RETHINKING AESTHETICS IN THE POLITICS OF THEATRE: A ROAD TO EDWARD BOND – THE ETHICAL.

VOLUME I

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ABSTRACT

Jacques Derrida contended that Marxism is dead, along with its hopes, and its discourses (1994: 52). This thesis arose from an assertion that the socialist utopia as a paradigm of perfect justice, equality and freedom, has been progressively effaced from most cultural and artistic enterprises, supplanted by economic need, political consensus, and social compromise. Class differences remain acute, yet the notion of class struggle is effectively absent across the Humanities. I propose Edward Bond's philosophical model as a unique route to reclaiming this neglected utopian function of culture.

Bond's plays and theoretical writings have been marginalized by the British theatrical mainstream. This study demonstrates that Bond's creative and ideological position is incompatible with any reactionary notion of 'mainstream'. Bond's radical materialism demonstrates an inherent and inevitable critique of most genres of theatre and performance.

Through an exploration of key philosophical theories that underpin the work of the dramatist, I reach a re-evaluation of aesthetics as an ambiguous medium of the dominant bourgeois ideology. Art is a repository of cognitive truths, but not of universal cognitive truths. In terms of class culture, it really forms part of a tradition "of the oppressed" (Benjamin, 1999: 248). Habermas proposes a unity of experience in the arts by bridging "the gap between cognitive, ethical, and political discourses". I contend that these discourses are undermined by bourgeois aestheticization, which distorts values and understanding, manifested in the daily delivery of most culture as an industrial enterprise.

Bond contends that, "[his] philosophy...makes ethics an ultimate reality" (Stuart, 2000: 56). Identifying an interaction between Marx's theory of reification and Nietzsche's evaluation on men of *ressentiment*, I construct a platform for approaching this complicated ethical question. I evaluate the dialectical validity of what Bond calls "the problem"; the "extreme" lives we lead in our liberal democracies, establishing his

philosophical position not as provocatively controversial but as logical, realistic, and materialistic.

Capitalist reification progressively conceals human meaning under "the essence of commodity-structure [...] in all its aspects" (Lukács, 1990: 83).   With its emphasis on the meaning of the human self, Bond's dramatic strategy is in a sense the application of Lukács's prescription against the reified mind.   For Bond, drama is crucial because it allows reified individuals to enact human choices that are impossible in their daily lives.

I conclude by addressing issues that arise from Bond's involvement in Drama in Education (DIE). Bond's theoretical output is evolving into a discrete, autonomous field and needs to be approached as such.   Volume II, a transcribed interview with the dramatist himself, contributes further to the issues arising from this thesis.

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VOLUME II (appendix)

Interview transcribed and edited following a visit to the dramatist on the 30th October 2004.

Overall introduction

In the introduction to the essays of *Adorno, The Culture Industry*, J. M. Bernstein pinpointed a major problem in the arts which, in my view, is equally true of theatrical fields. Bernstein suggests "If the division between the culture industry and high art was, during modernism and the early stages of post-modernism, the negative truth about society, where does that truth lie now?" (Adorno, 2001:26). This may need further explanation. In a letter to the author, Bernstein suggested that the separation between high art and the art of the culture industry inscribes the problem of our situation, since it gives us compelling art that is without explicit significant social content and without mass appeal – "elitism is a truth of the art world" he says – and art which has social content but lacks aesthetic authenticity. This is a negative truth in the simple sense that it reveals the problem, our fractured condition; "not where we should go and how we might get together." Thus, Bernstein contends, "an art that would be both social and authentic, as Brecht wanted to generate, is what we do not have" (letter to author: 18.05.02). My own experience corroborates Bernstein's argument: this frustrating perception has undermined my theatrical experience from the very start. If only because this study has radically challenged most of the notions I have accumulated through several years of theatre practice, I will use some of my own biographical accounts to facilitate further disclosure, and I invite the reader to regard these accounts as if I was my own guinea-pig under observation.

Theatre has been part of my life in one way or another for the last twenty-two years and my involvement came about in a very accidental way. Some time during the 1980s in Spain, one of the teachers of the school where I was studying technology asked me whether I would like to be involved in one of those plays most schools stage at the end of an academic year, and I agreed to it more for the fun and the company than to fulfil any acting aspirations. As a matter of fact, I was already seventeen and theatre had not had any meaning, significance or social value for me up till then. Calderon or Lope de Vega were, for me, embedded in the past and their plays and dates of birth were merely facts to be memorized in order to pass an exam at school and Shakespeare was the name of a foreigner whose name one could pronounce badly but definitely could not spell.

However, after concluding our play, a well-known theatre director, Juan Antonio Quintana – who happened to be there by chance – came to the dressing room and,

literally embracing me, asked me whether I would like to join his theatre company, the "Teatro Estable the Valladolid". All this was completely unexpected. From then on, other students and teachers of my school of technology looked at me *differently* thanks to *something* I did during that representation. Through subsequent studies, I discovered that my case was not unusual; a number of known actors and actresses have begun their professional acting careers in similarly fortuitous ways. For the first time in my life, they made me think I was "special" and "different" (later on in Chapter IV through Pierre Bourdieu I will come to realize that I had found an ideology: "charisma"). Still, I could not say what the real causes behind this newly-acquired identity were – was it the movement I made with my arm; the way I looked at the audience; or was it all the make-up and the lights? It was a mystery but I could not let it go. Finally I had found a purpose in life where up till then there had been none. There and then, I became an actor of the "Teatro Estable", leaving behind my aspirations for a 'real' job.

In the "Teatro Estable" we explored and staged theatre in its broadest and most disparate terms: from Valle Inclán to Lorca, from Ibsen to Strindberg, from Genet to Pinter. In addition to our own rehearsals schedule and experiments, we enjoyed the seminar classes of highly reputed professionals: Juan A. Hormigón, Pilar Frances, Ricard Salvat, and others. There was a profusion of skills which needed to be learned such as voice, corporal expression, dance, mime, and so on. However, it was not long before I realized that something was terribly wrong in that cultural sphere; that *something* which was terribly important to me was missing. During my working class upbringing our only serious concern was food on the table, the heating in winter, and to pay the basic bills; music was the last pop-song one heard on the radio, films were spaghetti-westerns in our local cinema and drama was TV soap-operas in which people were always guilty of something and "cried a lot"; with a bit of luck, the future was a job for life in the assembly line of a car manufacturer. We were not poor, but a short step away from it. Yet, most of the young actors I found in the "Teatro Estable" were virtually part of another world: students in law, journalism and medicine, with parents from the higher classes with high aspirations for their offspring. My fellow actors had enjoyed private classes of piano, had knowledge about art, classic music, theatre, spoke foreign languages and had travelled to the United States. There was throughout an aesthetic sense of the world which had nothing to do with the *other* world I knew to be out there. Art was "art" and we were "artists" forming part of an active culture.

A change of theatrical milieu did not change this perception. A few years later I became a student in the Paolo Grassi theatre school and in the Piccolo Teatro Studio of Milan (Italy) where theatre continued to be "theatre" and acting was now taught as a profession; it was a "job" like any other job. Here an actor had to learn discipline, disciplines, and not to question the director or the instructor but to do well just what one was told to do; it was – so we were told – for our own future well-being. An actress or actor as a "quixotic artist" was not "realistic" during my Italian instruction; in the search for a job, everything was up for grabs: advertisements, entertainment, or TV soap-operas. For the first time I started to be aware of the Culture Industry as an unavoidable imperative. Thus, during my first stage as theatre practitioner, the politics of theatre seemed to appear wrapped up in its own aesthetics to the point of concealment. Now this thesis has made me re-evaluate my memories of those times and realize that there was another factor which was never discussed, never pointed out among students or tutors: class differences – a real socio-historical condition that now underpins this thesis throughout.

A transfer into the realm of political theatre was, given the account above, only natural, but it did not help to relieve my frustration. As Bernstein contends, political theatre offered social content but, in the main, aesthetic authenticity seemed to me mostly absent; or, as Garcia Düttmann explains, mutated sometimes into a rational device (therefore scientific, as if impregnated with the scent of formalin) and other times just into an unformed or unfinished spectacle. I was experiencing the politicization of aesthetics (Düttmann, 1991: 533-34). That the good intentions of political theatre have created a backlash of contempt in people's attitudes seems to be generally acknowledged. Baz Kershaw reports that "for some time now the idea of 'political theatre' has been in crisis" because, he says, "postmodernism and related theories have profoundly upset established notions of the 'political' in theatre" (1999: 16). This thesis has allowed me to see (especially through Chapters IV and V) that it might be the other way round. It might be that postmodernism as we know it – that is, bearing in mind Gianni Vattimo's *The End of Modernity,* as an era defined by the crisis of humanism (1991: 31) and/or a historical stage of overall scepticism towards any holistic approach (Ibid: 180) – is a consequence of the social disillusions which were brought about by both political theatre and the political left. Political theatre and the political left have been offering solutions to social problems while, consciously or unconsciously, turning a blind eye to the fact that what we need is to change the system – or at least to work

towards that end. Of course, such a proposition – to change the system – would appear to most of us, perhaps now more than ever before, as an impossible utopian dream. This is nothing less than trying to imagine a world without capital, class differences and without private property. I recall Kant, who argued that moral values were the result of people's inability to imagine a future without God.[1] Now I think there is a relationship between current moral values and people's inability to imagine a world without capital.

The fact that the political may become extinct is a worrying prospect to Kershaw: that Brechtian vision of a world with "a growing measure of justice, equality and freedom" which could become a "thing of the past". (1999: 17). So, with this argument, Kershaw pursues the notion that "radical performance *might* [my italics] usefully replace 'political theatre' [because] it will allow us to more directly encounter [...] the promiscuity of the political in post-modernism" (Ibid). Kershaw suggests repeatedly that radical performance *may* produce or stimulate "radical freedom" but, as is the case with his use of justice and equality, he does not seem to offer a reliable or positive – that is, humane or ethical – account of what radical freedom is. Of course, he proposes freedom as "various freedoms" which are "resistant to dominant ideologies [...] but that also are transgressive and even transcendent of ideology itself" (Ibid: 18). The problem is that, as he acknowledges himself, "radical performance is made problematic by cultural praxis" (Ibid: 20); and I would say, extremely so. As I discuss in the second part of this thesis, transgression, transcendence, and even forms of "resistance" to dominant ideologies seem also to be some of the propelling components behind the Nazi and fascists emergences in 1920s' Germany and most of Europe. Not surprising that radical performance is for Kershaw "always a creative opportunity to change the world for better or for worse" (Ibid). Indeed, radical performance would always be a form of creativity but its structure and functioning tell us that it can be destructive as much as constructive – it could be good for us, but also bad or very bad; it could be for the *worse*. Transgression and transcendence are 'languages' prone to be used to serve the purposes of fascism; the ethical platform is not.

Searching for one aesthetic approach that is politically promising, Kershaw chooses radical performance because its transgressive and transcendent qualities might facilitate an exit towards spheres situated beyond ideology and "existing formalised powers" (1999: 18); but, as I will discuss in Chapter V, transgression and transcendency are intimately related to the phenomenal social success of fascism in 1920s' Europe.[2] If

fascism – which, as Chapter V will explain, is always incipient in capitalist societies – continues to be a real threat to humanity and humanism, I believe we need to invent or find concepts or languages that are completely unusable for the purposes of fascism. The dramatist Edward Bond is developing such a language – which is none other than the ethical language – because he too believes fascism is an all-too-real threat, that we live now in extreme times. In his "Thesis on the Philosophy of History" (orig. 1940) Walter Benjamin observed:

> The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule. We must attain to a conception of history that is in keeping with this insight. Then we shall clearly realize that it is our task to bring about a real state of emergency, and this will improve our position in the struggle against Fascism (1999: 248-49).

Bond's output reflects that we have not left behind that state of emergency today and has tried tenaciously to pass this perception on to others during his intervening 45 years as a dramatist. I believe he is correct in doing so.

I initially suggested through Bernstein that we do not have an art that can be both social and authentic. This is, Bernstein contends, art's negative truth. But there appear to be some exceptions to this rule. In my view and that of others (Davis, 2005), Bond has been uninterruptedly and consciously confronting this seemingly insurmountable "negative truth" in the arts by balancing content and form rather successfully. Ultimately, Bond answers "yes" to my initial question about whether – or to what extent – it is possible to enact the ethical question in the age of the culture industry; in other words, whether we can represent through symbols, not that which we want or need, but that which we *ought* to want or need.

In Bond's work social responsibility also has different meanings, depending on the platform on which it is situated, namely the political or the ethical. But as I will discuss throughout this thesis, his drama is not looking for answers. For Bond, we are being confronted by an impossible situation: to be a human being will be always problematic, but capitalism undermines, as he designates it, our humanness. By way of Bond's philosophy of drama I believe we could have an opportunity to develop an ethical language through which we would not offer answers to a particular social class, but to be able to ask the question "what does it mean to be human" for humanity *as a whole*.

We would not depict just one of the many problems that affect our societies, but the "problem", as he calls it persistently (throughout in appendix).

Summarising, this is the purpose of this thesis: not a critical study of theatres and/or theatre, or an analysis of Bond's creative output, rather an evaluation of the ontological problem to which Bond refers. Before his drama can be, as he says, not acted but *enacted* (appendix: 45), we need first to understand "the problem". For Bond, contemporary society is defined as an extreme situation in which inequality is considered the 'natural' order of things; where a human being needs the favours of another one – in the form of a job for example – in order to be; where privileges are a matter of chance and birth. Simultaneously, I expect to justify dialectically Bond's stated position as incohesive or unrelated to any other artistic field. While many other playwrights and theatrical genres have been influenced by his philosophy and output in one way or another (Sierzs, 2000: 34; 93; 97), I, like Jenny Spencer (1992) or David Davis (2005), have not been able to fully associate Bond with any field or any other particular author. He stands alone. His theatre is not theatre, it is drama; but nor it is like any other drama; he also proposes his drama for educational means but, as I will discuss in the conclusion of this thesis, its ontological intentions do not relate fully with current drama in education in the broadest sense; it is art but not like any other art. As he says, dissociating his drama from the rest of "theatres":

> Boulevard theatre glosses over the human paradox. Performance art thinks the solution is transcendental. Beckett thinks there is no solution. Brecht thinks that if the problem is clearly shown the solution can be found by thought. If that were so there would never have been a need or even the possibility of ideology. Euripides said you cannot talk reason to the mad – the clinically or socially mad. You cannot talk reason to fanatics, and most people are fanatics when it comes to earning their daily bread or walking the streets in safety. It is the creed of law-and-order (Bond, 2004:27-8).

I am not saying that his is a new philosophy. Through Bond, there is a rediscovery of a two and a half thousand year old philosophy: that of the ancient Greeks such as Sophocles and Euripides. For Bond is first and foremost a tragedian; and this is a basic or starting point in the dramatist's line of thought. Evoking the ultimate conclusion of Jan Kott's *The Eating of the Gods*: "In the theatre the present of the tragic heroes is also the present of the spectators" (1974: 265), Bond says, "each new generation goes back to the very basic problems, and therefore the very basic questions are never settled" (appendix: 34). Furthermore, Bond thinks that current perceptions about art and

culture act as critical barriers obstructing the communication of his philosophy and output to practitioners and audiences at large. For him, the role of drama and of dramatists is to ask "how do you create humanness" but, as a result of ideology – or rather, as a result of the ideologized mind – "[this] question has lain aside for two-and-a-half thousand years. [Thus] it must be asked again."[3]

To begin a discussion towards the ethical question with Bond is difficult, since there is in it a non-definite language at work. Bill Roper tells us that while Bond's underlying structure seems to be "remarkably similar"[4] during his whole life as dramatist, the language he uses changes continuously (Davis, 2005: 127). This is, I believe, the consequential approach of one that has made of the ethical realm its working tool. As Roper explains, "it is impossible to present Bond's account of human psychology as a clear and simple mechanical edifice [...] the ideas required for such project would be inimical to the subtleties and range of purpose of the human mind as it actually exists in the world and society" (in Davis, 2005: 127). Bond finds in the ethical the right site from which to propose his ancient question – namely, what does it mean to be a human being; but he is also aware that there are a number of obstacles preventing clear communication between him and audiences. These obstacles have their origin in ideology, for it is the one barrier that swathes and corrupts everything, including our experiencing of aesthetics.

The sub-title, "a road to Edward Bond," is an evocation of George Lukács' earlier study on Marx "My Road to Marx" (1933) (Lukács, 1990: ix) – and in more than one sense. As he explains in his preface to the New 1967's Edition of *History and Class Consciousness* (1990), Lukács was initially led to Marx through Hegel and Max Weber but fundamentally out of the "hatred and contempt [he] had felt for life under capitalism ever since [his] childhood (Ibid.: xi). If Kierkegaard had played a significant role in Lukács' initial road to Marx and then to his interest in ethics (Ibid.: ix), then similarly, without my earlier encounter with the writings of the Italian poet Pier Paolo Pasolini (1977; 1995), my appreciation of Edward Bond's drama and philosophy would have been rather improbable. In fact, it now feels as if my own road to Bond started even before I knew his name. Lukács' social and political contradictions led him into contact with diverse lines of thought which produced "a highly contradictory amalgam of theories" (Ibid.: x). They became, nevertheless, Lukács' decisive transitional phase towards ethics or his "inner human motivations", giving rise to his imperative need to

clarify some of the "mental confusions" he had accumulated as a result (Ibid.: xi). In other words, if Lukács approached Marx by other means and with other ends – ethics – so do I with Bond. If a road signifies a way between different places, my change of "place" comes about also as a result of necessity.

In one of his letters Bond tells me: "My problem is that I need to create a radical new theatre but one which has none of the flashy tricks – the reductive and reactionary effects – of most self-styled radical new theatre."[5] My concern here is to unearth and support the reasons behind Bond's needs for such a new theatre, and in doing so to contribute to further understanding of his stated position. As Bond says: "the first thing to say about my philosophy is that it makes ethics an ultimate reality" (in Stuart, 2000: 56).

Structure

This thesis suggests a rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre because it takes into account the uniqueness of Bond's stated position – that is, the ethical position – which appears to be in conflict with most cultural and artistic enterprises. This is posited as a point of reference throughout the following work. In the introduction to Chapter V, I emphasize Kate Katafiasz's assertion that Bond is "too provocative to be ignored". Bond provokes us because, as I will illustrate, within the mental vision of the dramatist, all meaning and/or perception is in need of reassessment. Justice is not justice, it is vengeance. Equality is mistaken for opportunity. And freedom does not extend beyond an act of shopping. Art – and therefore aesthetics – is a modern and ambiguous invention which does not secure a humane immediacy (in appendix: 2): it can work towards socialism but also towards fascism (in Stuart, 1996: 126). Hence, the title of this study: prior to appreciating in its fullest sense, the enormous humanist value of Bond's drama and philosophy, we need first to rethink the way we perceive the world. Through his letters (in bibliography), Bond explains that the fundamental problem which he must deal with through his drama and philosophy is to find channels of communication with the ideologized mind. This is why this thesis suggests that, before Bond's plays can be approached, one must first explore the writer's thinking and the possible theoretical approaches that support it. In addition, this thesis will attempt to reveal the difficulties that are involved in the ethical frame – its proper discovery as a

question – in order for it to be used as future reference in what now I would suggest as the Bondian field.

Thus, this thesis consists of two parts. The first part explores, through Chapter I, plausible notions of art as a conveyor of knowledge – that is, as Peter de Bolla suggests, art as a "knowing" (in Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212) – observing that these notions must be seriously undermined by ideology; chiefly, by conditions such as reification and resentment. Insofar as aesthetics is considered a specifically bourgeois discipline (Eagleton, 1991:8), especially since the rise of capitalism in the middle of the eighteenth century, its experiencing must be operating "as a thoroughly ideological category" (Eagleton, 1991: 90). If that is the case, the intrinsic knowledge of art – or, as Adorno calls it, art's "truth content" (Adorno, 1997:354) – must suffer severe distortions; including those instances in which an artwork alludes to or searches for what is of main concern here: a functional platform towards justice, equality, and freedom. That is why, Adorno says, in the history of bourgeois society, the existence of all great forms of art is paradoxical: "Aesthetic truth [is] bound to the expression of the untruth of bourgeois society" (Adorno, 2001: 77).

Chapter II attempts to find a feasible theoretical representation of the ethical question. It first exposes hidden structures of our capitalist society through Marx's theory of reification which helps us to comprehend a situation otherwise incomprehensible – that is, as I would say via Fredric Jameson, current capitalism strategically depicted by itself as an ahistorical "natural given" (Jameson, 2004). However, as I discuss in chapter I, Marx repeatedly reminds us that reification – or alienation - is above all a scientific category (Tucker, 1972: 355-58), and science does not seem to secure ethical questioning This is where Nietzsche's evaluation on men of *ressentiment* (Nietzsche, 2001; and in Reginster, 1997) seems to present itself as the supplementary building, the missing extension of Marx's reification. As Wittgenstein explained (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 685-701), the ethical field is a language like no other, which requires a holistic mind equipped to undertake intuition and imagination as much as reason. For ethical purposes, these two approaches seem to support each other. As absolute value of judgment (that is, not the assessment of what we want or what we need but what we *ought* to need or want) the ethical question, requires that we put under scrutiny both society's structures and ourselves, concurrently. While their philosophies dwell in different worlds – Marx the external or "us" and Nietzsche the internal or "I" – they

both argue for a revaluation of all values. As such, they counterbalance each other. Chapter II ends by suggesting the complex symbiosis of Marx and Nietzsche as a plausible platform from which to develop an understanding of the difficult ethical question. I propose this concept more like a two-dimensional glass which, when placed in a particular setting, reflects the world and ourselves – or paraphrasing Lukács, that which functions without ourselves and that which functions within (in Bentley, 1992:448) – at the same time. Bond's answer to reading the first part of this thesis – his poem "The Sheet of Glass" (originally written in 2002; now published in Davis, 2005: 94-5) – is of enormous significance because it expresses an analogous concept in relation to this work, favourably strengthening my own suggestions while simultaneously indicating that, in my journey to Edward Bond, I have set off along one feasible road.

The second part of this thesis, Chapters III, IV and V, attempts to articulate the constructed reconciliation of Marx and Nietzsche that has been suggested in the first part by way of what I think are culture's most relevant and conditioning frames or platforms: first through contradiction, then industry, and finally through ideology. By dialectically revaluating these grounds, I hope in this part to defend Edward Bond against those critics and scholars who pinpoint his philosophy as "too controversial and polemic".[6] I shall demonstrate that his position is more logical than irrational, more realistic than idealistic, more humanistic than partisan, more flexible than dogmatic.

But what is dialectics? Lukács, through Hegel, answers: "dialectics is this immanent process of transcendence, in the course of which the one-sidedness and the limitation of the determinants of the understanding shows itself to be what it really is, namely their negation" (1990: 177). Indeed, if one thing is made apparent in this part, it is that the ethical question refuses to take for granted notions like justice, equality and freedom. The synthesis through dialectics always ends negatively because in bourgeois society reification envelopes all life and thought. That is why dialectical thinkers are revealed here as criticizing the ground on which they stand and, in doing so, they reflect certain autonomy of thought, but they do not go as far as to really undermine it. Thus, humanist thinkers, precisely the ones who ought not to give up hope but to put life at the top of their agendas, can ultimately reveal themselves to be desperate nihilists who capitulate to fear with death or with defeatism – as is the case with Walter Benjamin's suicide or Adorno proposing Beckett as a solution (in Chapter III).

Education, intellectual and artistic activity are supposed to be liberating agencies but, as Pierre Bourdieu explains (1985), they "covertly" legitimize class differences (in chapter IV). The conservative bourgeois rejects the artist as a dangerous transgressor but, as Eagleton rightly explains, only because he is rejecting an "intolerable image of himself" (in Chapter V; 2002: 128). This is, therefore, a thesis that locates the bourgeois and the artist side by side on the same platform. A dialectics that is ultimately negative because through it justice is revealed as injustice, freedom as oppression, and equality confounded with opportunity. Class differences are today as unvarying as ever but the rallying cry for class struggle seems to have been vanished from the cultural realm. As Bond contends in his letters, this social situation has been brought about by the dominant bourgeois ideology which not only spreads through our external world (from without) but also through our internal self (from within) mediating our very faculties of perception and understanding. The problems seem innumerable, yet they all have a single core: social inequality. That is the ultimate conclusion of the second part of this thesis.

So this second part is constructed as if the subject of attention is covered by a number of layers which we must peel off. This process of unpeeling is in itself a means to an end. The layers are composed of an ever-increasing number of problems. Bond contends that these are none other than the problem's symptoms:

> The particular danger that we have from contemporary culture is that, instead of letting the problems be alive and create their own solutions, technology becomes so powerful, that it can deal with the problem itself. But really what it is doing is dealing with the symptoms of the problem (appendix: 34).

Chapter III attempts to articulate Bond's view of current society as an "impossible" situation through sources of contradiction in culture. Through Bond capitalist reality does not offer spaces of ideological indulgence. As he says, taking the Adornian thesis of negative dialectics to its most pungent limits: "owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder – in everything I'm against" (1995: 13). Supporting Bond's philosophical standpoint, this chapter teases out post-Marxist discourses trapped in the contradiction between means and ends. As Irving Wohlfarth contends, most post-Marxist critical theory seems to be entangled in whether there is any true autonomy within the "knot" of bourgeois aesthetics (1979: 975). Contradiction in culture is

revealed not as an innate and inherent element of human existence, but a condition determined by the relations between people's imperative to survive and a power which exploits that imperative. This chapter then poses a final question: What happens to art when real power is so abstract it cannot be adequately identified?

Chapter IV sifts the argument of our social situation as "impossible" into discourses of culture as industry. Through Pierre Bourdieu (1984; 1985; 1998) the chapter analyses the perception that most cultural practice ekes out its existence through a submissive capitulation to the wishes of capital growth on the one hand, while offering on the other a feasible explanation of the disappearing class struggle in post-industrial liberal societies. Amongst the ensuing issues discussed are the roles of the expanding petty bourgeoisie in the neutralization of society, or a social petty bourgeoisification. It also provides, through some of the examples proposed by the French sociologist, an empirical articulation of the interdependence suggested in Part I between Marx's reification and Nietzsche's *ressentiment*, mapping the functional relationship between class "jealousies" – that is, ressentiment – and class homogenization and/or neutralization – that is, reification – in culture. The chapter evaluates Bourdieu's division of culture into two fields: one as the field of large-scale cultural production (FLP) – material goods like cars, clothes, and popular art – and the other the field of restricted cultural production (FRP) – non-material goods like works of art, literature, and institutional education. The resulting picture suggests that class structures and *real* class differences are effectively blurred by the former field, while the later legitimizes those differences. Bond has completely abandoned the mainstream channels of theatrical representation relocating his output within the peripheral spheres of children's education. Assuming that post-industrial culture is truly an impossible terrain, Bond's latest strategy is not really the result of him being "difficult", as some critics suggest, but more a manifestation of his characteristic authenticity. Thus far and by way of Bourdieu's analysis of capitalist culture, intellectual and/or cultural activity itself appears as a fierce violent battle for supremacy. Every single intellectual activity appears to have an implicit relation with our consequent dominant ideology: competition aimed at dominance (1985: 40-3).

Chapter V continues the investigation of Bond's philosophy of drama and our social situation as "impossible" (and therefore "extreme"), focusing on ideology and, more specifically, exploring fascism and its meaning/s. Bond claims that "the basis of art

must be socialism: all other art is fascist. There is no art in between" (Stuart, 1996: 126). This chapter attempts to evaluate the extent to which the dramatist's claim is defensible, while simultaneously attempting to reinsert these two notions (which seem to have been erased from the dialectical spectrum) back into the agenda of theatre studies.

If we had thought of socialism and fascism simply as two ideological branches or models, Bond's platform of thought would have to be situated antithetically or irreconcilably not only against the likes of Adorno and/or even Trotsky, but against a good part of his own philosophy. Art, through Adorno, is supposed to be neutral and autonomous (O'Connor, 2000: 238-63); and through Trotsky classless: not the product of a class culture but of a humane culture.[7] With his drama, Bond does not want to teach or persuade anyone of anything: for humanness cannot be taught (in appendix: 52). That is why Chapter V attempts to explain that neither socialism nor fascism are ideologies *per se*. The former has yet to come into existence and the latter has yet to be "deciphered" (Poulantzas, 1974: 253; Allardyce, 1979: 368; Schnapp, 1993: 90). If the *Oxford Encyclopedia* (1997) has trouble defining socialism, this is because it is actually the ultimate ethical reality. In Marxist terms, it is the next stage in the history of human social development; the stage at which class differences and private property become conditions of the past, of pre-history. Traditional Communism has attempted to achieve that stage through the inculcation of its ideology with well-documented results: because the aims become more important than human beings, and because the human imperative is replaced, even through violent force, with the ideological imperative. Fascism is highlighted in this chapter because it is considered here not as an aberrant and/or abnormal event of history but as a real and continuous threat: an extreme consequence of capitalism and of capitalist representative democracy.

Through a comparative and contrasting evaluation of other contending lines of thought such as those of Terry Eagleton, this chapter attempts to defend the claim that fascism is a constant feature of capitalism. Through the agency of Bondian philosophy, before fascism becomes extreme it is perpetually incipient (in Davis, 2005: 186); and through Adorno and Horkheimer, that the culture industry as such is a sophisticated and deodorized form of fascism (Horkheimer, 1979: 167). Nicos Poulantzas's *Fascism and Dictatorship* (1974) receives lengthy consideration for this reason: because it explains the complex associations that the bourgeoisie and the petty bourgeoisies have with the

final materialization of fascism during the 1920s and 1930s in Europe; chiefly, the overall social effect produced upon all classes by the crisis of the dominant bourgeois ideology. Consider how significant Poulantzas' sociological classifications and definitions of the pro-fascist petty bourgeoisie are, when mirrored against some of the endorsed current post-modern practices: a penchant for transcendency and transgression as a strategy to overcome ideology; "neutrality" and a request for a neutral and fair State; their proclivity for and association with egalitarianism and equality of opportunity; praising of individualism and of the rise of the best and most able individuals. In sum, always frustrated, the petty bourgeoisie oppose big capital but fear proletarianization; they want changes but not to change the system.

For Bond reification tears out the human self – our humanness – creating a vacuum "into which ideology moves" (in Davis, 2005: 186). This line of thinking implies that we do not contrast opinions, but ideologies. Reification tells us that we do not need to consciously subscribe to a political creed; the pervasiveness of the dominant ideology orders for us our perceptions of the social world. However, the reality of our social life as unequal individuals is not totally erased from the human mind, giving rise to ressentiment and with it fear, hate, and suspicion of "otherness". Thus, the chapter concludes by recapturing the essence of all problems which reveals itself not just to be a result of capitalism, but of civilization itself: inequality.

This thesis does not conclude as if it had reached the end of a road – a road to Bond – but rather, the starting point. It is only from here, once the importance of the Bondian philosophy has been substantiated, that the problem commences. It considers the Bondian approach as a promising response to the claim that we do not have an art that can be both social and authentic; but recommends first of all that we rethink aesthetics in the politics of theatre before undertaking any study of the dramatist's output. For many of our acquired ways of perceiving art and the activities which are involved in the organization and execution of theatre are inappropriate in the, nevertheless, demanding Bondian realm. That is why I have attempted to circumscribe my study to a literary enactment of Bond's complex philosophical site – the ethical as ultimate reality – through a series of philosophical, political, and sociological theories, rather than making a critical analysis of Bond's theory and/or dramaturgical output.

It is beyond question that, in Britain, Bond is disapproved of by a rather large number of highly-reputed scholars, practitioners, and critics.[8] As Peter Billingham points out, that Bond is described by a journalist in a major British newspaper like *The Guardian* as "Bolshie [Logan, 2000], is a depressing but accurate reflection of the ways in which Bond has come to be viewed by many critics within both the press and the theatrical establishment".[9] The Bondian field is difficult. It requires a re-mapping of modern cultural consciousness, which unsurprisingly creates bewilderment and provokes antagonisms. Bond asks us to think of our liberal democracies as extreme while our lives are surrounded by an ideological network of securities and entertainments.

In her attempt to defend Bond's philosophy of drama as the sought-for radical discourse for theatre, Dorian Lambley explains that our cultural system appears to us as unified and natural because "the interwoven matrices of signs and symbols which constitute language are represented to us as specific discourses through our institutions – educational, judicial, recreational, social". In other words, it is because, she says, while language is used to transfer knowledge, it is also used to transform meaning (Lambley, 1992: 38). In the following study, especially through Chapter II and V, I have attempted to suggest a rather more specific reason to the problem of communication between Bond and 'others': reification according to Marxist theory. This study, therefore, concludes by recommending that which it has attempted to transmit throughout: that if, as Lukács contends, the problem in our societies is that all meaning is hidden by capitalist reification (Lukács, 1990: 83), Walter Benjamin explains that meaning would be perceivable once we are able to consciously apprehend that the "state of emergency" in which we live against fascism is not the exception but the rule (1999: 248-49). Both, Lukács and Benjamin, plainly support Bond's fundamental philosophical premises: the latter recognizing society as extreme and a call to an awareness of it and the former by claiming capitalist societies without meaning; as Bond says, "in the way in which societies use it [meaning], it does not exist" (1990b: 213).

Finally, this conclusion looks forward to the involvement of Bond into the realm of Drama in Education (DIE). While the dramatist's commitment to writing for the youngest undoubtedly has the potential to enrich schooling through drama, I query his discrete standpoint in relation to current DIE's literature. In my view, this stance will – yet again – give rise to conflicts among DIE's practitioners and theorists. Inasmuch as

the Bondian field is not considered a field in itself, unconnected as it is with current forms of art, theatre, drama, Theatre or Drama in Education, it will continue to create conflict. It cannot be neatly grouped, classified, formulated. In other words, Bond will not allow his work to be institutionalised. Bond's ethics as ultimate reality is a difficult concept (as I hopefully reflect through Chapter II, ethics is itself a very demanding realm; see, however, pg. 67) but, as I recommend through Lukács' final delivery, ethics might be the only way of thought – or *modus operandi* – through which drama will unearth for us again meaning. As Lukács explains, it functions in the same way that mythology, inexistent today, did for the ancient Greeks (in Bentley, 1992: 448).

The appendix, which forms part of this study as Volume II, attempts to incorporate an image of the dramatist and his latest philosophical development. Its content and form is specified in its introduction. It is fundamental to this thesis' exploration, for it is a continuous source of reference and inspiration. However, it is intended also as a celebration of the dramatist and his ideas, which have truly transformed *my* own reality – the way I now perceive the world; or as he would say, acknowledging that knowledge perceives us.

Endnotes

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[1] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, electronic edition, (www. arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr) in "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Chapter I, Section 3, "Opining, Knowing and Beliving."

[2] Much could be said about the real ideological motives behind the carnival form of radical performance. The basic principle could be resumed as a momentaneous purgation of social tensions by way of performed excesses so that we can go on being the same we were. This performative form, as Kershaw suggests radical performance is, is "a producer of a sense of freedoms" (1999: 19).

[3] This is part of a letter originally written for a conference in Paris, and then, Bond tells me, published on the front page of *Le Monde*. It was sent to me by the author and is dated 3rd October 2003.

[4] There are five reference points, Roper notes, which "remain identifiable positions across the intervening 45 years" of Bond, and these are:

- The self
- The potentially corrupting or creative group or society
- The void, the boundary, the gap or nothingness
- The natural world of matter
- The mind as essentially dramatising

[5] Copy of a letter addressed to the French director Jean-Pierre Vincent; dated: 13 October 2004.

[6] There are numerous examples of this: see for example Spencer, 1992:xiii and 11; Hay & Roberts, 1980:31; Michael Billington's "Bond's Have I None," Thursday November 14, 2002, The Guardian; Brian Logan's "Still bolshie after all these years," Wednesday April 5, 2000, The Guardian.

[7] In his essay "What is Proletarian Culture and is it Possible?" (1923)

[8] For example as "acerbic" (Mick Wallis, letter to author: 23.07.03), "Bolshie" (Logan, 2000), "dogmatic [...] right of Genghis Khan" (Hall, 1993: 342; 349), and/or "in need of dialectics" (Terry Eagleton, letter to author: 30.04.05) to name but few.

[9] Peter Billingham's original draft version of an eventually published 15,000 word essay for the series *Dictionary of Literary Biography*, Vol. 310: "British and Irish Dramatists Since World War II," USA: Thomson Gale, 2005 (sent to me by the author on 26th June, 2003).

PART I

1. CHAPTER I
Art as a "Knowing"

Introduction

Ever since Kant and Hegel, philosophers and dialecticians have continued to argue about art's properties, definition, and goals (Dickie, 1974; Fried, 1998; Graver, 1998; Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999). However, in their arguments most disputants overlook the very detail that to me seems most important. As Terry Eagleton has suggested, contemporary concepts of the nature and function of art – and consequently aesthetics – are bourgeois in the most literal sense (1991: 8).[1] "Freedom and legality, spontaneity and necessity, self-determination, and autonomy" are some of the crucial aesthetic elements included in works of art, says Eagleton (Ibid.: 3). Indeed, these are also the very attributes which enabled the bourgeoisie to finally leave behind those historical subjugating systems of the Church and the Monarchy. Today more than ever before, the bourgeoisie has declared itself triumphant over everything else.

In spite of this, Eagleton extends his argument above art's contradictory nature by suggesting that the concept of aesthetics as autonomous entity is "radically doubled-edged: if on the one hand it [aesthetics] provides a central constituent of bourgeois ideology, it also marks an emphasis on the self-determining nature of human powers and capacities" (Eagleton, 1991: 9). It is true that in this instance the critic's argument might seem both ambiguous and highly contentious. However, through Eagleton's criticism, I see also that the utopian longing for justice and equality might be a conception intrinsic to aesthetics and this, in my view, acts also as an important function in Edward Bond's philosophy.

Today, I think utopia is understood in general terms to be that which is impossible to attain. But historically, utopia has been seen as a functional element of culture. Culture – both subjectively and objectively – expresses "the need for freedom [which is] denied by the class organization of society" (Gartman, 1991: 440). Culture did indeed fulfil, in a functional way, the aspirations of the bourgeoisie when it finally freed itself from the

feudal yoke – historians tell us how it culminated with the European revolutions of 1848 (Burne, 1989: 891-98). Does theatre, and culture for that matter, fulfil that utopian function (which in my view ought to be its *raison d'être*) now? Current criticism and studies indicate that this is a question under continuous scrutiny.

Only recently, a number of prominent scholars and critics of the theatrical realm held a symposium enquiring into the social function of theatre, proposing the debate "How can theatre contribute to unmasking and critiquing [sic] injustice?"[2] I had originally come into theatre believing that this was indeed what theatre was supposed to have achieved. But after many years of theatrical innovation, theatre is still asking how to do it. Perhaps Bond is correct when he distances himself from theatre as such. The question itself is deeply problematic of course, not least because injustice cannot be identified. As the postmodernist would say, nothing is what it seems. But, to take just one example, is it not a clear fact that our society is made up of disproportionate inequality and/or class difference? That a few are extremely rich while the majority suffer depravation? I do not think 3.6 million children living below the poverty line in Britain alone (Denny and Elliot, 2004) is an "unjust" situation that somehow cannot be recognized because "masked". As I suggested at the above symposium, perhaps the question should not be how to unmask injustice but, as Bond contends, what is the meaning of justice itself? That approach then elicits a whole new set of questions. Unfortunately, it became very clear to me that within this milieu there was a general unawareness of Bond's output – especially of recent works such as *The Children* (2000), *Have I None* (2000), *Chair* (2001), *Existence* (2002), *Born* (2004), *The Short Electra* (2004), and particularly *The Under Room* (2005).[3]

In my view, Bond assesses the problem through a logical process starting with a simple remark from which the rest of his thought develops: that society is not just and therefore the meaning of justice is always adapted for the purposes of injustice. "No one can be at home in it" (Bond, 2004: 25). His approach is not new but an ancient viewpoint which seems to have been forgotten: that in an unjust world human beings live in a constant yearning for justice. The problem he observes is that, in our ideologized societies, "the desire for justice becomes the psychological *need* [his italics] for injustice" (Ibid.). Thus, questioning whether we can apply justice or whether we can even recognize justice or injustice is not feasible. Bond proposes instead that we step back and examine what the *real* meaning of justice is and, more important still, *why* human beings have an

intrinsic imperative for justice. Although the dramatist cannot give us a perfect definition of what justice is, the dramatization of "the problem" might give us an insight. Bond calls this problem the "Invisible Object", but he knows that, as it was for the ancient Greek dramatists, "in tragedy no one is guilty – justice has another meaning" (Ibid.: 31). A theatre still hoping to unmask injustice is, in reality, looking around for guilty parties – that is, trying always to resolve a series of social problems – while the drama Bond suggests is seeking to challenge "the problem", the whole social system – that is, capitalism. It is the difference between wanting changes and changing the system. I will return to this most important differentiation through Chapters IV and V. However, I think that aesthetic discourses present some important perspectives on the kind of non-grammatical language involved in ethics as ultimate reality, and thus throw light on the complexities of Bond's philosophy, so I will touch on the most pertinent of these accounts next.

1.1 SECTION I

1.1.1 Beyond factual knowledge: the cognitive.

Attempting to resolve the unresolved contradictions of theatre is not a characteristic of theatre studies and its practitioners. As a matter of fact, in order to unfold the question of this thesis, theatre will form part of the discussion less and less; for theatre's contradictions are one and the same as those of the arts and culture at large. As I hope to expose in the following chapters, critical theory has attempted to resolve the intrinsically contradictory languages of an art trapped within social systems dominated by ideology (be it capitalist or communist), contributing with new questions and new theories but without much real success. Having said that, to me, one of the most pertinent and hopeful of the propositions made by critical theorists came initially from Jürgen Habermas. According to Lyotard, what Habermas requires from the arts "is, in short, to bridge the gap between cognitive, ethical, and political discourses, thus opening the way to a unity of experience" (Lyotard, 1984: 70). This formula seems both appealing yet highly complex. But though Lyotard says that he does not know what sort of unity of experience Habermas has in mind (1984: 72) and Habermas himself does not seem to say what it is either (Habermas, 1981; 1989; and 1993), the general idea of bridging the gap between cognitive, ethical and political discourses has strong parallels with Bond's philosophy. Bond says that our society is extreme because,

within social structures based on inequality, human beings cannot make true responsible choices (appendix: 12-3). However, there is a gap where, in his view, we can make these choices, and this gap is drama. More specifically, drama is the gap because "we are the gap" (Ibid.: 17). While Habermas addresses the arts as if it was a universal given, for Bond, art as such – and therefore culture as industry (appendix: 45-6) – is a fairly recent bourgeois phenomenon, more a part of the problem than part of the solution. This will be examined later on through Eagleton's criticism, especially through his work *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* (1990). However, for the time being and for the benefit of the discussion, I will continue to use terms like 'art' without pointing to any of their conflicting contradictions. I will now explore Habermas' formula by way of its three elements – the cognitive, the ethical and the political – and in doing so, provide some insight into the main focus: the ethical.

In order to discover how we could bridge this "gap" between cognitive, ethical and political discourses, we could argue that we need first of all to examine what the modus operandi of each one is, so that we might establish later what a unity of experience in the arts – and consequently in theatre – would be. Originally, my findings suggested that of the above three discourses proposed by Habermas, the ethical and the political could have been viewed alone if the cognitive discourse of a play – of a work of art – was examined first. This is suggested particularly in Kemal and Gaskell (1999 and 2000) and more specifically in the study of Peter de Bolla (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 206-220). Yet, as I will explain in the next chapter, subsequent evaluations of the works of Marx and Nietzsche show that it is the ethical discourse that contains the most critical promise of unity.

But what could be seen as primarily a cognitive discourse in theatre? The most plausible response would be that which is concerned with the aesthetic values of a dramatic piece.[4] It would appear that the political is always inherent in a work of art – for bad or for good – but that is not the case with either the cognitive or the ethical discourse. Augusto Boal has already noted the intrinsic nature of politics in theatre. As he suggested in his *Theatre of the Oppressed*, "those who try to separate theatre from politics try to lead us into error – and this is a political attitude."[5] Moreover, and according to current thinking on the philosophy of aesthetics, it would appear that the cognitive discourse emerges from the aesthetic qualities of a work of art (Krausz, 2002;

Pillow, 2000: 72-86 and Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 206).[6] Let us proceed to discuss the cognitive discourse for it seems to have some definitional problems.

One of the obstacles in examining the cognitive discourse is that, in reality, it transcends knowledge (theory, history etc) itself. This is so because factual empirical knowledge does not mean knowledge as we commonly understand it. As Adorno contends, the task of understanding dissolves and yet preserves art's enigmatic quality (Adorno, 1997:177). Nevertheless, to say that a true work of art has intrinsic cognitive qualities is for most of the theorists examined here a highly plausible assumption. According to Alex Neil, Aristotle defends art as innately cognitive when he holds that poetry "speaks … of the kind of events which could occur, and are possible by the standards of probability or necessity" and therefore poetry "is both more philosophical and more serious than history" because it "speaks of events which have occurred" (Kemal, & Gaskell, 1999: 68). In other words, if for Aristotle poetry – that is, art – is a predominantly cognitive experience, he is also saying that cognitive knowledge is more "trustworthy" than any other field of knowledge. But the crux of the problem today is not only how to discern what true art could be but also distinctions between true art and popular, post-industrial culture. I will address this issue in more depth in Part II. In my view, the writings of Theodor Adorno on the culture industry should continue to be seriously considered. The next extract from Adorno's "The Culture Industry Reconsidered" gives a concentrated summary of what the culture industry is for the philosopher:

> The culture industry is the purposeful integration of its consumers from above. It also forces a reconciliation of high and low art, which have been separated for thousands of years, a reconciliation which damages them both. High art is deprived of its seriousness because its effect is programmed; low art is put in chains and deprived of the unruly resistance inherent in it when social control was not yet total. (Adorno, 2001: 98-9)

As a consequence of the above, Adorno has been accused of elitism, but we should at least acknowledge that his examinations and conclusions on the culture industry ring more true today than when Adorno and Horkheimer together published *Dialectic of Enlightenment* in Amsterdam in 1947; that culture has been taken on by the very same powers some "culture" used to attack. Some prominent agents of the culture industry offer visible examples: Mick Jagger, of Rolling Stone fame, was initially a living model

of the popular anti-establishment who has recently accepted an OBE from the Queen; similarly, David Hare and Harold Pinter accepted honours from the Queen in 1998 and 2002 respectively (Saunders, 2004: 256). I will return in full to the analysis of culture when it is confined within the mechanics of industrial production. Before this can be addressed, I need first to explore cognitive discourses and the possible implications in rethinking aesthetics.

What is a cognitive discourse?[7] A broad definition can be extracted from most dictionaries as the notion of a knowledge that has been acquired by people without the support of scientific evidence. Unconsciously, from infancy to adulthood, it seems that our brain acquires empirical data – that is, when sense-experience has a primacy over reason and intellect in the acquisition of knowledge. But human cognition does not seem to be just about the acquisition of knowledge as we generally understand it (that is, the acquisition of language, mathematical rules, the learning of behavioural convention, and such like), it appears to transcend knowledge itself, to the point of being supplanted by a seemingly universal "knowing" (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212). The means with which I designate this "knowing" comes from the realm of psychology and the notion that human beings, irrespective of their geographical, historical and cultural boundaries, display a sense or sensitivity towards what is good or bad, true or false for themselves and for their communities.

Sigmund Freud dedicated a life to the study of how the memory acts in the unconscious, disrupting people's thought and feelings, especially in relation to instinctive sexual and self-preserving motivations. But it was his student, Gustav Jung, who posited both a personal and collective unconsciousness, when he observed parallels of myths and symbols exhibited by different and separate traditions and cultures. Jung's cited examples of collective unconsciousness include the universal human apprehension of darkness, and the sharing of a divine entity which, according to Jung, is broadly in conflict with and therefore an extension of the human mind.[8]

However, a dialectical distinction has been made, in which the dialectics on the cognitive have shifted from the acknowledging of an acquired "knowing" – which is what really interest us here – to the search of the "unknown" and "occult" – which is out of my advocacy for a unity of experience in theatre and its evaluation. In this distinction I cannot ignore one of the most influential figures amongst those who search

in theatre for the unknown and occult, Eugenio Barba. Barba has given substance to theatrical anthropology – he is the founder of the International School of Theatre Anthropology (ISTA) based in Denmark – which has become an important venue in the field of theatre. Barba could be presented as a theatre practitioner whose main interests in theatre are the qualities of cognition, but his approach is rife with defective discourses on knowledge and current criticism has adjudged his work to be driven towards incongruence and contradiction.[9] As Barba says, his work "is not a search for knowledge but for the unknown" (Barba, 1995: 5). These aesthetic-mystical traits of Barba call to mind the perpetual, always present thought of Nietzsche, when in *Human All Too Human*, with his satirical style, he reflects on the dangers that art might visit upon the artist:

> When art seizes an individual powerfully, it draws him back to the views of those times when art flowered most vigorously; then its effect is to form by retrogression. The artist comes more and more to revere sudden excitements, believes in gods and demons, imbues nature with a soul, hates science, becomes unchangeable in his moods like the men of antiquity, and desires an overthrow of all conditions that are not favourable to art, and this with the vehemence and unreasonableness of a child. (Section IV, No. 159)

It appears that the cognitive offers certain joint properties involving discourses of psychology, art, philosophy and anthropology among others.[10] In the realm of theatre, the notion that I will follow on the cognitive discourse is the perception of art as a "knowing" (see below). This human knowing seems palpable when experiencing art or reading philosophy. I will not say here what knowledge this "knowing" has, because perhaps it does not have any at all in the factual sense. Yet, who, when reading good philosophy or experiencing "true art," has not experienced the surprise of finding oneself exclaiming "Yes, it is true!" as if what is revealed to us is a knowledge that we already possess? Or, following Edward Bond latest philosophical conclusion, as if knowledge itself "perceives us" (appendix). Peter de Bolla proposes that an aesthetic event gives us a kind of knowledge that is not available in other forms of learning and provides three-pointed definitions:

> The artwork is a knowing.
> Our attempt to know that knowing is called our affective response to or experience of the artwork.
> This experience of response raises in us the feeling of sublimity; hence what we know of that knowing is called the sublime. Sublimity, then, is the name we

give to what we recognise, or know, as that which we have yet to know: the artwork is a knowing. (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212)

I will go on to argue that this cognitive sense of art as knowing is made recognisable by way of experiencing the sublime; a knowing through which it might be possible to overcome the external influences of ideology and towards an ethical experience.

1.2. SECTION II

1.2.1. "Knowledge perceives us" (appendix: 16) or the sublime: a stage of choice toward the ethical.

"Knowledge perceives us." This is one of the most defining and challenging thoughts I have found in my analysis and one that sets the boundaries of Bond's philosophy and his latest dramatic strategies. Bond's approach to knowledge as if it had a theological quality has led me to reconsider some studies which perceive the sublime rather as a cognitive experience. In my view, Bond refers not just to knowledge *per se* but to that *situation* or setting in which we would be perceived by knowledge. Of course, he is referring to his unique way of understanding drama. Thus, through Bond's assessment, knowledge might be envisaged both as unreachable and/or unexpectedly reachable. Unreachable because if knowledge perceives us and not the other way round, current channels of education and scholarship could not grant the attainment of knowledge; if it is knowledge which perceives us, sometimes we will necessarily take the wrong path and look for knowledge where it is not. It would not mean either that we have to "sit down" passively waiting for it to come to us, it means that there are concrete situations where knowledge might just *touch* us – and only then. It is unexpectedly reachable because we would be unprepared for the unexpected experience which would leave us in awe – in amazement, fear or terror – in other words, experiencing the sublime. Bond explains it thus:

> There is a sense, not in which we understand knowledge or learn knowledge, but a sense in which knowledge perceives us. [...] if it's dark, and I stumble in the dark and I hit that tree, in a certain sense though I haven't seen the tree, the tree has seen me. Do you see what I mean? That tree is there and I've run into it; I haven't seen it. So the tree says "no, I'm here; you can't pretend I'm not." You can't fabricate that reality. Well, if you think about that in a slightly more

complex way, not just as a tree; if you think about knowledge in a more complex way, you can also say "it is not that I understand *this* but that *this* perceives me. And then I will be at home in the world." I will be at home in the world because the world would not become an instrument by which I can corrupt my humanness. Let's pretend I say "let's go and dig for gold" and therefore "let's us have mines but instead of working at it ourselves, we'll have slaves to go and work in the mines for us." By this example, the world is in a sense corrupting my humanity: because I'm using the world in a way that destroys other people. If you read Aristotle's *Politics* - 'Book V' I think it is - which is about slaves... it's extraordinary! It is like, you know, both the slave and the master should agree that slavery was good for them. And one thinks "Oh, c'mon, you know! How can this very intelligent person think these things?" Because it was logical then; because at that moment in history he couldn't imagine a world beyond that. Now, I think it would be possible for us to be so certain of the world that we could then say "knowledge perceives us; that there would not be a barrier; we would not use the world to corrupt." At the moment, of course, we use the world constantly to corrupt ourselves. The world becomes a *witness* on our behalf to our corruption. And one doesn't have to say "yeah, well, I need a theory of Thanatos or human beings are animals" or something like that. You *don't need* any of this. You can think in terms of concepts [the italics intend to reflect Bond emphasis on the words] (appendix: 16).

I think there are striking parallels between a knowledge that perceives us and some of the philosophical notions about the sublime. Most scholars agree that the concept of the sublime has been left unaddressed by art critics from the end of Romanticism up to the overcoming of post-modernism's first shock (Souza, 2003: 310). But now the sublime is reappearing with great impetus in most writings in the realm of the arts in general and aesthetics in particular. There is also an important treatise called *On the Sublime* attributed to Longinus (circa 1st century AD)[11] which continues to be a good source of discussion among aestheticians (though the name of the author seems to be down to a scribe's error). What most interest us now of Longinus' Sublime is that his formulation suggests transference of a cognitive nature, when he says "the true sublime uplifts our souls; we are filled with a proud exaltation and a sense of vaunting joy, just as though we ourselves had produced what we heard" (in my copy: 107). This has Nietzschean parallels in *The Birth of Tragedy*, in "the joy of becoming" from Greek tragedy (Nietzsche, 2000: 75), as well as with Peter de Bolla's suggestions that the aesthetic qualities of a work of art are a "knowing". In very general terms, according to James Mandrell, we could also say that the sublime "is an experience of transcendence expressed as the passing of any reasonable limits; it represents an attempt to take hold of the unimaginable, the ineffable" (1991: 298). To Peter de Bolla, the sublime starts where aesthetics distinguishes beauty from something "else;" that "else" is the sublime.[12] In other words, Bolla suggests that the sublime comes into sight when

something is beyond the formal descriptions of beauty, which itself is based on a pleasing kind of harmony. The sublime is also associated with vastness, magnificence and violence in nature, like the vision of a sunset, a volcano or the firmament. But it is also associated with the particular, there where the particular explains the universal. Bolla uses the example of exclaiming "Oh, sublime" when looking at some cakes or when someone says "cool shoes": we do not know what it is about that particular object and yet it "has" it.

Kant (1982), Hegel (1975) and Burke (1987) argued for different interpretations on the sublime. Through the agency of Jonathan Strauss, Christine Battersby suggests that the Kantian sublime expresses reason as the clear victor (Battersby, 2003: 73-4; Strauss, 1998:36). But not unlike Hitler (Turner, 1972: 552), Kant also thought that long periods of peace "usually debases the mentality of the populace" preventing it from experiencing the sublime (Kant, 2000: 263). However contextual this might be of Kant and his era, it seems to me a totally irrational viewpoint; a viewpoint which was eventually adopted by the futurist movement and fascists like Marinetti (1876-1944) or communists like Mayakovsky (1894-1930).[13] For Hegel beauty and the sublime are spiritual phenomena or *Geist*, (*Lectures*, Vol. 1: 90-91). But the argument that better fits with my ethical questioning is the one laid down by Edmund Burke who argues that terror is the ruling principle of the sublime (1987: 46). Burke's philosophy on the sublime seems to have been an influential source of inspiration for Melville's *Moby Dick* (a copy of the *Enquiry* was found in Melville's personal library) (Glenn, 1976: 165).

Kant, Hegel and Burke all support the idea that the sublime is mainly a religious experience. All three argue that when we experience the sublime, we get a glimpse of God's omnipotence emanating from those objects whose particulars attract our attention. However, through Burke (1987) and Immanuel Kant the sublime is also a consequence of power, and it is linked with those people or things who have power over us "so that strength, violence, pain and terror, are ideas that rush upon the mind together" (Burke, 1987: 65). As Kant says, we enjoy the sublime where terror is distinguished from real fear, that is, when we contemplate the sublime in astonishment from a position of safety (Kant, 1982: 260). In other words, if we were really afraid, we would be unable to make a judgment about the sublime "it is impossible to find satisfaction in terror that is seriously intended" (Ibid.: 261). What Bond is looking for

in drama[14] is to place us, its audience, in such a position that we feel totally alone in the world. As he says:

> "You are alone in tragedy because you have to accept responsibility for it; only you in the whole of the universe of that moment. And the universe then becomes a theatre, in which only you can make the choice. Only you can be perceptive or not see what's happening "there". It's said that Napoleon could glance along a rank of soldiers and say "that man's button is undone". Because he had this peculiar form of perception, he just went like that and saw it. I say Napoleon, but I think drama can do something like that to *everybody*. And in that sense drama will perceive *you*, it would say "this is the situation," and then you are absolutely, entirely alone [...] you got to make a decision (appendix: 23-4).

I have recorded Bond often referring to Kant or Hegel in his writings, letters, or in conversation but I do not have any record of him mentioning the sublime. Nonetheless, I think strong parallels can be perceived here between what Bond expects from his drama and what Kant and Burke expect from the sublime. Terror, violence and fear are predominant elements of Bond's drama. And as with the sublime, we experience them from a position of safety – a position which might allow us to make choices – that is, the type of choices which we cannot make when going about our daily routines. Could it then be that the sublime is the answer to Habermas' initial proposition: the element which bridges the gap between the ethical, the cognitive and the political? Bond says that our social system is extreme because it does not allow us to undertake human choices but, he says, there is a "gap" in drama. Could the sublime be the "gap" Bond identifies for us in his drama? Could the sublime be one fundamental part of what Bond ultimately aims at in his drama – ethics? (Stuart, 2000: 56) Wittgenstein concludes that ethics is ultimately like no other language to the point that he considers it to be *a* "silence" (Cahoon, 1996: 199); and is it not silence that forms another important element of a subliminal experience, a fundamental part of experiencing loneliness?

One more of the parallels between Bond's dramatic aim and the cognitive nature of subliminal experience needs to be pointed out here. We can say that in both the sublime and Bond's drama[15] we can experience loneliness. However, Bond's ultimate end in the strategy of his drama is socialism – or a society in which everyone is equal and in which private property has finally been abolished. This would necessarily mean a world in which everyone acknowledged everyone else. Thus, through Bond we are not talking of that loneliness related to the celebration of the individual as an independent and

autonomous agent who only thinks about his or her own pleasures and necessities; through Bond we are talking of a loneliness which replaces the imperative "I" with the imperative "us". Is there, in the sublime experience, an ontological knowledge that proposes a classless society? Illustrating further the sublime reflection as productive not of conceptual structures, but of "affine networks" (Pillow, 2000: 115), Kirk Pillow suggests that the sublime might have the potential to unite that which seems to preclude any form of unification (Ibid.: 111-115). He seems to be identifying the sublime as a functional dismantler of class differences. Pillow's suggestion is, in my view, further supported by Christine Battersby's readings of Kant, through which she indicates the sublime as a functional element that rejects individualism. For Battersby, the Kantian sublime expresses an incompatibility between abstract reason and sensuous imagination, but represents reason as the clear victor, and she adds:

> [Experiencing the sublime] is a moment in which the 'I' identifies with an abstraction and in so doing negates the individual that it had previously been. The sublime moment is thus a self-identification in which an abstract and impersonal self rejects a sensuously interested and personally interested self. This triumph is felt as terror, which in itself reveals a profound aversion or resistance to this sublimation on the part of the individual (Battersby, 2003: 68).

If the experiencing of the sublime works against any doctrine of multiple interpretations or multiple meanings, would it not mean that the sublime also works against all art forms whose main interest is to represent the emotional individual, the subjective, and there where an artwork reflects the state of mind of the artist rather than the external world? Assuming that in experiencing the sublime the individualist is forced to capitulate cognitively to a sense of being both together and interdependent with everyone else in the world, would it not mean that the sublime is in an antagonistic relationship with all expressionist forms of art (Futurism, Symbolism, Dadaism, Surrealism, Theatre of the Absurd, Abstract Expressionism), and all those forms which reflect first and foremost the mind of the artist? Bond objects to all art forms as incapable of offering the utopian liberation he is looking for: "art is another form of scratching on people's eyes, of a blindfold" (letter to author: 31.10.03).

I must note, parenthetically, that the appreciation of the sublime by an individual depends also on her or his "aesthetic disposition" (Gartman, 1991: 424) which seems to be directly proportional to her or his position within a social system based on class

differences. As current encyclopedias suggest, expressionism with a small "e" can be detected as early as in El Greco's distortions of his paintings, and yet, these paintings seem also to offer a subliminal experience or content (I am thinking for example of the *Burial of Count Orgaz* (1586)). Art criticism tells us that it is from van Gogh, in painting, and August Strindberg, in theatre, that expressionism becomes Expressionism (Burne, 1989: 1000; 1005). Is there a subliminal passage towards the ethical through their works? In my view, van Gogh stands alone as, perhaps, one of those few cases where the particular finds the universal and vice versa. His expressionism becomes almost theological and epic, interiorizing the external and not the other way round – that is, exteriorizing the internal as I think most expressionist artists do. However, the contrast between van Gogh's letters and those of Strindberg could not be more striking: both lived turbulent lives and battled with mental instability, but while van Gogh's letters reflect a man longing for a world of justice and equality (1958), those of Strindberg reveal a man afflicted by a fierce hate towards Jews (Meyer, 1988: 171) women (Ibid.: 170) with an incipient celebration of the of the Arian race as "superior" (Ibid.: 169). I will expand further this discussion in the next section when I evaluate some of the reasons behind Bond's objections to art and culture.

Returning, however, to my main argument on the parallels between notions on the sublime and Bond's philosophy of drama as an ethical choice, the sublime takes an additional and unexpected turn: that of the need for social justice – or at least, an awareness of it. Take for instance, the unprecedented events of 9/11 in New York: how many of us experienced the sublime while we were witnessing the horrors of the Twin Towers collapsing with thousands of people inside, from the safety of our homes and through our televisions? This is a highly disturbing question yet one that a critic like Jean Baudrillard does not circumvent when he says: "that we have dreamed of this event, that everybody without exception has dreamt of it, because everybody must dream of the destruction of any power hegemonic to that degree – this is unacceptable for Western moral conscience, but it is still a fact, and one which is justly measured by the pathetic violence of all those discourses which attempt to erase it. It is almost they who did it, but we who wanted it."[16] Do not we take particular pleasure from reading, imagining or being told about the fall, ruin or distress of a great empire? Thus, assuming Kant and Burke are also correct, Baudrillard must be right in positing 9/11 as a subliminal experience in which, from a position of safety, we witnessed such a

powerful empire bearing such terrifying destruction. When confronted by a subliminal experience we are told what we already know.

There seems to be a clear correspondence between Bond's conceptualization of what good or correct drama is – that is, as a *knowledge* that perceives us – and the cognitive nature of the sublime. Through this analysis it seems clear that there is no one art that is subliminal to the exclusion of the others; instead, through true art we *always* experience the sublime. However, in his search for the ethical, Bond rejects in the strongest terms all the "other" forms of art, culture or any creative field that has been legitimised by social configurations – like institutions of cultural authority – and/or theoretical principles. "Art is something elite" he says, and adds:

> As far as one can see, for Shakespeare and say, Euripides, it wasn't an elite audience but a mass audience. It came from different strata of society. We are not more stupid than the people were then. On the contrary, I'm sure we're more intelligent. So, it's no use taking kids or asking older people to go to the theatre and see something that is called art. Or indeed, going to see something called Brecht! You have to write those plays in such a way that will have an immediate impact on people's lives. Otherwise, there is no point to it... (appendix: 46).

In the following sections, I will look into the ideas that emerge from discussions on the aesthetic principles in art, specifically those between particularism and generalism. In addition, I will continue to explore Bond's attitude of rejection towards most modern art and culture, and whether this is justified.

1.3. SECTION III

1.3.1. Cognitive experience versus aesthetic principles – theory as abstract knowledge.

What is a work of art? For every definition there seems to be a counter-example. Sebastian Gardner presents two simple definitions: "art as the imitation of beautiful nature, and art as the communication of feeling" (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 236). But there are many things that are not art and yet still might be beautiful or that communicate feeling. Fascist propaganda appeals to irrational feelings and to a sort of perfect social balance in an "utopian" sense of it; a gun might also be beautiful (I will return to discuss fascism in chapter V). For some time now, Wittgensteinians,[17] such as George Dickie, have put forward the idea that art can be defined through an *Institutional Theory* (Dickie, 1974). The theory states that something is a work of art as soon as a figure within the artworld has given it the status of being a candidate for appreciation, or if it has been created in order to be presented to the artworld (Ibid.: 60-1) (I make further evaluations on culture and industry in Chapter IV). As Gardner very reasonably argues, art would, as a consequence be nothing but an "honorific" term. *Institutional Theory*, Gardner says, tends to classify rather than to evaluate: "Evaluation [of an artwork] is just as integral to the concept of art as it is to moral concepts" (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 236). It would be reasonable to suggest instead that we should appreciate art for aesthetic values first before classifying it. Gardner holds this view when he concludes "we do not first classify objects as art and then discover that they happen to be aesthetically rewarding" (Ibid.).

There are controversial debates in the field of aesthetics because scholars do not seem to agree on whether their principles of aesthetic judgment exist (Conolly and Haydar, 2003: 114). One of these debates relates to the distinctions between particularism (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 557-58) and generalism (Conolly and Haydar, 2003: 114). The Generalist thesis tells us that the reasoning behind our aesthetic evaluations is general in nature. So, if we say that "an artwork X is good (V) because of quality A, we must then be committed to principles"; principles that, nevertheless, may be undermined by continuous debate (Ibid.). By contrast, Particularism states that there are no general reasons and thus, no principles – that is, "when we say that X is V because

A, we are not committed to the notion that generally A is a good-making quality in works of art" (Ibid.: 115).

I would be inclined to argue that, today, most art and its criticism gravitates around particularism, for "there are no rules linking the presence of [particular or general] properties in artworks" (Ibid.:119). Particularism is, of course, the easiest way of circumventing the problem of whether our appreciation of art is correct; with it everything is permissible and all interpretations are valid. However, from the context of our main argument – that is, the ethical properties of an artwork – particularism brings with it serious problems. Particularism is not committed to whether an artwork has positive or negative properties – that is, whether it is "good" or "bad" for us all in an ethical sense. An art critic might argue that such and such artwork has a positive "value" but, as Oliver Conolly and Bashshar Haydar explain, the critic of a particularist artwork is not committed to the notion that the artwork's property has a positive or a negative "valence" (2003: 118). Conolly and Haydar use the psychological term "valence" to mean its intrinsic emotional significance "either positive or negative" (Ibid.).

The generalist approach has one significant point of value – it allows the analysis of whether an artwork contains a sense of balance and/or elegance, and a positive valence. Of course, the concept of elegance invites a highly complex discussion and would require far more attention than I can afford here: a particularist could argue that there is "balance" – or the intention of it – in a tin full of excreta; but few would argue that such "artwork" has a positive valence. On the other hand, one could argue that an image depicting love or justice encompasses both a positive emotional force in itself – that is, positively valenced properties – and elegance through, say, their ultimate consummation. But it is also true that, in the name of love and justice, people are capable of committing terrible acts. This is one of the most important philosophical preconditions in Bond's drama: "paradoxically the imperative to justice can never let us rest, yet it may destroy us" (Davis, 2005: 136).

That said, there is truthfulness in the balanced properties of a work or art – in the cognitive sense – for the same reason that there is truthfulness in the sublime. Conolly and Haydar find truthfulness in Shakespeare through the fact that the comic scenes of plays like *Hamlet* or *Macbeth* do not dilute their dramatic intensity; the comic actually

adds intensity (2003: 120). Their claim recalls Bond's dramatic principle which asserts that in good drama the tragic needs the comic and vice versa. As he says "the tragic always, always touches on the comic" (in appendix: 25). For the dramatist, good drama has *a* logic which some authors corrupt – especially, he says, those like Brecht – in order to win the audience over to the authors' ideology. By way of reinterpreting Brecht's *Mother Courage*, he explains his posturing as follows:

> ['Mother Courage'] is upset by the loss of her daughter. Now, what 'Mother Courage' would really say is "Oh, I must get another person; I must get another servant to help and I'll have to pay until I have another daughter" or something like that. She wouldn't mourn about her daughter! [...] Well, it should be according to Brecht. If we are entirely made by the objective situation, what is this soul he [*Brecht*] suddenly produces? And she then has to pay somebody to bury her daughter; she has to hand over the money. [...] So she pays somebody to bury her daughter, and then she puts the cart handles on and starts to move off and the wheel comes off. Now, 'Mother Courage' cannot change the wheel - she is not physically strong. Consequently she has to go to the man and says "would you repair my cart." He says "I'm burying your daughter." She says "no, no... I want you to repair my cart, because I have to get to the market" and the man would say – wouldn't he? – "well, you know, to bury your daughter costs 10 Marks; to repair you wheel costs 50 Marks." Obviously! And so 'Mother Courage' would say "well, if I have to spend 50 Marks, I have to spend 50 Marks, but I cannot spend 60 Marks." So Mother Courage goes and buries her daughter herself. Now, that I would regard as an extreme situation. But Brecht wouldn't do it. Partly also because it is dangerously comic. (appendix: 25)

Bond has a strong sense of the unity of "the comic and the tragic", seeing them as interdependent elements. As a principle, could this unity measure the cognitive qualities or the "knowing" values of a work of art (Kemal and Gaskell, 2000: 212) and therefore be regarded as affine to the generalist thesis? It could be in more than one way because Bond's philosophical interest is focused not just on theatre and/or drama, but on the whole spectrum of the creative fields. For example, Bond reserves his praise more for leading painters than playwrights, from Caravaggio, in his painting *The Death of the Virgin* or *Doubting Thomas* (Davis, 2005: 206) to Manet and Van Gogh (appendix: 40). As George Bas notes, "for Bond all arts call upon dramatic expression or rhetoric" (Davis, 2005: 201). Furthermore, "the comic and the tragic" is just one among several important technical terms of the Bondian theatre, including "Accident-Time," "Aggro," "Agon," "the Lie/Truth", and others. While it is not the purpose of this thesis to analyse the meaning of these terms and how they operate –Georges Bas and Jérôme Hankins

have already done this in depth (Ibid.: 201-20) – to me, they indicate Bond's awareness of the limitations of factual language within the field he is really interested in: ethics. Words, terms, expressions or designations have, within Bondian "theory", a figurative character, in the sense that they are intended more as the metaphorical construction of an ethical question.

Through his evaluation of ethics and knowledge, Wittgenstein arrived at a point where he felt it was impossible to speak any further, recommending "silence" as the final solution – hence his dictum "What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence" (Cahoon, 1996:199). I believe Bond is trying to take over from that point at which Wittgenstein declared it was not possible to make further linguistic comment; and that point is none other than drama. As a result, any discussion of principles or rules in relation to Bond becomes a rather complex matter. Rules and principles imply a science which, for the dramatist, would only answer the *whats-and-whens* of a problem, while his drama also wants to consider the *whys*, simultaneously and without conflict (Bond, 1998: 3). Herein lies a problem: *whats-and-whens* imply the need for a solution to a particular problem; *whys* imply that this particular problem must be discussed within the context of many other problems which themselves are only single parts of the problem in the ontological/universal sense. It seems to me only logical that Bond finds that art should not be assimilated to science in any way; for the same reason that Kant and then Wittgenstein thought it erroneous to contemplate ethics or even philosophy as a science (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 601; 689). As I will discuss below, the scientific search for criteria, rules or principles in the arts can mutate into a means by which art faces its own destruction.

In his essay "Petrus Camper's Angle", Stephen Jay Gould (1991: 229-40) presents the case of the Dutch anatomist Petrus Camper (1722-1789) who, like many of us, believed that the cultures of ancient Greece and Rome had reached a height of refinement never since repeated and perhaps impossible to recapture (Ibid.: 234). However, observing that the heads of Greek statues, such as Venus or Apollo were of a superior beauty even to those of Rome, he could not think this was the result of sheer intuition on the part of the sculptor, "for proportion and harmony, geometrically expressed, were hallmarks of Greek thought" (Ibid.: 236). Camper knew that the people of ancient Greece were no more physically beautiful than those of ancient Rome; after all, he had evidence – from coins for example – that they were very much like us today, warts and all. Camper, says

Gould, was first of all a scientist for whom the motto "beauty is only beautiful by its own beauty" was absurd and in need of a scientific resolution (Ibid.:235). He could not apply scientific criteria to a sunrise, a calm sea, or a starry sky – such things that excite a sensation of pleasure in all people – but he could study the physical proportions of the head of Venus as possessor of a superior beauty. After much research, Camper found the "secret". The beautiful busts of antiquity had achieved their pleasing proportions by an exaggeration of the facial angle beyond values attained by real people. "Romans, he found, preferred an angle of 95 degrees, but the ancient Greek sculptors all used 100 degrees as their ideal" (Ibid.: 236). At values of more than 100 degrees, a human face-shape begins to look displeasing, as if it was afflicted with hydrocephaly. The ancient Greek sculptors pushed beauty's value right to the edge, where maximal beauty tends towards deformity. However, when Camper defined the criteria of aesthetic abstraction – that is, of beauty – with geometrical exactitude he also supplied a tool for the "ordering of human races by facial angle – and in the usual direction of later racist rankings, with Africans at the bottom, Orientals in the middle, and Europeans on top" (Gould, 1991: 229-40). Stretching his argument even further, Camper wrote:

> As the facial line moves back [for a small face tucked under a bulging skull] I produce a head of Antiquity; [...] as I bring it forward [for a larger, projecting face] I produce the head of a Negro. If I bring it still further forward, the head of a monkey results, more forward still, and I get a dog, and finally a woodcock (Gould, 1991: 238).

Giving preference to the *whats-and-whens* over the *whys*, the anatomist concluded by grading Africans closest to apes and North Europeans nearest to Greek gods. The forces of destruction and exploitation did not fail to notice Camper's angle, and used it as one more device of the later quantitative approach to scientific racism, formerly during the European expansion into Africa and Asia, and subsequently during the Nazi Germany as a foundational device of Eugenics and the classification of "inferior" races. "Good", Bond tells us, "is a universal derived from the holistic mind in response to *why*" (Bond, 1998:3). And "why", I would say paraphrasing the dramatist, needs reasoning as much as imagination.

1.3.2. One theory: Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* (1997)

Theory in the arts needs to be taken with a certain amount of reserve, not just because it comes as result of speculative thought about the abstract, but also because art theory needs to be put into its socio-economic and historical context. Bond notes that our surroundings change continuously, but the question continues to be the same, that is, "What does it mean to be a human being?" Yesterday's theory needs to be upgraded because we find ourselves looking at "the problem" from today's platform, so "the problem" seems to have changed while in reality it is the same old one. (appendix: 31-2). By way of Bond I would question how many of us are able to rearrange our mental conceptual structures so that we can make appropriate choices, especially if what concerns us is a humane future. In my view, changes in the socio-political are being produced at such a fast pace – especially through continuous technological and economical developments – that few of us can keep up. Daily, our perception of the world becomes outdated, causing further social alienation. Bond helps explain through his assertion that he would not write *Bingo* (1984) now because the social situation is too different and disconnected with the times in which it was written a few years before, during the 1970s (appendix: 46).

As I have mentioned, situating Bond's philosophy into any of the known types of theatre and theatrical theory is a difficult task not because he totally rejects theory, but because he is constantly rewriting it. It is not coincidental that Adam Thorpe looks around for British playwrights at the forefront of dramatic attack against war, and he only finds Bond (*The Guardian*, 2006: 18-19). Kate Katafiasz has also recently weighed up some of the most crucial theories of the theatrical field (Davis, 2005: 25-48) – that is, the mimetic, the formalist and the expressionist theories among others – against Bond's philosophy in order to evaluate his "extreme dissatisfaction with the practitioners and dramatic structures of the twentieth century" (Ibid: 35). In each instance Bond's work is mostly portrayed as a case apart, unconnected with any other theory or theorist.

