

ARCHAEOLOGY OF DESTRUCTION

A REINTERPRETATION OF CASTLE SLIGHTINGS IN THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR

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ABSTRACT

This thesis addresses the archaeology of destruction and the challenges and opportunities it presents to archaeologists. It primarily focuses on the recording, analysis, and interpretation of destroyed buildings, and how the overall life cycle of these buildings affects our understanding of the destruction evidence. At its core are two fundamental arguments. The first is that the deliberate destruction of a society's material culture is a complex social phenomenon with a variety of causes and effects, all of which deserve to be examined closely by the archaeological community. The second is that the methodological challenges posed are so complex that they require a multidisciplinary approach utilising a range of subjects including—but not limited to—history, structural and explosives engineering, building construction, and conservation.

These themes are explored by looking at one particularly misunderstood type of destruction: the slighting of castles in the English Civil War, specifically between 1642 and 1660. While the word 'slighting' is generally used as a synonym for destruction, its application to castles has been problematic as interpretations of what this means vary widely. In the absence of a universally recognised definition, this thesis has provided one: the non-siege, intentional damage during times of war of high status buildings, their surrounding landscape or works, and/or their contents and features. In the course of expanding the definition of slighting, several common assumptions regarding the motivation for slighting are challenged. The most prevalent is that slighting was simply a fiscal and military policy by Parliament to save money and 'deny use to the enemy'. Instead, other social, religious, and political factors are shown to be equally if not more significant causes for destruction, including local rivalries, social climbing, gender tensions, property speculating, and religious turmoil. The conclusion is that communities both benefited and suffered from slighting, and played active roles in instigating, stopping, and interacting with the destruction in their midst.

CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	
CONTENTS	i
LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND TABLES	vi
LIST OF FIGURES	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	xvi
AUTHOR'S DECLARATION	xviii
ABBREVIATIONS	xix
CHAPTER ONE	1
AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF DESTRUCTION: THE SLIGHTING NARRATIVES OF CASTLES	
1.1 'Archaeology of destruction' and 'slighting': An introduction	1
1.2 What is meant by 'slighting'?	6
1.2.1 Slighting: An historical context	10
1.2.2 Slighting: A Judeo/Christian context	12
1.2.3 Slighting in Britain: An overview	16
1.3 What is meant by 'castle'?	19
1.4 Literature review: Approaches to Civil War slighting	21
1.4.1 The Architectural Design/Evolutionary View, or <i>Was the castle impressive enough to withstand a beating?</i>	22
1.4.2 The Historical/Big Picture View, or <i>Why the beating was not personal</i>	24
1.4.3 The Archaeological View, or <i>What beating?</i>	27
1.5 Thesis Aims and Outline	30
CHAPTER TWO	35
PATTERNS: SLIGHTING DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR	
2.1 Introduction to regional loyalties and governmental structures	36
2.2 The 'discourse' of patterns	43
2.2.1 Gazetteer slighting patterns (chronological)	44

2.2.2	Gazetteer slighting pattern (geographical)	54
2.3	Discussion	57
CHAPTER THREE		59
METHODS AND METHODOLOGIES: HOW WAS IT SLIGHTED AND HOW CAN WE TELL?		
3.1	Methods of slighting	60
3.1.1	Picking	61
3.1.2	Undermining	64
3.1.3	Gunpowder	67
3.1.4	Fire	69
3.2	Problems of identification	73
3.2.1	Construction	74
3.2.2	Civil War refortification of sites	76
3.2.3	Siege damage	77
3.2.4	Theft	83
3.2.5	Urban/rural pressures and habitation	85
3.2.6	Conservation/excavation	87
3.2.7	Environmental damage	90
3.3	A new methodology	92
CHAPTER FOUR		95
'PICKING APART' SLIGHTING: EVIDENCE FOR DAMAGING A CASTLE BY HAND		
4.1	Types of picking damage: Primary, secondary, and indeterminate	96
4.2	Primary and indeterminate damage	100
4.2.1	Facing stone and rubble core	101
4.2.2	Heraldic and religious imagery	112
4.3	Secondary damage (building material salvage)	118
4.3.1	Facing stone	118
4.3.2	Timber	123
4.3.3	Metals	132
4.4	Secondary damage (architectural salvage)	136
4.4.1	Fireplaces	137
4.4.2	High status stonework	140
4.5	Conclusion	142
CHAPTER FIVE		147
'UNDERMINING ARGUMENTS': EVIDENCE FOR DAMAGING A CASTLE BY COLLAPSE		
5.1	The role of gunpowder: An essential requirement?	148

5.2	Undermining with gunpowder? An appraisal of Corfe Castle	152
5.2.1	Corfe and the Civil War: A background history	153
5.2.2	Undermining evidence for Corfe Castle	155
5.2.3	Discussion	164
5.3	Undermining without gunpowder: An appraisal of Raglan Castle	168
5.3.1	Raglan and the Civil War: A background history	168
5.3.2	Undermining evidence for Raglan Castle	170
5.3.3	Discussion	171
5.4	Undermining a curve: An appraisal of Helmsley Castle	174
5.4.1	Helmsley and the Civil War: A background history	174
5.4.2	Undermining evidence for Helmsley Castle	175
5.4.3	Discussion	177
5.5	The blurred line: Distinguishing undermining from bombardment at Scarborough Castle	179
5.5.1	The documentary evidence and the established narrative	179
5.5.2	The archaeological evidence: An assessment	180
5.5.3	Discussion	181
5.6	Conclusion	183
CHAPTER SIX		186
THE PRIVATE FACE OF SLIGHTING: KENILWORTH CASTLE AND PRIVATISATION		
6.1	'The Story' of a castle: Kenilworth revisited	187
6.2	Kenilworth Castle: An introduction	189
6.2.1	Kenilworth Castle in the Civil War	191
6.3	Slighting 'identities': Who was involved?	193
6.3.1	Henry Carey, 2 nd Earl of Monmouth	193
6.3.2	Col/Maj. Joseph Hawkesworth	196
6.3.3	The Parliamentarian officers	197
6.3.4	The purchase	198
6.4	The buildings: Destruction, transference of materials, and new messages	200
6.4.1	Leicester's Gatehouse	201
6.4.2	The keep	205
6.4.3	Discussion	211
6.5	Slighting in a wider context: The eye of the beholder	212
6.5.1	'Watery landscapes' and wooded past-times	213
6.6	Slighting in perspective: Kenilworth's contribution to 'The Story'	216

CHAPTER SEVEN	219
THE PUBLIC FACE OF SLIGHTING: PONTEFRACT CASTLE AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT	
7.1 Pontefract Castle: An introduction and history	220
7.1.1 Pontefract Castle in the Civil War	222
7.1.2 Contemporary slighting sources	223
7.2 The petitions of Pontefract Castle	224
7.3 Demolition accounts: Labour	228
7.3.1 Stone	229
7.3.2 Timber	232
7.3.3 Metals	234
7.3.4 Miscellaneous	236
7.4 Demolitions accounts: Revenue	242
7.4.1 Trustees and family	242
7.4.2 Metals and glass	246
7.4.3 Timber	251
7.5 Conclusion	254
CHAPTER EIGHT	258
CONCLUSION: PUTTING THE PIECES TOGETHER	
8.1 Putting the pieces together: The methodological implications	258
8.2 Future directions	265
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER TWO	269
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER THREE	274
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER FOUR	284
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER FIVE	325
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER SIX	362
FIGURES FOR CHAPTER SEVEN	381
APPENDIX I: Civil War Timeline (1642-1649)	383
APPENDIX II: Thompson gazetteer (as recorded in 1987a, 179-85)	386
APPENDIX III: Thompson gazetteer (arranged by year)	397
APPENDIX IV: Sites visited	402
APPENDIX V: Orders issued by Major-General Lambert, Commander-in-Chief in these Northern Parts; 1648 [Concerning Knaresborough Castle]	403

APPENDIX VI: Correspondence between Sir Ralph Bankes and Sir Walter Erle related to Corfe timber	405
APPENDIX VII: Kenilworth Castle legal transactions and survey extracts	407
APPENDIX VIII: Correspondence of Capt. Adam Baynes	410
APPENDIX IX: Petition to slight Pontefract and Middleham Castles (Yorkshire Grand Jury)	412
APPENDIX X: Petition to slight Pontefract Castle (The Town)	413
APPENDIX XI: Lambert's letter concerning Pontefract	414
APPENDIX XII: Orders from the West Riding Committee	415
APPENDIX XIII: Pontefract demolition accounts	417
GLOSSARY	427
BIBLIOGRAPHY	431

LIST OF DIAGRAMS AND TABLES

CHAPTER TWO

PATTERNS: SLIGHTING DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR

Diagram 2.1 Diagram showing the number of positive references to slighting by year (original data source: Thompson 1987a, 179-85, gazetteer of proposed and executed demolitions).

Diagram 2.2 Diagram showing the number of positive references to slighting—pre 1648—listed by county (original data source: Thompson 1987a, 179-85, gazetteer of proposed and executed demolitions).

Diagram 2.3 Diagram showing the number of positive references to slighting—post 1647—listed by county (original data source: Thompson 1987a, 179-85, gazetteer of proposed and executed demolitions).

CHAPTER FOUR

'PICKING APART' SLIGHTING: EVIDENCE FOR DAMAGING A CASTLE BY HAND

Diagram 4.1 Classification chart showing primary, secondary, and indeterminate damage types and how they are manifested.

Diagram 4.2 Primary damage and the interrelationships affecting interpretation of evidence.

Diagram 4.3 Materials salvage and the interrelationships affecting interpretation of evidence.

Diagram 4.4 Architectural salvage and the interrelationships affecting interpretation of evidence.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PUBLIC FACE OF SLIGHTING: PONTEFRACT CASTLE AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Table 7.1 Labour expenditure relating to stone, Pontefract Castle.

Table 7.2 Labour expenditure relating to timber, Pontefract Castle.

Table 7.3 Labour expenditure relating to metals, Pontefract Castle.

Table 7.4 Miscellaneous expenditure, Pontefract Castle.

Table 7.5 Purchases made by trustees, Pontefract Castle (Status source: Holmes 1882; Quinn 1992).

Table 7.6 Purchases made by individuals with the same surname as a trustee, Pontefract Castle (Status source: Holmes 1882).

Table 7.7 Five most profitable single purchases of lead, Pontefract Castle.

Table 7.8 Top five most profitable single purchases of timber, Pontefract Castle.

LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER TWO

PATTERNS: SLIGHTING DISTRIBUTIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR

Figure 2.1 Map of areas discussed in thesis (San Jack Media).

Figure 2.2 Map showing territorial control of both sides in Spring 1643 (San Jack Media after Gaunt 2003).

Figure 2.3 Map showing territorial control of both sides in Autumn 1644 (San Jack Media after Gaunt 2003).

Figure 2.4 Map showing territorial control of both sides in Autumn 1645 (San Jack Media after Gaunt 2003).

Figure 2.5 Geographical distribution for proposed or ordered slightings in Thompson's gazetteer, 1642-1660 (Malaws/Rakoczy).

CHAPTER THREE

METHODS AND METHODOLOGIES: HOW WAS IT SLIGHTED AND HOW CAN WE TELL?

Figure 3.1 Explosion damage pattern in Gatehouse at Newark Castle (Nottinghamshire) as defined by its cratered out shape and highlighted by extensive Victorian restoration.

Figure 3.2 Wall at St. Mary's Abbey (York) showing fire damage *in situ*, as well as new ashlar blocks.

Figure 3.3 Extensive reddening and surface degradation of fire damaged wall, St. Mary's Abbey.

Figure 3.4 Porch area of Hopton Castle (Shropshire) with alleged fire damage in upper left area of entranceway.

Figure 3.5 Close-up of fire damage area, Hopton Castle (Shropshire).

Figure 3.6 Panelling nailed into the wall at Allerton Castle (Yorkshire), showing the air space that fed the fire.

Figure 3.7 Fire damaged stone from Allerton Castle (Yorkshire), showing signs of surface reddening.

Figure 3.8 Fire damaged tile with melted drops of lead attached (Allerton Castle).

Figure 3.9 Close-up of fire damaged tile with melted drops of lead attached (Allerton Castle).

Figure 3.10 Melted lump of lead found onsite after the fire (Allerton Castle).

Figure 3.11 Roofing timber beams still *in situ*, showing signs of surface charring (Allerton Castle).

Figure 3.12 West side of keep, showing a small fire damage pattern low to the ground (Knaresborough Castle).

Figure 3.13 Close-up of the Knaresborough keep damage pattern, showing the twin bore holes on either side of the centre crack.

Figure 3.14 External wall of Skenrith Castle (Wales) showing robbed out lower half.

Figure 3.15 South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire), showing its current partial use as a working farm (photo courtesy of English Heritage).

Figure 3.16 Two illustrations from 1848 of Clitheroe Castle Keep (Lancashire) showing how the structure looked before conservation, and how the artist thought it would look post-conservation (Best 1990).

Figure 3.17 Interior of Clitheroe Castle Keep (Lancashire), showing use of cement in past conservation work.

CHAPTER FOUR

‘PICKING APART’ SLIGHTING: EVIDENCE FOR DAMAGING A CASTLE BY HAND

Figure 4.1 The Outer Gate of Skipton Castle, with re-built upper half.

Figure 4.2 Close-up of the left turret of the Outer Gate, Skipton Castle, detailing pre and post slighting construction.

Figure 4.3 The outside of the watchtower, Skipton Castle, with the larger windows and different stonework of the re-build visible in the upper courses.

Figure 4.4 The interior of the watchtower, middle floor, Skipton Castle. Lower half shows the original medieval wall thickness, while the upper half is Lady Anne Clifford’s rebuild.

Figure 4.5 Close-up of the wall junction between pre and post slighting building phases, Skipton Castle.

Figure 4.6 Site map of Knaresborough Castle (San Jack Media after Kershaw 1998, 9).

Figure 4.7 Aerial view of Knaresborough Castle (San Jack Media after Kershaw 1998, 4).

Figure 4.8 Gatehouse towers of Knaresborough Castle, G1 (left) and G2 (right).

Figure 4.9 Close-up of base of G2.

Figure 4.10 Back view of G2 (left) and G1 (right).

Figure 4.11 G1 with portcullis groove and putlog holes.

Figure 4.12 G2 with portcullis groove and putlog holes.

Figure 4.13 Outside view of G2.

Figure 4.14 T2 (left) and T1 (right), with modern wall and war memorial just beyond.

Figure 4.15 T1 showing weathering damage and replaced ashlar.

Figure 4.16 T2 showing weathering damage and replaced ashlar.

Figure 4.17 Side view of T1, looking east.

Figure 4.18 Back view of T1.

Figure 4.19 Side view of T1, looking west.

Figure 4.20 Plinth of T1, looking east.

Figure 4.21 Plinth of T1, looking west.

Figure 4.22 Front view of T2, looking north.

Figure 4.23 Side view of T2, looking east.

Figure 4.24 Side view of T2, looking west.

Figure 4.25 Back view of T2.

Figure 4.26 Clockwise from left: ashlar with claw tooling, architectural fragment with chamfered moulding, and a nook shaft from a window or door, all located in the rubble core of T2.

Figure 4.27 Steep incline of cliffside along T2 and T1.

Figure 4.28 Cliffside west of the keep, overlooking the River Nidd.

Figure 4.29 View from the castle, looking northwest.

Figure 4.30 Heraldic panel above entrance through the Cross Range, South Wingfield Manor (photo courtesy of English Heritage).

Figure 4.31 Southern exterior of Cross Range, South Wingfield Manor, with heraldic panel above arch (photo courtesy of English Heritage).

Figure 4.32 Cawood Castle Gatehouse and (inset) and its surviving shields.

Figure 4.33 Garrison Gate, Basing House, and (inset) its surviving shield.

Figure 4.34 Peveril Castle Keep, looking south, showing the scale of secondary damage.

Figure 4.35 Peveril Castle Keep, looking southeast, showing the scale of secondary damage.

Figure 4.36 Peveril Castle Keep, looking east, showing the scale of secondary damage.

Figure 4.37 The southern corner of Peveril Castle Keep, showing how the inaccessible side of the castle has retained its facing stone.

Figure 4.38 Secondary damage at Peveril Castle in the form of removed Quoins.

Figure 4.39 *Left:* Damaged curtain wall at Basing House. *Right:* House built from castle brick in Old Basing.

Figure 4.40 Possible robbing pattern at Raglan Castle (Wales).

Figure 4.41 Secondary damage pattern in the form of removed facing stone at Middleham Castle (Yorkshire).

Figure 4.42 The corbel placements in the lower hall, Harewood Castle (Yorkshire) (view 1).

Figure 4.43 The corbel placements in the lower hall, Harewood Castle (Yorkshire) (view 2).

Figure 4.44 Joist hole placements in the buttery, Raglan Castle (Wales) (view 1).

Figure 4.45 Joist hole placements in the buttery, Raglan Castle (Wales) (view 2).

Figure 4.46 Interpretation panel at Knaresborough Castle showing a demolition flue to melt lead.

Figure 4.47 Surviving fireplaces at South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) (photo courtesy of English Heritage).

Figure 4.48 Panelling and chimneypiece at Badminton House (Gloucestershire), formerly in Raglan Castle (Wales) (Kenyon 1988).

Figure 4.49 Removed fireplaces from the apartments block, Raglan Castle (Wales).

Figure 4.50 Removed fireplace from the Great Hall, Harewood Castle (Yorkshire).

Figure 4.51 Removed fireplace from the Great Hall, Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire).

Figure 4.52 Remnants of a fireplace still *in situ* in the Long Gallery, Raglan Castle (Wales).

Figure 4.53 Garden wall ‘fireplace’ located in the village of South Wingfield, Derbyshire.

Figure 4.54 Close-up of ‘fireplace’ showing angle roll mouldings and geological difference of stones.

Figure 4.55 The Pitched Stone Court at Raglan Castle (Wales), showing secondary damage of a possible removed high status object (Kenyon 1988).

Figure 4.56 Close-up of secondary damage in Pitched Stone Court at Raglan Castle (Wales).

Figure 4.57 Fountain Court of Raglan Castle (Wales) with the Grand Stair entrance in inset.

Figure 4.58 The Grand Stair leading to the apartments in the Fountain Court, with areas of secondary damage and various features numbered.

Figure 4.59 The doorway from the courtyard to Great Hall staircase at Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire).

Figure 4.60 View from the Great Hall staircase of secondary damage pattern at Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire).

Figure 4.61 Close-up of secondary damage pattern across from the Great Hall staircase at Old Wardour (Wiltshire).

Figure 4.62 Pair of shell-headed seats next to the main entrance at Old Wardour (Wiltshire) (Davison 1999, 6).

CHAPTER FIVE

‘UNDERMINING ARGUMENTS’: EVIDENCE FOR DAMAGING A CASTLE BY COLLAPSE

Figure 5.1 Corfe Castle, illustrating both its pre-slighting and post-slighting states (after The National Trust 2003).

Figure 5.2 The exterior of the Outer Gatehouse of Corfe Castle [13], looking north.

Figure 5.3 Interior of the Outer Gatehouse [13], looking south. Debris to the right.

Figure 5.4 Close-up of the exterior archway of the Outer Gatehouse [13], looking north.

Figure 5.5 The eastern half of the Outer Gatehouse [13] and Horseshoe Tower [12], looking northeast. Vegetation covered debris to right.

Figure 5.6 The western half of the Outer Gatehouse [13] and the First Tower [1], looking northwest.

Figure 5.7 The southwestern curtain wall and towers, showing the First Tower [1], the Second Tower [2], and the Third Tower [3].

Figure 5.8 The First Tower [1], looking south.

Figure 5.9 The First Tower [1] and vegetation covered castle debris, looking up and east.

Figure 5.10 The Second Tower [2] and curtain wall in foreground, looking north (view 1).

Figure 5.11 The Second Tower [2] and curtain wall to right, looking north (view 2).

Figure 5.12 The Second Tower [2], looking up and east.

Figure 5.13 Overtaken section of curtain wall on southwestern side.

Figure 5.14 Masonry debris from southwestern curtain, located at bottom of hillside.

Figure 5.15 Masonry debris from southwestern curtain, located on side of hill.

Figure 5.16 The South Tower [6], looking up and northeast.

Figure 5.17 The Butavant Tower [7], looking up and northeast.

Figure 5.18 Southwest Gatehouse, looking northwest.

Figure 5.19 Close-up of South-west Gatehouse, looking northwest.

Figure 5.20 Close-up of South-west Gatehouse, looking southeast.

Figure 5.21 South-west Gatehouse, looking southwest from the inner ward.

Figure 5.22 Western drum tower of the South-west Gatehouse, looking east.

Figure 5.23 Keep and inner ward area (National Trust Photographic Library/Derry Robinson).

Figure 5.24 Southeastern elevation of Corfe Castle Keep.

Figure 5.25 Southwestern elevation of Corfe Castle Keep.

Figure 5.26 Eastern elevation of Corfe Castle Keep (RCHME).

Figure 5.27 Close-up of eastern elevation and fallen part of wall.

Figure 5.28 Close-up of wall collapse on the exterior side of the east wall.

Figure 5.29 Interior of east wall of keep, with collapsed upper wall in background.

Figure 5.30 Close-up of the interior east wall of the keep, with collapsed wall in background.

Figure 5.31 View of keep from the north showing the eastern, southern, and western elevations.

Figure 5.32 Leaning wall, western approach (View 1).

Figure 5.33 Leaning wall, western approach (View 2).

Figure 5.34 Leaning wall, western approach (View 3).

Figure 5.35 Inner ward area [10] showing the distribution of smaller wall fragments.

Figure 5.36 Close-up of wall fragment in inner ward area (View 1).

Figure 5.37 Close-up of wall fragment in inner ward area (View 2).

Figure 5.38 Close-up of wall fragment in inner ward area (View 3).

Figure 5.39 Raglan Castle, with destroyed keep in left foreground (Skyscan Balloon Photography for Cadw).

Figure 5.40 Ground plan of keep, showing approximate area of missing masonry (San Jack Media after Kenyon 2003).

Figure 5.41 The keep, looking west, with the apron wall in the foreground.

Figure 5.42 The remains of the damaged wall, showing two structural voids in the form of a fireplace (left) and well (right).

Figure 5.43 The damaged wall viewed from above, showing the variations in wall thickness.

Figure 5.44 The remains of the southeastern wall, showing the series of windows situated above the well.

Figure 5.45 *Left:* The vertical destruction pattern in the southeastern wall. *Right:* A close-up of two of the bisected windows in the wall.

Figure 5.46 A profile view of Hastings Tower at Ashby de la Zouch (Leicestershire), showing a vertical damage pattern and the bisection of two upper windows.

Figure 5.47 The damage pattern of the northeastern wall, showing much higher placed windows.

Figure 5.48 Evidence for repair work in the structural remains of Raglan Castle.

Figure 5.49 Site map of Helmsley Castle (Ministry Of Works).

Figure 5.50 *Left:* Artist's impression of the East Tower (Coppack 1990). *Right:* The East Tower as it looks today, with roughly half of its structural mass no longer *in situ*.

Figure 5.51 Vegetation covered debris at the foot of the East Tower.

Figure 5.52 Close-up of rubble debris from the keep, currently located in the castle ditch.

Figure 5.53 External side of the keep with the postern gate on the right, looking southeast.

Figure 5.54 Close-up of the internal side of the postern gate.

Figure 5.55 The internal northern wall of the keep, showing the gradations of wall height, the postern gate (left), and corner recess (right).

Figure 5.56 Autocad model of the internal northern wall of the keep.

Figure 5.57 The eastern internal wall of the keep, viewed from the keep interior.

Figure 5.58 The eastern wall of the keep, viewed from above.

Figure 5.59 The external side of the east wall showing the gradations of height.

Figure 5.60 The east wall of the keep, looking south.

Figure 5.61 3D model (CAD) showing the northeast wall from above (view 1).

Figure 5.62 3D model (CAD) showing the northeast external elevation (view 2).

Figure 5.63 The remains of the eastern wall, internal elevation.

Figure 5.64 3D model (CAD) showing the internal eastern elevation.

Figure 5.65 The collapsed west wall of Scarborough Castle Keep, looking northeast.

Figure 5.66 The current slighting presentation at Scarborough Castle showing (left) an artist's impression of the collapse of the keep from artillery, and (right) the plaque on the other side of the keep which informs the public that the damage is due to slighting.

Figure 5.67 The damaged west wall of Scarborough Castle Keep (Yorkshire), looking east.

Figure 5.68 *Left:* Stairwell at Raglan Castle Keep, looking southwest. *Right:* Raglan Castle Keep looking northwest.

Figure 5.69 Floor plan of Scarborough Castle Keep (Goodall 2000, 16).

Figure 5.70 Profile views of Scarborough Castle Keep showing the destruction pattern of the remaining fabric. *Left:* Looking north. *Right:* Looking south.

CHAPTER SIX

THE PRIVATE FACE OF SLIGHTING: KENILWORTH CASTLE AND PRIVATISATION

Figure 6.1 Kenilworth Castle, Warwickshire (English Heritage).

Figure 6.2 Site plan of Kenilworth Castle as it looks today, with the principle structures discussed in this chapter highlighted in yellow (San Jack Media after Renn 1991).

Figure 6.3 Artist's impression of Kenilworth Castle in the 16th century (Ivan Lapper/English Heritage in Renn 1991).

Figure 6.4 Four of the principle building projects at Kenilworth and their position within the site (San Jack Media after HMSO 1958).

Figure 6.5 *Left:* Leicester's Gatehouse, looking northeast. *Right:* Leicester's Gatehouse looking northwest, showing Hawkesworth's two story extended wing on the east side.

Figure 6.6 Floor plan of Leicester's Gatehouse, showing Hawkesworth's additions and alterations (Morris 2006, 29).

Figure 6.7 The north approach to the gatehouse, now significantly altered from its Civil War state.

Figure 6.8 The likely direction of approach to the house, the original layout obscured by a mock Victorian 'gatehouse'.

Figure 6.9 The approach to Hawkesworth's new home, viewed from the second floor of the gatehouse.

Figure 6.10 *Left:* The visitor's view of Hawkesworth's new house, looking southeast. *Right:* The visitor's view of the destroyed keep, looking southwest.

Figure 6.11 *Left:* The new western entrance with crenellated porch as it looks today. *Right:* The entrance as recorded in 1779 by Moses Griffiths (Morris 2006, 52).

Figure 6.12 Close-up of the classical frontispiece of Leicester's porch. Carved into the stone are Leicester's initials and variations of his family badges.

Figure 6.13 The south room on the ground floor, looking southwest.

Figure 6.14 Leicester's alabaster fireplace, and above, oak panelling and fittings, all of which was removed from other buildings.

Figure 6.15 *Left:* Close-up of Leicester's motto carved into the mantelpiece. *Right:* Close-up of Leicester's initials and family badge, as well as 1571, the year of the mantelpiece's construction.

Figure 6.16 View of the keep from the south bay window on the first floor.

Figure 6.17 View of the keep from the west front.

