

**Reconceptualising 'honour' for Muslim Women: Perceptions, Praxis and New
Modalities**

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Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of Doctor of
Philosophy

The University of Leeds

School of Languages, Cultures and Societies

October 2022

The candidate confirms that the work submitted is her own and that appropriate credit has been given where reference has been made to the work of others.

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The work in Chapter 2 includes work from the following publication: Comprehending and Critiquing the Concept of 'Honour' in Contemporary Muslim Communities, Sanah Mehnaz, published in the International Multidisciplinary Research Journal - ISSN 2424-7073 Gender & Women's Studies - Volume 1, Issue No.1 (July 2019): Pages 45-50

Acknowledgments

I begin by praising Allah the most high, the most merciful, for guiding me towards the path of knowledge and critical thinking. For instilling within my heart, the passion to investigate and uncover the concept of honour from within His words in the Qur'an and from the guidance of His Prophet Muhammad. There is no doubt that this work would not be possible without the will of Allah.

I send peace and blessings on His beloved messenger Muhammad (peace be upon him). It is due to his perfect example, his love and justice that this believing woman held firm belief in the existence of an egalitarian and just conception of honour.

I would like to thank my primary supervisor Dr Fozia Bora for her endless support and guidance throughout the whole of my thesis project. You went above and beyond in your role as supervisor making this difficult journey one of ease. Moreover, beyond supporting me to develop as a researcher you have been a friend who has encouraged me with care and compassion throughout the most difficult moments. I am forever thankful for the assurance, ease and support you made available to me throughout this whole process. I cannot express in words how grateful I am.

I would also like to extend thanks to my supervisors Dr Mustapha Sheikh and Dr Tajul Islam for their guidance and feedback. Were it not for your support from when I first embarked on the journey of Islamic studies in the academy, I would not have continued onto the stage of a PhD researcher. This gratitude is also due to Dr Hiam El-Gousi, who has played a major role in motivating me to pursue a PhD. Thank you for your continuous support and encouragement.

I would like to thank to all the individuals who have provided some guidance throughout my thesis journey. Thank you to Dr Abdul B Shaikh for his constructive feedback on initial stages of this research. I am also grateful to Dr Sofia Rehman for providing space and facilitating crucial discussions that have allowed me to develop as a researcher and to advance my

research. I am also grateful to Rushna Ali-Sadler a fellow researcher and friend. Thank you for being so generous with your time and expertise.

I would also like to thank the White Rose College of Arts and Humanities for my WRoCAH scholarship. Thank you once again to Dr Fozia Bora who helped me secure this funding.

Finally, I would like to thank my parents, Maneer Begum and Ghazanfar Mahmood. You have believed in me and encouraged me and were it not for your continuous love, support and prayers I would not be where I am today. You have always been so proud of even my *smallest* achievements. I hope I have made you both proud through this thesis. I am forever grateful for everything you have done for me. There are not enough words for me to express my gratitude. A special thank you to my mother, you have practically supported me throughout this whole process with food packages, unrestricted childcare and emotional support. Without your help I would not have been able to complete this thesis. I would also like to thank all my sisters Mehvish, Aisha, Aqsa and especially Sehrish for being a second mum to Abu-Bakr when I needed it the most. My sister-in-law Sonia, thank you for all the help in my final year. Thank you to all my family and friends who have been patient with me throughout this process, you are too many to name, but I am grateful to you all. To my husband, friend, and my love Sakib Zarahit, thank you for being my biggest support. Your love, care, compassion have been endless. You have encouraged and believed in me during my most difficult moments, and I am forever grateful for your companionship. Finally, my son, Abu-Bakr. Thank you for your patience, love, and the best cuddles. Mummy could not do this without you.

Dedication

To the light in my life, my son, Abu-Bakr. You came into my life during this research, and I worried that I perhaps would not be able to reach the finish line. But you filled these challenging years with sweet laughter, joy, and the purest love. You motivate me every day and I dedicate this work to you and your little brother, Ali Murtadha (who perfectly timed his arrival at the end of this thesis journey).

Abstract

Honour is a term readily associated with Muslim communities within the contemporary period in reference to barbaric and primitive beliefs and praxes that have a detrimental impact upon Muslim women. This thesis sets out to examine and critique the contemporary concept of honour within Muslim communities, alongside Western portrayals of these honour codes. It sets out to uncover the implications of these beliefs and praxes on the lives of Muslim women, through an in-depth critique of the notion of honour. This thesis critiques the double patriarchy that Muslim women face in the name of honour. Internally, within Muslim communities, manipulation subsists in the patriarchal conceptions and implementations of honour. Externally, the orientalist and colonial current day Islamophobic ideological project and its related systems utilise the concept of honour to weaponise 'the Muslim woman' and make claims on her behalf, rejecting her agency and humanity.

To dismantle these two dominant patriarchal exploitations of women in the name of honour, this thesis returns to the primary sources of authority, the Qur'an and *sunna*, to uncover its egalitarian and gender-neutral conception of honour. Further, to consider the implementation of such an honour system, it examines the possibility of situating a concept of honour within the field of Islamic jurisprudence, particularly within the area of *Maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*.

Ultimately this thesis presents an egalitarian, gender-neutral framework for the concept of honour derived from the primary authoritative sources. It calls for the abandonment of patriarchal, culturalist, and reductionist understandings of honour that impact the lives of Muslim women and conflict with the core values underpinning the Qur'anic and Prophetic conception of honour.

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Transliteration

I have used the IJMES transliteration system for Arabic names and terms.

I have retained the common spelling for some names and terms such as Qur'an, Muhammad, Makkah, Madina, Makkan, Madinan etc.

Abbreviations

CMHP- Contemporary Muslim Honour Paradigm

HBV- Honour Based Violence

FGM- Female Genital Mutilation

d. – year in which an individual passed away

Dates

All dates are given in accordance with the Hijri and Gregorian Calendar. Where there is only one date given, it is the Gregorian date.

Introduction

Why honour?

Honour signifies a range of meanings from dignity, respect, esteem, self-worth etc. The term relates to nuanced ideas of honour as right, as an ideal, honour codes, as a marker of an individual's worth in society, as a value etc. A form of honour exists within many contemporary societies and history reveals that it has been a meaningful part of many historical communities. Honour can be both internalised and externally imposed. Within the contemporary period we find that the internalisation of honour can occur in beneficial and harmful ways. In its beneficial form, internalised honour can manifest in the form of self-defined understandings and applications of honour based on a personal, spiritual, communal, and inter-female agentic force. In contrast, externally imposed honour ideals are prevalently patriarchal and Islamophobic. Harmful internalisations of honour can also be linked to these forms of externally imposed honour ideals and practices.

In the contemporary period, externally imposed harmful honour ideals and practices, and harmful internalisations of honour have become the hallmark of the concept of honour. Moreover, honour seems to have been designated an exclusive intensified association to Islam, Muslims, Muslim communities and the Islamicate. This is despite practices and ideals relating to honour having no geographical, cultural, or religious boundaries. Yet, despite the ubiquitous nature of the concept of honour the burden of its patriarchal manipulations appears to be placed on a specific group of people. Negative, oppressive, backwards, barbaric honour practices and praxes are relegated to Muslims, Muslim communities, their cultures, and Islam. So much so that some contemporary academic works, media representations and broader patriarchal systems and institutions of power have influenced conceptions of honour reducing it to nothing more than a patriarchal oppressive system of thought and practice. Today when the word honour is used, most individuals immediately think of honour crimes/killings/violence (henceforth abbreviated to HBV, honour-based violence) concerning Muslims and Islam.

Motivated by both the oppression Muslim women are subjected to in the name of honour, and the reductionist exclusive association of 'honour' to its negative

manifestations, in the form of HBV within Islam and by Muslims, this research project set out to understand the complexities and existence of this widespread yet seemingly abstract concept. It began aimed at defining the term honour. I intended to critique the contemporary ocean of abstract meanings and usages implied by and associated with the term honour due to its dominant association to Islam, Muslim women, and Muslim communities. To explain its limits and define its boundaries. But honour cannot be defined by a single definition. No single sentence can grasp the complex system associated with the term honour. Conceptions of honour throughout the world, both within the geographical West and the non-West, vary but are also present and meaningful. It soon became clear that attempting to define the term honour would only limit and restrict the complexities of the term and deem it as consistent when indeed it is not. Reducing the term honour is perhaps central to the challenges and struggles Muslim women face today in the name of honour. Thus, this research no longer defines honour. For honour is not static it is not one. The reality of Muslim women and Muslims in general, our lived experiences differ. Our practice of Islam differs. Islam is not static. Likewise, Muslim conceptions and practices of honour also vary.

Honour, a concept

It is more befitting, therefore, to speak of honour as a concept. A concept is defined as a principle, idea, or theory (Cambridge Dictionary, 2021). It is a thought or notion conceived in the mind regarding a central idea or theme (Merriam-Webster). In contrast to a specific definition which sets definite clear limits, 'concepts are defined as abstract ideas or general notions that occur in the mind, in speech, or in thought. They are understood to be the fundamental building blocks of thoughts and beliefs' (Ask Difference, 2019). Honour is therefore referred to as a concept throughout this thesis.

Key terms

Before expanding on the aims of this thesis, several terms that have already been used in this introduction require some clarification. The terms the 'West' and 'Islam' are loaded with meanings. According to Salman Sayyid (2015, xxiii), 'the West' and 'Islam' are shorthand expressions 'for complex and mobile formations, the boundaries of which are not given, but rather are political in nature and the sites of constant struggle'. However, he stresses that internal differences in Islam and the West do not

invalidate either's existence rather, it is the attempts to erase internal differences, a logic of collective identities, through the very invocations of these names that make the terms significant.

The West

My use of the terms 'the West' and/or 'Western' occurs in two ways throughout this thesis. In some instances, I use these terms to refer to a geographical locus. These uses are obvious as I also use specific terms such as Britain (referring to England, Scotland, and Wales), Europe and America alongside these terms. More broadly then, these terms are used to refer to the minority world (those countries that are seen as 'developed' as opposed to the majority world). The second type of usage refers to an ideological project.

The West can be seen as a construction in opposition to and in comparison, to the non-West. Predominantly the non-West has been defined 'by the distortion of features that are 'normal' within Western history' (Sayyid, 2015, xxii). I use the terms 'the West' and 'Western' to represent these narratives that signify the epistemic discourses and ideas that are fundamental to colonial thought and interventions and the conscious efforts to depict the West as epistemologically superior. Orientalist, colonial, and Eurocentric ideologies, discourses and systems are rooted in dichotomies of the West and the rest. Sayyid stresses (2015, xvi) Eurocentrism is not 'simply bias in scholarship or statecraft, but an attempt (geographical, cultural and epistemological) to shore up Western or white privilege'. My usages of these terms signify this current world order where, the West is depicted as normative, superior, civilized, and modern in comparison to the non-West. My use of these terms signifies this construction, that is institutionally, politically, and academically, through state mechanisms, including the media and universities, creating a depiction of the West in contrast to the non-West. I do not insinuate that such depictions and conceptions of the West are held within the geographical West collectively. I would argue such epistemological conceptions of the normative, superior West relate to the systematic and institutional powers that are the gatekeepers of ideas of Western hegemony and superiority.

Islam

Regarding Islam, Sayyid suggests it is a master-signifier. 'What this means is that there are no multiple Islams, but rather that all Muslims attach themselves, and are attached by others, to one Islam' (Sayyid, 2015, xxiii). Despite varying interpretations of Islam, it is the attachment to this term and attempts to interpret this *one* Islam that unifies Muslims together. 'Islam is the name that gives Muslims a name' (Sayyid, 2014, 1) As such, throughout this thesis my general usages of the term Islam are to signify Islam the master-signifier. More specifically though, when I speak about honour *within* Islam and Muslim communities, I use the term Islam here to refer to the textual tradition within Sunnī Islam. Therefore, my inquiry into honour *within* Islam refers to honour in the Qur'an, Prophetic sayings, and classical legal tradition. At times I also refer to this as *the tradition*. My examination of honour within Muslim communities then refers to the lived practice and realities of honour in the lives of Muslims.

Textual conceptions and usages of honour cannot be deemed as representative of the lived realities and practices of Muslims. To fully comprehend the significance of honour in the lives of Muslims and to account for how textual conceptions have been transformed it is crucial to examine the lived realities of Muslims. As such, a textual inquiry and an inquiry into historical and practical lived realities are equally of relevance. However, an in-depth historical inquiry is beyond the capacity of this research project. Nonetheless, some historical inquiry is present alongside an examination of contemporary lived realities of Muslim communities. Thus, despite this project containing both textual and historical inquiries, it is primarily a textual inquiry that proposes reformation to practices and conceptions of contemporary honour beliefs and practices based on scriptural and textual reinterpretations.

Islam and Culture

History substantiates that Islam has always assimilated cultural practices. Culture can be understood as:

... all man's shared beliefs, values, ways of making things, ways of behaving. Culture includes games, songs, and dances; ... the structure and operation of families, governments, and educational systems; the division of authority, assignment of roles, and establishment of norms within such systems; language and all other codes, and the shared

concepts which are encoded; ... and to ensure through social pressure and rewards the carrying out of its imperatives. These shared behaviours and predispositions, part of us and of the people who surround us, we call the cultural context.” (Cited in Baldwin et al. 2006, 148).

Islam and culture can therefore never be separate and distinct, rather they overlap and assimilate in many ways. According to Leila Ahmed (1992), as early as the Arab conquests we saw two processes: the Arabisation and Islamisation of conquered places. Giving the example of Iraq she states that alongside these two processes was the

...simultaneous integration of the culture, customs, and institutions of this culturally and administratively complex region into the emergent Islamic civilization. Fusion and assimilation took place in a broad variety of ways, including in the lives of individuals, in administrative and bureaucratic practice, and in the literary, cultural, legal, and intellectual traditions’ (Ahmed, 1992, 81).

Such assimilation has been welcomed in the legal sphere through principles such as *‘urf* (custom), for instance (Kamali, 2003). As such Islam has never been detached from the cultural ideals, values, and traditions of varying Muslim communities. This contributes to why Muslim communities are not identical in their practice of Islam and why varying interpretations exist. The belief and practice of Islam do not occur in a vacuum.

Yet, the assimilation of cultural ideals and norms, such as ideals of gender and sex by early scholars have also proven to be problematic. According to Ahmed (1992, 82) gender norms, assumptions, and practices of the Abbasid age ‘...became inscribed in the texts the men wrote, in the form of prescriptive utterances about the nature and meaning of gender, or silently informed their texts simply as assumptions about the significance of women and gender’. When interpretations of Islam informed by cultural influences are considered as definite, and ahistorical then the universality of Islam and its ability to adapt, embrace and evolve is reduced. This tension will be examined

further throughout this thesis. What is certain is that Islam and culture cannot be separated and therefore an inquiry into the lived realities of Muslims is equally important as a textual inquiry. An examination that exclusively focuses on texts cannot represent how those texts are utilised and implemented in practice.

Muslim communities and Muslim Women

Just as Islam is not static as such, Muslim communities and Muslim women are not homogenous. Their lived experiences, social, political, economic, historical, cultural realities etc. impact their existence. My usage of these terms thus does not imply that they are uniform or static. I use these terms instead, as broad markers of diverse and complex individuals and groups. At times I also use the term Islamicate. Islamicate refers to 'not directly to the religion, Islam, itself, but to the social and cultural complex historically associated with Islam and the Muslims, both among Muslims themselves and even when found among non-Muslims' (Hodgson, 1961, 59).

Honour

The term honour is a politically loaded term. It has a complex Western history (see chapter 2). It is also a term associated with Muslims and Islam in a problematic and reductionist manner. Yet, to address, challenge and disrupt the inconsistencies of the term honour it becomes necessary to use this very term. The use of this term is also central in deconstructing and reconstructing to arrive at a reconceptualisation. Therefore, throughout this thesis, I retain the use of this term despite its overwhelmingly negative inferences. I will discuss the term honour and the related Arabic terms of *sharaf*, *ghayra*, and *'ird* alongside the dichotomy of honour and shame in more detail in chapter 2.

Double patriarchy, double oppression

Although this project avoids setting a stagnant and condensed definition of honour, current usages, and associations of the term honour to HBV are not only inadequate but detrimental to the lives and rights of Muslim women. The concerns of this project are thus:

1. Challenging and disrupting the patriarchal conceptions of honour that exist within Muslim communities to arrive at a gender-egalitarian and just concept of honour.
2. Exposing and critiquing the manipulation of honour in the West, which occurs through Western epistemic and political systems of power, against Islam, Muslim women, and men which, in of itself is a form of patriarchy.

According to Asma Barlas (2015), patriarchy can be defined in 'narrow (specific) and broad (universal)' terms (2015, 12). The narrow specific form of patriarchy relates to traditional patriarchy. This patriarchy assumes 'a specific mode of rule by fathers'. It is based on the view 'of God as father/male and a theory of father-right extending to the husband's claim to rule over his wife and children' (2015, 12). Patriarchy in its broad universal form is a 'secular politics of sexual differentiation that privileges males by "transforming biological sex into politicized gender, which prioritizes the male while making the woman different (unequal), less than, or the 'Other'" (Eisenstein 1984, 90 cited in Barlas 2002, 12). Patriarchy, therefore, associates social differences with biological differences. Socially constructed gender norms are therefore imposed according to biology and sex, privileging males.

The concept of honour is utilised by patriarchy, be this within Islam or externally through Western ideological projects of Eurocentrism, colonialism, and Orientalism. Internally honour is exploited through the dominance of a male-centric patriarchal reading of Islam that has been constructed and emphasised by a male elite. This form of patriarchy is what many reformists and Muslim feminist scholars and activists are challenging within the contemporary period.

The external patriarchy

But there also exists an external form of patriarchy that Muslim women are victims of. The weaponisation and politicisation of Muslim women, particularly since the colonial period, is an external form of patriarchy. Within the West popular mentionings of honour in Muslim communities and Islam seem to exclusively relate to HBV. Honour is utilised as an example of the depraved system of practice and belief within Muslim communities. Through exclusive coverage and mentioning of harmful honour practices, by the West, we see Islam and Muslim communities depicted as other,

barbaric, backwards, and primitive. A system of belief and practice that is complex and vast is reduced to the aspects of it which are harmful. The West is thus relegated to the position of saviours of Muslim women from this harmful system. In presenting itself as liberating, modernised and a bearer of justice, the West is centred in calls to emancipate Muslim women. The Muslim woman is thus reduced to a homogenous category incapable of knowing her rights and incompetent to achieve justice for herself. Harmful conceptions of honour and Muslim women also exist internally within Muslim communities and their patriarchal understandings of Islam.

The internal patriarchy

The Muslim woman is constantly policed by the *necessity* to guard honour, her own honour, the honour of her family and community, and the honour of *men*. She is deemed as the vessel of honour. Her actions are determinant to the position of honour. She alone is held as capable of preventing shame or causing it. An honour concept is linked to everything Muslim women do. Concepts of honour and shame are evoked as a way of deterring women from visiting the mosque, for it is better for them to pray in their homes, to not take up certain careers as they are shameful for women, to not dress in a way that can be deemed as shameful by society, to not be seen with a male who is not her guardian (*mahram*) in public, to not be alone outside the home at certain times, to not visit certain places, . . . the list can go on. Quite simply, honour and shame can be used to dictate and control every aspect of a Muslim woman's life.

Yet, despite the awareness of these prevailing beliefs within the Islamicate there appears to be no rigorous inquiry into what exactly a concept of honour is. The fight for gender justice within Islam has become vigorous through the works of modern reformists thinkers and Muslim feminists. There is no doubt that Muslim women are actively addressing the internal challenges they face within their communities both in the name of Islam and culture. Polygamy, forced marriages, female genital mutilation, men as the maintainers of women (*qawammun*), sex segregation, female dress codes, education rights, employment rights, marriage and divorce rights are but a few of the topics being critiqued and reformed within the modern period. Linked to many, if not all of these contemporary concerns, is a concept of honour. There appears to be a clear acknowledgement of the role an honour ideology plays in the emphasis and

existence of many patriarchal practices that impact Muslim women today. Yet there is no inquiry into this concept.

HBV is acknowledged by some reformist scholars, such as Asma Lamrabet, as injustices that *can* be justified by certain readings of Islam (2016, 2). Fatima Mernissi also acknowledges that some Muslim authors link female infanticide to honour (Mernissi, 1991, 190). (These positions will be examined in chapter 1). More common though and less noticed, or focused on, are the casual references to honour in both traditional and reformist scholarly works (Ibrahim, 2020, 32-38). Honour, and at times shame also, is mentioned with no clarification, as if it is a concept that readers are well informed of and can comprehend the value system attached to it. There never appears an explanation let alone a direct in-depth inquiry into exactly what the concept of honour in Islam is. It is a concept taken for granted.

Honour an abstract concept

This readily referred to concept of honour is dominant but continues to exist without any meaningful critique or inquiry into how or why it has been afforded such a position.

As a Muslim woman, my desire to research the concept of honour is both personally and intellectually motivated. I was aware of the existence of a concept of honour, one which influences my possibilities. It is a concept that I know is central to my identity and existence. Alongside the external impositions of these 'honour' ideals, I also impose some standards of honour upon myself. Yet, the significance of honour in my life was not simple for me to explain. It was this lack of clarity for such a central concept that this research intended to overcome. Very soon though, it became clear that the lack of clarity is rooted in the hijacking of the concept of honour. A concept appropriated by a double patriarchy causing it to be determinantal to Muslim women.

Despite these patriarchal understandings dominating the concept of honour, it is still significant in the lives of many Muslim women. Many Muslim women embrace the concept of honour and utilise, reform, and adjust it according to their lived realities. They embrace the positive aspects of honour and challenge and reform the harmful aspects (this will be further discussed throughout this thesis, particularly in chapters 7 and 8) (Brohi, 2018; Withaecks and Coene, 2014).

However, countless women are dominantly still the victims of harmful honour beliefs and practices from both double patriarchal manipulations. I argue, however, that the lack of clarity regarding the concept of honour is what allows the concept to be dominated by patriarchal understandings and manipulations. Honour remains an abstract concept for the endorsers of honour, in academic works, in religiously motivated scholarly works. Simply put, a satisfactory understanding and explanation of honour within Islam, embedded and influenced by the authoritative sources of Islam, that Muslims claim inform all their beliefs and actions, does not seem to exist. Honour as a concept is being sabotaged by patriarchal understandings. Its dominant contemporary usage is formed, influenced, and motivated by patriarchy. But Islam is used as a signifier, as the hallmark of Muslim beliefs and praxis of honour. This is an association that can no longer be taken for granted. If honour is existent and necessary within Islam, then this must be proven. Honour as it exists today must be disrupted and dismantled. Ultimately the concept of honour in association with Islam must be substantiated, critiqued, and reconceptualised.

The research questions

Regarding the contemporary period and the concept of honour and its impact on Muslim women two issues are pertinent:

1. The internal patriarchal sabotaging of the concept that has reduced the concept to a system of policing and controlling Muslim women
2. The manipulation and utilisation of the concept of honour by external patriarchal projects to reduce this complex concept and to make demands from Muslim women on their behalf.

To address these concerns this project aims to answer the following research questions:

1. What concept of honour can be derived from the Qur'anic text?
2. What Prophetic usages and conceptions of honour can be derived from the ḥadīth corpus and how have classical ḥadīth commentaries of these Prophetic usages impacted Muslim women?

3. How can Qur'anic and Prophetic honour conceptions be used in relation to the reformation of legal rulings in Islam that have a detrimental impact on Muslim women?
4. How have textual honour ideals and codes been transformed and developed into contemporary Muslim community beliefs and practices?
5. To what extent have Western usages and conceptions of honour in Islam and contemporary Muslim communities impacted Muslim women and the notion of honour for Muslims?
6. What frameworks are necessary for a reconceptualisation of honour ideals and praxes within the contemporary that can result in egalitarian and context-relevant understandings of honour?

Researcher positionality

Objectivity in works such as this is not a reality. When researching cultures, communities, religions and their belief and practice systems it is not possible for a researcher to completely detach their own experiences and biases in their work. This however does not mean that a researcher cannot produce research that is significant and critical. On the contrary, in some instances, the positionality of the researcher can be crucial in paving the way for reform and criticality. My positionality is central to the aims and the outcomes of this research.

The urgency to research the concept of honour arises from my lived experiences of Islam within a British South-Asian Muslim community. Although the implications of this research are relevant to all Muslims, this primary audience has influenced the research questions and methodology. As such the methodology of inquiry is based on the English term 'honour', and the subsequent sources and the translations of these sources I use within chapters 4 and 5 are informed by how tradition is received within this community (see chapters 2, 4 and 5 for further details on the selection of sources and usage of the term 'honour'). The English term honour will reveal:

I conducted this research as a believing Muslim woman. My concerns and motivations in researching this topic stem from my position as a Muslim woman. Although this research has been driven intellectually and academically, it is my identity, my lived experiences, and my reality as a Muslim woman that truly ignited the desire and sense

of urgency to examine the topic of honour. Moreover, it is the domination of a patriarchal male elite in dictating the concept of honour that I challenge through my position as a Muslim woman. My positionality centres the voices and experiences of Muslim women.

Muslim scholarship, throughout history, has traditionally been dominated by a male elite that emphasises a male-centric interpretation of Islam.

Despite examples of exceptional female scholars and personalities, the reality is that female scholarship and intellectual engagement was not equal to that of males (Nadwi, 2007). Women were not afforded a comparable space to men. In the contemporary period, female scholarship and engagement with the tradition have arguably increased. Yet, much of this contemporary female scholarship is not granted space within normative Islamic scholarship. For female scholars who call for gender justice and critique patriarchal manipulations of Islam, it seems as though little to no space is granted at all except in academia, or female-led organisations such as Musawah or Sisters in Islam.

Nonetheless, within the contemporary period, the works of female Muslim scholars are innumerable and a driving force in the critique of patriarchal understandings and practices of Islam. This research, therefore, contributes to the growing field of research that centres the voices and positionality of Muslim women.

Female Scholarship

In this contemporary period, we find female scholarship can be placed into four main categories relating to Islam and Muslim women.

1. Those who completely reject the possibility of an egalitarian reading of Islam. They see Islam as patriarchal and incompatible with feminist ideals of gender equality.
2. Second, are the female scholars who identify as Muslim feminists and embrace feminist methodologies and frameworks as the means to arriving at gender justice and the egalitarian message of the Qur'an.

3. Third, are female scholars who primarily identify as believing Muslim women rather than Muslim feminists, motivated to the cause of gender justice primarily because of the Qur'anic egalitarian message and Qur'anic worldview of justice.
4. Finally, are those female scholars who uphold patriarchal interpretations of Islam. (I will not comment any further on these scholars as their work upholds commonly known prevailing male-centric interpretations of Islam).

Regarding the first group, which is the stance of white feminism and secular feminism, this position is refuted by the works of the female scholars in the second two categories who not only critique patriarchal readings of Islam but substantiate the egalitarian and gender-just message of Islam. Female scholars in this category do not conceive Islam as compatible with justice and rights for women. For such secular feminists, Islam is the problem and thus patriarchal understandings of Islam are conceived as the only possible interpretation. It is such feminism that we find coalescing with the external Western patriarchal manipulations of honour. Just as patriarchy reduces the Muslim woman to a homogenous, depraved category incapable of knowing her rights, similarly, white secular feminists perceive the Muslim woman as being victims of false consciousness and the possibility of their liberation is through denouncing backwards beliefs and practices of Islam and embracing liberal secular beliefs and values.

In refutation to secular feminists are female scholars who demonstrate how feminist frameworks and methodologies can be utilised and be of benefit in achieving gender-just readings of Islam. Female scholars such as Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Mulki al-Sharmani, Ommaima Abou-Bakr, Fatima Mernissi (to name a few) substantiate in their works that patriarchal interpretations of Islam can be refuted. Methodologies and frameworks utilised by these Muslim feminists demonstrate that gender-just and egalitarian readings of Islam can be achieved and as such Islam is not inherently patriarchal. Their works emphasise that gender justice is intrinsic to Islam. The possibility and space to uncover this message can be found within Islamic/Muslim feminism.

The third category is inclusive of female scholars who do not embrace the category or label of feminist (for various reasons). Scholars such as Asma Barlas (2002) demonstrate the possibility of uncovering the Qur'anic message of gender justice

through the Qur'an itself. As such they emphasise that Islam is intrinsically egalitarian and calls for gender justice.

Since the beginning of Islam, with for instance the querying of Umm Salama, the wife of the Prophet Muhammad, as to why the Qur'an did not address Muslim women, Muslim women have been engaging and demanding justice. This has varied throughout Muslim history and of course conceptions of gender justice today cannot be imposed on the past. However, even in avoiding such presentism, it is clear, that before the development of feminism and feminist methodologies and frameworks Muslim women have engaged in scholarship and intellectual inquiry. Moreover, if we believe the Qur'an is intrinsically egalitarian and gender-just then we must acknowledge that this gender-just message existed before and without feminism.

Within this category of scholars who do not embrace the label of feminism, we can also include scholars such as Celene Ibrahim (2020) and Shuruq Naguib (2010) although I attest that each of their positionalities is unique (unlike Barlas for instance they do not claim classical scholarly works are entirely patriarchal). Naguib (2010) in her research presents an interesting middle position from that of Muslim feminists and traditional patriarchal interpretations of Islam.

She disrupts the binary of modern/feminist/egalitarian vs traditional/male-centric/patriarchal readings of Islam (Naguib, 2010). She stresses that the devaluing and excluding of classical scholars is not only excluding male scholars but female voices also. This 'counter-position' is what renders most feminist scholarship as outside of 'communal perspective'. As such we need a reading and engagement within the tradition that is critical and inclusive. Rather than disregarding classical and traditional scholarship in its entirety, we must embrace this intellectual history whilst also being critical of it.

It is this position to which I find myself most closely aligned. Despite my work being motivated primarily by my position as a believing Muslim woman, I am indebted to many great Muslim feminist scholars. Although my ideals of gender justice are embedded in the Qur'an, Muslim scholarship throughout the ages has not fully nurtured a space for Muslim women to critically engage with and create scholarship

equally to men. Nor can we expect that it has been driven by our modern ideals of gender justice. Muslim women have been marginalised in traditional spaces and scholarship. Inevitably this has led to concerns of Muslim women not being addressed in an adequate meaningful manner. Traditional scholarship and their concerns have been male-centred. Thus, although it is my firm belief that gender justice is intrinsic to Islam, I acknowledge that my ability to address the dominance of patriarchy and gender inequality within Islam would be difficult without the work, methodologies, and frameworks brought forward by female Muslim scholars and feminists. Nevertheless, I attest that despite Muslim women not being positioned equal to men in traditional scholarship, this scholarship is both necessary and beneficial for contemporary scholarly works.

Traditional scholarly works pave the way and are a part of Muslim intellectual history. Denouncing or completely rejecting the historical scholarly contributions of the past is erasing crucial intellectual endeavours of Muslims throughout history, men, and women. Rather than dismissing these works and methodologies, as some feminist scholars call for, or following them uncritically, as many conservative scholars do in the contemporary era, a middle position, as proposed by Naguib is crucial. We must engage with the tradition and embrace its strengths; however, we must also be critical of it.

As such I see my research as a demonstration of the possibility and the necessity of situating female Muslim scholarship in the normative category of Muslim scholarship despite it utilising Muslim feminist frameworks and methods. The borrowing and utilisation of methodologies and frameworks is not something new to the contemporary period, or Muslim female scholarship. On the contrary classical male, Muslim scholars did this throughout history in their use of Greek philosophy, for instance. As such I label myself as a believing Muslim woman and not a feminist, yet this work does utilise feminist arguments, since it is not possible to avoid doing so when Islamic feminism has centred the concerns of Muslim women, and gender justice, in a manner that normative Muslim spaces have not.

My reservations in endorsing the label of feminist also relate to the term feminism being politically charged and its consequences on Muslim communities. The term

feminism is looked to with suspicion in most normative Muslim spaces due to reasons such as the external patriarchy I have mentioned above, and secular feminism. It is integral in research that deals with practices and concepts that are central to Muslim community consciousness that such work is centred around those concerned. Although a thesis is for a specialist academic audience the subject of this thesis is one that concerns the Muslim community. As such, I have been conscious of endorsing methods and sources that are deemed authoritative within this community. If this research is to have an impact beyond the academy and discipline of Islamic studies, then it must be conscious of what the community deems as authoritative and actively engage with these sources. Thus, although I consult feminist frameworks and methodologies this thesis primarily relies on the primary sources of authority in Islam - the Qur'an, and Prophetic sayings - to construct an egalitarian conception of honour.

This research is therefore also influenced by a decolonial framework. To arrive at an understanding that is both egalitarian and embedded in the authoritative sources of Islam this research sees it necessary to disrupt colonial and Eurocentric logic. To enact this disruption this research:

1. Uses Muslim authoritative sources as the dominant and foundational sources
2. Centres Muslim academic research and Muslim experiences
3. Is critical of Eurocentric sources and standards
4. Critiques Eurocentric conceptions of honour and shame that are taken for granted and as normative

Methodology

This thesis applies a variety of research methods due to its varying analytical aims. This project is multi-disciplinary and therefore engages in intersectional analysis. This research engages in a discourse analysis of honour in the contemporary era, historically and in scriptural and textual sources. To conceptually analyse honour this research looks at historical Western usages of the term honour alongside pre-Islamic honour beliefs and practices. It compares these historical usages of honour to contemporary Muslim beliefs and practices to identify how the concept of honour developed and transformed into its contemporary form. This historical inquiry will be

brief as the primary concern of this research is a theoretical reconceptualisation of honour.

When examining the Islamic sources of authority, source criticism and discourse/lexical analysis will be endorsed. To achieve a critique and reconceptualisation of honour, honour occurrences within the Qur'an will be examined through classical exegetical and contemporary hermeneutical methods. Many contemporary Muslim feminists centre the Qur'anic text in their reform works. However, central to this research project is *also* the Ḥadīth corpus. Despite critiques of the authenticity of the Ḥadīth corpus in academic works, it is an authoritative source in the Muslim tradition and normative Sunnī Islam (see chapter 5). As such, this project relies on both the Qur'anic text and Prophetic sayings in its reconceptualisation of honour.

A theoretical reconceptualisation of honour, however, is not enough to bring reform to negative practices that exist within Muslim communities. This research, therefore, also examines how the concept of honour based on the Qur'anic text and Prophetic sayings can be utilised for reformation in Islamic law. Here the research shifts to focus on the philosophy and ethics of law. Normative religious texts will be critically analysed, as will traditional juristic legal tools.

Reform in law cannot be solely designated to legal manuscripts and rulings within traditional legal thought. For meaningful reform, the impact of contemporary law on Muslims, and specifically Muslim women, must be considered. Therefore, this research engages in a socio-political inquiry into the existence of honour within contemporary Muslim communities and legal systems. The later part of this project is dedicated to examining honour as it is perceived within the contemporary West to allow for an understanding of how honour has been racialized in the present.

Overall, this research engages in a female-centric, intersectional tradition-based approach. It is both a conceptual and textual analysis.

Chapter breakdown

The chapter breakdown for this thesis is as follows:

Chapter 1: Literature review

This thesis begins engaging in a review of the academic discussions and examinations of honour and HBV, that exist in contemporary scholarly works. This chapter will highlight the gaps in scholarship and the subsequent aims of this project. The literature review expands on some of the concerns addressed in this introduction.

Chapter 2: The reality of honour

Chapter 2 will begin with examining the English term honour, to account for its specific history and usages. Alongside the English term, Arabic comparable terms will be examined such as *'ird*, *ghayra*, *sharaf*, etc. This chapter will identify the internal problematic practices of honour alongside challenges of translation and language within the contemporary. I will present an inquiry into the broad spectrum of honour praxes and beliefs within the Islamicate. This chapter stresses the necessity of embedding a reconceptualisation and critique of honour within the textual tradition of Islam.

Chapter 3: Honour in Pre-Islamic Arabia

Chapter 3 examines the socio-cultural context of pre-Islamic Arabia, where the Qur'anic revelation occurred. This context will shed light on how the Qur'anic text addressed prevailing honour praxis. It will also briefly present the existence of honour before and beyond Arabia to disrupt misconceptions of honour as a practice exclusively associated with Arabs. This chapter will therefore lead the way to uncover whether the Qur'an disrupted existing honour practices, reformed them, abolished them, or enforced a completely new system of honour.

Chapter 4: Honour within the Qur'anic text: a theological consideration

Chapter 4 presents a concept of honour derived from the Qur'anic text. It utilises both traditional exegesis work and Islamic feminist Qur'anic hermeneutics to present the possibility and necessity of a holistic ethical Qur'anic conception of honour. Honour occurrences within the Qur'anic translation of Abdullah Yusuf Ali are identified through a linguistic inquiry and a thematic analysis. The commentaries of Yusuf Ali (a contemporary commentary) alongside the classical *Tafsīr ibn Kathīr* will be analysed to compare conceptions of honour in classical exegesis and contemporary works. This

chapter presents the possible themes of honour that exist in the Qur'an. It stresses the necessity of critiquing reductionist gender-specific honour codes of the contemporary that are contrary to the broader holistic message of honour based on the Qur'anic text.

Chapter 5: Honour and the Ḥadīth

In acknowledging the position of Ḥadīth within Sunnī Islam the Ḥadīth is imperative to uncovering a conception of honour. This chapter will examine Ḥadīth on honour, in specific chapters in the canonical *Ṣaḥīḥayn* (*Ṣaḥīḥ Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*). I will examine Prophetic sayings that utilise the terms '*ird*' and *ghayra alongside*, classical Ḥadīth commentaries to analyse how these concepts were conceived by traditional Ḥadīth scholars. I will examine Ibn Ḥajar al- 'Asqalani's (d.852/1449) *Fatḥ al-Bārī*, a commentary on *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, and Imam al-Nawwai's (d.676/1277) commentary on *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. These Ḥadīth and commentaries will be reread considering the Qur'anic conception of honour discussed in chapter 4.

Chapter 6: Honour in *Maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*

To disrupt patriarchal honour practices, a reconceptualisation of honour based on the Qur'an and Ḥadīth must be used to reform and critique legal rulings. Chapter 6 explores the relevance of a *maqāṣid* approach in centring ethics of honour in legal reformation. It examines the inclusion of honour as a *maqāṣid* by both classical and contemporary scholars, taking into consideration how an honour *maqāṣid* can be of necessity for the reformation of legal rulings that are informed by or implicitly endorse honour ideals contrary to the Qur'anic and Prophetic concept of honour. This chapter focuses on the philosophy and ethics of law.

Chapter 7: Honour through the Western Patriarchal Lens: Orientalism, Colonialism, and Islamophobia

Chapter 7 situates the challenges of honour into the contemporary focusing on the external forms of patriarchy. This chapter considers the impact of colonialism, the formation of nation-states, and patriarchy on the concept and usages of honour in the contemporary focusing on the impact of this upon Muslim women and Muslim communities more generally. It critiques popular western reductionist cultural narratives that reduce a complex moral system of honour to exclusively HBV. This

chapter exposes the varying factors that contribute to the existence and challenge of honour within the contemporary period.

Chapter 8: A reconceptualisation of honour: new modalities and a framework towards reform

Finally, chapter 8 presents a framework of honour to be utilised to reconceptualise and reclaim honour in Islam. This framework is presented as a preliminary egalitarian honour framework to be utilised in the reformation of patriarchal conceptions of honour. This framework is developed based on the primary sources of authority in Islam and is one that can pave the way for a reconceptualisation of honour within Islam and Muslim communities. It focuses on the ethics of honour as a means of reclaiming the gender-neutral egalitarian just concept of honour as advocated in the Qur'an and Ḥadīth.

The concluding chapter focuses on future directions in the examination of honour in Islam and Muslim communities. It sets out the various trajectories in reclaiming honour from patriarchy.

Ultimately this research project reconsiders honour ideals, perceptions and practices within Islam and Muslim communities. Through reconsideration of honour perceptions and praxes, I intend to suggest new structures of understanding honour that can impact the manner honour is incorporated in Islamic law and within the Muslim communities to bypass patriarchal presumptions and constructions of honour that have had a deep impact upon the lives of Muslim women. This research aims to portray the possibility and necessity of arriving at egalitarian and gender-neutral conceptions of honour within Islam. Only after arriving at a gender-just conception of honour can we begin to reform gender-biased practices and laws that exist within Islamic jurisprudence and Muslim family law. The detrimental impact of gender-biased honour applications upon the lives of Muslim women can only be overcome by dismantling and reconceptualising the very concept that lays at the foundation.

Chapter 1: Literature review

1.1 Introduction

There exists an abundance of research on the concept of honour within Islam and Muslim communities, and its impact upon Muslim women. However, when analysing available literature, it becomes apparent that there are many gaps within the field. The following literature is a selection of what is available concerning honour in Islam and Muslim communities. These articles and chapters are representative of the main conclusions that are reached concerning this topic. This literature review provides an insight of and biases within contemporary honour literature.

The bulk of literature focuses on and, in some instances, exclusively associates honour ideals and practices with HBV. The overriding view of honour practices and beliefs being culturally influenced is also explored within some of the literature alongside the existence of honour praxis in relation to materialism. The examination of the notion of honour in relation to Islam is also present within the following literature, with the dominating conclusions disassociating Islam's influence from contemporary beliefs and praxis. Such research is critiqued in instances where the disassociation of Islam is not reached through a thorough examination of the Islamic sources of authority, specifically the Islamic legal apparatus. Nevertheless, research examining themes of patriarchy and sexuality in relation to Islam are presented. From the following literature it becomes clear that honour practices and beliefs exist within both Muslim and non-Muslim communities. Literature examining both types of communities are explored within the following. The existing notions of honour within these communities represent how honour ideals lead to practices aside from HBV. Thus, literature examining the broader implications of contemporary honour ideals is also presented. Due to this project dealing with the impact of honour ideals and practices on the lives of Muslim women it is deemed necessary to examine research by major researchers relating to Muslim women in Islam. These works, despite not directly dealing with honour ideals and practices, provide useful methodologies to a project dealing with the right of Muslim women in Islam.

1.2 HBV and cultural influences

A preponderance of literature dealing with the honour in Islam or Muslim communities focuses on HBV. Recep Dogan (2011) in his article *Is honour killing a 'Muslim phenomenon'? Textual interpretations and cultural representation* rightly expresses how communities with prevalent practices of HBV strongly associate with ideas relating to the concept of honour. Yet he expresses how it is 'cultural interpretations and understandings of honour and shame, rather than Islam or other religious beliefs, which dictate what is perceived as honourable and what is not...' (Dogan, 2011, 423). Dogan (2011) associates HBV with culturally influenced understandings of honour. He (Dogan, 2011, 424) attempts to dissociate any religious influence in relation to existing honour perceptions and HBV within Muslim communities by categorising any Qur'anic justifications as 'distorted and very conservative interpretations'. He further opines that Islam's 'true' principles have been distorted under the cultural façade of some Ḥadīth, whose authenticity is disputed (Dogan, 2011, 424).

For Dogan (2011) HBV is a product of social interactions that occur between members of a society. He associates their prevalence in Muslim communities with distorted Qur'anic interpretations and culturally manipulated Ḥadīth. Throughout the article Dogan (2011) holds strongly to the view that any justifications for HBV in the name of Islam are based upon distorted perceptions of the 'Islamic' concept of honour. He believes Islam's 'true and egalitarian principles' have been overridden by 'societal cultural norms' resulting in the honour practices and perceptions that exist within Muslim communities today (Dogan, 2011, 428). Dogan attempts to prove his argument through firstly presenting existing honour beliefs and then comparing these to what he perceives as contrary authentic interpretations of Qur'anic verses. Yet, Dogan fails to explore the concept of honour within the primary sources of authority.

Further, Dogan's attempt to separate religious and cultural influences upon honour ideals and praxis overlooks the relationship between religion and culture. His analysis comes with the assumption that both religion and culture are separate. However, religion is arguably formed, developed, experienced, and expressed within cultures. Religion is embedded within cultural experiences. It is therefore inadequate to argue that culturally informed practices cannot be influenced by Islam (see introduction).

Dogan (2011) stresses that the concept of honour that inspires HBV is closely associated with the concept of shame and is dependent on the conduct of all its members. However, what is required from male and female members differs greatly. The concept of honour rests on the ideal that a man's honour is affected by the conduct of his female family members and his ability to control and maintain their behaviour. As Dogan (2011, 425) expresses, 'the honour of a man obliges him to defend his honour and that of his family; and the honour of a woman obliges her to maintain and protect her purity'. This inevitably has led to the expectation of varying behaviours and attitudes from the different sexes.

Moreover, as Dogan (2011, 425-427) rightly conveys, the view that male honour can only be sustained through the control of female sexuality, has become a central belief in honour codes within contemporary Muslim communities. Female sexuality is explored extensively by Fatima Mernissi. In her book *Beyond the Veil: Male-Female Dynamics in Muslim Society* Mernissi (2011, 52) summarises the Muslim perception of female sexuality:

The Muslim woman is endowed with a fatal attraction which erodes the male's will to resist her and reduces him to a passive acquiescent role. He has no choice; he can only give in to her attraction, hence her identification with *fitna*, chaos, and with the anti-divine and anti-social forces of the universe.

Such perceptions of female sexuality have resulted in the honour of male Muslims and the Muslim community being dependant on the behaviour of Muslim women.

Dogan's (2011) method of examining the concept of honour is comparable to other researchers. He appreciates the existence of honour perceptions and HBV in various communities and highlights how to some extent they are more prevalent in Muslim communities in comparison to non-Muslim communities. He further presents key ideas that exist within Muslim honour codes. However, he dismisses the view that these honour ideals and practices may be emphasised and approved in Islam by means other than Qur'anic interpretations he identifies as distorted. Like many others, for Dogan (2011), the existence of honour codes and practices within the Muslim

community is a result of cultural modifications and influences and not authentic religious beliefs.

Yet, Dogan (2011) emphasises his view with the aid of a general exploration of a few Qur'anic verses and Ḥadīth which, it can be argued, do not sufficiently support his claim that honour ideals are not emphasised by Islam. He further fails to appreciate the impact other authoritative sources such as *fiqh* rulings or *uṣūl al-fiqh* may have had or may continue to have on the concept of honour that exists within Islam and contemporary Muslim communities. This failure has resulted in Dogan (2011) not acknowledging that the concept of honour within Muslim communities may have existed throughout the history of Islam and not just in contemporary communities. To fully comprehend the impact honour has on contemporary Muslim communities it is crucial that the concept of honour is examined in relation to all sources of authority within Islam including the Qur'an, *sunna*, legislation, and the tools used to form this legislation, *uṣūl al-fiqh*. Further it is vital that the development of this concept is investigated through an examination throughout history. Without such an investigation, concluding that honour ideals and practices within contemporary Muslim communities are a result of cultural influences is inaccurate and limiting.

Similar to Dogan (2011), Anushree Tripathi and Supriya Yadav (2004, 63) in their article, *For the sake of honour: But whose honour: honour crimes against women*, identify crimes influenced by notions of honour as 'culturally sanctioned homicidal violence directed at women'. They identify key factors that contribute to contemporary HBV as the pressure to preserve family honour, the reaction to suspicion of women regarding sexual relations outside marriage, victims of rape, unfaithful married women, women seeking divorce, women eloping with men whom they have chosen to marry or refusing to marry a man chosen by the family (Tripathi and Yadav, 2004, 64). Like Dogan, Tripathi and Yadav (2004, 64) appreciate that honour ideals such as the preservation of male honour through the obedience of females are '...deeply ingrained in both Islamic and Asian tribal cultures...'. However, they are also inclined to the view that HBV are not rooted in the Islamic tradition. Despite acknowledging that perpetrators of HBV 'defend their act of murder by referring to the Koran and Islam' they arrive at the conclusion that 'the concept of honour killing does not exist in Islamic law' (Tripathi and Yadav, 2004, 64-65). Yet, they fail to apprehend that the absence of

a clear authorisation for HBV within Islamic law does not substantiate that Islamic law or, Islam, has *no influence* or impact on honour codes or HBV. Although their claims may be correct, for these to have an impact within Muslim communities they require to be substantiated through use of the primary sources. Furthermore, the role of these sources and Islam in the justification of these crimes by perpetrators within Muslim communities must be accounted for and contested. What concept of honour can be derived from the primary sources of authority? It is vital to investigate if honour codes have had an influence on the construction of legal rulings in Islam.

Tripathi and Yadav (2004) identify that HBV are instigated by a variety of so-called Islamic ideals and practices, and it is therefore necessary to examine honour in connection to all these areas and not just honour killings. For example, they recognise that honour killings are predominantly perpetrated in the areas of marriage and divorce; nevertheless, they fail to critique legal rulings relating to marriage and divorce. One must question: did honour codes affect the formation of traditional legal rulings in relation to marriage and divorce? Do these legal rulings contribute to honour crimes today? If so, what honour codes were used to influence their formation? These questions are crucial if one is to challenge the existence of honour ideals and crimes within Muslim communities today. However, Dogan (2011), and Tripathi and Yadav (2004) all conclude that HBV is not associated with Islam simply because there is no direct explicit mention of HBV in the Qur'an, *sunna* or Islamic legal rulings. This is not a sufficient deduction as it assumes that examined verses are explicit in their meaning. However, one should not overlook the implicit verses within the Qur'an. The concept of honour within the Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth corpus is central to comprehending, addressing, and challenging contemporary honour conceptions within Muslim communities.

Tripathi and Yadav (2004, 77) present prevention methods for HBV. They argue, educating women on their human rights will assist in overcoming HBV. However, arguably it may be more effective to speak to Muslim women according to the modes they use to justify honour ideals and practices. If women within these communities believe that existing honour ideals and practices are justified and are a part of Islam, then attempts to overcome these practices must include communicating a more authentic understanding of honour within Islam.

In her article *Patriarchal Violence in the Name of 'Honour'* Aisha Gill (2006, 1-12) examines how British media reports misrepresents ethnic minorities in relation to honour crimes. Gill (2006, 1) highlights honour ideals do not only lead to killings, but they also influence a range of other violent and oppressive practices. These include 'forced marriage, the sisters and daughters being sold into slavery, mutilation, and the deprivation of freedom, education, or friendship' (Gill, 2006, 1). Gill (2006, 2) presents the general motivations behind HBV; however, she does not examine honour as an ideal within Islam. She (2006, 2) explains the concept of honour as 'very broad and inclusive, containing an entire codex of concepts and behaviours'. Her view is clear that honour is not a religious ideal.

One of the major concerns within the article is the positioning of HBV within 'the sphere of cultural and family frameworks' outside of legislative reform (Gill, 2006, 1). Gill (2006, 2) argues 'there is no definition of honour-based violence that is appropriate or relevant cross-culturally'. Within the article Gill (2006, 3) emphasises how media reports on HBV have 'influenced mainstream public perception of ethnic minority groups and even engendered racism'. She (2006, 5) emphasises that despite a general tendency of the media to portray HBV as a problem of Muslim communities it is not fundamentally Islamic. Like Dogan (2011), and Tripathi and Yadav (2004) she fails to critique whether beliefs that result in HBV are embedded within Islamic authoritative sources. She further argues that a 'more refined understanding of the relationship between culture and morality can lead to a more nuanced approach to the construction of a human rights framework' (Gill, 2006, 3). The remainder of Gill's (2006) article which focuses on universalism, cultural relativism and human rights is not directly relevant to the current research project. However, the article represents how Gill, like many others, does not examine honour and HBV through the Islamic sources of authority.

1.3 Honour and materialism

HBV is also examined by Tahira S. Khan (2006) in *Beyond honour: a historical materialistic explanation: honour related violence*. She defines, contextualises, and theorises 'various patterns and dimensions of violence against women committed in the name of an abstract notion of family honour or spousal passion' (Khan, 2006, x). Khan (2006, 3-132) presents how the terms honour and honour killings have been

used in electronic media for no more than 15-20 years, despite it always existing. Indeed, despite media coverage of HBV only being a modern occurrence, the concept of honour has existed in Muslim communities and in Islamic authoritative texts since the formation of Islam. What is difficult to locate however, is how this concept has developed and transformed. An examination and critique of the changes in perceptions of honour through time is an urgent need. Such an examination would require an intersection between diachronic and synchronic analysis to arrive at a thorough understanding of honour ideals and praxis.

Khan's (2006) methodology for analysing the Qur'an, and Ḥadīth is one that many have adopted. She examines verses pertaining to the duties and rights of Muslim women, their intellectual status, polygamy etc. (Khan, 2006, 85-93). However, she does not partake in an examination of honour as a concept within these sources. Khan (2006) examines these areas in a manner that researchers such as Dogan (2011) have. She explores verses and Ḥadīth that relate to the rights of women rather than investigating the stance of honour as concept or ideal.

She (2006, xi) adopts a historical materialistic approach when examining honour as she believes that 'oppression of women is a social, historical and alterable phenomenon...family and family relations are shaped by material forces such as the ownership of private property, and to a larger extent, the mode of production'. She emphasises how 'economic inequality preceded legal inequality...misogynistic laws have not emerged in a socio-economic vacuum...' (Khan, 2006, xvi). Her examination focuses on historical occurrences of HBV in Muslim and non-Muslim societies. However, this examination greatly focuses on honour crimes and not so much on honour as a concept or ideal and its broader implications.

Regarding the formation of legal rulings, Khan (2006) argues that religious leaders and scholars had material interests of their own when they formulated laws. She expresses how one of the most significant historical developments in Islam, 'During the first five centuries after the death of the Prophet had been the gradual construction and refinement of the *sharī'ah*, the religio-legal code for guidance' (2006, 26).

She argues that the draftsmen of the *shari'ah* were men who were not free from influences, especially influence from materialism. Khan (2006) does not explore whether these men were influenced by factors other than materialism. For Khan (2006), historical lawmakers were vested in protecting their own interests, which were inevitably impacted by their economic conditions. She expresses how the institutionalisation of veiling, segregation, polygamy, and concubines were all modifications and misinterpretations that occurred after the death of the Prophet due to the impact of social and economic activity (Khan, 2006, 27).

Despite Khan (2006) not exploring honour as ethical codes and a moral concept and their impact on the formation of legal rulings she does offer a useful critique and contextualisation of injustices against women as influenced by materialism and economic factors. For Khan (2006, 27-28), honour crimes and ideals become the result of 'the geographical and political expansion of the Muslim empire ruled by the Umayyad dynasty in the 8th century'. In turn 'by the time of the emergence of the Abbasid caliphate veiling and female segregation trickled down the elite groups of society to the middle classes in feudal villages, rural communities, and commercial towns and cities of the caliphate where today's modern states such as Iraq...are situated' (Khan, 2006, 27). She (2006, 31) expresses how egalitarian socio-moral attitudes had been transformed into aggressive socio-economic and socio-political values.

For Khan (2006), and correctly so, honour is a relative term that can be defined and redefined depending on socio-economic and cultural contexts. However, she fails to examine the development of honour throughout Islamic history within varying socio-cultural contexts. To critique the development and transformation of honour within contemporary Muslim communities it is crucial to investigate how honour codes arose and transformed throughout Islamic history.

Further, Khan (2006, 42) does not present a thorough examination of the term honour in Arabic. Rather, she traces the word honour to its Latin origins. However, if one is to critique Islamic sources of authority it is vital to explore terms relating to honour in the Arabic language. She further appears to cross between the terms honour and honour crimes when explaining these concepts. However, they are not interchangeable

notions or concepts and therefore deserve distinct definitions and examinations. This is something that is present in many research articles that focus on honour and HBV and is extremely problematic. Such methods result in the concept of honour being solely related to HBV. In reality, honour as a concept has considerable broader implications than exclusively HBV.

Khan (2006) presents the major contemporary factors that lead to honour crimes as adulterous, immoral and disobedient women. She further states how the perception of these factors as being shameful are dependent on how individuals chose to perceive them. 'There exists no such thing as honour/shame schema or piety/immorality unless it is recognised and perceived by the people living around us' (Khan, 2006, 63). One should therefore ask, why do Muslims recognise the concepts of honour and shame? Why do they associate this recognition with the religion Islam? Is their recognition approved and emphasised in scriptural texts? In addition to examining how materialism and economics contribute to this problem, we must critique the existence of honour in Muslim communities through sources Muslims believe justify their beliefs, the Qur'an, Ḥadīth, legal texts and throughout Muslim lived histories.

Khan (2006) presents the works of other major researchers relating to Muslim women and honour. She highlights the work of Nawal el Saadawi as examining honour in terms of women's anatomy and physiology. Lama Abu-Odeh examines honour in relation to contemporary Muslim communities. She explores honour crimes and the construction of gender in contemporary Arab societies. Abu-Odeh also focuses on legal perspectives but dedicates her examination to punishments and transgressions leading to honour crimes. Ghada Karmi traces the concept of honour to pre-Islamic Arabia and how sexuality, behaviours of women etc. impacted tribal honour whereas such factors today impact the family honour (Khan, 2006, 45). Nafisa Shah explores honour as a male value which is measured against a woman's body. For Shah, honour is masculine whereas shame is feminine (Khan, 2006, 46). Khan disagrees with Shah's classification and argues that both shame and honour belong to men, and women can only bring either shame or honour. The above contributions to the study of honour represent how most research concerning honour focuses on issues of sexuality and contemporary practices of HBV and punishments. There is still a major

gap concerning honour as a concept and ideal within the Islamic sources and how these ideals may have impacted the formation of legal rulings.

1.4 Honour within contemporary Muslim and non-Muslim communities

The literature on honour in relation to Muslims predominantly focuses on HBV. However, honour has broader implications and influences within Islam and Muslim communities aside from crimes and killings. Lila Ramas Shahani (2013) in, *A question of izzat: honour, shame and ownership among Sunnī Muslims in South Asia and the British diaspora*, focuses on two contemporary Muslim communities based on the literary novels *Brick Lane* by Monica Ali and *Maps for the lost lovers* by Nadeem Aslam. Shahani (2013, 270-280) focuses on the two communities present within the novels, a Bangladeshi community in London and a Pakistani community in North England. She explores how 'the intertwined notions of honour and shame are understood and transformed as they travel from their South Asian origins and are translated in the context of British Diasporic Muslim communities' (Shahani, 2013, 273). Shahani (2013, 273) argues that 'such translations - rather than rupture received ideas about honour and shame - actually become modulated and occasionally intensified...'.

For Shahani (2013, 274), the existence of honour ideals within diasporic Muslim communities within Britain are the result of Britain drawing from 'imperial practices of defining populations in sectarian rather than ethnic terms, stressing religious identity over race and ethnicity'. Such a claim suggests that Shahani perceives notions of honour as religiously influenced. For Shahani (2013, 274) it is due to the emphasis on religious identity that has allowed certain notions of honour and shame to remain rather than being opened to 'secular transformations'. As a result, Shahani (2013, 274) states how, 'this re-inscription of such notions also had an adverse effect on one of the most significant members of the diaspora- women'. Yet, Shahani claiming religiously influenced notions of honour and shame had not undergone secular transformation comes with the assumption that secularisation would overcome honour ideals and practices. However, HBV and crimes of passion exist within secular societies. Her claim dismisses the influences of varying factors such as race, ethnicity, economic condition etc. on the existence of honour related crimes and practices. In critiquing the existence of negative honour ideals and practices one must be conscious

to avoid exclusively identifying certain practices with certain cultures (see chapter 7).

Jonathon Brown (2016) in his article *Islam is not the cause of honor killings. It's part of the solution* emphasises how Islam does not endorse or authorise HBV. For Brown (2016) '...violence against women is a global problem with roots much deeper than the doctrines of one religion or the features of one culture' and therefore it must be addressed accordingly. Brown (2016) is steadfast on the view that HBV are far from a Muslim problem as crimes of passion are prevalent in many non-Muslim societies and further, that HBV are not the most prevalent form of 'femicide'. Although this may be accurate this does not undermine the prevalence of HBV within Muslim communities nor does imply that ideals and beliefs fuelling such practices are not existent or authorised within the Islamic sources of authority. For Brown (2016):

Shariah law has a clear position on honor killing, drawing directly on rulings made by the Prophet Muhammad: a husband who kills his wife and/or her lover has committed homicide like any other case, even if the husband caught the two in the act. The basis of this comes from Ḥadīths, or sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. When he was asked what would happen if a husband found his wife with another man, the Prophet responded that the husband could not kill him and that no one could be punished unless the husband brought four witnesses who had seen the act.

However, as previously mentioned the lack of approval for HBV does not clarify whether the Islamic sources of authority promote ideologies that may contribute to crimes or killings, or any other practice influenced by honour codes. Nevertheless, Brown (2016), unlike Shahani (2013), appreciates that HBV instigated by honour ideals do exist within non-Muslim societies also. He argues that the fact that the *sharī'ah* does not approve of HBV and that most laws relating to HBV within Muslim countries are imported from Europe indicate that 'violence against women is mankind's problem, and it's as much a part of the past and present of the West as anywhere else' (Brown, 2016).

Shahani (2013) recognises the existence of honour codes within contemporary Muslim

communities as a problem that is not isolated from religious influence. Rather, 'the patriarchal and misogynistic effects of honour and shame have been carried over and redeployed, both in Sunnī and Shi'a communities' (Shahani, 2013, 274).

She presents key honour ideals that exist within contemporary Bangladeshi and Pakistani diaspora communities. These include views of honour being central in relation to community and kin and the view of honour as a man's responsibility and shame as a woman's burden. These communities perceive men as the protectors of honour whereas women are seen as the preservers of honour. Such views impact the broader social, religious, educational, and economic rights of women. However, current research, despite presenting ideals of contemporary honour codes, fail to critique the development of these ideals against historical honour codes and fail to critique the broader implications of honour ideals upon Muslim women in relation to Islamic law.

Alongside appreciating the religious influence in the existence of contemporary honour ideals, Shahani (2013, 278) highlights that honour 'is ultimately less the product of a monolithic religion than an anthropological and historic-cultural construction. Like all such constructions, the complex of honour and shame is contingent upon changing conditions'. Shahani's (2013) conclusion is very much true even if one claims that these ideals are influenced by religion. Indeed, religious ideals and constructions are not free from influence of changing conditions. For instance, Islamic law can be derived from the utilisation of principles within *uṣūl al-fiqh* (tools of jurisprudence) that appreciate and give room to cultural practices and influences. Principles such as *istihsan* إِيْتِحْسَان (to approve), *maslahah* مصلحة (benefit or interest) and *urf* عرف (custom) etc. contribute to the flexible nature of Islamic law. *Istihsan*, which, literally means 'to approve or to deem something preferable' allows Islamic law to adapt within changing societies, encouraging 'flexibility and growth' (Kamali, 2003, 324-325). *Maslahah*, which literally means benefit or interest refers to 'unrestricted public interest...' (Kamali, 2003, 351). For al-Ghazali, 'maslahah consists of considerations which secure a benefit or prevent a harm...' (Kamali, 2003, 351). These principles also relate to *urf*, literally meaning 'that which is known' or custom is the collective recurring practice of a group of people that is perceived as acceptable by 'people of sound nature' (Kamali, 2003, 369). A detailed critique of these principles and their use within

Islamic law will not be provided, however, the existence of such principles represents how Islam is not free from influence of cultural factors.

Current research focusing on honour can also be categorised with reference to the varying Muslim communities it focuses on. Like Shahani (2013), Susan Ramussen (2015) in her article *Understanding honor in religious, cultural and moral experience* explores the importance of honour for diasporic Muslim communities in Britain. Ramussen (2015) highlights how, within her case study, attitudes to honour are shaped by both the religious and cultural identity of women. Ramussen (2015, 22) investigates why ideas of honour remain central to diasporic communities by providing a cross cultural comparative perspective. She uses her findings from field research in 'Tuareg communities of Norther Niger and Mali' and secondary data regarding Egyptian Bedouin Arab and Iraqi Kurdish societies, comparing these to the case study of diasporic British Arab Muslims.