But theatrical theories, practices and Bond's output are not the main subject of enquiry here. Bond's philosophy functions here, so to speak, as a *filter*, in order to reveal an ethical frame of reference: that is, to what extent knowledge and/or truth is transferred between a producer of artworks – an artist – and the recipient of that artwork, an audience. Bond finds this impossible because, he says, the human "self" has been lost

through reification, "creating in us a vacuum into which ideology moves" (Davis, 2005: 186). Amongst those frames that could be suggested from the philosophy of aesthetics (and with Bond's philosophy of drama in mind as a defensible model), one stands out as a plausible frame of departure: a frame built from Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* (1997). This is the case in spite of a series of contradictory arguments characteristic of Adorno's aesthetic theory, that place him in conflict with those of Bond, and with art as an ethical venture.

One of these particularly contradictory propositions claimed by Adorno in his *Aesthetic Theory* is the autonomy of art.[18] He states that true art has no political influence, does not intervene politically and where it does, it is detrimental for the artwork itself (Adorno, 1997: 255). And yet he also argues that art demystifies power (Ibid.: 243) which, politically speaking, should be considered as a powerful way of changing society. I would instead support Brian O'Connor's reading of Adorno's thesis, which argues that "if society is, as Adorno claims, ideological then culture, art specifically, cannot exist harmoniously with society without merely repeating ideology" (O'Connor, 2000: 17). This seems to suggest that an artwork should try, at all costs, to go beyond ideology, but at the same time it cannot avoid it. It is, in other words, like promising the impossible which is why works of art are for Adorno utopian constructs of necessity; the impossible is embedded in our social life which subjects our humanness to a continuous degradation. For Adorno, works of art effectively reverse this predicament: "whereas in the real world all particulars are fungible, art protests against fungibility by holding up images of what reality might be like, if it were emancipated from the patterns of identification imposed on it" (Adorno, 1997: 122). Interestingly enough, Adorno's observation on our daily lives as a condition of hopelessness, and art as a promise of the impossible, is very similar to what Bond pursues with his drama. Again, for him our society is extreme because it does not allow us to enact human choices in relation to our future; his drama is the site where we can enact responsible choices, seek out the meaning of justice and freedom, without being crushed by the capitalist "extreme situation":

> [...] it's as if you can deal with human society as if human beings were machines. On one hand you have reason and on the other there is something called entertainment (pleasure) and "art," and the two have nothing to do with each other. I think that if you divide the two, you dehumanise both. That's why I say that with imagination the search is for reason. This means that drama always has to create extreme situations, because is only in the extreme situation that you actually have to identify what are you going to do.

You have to make a choice. To consciously make a choice is the human dilemma (appendix: 12).

Drama as a place of choice is what, in my view, makes of Bond a true architect of optimism. Quite a different sphere is the art envisaged by Adorno. "Art is the promise of happiness, a promise that is constantly being broken" (Adorno, 1997: 196) he says, but it is because the philosopher reflects upon an art exclusively framed within the hopelessness induced by the bourgeois ideology. From Joyce to Beckett and then subsequent Absurdists like the latest In-Yer-Face theatre: why trouble oneself with visions of justice and equality if we are cursed, predestined to fail? It is not accidental that the Hegelian concept of the "truth content" of art is one of *Aesthetic Theory's* central tenets. It seems that Adorno conceives works of art primarily as vehicles of philosophical truth, which with him is as to say transcendental truth; a truth that escapes the fallibility of the human condition. Art in that vein is not concerned with improving, revealing and renovating the lives of existing individuals; it is just an esoteric exercise for the privileged few who themselves must be previously initiated into the sophisticated and charismatic realm of art appreciation. In spite of this, I believe Bond's philosophy of drama could redeem a good part of Adorno's aesthetics insofar as they both give emphasis to the present indigent state of human reality and seek to illuminate a path toward what has never-yet-been. Adorno's *telos* is utopia in the sense of reconciliation of man with nature - existence and essence, thought and being (in Wolin, 1990: 42-4); Bond's is also utopia but in the sense of a socialist society of equals and free individuals. Bond and Adorno converge in two more important points of reference in their work and thinking: one is that they "stand in defence of a modernism that would not betray the hopes of the past" (Adorno, 1997: xx).[19] The other – and the consequence of the first – is that for both "artistic experience demands comprehending rather than an emotional relation to the works of art" (Ibid.: 355).

Adorno's aesthetic theory, I would suggest, is demanding and intimidating precisely because, as Brian O'Connor observes, his distinctions are "exceedingly fine." (O'Connor, 2000: 241). It is also demanding because his theory reflects his contradictory position of entanglement between a longing for a neutral art and an art that nevertheless has to have "truth content" (see below) without trying to bypass the bourgeois order. The problem is that when he wishes art as neutral, Adorno is in reality referring to what he melancholically calls "the great art of the bourgeois era" which, as

O'Connor explains, for Adorno was characterized by its apparent independence from society: "[great art] is not created for the purposes of public utility nor does it serve what Benjamin called a 'cultic function' [his italics]" (O'Connor, 2000: 239). The following diagram attempts to cluster Adorno's complex aesthetic theory into a more comprehensible image:

Thus Adorno states:

> The relation between determinacy and openness in aesthetics is perhaps clarified by the fact that the ways available to experience and thought that lead into artworks are infinitely many, yet they converge in truth content (sic). (Adorno, 1997: 354)

From this frame, determinacy and openness tell us of the autonomy of art, but also of authenticity and social responsibility. Of course, it is difficult to argue that in order for the artist to reveal this, there are (mediated by form and content)[20] indeed infinite ways to do it. But art seems to me to be bound by experience (history) and thought (philosophy). And yet, bound as it is, Adorno makes a very relevant point: that truth content is 'the emancipation from and reconciliation with myth" (Ibid.: 212). Here I

most recognize Edward Bond's work and philosophy of drama, for example his demystification of Shakespeare in *Bingo* in the 1970s. In a sense, Bond has emancipated himself from two myths, Brecht and Beckett (who have to this day maintained their canonical status within theatre studies) despising them both, the former as a liar and the latter as a pessimist nihilist (appendix: 15; and Saunders, 2005: 68 respectively). I also interpret his position against Brecht and Beckett as an act of reconciliation in the sense that, by breaking off from them, Bond does not endure any further conflict from that department – and in the process he also has liberated his audiences. Even if, to a certain extent, the philosophies of Adorno and Bond often intertwine – especially through their assessment on current culture as industry (Adorno, 2001) – Bond objects to that famous dictum of Adorno "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric" (O'Connor, 2000: 210) to which the dramatist replies: "It's nonsense. [...] Adorno talks absolute foolish nonsense when he says you can't write poetry anymore after Auschwitz. The-home-of-poetry-IS-Auschwitz. That's where poetry comes from" (appendix: 7).[21]

While I would regard Adorno's aesthetics as a good model – art with implicit truth content and working towards utopia, which reflects to a good extent Bond's philosophy itself – the elements which comprise such a formula cannot be unaffected by ideology. As we will see in the next chapter when we evaluate Marx' reification and Nietzsche's "man of ressentiment", human predicaments like openness, determinacy, experience and thought cannot be given for granted in a society made up of class differences. This seems indeed to be our condition and an important subject of discussion, influencing this study throughout. With his formula, Adorno might as well be proposing art within an accomplished utopian situation – that is, in a socialist society made up of free and equal individuals. As David E. Cooper explains, Adorno sought to remonstrate against the scientific bent of industrial capitalism (which he says, dismisses any human purpose "beyond objective knowledge") by siding with the avant-garde artists who, he thought, were resisting the "capitalist transformation of the arts into a tranquilizing entertainment industry" (in Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 708). For this purpose, he proposed Beckett and Schoenberg as two of his greater exemplars: a move that Terry Eagleton properly identified as a self-defeating "compact with failure":

> It is the most caricatured side of his thought: Beckett and Schoenberg as the solution to world starvation and threatened nuclear destruction. This is the

Adorno who deliberately offers as a solution what is clearly part of the problem, the political homeopath who will feed us sickness as cure (Eagleton, 1991: 360).

However, I do not think that compactness with failure is an idiosyncrasy unique to Adorno's thought, as Eagleton implies. Instead, and especially within advanced capitalism, it forms a crucial component of the aesthetic dimension at large. As I will discuss in Chapter V, Eagleton himself does not seem to be free from it. Adorno tries to conceive works of art as vehicles of philosophical truth (1991: 54; 129; 212), as vehicles of the utopian "promise of happiness", which is a promise that he acknowledges is constantly being broken (Ibid.:196). After all, Adorno knows that artists must give way to their utopian promises – that is, trying to reveal truth content by creative means – from within a capitalist society and through the means of bourgeois culture which makes of the whole an "impossible" setting, as I will explain in Chapters III, IV and V.

To support this, I use the example of the Italian poet Pier Paolo Pasolini (1972-75) who spent a lifetime's work attempting to find a language of liberation against the bourgeoisie. In the 1960s Pasolini concluded that there were *only* two types of art (and therefore only two of types of theatre): one bourgeois and the other bourgeois anti-bourgeois (Pasolini, 1995: 716).[22] This can be extended to encompass the whole spectrum of theatrical activity: one being traditional and the other avant-garde; one institutional and the other of protest; one academic and the other of underground and so on (Ibid.). To make his divisions of art/theatre even more "vivaci" [lively], he categorized the bourgeois theatre as the theatre of "chiacchiera" [of gossiping] and the bourgeois anti-bourgeois as that of the "gesto o dell'urlo" [of gesture or of screaming] (Ibid.).[23] In order to oppose a theatre of oppression (that is, bourgeois), Pasolini conceived six tragedies[24] together with a "Manifesto per un Nuovo Teatro" (1965) (Ibid.: 711-32) which he called "Il Teatro di Parola" [The Theatre of the Word]. In a very well documented account, Pasolini's "Theatre of the Word" intended theatre to be a democratic "cultural ritual" without any "spectacular, or mundane interest" (Ibid.: 732); posited in opposition to a theatre understood as "social ritual", "political ritual", or "religious ritual" (Ibid.: 731). In a sense, his theatrical manifesto recalls Trotsky's support for a new human culture against a culture of classes;[25] but while the latter thought it impossible "to create a class culture behind the backs of a class" (Ibid.),

Pasolini intended to do precisely that, trying to reach the working class surreptitiously by siding with the intellectually advanced bourgeoisie. As he says:

> Il teatro di Parola è popolare non in quanto si rivolge direttamente o retóricamente alla classe lavoratrice, ma in quanto vi si rivolge indiretamente e realisticamente attraverso gli intellectualy borghesi avanzati che sono il suo pubblico (Pasolini, 1995: 732).

> [My translation: The theatre of the Word is popular not because it is addressed directly or rhetorically to the working class, but because it is addressed indirectly and realistically [to them] through the intellectually advanced bourgeoisie which are its audiences.]

Aware as he was that class differences and social inequality are at the heart of "the problem", Pasolini sought to oppose the bourgeoisie in all his manifestations. How? By way of the bourgeoisie itself. This time it is not the "gossiping" bourgeoisie or the "scandalous" bourgeoisie, this time it is the "intellectual" bourgeoisie. Was Pasolini, like Adorno offering a solution that is (paraphrasing Eagleton) part of the problem?[26] Eagleton might be right and Adorno's thought might be conditioned by his own compactness with failure, but are we not all conditioned in one way or another by the same ideological affliction? Aesthetics are bourgeois; but has not the bourgeoisie demonstrated well enough that it will not permit the abolition of class differences nor of private property? It seems to me imperative to press on towards the next historical stage of emancipation but revolutionary discourses seem to have been erased from our cultural framework. Bond says "I criticise at length our present situation because I think we are failing to recreate humanness. In this sense we are "already dead" (17 July 2003: 2). The dramatist – I think correctly – dismisses any ideological stance as a corrupting agent of that humanness he is looking for. Art might be the ultimate, socially emancipating force with which to illuminate the natural development of human beings, but the question is, what art? The art of whom?

Conclusion to chapter I

This is not a discussion against theory; like Heidegger, I think theory is important but limited when humanness and/or the creative self is the object of attention (Wild, 1963). Through Heidegger we might say that there is a traditional misunderstanding of humanness which starts with Plato's fascination with theory (1955). Indeed, as I work through this thesis I realize that the fundamental problem behind my ethical questioning is not *only* capitalism, but civilisation itself. This explains why Heidegger should want to make anthropological ontology out of philosophy (Wild, 1963: 664-77). It also seems to be a fundamental pillar of Bond's philosophy: "what is the origin of the individual self?" He tells me in one of his letters "The answer would throw light on culture, politics, society and whatever other things are human." (Davis, 2005: 186).

Bond, like Wittgenstein, does not have a final answer but rather than keeping silent as the latter suggests, he produces a great amount of "theoretical" writing, not only about how his drama ought to be made, but on the whole spectrum of humanistic thought. This has created a good deal of misunderstanding about the dramatist. In his thesis, Ahmed Hasaballa Elhag disputes whether Bond is actually an artist at all, for should not an artwork itself say all that the artist needs to say? If Bond needs to explain what his plays are about so exhaustively, does not this demonstrate that his plays are a failure? (Elhag, 1989: 34-40). It would seem that Elhag has a fair point. As I explained in the overall introduction, I myself thought of art – or theatre – as something which can only be explained through itself, or that it could be only intuited, say, charismatically. But ultimately I realized that this kind of mistaken analysis leads us to become victims of the kind of theatrical mysticism that, as Pier Paolo Pasolini noted, makes of us actresses and actors, "ignorant, pretentious and ridiculous" (Pasolini, 1995: 724). Elhag does not recognise the fact that, in the formation and final legitimization of art and artists, there are at work complex interactions between arbitrary concessions, institutional authority, and economical imperatives which are all conditioned by the dominant ideology. Provided that art and theatre continue to be firmed constituents of the bourgeois culture, it would be inappropriate to criticize Bond from within those confines.

This will be indeed my final deduction: in order to apprehend Bond's ends we must try first to step back from prevalent forms of modern theatre which, the dramatist relentlessly contends, are inadequate for the purposes of the ethical question (Davis, 2005: 126). That is why I think a revaluation of culture – that is, art's location – is required here, particularly through Chapter IV when I deal with culture as contradiction, the politics of cultural appreciation, and the cultural legitimization of class differences through the "ideology of charisma" (Gartman, 1991:425).

Nevertheless, why is it so crucial for Bond to explain at length what his drama is about? This question is an implicit part of the title of this thesis. In questioning the ethical, terms like aesthetics, politics, or social responsibility acquire new meanings. For example, we have said that when we experience true art we perceive a knowledge we already posses; Bolla calls it a "knowing". Kant and Burke tell us that there is also a "knowing" in the sublime, but that we can experience the intrinsic truth content of the subliminal experience *only* from a position of safety. Consider now two hypotheses: one, that an important component of all artistic representation is indeed the sublime; and two, that in our capitalist societies only those who form part of the top classes benefit from a real sense of safety. Would it not mean that only the privileged few can access the true content of art? Or even worse, would it not mean that universal appreciation of great artworks is just self-deception on a massive scale? This cannot be stressed enough because, I believe, most of us do not live in a position of safety. Bond even holds that, because of our daily need to survive in an unjust social system, our "self"[27] has been lost, creating a "vacuum into which ideology moves" (Davis, 2005: 186). He writes exhaustively about it because he believes our sensory perception has been corrupted. Of course, the task of this thesis is to answer the old epistemological predicament: to what extent can Bond's claim to knowledge be justified?

Through Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, David Bell tells of three fundamental powers of the mind: one is intuition and sensibility ("sensations, impressions, sense-data" and so on), the second is the faculty of "understanding" (our intellectual capacities, which also involves the power to conceptualize), and the third is to reason (that "we are able to infer logically, and to draw valid conclusions") (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 593). I do not take issue with whether or not human beings have these three fundamental powers, but I would argue that Marx's theory of reification and Nietzsche's evaluation

1. Chapter I
Art as a "Knowing"

of "men of ressentiment" (see next chapter) undermine Kant's powers of the mind. András Gedö comments that after a debate with Oswald Spengler, who was contemptuous not only of Marx but also of Nietzsche, Max Weber said:

> The honesty of a contemporary scholar and above all, of a contemporary philosopher, is to be decided on the basis of his attitude to Nietzsche and Marx. Those who do not acknowledge that they could not carry out considerable parts of their work without the work done by these two, are cheating themselves and others. The world in which we ourselves exist intellectually is a world largely molded by Marx and Nietzsche. (Gedö, 1998:337)

As I will illustrate in the next chapter there seems to be a Marx-Nietzsche ontological relationship juxtaposing their apparent antithetical standing which might enable us to unfold the convoluted discussions related to the ethical, the political, and the cognitive. Ultimately, I believe they offer a serious departure point towards an ultimate reality – Bond's ethical reality. Finally, the power of principles and theory of aesthetics which discloses to us art's multiple values and/or faults might be debated but one thing is incontestable: as Bond writes in one of his letters, "art notoriously may serve power" (letter to author: 31.10.03); art is not always "good" for all of us; it can be "bad" and "very bad". As Benjamin put it, art can be the result of "a 'good' (socialist) and a 'bad' (fascist) aestheticization of experience" (Vattimo, 1988: 55). It is unclear at this stage whether the dialectical situation we are broaching is a pessimistic or optimistic one. On the one hand, a solution seems impossible but, as Bond states, at least we have drama – we can dramatize "the problem". As he told me "I'm not optimistic about the solution; I'm optimistic about the problem" (appendix: 18).

Endnotes

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[1] Indeed, Brecht also regarded aesthetics as the specific device of the bourgeoisie. But he did not just stop at this as an assessment of aesthetics: through his own interpretation of epic theatre, he called for the destruction of aesthetics itself (Brecht, Vol. 1, 1963:17). That is why, from the realm of ethical discussion, I would consider Brecht's theoretical engagements highly contentious and/or dangerous. As I explain later on via Garcia Duttmann (1991), the proletarian dictatorship's ideology was virtually engaged in the destruction of aesthetics through its total politicisation. Sending millions to torture and to certain death in the Gulag formed part of aesthetics' destruction. On the other side of the scale, stands of course the aestheticization of politics: fascism - with well known consequences (Duttman, 1991).

[2] This was one of the questions posed in the symposium "Beyond Postmodernism: Performance, Politics, Publics." The panellists included Baz Kershaw, Graham Ley, Helen Nicholson, Alezs Sierzs, Sophie Nield and Dan Rebellato. It was held at Birkbeck College, Universtiy of London, on Monday 19 September, 2005. The main areas under discussion were correlated with Aesthetics, Politics and Ethics in the field of theatre which, in many senses, underlines the current relevance of this thesis. In my view, the symposium's general outcome did, once again, support with vivid evidence the conclusions of this thesis. One of them, as I will discuss further, Fredric Jameson's final remark that if modernity and the discourses surrounding it are to be regarded as "ways of talking about capitalism," then those surrounding post-modernity are "ways of refusing altogether to talk about it" (Prendergast, 2003:109).

[3] During my encounter with him, Bond gave me original and unedited copies of *Chair* (2001), *Existence* (2002), *Born* (2004), and *The Short Electra* (2004), which might be of great biographical value and can be supplied if required.

[4] And yet, it could well be argued that intrinsic cognizance in art is in itself the whole undivided 'unity of experience', and therefore that it would not be feasible to divide a unity of experience in three different discourses – the ethical, the political, and the cognitive. Consequently aesthetics in theatre (that is, when we talk of theatre as a work of art) is the unity of experience itself. It could also be seen that the political and the ethical are in themselves autonomous discourses but when they are put in the context of the arts they loose their autonomy, and become blended and intrinsic to aesthetics itself instead of being three autonomous concepts. That is why I suggest the examination of the cognitive discourse or, as the title of this thesis implies, what are the aesthetics in the politics of theatre.

[5] 1979: Foreword.

[6] Also John Gibson's 'Between Truth and Triviality', in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 43, No. 3, July 2003, pp. 225-237; John Dilworth's 'Artworks Versus Designs', in *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 41, No. 2, April 2001, pp. 163-177.

[7] Here I have also considered earlier readings made of Freud's *The Interpretation of Dreams* translated by James Strachey, Harmondworth: Penguin, 1976; *Jung in Context* ed. by Paul Bishop (1999) Routledge; and *Jung: Selected Writings*, by Anthony Storr, London: Fontana Paperback 1983.

[8] Jung seems to have dedicated most work to the conflictual relationships between personal creed, that is, "a confession of faith intended for the world at large and [...] thus an intramundane affair"; and the relationship of the individual to God, that is, religion as an extramundane factor (in Wehr, 1988: 36; and footnote 21: 134).

[9] See Jane Turner's article "Theatre Anthropology" in *Anthropology Today*, Vol. 5, October 1995, pp. 20-21. In it she makes a report of her participation at the ninth annual session of the ISTA. Turner explains how Barba does not engage in debates about his work agenda and its political implications when he is accused of things like cultural appropriation. As Turner says

"He [Barba] remains aloof from the participants, and although we are all told at the beginning of the session that we are all part of the ISTA family, it is as the children who should be seen but not heard." Turner also give details of how now Barba is only interested in "pre-expressive scenic behaviour", which shed light on my doubts about Barba as merely an irrationalist who is moved by his spiritual interpretation of the world. Turner describes an incident in which, at Barba's instigation, performers from Odissi, Kabuki, Orixa, Decroux and Topeng traditions were obliged to improvise together. The result of this approach was that, in a performance, the spectators were seduced only by the spectacle; an affirmation of the 'other' as exotic. Turner then remarks that most of the participants were frustrated by the seeming disparity between what Barba says and what he does.

[10] Among others which have not been included here, such as linguistics and computer science (for more on this see Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 12-15 and 174-85)

[11] Widely available on the Internet: see for example W. Rhy Roberts translation at classicpersuasion.org/pw/longinus, Cambridge University Press, 1899.

[12] Broadcast by BBC4, Melvin Bragg's *In Our Time*, "On the Sublime with Peter de Bolla", Thursday, 12th of February, 2004, 9:00 am

[13] Two of the main representantives of Futurism: the Communist Vladimir Mayakovsky (1894-1930) whom Stalin declared to be him the 'best and most talented poet of the Soviet epoch' and the Fascist Filippo Tommaso Marinetti (1876-1944). As Benjamin says, the examples below show its most dangerous trait, a "virtue of clarity:"

> For twenty-seven years we Futurists have rebelled against the branding of war as anti-aesthetic.... Accordingly we state:... War is beautiful because it establishes man's dominion over the subjugated machinery by means of gas masks, terrifying mega-phones, flame throwers, and small tanks. War is beautiful because it initiates the dreamt-of metalization of the human body. War is beautiful because it enriches a flowering meadow with the fiery orchids of machine guns. War is beautiful because it combines the gunfire, the cannonades, the cease-fire, the scents, and the stench of putrefaction into a symphony. War is beautiful because it creates new architecture, like that of the big tanks, the geometrical formation flights, the smoke spirals from burning villages, and many others... Poets and artists of Futurism! ... remember these principles of an aesthetics of war so that your struggle for a new literature and a new graphic art... may be illumined by them! (From Marinetti's "Manifesto on the Ethiopian Colonial War") (in Benjamin, 1999: 234-35)

And from Mayakovsky's "Left March" (1919):

> Does the eye of the eagle fade?
> Shall we stare back to the old?
> Proletarian fingers
> The throat of the world
> Still tighter hold!
> Chest out!
> Shoulders straight!
> Stick to the sky red flags adrift!
> Whose marching there with the right?!!
> LEFT!
> LEFT!
> LEFT!"
> (From Britannica Online: www.mayakovsky.com/index; accessed: 07.04.02).

[14] I will not enter into Bond's new acting and staging techniques here – that will require a whole analysis of its own. However, David Davis's *Edward Bond and the Dramatic* Child (2005) is

the latest appraisal of Bond's recent theoretical and philosophical developments intended for young, adults and educators alike.

[15] On the other hand, it should be added that some might not experience anything at all through Bond's drama – that is, not even a sense of loneliness. As a matter of fact, Bond is perfectly aware of this, which is why he has effectively withdrawn from writing for adult audiences and into writing for young/students audiences. His change of strategy is a very logical one though: he does not say society is extreme in a figurative way just to be controversial; he really believes that that is the case. He finds that our society is corrupt and corruptive – for injustice forms part of our daily lives as if it was a natural given. Therefore, adults have been corrupted and from that he concludes that the drama he intends to do would work mainly with those who do not (yet) have to endure a daily grind of injustice throughout (see for example appendix: 2; 45-7). Of course, this is a judgment which I imagine many adults would find highly contentious. Indeed, critics might argue that if adult audiences did not experience what Bond expect them to experience, then it is not because their perception has been corrupted by an extreme society, but because Bond has not been successful construing or exposing his play's aims. However, I certainly experienced as adult that ontological sense of loneliness during his last play *The Under Room* (staged on the 8th November 2005 in Birmingham by Big Brum theatre company). I suppose I have been as exposed to the dominant ideology as any other human being. That is why I also think that Bond's shift into drama in (or as) education is a very logical one, which tells me of his authenticity. That is why the following re-evaluation on Marx' theory of reification and Nietzsche's evaluation of men of *ressentiment* in the next chapter becomes so important and relevant.

[16] "The Spirit of Terrorism," Translated by Rachel Bloul, *Le Monde* 2 November 2001.

[17] See for example Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* in which the critic remodels Wittgenstein's thought "Die Welt ist alles was de Fall ist" ("The world is all that is the case": from Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) repeatedly (Adorno, 1997: 205; 318; or 369).

[18] O'Connor "The Autonomy of Art", pp. 238-263. O'Connor, the editor, quotes the section as being from "Society", *Aesthetic Theory* (1970) (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984) pp. 320-52 (abridged), Translated by C. Lenhardt).

[19] That is, looking forward to a more egalitarian, just and rational world, which are the foundations of humanism and the conclusion of art. See (just few of many examples): Ian Stuart's *Edward Bond's Letters 5*, preface xiii, in pages 4, 5-6, 38, 67-8. Routledge 2001. Also, Ian Stuart's *Selections from the Notebooks of Edward Bond*, Volume One 1959-1980, p. 201, Methuen, 2000.

[20] Adorno suggests that "form is mediated in-itself through content [...] and content is mediated by form; while mediated the two must be distinguished [...] form and content are not to be confused, but they should be freed from their rigid antithesis" (*Aesthetic Theory*, 1997: 356)

[21] The discussion on Auschwitz and the death of poetry requires further discussion which I shall give later on in this thesis. See also O'Connor's *The Adorno Reader* (2000) firstly page 210 and then page 86 where Adorno seems to apologise, reconsidering his earlier assertion.

[22] My translation from an Italian edition.

[23] On the theatre of "gossiping" Pasolini refers to authors like Chekhov, Ionesco or Albee; and on the theatre of "gesture" or of "screaming" he refers to groups like The Living Theatre (1995: 717).

[24] These are: *Orgia* [Orgy] (1968), *Porcile* [Pigsty] (1968), *Calderon* (1973), *Affabulazione* [Fabulation(?)] (1977), *Pilade* [Pylades] (1977), and *Bestia da Stile* [Beast of Style] (1977). Published in Pasolini's *Teatro* (1995).

[25] "What is proletarian culture and is it possible" (1923), in www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky; accessed: 17.07.01.

[26] He must have been aware of his own contradictory condition, as one can easily find him apologising for what he called his own bourgeois "linguistic contamination". For example, In the collection of letters *Le Belle Bandiere* (1977) ("The Beautiful Flags") he protests when his narrative works *Ragazzi di Vita* (1955) and *Una Vita Violenta* (1959) are taken by the "idiotic" critics as "leterari documentarismo" (literary documentarism) whereas, he says, they are works in the line of "Verga, Joyce and Gadda" (1977: 63). But he could not be oblivious to the fact that these are writers who form part and parcel of the bourgeois literature. Furthermore, later in the same letter, Pasolini apologises again for having to adopt, out of pure necessity, such language –that is, that of Joyce - which he calls "contaminazioni linguistiche" (linguistic contaminations) (Ibid.). One can find Pasolini apologising again for his bourgeois contaminations in the introduction of his play *Calderon* (1995: 27).

[27] For an account of Bond's "self" see Davis, 2005: 59 and 127.

(PART I)

2. CHAPTER II

The Legacies of Marx and Nietzsche:
dealing with reification and *ressentiment* – the numbed self.

Introduction

One could suggest that art expresses things about life, about people and about the self that are not revealed in political or scientific thought; its great power consists in its ability to connect human beings, as though by invisible wires, at the most profound and intimate levels. If human beings search for truth about themselves in the world, it is said that art offers it. We have said in the previous chapter that art contains a "knowing" but if Adorno is correct and aesthetic truth is "bound to the expression of the untruth of bourgeois society" (Adorno, 2001: 77), then the existence of art itself is paradoxical, for we might say that we live in an era of bourgeois celebration. In his writings Nietzsche calculates that truth about the world does not mean the attainment of an absolute truth (for further discussion see below), which is actually unattainable. The attainment of an absolute truth would also be counterproductive: should we attain absolute truth, further thinking would be redundant and so, therefore, would humanity. That is one of the flaws of the main religions: they have the certainty of a life after death, and so tangible life is only secondary, and a short passage to the 'true' eternal life. In other words, suffering, as the Catholic Church likes to tell us, for example, would be a good 'tactic' in order to reach the divine heavens.

In Nietzschean terms, the search for truth about the world means the evaluation of history for an understanding of the present which would enable us to question the future. This, according to Nietzsche, is only possible if human beings are *truly* honest with themselves (see below). This sort of honesty would go beyond our everyday, 'more or less' honest acts such as paying taxes, or being 'sincere' with our partners and neighbours, and saying what we 'really' think. The act of honesty Nietzsche is proposing is a shattering act, because we will get shattering answers. As Nietzsche says in *The Gay Science*, such honesty "would bring disgust and suicide in its train" (Section 107). Perhaps Nietzsche is suggesting that a true state of "knighthood" (see below) is attainable, though the way to get there would be painful in the extreme. Adorno makes one suggestion: that we should recognise that the society we create is fundamentally

antagonistic to ourselves and that nevertheless we accept it to the extent that we ourselves help to maintain such a society (O'Connor, 2000:12-13). In other words, that our own lives are dominated by an irrational situation, which is inter-dependent with a society based in market-philosophy and its "principle of exchange".

This principle of exchange is to me one of the most important of Adorno's arguments and in its briefest form is explained thus: "that the essence of this society [is based] in a mechanism to which individuals are entirely subordinate in even the most basic features of their lives" (Ibid, 13). Adorno holds that we seem unable to recognise the inhuman situation in which we live – as he says, from "within" – and therefore, do something about it. He also says that the origin of this socio-mental 'paralysis' has its core in a modern human "false consciousness" which "generates irrationality in that it disguises a state of affairs which has to be transformed."[1] Of course, as we will see later on, with the term "false consciousness" Adorno is continuing the discourse started by Marx and developed by Lukács, in *History and Class Consciousness* (1990). Bond also coincides with Adorno when he tells us that we are living in a situation we simply do not understand: it is too complex, too ideologized, and too impossible. It is a situation which, he says, makes us mad and "as Euripides says 'you can't go along to a madman and teach the madman to be sane'. It's impossible" (appendix: 10).

Adorno's and Bond's thought coexists only momentarily: Bond also thinks that solutions are impossible if one pretends to claim a human world from inside the regulated world of capital growth and cultural production. But, differing with Adorno, Bond claims to have found in drama a terrain where the impossible becomes possible; where the forces of the regulated world cannot obfuscate or threaten our search for a human meaning. As he says, "the world doesn't give us our humanness – or a god for that matter. It is something we create: from ourselves, through our relationship with other people. That is, drama and ONLY drama can solve that situation" (appendix: 9). Thus, with Bond, all is not lost as it is in Adorno's "Dialectics of Enlightment" (O'Connor, 2000: 155-74) or his "Negative Dialectics" (Ibid.: 54-79). Adorno stops at his thesis on mass deception, that is, what he calls "the Culture Industry", and sees that our humanness has been numbed by advanced capitalism, claiming for his theory Oedipus' answer to the Sphinx's riddle: "It is man!" (O'Connor, 2000: 159). It seems logical then that at the end of his *Aesthetic Theory* (1991) Adorno presents Beckett as one of the greatest artists of all times and his *Endgame* (1973) a true artwork. The

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The legacies of Marx and Nietzsche

position of Adorno in relation to Beckett is entirely in keeping with his own theory. For Adorno the situation is impossible because we are our worst enemies – that is, horrors and demons are mirror images of men (Ibid.) – and for Beckett "we all are born mad" (in *Waiting for Godot*, Act II, 1973: 80). Bond also thinks that current culture works as a device of mass deception but objects in the strongest terms to the Darwinian and/or Freudian view that we are our worst enemies (appendix: 10-1): for him the problem rests upon humanity not being able to make logical choices because of the situation in which it is located. Thus Bond tells us: "If I talk about the logic of humanness, THIS is also the logic of drama, because drama is seeking the logic of humanness; that's what the logic of drama is about: the constant imperative of what does it mean to be human, and that means to try and make the world a home" (appendix: 15). For Bond we are not born mad; the social system, the world/situation into which we are born makes us mad. Let us look then at that situation and see whether Bond's stated position can be justified.

2.1. SECTION I

2.1.1. The state of play

Some may argue that we are not entirely subordinated – to the wishes of the market, for example - because we live in democracies, whose governments are elected freely by us, the people. But do we in live in democracy, following the specific terms found in the dictionary? According to the Oxford English Dictionary, democracy is "Government by the people (from its Greek *Demos*=people and *Kratia*=power); a form of government in which the power resides in the people and is exercised by them; a form of society which favours equal rights, the ignoring of hereditary class distinctions, and tolerance of minority views". As a matter of fact, this definition does not seem to reflect our society. As Aristotle tell us in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, sometimes Athens was a timocracy (*timē* = value – though also honour), that is, a government ruled by the ruling-class, which was considered a constitution (Book VIII, part 10). For Aristotle, Timocracy was even worse than the other two constitutions, monarchy and aristocracy, because it was a time of tyranny; for tyrants "pursue only their own good [...] look to their own advantage" (ibid.). What Aristotle notes in Book VIII of *Ethics* has an enormous relevance in the studies of ethics, for it stands in direct opposition to the Hegelian idea that during the Classical period the Greeks lived unreflectively as citizens of the polis and therefore saw no conflict between self-interest and the common good.[2] That Aristotle evaluated

Timocracy, indicates that there was some reflection taking place. This also has a contemporary relevance when considered in relation to current domestic and international policies, and the latest and most immediate events. I will not elongate the contemporary political discourse. Some theatre practitioners want to believe that theatre, as a fully artistic enterprise, can answer the question of whether people are able or not to answer for their own lives; the more immediate problems of *how* and *with what effect*. Adorno does not think that we can see clearly where we stand, for the reasons stated above. We ought, though, to be able to answer Aristotle when he asks: is our world run by tyrants – that is, by those whose only aim is self-interest – or by people whose only concern is the common good?

Adorno's approach leads me to conclude that the condition of "false consciousness" is reflected in the kind of democracy we have at the moment. The sort of democracy we have in the West is called Liberal or Representative Democracy. In his paper "Theatre and Democracy" John McGrath[3] holds that "its main current purpose is to provide the global legal framework for the multinational corporations to increase their power and profit" (2002:134). And in order to support his suggestion he quotes extensively the social critic and editor, Cornelius Castoriadis,[4] whose ethical account of representative democracy calls into question its moral value:

> Nowhere among the political philosophers – or among those who claim to be such – has there been any attempt to provide a reasonable foundation for representative democracy. What is this theological mystery, this alchemic operation that makes of your sovereignty, one day every five years, a fluid that spreads over the entire country, enters into the ballot boxes, and comes out again that same evening on the television screen, on the faces of the 'representatives of the people'? This operation is clearly of a supernatural character, and no one has ever attempted to provide a foundation for it or even to explain it. People limit themselves to saying that under modern conditions direct democracy is impossible, therefore that representative democracy is necessary. (ibid.)

In addition, the executive, a fundamental part of Representative Democracy, demonstrates that a rational and fair communication between government and its people is just not there. In Great Britain for example, the Prime Minister stands at the apex of the executive. He has autonomous power to choose his cabinet which in turn is responsible for implementing the policies of the executive – that is the Prime Minister. Furthermore, in conventional British politics, all the members of the cabinet must publicly support the executive's policies or resign (as we have seen in recent events

when the cabinet members, Robin Cook and Claire Short, had to resign because their opposition to the war on Iraq). Castoriadis defines the executive thus:

> In the modern period, where Governments are nearly omnipotent, we notice that in the imaginary sphere and in political and constitutional theory the Government is hidden behind what is called the "executive" power. This term is tantamount to mystification, it is a fantastic abuse of language, for the "executive power" does not "execute" anything. The lower echelons of the administration do engage in "execution" in the sense that they apply, or are supposed to apply, pre-existing rules. When the Government wages war, however, it does not "execute" any law; it acts within the very broad bounds of a law that recognizes it has this "right." And this we have seen in reality, in the United States with the Vietnam War, Panama, Grenada, and now we are probably going to see it again in the case of the Persian Gulf, after which time Congress will be unable to do anything but approve of the action [all through were his inverted comas] (ibid.)

Democracy has been severely distorted by this multinational form of Representative Democracy. Consequently, we do not live in a democracy. Do people acknowledge this situation? Following Heidegger, Gianni Vattimo seems to associate our detachment from the social postmodern with Heidegger's term *Verwindung* (Vattimo, 1988: 172). Vattimo tells us that only Heidegger could translate it into French as a "going-beyond that is both an acceptance [or 'resignation'] and deepening, while also suggesting both a 'convalescence', 'cure' or 'healing' and a 'distorting' or 'twisting'"(Ibid.: xxvi; 172). For Vattimo *Verwindung* is a term which indicates "the end of philosophy in the form of metaphysics" (Vattimo, 1988: 173); a crucial concept for any philosophical nihilism that is not resigned to a world of illusion and the paralysis of all understanding (Ibid.: xlix-l). Do we live in a sort of limbo then? How could it be otherwise? The fluctuations of the market on the one hand and powers of the "executive" on the other make our lives excessively dependent on something which is literally unreachable.

We seem paralysed and also conforming because most of us expect to prosper (how, otherwise, could anyone have the courage to initiate a family and to nurture children?). However, according to Marx, Lukács and Adorno, our expectations towards the future must be measured in relation to an effectual alienation from the present which, nevertheless, is modelled by parameters manipulated by present information – media, newspapers, governmental manifestos, institutional education, and so on.[5] If "false consciousness" stands up to its definition, the prospect of a prosperous future cannot be acknowledged nor can it be recognised by individuals of the modern, post-industrial

world. If our internal, mental abilities to discern the world as we live it, is false, the so-called cognitive perception (that is, the way artists and audiences recognise the "knowing" intrinsic in works of art) has to be negatively affected by it. In my view, we cannot fail to take into account that an ethical position needs to be weighed up against the suggestion that, in the contemporary world, our lives – and our thoughts – are conditioned by the predicament of false consciousness.

2.1.2. Human Reification

Adorno's false consciousness is a corollary of Marx's reification. The term "reification" is hardly an everyday word, and its verb form, "to reify," is defined by *Oxford Encyclopedia* as "to convert (a concept, etc) mentally into a thing". Its noun's definition, "reification", is explained more conspicuously as "The mental conversion of a person or abstract concept into a thing." According to Marxist theory, reification is also depersonalization, *especially* when, in capitalist industrialization, the worker is considered as a commodity (in *Capital*, Chapter One, Section 4).[6] For Lukács, reification conveys the sense of the process of being changed into a thing, which irremediably changes people's relationships among themselves – in a crude way "people take on the character [of being] a thing" (Lukács, 1990: 83), leaving behind, or putting onto a second plane, their humanity. For Adorno, reification means "the perception of what is qualitative as quantitative" (O'Connor, 2000: 13).

Perhaps because a Neo-Marxist, more interested in the conciliation of Marxism within post-industrial societies,[7] Adorno does not give further insight into the origins of that perception, therefore I need to re-evaluate some of Marx's theory here. There are, however, other definitions of human reification outside the Marxist one that need to be distinguished. Some social studies suggest that reification is interpreted as a state of amnesia in which the individual 'forgets' the human origins of the social world. In this view, social phenomena are apprehended instead "as if they were something other than human products – such as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will" (Berger and Luckmann, 1966: 89). This "forgetfulness" is explained, in turn, as a defensive reaction by which the individual seeks to establish psychic stability in the face of "some fundamental terrors of human existence, notably the terror of chaos" (Berger and Pullberg, 1966: 68). I will argue that instead, and according to

Marx, reification should be viewed as the result of specific socially-structural conditions intrinsic to the capitalist system rather than as a universal feature of human psychology.

The necessary opening point for an evaluation of Marx's theory of reification is the section in Chapter One of *Capital* entitled "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret thereof". The notion of commodity fetishism which lies at the heart of Marx's theory of reification is introduced in the following passage:

> A Commodity is therefore a mysterious thing, simply because in it the social character of men's labor appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the product of that labor; because the relation of the producers to the sum total of their own labor is presented to them as a social relation, existing not between themselves, but between the products of their labor. This is the reason why the products of labor become commodities, social things whose qualities are at the same time perceptible and imperceptible by the senses [...] A definite social relation between men [...] assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things [...] This I call the Fetishism which attaches itself to the products of labor, so soon as they are produced as commodities, and which is therefore inseparable from the production of commodities.[8]

There is a second and linked cause of reification which is suggested by Marx as the notion of the "personification of things". With this notion, Marx draws a direct connection between alienated forms of social practice and reified forms of social consciousness. Reified consciousness, like all forms of consciousness, is determined by the concrete life-activities of which it is a part. For Marx, knowledge of social relations – 'theory' in the broadest sense of the term - is constructed in and through the actions which produce, maintain, and transform those social relations – 'practice'.[9] Marxism is not the only theory to see a connection between the above defined powerlessness and resigned human condition and the reified forms of social consciousness. From studies on child development, Val Burris, for example, notes the extreme reification of the young child's conception of the social world and attributes this to the underdevelopment of the infant's sense of autonomous subjectivity (Burris, 1982: 307). Burris says that when the child confronts a system of pre-existing, external, and "frequently coercive" social institutions, the infant views the "ontological status" of these as equivalent to that of natural objects (Ibid). Names, for example, are understood as belonging "to the intrinsic nature of things and emanating from them". Moral norms are thus projected onto the objective realm and understood as "categorical imperatives" (Ibid.: 320). Such reification declines as the child "becomes increasingly autonomous of adult constraint

and gains a stronger sense of his or her own subjectivity" (Ibid). By way of Marx and Lukács we know differently.

The theory of Marx was the result of social criticism of 19th century capitalism. Then, the social relations of manual production and factory work were the chief source of reified forms of social consciousness, while in contemporary liberal capitalism the application of science to industry has transformed the relations of production into relations of services – that is, mental labor has displaced manual labor in most parts of the economy.[10] Lukács tells us that the reifying market relations have been, not just modified, but increased by the progressive power of monopolistic corporations which are themselves helped by the bureaucratic state (1990: 98). As a result, new forms of human reification have emerged.

Alongside the fetishism of commodities, we now have a fetishism of technology, a fetishism of bureaucracy, and a fetishism of occupational credentials – that is, professional qualifications. The introduction of new technologies for mass production, communication, and control appear to some theorists – including Adorno, Horkheimer, Lukács, and Benjamin himself – as the most important sources of reification in contemporary capitalist society. The functions of "decision-making" and the coordination of production have been transferred from workers to machines, so that work roles have become fragmented and "deskilled".[11] Furthermore, as Jacques Ellul explains in a rather fatalistic fashion, from the standpoint of the individual producer, it appears as if technology itself were responsible for the alienating character of work in contemporary society, rather than the social forces shaping the development of technology. In *The Technological Society*, commenting upon the "dehumanized factories" of modern society, Ellul writes: "It is useless to rail against capitalism. Capitalism did not create our world; the machine did" (Ellul, 1964:5). Taking the cue from Ellul we might say that this modern form of reification has left the individual with a degree of fatalism, but more as if it was some kind of non-reflective theology.

Other forms of reification can be observed in the fetishism of bureaucracy, which is manifested in the common attitude towards the unresponsiveness of government as an unalterable fact of *nature* – this attitude has been more visible recently in the sphere of journalism, and its response to the global war on terrorism led by US, the unilateral war and the resulting occupation of Iraq. According to Max Weber, an irrefutable trait of

modern society is the spread of bureaucracy as a technical imperative which affects the inflexible and undemocratic character of contemporary liberal democracies, "increasing the distance between government and its people" (Weber, 1968:973). But it is in the following extract that the traits of bureaucracy seem to me to be depicted with a character of permanence; and as characteristic of liberal democracies as it was once of totalitarian systems like those of Soviet Russia or Nazi Germany:

> The decisive reason for the advance of bureaucratic organization has always been its purely technical superiority over any other form of organization. The fully developed bureaucratic apparatus compares with other organizations exactly as does the machine with the non-mechanical modes of production. Precision, speed, unambiguity, knowledge of the files, continuity, discretion, unity, strict subordination, reduction of friction and of material and personal costs – these are raised to the optimum point in the strictly bureaucratic administration. (Ibid.)

Another source of reification in contemporary capitalist society has been the development of a mass system of public education as an institution for the acquisition of academic qualifications – and the sorting of individuals into positions within the social division of labour. Indeed, the transfer of class privilege, once the direct and visible result of the inheritance of property, has been replaced now by a complex system of unequal schooling. Social relations that were once responsible for the inequality of class, have now been incorporated in (and disguised behind) "the technical processes of skill acquisition" (Bowles and Gintis, 1976: 123-9). As if it was merely another commodity, academic qualifications produce a fascination which comes to be fetishized as an inherent source of value, rather than seen as a token granted as the result of knowledge gained, and the underlying structure of social relations.

It is bureaucracy though, at its different levels of complexity observed during the twentieth century which could be proposed as one of the most alienating methods of social reification. The methods specified by Weber above – precision, speed, unambiguity, and so on – specific to bureaucracy, have had a key role in the running of totalitarian systems like fascism and communism as they have now in liberal democracies. During the Nazi period in Germany and its occupation of Europe, it was the machinery of bureaucracy that made possible the transportation of millions of men, women and children to the gas chambers, efficiently, cheaply and swiftly. Only the methodology of bureaucracy could make possible the task of killing and incinerating 12,000 people daily, as it did in Auschwitz.[12]

2.1.3. Adolf Eichmann among us.

Indeed, from the days of Nazi Germany, there exists a case that might help a general appreciation of the grave consequences of human reification. When the chief of the bureaucratic apparatus of Nazi Germany, Adolf Eichmann, was put on trial in Israel – after being abducted in Buenos Aires, Argentina in 1960 by Mossad (Israeli intelligence) – his only and continuous defense was that he had merely been a devoted civil servant (Levy, 1994:121-34); and there is enough evidence to suggest that he was telling the truth at its simplest. Simon Wiesenthal[13] himself, who was internationally known as a dedicated Nazi hunter, indicates that he made a mistake in looking for a motive in the earlier life of Eichmann. "There was [in Eichmann] no motive, no hatred, no anti-Semitism" says Wiesenthal (Ibid.:100). Eichmann's case needs to be emphasized here because his personal circumstances could describe the life of any ordinary person going about their daily business now. At the time he was arrested, he was considered by all those who knew him as a model father of three and a commendable, hard working manager in the Mercedes-Benz car factory of Buenos Aires (Ibid.:130).

His life story confounds the assumptions of those who would think of the Holocaust executioners as "monsters". Wiesenthal and the Israeli prosecutors were unable to find any signs of monstrosity or deviancy in Eichmann. During his interrogation in Israel, Eichmann acknowledged that, if his bosses had ordered him to kill his father, he would have done so. And if Hitler had ordered him to ship the Jews to Palestine, instead of Theresienstadt and Auschwitz, and let them start a Jewish state, he would have done that too (Levy, 1994:131-32).[14] Wiesenthal reports how a good friend of the Eichmann family, one who had not been a Nazi, simply refused to believe the accusations against "that oafish, lackluster Adolf who never spoke up and often seemed to get stupidly stuck in just one idea" (Ibid. 100). From the investigation he made into the lives of many Nazis, Wiesenthal confirms what very few want to acknowledge: that nobody was a born killer. They had been farmers, workers, clerks or bureaucrats. None had a prior criminal record; some had very good early childhoods. In other words, they were the kinds of people that one meets every day.

What lesson we can learn from the case of Eichmann? That one does not need to be fanatical, sadistic or mentally ill to murder millions? That it is enough to be a loyal follower, eager to do one's duty for any powerful and unaccountable established system – be it the *Führer* or Stalin or *another*? That it is enough to be driven by the prospect of a successful career? The similarities of bureaucratic functions throughout modern history are palpable. In Nazi Germany the hand of a civil servant puts a signature with the stroke of a pen, confirming and authorizing the shipping of thousands to their deaths, in today's Occident the hand of another civil servant implements a policy for a minimum wage in the same fashion, ignoring the fact that as a result, millions of children and adults will continue to live below the official levels of poverty, while a few will continue to accumulate monumental richness.[15] Wiesenthal was bewildered by the fact that, on examining their private lives, the characters of the Nazi executioners, of the administrators of death, were those of normal and caring individuals. And he concludes, "in the moment Eichmann put on the swastika, the first casualty he deported was not a Jew, but his own conscience." (Levy, 1994:101). In response to this, I would suggest to Wiesenthal that, as Marx explains in *Capital*, as Adorno and Horkheimer sustain in their *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1979), as Georg Lukacs holds in *History and Class Consciousness* (1990), and as Walter Benjamin defends in his thesis *Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction* (1999: 211-45), reified individuals like Eichmann are the consequence of a particular socio-political state of affairs, in which, by the act of embracing any given prevailing ideology, they attain a blind conscience. In its simplest designation, the essence of the reification of human beings is tracked down to capitalist values – that is to say, to economic factors. Eichmann did not throw out his conscience the day he put on the swastika; when he put on the swastika, his conscience was already supplanted by material value. As Lukács explains:

> [...] the reified mind has come to regard them ["the relations between men that lie hidden in the immediate commodity relation"] as the true representatives of his societal existence. The commodity character of the commodity, the abstract, quantitative mode of calculability shows itself here in its purest form: the reified mind necessarily sees it as the form in which its own authentic immediacy becomes manifest and – as reified consciousness – does not even attempt to transcend it. On the contrary, it is concerned to make it permanent by 'scientifically deepening' the laws at work. Just as the capitalist system continuously produces and reproduces itself economically on higher and higher levels, the structure of reification progressively sinks more deeply, more fatefully and more definitively into the consciousness of man. Marx often describes this potentiation of reification in incisive fashion. One example must suffice here:

"In interest-bearing capital, therefore, this automatic fetish, self-expanding value, money generating money is brought out in its pure state and in this form it no longer bears the birth-marks of its origin. The social relation is consummated in the relation of a thing, of money, to itself. Instead of the actual transformation of money into capital, we see here only form without content. [...] It becomes a property of money to generate value and yield interest, much as it is an attribute of pear trees to bear pears. And the money-lender sells his money as just such an interest-bearing thing. But that is not all. The actually functioning capital, as we have seen, presents itself in such a light that it seems to yield interest not as functioning capital, but as capital in itself, as money-capital. This, too, becomes distorted. While interest is only a portion of the profit, i.e. of the surplus value, which the functioning capitalist squeezes out of the labourer, it appears now, on the contrary, as though interest were the typical product of capital, the primary matter, and profit, in the shape of profit of enterprise, were a mere accessory and by-product of the process of reproduction. Thus we get a fetish form of capital, and the conception of fetish capital. In M-M' we have the meaningless form of capital, the perversion and objectification of production relations in their highest degree, the interest-bearing form, the simple form of capital, in which it antecedes its own process of reproduction. It is the capacity of money, or of a commodity, to expand its own value independently of reproduction-which is a mystification of capital in its most flagrant form. For vulgar political economy, which seeks to represent capital as an independent source of value, of value creation, this form is naturally a veritable find. A form in which the source of profit is no longer discernible, and in which the result of the capitalist process of production – divorced from the process – acquires an independent existence." [Marx's *Capital*, Vol. III] (Lukács, 1990: 93-4).

Thus, through the above evaluation we might extract at least one simple list of equivalences: firstly, that we, people, are reified by capitalism; secondly, when people suffer from reification all things develop an intrinsic value, people included (that is, with a value that can be used for exchange); and thirdly, reification must be impairing the way we perceive life – or how life ought to be in a humane world. If the reality of today corresponds with the Marxist evaluation of human life, and reification and/or "false consciousness" is imbedded in us to the extent that human consciousness is not *there*, how can we trust our own judgment? Returning to my main argument here, if we all are totally rooted in capitalism, how can philosophers, cultural and art practitioners and then critics recognize the true value of a work of art? If we all are reified to the point of having replaced even our own unconscious with material value, to the extent that our own acquired "false consciousness" prevents us from perceiving it, how can we make discourses on the cognitive, on the ethical and on the political? Reification casts

doubts on every single aspect of our lives: from art to science, from education to social inter-relations. One could even say that our ideas are shaped by the social system in which we live, and not the other way round. In spite of this, figures like Castoriadis offer auspicious arguments "that a society is autonomous not only if it knows that it makes its laws but also if it is up to the task of putting them into question" (McGrath, 2002:136).

For Bond, drama is a way of questioning; the questions of the holistic mind whose unattainable solution blossoms in drama. And while the dramatist shows distinctive warning signs about our society and the loss of humanness, one certainly cannot accuse Bond of being a pessimist, as he tells me: "You also ask about my current situation [...] I think we can understand the situation and need not withdraw into Beckett's despair or serve gangster-states as finally Brecht did [...] unlike Sarah Kane I cannot kill myself – and certainly don't want to. If my plays have any use they will be used" (letter to author: 17.07.03). But again, how can we individuals be up to the task of working towards freedom, democracy and justice, if according to the above, our lives are determined by an ontological reification? Would it not be as if we were asking a blind person to see? Racing as he was for position and status, could we ask "Eichmann" to forget about his aspirations?

2.1.4. Reification as state of emergency.

McGrath is optimistic when he argues that we should not undervalue human thought and endurance: "the dialectics of society can never be stopped or suppressed for too long" (2002: 138). He then suggests fourteen commendable points or ethical strategies for a theatre that will consciously work towards an hypothetical *authentic* democracy (Ibid.: 137).[16] However, as Walter Benjamin had already suggested in "Thesis on the Philosophy of History" (1999: 245-56), the problem of human reification has a character of urgency, because it would be too easy to underestimate the foremost universal imperative of having to make a living. As Benjamin concluded, "the tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the 'state of emergency' in which we live is not the exception but the rule" (Ibid.: 248). The very human characteristics of Eichmann described above can be identified throughout the social spectrum of social life today: we yearn social success and status. In the process we might find ourselves submitting to the powers that be, and to their requirements of total loyalty, unquestioning obedience

and strict compliance with whatever the established rule of law. Eichmann was not a "monster," but a reified individual, and as such, he could not identify human values in people, just their economic values. How long will Bond's or McGrath's sort of philosophies of drama and theatre have to operate before the capitalist condition brings about another Auschwitz or Hiroshima? Because if Lukács is correct, human reification by way of capitalism does not remain a stable characteristic, it grows continuously, penetrating into us deeper and deeper. As he says, the task is phenomenal:

> Even thinkers who have no desire to deny or obscure its existence and who are more or less clear in their own minds about its humanly destructive consequences remain on the surface and make no attempt to advance beyond its objectively most derivative forms, the forms furthest from the real life-process of capitalism, i.e. the most external and vacuous forms, to the basic phenomenon of reification itself (Lukács, 1990: 94).

I shall stress it again here and in following chapters. The notion that our lives are characterized by the "extreme" (that is, by an impossible human condition in which we do not really have a choice but continuously feed a system that works against us) shapes Bond's philosophy of drama and plays entirely. One of the main goals of this thesis is to evaluate whether the position of Bond and his philosophy of drama is justifiable or not. In more than one sense, the dramatist is proposing a language of destruction: that is, a language which intends or hopes to destroy all those elements that, in his view, work against humanity: be it capitalism, religion or morality, types of philosophies, types of theatre, the modern concept of art or culture, and so on (see appendix).

Worryingly though, as Garcia Düttmann explains, fascism has a chameleon-like tendency to appropriate any language of destruction that does not fulfill the aims of fascism itself (1991:537). I am arguing from the perspective that any practicing theatre that stands for true democracy and against fascism would, by definition, also propose a language of destruction. That is, it would have to try and find its own language, so that it had a chance to destroy those conventional languages which obstruct true democracy in the first place. I say conventional languages; Nietzsche would say conventional moralities. Searching for new forms of communication, one could argue, is what many theatre practitioners have been doing for some years now, but while this process is going on, we should take into account that there are two most relevant and substantial dangers. One is that fascism could appropriate the very devices that theatre might use in the struggle against fascism: "Fascism, whose goal is to conserve tradition in the midst

of the very destruction which protects and threatens it, profits from this ability: it exploits the consequences and so institutes a tradition of destruction." (Ibid.). The other danger is that, as Duttmann says, a language of destruction "only says destruction, it has nothing to say, it communicates nothing" (Duttmann, 1991:554). I will examine fascism thoroughly in Chapter V. At this point I advance the idea that fascism is so inconspicuous it can be many different things to different people. As Horkheimer contends, fascism is not unique to Germany, Italy or Spain but is the culmination of capitalist societies; or, as Lukács says above, fascism could be reification's "destructive consequences"; or a capitulation of the individual to a mainstream cultural trend (Horkheimer, 1979:154). Insofar as the masses are unconscious "slaves" to the culture industry, could fascism already be a dominant societal system hidden in the background of our culture? This is a complex issue which defines the contours of Part II of this thesis.

Individual will is compromised by the industries that manufacture our needs and desires. It makes no difference whether or not the majority of people recognise their society as fascist; moreover, fascism unrecognized is all the more dangerous because it is impossible to fight what cannot be identified. Indeed, as Horkheimer believed during the earlier period of his life as critical thinker,[17] our sensory abilities can only perceive surrounding structures (that is, the context in which we live) through a process of abstraction; in other words, not by attending to the logic of human reification as a problem, which is real, but by withdrawing from it.

> The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so reified that the idea of anything specific to themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract notion: personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining white teeth and freedom from body odor [sic] and emotions. (Horkheimer, 1979:167).

One could wonder to what extent is the political concern with the theory of reification. Baz Kershaw suggests that the political has been tried exhaustively in recent times without major consequences (1999: 18). Yet, what really does seem to have been exhausted is the number of forms of political discourses. Human beings *are* political *per se,* and the content of the political is and will continue to be of the utmost importance. For the purpose of unity of experience in the arts towards the ethical, the political will have to find a *new* definition for itself, perhaps in the vein of an ethic-ideological character; or taking forms of discourses from the ethical. I am not arguing

here for a rejection of our cognitive capabilities, but as we have seen above, if human reification in capitalist societies is a permanent condition, we are also saying that our empirical-factual knowledge might have been, at least in part, damaged. It will necessarily mean that our cognitive perceptions are distorted in one way or another.

Through Bolla, I have suggested that true art is, or has a "knowing". Through Kant and Burke, I have said that the sublime tells us a "truth". But to whom is this truth told? To all of us or only to a chosen few? To what extent does an individual without education, status, or the safety of a bank account, experience the "intrinsic" truth of an artwork or the truth of a subliminal setting? Have we not suggested through Kant and Burke (in Chapter I) that people perceive this truth content in artwork, in the sublime, only from a position of safety? Regardless of our status or social condition, most of us live within the human threshold of constant need, but some very much more than others. This must create *per force* an imperative of competitiveness in which the other becomes an item of value no different from any other commodity for sale or purchase. Hence, I would treat ethics as the embodiment of a unity of experience in the arts, which eventually might give its own voice to the political and to the cognitive.

2.2. SECTION II

2.2.1. Ethics alongside Marx and Nietzsche: an attempt at reconciliation

From the numerous theories and philosophies that contribute to modern human knowledge, very many of them converge sooner or later into the thought of two major figures of modern thought. One is Marx; the other is Nietzsche. As András Gedö explains, both Nietzsche and Marx have common nihilistic essentials (Gedö, 1998:331). He notes how Lyotard strove in the early seventies to reinterpret Marx's *Capital* with reference to Nietzsche, and Foucault "presumed" to have found in the mid-sixties a common denominator in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud.[18] Nietzsche's work is reflected in the work of many philosophers, and in current journals of the most diverse realms, Nietzsche is being reviewed with growing impetus especially in Anglo-American philosophy.[19] Most would agree that a characteristic of Nietzsche's thought is its complexity. As A. C. Pigou explains "His exposition is disjointed, sometimes almost incoherent" (Pigou, 1908:343). Yet, as Brian Leiter holds, what distinguishes Nietzsche from the recent Anglo-American writers is that the former situates his critique of morality within a broader "cultural critique", attacking morality as a variety of social and cultural forces "posing obstacles to human flourishing" while the latter group seem to be "critics of particular *philosophical theories of morality* [his italics]" (Leiter, 1997:252).[20] This is because, in my view, poetry and philosophy are sharply contrasted by scholars at large (it could be argued that there is always a philosophical content in poetry and not vice versa). With Nietzsche this is not the case.

In order to appreciate the real value of Nietzsche, we have to acknowledge first that "the spirit of wonder that prompts poetry [and] the impulse to philosophy" (Pigou, 1908:343) converges in Nietzsche. A. C. Pigou explains that the difference between Nietzsche and current Anglo-American philosophies on morality "is not in attitude but in method, the [latter] following the hard road of systematization, the [former] flying to the same goal on wings of intuition" (Ibid.). Furthermore, Pigou contends that the point where philosophy and poetry meets in Nietzsche is Ethics because "positive construction in ethics *is* insight and little else [his italics]". In this Nietzsche distances himself from the general tendency to take Ethics as a systematic work, which in that department, "is entirely negative" (Ibid.).

Pigou suggests then that any hope to understand Nietzsche rests in the employment of "a time-worn distinction between means and end" (p. 344) in Nietzsche's work as an entirety. Peter Berkowitz (1996) concurs, remarking that the dominant theme to *The Birth of Tragedy* "is not artistic creativity, as is commonly supposed, but wisdom: how it is acquired, what it reveals and its staggering impact on the individual who dares to lift its veil" (Berkowitz, 1996:61). In the preface to *The Birth of Tragedy*, "Attempt at a Self-Criticism",[21] Nietzsche wants to remind us that "the entire book recognizes only an aesthetic sense and a deeper meaning under everything that happens"; that "the existence of the world is justified only as an aesthetic phenomenon" (Nietzsche, 2000: Section 5). Berkowitz interprets this not as a contradiction, but as an emphasis on the idea that the fundamental human activity is "individual creativity".

It appears to me that the real meaning that Berkowitz takes from Nietzsche is that wisdom and art are, if not the same thing, closely related. Although one could argue that Nietzsche's critique on morality seems to be in constant contradiction, as Leiter explains, this is because he uses the word "morality" (Moral) "in both positive and negative senses" (Leiter, 1997:263). As I shall explain, Nietzsche uses morality in both senses because his work is not a theory of morals, but an ethical work about conventional morality, which is why he seems to reject any systematic approach. It is appropriate to point out here the distinction between ethical and the moral discourses for, as I have observed, there is a tendency to blend one with the other. Irving Horowitz offers the following:

> Ethics is the investigation of alternative theories and modes of conduct. Its primary concern is not with the resolution of moral controversy as such, but the reduction of indeterminacy in explaining how people (philosophers included) come to make valuative choices; the social and ideological basis upon which these choices can and are made; and the possible range of consequences of one frame of value decisions over another. In short, **ethics** is the empirical science of human conduct.

> Morals is the essentially arbitrary choice of one set of value decisions over another. The study of morals is the study of the obligations and consequences imposed by postulating a specific course of action. A moral standpoint is furthermore a guide to the selection of categories for the purpose of resolving moral dilemmas. In short, **moral** theory is the rational appraisal of the paradoxes in human conduct made from a particular existential standpoint. (Ibid.:105)

According to Horowitz's definitions, we might say that Nietzsche is, above all, an ethicist. And he is so because he evaluates conventional morality empirically – that is, with an intuitive and evaluative character. He carries out an historical estimate of moral conventions and in doing so – most of the time in a characteristic satirical key – he sees that these conventions are a mask behind which people hide their basest instincts.[22] While it would be inappropriate to think of Nietzsche as connected with anyone or any particular field, we might say that although Nietzsche is a non-revolutionary in the Marxist sense (Gedö, 1998:332), he is a revolutionary in the ethical sense.

In *The Birth of Tragedy* for instance, Nietzsche sees creative man in perpetual conflict with two antithetical concepts: the Apollonian and the Dionysian. In Greek mythology Apollo is the God associated with science and civilization – with rationality. By contrast Dionysos, who was the patron of the arts, is the God related with drunkenness, orgies and ecstasy – with irrationality. And yet, in my own reading of *The Birth of Tragedy*, Nietzsche proposes to reconcile both science and poetry, rationality and irrationality while at the same time maintaining a difficult boundary, more like a convergence where conflict/affinity are intertwined. His re-evaluation of everything brings forward a demanding balance which attempts to indicate a path towards an ethical reality. I think this notion is made palpable in the following extract from *The Birth of Tragedy*:

> From the feverish excitement of these festivals, knowledge of which reached the Greeks from all directions, by land and sea, they were apparently for a long time completely secure and protected through the figure of Apollo, drawn up in all his pride. Apollo could counter by holding up the head of Medusa in the face of the unequalled power of this crude and grotesque Dionysian force. Doric art has immortalized this majestic bearing of Apollo as he stands in opposition. This opposition became more dubious and even impossible as similar impulses gradually broke out from the deepest roots of Hellenic culture itself. Now the effect of the Delphic god, in a timely process of reconciliation, limited itself to taking the destructive weapon out of the hand of his powerful opponent. This reconciliation is the most important moment in the history of Greek culture. Wherever we look the revolutionary effects of this experience manifest themselves. It was the *reconciliation* [my italics] of two opponents, who from now on observed their differences with a sharp demarcation of the border line between them and with occasional gifts send to honour each other (2000).

Thus, recapitulating, we might say that the Apollonian condition is, in Nietzsche, a state of intensity in which a creative vision of form is fully realized. The Apollonian

inclination is toward method, rationality, and rules. Conversely, the Dionysian condition is characterized by an explosion of form, and by a release of energy; it is like an impulse towards disorder, irrationality, and spontaneity, and by an ability to respond to any stimuli, in a state of emotional intensity. Thus, Apollo and Dionysius are two different characters but according to Nietzsche, in the arts they counterbalance each other. I question myself then, is it not here where the ethical, political and aesthetical discourses want desperately to *touch* each other?

Introducing Marx into this Nietzschean discourse, it would be natural to place Marx as Apollonian and Nietzsche as Dionysian (though, as we have seen, one could argue that in full terms Nietzsche is not fully Dionysian, and then that neither was Marx completely Apollonian).[23] By taking the matter of distinctions even further and for the sake of insight into the subject that will matter more hereafter – that is, in discussing Nietzsche's profound sense of honesty – I would like to include now some important peculiarities of these two important figures. Given that "the world in which we ourselves exist intellectually is a world largely molded by Marx and Nietzsche" (Gedö, 1998:337), their apparent unawareness of each other seems to me extraordinary.

During 1850s and 1860s, Marx's and Engels' "The Communist Manifesto" (1848) had been made widespread throughout Europe by intellectuals and working leaders. Surely Nietzsche had to come into contact with the communist pamphlet in one way or another during his earlier studies (Nietzsche was born in 1844). How is it then that Nietzsche does not seem ever to acknowledge Marx or the incipient Communist movement? Marx is the theorist of revolutionary materialism, but he is also part and parcel of ethical theory. At a time when the bourgeois intellectuals were dazzled by the prospect of fame and success in all realms of the arts and the sciences, Marx focused his attention upon a simple yet huge fact which locates him outside ideology and materialist theory, and at the head of what one day could be referred to as the 'ethico-universal': Marx discovered the law of development of human history. He identified the simple fact, I would say hitherto hidden by an overgrowth of ideology, that mankind must first of all eat, drink, have shelter and clothing, before it can indulge in such pursuits as politics, science, art, or religion.[24]

Marx came to this conclusion at a time when social success and innumerable innovations were being celebrated at all levels. Astronomical discoveries were at their

height in the 1840s and 1850s. These were the remarkable years that saw the advent of Morse Telegraph, Brunel's 'Great Britain', 'The Great Exhibition of London', and above all, Darwin's *The Origin of Species*. This period of discovery and scientific wonder, of social achievement in all realms, from science to philosophy, from literature to drama, is also the time when the Irish Famine (1845–51) brought starvation to 350,000 men, women and children. While the advanced classes were being dazzled by the enlightenment's radiance; misery and suffering was rampant among the majority, the lower classes. Technological progress meant that many machines required an unskilled backup workforce of women and children in the new factories – especially by the textile mills and the mines (Mühlberg, 1988: 21). Naturally, these social facts need to be considered within their historical context and it is unwise to judge yesterday's norms by today's standards. Indeed, in the 1840s a Prussian government adviser reported that the employment of children was not only "natural" but a "charitable blessing" (Mühlberg, 1988: 22). But in his report, the government adviser could not avoid observing that their one-sided occupations were "indisputably pernicious"; and this attitude is reflected in the following report after a visit to a pin factory employing 100 children:

> Their tasks are not exactly difficult, yet some of their labours are at least tiring, and others not undangerous. This applies specifically to the casting of the heads. The skill, agility and dexterity of the children in all these labours is astonishing. The tools and machines which they operate are meaningful; the children themselves, who sit working in rows bending forwards and backwards, but all making the same movements and the same sound almost to a beat, strike the observer as if they were machines (Ibid.)

Although most people then judged such a society as perfectly 'normal', today we find aberrant the kind of human exploitation perpetrated during the 19th century. One can only wonder whether in hundred years time, people will find appalling what we now consider normal: unemployment at 17 million in the EEC alone on the one hand, and low paid tedious jobs with long and exhausting shifts on the other; selective, private and exclusivist education versus state education – in short, the social structure of our liberal democracies. The Enlightenment of the 19th century offered so much that glittered but Marx was one of only a few that paid due regard to the other human misery which was hidden behind the glitz. It was all apparently ignored by Nietzsche.

Attempting to bring Marx and Nietzsche into a state of reconciliation for the purpose of a common, ethical end is not an easy task. The latter retained for himself the Hegelian formulation that the mind or the spirit determines the course of human history, while Marx reverses Hegel and tells us that human life is determined by economics, which forms the basic core of Marxism. However, a reconciliation does not mean to merge them into a single philosophy – that would be unworkable – it means to pay due consideration to both when decision-making is at stake. It might be interesting to note that their very upbringing puts their lives in conflict with each other. Marx was born Jewish, he was subsequently baptized with the name of Harry Heine.[25] Being Jewish during the second half of the 19th and early 20th century in most European countries, especially France, Germany, Poland and Russia, meant to be hated, persecuted, and to live in constant fear. It was only natural that Marx's father – himself a petty bourgeois – sought for his son the chance of opportunity denied to the Jewish people as a matter of birth. While Nietzsche, the son of a protestant priest, was a successful academician at the University of Basel,[26] Marx was the most hated and calumniated man of his time because he said the unthinkable: that all men should first have decent lives. Governments, both absolutist and republican, deported Marx from their territories. The Bourgeoisie, both conservative and ultra-democratic, rivaled one another in heaping defamations upon him.

Contrast this with what has been the fiercest argument of all among scholars: whether or not Nietzsche was an anti-Semite. As I will explain, single evaluations cannot be taken to the letter with Nietzsche, nor can we make judgments from single paragraphs of his writings. If Nietzsche was read so, plundering through his works by way of paragraphs here and there – and he warns against this method of reading his works himself – he certainly would appear monstrous. However, if many individuals misread Nietzsche, we should also acknowledge that only Nietzsche is to blame. (We shall remember it again hereafter: namely, that it is difficult to decide whether there are two *Nietzsches* – the poet and the philosopher – or one). At the time when he was publishing the second part of *Thus Spoke Zarathustra* in 1883, he had already written and published "Part 1" in which his critique on moral decadence is expressed in such terms: "Rabble-hodgepodge: therein is everything mixed with everything, saint and swindler, gentleman and Jew, and every beast out of Noah's ark."[27] It seems clear that Nietzsche intends, "saint" and "gentleman" to equal "good", and "swindler" and "Jew" to equal "bad". Later on in Part I, what Nietzsche allows us to see is that in reality he is referring to

Plato, Descartes, or Kant who are as unacceptable to him as Christianity or any other metaphysical religion. "Be faithful to the earth!" he admonishes his followers time and again in *Zarathustra* (Part I). And yet, while Nietzsche was writing the last words of the second part of *Zarathustra*, his sister married Bernhard Foster, a leader of the German Anti-Semitic movement, who had enormous influence during the Nazi period.[28] And it would appear that Nietzsche had excellent relations with his sister and brother-in-law.

"The worst readers", protested Nietzsche, "are those who behave like plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile the whole" (in Hollingdale, 1977:16). This indicates that he was aware that his work was prone to misinterpretation. However, to whom was he addressing his writings? What for Marx was fundamental in the foundation of a better world – that is, bread – is simply ignored by Nietzsche. Nietzsche was not addressing his writing to the world, but to the socially privileged few (such as his ex-friend Wagner). When he refers to "people", which he does rarely, he does do by drawing attention to conventions and negativity, but the only people he lets us visualize are the particular and small group of bourgeoisies and ruling-classes ignoring the masses:

> How repulsive pleasure is now, that crude, musty brown pleasure as it is understood by those who like pleasure, air "educated" people, our rich people [note parenthetically that a remark on anything directly related with money is extremely rare in Nietzsche], our rulers! How maliciously we listen now to the big country-fair boom-boom with which the "educated" person and city dweller today permits art, books, and music to rape him and provide "spiritual pleasures" [all his inverted commas] (*The Gay Science*, section 4).

In 1870, Nietzsche served as a volunteer medical orderly in the Franco-Prussian War. The complexity of the man might be explained by laying out a set of hypothetical questions in relation to this. The first is whether he volunteered because he was a dutiful servant of the institutions of authority. If he did so, Nietzsche would present himself with a lack of authenticity, for his writings clearly argue for a revaluation of all values; not only religious but civil values too. The second supposition is whether he went to the Franco-Prussian war out of nationalistic pride and in support of the 'Iron Chancellor', Bismarck, the instigator of the Franco-Prussian war and an important forebear of Nazi idealism.[29] This would add further support to the simplistic theory that Nietzsche is himself one of the precursors of Nazism; after all, his concept of the will to power is

directly linked to the idea of the "supermen" without feelings and without compassion, and his hostility towards "polluting" Jewishness well documented.[30]   But Nietzsche denies it categorically:

> We who are homeless are too manifold and mixed racially and in our descent, being "modern men" and consequently do not feel tempted to participate in the mendacious racial self-admiration and racial indecency that parades in Germany today. (*The Gay Science*, section 377)

And a third supposition is whether Nietzsche went voluntarily to serve his country during wartime because he felt the moral obligation to do so. But was he not supposed to be the anti-moralist?[31]   This is where misunderstandings on Nietzsche are rife. As Pigou explains, it would be wrong to assert that he condemns sympathy and love: "What he condemns" says Pigou "is the direction which it [love and sympathy] at present takes" (Pigou, 1908: 349); that is, for example, as a means to an end. In the essay "Why Marx or Nietzsche?" András Gedö explains that "the philosophical Marx-Nietzsche controversy implies an awareness of the fact that Marx is *the* alternative to Nietzsche" (Ibid.: 338).   From the reading he makes on Nietzsche, Gedö explains that this conclusion comes from Nietzsche himself; that in the work of Nietzsche as a whole there is a sempiternal foreboding of the fateful consequences of his own philosophy, and he supports his suggestion with the following:

> There shall one day be attached to my name a reminder of something monstrous—of a crisis the like of which has never been on earth, of the deepest collision of conscience, of a decision against everything that up to now has been believed, demanded, kept holy. I am not a human being, I am dynamite. (Ibid.: 339)[32]

In my view, here Nietzsche is not talking of Nietzsche. It is more as if, by putting himself forwards as the sacrificial lamb, he was saying to the Gods "Do you see all these men here? They are repulsive in body and soul, their actions are horrifying, they do not learn from their actions, but before you take them, give them more time. Here, take me, it is me, and only me the monstrous thing; I am dynamite." What I read is that the Anti-Christ Nietzsche becomes Christ (we should remember here that he was the son of a preacher). Subverting Gedö's analysis, Nietzsche is actually looking to a better future; looking towards that day when the unborn – as Wole Soyinka likes to call those who *are* in the future[33]– will be horrified when, looking back in history, they see the horrors and miseries that their ancestors had to endure, which we shall repeat again:

"There shall one day be attached to my name a reminder of something monstrous – of a crisis the like of which has never been on earth." In the act of talking to himself, he is, in my view, detaching himself from Nietzsche and so embodying the human being as universal.