Figure 6.18 Antiquarian views of the north side of the keep. *Clockwise from top left:* Henry Jeayes, c. 1792-1800 (Birmingham Archives, Aylesford Collection), 1820 engraving after the drawing by J.V. Barber (Birmingham Archives, Aylesford Collection), drawing from the 1822 guidebook by Merridew & Son, and Thomas Cole, 1841 (Juniata College Museum of Art, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania).

Figure 6.19 The keep from the southeast, showing its solid Norman construction and corner turrets.

Figure 6.20 The north side of the keep, showing the forebuilding to the right.

Figure 6.21 Close-up of the damaged stonework of the upper plinth of the north side of the keep.

Figure 6.22 The northeast corner, showing the former point of connection with the north wall.

Figure 6.23 The northwest corner, showing the former point of connection with the north wall.

Figure 6.24 *Clockwise from top left:* The internal elevations of the east, south, and west walls, all showing a substantial amount of original, undamaged stonework.

Figure 6.25 The upper half of the internal, south wall of the keep, showing intact and undamaged joist holes.

Figure 6.26 The north plinth, showing the damaged upper courses.

Figure 6.27 Close-up of the plinth on the eastern elevation, showing considerable damage to its upper courses.

Figure 6.28 *Left:* The linear pattern of the exposed rubble core, NE corner. *Right:* The linear pattern of the exposed rubble core, NW corner.

Figure 6.29 The northeast corner of the keep, showing the remnants of an upper floor stairwell.

Figure 6.30 The northwest corner of the keep and its distinctive destruction pattern.

Figure 6.31 A view of the northwest corner and its exposed rubble core, showing the difference in construction quality between the upper and lower sections of the wall.

Figure 6.32 The base of the ten foot north wall.

Figure 6.33 The northwest corner, looking south. Although some rubble core stands out, the right angle of the profile clearly shows that—if picked—the north wall was picked completely down to base level.

Figure 6.34 The intact south wall of the keep, showing Leicester's inserted Tudor windows.

Figure 6.35 Close-ups of the west (left) and east (right) buttresses, south wall.

Figure 6.36 The remnants of the Great Mere from the south, giving a small hint of the castle's former appearance (English Heritage).

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE PUBLIC FACE OF SLIGHTING: PONTEFRACT CASTLE AND COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Figure 7.1 Site map for Pontefract Castle, Yorkshire (Roberts 2002, 4)

Figure 7.2 Oil painting of Pontefract Castle, looking north. Attributed to Alexander Keirinex, c. 1625-30 (Pontefract Museum).

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AUTHOR'S DECLARATION

This thesis is based on original work and research, and the responsibility for any errors lies entirely with the author.

All images and maps contained in this thesis are the author's unless otherwise credited. In some cases, images and maps originating elsewhere have been altered in order to provide new information or clarity, and where this occurs the original source has been identified.

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations used in this text

ARCUS	Archaeological Research and Consultancy at the University of Sheffield
CJ	Journals of the House of Commons
CSPD	Calendar of State Papers Domestic
CWT	Civil War Tracts (Minster Library, York)
FAS	Field Archaeology Specialists
HMSO	Her Majesty's Stationery Office
LJ	Journals of the House of Lords
NA	National Archives (Kew, London)
RA	Royal Armouries Library Services (Leeds/Fort Nelson/Tower of London)
RCHME	Royal Commission on Historic Monuments of England
TT	Thomason Tracts (Bodleian Library, Oxford, and British Library)
VCH	Victoria County History
WCRO	Warwickshire County Record Office

Chapter One

Archaeology of Destruction: The slighting narratives of castles

'A man's house is his castle, et domus sua cuique est tutissimum refugium; for where shall a man be safe, if it be not in his own home?'

(Sir Edward Coke, seventeenth century)

'...Resistance can be detected by deliberately looking for differences between artefacts and texts. In most cases the texts represent the self-promotion of the dominant class, while the assemblages which constitute the material culture represent the subversive sub-text'.

(Carver 2002, 477)

1.1 'Archaeology of destruction' and 'sighting': An introduction

This thesis is about the archaeology of destruction. Specifically, it is about the challenges that the study of destruction in the past poses for archaeologists, and about the issues raised by such an endeavour. These include why past societies were motivated to destroy objects and structures in their environment, and how we as archaeologists interpret (or ignore) the evidence of these activities. At the root of this thesis are two fundamental arguments. The first is that the destruction of any society's material culture is a complex social phenomenon with a variety of causes, effects, and factors, and that this phenomenon is worthy of study in its own right. The second is that this complexity requires us to critically engage with the physical evidence left behind, an engagement that must be methodical and multidisciplinary in approach. These points will be argued through the examination of one type of material culture, medieval English castles, and even more specifically, by looking at one particularly destructive period of British history: the English Civil War, and the widespread destruction of castles and manor houses that occurred in Britain during the 1640s and 1650s. Although the destruction of property was pandemic during the English Civil War (Porter 1994), these structures were ostensibly destroyed in order to prevent further military use, or, in the terminology of contemporaries, were 'made untenable' or 'sighted'. The accuracy of this claim, and the methods we as archaeologists can use to test it, make up the core of this thesis.

The reasons underpinning the selection of slighted castles (as opposed to monasteries or other forms of destroyed material culture) are varied. One significant factor is the opportunity to question long-standing assumptions about why castles were targeted for slighting. As presented by historians, these reasons are ‘obvious’: captured castles were an economic and logistical liability (Hutton and Reeves 1998, 200), and as Parliament itself argued, it was cheaper to slight a castle than to maintain it since ‘to garrison well all places of that condition in England were to employ more forces than the commonwealth can bear the burden of’ (CSPD, 1649-60, 232). Arguably, to abandon them left them vulnerable to reuse by the enemy. This could result in losing control of a region, enabling the other side to maintain supply lines and move armies, as well as raise revenue from the local population. The Parliamentarian Sir John Meldrum therefore justified his slighting activities by arguing that ‘the enemy might have found a nest to have hatched much mischief at this time. Reading might have produced the same effects if the fortifications had not been demolished...’ (CSPD 2/11/1644). Consequently, the general consensus now—based on arguments articulated then—is that the slighting of castles was a militarily and economically necessary course of action (Kightly 1979, 188; Thompson 1987a, 153; Porter 1994; Newman *et al.* 2001, 16).

By examining slighting in more detail, archaeology offers a chance to challenge the dominant hold historians have on this subject: in other words, to see (slighted) castles not as ‘abodes of tyranny’ and ‘a snap of the fingers in the face of autocratic power’ (Piggott 1976, 120), but as the ‘subversive sub-text’ that questions the ‘self-promotion of the dominant class’ (Carver 2002, 477) that is rife in Parliament’s justification for its acts. This recognition of historical archaeology’s potential to explore power relations, particularly those denied a voice in the historical record, is already well established (Little 1994, 23; Johnson 1996; Steane 2001; Creighton 2002; Liddiard 2005). The argument that is presented here, of course, is that unlike intact feudal castles, slighted castles are the victims of power, not the wielders of it, and that vital clues about this power transfer are still contained in the archaeological record. Since the valuable contribution of documents to archaeology has already been firmly established (Little 1994; Moreland 2001; Carver 2002), the objective here is not to dismiss the

documentary evidence relating to slighting, but rather to use archaeology to ask ‘new questions of old texts’ (Moreland 2001, 105) in order to build a better understanding of the process and effects of slighting.

At an even more basic level, it is argued here that a purely documentary approach to interpreting slighting is inherently problematic due to the limitations of the evidence. For example, military or Parliamentary orders may or may not have been carried out, and if they were, the methods or results can remain invisible to us. Contemporary accounts of the Civil War can be heavily biased or outright propaganda, and information can, just as today, be based more on conjecture or rumour than confirmed fact. Moreover, the rhetoric of damage accounts can hide a variety of motivations, including attempts to raise or break morale, the solicitation of financial assistance, or the justification of potentially illegal or unpopular acts. Consequently, while contemporary documents can provide valuable data relating to the slighting of castles, they can also complicate the picture with potentially biased or inaccurate information.

The extensive historical scholarship of the Civil War period presents a related challenge in the form of conscious and subconscious biases of secondary accounts of the Civil War. The majority of these biases favour the Parliamentarian cause (Hutton 2003, xiii-xxvii), the cause of which are lingering but still powerful views that Parliamentary success was a seminal moment in Britain’s long term development as a ‘civilised’, progressive, and democratic nation (Gardiner 1893; Trevor-Roper 1953; Butterfield 1973; Hutton and Reeves 1998; see also Section 1.4.2). These subtle (and sometimes unsubtle) prejudices have resulted in a two-tiered slighting discourse: a dominant one from historians which de-emphasises the complexity of slighting, and a largely silent and subservient one from archaeologists which neither adds to nor contradicts this interpretation.

It is this unequal relationship between the two disciplines—this unwillingness of archaeologists to challenge the simple interpretation of historians regarding slighting—that this thesis seeks to address. This is based in large part on the recognition of the role

archaeology plays in making ‘the inarticulate speak’ (Moreland 2001, 105). I argue here that understanding the practical and symbolic importance of the physical evidence of slighting is crucial if we hope to understand the real effects of destruction in a community. This is especially important since slighting—much like the destruction of abbeys in the Dissolution—resonated on local, regional, and national levels, and consequently, impacted societies at both macro and micro level. Essentially, understanding the archaeology of a slighted castle is another vital step in understanding what destruction does to buildings and individuals, and beyond that, a society and a culture.

Another reason for looking at slighted castles from an archaeological perspective is the sheer quantity of rich and largely unexamined evidence provided. This can take several forms. For example, the act of slighting itself can deposit evidence in the archaeological record, either as below- or above-ground rubble, and the survival of standing ruins provides important clues as to how and why structures were targeted. Moreover, the absence of particular parts of a building or site—negative evidence—is itself another crucial component of the archaeology of destruction. Both of these tie into the broader point that a building’s life cycle contains a biography of experiences, of which slighting is but one form of many types of destruction that it will experience in its lifetime. An important point that will be discussed at some length is that it is impossible to discuss one form (in this case, slighting) without also considering the other kinds of destruction that a structure has endured in order to survive.

This concept of a building’s biography—a history of events and relationships that it has participated in—is especially important since the biography of so-called ‘medieval’ castles is already well established and entrenched. I refer now to the corpus of castle scholarship (see Section 1.3) that has predominantly been preoccupied with a castle’s construction and military/medieval use. This singular focus has resulted in a wide recognition of the role castle construction played in establishing political authority (King 1988; Thompson 1991; Pounds 1994; Jones 1999), but virtually no debate or discussion about the meaning behind destruction, particularly in a post-medieval context. Instead,

the representative view is that ‘the story of fortification and siege craft in these civil wars is best seen not as an episode in the history of warfare but a key one in the transition of the British and Irish from warrior to civilian societies’ (Hutton and Reeves 1998, 233). Constructing castles is therefore a story of domination and control, but destroying them is about turning away from that feudal past and embracing a more ‘progressive’ and ‘civilised’ future. Consequently, the collective biography of castles tends to ‘end’ with their destruction in the seventeenth century; with the exception of the few that were not slighted or destroyed by sieges, castles ‘declined’ and their symbolism and significance ceased.

This lack of interest in a castle’s new ‘use’ in a post-slighting context, and in the act of slighting itself, is evident in the way castle slightings are discussed in a range of texts. At an introductory level, castle gazetteers usually reveal only sporadic references to Civil War involvement (Simpson 1949; Warner 1981; Brown 1989; Pettifer 1995 and 2000; Evans 1998; Harris 1991; Fry 2001). More specialised military/castle histories tend to provide more detail, but even here the level of information about slighting varies considerably (Johnson 1978; Kightly 1979; Thompson 1987a; Saunders 1989; Gaunt 1991; Harrington 1992). The inconsistencies in coverage become even more noticeable when the corpus of castle scholarship is collectively considered: slightings are omitted, credited, or denied depending on the dictates of writing style or priorities, often in stark contrast to what is written elsewhere. Bodiam Castle (Sussex), for example, was slighted (Ashdown 1911, 158; Ormsby-Gore 1951, 37; Fry 1974, 94) or spared slighting (Thompson 1987a, 155; Harris 1991, 74), depending on which source is consulted. This confusion in part stems from a reluctance to engage with castles in a post-medieval context, but perhaps equally important, it shows a lack of clear understanding of what slighting *is*. As this term is by no means self-evident, its use here will be clearly defined to avoid the pedantic arguments over definitions that plague castle studies, as well as to provide justification for why narrow definitions are, in the context of this research, particularly unhelpful.

1.2 What is meant by ‘sighting’?

‘A curious euphemism for wrecking’.

(Ingham 2001, 8)

The term ‘sighting’ (or ‘sleighting’) is a difficult word to define, made more so by the fact that linguistic recognition of its more physical and martial usage remains sporadic; most dictionaries consider it to be an obsolete term and consequently do not include it. In contrast, its usage in the context of social etiquette is widely recognised: to ‘sight’ or ‘cut’ someone is to commit a small but unmistakably insulting act. As an adjective, it denotes something small and less capable (such as a ‘sight’ limp), or something insubstantial or even frail or undesirable (for example, a man of ‘sight’ build, or having a ‘sight’ cold). Although ostensibly different from their ‘obsolete’ counterpart, these social definitions of sighting provide an interesting glimpse at some of the emotional undertones underpinning the word’s etymology: whether sighting an individual or sighting an individual’s castle, an element of humiliation, insult, or undesirability is an inherent part of the act.

Perhaps significantly, this element of power and humiliation is lacking in the official definitions of the ‘military’ and ‘obsolete’ type of sighting. The Oxford English Dictionary (Second Edition) classifies its (noun) definition as ‘the action of razing or demolishing’, as well as ‘the action of levelling (ground)’. Destruction is an explicit component, but its cause, form, and extent are left in doubt. The definition says nothing, for example, about military necessity being the impetus for the action. It does not state what the structure was—whether it was a high or low status building—and gives no indication about the methods used. From the outset, therefore, any attempt to understand sighting is clouded by problems about how to interpret the word sighting itself. There can be quite a large disparity between structures that have been ‘razed’, which implies levelling, versus those that have merely been ‘demolished’, which does not. Moreover, does a structure that is destroyed in the sacking of a city constitute sighting, or must there be a pre-meditated, ‘authorised’ order? Linguistically, this point remains unclear and open to interpretation.

Contemporary sources do little to clarify this situation, and for the most part, its usage and development in the seventeenth century is difficult to trace. Despite arguments that Parliament made a distinction between ‘demolish’ and ‘slight’ (Thompson 1987a, 147; Porter 1994, 130; Roberts 2002, 434; M. Morris 2003, 261), there is little documentary evidence that suggests contemporaries understood a distinction in practical terms. For example, terms like ‘demolish’, ‘dismantle’, ‘slight’, ‘make indefensible’, and ‘make untenable’ appear interchangeably, with no explanation as to how these terms differed from each other. The order for Ashby de la Zouch Castle was to ‘slight *and* make untenable’ (CJ 25/11/48, italics mine), while that for Oxford was to ‘slight *and* dismantle new works’ (CJ 2/3/47, italics mine). For Lichfield Close, the full confusing picture was thus: first the works and walls were to be demolished (CJ 4/8/46), then made untenable forthwith (CJ 2/3/47), then dismantled (CJ 19/7/47). The assumption is made that ‘make untenable’ and ‘slight’ must be less drastic an action than ‘demolish’, but what this meant in real terms is unknown. It is evident too that in many cases the rhetoric of destruction often made these distinctions virtually meaningless. At York, for example, the new works were ordered to be ‘slighted *and* demolished’ (CJ 26/2/47, italics mine), and at Basing House the order was to ‘*totally slight* and demolish’ (CJ 15/10/45, italics mine). This combination of Parliamentary rhetoric and the ambiguity of terminology clearly had consequences. In the case of Belvoir Castle, those sent to inspect the results of that castle’s slighting ‘professing not to be soldiers’ were uncertain whether the work was sufficient (CSPD 20/7/49). Even when orders were clear, however, it did not guarantee results. The order for Raglan Castle states that it, ‘the works about it, and the House and Buildings thereof, be forthwith pulled down and demolished’ (CJ 25/8/46), and yet a substantial amount of masonry remains today.

The difficulties contemporaries had in defining or understanding slighting has been matched—if not surpassed—by historians today. Definitions of the word ‘slighting’ vary wildly, as do interpretations of how and when it was carried out. Many historians are specific to the point of being misleading. Hutton and Reeves (1998, 233) make the claim that ‘the “slighting” of enemy castles...and demolition of captured aristocratic and gentry seats by the Long Parliament’s forces represented an enormous reduction in the

number of actual or potential fortresses...'. While there is nothing fundamentally wrong with this conclusion, the emphasis on Parliament distorts the true picture. It overlooks Parliamentary castles that were destroyed by Royalists, such as Brampton Bryan and Hopton, as well as sites such as Wilton Castle (Herefordshire), which was destroyed by townspeople as a reaction against the owner's neutrality (Pettifer 1995, 103). Despite these kinds of intriguing 'exceptions', however, Parliament is repeatedly made an integral part of the definition of slighting (Kightly 1979, 188; Thompson 1987b, 210; Harrington 1992, 22; Fry 2001, 115; Johnson 2002, 173). This confusion is exacerbated by attempts to date the beginning of a Parliamentary policy, either with the inexplicable phrase 'after the war' (Fry 1974, 92; Parker 1988, 42; Harris 1991, 58; Matarasso 2000, 196; Pettifer 1995, 326), or with an array of arbitrary years. As a result, various sources date the 'policy' of slighting to after 1644/45 (Oman 1926, 26; Kightly 1979, 188; Hutton and Reeves 1998, 199), the year 1646 (Harrington 1992, 22; Matarasso 2000, 196; Wiggins 2001, 239), the year 1647 (Harrington 2003, 57), or the year 1648 (Porter 1994, 130; M. Morris 2003).

This treatment of chronology as an integral part of the definition of slighting is matched by an equal attempt by historians to define the technical aspects of slighting in too narrow, or too wide, a fashion. Often this involves an inappropriate level of speculation. For example, Kightly (1979, 188) states that castles were slighted 'by the demolition of crucial parts of their fortifications', but this premise is based on several fallacies. It assumes that 'crucial' aspects of a structure were readily obvious and agreed upon by contemporaries, and by implication, that non-'crucial' elements were ignored in the slighting process. It is also taken for granted that the reader already knows what a 'crucial' feature of a fortification is, thereby giving the impression that this is not a subject that is open to debate. For others, slighting is defined by its method. Both Clark (1884, vol 2, 309) and Oman (1926, 26) explicitly state that slighting involved the 'blowing up' of castles, which immediately discounts castles that were undermined without explosives, picked¹, or slighted using other methods. Some tie their definitions,

¹ This term for destroying by hand is one of several used by Thompson (1987a) and its use has been adopted here. See also Chapter Four and the Glossary.

even if only initially, to the affected parts of the castle, usually towers, gates, and walls (Fry 1974, 92; Gascoigne 1975, 68; Porter 1994, 130; Roberts 2002, 434; Gaunt 2003, 87). By focusing all attention on these areas, however, the destruction of places such as chapels, libraries, service buildings, and landscape features has been quietly ignored. The result is a myriad of perspectives that prioritise different aspects of a castle, although the general unifying theme is the martial nature of the targets.

This almost exclusive emphasis that slighted targets were inherently military entities is tied into the deeper issue of contemporary motivation. Some historians have taken contemporaries at their word and have made military necessity the reason for the slighting (Warner 1981, 190; Fry 2001, 115; Gaunt 2003, 87; Friar 2003, 271). At their most specific, historians say this was to make them ‘indefensible’, and at their vaguest this was to prevent ‘future use’. Both definitions have their problems. Making a structure ‘indefensible’, just like slighting ‘crucial’ parts, assumes that there is a standardised method that is (and was) universally recognised. It also assumes that a destroyed site cannot be militarily used again, whereas the garrisoning of Scarborough after the destruction of its keep clearly demonstrates that this is not the case (see Binns 1996). Also, arguing that castles were slighted to prevent future use disingenuously implies that castles had no post-slighting lives. As this thesis will show, many were slighted in a controlled way so as to still preserve their value as a gaol, courthouse, or place of habitation. On an even broader level, strict interpretations oversimplify human actions and rob them of their complexity. Human aggression has several causes and is generated in many ways (Carlton 1990, 30), and arguably there is little to be gained by looking at a single cause for an intrinsically aggressive act such as slighting. A whole range of cultural, religious, political, and basic human impulses must be considered, whatever the official explanation offered by contemporaries for their actions. This recognition that slightings could be symbolic and/or punitive has occurred in a limited way already (Thompson 1987a, 153; Harris 1991, 58; Tennant 1992, 220; Johnson 2002, 174; M. Morris 2003, 261), but on the whole it remains a largely unexplored subject.

With all of these concerns in mind, a deliberately fluid definition for the term ‘slighting’

has been adopted for this thesis: the non-siege damaging (during times of conflict) of high status buildings, their immediate landscape, their physical remains, and/or their contents. As much as possible accidental damage will be excluded, as well as demolition freely committed by rightful owners. These points are not always clear-cut (Thompson 1987a, 139), particularly since ‘rightful owners’ can be interpreted in a moral as well as legal sense, and free will is not necessarily easy to establish. Bolsover Castle (Derbyshire), for example, was ‘legally’ sold to a group of property speculators who began dismantling several of its buildings, only to be repurchased later by its pre-war Royalist owner (Symonds *et al.* 1995, 13). Similarly, the owner of Baconsthorpe Castle (Norfolk) was forced to buy back his own estates and ultimately had to dismantle his own castle to recover his financial losses (Rigold 1966, 5). These ‘grey areas’ of slighting illustrate that distinctions of *interpretation* about types of damage will be made, but in doing so there will be no *linguistic* divisions made, such as between ‘slight’ and ‘demolish’.

1.2.1 Slighting: An historical introduction

The origins of slighting are impossible to date but probably developed in tandem with warfare itself. *The Iliad* speaks of the siege and sack of Troy, and Alexander the Great stormed and sacked the Phoenician city Tyre in 332 B.C. (Carlton 1990, 58-9). Much of the destruction was symbolic, particularly in the Roman world. When the Romans sacked Jerusalem in A.D. 70, the temple was a focus of destruction (*ibid.*, 83). The Roman vendetta with Carthage resulted in that city being destroyed in 146 B.C., with the added indignity of the earth being salted to ensure that nothing would grow there again (Scullard 1935, 307). This drive towards total destruction was also utilised by Rome’s enemies. The Ostrogoth Totila set out to raze Rome to the ground in A.D. 546 (Morris 1979, 139; Moorhead 2001, 146), but ended up expelling the inhabitants instead (Carver 1993, 72). These attempts at sending messages to the populace through destruction were especially poignant after schism in the empire brought duelling religious ideologies between East and West. This is amply demonstrated by the eastern emperor Constans II stripping bronze tiles and selected statues from the Pantheon (at the time a church), a move that hints more at symbolic warfare than economic necessity (Carver 1993, 72).

Unlike for later periods, destruction has widely been recognised to have been a method of asserting power and authority in the medieval period (Bradbury 1994, 71-73; Strickland 1996, 277-8; Rogers 1999, 151), and this was still true for later periods. During the Crusades, Christians and Muslims both slighted structures, and destruction was the understood by-product of resistance. In 1265, for example, victorious Muslims toppled the higher sections of the walled fortifications at Caesarea into the moat (Edbury 1999, 106). Similarly, after a three-year siege, the castle of Montreuil-Bellay was razed by Geoffrey of Anjou (Bradbury 1994, 77). Destroying the important buildings of the enemy demonstrated that the lord or ruler was powerless to protect his people (*ibid*, 79), and could often be very symbolic. In Scandinavian and Old English texts, for instance, attacking the enemy's great hall was tantamount to attacking civilisation, order, and leadership (Evans 1997, 101-102; Hedeager 2002, 6; Sørensen 2003, 270). Destruction, however, could also provide practical benefits by destroying the infrastructure of resistance. In other words: 'Destroy the basis of individual wealth, destroy the basis of taxation. Destroy taxation, destroy the ability of an entire society to secure its own defence' (Allmand 1999, 263). This relationship between destruction and economy can also be seen in instances where resistance was punished with taxation, such as the case of Wigmore (Bradbury 1994, 77). Consequently, slighting was a multi-faceted phenomenon that incorporated military, symbolic, and economic interests, all of which could overlap and blur.

As nations grew in size and organisation, destruction could also be used to maintain political control over a region. Castle building that threatened the ruling elite was often viewed as an expression of 'illegitimate' power, particularly when 'legitimate' authority was disputed. Such structures could be ruthlessly dealt with. England (see Section 1.2.3 below) experienced this during Stephen's reign, but it was a practice observed in many cultures. In France, Henry IV destroyed several castles after 1593, and in his suppression of French nobles in the 1630s, Richelieu destroyed even more (Parker 1988, 41-2). This practice was not confined to just the West, however. In Japan, each lord was restricted by the shogun to one castle each, and in the western province of Bizen, the number of fortified places fell from over 200 to just one by the year 1615 (*ibid*, 144). Slighting was

seen as an effective means of controlling potential claimants to power, or at other times, as a method of punishing those who had failed to support the emerging new power. The latter occurred in Scotland in 1579 when Craignethan Castle was slighted as revenge against the Hamiltons for supporting Mary Queen of Scots instead of the Regent (Fry 2001, 255). In a politically unstable world, therefore, slighting was a means to demonstrate the ‘restoration of order and of the new man’s power’ (Bradbury 1994, 77), and was ultimately as important a tool of domination as constructing one.

1.2.2 Judeo/Christian beliefs and slighting

‘Then the Israelites made a vow to the Lord: “If you will let us conquer these people, we will unconditionally dedicate them and their cities to you and will destroy them”.’

(Numbers 21.2)

The biblical influence on warfare in the West is widely recognised (Parker 1993; Bradbury 1994; Strickland 1996). This influence was particularly strong in the English Civil War, and a wealth of scholarship has explored the many facets of its influence during this period (Manning 1973; McGregor and Reay 1986; Hill 1991; White 1992). The link made between military and religious interests was an overt one. The preaching of sermons to soldiers was common (see Fallon 2003), and non-attendance in both armies was an offence (Donagan 1988, 85). To deeply religious troops, the Old Testament served as ‘the puritan soldier’s *vademecum*²’ (James 2001, 186). The influence of religious words extended beyond the warfront, however, and a thriving press produced tracts and pamphlets for both sides that mixed war reports with religious justifications (see Raymond 1993). Biblical arguments—and in particular, biblical *language*—were therefore a crucial element in how the war was perceived and waged.

The relationship between destruction and Biblical beliefs was a multifaceted one that manifested itself in a variety of ways. In a more general sense, destruction often served as a Biblical metaphor to express moral outrage against the enemy and to extol the virtues of continued resistance to his ‘malignancy’. One of the most common metaphorical themes was decay in buildings, which were symbolic of the decay of

² Roughly translated as ‘to carry along’, but its general definition is ‘reference manual’.

human life, as well as represented the natural prelude for resurrection (Woodward 2002, 89 and 93). In a sermon to the House of Commons in 1643, Henry Wilkinson urged his listeners to

‘Take heed of building upon an old frame, that must bee all plucked down to the ground; take heed of playstering when you should bee pulling down; now it is apparent that the old house built up by the faction of Antichrist is leprous, the plague of leprosy hath appeared in every part thereof; it has been scraped and the stones plucked out, and plaistered up againe, and yet the leprosie breaks forth, therefore according to the Law of leprosie, Lev 14.44.45 it must be pulled down, and you must not make use of the materials of it, but according to the Law they were to bee cast out into an uncleane place...there was a curse upon Jericho, Iosb 6.26 it was razed down never to bee built, so must Babylon be plucked down and every part of it, there-fore take heed there be no building upon any part of that frame that is cursed.’