Ramussen (2015, 23) questions how one is to classify practices within any community as either cultural or religious. She highlights how 'culture, not just theological doctrine or dogma, defines religion' (Ramussen, 2015, 23). Unlike researchers such as Dogan (2011) and Tripathi and Yadav (2004), Ramussen (2015, 22-26) recognises how both religion and culture can influence perceptions and practices within certain communities. Ramussen's findings within the Tuareg communities are not directly relevant to the aims of the current research and its British context; however, her findings represent key issues when examining practices such as honour. She (2015, 34) emphasises how:

Caution is needed in interpreting honor-related beliefs and practices within and across cultural settings. We need to carefully listen to what those enmeshed in these values and practices think about them. A religion may look very different from one society and culture to another, and it may also look very different within the same culture and society, from one context to another.

The examination of HBV in varying Muslim communities can also be found in the article *The Politics of honor: patriarchy, the state and the murder of women in the*

name of family honor, by Manar Hasan (2002). Hasan (2002) explores contemporary instances of HBV within Jerusalem. Within Hasan's article what is most relevant to this current research project is how honour and shame are defined and understood. Hasan focuses on defining honour in relation to family honour, as a patriarchal unit, referring 'chiefly to the honour of the males in the family'. As within the definitions of contemporary honour ideals by Dogan (2011), Khan (2006), Tripathi and Yadav (2004), and many others, Hasan (2002) presents the maintenance of honour through a system of male control and domination, maintained through the utilisation of a codex of laws that allows males to determine female 'behaviour, actions, desires and even their thoughts' (Hasan, 2002, 3). Hasan (2002, 3) further presents some Arabic terms relating to the behaviour of women, such as *Hishma*, which is associated with female sexual behaviour. Through the varying Arabic terms, she highlights key elements of contemporary honour codes within Arab societies including 'the demand that the unmarried woman remain a virgin, and that the married woman remain faithful to her husband, the term also serves public consciousness which demands that the Arab woman, like the wife of a king, should be above all suspicion in the eyes of the relevant community' (Hasan, 2002, 3).

According to Hasan (2002, 3) 'if one regards the Arabic *i'rd* عرض as equivalent to honour and its opposite 'aib عيب as equivalent to shame it becomes clear that the concept of family honour is very broad and inclusive, actually expressing an entire codex of concepts and behaviours incumbent in the main on females'. Indeed, it is clear from the variety of research conducted on HBV and the concept of honour within Muslim communities that honour is a vast concept. Moreover, the notion of honour in Islam is very much surrounded by unclear and even contradictory understandings. A clear understanding of the concept and its stance within Islam is something yet to be produced. Within her article Hasan (2002) moves onto to explore the honour ideals she presents regarding Palestinian society and examines the implications of the predominant understandings of honour upon women. The later part of Hasan's (2002) research is of less relevance to this research. However, her defining of honour represents two key issues. Firstly, as many others have represented, the burden of honour is predominately imposed on women. Secondly, the understanding of honour within Arabic varies greatly and hence, so do the implications of the concept.

The Christian missionary, Roland Muller (2001), explores concepts of shame and honour in Islam within his book *Honor and Shame: unlocking the door*. Muller's (2001) insights into honour and Islam are not distinct from his apparent missionary aims. However, he does identify honour with broader issues, such as education, something many academics have not done. Muller (2001, 89-91) highlights how within the Arab world hospitality towards guests is an act of honour alongside, a man obtaining education, entering a marriage, and a man's honour being dependent on his wife's behaviour. Despite Muller (2001) not engaging in-depth with the aforementioned areas, he does highlight how the notion of honour is central in Muslim societies. This is represented by the variety of issues honour influences. His work therefore highlights that honour, in Muslim communities, needs examination in a broader sense rather than just in relation to HBV.

Muller (2001, 93) also highlights Arabic terms for honour. *Sharaf* شرف (honour) encompasses 'pride and dignity that a family possesses due to its longstanding good reputation in the community for producing upright men and women who behave themselves well, marry well, raise proper children, and above all, adhere to the principles and practice of their religion' (Muller, 2001, 93). Another term Muller presents is '*ird*', something that can be ruined by even a lie. Muller's (2001) explanation of the Arabic terms is extremely limited. Nevertheless, he does highlight Arabic terms for honour, something that very few researchers have done when dealing with honour and Islam or Muslim communities. To examine the perceptions and practices of honour in Islam and Muslim communities, it is vital to understand the relevant Arabic terms for honour that are used within the sources of authority and within the Muslim communities.

In his book *The Honor Code: How Moral Revolutions Happen*, Kwame Anthony Appiah (2010) examines major moral revolutions that have occurred in the past and campaigns towards present revolutions. Within his examination he (2010) explores the historical practice' of duelling, foot binding and slavery. His (2010) exploration of these practices offers a useful analogy with the examination of honour ideals and practices in Muslim communities in that it represents how honour ideals can be transformed, developed, and implemented to overcome negative honour practices and perceptions.

Similar to James Bowman (2006) in his book *Honor a History*, Appiah (2010) examines the contemporary practice of honour killings in Pakistan. Appiah (2010, xvi) uses his examination of past events to 'address one of the most challenging problems that honor poses in the contemporary world: the murder of women and girls in the name of honor'. However, he highlights how the impact of honour ideals and perceptions is not only on HBV. Rather, these ideals and perceptions also impact a variety of other issues and thus, 'making sense of honor can help us grapple with other contemporary problems' (Appiah, 2010, xvi). As has been previously mentioned, honour ideals impact the social, economic, religious, and political rights Muslim women.

Bowman (2006, 15-40) and Appiah (2010, 139-172) both address the influence of honour on issues such as rape and tribal feuds in Pakistan. For Appiah (2010), overcoming practices such as honour killings requires a shift in honour codes, as has been seen in overcoming other gender-biased historical practices. He argues for reversing the use of honour:

We may have more success with the emancipation of women from honor murder in Pakistan if we work to reshape honor than we will if we simply ring the bell of morality. Shame, and sometimes even carefully calibrated ridicule, may be the tools we need. Not that appeals to mortality-to justice, to human rights-are irrelevant. For the aim of the anti-honor-killing activism should be to encourage more of the people of Pakistan to realize that their country is disgraced by allowing these wrongs (Appiah, 2010, 172).

Appiah (2010) argues that applying the concept of honour and emphasising perceptions of practices such as HBV as shameful, immoral, illegal, and irreligious will lead to overcoming negative honour practices. He (2010, 153) argues that 'there is almost universal agreement among qualified interpreters of Islam that honor killing is un-Islamic'. He (2010, 153) emphasises that it is 'widely agreed across the world of Islam that neither the Koran nor the Sunnah...nor the Ḥadīth ...endorse the killing of women by men in their own family'. Similarly, Bowman (2006, 19) argues

the honor culture of the Islamic world predates its conversion to Islam in the 7th century. Throughout the Islamic world, the local honor cultures tend to resemble those of non-Islamic and non-Christian cultures nearby...

However, like many others Appiah (2010) does not examine whether ideals that lead to HBV are emphasised within Islamic sources. Further, Bowman (2006) does not explore whether influences from non-Islamic cultures are approved of within the sources of Islamic authority. It is important to explore whether there are tools within *uṣūl al-fiqh*, such as those previously mentioned, that authorise the influence of foreign cultural practices and ideals within Islam. Does Islamic law aid the indigenisation of foreign practices?

1.5 Honour, patriarchy, and sexuality

The existence of honour perceptions and practices in Muslim communities has also been linked to the presence of patriarchy within these communities. In the article *The historical roots and occurrence of honour-related violence in non-Muslim and Muslim societies*, Fildis (2013, 1) examines 'the formative phase of religious-legal ethical codes for disciplining of female sexual conduct...'. Unlike many other researchers who emphasise that negative honour perceptions are not a problem of the Muslim community, Fildis (2013, 1) highlights how 'most of the incidents reported in the local and global media come from Muslim communities living in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia...' making it necessary to examine 'why honour-killing practices are still present in Muslim societies'. Fildis (2013, 7) presents how 'reports and statistics establish that, in recent times honour-related violent incidents have occurred mostly among dominantly Muslim communities'. This necessitates an examination into what role Islam must be playing in this dominance. Within this article honour is defined and is highlighted as 'a relative term and can be defined and redefined in various socio-economic and cultural contexts with different attributes and its source of meanings vary from culture to culture' (Fildis, 2013, 2).

Fildis (2013) argues that the process leading to the establishment of patriarchy contributed to the existence of gender biased honour ideals and practices. A warrior culture, favouring male dominance, emerged throughout a period beyond the Arab

world 'over a period of nearly 2500 years from approximately BC 3200 to 692' (Fildis, 2013, 5). Increasing populations and evolving cities in turn lead to the commoditisation of women. This in turn led to the institutionalisation and codification of the 'patriarchal family, designed to guarantee male control of female sexuality' (Fildis, 2013, 5). Fildis (2013), like Mernissi (2011) argues, that ideals within the Muslim community relating to female sexuality and patriarchy contribute to the existence and emphasis of honour practices. Fildis (2013, 6) stresses that in order 'to comprehend the nature of honour related violence against women in certain societies, it is crucially important to understand the religious basis and cultural determinants for the formation of the institution of family in the historical perspective'. She highlights how the family is the construction, and deconstruction point, for ethical, social, and religious boundaries in all major civilizations. The family unit is the point of where female sexuality is controlled, disciplined, regulated, and penalized (Fildis, 2013, 6).

For Fildis (2013, 6-7), all major religions and civilisations before Islam had sexual ethics, concerning women, similar to Islam. However, these religions and civilisations 'transformed their attitudes toward female sexuality and developed a more open and liberal attitude toward male/female dynamics in their societies' (Fildis, 2013, 7). However Muslim communities have not developed such views. Fildis (2013) therefore appreciates that the issue of honour perceptions and practices is an existing problem within Muslim communities which relates back to perceptions of Islam's sexual ethics.

Similar to Khan (2006), Fildis (2013, 7) also emphasises the influence of economic and material factors on 'socio-religious, legal and moral boundaries in ancient, pre-modern and modern communities'. She (2013, 11) argues that 'the process of industrialisation and modernisation did not follow the same route in the feudal Eastern Muslim cultures within the same timeframe because their economic and social structures and needs were different'. Aside these factors colonisation, arguably, also played a role in the continuation of HBV (discussed in chapter 7).

Brown (2016) highlights the role of colonisation in the existence of HBV in Muslim communities. He (2016) suggests utilising Islam as part of the solution in overcoming honour killings. As previously mentioned, he argues that the *sharī'ah* does not approve of honour killings and that most laws relating to honour killings within Muslim countries

are imported from Europe and thus, crimes against women are a problem of mankind and therefore 'a part of the past and present of the West as anywhere else' (Brown, 2016). Brown (2016) brings to the reader's attention of an incident that occurred 1947 in the British colony of Nigeria. A man who had been sentenced to death by *shari'ah* courts due to murdering his wife's lover was saved from the 'backwards ruling' by English judges who saw his crime as a crime of passion (Brown, 2016).

Indeed, Brown (2016) is correct in view that violence against women is a problem within the West as much as it is within the East. Nevertheless, there is still inadequate research on honour as a concept within the Islamic sources. If one is to use Brown's (2016) suggestion of utilising Islam as a solution for honour killings, then it is necessary to comprehend the stance of honour within Islam. Only then can one clarify this abstract notion of honour that exists within Muslim communities and promote a clear egalitarian concept of honour.

For Fildis (2013, 13) the major factors influencing honour crimes in contemporary Muslim communities are 'the tribal, feudal class and caste systems' alongside economic conditions. In turn, these factors impact gender relations and ideals. She rightly highlights how strict penal codes and law enforcement within these contemporary communities will not overcome the challenges related to honour ideals and practices. Rather 'it is a change in the public and family's perception of female sexuality, geared by a change in material conditions that would check honour-related violence' (Fildis, 2013, 14).

Fildis (2013) comes to conclusions similar to researchers such as Khan (2006). However, she also highlights and explores the role of certain ideologies, such as patriarchy, female sexuality ideals, and gender-specific roles and ideals in relation honour and shame (Fildis, 2013, 4). Her research represents how negative practices and perceptions relating to honour within contemporary Muslim communities are an issue that may have its roots within the religion in its normative framework and its cultural expressions specifically when concerning the institution of the family. Fildis (2013) prompts one to investigate the role Islam plays concerning such practices.

1.6 The broader negative implications of honour

Alongside investigating the role Islam plays in honour crimes and perceptions it is also vital to examine the broader implications of honour ideals. Forouz Jowkar (1986) in her article *Honor and Shame: A feminist view from within* demonstrates an examination of honour as a concept and its broader implications aside from honour crimes and killings. Jowkar (1986, 45) examines a variety of Mediterranean 'face-to-face' communities and how 'the notion of honor as the apex of social values and the embodiment of social ideals established the framework for one's social worth as it is recurrently evaluated and sanctioned by neighbours, relatives, friends, and foes'. Jowkar (1986) presents honour as an ideology that determines one's social value within Mediterranean communities.

She highlights how despite extensive research having been conducted on honour in Mediterranean communities 'the literature exhibited little theoretical concern for the study of the historical origin of the concepts of honor and shame...' (Jowkar, 1986, 46). Such can also be said regarding research conducted on honour ideals and practices in contemporary Muslim communities. The preponderance of such research deals with HBV and very little can be located relating to the origins of honour codes within Islam.

Jowkar (1986) explores the key ideologies that exist within Mediterranean communities relating to honour. These findings, while not directly relevant to the examination of honour ideal in Muslim communities, represents a helpful methodology that has not yet been used in the examination of honour ideals and practices in Muslim communities and Islam. As Jowkar (1986, 50) highlights:

No religious dogma by itself can account for the origin of sexual double standards. However, sexist institutionalized religious doctrines are fertile ground for the legitimation of tenacious sexual hypocrisy.

The existence of honour perceptions and praxis within Muslim communities may not be solely due to Islam. However, it is inadequate to dismiss Islam as an influencing factor without a thorough examination of all its sources of authority. The notion of honour within textual tradition of Islam must be examined to comprehend its stance and its resulting influences within Muslim communities today. Dismissing HBV as

culturally influenced does not assist in overcoming the broader challenges and issues relating to honour that impact Muslim women and does not appreciate the way religion and culture can interrelate.

Similar to Jowkar (1986), Pnina Werbner (2015) presents the impact of honour ideals on practices other than honour killings. In her article *Veiled interventions in pure space: honour, shame and embodied struggles among Muslims in Britain and France* Werbner (2015, 162) highlights how 'notions of honour, shame and female sexual modesty have dominated group social relations between families and lineage, and continue to do so in the rural context'. Werbner (2015) emphasises how contemporary practices of veiling and purdah in Muslim communities, are symbolic of female modesty and therefore family honour. Thus, honour ideals within contemporary Muslim communities do not just contribute to the subsistence of HBV; they also influence the policing and control of Muslim women within these communities. Honour ideals impact women within Muslim communities in a variety of manners. If these broader honour ideals and practices are to be overcome, it is vital to comprehend the stance of honour within both textual and normative Islam.

1.7 The Muslim woman within Islam and Muslim communities

The impending impact of contemporary Muslim ideals and praxis on the rights of Muslim women have been subject to examination and critique by various eminent researchers. The contributions of female scholars such as Amina Wadud (1999), Barlas (2003), Celene Ibrahim (2020), Kecia Ali (2006), Mernissi (2011), Naguib (2010), and Ziba Mir-Hosseini (2003), to mention but a few, have covered a variety of issues particularly relating to Muslim women. Their inquiries form the major segment of contemporary scholarship that has afforded Muslim women rights and a voice to examine, critique and challenge both contemporary and traditional ideals and practices that negatively impact Muslim women. It is thus anticipated that one should find detailed critiques and discussions regarding the concept of honour within Islam and its impact upon Muslim women within their works. However, a thorough exploration of such research exposes how despite countless core issues being addressed and challenged the concept of honour has vaguely been evaluated within their works, specifically in relation to Islamic sources of authority.

1.8 Conclusion

The aforementioned research covers major areas that relate back to an examination of the concept of honour within Islam. Substantial research has been conducted on honour within Muslim communities relating to Muslim women. Yet it is apparent that most research falls under fixed categories leaving many areas untouched.

The works of researchers such as Dogan (2011), Tripathi and Yadav (2004), Gill (2006), Khan (2006), Appiah (2010) and Bowman (2006) specifically look at the practice of HBV within Muslim communities. These articles address the issue of honour considering its existence within the Muslim community and within the religion of Islam. Yet articles that investigate the impact Qur'an and *sunna* have on the perception of honour, incline towards conclusions that any religious justification presented through the primary sources are distorted or culturally influenced interpretations. Such articles dismiss the prospect of Islamic legal theory and rulings having any association or justification for negative honour perceptions or practices. Many of these articles conclude that the existence of negative honour ideals and practices within Muslim communities today are due to cultural beliefs and practices or the result of economic and social conditions. There is no consideration for how these factors may interrelate with textual or normative Islam and therefore allow religion to also play a role in their existence.

It is crucial to critically examine honour in relation to Islam and all its modes of authority particularly when Muslim communities perceive their interpretations and practices of honour as intrinsic to their religion. It is imperative that an examination of honour codes is done in relation to how certain honour-endorsing communities justify and perceive them rather assuming or concluding that their perceptions are cultural interpretations. Such conclusions also overlook the authorisation of cultural ideals and practices within the Islamic sources of authority.

When looking at current research it becomes clear that a great deal of research deals with negative honour practices within specifically Muslim communities. The research of Hasan (2002), Ramussen (2015) and Shahani (2013) etc. despite examining different Muslim communities highlights some consistent honour beliefs revealing, there are many similarities and beliefs relating to honour across these varying

communities. It is thus necessary to question: what factor could be contributing to some honour ideals and practices existing consistently amongst culturally differing Muslim communities? Could this factor be related to Islam?

From the existing research, it also becomes clear that contemporary honour ideals and practices are greatly associated with HBV. Such literature can be regarded as overwhelmingly empirical in nature. This literature does not focus on theories, or on the broader framework upon which honour ideals are formed, exist, or develop. However, Fildis (2013), Jowkar (1986), Muller (2001), Shahani (2013) and Werbner (2015) explicate how the notion of honour can impact a variety of practices and beliefs. It is thus vital that an examination of the concept be conducted, one that is not dominantly empirical but rather engages with theories. Further, honour codes and perceptions impact the lives of Muslim women daily in regard to gender segregation, veiling, employability, economic rights, abortion rights etc. Yet most research dealing with these issues do not focus on the influence of honour upon their existence. Further, there is little literature examining the positive impact honour can have ideals and practices within Muslim communities. Can notions of honour be empowering to Muslim women?

What is mostly striking about current research on honour and HBV is that it becomes clear that HBV in the name of honour are largely inflicted upon women when they are regarded by the perpetrators of this violence as not following laws or rules that are enforced upon them by men in the name of religion; yet there is very little or no research available that examines the concept of honour in relation to legal theory and legal rulings in Islam. Questions relating to the basis of honour codes, formation of legal rulings that impact Muslim women, and the influence of honour on these rulings is largely left unaddressed.

Therefore, this research intends to examine the notion of honour, as a broader concept away from HBV exclusively, within the Islamic sources of authority. It intends to clarify the stance of honour as a concept within Islam. Is honour in Islam egalitarian? Furthermore, is there a positive notion and ideal of honour within Islam? But first and foremost, does Islam promote and emphasise a concept and system of honour?

Chapter 2: The reality of honour

2.1 Introduction

For one to reconceptualise an ideology and system of thought and practice one must know what that concept is in its current endorsement. Contextualising and exploring the use and stance of the concept of honour within contemporary Muslim communities is vital to comprehend why a reconceptualisation is necessary.

Within this chapter, I begin by examining the very term honour. Considerations will be given to the implications of using the English term honour when investigating beliefs and practices of communities and people who have a very different history from a Western or European one. I will engage in a conceptual analysis of the Western concept of honour. I will present lexical definitions alongside an exploration of how terms relating to honour are overloaded with a variety of implications. I will further evaluate and deconstruct key terms within the Arabic language pertaining to honour and define them as they are perceived today by Muslims within the diversity of their contemporary communities. The literal and varying communal perceptions of the meanings of these terms will be considered.

A general overview of honour manifested as an ideology and through practice will be provided. I will examine a selection of contemporary beliefs and practices, which are generally not explicitly associated to the ideology of honour, to critique how they are associated with the broader contemporary ideology of honour. In examining what I call the contemporary Muslim honour paradigm (CMHP), consequences of honour alongside beliefs and practices that can be seen as maintenance mechanisms as well as casual beliefs and practices will be identified. Subsequently, the broader implications of the notion of honour, aside from HBV will be examined. As this chapter aims to clarify the use of terms and to contextualise the contemporary stance of honour within Muslim communities I have relied entirely on secondary sources.

It should be noted that honour praxis and practices of any community are vast, overloaded with differences, contradictions, and a complex history. Thus, the construction of a comprehensive account is one which is difficult to form. In terms of

this research, focusing on a single community will not provide sufficient grounds to achieve the research aims: to provide a portrayal of the varying ways the ideology of honour is manifested by Muslims within the contemporary. Thus, I will not limit myself to a single geographic location, ethnicity, or a single Muslim community. Rather, I present the dominant expressions of honour as found within varying Muslim communities within the contemporary period. Many of the practices and beliefs that will be explored will reflect how certain honour ideologies transcend geographic and ethnic boundaries.

Within contemporary Muslim communities honour ideologies and praxis are reduced and restrictive in their attribution to Muslim women and their conduct. This restrictive notion of honour however is also indefinite and can be manipulated to concern all aspects of Muslim women's lives. Further, understandings and practices relating to honour vary from community to community. The lack of uniformity in honour beliefs can also be found within a single community, for example diasporic Muslim communities within Britain. Conversely, some beliefs and practices relating to honour appear to be consistent within various Muslim communities. There appears to be no specific, set-in stone, understanding of honour nor clear-cut beliefs and practices ascribed to an honour ideology. Yet, the presence of an honour system lingers within most Muslim communities, as will be presented in the following. This abstract nature of honour contributes to the easy manipulation of vulnerable members of honour-endorsing communities.

2.2 Universalising honour

When examining terms in a language foreign to one's own, we seek a proper comprehension through our own language. Thus, when beginning an examination of terms in the Arabic language relating to honour, it is a simple assumption that we may use the English term honour. However, our conception of the word *honour* impacts our comprehension and critique of the Arabic terminology. This without doubt necessitates that the term honour should not be taken for granted, and rather be subjected to an exploration. Accordingly, I present below an analysis of the English term honour, alongside the challenges that arise when using the word to comprehend non-western ideologies and practices.

The following exploration of the term honour will be mostly based on Frank Henderson Stewart's book *Honor* (1994). The decision to explore Stewart's book is based on the first section of his work dealing with development and classification of honour in a Western context with the second half focusing on Bedouin honour and women. It therefore becomes extremely relevant to comprehend how Stewart conceptualises the term honour in relation to Bedouin honour ideals and practices. It will shed further light on the risks and dangers of using Western notions of honour for non-western people that may possibly arise within my research.

Although I will not be comprehensively critiquing the notion of honour as an English term as such, as the task falls outside the remit of this research, I will still provide some understanding of the English term to facilitate a better comprehension of the forthcoming Arabic terms and the implications of using the term honour. This examination will highlight how the very foundational assumptions of honour within the West at times contradict, conflict, and oppose the foundational values of honour within the Islamicate. As such a Western lens in examining honour, and the use of the term honour cross-culturally is flawed and has various negative implications that will be expanded on in chapter 7.

According to Stewart (1994, 9) 'when an anthropologist or historian identifies something in a non-Western society as honor, the meaning is simply that the thing so identified is more or less the same as what is called 'honor' in ordinary English'. Understandings of the concept of honour in English is therefore applied cross-culturally. However, Stewart (1994, 9) addresses the concern that although the use of the English term honour is correct it does not allow one to arrive at a thorough understanding of these terms in languages other than English. This is due to the lack of an in-depth understanding of the notion of honour in English. Thus, when a term is translated to mean honour, its meaning cannot be comprehended to a satisfactory level (Stewart, 1994, 9). To arrive at a deeper understanding of equivalent or near-equivalent Arabic terms, Stewart (1994) emphasises beginning with defining terms in the language we perform our critique in.

Stewart's examination is one that proposes a conception and application of the English term honour that can be applied 'cross-culturally' (1994, 6, 31). However, he goes on

to say that 'the Western notion of honor has never been analysed in a satisfactory fashion, so when we say, for instance, that 'ird means 'honor', it is still far from clear exactly what 'ird is' (1994, 9). This begs the question of how the application of the term honour cross-culturally can be justified if the term has never been understood adequately? How can a term that is not sufficiently conceived be used to refer to practices from varying cultures? This projects ambiguities and misunderstandings onto the other cultures practices and conceptions of notions that we assume are similar/same but may well be very different. I disagree that the term honour is representative of the broad system of honour, the practices, and beliefs, found within Muslim communities. When analysing Stewart's (1994) understanding of honour it becomes apparent that some of the foundational aspects of a Western notion of honour differ from what can be deemed as foundational aspects of an Islamic concept of honour. For instance, honour is described by Stewart in one example as relating to the way others perceive/view an individual. However, from a faith-centred approach it can be argued that honour is primarily concerned with God. Another form of honour Stewart discusses is vertical honour which again can be argued conflicts with the principle of justice emphasised within the Qur'anic text. These points will be discussed in more detail in the following chapters. However, the point I make here is that honour of the West, as theorised by Western intellectuals, and honour within Islam, based on scriptural sources, vary at foundational aspects.

'The word 'honour' is derived from *hones*, *honoris*, in classical Latin. Honour means respect, esteem and prestige' (Khan, 2006, 42). Some key lexical definitions of honour are as follows: 'good name or public esteem: reputation', 'showing of usually merited respect', 'a keen sense of ethical conduct', and 'social courtesies or civilities extended by a host', etc. (Merriam-Webster (a)). According to Bowman (2006, 4) honour is generally seen as 'the good opinion of the people who matter to us, and who matter because we regard them as a society of equals who have the power to judge our behaviour'. Contemporary conceptions of honour are much more multifaceted than can appear from these definitions. Honour has layers of implicit meanings and consequent actions and beliefs. The history and factors influencing and contributing to current day perceptions of honour cannot be disregarded, for it is all these factors that contribute to the definition and implications of the term honour today. Bowman (2006) and Stewart (1994) engage in such an examination within their works.

The uses of the term honour reveal how it is used to refer to 'things apparently quite different from each other' (Stewart, 1994, 10). Stewart (1994, 13) presents the following range of meanings within his book:

There are accounts that view honor as having only a single aspect:...the word "might best be translated as esteem, respect, prestige, or some combination of these attributes, depending on local usage," another writes that "a man's honour may be defined as the moral worth he possesses in the eyes of the society of which he is a member," while a sociologist sees it as "a culturally instilled conception of self as sacred social object."...Julian Pitt-Rivers, offers an analysis in terms of what he calls three facets: "a sentiment, a manifestation of this sentiment in conduct, and the evaluation of this conduct by others.

Stewart (1994) critiques the above analyses of honour and presents

The great variety of meanings of the word 'honor' is no more than a reflection of its long and complex history. And that history is not just one of peaceful linguistic drift. For centuries it was widely agreed that honor was something both important and desirable, and attempts were continually being made to capture the word for a particular set of values. In the seventeenth century honor was probably more important in England than ever before or after, and yet different people had very different, and often quite contradictory, ideas as to the kind of behaviour demanded by honor (Stewart, 1994, 31).

Stewart (1994) engages in an exploration of the development of honour specifically in Western Europe, since the time of renaissance, revealing how honour has been an important concept within Western society. His (1994) main findings in terms of the development of honour in Europe represent how honour increasingly became more internal and based on moral virtues. This moral idea of honour, which was originally seen to be like prestige, develops, he argues, into the idea of honour often being used to refer to as a right. Entitlement to this right became dependent on certain moral

virtues, 'referred to as a sense of honour' (Stewart, 1994, 69). Stewart (1994, 21) further argues, that providing a characterisation for what honour is a right to is something that cannot be offered due to honour not always affording the same rights. For Stewart (1994, 21) his main concern is arguing 'that honor is a right rather than that it is a right to some particular thing (sic)'.

The internalisation of honour, within modern usage, is explained by Stewart through his differentiation with the bipartite theory. The bipartite theory, as defined by Stewart (1994, 18-19), is 'the most commonly held nonjuristic theory of honor, the one that views inner honor as a personal quality (honorableness), and outer honor as reputation (for honorableness)'. Although Stewart disagrees with this theory, he accepts honour has an internal element. However, the internal aspect of honour is conceived differently by Stewart in comparison to those who ascribe to the bipartite theory. The bipartite theory argues that modern usages of the term honour are naturally internal and refer to personal qualities. Stewart (1994, 44), however, argues that modern usages of the term honour are in reference to honour as a right and the only internal quality of honour here is the personal qualities that entitle a person to that right. The sense of honour, according to Stewart (1994, 47) is comprehending what constitutes honourable behaviour alongside attaching oneself to this behaviour. He argues, that although honour can have a sense of internality, in reference to what internal qualities afford one the right of honour, it does not refer to a personal quality but to a right.

Stewart (1994, 54) classifies honour into two categories: personal honour and reflexive honour (see figure 1). Personal honour is further classified into two categories: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal honour is presented as the right to respect between a society of equals and is dependent on three factors (Stewart, 1994):

1. An honour code, which is seen as the basic set of rules that allow one to be accepted as honourable.
2. The honour group, are a group of those individuals who accept, endorse, and emphasise the honour code.
3. Shame, for honour to exist shame must also exist (The definition of shame will be explored in the coming sections). If the honour group do not fear shame, then honour would have no power in society.

Vertical honour, on the other hand, is not mutual respect of individuals within honour groups. Rather, it relates to respecting and praising those ‘who are superior, whether by virtue of their abilities, their rank, their services to the community, their sex, their kinship, their office, or anything else’ (Stewart, 1994, 59). In essence vertical honour can be seen as hierarchical and hegemonic. Without the existence of horizontal honour, mutual respect, vertical honour cannot be achieved. Reflexive honour which, is the need to retaliate or react to defend one’s honour, is more closely associated to horizontal honour rather than vertical honour. This is due to retaliation through means of attacking an individual cannot be exercised in response to a superior. This system of honour that Stewart (1994) presents is what I will come to argue in the following sections as contradictory to the system of honour promoted within the Islamic scriptural sources. Further, the presence of such a system within Muslim communities is one that is influenced by Western and patriarchal notions of honour and not by Islam (see chapter 7).




Figure 1

In the later sections of his book Stewart examines Bedouin honour. He (1994, 79) acknowledges many ways in which the usage of Bedouin honour differs to those within the West, for example it greatly operates within the Bedouin legal system in comparison to how ‘in Europe notions of honor have since the Renaissance generally operated largely outside the normal legal system’, however, he still imposes categories of personal honour and reflexive honour, developed from the experiences of Western honour, when attempting to analysis Bedouin honour. One must therefore question; how can these categorise accurately represent the Bedouin ideology of

honour when they have been constructed in response to a very different history of honour ideas?

The first apparent issue that arises from the use of the term honour is the imposition of a very specific development and history of honour as universal and normative. Such that these conceptions of honour are taken for granted. The coming chapters of this thesis will present how honour within Islam varies greatly in its basic foundational aspects from the 'cross-cultural' honour Stewart proposes.

The second issue with the term honour is how it exists within the contemporary West. Stewart's work although written in 1994 addressed the decline of honour within Western societies. Although I would argue, as do Bowman (2006) and Sommers (2018), that honour within Western societies is still very much present, it no longer occupies the central position it once had. Bowman (2006, 5), argues, despite

...the discrediting that honor has undergone, the basic honor of the savage – bravery for men, chastity for women – is still recognizable beneath the surfaces of the popular culture that has done so much to efface it. If you doubt it, try calling a man a wimp or a woman a slut.

He (2006) argues that so called 'traditional' perceptions of the notions of honour still exist today in the form of prevalent idea of masculine honour and female shame, be they implicit or explicit.

Gender-specific ideals of honour are not values of the past. As Bowman (2006) highlights, traces of such beliefs still linger within Western societies despite efforts to overcome gender-biased honour beliefs and practices. Similarly, Tamler Sommers (2018), in his book *Why Honor Matters*, argues that honour systems are still existent within the West and despite there being negative manifestations of honour this does not necessitate abandoning honour completely. Throughout his book Sommers (2018) details how honour can be endorsed in meaningful, beneficial ways. We can appreciate that even within the contemporary honour is not a principle that is unanimously denounced within the West. However, today we increasingly see honour highlighted within Western journalism, media, academic works etc as a gender-biased

phenomenon of the Islamicate. Despite, Western history evidencing the existence of gender-specific endorsements of honour that favoured men over women and the presence of such honour systems within the West still today, there is an inaccurate and biased attribution of gender-biased honour to Muslims and Muslim communities. Furthermore, what will become apparent in the following is that many of the gender-biased conceptions of honour that exist within the Islamicate today resemble honour of the West. One can therefore question why honour ideals that exist within the West, because of Western history and experiences, are also prevalent within non-Western communities? (These questions will be addressed in this chapter and chapter 7).

2.3 Consequences and implications of the term honour

I have attempted to demonstrate through a brief exploration of Stewart's (1994) analysis of the term 'honour' that the term has a complex history. Although my analysis has not been comprehensive, it remains clear that the term has developed and transformed throughout a specific Western history. Its uses and connotations have changed greatly, even within a given period of Western history, as demonstrated by Stewart (1994). Honour has transformed and developed within the communities and cultures it was and continues to be used in. Our understanding and use of the term honour today is a result of the history and transformations that occurred with the term throughout Western history.

Stewart (1994) emphasising the importance of comprehending the term honour within our spoken language before attempting to examine the term within another language such as Arabic, appears to be a flawed method. Our comprehension of the notion of honour and resultant practices that we see within the West cannot be assumed relevant or applicable to non-Western honour practices and beliefs. The term honour has its own very specific Western history. Our perception of honour within the West and our consequent attitudes, beliefs, and practices in relation to honour are a part of this Western history. Assuming this history and usage as relevant to non-Western communities is to assume that Western history and experiences are universal. This is not the case. Furthermore, the frameworks Stewart (1994) develops can consequently be seen as a Western academic framework and therefore these must also not be universalised. They should be seen as subjective. As Edward Said states, 'the study of the Islamicate world has to move away from the assumptions that it can be defined

by distortion of features that are considered 'normal' within Western history' (cited in Sayyid, 2003, vii).

We must question if the term honour is appropriate to use when addressing practices and beliefs of communities that have different histories, cultures, and developmental patterns to those of the West? Does the term honour have any relevance to these communities and the beliefs and practices therein? Moreover, by using the term honour are we imposing western ideals and practices of honour onto these communities to whom this notion of honour may be very much foreign? Does the use of the term honour result in this research falling into the trap of generalising and normalising western experiences of honour as universal?

Oyeronke Oyewumi (1997), in her book entitled, *The invention of Women: making an African sense of Western gender discourse*, addresses this crucial issue relating to western gender discourse. Oyewumi (1997, x-xi) brings light to the challenges we face due to 'relying on disciplinary theories and conceptual debates originating in and dominated by the West', resulting in our research questions not being generated from local conditions. We can misleadingly begin treating western categories and constructions as universal. She emphasises how 'all concepts come with their own cultural and philosophical baggage, much of which becomes alien distortion when applied to cultures other than those from which they derive' (Oyewumi, 1997, x-xi).

Similarly, the process of translating terms into another language is not simple. Translation is not just concerned with two languages rather, it is 'a transfer from one culture to another' (Dickins, et al. 2002, 29). According to Said Faiq (2004, 4) 'manipulation through translation not only violates the Arabic original but also leads to the influencing of the target readers and their views of the source culture and its people'. However, how then do we approach examining non-English terms and comprehending these beliefs and practices within Western contexts?

If we attempt to analyse the relevant Arabic terms, that are generally associated with the English term honour, by refraining from using the term honour, how do we then identify these terms in the West in a manner that is relevant and results in their subsequent beliefs and practices being perceived as significant? How can this be done

with any term from a language different to one's own language? How do we create research that can aid the comprehension of beliefs and practices of communities that are different to the one within which we are conducting our research? These questions reflect the challenges that arise in this research.

One method that can be used is to abstain from translating the Arabic terms as this will avoid the imposition of the specific history of the translations, such as the translation 'honour', being imposed on the Arabic terms. Rather, the original Arabic terms can be used whilst presenting an understanding that is more appropriate and truer to the use of the terms within their specific communities. We can thus, continue our research whilst using these terms keeping in mind the presented definitions. However, defining these terms is not a simple task. Just like the term honour, the various Arabic terms that have been associated with the term honour, are overloaded with various connotations and subsequent practices. These terms are also products of a specific history and transformation. Further, refraining from using the term honour will also result in this research not being perceived as relevant to the dominant association and discussion of honour beliefs and practices within Muslim communities. We find, both within and outside the West the term honour has, unfortunately, been dominantly associated to certain beliefs and practices in such a manner that removing this term will not aid in attempts to challenge, reform, and reconceptualise its use.

It therefore seems appropriate to continue using the term honour. This will allow the research to remain relevant to critiquing the attention drawn on honour within Muslim communities by the West. At the same time, it will avoid the simplification of the complex Arabic terms. The English term honour will reveal problematic and uncritical uses of the term honour to frame Muslims and Islam in Western discourses and will allow for the challenging of Muslim self-perceptions engendered through these Western discourses, as we have seen in the literature review.

As such, it should be noted that the use of the term honour within this research is not to infer Western understandings, nor to recall a Western history. Rather, the term honour is being used to identify and group the broad abstract beliefs and practices within the Islamicate that I present throughout my research. I refrain from assigning a specific definition to the term honour or restricting its meaning within this research.

The term honour should be seen as a label to group a cluster of related Arabic terms, beliefs and practices that will be examined in turn in the following.

2.4 Understanding honour for Muslims

The broad framework of this inquiry, intending to identify and explore the key aspects of contemporary honour ideologies within Muslim communities, will transcend geographic limits. The practices and beliefs regarding honour within Muslim honour-endorsing communities are vast and thus preclude the construction of a comprehensive account. Honour praxis and practices of any community will be overloaded with differences, contradictions, and a complex history. In terms of this research, focusing on a single community will not provide sufficient grounds to achieve the research aims, to provide a portrayal of the varying ways the ideology of honour is manifested by Muslims within the contemporary. I will present the dominant expressions of honour in varying Muslim communities within the contemporary period, which transcend geographic and ethnic boundaries. I attempt to represent a broader picture of key practices and beliefs relating to honour that persist through the Islamicate, though of course my range of scrutiny cannot be exhaustive. Any single belief or practice mentioned in the coming section cannot and should not be associated with every Muslim community. The Muslim world is not homogenous, and neither are any two Arab or South Asian (or other) communities. Each community may possibly have views and practices that are like others, but we are not justified in categorising any of the following as universal to the so-called Muslim world.

Providing a general explanation of this specific ideology of honour can be an extremely challenging task. Despite solely focusing on honour in relation to perceived Islamic norms and Muslim community praxis, we find that ideologies and practices diverge depending on various factors such as geographical location, individual status, and political, economic, and social conditions. This contributes to communities differing in beliefs and practices. Like Western honour ideals, honour within the notional 'Muslim world' has a long and diverse history. Specifically, in relation to practices and ideologies relating to concepts such as honour we find that long-standing practice and acceptance of 'unwritten laws' contribute to the abstract nature of honour and the possibility of manipulation and distortion of normative expressions and precepts. Yet, despite the nature of contemporary honour ideologies, one can find innumerable

beliefs and practices amongst these various communities that appear constant. One therefore must question: What has allowed certain honour ideologies and praxis to travel and remain static within these varying communities? To explore this question, it is necessary to comprehend the beliefs and practices relating to honour within these communities.

It is noteworthy that contemporary literature on honour is prominently focused on the English term honour (see literature review). Research examining terms of honour within Arabic sources is scarce. However, if one is to present an examination of the concept of honour within Islamic sources of authority, and its impact on Muslim women, it is necessary to explore the Arabic terms. One can then better appreciate the nuance of the notion in both past and contemporary Muslim societies.

2.5 Arabic terms

Within Muslim communities we find a variety of terms used to refer to gender-specific honour ideals and perceptions. The following commonly used terms reveal that the concepts of honour and shame within Muslim communities are extremely vague, complex, and difficult to reduce to a single definition. It should be noted that although the following terms are Arabic their usage can also be found within non-Arab societies in the appropriate native language. The general meaning and usage do not always differ greatly, such as *ghairath* in Urdu which has a very similar, if not identical use to the Arabic term *ghayra*. For this research, we have selected to examine Arabic terms only as this will allow a comparison and critique to be made with the uses of honour terms within the Islamic sources of authority.

Arabic terms of honour can have varying meanings and connotations.

Arabic *sharaf*, *ird*, *ihtram*, *izzah*, or *namus*. Culturally understood as a sign of God's pleasure and part of one's Muslim identity. May be displayed through ownership of land and resources, family solidarity, the chastity of women, and the personal characteristics of courage, generosity, hospitality, independence, wisdom, honesty, self-control, actions guided by reason, disinclination to conflict, avoidance of

degradation of others, mastery of culture, and verbal skill, particularly in poetry recitation (The Oxford Dictionary of Islam).

The use of these terms that I am concerned with here are those that relate to women, their chastity, and rights. This is due to within the contemporary, although generic gender-neutral forms of displaying honour can still be found in Muslim communities, honour has dominantly become associated with women, their sexuality and chastity. Moreover, it is this use of honour that has proven to be the most challenging and at times dangerous to women. Considering this, I have limited the current exploration and selected only three key terms whose use can be located widely across the Islamicate.

The Arabic term *sharaf* can be translated as honour, nobility, dignity, glory, distinction, or high rank (Almaany (a), 2010). It comes from the root verb which implies highness, both in physical position and in social standing (Hasan, 2002, 7). According to al-Khayyat (1994, 65-66), whose research has focused greatly on honour and shame within Iraq, *sharaf* refers to a broader sense of honour in comparison to *ʿird* which is restricted to sexual conduct. However, Unni Wikan (1984, 637), who has also explored concepts of honour and shame within the Middle East, discusses how she has ‘only heard the word *sharaf* used to refer to sexual honour’. *Sharaf* can also be understood as family honour (Shehada, 2009, 24). *Sharaf* as an ideology, is one that is deeply embedded within Muslim communities. And evidently its meaning, despite always relating to honour, can vary regarding its specific uses.

Ghayra, which relates to the honour system, can be translated as jealousy, enthusiasm, ardency, fervour, solicitude, vigilant care of concern and a sense of honour (Almaany (b), 2010). *Ghayra* has a dominant presence within perceptions of the ideal male members of Muslim communities. Marion Holmes Katz (2019) examines the concept of *ghayra* in her article *Beyond Ḥalāl and Ḥaram: Ghayra (‘Jealousy’) as a Masculine Virtue in the work of Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya*. *Ghayra* is presented as a ‘gendered emotional trait’ namely jealousy that is linked to ideas of male masculinity (Katz, 2019, 202). More specifically the ‘root lexical meaning of *ghayra* is almost universally associated with the sexual possessiveness of a spouse’ (Katz, 2019, 203).

Majdi Muhammad Ash-Shahawi (2004), a traditional Sunnī Muslim scholar, in his Muslim marriage guide aimed at providing 'Islamic' guidance for married couples, presents what can be deemed as a normative understanding of *ghayra*. His understanding represents a general traditional Sunnī perspective on the ideology and practice of *ghayra* for Muslims. Ash-Shahawi (2004) begins by presenting *ghayra* as a positive form of jealousy that one may feel when defending a falsely accused loved one. He represents this through the example of how 'the Messengers and their followers fought those who associated partners with Allah in worship or those who disobeyed his commands' (Ash-Shahawi, 2004, 85). Ash-Shahawi (2004, 85) argues that 'this form of *ghairah* is a necessary part of a person's religion: when one is bereft of such *ghairah*, he is also bereft of *Ad-din* (religion)'. Religion and *ghayra* are thus presented as coterminous. One should note here the exclusive male pronoun. Ash-Shahawi begins by presenting *ghayra* as a religious duty and necessity. He attempts to implicitly instil in his reader the view that *ghayra* is an emotion embedded in natural religion, and hence, actions according to these emotions are essentially a part of religion. It is only once he presents this broader understanding of *ghayra* that he begins to focus his advice on what is arguably the dominant contemporary understanding, a gender-biased conception.

This second form of *ghayra* is what he describes as jealousy which thrives due to honour. 'This occurs when one's ardent love and zeal for someone makes it anathema in his mind to have to share that person with someone else; or for that someone to love someone else' (Ash-Shahawi, 2004, 85). Ash-Shahawi (2004, 85-85) provides two gender biased examples of *ghayra*: one he describes as praiseworthy and the other as reprehensible.

An example of the praiseworthy kind is when one actually sees his wife, for instance, talking to a male stranger, and his sense of honour (*ghairah*) makes him angry. An example of the reprehensible kind of *ghairah* is for a man to be suspicious of his wife, without her having done anything to arouse his suspicion; this latter kind of *ghairah* spoils the love in a relationship.

Ash-Shahawi (2004) presents both instances of how *ghayra* may be expressed, where the male *responds* and *embodies ghayra*. In both examples the woman is presented as the one who may act in a manner that can subvert the honour of her husband. Although there appears no clear statement affirming that only a woman may bring shame and a man is one who enjoys honour, this is an implicit assumption throughout the text.

The next form of *ghayra* that is described is *ghayra* of a woman whose husband is married to more than one wife. In such a case Ash-Shahawi (2004, 87) advises the husband to 'be patient with her and advise her with gentle words'. He (2004) then moves on to advising the wife on *controlling* her *ghayra* and to not accuse her husband beyond reason. Although he does briefly mention that a woman who is the only wife may also feel *ghayra*, this does not seem to be as much of a concern as the previous. The main 'guidance' that appears to come from Ash-Shahawi for a woman is to suppress her *ghayra* or suspicion of her husband as it will ruin her peace of mind and ultimately her marriage. In comparison, regarding a man's *ghayra*, Ash-Shahawi (2004, 93) gives detailed guidelines on how a man should police and guard his wife as he is her 'guardian and protector'. Women are advised to suppress their *ghayra* and men are encouraged to embody *ghayra*.

Although Ash-Shahawi (2004) continuously reminds the reader, male and female, to not be excessive in their *ghayra*, it is clear from his guidance that ideally a woman should be pious and obedient so that her husband has no need to be overly suspicious. She should be trusting of her husband and avoid causing problems in her marriage. Ash-Shahawi's guidance cannot be used to represent all contemporary honour ideals and practices, it does however, represent what a so-called traditional religious enforcement of honour in contemporary Muslim communities may be based on. Such texts can be perceived as rhetoric and are not necessarily true representations of everyday practice. However, the underlining ideologies and assumptions within such texts do appear to impact contemporary Muslim practice. The influence such 'guidance' and beliefs can have on Muslim women will be discussed in the coming section on how honour is practiced within Muslim communities and what influences male perpetrators of honour crimes.

Within contemporary Muslim communities a man's *ghayra* is of much greater significance than a woman's that the lack of *ghayra* results in a man being classed as a *dayyuth* (Ash-Shahawi, 2004, 94). It is uncommon for such a term to be used for women. 'A dayyuth is a man who has no sense of honor (*ghairah*) when it comes to his wife and family: He sees them performing lewd, licentious deeds, yet he remains silent' (Ash-Shahawi, 2004, 94). Although the burden of honour is upon the female body there is also a burden of responsibility on male members of Muslim communities in ensuring this honour is maintained.

Another commonly used term that relates to honour is *'ird*. *'Ird*, like the previous terms, is significantly gender-specific. When attempting to define *'ird* we find that there are varying definitions and understandings of this term. It approximately relates to the idea of honour. However, it is 'somewhat ambiguous and imprecise' (Farès). According to al-Khayyat (1994, 65-66), *'ird* refers to sexual conduct and chastity. Others have defined *'ird* as male honour (Duderija, 2016).

The pre-Islamic concept of *'ird* related to the tribal group, the family, and the individual. This idea of *'ird* related to 'rebellion, courage, liberty, vendetta, chastity of the wife...' it was also associated with the 'warlike life led by the ancient Arabs' (Farès). 'It is evident then that *'ird* was in its origin associated with fighting' (Farès). This idea of *'ird* continued into the Islamic world with the coming of Islam. I will not explore the details of this continuation into the nascent Muslim community, this examination will be within the coming chapters. Yet, it is necessary to appreciate that the concept of *'ird* still exists in contemporary Muslim communities.

According to El-Saadawi (2015, 192) *'ird* has a 'special sense in Arabic':

It means the honour of a man as embodied in his womenfolk. His duty is to keep his honour intact by preventing anyone (apart from the husband) from having any relations with one of the women. This especially so with regard to protection of virginity.

The usage of the term in contemporary Muslim communities may vary but generally its usage is in reference to women.

...in Transjordan it is associated with the virtue of a woman or even with her beauty. In Egypt the *'ird* of a man depends in general on his wife's reputation and that of all his female relatives. In Syria the reputation of every member of a tribe reflects on a man's *'ird* (Farès).

According to Duderija (2016, 592), 'the concept of *'ird* has found its strong expression in the classical Islamic tradition, in the idea of male sexual jealousy (*ghairath*) that is being advocated as normative (neo-) traditional Muslim scholarship'. The role of *'ird* within the classical Islamic tradition will be explored in the coming three chapters.

Other terms of honour used commonly are *ihthiram* to respect, esteem, honour, regard, venerate, etc. and *fakhr* which is translated as glory, pride and honour. I will not explore all these terms individually as a general understanding of honour can be appreciated from the previous terms.

2.6 Shame

It would not be appropriate at this point to continue discussing honour without appreciating the meaning of shame. Shame, like honour, is an over-loaded term with a complex history and a variety of implications. Assigning a specific definition to shame would overlook the complex scope of its development and transformation. However, a detailed critique of shame is not the aim of this research. Yet, one cannot avoid delving into discussions surrounding shame when exploring honour.

The English term shame, like the term honour, has a complex history of ideas and meanings. The following lexical definition presents how the term is simplistically assumed within the contemporary period. 'A painful emotion caused by consciousness of guilt, shortcoming, or impropriety', 'a condition of humiliating disgrace or disrepute' and 'something that brings censure or reproach' (Merriam-Webster (b)). Shame is associated with shortcomings and failure to observe proper standards in relation to honesty and modesty. It is the perception of one, in the public eye, with disgrace and low esteem. This inevitably leads to criticism and disapproval from other members of the community.

Jowkar (1986, 45) expresses the role of shame in relation to honour as: '...the centrality of the ideology of honor as a measure of one's social worth, and shame as a sanctioning mechanism for its enforcement...'. Focusing specifically on the use of shame in relation to honour within the Islamicate we find two main Arabic terms 'aib and 'ār which are generally translated as shame. Hasan (2002), in her article *the Politics of honor: patriarchy, the state and the murder of women in the name of family honor*, explores Abu-Zeid's distinction between these two types of shame.

'Aib only influences and shames the doer of the deed, without affecting the members of his or her family. Thus, it is not connected with family honor, and the punishment is light, such as open accusation of the man or woman, or subjecting the person to ridicule. As an example, he mentions a woman who decides to wear an immodest dress. 'Aar, by contrast, as in the case of adultery, shames not only the doer of the deed but their family as well, thus requiring severe punishment, even death. For Abu-Zeid, only this second type of shame, 'aar, is connected with the concept of family honour, 'ird (Hasan, 2002, 4)

However, Hasan (2002) does not agree with the separation of shame terms. In terms of the contemporary situation of honour and shame systems I would argue Hasan is correct in disagreeing with such a separation. When examining honour within Muslim communities it becomes apparent that the practices and beliefs surrounding the honour/shame system are both varying and, in some instances, practiced incoherently. Thus, the ideology of shame which is associated to the challenge or transgressions against honour beliefs and practices also proves to be inconsistent. As, Hasan (2002, 5) argues that actual cases of retaliation to prevent or respond to shame 'prove how arbitrary and even inconsistent punishment is'. One Palestinian interviewee, in Hasan's (2002, 4) research, states 'in our society, everything is 'aib, to love, to choose a potential husband is 'aib, even to laugh in a loud voice is 'aib'. Thus, categorising transgressions to practices and beliefs of honour in fixed categories of shame does not seem accurate or appropriate.

I feel it necessary to mention here that, theories and models of honour and shame are much more extensive than I could possibly portray in my brief exploration of the terms.

However, focusing on the varying models of honour and shame and subsequently ascribing to a certain theory or model is not of much relevance within this research. My concerns are the way honour exists in beliefs and practice within Muslim communities and how these beliefs and practices reflect an uncertain and at times inconsistent system of honour. It is due to these inconsistencies that I intend to propose a framework derived from the Islamic sources of authority to develop, advance, and arrive at a theory of honour relevant to Muslim communities (see chapter 8).

2.7 The contemporary Muslim honour paradigm

Generally, when one considers honour within the Islamicate they focus on or are conditioned to consider HBV. Honour is greatly associated with a male figure: father, husband, brother, or son, controlling or inflicting harm on a female family member due to beliefs embedded in the ideology of honour and shame. The dominant attention and thought given to HBV within media outlets and academic literature creates an exclusive association of honour, within the Islamicate, to crimes and killings. This unfortunately, restricts the comprehension and appreciation for the broader implications and consequences of the ideology of honour. It reduces a broad notion of honour to a single instance of its manifestation.

Within the following section I am to present how the ideology of honour is expressed in a variety of forms throughout the contemporary Muslim world. I call this the contemporary Muslim honour paradigm. I will argue that the manifestation of honour through HBV can be identified as a consequence of a challenge to, or acting contrary to the ideology of honour within the Islamicate. Such violence is used to maintain the honour system and to remove and punish anyone who challenges it. However, there are also other measures in place to reinforce and ensure the practice and obedience to the honour system. These I call maintenance mechanisms.

Within the following I will present various practices that have a multilateral relationship to the ideology of honour. Firstly, the maintenance mechanisms that aid the emphasis and existence of the honour ideology through affirming and preserving a gender biased ideology of honour. Maintenance mechanisms are those beliefs and practices imposed on Muslim women, whose rejection or challenging of can lead to the

consequences of HBV. These practices and beliefs can also be seen as causal factors leading to male retaliation in the form of violence and murder. Alternatively, it can be argued that the ideology of honour itself is used to emphasise and maintain the existence of these practices. Maintenance mechanisms therefore arguably rely on the honour system to continue to exist and be enforced and likewise the honour system relies on the maintenance mechanisms.

I argue that the following beliefs and practices (maintenance mechanisms/ causal factors) are in a multilateral relationship with the concept of honour and therefore they must not be overlooked when exploring honour within the Muslim world. Although the nature of their association to the ideology of honour may not be entirely clear yet, it is certain that these beliefs and practices have an intimate relationship with the notion. This relationship becomes evident when transgressions and challenges to these beliefs and practices are identified as challenges to the honour ideology and ultimately result in the consequence: HBV.

A predominant expression and endorsement of honour within contemporary Muslim communities is through the policing and control of its female members. Ideologies promoting the control of female sexuality are apparent across the Islamicate. Female sexuality is viewed as able to impact the honour of male family members and the community. Thus, to preserve this honour the control of female members is seen as fundamental.

In her examination of honour and shame within modern Iraq Al-Khayyat (1992) highlights contemporary Muslim honour ideologies and praxis that are greatly concerned with female sexuality and notions of family and kinship.

The most important connotation of honour in the Arab world is related to the sexual conduct of women. If a woman is immodest or brings shame on her family by her sexual conduct, she brings shame and dishonour on all her kin (Al-Khayyat, 1992, 21).

The centrality of female sexuality to family and communal honour is not exclusive to the Arab world. This patriarchal stance exists in various Muslim communities. The

emphasis on sexuality to preserve honour relates to broader patriarchal notions of family and gender norms. Communities endorsing strong honour beliefs and values perceive the female body as open and the male body closed. The open body must be protected to prevent it from becoming impure, contaminated, or violated (Akpinar, 2003). The importance of guarding the female body is also linked to keeping the male lineage pure. 'The 'chastity of women' must be assured by externally imposed restraints because women are believed to have no internal, self-restraints' (Akpinar, 2003, 432). Beliefs regarding the structure of the family unit, the status of women, gender and sexuality contribute to how women are policed, and the desire to control their sexuality. These patriarchal beliefs and practices potentially contribute to the existence of honour codes and beliefs.

Implementation of controlling female sexuality can be seen through numerous practices present within various Muslim communities such as: 'gender segregation, early marriage, and enforced arranged marriage, as well as endogamous marriage rules and practice of sex only within marriage' (Akpinar, 2003, 429). These practices, although arguably also impacting Muslim men, are dominantly used to control female sexuality and uphold the honour of male family members. Attempts to limit female movement and engagement within wider society are in aid of maintaining honour. For instance, Katz (2019, 205) highlights the link between *ghayra* and the limiting of female mosque attendance in the work of classical scholars such as al-Ghazālī. Conversely, it could be argued that honour ideologies are used to maintain control of female sexuality and maintain the patriarchal gender hierarchy. If the rights of women are restricted, then the prospects of them acting dishonourably are also reduced. This therefore impacts female social, economic, political, and religious rights alongside basic rights to education and to work, giving men inevitable gender advantage. According to Nawal El-Saadawi (2015, 155):

In agricultural societies such as Egypt, the vast majority of women have toiled in the fields, side by side with men, for thousands of years. The economy of the country and its production therefore depend on the sweat of peasant men and women. Were it not for the fact that rural women leave their homes every day before sunrise, it would not be possible for the men who oppose women's emancipation to have their

morning meal. Yet, in Arab societies, there are still a large number of men who do not agree to women going out to work or be educated. Their argument is that, if a woman leaves her house to engage in such activities, she will lose her femininity – and probably her chastity and honour too.

There is clearly a dominant strategy within Muslim communities that involves attempting to prevent the loss of honour by preventing anything that may lead or contribute to this loss. Even when certain practices do not directly concern honour, if there is even the smallest possibility that the patriarchal notion of honour will be challenged, then we see that the overriding strategy would be to put an end to women engaging in these rights and practices completely. This is what we see with attempts to control female sexuality. It is not known to an honour-endorsing Muslim man that his womenfolk will express their sexuality in a manner that will be 'dishonourable'. However, due to the possibility, female family members will be policed. This can be by restricting their rights to education and involvement in society, enforcing specific dress codes or even in some instances endorsing practices that are physically believed to reduce their sexual desires and capabilities. This strategy can be seen as relating to the legal maxim of preventing the means to the unlawful. But the nuances of this maxim must also be considered. Furthermore, the contemporary endorsement of this strategy conflicts with many other legal maxims such as 'harm is not replaced by harm' and are arguably the spirit of justice of Islam (Hussain, 2016, 69).

The desire to control female sexuality to preserve honour can be found instilled within practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM). Although the practice of FGM is not far spread across Muslim communities around the world it still represents how African Muslim communities use this practice to prevent transgression leading to the loss of honour. El-Saadawi (2015), in her book entitled *The Hidden Face of Eve*, although mainly focusing on FGM, presents beliefs and practices relating to female sexuality and honour within contemporary Muslim communities. 'The importance given to virginity and an intact hymen in these societies is the reason why female circumcision still remains a very widespread practice despite a growing tendency, especially in urban Egypt, to do away with it as something outdated and harmful' (El-Saadawi, 2015, 50). Beliefs influenced by honour ideals are what emphasise such

practices. Those who practise such mutilation believe it will allow a girl or woman to protect her virginity, as sexual desires are minimized, thus allowing her to preserve her honour. Within these honour-endorsing communities we see the existence of a pressure to remain a virgin before marriage. Virginity and honour can be seen as synonymous for many Muslim communities who endorse honour beliefs and practices.

The apparent obsession with female virginity within Muslim communities, to preserve honour can paradoxically lead to the manipulation of women and their honour. Rather than protecting women, we find that such beliefs leave women in vulnerable circumstances due to the fear of losing one's honour. This fear can become so extreme that seeking justice for women who have been sexually harassed or abused can be seen as dishonourable. El-Saadawi (2015, 39) highlights how in terms of rape or sexual assault, 'even if [a woman] says something, or if the man is caught at the actual moment of sexual aggression, the family will hush up what has happened and refuse to go to court of law, in order to preserve the honour of the family and its reputation intact'. The criminal in such instances is free, safe from the consequences of his actions, whereas for the victim, 'her hymen is her honour and, once lost, it can never be replaced' (El-Saadawi, 2015, 39).

This obsession with maintaining virginity does not take into consideration that the hymen of a woman can tear without her engaging in sexual intercourse. For some honour-endorsing communities, white bed sheets not being stained with the blood of a woman on her wedding night after intercourse is proof of her dishonour. These views and practices surrounding female virginity have further led to contemporary medical practices of restoring virginity through hymen reconstruction surgery (Khan, 2006, 15).

What makes these young girls and their mothers go through surgical repair of the hymen is not the first night's pleasure of the husband. It is a fear of shame and loss of honour. A broken hymen can bring death to young girls on charges of fornication and premarital sexual affairs, which is not permissible in Middle Eastern societies... (Khan, 2006, 15).

The existence of such a belief system influenced by honour can be seen to impact women within the contemporary in a manner that leaves them vulnerable and subject

to mistreatment and abuse. Despite a dominant patriarchal view that such honour beliefs and practices will save women from losing honour and bringing disgrace upon themselves and their families etc, on the contrary these beliefs appear to expose Muslim women as easy targets to be manipulated and silenced.

2.8 Gender-specific honour codes

These gender biased beliefs and practices have demonstrated how the concept of honour within Muslim communities dominantly leads to negative consequences in the lives of Muslim women. These honour codes vary significantly for men and women. The male honour code is inclusive of the imposition of responsibility for controlling female family members. Men are required to ensure the maintenance of family reputation and honour through maintaining authority over the family. The burden of honour and shame is upon women and their bodies; however, it is seen as the males' role to ensure that this honour is not compromised. Men are assigned the controllers of women. Sezgin Cihangir (2012, 323), who explores and contrasts cultures with a high orientation on honour to those with a low orientation, highlights that such honour codes can be seen as 'benefitting men because it leaves room for men to behave in ways they want to, including being sexually active'. Thus, essentially a man's honour can only be harmed through the behaviour of his female family members and '...he cannot assure and protect the boundaries of his woman' (Akpinar, 2003, 433). El-Saadawi (2015, 181) highlights that 'the Arab man from Upper Egypt still believes that it is a subject of shame if the police or any of the security forces of the State replace him in taking revenge for his family' [in the event of them being wronged]. If he is to maintain his honour and the honour of his family, he must take revenge himself without assistance from the state. A man who cannot avenge damage to his own honour is seen as weak. There clearly exists a burden of honour upon men also.

In contrast, the female honour code is mainly focused on shame and sexual purity. 'Sexual purity includes the expression of restraint in sexual behaviour such as maintaining virginity before marriage, modesty, decorum in dress, and sexual purity in social relations- particularly with men' (Cihangir, 2012, 321). Thus, the female honour code is focused on the restriction of female behaviour, particularly sexual behaviour. To maintain this ideology of honour, women are required to remain sexually pure, modest, and obedient to their male family members (Glick et al, 2016, 543). This broad

yet abstract notion of honour allows men to control how a woman may act, what she may wear, where she may go and who she may speak to. 'Women and their sexuality are conceptualised and constructed as sources of socio-moral chaos (fitna), as the embodiments of seduction and a threat to a healthy exclusively male public social order' (Duderija, 2016, 589). Due to there being no apparent clear written ideals of honour and set practices of honour within contemporary communities, men have the power to govern what they deem as honourable and dishonourable. It is apparent that within honour-endorsing communities, ideas and beliefs surrounding honour are manipulated according to the benefit of the male members and what is deemed as appropriate for the family honour.

Honour beliefs do not only impact the bodies and external appearances of women. Alongside the policing of their behaviour, ideal honourable girls or women must have an honourable mentality and mind-set.