On Nietzsche I would say to Gedö, yes, Nietzsche the philosopher has ignored Marxist theory. In his evaluations he approaches the human dilemma as 'I' as opposed to 'us', he is oblivious to class differences and human economic conditions, and is all too well within the threshold of bourgeois philistinism. But are not men what other men allow them to be? Where can we situate the "Will to Power" in relation to Nietzsche's contextual class, the son of an orthodox protestant priest, the former lexicological linguist on Latin and Greek, the former admirer of Bismarck? In my view only with his opposite – but 'opposite' in the sense that a coin has two opposites – heads and tails. And Nietzche's opposite is Marx.

According to Marx, the evolution of man, in all history, is characterized by man's struggle with nature. Marx is referring not only to the nature 'outside' man, that is the material world, but to the nature 'inside' as well: the conscious, cognitive nature of man, in the ontological sense. And he says "When this antagonism between man and man, and man and nature is resolved the prehistory of man will come to an end and truly human history will begin."[34] Is he not talking here about the "super-man" Nietzsche longs for? Our struggle with nature goes beyond those basic physiological needs like the supply of food, time for rest, sex, and the expulsion of our various excretions. Men abuse and exploit the weak, and make wars and kill. For Marx, the primordial source-setting of man is simply economic, and simpler still, an embedded thirst for money. According to Marx, the real nature of money is depicted superbly by Shakespeare, who pinpoints two of its most spurious properties as follows:

> 1. It is the visible divinity — the transformation of all human and natural properties into their contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things: impossibilities are soldered together by it.
> 2. It is the common whore, the common procurer of people and nations.
> [And then Marx adds]
> Money, then, appears as this distorting power both against the individual and against the bonds of society, etc., which claim to be entities in themselves. It transforms fidelity into infidelity, love into hate, hate into love, virtue into vice, vice into virtue, servant into master, master into servant, idiocy into intelligence, and intelligence into idiocy.[35]

They are two coexisting thinkers who seem to evaluate two different "worlds" – one the material, the external, the palpable, the objective 'us'; the other the immaterial, the internal, the psychological, the subjective "I" – and in exclusivity.[36] Where Marx identifies the suffering of men in their capitalized conditions, Nietzsche points to the vacuity of moral conventions, which are the inspiring source of profit and exploitation. Where Marx defines the paralyzing alienation of men by capitalism as reification, Nietzsche in a non materialistic way defines it as *ressentiment*. By means of this logic, I would be inclined to defend the hypothesis that the ethical question – indeed its proper discovery as a question – starts by crossing out any delimitations between Nietzsche and Marx *a priori*. If Marx covers the material reasons for historical injustice through the exploration of all classes, Nietzsche goes as far but in another 'direction': indeed towards the dark sides of our inner mental being.

2.2.2. Nietzsche's men of *ressentiment*

One of my most significant findings in assessing aesthetics towards the ethical has been Nietzsche's evaluation of resentment – or *Ressentiment,* as he terms it in his *Genealogy of Morals* (2001). As a result of this, the frame of reference from which I intended to approach my ethical aim has been fundamentally reconsidered and my analysis has taken an unexpected turn. Nietzsche evaluates Ressentiment through the very subject that made him notorious in the public eye: religion. In the reading I make of the "Second Essay", "Guilt, Bad Conscience and Related Matters" (2001),[37] the priestship category to which Nietzsche refers is related specifically to Jewish culture and then consequently to that of Christianity. Even so he does not criticize Judaism and Christianity in racial terms, but in socio-cultural and historical terms. This cannot be stressed enough. While Jewishness and Christianity have been major influences on Western culture from the fall of the Roman Empire to modern times, for Nietzsche they correspond to a "slave" and "submissive" type of culture. In Bernard Register's "Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation," the author makes a very helpful critical analysis of the *Genealogy* explaining that it inquires into the psychological origin of a "typified" priest (1997: 281-305). He also notes that the actual history Nietzsche uses in *Genealogy* is of dubitable value (Ibid.: 282). However, I would agree with Peter Berkowitz that, in order to present essentially ethical views, what Nietzsche does in *Genealogy* is to "poeticize" history (Berkowitz, 1996: 27–8).

Although the term *ressentiment* as such seems to be outside the general use of lexicographers, the definition that Oxford Encyclopedia has of its co-relative "resentment," has corresponding similarities to the Nietzschean discourse on the moralities of priestship, and this is: "a negative attitude towards society or authority arising, often unconsciously, from aggressive envy and hostility, frustrated by a feeling of inferiority or impotence." This "feeling of inferiority or impotence" is indeed the substance from which Nietzsche construes his "Priest" type and which is then applied to his designation of Judaism and Christianity as a "slave-morality". *Ressentiment* is Nietzsche's particular and radical way of defining the whole of conventional morality, a critique on hypocrisy, and an attempt to detach himself from Plato, Kant and especially from his former tutor, the pessimistic Schopenhauer.[38] Reginster sees that, in Nietzsche's view, modern morality – that is, "the distinction between good and evil, the feeling of moral guilt, and the ascetic ideal – all have their origin in *ressentiment*" (1997:282). As I pointed out above, in my view the ethical question is as much conditioned by Marx's reification as it is by Nietzsche's evaluation on men of *ressentiment*. The Neo-Marxist dialectics of Adorno on "false consciousness" and Heidegger's apology for postmodernism through the term *Verwindung* (Vattimo, 1988: xxvi, xlix-l, 172-3) have both come about through the evolution of Marx's theory of reification and Nietzsche's evaluation on *ressentiment*. Thus, according to the readings made by Reginster, for Nietzsche the men of *ressentiment* – or priest type – "who are physically 'weak' and 'unhealthy' are defeated by the 'powerful physicality' and 'overflowing health' of the knights [he quotes from *Genealogy*, I, sections 6 and 7]" (Reginster, 1997:285). Consequently they develop a sense of "impotence" (Ibid.:286). From the various types of men of ressentiment listed by Reginster, I will enumerate here those which for my purposes are the most relevant:

> 1. The weakness of the priest creates their feeling of impotence only because they hold it responsible for the loss of their political supremacy. (Reginster, 1997: 286)

Here we could make allusion again to what seems to be an inter-relation between *ressentiment* and reification; between Nietzsche and Marx; the sought balance between Apollo and Dionysos. In my view, Nietzsche and Marx appear as oblivious collaborators who delineate a problem that continues to shape modern human society: the sempiternal class-warfare produced by class divisions and inequality. But

Nietzsche's evaluation of the world does not stop at a *mere* class-struggle. It gets worse than that. According to Reginster, for as long as the Judeo-Christian morality continues to hold sway in our minds, Nietzsche does not see an escape from this condition of *ressentiment* – and incidentally seems to take the same pessimistic view as Adorno's *Theory of Aesthetic*. As Reginster says:

> 2. The feeling of impotence [in men of ressentiment] is not a temporary state of mind caused by an accidental reversal of fortune. It must rather have become an essential feature [...] the analysis [of Nietzsche] presupposes that the priest believes he has tried everything he could think of to regain power and failed [...] It therefore inhibits any further attempt to recover political power (Reginster, 1997: 286).

Yet Nietzsche does not offer a material conclusion for a more "just and fair" society as Marx indicates we would with the fulfilment of a revolution of the masses. For Nietsche, it would depend on *where* one wanted to be incorporated, with the "priests" or with the "knights". If we chose to be a "knight" – the honourable man, the man of higher ethical values – we would not be sheltered from harm, because priests are nevertheless around. Nor would the destruction of the "priest" at the hand of the "knight" be desirable, because then the knights would have debased themselves to the levels of the priests by killing and destroying, thus becoming priests themselves. What Nietzsche urges is to be aware of the men of *ressentiment* because their condition is highly *contagious*. And he says so when he compares priests (or men of *ressentiment*) to sick people: "Sick people are the greatest danger for healthy people. For strong people disaster does not come from the strongest, but from the weakest. Are we aware of that?" (*Genealogy*, 2001, essay II, section 14). Reginster holds in the following manner the third and last feature of his evaluation on Nietzsche's men of *ressentiment*:

> 3. [...] the priest evidently refuses to accept, or resign himself to, his impotence. The priest's sickliness does not eradicate his "lust to rule," but only makes it "more dangerous" [his inverted commas] (Genealogy, I, section 6). Furthermore, rather than subsiding, as it would in the case of resignation, the hatred the priest harbours towards his victorious rivals, the knights, grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions. (Reginster, 1997:286-7).

Not surprisingly perhaps, German Nazi intellectuals of the period failed to recognise themselves as men of *ressentiment,* not even in the house of Nietzsche's sister, whose views concurred with those of the Nazi intelligentsia and where the philosopher's works were indeed discussed.[39] In my view, the portrayal of the principal protagonists of the

Nazi period fits Nietzsche's description of *ressentiment* like a glove. According to Wiesenthal's research, as a young person, Hitler was an unsuccessful artist of urban paintings who failed to be accepted at the School of Art in Vienna (Levy, 1994:15). He was also intensely in love with a rich Jewish girl who never noticed him, and who, nevertheless, was unreachable for the very reason that she was from a higher social class (Ibid.:19). Apparently Hitler had serious problems communicating with women and what is more, and perhaps as the result of this 'timidity', he also caught syphilis from a prostitute who, incidentally or not, was Jewish (ibid). Himmler was a chicken farmer in Bavaria during his earlier life (Ibid.: 114), and Eichmann tried repeatedly to obtain a University degree – mostly under pressure from his father – without ever taking it to a successful end (Ibid.: 93). They were common, futile men, in a culture that rated personal success and glory above all else. Their failures must have driven them to the darkest corners of their minds, feeling near to nothing. As the political philosopher Hannah Arendt puts it in her account of his trial, *Eichmann in Jerusalem,* which is pertinently subtitled *A Report on the Banality of Evil* (1964):

> From a humdrum life without significance and consequence the wind had blown him into History, as he understood it, namely, into a Movement that always kept moving and in which somebody like him – already a failure in the eyes of his social class, of his family, and hence in his own eyes as well – could start from scratch and still make a career. (Ibid.: 91)

Nietzsche saw them coming – the *Hitlers,* the *Himmlers,* and the *Eichmanns* and, we must say, the *Stalins* too – even before they were born. By way of the "hatred they harboured towards the knights", they grew into a monstrous killing machine filled with vengeance. They were men of *ressentiment.* How visionary was Nietzsche of the variants of human nature when we can observe now that the whole functioning device of the Nazi machinery was an extension of priesthood: Hitler at the head, omnipotent, unreachable, who was unquestionably taken as the only one who could speak to a god, and therefore of a divine character. And then his summum priests, Himmler and Eichmann, with their performative paraphernalia; one the extended arm of the leader, the other the organizer of the executions. They were priests with the same monstrous vengeful purposes of the Spanish Inquisition, the Catholic monarchs Ferdinando II and Isabella at the head, the 'Great Dominican Inquisitor' Tomas de Torquemada as the extended arm who coordinated the burning and torturing. A 'cleanliness' thereafter prolonged for more than five hundred years, killing thousands throughout Europe and

the expanding colonies.[40] Both types of "cleanliness", Nazism and the Inquisition, differed in form but they have their origin in same sense of baseness of priesthood to which Nietzsche refers: *ressentiment.*

But what happens when the men of *ressentiment,* the priestlike types, display signs of love, compassion and charity? Are they not signs of nobility and decency, of righteous morality? That, says Nietzsche, is the overwhelming craving of the priest for power, and for the feeling of being in power (Reginster, 1997:290-2). These "noble" signs, explains Nietzsche, are the revaluation the men of *ressentiment* make on what they really value: power. Reginster presents Aesop's famous fable of the fox and the sour grapes as a good parallel: "Unable to reach the grape it covets, the fox attempts to get rid of its feeling of frustration by persuading itself that the grapes were sour and so were not what it wanted anyway" (Ibid.:290). Likewise, when the priest *seems* to love or give charity, he is not changing his values, he is reconsidering how to get there: "as not all grapes are sweet, so not every form of power is 'real' power" (ibid). When the men of *ressentiment* give away something, they do so because it makes them feel superior.

I will illustrate this further with the following example: a writer friend of mine, who is black – I will omit the name for obvious reasons – tells me that when he goes to symposiums of literature, in order to know if he is among "racist bastards", he uses the trick of talking gibberish nonsense. If the people listening assent condescendingly to his mumbo-jumbo, then he knows he is surrounded by "snakes". Such patronizing behaviour, like giving away love and money, could be another form used by the men of *ressentiment* when they revaluate how to get the power they crave. The revaluation the men of *ressentiment* make is a far more radical form than that of Aesop's fox because what the priests have changed are their very values. Reginster explains that "if the fox were to emulate this type of revaluation, it would have to say not that the grapes are sour but rather that the sweetness itself is evil" (Reginster, 1997: 291). This takes us directly to a portrayal of so-called "virtuous" individuals. With unimpeachable morals, blameless, guiltless; they consider sex "dirty" and pleasure and enjoyment as "mundane banality" (it seems highly probable that Nietzsche was thinking as well of Schopenhauer). "One should not imagine," says Nietzsche, "it grew up as a denial of that thirst for revenge, as the opposite of Jewish hatred! No, the reverse is true! That love grew out of it as its crown" (*Genealogy*, part 1, section 8). What does Nietzsche really mean here? Reginster offers a skillful explanation with the following:

> The devaluation of power motivated by ressentiment thus turns out to be a last-ditch effort to gain it. The priest professes to embrace values and ideals he deems incompatible with power and political superiority, which he now regards as evil. But his *unacknowledged* [my italics] wish is that his altruistic "good deeds" for example, will bring him at last a taste of that power he still craves: "The happiness of 'slight superiority,' involved in all doing good, being useful, helping, and rewarding, is the most effective means of consolation for the physiologically inhibited." [the fragments in inverted comas are from Reginster's notes on *Genealogy*, III, 18] (Ibid.:291)

From this analysis, a series of unsettling questions follow. As I have suggested, Nietzsche defined ahead of time and to the point of perfection, the Nazi leaders in his evaluation of the men of *ressentiment* as the weak priests that hate the knights, the "hatred" the priest harbours towards his victorious rivals, the knights, "grows to monstrous and uncanny proportions" (see above). Could a parallel be drawn between the men of ressentiment, who made an ultimate revaluation of their own values for the purposes of power-appropriation, and the cases of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) around the globe, with their various charities and aims? Could charity be, by way of its very existence, maintaining a system of injustice to the point where it becomes difficult to discern who, ultimately needs whom?

In fact, Nietzsche's men of *ressentiment* extend across the whole spectrum of humanity. In Chapter V, by way of Nicos Poulantzas (1974), I will attempt to define the petty bourgeoisie as a class frustrated by its continuous demands for changes – that is, a "neutral" State, "social fairness", "opportunity", "condemnation of Big Capital's monopolies" and so on (Poulantzas, 1974: 251) – but fiercely opposing any attempt at changing the system; an idiosyncrasy which is determined by its own peculiar ideology. The link between Nietzsche's men of *ressentiment* and Poulantzas' definition of the petty bourgeoisie as the class which both despises and craves power appears extraordinary to me.

Furthermore, and for the sake of taking these Nietzschean considerations to their proper end – that is, round honesty's orbit – some self-exploration is due here. Is the purpose of this very thesis the attainment of knowledge? Or is it, on the contrary, for the purposes of prestige; for the debased and corrupted own cravings for happiness I do not have, which, by way of an academic title – itself granted by an institution of authority – will supposedly give me an intellectual superiority, which may put me in a superior

social setting in relation to the majority? By aspiring to a PhD, am I a "priest" or a "knight"? A crisis then develops because whether I have answered yes to one or the other, it always makes me a "priest". If I answer "yes, I am priest", therefore, I am "priest"; if I answer no, I am a "knight", because of course I want to tell to myself I am "of superior values", this craving for being "something or someone superior" makes me *ipso facto* a "priest". To me, Nietzsche's evaluation always answers "I am Eichmann". Consequently, we might say that "the man of *ressentiment*" is a state of deep frustration, in constant need of a resolution. Sometimes this frustration manifests itself by way of extremes – as the 1930s' and 1940s' European fascism – but it never goes away; always incipient, waiting to re-emerge. As Reginster, concluding, explains:

> The "man of ressentiment" [his italics] is thus left pathetically hanging between the impossibility to enjoy the satisfaction of desires he does not really have, and the impossibility to enjoy the satisfaction of desires he has, but cannot embrace. (Reginster, 1997:303)

Reginster does not offer solutions, as at no point does he venture beyond the modern standardized realm of philosophy. Towards the end of his article, he very briefly suggests that perhaps the "connection between the notions of integrity of self" and the idea of "self-creation" might offer a compatibility with Nietzsche's perspectivism about values – that is, a view of the world "about values" which is, inevitable, partial and limited (1997:305). Yet it would be wrong to think that we are damned. As I said initially, if we agree with Nietzsche's assessment on humans, he seems to suggest that one possibility for man would be to conquer that terrain in which we are finally able to be *truly* honest. To me this is like saying *free* – free from ideology, from morality, tradition, gods; in sum, from anything attempting to direct a way towards humanness and therefore a place in which we could create a society made up of equals. But he also says that such honesty "would bring disgust and suicide in its trail" (*The Gay Science*, Section 107). I will suggest then a hypothetical approach which might become not so putative if it is stressed within the following context.

We might say that Nietzsche attacks morality 'fiercely', at least Judeo-Christian morality and values. From a cursory reading of his writings one could deduce that he despised Jewishness as much as Christianity – the latter a development from the former. What is clear though, is that he despised their values, not the individuals. He attacked Judeo-Christianity for the same reasons that he later assailed Wagner (who went from

being Nietzsche's dearest and most admired friend to the lowest rank of human being). Nietsche saw in both the dangerous hypocrisy that emanates from an unappeasable resentment. When he saw a Christian or a Jew giving a few coins to a beggar, Nietzsche was horrified because he felt that the do-gooder demonstrated compassion whilst thinking "Thank god that I am not like thee!"[41]

Hypocrisy is, in my view, at the centre of all of Nietzsche's evaluations on the human being. His critique of disgust was centred on the conventions of morality which had to be induced, nevertheless, by *a priori* historico-cultural considerations. For Nietzsche, determining the origin of moral values was only a "means" to address his real concern; "to be precise, the value of morality" itself (*Genealogy of Morals*, Preface, 5). This is also revealed in another particular detail of Nietzsche's life. Initially, Nietzsche was a close friend of the German composer Wagner.[42] Now, in the second version of *The Birth of Tragedy* (1886), Nietzsche includes a sort of introduction entitled "An Attempt at Self-Criticism", in which he reminds us that, while the first version of 1871 *The Birth of Tragedy* was written with the "great artist" Wagner in mind, this was no longer the case with the second version of 1886. After seeing Wagner's *Parsifal* for the first time in 1882, the philosopher changed from admirer to fierce enemy of the composer, never missing the opportunity to use him as example of what he saw as the lower of men, the "priest" type. So he says in his *Genealogy:*

> [...] why Wagner was concerned about that manly (and also so unmanly) "simpleton from the country", that poor devil and nature boy Parsifal, whom he finally turned into a Catholic in such an embarrassing way. What? Was this Parsifal really meant to be taken seriously? For we could be tempted to assume the reverse, even to desire it—that the Wagnerian Parsifal was intended to be cheerful, as it were, a concluding piece and satyr drama, with which the tragic writer Wagner wanted to take his farewell, in an respectful manner worthy of him, from us, from himself, and, above all, from tragedy, that is, with an excess of the highest and most high-spirited parody of tragedy itself, of the entire dreadful earthy seriousness and earthy wailing of his earlier works, of the crudest form in the perversity of the ascetic ideal, conquered at last. [...] For what would Parsifal be if intended seriously? Do we need to see in it (as it was put to me) [his brackets] "the epitome of an insane hatred for knowledge, spirit, and sensuality?"

Thus, Nietzsche's whole ethical evaluation was concerned with the differences between those who, at the risk of having "fits of nausea" (2000: section 19), take the risk of being "truly" honest with themselves, and those that prefer to live as "slaves"

submissive to morality in all its pejorative sense. When Nietzsche saw Wagner's opera, he saw a "priest" preaching Christian moralities, but understood that behind his work Wagner was anything but a Christian, for a Christian ought not to crave fame, success, public appreciation, and unlimited access to limited resources. In answer to Wagner's *Parsifal*, Nietzsche wrote *The Anti-Christ* (1895), in which he is not proposing an attack against Christ, but against the men of *ressentiment* – the "priests" – whom he identifies as "these Jews and Christians" and who are for Nietzsche the real anti-Christ.

I would calculate Auschwitz and Hiroshima to be the ultimate consequence of the philosophies of Marx's reification and Nietzsche's men of *ressentiment*. My concern is that these two complex human conditions are as alive today as they were at the end of the 19th Century. We can only speculate what their reaction would have been, had Marx and Nietzsche faced at first hand such a systematic killing of human beings. On the assumption that honesty in its fullest meaning is a determinant of their thought, they would have to come to the conclusion that we are as near to an individual such as Eichmann as we are to anyone else; that a revolution without first apprehending the reasons for which we ought to assert "I am Eichmann" would end as futility or as crime. If as F. S. Lucas explains, Aristotle's ideal tragic plot is *not* when the hero is a good man coming to a bad end, but when he is a *rather* good man coming to a bad end (Lucas, 1961: Apendix),[43] Eichmann attained that ideal. In the human resolution I am proposing, the early life of Eichmann ought to be proposed as the template of a perfect hero of an ancient Greek tragedy; just as so many of us would be. Indeed, this is the very quality that makes a democratic experience of Greek tragedy. Needless to say, this would be a very painful and difficult step to take. Even McGrath's fourteen points on how to build a theatre towards democracy (see endnote 30) does not seem to me now more than an appeal to reason; the very condition which could all too easily end in spelling out new forms of ideology. An education more concerned with truth, knowledge, and the meaning of humanness than with markets would be a good beginning. Instead of young men and women leaving school crying out learned laments like "I am Spartacus! I am Spartacus! I am Spartacus!", education should teach us to be honest with ourselves and with history, so that we, even at the price of horror and disgust, when we leave school are able to cry "I am Eichmann! I am Eichmann! I am Eichmann!"

Conclusion to chapter II

What is the final moral from Nietzsche's ethical evaluation? When a hypothetical man or woman emerges – call them an agent – from among us to kill coldly, or steal unnecessarily, or become extremely rich through the exploitation of others weaker than themselves; or when, indeed, the agent is a tyrant that kills by the million (which, through detachment we often designate as a monstrous thing, or an abnormality of nature, or simply immoral or evil) that agent is harmful to us because she or he is a consequence of the whole. That is, this agent's very existence is a consequence of our way of life; a consequence of our moral conventions, our political decisions, our social systems. Nietzsche is saying that we would not be sheltered against harmful agents by putting them in prison or by hanging them or by going to war with them, because in such an unresolved society more and more harmful agents would always reappear. This analysis can be weighed up against a variety of modern examples. Take for example, West German reparations to the Jews in the 1950s which amounted to more than $37 billion and became crucial to the early survival of Israel (Levy, 1994:80). Like Simon Wiesenthal, I am of the view that when the Jews settled for material rather than moral restitution, they made the biggest of all the postwar mistakes (ibid.); a mistake that has had, one way or another, major relevance to current events of international terrorism. We will be finally sheltered against harmful agents – that is, against fascism[44] – when we put an end to our whole way of viewing things, including having a deeper understanding of what it is to be an advanced human being.

Nietzsche's evaluation on men of *ressentiment* unearths a deep-seated and unresolved human predicament which has been *within* us, as Hobbes and Hegel indicated, from the times when individuals assented to the establishing of authority, social hierarchy and, therefore, differing status (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 530; 612-14). Could it be that ressentiment is not a psychological condition intrinsic to human beings as such – dividing us into "priests" and "knights"; into "bad" and "good" individuals – but a by-product of civilization *per se*? This is precisely the critical point from which Marx moves forwards, leaving Nietzsche behind in that site Marx regards as prehistory. Yes, human *ressentiment* might be behind the atrocious crimes we commit against each other; behind those systems of morality through which it is possible to justify injustice.

But Marx, contradicting Hegel and Hobbes, comes forwards and determines that we resent not because it is innate in us, but because the economic foundations of our civil societies first generates and then legitimizes inequality as a human condition. Edward Bond has penetrated even further into this staggering notion and has tried relentlessly to pass it on through his writings. This is an extremely complex task because, to begin with, it requires a language powerful enough to prevail over ideology, which obscures, by way of reification, our very thoughts and perceptions. As an answer to these two first chapters, Bond sent me a letter which, in my view, reveals the true political and philosophical location of the dramatist. Especially pertinent is the following extract:

> As a species we are condemned to seek justice, it is as if we were driven. But the situation is difficult to read. All systems of morality are corrupt because their effect is to reconcile us to injustice – and as the effect is always justified by ideology, it is the unspoken <u>intention</u> of morality to reconcile us with injustice, to live unjustly – and because of the contradiction in the self this leads to the paradox that crime (acts against morality and law) may be expressions of the human need for justice. From this trap there is no immediate escape: societies must organise themselves (dated: 2 October, 2004).

I will return to this matter of inequality once I have assessed culture from the perspective of contradiction, industry and ideology in part II, especially in Chapter V. But are there possible solutions? In the letter excerpted above, Bond tells me that this is a pure human crisis which he thinks can be "meet head on" only through drama – because it is the only means through which would be possible to activate "the logic of humanness".

We might say then that it is not a case of studying whether it is Marx or Nietzsche who puts more weight in the balance for a real unity of experience towards an ethical reality in the arts or in theatre: our initial objective. Neither is it the case of expecting to achieve a unity of experience in theatre – as Habermas said, "bridging the ethical, political and cognitive discourses" so questioned by Lyotard (see p.1 in "general introduction") – constructing a sort of bond with the materialistic theories of Marx and with the ethical discourses of Nietzsche. I would now say that Habermas is fundamentally wrong. We cannot bridge these three discourses from the situation in which we are. How else, when Marx and Nietzsche prove that our empirical knowledge is simply not there. In the world described by Marx and Nietzsche a cognitive discourse is just a pretension; even worse, an aesthetic decoration. Bridging the political, the

cognitive and the ethical discourses could be a reality once our world is made up of truly free individuals as Trotsky envisioned it, when culture is 'human culture' instead of class cultures as it is now.[45]

I will turn to this matter during the following chapters but for now, I will just say that very possibly Habermas proposes a discourse that "bridges the gap" for the arts because he is, as Benjamin would say, a Neo-Marxist "negotiator".[46] If we were to follow the evaluations of Marx and Nietzsche, one on our external environment, and the other on our internal being and our decision-making, it would not necessarily follow that we would be (or would be *doing*) the just and right thing. It would, however, mean that we would not be going to be wrong *with intent*. We might then know, for example, what direction we should take to try to build up an uncontaminated form of human expression. Ideology should also be taken into account at all times: Marx proposed the solution of class struggle with proletarian revolution and it proved to be one of the greatest disasters of modern times, with Russia becoming a grotesque dictatorship ruled by men of *ressentiment*. Düttmann, by way of Benjamin, takes the ideological subject further and tells us that, when the destruction of old systems is not carried through to its very end, the forces of fascism or communism take on the social lead by definition: they both make changes, but class inequality as the original 'problem' goes on unresolved. As I see it, the only way we can make sense of the hypothetical symbiosis of Marx and Nietzsche, is by using the following metonymic example. Imagine ourselves looking through the glass of a window just as the sun begins to rise. In the action of looking through it, we can see the external world, and as a result, we are taking a Marxist view of the world. But if we look more 'closely', we might suddenly see ourselves reflected simultaneously, and as a result we are also taking a Nietzschean view of the world. The significant thing is that from looking *out* of the same window, we obtain at once two very different results: 'I' and 'us' – and they complement each other.

I sent Bond the content of this chapter thus far. Imagine my surprise when with his agreeable five-page response, he included the following poem entitled "The Sheet of Glass" (of which I had no previous knowledge):[47]

> There is a sheet of glass.
> You see through to what is beyond.
> A window
> It keeps out cold and rain.

You paint the back with silver
You see yourself.
The same glass but now it does a different thing.
The opposite.
You see yourself but not beyond.

At night you dream.
Can't remember who you are.
You go to the mirror to look for yourself.
All you see is the dark.
You can't see through it
... or anything in it.
You don't know who you are or what's beyond the mirror.
A dream is the opposite of being awake.
Or is it?
Is a dream a sort of mirror?

You wake and go to the mirror.
The dream's upset you.
You'd like a mirror which shows you
and at the same time lets you see what's beyond it.
So you break the mirror.
You cut your hand.
It bleeds.
But it works!
Through the broken gaps you see what's beyond the mirror
-you see other people there and what's happening.
And in the broken mirror still in place you see yourself.
But only bits of yourself.
For every bit you see of what's beyond the mirror
        you have to lose a bit of yourself.
It can't be otherwise.
It is the law of opposites.

Now
The mirror was magic.
Every morning when you washed your face you asked it
'Who's the best person in the world?'
The mirror looked you straight in the eye and said 'You'.

But the morning on which it was broken
... it didn't
- and it never did again.
Instead it said:

What are you for?
What are other people for?

According to John Doona, "The Sheet of Glass" was Bond's response to a group of teachers from seven Tameside secondary schools, on the "eastern edge of Manchester" (in Davis, 2005: 93), who posed the dramatist the following question: "What does a young person need to think about or to know at this time?" (Ibid.: 94). This poem has

been a revelation to me because it appears to be an enhanced version of the ethical relationship I had construed through Marx-Nietzsche above: a sort of "glass window" which, when situated within a specific setting, reflects "I" and "us" simultaneously and interdependently. In my view, this is the essence of a hypothetical synthesis of Nietzsche and Marx: stardust – what we all are.

Finally, if, as Lukács tells us, reification is the "immediate reality of every person living in capitalist society" (1990: 197) it must be determining our very perception and therefore undermining all thought and creative activity – that is, culture as a whole. Our situation seems like a real *Catch 22*: we long for true freedom, universal justice, and genuine equality but reification corrupts the powers of reasoning/intuition which we need in order to *get there*. However, Lukács also offers us a solution which actually determines the evaluative approach of the remaining thesis:

> [that reification] can be overcome *only* [my italics] by constant and constantly renewed efforts to disrupt the reified structure of existence by concretely relating to the concretely manifested contradictions of the total development, by becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions for the total development (Lukács, 1990: 197).

I think this is precisely what Bond is already attempting to do with his drama: to disrupt the reifying process by trying to make conscious the lost self. In a personal letter he tells me:

> You write much about reification. It makes sense and I agree with it – I tend to concentrate more on ideology. Reification implies a loss of the self, a numbing of the self. This creates a gap – space – vacuum – into which ideology moves. But the denied self seems to generate its own ressentiment – or as I put it, revenge, vengefulness. Ideology then fuels this and it leads to reaction and in extreme situations to fascism. Before the extreme, fascism is incipient. But what is the self that is alienated? (Now reproduced in Davis, 2005: 186).

The meaning of the human self is, indeed, the axis around which Bond's current dramatic work revolves. My task here is not to evaluate the dramatist's output, but to revaluate precisely what Bond calls "the problem", which, in my view, seems to be what Lukács suggests should be constantly disrupted: our "reified structure of existence" within capitalism. In the following part, I will cross-examine Lukács'

"reified structures of existence" by approaching culture from three of its most significant perspectives: contradiction, industry and ideology.

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2. Chapter II
The legacies of Marx and Nietzsche

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Endnotes

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1 In my view, "False consciousness" is a fundamental reference in the work of Adorno, which shapes his socio-political, cultural, and aesthetic evaluation throughout. See for example O'Connor in pages: 3, 5, 12-14, 36, 65, and specially 230-238.

2 See for example, Martin Heidegger's "Hegel and the Greeks", from "Conference of the Academy of Sciences at Heidelberg", July 26, 1958 in http://www.morec.com/hegelgre.htm, (pp. 17) or also Richard Kraut's Review on Nicholas White's "Individual and Conflict in Greek Ethics" (2002) in Ethics Vol. 3, no. 1, Autumn 2002, pp. 401-404, p. 403.

3 He died from leukaemia in January 2002. He is most known for his work with the 1970s theatre company 7:84 as well as a good collection of essays, letters, lectures and reviews. Edward Batley and David Bradly's book Morality and Justice: the Challenge of European Theatre (2001), testifies that McGrath was one of the most important exponents of theatre activism in Great Britain. Some of his most well known plays are The Cheviot, The Stag and the Black, Black Oil (1981), and Blood Red Roses (1981).

4 On Castoriadis see for example Philosophy, Politics, Autonomy (ed. David Ames Curtis, Oxford University Press, 1991), whose evaluation on matters pertaining modern democracy have valuable observations for the application of politics and ethics in theatre.

5 See also Anustup Basu's essay on fascism and information, 2004.

6 Online: Marx Internet Archive. http://www.marxists.org; accessed: 25.06.02.

7 The Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School began its work by criticizing Marxism - especially the concept of the "deterministic relation between the (social) super-structure and the economic base" (See on this "Reason or Revolution? Habermas's Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns" by Anthony Giddens, (in Bernstein,1985: 114-31)). Of those who were the founders of the Frankfurt School – that is, Horkheimer, Adorno, Benjamin and Habermas – only Benjamin did not seem to be overcome by the Neo-Marxist deviations of his colleagues (see for example on Adorno: Wohlfarth, 1979; Wolin, 1990; and on Horkheimer: Shaw, 1985). Nevertheless, critics do not seem to agree where to situate Benjamin, perhaps more due to his own political anachronisms. As Hannah Arendt says, his work was philosophy but he was not a philosopher, it was theory but he was not a theorist, he thought as a Marxist but he was not communist or committed to political meetings (Benjamin, 1999: 10).

8 Chapter one, Section 4, Marx Internet Archive; see endnote 6.

9 See Marx's Capital Vol. III, Part VII, Chapter 48, Part III "Revenues and Their Sources"; see endnote 6.

10 While manufacturing jobs are in continuous decline in western societies, the Service sector continues to grow. In UK, the service sector generated 1.3 million additional jobs in the last three years, a proportional increase of 7 per cent. At the same time around 400,000 manufacturing jobs were lost, accounting for a 10 per cent reduction in the sector's employee workforce. UK manufacturing now accounts for 14 per cent of all employee jobs compared to 17 per cent three years ago. See TUC website, www.tuc.org.uk/em_research/tuc-5156-f0.cfm, accessed: 21.03.02.

11 See Marglin, Stephen "What do bosses do? The origins and functions of hierarchy in capitalist production", Review of Radical Political Economics, 1974, Vo. 6, No. 2, pp. 60-112.

12 Data from Oxford Encyclopedia.

13 Simon Wiesenthal is famously known as the Nazi hunter. After he spent four years in twelve concentration camps during the Nazi era for being Jewish, he dedicated the rest of his life to tracking down wanted Nazi criminals. Eichmann, among others, was tracked down by the Mossad thanks to Wiesenthal investigations.

14 The records on Eichmann are most valuable in the study of reification and its consequences, I would argue, because here we have a man that came into the exterminatory Nazi machinery first because he was an expert in Jewish Zionism and was fascinated by it. As Wiesenthal records, Eichmann learned and spoke Hebrew perfectly and, before the Final Solution was put into effect, he made various efforts to find a solution to what was known then as the Jewish Problem, like the establishing of a permanent Jewish state in Palestine. The records shown by Wiesenthal tell us that, initially, Eichmann was paid as an expert civil servant on Zionism whose job was to implement as far as possible the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (a British statement in favour of a Jewish National Home in Palestine, at the time when it was part of the British Empire). However, in 1936 the tension between Arabs and Jews culminated in a revolt, which forced Britain to stop further immigration of Jews into Palestine - especially because of the great numbers of Jews Eichmann intended to move (Levy, 140-44). With a single signature, Eichmann passed from being an expert on Zionism to a systematic killer of Jews.

15 Though 700,000 children have been raised out of poverty since 1997, still 3.6 million live on less than 60% of average income – the government's poverty line. The levels of child poverty in Britain are among the highest of all European Union. As recently as 1998 Britain had the highest of all among the 15 of the Union. Inequality was still higher in 2002 than when Labour came to power. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) says that the richest 10% of Britain take home nearly 28% of total income, while the poorest 10% take home just under 3% (The Guardian, Wednesday, 31 March, 2004, p. 20).

16 I shall transcribe here McGrath's fourteen points for its historical importance and for its ethical relevance. They are concerned with the role theatre ought to have in the struggle for 'authentic' democracy and the areas of the socio-political on which theatre should focus, and are as follow:

> In celebrating and scrutinizing the values within the borders of the Demos.
> In contesting these borders, external and internal.
> In giving a voice to the excluded.
> In giving a voice to the minority.
> In constantly guarding against the tyranny of the majority.
> In demanding the right to speak publicly, to criticize without fear.
> In giving a voice to the oppositional.
> In seeking true and balanced information.
> In combating the distorting and anti-democratic powers of the mass media.
> In questioning the role of large corporations, national and transnational, to influence both the law and the government of the day.
> In defining and redefining freedoms for the age.
> In questioning the borders of freedom.
> In giving a voice to the less equal.
> In demanding impartial justice and equality of all citizens before the law, rich or poor.
> (McGrath, p. 137).

17 Through Brian J. Shaw's thoughtful criticism we learn how Horkheimer retreated from youthful radicalism to the "nostalgic conservationism of his later years" (1985:160). "As time went on" says Shaw, "Horkheimer became increasingly obsessed with somehow preserving the fading legacy of the Western liberal past. For all its manifest hypocrisy, the ideology of bourgeois societies in their formative phases had contained much of value. The emphasis upon the autonomy of the individual, the value of the family, and the worth of romantic love all played a positive role in the development of freedom and individuality" (Ibid.: 177).

18 He is making reference to Lyotard's "Notes sur le retour et le Kapital", In vol. 1 of Nietzsche aujourd'hui?, pp. 141–57, 1973, Paris: Union générale d'editions ; and from Foucault's. "Nietzsche, Freud, Marx." In Michel Foucault: Dits et écrits 1954–1988, edited by Daniel Defert and François Ewald, vol. 1: 1954–1969, 564||ff., 1994, Paris: Gallimard.

19 Among the numerous works assessed here, two have proved to be of fundamental importance. One is Brian Leiter's "Nietzsche and the Morality Critics", Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 2 (Jan., 1997), pp. 250-285, in which he reads Nietzsche as saying that our untutored morality, the morality of ordinary men and women, the morality that infuses our culture is, in fact, an obstacle to human excellence (p. 277); and the other is, Bernard Reginster's "Nietzsche on Ressentiment and Valuation", Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. LVII, No. 2,(June 1997), pp. 281-305, in which Reginster assesses Nietzsche's evaluation on the psychological condition he calls "ressentiment". Also in the bibliography included here we can see wide-ranging literary works that document the actuality of Nietzsche's thought and the varied discourses it inspires, e.g., Vattimo, Heidegger and most recently Peter Berkowitz's The Ethics of an Inmoralist, (Harvard University Press, 1996), also Joseph Margolis' What, After All, Is a Work of Art?, Pen State Press, 1999; or Mathew Rampley's Nietzsche, Aesthetics and Modernity, Cambridge University Press, 2000).

20 See for example, the discussion in Roger Crisp's "Egalitarianism and Compassion" (Ethics, Vol. 114, October 2003, pp. 119-126, (published by The University of Chicago)) in which the author debates the moral problems related to the difference between the rich and the super-rich and how we can apply roles of compassion and egalitarianism in those cases. See also on the same approach Larry Temkin's "Egalitarianism Defended", in Ethics, Vol. 113, September 2003, pp. 764-782.

21 Note that, as the text shows, this first section of the Birth of Tragedy was added to the book many years after it first appeared,. Nietzsche wrote this "Attempt at Self-Criticism" in 1886. The original text, written in 1870-71, begins with the Preface to Richard Wagner, the second major section.

22 "Nietzsche's Labyrinth": an accomplished Online Website on the life and work of Nietzsche (www.nietzschelayrinth.com); accessed: 27.03.01.

23 The "Marxist Online Archive" shows an earlier Marx as student in the University of Berlin (from 1821 to 1823) mainly interested in poetry, history and literature. Also, there is a Marx with a permanent passion for Shakespeare during his whole life (in www.historyguide.org). 09.10.01.

24 "Communist Manifesto", first published in 1848; and can be found in its entirety in http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/, accessed: 05.05.01.

25 All the evaluated historical data used here and hereafter has been obtained from www.marxist.org/archive and from Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia.

26 During which Nietzsche was granted several extensions of leave, and even granted a pension when he resigned in 1879 (he was then only 33 years old) travelling extensively to Venice, Genoa, Monte Carlo, Rome, and in friendship with the most influential figures of his time like Wagner himself was (Nietzsche's Labyrinth Online Archive).

27 Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Part I, No. 63, "Conversation with the Kings", translation by Thomas Common, edited by Paul Douglas, available Online: http://www. gutenberg.org/etext/1998, accessed: 17.05.01

28 Nietzsche's Archive Online. www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/ntexteng, accessed: 17.05.01

29 Oxford Encyclopedia. According to the source, Bismarck was an autocrat and a dictator by todays standards. He despised the idea of socialism and he sought to pulverize it with all his means.

30 The house of Nietzsche's sister in Weimar was a magnet for the Nazi ideologists of the 1930s, where they would extract from the works of Nietzsche those arguments valid for the purpose of Nazism. (Nietzsche Archive Online).

31 Of course the most probable answer is that at that time he volunteered for war, he was just a young philologist man of 26 years old, with all the anxieties of a young bourgeois, indeed a

nationalist in search for leadership and camaraderie. Another two years will pass before he writes his first book The Birth of Tragedy in 1872, and before his ethical evaluations begin to take shape

32 Also from Ecce Homo, book: "How One Becomes What It Is", section "Why I am a Destiny", Part 1, trans. by Walter Kaufmann, R. J. Hollingdale, and Anthony M. Ludovici, available online at www.geocites.com/thenietzschechannel/eh16.htm. accessed: 25.06.01.

33 "Fourth Stage: Through the Mysteries of Ogun to the Origin of Yoruba Tragedy." D. W. Jefferson. London. 1969.

34 Karl Marx. Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts. Translated by T. B. Bottomore, online: http://www.marxists.org, accessed: 27.02.00.

35 Ibid.

36 The chronological data available tells me that when Marx died at 64 years old (1883), The Birth of Tragedy (1872) had been around as a very successful piece of work for the last eleven years. I look with the same astonishment at the fact that Marx plainly seems to ignore Nietzsche in his works. Is it possible that Nietzsche never checked out a copy of the 'Communist Manifesto' (1848) or Das Kapital (1867)? Or that Marx was never introduced to the then explosive The Birth of Tragedy by any of his friends or during any of the many readings he did?

37 When I make my own reference to the Genealogy, I do so on the translation of Ian Johnston, 2001.

38 Both, Plato and Aristotle thought that aesthetics was inseparable from morality and politics. And regardless of my Nietzschean aversion to Schopenhauer's pessimistic and oracular precepts – which Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy takes very good care of – I am inclined to argue in favour of one of the singularities favoured by Nietzsche's earlier instructor, Schopenhauer: that the analysis of the will is the best judge in aesthetic matters, or at least it is the best beginning. According to Schopenhauer, the way we know that we are witnessing art depends on whether our will is or is not being exposed to objects or subjects of desire (wants, cravings, etc). He asserts that a subliminal sense emerges from the fact that anything which is hostile to our will becomes an object of pure contemplation; instead, the observation of things we may biologically need would catapult us into oblivion towards what should be instead our first interest: the artistic composition (Schopenhauer, 1981:48). That is why Schopenhauer scorns "still life" paintings – usually Dutch – that display things like food or drink: they would provoke our desire for food and therefore it would put to an end any aesthetic experience of the object, and would be the contrary of subliminal, which is exciting. (As I am translating from my Italian edition, the English adjective 'exciting' does not bring about the intended exact meaning. In Italian it is translated as "l'eccitante," which in Italian has connotations with sexual arousal or craving for something biological or organic, thus incompatible with Schopenhauer's art criticism; much different from the English word 'exciting' which is usually interpreted as 'interesting' 'inspiring' or 'invigorating'.)

39 "Nietzsche's Labyrinth:" Online website

40 As I mentioned before historical facts can be retrieved from Oxford and Encarta Encyclopedia.

41 Thus Spake Zarathustra and introduction by Friedrich Nietzsche. Trans. by Thomas Common, Project Gutenberg, see endnote 27 above.

42 From "Nietzsche's Labyrinth", website online: www.nietzschelayrinth.com, accessed 27.03.01.

43 Those very terms are not found to the letter in my copy of Poetics, but can be very clearly understood in Section 2, Parts XIII and XV.

44 The meaning of the term "fascism" – or better what it does not mean – will be examined later on in chapter V.

45 "What is proletarian culture and is it possible" (1923), in www.marxists.org/archive/trotsky, accessed: 17.07.01.

46 It is well known that for some time now Habermas has been cooperating with NATO in international politics. His public support for the bombardment of Serbia durian the war in Kosovo is fresh in the memory.

47 "The Sheet of Glass" was sent to me on 2nd October 2004 but was originally written during the spring of 2001; it has been eventually published in David Davis 2005: 94-5.

PART II

Recap and Introduction to Chapters III, IV and V.

The Culture Industry – contradiction, commodity and ideology.

When I told Edward Bond that, in my view, the most important characteristic of his work is an inherent optimism, he was swift to declare "But I'm not optimistic about the solution; I'm optimistic about the problem." (appendix: 18). This riposte epitomises precisely what I meant. Thus far, in attempting to evaluate the feasibility and appropriateness of 'bridging the gap' between the cognitive, the political and the ethical, I have identified a substantial problem. This should not, however, be the cause of hopeless apprehension. At least we have something: we have "the problem". To perceive that there is an urgent, serious problem is in itself a great achievement because it is hidden away in the very structure of our society; hidden in a society of distraction and entertainment. Moreover, Bond's statement above suggests that, actually, the dramatist might even be somehow grateful that the problem exists. Of course, Bond is not pleased with our social situation – palpably, quite the opposite – but there is an acknowledgement that without the *problem* – that problem from which all the other problems, important and unimportant, arise – there would be no great drama.

However, perceiving the problem is a problem in itself. The ideas I have discussed thus far, specifically the evaluations of the Marxist theory of reification and Nietzsche's evaluation on *men of ressentiment*, tell me that the big problem – the big question – is, where, as human beings, *ought* we to be? Put aside seeing the solution; are we able to perceive, or even to imagine where we *ought* to be? I stress this auxiliary verb 'ought' intentionally because it turns out to be a universal which absorbs the particulars of this thesis. In his "Lecture on Ethics" (1929) Ludwig Wittgenstein explains how this auxiliary 'ought' is an absolute judgment of value, or what Ethics should to be about (Cahoon, 1996: 192-8). Wittgenstein explains that Ethics is not about relative judgments of value, such as, what it is that one needs and wants, but what it is that one *ought* to need and want. With this angle of thought the particular is expelled and the condition of the subject becomes a function of the universal. This discourse on the aesthetics in the politics of theatre takes its prerogative from here.

Can we pinpoint where and how our situation ought to be then? Can we even see our current situation so that we can make a choice? As Terry Eagleton suggests throughout his work *The Ideology of the Aesthetic,* postmodern theorists see a myriad of little problems and therefore cannot accept the idea that there is a big one (Eagleton, 1991). Heidegger's partisans would tell us that "What health is, only the healthy can say [...] What truth is, only the one who is truthful can discern." (Ibid: 30).[1], which has echoes of a pseudo-Christian allegory: "let he who is without sin among you throw the first stone" (John 8:6). People with true religious faith do not have a problem, but a god to which all their hopes and potentials are directed. Of course, they have to follow the relevant Holy Scriptures, but at least they can follow some rules: in order to go to heaven one has to do this or that, and the rest will follow. Then, they can say with absolute certainty "I'm on the good side: I'm virtuous, righteous; I'm morally superior."[2] In contrast, those who have chosen to follow a materialist path, whose ambition is to make our physical world better for all; those who are concerned, not with an illusion or an ideal precept, but with the present and the future of human kind and do not have such a thing as a set of divine rules to follow, there is no available guidance as to whether they are truly 'on the good side; travelling in a good direction.'

This is, in short what the first part (chapters I and II) is about. In it, I began by assessing whether a unity of experience in the arts could be of benefit to theatre; whether it would be achievable in praxis or at least relevant or valid within the hegemonic frame of the Culture Industry, and I finished it shouting loudly "I'm Eichmann". This type of conclusion generates a very big problem because it creates conflicts with institutional education on one side and with cultural praxis on the other, and might be hard to overcome. During our most recent cultural praxis most people would recognise that the world is a battle between "John Wayne" and the "Apache"; between advanced honourable civilizations and savages; between good and evil. This is illustrated by Margaret Olin when she notes that in many films or plays whose language is English, Italian, French or Spanish, the Nazis are represented with strong German accents, while the goodies speak without any – even when the goodies are German themselves.[3] "The effect is to make the Nazis "them", the Jews and sympathetic German speakers "us" (Olin, 1997: 7). We can take this equation even further, because from this strategic effect one can deduce that by being on the 'good' side, you must inevitably be persecuted, raped, or tortured by those that are 'evil' and therefore one is for ever after compelled to be alert against the 'other' who is different and foreign. The 'other'

becomes, indeed, 'evil'. Following Daniel Cory's train of thought, this sempiternal threat becomes a precept in our mind. Threat gets imbedded in our brains as an instruction or injunction regarding moral conduct.[4] As Bertrand Russell argued, precepts are somehow "in the brain", but not, explains Cory, "in the same sense that a match is in a matchbox" (Cory, 1960: 581); precepts are as a "state" of the brain "among the events that compose the "stuff" of the brain" which is the "location of precepts" (Ibid.: 573). When a threat has become a "cerebral event", then the object of this threat can occur, not before (Ibid.: 576). This is a very relevant reflection because it might have to do with the idea I want to suggest later on, which is that things happen because we first imagine them. The idea is echoed in Hamlet's words: "Nothing is either good or bad, but thinking makes it so" (Act II, Scene II).[5]

But with these discourses, one could argue, I am actually giving the impression of being so postmodern, so neutral or uncommitted; of not wanting to discern between good and evil – which, I must stress, is different from wanting to go beyond it. When Jean Baudrillard suggests (in my view, irresponsibly) that in order to understand "something", in order to go beyond "Good and Evil", we should be just "immoral,"[6] he does not mean to be immoral in the sense of barbarous indifference. What he is actually saying in his essay as a whole has to do more with the old existing conflicts between the particular and the universal, and the overcoming of those universal morals whose primordial tasks are indeed the triumph of "Good" over "Evil." As a matter of fact, he is asking us to do away with our long standing acquired morality: that succession of Judeo-Christian precepts that have been, as I say above, imbedded in our brain. But it is another thing altogether to suggest to the general public that in order to overcome "Good and Evil" we have to be "immoral." It tells me that Baudrillard does not truly understand the situation. If his proposal to be "immoral" creates *ipso facto* connotations of depravity, violence and bestiality, in our highly moralized society it would always backfire. What Baudrillard perhaps wants is to call attention to such a crucial subject by way of being shocking. My approach thus far is to suggest that morality is not just a matter of problems, but *the problem* in itself. As Eagleton explains, "it was so for Marx as much as for Nietzsche" and adds:

> For Nietzsche the productive life-instincts are enfeebled and corrupted into what we know as moral subjecthood, the gutless, abstract 'herd' morality of conventional society. This is essentially a movement from coercion to hegemony: 'Morality is preceded by compulsion; indeed, it itself remains

compulsion for some time, to which one submits to avoid disagreeable consequences. Later it becomes custom, later still free obedience, and finally almost becomes instinct: then, like every thing long customary and natural, it is linked with gratification – and now is called virtue.' (Eagleton, 1991: 236)[7]

And this is why what I am proposing in this thesis is a very, very big problem – in fact, from the perspective of current global liberal capitalism, it is *quasi* an impossibility. Whilst I am identifying morality, I am doing it as the starting place for everything else, including market competition, class division, the pursuit of a successful career, nationalisms and so on. I stress *quasi* because although the task of forethinking a world beyond morality is such an awesome venture, there are, even in this terms, gaps from which it is possible to maintain intelligible discourses without giving the impression of proposing utopian gibberish. And this thesis is not about idealistic discourses. These gaps might be identified with what "in the more literal sense is a bourgeois concept": aesthetics. Bourgeois because, as Eagleton explains, aesthetics "provides the middle classes with just the ideological model of subjectivity it requires for its material operations" (Eagleton, 1991: 9). Though utterly important and useful, aesthetics has a kind of "double edged" autonomy:

> if on the one hand it [aesthetics] provides a central constituent of bourgeois ideology, it also marks an emphasis on the self-determining nature of human powers and capacities which becomes, in the work of Karl Marx and others, the anthropological foundation of a revolutionary opposition to bourgeois utility. (Ibid.)

In other words, aesthetics backfires.

Jürgen Habermas' proposition for a unity of experience in the arts by a 'gapping' of the cognitive (that is, aesthetics) political, and ethical discourses appeared as an ideal setting from which to begin a movement towards a responsible drama. Reciprocally, Edward Bond's works and philosophy of drama seem to be the best device to ignite that unity. Unfortunately, before we can make sense of that unity, first we need to be able to discern the above three discourses. But since everything is aestheticized by both morality and the dominant ideology, the location in which a unity of experience would be pertinent is just not there. Indeed, fitting like a glove, there is here a vindication for Bond's decision after all these years of playwrighting and theorizing, to concentrate his efforts on writing drama for children – a detail of vital importance and discussed later on as a conclusion. It is not that we cannot have confidence in Habermas' critical

theory and its praxis though.[8] From a kind of "legal pacificism" by means of international human rights, Habermas looks forward to "the transformation of international law into a law of global citizens" (Habermas, 1999: 263). Lamentably, in the global environment in which we live, we are united not by a language of international human rights – though we ought to be – but by what we are sold. The omnipresence of the corporate logos of McDonald's or Coca-Cola is the closest thing we have to an international language, as the world's six billion people can testify. "All the systems of morality are corrupt" says Edward Bond (appendix: 8) and Marxist and Nietzschean dialectics explains why it so within modern capitalist societies. Their theories are confirmed by the fact that it seems to be perfectly all right that a company like Nike pays Tiger Woods $125 million for wearing its shoes while Nike's entire 30,000-strong Indonesian workforce work for few dollars a day in conditions not unlike the workers of nineteenth century Europe.[9] So *we are all* corrupted and every enterprise we undertake, no matter how philanthropic the motive is, always becomes corrupted to a lesser or greater degree.

And how else could it be? From early infancy, human imperatives like belonging, relationships, and universal purpose are supplanted by the most powerful precepts: that human life is a continuous competition; that we have to contend with others to advance our own position, for privilege, for a price, and even for space. In fact, with amazing stoicism, children from very different social backgrounds soon conform to the idea that some of them are 'brighter' than others, which converts them into the cynics that will supplant today's cynics. A society in which parents give their children 'the best education they can afford', within the current sway of exchange/value capitalism, cannot augur anything but total catastrophe. Children no longer dream of being a sea-captain, an explorer or an astronaut; they simply 'want to make lots of money'. And some of us adults like to display consternation at this as if there was something wrong with our children. But there is nothing wrong with them; they just understand perfectly the *situation* in which they are living; living within *our* situation and making lots of money makes sense. It is the *situation*, which is utterly wrong.

The problem then ought not to be the adjustment of this or that particular, but to change the universal situation itself. Habermas would not say that what he most wants is "to make lots of money", but he accepts with thanks prized awards from the Spanish monarchy,[10] which will earn him lots of money, directly and indirectly. The social

connotations of such social events unmistakably work both ways: on the one hand they enhance Habermas' international reputation; on the other they further enhance the Spanish monarchy's legitimacy. What is really shocking then, the choices of Habermas or the moneymaking dreams of a child?

That is the conclusion of the last part (chapters I and II): a unity of experience in the arts such as Habermas suggests does appear to be an appealing formula, but in the context of our situation, of our condition, it promises failure. It is a true *Catch 22.* To propose the bridging of the gaps between the cognitive, political and ethical discourses is like saying that we can actually distinguish them, their shapes and their edges, when, as a matter of fact, the very workings of western capitalism makes them appear to overlap. This is remarked upon by Adorno and Horkheimer, and then Heidegger, Vattimo and to some extent Baudrillard too. To propose this unity of experience for the purposes of what art ought to be within our situation, is to ignore Marx's theory of reification and Nietzsche's conceptual evaluation on men of ressentiment. But Habermas does so because he is a social negotiator. From the dialectics of his writings, it is obvious to see that he has capitulated to the idea that a system without ruling classes – though nowadays we should talk of corporate classes – is unthinkable and therefore he has undertaken the task of negotiating with *them* as to what kind of better living standards there should be for all. As Eagleton suggests, "Habermas has been at pains to deny that the forms of communicative rationality can simply be projected forward as a utopian future [...] the Habermasian answer is that we simply have to talk it over" (Eagleton, 1991: 406; 412 respectively). And Habermas does so because, like everybody else, he only has one point of reference for what it is to be a human being, which is the traditional one. I shall extend this discourse throughout the rest of this thesis. I will only add here what Wittgenstein suggests are the limits of human inquiry:

> I can only describe my feeling by the metaphor, that, if a man could write a book on Ethics which really was a book on Ethics, this book would, with an explosion, destroy all the other books in the world. [...] Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts; as a teacup will only hold a teacup full of water and if I were to pour out a gallon over it. (Cahoon, 1996: 194)

But he also adds

> [...] not only that no description that I can think of would do to describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant description that anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its significance [...]

I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics was to run against the boundaries of language. [...] Ethics so far as it springs from the desire to say something about the ultimate meaning of life, the absolute good, the absolute valuable, can be no science. What it says does not add to our knowledge in any sense. [...] But I cannot help respecting [it] deeply. (Ibid.: 198)[11]

The rules have not being written down yet and perhaps they will never be. We have dialectics which help us to go on living but god help us if one day, in order to understand fully what a human being *ought* to be, we shall need the sign of "fraternity, freedom, and equality" hanging everywhere. This will be my final argument: many great thinkers give us very valuable points of reference, and we take from them as far as it suits our arguments but none of them can foresee humanity without taking references from tradition and through this process contradictions appear. But be cautious, because in this rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre I am not proposing a kind of postmodernist nihilism in the spheres of Aleks Sierzs's *In-Yer-Face Theatre* (2000). I am not denying the legitimacy of traditional thinking, but that philosophy and reason killed defenceless people by the millions with gas and atomic bombs. I cannot endorse Brecht and Brechtians because they teach, and in doing so they ideologize everything; and that will send us all sooner or later to the gulag; I cannot endorse Beckett and Beckettians because, like Adorno, they propose a pact with failure through their 'perverse' self-defeatist aesthetic (Eagleton, 1991: 349-50). I am, then, only left with the *situation*. Thus, the dramatist Edward Bond and his philosophy of drama fulfils the purpose of my thesis: because he rethinks the whole. He rethinks aesthetics and therefore culture.

In conclusion, through Bond I am left with very, very few models because in the aesthetics he is aiming at I cannot teach because all teaching is ideological, I cannot moralize with old precepts, I cannot idealise reality, and I cannot succumb to the temptations of *l'art pour l'art* – while all the way through, I have to remember at all times that, to some degree or other, I have been unmistakably corrupted – or rather, contaminated – because I have to live in the *real* world of our situation. As Edward Bond reflects "If owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder – in every thing I'm against – why bother to say."[12] It is as if the only thing I am left with is *silence*. And that is indeed what I am proposing, because this is not the common understanding of silence; it is a different silence which, in my view, only drama speaks.

In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Wittgenstein suggests a very remarkable view on Ethics:

> 7. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence. [Cahoon, 1996: 199]

I would suggest that the *silence* Wittgenstein identifies is the silence Edward Bond is looking for in the praxis of his writing. In drama we can make *that* silence speak, we ought to "pass over" the situation to audiences, without *saying it*. I would even say that Bond, after all these years and with his great reputation, is still learning to come to terms with the grandiosity of his proposal. That is why he told me "I don't know how to write plays [...] because then I'd write to formula" (appendix: 29). Yet Bond does have a kind of formula: he seeks to create a situation in which we, the audience, can make a choice; can be responsible for our acts (appendix: 12). All this will be considered further in the conclusion.

"It's the economy, stupid!"[13] With just four words, ex-US president, Bill Clinton seems to have distilled the essence of everything. He did actually tell the whole world what our situation was about. And of course Clinton is totally right. As Terry Eagleton explains, our society is masked throughout with the traditional force of God, freedom and family, but profit is the highest empirical value (Eagleton, 1991: 375), to a point at which, as Edward Bond asserts, it seems to own us through and through.[14] It would be preposterous to pretend that any of us is exempt from corruption to some extent. In his chapter "From the Polis to Postmodernism", Eagleton suggests that there is a sense of foreboding infesting everything. In my view this is totally justified: tear apart the world economy and we will eat each other. Dante's Hell would become a preferable place, because our old moral precepts would continue to live on. Art and artists have to live in this world too and as a result a Culture Industry has taken form. Drama has to live side by side with the Culture Industry which locks everything into the "structure of commodity production" (Eagleton, 1991: 348). "The first thing to say about my philosophy," Bond says, "is that it makes ethics an ultimate reality. This aligns it as a philosophy with the thoughts of Spinoza and Freud" (Stuart, 2000: 56). I believe that, when he pursues his "ultimate reality" – ethics – Bond is already pursuing the right course of action, but why does his "path" seem to run counter to most current culture? Is he the problem or is it culture itself? To answer that question I need not only to investigate, embedded as it is within the industrial production of goods, but also two of its intrinsic and conditioning elements: contradiction and ideology.

Endnotes

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[1] Eagleton quotes this from Martin Heidegger's *Nietzsche*, vol. 1: The Will to Power as Art (London, 1981), p. 127.

[2] As Bertrand Russell said in *Human Society in Ethics and Politics* "if throughout your life you abstain from murder, theft, fornication, perjury, blasphemy, and disrespect towards your parents, your Church, and your king, you are conventionally held to deserve moral admiration even if you have never done a single kind or generous or useful action. This very inadequate notion of virtue is an outcome of tabu [sic] morality, and has done untold harm." (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954, p. 40)

[3] Margaret Olin reminds us that "The concentration camp commandant in Steven Spielberg's *Schindler's List* (1993), for example, has an accent that sounds almost like a speech impediment." In her essay "Lanzmanss's *Shoah* and the Topography of the Holocaust Film", *Representations*, n. 57, Winter 1997, pp. 1-23, p. 7.

[4] This is expanded upon in a very interesting essay by Daniel Cory, "Philosophical Letter to Bertrand Russell", *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 57, No. 18 (Sep. 1, 1960) pp. 573-587, esp. p. 573 and then p. 581.

[5] P. 956, The Complete Works of W. Shakespeare, London: Spring Books, printed in Czechoslovakia (no date supplied)

[6] Jean Baudrillard, "The Spirit of Terrorism", trans. by Dr. Rachel Bloul, *Le Monde*, 2 November, 2001, p. 4 of my own copy.

[7] Eagleton quotes from Friedrich Nietzsche, *Human, All Too Human*, quoted by Richard Schacht, *Nietzsche* (London, 1983), p. 429

[8] Habermas, against all rules of dialectical engagement, stepped forward to defend the NATO bombing of Serbia in his essay "Bestiality and Humanity: a War on the Borderline Between Law and Morality" (*Constellations* 6, no. 3, 1999, pp. 263-72). With this, Habermas transformed critical theory into functions of war theory. His dialectics became war propaganda slogans such as that bombing was a "punitive military action against Yugoslavia"; its alleged goals "to ensure a liberal resolution of Kosovar autonomy inside Serbia." (p. 264 and 270) In my view, Habermas shows himself to be a liberal negotiator in the very fashion of the executive's cabinet of a liberal democracy. He has capitulated to the old pessimistic slogan that liberal capitalism is "the best of the worst" possible systems. Habermas *is* part today and benefits purposefully from the very reactive institutions found in the sustainment of the dual morality of "Good versus Evil". An example is his recent acceptance of the highly respected Spanish Prince of Asturias Prize (2004), which is an equivalent of Royal Honorary awards here in Britain. This criticism on Habermas and his current philosophical standpoint can be tested against Eduardo Mendietta's "America and the World. A Conversation with Jürgen Habermas" (*Logos* 3.3 – Summer 2004). As the somehow Habermasian Terry Eagleton explains (1991: 402-415) "Habermas has been at pains to deny that the forms of communicative rationality can simply be projected forward as a utopian future" (p. 406). Agreeing with Habermas, Eagleton suggests that normative statements and theoretical ones "admit of truth" and that "they too must be submitted to the rest of public argumentation" (p. 406). And who does "the rest of public argumentation" refer to if not the various factions of authority? Or is Eagleton implying the bizarre idea that the "rest of public argumentation" in liberal democracies could refer to *all* of us – the lorry driver, the factory worker, the public clerk and so on? According to Eagleton, "Habermas holds that communication is naturally oriented to agreement." (p. 405). Eagleton's final chapter is very estrange, because in the first three hundred pages or so of his *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Eagleton illustrates brilliantly how, since the appearance of aesthetics is a purely bourgeois concept, and Marxist reification interferes in every human aspect of our lives, the current culture industry tends towards the aestheticization of everything, which is where all the greater dangers are. And then, he turns into a Habermasian postmodern moderator and with

the effectiveness of a TV advert, he ignores the differences and conflicts of class as if they had magically evaporated.

[9] "Abuse rife in Indonesia Nike plants", by John Aglionby in Jakarta, February 23, 2001, *The Guardian.*

[10] Mendieta, p. 1.

[11] Ludwing Wittgenstein, "Lecture on Ethics" (1929)

[12] "Notes on the War Plays", p. 13.

[13] Originally, it was a sign hung in Bill Clinton's campaign headquarters to keep everybody 'on message' in 1992.

[14] "In the past" says Bond "even the wisest people believed many things which (if we believed them) would make us mad. When they acted on these beliefs they seem to us to been inhuman and cruel. In time (if there is time) we and our behaviour will be judged in the same way. But the old problem is now a new and greater crisis. Even in peace we destroy our natural world as if we were a cannibal devouring himself. The laws of our economy turn us into the servants of our machines, and we are their servants even when we are consumers [sic]. If, in this way, the machines own the world, they own us. They own us through the economic necessity which is the driving force of Western Consumer Democracy". ("Notes on the War Plays", The Journal for Drama in Education, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1995, pp. 6-16, p. 13)

(PART II)

3. CHAPTER III

Culture or contradiction

Introduction

In the final chapter of this thesis I will explain why it is my understanding that, perhaps more urgently than ever in the past, drama must try to tell that which cannot be told – that is, *saying it* without falling into ideological or moral discourses.[1] This approach is not without its problems, because drama must live within current culture, indeed, drama *depends* on culture for its own existence. To propose a drama outside the boundaries of culture would be like suggesting that drama can be without people. But why am I treating culture as if it could be an obstacle to drama; as if culture could oppose drama's values and consequences? Because the drama I will propose finds its initial stage in the dramatic strategies of Edward Bond; because it is a drama that, as I will expound in my conclusion, has more congruity, as it were, with the paintings of the cave dwellers than with current culture.

Despite all the complexities involved in discussions related to and with culture, I would like firstly to adopt the most basic definitions of culture from the field of animal behaviour, which, in my view, do not apply only to other advanced living things but to the evolutionary success of human beings themselves. One, that culture is "the transfer of information between individuals by imitative or social learning"; and the other that culture is "transfer of information by behavioural means."[2] Notions such as imitation and transfer of information have been specifically formulated to describe group differences in human behaviour (ibid) – and therefore culture/cultures – but these definitions are by no means unsophisticated. Apparently simple, they hold huge complexities – complexities that have surely increased in our post-industrial societies. Who should we imitate? Who is imitating whom? What kind of information is being transferred, and with what intent?

The above elementary definitions of culture do, however offer an interesting pattern. The growth and development of a group of individuals – that is, society – is relative to the inter-relations existent within it – that is, culture. In other words, culture might be

considered to be a fundamental factor of society's destruction or survival. Few words are as difficult to define as culture, but many would agree that teaching, learning and imitation are the very basics of it; in other words, that culture is the transmission of information or knowledge. I very much agree with Edward Bond when, in one of the rare occasions when the dramatist has used the word "art" in a non derogatory sense, he told me that "the people who painted buffalos on the cave walls were artists for all time" (appendix: 52). What was the real reason behind those paintings? Were they symbolic or merely figurative; just recording what the people saw? No one knows, but behind those twenty thousand year-old paintings in northern Spain and southern France one can see that people were trying to make sense of their environment and telling of their inherent humanness. The power of the cave dwellers' paintings comes from the fact that they were painted for *us*.[3]

3.1. Section I

3.1.1. Culture as industry

It would not be difficult to support the thesis that human beings would not have survived to this day without the cultural backbone of teaching, learning and imitation. But these cultural foundations might also be the axis about which the causes of our own destruction revolve. This is, in short, the essence not only of Adorno's Negative Dialectics – where everything lives within its own opposition – but the point at which Edward Bond's philosophy of drama finds its focal point. "When reason is used in human affairs," he says, "the result can be deeply irrational" (appendix: 10). This human paradox of being is a Marxist thought, which Adorno called "man's ongoing prehistory."[4]

I am not trying to romanticize anything here; I am not proposing a return to the Stone Age. Instead, the problem I am interested in today, for the purposes of drama, is whether the discourses entered into by Adorno on culture on the one hand, and currently by Edward Bond on the other, have a proper foundation. Whether, or to what extent, inherent humanness has been superseded in culture by economics – or, more specifically, whether the imperative of being a human being has been supplanted by the imperative of making money. In a post-industrial western society, can drama go on being drama – that is, making sense of the world – while fitting within a culture that is

seen as an industry: a culture that is both a contaminating agent and the recipient of continuous contamination by the market? "Under capitalism" says Bernstein "all production is for the market; goods are produced not in order to meet human needs and desires, but for the sake of profit" (Bernstein, 2001: 5).

According to Adorno and Horkheimer, culture now is an industry and as such becomes just one definition swathing everything (Adorno, 2001; Horkheimere, 1979). The question of whether culture is now *only* an industry – and therefore whether it follows nothing but the rules and methods of modern manufacturing and trade – has extraordinary implications upon any evaluation of culture and any of its manifestations, such as drama. If, as Steven B. Smith explains, man is shaped and moulded by culture (1985: 651), but culture now exists because, as the Frankfurt School tells us, there is a profit to make, what are the consequences then of the deduction "man is shaped and moulded by profit?"

Of course, culture is not (yet) simply industry but, as I will discuss hereafter, it has all the symptoms of taking that direction. The realm of sociology offers various meanings of what culture is, and these definitions can be placed in two main groups: the anthropological and the artistic (Bourdieu, 1977; 1977a; 1984; 1985). The first defines culture as the whole way of life in society: its values and ideas, its laws and its customs, its institutions and its systems. To the second group – that is, the arts – scholars usually apply more constricted definitions, yet perhaps with deeper meanings; more concern with what people have thought, made and said at its best.[5] But in a world which clearly has been taken up by the global philosophy of economy and exchange/value, this differentiation of culture into two main groups is problematic. It is no longer a question of whether cultural materialism can breach any narrow definition separating culture from everything else. Instead, the question should be whether there is culture as such at all. We have had *The End of Ideology* (Bell, 1965), *The End of History* (1992, Fukuyama), *The End of Modernity* (Vattimo, 1991), and even the end or death of man (Foucault, 1970:385; Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1982:28-43; Smith, 1985:652) – let alone Nietzsche's death of God, which already anticipated all these 'deaths' and encapsulated them all. Yet 'the death of culture' does not seem to be a matter for discussion. One could rightly argue that proposing a death of culture would be like proposing the death of thought itself, offering us no location from which we could carry out such discourses.

3.1.2. Culture and power

Proclaiming the death of such universals should not be taken as a prophecy of man's doom; but that would not be a heretical or outrageous thing to propose. As Steven B. Smith explains, what I am referring to is not culture's literal death, but "the dissolution of the subject" which is not to say that human beings as a species "are bound to disappear" (1985: 652). From some perspectives, dissolution is certainly a "death"; but from others, it is also a decomposition or disintegration of the mass into its constitutive components. What will disappear, argues Smith, are the historically specific conceptions that have underpinned our universal concepts through two centuries of western philosophy (Ibid.). What has to change is the way we conceive what culture *is*.

According to Bertrand Russell, it is one thing "to have awareness of universals" – which should be called *conceiving* – and another "a universal of which we are aware" – which should be called *concept*.[6] Whether we have "awareness" of culture or whether we are "aware" of it depends, I would say, on the kind of channels and systems employed in the transmission of it. If I follow on Smith's train of discourse then, it seems plausible that what is coming to an end are the notions of our permanent human attributes like freedom, autonomy, dignity, rights and so on (Smith, 1985: 652). Again, with it Smith does not mean their literal "elimination", but an end to the way in which these notions have been and are being used by the ruling classes; by the bourgeoisie. In contemporary Anglo-Saxon societies, for example, the expressions "We fight for freedom" and "In the name of liberty" are the daily proclamations of the current US president, George W. Bush, his Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, and of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. This highly subjective evocation of such moral absolutes provokes impassioned citizens to declare "when I hear them using those terms I want to puke".[7] The action of one side – the American and British leaders – and the reaction of the other – the people that live under their rule – constitutes a problem that marks the conceptual boundaries that identify an entire tradition of thought. Both sides endow traditional moral concepts such as liberality, piety and goodness with new meanings and implications. The meaning and praxis of culture must be affected by it in one way or another.

I cannot ignore Raymond Williams' *Culture and Society: 1780-1950,* in which he defines the meaning of culture from the setting of the French Revolution to that of the post-Second World War, making a study of the British working-class life and history

(1958). By considering culture in the context of its relations with the four terms – "class," "industry," "democracy" and "art" – Williams developed an approach which he named "cultural materialism" (Ibid.: 31 and 115). Although Williams' "cultural materialism" attempts to breach the narrow definitions that separate literature, culture and politics, there remains in his work a continuous contrast between "culture as art" and "culture as a whole way of life". Thankfully, many things improved in the western societies of the 1950s,[8] but when Williams made these considerations on culture, culture was about to undergo a cataclysmic shift: culture was about to become an industry through and through. As a result it is now quite difficult to answer even basic and logical questions about what is it that our culture is. Bond expands upon this by asking whether people can properly and seriously make sense of their world, and therefore not only be able to make choices, but take positive responsibility for those choices too (appendix: 13; 54). One cannot ignore the compelling question mark hung over Williams' sociological thinking by the Frankfurt School and its neo-Marxist theory of 'false consciousness'. After all, isn't making sense of the world in which we live what culture ought to be about?

In the 1970s, Williams attempted to assess culture from the angle of Marxist Methodology. For Williams at that point, culture was best seen as a specific process of production, "a material social process of signification" in its own right, as the way around the problem of "reflection" – that is, whether art is more than a simple "reflection" of the economic base (Williams, 1977: 70). However, Raymond Williams' train of thought sustains a restrictive critical judgment with which this thesis appears, willingly or unwillingly, to be in conflict. Williams is not radical enough. Of course, he was concerned with the problem of the relation between culture and hegemonic power – or dangers that might come about from the Marxist idea of society as super-structure. For Williams, the future imagined in Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty-Four* "is not a desirable one, but it is a perfectly possible one" (Williams, 1979: 301).

Anyone can see that Williams recognizes the inequalities of the class system and how he supports the idea of the need for a social change, again taking from Marxism what is too obvious: a precognition of the connections between politics, social development, culture and so on. And Williams absolutely thinks of himself as a Marxist, which has had a phenomenal relevance on cultural and sociological studies in Great Britain and beyond. "It is difficult to feel we are really governing ourselves" says Williams in *The*

Long Revolution "if in so central a part of our lives as our work most of us have no share in decisions that immediately affect us" (1973: 332). But then he says "the human energy of the long Revolution springs from the conviction that men can direct their own lives, by breaking through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society, and by discovering new common institutions" (1979: 375). Williams believed in what I would call 'an everyday culture'. Discarding the idea that the form of any society is a product of its material economic development, he also discards the idea that people's minds are to some extent corrupted by the sheer and justifiable need of material gain, which has taken in our minds the form of a precept, thanks to the overwhelming pressure consistently exercised by bourgeois ideology. In my view, to suggest that people can "break through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society" from our current capitalist situation of "no choice and no tools",[9] would be to imagine that people could pass through a wall of concrete six feet thick by hitting their heads against it; or to pretend that we could breathe underwater without any technological aid.