(TT E77(12) Oct 25 1643)

W. Strong preached a similar message to the House of Commons in December 1645:

‘Christ, Matth 7 tells us, that every man is a builder, and his hope and confidence of the goodness of his condition is his house, Job 8.15. the hope of hypocrites shall be as the spiders web, he shall leane upon his house, but it shall not stand; he shall hold it fast, but is shall not endure. One builds his hope onely upon the self flattery of his owne heart, and faith, I shall have peace, Deut.29.19.... A man may by his end destroy that, which he doth by his action most pretend to build; and by his end he may establish that, which by his act he seems to endeavour to destroy...’

(TT E313 (33) Dec 31 1645)

This rhetoric of destruction was not just allegorical, however, but was also used in very contemporary and political ways. References to the destroyed city of Babylon, for example, served to draw comparisons between God’s wrath in the past and His involvement in contemporary destruction. At the siege of Lathom House (Lancashire) in 1644, this was given an added poignancy due to the castle’s defence by a woman, Lady Derby. A sermon preached in nearby Wigan exhorted its listeners to ‘put yourselves in array against Babylon round about: all ye that bend the bow shoot at her; spare no arrows; for she hath sinned against the Lord...shoot against her round about: she hath given her hand; her foundations are fallen, her walls are thrown down’ (Espinasse 1874). As well as allusions to past destruction, however, contemporaries interpreted destruction as a possible sign of future spiritual developments, particularly the Second Coming of Christ. According to Henry Wilkinson

Chapter One—An Archaeology of Destruction: The slighting narratives of castles

‘the Prophetical Calender in which the time of the ruine of Babylon, and the building of [Z]ion is foretold, seemes to intimate that the time is neare approaching for the one and the other’.

(TT E377 (12))

This argument presented contemporary destruction as a sign that God was preparing to build a more godly society, an endeavour that demanded the support of righteous people. Mercy and compassion in particular were discouraged because God’s judgement was infallible. This was particularly pronounced in a 1643 sermon to the House of Commons entitled ‘The Robbing and Spoiling of Jacob and Israel’. It argued for the need

‘to make fuiell of their farest houses, and then to give satisfying reason for what was done, Because they have forsaken the Covenant of the Lord their God...when God gives up a people to robbing and spoiling, they would but look inwards, and if they finde not these sinnes making way for this judgement under which we suffer, let them argue the case with the Judge of all the world...

(TT E79 (10) Nov 29 1643)

This view that destruction was ‘deserved’ and that victims had ‘brought their fate on themselves’ was common (Donagan 1994, 1144). It also was not restricted to sermons, but featured heavily in the pamphlets of the day. Many expressed the belief that the changing fortunes of war reflected God’s will, but that divine punishment would ultimately be forthcoming. One pamphlet from 1645 argued that reasonable individuals knew that ‘when God purposeth to punish a people for their transgressions, he suffers (many times) their scourge to prevail, til they be reformed or destroyed’ (TT E294 (1)). Specifically, these ‘people’ included ‘Papists, Monoplists, Fugitives from Parliament, Popish prelates, corrupt judges, and other renegadoes (who are the chief fermenters of this unnatural War)...’ (*ibid*). Of this group, Catholics in particular were despised, and this was naturally reflected in attitudes to their property. Mercurius Civicus, London’s Intelligencer reported in 1645 that

‘Tuesday last in the evening many crucifixes, popish pictures, books, and many other popish trinkets taken in long acre [London], and some other papists’ houses were burnt in Cheapside, in the place where the cross formerly stood. This was a fit triumph for a day of thanksgiving, that as the popish army were defeated in the field, so their Romish and superstitious images should go to wreck at home’.

(TT E293 (24))

This concept of an ‘enemy of God’ who deserved destruction worked in tandem with the idea that God often acted to protect his chosen people *from* destruction. One particularly notable example was given in a sermon preached by Rev. William Bridge before the House of Commons after an attempted Royalist uprising in Norwich:

‘Ye have heard of the lamentation of Norwich. There was a generation of men that rose up and threatened to destroy the godly party there, but the Lord so ordered things in his providence that those whom they threatened to destroy were preserved and the destroyers perished, nigh two or three hundred (if relations be right) blown up with powder or spoiled, and three godly families consisting of about twenty persons in several rooms of the house that was blown up were all preserved, and not a bone of them broken, whilst the others flew up in the air, as spectacles of divine anger, as if God should speak from heaven. These are the people whom I would have preserved, and these are the people that I would have punished.’

(Cited in Ketton-Cremer 1969, 346-7)

Related to this idea of God’s protection—but less explicitly stated—was the belief that God’s favour entitled the righteous to the enemy’s goods. Contrary to fiery sermons that extolled complete destruction, the theme of plunder featured heavily in the Bible³, particularly in the Book of Joshua where the destruction of enemy cities was accompanied by the redistribution of their possessions and land among the Israelites. The implicit argument contained is that while complete destruction is what the enemy deserved, the appropriation of their wealth was an acceptable alternative and was justifiable on the grounds that the enemy was ungodly. This defence of plunder in effect presented the acquisition of material goods as a reward for righteousness and a rebuke against those who would defy God, a point not lost on seventeenth century minds. For example, in Carswall (Staffordshire), permission was granted by the County Committee to one Mrs. Cradock to fortify her house with timber or materials ‘from any papist, delinquent or malignant whatsoever’ (Pennington and Roots 1957, 7). A more or less similar view was put forward by the broadsheet *The Moderate Intelligencer* when it argued that the newly won Welbeck House (Nottinghamshire) *should* be burned, but because it was still needed ‘it may stand undemolished, and be bestowed upon some that have merited well in these present wars’ (TT E294 (16)). This kind of redistribution was an important feature of the fallout from the Civil War, and consequently will become an

³ For example, Deuteronomy 20:14; Numbers 33:52-55; Ezekiel 9-12.

important theme in later chapters.

In the seventeenth century world of England, destruction was not religiously neutral. When directed against enemies, it was considered to be God's work and a means to deliver His judgement. When suffered by one's own side, it was both a sign of the enemy's wickedness and the inexplicability of God's plan. For many, it was a portent that the End of Days was at hand, and as such was an urgent reminder of the importance of being one of His 'chosen'. These issues permeated throughout all strata of society, from the pulpit and through the broadsheets, and were a driving force behind how individuals reacted to the destruction around them.

1.2.3 Slighting in Britain: An overview

'The walls of the castle speak of both (the need for) domination and (at least the possibility of) resistance'.

(Moreland 2001, 118)

It is unclear when the practice of slighting began in Britain, although some evidence suggests that it is of ancient origin (Jones 1999, 164). Iron age hill forts like Maiden Hill clearly demonstrate that tribal defence was a necessary element of their existence, but it remains uncertain how early Britons conducted warfare. Unquestionably, slighting was a practice used by the time of the Roman occupation of Britain, and Maiden Hill itself had its gates smashed and its ramparts destroyed by the Roman forces in the first century A.D. (Sharples 1991). The Romans in turn suffered under the practice, with the warrior Queen Boudica sacking Colchester and London (Snyder 2003, 40-42). The subjugation of large parts of England brought some stability, but with the collapse of Empire came Rome's withdrawal, and, inevitably, more warfare.

The resulting power vacuum brought Britons into conflict with tribes from the north, as well as with invading Saxons. Slighting again played an important role, as described vividly by Gildas in *De Excidio*:

'All the major towns were laid low...In the middle of the squares the foundation stones of high walls and towers that had been torn from their lofty base, holy alters, fragments of corpses,

Chapter One—An Archaeology of Destruction: The slighting narratives of castles

covered...with a purple crust of congealed blood...There was no burial to be had except in the ruins of houses...'

(24.3-4, cited in Snyder 2003, 84)

The intermittent arrivals of the Vikings in the ninth century brought yet another wave of upheaval. The literature of the day recorded significant acts of plunder and destruction, primarily of isolated religious houses such as Lindisfarne Priory and Whitby Abbey (Fleming 1985). These successive waves of invasion and migration eventually resulted in open conflict and the destruction of established kingdoms like the Kingdom of Northumbria (Rollason 2003).

With the Norman Conquest, and in particular with the advent of castle building within Britain, the military situation began to change. While towns and urban populations continued to be important power centres, military strength increasingly became more concentrated within private residences. These newly emerging castles proved attractive targets during power struggles, and challenges to authority—such as building unlicensed castles—left them vulnerable to being slighted. The 'adulterine' castles of Stephen's reign (1135-54) were especially targeted and dismantled during this period (Kightly 1979, 86; King 1988, 20-23; Harris 1991, 22; Pettifer 1995, xv). Intermittent periods of warfare and instability, including the Barons' War (1215-17) and the Wars of the Roses (1455-87), resulted in the destruction of many more castles (King 1988), one of the most notable examples being the slighting of Carreg Cennen (Wales) (Thompson 1987b, 207; Pettifer 2000, 45-6). In Scotland, Robert the Bruce 'self-slighted' and destroyed strategic castles like Caerlaverock, Edinburgh, and Stirling to prevent English forces under Edward I from occupying them (Harris 1991, 54). For those defending a crown or trying to take one, slighting served as a means of wielding and denying power to those perceived to be a threat.

Not all slightings, however, represented bids for power at the highest levels of government. The Peasants' Revolt of 1381 illustrates how even the lowest orders of society were willing to use destruction—particularly of documents—as a means of protest (Dobson 1983). Higher up the social scale, families trying to establish influence

or control over a region would sometimes resort to the destruction of a rival family's home. For example, in the fifteenth century the Duke of Suffolk seized his neighbour's manor house, forced the villagers to demolish their own lord's house, and then had his own men destroy the buildings in their village (Gascoigne 1975, 28-9). Remarkably, the matriarch of the destroyed manor house had experienced the same thing in a different house nineteen years before, and her recollections of this earlier event paint a vivid picture of the horror of slighting. She describes how the men of a rival claimant to the house had come

'arrayed in manner of war, with cuirasses, coats of mail, steel helmets, glaives, bows, arrows, large shields, guns, pans with fire, long cromes to draw down houses, ladders, and picks with which they mined down the walls, and long trees with which they broke up gates and doors, and so came into the said mansion...they drove [us] out of the said mansion, and mined down the walls of the chamber...and cut asunder the posts of the houses, and let them fall, and broke up all the chambers and coffers in the said mansion, and rifled and bare away stuff, array and money to the value of £200'.

(Paston letters cited in Gascoigne 1975, 29)

In cases such as this, slighting served to humiliate one's rival as well as destroy an opponent's fortunes in order to further one's own.

In the sixteenth century, the Reformation unleashed a new kind of destruction that affected individuals on a variety of levels (see Duffy 1992; Gaimster and Gilchrist 2003). The most dramatic result was the Dissolution, during which numerous abbeys and other religious houses were sold and dismantled. One eyewitness of the destruction of Roche Abbey recorded that

'it would have pitied any heart to see what tearing up of lead there was, and plucking up of boards, and throwing down of spars, and how the lead was thrown down and cast into the church, and the tombs in the church all broken, and all things of price either spoiled, carped away, or defaced to the uttermost'.

(cited in Ryder 1982, 42)

However, destruction was not limited to the dismantling of buildings, but was carried out against religious architecture, tombs, libraries and other targets deemed to be religiously objectionable. The social and economic effects of these actions had far-reaching implications, particularly regarding the re-sale of items and the diffusion of

material culture. This is well illustrated by the practice of purchasing monastery libraries in order to dismantle their contents. One contemporary, John Bale, petitioned the monarchy to stop those who

'reserved...those library books, some to serve their jakes, some to scour their candlesticks, and some to rub their boots; some they sold to Grocers, and Sope Sellers, and some they sent over sea to the Book binders, not in small numbers, but at times whole ships full'

(cited in Bateman 2003, 366)

This collective destruction of buildings, features, and objects—like slighting—affected a generation of participants and observers, and shared similar methodological and symbolic characteristics to the dismantling operations that took place a century later (see Morris, R. 2003).

All of this paints an incredibly diverse picture of the major types of destruction in the British Isles, and of slighting in particular. It was both an instrument of terror used by invading armies, as well as a means of defence *against* invasion. It could be used by a central authority to attack buildings of military or religious significance, or could occur along smaller, more regional lines as families struggled for dominance over an area. In all of its contexts, however, it displays a complexity that hints at a range of causes and effects.

1.3 What is meant by 'castle'?

The term 'castle' has a variety of meanings and nuances, depending on the context of its use. However, the Oxford English Dictionary primarily defines it as: 1.) *A large building or set of buildings fortified for defence against an enemy.* 2.) *A fortress or stronghold.* 3.) *A large mansion or country house.* The most noteworthy feature of these definitions is their inclusiveness. Taken collectively, they encompass military forts, stately homes, city defences, and other non-specific structures. This ambiguity of language has posed a problem for academics and enthusiasts alike. The somewhat vague term 'castle' has been used to cover not only manor houses and fortified citadels, but also royal and Episcopal palaces, coastal forts, motte and bailey earthworks, and even modern

buildings that fit a certain design pattern.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, an emerging group of ‘castle scholars’ reacted by using a castle’s design evolution and perceived military value to determine its castle status (see Section 1.4.1). Their emphasis on the martial credentials of a castle led one early academic to dismiss castles built in the late medieval period as mere ‘palace-castles’ that were ‘scarcely castles in the military sense of the word’ (Clark 1884, 4). Many of these arguments were based around a castle’s architecture and use. Harvey (1911, xv-xvi), for example, stipulated that a castle must have a keep and an enclosure, although he did concede that tower fortresses lacking an enclosure might still reasonably be called castles. The purpose of these overtly military structures, of course, was to wage war and served as a castle’s sole or primary *raison d’être*. As late as 1974 (Fry, 11) the view was still propagated that the function of a castle was ‘to defend an important geographical position, to house troops and store armaments, and from which to police a district’. These ‘real’ castles were built primarily for war and subjugation, and their architectural development, date of construction, and military use were the dominant criteria used to establish their status as a castle. In contrast, later ‘castles’ which typically exhibited thinner walls, larger windows, and more spacious accommodation were generally excluded, with many preferring to categorise them as fortified manor houses. Brown (1976, 16-7) went so far as to call these ‘hybrids’ *domus defensabiles*, while Thompson (1987a, 2) preferred the equally wordy label of *Castrum turris*. In this traditional view, a castle was primarily defined by the sum of its parts.

This dry emphasis on the dominance of military and architectural design slowly gave way to a wider recognition of the multiple ways of interpreting castles (see Braun 1936; O’Neil 1953; Coulson 1979; Thompson 1991; Creighton 2002; Johnson 2002). While the definition of a castle still continued to revolve around the idea of military function, the importance of its residential dimension began to feature more heavily. Castles were acknowledged to be ‘a fortified residence which might combine administrative and judicial functions, but in which military considerations were paramount’ (Saunders 1977, 2). This view, while still placing supreme importance on the martial side of

castles, was beginning to reflect the wider social framework of militarism. Particularly strong was the idea that castles signalled an end to the practice of communal protection—such as Roman camps or Anglo-Saxon *burghs*—and were a key transition in the evolution towards state controlled defences such as Henry VIII's coastal forts (Brown 1976, 15-8; Kightly 1979, 72-3; Brown 1984, 7-8; Thompson 1987a, 1). A further key development in the debate about how to perceive castles was offered by Coulson (1979), who effectively argued that licences to crenellate were not restricted to just castles, and conversely, that not all castle construction was accompanied by a licence. His reinterpretation of the military capabilities of Bodiam Castle (Sussex) (1991) further questioned what it meant to 'be' a castle.

With this complicated historiography in mind, and to avoid unnecessary debate about the selection criteria used for this thesis, a broad use of the word 'castle' has been adopted for this research. No distinction will be made between 'real' castles and manor houses, and in the context of this work, buildings that traditionally would *not* be considered—such as Lichfield Cathedral and Close—are included. The underlying rationale is that how Civil War contemporaries viewed and interacted with these structures is a more useful criterion for determining their significance than other arbitrary determinations about their military viability. For these reasons, all references to 'castles' in this thesis will refer to high status buildings that suffered (or in some cases, evaded) various forms of slighting damage. It is to be expected that future research will refine this and adopt a more traditional approach, perhaps by narrowing the examination by building type (e.g. just religious buildings, or manor houses, or so-called 'real' castles), but as a pilot study, this thesis is attempting to answer broader questions than could possibly be attempted with too narrow a definition of the word 'castle'.

1.4 Literature review: Approaches to Civil War slighting

References to castle slights can be found as far back as contemporary pamphlets, journals, and letters, as well as various Parliamentary records like the *Calendars State Papers Domestic* (CSPD), the *Journals of the House of Commons* (CJ), and the *Journals of the House of Lords* (LJ). Despite this wealth of documentary data, as a studied

phenomenon it was largely ignored until the rise of castle studies in the late nineteenth century. The historiography of this specialist subject is a complex one (see Liddiard 2005 for a general discussion), but where slighting is concerned, three broad attitudes can be detected. These have been labelled here as: architectural, historical, and (belatedly) archaeological views of slighting. It should be stressed that these divisions are by no means exclusive. Archaeologists of the historic period invariably utilise documents, as do military and social historians, and there is often overlap within the various disciplines. These categories have been used not to pigeonhole individual authors (who inevitably defy easy compartmentalisation), but rather to sum up broad thematic approaches to the subject of castle slightings. These competing approaches to castle slightings give us a fragmented and distorted view, one that needs to be analysed before it can be challenged.

1.4.1 The architectural design/evolutionary view, or *Was the castle impressive enough to withstand a beating?*

This approach first emerged in the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, although its spiritual descendent is the photograph-laden gazetteers so prevalent today. The predominant theme of these works is the way a castle looks and/or repelled attack. At their best they purport to explain design evolution and shed light on architectural craftsmanship, and at their worst, they offer pretty pictures in coffee book format. Clark's seminal work *Mediaeval Military Architecture in England* (1884, 2 volumes) effectively launched this architectural approach in England by recording and describing the design and structural technique of a wide selection of castles. Like others of this genre (Harvey 1911; Armitage 1912; Thompson 1912; O'Neil 1953; Toy 1954), slighting is either not discussed at all or else alluded to in vague and brief terms, often as a side note. Armitage (1912, 177), for example, euphemistically describes Nottingham Castle as having been 'devastated by the seventeenth century spoiler', with no further explanation of what she means by this. Still others have suggested dismissively that castle ruins today have more to do with decay, neglect, and quarrying than the Civil War (Clark 1884, 309; O'Neil 1960, 113). While these factors do play a hugely influential role in how quickly a castle deteriorates, they are destructive processes that have often

affected structures in tandem with slighting damage, and the two should not be considered mutually exclusive (see Chapter Three for a full discussion).

This relative indifference to slighting is not uniform, however. One of the first to deviate from this trend was Oman (1926), who combined descriptions of the structural remains and landscape with a more anecdotal and narrative style that often included details of Civil War sieges or slights. His grouping of castles in a loose regional fashion further emphasised that architectural design and evolution were less of a priority than travelling to and ‘experiencing’ the site. As an ‘antiquarian for the masses’, he was arguably an influential force in the evolution towards tourism driven castle books (Hogg 1972; Smithers 1980; Warner 1981; Harris 1991; Pettifer 1995 and 2000; Peters 1997; Fry 2006). The main drawback to these works is the inconsistency and level of information provided, primarily due to the constraints of the gazetteer format. Smithers (1980), for example, correctly identifies that Raglan Castle was slighted, but fails to mention any Civil War involvement at all for Montgomery Castle, which of the two arguably suffered more severe damage. Similarly, and with the one exception of Corfe Castle, Braun (1936) discusses Civil War slights in a disembodied and generalised way, as if all castles had the same war experience. His assertion that ‘the great guns made short work of the old castles’ (*ibid*, 112) implies that the majority of destruction was the result of cannon fire. This blurring between siege- and post-siege destruction once again emphasises that it was a castle’s ability (or inability) to survive various kinds of destruction that was of primary interest.

Increasingly, this prioritisation of a castle’s defensive capabilities has been showcased through ‘picture books’ that emphasise the design and setting of the castle (Simpson 1949; Furtado *et al.* 1986; Brown 1989). Despite the fact that the increasing sophistication of photography offers huge possibilities for the investigation of castle slights, the gazetteer format invariably used (Simpson 1949; Sturdy 1977; Bailey 1984; Brown 1989) creates more of a voyeuristic fascination with ruins than anything truly academic. Even when grouped more thematically (Johnson 1978; Kightly 1979), the photographs are more evocative than illustrative. As an audience, we are allowed a

choice of two reactions: to marvel at the impressive military might of still intact walls and towers, or else to mourn those whose walls failed them in their hour of need. This innate appetite for ruins has spawned its own sub-genre of literature (Macaulay 1977; Thompson 1981; Bailey 1984; Endres and Hobster 2003), the synthesis of which is the idea that castles are equally noteworthy for the pathos they evoke, and for their continuing ability to awe and impress. In implicitly arguing this point, however, slightings are viewed as just one part of a castle's evolution from medieval giant to Picturesque ruin.

1.4.2 The historical/big picture view, or *Why the beating was not personal*

Of all the views on castle slightings, that of historians has been the most powerful and continues to wield enormous influence. To understand it, a grasp of the historiography⁴ of the Civil War is essential. The earliest work produced was Clarendon's *The History of the Great Rebellion* (Lockyer 1967), published in 1702-4 and claiming to be the definitive account of the war. Clarendon's undeniably biased view of events received a radical makeover in 1893 in the form of S.R. Gardiner's seminal work *History of the Great Civil War, 1642-9*. In it, Gardiner presented the conflict as a triumph of parliamentary democracy over monarchical absolutism, and epitomised the Whig view of history as a continuous march towards progress (Butterfield 1973). This interpretation of the Civil War underwent still further challenges, particularly from a Marxist perspective (Hill 1980), as well as from a 'crown vs. country' perspective that emphasised the rise of a gentry and 'middling sort' (Trevor-Roper 1954). However, these broad generalisations of the conflict have been attacked in the last fifty years, with the majority of historians emphasising instead the different facets of the war experience. Regionalism has been well explored (see Chapter Two for details), as well as other diverse areas including the role of women (Plowden 2000; Hudson 2000), the army experience (Kishlansky 1980; Woolrych 1987; Carlton 1992), radicalism among the citizenry (Morrill 1976; Underdown 1987), the Royalist war effort (Wilcher 2001; Hutton 2003), and the development of the arms trade (Edwards 2000). This huge corpus of work has given us a broad picture of why the Civil War started, how it was fuelled,

⁴ Additionally, see Appendix I for a timeline of English Civil War events.

and what the effects of it were.

This attention of historians has been something of a mixed blessing for castles. Whereas the architectural approach tended to view castles as objects to describe, devoid of their historical context, the historians have grasped that slighting is a recognisable social phenomenon that needs to be addressed, even if it is not always fully explained. This has been attempted by stressing the economic and/or military reasons that contemporary cited to justify their actions. Consequently, the view that castles had to be 'neutralised' through slighting because they posed an intrinsic military threat has become enshrined (Porter 1994; Strickland 1996; Hutton and Reeves 1998), as has the argument that slighting castles was cheaper than garrisoning them with one's own forces. Moreover, Porter (1994) has strongly argued that demolition was kept to a minimum, and that despite the protection afforded by the Committee of Indemnity, military commanders were loathe to open themselves up to legal recriminations by destroying property.

Moving away from a broad, national perspective, it soon becomes apparent that this narrative is contradicted by the wealth of evidence found in regional Civil War histories. For example, Tennant's (1992; 1996; 1997) work on the Midlands in the Civil War revealed several incidences of slighting—particularly by fire—and showed a bleak picture for castles and manor houses in that area. And unlike military and social historians who only concentrate on 'the big picture', Tennant clearly identifies the practice of slighting as 'a standard precautionary *and* vengeful measure' (1992, 220, emphasis mine). He amply demonstrates this by highlighting the relationships, personalities, and circumstances surrounding some of the slighted buildings and their owners, and in the process illustrates that some of the richest details about slighting can only be found within the more intimate framework of a local or regional historical narrative.

To further illustrate this point, compare the two following passages concerning Berkeley Castle, the first from a general castle book and the second from a Civil War history of Gloucestershire:

Chapter One—An Archaeology of Destruction: The slighting narratives of castles

‘The usual “sighting” was ordered by Parliament, but was carried out with some consideration for the owner, who was not greatly disliked by the victors. His residential buildings were left untouched, only the walls of the outer ward being destroyed and the breach in the keep enlarged’.

(Oman 1926, 88)

‘Berkeley Castle was hit particularly severely. Colonel Forbes broke the 1643 surrender articles by pulling down the walls, bridges and houses and ransacking the estate to his own profit. With successive governors’ misbehaviour and constant warfare in the area, Smyth reckoned that by June 1645, £3,000 worth of furniture had been ‘imbeaseled and spoyled’...The plunder went on for another year...[The governor] presided over the sale of much lead, the castle bells and gates, the destruction of hundreds of ancient charters for their silk strings, and the removal of some 700 moveables to Gloucester for auction...’

(Warmington 1997, 79)

Oman’s (1926) account of the slighting of Berkeley Castle provides a vastly different impression than the one given by Warmington (1997). To begin with, it fails to convey the full scale and scope of the damage and concentrates exclusively on the buildings. One reason for this discrepancy might be that Oman simply did not have access to the detailed primary source material that Warmington did. Even more fundamentally, however, it is arguable that Oman would not have considered the type of damage Warmington described to be slighting damage, and therefore would not have included it even if it had been available to him. The underlying attitude is that ‘lesser’ damage to furnishings, documents, and minor architectural features is not as significant or noteworthy as the ‘more important’ destruction of buildings. The former is presumably an unfortunate act of war committed by soldiers, while the government—for strategic reasons—reluctantly committed the latter. This unsatisfactory interpretation ignores the obvious relationship between destruction and profit, particularly as the big winners in the damaged property stakes were often Parliamentary officers. As Warmington (1997, 79) points out, in addition to the governor, eleven other officers—two of them local men—benefited from the destruction at Berkeley.

This comparison between Oman (1926) and Warmington (1997) might at first appear to be unfair. After all, one is a general book on castles with no real attempt at providing a coherent theory on destruction, while the other has the advantage of being based on primary research at a local and regional level. However, the argument for making such a comparison here is that it illustrates two overlooked but important points. The first is that Oman (1926), despite being a ‘light’ work that lacks academic vigour, is still

representative of the architectural genre as a whole when it comes to the subject of slighting; more academically robust works (for example, Clark 1884; Armitage 1912; O’Neil 1953; Brown 1976 and 1984) are no more informative than Oman (1926), and arguably, say even less about the subject of slighting than he does. The second point that deserves to be stressed is that despite Warmington’s (1997) obvious superiority in terms of destruction detail, he (and other regional historians) remain an untapped and overlooked resource in understanding slighting—not just by archaeologists, but also by other Civil War historians. This disparity between local and regional accounts on the one hand, and the grand, ‘national’ narratives on the other, suggests a deep, unacknowledged schism within the historical community about the nature of slighting and how it should be perceived, and we as archaeologists ignore it at our own peril.

