information in order to evaluate the range of choices available. One need not be pessimistic to realize the power of the various “empire[s] of Coca-Cola” (ibid.) to promote preferences and priorities different from those that arise from individuals autonomously deciding what they “have reason to value” (Sen, 1992 p. 5).

Sen’s engagement with the topic remains cursory and it receives little attention in the broader realm of human development studies. In spite of the ample reference to human development in the literature on cultural industries, there is little evidence of interest in the topic, let alone critical understanding, in human development literature. Some even argue that UNDP does not sufficiently consider the careful cultural understanding in the work of Sen and Nussbaum, and becomes ethnocentric in the process (Nederveen Pieterse, 2005; Telleria, 2015). The point here is that while the creative economy discourse should engage more actively (and critically) with the meaning of human development, also human development scholars should pay greater attention to cultural expressions and their role in contesting or embracing the politics of change.

The historical links between culture and development above are deliberately rather distant from the particular contexts of Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet this long history has clear implications for the ways cultural industries are inscribed in development thinking. If anything, this chapter has shown that promoting cultural industries is not necessarily the same as working with culture for development. The next chapter illustrates this contrast and highlights the possibility to critically reconcile these approaches.

3. The Numbers don't add up: Questioning the Divide between 'Developed' and 'Developing' Countries

The appeal of the creative economy discourse is significant. The following excerpt from an article in *The Economist* on the music industries in 'Africa' is telling:

A 2010 UN report claims that demand for music and other 'creative industry' products has remained stable during the global recession, and global exports of creative goods and services, e.g. music, more than doubled between 2002 and 2008. The report concluded that for developing countries, creative industries could prove to be "one of the most dynamic sectors of world commerce." (The Economist, 2011b)

This chapter aims to challenge this optimistic tone. Yet it will neither argue that there is no growth in this sector in developing countries, nor will it aim to undermine the efforts made to bank on cultural and creative potential throughout the world. The issues lie rather at the way UNCTAD measures the economic importance of the sector is measured and how this impacts the claims they make about the 'development' potential of the creative economy. In this chapter, I explore in detail how the current measurements are misleading at both a global level and when it comes to country-specific data in Burkina Faso and Ghana. The reason I include this quantitative chapter in an otherwise qualitative dissertation is precisely to show the lack of clarity in quantitative data. The limited insight the quantitative data offer also justifies my engagement with qualitative data and arguments, particularly when speaking of human development, which is about far more than the economy alone.

Hence, I claim that a closer look at UNCTAD data is needed to draw more balanced and context-dependent conclusions about the extent to which the discursive optimism holds true empirically. Some 'developing countries' (such as China) are doing well, yet some (Burkina Faso, for example) have less success. The differences between countries and those within regions serves as a basis to provide a more accurate and constructive reading on the (scarcely available) data on the cultural and creative industries worldwide. My analysis reveals that the classification of developed and developing countries presented in the Creative Economy Reports (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008; UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010) increases the absolute and relative shares of developing countries in the global creative economy. This obfuscates reality and obstructs the creation of evidence-based policies relevant to the creative industries. The core of this argument is built on a critical reinterpretation of the data presented in the Creative Econ-

omy Reports and the datasets available on the UNCTADstat website.⁹ I use the same data as those in the CERs, but draw different conclusions.¹⁰

The Creative Economy Reports aim to provide those working in, on, and for the creative sector with data to feed into well-informed policies. Moreover, they offer political arguments to pay greater attention to this cultural-cum-economic sector, and provide academics, consultants, and policymakers with data to build empirically informed (comparative) analyses from UNCTAD data sets. My analysis is facilitated through the online availability of these data through the UNCTADstat interface. It is thus no great surprise that many turn to UNCTAD and the CERs for information, data, and examples on the creative economy.

Many countries take the notion of the cultural or creative economy as a key element in their (sustainable) development strategies. Arterial Network, a pan African umbrella organization for the cultural sector has organised the annual African Creative Economy conference since 2011. The Lebanese capital Beirut has its own creative city strategy that banks on the cultural economy to revitalize parts of the urban area (Hill, 2008).¹¹ Burkina Faso (2010) explicitly ascribes the cultural industries a considerable role in its national development strategy.¹² The Secretariat of the Pacific Community recognises the CCI as an important economic sector (SPC, 2011). The Caribbean (CARICOM) countries takes up the cultural industries in their free trade agreements with the European Union (KEA, 2011). In South-East Asia, Indonesia set up a Ministry for Tourism and Creative Economy in 2011.¹³ China has been focusing on the cultural and creative industries since 2001 (e.g. Hui, 2006; O'Connor and Gu, 2012). And the group of ACP

⁹ <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/>

¹⁰ This chapter builds on data on international trade in the creative economy. The data used for this study are drawn from UNCTADstat, the UNCTAD online statistical database that comprises all raw data used to compile the statistical annexes of the CERs. This chapter thus advances the understanding of the global creative economy in exactly the same way as the CERs: by aggregating trade data by countries and groups of countries. I am thus unable to account for any possible inaccuracies or, more importantly, gaps in the raw data. Given the limitations of space, the scope is restricted to the *exports* of *creative goods*. As such, the available data on imports or net exports of creative goods is not discussed, nor the trade in creative services or overall growth rates in the creative economy. Reference to Human Development classification, as used by the UNDP refers to data available in the 2009 edition of the Human Development Report, which was published on 5 October 2009, leaving ample time to the editors of the 2010 CER to include the provided data. The OECD Development Aid Committee classification of aid recipient refers to the data available on 1 January 2009, for the same reasons as expressed above.

¹¹ See Krijnen and De Beukelaer (2015) for a discussion of the creative city concept in Beirut.

¹² See De Beukelaer (2013) for background information.

¹³ <http://www.budpar.go.id/asp/index.asp>

countries runs a support programme organized by their secretariat and funded through their structural cooperation with the European Commission Directorate General for Development Cooperation. It is unclear if these policies are taken seriously and move beyond mere discursive optimism about the potential of the sector.

3.1. Statistically boosting the impact of the Creative Economy

The pioneering interest of the UK in the creative economy is locally embedded, and is not easily transferred (Pratt, 2009), yet the ideas have been used widely. Though the creative economy discourse is not without critique. Some analyses point at the contradictory claims about its impact on economic growth. Tremblay (2011), for example, argues that the inclusion of some types of commodities (i.e. design) in the creative economy definition of the CERs unjustly increases the economic scope of the sector.¹⁴

Table 3-1 - Exports of Creative products by economic group, 2008 (in millions of US\$)

	<i>Worldwide</i>	<i>Developed Countries</i>	<i>Developing Countries</i>	<i>Countries in Transition</i>
Arts and Craft	32,323	11,443	20,715	164
Audiovisuals	811	726	75	10
Design	241,972	117,816	122,439	1,716
New Media	27,754	13,248	14,423	82
Performing Arts	26,136	22,539	3,323	274
Publishing	48,266	38,753	8,138	1,376
Visual Arts	29,730	22,578	7,097	56
All creative products	400,992	227,103	176,211	3,678

Source: UNCTAD (2010: 308-11)

Tremblay asserts that the creative characteristics of design exports in particular, that make up a significant share of the creative economy, are questionable (2011 pp. 293–294). His critique is primarily based on the fact that little (if any) distinction can be made between the creative production and mass-reproduction of so-called creative goods. What does it mean that a product is classified as part of “the cycle of creation, production and distribution” (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008 p. 226)? Upholding the term ‘creative industry’ for the entire design segment, including the mass production of design products, creates confusion, since no clear distinction can be made between the initial creation and mass (re)production of design-products (Tremblay, 2011 p. 294). Again, the inclusion of ‘design’ in the group of creative industries is problematic since the mass production of these commodities (hardly *creative labour*, one should admit)

¹⁴ An earlier and longer version of his article was published in French, under the title *Industries Culturelles, économie créative et société de l'information* (Tremblay, 2008).

counts towards the size of the economic sector, unjustly rendering it by far the biggest creative industry (Table 3-1).

It is clear from the observations above that caution should be exercised when looking into the data presented in the CERs. The remainder of this chapter is divided into two parts. First, I explore the problematic demarcation of developing/developed countries (section 3.2) and pay closer attention to the role of China in this context (section 3.3). Second, based on the particular context of Burkina Faso and Ghana (section 3.4), I question the logic that the CCIs drive development by looking into levels of spending power in both countries (section 3.5) and linking this to historical evidence regarding the relation between cultural industries and economic growth (section 3.6).

3.2. Developing or developed: illustrating the need for nuance

This section discusses the distinction between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ and contrasts datasets as presented in the CERs with OECD/DAC and UNDP classification systems. This forms the basis for a reinterpretation of data provided by the CERs and the way the balance of developed and developing countries changes when using OECD/DAC and UNDP classifications. In section 3.3, I repeat this exercise with China singled out. This is necessary because it the second biggest economy in the world and the single biggest exporter of creative goods (US\$97,753m) and yet is counted as a developing country.¹⁵

The statistical annex of the CERs shows that Japan and Israel are presented as the two sole ‘developed’ countries of Asia (UNCTAD 2010: p. 299). This implies that countries such as the Republic of Korea (GNI US\$19,650 in PPP, HDI rank 15),¹⁶ Singapore (US\$36,030, HDI rank 26), Hong Kong SAR (US\$31,410, HDI rank 13), Qatar (US\$69,750, HDI rank 37), and the UAE (US\$41,940, HDI rank 30) are classified as developing countries. Even though these countries rank higher than many countries that are presented as ‘developed’ in the CERs (e.g. Malta, Estonia, Hungary, and Po-

¹⁵ The USA comes second, with less than a third (US\$32,049m) of the exports of China in 2010.

¹⁶ The numbers given indicate the average income per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity) in 2009 according to the World Bank. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.CD/countries/1W?order=wbapi_data_value_2009%20wbapi_data_value&sort=desc&display=default

land).¹⁷ Prior to empirically illustrating the issue in detail, different key country classification systems are outlined.¹⁸

Table 3-2 below shows that, following UNCTAD CER classification, the balance between developed and developing countries is shifting on a global plan.

Table 3-2 - Creative Goods Exports, CER Classification, in US\$ millions

	Developed	Developing	Transition	Total
2002	123,169.04 62.13%	73,890.29 37.27%	1180.54 0.60%	198,239.88 100.00%
2003	135,503.36 59.98%	89,020.15 39.41%	1371.92 0.61%	225,895.43 100.00%
2004	152,618.74 58.33%	107,106.80 40.94%	1911.21 0.73%	261,636.75 100.00%
2005	164,907.86 56.80%	123,261.72 42.45%	2184.86 0.75%	290,354.44 100.00%
2006	179,295.94 56.68%	134,630.14 42.56%	2397.89 0.76%	316,323.97 100.00%
2007	211,036.88 57.03%	156,275.10 42.23%	2741.36 0.74%	370,053.34 100.00%
2008	227,170.99 55.57%	177,910.80 43.52%	3700.99 0.91%	408,782.77 100.00%
2009	184,801.17 52.70%	162,943.59 46.47%	2900.30 0.83%	350,645.06 100.00%
2010	196,142.11 51.18%	184,044.26 48.03%	3022.01 0.79%	383,208.38 100.00%

Source: UNCTADstat 2012

The Creative Economy Reports provide a classification of countries in three categories: developed (Table 3-3) and developing countries (Table 3-4), and economies in transition (Table 3-5). The explanatory note on the statistical annex of the 2010 CER covers only methodological issues in the measurement of the creative economy sectors. No indication is given on what particular basis countries are classified. It is clear however, that the classification follows the grouping presented by UNdata.

Table 3-3 - Developed Countries

Developed Countries

Northern America
Europe
Japan
Australia and New Zealand

Source: UNdata <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>

¹⁷ The observations made above are based on data provided through the classification list of developed/developing countries in the CERs in contrast to income-based data provided by the World Bank.

¹⁸ See Annex 1 for a full overview of all countries and their CER/OECD-DAC/UNDP classification. Same countries have insufficient data to calculate their HDI rank, and are thus marked as "NO DATA."

Table 3-4 - Developing Countries

Developing Countries

Africa
Americas excluding Northern America (numerical code 021)
Caribbean
Central America
South America
Asia excluding Japan
Oceania excluding Australia and New Zealand (numerical code 053)

Source: UNdata <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>

Table 3-5 - Countries in Transition

Countries in Transition

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)

Armenia
Azerbaijan
Belarus
Kazakhstan
Kyrgyzstan
Republic of Moldova
Russian Federation
Tajikistan
Turkmenistan
Ukraine
Uzbekistan

Transition countries of South-Eastern Europe

Albania
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Croatia
Montenegro
Serbia
The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

Source: UNdata <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm>

UNdata articulates the lack of a clear rationale for this classification as follows:

There is no established convention for the designation of 'developed' and 'developing' countries or areas in the United Nations system. In common practice, Japan in Asia, Canada and the United States in northern America, Australia and New Zealand in Oceania, and Europe are considered 'developed' regions or areas. In international trade statistics, the Southern African Customs Union is also treated as a developed region and Israel as a developed country; countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia are treated as developing countries; and countries of eastern Europe and of the

Commonwealth of Independent States (code 172) in Europe are not included under either developed or developing regions. (UNdata, 2013)¹⁹

Table 3-2 shows how developed countries saw their relative share in global creative goods exports decrease by 10.95 percentage points over the period between 2002 and 2010. Over the same period the relative share of developing countries increased with 10.76 percentage points and economies in transition increased with 0.19 percentage points. While the successes of many developing countries and regions are stressed, it is asserted that much is yet to be done to harness the full potential (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010 p. 257). It would, as a result, seem sensible to argue that developing countries have relatively gained most of the growing global creative economy over the past decade. Yet, the need remains to disaggregate and show which countries account for this change. I do this based on OECD and UNDP country classification systems that provide a range of groups beyond the simple division between 'developed' and 'developing' countries that UNdata upholds.

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Aid Committee (DAC) defines developed countries as those who do not receive any development aid from any of the OECD countries. The OECD/DAC closely monitors the amount of development funds countries receive, and how much OECD countries spend on international cooperation. The calculation of these amounts is highly complex, for the flows of Official Development Assistance (ODA) comprise technical cooperation, development food aid, humanitarian aid, debt forgiveness, administrative costs, contributions to multilateral institutions, and bilateral loans (de Haan, 2009 p. 24).

All OECD member states (including the Republic of Korea, listed as a developing country in the CERs) spend a share of their GDP on international development assis-

¹⁹ UNCTAD maintains the classification for *international trade statistics* yet refers to countries that are part of the Southern African Customs Union as *developing* and classifies countries emerging from the former Yugoslavia as 'economies in transition,' alongside Commonwealth of Independent States and Albania (while Slovenia, also former Yugoslavia, is classified as a 'developed' country). Moreover, the classification of countries of eastern Europe in the CERs is to a large extent at odds with what is presented by UNdata, where the above countries are argued to be neither developed nor developing (and thus presumably 'in transition' even though this is not clearly defined). Yet the following countries of 'eastern Europe' (UNdata, 2013): Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, are classified as 'developed,' while only Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation, and Ukraine are seen as 'in transition' (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010 p. 299). NB: no single EU country is 'developing' or 'in transition,' whereas the rest of the Central and South-East European region is in either one of these categories.

tance.²⁰ Countries receiving ODA are listed according to income categories, ranging from the relatively well-off Upper Middle-Income Countries, via Lower Middle-Income Countries, Other Low-Income Countries, to Least Developed Countries. All countries listed as receiving ODA will thus be regarded as “developing” countries.

Table 3-6 shows how developed countries saw their relative share in creative goods exports decrease by 13.75 percentage points, from 76.46% to 62.71% over the last decade. Developing countries, in contrast saw an increase in their relative share from 23.54% to 37.29% between 2002 and 2010. These numbers significantly differ from the relative (and absolute) shares quoted in the CERs in Table 3-2. The biggest share and ditto increase is found in the group of Lower Middle Income Countries (which comprises China).

Table 3-6 - Creative Goods Exports, OECD/DAC Classification, in US\$ millions

	No aid	UMIC	LMIC	OLIC	LDC	Total
2002	151,564.74 76.46%	9769.74 4.93%	36,367.24 18.35%	11.02 0.01%	85.30 0.04%	198,239.88 100.00%
2003	165,718.49 73.36%	10,184.34 4.51%	48,079.70 21.28%	1091.60 0.48%	174.92 0.08%	225,895.43 100.00%
2004	188,217.46 71.94%	12,180.48 4.66%	57,895.89 22.13%	2463.96 0.94%	207.19 0.08%	261,636.75 100.00%
2005	203,243.12 70.00%	13,411.18 4.62%	69,540.78 23.95%	3175.70 1.09%	271.37 0.09%	290,354.44 100.00%
2006	217,398.90 68.73%	14,698.28 4.65%	79,280.14 25.06%	3815.88 1.21%	302.86 0.10%	316,323.97 100.00%
2007	257,073.73 69.47%	16,909.52 4.57%	90,638.31 24.49%	4223.24 1.14%	353.64 0.10%	370,053.34 100.00%
2008	279,388.38 68.35%	18,858.69 4.61%	104,372.14 25.53%	4844.03 1.18%	371.55 0.09%	408,782.77 100.00%
2009	226,477.28 64.59%	15,729.53 3865.04%	102,228.27 29.15%	5111.01 1.46%	406.97 0.12%	350,645.06 100.00%
2010	240,320.29 62.71%	17,372.71 4.53%	122,842.42 32.06%	1503.28 0.39%	415.24 0.11%	383,208.38 100.00%

Source: UNCTADstat 2012, aggregated by the author

When looking at development issues beyond mere economic indicators and measures, the United Nations Development Programme’s (UNDP) Human Development Index (HDI) provides detailed data. These indicators form the basis of the Human Development Reports (HDR), published yearly since 1990. The HDI is a composite index, comprising income (in PPP), life expectancy, and education (aggregating literacy and primary school enrolment rates). (See section 2.6 for more details on Human Development.)

²⁰ For full official data see <http://www.oecd.org/statistics/>, and for OECD/DAC details for 2010 see: <http://www.oecd.org/dac/aidstatistics/47452876.xls>.

When classifying countries according to HDI data (Table 3-7), the relative share of developed countries in the global creative economy drop by 14.66 percentage points between 2002 and 2010, from 75.47% to 60.81%. The aggregate of countries with High (+0.02 percentage points), Medium (+13.16 percentage points), and Low (+0.02 percentage points) Human Development increased with 13.20 percentage points in the same period.

Table 3-7 - Creative Goods Exports, UNDP Classification, in US\$ millions

	VH	H	M	L	No data	Total
2002	149,618.83 75.47%	11,508.75 5.81%	36,133.92 18.23%	10.55 0.01%	882.06 0.44%	198,239.88 100.00%
2003	163,496.23 72.38%	13,194.73 5.84%	46,934.72 20.78%	22.50 0.01%	1006.36 0.45%	225,895.43 100.00%
2004	182,434.70 69.73%	15,643.58 5.98%	58,067.59 22.19%	27.68 0.01%	4234.94 1.62%	261,636.75 100.00%
2005	197,678.65 68.08%	17,039.80 5.87%	69,830.94 24.05%	40.57 0.01%	4039.77 1.39%	290,354.44 100.00%
2006	211,251.92 66.78%	18,980.49 6.00%	79,775.83 25.22%	30.38 0.01%	4297.45 1.36%	316,323.97 100.00%
2007	250,455.25 67.68%	20,792.67 5.62%	92,105.13 24.89%	82.62 0.02%	4601.58 1.24%	370,053.34 100.00%
2008	272,590.90 66.68%	23,626.93 5.78%	105,883.04 25.90%	233.88 0.06%	4638.50 1.13%	408,782.77 100.00%
2009	219,686.70 62.65%	19,479.47 5.56%	104,594.67 29.83%	124.91 0.04%	5156.65 1.47%	350,645.06 100.00%
2010	233,042.86 60.81%	22,357.90 5.83%	120,289.07 31.39%	120.02 0.03%	5653.10 1.48%	383,208.38 100.00%

Source: UNCTADstat 2012, aggregated by the author

The UNDP HDI allows for a less rigid interpretation of the performance of countries, as there is no absolute divide between developed and developing countries. The grouping is much rather organized on a scale ranging from Very High (VH) over High (H) and Medium (M) to Low (L) Human Development. Yet, in order to make a comparison with the CERs a division is necessary. I propose two ways to do this. In the first – rather conservative – case, only countries with Very High levels of Human Development are seen as ‘developed.’ In the second – and perhaps more contentious – case, also those countries with High levels of Human Development are seen as ‘developed.’ The group of countries with High levels of Human Development include Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Uruguay, just to name a few. Even when taking a more conservative approach, the share of developed countries differs significantly: 75.47% (HDI) versus 62.13% (CER) in 2002 and 60.81% (HDI) versus 51.18% (CER) in 2010.

This section highlighted how the relative and absolute shares of developed and developing countries fluctuate depending on the definition, demarcation and classification used. It is clear that the classifications of the OECD/DAC and the UNDP provide a far different reading of the share of developing countries in the global exports of creative

goods. Even when turning to a more nuanced demarcation, one category of ‘developing’ countries however sees a phenomenal rise in absolute and relative numbers: the Lower Middle-Income (OECD/DAC) or Medium Human Development (UNDP) group. The following subsection will clarify why precisely this group saw such an increase.

3.3. The Rise of the South: China and Beyond

Throughout the entire period for which creative product export data are available from UNCTADstat, China has been the single biggest exporter. Moreover, during the period from 2002 and 2010, the relative share of China in the exports of creative goods increased with 9.20 percentage points from 16.31% to 25.51%. This increase amounts to the majority of the relative increase of the share of the developing countries following the CER classification as shown in Table 3-9. The remaining lot of developing countries increased their relative share only by 1.53 percentage points. The combined share of developed countries and China falls to 76.69% in 2010, down from 78.44% in 2002, indicating that China alone compensates for almost the entire loss of the relative share of developed countries’ exports of creative goods. While the presence and importance of other ‘power blocs’ will be scrutinized in the following section, this section points at the magnitude of the share China takes in the global trade in creative goods.

Table 3-8 - Creative Goods Exports, CER Classification, China singled out. In US\$ millions

	Developed	Developing-C	China	Transition	Total
2002	123,169.04 62.13%	41,567.15 20.97%	32,323.14 16.31%	1180.54 0.60%	198,239.88 100.00%
2003	135,503.36 59.98%	50,470.46 22.34%	38,549.69 17.07%	1371.92 0.61%	225,895.43 100.00%
2004	152,618.74 58.33%	61,495.11 23.50%	45,611.69 17.43%	1911.21 0.73%	261,636.75 100.00%
2005	164,907.86 56.80%	67,752.15 23.33%	55,509.57 19.12%	2184.86 0.75%	290,354.44 100.00%
2006	179,295.94 56.68%	71,915.15 22.73%	62,714.99 19.83%	2397.89 0.76%	316,323.97 100.00%
2007	211,036.88 57.03%	83,276.13 22.50%	72,998.97 19.73%	2741.36 0.74%	370,053.34 100.00%
2008	227,170.99 55.57%	93,104.16 22.78%	84,806.64 20.75%	3700.99 0.91%	408,782.77 100.00%
2009	184,801.17 52.70%	87,203.55 24.87%	75,740.04 21.60%	2900.30 0.83%	350,645.06 100.00%
2010	196,142.11 51.18%	86,209.38 22.50%	97,753.88 25.51%	3022.01 0.79%	383,208.38 100.00%

Source: UNCTADstat 2012, aggregated by the author

When further disaggregating the group of developing countries following the OECD/DAC and UNDP classifications presented above, the huge stake of China in the

group of developing countries becomes even more apparent. From Table 3-9, it is clear that developing countries increased a mere 4.49 percentage points from 6.98% in 2002 to 11.47%. This starkly contrasts with the 9.20 percentage points increase of China alone in the same period, as outlined above. Also here, China compensates for most of the losses in the share of developed countries.

Table 3-9 - Creative Goods Exports, China Singled out, OECD/DAC Classification, in US\$ millions

	No aid	UMIC	China	LMIC-C	OLIC	LDC	Total
2002	151,564.74 76.46%	9769.74 4.93%	32,323.14 16.31%	4044.11 2.04%	11.02 0.01%	85.30 0.04%	198,239.90 100.00%
2003	165,718.49 73.36%	10,184.34 4.51%	38,549.69 17.07%	9530.01 4.22%	1091.60 0.48%	174.92 0.08%	225,895.40 100.00%
2004	188,217.46 71.94%	12,180.48 4.66%	45,611.69 17.43%	12,284.20 4.70%	2463.96 0.94%	207.19 0.08%	261,636.80 100.00%
2005	203,243.12 70.00%	13,411.18 4.62%	55,509.57 19.12%	14,031.21 4.83%	3175.70 1.09%	271.37 0.09%	290,354.40 100.00%
2006	217,398.90 68.73%	14,698.28 4.65%	62,714.99 19.83%	16,565.15 5.24%	3815.88 1.21%	302.86 0.10%	316,324.00 100.00%
2007	257,073.73 69.47%	16,909.52 4.57%	72,998.97 19.73%	17,639.34 4.77%	4223.24 1.14%	353.64 0.10%	370,053.30 100.00%
2008	279,388.38 68.35%	18,858.69 4.61%	84,806.64 20.75%	19,565.50 4.79%	4844.03 1.18%	371.55 0.09%	408,782.80 100.00%
2009	226,477.28 64.59%	15,729.53 4.49%	75,740.04 21.60%	26,488.23 7.55%	5111.01 1.46%	406.97 0.12%	350,645.10 100.00%
2010	240,320.29 62.71%	17,372.71 4.53%	97,753.88 25.51%	25,088.54 6.55%	1503.28 0.39%	415.24 0.11%	383,208.40 100.00%

Source: UNCTADstat 2012, aggregated by the author

When using the OECD/DAC classification the tendency is similar to the one in Table 3-10, following the UNDP classification below. Following this classification, the relative share of developing countries increased even less, with merely 4.00 percentage points from 7.74% to 11.74% between 2002 and 2010.

Focusing in China as a powerful exception has become common, and not without reason as illustrated above. There are however other countries and groups of countries that have attracted much attention given their impressive and at times unexpected progress in recent years. The 2013 UNDP Human Development Report focuses on *The Rise of the South* and indicates that:

Over the past decades, countries across the world have been converging towards higher levels of human development, as shown by the Human Development Index. All groups and regions have seen notable improvement in all HDI components, with faster progress in low and medium HDI countries. ... Although most developing countries have done well, a large number of countries have done particularly well—in what can be called the ‘rise of the South.’ Some of the largest countries have made rapid advances, notably Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, South Africa and Turkey. But there has

also been substantial progress in smaller economies, such as Bangladesh, Chile, Ghana, Mauritius, Rwanda and Tunisia. (UNDP, 2013 p. 1)

Table 3-10 - Creative Goods Exports, China singled out, UNDP Classification, in US\$ millions

	VH	H	China	M-C	L	No data	Total
2002	149,618.83 75.47%	11,508.75 5.81%	32,323.14 16.31%	3810.79 1.92%	10.55 0.01%	882.06 0.44%	198,239.90 100.00%
2003	163,496.23 72.38%	13,194.73 5.84%	38,549.69 17.07%	8385.03 3.71%	22.50 0.01%	1006.36 0.45%	225,895.40 100.00%
2004	182,434.70 69.73%	15,643.58 5.98%	45,611.69 17.43%	12,455.90 4.76%	27.68 0.01%	4234.94 1.62%	261,636.80 100.00%
2005	197,678.65 68.08%	17,039.80 5.87%	55,509.57 19.12%	14,321.37 4.93%	40.57 0.01%	4039.77 1.39%	290,354.40 100.00%
2006	211,251.92 66.78%	18,980.49 6.00%	62,714.99 19.83%	17,060.84 5.39%	30.38 0.01%	4297.45 1.36%	316,324.00 100.00%
2007	250,455.25 67.68%	20,792.67 5.62%	72,998.97 19.73%	19,106.16 5.16%	82.62 0.02%	4601.58 1.24%	370,053.30 100.00%
2008	272,590.90 66.68%	23,626.93 5.78%	84,806.64 20.75%	21,076.40 5.16%	233.88 0.06%	4638.50 1.13%	408,782.80 100.00%
2009	219,686.70 62.65%	19,479.47 5.56%	75,740.04 21.60%	28,854.63 8.23%	124.91 0.04%	5156.65 1.47%	350,645.10 100.00%
2010	233,042.86 60.81%	22,357.90 5.83%	97,753.88 25.51%	22,535.19 5.88%	120.02 0.03%	5653.10 1.48%	383,208.40 100.00%

Source: UNCTADstat 2012, aggregated by the author

In this section, I illustrate the rise of these countries. The growth of the creative exports of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) has been steady. Most remarkably is that they did not see a significant decrease of exports during the global financial turmoil that started in 2008-9. This contrasts sharply with the overall drop in creative goods exports in that period. Particularly the G8 and the European Union have seen considerable export losses, with slow recovery since the onset of the 'crisis.'

Table 3-11 illustrates that while also China saw exports drop in 2009, notably India generated positive growth during and after the crisis (with an increase of almost 100% in a year). But also the G77 have shown to be rather resilient throughout this period. Unsurprisingly, these regions have rapidly growing middle classes (UNDP 2013: 14) that consume and produce goods and services in the creative economy. The group of 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs), in contrast, only accounts for 0.12% (US\$416.36m) of the global creative goods exports in 2010, up from 0.04% (US\$86.30m) in 2002 and kept on growing steadily throughout the 'crisis.'

Table 3-11 - Country Groups

Regions	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
G8	83,892.10	90,376.56	101,774.59	112,553.26	122,626.40	144,313.32	152,715.26	124,280.46	131,818.42
G20	127,416.84	145,559.67	167,470.75	189,775.76	209,161.98	243,353.22	265,184.75	232,282.90	259,700.29
G77	64,773.63	79,314.54	96,880.56	112,270.73	123,203.77	143,474.92	163,191.60	150,978.06	170,876.47
EU (European Union)	86,139.03	97,861.54	110,456.85	117,509.31	128,155.02	151,389.01	163,724.69	132,586.86	139,605.64
BRIC	33,880.37	44,692.24	54,495.58	65,478.12	74,280.59	85,403.98	97,169.87	95,601.75	113,754.29
Brazil	739.16	886.79	1152.43	1193.31	1169.41	1210.90	1222.07	928.22	929.97
Russian Federation	818.07	852.09	1073.75	1245.17	1372.76	1480.77	1733.61	1330.93	1274.05
India		4403.67	6657.72	7530.07	9023.42	9713.34	9407.55	17,602.56	13,796.38
China	32,323.14	38,549.69	45,611.69	55,509.57	62,714.99	72,998.97	84,806.64	75,740.04	97,753.88
Least developed countries	85.30	174.92	207.51	271.43	304.02	354.44	373.23	406.97	416.36
Total	198,239.88	225,895.43	261,636.75	290,354.44	316,323.97	370,053.34	408,782.77	350,645.06	383,208.38

Source: UNCTADstat 2012

While this threefold increase over ten years is promising, the tiny share in the global creative economy means that 49 LDCs and the 880m (around 12 per cent of the global population)²¹ still account for merely 0.12% of the global creative good trade.

The 'South' is on the rise, but some countries rise less than others. This raises a new question and brings us to the next section: does the creative economy really drive (human) development, or do cultural industries flourish as a result? This remains largely a rhetorical question, as neither process can wholly be separated from the other, and neither process can thus fully drive the other. Yet, given the policy discourse that explicitly suggests that CCIs drive (human) development, it is worth exploring if (or to what extent) that claim holds up. The remainder of this chapter does exactly that, by focusing on data from Burkina Faso and Ghana.

3.4. Burkina Faso and Ghana: Creative Economy Statistics

This section presents data on the creative goods trade and domestic cultural industries.²² These data form the basis for the next sections, where I question the causality between cultural industries and development in Burkina Faso and Ghana.

The UNCTAD creative goods statistics for Burkina Faso and Ghana are incomplete, as there are no data for several years and for several sections of the creative economy. The trade in cultural services, moreover, is negligible, and will not be discussed here. The data I present follow the UNCTAD definitions of the sector in Table 3-12 and Table 3-13 follow the UNCTAD product classification, in spite of its known difficulties (see section 3.1).

Table 3-12 - Burkina Faso Creative Goods Trade in US\$ millions

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Net Exports</i>
2003	No data	No data	No data
2004	2.1	20.9	-18.1
2005	2.7	18.2	-15.5
2006	No data	No data	No data
2007	No data	No data	No data
2008	No data	No data	No data
2009	2.8	30.9	-28.2
2010	2.3	46.1	-43.8
2011	1.8	36.3	-34.5
2012	No data	No data	No data

Source: UNCTADstat 2014, aggregated by the author

²¹ <http://www.unohrrls.org/en/ldc/>

²² I follow the CCI definitions and classifications of the different data sets I build on.

In Burkina Faso, the net exports of creative goods have been consistently negative, as the imports far exceed the exports (see Table 3-12). In 2012, the biggest exports are interior design (US\$1.2m) and sculpture (US\$0.4m), while the biggest imports are yarn (US\$6.9m), recorded media (US\$6.6m), art crafts (US\$10.5m), interior design (US\$5.4m), and books (US\$4.2m). See Appendix B for a more detailed overview.

In Ghana, there were major fluctuations in both imports and exports in the period from 2003 to 2012 (see Table 3-13). In 2011, when exports peaked, the biggest exported product groups are carpets (US\$113.5m), books (US\$30.8m), and interior design (US\$3.2m), and the highest imports are interior design (US\$29.0m), books (US\$28.1m), recorded media (US\$26.8m), fashion (US\$25.2m), and newspapers (US\$10.9m). In 2012, exports dropped, because of a drop in carpets exports. The biggest exports are interior design (US\$1.5m) and fashion (US\$1.2m), while the biggest imports are interior design (US\$38.2m), books (US\$36.3m), fashion (US\$26.7m), recorded media (US\$18.4), and newspapers (US\$10.1m). It is unclear why there is such a fluctuation, and why there was such a peak in carpet exports in 2011. Though also in Ghana, where data are available, the net exports of creative goods are generally negative (with 2006 as an exception).

Table 3-13 - Ghana Creative Goods Trade in US\$ millions

<i>Year</i>	<i>Exports</i>	<i>Imports</i>	<i>Net Exports</i>
2003	No data	No data	No data
2004	No data	No data	No data
2005	27.3	80.8	-53.5
2006	86.6	75.0	11.6
2007	No data	No data	No data
2008	No data	No data	No data
2009	No data	No data	No data
2010	8.1	121.9	-113.9
2011	153.3 ²³	155.2	-2.9
2012	4.7	161.2	-156.5

Source: UNCTADstat 2014, aggregated by the author

The creative goods exports from both countries are, however, incomplete as much exports and imports go unrecorded. And even when they are recorded, the data may be insufficiently disaggregated to produce statistics that align with the product classifications that UNCTAD uses, particularly when it comes to ‘new’ cultural and creative in-

²³ The peak in 2011 exports is mainly thanks to a strong increase in carpets exports (US\$152.3m, up from US\$8.0m in 2010) and publishing (US\$31.1m, up from US\$0.4m in 2010). See Table B-3 and Table B-4 in Appendix B for a detailed overview.

dustries (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2010 p. 103). Much CCI activity remains strictly local, however. This means that on top of the international trade data UNCTAD presents, we also need insight into domestic markets. These data are even more difficult to obtain, as they are not always automatically collected. What follows is an overview of the data I have been able to find.

In Burkina Faso, the latest available data about the domestic turnover of the cultural industries dates from 2009. These data are presented in a report by the *Bureau Burkinabè d'Études et d'Appui-Conseils* (BBEAC, 2012), though it is unclear what their source is. The biggest product group consists of visual arts, applied arts, and crafts, which accounts for FCFA54.4b, or 1.38% percentage points of the 2.02% share of culture in the Burkinabè GDP (see Table 3-14).

Table 3-14 - Contribution of Culture to the Burkinabè GDP of 2009 (in FCFA)

	<i>Value added (in FCFA/XOF)</i>	<i>Value added (in €/EUR)</i>	<i>Relative share of GDP</i>
Visual arts, applied arts, and crafts	54,391,000,000	82,918,545	1.38%
Books and press	11,490,000,000	17,516,392	0.29%
Heritage	3,201,000,000	4,879,893	0.08%
Cinema and Audio-visual	3,402,000,000	5,186,316	0.09%
Performing Arts	3,586,000,000	5,466,822	0.09%
Recorded Music	1,035,000,000	1,577,847	0.03%
Cultural Events	811,000,000	1,236,362	0.02%
Training and Advisory Support	1,751,000,000	2,669,382	0.04%
Cultural Sector	79,667,000,000	121,451,559	2.02%
Total GDP	3,941,000,000,000	6,008,015,769	100.00%

Source: BBEAC (2012 p. 74)

Table 3-15 - Contribution of the Music Sector to the Ghanaian GDP of 2012 (in GH¢)

<i>Activity</i>	<i>Amount (GHC)</i>
Sales of CDS & Cassettes	9,057,198
Live shows	37,299,120
Royalties	700,000
Merchandizing	388,996
Sponsorship	127,382
Instrument manufacturers	27,355,272
Spinners	17,415,768
Public bands	834,251
TOTAL	93,177,988
2012 GDP at current prices (GHC)	73,109,000,000
Percentage of music contribution to GDP	0.13%

Source: KMPG (2014 p. 16)

For Ghana, there are no data for the domestic cultural industries as a whole. The Ghanaian Musicians' Union (MUSIGA) did however commission KPMG to conduct a study to highlight the economic contribution of music to the Ghanaian GDP in 2013 (see Table 3-15). The strongest segments of the music sector are live shows (GH¢37.3m), instrument manufacturers (GH¢27.4m), and spinners, i.e. DJs (GH¢17.4m).

The statistics presented above are little more than illustrations. Yet they do show an emerging engagement with the cultural and creative industries in empirical terms.

3.5. Between Willingness and Ability to Pay

This chapter has already shown that most CCI activity remains concentrated in 'developed' countries, and where it shifts to 'developing' countries; the winners are mainly the 'emerging' economies. Yet, when the CCIs are meant to drive development, there should be audiences who spend on culture. This section explores to what extent Burkina Faso and Ghanaian audiences are *willing* and *able* to sustain the domestic CCIs through expenditure.

Willingness to pay (WTP) is a "contingent valuation methodology" that aims to advance our understanding of the amount of people are willing to spend on a good or service (Throsby, 2001 p. 82). When using this method to gauge the economic value of culture, however, one presupposes that people *can* spend on leisure. It is precisely that presupposition that I call into question here. Hypothetically, people may be willing to pay for culture, but to what extent do people have the time and money to go to a concert, go to the cinema, buy a CD, and so on? The average spending on culture as percentage of GDP in European countries is 5.33% (Compendium, 2014), while the share in Burkina Faso is 0.62% and in Ghana 0.66% (UNESCO, 2015a).

My research suggests that audiences are very interested in 'their' music, but the data above show that the hypothetical willingness to pay in Burkina Faso and Ghana does not translate to mass consumption low due to the (very) limited spending power of most people:

The audience wants to hear Burkinabè artists, but they don't have money. It has to do with spending power, but also with what people are willing to pay for culture. Elsewhere it has a price tag, here that's less so. But it's mostly spending power ... music is mostly a product for youths. There are few artists [here] who aim at more upmarket audiences. (Cultural Activist, Ouagadougou #19)


I did the test, I put music in the shops ... and promoted it on the radio ... it hit a ceiling. In terms of physical CDs, it's not much, it's mostly downloads. The amount of money in people's pockets has a play in this. (Producer and Manager, Accra #11)

One Burkinabè artist puts this issue into a broader socio-political perspective:

*There's also our reality, cruel, but it's reality. The Burkinabè citizen has nothing. More than 80% of the riches, it's 15% of the population that holds them. That's not little. So, 85% of the people are in shit. How can we think that people who don't have something to eat will go see a show, even if it would have a healing effect?*²⁴ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

The numbers he provides may sound arbitrary, but 84% of Burkinabè citizens effectively live in multidimensional poverty²⁵ (see Table 3-16).

Table 3-16 - Comparative Poverty Measures Burkina Faso 2014



Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2014a)

This leaves a very small fraction of the population with sufficient disposable income to spend on culture:

The big problem is what? That is to say ... the African ... or the Burkinabè, to be more local ... we produce, but we don't have the means to consume what we produce. Can everyone pay to go to the movies? Well, there is a difficulty to consume what our artists produce. It's not that he maybe doesn't like it, but does he have the means? Is there a

²⁴ « Il y a aussi notre réalité, cruelle, mais c'est la réalité. Le citoyen burkinabé n'a rien. Plus de 80% des richesses, c'est 15% des gens qui tiennent. C'est pas petit. Alors, 85% des gens sont dans la merde. Comment peut-on penser que les gens qui n'ont pas à manger vont aller voir un spectacle, même si ça pourrait être curatif. »


²⁵ "The global Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) is an international measure of acute poverty. It complements traditional income-based poverty measures by capturing the severe deprivations that each person faces at the same time with respect to education, health and living standards. The MPI assesses poverty at the individual level. If someone is deprived in a third or more of ten (weighted) indicators (see left), the global index identifies them as 'MPI poor', and the extent – or intensity – of their poverty is measured by the number of deprivations they are experiencing." (Oxford Poverty & Human Development Initiative, 2015)

*real possibility for the industrialisation of culture? It's a really big problem.*²⁶ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #15)

Yet, this issue is not limited to Burkina Faso, as Ghana, in spite of its lower (multidimensional) poverty incidence (see Table 3-17), experiences a similar challenge:

Since we are still in a developing state, standards of living and money to spend is not huge. So people can barely spend much. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #4)

Table 3-17 - Comparative Poverty Measures Ghana 2014



Source: Oxford Poverty and Human Development Initiative (2014b)

Though the issue is not solely down to spending power:

There's a lack of spending power - our priorities ... the things we spend money on ... we regard leisure ... we don't want to pay for that. For the beach - now you have to pay for that, and it's taking a long time for people to accept that. That's how we are. We buy beer, and fufu and meat, but it's difficult to get them [the audiences] to go to concerts. (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

People are finding it very difficult to pay. Especially for live music. It costs money. You have to appreciate the effort and pay. (Entrepreneur, Accra #17)

While poverty indicators highlight the limited means of large parts of society the extent to which people are *willing* to pay remains low as well:

²⁶ « Le gros problème c'est quoi? C'est-à-dire, l'Africain ... ou bien le Burkinabé pour être plus local - on produit, mais on pas les moyens de consommer ce que nous produisons. Est-ce que tout le monde peut aller payer pour voir un film? Donc, il y a une difficulté de consommer ce que nos artistes produisent. C'est pas parce que peut-être il n'aime pas, mais ont-ils les moyens? Est-ce qu'il y a vraiment une possibilité d'industrialisation culturelle? C'est vrai un gros problème. »

People have a lack of culture, of education. They don't realise the importance of spending money. In Abidjan, there is a showbiz, where a student may save up all year to pay 10000 FCFA (€15) for one show. It's a problem of ... there is no star system [here, in Burkina]. That's not necessarily bad, but at this scale, it becomes bad. It's not really viable anymore.²⁷ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

Yet, because of limited earnings per concert, many artists see themselves obliged to play too often and too cheaply in the same places, often even at gigs with no entry fee as part promotional shows for major sponsors (see chapter 6). The terms of the creative economy discourse, between willingness and ability to pay, are however continuously conflated:

I think we can really force people to pay. But we are not exempt from critique ... we are in a context of pauperization. The consumer does not have a high level of revenues. It's known, in all the theories ... that people don't consume culture if the household budget is not very high. It's linked to the weakness of the household budgets.²⁸ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #11)

But not everyone agrees that the household budget is the biggest issue:

They'll pretend not to have anything, but it's the same people who will go drink a beer at 700 FCFA. And the next morning, he has to give something to the 'Madame' [wife]. He surely has 1000 FCFA in the pocket. Sadly, the ministry of culture has not been instrumental in working to incentivise the consumption of Burkinabè cultural products.²⁹ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14)

The demand exists ... well ... our problem is what? The specific case of Burkina, in terms of events, is the price of shows. Concerts at 1000 or 500, if it's too much it's 2000. In Bamako, you won't have a concert for less than 5000. It's clear; they have

²⁷ « Les gens ont un manque de culture, d'éducation. Ils se sont pas rendus compte que c'est assez important de mettre l'argent. A Abidjan, il y a le showbiz, où un étudiant peut économiser toute l'année pour payer 10000F pour un spectacle. C'est un problème de ... il y a pas de star system. C'est pas forcément mauvais, mais, si à cette échelle, ça devient mauvais. C'est plus vraiment rentable. »

²⁸ « Je pense qu'on peut vraiment contraindre les gens à payer. Mais on est pas exempt de critique ... on est dans un contexte de paupérisation. Le consommateur n'a pas un niveau de revenus important. C'est connu, hein, dans toutes les théories ... qu'on consomme pas la culture si le budget du ménage n'est pas très élevé. C'est lié à cette faiblesse des revenus des ménages. »

²⁹ « Ils vont prétendre qu'ils ont rien, mais c'est les mêmes qui vont boire une bière de 700 FCFA. Et le lendemain il doit donner quelque chose à madame. Il a bien 1000F dans la poche. Malheureusement - le ministère de la culture n'a pas été en mesure pour travailler pour une incitation à la consommation des produits culturels burkinabè. »

sold out concerts at 25000. Here, even if it's 5000, you'll have all sorts of problems. The revolution [under Thomas Sankara] fixed the price of a show at 300 FCFA in 1984 [see chapter 7]. 300, no matter which artist plays ... they invited big names at 300 ... you want to make them understand that this or that artist is more expensive? It's difficult. We managed to correct a bit ... we moved to 500 and to 1000. And now, with difficulty, at 2000. Not because there's no liquidity. In their heads, they are convinced that culture is not paid, it's not commercial. For them, it's a distraction, but we shifted from distraction to market value since. The public has not accepted that.³⁰ (Producer and Manager, Ouagadougou #3)

I discuss the references to history and neighbouring countries in chapter 7. What matters here is that the engagement with the creative economy discourse has prompted greater empirical engagement with the cultural industries. While this may help understanding the scope and organisation of the sector, it does not mean that the cultural sector will readily turn into economically viable cultural industries. Merely *saying* that culture has now shifted to a market approach does not mean that the potential of the existing culture will easily become economically viable. Moreover, the empirical attention on economic data diverts attention from a range of more normative questions. What should the cultural industries look like? How should they be 'developed'? Should they be supported? And, if so, for whom and by whom? These are however political questions that should be resolved through debate within Burkina Faso and Ghana. Because of the limited evidence base and the narrow empirical focus it is difficult to engage with such normative questions in an informed manner.

3.6. The Chicken or the Egg?

Some (countries) succeed in harnessing the potential of culture through the creative economy, while others don't. The question in this context is why some developing countries have not (yet) managed to 'develop' their creative industries. Why they do not profit much more from their rich cultural traditions and popular culture. But what are

³⁰ « La demande y est ... bof ... notre problème c'est quoi. Le cas spécifique du Burkina, en terme d'événementiel, c'est les prix des spectacles. Les concerts a 1000, 500, si c'est trop c'est 2000. A Bamako, tout précis, vous n'aurez pas de concert de moins de 5000. C'est clair. Ils font des concerts de 25000 (FCFA) avec les guichets fermés. Ici, même si c'est 5000 (FCFA), vous avez tous des problèmes. La révolution a fixé le prix d'un spectacle à 300FCFA an 1984. 300, quel que soit l'artiste qui vient ... ils invitent toutes les grosses peintures à 300 - vous allez leur faire comprendre que tel ou tel artiste est plus cher? C'est difficile. On est arrivé à corriger un peu, on est passé à 500, et a 1000. Et maintenant, avec difficulté à 2000. Pas parce que il n'y a pas la liquidité. Dans leur tête, ils sont convaincus que la culture n'est pas payante, ce n'est pas marchand. Pour eux, c'est la distraction, mais nous sommes passé de distraction à valeur marchande depuis. Depuis le public n'a pas subi ça. »

the underlying reasons? Many of the reasons can be ascribed to the history and social context of the countries, as UNCTAD readily admits:

Developing countries face huge obstacles, such as lack of investment and entrepreneurial skills, inadequate infrastructure, absence of appropriate financing mechanisms and weak institutional and legal frameworks to support the growth of the creative industries. (UNCTAD 2010: 224)

Interestingly, the importance of spending power is not listed. Yet the limited potential for countries in the South is clearly acknowledged:

As a result, access by Southern countries to the benefits of growth in the global creative economy has been limited at best. Indeed, there is a danger that when these countries are brought into international market networks, they will be relegated to the lowest value-adding stages in the value chain. (UNCTAD 2010: 224-5)

In spite of these known difficulties, which are also recognised in the literature (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2008b p. 14), the share of developing countries is still exaggerated in the CERs and the potential for these countries is underlined. Yet Table 3-12, for example, illustrates that Burkina Faso has seen no significant increase in creative goods exports in the period 2002-2010.

During my fieldwork encounters, many interviewees made reference to crude oil, gold, ores, cocoa, coffee, diamonds and other archetypical developing country riches. Culture, it was argued, is pretty much in the same position: there is ample potential that people see everywhere. But the investment needed to turn the 'rich cultural resources' into a flourishing cultural industry is huge. Few people are able to make such investments, and even less are inclined to do so, because the returns and spending power are limited. The reference to cocoa and coffee adds another layer to the comparison. Here, the importance of trade barriers; tariffs obstructing export of processed goods to the 'developed world' are rife and the expertise to produce books, CDs, films, etc. to an international standard is limited. These are but the symptoms of a troubled cultural sector, aiming to play the global creative economy game. There are many reasons that the cultural sector – or any sector in LDCs, to be fair – is not living up to its potential. However, Burkina Faso has hosted the biannual pan-African film festival FESPACO since 1969 (organised by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, and heavily supported by foreign donors). Many Burkinabè musicians are developing great work and tour the region, the continent and beyond (often with support from the ministry, or foreign cultural institutes such as *Alliance Française*, *Goethe Institut*, *Danish Centre for Culture and Development*, etc.). Theatre productions and festivals are of high quality (and heavily reliant on subsidies). And there is a steady output of feature films.

It seems contradictory, however, that the cultural industries are presented as drivers of development. Looking at the historical evolution of commoditized mass culture, the evolution occurred the other way around. Bakker (2008) follows Briggs (1991 [1960]) in arguing that demand for entertainment follows three pairs of explanations:

- Economic growth and increased leisure time spiked demand
- Urbanisation helped turning this demand into consumption
- Hike of young population increased demand further – as under-30s are a big (potential) market.

A clear example of this evolution is the film industry (Bakker 2011; Cook 2004). The industrial advances that allowed for the technical emergence of moving picture entertainment coincided with increased productivity, less working hours, and higher wages. As a result, there was a rather big market for cultural *texts* to be consumed in a (largely) urban context. The CERs, alongside many other initiatives promoting the creative industries on a global scale, seem to make that very argument in reverse: these very industries will be a motor of development, rather than the result of it. Should the data thus not be approached differently, by arguing that increased cultural consumption and flourishing cultural industries follow a socio-economically prospering society, and not vice versa? This is exactly the idea that is explored in this closing section.

Many countries in Africa currently see the coincidence of these three factors. The potential of the cultural industries may be on the verge of realization, yet caution is needed. Much of the economic growth in Africa is driven by the extraction of natural resources (oil, gold, copper, coltan, diamonds, etc.) and does not necessarily result in labour-intensive activity (which would increase spending power) (see e.g. Ayelazuno, 2014). There certainly is a demand for culture, especially from youths, yet their ability to spend on culture is limited. Moreover, there has been a drop in real spending power in many countries, in part due to a strong hike in food prices in 2008.

The model explaining the emergence of cultural industries above, however, derives from a particular time and place: the emergence of the film industries in the early 20th century in Europe and the USA (see e.g. Bakker, 2008). The question is if this can equally apply to the development of cultural industries in general and music industries in particular in Burkina Faso and Ghana. First, histories develop differently: While the above model seems sensible, this does not mean that it should serve as a teleological model for contemporary evolutions, as it emerged in parallel with mass industrialisation which is not the case in present-day Burkina Faso or Ghana. Second, the empirical data and observations on which this research builds are limited in geographical and temporal scope: They are meant as an explanation of a historical evolution, not as a prediction of future developments. Third, the global dynamics between domestic and

international markets make different dynamics hard to compare: While the USA had a strong internal market, many present-day 'developing' countries cannot always rely on their small internal market to render film or music production profitable. Four, the three elements cited above show that the wider socio-economic conditions are crucial in the emergence of viable cultural industries: efforts to support them should thus be part of active engagement with society as a whole.

3.7. Conclusions: Between Creative Statistics and Discursive Optimism

The creative economy has gone global. Or at least the creative economy discourse has. The UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports highlighted the relevance of this sector in many countries and provided ample quantitative evidence that was previously hard to find, and even harder to compare. Previously, it has been argued that the inclusion of certain product groups are problematic (Garnham 2005; Tremblay 2010), while this chapter makes the case that also the geographical demarcation used in the Reports is flawed and the implied causality between the creative economy and (human) development is questionable.

This classification of countries is problematic for several reasons. Firstly, it uses a classification that simply does not make sense. The Republic of Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore (among many others) are not developing countries, and should not be treated or classified as such – in contrast to what is done in the CERs. Secondly, China is the world's second biggest economy and first exporter of creative goods and should be highlighted as an exception in the analysis of the data, and not simply put forward as a developing country. Thirdly, the extremely limited share (0.11% in 2012) of the 49 Least Developed Countries (LDCs) in global creative goods exports, relative to its large share of the world's population (880m or some 12%) is troubling.

The way countries are classified in global reports on the creative economy should thus be far more detailed and balanced, because China and Burkina Faso are simply not part of the same category. And the inclusion of some 'developed' countries (with very high levels of Human Development) such as Singapore and South Korea should not feature in the group of developing countries at all. Similarly, intra-national imbalances and social inequalities regarding access to and participation in the creative industries merit greater attention. How can these countries profit from this sector, which bridges cultural and economic traits? In what ways can these often-fragile countries be supported in their attempts to unlock the potential of cultural practices? And in what ways can these countries hope to 'develop' cultural industries in a context where only a small middle class exists and the majority of the population does not have the surplus disposable income, available leisure time, or the habit to spend on culture?