In my reading of Marx, most of the time, in some sense, critical thinkers express the values or interest of their own class or their own social position (Marx, 1999; McLellan, 1977; Dietrich, 1988. Lukacs, 1971). Williams does not seem to break out from the convictions held by western liberal tradition. One of these convictions says Steven B. Smith, is that man has an "intrinsic capacity for reasoned judgment and the competence to conform conduct to the dictates of this judgment" (1985: 653). But the convincing view of the Frankfurt School would be that this is sheer fantasy. How can man "break through the pressures and restrictions of older forms of society" when "culture makes classes totally unrecognizable by burying them beneath an indistinct mass culture shared by all" (Gartman, 1991: 426)? If, as my findings suggest, Man's thinking and beliefs are the product of education, propaganda, ideology, and traditional morality, all transmitted by the mechanical and non-mechanical channels of culture then, no matter how justifiable and well organized the means are, a popular revolution will always end in the Gulag (see Chapter I). I am not suggesting that Williams is lying or writes in bad faith, indeed, quite the opposite. But it is obvious that the workings of the Culture Industry must also affect critical theorists, just like it affects everyone else. Any attempt to judge Williams unconstructively – that is, without pulling together all the factors of his intellectual developments – would be a serious error; just as it would be a serious error to do the same with his disciple and successor, Terry Eagleton.

3.1.3. Culture, society and socialism.

Interestingly, both Williams and Eagleton came from rural working class families, and both reproach the language of the post-Marxist political left at every given opportunity. "For Raymond Williams", says Eagleton agreeably, "Establishment-bred leftists who finally revert to type can be seen as cases of what he calls in *Culture and Society* 'negative identification'. The dissident offspring of the upper middle class throws in his lot with the militant proletariat, largely because they serve as a metaphor for his own quite differently motivated revolt."[10] It is a discourse that Eagleton has not changed since his work *The Ideology of the Aesthetic* in which he says:

> ...twenty years ago [his book was first printed in 1990], the political left discovered to its dismay that the system was currently too powerful, too total, to be broken [...] as a consequence of this gloomy revelation we have now post-Marxism – a name which one takes to designate those who have come right through Marxism and out somewhere the other side, rather than those middle-class liberals who, having remained exactly where they always were, now suddenly find themselves rather in fashion [...] it is as though, having temporarily the breadknife, one declares the loaf to be already sliced. The term 'post', if it has any meaning at all, means business as usual, only more so [his emphasis]. (1991: 381)

Culture has been most affected by this kind of capitulation of the political left into a liberal "social consensus" – which has not been the privilege of Britain alone, but is a common characteristic of post-war Western Europe. And the social class whose culture has been most affected by it has been the working class. As David Gartman explains in his criticism of Bourdieu's theory of culture (1991), a working class culture based on decency, sense of community and comradeship, together with lots of natural enjoyment in the process, has been shattered not only by the strategic workings of the bourgeois dominant ideology. This is now characterised by the ideology of the industry, market, and exchange/value philosophy of production, and a disillusion with the political ideas of the left. In contrast with Bourdieu's "ahistorical structuralism" (Ibid.: 421), says Gartman, the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer and Marcuse among others) contends "that culture performs its ideological functions for the class system by preventing any recognition of class differences, even a mistaken one" (Ibid.: 426). That is why I would say that the rural working class upbringing of Williams and Eagleton ought not to be disassociated from their discourses.[11] On the one hand they believe, as it were, in the goodness of people and their ability to overcome cultural dreariness through new forms of social intercourse, and of course, they display this optimism

within the framework of current times: "Through capitalism" says Eagleton in his critical analysis of Marx within aesthetics, "individuality is enriched and developed, fresh creative powers are bred, and new forms of social intercourse created" (Eagleton, 1991: 218). On the other hand, they identify capitalism as a system which "reduces the bodily fullness of men and women to a 'crude and abstract[12] simplicity of need'" (Eagleton, 1991: 198). And of course, Eagleton seems to be right in both instances. But Williams, and now Eagleton, seem to discard the Frankfurt's idea of total human reification – let alone any suggestion that the culture industry as such is a sophisticated and deodorized form of fascism (Horkheimer, 1979: 167).

Curiously enough, Eagleton applies in his criticism some of the language he criticises unfavourably in Adorno "where the reader has no sooner registered the one-sidedness of some proposition than the opposite is immediately proposed" (Eagleton, 1991: 342). Does Eagleton's critical thinking run with the hare and hunt with the hounds? I cannot expand further here the discussion of the partnership between capital and fascism without leaving out other important arguments that need to be evaluated first before I enter into it fully. But this is, in conclusion, why I postulated that the basic problem with cultural critics like Williams and Eagleton is their unwillingness to go beyond their natural parameters. It is only natural, since they themselves have become part of a privileged class. Seemingly they are not prepared to go down the path of radical thinking. As Irving Wohlfarth contends, most post-Marxists critics seem to be entangled in the question of whether there is any true autonomy within the "knot" of bourgeois aesthetics (1979: 975). While handling it, they might be confusing ideology with reality; or what is worse, liberty with the freedom to sleep under bridges. They acknowledge that our social system is unjust, but they are stuck under the popular slogan of 'being the best of the worst' after all. But why not focus instead on creating a social system which could be 'the best of the best'? In my view, critics like Eagleton criticize the ground on which they stand, and in doing so they reflect certain autonomy of thought, but they do not go as far as to really undermine it. But this apparent contradiction – appearing to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds – is not only a quality of Williams and Eagleton, but of most critical thinking from Kant to Adorno and Habermas, and forms an integral part of what it is widely known as dialectics.

3.1.4. Culture *as* contradiction.

There are various methods of dialectics: Plato's dialogues is one (1955); Kantian dialectics tries to show that any attempt to speculate beyond the limits of possible experience leads to contradiction; a Hegelian method of dialectics would be the interaction of the thesis as the contradiction of the antithesis, out of which a synthesis would arise. Marx applied and extended the Hegelian method appropriating it as dialectical materialism of Marxism. However, post-Marxists, I would argue, being as they are in a totally unprecedented historical situation – that is, in societies where culture both reifies and is a commodity, and post-Marxist dialecticians find themselves as part of the problem (Wohlfarth,1979; Smith, 1885; Gartman, 1991; Lears, 1992; Duttmann, 2002) – have not only to take bits and pieces from the methods that best suit their discourses, but also the application of a kind of discourse whose tactics put themselves as the target of their own dialectical attacks. It might be understood as a Kantian contradiction but elevated to the utmost height. Indeed, Adorno stands by this theory of "contradiction" and calls it "Negative dialectics".[13] "Theory" says Wohlfarth criticizing dialecticians "is supposed to live dangerously, but it also takes the precaution of making reservations" (1979: 978). And adds thereafter:

> Since intellectuals are 'both the last enemies of the bourgeoisie and the last bourgeois, there is no way out of such entanglement'. The anti-bourgeois is trapped within the arrested dialectic, the 'frozen unrest', of the bourgeois self. (Ibid.: 981; his inverted commas)

Hence, it makes sense that Eagleton tries to play the treacherous card of aesthetics in his quest for a better world (1991). So does everyone else worthy of notice before him: from Kant and Hegel to Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, from Marx and Engels to the Frankfurt School and Heidegger (Ibid.: 1). In his search for a proper answer, and as a tool against the agents of oppression – the bourgeoisie – Eagleton proposes aesthetics, which in its most literal sense is "a very bourgeois concept" itself (Ibid.: 8), thus adding further credibility to Wohlfarth's discourses. But this action is a treacherous one because wherever aesthetics appears in the picture, not only propaganda but authoritarian systems are never far away. Aesthetics, like one of its grotesque offspring, propaganda, always attempts to shape people's views of the world in which they live. As Irving Wohlfarth contends, even when the actions are "on behalf of the 'truth'" one is trapped in the "contradiction between means and ends" (1979: 969). There is no distinction, concurs Adorno, between mass mobilization and mass manipulation,

because both seem to work out by the means and ends of reified lies: "propaganda makes language an instrument, a lever, a machine [...] Deep down all men know that through this tool they too will be reduced to a tool as in a factory [...] Propaganda manipulates people; when it cries freedom it contradicts itself."[14]

Although the use of aesthetics against the bourgeoisie characterizes what Adorno means by "Negative Dialectics" at its purest, aesthetics – this "science" of sensuous perception – is identified by many as the only tool that plays against itself. This is why Adorno's system of dialectics, despite the parade of symptoms it diagnoses throughout his writings, even when they are proposed without tangible remedies, continues to be of paramount importance. With Adorno, one knows that there is not a negative dialectics as a contrast with other "dialectics". If one lives in the system, by the system and from the system, dialectics can only be negative; if not, to live under bridges or suicide is always an option. No one knows what would have happened to us without dialectics, but with it we know that where there is reason there is contradiction. As Wohlfarth pronounces, "We need Adorno [...] to outwit the cunning of the system by playing it against itself." (1979: 983).

Eagleton proposes aesthetics against the culture of the bourgeois ideology because there is nothing else to propose but the *tactics* of the bourgeoisie. Using aesthetics in this fashion becomes a kind of vaccine: using poison as antidote against poison. Certainly, this observation must be a motive of celebration, because it is at the origin of everything we do in the creative industry in liberal democracies. "Culture" says Eagleton "is deeply locked into the structure of commodity production; but one effect of this is to release it into a certain ideological autonomy, hence allowing it to speak against the very social order with which it is guiltily complicit."(1991: 348).

However, the attributes that conform to the basis of bourgeois ideology and to its very aesthetics – that is, individuality, originality, and/or uniqueness – also culminate in rivalry against others for the best positions. Even my main source of enquiry, Edward Bond, can be situated within the same sphere in this regard. As he told me himself, "very often the victories achieved [by the working class] are not through socialist politics, but through the successes of capitalism." (Appendix: 34). But he told me so, also aware that he was actually saying a "heretical thing" (Ibid.), for Bond also benefits from the bourgeois apparatus of commodity and exchange/value, be it via his agents,

publishers and/or institutions of education. As Eagleton explains above, we attempt to project forward utopian languages with certain ideological autonomy; but when we refer to the aesthetic apparatus of bourgeois ideology, this "certain autonomy" does not appear so clearly in the picture. As I have discussed in the previous chapter, there is a danger of using aesthetics to such an extent that it evolves into grotesque forms, bringing about the aestheticization of everything. It already happened during the 1930s, and back then it was called fascism.

3.2. Section II.

3.2.1. Negative Dialectics and Benjamin.

In his introduction to *The Adorno Reader*, Brian O'Connor explains how, in the eyes of Adorno, "the whole notion of culture has become problematical" (O'Connor, 2000: 17). I would be inclined to argue that culture has not just "become problematical" as if it was a recent problem, but that it has always been "problematical". As I shall explain at the end of Chapter V, within human civilization, wherever we assess culture, we assess contradiction. This is in my view where the Frankfurt School made one critical mistake. They analysed culture as if culture had seen better times; as if somehow culture had been straight until our age of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin, 1999: 211-45). "Culture" says Eagleton "is at once a document of civilization and a record of barbarism, the two as closely imbricated as the recto and verso of a sheet of paper." (Eagleton, 1991: 219).

The Sumerian people invented written language in 3,200 BC Mesopotamia but they also practiced horrendous rituals of human sacrifices, a favourite being impaling people while still alive (Burne, 1989: 37). The aesthetic concept of virtue was as corrupted during the enlightenment as it was during the darkest medieval periods. Voltaire famously refused to discuss atheism in front of the servants because he thought their faith would protect his possessions, and while he was writing *Candide*, he was also investing his money in the slave trade, for its rich and fast pickings (Ibid.: 711). While the third president of the USA, Thomas Jefferson, was writing the draft for the Declaration of Independence, complete with assertions like "We hold this truth to be self-evident: that all men are created equal" he would, at the end of his working day, choose a nighttime 'companion' from among his females slaves (Ibid.: 751). This

contradictory pattern in human history and its values does not seem to have changed through the passing of centuries. A human achievement of the last century is the discovery of penicillin, but so is the atomic bomb. Of course, those who are still anchored in the eighteenth century utilitarianist philosophies of John Stuart Mill would argue that essential values are not timeless but relative;[15] in other words, that things should be taken in their historical context. While this pattern of contradiction in pre-capitalist culture can be explained as the result of historico-contextual human needs,[16] alongside the rise of the bourgeoisie, culture serves instead as a "utopian function": that is, as David Gartman explains, culture expresses a need for freedom that is, nevertheless, "denied by the class organization of society" (1991: 440). Thus, with the increasing struggle of the bourgeoisie against feudal order, culture as utopian function, provides society with a "safety valve for discontent" (Ibid.).

Since this time, the bourgeoisie, mastering the fabulous tool of culture, has never stopped using it for its own ends. Following Georg Lukács' line of thought, Gartman expands this analysis by giving examples of the processes of literature before and after the revolutions of 1848[17] (Gartman, 1991: 442). Thus, "in the formative stages of capitalism", the narrative style of "bourgeois realists" like "Balzac, Dickens and Tolstoy", depict reality "as a historical creation of the strivings of human beings" within feudal societies (Ibid.: 441). Up to this stage, this struggle against feudalism had a collectivist character, because it was in the general interest of all classes to attain freedom of some kind. But, after the revolutions of 1848, and as soon as capitalism became firmly established, the bourgeois ruling class no longer had any interest in "progressive change, but in reactionary protection of its rule against the class to whom history passed the interest in freedom, the proletariat." (Ibid.: 442). As a consequence of this changed position of culture, says Gartman, "the descriptive style of bourgeois modernists like Joyce and Flaubert" came into being:

> no longer having an interest in progressive change, bourgeois writers were blinded to the nature of reality as a human creation and began to depict the world as a static, reified thing [...] People and their relations are not developed but merely described as already constituted products of forces beyond their control. The reality of class and struggle is thus behind this impenetrable façade of static things. (Ibid.)[18]

This cultural situation as a "façade of static things" in society has not only remained unchanged since Joyce but, as I want to argue, has been taken to a level of hegemonic

proportions in our postmodern times. Dialectical theory is entangled in it and, by way of its rhetorical reasoning, justifies itself expecting the unexpectable: that capitalism would abolish itself. This is, according to Walter Benjamin, what Marx expected for the future of capitalism: "one could expect [capitalism] not only to exploit the proletariat with increasing intensity, but ultimately to create conditions which would make it possible to abolish capitalism itself" (1999: 212). Here we have again the intellectual bourgeoisie having to deal with their own demons. Seeing the impossible task of taking society from the jaws of the capitalist's ideology which, so to speak, would leave him without a solid floor under his feet, the dialectical Benjamin suggests taking a good sleep, in the hope that in the morning the jaws would have just disappeared. Benjamin's case is a very interesting one because, as Hannah Arendt tells us, the philosopher has had a major influence on post-Marxist modern thought; perhaps more than what was predicted at the time of his death on September 26, 1940 (Benjamin, 1999: 7-58; 23). And, as I would argue now, it is in the way in which Benjamin took his own life, where the real character of post-Marxist dialectics takes the physical form of contradiction: interpreting Marxism and defining art while capitulating to defeatism or a commitment to failure.

While on the run from the Gestapo, says Arendt, Benjamin was living in Paris until it was occupied by the Nazis. When the Gestapo confiscated his apartment – with Benjamin's entire and most treasured personal library[19] – Benjamin tried to make a run to the Franco-Spanish borders, aiming ultimately for flight to America. In the company of a small group of refugees, Benjamin got to the Spanish frontier "only to learn" that the Spanish border officials – already operating under Franco's fascist regime – did not "honour visas" from France (Ibid.: 24). They were supposed then to return to France the following day. Instead, during the night Benjamin took his own life with an "overdose of morphine" (Demetz, 1986: xv). It is true that his utter desperation seems the dark finale to a relentless run of bad luck because, as Arendt says, "one day earlier and Benjamin would have got through without any trouble" (Benjamin, 1999: 24). But since Arendt also tells us that the border officials allowed Benjamin's group "to proceed to Portugal" the day after, and that even a few weeks later "the embargo on visas was lifted again" (Ibid.), in truth it seems that Benjamin's death by his own hand was not the result of the fighter who is hopelessly besieged by the enemy, but the result of a man overcome by his long lasting and profound pessimism.[20]

And yet few intellectuals[21] have had as much influence in post-Marxist dialectics as Benjamin has had, especially through "The Work of Art in the Era of Mechanical Reproduction" (1999: 211-45). Adorno criticized his friend Benjamin's "undialectic usage of Marxian categories" incessantly and he blamed Brecht's relationship with Benjamin for this (Arendt, 1999: 20).[22] Still, in his *magnum opus, Aesthetic Theory*, Adorno makes continuous reference to Benjamin's thought, only surpassed by those he makes of Kant and Hegel (Adorno, 1997). That the two philosophers are deeply entrenched in the negativity of their thought, is also postulated by Eagleton when he says that Adorno "maintains a compact with failure"; a 'failure' that comes from their unhealthy and frustrated relationship with their own Jewishness (Eagleton, 1991: 349). "Jews today", wrote Benjamin in 1925, "ruin even the best German cause which they publicly champion, because their public statement is necessary venal (in a deeper sense) and cannot adduce proof of its authenticity" (Aredrnt in Benjamin, 1999: 40). The consequence of this Jewishness, of this 'compactness' with failure, is for Eagleton evident when, in the case of Adorno, the philosopher proposes the vacuity of Beckett as the perfect example of a work of art. Interestingly, Eagleton seems to apply critical thinking with the same self-inflictive parameters of those of Benjamin: if the Jew Benjamin seems to break away from Jewish morality, the Irishman Eagleton also enjoys ethnic self-flagellation and says "Like Beckett, Adorno maintains a compact with failure, which is where for both Jew and Irishman all authenticity must start [...] There is something perversely self-defeating about this aesthetic" (Eagleton, 1991: 349).

The way in which Benjamin died brings to mind a very unpleasant and bitter hypothesis, which might project further negativity into the discourse of culture as contradiction. Let us agree with Arendt and say that, from one angle, it is difficult to classify Benjamin's train of thought (see endnote 21); but on the other, we might confidently say that, in a broad sense, he was a humanist thinker, intellectually involved in seeking rational ways of solving human problems. Now, and as the Oxford Encyclopedia suggests, humanism, in its broadest sense, is a philosophical and cultural movement which has been in continuous development since the Renaissance and is most concerned with placing man at the centre of the world; a humanist believes in social progress and consequently dedicates his life to knowledge. In the pursuit of that knowledge, humanism also requires from the practitioner a certain detachment from all forms of morality, religion and ideology – and of course crime – for humanism is concerned with the wellbeing of *all* men. Furthermore, and as I have indicated

repeatedly throughout this discussion, knowledge seems to be directly interconnected with the survival of human species.

Yet surprisingly enough, there is concrete evidence to suggest that, in times when extreme social conflicts demand from human beings to give their best in order to survive, some humanists (often those who are supposed to have most acquired knowledge) without any apparent will, seem to be the first to give up: "abandoning all hope, seeing nothing to make life seem worth living" (Kogon, 1960: 302). We can verify this humanistic defeatism from the records made by the survivors of the Nazi concentration camps.[23] Again and again, those who survived the camps tell us how those who were of the "scholar and intellectual" type, quickly broke down, while those with fierce ideological or religious convictions found the "considerable force of character to overcome the difficulties that faced them" (Ibid.: 304-05; 307-10). "Admission to a concentration camp", says Eugen Kogon, "constituted the shock that immediately hurled the newcomer in one direction or the other. The indignation or desperation that followed the initial terror decided whether he would gradually gain inward perspective and thus a chance for individual adaptation to the new life, or whether he would swiftly succumb." (Kogon, 1960: 304-5). Brought to the camps where "terror is lurking everywhere" with nothing but a life of intellectual study, humanists did not have any social justification – like being a proletariat, a party member, a religious sectarian, or interestingly enough, a common criminal. People survived because they bred vengeance and hate for the 'other'; because, by mastering forms of crime, they managed to be a step ahead of the rest of the prisoners: "there were many dead martyrs in the camps, but few living saints" (Ibid.: 306); or because, having religious convictions, wishing one's own death was actually a sin. Of course, says Kogon, this will to survive was not something that people had all at once, "it took a long time for a mind, torn from the anchorages of the outside world and thrust into life-and-death turmoil, to find a new inward centre of gravity" (Ibid.: 305).

This appears to me as a shocking thought, and a source of deep contradiction in the development of a theory of culture: that in situations in which one needs to collect all sorts of supreme human capacities in order to survive, a humanist fails to find the proper devices in his own knowledge. As if an unthinkable test of human praxis, or the handling of a sickening experiment, the records of witnesses from the death camps seem to give the triumph of life to the very systems the humanist most despises: crime,

ideology, religion, lies, opportunism and so on. While, instead, the epistemological justifications of knowledge seem to lead to the humanist death – as it did to Benjamin.

Why am I making use of such extreme historical records? In what possible way can I associate the extreme situation of a Nazi death camp with our current lives and culture? In our world of commodities, effortless communications and means of travel, pension schemes, supermarkets that give access to all kind of goods, social welfare, ceaseless entertainment, and so on and so forth, how can one dare to do such a thing? I have to because, when I propose a rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre, I am proposing the train of thought of the dramatist Edward Bond. In the realm of theatre, he is the only one who dares to postulate the opinion that we are *now* living in extreme times. Bond does not say this occasionally; his entire drama output is based on this conviction.

Philosophers such as Adorno and Horkheimer suggest that the basics of culture as mere transmission ended as such when culture became aware of itself (O'Connor, 2000: 231-8). The fortunes of culture were settled with the rise of capitalism in the middle of the eighteenth century, at a time when the discipline of aesthetics began to be considered by Kant, Hume and Burke (White, 1997: 125-143). The dramatist Edward Bond dismisses Adorno's stance in historical terms – and certainly, as we will continue to see, Bond cannot be blamed for it. But Bond's philosophy of drama and Adorno's cogitations on art have more in common than the dramatist might have thought and desired.[24] They both seek an art that cannot be addressed as 'art'; that cannot be included in the models of the hegemonic industries of cultural production.

But whereas Adorno seems to make an accurate description of the symptoms and causes of the culture industry as a truly hegemonic force, he offers the shocking contradiction of "neutralization" – or social disassociation – as solution. "Neutralisation", says Adorno, "is the social price art pays for its autonomy" (Adorno, 1997: 331). Like Adorno, Bond is also aware of the dangers of coercive association,[25] but proposes a very different method. While "neutralization" implies not only impartiality and absence of decided views, but also the conciliation of conflicts – as for example conflicts of class – the dramatist will not 'shut up' no matter what the outcome, and so he makes it clear:

We should have no illusions about what theatre and what drama can do. If I write a play and it is put on, I don't write that play to make the audience good or better or wiser, I want to make some of the audience worse. Because if I want to tell the truth and I live in a society which is unjust (and that is our basic problem) – if you have an unjust society, then you cannot any longer manage that tri-partite arrangement[26] in such a way that you increase the human quality of minds by consent to the existing institutions, you'll only do it in acts of defiance. But if I write a play, then I'm not doing that from an institutional point of view: that I have some divine muse that will tell me total truth which will suddenly convert everyone into being good people. If I put on a good play then I want to make some of the audience more fascist. What else can I do? Some of the audience will go out more fascist, fine, but I will have made them more fascist. That's the important point. I will have defined for them more clearly what fascism is. Of course, I hope some of the audience will go out able to fight fascism and racism better because of my play but quite clearly, if I'm going to do that, then I'm also going to do the other. We should have no illusions. Art is dangerous in that way but we can't shut up because if we do that then forms of fascism and reaction will take over completely.
(Bond in Byron, 1990: 20)

3.3. Section III

3.3.1. Demanding the impossible.

Thus far then, we might safely say that the issue at hand is not a matter of whether culture is contradictory apparatus *per se* or whether culture is contradictory because there is a transcendental, 'human nature' which makes culture contradictory (I will discuss further this issue in Chapter V and in the overall conclusion). Instead we should look into culture as a consequence of the struggle between those *above* and those *below*; between those to whom all power is granted and those who submit to it, independently of their willingness or unwillingness to do so. Contradiction then is not an inherent element in people's lives as if it was something acquired at birth – a 'human nature' - but a condition brought about by those situations in which people's very survival is determined by their reactions to the power that oppresses them. This is not solely a struggle for physical survival: in the struggle between power and its subjects mental sanity is at stake too. This is indeed where the arts come into play. Focusing their attention upon the almighty agents of power, artists have tried to make sense of a world that is predominantly unbalanced, limited in resources and unjust.

Interestingly, of all the arts, and especially since the Middle Ages in Europe, painting appears to be the field in which this struggle between power and its subjects – and the contradictions it entails – is most clearly observed as a fixed pattern. During the course of the last millennium painters have reflected the way in which power has shifted the object of their attentions. Firstly was God, divinities, crucifixions and saints; after that almighty kings, queens and their courts; and latterly painters have merely reflected in one way or another themes and subjects: primarily individuals (related with the bourgeoisie), and the almighty capital (especially after the revolutions of 1848). Indeed, from the end of the nineteenth century and thanks to the overwhelming success of the bourgeois ideology, things get very complicated. Painters, and all artists for that matter, seem to have had problems identifying where the power lies. It is true that some rare cases even shift their subject of attention altogether from forms of power to those that are subject to it – like common people are – as it is in the case of Van Gogh. "As far as I know" said the painter in one of his letters "there isn't a single academy where one learns to draw and paint a digger, a sower, a woman putting the kettle over the fire or a seamstress. But in every city of some importance there is an academy with a choice of models for historical, Arabic, Louis XV, in short, 'all really nonexistent figures' [his inverted comas]." (Van Gogh, 1959: 400).

While Van Gogh mentions the choice of academies available, he also addresses the same problem of 'power-fixation' within the tradition of painting. It is not a coincidence then that, a few years later, the almighty power of technology was the primary motive of the latter futurists, celebrating machinery and both its constructive and destructive power. Thus, through the means of culture people have hitherto been able to identify power: God, the King or industrialists and their machines; they were *above* and the rest were *below*. For good or bad, people have had a concrete object of attention – a tangible power – and could consequently make decisions about it. But where does power dwell now?

In spite of the above, one could argue that we all recognize specific institutions and agents of and with power: presidents, prime ministers, the military, constitutional monarchs, systems of law and so on. We even get information about the kind of monumental profits amassed by individual entrepreneurs which, in the eyes of most, position them within the boundaries of some form of power. Indeed, their decisions affect most of us greatly. This I am not arguing. However, all these are agents and

institutions of *authority* and they do not attain *real* power because their actions are totally subject to an entity well above their influence; an entity which complies entirely with the supernatural pronouncements of a bygone divinity: the arbitrary wishes of capital. Time and again in the media, we can see how expert economists not only cannot predict the outcome of the economy from one year to another, but from one month to the next. As with God or monarchs in the past, capital not only is unpredictable and capricious, as Marx explains in his *Capital* (1999), it exists *only* when it keeps on expanding. The agents of authority that I refer to above have indeed the task of organizing societies according to the needs of capital's expansion but they are not almighty, generational power like capital is. But while the areas of religion and monarchy have not trespassed the limits of conceptual transcendence, capital disregards this and affirms itself as both mythical and abstract, personal and impersonal.[27]

This is, in my view, why capital is blind to everything and everyone: whenever any given agent generates a product which generates profit, capital allows it to have a space in the market. For capital does not mind about the agent's intentions either; even on those occasions when the agent's output is a blatant manifest against capital itself.[28] I will say it again: these days journalists like to call the President of the United States the most powerful man on earth, but when ex-president Bill Clinton hung the sign "it's the economy, stupid" all over his electoral headquarters in 1992, he knew that, in spite of himself, capital had the last word.

Thus, up until the beginnings of the twentieth century artists were able to refer their works to a concrete power, transferring it into symbols. Now something remarkable has happened in our post-industrial societies: the power to which everything and everyone is subjected to is there – capital – but most of us seem unable to represent it, to question it, to paint it. "In its early stages," says Eagleton, "capitalism had sharply severed the symbolic from the economic; now the two spheres are incongruously reunited, as the economic penetrates deeply into the symbolic realm itself [...] We were now [...] in the era of postmodernism." (Eagleton, 1991: 373) Is it possible that capital has fused everything and everyone to such an extent? Because if that is the case, then it would be reasonable to suggest that the reason we are unable to *talk* about capital – as Fredric Jameson suggests (Prendergast, 2003: 109) – is because people are virtually unable to perceive, or to imagine for that matter, what position they occupy in society. If capital has fused the economic and the symbolic (and in works of art, the way in which people

represent things and their lives) then capital must have gone as far as to transform *us* into capital itself. This is actually what Marx and then the Frankfurt School have been telling us all along: that we ourselves are now commodities which accordingly are exchanged and valued.

And yet one could suggest that, in spite of everything, and in a vast variety and levels of complexity and sophistication, we produce more culture than ever before. Does this culture represent real power (i.e. capital) in such a way that it is discernible to everyone and therefore available for discussion? I do not think so because it seems that capital still cannot be represented in a concrete way. This might be understood better when considering what capital's best representative is: money. "Money," says Eagleton evaluating Marx, "is a kind of monstrous sublimity, an infinitely spawning signifier which has severed all relation with the real, a fantastical idealism which blots out specific value as surely as those more conventional figures of sublimity – raging ocean, the mountain crags [...] The sublime, for Marx as for Kant, is *Das Unform*: the formless or monstrous." (Eagleton, 1991: 213). This being the case, money (that is, capital) is both idealist and abstract;[29] a metaphysical *Absolute*.

Every time anyone suggests "we have to be realistic," money is never far from the object of attention. In total disagreement with thinkers like Marx, the Frankfurt School and then Eagleton above, the official channels of knowledge/transfer – that is, the media, schools of education and so on – tell us repeatedly that we live in a materialistic society. As the next two chapters will hopefully make clear, this is not the case. Capitalism, as Edward Bond asserts (in appendix: 50), is an extreme form of idealist system in which people are made to believe the illusions it offers like being a winner or becoming rich. However, very rarely we remember those that in this process become the losers. As Ernesto Che Guevara indicated, rewriting the theory of reification, capitalism has its own intrinsic anti-human laws but we are unable to unearth them as if they were "invisible":

> The laws of capitalism, invisible and blind for most people, act upon the individual without his awareness. He sees only the broadness of a horizon that appears infinite. Capitalist propaganda presents it in just this way, and attempts to use the Rockefeller case (true or not) as a lesson in the prospects for success. The misery that must be accumulated for such an example to arise and the sum total of baseness contributing to the formation of a fortune of such magnitude do not appear in the picture, and the popular forces are not always able to make this concept clear.[30]

This is why "be realistic, demand the impossible" should not be taken as a "fatuous slogan" which, as Peter Conrad wants us to believe, "encapsulates [an] innocent incomprehension of politics".[31] Yes, it is true that Conrad might be both right and wrong: he is right because in 1968 the proposition "be realistic, demand the impossible" was delivered by the very offspring of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie, creating contradicting slogans which ultimately worked to the detriment of class awareness, as has been verified by time.[32] As Conrad says in the same article "[they] believed that revolution meant a frolicsome irresponsibility, the indefinite prolongation of childhood."[33] But he is also wrong because this remarkable epigram holds in its semantics many of the ideas evaluated here, making it as relevant today as it was in May 1968, spray-painted on a wall of a Parisian Latin Quarter. If "be realistic, demand the impossible" has become corrupted it is because it became neutralized by the bourgeois' handling of it (Baudrillard, 2001: 10; Eagleton, 1991: 349; Adorno, 1997: 325, 1990: 175; Wolin, 1990: 40). Conrad seems to ignore the Marxist evaluation of capitalism as the most extreme form of idealist ideology, which will be discussed further in due course. "Be realistic, demand the impossible" is instead realistic, non-contradictory and above all, ethical through and through.

To fully grasp this one needs to be aware first of capital as a universal; in other words, as Russell suggested, via its conceptualization (1954: 86). However, the epigraph above is ethical because, as I have discussed via Wittgenstein before, it requires the application of thinking in manners that cannot be expressed with political or moral languages: it is an "absolute judgment of value". It is what we *ought* to want to do. It is realistic and non-contradictory because in the real situation in which we live, a demand for the abolition of private property – and therefore the abolition of individual interest or gain from people's psychological motivations – is an "impossible," an overwhelming thing to ask. Thus, Max Weber's pragmatic analysis of society, through which he concluded that a capitalist world based in technical efficiency and undemocratic administration, cannot be transcended:

> More and more the material fate of the masses depends upon the steady and correct functioning of the increasingly bureaucratic organisation of private capitalism. The ideas of eliminating these organisations becomes more and more utopian (Bilton et al, 1981: 730)

Of course it is utopia, perhaps even more today than in Weber's time. And yet, in the context of the field that interests us here – that is, drama – it remains the only thing we ought to ask: "the impossible;" that is, the realm of perfect freedom and justice; that is, utopia.[34]

Furthermore, what if, as Brian J. Shaw suggests, by way of this supposedly capitalist final triumph, a revolutionary subject no longer exists? (Shaw, 1985: 165) If for Kant moral beliefs were people's inability to imagine a future without God, a future without God's successor, Capital, seems simply impossible.[35] And it is impossible because, as I have discussed earlier via Marx and Marxist scholars, the gain of capital has become a precept in our minds. We *are* capital too. That demanding the impossible is a realistic proposition is actually the finest representation I can think of, providing I had to associate Adorno's "Negative Dialectics" (O'Connor, 2000: 54-79) with Edward Bond's philosophy of drama. Syntactically, it is impossible to demand the impossible and yet, as I previously noted via the dramatist "we can't shut up because if we do that then forms of fascism and reaction will take over completely" (Bond in Byron, 1990: 20).

So where does power dwell now? If we accept then that it is *in* capital, it resides everywhere, even as a precept in the minds of the recipients. This makes contradiction a fundamental constituent of all artworks, of all dialectics. That "Artists are radical for as long as they lack customers" as Peter Conrad says (in *The Observer*, 2002) is an antagonistic situation evident everywhere. As Adorno explains, when we live in a fundamentally "antagonistic situation," contradiction is presented in and by artworks as a "whole" (Adorno, 1997: 323). In this holistic situation, Adorno also includes the artist: for success makes them members and part of that power they purport to hate.

But how is the millenarian pattern of struggle between real power and its subjects fulfilled in the arts today? I need to return once again to the field of painting, bringing this section to an end. One could well argue that with the arrival of modern abstract art and its subsequent movements and 'isms' the representation of power seems to be totally non-existent. The progression for example from Marcel Duchamp's "ready-made"[36] in 1912, through to the phenomenon of Conceptual art in the 1960s in which the process and the idea of a work is more important than the finished product (if any) does not seem to pose any questions about power, but about the nature of art itself.[37]

Indeed, the influence of this approach has been so substantial that now it forms integral part of most artistic fields; as for example, the emerging new field of Practice as Research in Performance (also designated with its abbreviation PARIP).[38] But, on the assumption that *real* modern power (capital) is unrepresentable, could it be that non-representational paintings exemplified by modern abstract artworks are instead complying with the millenarian tradition of representing real power?

This takes me effortlessly on to what Christopher Prendergast calls Fredric Jameson's "final delivery": that modernity is not just "ways of talking about capitalism" but ways of *refusing* altogether to talk about it (Prendergast, 2003: 109). Thus my deduction is that since capital – that is, the formless sublime – cannot be represented in concrete ways, non-representational art actually complies, knowingly or unknowingly, with the artistic tradition of "power-fixation." Indeed, when Fredric Jameson explains how "money [is] the fundamental source of all abstraction" (1998: 25),[39] he might actually be offering art practitioners a good framework from which to search for the real origins of non-representational art. When painters and performers concentrate their efforts in questioning nothing but the nature of art itself, from a certain perspective it would look as if they were in reality celebrating power – celebrating capital – with the same reverential fervour with which Michelangelo Buonarroti celebrated God.

Conclusion to chapter III

With a sense of urgency, Edward Bond stresses through his works and writings the idea that we live in "extreme times." As a result, many scholars and critics including the *Oxford Encyclopedia* itself (which somehow makes it official) pin the badge of 'controversial' on his work and persona. And from the seemingly comfortable setting of our liberal democracies it is easy to understand why Bond is pigeonholed in such a way. During the second half of the last century we have seen situations in Africa, South-America, or the Far and Middle-East as 'extreme' as we see them right now, but all from the warmth and safety of our houses. Independent of whether these areas have suffered as a result of our western economies, most of us have had and have easy access to commodities and entertainments; social security and free education. As Bond says himself: "very often the victories it [the working class] achieves are not through socialist politics, but through the successes of capitalism" (appendix: 34). And of course, as Terry Eagleton seems to tell me in a personal letter, Auschwitz and

Hiroshima seem grotesque events of a bygone era.[40] But we abide to the same moral values on the one hand, and a form of highly evolved and sophisticated capitalist system on the other, which were, as I introduced before through Chapter II and will discuss through chapter V , behind the atrocities of Auschwitz and Hiroshima.

Thus, Bond is not 'polemical' for the sake of it. That we live in times of extremism is in my view reflected precisely in our inability to identify power. Our times are extreme because, as Steven B. Smith suggests, it seems as if we are currently ruled by "nobody" (1985: 653). Even Marxist Critical Theory, argues Smith criticizing Althusser, seems to be *a* Marxism "without a Knowing Subject" (Ibid.: 641-655). It is as if one could stop to ponder, bewildered, upon the questions 'where is the working class? Where is the class struggle'? Is it possible that Marx's dictum "All history has hitherto been a history of class struggles" means now in art and culture "hitherto" in its literal sense – that is, up to this point? Has history died?

This might seem an unnecessary rhetorical question because history does not "die" as such. Francis Fukuyama rightly wanted us to recognise the death of history because class struggle seems to have vanished (1992), and Marx only thought of history in terms of class conflict. But nor do we have, as Walter Benjamin suggested, a theory of history "on the basis of which fascism can be sighted" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 972). This is why, considering postmodern aesthetics as the aesthetics of the invisible, we live in extremely dangerous times.[41] This extreme capitalist situation in which all culture is industry must affect our perception of history in ways which Marx did not predict. Prior to suggesting what "responsibility in drama" means, we need to analyse the ways or mechanisms by which the market has industrialised culture. If there is one critic that contributes to the debate of how the mechanics of the culture industry affects us, while supplementing with further insights the abstract and philosophical dialectics of Adorno, the empirical perspective of the sociologist Pierre Bourdieu (1985) is the best on offer.

Endnotes

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[1]Again, here I am making reference to Wittgenstein's dictum *what we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence*. [Cahoon, 1996: 199]. See the introduction of this chapter p.103.

[2] Luke Rendell and Hal Whitehead, "Culture in whales and dolphins", in *Behavioral* [sic] *and Brain Sciences*, 2001, issue 24, pp. 309-382, p. 310. All the sources are from the scientific field of animal behaviour and are accordingly supplied in this article.

[3] I am making allusion here to one of the letters that Bond sent to me. In it he says "the cave-paintings were painted for *ME*." Of course, he is stressing the intrinsic meaning that they are great art because they were made for all people.

[4] Irving Wohlfarth, "Hibernation: On the Tenth Anniversary of Adorno's Death", *MLN*, Vol. 94, No. 5, Comparative Literature (Dec., 1979), pp. 956-987, p. 961.

[5] Pierre Bourdieu defines the first as "the field of large-scale cultural production" (FLP) and the second as "the field of restricted production" (FRP) (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). I will come back to the approach of Bourdieu later on in chapter V.

[6] *Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia*, see what it has to say on the word "concept" (The Learning Company, 1997)

[7] BBC Radio 4, Friday, 13 May 2005, "PM".

[8] The late 18th century seems a time ago: Britain has come a long way from the time when it was perfectly normal to have children as young as five and six years of age working 13 to 16 hours a day in the mills. In 1942, Lord William Beveridge (1879-1963) finally achieved the founding in Britain of the National Insurance. Nowadays it is taken for granted by all, and most forget that it is the product of great social struggle. Up to the 1900s British workers had only their bare hands – and the hope of not falling ill – to survive. Very little was added to the workers welfare during the years to come, right up to World War II. Unemployment was rampant, above all in the North of Ireland, Scotland and the North of England, due on one hand, to the U.S. Stock Market Crash of 1929, and on the other, to the five years from 1924 to 1929 in which Churchill as Chancellor "returned to the gold standard over valuing the pound, imposing serious handicaps on British exports, especially textile and coal-mining industries." (Cole, G. D. H, *The Intelligent Man's Guide to the Post-war World*, London: Victor Gallanz Ltd, 1947, p. 489). Socialist ideas, fought by the establishment as much as a democratic façade would permit, were, during the war, making space among hopeful British people. Those who had had access to the privilege of education like G. D. H Cole (1947), and those from humble classes who became teachers and lecturers, started to open the minds of the people with discourses *like What I Take for Granted*:

> *(1)* Standards of Living (...) to raise this standards in our country and throughout the world (...) to put and end to malnutrition, preventable disease and mortality, illiteracy and ignorance, and sub-human living and working conditions wherever they exist (ibid.: 35)

According to Cole, up to then the main presuppositions of capitalism were two important points: (1) the contention that men are too lazy or unprincipled to work unless they are driven on by the whip of starvation, or/and (2) that industry cannot be carried on unless those who work in it have the threat of the sack continually before their eyes. From 1945, people had the expectation that the quality of their lives should improve. During the next six years that the Labour leader Clement Attlee (1883-1967) was in office, vigorous programs of reform were carried through the nation. The Bank of England, the coal mines, civil aviation, cable and wireless services, gas, electricity, railways, road transport and steel were nationalized. The National Health Service was introduced and independence was granted to India (1947) and Burma. Europe had to be reconstructed. There was a pursuit of full employment which, it could be argued, in a capitalist society would lead to some sort of Socialism – ignoring, perhaps, that it would give rise to the haunting inflation. Cole, then, contended rightly that the workers, relieved of the fear

of unemployment "will now be in a position to exact higher wages, or as consumers, lower prices." (Ibid.: 199). But Adorno's predictions of his theory of "false consciousness" were made visible once again. Paradoxically, in 1951, one more Marxist prediction was materialized in the General Election, when a sick and debilitated W. Churchill was called by the British voters into office yet again.

[9] It is to the market that we owe our allotment; there is no way out of it. Following Irving Wohlfarth's criticism on Adorno's thinking, the bourgeois ideology makes us to confuse "liberty with the freedom to sleep under the bridges". People does not have either the choice or the tools with which to make choice possible; among other things because we do not have the tradition for it ("Hibernation: On the Tenth Anniversary of Adorno's Death", MLN, Vol. 94, No 5, Comparative Literature (Dec. 1979), pp. 956-987, p. 975-6)

[10] "Reach-Me-Down Romantic", *The London Review of Books*, Vol. 25, No. 12, 19 June 2003.

[11] I am younger than Eagleton and of Spanish upbringing, and while a liberal "social consensus" was established in Britain in the 1950s it was so much later in Spain – in the 1980s with the death of Franco. That is why I, for instance, recognize this identification with a melancholic memory of what people of the lower classes were, but that no longer are: we were poor but the doors of everyone were wide open all day long; today, all doors are closed, literally and metonymically. We were not afraid of being robbed. Today everyone is suspicious of each other. 'Tomorrow' was not a land of "opportunity" and "success" but a land of hope and decency. The only one who ever lied was the shopkeeper. Today, everyone has to master the proceedings of lying within the law in order to succeed or succumb. I believe that Williams and Eagleton have experienced those same human conditions, when the working class was very different from the working class of today, and it becomes very difficult to 'let it go', as it were. I have also experienced at first hand the damage that the leaders and intellectuals of the left have done in Spain, societally and therefore culturally, during the 1980s and 1990s. It is true that Spain might have a different social and historical context, but the patterns of progressive damage inflicted on what were already confused public perceptions seem to me closely similar. I was young and an activist in the Spain of the 1980s when the leader of the Spanish Communist Party (Partido Comunista Español – PCE) Santiago Carrillo, during some General Elections incessantly made use of slogans like "no hay nada más tonto que un obrero de derechas" (there is nothing more stupid than a right-wing worker). Slogans like these only cheered up those who were already supporters, but alienated all the rest of the workers, who were indeed right-wing supporters, Catholics to the core and of course, "stupid" and the silent majority. How could anyone expect anything else from the workers of Spain after forty years under the ideology, the propaganda and the aesthetics of Franco's dictatorship? Indeed, during those years under Franco, the ideologies of the left were run by and for the same "dissident offspring of the upper and upper middle classes" in exclusivity; not by the working class. Carrillo and those who put him as leader – indeed, the left wing intellectuals – caused far worse damage to the causes of socialism than the right could ever have dreamt of.

[12] "Abstract" says Eagleton, "because, when sheer material survival is at stake, the sensuous qualities of the objects intended by such needs are not in question" (ibid.)

[13] In the chapter "Negative Dialectics and the Possibility of philosophy" (O'Connor, 2000; pp. 54-78) Adorno resolutely says "dialectics not standpoint" (spec. pp. 56-9).

[14] From Adorno/Horkheimer's *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York, 1972); quoted in Wohlfarth's p. 984.

[15] Utilitarianism refers, in essence, to the idea that the goal of morality is "the greatest happiness of the greatest number." (See Bunnin, and Tsui-James, 1999: 617-40) In other words, natural rights are nonsense or as they like to put it, 'hunger is not bread'. Of course, from that perspective, slavery during the 18th Century had to have a justification even in the minds of those whose goal was equality and social justice. That utilitarianism is as functioning today as it was two hundred years ago is revealed by the fact that in current discussions it is mostly

accepted that the atomic bombs in Hiroshima and Nagasaki were actually for the good of a majority, and that the bombs saved more lives than they effectively killed.

[16] That is, in this case I am refereeing to those cultures trying to make sense of a world full of unknowns and menacing environments, and therefore with a need to create gods, kings, sacrifices and all the rest. This is entirely different from the relativist moral justifications that a utilitarianist could make about the actions of Voltaire and Jefferson.

[17] 1848 witnessed a series of revolutions in western and central Europe. They sprang from a shared background of autocratic government and economic unrest, as well as from the failure of conservative governments to grant representation to the middle classes, and the awakened nationalism of minorities in central and Eastern Europe. Revolution erupted first in France, where supporters of universal suffrage and a socialist minority under Louis Blanc caused the overthrow of the July monarchy and established the Second Republic. In most German states there were popular demonstrations and uprisings, and a movement for an elected national parliament to draft a constitution for a united Germany. Rioting in Austria caused the flight of both Metternich and the emperor, and the formation of a constituent assembly and the emancipation of the peasantry. Also, a movement for Hungarian independence, headed by Kossuth, led to a short-lived republican government from Budapest for all Hungarian lands; but Magyar's refusal to consider independence for its own minorities resulted in an insurrection by Croat, Serb, and Transylvanian forces and in Hungary's defeat by Austrian and Russian forces. In the Italian states there was a series of abortive revolutions which led to the temporary expulsion of the Austrians and the flight of Pope Pius IX from Rome, but the united, democratic republic dreamt of by Mazzini did not come about. A Pan-Slav Congress in Prague inspired Czech nationalist demonstrations to demand autonomy within a federal Austria. By 1849 counter-revolutionary forces had restored order, but the concept of absolute monarchy and the feudal rights of a land-owning aristocracy had been tacitly abandoned. (Oxford Encyclopedia, The Learning Company, 1997)

[18] Gartman makes this analysis from Georg Lukacs' "Idea and Form in Literature", pp. 109-31 and "The Ideology of Modernism", pp. 277-307, in *Marxism and Human Liberation*, New York: Dell., 1973.

[19] He had been able to get "the more important half" out of Germany, says Aredut. (p. 23)

[20] Peter Demetz adds some interesting information on the dreadful death of Benjamin – which, only to some extent, might dispute my own argument on Benjamin's inbuilt pessimism: Benjamin [...] "was told on the Spanish side by the local functionary (who wanted to blackmail the refugees) that Spain was closed to them and that they would be returned in the morning to the French authorities, who were just waiting to hand them over to the Gestapo. Benjamin – totally exhausted and possibly sick – took an overdose of morphine, refused medical help, and died in the morning, while his fellow refugees were promptly permitted to proceed through Spanish territory to Lisbon." (Demetz, 1986: xiv-xv). Only those who were told that "they were going to be handed over to the Gestapo" have the authority to talk of the terrifying feelings they experienced; if one adds sickness and exhaustion to it, hopefulness must sound like a sickening joke. And yet, the facts support my argument: Benjamin threw away that which no man can afford to throw away: the precious instant of hope.

[21] Nevertheless, as Hanna Aredut argues, of all the giants of dialectical thinking, Benjamin is the most unclassifiable: "his erudition was great, but he was no scholar; his subject matter comprised texts and their interpretation, but he was no philologist; he was greatly attracted not by religion but by theology and the theological type of interpretation but he was not theologian [...] he was not particularly interested in the Bible; he was born writer, but his greater ambition was to produce a work entirely of quotations; he was the first to translate Proust and Franz Hessel [...] but he was not translator; he reviewed books [...] but he was not literary critic; [...] he thought poetically, but he was neither a poet nor a philosopher" (pp. 9-10)

[22] See also Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory*, pages 56, 79, and 299.

[23] See Levy (1994, esp. 61 and 123); Kogon (1960, esp. pp. 300-328) in chapter twenty three, "The Psychology of the Prisoners"; and most recently the BBC has broadcast a series of documentaries on the Nazi concentration camps, from where many survivors did testify, bewildered, to these facts (one example was "The Nazis: a warning" on BBC2, April 30, 2005, time: 19:50 to 20:40).

[24] Edward Bond objects to Adorno's notorious claim that "to write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric" (O'Connor, p. 210). "On the contrary", says Bond "Auschwitz is the home of poetry" (appendix: 7). But if one makes an attentive reading of Adorno's works, this is also what Adorno says and he apologies for it, albeit in a far more complicated manner. What Adorno suggests in reality is not that, after Auschwitz, people should not create poetry anymore; but that what is certainly barbarous is to make poetry – and that is, art – with the same precepts as before Auschwitz and go on living all the same (O'Connor, 86-7). In my view, Edward Bond postulates the same thought. Indeed, after reading and correcting the transcript included here as appendix, Bond wrote in it the following comment "Of course I agree with what you say. My argument about the extreme in drama is that it forces people to define themselves one way or the other – but I also think that by creating total situations it can force people to see through themselves; to see themselves in their situation." (4 July 2005).

[25] Coercive because we are compelled to live by the system in one way or another, or succumb. Bond himself is well aware of it: "owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder – in everything I'm against" (Bond, 1995: 13). We own property, property that has been obtained with money which itself has been reproduced by the very system one confronts.

[26] According to Tag McEntegart, the "tripartite arrangement" to which Bond refers consists of the dynamic relationship between the people/community, the administration/state/church and what he calls "the Boundary" which provides the answers at any particular moment in history to the basic questions of existence: Why? What? Wherefore? Wherefrom? The power over and therefore the control of the *Boundary* have shifted throughout history (Tag McEntegart, "Imagining The Real & Realising the Imagined...", *The Journal of Drama in Education*, Vol. 20, Issue 2, Summer 2004, p. 13.)

[27] Here I am following Oxford Encyclopedia's notions about God (1997) and Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, specially the Chapter II of "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Section 3 "Opining, Knowing and Believing;" and also Chapter I, Section 3 "The Disciplines of Pure Reason in Respect of its Proofs."

[28] The publishing industry for example, is packed with Marxist works. And if my case in point is Edward Bond and his ongoing fight against capitalism as an extreme social system that works against human beings, the dramatist output of theory and plays is also expanding in the market rather steadily not only in Europe but now in the USA (According to the letter that the Parisian director of the Theatre National de la Colline, Allan Françon, addressed to Bond, dated 25 May 2005).

[29] Interestingly, according to Poulantzas, *Das Capital* is approached in two ways by two different groups of thinkers: as an abstract theory of economy by economists, and as an essential method of historic investigation by historians (Aricó, 1976: 92). And yet, says Poulantzas *Das Capital*, is neither a work on economics nor a work on history in its "immediate sense:" instead is a work that allows a theoretical reconstruction of history and economics (p. 100). However, in relation to the idea of capital as an abstract entity Poulantzas also highlights the fact that, by way of his own annotations, Marx himself could not grasp entirely the novelty of his own theory. "We can do it only through the symptomatic reading of it; of its indications, interpreting its own language and Marx's own mistakes" [my own translation from Spanish] (p. 91).

[30] Ernesto Che Guevara's *On Revolutionary Medicine* (1999; orig. 1960).

[31] "You say you want a revolution...," *The Observer Review*, Sunday January 20, 2002.

[32] The Italian author, Pier Paolo Pasolini, exposes this argument in full in one of his five tragedies, *Calderon* (In *Teatro*, Milan: Italy, Garzanti, 1995, pp. 27-165). This is an argument that will have proper attention in the next chapter "Culture or industry."

[33] Conrad, further justifying his position of scorn towards the 68's movement, also produces the example of the septuagenarian avant-gardist Pierre Boulez who was arrested by the police in November 2001. The French Police had been tipped off that during the 1960s he published a pamphlet proposing that the opera houses of Europe should be burnt down. "Had they captured a musical terrorist" says Conrad, "an incognito Taliban operative seeking to follow up the iconoclastic bombing of those giant Buddhas? Boulez had to explain that this long-ago incendiary manifesto was nothing more than a joke." (Conrad, 2002).

[34] When one talks of redeeming utopia, it should be specified what type of utopia one intends to redeem. Following Richard Wollin (1990) I do not propose here the utopianism so criticised by Marx: that utopian future which in essence "is a secularized version of eschatological religious longing." (Ibid.: 45). No. As I said before, if we ever live in a just and perfect world that needs signs reminding us what is good and what is bad; what is just and unjust. That is why I think we need, on the one hand, Adorno's version of aesthetics as a safeguard of determined negation in the arts; and on the other, Bond's philosophy of drama as a shield against drama's neutralization. But Weber also predicted an inevitable dehumanised world as a consequence of the mechanics of capitalist Western culture (Bilton et al, 1981: 731): if that comes true at any time, then drama would certainly become obsolete. If we were to follow Weber's views on capitalism, the question should not be "how?" drama is going to vanish from our mental mapping, but "when?"

[35] *Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, electronic edition, (www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr; accessed: 23.08.02.) in "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Chapter I, Section 3, "Opining, Knowing and Beliving."

[36] His *Fountain* – a bicycle wheel mounted on a kitchen stool, a bottle rack, and a urinal – is an example of what "ready-made" is.

[37] On Conceptual Art see *Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia*, 1997.

[38] On Practice as Research in Performance see Bella Merlin's "Practice as Research in Performance: a Personal Response," *NTQ* 20:1, (February, 2004), pp. 36-44. As Merlin says "I now appreciate that it was the *process* that was innovative, and not necessarily the outcome: anyone viewing the final theatre piece would not have seen anything [...]" (p. 41). This is indeed the very definition of what Conceptual Art is. Nevertheless, Merlin's article is also a refreshing – and courageous – contribution to the debate of whether wealth and economic security is behind all cultural purposes: "Why do practitioners research"? says Merlin " [...] ultimately we all need to put bread on the table [...] The thought of regular salaries, a pension scheme, long holidays [...]"(p. 39).

[39] In the same article by Jameson, read the most relevant section "The Philosophy of Money," pp. 27-9.

[40] Letter reproduced in full in chapter V, 'culture or ideology'.

[41] Some statistical notes might help to remind us of how in the western democracies there is a hugely important and fundamental problem which to this day remains unresolved: "The US" says Anthony Giddens "appears as the most unequal of all industrial countries in terms of income distribution. The proportion of income taken by the top 1% has increased substantially over the past tow or three decades, while those at the bottom have seen their average incomes stagnate or decline [...] Using the criterion of half or less of median income, 57 million people were living in poverty in the EU nations in 1998. About two-thirds of these were in the largest societies: France, Italy, the UK and Germany" (2001: 90).

(PART II)

4. CHAPTER IV

Culture or Industry

Introduction

According to David Hesmondhalgh, a distinction between the singular form "The Culture Industry" and the plural form "The Cultural Industries" is now needed (2002:15). Its singular form, he sustains, is a pejorative concept intended to shock, while its plural form "enriches" us all with its products – even to those "teachers, students, and writers" who "lapse into a pessimism similar to that of the 'Culture Industry' chapter" (Ibid.: 16). In his view, current culture enriches us with "plenty of exciting, interesting and funny" stuff (Ibid.: 23). Probably, but distinguishing between the plural and the singular form – that is, whether all culture is now an industry or whether culture is an amalgam of industries - might be a unnecessary distraction from a most relevant problem. Hesmondhalgh points to cultural industries as if he could divide culture into two big functioning groups: one a manufacturing culture reliant on the demands of market and exchange-value, and the other as an autonomous culture of a higher order. Culture might appear as such to a swift observer, but, as Bourdieu explains, both cultural fields are too compromised by their reliance on power and capital (1977; 1977a; 1984; 1985). On the other hand, by brandishing culture as "industries", culture has seemingly been grouped in the collective imaginary as part and parcel of a society totally *engulfed* by the philosophy of commodity exchange and value (Harvie, 2003: 16).

Following two centuries of continuous ideological clash, the current standardisation of culture as "industries" seems more like a final conquest of the final frontier: if real power is Big Capital (see Chapter V) and Big Capital is the result of industries, culture has been taken on by real power. Besides, could there be a culture that, in contemporary times, is not connected with industry/industries? Is there any cultural movement that has not, in greater or lesser measure, anything to do with any of the devices of exchange and value – publishing, publicity, marketing strategy, distribution, and so on? If one takes into account Nietzschean discourses of honesty, this *radical* nominative shift of culture into an industry should instead be recognized accordingly.

The theatre industry, the music industry, the creative industry are but a few of those fields that for too long pretended not to have major relations with the economic system.

The culture industry is, actually, an accurate definition: culture *is* – and has been for some time now – an industry through and through. It produces huge quantities of cash, public recognition and status, direct and indirect employment, and by decantation culture creates industries which creates more culture and so in rapid succession.[1] Thus, I would not argue here whether it is wrong to address culture as industry or industries. *Even* cultural practitioners need an income and surely a decent housing and holidays and all the rest. Instead, in my view we ought to apply our efforts trying to understand whether the traditional critical tension between power and its subjects has, in culture, been erased.

Critics like Hesmondhalgh celebrate the current field of cultural studies when it declares that popular culture needs to be taken seriously (2002: 39), but he seems to ignore the fact that Adorno and Horkheimer sat down to write "Dialectic of Enlightenment," "Negative Dialectics," and "The Culture Industry" because they took both popular and 'high' culture very seriously indeed; but for different reasons. When Hesmondhalgh asks us to take culture seriously, he does so because some cultural propositions are good producers of financial value and creators of industries.[2] Adorno and Horkheimer did not appear to disagree with Hesmondhalgh, because they were also of the view that cultural production had become "an integrated component of the capitalist economy as a whole" (Adorno, 2001: 9). But they also explained at length that, in mass culture, culture was not any longer the product of spontaneity as it ought to be, but imposed from "above". This is, in resumed accounts, the origin of their term the "Culture Industry" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 962), and if this is the case, culture's condition should be taken very seriously indeed. This is why when reconsidering this term, Adorno also advises that "industry" here is "not to be taken literally" because "it refers to the standardization of culture" itself (O'Connor, 2000: 233). Furthermore, as I have already suggested, in order to *do* culture, cultural practitioners have had to accommodate to the mechanics of capital expansion. In this process, culture has lost the sign of power, which enables culture to express a need for freedom. If this is the current state of culture, then cultural practitioners find themselves in a situation in which they are unable to apply culture's foremost function: its "utopian function" (Gartman, 1991: 440).

As Gartman reminds us, in the struggles between the bourgeoisie and the feudal rule, culture was the fundamental "safety valve for discontent" (Gartman, 1991: 440). It enabled the bourgeoisie culture to express the need for freedom until it finally replaced feudal order. The important thing now is to understand whether this supposedly essential "utopian function" of culture is currently at work. According to Bourdieu, in our post-industrial society culture's utopian function is "denied by the class organization of society" (Ibid.). On account of the findings presented here, my opinion is that it is indeed at work, but it operates as a tool of protection for the bourgeoisie's interests, while working to the detriment of everyone else, subjected to the wishes and tastes of the former.

A responsible proposition in the age of the culture industry would be then to reclaim culture's utopian function for the benefit of all – a demand for the "impossible." But according to Pierre Bourdieu's sociological theory, if current culture acts as a "system of symbols" which furthers class "misrecognition" (Gartman, 1991: 421), then people would not know whether they need a utopian function at all – except, of course, those who, via the capital power they possess, know already what freedom[3] feels like. So how could we represent in the arts the longing for freedom and justice of the oppressed class when, thanks to the dominant bourgeois ideology, *all* social classes believe they have as much freedom and justice as it is possible to get? Class 'misrecognition' seems to be one of the fundamental barriers obstructing any consequential utopian proposition.

It does not seem accidental that there exists prolonged scholarly debate over whether there is a faultless communication between creative practitioners and their audiences.[4] Indeed, by writing extensively about the ways in which his work should be understood and staged, Bond also acknowledges this problem. This issue was considered during our encounter, and the dramatist agreed that, in general, theatrical audiences are mainly comprised of elites (appendix: 44; 61). Yet, and by definition, elites would not have in mind a transformation of their very society; certainly not to a point in which their own status and privileges could be jeopardized. From this situation, and taking into consideration the dramatist's obvious hierarchical position within the field of theatre studies, Bond has emerged with a unique strategy: while he circumvents as much as possible not only the theatrical stream-line, but also its habitual audiences, the dramatist is actively involved with children's education. In my view, Bond's latter creative

relocation within these spheres – the education of infants, children, and adolescents –[5] has been not only an act of social responsibility and of authenticity, but a response to the "impossible" grounds of current culture industry's intrinsic ethos. Thus, here I will explore and discuss the premise behind such shift and those cultural grounds that may have provoked Bond's radical or unusual change of strategy. In order to evaluate this process, I intend here to look at the seemingly interdependent relationship between culture and industry by way of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of culture, to shed further light on Bond's creative strategy.

4.1. Section I

4.1.1. Class homogeneity through cultural consumption.

While the Frankfurt School tell us that current culture acts as reification, and therefore "obscures the real class relations between people" (Gartman, 1991: 422), Bourdieu suggests that current class relations are put out of sight by a bourgeois "symbolic violence" exerted upon the social classes (Ibid.: 424). The French sociologist ignores the theory of reification, Gartman explains, because his theory is ahistorical and so he is not concerned with the changing relations of production on which capitalist culture is based (Ibid.: 421-3). Interestingly, while Adorno's analysis of culture is most often abstract and philosophical, Bourdieu's is "painstakingly empirical" (Ibid.: 422). Nevertheless, in the task of explaining the specific aesthetics at work in current culture they complement each other.[6] Thus, Gartman proposes the analysis of both theories as a new neo-Marxist theory of culture in relation to the "effects of class on culture in historical class struggle" (Ibid.: 423). Here, I will focus my attention on those examples by which it is possible to explain this apparent lack of struggle between social classes in current post-industrial times.[7] This is, in essence, where current culture appears dysfunctional when situated in a historicist perspective; this is where current dysfunctionality of culture and Bond's nomination of current times as "extreme" meet.

Measuring his own historicist analysis against Bourdieu's *Distinction* (1984), Gartman gives a good account of how, from the beginning of the industrial revolution, power – or as Nicos Poulantzas designates it, "Big Capital" (1974) – has arbitrarily allocated a value to each of the three historical distinctive class cultures (that is, to the bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and to the working class "peasants and industrial workers") by means of "symbolic violence" (Gartman, 1991: 424). This violence is hidden from the

"victims" themselves and therefore accepted (Ibid.: 425). In what ways can this violence be hidden? While the Frankfurt School analyses this hidden violence by way of their theory of "false consciousness" which obscures classes altogether (O'Connor, 2000: 13), Bourdieu differentiates his theory from that of the Frankfurt School by "establishing a hierarchy of honor [sic] between them" (Gartman, 1991: 426). Thus, the true origins of the groups are abstracted by appearing as differences in "individual worthiness" (Ibid.). But how is it that these three social and cultural classes allow themselves to be violated, as if they were submissive victims? Gartman says that it is so by way of what Bourdieu calls *habitus*, "a practical sense that is not consciously formulated or chosen" (Ibid.: 425).[8] Curiously, the term *habitus* brings to mind Adorno's term "false consciousness," which, as I explained in Chapter I, is Adorno's way of explaining Marx's theory of reification in the setting of a post-industrial society.[9] But most important, Bourdieu's *habitus* provides supplementary support to the argument that cultural attitudes gradually become precepts in our mind, which I previously suggested via Russell in the introduction of this part. Thus, according to the French critic, *habitus* is "the disposition or system of dispositions, resulting from the invisible mechanism of alignment and regulation" (D'Arcy, 2005:325). How can this be? Because, as John Thompson explains, "habitus is acquired through a gradual process of inculcation" resulting in a "durably installed system of dispositions."[10] Thomson's "habitus" and Russell's "precepts" appear undoubtedly to be two branches of the same tree. *Habitus* is one more contribution to the current debate about whether it continues to be feasible to use terms such as working class.[11] This is important inasmuch as culture is understood to be the by-product of a struggle via symbols: that is, in historicist terms, first a struggle against God, then a struggle against the King and lately, a struggle against "Big Capital."

4.1.2. Symbolic violence

When Bourdieu says that power allocates value to the usual three classes, in my view he is adding a very important detail, further supporting the thesis that capital has become – perhaps for as long as it has been with us – an entity all of its own. Because suggesting that power imposes a "value" – or a *habitus* that becomes a precept by way of "symbolic violence" – upon the working class and upon the petty bourgeoisie presents a logical course: in societies divided by the degree to which they can access resources, those who have more exert power upon those who have less. But when Bourdieu also

includes the bourgeoisie as a class to which a value is allocated, would it not mean then that "power" imposes a value on itself? Does Bourdieu mean that the bourgeoisie is a subjugated class too? In a sense, like Poulantzas, I think he does.[12]

Historically, one function of culture is to find ways of representing or defining real power to us, its subjects. Sources of power such as nature, a god, a Pope or a king could be pinpointed and its subjects could choose whether or not to revolt. But now *real* power is such an abstract and unrepresentable entity as Big Capital to which all – kings, popes and presidents – submit. People may demonstrate against anti-social political decisions, but they have little to say when these are the product of financial fluctuations. Thus, does capitalism give a value to the bourgeoisie itself? Has it used the bourgeoisie for its own purposes? George Lukács describes this feature of capitalism several times: "man in capitalist society confronts a reality 'made' by himself [...] which appears to him to be a natural phenomenon alien to himself; he is wholly at the mercy of its 'laws'" (1990: 135). The dominant ideology offers us a precedent which will be further elaborated in the next chapter. In order to protect itself, Big Capital sometimes sacrifices some of its most direct agents, as it did during Nazi Germany with the Jewish bourgeoisie. Anti-Semitism has an origin in the inherent anti-capitalist side of both the working class and the petty bourgeoisie. However, as Poulantzas explains, it is through the "mystified" anti-capitalist side of the petty bourgeoisie that the image of the "rich exploiting Jew" is "adapted" to the needs of Big Capital (Poulantzas, 1974: 254-55). "This aspects suits big capital," says Poulantzas, "not only because it shifts the anti-capitalism of the petty bourgeois masses onto the Jews but also because it corresponds to its colonialist and expansionist interests" (Ibid.). For the time being, this is enough supporting evidence: the traditional three classes seem to obtain a value from Big Capital, regardless of their *habitus* and/or status.

Classes then, says Bourdieu, are defined by their levels of exposure to more or less necessity: "both economical and cultural" necessity (Gartman, 1991: 424). Within a scale of *exposure to necessity* and thanks to its "high volume of capital", the bourgeoisie appears as the top class, which allows them to stand so very distant from the "economic necessities of life." (Ibid.). This stimulates in them a "taste for freedom" (Ibid.) which corresponds to the bourgeois's preference for all things "removed from mundane material functions;" in other words, it stimulates a fondness for artistic and cultural objects, "an aesthetic disposition" (Ibid.).[13] At the bottom of this type of scale, says

Bourdieu, stands the working class whose low income makes them ignore tastes for freedom, giving preference to functional things and "practicalities of material existence": all "natural, unformalized and sensual" things (Ibid.). Finally we have the petty bourgeoisie, which is situated in between the other two social classes and which, Gartman says, are "distinguished by their taste for pretension" (Ibid.). In other words, its features are delineated by its aspirations to bourgeoisie status, but it has neither the capital nor the *habitus* to achieve it.

Hitherto, Bourdieu's arrangement of class structures seems to fit more within the boundaries of late capitalism. In current post-industrial societies, thanks to an economy which is increasingly based on the production of services, the class-divisions between petty bourgeoisie and working class seem to have endured further misrecognition by way of ever more sophisticated "symbols", and therefore a more sophisticated "symbolic violence". But Bourdieu's and Poulantzas' labelling of the petty bourgeoisie as a class with aspirations to bourgeois status is in my view where all debate on current culture ought to concentrate. According to the arguments considered in the next section of this chapter, post-industrial class misrecognition is indeed the result of an overwhelming ideological domination by the petty bourgeoisie's *non-ideological* (see below) ideology of "taste for pretension". This does not mean that all classes aspire to a bourgeois status: neither the bourgeoisie nor the working class aspire to bourgeois status because the former is already there and the latter is too far away from it. Instead, it means that in the current social hierarchical ladder, those classes who are competing for a better social status always believe they should be one level above their *rightful* status. Thus, by way of their higher wages, and therefore an enhanced access to material and non-material cultural goods,[14] working class individuals *believe* they have reached the status of middle-class; middle-class the status of the upper middle-class and so on.

In this sense, and mediated by Max Weber's refined definition of bureaucracy, the ideology of the petty bourgeoisie appears also as a highly sophisticated bureaucratization of a society in which individuals are made to believe that they are chosen on merit and free and able to progress up the hierarchy – a progress that is controlled by the *top* (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 369; 70-2-4). Consequently, in such a supposed society the individuals must also believe that if they do not progress up the hierarchical ladder, it is not a consequence of their *rightful* class category but of their own individual capabilities: indeed, that his or her low status is the result of his or

her own failure as an individual. Curiously, and even if Weber's kind of conceptualized society appears to some as hypothetical, it evokes current political slogans. In the United States for example, both Republicans and Democrats remind their electorate repeatedly that they are part of a society of opportunity in which individuals stand equal one to another. Similarly in Great Britain, Liberals, Conservatives and those in the Labour Party say the aim is to build a society based on equal opportunity.[15] By natural deduction, within these slogans an essentially emotive content is also concealed. It is a pseudo-referential encoding of the imperative "if you're poor and unemployed, you have only yourself to blame." Unsurprisingly, after four years of sociological research on "The Emerging British Underclass", Charles Murray came to a very similar conclusion "there is a fine line between acknowledging the agency of people in poverty and blaming them for that poverty" (Murray, 1999: 12).

4.1.3. Placing the petty bourgeoisie.

The order in which I have arranged the three traditional class structures – first the bourgeoisie, second the working class and third the petty bourgeoisie – is not accidental but intentional. On account of the class analysis of Poulantzas (1974), Bourdieu (1977; 1977a; 1984; 1985), and Gartman (1991), one could argue that during late capitalism the class struggle has been divided between the bourgeoisie and the working class solely, while the petty bourgeoisie is situated in a kind of 'reserve' class. A 'reserve' class because, as Poulantzas explains "strictly speaking, the petty bourgeoisie has no ideology of its own" (Poulantzas, 1974: 252).

According to Poulantzas, from its very origins, the petty bourgeoisie has granted to itself the position of social negotiator between classes (Ibid.: 241). It sees itself "as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and therefore a pillar of the State" (Ibid). Accordingly, the petty bourgeoisie stands on the lookout for the acts of the bourgeoisie or the working class – the irreconcilable classes – depending on the social state of affairs. And the petty bourgeoisie has hitherto been able to afford such a position, I would say, because it has the skills that both the working and bourgeois classes need. "The question of control and accounting" said Lenin in his famous pamphlet, *The State and Revolution* (1999) "should not be confused with the question of the scientifically trained staff of engineers, agronomists, and so on. These gentlemen are working today in obedience to the wishes of the capitalists and will work even better

tomorrow in obedience to the wishes of the armed workers."[16] Through Lenin's words then, we could assume that the two historically confronting classes, the bourgeoisie and the working class, do not endow a specific ideology to the petty bourgeoisie: they both merely *required* it as a supplier, making use of the skills the petty bourgeoisie possess. But while Lenin's proletarian dictatorship did employ the petty bourgeoisie's skills by way of objective physical violence – that is, under the threat of the Gulag and therefore death (Solzhenitsyn, 1974) – the bourgeoisie, as Bourdieu explains, made use of it by way of a subjective "symbolic violence": through the vision of a promised land in which they could become rich, or at least achieve social equality. Any resistance to such a vision, which includes a compulsory participation in the collective race for success, means social obliteration: life under a bridge.

Where does this theory appear tangible today? Advertising those who indeed become rich is a sophisticated means by which this modern illusion is given credibility.[17] The social condition in which an illusion is made credible is termed by Bourdieu the "ideology of charisma" (Gartman, 1991: 425). Similar to a collective precept, this is an ideology through which people develop the conviction that they are part of a cultural individuality based upon personal "worthiness and/or giftedness" (Ibid.). As Bourdieu notes it makes "winners appear not as exploiters but as gifted individuals with superior cultural endowment" (Ibid.: 423). Nevertheless, Gartman contends, neither the Frankfurt School nor Bourdieu seem to make "explicit how and why the reified, class-obscuring logic of capitalism infiltrates and dominates culture" (Ibid.: 428). And while they both agree on the notion that mass culture seems to impose upon the classes the illusion of a class homogenization, they defend their theories by suggesting that this is attained by different operative systems. On the one hand Bourdieu tell us that identical products are consumed by different classes, but they are perceived and appropriated differently according to their *habitus* (1985: 25). On the other, the Frankfurt School suggests that cultural products are appropriated similarly, thus levelling any cultural differences between classes (Gartman, 1991: 427; 429; Adorno, 1990: 87-9). However, a common notion stands out in both theories: a homogenization of classes by way of the cultural products they themselves consume.

4.2. Section II

4.2.1. The fields of restricted and large scale productions in culture.

As Gartman (1991) and Bourdieu (1985) explain, a homogenization of classes by current culture means, firstly, that culture acts as a strategic class leveller, where all believe they are on a fairly stable social ground, or where one believes that one has attained the status one *deserves*. It also, in turn, generates a legitimization of the current class structure. As Bourdieu argues, "culture and economy are intricately related in a web of mutual constitution" (Gartman, 1991: 421).

By way of some specific empirical arguments, Bourdieu and Gartman bring to light some of the evidence needed to reveal on the one hand, objective differences in current class structures, and on the other, the way in which those differences are subjectively obscured. They do so by categorizing culture into two blocks or fields: one is the field of "non material culture" and the other the field of "material culture" (Ibid.: 429). Depending on whether "symbolic or economic considerations come first," Bourdieu terms the first as "the field of restricted production" (FRP) and the second "the field of large-scale cultural production" (FLP) (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). Included within the field of "non material culture" (hereafter FRP) are things like visual art, music, literature and so on; and "material culture" (hereafter the FLP) includes cultural products like food, clothing and furniture. Up to this point, the differences between the two cultural fields are rather plain. But in my view, when Gartman criticises Bourdieu, he overlooks an important point Bourdieu makes: that while producers of the FLP do not make any secret of the fact that their fundamental purpose is profit, the FRP's producers must at least *pretend* to be free from "external demands" (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). In addition, a clear differentiation between mass or popular culture and high art or elitist art is not an uncomplicated affair. For example, in the field of FLP we include cars and furniture, but we must be cautious because, by way of Bourdieu's definitions, we can also include in it certain elements of music, visual art and literature.

Andy Warhol's Pop Art is a case in point. Through "institutions of consecration" (Ibid.) like criticism and the educational system, we can discern that there are successful means of transforming rightful FLP products like Warhol's Campbell's "Tin Soup" into *rightful* FRP symbolic goods. Also, in contrast with the FRP, the FLP products are

rather short-lived and "destined for consumers who are [...] non producers and non competitors" (Ibid.). While the analysis of the FRP exposes the social legitimization of the manifested class differences and the inequalities these differences entail, that of the FLP explains in which ways the real situation of the subjugated classes is hidden from view, acting upon the masses as a hypnotising mechanism of make-believe. While the FRP legitimates current class structure, the FLP helps to maintain people at bay from disturbing that very class structure which is legitimised by the FRP. To expand upon this I will first commence an examination of first the social effects of the FLP cultural products, primarily via Gartman.