1.4.3 The archaeological view, or *What beating?*

The contribution of the archaeological community to the general study of castles has been invaluable, particularly by encouraging the development of new ways of ‘seeing’ them (Austin 1984; McNeill 1997; Johnson 1999 and 2002; Mathieu 1999; Creighton and Higham 2003). This has been attempted in several ways. Keevill (2000) has looked at medieval palaces from a multi-faceted approach, addressing both their functional and social aspects. The relationship between buildings and the landscape has been explored with some success (Bowden 1999; Gilchrist 1999; Creighton 2002; Creighton and Higham 2003), and spatial analysis has revealed much about the social hierarchy of living quarters and the use of space in medieval society (Fairclough 1992; Johnson 1996; Grenville 1997; Mathieu 1999). Similarly, symbolism in material culture has received a great deal of attention and continues to explore the themes of authority, power, and order (Barker 1979; Coulson 1979 and 1991; Dixon and Lott 1993; Cherry 1997; Steane 2001; Johnson 2002). In a variety of important areas, archaeologists have greatly diversified their approaches to the study of castles and medieval buildings and broadened our understanding of how these structures were used and perceived.

Despite these successes, however, archaeologists as a group have largely failed to apply these fresh approaches to the post-medieval period, with the direct consequence that the

existence of slighting as a legitimate and viable area of research has yet to be fully appreciated. In part this is due to the continued preoccupation of Civil War archaeologists with a castle's military role, and consequently, the majority of work produced by this group has focused on fortifications, sieges, or battles (Kenyon 1982; Mayes and Butler 1983; Avent 1987; Courtney and Courtney 1992; Foard 1994, 2000, and 2001; Courtney 2001; Wiggins 2001; Roberts 2002; Sheppard 2003). While this substantial body of work has considerably enhanced our understanding of fortifications and battle tactics, it has collectively made only a modest contribution to a broader recognition and understanding of the slighting phase of castles.

This lack of interest in slighting is even more pronounced where non-Civil War archaeologists are concerned. Despite contributing solid research and fresh perspectives in other areas of castle research, many remain silent on the phenomenon of slighting. Creighton (2002), for example, rightly argues for a multi-disciplined, less narrow understanding of a castle's significance, and yet makes no mention of slighting. Particularly noticeable is the omission of slighting from regional archaeological surveys. In his overview of archaeology in the Marches, Stanford (1991, 143) devotes two sentences to the Civil War and no reference whatsoever to slights, despite the fact that Herefordshire alone has an average density of one castle every nine square kilometres (Creighton and Higham 2003), and that this region was staunchly Royalist and active for the King (Phillips 1874). Considering the high number of castles that were slighted in Ireland (see de Breffny 1992), coverage on Irish slights is also (surprisingly) almost non-existent. There is no mention of it in any of the essays in *The Medieval Castle in Ireland and Wales* (Kenyon and O'Connor 2003), and elsewhere, McNeill (1997, 229) ignores its Irish dimension and only states that the Civil War provided a 'military motive' for slighting *in England*. Similarly, despite Kenneth Wiggins' (2001; 2003a and 2003b) extensive work on Irish siege mines, he only briefly acknowledges slighting within an Irish context (2003a, 39). For many archaeologists, the issue of castle destruction has still not permeated into the realm of discussion, let alone debate.

Where archaeologists have addressed the phenomenon of slighting, the general trend has been to state its presence as opposed to interpret it. Harrington (1992), for example, briefly addresses slighting, but only in a functionalist manner, identifying the different methods used and some of the castles affected. His later work (2004, 59) argues for the necessity of identifying slighted castles and for understanding the methods used, but the rationale offered is that isolating destruction debris from underlying occupation layers will help us better understand the castle's Civil War use. In short, while identifying the presence of slighting in the archaeological record has been recognised as being of importance, understanding the significance of the phenomenon for its own sake has not.

A small minority of archaeologists have taken a different approach and 'explained' the significance of slighting by over-relying on historical narratives. Johnson (2002, 173-5 and 180), for example, recognises that slighting was partly a symbolic act and implicitly an assault on royal authority, and rightly points out that destruction was not random but targeted. His assertion, however, that slighting represented a 'victory [for] the middling sort of people' and is indicative of 'new ideas of moral and political order' (2002, 173) oversimplifies the complex causes behind destruction. Moreover, his Marxist and 'Whig' view that these 'middling sort' finally 'destroy[ed] the power of the castle, both culturally and physically' (2002, 175) has been attacked on wider theoretical grounds by numerous historians (see Section 1.3.2). It is arguable that seventeenth century attitudes towards castles—particularly during a period of armed conflict—were substantially more complex and layered than simple narratives of 'progress' have hitherto acknowledged.

Another argument put forward—based almost entirely on a straightforward interpretation of contemporary documents—is that slightings were nothing more than necessary acts of war, devoid of any symbolic or social meaning. This is the view taken by Newman *et al.* (2001, 16) who argue that the 'desire of the parliamentary military and the later Commonwealth government to undertake the systematic destruction of Royalist castles and great houses cannot simply be dismissed as a vengeful assault on the material wealth of their opponents, but must reflect a contemporary perception of the military

value of such structures'. However, they also argue that these so-called 'great houses'—many of which were besieged and/or slighted during the Civil War—were originally designed so that 'associations were consciously made with a medieval martial past, though within the context of buildings *clearly lacking in contemporary military value*' (*ibid* 45, italics mine). Once ruined, the symbolic value of castles was once again recognised by contemporaries: 'What had once been an integral feature of government and the physical expression of wealth and power had become romantic ruins, yet [the eighteenth-century antiquarians] still connected their owners and admirers with an ancient and perceived chivalric past' (*ibid* 2001, 19-20). This implies that symbolism was an important part of the construction of castles and later in the perception of their ruins, but played no significant role in the process of their destruction.

There have been notable exceptions to this trend. M. W. Thompson's work (1987a, 138-57 and 1987b) was the first to acknowledge the complexity and scale of the phenomenon, and to highlight it as an important subject in its own right. His compilation of all proposed Parliamentary slightings (1987a, 179-85) and analysis of the phenomenon is flawed in some respects (see Chapter Two for discussion), but remains unparalleled in the significance of its contribution to the subject and for its continuing impact on the way archaeologists think about slighting. Another notable contribution has come from Cadw, who have drawn attention to the Welsh dynamic of slighting (Gaunt 1991). Perhaps the most significant development of this work is the production of a distribution map of slighted castles, a feat which has not been achieved for England. In terms of their contribution to understanding slighting, the work of both men has served to open the door—in this case one that has been left barely ajar—and which beckons to be entered.

1.5 Thesis aims and outline

The objective of this thesis is to re-examine castle slightings from an archaeological perspective. In doing so, it seeks to not only add a much needed post-medieval aspect to castle studies, but to challenge historians to expand their current ideological framework beyond 'national' interpretations and to incorporate a more social and regional approach.

As a pioneering study, it will attempt to forge a blueprint for the investigation of slighted castles in particular, and for a more general ‘archaeology of destruction’ that focuses on destruction in a wider historical context.

Before outlining the format of this thesis, the parameters of its research agenda must first be established. First and foremost, this thesis is about the intentional, *non-siege* destruction of castles. Structural damage will be analysed in its broadest context, but siege and accidental damage will not be the primary focus. As the thesis will demonstrate, isolating these various forms of destruction is not always easy or possible, and many castles experienced multiple types of destruction. Basing House (Hampshire), for example, accidentally burned during its successful storm, but afterwards its building materials were given away for free to local inhabitants (CJ 15/10/45). This, of course, is one of the major challenges of looking at slighting archaeologically: the very nature of destruction—in effect, the obliteration of evidence—consequently makes the reading of such evidence more problematic. It is therefore unfortunate but inevitable that the lines between slighting and other forms of damage (particularly siege damage) will sometimes blur when evaluating the evidence of particular sites, and consequently it will not always be possible to isolate one from the other. Although this problem will never truly be overcome, it should lessen significantly over time as interpretations and analyses improve and wider debate is generated.

The second important parameter is geographical. Although the English Civil War was far from just an ‘English’ event (see Macinnes and Ohlmeyer 2002), the focus here is largely on English castles, with occasional supporting evidence drawn from Welsh sites. This decision was mainly a pragmatic one, although it is also based on the recognition that slightings in a Scottish, Welsh, and Irish setting have an additional historical context that should be explored in more depth than could be attempted here. Consequently, it is a primarily English slighting context which will be discussed here, although the social and political concerns of the ‘three Kingdoms⁵’ as a whole clearly played an influential role in shaping attitudes in England.

⁵ England, Scotland, and Ireland.

The third limitation that needs to be clearly acknowledged is that the bulk of the evidence examined or cited in this thesis will relate to medieval castle buildings slighted by Parliamentarians. This perhaps contradicts two fundamental points that have already been stressed: namely, that Royalists and neutrals—as well as Parliamentarians—initiated slighting, and that slighting was not just the destruction of walls and towers but also included graves, libraries, moats, landscapes, service buildings, domestic quarters, and personal possessions. While these points are valid and extremely important to recognise, and moreover will be explored intermittently in the thesis, the decision was made to predominately focus on the Parliamentarian slighting of buildings. This should not be interpreted as an indication of prioritised importance, but rather reflect the realities of establishing groundwork in what is essentially a pilot study in a new subject area. It is expected and in fact hoped for that future work will expand into these other areas and provide even more comparative data.

Having set up what this thesis aims—and does not aim—to do, Chapter Two moves us forward to an introduction to the historical and administrative context of the English Civil War. This is followed by an examination of how the established doctrine of historians that slightings were a military necessity came to dominate Civil War histories, and by extension, castle narratives. The source of this dogma and its underlying methodology is analysed, and the inherent flaws contained in an exclusively documentary approach are unpicked.

Drawing from these results, Chapter Three proposes a new, multidisciplinary way of identifying and analysing castle destruction. It begins by outlining the slighting methods available to contemporaries and discussing the practical issues surrounding their use. From there it explores the variety of challenges that problematise the evidence, including a range of phenomena that destroy or mimic traces of slighting in the archaeological record. The underlying ethos is that slighting can and should be ‘de-mystified’, and that this can be accomplished through a systematic approach that draws from a variety of disciplines.

Chapters Four and Five provide a methodological springboard from which to examine two complex methods of slighting: destroying by hand (picking), and destroying by collapse (undermining). In Chapter Four, a damage typology is established for picking that systematically categorises slighting by its underlying motivation. In doing so, it advocates a systematic approach to understanding slighting at site level, and demonstrates the rich complexity of the structural and archaeological evidence. Chapter Five adopts a similarly systematic approach through a methodological examination of undermining. This includes an assessment of the structural principles at work, as well as a consideration of how evidence for other forms of destruction varies from that left by undermining.

From these methodological foundations, the focus in Chapters Six and Seven then shifts to the wider social implications of slighting. Chapter Six does this by re-assessing the slighting of Kenilworth Castle (Warwickshire), and by analysing the private role of the individual in influencing and controlling slighting and its effects. Major themes to emerge are the spatial ‘use’ of destruction, the strategic re-use of castle material, and the different strands of narrative that can be teased from one castle’s slighting. This is explored further in Chapter Seven by reviewing the demolition of Pontefract Castle (Yorkshire) and considering its impact on the local and wider communities. It argues that slighting had broad ramifications for several strata of society, particularly for those who organised, executed, and profited from its destruction.

As a conclusion, Chapter Eight ties these diverse areas together by summarising their common links. It also highlights the still uncharted territory that needs to be explored, and maps out a vision of how an archaeological approach to slighting in particular, and to destruction more generally, can benefit not only Civil War Archaeology, but all practitioners that engage with destroyed artefacts, buildings, and landscapes⁶.

At its core, this thesis rests on a very basic premise: to truly understand a building, its

⁶ Many of these issues were recently debated and explored in the May 2006 *Archaeology of Destruction Conference* which was hosted by the Department of Archaeology, University of York.

historical and social context cannot be ignored (Brown 1984, 7). Its role in society must be analysed and debated, and fresh perspectives about its significance must be considered. The slighting of castles in the English Civil War remains a largely unexplored—and yet rich and complex—example of how human interests have been played out through material culture. In particular, archaeology as a discipline has much to offer on the subject of the castle in ‘decline’ (Kenyon 1990, 208), and this thesis seeks to explore how an archaeological approach to destruction can help us understand this aspect of our past. As Stocker (1994, 8) has argued: ‘The attention of archaeological recorders of buildings for the next decade should be turned towards making the case for the importance of particular buildings and groups of buildings’.

This is my case for slighted castles.

Chapter Two

Patterns: Slighting Distributions of the Civil War

'It is impossible to quantify the casualty rate among castles as a result of the Civil War, but it was clearly very high'.

(Thompson 1987b, 211)

Introduction

The previous chapter highlighted several problems with the existing slighting discourses. The general picture presented was one of confused narratives that either completely ignored or else definitively 'explained' the phenomenon of slighting, a problem exacerbated by the fact that very little substantive work had been done on the subject. In general, two opposing viewpoints could be detected. The first was a 'national' perspective that tended to see slightings in terms of military and fiscal policy, and which gave primacy to documentary evidence that mainly reflected the concerns of those in central authority. In contrast, examples such as Berkley Castle (Warmington 1997) not only provided a more regional perspective removed from the stated objectives of the ruling elite, but also hinted at the existence of a widespread and largely unrecorded scale of destruction.

From this, a fundamental question that emerges is how extensive castle destruction actually was in the 1640s and 1650s, and whether its distribution can be qualified and quantified in any kind of verifiable way. The underlying argument is that the deeper social meanings of slighting cannot be teased out without first establishing the scale of its impact, and by first understanding how our narratives about slighting distributions are derived. With this in mind, this chapter will address two of the most influential narratives, namely that castle slightings were primarily dictated by year and by location. Through a discussion of the merits of these points, it will ultimately be argued here that a national-focused, document-based approach provides a skewed picture of slighting that obscures the reality of destruction at 'ground level'.

2.1 Introduction to regional events and governmental structures

The importance of the localities¹ in the English Civil War has been generally recognised by historians (see Everitt 1969; Hughes 1985; Richardson 1997), and a great deal of scholarship has revealed the complexity of the Civil War political landscape. The synthesis of all of this work is that the local and regional Civil War experience was incredibly dynamic, and that issues such as political allegiances could vary sharply, both between and within individual communities (often due to several different factors such as employment, cultural differences, religion, race², etc.). Furthermore, just because towns and countryside might declare for one side or another, it did not necessarily mean that all of the inhabitants were in complete accord on the decision. These nuances aside, certain very broad generalisations have been argued about regional political allegiances and army concentrations between 1642 and 1643 (see Figure 2.2). From the outset both sides had core areas where support for their cause was strongest. For the King these areas were largely in the north, particularly North Yorkshire and rural parts of Lancashire (Broxap 1910; Wenham 1970; Binns 1996 and 2004; Hopper 1997; Cooke 2004). Additionally, he enjoyed strong support from a large portion of the West Country, the Marches, and most of Wales (Phillips 1874; Willis-Bund 1905; Coate 1963; Gaunt 1991; Atkin 2004). However, this support for the King was matched by an equal fervour for Parliament in several of the bordering counties such as Devon, Dorset, Somerset, Gloucestershire, and Cheshire (Dore 1966; Andriette 1971; Underdown 1973; Wroughton 1973; McGrath 1981; Atkin 1992; Stoye 1994; Goodwin 1996; Warmington 1997; Lynch 1999). This groundswell of popular support for Parliament was of course strongest in the East, particularly in London (Porter 1984; Coates 2004) and in counties such as Kent and Norfolk (Everitt 1966; Ketton-Cremer 1969). In contrast, the Midlands appears to have been sharply divided and bitterly contested from the very beginning of the conflict (Wood 1937; Hughes 1987; Davies 1992; Sherwood 1992; Tennant 1992; Tennant 1996 and 1997; John 2000).

As with all generalisations numerous exceptions can be found, and this general model of allegiances has been criticised as being out of date and too simplistic

¹ See Figure 2.1 for a map of all areas discussed in this chapter and throughout this thesis.

² In particular, Royalist Cornwall and Wales were both viewed by Parliamentarian pamphleteers as being religiously ignorant, backwards, and racially/culturally inferior (Gaunt 1991; Stoye 1994).

(Stoyle 1994, 255). For example, the 'Royalist' North was just as split in loyalties as the Midlands: in Yorkshire, this consisted of a mainly Royalist North Riding, but deep Parliamentary feeling in the West and East Ridings, while in Lancashire, Royalism was strong in the West and in towns like Preston and Wigan, and Parliamentary sympathies dominated in the south-east and in places like Manchester and Bolton. Equally, in the 'Parliamentarian' East, Kent had deep undercurrents of Royalist support which periodically broke out into insurrection (Stoyle 1994, 251). Military control over areas, therefore, does not necessarily reflect complete popular opinion in those areas, although at least initially it probably does reflect the majority view.

As the war progressed and territory was lost and won, these areas of military occupation and control of course shifted, producing a very fluid and changing landscape (see Figures 2.3 and 2.4). A full history of the battles and changing fortunes of both sides will not be discussed here as it has been covered extensively elsewhere (see Hutchinson 1863; Woolrych 1961; Lockyer 1967; Rogers 1968; Seymour 1975; Kishlansky 1980; Young 1981 and 1997; Gaunt 1991 and 2003; Emberton 1995; Binns 2004; Cooke 2004). In general, however, Parliamentary victories ensured that as the war went on, Royalist territories became increasingly reduced to their ideological 'heartlands', Wales and the West, as well as isolated garrisons throughout England.

By 1646 the Royalist cause was lost, resulting in the surrender of the King and the end of the First Civil War. The following year, 1647, was marked by protracted negotiations between the King, the Scots, and various factions in Parliament and the army, culminating in a series of Royalist uprisings beginning in the spring of 1648. These were largely concentrated in south Wales, Cumbria, Essex, and Kent, but riots and other activities also took place to varying degrees in London, Norwich, Bury St. Edmunds, Berwick-upon-Tweed, and elsewhere. The Scots—allied with Parliament from 1643 onwards—now switched sides and fought with their Royalist allies, culminating in their defeat at the Battle of Preston in August 1648. That same month the bitter siege of Colchester ended in a Royalist defeat which saw two of its commanders executed in the castle ditch. The Second Civil War was now over.

The year 1649 opened with the King's execution and the proclamation of his son, Charles II, as King by the Scots and the remnants of Royalist supporters in England. The Third Civil War largely took place beyond England and Wales, with most of the fighting occurring in Ireland in 1649 and Scotland in 1650. It ended in September 1651 with the defeat of Charles II and his Scottish forces at the Battle of Worcester.

Governmental infrastructures

Central to the war effort—both financially and militarily—were the administrative infrastructures that the Royalists and Parliamentarians both relied upon (see Gaunt 2003, 66-8, for a general overview). To date, no examination has been made of their role in the phenomenon of slighting, and consequently very little is known about this bureaucratic side of slighting. What is clear is that before the war, the most important person at county level was the Lord Lieutenant for each county. Appointed by the monarch, he was responsible for defending the county against invasion and, through his Deputy Lieutenant, organising and training the militia (Ketton-Cremer 1969, 31). Such men tended to be the dominant landed gentry in the county, and as such usually had a great deal of personal wealth and regional influence. This arrangement continued to be of significance once war broke out, although modified by the King in the form of six Lieutenant Generals for 'Royalist counties' (Anderson 1995, 84). Both sides relied on regional administrations (under a peer's control) to organise men and materials and coordinate military activities within their sphere of influence (Gaunt 2003, 66). Despite these similarities, significant differences existed between the two opposing camps.

Parliament

For obvious reasons, authority on the Parliamentary side was far less centralised and consisted of rule by '...ad hoc committees responsible to Westminster and often staffed by men from outside the old governing circles' (Underdown 1987, 153). As most slightings were committed by the victorious Parliamentary side, a familiarity with their administrative structure is essential³. At the top of this hierarchy was the 'Long Parliament', which between 1642-6 consisted of approximately 30 peers in the House of Lords and around 200 MPs in the House of Commons, although these

³ The following information about the various committees and administrative bodies is gleaned from a variety of sources, notably Newman 1990 and Gaunt 2003.

numbers fluctuated over time. Debate about slights occurred between both Houses, but over time increasingly came to be dominated by various committees.

These committees were essentially two-tiered and consisted of a dominant national level at the top, with subordinate regional levels underneath. Arguably the most significant in the former category was the Committee of Safety, which after 1643 and the inclusion of the Scots became the Committee of Both Kingdoms (also known as the Derby House Committee and the Committee for Irish Affairs). It was made up of four Scottish commissioners, seven peers, and 14 MPs and was ostensibly created to coordinate the military interests of England, Scotland, and Wales. Generally, orders to slight originated from the Derby House Committee acting on behalf of Parliament and were carried out by the Deputy Lieutenants or County Committees (Thompson 1987a, 142). Also important was the Committee for Compounding with Delinquents (also known as the Goldsmith Hall Committee) which supervised the county-based committees that dealt with the sequestered property of Royalists and recusants. Although technically not a part of the slighting decision-making process, they were *de facto* involved due to the higher likelihood of Royalist properties being slighted.

At a regional level, slighting was largely handled by the various county committees where most wartime administration occurred (Gaunt 2003, 67). These normally consisted of 12-40 men and were comprised of landed and lesser gentry who met several times a week (*ibid*). Most of the County Committee records have been lost⁴, and consequently, little is known about the decision-making process for slighting and how slights were organised or executed. Arguably, this is the group that had the most influence on how slights were carried out as they were responsible for arranging the labour and/or assigning the duty to other individuals (see below).

At the bottom of this hierarchy was the military. Slighting committed by military personnel consisted of two types: destruction instigated by troops for personal reasons, and more organised destruction carried out under orders from officers. Although administrative chains of command were normally followed, it was not unknown for troops or military commanders to make unilateral decisions to slight

⁴ A notable survival is the Order Book for Staffordshire (see Pennington and Roots 1957).

and then get them ‘approved’ afterwards. Sir John Meldrum’s defence of the razing of Gainsborough is a typical example of this (Thompson 1987a, 141). This was risky, however, and all decisions were open to criticism from one’s own party. Thus, Col. Massey was forced to defend his actions when the Gloucestershire Committee complained to the Committee for Both Kingdoms about the wisdom of Massey’s slighting of the works at Beachley (Warmington 1997, 66). Despite these occurrences, however, commanders seem to have avoided pre-emptively rendering a site unusable without authorisation.

The relationship between ‘local’ and ‘central’ authorities was a complex one that varied in flexibility, depending on circumstances. A closer analysis of the language of contemporary documents allows us to see the subtext of the dialogue between central authorities and the various regions. The Irish and Scottish Committee, for example, were allowed ‘*to consider how [Ludlow] garrison may be slighted*’ (CSPD 22/3/53, emphasis mine), which implies a degree of autonomous decision making. Similar language was used for Newcastle upon Tyne when a petition for materials was allowed ‘*if [the] Council think fit to demolish*’ (CSPD 13/9/55, emphasis mine). At other times, central authority could be dictatorially asserted. High Ercall House (Shropshire) is a typical example where Parliament *instructed* the County Committee *not* to demolish the buildings, but rather to slight and drain the moat instead (CSPD 6/4/46). At Broncroft, another Shropshire castle, the local Committee was ‘authorised’ to demolish and make untenable (CJ 11/7/48), which implies that permission was sought or needed beforehand. Occasionally, a slight air of reprimand or nagging can be found, such as the Lords’ instructions to the Eastern Association Committee that they should ‘take care to slight effectually’ (CJ 28/1/47). These relationships were further complicated by the occasional involvement of other parties such as outside counties or even nations. Banbury Castle (Oxfordshire), for example, had to be demolished with assistance from Warwickshire and Northamptonshire due to lack of funds (CSPD 15/7/48), and in the case of Carlisle Castle (Cumbria), the Scottish forces occupying it ignored repeated orders from their Parliamentary ‘allies’ to slight it, instead removing stone from nearby buildings to repair the castle defences (McCarthy *et al.* 1990, 199). Depending on the situation and who was involved, therefore, ultimate decision making power could vary between local and

central agencies, could be collaborative or imposed from above, and was characterised by varying degrees of cooperation or resistance.

In addition to (or in lieu of) a committee, governors of occupied castles were also responsible for carrying out slighting orders. In the case of Lancaster Castle, for example, the governor installed there was so lax in this duty that the order was given to his second in command, the deputy governor, to be carried out (CSPD 10/7/49 and 24/7/49). If the castle was not occupied or if no one could be found to do it, governors at nearby castles might be drafted in to oversee operations. This was the case at Christchurch Castle (Hampshire) where the Governor of Southampton was ordered to supervise the demolition (CSPD 30/11/50). He was also ordered to slight Winchester Castle, and was empowered to compel the county to carry it out (CSPD 16/12/50). Occasionally, as at Denbigh Castle (Wales), this resulted in the governor being given the building materials (CJ 15/4/47), although whether this was for personal or military use is often unspecified.

In practice, it would seem, a range of individuals might be called upon to act as impromptu slighting overseers. The responsibility for rendering Matchfield House (Worcestershire) untenable was delegated to ‘militia commissioners’ (CSPD 5/5/51), and at Carlisle (Cumbria) it was the ‘gentlemen of the county’ (CJ 26/12/46). The demolition of Winchester Castle was supervised by Richard Major, a County Justice (and father-in-law to Cromwell’s son) (Carpenter-Turner 1980, 111). Tattershall Castle (Lincolnshire) illustrates just how complex and protracted these arrangements could be. Initially, the owner Earl of Lincoln was ordered to slight the castle (CSPD 4/4/49). Secondly, the order was given to the governor of nearby Boston (CSPD 21/8/49). Finally, the JPs of the area were ordered to assist (CSPD 17/11/49), and money was allocated to one John Wincap (CSPD 29/3/50). This already complicated picture was made even more problematic by the often indistinct divisions between civic and military spheres. At Nottingham Castle, for example, demolition orders were given not only to a troop of dragoons (CSPD 9/5/51), but also to the ‘Governor, Mayor etc.’ (CSPD 9/6/51). This kind of military involvement was not unheard of, and Maj. General Lambert’s responsibility for Chirk Castle (Wales) is one such example (CJ 27/8/59). High level military involvement was rare, however, and most

of the castles ‘Cromwell knocked around a bit’ appear to have actually been destroyed by a motley collection of regional and local bureaucrats and petty officers.