Ignorance about the body and its functions in girls and women is considered a sign of honour, purity and good morals and if, in contrast, a girl does know anything about sex and about her body, it is considered something undesirable and even shameful. A mature woman with experience and knowledge of life is looked upon as being less worthy than a simple, naïve and ignorant woman. Experience is looked upon almost as a deformity to be hidden, and not as a mark of intrinsic human value (El-Saadawi, 2015, 58).

Contemporary gender-biased honour beliefs and practices not only intend to impact and minimise the agency of Muslim women, but they also seek to control and contribute to the construction of a limited mental capacity of women. The most obvious motive for the above is to ensure the maintenance of honour in line with the patriarchal family structure.

2.9 Consequence of honour

This pressure to maintain and protect honour upon male family members can be seen through the act of HBV. Women and girls who are accused or perceived as tarnishing their honour and the family honour are punished or murdered to restore this family

honour. The practice of HBV is not restricted to Muslim communities in the so-called Islamic world.

Muslim immigrant communities in Europe have taken their traditions and cultural practices along with them and continue to practice their own culture where control of female sexuality is concerned. Daughters and sisters in Sweden, Norway, Germany or the UK have been murdered. In Sweden, the Turkish Kurd community is notorious for committing honour related violence...in 2000, a young woman of Pakistani origin named Shehnaz was electrocuted by her brothers and mother in the UK (Khan, 2006, 21).

This is not to say that such killings do not occur within non-Muslim communities. It is clear from the previous chapter that honour killings or crimes of passion have occurred at the hands of both Muslims and non-Muslims. I will expand on this in chapter 7. However, the concern within this research is the existence of practice and crimes within Muslim communities and its association to Islam.

2.10 Reconceptualising honour

From this brief overview it becomes clear that the dominant perceptions and practices of honour within contemporary Muslim communities are overwhelmingly gender biased. Although I have not explored every possible manifestation of honour, within the contemporary in detail, such as the influence of honour ideals on dress and veiling etc., it is apparent that contemporary honour practices impact women and their rights more than they do those of men. It is therefore highly urgent that these dominating gender-biased beliefs and practices are challenged. It is also necessary to comprehend the relationship between these practices and honour ideologies and identify what is the causal factor. The roots and justifications of these beliefs and practices must be uncovered and deconstructed. If we are to reconceptualise honour and arrive at an egalitarian and gender-neutral position, we must seek out the problems generated by patriarchal readings and practices associated with honour and identify the origins of negative honour ideologies. Thus, before we reconceptualise honour we must step back and begin by firstly attempting to comprehend the very

notion of honour itself and consider how we intend to conceptualise it. Indeed, the sources we use will influence the understandings of honour we arrive at. Thus, bearing in mind the challenges already explored of universalising western ideas of honour, I argue that the notion of honour within Muslim communities must be comprehended and reconceptualised through a decolonial, faith-based approach.

2.11 Islam: an influential factor

As I have stressed several times, my inquiry into honour within Muslim communities is in relation to Islam. I have previously discussed why I have chosen to use Islam as my point of examination. Nevertheless, I will further justify this line of inquiry and why Islam can be seen as a possible influential factor in the following.

I have refrained from labelling the existence of gender biased honour beliefs and practices within Muslim communities as an Arab problem. This is simply because the endorsement of such beliefs and practices are present within Muslim communities outside the Arab world. ‘...There are reports both from the field and in the literature on the practice of honor killings in non-Arab Islamic societies, such as Pakistan, Turkey and Kurdistan’ (Hasan, 2002, 18). However, my focus on Islam should not be used to assume I perceive this as a Muslim problem either, such practices and beliefs are also existent within non-Muslim communities (see chapter 7). Despite, the focus of this research being Muslim communities and Islam, I am not claiming that Islam is the sole or most dominant factor emphasising or resulting in the practice of gender biased honour systems. Contemporary honour ideals and practices appear to be influenced and enforced by varying factors and hence it is inappropriate and inaccurate to mark a single factor as the only significant contributor to the existence of contemporary honour ideologies (see chapter 7).

Journalist Ayse Onal (2008) in her book *Honour Killing Stories of Men Who Killed*, presents her findings from interviews with 10 men imprisoned in Turkey after being convicted of killing either their mothers, sisters, wives, or daughters. Her findings reveal the nuances and complexities of family life, community influence and expectations, customs and tradition, the role of religion etc. in the existence of violence against women. In her various interviews we see factors such as financial and economic conditions, public opinion, geographical location etc. all impacting the

occurrence of HBV. What Onal's (2008, 73) book also represents is the role of Islam. Some perpetrators, for example Murat, emphasised that religion had less of an impact on their actions:

'Don't worry, if what you are asking is why my religious beliefs didn't stop me from committing the murder, I'll tell you. For someone who is oppressed, public censure carries more weight than religious commandments'

However, from other interviews there is strong presence of the role of Islam in the belief, practice and crimes committed in the name of honour. Some perpetrators believed "I'm innocent in the eyes of Allah' (2008, 165). Others used the notion of honour and Islam to prevent females from watching tv, gaining an education, and to segregate them from men even within the family home (2008, 172).

We see that Islam plays a central role in the consciousness of honour-endorsing Muslim communities. Onal (2008, 254) emphasises:

...there is almost no chance that legislation alone can end the murder of women in the Middle East and surrounding regions. Religion could help stop honour killings but religious authorities have not used their influence to this end.

Thus, despite many academics emphasising Islam has no role in the occurrence of honour crimes (see chapter 1), interviews with honour-endorsing individuals and perpetrators of HBV reveals that Islam does play a role in the conceptualisation and endorsement of honour values.

It is worth considering here the impact of honour upon Muslim men. It would be highly problematic and complicit to orientalist and colonial tropes to assume that Muslim men are barbaric and uncivilized and impose honour values on the women folk to control and undermine them. Such analyses are highly reductive and overlook the lived realities and complexities of honour-endorsing Muslim communities. Considering real accounts of individuals who endorse honour systems sheds light on the real nuances

and complexities of everyday life that contribute to the emphasis of such systems. Onal's (2008) interview portrays how the fears male preparators have regarding their women being vulnerable and or exploited are not misgiven or farfetched. Some of the interviews clearly represent how young girls are manipulated, sexually exploited, and abused. The concerns therefore of the male members of the family are not unwarranted, unrealistic, or unreasonable. However, the ways in which many of the male honour endorsers attempt to guard and protect their women folk, expose these women further to vulnerabilities making them susceptible to exploitation. We see how fear of real dangers to women within the community influenced by structures and systems within the home and larger society, alongside government failures in protecting these women, male family members being inadequately educated about how to empower their women to reduce their vulnerabilities, lack of trust in the capabilities of women to protect themselves, and an overall patriarchal conception of honour contribute to the misuses of the concept of honour.

Within these communities' men and women become victims to the patriarchal concept of honour. There is no doubt that women are impacted by honour in more detrimental ways. However, we also cannot overlook the psychological and lifelong impact honour systems can have on men too.

As such, within the coming chapters of this research, I aim to focus on a single influencing factor: Islam. The focus on Islam is not arbitrary. Islam appears to play a key role in the existence and emphasis of honour ideologies and practice within contemporary Muslim communities, as I have discussed above.

According to Duderija (2016, 592), an organic link between female modesty laws and family/male honour was formulated by traditional Muslim scholars. This link has survived and is still present within contemporary Muslim communities. It becomes vital to examine such constructions made by the traditional and early Muslim jurists who formulated normative Islamic legal principles and specific legal positions that relate to gender in general and honour. I aim to question whether the original sources of authority within Islam speak of or emphasise views and formulations of honour that lead to the outcomes we see today.

Khan (2006, 69) also appreciates the need to examine religion; she argues that in order 'to comprehend the nature of honour-related violence against women in certain societies, it is crucially important to understand the religious basis and cultural determinants for the formation of the institution of family in the historical perspective'. Although she focuses on the construction of the family unit rather than actual honour ideals and practices, she brings to light the role religion can play and the necessity of examining and critiquing this role. For Khan (2006, 69) 'the family is a mega platform where all the major civilizations and religions have constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed the ethical, social and, religious boundaries to control, discipline, regularize and penalize female sexuality'. Her findings are crucial in understanding the role of religion in relation to the impact of the family unit on sexuality, a factor closely related to contemporary honour practices. However, there still appears to be a gap consisting of a specific focus on the actual notion of honour within the early sources of Islamic authority, and specifically in legal rulings and legal thought.

2.12 Conclusion

To conclude, within this chapter I have explored the term honour in terms of its Western development and conceptualisation, and the implications and limitations regarding Muslim communities and Islam. I have attempted to highlight the assumptions and universalisations that can be imposed with the very term honour. However, the use of the term has been retained to engage with what has unfortunately become a reality regarding how certain practices and beliefs within Muslim communities have come to be labelled. I use the term honour, very literally, as a label and marker to group the diverse beliefs and practices and varying Arabic terms that have been associated to the English term honour.

This seems appropriate, more so, after an examination of the Arabic terms that are so commonly translated as honour. The examination of the dominantly used terms within contemporary Muslim communities, *'ird*, *sharaf*, and *ghayra* have demonstrated how the notion of honour within the Islamicate is far more nuanced and conflicted than a single definition can reveal. This complex nature of honour is further explored through the very practices and beliefs associated with honour.

Through the CMHP, I have attempted to represent how the notion of honour within the Islamicate is far more multifaceted and nuanced than can appear from focusing on the single aspect of honour consequences: HBV. I have proposed various beliefs and practices that dominantly exist within Muslim communities today, as both maintenance mechanism and causal factors for an honour system. These various manifestations of honour have been greatly overlooked regarding their association to the honour system. However, so called transgressions and challenges to these beliefs and practices resulting in the consequences of HBV, demand an in-depth inquiry into the notion of honour and the extent of its influence on the various beliefs and praxis addressed above. Ultimately, honour must be reconceptualised, and gender-biased honour beliefs and practices must be disassociated from an honour system rooted within Islam to overcome any form of honour consequences.

As Hasan (2002, 30) so perfectly summarises:

The concept 'family honor' is a fortified wall behind which are entrenched all the forces seeking to restrict the freedom and women, to maintain their economic and social inferiority and perpetuate special male prerogatives, employing ideological and coercive means, all the way to murder. This is effected by the legitimating stamp of approval of tradition through education and the protection afforded tradition by the religious establishment, even defending elements of tradition in contradiction with Islamic religion, such as the special clemency showed by men who have violated the moral code.

Chapter 3: Honour in Pre-Islamic Arabia

3.1 Introduction

As one of the main aims of this thesis is to examine the concept of honour within Islam, it is crucial to understand the context within which Islam began. The aim of the current chapter is not to explore the complexities and depth of honour ideologies and practices within pre-Islamic Arabia. It will not critique or provide an in-depth diachronic analysis of honour. Rather, it is to establish whether an ideology of honour existed through providing a general brief context of the period before Islam. I aim to briefly examine whether a concept of honour impacted practice and belief amongst the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia. Moreover, how these may have impacted women of this time. More specifically I will analyse terminology of honour to establish whether contemporarily endorsed Arabic honour terms were utilised within this period. Overall, this chapter will provide the socio-cultural context within which Islam came and will allow for an analysis of whether honour codes were abrogated, reformed, or sustained with the coming of Islam.

3.2 Sources

The sources that I will rely on within this chapter are secondary sources that examine pre-Islamic Arabia. This varies from research examining general pre-Islamic Arabia, to specific topics such as war, women, poetry etc. Overall, this chapter will present a general overview of the conception and endorsement of honour in pre-Islamic Arabia.

3.3 Arabia before the advent of Islam

Islam began with the revelation of the Qur'anic scripture in 610CE. This Arabic Qur'an, although being revelation relevant to all times and for the whole of mankind, was sent to the Arabs. Undoubtedly, the Qur'anic text responds to issues relevant to the context it was revealed in.

Arabia before the advent of Islam consisted of two main groups: the nomadic Bedouins and the sedentary or urban dwellers (Farrugia, no date, 143). Regarding the nomads or the Bedouin Arabs, they were further broken down into smaller tribes formed through the grouping of blood-related families (Farrugia, no date, 143). 'It was within the tribe (like a large extended family all united) that the Bedouin sought shelter

through companionship, livelihood or marriage; hence loyalty and obedience to his tribe was compulsory.’ (Farrugia, no date, 143). Within this Bedouin society, individuals only had rights and duties ‘as a member of his group’. (Lewis, 1993, 24).

Despite pre-Islamic Arabia, at times, being depicted as a period of barbarism and chaos, and subsequently commonly labelled as the period of *Jahiliyya* (ignorance), many historians have pointed out that the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia did have rules and guiding principles (Webb, 2020, 238). The Arabs had tribal codes the whole tribe conformed to. Within these codes, we find the mentioning and existences of concepts relating to honour. According to Abdullah El Tayib (1983, 27) the nomadic tribes were aware of concepts of prestige and reputation. The Arab always acted ‘to protect his pride, this being the foremost item of personal honour’ (Tayib, 1983, 27). Furthermore, inter-tribal codes of behaviour were also ‘based on concepts of honour (*sharaf*), represented by blood-feud (*thār*), jealousy (*ghayra*) for their womenfolk, hospitality (*karam*) and succour (*najdah*) of the weak, including women, orphans and combatants outnumbered by their foes.’ (Tayib, 1983 27).

A concept of honour existed within pre-Islamic Arabia and was one of great significance. Within this period, we find reference to three significant terms still used today within the contemporary, *‘ird*, *sharaf* and *ghayra*. Regarding the aims of this thesis what we seek to understand regarding the existence of a pre-Islamic concept of honour is whether these conceptions are like the practices and conceptions of honour that exist within contemporary Muslim communities. Moreover, as I will examine in the coming chapters, these pre-Islamic notions of honour were impacted with the coming of Islam and the development of Islamic authoritative sources.

3.4 Existing honour ideologies in Arabia

What is known of the concept of honour in pre-Islamic Arabia? For the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia, honour was of great importance. According to Muhammad Ayish (2003, 83), the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia had developed ‘primitive social systems, deriving their worldview from an unwritten code of tribal law and morality that cantered on the concept of dignity (*karama*)’. Alongside values such as ‘...genealogy (*nasab*), paternalism (*abawiyya*) and eloquence (*fasaha*)’ we find the existence of honour (*sharaf*) within these codes of dignity (Ayish, 2003, 83). Ayish (2003) goes further by

presenting the view of Rodinson (1981) who describes honour as the real religion and real social bond for the Bedouin Arabs more so than even the 'cult of Gods' (Rodinson 1981, 165 cited in Ayish, 2003, 83). Ayish (2003, 83) explains the concept of honour within this period as originally deriving from a person's lineage. However, it also related to courage, the ability to defend the tribes' independence alongside the chastity and freedom of the tribal women and other dependant members.

Honour appears to be a central notion to the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia and as Farrugia (no date, 144) mentions 'the main causes of wars among the Arab tribes in the pre-Islamic era were their sense of honour, manliness, their intense pride of tribal origin that demanded blood for blood, vengeance to compensate for the slain of one's tribe.' Riffat Hasan (2010) in her article *The Concept of Honour* speaks of pre-Islamic Arabia as being in constant warfare due to tribal feuds, which were further influenced by the harsh desert environment. It was within these circumstances that notions of honour seem to be associated with women.

Pre-Islamic Arab poetry is a historically important source material for the study of the period in which it was composed. This poetry reveals major aspects and attitudes of pre-Islamic life, values, and norms (Farrugia, no date, 152) According to Farrugia (no date, 151) pre-Islamic poetry explicitly focused on themes of:

...chivalry, honour, vengeance and warfare. These were the required social and poetical norms of the time.

Honour was an important theme in poetry. In Kevin Blankinship's review of *War Songs: 'Antarah ibn Shaddād*, we appreciate the importance of honour terms, specifically the term *'ird*, as there is clear usage of these terms in pre-Islamic poetry (Blankinship, 2018). *'Antarah ibn Shaddād* was a famous pre-Islamic Arab knight and poet, whose poetry can be found in the *Mu'allaqāt*. The seven *Mu'allaqāt*, written down in Umayyad times, are believed to be a collection of prize-winning pre-Islamic poems on the courage and endurance of its warriors, recited in contests at the annual fair at 'Ukaz' (Faizer, 1996). Rizwi Faizer (1996) presents two main ideal Arab virtues present within these poems: 1. *Muru'a* (courage, loyalty, generosity), 2. *'ird* (honour). Similarly, Hitti (2002, 95) presents how 'the ideal of Arab virtue as revealed by this ancient pagan

poetry was expressed in the terms *murū'ah*, manliness (later virtues), and *ird* (honour).'

According to Fildis (2013, 4), in both pre-Islamic and post-Islamic societies '...men's honour had been linked to the sexuality, conduct and behaviour of their women.' He argues, before the advent of Islam honour was linked to the tribe due to the tribal system, however, this tribal system had been reformed to what is known as the Muslim *umma* (community) and thus with the coming of Islam we find this tribal honour being transformed to family and communal honour. It seems relevant to question here if this continuation of men's honour being linked to female sexuality, conduct and behaviour was emphasised and approved of within Islamic scripture and through the practice of the Messenger Muhammad? Or was this a continuation of pre-existing ideals and practices that assimilated into conceptions of normative Islamic practice? Fildis (2013) does not clarify or make a distinction here between what practices and beliefs continued as a form of cultural practices and what was communicated regarding honour within the primary authoritative sources of Islam. This distinction is essential. It reveals whether honour ideals and practices that have continued to exist within Muslim communities are based on Islamic sources or if they are merely a continuation of pre-existing practices and ideals. Furthermore, is such a continuation deemed acceptable according to the primary sources, or does it conflict within Qur'anic principles?

3.5 Parallels in terminology: contemporary honour terms and their usages before Islam

Alongside analysing the existence of honour, it is useful to examine any parallels in language. It is essential to examine how relevant terminology may have transformed or may still resemble pre-Islamic conceptions and usages. In line with the previous chapter, this chapter examines '*ird*, *ghayra* and *sharaf*. Although these may not be the only terms relating to the pre-Islamic notion of honour, it is the terms that will be considered within this chapter.

'*ird*

Of these terms, the one that dominantly appears to have existed within pre-Islamic Arabia, and one we find being mentioned and emphasised within contemporary

Muslim communities is the concept of *'ird*. Peter C. Dodd (1973) presents a detailed discussion on *'ird* in pre-Islamic Arabia in his article entitled *Family Honour and the Forces of Change in Arab Society*. Dodd (1973) uses the study by Bichr Farés of *honour* in pre-Islamic Arabia to analyse the notion of *'ird* within this period. Accordingly, we find:

'Ird from its etymology seems to be a partition which separates its possessor from the rest of mankind. This partition is certainly fragile since it was easily destroyed.... [In the Jahiliyya period] 'ird was intense and of momentous importance; besides, it was the guiding motive in the acts and deeds of all the Arabs except those of the Yemen... on account of its sacred nature, it was entitled to take the place of religion; the Arab put it in the highest place and defended it arms in hand.' (Farés 1938 cited in Dodd 1973, 40).

We can conceive that for the Arabs of pre-Islamic Arabia honour, specifically *'ird*, was of great importance. Far beyond a concept of which we can only find minimal reference, *'ird* appears to be a fundamental principle. *'ird* was conceived as one of the two main ideal Arab virtues within poetry (Hitti, 2002; Faizer, no date). What we can understand regarding *'ird* is that it may not have been gender-specific, and in fact, it impacted all members of the tribe and was something all members of the tribe (male and female) had to be conscious of. As Farés describe it, it was an ideology that motivated the acts and behaviours of members of the tribe, and we can therefore assume that both men and women lived in accordance with the tribal codes of *'ird* (Dodd, 1973).

Ghayra

Ghayra is another term used within the contemporary period whose usage can also be found within pre-Islamic Arabia. Tayib (1983) mentions *ghayra* as being part of nomadic tribal behaviour codes. More specifically he refers to the concept as jealousy for womenfolk. Interestingly, we find the conception of *ghayra* as being linked to the honour of the male but impacted by women, as present within both the contemporary period and within pre-Islamic Arabia. Despite this term not being translated to honour, it appears that the relevance of *ghayra* to *honour* existed even within pre-Islamic

Arabia. It is thus necessary to explore whether this conception of *ghayra* as linked to honour and its association with womenfolk is present within Islamic scriptural sources, as it is within these two distinct periods? If it such then it can be argued that Islam emphasised the continuation of pre-existing honour codes and conceptions of *ghayra*. However, if this cannot be found within scripture then we must question how such conceptions have continued to exist into contemporary Muslim communities.

Sharaf

The final term, although not as problematic, according to some researchers, in terms of gender disparity in the contemporary as the aforementioned terms, is the term *sharaf* (see chapter 2). Although an in-depth analysis of this term in pre-Islamic Arabia is difficult to present due to limited sources regarding this period and this term, it is clear though that the term did exist within a tribal code of honour or as Ayish (2003) places it within a dignity-based code. Furthermore, according to Tayib (1983), just as *ghayra*, the concept of *sharaf* also existed in inter-tribal codes of behaviour. Although the usage of this term is not entirely clear, it doesn't seem to be used in a gender-specific manner to the extent *ghayra* is. Rather it appears to refer to a general broader conception of *honour* relating to tribal matters such as honour in relation to wars and feuds and tribal status. This, therefore, appears to impact all members of the tribe: men and women.

3.6 The impact of honour on women

Honour codes, alongside commonly used gender-bias contemporary terms of honour, do appear to have existed within pre-Islamic Arabia. In line with the aims of this thesis, it is crucial to comprehend how pre-Islamic Arabian honour codes impacted women. According to Dr Bhaskr Da Gupta, as cited in Shantanu Gupta's *Honour Killing: Glorification Through Murder?* (2008), pre-Islamic honour ideals and practices were linked to tribal practices of looting other tribes: horses, camels, and women. Subsequently, the loss of any of these was deemed as shameful and the loss of honour. It is within this period we see women being '...considered to embody the honour of the family and the society' (Gupta, 2008, 7). Gupta goes on to state 'Women in the pre-Islamic Arabia and even after the origin of Islam have always been treated as a mere chattel with its ownership rights lying with the father, which then is transferred to the husband after Nikaah' (2008, 8). Gupta here groups pre-Islamic and

post-Islamic practices of honour as one. She appears to argue that a continuation of honour ideals and practices can be found continuing into the period of Islam. Her sweeping statements however are not backed up with a thorough critique of the concept honour within Islam. We cannot distinguish if her statements are referring to a continuation of pre-Islamic practices and ideals into the period of Islam, or if they are referring to ideals and practices that are based on the Islamic sources. Such statements lead to an inaccurate association or conflation of cultural or pre-Islamic notions and conceptions of honour with Islam. The coming chapters will provide an examination to clarify such claims. Through examining primary sources of the Qur'an, Ḥadīth, and the secondary sources of Islamic jurisprudence I will dismantle attributions of honour to Islam that are not rooted within the sources, and furthermore, I will clarify what conception of honour existing within Islamic scriptural sources. Nevertheless, despite Gupta's inadequate critique of these honour practices in Islam, and the lack of distinction between scriptural Islam and interpreted and practised Islam, what she does highlight is how women symbolised tribal honour in pre-Islamic Arabia.

As mentioned previously Hasan (2010) speaks of pre-Islamic Arabia as being in constant warfare due to tribal feuds, and within these circumstances, we see how honour was associated with women. Because of the harsh desert environment, Hasan (2010) explains how there was a fear of women and girls being captured and molested. If this did occur then it would lead to a loss of honour, and therefore shame would fall upon the whole tribe (Hasan, 2010). Here we find, like contemporary practices within some Muslim communities, the necessity to avenge (see chapter 2). 'They would become duty bound to avenge the wrong done' (Hasan, 2010). Furthermore, we see the loss of honour being dependent (although not exclusively) upon the female body. Similarly, to the contemporary when the loss of honour and shame is associated to a full family or community, we see in pre-Islamic Arabia a loss of honour and disgrace of shame would fall upon the whole tribe. Thus, the female body was seen as a symbol of tribal honour and therefore needed to be protected and avenged accordingly.

Although not commonly associated to the concept of honour or labelled as a form of HBV, female infanticide can be seen as an example of a form of violence against women that the Arabs practised due to their honour code and the fears of loss of honour as mentioned above. 'A code of honour evolved among the tribes of pre-

Islamic Arabia and was embedded in the customary law that tribal sheikhs administered in resolving disputes in the absence of a strong state.’ (Baron, 2006, 3). It was under customary law that the guardian was given the authority to punish those under his guardianship, even if these resulted in their life being taken (Baron, 2006). According to Baron (2006) it is these harsh punishments that the Qur’an came to prevent through the prohibition of female infanticide and uncorroborated accusations of illicit sex. Hassan (2010) argues that despite female infanticide not being commonly linked to contemporary honour killings ‘a deeper analysis of both suggests that they are similar in some ways’. Despite the phrase HBV being a contemporary expression, female infanticide can be placed under this term. Hassan (2010) further argues that ‘one of the main reasons why some pre-Islamic Arabs killed their daughters at birth was their apprehension that these offspring were a potential threat to their honour.’ Burying daughters alive prevented them from threatening tribal honour in the future (Cinthio and Ericsson, 2006, 52). It is this fear of losing honour and being shamed that plays a major role in many contemporary honour related practices and forms of violence. Thus, the impact of the concept of honour upon the lives of women is not unique to the contemporary period. Rather, its detrimental impact on the lives of women existed in pre-Islamic Arabia.

3.7 Honour in other pre-Islamic societies

The impact of honour codes and conceptions upon the lives of women however, existed not only in nomadic tribes of pre-Islamic Arabia. The aforementioned conceptions and usages of honour and honour codes did not emanate from Arabia nor were they limited to this period or community. Fildis (2013, 5) presents how notions of honour and shame existed nearly four millenniums ago, therefore much before the period within which we see the coming of Islam. Furthermore, its existence was not only in Arabia.

Honour codes existed in the Roman period also. ‘The first instance of legislating female sexual conduct was in the reign of Augustus (BC 22 to 17 AD). Augustus introduced stricter laws regarding sexual morality and provisions establishing adultery as a crime or *lex Julia*’ (Fildis, 2013, 5). Furthermore, ‘...the husband and the father of the adulteress had the right to kill; not only were fathers and husbands given legal permission to kill their daughters and wives in case they committed adultery; brothers

(who had paternal powers) were also allowed to take action against their sisters' (Cantarella 1991; cited in Fildis, 2013, 5).

Clearly the notions of honour and shame were not only limited to Arabia or the period within which Islam began. It is therefore relevant to acknowledge this existence and distinguish between what would be deemed as pre-existing notions of honour and shame and what can be deemed as rooted in the Islamic sources of authority, (if these notions exist within them). Not only will this clarify the roots of negative honour ideals and practices, but it will also allow for a clarified conception of honour within Islam.

3.8 Conclusion

To conclude, a concept of honour did exist within tribal societies of pre-Islamic Arabia. This conception of honour, far from being of minimal importance, was one that formed part of tribal codes of behaviour or dignity codes. Honour was central to the Arabs and motivated their actions and loyalties. All three contemporary used terms, *'ird*, *sharaf* and *ghayra*, were utilised within pre-Islamic Arabia. Due to the limited sources on the topic, we cannot claim a comprehensive analysis of these terms and their usages. However, it does appear that terms such as *'ird* and *sharaf* were more general in usage and have become more gender-specific in contemporary Muslim communities. With the term *ghayra* we can see that its gender-specific usages still exist within contemporary honour-endorsing Muslim communities as they did in pre-Islamic Arabia.

From the uses of these three terms in pre-Islamic Arabia, we understand that honour within this period was dominantly related to the tribal structure. It related to lineage, conceptions of courage, tribal status, ability to defend the tribe – specifically dependents such as tribal women. It appears that honour within the tribe was not only concerning female sexuality and was therefore not completely gender-specific. There clearly were non-gender-specific tribal conceptions and commitments that were also embedded within notions of honour.

Nevertheless, despite the notion of honour appearing not to be gender-specific in all instances, honour conceptions did impact women within these tribal societies in ways that it did not impact men. We do see honour being associated with the female body

with the need for protecting and preventing the female body from being captured and molested. This concern seems to be specifically for women. Furthermore, practices of female infanticide represent the possible of loss of honour or shame being attached to the female body. This is not to say that these were the only means of loss of honour. Honour could be lost in various ways that conflicted with tribal codes of honour such as the inability to protect the tribe, or losses at war, etc. However, evidently, there did exist a gender-specific aspect to this tribal conception of honour, despite some aspects of the tribal honour code appearing to be gender-neutral.

It can therefore be argued that contemporary conceptions of honour existed before the coming of Islam within Arabia. Moreover, parallels can be found with specific terminology also. Thus, an examination of honour conceptions within Muslim communities must question the origins and development of these notions. Are they truly based on Islamic scriptural sources? Or are they a continuation of existing social norms and mores from the period within which the Qur'anic scripture was revealed? Furthermore, did the coming of Islam impact these existing notions in any way? And how did some of these conceptions transform to become more gender-specific (in the case of *'ird*). To answer these questions this examination must be extended to the primary sources, to see whether a concept of honour exists within them.

Chapter 4: Honour within the Qur'anic text: a theological consideration

4.1 Introduction

In the previous chapters I argued for an examination of the concept of honour within the authoritative sources of Islam. This chapter and the one to follow will be examining these sources that are generally agreed upon by Muslims as the primary authoritative sources. Such an examination is moving towards a non-Eurocentric comprehension of honour that centres Muslim agency and reflects the concern of contemporary Muslim communities. By embedding my analyses within the Qur'anic text, Ḥadīth literature and within Islamic jurisprudence I intend to bring forward an understanding of honour that is conscious of the spirit of Islam and Muslim history and experiences.

The aim of this chapter is to comprehend the theological stances of honour within the Qur'anic text through examining semantic fields of honour through a thematic analysis. I will critique traditional readings of honour and further, analyse honour occurrences within the Qur'an using a hermeneutical framework that calls for a cognizance of the ethical intent of the Qur'anic text, one that is informed by gender justice.

4.2 Traditional *tafsīr* and *tawīl* vs reformist feminist hermeneutics

Before engaging with the relevant verses, it is appropriate to explore Qur'anic methodologies and the methodology I will be utilising. The Qur'an has been a central point of focus of contemporary Muslim scholars. Within the contemporary period we find an increase in reformist methods of interpreting the Qur'an to arrive at gender-just, egalitarian, contextually relevant readings. Reformist, progressive and feminist scholars have critiqued traditional methods and interpretations of the Qur'anic scripture as male-centric, atomistic, and at times misogynistic. Scholars such as Wadud (1999), Barlas (2019) and Rahman (1982), to name a few, propose reformed hermeneutical approaches to rereading the Qur'an. An example of such a reformist Qur'anic methodology can also be seen in the work of the global organisation for equality and justice within Muslim families, Musawah (Musawah, 2021).

Musawah proposes a reformist methodology in reading the Qur'anic text that is attached to Muslim intellectual history and the *tafsīr* and *tawīl* tradition (Musawah 2021). They intend to advance the Qur'anic ethics through utilising classical readings

of the Qur'an alongside contemporary scholarship. Their method consists of various modes of inquiry including a holistic, thematic, linguistic, intra-textual, historical, and ethically focused inquiry. Central to reformist hermeneutical approaches is historicising the Qur'anic text and reading it holistically in contrast to what reformists deem as atomistic, fragmented traditional exegetical readings.

Naguib (2010, 16), in her research on Muslim feminist hermeneutics, represents how the methods of traditional exegetical scholars are commonly denounced by reformist scholars as restrictive and biased towards Muslim women. However, traditional methods such as engaging with Prophetic literature and linguistics etc, are adopted by these very reformist scholars such as Barlas. Naguib (2010) demonstrates, through the example of the menstruation verses, that traditional *tafsīr* has not always resulted in readings of Qur'anic verses that have been restrictive to women. On the contrary they have developed *less* restrictive readings for women regarding menstruation (see Naguib, 2010).

The corpus of traditional *tafsīr* and *tawīl* is vast. It would be highly problematic and damaging to the study of the Qur'an to call for the disavowal of this entire traditional science. This of course does not mean traditional *tafsīr* is not without limitations. Throughout Muslim intellectual history it is clear scholars and intellectuals engaged with specific areas and points of inquiry of the Qur'anic text. According to Imam As-Suyuti (2017, 111)

...people who were proficient in the Islamic sciences would write exegesis and limit it to specific topics. The grammarians considered the most important subject to be grammatical states...some scholars...were only concerned with looking at the stories in the Qur'an...other scholars wrote from a perspective of fiqh...other scholars wrote from the perspective of logic...'.

The great scholar of the Indian subcontinent, Shāh Waliyyullāh al-Muḥaddith ad-Dihlawī (d.1176 AH/ 1762 CE) also highlighted that 'there are different schools with regards to the art of Qur'anic *tafsīr*' (2014, 165).

The field is vast, and each of them intends to make the meanings of the Noble Qur'an understood, has delved into a particular discipline, has explained according to the measure of his own eloquence and understanding, and took the school of his colleagues as the most obvious. For that reason the domain of *tafsir* expanded to an unimaginable extent and innumerable books were compiled on it. (Shāh Waliyyullāh, 2014, 167).

Scholars focused on areas of the Qur'an that interested them or that they specialised in. Each of their contributions are invaluable and a part of a rich intellectual Muslim history. Equally however, these contributions are limited therefore necessitating a constant engagement with the Qur'anic text and a continuous advancement of Qur'anic methodologies.

Traditional hermeneutics of the Qur'anic text was dominated by an elite of male interpreters. It is undeniable that these scholars were conditioned by their own experiences and biases and approached the Qur'an through a male-centric lens. As such many of the Qur'anic themes that we find contemporary reformist scholars addressing and engaging with were not dealt with in a holistic manner by traditional exegetes. Contemporary scholars are also influenced by their context and thus approach the text with new insights and concerns. We cannot avoid a reading that is relevant to our context, namely the contemporary. By the nature of how we approach the text, we arrive at it with questions formulated and relevant to our context, as did the exegetes of the past. It is therefore necessary and inevitable that our understanding of concepts such as honour is constantly evolving, and our engagement should be through a constant hermeneutical circle. According to Wadud (1999) this hermeneutical circle needs to be concerned with three aspects: the context of revelation, the grammatical composition, and the whole text view. Reformist feminist scholars stress that it is the absence of the final aspect of the hermeneutical circle - the whole text view - in traditional exegetical works that has resulted in fragmented readings.

In regard to our ever evolving and developing relationship with the text through hermeneutics, Gadamer emphasises how prejudgements are a historical reality of our

being (Palmer, 1969, 182). '...Prejudgement are not something we must or can dispense with; they are the basis of our being able to understand history at all' (Palmer, 1969, 182). It is these prejudgments that an exegete cannot abandon. As Wadud (1999, 5) emphasises in regard to the Qur'an, every reader approaches the text with their prior text. This context within which ones reads the text, '...is inescapable and represents, on the one hand, the rich varieties that naturally occur between readers, and, on the other hand, the uniqueness of each' (Wadud, 1999, 5). Prior text is therefore something even classical exegetes could not escape. No reading of the Qur'anic text is absolute, not even widely revered classical readings.

However, as Naguib (2010) emphasises positioning contemporary hermeneutical approaches to the Qur'an against traditional readings as binary opposites is extremely problematic.

By embracing severing as a beginning, a feminist hermeneutic of the Qur'an is deafening itself to the earlier voices of Muslim women. For women had not been silent before the advent of modernity (Naguib, 2010, 18).

Furthermore, such binaries lead to the dismissal of a rich intellectual history of *tafsīr* and history that is not separate to and cannot be erased from Muslim lived experiences. The binary of 'modern/feminist/egalitarian' or 'traditional/male/misogynistic' is an 'uncompromising construction' (Naguib, 2010, 4).

Ultimately, in rejecting the *tafsir* tradition to reciprocate the exclusion, this new hermeneutic is premising an 'egalitarian' reading on an act of violence – a rupture that only strengthens suspicion and resistance within a tradition that is perceived by its practitioner as intellectually, politically, and even militarily threatened' (Naguib, 2010, 19).

It is crucial to engage with the traditional *tafsīr* tradition whilst being critical of it to advance readings of the Qur'anic text. I would argue that traditional exegetes can be seen as selective in the verses and themes they examined holistically. There are themes such as marriage and divorce, that many feminists have highlighted, that have

been dealt with in an atomistic manner leading to fragmented understandings that appear to conflict with the broader Qur'anic ethical intent. But there have also been themes that have been engaged with in a manner that challenged misogynistic views (as can be seen in the menstruation example given by Naguib (2010)). I argue that the concept of honour is such a concept that traditional exegetes have taken for granted and thus honour has existed in Muslim intellectual history and in the discipline of *tafsīr* and *tawīl* as a concept that has been inadequately engaged with in a holistic manner.

4.3 Methodology

Given the foregoing arguments, the methodology endorsed within this chapter, is influenced by traditional exegetical and reformist feminist hermeneutical methods. I will engage in a thematic analysis of honour throughout the Qur'anic text, as emphasised in the methodology of Musawah (Musawah 2021). However, my reading of the Qur'an by the Qur'an is indeed a traditional exegetical method, as is my reading of the Qur'anic concept of honour utilising the sayings of the Prophet which will come in the following chapter. Similarly, my inquiry into the grammatical composition of some verses is a method of the traditional exegetes. As such this chapter will demonstrate the advancement of traditional readings and methods of the Qur'anic text, as Musawah propose and Naguib (2010) also emphasises. Traditional *tafsīr* is not abandoned. Rather it is engaged with critically. My thematic analysis is influenced by a circular hermeneutical method of reading the Qur'an.

4.4 Hermeneutics

Fredrick Schleiermacher (1998, 231) emphasises how the art of understandings (hermeneutics), is incomplete without a circular understanding of the parts and the whole. 'We understand the meaning of an individual word by seeing it in reference to the whole of the sentence; and reciprocally, the sentence's meaning as a whole is dependent on the meaning of the individual words' (Palmer, 1969, 87). Honour verses cannot be removed from the context of the whole Qur'anic text, and we cannot understand the Qur'anic concept of honour without understanding its parts, the individual honour verses. It will become clear in the following that in traditional exegesis the terms relating to honour were commonly overlooked. How then could an understanding of the relevant verses be achieved without an understanding of the

individual words that they depend on? This further extends to situating these verses and the meaning of honour within the whole Qur'anic text. We cannot understand the meaning of these verses and their usage of honour without understanding the overall Qur'anic view and vice versa. To overcome these limitations and gain a coherent understanding of honour within the Qur'an, the concept of honour within the relevant verses must be interpreted through a hermeneutical circle. As Schleiermacher (1998) stresses, the movements between the parts and whole must be in repeated circular movements. Otherwise, the understanding of the whole will always remain preliminary and incomplete until we revisit the parts to further our interpretation and understanding.

My examination of honour within the Qur'an will be done using a 3-step process (see figure 2). I will rely on the renowned and extensively used English translation of Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2016). I will begin by locating all verses which Yusuf Ali has translated Arabic terms as the English term honour and categorise them into themes. These thematic categories will be used to analyse the overall dominant usages and associations of honour within the Qur'anic text. I will further identify the Arabic terms Yusuf Ali translates as honour and analyse and compare these to the ones previously identified in chapter 2. The identification of these Arabic terms will then permit a more detailed search for occurrences of honour within the Qur'an and an analysis of the semantic field of these Arabic terms. However, due to the remit of this thesis I will only commit to analysing those occurrences as identified within the translation of Yusuf Ali (2016).

My restriction to a single English translation is a result of the challenges of translating the Qur'anic text. Upon exploring numerous translations, it becomes apparent that the translation of terms varies. Some terms translated as honour by Yusuf Ali may not be translated as honour by other translators. One can find the same term within the Qur'anic text implying different meanings. Therefore, solely focusing on Arabic rather than the translation will not provide a solution. I therefore focus on one specific English translation for this inquiry. My choice to focus on a single English translation is also based on how the English term honour has become dominantly associated with contemporary Muslim societies. It is therefore appropriate to focus on how this very term is understood within translated texts of the Qur'an.

The use of Yusuf Ali's Qur'an translation is once again linked to my positionality as a South-Asian British Muslim and my situatedness and the use of translations within the non-Arabic speaking community that has influenced the research aims. Utilising the translated text and examining the term 'honour' aligns with the context in which the Qur'an is read, understood and received by the many non-Arabic speaking Muslims within Britain today, and the West more broadly. This is an inversion of the usual method of studying semantic fields within the Qur'anic text. However, as previously clarified, the usage of the English term 'honour' is relevant to how Muslim honour ideals and practice are conceived of and the framing of Muslims within the West. Thus the term 'honour' in English translations of the Qur'anic text is relevant and crucial in addressing contemporary challenges faced by Muslim communities regarding honour.

In regards to my specific selection of Yusuf Ali's translation, this is due to the following reasons.

My reliance on one translation overcomes the discrepancies in translations of Arabic terms for honour. Rather than focusing on numerous English translations of the Qur'an that are in agreement upon when an Arabic term is to be translated as the English term 'honour', I rely on one translation. This ensures a broader range of themes to be identified in association with honour. My reliance on a single translation has allowed 12 themes to be identified allowing for the thematic whole of honour to be discussed in relation to the Qur'anic text. Analysing various Qur'anic translations and identifying verses in which the translation of the Arabic terms for honour are agreed upon would result in a limited selection of themes and therefore would limit the scope and potential of a proposed thematic whole of honour within the Qur'anic text.

Further, the selected translation, alongside the commentaries and their translations, are popular and readily available to British Muslims. From my experience within both Barelwī and Deobandī institutes of traditional learning, it is apparent that Yusuf Ali's translation of the Qur'an is commonly used and viewed as a neutral representative translation (The Barelwī and Deobandī movements are popular intra-Sunnī groups that South-Asian Muslims commonly ascribe to; see Gilliat-Ray, 2010.)

This usage across varying Sunnī groups within South-Asian British Muslim communities also applies to the exegetical texts selected for inquiry. These texts are commonly included as a part of the curriculum in Islamic institutes of knowledge in the UK. The selection is thus representative of communal engagement with textual sources and how tradition is received in educational and religious institutions of British Islam.

Further, it should be noted that my inquiry is limited to 50 verses and therefore it cannot be seen as representative of all occurrences of honour within the Qur'anic text. Although my restriction to a single translation means my findings are not representative of honour within the whole Qur'anic text, nevertheless, this chapter's preliminary findings of honour occurrences within the Qur'an allows further routes of inquiry to be identified, which would not be possible without these findings. For a more thorough and detailed critique of the Qur'anic ideology of honour it would be necessary to take the located Arabic terms further and identify all their other occurrences, even when they have not been translated as the term honour. Due to the remit of this project, I have chosen to limit my inquiry. Nevertheless, it still reflects the potential and the necessity of engaging with the Qur'anic text to fully comprehend the notion of honour within Islam and the Islamicate.

The second process of this chapter will entail the examination of specific verses. I will present the traditional readings of these verses in the commentary of Yusuf Ali (2016) and *Tafsīr ibn Kathīr*, to highlight how the terms translated as honour were understood within a canonical *tafsīr* text and a contemporary traditional reading.

The final process of this chapter will be to critique the traditional interpretations of honour occurrences within the Qur'an through applying a contemporary hermeneutical approach that is conscious of the broader ethical intent of the Qur'anic text (hermeneutics of ethics), to reconceptualise and arrive at a theological conception of honour; one which is conscious of contemporary Muslim communities. I will present possible understandings of honour that arise from the selected verses focusing on the broader context of the verse alongside the grammatical composition of the translated terms.

The preliminary thematic analysis that will be presented in this chapter will be used with the findings from chapter 5, to propose an honour framework in chapter 8.




Figure 2

4.5 Verses revealed to address pre-Islamic honour ideals

Contemporary examinations of honour in relation to the Qur'an focus on verses to disprove negative honour practices prevalent within the contemporary period (see chapter 1). These verses despite not directly relating to a concept of honour are still useful in comprehending how contemporary honour practices are at times in conflict with the Qur'anic text. Amongst the many verses used to counter negative honour ideals are the verses relating *qadhaf*, *li'an*, and female infanticide. I will not explore these verses in depth here as this chapter aims to focus on verses that explicitly contain the term honour. These verses will, however, be examined in chapter 6. Nonetheless, these verses do represent a clear example of how the Qur'anic text directly challenged prevailing gender-biased practices that were informed by a notion of honour.

Although we can appreciate that the Qur'an challenged pre-Islamic honour ideals (see chapter 1 and 3) there is still a lack of clarity within academic research and traditional

scholarship regarding what concept of honour the Qur'an is promoting. The following verses will reveal how the Qur'anic text intended for honour to be conceptualised and how it reformed the pre-Islamic honour ideals.

4.6 Critiquing the dataset

There are 50 verses, within the translation of Yusuf Ali (2016) that contain the English term honour, some of which contain the term more than once (4 of the verses included into the inquiry contain the notion honour as a result of implied understanding from the Arabic text). The 50 verses relate to various themes which I have categorised into 12 thematic groups based on the broader theme of each verse in the context of its specific chapter (*surah*) alongside the use of the term honour within the verse. Some verses can be seen to overlap more than one category and some categories interrelate. However, I have attempted to form these categories based on the overriding themes of the located verses. My thematic categorisations are not exhaustive, they are however, the most broad and obvious themes. In order of the most occurrences of the term honour these themes/modes of address are as follows: prophetology, God, eschatology, human conduct in relation to the earthly realm, God bestowing honour on his creation, honour as a right of humans, the Qur'an, angels, supplication to seek honour, loss of honour, both genders explicitly addressed in relation to honour equally, and a final verse that mentions honour as belonging to God, the prophet Muhammad, and the believers collectively. These 50 verses occur in 33 chapters.

4.7 Makkan and Madinan verses

Type of Surah	Number of Occurrences
Makkan Surahs	23
Madinan Surahs	10

Table 1

The classification of verses according to the period of revelation provides insight into the broader context of a specific verses' revelation. Qur'anic chapters are categorised into 2 categories depending on their time of revelation.

Makkan chapters are those revealed before the migration to Madina (*hijra*), a period of 13 years. Madinan chapters are those revealed after the migration and was a period of 10 years. The Makkan chapters within the Qur'an are generally concerned with the unity of God (*tawhīd*), ascribing partners to Allah (*shirk*), eschatology, and other articles of faith (Zeeno, 1998). In contrast the Madinan chapters began to respond to the needs of the new complex community in Madina alongside informing the growing Muslim community of how to conduct themselves as Muslims. Madinan chapters are more concerned with legal aspects. Consequently, the period of revelation of the verses containing honour occurrences are telling of the broader context of the revelation of an honour ideology in the Qur'an.

Of the 50 verses located 23 are classified as Makkan and 10 as Madinan. From the categorisation of the Qur'anic chapters with honour occurrences these verses mostly appear to be revealed within the Makkan period. Based on these themes and dominance of revelation in Makkah it can be argued that honour within the Qur'anic text is less concerned with legal issues and more so with belief and ethics.

In regard to Makkan and Madinan revelation, Mahmoud Mohamed Taha (1996), proposed a very particular argument. He argued that the Qur'anic text includes two separate messages. Makkan texts can be seen as those that one adheres to in one's private life, whereas Madinan chapters are those that concern social, political and economic affairs. It is private practice pertaining to moral precepts and beliefs that Taha argues is the Second Message of Islam (Taha, 1996). He (1996) argues that the Madinan chapters were specifically for the period within which they were revealed and for the 20th century they were outdated. He (1996), thus, emphasised the Makkan chapters as those that represent an ideal religion which is inclusive of religious freedom and equality. Although, Taha's (1996) position is one that is radical, as in essence it is calling for the abrogation of one whole period of revelation, his categorisation of the two periods of revelation highlights an important matter.

From his analysis it appears that throughout Muslim history, Muslims have prioritised legal aspects of revelation. Although these legal aspects can also contain ethical and moral insights, the revelation that is primarily concerned with morals, Makkan chapters, have not been emphasised as much. As will be demonstrated in the

following, concepts such as honour have also been largely understood through a legal lens (as will be seen in the verse concerning *'idda*). However, as will become clear the occurrences of honour within the Qur'anic text are greatly in relation to moral and ethical precepts, however this is not the reality of honour in Muslim lived experiences. Instead, we find that concepts such as honour, when not relating to legal rulings and issues, have been afforded minimum attention and thus remain abstract and fragmented.

4.8 Arabic terms

The Arabic terms translated as honour are crucial in understanding the honour semantic field and the stance of honour within the Qur'anic text. From the previous chapter it is clear, within contemporary Muslim communities the ideology and practice of honour are far more complex and nuanced than can be reflected in the single English term, honour. The selected Arabic terms that were presented, (*'ird*, *ghayra*, *sharaf*), represent how contemporary conceptions of honour are concerned with complex and largely patriarchal conceptions relating to various factors such as protective jealousy, female sexuality, and overall female agency. Although the term *ghayra* reflects how at times honour pressurises male members of Muslim communities to feel the need to act according to the honour system it is clear that overall, the honour paradigm impacts women in a manner that is unparalleled for men. To fully comprehend the complexity of this system it is paramount to explore the relevant Arabic terminology. It is therefore appropriate to compare contemporary Arabic terms relating to the honour system to the occurrences of honour within the Qur'anic text to appreciate any transformations and developments that may have occurred throughout Muslim history.

Within the 50 verses several Arabic terms can be identified. For a detailed appreciation of the 50 Arabic terms translated as honour see table 2 below. A detailed exploration of the variations of these roots and how these terms occur is necessary to appreciate the expression, use and form of honour within the Qur'anic text. However, within 50 verses this task is greater than the project can fulfil. I therefore limit my detailed examination to 8 verses. These verses have been selected based on the relevance of their themes to the gendered issue of honour. I will do a linguistic inquiry into the specific Arabic terms for these verses only.

In some instances, Yusuf Ali (2016) includes within his translation the term honour in brackets. For these there is not exact Arabic term within the Qur'anic text that he has translated as honour. Aside from these there are 7 Arabic roots that can be located in various forms within the Qur'anic text that Yusuf Ali (2016) has translated as honour. It should be noted that not all derivations of these roots within the whole of the Qur'anic text are translated as honour. At times some of the terms he has translated as honour in certain verses have not been translated as honour in other verses. The broader implications of his translation are not going to be explored here. Yet, it is worth questioning why at times these terms have been translated as honour and at other times not?

	Verse	Arabic term	Arabic root
1	2:235	مَعْرُوفًا	ع ر ف
2	2:253	Honour included in brackets – corresponding English term is not explicitly part of the Arabic text, but is implied through meaning	
3	2:267	Honour included in brackets – Implied meaning	
4	3:26	نُعِزُّ	ع ز ز
5	3:45	وَجِبْهَا	و ج ه
6	4:31	كَرِيمًا	ك ر م
7	4:139 x2	الْعِزَّةَ	ع ز ز
8	5:12	عَزَّزَ	ع ز ز
9	7:157	وَعَزَّزُوهُ	ع ز ز
10	10:65	الْعِزَّةَ	ع ز ز
11	12:21	أَكْرَمَى	ك ر م
12	17:23	كَرِيمًا	ك ر م
13	17:62	كَرَّمَتْ	ك ر م
14	17:70	كَرَّمْنَا	ك ر م
15	17:80 x2	صِدْقٍ	ص د ق
16	18:34	وَأَعَزَّ	ع ز ز

17	19:50	صِدْقٍ	ص د ق
18	19:85	Implied	
19	21:26	مُكْرَمُونَ	ك ر م
20	22:18	مُكْرِم	ك ر م
21	22:30	يُعْظَمُ	ع ظ م
22	22:32	يُعْظَمُ	ع ظ م
23	23:116	الْكَرِيمِ	ك ر م
24	24:26	كَرِيمٌ	ك ر م
25	24:36	Implied	
26	25:72	كَرَامًا	ك ر م
27	26:58	كَرِيمٍ	ك ر م
28	26:84	صِدْقٍ	ص د ق
29	27:40	كَرِيمٌ	ك ر م
30	33:69	وَجِبْهَا	و ج ه
31	36:27	الْمُكْرَمِينَ	ك ر م
32	37:42	مُكْرَمُونَ	ك ر م
33	37:180	الْعِزَّةُ	ع ز ز
34	44:17	كَرِيمٌ	ك ر م
35	44:49	الْكَرِيمِ	ك ر م
36	48:9	تُعَزِّرُوهُ	ع ز ر
37	49:13	أَكْرَمَكُمْ	ك ر م
38	51:24	الْمُكْرَمِينَ	ك ر م
39	55:27	وَالْإِكْرَامِ	ك ر م
40	55:78	وَالْإِكْرَامِ	ك ر م
41	56:77	كَرِيمٌ	ك ر م
42	63:8 x2	الْأَعَزُّ الْعِزَّةُ	ع ز ز
43	69:40	كَرِيمٍ	ك ر م
44	70:35	مُكْرَمُونَ	ك ر م
45	80:13	مُكْرَمَةٌ	ك ر م
46	80:16	كِرَامٍ	ك ر م
47	81:19	كَرِيمٍ	ك ر م

48	82:11	كَرَامًا	ك ر م
49	89:15 x2	فَأَكْرَمَهُ أَكْرَمَنِ	ك ر م
50	89:17	تُكْرَمُونَ	ك ر م

Table 2

What is of concern within this chapter is a comparison of contemporary Arabic roots to those that have been located in the Qur'an. From the previous chapter it was established that amongst the variety of contemporary honour terms used the most dominantly used in relation to the CMHP, those that are most controversial, are the terms *'ird*, *sharaf* and *ghayra*. It is interesting to note that of the seven roots identified to have derivations translated as honour none of these roots are commonly used within contemporary Muslim communities in prevailing gender biased ways.

Roots	Number of occurrences throughout the Qur'an	Occurrences translated as honour by Yusuf-Ali	Base Meaning
ع ر ف	70	1	to know, to perceive, discover, to announce (Wahiduddin, 1998)
ع ز ز	119	6	To be strong, powerful, respected, to fortify, strengthen (Wahiduddin, 1998)
و ج ه	78	2	To face, encounter, confront, face, will, course/purpose/object one is pursuing, place/direction one is going/looking, way of a thing, consideration/regard (The Study Quran).

ك ر م	47	29	To be productive, generous, precious, valuable, honourable, noble, All-Generous, Most Generous (The Study Quran).
ص د ق	155	3	To be truthful, true, sincere, speak the truth, establish or confirm the truth of what another has said, verify, keep faith (The Study Quran).
ع ز ر	3	3	To prevent, turn away, reprehend, support, assist (The study Quran).
ع ظ م	128	2	To be great, powerful, mighty (Wahiduddin, 1998).

Table 3

The term *'ird* is derived from the root ع ر ض which occurs 79 times in 10 forms within the Qur'an. The form *'ird* does not occur in the Qur'an. Its use was present in pre-Islamic Arabia, and it has a dominant place in some contemporary Muslim communities, or ideologies similar to *'ird* are present yet, it is not used with the Qur'anic text (Bichr, no date). *Sharaf* which is from the root ش ر ف also has no derivations within the Qur'an. In terms of the term *ghayra*, the root of which is غ ي ر, variations of this root occur 154 times within the Qur'anic text in 5 forms. But none of those occurrences have been translated by Yusuf Ali (2016) as jealousy, zeal or protective jealousy in relation to honour as the term dominantly means. Further, the specific form *ghayra* cannot be located within the Qur'anic text.

The roots of terms translated as honour within the Qur'anic text can be seen in table 3. Remarkably, these terms are not commonly associated to the gender biased sexualised conception of honour that prevails within contemporary Muslim

communities. Moreover, upon looking at the total occurrences of derivations of these roots it becomes clear that these derivations being translated as honour are minimal. The only derivations of a root that Yusuf Ali (2016) always translates as honour is those of the root ع ز ر which only occurs 3 times. Aside from these, the dominant usage of all the other root derivations are instances that have not been translated as honour. It therefore appears that these terms have far more nuanced meanings and usages than of just honour.

Furthermore, contemporary conceptions of honour do not appear to be based on Qur'anic conceptions of honour or Qur'anic terminology. Not only are these contemporary Arabic expressions of honour non-existent within the Qur'anic text, but even the honour terms that are used within the Qur'an do not appear to share any likeness in meaning to concepts of honour concerning female sexuality, the need to preserve female honour or protective jealousy. To fully appreciate what Qur'anic terms for honour mean an in-depth examination of the semantic field of honour within the Qur'anic text is vital. Of course, this is beyond the word-limit of this thesis. Nonetheless, a thematic analysis of the 12 themes of honour will provide a broader outlook of the context of honour occurrences within the Qur'anic text.

4.9 Exploration of the 12 honour themes/modes of address

Theme	Number of verses	Qur'anic verses
Prophetology	12	Q2:253, Q3:45, Q5:12, Q7:157, Q12:21, Q17:80, Q19:50, Q26:84, Q33:69, Q44:17, Q48:9, Q69:40
Allah	9	Q4:139, Q10:65, Q23:116, Q27:40, Q37:180, Q48:9, Q55:27, Q55:78, Q69:40
Eschatology	6	Q4:31, Q19:85, Q36:27, Q37:42, Q44:49, Q70:35,
Human conduct on the Earthly realm	5	Q2:267, Q18:34 Q22:30, Q22:32, Q25:72

Allah bestowing honour on creation	7	Q17:62, Q17:70 Q24:26, Q24:36, Q36:27, Q37:42, Q89:15
Honour as a right of creation	3	Q2:235, Q17:23, Q89:17
Qur'an	2	Q56:77, Q80:13
Angels	6	Q21:26, Q51:24, Q80:16, Q81:19 Q82,11, Q81:19
Supplication seeking honour	2	Q17:80, Q26:84
Loss of honour	2	Q22:18, Q26:59
Explicitly addressing both genders together	2	Q24:26, Q49:13
Allah, prophet, and believers	1	Q63:8

Table 4

It should be noted that many of the themes of the selected verses overlap. In instances when a verse clearly falls into multiple themes, I have included them under each of the themes in the table above. As such there are more than 50 instances in total in the table above. This table however is not exhaustive of all the possible overlaps. There are subtle overlaps in themes that are not represented. The purpose here is to demonstrate the broad honour themes within the Qur'anic text.

The most prevalent category of honour verses is prophetology. This category includes 12 verses within which the translated term honour relates to a prophet. The first verse Q2:253, speaks of Allah raising the messengers to degrees of honour. According to Yusuf Ali's *tafsīr* (2016, 101), this refers to '...a two-fold sense: they were raised to high posts of honour, and they rose by degrees'. Other verses speak of how prophets are held in honour in this world and the next and the rank God has bestowed on them etc. (Q3:45, Q19:50, Q33:69, Q44:17). Honour is also presented in terms of a command to honour and assist the prophets of God (Q5:12, Q7:157). Verse Q12:21 concerns how prophet Yusuf was commanded to be treated by the *Aziz* who purchased him. 'Make him stay among us honourable....' Within his *tafsīr* Yusuf Ali

focuses here on the motives of the *Aziz*, 'The 'Aziz's motive was perhaps worldly. Such a handsome, attractive, intelligent son would get him more honour, dignity, power and wealth' (Yusuf Ali, 2016, 556-7). Although at this moment Yusuf was not on his Prophetic mission, I have included this verse with prophetology as it concerns a Prophet. Verse Q69:40 mentions honour of Allah, prophet Muhammad and the believers collectively and will be discussed in the following. There are two further verses within which the Prophets supplicate seeking honour (Q17:80, Q26:84). These represent how honour is desirable and should be sought from God, as the prophets invoked for it.

Overall, in this category we see honour referring to the raised honourable position of the messengers, or God's command for humans to treat the messengers with honour. I have refrained from providing the *tafsīr* of each single verse as within the *tafsīr* of Yusuf Ali (2016) there is no detailed explanation or engagement with the concept of honour. Nor is there an exploration of what the Messengers and Prophets being honoured indicates. The term honour is used throughout without an analysis for what it denotes.

The category of God contains those verses that attribute honour to God, portraying honour as a divine attribute, eternally belonging to God. There are 9 verses within the category. Verse Q4:139 and Q10:65 emphasise '...all honour is with Allah.' Verse Q23:116 describes God as the '...Lord of the throne of honour'. This verse can therefore also be seen as designating the created throne with honour. I have included this within this category as the honour of the throne is in relation to the throne being Gods. The remaining verses attribute honour to God '...supreme in honour', '...the Lord of honour and power', '...full of majesty, bounty and honour'. Verse 48:9 according to Yusuf Ali's *tafsīr* refers to God although some commentators have said it could refer to the Prophet Muhammad. Once again there is no analysis within Yusuf Ali's *tafsīr* of what is implied by honour and how honour is associated to the divine being of God. The attribution of honour to God, however, probes us to question the contemporary uses of honour that have limited it to represent a gender biased sexualised system of thought and practice. Why have contemporary Muslim communities dominantly associated honour to sexual conduct and have therefore limited the broader application of honour and its association to the divine being?

The category of eschatology is inclusive of all those verses within which honour is related to the last days, the day of resurrection or the afterlife, heaven and hell. These verses concern the believers and their honourable conduct which will lead them to an honourable abode of paradise and conversely the disbelievers who act contrary to honour and thus will be granted hell fire. Verse Q4:31 speaks of avoiding the forbidden to be admitted into gate of great honour, paradise. Other verses describe the inhabitants of paradises state ‘...and they (shall enjoy) honour and dignity’ and ‘such will be the honoured ones in the gardens (of bliss)’ (Q37:42, Q70:35, Q19:85, Q36:27). Conversely verse Q44:49 speaks of the inhabitants of hell who will be ridiculed by the keeper of hell for assuming ‘...wast thou mighty, full of honour!’. This theme emphasises honour in regard to broader issues of belief and accountability.

The category of human conduct in relation to earthly matters includes verses where humans are either being encouraged to earn their earnings honourably Q2:267, honouring the sacred rites imposed by God Q22:30, honouring the duty of sacrificing Q22:32, and ideas relating to lawful and unlawful matters Q 25:72. Verse Q18:34 relates to a parable of two men one of whom, in relation to his wealth and followings, boasts of being more honourable.

The next category is those verses within which honour is used in relation to Allah bestowing honour on creation. God states that He has ‘...honoured the sons of Adam...’ by providing them ‘...with transport on land and sea; given them for sustenance things good and pure; and conferred on them special favours, above a great part of our creation’ (Q17:70). Within this verse we see how being honoured by God does not relate to sexuality or any specific gender role. Rather it is concerned with God bestowing earthly favours on creation. Verse Q24:36 reveals how God has ‘...raised to honour...’ places of prayer, highlighting how honour is a notion beyond the limited contemporary conception that is primarily concerned with sexuality and gender. Verse Q89:15 is regarding how God tests man by giving him honour and gifts. These humans thus assume ‘...My Lord hath honoured me’. However, it is God testing His creation. Verse Q17:62 recalls Satan’s reaction at the creation of humans ‘...this is the one whom Thou hast honoured above me....’

Other categories include where the Qur'an and the angels are addressed in relation to honour. Once again there is no engagement with what honour exactly refers to in these verses within Yusuf Ali's *tafsīr*.

The above brief descriptions of the categorise of honour verses highlight the various uses of honour terms within the Qur'an. However, for a thorough and comprehensive appreciation, these verses must be critically analysed both regarding how they have been translated and their original Arabic text. They require a semantic and linguistic critique alongside a hermeneutical inquiry to fully comprehend the stances of honour. Nonetheless, these broad themes reveal how honour within the Qur'anic text is not dominantly associated with a specific gender or contemporary sexualised conceptions of honour. Themes that are concerned with human beings, human conduct in relation to earthly matters/the earthly realm and Allah bestowing honour reflect how honour in the Qur'an is a nuanced and complex notion unlike its sexualised gender biased contemporary usage. I now hope to further reflect on how the notion of honour in the Qur'anic text is one that is distant from sexuality or gender biases through the few specific verses I will examine in the following paragraphs.

The categories that I will now examine in detail contain 8 verses in total. The category of honour as a right of creation, the loss of honour, verses where both men and women are explicitly addressed relating to honour and a finally a verse that relates honour to God, His messenger, and the believers.