To begin with I ought to indicate here that Gartman is offering a theory located between the Frankfurt School's critical theory and Bourdieu's social theory. Because for him both have a weakness: "while Bourdieu postulates the pursuit of freedom to be a structurally conditioned taste characteristic of the dominant class alone,[18] critical theory holds that the praxis of all people is underwritten by a basic desire for freedom" (Gartman, 1991: 440). In other words, for Bourdieu, current culture reproduces class structure and therefore *would not* aim at a transformation of society (this is highly relevant in relation to Bond's contention that current society is an "extreme" form of society), while critical theory sustains that culture *may* transform society. As a supplementary theory, Gartman adds a "Lukácsian" theory based on the "historical development of class-obscuring" (Gartman, 1991: 442). Now, although Gartman could support the efficacy of this 'class-struggle' theory of culture with innumerable models of FLP, as an American, he chooses to do it with what I think is its most universal representative: the automobile.

4.2.2. Hand-crafting v. Assembly line.

As Gartman notes, the earliest cars were very expensive. They were "handcrafted" in very limited numbers by "highly skilled workers and consumed almost exclusively by the high bourgeoisie. They were part of an exclusive high culture of conspicuous consumption and leisure constructed by the bourgeoisie during the late 19th and early 20th centuries to legitimate its increasingly visible authority in industry and state in the face of working-class challenges" (Gartman, 1991: 442). Cars then were not just a means of transport but a symbol of power which was reflected by way of their design and their inherent aesthetics: unhurriedly assembled by highly skilled workers without

any pressure from market and management (Ibid.: 443). But during the 1910s large-scale commercial gain captivated the imagination of people like Henry Ford. This meant an acceleration of production which the skilled workers tried to oppose. Ford's response to this resistance became the norm throughout the industrialized world: the creation of the assembly-line. The assembly-line did not only mean the production of a "Ford T" every three minutes,[19] it also meant the substitution of skilled workers with "unskilled, divided, and mechanized labor [sic]" (ibid), which itself affected the vehicle's aesthetics. "Closely fitted, curving forms" were replaced, says Gartman "with the loosely jointed, harshly rectilinear shapes adapted to mass production" (Gartman, 1991: 443). Hence, the then inherent aesthetics of the cars continued to expose the giant gap between the wealthy and the workers: alongside the Ford's model T, which mirrored the true status of the owner, the wealthy were driving their expensive handcrafted vehicles. "These mass-produced cars [i.e. the Ford T]" says Gartman "symbolized the degraded class position of the lower classes" (Gartman, 1991: 443.). It is only up to this point, Gartman argues, that Bourdieu's theory of "class-symbolizing" applies within the context of FLP, for cars marked class belonging and therefore class "jealousies" and "emulation" (ibid.). For the short period that cars were just a form of transport, "the visible links of mass-produced vehicles to the alienated labor [sic] process were not socially problematic" (ibid.). But when cars became the cornerstone of the newly erected consumerism which "provided insulation [...] from the ills of the work place," the aesthetics mirrored by cars "had to be severed" (ibid.).

How did Big Capital sever those aesthetics which were reminding workers of their own degraded lives? Firstly, as a consequence of the workers' counteroffensives against the new "degraded process of mass production" (ibid.),[20] Big Capital granted them that which it could afford best: higher wages. Secondly by introducing a more "organic" design – that is, with the use of aesthetics itself – to manufacture a product which the workers would be able to buy through their newly-won higher wages (Ibid., 443-44). By hiring industrial designers, Big Capital removed from their manufactured goods all the signs of the assembly-line. With their higher wages, people could buy products that concealed rather than revealed their origin, and so the relation between the worker and the manufactured good was broken: "the ugliness of factory relations" becomes hidden "behind beautiful, organic surfaces" (Ibid.: 444). By 1949, the bodywork of cars was transformed into a smoothly integral, all-encompassing shell (ibid.). The very aesthetics of handcrafted luxury cars which, until then, had catered exclusively to the elite classes'

tastes became available to the masses. Interestingly enough, artificially adopted organic forms were not only applied to cars, but to all the rest of manufactured products: to radios, stoves, and to all kinds of domestic furniture. By transforming the FLP's aesthetic designs, all the symbolic traces of class conflict were buried under an illusionistic external shell. As a consequence, Gartman suggests, today "there are no 'working-class' cars, washing machines, video recorders, or even, with some exceptions concentrated on the young, styles of dress. In an urban department store or a suburban shopping mall, it is hard to know if a customer has a blue- or a white-collar occupation" (Gartman, 1991: 431).

Nevertheless, obscuring class relations by way of aesthetic design does not mean that all cars were alike. As Gartman explains, people expected products to appeal to their individuality (Gartman, 1991: 431); an individuality that was indeed repressed in the environment of the assembly-line. As much as it was during the 1940s and 1950s, today all kinds of automobile styles are widely available in the market. These different car types are catalogued as 'product hierarchies'; in other words, they are "differentiated by their price" (ibid.). Their differences are determined by superficial embellishments and technological devices, but all have their origin in the mass-produced assembly-line. As a result, cheap cars look externally like 'expensive' cars, differing from their expensive counterparts by specific technological additions, which are not noticed at first glance. Furthermore, graded models do not indicate distinctive "class tastes or real class differences in power but to mere differences in income" (ibid.). It is as if the FLP itself, by way of its own strategic aesthetics, could reconstruct the workers/consumers' perception of society by making credible the slogan "this is the land of the free", while shattering any possible questioning of their own real social conditions.

4.2.3. The Magnet Theory

The repercussions of this "symbolic violence" exerted upon the classes by the aesthetics of FLP has found new sophisticated highs in current culture. In my view, FLP's aesthetics seems to have surpassed the boundaries of its own traditional areas of influence, progressively engulfing not only many of those considered as FRP but beyond. Its reach now extends not only to all kind of symbolic goods (artworks) but it can also be recognized in areas like politics and economics. The way in which, for example, politicians appear in the media wearing 'casual' clothing, while sipping from a

mug of tea, has become all too familiar. The strategy is very transparent: by adopting the appearance of the 'common bloke' he or she becomes 'one of us'. This is not the prerogative of the politician; the top bourgeoisie is seen using it too.

Another important FLP cultural product brought into the ideological aesthetics of class homogenization and disguise are denim jeans. These hard-wearing trousers intended in origin as the labourers' outfit, have been progressively appropriated as the preferred 'casual' look of the top classes. The social effect is similar to that of cars but inversely vectorial: while FLP like cars give to the lower classes an illusional *push* towards the top of the social ladder, the top classes adopting working class' utilities (by wearing FLP like jeans) allow the lower classes to *pull* them down towards their own lower status, by reasoning "look, he/she is one of us, only successful." Again, like all FLP's goods, jeans themselves are graded accordingly and testify not to differences in power but to differences in income. As Gartman explains by way of Bourdieu and the Frankfurt School conjunctively (Gartman, 1991: 434), this puts in evidence a symptomatic social confusion of class: "Naked acts of class interest are clothed with the mantle of the selfless pursuit of commonly recognized symbolic goods, making winners appear not as exploiters but as gifted individuals with superior cultural endowment" (Ibid.: 423).

By classifying the relation between FLP's cultural products and the *habitus* it generates upon the social classes, an additional social theory could be constructed and applied accordingly: what I would call 'the magnet theory'. This would-be theory effectively cross-examines current political and cultural attitudes and tendencies. Take, for instance, two of the key factors that are continuously under debate in current Western societies: one, that all major political parties seem to be positioned in the centre of politics, proposing very similar ideas; the other is the counterpart of the former: that politicians declare themselves bewildered by the political apathy of the public, and the resultant dwindling turnout for general elections. Most critics suggest that this general political apathy is a direct consequence of the parties' consensual similitude of ideas.[21] In contrast, a "magnet theory" based on the relationship between classes and the FLP's modes of production and consumption would present a different analysis: that this apathetic and politically centralized relationship between political parties and the electorate is the consequence of a petty bourgeoisification of society. This contemporary society is one that aspires to be politically neutral. "The petty bourgeoisie" says

Poulantzas "*identifies* [his italics] itself with the State, whose neutrality it supposes to be akin to its own, since it sees itself as a 'neutral' class between the bourgeoisie and the working class, and therefore a pillar of the State – '*its*' State. It aspires to be the 'arbitrator' of society, because, as Marx says, it would like the whole of society to become petty-bourgeois." (Poulantzas, 1974: 241).

Could it be that our times have fulfilled Marx's prediction of a petty-bourgeois strategy towards a total petty-bourgeoisification of society? Could it be that Marx predicted this current 'centralization' of political parties; this decline in social trade-unionism; or/and the progressive dismissiveness of society at large – including the arts and its practitioners – for utopian propositions?[22] But a "neutralization" of society by way of a social petty bourgeoisification does not mean that the parts involved – i.e. all classes and subclasses - are indifferent to all ideas or ideologies. In Poulantzas's terms it means the neutralization of any conflict that impedes or might impede capital growth, and therefore, that all considerations outside it – included the human considerations – are secondary. Chapter V will, hopefully, clarify further this notion.

4.2.4. Neo-liberalism and Big Capital.

One could argue that a petty bourgeoisification of society, as an alternative to the traditional class structure, cannot be such a bad thing. The natural resolution of society's hierarchies is the abolition of the proletariat class altogether – and therefore the human exploitation inbuilt into it. Indeed, it will be interesting to see whether such a social system could finally offer the utopian perspective of the much sought-for elimination of alienated labour.[23] Unfortunately, even if we apply divergent terrains of criticism like neo-positivism on the one hand, and/or Marxist economism and historicism on the other, it will become clear that this current social petty bourgeoisification is determined, not by the collective pursuit of any utopian society made of free and equal individuals, but by the needs and wishes of Big Capital. Indeed, as Bourdieu explains, replacing social petty bourgeoisification with neoliberalism, "it ratifies the spontaneous philosophy of the people who run large multinationals and of the agents of high finance" (Bourdieu, 1998: 126).

Bourdieu's remarks on "the libertarian connotations" of current neoliberalism here are most significant. They fit flawlessly with Poulantzas' definitions of the petty bourgeoisie. On the one hand, Bourdieu observes that the libertarian connotations of current neoliberalism "give the appearance of a message of freedom and liberation to a conservative ideology which thinks of itself opposed to all ideology" (Ibid.); on the other, Poulantzas explains how the petty bourgeoisie's adopted ideology has the non-ideological purpose of "neutrality" (Poulantzas, 1974: 241). Thus, a progressive social petty bourgeoisification would not lead to class structure being abolished, it would simply transform it into "contradictory class locations" (Bilton et al., 1981: 64): that is, where employees increasingly appear both as the agents of capitalism and workers who are exploited to some degree all the same.

Indeed, if there has been a time in which petty bourgeois individuals were, at the economic level, generally considered small-scale producers and/or owners of material goods, and by which their class boundaries had clear definitions, in current post-industrial society this status has been broadened to such an extent that large sections of the working class have been progressively incorporated within the petty bourgeoisie's ideology. According to Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells, this is the result of a global capitalist consensus whose process was put into motion by Reagan and Thatcher and successfully enhanced by the Clinton Administration during the 1990s (2001: 14-15). By applying a neo-positivist perspective, we could examine British official statistics and see that in the last five years alone, there has been a phenomenal and constant growth of skilled individuals launching their own business or becoming freelancers. By definition, these workers are moving into the petty bourgeoisie, or at least, 'would-be' petty bourgeoisie. But the same statistics tells us that in 2003, while the number of self-employed increased by 8.9 per cent, the increase in employees was a mere 0.1 per cent.[24] "Workers," observe Carnoy and Castells "are gradually being defined socially less by a particular long-term job they hold than by the knowledge they have acquired by studying and working. This knowledge 'portfolio'[their commas] allows them to move across firms and even across types of work, as jobs get redefined" (2001: 16).

For neo-positivists like Ralph Miliband (1970), without "a certain sensitivity towards class struggle" (Poulantzas, 1976:68), this development could mean many things, or nothing at all, for each case needs to be studied in its precise context, *ad infinitum*. For Marxists like Poulantzas (1978; 1976; 1974; 1973) it would not mean an individual and

freely-taken shift from being an employee to being self-employed, but a class submission to the demands of Big Capital's continuous expansion, which is hidden by the combined mechanics of FLP and FRP (Bourdieu, 1985: 13-44). However, by way of their *ad infinitum* empirical observations, even neo-positivists would have to come to terms with the fact that an upsurge of self-employment might be caused by the increasing lack of adequate job offers, as the 0.1 per cent might suggest.

Language too shows signs of a progressive 'petty bourgeoisification' of society. Words like "globalization," "flexibility" and "deregulation" encapsulate also a neutralizing trend.[25] This petty bourgeoisification of society is making few new winners but generating a lot of losers, with much consequent human suffering. It does not seem to reflect a society that is on route towards class abolition, but a society in which individuals are effectively compelled to compete fiercely against each other. The competition is fierce because, as we have seen, what they have to compete for are tiny leftovers of the bourgeois. Thus, a "neutralization" of any struggle between classes by way of a petty bourgeoisification of society seems to be being achieved by an uninterrupted interchange between the dominant ideology and culture. The dominant ideology will need then to be defined more closely, for there are now new forms of class structure which, in our current cultural setting, are effectively creating a great amount of confusion.[28]

In this rethinking of aesthetics, we are beginning to address class obfuscation by way of examining FLP's cultural goods, and in doing so, we also need to be able to address the ways in which the factual class divisions are effectively legitimized. According to Bourdieu, Gartman and in great measure, the Frankfurt School, this class legitimization is exerted by the acquisition, practice, and application of the FRP (The Field of Restricted Production) cultural commodities (as I said above, non-material culture like visual art, music, literature and so on) and in great measure, education itself. I will explore these theories and their implications further.

4.3. Section III

4.3.1. Industrial boundaries – intellectual responsibility

To recap, through his analysis of both Bourdieu and the Frankfurt School, Gartman tells us that class structures and their differences are effectively blurred not just by way of the mass consumption of manufactured FLP cultural goods, but by the intrinsic ideology of traditional capitalism which, by a process of progressive self-renovation through its aesthetics, enforces itself upon the masses. If this social condition was not antagonistic enough, especially to those proposing utopian discourses, Bourdieu's analysis shows us that *real* class differences are further legitimized by the configurations at work in the FRP of "symbolic goods" (1985), by intellectuals, artists, educators and so on.

I am aware of the implications involved when arguing that the arts and institutions of education legitimise class differences when the accepted wisdom has it that the arts and institutions of education are supposed to *free* people instead. But Bourdieu does not expose whether those involved in the practicing of the FRP may indeed experience some degree of personal freedom – which they do. Compared with the agents of the FLP, the FRP is closed to the external world by its own boundaries; boundaries based on the highly sophisticated specialisation of its agents. In addition, the agents of FRP "enjoy a high degree of autonomy," because within this field they have the "power to develop their own criteria for the production and evaluation of their [own] products" (Bourdieu, 1985:13). By way of learning the languages and codes of the FRP, people can consequently gain access to it and advance up the social strata. For example, by way of those skills acquired within the FRP as dialectical thinkers, Raymond Williams and his former student and posthumous heir, Terry Eagleton, procured for themselves positions in the top spheres of the petty bourgeoisie as well as into the hierarchical spheres of academic authority, and all from humble working class origins. Having said that, and in accordance with Bourdieu's theory of charisma (Gartman, 1991: 425), those few examples in which subjects from the lower classes attain higher order status are of precious value to the upper and dominant classes' legitimization. By getting to the top by way of personal merit, they are simultaneously legitimizing not only class differences but the status of the highest classes; the reasoning being "only the best are at the top". That subjects formerly located within the masses of the lower end can obtain a hierarchical status – something that happens sporadically – must, at least, create a state

of confusion among the vast remaining masses, who eventually capitulate to the idea "I am where I am because it is what I deserve".[29]

4.3.2. Administering the FRP.

However, the FRP is only autonomous up to a point, because a product attains a higher cultural recognition, says Bourdieu, by a process dominated by "agents and institutions of consecration" like criticism and the "educational system" (Ibid.). Bourdieu emphasises that because of the FRP's dependency on institutions of consecration, its very members are able to bestow a symbolic legitimacy by way of *competing* among themselves (Ibid.: 23-27). This is very important: legitimization is acquired by way of violent symbols inherent in the attainment of academic authority, which corresponds to public prestige through the accumulation of published essays, specialized articles and books, and so on. Consequently, the whole process by which a symbolic good gains recognition and hierarchical status from the FRP becomes a vicious circle: the agents of consecration not only need to ensure the reproduction of a new generation of consecrating agents, but also the reproduction of a specific type of consumer who would have to obtain the "correct" skills – that is, pre-determined specific aesthetics, pre-determined specific philosophy, pre-determined specific history of art, and so on – in order to successfully appropriate those legitimized symbolic goods. Needless to say, such consumers would have to procure such skills by way of educational institutions. Thus, the consecratory degrees or levels of educational institutions are proportional first, to the number of their operational agents of consecration (for example, professors and/or 'artists in residence'), secondly to financial agencies, be they private or public, and thirdly and most importantly, a long-established tradition of "excellence."[30] To make matters worse, these "scholastic codifications" of the rules of the FRP, says Bourdieu, "are inseparable from the project of building a kind of intellectual papacy, replete with its international corps of vicars, regularly visited or gathered together in *concilium*" (Bourdieu, 1985: 42).

What follows from this is a succession of uncomfortable questions which cannot be avoided. To what extent pursuing an academic speciality within the FRP means supporting and safeguarding the legitimisation of social class differences? To what extent are the FRP and its agents a medium for its prolongation? In the field of theatre studies for instance, there are close circles of "vicars" for each "papacy" of distinction:

– from Brecht to Pinter, from Beckett to Hare. And of course, one cannot ignore Edward Bond in this respect, with this thesis as a case in point. Bond has specialists on Bond, as Pinter has specialists on Pinter. They and their respective cognoscenti both compete for a very limited market of specialised consumers who are themselves producers or would-be producers of goods of restricted production – that is, in this case, students, producers and educators of drama, theatre, and/or performance. Bourdieu's use of the word "vicars" rather than scholars might have pejorative connotations for some but it defines conflicts between sections of the upper classes of the petty bourgeoisie; a conflict which, as Bourdieu explains (1985), eventually legitimizes class distinctions itself.

Consequently, how does the FRP act as part and parcel of what Bond suggests is the current "extreme" situation? Firstly, both "vicars" and "popes" have need of each other in order to survive in the culture industry's market of value and exchange, and this need obliges them to exhibit exclusive forms of language and communication. As Bourdieu puts it:

> [...] a critic may find himself predisposed in favour of all kinds of avant-garde [which is a ciphered revelation] [...]; accordingly he may act as an initiate communicating the deciphered revelation back to the artist from whom he received it. The artist, in return, confirms the critic in his vocation, that of privileged interpreter, by confirming the accuracy of his decipherment (Bourdieu, 1985:37).

4.3.3. The battle for and against cultural status.

Interestingly enough, Edward Bond is himself one of those exceptional cases with working class origins who subsequently joins the top spheres of the FRP. Bond himself acknowledges this contradictory position,[31] yet he also seems to be located, we may say, in a very *particular* area of influence without parallel to any other dramatist or playwright. As Shakespeare's *Polonius* puts it: "neither a borrower, nor a lender."[32] Although Bond himself cannot circumvent his position as producer of goods within the FRP, he is nevertheless in a totally amorphous location when measured against Bourdieu's theory. Whilst Bond cannot avoid the formation of "vicars" or groups of specialists which are economically and culturally gathered around his work and persona, he does not make their *ride* trouble-free.[33]

Since he began in the 1960s, right up to present day, the dramatist has never stopped reassessing his own ideas and body of work (Coult, 1977; Hay & Roberts, 1980; Mangan, 1998; Spencer, 1992; Stuart, 1996 and 2000). Consequently, Bond's specialists find themselves at pains wherever they attempt to determine which subfield of theatre the dramatist should be located. Indeed, Bond's body of work most probably stands alone, not in a subfield, but defining its own new field outside the realm of theatre studies. In addition, the dramatist is outside the boundaries, protocols and internal laws specified by Bourdieu to which the theatre industry is also subordinated: that is, in Bond's case, the relationship between author and critic, author and media, author and institutions of consecration, author and publisher and agent and so on, do not fit within the categories and/or orders specified by Bourdieu. The appendix included here and Bond's personal letters to me demonstrate that Bond is perfectly aware of his own enduring paradox as a hierarchical agent of the FRP. As he tells me "[...] by writing and staging plays I participate in the prevailing culture [...]. This is true – but there are tensions and developments within a culture and you can try to be part of these."[34] By being located in such a singular ethical ground, that is, being "neither a borrower, nor a lender," Bond is effectively engaged in a battle against his own cultural status because, as he sustains, success in our "extreme" situation only can come about by way of corrupting and corrupted channels. If Bond were to be cooperative and reasonable with agents and institutions of consecration he would have to abandon both himself and drama: "For a loan oft loses both itself and friend."[35]

Nevertheless, the evaluation of Bourdieu's "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985) has one primary purpose: to assess whether it is justified to argue that our current social system is "extreme," as Edward Bond tirelessly insists it is. So far only a few like Bond or Bourdieu think so: most critics describe by way of Marxist economics and historicism a truly grim world on one hand, but on the other, they manage, by way of dialectics and critical theory, to synchronize *through* culture hopeful postulations for a better world. In fact, our world would not be "extreme" as such if we could sight a realistic solution on the horizon of current culture. Actually, even those supporting Bourdieu's sociology of art like Gartman does, do it with reservations because they think of culture as "an intervention in class struggle that may either reproduce or *revolutionize* [my italics] existing class structures" (Gartman, 1991: 445). Yet, like Adorno or Jameson, most thinkers subscribe to the idea that "all culture is ideological" (O'Connor, 2000: 17; Jameson, 2004: 44). Therefore, culture may also revolutionize

existing class structures as Gartman hopefully proposes, but none would be able to assure us that such revolution of classes would not be a restoration of the Gulag; the risk seems to be too high. While one says that culture could revolutionize existing class structures, one is simultaneously suggesting that culture could *restructure* those classes. Who can assure us that a new restructuring of classes would not become the old unresolved case of the oppressed turning oppressor?[36]

It is true that such theoretical postures in search of a real democratic society made Adorno a proper scapegoat of his time: "too utopian for the right, too bleak for the left" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 982). However, as I have discussed, Adorno's theory is not without foundation. It is in his work that we see the convergence of Marx and Nietzsche, as explored in the second chapter, because indeed we need a revolution, but a revolution fulfilled in its totality – that is, not only outwardly but inwardly; not only social but mental as well. This would not only mean a rise above the reifying ideology of cultural capitalism, as Marx hoped for, but a rise above *all* ideologies.[37] Since a utopian project would have to work towards the abolition of class differences and private property, a successful revolution towards utopia would also have to take into account Nietzsche's evaluation on human *ressentiment* jointly, or seriously risk a Stalinist restoration or even an analogous Pol Pot's Cambodia (Duttmann, 1991; Reginster, 1997). In other words, it would not be good enough to abolish the class system without universally abolishing human *ressentiment* once and for all. When Engels remarked that "there could be no greater historical tragedy for the working class than to seize power when it is not ready for it" (Solzhenitsyn, 1974: 194), he was concerned with the very same problem I am attempting to uncover here. And as Reginster explains via Nietzsche, the prospect of overcoming human *ressentiment* will involve extraordinary human conditions. For instance, even the starting point would have to include a universal understanding of the conditions by which human beings devise the value judgments good and evil; and subsequently the question "what value do we [ourselves] possess?" (Reginster, 1997: 281). It does not seem controversial then to suggest that in this capitalist world we live the "extreme": a place in which hope for a solution seems to be hoping for the impossible (Bond, see appendix).

Bond, through his own philosophy of drama, is nevertheless 'optimistic'. He says that though he does not see a solution; at least he *sees* the problem (appendix: 18). But as this research can attest, even to *discern* the problem is proving to be a giant quest.

Because the rest of us seem to suffer from a series of blinding symptoms: reification, false consciousness, unrecognition of our own class location, *ressentiment,* and so on. So what will the ultimate frontier of criticism be? In my view, it would be the very field in which ideas compete against each other – the field described by Bourdieu as "The Field of Restricted Production of Symbolic Goods" (1985) – the FRP.

Because of his "ahistorical structuralism,"[38] says Gartman (1991: 421), Bourdieu's analysis only partially shows current class unrecognition. In this analysis, Gartman seems to overlook Bourdieu's paper "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985) in which, step by step, the French sociologist investigates the phenomenon of a rather deceptive historical "autonomization" (Ibid.:14) of artists and intellectuals since the Middle Ages. In "The Market", Bourdieu's structural analysis permits an appreciation of the fundamental structures of the FRP by isolating the historical elements that conform to it. This is historical structuralism in its most precise meaning. For the French sociologist, the way we *are* is subjected to existing class-related material conditions. Consequently, says Bourdieu, current culture "inclines working people to reduce practices to the reality of their function, to do what they do, and be what they are [...] [it is] essential hypocrisy [...] so that what people do, they do as if they were not doing it" (Bourdieu, 1984: 200). One further depiction of current society as an extreme condition is found in Bourdieu's views on the progressive expansion of current "neoliberalism":

> [a] philosophy [that] knows and recognizes no purpose but the ever-increasing creation of wealth and, more secretly, its concentration in the hands of a small privileged minority; and therefore leads to a combat by every *means* [his italics], including the destruction of the environment and human sacrifice, against any obstacle to the maximization of profit   (Bourdieu, 1998:126).

Such an illustration of current culture – that is, a culture totally subjected by capitalism – would not seem to offer a reliable project towards class abolition. In contrast with Bourdieu's motionless class-structure, Marxist critical thinkers like Marcuse estimate that current cultural praxis reproduces unequal class structure but it may also transform society because of people's inherent desire for freedom (Marcuse, 1992). Gartman agrees with Marcuse. What interests us here is that, while these two theoretical discourses are different in essence, they might coexist within Bond's philosophy of drama. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, if we agree that a society can be defined as "extreme" when its "*only* [my italics] purpose is the ever-increasing creation

of wealth and, more secretly, its concentration in the hands of a small privileged minority" then Bond and Bourdieu assess our society in the same manner. For Bond capitalism is an extreme social and ideological system, where humanity is left behind the needs of market expansion (appendix: 26; 34). Secondly, if critical theorists like Marcuse contend that, by way of culture, there is at least some hope, so does Bond. The difference between them both rests on the fact that while Marcuse sees a gap towards freedom in the praxis of culture itself, Bond sees it *only* in Drama not in culture as such (appendix: 34).

Another question altogether is whether we should start understanding culture as a collection of insulated, unrelated, and even conflicting groups of cultural forms. As I will further discuss, there are grounds enough to suggest that current culture adopts the appearance of being formed by distinctive cultural fields while in reality this is not the case. It is by way of the culture industry's ideology, that culture seems a multi-structural collection of contrasting fields or disciplines, competing against each other by claiming that their cultural product has special and unique qualities; but their coherent and unified need for recognition from and by the "above" (O'Connor, 2000: 236-37) betrays them all. As one would expect, the "above" connotes Poulantzas' Big Capital (1974), Horkheimer's and Adorno's bourgeoisie (1979), or Bourdieu's institutions of consecration (1985). Here again, Bond reveals himself as an atypical agent of the FRP: his claim to uniqueness is all too obvious; but his disdain towards any recognition from the above is also too very clear.[39]

Bond's uniqueness is, nevertheless, not a pioneering approach. As Jan Kott explains, that ancient Athens contained the seeds of its own destruction is a notion in-built in the plays of Sophocles and/or Euripides: "tragedy recalls the past and foretells the future" (Kott, 1974: 247). Even through a quick inspection of the works of Bond, one could easily conclude that one of his main motivations for writing comes from a real fear that current bourgeois civilization contains the seeds of its own destruction. With this I am not referring to the classic Marxist conviction that capitalism will eventually collapse by its own weight, giving way to a socialist democracy as if following the predictions of historical natural rhythms as Benjamin thought or Trotsky hoped. As Bond explains:

> A great weakness of communism is that it has a built-in apology for its own mistakes. This is part of the theory of alienation. In a way you could call the

theory of alienation the aesthetic side of Marxism and the economic theory the other side. But it isn't an option or escapist form of alienation, of course. It is integrated into the experience of living under capitalism, or living under any political form which denies freedom of choice. (...) The passionate state of alienation is itself functionally dangerous because it is the condition of miserable acquiescence that enables capitalism to quietly flourish, or rather proliferate. The 2 potential characteristics are capitalism's answer to communism. They are very effective answers: they are fascism and madness. Classical Marxism states that capitalism is pregnant with its own destruction and that it must give birth to communism. Had I lived in the 19th century, I would have believed this. But it is clear that man didn't foresee the false trend and adaptability of capitalism – along with its ability to adapt workers to its needs. [...] Now as capitalism is always pregnant with fascism and madness and as it is totally armed - by technology – communism does not become inevitable (Stuart, 2000: 134-35).

This was a letter dated on the 13 January 1972. I think that the progress of globalisation is making Bond's thoughtful reflection ring truer by the day.

While this is the ultimate synthesis of Marxist criticism, such a visionary approach should not be censured for appearing too ideologically charged, for it has not been the only pronouncement of those who have had to endure the last two centuries of capitalism. During their incipient democracy, ancient Greeks like Sophocles or Euripides manifested this very apocalyptic fear in their plays. In Sophocles' *Oedipus the King* for example, Oedipus wants to know at any cost; Jocasta seems to know but pretends not to; and she certainly does not want Oedipus to know.[40] Both are driven to the same abyss. But they themselves were the source of the plague: they possessed within themselves the seeds of their own destruction. As Bond told me punctiliously, the great Greek dramatists envisioned self-destruction in their societies because they longed for democracy themselves, while their societies were not truly democratic (letter to author: 02.10.04).

So we should not think that envisaging self-destruction in-the-making is an exclusive quality of modern Marxist thinkers and poets. If self-destruction is ingrained in the structures of our capitalist era, it is not without precedent. In a Nietzschean way, such visionary fears have more to do with the human struggle for power: be it struggle as competing for authority (that is, politics); or struggle for an accumulation of capital (that is economics); or struggle as competing for cultural legitimacy (that is, artistic production). In my view, it is precisely through the *violence* inherent in any form of struggle that different and unconnected fields turn out to be overlapping.

But why should the FRP – that is, the field where cultural producers struggle for cultural legitimacy – be of special interest, above other fields and other social classes? While the distinctive characteristic of current politics and economics is the organization and the preservation of existing social systems, only the advance skills of those actively involved in the FRP offer the means to erect the so sought *impossible* socialist utopian sign for *all* of us; the sign towards a human world where the Marx/Nietzsche convergency is finally made universal; towards a free and equal man without *ressentiment*.[41] But as Bourdieu explains, the FRP has serious problems of its own. It suffers from the same hierarchical relations underlying our social classes (1985: 37). If the signpost to socialist utopia appears 'impossible', it is because the only operators that could erect such a sign – that is, the advanced agents of the FRP – have serious problems of their own.

4.3.4. The legitimization of class differences

As we have said, contrasting with the Frankfurt School's theory of culture by which class differences are concealed by the capitalist ideology, Bourdieu mantains that class legitimization is more a matter of hierarchical status. This, he says, is fed by a culture of personal worthiness – as I said above, a kind of "ideology of charisma" (Gartman, 1991: 425). And this personal worthiness, says Bourdieu, is acquired by the accumulation of capital wealth in the form of cash and properties and/or cultural wealth in the form of "symbolic goods" (Bourdieu, 1985: 13). As one might expect, there are functional differences among all the symbolic goods we currently enjoy: functions which are pertinent both to the FLP and to the FRP. But Bourdieu makes an additional subdivision to the FRP by grouping it into two major types. One is made up of that which is produced for "non-producers of symbolic goods – 'the public at large' [Bourdieu's inverted commas]" (Ibid.: 17), including most popular art, music, movies, some types of novels and theatre. These are goods which, while they are produced by agents of the FRP, aim to be part of the FLP, stimulated primarily by a crude yearning for profit. Included in Bourdieu's second FRP type are those produced for a restricted number of clients who are "producers of symbolic goods themselves" (Ibid.).

The first group of products are made widely available through commercial and mass media channels and do not need to take into account their clients' levels of education.

However, as Gartman and Bourdieu explain, "popular" should be treated with due care. For example, by way of empirical data, Gartman disputes Bourdieu's suggestion that there are "no rigid boundaries between popular culture and high culture" (Gartman, 1991: 430). But in my view, Bourdieu acknowledges this when he supports the idea that, actually, high culture – that is the FRP – suffers the same kind of pressure as that exerted upon the popular by the market of consumption through "publishers, theatre managers, art-dealers" and the rest (Bourdieu, 1985: 16). Thus, if for Gartman some of the agents of the FLP acquire a FRP status and their symbolic goods are consumed by all classes,[42] for Bourdieu the FRP suffers from the same ideological pressures and therefore some of their products seem to capitulate to the FLP's "lower" commercial pressures of market economy. Furthermore, in the FLP there are also interesting cases of "cultural relativism" (Bourdieu, 1985: 31) to which Gartman seems to be oblivious but Bourdieu is not. He takes note of those whose methods of production and cultural goods have the qualities of "middle-brow" cultural producers, whose ambitions are to take hold of the widest possible public,[43] and yet are conferred the hierarchical status of high art by various institutions of consecration.

Although most products within the FLP operate like proper material cultural goods (like cars, trousers, and so on) sometimes, a popular symbolic good operates *differently* and is consumed as if it was of a "higher" order. Consider for example the genre of "protest" music through which cultural relativism is accomplished: cases like the Latin American song-writers Atahualpa Yupanqui (1908-1992),[44] or Victor Jara (1932-1973);[45] North Americans like Bob Dylan; or as Bourdieu puts it, French like "Brassens, Jacques Brel and Léo Ferré" (Bourdieu, 1985: 32). They are effectively pursuing a contact with the masses, but by way of hierarchical and institutional "rehabilitation" by the institutions of consecration (Bourdieu, 1985: 31). They are all considered "poets" (Ibid.: 32). In other words, their works are extracted from the 'mundane' or 'minor' spheres and into the spheres of those symbolic goods which reveal "qualities of the first order" (Ibid.). It seems irrelevant whether a given popular symbolic good is sold by the hundreds or by the millions, or whether its identity is ideological like Yupanqui and Jara or "neutral" (that is, unreservedly petty bourgeois) like Brassens and Brel. A higher hierarchical cultural status will be obtained only when the agents and institutions of consecration have given them the proper authorization. Indeed, Jean-Paul Sartre's remark "There are qualities that we acquire uniquely through the judgements of others,"[46] Bourdieu concludes "this is especially so for the quality of

a writer, artist or scientist, which is so difficult to define because it exists only in, and through, the circular relations of reciprocal recognition among peers" (Bourdieu, 18985: 19). But more interesting here is Bourdieu's conclusion that when artists and intellectuals are recognized, in reality it is their own "claim to orthodoxy" that is being recognized (Ibid.).

However, Bourdieu's notion on "orthodoxy" needs to be observed within the framework of the bourgeois ideology: that means his is an orthodoxy based in the traditional bourgeois principles of autonomy, difference and liberty. It is there where a producer of symbolic goods lives in a continuous quest for the latest anomy; or at least an anomy in appearance. As Russell A. Berman suggests in Nietzschean manner, "liberty – 'an invention of the ruling classes' [...] the point however may be that liberty is an 'invention', i.e., a fiction which, as such, is counterfactual but which nevertheless is asserted by the "ruling classes," in order to continue to rule and thereby to preclude oppositional developments" (1989: 12). Bourdieu's conclusion above is most important because it reflects on all fields of intellectual and artistic creativity. Indeed, by way of his own analysis, Bourdieu is able to postulate that "there is not cultural position-taking which cannot be submitted to a *double interpretation* [his italics]" (Bourdieu, 1985: 40). For instance, his investigation also throws light on the very procedures of academic research, which cannot be ignored. He explains how the individual quest for a legitimized cultural space is also determined by the hierarchical position of each discipline in which scholars must have the "sensitivity necessary to sniff out [those] movements of the cultural value stock-exchange [sic]" (Bourdieu, 1985: 38-40). But over and above this, what the French sociologist is really seeking is to direct our attention towards a most hidden and abstract constituent of the FRP: a subtle yet connatural "violence."

However, a stamp of violence within the FRP must be a perfectly logical characteristic of the way its agents promote their cultural products. As it is progressively transpiring, everything emanates from aesthetics, which, as Eagleton sustains, is coincidentally "a bourgeois concept in the most literal sense" (1991: 9). Assuming that the bourgeois ideology is strongly embedded in all sectors of our society, the subtle violence of the FRP's agents would seem to be the natural by-product of bourgeois aesthetics: that is, being fiercely competitive; having a taste for advantage and privilege; and having a loyal subscription to individualism or, with science as pretext, to Darwin's "survival of

the fittest." Of course, this violence is "subtle" because these aesthetic ingredients must also be watered with the ever-unforgivable bourgeois aesthetic manoeuvre *per excellence*: good manners.

Thus, when cultural legitimacy is at stake, explains Bourdieu, consciously or unconsciously, intellectual or artistic preferences must be implemented by way of an implicit *violence* (Bourdieu, 1985: 42). Of course, this is mostly symbolic, but violent nonetheless. It is so because, as Bourdieu argues, violence is obedient to the specific logic of competition; again, in this case, competition for cultural legitimacy (Ibid.: 24). But how is it that this violent "competition" legitimizes class differences when it seems to be taking place intramurally – that is, only among those who form part of the FRP? It does so, Bourdieu concludes, by way of its own "fundamental norm" based on *exclusivity* (Ibid.: 43). In other words, whilst there are other ways of climbing up the social ladder – for example, by means of unlawful crime – a transfer of class, say, from working class to petty bourgeois, is seen as legitimate by all when it is via the authorization of one of the institutions of consecration.

For Bourdieu, this is the result of an historical process of "autonomization" (Bourdieu, 1985: 14-7). Since the middle of the 19th century,[47] artists and intellectuals have been able to enjoy an "internal principle of change" (Ibid.). To be precise, only artists and intellectuals know what their fields are about and therefore only they are able to implement internal norms of perfection. As Bourdieu adds, "If a relatively autonomous history of art and literature (or of science) exists, it is because the action of 'works upon works' [his inverted comas]" (Ibid.). One pertinent example among many here is the production of academic theses, in which strategic functions are applied by way of quotations, among other things – or, as Bourdieu calls it, employing the means of "citatology" (Bourdieu, 1985: 40). We cite others for many reasons, one being to display a familiarity with the work at hand, or as Bourdieu notes, "to avoid the appearance of plagiarising even ideas conceived independently" (Ibid.:41). But the fact is that most theses seem to be "works upon works" which in turn produce more works upon works and so on. Thus, following Bourdieu's theory, one could compare the FRP with a kind of *monstrous* entity that grows by feeding on itself. How does this monstrous entity legitimize class differences? By the fact, says Bourdieu, that "it corresponds to the social reality of the exercise of some power and of the 'recognition' [his inverted comas] of this power or of the systems of rules emanating from it" (Ibid.:

43).[48] The case of "Oxbridge" is again called to mind (see below endnote 30). Thus, if we had to look at current culture from Bourdieu's analytical perspective, the FRP not only legitimizes class differences, it *needs* class differences in order to preserve and justify its own existence.

One would have also to concede that these are complex discussions which sometimes seem to have negative effects on meaning. Bourdieu's boundless criticism on culture as a battlefield of violent symbolic goods could be paralleled for example with Adorno's postulation that "all culture is barbaric," by which cultural events are defined as subtle and complex acts of violence that (willingly or not) support a class system based on severe class differences (Adorno, 1990: 73-94). This reveals once again that there are more similarities than differences between the Frankfurt School's conceptual critical theory and Bourdieu's positivist sociology of culture.[49] It seems rather contentious to sustain, as Adorno does, that current culture is effectively supporting current class systems by way of being itself inextricably "involved in the class struggle for dominance" (Adorno, 1990: 81). But here he does not mean that classes are in a struggle with each other. On the contrary, Adorno is consistent in his evaluation so far: that thanks to its bourgeois aesthetics, class dominance ensues through a bourgeoisified culture in which any struggle between classes has faded away from sight. It seems to be true that bourgeois culture looks vigorous and dynamic but, like Adorno explains, it is thanks to its fundamental elements like "conflict, intrigue and development," while *the* conflict among the social classes has in truth been liquidated (Adorno, 2001: 76-7).[50]

"Intrigue" says Adorno, "is the aesthetic cipher for the bourgeois triumph over the feudal order, the triumph of calculation and money over the static wealth of land and the immediate repression through armed force" (Adorno, 2001: 76). It is the same intrigue used by bankers and tycoons that gave the fascists into the reins of power in the 1930s.[51] Thus, not only via Bourdieu but also via Adorno it is possible to argue the theory that the bourgeoisie, since its emancipation from the feudal yoke, and through its dominant process of mass industrialization, has managed to weld the bourgeois world and art itself into a single amorphous entity (Adorno, 2001: 61-97; 98-106). And as startling as it might sound, this seems to be one of the fundamental conclusions extracted from Bourdieu's sociology of culture: that wherever one says that aesthetics is through and through a bourgeois concept - as Adorno and specially Eagleton appear to suggest -, one must therefore also be saying that art itself, as the end result of aesthetics, is itself a

bourgeois event through and through. "That is why" says Adorno, "the existence of all the great forms of art is paradoxical" (Adorno, 2001: 77). Consequently, artists and their products must *per force* endure a constant and insurmountable dilemma: on the one hand the practicing of art ought to be done with a liberating function in mind, but on the other it is also inadvertently a celebration of our bourgeois social condition.

Bond seems to have been aware of the artists' precarious position within our culture industry for a long time. "A rational, free culture" said Bond as far back as 1977, "is based either on a classless society or at least on the conscious struggle to remove class structures and the economic, ecological, psychological, and political distortions they cause. [...]The answers aren't always light, easy, or even straightforward, but the purpose – a socialist society – is clear" (Roberts, 1985: 68).[52] Unsurprisingly, the dramatist is effectively avoiding contact with any agent of consecration, or with established theatrical circles of authority like the Royal Court or the National – which, incidentally, conferred to Bond his hierarchical reputation in the first place.[53] As a result, the very elements of the FRP that at one time legitimized Bond's works as symbolic goods of the first order, now tag the dramatist as "controversial", "difficult," "polemic," or even "bolshie".[54] I hope that this thesis will make clear that this is not the case, and that Bond's attitude stands in accordance with authenticity's strict criteria (Benjamin, 1999: 218-19; Kemal & Gaskell, 1999:82).[55]

"Extreme," I would say, is that those classes hitherto living under the bourgeois' yoke do not seem to have a proper idiosyncratic and emancipating language as did the bourgeoisie when it liberated itself from the feudal yoke. And all indicates that this is precisely the task that Bond has pursued – and pursues – consistently throughout his life as a dramatist. He seeks to find a proper emancipating language within a culture which is being subjected to an unrelenting industrializing processes. Even if he has found, or will find, that emancipating language, he also needs to find those interlocutors predisposed to speak it. Seeing that "the culture industry," concluded Adorno and Horkheimer, "[...] impedes the development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for themselves" (Adorno, 2001: 106), the task of finding proper interlocutors seems to me a dilemma from which there is no escape; in other words, a strict *Catch 22*. Yet Bond is adamant because, in his view, there is a gap: "I think the truth is that it is a Catch 21 and a half," Bond told me at the time of our encounter. "There is this gap [...] you see, it's not as sealed as it seems. We just behave

as IF it is but I think it is not. And I do think this is very important: each new generation goes back to the very basic problems, and therefore the very basic questions are never settled" (appendix: 36).

But where is that gap situated if, as he says, we are now living in "extreme" times? Bond also thinks that our current social system, in which the majority does not seem to have *real* choices, corrupts, and therefore its subjects are corrupted in greater or lesser measure.[56] And he wants to erect a sign towards the socialist utopia, but not through the usual channels of mainstream theatre and its regular audiences; not through the neutralising institutional channels of a society undergoing a relentless petty bourgeoisification. As I said above, he has refused – and refuses – major institutions like the National Theatre or the Royal Shakespeare Company permission to stage his plays, though they "have regularly asked him" (Davis, 2005: xvii). Despite his self-exclusion from the mainstream, the dramatist is now as active as ever, focussing his energies on writing plays and giving workshops for the youth and their education – his "Catch 21 and a half". To me it seems natural to conclude that, when the dramatist concentrates his efforts on the young, he is also trying to construct an emancipating language in that context, where it is more feasible. The young provide a place, as Bond says, where it is possible to fight "for the common future" (Davis, 2005: 22). However, whether the masses are unable to develop one emancipating language for themselves by way of their disadvantaged position, or are methodically dissuaded from developing one through the means of a relentlessly expanding capitalist culture, will continue to be a matter of perspectivist critical analysis. Paraphrasing Fredric Jameson (1998; 2004), no matter what the critics' perspective would be, and what dialectical interpretation they extract from it, they all would be looking at the same subject: capital.

Finally, the evaluation of Bourdieu's "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985) in my view, gives us a most compelling conception: that the exercising of power through culture – especially through the educational system – is enacted by means of "symbolic violence" (Ibid.: 24-6; 39-40). "Theories and schools, like microbes and globules, devour each other and, through their struggle, ensure the continuity of life" (Bourdieu, 1985: 14). Borrowing this remark from Marcel Proust, Bourdieu gives us an accurate epitome of what is in fact his entire sociological theory of art and literature. Substitute "life" for "capitalism" or for "social hierarchy" and the expected denouement will finally come to light. With Bourdieu one can formulate that violence does not like

competitiveness; that violence likes to exercise power on its own. Historically speaking, most ruling systems have secured their requests via the implementation of forms of violence. And by definition, violence is *only* inflicted upon non-violent subjects or social groupings. Thus, Bourdieu's theoretical contributions further explain why the forms of power are never at ease with art: because, when it applies its rightful utopian function, art *is* – or *ought* to be – a form of violence in itself.

The conceptualisation of art as a form of violence impels me to recall here Bond's mode of viewing art, which for him can only be fascist or socialist: "in our time the basis of art must be socialism: all other art is fascist. There is no art in between" (Stuart, 1996: 126). This and other ideological issues will be discussed in the next chapter because, as I hope to demonstrate, discussions on fascism require the supporting analysis of the serious problems of identification. Without it, we are in danger of "depriving it [fascism] of any specific content" (Allardyce, 1979: 387). Because fascism has content; the problem is that, to make it visible, one must 'peel' off its complex layers. I will discuss this more in the next chapter but must just note at this stage, that the main characteristic of fascism seems to be its ability to conceal itself behind form – that is, behind its aestheticization of everything (Düttmann, 1991).

For the moment I will propose, not a border line between socialist and fascist art, but between symbolic violent art and symbolic non-violent, submissive art. One difficulty here is that totally new discourses would be needed in order to discern different kinds – or subdivisions – of violent and non-violent art. For example, elements like performance art: "Agit-Prop, Celebratory Protest, In-Yer-Face theatre" and so on (Kershaw, 1994: 67-93), seem to be charged with an intrinsic aggressiveness which might have been wrongfully associated with the kind of symbolic violence characteristic of Bond's drama.[57] As Michael Billington and Aleks Sierzs suggest, there are certainly plenty of "aggressive" plays out there;[58] so much so that Billington considers it right to conclude that "we are living in an aggressively post-ideological age" (in Sierzs, 2000: 240). Yet, have these *aggressive* plays of In-Yer-Face theatre anything to do with the kind of violence needed to sustain a sign towards Jameson's utopia (2004)? If we had to follow Gartman's views – which he has procured for himself via George Lukács (Gartman, 1991: 442) – they do not. Instead, they seem to comply, consciously or unconsciously, with one of the fundamental strategic principles traditionally applied by bourgeois cultural practitioners, especially since the beginnings of the 20th century: the

idea that the world as it is, is static. As Joyce and then Beckett did before them, In-Yer-Face playwrights describe their characters as passive, surrendered beings, whose attitudes are submissive towards existing social facts. Unearthing an additional theory of culture perhaps more historicist than those of Bourdieu and the Frankfurt School, Gartman indicates,

> No longer having an interest in progressive change, bourgeois writers were blinded to the nature of reality as a human creation and began to depict the world as a static, reified thing. [...] these writers merely described the established facts of society and created characters who passively adopt various subjective attitudes toward them. People and their relations are not developed but merely described as already constituted products of forces beyond their control. The reality of class and struggle is thus obscured behind this impenetrable façade of static things (Gartman, 1991: 442).

In In-Yer-Face plays we are represented as wild and dysfunctional in a world which is run by forces beyond our control (Sierzs, 2000: 240). It is thus, effectively, not only the theatre of symptoms, but the theatre for and by the bourgeoisie. By representing a world run by forces beyond our control, the bourgeoisie and its capital virtually eludes any criticism, accusation or identification. When eminent critics as Billington and Sierzs regard our age as "post-ideological," they are giving one view while concealing another. Their view announces that the struggle between ideologies has finally ended. Since the end of the Cold War, this seems to be a publicly shared assumption, but this view simultaneously conceals the fact that, as a result of the latest ideological struggle, one ideology has triumphed over all things: the bourgeois ideology.[59]

Thus, In-Yer-Face theatre seems to be an art-form which displays on the one hand, an array of aggressive symbols, but on the other it appears as a non-violent, submissive art-form. Indeed, because power in it appears as non existent or too abstract, it is a force beyond human control. Just as Sierzs notes when he records Sarah Kane, many might think that In-Yer-Face's playwrights are to a certain extent the result of a Bondian influence (Sierzs, 2000: 101). If such influence has occurred, this has come to be only by way of the abstract essence of its form, while doing away with its content. As a result, what Adorno called its "truth content" (see diagram in chapter I) has been seriously perverted. As Bond says in *The Worlds*:

> Anger and apocalypse aren't enough. Theatre must talk of the causes of human misery and the sources of human strength. It must make clear how and why we

live in a culture of nihilism. And because the understanding of history has been contaminated with mythology it must rewrite it to make sense of the future (Bond, 1980: 109).

However, there can be no simple answer to the question of violence's manipulation. It is a clash between those who use a specific form of violence in order to preserve the power they have and those who use another specific form of violence against the former and for a 'common future'. As Alexander Garcia Düttmann meticulously explains, "violence directs itself against eloquence, against enlightenment, not only in a bourgeois and capitalist society but generally" (Düttmann, 2002: 113). And Bourdieu pinpoints, I think, a very important problem within the FRP – that is, among those of us trying to secure a space in the academia – which has rarely been approached: an overwhelming complicity with an ideology that has nothing to do with the ethical imperative. "What does it mean to be a human being?" Bond incessantly asks. While they were in the United States, Adorno and Horkheimer noted that the total effect of modern culture on humans was that of "dependency and servitude," and concluded by designating it as an era of "anti-enlightenment" (Adorno, 2001:106). In their view, the culture industry promises enlightenment, by way of "the progressive technical domination of nature" which, eventually, "arouses a feeling of well-being" (Ibid.). But that "feeling of well-being" we enjoy now becomes, says Adorno, "mass deception and is turned into a means for fettering consciousness," and adds on the same page:

> If the masses have been unjustly reviled from the above as masses, the culture industry is not among the least responsible for making them into masses and then despising them, while obstructing the emancipation for which human beings are as ripe as the productive forces of the epoch permit (Adorno, 2001:106).

Conclusion to chapter IV

As it can be noted in the appendix included here, Edward Bond shows great contempt for explanations or understandings of humanity that are reached via scientific methodology. This is not unjustified. Apparently neither Adorno nor Horkheimer regarded social empirical research favourably. This is an instance where, even against Edward Bond's wishes (appendix: 6; 10; 12; 33) the parallels of the dramatist's philosophy of drama and the Frankfurt School's critical theory encroach once again. According to H. T. Wilson, empirical research (in other words, positivism), was for Adorno the demonstration of "how far 'rationalisation' and 'standardisation' had gone:

neither mass communications nor sociology in America was free of it any longer" (Wilson, 1986: 135).[60]   If for Adorno empirical research was far-fetched, for Horkheimer it was "stupid":

> The average empirical scientist these days, said Horkheimer, is totally naïve vis-à-vis the prevailing schematism. Through the concept of 'facts', he posits as absolute both a form of perception which is conditioned down to the most insignificant detail, and all the conscious interests which organize the world, and then calls 'theory' the systemic presentation of these 'facts' But such a theory lacks self-awareness. It is stupid [his inverted commas]. (Shaw, 1985: 176).

Like Bond, critical theorists show no alliances with anything or anyone. Both the Frankfurt School and Bond object to positivism – to empirical research – because both seek to evaluate and question the dynamics of human beings within the capitalist location conceptually, which is indeed Marxist analysis in its most strict terms (Bilton et al., 1981: 170-82). There are, I think, enough philosophical arguments to support them. For example, by following Bertrand Russell, Daniel Cory sets a fundamental principle that can be observed recurring repeatedly throughout his paper "A Philosophical letter to Bertrand Russell" (1960: 573-587). This is: "if we could perceive in detail every thing that goes on in our environment [as Cory says, in a "spatio-temporal" way] we would be overwhelmed and unable to cope with it" (Ibid.: 581). Thus, our human world and what it *ought* to be – or the "problem", as Bond calls it (appendix: 18) – can be conceived only by way of imagination and logic.

Science, usually in concurrence with reason, needs to concentrate its attention on one detail at a time, and then another and so on. As the Oxford Dictionary tells us, science perceives truth by way of theoretical principles and by systematically classifying facts rather than by intuition and/or imagination. The latter is the very essence of Bond' philosophy of drama, and of the ethical as ultimate reality. Both the Frankfurt School and Bond object to the understanding of human beings through scientific theories because we are neither machines nor things. Science would study a painting by isolating minute fragments of it bit by bit; it could tell us the painting's chemical composition, the ingredients used in it and even the date in which it was painted. As Bond notes, "science is concerned with *what* and *when* [his italics]."[61] But by doing this, science cannot see the painting as a whole; it doesn't ask *why*. Science and reason are needed because complex societies need to have certain levels of organization – or else certain chaos. However, it is also irrefutable that behind Auschwitz and Hiroshima were the

best science and reason of the time, as Bond pointed out to me himself (appendix: 38). But Bond's philosophy of drama is not proposing a separation of science and reason – that is, the *whats* or *whens* – from the conceptual form of conceiving the world – that is, as he calls it, from "the cognitive holistic mind" – the *whys*. As he says:

> There is no necessary conflict between *what-and-when* and *why* unless one is proposed as the other. *Why* is concerned with value. Science has instrumental values of measurement and proof, but it looks at the world as if it were a great time-table. We know the train has arrived because we see it in the station. *Why* is its arrival on time good? Because the passengers can begin work on time. Is Mussolini good because his trains run in time? Suppose a train is arriving at Treblinka? Many *whats-and-whens* seem good in themselves. Health, for instance. Is it better that Himmler is dead or alive? Good is a universal derived from the holistic mind in response to *why* (Bond, 1998:3).

If our current postmodern condition is characterized by a general "incredulity toward metanarratives" (Palmer, 1998:16), Bond's holistic theory must be enduring against a wall of cultural opposition. In my view, incredulity toward metanarratives has been the product of a process in which the *whats-and-whens* of a 'scientized' society have progressively overlapped the *whys* of imagination and logic across all fields. In the field of theatre for example, as Richard H. Palmer demonstrates, deconstructionism has influenced most playwrighting and its staging during the 1980s and 1990s (Palmer, 1998:16), and practitioners do not seem to bring to a final conclusion this *pointillist* era. Yet deconstructionism's own technical quality – that is, the fragmentation of a given text into innumerable and even contradictory meanings – seems to me all too related to the mechanics of scientific analysis. Thus, explains Palmer:

> pointillism [breaks] down the phenomena of history into the smallest, most elementary units – the individual actors of history – and then connecting those units by means of 'juxtapositions' rather than causes. The reader would then be free to make 'what links he thinks fit for himself': a methodology that accurately describes Caryl Churchill's *Top Girls* [his inverted commas] (Palmer, 1998:16).

The risks, though, seem to me all too clear. To begin with, such deconstructionist history might be nothing but a toll-free highway to individualistic self-indulgence. It does not seem so different from the soldier who happens to know that he is being part of an unjustified war and yet concludes "anyway it is my job; that's what I'm paid for". If Palmer is correct, both the spectator/reader and the soldier are able to go on living in an unjust situation because they can take whatever fits better their *whats-and-whens*,

brushing aside the *whys*. But the problem is that we cannot do differently. Our current society is extreme because there is not in it a proper gap from where to face the *whys* – unless the rightful choice is, again, living under a bridge. Bond is very aware of this and it is reflected in his plays. He is not the idealist some would like to suggest. Bond knows that if we could implement perfect justice and freedom "tomorrow", it would be chaos and murder (appendix: 4). Lenin knew this too. Although he had in mind the utopian socialist society as the ultimate goal, he had to bring in the communist dictatorship in order to get there.

Furthermore, as it is manifested in his work, Bond is neither unrealistic nor dangerously naïve. As he tells me, drama is not going to solve the world's problems: "Of course no," and he adds, "that's all an organizational thing; it's a question of political organization; of social administration and all those things. But what I want to do is to try to provide a better understanding of what the situation is, so that then one can know what you should fight for and what you should aim for" (appendix: 33). The dramatist believes in drama because it is an event where human beings can make conceptual choices about freedom and justice. And as atypical as it might seem, by way of his empirical data Bourdieu's sociological theory of culture seems to support Bond's postulation even further, that indeed we live in an extreme situation. As Gartman says:

> Bourdieu's actors do not really act or choose anything – these enacted choices imply no acts of choosing – for their actions and choices are predetermined by their habitus [which itself is] produced by conditions of existence which rule out all alternatives as mere daydreams and leave no choice but the taste for the *necessary* [my italics] (Gartman, 1991: 438).

In other words, a taste for *whats-and-whens*.

Thus, we cannot, in my view, oversimplify an opposition between critical theory – that is, the evaluation of culture by conceptual means – and, positivistic, empirical demonstrations. In "The Market of Symbolic Goods" (1985), Bourdieu apprehends the full meanings of his theory of "symbolic violence" to such an extent that *all* modern cultural activity is put into question; that regardless, all critical thinking and empirical research form part and parcel of a culture that nevertheless is imbedded in capitalist structures of the acquisition of power:

> If the relations which make the cultural field into a field of (intellectual, artistic or scientific) position-takings only reveal their meaning and function in the light of the relations among cultural subjects who are holding specific positions in this field, it is because intellectual or artistic position-takings are also always semi-conscious strategies in a game in which the conquest of cultural legitimacy and of the concomitant power of legitimate symbolic violence is at stake. (Bourdieu, 1985:40)

As I discussed through the second chapter, our current times are not only "extreme" because we can support with overwhelming evidence the fact that we live in an unjust world, but because the well embedded ideology of the bourgeoisie (by way of traditional moral values, pursuit of status, social recognition, and successful acquisition of forms of power) irremediably steer us towards our own identification with characters like Adolf Eichmann. Indeed, our times are "extreme" because we continue to be compelled towards situations in which we say "yes" when we *ought* to say "no", or vice versa. By way of Bourdieu's analyses of capitalist culture, and even if it can be only perceived through its symbolic value, culture and intellectual activity itself appear as a fierce, violent battle for supremacy. For every single intellectual activity appears to have an implicit relation with our consequent dominant ideology: competition aimed at dominance (1985: 40-3).

Last but not least, it would not be particularly bold to argue that, if people have surrendered any claim to the utopian idea of perfect freedom and justice to the power of market and value, it has been out of a pure but grim Leviathan instinct. It is the fear of violent death under which individuals give up their natural rights to the absolute power, nowadays not of the state, as Hobbes asserted in his philosophy of self-preservation (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999:530-37), but to the power of our current market. In capitalist societies the distortions of class recognition produced upon the classes by culture seem to be fundamentally of an ideological nature. How could it be otherwise? If Western societies are based on evident social imbalances which are formed by huge and unequal levels of accessibility to resources, how is it possible that social classes misrecognize their *real* social positioning and *real* power? That the working class struggle is beginning to be regarded in many venues as obsolete,[62] in times where the boundaries between classes are perhaps sharper than in the last fifty years,[63] reflects, I think, the *problem* accurately.

As I said above with the assistance of Richard H. Palmer, there seems to be among most modern theatre practitioners a natural disposition towards the re-making of history as if it was made of a series of interrupted dots, which can be removed and relocated when and how it suits. Such an approach not only allows social self indulgence but, in my view, is the product of the now traditional bourgeois view that our world is both static and hopeless. This is a view that has come from Joyce, through Beckett and finds a contemporary voice in Pinter. Fortunately, Marxist historicism and economics help us to locate correctly some of the questions in this hugely problematical post-industrial setting. Because, from its platform, we can conceptualize history as if it was a sempiternal long rope, whose strands are twisted and woven by us and by our human struggle for domination – that is, we create concepts from necessity and therefore through a theoretical process.[64] How else could Bourdieu or Poulantzas explain factual class misrecognition? How else could have Bond seen the *problem*? As Leon Pompa concludes, "the present is not simply an addition to the past but a development of it" (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 1999:438). If this is so, Auschwitz and Hiroshima must also have something to do with our current society and its industrialized culture. Bond's philosophy of drama would ask, why?

Endnotes

[1] "The performing arts alone" says Harvie "earn an annual revenue of half a billion pounds, employ 74,000 people, and produce export income of £80 million." (2003:21)

[2] Hesmondhalgh makes evident this position when he defends, not without commiseration, those institutions that finance cultural production. As he illustrates with the following series of numerical statistics, these companies undertake considerable "risks" (2002:17):

> Nearly 30,000 albums were released in the USA in 1998, of which fewer [sic] than 2 per cent sold more than 50,000 copies [...] in publishing 80 per cent of the income derives from 20 per cent of the published product. (Ibid. 18)

[3] I will not enter fully into the discussion about what "freedom" or forms of freedom I am referring to. This continues to be a source of heated discussion in academic Journals. However, the sense of freedom that interests me here relates more with a given situation in which an individual is able to make responsible social choices within a situation of equality among individuals. A wealthy person in our society might very well make personal choices but it would not have anything to do with social responsibility, for the simple reason that personal economic wealth is indeed the product of social inequality (see "the ruling class theory" (Bilton et al., 1981: 207-08); "elite recruitment" (Ibid. : 208-11); and "elite integration" (Ibid.: 211-15).

[4] To what extent there is a correct communication between artworks and audiences continues to be a problem treated in greater or lesser degree by the majority of theorists and critics of culture

and the arts in modern times. Indeed, if there is a foremost subject matter within the fields of the arts this surely must be the one. Some specific examples are Aleks Sierzs' "Big Ideas for Big Stages, 2004" (*New Theatre Quarterly*, vol. 21, issue 1, February 2005, pp. 96-8); Gary Kemp's "Meaning and Truth-Conditions" (*The Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 48, no. 193, October 1999, pp. 483-493); John Gibson's "Between Truth and Triviality" (*British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol. 43, no. 3, July 2003, pp. 224-37, especially his section "texts as truths?" p. 226); Kathleen Gallagher and David Booth's *How Theatre Educates: Convergences and Counterpoints with Artists, Scholars, and Advocates*, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003; and above all William O. Beeman 's "The Anthropology of Theatre and Spectacle," (*Annual Review of Anthropology*, no. 22, 1993, pp. 369-93). Interestingly, and as far as I can confirm in the course of my evaluations, most seem to ignore Bourdieu's studies on the immutability of class differences and class misrecognition, which, in my view, should be at the forefront of discussions on relations between art and audiences.

[5] However, as Tony Coult remarks, Bond's creative dedication to and interest for children's education is not a recent decision; it goes back as far as during the 1980s (Davis, 2005:11). But also Coult concedes that now is mainly his only concern; that lastly his "energies are channelled largely into work for young people (Ibid.).

[6] It is interesting because Adorno and Horkheimer regarded empirical research as "stupid" (Shaw, 1985:176). But they — Adorno and Horkheimer on the one hand and Bourdieu on the other — arrive to similar conclusions. If for the former two the existence of classes is concealed by "ideological appearances" (Gratman, 1991:427), for Bourdieu class differences are hidden by the ideology of "charisma" (Gratman, 425).

[7] Still today many of us refer to society as "post-industrial" without relating it to a specific date. In the words of the Oxford Encyclopedia (1997) "the modern concept was elaborated by US sociologist Daniel Bell in his *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*" (1973). For Bell, a post-industrial society (the USA is taken to be a model) places a high value on "knowledge" and most of its citizens are well educated. The reduction in industrial production entails the shrinking and eventual abolition of the traditional working class, most citizens being employed in clerical or professional jobs. Nevertheless, "Critics" says the Encyclopedia "also suggest that the expansion in education and research has largely been concerned with improving industrial production processes rather than with pure knowledge." Thus, questioning the real aims of institutional education is of utmost importance in relation with the discussions of class identification and cultural distinctions. I will come back to it later on in this section.

[8] Gartman refers to Bourdieu's "Vive la Crise! For Heterodoxy in Social Science." *Theory and Society* 17:773-87, 1988/89, p. 783.

[9] See again O'Connor (2000) in pages: 3,5, 12-14, 36,65, and specially 230-238 among few examples.

[10] Quoted in D'Arcy 2005, p. 325.

[11] See Endnote no. 29, in Chapter I, "General Introduction."

[12] However, I am not alluding here to Michel Foucault's relativist idea that "power is everywhere" (1980: 137); power is not everywhere. It seems to me incontestable the fact that most of us, for a start, are powerless as a matter of fact. The nihilistic notion that one can assert a type of power through extreme/radical measures – i.e. suicide or going to live under a bridge - is just that, a nihilistic interpretation of what power could be. As he says:

> Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere [...] power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of nonegalitarian and mobile relations [...] where there is power, there is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power [...] these points of resistance are present everywhere in the power network. (History of Sexuality, 1980: 93-96).

On the other hand, if one looks into Foucault's thesis on power from a certain angle, his suggestion of power as being everywhere coincides with what I am attempting to suggest through the next discussion above that power is there but cannot be identified. If one thinks of Big Capital as real power, then power is everywhere, in the trivial and the important things (all around us there are signifiers of power: in front of me as I am writing these lines in the form of technology; the roof which shelters us is another signifier because it is in reality a mortgage; a credit card and so on). The problem I am suggesting is that real power cannot be identified in our post-industrial societies because the abstract nature of Big Capital; Foucault suggests that power cannot be explained, which seems to me rather a similar evaluation of power. For Foucault explaining power would mean observing power from outside, which, I would agree, is impossible; as he says: "there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix" (1980: 40).

¹³ The origins of the bourgeoisie's "aesthetic disposition" are exceptionally important in discussions related to the appreciation of the sublime. Schopenhauer was outraged about the fact that the locals of a beautiful rural area (peasants and small farmers) did not seem to appreciate the "transcendental" scenery in which they lived as educated and naturally gifted people did (1981:33-4). Of course, for the philosopher the appreciation of the sublime was not purely a matter of economics – or by the fact of being on the safe side of society – but by way of being "naturally gifted." He did not think of it in economic and historical terms, and I have found no evidence that Schopenhauer read Karl Marx at any time. To this day, this continues to be a false assumption which is being fed by the "theory of charisma" explained by Bourdieu. Interestingly, Burke also proposed the same argument from a different perspective, when he suggested that the appreciation of the sublime was proportional to the level of safety in which the contemplator was situated (Battersby, 2003:69-70). If for Burke "safety" was related to physical and geographical distance – for example, the contemplation of a volcano's eruption; for Bourdieu it is down to the distance one has from the "economic necessities of life – that is, the amount of capital one has access to. Thus, Schopenhauerians enjoy the scenery aesthetically because the do not have to live from the very thing they marvel at; peasants and farmers cannot get pleasure from the "sublime" in which they live because it can also be the very thing that kills them.

¹⁴ In Gartman's account culture is divided in two fields: non-material and material cultural goods. Non-material cultural goods are related to artistic production like visual art, music or literature; while material cultural goods are things like food, clothing, and furniture.

¹⁵ This was made evident once more in the speech given by Tony Blair to the Labour Party members in Brighton (Tuesday, 14:30, 27 September 2005). Although the British era from 1945 to 1979 had been characterized by a *consensual* style of politics, the motto "being part of a land of opportunity" did not form part of the British's political language until Margaret Thatcher was elected. (See Peacock, 1999:5-25).

¹⁶ In Part 4 "The Higher Phase of Communist Society," of Chapter IV "The Economic Basis of the Withering Away of the State."

¹⁷ Clearly, this can be related to all enterprises: the example of the former "employee" tycoon whose billionaire status began in the humble space of his/her garage (like the founders of Microsoft or Amazon) is celebrated daily in the media. This example must leave most people in awe wondering whether these tycoons are truly a kind of super-human. Because how is it then that while they are indeed exhausted by work and not precisely mentally impeded, most people do not manage to make ends meet each month. But it is in the field that interests us most, that of practicing theatre, where one could painstakingly observe at first hand this "imposed illusion." From 1985 to 1994 I did acting studies and its praxis in countries like Spain, Italy and France. Some of the institutions in which I practiced it were notable like the Piccolo Theatre Studio in Milan (pertinent documents can be supplied if required). During those years, the one and only thing that the many acting students I met hoped for, the fundamental reason for them making such huge personal sacrifices was to become 'famous'. Success was not just being able

to make a decent living from acting skills, but to become the next Bruce Willis, the next Sean Connery. Yet, thousands of acting diplomates emerge every year from acting schools throughout Europe, of which only few secure placements as an actress/actor – usually within modest provincial companies; while the remaining majority stand forever in limbo, hopelessly waiting for that 'magical' moment in which they are "discovered" by the almighty agent. Furthermore, the schools of acting feed this 'illusion' to the students by saying only the "best" and most 'hard-working' access the podium of riches and fame. In fact, the very entry procedures of selecting students in these acting schools feed this "ideology of charisma": by way of hand-picking, for example, twenty four from three hundred aspirants following a 'methodical' individual selection. Those chosen few students will believe of course to have "especial, magical or superior" personal qualities in relation to those which have been not accepted. But then, even those few "privileged"(which are, in a European context, thousands) must find a job when they finally leave their schools. As a result innumerable castings, commercial or not, are dealt with, while in the process considerable personal resources are wasted. The example of how success is achieved is constantly repeated in the media: like a lottery, one was in the right place at the right the moment. As a result, the goal of theatre– that is, to tell a story to which people can relate – is, in the process, forgotten.

The U.S. is generally viewed as the most vigorous location for actors/performers but its governmental Department of Labour makes it clear that "of the nearly 100,000 Screen Actors Guild (SAG) members, only 50 might be considered stars. The average income that SAG members earn from acting is less than $5,000 a year." (Bureau of Labor [sic] Statistics, www.bls.gov; accessed: 21.11.03). My observations over ten years can be applied to the rest of artistic fields. Up-to-date British research for instance, supports my empirical example, showing that "men studying arts subjects could, on average, end up worse off financially over their working lives than if they had skipped higher education completely." (Neasa MacErlean, "Future Shock as Degrees bring no Profit", in *Cash* (Student Special) *The Observer*, 4 September 2005, p. 2; Source: "The Return to a University Education in Great Britain" by Nigel O'Leary and Peter Sloane, Swansea University). MacErlean's article also charts how, while all the degrees' earnings in a lifetime have been nevertheless substantially reduced to an average of +/-£175,000, those who graduated in the Arts do not get above £22,458 (However, the earnings I am noticing here concern solely "Men;" because interestingly the chart also shows how statistically, all "Women's" degrees earn in a lifetime well above those of "Men" – specially in the Arts where "Women" even earn five times as much. Nevertheless, I do not have space in this thesis to explore such a subject as "gender and the culture industry," but it would certainly be a thesis of extreme relevance and interest).

[18] Assuming that a taste for freedom is an aesthetic disposition, and that aesthetics is an inherent component of the bourgeois ideology, Bourdieu is therefore here supported also by Terry Eagleton (1991).

[19] From Oxford Encyclopedia, 1997.

[20] Needless to say, one could argue that Gartman seems to unfold here the particular historical class-struggle of the United States, for workers' counteroffensives against big capital brought about different results in different countries. If workers' actions granted higher wages in the States, it brought Civil War in Spain. Nevertheless, I continue to believe that Gartman's conclusions about the historical development of cars in America, in post-industrial consumeristic societies are all too universal. It was a matter of time – in Spain by way of the Francoist state – before Gartman's American positivism could be applied every where else including Spain.

[21] Parallel to these discourses appears Baudrillard himself when he discusses the European Referendum on the latest proposed European Constitution and how, in his view, the French voted "no" because they feel trapped in a consensual "there-is-no-alternative; all are offering the same" (Baudrillard, 2005:24-5)

[22] Polly Toynbee presents an unusual and refreshing article on the gradual disappearance of utopian propositions which she calls it a "strangulation of dreams." Toynbee argues how "unions themselves are hollowed out, emptied partly by years of devoting more resources to baronial priorities than to recruiting the lowest paid and most vulnerable." (*The Guardian*, "This Strangulation of Dreams is Creating a Phantom Party," Friday, September 30, 2005, p. 31).

[23] It would be interesting because things have taken an unexpected twist after the collapse of the USSR. Paul Auerbach for example, portraits in his article an interesting view about the real possibility of a socialist future by way of injecting more resources into schooling: indeed, increasing a petty bourgeoisification of society. As he contends: "we live in a period unprecedented in its possibilities for the development of socialism" (1992:5). But this was his thinking in 1992. If then one could visualize a gap in the system towards that utopia, today that gap might have been once again sheltered by insurmountable *distractions*, be it the US and UK's direct involvement in the political shaping-up of oil producing countries, international islamo-fascist terrorism, unstoppable growth of extreme poverty in developing countries, and a countless list of other, no less important issues. As Bond contends, "extreme times" seem to be here to stay and do not seem to get better. However, as Bond also contends, we have drama to make visible a gap through which it might be possible to look forward to a humane future.

[24] The latter phenomenal increase of skilled individuals launching their own businesses and becoming freelancers - from builders to professors, from plumbers to engineers – testifies to this rather general embracing of "ideological" petty bourgeoisification. According to the Office for National Statistics, since the Spring of 2001, there has been a constant increase in self-employment of around 17 per cent per year. But this transformation of class-status – from employee to self-employed – has not only been the preference of those "managers, senior professionals and skilled traders," like builders and plumbers; there is a very similar percentage increase for other occupations like "machine operatives and elementary occupations", like cleaning and catering. (Cray Lindsay, Claire Macaulay, "Growth in Self-employment in the UK," *Labour Market Trends*, October 2004, Vol. 112, no. 10, pp. 399-404, (Labour Market Division: Office for National Statistics))

[25] On current relations between the State, Globalization and Capitalism read the accomplished article by Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells (2001, pp. 1-18).

[28] For instance, not only are middle and petty bourgeois classes fragmented and sub-fragmented into what are very thin divisions, in which the working class is effectively included, by way of acquired skills. Now we must take also into account unemployed classes – now more than 22 million only within the E.E.U. – and a rapidly emerging underclass classes. Although these later classes might exhibit in some cases an overlapped status, their habitus is in most cases totally dissimilar. (See SEN,1997; Coates, 1998; Murray, 1999; Davis, 2004).

[29] The bygone era in which an altruistic landlord would fund the education of one of his servants' children (eg if they were considered specially talented) perhaps offers a more concentrated idea of class legitimization by way of charismatic conferment. In many ways, the top classes bestowing grants upon subjects from the lower classes continues to be a sort of tradition, and a universally accepted social function which might have become a precept in the minds of the collective imaginary. It is hard to overestimate here the importance of Nietzsche's *On the Genealogy of Morals* (2001), and his evaluation of "Men of Ressentiment". For Nietzsche's evaluations of modern morality, the distinctions between good and evil, the feelings of moral guilt, and the aesthetic ideal, piece together the origins of this educational "charity" of the rich towards the poor.

As a matter of fact, it is not clear who gets more benefit from the action of bestowing grants to those who cannot afford a place in a highly reputed academic institution. Obviously, the grant's recipient acquires a higher status, but it is also all too obvious that the donors of that grant procure for themselves a highly valued and socially cherished good: moral capital. As Nietzsche argues throughout his writings, this is the real end that was being sought. The consequent

question is all too blatant, but nevertheless impossible without substantial amounts of naivety: should human beings need the charity and compassion of other human beings – or institutions – in order for them "to be?" To close this point, Terry Eagleton gives us a very pertinent example: "St Catherine's, the college to which I have just migrated, [...] began life in the nineteenth century as a society for matriculating students too poor to gain entry to the University, which is not least [one] of the reasons why I am honoured to be associated with it." (1992:29). But Eagleton, which seems aware of Nietzsche's indictments, lets us know that he does not forget his own genealogy by concluding on the preceding: "But since being a professor is better than having a job, I don't intend to look a gift horse in the mouth" (Ibid.:30).

[30] Among the most unequivocal cases in the whole of Europe are the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge – 'Oxbridge'. But it is perhaps the University of Oxford that exemplifies Bourdieu's ideology of charisma to a greater extent: the roster of distinguished scholars from its lecture rooms is incredibly long if compared with any other university (see Bilton et al., 1981:208-11). Since its founding in 1823, the Oxford Union, effectively an elite club, has numbered among its members many of the United Kingdom's most noted political leaders (Oxford Encyclopedia).