In response to these questions it can be argued that in the context of LDCs, the creative economy is probably not primarily a driver of development, but rather an indicator. If there is a sizable middle class with spending power and education concentrated in cities, a context exists in which music, books, theatre, movies, etc. will be in demand. Greater human development may encourage the development of activities and the creation of cultural goods that can be profitable. This means that the shift from 'cultural development' to 'culture for development' through the cultural industries is less promising than some optimists imagine. The high hopes regarding the (human) development impact of a sector that is in itself developing are simply overstated.

In conclusion, the focus on the cultural and creative industries should be part of a holistic set of initiatives aimed to advance Human Development. An adequate assessment of the complexity of the field precedes the further development of apt measures. More importantly, beyond the averages of growth and export numbers, the creative economy is about far more than trade alone. It also conveys symbolic meaning. And this meaning may help to articulate what kind of social and economic life we envisage, which is as much part of development as anything else. Because we want bread; but we want movies too. This is why the remainder of my dissertation engages in empirical detail with the conditions and drivers of human development in two small countries, and not with economic development as a proxy for such human development, as this would be a contradiction in terms.

4. Cultural Policies and Development Plans: Overlapping Frameworks for Culture

Culture is obviously central to cultural policies in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet, through the creative economy discourse, culture is now also increasingly present in development plans of both countries. This section clarifies how culture and cultural or creative industries feature in these different policies and policy levels. My argument is that, as cultural and creative industries become more explicit in cultural policies and development plans, there is a significant conceptual shift in the use and meaning of the term 'culture.' While culture long referred to a holistic series of processes, as a fabric of social cohesion, and as a bridge between 'tradition' and 'modernity,' culture is now increasingly seen as a driver of economic growth.

The particular policies and approaches differ between Burkina Faso and Ghana. They inherited administrative and political systems from different colonial powers and transformed these approaches significantly over the past five decades. There are, however, also similarities. That is why I engage in a detailed analysis of policy discourse in this chapter. This engagement is not separate from (or an introduction to) my fieldwork through interviews and observation; it is very much part of the same process, as I have argued the need to triangulate policy analysis and field observation (De Beukelaer, 2013). Moreover, it shows how the current use of the creative economy discourse is both recent and rooted in earlier debates at African Union and UNESCO levels.

Both countries have an explicit policy text for culture. According to the UNESCO Culture and Development Indicator Suite, their governance framework for culture is well established in both countries, even though culture has a weak share in the economy of both countries (UNESCO, forthcoming; UNESCO, forthcoming). While the presence of a formal cultural policy is not unique in the African context, merely 15 out of 53 African countries had such policies in 2011³¹ (Forbes, 2011 pp. 129–131). These policies define culture both broadly (as a way of life) and narrowly (as creative expression). The broad understanding includes ways of life, spiritual, and artistic notions. In using such a broad definition, these policies explicitly engage with the ethnic diversity within the countries, and stress that this is as a positive element in society. The Burkinabè text, however, also stresses ethnic diversity as a potential source of conflict (MCTC, 2008 p. 7). Yet, while most governments tend to use build on this 'anthropological' understand-

³¹ The cited overview dates from before the secession of South Sudan in 2011.

ing of culture, this hardly ever translates to concrete cultural policies beyond the arts and heritage (Pyykkönen and Isar, forthcoming).

The narrow understanding of culture focuses on cultural expressions, primarily through the cultural and creative industries. These CCIs feature explicitly, though not prominently, in the cultural policies. A clear explanation for this is that these documents date from before the publication of the UNCTAD creative economy reports (2008; 2010), which stressed the link between cultural industries and development.

Cultural policies are, however, not the only texts that work with culture. National development plans also refer to culture, but build more explicitly on the narrow understanding of culture through the cultural and creative industries. In doing so, they reflect the paradigmatic shift from culture as a basis of national identity and ethnic diversity towards culture and (artistic) creativity as a driver of economic growth through cultural goods and services. These plans, moreover, explicitly inscribe the cultural and creative industries in the tourism strategies of the countries.

In order to fully grasp the particularities of these policies and their recent shifts, a detailed reading of Burkinabè and Ghanaian texts is necessary. In this chapter I provide insight in the particular use of the “global script” (Pinheiro and Hauge, 2014) of the creative economy discourse and explore its uptake and meaning in Burkina Faso and Ghana. The overall aim of this chapter is to expose the implications of the largely uncritical adoption of the creative economy discourse in these countries. I do so by asking the following questions. What is the place of culture and cultural industries in development plans and cultural policy? What is the institutional framework? What definitions and classifications of the cultural and creative industries do these documents build on in Burkina Faso and Ghana?

Section one and two respectively explore the policy contexts in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Section three engages more closely with the use, definition, and demarcation of the creative economy discourse in both countries. In conclusion, I stress how the overlapping policy engagement with the creative economy discourse creates confusion regarding both concepts and their meaning for policy.

4.1. Burkina Faso: Between Cultural Policy and Sustainable Development Plan

In Burkina Faso, Culture is a competency of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT). Until 2011, the Ministry of Culture, Tourism, and Communication (MCTC) administered it. Communication now falls under a separate ministry of Postal Services,

Information Technology, and Communication.³² Since independence, culture has fallen under a range of different ministries, and changed often between the ministries of education and youth, until it became a self-standing ministry in the 1980s (Guingané, 1996). The current cultural policy dates from 2008, and was drafted under the previous ministry. This section shows how the focal point on culture shifted from a means to maintain social peace (*paix social*) to an instrument in the struggle against poverty (*lutte contre la pauvreté*).

The cultural policy clearly defines culture from the outset:

Culture may now be said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs. (MCTC, 2008 p. 7)³³

This definition follows the Mexico city Declaration on Cultural Policy verbatim (UNESCO, 1982c). The policy explicitly stresses that culture is not reduced to the arts sector alone.

The cultural policy is part of the broad 'Burkina 2025' long-term development plan and the medium term strategic framework in the struggle against poverty.³⁴ In this context, the national cultural policy aims to build a foundation for the future based on mutating endogenic realities. At the same time, it aims to strengthen the creative economy (MCTC, 2008 p. 8). The Burkinabè cultural policy was revised after the *Nairobi Plan of Action for the Cultural Industries in Africa* (African Union, 2005) and the UNESCO *Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions* (2005b). The previous cultural policy did not focus explicitly on cultural industries (André, 2007; Andrieu, 2007). In order to advance the commercial viability of the sector, the text focuses on regional initiatives and international debates (UNESCO and UNCTAD) in order to respond to the unequal international relations regarding the production and trade in the cultural industries (MCTC, 2008 pp. 11–13).

The budget of the culture ministry is around 0.30% of overall government expenditure, and amounted to CFA1.6billion (some EUR2.5m) in 2003 to CFA2.8billion (some

³² « Ministre des Postes et des technologies de l'information et de la communication. »

³³ « La culture peut aujourd'hui être considérée comme l'ensemble des traits distinctifs, spirituels et matériels, intellectuels et affectifs, qui caractérisent une société ou un groupe social. Elle englobe, outre les arts et les lettres, les modes de vie, les droits fondamentaux de l'être humain, les systèmes de valeurs, les traditions et les croyances » (MCTC, 2008 p. 7; UNESCO, 1982c p. 1).

³⁴ « Cadre Stratégique de Lutte contre la Pauvreté » or « CSLP » (MCTC, 2008 p. 8).

EUR4.3m) in 2006 (MCTC, 2008 p. 25). Foreign subsidies to the cultural sector ('cultural cooperation') is estimated at over CFA1billion (some EUR1.5m) per year (MCTC, 2008 p. 26). Moreover, 71,71% of cultural subsidies come from foreign donors (Mandé, 2011).

The aims of policy interventions are to:

- Turn Burkina Faso into a major cultural player in West Africa
- Attract national and international investment in national cultural industries
- Reinforce social cohesion and peace
- Promote cultural integration at a regional (West African) and international level³⁵ (MCTC, 2008 p. 53)

The policy proposes four strategic objectives:

- Preserving cultural diversity by promoting 'enculturation' to consolidate social cohesion
- Reinforcing the institutional capacities in the cultural sector
- Structuring and developing the cultural economy
- Reinforcing cultural cooperation and supporting the international diffusion of Burkinabè cultural products³⁶ (MCTC, 2008 p. 41)

The principal document dealing with strategies for development in Burkina Faso since 2010 is SCADD, the Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (see Figure 4-1).³⁷ Within this comprehensive plan, addressing a full range of strategies for poverty alleviation, culture takes a small but 'key' position – primarily through the cultural industries. These industries are, to be precise, part of the first of four strategic axes defined by the Burkinabè government. The foci of these axes are 1) the development of pillars of accelerated growth, 2) the consolidation of human capital and the promotion of social protection, 3) reinforcement of good governance, and 4) taking

³⁵ « Faire du Burkina Faso un pôle majeur de la culture en Afrique de l'Ouest ; Attirer davantage d'investissements nationaux et étrangers dans les industries culturelles nationales ; Renforcer la cohésion et la paix sociales ; Favoriser l'intégration culturelle sous-régionale et internationale » (MCTC, 2008 p. 53). »

³⁶ « Préserver la diversité culturelle en vue de promouvoir l'inculturation et de consolider la cohésion sociale; Renforcer les capacités institutionnelles du secteur de la culture ; Structurer et développer l'économie de la culture ; et Renforcer la coopération culturelle et soutenir la diffusion extérieure des produits culturels burkinabè » (MCTC, 2008 p. 41).

³⁷ « Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable. »

into account transversal priorities in development policies³⁸ (SCADD, 2010 p. 39). The technical language shows that this document is used as a guiding document for negotiating development priorities with foreign donors.




Figure 4-1 - Cover of the ‘Stratégie de Croissance Accélérée et de Développement Durable’ Policy Document

In 2009, the head of the *Direction des Études et de la Planification*, of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism participated in the colloquium “Culture and Creativity: vectors for development” organised by the Directory General for Development Cooperation of the European Commission. This led to the inclusion of the cultural industries in the subsequent national development plan. The SCADD presents the cultural industries as one of the axes of economic growth. It forefronts crafts and established cultural festivals as cultural industries with potential to support accelerated growth and sustainable development (SCADD, 2010 pp. 45–46), this is hardly surprising given the strong economic role of crafts in the Burkinabè cultural industries (see Table 4-1 below).

Crafts have a strong economic potential towards job creation. The sector now employs over a million people, of which half are women (dyeing, basketry, weaving, pottery, sewing, hairdressing, and make-up). In addition, it is a sector that, in the urban informal

³⁸ « (i) Le développement des piliers de la croissance accélérée, (ii) La consolidation du capital humain et la promotion de la protection sociale, (iii) Le renforcement de la bonne gouvernance, (iv) La prise en compte des priorités transversales dans les politiques et programmes de développement » (SCADD, 2010 p. 39).

*economy, consists of a high concentration of poor workers. The government intends to use this sector in its pro-poor growth strategy.*³⁹ (SCADD, 2010 p. 45)

The primary focus within the SCADD on future action of the cultural industries is on tourism, while the need for focus on entrepreneurship and funding mechanisms is equally stressed (SCADD, 2010 p. 46).

Following this explicit focus on tourism and culture, Burkina Faso needs a more thorough understanding of the social and economic role of culture. To respond to this need, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism commissioned a study executed by *Bureau Burkinabè d'Études et d'Appui-Conseils* (BBEAC)⁴⁰ which was funded by the UNESCO International Fund for Cultural Diversity.⁴¹ The report of this research addresses a wide range of issues in relation to culture and development in the country (see Figure 4-2).

The study itself is organized in two parts. The first part consists of 3 chapters and sketches a picture of the cultural sector in Burkina Faso. It highlights 1) the institutional context of the cultural sector, 2) public spending on culture, and 3) the particularities of the Burkinabè economy in general and the potential and weaknesses of the branches of the cultural sector in particular. The data on the macro-economic contribution of culture presented probably stem from a report published by the OIF (2009), yet adequate referencing is missing throughout the Report.⁴²

³⁹ « L'artisanat présente un fort potentiel économique et de création d'emplois. Il emploie actuellement, près d'un million de personnes dont la moitié constituée de femmes (teinture, vannerie, tissage, poterie, couture, esthétique et coiffure, ...). En outre, il constitue, avec le secteur informel urbain, des domaines de forte concentration des pauvres. Aussi, le Gouvernement entend t-il utilisé [sic] l'artisanat comme un des leviers de la promotion d'une croissance pro-pauvres » (SCADD, 2010 p. 45).

⁴⁰ The BBEAC is a makeshift organisation that seems to have appeared solely for the purpose of this study. As a result, it has taken many queries before I found someone who had a clear idea about the name of the person behind the BBEAC. Even when they had a clue, phone calls had to be made to dig up the name. Only later, I found that Jacques Guéda Ouédraogo authored the report. This indicates that his contacts of the sector are limited at best. More worryingly, it may also show that his knowledge may not be sufficient to conduct a research into the cultural sector. While hiring Burkinabè consultants to execute studies is beneficial to developing local expertise and know-how in the long run, the current selection procedures of these consultants seem to be ineffective. The allocation of consultancy contracts remains largely within closed circles of government officials who use this kind of extra work to generate additional income on top of their modest wages and create a network of mutual favours.

⁴¹ This fund is an operational measure of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005b), as Article 18 stipulates that a fund will help attain the goals of the convention.

⁴² The numbers from 2009 seem to be the last adequate data that are available on the economic scope of the sector, as these were also used in the presentation of a more recent study



Ministère de la Culture
et du Tourisme



**ETUDE SUR LES IMPACTS DU SECTEUR DE LA CULTURE
SUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT SOCIAL ET ECONOMIQUE
DU BURKINA FASO**

*Bureau Burkinabè d'Etudes
& d'Appui-conseils (BBEA)
Rapport final, Mai 2012*

Figure 4-2 - Cover of 'Étude sur les Impacts du Secteur de la Culture sur le Développement Social et Économique du Burkina Faso'

Table 4-1 - Contributions of Culture to the Burkinabè GDP in 2009

	<i>Value added (in FCFA/XOF)</i>	<i>Value added (in €/EUR)</i>	<i>Relative share of GDP</i>
Visual arts, applied arts, and crafts	54,391,000,000	82,918,545	1.38%
Books and press	11,490,000,000	17,516,392	0.29%
Heritage	3,201,000,000	4,879,893	0.08%
Cinema and Audio-visual	3,402,000,000	5,186,316	0.09%
Performing Arts	3,586,000,000	5,466,822	0.09%
Recorded Music	1,035,000,000	1,577,847	0.03%
Cultural Events	811,000,000	1,236,362	0.02%
Training and Advisory Support	1,751,000,000	2,669,382	0.04%
Cultural Sector	79,667,000,000	121,451,559	2.02%
Total GDP	3,941,000,000,000	6,008,015,769	100.00%

Source: BBEAC (2012 p. 74)

The argument goes that there is a tremendous cultural wealth that can be tapped upon, but that has not been sufficiently exploited in spite of the great existing demand among

in Ouagadougou on 28 January 2013. This, in spite of detailed statistical yearbooks published by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (2010; 2011; 2012).

the primarily young population (BBEAC, 2012 p. 35). Generally, the study argues that the weaknesses of the cultural sector throughout the country is the lack of an exhaustive overview of cultural activities, the weak coordination of the sector, the limited and oftentimes difficult access to financing and subsidies, insufficient numbers of foreign tourists, and too strong a reliance on the state (that does not have sufficient funds to respond to the high demand of subsidies in the sector) and international partners (that tend to frame projects and funding in their own agenda, arguably leaving insufficient leeway for the development for a locally informed vision on culture) (BBEAC, 2012 pp. 35–36).

Table 4-2 - Division of Cultural Labour in Burkina Faso by Sex and Occupation in 2009

<i>Principal Activity</i>	<i>Sex</i>			
	<i>Masculine</i>	<i>Feminine</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>%</i>
Clothing Manufacturing	15714	11837	27551	16.7
Spinning, Weaving and Finishing of Textiles	6944	19127	26071	15.8
Manufacturing of cork, wooden, and straw articles	9619	15207	24826	15.1
Repair of personal and household articles	9458	1737	11195	6.8
Manufacturing of Ceramic products	754	8507	9261	5.6
Manufacturing of other textile articles	4348	2606	6954	4.2
Sports, recreational, and play	3220	3333	6553	4.0
Cinema, Radio, Television	5264	-	5264	3.2
Manufacturing others	3271	745	4016	2.4
Others	16310	3249	19559	14.2
Total	94184	70408	164592	100.0
Relative Share	57.2%	42.8%	1.78%	
Total active professionals	4572065	4689979	9262044	

Source: BBEAC (2012 p. 75)

Moreover, BBEAC study argues that the cultural sector contributes FCFA 80 billion (some EUR121 million) to the GDP of Burkina Faso in 2009. Moreover, imports of cultural goods are at FCFA143 billion in 2011 (or some EUR218 million), while exports are limited to FCFA 13 billion (or some EUR20 million) (BBEAC, 2012 p. 5). While the significant imports (and relatively insignificant exports) point at a real demand for products of cultural nature and the problematic lack of accurate data on the sector, the report lacks overall detail on the demarcation of the sectors and the provenance of the presented data. One issue, for example, is that the quoted export numbers of creative goods is greatly at odds with the numbers available from UNCTADstat (2012), as they

indicate that the exports in 2011 amounted to US\$ 2 million, which is well below the EUR20 million quoted by the BBEAC, as Table 4-3 below illustrates (see also Section 3.4 above).

Table 4-3 - Burkinabè Net Imports of Cultural Goods in 2011 (millions)

	<i>BBEAC (EUR)</i>	<i>UNCTAD (USD)</i>
Imports	218	36
Exports	20	2
Net Imports	198	34

Source: BBEAC (2012 p. 5) and UNCTADstat (2012)

Table 4-2, however, indicates that the total share of cultural workers in Burkina Faso is 164,592 in 2009 and it presents 1.78% of the total active professionals in the country.⁴³ The next chapter discusses the challenges regarding data and classification in greater detail. The latest numbers indicate a 2.14% share of cultural employment (UNESCO, 2015a).

According to the study, the relative absence of the state in combination with the dynamism of players in the field has facilitated the emergence of a number of successful cultural houses and festivals. These initiatives largely build on international networks of funding and cooperation, which *de facto* take over the role of the Burkinabè government to subsidize market failure in the sector. One entrepreneur I interviewed defines this as the *faire-faire* principle (as opposed to the free-market mantra *laissez-faire*).⁴⁴ This means that the government sets a broad and general framework, but leaves the implementation to networked and entrepreneurial Burkinabè cultural actors in conjunction with support from foreign organizations. Such activities, like the *Carrefour International du Théâtre de Ouagadougou (CITO)*, *l'Atelier Théâtre Burkinabè (ATB)*, *la Fédération du CARTEL*, *l'Espace Culturel Gambidi (ECG)*, *l'association SIRABA pour le théâtre*; *le Centre de Développement Chorégraphique (CDC)*, *l'Ecole de Danse Irène Tassebédo (EDIT) pour la danse*, *l'association Umané Culture*, and *l'association Jazz à Ouaga* (MCT, 2013 p. 21) operate at a relative distance from the culture ministry, and balance their own agenda with those of their respective funders.

⁴³ Interestingly, according to this study, there are less than 1 million active professionals (BBEAC, 2012 p. 74) on a total population of some 15 million in 2009.

⁴⁴ Where “laissez-faire” is a common term that denotes a governmental approach that leaves the market fend for itself, while it connotes a neoliberal approach to public-private relations. “Faire-faire” denotes making someone do something for you. It thus connotes an approach to governance that externalises the execution of policies to the civil society, often in partnership with international donors. This process is often called “NGO-isation”, since social movements need to take over tasks of the government and is a equally part of neoliberal processes of globalisation (Sheppard et al., 2009 p. 95ff).

In sum, the Burkinabè cultural policy (2008) provides a holistic understanding of culture that spans a broad range of notions of the concept. The cultural industries are part of this, but do not form the central focus of the document. The SCADD (2010) proposes the cultural industries as one of the 4 axes of accelerated economic growth in the country, by linking it to tourism and export strategies. The study of the social and economic impact of culture (BBEAC, 2012) provides insight in both the economic role of the cultural industries and the social role of culture in a more 'traditional' reading, but fails to link the two approaches (De Beukelaer, 2013). The focus of the cultural policies and development plans is thus significantly different. Yet, pending the adoption of a revised cultural policy, it is unclear how this will reflect on the explicit cultural strategy in the country. This means that, while culture was previously instrumentalised for national unity ('cultural development'), it has now become increasingly expedient (Yúdice, 2003) in economic terms ('culture *for* development').

4.2. Ghana: Cultural Policy from 'Chieftaincy' to 'Shared Growth'

In Ghana, Culture is a competency of the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, and Creative Arts since 2013.⁴⁵ Yet the civil society in the field of culture calls to give culture and, in particular, the "creative arts industry" its own ministry (Ocansey, n.d.), and laments the limited budget of the current ministry (Osarfo, 2014). Until February 2013, the cultural competency fell under the Ministry of Culture and Chieftaincy, which is now the Ministry of Chieftaincy and Traditional Affairs.⁴⁶ Previously, culture was primarily connected to tradition and livelihood, with less explicit attention for cultural expressions and cultural industries. At present, there is a stronger focus on culture as a part of Ghana's tourism strategy. Ghana is one of the main tourist destinations in the region, in part thanks to the cultural diversity, heritage, and cultural vibrancy of the country, alongside its political stability. Another important reason for the influx of tourists is the historical connection with the Americas through slave trade. Many African-Americans head to Ghana, which they see as the 'motherland,' to rekindle ancestral connections and discover African roots (Bruner, 1996).

Culture thus connects multiple parts of Ghanaian life and politics. It is prominent in many texts, but intentions are not always translated into action. The following excerpt from John Atta Mills' presidential Shared Growth Agenda, the country's development plan since 2010 illustrates this.

⁴⁵ <http://www.motcca.gov.gh/>

⁴⁶ <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/2012-02-08-08-18-09/ministries/239-ministry-of-chieftaincy-and-traditional-affairs>

To make it an instrument for social and economic development, the role of culture in the national development process has been duly recognized in the 1992 Republican Constitution of Ghana, under the Directive Principles of State Policy (Article 26(1) – (2) and 36(1) – (4)). Subsequently, Ghana has promoted the establishment of the National and Regional Houses of Chiefs to give the institution platforms for coordinating its activities and to participate in the national development process. The Ministry of Chieftaincy and Culture was established in 2006 to coordinate issues and activities relating to the development of chieftaincy and culture. However, the existing policy and institutional framework on culture and development remains weak. The key institutions are under-resourced; documentation on Ghana’s cultural history and chieftaincy including lines of succession are poor; a number of abandoned centres of national culture is scattered across the length and breadth of the country; and the support mechanism for the chieftaincy institution remains weak. (Atta Mills, 2010 p. 28)

Culture, moreover, is also integral to the overall development strategy of the country:

In this era of globalization and technological challenges, culture should be recognized not only in terms of capital for development but also as the most important driving force in human and material development, as well as democratic governance. Indigenous knowledge, history, cultural values and institutions, arts and crafts continue to influence national development. (Atta Mills, 2010 p. 27)

These ideas and aims echo the earlier cultural policy text, which dates from 2004, when culture fell under Chieftaincy. Yet, a separate body, the National Commission on Culture, in fact drafted the policy⁴⁷ with help from a Kenyan expert and with financial support from Germany. The cultural policy, in contrast to the development plan above, clearly defines what ‘culture’ means:

Culture is the totality of the way of life evolved by our people through experience and reflection in our attempt to fashion a harmonious co-existence with our environment. This culture is dynamic and gives order and meaning to the social, political, economic, aesthetic and religious practices of our people. Our culture also gives us our distinct identity as a people. (NCC, 2004 p. 9)

Yet, the text equally describes what culture entails:

⁴⁷ “The National Commission on Culture was established in 1990 by Provisional National Defense Council Law 238 to manage from a holistic perspective, the Cultural life of the country. In the execution of the aforementioned, the National Commission on Culture is enjoined, among other things, to promote the evolution of an integrated National Culture, supervise the implementation of programmes for the preservation, promotion and representation of Ghana tradition and values; and perform such other functions as may be prescribed by government.” (NCC, 2014)

Our Culture manifests in our ideals and ideas, beliefs and values; folklore, environment, science and technology; and in the forms of our political, social, legal and economic institutions. It also manifests in the aesthetic quality and humanistic dimension of our literature, music, drama, architecture, carvings, paintings and other artistic forms. (NCC, 2004 p. 9)

The particularity of the Ghanaian cultural policy is that it does not only refer to tradition and history in an abstract manner, but that it also illustrates how this historical reflexivity is enshrined in Asante culture. This illustrates how broad and holistic the understanding of culture is in 2004, before subsequent policy texts increasingly reduce it to a more narrow understanding. While culture remains present in a holistic way, as the quotes from the development plans above illustrate, I argue that, because references to culture remain largely introductory, this holistic focus is not operationalized in practical policy approaches:

Culture is a dynamic phenomenon. This is established by our concept of Sankofa, which establishes linkages with the positive aspects of our past and the present. The concept affirms the co-existence of the past and the future in the present. It therefore, embodies the attitude of our people to the interaction between traditional values and the demands of modern technology within the contemporary international cultural milieu. (NCC, 2004 p. 9)

Figure 4-3 - Sankofa: 'return for it'



Sankofa (Figure 4-3) is often combined with Ofamfa. They respectively mean 'return for it' and 'critical examination.' When combining them, they gain a more complex meaning: "a return to the past must be guided by critical examination" (Gyekye, 1996 p. iv). The policy text thus explicitly stresses the need to engage with history in a critical manner. This is repeated in relation to a range of different fields of activity. Yet there is less focus on what Sankofa and Ofamfa mean in practical terms with reference to, for example, broadcast or language policy.

The Ghanaian cultural policy mentions the 'culture industry' in a separate section. Here, the link to crafts and tourism is clear, but a real definition or formal demarcation of these industries is lacking (see next section) (NCC, 2004 pp. 42–45). The principles of implementation state that the:

Cultural Goods and Services are an integral part of the national economy. However, for creativity and cultural entrepreneurship to thrive and contribute to wealth and employment generation, it is necessary to protect cultural goods and services from the forces and logic of the free market economy through tax relief and other measures. (NCC, 2004 p. 16)

The focus on tax relief is one of the points where the ambition of the text has not yet translated into practice.

The general tendency of the cultural policy is to embrace culture simultaneously in broad and narrow notions, while committing to support all forms of culture. It is strong on commitment, but weak on the articulation how to advance. One of the mechanisms proposed to implement the aims of the policy is the Cultural Trust Fund (NCC, 2004 p. 21). This Fund was established in the year the cultural policy was published (GhanaWeb, 2004), but it is unclear to what extent this fund still exists or what it has been able to attain. The lack of a budgetary clarification underlines this issue. Later documents, such as the Creative Sector Medium-Term Development Plan (NDPC, 2012) do provide detailed actions and budgets. This document builds more strongly on the creative economy discourse, and was drafted by the National Development Planning Commission (NDPC), and not the National Commission on Culture. The overall national development policy framework focuses on culture primarily through the 'creative industry':

The key strategies for enhancing the competitiveness of the private sector are: private sector development; good corporate governance; development of viable and efficient micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs); accelerated industrial development; development of the tourism industry; and the promotion of the Creative Industry. (NDPC, 2010 p. xiv)

The Ghana Shared Growth Strategy stresses the following issues concerning the efforts to "promoting the creative industry for economic development" (NDPC, 2010 pp. 138–139):

- Weak institutional framework for the development of the Creative Industry
- Weak sector-related laws which do not conform with the five column models which are copyright law, copyright contract, neighbouring rights, collecting societies and enforcement, to conform to global standards

- Lack of access to long-term financing for the sector
- Lack of appropriate collection society
- Weak enforcement of copy right [sic] laws
- Weak coordination mechanism among the Ministries, Departments and Agencies (MDAs) on issues related to the Creative Industry
- Lack of designated unit within the MDAs to facilitate the growth of the Creative Industry
- None existence [sic] of a Council for the Creative Industry to oversee the growth of the Creative Economy

Culture runs through the constitution and the development plans of Ghana, and the attention to the cultural past has long been exemplified by Sankofa and Ofamfa. The cultural or creative industries, however, are not central to the cultural policy, but feature increasingly in medium and long-term development plans as a driver of economic growth and a basis for tourism. At the same time, while the cultural policies focus on decolonizing cultural life (Ayibadeinyefa, 2011 p. 17), there is little attention to the fact that much of cultural policy ideas and debates are uncritically imported – which some stakeholders referred to as ‘colonization’ (Cultural Activist, Accra #2).

Across both countries, the overlap between cultural policies and development plans has become explicit, but only in to the extent that the cultural industries feature prominently in development plans. The major change lies in the shift from culture as a fabric of social cohesion and as a bridge between traditions and their mutations towards an understanding of culture as a driver of economic growth.

4.3. Defining and Delineating Cultural Industries

Generally speaking, the national uptake of the cultural or creative industries discourse is rather recent. Yet the discourse has featured at the international level since the 1970s (UNESCO, 1982a). Explicit engagement on the African continent started with the first Dakar Plan of Action (OAU and UNESCO, 1992), culminated into the second Dakar Plan of Action (ACP, 2003) and the Nairobi Plan of Action for Cultural Industries in Africa (African Union, 2005) before becoming an integral part of the Arterial Network publication *Adapting the Wheel: Cultural Policies for Africa* (Forbes, 2011).

This section explicitly engages with the definitions of the cultural and creative industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana. And, it equally shows which particular activities are included in these definitions. This is needed because, while the general creative economy discourse is global, the particular use is locally defined. This section clarifies the particularities of the discourse in the context of Burkina Faso and Ghana (see Table

1-1). In order to work with this discourse and measure activity, a clear definition and demarcation is needed.

In Burkina Faso, the cultural industries are defined as (MCTC, 2008 pp. 67–68):

*Industries producing cultural goods and services. The content of these goods, services, and activities encompasses the signification or the values transmitted. The artistic expression of these goods, services, and activities, encompasses the cultural expression that results from creativity or aesthetic creation.*⁴⁸

This definition is almost an exact copy of the way UNESCO defines cultural expressions in a preparatory document towards the 2005 convention (UNESCO, 2004). In spite of the active engagement with the concept, the document explicitly articulates reservations about the use in the Burkinabè cultural context (MCTC, 2008 pp. 25–26):

*The cultural industries are, as a whole, embryonic. The most viable sectors are cinema and audio-visual industries, and the recording industry, and we can add the crafts industry.*⁴⁹

The SCADD does not provide a clear definition of the cultural industries, but links it to crafts and tourism industries (SCADD, 2010 pp. 45–47). A later study prepared for the Ministry of Culture and Tourism (MCT, 2013) does advance the understanding of the concept significantly. It locates the origins of the discourse in the work of Adorno and Horkheimer, its later transformations through policy discourse in France, Britain, and Australia and its subsequent uptake in debates at the international level (notably UNESCO and UNCTAD). The definition here extends beyond the approach in the National Cultural Policy described above, and demarcates the boundaries of the field, building on the UNESCO convention (2005b) and Nairobi Plan of Action for the Cultural Industries in Africa (African Union, 2005):

- Recorded music (discs)
- Performing arts and festivities (theatre, dance, music performance)
- Cinema and audio-visuals (cinema, video, radio, and television)
- Books, press, and digital media (books, publishing, newspapers, magazines, online press)

⁴⁸ « Industries produisant des biens et services culturels tels que définis ci-dessus. Le contenu de ces biens, services et activités désigne la signification ou les valeurs ainsi transmises. L'expression artistique de ces biens, services et activités, désigne l'expression culturelle qui résulte de la créativité ou de la création esthétique » (MCTC, 2008 pp. 67–68).

⁴⁹ « Les industries culturelles sont, dans l'ensemble, embryonnaires. Les filières les plus porteuses sont les industries du cinéma et de l'audiovisuel, du disque auxquelles on pourrait ajouter celle de l'artisanat d'art » (MCTC, 2008 pp. 25–26).

- Arts, crafts, and applied visual art (photography, painting, sculpture, drawing, crafts, hairdressing and clothing, decorative arts)
- Technologies with cultural and creative content (videogames, ICT, digital)
- Cultural heritage (material and immaterial heritage)
- Cultural tourism (MCT, 2013 p. 14)⁵⁰

Official texts in Burkina Faso use the term 'industries culturelles' while the study for the ministry that provides a clear demarcation of the concept by sectors refers to the 'industries culturelles et créatives.' The term commonly used by stakeholders in the cultural sector, however, remains 'industries culturelles.'

Overall, the definition is used in a creative way. The BBEAC (2012) study discussed in the previous section, for example, fails to provide a clear demarcation of the sector, but does give fairly detailed disaggregated data on imports and exports. The problem here is that the imported cultural products chiefly constitute "tobacco-based products [whatever that may be, apart from cigarettes], appliances for the reception, conversion and transmission or regeneration of voice [does this include mobile phones?], tiles, textiles, used clothing, shoes, furniture, beauty products and makeup" (p. 79).⁵¹ At the risk of being cynical, it would seem like quite a victory for both the tobacco and cultural creative economy lobby if cigarette sales and imports would be included in CCI statistics. The sectors above surpass the most 'creative' use of statistics in the creative economy (Tremblay, 2011) (see Chapter 3). This highlights the need to have a more unified approach (at least within the country) as to what goods and activities are part of the cultural industries. But before it can be demarcated, the sector needs to be defined more clearly.

In Ghana, the cultural policy document mentions the 'culture industry' in an explicit, though superficial, manner. It addresses sectors like tourism, food, clothing, and gift shops, but does not provide a definition or demarcation of the concept nor the sector (NCC, 2004 pp. 42–45). Broadcast and audiovisual media are addressed in a different

⁵⁰ « La musique enregistrée (disque); les arts de la scène et festivités (théâtre et arts apparentés, danse, spectacle de musique) ; le cinéma et l'audiovisuel (cinéma, vidéo, radio et télédiffusion) ; le livre, la presse écrite et numérique (livre, édition, journaux, magazines, et presse en ligne) ; l'artisanat d'arts, les arts plastiques et appliqués (photographie, peinture, sculpture, dessin, artisanat d'art, art capillaire et vestimentaire, arts décoratifs) ; les technologies à contenus culturelles ou créatifs (jeux vidéo, TIC, numérique.). le patrimoine culturel (patrimoine matériel et immatériel) ; le tourisme culturel » (MCT, 2013 p. 14).

⁵¹ « Les produits à base de tabac, les produits tels que les appareils pour la réception, la conversion et la transmission ou la régénération de la voix, les carreaux vernissés ou émaillés en céramique, les produits de l'habillement (tissus, articles de friperie, chaussures, etc.), les meubles, les produits de beauté et de maquillage. » (BBEAC, 2012 p. 79)

chapter, where an ambitious programme to work with Ghanaian value systems towards locally produced and locally relevant content. It furthermore stipulates the pre-eminence of national over foreign content in the media (NCC, 2004 pp. 46–48). Similarly, the link between culture, science, and technology is addressed in a separate chapter, focusing on the need to develop a broad inclusion of indigenous knowledge and technology into scientific advancements (NCC, 2004 p. 49).

Yet, when discussing the potential of the cultural and creative industries, this is not done by explicitly using the term:

Ghana is endowed with traditional arts, which form the basis of our traditional industry. These art forms thrive very well and account for a significant proportion of employment and revenue generation in the informal sector. This policy shall ensure the growth of the arts to promote creative talent development, and to serve as the means of passing on traditional skills and creativity to the youth. (NCC, 2004 p. 30)

The National Development and Planning Commission (NDPC) provide a somewhat more coherent introduction to the sector in their Creative Sector Medium-Term Development Plan:

The creative economy is the complex interaction between culture, economics and technology. A new development paradigm is emerging that links the economy and culture, embracing economic, cultural, technological and social aspects of development at both the macro and micro levels. Central to the new paradigm is the fact that creativity, knowledge and access to information are increasingly recognized as powerful engines driving economic growth and promoting development in a globalizing world. The emerging creative economy has become a leading component of economic growth, employment, trade and innovation, and social cohesion in many countries. In line with these developments, the Government of Ghana recognizes the potential that the Creative Industries have to shape and reinforce Ghana's economic growth. As a result, it has become Ghana government policy to organise the sector in a more strategic manner so that it will be able to deliver services and contribute to the larger good of the economy. (NDPC, 2012 p. 1)

Alongside this definition, the document classifies the sector in ten domains (NDPC, 2012 p. vi), providing an exact copy of the UNCTAD classification proposed in their creative economy reports (2010 p. 8):

- Cultural sites (Archaeological sites, Museums, Libraries)
- Visual Arts (Paintings, Sculptures, Photography, Antiques)
- Publishing and Printed Media (Books, Press, and other publications)
- Design (Interior, Graphic, Fashion, Jewellery, and Toys)

- Creative Services (Architectural, Advertising, Cultural and Recreational, Creative Research and Development, Digital and other related creative services)
- New Media (Software, Video Games, Digitalized Creative Content)
- Audio Visuals (Film, Television, Radio, and other broadcasting)
- Performing Arts (Live Music, Theatre, Dance, Opera, Circus, Puppetry, etc.)
- Traditional Cultural Expressions (Arts and Crafts, Festivals and Celebrations)

The aim of including culture and creative arts in the National Development Strategy is “to harness, develop, promote and maximize the utilization of cultural assets and values to serve as the basis for national identity, quality education, wealth creation and socio-economic empowerment” (NDPC, 2012 p. 20).

The document provides some detail on the visual arts and music sectors, but not on the eight others, due to a lack of available data (NDPC, 2012 p. 6). It does, however, provide a detailed and budgeted plan of action (NDPC, 2012 pp. 26–72) for a total budget of GH¢7,789,865.00, or EUR 1,885,926.00 (NDPC, 2012 p. vii).

Overall, the terminology shifted from “culture industry” to “creative sector”, “creative economy” and “creative industries” in official documents. The competent ministry is now called “Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts” and refers to the sector as the “creative arts industry” (Ofosu-Adjare, 2013). And the most common term throughout interviews and meetings was “Creative Industry” (in the singular).

4.4. Conclusion: The Practical Need for Conceptual Clarity

The engagement with the global creative economy discourse in Burkina Faso and Ghana is largely driven by two major international policy documents, as overlaps with local policies suggest. In Burkina Faso, the use, definition, and demarcation of the ‘industries culturelles’ can be retraced to the UNESCO (2005b) Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions. In Ghana, the use, definition, and demarcation of the ‘creative (arts) industry’ builds on the UNCTAD (2008; 2010) Creative Economy Report definition.

The explicit engagement with the creative economy discourse across policy domains and documents creates a *de facto* overlap between development plans and cultural policies. Given this recent shift, it remains as of yet unclear what the practical implications of this overlap are. Though it is clear that this has formally altered the notion of culture in public policy from ‘cultural development’ where the focus lay on the creation of national unity towards ‘culture for development’ where culture, by means of the ‘industries culturelles’ and the ‘creative (arts) industry’ is meant to help drive development – in economic terms and otherwise.

As a result, the overlapping engagement with culture calls creates confusion as to what 'culture' really means in development plans and what 'development' means in cultural policies and planning documents. The overlap is potentially interesting, but a more thorough understanding is needed to allow for a fruitful debate across ministries.

Finally, while the discourse is now widely used in different guises, the definitions and demarcations of the sector remain either way vague or derivative of international policy documents. There is, so far, no sign of a grounded conceptualisation and demarcation of what the creative economy discourse means for Burkina Faso and Ghana. In the next chapter, I address the practical and ideological implications of this conceptual opacity in detail.

5. Conceptual Divergence and Strategic Adoption of the Creative Economy Discourse

In spite of the discursive engagement with cultural and creative industries, there is a remarkable reluctance to fully embrace the term in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Stakeholders at all levels often mention the cultural industries because of the centrality of the discourse in national cultural policies and international texts (see Chapter 4 above). But many of them also contest the term when discussing its meaning in the context of cultural creation and circulation in the local context. They reject the notion of the cultural industries on the grounds that the sector is not sufficiently organized, and that it does not correspond to ideals of proper (cultural) industries. Overall, there is little belief among those working in culture that cycles of production, dissemination, and consumption can actually be called cultural or creative industries. I argue that the reluctance to embrace the discourse is not because there are no music industries (or cultural industries in general), but because the imported discourse does not adequately reflect the existing practices.

The *African Creative Economy Conferences* (2011, Nairobi; 2012, Dakar; 2013, Cape Town; and 2014, Casablanca), organised by Arterial Network attempts to engage with the characteristics, specificities and challenges of the creative economy in countries across the continent. One presenter argues, at the first edition in Nairobi, that “the creative economy is a new concept, a new reality”⁵² (Odia, 2011 p. 1), and goes on to characterise the sector in general terms:

*The industrialization of culture consists of three factors: the division of labour, the mechanisation of production, and the valorisation of capital.*⁵³ (Odia, 2011 p. 4)

This is a clear instance where the complexity of cultural and creative industries is reduced to a prescriptive formula. It stresses what these industries *should* be rather than how current activities may help transform the discourse. Another presenter at the same event stresses that:

[A] new language is needed and shared coherent arguments for why the market is not an adequate guardian of culture and why culture is valuable in its own right. A narrative that takes us further than the formulation of ‘arts for its own sake’, ‘culture for develop-

⁵² « L'économie créative » est un nouveau concept, une nouvelle réalité. » (Odia, 2011 p. 1)

⁵³ « L'industrialisation de la culture passe par trois facteurs : la division du travail, la mécanisation de la production et la valorisation du capital. » (Odia, 2011 p. 4)

ment or *'the cultural dimension of development' and the 'creative industries.'* (Joffe, 2011)

The remainder of this chapter points at the challenges that prevail in the strategic use and contestation of an imported discourse in the context of cultural production. In doing so, I stress the fact that such a 'new language' is yet to take form. In this context, stakeholders and policymakers in the cultural sector in Burkina Faso and Ghana focus too much on the perceived orthodoxy of the global discourse, and pay insufficient attention to the ways existing practices are in fact part of a historically and culturally contingent kind of cultural industries that has its own inherent merit and challenges. My aim is to show that the discourse should change to accommodate the existing practices to a greater extent than the other way around.

There is, moreover, no agreement on the way this discourse does and does not apply to Burkina Faso or Ghanaian contexts. There are but a few of my interviewees who would initially argue that there are indeed cultural or creative industries in the context they work in. While they argue that the concept can be used, they remark that the industries, in spite of their existence, are still in an emergent phase. Both policies and stakeholders acknowledge this explicitly (Zida, 2010 p. 63; Zorom, 2012 p. 79). This section explores the strategic adoption of the discourse by stakeholders in both countries. This means that the term is used, but more to play for strategic purposes, as highlighted at the end of this section, than to engage with the organisation and logic of the production, distribution, and consumption of culture.

This chapter aims to show *how* the tension between the conceptually divergent (and at times contradictory) use and the strategic adoption of the creative economy discourse matters. I do not simply show that the discourse is contested, but highlight in what ways the current lack of clarity, which particularly relates to the fourth and fifth points made above, causes the discourse to both lose a clear basis for empirical engagement with the sector (because the definition and demarcation are not clear) and limits the public debate on the ideological foundations and socio-economic contradictions of the sector.

5.1. 'Embryonic' Cultural Industries in Burkina Faso

Nearly all interviewees in Burkina Faso expressed reluctance to embrace the term 'industries culturelles' to describe existing activity.

The sector is not really at the level of the 'industries culturelles': it is not yet aware of its potential. The discourse is there, but the knowledge and vision are lacking. (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14)

There are major events that demonstrate an occasional economic effervescence, but it's not an industry.⁵⁴ [What exists in Burkina Faso], I don't call that 'industries culturelles,' because there is no structure. We take it on the side. There are individuals, but there is no industry.⁵⁵ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #15)

To tell you the truth, I have to admit, I do not understand the concept ['industries culturelles'] very well. This concept, it is as if, from one day to another, culture will become like cotton or gold [two major Burkinabè exports]. I have a problem with this at the level of financial profitability. You should not dream. I have the impression that when talking about cultural industries, say, Burkinabè dancers will get up one day and 'bam!' they'll become like beer sellers: during the day they dance, and in the evening they will do the accounts. I caricature, alright. But there is a commercial language, strictly financial, that is being applied to the level of culture.⁵⁶ (International Organisation, Ouagadougou #17)

The above quotes illustrate one common thread through the use of the term: the discourse is strategically adopted, as the sector buys into the discursive shift in policies (see Chapter 4), but the divergent understanding of the term hampers its full embracing by the same stakeholders – much like in other countries. The reasons differ slightly, and range from a lack of vision, of structure, of knowledge, or of economic performance. None of my interviewees engage with the perceived orthodoxy of the cultural industries as a concept or the logic at work in the existing realm of cultural production and trade. The focus is on the level between the discourse and the practice, but not very much with discourse or practices in themselves. This reflects the fact that the notion of the cultural industries has come in through international discourse, rather than a critical engagement with the sector itself. Yet some interviewees point at the lack of real engagement with the new discourse, and point out how it is adopted on a mere superficial level:

⁵⁴ « Il y'a des manifestations majeures qui subissent une certaine effervescence économique ponctuelle ... mais c'est pas une industrie. »

⁵⁵ « [Ce qui existe au Burkina Faso], je n'appelle ça pas des industries culturelles, parce que c'est pas structure. On prend ça a côté. Il y a des individualités, mais il n'y a pas une industrie. »

⁵⁶ « Pour te dire la vérité, pour bien t'avouer, je ne comprends pas très bien le concept. Le concept-là, c'est comme au jour du lendemain on peut dire que la culture ... va devenir comme le coton ou comme l'or. Au niveau rentabilité financière, à ce niveau, j'ai un problème. J'ai l'impression que quand on parle des industries culturelles, c'est comme si au jour du lendemain la culture au Burkina ... euh ... les danseurs burkinabés vont se lever un lendemain, et puis, baf! Ils vont devenir comme des vendeurs de bière, le jour ils vont danser, et le soir ils font des comptes. Je caricature hein. Il y a un langage commercial. Purement financier qu'on est en train de ramener au niveau de la culture. »

I find that there are no cultural entrepreneurs. Each claims to be a cultural entrepreneur. Every manager with one or two artists pretends to be an entrepreneur. But this title cannot be claimed, it should be earned.⁵⁷ (Manager, Ouagadougou #8)

At the same time, the very notion of the cultural industries is challenged as exogenous.

It is true that the notion of the 'industries culturelles' seems new, because it corresponds to an organisational system that is not necessarily our own. When we talk about crafts, we're no longer in that domain. There was no industrial notion of cultural products and goods. Cultural goods were created to respond to a certain social, and perhaps even economic, need. But, this was in a much smaller context, a local context. This is why we speak much more of crafts. This is far more developed than the 'industries culturelles.' The 'industries culturelles' can thus build on the existence of arts and crafts in order to evolve towards another level, which is industrialisation.⁵⁸ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #15)

This quote illustrates that, while crafts are formally part of the cultural industries, their internal organization is seen as different from the 'real' cultural industries. This chimes with the conclusions of a study of the sector, that argues that the Burkinabè 'industries culturelles' remain at times closer to craft than industry (d'Almeida and Alleman, 2010 p. 7). This shows the extent to which the cultural industries are seen as fundamentally different from existing practices in arts and crafts in Burkina Faso. The interviewee in question does not recognise that crafts may present a *different form* of 'industries culturelles' that is not necessarily a stage that would have to be addressed in order to become part of the current discourse. There is however ample leeway in the conceptual understanding of the cultural industries to accommodate existing practices within this hegemonic discourse. This is an instance where the language of the cultural industries should adapt to the existing practices, and not the other way around. Yet there remains a deadlock between the alien-ness of the term and the lack of a perception of culture as industrial:

⁵⁷ « Je trouve qu'il y a pas d'entrepreneurs culturels. Chacun prétend être un entrepreneur culturel. Chacun qui a un ou deux artistes à manager prétend d'être un entrepreneur. En plus, ce titre, ça se réclame pas, ça se mérite. »

⁵⁸ « C'est vrai que la notion industries culturelles semble nouvelle, parce que elle correspond à un système d'organisation qui n'est pas forcément le nôtre. Quand on parle d'artisanat, on se trouve plus dans ce domaine-là. Il y avait pas une notion industrielle des produits et biens culturels. Les biens culturels étaient faits pour répondre à un besoin social et même peut-être économique. Mais dans un cadre plus petit, dans un cadre local. C'est pour cela qu'on parle beaucoup plus d'artisanat d'art. C'est beaucoup plus développé que l'industrie culturelle. Donc l'industrie culturelle peut donc se reposer sur cette existence sur l'artisanat d'art et évoluer vers une autre étape qui est l'industrialisation. »

Today, we have imported this notion of the industrialisation of culture. And people, first of all, do not understand this notion.⁵⁹ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #15)

The main issue is not a rejection of the discourse as such, because it is embraced for strategic purposes. The issue is that industrialisation is seen in relation to manufacturing industries where structure and formality are key. This links badly, however, to the understanding of cultural industries as *critique* of the transposition of such an industrial logic to the field of culture (see Chapter 2 above). Much like other *buzzwords* in international development debates (see e.g. Cornwall, 2007), the concept acts as the basis of a supposedly “universal script” (Pinheiro and Hauge, 2014; Dzudzek and Lindner, 2013). In order to change the understanding of the terms to accommodate the culturally and historically contingent practices, the global debate should allow for more open engagement so that the discourse can be contested and better translated. At present, much of the discourse is perceived as part of the agenda of others, without a clear understanding of the differences in understanding:

When they [UNESCO] speak of ‘industries culturelles,’ we are peripheral to their concern. We do not speak in the same way. They speak of their ‘industries culturelles,’ not ours. We are there [at UNESCO in Paris] to vote yes or no, but it does not go beyond that.⁶⁰ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #15)

The quote above refers to negotiations at UNESCO level about the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005b). This convention prompted the revision of the cultural policy text in Burkina Faso (see Chapter 4 above). The latest creative economy report, however, takes a far more inclusive approach towards the diversity of cultural industries around the world (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). This means that there is increasing attention to the global divergence in the meaning and use of the concept. Notwithstanding the above critique, some commentators remain cautious, but stress that the sector is changing a lot:

I can say that Burkina Faso has no music industry. Production barely exists. Seydoni [a major production house and CD/cassette manufacturer] has closed shop, but came back.⁶¹ You need a full chain to be able to speak of a chain, which we don’t have. But it

⁵⁹ « Aujourd'hui on a importé cette notion d'industrialisation culturelle et des gens qui ne comprennent pas cette notion d'abord. »

⁶⁰ « Quand ils [UNESCO] parlent des industries culturelles on est la périphérie de leur préoccupation. On parle pas de la même manière. Ils parlent de leurs industries culturelles - pas les nôtres. On est là pour voter oui ou non - mais ça ne dépasse pas ça. »

⁶¹ This is a popular misconception. The company divested distribution and some manufacturing processes, and had to let go of some employees in the process, but it never fully closed.

*is important to note that there is, however, improvement. Producers are rare, but try to get organised. We have associations for managers and producers. What is left to do is really to put the foot on the accelerator.*⁶² (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #10)

And, occasionally, stakeholders would contend that there are actually cultural industries in the country:

*Saying that there are no 'industries culturelles' in Burkina Faso, that's completely wrong.*⁶³ (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #18)

When this idea is shared more broadly, respondents refer to Seydoni Productions as the only 'industry' (in the singular, presumably because it is just this one company) that hosts the biggest recording studio and the only large-scale cassette and CD duplication facility of the country. Due to a limited profit margin on distributions, they stopped that activity. Yet, even when making the case that there are in fact cultural industries, reservations remain. This is particularly the case for the interviewee above:

*One could say that the industry is not organized, and the government is not busy doing this.*⁶⁴ (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #18)

In spite of the focus on the 'industries culturelles' as a quintessentially private enterprise, most stakeholders still expect the government to take the lead. This not only manifests itself in conceptual terms, but also at a practical level. In several informal conversations, stakeholders stressed the need for endorsement by the ministry before projects could be initiated. But the ministry itself tries to instigate movement precisely in the opposite direction:

It's true that we speak of the 'industries culturelles,' but in the heads of the cultural actors, it's not clear. Even those who are active in cultural entrepreneurship remain attached to the teats of the state for subsidies. Even Seydoni Productions, they asked [the state] to participate in their capital investment. It is difficult. In their heads it's not

⁶² « Je peux dire que le Burkina Faso n'a pas d'industrie musicale. La production n'existe presque pas. Seydoni a fermé le pot, mais est revenu. Il faut toute une chaîne pour parler d'une chaîne ... ce qu'on a pas. Mais c'est important de noter quand-même qu'il y a de l'amélioration. Les artistes sont de plus en plus formés, et coachés. Les producteurs sont rares, mais ils essayent de s'organiser. On a des associations de managers et des producteurs ... il reste vraiment de mettre le pied sur l'accélérateur. »

⁶³ « Dire qu'il n'y a pas d'industries culturelles au Burkina Faso, c'est complètement faux. »

⁶⁴ « On peut dire que l'industrie n'est pas organisée, et le gouvernement n'est pas en train de faire ça. »

*clear. It is a work that needs to be done by ARPIC and ministry so that, little by little, people will accept.*⁶⁵ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14)

What “people will [have to] accept” is the shift away from depending on government to the need to develop a more entrepreneurial way of working. So the civil servant above implies that embracing the creative economy discourse is not a neutral choice. It is about making clear that the state cannot be the sole patron of the arts, and that private engagement needs to increase in order to render large parts of the cultural sector economically viable. A musician supports this approach explicitly:

*The idea of the cultural industries – or the music industries, because that is the field I master – is still new. Producers, artists, agents, and so on are in a period of – not apprenticeship, but ... trial and error, in order to eventually understand. Not everyone has understood that it [the ‘industries culturelles’] is a personal business before it is one of the state.*⁶⁶ (Musician, Ouagadougou #7)

In spite of the reluctant optimism of those who embrace the discourse in a strategic way to focus more on the potential of the market as opposed to the limited ability of the state to support cultural activity, some concerns extend well beyond nomenclature. One person comments:

I don't really see [the ‘industries culturelles’] and I'm not very optimistic. I don't see concrete perspectives. The fact is that the Burkinabè cultural sector does have some things to offer, but does not know how to sell itself. Domestically, this is because everything is blocked, and internationally because there are no mechanisms to sell culture abroad. (Cultural Activist, Ouagadougou #19)

This criticism points at a schism between the languages used to address the cultural sector and the way it is perceived by a range of stakeholders. The argument above,

⁶⁵ « C'est vrai qu'on parle des industries culturelles. Mais dans les têtes des acteurs culturels, c'est pas clair. Même ceux dans l'entrepreneuriat culturel restent accrochés aux mamelles de l'Etat pour des subventions. Même Seydoni productions, ils ont demandé de rentrer dans leur capital. C'est difficile. Dans leurs têtes c'est pas clair. C'est un travail qui doit être fait par ARPIC et le ministère pour que petit à petit les gens acceptent. »

⁶⁶ « Cette idée des industries culturelles - ou bien musicales, comme je maîtrise ça - c'est encore nouveau. C'est encore nouveau. Les producteurs que les artistes, les agents etc., ils sont tous dans une période de - pas l'apprentissage ... mais le tatillonne – pour comprendre éventuellement. Pas tout le monde a compris que c'est un business personnel avant que c'est un business de l'Etat. »

that “everything is blocked” within the country is crucial, because politics plays a far greater role in the Burkinabè cultural sector than formal policy texts show.⁶⁷

While the creative economy discourse is strategically adopted throughout the cultural sector, in order to respond to the current trend in policy, the term ‘industries culturelles’ remains little understood. Whether music workers think there they are part of ‘industries culturelles’ in Burkina Faso or not, they think of it as something foreign and abstract that the Burkinabè cultural sector should start resembling. Yet no one speaks explicitly of the particular characteristics of the currently existing cultural production, distribution, and consumption strategies and patterns as *sui generis* Burkinabè – or *mutatis mutandis* African – cultural or creative industries.