Royalists

Of the two, far less is known about the Royalist governmental infrastructure because fewer records have survived (Gaunt 2003, 68; Hutton 2003, 86). In general, Royalist command and administration was more unified (Anderson 1995, 86), although this did not necessarily make it more successful. Its obvious head was the monarch, who drew support from a makeshift Royalist ‘Parliament’ based in the King’s headquarters at Oxford. Its most important committee was the Council of War, similar to Parliament’s Committee of Safety, which advised the King on military strategy but had limited power in practical terms. In contrast, the Commission of Array empowered the raising of troops and the imprisonment of enemies, and in theory probably dealt with some issues relating to the destruction of enemy property. Arguably, however, the administrative entities that had the most influence on the execution of slighting would have been the various county committees, of which little is known, and the military chain of command.

The lack of surviving records makes it difficult to establish the influence and responsibility each party within the Royalist infrastructure had regarding slighting. Consequently, Royalist slights tend to be viewed as impromptu ‘on the ground’ decisions made by military commanders (and largely executed by troops). Often, speed and inadequacy of slighting resources were the defining characteristics, and the Royalist slighting of the garrison at Reading is a typical example of this (Harrington 2004, 22). The lack of documentary evidence for an organised, Royalist ‘policy’ of slighting, as well as a tendency to view Royalist destruction as ‘knee-jerk’ military actions, has meant that they are typically under-represented in discussions about national distribution patterns and often overlooked in favour of better documented Parliamentary slights. While this thesis recognises this to be a particular problem that needs to be addressed, the focus for this chapter will nevertheless centre on Parliamentary slights as this is where the discourse of slighting distribution patterns derives from.

2.2 The ‘discourse’ of patterns

In outlining the critical problems with the current discourse of slighting, Section 1.4 of Chapter One highlighted the various strands of narrative surrounding slighting. These included ‘progressive’ interpretations that provided military and financial explanations for why slighting occurred at a national level. Two of the most important aspects of this discourse are that slights became more prevalent *after* the First Civil War (1642-1647), and that so called ‘inland’ castles were slighted while coastal ones were spared. These arguments were first propagated by M. W. Thompson (1987a), who tied these chronological and geographical patterns to contemporary military concerns (of which more will be said below). Using Parliamentary records as his primary source, Thompson (1987a, 179-85; Appendix II) compiled a gazetteer of all proposed and executed demolitions between 1642 and 1660. While acknowledging that its 149 entries were not statistically representative, Thompson (1987a, 142) nevertheless argued that the documentary sources they were drawn from ‘...allow us to form a general picture of the extent and nature of the demolition that took place between 1646 and 1659 which tallies reasonably well with the remains that are visible today’. In the years since, his work and the chronological and geographical interpretations of slighting resulting from it are still recognised both explicitly and implicitly as the standard (Parker 1988; Porter 1994; Newman *et al.* 2001; M. Morris 2003). As such, no further research has been attempted in this field.

The purpose here is to explore further the two patterns that Thompson (1987a) identified, and to assess the strength of his claims that these patterns reflect larger military strategies. In the absence of any other national surveys—either document-based or archaeological—to serve as a comparison, Thompson’s (1987a, 179-85) own data set will be used for analysis, albeit in a slightly altered form so that it can be re-examined for chronological and geographical patterns (Appendix III). Each *Parliamentary reference* to slighting is counted, first chronologically and then by county. The intention is not to offer an alternative slighting distribution pattern, but rather to ask questions of the existing ones in order to facilitate a more nuanced recognition of other, less visible patterns.

Before proceeding, certain limitations of this format must be acknowledged. First, not all of the entries in Thompson's original gazetteer relate to castles. A small number refer to towns, and three represent entire counties. Second, not all of the entries pertain to actual structures. Included in the gazetteer are Parliamentary references to the slighting of 'works', which in most cases referred to landscape or temporary structural defences that had been erected around a castle as a protection against siege. Third, some entries include references to the slighting of town walls, works, and other defences, but specifically exempt the castle from destruction, or else are unclear about whether the slighting order encompasses the castle buildings. Fourth, and most importantly, it is the number of *positive references to destruction* per year that are being counted, and not the *number of castles* ordered to be slighted. This means that although the original gazetteer was made up of 149 entries, the analysis attempted here will examine the individual assortment of references for each of those 149 entries. For example, Montgomery Castle alone is responsible for five of the fifty slighting references made in 1649, and patterns such as this will be the prime focus of discussion in 2.2.1 and 2.2.2.

2.2.1 Gazetteer slighting patterns (chronological)

The first of Thompson's (1987a, 143) arguments to be considered is that the destruction of 'ancient fabric' was limited in 1647, but occurred with more severity and frequency in 1648 and later: in particular, that 'some of the most severe demolition was carried out in the period 1648-51'. The data underpinning Thompson's argument was derived mainly from Parliamentary records for the Commons and the Lords, and even more narrowly, consisted of two simple observations: firstly, that the House of Lords consistently 'watered down' any slighting initiatives forwarded to them by the Commons in 1647, and secondly, that the wording of orders usually pertained to disgarrisoning and the slighting—not of castles—but of 'new works' (bastions, forts, trenches, etc.) (1987a, 142-3). The latter is euphemistically referred to as a 'great tidying up exercise, returning the situation to what it had been in 1642, leaving the masonry fabric of the ancient fortifications largely intact' (*ibid*, 143).

Thompson's first point about the Lords appears to be valid, and it makes sense that peers—even Parliamentary ones—would be cautious about endorsing a severe policy of property destruction against fellow peers in the Royalist ranks. Less convincing is the argument that slighting orders in 1648 were simply harsher versions of the original 1647 orders. To begin with, several castles mentioned in 1647 (Crayke, Cawood, Eccleshall, Haverfordwest, Middleham, Salcombe Fort, etc.), do not reappear in parliamentary records for 1648, and in some cases are never mentioned again. One explanation might be that their 1647 slighting was considered sufficient to not warrant further attention later. Equally, it is possible that they did not get slighted in 1647 (despite orders) and simply 'slipped under the radar' during later Parliamentary deliberations about what to slight. Either way, their omission in 1648 is significant and contradicts his main assertion that in 1648 'the same mistake was not made again' (Thompson 1987a, 143). A second weakness in his argument is the fact that a significant number of pre-1648 destruction entries are *not* restricted to just 'works'. For example:

- Sherborne: CJ 27/9/42: 'Earl of Bedford to raze to the ground'. 24/10/42: Dep. Lieutenant forthwith to demolish'. CJ 1/11/42: 'authority to sell lead, iron, boards'.
- Basing House (Hampshire): CJ 15/10/45: 'Forthwith totally slight and demolish, materials free for those who fetch them'.
- Berkeley (Gloucestershire): CJ 28/7/46: 'Slight garrison, works and gates and some parts of wall be slighted and thrown down'.
- Aberystwyth and Cardigan (Wales): CJ 3/3/47: 'Disgarrison and demolish'. 19/7/47: 'Adhere to vote'.
- Wallingford (Berkshire): CJ 23/2/47: 'Slight and dismantle'.

A simple severity/chronology relational explanation fails to address why *these* castles (and others like them) were ordered to be destroyed *before* the Second Civil War. It also confirms that—regardless of whether execution actually took place—Parliament was prepared (at least in some cases) to engage in more than just a 'tidying up exercise' before 1648.

Another way of testing Thompson’s core chronological argument is to rearrange the data in a different way. A similar tactic has been used to challenge the assumed relationship between the frequency and distribution of sieges in the Wars of the Roses, with results that have debunked some of the enshrined ‘truths’ about that conflict (see Liddiard 2005, 72-78). In this case it is not the frequency of *sieges* but Parliamentary references to slighting (predominantly from the Lords and Commons) that have been re-examined, primarily by organising Thompson’s gazetteer entries *by year*. The gazetteer slighting data, when broken down by reference year, is set out in Diagram 2.1:




Diagram 2.1 Diagram showing the number of positive references to slighting by year (original data source: Thompson 1987a, 179-85, gazetteer of proposed and executed demolitions).

At first, Thompson’s assessment appears to be completely accurate. As predicted, the years 1642-1645 show an unsurprisingly low level of recorded Parliamentary interest in slighting. Since this is the period where the bulk of hostilities in the English Civil War took place, castles were more likely to be garrisoned than destroyed, except for occasions where a ‘scorched earth’ policy dictated a hasty retreat (Thompson 1987a, 141). The three references for 1642 all pertain to one castle, Sherborne (Dorset), and 1643’s lone reference is simply to approve Col. Rigby’s demolition of Thurland (Lancashire) and to save him from indemnity. Such low numbers do seem to confirm

that a coherent, active policy of slighting was not uppermost in the minds of Parliamentary officials.

A sudden jump in 1646 (from 6 to 50 references) coincides with the King's surrender and the end of armed hostilities. This, too, is not unexpected, and is consistent with the beginnings of discussion about which occupied garrisons could be dispensed with and which should be maintained. It is the results for 1647, however, that provide a marked contrast to Thompson's narrative of a slighting initiative gathering steam *after* 1648. References in that year double from the previous year of 1646 (to 100) and reach their highest levels. This development makes sense from a logistical standpoint since a full year without military conflict would have freed up the various committees to devote more attention to deliberation about slighting. Additionally, with garrisons more settled and civic authorities out of 'battle mode', more correspondence about how and whether to proceed would also increase the number of references to slighting. In 1648, however, the year of the Second Civil War and supposedly the turning point for Parliament's hardening towards castles, references to slighting *fall*, not rise, with only 30 references recorded for that year. Even in 1649, after relative equilibrium in England was restored and the King was executed, references only rise to 50, the same level as in 1646. This does not support the view that a bitter and active Parliament tried to rectify their former 'softness' in the First Civil War by suddenly taking a hard line after the Second. In fact, fewer references in 1648 and 1649 probably reflect the fact that slighting was *less* of a concern, possibly because more sites had been damaged earlier than is supposed.

All of this challenges the accuracy of some of the most fundamental conclusions about the chronology of slights. In particular, it discredits the notion that Parliament was *more* concerned with slighting *after* 1647, and that a harsh line was not taken against castles until the Second Civil War. In order to understand this data even further, the next two sections will now divide it up both chronologically and by county: first 1642-1647, and then 1648-1660.

Slighting references by county for 1642-7

Diagram 2.1 clearly illustrated that after 1645 Parliamentary interest in slighting increased significantly, reaching a peak in 1647. Dividing up the same data by county⁵ provides an even clearer idea of how complex the situation was for the years 1642-7. Diagram 2.2 clearly shows that Parliamentary references to slighting were not uniformly distributed across all counties, but varied considerably from area to area. The highest rate of references were for Wales (32) and Yorkshire (27), both of which had contributed so much support to the King's cause in the First Civil War. In Yorkshire, the 27 references in this period were widely spread over 14 castles, all but one of which (York) used the terminology 'make untenable'. This clearly shows that Parliament's interest in Yorkshire castles during the First Civil War was widespread throughout the county and focused on more than just 'works'.

A comparison with Wales reveals some interesting similarities and differences. As in Yorkshire, the references for Wales were widely distributed: out of 21 Welsh castles mentioned in the gazetteer, 16 were referred to in the period 1642-1647. The fact that such a large quantity of castles in both regions were singled out, rather than the references concentrating on a small handful in each region, suggests that this period saw the development of a broad *policy* towards slighting, albeit one that may or may not have been implemented at county level. One crucial difference between the Yorkshire and Welsh references, however, is that the term 'make untenable' was used much more rarely in Wales, with a wide range of other orders also more prevalent, including: 'make indefensible', 'demolish', 'slight', 'slight *and* make untenable', 'demolish *and* make untenable', and 'demolish *and* slight'. This stark contrast in language might confirm an anti-Welsh bias, and certainly illustrates that—officially, at least—Parliament shied away from the use of strong destruction rhetoric for castles owned by fellow Englishmen.

⁵ Thompson's (1987a) use of modern county names has been preserved.




Diagram 2.2 Diagram showing the number of positive references to slighting—pre 1648—listed by county (original data source: Thompson 1987a, 179-85, gazetteer of proposed and executed demolitions).

There are, of course, deviations from this pattern, as demonstrated by the next two most represented counties, Staffordshire (11) and Dorset (10). Both counties were hotly fought over, but unlike Yorkshire and Wales, their references are less dispersed and more concentrated. Staffordshire's eleven references refer to only four sites (Dudley, Eccleshall, Lichfield Close, and Tutbury), while Dorset's ten all focus on just five sites (Corfe, Lyme Regis Town, Sherborne Castle, Sherborne House, and Wareham). Beyond these similarities, however, there are significant differences in how both counties were dealt with by Parliament. The terminology used for Staffordshire's four castles, like Yorkshire's, is *make untenable*, particularly for the year 1647, but those for Dorset are far less uniform: Sherborne Castle (1642/5: 'raze to ground', 'demolish', 'slight'), Corfe (1646: 'demolish'), Lyme Regis Town (1646/7: 'slight', 'dismantle'), Wareham (1646: 'slight'), and Sherborne House (1647: 'slight', 'make indefensible'). Unlike Staffordshire, where 'make untenable' was the norm for this period, in Dorset it does not garner a single mention.

This variance in language between the two counties (and with Yorkshire and Wales) illustrates that it is not *time* that is the significant characteristic of the phrasing of Parliament's orders, but *geography*. Why this should be so is not immediately clear. There is no consistent common denominator such as the severity of a siege: Cawood Castle (Yorkshire), for example, with no appreciable siege history of any significance, was ordered to be 'made untenable' (1646/7) as was Lichfield Close (Staffordshire) (1647) and Pontefract Castle (Yorkshire) (1647), both of which were bitterly fought over in the First Civil War and inflicted heavy casualties on those involved. On the surface, at least, there is no obvious reason for why two of Dorset's castles (Corfe and Sherborne) should warrant language like 'raze' and 'demolish', while equally 'malignant' castles in other English counties do not. Contemporaries obviously made distinctions in their language choices, and the predominant use of certain terms in specific regions but not others must be significant. It is worth considering whether MPs from the various regions were deliberately influencing *how* orders were to be phrased for castles within their spheres of influence, and equally, how much of their language should be interpreted as literal instruction and how much was 'political speak', to be implemented as others (in this case, the county

committees) saw fit. All of this indicates that the Parliamentary record for slights within 1642-7 is far more complex and nuanced than the current narrative suggests.

Slighting References by County for 1648-60

The period for 1648-60, like that of 1642-7, shows equal complexity when broken down at county level (see Diagram 2.3, next page). As in 1642-7, castles in Yorkshire (21) and Wales (14) were still dominant priorities for Parliament, but the reasons for this are far from straight-forward. Unlike 1642-7, the references for 1648-60 are not evenly dispersed across several castles. For Yorkshire alone, over half of the references are for just two castles, Mulgrave (6) and Wressle (6). These references are not confined to the same year (Wressle's occur mostly in 1649 while Mulgrave's are largely for 1651), but both deal predominantly with problems of execution and bureaucracy (see entries in Appendix II). It is unclear why these two castles received extra Parliamentary attention, but their proximities to the strategic coastal towns of Whitby and Hull may have been a significant factor. The remaining nine Yorkshire references were therefore distributed among just six castles, only three of which (Helmsley, Knaresborough, and Sheffield) were in the so-called decisive year of 1648.

A similar situation can be seen for Wales and its 14 references for this period. Unlike 1642-7, when 16 out of 21 Welsh castles were singled out for mention, the 14 Welsh references in this later period refer to just eight of Wales' 21 castles. Of these 14 references, six alone revolve around just one castle, Montgomery, and as above in Yorkshire, deal largely with the bureaucracy of demolition. The data for Wales is also similar to Yorkshire in that these later Welsh references fail to show any demonstrable significance for the year 1648: Montgomery aside, two of the references are for 1649 (Hawarden and Aberystwyth), one is for 1652 (Holt), three are for 1653 (Caernarfon, Conwy, and Red), and two are for 1659 (Chirk).




Diagram 2.3 Diagram showing the number of positive references to slighting—post 1647—listed by county (original data source: Thompson 1987a, 179-85, gazetteer of proposed and executed demolitions).

Lancashire, another county with strong Royalist elements, provides further evidence that taking a punitive stance against castles was not one of Parliament's main concerns immediately after the Second Civil War. Lancashire's twelve references pertain to only four sites: Clitheroe (2), Lancaster (6), Liverpool (3), and Lathom House (1). The latter is possibly a typographical error (Thompson records it as 1656, when in fact 1646 is probably more apt), and equally, Liverpool's three references for this period all took place in 1659, well past the Second and Third Civil Wars. This suggests that, despite Lancashire being a hotspot of Royalist activity during the Second Civil War, Parliament was not actively seeking to destroy a broad cross-section of castles in that county.

Not all slighting orders related to overtly 'Royalist' counties. In particular, castles in Lincolnshire (14), Hampshire (11), Gloucestershire (10), Surrey (10), and Somerset (9) all received a surprising amount of attention that is not connected to issues of county loyalty and bears little relation to the events of the Second and Third Civil Wars. Twelve of Lincolnshire's 14 references, for example, relate to just one castle, Tattershall, and reflect an ongoing saga of owner reluctance, bureaucratic confusion, and issues of compensation (see entry in Appendix II). Similarly, in Gloucestershire, Sudeley Castle alone accounts for eight references, all of which revolve around issues of execution or compensation, and nine of Hampshire's eleven references show a singular obsession with Winchester Castle.

The evidence of slighting orders show that rather than employing a broad policy of targeting castles across each county, Parliament concentrated on a handful of 'problem' sites in each county. The gazetteer entries for these 'problem' sites indicate that it is difficulties with compliance and issues of compensation that largely caused these higher incidences of Parliamentary references, and for that reason it should not be assumed that these sites were singled out for strategic, military reasons. These 'problem' sites even occurred in 'Parliamentarian' areas that 'turned' Royalist later in the war, such as Essex and Kent, as well as areas that remained staunchly Parliamentarian throughout. Kent, for example, only had three references, all of which pertained to Dover Castle. These references all date from 1651 (years after the Second Civil War) and occurred *before* the end of the Third Civil War (a conflict in

which Kent played no direct part). Unsurprisingly, considering the bitterness of the siege of Colchester, all of Essex's five references relate to Colchester Castle, but these too are not from 1648 but rather spread out between 1649 and 1651. This suggests a far more complex and subtle slighting landscape existed between 1648 and 1660 than existed *before* the Second Civil War. In particular, it demonstrates that the focus of Parliamentary attention was clearly *not* on reducing large numbers of sites in 'malignant' counties, but rather was bogged down by the bureaucratic challenges that a small number of sites presented. Moreover, the high number of slighting references in the 1650s, and in particular the mid to late 1650s, opens up new questions about the motives underpinning these anomalous entries.

2.2.2 Gazetteer slighting pattern (geographical)

'From 1646 to 1659 the word that was used to justify slighting of a castle was 'inland': 'being inland castles' these ten Yorkshire castles should be made untenable. The risks of attack from overseas, by foreigners or foreign-supported Royalists were felt to be greater than risings inland...As a result, coastal castles and forts usually remained garrisoned and were not slighted. Demolition was carried out mainly in the Midlands and Yorkshire, east and south Wales, the Thames Valley, and particularly after the Second Civil War, in Essex, Surrey and Hampshire.'

(Thompson 1987a, 153-4)

'In East Anglia, Kent, Devon, Cornwall, Cumbria and Northumberland, evidence of slighting is not common; in Yorkshire (Scarborough, Helmsley, Middleham, Wressel, Pontefract, etc.), the Midlands (Bolingbroke, Nottingham, Belvoir, Kenilworth, Tutbury, etc.), and much of Wales (Hawarden, Flint, Montgomery, Aberystwyth etc.) it is the rule rather than the exception'.

(Thompson 1987a, 155)

Thompson's second most influential argument is that castles were slighted because they were 'inland', whereas most coastal castles were spared. His argument is based in part on the explicit language used by Parliament, as well as the implicit assumption that if a castle was omitted from Parliamentary records, it was not slighted. Consequently, the Henrician forts and naval stations were maintained, Dover (Kent) was spared, and the Sussex castles of Arundel, Bodiam, and Herstmonceux were not slighted (Thompson 1987a, 155). Although his view is fairly dogmatic, Thompson (*ibid*) does recognise certain exceptions to this 'rule': the west coast, including Liverpool and Bristol (because the Irish 'threat' had been neutralised

in 1649), the fortifications around Plymouth and Dartmouth, Christchurch and Winchester Castles (Hampshire), and Scarborough Castle⁶ (Yorkshire).

Several flaws can be found in the presentation of Thompson's 'coastal' argument. The first is that, except for the 'frontier' zones of Wales/Ireland and Scotland, no credible attempts are made to explain *why* exceptions occurred. The argument that Scarborough (Yorkshire) was slighted for being Royalist, for example, does not explain why Royalist King's Lynn (Norfolk) was not. No explanation is offered for why Christchurch and Winchester Castles were demolished but other eastern and southern strongholds were not, nor why the fortifications of Plymouth and Dartmouth were slighted. Moreover, Thompson's (1987a, 155) argument that it was Kent's disloyalty in the Second Civil War of 1648 that prompted the proposal to slight Dover ignores the fact that the proposal was put forward in 1651, three years *after* Kent's participation in the revolt. It also fails to address why Dover was singled out for consideration, but other more troublesome Kent Royalist castles were not. These included Upnor, Walmer, Deal, Sandown, Sandgate, and Canterbury (Smithers 1980, 118), none of which are included in Thompson's gazetteer.

Even more fundamentally, Thompson's inland/coastal argument fails to provide any firm criteria for what sites contemporaries realistically considered to be 'coastal'. It is implicit, however, that if a castle was situated 'near' the sea and was 'obviously' built for defence, then its absence from slighting orders reflects its perceived military usefulness. Johnson (2002) has challenged this view that a castle's usefulness for sea defence is 'obvious', using the 'coastal' examples of Cooling (Kent) and Bodiam (Sussex) as evidence that coastal castles were not necessarily military in name. Bodiam lies ten miles from the sea and 'guards' an unimportant river 'going nowhere in particular' (Johnson 2002, 24). Thompson's (1987a, 155) main argument is also weakened by the fact that his assertion that Bodiam and Arundel were not slighted is not unanimously shared. Several argue that Arundel *was* slighted (Gascoigne 1975, 44; Pettifer 1995, 244; Salter 2000, 20), and views on Bodiam are split between those who think it was slighted (Fry 1974, 94) and those who argue it was not (Harris 1991, 74; Pettifer 1995, 246; Endres and Hobster 2003, 18). This wide difference of

⁶ Thompson erroneously argues that (despite being a coastal castle) Scarborough Castle was slighted. See Section 5.6.1 in Chapter Five for details.

opinion confirms that the importance of these castles to contemporaries should not be seen as a foregone conclusion, and that their proximity to the coast may or may not have influenced the slighting decisions made about them.

As in the chronology section, it is worth looking at the data in a different way and plotting Thompson's gazetteer data onto a map to look at it in its geographic context. Figure 2.5 shows the complete distribution pattern for Thompson's data for the years 1642-1660. The map confirms that the majority of slighting references were for castles in the 'middle corridor' of Britain, with an especially strong concentration in the Marches, the Midlands (South, East, and West), and North Yorkshire. It fails, however, to reveal a conclusive pattern of only landlocked slightings, and in fact shows a substantial number of castles located nominally in coastal areas including, of course, Thompson's anomalous 'exceptions' of Scarborough, Dover, Christchurch, Winchester, and Plymouth. The reasons behind these exceptions remain unclear, but might be discovered by further research at the local and regional level in order to identify possible contributory factors that are not detectable at the national level. It is worth considering as well, however, that an omission of slighting references in many regions might reflect the fact that there were actually no serviceable castles *to slight*. This is certainly true of large parts of East Anglia where fortified castles like Norwich Castle were in the minority, and castles such as Castle Rising, Castle Acre, Caister, Framlingham, and Orford played no known role in the Civil War. Moreover, a failure to discuss the slighting of so-called coastal castles might not reflect a desire to protect the realm from foreign invasion so much as a desire to protect their own immediate interests. In particular, the protection of London would have been paramount, and since Kent was the 'gateway' to the capital, this might explain why Kent's castles were not 'punished' for their role in the Second Civil War.

Another criticism of Thompson's interpretation of the distribution data can be drawn from work done on England's settlement patterns throughout various periods of history (in particular, see Roberts and Wrathmell 2000 and 2002). The 'middle corridor' of England, where most of Thompson's slighted castles are situated, corresponds with what Roberts and Wrathmell (2000 and 2002) refer to as the Central Province, an area characterised by population increases, the growth of royal

power, and the steady use of taxation and bureaucracy throughout the medieval period (Roberts and Wrathmell 2002, 145). As a result, a large number of castles were originally situated in this general area of the landscape, and it is therefore unsurprising that so many of the Parliamentary references reflect this—quite simply, there were far more inland castles than coastal ones for Parliament to discuss. And finally, lest too much analysis of the distribution pattern be attempted, it should be reiterated that this distribution map is only a representation of the *proposed or ordered* slights of Parliament between 1642 and 1660, as recorded by Thompson (1987a, 179-85). In short, the resultant pattern in no way reflects the real number or distribution of slights that were actually executed, and therefore any analysis of it is inherently limited and flawed. Moreover, as castles not specifically mentioned in Parliamentary records were excluded from Thompson's original research parameters, it tells us nothing about the rhetoric or priorities of those at local and regional levels who were no doubt arguing for or against the slighting of castles within their spheres of influence.

2.3 Discussion

This chapter has demonstrated some of the basic problems with simple chronological and geographic interpretations about why slighting took place. In particular, the argument that slights increased in number, frequency, and severity after the First Civil War was shown to be incorrect or debatable, and other hitherto unexplored regional patterns were uncovered. These patterns did not suggest an obvious coastal/inland motivation, but rather hint at other currently invisible causes that created regional imbalances in the slighting references.

One of the most notable problems that has come to light by assessing Thompson's gazetteer is that a compilation of written orders provides no real insight into what is actually taking place at 'ground level'. By predominantly using records from the House of Commons and the House of Lords, Thompson (1987a, 179-85) has presented a top heavy view of slighting that focuses on what was *discussed* at a *national* level. The dual emphasis here highlights that it is not slighting itself that he has analysed, but rather its rhetoric. Moreover, it is a rhetoric taking place among an elite far removed from the realities of implementing destruction at ground level.

While this has its own interesting elements worthy of further exploration, it is not a useful means of making presumptions about the execution and extent of *actual* destruction. As previously highlighted, such an approach also ignores destruction committed by Royalists, as well as the scores of sites whose destruction—to varying degrees—took place across the land but never received Parliamentary notice.

This raises two fundamental questions that must be considered. The first is whether we *can* determine which castles were slighted. Doing so means moving beyond trite and simple assumptions, sweeping generalisations, and definitive assertions, and requires a massive shift away from the top heavy rhetoric that occurred at a national level. Having done so, the second question beyond that becomes how are we to identify and understand the practical effects of slighting at ‘ground level’? This is crucial if we hope to establish much clearer regional or chronological patterns, and if we want to understand how slighting affected those involved in its execution.

Chapter Three addresses all of these problems by outlining a new methodology to tackle old (and new) questions. This is done by going back ‘to the basics’: first, it identifies the slighting methods available to seventeenth century individuals and provides basic information about each process and how it can be recognised in the archaeological record. Second, it highlights various problematic issues that affect the survivability of slighting evidence, and third, proposes a more systematic, multidisciplinary methodology for recognising and recording the effects of slighting.