My choice of inquiry of these categories is based on what honour within the contemporary has dominantly come to represent in Muslim communities in relation to issues such as the possessors of honour, the possessors of shame, those who cause the loss of honour, those who are entitled to honour, factors that lead to the loss of honour etc. I therefore have chosen the above-mentioned categories as they link to the CMHP and can assist in challenging gender bias conceptions.

4.10 Four themes relating to the contemporary Muslim honour paradigm

The following verses will be examined alongside their commentaries by Yusuf Ali (2016) and Ibn Kathīr. These commentaries will then be critiqued against the principles of a hermeneutical approach that is conscious of both the overall holistic ethical

Qur'anic framework and gender justice. I will firstly begin with presenting traditional *tafsīr* commentaries of these verses to appreciate their considerations of honour. Reflecting upon and highlighting the limitations of these readings I will comment on possible reading of these verses that occur when considering the concept of honour and the grammatical construction of these verses. I will then consider the implications of comprehending the concept of honour within the Qur'anic text.

4.11 Honour as a right of human beings

There are 3 verses within the translation of Yusuf Ali (2016) that present honour as a right of humans. These verses ascribe honour as a right of women in *idda* (waiting period), parents and orphans. Within contemporary Muslim communities the possessors of honour generally appear to be male members of the family/community. Conversely it is the female members who cause the loss of honour (see chapter 2). It is clear from the previously discussed categories (whom Allah bestows honour upon) that honour is not solely designated to men within the Qur'anic text. Honour is not gender-specific. However, the concern with this category is those humans the Qur'anic text *demand*s honourable treatment for from other humans. These verses call for a critique of contemporary practices and beliefs that designate honour to men.

Verse 2:235

Verse Q2:235 is in a Madinan chapter. The term *ma^crūfan*, from the root ع ر ف has the base meaning of to know, to perceive, and discover. Verse Q2:235 is situated among verses that dictate human social conduct and behaviour on earth. These verses address broader issues pertaining to divorce, marriage, the waiting period, charity, sexual intercourse etc. They also speak of spending one's wealth on different categories of individuals and further a variety of unlawful and lawful behaviours. The verses discuss sexual relations between man and woman and the conduct of divorce. Within the verse we find the order 'do not make a secret contract with them except in terms honourable...'. Although the verse concerns a legal issue, it is guided by ethical/moral mannerisms. The instruction to speak and propose marriage in terms honourable appears to be clearly directed at men. We see how secret hidden proposals are dishonourable.

Interestingly, Yusuf Ali's (2016) commentary is concerned with the legal aspect of this verse. There is no consideration of implications of the term honourable. He instead focuses on the deficiency of a woman's mind-set during this period, 'she is not fitted to exercise her fullest judgement' (Yusuf Ali, 2016, 94). For Yusuf Ali (2016) the focus of this verse is the legal guidelines of proposing to a widow and the guidance in regards the broader implication of honour being right of a woman does not appear to be of importance.

Conversely Ibn Kathīr does explore the mentioning of honour. In his commentary he uses the following accounts to explain the idea of honour. It should be noted that here the mentioning of honour is not the primary focus rather Ibn Kathīr focuses on the matter of *'iddah*, mourning the deceased husband and marriage proposals during *'iddah* as the primary point of these verses.

Al-'Awfi said that Ibn 'Abbas said, "If the woman is divorced or if her husband dies and then her *'iddah* term ends, there is no sin that she beautifies herself, so that she becomes ready for marriage proposals. This is the way 'that is just and honorable'." It was reported that Muqatil bin Hayyan gave the same explanation. Ibn Jurayj related that Mujahid said: (...there is no sin on you if they (the wives) dispose of themselves in a just and honorable manner.) "refers to allowed and pure (honorable) marriage." It was also reported that Al-Hasan, Az-Zuhri and As-Suddi said the same (Ibn Kathīr, vol 1, 655-667, Quran Tafsir Ibn Kathīr (a)).

Ibn Kathīr presents the act of honourability as dependant on the conduct of women. He related honour to a woman beautify herself and remarry after the waiting period. These accounts place the burden of honour expressed within the verse upon the woman.

Rereading this verse, it can be understood that creating a secret contract with the widowed woman is opposed to speaking to them honourably. Attempting to propose or instigate a proposal in secret is a form of dishonour. The ideology of honour here has been understood by the exegetes to be specifically associated to this legal act of seeking to marry a widow. They have not focused on the ideology of honour within this

verse within the context of a broader Qur'anic ethical framework. Further, according to the commentary of Ibn Kathīr, what is deemed as just and honourable is based on the woman ending *her* period of waiting and then beautifying *herself* in preparation for marriage proposals. The duty to conduct oneself honourably is placed upon the woman. There is no concern within his commentary with how the man may conduct himself in an honourable manner.

It is clear from a semantic analysis of this verse who the burden of honour falls upon. Furthermore, an exploration of the Arabic grammatical composition of the verse also reveals how the burden of honour is not upon women in this verse. The term *ma'rūfan* is an accusative masculine indefinite passive participle. The doer of the action that is being described by this adjective is reflected in the verb *taqūlū*, which is a second person masculine plural imperfect verb. The verb can refer to males (plural) or could be addressing a group of both men and women. Therefore, the order to speak in terms honourable can arguably be to a group of men or a group of men and women. Most definitely this is not addressed solely to women. Yet surprisingly, Ibn Kathīr limits his guidance towards what would be deemed as honourable to the conduct of women. Yusuf Ali (2016) focuses on men proposing marriage, yet he does not delve into the Qur'anic intent of what is considered as honourable. Clearly the order to speak honourably in this verse is aimed at those who are proposing to the widowed women and is therefore commanding men to speak in terms of honour and is affording honour to these women.

Verse 17:23

The next verse concerning honour as a right is verse Q17:23 which is regarding honour as a right of parents. This verse is within a Makkan chapter. The Arabic term translated to honour is *karīman* from the root ك ر م has the base meaning to be productive, generous, precious, valuable, honourable, and noble (The Study Quran). Within this verse we see the command to worship none besides Allah alongside the command to be kind and virtuous to parents, with a final emphasis on addressing them '...in terms of honour'. The broader themes of this chapter focus on commandments dealing with taking a life unjustly, spending from that which God has provided you etc. It further speaks about those individuals who have a right upon you, namely the poor

and needy in terms of charity but also conduct. Right of conduct and duty is also related to parents. It is here we find the emphasis on honour.

Once again, the term honour is not examined within Yusuf Ali's (2016) commentary. There is no exploration of what the term honour may be referring to. Rather, it seems to be either taken for granted as an ideology and standard of practice that is known or is innate or as a term that does not inform the meaning of the verse and therefore lacks importance. Yusuf Ali's (2016, 700) only focus in regard to honouring parents is that the act is 'an individual act of piety; hence the singular *taqul*, *qul*...'.

Ibn Kathīr, however, does explore this verse in more detail. He expresses how worshipping God is connected to the idea of honouring parent. He further details what would entail addressing one's parents with honour: 'meaning gently, kindly, politely, and with respect and appreciation' (Ibn Kathīr, Vol 5, 604-605, Quran Tafsir Ibn Kathīr (b)). He then engages in an extensive discussion of the treatment of parents.

From the verses one can deduce that speaking to parents with contempt and repelling them are all averse to the idea of addressing parents with honour. Yet it is surprising that the above exegetes did not afford attention to the particularities of speaking to parents in terms of honour in association to the broader Qur'anic intent of honour. It appears they are not concerned with the broader ethical/moral intent of the Qur'anic honour.

The term translated as honour within this verse *karīman* is an accusative masculine singular indefinite adjective. It is linked to the noun *qawlan*, an accusative masculine indefinite verbal noun. *Karīman* describes the manner of speaking (*qawlan*) to them (*lahumā*). *Lahumā* here refers to *wa bil wālidayn*, which is mentioned earlier in the same verse. *Wālidayn* here is a genitive masculine dual noun and therefore refers to both parents, mother and father. The command in this verse to speak in terms of honour is gender neutral and aimed at both parents. Similarly, those who are commanded to speak in terms of honour are expressed in the term *wa qul* which is a 2nd person masculine singular imperative verb. Therefore, it could be argued that this command to speak in terms of honour is directed only to men; however, when taking

into consideration the broader context of the verse it seems appropriate that this command to speak in terms of honour is directed at both men and women.

Verse 89:17

The final verse Q89:17 in this category is about honouring orphans. This verse was revealed within a Makkan chapter. The Arabic term translated as honour is *tukrimūna* from root ك ر م. This verse is situated among verses with a broader context of social welfare. These verses thus, interestingly deal with honour in a broader context. Although I have not chosen to focus on these verses specifically it is relevant to mention their context here. Within these verses we see how humans proclaim how God has honoured them when they receive God's blessings. However when these blessings are removed, they cry about how they have been humiliated. Yet God says that both instances are a test. Therefore, it emphasises that abundance in blessings, and the lack of provisions, do not indicate or relate to honour. God then emphasises where honour is relevant and that is in relation to conduct towards orphans. Here mistreatment of orphans and the unlawful consumption of their wealth are contrary to treating them with honour.

Regarding this specific verse Yusuf Ali focuses on how orphans are potentially wronged. His explanation can be seen to describe what dishonourable conduct towards orphans is: '...embezzle the helpless orphan's inheritance, and to waste their own substance in worthless riot instead of supplying the people's real needs' (Yusuf Ali, 2016).

Ibn Kathīr does acknowledge honouring orphans. He refers to a Prophetic tradition in which the Prophet Muhammad expresses his closeness to the guardians of orphans in paradise. However, he does not detail how one can honour orphans as he did in regard to honouring parents (Ibn Kathīr, Vol 10, 476-477).

The term *tukrimūna* is grammatically a 2nd person masculine plural (form IV) imperfect verb. In this verse God is rebuking those who do not honour orphans. The term *tukrimūna* being a 2nd person masculine plural could be referring to a group of males or a group of male and females. Therefore, the duty to honour orphans can be seen as falling upon both men and women.

We thus see from these 3 verses that the Qur'anic text specifically demands honour from other humans to 3 categories of humans. Of these 3 categories, 2 concern both men and women and one specifically concerns honouring women.

4.12 Loss of honour

The next category of importance is those verses that speak of the loss of honour. Within contemporary Muslim communities the loss of honour is prevailingly associated to female conduct and primarily in relation to their sexual conduct. It therefore is crucial to explore the instances when God refers to the loss of honour.

Verse 22:18

The first verse within the category of loss of honour is the Madinan verse Q22:18. The term *mukrimin* from the root كرم can be translated as one who bestows honour. Within this verse God emphasises what is in the heavens and the earth is submissive to God yet, '...a great number are (also) such as are fit for punishment: and such as Allah shall disgrace, - none can raise to honour: for Allah carries out all that He wills.' This verse is among verses that address eschatological matters such as details of the Day of Judgment. The loss of honour relates to this broader context of accountability and sin.

In this verse honour is emphasised as unattainable except by God's will. Yusuf Ali (2016, 855) explains those who 'defy Allah's Will must suffer pain and disgrace, for Allah is well able to carry out His Will'. Once again there is no focus on a concept of honour. Similarly, Ibn Kathīr's main focus is on the matter of prostration to God, and he does not explore how this verse may be indicating a loss of honour (Ibn Kathīr, Volume 6, 538-539).

This verse refers to the loss of honour, or more specifically those whom God disgraces and how they cannot attain honour. The term translated to honour is *mukrimin* which is a genitive masculine indefinite active participle followed by *min* the preposition. The preposition links to the verb *yuhīni* which is a 3rd person masculine singular imperfect verb and the 3rd person masculine singular personal pronoun, *lahu*. The subject of *yuhīni* is God and the object is those who are disgraced, *lahu*. *Lahu* being a 3rd person

masculine singular personal pronoun therefore literally refers to males. Therefore, those who are disgraced with a loss of honour are men. The Qur'anic text does not specify the loss of honour to females exclusively, but it could be argued it does regarding men.

Verse 26:58

The next verse within this category is verse Q26:58. This verse is located within a Makkan surah. These verses relate the story of Moses and Pharaoh. However, the context of loss of honour is related to Pharaoh and his army.

Yusuf Ali (2016, 855) understands the loss of honour within this verse to be literally in reference to the children of Israel.

The children of Israel certainly inherited the gardens, springs, treasures, and honourable positions in Palestine after many years' wandering in the wilderness. But when they were false to Allah, they lost them again, and another people (The Muslims) inherited them when they were true in Faith.

According to ibn Kathīr, Pharaoh and his army were punished by God via the very things they intended to inflict upon the children of Israel, '...meaning, they were thrown out of those blessings and into Hell, and they left behind the honourable places, gardens and rivers, wealth, provision, position and power in this world...' (Ibn Kathīr, Vol 7, 231-232, Quran Tafsir Ibn Kathīr (d)). From this commentary the loss of honour is associated to the loss of earthly provisions and blessings. The Qur'anic conception of honour within this verse appear to concern disobedience to God and the loss of blessings and honour as a form of punishment. But this loss is not due to any abstract idea, it is due to disobeying God. We see that God is the one who causes the loss of honour. Therefore, it seems appropriate to deduce that the loss or gaining of honour is dependent on obedience to God. Humans are not entitled to proclaim the loss of honour of another individual nor prescribe a punishment for this loss. This is exclusively the right of God.

The word translated as honour in this verse is *karīmin*, which is a genitive masculine singular indefinite adjective. This verse follows on from the previous verses that speak of expulsion from gardens, and this verse describes what they have been expelled from: springs and treasures, and every kind of honourable position. In the previous verse ‘those who have been expelled’ is expressed through the word *fa akhrajnāhum*. The word *fa akhrajnāhum*, can be broken down into *akhraj* – 1st person plural perfect verb, *nā* – subject pronoun and *hum*- 3rd person masculine plural object pronoun. Therefore, God states that God expels them, which can refer to a group of males or a group of male and female. The expulsion and resultant loss of treasures and every kind of honourable position is clearly applicable to both genders. Once again, this loss of honour is not exclusive to females only. Furthermore, the loss of honour is not exclusive to sexual conduct rather it relates the broader spectrum of disobedience to God.

4.13 Addressing both genders together

The next category of interest within this research is those verse within which God addresses both sexes explicitly. These verses are crucial to appreciate any sex-specific associations or implications of honour within the Qur’anic text. Within contemporary Muslim communities we see that the ideology of honour has come to represent very different ideas for men and women. Contemporary honour ideologies are dominantly gender-specific. These gender biased conceptions and practices of honour are not only greatly unjust and prejudiced towards Muslim women, but they negatively impact their lives.

Verse 24:26

The first verse within this category is verse Q24:26 and is located within a Madinan chapter. The verse equally addresses both men and women. The term translated to mean honour in this verse is *karīmun*. This verse occurs in the broader context of verses that explore Gods favour upon mankind, the slander of ‘Ā’isha, and thus the corruption of accusing chaste women.

This specific verse therefore follows on from the above issues and addresses both men and women. What concerns us in this verse is ‘a provision honourable’. Following

the general scheme of the verse it seems appropriate to deduce that the promise for an honourable provision for both male and female equally.

Yusuf Ali's (2016) commentary of this verse focuses on the ideas of pure and impure. Interestingly once again he (2016) does not choose to focus on the aspect of honour within the verse.

The pure consort with the pure, and the impure with the impure. If the impure, out of the impurity of their thoughts, or imaginations, impute any evil to the pure, the pure are not affected by it, but they should avoid all occasions for random talk. Forgiveness for any indiscretion which they may have innocently committed, and spiritual provisions of protection against the assaults of Evil. It is also meant that the more evil ones attempt to defame or slander them, the more triumphantly will they be vindicated and provided with the physical and moral good which will advance their real life (Yusuf Ali, 2016, 90-3).

Although Yusuf Ali (2016) does not specifically relate his commentary to the accusation against 'Ā'isha, the same themes arise. Ibn Kathīr's commentary on this verse does situate it in the context of the accusation against 'Ā'isha. He refers to some statements of the prophet's companions within which they explore the good and bad men and women in relation to those who accused 'Ā'isha and those who did not. This refers to those who indulge in evil speech and those who do not. He associates forgiveness and the provision of honour specifically to 'Ā'isha. Honour here is understood as

...with Allah in the Gardens of Delight. This implies a promise that she will be the wife of the Messenger of Allah in Paradise (Ibn Kathīr, Vol 7, 56-57, Quran Tafsir Ibn Kathīr (e)).

Here Ibn Kathīr understands the honourable provision to be directed at 'Ā'isha as a promise of her companionship with the Prophet Muhammad in paradise. Yusuf Ali (2016) does not provide any exploration of the 'provision honourable' and Ibn Kathīr, despite the broader context of the overall verse limits this aspect to 'Ā'isha alone.

Based on the semantic meanings of this verse as a whole it is clear that the term *karīmun*, refers to both male and female. Moreover, the grammatical construction also indicates such. The term *lahum*, which indicates who forgiveness and a provision honourable is aimed at, is a 3rd person masculine plural personal noun and although can refer to a group of males it can also refer to a group of males and females as indicated by the verse as a whole. Therefore, it is clear from this verse that the provision of honour is gender neutral and does not seem to be exclusively relating to ‘Ā’isha.

Verse 49:13

The next verse within this category is verse 49:13 which is within a Madinan chapter also. The general theme of this verse and those surrounding it are concerned with unity of the believers as one family and the idea of honour ascribed to the righteous among all these believers.

Once again within this verse God addresses male and female. The Qur’anic text mentions which male and female and nations and tribes, are the most honoured. ‘Verily the most honoured of you in the sight of Allah is (he who is) the most righteous of you.’ Within this verse honour is something attainable by the righteous be they male or female, from any nation or tribe. The concept of honour within this verse is not limited to a specific gender, a specific nation or community. The only specification for this honour is *righteousness*. It is further, not associated exclusively with sexual conduct, sexuality, or any specific category of actions. Righteousness is a broad category.

Yusuf Ali (2016), focuses on the idea of how mankind has descended as tribes, races, and nations etc. He emphasises how they are all one before God and the only distinction in terms of honour is for those who are ‘most righteous’. Interestingly in this verse Yusuf Ali (2016, 1407) does consider the term honour. However, his consideration is once again limited. He does not focus on the Qur’anic criteria for receiving the title of the most honourable, nor does he delve into what it entails to be righteous according to the Qur’anic text. He does not emphasis how within this verse

a clear link is being created between righteousness and honour. Furthermore, this righteousness and honour are not for one specific gender.

Ibn Kathīr focuses on the formation of nations and tribes. He mentions how 'all people are the descendants of Adam and Hawwa and share this honor equally' (Ibn Kathīr, Vol 9, 206). Here we see honour being conceptualised as something belonging to all human creation. Focusing specifically on his understanding of '...the most honoured of you...', Ibn Kathīr presents the Prophetic statement:

Al-Bukhari narrated that Abu Hurayrah said, "Some people asked the Prophet, 'Who is the most honorable among people' He replied, (The most honorable among them with Allah is the one who has the most Taqwā.) They said, 'We did not ask you about this.' He said, (Then the most honorable person is Yusuf, Allah's Prophet, the son of Allah's Prophet, the son of Allah's Prophet, the son of Allah's Khalil.) They said, 'We did not ask you about this.' He said (Then you want to ask me about the Arab lineage) They said, 'Yes.' He said, (Those among you who were best in Jahiliyyah, are the best among you in Islam, if they attain religious understanding.)"

He further cites various other similar Prophetic traditions that emphasise honour is attained through righteousness and consciousness of Allah. It is clear from the cited narrations and Ibn Kathīr's overall interpretation of this verse that the concept of honour within this verse is associated with broader ideals of human conduct in relation to the divine being of God. It is far from limited to a single ideal of sexuality nor is it limited to a single gender. Rather, once again, we see the position of honour being related to the divine being and human consciousness of God.

This gender neutrality is also explicit through the overriding meaning of the verse that indicates that the reference to honour is to both genders. Focusing on the grammar of the term translated to honour, '*akramakum*, via the possessive pronoun *kum* which is 2nd person masculine plural, we can see that the reference to honour here once again can be a group of men or a group of men and women.

4.14 Honour of Allah, the Prophet, and the believers

Verse 63:8

The final verse Q63:8 we find honour ascribed as belonging to God, the prophet Muhammad and the believers. This verse is located within a Madinan surah. The verse contains two terms translated to mean honour: *al-a^cazzu*, and *al-^cizza*.

The first occurrence ‘...surely the more honourable (element) will expel therefrom the meaner’ refers to the words spoken by ‘Abdullah bin Ubay bin Salul who spoke of himself and his following as the more honourable and the immigrants of Makkah as the meaner. Here the verse emphasises, ‘But honour belongs to Allah and His Messenger, and to the Believers...’ collectively attributing honour. Honour is associated to those who believe in Allah and the Prophet Muhammad, and therefore the broader concept of belief and disbelief. There is no distinction in terms of gender rather, honour is emphasised as belonging to all believers.

Within this verse we find reference to terms translated as honour or honourable twice. The first use of an honour terms is according to Yusuf Ali’s (2016, 1552) commentary in reference to ‘Abdullah bin Ubay, the leader of the hypocrites of Madina who hoped to lead Madina until Muhammad came. The reference of ‘the more honourable’ is how he referred to himself and those who supported him. The second use of honour is in refutation to this. God emphasises ‘honour belongs to Allah and His Messenger, and to the Believers; but the hypocrites know not’. Yusuf Ali (2016) does not focus on the implications of the use of the terms honour. He only addresses those who referred to themselves as the more honourable. Yet, this verse appears to indicate a much broader scope relating to honour.

Similarly, Ibn Kathīr also devotes his commentary on this verse on the events relating to ‘Abdullah bin Ubay. He does not give any consideration to the latter part of this verse and its broader application in relation to honour (Ibn Kathīr, Vol 9, 653-658).

Through the meaning of the verse, it is clear that honour is attributed to God, the Prophet Muhammad, and the believers. Focusing on who exactly the term *mu’minīna* entails the term is a genitive masculine plural (form IV) active participle, and therefore despite it being grammatically possible for it to refer to a group of males, it most likely refers to a group of both males and females. Once again, the attribution of honour is

gender neutral. The Qur'anic text dismisses the claims of the hypocrites as honourable. Honour is therefore related to a foundational tenant of faith within Islam, that is relevant to both genders. According to this verse honour appears to transcend the exclusive limited scope of earthly matters, and instead is also concerned with the divine notion of belief.

4.15 Deriving a conception of honour

From the broader 12 themes within which the honour verses have been categorised and the detailed examination of the above 8 verses, one can appreciate the general stance towards honour within the Qur'anic text. It is not exclusively concerned with sexuality, nor is it limited to a single gender. An ideology of honour does exist within the Qur'anic text. But this ideology is not gender biased or concerned with the conduct of women, as has come to be the normative application of honour within contemporary Muslim communities. From appreciating the 12 categories we see that honour within Islam is a nuanced and broad concept. Its relevance is beyond the earthly realm exclusively and is concerned with broader theological and moral issues.

From focusing on these 8 verses, it becomes apparent that despite the dominant emphasis on honour within contemporary Muslim communities, traditional exegetes did not focus on occurrences of honour within the Qur'anic text to form an overall Qur'anic conception of honour. Of course, my selective inquiry is not without limits and is not representative of honour throughout the whole Qur'anic text. Nor can I claim from my limited analysis that traditional exegetes completely refrained from focusing on honour as a point of analysis and interpretation. However, from the few selected verses, which in themselves exhibit a pivotal usage of the term honour, it is apparent that in interpreting these verses, the exegetes did not holistically focus on the Arabic terms translated as honour. This leads one to question why did the traditional exegetes not see these references as important? Why did the traditional exegetes not focus on develop a conception of honour based on the Qur'anic text? If honour was not a central idea in the era of traditional exegesis, when and how did it gain importance for contemporary Muslim communities? Furthermore, what was their stance on the already existent honour norms in Arabia and why did they not utilise the Qur'an to reconsider these existent beliefs and practices (see chapter 3)?

Despite, Ibn Kathīr affording selective attention to occurrences of honour terms, for instance when he details what is implied by honouring parents, there still seems to be an absence of a broader holistic understanding and appreciation of the overall Qur'anic conception of honour in his exegesis. Are the Qur'anic occurrences of honour terms in relation to an ideology or broader belief system? Are they intended to be representative of a broader ethical/moral framework? These questions are left unanswered due to the limited appreciation and examination of honour in traditional Qur'anic exegetical texts.

The Qur'anic concept of honour is not gender biased. Certainly, fear of the loss of honour and the burden of honour are not imposed solely on women. Despite contemporary Muslim communities dominantly imposing the burden of honour upon Muslim women's bodies, their sexuality, their conduct and their agency, such ideals do not exist within the Qur'anic text. Rather honour appears to be a gender-neutral concept. If anything, the grammatical construction of these verses would indicate that the burden of honour falls upon men.

The interpretation of these 8 verses by both my chosen modern and medieval exegetes reveals a disjointed atomistic understanding of honour. At times we see the term honour completely being overlooked and at other times we see understandings emerging that are not coherent and in harmony. Aside from the limited understanding we have in regard to whom the burden of honour falls upon within the Qur'anic text, the above examination is telling of how the very method of interpretation within these traditional texts is at times problematic. The incoherent understandings of honour that exist within these exegetical works are representative of the overall disjointedness and incompleteness of a Qur'anic ethical framework. As emphasised by M. A. Draz (2008, 3) 'no one has up to now undertaken to expound the ethical law of the Qur'an as a whole; nor have its principles and rules been presented as a coherent structure, independently of its links with related disciplines'.

4.16 Conclusion

Despite it being clear that the occurrences of honour within the commentaries of Yusuf Ali and Ibn Kathīr are not concerned with sexuality, or exclusively with females, there is still no clear stance on honour within the Qur'anic text. Throughout my examination

of my selected verses, I have offered a reading that is inclusive and a product of my contemporary Muslim experience of honour. My reading reflects one that is very conscious of ideas surrounding honour and has aimed to highlight how the Qur'anic text may in fact have an ideal of honour that is very distant from the sexualised gender-biased ideology of honour that dominates contemporary Muslim communities. Yet, there is still a need to further clarify the Qur'anic conception of honour. What is the Qur'anic intent regarding the concept of honour? Should it be perceived as a part of a broader gender-neutral Qur'anic ethical framework? Is it a concept that transcends a limited human association?

Although my inquiry cannot offer definitive answers to these questions, it paves the way for us to consider and acknowledge that to conceptualise honour we must consider the Qur'anic occurrences of honour. Rather than attempting to discredit the ideology of honour, which is readily done in academic works that do not call out orientalist and colonialist accounts of honour, we must appreciate that the ideology of honour within Islam is far more complex and nuanced than its limited contemporary associations and comprehensions. Rather than disregarding the notion of honour as gender biased and non-egalitarian towards Muslim women, the concept must be critiqued and ultimately reconceptualised through a framework that is inclusive of Muslim textual authorities and experiences. I will suggest such a framework in chapter 8 based on the findings within this chapter and the findings in the following chapters.

The task to reclaim honour within the Qur'anic text and in Muslim history is not one of minuscule implications. Reinterpreting the stance on honour within the Qur'anic text not only allows for readings that foregrounds justice within the Qur'anic intent but also paves the way to reclaim the concept of honour within Muslim tradition and lived experiences. Reclaiming the concept of honour is one step towards a more coherent understanding of the Qur'anic ethical framework. The concept of honour needs reclaiming from negative gender-biased misinterpretations prevalent within contemporary Muslim communities, that uphold and emphasise a system of patriarchy. Yet, it also needs reclaiming from 'the West'. The politicisation of women through Orientalist and colonial narratives further deploys deficient conceptions of honour in Islam (this will be examined in chapter 7).

This chapter further stresses the problematic nature of contemporary honour theorisation, which is influenced by and embedded in Western theorisation and gender discourse. Western attempts to conceptualise honour within the Islamicate result in western theories that do not fall in line with the Qur'anic conception of honour to be used when comprehending and critiquing honour within the Islamicate. If we are to fully comprehend honour in a manner that is relevant to Muslim history and experiences and one that has not been influenced by Orientalist and colonial narratives, we must seek understandings that are rooted in a Muslim framework.

The concept of honour within the Qur'an is distant from what exists within contemporary Muslim communities. Such limited gender biased conceptions of honour are not only detrimental to Muslim women but are an injustice that works against the complex gender-neutral conception of honour within the Qur'an. Qur'anic honour transcends the earthly realm, and encompasses matters pertaining to faith, morality, and God consciousness.

Chapter 5: Honour and the Ḥadīth

5.1 Introduction

The current chapter explores honour occurrences within Ḥadīth literature. It aims to identify and examine Ḥadīth that mention terms of honour that relate to or could be understood to relate to contemporary honour praxis. I intend to bring to light understandings of these Ḥadīth that may oppose contemporary gender biased notions of honour that persist within Muslim communities. Thus, following on from the previous Qur'an-oriented chapter, in this chapter, I fundamentally aim to return to the second most religiously significant source, the Ḥadīth literature, to bridge the gap in understandings and practices of honour that exist within the contemporary Muslim world with concepts of honour that can be found within the primary sources of authority. The significance of the Ḥadīth within the lives of Muslims makes consulting this source paramount. This importance warrants an examination of whether there are any discrepancies between contemporary Muslim honour ideologies and practices and what is conveyed through the Ḥadīth traditions.

Specifically, this chapter aims to answer the following questions through examining a selection of Ḥadīth: Are notions of honour existent within Ḥadīth literature? If so, how were these Ḥadīth and the mentioning of honour within them understood by early or medieval Ḥadīth scholars? What are the implications of their understandings for contemporary Muslim communities? Can rereading these Ḥadīth from a female-centred perspective, conscious of contemporary efforts for gender egalitarianism, and the Qur'anic overriding notions of justice, help us move towards egalitarian conceptions of honour within Islam and Muslim communities? For these questions to be answered to their fullest capacity, I would be required to consult all the relevant Ḥadīth, at least those within the six canonical texts. The Ḥadīth corpus in its entirety is huge. What began as private records in collections known as *ṣaḥīfa* continued to develop into *muṣannaf*, *musnad* up until the early 9th and 10th century when *sunan/ṣaḥīḥ* books began to be formed (Brown, 2018, 32). The compilation of Ḥadīth texts continued for over 100 years after the compilation of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim (ṣaḥīḥayn)* (Brown, 2018, 42). Locating all references to honour within these

is a task beyond any single research project and doing such would not prove to be useful in relation to the aims of this research.

I limit my inquiry to the *ṣaḥīḥayn*, focusing my analysis on those texts that are accepted as canonical within normative Sunnī Islam. Yet searching for the term honour within all these texts results in a huge body of Ḥadīth traditions. Similar to my findings within the Qur’anic text, the use of honour terms varies greatly. For instance, we find companions speaking of their love for the Prophet in relation to the term honour. Although these Ḥadīth and the mentioning of honour within them are of significance, all these uses of honour terms are not entirely relevant to this research project and contemporary gender-biased uses of honour that have negative implications for Muslim women. It, therefore, seems appropriate to set aside an inquiry focusing exclusively on the English term honour. Rather, I will explore commonly used terms within the contemporary (specifically *‘ird* and *ghayra*). Unlike within the Qur’anic text, these terms are present within Ḥadīth literature. Within this chapter, I will examine the occurrence of *‘ird* and *ghayra* within a select number of Ḥadīth traditions. Despite being limited to a select number of Ḥadīth, my analysis paves a new line of inquiry for future research on honour within the Ḥadīth corpus and presents the view that a conception of honour clearly exists within the Ḥadīth literature.

My process of Ḥadīth selection can be seen illustrated below:




Figure 3

5.2 Distinguishing Ḥadīth and Sunna

Before engaging in the discussion, it is appropriate to differentiate between what is deemed a Ḥadīth and what is *sunna* to clarify the terms I will be using. Both terms are at times used synonymously despite them differing in meaning (Kamali, 2005, 56).

Kamali (2005, 56) states that *sunna* literally means ‘...a trodden path, or *tariqa*, a precedent and exemplary conduct...’ or ‘...tactical examples...’. Before the coming of Islam, *sunna* in pre-Islamic Arabic referred to ‘the customary law prevailing in Arabia’ (Khadduri, 1997, 4). In the early periods of Islam, it referred to customs or practices of the community. Over time this usage became limited. At present the term *sunna* exclusively refers to the practices of the Prophet Muhammad. By the end of the 2nd century AH the term excluded the practices of companions, greatly due to the works of Imam *Shafi* (Kamali, 2003 60). In his famous book *Risalah* ‘it is in his discussions of the sunna and traditions that we find one of Shafi’i’s greatest contributions to Islamic jurisprudence’ (Khadduri, 1997, 35). It was Shafi’i who clarified the use of terms such as *sunna* as he ‘...made a distinction between an authentic tradition from the Prophet and a narrative which embodies the opinion of a Companion or a leading jurist; the latter may be useful in clarifying the meaning of a text, but it should not be as binding as a tradition from the Prophet.’ (Khadduri, 197, 36).

The *sunna* thus became specifically known as example of the Prophet. The *sunna* being implementation of a law is therefore deduced from the Ḥadīth, the corpus of literature within which these *sunna* are recorded (Kamali, 2003, 61). Ḥadīth literally means ‘narrative, communication or news consisting of the factual account of an event’ and is in the form of written or verbal communication (Kamali, 2003, 61). According to the juristic definition the Ḥadīth are the recorded sayings, actions, and tacit approval of the Prophet Muhammad (Kamali, 2003, 60). It is this technical/juristic definition that became dominant by the end of the 2nd century AH (Kamali, 2003, 60).

The Ḥadīth texts hold substantial weight within Muslim communities. The Prophet is seen as the vessel and vehicle of the words of God who not only communicated the Qur’anic text but clarified it. As such, the Ḥadīth corpus is central in Muslims recognising and replicating the practice of Prophet Muhammad. ‘...The *sunna*, being explanatory to the Qur’an, is subordinate to it’, nevertheless it is still perceived as

central to understanding the Qur'an text (Kamali 2003, 81). Although not the directly revealed words of God (exoteric revelation (*wahy zāhir*)), the Prophetic sayings are inspired guidance to the Prophet (esoteric revelation (*wahy bāṭin*)) which he then communicated to the Muslim community (Kamali, 2003 79).

According to Mustafa Shah, 'the Sunna was accentuated as a construct of authority and was used to configure the normative practices and paradigms of the faith' (Shah, 2010 2). It is the *sunna* that is derived from the Ḥadīth text that Sunnī Muslims look towards to understand the life and practices of Prophet Muhammad. The *sunna* is the authority that heavily influences Muslim normative practice and conceptions of belief. Most certainly, regarding honour *sunna* and Ḥadīth are central.

5.3 Positionality of the Ḥadīth

The Ḥadīth corpus is widely regarded as the second most important source of authority within the Islamic tradition and categorised as a primary source of law along with the Qur'anic text. Some scholars have argued that certain Ḥadīth (namely *mutawātir* meaning recurrent and defined as 'a ḥadīth narrated by a large number of people, so much so that is inconceivable that they could have all collaborated in order perpetuate a lie' (Kamali, 2005, 169)) are in close proximity to the authority of the Qur'anic text. Shah (2010, 2) argues that although the Qur'anic text focuses on a range of issues from eschatology, theology, legal matters, and ethics, it is the Ḥadīth that '...preserve the explicit documentation for the augmentation, contextualisation, and implementation of these teachings, garnering in the process a much more exhaustive corpus of date'. The interpretation of the Qur'anic text via the Ḥadīth corpus has been utilised by scholars of Qur'anic exegesis (*tafsīr*) since the beginning of *tafsīr al-Qur'ān* (commentary on the Qur'an). Arguably even before the formal compilation of Ḥadīth texts, which began in the 2nd century AH, and the formation of a science of Ḥadīth, the companions and those succeeding them readily referred to the Muhammad's sayings concerning Qur'anic verses. It was the Prophet who had not only communicated the verses to the companions but also provided the explanations of them. The utilisation of Ḥadīth in Qur'anic interpretation by traditional scholars represents the central position of Ḥadīth within *sunnī* Islam. This centrality and its influence upon normative practice as well as the understandings of the primary central authority, the Qur'an itself, represents how impactful Ḥadīth can be in deconstructing and reconceptualising

the notion of honour. A reconceptualisation of honour through an authority such as the Ḥadīth corpus is likely to impact honour conceptions within Muslim communities, as it is this very source Muslims see as authoritative and representative of the Prophet Muhammad.

This is not to say that the reliance on Ḥadīth cannot be problematic. The conception of the Ḥadīth corpus as second if not extremely close in authority to the Qur'anic text is what Nimat Hafez Barazangi (2015) is extremely critical of in her book entitled *Women's identity and rethinking the Ḥadīth*. She emphasises the need to bring the Ḥadīth back to its original position within Islamic thought as second to the Qur'anic text, and Qur'anic principles. Barazangi (2015, 1663) asserts '...I am not questioning nor refuting the importance of Ḥadīth as "the richest source for investigating early Islamic history" ('Azami, 1978:xvii), but I am questioning the rationales behind its canonisation, misuse and abuse when it was made a primary instrument in deriving meanings and rules from the Qur'an to the point that sometimes it was used before the Qur'an'. The point of the *sunna* not transgressing the Qur'an is also emphasised by Al-Qaradawi (2006, 92) who states that the *sunna* must be understood in light of the Qur'anic text and when interpreting the *sunna* the understanding closest to the Qur'anic text is always given preference. Of course, Barazangi's critique of the use of Ḥadīth is a reasonable one, for it is the Qur'anic text that is the overriding authority within Islam. Thus, when reconceptualising honour through the Ḥadīth I aim to ensure the Qur'anic notions of honour, discussed in chapter 4, are not abrogated. When focusing on issues such as notions of honour with intent to bring reform on a community level, it is impossible to not engage with Ḥadīth literature however, this can be done without diminishing notions already placed in the Qur'anic text.

5.4 The sources

This chapter relies on Ḥadīth in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. My restriction to these two sources is due to their authoritative nature and status as canonical within the Muslim community, as will be examined later. *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* was compiled by Muhammad bin Ismā'īl bin Al-Mughirah Al-Bukhārī and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* by Abul-Hussain Muslim bin Al-Hajjāj. Both Bukhārī and Muslim 'were the first to produce Ḥadīth collections devoted only to Ḥadīth whose *isnāds* they felt met the requirements of authenticity' (Brown, 2018, 33). Unlike their teacher the *ahl al-Ḥadīth* scholar Ibn Hanbal, they felt the use of weak

Ḥadīth was not necessary when there was such a large selection of authentic Ḥadīth that existed. Their books can be seen as the first wave of what many have called ‘the *ṣaḥīḥ* movement’ (Brown, 2018, 33). These texts do not contain all the authentic Ḥadīth that exist. Rather, ‘Al-Bukhari had only selected *ṣaḥīḥ* Ḥadīth useful, for his legal discussions, and Muslim had limited his book to Ḥadīth whose authenticity he believed was agreed on by all.’ (Brown, 2018, 40). These collections were not compiled except with the utmost critical scrutiny in line with the developed science of Ḥadīth during those times. I will elaborate on this science of Ḥadīth in the following sections. It is due to such scrutiny that the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* began to be recognised as the most authentic books after the Qur’an.

The specific texts of the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* that I will be using within this chapter are two translated volumes. Despite this research being greatly concerned with terminology, understandings, and utilisation of the term honour, translating these Ḥadīth myself would not prove to be any more useful than using already available translations. In fact, utilising existing translations is more relevant as this research aims to explore how honour terms are understood and endorsed within contemporary Muslim communities. The translations I will be using are Muhammad Muhsin Khan’s translation of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and Nasiruddin al-Khattab’s translation of *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. The selection of these sources is once again influenced by the sources available and commonly used by British Muslims within the community and within educational and Islamic institutions. These texts are popular translations that are readily available to contemporary Muslims, especially those within the West (who will be the focus of chapter 7). When looking at the translations of the relevant terms for this chapter we find that *‘ird* is translated as honour and *ghayra* as jealousy, sense of honour, and self-respect (we find some instances where *ghayra* has not been translated and transliteration of the Arabic term is provided). Thus, they are translated as what is commonly understood of these terms in the English language within the contemporary period. It is these understandings that this research is examining and therefore using these translations, rather than translating these Ḥadīth myself, is appropriate.

5.5 Canonisation

The status the *ṣaḥīḥayn* as the most authoritative after the Qur’anic text is an example of how canons form. According to Brown (2007, 5) ‘canons form as the nexus of text,

authority and communal identification', but their process is not random or inevitable. He (2007, 5) emphasises how the process of canonization involved a community's authorisation of certain texts to meet their own needs, which '...entails the transformation of texts, through use, study, and appreciation, from nondescript tomes into powerful symbols of divine, legal or artistic authority for a particular audience'.

By the mid 10th century, the *ṣaḥīḥ/sunan* movement was beginning to be endorsed as authoritative. The position previously afforded to the *musnad* compilers such as Ibn Hanbal and al-Humaydi 'as pillars of Ḥadīth scholarship' was slowly shifting to Imam Bukhārī and Imam Muslim and their collections (Brown, 2018, 40). Soon the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, being recognised as two collections that exclusively included authentic Ḥadīth began to serve '...as a common reference for determining Ḥadīth authenticity' (Brown, 2018, 41).

The canonisation of the *ṣaḥīḥayn*, while a response to the community's needs, does not however imply that these are the *only* texts worthy of the status they have been given. As Brown (2007, 15) argues, 'the study of canonization is more a study of historical perceptions than of historical reality'. During the 5th century AH, scholars from the Shafi'i, Hanbali and Maliki schools began utilising these texts as a 'measure of authenticity in debates and polemics'. By the 8th century AH, Brown (2007, 7) argues, 'the Hadith-wary Hanafi school' also began following this approach. Eventually for all the *Sunnī* schools of law and theology, '...the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* would be the common language for evaluating the authenticity of Ḥadīth in interschool debates.' (Brown, 2018, 41). They subsequently became a standard measure by which the Ḥadīth sciences developed.

However, Brown goes on to explain this position granted to the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* was not as rigid as we find within contemporary times. Despite the position granted to these collections, not all the Ḥadīth within them were always emphasised. Brown (2018, 41) argues that if for instance a scholar of the Shafi'i or Hanafi school found a Ḥadīth within one of the collections that they did not agree with, then they '...had no compunction about criticizing its authenticity'. It was thus not controversial to criticise the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, as it has become in the modern period due to 'Muslim Scholars' eagerness to protect

the status of two books that they see as symbols of an Islamic tradition under attack from modernity' (Brown, 2018, 42).

Despite this critique of the process of canonisation and the classification of these texts, their status as canonised texts has impacted the formation of normative *Sunnī* Muslim thought and experiences. Taking into consideration this gradual authoritativeness granted to the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* and the contemporary position being one that strongly emphasises them as second after the Qur'anic text, it is only appropriate to focus on these collections in my attempt to comprehend and reconceptualise the notion of honour.

5.6 Ḥadīth Commentaries

To aid the comprehension of Ḥadīth in the early periods, we see the development of Ḥadīth commentaries. These played two major roles in relation to the Ḥadīth corpus.

1. To assist students in their study of the Ḥadīth traditions '...in the basic task of reading and understanding the difficult phrases, names and obscure meanings embedded in the isnāds and *matns* of a hadith work' (Brown, 2018, 54).
2. They assisted the scholars and offered them a place '...to elaborate in detail on any legal, dogmatic, ritual, or historical issue that they found relevant to the hadith in the book they were discussing' (Brown, 2018, 54).

The writing of Ḥadīth commentaries, particularly on the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, gradually became common practice for 'accomplished Muslim scholars', and such writings have continued to be written into the modern period (Brown, 2019, 55). I will be relying on two texts that are accepted as the leading commentaries of their relevant *ṣaḥīḥ* text.

1. Ibn Ḥajar al- 'Asqalānī's (d.852/1449) *Fatḥ al-Bārī*. A commentary on *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*
2. al-Nawwai's (d.676/1277) commentary on *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*.

I will be relying on the original primary Arabic sources, and where possible secondary sources that have translated extracts of the original works. These two primary sources have not been completely translated into English and therefore my reliance on secondary sources, which is limited to only certain citations, is to consolidate my translation of the meaning from the Arabic source into English. Alongside the secondary sources I will be also using an Urdu translation of *Fatḥ al-Bārī* to consolidate

my translation of the Arabic text, as there is no translation available in English. The Urdu translation I will be using is *fayẓ ul bāry tarjamah fataḥ ul bāry* by *maktabah aṣḥāb ul ḥadiyṣ*. As such most translated extracts and rewordings found within this chapter are my own.

5.7 Chapter structure

The central investigation offered in this chapter takes the form of a 4-part examination. The first aspect will focus on how Imam Bukhārī and Imam Muslim ensured the Ḥadīth they included within their collections fell into the category of ‘authentic’ or ‘sound’. Within this first section, I will be examining *isnād* (chain of narrators) and *matn* (body of the Ḥadīth / or the content) criticism. Second, this chapter will focus on the need for a female-centred reading of these select Ḥadīth. Third, I will be focusing on the interpretation of these select Ḥadīth through examining Ḥadīth commentaries. Finally, I will be presenting a rereading of these Ḥadīth, one that is conscious of the Qur’anic *tawḥīdic* paradigm and ideals of justice and gender egalitarianism.




Figure 4

Due to my research being concerned with how certain Ḥadīth may have been understood and implemented within the Muslim community I will devote a larger portion of this chapter to the interpretation of Ḥadīth and *how* they can be reinterpreted. Nevertheless, it is vital to explore the authenticity of these Ḥadīth. I will,

focus on the general conception of the *isnād* and *matn* within the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*. My discussion will only reveal popular or even canonised opinion regarding these Ḥadīth collections and will not allow for a critique of the *isnād* of my select Ḥadīth.

5.8 A traditional inquiry

The *Ṣaḥīḥayn* are known to contain only *ṣaḥīḥ* narrations ‘...the *isnād* of which coheres continuously through the transmission of one upright and accurate person from another up to its point of termination’ (al-Shahrazūrī, 2006, 5). Bukhārī is known as the first compiler to compose a collection containing only sound Ḥadīth, followed by Muslim. It was commonly stated by the early scholars that after the Qur’anic text there was no religious text more rigorously authenticated than the books of Bukhārī and Muslim (al-Shahrazūrī, 2006).

Sound Ḥadīth are broken down into subcategories with the highest of these in rank being those sound Ḥadīth which are included within both *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* known as ‘agreed upon to be sound (*ṣaḥīḥ muttafaq ‘alayhi*)’ by the scholars of hadith’ (al-Shahrazūrī, 2006, 15). Al-Shahrazūrī (2006) explains that this acknowledgement of ‘agreed upon to be sound’ although literally referring to the agreement of Bukhārī and Muslim, also implies the agreement of the Muslim community. This is because, ‘...the agreement of the Muslim community on it necessarily follows from the agreement of Bukhārī and Muslim and is concurrent with it, because of the agreement of the Muslim community to receive with acceptance whatever Bukhārī and Muslim agreed upon’ (al-Shahrazūrī, 2006, 15). Following this category, the next two subcategories of sound Ḥadīth are ‘...the sound hadith included only by Bukhari, that is, as opposed to Muslim...’ and ‘...the sound hadith included only by Muslim, that is, as opposed to Bukhari...’ (al-Shahrazūrī, 2006, 15). All the Ḥadīth that are to be examined within this chapter fall within these first three subcategories of sound Ḥadīth.

Ḥadīth scholars relied on five criteria to determine whether a Ḥadīth was authentic or not. These are:

1. ‘...continuity of the chain (*ittisāl al-sanad*),
2. integrity of narrators’ character (*al-‘adālah*),

3. precision of the report (*al-dabt*),
4. non-deficiency (*ghayr al- 'illah*), and
5. non-aberrance (*'adm al-shudhūd*).’ (Khan, 2010, 31)

The first three concern only the *isnād*, and the latter two concern both the *isnād* and *matn*. It is only after a Ḥadīth fulfils all the above criteria’s that it is deemed authentic (Khan, 2010). From the above it may be assumed that the classification of Ḥadīth being sound is based more on the quality of the *isnād*. The *isnād* is the chain of narration leading back to the Prophet Muhammad. A chain of individuals who had heard the tradition from the mouth of the individual they mention in the *isnād*. *Isnād* criticism has been a crucial vehicle for the internal critique of Ḥadīth, and was a central mechanism endorsed by the scholars of Ḥadīth to determine the authenticity of a narration. Although some have argued that *isnād* criticism was the dominant method endorsed by Ḥadīth scholars, *matn* criticism is also a tool within *uṣūl al-Ḥadīth*. Since it is the very content of Ḥadīth that impacts the lives of Muslim women it is necessary to explore whether there is an analogous process of critique of the Ḥadīth from the perspective of the content, to that of to *isnād* critique

Today, with the canonisation of the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, the purpose of the *isnād* is not as crucial as it was during the formative period of the Ḥadīth science. Today Muslims do not ask for a full *isnād* of a narration; rather, it is sufficient for the Ḥadīth to be included in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* for it to be accepted as authentic. During the early periods, the *isnād* was what was used to determine the authenticity of a narration. According to Brown (2018), the ‘...origins of the *isnād* were as commonsense as its function, beginning with the rise of hadith forgery’ (Brown, 2018, 80). He quotes Muhammad b. Sīrīn, who explains that it was not until the strife (which Brown assumes is most probably the 2nd civil war in Islam, 680-692CE) that people began to demand ‘name for us your sources’ (Brown, 2018, 81). Alongside the *isnād* being free from any discontinuities, the individuals within the *isnād* were also examined. Their reliability was probed to ensure that an unreliable person, and therefore an unreliable *isnād*, would not be deemed authentic (Brown, 2018). According to al-Shahrazūrī (2010, 5), a Ḥadīth which has been classified as sound (*ṣaḥīḥ*), such as those within the *Ṣaḥīḥayn*, ‘...is a “supported” hadith (*al-ḥadīth al-musnad*), the *isnād* of which coheres continuously through the

transmission of one upright and accurate person from another up to its point of termination'. Yet, despite being seen as a unanimous view among Sunnī Ḥadīth scholars, especially early and traditional scholars, that the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* contain sound Ḥadīth only, this view is not without critique.

Despite all the Ḥadīth within these two collections being classified as *ṣaḥīḥ*(sound) Siddiqi (1993) emphasises how it is a mistake to assume '...that the *ṣaḥīḥ* is free of defects, or that the Muslim scholars have failed to criticise it in certain respects' (Siddiqi, 1993 58). He goes on to present how Al-Dāraqutnī in his work *al-Istidrāk wa'l-tatabbu'* identified almost 200 traditions within *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* that had weakness (Siddiqi, 1993 58). Similarly, Mernissi (1991) also highlights weakness in the narrator Abu Bakra, by way of a traditional method, through exploring biographical literature one of which speaks of how '...he was convicted of and flogged for false testimony by the Caliph 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab...' yet his Ḥadīth concerning the political agency of women has still been included by Bukhārī within his *Ṣaḥīḥ* (Mernissi, 1991 60). Despite the status the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* hold within Muslim communities, the traditions within these collections have been and are still worthy of critique by the very traditional methods of *uṣūl al-Ḥadīth* (the traditional science dedicated to the scrutiny and authentication of Ḥadīth) that were developed and utilised by their compilers.

The methods developed and endorsed by the early Ḥadīth scholars have also been greatly critiqued. Western scholars such as Goldziher, have concluded that early Ḥadīth scholars solely relied on *isnād* criticism when authenticating Ḥadīth traditions (Goldziher, 1971). Many western scholars, including Fazlur Rehman, upheld the conclusions of Goldziher that early Ḥadīth scholars, if faced with a Ḥadīth that contained an obvious absurdity or anachronism, would not reject it if the *isnād* was sound (Brown, 2010, p80-81). This brings us to our next concern: whether the Ḥadīth in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* had undergone content criticism. Contemporary scholars have highlighted how *isnād* criticism alone may not be sufficient to deem a Ḥadīth sound. Alongside *isnād* criticism content criticism is very much necessary. Yet despite content criticism being developed by the early Ḥadīth scholars, there is much discussion regarding the extent it was used. Academics, such as Kamali (2005, 5) however, have argued that the methodology of Ḥadīth is far from inadequate and if there are any

uncertainties it lies only in whether they were developed early enough and in ‘a holistic manner to deliver its desired results’.

5.9 Content criticism

Brown challenges this critique of early Ḥadīth criticism (Brown, 2010). He examines whether early Ḥadīth scholars utilised content criticism as a tool for determining the authenticity of Ḥadīth narrations. It should be noted that Brown (2010) does distinguish between the terms *matn* criticism and content criticism that are used synonymously by many researchers. Brown (2010) argues that the term *matn* criticism was utilised by early Ḥadīth scholars in critiquing the Ḥadīth text but not its meanings. They would critique the wordings of a narration in comparison to another narrated version of the Ḥadīth, both whose meaning did not differ. *Matn* criticism according to Brown was not concerned with the meaning of the narration as is implied by content criticism (Brown, 2010, 179). Israr Ahmad Khan (2010, 33) in his book entitled *Authentication of Hadith: Redefining the Criteria* cited Al-Khair Abdai who ‘...explains that deficiency in the text can be of various kinds: (1) the text of a tradition goes against the Qur’an, (2) the text is in contrast with the very objective of Islam, (3) the text clashes with established history, (4) the text appears to be irrational, (5) the text contradicts general observations, (6) the text contains information about reward and punishment disproportionately, and (7) the text comprises unsound words and meanings’.

According to Brown (2010) locating content criticism from early Ḥadīth scholars is difficult, to the point it seems as though it was not frequently used or not used at all. However, when examining later content criticism, in the 6th century AH, Brown (2010, 197) finds that the critique of Ḥadīth under content criticism show similar patterns of critique with earlier *isnād* criticisms, which could indicate content criticism was being practised under the broad category of *isnād* criticism. According to Brown (2010, 200) ‘...the fact that early Ḥadīth critics do not seem to have applied content criticism as modern historians would construe it does not mean that they did not apply it at all’. He suggests early Sunnī Ḥadīth scholars did not willingly utilise content criticism due to conflicts between the schools of thought: *ahl al-Ḥadīth*, *ahl al-ra’y* and *ahl al-kalām* (Brown, 2010, 190-191).

The *ahl al-Ḥadīth* 'espoused a reliance on the material transmitted from the early community to elaborate Islamic law and dogma' in comparison the *ahl al-ra'y* who 'favoured a more selective use of hadith combined with a reliance on independent legal reasoning' and the *ahl al-kalam* who 'leaned towards the Hellenistic rationalist tradition' (Brown, 2010, 190-91). In their varying methods and outlooks, we find early Ḥadīth scholars being cautious of how and what methods they utilised. The *ahl al-Ḥadīth* found themselves unable to openly endorse a method of content criticism, the method of the rationalists (*ahl al-ra'y*) as it was the rationalists 'who mocked their reliance on the isnād and saw content criticism as the only true means of evaluating the authenticity of hadith' (Brown, 2010, 201).

To acknowledge a problem in the meaning of a hadith without arriving at that conclusion through analysis of the isnād would affirm the rationalist methodology. For this reason, content criticism had to be concealed in the language of isnād criticism (Brown, 2010, 201).

The intra-Sunnī debates of this time represent how even the formative period of Ḥadīth science was not without its disparities and contestations (Brown, 2010). Without going into further details on these ongoing intraschool differences, disputes, and theological stances, we can appreciate that perhaps through the utilisation of certain technical terminology, Ḥadīth scholars could make content and *isnād* criticism undistinguishable (Brown, 2010, 196). For example, terms like *munkar* (not accepted) do not specify whether the Ḥadīth was rejected due to a fault in the *isnād* or content or due to content criticism (Brown, 2010). Similarly, al-Shāfi'i in his *Risalah*, despite claiming reliability is determined by the narrators' states 'except for a few Ḥadīth, whose truthfulness or falsity is demonstrated by the transmitter narrating something the likes of which could not be or that contradicts better-established evidence' (Brown, 2010, 201). This comment of al-Shāfi'i seems to indicate content criticism.

From this brief discussion we can appreciate that despite the disagreements regarding the extent of its use, content criticism did exist in some form in the early periods of Ḥadīth criticism. However, content criticism and *isnād* criticism were not analogous. *Isnād* critique was the dominant method. Thus, the very content, which affects the formation of beliefs and practices including those that have an impact on the lives of

Muslim women, was not debated over or afforded the same critical examination as the *isnād*. With the critique and analysis of the Ḥadīth science into present times, we can firmly hold that content criticism is a crucial step, combined with *isnād* criticism, in determining the authenticity of Ḥadīth narrations. Although this chapter will not be undertaking a critique of the *isnād* of my selected Ḥadīth, it is still worth noting that the soundness of these Ḥadīth should not necessarily be taken for granted. While I mainly focus on the content and interpretation of these Ḥadīth due to the position these traditions hold within Muslim communities, and the impact they have/can have on the formation of beliefs and practices, a further inquiry into their *isnāds* is something that can further help in the reconceptualisation of the notion of honour. It is still essential to question how authentic these sources are.

5.10 A female-centred re-reading: Mernissi, feminism and the tradition

Before moving on to the interpretation of Ḥadīth, I want to highlight another crucial aspect of my examination of my select Ḥadīth: a female-centred re-reading.

Mernissi (1991), in her book *The Veil and The Male Elite* extensively explores select Ḥadīth narrations that are readily accepted by Sunnī Muslims as sound, yet which are problematic regarding women. Islamic feminists and human rights activists have argued that these Ḥadīth problematically single out Muslim women in a manner that deprived them of basic human rights. However, Mernissi (1991) does not reject the whole Ḥadīth canon. Rather she appreciates, and rightly so, the weight of Ḥadīth literature alongside the other Islamic sciences. She further engages with the traditional tools used within Ḥadīth science to critique her selection of Ḥadīth (Mernissi, 1991).

Despite Mernissi (1991) being a feminist, inspired by feminism and the fight for Muslim women's rights, her call for these rights and critique of patriarchy within the Islamic tradition is through and by her acknowledging the authority, as perceived by the Muslim community, and prestige of these very sources. Mernissi is very much engaged in traditional scholarship. Her methodology is one that I see as both traditional and relevant in both endorsing long established and accepted methods within Muslim scholarship but also one that gives Muslim women a voice, by challenging what became a male dominated tradition. This voice as Mernissi herself emphasises is supported by the primary sources and Islam itself (Mernissi, 1991). It

predates, I believe, feminism, and requires Muslim women to be actively engaging with the traditional sources.

Mernissi (1991) demonstrates that a female-centred reading can be achieved through utilising the methods developed by the early Ḥadīth scholars, which have been for too long dominated by male scholarly elites. Thus, an important aspect of the following inquiry is that it is one carried out by a female scholar conscious of the impact of notions of honour on the lives of Muslim women.

Female narrators of Ḥadīth are championed in Islam. We see this especially within the contemporary period with the rise of Islamic feminism and efforts to include Muslim women in usually male dominated spaces be these the mosque or intellectual spaces. We see famous historical Muslim women becoming a topic of interest to highlight how women have been active in the early periods in relation to the formation of tradition. Figures such as ‘Ā’isha and Umm Salama, wives of the Prophet Muhammad, and various other female companions who narrated many Ḥadīth are spoken of greatly. Indeed, their roles as narrators of Ḥadīth is evident through the traditions they narrated and their mentioning in biographical dictionaries (Nadwi, 2013, Barazangi 2015, Sayeed, 2013, 12,). Contemporary works such as Akram Nadwi’s book *al-Muhaddithāt: the women scholars in Islam*, goes further into other fields such as *fiqh* and represents women such as the aforementioned Ḥadīth narrators, jurists, and other female figures within Muslim history who had learnt and taught Ḥadīth and *fiqh*, amongst other disciplines (Nadwi, 2013).

Nevertheless, we must take heed of Sayeed’s caution of producing an ‘anachronistic’ analysis, when addressing Ḥadīth and women’s participation in the premodern field, through modern lenses of women’s agency and empowerment. She argues, ‘to understand the fluctuating trends of Muslim women’s participation in early and classical Islam, we must avoid reading into our texts either misogyny or alternatively explicit desires to empower women’ (Sayeed, 2013, 18). Sayeed argues that challenging patriarchy was not a motivating factor for female participation in the classical periods; rather, their dedication to preserving the legacy of the Prophet Muhammad is what determined them. She (2012, 18) asserts,

The ranges of actions of classical Muslim women were constrained by the norms of their communities, which channelled their intellectual potential towards hadith transmission rather than law or theology. It is through embracing and upholding those norms, not subverting them, that they acquired stature and, in all likelihood, personal fulfilment.

However, I feel it is a great injustice to Muslim women, past and present, to not question the limited contribution to Ḥadīth transmission, the absence in other fields of scholarship, and more so the norms of the communities that resulted in this. Not only is this precedent of limited female participation used today to limit Muslim women's agency further, but it also deters us from questioning why the egalitarian principles within the Qur'anic text that seem so apparent to many Muslims today, were not influencing Muslim women's active participation in their societies. Principles of gender egalitarianism and justice, intrinsic to the Qur'anic worldview, were clearly overlooked regarding Muslim women. These principles, which are also of feminist concern today, are rooted in the primary authoritative text of the Qur'an and they are ideals of Islam that predate the modern period. Leila Ahmed (1992) expresses the same concern in her book *Women and Gender in Islam*, within which she stresses that ideals such as gender egalitarianism were undermined early in Islam through territorial expansion that led to cultural assimilation. She argues that female agency was limited due to the influence of other cultures such as the Mesopotamian. Hence, it is crucial to question why, despite Qur'anic concerns, Muslim women were conditioned to live and participate in circumstances that did not afford them equal opportunities to scholarship and the development of the Islamic sciences? Why did Muslim women's commentaries on Ḥadīth traditions not carry the same import as those of male commentators?

Despite Muslim women being active in transmitting Ḥadīth, seeking knowledge, and further disseminating this knowledge, one matter seems clear: Muslim women were not active participants in the formation of the sciences of any of the traditions. As Sayeed rightly questions in her research, 'were the female narrators remembered as scholars or more as purveyors of oral tradition acquired through happenstance?' (Sayeed, 2013, 12) Indeed, this limitation of Muslim women's agency is not rooted or based on Qur'anic ideals, or the practice of the Prophetic community.

Researchers such as Mernissi (1991) and Barazangi (2015) question these very injustices in their works. For instance, why is it that although ‘Ā’isha, wife of the Prophet, corrected and refuted many traditions narrated by companions, as recorded by *Imam Zarkashi* in his book entitled *Collection of ‘A’isha’s corrections to the statements of the companions*, these traditions were not included in the canonical Ḥadīth compilations of Bukhārī and Muslim? (Mernissi, 1991, 77-78). Why did ‘Ā’isha’s objections and corrections not take precedence when she was the wife of the Prophet and known to be a great scholar? Similarly, Barazangi (2007, 1) in her research delves into why, ‘...despite the fact that many of these narratives were attributed to early Muslim women as transmitters - especially some of the Prophet’s wives – history books hardly have reference to these women making meanings in their own *ijtihād* (independent inquiry), generating *fiqh* (jurisprudence) rules of these narratives, or even involving in the development of Qur’an and Hadith sciences’.

We must question and challenge the absence of women in fields such as interpretation of Ḥadīth. Hence, the following rereading of my select Ḥadīth, not only challenges the imposition of patriarchal interpretations, gender bias conceptions of women in Islam, but I am, like other Muslim women of this modern period, challenging the very norms and ideals that conditioned the lives of Muslim women of the past and the opportunities made available to them. If we are to dismantle the overriding patriarchy that has continued to dominate scholarship within and on Islam, we must challenge it from its beginning, and through its developments and transformations.

5.11 Critiquing the Ḥadīth

After appreciating the above traditional methods and the need for a female-centred rereading of Ḥadīth, I will now move onto examining my select Ḥadīth. The following inquiry is based on Ḥadīth that contain the terms *‘ird* and *ghayra*, many of which are found in both *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* and *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, with slight variation in wording.