5.2. The ‘Emerging’ Creative (Arts) Industry in Ghana

In Ghana, the general appreciation of the creative economy discourse is slightly more positive than in Burkina Faso. But also in this context, the claim there actually is a ‘creative (arts) industry’ in the country, is usually followed by the clarification that they are not functioning properly:

It has become a fashionable expression. Where I'm concerned, I have been a music producer and promoter. I think ... I don't think the Ghanaian industry has developed to the extent that you can speak of a music industry. There are promoters and artists, that's all. (Producer and Manager, Accra #18)

There are several reasons for this reluctance. One argument is the fact that the sector does not live up to its potential:

The reality of the music business is at odds with the expectations. That's why I don't call it an industry. It has been changing a lot in the past 20 years. We have a few more years to go before I'll be comfortable saying we have an industry. And then we can start grooming the industry. But now we are shaping the industry. I do not think we are there yet. (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

But, commentary also builds on a perceived lack of coherence:

I'm not gonna say we have an industry, yeah. Because there's nothing really ... there's no coordination ... no network. What I wanna say is that ... those who have been in the industry for a long time ... some have benefited. We have no industry, but some have

⁶⁷ There is much hope in the cultural sector after the 2014 popular uprising (that was partially driven by key musicians) that the connection between politics and culture will become less tainted by party politics through political patronage. Yet any engagement with changes after 30-31 October 2014 falls beyond the scope of my dissertation.

benefited. There must be something good in there. (Producer and Communication, Accra #12)

So, while this interviewee challenges the existence of the 'creative (arts) industry' as such, later references to the sector use the very term. This ties in with the imaginary of the industry as something that exists *elsewhere*, but which has not yet come to fruition in Ghana:

The structure of the industry, the things that are supposed to be in place for the industry to function properly, just as is done abroad, are still very inadequate. There is still a lot of work going on to get the industry to run properly. (Entrepreneur, Accra #19, Emphasis Added)

This, however, contrasts, with some voices that make the argument that the music or creative industries do in fact exist in Ghana. And, while this argument is exceptional in Burkina Faso, in Ghana it is slightly more common.

They are proper industries. They are in flux. The basic structures are there. We need to fine-tune and make things attractive. We have GHAMRO. So, there is an industry in Ghana ... it's not operating at the moment ... we are not far from it ... but there are stringent measures to make it work. Before, there was apathy, lack of interest. Now we see something can work here. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6)

Another stakeholder argues:

It's an industry. It's not properly organized, but it provides employment to a lot of people. But it's growing because people start taking it more seriously. Not at the pace we want it to - but it's definitely a long way from how it was in the past. It's an industry. There have been efforts to make the government to see it as such, and to acknowledge it as such. (Entrepreneur, Accra #19)

While the term is explicitly embraced, it always comes with reservation. The need to be more 'organised' is central, also when alternative terms are proposed:

No, you can't speak of a music industry in Ghana. We have a music market, which is the word I prefer to use. We have a market, and the market still needs to be organised, needs certain things to be put in place, in order to build it into an industry. We are not quite there yet. (Entrepreneur, Accra #17)

Such thinking remains firmly rooted in the paradigm of teleological development thinking. It implicitly echoes the modernization theories, such as Rostow's five stages of economic growth in the mid-20th century (1960). Yet, beyond organisation, a major challenge remains the measurement of the sector. One stakeholder made the explicit argument that activity needs measuring before it can be called a real industry.

When I say industry, I am referring to an area or a sector that is making money. For a long time it wasn't organised, it improved tremendously now. But I think I don't like calling it an industry, because we still can't quantify it. If we are able to quantify it and see how much it contributes to GDP and all those things than we can say, "this is an industry." (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

Since this interview, the Ghanaian musicians union (MUSIGA) released a study they commissioned from KPMG to calculate the scope of the music industry in the country. Yet, measuring the economic performance of the music industries alone has proven to be a major challenge, and engaging with the cultural or creative industries as a whole poses a pertinent question: which activities are part of these industries and which ones are not? Almost all spinners (DJs) perform at funerals (KPMG, 2014 p. 115), for traditional groups, funerals constitute the biggest source of income (over GH¢6m out of a total of nearly GH¢9m) (KPMG, 2014 p. 128). How can the prominence of (live) music at funerals in Ghana inform a Ghanaian understanding of value creation in music? And what does this mean for the 'creative (arts) industry' as a whole? What place do religious and life-cycle celebrations (baptisms, weddings, and funerals) have in the Ghanaian 'creative industry'?

Many questions remain, but the active *blogosphere* in the Ghanaian cultural sector makes for a vivid discussion forum on the 'creative (arts) industry' in general and the music industries or 'showbiz' in particular. While academic interest is merely emerging, conceptual and practical debates are becoming public, as the following excerpt from a blog-post illustrates:

Although there are clearly discernible continuities between 'cultural' and 'creative' industries, the emerging, or even emerged, international consensus is that the difference can be described as an extension or even shift from the concept of publicly funded or subsidised 'arts' or 'cultural initiatives' and broadcast media to more modern and knowledge intensive applications of creativity. (Addy, 2013)

The comparison between the existing structures and an idealised image of such industries elsewhere implicitly locates the existing industries on a teleological vector of progress. This means that what exists is inadequate in the light of what should be reached. I argue, however, that the challenge lies less in following this teleology and more in focusing on translating the notion so it better suits what exists, because the thriving informal cultural economy is not something new. It has always existed in some way or another. In 1996, for example, Ghanaian popular music had a 71% share in the national market for popular music (Throsby, 1998 p. 199). A clear illustration that there has long been potential, and that many traces of vibrant culture still prevail. In spite of

all the limitations and obstacles, Highlife has known a great era of success in Ghana and beyond. And currently Hiplife (see Shipley, 2013) and Azonto are popular.

While government is embracing the discourse and takes initiative to transform the existing market into 'real' industries, much effort comes from the civil society:

For some of us it's a passion. And with a passion comes a mission. And the mission is to establish a bona fide music industry. A music industry that can make money for the people who work in it. An industry that has standards: quality that trains its personnel to be able to work within it and serve it. A lot of people are working blindly in a market because they have the passion, but they don't have the knowledge. They don't understand the different aspects that building an industry require. For some of us who understand, it's a mission to lead by example, to set up something that is viable, that has the right things in place, to see that people emanate. (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

It is precisely because different stakeholders are experimenting, and applying their understanding of the sector, that I argue this insight should inform policies more than the global creative economy discourse. The discourse should adapt more to the context it aims to describe and not the other way around. In more general terms, it means that the 'informal' economies of Ghana (Hart, 1973) and Burkina Faso (Dijk, 1986) need to be taken seriously as a substantial and inherently valuable part of economic life that is not a priori inferior to the 'formal' economy. It remains challenging to link such informal activities to formal policies, funding and financing, and to support programmes. Using mapping techniques that expose the links between the formal and the informal are crucial to respond to such challenges (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 28). The need to make such connections fundamentally links to the need to reconsider the exact meaning of the cultural and creative industries. To illustrate this, it is useful to go back to a quote referred to in the introduction:

The creative industry has been around not too long; I wonder how many people really understand the concept. It's been a very short time. When we say culture industry, whose culture industry are we talking about? The whole world is talking about UNCTAD, but is that our cultural industry? We must think about what we call culture industry and where they are. When we define [it] ourselves and we are willing to defend it, that's when I think we'll understand this whole concept. This deforms the view of Ghanaian production, it's perhaps not what we think is Ghanaian. We have to discover ourselves, what our creative industry is. (Cultural Activist, Accra #2)

The challenge in Ghana and Burkina Faso lays not so much in the mere naming of the sector, but in the need to connect the discourse that is used to what exists in practice. I'm not saying that the creative economy discourse should be used, but if it is (which is the case) there is a need to better connect it to what has existed in practice. Though

the reluctance to embrace proper ‘translation’ of the term, I argue, lies less in the absence of a music sector that can pass as music industries, and more in the fact that the largely foreign terminology does not adequately reflect the perceived reality of artists and entrepreneurs.

While the cultural and creative industries remain contested by stakeholders in the field, their use serves multiple purposes. First, the economic promise (however skewed) helps reducing the social stigma associated with artists and cultural entrepreneurs. In both countries, the cultural sector was long seen as a last resort for those who fail at ‘real’ work in life (see Chapter 6 for discussion). Second, the discourse helps placing culture higher up on the list of policy priorities (albeit in a reductionist understanding, because ‘culture’ and ‘cultural industries’ are not the same, see Chapter 2). Third, the changing approach to culture provides an incentive to approach the economics of culture in a more systematic and empirical way. Burkina Faso is in fact doing great work in this regard with their statistical yearbooks (Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, 2010; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, 2011; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, 2012), while the data for the cultural sector in Ghana is far less systematic (KPMG, 2014). Fourth, the optimism associated with the creative economy discourse is a stimulating factor for stakeholders and helps building momentum. This optimism coincides with the “Africa Rising” (The Economist, 2011a) trope, which may backfire, as I discuss in Chapter 8.

My argument in this section is that the engagement with the creative economy discourse in both Burkina Faso and Ghana is too outward-looking. It looks at solutions for perceived problems elsewhere, instead of embracing the makeshift solutions that exist in order to build on them. The confusion between (cultural) policy as discourse and as practice creates the impression that the existing practice needs to adapt to the discourse. Though I argue that this need not be the case.

5.3. The River and the Caiman

The discrepancy between the discursive use and practical reluctance to fully embrace the creative economy discourse signals an issue that extends beyond terminology. Yet the reluctance is not built on a rejection of the discourse on grounds of principle – as is often the case in Europe (Gielen, 2010; Lovink and Rossiter, 2007). It builds on the realization that what exists cannot always be called a properly functioning industry. This raises the question to what extent the claim that these very industries are supporting human development in a variety of ways holds up.

The global use of the creative economy discourse signals a paradigmatic shift in the understanding of culture in society. This shift is often accepted without much contesta-

tion. In one particular interview, a Burkinabè stakeholder described this as a *fait accompli*: “When the river turns, so must the caiman” (Civil Society, Ouagadougou #20). This would mean that there has been a change, and it must be followed. And that is precisely what I am trying to counter here. Ideology is imposed on a context as a solid external force. As a result, the existing praxis has to be translated and transformed to suit the new *doxa*. This is not unique to West Africa, as this discourse has greatly influenced many cultural and economic policies around the world, often turning a blind eye to the known contradictions of the sector (Scott, 2009).

To take the metaphor of the river and the caiman further: What is perceived and presented as a river, is in fact a man-made canal. Policy discourse is directive, but it is also the result of very intentional processes. Much like a canal, it is a quintessentially human and value-laden intervention. As such, the creative economy discourse is not something that should simply be followed, it is something that can and should be conscientiously made. Some engagement with such challenges exists, Mike van Graan for example asks what *kind* of creative economy would actually benefit the continent most, one that focuses on economic growth, or one that focuses on human rights and freedom of expression (2011 p. 4). Yet, the limited debate about the terms constrains the space for contestation of the exogenous understanding and conceptualization of culture and policy. The seemingly laconic acceptance of a changed terminology in Burkina Faso and Ghana needs to be located in a broader debate on ideology and political economy, responding to the lack of profound insight in the discursive shifts in the understanding of culture.

In other words, the creative economy discourse does not exist in a void. The interest in the notion of the creative economy builds on a promise: “Developing Countries around the world can find ways to optimize the potential of the creative economy for generating socio-economic growth, job creation and export earnings” (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008 p. 8). It is telling that this exact phrase is used in Ghanaian policy documents (NDPC, 2012 p. viii). Yet, UNCTAD clearly addresses that “[there are] obstacles such as lack of investment, lack of entrepreneurial skills and inadequate infrastructure to support the growth of the creative industries” (2008 p. 40). The way the issue is framed suggests that a technical intervention regarding investment, skills training, and infrastructure development are sufficient to realize the potential of the sector.

A similar argument is made in Article 14 of the Convention on the Promotion and Protection of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005b pp. 8–9):

Parties shall endeavour to support cooperation for sustainable development and poverty reduction, especially in relation to the specific needs of developing countries, in

order to foster the emergence of a dynamic cultural sector by, inter alia, the following means:

- *The strengthening of the cultural industries in developing countries*
- *Capacity-building through the exchange of information, experience and expertise, as well as the training of human resources in developing countries, in the public and private sector*
- *Technology transfer through the introduction of appropriate incentive measures for the transfer of technology and know-how, especially in the areas of cultural industries and enterprises*
- *Financial support*

In this context, the emergence of a “dynamic cultural sector” will be fostered by technical interventions: Capacity building, technology transfer, and financial support are external measures that presume that the intrinsic potential of what is practiced is insufficient. The technical approach to the issue as illustrated above is crucial. It suggests that there is potential and that there are obstacles, but also that these obstacles can be clearly defined and ways to overcome these obstacles are readily known: “through the application of modern scientific knowledge, economics, and scientific production” (Esteva et al., 2013 p. 1). More specifically, the UNESCO Convention implicitly proposes further commoditization and governmentalization of culture, in the sense that the Convention makes “culture a central task of governance for international and national cultural policies” (Pyykkönen, 2012 p. 550).

The appeal of the creative economy discourse, however, also builds on necessity. There is a widespread understanding within the cultural sector that any public funding for culture is in direct competition with costs for education, healthcare, defence, and infrastructure – not to forget the entitlements of the president and all government ministers. Many thus see the need to find a way to cope without much (or any) governmental subsidy. The political and economic independence it promises is appealing in a context where support often comes with strings attached. The cultural industries provide a way to conceive of a cultural ecology that does not necessitate such funds. As such, it seemingly provides a resolution to a longstanding issue in cultural policy debates, as has been argued nearly 25 years ago:

We live in an era of priorities, not ideals. Under any form of government, there is not enough public money available to fund everything worthy of support. Money spent on art and culture needs, like everything else, to be justified against other areas of public subsidy. [...] An expansion of the budget for art and culture means a reduction of the budget for social services, education, housing, or some other area of public provision.

Without a substantial increase in all forms of public spending, it is socially irresponsible to spend money on art and culture if it cannot be rigorously justified. (Lewis, 1990 p. 1)

Lewis, however, focuses on the general need to justify public expenditure on culture. Such a justification is often a necessary strategy, because arguments based on “the virtues of culture” alone are unlikely to convince the ministry of finance (Throsby, 2010 p. 196). This is still the case, but the terms of the debate have changed. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, the argument is made that the sector should realize its own economic potential because support from the government is unlikely to increase significantly. The change in the cultural policy discourse towards economic independence builds on a paradox. In order to make a case for public subsidy for culture, the sector needs to prove its economic viability. So, in order to get support, it has to prove it does not need any support. The debate may be far more nuanced than this, as the sector yields social and economic benefits that are greater than the provided funds (Sacco et al., 2014 p. 3). Yet, some Burkinabè and Ghanaian entrepreneurs believe that a cultural business is just like any other business, and that it should be treated as such:

[Politicians] tell us that we have a business like the others; like those selling cement, cocoa, and so on. Cool! That's good. (Entrepreneur, Burkina Faso)

One does not have to be a cynic to see that this argument can easily backfire. Why would any government provide structural support for a sector that does not need any support to be viable? So I asked an artist if they think the sector can be self-sustainable:

You wouldn't know; but all over the world, now, creative industries are fighting for itself. And they are proving it. It all depends on how we can play it out, and if we can attract enough government funding to make the industry lucrative enough. (Musician, Ghana)

The contradiction between the lucrative nature of the cultural industries and the need for government funding to make it lucrative is telling. It symbolizes how the case for culture can seemingly only be made on economic grounds. The social elements and impacts are a nice surplus, but they hardly justify public expenditure.

5.4. There Is No Alternative?

The origins of the discourse are many, yet the result is one: There is no alternative. The rise of the creative economy discourse presents itself as the most crucial way in which culture can help advancing development; in doing so, it provides a radical market-oriented approach to cultural funding. At this point, the subliminal neoliberal ideology of the cultural industries becomes visible: “the cultural economy celebrates agency and entrepreneurial spirit, it amounts to the co-optation of creativity for neoliberal de-

velopment” (Da Costa, 2010 p. 511). David Harvey (2005 p. 2) defines neoliberalism as follows:

Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices. ... Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution [or culture, in this case]) then they must be created, by state action if necessary.

The same argument, indeed, goes for culture. If markets do not exist, they must be created. In this regard, the global uptake of the creative economy discourse illustrates how “neoliberal globalization” permeated cultural policies around the world (McGuigan, 2005). In spite of this free use of the term globalization, his analysis remains geographically constrained to the usual Anglo-Saxon suspects. Similarly the cultural policies under the British New Labour government have also been called neo-liberal, albeit with reservation (Hesmondhalgh et al., 2014). In Burkina Faso and Ghana, the mantra of neoliberal economics, that ‘there is no alternative’ to the market, is not often used in an explicit way, yet its spirit echoes through cultural industries initiatives. The message is that cultural entrepreneurs need to embrace the opportunities that exist. It is their role and responsibility to take risk and realise the dormant potential. While the South Africa-based African Arts Institute engages in explicit debates on the meaning and boundaries of neoliberalism in cultural policy (Sanan, 2014), such questions remain absent from debates in Burkina Faso and Ghana.

Culture is, in other words, subjected to a colonizing logic. Neoliberalism can be seen as economic imperialism (Harvey, 2005) as much as it can yield benefit to those who engage in an entrepreneurial way with the potential the market has to offer (Perullo, 2011 p. 30). It is obvious that such an imperialist or colonizing force is not absolute, but the question how to negotiate the boundaries between the traditional expressions and the cultural industries in policy remains. One interviewee decidedly rejected the notion of the cultural industries because it is such an alien term: “Why do you want to force us into concepts that are not necessarily our own?” (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #15). Yet they equally rejected a possible understanding of the concept as neoliberal. While the elements that make up the versatile term may be applicable to such contexts, the conceptual critique above is equally valid for the very notion of neoliberalism. Reducing this process in Burkina Faso or Ghana to a neoliberal tendency does not do justice to the socio-economic constellation: ‘Africa’ is not following ‘Euro-America’ but is at the

vanguard of a more radical form of market capitalism (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 pp. 15–16) as there is far less to hold on to in terms of formal socio-economic arrangements (see Chapter 9).

5.5. Conclusion: Towards a Discourse of Practice

In sum, the challenge in both Burkina Faso and Ghana is that the link between cultural industries and culture is not entirely clear in cultural policies, and becomes even less clear in development plans. Extending the embrace of the creative economy discourse further deepens the initial absence of a clear link between both. The more this discourse is adopted, the more reductionist the term 'culture' becomes, to the detriment of a broader and more holistic understanding in both cultural policies and development strategies. It also provides a challenge to advance the debate on the demarcation and delineation of the concept and the field, since many stakeholders feel disconnected from the discourse that regulates their realm of activity.

There are, however, increasing efforts to address these challenges. The Burkinabè national broadcaster aired a two part television debate on the economic potential of the cultural sector (over three hours in total), bringing together key stakeholders in the field (RTB, 2014a; RTB, 2014b). This debate remained largely limited to two camps. On the one hand, there is the more established generation who focus more on artistic expression and cultural diversity. They frame the debate as a challenge to the precarious funding balance in the country, but equally stress the potential of cultural industries to take the sector seriously. On the other hand, there is a younger generation, with a far more entrepreneurial spirit. They call on the government to take the business of culture seriously, and ask for help to structure it. In this context, the focus is much more on law enforcement and tax breaks than on subsidies. The tension persists between those who see culture mainly as a collective venture with public support and those who see culture as a private venture in a competitive marketplace.

This debate is in no way unique to Burkina Faso. There are tensions between different *kinds* of cultural agents everywhere. And, like anywhere else, this debate will remain in flux: What should be subsidized and what can be left to the market? This means making choices, as one artist in Burkina Faso (Musician, Ouagadougou #1) contends: It requires a shift from minor funding few many, to more significant funding for a few. Yet, in order to have that debate in a clear manner, the different positions of different stakeholders in the debate should become more explicit and pronounced, so the weighting of their respective interests in public policy and action can be negotiated in an actual public debate. This does not mean that there needs to be agreement on *one* definition, but rather a clear acknowledgements of their existing and real differences.

This chapter has shown how the creative economy discourse has influenced thinking and policy concerning culture and development in recent years. It equally signalled the selective adoption of the discourse by stakeholders across the sector. The remaining question in this regard is: how can the discourse critically incorporate existing practices, rather than trying to make such practices conform to an alleged, though non-existing, universal logic? While there is increasing evidence from a variety of places that the creative economy discourse is translated in particular contexts around the world (Prince, 2010; Pinheiro and Hauge, 2014; Cunningham, 2009b; Cunningham, 2009a; Wang, 2004), there is comparatively little engagement with the African continent in general, and even less with Burkina Faso and Ghana in particular. The following chapters engage with this challenge in order to provide a workable framework for engagement with the cultural and creative industries, as they do in fact exist in both countries.

6. Looking for Money in Music

This chapter deals with a key paradox in music industries: While there is music in all corners of our lives, most musicians and music workers struggle to make a living. This is widely documented, as most records fail to break even and most musicians earn below-average incomes in Senegal (Penna et al., 2004 p. 98), the US (Caves, 2000 pp. 78–83), and the UK (Musicians' Union, 2012 p. 16), if not everywhere around the world. In spite of a rich past and an equally vibrant present, the net exports of Burkinaabè and Ghanaian culture remain low (as chapter 3 illustrates). This chapter engages with the challenges of making money from music *within* the country. Whatever the reasons may be, many people working in music are mostly in dire straits and there is little reason to romanticize this (Laaser, 1997 p. 54).

Throughout this chapter, I ask two guiding questions: What strategies are used to generate income in (in)formal economies, plagued by piracy and hampered by limited spending power? Is the creative economy discourse helpful in providing avenues to increase income and on a personal level and on a social level?

I argue that the main strategies are shifts towards 'autoproduction' and performance; the former is necessary to remain visible and get paid concerts and the latter is where most artists generate revenue. I deliberately refrain from using the term "live", because many concerts in Burkina Faso and Ghana are in fact lip-synced out of practical and financial considerations: there are few artists who have the skill and experience to perform live, so instrumentalists as well as equipment and technical personnel come at a price.

In order to contextualise and explain this shift, I argue that blaming piracy for the increased difficulty of making money from music – which most music workers in both Burkina Faso and Ghana do – is both incorrect and misleading. In both Burkina Faso and Ghana there is copyright legislation in place. What is lacking is enforcement. Here, I make the case that while piracy is a serious issue; there is no simple solution for it. This is because there is no universal or even known solution to the current digital challenges and it is a symptom of a wider range of problems rather than simply a problem in itself. (In chapter 7, I connect this to the issue of *payola*.⁶⁸)

⁶⁸ Payola is a bribe paid to radio and television stations, often directly to DJs and programmers, to get airplay. This practice and its implications are described in more detail further in this chapter.

The systemic failures I identify throughout this chapter exist within and beyond the music industries. They include the limited enforcement of copyright legislation, but also the limited engagement with heterodox solutions that are both context-specific and build on existing strengths. While there is a growing middle class with an appetite for music and events, they create a bubble within which the success of a few obfuscates both the lack of opportunity for most artists, and the limited means to participate in this culture for most people. At the same time, GHAMRO, the collective management organisation (CMO) in Ghana, cracks down aggressively on illicit street vendors without offering a legal alternative, they also largely fail to go after media outlets that would pay far higher fees. Yet, while media pay little or no licensing fees (partly because there is no logging system), the entry cost for content owners is high due to payola. And, finally, while most money-making has shifted from recorded music to events, the communication channels to communicate these concerts and shows are barely existent; in Accra, for example, it's hard to find out about concerts before they occur.

The challenges I discuss are not new. Wallis and Malm (1984) addressed the difficulties to make money from music in great detail in their book *Big Sounds from Small Peoples*. But in the three decades since this seminal book was published, the context in which music is created and circulated has changed drastically. The rise of digital technologies made production and piracy easier and cheaper. And, the wide-ranging claims of the creative economy discourse have increased the expectations about the role of music, which is reflected in policy. Yet my focus remains by and large the same: how do the “big sounds” of small countries like Burkina Faso and Ghana help music workers make a living? I argue that the creative economy discourse has been helpful in increasing the social standing of music workers, but that social and legal protection of the different activities involved need far greater attention. This includes the fact that most retailers are now deemed ‘pirates,’ which means that they are in fact persecuted for their role in the informal music industries, rather than encouraged to integrate their work into a legal framework that would support artists too.

Throughout this chapter, I make five connected points. First, risk is inherent to cultural industries and that it should be acknowledged as such. Second, piracy is not simply a problem that should be eradicated, but a series of historically contingent practices that may in fact be part of the solution. Third, while producers are reducing investment in music, this is only partly due to piracy, the rise of home studios (where ‘autoproduction’ takes place) forms a bigger threat. Fourth, I explore the increased importance of music performance as a way to earn a living in a precarious context, and explain why this is not a sustainable solution. Fifth, I argue that while the creative economy discourse and the success of some have increased the social acceptance of music work, there is still a need to provide greater legal and social protection to music workers to enable them

to better deal with risk. In conclusion, I argue that if music should sustain the livelihoods of music workers, there is a need to make cultural industries policies look more like social policy than like business policy, because the success of the few does not 'trickle down' to the rest.

6.1. Music, a Risky Business?

Cultural industries are a risky business (Prindle, 1993). They are arguably riskier than many other activities because of the volatile tastes of cultural consumers and, hence, cultural consumption (Garnham, 1990 p. 161; in Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 27). Predicting success is hardly ever possible, simply because "nobody knows" how to do this: over 80 per cent of music releases do not manage to recuperate investment in the US (Caves, 2000 p. 61). At the same time, the relatively low levels of interpersonal trust and high levels of personal risk are part of the relatively informal career trajectories in the sector (Banks et al., 2000 p. 460; Gibson and Kong, 2005 p. 554).

In response to the levels of risk inherent to the sector, major conglomerates have been developed strategies to mitigate risk. They use economies of scale and (both horizontal and vertical) integration (Miège, 1987 p. 274) to offset risk by relying on a small number of major hits within their catalogues and establishing control over circulation (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 27); this helps large companies (majors) maintain a dominant position in the market. Similarly, a constant play of merging companies and divesting loss-making activities is meant to limit risk over time, even though this is in itself a risky enterprise that does not always work (Fitzgerald, 2011). The bulk of these strategies depend on scale. A large catalogue, a diverse range of media, and a level of vertical integration can help bigger enterprises to balance the failure of most investments and the great success of a few hits.

Cultural industries may generate high overall profits, in spite of the obvious risks, but individual businesses may experience significant difficulties reaping proportional rewards from the sector (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 28). Working in culture means trying to succeed in uncertainty (Menger, 2009), so risk and uncertainty are not exceptional stages at the outset of a career or the start of a new enterprise: they are at the very core of cultural industries.

Two features of the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana make them particularly prone to risk. At the level of the sector as a whole, there are few bigger enterprises that can mitigate risk internally. (Yet, section 6.4 below shows that the bigger organisations that exist do not produce music, but focus solely on events management, where they 'crowd out' smaller companies.) At the level of individual businesses, the lack of formal distribution systems in tandem with high piracy rates drive music workers to rely

on live events, thus missing out on the economies of scale intrinsic to record sales and licensing. The ways to mitigate risk are thus very limited, and the shift to live music (another 'logic', according to Miège, 1987) comes with its own risks (see section 6.4).

The high levels of risk are however not adequately taken into account in cultural industries policies and initiatives in Burkina Faso, Ghana, and Niger even though this is explicitly mentioned in reports (Kamara, 2004; UNESCO, 2010). Some entrepreneurs stress the need to make concessions at an early stage, and hold back on high expectations. Yet the realization that culture is not an easy way to make a living is not universally shared:

DJ Black of Joy FM laments, "Some kid will have one hit and think he is famous. Meanwhile he has no money. To be a long-term success and really make money in Ghana music is not easy." (Shipley, 2013 p. 23)

This issue equally prevails at policy levels. In the Burkinabè cultural policy, the only mention of risk is in relation to a SWOT-like analysis regarding the implementation of the policy (MCTC, 2008). The Ghanaian policies do not mention risk at all (NCC, 2004). On a larger scale, the *Compendium of Reference Documents of Cultural Policies in Africa* (Kovács, 2009) and the Arterial Network guide on cultural policy approaches (Forbes, 2011) do not engage explicitly with the extent to which business in the cultural sector is risky.

The 2013 creative economy report, however, warns against risk taking. Because dreaming too big and growing too fast is risky, it can be better to remain small and specialized. This could provide greater stability while retaining a scale that is easier to combine with domestic life. Scaling up is not always the best solution, as it may disrupt social and economic ties that rely on interdependence at a small scale (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 104–5). Similarly, when it comes to loans and investments, specialized advice and schemes are needed to mitigate risk. Institutions with such expertise are starting to emerge (as I discuss in Section 8.3).

Making a living from music is a risky undertaking anywhere in the world. While some reap high rewards, the vast majority of music workers have difficulties making a living. The risks in Burkina Faso and Ghana are arguably even higher, because the spending power of the public is limited (chapter 3) but also because there is no real distribution network and piracy is very prevalent. The following section argues that while piracy is a part of the problem, it is just one of many issues that make it difficult to earn a living from music.

6.2. Piracy: An Easy Solution to a Difficult Problem?

The rise of digital technologies such as cheap CD burners, USB sticks, MP3-players, Bluetooth-enabled smartphones, and YouTube streaming of music has eroded weak distribution networks. Demand has shifted from CDs to MP3 files, and as long as music formats are not available legally, piracy cannot be fought. This is precisely why I argue that piracy is not the problem, but merely the symptom of an issue that is more elaborate and less easy to resolve. In this regard, piracy is “simply part and parcel of the global shifts in technology, which offer both new opportunities and new challenges, and which require new strategies” (Stobart, 2010 p. 51). And it actually draws in an audience into the realm of music distribution that would otherwise be unable to afford these products (Grassmuck, 2014). As a result of contraband sales, cultural entrepreneurs in Burkina Faso and Ghana focus on creating on ‘fast’ sellers as oppose to ‘best’ or ‘long’ sellers. This is necessary to recuperate the investment and generate profits before pirates start selling the copies. Music workers argue that the race is not against the cultural and symbolic obsolescence, but against piracy.

There are two mutually reinforcing aspects that have turned this shift into a problem. On the one hand, the ‘legitimate’ recording industry has not yet been able to integrate these technological shifts and the changing consumption modes of their (potential) customers into their business models. On the other hand, street vendors or ‘pirates’ who have started selling music files have taken advantage of this. Yet their proceeds do not flow back to artists and producers. My point here is twofold. First, these ‘pirates’ are both part of the problem and the solution. Second, it is easy to blame piracy for the difficulty to make money from music in the digital era, but this is just one part of the problem, and focusing only on this element is unlikely to increase revenue.

It is important to stress that the legislative framework in both Burkina Faso and Ghana is good. Both countries have copyright laws and ‘collective management organisations’ (CMOs) that collect and disburse royalties. Yet numerous authors (Kernfeld, 2011; Lobato, 2010; Larkin, 2004; Larkin, 2005; Larkin, 2008; Boateng, 2011; Priest, 2014; Collins, 2006; Wu, 2005) have illustrated that copyright is not always the best way to ensure that artists and industry workers earn a good living. More importantly, legislation has historically been rather ineffective in the fight against piracy (Kernfeld, 2011). In contrast to this, Larkin argues in his study on the media distribution in Nigeria that the ‘infrastructure of piracy’ constitutes a network that can help the legitimate sale of music or films:

In recent years a wholesale shift has occurred in which entrepreneurs previously involved in the distribution of pirate material have switched to the reproduction and dissemination of legal media. A mass importation – largely illicit – of foreign music and

films brought about the capital and professional expertise that facilitated this shift and the rise of a local film. (Larkin, 2005)

I argue that this approach merits serious engagement of music workers in Burkina Faso and Ghana, because the distribution network pirates have is far bigger and better than any other. It would, however, not be the first time that such an attempt is taken in the context of Ghana, as 'pirates' have sought collaboration with the music industries in the past. In the 1980s, a Ghanaian alliance of 'illegal' street vendors of cassette tapes initiated a scheme through which they paid a fair share in fees to the state copyright collection society (COSGA), only to be dismantled under pressure of the IFPI (Collins 2006). A potentially successful regularization of 'piracy' into the legitimate music distribution circuit stalled, with a lasting impact on music sales to date.

Piracy, after all, cannot be eliminated by legislation, but only by incorporating their *modus operandi* in the mainstream circuit. The trade of pirates provides new ways of music consumption that are often innovative and popular with audiences, not solely because of lower prices. The history of music piracy shows that this advantage of pirates does not fade with legislation, but by the incorporation of their practices in the legitimate circuit. This is true for song sheets in the early 20th century, as much as it is for tape recording, and digital file sharing (Kernfeld 2011). Piracy thus results both from the increased technological potential to generate illicit copies for resale and the reluctance, if not outright refusal, to experiment with licensing and enforcement models that deviate from the imposed (Western) norm: "it seems like the current discourse on global IPR has a much stronger tendency to take the European course of development for granted as globally predetermined route of progress" (Fredriksson, 2014 p. 10).

Yet, the blame is not only on technology. The success of Nollywood in Nigeria shows that strict copyright regulation is not a precondition for the development of thriving cultural industries (Lobato 2010, 246). The flourishing of *Tecno Brega* (literally 'cheesy techno') in Northeast Brazil builds mostly on live events, while recorded albums serve more as promotional material (Grassmuck 2011, 25). Similarly, the music industries in Kingston, Jamaica also functions more or less without an effective copyright regime. This is why it is probably more useful to take piracy seriously as an instance of the informal economy, which is also neither good nor bad (Lobato, 2014). Yet there is little reason or ground to romanticise the piracy (Power and Hallencreutz, 2004 pp. 237–8), though a "simplistic opposition between legality and illegality that divides pirates from others renders almost impossible any serious understanding or engagement with the phenomenon of piracy" (Liang, 2014 p. 59).

While enforcement of legislation is needed, the more important consideration is to make sure that this enforcement upholds the law to help make music workers earn a

living, not to simply eradicate illicit activity. This is why I call piracy an easy solution to a difficult problem. It seems as if eradicating piracy is the solution, but this approach fails to identify the problem. The attempts of GHAMRO (the Ghana Music Rights Organization) to fight piracy is emblematic of this:

GHAMRO has ensured that people pirating get persecuted and jailed. Recently, five people were jailed, two years each. They got fine the equivalent of 6000GH¢, some 3000USD. And it will be defaulted in 2 years each. That's part of GHAMRO's work. It was like a dream fulfilled. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6)

This action got attention in the Ghanaian press (GhanaWeb, 2012; Owusu-Amoah, 2013), but is unlikely to resolve the actual issue. One musician commented that:

It is pathetic. Where does the small fish get the CDs from? The entire nation is pirating music. (Musician, Accra #3)

Yet this challenge goes beyond Ghana, the entire world is pirating music. Though GHAMRO focuses on the 'small fish' to resolve this issue, even if there is little evidence that going after the 'big fish' makes much difference (Mattelart, 2009 p. 323). As long as there is no alternative, GHAMRO also fails to recognise that music (and culture in general) needs sharing and replication to accrue meaning. Even though it requires artificial scarcity to make cultural expressions accrue value in economic terms (Garnham 1987), there is a mismatch between the supply and the demand side.

The existing cultures of circulation in Burkina Faso and Ghana may be largely illicit, but they are effective in distributing music. Rather than trying to replicate the (largely defunct) copyright regime of the West, the solution is probably less glorious than hoped for: a levy on all blank discs (as is the case in Burkina Faso), USB-sticks, and smartphones and a sincere attempt to turn the 'illegal' street vendors into 'legal' entrepreneurs by creating either a blanket fee for street vendors (akin to the attempt to regularise cassette sales in the 1980s), a digital platform that tracks sales, or unique download codes (following the model of phone credit). Such measures may not eradicate piracy at once, but no single measure will. This is not a romantic argument, but a pragmatic one: With the rise of digital piracy, history is merely repeating itself, since "constructing the unauthorized commercial copying of music as piracy destroyed the beginnings of a vibrant local music production industry [in the 1980s]" (Boateng 2011, 95; see also Collins 2006). Instead of trying to address the perceived problem as a potential solution, the copyright discourse is framed in terms of 'potential' (economic return from creativity) that is lost because of what is lacking (enforcement) (Schultz and van Gelder 2008, 122–134), while ignoring the potential transformation of what exists. The kind of enforcement that is needed is not addressed, thus remaining captured in

the *kind* of technocracy that the culture and development approach aims to transgress. Yet the allegedly orthodox logic dictates that:

Once we clear them [the pirates] from the markets, we can take over and give people legal downloading. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6)

The same person continues to argue that:

There are entrepreneurs and investors who are looking at providing legal services ... some already started. That business will only thrive if the illegitimate market is eradicated. You cannot compete with pirates ... their cost structure is basically nil. You just need a laptop. They pocket money that is not theirs. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6)

This approach, however, inverts causality. It is only when legal downloading exists, that stringent enforcement of the copyright law makes sense. The 'pirates' who currently control proximity sales make up the strongest music distribution network in the country. They have a large catalogue, operate in proximity of their customers, and provide a valued service. Instead of providing a way to legalize this practice, these entrepreneurs are punished for their ignorance of the law. The only way to legalise their activities is by first providing a credible alternative and then strictly enforcing the law, otherwise the eradication of piracy will eradicate the only effective distribution network as well. Even though GHAMRO tries to gain credibility by cracking down on street vendors, they do not propose an alternative to this illicit practice:

They [audiences] look for the cheapest options ... so then, that helps piracy to thrive. The law is not being implemented, there's no reason to be scared. If you want to set up an operation ... you can come to us ... you pay x amount and you can sell ... that is perhaps a way to transform the pirate trade. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6)

At this point I ask if such a mechanism currently exists.

Currently, no. But we have been approached, and they asked for a license. But we can only license what we have the rights to. That's what we are working on. People are not making any money at all by downloads ... so we try to make legitimate shops ... but limited to those whose rights we hold, but the pirates want everything ... (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6)

Only when there is a legal alternative, the enforcement of the can law incite change. Otherwise, the piracy crackdown will deteriorate the efficient distribution network that is currently in place. What is missing is a real engagement with the following questions: how can we find a way to build on the vast and efficient network of pirates to respond to the consumption habits and preferences of people, who want to buy MP3s at the bus stop directly towards their phone? How to do this legally, efficiently, and in a cost-

effective manner, without destroying the existing networks of (admittedly often illicit) retailers? At present, the result of these repressive actions is rather the exacerbation of tensions in social and economic terms (Skinner, 2014 pp. 264–265), rather than a step towards a sustainable solution to the question how the music industries can sustain the livelihoods of artists, producers, managers, *and* retailers. One of the challenges in this regard is that both the music business and researchers pay far too little attention to what pirates have to say and what they can do *with* rights holders (save some exceptions: Tade and Akinleye, 2012).⁶⁹ Yet, overall, CMOs are too slow to adopt a framework to allow for such change, even if entrepreneurs are trying to incorporate new technologies:

*The minister and the BBDA have to change their approach. I proposed to work with releases on USB sticks, but because it's not something physical on which you can stick [a banderole], they would not recognize it. Anyone can get the card [USB stick] and leave the sticker. But their texts do not allow it. If they don't change the texts, we cannot do it. But I thought of it.*⁷⁰ (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #13)

In Ghana, the active engagement with legal alternatives for digital distribution, both online and through proximity sales is promising. And the adoption of a levy on blank discs in Burkina Faso has increased income for the BBDA. But there is urgency to dealing with declining income from music sales, as the industries in these countries rely much more on music sales than on income from licencing and other means. Such other revenue streams have mitigated the income losses from piracy in many Western countries (Hesmondhalgh, 2009 pp. 65–66). The way out in Burkina Faso and Ghana is to first invest in legitimate distribution that builds on current consumption habits, then to try incorporating as many 'pirates' as possible into this distribution network (to keep both the network and their jobs in the industry), and finally to enforce the existing legislation to reduce the incidence of piracy, while giving illicit street vendors the chance to legalise their activities.

⁶⁹ This is, admittedly, a lacuna in my own empirical work as well. Though given my focus on the role and uptake of the cultural and creative industries discourse, and its implications on policy and support, the issue of piracy is not my central concern. Though it does illustrate the complexity of the matter and certainly merits further empirical and theoretical engagement. The book *Postcolonial Piracy* (Eckstein and Schwarz, 2014) provides an excellent starting point for further exploration of this topic.

⁷⁰ « Il faudrait que le ministère et le BBDA changent leur apport. J'ai proposé de faire mes productions sur les cartes mémoire et les clés USB, mais comme c'est pas un truc physique qu'on peut sticer, ils ne reconnaissent pas ... leurs textes ne permettent pas. S'ils ne changent pas les textes on ne peut pas faire ça. Mais j'y ai pensé. »

Perhaps there is a need to rethink the notion of copyright, which is now an individual affair, into something that is in fact more collective. The current crisis in legislation and enforcement certainly prompts a reconsideration of what copyright is and should be, well beyond the simple juxtaposition of 'bad' piracy and 'good' copyright enforcement. Yet the failure to adopt a shift towards legitimate digital music distribution in Burkina Faso and Ghana in combination with the ability of pirates to seize this opportunity has resulted in decreased investment into music production, leading to the rise of auto-production in home studios. The risk has thus shifted to individual artists who increasingly have to tap into their own resources to invest in the hope of generating a return.

6.3. Disappearing Producers and the Rise of Auto-Production

The first evidence of Ghana's recording industry I witnessed doubled as proof of its demise. When driving through Kumasi on my way from Ouagadougou to Accra, I noticed a large building on the outskirts of the city: A big grey warehouse, seemingly void of activity, but bearing traces of its history. The outside wall of the building read 'Ambassador Records,' which, since its foundation in 1965 until the early 1980s was one of the major pressing plants in the country (Collins, 2006 p. 161). Throughout my research work in Accra, I was often reminded of this place, as virtually everyone I spoke to, from artists to managers and policymakers, lamented the dramatic reduction in CD sales in the past decade. In Burkina Faso, the situation is quite similar, with one major difference. The country only started operating a CD and cassette production facility around the year 2000, when Richard Traoré founded Seydoni Records:

Burkina started having its duplication systems 14 years ago [interview in 2013]. In Mali, that was 30 years ago, and in Côte d'Ivoire 40 years. As an artist ... it is a bit like a pregnant women who does not give birth ... no studio, no album, no revenues. (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #18)

This means that while Ghana, and other countries in the region, operated music studios and duplication facilities for the past four to five decades, Burkina Faso started CD pressing at the moment that sales started deteriorating. As a result, the efforts to generate profits from production were limited, and efforts to establish a countrywide legitimate distribution network collapsed after a few years of operation.

This section discusses four intertwined evolutions in the field of music production in both countries. First, professional producers invest less in new productions, or shift to organising events, because the returns are diminishing, through changing consumption patterns and piracy. Second, this decline, in combination with the increased availability

of cheap digital recording devices, caused a rise in auto-production in (artists') home studios. Third, music production is no longer primarily meant as a profitable commodity, but rather as a 'business card' for artists in search of paid gigs. Four, in spite of the rising spending power of a growing (though still marginal) middle class, there formal infrastructure for the consumption of music is fragile, and the difference between 'original' and 'pirated' works is at times hard to tell.

First, because of decreasing revenues from record sales (as discussed in section 6.2), investment in music production has decreased and distribution networks crumbled, which caused the recording industry to stall. While the exact timeframe differs for stakeholders, their argument is similar to this one:

In 2000, 2002 tapes, that worked well. But with USB Sticks etc. ... it makes that the disc [CD] market does not work anymore. We had two [production] houses [i.e. Bimo vision and Seydoni Productions] that fell.⁷¹ (Manager, Ouagadougou #9)

The claim that the two production houses fell is factually wrong. Both companies still operate, even though they divested some activities as they were no longer profitable. Seydoni Productions continues to record and release albums, albeit at a slower pace than when they started. The company was, and remains, a largely philanthropic venture of its founder, Richard Traoré, who earned a living through exporting European meat and milk products to West Africa when living in Sweden. Bimo Vision doubles as a company importing a range of products from Taiwan,⁷² which eclipses profits from music. The activities of both companies illustrate that their activities in music production have never been their sole, let alone biggest, source of revenue. Yet even when they have significant other sources of income, production activities are not sufficiently profitable to continue.

The situation in Accra is somewhat similar, even though the history of music recording and distribution is longer (see Plageman, 2012; Collins, 1996; Collins, 1992). But enthusiasm to invest in music production is limited, as my encounter with an entrepreneur in Accra illustrates:

Q: Would you invest in music production at this point?

A: I could. We've done this in the past. We discovered [artist]. We invested in CDs,

⁷¹ « En 2000 - 2002 avec les k7, ça marchait bien. Mais avec les clés USB etc. ... ça fait que le marché du disque ne marche plus. On avait deux grandes maisons qui sont tombées. »

⁷² Burkina Faso is one of three African countries (alongside São Tomé & Príncipe and Swaziland) that maintain full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. This is very visible in the urban landscape of Ouagadougou, as the Taiwanese flag marks infrastructural projects, their cultural academies perform regularly, and large billboards advertise products from Taiwan as the 'better' China.

pushing and promoting them for two years.

Q: Was that profitable?

A: No (laughs)

Q: Would you do it again?

A: No

The point here is that both younger and more established artists have difficulties finding producers willing to invest:

Now, there are hardly any producers in the country. For example, we are now preparing the 6th album for Sana Bob, which is self-financed.⁷³ (Manager, Ouagadougou #10)

This brings me to the second evolution: artists and their managers, as well as the occasional crowd-funded production, fill the void created by disappearing formal producers:

The production of an album costs around five million FCFA, while autoproduction [costs] some one million in total.⁷⁴ (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #18)

The lower cost, and often-inferior quality, of auto-produced albums make it possible to recuperate the investment. At the same time, it both forces and facilitates more direct contact between artists and their audiences:

The youths follow news and music online. The world is no longer a closed world. Eventually, artists have understood this. Here, this works well.⁷⁵ (Musician, Ouagadougou #7)

Yet, the most acute reason for the rise in auto-production remains the need to get records 'out there':

If I do not autoproduce, I don't have a voice. I'd like to play everywhere, but there are not enough venues.⁷⁶ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

The lack of venues is an issue I discuss in greater detail in the next chapter. Though the rise of small producers and event organisers is in fact linked to the downscaling of

⁷³ « Maintenant, on a presque pas de producteurs dans ce pays-là. Par exemple – on est en train de préparer le 6ième album de Sana Bob – c'est de l'autofinancement. »

⁷⁴ « La production d'un album coûte 5m pour la production. Et les autoproductions se produisent pour environ 1million. »

⁷⁵ « Les jeunes suivent les nouvelles et la musique en ligne. Le monde n'est plus un monde fermé. Éventuellement, les artistes ont compris ça. Ici ça marche très bien. »

⁷⁶ « Si je me autoproduis pas, je n'ai pas de voix. J'aimerais jouer partout. Mais il n'y a pas assez de scènes. »

Seydoni Productions. Several former employees of the company now run their own businesses that focus more on artist management and event organisation. While the retreat of producers created a space for smaller initiatives, the disappearing production was in fact also the driver of the current live scene, which I discuss in the next section.

The third evolution is the changing role of CDs in the music industries. Most artists now have difficulties finding producers who are willing to invest in their talent. Yet, thanks to comparatively cheap digital production facilities, artists will invest in the production themselves, and produce albums solely as 'business cards' as an artist in Burkina Faso explained:

For us, artists, it's our business card. We have moved to the stage. We have to do shows to live. But we use CDs as business cards, as a passport, because, as a result of piracy CDs don't bring in a lot. In fact, it has led artists to be himself producer [sic].⁷⁷
(Musician, Ouagadougou #7)

This reflects a global tendency that is equally documented in Bolivia (Stobart, 2010 p. 49). Surely, artists will try to sell albums, and succeed to some extent. Yet the main aim of records is now to provide an overview of the (new) work artists can perform on stage to promoters and to gain popularity in order to draw audiences to their live concerts, where most money is made. This leads to a contradiction in the behaviour of stakeholders across the music industries. They argue that the lack of a formal distribution network and the strong position of pirates has allegedly caused the decline of investment by formal producers. Artists and their managers investing more in albums themselves, as they need these albums for promotional purposes, popularity, and eventually paid shows. Yet, this strategy only works because pirates distribute their work, hence the term "promotional piracy" (Croxson, 2007). But once artists have attained a certain level of fame and success, they will blame pirates for their limited income from album sales (Tade and Akinleye, 2012; Lobato, 2010; Shipley, 2013). Piracy is thus not just a technical issue.

At the same time, many artists now care more about the gradual development of audiences alongside the quality of music production than about the sales of albums:

We have to make sure musicians produce ... the music they are producing now is all rubbish. (Musician, Accra #21)

⁷⁷ « Pour nous artistes, c'est notre carte de visite. On est passé à la scène. On doit faire la scène pour vivre. Mais on utilise le CD en tant que carte de visite - passeport - pour ça, à cause de piraterie les CD ne rapportent pas grand-chose. Justement - ça a amené les artistes des "himself producer". »

We have to start with the simplest things, before people will appreciate caviar. We have to give them the things they know, later we add the caviar. They'll see the difference, they're not stupid. You have to trivialize it. Art should not be banal, but we lack banality in art. We don't find CDs and there are not enough shows.⁷⁸ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

In sum, their aim is to use more, and eventually better, production to connect artists to their audiences. The current lack of ample quality and quality will drive audiences to foreign products:

We have to follow the example of cinema in India or Nigeria. We have to consume locally. Production. Production. Production. If we do not have production, we are obliged to consume foreign products. How can we advance things? Because there is demand.⁷⁹ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

Yet, the examples of Nigeria and India are misleading. These countries have one thing in common that neither Burkina Faso nor Ghana has: large populations. This brings me to the fourth evolution. The middle classes are growing in virtually all countries around the world (UNDP, 2013), yet in Burkina Faso and Ghana they remain small in absolute numbers because the overall populations are small. This leads to a mutually reinforcing problem. Most people lack the spending power to buy CDs. Yet those who have money have difficulties obtaining those original CDs because they are hardly available:

They're ready to buy a work. It's something. But it's not available. One has to start by making the works available.⁸⁰ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

There is, however, a tension between audiences' *ability* and *willingness* to pay for music (which I discussed in section 3.5). Yet, the challenge at this point lies in a combination of factors. Income from album sales dropped and production shifted to home studios. This helps maintain a creative culture and allows artists to use albums as promotional material. Ironically, they later blame pirates for selling their works once they get famous. While recorded music remains important, it is no longer a major source of rev-

⁷⁸ « Il faut qu'on commence avec le plus simple, avant que les gens apprécient le caviar. On doit leur donner ce qu'ils connaissent, après on ajoute le caviar. Ils vont voir la différence, ils ne sont pas cons. Il faut banaliser ça. L'art doit pas être banal, mais on manque de banalité dans l'art. On trouve pas des CD et il n'y a pas assez de spectacle. »

⁷⁹ « On doit faire comme le cinéma en Inde ou en Nigeria. On doit consommer local. Production. Production. Production. Si on a pas la production, on est obligé de consommer de l'extérieur. Comment peut en faire en sorte que ça avance? Parce que, il y a la demande. »

⁸⁰ « Ils sont prêts à payer un opus. C'est quelque chose. Mais c'est pas disponible. Il faut commencer à rendre les œuvres disponibles. »

venue for artists. The result of these intertwined shifts is that musicians and their management shifted focus to events in order to make a living.

6.4. Performing Music for a Living

The decreased income from the mediated music economy encouraged a shift from albums (CDs or cassettes) to an economy based on (live) performance (Holt, 2010). This section discusses the particularities of the revival of (live) music performance in Burkina Faso and Ghana in the context of the global shift towards music performance in the music industries. Though I use the term 'live music' very cautiously: many music performances are lip-synced. While the live music scene is undergoing a revival, it remains small relative to singing over a tape, as this remains the far cheaper (and thus more profitable) option.

The central focus of this section is on the question what this shift means for people who work as artists or otherwise in the sector. First, I outline why live music initially disappeared in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Second I address similarities and differences with the global evolutions. Third, I highlight some of the challenges that musicians and their management continue to encounter in both countries. In closing, I argue that while (live) performance currently 'works' as business model, relying primarily on these activities will continue to weaken the music industries.