Chapter Three

Methods and Methodologies: How was it slighted and how can we tell?

Introduction

'Archaeology is one means of understanding how our surroundings have come to their present condition, and of placing a value upon them...'

(Meeson 1994, 254)

Chapters One and Two exposed some of the basic flaws of the current narrative of castle slightings by highlighting two severe problems: a lack of interest in or understanding of actual slighting methods, and an over reliance on Parliamentary records to 'explain' slightings. The end result has been a narrative of castle slightings that largely ignores the physical and documentary evidence at site and regional level, preferring instead to use broad, national explanations for how and why slighting occurred. These explanations are especially problematic because they fail to establish satisfactorily what slighting *is*, resulting in a myriad of contradictory and even hyperbolic statements that characterise slighting as little more than the 'blowing up' of castles.

This chapter will address these issues and build on the two previous chapters in several ways. First, it will identify the slighting methods available to contemporaries and discuss the various logistics of how they were implemented and how they 'worked' in a practical sense. Secondly, it will highlight other causes of destruction—unrelated to slighting—that obscure, erase, or complicate the recognition and understanding of slighting evidence. The final part of this chapter, and the natural outcome of the first two sections, will argue for a new methodological approach that looks at castles in a much more holistic way. It does not reject the use of documents, but rather advocates an archaeological approach that also draws on a wide range of disciplines and specialist subjects. In doing so, it aims to establish higher standards for the slighting terminology we use, and to promote a closer dialogue between archaeologists and others with specialist knowledge about destruction.

3.1 Methods of slighting

Carmarthen (Wales): 'The castle is now converted into a gaol, and disfigured in the usual way'.

(Armitage 1912, 285)

This thesis argues that a clear understanding of the process of slighting must derive from clearly established definitions of slighting. In order to do this, it is necessary to answer several basic questions: what methods were available to contemporaries, what knowledge was required, and how were they implemented? What can we, as archaeologists, decipher about these methods from buildings and documents, and what remains unanswered? And perhaps most important of all, what do the practicalities of these methods reveal about the motivations of those carrying out the destruction?

In addressing these questions, it must first be established that there was no 'usual way' to disfigure a building. Timber beams and flooring could be burned, and glass could easily be smashed. Stone, particularly in the form of walls several feet thick, presented a greater challenge and required more forethought and effort. It could be destroyed slowly and piecemeal by hand, or else destabilised rapidly by the strategic removal of key structural components. The existence of gunpowder provided contemporaries with a series of further options: namely, augmenting the impact of undermining, or ripping apart masonry through sheer explosive force. These can all be condensed into four distinct, destructive methods:

- Picking building materials apart with handheld utensils (shovels, crowbars, pickaxes, etc.).
- Undermining a wall or tower, with or without an explosive charge.
- Blowing masonry apart by placing detonating gunpowder in a chamber.
- Setting fire to buildings.

The method used depended on several factors. There were practical considerations that had to be taken into account, such as the shape and construction of the building, or how much time was available and what tools and expertise were to hand to oversee and carry out the destruction. Other considerations were political or social. They included whether there was organised opposition or support for the destruction,

or what the repercussions might be against those responsible. The method chosen also depended on the immediate objective of those involved. Motivations ranged from humiliating/punishing the owner, retrieving materials, rendering the building uninhabitable, venting aggression, and asserting authority in a 'malignant' area. Of course, these reasons were rarely mutually exclusive and many sites demonstrate evidence of more than one of these factors.

Defining and thinking about the methods used by seventeenth century slighers is, however, only the first step. The intervening three and a half centuries have brought a myriad of changes to slighted castles, both natural and human in origin, and understanding how these processes have affected the castle (and the slighting evidence it contains) is a crucial aspect of studying castle destruction. This is because later alterations and developments can obscure, erase, or mimic evidence for slighting damage, and an awareness of their characteristics assists in the identification and isolation of the various causes of destruction at site level. This necessitates a two-pronged approach: an examination of the minutiae of damage evidence at site/wall/material level, but also an awareness, as much as possible, of the overall life cycle and history of the castle since its slighting phase. This holistic approach is the only way to isolate slighting damage from the myriad of other factors that cause buildings to decay and disappear. The rest of this chapter therefore serves as an introduction to how these themes will be explored in later chapters, beginning with an understanding of the methods themselves.

3.1.1 Picking

One of the simplest ways to destroy a stone building was to remove or damage the material from which it was made. This, however, was by no means a simple task. Whether a Norman castle or a fortified manor house, a wide range of challenges existed for those trying to slight. Walls that were several feet or even yards thick consisted of dressed ashlar blocks of considerable size, bonded to a dense rubble core of varying consistency and strength. Usually made of limestone or sandstone, the durability of these walls depended greatly on construction methods, geology, the bedding of the stone, the strength of the mortar, and other structural and environmental factors. The stonework, however, was not the only material within the

castle. Timber beams and planks, glass, bricks, tiles, and lead window linings and pipes were just some of the other features that were targeted for destruction or removal, as well as the contents and furnishings of the house.

The tools and methods utilised for the job varied depending on what one wanted to achieve. Common tools for working with stone included crowbars, levers, and picks of various kinds (Andrews 1974, 66), and at Stafford instruments of this type were considered valuable enough to warrant being secured in the magazine (Pennington and Roots 1957, 340). When Newark Castle (Nottinghamshire) was being slighted, the surrounding villages were ‘summoned to come in with spades, shovels, pickaxes and other necessaries...’ (Warner 2000, 55), and similar implements were used at Raglan (Wales) (Friar 2003, 272). These tools were used for two different types of picking: non-salvage destruction and salvage destruction. The former involved knocking courses of stonework and rubble core outward, creating a huge pile of debris at ground level in the process. For logistical and safety reasons, this was carried out from top to bottom, beginning with the roofs and battlements, and often resulted in a significant reduction in the height of the structure (see Section 4.2.1 in Chapter Four). The second form of picking, the salvaging of materials, was an act carried out both by those in control of the castle and by those surreptitiously robbing from it (see Section 3.2.4). It was characterised by the removal of certain materials such as stone, timber, or metals, and required significant alterations to the picking technique already described (see Section 4.3 in Chapter Four). Both forms of picking were equally destructive, but as Chapter Four will demonstrate, the evidence they left behind in the archaeological record is distinctly different.

It is also important to consider who was carrying out the manual labour and why they were involved, particularly as this would have had an impact on how the work was performed. Kightly (1979, 188) argues that ‘local people joined in the destruction with a good will’ and that to contemporaries this seemed ‘elementary common sense’. At Raglan, a contemporary noted how the ‘country people were summoned...to draw [dredge] the mote in hope of wealth; their hope failing, they were set to cut the stanks [dams] of the great fishponds, where they had store of very great carps, and other large fish’ (cited by Friar 2003, 272). Similarly, at Newark the

work performed is argued to have been carried out by nearby villagers and townsfolk to a substandard level (Warner 2000, 55). The fact that Newark retains some of the best Civil War earthworks in the country tends to confirm this view. At the opposite end of the scale, the four-month demolition of Montgomery Castle was carried out by miners, masons, carpenters, and 150 labourers, and appears to have been a highly organised affair (Thompson 1987a, 186-193). The size and type of labour force needed, therefore, was in part guided by the immediate objectives at hand: a community that wanted to reuse or sell the materials would avoid methods that were wastefully destructive or reduced profit, just as a 'demolition gang' brought in to quickly destroy a site would strive to do the opposite.

It has been argued that careful demolition seems to have required craftsmen of various trades, while unrestrained destruction relied heavily on civilian labour. Knowing these details, however, is only part of the story, and we are left with important questions about why people participated in picking. Any reluctance among civilian labour to carry out this backbreaking work, for example, might stem from an ideological opposition to the party ordering it or from a simple aversion to do hard work for little pay; anxiety over possible future attacks and general apathy are also possible explanations (Harrington 2003, 57). Equally, in cases like Raglan where the populace appear cooperative and enthusiastic, the causes can be varied. These include poverty, hope for personal gain, deep-rooted antagonism towards the landowner or local garrison, and fervent support for the war effort. Determining private motives is also challenging in those cases where the 'free will' of the labour force is open to debate. In London, for example, servants were sent to help dismantle the city defences (Smith 1997, 79-80), and cases such as this question how much independent decision-making each individual in the labour force actually had. Consequently, the motivations and thoughts of those executing destruction at 'ground level' remains a largely unexplored and potentially crucial key to understanding picking, and needs closer examination.

Discussions so far have centred on pickings organised and executed by civilians—with or without the retrieval of materials—but it is important to point out that picking overall was more complex than this. As Chapter Two demonstrated, the military

could also be involved, although it is harder to quantify what actions fell under their responsibility and how much of these actions were ‘delegated’ to civilians. As Howell (2000, 393) has argued in relation to the medieval demolition of the Roman tetrapylon at Caerleon, large-scale dismantlings required a certain amount of engineering expertise, and experience and knowledge of this kind tended to come from the military. Conversely, picking was not always premeditated or organised. In its most spontaneous form it consisted of simple vandalism or plunder, both of which the armies of the day excelled at. Berkeley Castle (Gloucestershire) has already been touched upon in Chapter One (see Section 1.4.2), but it was by no means exceptional, and its scale suggests that it was just as destructive as methods used in more organised operations.

Due to the complexity and extent of picking as a method of destruction, these issues (and how to understand them in an archaeological sense) will be examined in depth in Chapter Four.

3.1.2 Undermining¹

Perhaps the quickest and potentially most thorough method for destroying a structure was undermining. This consisted of interfering with a wall’s load bearing capacity, primarily by removing supporting components, which included arches, vaults, buttresses, and other features that strengthened a wall, or else took the form of weakening a wall by reducing its thickness through the strategic removal of its stone mass. As further logistical techniques will be discussed in Section 3.2.3 (Siege Undermining) and again in Chapter Five, this section will serve as an introduction to the physics involved, as well as some of the available options associated with this method.

The precise reasons why buildings collapse are complex (Heyman 1995, 25). At its most basic level, the function of any building is to channel loads to the ground

¹ In addition to the referenced literature, this section has benefited from discussions with the following: David Dickinson, Civil Engineer (Network Rail), Stuart Ellis, Structural Engineer (English Heritage), Robert Thew, Structural Engineer, (Dossor Group), Anthony Park, Alasdair Beal, and Stuart Broadley, Structural Engineers (Thomasons LLP), Ian Andrew, Structural Engineer (White, Young, Green), Brigadier William Woodburn (Retired) (Royal Engineers), John Ruddy, Structural Engineer (Capstone Consulting Engineers), and Frank Clough, Civil Engineer (Retired).

through its component materials using the least amount of ‘work’ (Salvadori 1990, 59). These ‘dead loads’ are the same today as they were in the past and consist of beams, floors, ceilings, roofs, inner walls, and anything that is structurally ‘always there’ (*ibid*, 43-44). In addition to these *downward* bearing loads, structures have loads that are distributed laterally, creating a complex interweaving of structural forces that must be carefully balanced. Masonry structures, which favour static conditions, were never designed to be elastic and therefore do not cope well with introduced stresses (Balderrama 1998, 108). Undermining interrupts a structure’s established load bearing channels and puts pressure on the structure to ‘adjust’ by redistributing the load elsewhere. How well the building achieves this depends on a variety of factors such as its materials, the quality of its construction, and where and how much its supports are compromised. Undermining does not automatically result in the collapse of masonry, and in many cases minor cracking may be the only result (Wiggins 2001, 222). In severe cases, however, the weakened area is unable to support the dead loads located above it and against it, and major cracking or collapse results. If this area is bonded to other walls or structures which provided mutual support, the knock-on effect can be the twisting, cracking, collapsing, or movement of connected structural features. For this reason, corners provide ideal targets for undermining not only because they already bear a significant amount of the brunt of structural forces from above, but also because they spread the destructive force through more of the structure than would result from undermining a straight wall (Wiggins 2001, 222). They also often provided convenient access points from which to remove masonry material in order to facilitate the undermining process (see below).

The undermining process occurred in one of two ways. The first was sub-ground destabilisation, which basically involved removing soil underneath the foundation of the structure being undermined. This was an option only if the foundation was not too deep and the soil was amenable to digging. It was well suited to perimeter towers or walls on steep inclines or ditches, the result of which was usually the tipping outward of the structure in the direction of the removed earth (see Section 5.2 in Chapter 5). This method could also serve as an alternative to tunnelling into structures which were particularly strongly bonded (see Section 3.2.1). This second

type of undermining, or '*into-mining*', involved the strategic calculation of a structure's weakest points, then the selective removal of stonework *above* foundation level in a horizontal 'tunnel' inside the wall core. To delay collapse, timber props were inserted to provide temporary support until the crucial time when destabilisation was to be instigated. Several options existed for removing the props. Oxen or shire horses could be used to pull the timber free, or else the props could be burned. In order to augment the force, gunpowder was also used, although this added an even more unpredictable element to what was already an inexact science. While it is difficult to determine how often explosives were used in the slighting process, it could be argued that gunpowder would have been used if available, particularly since explosive charges were already standard practice in siege mines (Wiggins 2001, 238). The use of gunpowder in undermining castles should not be treated as a foregone conclusion, however, for as Chapter 5 will demonstrate, undermining was a complex process that involved a variety of contributing factors.

Understanding undermining, however, takes more than just a grasp of the physical mechanics at work. It also requires recognition of the secondary—particularly the intangible and human—factors that played a role *before* undermining occurred. In particular, this requires an awareness of the broader engineering knowledge contemporaries might have had, and how this would have affected their assessment of the castle's weak points. This act of looking for structural weak points is still common practice today in a variety of fields that deal with historic buildings, particularly conservation. According to Feilden (2003, 20) this involves assessing a building's strength using three main criteria: first, the overall form of the structure, second, its individual elements (walls, foundations, roofs, soil), and third, the materials these things are made of. The challenge for archaeologists is to take a similar approach and look not with a conservationist's eye, but from the perspective of seventeenth century engineers, and in doing so ask the same questions about the castle they would have: Were explosives to be used? What side of the structure should be undermined, and at what height and to what depth into the wall? How much timber would be needed and where should it be placed? The answers to these questions would have varied from site to site, despite the plethora of military manuals and knowledge available at the time (see Chapter 5). Rather, each castle's

unique circumstances in terms of construction, physical environment, availability of timber, and the engineer's level of experience and knowledge would have drastically affected the methods chosen, and ultimately, the end results.

3.1.3 Gunpowder

A third option for slighting buildings was to cause an explosion by packing a chamber with gunpowder. This process is euphemistically referred to by many scholars as 'blowing up' and is often confused with explosive undermining. From a methodological perspective, it differed from explosive undermining in that the gunpowder was not being used as a secondary *aid* to another process of destruction, but was rather the primary source of unchannelled destruction. To date, the use of gunpowder to slight castles has rarely been critically examined, unlike other aspects of gunpowder, such as its manufacture and distribution. A great deal of research has taken place on the history of gunpowder, the logistics of its production, and its importance to field armies (see Buchanan 1996; Edwards 1998, 234-271; Keen 1999; Cocroft 2000, 14-16; Edwards 2000, 107-120; Buchanan 2005). Evidence in the archaeological record is poorly represented (Cocroft 2000, 14), and consequently most information about the use of gunpowder in the English Civil War derives from documentary sources. Numerous primary and secondary sources confirm that both sides went to great lengths to secure the raw materials and to ensure a steady supply of the finished product. Despite this, at any given time demand exceeded supply, and although production increased markedly as the war progressed, self-sufficiency by either party was never realised (Edwards 1998, 245). Its status as a prized commodity meant its manufacture and storage would have been fiercely controlled by the military, and local bureaucracies would no doubt have had a hard time obtaining it without the cooperation of the army. All of these factors would have had important ramifications for any decisions made at local level about how to carry out slighting.

The consistency of gunpowder changed over time, but during the Civil War its key ingredients of saltpetre, charcoal, and sulphur were mixed to a ratio of 75:15:10 (Edwards 2000, 108). Gunpowder was usually stored in barrels of 100 lbs, but could also be kept in large vats of two cwts (hundredweights) or more, as well as in smaller

budge barrels constructed with copper hoops to avoid sparks (Edwards² 2004, pers. comm.). Accidents were not uncommon (see Section 3.2.3), and documentary accounts suggest that the resultant effects on masonry could be devastating. Depending on the quality and placement of the powder, the resulting debris would in theory be much smaller and jagged than that produced from undermining. Whether the blasted rubble would be easily discernible in an excavation is debatable, although material in the immediate vicinity of the blast would be expected to show scorch marks, charring, and perhaps a change in mortar chemistry (Emmerson³ 2005, pers. comm.). As difficult as it is to detect and record these changes in rubble composition, it is perhaps more so to record the structural effects of a gunpowder explosion. This is due to the obvious effects of explosion on a structure, namely destabilisation or even complete obliteration from the archaeological record. Even if survival does occur, explosion damage ‘can develop planes of weakness in structures’ that worsen an already weakened area and potentially hasten collapse (Mills 1998, 59).

This lack of survival in the archaeological record makes quantifying its use difficult. A rare survival—allegedly created by a mine detonation—was found at Newcastle-upon-Tyne in the form of a ‘funnel shaped crater 16 x 20 ft and at least 5 ft in depth’ (Harrington 2004, 18). Archaeologists working at Newark Castle (Nottinghamshire) have attributed a similar pattern in the porter’s lodge of the gatehouse to the use of gunpowder, although gunpowder was probably used at various points across the site (Marshall and Samuels 1997, 40) (Figure 3.1). The ‘cratered-out’ pattern is detectable in the presence of later Victorian restoration work which replaced damaged or missing original fabric. This restoration was carried out by the famous Victorian architect Anthony Salvin between 1845-8 (*ibid*; Notts SMR, monument report for 3040[1]) and reflects an attempt to stabilise the building and prevent collapse. Its use here demonstrates that restoration work—as well as being of interest to architectural historians—is a valuable tool for understanding past destruction processes like explosion. Not only can it ‘preserve’ the original destruction pattern *in situ*, but it highlights structural areas that earlier generations recognised as being at risk of collapse, possibly due to their Civil War slighting experience.

² Professor Peter Edwards, Gunpowder Historian, Roehampton University.

³ Roger Emmerson, Institute of Explosives Engineers.

Assessing whether evidence for gunpowder damage exists at any site—and consequently, whether this method was used—brings with it an obligation to consider a variety of other related issues. To begin with, it is necessary to consider the logistical controls over gunpowder's production, use, and movements, especially in relation to military involvement at the site. In some cases this evidence indicates 'self slighting'. At the fortified manor house of Clogaveraine (Wales), for example, the fleeing defenders blew up their own gunpowder as well as burnt the house and slighted the defences (TT E21.23 cited in Avent 1987, 188). Its inherent quickness as a method of destruction made it—like fire—particularly popular with field armies on the move. It could also be argued, however, that the sheer noise and drama of its execution, as well as its ability to produce impressive ruins and widespread debris, made it an especially good choice if a hard line message was being sent out to the owner or the 'malignant' locals. However, any consideration of whether gunpowder was used must always be balanced with the reasons gunpowder might *not* have been used: in particular, the fact that it was expensive and dangerous to handle (Lewis 1971, 123; Thompson 1987a, 151), onerous to move (see Chapter 5), and required coordination between military and civilian bureaucracies when used in organised slightings. In short, the use of gunpowder at site level should never be viewed as an assumed fact, but should be cautiously considered as one possible option, depending on supporting and corroborating evidence.

3.1.4 Fire

Burning houses during the Civil War was a common tactic for both sides (Thompson 1987a, 139; see Tennant 1992, 209-222, for a good introduction). In Gloucestershire alone, Yate Court, Campden House, Lypiatt House, and others 'went up in flames' (Warmington 1997, 78), and military commanders such as the Parliamentarian Colonel Barnard at Cwmhir Abbey justified their actions by claiming that it was necessary in order to 'render it unserviceable for the future' (CSPD 8/12/44). On the Royalist side, Prince Rupert's arson policy and his torching of Birmingham in April 1643 compelled Parliamentary pamphleteers to blackly refer to the foreign prince's 'burning love for England' (cited in Tennant 1992, 210). The use of fire to destroy houses was not uncontroversial, however, and its occurrence was condemned in some quarters:

'We heare since that [Beoley House] is burnt down also, whether because a Papists house, or an house Fortified, we know not; but foresee sad dayes to come in England if we fall to burning...[The Royalists] burnt at [Birmingham] and divers other places, and in that went before us. It were to be wished we had never taken so bad an example to go by.'

(cited in Tennant 1992, 212)

Despite this kind of lamentation, fire continued to be an important method for destroying castles and manor houses throughout the Civil War, particularly as it was by far the cheapest method available in terms of resources.

Archaeologically, there has been little research done on how fire and heat impact different types of stone (Dimes 1998, 131), although some of the general effects are widely recognised. Most commonly this includes blackening, shattering, and/or decomposition (Honeyborne 1998, 165), as well as the easily recognisable reddening of stone surfaces. It is a misnomer to say that stone 'burns', however; rather, it is weakened by close proximity to burning materials which in turn affect its composition and colour (Dimes 1998, 131). Visually, the interior face of St. Mary's Abbey Wall, located along Bootham Road in York, provides a particularly good example of the range of damage that can result (Figures 3.2 and 3.3). In 1942, this part of York suffered an initial wave of firebombing that was used to 'light up' other targets for a second wave of high explosives bombing (Taylor and Kessler 1986, 18). The intensity of this incendiary attack is evident not only in the deep reddening of much the abbey's limestone, but also in the widespread shattering of surface stone, in some cases so severe that it necessitated replacing the ashlar.

The challenge facing archaeologists, particularly where slighting is concerned, is to use fire damage patterns to explain past destructive acts and/or isolate other causal factors. This is particularly important at sites such as Shelford Manor (Nottinghamshire), where excavations have revealed stones with scorch marks (Notts SMR, monument description for 8251[1]), in order to understand where fires began and how far they spread through the building. It is important, too, that vital fire clues are not missed in the surveying of standing fabric. This is illustrated by the alleged fire damage to the porch area of Hopton Castle (Shropshire) (Figures 3.4 and 3.5), which occurred, according to local legend, when the castle was sacked and its garrison massacred by Prince Rupert.

Of course, not all fires at Civil War sites should be attributed to slighting (or even the Civil War), and this poses an additional challenge that must be considered. Several castles, such as Dudley in 1750 and Wressle in 1796, suffered from accidental fires that damaged them to varying degrees (Porter 1994, 130). In some cases the fires were intentionally set, as evidenced by the burning of Nottingham Castle in 1831 by a mob allegedly enraged by the owner's opposition to the Reform Bill (Brodie 1994, 114-5). These cautionary tales remind us that Civil War arson should never be assumed, but instead should be considered and rejected if the evidence does not support it. The keep at Knaresborough Castle (Yorkshire) particularly illustrates this point. The western side of the tower displays a small and inexplicable fire damage pattern not far off the ground (Figure 3.12). A closer examination of the fire damage reveals what looks like two equally sized bore holes, suggesting that at one time in the past something was fixed to the wall (Figure 3.13). It is possible that an interpretation panel similar to the one shown in Figure 3.12 was here before the ground level was raised to its current height, and that this earlier sign was vandalised with fire. These and similar obstacles to the correct identification of slighting will be discussed further in Section 3.2.

It is important to note that now—as in the past—fire, as a behavioural entity, is complex and variable. Structural and environmental conditions, particularly a fire's access to air and combustible materials, can have an enormous impact on how a fire destroys a building. For these reasons, discussion with experts in other specialist fields can raise important issues that archaeologists must address in order to understand some of the mechanics of slighting. In particular, the modern forensic science of fire investigation offers valuable insight, and a rare opportunity to understand how fire damages historic buildings occurred in January 2005 when a fire broke out at Allerton Castle (Yorkshire)⁴. Although the contributory factors were varied and complex, the role of wood panelling in spreading the fire was crucial. This was largely due to the small air space between the interior walls and the panelling (Figure 3.6). Both wood and air provided fuel, dictated the direction of

⁴ Many thanks to Trevor Lunn (Arson Investigator for Yorkshire Fire and Rescue Service) for sharing his thoughts on the investigation and on arson in general, and to John Edmunds for providing access to the site.

‘travel’ vertically, and once the fire reached the roofs, allowed it spread horizontally through several areas of the castle.

The condition of materials that survived the Allerton Castle fire reveals other details about how materials react to extreme heat. Discolouration of stone was present (Figure 3.7), and due to its low melting temperature, several damaged tiles were found with melted drops of lead still attached to their surface (Figures 3.8 and 3.9). Denser lead material, probably from the roof, was also found melted amid fire debris (Figure 3.10). Intriguingly, a significant amount of timber managed to survive in the roofs, despite the intensity of the fire in this part of the castle (Figure 3.11). The main factor at work was the age and size of the oak beams, many of which experienced surface charring but managed to retain a great deal of material cohesion. In essence, these beams simply had to ‘wait it out’ until all of the surrounding combustible materials were exhausted and the fire ‘moved’ elsewhere.

What are the applications for this kind of modern understanding of fire on events that happened 360 years ago? The first is the obvious methodological benefits of knowing how to identify evidence for fire, particularly if timber has long since ceased to be *in situ*. This includes using burn distribution patterns in stone to track the trajectory or intensity of the fire, as well as using the location and density spread of lead debris in excavation material. Comparisons with other modern and documented fires—such as the one at Windsor Castle in 1992—could provide even more useful methodological data. Secondly, it forces us to re-think our perception of fire as being a quick and easy way to destroy a building. The survival at Allerton of large timber beams—albeit with external charring—demonstrates that hard, thick, well seasoned oak can be extremely resistant to fire, even at high temperatures for several hours. Also, the importance of panelling suggests that it probably played a similar role in Civil War burnings, and raises questions about how and where fires were kindled in areas that lacked panelling.

On an even deeper level, confronting our own modern ignorance about how fire destroys forces us to re-assess whether contemporaries saw fire as a quick and easy method. How much of an understanding was there of the best locations and methods

to start fires? Could setting these fires have taken more time and strategic planning than we realise? There are occasional clues in the historical record, most of which suggest that fires were targeted and assisted. The fire that destroyed Milcote House (Warwickshire), for example, was set in 'three or four several places' (Tennant 1992, 213), and in destroying the manor house at Ayneho, Royalists '...did lately carry loads of straw into the house...and set the straw on fire and burnt down not only his dwelling house...but also burnt all the barnes, stables and outhouses thereto belonging...' (Tennant 1992, 218). The latter in particular shows both that a significant amount of labour was sometimes involved before the fire in order to create better burning conditions, and also that buildings completely lacking a military role were sometimes targeted for destruction. This should in turn lead us to ask further questions about stated versus unstated objectives, and whether the way a fire was executed can reveal hidden motives and attitudes about those perpetrating it.