[31] See again Bond, "Notes on the War Plays", The Journal for Drama in Education, Vol. 12, Issue 1, 1995, pp. 6-16: "owning a house in our democracy implicates me in murder." (p. 13).

[32] Hamlet: Act I, Scene III (Shakespeare, William, The Complete Works of W. Shakespeare, with a preface by Sir Donald Wolfit C.B.E., London: Spring Books, printed in Czechoslovakia (no date supplied)), p. 950.

[33] As Bond tells me in a letter dated 14/07/2004: "I've also been writing theoretical guides to help eight authors who are contributing chapters to a book on my plays (Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child) [2005] to be published this autumn. There were many theoretical misunderstandings I had to clean up."

[34] Bond is referring to his reading of the last section "culture or contradiction." Letter dated 5 December, 2005.

[35] In April 2006 The Royal Court will celebrate its 50th anniversary proposing among other things "A full season of new plays involving acclaimed artists from 50 years of British theatre" (see: www.royalcourttheatre.com/support.asp) Of course, such a specific event without Edward Bond's presence in it cannot have the intended significance. And it seems that the dramatist has been accordingly invited to attend to it, but Bond is adamant: "I've told my agent Tom that I don't want to be part of the Royal Court 50th celebrations next year. He said people will say you're being difficult..." Letter, 7 July 2005.

[36] Coincidentally, Dan Baron Cohen sent me a paper in which the question of the oppressed turning oppressor appears as a fundamental source of argument in his own studies (letter received on the 14th of July, 2003). In my view, Nietzsche's evaluation of men of ressentiment illustrates how this problem is and will continue to be of highly complex resolution.

[37] And to surmount ideology is going to be a very complex affair indeed. Jameson himself, whose subject-matter and defining concern throughout his work is precisely utopia, says: "The point about ideology is not a particularly complicated one: it sets out from the conviction that we are all ideologically situated, we are all shackled to an ideological subject-position, we are all determined by class and class history, even when we try to resist or escape it. And for those unfamiliar with this ideological perspectivism or class standpoint theory, it is perhaps necessary to add that it holds for everyone, left or right, progressive or reactionary, worker as well as boss, and underclasses [sic], marginals [sic], ethnic or gender victims, fully as much as for the ethnic, race or gender mainstreams." (Jameson, 2004:47).

[38] When a phenomenon is analysed through structuralism this is to be seen as a system of structures, which are regarded as more important than the isolated elements that make them up. Structuralism derives from the linguistic theories of the Swiss Ferdinand de Saussure in the early 20th century. Structuralism as a method of study was also at the core of the well known

anthropologist Jean Lévi-Strauss, whose works argue that people's thought processes exhibit the same structural properties the world over, which has had major consequences in all fields of knowledge. On structuralism see Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1996: 240; 716-17.

[39] We ought to make clear considerations between an artist declining recognition from the above and a transgressive artist, which Bond is not. When I refer to the "above" I am indeed referring to the agents and agencies of authority: those that, in a social system of class differences, are in a position of conferring honours and awards. Instead, as Anthony Julius explains, a transgressive artist seeks indeed recognition from "the above" but he/she has only one audience and he/she attacks it. This thesis is confirmed by Julius's example on Cindy Sherman's lament: "I wanted to make it very clear what my concerns were about, and try to be different and challenging. I've always been so well received publicly that it started to bother me" (Anthony Julius' "Death by Exhaustion," The Guardian Weekend, 28 September 2002, pp. 18-24, p. 24). Bond seems to me more linked with the spirit of Goya: by enhancing violence he intends to diminish the reactionary influences of a social system which is inherently violent. Thus, like with Goya, Bond has two audiences: one to which he appeals and one that he attacks; and, in contrast with the transgressive artist, there is no overlapping between these two.

[40] In my view this is clearly manifested in the following section in which Sophocles' Jocasta finally understands that her husband Oedipus is also her own son, and yet she clearly gives the impression that she wants things as they are:

> As for marrying your mother, you're not the first
> To have dreamed that dream; every son
> Is his mother's son in imagination
> Or in day-dreams. Its commonplace.
> If a man broods on his most private fantasies
> His life won't be worth living, believe me! (Taylor, 1998:41).

When the shepherd gives Oedipus all the evidence he needs to understand his own origins, Jocasta replies: "(Jocasta is white with fear, hardly able to reply) *What man...?What does it matter... One shepherd or another... What difference does it make? None of it matters. Forget it. The whole thing. Don't pursue it* (Ibid.:44).

[41] Here again the reader might need to take into account the second part of the first chapter where the implications of Nietzsche's *men of ressentiment* are assessed. Further reading can be found in the exceptionally important paper by Bernard Reginster, "Nietzsche on *Ressentiment* and Valuation" (1997).

[42] However, the data submitted by Gartman clearly shows that, although all classes participate in the consumption of both popular and high culture, the upper classes express a greater preference for "legitimate art" like classical music, painting, literature, playwriting and so on. The tiny minority of manual workers preferring "legitimate art" shows an exception which confirms the rule. This verifies even further that a particular cultural *habitus* goes alongside the status of class. (Gartman, 1991:429-30).

[43] According to Bourdieu, "middle-brow" art is aimed at a public referred as "average". It is also correct to include middle-brow artists in the FLP because their works, says Bourdieu, are "entirely defined by their public" (Bourdieu, 1985:28). Middle-brow artists' ambitions are to take hold of the widest possible public. Bourdieu, quoting the remarks of a prominent French writer, which is also the beneficiary of the *Prix Interallié* and the *Grand prix du roman de l'Académie Française*, clearly designates the great social relevance that middle-brow art exerts upon my own argument that our society is currently undergoing a progressive petty bourgeoisification: "My sole ambition is to be easily read by the widest possible public. I never attempt a 'masterpiece', and I do not write for intellectuals; I leave that to others. For me a good book is one that grips you within the first three pages." (Bourdieu, 1985:28). It follows, as Bourdieu postulates, that middle-brow art relies on "accessible aesthetic effects", and on a systematic exclusion of all "potentially controversial themes"; in other words, it pursues a

public distinguished by its petty bourgeoisie's "neutral" ideology (Poulantzas, 1974:241) – the majority.

[44] The case of Yupanqui is one of the most remarkable because although he always intended to be a singer of the people, and often enough his song-writing takes on themes related to the underprivileged classes – that is, Gauchos, Indians, workers, immigrants and so on – during his life he has been awarded innumerable prestigious institutional honours, from international awards to Doctor Honoris Causa (for further information see www.todo-argentina.net/biografias/Personajes/atahualpa_yupanqui; accessed: 18.04.02). In my view, and following Bourdieu's analysis, this has effectively extracted Yupanqui from his association with the masses of working classes, allocating him among the high spheres of hierarchical superiority and dominant classes. The effect on the masses is of course of admiration, but now it is an admiration more related to a theological mysticism as if Yupanqui's symbolic goods had more to do with a "divinely superior intuition or inspiration"; in other words, here again legitimizing strong class differences by way of implementing the bourgeois "ideology of charisma". His songs could have had an intrinsic utopian function but, if we follow Bourdieu's sociology of art, it has been effectively "neutralized" by honorific institutional conferments. A very similar case can be found within our very terrain of theatre practice, where we have for example the Nobel Laureate Dario Fo. That his original works are intended for the popular masses is beyond question, however the continuous recognition by the institutions of consecration have positioned Fo at the pinnacle of the artistic hierarchical ladder (for a full account on international awards to Dario Fo see http://nobelprize.org/literature/laureates/1997/fo-bio.).

[45] Victor Jara (1932-1973) was a Chilean folk singer assassinated during the Coup of General Augusto Pinochet while detained with thousands of others in the infamous Football Stadium of Chile. Jara's songs were also focused on the lives of the workers and simple people of Chile which, straightforwardly, denounced injustices and political corruption. Of course, we will not know whether Jara would have attained the artistico-hierarchical status of Yupanqui, but among most Spanish speaking University students for example he is certainly considered a "poet" through and through (further information on Victor Jara in www.msu.edu/jara/evida; accessed: 18.04.02).

[46] Bourdieu quotes from: Sartre's "Qu'est-ce que la littérature?" Paris: Gallimard, (1948), p. 98.

[47] Here again is where the suggestion forwarded by Gartman that Bourdieu's theory is ahistorical is not well justified (Gartman, 1991:421-3). When Bourdieu notes the middle of the 19th century as the true starting point of the FRP's autonomy, he is also stressing the year 1848 in which the European monarchies started to collapse and the bourgeoisie emerged from the feudal yoke as an independent and autonomous class.

[48] "The state" says Bourdieu, "after all, has the power to orient intellectual production by means of subsidies, commissions, promotion, honorific posts, even decorations, all of which are for speaking or keeping silent, for compromise or abstention" (Bourdieu, 1985:27). It calls to mind again the case of Jürgen Habermas accepting the highly prestigious Spanish Principe (Prince) of Asturias Prize (2004).

[49] We might need to keep in mind that this is a similarity that would please neither Horkheimer nor Adorno, for empirical research – positivism – was regarded with contempt by both (Shaw, 1985:176).

[50] Then again, when one reads Adorno's theories, to a certain extent, a seemingly intrinsic antinomy might become a familiar feature of his writings. But this also might be a problem more related to the level of attention a reader might put upon Adorno's writings. Just as it is true, I would say, that all theorists need a through reading, Adorno's writings "demand of the reader an unusual level of concentration in order to be able to stay with the vastness of detail, complexity of argument" (O'Connor, 2000:1). And we ought to admit, many within the scholarly milieu apply the old tradition of reading works by way of random paragraphs, adjusting ideas to preferred discourses. This seems to be an old problem which was noted already by Nietzsche. "The worst readers" protested Nietzsche, "are those who behave like

plundering troops: they take away a few things they can use, dirty and confound the remainder, and revile the whole" (Hollingdale, 1977:16).

[51] Although this is a historical fact repeated throughout critical theory studies, it is a most uncommon observation within the classrooms of standard education and institutional textbooks. As far as I can account for, only the recent BBC documentary "The Nazis: A Warning," has been a refreshing attempt to set history straight with the general public (BBC2, 30 April, 2004). In it, it is stressed the fact that President Hindenburg disliked Hitler enormously and considered him a dangerous nutter. Only after great pressure from powerful figures of the business and financial world, did Hindenburg appoint Hitler with the German Chancellery in 1933.

[52] From a letter addressed to Tony Coult, dated 28 July, 1977.

[53] I cannot now examine in detail the situationists' arguments that surrounded Bond's momentous period during the 1960s and 1970s. Discussing the parameters by which Bond attracted the attention of some of the critics, scholars, and theatre practitioners of the 1960s would be too speculative – whether the young Bond would have been offered the same opportunity of staging his plays *today*. However, Bourdieu's social theory based in historicist and economicist Marxism, might offer an interesting degree of relation between the seemingly "revolutionary" days of the late 1960s and the fact that an author without academic training like Bond gets, as exceptional as it is, a hierarchical status within the FRP. As Gartman says via Bourdieu, "Historic shifts in the relative scarcity of resources within fields disrupt the equilibrium established between the objective opportunities for success within it and the subjective expectations (habitus) of individual participants. Such disruptions give rise to cultural struggles between established and parvenu cultural fractions that change field. [...] in the field of education the increase in the number of students and teachers in the 1960s caused a devaluation of their credentials on the job market. This, in turn, produced a discrepancy between the career expectations they internalized under the previous structure and the changed structure of the field. The result of this discrepancy was the revolt in the universities culminating in May 1968" (Gartman, 1991:439). Whether a dramatist like Bond, profoundly anti-establishment as he was and is, managed to get the attention of critics and theatre practitioners during the 1960s as a result of a protest induced by a devaluation of students' credentials in the 1960s, or whether Bond attracted them because they, like the dramatist, were also looking forward to a utopian socialism, could very well be ample material for another thesis.

[54] For example, see Brian Logan's interview with Bond, "Still Bolshie after all these years," *The Guardian*, Wednesday 5 April, 2000.

[55] As Nicholas Davey remarks quoting Gadamer on authenticity, "the artwork cannot be considered an object, as long as it is allowed to speak as a work of art and is not forced into alien relationships such as commercial trade and traffic" (in Kemal & Gaskell, 1999: 82).

[56] In which ways we are corrupted has already been extensively discussed here. Another thing altogether would be to argue over the terminology employed. Being corrupt not only implies decay and putrefaction; it also implies, says the Oxford Dictionary, "acting dishonestly in return for money or personal gain." However, another author somehow not dissimilar from Bond, Pier Paolo Pasolini (1922-1975), on whose works I have worked extensively in the past, referred to the Western masses not as "corrupted," but as "contaminated." The signifying connotations are fundamentally the same: all means of communication have primarily bourgeois foundations, and therefore art, language, and so on must be affected – that is, contaminated – in one way or another. (see Pasolini, 1991:63; 1995:713-32; and Rumble, 1996:13-4 or16-7).

[57] Regardless of the fact that In-Yer-Face playwrights like Sarah Kane identify Bond as one of their most important original influences. As Kane said herself: "The first draft of Blasted was dreadful, full of huge dense monologues about the characters' backgrounds, every feeling stated, every thought spoken. A friend read it, and didn't say very much, but he gave me a copy of *Saved*. I'd read this years before, but I read it again in 1993. And that really was where I learned to write dialogue" (Sierzs, 2000:101).

[58] Billington and Sierzs allude to plays and playwrights like Patrick Marber's *Closer* (2000), Mark Ravengill's *Shopping and Fucking* (1996), Phyllis Nagy's *Never Land* (1998), and of course Sara Kane's *Blasted* (1996).

[59] Needless to say, I cannot discuss here whether this applies to those countries supposedly under the yoke of communist dictatorships like China or religious fundamentalists like Iran. However, all indicates that behind their autocratic facades, capital growth is as much an issue as it is in our western liberal democracies, with their consequent class system based on difference and status.

[60] I must note that when Adorno refers to empirical research he does so from his own American experience which, as he himself describes, was not free from obstacles like access to funding and consequently prearranged stipulations. For example, Wilson also quotes Adorno saying "Naturally there appeared to be little room for critical social research in the framework of the Princenton Project. Its charter, which came from the Rockefeller Foundation, expressly stipulated that the investigations must be performed *within the limits of the commercial radio system prevailing in the United States* [Wilson's italics]. It was thereby implied that the system itself, its cultural and sociological consequences and its social and economic presuppositions *were not to be analysed* [my italics]. I cannot say that I strictly obeyed the charter." (Wilson, p. 136; footnoted: Theodor Adorno, "Scientific experiences of a European scholar in America," in *The Intellectual Migration: Europe and America. 1930-1960*, ed. Donald Fleming and Bernard Bailyn (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press. 1968), pp. 338-70, p. 343) However, Adorno's American experience rings a bell throughout European Universities: funding for theses in Humanities where pure speculative thinking is the subject, is progressively becoming atypical in relation to other scientific fields. Only recently the BBC4 documentary "Under Laboratory Conditions" (21:00-22:00, 27 January, 2006) showed quite clearly that academic research in *all* fields is getting adequate funding *only* in those cases where the project meets the requirements of viable commercial profits. Humanities studies are under a great risk of extinction.

[61] In Bond's "Rough Notes on Drama," as part of "Building Bridges – Laying the Foundations for a Child-Centred Curriculum in Drama in Education," a collection of papers an articles published following the 1998 Annual Conference of the National Association of the Teaching of Drama (NATD), held at Newman College, Birmingham; copyright for The National Association for the Teaching of Drama, 1998; supplied to me by the British Library Document Supply Centre (Request Ref. No. LS18764), pp. 1-178, Bond's "Rough Notes on Drama:" pp. 1-11, p.3.

[62] See one example among many: Steve Morris' "Working class still there... up to a point" in *The Guardian*, 22 February 2003, p. 13.

[63] "In 2002 two-thirds of the population had incomes below the national average of £396 a week [...] the media income – the middle point in the income distribution – was £323 a week. The richest 10% take home nearly 28% of total income, while the poorest 10% take home just under 3%, the IFS said." (Charlotte Denny and Larry Elliot, "Labour is tackling deprivation but inequality is rising," *The Guardian*, Wednesday March, 31 2004, p. 20).

[64] This is an epistemological position based in the "production of knowledge" which occurs in the "thought process." For a detailed account about Marxist historicism and ways of approaching it, see Poulantzas: 1976:63-83.

(PART II)

5. CHAPTER V

Culture or ideology.

Introduction

In one of his letters Edward Bond contends: "The basis of art must be socialism: all other art is fascist. There is no art in between" (in Stuart, 1996: 126). Whether art can be specified *only* as socialist or fascist is one of the prime motivations behind this rethinking of aesthetics in the politics of theatre and one which, in my view, urgently needs a viable articulation. Not just because, as Kate Katafiasz suggests, Bond's assertions are "too provocative to be ignored",[1] but because such a claim continues to be the unresolved paradigm that has hung over modern and postmodern criticism on creative activities. Art, Adorno has told us in Chapter I, is supposed to be neutral, but he also says that that is the impossible situation of art: its "negativity". In a society characterized by class differences and inequality, resulting in class struggle and/or class resentment, art is trapped by one side or the other: by the oppressors or by the oppressed.

As I will point out below, Trotsky also lamented a culture divided by social groupings – that is, whether particular art is part of a proletarian culture, or of a petty bourgeois culture, or of a bourgeois culture. Art, he said, should be part of human culture as a whole but that this could only be possible in a classless society. However, many would argue now that ideological neutrality – or at least appearing as if outside ideological discourses – is at the base of cultural practice in the postmodern. For example, noting that radical actions, criticism and ideas have become a rarity in theatre, Baz Kershaw examines whether the radical "*may* [my italics] survive and flourish through the excesses of performance" (1999: 56). His study on the radical is a reaction to the failures of political theatre to continue its once-flourishing discourses on justice and egalitarianism. He hopes that the vacuum left by the disappearance of political theatre can now be occupied by "radical performance" (Ibid.: 17). Nevertheless, Kershaw tells us that the most "acute" definition of radical is made by Raymond Williams: "radical seemed to offer a way of avoiding dogmatic and factional association while reasserting the need for vigorous and fundamental change" (Ibid.: 18).

Through Poulantzas' theory of fascism I intend to explore whether the radical to which Kershaw refers has similarities with the kind of "social" neutralism the Greek sociologist attributes to the petty bourgeoisie: autonomy, opposition to capitalist oppression, ideological neutrality, change towards a better world, requesting a fair and neutral state, and so on. As Kershaw himself acknowledges, quoting Jan Cohen-Cruz, "radical performance encompasses left- and right-wing politics. Broadcasting the Aryan ideal to the masses... the 1934 Nuremberg Party rally is a paradigm of street theatre as media opportunity" (Cohen-Cruz in Kershaw, 1999: 20).

Can art be ideologically "neutral", and avoid "factional association", or is it only socialist or fascist? Major figures of critical thinking – such as Benjamin, Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse or Lukács - have dedicated great amounts of time to the evaluation of this modern question. And yet, today the claim seems to be buried under the dust of our post-industrial condition. In the realm of mainstream politics it has been buried altogether. As Rodney Barker observes, for the new left as much as for the new right, "socialism [is] either dead or suffering distant exile[:] the old arguments [are] no longer to be found, the old proposals [have] vanished" (1997: 252). Reviewing David Miliband's *Reinventing the Left*, Barker notes the "almost complete absence of the word 'socialism' from its pages" (Ibid.: 251). He points out the ironical characteristics of current politics: while the new left declares the death of socialism, they find themselves on the rise – of course, he was referring to New Labour in 1997. As I am reviewing these words, one of the new contenders for the Liberal Democratic Party's leadership in Great Britain announces that its main political plan is "to look forward to the future, without regard for the old left and right approaches."[2] This kind of political posturing seems to function as one more example of current socio-political neutralisation; incidentally vindicating Poulantzas' sociological theory which, as I have already indicated, claims that our western societies are enduring a progressive petty-bourgeoisification – that is, a class neutralization. If the word "socialism" barely appears in current literary texts, the word "fascism" has even been stigmatised. For instance, in a personal letter, Terry Eagleton tells me that he dislikes "the loose use of the word 'fascist' by the political left,"[3] and I think very few critics would disagree with him. A far more basic and critical matter has arisen in the course of this research though: not just whether art can be socialist or fascist, but whether these terms are used appropriately. Eagleton's letter on this subject is a most providential contribution

because it allows me to explore important yet inconspicuous loopholes of the term "fascism" and its meaning – or better still, what it does *not* mean.

5.1. Section I

5.1.1. Preliminary reflections on socialism

Would it be possible to verify dialectically whether any artwork is only one of the two: fascist or socialist? This question is a deeply complicated one. If Marxist critical theory or Fascist studies can tell us something definitive about it, this is that socialism as much as fascism are terms yet undefined. The first has not as yet come into existence, and the second has yet to be "deciphered" (Poulantzas, 1974: 253; Allardyce, 1979: 368; Schnapp, 1993: 90). Without underestimating the importance of making a systematic analysis of the human values behind the term "socialism", it is not possible to evaluate both concepts fully here. Thus, I shall concentrate my discourse mostly on fascism, which, in my view, is in need of urgent attention. Before going on to define what fascism is not, I shall first make some important points about the ethical value of a utopian socialism.

A starting proposition is, then, that socialism is a generic concept and will continue to be guesswork; whereas fascism is a generic term but not a generic concept. In the strictest meaning of the word, "fascism has no meaning beyond Italy"(Allardyce, 1979: 370). One thing is clear though: as Gilbert Allardyce puts it, if the study of what fascism *is* "begins with the study of capitalism" (1979: 369), the study of what socialism *could be* begins with the study of Marxism. Trotsky himself had socialism quite clear in his mind. In his essay "What is Proletarian Culture and is it Possible?" (1923) he observed that real socialist art would only come into being when class differences were finally dissolved into a socialist community, the proletarian class freeing itself from "its class characteristics and thus ceas[ing] to be a proletariat."[4] For Trotsky there is no such thing as a proletarian culture and in fact "there is not reason to regret this" (Ibid.). This argument is exceptionally important because in reality the socialism that Trotsky had in mind had more to do with ethics than with ideology. His socialism wishes to get rid of class culture "in order to make way for human culture" (Ibid.); and very suitably he adds, "We frequently seem to forget this."[5]

Interestingly, Trotsky's conclusion on what culture ought to be, once his utopian socialist society had come into existence is not, in my view, incompatible with that branch of dialectical criticism headed by Adorno, which situates art within the spheres of neutrality and autonomy (O'Connor, 2000: 239-65). On the contrary, it throws light on the perennial problem of paradox in Adorno's theory of art because art itself is confronted by a colossal set of contradictions: trying to explain art within the claustrophobic frame of capitalism; and, therefore, art within a "class culture". Like Trotsky before him, Adorno states "there is nothing in art that is directly social" (O'Connor, 2000: 242). And of course, he is also more or less correct if only for two reasons: first, because he understands the damaging effects of those creators that, like Brecht, use art as an ideological device (in Brecht's case, Stalinist communism),[6] and second because, while Adorno seems to think of art in the same manner as Trotsky, he always reflected upon art within the modern bourgeois framework; roughly from the bourgeois revolution of 1848 to his own days. Adorno recommends that art and artists be autonomous for the same imperative reasons that an entrepreneur seeks autonomy for himself and for his industry; not because, like Trotsky, he sought in any way a society of equals. In fact, like his partner Horkheimer, in the end Adorno resigned himself to the idea that "a total revolution [...] was not possible" (Shaw, 1985: 179), which is as to say that a society without private property and without class differences is not possible. They both wanted people "to believe", Brian J. Shaw reasons, but offered "nothing to believe in" (Ibid.).

In his essay "Culture is Ordinary" (1958) Raymond Williams – who continues to be one of the most influential cultural critics in modern Britain – defined as "absurd" the "leftist" claim that certain art forms were or were not "socialist" (Gray and McGuigan, 1993: 5-14). I will not expand too much on the cultural critic, but Williams was not drawing a distinction between terming an artwork "socialist" in the sense of "left-wing" *politics*, and applying the term because the artwork proposes in its structure a future utopian socialist society, as Bond does. What was absurd for Williams was to be accused of being hostile to socialism for saying that George Eliot was a good novelist (Ibid.: 14), which still does not preclude Bond's assertion that art is or is not socialist. Williams makes obvious his celebratory but factionalist relation with bourgeois culture which, according to him "has given us much, including a narrow system of morality" (Ibid.: 9). And then he criticises the "Marxists" for identifying the culture of his time as bourgeois which, he says, is a "mistake" that everyone seems to make. But neither does

a Marxist necessarily have to be a member of the Communist Party or Fourth International as Williams seems to imply all the way through his essay, in that he repeatedly uses the formula, 'the Marxists say [so and so]" (Ibid.).

The problem with Williams, I think, is that he did not think of socialism as an ethical ultimate reality as Bond does (Stuart, 2000: 56), instead he posits bourgeois culture as the best possible option. My final reflection on Williams' criticism is to identify the highly paradoxical position the critic takes; a position which, I would suggest, has been of great influence in our western world: he protests in the strongest terms against the Marxist claim that "we live in a dying culture, and that the masses are ignorant" (Gray and McGuigan, 1993: 9). But a few pages later he displays a need to reflect upon it, bringing out into the open what are the real starting points of his protest:

> [...]: the people we meet aren't *vulgar* [my italics] [...] a few weeks ago I was in a house with a commercial traveller, a lorry driver, a bricklayer, a shopgirl, a fitter, a signalman, a nylon operative, a domestic help. I hate describing people like this, for in fact they were my family and family friends. Now they read, they watch, this work we are talking about;

But he knows better and therefore adds:

> Very well, I read different things, watch different entertainments, and I am quite sure why they are better. But could I sit down in that house and make this equation we are offered? Not, you understand, that shame was stopping me; I've learned, thank you, how to behave.
> (Williams in Gray and McGuigan, 1993: 13).

Of course, as Williams says, people are not vulgar; we people have human qualities which ought to be considered as the top of our agendas in every enterprise we do. But to me it is as if Williams is pretending for us to believe that ignorance and vulgarity are two conditions of the same token. He reads and watches better things than his friends, he says, and he cannot tell them why they are better because of shame? Good manners? Or because he is less ignorant than them, and in order to maintain a coherent discussion between each other, his less learned friends would have had to invest a time and energies which they obviously never had – for numerous social reasons? Certainly, Williams does the right thing with his less learned friends, but it appears as incontestable that he cannot talk with them about the things he thinks are best and most valuable.[7] In my view he is stressing even further the notion of culture as an

assemblage of cultures subjected to class differences; differences which ought, according to my argument here, to be abolished.

That socialism has so far not occurred anywhere in the world seems to me incontestable, despite years of communist dictatorships whose ultimate end was supposed to be indeed the creation of a socialist society of equals.[8] To be equals in the full sense of its meaning, must *per forza* entail phenomenal difficulties: not only in the sense of any individual having equal rights and equal responsibilities to any other individual, but also an equal faculty of knowing and reasoning. It is a matter, I think, of differentiating between socio-political means – that is, an ideology and its implementation – and the ultimate aim of those means. The *Oxford Interactive Encyclopedia* (1997), with its characteristic circumspection, is able just to tell us that communism is rightly an "ideology" but that socialism is nevertheless "difficult to define with precision." Indeed, something that has not come into existence cannot be identified in the first place. Erich Fromm suggests the following definition of socialism:

> Socialism is the abolition of human self-alienation, the return of man as a real human being. It is the definitive resolution of the antagonism between man and nature, and between man and man. It is the true solution of the conflict between existence and essence, between objectification and self-affirmation, between freedom and necessity, between individual and species. It is a solution of the riddle of history and knows itself to this solution. For Marx, socialism meant the social order which permits the return of man to himself, the identity between existence and essence, the overcoming of the separateness and antagonism between subject and object, the humanization of nature; it meant a world in which man is no longer a stranger among strangers, is in his world, where he is at home. (Fromm, 1992: 69)

We, like Jameson, can in reality only fantasize about the idea of socialism. While one could define a socialist condition as a social world where human beings are *truly* equal; another definition could be posited, that socialism is about universal employment, or the abolition of labour altogether (Jameson, 2004: 47), or a state of existence without class differences or private property, where people are free to engage in true responsibilities and make true choices that will concern not only the individual but all – those living and those that have yet to be born – where everyone is welcomed as a human being in a human world. The path to socialism would necessarily be very complicated indeed, if only because it would be trampled by endless discussions. If a socialist condition would

be a state of perfect democracy and therefore perfect justice, socialism is then an end-product or an 'absolute value'. But according to Wittgenstein's critique on ethics, socialism would *not* be then an ideology but an ethical end in itself: it would be the "impossible" utopia; an absolute value; that which *ought* to be (Cahoon, 1996: 192-8).

Yet, there has been, I think, a kind of strategic reasoning – through the media, education, the church and so on – during the second half of the last century, determined to confound communist dictatorships with Communism's intended end – that is, socialism (Jameson, 2004: 35-54). This incorrect conception of socialism has become a precept in the collective imaginary and, as Russell explains, to challenge a precept becomes a very difficult operation (Cory, 1960: 581). For example, through major media channels, to millions of people and apparently totally uncontested, such an informed novelist as Frederick Forsyth tells us that, according to history, socialism is a proven "failure".[9] Nothing would persuade people like Forsyth that, thus far, socialism has never been tested as it has never come to pass anywhere in the world. However, theorists like Poulantzas tell us that Forsyth's conceptualization of socialism needs to be taken in its right context, and thus he says:

> History has not yet given us a successful experience of the democratic road to socialism: what it has provided – and that is not insignificant – is some negative examples to avoid and some mistakes upon which to reflect. It can naturally always be argued, in the name of realism (either by proponents of the dictatorship of the proletariat or by the others, the orthodox neoliberals), that if democratic socialism has never yet existed, this is because it is impossible. Maybe. [...] But one thing is certain: socialism will be democratic or it will not be at all (Poulantzas, 1978: 87).

There can be no doubt, then, that this general failure to distinguish with due rigour between ideological, moral or ethical discourses has had detrimental consequences within Theatre Studies. For instance, as a consequence of his philosophy of drama – and of statements like the one that opens this chapter – Bond is too often accused of "politicizing art" as literally as Ahmed Hasaballa Elhag does all the way through his doctoral thesis (1989). This is tantamount to saying that Bond, whose entire work and theory is motivated by a vital yearning for a future socialist democracy, has the same dramatic strategy of Brecht which, as Benjamin clarifies in his letters, clearly stood for a Stalinist communist dictatorship (Demetz, 1986: 215-16).

If anyone has taken a stand in the strongest terms against the philosophies and dramatic practices of Brecht within the field of theatre, it surely is Bond himself. And he does so in a totally uncompromising manner – which might be one of the reasons why most scholars and practitioners seem not to know how to fit Bond's techniques and philosophies into their institutional academic agendas. In explaining Bond's own location in opposition to Brecht, even a well-known Bondian practitioner like Peter Billingham tries rightly to stay within the due boundaries of scholarly debate when he says "Bond has argued that the ideological base of Brechtian methodology has fulfilled its historical context and purpose and that political theatre needs to re-occupy – or discover a new – essentially anthropological questioning of the ontological site of human existence".[10] For Bond, however, Brecht is not just a question of due historical regard; as he told me himself during our encounter, in our current social situation the dramatist is "far more desperate than that: [...] So, this is why I'm not interested in Brecht – you know, find the gestures, find the abstract thing... I'm not interested in that any more. [...] I need something that will take me further. I need to be able to look at the stage and see... the invisible object presenting me!... with the necessity of making a choice" (Appendix: 27).[11] When the Le Monde's journalist, Fabienne Darge, asked Bond in what ways his vision of the tragic was different from that of Brecht, the dramatist replied unambiguously:

> Pour moi, Brecht est un irresponsable, un gangster politique, le poète d'Auschwitz et du Goulag. Il a trahi la pensée d'Aristote, il s'est fait le serviteur d'une dictature abjecte, l'Allemagne de l'Est, où régnaient l'injustice et le mensonge. Et maintenant, des metteurs en scène montent ses pièces en pensant que c'est du théâtre politique... Je trouve cela obscène.[12]

> [My translation: "For me, Brecht is irresponsible, a political gangster, the poet of Auschwitz and the Gulag. He betrayed Aristotle's thinking, becoming the servant of a despicable dictatorship, East Germany, where injustice and lies were the rule. And now, theatre producers put on his work thinking that this is political theatre... I find that obscene"]

Evidently, this is quite different from saying that Brecht's methodology "has fulfilled its historical context and purpose"; Bond is trampling on Brecht's theory of theatre, as if it were an infectious bug. Conversely, it would not be appropriate to reproach Elhag or anyone else for thinking of Bond as a "political" or an ideologically overcharged dramatist; there is a logic to it. We need to acknowledge comprehensibly the dialectical position of those that would take Bond's assertions as "shocking", "too provocative" or,

as Terry Eagleton tells me in a personal letter, "in need of dialectics".[13]   Maybe.   In more than one sense, I myself imagine that scholars like Elhag think of Bond as one entering a crowded Catholic church and then shouting "You believe in God because that preacher there is a liar; to go on living you need the lie, and you know it." Of course, I am certain that the dramatist would not do such a thing and I hope I am forgiven for my hyperbolical *prosopopoeia* here. Bond knows that these kind of tactics would not do any good – this is made repeatedly clear in his plays, other published writing and the included Appendix. But he achieves a similar stridency through the apparatus of drama. In order to avoid ideological misjudgements, perhaps we need to set once and for all an ethical space where we can use the terms "fascist" or "socialist" without instantly being categorized as "political".

The notion that both fascism and socialism have been surmounted and dealt with in history is all too widespread: the former with the victory of the Allies over the Axis Powers in 1945, and the latter with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989. In addition, there does not seem to be any familiar or historically archetypal symptoms by which it is possible to identify whether an artwork is socialist or fascist in current western society. As I said earlier via Walter Benjamin, neither do we have a theory of history "on the basis of which fascism can be sighted" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 972). But Walter Benjamin's letters make me think that, actually, it is dialectics which is in serious need of thinkers like Bond. By stating that art can only be socialist or fascist, Bond could be accused of practising not dialectics but just crude thinking. But when Bertolt Brecht told Walter Benjamin that "the main thing is how to think crudely; Crude Thinking, that is the thinking of the great." the latter added: "There are many people whose idea of a dialectician is a love of subtleties... [His ellipsis] Crude thoughts, on the contrary, should be part and parcel of dialectical thinking, because they are nothing but the referral of theory to practice."[14] Bond's crude thinking is, in my view, as much a referral to practice as it is to reality; that is why, within the ambit of Theatre Studies, his philosophical proposition about drama is a very unique one.

Bond, as he told me himself, does not see a solution, as surely did Brecht by way of a proletarian dictatorship and its Committees of Public Safety; Bond sees "the problem." What does he propose then, for unmasking injustice in a society in which we cannot make real choices or offer real solutions – unless, as I have said before, we make the ultimate decision to sleep under bridges? The answer is drama. For drama provides the

place where people can make choices without being crushed by the overwhelming forces of Big Capital;[15] the place where, paraphrasing Wittgenstein's theory of ethics, we can make decisions through the still unresolved language of ethics: "silence." We still need to understand what freedom and democracy *really* mean; having the chance to make choices and being responsible for them might help towards this goal. Of course, in drama these are choices that can only be made within the spheres of the conceptual, but it is a start. We need dialectics in order to unfold the synthesis, more complete and nearer to the truth than its confronting elements, the thesis and its antithesis. Yet, as Adorno indicates all through his symptomatic and punctilious descriptions, in our bourgeois modern society all dialectics become Negative Dialectics. That Adorno proposes Beckett's figuring of vacuity and failure (O'Connor, 2000: 319-50) and Schoenberg's discordant scores (Ibid.: 280-303) as solutions "to world starvation and threatened nuclear destruction" (Eagleton, 1991: 360) is not accidental. On the contrary, it is one of the few instances in which Adorno's theory does not appear contradictory but ratifying: his theory of art corresponds to the bourgeois aesthetics of forecasted failure and mass dysfunctionality. It is a dialectics whose synthesis always ends negatively. As Terry Eagleton advises, Adorno's solution "is a solution that is clearly part of the problem".[16]

Raymond Williams observed that "socialism would be much more complicated than capitalism," and before him Oscar Wilde complained that it would take "too many evenings" (Jameson, 2004: 43, quoting Williams). The view is that utopian socialism appears to be *beyond* the bounds of possibility while fascism is all too clearly *within* it; implying the ever present danger of its re-establishment. This is tantamount to saying that to undertake a path towards socialism is the *difficult* way while fascism is the *easy* one. Could this division be applied to artists and their artworks? Between those who surrender their artworks to production schedules, popular taste and fashion, to profits,[17] and those who do not? I have already proposed via Bourdieu a division between "violent," non-submissive art and "non-violent," submissive art. Earlier via Garcia Duttmann, I also brought into the discussion the urgent task of "inventing" concepts, languages or settings that are entirely unusable for the purposes of fascism; a task which, by its multi-dimensional characteristics, the field of theatre practice seems to be better equipped to undertake than other creative fields. But the letter from Eagleton below prompts me to suggest that there is too much confusion concerning fascism. How can we undertake such a task if we have such contrasting and even opposing

conceptions of what fascism is or is not? Would it help if one could suggest dialectically that neither the general concept of socialism nor the undefined fascism have anything to do with ideology? That the former never came into being and the latter perhaps never died? And above all, would it help if one could establish in which ways socialism and fascism meet their roots in people's intrinsic yearn for justice? This is to me a new question of cardinal importance, triggered by the philosophy of drama of Edward Bond. As he says:

> The desire for justice becomes the psychological need for injustice. Traced to its roots, the good motivates the bad – but the roots are hidden in human chaos. It is a paradox. It makes the world-home a place of hate, revenge and enmity. That is why the individual's desire for justice becomes at the same time society's need for injustice" (2004: 25).

If in 1979 Allardyce was already complaining that fascism was "too hot to handle" (1979: 369), nowadays it has either become dead cold by a progressive "loss of heat" or so hot it has been "vaporized". In this chapter I will examine the concept of fascism, and at the same time attempt to put its questioning back on the agenda of Theatre Studies.

5.1.2. Eagleton versus Bond – 'one' socialism versus 'another' socialism

There is, throughout Terry Eagleton's writings, an easily recognisable and constant objection to the idea that our current liberal capitalism could also be defined as another, more sophisticated form of fascism. If by way of Adorno, Horkheimer, Benjamin, or Marcuse[18] one was to suggest that our current post-industrial liberal capitalism is a deodorized form of fascism, for Eagleton this would be a gross misrecognition. He says:

> It is by now widely agreed that Adorno's experience of fascism led him and other members of the Frankfurt School to travesty and misrecognize some of the specific power-structures of liberal capitalism, projecting the minatory shadow of the former sort of regime upon the quite different institutions of the latter (Eagleton, 1991: 359).

However, this prominent critic does not specify to whom he is alluding when he says "widely" anywhere in his *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*. With that question in mind I sent him a letter and, making the most of it, I also included some arguments defending the Frankfurt School's case. For example, I suggested that there are disturbing similarities in the basic psychodynamic principles of Fascism and Liberal Capitalism. As Adorno explains, psychological dependency and social conformism are two of the most conspicuous constituents in both systems (Adorno, 2001: 135-45). It ought to be disturbing indeed to find that Hitler's *Mein Kampf* proposes the same tautological tactics that are at work today in many of today's "soap-operatic" commercial and political events: from sports to adverts, from news and broadcasting to general elections, from television and radio serials to literature, and so on. "The art of propaganda" wrote Hitler, "lies in understanding the emotional ideas of the great masses and finding, through a psychologically correct form, the way to the attention [...] people do not have multiple shadings; [propaganda] has a positive and a negative; love or hate, right or wrong [...] the masses are slow-moving, and they always require a certain time before they are ready even to notice a thing, and only after the simplest ideas are repeated thousands of times will the masses finally remember them."[19]

Is Adorno's conclusion such a 'ridiculous misrepresentation' of fascism; a "travesty" as Eagleton suggests? Addressing his audience in Nuremberg (1934), Hitler said, "Propaganda took us to power. Propaganda helps us to remain in power. Propaganda will help us to conquer the world" (endnote 19). We should not need further supporting evidence to conclude that the successful globalization of liberal capitalism and its intrinsic idealism comes as a result of a worldwide systematic dissemination of the riches that we supposedly enjoy in our western "democracies" (Abu-Lughod, 1997).[20] Capitalism does not need now to impose its dominance through sheer force under the leadership of this or that lunatic because we have advertisements which, as Judith Williamson suggests, "are one of the most important cultural factors moulding and reflecting our life today. They are ubiquitous, an inevitable part of everyone's lives: even if you do not read a newspaper or watch television [they] form a vast superstructure with [...] autonomous existence and immense influence" (1993: 188). The dominant ideology is pushed within ourselves, she says, not through the things we produce, but through the things we consume (Ibid.: 190). Neither should we ignore the dangers connected with an aestheticization of everything which, as Düttmann explains in his most pertinent essay "Tradition and Destruction" (1991), is one of the fundamental malaises of the postmodern. I also pointed out to Eagleton that, like the Frankfurt School (O'Connor, 2000: 9), Marcuse (1992: 15), Lukács (1971: 23), Benjamin (1999: 234) and quite a good number of prominent scholars, Edward Bond also thinks we could be now 'living a kind of fascism';[21] I repeat, however 'deodorized'. As Bond tells us: "To call Reagan, Thatcher and Major, Hitlers would be grotesque. But Hitlers are no longer necessary. In the media age democracy can destroy itself. It does so when it makes icons of its lies. Fascism occurs only when – but always when – the real causes of social injustice are denied" (Bond, 1995b: 20). Summing up, I wanted to put to the critic that, if so many prominent thinkers arrived at the same conclusion, surely such arguments must be made up of at least some "truth content" (see diagram based on Adorno's theory in chapter I, section III). Promptly and kindly, Eagleton sent me the following providential letter; providential because it will allow me to explore here these important yet inconspicuous loopholes within the meaning of the term fascism itself – or better still, what it does not mean.

Dear Cesar Villa,

[...] Among the 'widely', when it comes to Adorno on liberal capitalism, I was thinking I suppose of Jay, Jameson, Anderson and Habermas. Fascism and liberal capitalism clearly have much in common, as you suggest, and the former grows out of the latter; but I dislike the loose use of the word 'fascist' by the political left, which I think devalues the notion, and the distinctions between the two regimes are surely as vital as the affinities. Bourgeois democracies are typically characterised by contending political parties, parliamentary rule, non-dictatorship, formal (if not always actual) civil liberties, relatively autonomous media, the non-militarisation of everyday life, labour movements and trade unions, rationalism rather than mythology, liberal-bourgeois rather than totalitarian ideologies etc. None of this is true of the classical fascist regimes – which is not for a moment to underestimate the sinister corporatism, shrinking of civil liberties, attacks on the labour movement, curbing of free speech and so on of many bourgeois democracies. (The United States is in practice a one-party state, but not in principle – and I think the principle matters). To claim with Bond that we are now living fascism seems to me a dangerous hyperbole, and an emotive rather than rigorous use of the term. To say that this is as bad as fascism is to say that fascism was as bad as this, which seems to me a grossly self-indulgent underestimation of the evil of the fascists. Marx of course had undying praise for liberal democracy (as well as vehemently opposing it): it seemed to him to spring from the most revolutionary class in history (the bourgeoisie), and to be at once emancipatory and enslaving. I doubt he would have said the same had he lived to see the Nazis. Mr Bond needs a little more dialectics... (30 April, 2005).

I might be at fault here because I wish I had sent Eagleton a detailed introduction to Bond's social evaluations and line of thinking, seeing that his reply shows an all too obvious unawareness of them (see endnote 21). What is interesting is that while they both manage to perceive the same object/problem, their *perception* of it is conspicuously different. They both might claim to be socialists in one way or another but certainly their different conclusions about our current social system can only be the result of different ideological positions. They agree that "fascism and liberal capitalism clearly have much in common", as Eagleton says above; the problem is that, while Eagleton seems to make clear that that commonality of fascism and liberal capitalism does not make liberal capitalism an "extreme system", it does for Bond. In fact, in the conclusion of his work "The Illusion of Postmodernism" (1997), Eagleton even seems almost to have been coerced into coming to terms with the fact that, with capitalism, fascism could be a threat, as he says: "I must end, *regretfully* [my italics], on a minatory note. Postmodern end-of-history thinking does not envisage a future for us much different from the present, a prospect it oddly views as a cause for celebration. But there is indeed one such possible future among several, and its name is fascism" (1997: 134).

As he has with aesthetics (1991: 9), Eagleton has on capitalism quite a doubled-edged view. In his paper "Capitalism and Form" (2002), he discusses bourgeois capitalism not as a "stable, predictable and enduring" social system but, like Brecht did before him (Brecht, 1983: 47), as a neverending extreme revolution "perpetually agitating, unmasking, disrupting, dissolving" (Eagleton, 2002: 121). Even more, Eagleton also recognizes how liberal capitalism "enjoys a kind of horrified intimacy with fascism" (Ibid.: 128); and this is a "horrified intimacy" that he acknowledges repeatedly (Eagleton, 1991: 379; 1996: 134). Now, Eagleton's evaluation on fascism and capitalism appears *almost identical* to Bond's own philosophical assessments – at least up to his points of "intimacy," and of capitalism as the true "extreme" system (Stuart, 2000: 134-35; 2001: 70-2; Bond, 1995: 20; Roberts, 1985: 38-41). However, if their placement of fascism and capitalism as entwined systems is almost identical, this 'almost' makes all the difference. As I said before, critics like Eagleton criticize the ground on which they stand, and in doing so they reflect certain autonomy of thought, but they do not go as far as to really undermine it. For example, while critiquing the bourgeois agent as "criminal" (Eagleton, 2002: 119), "selfish," "gargantuan," and even as the "true anarchist" (Ibid.: 128), there is also a kind of self-indulgent celebration or even admiration towards the bourgeoisie in Eagleton's writing. For him in capitalism there is "something ignoble", but there is "something epic about it" as well (Ibid.: 125).

Accurately enough, Eagleton seems fascinated by the fact that our ongoing ruling bourgeois system is itself the product of an ongoing revolution – which one could safely suggest is one of its most embarrassing characteristics. On the one hand, it fiercely defends capital growth and class difference – that is, social stability – and on the other it is unrelentingly and rapidly transforming social infrastructures precisely because capital growth must be sustained at all costs. And the critic reaches such ambivalent conclusions because, in my view, he seems ultimately to suffer from the very ideology he criticises. Thus says Eagleton, "the honest bourgeois may reject the artist as a dangerous transgressor, but the virulence with which he does so, rather like the puritan denouncing pornography, betrays the fact that part of what he is rejecting here is an intolerable image of himself" (Ibid.: 128). Ideology reaches everywhere. Eagleton seems here to be saying that the bourgeois knows deep inside how to be the true "artist": the "innovator", the "revolutionary", the "transgressor". Yet, to compare capitalism and its agents with anything *epic*, anything *heroic*, seems to me a grotesque joke of cultural criticism. The achievements of the bourgeoisie are in more than one

sense quite remarkable, but there is nothing heroic or epic in its capitalistic machinations. Capitalism has endured fights against nature, but it is hardly a "heroic struggle". It is not like saving the human race as in Milton's epic *Paradise Lost* (1998; orig.1667), nor even just a community, at the expense of his or her own life. In some sense, capitalism or the bourgeoisie might have helped humanity to be safer – indeed many lives have been saved due to such innovations as penicillin – but within the bourgeois system all reasons are easily undermined by economic imperatives.

5.1.3. Socialism is too difficult; fascism is too easy.

Knowing that for many Marxists he would be saying something "heretical", Bond himself told me, "the victories it [the working class] achieves are not through socialist politics, but through the successes of capitalism" (Appendix: 32). But if capitalism has achieved extraordinary results, it is for the same reason that it has accomplished extraordinary crimes: for the sake of capital growth. For the epic hero, all human imperatives come first; for the bourgeoisie human imperatives are ultimately not just peripheral but, as historicism and economicism show quite clearly, in many cases they have been an inconvenience.[22] For the bourgeois there is no "us", only "I", and thus its deeds cannot be epic. I refer here, of course, to Milton's sense of the epic because I do not expect Eagleton to think of the epic in relation to our own field, theatre studies. It is not appropriate, for example, to assess his definition of the epic against that of Piscator or Brecht (Taylor, 1992: 94; Demetz, 1986: 213). Eagleton defends his idea of the commercial as epic by diagnosing the classics' definitions on the epic as unsuitable to current times because, he says, "no classical epic ever imagined that you could wring from commerce the kind of prodigious vitality, tragic destructiveness, titanic characters and panoramic vision that could be derived from martial, mythological and political matters" (Eagleton, 2002: 124-25). One could see it differently: that the classics could never imagine that one day social critics would envisage as epic, the pursuit of capital growth, the enterprises and machinations of money-makers. More suitable here would be Edward Bond's definition of epic, which seems to me the most correct and pragmatic of all because it takes from Piscator and Brecht's ideological sense of the epic, and relocates it to the totally new ontological heights of ethics; thus transcending ideology. As he says on the epic:

> The form of the new drama will be epic. This name is often misunderstood, partly because the form isn't yet fully developed. An epic play tells a story and

says why it happened. This gives it a beginning, a middle and an end joined together in a truthful way. This isn't true of the theatre of the absurd. It sees life as meaningless: it has a beginning and an end but not middle. The bourgeois theatre is concerned only with anecdotes: they have a middle but not beginning and end.

Epic plays don't need to cover centuries or have a cast of armies. The essence of epic theatre is in the way it selects, connects and judges. Even when it deals with two people quarrelling in a kitchen it draws its method and values from the understanding of the history of all men. How else should you judge between right and wrong? Bourgeois writers believe that only they write with subtlety and sensitivity. They see epic theatre as abstract, inhuman and cold. But what they call subtle and sensitive is only arbitrary and incomplete. They try to derive meaning from the incidental. No, the broad structure of history must be understood before the incidents in it can be given meaning. That's why the epic is the only form of theatre that can be subtle and sensitive – and have good taste, wit, nuance and human intimacy. Bourgeois theatre lacks this sense of purpose and this makes it inhuman. It would be unfair to judge its subtlety and sensitivity on the fodder it gives to tired businessmen and their bored clients. That would let it off very lightly. It ought to be judged on the crudity, shallowness and vulgarity of the plays admired by its intellectuals. (Bond, 1980: 109).

I will not list here the innumerable instances in which both critic and dramatist arrive at the same theoretical conclusions, but it will be useful to examine one example. As he tells me in his letters, the interpolation of fantasy into reality is for Bond one of the most pronounced sicknesses of our modern times; be it by way of cultural production, mainstream politics, media, education, or religion. Eagleton identifies this interpolation in the same way, but for him it is not a problem: "we must come to terms, with the fact that fantasy, desire and disruption are in some sense part of the given order" (Eagleton, 2002: 121). Yet, to say that "we must come to terms" also means literally 'to reconcile with'. Eagleton appears to suggest that postmodern society at large has capitulated to a world that feels more at ease when delimited by fairy tales. However, as I will note here, several examples demonstrate that for the critic there is not final, unambiguous thesis: first the critic sees fantasy in the postmodern as an opportunity to encounter liberatory languages – a way to the transcendent through fantasy as an "anarchic [...] dynamic operation of capitalism" (Ibid.: 121-24); and then as "pure negation" of reality itself (Ibid.: 126). From his dialectics, one ideas seems conclusive though: for Eagleton fantasy *might* be a way to transgression which, he says, becomes transcendence; fantasy is a form of desire and, therefore, of salvation. As he says:

This is part of Goethe's great achievement in *Faust*. With Faust, transgression becomes transcendence—a perpetual spiritual striving which refuses to rest in the present, and so an angelic version of demonic desire. Indeed, Faust will be damned only for *ceasing* to strive, and his spiritual quest is as much a defiance of Mephistopheles as the fruit of a pact with him. In a masterly equation, desire *is* salvation, and so is stripped for the most part of its disruptive, hubristic qualities (Eagleton, 2002: 130).

Fantasy becomes transgression which becomes transcendence, then becomes desire and then finally salvation. Bond clearly would not only never suggest such an idea but he would refute it (see overall conclusion). Of course, within a middle class setting reality might seem dull, grim, and boring – and current mass culture, which is mostly based in pure entertainment, ratifies this. Break free from that context and reality is also soaked with blood, brutality and tyranny; a world of injustice that needs to be repaired. However, it will not be repaired with fantasy but, as Bond insistently suggests, with imagination. Fantasy forms part and parcel of the problem because it displaces the latter. "Our fantasy fixation is worrying," remarks Felipe Fernandez-Armesto, "fantasy doesn't just feed on the imagination, it drains it. Virtuality erodes reality [...] we flee to fantasy in recoil from truth."[23] Fantasy is delusory imagination and we theatre practitioners should ask whether and when the former has been or is being confounded with the latter.[24] Only through imagination might we foresee the product of our actions. As if it were a drug, in our minds we might "fly" with fantasy and levitate among clouds without any need for wings, but if we fly for real it is only because some people put imagination into it. "Fantasy is imagination free-wheeling," Bond tells us, "but imagination is impregnated with reality and reality with imagination [...] imagination is the search for meaning" (1998: 7). And concurring with Fernandez-Armesto he adds: "When the imagination is fantasised it becomes destructive" (Ibid.: 11).

Through his views on the epic above, Bond reinforces one of my prior critical suggestions: that in contrast with what Eagleton assumes about Bond, he and Bond appear to recognize or visualize the same problematic structures that form our bourgeois culture. But, while they see the same problem, they draw, not opposing, but contrasting conclusions. Here again we have the case of socialism being problematic or *difficult* by praxis. Capitalism instead is unproblematic: capital growth and profits are the aim of all capitalists. Of course, problems arise from the need to organize societies in such a way that capital growth and profits are constant, but a consensus is pre-established by all concerned. Those who might jeopardize or question the consensus are subtly pushed to

the fringes and become ostracised – or they are accused of being anchorites, as some do with Bond (Logan, 2000). If they become a source of social conflict, and therefore affect production and domination, they are simply "annihilated" as was the case with Victor Jara in 1973 Chile.

That most of us will always choose an easy route of action instead of an arduous one – or rewording Bond, a route through *whats-and-whens* instead of through *whys* (Bond, 1998: 3) – is a matter of serious concern to me. And it should be for all those who are involved in humanistic studies and who make a living from it in one way or another. As exposed by the recent BBC4 documentary, *Under Laboratory Conditions*, there is already a palpable and progressive reduction of university departments of Humanities, and the remaining departments are finding it increasingly difficult to find funding for humanistic research, fundamentally due to the fact that "money is allocated principally to those research projects which can demonstrate to have a viable commercial profit."[25]

If the culture of *whats-and-whens* continues to expand at this rhythm, eventually only a few institutions in the academic world will offer humanist studies and only in cases of outstanding excellence and/or privilege. That I ask about the *whys* does not mean that I have the answer; at least not the kind of answer the "non holistic mind" expects to obtain (Bond, 1998: 3) – nor a civil servant with the responsibility of distributing funding according to governmental policies. Some *whys* sound like a "why" but are really *what-and-whens*. For example, if one asks a school teacher "why does it rain", the teacher is likely to explain evaporation, condensation and so on, and that kind of answer would in reality be answering *whats-and-whens*. Only if the student replies "yes, but why?" would things need to be reconsidered. The *whys* Bond is referring to form part of a cognitive questioning which permeates the holistic mind; Bond, applying a logical truth, reminds us that "there is a universal good but not a universal bad" (Ibid.). Of course, I am talking again of ethics and Wittgenstein's ethics as "silence." Garcia Düttmann evaluates this line of argument in relation to Adorno on one hand and Heidegger on the other but, in my view, he becomes entangled and frozen by the enigma of whether it is possible to uncover meaning from the question – the *whys*. His position is in keeping with the fact that, actually, he is not a dramatis or a poet. Nevertheless, in the following excerpt he shows his position to be closer to Wittgenstein and Bond than to Adorno:

One who raises the question of meaning has already lost meaning, is asking too much or too little [...] the answer both is and is not the meaning of the question. It is the meaning of the question because the question calls for an answer, and does not exist prior to the answer. But it is not the meaning of the question because the question does not include the answer within itself "as something intended" [his quotations marks] (Düttmann, 2002:106).

If I can paraphrase Düttmann, the answer would then consume the question, because the question, "is not the question *yet* [my italics]" (Ibid.). And I think Düttmann is right in the sense that the meaning contained within our answers to the *whys* made by a holistic mind becomes meaningful *only* within the parameters of drama, when the problem is dramatized.[26] However, I do not think Düttmann is thinking of tragedy – even as a 'specialist' on Benjamin – when he thinks of questions and their meanings' answers; let alone Bond's form of tragedy/drama.

The idea of Eagleton as a socialist is as contentious as his own suggestion that Oscar Wilde was a socialist. In his paper "Saint Oscar: a Foreword", he addresses Wilde as "the Oxfordian socialist protodeconstructionist" (1989: 126). And he adds, "Wilde is political in all the most fundamental senses of the term [...] political, for example, because he is very funny, a remorseless debunker of the high-toned gravitas of bourgeois Victorian England. He is radical because he takes nothing seriously, cares only for form, appearance and pleasure, and is religiously devoted to his own self-gratification" (1989: 127). If the problem of applying dialectics within a petty-bourgeoisified milieu is that it always ends negatively, in his enthusiasm for Wilde, Eagleton seems to offer a perfect example, while he loses any residual sense of historicism and economicism. Now the very definitions of bourgeois decadence – taking nothing seriously, caring only for form, total commitment to self-gratification – are also supposed by Eagleton to be socialist traits. I am not saying that a socialist is a kind of anchorite aesthete in the veins of Schopenhauer – who was by no means a socialist. But if a socialist democracy implies freedom and equality, it also implies the abolition of religious or moral principles; and therefore, fun and pleasure could not be called sinful. Thus, while in different works Eagleton tell us that being "self-gratifying", "radical," and "all aesthetical" are characteristic traits of the bourgeoisie (1991: 168; 2002 :130), in relation to Wilde he decides that these are socialist traits.

Furthermore, Eagleton surely commits the mistake of non-dialectical reduction, by designating Victorian England as simply "bourgeois". Victorian England was in

practice bourgeois but still feudal in principle and this makes all the difference. Both the Houses of Commons and Lords gained constitutional rights in relation to the monarchy as far back as the reign of Richard II in the 14th century; and surely we would not identify those times as a bourgeois era. Most surviving documents about Shakespeare tell us that he was a successful businessman and very little about him being the greatest playwright of all time – not even his death certificate. Historians have located the installation of the bourgeois order in Europe from the year 1848, yet it does not mean that the monarchic myth was swiftly annihilated – especially in Great Britain. Every single day I pass by a War Memorial with the words "For King and Country" engraved on it; first King, then Country. The bourgeois ideology has taken a grip of society progressively, not instantly. Thus, if Wilde "debunked" the gravitas of the "bourgeois Victorians", it was because they were, yes bourgeois, but also monarchists. The bourgeois Wilde was indeed a threat to the then given order because it was not bourgeois order in its full meaning, but a moribund feudalism. It was thanks to the bourgeoisie's taste for freedom (Gartman, 1991: 439) and, thus, to bourgeois artists like Wilde, that the bourgeoisie emerged finally from the feudal yoke. Wilde pastiches the emergent aspects of dominant bourgeois ideology and threatens its residual elements, in order to make it an adequate fit to the class's true historical condition. It is interesting to observe how Eagleton suffers from the same ambivalences he observes in others – as, for instance, Adorno.

Now, in his letter above, Eagleton accuses Bond of being "hyperbolic" and "emotive". But Bond is neither related to utopia in the sense of an impossible imaginary, nor, as it were, in a fantasized idealism. As he tells me in a recent letter, "Wilde said that a map that doesn't have a place on it for Utopia is useless. That sounds nice but is dangerous nonsense. A map of Utopia that doesn't have a place for reality is a map of hell."[27] If Eagleton's terms refer to Bond's words as the product of the dramatist's strong feelings in relation to our current social state of affairs, I think he is right. After all, we are human beings; and some of us are poets, who can access intense emotions. Only machines do not have emotions. I will not discuss here emotive theory, and its relation to logical positivism. Bertrand Russell, through his re-establishment of empiricism, tells us how ethical and value judgments are expressions of feelings, not of descriptive statements (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 200-02; 704-05); in other words, the *whats-and-whens* characteristic of scientism. But, if in relation to Bond, the intended meaning

of "emotive" is for Eagleton extravagant, self-indulgent, or wishful thinking, then I think he is quite wrong – and I hope to demonstrate it here.

Through close reading of both the critic and the dramatist, I feel confident to suggest another of their common similarities: a fierce honesty. Of course, whilst situated in their respective 'ideological constituencies', in the case of Eagleton, his honesty reveals (or betrays) to us his position not just as a bourgeois critic, but to his having capitulated to the same spirit of failure he so criticizes in Beckett and Adorno (1991: 341-366). For instance, in one of his previous papers, "The Crisis of Contemporary Culture" (1992), Eagleton begins by making an appreciative introduction about his then new position as professor at St Catherine's College, Oxford and, after an erudite mixture of embarrassment, humility, and gratitude, he closes it by saying: "when I reflect on my own dubious genealogy and penchant for mimicry, I can't avoid the overpowering feeling, not least in the small hours of the morning, that I have become Warton Professor by a kind of mistake. But since being a professor is better than having a *job* [my italics], I don't intend to look a gift horse in the mouth" (1992: 30). Now, contrary to what some would argue – and despite Eagleton's own evident rhetorical construction of a 'joke' – I do not see any motive for irony or sarcasm in his use of this proverb; on the contrary, if aesthetics and ideology encapsulate all and everything, we ought to take it with the importance it deserves. Because, by analysing it closely, it would tell us of the ways in which the bourgeois ideology of charisma and difference (Bourdieu, 1984; 1985) pervade every part of our lives.

Through his comments above, Eagleton has told us two things about his own ideological location. With the first, "better being a professor than having a job", the critic confirms Bourdieu's thesis by acknowledging the fact that to be a professor situates him in a position of privilege, reproducing on the one hand, and legitimising on the other, traditional class structures. The irony is that Eagleton is totally correct: having to endure a "job" is mostly demeaning, alienating, and uncreative – especially if one is unfortunate enough to be amongst those millions of Chinese employees working in an assembly line for five pence per hour. But his remark also underlines the fact that his cultural criticism is revealed more as "intraclass strife [that is, occurring within his own social class] which never fundamentally challenges the class structure of capitalism, since all bourgeois fractions have an interest in their joint domination of the working class" (Gartman, 1991: 439). And of course thinkers like Eagleton are

prominent because they make a difference: but only within the realm of authority. Since his struggle is for symbolic capital, it often leads to changes in literature, education and art, but not beyond them; not beyond his own class. "Better to be a professor than having a job" through Eagleton's mouth is a coup of sheer honesty but also a reaffirmation of Bourdieu's sociological theory of culture (1985); especially when our world is basically structured by a majority who must either endure a job (or worse, have to find one) and a minority that does not. With his second comment, namely that he does not "intend to look a gift horse in the mouth," Eagleton reaffirms even further the thesis that if there is class conflict, in the Field of Restricted Production (FRP) this takes place solely "within the predetermined confines of the field," but without challenging "the rules of the game" (Gartman, 1991: 438). Conversely, the critic exposes his own position as a *dominated* fraction of the bourgeoisie, because after all, his status is determined by the "gifts" offered to him by the *dominating* fractions of it.

It is not coincidental then that among all those giants of thought that Eagleton criticises in *The Ideology of the Aesthetic*, Jürgen Habermas is situated quite positively and parallel to the theory of his mentor, Raymond Williams (1991: 404). Thus, by way of Habermas and Williams, the critic lets us know also that "only in the context of radical democracy [...] would truth properly flourish" (Ibid.: 405), but because we live in a continuous state of inequality and domination, this is an "idealized future condition" (Ibid.); in other words, "if we wish to know the truth," says Eagleton, "we have to change our way of life" (Ibid.). This is a pure *Catch 22* based on anticipated failure: no truth is possible without real democracy, but nor is there real democracy without truth. How are we supposed to change our way of life? With cooperation and linguistic communication, says Eagleton quoting Habermas, which "must *of necessity* [his italics] rely on reason" (1991: 405). *In summa*, paraphrasing Habermas, Eagleton's answer is "that we simply have to talk it over" (Ibid.:412).

Interestingly enough, when he agreed to receive awards from a traditional agency of authority such as the Spanish monarchy (Mendieta, 2004: 1), Habermas, like Eagleton, did not "look a gift horse in the mouth" either. In my view, to achieve the true democratic ideal, we will need far more than the social communicative negotiations Habermas and Eagleton suggest; we will also need from them some move that really represents all of us; if only a symbolic gesture. "Decorations," says Bourdieu

pertinently, are all "for speaking or keeping silent, for compromise or abstention" (Bourdieu, 1985: 27). Eagleton, like Habermas, certainly has not kept silent, but would his "decoration" – his "gift horse" – have been granted if he had not found an intermediate way of criticism in between the agents of liberation and those of oppression: that is, a "compromise." If success in our society can be attained by way of making compromises and mutual concessions, in my view keeping silent is by far the preferred method for most of us – if not to attain success, at least to procure a living for ourselves.

"If A is success in life", formulated Albert Einstein, "then A equals x plus y plus z. Work is x; y is play; and z is keeping your mouth shut."[28] As I have indicated, Bond possesses an enviably high status within the "Field of Restricted Production:" he is noted in the most prestigious encyclopaedias as one of the most important dramatists of recent and current times, his writings and plays give rise to all kind of theses and papers, influencing new generations of playwrights, theatre movements, and so on (Shank, 1996: 66-77; Spencer, 1992: xiii; Sierzs, 2000: 92). Yet, he does not "keep silent" nor compromise, and at a dear cost to him: as I could verify for myself during my visit, Bond does not enjoy a life of riches as one might expect from a man with such cultural status. Of course he would agree that it is better to be a professor than to have a job, but this is precisely the logic underlining the serious problem we have at hand; and we can be absolutely certain that Bond *would* look a gift horse in the mouth. George Lukács observed that an important section of the political intelligentsia of the left "came more and more strongly under bourgeois influence" (1990: 227). The theory of reification tells me that bourgeois ideology permeates everything; including critical theory with a penchant for socialism, and this I think it is the case with critics like Eagleton. And as Bond says:

> The problem isn't that we are different characters, have different opinions, but that when there are different ideologies there are different realities (letter to author: 06.10.05).

5.2. Section II

5.2.1. Fascism or fascisms.

It is not my intention to call into disrepute the well-deserved intellectual reputation of a thinker like Eagleton. Certainly without him this work of rethinking aesthetics would have been far more difficult than it already is. What I am trying to assess here are the reasons for which a prominent critic like Eagleton would rightly identify fascism as "enjoying a horrified intimacy" with liberal capitalism (2002: 128),[29] and then complain against any paralleling of current capitalism with fascism, because the latter is *only* such when it is the product of "evil ... fascists". Of course, the critic would be right if fascism was *only* the physical elimination of political opposition; the gassing and enslaving of social "inconveniences" or social scapegoats – racial minorities and communists; the assassination of humanist thinkers, and other monstrosities. But, as an important number of studies of fascism demonstrate (Epstein, 1964; Turner, 1972; Allardyce, 1979; Schnapp, 1993; Coupland, 2000; Kershaw, 2004; but esp. Poulantzas, 1974), these examples are only part of a "type" of fascism among many others. The atrocities of Auschwitz are accurately located within fascism, but the latter is not only the extremes of the former.

I was a ten year old living in Spain when Franco finally died in 1975. As Eagleton notes above on fascism, the dictator banned all political opposition of any kind, but I can confidently assert that an overwhelming majority of Spaniards would protest if Franco's forty years dictatorship were called fascism; they would prefer it to be called *Franquismo* instead. Yet, whilst incontestable that Spain has lived under the yoke of fascism for forty years, it was not "bad" in the sense that Eagleton deems fascism either. On the contrary, powerful memories of my working-class background tell me that everyone around me had a voluptuous *joie de vivre* of a kind that now seems to me extinct. One could argue that such 'collective happiness' was the result of a successful ideological isolation of the natives; or in other words, the natural "happiness" of the ignorant (Kiernan, 1980).[30] But then they would have to explain why so many people from the 'advanced' democratic European countries of the north thought of Francoist Spain as a "wonderful" place to live to the extent that a good number of them decided to stay there permanently. To this day I have English friends who have lived permanently in Spain for many years, including during Franco's last ten years in power. Tell them

that Franco's Spain was a fascist regime and they would immediately answer "nonsense". Of course, had they admitted that indeed it was a fascist regime, they then would have had to deal with the question of whether they were fascists themselves - again, because during the 1960s, Spain was for them such "a great place". During the last twenty years or so of Franco's dictatorship, Spain was in general terms poorer than it is today, but there was full employment, free health care for all, very low levels of crime and so on. And the assassinations and political purges committed during the first years of the regime were, through many years of political indoctrination, forgotten. Thus, within a criterion of daily basis, one could say that a Spain governed then by fascists was not such a "bad" place after all. It is more than interesting to know that Oxford University declared two minutes of silence as an act of respect for Franco's death in 1975.[31] If they had had the suspicion that such a public manoeuvre would have identified them with fascism in any way, would the Oxford Dons have consented to it? Would Eagleton call the Spain of Franco fascist? Of course Franco's Spain was seized by fascism; but it was a different type, a different form of fascism and, among all the forms, there are not two alike. Fascism does not have to kill millions with gas to be fascism.

This is why fascism is so difficult to define. There are two compelling reasons for this: one, that fascism is not a "generic concept" (Allardyce, 1979: 370); and the other, that fascism "is not an ideology" (Ibid.: 378; Poulantzas, 1974: 253). Thus, as Eagleton urges in his letter, let us then make a "rigorous use of the term". Firstly, fascism does not have a set of principles or a theory from which it can seek guidance like communism does. "To recognize the variety of fascism," observes Allardyce, "is to recognize the need to free it from the tyranny of concepts" (1979: 369); and he has good grounds for claiming this. For example, Jacques Doriot, the leader of the French fascist party, the *Parti Populaire Français*, protested against the claim that they were fascists because they did not have any thing to do with the Italian Blackshirts or with the Nazis: "those regimes would not fit in our country," he declared (Ibid.: 370). Even more significant, "when Mussolini invited the leader of the *Falange Española*, José Antonio Primo de Rivera, to attend the international fascist congress at Montreux in 1934, he flatly refused. The Falange was not fascist, he protested, it was Spanish" (Ibid.: 384). Furthermore, if fascism was, as Allardyce critically notes from other scholars' work, "a developmental stage in the modernization that advanced and industrialized a nation's economy," even Hitler was not a fascist, in the sense that Germany "was fully

industrialized when Hitler came to power" (Allardyce, 1979: 372). As a matter of fact, the people of Nazi Germany surrendered their wills to Hitler in ways not matched by the peoples of other fascist regimes. And there were many other fascist regimes during the same period – such as Croatia from 1941, Estonia from 1939, Latvia from 1934, Lithuania from 1926, Romania from 1930, or Hungary during the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s – each one of them with its own and unique national version of fascism, which was inappropriate for export to any other country's political and cultural context.

It would also be a great mistake to ignore Sir Oswald Mosley in the Great Britain of the 1930s. His National Union of Fascists party did not achieve any significant social prominence or support – the violent marches and rallies staged in the East End of London by Mosley's fascists found considerable public and political opposition. But fascist movements found as much opposition in other countries – if not more – where fascism did nevertheless seize power.[32] Mosley has found his way into the annals of history as a "patriotic traitor" (Allardyce, 1979:370), but other substantiated reasons have made scholars rethink this viewpoint. The most important reason for his failure was that Mosley tried to emulate Mussolini's fascism, oblivious to the fact that the fascism of the latter was fit *only* within the historico-economical particularities of Italy. Even Mosley realized his mistake in later life, footnotes Allardyce (Ibid.). But to me this is as to say that Mosley's fascism did not emerge in Britain because Mosley himself was not "bright" enough; that his fascism failed because he did not comprehend the values of the British people of the time. Scholars in fascist studies such as Allardyce ought then to explain that the leaders of fascist Europe are indeed remembered for being anything but "bright". Franco was famously stubborn, cruel and totally indifferent to human suffering "because idiotic" (Julia *et al.*, 2004: 34); Mussolini and Hitler were clearly better suited as histrionic actors for the masses than the Spanish dictator but their absurd military strategies are all too well recorded as a source of bafflement to their commanding officers and to subsequent historians.[33] As Hannah Arendt and then Simon Wiesenthal concluded, if fascists were anything, it was certainly not cunning. "The trouble with Eichmann," wrote Arendt, "was precisely that so many were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal" (Levy, 1994: 296).

So, why was it different with Mosley in Britain? The answer lies within the second reason why there are not two fascist states or movements alike: that is, that fascism is

not an ideology in itself. As Eagleton himself seems to concede in his criticism (though in a rather ambiguous manner) it sprouts from the mighty tree of bourgeois ideology; and only when bourgeois ideology is under threat or experiencing an ideological crisis. However, Eagleton seems unaware of Poulantzas' major studies on fascism which demonstrate how it does not just bloom in capitalist societies as an *accident*, or by way of a natural relationship between good and evil as Eagleton wants us to believe in his paper "Capitalism and Form" (2002: 128). If I can extract a conclusion from Eagleton's letter, it is that there is a wide confusion with and apprehension towards the term "fascism" and its meaning. And if reassessing aesthetics in the politics of theatre means re-evaluating the way we perceive our human world, our values and our experiences, "fascism" is a term calling for a cautious resolution of its own; if only to demonstrate that Bond and the Frankfurt School might be sighting it in a more accurate and materialistic way than critics like Eagleton like to think.

5.3. Section III

5.3.1. Rethinking fascism: class neutralization by 'other' means.

Fascist studies is a field of numerous and contrasting definitions. If one study suggests that fascism was a sophisticated incident in the course toward modernization (Turner, 1972: 547-64), another one rightly objects that it might be true in the case of 1930s' Italy, but not in the rise of Hitler's movement in an already modernized Germany, which at the time was one of the most advanced countries in the world (Allardyce, 1979: 375). As a matter of fact, during the 1920s and 1930s any scientist or humanist with certain self-esteem had to be as fluent in German as today we must be fluent in English. On the other hand, if Nazism "bedevils" this theory of fascism as a "mass-mobilizing, developmental dictatorship in modernizing nations", then, Allardyce tells us, scholars like Turner must also explain the cases of anti-fascist regimes like those of "Stalin, Castro, Ho, Nkrumah and Nasser", which, with modernization and mechanization as a goal, were – and are in the case of Castro - also authoritarian and mass-mobilizing (Allardyce, 1979: 375). Turner answers that this is so because they are also "fascists" or "fascistic", which, as Allardyce says, rightly outrages most historians (ibid.).[34] To make matters worse, while one might propose fascism as a vicious thrust towards modernization, another one finds that, actually, fascism is an anti-modernist

reaction, against the liberal decadence of the big metropolis on the one hand and for a "revival of the cults of sword and soil" on the other (Turner, 1972: 551). In fact, and especially during the period of Nazi and Italian-fascist gestation, their leaders sought not only a revival of medieval myths, but also that of "pre-Christian, even pre-civilized ones" (Ibid.).

Fascism then even had a utopian anti-capitalist outlook which they referred to as "socialism" (Ibid.), which in Germany resulted in a Nazi party with the incongruent name of National Socialist Party. This anti-modernism was not just the visionary revolution of a horde of obtuse middle-class peasants like the poultry farmer Heinrich Himmler. The existentialist Martin Heidegger, whose overarching question "what is being?" made him one of the greatest philosophers at the time, was deeply involved with the Nazi party.[35] The involvement of Heidegger with the Nazi Party reflects the missionary spirit reigning at the time,[36] bent on saving Germany from human depravity and moral decay. This redemptive struggle had clear roots in an accumulation of devastating economic events like the Versailles Peace Settlement and then the Great Depression of 1929, that left Germany under the sway of staggering inflation, street crime and six million unemployed. Then again, the argument that fascism – or Nazism – is an anti-modernist movement is highly contentious: "as soon as they realized that the industry was a source of immense power [...] industry grew still bigger in the Third Reich" - as it did in the Italy of Mussolini (Turner, 1972: 557). Allardyce notes other scholars for whom fascism is also understood as an international movement by way of some cross-national features or "shared traits". Salutes, uniform shirts, squads, and so on all contribute to this suggestion (Allardyce, 1979: 378); but these, suggests Allardyce, are "features too limited and external to provide a compelling generic [international] classification [as well as] too mixed, diverse, and exceptional to be collected [into anything concrete]" (Ibid.). And neither can we ignore the suggestions about the origins of fascism which questions whether there exists *a* fascism with an intellectual content. As Allardyce explains, "historians disagree not only over who the intellectual forebears were, or whether there were any forebears at all, [and therefore] whether fascism itself is an ideology in the first place" (Allardyce, 1979: 379).