The decline of the live music scenes of Burkina Faso and Ghana is a history that includes technological change and politics. The rise of DJs and lip-sync shows significantly reduced the cost of music performance. As a result, instrumentalists lost work and prestige to singers:

When I was young, I heard a lot of musicians play. But after our time, all people would hear was disco and sound systems. Before, you would hear bands rehearsing. You played along, and before you knew, you got a job. And the clubs owned the instruments, and they employed musicians. Now, many of the instruments got rusted. (Musician, Accra #3)

Also, the music in itself changed. Originally, Ghanaian songs were highlife and necessitated live music, but that changed to digital age stuff with computers. Musicians did not necessarily want to perform live; it was less expensive than having a live band (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #4)

At the same time, music making used to feature more strongly in social and school life:

In the schools, where we had a lot of school bands. There were competitions, 'pop chains,' we called them. Every summer schools would have their best bands in competition ... prizes would be given to the best three, and schools would be proud. So - you

played, you got the girls, you got your fame. It was an incentive for a lot of guys to become musicians - unlike today. (Entrepreneur, Accra #17)

Most stakeholders in the music industries, however, cite political events as a reason for the decimation of live music venues, performances, and revenues. The reasons are very different in Burkina Faso and Ghana, but they both occurred in the early 1980s. In Ghana, the military government of Jerry Rawlings enforced a curfew (from 1982-1984) that kept nightclubs empty and musicians unemployed:

When I was growing up, this country was thriving on live music, especially in Accra. But, when Rawlings came to power, there was a curfew that stopped people from going outside. The military regime was strict. People were beaten etc. You had to be in by six. That killed live music. Many musicians became redundant, because people would go to work during the day and in weekends and evenings people would go out. They [the government] did not think about the fact that they killed that part of the culture [with the curfew]. (Musician, Accra #3)

One of the lasting consequences of this curfew is that the locus of music performance shifted from nightclubs to churches:

Live music suffered - and has not managed to get back on its feet ... because of the curfew. Almost all live musicians moved into the church, they had better services, or, conditions; some of them stayed in the church. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #4)

As a result, the military regime of the early 1980s is often quoted as a reason for the downfall of live music in Accra and beyond:

It's been difficult to get things back on track. Some bands had 4 gigs a day back in the 1970s ... they were generating income. If it had continued, we would have had a vibrant live sector. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #7)

Some stakeholders are fully aware that this particular period is used merely as shorthand for a more complex set of issues that plagued the country in the late 1970s and early 1980s. But, too often, the curfew has become a trope that simplifies a complex set of issues into one clear cause that can be ascribed to one person: former president Jerry Rawlings.

In Burkina Faso, the reasoning is very similar, even though origin of the problem is not a curfew, but the government-imposed reduction of concert prices to 300 FCFA in the early 1980s. Currently, prices range from around FCFA 500 in the provinces to FCFA 1000-2000 in Ouagadougou, so prices did nominally increase since the 1980s, up from

FCFA300.⁸¹ But the joint influence of spending habits, spending power, history and so on is simplified to one intervention. Many musicians and music workers still blame the current low concert prices on a rather short-lived policy of former president Sankara over 30 years ago. Similar to the situation in Ghana, one specific act of a former president is popularly seen as the cause for the small live music scene today.

In the next chapter, I challenge the reductionism of this historical reading, as it is questionable that political choices made in the 1980s had such lasting impact on the music industries today. Here, it is necessary to understand that the decline of the Burkinabè and Ghanaian live music economy that thrived until the early 1980s is not only caused by the rise of a mediated music economy. This is important because, in the 1980s, Wallis and Malm (1984) focus almost exclusively on the mediated and mediated music economies, suggesting the higher relative importance of recorded over live music. When I asked what forms the biggest source of revenues, CDs or concerts, a Burkinabè artist manager commented that:

*There is not even competition! It's mostly shows. It's like that in the world. CD sales have plummeted. We will have to find other formulas. If the Internet develops a bit more in Africa, it might do the trick.*⁸² (Manager, Ouagadougou #10)

Music performance is thus increasingly central to both revenues and audience experiences. Such performances range from impromptu concerts on the street (as Figure 6-1 illustrates) to major shows (see Figure 6-2 below).

The greatest number of public concerts in Ouagadougou and Accra take place at a small number of club-sized venues, restaurants, and hotels. In spite of this revival of music performance, there is a range of issues that hampers the consolidation of this shift. First, performance does not equal 'live' music; second, there is a lack of adequate venues to accommodate a thriving live music scene; third, some 'big fish' occupy the most profitable segment of the concert market; fourth, presales are hard to organise, thus limiting risk-mitigation; and finally, promotion for concerts is expensive relative to revenues. These issues limit the overall profitability of the concert circuit in both countries.

⁸¹ In nominal terms, this price increase lags behind on inflation, due to the sharp devaluation of the FCFA exchange rate to the French Franc in 1994, that was meant to help increase exports from the FCFA countries.

⁸² « Il y a même pas match! C'est plutôt les spectacles. C'est comme ça dans le monde. La vente des CDs a chuté. Il va falloir trouver des autres formules. Si l'internet se développe un peu plus en Afrique, ça pourrait faire l'affaire. »



Figure 6-1 - A band playing live music at Madina station in Accra

First, music performance does not always mean 'live,' and even when it does, it is clear that most musicians do not have the habit of playing for an audience:

Those who play live, they don't know how to play well. So they'll say "oh massa, this live, I don't want, play the CD for me." We don't train them well. We don't respect live music. We are not able to bring the best out of the artists. (Manager, Accra #20)

Live music is only coming back. There's few more venues popping up here and there. But even so, the music they play is not local music; they do a lot of covers. We have to educate the people that by playing and composing your own music - you do not only accomplish being a musician, but you also earn money directly. (Entrepreneur, Accra #17)

This does not mean that there are no good shows. But the combination of ill-trained musicians, sound engineers, light technicians, and the limited availability of sufficiently big and powerful sound systems often make the live experience a weaker version of the album. At the same time, it means that those who are skilled at live performance have relatively much power. They get comparatively high remuneration for their sessions, be in rehearsal, live, or recording. These musicians thus have a limited loyalty to the bandleader as they are merely employed. This means that setting up a new

band or live show is a costly endeavour, for which the investment falls on the lead singer or their management.



Figure 6-2 - Floby concert at SIAO, Ouagadougou

Second, there is a lack of adequate venues of different sizes, which is one of the key elements of “thriving musical places” (Hesmondhalgh, 2013b pp. 125–127). Both Accra and Ouagadougou have venues in all sizes, including roadside ‘maquis’ or ‘spots’ to club-sized venues, such as *Madiba Maathaï*, *le Foyer*, *le P’tit Bazar*, and *le Jardin de l’Amitié* in Ouagadougou, and +233, *Afrikiko*, or *Labadi Beach* in Accra. There are also larger permanent music venues such as Reemdoogo, CENASA,⁸³ or the Institut Français in Ouagadougou and the National Theatre and the Alliance Française in Accra. Both cities have a range of occasional venues as well, like the Maison du Peuple in Ouagadougou, or the Conference Centre or the *Dome*⁸⁴. Beyond these event halls, several sports stadiums are used for events, even though this remains occasional. In sum, there is a range of venues, but there is a need for more and better-equipped in-

⁸³ CENASA (Centre National des Arts du Spectacle et de l’Audiovisuel) is a cultural centre, built for that purpose by the Taiwanese. Though the venue has bad acoustics, as a result of which it was not often used for concerts. It has been transformed into a cinema in 2013, which is marketed as more upmarket than the bigger Ciné Burkina and Ciné Neerwaya venues.

⁸⁴ This event marquee on the grounds of the Accra conference center was built for the 2008 UNCTAD meeting in the city. It has since been popular as a venue for music and other events. Though, after a long period of closure for maintenance, it is unclear if the venue will reopen, as there have been speculations that it would have been declared an illegal structure in 2014 (Owusu-Amoah, 2014). The dome should not be confused with the neighborhood “Dome”, north of Achimota.

frastructure to accommodate the rise in popularity of shows and concerts (see Chapter 7). While the return to live music as a key earning model does work for some artists, the limited availability of adequate infrastructure strains the potential of this segment of the music industries.

Third, the revenue model disproportionately benefits quasi-monopolistic leaders in the business. In the West, AEG and Live Nation are the most powerful players and most profits are made from “upscale shows in large venues” (Holt, 2010 pp. 249–251). This is no different in West Africa. In Ghana, *Charterhouse* organises the annual *Vodafone Ghana Music Awards* (VGMA). In Burkina Faso, *Biz’Art Production* organises the *Kundé d’Or*, the Burkinabè music awards. These are high profile events that come at a high price. In 2013, tickets to the VGMA go for GH¢100 to GH¢200 (VIP), while the Kundé go for FCFA 50,000.⁸⁵ Alongside these award shows, both Biz’Art and Charterhouse organise other profitable events in the music industry. This means that they are both gatekeepers and major employers of artists in these countries, albeit with very different strategies.

Biz’Art Production in Ouagadougou is specialised in ‘operational marketing,’ linking major corporations to potential consumers through the popularity of musicians. This includes product launches for new instant coffee flavours, new mobile telephony providers, or other consumables. This marketing strategy aims to draw attention to new products through free concerts. This allows audiences to experience large-scale events with popular artists, even though their on-stage presence is usually eclipsed by promotional images and messages. And it allows artists to perform for sizable fees. The downside is that these events saturate the market, perpetuate the expectation that concerts are free or cheap, and favour a small minority of artists.

Charterhouse in Accra focuses mostly on corporate events. That is, private events that are directly billed to the commissioning companies. Given the frequency of these events, they claim to be the single biggest employer of musicians in Accra. In financial terms, this may be accurate, though they only employ a small fraction of musicians. These events, like those by Biz’Art Production bear little risk, since contracts are signed with commissioning companies and the final invoice is not dependent on the presence or appreciation of the audience. So, once a contract is in, there is no uncertainty about the volatility of audience preference or competing events. Given the high production cost, the importance of an event portfolio, and the need for high level busi-

⁸⁵ In 2013 VGMA prices range from €40 to €80 (VIP), while the Kundé cost around €75. Needless to say these events are not socially inclusive. The events are, however, also broadcast live on television.

ness and political connections, there is little chance that other companies will threaten the near-monopolistic position of these enterprises.

Fourth, many event organisers face high fixed costs and very limited abilities to organise presales. This is largely out of fear for contraband presale tickets, but also because the distribution infrastructure for such sales is largely absent. There are exceptions (e.g. music award shows), though they rely mostly on phone reservations in combination with cash payments at the company's headquarters. This is a very cumbersome procedure, for organisers and audiences alike.⁸⁶



Figure 6-3 - Publicity for Floby's concert at the SIAO, Ouagadougou

Finally, it is difficult to reach audiences to make them aware of upcoming events. While online platforms are increasingly important in promoting concerts, they remain insufficient to reach the majority of the population. Promotional space in newspapers, roadside billboards (Figure 6-3), or airtime on radio and television are relatively expensive.

⁸⁶ My own inability to deal with the challenges of getting presale tickets for such shows meant that I did not manage to attend the music awards in Ghana or Burkina Faso during my period of research.

At the same time, there is little cultural journalism to speak of. With some exceptions,⁸⁷ journalists will effectively work as PR copywriters who will not show up to any event if you do not pay, but if you do pay, you will not get a negative review. The lack of a regular (free) publication that announces concerts and other events (which, does exist in Niamey and Dakar, for example), hampers the communication of events in both Ouagadougou and Accra.

In spite of these challenges, the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana build on (live) music performances to make a living. Yet, while live music provides a stream of direct income for artists and their management, it does not resolve the salient issues regarding copyright enforcement, licensing, and the retreat of professional producers. A strategy is needed to include these elements into a holistic vision on the future of the music industries in the digital era. Embracing the creative economy discourse has increased the focus on the empirical understanding of the cultural sector. Though this remains rather a strategy for advocacy than an analytical tool to understand the sector. And in spite of this discourse, the social and legal status of music makers and music workers remains precarious, not least because the strong reliance on live music creates very unstable income streams for artists.

6.5. Artists as Cultural Workers: Between Reverence and Social Status

The rise of the creative economy discourse in Burkina Faso and Ghana has drawn greater attention to the successes of artists and their managers, alongside supporting professions in the cultural industries. This new language helps seeing cultural work as a kind of labour that needs attention in terms of work conditions, social protection, education, and regulation, just like any other sector. Surely, reverence for highly successful artists is nothing new, but the political attention to the economic potential of culture has created greater awareness about cultural work as a profession. At the same time, the centrality of artists in advertisements and their ostentatious display of (leased) wealth in public seemingly increased the status of artists in society. However, historically speaking, artistic professions were socially seen as inferior, as I discuss below. The question remains if the current optimism about cultural and creative industries has alleviated the precarious living and working conditions of most artists.

In response to this question, this section asks if the current political and advocacy focus on the creative economy discourse has helped improving the social and legal sta-

⁸⁷ There are several great journalists with a heart for culture. Their passion can however not make up for the structural lack of attention for culture (beyond mere entertainment) in the media.

tus or artists and cultural workers. In order to do so, I first briefly address the international debates leading to the *Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist* (UNESCO, 1980). Subsequently, I show that the structural challenges of the sector perpetuate the precarious working conditions of music makers and music workers, because the profits are overall limited. Finally, I argue that artists' preoccupation with status through fame may increase the social stature of the few, but active social protection through a legal statute is what would most benefit the many, particularly in the long run.

In the late 1970s, the International Labour Organisation and UNESCO engaged in a debate on the social and legal status of artists around the world. The debates and studies emanating from this engagement resulted in the *Recommendation concerning the Status of the Artist*, also the *Recommendation of Belgrade* (UNESCO, 1980).⁸⁸ This documents sets out a range of recommendations regarding the training, social status, employment, working and living conditions, and cultural policies and participation. Its key aim is to provide a legal framework so artists can find adequate protection that recognises the irregular working conditions of most artists.

The social respectability of any profession is best measured by the reaction of parents when their child expresses the plan to pursue a career in that field. Few aspiring doctors, lawyers, or engineers will face the doubt or resistance from their parents that aspiring musicians face. This has much to do with the job insecurity and fluctuating revenues in the sector. Yet, the social stigma on artists also builds on the perception that they are "rascals, drunkards, and failed men" (Plageman, 2012 p. 187). The focus on 'men' is not accidental. The vast majority of music industries workers in both Burkina Faso and Ghana are male. While in both countries, a good portion of lead singers are female, other industry activities are strongly dominated by men. In Ghana, women hold a few key advocacy positions, but overall, the sector does not come near having gender balance. The reason most men give for the lack of female colleagues is work in music is simply not suitable for women because it includes frequent evening work and travel, which would allegedly not be feasible in combination with a family.⁸⁹ Generally speaking, the social standing of work in music remains low:

⁸⁸ "The world 'status' signifies, on the one, hand, the regard accorded to artists, defined as above, in a society, on the basis of the importance attributed to the part they are called upon to play therein and, on the other hand, recognition of the liberties and rights, including moral, economic and social rights, with particular reference to income and social security, which artists should enjoy." (UNESCO, 1980)

⁸⁹ This is, of course, a hypocritical and condescending thing to say. It implies that men do not think it is suitable for women to behave the way men do, particularly when away from home. This says more about what men do themselves than what they think women should (not) do.

[People] think that music ... is just for parties ... I don't know ... that it's not a real profession, you know. When there are ceremonies ... to have fun ... yes. But they don't take it to be a real profession.⁹⁰ (Manager, Ouagadougou #10)

You have to make [them] understand the sector. When you tell someone you're a cultural entrepreneur ... they'll ask you why you don't look for work ... what does that mean? It means that people don't understand what we do. So, we also have to make sure the minister manages to work towards valorising the sector.⁹¹ (Manager, Ouagadougou #9)

At the same time, there are some changes that incrementally improve the respectability of music makers and workers:

Previously, music was seen as a refuge for dropouts. Now, a lot of people go to school and still practice music. That is also ... gradually ... becoming a mainstream career. (Entrepreneur, Accra #19)

But, perhaps because the notion of the artist as an actual profession is a recent phenomenon in Burkina Faso (Rousseau, 2007), there is still much restraint about encouraging talented youngsters to pursue a career in music (industries):

Parents are still worried about career continuity. The elites still stress good studies and music on the side ... but always with a degree to look back upon. Many people who are playing music do not have education. (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

This illustrates that in spite of the rise of commercial culture, and the concomitant rise of potential revenues, cultural work is generally not seen as a respectable and feasible way to generate a family income (Plageman, 2012 p. 188). This means that for most, cultural work remains either way a default option, because they have little other opportunities, or a work of love, precisely because they can cope with financial setbacks through non-cultural income:

These days, someone who knows how to get around working in culture, it's already someone who is, at the basis, passionate. Otherwise they would not dare doing this

⁹⁰ « On pense que la musique ... c'est juste pour les soirées ... je ne sais pas ... que ce n'est pas un vrai métier, quoi. Quand il y a des cérémonies ... pour amuser oui ... mais ils ne prennent pas ça comme un vrai métier. »

⁹¹ « Faut essayer à faire comprendre le secteur. Tu vas dire à quelqu'un que t'es entrepreneur culturel ... il vont te demander que tu peux pas chercher du boulot ... ça veut dire quoi? ça veut dire que les gens ne comprennent pas ce qu'on fait. Alors, faut aussi que le ministre arrive à travailler à valoriser le secteur. »

profession that is considered as the profession of a 'loser'.⁹² (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

Framing musicians' and artists' social status as inferior remains common. Yet the perceived recent increase of respectability does not take into account that musicians were more widely employed before the 1980s, as the previous section indicated. Nor does it account for the limited ability of most Ghanaian artists to make a living from their music (Shiple, 2013). On the other hand, one Ghanaian recounts that from 1969 when Osibisa, a major band in Ghana's musical history, attained international fame, "it brought some respectability" (Entrepreneur, Accra #16) to the line of work, too.

The political and policy attention to the cultural and creative industries in general has created a window of opportunity to address the precarious social statute of artists and cultural workers. The Burkinabè government signed a decree on the statute of the artists on 25 March 2013 (Burkina Faso, 2013). A civil servant explains the aim of this framework:

So, in a way, the durable solution is that artists can work in an environment that allows them to make a living. And that, little by little, they may have a status with social security.⁹³ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14)

In this context, there is both awareness about the precarious statute of artists and cultural workers, and the intention to improve their plight. Yet the signing of this framework has taken a long time and the implementation will likely take even longer. At the same time, the implication of this decree is also that artists will be legally inhibited from emergency help from the government:

We can no longer have artists marginalise themselves. Because when an artist falls sick, immediately there's a phone call to the minister. But the minister isn't there for such things.⁹⁴ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14)

⁹² « Aujourd'hui, quelqu'un qui sait pratiquer la culture, c'est déjà quelqu'un à la base ... déjà passionné. Sinon il n'oserait pas faire ce métier-là, qui est considéré comme métier de "loser". »

⁹³ « Donc, quelque part, la solution durable, est que les artistes puissent travailler dans un environnement qui leur permet de vivre. Et que petit à petit, qu'il puisse avoir un statut avec une sécurité sociale. Ce processus de statut d'artiste depuis 2001 - le travail qui est à faire reste plus important de ce qui a été fait. Parce que là il faut passer à l'étape pour les négociations pour des conventions collectives avec les employeurs, parce que l'artiste est souvent là en tant que employeur et employé. »

⁹⁴ « On ne peut plus continuer regarder les artistes se marginaliser. Parce que quand un artiste tombe malade - toute de suite il y a des coups de fils au ministre. Mais le ministre n'est pas là pour ça. »

Though the reflex of artists to rely directly on the ministry is not surprising: there is no formal social security nor safety net for artists. While the government's intentions to change this are necessary, artists remain sceptical about their impact:

*The 'status of the artist' has been voted a year ago [interview dated from August 2013]. Nothing has been done ... it's nothing but paper ... lots of dust under the carpet: you have the impression that all is clean. That, that's Burkina Faso ... no one is united ... as people are poor, it's easy to divide them.*⁹⁵ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

In Ghana, there is no legal framework, as there now is in Burkina Faso, but the Musicians' Union (MUSIGA) is stronger than its Burkinabè equivalent. The union focuses more on the negotiation of minimum wages for musicians, rather than lobbying for a better legal framework:

Take a five-piece band playing at a hotel for GH¢500. We're looking at a situation where we can do enough advocacy at the level of organizers ... to agree on a minimum for performances, towards standardization of wages. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #5)

In sum, both countries are making small but significant steps to improving the social status of cultural workers. The difference in the approach illustrates the colonial legacy: Where collective bargaining is stronger in Ghana, the Burkinabè response is far more centralised and controlled by the government. Though, overall, the creative economy discourse helps seeing cultural work as a category of labour that needs serious attention and policies, just like any other business. The risk remains that the entrepreneurial optimism associated with the sector detracts attention from the persistent social challenges:

"The industry creates more job opportunities for people than the oil sector thereby creating more wealthy individuals", [Theresa Ayoade⁹⁶] told reporters at a Ghana Music Awards Forum in Accra on March 22, 2011. (Quandzie, 2013)

It may be true that there are more opportunities in the 'creative (arts) industry' than in the oil sector, but this is hard to prove given the lack of sector-wide employment data. Ayoade's claim about the music industries propensity to create wealthy individuals, however, looks mainly at the top performers in the sector and does not address the majority of artists and cultural workers who try in vain to make a living. This struggle of

⁹⁵ « Le statut d'artiste, il était voté il y a un an. Rien a été fait ... c'est que du papier ... beaucoup de poussière sous le tapis - t'as l'impression que tout est propre. Ça, c'est le Burkina Faso ... personne est uni ... comme les gens sont pauvres, c'est facile de les diviser. »

⁹⁶ Ayoade is the manager of Charterhouse, which organises the Ghana Music Awards.

musicians and music workers can be understood as precariousness, which Guy Standing (2011 pp. 7–13) defines as the lack of a clear occupational identity and the lack of security regarding employment. It signals a new kind of class, that exists across a range of blue and white collar professions, where job flexibility is more common than job security, for better *and* for worse.

Precariousness also signals a social critique of labour conditions, particularly in the downturn of social democracy in the West, where this new class has to cope with uncertainty that labour flexibility inadvertently brings about (Standing, 2011). While the term is thus used primarily in contexts where the protection of labour conditions deteriorated, it can arguably also be applied to many so-called developing countries as well, precisely because the ‘North’ is starting to look more like the ‘South’ in this regard (see section 9.3): “Members of the precariat have lost the standard labour conditions they previously enjoyed: a safe, stable job with appropriate access to education, health services, pension plans, holiday time, and so on. They are thus joining the ranks of the underdeveloped majority, even when they live in Birmingham or Chicago” (Esteva et al., 2013 pp. 27–8). Section 6.1 has shown that no one can predict what will have success, so there is a need to try as much as possible; sadly, this means that not all will succeed. Precariousness is a guiding concept in this section because it offers a way to show that insecurity and exploitation are in fact inherent to creative labour (Hesmondhalgh and Baker, 2010 p. 161); it is not a condition that ‘development’ will solve, unless the terms of labour are duly negotiated.

In the cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana, precariousness builds on three mutually reinforcing issues.⁹⁷ At the consumer end, there is limited overall spending power. Disposable income of most people does not allow for (much) discretionary spending on culture. At the distribution end, limited spending power affects sales. This leads to – often-illicit – strategies to lower retail prices of CDs, DVDs, or books. This in turn, erodes the readily fragile value chain. Which means that, also at the production end, profits are limited, and room for investment is lacking. Moreover, the cultural industries build on an availability of surplus labour. There are far more university graduates than the civil service and established companies can employ. Some of these graduates rightly see opportunities in the cultural industries, but also in this sector, there is a systemic tendency towards strategic overproduction, where the success of the few depends much on the attempts of the many (Negus, 2014 pp. 33–34).

⁹⁷ In his chapter on “Money Trouble” among Malian musicians, Skinner argues that “such troubles are not just about money; rather, they index a pervasive sense of precarity that triangulates social, political, and economic uncertainty for which money, and its widespread lack, is the privileged sign” (2014 p. 246).

What does this triple basis of precariousness mean in practice? Given the recent decline of record sales, many have turned primarily to the organization and live events. But due to inadequate infrastructures it is difficult to run events that are sufficiently profitable to cover the relatively high costs to organize the event. At an organizing cost between FCFA1m and 15m (some EUR1,500-23,000) for an average concert in Ouagadougou, and a going rate for concert admissions between FCFA500 and 2000 (0.76EUR and 3.05EUR) there are barely any venues that allow for a profitable combination. For a 'cheap' concert (at FCFA500) of a starting artist (total cost of show FCFA1m), a paying audience of 2000 people is needed to break even. Yet there is no venue that allows for such a capacity at such a low production cost. Similarly, an expensive concert (at FCFA 2000) for a bigger artist (total cost of show FCFA8m) requires 4000 paying punters to break even. In Ghana the numbers differ, but the principle is by and large the same.

There are, however, exceptions that show great creativity and resourcefulness to making things work. In Ghana, artist Becca released an album as a free addition to Graphic Showbiz, a newspaper focused on entertainment, with sponsoring from an electronics brand; the club +233 promotes live music in Accra, providing a steady income for a range of musicians; Scratch Studios focuses on licensing contracts for Ghanaian artists, alongside music production; and corporate events provide a basis of income for a growing group of musicians. In Burkina Faso, singer Patrick Kabré balances international touring with small (and bigger) concerts throughout the country; Alif Naaba won the *Visa pour la Création* (Visa for Creation) from the French ministry of foreign affairs and the Institut Français in 2012, which allowed him to record his fourth album, and tour the French institutes across the continent; and several popular artists have sponsorship contracts.

The successes are many, but they are not necessarily representative. In any case, they do not (re)present a blueprint for a way out of the impasse between the potential of the cultural and creative industries and the ability of people to make a living from music. In sum, the centrality of the cultural and creative industries in the public policy and debate have increased the social status of artist and cultural workers as a profession, but the discourse has so far not prompted a better legal status or social protection. Improving the livelihoods of all music workers – including those who are now deemed to be 'pirates' – is a central challenge that an optimistic embrace of the free market of cultural and creative industries is not going to resolve without adequate (and progressive) social policy.

6.6. Conclusion: The Need to Balance Work and Welfare

This chapter asks how music makers and workers make money from their music: What strategies are used to generate income in informal economies, plagued by piracy and hampered by limited spending power? Is the creative economy discourse helpful in providing avenues to increase income on a personal level and on a social level?

Overall, the music industries, like cultural and creative industries in general, are a risky business. Neither national policies (e.g. development plans) nor global reports (e.g. the creative economy reports) focus on this sufficiently. This causes many stakeholders in the sector to underestimate such risks, and overestimate the detrimental effects of piracy. Yet, while the enforcement of the otherwise good copyright legislation in Burkina Faso and Ghana is limited, the current challenge is technological change. So far, legitimate companies in the music industries have been unable to adapt their (weak) distribution networks to the changing technologies and concomitant changes in audience preferences. When consumers want to buy music files to play on their phone and these are almost exclusively available from illicit street vendors, I argue that neither audiences nor 'pirates' are solely to blame for the limited returns from music sales. Yet this is precisely what hardliners in the record business claim.

At the same time, producers invest less in albums because of limited returns on their investments. Musicians and their management take over this role, often in home studios. Production, after all, remains necessary to gain popularity, which is a prerequisite for economically viable (live) performances. Those concerts and shows are now their main source of income, in line with global trends. However, also in this branch of the music industries are most profits generated by a limited number of people and businesses. This results in an uneven development where a few 'best practices' overshadow the vast majority of artists and cultural workers. Some people succeed, but most get by through subsistence entrepreneurship.

While embracing the creative economy discourse as a driver of public policy has generated some greater social recognition and status for music workers (that is, for those who are successful), it has not prompted a systematic engagement with cultural work as a particular type of labour. This means that the particularities of the sector, largely tied to the levels of risk, do not translate into tailored approach for the sector. This lack of attention is exacerbated by the sheer inequality *within* the sector. In order to address these inequalities, the creative economy agenda should become more explicitly social in its aims and approaches. Or, more explicitly, CCI policies should start looking more like social policies than business policies. This means a more explicit normative engagement with the creative economy discourse at a global level, and a greater recogni-

tion of the challenges in individual countries. This is a challenge reconnects cultural and development policies, as neither realm can address this on its own.

Yet there is equally a need to incorporate greater attention to the 'cultures' of revenue generation that have evolved in both countries. This means that there is a need for a contextual understanding of piracy – and other issues in the music industries. This is precisely where 'culture' as a way of life and 'culture' as cultural industries collide. This is the point I have made in Chapter 2: seeing culture as a way of life forms the basis for a critique of orthodox 'development thinking' by incorporating existing practices in the search for change. But seeing piracy, shadow distribution networks, and technological innovations as challenges that merely need technical solutions does not build on culture in that way. It makes 'developing cultural industries' part of the kind of development discourse that the incorporation of culture aims to challenge. The technical 'enforcement' of copyright legislation according to a Western model, calls for the creative destruction of the practices that exist. Even without considering that this Western model has no real solutions in the digital era, it ignores that the context in which the music industries currently exist matters.

Culture should be a basis to understand what exists, and what is possible within that context, bearing in mind that culture is always a realm of struggle, debate, and reconsideration: "Culture and development is not simply a matter of including culture but also of interrogating culture as a terrain of power, culture as ideology" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 77). Hence the focus on piracy: what should be the relation between musicians and their audiences? And in what ways can existing practices, including piracy, serve to devise policies that aim for inclusive employment in the cultural industries, especially for those in the margins of society? The focus should be on working with what exists, in order to understand what should be and can be. In this regard, the creative economy discourse looks much like conventional development thinking, where there is more attention for technical issues than fundamental questions (Clammer, 2012 p. 47) (see Chapter 9). In the next chapter, I address the links between the 'hard' and 'soft' infrastructure of cultural policy is needed to make (live) music performance work as a way to generate revenues.

7. The 'Infrastructure' of Cultural Policy: Buildings, Support, and History

In his seminal work on media infrastructure in Nigeria, Brian Larkin (2008) explores the modernist ideology of the colonial state through its focus on the built environment and technological advancements. This ideology and its physical manifestations, he argues, are taken up by the post-colonial independent state as a sign of their power and efficacy. These infrastructures are not functionally invisible, as is often the case in the West, but rather ostentatiously present: initially by virtue of their functionality, but now increasingly through a lack of reliability. This is the case for utilities such as electricity, Internet, water, and other public provisions. Precisely because of the near-daily power cuts (in both Ouagadougou and Accra), the lack of a steady water supply (in Accra), and the slow, unstable Internet connections in both capital cities (let alone in the provinces), it is impossible to ignore the vital role of infrastructure in daily life.

In this chapter, I explore the role of infrastructure as a conceptual and physical feature through its most visible form in the context of the music industries: concert venues. Infrastructure refers to both the physicality of cultural venues (that are both practical and symbolical in their use and prestige), social infrastructures, and the politics that underlie the creation and functioning of these different notions of infrastructure. This includes the financial and political infrastructure that links finance, politics, and business in what is, as of yet, a precarious balance.

The shift towards live music as primary earning model in the music industries (see chapter 6) puts pressure on this balance, as the growing need for concert venues creates a need for more and better concert venues, as stakeholders in the Ghanaian and Burkinabè music industries stress. While this is a legitimate demand, my argument is that even though there is a need for infrastructure, the real challenge lies in critically re-examining the historical framework that gave rise to the current conditions. In doing so, I argue that the preoccupation with the built infrastructure is overshadowing the social and political infrastructure. Contrary to popular belief, the current challenges in the music industries are the result of a broader range of issues than 'piracy' and political decisions made in the early 1980s as I mentioned earlier. This 'popular belief' is the result of a reductionist historiography, which I discuss in detail in section 7.4 of this chapter.

The remainder of this chapter addresses three issues that emerge from the increased importance of live music discussed in the previous Chapter (6). First, the increased reliance on live music for income creates greater demand for better concert venues. Second, the demand for venues and the need for investment fuels a debate concerning

the balance between public funding and private investment. Third, most stakeholders think the grass is always greener elsewhere. I take their interest in practices elsewhere seriously, but argue that their perceptions largely build on incomplete (if not false) information.

My argument that connects the above three issues is that history matters. Yet the selective popular memory that lies at the basis of commonplace myths of success and demise distract both debate and policy from engagement with past failure. Yet, it is precisely in being more aware *why* things changed and people failed that the central challenges of the CCIs can be confronted. A reflexive understanding of history is needed that moves beyond selective popular historiography that reduces a complex range of events to a single event or person. In closing, I locate the contradictory politics of infrastructure in the music industries, which oscillate between hope as despair in the popular discourse on 'Africa' as a continent caught between historical "Afro-pessimism" and present-day business-driven "Afro-optimism" (Nothias, 2014). This reflection on the historical and political infrastructure of cultural policy opens up towards the next chapter, in which I explore the centrality of 'capabilities' – that are part of the 'soft' infrastructure – in the understanding of human development.

7.1. The politics of Infrastructure

The increased importance of (live) performance in generating income for the music industries has made concert venues a growing necessity in the business. Across stakeholders in both Burkina Faso and Ghana, there is a consensus that more venues have to be built to respond to a growing need:

*We need a venue of at least 4000 seats, well equipped ... this will allow cultural entrepreneurs to get organised. So they can recuperate their investments ... this will create employment.*⁹⁸ (Musician, Ouagadougou #7)

If we had a good venue for 10000 - people would be able to watch such a programme for 30GH¢. Volume would make up for the income. We need a good-sized amphitheatre ... if the industry had that, it would do us a world of good. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #5)

There are good reasons to ask for more and better venues. Demand is growing, but infrastructures are lagging behind. The venues that exist are often not ideal for musical

⁹⁸ « On a besoin d'une salle d'au moins 4000 places, bien équipée ... ça va permettre aux entrepreneurs culturels de s'organiser. Qu'ils puissent récupérer leurs investissements ... ça va créer des emplois. »

performance. This is partly because of technical limitations, such as acoustics, lighting, and sound systems. Yet the bigger issue is that the sizes of the venues make it difficult to break even. In Ouagadougou, smaller venues (like *Reemdoogo* or *CENASA*, see Table 7-2) are often too small to break even, because 500-600 people at FCFA 1000 gives a very limited budget for artist fee, promotion, venue hire, sound technician, sound system. Even the bigger venues (like the *Maison du Peuple*, see Table 7-2 and Figure 7-1) are not big enough to benefit from economies of scale, as the production costs for that venue are much higher, as there are hardly any venues of similar size to which the productions could travel within the country, and international productions require high investment and political and business connections. The cost for bigger PA systems, more promotion, and higher artist fees reduce the profit margin of one-off events.



Figure 7-1 - The 'Maison du Peuple' (House of the People) in the City Centre of Ouagadougou

The situation in Accra is comparable. While the city has fewer venues, they are in fact better equipped. The major difference between Ouagadougou and Accra is that the former has a greater variety of venues (Table 7-2) but is largely limited by the low ticket prices, while the latter has fewer venues (Table 7-1) but has a larger middle class that can afford the steep prices for premium events (see section 3.5). This makes it possible for a small number of venues to make a profit, as is the case in the club '+233':

Monday to Thursday - entrance is free. On the weekends, when we get bigger bands - there is a cover. Friday, usually 20GH¢, Saturday and Sunday 10GH¢. It's not that much. People spend 40¢ on Saturday to go to Mövenpick [hotel, downtown] to listen to a DJ. (Producer and Manager, Accra #18)

Table 7-1 - Overview of Main (Concert) Venues in Accra

<i>Venue</i>	<i>Capacity</i>
Municipal Stadium	45000
Dome	5000
National Theatre	1500
Conference Centre	1300
Alliance Française	500

Source: the author

Table 7-2 - Overview of Main (Concert) Venues in Ouagadougou

<i>Venue</i>	<i>Capacity</i>
Stade du 4 Août (see Figure 7-5)	35000
Stade Municipale	15000
Palais des Sports	4600
Maison du Peuple (see Figure 7-1)	2400
Le Cour du SIAO	1500
Palais de la Jeunesse et de la Culture	800-1000
Jean Pierre Guingané	
Espace Culturel Gambidi	500 / 200 / 300
Atelier Théâtre Burkinabè (ATB)	600 (+ Le Foyer)
CENASA	600
Reemdoogo (The Garden of Music) (see Figure 7-4)	500
Institut Français	435 (open air) & 194 (indoor)
Centre Culturel Burkinabè	200

Source: (Fuchs, 2011 p. 54) and the author



Figure 7-2 - Live Music on Sunday Afternoon at Maquis 'Boulougou' in Koulouba, Ouagadougou

Alongside the larger, more formal events venues there is a range of smaller pubs, clubs, and stages where music plays a key role. In Ouagadougou, a club like *Matata* in

Dapoya is a lively open-air venue that hosts DJs and some lip-sync performances. It is one of the key nodes in the bustling weekend nightlife of the city. *Le Foyer* is a smaller venue, located in the compound of the *Atelier Théâtre Burkinabè* (ATB) and programs live music nearly every week. At the same time, there are also long-running 'maquis' that program live orchestras playing 1970s classics throughout the weekend like *Sports Bar* in Gounghin, or *Boulougou* in Koulouba.

There are also smaller and newer venues that focus on live music in an open and accessible way, such as *Barratô* in Cissin, just to name one example (see Figure 7-3). At the same time, there are also more expat-oriented places like *Bar-K*⁹⁹ in Koulouba.



Figure 7-3 - Live Music on Friday Night at Maquis 'Barratô' in Cissin, Ouagadougou

In Accra, the *Republic Bar* in Osu, or +233 and *Afrikiko*, between Nima and Flagstaff House (the seat of the president), are key examples of such smaller venues. Yet, overall, there are ample 'maquis' in Ouagadougou and 'spots' in Accra where music plays an important part of weekend entertainment. The weekend is indeed, the prime moment for music. Both in Ouagadougou and Accra, it is rare to find any shows that happen during the week, with the exception of +233, for example, which programmes throughout the week, or Reemdoogo (see below) on Thursdays.

Yet, venues beyond the capital cities are less structured and come in smaller numbers:

⁹⁹ This is a piece of wordplay: Bar-K is a francophone homonym of Barka, which means 'thank you' in Mooré, the most common language in Ouagadougou.

Accra is the capital - so the rest are smaller, some without a backstage. That needs a lot of development. The government ... through the centre of national culture has them ... but most of them are not operating as they should. I am looking forward to be able to duplicate a national theatre show around the country. But some of them are not finished. Some are so far out of town that transportation is not arranged. So it is difficult for the people. (Musician, Accra #8)

These venues are needed to create a lively music scene in the country. Far too many artists already perform too often in the same place, thus reducing the appeal of their performances for audiences.



Figure 7-4 - The Amphitheatre of Reemdoogo in Gounghin, Ouagadougou

There have been efforts to make changes. The best example of this is *Reemdoogo*, which in Mooré literally means *The Garden of Music*, in Ouagadougou (see Figure 7-4).¹⁰⁰ This venue, inaugurated in 2004, has a capacity of around 500 seats, but also includes rehearsal spaces, a conference room, a documentation centre, and a maquis (Fuchs, 2011 p. 17). It is located in the densely populated popular neighbourhood

¹⁰⁰ The music industries support mechanism ARPEM (see Chapter 1) grew out of Reemdoogo. Support for the economic aspect of music was meant to be integral to the Reemdoogo project, but it received insufficient attention, which prompted the establishment of a separate structure. The increasing focus on music industries, and now cultural industries, in Ouagadougou thus grew from an initiative that is focused on performance and creation. Support for music industries in Ouagadougou is thus inextricably linked to efforts to improve live performance and music. This remains a necessity, as most 'modern' musicians do not have the skill or habit to perform live.

Gounghin, and functions as one of the key meeting points for (aspiring) musicians in the city. The municipality of Ouagadougou proposed the venue in order to develop a project for young musicians. The city of Grenoble is the major funder of the project,¹⁰¹ and it has benefited from the technical and strategic support from *Culture et Développement*, an NGO based in Grenoble. The popularity of the place has prompted a study to explore the establishment of a second Reemdoogo, which would be located in Bogodogo, a vast area of Ouagadougou with relatively few facilities for music (Fuchs, 2011 p. 28).

Reemdoogo, however, remains the exception that confirms the rule: it is a unique project in West Africa. Yet it is hardly known as an example in Ghana, where the common call is to build concert venues, not multi-purpose centres that combine music creation, rehearsal, and performance:

It's a pity Ghana cannot boast of an adequate multi-purpose indoor facility such as the O2 Arena in London or the Staples Centre and Nokia Theatre in Downtown LA or Madison Square Garden in New York City, for our numerous entertainment concerts and events. ... The only solution is to build at least one multi-purpose indoor arena that could host at least 50,000 people. But the question is: Who should build that event saver? (Akwei, 2013)

Such infrastructures are indeed needed, and a part of the solution may actually lie in political infrastructure, rather than physical infrastructure alone, as the interaction between sports stadiums and event organisers is currently impeding optimal use of these venues (these sports venues are in fact used for cultural events, see Figure 7-5, but this remains the exception rather than the rule). Yet limited availability (and not strictly the existence) of large venues remains secondary to the need to create a more connected range of infrastructures that do not only focus on performance, but also on creation. Hence my argument is twofold.

In the first place, infrastructure is more than venues alone, and includes a range of 'hard' and 'soft' elements:

Hard infrastructure is the nexus of buildings and institutions such as research institutes, educational establishments, cultural facilities and other meeting places as well as support services such as transport, health, and amenities. Soft infrastructure is the system of associative structures and social networks, connections and human interactions, that

¹⁰¹ Ouagadougou and Grenoble are partner cities, as part of the politics of decentralised development cooperation in France (Fuchs, 2011 p. 17).

underpins and encourages the flow of ideas between individuals and institutions.
(Landry, 2000 p. 133)



Figure 7-5 - The FESPACO (2013) Opening Ceremony ‘Stade du 4 Août’ in Gounghin, Ouagadougou

Landry’s delineation is questionable because the need for ‘hard’ infrastructure cannot be separated from the ‘soft’ infrastructure, which is needed to make the former work. This is why I speak of the politics of infrastructure, because it “refers to [the] totality of both technical and cultural systems that create institutionalized structures whereby goods of all sorts circulate, connecting and binding people into collectivities” (Larkin, 2008 p. 6). In this regard, I follow Hesmondhalgh (2013b pp. 125–127) in arguing that thriving musical places need a combination of several elements to make things work:

- Live music venues of different kinds and sizes
- A good quality of live music venues
- A sympathetic legal and regulatory environment (for venues)
- Good transport infrastructure, street lighting, and high degrees of personal safety
- National and/or local education systems and curricula that value music highly
- National and local communication systems which value a range of musical genres highly, and provide the means for musicians to build audiences
- Libraries and museums
- A mixture of “cultures” in a locality

This shows how the need for *more* venues is linked to the need for *better* venues in a broader context conducive to musical activity. In Ouagadougou, for example, most stakeholders in the music industries did not so much complain about the lack of venues, but lamented the disconnect between the hard and the soft infrastructure: Many cultural venues are built for political prestige, which is evident in the limited attention to acoustics, usability, and purpose. From the outside, these venues look appealing, but they are ill equipped for performing arts. As a result, their prestige diminishes quickly. One clear example of this is the recently completed *Palais de la Jeunesse et de la Culture Jean Pierre Guingané* that has white tiles on the stage, bad acoustics, and no adequate lighting or sound system.

This illustrates that politics is a crucial part of the ‘soft’ infrastructure. There is technical know-how to build venues with good acoustics, but the inclusion of such expertise needs to be prioritised, budgeted, and planned before it becomes part of the physical building. Building a new venue is not just a technical need. The decision whether the project is public or private, where it is located, how and by whom it is exploited, and what kind of audience it aims to attract are clear political considerations that need public deliberation. The following section shows how finding the resources to invest in hard and soft infrastructure continues to pose challenges that need public consideration.



Figure 7-6 - Palais de la Jeunesse et de la Culture ‘Jean Pierre Guingané’ in Cissin, Ouagadougou

7.2. Support and Investment: From Whom and for Whom?

Cultural policy provides a framework for public action in the broad field of culture. It thus constitutes a vital part of the ‘soft’ infrastructure for culture. In the context of post-colonial states, this meant – particularly in early post-colonial years – a focus on nation-building through the conciliation of a wide range of ethnic groups under the unified sense of belonging to a state that was yet to become a nation.

Burkina Faso was called Upper Volta throughout the period of colonial rule and the first 24 years of independence (from 1960-1984). The name of the country now means 'the land of the upright men,' though its former name merely means that it is located north of the Volta region (in present-day Ghana). Ghana was called Gold Coast until the end of colonial rule in 1957. The name is an obvious reference to the rich gold resources found in the area, but also masks the role of the country's coastline as the epicentre of Atlantic slave trade by Danish, Swedish, Dutch, Portuguese, German, and British 'merchants.'

In response to these long and brutal histories, the new names of the countries signalled the start of an era of active cultural politics. These new names created a framework for national unity of the diverse ethnic and religious groups that were lumped together at the 1884-85 Berlin conference at the height of the 'scramble for Africa.' Halfway the 20th century, culture became, through language, symbols, and 'traditions' instrumental in creating a joint sense of belonging to an imagined community. This helped both create a basis for a shared sense of identity at the basis for struggles for independence. The early independence era, however, did not have formal cultural policies that focused on public subsidy of the arts, even though there was in fact public funding. In Ghana, this was through direct employment of artists that helped fostering a shared national identity across ethnic groups. The structural adjustment programs of the 1980s created a context in which it became difficult – if not impossible – to justify state subsidies, leading to a sharp decline in public spending on culture. In Ghana, this meant that the informal cultural policy of employing musicians in public service to form bands for all branches of government administration ceased to exist. In Burkina Faso, this meant that the cultural policies (derived from the French statist model) formally provided subsidies, even though the budget has been extremely limited.

Throughout the second half of the 20th century, a range of foreign (most often European) donors provides funding for culture. These include the *Danish Center for Culture and Development*, *Africalia*, the *Alliance Française*, *Goethe Institut*, the *British Council*, *Hivos*, *Stichting DOEN*, the *Prince Claus Fund*, and so on. These bodies fund creation, production, and circulation. Many of them have historically set the agendas and created an additional layer of informal cultural policy, without any accountability to the 'partner' country. This process is slowly changing, as donors have become more aware of the unintended implications of the work they do. Yet, for decades, many foreign organisations have been co-creators of a *sui generis* amalgam of cultural policies.

As a result, the actual cultural policies of Burkina Faso and Ghana, as opposed to what exists in writing, differ radically from the cultural policies of European countries, where they are historically strong: the largest share of funding for culture comes from foreign

donors, and not the local ministry of culture, as is the case in Europe (see below). This influences the kind of choices that can be made. More importantly, accountability does not simply refer to a relationship between the state and its citizens; it includes foreign donors whose power in fact exceeds that of the culture ministry. The cultural infrastructure in both countries forms a clear example of the complex relation between the citizenry, the state, and foreign donors. The Ghanaian National theatre was built by the Chinese as a 'present' to the country in 1992. It is currently operated by the National Commission on Culture under auspices of the Ministry of Tourism, Culture, and Creative Arts and administered by executive director Amy Appiah Frimpong (Osei-Boateng, 2014). And the Alliance Française, owned and operated by the French is one of the more lively cultural venues in town (see Table 7-1). The Burkinabè context is similar, where the CENASA was built by the Taiwanese as a 'present,' and several other venues were funded in large part by Taiwan. Reemdoogo, the Garden of Music, on the other hand, was built in collaboration with, and with funding of the city of Grenoble (see Fuchs, 2011 for a more detailed account of this collaboration).




Figure 7-7 - Cultural Policy Stakeholder Relations

While the French and British influence on the cultural *policies* of respectively Burkina Faso and Ghana has been significant and generated two different kinds of cultural *politics*, their similarity is more striking on at least three accounts. First, they initially served to create a nation following the end of colonial rule. Second, structural adjustment in the 1980s prompted cuts in public funding for culture, whether directly (by diminishing

budgets) or indirectly (by eliminating culture from school curricula). Third, the presence of foreign donors with their own agendas *de facto*¹⁰² influenced the cultural politics and policies by providing the majority of funding for the sector and setting guidelines and foci for funded projects. As a result, the politics of culture in these countries are not simply part of a social contract between a sovereign government and its citizens (see Figure 7-7). Cultural policy is an ad-hoc set of ideas and practices that is far more complex than merely the legal framework that formally constitutes public policy.

Figure 7-7 illustrates how both donors and partners *de facto* influence the field of cultural action and policy by virtue of funding activities, maintaining collaborations, creating activities, and operating key venues (see for example the Institut Français in Figure 7-8). This is by no means a unique constellation, as many countries have foreign cultural centres and actors operation on their territories. What makes the situation different in the context of Burkina Faso and Ghana (and many other countries that receive 'development cooperation') is that these foreign players provide the bulk of funding for arts and culture (Mandé, 2011). This gives them the power to influence policy and practice, whether they intend this or not.



Figure 7-8 - 'SIDO' (Nadège Ouédraogo and her band SIDO) live at the K-fête, the bar of the Institut Français, in the City Centre of Ouagadougou

¹⁰² This contrasts with the lack of *de jure* influence of these players – as they have no legal or formal influence over cultural policies.

The role of foreign actors is however changing as a result of diminishing budgets for both culture and development cooperation in traditional donor countries due to the economic 'crisis' and subsequent ideological struggles over state budgets in Europe.¹⁰³ European donors have become less active and increasingly steered towards the creative economy discourse, at home and abroad. This has resulted in a shift in public policy thinking: culture is no longer seen as a field in need of perpetual support, but a realm of activity that needs investment to become self-sufficient and economically viable (Garnham, 2005 p. 16), as evident in 'regional' development (Lee et al., 2014) or creative cities (Vivant, 2013) strategies:

*The [cultural] sector always benefited from subsidies ... and ARPEM tried to break with that. [...] Yes, it is the change that ARPEM aimed to help generate. A shift from a spirit of subsidies towards a spirit of investment. But the difficulty persists ... banks ... have difficulties ... a reluctance to finance culture.*¹⁰⁴ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #11)

Yet there has been a silent shift from (recurrent) cultural subsidies to (one-off) 'investment' in culture:

Vice-President John Dramani Mahama,¹⁰⁵ on Friday said Government had allocated 2 million Ghana cedis (some €800k in 2013) for the creative industry, to boost the sector to enable it to obtain international standards. (The Chronicle, 2012)

This contribution was framed as a one-off payment to the music industry of the country. The Musicians Union (MUSIGA) received the money and spent it on a study to explore the size and economic impact of the music sector in the country (KPMG, 2014) and the first Ghana Music Week (Accra 4-1 March 2013, see Figure 7-9).

¹⁰³ While the budgets of European "partner" countries decrease, the collaboration with "new" partner countries such as Brazil, Turkey, China, Taiwan, etc. is increasing. Though I did not manage to obtain sufficient empirical data on these changes to comment on them in detail.

¹⁰⁴ « Le secteur a toujours bénéficié des subvention ... et ARPEM a voulu casser ça aussi. [...] Oui, c'est le changement que ARPEM a voulu créer un changement d'un esprit de subvention vers un esprit de financement. Mais la difficulté persiste toujours ... les banques ... ont des difficultés, une réticence de financer la culture. »

¹⁰⁵ Mahama is now president after president Atta Mills passed away on 24 July 2012 and winning the elections on 7 December 2012. His 50.7% victory was initially contested by the opposition, but was deemed legitimate by the supreme court after an 8 month process (Brierley and Oforu, 2014). While initially hailed for his support to the cultural sector (The Chronicle, 2012), Mahama is now also criticized for his dealings with the cultural and creative sector (Yamoah, 2015).



Figure 7-9 - 'Ghana Music Week' Poster at the MUSIGA National Head Office in Accra

The budgetary considerations are however not merely ideological in nature. There are considerable limitations to public spending that makes for difficult choices, as this example illustrates:

The ministry of culture asked the ministry of finance to fund the participation to 'Francophonie festival' in Quebec. He says, at the moment I have a request from the health ministry ... because there is a meningitis outbreak [the disease is endemic in Burkina Faso during certain months] ... 200 million (FCFA) to purchase vaccinations. So, there is no 10 million (FCFA) for the journey. So they left out a dance group and a music group. The minister said he couldn't fund such a thing while people are dying from meningitis ... that is understandable. But this indicates to what extent a guy like that [minister] does not understand. I agree, the sick should be treated. But it's not like 10 million to go and sell culture abroad ... that won't kill the country.¹⁰⁶ (International Organisation, Ouagadougou #17)

¹⁰⁶ « Le ministère de la culture demandait le ministère de la finance pour aller à un festival de la Francophonie à Québec. Il a dit, actuellement, j'ai une demande du ministère de la sante ... parce que la méningite est là ... 200 millions pour acheter les vaccins. Alors ... y'a pas le 10 millions pour le voyage ... alors, ils ont laissé un groupe de danse et de musique. Le

Yet, even before the discourse shifted to cultural and creative industries, many (if not most) people I have encountered were active in culture work without (much) support from the government:

[Some artists] have the time to run after subsidies. I don't have the time, I work in my studio. I don't have the time to wait for the minister or until a 'guru' passes by, as we say. It's not like I don't submit any applications [to the ministry]. I submit like everyone else. Some are funded at low budgets, others not at all. The most important thing is that we can continue.¹⁰⁷ (Musician, Ouagadougou #1)

As a result of the limited stake of public funding in these activities, there is an increasingly loud call to focus more on private patrons than on public support to move the sector forward:

It is about time there is a created partnership to pool funds in order to build a multi – purpose arena, like the Staples Centre [in Los Angeles, California], to host local and international concerts, boxing matches and other events rather than wait for another 50 years for government to make the move. (Akwei, 2013)

The challenge at this point is that the banks and investors are not readily convinced by the economic potential of the cultural sector. And even if they are, the 'cultural' difference between bankers and cultural actors forms an impediment to collaboration. The failure of the Ghanaian-Danish microfinance project for music industries illustrates this point clearly (see section 7.3 below). At the same time, most cultural workers lament the lack of access to funds from banks. Yet here are at least three reasons that this difficulty is not simply based on a lack of understanding between cultural and financial workers. First, virtually all interviewees who lamented the lack of access to capital through banks turned out to have never tried obtaining a loan. Second, there is a West-African guarantee fund for the cultural industries, that backs bank loans for cultural projects and investments (see section 8.3). Third, those who channel their income through bank accounts get offered loans. So, those who do not need funds can get access, and those who need it often give up before trying. This means that the cultural sector has

ministère de la finance a dit qu'il peut pas financer un truc comme ça pendant y'a des gens qui meurent de méningite ... ça peut se comprendre. Mais ça veut dire à quel niveau un gars comme ça ne comprend pas. Je suis d'accord. Y'a des malades à soigner. Mais c'est quand-même pas 10 millions pour aller vendre la culture à l'extérieur ... c'est pas ça qui va tuer le pays. »

¹⁰⁷ « Ils ont le temps de courir après les subventions. Je n'ai pas le temps. Je travaille dans mon studio. Je n'ai pas le temps d'attendre au ministère. Où bien qu'un 'guru' passe, comme on dit, c'est pas que je dépose des dossiers. Je les dépose comme tout le monde. Quelques-uns sont financés à petit budget, et des autres pas du tout. L'importance est que je puisse continuer. »

little experience in engaging with banks, which in turn have little experience with culture.