5.12 The Prophetic usage of the term ‘ird

I have selected two Ḥadīth from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, one of which can also be found in *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, regarding *‘ird*. Both have been included by Imam Nawawī in his

collection of forty Ḥadīth (Al-Nawawī, 2019) (This source is the English translated text which has been translated by Adil Salahi). The forty Ḥadīth traditions form a separate genre of Ḥadīth collection, usually containing forty Ḥadīth alongside commentaries and are most likely inspired by the Ḥadīth ‘Whoever memorises/preserves forty Ḥadīths of my *sunna* (or, my traditions) for my community, God will raise him among the jurists on Resurrection Day’ (Lucas, 2016). Imam Nawawī’s collection of forty Ḥadīth is known to only contain sound Ḥadīth that focus on the ‘core teachings of Islam’ (Lucas, 2016). Thus, my select Ḥadīth are not just commonly known but deemed to teach the fundamentals of Islamic teachings.

It was narrated that An-Nu’mân bin Bashîr said: “The Messenger of Allâh said – and An-Nu’mân pointed with his finger to his ears – “That which is lawful is clear and that which is unlawful is clear, and between them are matters which are unclear which many people do not understand. Whoever guards against the unclear matters, he will protect his religion and his honor, but whoever falls into that which is unclear, he will soon fall into that which is unlawful. Like a shepherd who grazes his flock around the sanctuary; he will soon graze in it. Verily, every king has his prohibited land and verily, the prohibited land of Allâh is that which He has forbidden. In the body there is a piece of flesh which, if it is healthy, the entire body will be healthy but if it is corrupt, the entire body will be corrupt. Verily it is the heart (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, vol 4, 320).

This Ḥadīth can be found in the *Ṣaḥīḥayn* and is thus classified as *muttafaq ‘alayhi* meaning ‘agreed upon to be sound’ (al-Shahrazuri 2006, 15). According to Jamāl Ahmed Bādi, a professor at the University of Malaysia, Bukhārī placed his classification of this Ḥadīth within the theme of trade because the Ḥadīth is on the issue of lawfulness, unlawfulness and the grey area of doubt are all relevant to the topic of trade and business (Bādi, 2019, 60). Similarly, the categorisation of this Ḥadīth by Imam Muslim in his *Ṣaḥīḥ* is also based on the issues of lawfulness, unlawfulness, and doubtful matters.

This Ḥadīth has been deemed, by Imam Nawawī and other Ḥadīth scholars, as one of those through which Islam in its entirety can be comprehended (Nawawī, vol 6, 32-

34). The commentary of Imam Nawawī extensively speaks about eschewing doubtful matters to guard one's religion and honour, and the state of the heart impacting the whole body (summarised from my own translation of the Arabic text). Unfortunately for my purposes, the discussion is mainly preoccupied with the topic of doubtful matters, and what we don't fully discern is what *'ird* or *honour* consists of in precise terms. One can trace a presumption from Imam Nawawī that *'ird* is understood by his audience. This leads one to assume that it was a commonly used and endorsed term during this period and therefore required no clarification.

In regard to the words of the Prophet, 'he will protect his religion and honour' (*faqad 'istabra'a li dīnihi wa 'irdihi*), Imam Nawawī states that the one who stays away from doubtful matters saves himself from defamation in regard to his religion, and also saves and maintains his honour from the words of people (Nawawī, vol 6, 32-34). What is interesting here is Imam Nawawī's association of honour (*'ird*) with the words of people. One can assume this implies the approval and perception of the community. It is this association of honour with the approval of a community that we find prevalent within Muslim communities today. We may further understand that it is the verdict and (dis)approval of the community that leads to one's honour being impacted, if not lost.

Despite Nawawī not presenting an extensive explanation of the concept of *'ird*, it is one of importance, as can be inferred from how the Prophet mentioned it within the Ḥadīth. The emphasis on the concept of *'ird* can be further seen through Imam Muslim's dedication of an entire chapter, Chapter 10 of the 'Book of al-Birr' entitled 'The prohibition of wronging, forsaking, or despising a Muslim and the inviolability of his blood, honor and wealth', which focuses on hadith concerning *'ird* (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, vol 6, 431). So, although the commentary of the above Ḥadīth has not revealed much to us regarding the details of *'ird*, the importance of the notion in Islamic thought and belief are clear from a chapter being dedicated to it. The following narration can be found in the chapter:

It was narrated that Abû Hurairah said: "The Messenger of Allah said: 'do not envy one another, do not artificially inflate prices, do not hate one another, do not turn away from one another, do not undercut one another. Be, O slaves of Allah, brothers. The Muslim is the brother of his fellow-

Muslim. He does not wrong him, forsake or despise him. Piety (Taqwā) is here” – and he pointed to his chest three times. “It is sufficient sin for a man to despise his Muslim brother. A Muslim is unlawful to another Muslim, his blood, his wealth and his honor.” (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, vol 6, The Book of al-Birr, chapter 10, 431-432)

This Ḥadīth differs from how honour is spoken about in the previous Ḥadīth. The previous Ḥadīth spoke of how one can impact their honour through engaging in doubtful matters, and Imam Nawawī spoke of how such actions will result in the communities speaking against one’s honour. Yet within this Ḥadīth, we find that the Prophet stressed what is unlawful for a Muslim regarding another Muslim, ‘his blood, his wealth and his honour’ (*dammuhu wa māluhu wa ʿirḍuhu*). Interestingly, Nawawī explaining in the previous Ḥadīth that the community may speak against someone and impact his/her honour, this Ḥadīth speaks of how a Muslim’s honour is *unlawful* for another Muslim to besmirch or damage.

In his commentary, Imam Nawawī focuses mainly on the first part of this Ḥadīth regarding a Muslim’s conduct towards another Muslim. He explains each aspect (do not envy one another, do not artificially inflate prices, do not hate one another etc.) However, he does not go into any detail regarding the later part (‘...A Muslim is unlawful to another Muslim, his blood, his wealth and his honour...’) (Nawawī, vol 8, 362-364). Once again it appears, due to the lack of explanation, that the concept of honour here is possibly taken as a recognised concept within the Muslim community, a basic notion commonly known amongst people just like knowledge of the impermissibility of killing someone or wrongly taking their wealth. Yet, despite the lack of an explanation, we can clearly appreciate from the Ḥadīth how important the honour of a Muslim is, as it is listed along with blood (meaning ‘life’) and wealth.

Dr Bādi, in his commentary on this Ḥadīth, focuses on how valuable the honour of a Muslim is, citing the saying of Ibn ‘Umar in *Jāmi’ al-Tirmidhī* (which was graded *hasan*) whilst he was looking at the *Ka’bah* (the house). Ibn ‘Umar stated “What is it that is more honored than you, and whose honor is more sacred than yours? And the believer’s honor is more sacred to Allah than yours” (Bādi, 2019, 283-4). The *Ka’bah*, the house of God, is highly sacred; however, according to this tradition, the honour of

a Muslim is far more sacred than the honour of this house of God. How then would God permit the tarnishing of a Muslim's honour, the targeting of women's honour, any attack or manipulation of a Muslim's honour if it is more sacred than His sacred house?

Within contemporary Muslim communities, Muslim women face a double oppression through the manipulation of notions such as honour. From within the community patriarchal conceptions of honour result in this notion being used to regulate and limit women's agency. For instance, notions of honour, alongside other practices such as segregation which are deemed to be based on the primary sources of authority in normative Muslim practice, are used by some Muslim communities to prevent or look down upon female members of the community receiving an education (Abu-Lughod, 1993, 208) (see chapter 2). Externally, we find honour being distorted through orientalism leading to the victimization of Muslim women, and once again limiting their agency to that of oppressed beings (see chapter 7). Contrary to conceptions of honour from within the Ḥadīth which portray honour as a notion that is more sacred than God's house, the notion of honour has become a means of obsessing, accusing and ostracising women all in the name of preserving so-called honour. Rather than these women being perceived as human beings and their honour as their right, a right that must be protected, the notion and idea of honour seem to be of more value than the one whom it belongs to. The above Ḥadīth rather than emphasising this idea of honour as being sacred and needing to be protected by any means, instead emphasises how a Muslim's life should be valued and honoured. It is not this notion of honour that is sacred but the human being that is sacred. Honour is what has been given by God to the human. It is not of more importance or value than the human.

The sacredness of the human is further emphasised in similar words of '...your blood, your property and your honor are as sacred and inviolable as the sanctity of this day of yours...' in the last sermon of the Prophet Muhammad (Bādi 2019, 274). The last sermon of the Prophet is extremely significant to Muslims and the fact that the Prophet chose to emphasise this point in his final sermon signifies how valuable the blood, property and honour of a Muslim are. Yet, unfortunately, honour, especially that of Muslim women, has become an instrument of control and manipulation within Muslim communities.

Bearing in mind the two Ḥadīth above, within which *‘ird* is used, we begin to understand the position of this notion in accordance with the Prophet’s traditions. We can appreciate how honour is bestowed upon all Muslims. It is not gender-specific. This honour, however, is not above the human. Rather, the honour of a Muslim must be protected and respected as a means of protecting and respecting the human. When the Ḥadīth narration mentions it is a sin to even despise a Muslim, then how can one conceive it acceptable to tarnish a Muslim through their honour? How can this notion be used so brutally to control and tarnish the name of Muslim women?

Another interesting aspect of the statements of the Prophet is how one’s religion (*dīynihī*) and *honour* (*‘irdihī*) are placed together and impacted by the same actions, those that relate to doubtful matters. One could, therefore, argue that honour (specifically *‘ird*) is very closely related to one’s religion to the extent that one can save or lose either, depending on the same conduct and actions; thus they are inseparable. However, within contemporary Muslim communities, accusations of loss of honour or defamation of honour are more likely to be found than accusations against one’s religion. In contemporary Muslim communities, there seems to exist more dire consequences for loss or impact of one’s honour, than how one impacts his religion. HBV are consequences of suspicion and accusation of a woman impacting or ‘losing’ honour; however, similar consequences cannot be found for acts that could be deemed as impacting one’s religion such as not doing mandatory practices such as the five daily prayers. Muslim actions and beliefs that are deemed as mandatory aspects of religion are not policed in the same manner as beliefs and practices associated with honour, especially those concerning women. Despite these both being brought together in the above narration, why do Muslim communities seem to dominantly focus on the idea of honour? Could it possibly be because honour is easy to utilise as a means of policing people, specifically women? Furthermore, is it because the consequences of honour are more impactful on the lives of women and thus utilising this concept assists in upholding patriarchal structures and ideals?

Interestingly, within these Ḥadīth honour and shame are not a binary as they exist within contemporary honour-endorsing Muslim communities. In chapter 2 I discussed how shame is a direct consequence of the loss/impact of honour within contemporary Muslim communities (Akpınar, 2003; Al-Khayyat, 1992; Cihangir, 2012; Khan, 2006).

However, the Prophet did not speak of the loss of honour or impact upon one's honour in terms of shame. One cannot help questioning the emphasis on this binary within contemporary Muslim communities. Why is it that Muslim communities today perceive the loss of honour, or impact on one's honour, as resulting in shame? Clearly, in the Ḥadīth there is no mentioning of shame. Where is the formation of this binary rooted? And how has it become so central to contemporary Muslim honour conceptions?

5.13 The Prophetic usage of the term *Ghayra*

Alongside *ʿird*, *ghayra* is also a crucial honour concept (see chapter 2 for definitions). *Ghayra*, commonly understood as protective jealousy, is a central aspect of the CMHP. What follows is an examination of Ḥadīth, that contain the term *ghayra*, to analyse the Prophetic usage and conception of this term.

The Ḥadīth commentaries analysed are from ibn Ḥajar's *Fath al-Bārī*. When exploring *Fath al-Bārī* I will exclude comments on *isnād* or grammatical/ linguistic style or variations of similar narrations. My focus will be on how the meaning of the Ḥadīth has been presented and subsequently, to utilise and comment on these interpretations in line with my research questions.

The three chapters present in *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* that are dedicated to the topics of *ghayra*, are within the book of *nikāḥ*. They are entitled: 'Chapter *al-Ghaira*', 'Chapter the jealousy of women and their anger' and finally, 'Chapter the man's attempt to prevent what may arouse his daughter's jealousy, and his demand that she should be treated justly' (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, 2015 102-106). Despite all three chapters containing the same Arabic term *ghayra* the translator of this collection of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* has decided to keep the original Arabic term for the first chapter, whereas in the remaining two chapters that concern Muslim women, he has chosen to translate the term as jealousy. Is this difference in translation influenced by something within *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* itself? Or is it influenced by other traditional sources such as commentaries of *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*? Or could it be that this manner of translation is due to contemporary conceptions of gender and gender-specific notion of honour terms such as *ghayra*? One also cannot overlook the categorisation of the Ḥadīth by Bukhārī. Why has Bukhārī chosen to separate those Ḥadīth that relate to a women's *ghayra* but then include one such Ḥadīth in the previous category? Why has he also decided to

separate the third chapter? An in-depth critique of these chapters and the select Ḥadīth in the following discussion will address some of the concerns of the questions.

From reading all the Ḥadīth within these two chapters it becomes apparent that these traditions primarily concern either the companions/family of the Prophet (wives or daughter) and their *ghayra* (the *ghayra* of the Muslim believer) or the *ghayra* of God. In most of the Ḥadīth we find that *ghayra* is always related back to the Prophet and God. But when focusing on the main subject or the possessor/expresser of this *ghayra* within these Ḥadīth it is either God or the companions/family of the Prophet. I will now go into a deeper discussion of these varying attributions of *ghayra* found within these Ḥadīth and the implications of these attributions.

5.14 The chapter entitled *Ghayra*

Beginning with the chapter on *ghayra* in the commentary *Fath al-Bārī* we find that *ghayra* is described by Qadi Iyad and other scholars as “deriving from a change in the heart and an outburst of anger or rage” (my translation). *Ghayra* is described as a feeling that is derived from a change or shift in what one feels within their heart. More specifically this change is related to feelings of anger. Within *Fath al-Bārī* we find *ghayra* being presented as a feeling that is prevalent between spouses. It is seen as a right of all human beings. Moreover, it is also attributed to God. This is explained through the tradition narrated by Abu Hurayra who states: ‘The *ghayra* of Allah is when a believer does what He has made unlawful for him.’ (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009).

Interpreting this narration, Ibn Ḥajar says: "Such an unstable condition of the heart as "jealousy" should not be interpreted as an intrinsic attribute of Allah since transmutation is not one of the attributes of Allah. Thus "jealousy" should be interpreted as the act of "menacing" and "punishing".' (Naseef, 1999, 65)

We can deduce, that Ibn Ḥajar associate's feelings of *ghayra* to feelings of jealousy, with the exception of when *ghayra* is attributed to God. In such instances jealousy, which he describes as an unstable condition of the heart and a change, is not appropriate for God as change is not an attribute of God.

Qadi Iyad further presenting the details of *ghayra* describes it as being concerned with feeling great zeal and unease of consciousness and that such a feeling is what leads towards feelings of anger. Regarding the Prophet Muhammad, we find that it is stated that of mankind none felt more *ghayra* than him. However, he only felt *ghayra* for the sake of God and Islam. We, therefore, find that he never took revenge for himself (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). This is a crucial point in relation to contemporary honour practices that will be explored later.

The above explanation of *ghayra* is what can be found within *Fath al-Bārī*. Despite the discussion broadly covering the term *ghayra*, the *ghayra* of the Prophet and God, a precise definition of *ghayra* cannot be deduced. Perhaps this is because the very feelings that are being described through this term are not such that can be understood through a specific definition. What can be comprehended about *ghayra* from this broad explanation is that *ghayra* is a feeling. It is an emotion that stems from the heart and is linked to emotions of anger, zeal and jealousy. These feelings of *ghayra* are not limited to any specific circumstances, actions, or beliefs by Ibn Ḥajar. Rather, it appears to be a general feeling that can be aroused in any circumstances. The broad scope of the feeling of *ghayra* can be further assumed through the way Ibn Ḥajar emphasises the limited instances of when the Prophet Muhammad felt *ghayra*: for the sake of God and Islam. This limitation appears to be distinguishing between the *ghayra* felt by the Prophet and that felt by other humans. Nevertheless, despite Ibn Ḥajar only offering a brief introduction to the term in his explanation of the chapter, the nature of *ghayra* can be further understood through the Ḥadīth within the chapter.

Ghayra felt by the companions

Beginning on those traditions that mention the feeling of *ghayra* by a companion of the Prophet I have selected the following few to discuss.

The first tradition concerns the companion Sa'ad b. 'Ubāda. Within this tradition we also find the Prophet explaining *ghayra* relating to himself and God, thus extending the notion from the human domain to the divine.

Sa'ad bin 'Ubada said: 'If I saw a man with my wife, I would stroke him with the sharp edge of the sword.' The Prophet said (to his companions),

“Are you astonished by Sa’ad’s (Ghaira) sense of honour? (By Allah) I have a greater sense of Ghaira than he has, and Allah has still greater sense of Ghaira than I have.” (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, Volume7, book 67, chapter 108, 102)

This tradition is also found within Muslim with additions that focus on a comparison between the *ghayra* humans feel and that of God.

It was narrated that Al-Mughîrah bin Shu’bah said: “Sa’d bin ‘Ubâdah said: ‘If I saw a man with my wife, I would stroke him with my sword, and not with the flat side of it.’ News of that reached the Messenger of Allâh and he said: ‘Are you surprised at the jealousy of Sa’d? By Allah, I am more jealous than him, and Allah is more jealous than me. It is because of His jealousy that Allah forbade immoral deeds, both open and secret. There is no person who is more jealous than Allah, and there is no person whom warnings are more beloved than Allah. Because of that, Allah sent the Messengers as bearers of glad tidings and warnings. There is no person to who praise is more beloved than Allah. Because of that Allah made the promise of paradise.’” (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, vol 4, book of *Li’an*, 195-196)

Within the commentary of Ibn Ḥajar we find reference to another Ḥadīth within *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*. Within this narration, Sa’ad asks the Prophet, “If I find another man with my wife should I leave them until I can bring forth four witnesses?” To this, the Prophet stated “Yes”. Additionally, Ḥakīm narrated that when verse 4 of surah An-Nur was revealed Sa’ad questioned in regard to it, “if I find a man with my wife should I not move them until I bring four witnesses? By God, until I find four witnesses, he will fulfil his need” (meaning sexual intercourse). To this, the Prophet said to the people of Ansar, ‘Do you not listen to what your leader says?’. The people of Ansar replied saying, “Oh Prophet do not reproach him for he is a man of great *ghayra*. Never has he married except that he has married a virgin, and never has a man among us dared to marry a woman he has divorced because of his severe *ghayra*”. Sa’ad then went on to say to the Prophet, “although I know this is the truth from my Lord, I am astonished as by the time I gather four witnesses they will complete the act” (meaning

sexual intercourse) (summarised from my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009).

The above Ḥadīth and commentary reveal the tolerance of the Prophet Muhammad towards his companions' feelings of *ghayra*. Not only was this tolerated but it was seen as natural and praiseworthy. The feelings of *ghayra* are presented as felt by the Prophet himself and, as he himself describes his own *ghayra*, as greater than that of his companion Sa'ad's. Furthermore, we see *ghayra* is not something restricted to the earthly domain, nor humans, as the Prophet explains that the greatest *ghayra* is that of God.

What is apparent from the emotions of Sa'ad is the existence of an association of virginity, female sexuality, and honour within the nascent Muslim community. We can deduce that pre-Islamic notions and ideals of honour continued to exist within the new Muslim community. However, this continuation is clearly rebuked by the Prophet. There is a clear prohibition of reacting in accordance with one's feelings of *ghayra* and an emphasis on controlling these natural feelings. Despite the subject individual not being blamed for feeling *ghayra* within these Ḥadīth, we can appreciate that reacting negatively due to these feelings is contrary to Prophetic teachings. Specifically, from the Ḥadīth mentioned by Ibn Ḥajar in his commentary regarding Sa'ad b. 'Ubāda, we find that despite the Prophet not rebuking feelings of *ghayra* felt by his companions, he was also *not* tolerant of the desire to act in vengeance or to respond negatively due to these feelings. The Prophet's evident *disapproval* of Sa'ad's desire to react with violence due to his feelings of *ghayra* stands in stark contrast with practices of HBV in some Muslim communities today. In the name of honour and protective jealousy, male members of families retaliate against what they perceive as transgressions against notions of honour. However, here we find Sa'ad speaking of finding his wife with another man, yet the Prophet does not permit him to separate the two, let alone respond with violence. This Ḥadīth clearly disapproves of HBV.

What can also be appreciated from this Ḥadīth is that *ghayra* is not an emotion exclusive to the general Muslim. *Ghayra* is associated with the Prophet and with God. This takes *ghayra* away from the human realm exclusively and reveals a divine

association. As clearly stated in the Ḥadīth, *ghayra* in its greatest form is related to God. The *ghayra* of God will be discussed in length in the following section.

One cannot help but note that the greatest form of *ghayra* is associated with God, yet there is no clear guidance in the Qur'an, the words of God, regarding how to respond to feelings of *ghayra*, or any mention of the term at all. The only guidance one can extrapolate from the primary sources of authority is what we find within the Ḥadīth, that such feelings must be controlled. It becomes necessary to then question the resultant actions of feelings of *ghayra* in contemporary Muslim communities as what are infamously known as HBV. If the Prophet Muhammad is guiding the Muslims to control their natural feelings of *ghayra* without retaliating, then how can Muslims within the contemporary assert that Islam justifies these feelings alongside their HBV, supposedly to restore honour? As previously mentioned, Qadi Iyad highlighted how the Prophet only ever felt *ghayra* for God and his religion Islam. If this is described as the greatest form of *ghayra*, then isn't it this form that Muslims should be aspiring towards? Within the Ḥadīth mentioning's of *ghayra* emphasise controlling and suppressing these feelings. We can appreciate there are different types of *ghayra*: the *ghayra* experienced by humans relating to worldly matters (such as *ghayra* felt between spouses), *ghayra* relating to God and Islam (as experienced by the Prophet), and finally the *ghayra* attributed to God relating to the conduct of humans. These varying forms of *ghayra*, as found within the Ḥadīth, appear to represent different levels of *ghayra*, with the *ghayra* of God being the greatest form (this point will be expanded on below see diagram 5.3). Furthermore, there is clear guidance disapproving of some modes of expressing *ghayra*, specifically reacting in violence. Taking into consideration these aspects one must ask, should Muslims consider the *ghayra* of God in arriving at an understanding of what form of *ghayra* is closer to God and Islam? Surely understanding the *ghayra* of God and His Prophet allows for a reconceptualisation of *ghayra* that can be labelled as the optimum conception of *ghayra*. An analysis of the *ghayra* of God follows below.

Another tradition relating to companions' feelings of *ghayra* is a narration in which the Prophet speaks of 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, later his second caliph.

Narrated Jabir bin Abdullah: The Prophet said, “I entered Paradise and saw a palace and asked whose palace is this? They said, ‘This palace belongs to ‘Umar bin Al-Khattab.’ I intended to enter it, and nothing stopped me except my knowledge about your sense of Ghaira (honour, self-respect etc.) (O ‘Umar).” ‘Umar said, “O Allah’s Prophet! How dare I think of my Ghaira (honour, self-respect etc.) being offended by you?”. (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, vol7, book 67, chapter 108, hadith 5226, 105)

Within this tradition, we once again find the mentioning of the companions’ *ghayra* and the Prophet does not negatively speak of this, nor rebuke them. Rather it is spoken of as natural, and one could also argue it is something praiseworthy, as these traditions are speaking of the relevant companions in a positive manner.

The Ghayra of God

The *ghayra* of God is a significant topic within the chapter of *ghayra* in Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī. As discussed previously, we find the *ghayra* of various companions and the Prophet, also discussed within these narrations, but each of them (except the narration regarding the wives of the Prophet and the broken dish (this Ḥadīth will be discussed later) always mentioned the *ghayra* of God. Nevertheless, there are several Ḥadīth within the chapter on *ghayra* of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, some of which are also found within Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, which primarily focus on the *ghayra* of God. These Ḥadīth reveal to us how *ghayra* is not exclusively associated with human beings, let alone men. Contrary to the dominant contemporary beliefs that *ghayra* is a feeling that men must possess, and which represents masculinity, these Ḥadīth reveal to us that *ghayra transcends* the human realm (Fath al-Bārī, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). Imam Muslim, in his Ṣaḥīḥ, dedicated a separate chapter in his Book on Repentance to this topic, entitled ‘*the protective jealousy of Allah the highest, and the prohibition of immoral behaviour*’, within which we find 9 narrations relating to the *ghayra* of God. Exploring each of these narrations in detail is beyond the capacity of the present chapter and is also not necessary as these traditions relate the same ideas as can be deduced from the few traditions I present in the following. A conceptualisation of the *ghayra* of God will be formulated to allow for a critique and reconsideration to contemporary Muslim honour beliefs and practices.

Narrated ‘Abullah bin Mas’ud: The Prophet said, ‘There is no-one having a greater sense of Ghaira (honour or self-respect etc) than Allah. And for that He has forbidden the doing of evil actions (illegal sexual intercourse etc.) There is none who likes to be praised more than Allah does’ (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 108, Ḥadīth 5220, 102)

Narrated ‘Aishah: Allah’s Messenger said, “O followers of Muhammad! There is none, who has a greater sense of Ghaira (honour or self-respect etc.) than Allah, so He has forbidden that His slave commits illegal sexual intercourse, or His slave-girl commits illegal sexual intercourse. O followers of Muhammad! If you but knew what I know, you would laugh little but weep much!” (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 108, Ḥadīth 5221, 102-103).

Narrated Asma’: I heard Allah’s Messenger saying, ‘There is nothing (none) having greater sense of Ghaira (self-respect) than Allah.’ And narrated Abu Hurairah that he heard the Prophet (saying the same) (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 108, Ḥadīth 5222, 103)

Narrated Abu Hurairah: the Prophet said, ‘Allah has a sense of Ghaira, and Allah’s sense of Ghaira is provoked when a believer does something which Allah has prohibited’ (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 108, Ḥadīth 5223, 103).

It was narrated that ‘Abdullah said: “the Messenger of Allah said: ‘There is no one to whom praise is more dear than Allah, glorified and Exalted is He, and because of that He praised Himself. And there is no one whose ghairah (proactive jealousy) is greater than Allah’s, and because of that He forbade immoral actions, both those that are committed openly and those that are committed in secret”’ (*Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim*, vol 7, The book of repentance, chapter 6, 134).

It was narrated that Abu Hurairah said: ‘The Messenger of Allah said: ‘Allah has a sense of protective jealousy and the believer has a sense of

protective jealousy, too, and the protective jealousy of Allah is provoked when the believer does something that is forbidden to him” (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, vol 7, The book of repentance, chapter 6, 136).

Comprehending the *ghayra* of God is crucial to fully understanding the concept of *ghayra*, particularly as the Ḥadīth mentioned above describe it as the greatest form of *ghayra*. The topic of the *ghayra* of God has dominated the Ḥadīth within Bukhārī's chapter on *ghayra* and is evidently a primary aspect of the notion of *ghayra*. As we saw in the previous chapter, the second most common occurrences of the term honour within the Qur'anic translation of Abdullah Yusuf Ali were those relating to God. Understanding these multiple layers of *honour* and *ghayra* within these primary sources and the positionality of these to God is crucial in our reconceptualising of these notions and thereby critiquing contemporary gender biased conceptions of *honour*.

Customarily within Muslim tradition the example of the Prophet Muhammad is utilised as a means of providing an exemplary mode of conduct. As I have previously discussed in the previous section, the *ghayra* felt by the Prophet was classified as the greatest *ghayra* felt by humans. However, it seems imperative to utilise the *ghayra* of God as a means of distinguishing human conduct from attitudes and attributes of the divine. Indeed, the attributes of God cannot be mirrored or come in any proximity to that of humans according to *Sunnī* theological conceptions of God. Dogma relating to the divine, as can be found in classical texts such as the famous *al-'Aqīda al-Ṭāhāwīyya* *The creed of Ṭāhāwī* written by the great scholar Imam Abu Ja'far al-Ṭāhāwī, emphasises how 'nothing is like him' (*wa la shay'a mithluhu*) and 'no creation bears any similarity to Him' (*wa la yushbihuhu al-anām*)(al-Ṭāhāwī, 15). From this foundational text on doctrine, we understand that nothing can be like God or have any similarity to him. The examination of the *ghayra* of God therefore does not call Muslims to embody such *ghayra*. Rather, it is to emphasise, in accordance with established doctrines of the divine, that such attributions of honour cannot be claimed by humans. Understanding the *ghayra* of God, and the Prophet, reveals a hierarchy of *ghayra* that exists within Islam, a hierarchy that is defied by contemporary conceptions and practices of honour. According to the doctrine of God, the *ghayra* of God is exclusive to God alone. It is thus, this level that humans cannot attain and should not be

attempting to. Instead, Muslims, utilising the *sunna* and Ḥadīth, should be aiming to emulate the Prophet and his sense of *ghayra* as he is seen as the embodiment of Gods words and law. The *ghayra* of the Prophet, not of God, should be used as an analogy by Muslims. God's *ghayra* is exceptional and exclusive to Him. The only cues Muslims should be taking from the explanations of the *ghayra* of God are cues indicating what their feeling of *ghayra cannot* be. What does the *ghayra* of God comprise of that which cannot be replicated by humans?




Figure 5

According to *Fatḥ al-Bārī*, as we have previously discussed, ibn Ḥajar discusses the *ghayra* of God in the initial chapter commentary (*Fatḥ al-Bārī*, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). In explaining the *ghayra* of God 'Al-Haafiz Ibn Hajr says: "Such an unstable condition of the heart as "jealousy" should not be interpreted as an intrinsic attribute of Allah since transmutation is not one of the attributes of Allah. Thus "jealousy" should be interpreted as the act of "menacing" and "punishing".' (Naseef, 1999, 65). Ibn Ḥajar distinguishes between the *ghayra* felt by humans as jealousy and the *ghayra* attributed to God as a threat or punishing. Considering the terms menacing and punishing, could it therefore be argued that *ghayra* relating to one intimidating, threatening, or punishing an individual is exclusive to God? Is, in accordance with the above Ḥadīth and the commentary by ibn Ḥajar, *ghayra* of the human realm merely intended to be a feeling, a feeling that should not be transformed

into an action? I argue that the transformation of *ghayra* into an action of punishment is exclusive to God. This level of *ghayra* cannot be embodied by humans. The reaction of *ghayra*, in the form of HBV, is a clear violation and challenge to the divine and His greatest form of *ghayra*.

Focusing on what provokes the *ghayra* of God, from the above narrations we find: evil actions, illegal sexual intercourse, a believer doing that which God has prohibited, and immoral actions committed openly or covertly. Interestingly within contemporary Muslim communities, we find that human *ghayra* is greatly provoked by so-called transgressions by Muslim women. These transgressions can be as simple as the desire to work, or more specifically relate to so called sexual transgressions, such as losing virginity before marriage. What is certain is that within contemporary Muslim communities, feelings of *ghayra* are likely to relate to suspected sexual transgressions by women and not non-sexual religious transgressions such as, for instance, a man consuming alcohol. Within the contemporary, we find Muslims have increasingly associated *ghayra* with sexuality. Yet, in the above Ḥadīth we find that even the greatest form of *ghayra* attributed to God is not exclusively related to sexual transgressions or a single gender. Rather, the *ghayra* of God is provoked by a *believer* (male or female) doing *anything* that God has forbidden. It is thus highly problematic to limit *ghayra* to the sexual conduct of women, when God has associated *ghayra* to both genders and all actions prohibited to them. The *ghayra* of God represents a broader sense of reckoning. Furthermore, if the *ghayra* of the believer is supposed to be a feeling of morality, then consequently feelings of *ghayra* should firstly concern oneself, rather than others.

In understanding the *ghayra* of God and the *ghayra* of human beings I find the *tawḥīdic* paradigm (see chapter 4), as utilised by Wadud in her reading of the Qur'anic text, to be relevant and highly applicable to reading the above Ḥadīth and the position of *ghayra* within them in an egalitarian way, and for reconsidering honour within these Ḥadīth. I take into consideration here the ethical term *tawḥīd*, as presented by Wadud in her book *Inside the Gender Jihad*, which '...relates to relationships and developments within the social and political realm, emphasizing the unity of all human creatures beneath one Creator' (Wadud, 2006, 28). Wadud (2006, 28) argues, if the ethical term *tawḥīd* was a reality in the everyday life of a Muslim, then there would be

equality and no distinction between humans based on ‘...race, class, gender, religious tradition, national origin, sexual orientation or other arbitrary, voluntary, and involuntary aspects of human distinction.’ Rather the only distinction would be *taqwā* (moral consciousness). Indeed, true belief in *tawḥīd* (oneness of God) must entail believing He alone is above all of creation, and this requires the dismantling of any other hierarchies. Therefore, the *ghayra* of all creation, male or female, must be equal, and cannot reach or surpass the *ghayra* of the divine.

The Ghayra of Muslim Women

The following Ḥadīth of the chapter of *ghayra*, that I have left to discuss until last, is the Ḥadīth of Anas relating to the wives of the Prophet. This Ḥadīth, although relating to women, has not been included in the following chapter of *ghayra* within *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, which focuses on the *ghayra* of women. The reasons for this are not clear as this Ḥadīth does not mention the *ghayra* of God or the Prophet. Nevertheless, despite this Ḥadīth not being the final Ḥadīth within Bukhārī’s chapter on *ghayra*, I have chosen to discuss it last, and instead within my section of *ghayra* and Muslim women as it relates more closely to the Ḥadīth found within *Bukhārī*’s following chapters that concern women. As we will see in the following the commentaries of these Ḥadīth also appear to link.

Narrated Anas: While the Prophet was in the house of one of his wives, one of the Mothers of the believers sent a meal in a dish. The wife at whose house the Prophet was, struck the hand of the servant, causing the dish to fall and break. The Prophet gathered the broken pieces of the dish and then started collecting on them the food which had been in this dish and said, “Your mother (my wife) felt jealous.” Then he detained the servant till a (sound) dish was brought from the wife at whose house he was. He gave the sound dish to the wife whose dish had been broken and kept the broken one at the house where it had been broken. (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol7, book 67, chapter 108, Ḥadīth 5225, 104)

Explaining this Ḥadīth Ibn Ḥajar stated that ‘This narration proves that a jealous woman should be excused since she is blinded by anger and passion which have

been aroused by her jealousy (Naseef 1999, 67) He further explains that all the scholars have commented concerning this Ḥadīth that the woman should not be blamed for what she does whilst feeling *ghayra* because in such a situation her mind is veiled (implying she cannot think or act rationally) due to the intense anger she feels as a result of *ghayra* (summarised from my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). From the manner Ibn Ḥajar attempts to normalise the feelings of *ghayra* experienced by women, negative gender-specific assumptions concerning women can be deduced. Unlike the explanations of *ghayra* relating to men, in relation to women we find Ibn Ḥajar, and ‘all scholars’ as he states, associate *ghayra* felt by a woman to irrationality. Irrationality of women therefore appears to be a common trope in the discussion of women by early Ḥadīth scholars.

To validate the *ghayra* experienced by women, Ibn Ḥajar presented the *ghayra* felt by *Sāra*, in relation to *Hājar* (the wives of Prophet Ibrahim). Ibn Ḥajar presents this was one reason for Prophet Ibrahim taking *Hājar* and their young child Ismā’īl and migrating to Makkah (Abu Rahma, 2018). It was his attentiveness and care for the feeling of *Sāra* and her *ghayra*. Rather than rebuking her for feeling these emotions, he instead took *Hājar* and Ismail. He removed what was causing *Sāra* to feel *ghayra* (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 634-646; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009).

Ibn Ḥajar attempts to justify the feeling of *ghayra* experienced by Muslim women. He validates this as a natural feeling and further presents the example of Prophet Ibrahim and his wives to demonstrate that these feelings have been felt by human beings even before the time of the Prophet, moreover even by the wife of Prophet Ibrahim. Yet, we must consider here the need for Ibn Ḥajar to justify the feelings of *ghayra* of a woman, when he does not do the equivalent for the Ḥadīth which mention the *ghayra* felt by men. This indicates to us that even during the time of Ibn Ḥajar there was a prevailing attitude amongst the Muslim community within which the *ghayra* of men was normalised, whereas that of women was perhaps not seen in the same manner. One can further argue that this attitude was present in the community of the Prophet Muhammad, as can be deduced from the existence of these Ḥadīth within which the Prophet is normalising *ghayra* felt by women. Yet, the efforts of the Prophet seem to have not reformed perceptions of women feeling *ghayra*, as clearly even during the time of Ibn Ḥajar (773-852AH/ 1372-1449CE, nearly 8 centuries after the passing of

the Prophet), these gender bias conceptions still existed. Despite beliefs of *ghayra* being a masculine trait not appearing to be rooted in the primary sources of Islam, they still appear to resemble beliefs of early Muslim communities, and such beliefs continue to exist within contemporary Muslim communities. A conflict seems to exist between *ghayra* in the written sources and the practice of the community, not only in the modern period, but also in the classic periods, such as the period of Ibn Ḥajar. Ibn Ḥajar's efforts to justify *ghayra* can also be appreciated through his commentary of the following Ḥadīth.

The second chapter relating to *ghayra* in *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī* is the chapter entitled: 'Chapter on the jealousy of women and their anger.' Regarding this chapter Ibn Ḥajar mentions the Ḥadīth narrated by Jabir ibn Atiq in which he states that the Prophet had said 'There is *ghayra* that Allah loves and there is *ghayra* that Allah hates. As for the *ghayra* that Allah loves it concerns that which is not doubtful, and as for the *ghayra* Allah hates it concerns that which is doubtful' (my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 646-649; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). Ibn Ḥajar argued that the feeling of *ghayra* is a natural inherent feeling for women; however, if a woman becomes excessive in her feelings of *ghayra* then she is blameworthy (Summarised from my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 646-649; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009).

He then goes on to speak about the types of *ghayra* that would be problematic or cause a woman to be blameworthy. He states:

Jealousy is inherent to women. However, a jealous woman is to be blamed when her jealousy becomes excessive. This also applies to men..... If a woman is jealous because she fears that her husband is committing adultery or because he is not treating her equally with her co-wife, and if her doubts prove to be true, then his attitude is not permissible, and he is to blame. If on the other hand the husband is just and treats his wives equally and, despite all this, one of his wives is still jealous, she is to be excused since jealousy is human and inherent to all women. However, this jealousy should not lead to prohibited acts or speech. This is what we learn from the attitude of the pious female companions of the Prophet (Naseef, 1999, 66-67).

Once again, Ibn Ḥajar attempts to portray the *ghayra* of woman as a natural human feeling. He emphasises that men can also be blameworthy for excessive *ghayra*. Ibn Ḥajar here clearly attempts to dismantle any gender disparity regarding this notion, indicating once again that *ghayra* was possibly not perceived as equivalent for both genders during his lifetime. However, within his attempts we still find the existence of gender bias assumptions regarding women who he attributes jealousy to as something inherent. The question one cannot help but ask therefore is, what influenced the existence and emphasis on gender discrepancies in the notion of *ghayra* within Muslim communities? Despite some efforts of scholars such as Ibn Ḥajar to refute them, they still exist within Muslim communities today. To arrive at the answers to such questions, honour must not only be examined through authoritative sources (as within this project), but a historical inquiry must also be undertaken to understand the complexities of the lived realities of Muslim communities throughout Muslim history and within varying Muslim communities. This will allow for a critique of how practices and beliefs, which are not rooted in the scriptural sources, are transformed into normative aspects of Islam.

In Bukhārī's chapter regarding the *ghayra* of a woman we find two traditions narrated by 'Ā'isha the wife of the Prophet Muhammad. Both these concern her feelings of *ghayra* towards the Prophet Muhammad. The first Ḥadīth (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 109, Ḥadīth 5228, 106) does not include the specific term *ghayra* and neither does Ibn Ḥajar dedicated any aspect of his commentary to this term. We can assume Bukhārī included it within this chapter to demonstrate how a woman feels and expresses her *ghayra*.

Nevertheless, I will be excluding this Ḥadīth from my discussion, as it does not provide any further insight into *ghayra* apart from what has already been discussed, that it validates the feeling of *ghayra* by a woman. This Ḥadīth presents it as a natural inherent feature of human beings as even the wife of the Prophet felt it in regard to her husband.

The final Ḥadīth within this chapter is another Ḥadīth related by 'Ā'isha:

Narrated 'Aishah "I never felt so jealous of any wife of Allah's Messenger as I did of Khadija because Allah's Messenger used to remember and praise her too often and because it was revealed to Allah's Messenger that he should give her (Khadija) the glad tidings of her having a palace of Qasab in paradise." (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 109, Ḥadīth, 106).

In the commentary we find that the *ghayra* felt by 'Ā'isha was due to the Prophet Muhammad frequently remembering his first wife Khadīja in great prestige. Despite Khadīja having already passed, and therefore not being married to be Prophet at the same time as 'Ā'isha, 'Ā'isha still felt feelings of *ghayra*. Ibn Ḥajar states that this Ḥadīth 'proves that jealousy is not a blameworthy act as here is one of the greatest women, 'Ā'isha, who was jealous of Khadija...' (Abu Rahma, 2018)

The final Ḥadīth referring to the *ghayra* of companions or the family of the Prophet is a Ḥadīth in which the Prophet Muhammad is conscious of his daughter Fāṭima feeling *ghayra*, and his attempt to prevent this. In *Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, 'Chapter on the man's attempt to prevent what may arouse his daughter's jealousy, and his demand that she should be treated justly' we find:

Narrated Al-Miswar bin Makhrama: I heard Allah's Messenger who was on the pulpit, saying, "Banu-Hisham bin Al-Mughira have requested me to allow them to marry their daughter to 'Alī bin Abi Talib, but I don't give permission, and will not give permission unless 'Alī bin Abi Talib divorces my daughter in order to marry their daughter, because Fatima is a part of my body, and I hate what she hates to see, and what annoys her, annoys me" (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*, vol 7, book 67, chapter 110, Ḥadīth 5230, 106-107).

Faṭḥ al-Bārī includes an extensive commentary on this particular Ḥadīth, which focuses on various aspects relating to the status of Fāṭima in relation to her father the Prophet, and the topic of polygamy (*Faṭḥ al-Bārī*, vol 15, 649-655; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). Here I will present the main details, specifically those that relate to the topic at hand. According to Ibn Ḥajar, news reached Fāṭima that her husband 'Alī

intended to marry the daughter of Abu Jahl. Fāṭima, subsequently said to her father, "People assume that you do not get angry for your daughters, and 'Alī is intending to marry the daughter of Abu Jahl" (my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 649-655; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). Fāṭima clearly did not approve of her husband marrying a second wife.

Ibn Ḥajar further quotes al-Zuhrī who emphasises that the Prophet's disapproval of 'Alī marrying a second wife, was due to it not being possible for his daughter and the daughter of the enemy of Allah to be married to the same man nor to live in one home (summarised from my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 649-655; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). Similarly, Imam Nawawī in his *sharḥ Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* states how '...It may also be understood as meaning that it was haraam to join them together... So, one of the things that are haraam with regard to marriage is being married to both a daughter of the Prophet of Allah and a daughter of the enemy of Allah at the same time...' (Al-Munajjid, 2020).

Ibn Ḥajar further quotes Ibn at-Teen who stated that this statement of the Prophet preventing 'Alī from marrying another wife, whilst being married to Fāṭima, was due to it being an act that would hurt the Prophet and hurting the Prophet is forbidden. If it were not for Fāṭima, 'Alī would have not been prohibited from taking a second wife. This is due to the Prophet being hurt by Fāṭima being hurt, and as we have mentioned above Fāṭima clearly disapproved of her husband marrying again (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 649-655; and Al-Munajjid, 2020). Imam Nawawī also stressed this point '...Because that would have led to hurting Faatimah, in that case it would have hurt the Prophet...too, and the one who hurts him is doomed. For that reason, he forbade him to do that, out of compassion towards 'Alī and towards Faatimah.' (Al-Munajjid, 2020).

Ibn Ḥajar explains this specific ruling regarding Fāṭima as, 'this incident occurred after the conquest of Makkah, at which time none of the daughters of the Prophet...was still alive except her; after losing her mother, she had lost her sisters, and giving her cause to become jealous would have exacerbated her grief.' (Al-Munajjid, 2020). Ibn Ḥajar emphasises how due to all this loss, she would have no person to confide in and seek reassurance from if her husband took another wife. If Fāṭima was happy with 'Alī marrying again then the Prophet would not have prevented 'Alī from doing so

(summarised from my translation) (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 649-655; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009).

The primary reason there was a prohibition was due to the feelings of Fāṭima (*Fath al-Bārī*, vol 15, 649-655; Maktabah Aṣḥāb ul Ḥadiyṣ, 2009). From the commentary of Ibn Ḥajar one can perceive that he assumes the statement of the Prophet as being specific to his daughters or to Fāṭima (Al-Munajjid, 2020). Rather than expanding the relevance of this narration, the commentary seems to restrict it to the case of Fāṭima and ‘Alī. However, more can be taken from this narration and applied today in the lives of contemporary Muslim women. Specifically thinking about honour and *ghayra* this Ḥadīth is very relevant in asserting the right of women to exercise their full agency regarding their own being, emotions and mental health.

I argue that ibn Ḥajar limits the applicability of the message of this tradition to Fāṭima, and overlooks the position afforded to women regarding their rights in marriage. This narration highlights that not only are feelings of *ghayra* natural and acceptable for women to feel and express, but a woman should not be forced to agree to a polygamous marriage. Rather her view is paramount. Although polygamy is permissible in Islam, in accordance with the practice of the Prophet, care and consideration should be given to a wife’s feelings, and her mental state. This is how the Prophet Muhammad considered and responded to his daughter’s feelings and mental health. Although within the commentary and Ḥadīth, terms associated with mental health are not present, as this is modern terminology, there is still an apparent awareness of the fact that Fāṭima would not be able to cope emotionally with her husband marrying again, as can be seen in Ibn Ḥajar’s explanation of Fāṭima no longer having anyone to confide in.

This Ḥadīth is key to understanding not only that women’s feelings of *ghayra* are natural and normalised in Islam, but that their feelings of *ghayra* should not be provoked or tested. This Ḥadīth demonstrates how the Prophet prevented his daughter from having to feel excessive forms of *ghayra*, and as Bukhārī has labelled this chapter, for her to be ‘treated justly’ (*Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī*) It therefore seems that Bukhārī associated fair and just treatment with the prevention of provoking feelings of *ghayra*. Thus, although *ghayra* is a natural feeling, it seems as though there is a

general encouragement for Muslims not to aggravate and provoke these feelings in another Muslim, male or female. Nonetheless, when one does experience these feelings regardless of gender, then this is not something to look down upon or see as negative.

5.15 Rereading honour Ḥadīth

On examining the texts, contexts and metatextual meanings of the modest sample of Ḥadīth that deploy the terms *ʿird* and *ghayra*, we can immediately appreciate that a particular conception of these terms can be derived from the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad. This conception varies from the usage we find within contemporary Muslim communities. Rather than a communal notion that calls for retribution to maintain its existence, the Prophetic usages of the term's emphasise suppressing one's feelings of anger and jealousy, individual accountability, and utilisation of honour as a means of increasing God consciousness and morality.

The Prophetic usage of the terms *ʿird* and *ghayra* can be utilised in reconceptualising notions of honour linked to these terms in contemporary Muslim communities. As I have previously mentioned, from the above analysis, we cannot see a clear link between *ghayra* in source texts and contemporary religious-cultural interpretations of what honour means and entails for individuals, couples, families, communities and networks. This discontinuity between source texts and normative honour practices and beliefs appears to exist in early Muslim communities, and within contemporary Muslim communities.

Regarding *ʿird*, we see, from just two Ḥadīth, how the term is complex and has multiple layers of meaning. The inferences regarding *ʿird* from the above Ḥadīth portray a notion highly contrary to contemporary usages. Two main conceptions of *ʿird* can be derived: 1. The prohibition of harming, impacting negatively or denigrating another Muslim's *honour* 2. A Muslim's actions may impact their own honour.

From the first conception, the blood, wealth, and honour of a Muslim are inviolable to other Muslims. The grouping of these three issues represents how one's honour is equated to their life (their blood) and how others should value and preserve it. Honour

is bestowed by God upon His creation and should be valued as a right from God. Unfortunately, Muslims today, particularly Muslim women, experience their honour being tarnished at the simplest act that the community or family *perceives* as a transgression. Alongside the stripping of this woman of her honour, her family (including male members) are also stripped of theirs unless they can compensate for this loss through HBV. These contemporary conceptions are problematic and conflicting with the notion of *ʿird* in the Ḥadīth. Patriarchal conceptions of honour have influenced Muslim men, and women, to effortlessly accuse other Muslims (predominantly women) and attempt to tarnish their honour. There appears to exist an ideology within which certain individuals believe that they can take the honour that God has bestowed on His creation away from them, due to actions and beliefs they deem as transgressions. However, the Ḥadīth emphasise how a Muslim's honour must be preserved, and not only by the individual who possess this honour, but by other individuals too. Therefore, questioning or attempting to tarnish someone's honour is a transgression itself against the Prophetic conception of honour. Indeed, if this is a right bestowed by God upon His creation then only God has a right to remove or alter this honour. He has not bestowed this right on any of His creation (see chapter 4).

Secondly, regarding the actions of a Muslim that may impact their honour, I argue only God has the right to alter the honour He has bestowed on His creation. In this conception of honour, we find that the burden of keeping one's honour intact is upon the individual. Not only does this dismantle contemporary conceptions of honour belonging to a family or to a community collectively (see chapter 2), limiting honour to each individual alone, but it further privatises honour between the individual and God. Furthermore, the emphasis of one staying away from unclear matters resulting in protection of religion and honour presents how honour is likened to one's religion. Additionally, the unclear matters that could be implied within this Ḥadīth are not limited to sexual transgressions, but any form of disobedience to God. Honour is not limited to sexual conduct and instead appears to be a broader moral conception through which one should aim to abide by all the limits set by God, as was apparent within chapter 4. The judgment of this is indeed by God alone. Honour is not a mechanism of policing the sexual conduct of Muslim women; it is a right bestowed by God upon His creation, intended to be a part of each individual's morality, guiding them away

from any form of transgression and towards obedience to God. It is gender inclusive and relates to an individual's relationship with the divine and with Islam in the broadest sense.

In contemporary Muslim communities we find that the concept of *ghayra*, although not meaning honour *per se*, is closely associated with honour and masculinity. According to Katz (2019, 203) within ḥadīth literature *ghayra* is a gendered emotion. Male *ghayra* is seen as a 'guarantor of social order' whilst female *ghayra* is 'petty marital irritants'. I disagree with this analysis. Instead the ḥadīth literature attempts to normalise female *ghayra* through emphasising *ghayra* as a gender-neutral emotion that is experienced by male and female believers. The contemporary limited association of *ghayra* to men is a major distortion of the Prophetic conception of *ghayra*. The linking of *ghayra* and honour, I argue is valid, although its contemporary association is flawed. Within contemporary Muslim communities *ghayra* is invoked in relation to sexual transgressions and the desire to police and control Muslim women and their sexuality. I argue this limits *ghayra* from its fullest capacity and reduces it to a patriarchal tool of manipulation.

Ghayra, in the Ḥadīth and commentaries, is an emotion: a feeling of anger or jealousy. However, this feeling does not only relate to sexual matters (as we saw in the Ḥadīth of Sa'ad) but also relates to one's general moral character and conduct (as we saw in the Ḥadīth concerning 'Umar b. al-Khaṭṭāb), feelings between spouses (as we saw in the Ḥadīth regarding the wives of the Prophet), and it is also a feeling that one should not wilfully provoke (as we saw in the Ḥadīth regarding Fāṭima). Although *ghayra* is portrayed as a natural feeling experienced by both men and women, there is an emphasis within the Ḥadīth for one to control one's *ghayra*, and to not test the limits of another's *ghayra*. *Ghayra*, should be a feeling experienced by one but not transformed into an action. Unfortunately, it is this transformation of *ghayra* into HBV that we find within contemporary Muslim communities today. The contemporary association of *ghayra* to masculinity, an ideology that clearly appears to have existed even during the life of the Prophet, greatly influences the transformation of the feeling of *ghayra* into actions of violence. I argue that the contemporary limiting of *ghayra* to men only is in clear contradiction to the Prophetic conception of *ghayra* and in direct

conflict with the *ghayra* of God. This natural feeling is experienced by an individual for a variety of reasons, not only in relation to sexual conduct.

This broader scope of *ghayra* can be appreciated through understanding the *ghayra* of God and the Prophet. Firstly, understanding that both God and the Prophet have *ghayra* presents this notion as far more complex than its contemporary conceptualisation and application. Focusing on the *ghayra* of the Prophet, we find that he only ever felt *ghayra* in relation to God and Islam. This takes *ghayra* away from personal feelings and non-religious matters and limits it to God and Islam. This links back to the concept of honour relating to *ʿird*. Just as honour above was discussed as a moral tool that an individual should use regarding their own morality, similarly *ghayra* should be felt in regard to one's own morality and one's connection with the divine. It seems to be, in the Prophetic form, a feeling that evokes a sense of respect and protectiveness of God and Islam. Of course, the Ḥadīth demonstrate cases when *ghayra* was experienced by companions in ways that were not directly connected to Islam or to God. But I argue this is *ghayra* at the basic level, which the Prophet encouraged one to not transform into an action. Thus, the second level is that of the Prophet Muhammad, the level Muslims should be aspiring to, in which *ghayra* does not relate to oneself or one's worldly interests, but instead is reserved for God and one's personal belief and association to Islam. At this level *ghayra* is a feeling that helps to guide a Muslim to protect their relationship with God. Again, I argue that this *ghayra* is personal between God and the believer.

The third level of *ghayra* is the greatest and that is the *ghayra* attributed to God. Ḥadīth relating to the *ghayra* of God dominated this topic and reveal how *ghayra* is not limited to the human domain but surpasses this to the divine domain. The *ghayra* of God, I argue, is exclusive to God and no human can claim to mirror this form of *ghayra*. Within the *ghayra* of God, as Ibn Ḥajar explains, we find that it is God's way of being stern and menacing towards His creation, to prevent them from transgressing from *His* limits. However, it is God *alone* who can intimidate His creation to move away from doing what He has made unlawful. Unfortunately, in many contemporary Muslim communities we find that men have afforded themselves the position of threatening and policing other Muslims' behaviour, especially that of women and girls. This, I argue, is a direct challenge to God's *ghayra* and an attempt to act in a manner that is

exclusive to God alone. Furthermore, acknowledging and acting in accordance with the beliefs that God's *ghayra* is the greatest and that all human forms of *ghayra* are equal, regardless of gender, and rank below that of God's, is in accordance with the ethical terms of *tawhīd* and the *tawhīdic* paradigm.

In the human realm of experience, *ghayra* is characterised in the classical sources as a feeling, an emotion, not exclusively related to sexuality or honour, but rather to a broad spectrum of issues. More importantly it is a religiously sanctioned feeling that can be experienced by any person, not exclusive to a single gender, a feeling that should make one hesitant to do what God has deemed unlawful, and a feeling that, even if felt for non-religious matters, should not transform into negative action. Rather, it should create reform within oneself and direct one towards being closer to the divine.

Finally, I have emphasised that throughout these Ḥadīth, those concerning both *ʿird* and *ghayra*, there is a sense of privatising honour to an individual. The status of an individual's honour is between God and an individual; it should have no impact on any other individual. Any supposed connection between honour in Islamic source texts and modern practices of HBV against or the oppression of women in the name of such honour is highly misconceived and runs entirely contrary to Prophetic teaching. The following Prophetic tradition from *Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim* underlines this vital point:

It has been narrated on the authority of Abu Huraira that the Messenger of Allah said: One who defected from obedience (to the Amir) and separated from the main body of the Muslims - if he died in that state - would die the death of one belonging to the days of Jahiliyya (i.e., would not die as a Muslim). One who fights under the banner of a people who are blind (to the cause for which they are fighting, i.e. do not know whether their cause is just or otherwise), who gets flared up with family pride, calls (people) to fight for their family honour, and supports his kith and kin (i.e. fights not for the cause of Allah but for the sake of this family or tribe) - if he is killed (in this fight), he dies as one belonging to the days of Jahiliyya. Whoso attacks my Ummah (indiscriminately) killing the righteous and the wicked of them, sparing not (even) those staunch in faith and fulfilling not his promise made with those who have been given

a pledge of security - he has nothing to do with me and I have nothing to do with him (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim online, book 33, chapter 13, Ḥadīth 1848).

The killing in the name of family or community honour (HBV), or due to kin or tribal loyalty, is contrary to the notion of honour outlined in key Islamic sources. These sources can be read as reforming and/or proscribing prevalent practices of HBV in pre-Islamic Arabia. Within this Ḥadīth we see that such practices, which regrettably persist in some contemporary Muslim communities, are associated by the Prophet himself with the period before the advent of Islamic social reform.

5.16 Conclusion

This chapter's selective analysis has demonstrated that honour terms do occur within Ḥadīth literature, and that there is clear and compelling scope to form an egalitarian – and ultimately private, anti-oppressive and anti-violent – conception of honour that is based on Prophetic teaching and usage. This notion differs greatly from the gender-biased, patriarchal conceptions that prevail in some of these communities. Not only is honour in the Qur'an and Ḥadīth not limited to sexuality, but it appears to be concerned with a more holistic moral outlook and self-accountability on the part of every Muslim.

The task of reconceptualising the notion of honour in the light of Prophetic literature and guidance is an urgent exigency of our times, and this chapter demonstrates that there is much potential and further work to be done within this field by academics, activists, religious scholars and perhaps also policymakers guided by sensitive scholarship and research on this topic. Honour broadly conceived is indeed an important aspect of Prophetic guidance, which sets out a set of notions around honour that are in essence equally empowering for Muslims of all genders. This Prophetic guidance – which directly challenges discrimination against women in the name of honour and dismisses the obsession over women's sexuality on the part of men who wrongly see themselves as the guardians of this honour – should be harnessed to reform contemporary practices in line with, and in the light of, the above-demonstrated egalitarian values underlying the conceptualisation of honour in foundational religious texts. For a concept of honour does indeed exist in Islamic teachings, but it is one that has been widely distorted in patriarchal communities with disastrous and deeply harmful consequences.

Moving on from an examination of honour in the Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth literature, it is important to understand the utilisation of these sources. Although the Qur'an and Ḥadīth set out a concept of honour, it is vital to analyse *how* these notions have been used or incorporated in the formation of law. To arrive at a clear comprehension of how honour had been transformed from the authoritative sources of Islam to present day uses and conceptions, my analysis of honour will now progress to honour and its meanings, values, and applications within an Islamic tool of jurisprudence namely *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*.

Chapter 6: Honour and *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah*

6.1 Introduction

Islamic jurisprudence although secondary to the Qur'an and *sunna*, influences and informs contemporary normative Muslim practices and ideologies. This chapter will examine key relevant features of Islamic jurisprudence to critique its impact on Muslim women today. Islamic jurisprudence is the field of knowledge encompassing the formation of *fiqh* by tools known as *uṣūl al-fiqh*. This discipline is in simple terms the interpretation of *sharī'ah* as deduced from primary sources of authority to formulate legal rulings in response to the needs and issues arising in the Muslim community. The development, formulation, and deduction of the legal injunctions, derived from the primary sources, was an endeavour dominated by male jurists in the early centuries of Islam. The absence of women during the formation and development of this science has resulted in negative implications for Muslim women today. Furthermore, the dominant belief in Muslim communities today, that Islamic jurisprudence and *fiqh* are absolute, and representative of the intent of the primary sources free of any subjectivity or biases, has further led to male-centred interpretations of the primary sources being adopted as if they were the primary sources themselves. *Uṣūl al-fiqh* developed over time as a set of tools, which described foundational principles of law and were formalised over a course of time, through broad consensus. Within the field of Islamic jurisprudence *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* (objectives, intents, goals, etc. of Islamic law), unlike *uṣūl al-fiqh*, did not become the prevailing methodology to develop law. As such it occupies a shadow presence, the value of which has been discussed by scholars. However, it did not develop into a key framework, nor an ethical value system to govern *sharī'ah*.

The vastness of the field of Islamic jurisprudence, will not permit an examination of the concept of honour in the whole of the discipline. Rather than selecting certain rulings for critique, to ascertain whether honour concepts had an impact on their formation, I intend to examine *maqāṣid*, broadly-speaking, as there is a definable notion of honour prevalent within this subject area. Examining *maqāṣid*, as will become clear throughout this chapter, helps to reveal the conceptions of honour that existed in the premodern period, and represents the juristic concern about honour as a concept. The

focus on *maqāṣid* is relevant to the possible formation of new frameworks and methodologies to contextualise legal rulings and challenge the negative implications of honour concepts for Muslim women today.

In the contemporary era there is increased focus of the subject of *maqāṣid*, and a realisation that it could offer a particularly useful mode of addressing the contemporary needs and concerns of Muslim communities. Within the contemporary effort is underway amongst reformist scholars and feminists to re-examine the field of jurisprudence, and to reopen the doors of *ijtihād* (independent reasoning) to arrive at contextually relevant and egalitarian conceptions of law through utilising the frameworks of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*. It is within this context that I limit my focus in the present chapter to honour in relation to this particular branch of legal knowledge, values and reasoning known as *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah* (I will shorten this term to *maqāṣid* henceforth and in instances when the singular term *maqṣad* is relevant I will retain use of the plural *maqāṣid*). An examination of *maqāṣid* will allow for the critique of existing formulations of legal rulings that are not relevant to, or are problematic, for contemporary Muslim communities and more importantly conflict with the worldview of the Qurʾan.

This chapter will examine how the concept of honour derived from the primary sources, possibly transformed to its contemporary formulation, through analysing its existence in one specific area of jurisprudence: *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah*. It will present how this concept was one that the jurists disputed over despite it being based on the Qurʾanic text. What will become clear is that early conceptions of the notion of honour were not as restrictive in terms of their meanings and associations with concepts such as sexuality, as they have become in contemporary times. However, in terms of the treatment of Muslim women, legal ideals and texts are not enough to reveal the reality of lived histories. Therefore, this chapter presents the conceptions of honour concerning women in the field of *maqāṣid* and through two legal rulings of *qadhḥ* and *liʿan*. (*Qadhḥ* and *liʿan* are two legal rulings deduced from the Qurʾanic text that some pre-modern jurists based their inclusion of the honour *maqāṣid* on. These will be discussed in more detail in the coming sections). It cannot be claimed that these legal ideals were acted upon and formed the historical realities of pre-modern Muslim communities. The answers to this would be established through an

examination of social histories of pre-modern Muslim communities; however, that is beyond the capacity of this research.

This chapter will begin by exploring *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* and how they were utilised in the pre-modern period. It will then identify the existence of a notion of honour in early understandings of *maqāṣid* and analyse the impact of these upon Muslim women. It will examine the advancement of *maqāṣid* in the contemporary period examining why and how there is an increasing emphasis on this theme of jurisprudence. I will analyse both pre-modern and modern conceptions of honour as a *maqāṣid*. Finally, I will examine whether *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* can be utilised to reconceptualise the concept of honour in Islam, and how this can ultimately be used to challenge gender-biased legal ideologies and practices to improve the lives of Muslim women in contemporary Muslim communities.