3.2 Problems of identification

Unfortunately, understanding slighting methods and identifying that destruction in the archaeological record is not a straightforward process. Unlike other 'artefacts' that have been deposited and sealed in the below ground archaeological record, castles and fortified houses present a much more complex picture. These sites were not only radically transformed during their Civil War lives, but have undergone important changes in the 360 years since that must be recognised and noted. Some of these changes were effected before slighting by those preparing the site for defence, as well as by those attacking it. These alterations can be seen in the earthworks constructed around towns and buildings, and in the gun loops and artillery platforms that were added into walls. After the Civil War, further destructive changes took place in the form of stone robbing, post war alterations, and urban expansion. Somewhat poignantly, still more damage was inflicted by antiquaries and conservators, many of whom, in their zeal to display or 'protect' the past, often employed methods that destroyed archaeological and architectural information. All of these factors can obscure, erase, or complicate the correct identification of slighting evidence, and consequently, in order to understand the phenomenon of slighting, it will be necessary to understand the other destructive forces that helped create the castle ruins in existence today.

3.2.1 Construction

'All wall[s], whether they be of stone or of brycke, or of claye with strawe or mudde, must be made levell and plumme, or[else] they be redy to fall'.

(Horman, 1519, cited in Salzman 1952, 88)

One fundamental way that a structure's long term viability is threatened is by a poor initial design or construction (Honeyborne 1998, 169). Construction and architectural issues have been covered in some depth elsewhere (for a sample, see Salzman 1952; Andrews 1974; Harvey 1975; Gordon 1978; Clifton-Taylor *et al.* 1983; Coldstream 1991; Parsons 1991; Heyman 1995; Ashurst and Dimes 1998; Binding 2004), and therefore this chapter will not go into great detail about how castles were constructed. However, because most slighted buildings were medieval in origin, highlighting the basics of medieval construction practices will be useful before examining how that work came to be destroyed.

The first and most important part of a castle's structural stability was the foundation, so much so that its construction fell under the supervision of the master mason (Harvey 1975, 107). While a great deal of variation occurred regarding their depths, foundations generally had more breadth than the walls built above them, and it was of the utmost importance that the stones were packed tightly (Salzman 1952, 83). Land subsidence and changes in water tables could have disastrous effects on foundation stones, thereby making the choice of site and the laying out of foundation stones a fundamental consideration. The walls resting on the foundations were usually made up of an inner rubble core, comprising irregularly shaped stones and mortar, and an outer face of undressed or dressed stone (for the latter, this thesis uses the term 'ashlar', although the subtle degrees of classification for it are noted but not explored here (see Hill 1998, 98-9)). These walls varied dramatically in terms of their thickness and quality of construction but could be exceedingly strong and well crafted, as noted by George Owen of Pembrokeshire in 1603:

'...all the buildings of the auncient castells were of lyme & stone verye stronge & substancially built, such as our masons of this adge cannot doe the like: for althoughe all or most of the Castells are ruinated and remayne uncovered, some for diverse hundred yeres past, yet are all the walls firme and stronge, and nothing [i]mpayred, but seeme as if the lyme and stone did incorporate the one with the other & become one substance inseperable: so that [i]t [i]s more easie to dig stones out of the mayne Rocke, then to pull downe an old wall...'

(cited in Thompson 1987b, 206)

Despite this propensity for strength, medieval walls were still affected by several construction issues that impacted on their long term stability. These issues could result from design decisions, such as the bonding of curtain walls to towers; this created an imbalance in weight and encouraged the development of fissures and instability (Toy 1955, 31). They also related to how construction was executed at a more minute level; it was crucial to cut stones according to the natural bedding of the sediment, and although this was recognised, masons did not always adhere to it in practice (Salzman 1952, 125; Andrews 1974, 65; Mills 1998, 58). Poorly cut stone accelerated the rate of natural decay and potentially weakened the building, affecting its ability to cope with ongoing (and introduced) structural stresses. Additionally, sharp corners, holes, and cracks also raised local stresses (Gordon 1978, 65), with further cracks forming along points of weakness and straight joints (Mills 1998, 62). These issues are just a few among many that contributed to the resilience (or lack thereof) of individual structural components, as well as the building as a whole.

This variability in the construction quality of buildings is generally recognised. Less acknowledged and understood are the catastrophic repercussions these earlier decisions had on a building already weakened by Civil War damage. Research on buildings in earthquake areas has established a clear relationship between quality construction and less structural damage (Balderrama 1998, 108), and evidence suggests poor construction served as a direct cause of later deterioration, as well as indirectly contributing to collapse instigated by natural forces (see Section 3.3.7). At Bolton Castle (Yorkshire), one theory put forward for the collapse of the North-East Tower is that the foundations, thought to be those of the original manor house, were not equipped to bear the weight of a multi-storeyed tower (Jackson 1956, 23). This is particularly significant because the castle is often alleged to have suffered slighting and/or siege damage—as well as environmental damage—and understanding how inherent structural weaknesses might augment these processes is invaluable. In some cases, such as Bramber Castle (Sussex) it can even disprove popularly held assumptions about the site. Since the eighteenth century, Bramber's deteriorated state has been attributed to slighting, but excavations in the 1970s identified poor construction, natural land subsidence, and stone robbing as the chief causes for its condition (see Barton *et al.* 1977).

Although its main component material, stone is not the only factor in construction, and timber, lead, iron, glass, and tiles all played important structural roles. Of these, the two most important materials were lead and timber. Roofs consisted of lead cast sheets weighing as much as fourteen pounds per foot (Andrews 1974, 77), and this weight, intensified by gravity, made the roof the most significant load that the stone walls had to cope with. Most roofing infrastructures were made of timber (Friar 2003, 248), which in England invariably meant oak, and it was through the intricacies of roofing construction that the weight of the roof was distributed to the stone walls (see Harvey 1975, 147-158; Harris 1993; Dean 1996). At lower levels floors, which consisted of joists resting on main beams (Harris 1993, 26), provided lateral support to walls, and how deeply they were imbedded into the walls had a profound impact on how their removal affected the structure as a whole. Less visibly, however, timber also played a stabilising role when inserted into the rubble core of a wall by reducing the stress on the outer skins (Heyman 1995, 84). The relationship between stone, timber, and lead was therefore a largely symbiotic one, and anything that upset this delicate balance had the potential to affect adversely the structural integrity of the building as a whole.

3.2.2 Civil War refortification of sites

The study of sieges and fortifications of the English Civil War has been considered extensively elsewhere by archaeologists and military historians. This coverage includes overviews of general European and British administrative developments (see Duffy 1979; Kightly 1979; Kenyon 1981 and 1990; Parker 1988; Saunders 1989), as well as more detailed surveys of siegecraft and fortifications during the English Civil War (see O'Neil 1945; Harrington 1987 and 2003; Reeves 1996; Hutton and Reeves 1998; Foard 2001; Wiggins 2001). Overwhelmingly, this work concentrates on changes in offensive and defensive tactics, although the need to include more 'social' agendas—such as the use of archaeology to shed light on siege conditions—has been expressed (Harrington 2004). One common feature that has been highlighted is the rapid refortification of sites following the breakout of hostilities, although the extent and nature of such activity varied greatly. In places that lacked medieval walls, such as Cirencester, these fortifications could be as rudimentary as posts and chains (Warmington 1997, 33), as well as timber and earth

thrown up to prevent cavalry charges. Even towns with masonry walls utilised earthworks, however, and these ranged from simple ditches to complicated outerworks known as 'sconces' and forts and other defensive creations (for examples see Ellison *et al.* 1979; Kenyon 1982; Durham *et al.* 1983; Drage 1987; Courtney and Courtney 1992; Foard 1994 and 2000; Smith 1997; Warner 2000; Sheppard 2003). Perhaps the most famous surviving Civil War earthwork is the Queen's Sconce, one of several defensive features created around Newark (Nottinghamshire). These new 'works' not only altered the archaeological record by their creation, but also frequently deposited evidence into the archaeological record through their subsequent siege and slighting experiences.

Refortification was not just restricted to landscapes. Standing fabric was sometimes altered to create artillery placements, evidence for which has been detected at Sandal Castle (Yorkshire) (Mayes and Butler 1983). At Skipton Castle (Yorkshire), the fear of this occurring prompted Parliamentary officials to insist on the construction of thinner walls when the slighted towers were later rebuilt by the owner (see Section 4.2.1 in Chapter Four). Not all changes involved heavy artillery such as cannon or demi-cannon, however, and lighter minions or falcons were sometimes mounted onto walls (Reeves 1996, 28). All of these alterations were extremely destructive, and consequently the evidence they have left in the landscape and archaeological record pose obvious problems for identifying slighting activities. A tower reduced in height to accommodate cannon, for example, may leave similar damage evidence to one slighted by picking later, and this must always be borne in mind when slighting is suspected to have taken place at a site.

3.2.3 Siege damage

It could be argued that for all the alterations and damage defenders created in their own castles, those attacking them inflicted (or at least tried to inflict) much more. This type of destruction, known as siege damage, could be minimal or severe, and occurred during any hostile attempt to gain possession of a castle or fortified site. During the seventeenth century, siege damage fell into three broad categories: first, the explosion of gunpowder; second, siege undermining; and third, artillery bombardment. The damage created by all three can be difficult to differentiate from

slighting damage (see Section 5.6 in Chapter 5), and consequently, a familiarity with all three is crucial to the study of the archaeology of slighting.

Accidental explosion

As discussed above, gunpowder was in great demand by both sides during the English Civil War and played a crucial role in military events. Its volatility, however, made it extremely dangerous, and accidental explosions such as that at Hoghton Tower (Lancashire) in 1643 which destroyed the building and killed sixty soldiers were common (see Broxap 1910, 69). A similar accident took place in the North Blockhouse at Hull when ‘nine or ten hand grenades...took fire, rent the floor, [and] slew [a cannonier] and four more’ (Rushworth Collection cited in Howes and Foreman 1999, 34). One of the worst events occurred in Norwich in 1648 when the town’s magazine exploded during a riot. An estimated eighty barrels of gunpowder were accidentally set off, resulting in the deaths of about forty people and the execution of eight rioters in the ditches of Norwich Castle (Ketton-Cremer 1969, 348 and 349). Afterwards, special parish rates were enacted to pay for glaziers, carpenters, and masons to repair the extensive damage (*ibid*, 343). Contemporary accounts give some idea of the structural and human cost, as well as provide nuances of detail about the effects of explosion:

‘...at least 40 houses was blown up and spoiled by powder, the blow whereof did shake the whole city, threw down part of some churches, wounded and killed a great many of the inhabitants, the certain number not being yet known, nor many of them that were killed, as yet found, or can be known, for many were torn in pieces, and carried limb from limb, several legs, arms, &c. being found in the streets, but we already find missing and mortally wounded at least 120 persons; besides as many more which received slight wounds & hurts.’

(TT E 423 (17))

‘...where tis reported that at least fourscore are slain and divers wounded; they are now pulling the mangled bodies out of the rubbish...The break of the air with the powder have blown most of the glass out of Mr. Hobart’s house and mine and out of the church, a great deal of damage done to the city.’

(Prominent citizen Joseph Payne, writing to his brother-in-law in London.
Cited in Ketton-Cremer 1969, 344)

‘In the blowing up of the house there were 3 families in it consisting of as I am informed twenty-four persons, divers neighbours next of many persons all overwhelmed in the same ruins, some lying above four hours buried are alive, all miraculously preserved, not one slain, all the other dead, we hear not of one in the house escaped alive, above forty persons already

taken up, how many more shall [be] we know not, besides broken shattered pieces blown far and nigh, abundance.'

(Letter written by Deputy Mayor, Christopher Baret to Speaker of House of Commons.
Cited in Ketton-Cremer 1969, 346)

From a methodological perspective, the key characteristics of these explosion accounts are outward expansion and *force*. This is obvious from terms such as 'the blow', 'did shake', 'the break of air', 'blown most of the glass out', and 'broken shattered pieces blown far and nigh'. Just as dangerous, however, was the destabilisation to structures that could result, and the resulting collapse of masonry probably killed far more than those killed directly by the blast itself. An added danger was fire: just a spark was enough to ignite gunpowder, but if it was a structural fire that set off the explosion, then further destruction and loss of life could occur from fire engulfing the ruins after explosion. This is well illustrated by the destruction of Abbotsbury House (Dorset), as recorded by the Parliamentary commander Anthony Ashley Cooper:

'...for the powder taking fire blew up all that were in the house, and blew four score that were in the court a yard from the ground, but hurt only two of them...The house is burnt down to the ground, and could not be saved.'

(Christie 1871)

Of course, the use of such historical sources is not without its problems (see Section 3.2). Descriptions of carnage could have been exaggerated or downplayed for political reasons or dramatic effect. The intended audience and their possible reaction, as well as the motivation of the writer, must therefore be considered. In the case of Abbotsbury House, this means the claim that the house 'could not be saved' cannot be taken as evidence that attempts were made to save it. Such accounts may have been used to justify subsequent actions such as robbing, or to support requests for financial assistance. Some caution must also be used when contemporary accounts are used to gauge the severity of a building's destruction. The imprecision of words such as 'wrecked', 'ruined', 'blown up', and 'destroyed' can give erroneous impressions of the scale of destruction caused and result in inaccurate assumptions about its usability. For these reasons, understanding the documentary context, as well as the building's subsequent history, is critical for accurately assessing the initial scale of the explosion.

One of the additional challenges facing archaeologists is differentiating accidental explosion damage from that associated with slighting. The evidence left behind by both is virtually identical, and here too an understanding of structural context and familiarity with military engineering may help. For example, accidental explosions occurred wherever the gunpowder was being stored, but gunpowder slightings were chosen and planned. It would therefore be expected to find evidence for the former in areas where gunpowder would have been stored, or in places where artillery might have been in use. Conversely, the premeditated nature of slighting with gunpowder meant that the best rooms or areas could be targeted for the maximum structural damage, and therefore evidence in rooms that would not normally be associated with the storage of gunpowder might reflect slighting rather than accident damage.

Siege undermining

Undermining during a siege is by no means an early modern phenomenon. Its use is ‘as old as the first attack on a fortified place’ (Wiggins 2001, 6) and was used extensively in the ancient world (Toy 1955). The Byzantines favoured the tactic of undermining (McGeer 1995, 128), and throughout the Middle Ages defenders especially feared it. This early method of undermining consisted of digging out a ‘gallery’ mine, the earth above being supported by timber beams, until the stone foundation of the castle wall was reached. The sappers would then remove the stonework and hollow out a space, to be filled with timber that would later be ignited. This ‘burnt prop’ method would hopefully result in subsidence that could have devastating effects, such as the collapse of the southeast angle of the keep at Rochester Castle in 1215. Alternatively, it could also result in simple cracking and failure to achieve substantial results, namely the fall of masonry and the collapse of a wall (Wiggins 2001, 222).

With the advent of explosive charges, siege undermining was transformed with devastating results (Wiggins 2001, 220), and most Civil War engineers abandoned the burnt prop method in favour of explosive mining (Wiggins 2001, 238). Dozens of castle and town walls were breached using this method, including Old Wardour Castle, which suffered destructive undermining in two different sieges (Pugh and Saunders 1968). The Royalists at Wardour tried different tactics, ‘either by digging a

hole in the castle-wall, and putting a sufficient quantity of powder therein to blow it up, or by undermining the said wall, and supporting it with timber, and then setting it on fire: whereby they supposed to destroy that also on which the wall rested, and so to bring down the wall...' (Firth 1894, 67). It seems likely that undermining tactics varied depending on siege conditions, availability of resources, time, and experience.

Despite having been spared the horrors of entrenched warfare endured by the continent in the 1600s, England does not appear to have lacked experienced and knowledgeable labour with regard to mining operations. From the early sixteenth century onwards military manuals provided information about the tactics of siege mining (Wiggins 2003a, 20; see Reeves 1996; seventeenth century military manuals collection in RA Fort Nelson/Tower of London). Commercial miners were also available in several parts of the country to assist with military operations. How easy it was to engage their services is difficult to determine. Gloucestershire, a predominantly Parliamentarian region, had miners who were reluctant to act on behalf of the king. During the siege of Gloucester, the miners of Dean are either reported to have fled (Warmington 1997, 49) or were pressed into service by the Royalists (Reeves 1996, 175). In the Midlands, fifty miners from the coalfields of Cannock Chase were brought in to undermine Lichfield Close (Reeves 1996, 96-9), although no mention is made of whether this was forced or voluntary. Men with mining skills were obviously prized by both sides, and the various mining regions of Britain ensured that skilled labour was usually available, if not always enthusiastic.

From an archaeological perspective, the remains of siege undermining can be extremely difficult to differentiate from undermining that occurred in a slighting context. One determining factor is the existence of a mineshaft. Since siege mines usually originated some distance from the castle walls, any gallery mines discovered beyond the immediate vicinity of castle walls are probably an indication of siege activity rather than slighting (for examples, see Wiggins 2001; Roberts 2002). However, undermining could have varying results, and thus we must be wary of presuming that structural damage to walls adjacent to a gallery mine are the result of siege activity. Several mines were sprung with little or no results, or were interrupted before completion; some weakened the structure, only to cause collapse years or

centuries afterwards due to other stresses. Once again, a nuanced approach is required that balances archaeological evidence for siege activity with an understanding of the undermining options and criteria that contemporaries would have used.

Civil War artillery

'No wall exists, however thick, that artillery cannot destroy in a few days'.

(Niccolo Machiavelli, 1531)

The use of artillery in the Civil War, as well as its capabilities and limitations, is a subject that has been much covered, and consequently will not be reiterated here (see O'Neil 1960; Lewis 1971; Haythornwaite 1994; Reeves 1996; Edwards 2000; Harrington 2003; Henry 2005). Its dominant role within military narratives has prompted some to assert that it is responsible for most, if not all, of the structural damage inflicted on castles in the Civil War (Oman 1926, 24; Braun 1936, 102 and 112; Matarasso 1995, 196). As Braun (1936, 112) put it, 'the great guns made short work of the old castles. One by one down came the outer walls of the strong keep-towers...'. In this narrative of military 'progress', therefore, castles are portrayed as being outdated symbols of obsolete technology that were no longer relevant in the age of artillery.

The actual picture of damage caused by artillery is probably much more complex and difficult to quantify. Gaunt (2003, 87) has pointed out that many castles managed to weather bombardment reasonably well, and some castles, such as Knaresborough (Yorkshire), surrendered quickly once bombardment had created a sudden breach in defences (Grainge 1855, 110-11). Others chose to hold out, and for that reason experienced much more widespread artillery damage. Every room at Goodrich Castle (Herefordshire) is said to have been damaged by cannon fire (Young 1981, 28), and similarly, at Newcastle-upon-Tyne, an artillery breach was so severe that it resulted in the reconstruction of a 180 ft stretch of wall (Harrington 2004, 18). Artillery damage, therefore, varies significantly from site to site, and in some cases played no role at all.

Like other destructive phenomena, the use of artillery poses a series of issues for archaeologists trying to separate siege from slighting damage. Laugharne Castle (Wales) is an example where missing masonry (in this case from the gatehouse) cannot be definitively blamed on artillery, slighting, or a combination thereof (Avent 1987, 195). There are no simple solutions, but several factors can help in the correct identification of artillery damage. These include an understanding of the logistical capabilities of certain kinds of artillery (distance, impact force), as will an awareness of angles of trajectory and where the besieging force's artillery could have been placed. Primary source material is another obvious resource, and in at least one case has proven decisive in identifying one castle's 'sighting' damage as artillery damage (see Chapter Five, Section 5.6.1).

3.2.4 Robbing/Theft

*'Your noble blocks wrench'd from your ancient walls
Are burn'd for lime by greedy slaves of gain.
Villains! If such as you may have their way
Three ages more, Rome's glory will be gone.'*

(Pius II, fifteenth century, cited in Woodward 2002, 8)

Once built, structures have always faced the threat of having their component materials removed, and the re-use of stone and other materials has been an important feature throughout Britain's history (see Woodward 1985; Parsons 1990; Stocker and Everson 1990; Tatton-Brown 1990; Eaton 2000). In the 1640s, this re-use falls into two types: removal instigated by the owner or some other entity in control of the site, and surreptitious removal by those who do not have the legal right to take the materials (henceforward referred to as 'theft', as opposed to the technical archaeological term 'robbing'). The logistics of how both groups removed materials are complex and exhibit subtle differences to each other, and consequently stone robbing (and theft) will be explored in some depth later in Chapter Four.

The underlying reasons for removing stone—legally or otherwise—were fairly standard and can be summarised into three broad categories: casual, functional, and iconic re-use (Stocker and Everson 1990, 84). All three types played an important and complex role in the seventeenth century slighting and abandonment of castles. Casual re-use was the most common and usually took the form of stone removed for

use as rubble in building projects elsewhere (Stöcker and Everson 1990, 84). Skenfrith Castle (Wales) provides a typical example of the type of pattern produced by this kind of stone robbing (Figure 3.14). In particular, the most noticeable characteristic is that the removal of each stone has led to the removal of adjacent stonework in a 'follow on' pattern; in other words, the removal of one block or stone facilitates the dislodging of those bordering it, thereby creating a larger 'pattern' of damage in the form of exposed rubble core. The opportunistic theft represented by these patterns appears to have been rampant in the aftermath of the Civil War, although most castles did not reach the attention of the House of Lords like Cawood Castle (Yorkshire) did in 1660:

'Upon reading the Petition of Richard Harbred, Wm. Smith, and others, Tenants to the Manor of Cawood, in the County of Yorke; shewing, "That the Castle of Cawood hath been lately demolished and pulled down, and the Materials carried away, by George Hewley and Wm Rowden, and their Agents:" It is ORDERED, &c. That there shall be no further Waste committed in or upon the said Castle of Cawood; nor that the Materials or any Part of them shall be taken or carried away from the said Castle, until the Pleasure of this House be further signified'.

(LJ 24/8/1660)

Documentation of this kind is useful insofar as it highlights the existence of tensions surrounding the control over materials, as well as provides the names of those wanting to retain the materials and those who were accused of removing them. It is of no use, however, in answering practical questions about how much was removed and from what parts of the castle, or what kind of material was stolen and where it ended up. Similarly, documents such as this invariably fail to address broader issues such as how the dispersal of such large quantities of materials changed the built environment of a particular community. The answers to these and similar questions could not only give us valuable insight into the extent of the original slighting, but also the priorities of those robbing out the stone.

Furthermore, the difficulties presented by authorised as well as unauthorised removal are obvious and manifest themselves primarily in the destruction and absence of evidence (Eaton 2000, 133). This means that unless dateable material is found nearby, it can be difficult to ascertain when the material was removed—if it occurred as part of the initial slighting phase or later by thieves—thereby complicating any

interpretations about how much was removed as part of the slighting process. Because the act of robbing is so destructive, it can also destroy vital evidence in the surrounding archaeological record. This occurred at Bramber Castle (Sussex) where damage caused by ashlar robbers was so extensive that it prevented the dating of a domestic rubbish deposit in the cellar (Barton and Holden in Barton *et al.* 1977, 32). Robbing also contributes to the decay of walls by exposing mortar and wall cores to the elements and plant growth (Ashurst 1998, 4; see Section 3.2.7), both of which accelerate the rate at which collapse of masonry occurs. These and several other important issues relating to the practicalities of robbing and theft will be discussed more succinctly in Chapter Four.

3.2.5 Urban/rural pressures and habitation

'It used to be said that an Englishman's house was his castle. It seems that this is no longer true in a town planned area'.

(Lord Cranborne in *The Times*, c. 1930s, cited in Mandler 1996, 100)

Most historic masonry buildings still in existence have been altered during their lifespan (Mills 1998, 59). Each has its own unique history of events that have affected its appearance, structural integrity, or character, as well as its landscape and environment. These changes could be minor or sweeping, but very often occurred for everyday, ordinary reasons: 'through ploughing, grazing, vegetation clearance, public access or changes in conditions of grounds' (Watt and Swallow 1996, 233). These ordinary reasons, however, have had a profound impact on the survival of slighting evidence in the archaeological record.

One major force for change was the adaptation of a site for agricultural use. Several rural castles were converted totally or partially into working farms at various points in their existence, of which Tutbury, Mackworth, Wressle, and South Wingfield Manor are examples (Figure 3.15). Agricultural usages in general have had a detrimental effect on the survival of Civil War fortifications and earthworks (Harrington 2003, 58), and therefore make understanding the slighting actions of contemporaries more difficult to interpret. At Newark (Nottinghamshire), for example, an excavated town ditch showed possible evidence for the levelling of Civil War defences, but equally, an agricultural explanation could not be ruled out (Drage

1987, 131). In Wiltshire alone, survey work in 1969 revealed that 250 out of 640 monuments had been ‘severely damaged or totally destroyed’ by agriculture (Champion 1996, 52), and this trend is likely to have been similar in other counties.

In more populated areas, the destruction or alteration of fabric was just as pronounced if not worse. Some castles retained a civic role (Emerick 2003, 33), but in doing so were liable to be altered. At sites such as Knaresborough, Pontefract, Lancaster, and Lincoln, various structures had to be modified for use as gaols or law courts. In areas that became heavily populated, the Industrial Revolution took a particularly destructive toll on castle sites. Urban expansion, traffic, and new building projects exerted pressure on officials to remove ruins and town walls, many of which were knocked down or partially destroyed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Thompson 1987b, 211). One notable urban survival was the keep at Newcastle-upon-Tyne (albeit heavily restored), although much of the site as a whole did not survive. Many of the external and town walls were torn down to make way for roads and railways, and several of the towers were altered for use by city guilds and craftsmen (see Holmes 1896; Hugill 1970). For some castles, such as Bristol, Liverpool, and Sheffield, this urban expansion was so severe that they virtually ‘disappeared’. Today, the Sheffield Markets stand on the site once occupied by the castle and no upstanding masonry remains.

A significant amount of damage was also caused by the owner(s) or occupier(s) of the castle (see also Section 3.2.6 below). In some cases this was caused by the desire for continued habitation, often by a multitude of people. Hartlebury (Worcestershire) saw its residential buildings converted into a mansion for a group of bishops (Pettifer 1995, 279), while at Bolton Castle (Yorkshire) the ruins of the North-East Tower and the East Curtain accommodated several tenements and even a cottage (Jackson 1959, 23). Unoccupied or unused sites faced the further risk of being plundered for materials or features by later owners. This occurred at Warkworth Castle (Northumbria) in 1672 when the estate auditor removed ‘272 waggon loads of lead, timber, and other materials with which to build...[a] manor house at Chirton’ (Hunter Blair 1954, 11), and as late as 1911 the new American owners of Tattershall Castle (Lincolnshire) were removing fireplaces until forced to stop by the resulting

national outcry (Champion 1996, 45; Thompson 2006, 55). In extreme cases, owners did not just selectively dismantle but completely demolished. This was the case at Woodstock Manor (Oxfordshire) which was demolished in 1723 despite protests from antiquarian quarters (Delafons 1997, 10). Similar demolitions continued without much opposition throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries until finally reaching a peak in the 1950s (Mandler 1996, 100 and 108).

3.2.6 Conservation/excavation

'...the survival and condition of an object or structure may tell us as much about the attitude of people towards it since its creation as they do about the impulses which prompted the original construction'.