While much of the management and financing of the cultural sector is supply-driven, through subsidy and sponsorship, demand matters greatly as well. The challenge in this regard is the limited spending power of most Burkinabè and Ghanaian citizens. As illustrated in section 3.5 above, the low income of most people constrains their ability to spend on culture.

In sum, on the supply-side, funding is limited and access to private investment is difficult, while on the demand-side, spending power is limited. Yet, the discourse of the cultural and creative industries creates the impression that culture can be self-sustainable *and* serves as an advocacy-argument for more public funding. The result is that the thinking on the role of culture in society and the extent to which public funding is needed or justified has become dangerously simplified, as the following example illustrates:

In the field of culture, we have a system of 'assistantship' in Burkina. We want to be assisted by the state, by diverse (international) cooperation bodies ... everyone. And someone who wants to make music in Burkina is convinced that the state has to give money ... yes yes ... "the state does nothing for us ... the state this and the state that ...". But a woman who sells 'Soumbala' rice [a West African dish with sauce from Néré seeds] does not expect anything from the state ... she will borrow money, produce, and sell. We take credit, we buy, we sell, and we reimburse. Women, farmers, everyone does that. But no artist does that – not one. This does point at a problem. There is a system of assistantship, and because of that, I salute the filmmakers who make two or three films a year a year – that everybody criticizes – but they have the highest revenues [see below].¹⁰⁸ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14)

The filmmakers this civil servant refers to are directors like Boubakar Diallo, who has a steady output of popular films, such as *Congé de Mariage* (2012) and *Clara* (2010). In contrast to the older generation of filmmakers, like Idrissa Ouédraogo, Gaston Kaboré, and S. Pierre Yaméogo, these popular directors draw Burkinabè audiences to the cinemas and manage to generate a profit. The older generations mostly work on public

¹⁰⁸ « Au niveau de la culture, on est dans un système d'assistanat au Burkina. On veut être assisté de l'Etat, différentes coopérations ... tout le monde - et quelqu'un qui veut faire la musique au Burkina est convaincu que l'Etat doit donner de l'argent ... oui oui ... "l'Etat ne fait rien pour nous ... l'Etat est comme ci, l'Etat est comme ça". Mais une femme qui vend du riz de Soumbala n'attend rien de l'Etat ... elle va prêter de l'argent, produire et vendre. On prend un crédit - on achète, vend et rembourse. Les femmes, les paysans, tout le monde fait ça. Mais aucun artiste fait ça – aucun. Il y a quand-même un problème. Il y a un système d'assistanat, et ça fait que je salue les cinéastes qui font 2-3 films par an - que tout le monde critique, mais ils ont les meilleures recettes. »

funds and create films that are more generally geared to festivals and international audiences. The combination of appealing to Burkinabè audiences and generating own revenue shows that there are cultural industries in the country that work in symbolic *and* economic terms.

Even though the market can help creating distributing, and valorising a range of cultural expressions, this very market needs to be balanced by a debate concerning its limitations. The market, while generally an adequate mechanism for the production, distribution, and consumption of popular music, is unlikely to produce the full range of “credible” cultural goods (Keat, 2000 pp. 159–60) that society has “reason to value” (Sen, 1992 p. 5). This argument, Keat insists, does not place culture out of the market sphere, but provides a rationale to let the market work for those expressions it can accommodate, and think about ways to provide alternatives for those expressions that do not. Yet, the complex interplay of internal and external funders, which both influence the actual politics of culture in Burkina Faso and Ghana indicates that the market and state need balancing with foreign entities in order to understand the politics of funding and investment in the cultural sector (see Figure 7-7).

While the Burkinabè cultural ministry is currently developing a ‘mechanism’ to both fund and invest in culture (see section 8.3), thinking about cultural policy generally lacks nuance. What kind of activities should be supported, and which ones should be economically viable? Whom should they provide support to and to what extent? How can foreign cultural actors better align themselves to local policies and priorities? How can receding funds from foreign donors be compensated?¹⁰⁹ How should public funding for culture be organised? To date, these questions remain largely unanswered.¹¹⁰ In section 9.6, I engage more explicitly with the ways the engagement with the creative economy discourse can (or perhaps *should*) move forward. The result is that, there is little dialogue, let alone agreement, on who should invest in infrastructure, and who should benefit from this.¹¹¹ The conversation, for it is hardly a broad debate, is more

¹⁰⁹ There are no detailed data (let alone trends) regarding foreign donor funds specifically for culture. And the rise of ‘new’ donors such as Brazil, Turkey, and China are not well documented. This requires further research.

¹¹⁰ The debate is largely divided along generational lines. Older generations adhere more to the traditional understanding of culture and the French statist approach to public support, while younger generations (often part of returnee diaspora who grew up in Côte d’Ivoire) are more business-oriented. Few voices try to reconcile both approaches, which results in a debate of extremes that pays insufficient attention to the fact that these approaches could be mutually inclusive, if balanced with consideration.

¹¹¹ In Chapter 9, I engage with the ways such questions can reconnect cultural and development policies more substantially.

preoccupied with looking at the 'hard' infrastructure elsewhere than the 'soft' infrastructure within the country. This is an issue that is well-documented in the UK (e.g. Pratt, 2010; Pratt, 2014; Lee et al., 2014), and seems difficult to transgress.

After the popular uprising of 30 and 31 October 2014, which ousted president Blaise Compaoré (see Chouli, 2015), there has been a tremendous increase in debates and consultations in the field of culture. On the one hand, this is political opportunism of a sector that sees a possibility to forge a change of policy and secure greater support from the transition government and from the new government that will take office after the elections on 11 October 2015. On the other hand, the changing politics and the pivotal involvement of cultural activists and artists in the revolution create an atmosphere that allows for a more open and active debate. The results of this remain to be seen, but there seem to be indications of emerging change in the politics of cultural policy since the 2014 popular uprising.

7.3. The Grass is Always Greener

It is very tempting to let yourself be blinded by the idea of someone else's success. This is particularly the case in a world dominated by 'best practices' that are widely shared as sources of inspiration. The perspective of stakeholders in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian music industries are also influenced by the idea that things work better elsewhere. In this section, I show how two mutually reinforcing assumptions are hampering critical reflection on the past and the present of the music industries. Very few stakeholders have the experience or the insight about situations elsewhere to make sound and informed comparisons. And the outward-looking tendency implicitly perpetuates the sense of inferiority vis-à-vis other countries and regions. In order to demonstrate this, I will draw on three kinds of comparisons that stakeholders often make. First, between Anglophone and Francophone African countries. Second, with neighbouring countries. And, third, with Western countries, often along former colonial ties.

First, comparisons between Anglophone and Francophone arts build on anecdotes and superficial examples. Yet these comparisons are crucial for two reasons. The assumption that the other 'realm'¹¹² does better goes both ways, yet they are both mostly wrong. And they are wrong precisely because those who make such comparisons have little understanding of the other realm, because there is a significant language barrier

¹¹² I call the Anglophone and Francophone spheres realms, precisely because they are spheres of thought and influence that are not spatially bound. (And, as Rwanda has shown, a country can in fact shift from one 'realm' to another.) I do not deconstruct the essentially ethnocentric remnant of colonial rule that make up these ties, nor do I discuss the Lusophone 'realm' that influences large parts of the continent as well.

and little exchange or trade. As a result, there is much gazing across the fence (albeit from a distance), without actually crossing it.

In Ghana, there is a sense that Francophone African countries pay more attention to culture, and that there is more support coming in from the French government for the arts:

I may be totally wrong, but I think that Anglophone countries are different from Francophone countries. Our sense of understanding is very different. I look at Alliance Française, and wonder why British Council has not built anything like that? We need that kind of support. I know British Council does a lot. But they should also have a place like Alliance Française with instruments etc. (Musician, Accra #3)

This musician is not “totally wrong,” but draws conclusions from superficial observations. The Alliance Française does invest more in artistic production than the British Council that favours training entrepreneurs, but the French also operate in Anglophone countries and their strategies are not necessarily matched by ‘Francophone’ governments in Africa. Though the assumption that things are better in Francophone countries is commonplace:

You know the francophone countries; there is a lot of support. (Musician, Accra #8)

I know musicians who have recorded in francophone countries. There is a certain bond, and the respect and appeal and respect for culture is maybe a bit higher in other francophone countries. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #4)

Burkina Faso knows they have no resource, so they invested heavily in culture. We [Ghanaians] did not really develop this. Maybe this is neo-colonialism. The French really helped develop culture. (Journalist, Accra #15)

In the Anglophone realm, there is thus a widespread belief that Francophone African countries get more support and have more respect for culture. This creates the impression that such respect would translate to a more locally-oriented music business:

Let me say you one thing ... on the radio, compare the Anglophone countries with the Francophone countries ... percentage wise - DJs support their own there. Here you only hear American stuff. They have numbers supporting their local artists. If I put on a show with just traditional artists - there would be nobody here. (Producer and Manager, Accra #18)

This contrasts sharply with what Burkinabè have to say about the media in Ghana:

In the case of Ghana ... the state ... takes [sic] radio broadcast quota, and they had a boom in their music. Those are elements we can verify, it permits a boom.¹¹³ (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #11)

They are both factually wrong. Ghana has no broadcast quota, and has a high incidence of foreign music on the radio.¹¹⁴ In Ghana, it is even more explicit than in Burkina Faso, because they play more music from the USA, where most foreign music in Burkina Faso comes from Côte d'Ivoire. Moreover, Burkina Faso does in fact have quotas for radio music, both public and private, though they are simply not enforced (see section 8.1 below).

The presumed difference between these realms has other implications as well. In Burkina Faso, ARPEM invited Lloyd Stanbury from Jamaica for a training session in Ouagadougou, precisely because of the assumption that Anglophones are “more pragmatic” (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #22). This idea resonates strongly with artists:

We are in the 'francophonie,' we protect things – but [for] the Anglophones, it's business. We were in the US, they asked if we bring in money or not. It's not about knowing this or that person. They're not aristocrats. The English [Anglophone] is in a system where culture is sold.¹¹⁵ (Musician, Ouagadougou #7)

Here, we count on public subsidies. There, they do not wait for the minister. Here, it's business, but in association with the minister.¹¹⁶ (Musician, Ouagadougou #7)

Yet, what the Burkinabè do not see is that the framework for culture in Ghana is far more limited (see the difference in venues between Ouagadougou and Accra on page 141 in Section 7.1). And the Ghanaians do not know how utterly limited government support is in Burkina Faso. The fact that there is nearly no exchange of artists, policies,

¹¹³ « [Dans] le cas du Ghana - l'Etat ... prend des quotas de diffusion des radios, et ils ont eu un boom de leur musique. C'est des éléments qu'on peut vérifier, ça permet un boom. »

¹¹⁴ The lack of effective logging systems (Amoah, 2015) makes it difficult to give details on the incidence of 'local' versus 'foreign' music in Ghana. Though someone connected to GHAMRO argued that effectuating international agreements on royalties payments would cause Ghana to have a negative trade balance in that regard, meaning that they estimate that more foreign music is played in Ghana than Ghanaian music abroad (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #6).

¹¹⁵ « On est dans la Francophonie on protège des choses - mais les anglophones, c'est du business. On était aux États-Unis. On demande si tu fais rentrer de l'argent ou pas. C'est pas si tu connais telle ou telle personne. C'est pas des aristocrates. L'anglais est dans un système où la culture se vend. »

¹¹⁶ Ici on compte sur les subventions publiques. Là-bas ils attendent pas le ministre. Ici, c'est le business, mais avec le ministre associé.

initiatives, or practices across the linguistic divide only perpetuates the perception of the Anglophones that the Francophones do better, and vice versa.

Second, the comparisons also occur between 'neighbouring' countries. This includes comparisons between direct neighbours like between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire, or near-neighbours like between Ghana and Nigeria. Because of the historical ties and continued exchange between these countries, there is a better basis for comparison. Yet, this remains mainly based on incomplete and anecdotal information. In short, it is more admiration than comparison, as is clear from an article on the leading Ghanaian music website *GhanaMusic.com*:

Nigerian artistes are more united as an ant colony, producing good quality music, playing every major show worldwide, making more money and are in control of our radio and streets. (Ghana Music, 2013)

The fame of pop stars like P-Square¹¹⁷ and the success of Nollywood films across the continent provide ample illustration of these claims:

Nigeria right now, its image has changed because of Nollywood. I have friends in Jamaica ... who recognised a 'Naija' [pidgin for Nigeria(n)] star I took a picture with and put on my Facebook. Similar, Bollywood is doing a lot of good for India ... If in Ghana, we manage to weight culture adequately, it will help. (Musician and Civil Society, Accra #5)

Take Nigeria, the government would give money to artists that are doing well so they can be pushed outside. That's why P-Square etc. are doing so well. In Mali - Salif Keita was also pushed by the government. That's what I know. (Manager, Accra #20)

The stories in Burkina Faso are similar, as they refer to the alleged support of the government in Côte d'Ivoire for 'Couper Decaler' music (Civil Servant, Ouagadougou #14). Some stakeholders also make comparisons with other neighbouring countries, even though this remains more sporadic:

I think we have to set it [royalties payments] up. Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, they have done it. We should make this happen. They play my music in Côte d'Ivoire, and I get my money. Why not Ghana? (Musician, Accra #3)

Nigeria succeeded, nonetheless. Every day there's a production. The pirate does not have his place there.¹¹⁸ (Entrepreneur, Ouagadougou #12)

¹¹⁷ This R&B duo (identical twins Peter and Paul Okoye) is very famous in large parts of the continent.

The latter comment is precisely the opposite of what several studies on the cultural industries have shown; Nigeria has many pirates too (Lobato, 2010; Larkin, 2005; Tade and Akinleye, 2012). Yet there is hope that the understanding between countries will improve as there is increasing attention to comparative studies, as an insightful MA dissertation on Ghanaian and Nigerian cultural policies illustrates (Ayibadeinyefa, 2011).

Third, only in a last instance, music industries stakeholders start making comparisons to the West:

Unlike Europe, the Americas, and the other developed world where people can pay for such music via debit and credit cards online, payment platforms for such purposes are non-existent in Ghana and most parts of Africa. The MUSIBUY Solution provided by GLOBA is an answer to this problem. (MUSIGA, 2013)

The lack of a factual understanding of politics and practices across linguistic realms hampers an informed appreciation of the positive and negative traits of the minor differences that exist. As a result, there is also limited comparative scholarship that explores such differences (language is not the only reason for this, see section 9.3).¹¹⁹ At the same time, the assumptions that things are better elsewhere also lack a sense of historical awareness, even though the bigger challenge is that the history *within* the country is often reduced to single events (see section 7.4 below). Yet reducing both examples elsewhere and complex histories to superficial narratives before extrapolating them as ‘best practice’ examples for policy limits the potential for mutual learning from practices elsewhere and in the past.

There is no straightforward solution to this issue. Yet it would be helpful if global reports, governments, donors, and other stakeholders paid greater attention to ‘bad examples’ (De Beukelaer, 2014b). These examples should help understanding of why hopeful and well-meant initiatives failed by providing an alternative reading of existing practices to the ‘good’ or ‘best’ practices bias that prevails. The current obsession with superficial examples as ‘best practices’ builds on a limited understanding about the challenges that exist elsewhere, which creates the false impression that solutions lie in copying others’ solutions, even if they are mostly dysfunctional.¹²⁰ Yet the regime of

¹¹⁸ « Le Nigeria a réussi quand-même. Chaque jour il y a production. Le pirate n'a pas sa place là-bas. »

¹¹⁹ Yet there is little indication that scholarship has a genuine influence on (cultural) policy, in spite of the ostentatious focus on ‘evidence’ (Belfiore, 2009).

¹²⁰ This is a problem that no country or organization alone can resolve. It is however telling that I shifted the empirical focus of my research because the project I initially meant to look at

experts engaged in the “slick presentation of the success or desirability of particular policy programmes (or the equally slick tales of policy failure and undesirability)” (Prince, 2012 p. 199) make it difficult to engage with more complex (and perhaps ambiguous) accounts of what exists, both ‘home’ and ‘abroad.’

Stakeholders in the cultural industries draw inspiration from the growing number of great examples. Yet, little is known about this specific contexts and realities. What are the histories, policies, failures, and people behind these initiatives? These are not actively disregarded, as little information is often known, but the shift from potential to realisation is a long and messy process that simply does not get enough attention. The messiness and endemic failure of many initiatives is something that hardly needs illustration to anyone who has developed cultural initiatives anywhere in world. But it does require more active engagement. Because currently, the unspoken rationale remains that if it works in Nigeria or Argentina, why not elsewhere?

The ‘special edition’ of the Creative Economy Report in fact mentions one ‘bad’ example, but presents it as a ‘best practice’: In Ghana, a micro-finance project has been set up between the Institute for Music and Development (IMD), ARB Apex Bank, and the Danish Centre for Culture and Development (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 117). To date, this has, however, not yielded the expected result and the project is currently dormant. Why not try to convey details about the encountered difficulties in the Report or on the IMD website, in order to avoid future obstacles – or even failure – in other countries or cultural industries? This is merely one of many examples where failure should not be seen as the end of a project, but merely as one step in a long road to better practices. This is the way the IMD actually looks at the project, yet the Report falls short in conveying this (De Beukelaer, 2014b p. 95).

In sum, while stakeholders at all levels often turn to ‘best practices’ elsewhere as sources of inspiration, there is hardly any critical engagement with the ways things actually work elsewhere, with the ways these practices came into being, or with the historical, social, cultural, and political contexts that facilitated or obstructed the ‘development’ of such practices. My argument is thus, that there is space for mutual learning across borders, but such learning should be adequately contextualised, not least in historical terms.

failed (a pilot project of the EU DG for development and ACPCultures). While I have been in contact with some people involved in this project, they refused to share any of the reports or insights and barred access to stakeholders in partner countries. Yet, it would have been instructive to explore why this project failed, and how similar failure could be prevented in the future.

7.4. Beyond Selective Popular Memory

The most popular explanation for the demise of live music in both Burkina Faso and Ghana is located in a very narrow historical window: the early 1980s. Many stakeholders in the sector blame the curfew during the early Jerry Rawlings regime in Ghana, and the lowering of concert ticket prices during Thomas Sankara's presidency in Burkina Faso. This section questions the centrality of these events in the history of live music in both countries. First, by highlighting that these popular histories are incomplete and thus reductionist, rendering them nearly useless to inform current needs for policy change. Second, by stressing that the reduced role of live music is also linked to the proliferation of recorded music and television, an element that is hardly ever mentioned by stakeholders in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian music industries.

There is however a strong case to take a closer look at history in order to rethink contemporary policy-decisions. History does already inform the choices that are made for 'development,' but does so implicitly, and often unknowingly:

Without the explicit input of critical and reflexive professional historians, the 'history' which policy-makers use is likely to be naïve, simplistic, and implicit, often derived from unconscious assumptions or vague memories; as such it is likely to be highly selective, used to suit predetermined purposes, and to be largely unverified. The (ab)use of history in this form not only represents a problem of commission but also of omission, in that it both invokes a defective and distorted rendering of history but also denies the policy process the vast reservoir of imaginative resources available from more formal historical research. (Woolcock et al., 2011 p. 75)

It is precisely the combination of simplistic anecdotal histories and the lack of understanding of historical evolutions in the music industries that I address here. The historical contexts and policies are palimpsests. Such palimpsests mask many untold histories. The term palimpsest refers to manuscript writing in Medieval Europe, when parchment was used to write on. Given the high price and scarcity of parchment, which was used before paper became common in Europe, there was a tendency to wipe out redundant contents from unused parchment and re-use it. It was however impossible to wipe out the previous contents entirely, so they remained somewhat visible underneath the new contents, while providing a new basis to create new texts, the traces of previous scriptures remain visible. This practice has become a metaphor in urban studies (e.g. Khirfan 2010) and cultural studies (e.g. Dillon 2005), since cities and cultural texts are also layers of change built on the foundations of earlier buildings and meanings, literally and metaphorically. The attention goes, almost without exception, to the major monuments and ruins that everyone knows. Yet, also the actual histories of these monuments remain unknown to most people. In almost every interview I conducted,

the same story about the detrimental effects of policies and politics in the 1980s came up.

Here, I want to quote a clear and detailed version of the Ghanaian (hi)story provided by one of my interviewees, in order to illustrate that even well informed participants can offer rather reductionist accounts:

The reasons for the lack of live music today in Ghana is down to several factors. I think in the main [was] the revolution of 1981 where a curfew was imposed which restricted people's movements between 6pm and 6am, so we became chickens. We should stay at home - whatever we chose to do at home, fine. But we could not be in the streets or in town. That obviously affected entertainment in terms of nightlife etc. etc. Two years of that and almost all nightclubs closed down. There was obviously no business, so every businessman changed course. The revolution itself brought social upheaval that upset people. Some went in self-imposed exile, because they disagreed with the regime, and a lot of musicians also left. The second fact is that the revolution affected a certain business class – entrepreneurs. The revolution looked at people who had been very successful - rightly or wrongly - as being economic saboteurs, people who exploited the masses etc. And a lot of them would be patrons of music band and musicians - who withdrew their capital. Their display of wealth and affluence was against the ethics of the revolution. This in itself also killed the few bands and the patrons that there were ... who were buying instruments for musicians etc. This also compounded the problem. The third factor was the fact that up until the revolution, a great number of musicians were employed by the state. I'd say up to 80%. Historical, in the sense that Kwame was a great lover of the arts, and as much as he could, he'd portray ... and show off our cultural heritage. So, and the state became a patron of many bands and musicians ... so ... you had state organisations, companies ... that all had bands. The hotels as well, the distilleries, the army, the police, the navy, the air force etc. They'd play everywhere ... they were bands; they played anywhere they were called to play. They even recorded ... albums, singles. They all had bands. And these musicians were salaried, got living quarters, sometimes transport, instruments etc. A lot of Ghanaian musicians were spoiled by the state. They had a very comfortable, cushy, job; they got a monthly salary. Conditions were quite good. With the coming of the revolution, all these things came to an end. There was no more state support for entertainment. The musicians were ... without any work ... any salaries ... they had to find work. They left for Nigeria; they left for Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal ... the majority also found themselves in Europe, US, Australia etc. They became the diaspora musicians - who later came back in different guises ... like burger high life [referring to highlife as it evolved among Ghanaian diaspora in Hamburg]. This is a direct result of this. Ghanaians who left and settled in Germany and form bands there and fused some funk with high life. The other factor

is that music education was cancelled at the behest of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank who were putting Ghana through a Structural Adjustment Program. They felt that subjects like that were not relevant to the development of a country. How they got to thinking like that, god knows ... (Entrepreneur, Accra #17)

The most interesting element of this account is that it provides a very detailed insight into the history of the few years in the early 1980s. Yet, while this entrepreneur conveys ample detail, the origins of current challenges are reduced to a narrow point in history. The currently relatively small live music scene in Ghana can be traced back primarily to a curfew that lasted from 1981 to 1983. This both presumes that the situation was far better before the start of the curfew installed by the military rule of Jerry Rawlings and his Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), and that 30 years are not sufficient to overcome the effects of this period.

The same kind of argument is made in Burkina Faso, where the (also military) government of Thomas Sankara from 1984 to 1987 imposed a lowering of concert ticket prices that allegedly harmed the profitability of live music, and starved off the business as a result. There are some voices that challenge the extent to which these policies can effectively explain the current challenges:

Under Sankara ... prices were at 300 FCFA. Thinking that, despite the short period, this could have done something to the collective consciousness ... I think that this is in part something they want to blame Sankara for. Even though he did more for culture than Blaise [Compaoré]. In four years, he built polyvalent venues in every region. They're still in use. I'm no fan of Sankara, but that's his legacy. In that era, the policy was to bring artists to the people, and from that era onwards people were able to tour the country. Culture served as a political means. That was also the case elsewhere, with Bembeya Jazz in Guinea; also with Nasser [in Egypt]. But I do not think that this [the prices under Sankara] can still influence the mentality so strongly 25 years later. (Cultural Activist, Ouagadougou #19)

Similarly, in Ghana, some more historical breadth is sometimes added to the history:

But when the coup came in the 1980s. In that year, we also got a drought, so there was no food. So you don't go play in the afternoon, if you have no food to eat. (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

But, in this account, the essence remains that the demise of a lively and lucrative live scene was rooted in social and economic policies of socialist military regimes in the 1980s. Yet the seeds for such changes preceded the rule of Rawlings by at least a decade:

Another element that got the music business into trouble was the 1969 expulsion of foreigners. They all had to leave within two weeks. Igbo people from Nigeria ran many nightclubs. Also the Lebanese had to leave. [Kofi Abrefa] Busia claimed that foreigners were taking jobs from Ghanaians. This was in a way also a reaction to the pan-African tendency of Nkrumah. Testament to this is the fact that this law was written by the National Liberation Council that overthrew Nkrumah. (Academic, Accra #7)

Very few stakeholders effectively incorporate a broader and more complex historical reading into their understanding, in the way that this interviewee does.¹²¹ More strikingly, they focus even less on the efforts both presidents made in this era that directly or indirectly benefited musical activity. During the rule of Rawlings, the National Theatre of Ghana opened in Accra, a first copyright act was introduced in 1985, and he also extended the electricity grid to the North of the country, which facilitated both the production of music as the spread of media, and amplified music. In Burkina Faso, Sankara created cultural centres in the 13 regions of Burkina Faso:

In four years [1983-1987], he built multi-purpose venues in every region. They are still in use. I'm not a fan of Sankara, but it's his legacy. (Cultural Activist, Ouagadougou #19)

Moreover, there is a general belief that the music life between independence (Burkina Faso: 1960; Ghana: 1957) was better than what followed from the 1980s onwards, as “the early years of Ghana’s independence is in retrospect the golden period for Ghana’s creative industries” (Amarteifio, 2011):

It was booming before the military period. It went down. They went overseas ... the transition to democracy saw all those outside coming back and the youth now took over. (Entrepreneur, Accra #19)

Yet, while live music was more prominent and ubiquitous, this does not necessarily mean that living conditions of musicians were much better than they are now (Plageman, 2012 p. 222). Though the limited documentation and recognition of this hardship makes it difficult to what extent things have changed and to consider what kinds of policies needed today. This also means that the broader range of challenges, including the shift to recorded music (and back), the place of music (and arts in general) in education, and the full range of past policies and initiatives are crucial to understand how present-day policies and support programmes could possibly help advancing the music industries.

¹²¹ Evidently, one cannot expect everyone to develop an academic understanding of history. But the popular account of history is too reductionist, which limits the possibility to connect past, present, and future.

Woolcock, Szreter, and Rao (2011 p. 87), argue that “the past is a foreign country, [as] they do things differently there”, by citing novelist L. P. Hartley. This truism provides a basis to connect this section to the previous one: the grass is the greener elsewhere, but the past is also a greener pasture in the foreign country that is history. While this is some truth in this nostalgia, caution and detail are needed when looking at the past to imagine the future. Much like looking at neighbouring countries, looking at the past should go beyond cherry-picking “best practices” that look good from a distance.

7.5. Conclusion: The Future Between Hope and Despair

The optimism linked to the cultural industries is part and parcel of a more general optimistic ‘vibe’ about the African continent as a whole. Until recently, much thinking and writing on the situation in, and the possibilities of Africa have been tainted by Afro-pessimism. This tendency to frame events on the continent as politically and historically inevitable has long plagued the understanding and coverage of past, present, and future (Nothias, 2014). In the past decade, this pessimistic imagination of the continent has been gradually superseded by a far more optimistic discourse, even though this remains based on the same kind of tropes that “essentialise, racialise, rank, describe selectively, and predict” the fate of Africa, even though these tropes are now used in a positive manner (Nothias, 2014 p. 335). This celebratory imagination is largely based on the significant GDP growth of certain countries, but also changed the framing of ‘African’ culture to an optimistic and hopeful language (Versi, 2014; van Graan, 2014; The Economist, 2011b). Nonetheless, the optimism about the perceived “virtuous circle of economic growth and improved governance is already starting to wear thin” (The Economist, 2014 p. 49).

I follow neither the Afro-pessimist, nor the business-oriented Afro-optimism. My focus is on the ways a range of actors is transforming potential into practical realizations. Yet, while many the results of even more initiatives are hailed as great examples (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 53–86), I address the limited attention to the connection between the past and the future in cultural policy debates. As opposed to exploring the, admittedly complex and opaque, history that created the current context, most stakeholders in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural industries reduce history to a brief period in the 1980s. At the same time, the perceived successes elsewhere form the basis for superficial and often erroneous comparisons. Many examples elsewhere are indeed not really successful, yet they are no outright failure either. The subtlety of these difficulties is hardly reflected in debates at national and global levels.

In spite of these real difficulties, there are far too many promising and sincere attempts to make changes at this delicate level to dismiss any of them as futile. The underlying

conditions that shape these relative successful failures are crucial towards 'developing' cultural industries. That is why I illustrate the need to take context and history seriously. It simultaneously stresses the need for a normative impetus and necessity to balance this with empirical judgement. Not least because optimism must remain cautious, for it could be countered too easily (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 51).

History and global politics make it easy to resort to pessimism and even cynicism about the plight of 'Africa,' yet there is in fact much reason to be optimistic and hopeful (Nyamnjoh, 2008 p. 129). This chapter has shown that the balance between hope and despair lies in a critical examination of the politics, the examples, and the histories, of cultural production; it lies in a culture that looks forward by looking at the past.

8. Capabilities: Between Intention and Intervention

The the creative economy discourse has inspired practical efforts in Burkina Faso and Ghana. This chapter engages with such attempts in light of human development goals and capabilities advancement.

There is ample reason to agree with the contention that “we need to think less in terms of ‘needs’ (with its implied connotation of passivity and dependence) and more in terms of positive capabilities” (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 111). But there are different levels and ways to engage with this. The UNESCO Creative Economy Report focuses on institutions and pathways as critical factors in the development of cultural industries (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 87–122). What is currently missing is an engagement with the capabilities that underlie the formation and consolidation of such institutions. As such, a distinction is made between what is to be attained and where the bottlenecks are located (in terms of networks and skills) that continue hampering the full potential of these institutions.

In order to conceptualize the diverse levels at which efforts towards supporting individuals and/ or institutions to act are made, my analysis builds on the ‘capabilities’ approaches of Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. The term ‘approaches’ is used in the plural because the respective ideas of Nussbaum and Sen on the building blocks of human development differ. Despite their differences, both Nussbaum and Sen provide a way to look beyond obstacles to and realizations of ‘development.’ In their understanding of processes, rights are referred to as ‘entitlements’ and realizations as ‘achieved functionings.’ It is, however, at the level of capabilities that there is room for change. But it is also at this point many things, often invisibly, go wrong. Also when discussing cultural industries, the focus is most often on what preconditions *should* exist or what results *should* be attained and less on *how* this should be done.

The approaches as conceived by Sen and Nussbaum do however build on an understanding of capabilities that is narrowly defined in terms of individual possibilities. As such, they do not take into account the structural context or circumstances required in which capabilities (fail to) exist (Jackson, 2005 p. 104). This echoes the liberal school of political philosophy in which their work originates. The social and institutional aspects that can both reinforce and weaken individual capabilities are not sufficiently discussed. Yet, capabilities can also be understood in terms of institutions, social relations, and entitlements. These levels respectively translate into structural, social, and individual capabilities (Jackson, 2005 p. 118). This helps to translate the tension be-

tween structure and agency into the 'capabilities approach': institutions operate at the structural level, and individuals at the level of agency, whereas the social context hovers in between, as the realm where institutional structure and individual agency are translated and contested (Jackson, 2005 p. 117).

My focus in this chapter is deliberately narrow. I pay little attention to 'hard' physical infrastructure (see Chapter 7). As such, electricity, Internet, event venues, and so on are not explicitly part of this exploration. This is because the 'soft' infrastructure is important in the process to make the hard infrastructure work. A common theme in interviews and encounters with the Burkinabè and the Ghanaian is infrastructure: there are issues with venues, electricity, Internet, logging of content use in the media (i.e. recording what music is played, so royalties can be paid to the right people), and so on. But as straightforward as these issues seem, they cannot be overcome simply: it takes active engagement with the capabilities of stakeholders to gradually overcome such challenges.

The discussion here builds on a selection of key capabilities that is grounded in the particular context under scrutiny. There is no definitive list of required capabilities. Nussbaum provides one, yet invites alternative compositions (2011 p. 36), but Sen refrains from providing one, since he argues that democratic processes, as opposed to theoretical reflections, should form the basis of such a list (Sen, 2004a p. 77; Robeyns, 2005 p. 106). The overview here is thus by definition tentative and incomplete. The selection I have made here builds on extensive fieldwork and policy analysis that provided a grounded basis for identifying crucial capabilities or 'instrumental freedoms', as Amartya Sen calls them. Therefore the following sections will look more deeply at drivers of capabilities such as: political participation, transparency guarantees, economic facilities, social opportunity, and education.

In short, this chapter is about the messy processes that aim to transform potential into realization. It simultaneously stresses the need for a normative impetus and necessity to balance this with empirical judgement not least because, optimism must remain cautious for it could be countered too easily (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 51). History and global politics make it easy to resort to pessimism and even cynicism about the plight of 'Africa,' yet there is in fact much reason to be optimistic and hopeful (Nyamnjoh, 2011 p. 129).

8.1. Political Participation as Human Development

Amartya Sen provides a three-tiered approach to participation in political processes that can advance capabilities. He distinguishes between the *direct*, the *instrumental*, and the *constructive* roles of the exercise of political rights. The *direct* importance re-

lates to active political participation in elections and the social process surrounding them. The *instrumental* role helps in enhancing people's ability to be heard about their needs and wants in the political arena. The *constructive* role relates to the underlying debates that help articulating and conceptualizing the 'needs' that are claimed and negotiated (Sen, 1999 p. 148). This links to the framework in which cultural policies shape the context of cultural industries, as I have argued in the previous chapter, particularly the constructive part of the political debate remains weak in both Burkina Faso and Ghana, because there is little debate on *what kind* of cultural industries are needed. The following subsections look more closely at these three themes.

A key trope in the relation between politics and culture is 'political will.' This refers to the translation of new and existing policies into practice: while the texts are there, and politicians pay lip service to the virtues of culture, this does not readily translate into action. In spite of their different political cultures, Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural actors perceive the lack of political will as a major issue. Yet the countries do not easily compare: Ghana is a reasonably functioning democracy with fair elections, free press, and a public administration influenced by British colonial rule and. Burkina Faso is only formally a democracy; its electoral system is a superficial guise that masks the rule of President Blaise Compaoré since 1987.¹²² Free press is limited due to politically influenced (self-) censorship. Moreover, public administration bears a significant influence from the French system through colonial legacy.¹²³

The perceived lack of political will is cited as one of the major reasons why there is no real change towards a more established and remunerative set of cultural industries. Yet, there are policies in place and there is openness to involvement and engagement of civil society. Often, there is a sense that it involves speaking up for the importance of the arts and culture. The importance can be situated in cultural terms, for greater recognition of certain practices or expressions. More often, it means articulating greater recognition of the social status of people working in the cultural sector, in law and in

¹²² Blaise Compaoré was forced to resign on 31 October 2014 by popular protest throughout the country. The analysis here thus builds on the situation before that date.

¹²³ This is just a brief introduction to the political constellation of these countries. In Ghana, a detailed reading of the supreme court ruling on the petition of the 2012 elections that upheld the presidential term of John Dramani Mahama (National Democratic Congress) after he took over office from John Atta Mills upon his passing earlier that year sheds light on the internal contestations of the fairness of Ghana's political constellation. Similarly, in 2014, the CDP (Comité pour la Démocratie et le Progrès), the party of Compaoré, has seen a significant exodus of its members to the opposition following popular protest against his attempt to change the constitution in a way that would allow him to run for president again in 2015. As this is not a treatise on the political situation in West Africa, engagement with these national political struggles remains tangential to the overall argument.

discourse. But most often, it means making a case that the arts and culture are serious about their business. Recognition about the economic viability is important for investors and banks to take cultural entrepreneurs seriously. Sometimes, it does however mean that there is an expectation that political talk is translated into political action. The desire to receive some form of subsidy or support often influences the perception and reception of government policies for the sector. This raises the question; what is hampering the effective engagement of the cultural sector with the government in order to negotiate the further role politicians can play? The direct or intrinsic virtue of actual public engagement is not fully translated into action in Burkina Faso. This is, in part, due to the unorganized civil society, but also, and perhaps more importantly, due to the lack of actual democratic deliberation of policy.

The question remains why the mutual expectations of governments and cultural entrepreneurs are not always on a par? The driving idea of governments for adopting the creative economy discourse is to a large extent that people working in culture should be able to make a good and stable income from their activities. This is, after all the predicate of the exogenous cultural and creative industries discourse that actively influenced the policy language in recent years. Yet, the cultural sector seems to embrace this discourse in the assumption that it will lead to greater governmental recognition – and potentially, financial contributions to the sector. The on-going negotiation of the terms and limits of public and private activities is generally instrumental in the political negotiation of claims that can be laid on public spending. Sen calls this level of political engagement the *instrumental* use of political participation. It helps lay claims on certain needs and helps find a common ground to negotiate the terms of interaction between government and civil society.

Both in Burkina Faso and Ghana, civil society attempts to bring together the fragmented cultural field in order to negotiate and formulate a joint vision towards legislation, policy, and support. There is, as of 2010, little or no collective bargaining and lobbying in the Burkinabè cultural ecology (d'Almeida and Alleman, 2010 p. 9). While governments, as well as networks and organizations (such as MUSIGA in Ghana, and APRODEM¹²⁴ in Burkina Faso), have been trying to change this. It is, however a process that requires time and great effort. The greatest effort is perhaps for many individuals to see the benefit of concerted action. In part this can be linked to issues of trust, as described above. Yet, particularly in Burkina Faso, the difficulty to build sustainable alliances limits the opportunity for collective bargaining. In this context, it is the Burkin-

¹²⁴ L'Association des Producteurs, Distributeurs et Éditeurs de Musique (Benguelet, 2012).

abè Ministry of Culture and Tourism who is (indirectly) funding the establishment and consolidation of sector organizations in order to facilitate their lobbying power.

There is no formal censorship in Burkina Faso, but there is a clear sense of what can be said and what cannot. These limitations are a combination of hierarchical relations, aversion to open conflict, and a subliminally repressive climate in political terms. Yet, politically active musicians, like Smockey (from *se moquer*, to mock) and Sams'k Le Jah, are explicitly defying the powers that be. As a result, their music does not get air-play on the national radio or television. And they have been threatened because of their political engagement (Kere, 2007). But, after years of active engagement in music, these activists are still at the vanguard of political protest by leading the *Balai Citoyen*, which has been instrumental in ousting Blaise Compaoré.

These artists and their work actively foster a basis for political engagement. In spite of the social and structural limitations in artistic and political expression, a compelling movement has grown increasingly visible in 2013 to contest the attempt of President Blaise Compaoré to change article 37 of the constitution. This would allow him to run for President again and remain in power until 2020. The protest movement, *le Balai Citoyen* refers to citizens making the effort to clean-up politics in the country. In spite of limitations in political participation, the involvement of artists constructively informs and engages citizens in their struggle to be heard. Yet, their “expressiveness and emotion also imply that [such] dissonant voices will be heard, but these are aspects of culture that policy-makers are not always prepared to accommodate” (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 40).

On a level more directly related to the cultural industries, there is a growing group of young cultural entrepreneurs who want to make a living from their activities and who are demanding fiscal reform (d'Almeida and Alleman, 2010 p. 5). Similarly, 7 September 2013 saw a coalition of cultural journalists (*J2C, Les Journalistes et les Communicateurs pour la Culture*) organize a march to demand the enforcement of the existing music quota legislation. The aim was clear and simple: the law that stipulates that a 60% of public media and 40% of private media content should be local has to be enforced. Pending concrete results of this action, it is interesting to consider that the initiative was taken by a few journalists and not by the rights holders or managers in the music business (Somé, 2013). There is however, little debate on the contradiction between the call for protectionist measures (in the form of media quota) and the struggle at African Union and ECOWAS/CEDEAO levels to create common markets for culture (OAU and UNESCO, 1992; African Union, 2005). Yet, in the case of Zimbabwe, where 75% local content quota exist for all broadcasters the results are mixed: while there is more airplay for (young) local musicians, audiences lament the quality of (at least some

of) their work and the media exposure and “popularity has not translated into commercial success” (Chari, 2013 p. 39). The call to enforce Burkinabè media quota may thus not be the most effective strategy for the music business.

The challenge to improve political participation far exceeds the challenge to consolidate the cultural industries. Success in negotiating apt policies, partnerships, and regulatory frameworks in the cultural sector is an indicator to what extent the politicians and civil society manage to negotiate the terms under which the needs of the sector are translated into political will and action. The current debate is not only instrumental towards negotiating policies and strategies to implement them, but also constructive in defining what kind of needs should take priority (Sen, 1999 pp. 153–154). A prominent Burkinabè musician argues that the status quo currently aims to make everybody happy by trying to support all of them, while in fact providing no one with the necessary means to produce quality recordings or accompanying video clips. His argument is that, rather than not making any choices by giving tiny shares to virtually all, the choice should be made to support fewer initiatives in a more substantial way. This, he argues, is the only way that emergent production can be helped to attain the quality needed to convince audiences of its worth. Making such choices, is however a key problem in cultural policy approaches, where a balance has to be struck between access and excellence, as the role of the government as a facilitator or as an architect of cultural practice (Craik et al., 2003 p. 29). These are not simply practical but political choices, which stress the need for greater collaboration and negotiation between the cultural sector and its ministry.

8.2. Transparency Guarantees

The previous section illustrates the expressed need of the Burkinabè cultural sector to receive direct or indirect support from their government. This is however not a universally perceived necessity, as a fair amount of stakeholders indicate the opposite. They claim that cultural subsidies are not a good idea, for different reasons. A small minority would express explicitly that such subsidies are merely market distortion, as the free market would balance the exchange of supply and demand without the unfair competition that is fostered through public subsidies to private enterprises, thus following dogmatic defenders of free enterprise in all fields, including culture (e.g. Cowen, 1998). Yet several of my interviewees argued that subsidies are not an effective way of support, because of the way they are administered. It is however all too easy to blame individuals alone for perpetuating ‘corruption.’

The following four examples show the ways (a lack of) transparency influences the cultural industries. First, the tension between state and private sector in Burkina Faso is

considered. Second, *payola* in Ghana serves as an example to discuss the relation between artists and managers on the one hand and gatekeepers in the media on the other hand. Third, the administration of royalties by copyright collection societies is discussed, building on examples from Ghana and Burkina Faso. In closing, the high level of informal trade and interaction makes the challenge to operate in greater transparency difficult, not least because many cultural workers are actually not keen on disclosing their books.

The balance between public subsidies and private investment is a contentious issue around the world. Not only in Burkina Faso. Yet, in Burkina Faso, there is little debate on the amount of public support that is needed. There is a general understanding that the overall budget of the government is limited, and that even the slightest increase in funds for culture undercuts further investment in education, health, or infrastructure. This is no reason not to provide any public support as such, but the high priority of virtually all forms of public expenditure make the need for cultural support challenging. In short, there is too little funding and there is a fairly broad consensus that this should increase. Even though there is widespread understanding, increased public expenditure is not necessarily a realistic scenario.

There is a tendency among those who do not generally receive subsidies to dismiss the need altogether. This is because of the way they are administered. The perception is strong that there are no transparent processes in place when allotting and distributing funds, amounts are rather symbolic than sufficiently substantial to make a difference in a production or promotional budget.

When it comes to promoting music in the media, transparency also forms an issue. This is largely due to the intertwined practices of *payola* and royalties. *Payola* could be said to undermine their role as gatekeepers. The costs associated with *payola* are usually offset through royalty payments and music sales that flow back to the rights holders (thus the investment is paid back), but this return is limited in Burkina Faso and Ghana because royalties are limited. *Payola* has been around from the early days of popular music throughout the world, and while regulation has made the process more transparent, it has not disappeared (Caves, 2000 pp. 290–294). Further, there is a combined issue in Ghana; on the one hand, there is no clear regulation, let alone enforcement on the ways DJs and television programmers are to work together to promote music. Afia Sarpong (2014) discusses this in the article *Payola abr3*, which literally means “tired of payola,” on Ghanamusic.com. On the other hand, there is no logging system in place to record what music is played and how often. This limits the possibilities to charge media organizations for content use and limits the ability of the Ghana Music Rights Organization (GHAMRO), currently the only copyright collection society in

the country, to justly divide up the proceeds among artists according to their popularity. While GHAMRO is looking for solutions to this issue, they fail to practice what they preach: obtaining data from them regarding income and payments has not proven successful.¹²⁵ A team of KPMG researchers conducting a large study for the Ghanaian Musicians' Union (MUSIGA) encountered the same issue. The otherwise detailed report on the music sector in Ghana only reveals the overall royalties receipts (GH¢700,000 or EUR182,800), on a total revenue of GH¢140 million, or EUR36,559,638 in 2013 Gh¢ (KPMG, 2014 pp. 129–130). This means that royalties make up only 0.5% of income from the sector. A recommendation would be to take the first step and publish all data publicly. That way both artists and media know what is paid in and out in terms of royalties and it could be done in a visibly fair way. This would make sense as GHAMRO replaced COSGA because the sector perceived the latter as insufficiently transparent.

In Burkina Faso, on the other hand, there has been a steady increase in royalty payments. This is in large part thanks to a levy on blank discs to compensate for royalty losses from piracy and home copying, which provides far greater transparency. The *Bureau Burkinabè du droit d'Auteur* (BBDA), the copyright collection society, has published all records in statistical year books of the Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme (2010; 2011; 2012). The revenues from copyright are also significantly higher: in 2009 the BBDA raised FCFA893.9m (EUR1.4m) in royalties on a total estimated music turnover of FCFA5,432m (EUR8.3m) (BBEAC, 2012 p. 74). Royalties thus amount to 16.5% of total income from music, whereas piracy is equally rife. Yet, also in Burkina Faso, the need for payola and the limited royalties payments poses a challenge for artists, who often have to invest in these costs personally (Culture et Développement, 2010 p. 7).

The increasing availability of data and the greater openness of debates provide a basis for more active public deliberation about ends and means. Yet, the availability of such information does not solely depend on governments and public bodies. Transparency goes both ways, and while governments and copyright collection societies may have difficulties communicating their processes and data, so do the cultural industries provide a challenge when it comes to being measured. The high degree of informality in the cultural sector poses particular challenges. If cultural businesses would declare their earnings to the tax office, the economic turnover would be far more detailed and

¹²⁵ The lack of administrative transparency in collecting societies has also been problematic in Senegal (Penna, Thormann, and Finger 2004, 105).

reliable, forgoing the need to make imprecise estimates of mapping exercises with incomplete coverage.

Yet, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, many cultural workers and businesses are not formally registered with the chamber of commerce. This is a reality that is unlikely to undergo radical change in the near future. Not because there will not be many cultural enterprises registering as formal companies, but rather because the informal sphere does not have the same meaning as it often has in the global North, where it is associated with tax evasion. In Accra and Ouagadougou, the informal economies have been discussed in detail (Hart, 1973; Dijk, 1986), and those in Lagos provide insight into recent evolutions in light of digital technologies (Lobato, 2010). The existence of informal economies is not an issue as such, since such activities reduce unemployment (even if this remains unregistered by labour statistics), they also provide on-the-job training and a way into the economy (often through sub-contracting) (Dijk, 1986 p. 178). The ways in which they are included in (cultural) policies make all the difference. Informal economies are a field of action that should be understood as a vital constituent of fragile and emerging cultural industries, and not as a problem that needs to be overcome at all cost. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter. What matters here is that informal activity renders the sector relatively opaque. Trade, employment and turnover are estimated but provide relatively little reliable data for governments and sector lobbyists to work with.

8.3. Economic Facilities

In Burkina Faso and Ghana, there is limited government support for arts and culture (d'Almeida and Alleman, 2010; KPMG, 2014). The Burkinabè Ministry of Culture and Tourism holds some 0.30% of the total government budget on culture (BBEAC, 2012). In Ghana, the Ministry of Tourism, Culture and Creative Arts supported the music sector, through the musicians union, with a GH¢2m (some €800K) in 2012. The overall lack of access to money is a major constraint to long-term thinking (Culture et Développement, 2010 p. 9). Managers have the tendency to sign artists quickly, even though they lack capital to invest in production and promotion (Shiple, 2013 p. 23).

At the same time, banks are reluctant to invest. Even though the *Guarantee Fund for Cultural Industries* has existed since 2003 at the *ECOWAS/CEDEAO Bank for Investment and Development* in Lomé to facilitate and secure bank loans for the cultural industries (in collaboration with the OIF). This fund guarantees repayment of 80% of loans in case of default or non-repayment. But banks remain suspicious, and this is not entirely without reason. In Burkina Faso for example, few loans have been granted thanks to this mechanism, and in the rare cases it has been used, significant issues

with repayment have decreased the confidence of local banks, who are the institutions granting the loans. In Ghana this initiative is little known and no interviewee, from the sector, mentioned trying to obtain investment from this source, even though it is open to all ECOWAS/CEDEAO member states. There is however other a smaller initiative within the country: the *Institute for Music and Development* (IMD)¹²⁶ and the *Danish Center for Culture and Development* (DCCD)¹²⁷ have established a micro-finance mechanism for the cultural sector. This also has known issues, as the cultural differences between bankers and artists have proven difficult to bridge:

Making them understand that this is what you need. So, it meant for a very difficult situation. Because the bank that could help, didn't understand how to help. And they, who need to help the bank to help understand them, didn't understand how they could help the bank make them understand. (Cultural Activist, Accra #2)

The fund is, however, cited as a good practice in the *2013 Creative Economy Report* (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 117), even though it is in fact dormant and the complex context has not yet been fully addressed. This is one of the instances where greater critical engagement with the nature and context of the sector is needed. In spite of ample goodwill from artist-entrepreneurs and bankers, in order to make such initiatives attain greater success, mediation is needed. Moreover, in this context, there is probably greater cultural similarity between professionals (bankers or artists) around the world, than cultural similarity in a certain place. Here, global networks of willing bankers could provide a framework to build greater understanding of the cultural industries in order to allow for better assessment of financial needs. Though there is also need for less voluntary measures that can form an integral part of cultural policies.

In Burkina Faso, the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, in collaboration with the *Direction de la Promotion des Industries Culturelles et Créatives* (DPICC) and *Appui au Renforcement des Politiques et Industries Culturelles* (ARPIC), is working towards the implementation of an *Agence de Développement des Industries Culturelles et Créatives* (ADICC) to provide technical support, funding and investment for the cultural sector. A

¹²⁶ “The Institute for Music and Development (IMD) contributes to the evolution of a professional and vibrant music industry in Ghana and continues to play a pivotal role in the development of a self-sustaining music industry network in Africa through advocacy, documentation of traditional and contemporary music styles and their dissemination through the electronic media as well as production of Audio visual material, human resource and institutional capacity building and creation of network opportunities.” (<http://www.imdghanaonline.org/aboutus.html>)

¹²⁷ The DCCD (or CKU in Danish) “is a self-governing institution under the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In close cooperation with Danish embassies and representations, CKU manages culture and development programmes in The Middle East, Asia, West Africa and East Africa.” (<http://www.cku.dk/en/aboutcku/>)

feasibility study was concluded in 2013, and the agency is, as of 2014, to become active. There are thus some signs that the limited government funding for the cultural sector may be reinforced by a number of local initiatives, both in terms of subsidies and loans.

However, not only banks, but also entrepreneurs in the cultural industries distrust the sector. Banks generally distrust the sector, in spite of obvious successes, because of its volatility. Yet, there are few people in the sector who are willing to invest in certain parts of the industries, particularly production. There are many examples of successful artists that have scored hit songs that provided significant income. While some reinvest their proceeds in the cultural industries, bigger companies tend to diversify their investment portfolio, beyond the cultural industries, rather than expanding production within and beyond their organization. Even those who work in the sector often share the reluctance of banks to invest in cultural industries. This shows that there is ample understanding concerning the risk that characterizes the sector, even though there is little explicit engagement with this risk as a general characteristic of the cultural industries, as discussed in the previous chapter. In part, this is due to the lack of "sound professionalism" in the sector (Culture et Développement, 2010 p. 8) but also the incommensurability of the 'cultures' of banking and cultural industries. While there are strategies that help mitigate this risk in the formal sector, these do not necessarily translate well to formal enterprises and the logic of banks and investors.

In spite of the on-going efforts to improve access to investment, the creative economy discourse remains mostly seen as a way to make a case for more subsidies or support for adequate infrastructure. This leads to a contradiction: while governments attempt to *develop cultural industries* in order to encourage entrepreneurship and profitability, the majority of participants in training schemes see these initiatives mainly as a way to obtain subsidies for their enterprise or support for the cultural sector as a whole. Even throughout the process of business plan development in Ouagadougou, subsidies were invariably mentioned in participants' budgets, ranging from symbolic to decisive amounts. The point here is that still too many entrepreneurs build a budget on the presumption that the investment will be subsidized, and that only the working costs will need to be covered. There is however, a growing group who see the potential of working with economically viable initiatives in the market economy. Most cultural activities in popular culture can successfully subscribe to that logic. Though, 'traditional' artists like Zougnazagmda in Burkina Faso and King Ayisoba in Ghana are very successful, both culturally and economically. Other initiatives remain dependent on local or international support to sustain their activities. Music schools or the publication of books in national languages cannot survive without support. There are unfortunately far more ideas than can be supported. So there is a need to make difficult choices. The limited studies that

are conducted in the context of Burkina Faso propose a range of initiatives without any attention to budgetary restraints (BBEAC, 2012; De Beukelaer, 2013).