6.2 What is Maqāṣid al-sharī'ah?

Maqāṣid al-sharī'ah can be defined as the objectives, purposes, intents, principles, or goals of Islamic law. 'For a number of Islamic legal theorists, it is an alternative expression to 'people's interests' (*masālih*).' (Auda, 2008, 3). *Maṣlaḥah* (pl. *Maṣāliḥ*) can be understood as the realisation of benefit, which is also the underlying value of the *maqāṣid*. According to Kamali (1999) the terms *maṣāliḥ* and *maqāṣid* have been used interchangeably by the scholars, and some contemporary scholars use both terms because of the overlap in their meanings. *Maqāṣid* can be seen as a pivotal theme of Islamic jurisprudence. They are variously addressed as a subject, a theory and at times as a set of principles (Manzur-E-Elahi and Osmani 2011). *Maqāṣid* are primarily found within and extrapolated from the Qur'anic text and *sunna* within which they may be explicitly mentioned. At other times scholars may use *ijtihād* (independent reasoning) based on rulings from within the Qur'an and *sunna* to bring forward *maqāṣid* that may not be explicitly stated (Al-Raysuni, 2005). Fundamentally, *maqāṣid* are the wisdoms behind legal rulings. *Maqāṣid* can also be seen as an 'umbrella term'; as Adis Duderija (2014 a, 2) highlights, it has been connected to many other terms in premodern scholarly works such as '...public interests (*al maṣāliḥ al-āmmah*) and unrestricted interests (*al-maṣāliḥ al-mursala*), as well as other principles such as *istiḥsān* (juridical preference),

istiḥsāb (presumption of continuity), and avoidance of mischief (*maḥṣada*)...'. According to Jasser Auda (2014), there are roughly two main schools in terms of how *maqāṣid* are understood and utilised. The first school consider that the correct application of the *sharī'ah* will lead to *maqāṣid* occurring in society. The second school reasons that the *maqāṣid* come before the application of the *sharī'ah* and guide the application of *sharī'ah* in society. As will become apparent in the following, it is the second school of thought that seems to lead the way to a comprehensive and reformist approach to *maqāṣid* in Islamic law in ways that will benefit contemporary Muslim communities.

The *sharī'ah* is grounded in the protection and facilitation of what is beneficial to individuals and communities. Kamali (2008, 2) expresses how the Qur'an is clear on its objectives in favour of creation. The Qur'an is expressive of the objective, rationale, purpose, and benefit of many of its commands and injunctions (Kamali, 2008, 3). This is clear through several examples he presents such as the command for *wuḍū* (ablution) for which the Qur'anic text presents the rationale of 'God does not intend to inflict hardship on you. He intends cleanliness for you and to accomplish His favour upon you' (5:6). We find that both the Qur'an and *sunna* are expressive of the justification and intent behind laws concerning both civil matters (*mu'āmalāt*) and acts of devotion (*'ibādāt*). Consequently, identifying the objectives of Islamic legal rulings and ensuring that the intent and objectives of the law are maintained is central to all civil and devotional acts in the normative Islamic legal framework.

Despite the purpose or objectives of laws being evident within the Qur'anic text, during the early stages of the development of Islamic legal thought, the classification of the *maqāṣid*, which will be discussed in the following pages, did not develop until the 5th Islamic century (Auda, 2008, 17). It was not until the 8th Islamic century that we find the topic of *maqāṣid* developing further from its preliminary understandings. Auda (2016) argues that in the present, *maqāṣid* have still not fully developed into a discipline but it is slowly becoming one. I now present the key aspects of what *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* are.

Traditionally *maqāṣid* have been categorised into three levels:

1. essentials or necessities (*ḍarūriyyāt*)

2. complementary benefits or needs (*hājīyyāt*)
3. embellishments or luxuries (*taḥsīniyyāt*) (Audua, 2008, 4; Kamali, 2008, 3).

The category of *ḍarūriyyāt* concerns those matters that are essential for a normal functioning society inclusive of the survival and wellbeing of its individuals. These are deemed essential to such an extent that without them there would be ‘...chaos and collapse of normal order in society.’ (Kamali, 2008, 4). *ḍarūriyyāt* aim to protect five key areas that are considered essential for meaningful human existence: faith (*al-dīn*), life (*an-nafs*), lineage (*al-nasl* or *al-nasb*) which is sometimes referred to as family, intellect (*al-‘aql*) and property (*al-māl*), which refers to the economic wealth needed for one to live on. According to Auda (2008), some jurists also included a sixth necessity, ‘the preservation of honour’ (*al-irḍ*), which is sometimes translated as dignity.

The next category, *hājīyyāt*, is deemed as not as necessary for a normal functioning society as *ḍarūriyyāt*. These are classed as those matters of benefit which can bring ease or remove hardship; however, the hardships they aim to remove are not a threat to normal societal order or individual survival (Kamali, 2008, 4-5). Examples of these include ‘...marriage, trade and transportation’ (Auda, 2008, 5). Matters in this category can become deemed essentials (*ḍarūriyyāt*) if they concern society at large (Kamali, 2008).

The final category is *taḥsīniyyāt* which is essentially luxuries that Islamic law encourages and values, or as Kamali (2008, 5) explains, they are matters that ‘seek to attain refinement and perfection in customs and conduct of people at all levels of achievement’. However, they are not a high priority in life. Examples of this can include a beautiful home, dressing oneself beautifully etc. Despite the categorisation of three separate levels of *maqāṣid*, Auda (2008) stresses that the three levels overlap and interrelate to such an extent that the higher levels also serve the levels below them.

In terms of conflicting interests, it is always those within the lower categories that will be sacrificed for a higher priority *maqāṣid*. Furthermore, ‘when there is a plurality of

conflicting interests and none appears to be clearly preferable, then prevention of evil takes priority over the realisation of benefit' (Kamali 2008, 5).

Maqāṣid can also be classified as general purposes (*al-maqāṣid al-‘āmmah*) which are seen as broad comprehensive aims of Islam and the *sharī‘ah*, or particular goals (*al-maqāṣid al-khāssah*): those relating to specific themes or subject matters such as family laws, financial matters (Kamali, 2008, 6). Another categorisation mentioned by Kamali (2008, 6) relating to the source of the *maqāṣid*. Definitive goals (*al-maqāṣid al-qat’iyyah*) are clearly stated in the Qur’an or *sunna* ‘...such as the protection of property and honor of individuals, administration of justice, right to financial support among close relatives and the like...’ (Kamali, 2008, 6). Those objectives that are not supported by evidence within the primary sources are therefore called speculative purposes (*al-maqāṣid al-ẓanniyyah*) and these are seen as having less importance than definitive goals and are disagreed upon (Kamali, 2008, 6).

A broader discussion of how *maqāṣid* are prioritised and identified would be immensely wide-ranging, and beyond the scope of this research project. Moreover, there is abundant research that can be located to explore *maqāṣid* in more detail (please consult Al-Raysuni (2005), Auda (2008, 2014, 2016), Kamali (1999, 2001, 2003, 2008)).

6.3 The necessity of the *maqāṣid*

The practice of deducing objectives and goals of legal rulings is a practice that is embedded within the Qur’anic text, as I have mentioned above. God presents the objectives and purposes behind legal rulings. The *sharī‘ah* is intended to fulfil certain purposes and to seek out these purposes and objectives in line with the Qur’anic style of reasoning legal injunctions. As such, the companions, albeit not in this later developed terminology, sought out *maqāṣid* from legal rulings (Kamali, 2008). It was therefore natural for the discipline to form. The concern for the objectives and rationales of legal rulings has always been present in this sense. If anything, the emphasis has varied throughout Islamic history. *Maqāṣid* never became formalised as a system to guide Islamic law. Thus, although important *maqāṣid* never become central. This can also be understood when looking into the emphasis on more literalist and legalistic tools and modes of Islamic law. *Maqāṣid* being more concerned with the

philosophy and ethics/ morals of legal rulings was not emphasised. We can appreciate this more in the contemporary era, where feminists and reformists are now calling for a reform of literalist approaches and instead are emphasising the spirit of the law over the letter. They emphasise the spirit of the law over literal applications that do not focus on the philosophy of the ruling.

It is *maqāṣid* that can pave the way for contemporary Muslims to truly appreciate the rationale, ethos, and purpose of Islamic laws. In uncovering these objectives of the Qur'anic text, Muslims can draw closer to understandings and applications of the legal aspects of Islam that are fully embedded within the Qur'anic world view.

6.4 Historical/ early uses of *maqāṣid*

To understand the contemporary potential of honour in *maqāṣid*, a brief review of its historical development is relevant. Despite the objectives and rationale of commandments and rulings being presented throughout the Qur'anic text and thus being a norm embedded within the Qur'an, the topic of objectives of the *sharī'ah* was not afforded a significant position in the early periods of Islamic jurisprudential development. It was not until the 5th century of Islamic history that *maqāṣid* began to be classified, and it took until a few centuries later for these ideas to develop further.

During the formative period of Islamic jurisprudence, *maqāṣid* was not an emphasised theme of jurisprudence in contrast to other developed tools, and as Kamali (2008, 9) stresses, its mention cannot be found in major early textbooks on jurisprudence. This was mainly due to *maqāṣid* concerning the philosophy of law whereas 'Islamic legal thought is broadly speaking, preoccupied with concerns over conformity to the letter of the divine text, and the legal theory of *uṣūl al-fiqh* has advanced that purpose to a large extent' (Kamali, 2008, 9). Kamali (2008) stresses that *uṣūl al-fiqh* has allowed for a literalist approach to law to be emphasised, resulting in the ethical intent of the law not to be centred. This was evident in chapter 4 within Qur'anic commentaries where we saw honour being emphasised in legal terms rather than being analysed in holistic ethical terms. It was this textualist tradition of the first few centuries that did not afford *maqāṣid* much consideration and thus it was not until the time of scholars such as al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111) and al-Shātibī (d.790/1388) that we see *maqāṣid* developing significantly (Kamali, 2008, 9). This is not to say

that *maqāṣid* was rejected by earlier scholars; rather, it never became central in mainstream juristic thought (Kamali, 2008).

In terms of the development of *maqāṣid al-sharīʿah* earlier scholars had mentioned the *maqāṣid* in their scholarly works (Al-Raysuni, 2011, 5-45; Kamali, 2008, 10). Some of the scholars they mentions are as follows: al-Ḥakīm al-Tirmidhī, Abū Manṣūr al-Māturīdī (d.333/944), al-Bāqillānī (d.403/1112), Abū al-Maʿālī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbd Allāh al-Juwaynī (d.478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d.505/1111), Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.606/1209). The details of their contributions and theorisations of *maqāṣid* are available in a plethora of research that covers the history and development of *maqāṣid* (please consult al-Raysuni, 2011; Kamali, 1999, 2008; Auda, 2014, 2016).

The main contributions that have been highlighted as significant in the development of *maqāṣid* are those by scholars such as al-Juwaynī (d.478/1085), al-Ghazālī (d.505/1111) and al-Shātibī (d. 790/1388). I present here a summary of their major contributions to the subject.

Al-Juwaynī (d.478/1085) is known for his prominent work concerning *uṣūl al-fiqh*. He greatly influenced the work of al-Ghazālī (d.505/1111) who according to al-Raysuni (2005, 12) despite becoming more renowned and distinct from his *shaykh* ‘...the first of al-Ghazālī’s works on the subject of *uṣūl al-fiqh*, namely, *al-Mankhūl*, nevertheless consists of nothing but faithful summaries of al-Juwaynī’s views’. In terms of *maqāṣid*, al-Juwaynī is known to have had a revolutionary role in the subject area. In his book *al-Burhān*, he specifically uses terms such as *maqāṣid*, *al-maqṣūd*, *al-qāṣd*, and *gharaḍ* to highlight the purpose of various matters (al-Raysuni, 2005, 12). One of al-Juwaynī’s major contributions to the subject of *maqāṣid* is his five categories of legal bases which he reduced to three categories of the Lawgiver’s objectives: essentials, needs and enhancements (al-Raysuni, 2005; Auda, 2008; Kamali 2008). It is these three categories that are still generally accepted and endorsed. Further, it was al-Juwaynī who first mentioned five values which he placed in the category of essentials: ‘religion, human life, the faculty of reason, progeny, and wealth.’ (al-Raysuni, 2005, 16). However, according to Crane (2018, 168), it was al-Juwaynī’s student al-Ghazālī, who standardised the five essentials of *maqāṣid*.

Al-Juwaynī's student Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazālī although greatly influenced by the work of his teacher, did not refrain from revising, amending, and developing his ideas further. It was al-Ghazālī who organized Al-Juwaynī's proposed 5 essentials in the following order: 1. Faith, 2. Soul, 3. Mind, 4. Offspring, and 5. Wealth (Auda, 2008). He further coined the term *al-ḥifẓ* (preservation) as applying to each of these essentials. Al-Ghazālī focused on the purpose of legal rulings through the lens of the benefit they could bring or the harm they could prevent. According to al-Raysuni (2005, 21), 'the steps which al-Ghazālī took and the principles which he refined and clarified with respect to the objectives of Islamic Law came to define the parameters for the *uṣūliyyūn* who succeeded him until the time of Imam al-Shāṭibī, who represents the third turning point in the history of *uṣūl al-fiqh*'.

Al-Shāṭibī's (d. 790 AH/1388) contribution to the field of *maqāṣid* can be appreciated through his work *Al-Muwāfaqāt fī Usūl al-Sharī'a*. Al-Shāṭibī delves into crucial aspects of Islamic hermeneutics and the contention that exists between text and reality (al-Shāṭibī, 2015 vol 2). In terms of *maqāṣid*, he utilised the same terminology as al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī (Auda, 2008). An important contribution by al-Shāṭibī to the field relates to how *maqāṣid* can be identified. *Maqāṣid*, through a textualist approach are generally understood to be identified through clear text, command, and prohibitions (Kamali 2008). Al-Shāṭibī also affirmed the need to utilise explicit injunctions from within the Qur'an, which is unanimous amongst scholars, however, he emphasised 'that adherence to the obvious text should not be so rigid as to alienate the rationale and purpose of the text from its words and sentences' (Kamali, 2008, 13). He thus went further and stated that induction (*istiqrā'*) is one of the central methods in identifying the *maqāṣid*. Al-Shāṭibī also broadened the scope of benefits (*maṣāliḥ*) to include all those benefits '...pertaining to this world and the hereafter, those of the individual and the community, material, moral and spiritual, and those which pertain to the present as well as the future generations' (Kamali, 2008, 14). Ibn Ashur highlights 'al-Shāṭibī as having epistemologically and methodologically restructured *usūl* by centring the topic of *maqāṣid* in relation to all aspects of *usūl al-fiqh* (El-Mesawi, 2018, 59).

Looking at the overall premodern development on *maqāṣid* we find that the scholars of *maqāṣid* came to the realisation that not all *maqāṣid* can be located in the Qur'an

or *sunna*. *Maqāṣid* within these two sources cannot form a conclusive list. This is known through the works of the early scholars of *maqāṣid* who identified *maqāṣid* through *ijtihād*, such as al-Juwaynī and al-Ghazālī, who were the first to emphasise five essential objectives. A key observation, however, made by Duderija (2014 a, 3) presents how the majority of premodern scholars ‘...restricted the scope of *maqāṣid* to those falling outside the realm of ‘*ibādāt* (*worship* rites) and some explicit and unambiguous Qur’ān-*Sunna* injunctions (*muqadarāt*) such as the *fāra’id* of inheritance, and the (corporal) punishments *hudūd*’. Nevertheless, there were scholars, whom Duderija (2014 a) describes as ‘dissenting voices’, who went beyond this restrictive approach. Amongst these scholars, we find the names of Najmal-Din Al-Tufi (d.716AH), al-Ghāzālī (d.1111 AH), and Al-Shātībī (d. 790 AH). Yet, the subject of *maqāṣid* and philosophy of Islamic law did not have any substantial impact on Islamic law because these minority voices, as Duderija (2014a) emphasises, were not popular and appeared too late into the development of the Islamic legal tradition.

6.5 Modern use of and emphasis of *maqāṣid*

In the contemporary period, we find that *maqāṣid* has become a central theme in many reformists’ scholarly works. Auda (2008, 23) emphasises that a *maqāṣid-based* approach is more relevant now than ever before in the modern period, and it is a ‘methodology from “within” Islamic scholarship that addresses the Islamic mind and Islamic concerns’. *Maqāṣid* has begun to be seen as a means of reforming legal theory and the formation of legal rulings in a manner that is both conscious of evolving Muslim context and lived realities, alongside the intent or spirit of the law. It is a method that is seen as a part of traditional jurisprudence, though one that allows for conceptions and formation of legal rulings that are relevant to Muslims and their needs in the contemporary era. I now briefly explore contemporary efforts to utilise *maqāṣid* to uncover how the *maqāṣid* discourse has continued to develop and inform Muslim thought and to demonstrate why my research has selected *maqāṣid* as a means of utilising reconceptualised notions of honour within Islamic thought and the Islamic legal sphere.

There are innumerable contemporary scholars who endorse a *maqāṣid* approach within their research. Scholars such as Ibn Ashur (2006), Kamali (2008), al-Raysuni, Auda (2008), Qaradawi (see Duderija, 2014 a), Zainab Alwani (2014), Scott Siraj al-

Haqq Kugle (2010) and many others are centralising *maqāṣid* in their attempts to reform Islamic legal theory and laws that they see as based on static, legalistic approaches that are divorced from the broader ethical intent and message of the primary sources. Now I therefore present the main conceptualisation of *maqāṣid* of a select number of contemporary scholars to highlight the direction *maqāṣid* is now taking.

According to Crane (2018, 164) Ibn Ashur's 20th century work *Treatise on Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah* 'marked the first serious attention given by Muslims in the Sunnī world to normative Islam in six hundred years'. The earlier attempts of scholars, to broaden the scope of *maqāṣid*, can be seen to have continued with more force in the modern period by reformist scholars such as Rashid Rida (d. 1935) who incorporated women's rights in his approach; Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.1996) who emphasised justice and freedom as essential *maqāṣid*; Yusuf al-Qaradawi who extended the list of *maqāṣid* to include social welfare and support (*al-takāful*), freedom, human dignity, and human fraternity among the higher objectives and *maqāṣid* of the Shari'ah' (Kamali, 2008, 12). Ibn Ashur added '...equality, freedom, and orderliness...' in his conception of universal *maqāṣid* etc. (Duderija, 2014 a, 6). We find that contemporary *maqāṣid* scholarship is not only building upon premodern *maqāṣid* methodologies but is expanding its scope and according to Duderija (2014 a6), '...in fewer cases, elevates hermeneutically these approaches above the clear nuṣūṣ (texts) found in the Qur'ān and Sunna'. These attempts to broaden the scope of *maqāṣid* also reveal how reformist scholars are not unified in the manner they conceptualise or engage with the subject of *maqāṣid* and that the subject is still developing (Duderija, 2014 a). 'We find the scope of *maqāṣid* being extended from the five key essentials to a broad list of varying objectives and rationales.

Despite *maqāṣid* being rooted in the Qur'an and *sunna*, they go beyond these texts in terms of 'the general philosophy and objectives' of injunctions found within them (Kamali, 2008, 24). Kamali (2008, 24) asserts that 'by comparison to the legal theory of the sources, the Uṣūl al-Fiqh, *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* are not burdened with methodological technicality and literalist reading of the text'. The utilisation of *maqāṣid* allows for flexibility and reading of the *sharī'ah* that can adapt to the

changing times and circumstances. He argues 'at a time when some of the important doctrines of *Uṣūl al-Fiqh* such as general consensus (*ijmā'*), analogical reasoning (*qiyās*) and even *ijtihād* seem to be burdened with difficult conditions, conditions that might stand in a measure of disharmony with the prevailing socio-political climate of the present-day Muslim countries, the *maqāṣid* have become the focus of attention as it tends to provide a ready and convenient access to the *Sharī'ah*' (Kamali, 1999, 206).

My discussion of the contemporary direction *maqāṣid* is taking has been brief because I have only intended to present an overview. I will discuss more specific examples of contemporary efforts that relate to honour in the coming sections. However, it can be appreciated, from the above, that *maqāṣid* are being utilised as a means of addressing many contemporary issues in Muslim communities and is further a method of critiquing and reforming existing laws to develop laws that are more contextually relevant and in harmony with the Qur'an's broader ethical/moral framework. Many new universal *maqāṣid* such as human rights, equality, freedom, women's rights, fair treatment etc. are being proposed by contemporary scholars (Auda, 2008). My recourse to *maqāṣid* for examining conceptions of honour in contemporary Muslim communities is thus logical and appropriate. However, despite contemporary efforts to advance a *maqāṣid* approach, which would allow room for a reconceptualisation of honour, as will become clear in the following, a notion of honour was already being considered in relation to *maqāṣid* in the pre-modern period. A *maqāṣid* approach is consequently one that is not only relevant to our present-day conceptualisations of honour but was arguably relevant before the modern period.

6.6 Honour as a *maqāṣid*: pre-modern scholars

As I have mentioned earlier honour (*ird*) was included by some scholars as one of the essential/necessary *maqāṣid*, bringing the usual category from five to six essentials. Kamali (2008, 7) in his categorisation of definitive and speculative goals included 'honour of individuals' as a definitive goal (*al-maqāṣid al-qat'iyyah*), as clearly referred to in the Qur'an and *sunna*. From the previous chapters on the Qur'an and Ḥadīth (Chapter 4 and 5) it is clear a concept of honour is present within the primary sources. Moreover, an analysis of the various references to honour terms within the primary sources reflects a conception or notion of honour constructed by God and His messenger that can be read as wide-ranging in implication and application and gender

neutral. Yet, there does not appear to be agreement by scholars on the inclusion of honour in the list of essential *maqāṣid*. In this section I aim to highlight some scholars and jurists who did include honour as an essential *maqāṣid*. I then aim to examine why they included honour and their understanding of honour (specifically *irḍ'*), as well as the actual and potential implications of their usage.

Scholar	Date of death	Contemporary scholars who mention them as including honour	Contemporary scholars who mention them as not including honour
al-Āmirī	381/991	Auda	
al-Juwaynī	478/1085	Auda	
al-Ghazālī	505/1111	Auda	Al-Raysuni
al-Qarāfī	684/1285	Ramadan, Kamali	Al-Raysuni
Najm al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī	716/1316	Crane	Al-Raysuni
'Ibn al-Subkī	771/1369	Kamali, Al-Raysuni	
al-Shātībī	790/1388	Auda	Al-Raysuni
al-Shawkānī	1250/1834	Kamali, Al-Raysuni	

Table 5

Certain scholars acknowledged honour as a separate category of essential *maqāṣid* (the sixth category), whereas others included it within one of the existing five essentials due to their definitions of honour. Generally, honour was eventually acknowledged by some scholars within the theory of *maqāṣid*. However, it was the understanding of what honour related to and whether it required a separate categorisation or whether it fitted into existing categories, and what level of *maqāṣid* it related to, that scholars who did include honour seem to disagree upon. According to Kamali (2008, 11) the inclusion of honour (*irḍ'*) 'was initially thought to have been

covered under lineage (*al-nasl*, also *al-nasb*)...' however, those who advocated for its inclusion into a separate essential 'relied on the fact that the Shari'ah had enacted a separate *ḥadd* (a set of punishments enunciated in the Qur'an and *Sunna*) punishment for slanderous accusation (*al-qadhf*), which justified this addition' (the *ḥadd* punishment will be discussed further in the following section).

Al-Raysuni (2005) mentions various scholars who included honour (*'ird*) as a sixth essential. He (2005, 28) mentions 'Ibn al-Subkī (d.771/1369) as saying, 'that which may be deemed essential includes the preservation of religion, human life, the faculty of reason, family lineage, material wealth, and honor'. In his *al-Muṣannaf*, Najm al-Dīn ibn 'Abd al-Qawī al-Ṭūfī (d. 716/1316) is highlighted to have also added honour. However, according to Al-Raysuni (2004, 28), upon examining the grammatical composition of his list it appears that honour is included as a part of the category of wealth or property and not as an essential *maqāṣid* itself. Yet according to Crane (2018, 168) the preservation of honour as a *maqāṣid* was emphasised by al-Ṭūfī.

There is further mentioning of honour as a sixth essential by the Mālikī jurist al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285). However according to al-Raysuni (2005) this is more of an acknowledgment of others who included honour as the sixth rather than al-Qarāfī including it himself. Interestingly Tariq Ramadan (2012) does mention al-Qarāfī (d. 684/1285) as adding honour (*'ird*) to his list of essential *maqāṣid*. Similarly Kamali (2008, 11) also states that al-Qarāfī added the protection of honour (*al-'ird*) as a sixth *maqāṣid*. Similarly, to al-Raysuni, Kamali (2008) also presents honour being endorsed as a *maqāṣid* by ibn al-Subkī (d.771/1370) and later by al-Shawkānī (d.1250/1834).

Al-Shawkānī is said to have highlighted the inclusion of the sixth category of honour by jurists in his work (Hallaq, 2018, 128). Al-Raysuni (2005, 28) presents the defence of al-Shawkānī who states:

Some later scholars added a sixth, namely, the preservation of people's honor. Most sensible people would be willing to give up their lives and their wealth before they would be willing to give up their honor...The Law has established a penalty for assaulting someone's honor through

slander and, indeed, one's honor is more worthy of preservation than anything else. A person might be willing to pardon someone who had assaulted his physical person or his material possessions, but you would hardly find anyone who would be willing to pardon someone who had assaulted his honor. Thus someone has said: *It is a small thing for our bodies to be afflicted so long as our honor and our minds are spared.*

From al-Shawkānī's explanation, we can appreciate the role honour may have played within his historical-cultural context. Honour is emphasised as of more importance than wealth and even life. He further presents his reasoning for including honour as being due to the *ḥadd* punishment for slander (*qadhf*). The final few sentences of al-Shawkānī's statement sheds light on how honour may have possibly been conceived in the lives of ordinary Muslims. The emphasis appears to be on how everything is pardonable and endurable except an assault on one's honour. We can appreciate the weight an ideology of honour held in some pre-modern Muslim societies. Despite differences of opinion amongst the scholars, there does seem to be an acknowledgment here of honour ideologies and practices within their communities. Although I do not explore social histories as such in this chapter due to the limitations of space, such an examination would be valuable in shedding light on the tension and complexities that exist between the text, spirit of the law and how *sharī'ah* was operationalised and Islamic law practised in the lives of Muslims. We can predict that discrepancies existed in the way honour was conceptualised and emphasised in the lives of Muslims and their legal textual sources.

Auda (2008, 24) mentions that preservation of honour was included as an essential/necessary *maqāṣid* by al-Ghazālī and al-Shātibī, something al-Raysuni does not mention for either scholar. Yet al-Raysuni (2005, 142) cites al-Shātibī mentioning 'preservation of honor, if it is counted amongst the essentials, has its origin in the Qur'an and is further clarified in the *sunna* through the provision pertaining to *li'an* and *qadhf*'. It therefore seems that al-Shātibī does acknowledge honour as a *maqāṣid*. However, the disagreement he comments on concerns which level of *maqāṣid* honour occupies. Likewise, al-Raysuni does not mention honour as a *maqāṣid* in his brief accounts of the contributions of al-Āmirī and al-Juwaynī. However, Auda (2008, 24) mentions that expressions relating to the preservation of

honour ‘...were also preceded by al-‘Āmirī’s ‘punishment’ for ‘breaching honor’ and al-Juwaynī’s ‘protection of honor’. We can appreciate that there is a lack of clarity in terms of how and which scholars included honour as a *maqāṣid*. What is clear though, honour was a part of the development of the subject of *maqāṣid* and most jurists who did include honour deemed it as having its origins in the Qur’an and *sunna*.

6.7 Honour as a *maqāṣid*: modern scholars

In terms of modern scholarly developments in the field of *maqāṣid* and specifically concerning honour, we find that the position of honour is still disagreed upon for example, by scholars such as Ibn Ashur and al-Raysuni, a Moroccan jurist, who both disagree with the inclusion of honour as a sixth category of essential *maqāṣid*. Ibn Ashur (d. 1973), a scholar of reform and a Maliki jurist concerned with the reform of Islamic education and jurisprudence, ‘...is widely considered to be a leading voice of Islamic reform in the first half of the twentieth century’ (Ben Ismail, 2022). In his *Treatise on Maqāṣid al-Sharī‘ah*, he argued that the preservation of honour (*‘ird*) is not an essential *maqāṣid* (*ḍarūriyyāt*) but rather a complementary benefit or need (*ḥājīyyāt*) (2006, 123). He argued that scholars such as the pre-modern classical scholar al-Subkī in his *Jam’ al-Jawāmī* only included honour as an essential *maqāṣid* due to the severe *ḥadd* punishment imposed by the *sharī‘ah* for slander (*qadhf*). He further argued:

We do not, however, see any necessary correlation between what is indispensable and that whose violation incurs the *ḥadd* penalty. This was most likely the reason why al-Ghazālī and Ibn al-Hājib did not classify the preservation of honor in the *ḍarūrī* category. This kind of *ḍarūrī* is rarely dealt with in the Shari’ah because human beings have taken care of it by themselves from time immemorial and it has thus become deeply ingrained in their nature. No civilized human society can be found that does not care about it (Ibn Ashur, 2006, 123).

Thus, Ibn Ashur (2006) includes honour within the category of complementary benefits and needs (*ḥājīyyāt*). Although its preservation is in the interests and needs of the community, he argues that neglecting the preservation of honour will not cause a collapse in social order. Instead, the most it will lead to is society not functioning well.

He thus asserts, 'the protection of honor, which means the protection of people's honor from being offended and tarnished, belongs to the category of ḥājī, so that people refrain from offending one another by even the slightest means, such as speech' (Ibn Ashur, 2006, 124). He further argues that it is something 'human beings have taken care of by themselves...and it has thus become deeply ingrained in their nature' (2006, 123). However, arguably, within contemporary Muslim communities the only ingrained conceptions of honour that exist are negative and gender-biased against Muslim women. Would it therefore not be necessary to have a conception of honour further developed and advanced in a methodology such a *maqāṣid* to prevent it from being misconstrued and utilised as a means of oppressing Muslim women?

Ibn Ashur's position on honour as a *maqāṣid* relates to his questioning of whether *ḥadd* punishments are centred on the protection of necessary/essential *maqāṣid*. Or furthermore '...are these penalties the only criteria of what is universal necessity?' (El-Mesawi, 2018, 75). El-Mesawi (2018) highlights how for most classical jurists this was the case, that *ḥadd* punishments indicated the essentiality of the objective they were based on. However, Ibn Ashur disagreed with this correlation and argued that *ḥadd* punishments are not exclusively related to essential *maqāṣid*. Rather, they can be linked to *maqāṣid* at the other levels. It is here we see how the severity of the *ḥadd* punishment of *qadhf* led to some scholars including the protection of honour (*ḥifz al-ʿird*) as an essential *maqāṣid*. But, because Ibn Ashur does not see a correlation between *ḥadd* punishments and essential *maqāṣid* he does not categorise honour as essential (El-Mesawi, 2018). However, aside from its relevance to *ḥadd* punishments, the notion of honour has a crucial presence within the primary sources, relevance that has far-reaching applications and implications (as is evident from chapters 4 and 5).

Al-Raysuni (2005, 29) argues that adding honour as a *maqāṣid* is problematic... 'a further problem associated with this addition is that the preservation of people's honor is not subject to precise measurement or definition: Where does it begin and where does it end? And where is the dividing line between the preservation of honor and the preservation of al-nasb, or lineage....'. I would argue that the limits and scope of honour as a *maqāṣid*, although not clear in pre-modern works, can be established based on Qur'anic and Prophetic conceptions of honour. Although I can appreciate

the problematic nature of honour currently, I disagree with al-Raysuni using this to argue that it should not be included as a *maqāṣid*. There is a notion of honour in the primary sources of authority that needs to be used to construct a conception of honour that is based on these sources and not one that is open to exploitation by patriarchal conceptions that we see having a negative impact on the lives of Muslim women today. (I discuss this further in the coming section).

Alongside disagreements in terms of what level of *maqāṣid* honour should occupy, or whether it should be included at all, some contemporary scholars (like some pre-modern scholars) place honour into existing categories of essential *maqāṣid*. Hallaq (2018, 135) suggests that honour can be included in the category of offspring (*nasl*) as there are many ways in which the two interrelate. However, I believe that Qur'anic conceptions of honour are broader than this. It thus does not represent the totality of honour in the Qur'an if we limit its association to offspring.

According to Auda (2008, 24), the preservation of honour has gradually been replaced '...with 'preservation of human dignity' and even the 'protection of human rights' as a purpose of the Islamic law in its own right.' It appears, understandings of what exactly a notion of honour would include, and concern are still not clear. A conception of honour is still not fully developed in the Islamic tradition with absolute clarity. However, honour as a concept has a dominant presence in contemporary Muslim communities, especially concerning Muslim women (see chapter 2).

This lack of clarity surrounding the notion of honour leaves room for tendentious androcentric interpretations thereof, alongside the manipulation of Muslim women. This can be seen in the lived realities of Muslim communities but also via some contemporary conservative scholarly works. Muhammad Adil Khan Afridi (2016) in his article *Maqasid Al-Shari'ah and Preservation of Basic Rights* includes the category of honour (*'ird*) with lineage. His explanation of this category begins with a gender-neutral conception of honour where he emphasises:

Islam is very concerned about the dignity of a person and emphasises the importance of protecting dignity. Protection of dignity includes protecting individual rights to privacy and not exposing or accusing

others of misbehaviour. It also means ensuring that relationships between men and women are respectful and responsible. Islam has enacted a number of guidelines to protect the dignity of mankind. It prohibits its followers from accusing others of mischief such as committing adultery or other immoral behaviours.

This understanding I argue is in line with honour occurrences within the Qur'anic text. However, Afridi (2016, 282) expands his conception of honour to include sex segregation and covering the *awra* as '...women who cover their *awrah* are respected and safer compared to those who display parts of their body meant to be concealed from public gaze'. He expands a conception of honour that is gender-neutral to one that becomes centred around the body and sexuality of Muslim women. This is just one example of the prevailing misinterpretations and harmful conceptions of honour that exist in contemporary Muslim communities today that result in toxic patriarchal honour cultures, and HBV and psychological violence. The lack of clarity surrounding honour is not representative of its importance in authoritative Islamic textual sources (as some contemporary scholars argue in their attempts to distance Islam from negative honour uses and conceptions). Rather, it reflects the need, or more so the urgent necessity, to reconceptualise this notion based on the Qur'an and *sunna*, and thus allow for the rejection of patriarchal conceptions that do not align with honour in Islam broadly conceived.

Through examining pre-modern and modern developments of *maqāṣid*, what has been established is that honour as a concept and as an objective of Islamic legal rulings was present in the scholarly contributions and consciousness of early jurists and scholars. It confirms that a conceptualisation of honour persisted in Muslim religio-legal consciousness, and the probability of its widespread impact on Muslim lived experiences past and present is very high. Although this project cannot engage in an in-depth inquiry into social histories and realities of various historical Muslim communities, the works of key scholars and their concerns and emphasis on certain practices and concepts reveals what was occurring at specific periods of history, or conversely what was not occurring, for which reasons they felt the need to address certain issues. Thus, works addressing whether honour was one of the essential *maqāṣid* or not reveal that a notion of honour clearly existed in relevant

historical Muslim communities. Furthermore, as I have presented in my previous 2 chapters, the works of the varying jurists and scholars further emphasise how a concept of honour is ubiquitous in the primary sources and therefore found a persistent space in the field of Islamic law even while it remained the subject of debate.

Given that a notion of honour is present in the Qur'anic text and the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad, why did the scholars disagree on its position? Perhaps this is due to the concept of honour not being holistically developed. This is evident from the popular classical commentaries of the Qur'anic text. It seems relevant at this juncture to examine the legal rulings which led to some scholars including honour as a sixth *maqāṣid*.

6.8 Honour and legal rulings: *qadhf* and *li'an*

It is clear that most scholars who endorsed the honour *maqāṣid* based this upon the legal rulings of *qadhf* and *li'an*. To further understand the rationale and scope of their inclusion of honour I will examine these two legal rulings.

Qadhf is false accusation of *zina* (illicit sexual intercourse) (Islam, 2020). It is a crime for which the punishment has been fixed by the primary sources of authority (Peters, 2005, 53). According to Peters (2005, p87), 'the law of *ḥadd* protects four central interests and values of society: public order, private property, sexual order and personal honour.' These legal rulings are central in terms of protection of honour and we can thus appreciate how the jurists extracted honour as a *maqāṣid*. According to Islam (2020, 894), the scholars classify *qadhf* as '...defamation of adultery or fornication, homosexuality, or denying the fatherhood or motherhood of someone'. Peters (2005) highlights how *qadhf* is the only *ḥadd* punishment, out of 7, that is not solely deemed as the claim of God, but it is also seen as the claim of humans and its prosecution is dependent on the victim initiating the complaint.

The legal ruling of *qadhf* is based on surah An-Nur 24:4-5. It is worth highlighting here that the Arabic term translated in the above translation by Yusuf Ali as 'chaste women' is *muḥṣanāt* from the root ح ص ن (Corpus Quran, 2009-2017). Interestingly, the term has been translated as 'honourable women' by other translators such as Mohammed Marmaduke William Pickthall (QuranO). Due to Yusuf Ali translating this term as

chaste I did not include this verse in my analysis of Qur'anic honour occurrences. However, there clearly is a link between this verse and a notion of honour.

The legal ruling developed in *fiqh* based on this Qur'anic verse is detailed with slight variations between the four Sunnī schools of thought. Therefore, I will highlight only the main and necessary aspects needed to comprehend the role of honour in relation to this legal ruling.

According to *The Mukhtaṣir al-Qudūrī* of Imām Abū'l-Ḥusayn Aḥmad Ibn Muḥammad Ibn Aḥmad Ibn Ja'far Ibn Ḥamdān (a manual of Islamic law according to the Hanafī School of Law) *qadhf* is an unsubstantiated accusation of unlawful sexual intercourse (Ibn Hamdān, 2010). It is:

When a man accuses a *muḥṣan* man or a *muḥṣanah* woman of explicit unlawful sexual intercourse without substantiation, and the person accused of unlawful intercourse (*maqdūf*) demands the *ḥadd* punishment the judge (*ḥākim*) is to carry out the *ḥadd* punishment on [the accuser]. [It is] eighty lashes if he is a free man, which are dispersed over his limbs[...] Whoever denies the lineage of someone and says, "You are not your father's," or "O son of an adulteress," and his mother was a *muḥṣanah* who is dead, and the son demands the *ḥadd* punishment for her, the person who makes the unsubstantiated allegations of sexual misconduct is subjected to the *ḥadd* punishment. (Ibn Hamdān, 2010, 547-8)

Accordingly, those who cannot substantiate an accusation are to be flogged 80 times, their testimony can never be accepted, and they are to be labelled rebellious and not of good character (Ibn Kathīr, 2003, vol 7, 24). In terms of details that all 4 legal schools of thought agree upon we find: the quantity of 80 lashes (as it is based on the Qur'anic verse), the statement of accusation must be a clear statement by the free-will of the accuser, the accuser has to be sane and mature (reached the age of puberty – *baligh*), and it is the accuser's responsibility to provide 4 witnesses (the burden of evidence is on the accuser not the accused). If the accuser cannot substantiate his accusation with 4 witnesses who can testify that they saw the act of illicit sexual intercourse (this

requires them seeing the act of penetration) then the accuser is subjected to the punishment of *qadhf* (Islam 2020).

I will now explore some key aspects of the above legal ruling that can assist in our understanding of how honour may have been conceived: the necessity of 4 witnesses who have seen the act of penetration, the burden of evidence being upon the accuser, not the accused, and finally the gender neutrality of the legal ruling.

The requirement of 4 witnesses who have witnessed the act of penetration can be understood as a deterrent for accusers alongside a means of ensuring accusations can be backed up through reliable witnesses. According to traditional scholarship, there exists an understanding that the possibility of gathering 4 witnesses who have witnessed the act of penetration is unlikely and difficult. As Islam presents ‘...in several authentic sayings of the Prophet, the evidence of the four witnesses must be direct, and not merely circumstantial: in other words, it is not sufficient for them to have witnessed a situation which made it evident that sexual intercourse was taking or had taken place: they must have witnessed the sexual act as such and must be able to prove this to the entire satisfaction of the judicial authority’ (Islam, 2020, 895). This requirement can be comprehended as a means of discouraging accusations being made. Moreover, even in the case when an individual does witness illicit sexual intercourse, it is as if God is discouraging the publicization of this act through the requirement of 4 witnesses. The potential accuser would fear being inflicted with the *hadd* punishment themselves and thus it seems that the safest scenario would be to avoid disclosing or accusing anyone of illicit sexual intercourse. It seems that God is protecting the dignity and honour of His creation by deterring the possibility of accusations being made against them.

This links to the second requirement of the burden of evidence being upon the accuser and not the accused. In such instances, the accused are assumed innocent and there is a clear effort to guard the individual’s reputation against accusation and defamation. If we understand this through the lens of honour, God is guarding their honour and they are assumed to be honourable. Honour here can be seen as a given. On the contrary, it is the burden of the accuser to prove their accusations.

Focusing on the above verse, it specifically refers to accusations or rumours that are made *against women*. However, according to ibn Kathīr, it equally applies to accusation against men (Ibn Kathīr, 2003). Yet, what the wording of this verse could be revealing to us is the attachment of honour and thus the more impactful or detrimental effect of defamation and accusation on the lives of women over men, during the period of revelation. Indeed, when a woman is being accused of *zina* subsequently the man is also being accused of this act. However, in this verse, we see God guarding the dignity of women. This perhaps could be an indication of how even after the coming of Islam, in the early Muslim community, honour was still associated/attached to the body of women. Arguably the concept of honour within the Qur'an and what the Prophet had brought into Arabia, did not lead to instant reforms.

In terms of Islamic law, despite the above verse addressing male accusers, the ruling of *qadhf* is gender neutral. The four Sunnī schools of Islamic law classify the *ḥadd* for *qadhf* as equal for both genders (Islam, 2020, 895). However, there clearly is a deeper moral/ethical reform that is being stimulated in this Qur'anic verse, a reform that could be related to the negative gender-specific associations of honour/dignity etc to the body and conduct of women.

Related to the ruling of *qadhf* is the ruling of *li'an*. Barlas (2019 222) states if a husband cannot bring forward 4 witnesses in his accusation of adultery against his wife he can engage in the process of *li'an*. *Li'an* is the oath of condemnation or 'imprecation by both parties' (meaning husband and wife) (Ibn Ḥamdān, 2010, 447). These verses that follow the *qadhf* verses are those concerning *li'an*, the accusations made against one's wife (see Qur'an 24:6-9).

According to Ibn Kathīr (2003, 25), 'this Āyah offers a way out for husbands'. It specifically refers to when a husband accuses his wife of adultery, but cannot substantiate his accusation, then he can swear the oath of condemnation. (This is also the case if he denies the paternity of her child (Ibn Ḥamdān, 2010)). He is to take this oath four times and on the fifth time invoke that '...the *curse* of Allah on themselves if they tell a lie' (Qur'an 24:6-9). This results in a divorce. Furthermore, the woman is to be subjected with the *ḥadd* punishment for adultery unless she takes the oath of condemnation 4 times swearing that her accuser has lied and on the 5th time invoking

the *wrath* of Allah upon herself if she is lying. Ibn Kathīr (2003, 26) emphasises that the difference in wording regarding the 5th oath (curse for men and wrath for women) is ‘because usually, a man would not go to the extent of exposing his wife and accusing her of *Zinā* unless he is telling the truth...’. This problematic statement potentially reflects the gender stereotypes that existed during the time of Ibn Kathīr. Most definitely it reflects his view of men in comparison to women whom even after taking the oath, he sees as liars: ‘so in her case the fifth testimony calls for the wrath of Allāh to be upon her, for the one upon whom is the wrath of Allāh, is the one who knows the truth yet deviates from it’ (Ibn Kathīr, 2003, 26). We see here how his gender-biased conceptions impacted his commentary of the Qur’anic text when indeed the Qur’anic text does not specify any form of gender disparity in this verse.

Conversely in *The Mukhtaṣir al-Qudūrī*, the discussion of *li’an* appear to be more gender-neutral in comparison to Ibn Kathīr’s explanation which depicts the wife as the sinner even when she takes an oath of her innocence. In this legal manual (Ibn Hamdān, 2010, 447) it is the wife who can demand ‘the consequence of an unsubstantiated accusation of sexual infidelity’. If the husband refrains from taking the oaths he is to be detained until he does or he admits he was lying. If he was lying, he is subjected to the *ḥadd* punishment for *qadhf*.

What can be conceived through the commentary of Ibn Kathīr and the explanation presented in the legal textbook is how this verse can be understood in favour of men, or gender neutrally. I would argue that despite Ibn Kathīr’s view of a man not possibly being able to lie against his wife, this verse can be seen as protection for women. If it was the case, and the man could not be lying in such a situation, then would it not be befitting for the woman to be subjected to the *ḥadd* punishment and be divorced from the male without her needing to also take the oath. On the contrary, any man and woman who engage in the process of *li’an* are divorced and not inflicted with the *ḥadd* punishment. This is to protect both individuals. In terms of reputation and honour it could be argued that God is saving the wife from having to live with a man who had accused and defamed her honour. Rather than her being subjected to his false accusations and suspicions God is removing her from this situation and freeing her. Furthermore, if one was to argue for one gender being favoured over the other in the verse then we could argue that women are being favoured. Barlas (2019, 222)

asserts, 'the Qur'an here privileges the evidence of wife over that of her husband and of a woman over that of a man, but Muslims do not read his provision as a sign of inequality and female privilege' but interestingly, as we can see with the example of Ibn Kathīr, classical commentaries show there was no hesitation in privileging the husband/men.

What we can conceive from both the Qur'anic rulings of *qadhf* and *li'an* is the historical context of Arabia where the Qur'an was revealed. Indeed, these verses are a response to the realities of the period of revelation and reflect how accusations were made against women, relating to the notion of honour. These ideologies of honour potentially continued to exist in Muslim communities as we have seen the mentioning of them in Ḥadīth literature (see chapter 5) and within this chapter, we see that honour arises as a possible objective of Islamic law within the subject of *maqāṣid*. However, the attachment of honour or reputation to the female body is a limited association. We can appreciate from these legal rulings the concern of honour with sexuality and subsequently this relevance may have informed pre-modern scholarly conceptions of honour. However, although sexuality is relevant to the concept of honour chapters 4 and 5 have revealed that honour is a much broader concept and as such an honour *maqāṣid* can have far greater implications and uses than just relating to taming female sexuality.

6.9 The impact of early conceptions of honour on women

Although the concept of honour was not advanced, in terms of *maqāṣid*, in comparison to the extent other concepts and objectives were, the above inquiry, alongside the Qur'anic and Prophetic inquiries in chapters 4 and 5 outline a framework upon which an understanding of honour can be further developed. We can see from the scholars who endorsed honour as a *maqāṣid* that it was either included into an existing category or deemed as an objective in its own right. Moreover, this latter categorisation was due to the *ḥadd* punishments discussed above. Therefore, we can certainly see that a concept of honour was conceived from the Qur'anic text, and the *ḥadd* laws within it, to inform some areas of the Islamic legal tradition. Honour, therefore, within the Qur'an was not completely overlooked in the pre-modern period.

What the legal rulings of *qadhf* and *li'an* reveal is that contrary to dominant contemporary conceptions of honour concerning policing the female body and sexuality, these laws are concerned with the *protection* of the honour and dignity of *both* men and women. According to some readings of these verses it could be argued that women's honour and dignity seems to be the primary concern. These legal rulings did not encourage the policing of the female body, protecting the ideal of honour at the expense of the female body or valuing it above the female body. They can be seen as means of deterring or making it difficult for accusations against the honour or dignity of another individual. This is in stark contrast to the practices of contemporary HBV, many of which are a result of speculation. Far from the involvement of any witnesses, Muslim women in contemporary Muslim communities become victim to violence based on doubts and rumours regarding their conduct and behaviour. Furthermore, the scope of honour in relation to female conduct, as I have mentioned throughout this thesis, has become so broad in the contemporary that it is deemed to encompass all that relates to women, their sexuality, their conduct, their dress, their occupations, their social and political freedoms, their religious conduct, their biological capabilities in childbearing, and innumerable aspects relating to their body and rights. For Muslim men the scope of honour has been reduced to the policing and control of women. Such a conception does not coincide with the notion of honour in the Qur'anic text, Prophetic traditions, and the possibility of an honour *maqāṣid*. Although the link between honour and *maqāṣid* was not developed extensively in the pre-modern period, *its* existence is there and is promising for a future development of a *maqāṣid* that is based on a broad, gender neutral conception of honour.

The once neglected subject of *maqāṣid*, which is now being revived and developed further to address contemporary problems including ones with a long presence in Muslim social history, is a way forward; it moves beyond recognising the deep-rooted and harmful problems surrounding contemporary notions of honour and offers a framework and method to challenge these negative conceptions. If we observe only the above two legal rulings (*qadhf* and *li'an*) then it seems that practices relating to honour are very much disconnected and distant from textual and philosophical conceptions of honour. *Maqāṣid*, therefore, offer a tradition-based yet rational and ethical methodology to bear on bringing about reform in the conceptualisations and praxis of honour as a social value. It is a method that emphasises the spirit and intent

of the law above literalist legalistic methods that conflict with the ethical/moral Qur'anic vision. I have briefly discussed above the general works of reformist scholars concerning *maqāṣid*. I now focus on specific models which relate more closely to the subject of honour and demonstrate the potential viability of the *maqāṣid* approach in critiquing and reconceptualising notions of honour to arrive at egalitarian concepts that are truer to the Qur'anic intent of honour, and further how these can be utilised to critique legal rulings that do not preserve the objectives of law.

6.10 A *maqāṣid* utilising honour

Auda (2008, 53-4) emphasises how 'current applications (or rather, misapplications) of Islamic law are reductionist rather than holistic, literal rather than moral, one-dimensional rather than multidimensional, binary rather than multi-valued, deconstructionist rather than reconstructionist, and causal rather than teleological' thus the need for a *maqāṣid* approach is imperative (Auda, 2008, 53-4). If instead of looking to rigid rulings and forming understandings of honour based on these and the patriarchal desire to police and control women, we look to the higher philosophical and theological concept of honour in the Qur'an and Ḥadīth, we can uncover a more holistic and gender-neutral objective of honour that can also inform socio-ethical practices. A *maqāṣid* approach does not imply dismissing the entire legal edifice in Islam to adopt a philosophical approach. Rather, as Kamali (2001, 13) clarifies, 'the goals and purposes of the *sharī'ah* (*maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*) ...has the potential to revitalise *usūl* and *sharī'ah*. A *maqāṣid* approach is one that will allow for critique and reform of both the existing legal tradition and the tools and methods used to derive these legal rulings.

Mariya Ali (2014) explores the utilisation of *maqāṣid* as a means of developing a humanistic Islamic framework. She calls for challenging the honour ideology through a *maqāṣid* approach as she identifies this ideology as a key factor for the motivation to restore honour and therefore the continuation of abuse of victims of child sexual abuse. Ali (2014) agrees with the impact the dominantly legalistic direction Islam has taken. She emphasises how honour cultures that exist in Muslim communities today relate to 'misinterpretations of rulings and cultural influences' resulting in the prescription of 'strict codes of sexual morality and general behaviour that protect the offender instead of the victim' (Ali, 2014, 509). Although honour killings are not

legalised in Islamic law, Ali (2014) asserts that the honour cultures that exist today in Muslim societies 'create conditions that give rise to various forms of gender-based violence'. This in turn results in the misapplication or complete disregard of the higher aims and objective of Islam. She thus calls for the development of an Islamic framework that reconciles human rights and Islamic law through the flexibility of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* and *maslahah*. Such an approach seems promising. However, it cannot be divorced from in formulating a gender-neutral conception of an honour *maqāṣid*. I argue that honour is a part of the higher objectives and aims of Islam.

Thus, to develop an honour *maqāṣid* is crucial to comprehend the Qur'anic and Prophetic intent, objective, and rationale of honour. From the inquiries in chapters 4 and 5, both these sources advocate for reform in the code of honour that existed in Arabia before Islam. There is a concept of honour that is being conveyed that is gender-neutral and not exclusively concerned with the female body or sexuality. The Qur'anic notion of honour is principally a notion of dignity bestowed on humans by God.

Shahzadi Pakeeza and Junaid Akbar (2019, 22) also affirm that the Qur'an conveys the concept of honour as a form of dignity bestowed upon all of humankind as a 'birth right' by God. They present the words of Sayyid Qutb who stated '...dignity is the natural right of every individual', thus they argue that 'honor and dignity is not grossed by their commendable behaviour; it is just because of the countenance of Lord's grace. "Honor" and "Dignity" is consequently, the unqualified right of Human beings.' (Pakeeza and Akbar, 2019, 29). It is the unqualified right of each individual bestowed upon them by God is to be protected not the notion or ideal of honour, but the individual who is bestowed the honour.

However, we must go beyond just extracting a conception of honour from the Qur'an. It is not enough to recognise that such a notion of honour exists, but we must extricate the beliefs and practices that are entrenched within contemporary Muslim communities that contradict this notion. We must address violations of the Qur'anic concept of honour. A key exigency is for us to develop this notion within the field of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah* and then utilise an honour *maqāṣid* in challenging and

reforming legal rulings and ideologies that contradict or put the objective of honour at risk. If we are to move away from abstract and tokenistic conceptions of honour, then we must use these understandings to challenge and overcome any practice or belief that contradicts or undermines this notion. This is indeed a complex and long process. However, its starting point must be the Qur'an and *sunna*. We must move away from understandings that perceive honour as human dignity bestowed upon all of humankind by God in a manner intended to *only* inspire Muslims on a spiritual level regarding their relationship with God. Rather the notion and principle of honour must inform our beliefs and practices in Islam broadly and holistically. We need to develop an understanding of honour that extends its impact to the social, political, economic, and ethical spheres, etc. also. Our spiritual relationship with God is also dependant on these broader aspects. Personal, spiritual honour cannot be divorced from practical, holistic applications of honour in the daily lives of Muslims. We must extend challenges to negative contemporary honour praxis and beliefs that are present in all areas of contemporary Muslim communities. In turn, this will allow for an understanding of honour from within the Qur'anic text and based on the Qur'anic ideal and vision of honour, to actively inform Muslim consciousness and practice.

Such work, that is extracting non-patriarchal and gender-neutral concepts from the Qur'an to reform existing Muslim law is already underway by scholars such as Duderija (2014c). In his article *Maqāṣid al-Sharī'a, Gender Non-patriarchal Qur'ān-Sunna Hermeneutics, and the Reformation of Muslim Family Law*, Duderija (2014c, 202), identifies Qur'anic concepts that can lead to a reform in law:

... maqāṣid of relevance to the reformulation of classical Muslim family law can be derived from either non-gender-specific or specifically female-gender-inclusive Qur'anic concepts of: *khailāfa* (vicerency), *taqwā* (God consciousness), *ma'ruf* (doing what is commonly known to be good), equality in creation and human worth/honor (*karama*), *wilāya* (mutual support or companionship), *qisṭ* (justice). These central Qur'anic concepts are employed either directly or indirectly in the Qur'an in the context of gender or spousal relationships as well as in the context of regulating the relationship between the Creator and the created, as well as in general human social intercourses. As such they would be

applicable to the realm of family life as well, which is a significant and integral part of both.

Duderija thus proposes a 'gender-symmetrical reinterpretation of Muslim family laws' (2014c, 193). He argues (2014c, 201) that the new *maqāṣid* that can be utilised to reform Muslim law are '*rahma*, *muwadda*, and *sakīna*, that is, mercy (or compassion), love, harmony (or tranquillity), sameness/equality, and intimate closeness' and to this list, I add honour, which he also recognises as a Qur'anic concept. (He identifies this concept with the Arabic term *karama* but as chapter 4 reveals the Arabic terms that suggest a notion of honour are many). Accordingly, a *maqāṣid* of honour calls for men and women to be conceived as ontologically equal and thus equal in how the Qur'anic conception of honour applies to them. It is not a conception that is exclusively concerned with sexuality, or the body, or humans policing one another. Rather it concerns the human relationship with the Divine on a spiritual and personal level, which in turn influences the human agent's beliefs and practices on the earth on a social level.

6.11 Conclusion

Formulating a *maqāṣid* of honour in the contemporary era when there is a developing interest in the subject of *maqāṣid* is promising and necessary. In a period where the scope of *maqāṣid* is being extended to include principles and objectives that relate to contemporary concerns and needs of Muslims, a notion of honour that is both recognised in pre-modern scholarship and continues to be a concern of contemporary Muslim communities is a critical need and far from challengeable. Recognising the notion of honour in the Qur'an and *sunna* and using this to develop an honour *maqāṣid* is not an attempt to impose new contemporary ideals upon the Qur'an; rather, it is an attempt to uncover and reapply the Qur'anic ideal of honour that was intended by the revelation. It is to challenge negative notions of honour that impact the lives of Muslim women, and at times men too, which find their roots in eras prior to the coming of Islam as well as through periods of Islamic history. In focusing on an honour *maqāṣid* in the pre-modern and modern period in this chapter, I have demonstrated the viability of a *maqāṣid* approach, but there is much work yet to be done. There are questions and directions of inquiry that this chapter could not go into.

Nonetheless, it paves the way for developing an honour *maqāṣid* that can have meaningful impacts on Islamic law and its ethical reform.

Further questions to be considered to push forward this development are: what are the implications of the varying levels of *maqāṣid* and where can honour be situated to have a meaningful impact? How can a *maqāṣid*-based reconceptualisation of honour via the values and references of the Qur'an and *sunna* be used to influence and transform current understandings of Islamic law concerning women and family life (looking at specific legal rulings)? Further, existing legal rulings based on gender-biased conceptions of honour need to be identified and then reformed in accordance with a gender-neutral Qur'anic conception of honour. There is much to be done beyond theorising and developing a methodology. New methods and modalities must be utilised in meaningful ways for reform to be enacted practically.

Chapter 7: Honour through the Western Patriarchal Lens: Orientalism, Colonialism, and Islamophobia

7.1 Introduction

Throughout this chapter I frequently use the terms ‘the West’ and ‘Western’. Please see the Introduction chapter for clarification on the usages of these terms.

Thus far, this thesis engaged in an internal critique of the concept of honour within authoritative Sunnī Muslim sources. This internal critique has revealed how references to honour within these sources can be read through an egalitarian lens conscious of the needs of Muslim women. Yet, patriarchal influences have allowed for non-egalitarian gender-biased conceptions of honour to infiltrate and ultimately dictate considerations of the notion of honour within Islam and Muslim communities. This has occasioned narrow reductionist understandings of honour to dominate and harmfully impact the lives of Muslim women, and to undermine the ethical vision of the Qur’anic text. Before collectively reflecting on the findings of the previous chapters it is appropriate to analyse the impact and influence of the West upon these conceptions of honour. Islamic-Western encounters since the 18th/19th century are essential to comprehending the relationship between the West and the non-West, or more specifically Islamicate discourses and social realities as juxtaposed with those prevailing in the Western world today. An analysis of the pre-modern period and the succeeding period of colonialism and modernisation as played out within the Muslim world reveals the strong impact of Western ideologies regarding the present-day predicaments of honour in the Islamicate worlds that I have discussed so far in this thesis.

This chapter addresses the following questions: How have textual honour ideals and codes been transformed and developed into contemporary Muslim community beliefs and practices? What impact have Western usages and conceptions of honour in Islam and contemporary Muslim communities had upon Muslim women and on the very notion of honour for Muslims at large?

Throughout this chapter, I aim to analyse oriental and colonial encounters with Islam, and the subsequent change in Muslim emphases on honour. I begin by offering an analysis of pre-modern legal systems in the Muslim world to draw a comparison with the legal systems of the newly formed nation-States. This will reveal the influence of colonialism, Western ideals of modernisation and their legal philosophies and systems on the newly formed Muslim states. I aim to examine how the West, having its own notions of honour, conceived the complex moral system and concepts of honour of the Muslim communities it colonised. Within this initial section, I hope to uncover how notions of honour were used to otherize and manipulate Muslim communities.

From this inquiry, I proceed to a contemporary analysis of conceptions and depictions of Muslim honour beliefs and practices within the West, specifically in Britain. Within this section, I will examine how so-called Muslim notions of honour are still exploited to otherize Muslims. This exploitation I associate with the broader existence of Islamophobia in contemporary society. Although this chapter will be concise, it will fulfil the purpose of presenting how the manipulation and misapplication of a notion of honour relating to Islam and Muslim communities is not only an internal form of injustice against Muslim women. Such negative honour conceptions are preserved by a double patriarchy. The internal patriarchy that exists within Muslim communities and patriarchal understandings of Islam has been challenged in the previous chapters. This current chapter will offer critical consideration of the role of external patriarchy, manifested through orientalism, colonialism, Eurocentrism, and Islamophobia in perpetuating negative honour conceptions. It will decode and decipher honour and its framing within Western discourses. Through discourse analysis and a socio-political critique of how honour within the Islamicate has been conceived and utilised within and by the West, it reveals how western discourses and policies are implicated in the ways in which violence is enacted upon Muslim women. The utilisation of the term honour by the West essentialises HBV to non-Western cultures and Islam, and in doing so does not benefit Muslim women in any meaningful way. Ultimately, I argue for the abandonment of terms which associate honour with HBV (I retain the use of the term honour-based violence to identify with its contemporary utilisation although I do not agree with the association of honour to these acts of violence). A term that cannot constructively assist in the overcoming of violence against women and prevents Muslims from reclaiming a gender-neutral concept of honour, as can be

derived from their primary sources of authority, is a term complicit in the dangers of patriarchy.

7.2 Colonial interventions, the formation of nation-states and evolving patriarchies

An external form of patriarchy is also embroiled in the manipulation of the notion of honour in Islam. To fully comprehend the extent of this external patriarchy it would be ideal to consider how honour transformed from within textual sources to lived realities throughout Muslim history and into its contemporary forms. To bridge this gap, a detailed analysis of the historical lived realities of early, medieval, and premodern Muslim communities is required. Further, textual, and legal sources/documents do not necessarily represent lived realities. Legal manuals, for example, are but the concerns and interpretations of a male-dominated scholarly elite. Historical accounts of Muslim communities regarding matters such as women's self-determination and rights reveal a great deal of nuance. In terms of honour, we can assume such an inquiry would be crucial to mapping the developments and transformations of honour. Knowledge of how various Muslim communities extracted understandings of honour from scriptural and legal sources can shed light on, and aid, understandings of contemporary Muslim honour ideologies and practices.

Due to this thesis primarily focusing on a reconceptualisation of honour, it is not possible to engage in such a historical analysis in great depth. Nevertheless, the focus of this chapter is on how honour has been conceived and impacted by Western interventions and narratives and, thus, it is crucial to begin with even a brief account of the impact of colonial and imperial interventions on the Muslim world. I present a concise account of this, specifically regarding the legal realm, as crucial context for contemporary stances on honour.

Professor of history and law, Amira Sonbol (2003, 2007) extensively examines the shift in legal practices within the Ottoman empire to the period of nation-state formation in the Muslim world. Her findings reveal how, contrary to popular contemporary beliefs, especially those espoused in and by Western discourses, the formation of nation-states profoundly intensified the impact of patriarchy upon Muslim women. She does not negate the existence of patriarchy and its impact upon Muslim women in pre-

modern or pre-colonial Muslim historical realities. However, she exposes how the impact of patriarchy intensified with the formation of nation-states alongside colonial influences, especially regarding the legal realm relating to Muslim women, their self-determination, and rights. Pre-modern states, unlike modern nation-states, 'did not establish legal codes determining social relations...' (Sonbol, 2003, 229). The 'Islamic law' utilised by modern nation-states today varies greatly from the law practised in pre-modern *sharī'ah* courts. Sonbol (2003, p,233) stresses that:

Under the old laws, women worked and invested in businesses and they had access to divorce through the courts without the need for their husband's permission. Unlike courts today, qadis had neither the right to force a woman to stay with a husband she wanted to divorce, nor did they question her reasons for asking for divorce. The qadi's role was that of a mediator regarding financial rights and support given the circumstances of the divorce. Modern family law clearly worked against women'.

With the formation of nation-states, we see a transformation in the authority granted to male religious authorities and state actors. Deniz Kandiyoti (2002) stresses how the role of the state has mostly been neglected in studies of women in Muslim societies. Such disregard concerns both current governance and state but also during the era of the formation of nation-states. She argues (2002) that through various state policies we find the reproduction of gender inequalities.

Contrary to accounts of honour, shame, and rape in contemporary Muslim communities where rape victims are stigmatised and silenced due to the loss of honour and resultant shame, Sonbol (2003, 248) demonstrates that pre-modern Ottoman court records of fathers, brothers, mothers and girls coming 'forward in rape cases casts doubt on the usual image of punishing the victim for sexual crimes committed against her'.