Indeed, the ideological origins of the fascists leaders highlight this problem. Hitler might have been formed by "influences of the Right", as Allardyce says, but the French fascist leader Jacques Doriot was an ex-communist formed by Marx and Lenin, and

Oswald Mosley was a former Labour MP known to be influenced by the social economist John Maynard Keynes (1979: 386), whose principles underpinned the foundation of the British welfare state (Cole, 1947: 35). Even the former school teacher Benito Mussolini, the originator of the term fascism, initially became a prominent Italian figure as a socialist journalist.[37] In fact, if scholars like Fritz Stern (1961) and Hannah Arendt (1964) are so baffled by fascism it is because, among other obscurities, they cannot find a specific common ground for "prefascism" nor for a "protofascism". Of course, on "prefascism" they find Hitlerism as the "big bang" triggered by a "long fuse" (in the case of Germany the ignominious Versailles Peace Settlement of 1919). But France and Italy were direct beneficiaries of the Peace Settlement and they went down the fascist road anyway.[38] On "protofascism," throughout Europe there can be found diverse clusters of self-appointed followers of Hitler, Franco, or Mussolini, but one cannot compare their pitiful, clownish, melancholic, and folkloristic displays with the real "thing". When Hitler, Franco, and Mussolini died, their type of fascism died with them.

Now, different definitions within fascist studies ultimately flow into numerous and disparate lines of thought, but here I will draw a line only between two groups. Once again, they both seem to perceive the same problems concerning the term fascism but, by way of their clearly separated ideological positions, they come to different verdicts. One is defined by scholars like Allardyce (1979), Turner (1972), Epstein (1964) and Kershaw (2004) – who to me seem to represent a mainstream line of thought in fascist studies. The second is defined by Nicos Poulantzas (1974).

Both lines of thought demonstrate quite successfully that fascism is not a general concept, not an ideology, not even a cult of personality type – that is, a "reduction of fascism to mental processes" (Allardyce, 1979: 386). Having said that, what the first group really aim at is a final eradication of the term fascism from the "political rhetoric of our own times" (Allardyce, 1979: 388; Turner, 1972: 563-64; Epstein, 1964: 320). For them, fascism was first coined not just by Mussolini, but by ill-informed Marxists whose anti-fascist fervours made them blend Nazi Germany with Fascist Italy and then with the rest of similar – but "unrelated" - multinational "phenomena" into one "generic label" (Turner, 1972: 564). For the Marxists, says Turner, all were fascists; all were "agents of finance capital" (Ibid.). Wanting to dislocate Nazism from fascism as a unique, bizarre, and separated historical episode, Ian Kershaw asserts "Nazism was

Hitlerism, pure and simple" (2004: 242). In other words, for this group fascism ends up divided and subdivided between radical and traditional, and moderate and less-traditional, and more-radical and so on, to such an extent that fascism is finally erased from their discourses. When it was too radical, it was not fascism, it was Nazism; when it was too moderate, it was not fascism, it was traditionalist nationalism (Ibid.: 247). In fact, their final reckoning is such, that fascism becomes situated within the meaningless spheres of "romanticism": it meant nothing and it is "dead" (Allardyce, 1979: 388). Of course, "the memory of the Final Solution," says Allardyce, "will [...] always keep fascism immediate and alive for scholars of human sciences," but his recommendation is that the term fascism should be confined within the time limit of history (Ibid.). This is then one line of thought; it does not find major connections between different fascisms and when it does, they are superficial – like shirts, salutes, barbed wire, insignia and so on. For them fascism should become a foreign word "again", and "untranslatable outside of [sic] a limited period of history" (Ibid.); in other words, they propose to study fascism in the same fashion a biologist might study a dodo.

Nicos Poulantzas's sociological study (1974) exemplifies what I would call the second line of thought on fascism. Like the first group, it also demonstrates that fascism is not a general concept, not an ideology, nor a cult of personality type but, unlike the first group, its fascism is not a foreign word, dead and buried. It is, rather, a living social element which surfaces by way of greater or lesser extreme measures, depending on the needs of the dominant ideology. Certainly, it cannot be pointed at as if it was a concrete particular, but only because the *sine qua non* condition for fascism to exist is an all too perennial struggle for domination and exploitation (Ibid.: 143). I will not speculate why the first group above (we might as well include critics like Eagleton in it) ignores the fact that fascism *always* arises where class struggle truly threatens the dominant class's real power.[39] This seems to me incontestable not only in the historical terms of 1930s and 1940s in Europe but all around the world and throughout the second half of the twentieth century. Thus, through Poulantzas' line of thought we can on the one hand see fascism as an amalgam of different fascisms having distinct and unconnected contextual features – thus acknowledging the first group; but also on the other see a common denominator through which it is possible finally to picture the rise of all fascisms as definitive of *one* fascism – ignored by the first group. The rationale is this: that the rise of fascism corresponds in *all* cases to the ideological crisis of *all three* historico-social classes – that is, not only to the ideological crises of the dominant

bourgeoisie, but also of that of the petty bourgeoisie and of the working class. Now, in my view this is a highly important analysis which situates fascism in a totally new light in relation both to an obvious non-Marxist line of thought like that of Turner or Allardyce, but also against an increasingly exercised "Marxist" one since World War 2 – that of guilt and *mea culpa*.[40]

Without Poulantzas' analysis, Marxist historicism and economicism – and especially the Marxist-Leninist branch (Lenin, 1999) – rightly concludes that, in all cases, the rise of fascism corresponds *only* to an *offensive* step and an offensive strategy on the part of the bourgeoisie. In "Reconsidering the Spanish Civil War", Ronald Fraser is compelled to conclude:

> The war served another purpose in the Franquista [sic] camp. Politically, the hegemonic fraction of the ruling class had been discredited by its inability to legitimize ruling-class domination under the republic. This failure was now to be made good. Hegemony would be exercised by a dictator: ruling-class domination would now become an overt dictatorship of the bourgeoisie (1981:49).

Many of us have had the opportunity to corroborate Fraser's conclusion recently. According to the recent documentary broadcast by BBC2 "The Nazis: A Warning," in the Weimar Republic of 1933 only Hindenburg, its president, could appoint a German Chancellor. Apparently Hindenburg thought Hitler to be a "maniac lunatic," a "dangerous" man and disliked him deeply. And yet he appointed him German Chancellor. The documentary's conclusion is that Hindenburg handed over the Chancellery to Hitler because he was under "enormous" pressure from powerful capitalist figures of the banking and manufacturing industries.[41] Indeed, says Poulantzas, what does a crisis of the dominant ideology mean? Why was it "discredited"? During the 1920s and 1930s a growing mass of oppressed classes started to question and attack the ideology of the dominant class – "the real 'cement' of a social formation" (1974: 76) – affecting the very "relation of the bourgeoisie to its own ideology" (Ibid.: 77). As the aforementioned documentary told us, Hindenburg did not just capitulate to the pressures of powerful capitalist figures; he had to take into consideration the threat of a Bolshevist revolution. We ought to remember, like Poulantzas does, that the ruling of the dominant classes was rarely questioned by the lower classes; the aftermath of the First World War, and especially the 1917's Russian Revolution contributed firmly to a class consciousness among many millions of workers around the world (Poulantzas, 1974: 17). We can only speculate about the kind of

mental turmoil that went through the minds of the dominant classes when their power and authority started to be challenged by the "inferior" masses during the preceding years of fascist Europe.

However, Poulantzas compels us to bear in mind that the rise of fascism does not correspond entirely to a crisis of the bourgeois ideology. As soon as fascism began to be a concrete movement, the strategy of the oppressed classes – that is the working class movements and parties – moved from a state of attack to that of defence (1974: 78). In my view, among the numerous episodes corroborating Poulantzas' thesis, one particular event embodies the general disorder and dilettantism (see also endnote 42 below) of anti-fascist organizations not only in Germany but throughout Europe. "On the night of 22-23 February [1933]" notices Poulanztas, "the night of the Reichstag fire, 4,000 communist organizers were arrested at one fell swoop, without a blow being dealt. [And he adds] For a party which believed in imminent revolution, this seems incredible" (Poulantzas, 1974: 186). The KPD (the German Communist Party) were then virtually "caught asleep,"[42] but was the position of other political factions of the left also a "defensive" one? To what extent did they bear responsibility for the rise of fascism? Through Poulantzas' thorough examination we may answer this complex question by noticing first that the social and ideological functioning of the remaining parties were of the "social-democratic type" (Poulantzas, 1974: 147-56). Social democracy is rather a negotiating social apparatus between the working class and the bourgeoisie in order to offer the necessary "means for big capital to carry out its policy [of capital growth]" (Ibid.:155); in other words, for Poulantzas social democrats are "employees" of big capital – virtually formed by the petty bourgeois classes – and their policies are conceived only within the frame of social consensus (Ibid.: 156). Nevertheless, while Poulantzas disagrees with the Marxist-Stalinist line of theory in which social democracy is envisaged as a collusive ideology of fascism,[43] his theory shows that social democracy bears grave responsibility in the success of fascism. Once the bourgeois dominant ideology began to collapse under its own ideological crisis, social democracy became an obsolete instrument for carrying out its policies (Ibid.: 156). As soon as bourgeois support had been suspended – for example, in the form of funding – the social democratic parties could not continue their parliamentarian opposition to the communists on one side and to the fascist thrust on the other, with their consequent capitulation (Ibid.). Again, in the documentary, "The Nazis: A Warning," we were offered the contrasting testimony of those who were parliamentarians during the

preceding days of Hitler's final settlement as Führer. According to their recollections, Nazism took them by "surprise" because although they understood the gravity of Hitler's speeches and actions they thought "to be able to control him through parliament". It seems to me difficult to subscribe to this idea that the apathy of the social democrats then was the result of a kind of social or political naivety. Poulantzas' study cannot be more categorical about the social democratic movement and its acolytes, the petty bourgeoisie: they had to choose between a proletariat dictatorship – and therefore a sure loss of gained status – and a fascist dictatorship which would, nevertheless, maintain a social *status quo*. And they choose the latter; not by supporting or colluding with the Nazis (who were petty-bourgeois themselves) but simply by getting out of their way.

On the other hand, Poulantzas also exposes quite clearly that in all fascist forms of State, there is a period from the start of the process, which includes the bourgeoisie's support and the petty bourgeoisie's political withering, to the "point of 'no return' [his inverted commas]" (Poulantzas, 1974: 66). At that stage, there is a point of irreversibility in fascism's growth and all the essential elements of the coming fascist system have the sense of a *fait accompli*. Surely there must have been at least some bourgeois and petty-bourgeois elements who might have foreseen the forthcoming extremes of some of these fascist States; but by the time they came to fully appreciate the true extent of the social damage, it was too late.

At the same time, this "point of no return" – as if an unexpected shock – makes me question my own judgement as to whether the contemporary parliamentarians were affected by a kind of dysfunctional social naivety. If this were so, it might have some pertinence today. This critique corresponds to the case of the Italian Giacomo Matteotti (1885-1924), a notorious socialist parliamentarian assassinated during the initial rise of Italian fascism. In an Italy where few people dared to speak their minds, Matteotti denounced the fascists in parliament, giving details of the extent of the fraudulent practices used to obtain fascist majorities; and demanded that the elections be declared void (Burne, 1989: 1085). Poignantly, at the end of that speech he told the deputies "and now get ready for my funeral." Indeed, a few days later he was abducted never to be found again (Ibid.). It is difficult to conclude whether, on completing such an act of bravery, this statement verifies that Matteotti knew the true gravity of the situation, whether he was simply suicidal, or whether simply naïve.

I think of Matteotti's case in this way because it reminds me of Bond's deliberations about current times. Our dramatist writes extreme plays because, he says, the "situation" in which we live continues to be extreme and urgent (Appendix: 20). Most people think that this is an exaggerated view of our liberal democracies because we have freedom of speech and all the rest – Eagleton is a perfect example of this position. But, as Bond underlines in his last play *The Under Room* (2005)[44] (I will return to discuss this play in the conclusion), there is nothing in our liberal democracies that guarantees that it will not be lawful to gas him in twenty years' time because of what he writes here now. This is what continues to make our times extreme: the "problem" which resulted in a fascist Europe continues to be among us without being resolved. The "problem" which Bond – with his holistic mindset – repeatedly refers to, is of course the universal human condition of social inequality; a condition which seems to be the ordinary situation:

> Dante seems to have needed a place called "Hell" – which is very much like Auschwitz - because he was exiled from Florence. Therefore one can say that there is something extreme going on in Dante's mind. It is true that these huge historical crises are of great importance, but there is also a continuity of humanness: it never snaps; it never breaks; it can find the extreme problems in [...] what might appear to be quite ordinary situations (Appendix: 7).

While fascism corresponds, then, to a position of attack by the bourgeoisie and defence by the working class, it also corresponds to an economic and ideological crisis "for the entire petty bourgeoisie" (Ibid.: 247; 251). Poulantzas' analysis of the petty bourgeoisie is of particular importance here because it answers a series of ideological conundrums which seem ingrained within the postmodern, the current culture industry, and even within the current discussions on globalization. As I have discussed in Chapter IV via Bourdieu, while differences between classes are today sharper than ever,[45] effectual class struggle appears instead as to have vanished; not just from the West, but from the world at large.[46] I am referring here to previous discussions on current social petty bourgeoisification or also social neutralization of classes. Through Bourdieu's theory I have discussed how on the one hand the culture industry acts as a sedative of the masses and on the other, how actual class differences are legitimized by a petty bourgeoisie situated at the top of the culture industry itself; in other words, by the agents involved in the Field of Restricted Production (FRP). However, I could not explain through Bourdieu's theory the contradictory languages, symbols, or messages that are usually

produced by the advance sectors of the petty bourgeoisie. How to explain, for example, the ambiguous position of a critic such as Eagleton, whose anti-capitalist discourses, declarations against "Big Capital," appeals to social justice, parliamentarianism and so on, are visibly entwined with his own support for the *status quo*. This is, according to Poulantzas, a contradictory characteristic caused by the ideological identity of the petty bourgeoisie (1974: 241); indeed caused by its own class position between the two irreconcilable classes: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In short, when the Greek sociologist illustrates the contradictory characteristics of the petty bourgeoisie, in my view he is simultaneously shedding light on the postmodernist problem of class-cultural homogeneity and social neutralization as much as on the rise of fascism.

5.3.2 Historical parallels of the petty bourgeoisie and fascism

Poulantzas classifies the petty bourgeoisie as if it was composed of various levels. I will consider here just the two major ones: the economic and ideological levels. The economic level is, Poulantzas says, rather obvious: the petty bourgeoisie are small-scale producers and/or small-scale owners (including those in possession of skills); a fact which positions them both close to the bourgeoisie "(through ownership) [his brackets]" and to the proletariat, because they are also "labourers" (1974: 241). But this very position makes them also "opposed to both the bourgeoisie, which progressively crushes them economically, and to the proletariat, as they fear proletarianization and are fiercely attached to (small) [his brackets] property" (Ibid.). Now, at the ideological level the effects on the petty bourgeoisie are both comparatively rather complex, but also, I think, too relevant to ignore here when the matter at hand is rethinking aesthetics in the politics of theatre.[47] On this account, Poulantzas identifies the following three effects (I paraphrase for the sake of brevity):

(1) *"Status quo anti-capitalism:"* while the petty bourgeoisie is against "big money", they approve of the *status quo*, because they fear proletarianization. They like to be associated with "egalitarianism" "and equality of opportunity" on one side, and "parliamentary cretinism of equal suffrage" on the other. However, the petty bourgeoisie want change without changing the system; they also aspire to participate in the "distribution of political power", without "wanting a radical transformation of it" (1974:241).

(2) *The myth of the "ladder"*: fearing proletarianization "below," and attracted to the bourgeoisie "above", they [the petty bourgeoisie] aspire to the bourgeois life-style though the individual rise of the "best" and "most able". This form is helped by high levels of education, including the ideology of "culture" as

"democratic" and "neutral", and a "neutral educational system". Some "elitist" factions of the petty bourgeoisie even replace some of the bourgeoisie "for not doing its job" but society remains unchanged. (Ibid.:241-42).

(3) *The "power fetishism"*: because of its economic *isolation* [his italics] (which also gives rise to "petty bourgeois individualism"), and because of its economic closeness and antagonism to both bourgeoisie and proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie believes in the "neutral" State.[48] Moreover, the petty bourgeoisie identifies itself with the State – "*its*" State aspiring to be the "arbitrator" of society, because as Marx says, it would like the whole of society to become petty bourgeois [all inverted commas and italics as in the original] (Ibid.: 241).

Resentment, frustration, and/or fear: these are conditions characteristic of the petty bourgeoisie which correspond again and again to the rise of *all* forms of fascist States.[49] But if it is important to evaluate the direct relation of fascism with the petty bourgeoisie, it is because it clears up the predicament of why fascism is not an ideology; and as such is *not* a field of research in the same way that "the ideological ensembles essentially tied to the bourgeoisie and the working class" are (Poulantzas, 1974: 253). It is primarily because its ideology is a projection of the bourgeois ideology – that is, it is an adopted one – but also because, at the political level, the petty bourgeoisie is difficult to define, being as it is divided itself in different groups, sectors and interests. As Poulantzas says above, the petty bourgeoisie not only ostentatiously displays a fierce individualism; it has traditionally been understood and categorized as such by all – especially itself. In fact, as Poulantzas explains very clearly, the petty bourgeois are so fractionated as a class that they do not have "long-term political interests 'of their own' [his commas]" (1974: 243). When they manage to organize a political party they do so "directly through other apparatuses of the State [but only because they see the State as] opposed to the bourgeoisie's interests and in agreement with its own" (1974: 243). However, Poulantzas warns us against misunderstanding or underestimating the petty bourgeoisie, simply because its unstable nature and changeable class location do not prevent it from becoming, upon *necessity*, an authentic social force. Only Trotsky and Gramsci, Poulantzas tells us, had a correct understanding of the relationship of fascism to the petty bourgeoisie:

> While he stressed the fact that fascism represented the interests of big capital, Trotsky still insisted that fascism was "basically (the) program of petty bourgeois currents [...] [which shows that] the self-determination of the petty bourgeois masses of the people is for the whole fate of bourgeois society".

Gramsci too, while emphasizing that fascism was "the servant of capital and of the landowners", was the first to point out (in 1921) that fascism was at the same time "the ultimate political incarnation of the petty bourgeoisie" [his inverted commas and brackets throughout] (Poulantzas, 1974: 245, fn.7).

Thus, Poulantzas tells us, the rise of fascism can be formulated as follows: (a) All instances start with an initial fear of social revolution on the part of the ruling established classes. (b) As a result, they welcome fascist movements or actions which function as a counter-ideology and counter-organization to the revolutionary threat. (c) Because the fascist movements are fundamentally formed by agents of the petty bourgeoisie, they attract the support of large sections of the petty bourgeoisie – that is, everyone who possesses something that could be for sale: small and medium landowners, skilled labourers, professionals, white collars, academics and so on.[50] But fascism attracted the petty bourgeoisie for the simple reason that it itself is as much "an amalgam of contradictory elements" (Poulantzas, 1974: 253) as is fascism itself. In fact, if fascism is not an ideology and it is impossible to extract a definition from it, this is because hitherto, fascism has been a projection of the petty bourgeoisie's own contradictory elements: they are hostile to communism but also denounce the abuses of capitalism (Epstein, 1964: 306); they celebrate mythical legends in an anti-modernist fashion and with anti-modernist aims but through a society built by an advanced industry (Turner, 1972: 557); they condemn liberal parliamentary democracy as "degenerate, corrupt and incapable of dealing with current problems" (Epstein, 1964: 306) – which, as Epstein says, was unhappily all too true. (d) And finally the point of "no-return": once fascism has settled in as a form of State, "it accelerates the consolidation and stabilization of the economic supremacy of big finance capital over the other dominant classes and class fractions" (Poulantzas, 1974: 98).

But fascism does more than just represent the interests of big capital: the decisive domination of big capital is achieved by a progressive and effective "neutralization" of the contradictions among classes and domineering factions (Poulantzas, 1974: 98). In other words, class differences remain untouched while the class struggle is finally erased. In fact, as historical records tell us, the big industrialists were so desperate to recover lost production – lost, because of the preceding years of social skirmishes and labour unrest – that they put the industrial machine at full speed. Their industrial development, technological innovation, and a tremendous increase in the productivity of

labour were a source of admiration of the remaining capitalist non-fascist nations (Pitigliani, 1940: 381; Smith, 1936: 170).[51]

Full employment also became a reality among the working classes of the fascist nations, which historically has brought forth a subsidiary consequence: inflation – a problem that our current monetarist governments are extremely eager to avoid, with dear consequences for many of us.[52] This had to be counterbalanced through economical and geographical expansionism; that is, imperialism – which, as it happened, had perforce to clash with the imperialist interests of other capitalist nations. Of course, I cannot address in full here the causes of World War II, but it seems to me also true that through Poulantzas's social theory Western modern history acquires a rather contrasting "outfit". If we can now assume that fascism is but an extreme form of the capitalist State – that is, an exceptional capitalist State – and a consequence of the crisis of the dominant bourgeois ideology, then the armed conflict between the Allies and the Axis was not just a war between two different, antagonistic forms of capitalism – one "extreme" and one "moderate" – it was a conflict between a bourgeois dominant ideology who first suffered and then resolved its own crisis and another bourgeois dominant ideology whose hegemonic dominion was never put in doubt. As the historian A. J. P. Taylor remarked, "it very quickly became clear that it was not a war against fascism, but a war against the Germans", the "traditional" enemy (Boyer, 1977: 50).[53]

Fascism then does not come as a bolt from the blue: it is the product of a social development towards an ideological homogenization of society for the purposes of capital growth through the means of force. As Poulantzas notes via Gramsci, it represents the forceful final fusion of all classes into a single social phenomenon and under a single leadership, resolving the ideological disparities and confrontations which are intrinsic to class differences and inequality (Poulantzas, 1974: 75). And it is only through this conclusion that the failure of Mosley's fascism in 1930s Britain can finally be answered. Britain and the United States were as affected by the transition to monopoly capitalism and by "economic crises" as were Germany or Italy (Burne, 1989: 1098), but as Poulantzas points out, the "State power, State apparatus and forms of State, [their] national unity nowhere shows weakness comparable to those of Germany and Italy" (1974: 34).[54] In other words, the reason why fascism did not settle in Britain was not because Mosley was less "smart" than other fascist leaders, or because there was an "active" British anti-fascist national unity; it was because the bourgeois

dominant ideology was as strong, secure, and formidable as ever. Thus, by way of (among other factors), its own empire, the British establishment had already in Britain what Hitler, Mussolini and Franco ultimately sought in their respective countries: the neutralization of the petty bourgeoisie's and bourgeoisie's conflicts of interests.

Having said that, in discussions related to fascism we cannot bypass the fact that, since Britain crushed European fascism – the "foreign monster" – the British collective mind must be predisposed to stand in a position of moral superiority. In relation to Germany, Garcia Düttmann tells us that "Adorno anchors the concept of the people in a national consciousness which is capable of constituting itself as a consciousness of guilt" (2002: 130). In my view, the opposite case of Britain should also be regarded with opposite consequences: a national British consciousness which is capable of constituting itself as one of innocence, shamelessness or a sense of virtue. This constitutes in my view a kind of fuse in waiting, which the powers that be can ignite at any 'needed' time without having to endure a real popular opposition. In all probability, this has kept the people of this country in a forsaken condition of ideological defencelessness, unable and unwilling to perceive with clarity what Bond calls "the problem": when Britain makes war, it fights "evil". As Garcia Düttmann formulates, "what one identifies with, the essence of one's own group, unwittingly becomes the good; the alien group, the others, become the bad" (Duttmann, 2002: 133).[55]

5.4. Section IV

5.4.1. The enemy within: equivalences in the postmodern.

That fascism is not just nothing, but *nothingness* is a very real danger of our times. It is impossible to extract a proper value from it; it is there and it is invisible; it does not even have a name. Instead of fascism it could have been called $Xb+0^2$ by some lunatic petty bourgeois but that would not have altered the horrific end-product. What is worse: trying to study fascism to the exclusion of everything else is actually like to trying to understand a disease *just* by observing the contorting symptoms of some poor infected creature. If fascism is the product of fear, fascism must be real and occurring. It compensates for and thus exploits fear of the mysterious, fear of defeat, fear of being left behind, fear of the "other", fear of death; and if cruelty and violence are the offspring of fear, it is no wonder that cruelty and violence have been hand in glove with fascism. Asking "How is Hitler possible in a liberal constitution?" Anustup Basu rightly highlights how difficult is to conceptualize fascism in the postmodern "without the formalist baggage of secret police or concentration camps", which in the public domain, he says, "constitutes a historicist definition of fascism" (2004:68).[56] Let us reassure Basu as well as Eagleton: if what they fear is either Hitler or *his* fascism, they will not find them; not now, not ever in the future.

And yet the memory of Vietnamese children running away from their napalm-bombed village with their scorched skins hanging like rags is all too fresh. An old Arab holding up a stump of blood and dust with his hands – a two-year-old dead baby – while pleading "Why! Why!" has formed part of our domestic decorations.[57] And violence and cruelty are not just deployed in a physical manner in faraway countries. There is such a thing as psychological violence and psychological cruelty and it forms part and parcel of our intrinsically unequal liberal Western society. The imposition of sheer poverty is one way of enacting violence and cruelty and the world at large is in real terms a "planet of slums" (Davis, 2004:5-34).[58]

Unemployment, as another example, is a problem which seems to be taken into account only during pre-electoral manifestos, and appears to be without solution. And yet it is, at the level of the capitalist system, a problem without solution. For as long as capital growth takes precedence in our social system, full employment will not be possible

because it would effectively trigger inflation which equals to a devaluation of financial assets.[59] It is a simple and logical equation which does not allow middle strategies.[60] And the human consequences are dire. As empirical research shows, it plays "havoc with the lives of the jobless, and causes intense suffering and mental agony [...] with elevated rates of suicide [...] morale damaging [...] and a motivational impairment with long psychological consequences" (SEN, 1997:161).[61] And if one of fascism's basic devices for the control of the masses is the induction of fear, the reality of unemployment functions by way of very parallel psychological effects in the minds of those who actually have a job. "We as individuals," Jameson suggests "entertain a relationship with money and greed, with property, and we are thereby led to wonder what life would be like without these things" (Jameson, 2004:39). It is a pure existentialist problem. As I have already said in the overall introduction, if for Kant moral values were due to people's inability to imagine a future without God,[62] in my view, our moral values nowadays are due to people's inability to imagine a future without capital. Thus, Jameson adds:

> we are most of us employed, but familiar with the fear of unemployment and the lack of income, and not unacquainted with the psychic misery involved in chronic unemployment, the demoralization, the morbid effects of boredom, the waste of vital energies and the absence of productivity – even if we tend to grasp these things in bourgeois and introspective ways (Jameson, 2004: 39).

Could it be that, what I will define below as a petty bourgeois aesthetics of denial (a type of class response more in tune with a sophisticated form of fascism or capitalist dictatorship) is actually the result of enormous amounts of information, as Anustup Basu suggests (2004:68)?[63] Or could it be that, supporting even further Jameson' theory of "fear" above, people are in truth "fully aware of what is going on", and that the critical matter is personal security? "Security," say Martin Carnoy and Manuel Castells, "ultimately translates into economic growth and improving living standards. In this sense, even social inequality is not a major issue. If people see their lives improving, they will not be ready to lose what they have only to correct the injustice of the rich getting richer" (Carnoy and Castells, 2001: 3). In my view, both theories are correct but in the sense that they form part of a series of contributions that point to a single problem: capitalism.

Nevertheless, the absence of an effectual class struggle in liberal modern societies seems to me extraordinary in historical terms. Of course, there are occasional signs of opposition or protest against very specific policies, or against grotesque governmental decisions like the recent invasion of Iraq. But these are always popular demonstrations against particulars, not against the current state of affairs; against a system of inequality and class difference itself.[64] This is why the theory of reification is so important: as I said before in the conclusion of Chapter II, we need to overcome human reification by constantly disrupting our reified structure of existence "by becoming conscious of the immanent meanings of these contradictions" (Lukács, 1990: 197).

Bond asserts that our current societal system – that is, based on capitalism – is extreme; and that this social condition in which people must live in the extreme makes people mad. If that is the case, it is no wonder that we are "resigned to a world of illusion and the paralysis of all understanding" in the postmodern (Vattimo, 1988: xlix-l). For communication is surely impossible amidst maddened people. As Bond responded during an interview with Brian Logan "the people who went off in 1914 were socially mad; the people who dropped A-bombs on Hiroshima and named the bombs after their mothers, they were mad – there's no other way of describing it. But it's totally acceptable. Why is that so? Because our societies are unjust" (Logan, 2000). Regardless of whether the accuser is a great poet, I suspect people might find it hard to accept such judgements on humanity at large: "Who? Me mad? How dare you!"

Too often, politicians, artists and intellectuals criticize their adversaries by way of indulging the popular ego with congratulatory statements like "the public is far more intelligent than they think", or "that's one way of patronizing the public". And yet, as Aristotle concluded, true poets are more philosophical and more worthy of serious attention than any historian, philosopher or scientist, because poets are not concerned with particular facts but with universal truth (1987: Chapter 9, 5-6). But as supported by the latest research on socioeconomic determinants of physical and mental health, Bond might be more accurately materialistic and realistic than many would like to believe. Answering the question, "Why is Violence More Common Where Inequality is Greater?" the epidemiologist Richard Wilkinson substantiates Bond's intuition that inequality harms health in all its domains and is "socially corrosive" (2004: 1). Through Wilkinson's investigations one thing is made apparent: social violence and individual levels of health are proportional to the levels of inequality *within* a given

society. In other words, levels of physical and mental health are not related to income differences between the developed societies, but to income differences within them – "even among the non-poor middle classes" (Ibid.: 5).

Evaluating inequality does not only mean pinpointing the striking differences between those who are poor and those who are rich, analysing the asocial effects of low material living standards, or centring the attention on the damage done by poverty. Evaluating inequality for Wilkinson also means to observe the health effects in relation to social status, social position, and dominance and subordination. The United States, for example, is supposed to be far richer than say Costa Rica yet, in general terms, medical research shows that the people of Costa Rica enjoy a far better level of "psychosocial wellbeing" and health than the people of the United States do (Wilkinson and Marmot, 2001: 1233). The most conspicuous cause is the most logical one: the inequalities of income and status of the people of Costa Rica are far smaller that those of the people of the United States. These studies do not ignore the fact that sheer poverty is lethal, but they also underline the fact that the mere social status of individuals objectively affects their health. In Britain for instance, "absolute mortality has been falling [but] inequalities in mortality have increased" (Ibid.). Furthermore, Wilkinson and Marmot do not believe that improving access to resources without resolving social inequalities would resolve the psychosocial ill health of individuals:

> If, in the spirit of neo-materialism, you give every child access to a computer and every family a car, deal with air pollution, and provide a physically safe environment, is the problem solved? We believe not. The psychosocial effect of insecurity, anxiety, social isolation, socially hazardous environments, bullying, and depression remain untouched (2001: 1233).

It has been said that ignorance is more dangerous than atomic bombs, but even more dangerous is, I think, to cultivate a field of inequality where the only possible harvest is resentment – and resentment, I would argue, is a form of madness. It is very interesting to consider Wilkinson's observation that "the most frequent trigger to violence is disrespect, loss of face, and people feeling looked down on" (2004: 8). He builds up his argument quoting from the prison psychiatrist James Gilligan, who says that after 25 years collecting information on inmates, he has "yet to see a serious act of violence that was not provoked by the experience of feeling shamed and humiliated, disrespected and ridiculed, and that did not represent the attempt to prevent or undo this 'loss of face'

[his commas] no matter how severe the punishment" (Wilkinson, 2004: 8). However, just like the major fascist movements did before them, many would ask whether violence is an inbuilt, indeed an evolutionarily successful, characteristic of humans; because, after all, the history of ancient and modern civilization is based on continuous and violent struggle.

This is indeed the subtlety I read in Eagleton's "Capitalism and Form" (2002). For him the relation between the bourgeoisie and fascism is a "pact with crime" (2002: 127). And this pact, he says, is the result of a "natural" attraction for "crime and villainy" which has carried an aura of glamour since the early modern society (Ibid.: 128). "Othello and Iago, Goethe's Faust and Mephistopheles, Ahab and Moby-Dick" Eagleton tells us: "it is impossible to decide whether the partners are allies or adversaries [...] they enjoy the kind of "horrified intimacy with the Satanic [...] that liberal capitalism has with fascism" (Ibid.). In his criticism, Eagleton offers two additional readings: first, that if the relation between liberal capitalism and fascism is one of a pact with crime, he is also intrinsically saying that the bourgeoisie nevertheless represents the non-criminal, "good" element; and second, that this ambiguous relationship is also the result of a "natural" attraction for violence, for crime. This line of thought is not unusual. It brings to mind the fragment that Orson Welles felt compelled to include in Graham Green's screenplay *The Third Man* (1949): "Italy for thirty years under the Borgias, they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed—they produced Michelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love, five hundred years of democracy and peace and what did that produce...? The cuckoo clock."

The problem with this line of thought is that it seems to consider the development of human beings not very differently from the way Hobbes or Hegel did. For Hobbes, human societies only seem to begin with civil societies – already there when individuals agreed to recognize political and hierarchical authority. Without this "contract", Hobbes thought, violence and disorder would be the "inevitable condition" of human beings (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 530).[65] The modern usage of the term civil society is perhaps a more Hegelian version based on economic and social order by way of a supposedly "free co-operation" between individuals, involving private property, market exchange and so on. But obviously, inequality and status were not issues of concern for the prominent idealist Hegel (Bunnin and Tsui-James, 1999: 612-14). Now,

Wilkinson's studies on the relationship between violence and inequality tell me that human existence should not be measured exclusively against the history of human civil societies; on the contrary, human civil societies are the very last link of a long chain in the development of human beings. In fact, "during 90 or 95 percent of our existence as 'anatomically modern' [his commas] human beings," argues Wilkinson, "we lived in remarkably egalitarian hunting and gathering societies, based on gift and food sharing" (2004:9). He supports his argument by pointing to more than a hundred anthropological reports on recent hunter-gatherer societies spread over four continents, from which he draws the conclusion: "they share food, not simply with kin or even with those who reciprocate, but according to need even when food is scarce," and adds:

> There is no dominance hierarchy among hunter gatherers. No individual has priority of access to food which [...] is shared. In spite of the marginal female preference for the more successful hunters as lovers, access to sexual partners is not a right which correlates with rank. In fact rank is simply not discernible among hunter gatherers. This is a cross cultural universal, which rings out unmistakably from the ethnographic literature, sometimes in the strongest terms (Ibid.: 10).

Parenthetically speaking, I cannot stress enough the importance of Wilkinson's evaluation on equality in relation to Bond's ethical questioning of what he ontologically calls "the problem". It would be wrong to assume that violence/crime is intrinsic to human development; if Wilkinson is correct, it is intrinsic to the latest 5 or 10 percent of our human development in societies based on inequality. We should ask, as Wilkinson does, "why [is] inequality, or social hierarchy... so antithetical to better social relations and to community life?" (2004: 9). The actions we take are not an inbuilt characteristic of our species but are the result of our type of social relationships: whether the social status type (that is, vertical societies) or on the friendship type (that is, horizontal societies). If violence is based on social status we will fiercely compete against each other for scarce resources, much the same as any other animal species. As Wilkinson notes, "for members of almost any species, the worst competitors are not other species, but other members of the same species" (Ibid.). Thus, whether other people are the best or the worst does not depend on whether "evil" or "good" is part of their character, but on the nature of their social relationships.

But the most relevant point extracted from Wilkinson's study is the acknowledgment that social inequality makes human beings sick in one way or another by transforming

them into obsessive individuals: obsessed with status, standing, reputation, career and so on. It is not humanly relevant whether we are poor or rich then. "The world's most primitive people have few possessions", anthropological studies confirm, "but are not poor [...] Poverty is not a certain small amount of goods, nor is it just a relation between means and ends; above all is a relation between people. Poverty is a social status. As such it is an invention of civilization" (Wilkinson, 2004: 7). Bond has been trying to tell us for many years now that humanity will only have a future when "the human imperative acknowledges the human imperative in everyone else".[66] Psychiatry considers obsession as a mild type of mental illness: a morbid preoccupation which can be psychotic or neurotic. When the obsession has a delusional quality, psychiatrists call it a psychotic obsession. When the person knows the obsession is irrational, but is unable to control it – that is, it is an endlessly recurrent, intrusive thought, such as continuously doubt: "Am I *really* the important person I ought to be?" – then it is a neurotic obsession.[67] It does not seem outrageous to argue that fascism is the result of a social psychosis produced by social inequality; a condition very much with us now.

5.5. Section V

5.5.1. Civilization through inequality.

Of course, neither Bond nor the Frankfurt School is saying that our current situation is as "bad" as the fascism endured by the Germans between 1933 and 1945. However, neutralization of the human/class conflicts which unequal societies inevitably produce, as well as the elimination of class struggle, was the end result of the exceptional fascist State. How long liberal capitalism and its culture will be able to keep at bay a clash of classes is something about which we can only speculate. This rethinking of aesthetics makes one thing clear though: if one day human beings finally achieve to construct socialist societies, it will be because they will be truly democratic or they simply will not be socialist. Eagleton seems to consider fascism *only* from the perspective of economically advanced Western Europe, leaving out the rest of the world. But as Allardyce says, we have seen fascist regimes "everywhere in the Third World" during the whole of the last recent century (Allardyce, 1979: 375). In fact, Mussolini's prophesy that "the twentieth century would be the century of fascism" (Ibid.), has not been too far from the truth. The most conspicuous case, South America, has endured brutal fascist dictatorships throughout its vast geography and during most of the last half of the Twentieth Century. And Western liberal democracies like the United States have

effectively provided the financial, strategic and political support to install dictators in most of these countries at one time or another (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993).[68] Baroness Thatcher interceded for Augusto Pinochet while he was under house arrest in Britain in 1999, addressing the dictator as "a friend which the UK is in debt to," and her call was all too true.

The UK owed Pinochet, not just because, as she said herself, Pinochet helped the British army during the 1982 Falklands War, but for a less symbolic, more substantial episode which might help to pinpoint better the real problem. Up to the time of Allende's presidency, copper in Chile – the world-largest producer of it – was being mined by the US company Anaconda Copper. While Chile's copper had been exploited by Anaconda, its price had been artificially slashed (Ibid.:170). The true beneficiaries of that situation did not include the people of Chile, but financiers at London's Stock Exchange, where most of the world's copper was traded (Ibid.:170). The nationalization of the copper's mines by Allende and the consequent rise of its price was a terrible blow, not only to London, but to the international financing and trade industry. With his coup, Pinochet promptly amended Allende's Chilean 'misfit' to the needs of international merchandizing, returning Chile's copper to Anaconda with the consequent restoration of the UK as principal beneficiary of it. Now, could the young students and trade unionists who were thrown from military airplanes into the ocean by Pinochet's executioners (Constable and Valenzuela, 1993:94), have had the thought: "this is not as bad as the evil of the fascists?" The Chileans of Pinochet (1973-89), the Argentineans of Videla (1976-83), or the Nicaraguans of Somoza (1930-79) to mention but a few, were murdered not because fascists are "evil", but because the history of class struggle, secured by its ideological constituents of dominator and dominated, converts capital growth into an imperative above any other human imperative. It becomes *all-that-matters* and makes people commit "evil" actions. This is very different from asserting that "Tom, Dick and Harry" are "evil".

The importance of this approach to analysing human events cannot be stressed enough. The fundamental problem is not whether Pinochet and his executioner are "evil", as Eagleton might suggest, but rather, as Bond's philosophy of drama asks, whether their repugnant actions are the result of human beings being *convinced* they are doing an act of justice: one question approaching justice via Hobbes and the other via Marx. Would the relation executioner/victim have changed if they had exchanged roles? Not at all.

The victim would have become the executioner and *vice versa*; perhaps, like Brecht, by way of a Committee for Public Safety which sends people to death in a Gulag instead of by way of an airplane.[69] This is why Bond would ask "why" they did what they did instead of "what and when". Had thinkers like Eagleton put this perspective to work, they would have been forced to dig under the "evil" human beings, unearthing a system – indeed the bourgeois moral and ideological values suggested by Eagleton as "liberating" or "epic" (2002: 125) – from which those "evil" human minds feed. In this regard, Bond sent me this very pertinent letter:

> French educational authorities are publishing two books and they send me (late) chapters to read – and sometimes they are worrying and I have to correct them at length (They write about "evil" and "good" and I don't - except perhaps now and then rhetorically). I write about justice and injustice (and hence site, as prior to character and even motive). I think it's a different way of looking at reality – and indeed [it] changes reality into realities. The problem isn't that we are different characters, have different opinions, but that when there are different ideologies there are different realities (6 October, 2005).

After 1945, the world at large thought it was entitled to point a finger at the Germans, but, when hundreds of thousands of them were subjected to conditions resembling the worst features of Nazi concentration camps in the Gulags of Soviet Russia, they all kept silent (Kogon, 1960: 320). To people like Eugen Kogon – a survivor of Buchenwald – this "collective complicity" of silence was a terrible blow because he knew it to be the result of unchanged moral and ideological values; the very values that had driven the world to commit such atrocious crimes during earlier years. For Kogon the only conclusion was this: "the spirit of Hitler lives on in others as well" (Ibid.). In my view, Edward Bond's entire philosophy of drama arises from perceiving the world in the same manner as Kogon: the meaning of justice is desperately in need of a resolution, or will face dire consequences. If for Bond our current society is "extreme", it is because within capitalism it is impossible to acknowledge the now old human imperatives of "liberty, equality, and fraternity".

However, Bond's philosophy does not justify the executioner. I am perfectly aware of the negative connections that such discourses might raise in unprepared minds (I was *there* myself and am still learning). I argued earlier that the path to a socialist utopia seems a very difficult one indeed. In some senses, it would be easier for me to follow Eagleton's line of thought than that of Bond, and believe that Auschwitz was the

creation of "evil" people who happened to be called fascists. But then I would perforce have to believe in fairies, ghosts, witches, demons, and, of course, in gods. Then it would all appear as if it had a divine purpose and it would be easier. Actually, despite the detailed readings I have made of Eagleton's works – including his self-representation as an "unreconstructed" socialist (1992: 31-2) – I have not been able to determine whether he is a secular or religious person.[70] Had he been a religious person, his ambiguities in relation to capitalism *vis-à-vis* fascism could have been explained in a stroke: if a divine being is the creator of our predicaments, then crime and injustice must be part of a divine strategy or as a result of the sporadic or periodic actions of evil. But if Eagleton is a secular thinker, then his reading of the fascists as "evil" becomes the verification of my own hypothesis: rethinking aesthetics is rethinking the "whole", through a holistic mind like Bond advises, and therefore requires conceptualizing with imagination, reason, and logic our human world.

Yet, years of ideological hammering have left us in a place from which it is very difficult to imagine a world without capital. I cannot help but recall Adorno's aesthetic formula on the "Truth Content" of an artwork (Adorno, 1997: 354; see also my diagram on chapter I, section III.). Take away only one of its components – be it determinacy, openness, form, content, or experience and thought – and the "Truth Content" of a work of art will have vanished from the picture. As Bond tells me in another of his letters, "But the situation is difficult to read"; and as if he was himself answering Eagleton's letter, he adds:

> All systems of morality are corrupt because their effect is to reconcile us with injustice – and as the effect is always justified by ideology, it is the unspoken intention of morality to reconcile us to injustice, to live unjustly – and because of the contradiction in the self this leads to the paradox that crime (acts against morality and law) may be expressions of the human need for justice [...] the contradiction is also in ourselves. We are driven by the need of justice, but ideology distorts this into the performance of injustice – and the ideologized mind is part of the ideology [his underline] (2 October, 2004).

When considering the problem of making socially responsible drama I cannot ignore the psychosocial aesthetics of denial. This, in my view, is the social by-product resulting from the petty bourgeoisification of society at large and must surely be impregnating most culture and thinking. It is not new, and as can be observed through Poulantzas above and Bourdieu in Chapter IV, it is not just a class characteristic of the petty

bourgeoisie, it comes with the baggage of being part of unequal societies. Like Martin Carnoy, Manuel Castells (2001: 3) and Richard Wilkinson (2004: 1), I think that most people are in truth aware of what is going on; that most of us intuitively know already that unequal societies are humanly corrosive. But as Fernandez-Armesto claims, we tend to recoil from truth. Not because we do not like the truth (because I think we do), but because deep inside, human beings need instinctively to live in equilibrium with everything and everyone else. The problem is that, while we *all* want to live in a just world – do not exclude anyone; no matter what the crime – as Bond tells us through his whole body of work, we have not yet learned to recognize that longed-for justice in everybody else. This has self-evidential consequences all around us. We find ourselves living in a chaotic, unbalanced and ugly world. In order to go on living, we create a 'balanced' world within ourselves and in our immediate localities – for example, in our gardens, in our home decorations, our jobs, in most art ventures and so on. Even the lowliest individual, living in a chaotic and unordered environment, has a secret corner with a particular photograph, or a secret box where she or he has precious symbols neatly assembled. While the smoke rose out of the chimneys, even concentration camps' inmates tried to recreate this feeling of balance with their niggling residue of "recreation" time with "music", "sport," the practicing of some "painting", or the cultivation of a flower in an empty tin (Kogon, 1960: 133-40). We "stare" away from the world, but only because we need to survive the "wrongful situation" in which we live.

Schopenhauer thought clinical madness was actually a protective device of nature. He formulated that, since a person can be driven to suicide by enduring a great suffering, if nature protects life at all costs then madness might be a kind of circuit-breaker of nature impeding the suicidal from actually committing the act. In the words of the philosopher "then nature in the throes of self-preservation destroys the thread of memory" (1981: 79-80).[71] Certainly we are the victims of a long-standing syndrome, which now appears to me not just to be the product of the later bourgeois ideologies and their intrinsically contradictory moralities, but the product of an entire human civilization which has been based on inequality, the mother of all crime and injustice. I would like to call it the "Picasso syndrome". The story goes that Picasso told Roland Penrose, "My mother said to me, if you become a soldier, you'll be a general; if you become a monk, you'll end up as the pope. Instead, I became a painter and wound up as Picasso."[72] How many of us expected to be popes, generals or Picassos and ended up as "ordinary" as the next man?

Or what crimes have been committed in order to be one of them? Our theatres are awash with "problem plays" – whether Tony Blair is a liar; whether a train killed people because of corporate greed; whether women are as ambitious as men – or plays without *any* problems *at all*. But what we urgently need are "answer plays" and only Edward Bond seems to be working to fill that gap. There is plenty of space for more activists, poets, writers, thinkers, scholars, or theorists in that gap. We may try with all our might to resolve as many problems as "civil societies" throw at us, but if we forget, ignore, or neglect that they all have an origin in the *real* problem of inequality, problems will go on being neglected. We will seek nothing more than a way to make a living from them.[73] As Bond has told us for many years now:

> A rational, free culture is based either on a classless society or at least on the conscious struggle to remove class structures and the economic, ecological, psychological, and political distortions they cause. A writer's work should be part of this struggle. [...] now I've become more conscious of the strength of human beings to provide answers. The answers aren't always light, easy, or even straightforward, but the purpose – a socialist society – is clear (Roberts, 1985: 68).

The mother of all problems is inequality. Concluding this study with the simplest of arguments feels, in a way, as if one has been cheated. And of course, there is nothing original about it. But what is new is the setting, the new social structures and complexities surrounding the problem. That is why it will always require new insights, new poets: as Bond says "each new generation goes back to the very basic problems" (appendix: 36). The question is whether this celebratory bourgeois culture that we have discussed has managed to blur these basic problems to such an extent that they have become unrecognisable to most of us.

Conclusion to chapter V

It has been said that when Poulantzas developed his theory, society was very different from today, and that therefore, his work does not provide us with the necessary answers to today's problems (Carnoy and Castells, 2001:18). "Social theories are not supposed to provide answers forever," they say (Ibid.). It is true that the world at large has experienced great socio-political changes since the 1970s. Through ongoing monetarist globalisation, the relative autonomy of the state as an organization with legal supremacy over a specific territory and population is, in overall terms, "fading away" (Ibid.:17).[74] Poulantzas formulated his social theory while thinking of workers as a solid class with

traditional identities that are now all but disappearing. By being individualized, their social networks – the group of friends in the company, the after-work hangouts, the trade union – have lost much of their social function; as Carnoy and Castells say "they are as 'permanently temporary' [their commas] as the work itself" (Ibid.:16).

But we can agree with Carnoy and Castells' analysis only up to a certain degree. Since Poulantzas wrote *Fascism and Dictatorship* (1974), capitalism has been frenziedly active transforming both itself and worldwide societies, but only because, in order to 'live on', it continuously needs to readjust to its principal criterion of constant capital growth and profit. The familiar three-class pyramid-like model, though substantially mutated by way of class transpositions, still applies (Bilton et al, 1981:64): the minute triangle situated at the top still represents the owners of the means of production, the bourgeoisie; while the lives of the wide middle section still depend on wages, no matter whether they are higher or lower, and at the bottom comes the strata of the poor. I have discussed the social petty bourgeoisification of our liberal democracies and the dangerous side-effects produced by a class characterised by perennial frustration and resentment. For these reasons Poulantzas' social theory remains as relevant now as it was thirty years ago because the idiosyncratic aspirations and fears of the petty bourgeoisie have not changed fundamentally since then.

Whoever followed the electoral results of the local elections in England and Wales during May 2006, might have observed a worrying increase of local counsellors from the BNP – from 20 to 46.[75] Furthermore, Labour MP Margaret Hodge has recently been criticised for saying that "80% of white middle class families are tempted by the BNP" (Ibid.). But the detail which has really awakened the interest of a "bewildered" press is that many of those who helped the upsurge of the BNP were long standing supporters of the Labour Party itself. The media at large has interpreted such an ideological shift as a protest vote against the Labour Party, but the conversion seems to me all too divergent; unless – and this is where Poulantzas' theory would strictly apply today – Labour Party supporters themselves form part of the large sections and sub-sections of the petty bourgeoisie. Then such a move is not inexplicably contradictory, but, according to Poulantzas, the natural and spontaneous outcome of a class conditioned by intrinsic idiosyncrasies: sempiternally frustrated by the impossibility of fulfilling their ambitions; frightened by the continuous prospect of becoming poor; threatened by competition for resources, and therefore in fear of immigrants, legal or illegal; intimidated by the

unlawful incursions of new and growing minorities like the underclass;[76] and subject to an ever-growing pressure from the new rules of engagement of big capital – that is, market globalization – which demands to continuously update their acquired skills or "perish", and so on...

I consider the ongoing petty bourgeoisification of society not dangerous because of the conspicuous growth of the petty bourgeoisie class itself, but because of its symptomatic social consequences; namely, a concoction of ambition and frustration. In *Thatcher's Theatre* (1999), D. Keith Peacock notes the petty bourgeoisie's palpable growth as the upsurge of a "New Class" which he describes as "college-educated people [...] [a] post-industrial society working for state institutions: scientist, teachers, and educational administrators, social workers, lawyers, etc. [...] It is a numerous class and expanding; it is a disproportional powerful class, ambitious and frustrated" (Ibid.: 25).

"Marx," Poulantzas concludes, "following Hegel, said that history can sometimes repeat itself: but what the first time was tragedy, is the second time farce. The formulation is striking, but it is true in one sense only: there are such things as black comedies [...] And there are funny men in history who only kill others" (1974:358). In my view, the fascist "bogey", as the sociologist calls it, will not be a danger when it takes unsophisticated or familiar forms, but when it reasserts itself by way of new and unrecognizable forms. Capitalism will sooner or later have to deal with the new political frontiers like ecological sustenance, energy supply, the unbalanced growth of an ageing population in the Western societies, and/or the immense numbers living on the breadline throughout the world at large which will surely seriously threaten capital expansion. Civil liberties that we all take for granted today will be affected to some degree by the consequent social conflicts, which might produce a crisis of the dominant ideology, reproducing the very social situation that unleashed fascism in 1920s' Europe; only this time it will not be in some European countries but in the world at large. In the 1970s, Poulantzas was still able to take into his social studies notions like "the revolutionary fervour of the working class and the masses" (Ibid.). I do not think this is the case any longer.

Trotsky thought that the fundamental stages of the development of mankind could be established as follows: "prehistoric 'history' of primitive man [his commas]; ancient history, whose rise was based on slavery; the Middle Ages, based on serfdom;

capitalism, with free wage exploitation; and finally, socialist society" (1923). The ultimate purpose of Bond's drama is also a future socialist society, but as he told me, he is not optimistic about solutions; he knows that such a future might be as unreachable as the past itself. "I have melancholy for a future," he said to Peter Billingham.[77] Bond believes that capitalism is too cunning to collapse under its own weight as many other Marxists like Benjamin like to think; and least of all, if it does, that it would be in a quiet or pacific way. Poulantzas might have recognized a revolutionary fervour of the masses in the 1970s, but today it is extremely rare to hear or read someone suggesting the abolition of both class differences and private property – not even in "melancholic" terms. Social petty bourgeoisification affects everyone, at every level of wealth or poverty, by way of uncontested propaganda, commercial adverts, education, and so on. As I have said above (see endnote 20), information and propaganda is even reaching remote and still-ancient tribes, from the tribes of Papua Guinea to the hunter-gatherers of southern Africa. It is affecting cultural traditions that have hitherto been based on communal equality and sharing.

It is no longer appropriate to apply the three class model to a specific state in isolation, now that we are dealing with a production process that is directed by a globalized economy. As a good number of contemporary sociological studies reflect, the rapid changes in the class structure (like the expansion of clerical – or white collar – occupations, the rise of the affluent worker and/or social and generational class mobility) makes sociology a field in continuous need of updating. But the traditionally capitalist mode of production has not disappeared; it just has been displaced to Third World countries where it is easier to amass surplus value[78] – owing to the fact that labour is even cheaper. According to Poulantzas' Marxist theory, "the *production process* [his italics] is defined not by technological factors, but by the unity of the labour process and the relations of production" (Poulantzas, 1973:30). In my view, the three class model becomes clear cut on a global scale; but it also tells me that if, at any time, this global, dominant ideology suffers sufficient deterioration or threat to the point of unleashing a crisis, the prospect of an exceptional fascist regimen on a global scale is real and terrifying.

Bond does not think there are solutions, or that the knowledge that might take us to that ultimate solution is attainable – at least not through teaching, not through dialectics, not through most of our current forms of art. He does not even believe that we can learn,

acquire, or perceive knowledge, but that "knowledge perceives us" (appendix:16). And I think he is absolutely right. I think there are ontological truths which cannot be transmitted by way of written words, or teaching, or political discourses but through the "problem's" dramatization. As Bond tells me: "the way we think is 'we've got a problem, solve it' – and the answer is 'no; we've a problem, make it creative'" (appendix: 49). I only hope that with this thesis and its conclusive chapter I have been able to "enact" – in the sense of inspiring but also in the sense of performing – in written words the conceptual significance of Bond's cognitive perception; of Bond's crude thinking: "the thinking of the great" (Benjamin: 1999: 21).

Endnotes

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[1] From the conference "Reputations: Edward Bond," held at the Theatre Museum in London on the 11th March, 2005, which was made available through the Theatrevoice.com website (accessed: 25.04.05); chaired by Aleks Sierzs, the speakers were: Peter Billingham, Kate Katafiasz, Chris Cooper and Mark Ravenhill.

[2] BBC News, 19th January 2006.

[3] Letter received on the 30th March, 2005

[4] Trotsky, Leon, (1923) "What is proletarian culture and is it possible?" Transcribed in the *Philosophy/History Archive* Online: www. arxists.org/archive/Trotsky.

[5] Brecht does not agree with Trotsky, a fact that, in my view, he makes clear all through his writings and theory of theatre (*Escritos Sobre Teatro* – Writings about Theatre *Schriften zum Theater* - Vol. 1, 2, and 3, 1983). As I translate what he says from a Spanish edition: "a proletarian art is an art as any other art, in other words, it is even more art than proletarian art" (Vol. 1, p. 70).

[6] In his "Conversations with Brecht" Walter Benjamin notes: "Yesterday morning Brecht came over to show me his Stalin poem, entitled "The farmer to His Oxen." At first I could not see the point; and when, after a moment, the thought of Stalin crossed my mind, I did not dare hold on to it. This effect corresponded roughly to Brecht's intention. [...] It did indeed pay tribute to Stalin – who in his view had immense merits." Letter dated July 25, 1934 (Demetz, 1986:215). But, in case one feels like contesting that, at the time, Brecht did not know anything about what the Stalinist regime was doing to its own people, Benjamin adds in the same letter: "He [Brecht] was following Russian developments, and equally the writings of Trotsky. They prove that grounds for suspicion exist; justified suspicion that called for a sceptical view of Russian affairs. Should the suspicions one day be confirmed, one would have to oppose the regime – and that means *publicly* [his italics]." Furthermore, by recording Brecht's words, Benjamin also reveals Brecht's intransigent ideological position: "On the other hand" says Brecht according to Benjamin, "the fact that certain criminal cliques are at work in Russia itself is beyond doubt. It can be seen periodically from their misdeeds [...] We have paid for our position; we are covered by scars. It is natural that we are also particularly sensitive" (Ibid.:216).

[7] I am actually well acquainted with Williams' sort of defence of the working class. Coming from a Spanish working class background myself I have witnessed at first hand the "good manners" of the superior Spanish patrician families towards their "friends" workers, with the occasional 'pat on the back' conversation about the "good things of life" and it is very similar to that described by Williams above. I am not comparing Williams to a post-Francoist Spanish patrician family of course. We are not born vulgar, but beautiful and pure; but we are born ignorant and it is up to a society to make complete human beings out of the innocent beings we are at birth. As a matter of fact, this is what culture is supposed to be: a continuous transfer of knowledge. It is not a coincidence that the preferred poet of the Spanish bourgeoisie is without doubt Garcia Lorca: because with Lorca one knows that class differences actually produce culture; "wonderful ordinary culture."

[8] As it was with the Soviet Block, this can be verified in the written constitution of Cuba as one of the surviving communist regimes. In article 50 it makes clear that their end is "towards the construction of socialism [hacia la construction del socialismo]," though they seem to be caught up in a neverending communist dictatorship with a seemingly unmovable leader Fidel Castro (see the Cuban Constitution at http://www.cuba.cu/gobierno/cuba; accessed: 03.08.03). Of course, there is on this subject a plethora of discussions to take into account. Cuba is as far from a utopian socialism today as it was during the initial days of the revolution. Whether it is so by internal or external causes, or by the sum of both – a dictatorship and the long-standing US embargo, among many other things – is rightly the source of long theses (read for example Miguel Angel Centeno (2004), or Frank O. Mora and Quintan Wiktorowicz (2003)).

[9] In an interview with the journalist Jeremy Paxman, BBC2, *NewsNight*, 16 September 2004.

[10] From the original draft version sent to me by Billingham on the 26 of June, 2003; eventually published as a 15,000 word essay for the series *Dictionary of Literary Biography*, Vol. 310: "British and Irish Dramatists Since World War II," USA: Thomson Gale, 2005.

[11] For a full definition on the Invisible Object as Bondian term see Bond, 2004:24-32; Katafiasz, 2004:7-11; and Davis, 2005:45; also in the conclusion of this study.

[12] As it appeared in the printed edition of *Le Monde*, 19 April, 2003.

[13] Letter received on the 30th of April, 2005.

[14] Walter Benjamin, *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, Plimbico, 1999, p. 21

[15] For the meaning of "Big Capital" see Nicos Poulantzas' *Fascism and Dictatorship*, trans. by Judith White, NLB 1974, esp. pp. 97-111.

[16] For Eagleton there are two different Adornos: (1) the one who "retreats from the nightmare of history into the aesthetic [...] It is the most caricatured side of his thought: Beckett and Schoenberg as the solution to world starvation and threatened nuclear destruction. This is the Adorno who deliberately offers as a solution something that is clearly part of the problem, the political homeopath who will feed us sickness as cure. And (2) Adorno the theorist for whom the aesthetic offers a paradigm, rather than a displacement of emancipatory political thought" (Eagleton, 1991:360) [For a critical account of Adorno's use of the aesthetic as political paradigm, see Albrecht Wellmer, 'Reason, Utopia and the *Dialectic of Enlightenment*', in R J Bernstein (ed.) *Habermas and Modernity* (Cambridge, 1985)]

[17] *Ampersand* editorial, the Arts & Business Newsletter, is quite clear: "Arts & Business will continue to make the case for the arts, because we genuinely believe that they can aid the competitiveness of a business [...] we suspect that some businesses may use the current situation as an excuse to jettison unrewarding partnerships [my underlining], but we will campaign for increased investments in the arts" (2001/2002:2).

[18] One could ask why I do not say in short the Frankfurt School. Because while Jürgen Habermas was part and parcel of that school, he has palpably taken a very different philosophical path – that of social negotiation and mediation. "Under other historical conditions," said Habermas, "the juxtaposition of the categories 'revolution' and 'reform' constituted a sharp line of demarcation. In industrially advanced societies it no longer discriminates between possible alternative strategies of change" (Wilson, part II, 1986:290). On this Wilson adds: "the foregoing is not offered as evidence that Habermas is no longer a Marxian thinker; on the contrary. But it does suggest a new direction for the critical theory of society given its earlier retreat from Marx's revolutionary solution into 'negative dialectics' as the basis for a *theoretical* [his italics] materialism" (Ibid.).

[19] Browsed from Internet: http://members.theglobe.com/Jenab/historical/mkv1ch01.htm; accessed: 13.10.00.

[20] In her article "The Interpretation of Culture(s) After Television," the author examines how television has influenced all cultures ideologically. The ideology of mass-consumption is affecting all cultures around the globe – from the tribes of Papua New Guinea to the slums of Egypt or Morocco. Television acts as a window, observes Abu-Lughod, through which the illusions of riches, values, and aesthetic ideals of the Western democracies are propagandised.

[21] As I will attempt to demonstrate here, there is a terrible irony in an imaginary encounter between Eagleton and Bond: in my view they would be suggesting the same idea about whether fascism is there "somewhere" with us or not, and yet they would scoff at each others' discourses. They both speak English, but they both speak totally different 'languages'. For example, in his short article "Postmodern Art and Auschwitz," Bond is telling us crudely yet poetically what the dialectician Eagleton says subtlety: "we do not live under the police tyranny of Stalin or Hitler" says the dramatist, and adds:

"Western Consumer Democracy [sic] is a soft tyranny. But its lies lead it into barbarism. Each day here and in America there is more greed, destitution, despair, violence and crime. We return to the fears of the twenties, the stalking ground of fascism. And our response to it is still Hitlerite [sic]: more barbarism – punish, imprison, regiment. The Americans have imprisoned a man for twenty-five years for stealing a slice of pizza. Its [sic] a matter of time before they televise their executions. This is the language of our press and Parliament, the chattering of the Auschwitz-classes. To call Reagan, Thatcher and Major, Hitlers would be grotesque. But Hitlers are no longer necessary. In the media age democracy can destroy itself. It does so when it makes icons of its lies. Fascism occurs only when – but always when – the real causes of social injustice are denied" (Bond, 1995b:20).

[22] Until The Mines Act of 1842 children as young as five were employed hauling trucks in passages too narrow for men. Thereafter, *only* those of ten and above were allowed to work underground in the coal mines of Britain. However, the bourgeoisie did not give up without a fight; the Mines Act was implemented not without the industrialists' fierce objections because then it was "a time of adverse trade figures" (Burne, 1989:889). During the whole of the 19th Century and well into the beginning of the 20th, child labour was in high demand not only in the textile mills, "but the food, drinks and tobacco industry, brickworks, paper mills, and the chemicals, printing machinery and metalworking sectors" (Mühlberg, 1988:21). Three were the fundamental reasons: one, automatized machinery did not require special skills, but small body sizes – like children's little fingers – were very convenient; two, although they worked as many hours as adults – up to sixteen hours per day – they received far lower wages; and three, "the children were completely defenceless" (Ibid.:81). However, as I will discuss later on, these progressive yet small improvements on people's human conditions – which were nevertheless attained by way of the ruling class' concessions – might have had more to do with the way the ruling classes have viewed the world through their sensuous perception (that is, the prevailing aesthetics) than by way of any acquired moral or ethical value. Today most of us, liberal minds, contemplate with horror the vision of children working; I wonder if in fifty or hundred years time, a more advanced and just society would consider the current working conditions of many women and men as horrific. Not just of those workers we know on the Third World – because already many regard them as horrific – but also of those that now are regarded as "normal," "decent" jobs like driving, working on an assembly line, secretarial work and so on. Would the aesthetics of the future regard them as a waste of human creativity?

[23] "On Cultural Impoverishment," The Guardian, Saturday December, 21 2002, p. 4.

[24] A closer look at some of the leaders' views of our theatre industry shows the West End producer, Thelma Holt, telling *The Independent*, "while no one would deny the industry has its problems,it also enriches the lives of many people. What I often experience is sheer magic" (*The Independent*, 3 March, 2001).

[25] BBC4, 21:00-22:00, Wednesday 15 November 2005.

[26] I will illustrate further this complex reasoning with some personal experiences in the conclusive chapter.

[27] Letter dated 31 October 2003.

[28] Quoted in the *Observer* of 15 January 1950.

[29] In fact, Eagleton acknowledges the relationship between fascism and liberal capitalism repeatedly: as he says in his letter to me, he would identify fascism as "growing out" of capitalism; or that fascism is very much a possible future (1997:134); or that liberal capitalism and fascism are kind of cousins from the same family: the latter reappears when the first is being threatened (1991:379).

[30] Needless to say, many other internal and external historicist causes like Catholicism, progressive loss of the Spanish empire, unfortunate cultural traditions and so on, might be at the

heart of the Spaniards' collective dysfunctionalities during the Franco's era (Kierman, 1980:97-107; see also Julia et al.:1999; Barea, 1984).

[31] We know this suitable fact thanks to an inconspicuous article in the media about Ken Livingstone's current companion, who apparently became prominent when she refused to observe the silence for Franco's death while she was a student in Oxford (*The Guardian*, 10 October 2001, p. 17).

[32] As Allardyce notes, the fascists were noisy and extravagant throughout Europe but they never obtained popular support. "In Spain, often considered the third fascist homeland, the Falange (numbering no more than twenty-five thousand members) received only [...] 0.7 percent of the total national vote in the last pre-Franco election of 1936" (1979:376). The Nazis – the most "successful" fascists of all – only got 37.4 percent at the depth of the depression in 1932 and it remained its best vote.

[33] Edward Bond punctiliously noted to me that, in persptective, "it might very well be that if there had not been a Hitler, Heisenberg and others like him would have provided the German army with Atom Bombs. And then God only knows what would've happened; it leaves the uncanny thought that perhaps the world was saved by Hitler" (Apendix, p. 33).

[34] There has been for some time now an attempt to put fascism side by side with communism which seems to me dangerously wrong. It is not accidental that such arguments usually come from right wing sources. Although both are totalitarian systems, their aims are quite opposite, and that should not ever be erased from our minds. The basic law of human existence for the fascists is "eternal struggle" – and, in many senses, there is not very much to add to it (Kershaw, 2004:252); while the communists followed a specific Marxist-Leninist theory which aimed for a society made of free and equal men and women. Were there – and are there – crimes committed in the process? Absolutely, but to mix up the principles would be a huge mistake. Nor can we ignore the historical connections between the attained social welfare of the working class all through liberal Europe during the last half of the twentieth century, and the ideological pressures exerted by the Soviet Union upon our liberal capitalists states during the Cold War. As I said before, the path toward socialism is a very difficult one, while fascism is quite uncomplicated.

[35] In fact, according to John Bauville, Heidegger's involvement was such that he gave his university lectures wearing a Nazi uniform (In John Bauville's broadcast play, *Todtnauberg*, the author discusses the paradox of Heidegger imagining an encounter between Heidegger, the poet Paul Celan – a Jewish survivor of the Nazi's camps – and Hannah Arendt in Heidegger's own cottage in Todtnauberg – a little village situated in the Black Forest, Germany (BBC Radio 4, Friday 20 January, 2006).

[36] In my view, there is a strong contextual relationship between fascism as anti-modernist and anti-scientist movement and Heidegger's *variety* of philosophical existentialism. For Heidegger the world had succumbed to the game of power politics where the "peoples of the earth have become masses, human life has been levelled down, and the Gods have fled from this darkening world" (Wild, 1963:667). As a matter of fact, Heidegger was not pointing only to the Versailles Peace Settlement as the cause of Germany's problems; for him the events of the 1920s were the culmination of a gradual impoverishment of the meaning of Being which had already begun in Greek times (Ibid.:670). To me it appears clear that Heidegger could not let pass the opportunity of the Nazi idea as an "elaborate web of responsibilities and restrictions" (Turner, 1972:551); this was effectively the utopian possibility of "Being" what we were not but we always wanted to be – that is, superior beings with superior "honourable" values. Indeed, for the philosopher was no longer thinking of philosophy as philosophy but as anthropological ontology. How else could Nazism convince the German masses to such an extent that their Reich would go on for thousand years? No other fascist regime conquered the collective mind of a country's people in such a complete way. Of course, as happens with deceiving ideas in the struggle for domination, there is a point of no return with fascism which took everybody by

surprise, Heidegger included (Wild, 1963:664-77). This is discussed later on, through Poulantzas' analysis.

[37] Oxford Encyclopedia.

[38] Whether France was already fascist when the Germans marched up the Champs Elysees continues to be a source of great controversy. In my view, a crisis of the dominant ideology in France was as certain as it was in Germany and Italy. The fascists François Darlan and Pierre Laval formed the Vichy Government of Marshal Pétain, and had an overwhelming popular support. Arturo Barea, the Spanish Republican author of the celebrated autobiographical trilogy *The Forging of a Rebel*, fleeing from the victorious Spanish fascists via the Pyrenees depicts a France with an unreserved aversion towards communists, socialists, and minority races – not only the French authorities but the population at large (Barea, 1984:384-86). Most of the Spanish refugees were given eight days to live the country under the threat of being arrested and "dumped on the German frontier to their fate" (Ibid.:384) (Barea himself came to live in England from 1939 until his death in 1957).

[39] I have found it very strange not to be able to relate Poulantzas' conclusion here in any way with any other scholar – not just with the above first group (which seems to me a non-Marxist approach), but also with Marxists and Trotskyites at large, scholars like Arendt or the Frankfurt School. Even if, by way of a footnote, some scholars of the first group seem to evaluate Poulantzas' studies on fascism as a major historicist, didactic, and – most important – "de-Stalinized" work of scholarly precision, (Allardyce, 1979:369). And yet, while Poulantzas' theory is footnoted, it is then completely ignored in the framework of their analysis. This seems to me inexplicable.

[40] It is common knowledge, I think, the sense of guilt dragged along by many Marxists and Marxist critics. Critical Theory is indeed one of those all too obvious examples. Brian J. Shaw illustrates Horkheimer's own deterioration to capitulation, but as if failure was already inscribed in the first of his theories for human salvation: "Horkheimer offers resignation as the only possible course of action precisely because reality is irrefutably irrational" (1985:176).

[41] "The Nazis: A Warning," BBC2 19:50-20:40, 30 April 2005. This documentary has offered a very different, refreshing, and courageous account of history within the public domain; especially when most historical studies I know could only tell me that "Hindenburg did not oppose" the rise of Hitler – full stop.

[42] Of course, we are dealing here with the general context of the KPD, whose tactics were considered by observers of the time as *dillettantisch* (dilettante) (Poulantzas, 1974:186). However, during 1932, Poulantzas tells us, illegal pamphlets and books on the 'art of insurrection' abounded, and in the month following Hitler's accession there were street battles and skirmishes, but they were always *defensive* battles against Nazi attacks (Ibid.:187). It would be wrong to say, notes Poulantzas, that communist parties at large capitulated entirely, but it is nevertheless true that they bore a heavy responsibility for the rise of National Socialism (Ibid.).

[43] Poulantzas examines the Fifth and Sixth Communist Congresses of 1924 and 1928 respectively by which a series of theories of fascism were established; among them the theory that "fascism and social democracy are two sides of one and the same coin of the dictatorship of big capital. Social democracy is already transforming itself from the right wing of the labour movement into the left wing of the bourgeoisie and therefore of fascism" (Poulantzas, 1974:148). But the one idea repeatedly quoted among activist communists was the diagnosis of Stalin: "Fascism is the bourgeoisie's fighting organization that relies on the active support of Social-Democracy. Social-Democracy is objectively the moderate wing of fascism... These organizations do not negate, but supplement each other [Poulantzas quotes from *Works*, vol. 6, Moscow, 1952-5, p. 294]" (Ibid).

[44] Still unpublished at the time of the performance, which I attended, it was staged in the Mac Studio Theatre of Birmingham by the Big Brum theatre company and jointly directed by Chris Cooper and Edward Bond, on November 8th, 2005.

[45] "Today's filthy rich are wealthier, healthier and more secure than ever," says Max Hastings in his article "They've never had it so good," in which he exposes current times as "the perfect age and place to be a fat cat" (*The Guardian*, Saturday August 6 2005, p. 19).

[46] I think it is incontestable that the longing for a socialist utopia of true democratic equality has been eradicated from human minds at large. In those few countries where they have still communist regimes, like China, Cuba or North Korea, if there is dissidence against the oligarchs it is not for a final conclusion of communist dictatorship into democratic socialism, but in order to replace communism with liberal capitalism (Centeno, 2004; Mora and Wiktorowicz, 2003). The same is applied to those Arab countries currently subjected to tyrannical regimes of despot monarchs like Morocco or Saudi Arabia or subjected to the lunacy of religious forms of State like Iran.

[47] If only because, indeed, theatre practitioners and theatre scholars are part and parcel of the petty bourgeoisie by way of the skills they supposedly possess – and, in my view, displaying the very symptomatic contradictions defined above by Poulantzas. In a symposium held at the University of London entitled "Beyond Postmodernism" (19 September 2005) I had the opportunity to verify not only Poulantzas' theory, but that of Jameson and Bourdieu. "How can theatre contribute to unmasking and critiquing injustice?" was one of the questions proposed by the organizers of this symposium and the very reason I attended it. There I found well known figures of the theatre industry, including Baz Kershaw, Alezs Sierzs, Graham Ley and scholars and lectures from all over Britain. My immediate thought was "if theatre is not already contributing to unmasking injustice, what is it all about?" However, although the numerous attendants presented a good deal of important matters in their papers, none of them – at all – were directly or indirectly discussing capitalism itself, or the final abolition of class differences. Some suggested a "role for theatre in calling to account the executive and the judiciary" (Tom Maguire); other talked of "re-energising communities culturally, socially and politically through theatrical explorations" (Wallace McDowell); and all of them had hostile words against postmodernism, globalisation and economic domination – all examples which are vindicated by Poulantzas's petty bourgeois definitions. However, to me the whole series of contributions and discussions in this symposium were denoted by Alezs Sierzs' last remark: that postmodernism is typified by Tony Blair being a liar and getting away with it. With supportive laughter all present assented with Sierzs. I then remembered my conversation with Bond and pointed out that also the Archbishop of Canterbury thought that Tony Blair was a liar and that he was going to hell for it. Of course, what I had in mind with my remark was an attempt to take the discussions away from particulars and, as I indicated, to call the attention to our capitalist system itself. Because like Bond, I do not think Blair is a liar in the sense that he does not go to bed thinking "I hope they don't catch me," or something similar (appendix:42). Blair is a petty bourgeois putting to work his skills like the rest of the petty bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie expect him to do; which is, first and foremost, to take care of capital growth. I was answered with a general and all too long silence. It is difficult to know in those cases whether it is because people were unprepared for my comment or because they thought me idiotic. However, more frustrating was the fact that a few scholars approached me afterwards – three of them, in actual fact – whispering that they agreed with my remarks and that they wanted to know more. Why they did not shared their thoughts at the right time with the rest of the audience instead of leaving me there cornered and wondering? It has become all too obvious to me that terms like political theatre, fascism, socialism, or capitalism have been erased from the vocabularies of most theatre practitioners; like in this symposium, now these terms have been supplanted by the term "ethics". This is both a hopeful and a worrying situation because ethics might become another sophisticated edged tool with which to cut our own fingers; in other words, that ethics ends reconstructed in such a way as to become one more tool for the petty bourgeoisie's aesthetics of denial.

[48] Interestingly enough, in the above symposium "Beyond Postmodernism," there were quite few papers pointing to the "failures of the state to fulfil it responsibilities in respect to the The Law" (Tom Maguire), and a call for a "fair" and "neutral" State.