Limited access to subsidies, investment, and loans poses a problem for many entrepreneurs in the cultural industries. The active focus on increasing possibilities to access economic resources to turn ideas into practice is welcome. Yet, in trying to create a climate friendly to business and investment, greater attention should be paid to social opportunities within existing and planned initiatives:

The risk of making culture and creative industries policy-making 'safe' for investors or the authorities is of watering down goals to the point where it loses cultural meaning and merely becomes old wine in new bottles. A business-as-usual co-opting of cultural expression for existing interests, all the while missing opportunities to enhance dialogue, debate and, ultimately, new forms of development for marginalized people. (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 99)

While there is a need to consider the aggregation of wealth in the cultural industries and society as a whole, the more vital consideration is the spread of the opportunities that arise from economic development (Sen, 1999 p. 39), as “the impact of economic growth depends on how the *fruits* of economic development are used” (Sen 1999, 44, emphasis in original). Also in music, the ‘winners’ need due attention, but those that are working at more ‘informal’ levels may need even more attention in order to have sufficient “space to grow and innovate” (Bloustien, 2009 pp. 464–5).

8.4. Social Opportunity

Social opportunity (or social capital) is an important determinant of success in the cultural industries. This section addresses five ways through which decisive action can mitigate social inequality in the cultural sector.

First, artists and cultural professionals in Burkina Faso and Ghana have long been marginalized. The profession is often still seen as an option of failure, a last resort for those who have failed in life. It is not seen as “a viable career choice unless they already have financial resources” (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 121). As a result, the tendency remains to migrate to the North in order to pursue a career in a more favourable environment (African Union, 2005 p. 6). Yet, many successful artists and entrepreneurs have helped make transformations. As a result, in Burkina Faso and Ghana, culture is increasingly seen as a respectable profession through which a decent living can be made, even though the stardom of the few reflects on the aspirations of many. The legal framework to see artistic and cultural activity as a particular kind of work is, however, lagging behind. Both countries have a legal framework for artists in the making. The Burkinabè text was voted on in 2012 but as of 2013, this framework exists on-

ly on paper. Moreover, it is unclear how these regulations engage with the more normative question about what precisely constitutes 'good work' in the Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural industries, even though such an understanding is needed to frame the debate (Hesmondhalgh, 2010).

Second, there is an emerging commitment from ECOWAS/CEDEAO ministers of culture and youth to build on the cultural industries to provide employment for the West African youth. The *Praia Declaration* (UNESCO, 2013) engages explicitly with the need to work towards inclusive and sustainable youth employment. The concerted debate at a regional level provides a hopeful start for future action. Yet, the follow-up and evaluation of these intentions are crucial (Mensah, 2013). The next section, on education, provides insight into the difficulties concerning education and inclusion of youth.

Third, Burkina Faso and Ghana know low levels of interpersonal trust, as indicated in the UNESCO Culture and Development Indicator Suite (UNESCO forthcoming) that is reflected in the organization of the cultural sector. The limited trust in collaborators generates hierarchies that concentrate power. Given limited transparency and accountability, this creates a *de facto* class divide between the big and the small operators in the sector. Where collaborations emerge, they often take the form of cartels, which further erodes trust in those who have 'made it' by those who have not (yet) made it. In Ghana, the tensions surrounding this divide are discussed openly, partly through online forums like *Ghanamusic.com*. In Burkina Faso the debate is more covert, even though (and perhaps precisely because) the hierarchies are more explicit than in Ghana, both in the music industries and in general.

Fourth, there is a socio-cultural habit of engaging in kinship jokes (*parenté à la plaisanterie*) to defuse strained social relations between ethnic groups. In practice, this means that there are relations between ethnic groups that allow people to engage in making jokes in order to get across difficult messages. This helps to avoid confrontation, as these jokes are not seen as offensive, even though they may carry important and difficult messages. The *Study on the Social and Economic impact of Culture in Burkina Faso* (BBEAC, 2012) discusses the potential benefits of this tradition for social development in detail. In Burkina Faso, the report that discusses this link also addresses the economic role the cultural industries can play. Unfortunately, the author makes no connection between the social impact of the kinship jokes to the economic potential of the cultural industries (De Beukelaer, 2013). Developing this connection explicitly would be helpful precisely because it addresses power relations and conflict resolution.

Fifth, there is high involvement of 'returnees' or former diaspora in the cultural industries. They bring many good ideas, expertise, money and a whole different mind-set.

Ghana has strong connections with Nigeria, Germany, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA), while Burkina Faso gravitates towards Côte d'Ivoire, France, Belgium and Canada. The focus here is on returnees from Côte d'Ivoire to Burkina Faso, since they constitute a large group of *returnees* and because they occupy key positions in the Burkinabè cultural industries and there is a greater tendency of returnees or diaspora to take key positions elsewhere. Most of them have come back to Burkina Faso in the past decades to study after growing up in Abidjan or elsewhere in the neighbouring country. There are two principal reasons for their return. First, the higher university fees for non-Nationals, forcing many Burkinabè back to Ouagadougou to pursue studies, rather than staying in Côte d'Ivoire. Second, many were forced to return due to the civil war that erupted in the process of democratization after the 33-year reign of the first Ivorian President, Felix Houphouët-Boigny. This led to xenophobic hostilities against diaspora Burkinabè, often holding Ivorian citizenship. Upon their return they witnessed a cultural life that did not resemble the dynamism of Côte d'Ivoire, where artists like Alpha Blondy, Tiken Jah Fakoly, Magic System, and DJ Arafat had established lucrative careers. Hence they started organizing events, occupying radio presenter posts, and so on. In short, they brought innovation. Yet, in doing so, they also took control of the commercial cultural sector in the country, by virtue of (re-) establishing it. Their first-mover advantage of the diaspora has translated into a rather firm grip on the sector, while they transformed the way the cultural sector is seen.

The literature on the cultural industries is clear to indicate, contrary to the celebratory claims in policy documents, that social inclusion takes active (policy) effort (Oakley, 2006; Belfiore, 2002; Peck, 2005). Or, to use a metaphor, "big fish eat little fish" in the music industries (Penna et al., 2004 p. 103). This, too, is obvious from the limited success most artists have, as compared to the few who serve as example and source of aspiration: "While a few artists transform musical value into other forms of wealth through the conversions of fame, most remain both hopeful and anxious about the potential connections the music will bring" (Shipley, 2013 p. 283). In this context, social inequality is one of the "negative tendencies" (Girard, 1982) that should be taken into account when devising policies in the countries. This argument is crucial to human development as well, since creating opportunities for as many people as possible makes more prosperous and inclusive societies possible. Opportunities are capabilities that build on deliberate choice, not on economic performance alone, and it is not simply "a luxury that only richer countries can afford" (Sen, 1999 p. 143).

8.5. Education

Education is a key part of Human Development Indicators, as it enhances capabilities on an individual level. Education however, occupies a peculiar position in the capabilities approach, because it is actually an 'entitlement' and not a 'capability' as such. This is a crucial difference, since education is something that can help attaining capabilities, but does not form an individual capability in itself. It is thus a means towards developing capabilities.

The relation between culture and education is a highly complex one. In the Burkinabè music sector formal and informal learning coexist and much learning is autodidactic (Culture et Développement, 2010 p. 9). Advancing education requires a holistic model that builds on extended formal and informal education (van Beilen, 2012 pp. 62–63), even though education alone cannot help stimulate the cultural industries (van Beilen and Hearn, 2013 p. 219). Cultural education establishes and helps continuing traditions while raising interest and teaching artistic skills to children and adolescents. This lays the foundation for cultural creation. Much of such creation remains in the sphere of amateurism, in the best possible sense of the word: a work of love. Yet, it also allows for new generations of artists to emerge, which in term allows for the cultural industries to draw from the realized cultural potential.

This section addresses the current place of culture in education at three levels: first, training courses for adult professionals; second, arts administration and arts programs at universities; and third, education at primary and secondary school levels. Each level struggles with specific problems but the initiatives in place are addressing real needs in a very constructive way.

Training programmes that focus explicitly on skills development in the cultural industries form the most explicit and visible link between education and the cultural industries. Only such short training programmes focus explicitly on cultural and creative industries. Burkina Faso has ARPIC and in Ghana, one of the initiatives consists of workshops jointly organized by MUSIGA and the British Council. These initiatives are built on relatively short-term project funding, primarily through foreign donors. One of their principal aims is to train artists and cultural entrepreneurs to run their activities as economically viable businesses. Much attention is paid to the legislative, regulative, and fiscal framework in which they are meant to work. As such, these training programs are part of an effort to regulate informal activity into a formal economic setting. The content of cultural industries training does not necessarily build on existing prac-

tices in the sector. At least in the context of *Esprit d'Entreprise*¹²⁸ (the spirit of enterprise) in Burkina Faso, January 2013, the focus was in line with the ideological critique outlined in the previous chapter. The approach was technical and prescriptive. Any traditional way of working and trading was dismissed as inadequate, and no attention was paid to the reality that the entrepreneurs and administrators have as a starting point. There was no room to discuss divergent models, even though they are known and documented (Spaas, 2012; Daffé, 2013).

Yet, even more can be said about the scope and duration of trainings. One training week is too short. Particularly since the levels of previous knowledge is not equal between participants, limiting a swift start and steady tempo. The general level of education limits full engagement of participants. Moreover, the method of teaching is very instructive. While the course book is built around examples, these are solved as a group, leaving little chance to develop an active understanding of the material.

Nonetheless, skills-oriented training for practicing professionals is a need. And the existing initiatives provide a sensible response to that need, even though the demand still outweighs the offer. Since these initiatives are the only local education initiatives that focus explicitly on cultural industries, alongside continental initiatives by Arterial Network, far greater engagement is needed. Particularly since the networks these initiatives should have formed are yet to materialize, in part due to failure of the ARPEM project in Abidjan and Dakar. For the next generation of cultural workers, a shift in higher education is needed to accommodate the growing demand for professionalization in the cultural economy.

Internally, training programs also pose problems. International partners currently primarily carry the cost of training, although APEIC¹²⁹ in Niger is an exception, where the government is contributing the largest share of the budget. The institutional framework is also taxing for such initiatives (Ouédraogo, 2012 p. 27). More structurally, there is a significant discrepancy between the formal evaluation of training sessions in Burkina Faso (Ouédraogo, 2012) and the feedback given by participants during interviews. While appreciation of these programs is high according to official reports, informal conversations with participants reveals that such training does not fully respond to their needs.

¹²⁸ The author took part in this training 28-31 Jan 2013. This section is therefore based on personal observations and informal interviews with participants.

¹²⁹ *Agence de Promotion des Entreprises et Industries Culturelles* (Agency for the Promotion of Cultural Enterprises and Industries).

Higher education poses a particularly serious challenge. In Burkina Faso, there are courses in arts administration (e.g. University of Ouagadougou) and artistic practice (e.g. INAFAC,¹³⁰ Ouagadougou) and they operate on a very small scale that is not sufficient relative to the size of the population. Arts programs have also not yet adapted to the cultural industries logic because its uptake is so recent and expertise is lacking to do so. More importantly, they provide relatively little critical insight into that logic. As a result, the tendency in Burkina Faso is to attend the Université Senghor in Alexandria, where the cultural department offers graduate programs in cultural heritage and cultural industries, leading to some active engagement with the cultural industries, such as Zida (2010) and Zorom (2012). This institution is an initiative of the OIF meant to support the development of Francophone Africa. Since 2013, Burkina Faso also hosts the *Institut Africain des Industries Culturelles* (African Cultural Industries Institute), a school for higher vocational training in the sector.

In Ghana, greater attention is paid to university-level training of (traditional) performing artists (e.g. University of Ghana, Legon, University of Winneba, Methodist University, and University of Cape Coast):

What Nkrumah did - was to teach music in the schools. He even built Winneba, the teacher training college, where music was part of the curriculum. (Entrepreneur, Accra #16)

In spite of these efforts of the first Ghanaian president, the engagement with cultural policies and creative industries is still nascent, yet there is a realization that these elements should be taken up in the curriculum, and one interviewee has been working closely with the education ministry to push this agenda (Cultural Activist, Accra #2).

Higher education in general has to cope with a troubled legacy that may in part be blamed on the neglect of higher education in colonial times and the relative incapacity at a later stage to adapt the curricula to national contexts (Boahen, 2011 p. 106; Kovács, 2008 p. 99). The habit of the elites to attend university in Europe and the USA has largely perpetuated this tendency, even though the University of Ghana has trained a number of influential global scholars. However, limited focus on basic research, the near-absence of teaching in local languages (Teferra and Altbachl, 2004 p. 45) and low number of programs that extend beyond practical courses hampers the quality of education (Connell, 2007 p. 109). Both for training and higher education, most textbooks and teaching examples build on foreign contexts, often following former colonial ties. .

¹³⁰ *Institut National de Formation Artistique et Culturelle* (National Institute for Artistic and Cultural Training).

There is those who got their degree through the colonial legacy, who went to school in France ... who were grafted to Africa, forgetting the social realities. And there are those who have learned on the job, they know what they are talking about, but they lack the pedagogical skills, the art of speaking in class. The government has not yet found a solution at that level. We speak of French structures that do not exist here. In general, we are in Africa. (Producer and Manager, Ouagadougou #2)

While this practice is inevitable at almost all universities, the relative absence of literature on cultural policies or cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana is an issue that must be addressed. It is worth noting some efforts to correct this imbalance, for example, an entrepreneurial alumnus of the cultural administration programme in Ouagadougou published a guide for the sector (Bara, 2014). There is a need for more initiatives like this one, that can transform teaching about the cultural industries in the region, not at least because engagement with culture at universities (particularly in advanced courses and research) gives greater public legitimacy to pursue arts and culture as a profession (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 120).

Primary and secondary schools in Ghana and Burkina Faso do not generally offer cultural or artistic education as part of the curriculum (Flolu, 2000; UNESCO, forthcoming; UNESCO, forthcoming):

Now they do it [cultural education] Fridays under social studies, which is really terrible. Now when you talk about the chicken and the egg, people become music teachers, but where will they teach? The cycle is not complete. In the GSG [Ghana Shared Growth development agenda] we stipulated it needs to be part of education. But it has to be implemented, otherwise it serves no purpose. We have to start meeting with ministers and parliamentarians. I bet you none of them have heard about it ... even though it is government policy. We have to make sure they read it, organise workshops, as to how they want to implement it. This is a very crucial next step. I'm hoping definitely by next year, they should be able to do this. It's now July [2013]. (Cultural Activist, Accra #2)

The reasons for this are diverse. In Ghana, cultural education was cut from the school curriculum during the Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) imposed by the International Monetary Fund in the 1980s. In Burkina Faso, it is less clear what the reasons are but the outcome is rather visible; musicians lament their limited knowledge of music theory and composition, while signalling the need for opportunities to improve their instrumental skills.

The success of live music in Ghana is often linked to lively musical life in Ghanaian schools between independence (when the first President, Kwame Nkrumah, paid great attention to the arts as a means of forming the nation) and the SAPs in the 1980s. The cut in cultural (and other parts) of education is often blamed on Jerry Rawlings, who

served as Head of the military regime at the time. This action, was however part of an army-enforced imposition of radical macro-economic reforms (Reid, 2009 p. 306), which were a reaction to the slumping economy of the late 1970s and early 1980s. In a similar way, theatre featured prominently in Burkinabè secondary education between the 1960s and 1980s, after which only some of the activities were taken up by private initiatives (Guingané, 2001). This is, in fact, a far more general problem, as similar shifts away from formal engagement with education have occurred across the continent.

At the level of education in general, many choices have to be made. Given the low rates of literacy in Burkina Faso (29% [adults 15+] and 39% [youth 15-24], and respectively 7 and 6 percentage points less for women), priorities may seem to lay elsewhere. Even in Ghana, where literacy rates are significantly higher (67% [adults 15+] and 81% [youth 15-24] and, respectively 6 and 1 percentage points less for women),¹³¹ basic education for all remains a challenge. In spite of such challenges, there is little reason not to include broad attention to artistic and creative education throughout all levels of education, particularly since there is an increasing contradiction between policy aims (that focus on cultural and creative industries) and the existing curricula (that increasingly focus on subjects with immediate economic benefits) around the world. Artistic and creative focus in education fosters the formation of imaginative minds that benefit from play, creative expression, and artistic imagination, which is crucial to the well-being and democratic citizenship of all (Nussbaum, 2012) and professional development towards the cultural industries of an important minority.

The present situation in Burkina Faso and Ghana resembles the Tanzanian case, where musical practice, from learning through to performing has become dependent on the ability to learn as an autodidact (Perullo, 2011 p. 143). In terms of general education, there are however major efforts to get arts and culture (back) into the school curricula in Ghana and Burkina Faso. UNESCO is currently supporting an inter-ministerial effort to include arts and culture in the curriculum (UNESCO, 2014). Similar efforts are made in Ghana, under the initiative of the Ghana Culture Forum. The question remains why this part of the school curriculum was ever eliminated in the first place.

This resonates with the ideas shared at the World Conferences on Arts Education in Port Elizabeth (2001), Lisbon (2006), and Seoul (2010) that called for the permanent and central inclusion of culture in the education curriculum, and “study ways and means to draw up localized Arts Education programmes based on local values and traditions” (UNESCO, 2006 p. 18). During a roundtable on difficulties in the music sec-

¹³¹ 2012 data obtained from <http://data.uis.unesco.org> (accessed 2 May 2014).

tor in the Northern region of Ghana, a proposal was made to overcome the current challenges in terms of education. How can the knowledge and skill of older artists be used to reintroduce artistic education in schools and beyond? This builds on the double challenge that currently exists: a lack of education and a lack of social protection for aging musicians. This could moreover provide a way to bridge gaps between traditional and contemporary ways of expressing culture. Including the arts and culture in primary and secondary schools curricula would provide sizable and stable income opportunities for artists. Though, finding the balance between traditional apprenticeships and present-day social and educational structures in policies remains a particular issue (Perullo, 2011 p. 353).

In the context of education, the previously discussed (see section 4.3) symbols *Sankofa* (“return for it”) and the *Ofamfa* (“critical examination”) that together mean: “a return to the past must be guided by critical examination” are useful too. (Gyekye, 1996 p. iv). These concepts need not refer to a romantic yearning for the past: “A mere restoration of the ancient past – whatever glory attached to it in collective memories – was out of the question. But a run forward in the present path of development was equally absurd” (Gilbert Rist, in Esteva et al., 2013 p. 53). There are two reasons these ancient symbols matter in this debate. On the one hand, they exemplify the argument made in chapter two. A critical examination of history can serve to help understanding where critical junctures in cultural industries and traditions may overlap or collide. This could, in turn, help bringing the current discourse closer to the current practice. This is a challenge in cultural practice and arts education, as “Ghanaians still have to face the increasingly difficult but inescapable task of developing an educational system that will synthesize indigenous Ghanaian culture and traditional orality with the literary and scientific resources of modern education” (Flolu, 2000 p. 27). On the other hand, *Sankofa* and *Ofamfa* are not at all forgotten. A crucial illustration of this is the use of these symbols as decoration on the outer wall of the TV Africa studios in Accra. The presence of this culturally laden message signals a connection to its meaning, also in the television business. Yet, there is far less attention to the meaning of such symbols in policy debates than there is to the aesthetics of their presence. Even though similar concepts have been discussed widely, for example by Akinsola Akiwowo, through the concept of “ifogbontaayese ... the wisdom to remake the world” (Connell, 2007 p. 92).

My more general point is that the risk that skills training and (cultural) management will take the upper hand in (higher) education and (vocational) training is real. In many countries around the world, this is a crisis silently unfolding (Nussbaum, 2012). Following Nussbaum, I argue that in the face of cultural, democratic, and spiritual survival, education should remain more than merely practical skills for economic growth. A major account of such debate falls well beyond the scope of this report. Suffice to say, cul-

tural industries are not operating in a policy and social vacuum, but neither do they operate in an intellectual vacuum. The arts and humanities should, in other words, be central when developing cultural industries (Nussbaum, 2012; Belfiore and Upchurch, 2013), yet “many governments around the world continue to view cultural education as an interesting addition to the overall schooling, rather than an integral part of it” (Bell and Oakley, 2015 p. 36).

8.6. Conclusion: Capabilities for Culture

The possibility to learn skills is needed to participate in political life, so having access to transparent records, having (equal) social possibilities and opportunities, and having access to an education is crucially important. This is significantly different from the skills-oriented training that is often organized for cultural workers, mainly because ‘capabilities’ are not the same as ‘capacities’. Whereas this chapter focuses on the socio-political context in which certain choices can (or cannot) be made, it far transgresses the kind of options provided through training. This does not mean that training is not needed or would be inadequate. Training is needed and often they respond to real demands. The point is, that human development is about the capability of people to live “the life they have reason to value” (Sen, 1992 p. 5). This means that there is a need to move beyond providing tools that are *perceived* to be vital to the kind of activity that is *thought* to be instrumental in the development of cultural industries, or by extension, society as a whole. If cultural industries are really about human development, training is not enough. While it would be a rather gratuitous to point out there is a need for more accessible, better and more creative education; it is a point that cannot be made often enough. The following chapter moves beyond this argument and links the need for engagement with a framework for action towards a more theoretical framework for cultural policy.

9. Developing Cultural Industries: Learning from the Palimpsest of Practice

There is, and has long been, an incredible amount of cultural creation in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet, such activity has only recently become framed as through the lens of the creative economy discourse. This poses challenges for the understanding of the long history and the inherent contradictions of these industries as an instrument of critique and reflexive understanding. Yet, in spite of misunderstandings about what the cultural industries exactly are and how they work, there has been much active interest in adopting and encouraging the creative economy discourse and logic in the cultural sector.

In many ways, acknowledging the economic potential of culture and creativity is a welcome change. First, it helps promote the cultural workers as part of a dynamic economic sector that needs to be taken seriously in policies and regulations. This should help realize the *potential* of the sector. Second, it may help overcome unequal access to global cultural markets. This is, at least, what Article 14 of the Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005b) argues: in order to take part in global cultural markets, the local cultural industries need strengthening. Yet this is to quite an extent merely wishful thinking. Third, the focus on local cultural industries provides a way to tell stories and give voice to share those stories locally and more widely (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2008b). Culture thus provides a socio-economic vehicle to articulate views on life, society, the past, and the future (Appadurai, 2004; Clammer, 2012). However, the popularity of the creative economy discourse should not eclipse the range of cultural and creative activities that will never be economically viable. These activities need a place in policy and practice, as much as they need a place in society. Even if the cultural industries are a helpful concept, they are not a panacea for the challenges of cultural production, distribution and enjoyment.

These important objectives deserve much attention. Yet, a central issue of any project in the name of 'development' has been finding the ways to turn potential into realization. This is where culture becomes crucial to development. Here, culture is not the stories that are told (be it through music, painting, films, or literature), but the ways they are created, circulated, and appreciated (not to say consumed). The point is that the 'culture' of cultural production (which includes *how* things are done, *who* holds power, and *what* it means to trade in culture) is the basis for existing cultural industries, which means that culture should be understood in order to deal with both the diversity of cul-

tural production and the diversity of cultural products. This is primarily a pragmatic concern, since the possibility to engage in policy-transfer in the field of cultural industries is limited at best (Pratt, 2009). This means that context matters more than 'best practice' examples from elsewhere. The paradox is that the cultural industries can, on the one hand, help form and articulate such a change, whereas, on the other hand, they equally form a practice that can itself form a driving force of teleological modernization (Laaser, 1997 pp. 52–53).

At the same time, cultural expressions are transformative in their relation to so-called traditions, such that “Senegalese rap artists have seized upon and exploited *Africanisms* (particularly *griotism*¹³²) through various symbolic, linguistic, textual, and musical means” (Tang, 2012 p. 79). This chapter addresses the above paradox towards a policy-oriented solution.

9.1. The 'Palimpsest' of Cultural Production

Cultural industries exist pretty much everywhere in some form or another, in the sense that some relation between cultural expressions and commerce exists. Yet, the very relation between cultural expressions and trade is culturally contingent (Bharucha, 2010). Such a relation existed well before the notion of the creative economy and it will probably outlive it. So, developing cultural industries is not about teaching how to be an entrepreneur, or how to become economically viable, even though this may be part of a strategy. Developing cultural industries is about understanding what exists and seeing it as a form of practice in its own right. Improvements can be made in such practice and there is room for imagining how things could be radically different. But instead of imagining the radical difference based on models derived from France, Britain, or the USA, there is a need to build a firmer understanding of what exists. The current engagement with the creative economy discourse, however, insufficiently takes into account the ways in which cultural expressions are created and are much older than the present-day notion of the creative economy.

The practices and roles of the cultural industries are diverse: “Across the global South, cultural creativity is located in diverse cultural landscapes, epistemologies and worldviews, and layered within multiple histories and continua – pre-colonial, colonial, modern, and now emerging post-modern urbanism. They span oral, literate and neo-digital cultures as well as both informal and formal economies, all situated within rural,

¹³² Griotism means building on the legacy of the West Africa griots, who served as court musicians and (informal) advisors to political leaders in the past. Many contemporary musicians come from a long lineage of griots and while they remain recognized as the heirs of this tradition, griots have evolved into contemporary professions around music and word.

peri-urban, and urban settings” (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 87). Yet, this kind of holistic view of the sector remains largely excluded from the conversation. The discourse of the creative economy is contrarily colonizing the cultural imagery, primarily through the perceived orthodoxy of the conditions for creation and circulation, rather than through the influx of cultural expressions, which is crucial in the cultural imperialism thesis (Tomlinson, 1991). Critical development scholars argue that such a foreign imaginary is not wanted or needed as valid local knowledge (systems) exist (Shizha and Abdi, 2014 p. 3). This means that culture and development is solely about *what* cultural expressions are, but also about *how* they are produced, circulated, and consumed. Yet as I have shown, the creative economy discourse does not connect well to existing practices in Burkina Faso and Ghanaian cultural (policy) debates.

The creative economy discourse increasingly acknowledges and celebrates existing practices (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013). The vernacular translation of this debate among practitioners focuses primarily on transformations from current practice (or, the existing potential) to what *should* be practiced (the realization of that potential). The paradox is that there is little understanding of these existing processes (at least in a way that can be systematically translated to policy debates) and that there is little debate on what should be aimed for; the normative dimension regarding the *kind* of cultural industries that could be developed should be central. When linking this potential for transformation, two opposed scenarios can be discerned.

On the one hand, cultural practice is framed as embryonic, emergent, and thus implicitly as inferior in Burkina Faso and Ghana. To a great extent, the way forward is framed in technical terms, building on the idea that solutions are known and that skills transfers, capitalization, entrepreneurship training, and the creation of infrastructure and institutions will transform existing practices into ‘developed’ cultural industries (UNCTAD and UNDP, 2008 p. 40). UNESCO (UNESCO, 2005b p. 8) makes a similar argument in the *Convention on the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural Expressions*. A concrete example here is a music distributor in Burkina Faso, who aims to establish a megastore, much like the ones found in Asia, Europe or the US. This approach echoes the kind of modernization thinking that was common in early development studies (De Beukelaer, 2012 p. 20), and the ‘creative destruction’ of cultural praxis towards fully modernized cultural industries using the Western model, thereby changing its ethos (Cowen, 2002 p. 51). Stakeholders in the cultural industries compare the existing practices to a textbook ideal that is rarely questioned and hardly exists. This does not mean that all stakeholders in Burkina Faso and Ghana think this way. There are critical voices, but they remain largely subsumed under the hegemonic entrepreneurial optimism and only given little critical consideration concerning change processes. A general teleological vision of change (whereby Western ways of producing, sharing and enjoying

cultural expressions), is the aim. Yet, given the great diversity in the way culture is created and circulated, the focus within this paradigm remains on the modernization of cultural industries within the realm of orthodox development planning.

On the other hand, cultural practice is embedded in a notion of tradition and indigeneity. These notions form the basis for a critical, albeit minor, stance in development thinking. The aim here is not to come up with an alternative understanding of development, but to articulate “alternatives to development” (Escobar, 1995 p. 215). Such alternatives are framed in notions of indigenous knowledge (e.g. Shizha and Abdi, 2014) or post-development (Rahnema and Bawtree, 1997). Ironically, this stance is high on doctrine and low on scholarly basis, much like development strategies as a whole (Apthorpe 2005, 133–134). It provides an ideological critique of development, questioning its notion, intentions, world-view and mind-set (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 175). The economic mind-set implies a reductionist view of existence. Thus, according to Sachs “it is not the failure of development which has to be feared, but its success” (Sachs, 2010 p. 3). But when the theology of development is rejected, it is replaced by development “agnosticism” (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 187) that fails to provide a firm basis for constructive engagement with practical challenges. Poverty and underdevelopment may be discursive constructions of difference, but deconstructing these terms does not solve the issues the (admittedly politically suspicious) discourse addresses. Moreover, post-development builds on the false premise that modernization is a singular project moving toward one modernity and fails to recognize the simultaneous existence of multiple modernities (Gaonkar 1999). On top of this, the wholesale dismissal of the ‘development’ discourse assumes that many people still live in some form of ‘indigeneity’ that is that is unaffected by the exogenous change that development embodies. A ‘return’ to some notion of pre-modern, pre-development, or pre-colonial idyll is an implausible option.

How to deal with the tension between these approaches to transforming informal (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 26–28) and embryonic (Burkina Faso) or emerging (Ghana) cultural industries? Such an opposition only makes sense within a logic of modernizing progress that thrives on a dichotomy between modernity and tradition (Pigg, 1996 p. 163; in Schech and Haggis, 2000 p. 37). The cultural industries can be “seen as a diverse and locally defined construct, where the cosmopolitan cultural entrepreneur acts as a hybrid agent, negotiating terms of modernity; both spatially and temporally” (De Beukelaer, 2012 p. 21). Actual practices thus better reflect the overlap between ‘old’ and ‘new’ ways of organising the cultural sector than the uncritical uptake of the creative economy discourse suggests. The very products of the cultural industries are, moreover, instrumental in negotiating such terms: “Creativity in African cinema does more than re-imagine Africa and the challenges of being African. It also tells

the story of how Africans are actively modernizing their indigeneities and indigenizing their 'modernities,' often in ways not always obvious to those obsessed with cultural hierarchies" (Nyamnjoh, 2008 p. 131). But what does this mean for policies and initiatives for the cultural industries?

Seeing policies as part of a normative palimpsest can help overcome the apparent opposition between continuity and change (see Section 7.4). In the process of decolonizing both theory and policy, recognizing the existing palimpsest is needed to look forward and backward at the same time, explicitly recognizing the multiple developing spheres provides a framework to build on them. Boahen (2011 p. 112) explicitly makes the case that "Africans [should] take the colonial impact very much into account in the formulation of their future development programs and strategies." Similarly, the perpetually overlapping urban-village divide, and the strong pre- and post-colonial histories play a vital role in understanding both the limitations and the possibilities within a given context; the same goes for rituals and religious considerations (Bharucha, 2010). The conceptual discussion of the terms 'culture' and 'development' (see Chapter 2) is also part of such a palimpsest. In sum, a palimpsest of policies links global and local histories through ideas and concepts, leading to culturally contingent understanding of, in this case, cultural industries.

Developing cultural industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana is an activity that currently resembles attempts to make the territory look like the map. The focus is, to a great extent, on making the informal, though existing, activities look more like what the cultural industries *should* be. This links in with the 'river-canal' metaphor (see Chapter 5) the proposed changes are not a natural change, but the result of (often ideologically infused) choices. To take this metaphor further, in trying to create the right conditions to make the cultural industries flourish, there is a presumption that there is a map that can be followed, whereas the actual challenge is to create a map from the existing cultural territory. This does not mean that a solution lies in simply mapping the existing enterprises and activities. It is more crucial to build a critical understanding of the creative economy as a malleable discourse in correspondence to needs and priorities of a certain country, city or region.

Framing the context of cultural production and circulation is thus not a theoretical gimmick. It is a way to show that current policies are in fact normative responses to failures and contradictions of earlier policies and equally normative aspirations for the future. For example, if culture had not been cut from Ghanaian school curricula, the current policy debate would take a very different approach to culture. Or, if there had been greater participation in the design, planning, and exploitation of cultural venues in Burkina Faso and Ghana, the existing infrastructure would probably be more suitable

to the needs of the sector. This, in turn, would have resulted in different focal points in the current debates. The current policy aim is thus not only to rectify past mistakes and avoid future issues, but also to understand why certain bad choices were made in the first place. Similarly, there is a need to re-contextualize the path dependency of 'Southern' creative economy thinking. Path dependency refers to the principle that "the order in which things happen affects how they happen; the trajectory of change up to a certain point constrains the trajectory after that point" (Kay, 2005 p. 553). This principle helps understanding socio-historical factors that both enable and constrain particular kind of change. The point here is that path dependency, while not a way to predict the future, may help to contextualize and theorize the histories of cultural production in order to understand what, but mostly *why* certain things happened and how this influences strategies for future change.

To reiterate, this is not because 'Africa' or 'developing countries' are particular cases that do not fit the global discourse. It is because each locale has a distinct history that forms the basis of the present. Most of all, these (hi)stories are intertwined with local politics, revolutions, struggles, cultures and untold stories. Yet, the previous chapter has shown that much of these histories and particularities are often reduced to single narratives that have become common knowledge. Both in Ghana and Burkina Faso, the 1980s are seen as periods that incited radical changes in the music industries. Little attention is paid to the historical continuum in which these events occurred and in which the current initiatives are equally embedded.

Even though existing practices are embedded in local realities, the relation between culture and society, through history, politics, and economy is a debate that is tied in with evolutions at a global level. Focusing on current challenges and approaches as a palimpsest of previous failures and successes, in which future visions are explicitly inscribed provides a way to rethink that relation. The palimpsest of circular relations thus forms a basis for a more explicit critical engagement with the past, present, and future.

9.2. Models of the Cultural and Creative Industries

The framing of culture in Burkinabè and Ghanaian policy has gradually shifted from a project of national coherence (in need of public support) to a driver of the economy. That shift, this section argues, is necessary, but it has been taken too far; building too much on and it embodies the ideal basis of the argument that different models of the creative economy are part of a teleological development, rather than a range of diverse logics that necessarily exist in parallel. Potts and Cunningham provide an overview of four ways to understand the link between the *creative* industries and economy as a whole: First, in the 'welfare model' the economy drives creative industries through

transfers of resources. Second, in the 'competition model', the creative industries are just another industry. Third, in the 'growth model' the creative industries drive the economy through high rates of growth. Fourth, in the 'innovation model' the creative industries evolve the economy through transfers of knowledge (Potts and Cunningham, 2008 p. 239).

Particularly in the case of popular music in Burkina Faso and Ghana, these models fail to provide an adequate depiction of general tendencies. The high performers of the music industries do not primarily rely on the limited spending power of the majority of the population to sustain them, but draw on corporate sponsorship: "instead of corporations mediating the relationship between consumers and producers, musicians are facilitating the relationship between corporations and publics" (Shipley, 2013 p. 283).

Performances of Floby, one of the most popular artists in Burkina Faso, look more like telecom-publicity than a concert. Whether these activities constitute a drain on the economy in the form of net transfers from the sponsoring companies, or if they are effective advertisement vehicles, leading to increased growth, is difficult to discern. But the overall typology of models, from subsidies to innovation is neither adaptable nor adapted to the context in these countries.

Moreover, the models above derive from the creative and not the cultural industries. The crucial importance here is that the former is more encompassing than the latter, by including sectors like software and design, that account for the majority of the 'growth' element (Tremblay, 2011) and ICT-driven enterprises that are key to the 'knowledge economy' (Garnham, 2005). The scope of these sectors remains limited in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet this means that they are probably the sectors with the highest potential growth. As highlighted in the introduction, Burkina Faso and Ghana build on the conceptual and typological basis of the cultural industries.

In the context of Burkina Faso and Ghana, the 'innovation' model is arguably the most promising. The 'informal' cultural industries build on models that somehow work in spite of the often-cited obstacles, like inadequate infrastructure, limited access to funds, insufficient training possibilities and limited enforcement of (otherwise good) policies and regulations. The cultural industries in this context build less on the gradual hollowing of the welfare state (discussed in relation to precariousness in Chapter 6) than on a response to a general need for entrepreneurial coping with rampant inequality and poverty. The on-going shift from very limited government support to a stratified market between high-earning sponsorship contracts and few opportunities for well-paid live performances can hardly be captured in this Eurocentric model. On the one hand, there are those who have sponsorship contracts. Artists rely primarily on their audiences to 'like' them, not so much to spend on them but to demonstrate their popularity. Expo-

sure is thus sold to companies (in the form of sponsorship). This reflects in extremely heavy publicity for corporations at concerts, where the differentiation between cultural expression and product placement is almost entirely blurred. In this context, music primarily becomes the means to attain external commercial aims: publicity for major telecom and food conglomerates. On the other hand, the majority of musicians do not have such contracts. Some of them operate between local and international networks to make a living but the greater part sees little monetary return for their sacrificial labour.

There is thus a model, or rather an intertwined set of models between sponsorship contracts and subsistence entrepreneurship, which somehow works. Similarly, Lobato (2010 p. 346) discusses “cultural production under weak copyright” in Nigerian “Nollywood” film industries as a “concrete example which we can use to road-test some of [the] theoretical propositions” regarding Western reflections on the reduced role of copyright (see Lessig, 2004). Rather than seeing the debates and practices in Nigeria as empirical illustrations of Western theories, they serve as a basis for greater theoretical engagement in their own right (Larkin, 2008). Such divergent models are crucial to understand the global creative economy if that discourse really is global.

9.3. A Theoretical Basis for Grounded Plurality

A mismatch remains between the global nature of the creative economy discourse and the engagement with the term in particular places. Most framing of the global creative economy discourse remains confined within Western social theory, as Flew (2013) unknowingly illustrates, in spite of existing efforts to ‘de-Westernize’ media theory (Nyamnjoh, 2011). If the cultural industries of every Western country deserve to be treated in their own right, this should be the case for every country. Such an argument does not solely apply to cultural production, but to social theory as a whole, as it is re-orienting its focus and locus in a multipolar world. Achille Mbembe, for example, argues that “the world is catching up with Africa, not the other way around,” but also that “Africa needs to pursue becoming its own centre” (Blaser, 2013).

Mbembe is far from being the only one to make such an argument. The recent work on ‘southern theory’ (Connell, 2007) or ‘theory from the south’ (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012) articulates clearly how such normative and theoretical diversity works in practice. Similarly, economics is increasingly framed in pluralist (Fullbrook, 2008b) and post-colonial terms (Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela, 2004; Pollard et al., 2011b). These particular approaches deserve greater attention prior to discussing their implications for the creative economy discourse.

Comaroff and Comaroff, much like Mbembe, argue that African modernity is not “running behind Euro-America, but ahead of it” (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 12).

Moreover, such modernity is a vernacular, in the same way that 'Euromodernity' is a vernacular that takes many forms (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 9). This is illustrated by their openness to "rapacious enterprise: to asset stripping, to the alienation of the commons, to privateers, to the plunder of personal property, to foreign bribe-giving. In sum, to optimal profit at minimal cost, with little infrastructure investment" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 15). Hence, 'Africa' is already living the kind of ultra-capitalism that much of 'Euro-America' is only slowly moving towards. They conclude that (what I would call) the palimpsest that forms the overlap of colonial inheritance and the "post-colonial availability to neoliberal development" make Ghana and other 'Southern' countries "a vanguard in the epoch of the market" (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 16). If the South is running ahead of the North, the theories of the latter are unlikely to provide the solutions to the challenges of the former. This underlines that:

The need to interrogate the workings of the contemporary world order – to lay bare its certainties and uncertainties, its continuities and contingencies, its possibilities and impossibilities, its inclusions and exclusions – has become increasingly urgent. (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 48)

Connell, on the other hand, challenges the hegemony of Western social theory in social sciences that builds on the false premise that "modernity created itself within the North Atlantic world, independent of the rest of humanity" (Connell, 2007 p. x). Yet, such a theory of "modern societies" presumes universal validity (Connell, 2007 p. 212), but "mainstream sociology turns out to be an ethno-sociology of metropolitan society. This is concealed by language, especially in the framing of its theories as universal propositions of universal tools" (Connell, 2007 p. 226). Nonetheless, she argues that "colonized and peripheral societies produce social thought *about the modern world* which has as much intellectual power as metropolitan social thought, and more political relevance" (Connell, 2007 p. xii, emphasis in original). Such efforts, have however been crippled, since "governments turned to foreign advisors, while NGOs wanted only consultants, not basic research programs, assuming that 'poor research was good enough for the poor'" (Connell, 2007 p. 109). As a result, on the topic of cultural policies and cultural industries, there is hardly any academic research by local researchers that focuses empirically on African countries and there is too little critical engagement with the concepts and theories at all. The metropolitan advocacy and 'technical assistance' to implement cultural industries agenda plays an important role, both through governmental and non-governmental organizations. As long as cultural funding comes from international partners, they will likely maintain (implicit) influence on the conceptual language of policies.

This does not mean that no 'basic' research has been conducted in the South. Yet, limited research funding and frameworks has held back more substantial engagement at local universities. As a result, there remains a highly unequal exchange of ideas between the global North and the global South, in which "theory' is generated in the west and data are supplied by the south" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 9). Such 'academic dependency' builds on three pillars in the south: first, greater focus on the empirical than the theoretical; second, the tendency to study primarily their own country (whereas the north is more outward-looking); and third, the relative lack of comparative studies due to a focus on single case studies (Alatas, 2003 pp. 608–609). The academic dependency is slowly waning, but there remains a comparative disadvantage, to say the least.

The critical reconfiguration of social theory occurs in parallel to the call to reconceptualise economic thinking as a pluralist endeavour (Fullbrook, 2008b). This reflects protests by economics students that call for a reconsideration of economics disciplines as a practice that thinks beyond the reduction of human behaviour to a 'homo economicus.' Pluralist economics equally asks to consider cultural and historical contingencies and greater empirical grounding of economic theory, allowing greater openness to insights of other disciplinary approaches to "economic reality" (Fullbrook, 2008a pp. 1–2).

Postcolonial economics approaches such plurality of thought and practice through postcolonial theory, which has had little influence on economic thinking so far (Pollard et al., 2011a p. 9). Here, much like in the reflections on southern theory, the main aim is to generate a possibility for meaningful dialogue that takes heterodox practices seriously, because:

Assumptions about the production and circulation of economic knowledge create blindness to the possibilities of knowledge sharing about contemporaneous experiences of successful economic strategies in the Global South, which is often tantamount to a ['Northern'] refusal to learn from experiences elsewhere. (Pollard et al., 2011a p. 12)

Postcolonial economics thus aims to create a space in which unorthodox practices can be articulated and understood in their own right and framework, rather than seeing them as mere deviations from orthodox economics (Zein-Elabdin and Charusheela, 2004; Pollard et al., 2011b). Such a reading of the economy emerged first in practice, before it has been theorized (Larner, 2011 p. 91), in the same way that 'theory from the south' is grounded in everyday practice rather than in abstract normative theory (Comaroff and Comaroff, 2012 p. 48). Postcolonial critique provides a framework to think through the cultural industries as a palimpsest, both economically and theoretical-

ly. It is used as shorthand for the historical complexity that needs framing and understanding.

Practically, informal cultural industries need greater understanding within the above theoretical frameworks in order to grasp the role they play within society. Informality is not simply an anomaly in economic practice that needs direct policy action to eliminate it. While efforts are needed to engage with informal activity, this should be directed towards the improvement of livelihoods of those involved in informal economies. Policy intervention in this area has different work for self-employed and wage workers (Chen 2007, 11). Moreover, whether they are formal or informal, the “hierarchies that govern contemporary Ghana’s urban contexts are not products of persistent continuities or inevitable transformations; they are the result of generations of Ghanaians’ efforts to actively reshape their lived realities, often in a climate defined by music, dance, and a great deal of fun” (Plageman, 2012 p. 230). This means that contemporary sociology of cultural production, too, is always a culturally contingent model of activity that exists both thanks to many previous successes and due to as many mistakes – in policy, intervention, advocacy, and entrepreneurship. The following section engages more closely with the circularity that links past and present choices in a constructive way.

9.4. Towards a Circular Politics of Culture and Development

Development, like happiness, is not an end point that can be reached (Stewart, 2014). This undermines the division between developing and developed countries, as no country can, or should, claim to be fully ‘developed’ (Neuwirth, 2013). This implies that they do not need to evolve any further, which is ideologically suspicious and empirically incorrect. More importantly, there is no finality to measure. The focus of measurement and action should thus be on the process, because rather than making radical changes, the aim is for gradual change within the existing context. In this context, the reductionist measuring of such change as economic growth, through the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), becomes even more challenging (Fioramonti, 2013). As a result, understanding change as linear progress does not do justice to the messiness and contradictions that societal change embodies. Instead, could a conceptual understanding be used to frame and phrase on-going processes of change? What kind of metaphor could help a greater understanding and envisaging of transformation?

Envisaging ‘development’ as circular, instead of linear, politics allows political context and history to be built upon, layer upon layer, as with a palimpsest. Development is thus not a departure from the past towards the future, but a constant reconfiguration of history in the present. This permits culture (and to some extent ‘tradition’) to be seen as a realm of struggle, both in the past and the present. Most importantly, the circular un-

derstanding of development implies a far greater focus on the process of change than on the goals it aims to attain. The previous chapter outlined five key levels at which such process-oriented actions are taken, while this chapter outlines a theorization of such processes. This section also closes with a clear policy-oriented example of a circular, process-focused understanding of development.

Linear progress implicitly bears a promise of change for the better. Circular change, on the other hand, does not share that intrinsic optimism. 'Going around in circles' is a negative cliché that illustrates this. More pessimistically, a vicious circle of change provides an even more bleak view on such change, since it implies that things are progressively getting worse. More optimistically, a virtuous circle allows the observer to see circularity in a more constructive way. Circularity avoids transgressing into the false choice between modernization and post-development: it stresses the link with the past while underlining continuous evolution. Even though every generation and technological evolution brings change, "we do not reinvent culture every generation" (Clammer, 2012 p. 56). Using the example of copyright (see also Chapter 6) I discuss both vicious and virtuous circles.

The market for recorded music has changed radically since the advent of digital technologies that allow the transfer of music across players and between people through the Internet, Bluetooth, and direct file transfer (copying each others music libraries). This is a global issue that affects the music industries in general, and the recording industry in particular. The disc, which served as a major vehicle for music circulation and revenue generation throughout the 20th century is in decline, and it is unclear what kind of technologies or business models may provide the music industries with an equally widespread and lucrative medium (Gebesmair, 2009 p. 483). Given the shift in commercial activity, away from discs to live music, merchandizing, and experiences, the plurality of the music industries should be stressed to overcome the limited and limiting focus on the music industry in the singular as a concept that often simply means the recording industry (Williamson and Cloonan, 2007; Sterne, 2014).

In both Burkina Faso and Ghana, the cycle of production, dissemination, and consumption is more or less in place and works to a certain extent. There is production and cultural products are circulated. There is ample consumption, even though a considerable amount is illicit. But, around the world, there is no clear understanding how to cope with the changes of the past decade that caused such a radical increase in piracy. Rather than trying to supplant the current, admittedly imperfect, cycle of the cultural industries with a broken copyright regime (Edwards et al., 2013), the solution lies in adopting current practices as a basis for change. The point here is that the wheel already exists.

Much like the work of Arterial Network to help countries to “adapt the wheel” of cultural policy (Forbes, 2011), existing practices form a useful basis for adaptation.

The vicious circle of mutually reinforcing issues (Figure 9-1) undermines the constructive evolution of practices within the music industries for example: limited spending power of audiences increases the demand for music at the lowest possible price. Through street vendors, Bluetooth file-sharing, and official downloads via telecom-providers, this demand is increasingly met. These largely illicit transactions limit the economic return to the rights holders. This limits the economic viability and profitability of the music industries, straining working conditions, particularly for those in informal wage labour. Given low economic return and the opacity of financial transactions, access to finance from banks is difficult to obtain. This makes large-scale (collaborative) investment in cost-efficient production difficult, leading to relatively high manufacturing costs for CDs and cassettes. This increases the price of legitimate releases and drives consumers to cheaper, pirated alternatives.




Figure 9-1 - The Vicious Circle of Music Circulation: Highlighting Obstacles

This overview is necessarily incomplete, as each part of the circle is intertwined with other circular issues. Limited spending power in the society as a whole, for example, depends on far more than the music industries. The same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for the other parts. The implicit promise that merely enforcing the existing copyright legislation will solve the intricate and connected issues throughout the music industries is misguided. It is an important step that needs attention but it is not disconnected from other interventions. Similarly, the idea that replacing the current cyclical cultural ecology with a new one, by modernizing practice, negates that the inherent capacity of the existing and indeed imperfect model to transform to a more adaptive model that embraces vernacular innovation.

The virtue of this vicious circle lies in its explanatory capacity: piracy is not uniquely to blame for the issues prevailing in the music industries. The vicious circle, or downward spiral, of mutually reinforcing issues can only be tackled by addressing each of these elements in their broader societal context. That is precisely what the virtuous circle model aims to clarify.

The virtuous circle of music industries (Figure 9-2) places attention on small changes and adaptations within the elements that make up the circle. For example, while technology lies at the basis of the surge in (digital) piracy since the late 1990s, it has also created new possibilities for distribution. Distribution practices, however, need regulation and the terms of practice need to be negotiated by and with the rights holders and those selling content. But prohibiting them is unlikely to have a positive effect on the cultural industries, because it undermines the most extensive existing music distribution network (Collins, 2006 p. 163). Piracy actually grows from the inability of the vested industries to quickly embrace and adopt new technologies, as history has shown repeatedly. Piracy cannot simply be eliminated, therefore 'legitimate music industries' should embrace the practices of the pirates in a legal and accessible way (Kernfeld, 2011 p. 221). By including the people working as pirates in such a regulation, it could strengthen the working conditions of music vendors and returns for rights holders. Street vendors can become pillars of a vast and fast and legitimate distribution network, embracing digital media. Once such practice is established, the enforcement of copyright legislation becomes gradually effective: it no longer undermines the link between musicians and their audiences, but weeds out those who continue to provide contents without holding the rights to do so.

This also means that street vendors can become legitimate distributors, instead of being marginalized. The returns from such legal sales will give greater proof of viability to music producers and artists in order to obtain external investment. Such investments

can help harnessing the potential of innovation for cost reduction and the improvement of quality standards, which in turn leads to greater markets for products.




Figure 9-2 - Virtuous Circle of Music Circulation, highlighting potential solutions

This circular approach means that very fine and detailed attention should be paid to issues at many levels, like education, infrastructure, and policy, just to name a few. There is thus no need to re-invent a new kind of cycle that does away with what exists.

Whether the circle is vicious or virtuous, much remains to be said about the approach to change. What kinds of policies are devised to render the cultural industries more viable? What kinds of initiatives are deployed to make such ideas reality? Because the understanding of the term 'cultural industries' in Burkina Faso and Ghana is limited (see Chapter 4) and its adoption in policy and practice generally remains superficial (see Chapter 5), policy texts focus more or replacing the existing 'heterodox' cultural industries with a an orthodox understanding of the cultural industries (insofar this exists). At the same time, initiatives like ARPEM and ARPIC in Burkina Faso, in fact, aim to transform the existing practices. Yet, also in such cultural industries support pro-

grammes, the focus is more on realizing a presumed orthodox commercial cultural practice than transforming the existing practices, particularly of the more vulnerable and precarious workers, into more inclusive cultural industries that build on what people are doing, rather than what they *should* presumably be doing.

Transforming unorthodox (and perhaps illicit) practices into legal and regulated heterodox practices has historically proven to be a challenge. The Western record industry lobby (IFPI) does not look favourably towards distortions of their allegedly orthodox practices. For example, in the late 1980s, when Ghanaian 'cottage-industry cassette production' became legalized under the initiative of the Ghana Tape Recordists Association (GTRA), allowing street vendors (considered by some to be music pirates), to pay a blanket fee to rights owners. This strategy is also attempted elsewhere:

Certain ('pirate') vendor unions [who] have sought to become legitimate distributors, entering into contracts with artists. However, their attempts to work more formally and on a larger scale with music producers have often been dogged, on both sides, by cultural differences and a sense of mutual distrust. (Stobart, 2010 p. 50)

The IFPI reacted against this by funding the lobbying activities of antagonist groups in the country. The GTRA's attempt to regularise their activities was dismissed. The re-centralized solution to cassette piracy was the use of *banderoles*¹³³ managed to reduce piracy from 90% to around 15% until the late 1990s. As a result, many young entrepreneurs with good intentions (they wanted to regularize their business) were pushed out of the music business, leaving a vacuum in the distribution sector (Collins, 2006 p. 162).

Banderole use did not survive the transition to the digital era: the same kind of illicit street vendors now sell MP3s from laptops on the street. The current issue is almost identical to that of the 1980s: the 'illegal' street vendors are prosecuted for their activities (GhanaWeb, 2012) and while there is no viable alternative, street vendors cannot operate legally due to the lack of a legal framework and the absence of any initiative that would allow them to pay royalties. At the same time consumers have little possibility to purchase music legally. Earlier suggestions to harness the digital potential of digital technologies (Collins, 2006 p. 164) did not lead to much change. One exception is an initiative by MUSIGA, the musicians union, to launch an online music sales platform (MUSIGA, 2013), that remains as of yet in the planning stage.

¹³³ Banderoles are stickers used to indicate the authenticity of a product and are a source of income for collective management organisations (CMOs), which collect royalties on behalf of rights holders.

Setting up an effective distribution mechanism for digital music files among people who often do not have a credit card to purchase music through a legal platform was and is still a challenge. Evidence suggests it is counter-productive to prohibit street vendors and their activities, since this undermines an effective distribution system. The main problem with this is that rights holders are not paid. Regularizing the work of these pirates through an initiative like that of the GTRA may initially yield little to rights holders, but it provides a potential way forward to build on a vast and effective distribution network in order to gradually increase the revenue from sales, much like Nollywood became a booming industry by working with pirates (Lobato, 2010 p. 346). It is difficult to make a business case for fighting piracy when there is no alternative; the issue lies less in the social deviance than in the highly effective distributive capacity that has grown thanks to piracy (Lobato, 2010 p. 347).

There is room for innovation and change from abroad. Existing cultural businesses can learn from engaging with the framework of cultural industries. As a result, those cultures of creation, distribution and consumption form a fertile base to pick ideas from the creative economy discourse, rather than being taken over by it. Hence the question: how can culture be brought back into the creative economy discourse?