A serious change took place with the introduction of Western law as a basis for criminal law in Muslim countries ruled by colonial powers. Criminal codes and legal precedent, particularly from France, became

the norm for countries like Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria. These modern courts introduced the issue of intent as part of the formula for proof of rape. According to the new laws, the actions of the victim became a source of scrutiny. This focus on the woman's actions put victims on the defensive and allowed men to get away with rape. It also made families unwilling to come forward with accusations of rape because attacking the victim family member's morals dishonoured the family (Sonbol, 2003, 248).

The inspiration for the new court system, in Egypt for example, was the European model which, according to Sonbol (2003, 233), was not surprising since the reformers themselves were either British advisors to the Egyptian government or Egyptian graduates of French and British law schools. These individuals 'were imbued with the laws and philosophy of law they studied in Europe which they brought home and proceeded to imitate'. Although the content of the law was claimed to be derived from the *sharī'ah*, '...in fact and spirit, the methodology for selection and execution of the law are all based on European models and prevailing European philosophy of law and gender of those times' (Sonbol, 2009 182). Modern personal status law in newly formed nation-states were thereby constructed through a combination of *fiqh* rulings and the influence of European philosophies of law and gender. These 19th century law reforms did not improve the lives of women; rather, they allowed the state 'to extend its hand into personal law' (Sonbol, 2007, 285). This period also marked Europe's social and political achievements being utilised as a model for modernity and progress (Najmabadi, 2002, 48).

The development of penal codes and legislation within the new formed nation-states amidst colonial influences reveal how Western discourses of honour influenced the newly formed nation-states conceptualisation and incorporation of honour into legislation. It will become clear that the negative effects of honour are a product of both internal and external patriarchies.

In her article entitled *Women, Honour, and the State: Evidence from Egypt*, Beth Baron (2006, 2) highlights, through the example of Egypt, how groups that formed the state intelligentsia, namely '...its legal, medical, and policing professions', did not prioritise

overcoming patriarchal conceptions and practices of honour that existed on tribal or communal levels. Instead, 'concerned with guarding male prerogatives, these professionals threw their weight behind customary notions of honour, strengthening, perpetuating, and at the same time transforming honour ideals and practices' (Baron, 2006, 2). The state took the position of endorsing '...new criminal law codes, encouraging medical checks, and stepping up the counting, policing, and prosecution of crimes' (Baron, 2006, 2). It is within these new state interventions that we can identify a new emphasis in the legal status of honour crimes from previous iterations in the same regions. We also see how Western conceptions of honour and crimes of passion influenced legislation regarding honour crime.

In the early modern Ottoman state, despite Arab customary practices of honour and honour crimes existing and allowing a 'guardian' to kill with impunity within his own district, 'he could not do so under Islamic law or Ottoman state regulations, and the crime had to be concealed from the authorities through village collusion' (Baron, 2006, 4). Baron quotes Dror Ze'evi who, focusing on the example of 17th-century Palestinian records of accidental deaths of women, reveals that they were recorded as 'women who fell into wells, slid off roofs, or were buried by stone avalanches' (cited in Baron, 2006, 3). Although Ze'evi concludes that these killings were more than likely motivated by honour codes, records signify that they were not outwardly stated as such to the authorities. However, in the new nation-states, we see the state endorsing the category of honour crimes and further reducing punishments, or even imposing no punishment, for preparators. We find the state validating such violence.

According to Baron (2006, 6), the pre-modern right of the *qāḍī* in judging violations of honour according to the *sharī'ah* were removed in Mehmed Ali's 1844 Code, giving such crimes place under the jurisdiction of state courts (Baron, 2006, 6). 'According to the Code of Mehmed Ali, if a man killed his wife and/or lover because she had committed adultery, he was free from criminal responsibility' (Baron, 2006, 6). Eventually, by the 1970s, there were very few criminal cases that *sharī'ah* courts could address.

The policing of female sexuality is not a modern practice. These practices existed in the Ottoman state and in pre-modern/medieval Muslim societies. Similarly, honour

codes and tribal/customary honour practices have existed throughout Muslim history in some form. Although the full extent of these practices has not been examined within this project, as this is not a solely historical analysis, this brief examination does clarify the role the modern state played in the emphasis on honour crimes. The state, in mobilizing 'modern legal, medical, forensic, and other resources', facilitated the emphasis and enforcement of honour codes and crimes in a manner they had not been before, or as Baron states 'to facilitate and legitimize expansion' of 'fathers, brothers, uncles, cousins, or religious authorities' (2006, 9). '...By enshrining the notion of family honour in penal codes and checking a girl's condition, the state sanctified and solidified its importance' (Baron, 2006, 9). According to Sonbol the new form of 'state patriarchy' was 'the key informing ideology that guided states in their 'selection' of traditional *fiqh* doctrines to include in their new codifications of Muslim family law...another development associated with the new power of the centralized state, and apparently quite distinct from the pre-modern practice, was the matter of enforcement' (cited in Welchman, 2015, 136). The state began to enforce and condone patriarchal practices in a manner that had no precedent in Islamic legal theory or practice. Thus, we see two forms of patriarchy influencing how honour codes were to develop and become codified within the modern period. On one side we have state patriarchy, which we can see as a form of internal patriarchy within these Muslim countries, in a new modern form. On the other hand, we have the external form of colonial patriarchy, which brought its own patriarchal conceptions of honour and passion that further influenced how states conceptualised and included honour in legislation. Both forms of patriarchy coalesce.

According to Yeğenoğlu's important intervention *Colonial Fantasies: Towards a Feminist reading of Orientalism* (1999, 126), 'the nationalist project in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was heavily under the influence of Western models of modernity'. Examples of such influence are evidenced in penal codes. In Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal code as presented by Abu-Odeh (1997, 295), which is still used today (Fanack, 2021), we see the strong influence of French Penal Codes.

"Excuse in Murder," Article 340 provides: (1) He who catches his wife, or one of his (female) unlawfully committing adultery with another, and he kills, wounds, or injures one or both of them, is exempt from any

penalty. (2) He who catches his wife, or one of his (female) ascendants, descendants or sisters with another in an unlawful bed, and he kills or wounds or injures one or both of them, benefits from a reduction of penalty.

Abu-Odeh (1997) reveals how this article was developed from two legal sources: the Ottoman Penal Code 1858 and the French Penal Code 1810. 'From the Ottoman Code, Article 340 of the Jordanian Penal Code adopted the expressions "female unlawfulness" and "unlawful bed." From the French Code, the article borrowed the expression "ascendante, descendante" and the idea of a partial excuse...' (Abu-Odeh, 1997, 295). Abu-Odeh asserts that there is a clear tension between the ideas of passion and honour in Arab penal codes which is in part influenced by Western penal codes.

The formation of nation-states and colonial influences represents the overall shift from pre-modern to modern courts and legal systems in the Muslim world. Preceding late-19th-century reforms the practice of *sharī'ah* by the pre-modern courts demonstrated the assimilation and consideration of social practices of the community within which rulings were being formed (Sonbol, 2009).

One could talk of the courts as indigenous social institutions, organically linked to the communities they served, where the interpretation of *Shari'ah* law was moulded to the local *'urf*, and where the wide array of Islamic *fiqh* sources represented valid sources of law. This abruptly shifted during the modernisation era, when the influence of European philosophy and legal systems was embedded into new, standardised personal status codes (Sonbol, 2009, 201-202).

Three clear and pivotal differences arise between the codified personal status laws of the new nation-states and the *sharī'ah* due to the codification process and the influence of European philosophy. These are: (1) 'the philosophical approach to gender and law; (2) the application of law in courts; and (3) the codified structure of the law itself' (Sonbol, 2009, 188). 'Common practices, at the heart of a system which

had been organically linked to the society it served, were replaced by particular laws suitable to nineteenth-century nation state patriarchal hegemony' (Sonbol, 2009 184).

The preceding is simply an indication of the evolving legal systems of the East and colonised lands. There are also other factors that have impacted how HBV become systemised into the legal apparatus. Factors such as tribal and customary societies migrating to cities and urban areas, the dominance of male and patriarchal ideologies within authoritative spaces; all these influenced how honour was viewed and utilised (Baron 2006). Alongside varying religio-legal factors, other social, economic, and political factors further influenced and impacted how honour developed over the modern period. But what is necessary to highlight here is the role Western colonial forces had in the development and codification of honour ideals and practices and modern nation-state legal systems. In short, the conception of honour in the Eastern lands, and its codification into law, was deeply influenced by Western interventions.

7.3 Orientalism

Alongside the impact of colonial interventions, we find Orientalist narratives shaping depictions of the colonised lands within the West through the othering and eroticisation to present the West as superior. Orientalist depictions of non-Western cultures and societies, and Islam, as other, barbaric, inferior, immoral, and lesser than the West continue to exist in current day Islamophobic narratives. Despite today the West having distanced itself from gendered notions of honour, during the period of colonialism and Orientalism a gendered notion of honour was endorsed. We examined this notion in chapter 2; in this chapter, we will explore how the honour-endorsing West viewed and portrayed the honour of the so-called 'other'.

Orientalism, Said (1978) demonstrates, was the construction of the Orient based on European Western experience. 'Orientalism is a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological distinction made between "the Orient" and (most of the time) "the Occident."' (Said, 1978, 2). Orientalism viewed the Orient and Islam 'as an object for investigation and control' (Yeğenoğlu, 1999, 14). The Orient was 'depicted', it was a place the West 'judges', 'disciplines', 'illustrates' to the extent that it become 'contained' and 'represented' by Western frameworks (Said, 1978, 40). These depictions of an '...irrational, depraved (fallen), childlike...' East were

contrasted with a 'rational, virtuous, mature, "normal"' West (Said, 1978,.40). Said asserts (1978, 36) that 'there are Westerns, and there are Orientals. The former dominates; the latter must be dominated, which usually means having their land occupied, their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power'. Within such conceptions, we find the justification for the colonisation of the East.

Regarding the notion of honour and its allied notion of shame, Said's work does not primarily focus on portrayals of Eastern honour/shame dynamics by the West; however, we still do find mentioning of the notion in his references to Orientalist accounts of the Occident. Said (1978) presents the February 1972 issue of the *American Journal of Psychiatry* article entitled *The Arab World*, written by Harold W. Glidden. In this article, within which Glidden only uses four references to substantiate his claims regarding the Orient, he apparently 'uncovers' 'the inner workings of Arab Behaviour' which the West view as 'aberrant' and the Arab deems 'normal' (Said, 1978, 48).

After this auspicious start, we are told that Arabs stress conformity; that Arabs inhabit a shame culture whose "prestige system" involves the ability to attract followers and clients ... that Arabs can function only in conflict situations; that prestige is based solely on the ability to dominate others; that a shame culture - and therefore Islam itself - makes a virtue of revenge ... that if from a Western point of view "the only rational thing for the Arabs to do is to make peace...for the Arabs the situation is not governed by this kind of logic, for objectivity is not a value in the Arab system."...the Arab need for vengeance overrides everything, otherwise the Arab would feel "ego-destroying" shame (Said, 1978, 48-49).

The depictions of the East here represent a barbaric, backwards, and morally inferior society and culture, portrayals that still exist within the West today. 'Talal Asad suggests that the Orientalist's concern in comparing and contrasting the Orient with his/her own civilization is to show the absence of "liberty," "progress," and humanism in Islamic societies, and that the reason for this absence is located in the religious essence of Islam' (Yeğenoğlu, 1999, 97). This contrasting is evident in the above

discourse of shame by Glidden (Said, 1978). The unnuanced reference to a shame culture against a sophisticated West can still be located today within some academics', secular feminists', media, and Western human-rights activists' narratives and research. Much has not changed since the publishing of Glidden's article in 1972. Today within the West, honour and shame are still invoked as backwards and barbaric concepts and systems benefitting the egotistic, barbaric males of the East, at the expense of women. Current popular Western depictions, (through the media, government policies and some academic scholarly work, as will become apparent in the following) of the honour-shame complex of the East and Muslim communities resemble Orientalist and Colonial narratives and are a continuation thereof. There appears to exist a conscious effort in constructing portrayals of a system which is far more complex than Orientalists and colonialist intend to portray, as simply a dated, barbaric mode of controlling and subjugating women.

More astounding, though, are the conspicuous double standards in social norms, values, and practices between Western communities and those in the majority world. In the current era, Western depictions of the honour/shame complex of Muslim communities is portrayed as outdated. But in the period where we see these othering depictions being formed (the period of colonisation), the West still dominantly endorsed a retrogressive notion of honour. Abu-Odeh in his 1997 article *Comparatively Speaking: The "Honour" of the "East" and the "Passion" of the "West"*, examines honour crimes in the Muslim world and the attempts to create a legal discourse concerning these crimes through codifying crimes of honour. Through discussing the legal and conceptual positioning of honour crimes in the Muslim world, he compares these to crimes of passion of the West. In his examination, it becomes clear that an ideology of honour not only existed in the West but also informed legal codes relating to crimes and violence in the name of honour. Such influences on penal codes have also been stressed by Baron (2006) and Sonbol (2003, 2007), as I discuss above.

Abu-Odeh (1997, 290) highlights that while the two systems of honour-based violence, those prevalent in the majority and minority worlds or in Eastern vs Western contexts, are not identical, some similarities allow for crimes to be dealt with in the same manner. He shows how in both Arab and in American legal systems, concepts of

honour and passion coexist and are brought together, despite inherent tensions in this violent coexistence. (It should be noted that this paper was published in 1997 and therefore these findings are more representative of honour codes in the West in this period.) The comparison of HBV and crimes of passion will be dealt with in more detail in the coming sections. For now, the point I emphasise is that although understandings of crimes of passion may have changed in the current period and may seem distanced from a traditional and highly gendered concept of honour, earlier developments of the idea of crimes of passion were informed by a notion of honour that can be clearly recognised as privileging male sensibilities over women's safety. Abu-Odeh cites Victoria Nourse, who states 'in early modern law, passion was defined by a set of categories derived from an older social order, indeed a code of *honor*...Adultery was at the centre of the categories, the classic source of adequate provocation, enforcing rules of gender relations grounded in an older idea of *property*' (cited in Abu-Odeh 1997, 299). A concept of honour within the West, in the 19th and 20th centuries, was linked to adultery and the objectification of women as the possessions of their husband. Thus, Glidden's portrayal of the Eastern 'shame system' seems to clearly be an attempt to portray the East as 'other', as atavistic, and retrograde. In reality, the honour/shame complex was not new to Glidden; in fact, it was fully embedded in Western thought and informed Western conceptions and behaviours towards women (see chapter 2 and following sections). '...A comparative analysis of the legally sanctioned violence against women (for intimate or sexual reasons), of both the Arab legal system and that of the American, reveals the fallacy of ... the orientalist construction that the East is different from the West...' (Abu-Odeh, 1997, 290).

A plethora of evidence gathered by Said, Yeğenoğlu, Baron, Sonbol, Abu Odeh, Khalid and others reveals then that Orientalist narratives have a specific association with gender. 'Gendered orientalism created categories of people according to race and gender, defining through these categories what 'men' or 'women', 'us' and 'them', 'Afghan/ Arab/ Muslim' and 'Western' are and do' (Khalid, 2011, 27). Gendered Orientalism within the contemporary period can be conceived in the justifications of the 'War on Terror'. The discourses deployed dichotomies of 'good vs. evil, civilised vs. barbaric, rational vs. irrational, progressive vs. backward' (Khalid, 2011, 15). In this Western hegemonic narrative and similar narratives of liberating Muslim women and calls for Muslim women's rights, we find the manipulation of conceptions of gender,

gender roles and sexuality 'along racial lines' (Khalid 2011, 15). What gendered orientalism contributes to is the creation of gendered hierarchies where 'barbaric brown men' and 'oppressed brown women' are placed at the bottom (Khalid, 2011, 20). The repeated mentioning of good and evil binaries and the 'women's rights' rhetoric in the 'War on Terror' narratives reveal a different set of motives to the acclaimed response to 9/11 or the possession of weapons of mass destruction (Khalid, 2011 20). Military operations, like those in Afghanistan and Iraq, that were based on a supposed and much-publicised commitment to women's rights made the situation worse for women. What these other justifications represent is Orientalist logic. Appeals to women's rights disguise the gendered orientalism that is linked to patriarchy and hegemonic toxic masculinities and disguise the gendered tensions and oppression Western women have also faced and continue to face in the West. The same can be said for the utilisation of the honour/shame complex by the West to depict non-Western societies as backwards and inferior. Thus, the critique of honour codes that is at the heart of this analysis is necessarily as deeply focused on the role of Western-colonial and Orientalist anti-women discourses and policies as it is upon internal honour codes in Islamic societies, past and present. I turn now to a deeper scrutiny of how women are positioned in the wider discourses of Orientalism and how these depictions affect their lives in the real world.

7.4 Positioning Muslim women in Orientalist narratives

Regarding Muslim women and Orientalist narratives during the colonial period, we see two dominant positions:

1. The eroticisation of Muslim women and the desire to unveil them to fulfil Western male fantasies.
2. The comparison/contrast between 'liberated' Western women and 'oppressed' Eastern women, who must be saved from their barbaric culture and menfolk by the West and by Western 'sophisticated' and 'liberal' ideals.

The first view, the positioning of Muslim women in Orientalist narratives, is discussed extensively by Yeğenoğlu in her previously referenced book *Colonial Fantasies* (1999). Yeğenoğlu (1999, 11) analyses how the veiled Oriental woman not only signifies women of the Orient as 'mysterious and exotic'; it also represents the whole of the Orient as 'feminine, always veiled, seductive, and dangerous'. She argues that

'the Western feminist desire to lift the veil of the Oriental woman in the name of "liberating" her reflects the historical, cultural, psychical, and political obsessions of the culture that produced Western women' (Yeğenoğlu, 1999, 12).

In her critical scrutiny of the veil through the Western lens, Yeğenoğlu (1999) presents how the West is obsessed with unveiling Muslim women and unveiling the mysterious Orient. 'In Western eyes, the Orient is always *more* and *other* than what it appears to be, for it always and everywhere appears in a veiled, disguised and deceptive manner' (Yeğenoğlu, 1999, 48). This desire to unveil is clearly depicted in the work of Malek Alloula (1986), *The Colonial Harem*, where he exposes the postcards as staged, distorted images that reveal more about the coloniser's fantasies and desire to unveil the Algerian woman rather than reality during the period of the French colonial presence in Algeria.

In regard to the second position, the comparison of the Eastern women to the Western woman and Western saviour narratives, 'one of the central elements in the ideological justification of colonial culture is the criticism of the cultural practices and religious customs of Oriental societies which are shown to be monstrously oppressing women' (Yeğenoğlu, 1999, 98). It is within the Orientalist constructed images of the 'highly charged symbols' the East, Muslim culture, the harem, the veil and polygamy, that functioned as 'synonyms of female oppression', that the colonial female desire was 'nourished' (Yeğenoğlu, 1999, 100). Here I do not make the point that the Orient did not contain problematic practices but rather, it was the view propagated within the West that such problems only existed in the Orient. By depicting the Orient as inferior, Orientalists, whether in writing, in postcards or in policy, represented themselves, their women and their social norms as modern and liberated. Women of the Orient had to be freed in accordance with Western standards of liberation. This is the same discourse we can locate within Western media, policy, military campaigns and even tendentious 'academic research' today, and the now-failed American invasion of Afghanistan is a prime example of this.

Today, HBV is utilised to portray the urgency of protecting and freeing Muslim women. The term 'honour crime' essentialises crimes and violence that occur within non-Western cultures, including and especially Islamic cultures, and depicts them as

unique to the broader category of gender or domestic violence and as prevalent in Muslim households. The specific terms and depictions of this violence of the East and Islam perpetuates a West vs the rest dichotomy. It presents the East and its violence against women as barbaric, and as non-existent within the West. But as the remainder of this chapter will reveal, gendered and domestic violence exists within the West too, in astonishingly and dishearteningly persistent ways. Moreover, the foundational ideologies of these forms of violence are similar and rooted in patriarchal notions of honour. Ultimately, the otherizing of the East and Islam through utilisation of 'honour' and its associated practices mirrors the weaponization and politicisation of Muslim women in early Oriental and Colonial discourses, while erasing, de-emphasising or 'white-washing' gender-based honour codes of violence and control that are highly ubiquitous across communities in the 'developed' Western world.

7.5 Current day Islamophobia

Western orientalist narratives and colonial influences have continued to impact modern Western conceptions of the East/Islam and 'their' ideologies and practices of honour. Despite a profoundly gendered notion of honour existing within the West, Orientalist narratives essentialised the honour/shame paradigms of the East to portray them as backwards, inferior and uncivilized. As one of the consequences of colonial interventions, we see crimes of passion (which are rooted in honour ideologies) influencing the establishment of honour in state judiciary within the East. Yet, honour within the East, despite Western influences on its modern form of existence, is emphasised as one of the many indicators and practices of the uncivilized, backwards East. Muslim men are depicted as oppressive and barbaric upholders of uncivilized cultural ideals. We see that these Orientalist narratives persist to this day in Islamophobic rhetoric in policymaking and in mainstream journalism/media.

The term 'Islamophobia' according to the *Runnymede commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia* (1997), concerns unsubstantiated hostility towards Muslims. A more recent definition defines Islamophobia as 'rooted in racism and is a type of racism that targets expression of Muslimness or perceived Muslimness' (Islamophobia-definition, 2021).

The Runnymede report stressed some key findings concerning the subsistence of Islamophobia in Britain. Placed under the category of 'closed views' of Islam, these were perceptions of: Islam as single, monolithic, static and unable to respond to new contemporary realities; Islam as 'other' and unable to share common values and ideals with other cultures; Islam as inferior to the West, 'barbaric, irrational, primitive, sexist'; clash of civilization narratives that represent Islam as inherently violent, aggressive and a threat; Islam as a political ideology; critiques of Islam based on its criticisms of the West; the exclusion and discrimination of Muslims based on hostility towards Islam; and the acceptance of this hostility as natural (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, 5).

The otherization of Islam from the West is induced through both implied and unequivocal differentiation as follows: "We are civilised, reasonable, generous, efficient, sophisticated, enlightened, non-sexist. 'They' are primitive, violent, irrational, scheming, disorganised, oppressive" (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, 6). Such rhetoric is evident in the way honour is depicted and associated with Islam and Muslims within the West.

7.6 Britain and Honour

Within Britain, but also the West more broadly, we can see the continuation of Orientalist style otherization of the East and Islam. Here I will attempt to analyse the major aspects of this complex and multidimensional subject of honour in Britain. Ultimately this section aims to shed light on the problematic nature of how honour is conceptualised and utilised within Britain, which subsequently further impacts the lives of Muslim women.

7.7 Media

A fitting place to begin with is the mainstream media that largely shapes public opinion, in print form, broadcast on TV/radio or online in social media, blogs, podcasts, chat forums and the like. 'The media play a crucial role in reinforcing social perceptions'; however, the media frequently creates sensationalised views (Keyhani, 2013, 274). Much of the contemporary Western conceptions of HBV are in some way influenced by media representations. Media outlets, as will become clear, perpetuate Orientalist style depictions of the East, and specifically Islam.

The Runnymede report (1997) identifies a recurring theme of British media portrayals of Islam as oppressive to Muslim women in a manner far more deplorable in comparison to the treatment of women in other cultures and religions. Keyhani (2013, 261) asserts that there is plentiful research representing how Western Media, including the British Media, 'portray honour killings as a Muslim phenomenon'. The media within Britain hold a central role in how Islam is 'conceived and generalised' (Keyhani, 2013, 261). By '...identifying Islamic cultures as deeply imbued with backward approaches to gender relations, associating Islam intrinsically with honour killings, and highlighting Islamic cultures as therefore inherently problematic have left a tangle of anger and moral superiority' (Sen cited in Keyhani, 2013, 261). Honour killings alongside other practices such as FGM and forced marriages, are 'still routinely referred to in media reports as 'cultural practices', as if these reflect normal and widely endorsed behaviour in minority communities' (Dustin and Phillips, 2008, 419). These media portrayals reinforce Orientalist narratives of non-Western cultures and Islam as oppressive to women and emphasise the necessity of minority communities to assimilate to the superior Western civilized culture.

According to Gill, (2006, 6), 'the public discourse in Europe has been simplistic, sensational and essentialist, stigmatising ethnic and religious groups, and dividing communities between 'us' and 'them' or 'others'... the 'others' are criticised as outsiders and as problematic communities, with barbaric and backward cultures'. She further highlights some central themes that become evident in media coverage and reports concerning HBV:

Violence against women in this group was overwhelmingly defined as 'clash of cultures' and 'honour killings' ... Phrases like 'ghastly way of life', 'culture' and 'western ways' were used to describe the event and the experiences of young women of Muslim background in general. The idea that honour crimes had become an 'epidemic' was pervasive in media accounts (Gill, 2006, 3).

Dustin (2016) examines the media portrayals of child abuse cases in the UK by both white and Asian (and/or Muslim) male perpetrators. These cases reveal inconsistencies in media coverage depending on the identity of the victims and

perpetrators. In terms of crimes of white men, if culture was blamed, it was the culture of a specific 'time and place in British history', but the problem was not collectively associated with *white British men* (Dustin, 2016, 55). Conversely, regarding the case of Asian or Muslim perpetrators, culture and collective identity were centred in media portrayals.

Noticeably, when crimes are committed by minority or Muslim perpetrators, or if the victims of HBV are minority or Muslim women, then the significance of culture is overly privileged in popular Western narratives, and the crimes are generally portrayed as HBV. For Western men who commit violence or murder against partners, due to sexual affairs or due to partners deciding to leave them, the media portrays this as an individual acting due to provocation. Varying factors are considered in accounting for the cause of violence. Yet, 'the specific details of the crime and individuals concerned are less remarkable than the broader phenomenon of 'honour violence' when violence occurs within minority communities within Britain (Dustin 2016, 57-58). The comparison of honour crimes and crimes of passion will be analysed in further detail in the coming. Yet it is clear, media outlets within Britain, and the West more generally, perpetuate Orientalist depictions of the East and emphasise stereotypes of the 'other' as barbaric and oppressive to women while ignoring parallel 'honour' codes that bring violence, control and oppression to the lives of white/Western women across social classes in Western societies.

7.8 Conceptualising honour in policy and law

Four key practices, commonly found within the media as associated with the Middle East or Islam, subsequently influenced public policy. These were (according to Dustin and Phillips, 2008, 405):

1. Forced marriage
2. Honour Killing
3. Female Genital Cutting/mutilation or FGM
4. Women's Islamic dress

It is within the area of developing public policy that the issue of honour killings becomes further problematic. We begin to see Orientalist tropes, and Islamophobic

narratives dominating the way these practices are conceptualised, and further, how they are tackled. In government attempts to address these issues, we see prevailing Islamophobic tropes: of minority communities in Britain depicted as monolithic, and anti-immigration agendas becoming intertwined with attempts to protect women. Addressing practices relating to minority women in Britain appears to be dominated by and go hand-in-hand with 'promoting stereotypes of culture' (Dustin and Phillips, 2008, 405). In terms of anti-immigration agendas, these are not only restricted to Britain. Such agendas are also apparent in Donald Trump's travel ban imposed during his presidency. Honour killings were mentioned as a justification for the banning of individuals from certain countries from entering the United States of America (Bangs, 2018).

7.9 Multiculturalism

The conceptualisation of HBV is central to how such crimes have subsequently been addressed in public policy and are understood by British society. Multiculturalism was introduced into Britain as a means of combating racism and aiming to 'promote an integrated and tolerant society, where the diversity of cultures and races are valued equally' (Keyhani, 2013, 270). Yet it has been criticised for becoming an excuse for inaction. However, it is in the name of multiculturalism that conceptions of culture have been abused:

In both academic and popular discussions of multiculturalism, there has been a tendency towards what Uma Narayan (2000) describes as cultural essentialism, or Seyla Benhabib (2002: 4) as a 'reductionist sociology of culture': a tendency to represent cultures as more distinct from one another, less marked by internal contestation, and more determining of individual behaviour, than is ever the case (Dustin and Phillips, 2008, 408).

According to Dustin and Phillips (2008, 408) cultures are ordered along an axis that identifies non-European cultures as inferior and backwards and progressive cultures being European, Western cultures. This axis identifies 'the actions and beliefs of people from minority or non-western cultures simply as expressions of 'their culture, which not only presumes an extraordinary degree of homogeneity within the cultural

group, but also denies individual agency' (Dustin and Phillips, 2008, 408). We see practices that are more prevalent in certain cultural groups being depicted as 'cherished cultural tradition' as if all members of the culture engage in the practice of, for example, forced marriages. Within such discourses culture is depicted as an overpowering force that dictates all behaviours including murder in some communities.

According to Mason (2018, 22-24), multiculturalism as a political programme faces many criticisms, some of which are:

1. It essentialises the concept of culture and treats it as 'static, homogenous, and bounded'.
2. It is not for the benefit of women. Provocation 'advantages' could be serving perpetrators and placing women of these communities at further risk (this will be discussed further in the following pages).

Some of these critiques demonstrate how gender-biased this system can be, and how it impacts women negatively by conflating the more complex causes of violence against women into misrepresentations of 'culture'. Minority women's voices are notably absent in many of these debates around multiculturalism and gendered violence, and the neglect of the multiple forms of male domination as well as racialised 'othering' that attack and oppress Muslim women are rarely discussed with the evidence, depth and nuance that is so urgently needed, with Muslim women's views at the heart of the discussion.

Women's groups called for more impactful actions to be taken relating to violence against women from minority communities. 'Activists sometimes complained that the government was failing to act because of an exaggerated respect for cultural difference' (Shachar, 2001, 66). Yet when the government did take up these matters, Shachar (2001, 66) argues that '...they threatened to become entangled with anti-immigration or anti-multiculturalism agendas, encouraging representations of minority cultural groups as inherently backward or oppressive, and stereotyping women from these groups as 'victims without agency''. Ironically, the government that seemed to avoid delving into 'cultural' practices in the name of tolerance and respect for other

cultures did away with these values when they were pressed to recognise the risk women from minority communities were exposed to. Rather than implementing positive legislation to support these women, the British government instead used these narratives to push their own colonial and orientalist agendas further. Delays in government acknowledgment of violence against women as a human rights issue were in part due to these practices being associated with issues of race and immigration (Dustin, 2006, 53).

7.10 Provocation

HBV is not the only form of domestic or gendered violence prevalent in Britain. It is also not the only form of violence where perpetrators have been excused or had their punishments lessened. Concerning murder within the UK, provocation was 'a partial defence to homicide pursuant to the Homicide Act 1957' (Keyhani, 2013, 266). The provocation defence was developed in England when homicides were punishable by death. Murders committed due to provocation were treated differently from other types of homicide and the provocation defence reduced what would be a murder charge to manslaughter (Abu-Odeh, 1997, 296). For a defence of provocation to be established, two tests were required to be undertaken: a subjective and objective test.

The subjective element determines whether the defendant suffered from a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, whereas the objective element determines whether a reasonable man would have acted in the same way as the defendant (Keyhani, 2013, 266).

The questions then are: who is deemed a reasonable man, and what are 'reasonable' behaviours? Indeed, the so-called objective aspect of the test is based on a subjective conception of a reasonable man. The historical origins of the defence of provocation reveals that:

In the 2003 Consultation Paper on 'Partial Defences to Homicide', the Law Commission of England and Wales found that the defence of provocation is "historically rooted in male notions of honour." However, although men in Britain continue to use cultural defences, they no longer refer to 'honour' as a motivating factor. Instead, in Western societies,

“men’s excuses for murder often rest on ‘nagging and shagging’ defences, which caused the man to ‘snap’ and kill out of anger.” Thus, the association of honour with murder or domestic violence is now mainly applicable to ethnic minority communities in the UK (Keyhani, 2013, 266)

As I have mentioned earlier, crimes of passion are rooted in historical notions of honour. Yet, today, clear distinctions are drawn between crimes of passion and crimes of honour in Britain. These distinctions lead to the HBV being depicted as specific to minority or non-Western cultures who are subsequently seen as other, barbaric, and backwards in comparison to the liberated modern West. Yet, ironically, as Keyhani (2013, 268) emphasises, despite HBV being utilised to depict the ‘...plight of Muslim women as oppressed and needing to be saved from a barbaric system, the provocation defence in the UK can assist in men being saved’ from the full consequences of their crimes. As Abu-Odeh states, ‘the provocation exception exhibits a continuum of acceptance of honour crimes as a necessary means to an end’ (Cited in Keyhani, 2013, 268).

In 2010, we saw the abandonment of the provocation defence for ‘the loss of control’ defence. However, arguably this is broadly similar to the provocation defence (e-Law Resources, no date). Thus, the issues of ‘provocation’, or ‘loss of control’ and the notion of ‘honour crime’ remain live ones for women of both Muslim and other backgrounds.

7.11 Domestic violence and crimes of passion

What can be deduced from the provocation defence and the loss of control defence is that gendered violence is not unique to the non-West or Islam. Whether they are framed as domestic violence or crimes of passion, they all can, inclusive of the HBV, be placed beneath the umbrella terms of gendered violence, violence against women, patriarchal violence, misogynistic violence and so on. These terms are arguably either synonymous, overlapping or interrelated. But of course, as this research project has demonstrated, semantics are crucial. It is in the discussion of semantics that we begin to realise the varying implications and consequences of terminology and its uses in the lived realities of people. The framing of certain types of violence within minority

communities, with varying terms in comparison to acts of violence occurring within other (white) communities in the West, has specific consequences. The terms are utilised for specific reasons: they perpetuate dichotomies of the West vs the rest. Before expounding further on this point, I will first examine crimes of passion that have been mentioned throughout this chapter. To understand the impact of these varying specific terms, it is crucial we apprehend precisely how gendered violence is categorised within the West.

We have established that crimes of passion are based on historical Western conceptions of honour. Above I have mentioned Abu-Odeh (1997, 298-299) quoting Victoria Nourse regarding the progression of the crime of passion which, in early modern law, was defined by a code of honour. Abu-Odeh asserts, that the notion of the crime of passion within the United States, and I argue in the West generally, is 'in extraordinary disarray'.

... Although most jurisdictions have adopted what appears to be a similar "reasonable man" standard, that standard has been applied in dramatically different ways, with jurisdictions borrowing from both liberal and traditional theories. Some states require a "sudden" passion, others allow emotion to build up over time; some reject claims based on "mere words," others embrace them. (Abu-Odeh 1997, 298-299).

The legal diminishment of punishments for intimate or domestic violence – violence that is excessively associated with Middle Eastern or Muslim countries – in reality, knows 'no borders' (Bangs, 2018, 3).

That femicides are considered "honor killings" in the United States only when "brought" to the country by MENA immigrants is not only orientalist, but ignorant of a broad permissiveness of intimate partner violence that has long been an accepted part of American culture. The U.S. legal doctrine reducing murder charges to manslaughter in the case of adultery have been in operation for over 200 years (Bangs 2018).

The notion of 'passion' within the West, like the term honour, is also complicated and imprecise, allowing for its manipulation to the detriment of women. Yet contemporary usages of the term, especially within popular Western discourse, sternly separate and highlight the distinctions of this crime from HBV of the East and in Islamicate communities. Some of the differences emphasised are for instance the victims of the crimes. Abu-Odeh (1997) states that it is mainly wives and girlfriends who become victim of crimes of passion. Whereas, in the East, it is daughters and sisters. Major differences attributed to the two forms of violence are that honour is conceived to be based on ideas of 'kin, status, honor, and collectivity,' whereas crimes of passion are based on ideas of 'individualism, romantic fusion, and sexual jealousy' (Abu-Odeh 1997, 293).

Yet, what is ordinarily overlooked is the similarities of the two forms of violence. Abu-Odeh (1997, 298) states that adultery was a central factor in the crime of passion and honour crimes. The act being witnessed was not required and the belief of it occurring was sufficient for defence. This idea of reacting with violence in moments of suspicion is also a common cause from contemporary HBV in Islamicate contexts. As I discussed in chapter 2, perceived sexual misconduct, or even doubt regarding sexual transgressions and loss of virginity is enough to incite HBV. Such non-substantiated accusations diverge from Islamic practices of *qadhaf* which we discussed in chapter 6. It therefore appears that reactionary forms of violence more closely replicate Western models of provocation and deviate from the Islamic injunction of illicit sexual acts needing to be witnessed and not based on suspicion. Thus 'jealousy, sexual refusals, and perceived and actual infidelity on the part of women' are mentioned as motivations for a man committing crime of passion, but are also motivations for HBV (Dobash, et al. 2004, 582).

Crimes of passion are commonly associated with 'jealous men' against their 'supposedly unfaithful' partners whilst HBV are by 'vengeful relatives' against 'female family members' who have caused dishonour (Goldstein, 2002, 28). Yet, in both crimes, there is a shared assumption that women's sexual conduct is a viable cause in the instigation of a man's loss of control (Phillips, 2003, 35). Thus, as Goldstein (2002, 28) rightly emphasises, these terms are far from precise as 'they overlap greatly in usage, but they are similarly, and troublingly, guilt-mitigating'. The policing of female

bodies and sexual agency and, crimes committed based on doubts of sexual 'transgressions' are foundational to both crimes of passion within the West and honour crimes of the East. Be they crimes of passion or HBV, the victims are women. Yet oddly the two kinds of crimes are considered distinctive and very different from one another in popular Western consciousness.

Abu-Odeh (1997, 305-6) stresses:

Rather than a dividing line separating them, "East" and "West" seem to meet in a circular movement where one becomes the other... American "passion" unleashed merges with Arab honor released: more women are killed, for "provocative" acts more numerous, after more time has passed, based on evidence more tentative. The twain East and West, when it comes to violence against women, meet.

What terminology does is shift the attention to who is *more* barbaric, violent, inhuman, and backwards. Varying terminology allows for the problems to be shifted elsewhere to the other, the non-West. Major attention and efforts are dedicated to liberating the oppressed women of non-Western cultures. Liberating them with modern Western values. This comparison and use of specific terminology allow the West to disguise its own negative, misogynistic practices and realities. It distracts us from identifying the cause of the problem. It diverts us from challenging the patriarchy that transcends geographical boundaries and locations. Violence against women, whether labelled as domestic violence, gendered violence, patriarchal violence (etc.) is a reality that all women can become victim to, regardless of geographical location, class, race, ethnicity, religion, or marital status. There is a range of varying intersectional factors that influence the violence women experience. What is common though is that violence against women is present in all societies, regardless of how we choose to discuss it.

7.12 The deficiencies of culturalist framings of honour and the broader factors at play

At the start of this chapter, I briefly discussed the role of patriarchy in influencing the formation of nation-states, in perpetuating gendered violence through the codification

of notions of honour into the legal systems in a manner that had no precedence in pre-modern Muslim societies. In this section, I intend to highlight the inadequacies of associating certain forms of violence with honour and therefore deeming them cultural forms of violence, and further, the role of the state and other factors in perpetuating negative honour codes that impact women. It will become clear that the label of honour as a cultural belief system and system of practice is flawed and inaccurate, as it overlooks various interrelating factors and aspects that impact the persistence of violence against women.

Abu-Lughod (2013, 113) describes the term honour crimes as ‘...the most iconic of the cultural-legal categories created to describe the deplorable state of women’s rights in the Muslim world’. She (2013, 114) argues that when honour crimes are labelled as acts of violence or practices specific to certain ethnic or cultural communities, then it is the culture itself that is being identified as the cause of violence. It is not that acts of violence are reprimanded but rather entire cultures, communities and subsequently Islam in some cases.

In her book *Do Muslim Women Need Saving?* Abu-Lughod (2013, 113) challenges the use of the term honour crimes as ‘this category risks consolidating the stigmatization of the Muslim world and does not do justice to women’. She (2013, 115-116) identifies four problems with the category of honour crimes. These four problems relate to the broader factors that are disregarded because of the usage of this term.

1. The first factor is the simplification of morality within such societies. She asserts how prevalent usages of terms such as honour distort the complex relations that exist between men and women within honour-endorsing communities.
2. Usages of the term honour to signify cultural practices perpetuate colonial and orientalist narratives of the West vs. the rest and civilized vs. uncivilized, as we have discussed in the aforementioned pages.
3. Her third point stresses the erasure of ‘the modern state institutions and techniques of governance that are integral to both the incidents of violence and the category by which they are understood’ (2013, 115-116).

4. Finally, there is the problem of honour crimes being conceived of as an 'antipolitics machine' that masks the impact of 'social transformations and political conflicts' (2013, 115-116).

7.13 The simplification of moral systems

Abu-Lughod (2013, 116) argues honour terms do no 'justice to the way women see themselves in such communities'. Her personal experience of having lived many years within a community that 'prided itself on its commitment to honor' exemplify honour values as part of a 'shared and complexly lived moral code that inspired and obligated individuals'. She stresses, 'for the men and women I knew, honor was based on upholding personal ideals from valor to generosity, from trustworthiness to refusal to accept slights' (2013, 116-117). Honour, within these communities was relevant to men in a manner similar to how it was to women:

men were expected to keep a respectful distance from unrelated women and to treat them politely. They would never mention their wives or other women from their family in front of other men – out of respect. Sex outside of marriage was dishonourable for both men and women.

In her book *Veiled Sentiments* (1986) Abu-Lughod goes into extensive detail about the Bedouin tribe Awlad 'Ali and their honour codes, revealing their complexities. In these accounts, we find women who did not see themselves as constricted by honour codes and rather spoke of themselves 'as persons who knew right from wrong' (Abu-Lughod 2-13, 118). Nevertheless, despite these shared values of honour, we cannot overlook the fact that the consequences of honour are not always equal. Women generally face significantly harsher consequences of honour breaches than men. Yet, negative experiences of honour are not homogenous within Eastern or Muslim communities. Abu-Lughod's works' evidence how honour codes are valued and cherished by both men and women and that the impact of such codes is more complex and nuanced than what is communicated about them in a variety of Western narratives of honour. As she (2013, 117-118) interrogates: 'should this moral system that sets ideals for both men and women – shaped as it is by the social structure of patrilineal kin relations that organizes descent, inheritance, economy, and political and social

relations – be understood (and judged) as simply a form of patriarchal oppression of women leading to violence?’

7.14 Perpetuating colonial and Orientalist narratives

Popular Western narratives of honour and terms like ‘honour crimes’ divide civilized from uncivilized, the West from the rest. In Western condemnations of HBV, the honour code is depicted as an illiberal value, one that the West does not embrace. The selective association and focus on violence regarding honour leads to honour codes being further depicted as barbaric, oppressive, and illiberal. Dustin and Phillips (2008, 412) also emphasise how language and definitions can be highly problematic especially in relation to topics such as HBV. They (2008, 412) argue that ‘use of the term honour can suggest that the crimes are in some sense honourable’. Furthermore, they stress how contrasting crimes of honour of the East with crimes of passion of the West feeds into ‘Orientalism that represents minority cultural groups as profoundly different in their values and behaviour from majority cultural groups’ (Dustin and Phillips, 2008, 412). But as Abu-Lughod asserts, such violence is not exclusive to certain cultures and communities nor exclusively related to their honour codes.

Things can go wrong for people everywhere. Some fathers are violent, some brothers commit incest, there are men who kill their wives and lovers on suspicion, and there are families and marriages that are dysfunctional and abusive. “Honour cultures” do not have a monopoly on violence against women...And not all families in communities where sexual modesty is a key element of young women’s morality react the same way to suspicious or sexual infractions. The problem is that when violence occurs in some communities, culture is blamed; in others only the individuals involved are accused or faulted (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 126-127).

Such narratives of censoring culture result in ‘self-righteous commitment’ creating a superiority complex where the West is portrayed as above such barbaric forms of violence and worthy of the role of saviour (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 127). This act of treating HBV as timeless cultural practices prevents such violence from being seen as ‘perverse and diverse acts of individuals in different circumstances who sometime

work with a complex of concepts linked to honor' (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 128). Such orientalist and Islamophobic narratives lead to the stigmatisation of whole communities. In turn, such categorisations provide opportunities for discourses to be manipulated and to push for anti-immigration agendas, as I have mentioned earlier (Bangs, 2018; Reddy, 2008, 210-211).

7.15 Erasing the influence of modern state institutions and governance

Terms such as HBV also conceal governmental and transnational organizations' impact on people and communities. Regarding human rights reports, Abu-Lughod (2013) expresses how such reports hide away the impact of such institutions. Honour crimes '...whether "over there" or "in our midst," are always implicated in the social institutions of policing, surveillance, and intervention', as we have discussed already in relation to the formation of nation-states (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 131). She further asserts that it is the failure of such organisations that is responsible for the victimization of many women.

Honor crimes cannot be analysed as if they were free-floating or rooted in ancient codes and tradition-bound cultures. The honor crime gives legitimacy and resilience not just to all the mechanisms of regulation, surveillance, and mass mediation intrinsic to modern state power but also to the specific forms and forums of contemporary transnational governance, whether neoliberal economic institutions or humanitarian intervention of the feminist or military sort (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 136).

Many attempts of states to regulate HBV are themselves a form of violence. Overlooking the role of the state has led to the inability to 'account for important variations encountered in women's conditions both within and across Muslim societies' (Kandiyoti, 2002, 1).

7.16 Disregarding the complexities of history

Abu-Lughod's (2013) final point concerns the utilisation of term 'honour crimes', as indicative of cultural practices, and as being an erasure of history. She calls for the 'recognition of the dynamic historical transformations that are affecting women, families, and everyday life in all communities...' (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 136). Focusing

on the historical context of colonialism, which I discussed earlier, it is clear colonialism played a central role resulting in honour codes being further emphasised within colonised lands (Baron, 2006). Initially classified as tribal and customary practices of honour that were not outrightly legitimated by that state or authorities, they soon enough became part of state legislation.

Honour had once been more directly tied to valour and manliness, but as the avenues in which a man could express his masculinity diminished - his weapons confiscated and his lands stripped away - the main repository of his honour became a woman's body. Other factors changed along the way: modern medicine made it possible to both verify virginity and 'fix' it. Women, who had generally been the victims of crimes of honour, also became occasional perpetrators. And the state - the defender and avenger of family honour - used violations of honour, particularly rape, to intimidate its enemies (Baron, 2006 14-15).

Similarly, Al-Hibri (2003, 196) rightly draws our attention to the case of the United States of America (though the features of this case study can be applicable in the West more broadly) in the aftermath of 9/11. At this juncture, there was an amassed sense of 'fear, frustration, experiences of discrimination, and job insecurity' that affected Muslim families. This intensified pressure only worsened circumstances where domestic violence was already occurring. The aftermath of 9/11 is one example, but the reality is that Muslims, like all human beings, are subject to varying conditions that can trigger violence and abuse. This is emphatically not a justification for such abhorrent violence. But it is necessary that we acknowledge the way majority-world communities within the West are afforded forms of acknowledgment and validation, so that neither their culture alone, nor their religion or values-system, could be the cause(s) of their violence. The reality is far more nuanced and complex. A reductionist approach does no justice to Muslim experiences and will not assist, but in fact will hinder, attempts to prevent such violence.

Reddy (2008, 310), equally, argues that 'culturally-focused responses to issues such as honour-related violence may ultimately prove counterproductive, causing communities to turn further inwards and reinforce the practices in question, in part as

a response to fear for their survival, cultural or otherwise, as a community'. This can most certainly be said of contemporary Muslim communities who find themselves struggling with the challenges of being diasporic communities within the West, and more globally, struggling with the colonisation and orientalisng of their lands, cultures, beliefs, and practices.

Furthermore, political parties within Muslim countries have utilised the critique of Western influences as a political tool. Abu-Lughod (2013, 139) gives the example of Jordan where politicians from the Islamic party manipulated the notion of honour crimes '...in their resistance to the efforts of feminist campaigners...to reform penal law'. These politicians characterised the reforms of penal codes as efforts to prevent the '...Western plot to undermine Jordanian society and morality' (Abu-Lughod, 2013, 139). These versions of gender norms and gender-biased emphases on honour 'can be explained as arising from intellectuals' reactions to colonial modernity and their defensive attitude of protecting and preserving cultural identity in the form of the status of women and traditional family relations' (Abou-Bakr, 2015, 56). Ironically, as we have already seen, these reforms were in fact influenced by Western laws. Colonial domination and orientalist discourses of the East resulted in a 'cultural resistance around women and the family' (Kandiyoti, 2002, 7). Alongside colonial administrators utilising Muslim women for their agendas, Christian missionaries selected 'sexual mores and family traditions of Muslims as part of their 'civilising' mission' (Kandiyoti, 2002, 7). The utilisation of the female body, ideals surrounding the family, and notions of honour by politicians and the elite of Muslim male religious leaders, further inculcated patriarchal practices and notions of honour.

Such struggles against the influence of Western ideologies, whether politically or religiously motivated, were dominantly directed towards women and familial matters. The patriarchal powers at play that allowed men to emphasise beliefs and practices that benefited them, and disproportionality negatively impacted women, cannot be overlooked when accounting for contemporary honour conceptions. Even while we acknowledge that some men are victims of honour ideologies, we cannot ignore the inevitable benefit such systems provide to men overall. As Badran (2002, p201-202) asserts:

In a division that was never precise, the state increasingly came to influence their public roles, leaving to religion the regulation of their private or family roles.... While promoting new social roles for women, the state could not afford unduly to alienate patriarchal interest and has therefore made various accommodations and alliances. Whatever their competing interests, the state and religious forces have retained patriarchal forms of control over women.

Modern states have been contradictory in their policies and discourses. The newly formed post-colonial state 'characteristically imposed its own agenda and in so doing attempted to define the 'woman question' to suit its own political ends' (Badran, 2002, 228). Despite the state promoting female participation for 'pragmatic and ideological purposes, it has also upheld imbalanced gender relations and male authority out of political expediency' (Badran, 2002, 228).

Thus, as Abu-Lughod (2013) emphasises, we must acknowledge the political, religious, social context, as well as reactions to racism, when attempting to nurture and embed more egalitarian gender relations and countering notions of 'honour' that affect women negatively by circumscribing and controlling their lives in ways we have touched on previously. Terms such as honour, that associate violence to culture, divert us from identifying the historical and contemporary realities and dynamics that influence such violence.

7.17 The limitations of cultural categorisations

In her article *Gender, Culture and the Law: Approaches to 'Honour Crimes' in the UK*, Reddy (2008, 305) analyses the identification of honour crimes as gender-based violence, or as a cultural tradition, and the subsequent impact of either label on the protection and prevention of such violence. She argues against cultural categorisations emphasising that they overlook the relevance of such violence in the broader category of gender violence, resulting in inadequate protection for the rights of women within minority communities and the stigmatisation of whole communities (Reddy, 2008, 305).

As we have seen from Abu-Lughod (2013), Bangs (2018) and Reddy's (2008) analyses, there are a variety of factors that contribute to the existence of HBV. Collectively, these intersectional factors impact violence on women from within minority cultures and groups; no single factor can solely account for such violence. As Abu-Lughod (2013, 141) emphasises, 'it is a problem when we consistently fail to compare murder and assault rates by intimates between societies in which women are allegedly victims of honor crimes and those in which honor is not invoked as a motive, justification, or legal excuse'.

As such, prevalent uses of the term honour in relation to crimes and violence does no service to identifying, preventing, or overcoming violence or any other negative implications of so-called 'honour'. The term instead sustains dichotomies of West vs the rest that support the ideological project of a superior West. The term has become a tool for a Eurocentric ideology.

7.18 How to move beyond the term honour

Moving beyond labelling certain forms of violence as HBV is a matter many academics have focused on. Reddy (2008, 306) argues for honour-based violence to be situated within the broader category of gender violence. She argues against culturally differentiating such practices. Keyhani also highlights that (2013, 255), 'until recently, such crimes largely escaped national scrutiny, and to some extent still do, because they are often viewed as 'traditional or cultural practices'. Despite HBV being emphasised by some as a distinct form of domestic or gendered violence, in both domestic violence, which is described as 'a form of emotional, psychological and/or physical abuse suffered by women at the hands of their husbands or male partners', and HBV, there is a common expectation of 'silent endurance from the woman' (Keyhani, 2013, 263).

Any form of violence against women, be it labelled domestic violence, gendered violence, crime of passion or HBV, is equally abhorrent in that it discriminates against women, inhibits the quality of their lives, prevents them from fully experiencing their rights, and hinders their basic freedoms and agency. All variations of violence against women are based on the fact that they are 'directed against a woman because she is a woman' and such violence 'affects women disproportionately' (Keyhani, 2013, 264).

These forms of violence can be ‘physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, coercion and other deprivations of liberty’ (Keyhani, 2013, 264). Why such violence may occur can depend on a variety of factors, but it is rooted in the shared patriarchal beliefs that women are inferior, subservient, second to man, and can be dominated. Despite the various labels, women from all communities can become subject to some form(s) of gender violence.

7.19 Honour and human rights

Gill (2006, 1-2) argues how more broadly gender violence, not just those forms based on notions of honour, have *not* been situated in a human rights framework and instead have been ‘left within the sphere of cultural and family frameworks, places that remain outside the scope of legislative reform’. One direction towards a human rights framework and proposed way to overcome the inadequacies of multiculturalism is ‘mature multiculturalism’. This concept is advocated by feminist such as Hannana Siddiqui, who argues ‘that ‘mature multiculturalism’ should be about taking forward the human rights agenda and bridging the gap between race and gender’ (cited in Keyhani, 2013, 272; Meeto and Mirza, no date). Activist groups within the UK, such as the Southall Black Sisters, call for mature multiculturalism, where forms and acts of violence against women are ‘understood as abuses and violations of women’s fundamental human rights, ‘irrespective of the cultural or religious contexts in which they occur’ (Women Against Fundamentalism and Southall Black Sisters, 2007, 17 cited in Reddy, 2008, 311). The human rights framework also has a strong and valuable overlap with the Islamic *maqāṣid*-based rights system, from which a new conceptualisation of honour can be productively and humanely derived (see chapter 6).

Abu-Lughod (2013, 115) recognised that ‘naming and criminalizing’ violence can have positive effects such as encouraging legal reforms, highlighting the brutality of violence to governments and communities, warranting the need for the creation of ‘shelters, training programs for police, and relief efforts for women’. However, she rightly questions: ‘...are there ways to achieve such goals without defining some acts of violence against women as peculiar?’ (2013, 115). Similarly, Gill (2006) who, while appreciating how understanding the relationship between culture and morality can contribute to the development of more nuanced approaches in relation to tackling

gendered violence within human rights frameworks, cautions that we must be critical of two dangers: firstly, the danger of universalising western feminist ideas of morality, and secondly allowing for human rights violations for so-called multicultural accommodation. (Gill, 2006, 1). Of course, as we have already discussed, multiculturalism seems to place women from minority communities at further risk rather than the so-called positive cultural tolerance it professes to invoke.

A human rights framework is one that some academics and Muslim women's rights activists enjoin for the betterment of the lives of Muslim women. Keyhani (2013, 256) argues that a 'crime of honour' 'should be treated as a violation of human rights and not as a religious or cultural practice'. Although I do not intend to engage in discussion of this at length, it is worth mentioning that human rights frameworks can come with risks and apprehensions also. Mir-Hosseini (2015, 29) stresses how the aftermath of 9/11 and the 'War on Terror' further compiled 'the politics of gender and Islam'.

The invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq – both partially justified as promoting 'freedom' and 'women's rights' – combined with the double standards employed in promoting UN sanctions, showed that both international human rights and feminist ideals are open to manipulation and that there is a huge gap between these ideals and the practices of their proponents. For some Muslim women this was also a turning point, as they felt caught between those trying to impose patriarchal and violent vision of their faith and those trying to impose a neo-colonial project in the name of human rights and feminism (Mir-Hosseini, 2015, 29).

The experiences of colonialism and post-colonialism impacted the reception of human rights in the 'Muslim social imagination' (Abu El Fadl, 2009, 117). From the perspective of the colonised '...they encountered such conceptions as part of the 'White Man's Burden' or the 'civilising mission' of the colonial era and as part of the European natural law tradition, which was frequently exploited to justify imperialistic policies in the Muslim world' (Abou El Fadl, 2009, 117). Human rights frameworks can therefore also pose challenges when combating violence within non-Western cultures, through serving Eurocentric analyses and neo-colonialist policies. Nevertheless, a *maqāṣid*-based rights system as discussed in chapter 6 can be seen as a system that overlaps

with a human rights framework but is one that is based on and authentic to the Islamic tradition. As such a reconceptualisation of honour based on this system can assist in achieving a gender-neutral egalitarian conception of honour as a right that can be utilised to overcome violence and killings in the name of honour.

7.20 Taking the term honour for granted

In addressing certain forms of violence that exist within the Islamicate worlds, namely HBV, we can see how the use of specific terms should not be taken for granted. The use of the term honour in relation to some forms of violence is politically and racially motivated. It is often a categorisation overloaded with colonial and Orientalist assumptions. Not only will challenging such categorisations assist in overcoming prevailing Islamophobic narratives concerning the *oppressed Muslim woman* and *barbaric man* in Islam and Muslim cultures but will also aid in developing more constructive methods in dealing with such forms of violence. Rather than scapegoating culture, denouncing the use of the term honour in relation to violence will allow for intersectional factors to be acknowledged and positioned within Muslim women's rights activism.

The problematic nature of the term honour in association with specific communities' violence has also been acknowledged by the NGO UN Women. UN Women no longer utilises the term honour crimes and instead identifies '...that of all women victims of homicide in 2012, half were killed by intimate partners or family members' (Bangs, 2019, 7). Recently the Office of the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights called for a move towards viewing intimate partner violence and honour killings as alike and as forms of 'arbitrary execution—therefore violating the right to life' (Bangs 2019 7). Such positioning would allow for '...tactics employed in different parts of the world - regardless of whether the crimes are dubbed as relating to "honor" or "passion" ...' to be utilised globally in the broader category of gendered or domestic violence. Ultimately, the denunciation of terms like honour '...serves to reject otherized, racist, and xenophobic appropriations of gender-based violence' (Bangs, 2018, 9).

The reality is that gendered violence and discrimination do not occur in a cultural vacuum. There is a confluence of a complex history; social, economic, political

realities; manipulation of religion by a patriarchal male elite; the patriarchy of colonialism and Orientalism; and the modern-day otherization of Muslims and Islam through incessant Orientalist narratives and Islamophobia, that all contribute to the existence of such violence. The utilisation of terms such as HBV does no justice to Muslim women and instead conceals the complex nature of such violence and perpetuates narratives that aim to push a politically motivated narrative. They tarnish a complex system of thought and belief that the preceding chapters of this thesis have aimed to shed light on.

Focusing on varying factors and the broader intents allows us to highlight the larger aspects and factors that influence the existence of HBV. It dismantles the flawed exclusive association of these practices with 'culture' by means of which varying intersectional factors are predominantly overlooked, and instead the culture and religion of minority communities are emphasised or identified as the major forces predetermining crimes and violence. Meanwhile, seemingly Western-origin violence is not identified in terms of culture or religion. According to Dobash et al. (2004, 579), early studies of murders by men in Britain focused on contributing factors such as economic status (with poverty being seen as a high-risk factor), previous criminal behaviour, consumption of alcohol, intergenerational factors such as a man witnessing a violent father attacking his mother, and furthermore the psychoanalytic approaches that focused on the behaviour of women that may have incited violence in men. These kinds of factors, even where they are highly relevant to instances of violence against women and girls, are rarely considered when the perpetrators are from minority or Muslim communities.

7.21 The complexity of honour systems: women who embrace honour

Before concluding this chapter, it is useful to summarise the findings of Sophie Withaekx and Gily Coene (2014) in their article '*Glad to have Honour*': *continuity and change in minority women's lived experience of honour*. This article voices the complexities, flexibility, and lived realities of the notion of honour from the perspective of Muslim women. Withaekx and Coene (2014) convincingly challenge culturalist understandings of honour, arguing that such approaches depict non-Western communities as homogenous in the ascription made to them of notions of honour, and

are entirely reductionist. Honour does not mean the same thing for every honour-endorsing Muslim, or member of a non-Western community. They stress that HBV is not only based on historical cultural values of honour. Rather, such violence is a result of 'complex historical and socio-economic processes' (Withaecks and Coene, 2014, 379). Through the narratives of two women living in Belgium (of Moroccan descent) they portray how lived experiences and circumstances equally impact understandings of honour as much as 'cultural honour values' do. Their findings shed light on why many women proudly embrace values of honour. We see how flexible, varying, and complex notions of honour and their subsequent practices are. Despite some negative implications, honour was a concept that these women negotiated, redefined, and reworked rather than abandoned. The negotiated conceptions of honour these women arrived at and endorsed varied but were representative of their own journeys and the intersectional factors that were the realities of their individual lived experiences.

These strategies of re-interpretation may prove liberating and supportive of individual women's interests, serving to emancipate them from oppressive practices and traditional expectations. They might just as well, however, consist in women's continuing inscription in patriarchal gender ideologies, necessitating an interrogation for their effects on women's empowerment in the long term (Withaechx and Gily, 2014, 387).

What is crucial then is the positioning of the women concerned at the centre of discourses and critiques of notions of honour. Equally important is acceptance of their agency and capability in doing such. Honour narratives cannot be hijacked by men or by those with witting or unwitting neo-colonialist agendas that further oppress women and girls: neither Muslim men in their domination of so-called Islam through their patriarchal readings and notions of gender, or men in non-Western communities who manipulate patriarchal readings of Islam to establish a patriarchal order and male domination; nor Western torchbearers of patriarchy (men and women) who through their tropes of Orientalism and colonialism rob Muslim and non-Western women of their agency and rights to dictate their own narratives of honour. Withaechx and Gily's (2014) cogently argue that calling for a wholesale abandonment of a notion of 'honour' that has been analysed through a culturalist reductionist lens is a disingenuous act. In

fact, honour is a multivalent value that is intrinsic to the historical and current lived realities of many individuals. As for its negative understanding and implications, women who are impacted by honour must be at the centre of reconceptualising and challenging negative notions of honour. This thesis is an example of the possibility and necessity of Muslim women reconceptualising honour. They must be supported to lead the path to reform, to help to arrive at egalitarian and gender-neutral conceptions of honour. The lives of many Muslim and non-Western women are evidence of their ability and success in negotiating and utilising honour for their own advancement and benefit. Of course, this is not denying that there is much work to be done. However, abandoning honour with the view of it being an entirely negative cultural notion is an injustice to its true complex realities. What is needed is a reconceptualisation, and new frameworks and modalities, for understanding and utilising the notion of honour, as I propose in the following chapter.

7.22 Conclusion

Throughout this thesis, I have affirmed honour as a system of belief, which in turn influences practice, as existent within Islamic thought and behaviour. This system of honour is a holistic one that impacts a whole variety of beliefs and practices within Islam. Yet, it is necessary with this acknowledgement to engage with points of tension regarding the conception of honour. Yet the tensions are not only internal. As this chapter has revealed, contemporary academic media and policy stances regarding honour, its conceptions, its practices, and its position in the legal realm are influenced by Western framings. Since the formation of nation-states and penal codes, the otherizing of the non-West has been part of a Western ideological project in which honour was and is utilised, appropriated, and manipulated.

A comprehensive constructive resolution to the current problematic associations and practices of honour in the Islamicate are not easy to arrive at. Nevertheless, what this chapter does is set in motion and initiate some crucial first steps in interrogating the concept of honour as played out by and for Muslim women in British and Western contexts. The term honour is beyond problematic. In realising the broader influence of Western narratives of honour, and the manipulation and distorted focus on HBV exclusively, especially for minority communities in the West, it becomes clear that this term's association with violence, crimes or killings should be rebuked and abandoned.

Terms that do not essentialise and attribute violence to non-Western cultures or to the Islamic religion, including domestic violence, gendered violence, patriarchal violence, violence against women and girls or violence perpetrated by men (to name a few), will do better justice in our fight against the patriarchal violence and discrimination that women encounter, and will also pave the way for Muslims to reclaim a gender-neutral conception of honour that is rooted in the primary authoritative sources.