[49] On the other hand, the profiles of authoritarian communist leaders like Stalin seem to me fit enough to be included within the psychological conditions of resentment, frustration and fear. Stalin was the son of a successful shoemaker, initially trained to be a priest in a religious school, and therefore a proper petty bourgeois at the outset of the Russian Revolution (Oxford Encyclopedia). However, I think that Stalin as a typology of a permanently resented petty bourgeoisie is better recognized by way of Nietzsche's evaluation on *men of ressentiment*, which has been extensively treated here in the first chapter.

[50] I will not include in the primary text of this evaluation the large chunks of the working class who were effectively lured towards the fascist call. Not because it would be a complex discussion, but mainly because, after all, the actions of the working class depend entirely on its leadership which are mostly petty bourgeois agents themselves. Thus, Poulantzas explains, in my view incontestably, how trade unionism is a social democratic expression of the petty bourgeoisie ideology, and therefore of the bourgeoisie ideology (1974:143-47). Tracing the trademarks of trade unionism's revolt, he illustrates the ways in which these are in reality expressions of the petty bourgeoisie in revolt:

> (a) Anarchism: [...] which combines contempt for organization and political objectives with ignorance, under the pretext of the "lived experience" of *factory life*.
> (b) Spontaneism: i.e. contempt for organization, and the abstract cult of direct and 'spontaneous' action – the expression *par excellence* of petty bourgeois "individualism."
> (c) "Putschist jacquerie:" [...] rejects Marxist-Leninist ideology and mass political struggle: it is based on a totally abstract cult of the exemplary "violence" of "active minorities," characteristic of the rebel petty bourgeois (1974:145).

On the other hand, psychology and the traditional-aesthetic were factors exploited by the fascist movements, especially in the case of the working class peasantry: in Spain, for example, great numbers of peasant workers fought for Franco because they were vehemently Catholics by tradition. For them Franco was fighting against the anti-God – against the burning of Churches and the killing of priests. Other workers sided with Franco simply in order to survive: because they were caught geographically on the fascist side and so on (see Julia, 2004). We cannot ignore the fact that the rise of fascism corresponds with a disenchantment of the workers towards "leftist" parties. Once fascism was installed as a form of the capitalist State, the neutralization of the working class within the fascist regimes came to be by way of concessions in "social" legislation. But we should not forget that, again, the leaders of "leftist" parties were petty bourgeois themselves. In the section "Fascism and the Working Class," Poulantzas explains in detail how the working class had already been thoroughly defeated by the time fascism came into power, and the bourgeoisie did not have to pay for this defeat with any catastrophic equilibrium. In fact, the fascist State provided "insurance which was established for industrial accidents, illness, old age, childbirth, etc," for the workers, which in Italy – as well as in Spain – had previously been practically non-existent during parliamentarian democracy (1974:165-67; 218-22).

[51] And the extent of the industrial thrust had no boundaries. Those who designed the Final Solution did not only have in mind the extermination of the Jewish populations; it was also a properly rationalized exercise based on economic priorities. Hundreds of thousands of men and women fit for work and/or with skills were virtually worked to death (Kogon, 1960:88-107). Without the cost of living maintenance, transport, or housing, slave-labour provided phenomenal profits not only in the manufacturing of arms, but in all kind of works like masonry, rail lines, clerical work and so on. The thousands dying of exhaustion were supplanted immediately by "men already in a wretched physical state" (Ibid.:104).

[52] As a matter of fact, in the EEC there are roughly 27 million unemployed, most of them chronically so; and we should not ignore the fact that a great number of unemployed are not accounted for. This seems to be widely known and even accepted as "natural." Referring to the Bank of England and the US Federal Reserve System, a newswoman of "BBC World Business Report" (on *BBC News 24*) reported, with the same mood one would deal with trivia, that "they don't want too many people getting jobs [...] it is a delicate balance [...] they have to control inflation" (7 April 2006, 00:40 hours). To me this is one more social case which illustrates when the extreme becomes ordinary.

[53] As a matter of fact, Britain continued to do business with Germany and Italy as usual until the invasion of Poland on September 1939 – and the USA until Pearl Harbour in December 1941. They did so even after the German bombers destroyed the Basque town of Guernica with incendiary bombs on 27 April, 1937 (an indiscriminate bombing of civilians which did not have, until then, a historical precedent). Noel Monks, a British reporter, arrived soon after the bombing and reported in the British newspapers "soldiers were sobbing like children [...] the smell of human flesh was nauseating" (Burne, 1989:1111). They did so even after Hitler's occupations of Austria and of the French controlled Rhineland, the Czech controlled Sudetenland; and they did so even after the occupation of Czechoslovakia. When Britain finally declared war to Hitler, Neville Chamberlain said: "[...] consequently this country is at war with Germany" (Ibid.:1117). Why were the terms fascism or Nazism disregarded in his radio broadcast speech?

[54] "The British Empire reached its zenith in the 1920s when German and Ottoman mandates were acquired, and over 600 million people were ruled from London," the Oxford Encyclopedia tells us. In fact, to the British petty bourgeoisie the Empire offered promises of positional success and riches well beyond the aspirations of the German and Italian petty bourgeoisie. We should not ignore the fact that nationalist British mantras like "Britannia rules the waves" have been a phenomenal device of national unity which, in my view, continues to influence the psychology of the British social classes at large. The mental effect of such a device of propaganda is quite simple and similar to that of a commercial: in a land of inequality, we all are sailing in the same boat, the worker, the shopkeeper, the banker, and the industrialist – and the illegal immigrant cleaning their offices at five in the morning?

[55] Düttmann's *The Memory of Thought* (2002) proposes the idea that after World War II a kind of general catharsis was experienced by the German peoples – and perhaps also by the Japanese – which necessarily had a positive humane outcome, at least during the first stages of post-war. "Because we feel the collective guilt," contends Düttmann via Karl Jaspers, "we also feel the enormous task of renewing human existing from out of its origin – the task which all human beings on this earth share together, though it manifests itself more urgently, and more feelingly, there where a people that has become guilty stands before nothingness" (2002:128). In fact, via Düttmann I could cite another new problem which as far as I know has not been addressed by anyone: that the fascist peoples of nations like Spain, Italy or France have not been compelled to experience any catharsis at all. Franco's regime went on until 1975, followed by a process into a constitutional democratic monarchy without any significant changes among the dominant classes or institutions of authority. When the Allies entered Italy, there was not a fascist to be seen and the execution of Mussolini in Milan acted as a factual end to fascism. In France they still find it difficult to discuss the fact that the country was virtually divided between the resistance and the collaborationists. In my view, the absence of any collective cathartic experience has left these countries exposed to a "naturalization" of fascist parties and fascist idealisms, considered as "outrageous" in countries like Germany (as the historical guilty party) or Britain (as the historical indicter).

[56] I gratefully acknowledge Professor Mick Wallis for sending me this most pertinent article.

[57] We can only speculate about the ultimate mental effects produced by the images of such human destruction within the safe environments of our own houses: those flowers, colourful paintings and comfortable sofas that surround our television screens – especially in the minds of our youngsters.

[58] During the Reagan and Bush administrations, the IMF and the World Bank implemented a world wide "Structural Adjustment Programme" (SAP) during the 1980s and 1990s. These policies included: "devaluation, privatization, removal of import controls and food subsides, enforced cost-recovery in health and education, and ruthless downsizing of the public sector" (Davis, 2004:18). They effectively made the middle classes of developing countries disappear into the poor classes and the poor poorer (Ibid.). Now a staggering one third of the global urban population reside in slums half of whom are under the age of 20 (Ibid.:13).

[59] There are two clear lines of practice within the capitalist system: one is the European Keynesian form of fiscal policy and relatively free social security and the other the monetarist based on Milton Friedman's economics and characteristic of the individualist "self-help" found in the USA. It is becoming clear that European policies are trying to install monetarism progressively, especially in Great Britain, a trend begun by Thatcher in the 1980s. Monetarism concentrates on achieving and maintaining the stability of the price level, which monetarists believe depends on proper management of the money supply mainly through monetary rather than fiscal policy. Hence "monetarism". Observe that "money supply" is the amount of money circulating in an economy at a moment in time, and "fiscal policy" that part of government policy concerned with taxation and public-sector expenditure (Oxford Encyclopedia). Now, as Amartya SEN [sic] explains, one of the basic characteristic philosophies of monetarism is "self-help": that is, where people must take care of themselves and the governmental support for the poor and the ill is very limited (1997:168). The principal – perhaps the only fundamental one – task of a monetarist governments is to tackle inflation through the control of money supply, while any other social imperative must adjust to that control. As a result the rich are richer, the top middle-classes are also better off but at an increased distance from the rich and the distance from the poor – whose numbers also grow out of proportion – escalates. The results are clear for all to see. At Western international level there are two contrasting results: The USA and the Keynesian European type. In the USA type unemployment is lower but 43.6 million people are virtually without any kind of medical coverage or any kind of insurance, increasing at a rate of 2.4 million per year (U.S Census Bureau, 2003). Social security is an integral part of the Keynesian European type but unemployment stands at the level of the 1932's Depression with 27 million without jobs (Vlieghere and Vreymans, 2006), not including many of those who, like me, are effectively without a remunerated job and not included as unemployed. However full employment is neither desirable in the European Keynesian type because inflation would have to be prevented at all costs.

[60] No one is either expecting solutions from the leftist parties of social democracy or "socialist" parties; as scholars such as Ken Coates remark, these parties have passed their "sell-by dates" (1998:133). In spite of everything, critics like Coates are optimistic and believe in direct actions of struggle against unemployment by way of "organizations of the excluded" [my commas] like the European Network of the Unemployed which unites unemployed people from fifteen European countries (Ibid.:131-34). However, as their last 10 years of action attest, their actions do not seem to have improved the situation whatsoever. And, recalling Poulantzas here, nor will they, because they propose change without changing the system.

[61] With the addition of "loss of current output and fiscal burden" (SEN, 1997:160), "Loss of freedom and social exclusion" (Ibid.), "Skill loss and long run loss of confidence" (Ibid.:161), "Ill health and higher rates of mortality" (Ibid.:162).

[62]*Critique of Pure Reason*, Trans. by Norman Kemp Smith, electronic edition, (www.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr; accessed: 23.08.02) in "Transcendental Doctrine of Method," Chapter I, Section 3, "Opining, Knowing and Beliving."

[63] As Basu points out via Walter Benjamin "No information, whatever it might be, is sufficient to defeat Hitler?" (2004:68).

[64] In fact, all these seem to me cases in which people ask for changes but not for a change of system; a feature which defines Poulantzas's theory with precision. In Spain for example more than 1 million protested in the streets of Madrid against the then Spanish president and right-

wing leader Aznar, and his decision to send Spanish troops to Iraq. Such popular numbers of dissent were unprecedented in the history of Spain, but their protests did not produce any changes whatsoever.

[65] Even more so knowing that he developed his philosophy during the terrible events of the English Civil War (1642-49).

[66] Bond's letter to Graham Saunders dated 7 November, 2004; a copy of it was sent to me by the dramatist.

[67] Oxford Encyclopedia.

[68] See also the latest declassified CIA documents relating to the military coup in Chile in 1973 against Allende. Among them a description of the CIA Project FUBELT stands out: a codename for CIA covert operations to promote a military coup in Chile for fear that Allende "could end" democratically elected president (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv).

[69] In relation with this line of thought, quite important are the social explorations of Dan Baron Cohen, which question "the capacity of the oppressed to turn oppressor." For Cohen this complex question is worth examination only when our social relations are constantly taken into account, asking "Why do the cultures of our radical organisations and popular administrations tend to become so conflictual, authoritarian and self-destructive?" This is essentially why a clash of classes is neither desirable in a world divided by the moralities of "good" and "evil:" we need to understand first the profound meaning of human justice and equality. But, would we ever get to abolish human resentment as defined by Nietzsche?
("Reflections on the path - towards a pedagogy of self-determination," a 21-page paper sent to me by the author and received on the 14th July, 2003).

[70] As far as I know, in Eagleton's works God comes to mind only in those instances in which Nietzsche is part of the discussion (Eagleton, 1991:234-61; 1992:33). And even then it is not clear whether he regards Nietzsche's death of God with a melancholic sentimentality or regret, or whether he is suggesting that God is not dead enough. In his view, Nietzsche tells us that "history must learn to be self-generative and self-legitimating, open its ears to the hard lesson of the aesthetic. This whole proliferating network of dominance, aggressiveness and appropriation must confront the death of God and have the courage to be its own rationale. The death of God is the death of the superstructure; society must make do instead with the 'base' [his italics] of its own productive forces, the will to power." But then he says without ado: "Viewed in this light, Nietzsche's work signals a legitimation crisis in which the brute facts of bourgeois society are no longer easily ratifiable by an inherited motion of 'culture' [his italics]. We must tear aside the 'mendacious finery of that alleged reality of the man of culture' [he quotes from The Birth of Tragedy], acknowledging that none of the social legitimations on offer – Kantian duty, moral sense, Utilitarian hedonism and the rest – are any longer convincing" (1991:258-9). In other words, for Eagleton, Nietzsche celebrates power – "violence and domination" (Ibid.) – as an end in itself, and Eagleton concludes that this ought to be instead the "glamour of the cosmic ideologies we should supposedly surpass" (Ibid.:259). Is he engaged on a graveside eulogy of spirituality? What his paper "The Crisis of Contemporary Culture" seems to offer is that we have to work out a "good" capitalist system against a "bad" capitalist system (1992:32-4). Indeed, because for Eagleton – as it is for Habermas – it is better to work out a consensus with the bourgeoisie (1991:259), than the possible horrors of turning an aesthetic against another (Ibid.). Which might be also true, but in my view and as I made clear in the second chapter, Eagleton makes a rather incorrect reading of Nietzsche. It is not that Nietzsche wishes the death of God; instead his is a reaction to the hypocritical Judeo-Christian morality of those who, while they say they believe and do acts in the name of God, have effectively *killed* God with their gargantuan appetites for success and riches. As Albert Camus rightly observed "Nietzsche has not conceived the project of killing God. He found [God's] death in soul of his era" (1985: 83). Edward Bond declares unambiguously that he longs for the death of God because only then, he says, we will be truly free (appendix: 13). Instead with Nietzsche it is not clear to me whether he wishes or declares the death of *a certain* god – that is praised by hypocrites – or God. And if

someone could point to me to the section, the line, the sentence, or the passage through which it is incontestable to assert that Nietzsche longs for or finally declares the death of God, as Eagleton asserts, in the very same sense of that of an atheist, I will then be eternally indebted.

[71] Of course, people have endured different levels or degrees of extreme situations. In July 1944 Maidanek was the first Concentration Camp to be liberated by the Red Army. Apparently the Allies were not prepared for the kind of horrors they were about to record therehence. Yet, the Nazis had begun to forcibly transport hundreds of thousands of people to the *Arbeitslager* (Labor Camps) as far back as 1934: long columns of people were made to walk through major German cities daily and then transported as freight. The Final Solution was set in motion in 1942; by May 1945 1.5 million children, and 5 million women and men had been gassed in the *Vernichtungslager* (extermination camps). When the Nazi Germany finally capitulated and the extent of savagery in the Nazi camps was officially revealed, none seemed to have imagined that such a colossal slave-labour movement could be connected to human mass extermination: not the Allies' Intelligence Agencies, not even the people living in the immediate districts of Auschwitz, Belsen, Dachau, or Buchenwald; as Simon Wiesenthal tells us, not even the Jewish Councils' leaders like those Rabbis who indeed were made the ghetto's organizers and lists' suppliers to Adolf Eichmann, "deciding which names should be put on 'transport lists' [his inverted commas] for the death camps" (Levy, 1994:84) – at least that is what they told us.

Of course, as Eagleton tells me, now things seem different: we have the "principles" of bourgeois democracies: "contending political parties, parliamentary rule, non-dictatorship, formal (if not always actual) civil liberties, relatively autonomous media, the non-militarisation [sic] of everyday life, and so on." However, now most people also know that most of the United States's economy rests in the manufacturing of weaponry for its military machine. In fact, its $522 billion of military spending in 2006 dwarfs frightfully the $62.5 billion of its closest rival, China (in Nick Mathiason's "Facts and Figures – The Military Money Machine," *Business and Media – The Observer*, 19 February 2006, p. 6). As a result the American elderly and disabled must endure further cuts in their public allowances; Bush proposes to save a further $36 billion in their Medicare health programme, and of course, education and environmental spending also face severe cuts (Ibid.). But not even through his dialectics could Eagleton justify the fact that if a country's economy and growth of capital rest in the manufacturing and supply of its military machine as much as the United States does, it is likely to be in need of an enemy, real or imaginary. Surplus of manufacturing goods is not an option in any industry, and missiles and bombs do not enjoy an exception from this rule. Of course there are other conceptual problems that need to be taken into consideration. I, for example, think that most people are not measuring properly the gravity of the information we received because most of us are not intellectually prepared for it. I agree with the professor of mathematics John Allen Paulos when he says that we suffer from innumeracy. We are bombarded through the media with millions here and there while these kinds of numbers do not mean much to us anymore. As he says "many educated people have little grasp for these numbers and are even unaware that a million is 1,000,000" (1990:8). So, just to put the meaning of the above numbers in their proper context, I am compelled to point out here that if we had to count 1.5 million children at a rate of one child per second, it would take us for example 432 hours or roughly 18 days without any break in counting; 5 million people would take us 58 days; and a queue of 6.5 million people would cover more than half the earth's diameter at the equator; or that $522 billion are $522,000,000,000.

[72] Hilary Spurling's review on Elizabeth Cowling's book *Visiting Picasso: the Notebooks and Letters of Roland Penrose*, *The Observer Review*, 23 April 2006, p. 21.

[73] This is why I consider Cohen's criticism of Augusto Boal refreshing, relieving, and overdue. In the form of an internal monologue, the scholar's critique of Boal and his method of theatre intervention – the "Theatre of the Oppressed" – as a theatrical approach which has finally lost its initial task of understanding and construing paths of human liberation by way of its own institutionalisation. As Cohen says "internally" while he is listening to one of Boal's public speeches: "Why is no-one whispering? Why is no-one restless? Why is no-one crying 'stop'?

Stop sensationalising misfortune! Stop trivialising the epic! Stop appropriating the narratives of the oppressed into your own grand narrative!" (Cohen, 1999). It is not "the problems" I would say to Cohen; it is "the problem." Could it be that for Boal, like for Picasso, the most important thing was/is to be Boal first?

[74] Actually, in so many countries the state has lost its autonomy altogether. As Carnoy and Castells confirm in their recent socio-political analysis, many states are captured by specific groups – like in Russia, Mexico, Nigeria, and many others – becoming "predatory states"; other states have lost also autonomy when captured by "fundamentalist identity movements", be it religious or nationalists – as in Iran (2001:16).

[75] "BBC News," 5 May 2006.

[76] It is only now that I make reference to this new class while, nevertheless, it has been the object of considerable attention in my studies. On the one hand, I have not included this class in discussion of class differences because it would not add anything significant to the principal thesis on injustice and inequality. On the other, though a good number of research studies show that this is a class of difficult definition and growing, the underclass' especial *qualities* appear to me more as an active and radical social protest – of course disorganised and regardless of whether this is a conscious or unconscious protest – and I think that its intrinsic nature similar to civic boycott is worth of notice. According to Charles Murray's four years of research, this group cannot be located within the poor classes; the underclass appertains to *another* type of poor class (1999:24). As he suggests, "people who live on low incomes have aspirations just like others in society: they want a job; a decent home; and income enough to pay the bills" (Ibid.:8). But the underclass is distinguished by their undesirable behaviour: "drug-taking, crime, illegitimacy, truancy from school and violence" (Ibid.:19). However, this unruly behaviour seems to me the logical response to a society which celebrates the very condition of inequality. Their poverty, as Allan Walker explains, is not just caused by factors beyond their control – like traditionally poor people are – but, in large measure, "by their own behaviour" (1999:67). And this is a behaviour which, from a certain perspective, is revealed to me more as activist behaviour. Just consider the following empirical example:

> To make a decent living, a youth of 21 explained to me, you need £200 a week – after taxes [would the youth say today £300/400 a week?] He would accept less if it was all he could get. But he conveyed clearly that he would feel exploited [my underline]. As for the Government's employment training scheme, YTS, that's "slave labour" [his inverted commas; my underline] [...] [this is quite a fracture with the old working class attitude of an older generation, as it was told to Murray by an old worker:] "I was brought up thinking work is something you are morally obliged to do" [his commas] (Murray, 1999:40).

[77] Conference: "Reputations: Edward Bond," 11 March 2005.

[78] Surplus Value: a term employed by Marx to specify the difference between the use value of labour (the value of the productive output of labour) and its exchange value (wage) in his labour theory of value. Surplus value occurs only in the case of labour, not other factors of production, and it is appropriated by the capitalist in the form of profit (see the "Theories of Surplus Value" in Marx's *Economic Manuscripts* freely available in www.marxists.org/archive).

Overall conclusion

The task of rethinking aesthetics in the politics of theatre has been generally ignored or avoided. Aesthetics had been allowed to become the exclusive domain of the realm of philosophy, while politics seemed to be the jurisdiction of theatre practitioners. Yet, I have found that quite recently there has been an upsurge of academics and practitioners of theatre and drama showing a very special interest in this matter. In my view this recent activity merely indicates a state of constant malaise, not only in theatrical affairs, but in the arts in general.

I have verified, among other things, that aesthetics is inseparable from morality and politics. In doing so I have not supplied anything really innovative or original: it was so also for both Aristotle and Plato. It has continued to be so all the way through the most prolific periods of human creativity like the Enlightenment, or the age of 'reason'. It was so for Kant and Hegel and all the subsequent thinkers of modernism. But in undertaking an evaluation of this formula and its values, I have found that this inextricable combination is also the recipe that, in recent history, has driven us to Auschwitz and Hiroshima. In fact, even Hitler's *Reichsminister* of Information and Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, an enthusiastic connoisseur of expressionism and an expressionist dramatist himself, thought that aesthetics is inseparable from morality and politics – and he applied it quite successfully with known consequences (Barnett, 2001: 161-185).

However, aesthetics is a complicated and contentious issue. As Terry Eagleton explains (1991), if aesthetics is always conditioned by the dominant ideology, it must necessarily have an impact on everything we do and think; for aesthetics mediates our taste and values. When artistic representation, say theatre, is used as a medium for treating discourses of justice and freedom, the result seems always to be debatable, inconclusive, and/or negative. Aesthetics as the 'mirror' of the dominant ideology reverberates through George Lukács' final, unambiguous delivery: "modern drama is the drama of the bourgeoisie; modern drama is bourgeois drama" (Bentley, 1992: 425); through Adorno's thesis that dialectics ends always negatively (O'Connor, 2000: 54-79); it pulsates in all forms of fascism (Chapter V). I believe the Bondian philosophy of drama offers a feasible doorway towards that sought-for platform where justice and freedom can be, as he says, "problematised" (Davis, 2005: 173).

Edward Bond is generating a new field of thought. It is complex and developing continuously, bewildering scholars and practitioners at large – and he is very aware of it, as he says:

> Rereading Freud reminded me how I am involved in a basic disagreement with much of what is the foundation of modern cultural consciousness: Freud, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Hegel, Marxism reduced to mechanical-materialism (copy of letter to Graham Saunders sent to the author: 20.10.04).

Some of them regard Bond as one of the greatest dramatists and philosophers of the last and current century; many do not seem to take him seriously. As he lets me know through one of his letters, even scholars who have been faithful to the Bondian field for decades do not seem to capture its right meaning completely: "I've have also been writing theoretical guides to help eight authors who are contributing chapters to a book on my plays to be published this autumn (he refers to the last work *Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child*, Davis, 2005). There were many theoretical misunderstandings I had to clean up" (letter to author: 14.07.04).

I have said in the general introduction, this conclusion is not the end of the road; it is just the beginning. I can only hope that we are now nearer to Bond's philosophy and his theory of the logic, to his "crude thinking – the thinking of the great" as Brecht put it (in Benjamin, 1999: 21). The next stage ought to be its praxis: the ways by which such philosophy becomes a practical social activity. And there is a great deal of work to do when the task is finding ways of communicating with our ideologized minds; when the task is to re-define a human meaning which capitalist reification progressively conceals under "the essence of commodity-structure" (Lukács, 1990: 83) – as Lukács suggests, the central problem of capitalist society "in all its aspects" (Ibid.). This central problem would be made perceivable once we are able to consciously apprehend that the "state of emergency in which we live against fascism" is not the exception but the rule, which, as Benjamin contended, is manifested to us by the "tradition of the oppressed" (1999: 248-49). This was within the fundamental scope of this study and it is my contention that Bond is effectively working in that area through his drama.

This conclusion is thus intended more as an introductory discussion of Bond's latest developed theory: looking forward at Bond's engagement with Drama in Education

(henceforth DIE), it will attempt to determine some of the potential arguments which might arise from this association and therefore to suggest some recommendations.

Section I

The problem of communicating through the ethical

Strong parallels have appeared between Lukács and Benjamin's lines of thought and Bond's strategies and devices of drama through this study. First, through his drama, Bond attempts to project Benjamin's state of permanent emergency, of danger, against fascism and in a way which requires urgent attention; that requires choices. As he says, "to *consciously* [my italics] make a choice is the human dilemma" (appendix: 12). Secondly, he does so through a dramatic strategy – or a series of drama-devices – which recalls Lukács' "essence of commodity-structure". He presents it as a problem that permeates our lives universally – that is, "in all its aspects" – be it through the trivial or the important; through the private or through the collective. One of Bond's more recently developed specific devices (which recalls the Marxist/Lukácsian notion that capitalism's essence is a *hidden* problem – yet perceivable everywhere) is his term "The Invisible Object" (henceforth IO) (Davis, 2005: 90; appendix: 26-7). However, before I discuss the relationship between Bond's IO and Lukács' capitalist "essence", I will first briefly clarify the general principles of Bond's latest description of what his drama is: the Theatre Event (henceforth TE).

One should mention that TE is the result of Bond's continuous theoretical development. Up to the 1970s and since his first performed play, *The Pope's Wedding* in 1962, Bond referred to his drama as Rational and/or Epic Theatre: in his own words, where theatre is thought of as a forming part of a "conscious struggle to remove class structures" and towards a socialist society as ultimate reality (Letter to Tony Coult, 28 July 1977; this is also quoted in *A Companion to Post-War British Theatre*, Barnes, 1986: 75) (Roberts, 1985: 68). However, Bond was very keen to remark that his Rational/Epic Theatre opposes that of Brecht. While Brecht, he said in one of his letters, "attempts to create a gap between reason and emotion – so that we can be emotionally free and thus re-describe the social world more rationally (Stuart, 2001: 7; and in Brecht, Vol. 3, 1983: 17), for Bond "reason is not free to describe the world unless it is free to redistribute emotion" (Ibid: 8) (on Bond's definition of Epic and Rational Theatre see also "A Note to Young Writers" in *The Worlds*, 1980b: 106-9). If for Bond it is wrong to totally

separate emotions from reason – because, Bond argues, "if the audience is alienated they can't experience empathy at the same time" (Davis, 2005: 166) – his philosophy also opposes in the strongest terms the Stanislavskian approach where "feelings predominate" (Ibid.). As he said in a letter to John Doona (Manchester, 4 March 1996), "[...] "I tell the actors to play the play not the character" (Stuart, 2001: 24). "Stanislavski's system puts the audience in the same confused state as the characters," Kate Katafiasz argues, "denying them the vital opportunity to reassess the relationship between reason and imagination" (Davis, 2005: 27). This is, I think, not somewhere in between Stanislavsky (1977; 1981; 1983a; 1983b) and Brecht (1983), but way beyond any of the old staging techniques. As David Davis argues:

> What Bond wants in his own theatre is a relationship between actors and audience where the audience is engaged with the action of the play, with the possibility of empathy and emotion, but where the imagination is stimulated which then has to seek reason. Imagination and reason predominate. With this approach, he seeks to alienate from within the act, which is without breaking the empathetic relationship forged between actors and audience (Davis, 2005: 166).

Thus, Bond seems to be attempting a difficult balance where imagination and reason have equal prominence; this is the result, I would argue, of the dramatist's own progressive shift into the ethical realm. With this I do not mean that ethics was not already a fundamental part of Bond's philosophy from his very outset; but it was not as unconditional and as consciously a part as it is now. As I argue through Chapter V, to long for socialism is, in its strict meaning, to long for the ethical – what it *ought* to be: a society made up of equal individuals. However, at some point during the late 1980s and early 1990s,[1] Bond's predominant use of the word "socialism" started to be displaced in his writings by terms such as "justice", the "ethical", and "the imperative to be human"; as much as he has replaced Rational/Epic Theatre with TE in his writings. Now, in the Bondian philosophy, a "socialist society as ultimate reality" has been substituted for "ethics as an ultimate reality" (in Stuart, 2000: 56). When I commented on his shift of language to him during our encounter, Bond answered:

> "the problem about socialism is that... there're two things: there is the long term pattern from Hegelian to Marxist theory. And then there's a rational structure of history that must classify everything and therefore that Marxism is a science – and that socialism is a science because it's inevitable. And I don't believe that at all. What I see is that you have to talk about the logic. Now that's very, very different (appendix: 31).

It is indeed the "logic of humanness"[2] which marks Bond's dramatic strategy today; and interestingly, as Bond argues through his revised reconstruction of Brecht's *Mother Courage* (see chapter I: 31; appendix: 24-5),[3] ideological decoration does not seem to be compatible with a logic whose ultimate purposes are but the understanding of humanness; for Bond's drama does not suggest solutions to the societal – the realm of politics: "drama seeks understanding" (Bond, 1998: 9). In the Bondian philosophy, human events are seen as the product of a fundamentally unjust society: crimes might be in reality cries for justice; the best human intentions might end up as horrible acts against humanity; none is guilty in ancient tragedy. Thus, plays like *The Children, Have I None* (2000) or the latest *The Under Room* (2005) – which I had the opportunity of attending in Birmingham – might appear to be profoundly complex but their structural and thematic simplicity is incontrovertible.[4] The changes in Bond's philosophy and output throughout his productive life as dramatist tell me also of his unbroken anti-bourgeois spirit. As he says in the appendix, "when you have a thought, the world changes" (appendix: 19). But the world does not change in the bourgeois-Joycean mind, which is unchangeably static. Changing is actually a strategy for liberation. Accordingly, Bond says:

> What is truth? How could I live with the truth? Well, you live with the truth by creating it. It's not "Oh, I'm going to see the truth". If I'm going to see the truth, I have to change myself. So I change my understanding – and in important things. It's not that I change my understanding about "that"; I change myself in order to be able to understand, because that tells me how I will see the world. So, there are ideological structures in ME, which are lies and truths, and that is what I'm interested in. (appendix: 20-1)

TE is then a mental ongoing development of Bond's definition of his own drama and of what, in his view, drama ought to be:

> TE drama proceeds by constantly recreating the meaning of its events [...] In contemporary theatre violence, sentimentality and pessimism are taken to have meaning in themselves and are used to give meaning to a play's events. That is decadence [...] TEs are analytic, not stylistic [...] They close the gap of empty effects and aesthetics between drama and life. They make drama radical in a time of show-biz, reductive entertainment, TV drama and 'show productions'. TE restores to the Tragic and the Comic their formidable power. It opens up vast new areas of meaning and drama and places it back at the centre of our lives. [In other words] TE invalidates received and ideological meanings and establishes new meanings in their place (Davis, 2005: 84-5).

Thus, returning to our initial question, in which way does Bond's IO – TE's fundamental dramatic device (Davis, 2005: 90) – recall Lukács' notion that capitalism's essence is a *hidden* problem, yet perceivable everywhere and in everything? With the IO, Bond attempts to make visible that which is "hidden in ideology and convention" and which, he says, only an actor can make visible; not acting but enacting (Ibid.). "Acting can just be copying," Bond argues, "but in English to enact something has a double meaning: if you enact an act of parliament, it becomes the law and changes reality" (appendix: 52). Bond advises us to look at the example in his play *I Have None*, in which "Sara's IOs are drawn to their extreme expression when she poisons herself and leaves the room"; a poison which is firstly and consciously intended for another of the play's three characters, Grit (Bond, 2000: 86-7). The IO attempts to expose "contradictions we accept in life in order to survive [...] when contradictions lose their historical purpose [for example, he says, Aristotle's validation of "slavery during ancient times"] they are destructive, but they become deeply interwoven into daily life" (Davis, 2005: 90).

As I said above, IO seems to me to echo Lukács' essence of capitalism, which is identifiable even through the most inconspicuous objects or instances. For example, Bond recently sent me a letter. From a distance I immediately recognized his handwriting. As I picked it up, I realized the stamp's content: on it there is a reproduction of Queen Elizabeth, smiling broadly at a horse's face; the stamp is a celebration of her birthday, of the monarchy – the celebration of a contradiction – which has lost its purpose. I do not think Bond's hostility towards any kind of monarchy needs further comment; it forms part and parcel of the Bondian philosophy. His play *Early Morning* (1967), in which he portrays Queen Victoria ("Call me Victor") in a lesbian relationship with Florence Nightingale, is a hilarious statement highlighting the absurdity of monarchic states. As it was expected, the play was banned in its entirety by the Lord Chamberlain whose office stated tersely "His Lordship would not allow it".[5] Putting a stamp on a letter is by all means one of the myriad of inconspicuous actions we carry out during our lives; but the picture of Bond, of all people, playing a part in Queen Elizabeth's celebrations, even through such an indirect and insignificant act, might help to illustrate both the universality of Bond's IO and Lukács' "essence of commodity-structure" which affects *all* aspects of our lives (Lukács, 1990: 83).

Bond's terminology undergoes continuous mutations but not because he is inconsistent in his attitudes. He attempts to look into the same question – the same "problem" - again and again, but from different angles. "How can you unpeel the layers of ideological obfuscation that destroy reason" he says, "not by appealing to reason. That is the whole problem [...] how can you talk humanness to Hitler?" (letter to Graham Saunders, 07.11.04) (in Davis, 2005: 185). Indeed, in this letter to Saunders there is already a hint that now, for Bond, IO is not just a fundamental device of TE; but, as I had thought through my readings, that IO and TE are actually prone to be the same thing: one concept through two multidimensional terms. As Bond eventually says to Saunders:

> This is what TE/IO is. I do not hold a mirror up to nature but a spanner up to the universe. Nature is not the human universe. For that there is no mirror because we create the mirror – otherwise the blind cannot see. The mirror then becomes reality – it is a matter of logic (Ibid.).

It has not been within the scope of this study to describe minutely each and every one of the lately-developed terms of the Bondian philosophy. However, Bond's journey towards the praxis of his own philosophy seems to uncover a site where the traditional meaning of words is not good enough; precisely because, as the theory of reification shows us (see Chapter II), ideology also seems to recreate or reconstruct a superstructure of meanings which contributes to subvert humanness for its own purposes. So Bond is creating, we might say, his own idiosyncratic vocabulary. The latest book, *Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child* (2005) confirms this claim: its "glossary of terms used in Bondian Theatre" (Ibid.: 201-20) for example, offers a series of key technical expressions which attempt to reflect Bondian terminology and its complexities. One significant quality of this terminology is that, often, some of these Bondian concepts result from the combination of two, three or more different concepts that are often apparently opposite. Thus we encounter "accident-time" (Ibid.: 90; 201-02), the "tragic and the comic and the imperative to be human" (Ibid.: 217-19; appendix: 4; 10), the "lie/truth" (appendix: 4; 8; 21), and so on. On account of this study, I am in a position to suggest that Bond's compositing of concepts comes about as a result of the ethical mind – or also, the holistic mind – which attempts humanizing ways of connection with the ideologized mind. As I said in Chapter V (p. 187) via Bond "The problem isn't that we are different characters, have different opinions, but that

when there are different ideologies there are different realities (letter to author: 6 October, 2005).

Most forms of art display an intrinsic need for change but, as Baz Kershaw seems compelled to admit while defending his thesis for Radical Performance, the resulting change may be also for the worse (1999: 20). Through the ethical mind all thinking and creativity is *always* an opportunity to change the human world *only* for better, and humanity/humanness is always at the top of the agenda; with it, Auschwitz cannot be an option and neither can the Gulag. In my view, Bondian terms do not come about just as a result of, say, the dramatist's poetic impulses or the artist's power of insight;[6] they are, above all, the result of the dramatist's commitment to the ethical platform. This ethical approach does not allow mental processes towards final "solutions" or "theories", nor through ambiguities, uncertainties or protocols of communicative engagement. Thus, not just complex concepts like justice, truth or humanness are reconsidered; even the simplest of terms cannot be used without prior reflection in the Bondian field.

On the back cover of *Edward Bond and the Dramatic Child*, the publisher describes it as "the first book in English fully to explain Edward Bond's new form of theatre". Of course, these lines are designed to deliver a swift, marketable introduction but, in my view, the use of "fully", "new," and "theatre" within the ethical parameters of Bond's philosophy might seriously misguide a casual reader. Firstly, for some "fully" might imply a resolved theory or problem but when the subject is humanness and/or the human paradox, Bond does not intend to resolve the problem; he attempts to make it creative. Thus, while the book seems to me a very valuable guide to Bond's latest philosophical development, it is more of an introduction than a "full" explanation of Bondian complexities. Secondly, his drama might seem to be a "new" form of theatre, but only because, as he says, "our definition of drama is inappropriate to modern society and so it is not taken seriously" (Bond, 1998: 1). In my view, Bond's dramatic approach is not new but closer to that of Sophocles and Euripides. We call them the classics but, as he tells me, surely they did not write their plays thinking they were creating "classic" tragedy (letter to author: 02.10.04). With ancient tragedy, no one is guilty, and so it is with Bond's plays. Bond's drama seems "new" because in our capitalist society humanness has been put aside by ideology. As the French director, Alan Françon, claimed in *Le Monde* "I consider Bond as a colossus of modern writing [...]; Bond is a contemporary Shakespeare" (1995).[7] And thirdly, when Bond uses the

term "theatre" he does so in a figurative sense – that is, out of the simple need to communicate. As I have pointed out through numerous examples in this study, he is very insistent throughout his writings that the drama he has in mind has nothing to do with any of the current forms of theatre and/or performance. Bond puts it as follows:

> "Theatre" deals with the psychological-self. It turns the stage into the site of the psychological-self. It is never wholly free of ideology. The ideology may be benign or virulent. Its method is style, convention, mannerism. It animates it self by reverberations within imagination but closes off the relation to objective reality. It uses acting skills, which may be eminent, shock effects and emotive lighting and music. It reaffirms, consoles, reassures and entertains but enervates. It is as if there were styles in sickness. It does not touch reality. It takes the dog for a walk and pretends it is discovering a new country.
>
> [...] "Drama" uses the stage as the site of the pre-self. [...] This is the site of the imperative to be human, of the Tragic and Comic and of creativity and justice. [...] what is drama's purpose? Administration cures or punishes. It cannot resolve the complications of being human. Law may be better or worse but it is never justice. How can a practical judge understand crime as an affirmation of justice? [...]. The human mind is a dramatising structure. We have only one way of creating humanness: drama. (Bond, 2004: 27).

Finally, through his drama, Bond is not proposing some form of irresponsible idealism either; not suggesting the immediate abolishing of capitalist social administration and the law, as some might interpret from the above. Far from it. Bond is perfectly aware that, for the time being, the human paradox is trapped within the impossible site of ideology, and that the ethical mind does not tolerate adventurous anti-human suggestions: "It would be disastrous if administration and law tried to resolve the human paradox. We have not learnt to live without ideology. We need administration and law" (Bond, 2004: 27). Technology might be giving us the impression of experiencing history and the 'future' but, inasmuch as the human paradox, our humanness, is not appropriately approached – that is, as he says "dramatised" or "problematised" - we will continue to be trapped within the boundaries of prehistory. This is why, following Marx, Adorno rightly called our social situation "man's ongoing prehistory" (Wohlfarth, 1979: 961; see also Chapter III: 72).[8] To me, the question now is not whether Bond's philosophy is "too provocative to be ignored", as Kate Katafiasz argues (see quotation at beginning of Chapter V), but to understand the reasons of why many of us feel provoked or angered by what the logical-minded Bond says.[9] The dramatist's output is copious and diverse yet, in a sense, he seems to be telling the same story again and again: our lives are ruled by the extreme – that is, by ideology – which supersedes

or supplants our humanness. On this Michael Mangan seems to make a similar observation:

> Bond's plays comprise in effect one long, and as yet unfinished, poem. It is true that, despite the great variety of theatrical modes, genres and styles which he employs, Bond's plays are in a sense all telling the same story. But it is a story so big and so important that it encompasses a multitude of other narratives: it is the story of what it costs to find our humanity (in McEntegart, 2004: 12).

Section II

The problem of grouping and/or classifying the Bondian realm.

In order to find that "lost" humanity, Bond argues, we must make choices which cannot be formulated within the routine of our everyday lives but in the act of dramatising it; because, in his view, science will not answer this either. Other important philosophers have approached the same question – what does it mean to be a human being – but if one scrutinizes the dramatist's philosophy seriously, it seems to be rather in a class by itself. For example, through a swift reading, Bond's preoccupation with the self could seem to correspond to Martin Heidegger's *Dasein* – or "What-is-being" (Dreyfus, 1991); even some of the important idiosyncratic qualities of the former seem to be defined by the latter. On the one hand, like Bond, Heidegger's philosophy argues that, while science has become dominant in our times, "it is incapable of giving us an adequate grasp of our existence in the world. It is blind to what is essentially human and, if left to itself, will destroy us" (Heidegger in Wild, 1963: 671; Bond in appendix: 34). On the other, Heidegger points out that many of the things he wishes to say about *Dasein* "were better said by Hölderlin [Friedrich, 1770–1843] than by any possible philosophical discourse" (ibid.); in other words, that *Dasein* is the terrain of an undistinguishable association between the thinker and the poet (in Wild, 1963: 671) – which seems to me a rather good description of Bond the dramatist and the thinker.

With his drama, Bond does not intend to teach or to persuade us of anything, as he says: "they think that drama can be a lesson but it is not [...]. It's the creation of justice. It is not TEACHING you to be just" (appendix: 8); and adds: "what knowledge is there that can teach you to be human? As far as I know I can't teach anyone to be human; all I can do is to set up those situations where you have to say to yourself 'what do I choose to do in this situation?'" (Ibid.: 10). Again, Bond's philosophical framework here

continues to be similar to what Heidegger expects of a thinker who focuses on the meaning of Being: "the thinker is not interested in achieving mastery or control. He is seeking only to understand what he himself and other beings are" (in Wild, 1963: 671). Thus, one could say that both philosophies, those of Bond and Heidegger, seem to be involved within the ontological realm but, in reality, they could not be more antithetical to each other: Bond, as all scholars dedicated to his work contend, is a strict Marxist-materialist thinker (Davis, 2005; appendix: 50); while Heidegger is totally engaged with the languages of transcendentalism and therefore approaches humanness as a metaphysical idea, abstract, incorporeal essence as if there was or could be a "human nature" which needs to be extracted from its hidden place (Guignon, 1990; Wild, 1963; Dreyfus, 1991).[10] But transcendentalism does not mean much in the Bondian philosophy: "there is no 'human nature', we create our humanness", Bond says (in Davis, 2005: 218). As George Bas and Jérôme Hankins explain:

> Because Bondian terminology results from the fact that he recognises no spiritual or eternal dimension, conceptual and permanent, outside the material world, Bond challenges various religious mythologies, ideologies, morals, beliefs etc, created by all those that set themselves up as Authorities – societies, churches, nations or states – in order to achieve domination, the arbitrary and imposed nature of which make them in fact "transcendences". That includes, for example, patriotism, racism and original sin. This surprising and paradoxical aspect is what makes Bond's thinking and radical criticism of all transcendence both original and difficult (Davis, 2005: 220).[11]

Bas and Hankins regard Bond's line of thought on humanness and transcendentalism as "original and difficult" because, in my view, in a world of ideas conditioned by the tradition of doom, to suggest that there is no human nature, that we create it, is a plainly optimistic attitude. Like Bond, Fredrick Jameson also contends recalling Brecht that "if there have been not just one human nature but a whole series of them it is because human nature is not natural but historical" (2004: 37) – that is, human nature is not innate. If that is so, then the so-called human nature can be changed by changing history, "the result of human praxis" (Ibid.). However, thinkers like Bond and/or Jameson face an overwhelming contender: the long-established Christian notion that "man's greatest crime is to be born" as Calderón de la Barca ultimately delivered in his *Life is a Dream* (1635) (2000: 106). Indeed, three hundred years later and for Beckett and Beckettians "we all are born mad" (in *Waiting for Godot*, Act II, 1973: 80). And when Pinter asserts that "I am not interested in people... I know nothing about people... I know only of my characters",[12] he is actually chasing such tradition: he is voicing

distaste for people as if we were already born mad or criminals, as if a pre-established human nature was conducting our acts: some of us are good, and some of us are bad.

Imagination is another of the central constituents of the Bondian philosophy which adds further originality and difficulty to Bond's idiosyncrasy; and Bond and Bondian scholars are very keen on differentiating the dramatist's conceptualization of imagination with the imaginary, its opposite (Davis, 2005: 209). While the latter concept is understood as a mental evasion from reality, the former "desires reality" or aims at becoming reality (Ibid.). Furthermore, Bond's imagination is more about imagining others imagining (Ibid.: 210) which, in my view, is a philosophical position prompted by Bond's commitment to the ethical platform.[13] There is a logical correlation between two of the dramatist's arguments: one that imagination can be constructive but also destructive (letter to author: 31.10.03) and the other that art can be only socialist or fascist: "There is no art in between" (Stuart, 1996: 126). As I have illustrated in Chapter V, the validity of Bond's 'line of demarcation' of the arts lies precisely in its non-ideological intention; in its ethical content. In a sense, we can now say that fascism is both the ultimate consequence of a complex combination of fear and frustration, and imagination made real. The petty bourgeois class, and very influential social class, fears poverty and squalor on the one hand, and is frustrated because Big Capital oppresses them, rarely allowing the fulfilment of their bourgeois aspirations on the other. The fact that our current societies are subjected to an ever-increasing petty bourgeoisification and that fascism can comfortably side, unnoticed, with transcendental and transgressive languages – which seem to be on the rise in many cultural fields – should be an issue of serious concern; especially when such languages are primarily intended as liberatory devices in justice's name.[14] By contrast, through Bond, imagination seems to construct languages unusable for the purposes of fascism and thus avoid this serious threat.

Thus, while imagination is not intended as a solution in the Bondian philosophy - it is more about trying to understand the ever-latent human paradox; that is, imagination as part of the human paradox which *always* seeks justice - imagination itself can be destructive, because its functioning is relative to its site. This is a difficult problem in itself and one of Bond's important peculiarities which, in my view, makes of him such an extraordinary author in the current cultural spectrum. For him "imagination and not reason makes us human [...] reason seeks the rational, imagination seeks the logical"

(McEntegart, 2004: 12). At the moment its site is ideology and imagination is abused by it. Through her attempt to support Bond's philosophy, Tag McEntegart uncovers imagination – "a phenomenon that cannot be simplified" – as being "naturally inclusive and inconclusive" simultaneously. It is inclusive because it draws all of our other qualities (common sense, intuition, and/or reason) together; and inconclusive because it does so in a "prolonged swirling uncertainty" which protects us from the "temptation of premature conclusions" (2004: 21). As she says through Ralston Saul's *On Equilibrium* (2001):

> How do you leap off a cliff and fly? First you imagine you can do it [then] you work out how to do it. [However, imagination] doesn't know enough about where it's going to claim solid respectability. Jump off cliffs? How? Why? To save people? To transport them? To visit them? [...] To drop bombs on people from the above? [...] imagination accepts naturally all the above [...] <u>unless ethics intervenes</u> [my underlining] (McEntegart, 2004: 21)

It cannot be stressed enough: imagination might also be destructive unless ethics intervenes. This is one factor through which Bond's philosophy is revealed to me as an urgent social necessity. Attempting to imagine a future made up of equal individuals living in a true democracy, goes beyond the ideologized mind's comprehension; and Bond seems to know the kind of struggle we are dealing with. As he says, "ideology attaches meaning to things and institutions and then they do our thinking for us" (Bond, 2004b). In this study, I have made a journey through the theory of reification – from Marx, through Lukács, the Frankfurt School, and to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu on the one hand and Nicos Poulantzas on the other – assessing ideology's distortion of meaning. It has explained to me the socio-political factors behind the praxis of culture as industry, but also the bureaucratic blindness of characters like Adolf Eichmann and the nightmarish and exceptional fascist States as inevitable social events when capitalism is threatened to the point of crisis. Through imagination ideology feeds fears and fear of "otherness": it gives rise to all types of negative, psychotic feelings like envy, hostility, inferiority and impotence; in other words, it gives rise to what Nietzsche depicted as men of *ressentiment* (Chapter II) which eventually justifies all-out violence and destruction. (As I note in Chapter I, p. 24, the Futurists thought of war as "necessary" and "beautiful", but so did Kant.) Ethics, as Wittgenstein repeatedly claimed, cannot be explained – likewise attempting to explain what we *ought* to be, what we *ought* to need. However, for Bond, ethics is at work when the human paradox is dramatized, and no-one is guilty in his drama.

I believe McEntegart is absolutely correct when, through Henry Plotkin (Professor of Psychobiology at University College, London), she claims, "culture is an imagined world made real" (2004: 20). This thought stimulates the last of Bond's plays, *The Under Room* (2005), only his is a world where, as he told me during our encounter, "the impossible becomes inevitable" (appendix: 34). What the ideologized mind imagines "today" becomes reality "tomorrow". In *The Under Room,* for example, we are presented with a near-future situation where it is lawful to gas illegal immigrants and/or shoplifters. A woman finds a stranger from another country on the run in her cellar, which is where all the action develops. As the stranger discloses his own enforced choices the woman's cultural certainties disintegrate. A tripartite relationship is created when a people trafficker comes into play promising "papers and a new life" for money. The play, directed by Chris Cooper and Bond jointly, is itself a master-class on the Bondian terminology: characters do not take prominence on the stage. Instead, Bond's attempts to reach our consciousness through the Invisible Object of simple objects – a knife, a piece of cloth, cups, a table. As David Davis remarks, Bond "is centrally concerned with putting value into objects rather than characters. He would be searching for objects which could connect with the radical innocence remaining in us. This is why he tends to use cups, chairs, tables: everyday objects not already overloaded with ideology" (Davis, 2005: 176). In order to avoid any ideologized affectation, the immigrant is represented by a dummy – a nobody – while an actor on stage speaks his words. Bond construes *The Under Room* taking as reference imagined worlds such as that of the *Daily Mail* paranoia which becomes "real" when the immigrant tells Joan, the woman, that he is a shoplifter; but Joan corrects him:

> Joan: it isn't called shoplifting any more. That's what our parents called it. It's called shoplooting.

The dummy – the immigrant – who is trying to get to "the North", says:

> Immigrant: in the north life is more easy. They do not shoot you for shoplifting. They could not shoot you for shoplifting here. It was not nice. They change the name. They shoot you for shoplooting. That is nice. People like it. Not only shopkeepers.[15]

Anti-human ideas seem "impossible" in an age of reason; but when do they become inevitable? "It all depends on how that situation defines itself," Bond argues.

Expanding on this, I think the dramatist gives clear signals that, there and then during our encounter in October 2004, he has started to map *The Under Room* when he says:

> If I say "look, in seventy years time, it might be that, if you are a shoplifter, you just would be gassed." And people say "c'mon! But that's bizarre!" And I say "no, look, it depends on how that situation defines itself". Because, if I'd said in 1870 [...] "in seventy years time, if you are Jewish, you will be gassed," people would have said "this is fantasy!" They wouldn't believe it (appendix: 34).

The systematic killing of Jews together with those human groups who were considered socially undesirable by the Western-European majority – gypsies, homosexuals, the physical and/or mentally deformed and so forth – did not become a reality through a sudden un-historical twist, like a bolt. In a letter dated 15 February, 1886, August Strindberg wrote a letter to his brother, Alex, which reflects the social ethos of those days: "[...] And in Germany they have divided the country so that eighty per cent of it belongs to them [the Jews]. [...] we have the right too – to flee from them, since we cannot beat them" (Meyer, 1988: 171). We will never know what would have been Strindberg's answer if another dramatist had told him that in 60 years the Jews would be gassed systematically, but I am of the view that he would not have believed it. If we fly because we have imagined it first, did Auschwitz become a reality because it was imagined first?

The 19th century cultural ethos of Strindberg has not changed much; as a consequence of ideological reification, *ressentiment* continues to inhabit the vacuum left in the human self. As I say with the aid of the Buchenwald's survivor, Eugene Kogon, in Chapter V, p. 225, "the spirit of Hitler lives on" (Kogon, 1960: 320). Bond says it would be immoral not to do a drama of extremes in a society ruled by the extreme (appendix: 4; 7; and 12). Much of the time, as Lukács would say, the object which will make us conscious of our extreme situation is hidden by ideology, so the extreme presents itself as trivia, as common, ordinary, or routine (like the stamp on an envelope). This is why Bond rightly talks of attempting to make visible the IO. Mass information faces us with extreme events of course – and 24-hours a day if we wish – but as Benjamin demonstrated in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction," information via mechanical reproduction, ahistorical and aestheticized, always ends up reproducing the dominant ideology to us (Benjamin, 1999: 211-45; also Basu, 2004: 64-71 and/or Chapter V: 218). However, sometimes the extreme might face us crudely and without subtleties, which is what I will attempt to illustrate below.

Overall conclusion

If I thought it necessary to start the introduction of this study by condensing years of my own theatrical experiences in a few lines, here, my task is to enlarge that which, in real time, was no more than few seconds. Some years ago we were visiting in Spain. Our car needed some mending and I took it to a garage nearby. I stood chatting with two of the mechanics, trying to learn what was wrong with the car while they were working on it. Soon, two gypsies (gitanos), a child holding hands with his father, approached the mechanics just to say that, as they had agreed, they were leaving with them the car whilst they went to a supermarket. (There was a time in which Spanish gypsies were truly peoples apart: out of the ordinary manners, language and clothing, always on the move. In this instance, apart from their distinctive facial features – their prominent cheekbones and darker skin than most non-gypsy Spaniards – there was nothing out of the ordinary about this child and his father. I did not give a second thought to their immaculately combed hair, their conventional and clean clothing, polite manners, and average car). Without saying a word, the mechanics looked at the gypsies, making a slight, silent nod with their heads as if they had understood. This account would not have been of any interest had it not been for the fact that, as soon as the child and his father were at a safe distance from hearing anything, one of the mechanics said with the utmost seriousness: "ojalá les tiraran a todos por un barranco" (I wish they were all thrown down a cliff). The mechanic seemed to say this to his companion but he was also anticipating agreement in my eyes. His search for my agreement – to a person who was a total strange to him – demonstrates that his hatred towards gypsies was not an isolated example: it must form part of the Spanish social imaginary at large. I froze. My mind was inundated with all sorts of questions and visions; I felt it was imperative to do or say something yet, I did not say anything.

I have regretted my silence ever since; it made of me an accomplice to an imagined crime. Now this study tells me that, there and then, silence was the only possible ethical answer; that my only option to get through to the Spanish mechanic's resentful mind would be through a dramatization of "the problem". If the situation defines itself, if culture is an imagined world made real, I would have to confront the Spanish mechanic standing at the edge of a cliff with a gypsy child in his arms and giving him a chance of choice before he throws the child onto the abyss; perhaps a chance of choice before he throws his own father, secretly a gypsy himself, or then his own children. Would he have taken responsibility for his *imagined* actions? Through Bond the question is, how

long before the mechanic's imagined world becomes real? Now it is said that the law protects minorities but, as Lukács and then Bond would contend, the law cannot circumvent ideology – one, because ideology is part and parcel of the law and two, because punishment does not tell us *why* it is wrong even to imagine to throw a whole community from a cliff – otherwise minds like that of the Spanish mechanic would be unthinkable.

Now I live in England and the wheel has turned around. My physiognomy, dark hair and brown skin, make some people think that I am of Pakistani origin (unsurprisingly so, considering that even some Pakistanis I have met here have thought at first I was of Pakistani origin). As a result, now and then I must face a "Spanish mechanic" silently nodding at me. I have come to realize that I have become a "gitano"; the "other".[16] We need to stop the proliferation of hatred for the "other" before it becomes a tool for power once again, but it will not be possible with only human rights which just cure or punish. As Bond says, we need to imagine totally new worlds of justice, and explore and then recognize our own "right to be human" (letter to author: 31.10.03). This is indeed Bond's essential theme in *The Children* (2000): not just the right to be human, but the right to be *Antigone*, which for Bond stands as a symbol of humanness. As Bond pointed out in an interview with Helen Nicholson on 1st December, 2000, "retaining your Antigone self, your right to be in the world" is imperative (2003: 19).

In a rapidly changing world in which technology makes capitalism ever more sophisticated, the ethical will need to test different strategies or approaches; so that the human paradox becomes a time of discovery for all, a time of creativity and, hopefully, a chance to imagine the unimaginable: a human world without class differences and without capital (Bond in Stuart, 1998: 118). As Graham Saunders indicates, Bond, contrary to what some think, has not withdrawn from the public. Indeed he is as active as ever (2004). He has changed his strategic approach, not going into 'exile' as some have suggested, but abandoning the British mainstream theatre into DIE, and claiming to be very satisfied with his choice. As he said to a journalist in 1994: "I last had a new play [*Summer*] professionally staged over here [the UK] over twelve years ago. Yet critics seem strangely obsessed with me [...] Why don't you forget me? We are now no bother to each other. I'm very happy with what I'm doing and my good fortune still surprises me" (Saunders, 2004: 263).

The involvement of Edward Bond with the field of DIE, together with conferences, workshops and directing his own plays attests to his tremendous vitality and productivity. Now *The War Plays* (1987) have been set as an optional text in the French Baccalaureate (letter to author: 01.06.05), and Bond is the second most produced writer in France after Moliere.[17]   Bond's current writing with the young in mind indicates an optimistic dramatist who looks forward to the future.   However, as he says, looking forward to a future in which the "problem" – the human paradox – might be finally liberated from the net of ideology, but not resolved. As he says: "I'm optimistic about the problem, but I'm not that optimistic about the solution" (appendix: 18).   As proposed during the 1998 conference "Building Bridges" organized by the National Association for the Teaching of Drama (NATD), drama could become an invaluable tool to humanize formal learning (p. 19); and there are clear signals that ideology affects individuals from the very start of their formation – perhaps when individuals are more vulnerable to ideology's pernicious effects. From his observations on some of the workshops currently arranged in schools by Big Brum and with the occasion of staging *The Under Room*, Steve Williams reports:

> It was difficult to tell whether what they [the children] said reflected their own thoughts and feelings or whether they echoed things they had heard at home, on the streets or in the media. 'Immigrant' was linked with Twin Towers, cheap labour, people sneaking into the country in lorries and the French who 'let foreigners into the country in lorries and won't let them back into theirs' (Williams, 2005: 19)

Bond's full involvement with DIE seems to me the logical development of an author whose dramatic map-making seems to be mainly focused, not on any instant reward like social success, but on a de-ideologized and then humanized future. Of course, if the future is the goal, the youngest are its most suitable deliverers.   The literature on DIE reveals a series of relevant concerns about institutional education, some of which are not dissimilar from those found in the Bondian philosophy.   For example, there is a suggestion that institutional education needs to include drama in the classroom as a counterbalance to its "culture of silence [...] – the dull transfer-of-knowledge classes – [...] through a curriculum based on facts; facts that can be measured and examined [...] from kindergarten to high school" (Innes et al.: 2001: 207).   In other words, drama might help the young to construct a voice of dialogue in a world of monologues. Others sustain that drama might help students to construct "visions of the world 'as it is' in itself" (Bleeker, 2004: 31); or that drama in the classroom might help to experience

notions of trust, responsibility, and/or perceptions of integrity, encouraging students to become active participants on ethical and moral dilemmas (Bundy, 2003: 178; Berry, 2002: 236; Editorial, 2005: 123).

Then again, I do not think the Bondian approach will be free from conflict with other DIE scholars, practitioners and theorists because, among other things, it appears to be a field constituted of a series of conflictual agendas, principles, and/or philosophies itself. Ethics and systems of thought concerned with humanness, for example, are recurrent within the literature at large on DIE but, while most use similar linguistic symbols or signs, the reflected meaning is in contrast from one DIE context to another. Some would say this is a problem of semantics, for signs have different meanings to different recipients – ethics itself, for example, would mean one thing to a corporate executive and a very different one to, say, Edward Bond. Instead, I would say, this is a problem not of semantics or of culture or of opinion or character but, as I have discussed throughout Chapter IV and V, of ideology. Ultimately, as Marx and Engels stated, addressing the bourgeoisie in their "Communist Manifesto", a problem determined by the "economic conditions" of the bourgeoisie's existence itself (in Tucker, 1972: 17). Thus, while Bond's education work is more designed to encourage young people on a journey of self-creation (Nicholson, 2003: 13), it refuses to be part of any environment where, as DIE's scholars Maureen Innes, Tim Moss, and Heather Smigel propose, the "teacher of drama teaches and the learner learns" (Innes et al.: 2001: 211); even if that which is attempted to be taught by the teachers and learnt by the students is "drama for understanding" (Ibid.). Some DIE variants like Role Drama and/or Therapy Drama[18] do seem to evoke Bond's philosophy in principle, suggesting indeed a "Drama for understanding" within the classroom. But this is an "understanding" where DIE seems to be a system to teach "persuasive writing [...] survival, self-belief, motivation and discipline" (Ibid.: 210); a platform where students develop communication skills: "talking, listening, negotiating, defending and responding" (Ibid.: 211). This is even a drama used as a catalyst of violence and/or aggression "exploring 'ways of being in the world'" (Bundy, 2000: 265) which, incidentally, seeks "to build self-esteem and self-confidence" both within the boundaries of the prison system and the classroom (Ibid.), evoking these two environments as if they were an extension of each other. In other words, to me this DIE appears more like the operational platform of social workers, whose aim is the social rehabilitation of those individuals who are social outsiders – and therefore, a source of social conflict – or in danger of becoming one of them. I am not

criticizing the important social function of social workers, nor the attempts of DIE teachers at instructing the necessary social skills which are so needed in our competitive societies at all, but as Bond observes, the allocation of social expectations does not address the need of changing the system. The dramatist's own visual imagery on this case says it all:

> It seems to me that most people are actually thrown into a huge great big rubbish dump outside a city, and told to go and find themselves... it's somewhere in that rubbish. And I have this image of kids scrabbling around looking for themselves. And they are punished if they don't get it right, and rewarded if they can see the trick (in Nicholson, 2003: 16).[19]

Persuasive writing, self-esteem, and/or negotiating skills undoubtedly are crucial "tricks" to promote one's self and an advantage in the climbing race for social position and resources. Bondian philosophy recognizes our need to acquire "tricks" in order to pull through in life but aspires to expose it as a situation that engenders injustice. To acquire "tricks" in order to compete against others is not a choice, it is an imposition.

Thus, as it is/was with British mainstream theatrical venues, I do not think Bond's involvement in DIE will be an untroubled venture, embraced by all. David Davis, perhaps the one leading scholars on both DIE and the Bondian philosophy, also acknowledges that, although Bond "has allied himself with drama and theatre in schools [...] it is surprising that he has so far made no major impact on drama in education theory and practice" (Davis, 2005: 163). Davis primarily criticises the institutional syllabus of one of the GCSE (General Certificate in Secondary Education) drama boards unreservedly, even regarding the situation within DIE as "alarming" (Ibid.: 165). As he says "the pressure to test and write attainment targets has tended to drive what is taught in drama down to the level of examinable skills. In this climate it is understandable for teachers to reach for a formulaic approach" (Ibid.: 164). In his essay, Davis observes some similarities between Bond and other important approaches to drama in schools – such as that of the influential DIE figure Dorothy Heathcote (1990; 1996). Davis finds, for example, that both, Bond and Heathcote, "see drama as fundamental to humanity" (Davis, 2005: 171), but observes that their goals are opposite: that Heathcote sees herself as an educator and drama as didactic, whilst Bond seeks in drama a platform for human self-questioning; that the former sees drama as a site in which to solve problems and the latter where "human relations are to be problematised" (Ibid.: 173). As I noted above with other DIE literature, there are, as Davis calls it, points between the Bondian

philosophy and Heathcote's approach which might appear as 'connected' at first glance, whilst in reality, they occupy different ideological sites altogether (which confirms my suggestion above that even if we can find similar terminology throughout DIE literature, Bond's DIE is, again, a philosophy of drama apart) as Davis' essay reflects with such points as the following:

- From the start Heathcote subordinated dramatic action to meaning; Bond sees the essence of theatre as dramatizing meaning.
- Heathcote emphasizes the significance of actions and objects; Bond focuses on how objects can hold human values and how actions and gestures etc. can form the basis of theatre events.
- Heathcote sees drama not as telling a story but the 'story' coming out of how the attitudes and actions of the people in the play shape events; Bond shapes his theatre form by providing the potential for a series of Theatre Events, which explore the relationship of the characters to the social world and each other. Story is more important to Bond than to Heathcote.
- Heathcote writes: 'Drama, expressed as Theatre, has fundamentally a didactic purpose presented as an aesthetic experience;' Bond would never say this. In fact he would refute it. Heathcote sees herself primarily as an educator; Bond does not. (Davis, 2005: 169-71).

Epilogue

I opened this study considering J. M. Bernstein's claim that we do not have an art which could be "both social and authentic, as Brecht wanted to generate" (see overall introduction: 1). I, too, do not think that such art is truly attainable inasmuch as human beings are denied the capacity to act, the ability to make or create their history, and are instead regarded as an inert or recalcitrant mass by the powers that be. In other words, social and authentic art will be beyond us for as long as inequality constitutes the foundational framework of our societies. In order to be, art needs a human culture, not a class culture. Lukács started his celebrated study "The sociology of Modern Drama" (1914) stating unambiguously: "Modern drama is the drama of the bourgeoisie; modern drama is bourgeois drama" (in Bentley, 1992: 425). He observed that, in modern drama, the divisional line between man and his environment [...], between the hero and his destiny", so characteristic of Greek and of even Shakespearean drama, had been abandoned (Ibid.: 427). While in ancient drama, destiny came to the hero "from without", in modern drama there is no destiny because in it the world 'within' predominates, engendering, therefore, extreme forms of pathological individualisms; the human world becomes thus perennial, unchangeable and/or unhistorical. Lukács asked whether there can still be a drama which, as it was with that of the ancient Greeks, sees ahead to the collapse of an entire world, of an entire social system, replacing the old bad with the good, "or by something better than the old" (in Bentley, 1992: 427). He asked whether the heroes of bourgeois drama – passive, defending rather than attacking, desperate with anguish (Ibid.: 429) – could be replaced with an up-to-date version of Oedipus, Antigone and/or Orestes. Through his study, Lukács came to realize that tragedy has become highly problematic in contemporary bourgeois culture primarily because, unlike in ancient Greece, mythology is absent. That is why bourgeois drama, Lukács says, has replaced mythology with the only device available – character – ultimately converted into a pathological case which justifies everything. Thus Lukács says:

> When the motivations are wholly based upon character [...] the wholly inward origin of this destiny will drive the character relentlessly to the limits of pathology. The non-pathological Orestes of Aeschylus was driven from without by what drives Goethe's from within; what once was destiny, becomes character for the modern poets (in Bentley, 1992: 448).

He is saying that modern drama treats the human paradox as if it was the result of supposedly inbuilt human nature – that is, only explained by way of the transcendental –

which, I would say, distracts our attention from the real cause of our *Athens'* pest: class difference. Thus, Federico Garcia Lorca, to name a celebrated modern author, offered us characters that, in reality, are static in time, built as if they were born to be what they are. As with *La Zapatera Prodigiosa* [The Shoemaker's Wonderful Wife] (1978; orig. 1930), Lorca celebrates folklorist differences represented by the shoemaker, the wife, the major, the priest, the guard and so on, without offering them any destiny. Only death will finally change them into something else: corpses. Lukács concludes his study by asking whether there is, within the bourgeois culture, any possibility that remains open to drama; whether we have something that could replace the equilibrium which was offered to us by the lost mythology. His answer is most pertinent: "this equilibrium can be achieved only in the medium of ethics" (in Bentley, 1992: 450). However, and most interestingly, for Lukács, as it is for Bond, ethics is not a solution. As I indicated above, if for Bond drama is the ethical site where "human relations are to be problematised" (Davis, 2005: 173), for Lukács ethics is the platform through which the problem really "commences", as he explains:

> So long as tragedy did not become ethically problematic, either inwardly or outwardly, the pure aesthetics of structure functioned quite naturally: from a given beginning only a given result can follow, since the ethical structure is a given precondition known to the poet and public alike. But when ethics cease to be a given, the ethical knotting within the drama – thus, its aesthetics – has to be created; whereupon ethics, as the cornerstone to the artistic composition, move necessarily into the vital centre of motivation. In this way the great and spontaneous unity of ethics and aesthetics, within the tragic experience, commences to be the problem (in Bentley, 1992: 450).

I think that, through Bond's philosophy and drama, we have a momentous opportunity to work towards a society that one day could be made up of free and equal human beings – towards ethics as the ultimate reality, as Bond likes to call his philosophy – no matter how far and precarious that aim might be. I believe that through his involvement with DIE, the dramatist has chosen the only platform viable, and also, I think, the most demanding. Think for instance of one pertinent example which I am sure will resonate with most parents: my eight year old son returned recently from another child's birthday party. As usual, at the end, he was given a little bag containing some toys and sweets. Reproduced in the bag was one of those comic strip super-heroes with overgrown muscles and futuristic guns, fierce and aggressive – its name, "Justice". It was all too evident that justice in that context meant the elimination of those who are bad; it meant vengeance. My son asked me then what justice means and my attempt at

answering him demonstrated just how difficult and complex it is to answer such question. Firstly, it was difficult because I found myself competing against the strong message projected by the figurine in his little bag – a message found in most of the merchandised entertainment-products designed for children. The second problem came about because, as I have come to realize through Bond's philosophy and this study, justice is not about punishment; indeed justice could only be created with the proviso that we all are living in true democracy; in other words, as Bond claims, once it has become problematised. Drama would have been the best apparatus for providing my son with the answer to what justice is: that which has not yet come into being. As Bond says:

> 'Being human' is not an instinctive thing, it is learned in the psyche's drama... The psyche and society are a theatre or a prision. Education for the market's needs could be a prison. We must educate children for democracy. At the heart of all democracy is drama (in Nicholson, 2003: 13).

What is drama for Bond? For him it is as demanding as the meaning of ethics itself:

> There are two cups, one white and one blue. The white cup has a handle. The blue cup has none. We break the two cups and trample and scatter the pieces. We carefully reassemble them. No fragment is left over. There is no crack on the cups, not one sign of breakage, each cup is perfect. But the blue cup has the handle and the white cup has none. Drama changes reality.[20]

In conclusion, I have been drawing this thesis from the ideas of Edward Bond and I have found my discourse going towards 'another' Edward Bond and beyond: terms like radical, justice, humanness, drama, enacting, not acting, the tragic and the comic, and lies and truths have acquired new meanings. Edward Bond has become the DOOR to something beyond himself – and, as the appendix reflects (Volume II) I like to think he thinks so too.

Endnotes

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[1] For example, Jenny S. Spencer makes only a short note about Bond's TE at the end of her *Dramatic Strategies* (1992: 257). By 1995 TE appears to take a distinctive form in the dramatist's philosophy when in one of his letters says: "I think the TE isn't an aesthetic device or theatrical gimmick: it is the only way I know that we can make theatre profound again. [...] You have to alter the critical image and the critical description. That's why I think theatre is philosophy and not psychology (Stuart, 2001: 15).

[2] "The logic of humanness" is one more of the latest Bondian terms; Bond describes it thus: "A scientific age understands human beings reductively. We are said to be determined by our biology. Literally, it is claimed that science knows more about us than we know about ourselves. This makes science the enactment of paranoia. It ignores the fact that we do not evolve as animals in their environment. Our environment is history and we create our own humanness in culture [...] Drama is the logic of humanness" (Davis, 2005: 91-2). Bond also defines humanness as that which "is socially, culturally created within the mind's excess capacity" (Lambley, 1992: 40).

[3] See also Kate Katafiasz's most illustrative Bondian discussion against Brecht's theatre of alienation in Davis, 2005: 33-4.

[4] I must say parenthetically that, in a sense, the development of Bond's dramatic creativity, from that of his major epic landmarks like *Lear* (1971) or *Human Cannon* (1986) – which require considerable casting and stage-production – to the simplicity of his latest plays, resembles to me the progressive thematic simplicity of great composers like Bach or Beethoven. Observe, for example, the elaborated themes of Beethoven's earliest thirty-two piano sonatas compared with the Ninth Symphony, which is an immense structure constructed from the simplest thematic cells. This is why I ask myself whether Bond's TE and current output could be also the natural consequence of a dramatist who has now reached the masterful heights of dramatic creativity.

[5] Peter Billingham's original draft version of an eventually published 15,000 word essay for the series *Dictionary of Literary Biography*, Vol. 310: "British and Irish Dramatists Since World War II," USA: Thomson Gale, 2005 (sent to me by the author on 26th June, 2003).

[6] I am referring here to the conference "Reputations: Edward Bond", made public on www.theatrevoice.com. A series of recordings made at the Theatre Museum of London with the Bondians Kate Katafiasz, Chris Cooper, and Peter Billingham among others as panelists (date: 11.03.05).

[7] Quoted from Big Brum's director Chris Cooper in the conference "Reputations"

[8] Indeed, as Marx said: "When this antagonism between man and man, and man and nature is resolved the prehistory of man will come to an end and truly human history will begin (*Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, trans. By T. B. Bottomore (Online).

[9] One recent example in which Bond seems to inspire anger and repulsion can be found in John Doona's article about the first reading of Bond's *The Short Electra* – one of the latest plays inspired by Euripides's *Electra* (a copy of it was given to me by the author himself in 2004 and can be supplied if required). Observe how some of the teachers of drama involved in this reading responded with horror and revulsion, leaving the room while the reading was taking place and defining Bond as a "mad old git asking kids to think about killing their mothers" (Doona, 2004: 43).

[10] I have already discussed the dangers which might arise from transcendentalism and transgression through the total involvement of Heidegger with Nazism in Chapter V, section III. And the influence of Heidegger's philosophy continues to be, in my view, phenomenal. The philosophy of Jose Ortega y Gasset for example, one more of Heidegger's pupils, permeates thoroughly through many aspects of the Spanish culture to this day, especially academia (Rodriguez Huéscar, 1964: 21). This is, as far as I know, a fundamental and serious problem which is still in need of a proper evaluation.

[11] From "A Glossary of terms used in Bondian Theatre" which was "written for the French edition of *The Hidden Plot*" (L'Arche Editeur) by Bond's French translator George Bas with Jérôme Hankins (in Davis, 2005: 201-20).

[12] "Harold Pinter Celebration," BBC 2, *Arena,* Saturday, 26 October 2002.

[13] See also Bond's "Notes in Imagination" which is published in conjunction with his play *Coffee* (1995).

[14] I am thinking here of the one-day symposium held at the University of London on the 19th September 2005 "Beyond Postmodernism – Performance, Politics, Publics", among others. See for example endnote 47 in chapter V, p. 237.

[15] My own notes taken while attending the play.

[16] This is what a couple of plumbers working on my own house told me few years ago when, relieved after discovering that I was a Spaniard, told me "we thought you were a paki".

[17] Billingham: see endnote 4.

[18] See for example Bundy, 2000 and 2003; Innes et al., 2001; Fleming et al., 2004; Gesser-Edelsburg, 2005; Coppens, 2002, among many others.

[19] Personal interview with Helen Nicholson, 1 December 2000.

[20] This is part of a piece sent to me by Bond which he calls "Two Cups". It has not got a date but it was part of a letter dated 08.11.04

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"Reputations: Edward Bond," conference held at the Theatre Museum in London on the 11th of March, 2005; it was made available online in: Theatrevoice.com accessed: 25.04.05; chaired by Aleks Sierzs the speakers were: Peter Billingham, Kate Katafiasz, Chris Cooper and Mark Ravenhill.

"Beyond Postmodernism – Performance, Politics, Publics," one-day symposium held at the University of London on the 19th of September 2005; the organizers were Baz Kershaw, Graham Ley, Helen Nicholson, Sophie Nield, and Dan Rebellato.

"Mapping Performance Research," an invited international seminar, 22 October 2005, University of Leeds, Bretton Hall Campus; Panellists: Christopher Balme, Gerry Harris, and Shannon Jackson; Respondents: Baz Kershaw and Simon Shepherd; Curators: Mick Wallis and Richard Gough.

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