9.5. Reclaiming Culture's role in the Creative Economy Discourse

Relocating culture, as a "pattern of living" (Apthorpe, 2005 p. 137), inside the creative economy discourse builds on incorporating southern theory and postcolonial thinking into a circular conceptualization of policies for the cultural industries. This includes both the cultural turn (Gibson, 2003) and path dependency (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 26; 89). Yet, merely 'adding and stirring' culture to development is a rather vague and often ineffective undertaking (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995a). Similarly, the numerous attempts to 'take culture into account' in thinking about development have however seen relatively little success (van Graan, 2010 p. 3). These approaches have one crucial element in common: they favour small and messy processes or histories over grand ideas and theories. The difficulty with them lies in the relationship between development research and practice, since the latter favours personal experience to grand (or small) theories (Apthorpe, 2005 p. 140).

But what does it mean to take culture into account for development? There are numerous ways to *think* of such a link (Radcliffe, 2006b p. 3), but the focus here is on three ways that the link is *used*. First, culture serves as a way to ease the implementation of development projects. In such a context, the projects remain as mainstream as before, but build on the cultural context, through applied anthropology, to facilitate the adoption and acceptance of such initiatives. Second, culture is a more subversive force, if you

consider the livelihoods of those who are 'to be developed' as an alternative to development, rather than merely a means to attain it. This is the post-development approach. Third, culture constitutes an area of struggle, through which normative future visions are negotiated. Culture, in this context, is used on both the anthropological and artistic notion. This "capacity to aspire" (Appadurai, 2004) forms the basis to reclaim the importance of culture for the cultural industries.

The capacity to aspire is part of a broader range of capabilities that form the basis for an informed citizenry to negotiate the terms of development:

"If a traditional way of life has to be sacrificed to escape grinding poverty or miniscule longevity (as many traditional societies have had for thousands of years), then it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity to participate in deciding what should be chosen" (Sen, 1999 p. 31)

Yet, this should not translate to a dichotomy between local 'good' culture and western 'bad' culture, since both are areas of struggle. And, currently the major area of struggle may be within every country, where small middle classes may have been 'misguided' or even 'bankrupt' (Wainaina, 2014).

The creative economy discourse across the globe is generally a preoccupation of experts, which undermines broad democratic debate. Middle classes thus strongly influence this discourse because they are part of it, even when there are public deliberations because only those with resources, "intellectual capital, money, and time" can really engage in such debates (Schlesinger, 2013 p. 31).

The history of music in Burkina Faso and Ghana shows that the interest in and love for music has transformed styles, expressions and practices due to political and technological change. Adaptation also occurred thanks to religious incorporation and social adaptation. During the period of technological change and curfew, musicians went to church or started working as spinners. They respectively kept live music active, and embraced the democratizing potential of music technology (Collins, 2012 p. 229). Cultural expressions are resilient and transformative, yet, instead of mainly looking forward, it may be a good idea to actually look back, and try to understand what worked well and what did not, in order to gain critical understanding of the palimpsest of cultural policy and practice.

The Ghanaian state failed to enforce a Western cultural property model, because its legal foundation "is part of a modernization framework that leaves very little space for alternative modes of social, economic, political, and legal organization, [and] because the Ghanaian state has not fully explored those spaces that do exist for considering those alternatives and infusing them into policymaking" (Boateng, 2011 p. 166). Under-

standing the apparent failure of for example, intellectual property rights is vital to rethink the possible role of cultural industries in relation to human development.

9.6. Conclusion: Cultural Policy Reconsidered

The current role for cultural policy, regarding cultural industries, in Burkina Faso and Ghana is to turn makeshift production and illicit distribution into an effective, viable, and fair framework for culture (MCTC, 2008; NCC, 2004). This entails a transformation of the existing, thus building on culture as a way of life in order to support and encourage culture as creative expression. Both Burkinabè and Ghanaian cultural policies stress the need to reconcile tradition, nation-building and cultural industries but do not spell out clearly how exactly to do this. These policies thus speak of good intentions, but lack the vocabulary and the practical approach to act on them.

In tandem with these policies, both countries produced (mostly) quantitative data on the cultural sector (KPMG, 2014; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, 2010; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, 2011; Ministère de la Culture et du Tourisme, 2012; BBEAC, 2012). There is indeed a need to build policies on data, even though policy making needs more insight on *how* things work, rather than how the sector performs economically (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005 p. 10). Qualitative insights are thus more useful to rethink policies and their aims than (often economic) quantitative measures.

UNESCO has long been attempting to come up with a set of indicators for culture and development. Their *Culture and Development Indicator Suite* (UNESCO, 2015b) proposes a range of indicators without aggregating them into a single number. This results in a so-called DNA, which visualizes the strong and weaker accounts of culture within particular countries. The CDIS thus provides a useful measure to engage with policy: it shows where the strengths and weaknesses are within countries, stressing where additional efforts are most likely to benefit the reinforcement of culture. While the project is promising, it is laborious and under-funded. It is unclear how it will survive and how it could provide a comprehensive coverage of countries.

The 2013 creative economy report provides a range of questions that can help set the policy agenda. In other words, it does not simply present trade statistics, arguing that economic growth will help increasing trade and development. Surely, it focuses on economic aspects of the cultural industries, but embeds this aspect in a broader understanding of human and humanistic development. The report proposes four categories of questions and breaks them down in an array of very specific questions to help further cultural policy agendas in a deliberative and contextual manner (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 124):

1. *What is the current situation? What are our cultural resources? What are our capacities to support the arts and culture in their contribution to sustainable development?*
2. *What is our potential? Do we have any particular strengths in the cultural area that can be used to fix existing problems or to create new development opportunities? Do we have cultural assets, such as heritage sites that give us a unique cultural identity or brand?*
3. *What are the areas in which serious problems might be addressed through cultural industry development? What are the gaps in our capacity to deal with such issues?*
4. *What will be the indicators of success? Are there benchmarks against which we can calibrate our performance? How will we know whether we have achieved what we hope to achieve?*

These questions illustrate the possible versatility of the cultural industries in development approaches, without reducing it into a panacea. One question should however be asked more explicitly:

5. *What kind of cultural industries should be developed? How should formal and informal, for-profit and not-for-profit, public and private, exclusive and inclusive initiatives be balanced?*

Much like the questions in the creative economy report, this question is not so much a basis for a clear indicator, but a fundamental consideration that requires active and explicit deliberation in policies. I argue, building on Bennett (1998 pp. 199–200), that the notion of the cultural industries should thus be a basis for a pragmatic engagement with culture as a policy field, and not be the basis for an abstract critique or a merely intellectual dismissal in the tradition of the Adornian ‘culture industry.’ Embracing the notion of culture as industry is thus not a surrender of culture to economics and administration, but the basis on which we *can* explore and define the practical boundaries of commercial and subsidised culture in pragmatic terms. Though the main implication of the question above that articulates such pragmatism, is that choices have to be made. Which parts of the cultural industries should be self-sufficient and which ones should receive public support? What kind of measures should be taken to include marginalized workers from (illicit) informal sectors into cultural industries that work for all creators and intermediaries? And, in what ways can the stratified audiences (low and high income, urban and rural, and so on) benefit from creations of the local cultural industries?

In order to reconsider the role of cultural policy for human development, the focus on existing gaps between existing practices and aims should be more explicit. First, this requires qualitative insight into cultural practice (*how* do things work, what does not work and why?). Second, this presumes a clear idea of the aims of cultural policies

(*what* should be attained?). Only when these questions are duly addressed, can a more practical approach be developed. Otherwise, *developing cultural industries* remains mostly a discursive project to rethink the cycles of cultural production and circulation through this hegemonic concept within the existing (albeit changing) socio-economic framework. Hence the need to identify the small but significant changes that can be made. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, this is implicitly done (see chapter 4), but this focus is what needs the greatest attention *within* the sector, in order to allow the existing cultures of the cultural industries to inform continuity and change. It is precisely at this level that the 'path dependency' of cultural production, circulation, and consumption plays a pivotal role. Practices should inform changes in the creative economy discourse, more so than the other way around.

10. Conclusions:

From Cultural Development to Culture for Development

The global spread and uptake of the creative economy discourse since the early 2000s has changed both the role of 'culture' in 'development' and the role of 'development' in 'culture' and 'cultural industries.' The metaphor about how the river has turned and the caiman must follow (in chapter 5) illustrates this vividly. Even if the river is in fact a man-made canal, the metaphor helps us understand the strong influence of the global creative economy discourse. This influence limits the extent to which cultural industries stakeholders in Burkina Faso and Ghana feel they have the power to do much but follow this pervasive and persuasive discourse. Before highlighting my central conclusions, it is important to reiterate the tension I aimed to resolve: how has the role of culture shifted from 'cultural development' to 'culture for development'?

In the literature on 'development' (that aims to understand how countries shift from being 'developing' to being 'developed' countries), the role of culture is limited. On the rare occasions that culture is explicitly linked to development (e.g. Schech and Haggis, 2000; Radcliffe, 2006a), the focus remains on culture as 'ways of life.' Social organisation, political structure, power relations, and economic activities are exponents of the cultural fabric of a country or a people. It is in this light that development is a cultural process: in order to negotiate and forge change within countries, development must acknowledge the cultural nature of the change it seeks. Culture and development, as a focus area in development studies constitutes a break from the dominant view that culture is an obstacle to development. In contrast, development anthropologists – who are at the basis of this culture and development approach – explore the tension between the way 'development' is *intended* and how it can actually be *implemented* (e.g. Mosse, 2005). This makes development a project that is by definition cultural, and the change development is meant to accomplish 'cultural development' more than anything else. Yet, within mainstream development studies and practice (much like in mainstream economics), such cultural foundations remain largely invisible to the dominant minority.

In parallel to the emergence of the 'development' paradigm after World War II, the cultural politics of Burkina Faso and Ghana (much like other 'developing' countries) have helped building a national culture. Both countries have a vast diversity of ethnic groups and languages. So neither language nor 'tradition' can reasonably serve as the self-evident fabric for national unity. There are so many languages and 'traditions' that such an approach would foster segmentation and not unity. Yet, both during and after the struggle for independence from colonial rule, the two countries needed to unite

their respective populations. While I will not redraw the complex and long history of that process here, it is important to understand that cultural *politics* (that only later became explicit *policies*) served to develop a joint national culture. In that sense, cultural policy (however implicit) has long been the driver of cultural development as the process that creates symbolic meaning that epitomise affiliation to a shared – albeit imagined – community.

These two approaches, that have remained largely detached from one another thus share a concern with how culture – respectively as “a pattern of living” (Apthorpe, 2005 p. 137) or as “symbolic creativity” (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 7) – develops as a key constituent of societies. The shift I explore in this dissertation is precisely how the above foci have ceded importance so as to embrace a new paradigm: cultural industries *for* development. This relatively new paradigm does not ask what development or cultural policies can do for culture, but how culture can serve development. This has two significant implications. First, culture is no longer synonymous with entire patterns of living or with all symbolic creativity that make up a complex societal imagination. The creative economy discourse largely reduces culture to those ‘products’ and ‘services’ that can be traded or measured in terms of their economic significance. Second, development signifies the tangible economic changes that trade in culture can help attain. In spite of ample lip service to the notion of ‘human development,’ creative economy indicators are economic and the policy approaches do not explicitly engage with the ‘capabilities’ that underlie the notion of human development. So the way ‘cultural industries’ and ‘human development’ are linked remains poorly understood, despite of claims about the former’s influence on the latter in the Creative Economy Reports and beyond. Most policies and actions remain focused on cultural industries to advance trade and economic growth. I argue that ‘culture’ and ‘cultural industries’ are two different things, particularly in relation to development. There are many kinds (or ‘cultures’) of cultural industries and even more ways to ‘develop’ them. Yet this diversity is not sufficiently present in the creative economy discourse.

This conclusion reiterates the implications of this tension and provides an overview of the contributions my dissertation makes to the understanding of the role cultural industries can play in human development. First, I challenge the ‘single story’ that underpins the creative economy discourse. Second, I highlight how my research has provided a more solid basis to link cultural industries to human development, through Sen’s and Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Third, I reiterate my contributions to the creative economy discourse. Finally, I show how the critical engagement with both historical and contemporary practice can strengthen the link between the different notions of culture highlighted above, and how this can help strengthen policy debates that take the existing diversity of practices and models seriously.

10.1. Beyond a Single Story

When it comes to artistic and creative expressions, the need for a variety of voices is clear. Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie argues that such a multiplicity is needed to allow for a variety of stories to emerge. If the possibility of people and groups to tell and share their stories is undermined by dominant “single stories” or repressive regimes, a constructive basis for cultural expression and intercultural dialogue is undermined. In her TED talk, Adichie makes the case that:

The single story creates stereotypes, and the problem with stereotypes is not that they are untrue, but that they are incomplete. They make one story become the only story. (Adichie, 2009)

She highlights the risk that stories build on a single stereotype, because they are framed within a grand narrative that is necessarily incomplete. The spread of such stereotypes at a global level has (rightly) continued to fuel fear of cultural imperialism and homogenisation. This single story is now increasingly challenged by multiple stories, and the global attention to the cultural industries helps broadening the narrative even further. This is the element of voice within the cultural industries that is rightly embraced (Barrowclough and Kozul-Wright, 2008b), because the cultural industries can help fight stereotypes. This does not mean that they would eliminate stereotypes, but cultural industries can help in creating a multitude of stories that can help to communicate complexities in identity politics and aspirations about the future, as Nyamnjoh argues:

Africans are not so much against stereotypical representations as such, but that if stereotypes are the game of the cultural industries, they would rather settle for stereotypes informed by their cultures and real life experiences, and not the figment of the imagination of some pontificating cultural other. (Nyamnjoh, 2008 p. 132)

Such stereotypes will inevitably remain problematic, but they can provide a way to reimagine the lives and futures people “have reason to value” (Sen, 1992 p. 5; UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 16). I would like to use two rich examples that aptly illustrate this point.

First, the satirical web-tv series *Samaritans*, about the non-existent NGO *Aid for Aid* challenges the international development aid business from a Kenyan perspective. The make-believe NGO, based in a posh suburban area of Nairobi, does nothing. They only exist to maintain the livelihood of their staff (a cosmopolitan blend of Kenyans and expats) and show hardly any real engagement with poverty reduction, allegedly their *raison d'être*. The series challenges taboo topics about white supremacy (or at least

privilege), class relations, and social order in a painfully accurate way. Yet it does so by building on stereotypes about the Kenyan middle class and international ‘aid workers.’

Second, *An African City*, a web-tv series set in Accra, follows the lives of five female returnees (diaspora resettling to their motherland) in a style akin to the American series *Sex and the City*. While blatantly ignoring the plight of the average Ghanaian, the series follows the lives of five women in Accra. It tackles a range of taboo topics in the lives of highly educated women in Ghana, again by reducing their personae to stereotypes. While neither of these examples provides a complete picture of the countries in which they are set, they do provide an engaged and critical outlook on the challenges of social relations and life aspirations of a particular class. Both series challenge the single story about ‘Africa’ as an ‘underdeveloped’ continent, and increase voice and agency to a range of characters. In this way, the cultural industries can provide a way to challenge the single story about people and countries. This is precisely what Appadurai (2004; 2013) calls the “capacity to aspire.”

My point is that, much like the stories that are told around the world, also policy discourse builds on culturally contingent narratives. When the cultural industries are reduced to a single (or even stereotypical) story concerning the possibilities to create, circulate, and share cultural creations, the existing variety of practices is not taken seriously. My research has shown that while the creative economy discourse risks becoming such a single story, it need not be this way. What is true for cultural expressions is indeed also true for policy debates: Only when the histories, cultural contexts, and dreams enshrined in shared stories are taken seriously, can they serve to inform action and change within that context. This illustrates the theoretical argument made in the previous chapter.

To be sure, the global creative economy discourse recently started taking seriously the “panoply” of practice within the cultural industries around the world (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 53–86). In spite of the increasing recognition in the policy discourse that “the creative economy is not a single superhighway, but a multitude of different local trajectories” (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 p. 15) there is still a risk that this approach becomes a single narrative that is uncritically adopted without sufficient attention to local particularities. This is because the current discourse still fails to translate the diversity of practice into a variety of policies and normative frameworks (see Chapters 4 and 5). This is particularly important since it insufficiently accounts for the subverting, reifying, and reworking tendencies, of subaltern actors (Da Costa, 2010 p. 519). The reason why the multiple examples presented in the 2013 Creative Economy Report do not necessarily translate to a multitude of policy approaches is that they remain superficial illustrations that are not contextualised, let alone conceptualised or

theorised. That is why I argue that policy approaches should be more inward looking. The lived realities, the histories, and the contestations that surround such policies remain largely left out of the debate, and receive less attention than 'best practices' elsewhere. As the closing section of this chapter highlights, there is also ample potential for learning from the creative economy discourse across borders, provided it is based on a grounded understanding of existing practices and equitable mutual exchange between countries, whether they are 'developed' or not. That is why the discourse should be more and better informed by a more sophisticated understanding of 'development.'

10.2. Cultural Industries for Human Development?

The central research question of my dissertation focuses explicitly on the link between the creative economy discourse and human development:

How does the creative economy discourse influence the relation between culture and human development in Burkina Faso and Ghanaian Cultural Policies and Development Plans?

Throughout my dissertation, I have shown that the actual link between culture and the cultural industries is limited at best. Moreover, the notion of human development is superficial in the creative economy discourse. While major reports and policy documents pay lip service to the possible contribution of the cultural industries to human development, any systematic empirical engagement with that claim is lacking. The statistical data available from UNCTAD do not use the UNDP country classification system, which is the only development 'ranking' that uses the notion of human development to gauge the degree of 'development' of countries (see Chapter 3). The engagement with culture is sporadic in the literature on human development, and reference to cultural industries nearly absent. This means that while the creative economy discourse claims an explicit link between the two, there is little systematic evidence to back this up and the conceptual framework to provide more evidence is lacking altogether.

The creative economy discourse thus makes claims about Human Development without a substantive basis. It is in response to the contradiction that my dissertation focuses developing a more structural engagement with capabilities, as they are the best way to conceptualise the real foundations of human development. I have shown that existing initiatives in Burkina Faso and Ghana do in fact aim to advance capabilities in the cultural industries. Yet they do so by focusing more strongly on short-term training programs for those already professionally involved in the industries than on providing a more holistic focus on cultural citizenship. Both countries, nonetheless, see significant

efforts to include arts and culture in primary and secondary education for all pupils (see Section 8.5).

There is a need for a more explicit focus on capabilities as both means and ends of development. Capabilities are different from artistic or business skills, because they focus on the possibilities people have within the social, political, and economic realms of society, rather than merely looking at the individual skills (Sen, 1999; Nussbaum, 2011). While the approach builds on a liberal (and methodologically individualist) philosophy, it can also accommodate the social and institutional capabilities that allow greater 'achieved functionings' in society (Jackson, 2005), which is what Chapters 6 and 7 illustrate. Chapter 8 focuses more explicitly on what this means in the language of human development and capabilities.

The capabilities approach helps avoiding two common pitfalls in attempts to develop cultural industries. First, it does not focus on the inadequate infrastructure, inefficient institutions, and lack of investment, but on a democratizing way to allow greater participation of the population at large in the negotiation of these needs. Second, it does not solely target 'directly useful' skills such as marketing, entrepreneurship, and technical expertise, by exploring the underlying social, economic, and political tendencies that obstruct access to such skills by the majority of people. The capabilities approach provides a way to constructively with them without overlooking the structural inequalities that prevent that the chosen strategies do not work for those who need it most. Capabilities, moreover, focus on the need to engage in deliberative action, that does not provide solutions for people, but engages people in the process of defining what lives or, *mutatis mutandis*, cultural industries they "have reason to value" (Sen, 1992 p. 5).

Capabilities are, thus, both the ends and the means of human development. This is insufficiently reflected in existing creative economy approaches. The key to linking cultural industries to human development agenda is through focusing actively and explicitly on capabilities. Currently existing training programs for people in the sector are a necessity, but do not engage enough with the much broader need for capabilities advancement within and beyond the cultural industries. Yet, even when focusing on the advancement of capabilities, the creative economy discourse should not only become global in its examples but also include a greater variety of ideas, concepts, and models to make sense of its link to development.

10.3. Sankofa and Ofamfa

The global creative economy consists of a patchwork of different cultural industries that relate both to each other and to an abstract ideal. In order to develop such cultural industries, there should be more focus on what that concept means, and more important-

ly, what it should mean, without being blinded by the nebulous orthodoxy of the concept. This includes challenging the uncritical adoption of an amalgam of definitions in Burkina Faso and Ghana. But in order to critically look backwards that allows looking forward, a close engagement with history is needed.

Yet the creative economy discourse generally lacks an engagement with history. There is some attention to the conceptual history of the Adornian term onwards, but there is little focus on the local histories of cultural creation and consumption. The 2013 Creative Economy Report mentions a few histories in passing, but overall the discourse remains framed as a future-oriented solution to a problem of today. The local uptake of the creative economy discourse should, however, locate the applicable aspects of this global script in relation to earlier efforts. Yet the modernizing ethic of the cultural industries logic is semantically detached from 'traditions' in cultural production. The respective socio-cultural bases of festivals, musical practice, and storytelling hardly feature in present-day considerations about cultural production. Where stakeholders in the Ghanaian or Burkinabè music sectors refer to history, a broad range of events are reduced to a single image of a certain president or political era causing hardship (see section 7.4).

The 'best practices' in the Creative Economy Reports and elsewhere are not only presented without their history, they are also invariably positive. Some of the examples, however, did in fact fail (De Beukelaer, 2014b p. 95). This shows two things. There is more need for deeper engagement with the background of examples, and the failure of initiatives needs to get more attention. But most initiatives are no failures, but no successes either. They continue to exist in perpetual struggle, despite the odds. Building an understanding of smaller and bigger, failing and succeeding intentions can provide lessons for future action. Cultural infrastructure is an example that illustrates this point.

Nearly all stakeholders in the music industries in Burkina Faso and Ghana mention that infrastructure is one of their major challenges. The venues in the capital cities are too small, too big, too expensive, or too run-down. In short, they exist, but they do not respond to changing needs. The proposed solution of many stakeholders is that the government should invest in more and better infrastructure. While this may partially help overcoming the problem (the rapidly growing cities can indeed use additional capacity), such a solution does not account for the social and institutional capacities and capabilities to better design and exploit existing spaces. The point here is that stakeholders in Burkina Faso and Ghana focus more on the perceived lack in the present and the expected change in the future than on events in the past that has led to the current challenges.

Looking at history to learn, as captured in the link between the Adinkra symbols *Sankofa* and *Ofamfa* (see Chapter 4), is enriching in itself. This approach not only allows a critical understanding of the past, but also a vision for the future that is rooted in existing cultural context. This is precisely what 'culture and development' proposes: generating changes in dialogue with the cultural past that created the present. My argument here is pragmatic. Many people have tried, and keep trying, to make a living from music – or culture in general – in the recent and more distant past. Tracing back these attempts and finding out why they worked and did not work will provide greater insight in present-day options than trying to transfer policies and best practices from around the world. Failure is not a bad thing. It only becomes an issue when it does not provide a basis for critique and improvement. The suggestion to help resolve historically and culturally contingent challenges is to focus more on the things that went wrong than on the perceived success elsewhere.

10.4. Towards a Plurality of Creative Economy Discourses

There is no single approach that can work to 'develop' cultural industries. There is, rather, a variety of insights that can help rethinking creation, support, and policy in a manner that reconciles the histories, contexts, needs, and aims of a certain locale. I propose four areas where learning across contexts (as opposed to decontextualized policy transfer) can help to advance efforts to develop cultural industries in a reflexive and critical manner. This is what I call 'mutual learning': it challenges the idea that knowledge exchange is a one-way street – as now often seems to be the case.

First, the categorical divide between 'developed' and 'developing' countries is not useful. If the creative economy is indeed global, its surrounding discourse would help to find commonalities as a basis for comparison and exchange, rather than maintaining a divide according to politically expedient and empirically out-dated divide between 'developed' and 'developing.' Why would the difference between 'developed' countries that are in 'crisis,' and 'developing' countries that are 'emerging,' or 'Africa' that is 'rising' matter anyway? Or, as a Burkinabè playwright and academic puts it: "A few decades ago African countries were 'underdeveloped', then they were 'developing' and then 'poor'. Today, they are not poor; they are in debt. The reality is the same, we are just playing with the wording" (Guingané, 2010 p. 12). This does not mean that the plight of the poorest and most marginalized should be overlooked. It stresses the need to engage in greater mutual learning to tackle issues like youth unemployment, social exclusion, ethnic and religious stratification beyond the 'developed-developing' divide. The poor in London and Accra do not look very different, and neither do the rich. At the same time, the way differences are framed between the capital and the (Northern) hin-

terland are by and large the same. As an alternative to dividing countries in wealthy and poor, it is more fruitful to look at social stratification within societies.

Second, the aims and methods of cultural and development policies increasingly aim for the same results: economic growth, employment, and (international) trade diversification. Cultural policies now focus on generating development for society and development policies now build on the creative economy discourse (which is not the same as culture). This provides a basis to reconsider the aims and focus of both. The link I have drawn between capabilities and cultural industries is one such way. Again, such comparisons and explorations are not limited by geographical boundaries. Yet there are obvious limitations concerning the possibility to transfer good ideas from one place to another.

Third, diverse academic disciplinary engagements with culture and development provide potential for mutual learning. Particularly the connection between ethnographic and historical work on the one hand, and policy-oriented disciplines on the other hand would benefit from greater interaction. This does not mean that cultural policy studies should be more like ethnomusicology in order to say something about music industries, or vice versa. It simply means that there is much to learn from looking well over the boundaries of (inter-)disciplinary foci. The way in which I have used both ethnographic observation and policy analysis in order to understand policies and their implementation is just one way in which such links can be made.

Fourth, to reiterate, the greatest resource towards developing cultural industries is history. While the creative economy discourse is rather new, its practices are decidedly not. Understanding why certain projects, initiatives, and policies did (not) succeed provides greater potential than looking across the border to another country where things supposedly work better. In Ghana, many interviewees made the comment that the cultural industries work better in Francophone Africa, while looking up to their distant neighbour Nigeria. In Burkina Faso, the perception lives among music industries stakeholders that the Anglophone African countries are better off, while they also envy the success of Côte d'Ivoire. From a distance, the situation always looks better than from within. Yet critical engagement with existing practices within Burkina Faso and Ghana is more likely to inform effective policies than simply copying a buzzword.

The central implication of the points above is that there is a need to connect discourses on 'culture and development' and 'cultural industries for development.' Culture should be a basis to understand what exists, and what is possible within that context, bearing in mind that culture is always a realm of struggle, debate, and reconsideration: "Culture and development is not simply a matter of including culture but also of interrogating culture as a terrain of power, culture as ideology" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 77).

Hence the focus on piracy (in Chapter 6): what should be the relation between musicians and their audiences? And in what ways can existing practices, including piracy, serve to devise policies that aim for inclusive employment in the cultural industries, especially for those in the margins of society? The focus should be on working with what exists, in order to understand what should be and can be. So far, the creative economy discourse looks much like conventional development thinking, where there is more attention for technical issues than fundamental questions (Clammer, 2012 p. 47). This is the point where the ideological implications of working with the creative economy discourse re-enter the picture. Is it really the role of culture to 'develop' the country? Or should 'development' mean that a country can have a flourishing cultural life? In any case, the tension between amateur and professional engagement in culture matters at both levels: how can culture be (or become) a source of revenue for some and a way of expression and sharing experiences and ideas for all? Or, more fundamentally: is culture the end or the means of development?

In the history of 'development' thinking, asking such fundamental questions often resulted in very pessimistic or overtly optimistic accounts as I illustrate in Chapter 7 on the social 'infrastructure' of policy. My point here is that understanding the challenges regarding physical and financial infrastructure (venues, studios, investment, etc.) is not simply a technical matter. These infrastructures depend heavily on the social and cultural infrastructure in which their existence is lacking or incomplete. Much rather than simply trying to create these infrastructures that simply do not exist, there is a need to better understand what does exist and why that is not working sufficiently well.

The aim of Burkina Faso and Ghana is to 'develop' their cultural industries. My dissertation provides insight into what policies, initiatives, and practices exist to do this. It shows what principles are at the basis of this discourse, rather than challenging the notion of the cultural industries on grounds of principle. In order to develop cultural industries, so they can help in the sharing of stories and imagination, while helping people earn a living, many things can be done. I argue that interventions have to build on a thorough understanding of what exists, as a basis for innovative solutions to prevailing problems. The cultural industries have long existed, albeit not by this name. So there is no need to 'develop' cultural industries in the way that development discourse has long dictated the need to 'Westernize.' In contrast, many minor changes within existing practices can inscribe the efforts to develop cultural industries in the palimpsest of cultural history that we call life.

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A Interviewees

Table A-1 - Interviewees Accra

<i>Role</i>	<i>Interviewee Reference</i>
Producer and Manager	Accra #1
Cultural Activist	Accra #2
Musician	Accra #3
Musician and Civil Society	Accra #4
Musician and Civil Society	Accra #5
Musician and Civil Society	Accra #6
Academic	Accra #7
Musician	Accra #8
DJ and Producer	Accra #9
Entrepreneur	Accra #10
Producer and Manager	Accra #11
Producer and Communication	Accra #12
Musician	Accra #13
International Organisation	Accra #14
Journalist	Accra #15
Entrepreneur	Accra #16
Entrepreneur	Accra #17
Producer and Manager	Accra #18
Entrepreneur	Accra #19
Manager	Accra #20
Musician	Accra #21

Table A-2 - Interviewees Ouagadougou

<i>Role</i>	<i>Interviewee Reference</i>
Musician, Ouagadougou	Ouagadougou #1
Producer and Manager	Ouagadougou #2
Producer and Manager	Ouagadougou #3
Civil Servant	Ouagadougou #4
Manager	Ouagadougou #5
Entrepreneur	Ouagadougou #6
Musician	Ouagadougou #7
Manager	Ouagadougou #8
Manager	Ouagadougou #9
Manager	Ouagadougou #10
Civil Servant	Ouagadougou #11
Entrepreneur	Ouagadougou #12
Entrepreneur	Ouagadougou #13
Civil Servant	Ouagadougou #14
Civil Servant	Ouagadougou #15
Musician	Ouagadougou #16
International Organisation	Ouagadougou #17
Entrepreneur	Ouagadougou #18
Cultural Activist	Ouagadougou #19
Civil Society	Ouagadougou #20
Producer and Manager	Ouagadougou #21
Civil Servant	Ouagadougou #22

Table A-3 - Interviewees International

<i>Role</i>	<i>Interviewee Reference</i>
NGO worker	NGO, France #1

B Creative Goods Trade Data Burkina Faso and Ghana (2003-2012)

Table B-1 - Burkina Faso Creative Goods Exports 2003-2012 in US\$ millions

YEAR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PRODUCT										
All Creative Goods	..	2.136	2.711	2.784	2.308	1.782	..
Art Crafts	..	0.030	0.154	0.002	0.020	0.112	..
Carpets
Celebration	..	0.005	0.002	..	0.004	..
Other	..	0.014	0.025	0.000	..
Paperware
Wickerware	..	0.007	0.038	0.001	0.011	..
Yarn	..	0.004	0.091	0.020	0.097	..
Audio Visuals	..	0.015	0.005	0.003	..
Film	..	0.014	0.001
CD, DVD, Tapes	..	0.001	0.003	0.003	..
Design	..	1.013	1.525	2.165	1.924	1.214	..
Architecture
Fashion	..	0.004	0.002	0.013	0.011
Glassware
Interior	..	0.995	1.508	2.150	1.913	1.205	..
Jewellery	..	0.002	0.013
Toys	..	0.012	0.003	0.002	..	0.009	..
New Media	..	0.005	0.043	0.002	..
Recorded Media	..	0.005	0.043
Video Games	0.002	..
Performing Arts	..	0.036	0.021	0.009	0.001	0.004	..
Musical Instruments	..	0.036	0.021	0.009	0.001	0.004	..
Printed Music
Publishing	..	0.103	0.067	0.042	0.024	0.026	..
Books	..	0.102	0.055	0.038	0.013	0.008	..
Newspaper	0.001	..
Other Printed	..	0.001	0.012	0.004	0.010	0.017	..
Visual Arts	..	0.935	0.896	0.566	0.339	0.421	..
Antiques	..	0.042	0.060	0.035	0.044	0.029	..
Paintings	..	0.036	0.053	0.020	0.031	0.003	..
Photography
Sculpture	..	0.857	0.782	0.512	0.264	0.389	..

Source: UNCTADstat

Table B-2 - Burkina Faso Creative Goods Imports 2003-2012 in US\$ millions

YEAR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PRODUCT										
All Creative Goods	..	20.951	18.207	30.989	46.097	36.316	..
Art Crafts	..	2.051	2.333	9.144	20.683	10.481	..
Carpets	..	0.157	0.181	0.187	0.258	0.175	..
Celebration	..	0.118	0.239	0.181	0.190	0.105	..
Other	..	0.019	0.048	0.020	0.018	0.065	..
Paperware	..	0.557	0.431	0.016	0.010	0.016	..
Wickerware	..	0.982	1.211	2.730	2.954	3.125	..
Yarn	..	0.219	0.223	6.011	17.253	6.994	..
Audio Visuals	..	0.103	0.172	0.000	1.117	2.495	..
Film	..	0.015	0.002	0.000	..	0.003	..
CD, DVD, Tapes	..	0.088	0.170	1.117	2.492	..
Design	..	5.862	8.884	8.726	9.650	8.976	..
Architecture	..	0.016	0.026	0.010
Fashion	..	0.479	1.133	2.221	2.579	3.131	..
Glassware	..	0.058	0.090	0.006	0.026	0.083	..
Interior	..	4.842	7.357	6.379	6.570	5.391	..
Jewellery	..	0.073	0.027	0.042	0.081	0.100	..
Toys	..	0.394	0.250	0.077	0.384	0.272	..
New Media	..	5.568	2.477	0.106	3.106	6.964	..
Recorded Media	..	5.435	2.383	2.920	6.618	..
Video Games	..	0.133	0.094	0.106	0.186	0.346	..
Performing Arts	..	0.054	0.049	0.027	0.019	0.032	..
Musical Instruments	..	0.054	0.049	0.027	0.019	0.032	..
Printed Music
Publishing	..	6.983	4.163	12.804	11.346	7.255	..
Books	..	4.727	1.764	10.300	8.493	4.213	..
Newspaper	..	1.114	1.086	1.920	1.866	2.458	..
Other Printed	..	1.142	1.313	0.584	0.987	0.584	..
Visual Arts	..	0.330	0.129	0.182	0.176	0.112	..
Antiques	0.000	0.000	0.002
Paintings	..	0.255	0.009	0.047	0.023	0.012	..
Photography	..	0.028	0.036	0.064	0.029	0.050	..
Sculpture	..	0.047	0.084	0.071	0.121	0.050	..

Source: UNCTADstat

Table B-3 - Ghana Creative Goods Exports 2003-2012 in US\$ millions

YEAR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PRODUCT										
All Creative Goods	27.318	86.577	8.053	152.306	4.684
Art Crafts	0.501	0.181	0.438	116.168	0.897
Carpets	0.000	0.010	0.051	113.501	0.163
Celebration	0.002	0.007	0.727	0.015
Other	0.360	0.138	0.121	0.413	0.023
Paperware	0.002
Wickerware	0.061	0.030	0.256	1.524	0.566
Yarn	0.078	0.002	0.001	0.002	0.132
Audio Visuals	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.000
Film
CD, DVD, Tapes	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.000
Design	1.808	7.099	6.879	3.563	2.708
Architecture	0.001
Fashion	0.017	0.002	5.823	0.256	1.156
Glassware	0.001	0.002	0.022	0.052
Interior	0.925	7.081	1.030	3.208	1.461
Jewellery	0.762	0.014	0.003	0.001	0.003
Toys	0.104	0.001	0.022	0.076	0.035
New Media	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.099	0.089
Recorded Media	0.000	0.098	0.088
Video Games	0.003	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.001
Performing Arts	0.334	0.290	0.135	0.145	0.340
Musical Instruments	0.334	0.290	0.135	0.144	0.340
Printed Music	0.000	..
Publishing	0.131	0.073	0.380	31.061	0.568
Books	0.125	0.043	0.349	30.830	0.375
Newspaper	0.000	0.008	0.016	0.168	0.003
Other Printed	0.006	0.021	0.015	0.064	0.190
Visual Arts	24.540	78.926	0.214	1.268	0.082
Antiques	0.000	0.008	..	0.000
Paintings	0.015	0.012	0.032	0.099	0.023
Photography	0.000	0.000	0.004	0.001	0.011
Sculpture	24.525	78.914	0.170	1.168	0.048

Source: UNCTADstat

Table B-4 - Ghana Creative Goods Imports 2003-2012 in US\$ millions

YEAR	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
PRODUCT										
All Creative Goods	80.814	75.008	121.945	155.181	161.165
Art Crafts	4.467	7.177	6.898	10.217	10.370
Carpets	0.771	1.050	1.542	2.295	2.083
Celebration	0.188	0.159	0.249	0.417	0.408
Other	2.288	3.681	4.038	5.111	5.769
Paperware	0.180	0.037	0.020	0.011	0.005
Wickerware	0.085	0.128	0.362	1.043	0.898
Yarn	0.955	2.122	0.687	1.339	1.207
Audio Visuals	0.611	0.929	5.159	6.131	5.205
Film	0.009	0.003	0.006	0.002	0.004
CD, DVD, Tapes	0.602	0.926	5.153	6.129	5.201
Design	28.843	33.805	42.373	60.161	72.139
Architecture	0.072	0.010	0.004	0.003	0.189
Fashion	15.648	16.318	18.267	25.192	26.660
Glassware	0.127	0.069	0.087	0.174	0.107
Interior	10.542	15.264	20.571	29.045	38.170
Jewellery	0.435	0.523	0.596	0.902	1.027
Toys	2.019	1.621	2.848	4.844	5.987
New Media	0.538	1.537	28.372	27.526	18.645
Recorded Media	0.306	0.839	26.937	26.792	18.356
Video Games	0.232	0.698	1.436	0.734	0.289
Performing Arts	1.300	1.899	2.960	4.641	5.101
Musical Instruments	1.290	1.877	2.820	4.586	5.059
Printed Music	0.010	0.022	0.139	0.056	0.042
Publishing	44.651	29.196	35.786	41.871	49.000
Books	34.480	16.834	24.770	28.148	36.313
Newspaper	9.113	11.209	9.178	10.942	10.149
Other Printed	1.058	1.153	1.838	2.781	2.537
Visual Arts	0.403	0.464	0.397	4.633	0.705
Antiques	0.009	0.006	0.001	0.004	0.002
Paintings	0.075	0.034	0.052	0.141	0.084
Photography	0.065	0.063	0.209	0.326	0.438
Sculpture	0.255	0.361	0.135	4.163	0.182

Source: UNCTADstat

C Development & Cultural Policy

This appendix provides background regarding debates in development studies and cultural policy studies. It is meant to be read alongside the dissertation as it provides some greater discussion on two major topics: development and cultural policy. The first section focuses on development. It addresses different paradigms in development thinking, explores different taxonomies of development, points out how cultural industries fit into development debates, and discuss how the capabilities approach may lead to a practical engagement with capacity building. The second section focuses on cultural policy. It distinguishes different models of policymaking and objectives, and discusses the legacies of French and British cultural policy in detail. It furthermore explores the shifting place of popular culture in cultural policy in both France and the UK and addresses the implications of the shift from cultural policy to policy for the cultural industries.

Development

Thinking about economic development has always been a contentious matter. This is in large part because the aims and the means of development are strongly intertwined. What development should attain and how this can be attained are strongly connected, but much of the debate focuses on either one of these aspects and takes the other as a given. Yet, a practical engagement with the process of development, and how to intervene in it, must take into account its goals. The underlying issue is that the mainstreaming of the term 'development' rests on the political division of countries into two camps: 'developed' and 'developing', thereby largely following the divide between colonizer and colonized.

In this section, I discuss the different uses of 'development' since the popularization of the term by US president Harry S. Truman (1949). Prior to that, I survey the primary schools of thought regarding 'development' since WWII (for a conceptual history that goes further back, see Chapter 2). These schools are: teleological theories of progress that lead towards *modernization*, Marxian *dependency* theories, structural adjustment and *neo-liberalism*, and *post-development*. Finally, I discuss the current paradigm of development thinking: *human development*, and the limited extent to which the ideas behind this approach are in fact taken seriously. Throughout the following sections, I explain how they relate to 'culture' by pointing out how culture can best be defined in

each of these contexts. As a result, the term culture has no *a priori* definition here; see Chapter 2 for a more elaborate discussion of the term.

Modernization Theory

Modernization theory is the teleological idea that there is a universal theory of progress to which the degree of 'development' of countries can be measured. The seminal work advancing this theory is *The Stages of Economic Growth* by Walt Whitman Rostow (1960 – below I cite the third edition of the book, published in 1990). The subtitle of this book (*A Non-Communist Manifesto*) explicitly positions the work in the realm of orthodox capitalist economic thought. Rostow proposes five stages of economic growth, through which countries should evolve to attain the “age of high mass consumption” (Rostow, 1990 p. 10). Incidentally, industrialized ‘developed’ countries such as the USA, the UK, and France find themselves at that point when modernization becomes the mantra of developmental politics in the early 1950s. As Rostow’s book was first published in 1960, it summarized, rather than influenced modernization thinking of the 1940s and 1950s. The five stages Rostow discusses are the following.

The first stage of growth is “the traditional society” (Rostow, 1990 p. 4), which comprises “the dynasties in China; the civilization of the Middle East and the Mediterranean; the world of medieval Europe; ... and societies ... unmoved or untouched by man’s new capacity for regularly manipulating his environment to his economic advantage” (1990 p. 5). The defining point in time where societies started to move beyond their ‘traditional’ base is Newton: who “is used here as a symbol for that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation” (1990 p. 4). A traditional society is thus one that does not have the rational nor practical capacity to understand the principles according to which the physical world can be manipulated.

The second stage of growth comprises “the preconditions for take-off” (Rostow, 1990 p. 6), which “were initially developed ... in Western Europe on the late 17th and early 18th centuries as the insights of modern science [hence ‘modernization’] began to be translated into new production functions in both agriculture and industry, in a setting given dynamism by the lateral expansion of world markets and the international competition for them” (1990 p. 6). It is remarkable that Rostow recognizes that most countries “saw the stage of preconditions arise not endogenously but from some external intrusion by more advanced societies” (Rostow, 1990 p. 6) without mentioning the violent histories of such intrusions, marked by colonial domination and exploitation of resources and people. The unequal power relations underlying these shifts form the key element in which ‘dependency theory’ discussed below is rooted.

The third stage of growth is “the take-off”, the “interval when the old blocks and resistances to steady growth are finally overcome” (Rostow, 1990 p. 7). This essentially means that the pre-existing social and cultural fabric is broken, in order to make place for a more universal capitalist modernity. Below, I discuss that this stage is the salient point at which culture matters most in modernization theory. It is the “old block [of] resistance” that needs to be overcome in order to allow teleological evolution towards a pre-defined notion of progress. While this stage was rooted in the UK, where the model originates (Rostow, 1990 p. xviii), its implicit universality was assumed when theorizing the steps all countries should take towards economic growth and progress.

The fourth stage of economic growth is the “drive to maturity”, which is a “long interval of sustained if fluctuating progress” (Rostow, 1990 p. 9). He goes on to “define maturity as the stage in which an economy demonstrates the capacity to move beyond the original industries which powered its take-off and to absorb and to apply efficiently over a very wide range of its resources ... the most advanced fruits of (then) modern technology” (1990 p. 10). He further argues that it generally takes some 60 years from the beginning of take-off to maturity. And while Rostow mentions that some countries lack the raw materials to pursue the kind of industry they chose to develop, he does not mention any implications for those countries that supply the said raw materials – again an issue that dependency theory challenges as an impediment to the ‘development’ of ‘underdeveloped’ countries in the ‘periphery’ (see section Dependency theory).

The fifth stage of growth is “the age of mass consumption” where “real income per head rose to a point where a large number of persons gained command over consumption which transcended basic food, shelter, and clothing” (Rostow, 1990 p. 10). It is, Rostow argues, at this point that “Western societies have chosen to allocate increased resources to social welfare and security” (1990 p. 11). Interestingly, while Britain entered the drive to maturity around 1830 and the USA in 1870 (1990 p. xviii), the latter marks the entry of the latest stage with the invention of Henry Ford’s automated assembly line in 1913-14 (1990 p. 11). The later entry of Britain in this stage is, at least in part, due to WWI that significantly strained the economy between 1914 and 1918.

As a sort of post-script, Rostow makes reference to an (as of 1960) unknown stage “beyond consumption”, which he likens to the three generations of Thomas Mann’s Buddenbrooks family: “the first sought money; the second, born to money, sought social and civic position; the third, born to comfort and family prestige, looked to the life of music” (1990 p. 11). While this stage, and particularly the reference to music, may be a mere footnote in modernization theory, it is a significant remark that could call into question the contemporary assumption that culture will be the driver of development, rather than the fruit of a completed line of progress. After all, if a life of arts and culture

characterizes an era 'beyond' consumption, does this not directly contradict the current drive to commoditize cultural expressions *in* (and not after) an era of mass consumption?

Modernization theory thus projected a historical evolution of countries' economies (within a framework of methodological nationalism) that captures the hopes and assumptions of early (post-colonial) development thinking that all countries might find themselves on the same path of progress. In short, modernization theory argues that poor countries are poor because they are not rich yet. With the right policies, technology, and institutions, it is however just a matter of time before they can join those who are enjoying the fruits of wealth through 'mass consumption.'

In modernization theory, culture figures in an implicit manner and is seen as a 'way of life' (see Chapter 2). On the one hand, the 'culture' or "old block [of] resistance" (see above) against modernization needs to be overcome in order to advance progress. This means that the culture of those who are not 'developed' yet is seen as an obstacle to development. In this case, the place of culture is recognized, albeit solely as an impediment to modernization. On the other hand, the 'culture' of modernization is not recognized as such. Modernization theory is presented as a universal theory of progress, even though it is reminiscent of a particular time and place (particularly the UK and the USA), and it evolved in that context before it was forced upon other areas and regions (primarily through colonial expansion and later 'developmentalist' intervention). The cultural context of modernization is ignored and deemed insignificant by the universalism of modernization theory.

Dependency theory

Contemporaries of Rostow, particularly Marxian economists from Latin America challenged the teleological modernization theory that did not incorporate major historical events. Modernization theory, as argued above, barely acknowledges the colonial exploitation and imperialist expansion of certain countries to the detriment of the sovereignty and economic self-determination of others. Yet, theorists (such as Prebisch or Baran – see below) argued that some countries are rich not because they are more advanced, but precisely because others are poor. The riches of the rich thus depend on the poverty of the poor, hence the term 'dependency' theory.

In 1949, Raúl Prebisch, an economist from Argentina, published the so-called *ECLAC/CEPAL Manifesto* that formed the basis for a Latin American political economy. The document, titled *The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems* (Prebisch, 1949), outlined the basic principles of dependency theory. This included a contrast between two kinds of countries: those in the centre and those in the periphery. The framing of development as a problem of dependency formed the basis

of the work on political economy by the *Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe* (CEPAL), the Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) in English. They have created a significant contribution to the Marxian understanding of (unequal) relations between countries (see the cited volume that captures their key texts: CEPAL, 1998).

In spite of the significant work of Latin American scholars associated with CEPAL, it was American Marxist economist Paul A. Baran (1957) who first popularized dependency theory (Ghosh, 2001). B. N. Ghosh (2001 p. 5) summarizes six ways in which, according to dependency theory, countries in the periphery become (and remain) dependent on the centre:

- LDCs are dependent on DCs for technology
- LDCs are dependent on DCs for economic and financial aid
- Balance of payment problems require help from DCs
- LDCs cannot follow an independent policy of capital accumulation
- LDCs are dependent on DCs for selling raw materials and their primary products
- Without the help of DCs, it is almost impossible for LDCs to develop economically

In sum, according to dependency theory poor countries are poor because they have unequal relations of exchange with rich countries. The latter disproportionately benefit from these agreements, which allow them to be rich. In response, countries in the periphery took out major loans to fund import substitution. The idea was that investing in industries that allowed the production of goods that would need to be imported would create both a stronger economy and less dependency on the countries of the center. Due to the lack of a comparative advantage, these countries needed to raise trade barriers to prevent (better and cheaper) products from entering the country. Import substitution is a form of modernization thinking, as it presupposes the need to industrialize. Yet it builds on the political economy of dependency theory in the sense that it aims to rectify structural inequalities in the global economy.

The role of culture in dependency theory is both strategic and instrumental. It serves to strategically create a 'third world nationalism' in the struggle against the economic imperialism of the center (Nederveen Pieterse, 1995b p. 178). At the same time, culture is instrumental in articulating contestation against the political economy of economic imperialism. In Chile, for example, Donald Duck comics were seen as a tool of imperialism indoctrination (Dorfman, 1975). Dependency theory is – on the surface – a political and economic critique of Western imperialism. Yet, underneath, it builds on cultural claims to unite the periphery in their struggle.

Structural Adjustment and Neo-liberalism

The attempts to 'develop' countries through 'modernization' proved more difficult than expected after several decades. Similarly, the radical economic policies of socialist regimes that tried to reverse the effects of dependency caused significant balance of trade shortages, i.e. greater imports than exports, creating a shortage of foreign currency. This called for the reconsideration of the paradigm for 'development' thinking and action. From the late 1970s and early 1980s onwards development thinking evolved in tandem with the global emergence of neoliberal politics. David Harvey (2005) connects the politics of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher to the rise of neoliberalism, and defines neoliberalism as:

A theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade ... Furthermore, if markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, education, health care, social security, or environmental pollution) then they must be created, by state action if necessary. (Harvey, 2005 p. 2)

The USA and the UK had leaders in place to implement the privatization of public services to create markets. These actions built on the thinking of free-market ideologues like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman. The mantra of these privatizations was, as Margaret Thatcher famously claimed, that 'there is no alternative.' This created international pressure for countries to liberalize public services in the form of an informal, though influential, Washington Consensus. The balance of trade shortages in many 'developing' countries in this era created leverage for international organizations such as the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (also known as the Bretton Woods institutions, after the place where they were founded after WWII). These organizations embodied and executed the economic policies of the Washington Consensus (Williamson, 2009). Their approach was to offer refinancing of debt and (partial) debt relief in exchange for structural reform. This means that neoliberalism in development circles is most commonly known as 'Structural Adjustment Programs' or SAPs. These reforms were predicated on the belief that "poor countries are poor mainly because of mismanagement" (Nederveen Pieterse, 2010 p. 43), and that neoliberal macro-economic policies would bring the growth and stability to 'developing' countries.

Culture in the context of neoliberal structural reforms resembles its role under modernization: as an obstacle to the advance of markets. Though there is one major difference. While modernization theory argued that 'underdeveloped' countries were merely behind on the teleological path to modernity, neoliberalism does not distinguish between these countries. Developing countries are not special cases or even backward,

they just lack the right kind of policies to make markets work. So, while culture implicitly served as an obstacle under modernization theory, it becomes insignificant under neoliberalism (see Table 2-1 in Chapter 2). However, the pressure to create markets and limit government spending on public services extended the realm under which cultural expressions should fend for themselves in the market (see section on Cultural Policy below).

Human Development

Development thinking has under modernization, dependency, and neoliberal approaches has been concerned primarily with the finality of the process, i.e. what being developed should look like and what should be done to get there. The major differences between these approaches remained restricted to the ways development could be attained. Human development takes a different approach, and focuses on what *capabilities* people need to achieve development. That includes the capabilities to enjoy the fruits of development and the ability to co-create a dignified socio-political context in which they can do so. This approach clearly distinguishes between substantive freedoms (or capabilities) and outcomes (or 'achieved functionings'): "The distinction between achieved functionings and capabilities is between the realized and the effectively possible; in other words, between achievements on the one hand, and freedoms or valuable options from which one can choose on the other" (Robeyns, 2005 p. 95).

What I aim to explain here is how this philosophy of justice came into being, what its different stances are, and how culture relates to this approach. The section on *Capabilities and Capacity Building* below engaged more closely with the ways in which this framework can be operationalized in the context of cultural and creative industries.

The basis of human development thinking builds on Amartya Sen's analysis of a particular historical event: the 1943 famine in East Bengal, currently Bangladesh. Sen showed in his book *Poverty and Famines: an Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation* (1981) that during the famine that killed 1.5 million people, the country kept on exporting food. He showed that while the finality of development (the production of sufficient food) was met, many people lacked the entitlement to this basic necessity to feed themselves. He concluded that development, seen from the perspective of a human being in a country, has more to do with their individual entitlement of produced commodities than to the overall average output of the country. This required a new way of thinking about what development is, how it is measured, and how governments can be nudged to help people live and thrive. It proposes a broader set of indicators in order to encourage politicians to invest in improving those metrics too. This is needed, Martha Nussbaum argues, because "health and education ... typically do not improve with economic growth" (Nussbaum, 2011 p. ix). Yet, as economic development counts for

1/3rd of the Human Development Index (see next paragraphs), making progress in terms of human development require rapid economic growth (Gasper, 2002 p. 443).

The combined focus on a justice and policy intervention created two different sides to thinking about human development. The first is the pragmatic institutionalized version, embodied by the United Nations Development Programme through their Human Development Index. The second is an abstract philosophy of justice that focuses on individual's capabilities (Nussbaum, 2011; Sen, 1999).

The UNDP Human Development Index is a statistical overview of the degree of 'development' of countries by means of a composite index. Mahbub ul Haq developed this index as a way of incorporating human development thinking into a clear statistical ranking of countries. The idea behind this was to include education (through school enrolment and adult literacy) and health (through life expectancy) as proxies of development alongside gross domestic product. By including these measures in the global ranking of development, countries would have an incentive to invest in education and public health, and not only in economic growth. The point was to come up with a measure that went beyond mere economic growth in GDP as an indicator of development (Sen, 2004a p. 79). Education and health are however mere proxies of the capabilities that underlie human development, that remain economic and insufficiently 'human' (Gasper, 2002 p. 445).