Chapter 8: A reconceptualisation of honour: new modalities and a framework towards reform.

8.1 Why Honour?

The concept of honour within contemporary Muslim communities is predominantly patriarchal. The victims of the 'sabotaging' of honour are predominantly Muslim women. To disrupt and challenge this victimisation this thesis set out to utilise the textual tradition within Islam to uncover whether a just, egalitarian concept of honour exists within the tradition of Islam and if this can be implemented in beliefs, practice, law, and ethics. This thesis has, through critically examining the concept of honour within Islam and Muslim communities, highlighted the challenges associated with honour both internally and externally to Islam.

The preceding chapters have substantiated that despite Islam being named as the source of guidance for contemporary honour beliefs and practices, by many Muslims and non-Muslims, it is in fact an amalgamation of various factors that contribute to the existence of gender-biased honour conceptions. If anything, these contemporary honour beliefs, and practices are informed by patriarchal understandings of Islam, and broader and more general systems of patriarchy. To dismantle the patriarchal manipulation of the concept of honour, it was crucial to uncover a text evidence-based Qur'anic and Prophetic conception of honour.

Honour is a value that has existed throughout human history, and despite modernisation and secularisation calling for the abandonment of such values, honour as a value and ideal still exists in many areas of life. Sommers (2018) in his book *Why Honor Matters* examines the various areas of life in Western societies that have not been able to depart from honour values and systems. From sports societies to daily life interactions and activities, Sommers sheds light on the way a system of honour continues to exist within the geographical West. He acknowledges the harmful practices and conceptions of honour that exist within the contemporary world and calls for these to be disrupted. However, he emphasises that the concept of honour is also one that is both necessary and worth holding onto. Sommers (2018) reveals that it is not only within religious traditions, or within Islam and Muslim communities, that a

system of honour operates and is cherished. Rather, even in the secular world, in modern organisations and institutions, honour continues to exist.

Focusing specifically on Islam and Muslim communities, this thesis has shown that honour is far more complex than its negative manifestations. Today, in the name of defending and liberating Muslim women, the concept and system of honour are denounced and utilised within the geographical West, but also by the epistemological project of the West, to speak on behalf of Muslim women. This violence against Muslim women assumes that they lack agency regarding the honour system. However, the concept of honour is one that many Muslim women embrace, utilise, and emphasise. It is a concept they see as part of their rights, dignity, and religious and cultural values and norms. As such it is Muslim women who must reclaim the conversations surrounding honour and its impact upon their lives, but with strong active support from allies of all backgrounds. There are many positive connotations of honour that are present within Muslim communities (Abu-Lughod). Honour is a core ideal within Islam. Its conceptualisation, if based seriously and methodically on the Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth corpus, is one that will be liberating and egalitarian. Even amongst the overwhelmingly negative uses and inferences of honour within the contemporary world, specifically impacting Muslim women, honour also exists in many positive ways. It is these positive manifestations rooted in the core ethical ideals of Islam that make a complete rejection of an Islamic honour system unwarranted.

One central observation relating to the existence of honour within contemporary Muslim communities is that it is not static nor uniform (see chapters 1 and 2). In fact, as I mentioned in the introduction, attempting to reduce the concept and system of honour as fixed and ahistorical contributes to its negative manifestations, which in turn affect Muslim women. The reality is that honour as a concept has varied, with many overlapping uses, connotations and associations depending on numerous factors such as geographical location and cultural, social, and political context. The nuances of the concept of honour and the limitations of the English term honour in representing the various terms and usages within the Arabic lexicon were examined in chapter 2. This present chapter will discuss how Qur'anic and Prophetic conceptions of honour allow for the overcoming of patriarchal manipulations of this concept, the limitations of contemporary language inferences and how to avoid reducing it to a static system.

Honour is to be reconceptualised through uncovering egalitarian and ethical conceptions of honour within the primary sources of authority. It is this broad and gender-neutral conception of honour that requires re-centring within Muslim belief, practice, and discourse on honour. This thesis has attempted to initiate this reconceptualisation.

8.2 Aims of this chapter

The present chapter will now delineate a framework of honour based on the findings within the primary sources of authority. This framework is preliminary and sets out the foundational features of the concept/system of honour within Islamic thought and practice, broadly-speaking. It is intended to guide assumptions and conceptions of honour that inform beliefs, practices and legal rulings within Islamic normative discourses and the lived practices of Muslim communities. The following proposed framework can be utilised – in further research as well as, eventually, in law and policy-making spheres – to ensure that the foundational values and ideals of honour practices remain in line with Qur’anic and Prophetic honour guidance and ethical intent. This framework, alongside the ethical underpinnings of honour that can be deduced through it, disrupt patriarchal applications of the concept, and allow for it to be utilised in a flexible, gender-neutral and egalitarian manner. It can dismantle the association of patriarchal conceptions with specific practices of honour ascribed to Islamic norms. This chapter will also briefly highlight where this framework can be utilised and what outcomes can be achieved through its application. Each component proposed within this honour framework presents the possibility of endorsing and applying an egalitarian concept of honour within Islamic and other discourses and in Muslim communities.

This preliminary framework will require advancement through a more in-depth inquiry into Qur’anic and Prophetic conceptions of honour, alongside historical conceptions and endorsements that have not been examined within this thesis. Nonetheless, this framework induces reform of existing honour ideals. It can assist in the dismantling of patriarchal manipulations of honour and the emancipation of Muslim women (and men in some cases) by means of a Qur’anic, Prophetic and decolonial honour reconceptualisation.

8.3 The Honour Framework

According to the primary sources of authority honour is ultimately multi-dimensional. One aspect of this multivalent honour is the individualistic/ private/ personal/ spiritual and the other is the communal/ public/ collective/ social. However, it is the former aspect that is given preference and superiority in the Islamic scriptural conception of honour. Furthermore, the latter is only of relevance in relation to the former, such that a communal/ social manifestation and embodiment of honour that does not benefit or supplement and nurture the individualistic/ private/ personal/ spiritual honour has conflicted with and transgressed from the holistic concept of honour that is present within the primary sources.

The following honour framework is based on the Qur'anic text and Prophetic sayings. The foundational aspects highlighted within it are essential for achieving an embodiment and manifestation of honour that benefits both the individualistic/ private/ personal/ spiritual and the communal/ public/ collective/ social. This honour framework (figure 6) conceptualises honour based on the following foundational underpinnings derived from the primary sources of authority:




Figure 6

Honour is not restricted to humans

From a holistic thematic analysis of Qur’anic honour occurrences, it becomes apparent that honour is not restricted to humans alone. Honour is mentioned in relation to both inanimate objects and animate creation.




Figure 7

This broad system of honour pervades various categories of ‘creation’ as can be seen in figure 7. This reveals that a concept of honour is indeed not exclusive to men or to people. God has bestowed various creations with honour. The broad association of honour present in the primary sources dismantles and disrupts the ideas of honour being dependant on the conduct of women, and the exclusive designation of the ranks of honour for men. An ideology of honour that reserves honour for men but is impacted by women is reductive and in conflict with the notion of honour that exists within the primary sources. Honour is a concept that surpasses the human, and the earthly realm. It extends to various creations, beings, and realms, and above all is attributed to God.

The levels of honour

Focusing specifically on honour concerning humans, we find in the primary sources a hierarchy of honour amongst general humankind, relating to belief/disbelief and observing the commands of God. There is no hierarchy, however, based on gender, class, economic status etc. of the kind that is prominent in the contemporary period. Furthermore, the designation of creation against this hierarchy of honour is not spelt out and is thus ‘known only to God’ in the Qur’anic paradigm. As such, no human can

claim that another has lost or been lowered in honour, as I discuss in detail in the forthcoming pages.

Regarding the system of honour beyond human creation, a hierarchy can be deduced from the Qur'anic honour verses, specifically verse (Q63:8), which emphasises honour belonging to the believers, the Prophet Muhammad and God. In examining this verse according to the honour-related thematic whole within the Qur'anic text and Prophetic discourse, a distinction can be deduced concerning these three attributions of honour (see figure 8).

The perfect and highest form of honour belongs exclusively to God. Despite honour being associated with God and humans, this honour is not identical. God's honour remains distinct and above that of humans. In discovering and uncovering the honour of God, humans can deduce the concept and function of honour in regard to themselves. The concept of honour associated with humans will not be equal or like the honour attributed to God, who is transcendent. As such, Qur'anic verses designate God as the single authority for increasing or reducing the honour of an individual. The loss of honour, though dependant on the actions of individuals, can only be imposed by God. It is therefore in conflict with the honour of God to assume humans can declare the state (loss or gain) of another individual's honour. The jurisdiction regarding the honour of an individual rests with God alone. The Ḥadīth also clarify this through stressing God's *ghayra* as being punishing against believers who transgress (see chapter 5). Comprehending the honour of God allows for contemporary honour practices and beliefs that conflict with the honour of God to be dismantled and abandoned.

The secondary position of honour relates to the prophets as discussed in chapter 4 and the Prophet Muhammad's *ghayra* (see chapter 5). The lowest level of honour is that of the rest of humankind. All human creation is bestowed with honour (Q17:70). There is no gender distinction in the Qur'anic text or Ḥadīth corpus pertaining to honour. Rather, these sources clearly emphasise that men and women are both recipients of God's honour. Amongst humans, however, distinctions of honour can be deduced between believers and non-believers.




Figure 8

All humans are honoured

One central emphasis regarding honour within the Qur'an is its association with 'the believers'. There are continuous references to honour in relation to believing men and women. We find that although all humans are designated honour in that they are the creation of God, the believers are told that they are granted a distinguished form of honour (Q 22:30, Q 22: 32, Q 25: 72, Q 37:42, Q 44:49, Q 49:13). How then does the honour of a believer and that of a disbeliever differ, and what do these different forms of honour entail?

The basic level of honour is that which all humans are bestowed with and entitled to. This honour relates to human interactions at a societal level. This implies that in terms of earthly relations and social interactions, etc. all humans are deserving of honour. The Qur'an emphasises dignity and justice for all creation, not just humans. Thus, there is a most basic level of honour bestowed on all creation, inclusive of humans.

Human honour is, however, distinguished based on belief in one God. Despite all humans being honoured, the primary sources are centrally concerned with the honour of the believers. This form of honour is distinct in its connection with God, and with acceptance and obedience to the prophets of God. It is this honour that is associated with entering Paradise, which is also referred to with honour. The mosque is another honourable place designated for the honoured believers. Access to these honourable places is emphasised as being for the believers. This is for all believers and is not gender-specific (a point I will expand on in the following).




Figure 9

The Honour of the believers

Within the Qur’anic text and Ḥadīth corpus we can extract what is deemed honourable, and results in an increase in the honour of a believer.

The honour of a believer is founded upon two aspects: their belief in God and their actions and roles on earth.




Figure 10

Honour as part of human fiṭrah

The cosmological and ontological equality of men and women has been examined extensively by many Muslim feminist and reformist scholars. Just as men and women are created from the same *nafs*, have equal spiritual potential and are equally responsible and accountable, similarly, they have been bestowed equal honour and have equal potential to impact this honour. As such, honour can be seen as an innate part of human *fiṭrah*. God created humans as honourable. Honour is thus an intrinsic part of human nature. This demands that humans interact with others in honourable

terms, within the limits God has set regarding conduct between humankind, and that they preserve and uphold the honour of other humans through guarding their own speech and actions against others.

Honour in relation to God

Regarding the human beings honour in relation to God, we see this form of honour being dependant on two facets:

1. Belief in God
2. Obeying the commands of God and taking care to not transgress God's limits

Belief in God can be divided into two further features

1. The oneness of God (*tawḥīd*)
2. The attribution of the ultimate honour to God




Figure 11

Despite all humans being bestowed with honour, there is a clear association of honour with the believers. The honour of the human is amplified by belief in God. To maintain and increase the honour bestowed by God on His creation, the primary necessity is belief in the oneness of God (*tawḥīd*). The *tawḥīdic* paradigm has been discussed

extensively by Wadud (2006, 24-32). According to this paradigm, human creation maintains a relationship of reciprocity along horizontal axes. Its relationship with God, however, occurs along vertical axes. God thus maintains superiority above humans, who have been created as equal to one another. The attribution of honour to God therefore also exists in such a way. Related to the oneness of God is thus the belief in honour attributed to God as being the greatest form of honour that exists (Q10:65, Q27: 40, Q37:180, Q55:27, Q55:78). It is a form of honour that transcends the human plane of existence. In accord with the *tawhīdic* paradigm then, it can be inferred that the believers' honour exists along a horizontal axis. The honour of the believers is therefore equal on all accounts. The most honourable is God alone. The only distinction amongst believers as mentioned earlier is that of prophets. But this distinction is one based on their role as prophets.

Considering the honour of creation and God we find that creation is bestowed with honour that can increase and decrease but God possesses ultimate honour that never fluctuates emphasising the uniqueness of divine honour in the hierarchy of honour.

The divine command: obedience and transgression

In their equal position of honour, we find that Muslim men and women are equally bound to obey the commands of God and not transgress God's limits to maintain and expand their honour (Q2:267, Q4:31, Q22:30, Q25:72, Q37:42, Q49:13, Q70:35). Men and women are thus equal on the requirements of honour and the outcomes. Throughout the Qur'anic text, there is clear mentioning of honour being associated with obedience to God. Many of these commands relate to human interactions and will be discussed in the following section.

Despite these commands relating to social interactions and the rights of humans and their honour within the earthly realm, ultimately, everything regarding honour within the primary sources relates to God. Honour is thus a divine concept.

The implications of the honour of God for human beings is such that no human, regardless of gender, class, ethnicity, economic status, social positions etc. should be designated a specific, raised rank of honour in comparison to any other human. God alone possesses the highest rank of honour.

Designating, for instance, men a specific or unique association with honour is in direct conflict with God's divine honour and therefore the oneness of God. Only God's honour is greater, and above human honour. To place the honour of men above the honour of women disrupts the hierarchy of honour within the Qur'an which places human honour on an equal axis below God's honour. This is however not to say that the Qur'anic text does not specify certain acts and beliefs as more honourable. On the contrary, the Qur'an and the Ḥadīth detail various beliefs and practices as increasing honour or reducing it. However, the authority to alter the honour of a human or the knowledge of the actual state of an individual's honour is only with God (this will be expanded on in the following). As such, no human is granted the authority to make claims regarding another's honour. This caution is also emphasised in the Ḥadīth that mention *'ird* (see chapter 5).

The honour of the human in relation to God can be seen as individualistic/personal honour. For this reason, human creation is answerable to God regarding its honourable or dishonourable beliefs and actions. Neither the Muslim community nor any individual Muslim is afforded the authority to police the honour of any other individual. Yet within the contemporary we see that honour codes are socially interpreted and imposed. These socially constructed systems of honour are in clear conflict with the system of honour advanced by the primary sources.

Honour in relation to human subjects (communal/collective honour)

Just as the honour of the believer in relation to God is individualistic and private, honour in relation to other humans can be seen as communal or collective honour.

It should be noted that in the previous section I argued that following the commands of God are part of the honour of a believer and such honour is private and individualistic. However, following the commands of God overlaps with the honour of a believer in relation to the honour of other humans, which can be deemed collective and communal. This may seem contradictory. However, the two co-exist without contradiction. Honour can be communal in that it is a right and duty of each believer to respect and maintain the honour of others through their own speech and actions. However, the private individualistic element here lies in the consequences of

transgressing these rights, and the reward of maintaining them through abiding by Gods commands. God alone is authoritative in the consequences and rewards an individual will reap relating to honour.

The Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth literature reveal that one can increase ones honour. Equally, honour can be lost or decreased through transgressing what God has deemed honourable conduct. Throughout the primary sources references to honour occur alongside guidance regarding what is deemed honourable and what is deemed unhonourable.

Honourable conduct exclusively relating to God	Honourable conduct relating to humans (this ultimately also relates to God)
Belief in the oneness of God	Avoiding major sins
Obeying the commands of God and not transgressing God's limits	Believing and following the Prophets
	Honouring parents
	Honouring orphans
	Honouring widows
	Honouring the mosque/ honourable places
	Not tarnishing the honour of others through our speech
	Embodying ghayra
	Honouring the sacred ordinances of God

Table 6

The details of these honourable acts have been discussed in chapter 4 and 5. What we find from these acts is that honourable conduct is not only personal and individualistic; it relates to avoidance of acts that can impact other humans negatively. Honour entails being honourable towards others with our actions and speech. This necessitates treating others in a way that is conducive to the realisation of justice and equality. Contrary to contemporary beliefs, honour is not familial or communal

exclusively regarding the conduct of women. Women are not responsible for maintaining the honour of others. Rather, the communal aspect of honour applies to all individuals' conduct within the community in regard to how they treat others. Thus communal/collective honour is the embodiment of honour where all humans are treated with justice and equality. It is a system where each individual is responsible for their own conduct and how this can impact others. Each individual must honour all members of their community, and all humans more broadly. How one embodies and manifests honour in its collective aspect thus impacts the personal/individualistic type of honour.

Regarding the recipients of honour, the Qur'an does not differentiate between types of believers. In exemplifying the inclusive and broad nature of honour within Islam, it highlights certain believers. In clear reform of pre-Islamic honour norms, the Qur'an uses the examples of marginalised members of society: orphans and widows. Moreover, parents are also mentioned, mother and father collectively, to dismantle hierarchies between the genders in the role of parenting (see chapter 4).

Being protective (embodying ghayra) towards all individuals

Returning to the idea of communal/collective honour we find the concept of *ghayra* which is dominantly present within contemporary Muslim communities (see chapters 1 and 2). *Ghayra* in the contemporary period is practised through the policing of women. Women are limited in endless ways in the name of guarding honour. But a reconceptualisation of honour reveals that a concept of honour based on the primary sources demands the protection of individuals through being cautious regarding the honour God has bestowed them with rather than maintaining and protecting this concept of honour at the expense of the human. Ironically, today a concept that the primary sources impose to ensure equality, justice, and dignity for all humans, is utilised in ways that contradict these aims and their basic essence. Today honour is weaponised in the very ways that cause one's own honour to become negatively impacted. The ethical intent of honour is lost.

Contrary to contemporary manifestations of *ghayra*, the Ḥadīth analysed in chapter 5 substantiate that Prophetic conceptions of *ghayra* are gender neutral. Both men and women in the nascent Muslim community are described by the Prophet as

experiencing *ghayra*. Contemporary conceptions of *ghayra* that relate primarily to the feelings of men predominately regarding 'their' womenfolk conflict with the concept of *ghayra* in Islam as feelings experienced by both genders. Western and so-called progressive critiques of *ghayra* as a patriarchal and 'primitive' emotion manifested in oppressive behaviour towards women, in attribution to Islam, are not accurate. It is fair to claim that the concept of *ghayra* within the contemporary period exists as a controlling, hyper suspicious, and inevitably a violent form of jealousy that is embodied by some Muslim men. These men embody toxic patriarchal forms of *ghayra* to profess their masculinity. The reasons for this were briefly addressed in chapters 2 and 7. However, to attribute this to Islam exclusively is inaccurate and misleading. Conversely, to insist that *ghayra* is not emphasised within Islam is also inaccurate. Instead, what we find is that the embodiment of *ghayra* within contemporary Muslim communities is dominantly in direct contradiction and conflict with the Prophetic concept of *ghayra*. *Ghayra* exists in Islam and is normalised for men and women. Interestingly, the guidance to not be excessive in this *ghayra* within the Ḥadīth was directed towards a male Companion of the Prophet, highlighting that the emphasis on *ghayra* as a part of masculinity is a pre-Islamic application of honour that Islam intended to disrupt (see chapter 5).

Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyya, who is influential for his work on Islamic ethics, emphasises *ghayra* in a broader theological context. He associates the emotion of *ghayra* with love for God, which would lead a believer to uphold God's rights and avoid violating His prohibitions (Katz, 2019, 210-212). For Ibn Qayyim *ghayra* is 'a theological and social value and suggests that it is volatile and potentially destructive' (Katz, 2019, 215). Ibn Qayyim's exploration of Muslim piety in relation to *ghayra* is largely concerned with the concept of male masculinity. In line with the ḥadīth on *ghayra*, he did not emphasise an 'unqualified endorsement of masculine passions'. However, we must move beyond simply stressing the necessity to limit male *ghayra* and emphasise the gender-neutrality of this concept. *Ghayra*, as understood from within the ḥadīth literature, is an emotion with implications broader than exclusive sexual jealousy and concerns the believers, male and female, equally.

The Ḥadīth emphasises a gender-neutral, moderate form of *ghayra*. As such these feelings of protectiveness are a part of human nature and felt by all humans. If these

feelings are manifested in moderation, they can serve as a means of protecting the honour and dignity of all rather than tarnishing and blaming individuals through the concept of honour.

It is an intrinsic feature of the human beings, part of their nature, to feel protective of their families, parents, children, spouses, siblings, friends, community, possessions etc. This protectiveness should be ignited when the honour of other individuals is being questioned and degraded. *Ghayra* is not a feeling of protectiveness that should be based on suspicion and excessiveness that leads to the tarnishing of and accusations against an individual's honour. It is not authorisation nor justification to police, restrict or control women, or anyone. This is not the form of *ghayra* Islam emphasised. Yet, rather than adopting Eurocentric ideals of the family, ethics and morals and thus abandoning concepts such as honour and *ghayra*, Muslim communities may find transformative potential in centring and reconsidering the ethics of care and justice promoted within the tradition of Islam. Concepts like honour and *ghayra* in accordance with the primary sources are concerned with the value, respect and dignity of each individual being upheld.

No matter who the individual may be there is a clear emphasis within the Ḥadīth literature commanding believers to guard their tongues against the honour of any other individual. The Prophet equates the honour of an individual to the sacredness of life. The inviolability of life is so central in Islam that the Qur'an affirms the taking of one life is as if killing all of humankind (Q5:32). If honour is likened to life one can comprehend the severity of tarnishing, doubting, questioning, and speaking of anyone's honour in vain.

Honour is not gender-specific

It is clear from the discussion thus far that honour is not gender-specific. Within the contemporary world, we find that hierarchies of honour are predominantly organised by gender. The burden of injunctions influenced by concepts of honour are predominately placed upon women. Honour is claimed by men and maintained through the policing and regulating of women and their bodies. However, honour within the primary sources of authority is not gender-specific. Amongst all humans, the burden and specifics of honour apply equally. The Qur'anic text does not impose

gender-specific ideals of honour. On the contrary, honour is spoken of in equal terms in association with all believers. More interestingly (see chapter 4) there is direct protection of the honour of women in the verses of *qadhaf*. Not only does the Qur'an dismantle gender-biased honour conceptions but it enforces the notion that honour belongs to women also.

There is no distinction within the primary sources regarding how either gender is bestowed honour, the conduct they are encouraged to embody to gain honour, what can cause the loss of honour etc. The primary sources are explicit on honour being gender neutral. There is nothing within the primary sources that indicates men are more deserving or possessors of a high degree of honour, or that honour is more prone to be impacted by the conduct of women.

Access to honourable places

This gender-neutral, egalitarian concept of honour is further substantiated through the reference to paradise and mosques as honourable places. The mosque is described within the Qur'anic text as an honourable place which emphasises the need to act honourably within it. Alongside the generic acts of honour such as being respectful, clean, assisting through charity, etc. a central act of honour is to not prevent anyone from accessing the mosque. The mosque alongside being a place of worship is also a community hub. The contemporary designation of the mosque primarily to men is not only contrary to the historical realities of early Muslim communities but is also contrary to the trajectory of honour in the Qur'an. Just as women are equal recipients of honour to men, likewise they ought to have equal access to honoured places within the earthly realm and beyond. The access, layout, etc. of the Prophetic mosque exemplifies how one can honour the mosque (Auda, 2017). No individual regardless of gender, class, ethnicity, etc. was restricted from access to the mosque. The call to honour the mosque is for all believers and access to it is equally for all. The contemporary prevalence of men preventing women from accessing the mosque is an act of dishonouring a place God honoured for all believers (Auda, 2017). As such access to honourable places like the mosque and the reward of increased honour are not gender-specific. All creation has equal capacity to embody honour and attain the honourable garden (Paradise).

The loss of honour

If honour cannot be lost due to the conduct of others, or more specifically women cannot impact the honour of their families or men, how then can honour be lost or decreased according to the primary sources of authority? In the above, I argued that the honour of a human is linked to both God and other humans. Similarly, the loss of honour also occurs in relation to these two categories.




Figure 12

Disbelief and transgressing the divine limits

The severest way to lose or decrease in honour is through disbelief. This is repeatedly emphasised within the Qur'an through honour being associated with belief in God. However, at the same time, the Qur'an speaks of all humans being honoured. As I have mentioned earlier this conflict is overcome in the realisation that God alone knows the state of one's honour. As far as the believer is concerned *shirk* (associating partners with God) and disbelief are the gravest sins that can impact their honour. This however does not mean disbelievers are to be treated without honour. On the contrary, it is part of the duty of the believers to treat all humans with honour (as discussed above).

As far as sins and transgressing the limits of God are concerned, as I mentioned earlier this links to human conduct because all human conduct is ultimately for God. Some of these commands directly relate to other humans and life in the earthly realm (as specified above). Aside from these, there are specific transgressions that are highlighted in the primary sources that can be understood as not directly relating to humans but rather a believer's private relationship with God (see table 6). These can

be understood as observing the sacred signs and ordinances of God, establishing prayer, performing the pilgrimage etc. (Q 22:30). These may not have a direct impact on other humans but still are commands of God.

A part of transgressing the limits set by God are those dishonourable actions and conduct which impact other humans. This list has been detailed above. It is these actions that can be seen as not honourable and therefore shameful. Included within these actions is sexual transgression. However, unlike prevailing contemporary gender-biased conceptions and beliefs of honour where females are policed and their sexuality is viewed as needing to be tamed to prevent the loss of honour of their male relatives and the acquisition of shame, the limits of sexuality set within the Qur'an are equally applicable to men and women. Moreover, sexual conduct is not the exclusive nor dominant means of impacting one's honour. Sexual transgressions are not singled out in the Qur'an. They are included with all other acts deemed sinful collectively and on equal terms. All the commands and limits set by God broadly and those relating to honour apply to men and women equally. Each individual is responsible for and capable of maintaining and impacting their own honour.

Ultimately, however, the loss or fluctuations in a person's level of honour is between them and God. No human being let alone male is granted the right or authority to police the behaviour of others and declare them unworthy of honour. Honour is granted to all human creation by God and God alone judges the worth of His creation's honour. The Qur'anic text and Prophetic sayings firmly disprove the notion of an individual's honour being tarnished or questioned by other individuals (for *qadhf*, *li'an* see chapter 6). There is a clear emphasis that those who intend to tarnish the honour of others as being immoral. This act is itself unhonourable and shameful. *Qadhf* verses substantiate this as do the Ḥadīth which urge the believers to recognise the sacredness of a believer's honour.

This very act is contrary to the system of honour the Qur'an intends to uphold and emphasise. This is so strongly opposed that one of the ways in which an individual loses honour and disgraces themselves is through tarnishing and accusing another individual's honour. Contrary to contemporary honour practices where the actions of others are negatively spoken of to publicise and declare individuals as unhonourable

and worthy of shame, the primary sources urge the believers to always strive to maintain and guard the honour of a believer through not publicly speaking of their shortcomings, and to not attempt to dishonour them. Such actions cause the accusers to be deemed shameful in the eyes of God. This category of 'honour concerning other humans' does not indicate that humans can affect the honour of others. Rather it represents those actions that we impose on others that can impact our own honour. As the Ḥadīth emphasise, gossip and slander in relation to another individual does not impact the honour of that individual but rather affects the honour of the one who engages in such slander. The slanderer is the shameful one who diminishes their own honour (see chapter 5).

Thus, the dominant contemporary emphasis on being cautious of defamation from the comments of the community and the role of the community in policing and restricting women are completely contrary to and in tension with the Qur'anic and Prophetic concept of honour. The honour bestowed upon creation by God can be reduced and lost but it is not the duty nor the right of any individual to claim the authority to judge another's honour. Moreover, the loss or increase in one's honour is not dependent on the comments, views or approval of any individual let alone the community. The irony is that today Muslims engage in practices that the Qur'an deems as unhonourable to accuse others of losing their honour.

Honour: lost and gained only by divine fiat

The complex system of honour within Islam is intended to regulate a believer's connection and obedience to God. Despite honour being a concept that impacts public and communal interactions, it is ultimately an individualistic system of morality. Honour can only be lost by the command of God and God alone is the knower of the state of His creation's honour. As such honour is an ideal, a value, a system that exists in Islam to encourage, motivate, and aid the believer in strengthening their relationship with God. The desire to seek honour is for the sake of God and with God alone. As such, transgressing the limits set by God, disobeying His commands, living contrary to the ethical values emphasised in the Qur'anic text, etc. are also a cause of loss of honour in the sight of God.

Despite transgressing the limits of God causing a loss in honour, as stated above, the outcome of this is private and between the individual and God. There is no designated general earthly punishment for transgressions that impact honour. Just as the loss of an individual's honour is known to and within the jurisdiction of God alone, so is the reward and increase in an individual's state of honour.

There is no specified earthly punishment for honour transgressions

A clear indication of the status of one's honour being in God's jurisdiction alone is the absence of a specified punishment for honour transgressions on earth. This absence of any specified consequences or punishments for transgressions that are said to impact honour and the absence of designated protocols set to be enforced to limit or prevent transgressions that impact honour substantiate that notion that God places the responsibility of one's honour on oneself.

In the contemporary world, we see women being policed; honour being attempted to be saved. We see the murder of women and girls occurring to restore honour. But honour-endorsing communities must ask themselves whose honour are they attempting to guard and restore? Whose honour are they responsible for? Do the actions of another impact their honour? And more importantly, has God granted them the authority to 'punish' what they deem as transgressions of honour? Despite honour-endorsing communities ascribing their patriarchal conceptions of honour to Islam, the answers to such questions if derived from contemporary honour practices are starkly contrary to the Qur'anic and Prophetic vision of honour. We saw in chapter 2 how male perpetrators deemed the murders they had committed as understandable or excusable within Islam. Yet according to the primary sources, no one is required to police anyone in the name of honour let alone commit violence or murder. Nobody is responsible for the honour of another as we see in the contemporary sense. Rather it is to maintain their own honour that they are commanded, and to protect their actions and tongues from attempting to tarnish the honour of others.

The absence of a prescribed punishment to be imposed by humans upon others who transgress the boundaries of honour set by God also reaffirms that the loss of honour is known by and in the jurisdiction of God alone. God alone can impose punishments for the loss of honour. Punishments for adultery for instance despite relating to the

concept of honour are specific and restricted by certain conditions. Aside from such explicit punishments, there are no specified consequences to be enacted on earth by humans. Most of the practices linked to the system of honour today, such as controlling female dress codes, restricting rights to education, restricted access to mosques, etc. are not deemed as transgressing the limits of God, or if one was to interpret for instance certain female dress codes as part of the commands of God, there is still no earthly punishments specified for transgressing these commands.

The manipulation of honour as a system of control and regulation is contrary to the broader honour intent in the Qur'an. The lack of an earthly punishment emphasises this. Ultimately for those who truly grasp the concept of honour, the biggest deterrent should be transgressing against God's commands, and invoking God's displeasure.

Fluctuating honour

From the aforementioned aspects of honour, we find that human honour is not constant. It fluctuates. Despite all humans being granted honour, it can vary in ranking depending on their actions, beliefs and relationship to God. The Qur'anic text and Prophetic sayings are clear on what are deemed honourable actions through its emphasis on how humans can and are honoured. It is through enacting the honourable actions and manners (see chapters 4 and 5) that one can increase ones honour. The preservation and engendering of human honour are dependent on the degree of implementation and enactment of these honourable practices, conduct and beliefs.

Ultimately though, the varying levels of honour are hidden knowledge known to God alone. Aside from the Prophets, whom God mentions in association to a distinctly raised rank of honour, the honour of all other individuals is hidden knowledge. As such the ultimate reward of honour will be in the honourable abode of Paradise as mentioned several times throughout the Qur'anic text. We see once again how the concept of honour operates in an individualistic/private manner.

8.4 Honour a broad concept

Within Islam, honour is a broad ethical and moral concept that is to be embodied dogmatically, spiritually, and practically. It is a concept intended to guide, encourage, and motivate Muslims. It is a blessing bestowed upon all human creation. From this

framework, a concept of honour derived from the Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth corpus is vast, multivalent and all-encompassing. However, it is the foundational values presented in this framework that can allow for this concept to have consistency and a universal foundation. This framework contours the principle of honour. The foundational aspects of the concept of honour can allow it to remain in line with the Qur'anic ethical intent and at the same time be flexible to the ever-evolving context of Muslims. Honour thus becomes a collective concept but it is also central to individuality within Islam. Honour as a concept guides the individual regarding their relationship with God and their commitment to Islam and thus inevitably also impacts communal and familial relations.

This is the system of honour that the Qur'an and Prophetic teachings promote. The very nature of honour is such that it accentuates value and purpose to everything, centring God. This is not a concept that is to be abandoned. But it needs to be reconceptualised, as has been proposed with this framework. The further advancement of this preliminary framework can allow for a deeper understanding of Qur'anic and Prophetic honour. Ultimately, the rewards and consequences of how honour is enacted, maintained, and preserved are with God. For communities who regard Islam and the primary sources as authoritative in their daily lives (see chapter 2), such a framework can be crucial in challenging patriarchal conceptions and practices of honour and arriving at gender-egalitarian implementations.

8.5 Ethical underpinnings of honour on Earth

From these descriptions above regarding honour, broader ethical underpinnings of honour can be extracted. These ethical principles can be deemed as broader principles of ethics and morality within the primary sources of authority, principles that lie at the foundation of the very concept of honour.

- Accepting in belief and embodying in practice the view that God alone is attributed the ultimate form of honour. This belief can only be embodied by practices that uphold an egalitarian, gender-just conception of honour as existent within the primary sources of authority.
- Treating all humans with justice and equity, regardless of all other factors, to uphold their God-given honour.

- Being truthful and fair in our dealings, in our testimonies, in our speech and conduct.
- Not transgressing the limits set by God regarding both the individual and communal aspects of our being.
- Ethical treatment of the earth, animals, plants, and all creation.
- Upholding the honour of all with a firm belief that the state, condition, and judgement regarding anyone's honour is God's jurisdiction alone.
- Embodying a concept of honour that professes dignity, respect, equality, care, justice, protection, acceptance, tolerance, and safety for all.

It is clear beyond doubt that the prevailing contemporary honour beliefs and practices both within Muslim communities, and those attributed to Muslim communities within the West, are contrary to and in direct conflict with the concept of honour that can be derived from the primary sources of authority. The hyper association of sexual conduct, specifically of Muslim women, to a concept of honour, reduces and restricts a complex, broad-ranging concept that the Qur'anic text repeatedly indicates as a means of liberating humans from pre-Islamic oppressive and patriarchal honour beliefs and praxis. This is not to say that sexual conduct is detached from the concept of honour. On the contrary, it is linked to honour, but this is the sexual conduct of all human creation, not just women. Moreover, the specifics of this sexual conduct and its impact upon an individual's honour equally apply to both genders. Today the behaviour of Muslim women is policed to preserve honour, specifically the honour of male family members. Yet the emphasis on honour within the primary sources disrupts this conception of honour that resembles pre-Islamic honour systems. The Qur'an establishes all humans as recipients of honour including marginalised members of the community. Women and men are equal regarding honour in all its possible manifestations. Ultimately, an individual is only responsible for the condition of their *own* honour.

8.6 How and where the framework can be utilised

The application of this framework can have multiple positive implications on the lives of Muslims. To arrive at an implementation of the Qur'anic and Prophetic concept of honour existing gender-biased patriarchal interpretations and impositions of honour must be disrupted. This without a doubt will be a long and challenging process. For

this to occur the concept of honour within the primary sources requires constant engagement and advancement. Furthermore, there are still many other areas where the concept of honour requires critique such as within the historical lived realities of premodern Muslim communities. These gaps will be discussed more in the concluding chapter. However, some preliminary ways in which reform and reconceptualisation of honour can be enacted using the proposed framework and findings are as follows.

- Education for members of Muslim communities.
- Engagement of religious leaders with the Qur'anic and Prophetic honour framework
- Eurocentric solutions (see chapter 7) are not viable and thus a decolonial faith-based approach is crucial.
- To further the reconceptualisation of honour we must reform both traditional (*fiqh*) and modern family laws (within Muslim countries) informed by patriarchal honour conceptions through the Qur'anic and Prophetic framework.

These will be discussed in detail in the following chapter.

8.7 Conclusion

The ideal of honour as exemplified in the Qur'an is one that guarded 'Ā'isha, the wife of Prophet Muhammad, from false accusations. It is a guarding principle that demands women be treated equally to men. They are recipients of honour on equal terms to men. Despite its misuse due to patriarchy and other wider factors, from a theological perspective, it is a concept that is intended to nurture a relationship of reciprocity between the believing men and women. Honour is a value that is so intrinsic to human nature (*fiṭrah*) that despite its overwhelmingly negative impact on Muslim women, because of patriarchal misapplications and manipulations, Muslim women still hold on firmly to this value (Brohi, 2018). Honour relates to humans, their social interactions, their conduct on earth, their self-betterment, their relationship to God, their belief in God, etc. It is a broad all-encompassing concept. But it emphasises equality, justice, dignity, and protection for all creation.

To overcome HBV and patriarchal misapplications within Muslim communities, it is the very concept of honour within Islam that must be utilised.

Conclusion

This thesis addresses two pertinent issues regarding the concept of honour and its impact on Muslim women in the contemporary world. These are:

1. The internal Islamic patriarchal sabotaging of the concept that has reduced it to a system of policing and controlling Muslim women.
2. The manipulation and utilisation of the concept of honour in external non-Islamic and western patriarchal projects/systems, which again reduce this complex concept to a tool for making demands of the Muslim woman and (illegitimately, without her consent) on her behalf.

The concept of honour has been hugely manipulated over time and into the present-day world. It is a concept that has led to a many-sided oppression of Muslim women within Muslim communities but also at the hands of many in the West, in ways that collude with and reinforce each other. This thesis has, however, shown that neither a continuation of these honour praxes, nor the abandonment of a concept of honour per se, can emancipate Muslim women from both external and internal patriarchies. Rather it is a reconceptualisation, one that centres Muslim authoritative sources and Muslim women, that can allow for a conception of honour to be arrived at and endorsed, one that is rooted in an Islamic ethical vision that can work to realise a range of benefits for Muslim women across many settings and locations, especially where fidelity to Muslim codes of conduct is valued and embodied. It is such a concept of honour, reformulated in line with ideals of gender justice and of racial and spiritual justice, which I have outlined in detail in my earlier chapters, that can allow for negative gender-biased honour ideals and practices to be countered and jettisoned effectively in culturally relevant and appropriate ways.

This thesis has shown that honour is a crucial value deeply inscribed within core Islamic source texts and enacted via interpretation within Islamic thought and practice in Muslim communities living in majority Muslim countries or as minorities elsewhere. It is a value that, despite the overbearingly oppressive praxes associated with it, many Muslim women hold onto as a quintessentially Qur'anic and Prophetic value. Honour

cannot thus be merely abandoned. To re-establish the position of honour within Islam as beneficial to women, as egalitarian and as gender-neutral, this research project has addressed the following research questions:

1. What concept of honour can be derived from the Qur'anic text?
2. What Prophetic usages and conceptions of honour can be derived from the Ḥadīth corpus and how have classical Ḥadīth commentaries of these Prophetic usages impacted Muslim women?
3. How can Qur'anic and Prophetic honour conceptions be used in relation to the reformation of legal rulings in Islam that have a detrimental impact on Muslim women?
4. How have textual honour ideals and codes been transformed and developed into contemporary Muslim community beliefs and practices?
5. To what extent have Western usages and conceptions of honour in Islam and contemporary Muslim communities impacted Muslim women and the notion of honour for Muslims?
6. What frameworks are necessary for a reconceptualisation of honour ideals and praxes within the contemporary world that can result in egalitarian and context-relevant understandings of honour?

The answers to each of these questions have been broached and presented in detail through the chapters of this thesis. A summary of my findings in each chapter now follows.

Chapter overviews

The literature review in this thesis highlighted the various areas and lenses through which the notion of honour has been critiqued, categorised and through which it has been associated with Islam. From a Western perspective, honour remained a central value before modernity, and it is through this very Western prism of honour that many researchers have attempted to comprehend and categorise the practices and conceptualisations of honour within the Islamicate. This thesis explored why such Western frameworks result in inadequate and flawed understandings of Muslim honour ideals and practices. The literature also presented two types of dominant views: one type attributes honour practices to 'culture', and the other centres Islam. I

also scrutinised research that investigates materialism and other contributing factors in contemporary honour practices. However, as the literature review highlighted and this thesis has gone on to show, neither of these views is satisfactory. Relegating these practices to cultural influences overlooks the attribution of honour to Islam by the very endorsers of these beliefs and practices.

Yet the researchers associating Islamic imperatives with contemporary Muslim honour practices and beliefs, and who hold 'Islam' responsible for the existence of negative honour ideals and practices, do so based on patriarchal interpretations of selected Qur'anic verses and Ḥadīth which are contingent and socially engineered by human agents over the course of history, both in the era of classical Islamic text interpretation and in the colonial era of European rule over great swathes of the so-called Islamic world. Overall, there has, to date, been no in-depth research that has examined the concept of honour within Islamic thought and practice through primary scriptural sources. No research has examined the root of honour endorsers attributing their actions and beliefs to Islam. If anything, most analyses of honour have resulted in reductive conclusions.

Thus, in chapter 2 of this thesis, I began with an examination of Western notions of honour and the use of the English term 'honour'. My findings revealed that the term honour is contested. Honour is not restricted to the Islamicate. Yet, in understanding honour, it is too often Western notions that are imposed on Muslim honour practices, impacting how we speak of, conceive, conceptualise, and categorise honour in Muslim communities. As such, this thesis only utilised the English term 'honour' as a *collective label* to refer to the complex and varied honour ideals and practices that exist in Muslim communities. These are practices and beliefs that Muslim communities have varied terms for, representing nuances that the single English term 'honour' cannot capture but rather reduces and flattens.

This chapter thus engaged with these varying terms to represent how honour within Muslim communities is complex and multifaceted. As such the dominant association of HBV with the essentialised notion of 'honour' that we find within the West is highly reductive and harmful for Muslim women. Honour is embodied and understood in many positive ways. In regard to the gender-biased practices and beliefs that impact

Muslim women, I demonstrated how these are also more complex than the popular reference to HBV. Through what I categorised as the CMHP I examined the varying interrelating practices, beliefs and restrictions that impact Muslim women today in the name of a system of honour. Again, many of these practices and beliefs are endorsed in the name of an honour system supposedly generated by Islamic values and norms. Yet it is nonsensical to take for granted Islam's position regarding the concept of honour in the shallow and thoughtless ways that we have seen thus far. Neither is it sufficient to utilise select Qur'anic verses and Ḥadīth to denounce contemporary practices attributed to honour without engaging with the concept of honour in the primary sources. Chapters 4 through 6 were thus dedicated to uncovering a conceptualisation of honour based on the Qur'an and Ḥadīth, and how it can be implemented with Islamic law.

Before analysing the primary sources, chapter 3 focused on the context of pre-Islamic Arabia where and when the Qur'anic text originated. In this chapter, I shed light on already existent and prevailing honour beliefs and practices. I also briefly examined existent honour systems beyond Arabia, highlighting that it was not only in Arabia that honour systems have persisted for millennia, transcending geographical boundaries.

Following on from this broader contextualisation and cross-cultural comparison, in chapter 4 I examined the concept of honour that *can* be extracted from the Qur'anic text. Through examining the various occurrences of the English term honour in a translation of the Qur'anic text, I extrapolated a preliminary thematic whole of honour occurrences within the Qur'an. Alongside this thematic analysis, the chapter also presented the varying Arabic terms that have been translated as 'honour', probing deeper into the relevant Arabic terms and offering an in-depth analysis of the honour framework imparted in the Qur'an. I thereby revealed through textual evidence that the Qur'an came to reform existing honour ideals by expanding the concept of honour beyond confinement to a single-gender or sexuality which would carry its weight. Honour within the Qur'anic text exists as a broad and all-encompassing concept that relates to both God and all His creation without exception and in non-gendered terms.

Alongside an inquiry into the Qur'anic text, I examined honour occurrences within the Ḥadīth corpus to shed light on the Prophetic conception of honour. The Ḥadīth

highlight existing honour ideals within Arabia, which were critiqued and reformed by the Prophet. From the varying Ḥadīth analysed, we find clear threads of evidence that the Qur'anic concept of honour is reinforced, confirmed, and emphasised within the second Islamic authoritative textual source. However, I also demonstrated how these egalitarian and gender-neutral Ḥadīth are conceived of by later commentators, who at times draw into their commentaries patriarchal and pre-Islamic influences upon the concept of honour, generated by themselves or others.

In both Qur'anic and Ḥadīth commentaries, we see first that a holistic conception of honour is not emphasised or referred to. There appear to be no consistent foundational principles regarding honour that could be derived from these primary sources, to be utilised to inform the canonical commentaries. Secondly, we see gender-biased honour ideals being infused into the commentaries of Qur'anic verses and Ḥadīth traditions. It is this lack of foundational features of a concept of honour that has allowed honour, within Muslim communities and in association with Islam, to be receptive to pre-existing patriarchal honour ideals. The initial arbitrary and weak conceptualisation of 'honour' in the earliest Islamic theological discourse, ideals has thus allowed honour to become dominated by patriarchies.

The lack of a clear conception and position of honour within the work of early jurists is also evident when we examine the science of *maqāṣid al-sharī'ah*. This further highlights how honour, despite being present in the Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth literature, was not fully advanced and thus continued to exist in its pre-Islamic form after the advent of Islam. Honour as a concept was largely undermined, as was the broader discipline of Islamic ethics, prior to the contemporary era. Nonetheless, in chapter 6 I demonstrated how honour as an objective of law was recognised and emphasised by some jurists. This chapter explored the potentiality of utilising an honour *maqāṣid* to reform existing Islamic laws that conflict with the Qur'anic and Prophetic conceptions and values of honour, and as such impact Muslim women in harmful ways. Such a method centres Islamic methods, thereby decolonising the reform of patriarchal legal rulings that are informed by a concept of honour at odds with honour in the primary sources. It is therefore also one that can perhaps be more readily accepted by honour-endorsing Muslim communities as a method that is derived from, and authentic to, their tradition.

Chapter 7 examined the broader challenges of external forms of patriarchy from the West in relation to the contemporary existence of honour in Muslim communities. This chapter accounted for the impact of colonialism and orientalism on prevailing honour laws within Muslim-majority countries. Britain specifically, but also the West more generally, continues the legacy of orientalism and colonialism via the ubiquitous presence of Islamophobia, in which the concept of honour is exploited to depict Muslims as other, violent, and primitive. In this chapter, I demonstrate that honour in its current form cannot be reduced to a cultural or religious practice. It arises and flourishes from an intersection of contributory aspects such as economic, social, and political factors, alongside religion and culture, all of which influence its current form. Western countries – their policies as well as cultural norms and media representations – both geographically, and in their overriding epistemological project, are deeply complicit in the negative conceptions and practices of honour that exist within Muslim communities in Muslim-majority countries and elsewhere. This chapter urged that honour systems must not be conceived of as detached from broader systems of patriarchy. Rather, they function and exist within these very systems, and in some ways because of them. As such, although this thesis has predominately been concerned with the role of Islamic source texts, legal frameworks, and interpretive tendencies in reconceptualising honour, it is also crucial to emphasise that this does not mean I identify ‘Islam’ as the sole cause. Rather, as this chapter emphasised, the existence of honour beliefs and practices in their current contemporary form is due to a multifaceted intersection of factors. Until all these are acknowledged and addressed via academic, policy, media, cultural and other political and discursive interventions, to which this thesis contributes, overcoming negative, patriarchal and gender-biased honour systems in the contemporary Muslim world or in Muslim diaspora communities will not be possible.

In light of this imperative, Chapter 8 subsequently presented a framework for honour based on the Qur’anic text and Ḥadīth corpus that can initiate a reconceptualisation of prevailing honour ideals. Currently, these are attributed to Islam but are in fact in conflict with the conception of honour derived from the primary sources. This framework sets out the foundational features of the concept of honour in Islam as it should be understood if examined in the light of Islamic and universal ethics, and with

intellectual rigour. As I have mentioned in chapter 8, there are various areas where this framework can be utilised to allow for reform of patriarchal honour ideals.

Further research

The finding of this thesis indicates that honour systems, beliefs and practices present within Muslim communities hold similarities, and are influenced by not only honour practices and beliefs that predated Islam, but also by more recent Western notions of honour as a result of colonialism. It would be incorrect to assume or assert that Muslim honour conceptions, in their contemporary form, have not been profoundly influenced by colonial, secular western forms of modernity.

What also becomes clear is that neither the Qur'anic text nor the Prophet completely abolished or called for the dismissal of an honour system. On the contrary, Islamic sources of authority appear to reform pre-existing systems of honour within Arabia. Yet this reform does not seem to have been comprehended, extracted, and implemented to inform an egalitarian and gender-neutral system of honour. The classical commentaries on the Qur'anic text, Ḥadīth commentaries and the science of *maqāṣid* in relation to honour reveal the clear discrepancies. However, there is still further research to be done to advance a wider reconceptualisation of honour within Islamic thought and practice.

During the course of this project, only a representative selection of Qur'anic verses and Ḥadīth have been analysed, as these corpora are vast in themselves. As such it would be false to claim that my proposed framework is based on *all* honour occurrences within these sources. What the selected verses and Ḥadīth traditions have shown, though, is that honour is a broad, multifaceted, holistic, gender-neutral, ethical and theologically driven concept within Islamic source texts, that informs an individual's relationship with God, society and other aspects of creation. To further advance these preliminary findings, it would be crucial to fully engage with the Qur'anic text and the massive Ḥadīth corpus to uncover further aspects of the concept of honour in Islam that bolster the reconceptualisation that I propose in outline in this thesis.

Regarding my readings of these source texts and my methodology of selection and interpretation, I mentioned in chapter 4 that I relied on an English translation – involving the term ‘honour’ – to select Qur’anic verses to examine. However, I also provided the Arabic terms that have been translated as ‘honour’ and presented their roots, the frequency of their occurrences in the Qur’anic text and the variety of English terms they are translated as. There is thus much scope to engage in an inquiry that focuses on Arabic terms and considers the varying meanings that they imply in various verses. This will in turn allow for a further level of in-depth discourse analysis of honour occurrences within the Qur’an, the varying contexts and thus the meanings and implications thereof. Similarly, there are many more Ḥadīths that utilise Arabic terms for honour. Examining all these Ḥadīths will allow for an even more comprehensive and minutely detailed understanding of how the Prophet conceptualised honour.

In regard to accounting for the similarities between contemporary honour systems, beliefs and ideals and pre-Islamic honour codes, in contrast to the Qur’anic and Prophetic conceptions of honour, my thesis has focused on a theoretical and conceptual analysis. This analysis can critique and initiate reform. However, it is also useful, when working towards reform, to understand all the factors that contribute to the development and transformation of honour within Muslim communities into its current contemporary form. Thus Chapter 7 scrutinised the discursive and epistemological mechanics by which colonialism and orientalism had a direct impact on how honour was categorised within law, and how legal rulings were formed to codify a system of honour that was not present in its current form within the relevant geographical locations of Muslim-majority countries/regions prior to colonialism. Although I did not engage in a fully-fledged historical analysis due to the constraints of time and word count, this brief examination reveals *how* the system of honour was transformed over time and in modernity. As such, further layers of historical analysis would shed yet more light on how honour operated as a concept within pre-modern Muslim communities. Was the more egalitarian conception of honour evident within the primary sources ever implemented within early or historical Muslim communities? Are there other external factors that have influenced the concept of honour throughout Muslim history aside from highly evident colonial and western influences? New endeavours in multi-context historical inquiry in the future could uncover answers to these questions.

Another aspect that this thesis touched on but could not fully delve into as a central point of enquiry is ethics and morality in Islam. The connection between the concept of honour with ethics is crucial. The subject of ethics in Islam is generally not as advanced as other disciplines within Islamic Studies, such as law, *tafsīr* and so on. In developing deeper and broader analyses of the subject of ethics in Islam, honour is a concept that will be central. Indeed, the subject of ethics of law ties in deeply with *maqāṣid*. As such, there is much scope for further investigation into Islamic ethics in general and the role of ethics in relation to law, as well as the position of honour in these areas.

Similarly, the position of honour within Sufism, as a significant area of intellectual, social, and devotional activity in the Muslim past, has not been explored within this thesis. Sufism in the contemporary era has attracted increasing focus on the part of researchers, academics, and scholars in the push towards recognising and endorsing an egalitarian understanding of Islam. The works of scholars such as Sa'diyya Shaikh indicate how Sufism can be a means of arriving at egalitarian conceptualisations of gender and sexuality within Islamic thought and practice. This is thus another trajectory through which the concept of honour can be further examined in the future.

Aside from the role of Islam in the existence of honour ideals and practices, this thesis has argued that to uncover the roots and causes of HBV, a multivalent and intersectional analysis of overlapping contributory factors is crucial. Although I have engaged in this work throughout my thesis and offered a concrete set of findings that I hope will be foundational for further research, the broader area of enquiry that I set out clearly still deserves greater attention in both academic and political/social spheres. As I mentioned previously, the focus of this thesis on Islam does not mean that all Muslim perpetrators of HBV name or invoke 'Islam' as a justification or a means to authorise their beliefs and practices. Muslim honour endorsers are not homogenous. Various factors contribute to and influence individuals' beliefs and practices. As far as Islam is concerned, reconceptualising honour is a crucial way to challenge the patriarchal conceptions of honour that too often prevail within Muslim communities, where Islam *is* seen as a justification. However, this is not a remedy for the wider issue of gendered discrimination in the name of 'honour'. As such it is crucial

to identify other factors such as economic/financial and social context, childhood traumas and so on. In chapter 7 I examined the various considerations that are given to white perpetrators of violence within Western discourses and in criminal justice systems. Such considerations are not granted to Muslim male perpetrators. As such, Muslim perpetrators of oppression or violence in the name of 'honour' must be afforded support and consideration of factors that may have impacted and conditioned them to act in the ways they have, in the way that their non-Muslim white counterparts are often put on a path of rehabilitation by tackling root causes of their misdemeanours in their social, economic, cultural, and familial backgrounds. Only then can we effectively work towards educating individuals to abandon patriarchal honour conceptions.

Directions of future research and impact

In the previous chapter, I highlighted how my proposed honour framework can be utilised to effect reform. Some of the suggested areas were as follows:

1. Education
2. Decolonial faith-based approach
3. Legal reforms
4. Ethics in Islam (as discussed in the preceding)
5. Broader reforms within Islam

Education

Regarding the education of the community, findings regarding the conception of honour within the primary authoritative sources must be available for Muslim communities. The findings in chapter 1 and 2 substantiated that for Muslim honour-endorsing communities honour was emphasised for a range of reasons. One of the central reasons was the belief that it was a part of their religious tradition that such values and restrictions in the name of honour were upheld. Thus, despite HBV specifically being addressed as a crime in Islam and something that is not authorised in primary scriptural sources it is clear that in contemporary Muslim communities the various other manifestations of the honour system exist as if they are in accordance with Islamic values and ideals. Onal's interviews represent this through the way in which religious scholars implicitly invoke honour ideals to uphold patriarchal practices and values within the community. The male perpetrators thus, despite some acknowledging that the murder they had committed in the name of honour may be a

sin, were convinced that God would pardon them as it was done to defend honour. It is thus crucial that education, in both religious and state institutions, addresses the concept of honour and challenges patriarchal implementations that are contrary to Qur'anic and Prophetic honour ideals. It is indispensable to utilise the very sources that honour-endorsing communities see as authoritative to initiate reform. As such, the Qur'anic and Prophetic honour framework is central in engaging Muslims to reconsider their honour systems, ideals and practices. Alongside religious and state institutions, educational programmes can occur through the work of NGOs. Perpetrator programmes within prisons and outside of prisons are crucial in pushing convicts to re-evaluate their honour ideals and the crimes they have committed. It is problematic to allow such individuals to remain content with their crimes because they deem them to be in line with the Qur'anic and Prophetic teaching when this is not the case.

To enact this reform on a community level it is essential that individuals who hold positions of power and authority are also trained accordingly. Educational workshops must be held based on this framework for community leaders, religious leaders, educators, NGOs, state/governmental institutions and organisations, to train them on how to engage with Muslim honour crime perpetrators, victims and honour-endorsing communities. This would contribute to providing educational facilities for communities and engaging them with reconceptualising their honour ideals and uncovering the roots of their existing honour values and practices. NGOs and government organisations and institutions can thus engage with such a framework and utilise it in their work with and within communities.

Onal's interviews explicated how alongside the authority of Islam as a religious tradition, religious leaders play a central role in endorsement of an honour system. The authority that they hold within the community regarding their opinions of Islam and values such as honour is instrumental in how a community can respond to a reconceptualisation of a core value such as honour. As such the proposed framework and suggestions for further inquiry must be utilised and engaged with by religious authorities if reform is to be effectively initiated. Honour can no longer pass as a vague, implicitly referenced value system. It is not sufficient to denounce honour killings yet uphold the very ideals and values that encourage and lead to these killings. As such

religious leaders must explicitly engage with and refer to the system of honour, based on the primary sources of authority. This will not only bring clarity but also allow for the dismantling of patriarchal applications of honour that are damaging and problematic.

Decolonial faith-based approach

Another aspect that relates to what honour-endorsing communities view as authoritative is centring sources of authority that are from within the Islamic tradition. For this reason, this thesis has engaged in a decolonial faith-based approach. As such, the findings and proposed framework can be seen as decolonial and faith-based also. This framework can therefore allow for Eurocentric conceptualisations and challenges to honour within Islam to be distinguished and separated from the conceptualisation of honour based on the Qur'an and Ḥadīth corpus. Eurocentric conceptions and categorisations of honour systems and values are largely misplaced, inauthentic and represent a form of patriarchy. Furthermore, honour-endorsing communities usually refer to holding onto what they deem as an authentic honour system as a form of resistance to 'Westernisation' and colonialism. As such a reconceptualisation of honour based on the primary sources of authority is the most likely way reform can be achieved. Thus, the suggested Qur'anic and Prophetic honour framework pushes for a decolonial faith-based approach that is also significant for the self-determination of Muslim women. It centres Muslim experiences, voices and sources of authority.

Legal reforms

Through initiating these primary modes of application of the proposed framework a more direct reform can be enacted through the reformation of laws and policies. Organisations such as Musawah demonstrate that reformation of family laws is a central concern within contemporary reformist and progressive intellectual institutions and activist organisation efforts. Many such efforts can be located within the contemporary world that substantiate how theoretical reforms are utilised to enact practical and legal reform. However, there is very little engagement with a reconceptualised notion of honour in the reform of legal rulings that are influenced by a patriarchal conception of honour (see chapter 1). As such I contend and demonstrate that the reform of legal rulings relating to honour cannot occur solely on the premise that honour killings are not authorised in Islam. Rather they must be rooted in the dismantling of core concepts of honour that inform these rulings but are contrary to

the egalitarian conception of honour based on the primary sources. A reconceptualised egalitarian conception of honour must not only dismantle patriarchal legal rulings but must inform the formation of new laws. This method can be useful in addressing traditional Islamic legal rulings and state laws and eventually, with the combination of the aforementioned methods of reform, may pave the way for the reform of customary laws. Central to the reformation of traditional legal rulings and the formation of reformed egalitarian rulings are the *maqāṣid of honour* that I discussed at length in chapter 6. Through centring a gender-neutral egalitarian concept of honour as one of the objectives of law, many laws that are informed by a patriarchal, gender-biased conception of honour can be reformed. If honour is to influence law then this influence must apply equally to men and women. An honour *maqṣad* (singular of *maqāṣid*) is equally relevant to men and women. As such the outcomes of honour being an objective of law must be consistent and equitable for all believers, regardless of gender, class, ethnicity, etc.

Reform of contemporary state laws within Muslim countries that are based on patriarchal, gender-biased or western conceptions of honour can occur through the proposed framework. A reconceptualisation of honour can also inform public policy in Western countries that may be influenced by reductive, culturalist and Islamophobic conceptualisations of honour and its role within Muslim communities.

Broader reform in Islam

The concept of honour and ethics of honour can result in broader reforms relating to Muslim women within Islamic religio-legal and even more popularly accessible discourses. As an egalitarian gender-neutral concept based on values such as justice, a reconceptualised value of honour can assist in re-establishing egalitarian gender norms within Muslim communities. A reconceptualisation of honour can have a broader impact and assist reformists, feminists, and Muslims in general to realign gender norms, ideals of sexuality, and various other practices with the quintessential honour values expressed in the Qur'an and Ḥadīth corpus.

Even if the above activities are pursued, it is important to note that the impact of a reconceptualisation of honour will not cause immediate change. Rather, this will be a gradual process. This thesis and its findings can be seen as initiating engagement with

the concept of honour from a decolonial, faith-centred perspective. As with my suggested areas of further research, it is clear that the very subject of honour within Islam requires extensive focus and engagement from a variety of stakeholders. What is equally clear, however, is that honour is indeed a central value in Islamic source texts and social life generally and focusing on its conceptualisation from within the Qur'anic text and Ḥadīth corpus is a critical step in explicating the foundations for an egalitarian and gender-neutral conception of honour to be developed and eventually applied. In terms of how the suggested honour framework can be utilised, once again the impact of this will be gradual. However, persistence and continual engagement with educating communities and reconsidering legal rulings will stimulate eventual long-term change. In short, honour practices, values, and ideals cannot be reformed overnight; however, this process must begin from within Islamic sources and tradition. This thesis has offered a significant step forward in the process of change-making and overturning a variety of discriminatory behaviours associated with honour.

Conclusion

Muslim practices of honour are both informed by Islam and by patriarchy in ways that transcend religious and geographical boundaries. Deeply embedded patriarchies exist in virtually all known communities, not just Muslim communities. Still, the negative gender disparity and discriminating honour codes within Muslim communities are very clearly influenced by patriarchal thinking that is not native to Islamic tradition in the form of its core original source texts. This patriarchy boldly uses Islam to legitimise its position in Muslim consciousness and practice, in ways that have not been challenged robustly enough with reference to these source texts and their contingent interpretation over time.

Islamic thought and practice, in the Prophetic era and for some decades after this, initially instilled a powerful and beneficial honour system, but this has been suppressed and dominated by a patriarchal conception of honour. This domination is supported by forms of patriarchy internal and external to Islam. It is this confluence of oppressions that must be overcome. In this sense, Islam as a belief system as well as a set of norms and values cannot be separated or viewed as distinct from Muslim honour beliefs and practices. It is the manipulation of Islam that is used to emphasise a

negative honour system and it is Islam that must be used to dismantle these patriarchal honour codes.

Utilising Islamic tradition and its sources to reconceptualise honour will of course not be a solution for all negative honour praxis, as I have mentioned previously. However, reconsidering the concept of honour based on Islamic sources can prove to be a constructive and culturally relevant and appropriate method in regard to individuals who centre Islam as a key justification and motivation for their honour beliefs and practices. Similarly, honour may not be the driving force or driving ideology for many of the practices relating to the contemporary honour paradigm. However, the concept of honour is utilised to justify many of these practices and thus becomes complicit in maintaining and emphasising the manipulation of Muslim women. It is the emphasis on the concept of honour and the severity of transgressing the honour system that is used to police and scare marginalised and weak members of communities. For this compelling reason, patriarchal honour conceptions must be challenged. The association of these with Islam can no longer be taken for granted. If we are to overcome the false attribution of patriarchal honour values to Islam, then reconceptualising the notion based on Islamic sources is crucial. The concept of honour in association with Islam simply must be reconsidered. My thesis has begun the work of disrupting this association and uncovering the egalitarian and gender-just concept of honour within the Islamic tradition.

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