The 'capability approach' claims that "the ends of well-being, justice and development should be conceptualized in terms of people's capabilities to function; that is, their effective opportunities to undertake the actions and activities they want to engage in, and be whom they want to be" (Robeyns, 2005 p. 95). What I focus on are the defining characteristics of these approaches in the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, the two principal theorists of capabilities. Afterwards, I engage with the role culture plays in the human development and capabilities approach in general.

Amartya Sen argues that "development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or overactivity of oppressive states" (Sen, 1999 p. 3). He further stresses that "what people can positively achieve is influenced by economic opportunities, political liberties, social powers, and the enabling conditions of good health, basic education, and the encouragement and cultivation of initiatives (1999 p. 5). He articulates these conditions as freedoms, because in the liberal political philosophy from which his work emanates: "What is ultimately important is that people have the freedoms or valuable opportunities (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they want to do and to be the person they want to be" (Robeyns, 2005 p. 95). While Sen refrains from articulating

what the capabilities are that he values in his political philosophy (Sen, 2004a), he does articulate five kinds of freedom, which he argues help “to advance the general capability of a person” (Sen, 1999 p. 10):

1. Political freedoms
2. Economic facilities
3. Social opportunities
4. Transparency guarantees, and
5. Protective security

The underlying idea behind focusing on these freedoms is to challenge the dominant position of economic growth in utilitarian development thinking. Economic indicators are merely a proxy for development, as they express what people *could* afford on average, not the extent to which they are able or interested in obtaining these commodities. So, the question is not whether people are (on average) achieving a certain level of development, but whether they have the capability to do so if they wish.

Contrary to Sen, Martha Nussbaum does provide an explicit, albeit tentative, list of capabilities, as his approach could otherwise encompass any and all capabilities (Robeyns, 2005 p. 106). Nussbaum’s list contains ten “central capabilities” (Nussbaum, 2011 pp. 33–34):

1. Life
2. Bodily health
3. Bodily integrity
4. Senses, imagination, and thought
5. Emotions
6. Practical reason
7. Affiliation
8. Other species
9. Play
10. Control over one’s environment

She argues that these capabilities are the very minimum of what it takes to live “a life worthy of human dignity” (Nussbaum, 2011 p. 32). Yet she stresses that while these ten capabilities are a minimum requirement for social justice, it may take more to attain justice, as these capabilities do not specify how to deal with injustice *above* this threshold (2011 p. 40).

Both Sen and Nussbaum make the case that their approach is a universal one, even though it is open to multiple interpretations and uses (Nussbaum, 2011 pp. 110–111). Nussbaum does provide a list of capabilities she thinks are crucial, but allows for ‘further specification’ (2011 p. 101). Moreover, she likens the capabilities approach to human rights, as they both seek “an agreement for practical political purposes and deliberately avoid comment on the deep divisive issues about God, the soul, the limits of human knowledge, and so on that divide people along the lines of doctrine” (2011 p. 109). She equally stresses that it is the liberal foundations of the approach that de-

mands “society to take a stand on some overarching values that protect all citizens in their choices” (2011 p. 111).

The Millennium Development Goals (2000-2015) and the Sustainable Development Goals (2015-2030) build on the notion of human development. They do so by focusing on eliminating some crucial limitations to people’s capabilities. In the case of the MDGs, there are 8 goals that should guide development planning and intervention around the world: 1) To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger; 2) To achieve universal primary education; 3) To promote gender equality; 4) To reduce child mortality; 5) To improve maternal health; 6) To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases; 7) To ensure environmental sustainability; and 8) To develop a global partnership for development.¹³⁴ This approach is concrete and measurable, which makes human development calculable. Though in doing so, it steers away the agenda away from normative debate (*what should development be?*), towards implementation and measurement issues (*how should we do and measure development?*).

The SDGs extend this engagement to 17 goals and make it a truly global agenda by focusing on sustainable development, which concerns everyone, everywhere:

1) End poverty in all its forms everywhere; 2) End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture; 3) Ensure healthy lives and promote well-being for all at all ages; 4) Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all; 5) Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls; 6) Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all; 7) Ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all; 8) Promote sustained, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work for all; 9) Build resilient infrastructure, promote inclusive and sustainable industrialization and foster innovation; 10) Reduce inequality within and among countries; 11) Make cities and human settlements inclusive, safe, resilient and sustainable; 12) Ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns; 13) Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts; 14) Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development; 15) Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably manage forests, combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss; 16) Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels; 17) Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.

¹³⁴ <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/>

The MDGs and SDGs build on the applied principles of human development (Hulme, 2010; Alkire, 2010). The UNDP Human Development Reports have, since 1990, provided a statistical framework to translate human development into a set of policy goals and tools. While the resulting advantage is that a global development agenda has a clear set of enumerable goals, the concomitant disadvantage is that the agenda has become hostage to those elements of human development thinking that can be measured. Though, as Nussbaum's list of capabilities (see above) indicates, many of the fundamental principles of human development *cannot* be counted.

In the theoretical work on human development and capabilities by Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, reservations about the place of cultural diversity and cultural rights are swept aside. They both argue that the capabilities approach has emerged from global debates between academics – to start with Sen, who is Bengali Indian, but also hold British citizenship and lives in the USA now (Nussbaum, 2011 p. 101). The more convincing (although not entirely unproblematic) defense of the global validity of the capabilities approach is that it is a normative tool. In that function, it effectively serves as a global basic framework for justice, much like human rights (e.g. Sen, 1999 pp. 227–248), that builds on fundamentals from all across the world. In defense against a more culturally relativist reading, Sen (1999 p. 242) argues that “while there is some danger in ignoring the uniqueness of cultures, there is also the possibility of being deceived by the presumption of ubiquitous insularity.”

The explicit engagement with how culture can play a helpful part in articulating and working towards capabilities is limited. The book *Culture and Public Action* by Vijayendra Rao and Michael Walton (2004a) is a rare exception. Following Sen's discourse, they argue that “culture is part of the set of capabilities that people have – the constraints, technologies, and framing devices that condition how decisions are made and coordinated across different actors” (Rao and Walton, 2004b p. 4). Overall, this book primarily focuses on the role of culture (as a *way of life*) on development processes and institutions (see e.g. Arizpe, 2004). A more innovative approach is articulated by Arjun Appadurai (2004), who focuses on the *Capacity to Aspire* as a fundamental tenet of development thinking. He starts from the observation that “it is in culture that ideas of the future, as much as those about the past, are embedded and nurtured” (2004 p. 59). He thus reads “Sen's work as a major invitation to anthropology to widen its conception of how human beings engage their own futures” (2004 p. 63).

On the whole, the Human Development and Capabilities Approach does not address the way cultural and creative industries relate to human development in practical terms. This becomes clear when looking at the *Journal of Human Development and Capabili-*

ties, which does not make any reference to cultural or creative industries throughout its lifespan (2000-2015). We can conclude that human development theorists have become interested in how culture could help articulate the future but they pay no attention to how these cultural expressions may operate in a socio-economic context (through cultural industries or otherwise) and make no mention at all about the possible role these industries could play to help attain human development – contrary to UN reports that claim these industries can play such a role. One of the original contributions of my thesis has been to point this out and act on it.

Post-Development

Theories about modernization, dependency, structural adjustment, and human development form mainstream development paradigms that have influenced policy in significant ways. Post-development, however, is a radical critique *of* development that never attained the level of normative acceptance that these paradigms did. Post-development thinking rejected the objectives, the mind-set, and the worldview associated with development (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000) – which, for the sake of the argument, encompasses all the above paradigms.

Post-development gained momentum in the 1980s, and thus overlapped with both neo-liberal and human development thinking. Yet, post-development is hardly a homogeneous school of thought. The rich post-development anthology of texts by activists, politicians, and social scientists edited by Majid Rahnema and Victoria Bawtree (1997) signals how diverse the rejections of developmentalism are. Whether their contestation of the hegemonic notion of development is based on environmental, social, cultural, or political grounds, they all challenge the goal of modernist development thinking: attaining universal levels of mass consumption (Nederveen Pieterse, 2000 p. 175). Critics of development thus challenge its aims and not merely its *modus operandi*, as they argue that ‘Western’ levels of mass consumption are not sustainable, possible, or even desirable. What should replace the race to attaining ‘development’ is a critical reconsideration of what our goal is, what we want society to look like.

Jan Nederveen Pieterse (2000) objects to the practical validity and viability of these post-development critiques, “because it attributes to ‘development’ a single and narrow meaning, a consistency that does not match either theory or policy, and thus replicates the rhetoric of developmentalism, rather than penetrating and exposing its polysemic realities. It echoes the ‘myth of development’ rather than leaving it behind.” (2000 p. 188). Post-development is strong on critique, but fails to articulate a clear and workable solution. Arguably, the lack of a universal normative agenda may be the strength of post-development thinking. However it collides with the institutional reality of development thinking, where the UN increasingly serves as a platform to articulate sets of

goals that steer the majority of people and resources in the same direction across the globe. (The Millennium Development Goals are the best example of the global harmonization of such goals.)

In this thesis, I take on board critiques on development thinking, but do acknowledge the need for structural and contextualized engagement with change. This is why I address the difficulty of ‘developing’ cultural industries through an ethnographic engagement with this process. In that regard, I follow Lourdes Arizpe in her claim that “culture is not embedded in development but development embedded in culture” (Arizpe, 2004 p. 181). Therefore, I do not reject the notion of change, but question the linear teleology of change by proposing to rethink interventions in the cultural industries as part of continuous, circular changes (see Chapter 9). At the same time, I stress the need to open the debate beyond the singular narrative of the creative economy. Such a singular narrative may not exist in the literature or even in UN discourse, but it exists in policy texts and in the programs that serve to implement them (Chapters 4 and 5).

Taxonomies of countries

Given the conflicting paradigms of development and the emergence of a ‘post-development’ movement that challenges the very notion of the term, classifying countries in neat taxonomies has become a challenging exercise. In this section, I outline the three major taxonomies (developed-developing; first, second, and third worlds; and north-south), and explain why I reject the developed-developing dichotomy even though I use the term ‘developing.’

The term ‘developing country’ has served as a euphemism for ‘underdeveloped’ country and as a contrast to ‘developed’ countries. This is the key message of Arturo Escobar’s (1995) seminal book *Encountering Development*. The use of the term ‘development’ was rooted in the post WWII political context in two connected ways. On the one hand, it ostentatiously showed the commitment of the USA (and later European powers as their colonies declared independence) to recognize the poverty many countries found themselves in around the middle of the 20th century. In this regard, the aim of development thinking and intervention was to foster economic growth (following Rostow’s teleological model) in order to “solve the social and economic problems of these parts of the world [i.e. Asia, Africa, and Latin America]” (Escobar, 1995 p. 5). This was a supposedly technical issue, where economic rationality, technology, and management would bring resolve. On the other hand, the discursive divide between ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ countries, based on the blanket assumption that the latter were ‘poor’ (without clearly defining what that meant) created a political need to overcome their poverty. The solution here was (at least from the US American perspective, which heavily influenced development debates) the further advancement of economic growth

as a socio-economic theology. This was more a deontological project to contain the expansion of communism than a utilitarian concern with the effects of these policies and interventions.

The politicization of the taxonomy of countries, depending on their 'development' extended because of cold war oppositions. While the capitalist 'first world' was directly opposed to the communist 'second world' the non-aligned 'third world' encompassed most 'developing' countries. The term 'third world' is commonly ascribed to Alfred Sauvy in 1952, though the term had been in use in 1949 (Wolf-Phillips, 1987 p. 1311). It became a term that became crucial to the self-identification of a group of countries that gathered in Bandung in 1955. These 'non-aligned' countries engaged in political and economic deliberation in order to jointly advance their position within the international political sphere: "Following Bandung, 'Third Worldism', as it was articulated by its main nationalist proponents, such as Nehru and Sukarno, meant that the governments of the 'Third World' sought, at least rhetorically, to chart a political and economic path between the liberal capitalism of the 'First World' and the 'state socialism' of the 'Second World'" (Berger, 1994 p. 259). So, legacies of the tension between the three worlds may remain, their meaning derives from a political context that has ceased to exist since the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and the fall of the USSR in 1991.

The 'third world' has however remained a common term to refer to 'developing' countries to date. A striking example is that one of the leading academic journals in 'development' studies has retained the name *Third World Quarterly* (but they also keep on using 'quarterly' in spite of their 12 yearly issues). It is however no surprise that Arturo Escobar (1995) does not use the currently more common term 'Global South'. In a survey of the literature Pagel et al. (2014) argue that the term 'Global South' only emerged after the end of the Cold War in the mid 1990s:

Since the end of the Cold War rhetoric in the 1990s resulting from the fall of the Iron Curtain, the division of the World into First, Second and Third World has become obsolete. Furthermore, the ubiquitous terms development and developing countries have equally lost some of their theoretical legitimacy, as the centre of global economic growth has been shifting to places outside the so called West (Europe, North America). (Pagel et al., 2014)

The 'Global South' however builds on the same taxonomical problems as 'developing' countries and the 'third world'. The most important one is that these taxonomies divide the world in groups rather than recognizing the social struggles within countries and the differences between countries in these groups. When looking into the classification of 'developed' and 'developing' countries in the UNCTAD (2008; 2010) Creative Economy Reports, I have shown that there is no solid rationale for this division and that the rigid

classification in two groups has no empirical basis (De Beukelaer, 2014a). Moreover, throughout my work, I refrain from referring to uncritically referring to Burkina Faso and Ghana as 'developing' countries, as this does not do justice to the particular ways in which their histories have evolved and keep on evolving. They are, most of all, post-colonial states with a particular set of challenges.

In spite of the semantic and empirical difficulties surrounding the taxonomy of countries, I do however use the term 'development' in a less critical manner. This is for two reasons. First, it is because it underlines the process of development. In this regard, I follow Rostam Neuwirth who argues that we all live in developing countries (Neuwirth, 2013), because this would allow a more humble exchange of ideas (beyond the implicit superiority of 'developed' countries) and because it better exemplifies the 'constant change' countries claim to engage in through invention and innovation. Second, I use the term because it plays on the connection between the role of cultural industries in development processes on the one hand and the initiatives in Burkina Faso and Ghana that serve to 'develop' cultural industries on the other hand.¹³⁵ Yet, in using the term in this way, I actively challenge the modernization and neoliberal paradigms in defining the *ends* of the process. Rather, in Chapters 5 and 6, I point out that there are risks of implicitly following the doxa of development if the objectives of development are not challenged and debated.

In response, I follow the human development paradigm, which focuses on the capabilities of all people that are both the object and the subject of development intervention to help give direction to what development should be. As a result, I do not focus on what the objectives of policy should be or how these should be implemented as this falls beyond the purview of my work. I have challenged the idea that development is principally a matter of building capacities, since this presupposes that these capacities that need building are knowable separate from the objectives they are meant to help attain. Only after identifying objectives can it become clear what capacities are needed to attain them.

Linking culture and development is in fact possible within each of the above paradigms. However, the notion of culture alters depending on the paradigm and the role culture could or should play.

Development and the Cultural Industries

While there is a significant body of literature that focuses on the role of culture in development, this largely emanates from anthropological enquiry. As a result, this litera-

¹³⁵ Hence the title of my book: *Developing Cultural Industries* (De Beukelaer, 2015).

ture engages more closely with culture as a 'way of life' than with cultural expressions (Radcliffe, 2006b; Radcliffe and Laurie, 2006; Da Costa, 2010; Sen, 2004b). One significant exception to that is the work by Arjun Appadurai on the 'capacity to aspire' (2004), as I referred to above. He discusses the role of cultural expressions can play in imagining a future, which is perhaps the most fundamental engagement with development possible. While he does speak of cultural expressions, he does not talk about cultural industries as such. Contrary to the claims made about development in policy and literature on the cultural industries, development literature makes hardly any mention of cultural industries.

The explicit engagement with the relationship between arts and culture, by means of the cultural industries, and development is very recent. Polly Stupples (2014) explores how the arts are valorized in development interventions. Though she does not engage very explicitly with the role of cultural and creative industries in this process. The title of my thesis suggests a shift from 'cultural development' to 'culture for development.' I refer to 'cultural development' as the combination of the following elements. First, cultural development is the recognition of the cultural foundations of development thinking, which has emanated from anthropological critiques of development thinking and practice. Second, it means taking seriously the cultural contexts in which development is meant to take place. And, third, it refers to using culture to implement development ideas and projects. This does not mean solely in an instrumental manner, but also using it as a basis to balance the universalist versus relativist tensions in debates about the normative dimensions of development (what is should be)(Nussbaum, 2003).

I use 'culture for development' as a way to capture the instrumentalization of culture through the cultural and creative industries. This agenda claims to continue thinking about 'cultural development' by connecting it to the role cultural and creative industries can play *for* development. Yet, in Chapter 2, I have shown how this is conceptually suspicious. The rest of my thesis explains that making a connection between cultural development and culture for development is needed to move beyond the contradictions in the claims about the cultural and creative industries in processes of development.

The argument of my thesis is precisely that 'cultural development' and 'culture for development' should be connected. This is however not a self-evident process. Cultural development remains mostly rooted in critical development studies, while culture for development connects more to cultural policy studies – particularly since cultural policies have become much more oriented towards 'policies for the cultural industries' (see below). My point is that the creative economy discourse ought to be disconnected from a technocratic teleology and connected to the anthropological insights about how development works (e.g. Mosse, 2005) how culture influences development (Schech and

Haggis, 2000; Clammer, 2012) and how culture can alter our understanding of development (Appadurai, 2004).

In sum, if the cultural industries can be linked to human development, a thorough understanding of the capabilities approach underlying this school of development thinking is needed to move beyond technocratic capacity building. The latter, in the way it currently features in the 'cultural industries for development' discourse (see e.g. UNESCO and UNDP, 2013) sustains a mainstream understanding of development where technical skills are put forward as ways to 'develop' cultural industries. Yet, focusing on capabilities might open up a normative debate about the *kind* of cultural industries that are worth developing and what kind of capacities might be needed to do so. The next section explains in detail how the normative and pragmatic links between capabilities and cultural industries might be conceptualized.


Capabilities and Capacity Building

The relation between capabilities and cultural industries is difficult to pinpoint because the former are the basis of an abstract normative theory of justice, while the latter are a concept that helps us looking at the social and economic processes in the economics of culture in a pragmatic and empirical way. This normative approach is exactly what researchers like Zitcer et al. (2015) propose as a way for policy-makers and planners to reconsider the role of arts and culture in urban regeneration. Yet, in this section, I aim to show how they can be linked and why that connection does not happen through capacity building, but is a prerequisite to this. Using the scheme in Figure 3 below, I explain the relation between A) capabilities, B) 'achieved functionings', and C) capacity building through an engagement with both the work of Sen and Nussbaum and the policy texts to which they apply (i.e. the Creative Economy Reports).

Martha Nussbaum argues that capabilities are "fundamental entitlements" (2003) in the sense that they form a more practical and concrete set of rights than the notions (and declarations) of human rights allow. Nomi Dave points out that:

Nussbaum distinguishes between Western conceptions of rights as 'negative liberties', in which legal protections exist and the state must 'keep its hands off', and the conception of rights as affirmative, which emphasizes states' obligations to act (Nussbaum, 2003 p. 39). The capabilities approach shares this latter 'right to' emphasis. In this regard, Nussbaum has outlined ten central human capabilities that she sees as fundamental entitlements. (Dave, 2014 p. 13)

Figure 3 - Capabilities and Capacity Building



Source: The Author

My argument is twofold: First, we need to define the ‘achieved functionings’ development is meant to foster. Second, this agenda can then help define what kind of capacity-building is needed. The remainder of this section explains this process in greater detail.

The first step (A) is to build on the freedoms and capabilities of people (within and beyond) the cultural industries to help think about what the ‘achieved functionings’ are which they want to attain (see Section ‘Human Development’ above). The UNESCO Creative Economy Report (2013, see Chapter 6) provides a helpful overview of categories in which planners and policy makers may consider developing indicators. Selecting indicators presupposes a debate about what the objectives are of focusing on cultural industries. Particularly section 6.5 of the report (UNESCO and UNDP, 2013 pp. 128–131) focuses explicitly on outcomes: what are the economic, social, cultural, and environmental outcomes to be attained through working with the cultural industries? Since there are more options than can realistically be focused on, this is thus a matter of choice. The freedoms and capabilities to choose and deliberate the path towards a life “we have reason to value” (Sen, 1992 p. 5) is thus crucial.

Sen’s approach has been criticised. Pierluigi Sacco et al., for example, claim that Sen’s approach is prone to “cultural parochialism, i.e. a self-indulgent, community-centered approach to cultural expression and participation that need not evolve into developmental social dynamics” (2014 p. 9) even though, they continue that:

In principle, this bias is in contrast with a rigorous interpretation of the capability approach, which makes room for virtually unlimited paths of personal and community human development and thus for the gradual construction of a comprehensive, inclusive knowledge society. But in practice, if individuals have little interest in the quality (i.e. in the cognitive richness and articulation) of cultural contents, beyond some basic level they will likely be willing to trade off further improvements of their cultural capabilities for the social reward of more inclusive, easy-going forms of cultural participation, thereby jeopardising cultural innovation, originality and sophistication of contents both on the side of supply (production) and on that of demand (access and participation). (Sacco et al., 2014 p. 9)

This critique does however overlook that greater capabilities will allow people to make informed choices about what they deem worthy. That is why capabilities are crucial to defining the *kinds* of cultural expressions and industries that should be pursued and the *kinds* of 'achieved functionings' culture *for* development are meant to foster.

Once policy objectives have been defined and the current state of things is assessed, it becomes clear what kinds of capacities are needed to attain the set objectives (step B). Andy Pratt (2013) argues that "capacity building is about removing a barrier to development through the investment in skills, training, education, and infrastructure such that industries are 'scalable'". While this is a valid argument, it does not address what *kinds* of capacities need building. Pratt argues that "in most places the creative economy is new, [and] there is no pre-existing tradition of extended production to build on, hence the project is almost to begin from scratch". But much depends on the definition of "extended production". Cultural industries however preceded the current 'creative economy discourse,' even if existing practices might have been makeshift, informal, or even illegal. This is certainly the case in Burkina Faso and Ghana. While this is not true of Pratt's approach, capacity building perspectives that fail to address existing practices, may risk operating in a framework of modernization that fails to recognize existing socio-economic structures. Second, he argues that there is an "entire range of support skills without which many creative events and processes cannot take place". This is true, but defining the objectives of the cultural industries (*what should they help attain?*) precedes the definition of activities (*what kind of activities are needed to attain the said goals?*) and those, in turn, precede the assessment of skills needed to develop such events and processes. This is why the identification and articulation of the 'achieved functionings' should precede the articulation of the capacity building needs.

There is however a resulting need to articulate the capacity building needs and the ways in which these skills can be learned. Yet, as my dissertation focuses on the first step (A) of the above scheme I have paid little or no attention to the ways in which this

capabilities agenda can practically be implemented. This both falls beyond the scope of my work and defining concrete capacity building efforts would counter my message: the normative debate on what cultural industries should be and what purpose they should serve will dictate what kind of capacities are needed. This should not necessarily be a process that takes places *first*, but it is a process that is inherently different from capacity building in the sector. (Movement D on the figure above indicates that this is a continual process, as the strengthening of capacities and the greater 'achieved functionings' might in turn increase capabilities.)

Much like the diversity of approaches to development, cultural policy exists in different forms as well. The following section explores how different legacies of public policy for culture have influenced both the definition and role of culture in society.

Cultural Policy

Cultural policy is a branch of public policy that articulates and delineates government intervention in the broad field of arts and culture. It governs both artistic creativity and collective ways of life through "systematic, regulatory guides to action that are adopted by organizations to achieve their goals" (Miller and Yúdice, 2002 p. 1). Because of the breadth of artistic and cultural activity, cultural policy is important in making clear what the state does and what it does not do. There are significant differences in the ways countries balance the 'ingredients' and how the role of cultural policy has shifted throughout post-WWII history.

This overview of trends focuses on the differing stances in Britain and France, because these countries have had a major influence on cultural policies in Burkina Faso and Ghana, and cultural policy debates in general. This overview starts from the formation of formal government bodies that served the implementation of government involvement in arts and culture. In Britain, this starts with the foundation of Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts, lead by economist John Maynard Keynes. This body became the Arts Council in 1946 (McGuigan, 1996 p. 57), an organization that still administers government arts spending 'at arm's length' from politicians. In France, the engagement with explicit cultural policies was formalized in 1959, through the creation of the *Ministère des Affaires Culturelles* (Ministry of Cultural Affairs), with André Malraux as its first minister (Poirrier, 2002 p. 181).

Models of Cultural Policy

Before discussing the founding principles and objectives of French and British cultural policies, it is worth looking at a more general taxonomy of approaches to cultural policy in order to locate their respective approaches in a broader context. David Bell and Kate

Oakley discuss the national context of cultural policy based on the taxonomy four major categories developed by Harry Chartrand and Claire McCaughey (1989). They distinguish the *patron* model; the *architect* model; the *engineer* model; and the *facilitator* model (see Table C-1 below).

Table C-1 - Models for Supporting the Arts

ROLE	MODEL COUNTRY	POLICY OBJECTIVE	FUNDING	POLICY DYNAMIC	ARTISTIC STANDARDS
Facilitator	USA	diversity	tax expenditures	random	random
Patron	United Kingdom	excellence	arm's length arts councils	evolutionary	professional
Architect	France	social welfare	ministry of culture	revolutionary	community
Engineer	Soviet Union	political education	ownership of artistic means of production	revisionary	political

Source: Chartrand and McCaughey (1989)

The *patron* model best characterizes the way the UK and Australia engage in with arts and culture. The primary objective of the policy is to foster excellence so local organizations and companies that can compete with other institutions at international standards. In order to do this, arts funding is administered 'at arm's length' (see below) of politicians and funding is allotted by peer evaluation. The advantage of this system is the strong support for artistic excellence and the limited political intervention in the particular organizations and projects that are funded. The downside is that this approach favours more traditional art forms and elite organizations, by virtue of being part of the peer network of evaluation.

The *architect* model best characterizes the French approach. In this context, the ministry of culture of the central government plays a pivotal role in defining priorities and administering institutions. The idea behind this is that direct support and a blanket approach to activities and institutions benefits the country as a whole. This paternalistic form of (social welfare) policy implies that the state (thinks it) knows what is best. While this approach has generated firm structures of support for the cultural industries, which has allowed for strong unions and stable careers for many cultural workers, it has also stifled the dynamism of arts and culture. Yet the significant support for key institutions has made them less reliant on own income (through box office and sponsorship), which should allow them to take greater creative risk.

The *engineer* model best characterizes the approaches in post-Soviet states and countries like Cuba. The primary objective of cultural policy in these countries is the promotion of a national culture in tandem with political education. The strategy to attain this

builds on government ownership of artistic production. The school of *Socialist Realism* articulates the emblematic result of such policies: the elevation of socialist political structures, institutions, and principles through art. Yet, while this approach has the potential to create a unified political sphere through culture on the surface, these cultural policies have underestimated the subversive potential of artists.

The *facilitator* model best characterizes the approach of the USA. While the absence of a formal policy text at the federal level in the USA might lead some to think that the country has no cultural policy at all, this is not true. While the National Endowment for the Arts is a small body with very limited funds and stifled power (Miller and Yúdice, 2002 pp. 46–50), they are not the key ‘institution’ in US cultural policies. The primary role the state plays in facilitation the diversity of culture throughout the country is through tax incentives. Some private cultural organization are recognized as non-profit organizations with under Internal Revenue Code §501(c)(3), which allows them to receive donations for with donors get tax breaks. The exemption is a measure without which many organizations would not be able to survive (Burch, 2010). Yet it also allows wealthy benefactors to steer cultural policy in a direction of their choosing, without direct government interference in the beneficiaries of their gifts. Though the tax breaks mean that there is a de facto government contribution, as the donor does not pay taxes of the amount donated. This means that some flagship organizations may benefit disproportionately from donor funds and public support (by means of foregone tax revenues). So, while the public supports the arts indirectly, there is no direct government policy to steer this, nor any accountability to the public.

The four approaches above are ideal-types of government intervention. While most countries currently operate on a mix of approaches, it is important to understand why and how these models came into being. Given the influence of French and UK approaches on cultural policy debates in Burkina Faso and Ghana (see Chapter 4), I further explore the foundational principles of these approaches before discussing the influence of their respective legacies on cultural policy formation and change in other countries.

Cultural Policy in France

French cultural policies are characterized by a strong role of the central government. This practically means that ministers and presidents often directly interfere with priorities and allocations of public funding for arts and culture. This, Kim Eling argues, is the result of a continuation of the cultural politics that characterized the French monarchy prior to the French Revolution that started in the late 18th century. The cultural politics and policies of the French Republics (the five eras of republican rule under different constitutions) continued the centralist and paternalistic approach to culture (Eling, 1999

p. 18). A key characteristic that illustrates the statist *grandeur* of French cultural policies are the presidential ‘grands travaux’ (large works) that were “rooted in the absolutist tradition by which French monarchs sought to immaterialize themselves by building palaces and gardens” (Eling, 1999 pp. 11–12), as most explicitly illustrated by the *Centre Pompidou* in Paris, named after Georges Pompidou (president between 1969–74), even though it did not open until 1977.

The founding of a formal Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1959 under the presidency of Charles de Gaulle (1959–1969) fostered a more transparent engagement with the arts and presented a break with earlier state engagement with culture as it created a cultural ‘domain’ between state and citizens (Urfalino, 2011 p. 21). What I discuss here are the initial two decades of cultural policy (1959–1981). The section below, *From Cultural Policy to Policy for the cultural industries*, engages more closely with the shifts that occurred in cultural policy in a more general way in both Britain and France from the 1980s onwards.

From 1959 to 1969, André Malraux served as Minister of Culture under of Charles de Gaulle. This was a period of grand discourse of democratization, as the decree founding the ministry stipulated that it “has as mission to render accessible the masterworks of humanity, and above all of France, to the greatest number of Frenchmen, ensuring the greatest possible audience for our cultural heritage, and to encourage the creation of works of art and spirit that will enrich it.”¹³⁶ This practically translated into a focus on ‘heritage, creation, and democratization’ (Looseley, 1995 p. 33ff). In spite of these grand aims based on politics of charisma of de Gaulle and Malraux (Dubois, 1999 p. 156), the actual engagement of the French state in doing so remained limited, with 0.39% of public expenditure being spent on culture (Eling, 1999 p. 5), as compared to a current average of 1.54% across Europe (Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe, 2015). Yet, in discourse and practice, the primary aim of Malraux remained the institutional dissemination of ‘high’ culture.

Until the socialist victory of the socialists in 1981, president Valéry Giscard d’Estaing (1974–1981) had a strong influence on cultural policy. Yet, under his presidency, the Ministry as a whole did not have the clear sense of direction it has under Malraux, but spent over a decade exploring, “in search of itself” (Looseley, 1995 p. 49), what its role

¹³⁶ « Le ministère chargé des Affaires culturelles a pour mission de rendre accessible les œuvres capitales de l’humanité, et d’abord la France, au plus grand nombre de Français ; d’assurer la plus vaste audience à notre patrimoine culturel, et de favoriser la création des œuvres de l’art et de l’esprit qui enrichissent. » (Décret 59-889, cited in Poirrier, 2002 p. 188)

should be. The lack of a charismatic Minister of Culture (in contrast to the earlier Malraux, and later Lang eras) may have played a role in this.

From 1971 to 1973, Jacques Duhamel was Minister of Culture under the presidency of Georges Pompidou (1969-1974). His tenure was characterized by an effort to extend the remit and action of cultural policy beyond 'high' culture. His efforts were however not nearly as radical as those of Jack Lang a decade later. Duhamel tried doing so by fostering small-scale community initiatives, rather than solely focusing on large institutions. His influence on the French tradition of cultural policy is however limited, given his short tenure and limited capacity to implement his ideas. He did however manage to gradually increase the share of government spending on culture to 0.61% by his last year in office (Eling, 1999 p. 6). The key continuation between the Malraux and Duhamel eras was the further creation and consolidation of *Maisons de la Culture* ('houses of culture') across France (Looseley, 1995 pp. 40–45; Ahearne, 2002 p. 9). Under the presidency of François Mitterrand (1981-1995), cultural policy was characterized by a reversal of Duhamel's initiatives and a gradual reduction of government spending to 0.41% on culture in 1981.

The important role of politics and of the state in the formulation and implementation of cultural policies in France has made cultural policy an area of a visionary capacity. The extent to which intellectuals and politicians jointly created a space to think about and act for culture is significant (Looseley, 1995; Ahearne, 2002; Dubois, 1999; Eling, 1999). While the current role of cultural policy in France has evolved from the strict approach of the state as an *architect*, as I discuss below, this principle remains strongly present in the way French cultural policy has taken form since the creation of a formal Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 1959.

Cultural Policy in the United Kingdom

Cultural policy in the UK is characterized by the role of the government as a *patron* of the arts. This stance emerged from a historical reluctance of the state, and politics in general, to actively engage with the arts, in spite of a passive regulatory tradition towards production through licensing and censorship (Gray, 2000 p. 36). This was rooted in the distrust of government and bureaucracy in the 'nation of shopkeepers' (Hutchison, 1982 p. 15). In practice this means that funding for arts and culture has been less politicized than in France. This manifested itself most clearly through the establishment of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB) in 1946 by John Maynard Keynes, the economist who counts as the architect of social democratic macro economic policies. This public body emerged from the Council for the Encouragement of Music and the Arts (CEMA) that was in fact a private body funded by the Pilgrim Trust, an American private donor in 1940 (McGuigan, 1996 p. 57; Gray, 2000 p. 39). The

ACGB “became a penurious, arm’s length ‘quango’ [see below] with a limited remit that still reflected Britain’s pre-war discomfort about public intervention in the arts” (Gray 2000, pp. 41–42, cited in Looseley, 2011 p. 366).

The use of a quango or ‘quasi-autonomous non-governmental organization’ (Gray, 2000 p. 41) in the form of a Non Departmental Public Body (NDPB) is meant to ensure the distance between politics and funding. Currently, this means that while there is a government body (now the Department for Culture, Media and Sport) that creates a legislative framework and sets a policy agenda in conjunction with other departments (Gray, 2000 p. 59ff), there are different councils that administer the financial support from the department to the cultural sector. These councils are the *Museums, Libraries & Archives Council*, the *Arts Council England*, and the *British Film Institute* (which predated the creation of the ACGB) (Gray, 2000 p. 71). Scotland and Wales have separate bodies (currently Creative Scotland and Arts Council Wales), though I am not discussing the internal politics of the different ‘nations’ within the UK, but discuss the idea of using councils at arm’s length as the defining principle the UK *principle* of cultural policy.

The way the Arts Council, which administers the bulk of public funding in England¹³⁷ alongside local council funding (Gray, 2000 p. 157ff) (though Lottery Funding has become a significant institution since 1994), ensures a distance from politics is by operating at ‘arm’s length’ from the government: “this principle defines the relative autonomy of the Arts Council and the Regional Arts Boards in deciding how to allocate the available resources to individual art forms and artists, and it should ensure— at least in theory—that decisions are not affected by political considerations” (Belfiore, 2002 p. 93). This means that, unlike the direct interference in France, British politicians have no formal power over the decisions of the Councils. Yet the independence was never absolute (Hutchison, 1982 pp. 27–40), yet it caused some confusion regarding the accountability of both politicians and the ACGB concerning state expenditure on arts and culture (Gray, 2000 p. 42)

In spite of its ostentatious distance to politics, the Arts Council in fact represented the cultural interests of a particular political and social class: the bourgeoisie. The class background of the Council’s members and directors further reinforced the socially progressive but culturally conservative approach (Hutchison, 1982 p. 151). This, in conjunction with the absence of a grand political vision for the arts in Britain (Looseley, 2011 p. 366), has generated a narrow range of policies at the Arts Council level in early

¹³⁷ I am not getting myself into the internal politics of the different ‘nations’ within the UK, but discuss the ACE as an exemplar of the UK *principle* of cultural policy.

years. Robert Hutchison characterizes their pre-1980 approaches as “‘disjointed incrementalism’ – ‘disjointed because *ad hoc* and piecemeal, and ‘incrementalism’ because only a limited range of policy options are considered and because, in practice, the Arts Council has gradually increased the range of its responsibilities, while resisting any radical revision of the guiding principles from which it has worked” (1982 p. 152). While French cultural policy was initially too grand to be feasible, British policy was too feasible to be visionary. Even if the independence of the body thus made it more of a bureaucratic apparatus than a politically expedient institution, it might have benefited from a more pronounced political vision.

The initial independence of these councils has however diminished since the 1970s. Until that period, the public value of (and concomitant public spending on) culture was not up for major debate. Though 1973-75 recession and subsequent conservative government under Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990) created a compounded challenge for public spending on culture. First, Thatcher tried to diminish public spending in all areas, building on the idea that the social welfare state was no longer affordable (‘there is no alternative’) (Gray, 2000 p. 53). Second, the changing culture of governance called for greater justification of public spending (Gray, 2000 p. 52). In that sense, the once unquestioned public value of culture was challenged. This forced the councils to rethink the basis on which they can defend the allocation of public funds to arts and culture. This has generated a significant (ongoing) debate about what the social, economic, and cultural value of the sector is (MacDowall et al., 2015; Belfiore and Bennett, 2008). At the same time, the influence of Thatcher drew UK cultural policy closer to the French approach (Looseley, 2011 p. 366).

Cultural Policy and Popular Culture

In spite of the differences in governance between France and Britain, their approaches towards the kind of culture that cultural policy administered was initially rather similar. Their notion of arts and culture was narrow and comprised mainly the ‘canon’ of cultural works that emblemizes the artistic and intellectual accomplishments of society (Looseley, 2011 p. 369). In this approach, the tension between ‘access’ to culture and ‘excellence’ of culture seemed simple: “the problem of popular access could be solved simply by bringing excellence to the ‘non-public’” (Looseley, 2011 p. 370). This elitist and paternalistic approach was well intended, but ignored the agency of ‘non-participants’ (in the ‘high arts’) in their capacity to select the culture they deem worthwhile themselves.

In the 1980s, the limits of this approach became rather obvious. First, for many people and many art forms, the market is very able to supply existing demand (see Keat,

2000). Second, it became clear that ‘non-participants’ were in fact participants when opening up the definition of culture to include ‘popular’ art forms that had remained hitherto beyond the remit and interest of cultural policy (Looseley, 1995 p. 113ff). And third, postmodern critique undermined the use of rigid categories of ‘high’ and ‘low’ art (Eling, 1999 p. 128ff). These shifts had important implications on the way cultural policy was conceived in France and Britain, albeit with meaningful differences.

In France, the legacy of May 1968 generated a turn in cultural policy towards ‘cultural democracy’ that should allow all citizens (including minorities) to develop their talents and create themselves (Looseley, 1995 p. 113). The ‘droit à la différence’ (‘right to difference’) gained further currency under the presidency of Mitterrand (1981-1995) (Looseley, 1995 p. 114). Then Minister of Culture Jack Lang (1981-1986 and 1988-1992) called for greater support for popular forms of art, as they better reflected the cultural life of the majority of the population. This included “chanson and pop music, comic strips, fashion, [and] the circus” (Looseley, 2011 p. 371). In discourse, Lang opened up towards a greater valorization of a variety of cultural activities, but this did not translate to sufficient public investment in these forms, in spite of increased funding. Yet Lang was very active and popular throughout his tenure (Looseley, 1995 p. 158ff), because he celebrated a great breadth of cultural activity so that “the great majority of people could, at one time or another, have the impression that he was championing their particular cause” (Ahearne, 2002 p. 23).

In Britain, the shift to more popular forms of culture was the result of the Tory’s combined interest in cutting public funding and increasing the usefulness of arts and culture for the community. This meant that Thatcher and Major governments “became more interventionist in the arts, converging with the French at least to that extent” (Looseley, 2011 p. 372).

In conclusion, the British and French approaches to devising cultural policy have different legacies tainted by their political histories. Britain has a stronger *patron* role with limited political interference whereas France largely operates its cultural policy as an *architect* (see Table C-1). Though the gradual shift from policies meant to foster the creation and dissemination of ‘high’ art towards policies for the cultural industries characterizes both countries and has made their policies increasingly similar. The shared characteristic is now that the economic role of arts and culture is more central and that the remaining base funding for institutions and projects needs justification on economic and social, rather than cultural, artistic, or humanistic grounds.

The legacies of these different approaches in Burkina Faso and Ghana are clear, but in practice insignificant. In Burkina Faso, the French influence is clear. The Burkinabè Ministry of Culture and Tourism directly administers public funding for arts and culture.

There are several venues and festivals created under patronage of political figures (see Chapter 7). In Ghana, the British legacy is visible. The Ghanaian Ministry of Creative Arts and Tourism plays a role in framing the sector in discursive terms, but has no clear formal funding mechanism in place, as the country does not have a funding body at 'arm's length'. Though, the ministry directly administers flagship institutions like the National Theatre and the National Museum. In sum, the principles of policy-making in France and Britain have influenced the ways the ministries that administer in Burkina Faso and Ghana. Yet in neither country does the ministry have the budget nor the political clout to execute the kind of cultural policy that they, in principle, embody. The embracing of the creative economy discourse has (however slightly) increased the visibility and standing of the ministries in charge of culture, thanks to the economic claims the sector now makes (see for example the study commissioned by MUSIGA, the Ghanaian Musicians Union: KPMG, 2014).

While cultural policy is becoming increasingly important at the urban level (see e.g. Grodach and Silver, 2013; Bell and Oakley, 2015 p. 76ff) in part due to the rise of the 'creative city' script (e.g. Landry, 2000), for many countries the debate is taking place at a transnational level. This is no less the case for Britain or France than any other country. The British 'creative industries' agenda is widely exported and transformed across the world (Cunningham, 2009a p. 14). This uptake, in turn, influences thinking in Britain itself. The French approach, with its strong role of the state, has been challenged by GATT/WTO free trade negotiations (Ahearne, 2002 p. 29; Trautmann, 2002 p. 196ff). Their response, the 'exception culturelle', has in turn led a formal engagement with culture and trade at UN level in the form of the Convention on the Protection and the Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (UNESCO, 2005c). While the legacy of both British and French cultural policies on global debates is clear, the preoccupation with culture of sovereign states is no longer primarily an internal affair.

The debates that take place at UNESCO (in particular since the 1982 Mondiacult meeting) and normative frameworks and messages the organization communicates are important to many so-called 'developing' countries, where debates on culture and cultural policy are not the greatest priority. The following section shows how UN bodies have channeled cultural policy and cultural industries debates in the past decades. In doing so, they captured shifting priorities in countries with strong explicit debates on the role of the state and market in the creation and provision of culture.

From Cultural Policy to Policy for the cultural industries

Cultural policy in Burkina Faso and Ghana formally emerged in the wake of the 1982 UNESCO world conference on cultural policy (MONDIACULT) in Mexico City (UNESCO, 1982b). This was the first moment UNESCO organized a global engage-

ment with cultural policy, after several regional events between 1972-1980, with the one focused on Africa taking place in Yaoundé in 1980 (UNESCO, 1982a p. 12). The first policy texts in both Burkina Faso and Ghana date back to 1983, one year after the global and three years after the regional UNESCO event on cultural policy. As highlighted in chapter 4, this event has continued to influence the wording of cultural policies in both countries to date.

In 1982, UNESCO also edited a book called *Cultural Industries: A Challenge for the Future of Culture*. This work included several references to the context in Africa, among which a chapter on the book industry in Tanzania (Kaungamno, 1982). This document did not create a significant impact on the language of cultural policy in either Burkina Faso or Ghana, as a real engagement with the cultural industries remain absent from their initial policy documents. While this engagement occurred in conjunction with the work of the Greater London Council between 1979 and 1986 (O'Connor, 2010 p. 27), it is part of a debate with an intended global reach.

In 1991, the publication of *The Development of endogenous cultural industries in Africa* (UNESCO, 1991) signals a more significant assessment of the state of the sector and a more explicit focus on the continent. This led to the *Dakar Plan of Action: Cultural Industries for Development in Africa* (OAU and UNESCO, 1992), a document jointly created by the Organization of African Unity (now African Union) and UNESCO. These documents clearly show that the initial engagement with the cultural industries across Africa predates the explosion of policy engagement with the creative industries in Britain under 'New Labour' from 1997 onwards. Yet the cultural industries discourse did not gain momentum across Africa until over a decade later, when the policy and academic debates on the creative industries and economy had percolated through the UN system by means of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005c) and the UNCTAD Creative Economy Reports (2008; 2010).

The question remains why a concept that had been circulating in policy contexts for over two decades (from the early 1980s onwards) eventually became central to cultural and development strategies in Burkina Faso and Ghana in the early 2000s. Or, why did cultural and development policies become policies *for* cultural industries? In order to explain this, it is worth looking at the ways cultural policies and cultural industries gradually became intertwined.

The policy-engagement with the cultural industries emerged in conjunction with the shift from the cultural industry (in the singular) to the cultural industries in the late 1970s. This shift "had given rise to a more empirically based understanding of the complex structure and viable dynamics at work in the production of culture" (O'Connor,

2010 p. 26). As a result of this shift, O'Connor argues, the cultural industries no longer served as intrinsically different from 'high art'. In France, a similar shift occurred under the reign of Minister of Culture Jack Lang, who rejected the categorical distinction between high and low culture and who fostered the reconciliation between public and private initiative in arts and culture (Eling, 1999 p. 8). This made it possible, and in a way necessary, to include the cultural industries into cultural policy, which had hitherto been focused on the democratization of access to high culture. The empirical understanding of the 'commercial' cultural industries started changing the role of cultural policy, beyond just widening its scope. From the 1980s onwards in the UK and Australia, the economic importance of culture became a justification for public spending (Throsby, 2010 p. 5). Yet, critics like Philippe Urfalino argue that the economic legitimation of cultural policy under Jack Lang in fact led to its dissolution (cited in Eling, 1999 p. 9). Culture thus lost much of its status as a 'public good' that needed to remain largely outside the market: 'Culture', previously seen as a marginal and mainly decorative or prestige expenditure, began to move much closer to the center of policy-making as a potential economic resource. It is in no small part due to this shift that French and British cultural policies have moved closer to each other since the 1990s (Looseley, 2011 p. 367).

This economic engagement with culture later became far more explicit and far-fetched, under the reign of 'New Labour' in Britain since 1997 (Hewison, 2014; Hesmondhalgh et al., 2015). Though the initial UK focus on cultural industries in the plural emerged as part of the radical cultural politics of the Greater London Council (O'Connor, 2010 p. 27) until the GLC was abolished by the conservative government in 1986 (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 166). The cultural focus of the GLC was quite different than mainstream cultural policy in that era. Cultural policy in the UK remained focused on disclosing 'high art' to more people. Yet "most people's cultural tastes and practices were shaped by commercial forms of culture and by PSB" (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 167). This did not mean that the GLC uncritically celebrated 'commercial' culture, but rather that they argued for greater recognition of the ways the vast majority of people actually engaged in cultural life. In this context, the GLC in fact echoed Raymond Williams' seminal claim that 'culture is ordinary' (2014). In discussing 'whose culture' is the object of cultural policy, Dave O'Brien makes the case that *not* taking part in 'legitimate' forms of 'art' is in fact "ordinary and usual" for the majority of people (O'Brien, 2014 p. 66).

The combination of the decline of ideology after the end of the cold war in 1989 (Fukuyama, 1992), the blurring of absolute truths (including the categorical divide between 'high' and 'low' culture) under post-modernism (McGuigan, 1996 p. 36ff), and the political articulation of a 'third way' of social democracy that embraced neoliberal poli-

tics (Giddens, 1999) created the political platform that transformed the balance between state and market in cultural policy. This did not only create a shift from public to private sector through the continued privatization of government activities, but also “a discursive shift from ‘state’ to ‘market’ *within* the public sector” (McGuigan, 1996 p. 52, emphasis in original).

While the GLC did not have the time to implement their cultural industries in line with their aims and objectives because they were abolished before they could do so (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 167), they did make an intellectual mark on the transformation of cultural policy in making the case that the distinctions between subsidized and commercial culture be challenged (Bell and Oakley, 2015 p. 28; Lee et al., 2014 p. 2). The GLC’s most important legacy is, quite ironically, the one that needed to break with its radical and politicized work. In 1997, when the Labour party came to power after rebranding their image as ‘New Labour’ they needed a new narrative for the UK economy. They found that narrative in the cultural industries, which their Department of Media Culture and Sport rebranded as creative industries. These industries served as the core of a new strategy that would recognize the role culture and creativity (including knowledge and innovation) would play in the postindustrial future of Britain. The connection between culture and urban regeneration emerged from the work by the GLC (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005 p. 3), even though their claims were more modest than those made by the New Labour government.

New Labour built on the policies of the GLC and the increasing empirical academic engagement with the cultural industries by stressing the economic importance of culture. This formed the basis for their broader economic claims regarding the regeneration of the UK economy. Yet, in their attempt to more explicitly pursue an economic agenda, the more progressive social focus of the GLC lost currency (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a p. 168). The more obvious difference between the GLC and New Labour was the naming and scope of the sector. While the GLC spoke of the ‘cultural industries’, the DCMS under Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2010) focused on the ‘creative industries’. This shift had three major reasons. Firstly, it captured the *Zeitgeist* by incorporating the emerging literature on the importance of creativity (Landry and Bianchini, 1995; Landry, 2000; Howkins, 2002; Florida, 2002), which had universally positive connotations: “after all, everybody could be ‘creative’ to some degree, couldn’t they?” (Oakley, 2004 p. 70). Secondly, it formed a political break with the more politicized meaning of the ‘cultural’ industries the GLC focused on (Hesmondhalgh, 2013a; O’Connor, 2010). Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the shift to ‘creative’ industries allowed for a broadening of the industries’ boundaries: the ‘creative’ industries included more sectors and its ‘cultural’ predecessor (Garnham, 2005; Tremblay, 2011). This helped to better incorporate the software activities that had become economically potent since the 1980s.

The shift from cultural to creative industries, as Nicholas Garnham (2005) calls it, generated a context in which software creators and businesses could align themselves with the more small-scale actors in arts and culture, in order to push for greater protection of intellectual property rights. At the same time, it allowed those working in the 'old' cultural industries to benefit from public support for the IT sector. In short, the broadening of the cultural to the creative industries made it possible to extend the economic claims regarding the sector (Tremblay, 2011). Yet the shift also allowed a stronger connection between cultural and knowledge industries. Though Hesmondhalgh (2013a p. 175) concludes that the shift also meant that "UK creative industries policy is based on an 'artist'-centred notion of subsidy, rather than an audience-orientated policy of infrastructural support – the very opposite, in other words, of the original GLC vision." In spite of this artist-centered approach, Kate Oakley (2009) argues that the arts in fact all but disappeared from the creative industries agenda.

The underlying reason of the increasing focus on the economic role of culture is that there was little else to turn to in this era (Peck, 2005 p. 761). The 'creative industries' became the dominant way of thinking about economic development in 'post-industrial' contexts: "the 1990s and early 2000s have seen a boom time in cultural policy under the sign of the cultural and creative industries as a result of industrial and cultural changes that have themselves been influenced by broader 'cultural' policy decisions" (Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 2005 p. 5). But the 'creative industries' played a double (and rather paradoxical) role in public policy: on the one hand, they formed the core of a new economic growth strategy, even if the evidence did not back up the rhetoric (Oakley, 2004). On the other hand, they were meant to make the economic case that would justify public expenditure on culture (see e.g. O'Brien, 2014 p. 17ff). In this context, David Throsby argues that "economists who control the purse strings in treasuries and ministries of finance tend sometimes to be unimpressed with propositions for expenditure that are based solely on the virtues of culture" (Throsby, 2010 p. 196).

The shifting discourses with increasing claims on the role of cultural industries in social and economic terms generated attempts to replicate initiatives and policies in countries around the world. The problem here is twofold. In the first place, the discourse of the cultural and creative industries gets reduced to a single narrative 'the creative economy' (as evidenced by UNCTAD (2008; 2010) and later UNESCO (2013) reports; in spite of the latter's engagement with the 'panoply of practices'). This initial problem leads to the second one, as it seems to suggest (to many policy-makers) that this singular approach can be successfully adopted through policy transfer, the decontextualized copy-pasting of approaches. Andy Pratt (2009), however, argues that this is not a feasible project.

Jamie Peck is more radical in his critique, as he claims strategies for creative cities to be “fast urban policy” (Peck, 2005 p. 761). Thereby he argues that such policies “give license to ostensibly portable technocratic routes and replicable policy practices that are easily disembedded and deterritorialized from their centers of production ... and manifest in the form of the serial reproduction of an increasingly clichéd repertoire of favoured policy interventions” (Peck, 2005 p. 767). While the ‘fast’ policy discourse travelled the world, its meaning and use shifted in different contexts (Wang, 2004; Prince, 2010; Pinheiro and Hauge, 2014).

Diane Stone (2004) argues that policy transfer often suffers from methodological nationalism, as transfer is often seen as a movement from one *country* to another. Yet, policy transfer does not simply (or even primarily) occur between countries, but percolates through international bodies that promote certain policies through their actions. In Burkina Faso and Ghana, this has occurred at the level of national policies through the work of respectively UNESCO and UNCTAD. Though regarding the implementation of these ideas, ACPCultures and the British Council respectively played a greater role. Thereby, the notion of conditionality is crucial; policy transfer did not simply occur out of interest of sovereign nation states, but resulted in large part due to the (implicit) conditionality of intervention (i.e. funding) by inter-governmental and para-statal bodies.

It would however be naïve to simply oppose policy transfer, as this is inherent to the ways in which policies are made and countries relate to each other. Yet a possible way to mitigate the problem of ‘Xeroxing’ policies (Pratt, 2009) without due regard to context is allowing policies to ‘slow down’: “no matter how fast the policy, it eventually runs into older discourses, older imaginaries, often embedded in longstanding networks of policy institutions, universities and think tanks, governmental departments, and networks of cultural practitioners, activists and consultants” (De Beukelaer and O’Connor, forthcoming). As a result, the ‘fast’ transfer of policies runs into the cultural, political, and social realities that surround the existing palimpsest of policies in which it is meant to be inscribed. Overcoming this issue would entail better connecting fast-paced ‘trendy’ policy concepts that use buzzwords to their underlying theories – e.g. connecting claims to human development to the literature on the capabilities approach that underlies it. At the same time, exploring the history of cultural policy, and why it slowly became a policy for cultural industries in many places, may be a first step in slowing down the pace of the ‘fast policy’ debate.