(Oakey 2003, 59)

Interest in and appreciation of the ruins of the past is by no means a recent development (see Piggott 1976; Jackson 1980; Thompson 1981 and 2006; Lowenthal 1985; Woodward 2002; Hunter 1996; Delafons 1997; Emerick 2003). As early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, numerous antiquaries such as John Leland, Anthony Wood, and William Dugdale were recording the physical remains of Britain's past (Piggott 1976; Currie and Lewis 1994). By the end of the seventeenth century, Sir Thomas Grosvenor illustrated that these scholarly interests were beginning to take root in the landowning class by building his new house and formal gardens in alignment with Beeston Castle (Cheshire) in order to incorporate the ruins into the house views (Mowl 2000, 69). This recognition of a ruin's place in the landscape was an important element of the Picturesque Movement, a phenomenon characterised by the landed gentry turning away from formally arranged gardens and towards 'natural' landscapes that were often based around historic ruins. This growing appetite for wild and ruined landscapes was fed by travel accounts and printed illustrations which enjoyed wide circulation among the educated classes. Men like Daniel Defoe (Rogers 1989), Viscount Torrington (Andrews and Andrews 1954), and the Buck brothers epitomised the gentleman traveller during this period, producing descriptions and illustrations of Britain's decaying abbeys and castles, and in doing so, promoted the idea that ruins were worth visiting and recording for posterity.

This early form of conservation/protection might have begun as 'an antiquarian and scholarly pursuit' (Delafons 1997, 1), but throughout the eighteenth century the

group that had most influence on how castles were ‘conserved’ were landowners. For many, the aesthetics of how ruined castles could be incorporated into views from new houses continued to be paramount, but also included ‘restoring’ the ruins to conform to new Picturesque ideas about wild landscapes. At Cartington Castle (Northumbria), for example, Lord Armstrong’s ‘restoration’ of the old castle was allegedly prompted in part by a desire for a ‘romantic vista’ from his nearby mansion (Pettifer 1995, 179; see Emerick 2003, 31-2). If the ruins were not deemed adequate or ‘authentic’ enough, new buildings might be added. At Tutbury Castle (Staffordshire), a mock ruin was built on top of the castle’s medieval motte (Cantor 1982, 132), and was one of more than thirty ‘ruins’ created in eighteenth-century landscape gardens (Woodward 2002, 126). The Civil War site of Belvoir Castle (Leicestershire) demonstrates how complicated this cycle of conservation and re-use can become. It was ‘completely rebuilt’ between 1654 and 1668, then rebuilt *again* in Gothic style in the nineteenth century, then damaged by fire in 1816, then rebuilt a final time shortly afterwards (Johnson 2000, 196).

This public interest in historic ruins had grown significantly throughout the nineteenth century, supported by a burgeoning and increasingly better educated middle class. As early as the 1820s and 1830s several intact castles like the Tower of London and Hampton Court were open to the public (Hunter 1996, 5), and by the middle of the century growing interest in ‘repairing’ ruined castles was strong. In 1845, Newark Castle (Nottinghamshire) became the first castle to be restored at government expense (Marshall and Samuels 1997, 40). The architect responsible, Anthony Salvin, is considered to have restored Newark and other castles such as Alnwick (Northumbria) and Dunster (Somerset) to a high standard (Johnson 2000, 196), but elsewhere ‘restoration’ was less sensitively done, posing serious problems to the structure in the long term.

These problems were mainly due to incorrect preservation techniques, particularly the use of iron cramps and dowels and the replacement of mortars with hard cements (Watt and Swallow 1996, 226). The use of iron in particular, especially when it has not been deeply placed within the wall, makes stone vulnerable to cracking (Honeyborne 1995, 170-1). Repair work at Ely Cathedral in the 1860s was carried

out using iron to stabilise the building, and by the middle of the twentieth century the result was extensive corrosion and damage to the stonework (Heyman 1995, 119). In the twentieth century, other forms of poor conservation work included abrasive surface cleaners and the use of concrete, both of which added further damage to structures (Ashurst 1998, 1). The problems all of these pose for identifying slighting are demonstrated by the conservation of the keep at Clitheroe Castle (Lancashire) in 1848 (Figures 3.16 and 3.17). The addition of buttresses and the insertion of cement stabilised the structure and prevented collapse, but they also destroyed significant areas of original fabric, and consequently, Clitheroe's slighting status has not been firmly established (Best 1990, 13).

As well as the alteration and/or conservation or of standing fabric, past excavations and clearances of the immediate and surrounding landscape present similar challenges for recognising slighting activity. Excavations became steadily more popular through the nineteenth century as local archaeology societies, beginning in Newcastle in 1813, formed across the country (Delafons 1997, 32; Emerick 2003, 39-45). Many of these early excavations were brief, sometimes as short as four or five days (Morris 2003, 236). This brevity, combined with a general failure to record the demolition distribution patterns of 'rubbish' stones, has meant that potentially crucial evidence about how masonry has collapsed has been lost. Moreover, the act of excavation itself can damage masonry by exposing hitherto concealed fabric to temperature changes, moisture, and new structural stresses (Feilden 2003, 77).

As well as excavations, mass clearances of debris and loose stonework took place at many historic sites across Britain. Most of these clearances were the result of legislative developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, particularly the creation of the Office of Works, and the records of their activities have remained largely unexamined (Emerick 2003, 69). Ruined abbeys appear to have received the most attention, with several clearances occurring after World War I (Coppack 1988, 4; Morris 2003, 236), but castles participated as well, as evidenced by the 'retrieval operation' carried out by the Office of Works at Goodrich Castle (Herefordshire). Although their zenith occurred in the first couple of decades of the twentieth century, mass clearances continued afterwards. This removal of demolition

material, combined with a lack of detailed records about its deposition and condition at the time of removal, has resulted in the loss of valuable slighting evidence at several sites.

3.2.7 Environmental damage

One of the most important causes of building decay and damage is climate (Feilden 2003, 93). In particular, storms are notoriously destructive and bring a variety of conditions that masonry structures (particularly when ruined) are not designed to cope with. Perhaps the most destructive is lightning: vertical cracks running through the masonry become wet in storms and act as conduits for the electrical surge, which in turn produces high temperatures and steam pressure within the masonry structure (Heyman 1995, 111). Not all damage, however, is instantaneous or the result of a direct hit. Lightning can indirectly destroy other parts of the structure when it causes masonry to collapse onto a lower roof (Feilden 2003, 116), or weaken a structure over time with multiple strikes. Before its eventual collapse in 1902, the Campanile in Venice had been struck by lightning so many times that a lightning rod was finally put in place in 1766 (Heyman 1995, 110). Wind damage plays another important role during storms: larger, thicker structures are more resilient, but features that lack sufficient mass or are too high can be blown over in strong winds (Heyman 1995, 125), with chimneys in particular having a poor survival rate (Kenyon 1990, 168). Unless historically noted, collapses of this type are notoriously difficult to date, and it is probable that several so-called ‘slighted’ buildings have been (and will continue to be) incorrectly identified as such.

Another environmental problem affecting the structural integrity of buildings is subsidence, or nature’s version of ‘undermining’. Although lacking the intensive earthquakes of other regions, Britain still experiences a variety of changes in its sub-terrain that profoundly affect a building’s stability. One major cause is a change in the water table. In London the removal of water has been blamed for cracks that developed in St. Paul’s Cathedral in London (Heyman 1995, 119), and it has been suggested that attempts to drain the Fens might have caused one of Ely Cathedral’s towers to collapse (*ibid*, 25). Mining is another significant cause of subsidence (Feilden 2003, 79), and it has been observed that some of the worst structural

problems are found in former coal or salt mining areas (Mills 1998, 63). The effects of this are often slow, causing cracking, slumping, or leaning over several years, or they can dramatically result in collapse. As Bramber Castle illustrates, collapse from subsidence can easily be mistaken for slighting (Section 3.3.1; see Barton *et al.* 1977).

Environmental damage does not have to be sudden or dramatic in order to destroy. As a building material, the lifespan of stone is limited (Bristow 1998, 1), and even if a building manages to survive subsidence and storms, it is still at the mercy of other slower environmental factors that gradually wear away at its component parts until the building's overall structural stability is compromised. One of the most powerful and relentless of these factors is 'weathering', or the deterioration of stone due to three main causes: salt crystallisation, acidic gases (pollution), and frost action, with salt crystallisation being the most damaging (Honeyborne 1998, 153). Salts (including potassium nitrate or gunpowder) are particularly dangerous because of their ability to exert pressure on pores in masonry, and cycles of wetting and drying lead to continual re-dissolving and re-crystallising (Honeyborne 1998, 154). The effects of this are most pronounced in stones that have been incorrectly bedded, particularly in structures in coastal areas, and pose serious threats both externally and internally. This is because the exposed wall tops of roofless buildings were never designed to cope with rain, and consequently absorb water that then travels internally throughout the rubble core of the wall (Ashurst 1998, 6). The potential result over time is the development of cracks and fissures, further weakening of the structure, and possible collapse.

All of these damaging environmental forces are further augmented by the continual and constant effects of living organisms on structural remains. These include bacteria, lichen, algae, and fungi, all of which can chemically damage the surfaces of stone (Honeyborne 1998, 167). On an even larger scale are plants: in their search for water, tree roots cause considerable damage by displacing stone and harming foundations, and ivy—a notorious destroyer of walls—has been credited with damaging many historical buildings, including Allington, Leybourne, and Corfe Castles (Honeyborne 1998, 167 and 184; Feilden 2003, 133). The use of ruins by

animals, particularly nesting birds, adds yet more damage (Honeyborne 1998, 169) and accelerates the slow rate of decay and collapse already at work.

For some, such as O'Neil (1960, 113), this gradual decay and neglect of ruins has had a more powerful impact on buildings than any Civil War slightings that may or may not have taken place at the site. The effects of this kind of cumulative, gradual decay, and of just how quickly a building's relative integrity can deteriorate, are evocatively captured in a Victorian account of South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire).

A 1785 sketch

'...show[s] that the roof over the banqueting hall was then perfect, and the windows glazed. Between 1789 and 1793 a large portion of the south wall of the banqueting hall fell down or was taken away, as we find by a comparison of the plates given by Shaw and Blore. About the year 1825, a lofty tower in the southeast angle of the north court fell down, and some twenty or thirty years ago the sides of the original well, which was still in use in the centre of the south court, collapsed, and the space has since been filled up.'

(Cox 1885, 7)

It is not difficult to see that through stone degradation, collapse of masonry, and the dislodgement of stones, evidence for slighting can be completely erased from the archaeological record.

3.3 A new methodology

So far, this thesis has cast a critical eye on how the subject of castle slightings has been addressed in past and current scholarship. In particular, it has criticised the way a small but influential group of historians and archaeologists has 'explained' slighting without considering the archaeological evidence and its potential to provide further answers. This chapter has made two additional key points: first, that there were four distinct methods of slighting that must each be isolated and understood, and second, that understanding these past processes is complicated by other factors that must in turn be isolated from slighting methods. The natural next step is the development of a new methodological approach, one that is evidence based, multidisciplinary, and seeks to create new data to challenge old narratives. This type of 'call to arms' has been made numerous times before regarding castles and/or destruction and warfare (Austin 1984; Thornes 1994; Hill and Wileman 2002; Johnson 2002; Morris 2003; Wheatley 2004, 3; Liddiard 2005, 151), and has even been argued from a conservation/restoration perspective (Watt and Swallow 1996,

225; Mills 1998, 55 and 59), but its application to castle slightings has never been attempted.

In order to achieve this new and flexible methodological approach, some traditional sources will be revisited, while radical new ones must be proposed. Unsurprisingly, historical accounts—both primary and secondary—will of course remain a valuable tool that will not be discarded. Equally, standard archaeological practices will also be used to evaluate the archaeological evidence of slighting. In this case, extensive and scaled surveys of whole structures have been avoided in favour of the selective photographic recording of evidence at a variety of sites across England and Wales⁵. The benefits of this system are that it provides a good cross-section of different types of evidence—the beginnings of a ‘damage database’ that will grow in size—and allows for a wider appreciation of patterns and trends that repeatedly turn up in the evidence. This visual analysis is supplemented by the use of other archaeological sources such as excavation reports, site and conservation plans, and SMR monument records, as well as a limited EDM survey of one site with a Leica 705.

Perhaps more radically, it is proposed here that no true understanding of destruction—and slighting in particular—is possible without the integration of voices from outside archaeology and history. These disciplines include, but are not limited to: structural and explosives engineering, stone masonry, carpentry, blacksmithing, materials conservation, quantity surveying, geology, and arson investigation. This integration of ‘outsiders’ is crucial if we are to understand not only the mechanics of how slighting was implemented in the past, but also how time and the environment have obscured this evidence in the present through the actions of other destructive processes unrelated to slighting. For the purposes of this thesis, this attempt at inclusion was accomplished through a wide series of consultations⁶, site visits, demonstrations, and secondary reading. It is readily acknowledged here that this is a limited first step, and that huge strides are still needed in order to further dialogue and create truly collaborative approaches to the archaeological study of destruction.

⁵ See Appendix IV for a list of all sites visited in the course of this research. Many of these sites served as direct sources of slighting evidence, whereas others were used more generally to build a more comprehensive picture of non-slighting destruction processes and the life cycle of castles.

⁶ All consulted experts can be found in the acknowledgements section, as well as footnoted in the relevant parts of the thesis.

The strength of this inclusive methodology is demonstrated in the next two chapters through an analysis of the logistics of two of slighting's most complex methods. Chapter Four examines the first of these, picking, and draws together historical, archaeological, and specialist sources in order to understand the process of destroying a castle by hand.

Chapter Four

‘Picking Apart’ Slighting: Evidence for destroying a castle by hand

Introduction

Chapter Three identified the range of castle destruction methods available to contemporaries and some of the broader issues surrounding them. This chapter will concentrate on one of these methods, picking a castle apart by hand, and explore the complexity of this process, both in its methodology and meaning. Chapter Three has already highlighted the variations in the infrastructure, calibre, and motivation of the picking labour force, and this chapter also seeks to expand this theme through an examination of how such variations are manifested in the archaeological and structural remains. The main argument advanced is that evidence for picking is not only still discernible, but that ‘typing’ these patterns contributes to our understanding of how and why picking took place. This has important implications not just for the study of castle destruction, but also for understanding other destructive processes that occurred in past societies. In short, understanding hand demolition is a crucial aspect of a wider study of the archaeology of destruction.

Because of the equivocal nature of the evidence, any attempt to understand picking must also consider the evidence for two other phenomena discussed in Chapter Three: unauthorised robbing, and damage caused by later owners. Although distinctive phenomena, they share important characteristics with picking and are part of a wider narrative of destruction and re-use. For this reason, it is important to understand the similarities and differences between all of them, and to assess whether these processes can be isolated from each other in the archaeological and structural record. This will be done by first categorising damage evidence into three types: primary, secondary, and indeterminate, and utilising examples from each to establish a picking typology. These distinctions are based on a proposed identification process

for classifying slighting damage and will utilise examples from numerous castles across England and Wales and make up the core of Sections 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4.

4.1 Types of picking damage: primary, secondary, and indeterminate

As defined in the last chapter, picking is the destruction by hand of a structure or any of its architectural features. This destruction could involve the retrieval of materials for re-use, or it could forego retrieval and centre solely on the destruction of selected materials or features. In both instances, the appearance or structural integrity of the building was damaged, in some cases beyond its ability to remain intact. This damage manifested itself in different ways depending on what caused it and the immediate goal of the person involved. For example, a person interested in removing stone or timber from a building will not cause the same kind of damage as someone knocking stone from the battlements without the intention of re-use. Identifying and classifying these differences in the evidence left behind is crucial in understanding how a structure was destroyed.

There have been no cogent attempts to classify picking, but two general approaches can be distilled from the bulk of historical and archaeological scholarship. The first ‘classification’ made by scholars is typified by descriptions that emphasise the military nature of picking, and consequently use language that suggest the use of extreme force. Castles were therefore ‘demolished’, ‘raised’, ‘levelled’, ‘pulled down’, ‘destroyed’, etc., all of which emphasises to the reader the inherent violence of ‘putting a castle beyond use’. In contrast, the other broad ‘classification’ tends to refer to castles being ‘robbed’ of materials, although distinctions are rarely drawn about what is meant by the term ‘robbing’. Here, the language used is less militaristic and implies that this form of dismantling was less destructive. Consequently, materials were ‘robbed’, ‘taken away’, ‘removed’, or ‘sold’, but the castle as an entity is not perceived to have been violently attacked. Grainge (1855, 94) is perhaps typical of such an approach when he asserts that Harewood Castle, which was partially dismantled, ‘does not appear to have been dismantled by violence...few of its parts, except the battlements, have been thrown down...’. In conclusion, previous studies have implied a binary distinction between two kinds of picking: a military

one characterised by use of extreme force, and a supposedly less destructive process designed to facilitate the re-use of materials.

Both of these generalisations, however, have problems. First, they presuppose that military and civilian interests were mutually exclusive and intrinsically different from each other. Second, they imply that an act of destruction such as 'military' slighting could not be done in a controlled and systematic way, and third, that the retrieval or re-use of materials was not itself a violent attack on a building. Finally, it is important to note that neither classification of picking is based on any widespread analysis of documentary, archaeological, or structural evidence.

Using data from a variety of sources and sites, this thesis proposes a more systematic and analytical classification system for grouping picking evidence. First, it argues that picking evidence is not arbitrarily distributed but conforms to certain patterns, the details of which will be discussed at length in this chapter. Second, it proposes that an understanding of these patterns is based on recognising the underlying motives behind each individual act of destruction, thereby making it a prerequisite that we understand the reason for the destruction before we 'classify' its pattern. Using this as a starting point, three broad categories of picking have been established: damage which resulted from a focused, purposive act (primary damage), damage that was an unintended consequence of such an act (secondary damage), and a third category (indeterminate damage) where the cause of destruction is less clear-cut (Diagram 4.1, next page). It must be stressed that these terms are not sequential; in other words, secondary damage should not be considered to follow primary, or primary damage to precede secondary. Rather, these terms strictly refer to the *motivation* underpinning the destruction and whether causing destruction was the *primary* reason for altering the building's appearance or merely a *secondary* result of an action committed for some other motive. With primary damage, the intention to cause destruction was the principal or perhaps even sole reason for destruction. It could be systematic or indiscriminate in its execution, but the underlying motivation remains the same: a desire or need to cause structural damage or disfigurement. This desire could spring from religious, military, social, or personal reasons, and its execution could vary in form. For example, it might manifest itself as attacks on

smaller targets such as furnishings, architectural features, and heraldic/religious imagery, but also—and more commonly—by targeting more crucial structural elements such as walls and towers.




Diagram 4.1 Classification chart showing primary, indeterminate, and secondary damage types and how they are manifested.

In contrast, secondary damage occurred when an act against a building necessitated creating more (and often unintentional) destruction. The most common reason for this where picking is concerned was the removal for future re-use or sale of materials or architectural elements, particularly when they were embedded or an integral component of the structure as a whole. Documentary sources and standing remains show that ashlar, timber, decorative features, metals, and tiles were all popular targets. Almost exclusively, evidence for secondary damage is predominantly found

in structural remains such as walls. It can manifest itself as negative evidence (missing building material, or that from a later date), or damaged original fabric.

The third picking type, ‘indeterminate’ damage, encompasses evidence that is significant because it demonstrates change in the structure or condition of the materials, but the cause of which is more speculative than with primary or secondary damage. Indeterminate evidence normally manifests itself as negative evidence, as when substantial parts of a structure are missing, or in the destruction of fragile materials easily damaged such as glass.

This typology is based on an extensive visual survey of over one hundred structures in varying stages of ruin across Britain and Ireland. For reasons of time and practicality it deliberately excludes the landscape, although in principle it could be adapted and developed to incorporate a typology of landscape destruction for slighting. These broad categories have been established to pinpoint the key areas of a castle that typically suffered destruction, or else were targets for removal and re-use. They are intended to serve as a heuristic device to begin thinking about the nature of the evidence. For example, window glass found in an excavation might be primary damage (deliberately smashed), secondary (accidentally destroyed as a result of lead or stone removal), or even deposited in a post slighting context (later abandonment and neglect). Similarly, a heraldic emblem that appears scratched or marked by musket shot, or was situated in a wall that was badly damaged, might be considered as evidence for primary damage. If it was removed altogether, particularly from an ordinarily inaccessible area, it might be more appropriate to consider the damage left behind as secondary damage, possibly by later owners or robbers. As the typology is based on deduced cause at site level, contextualising the evidence is crucial. This will become apparent through the examples discussed in the chapter.

The use of a heuristic device for thinking through the destruction evidence for slighting raises a series of issues. The first is that the intention is to understand the cause of specific acts of destruction on specific structures or features within a building, with the objective of applying this knowledge to an understanding of the site as a whole. Understanding the cause of a destructive act, however, is not the

same as fully understanding the *motive* that triggered it. For example, it would be inappropriate to conclude that because a site shows a great deal of secondary damage it was destroyed *only* because the materials were desired; its dismantling could easily have served wider military strategic aims as much as commercial ones. It would also be dangerous to assume that the existence of primary damage necessarily indicates that a structure posed any actual military threat. As we shall see, military and commercial involvement and interests were far more complex and intertwined, and understanding the *cause* of destructive acts is just the first step to understanding the wider motive(s) at work. A further limitation that must be borne in mind is that some evidence will be too ambiguous to easily categorise or explain. The category of ‘indeterminate’ was designed to cope with this, particularly with regard to negative evidence. The rationale is that, while it may be difficult or impossible to establish the cause of a wall no longer being *in situ*, the fact that it is no longer extant is in itself significant and informative. These seeming weaknesses will in fact be demonstrated to provide a degree of flexibility to the typology that allows much more nuanced conclusions about destruction to be made.

4.2 Primary and indeterminate damage

Primary damage evidence predominantly manifests itself in building materials, and of these, it is stone that tends to survive in the archaeological record the longest. The first focus (Section 4.2.1) will therefore be on facing stone and rubble core, and the impact of primary picking on walls and towers. Where substantial sections of masonry or structure are missing, indeterminate damage will be assessed alongside primary to supplement our understanding of the site. Since the actions of later owners and thieves have complicated the evidence (Diagram 4.2), these phenomena will be considered in conjunction with primary and indeterminate evidence. In Section 4.2.2, this analysis will be extended to include another type of primary damage, the destruction of heraldic and religious imagery.




Diagram 4.2 Primary damage and the interrelationships affecting interpretation of evidence

4.2.1 Facing stone and rubble core

Chapter Three established that the effective picking of a structure had to follow systematic principles. Picking too deeply at ground level could result in an unpredictable collapse, and picking too shallowly might only inflict cosmetic damage that still left the structure defensible. The best way therefore was the ‘top down’ method of jettisoning materials from above, as described in a letter detailing Wressle Castle’s destruction in October of 1648:

‘They fell upon the Constable’s Tower, and hath with much violence pursued the work on Thursday and Friday. Their agents would show no care in preserving any of the materials, but pitched of[f] the stones from the battlements to the ground; and the chimneys that stood upon the Lead downe to the Leades, which made breaches through the roof where they fell. All the Battlements to the rooffe, on the front of the Castle (excepting the high Tower over the Gate) are bett downe. What materials could be sav’d Mr. Plaxton did sett on some Tenants to take awaye, and laye in the barne. Belieeve it, Sir, his Lordship hath sustain’d very deepe losses in his house...’

(cited in Home 1908)

The Wressle account summarises two of the most crucial characteristics of primary damage. The first is that those committing the picking paid little or no attention to the revalue of a material, regardless of its worth to others, especially owners. The second is that the epicentre of picking was located at the highest point of a castle—the roof or battlements—radiating downwards to varying degrees, and resulting in an uneven ‘planing’ of towers or walls. This evidence has survived in numerous castle descriptions by early antiquarians. At Lancaster Castle, for example, it is primary damage that Cox (1896, 113) is describing when he writes that ‘old plans and views show that the curtain walls stood, but apparently lower in height, until their removal, at the end of the last century...’. Planing, however, was not necessarily the result of slighting. Thus, for example, the planing of Scarborough Castle’s (Yorkshire) round towers by its garrison was designed to create flat artillery platforms (Harrington 2004, 56).

As was noted in Chapter Three, uncapped wall tops are particularly vulnerable to the elements and are prone to accelerated decay and collapse. For this reason, Skipton Castle (Yorkshire) serves as a particularly valuable and well known example of a site where primary damage evidence has been fossilised in the standing fabric of the towers. After being slighted in 1648/9, the castle’s Royalist owner, Lady Anne Clifford, largely rebuilt the castle between 1657-9 (Spence 1991, 103-5). In addition

to Skipton, this formidable woman carried out similar building projects at her other castle properties, including Brougham, Appleby, and Pendragon Castles in Cumbria and Westmorland (see Summerson in Summerson *et al.* 1998). The style of Lady Clifford’s post-slighting building has been described as ‘conservative’ and ‘old fashioned’, in large part because she was intentionally presenting the ‘new’ castle as a stylistic (and symbolic) continuation of the destroyed ‘old’ one (*ibid.*, 52). However, what is important for this thesis is what these stylistic changes reveal about Skipton’s primary damage that is of interest, and two buildings in particular demonstrate this.

The Outer Gate and main entrance to Skipton Castle (Figure 4.1) were of considerable visual and symbolic significance. This was reiterated in Lady Anne’s rebuild where the family motto and shield were prominently set in the centre of the gateway. The post-slighting building phase includes the inserted larger windows either side of the shield, and those located either side of the archway in the left and right turrets. A clear stratigraphic break is evident in the contrast between original masonry and new stone located roughly halfway up the left turret and gateway centre, and two thirds up the right turret. Figure 4.2 shows this relationship in the left hand turret. The lower 18 courses of original sandstone are thinner and geologically distinct from the courses above them. They provide a clear indication of the extent of the picking of the tower. If the height of the rebuilt gatehouse was the same as the height of the original, the evidence suggests that roughly half of the Outer Gate was planed, although slightly more original fabric survived in the right turret than the left. However, it has been suggested that the original roofline of the castle was much higher (Spence 1991, 1), and if so, even more original fabric might have been jettisoned from the upper courses of the gatehouse.

A second structure that provides clear evidence of planing is the Watchtower (Figure 4.3). Once again, the upper courses of stonework are geologically distinct and characterised by larger stones than those below. Moreover, the windows in this new fabric are considerably larger than the original medieval windows in the lower courses. Also significant is the internal arrangement of the Watchtower at the level of the middle floor (Figure 4.4). The interior is lined with what appears to be re-used

material from the castle’s earlier construction phase and clearly shows the difference in wall thicknesses between the pre- and post-slighting material (Figure 4.5). This can be explained by the fact that while the original medieval wall was thirteen feet thick, Lady Anne was ordered to make the walls above thinner so that the new roofs could not support cannon (Spence 1991, 1; Anon¹ 1999, NP). Evidence of this kind provides valuable insight into how primary damage manifests itself in the structural remains, and highlights the fact that similar evidence at other sites might represent slighting damage.

It is important to note here that evidence for primary damage is not confined to standing fabric. Below-ground archaeology has an equally important role to play, especially at sites where no upstanding masonry remains *in situ*. Sheffield Castle (Yorkshire) is a good example of this and illustrates the range of damage evidence that can still be recovered. No illustration of the castle is known to exist and its layout is still not fully understood, despite a great deal of accumulated knowledge about Sheffield in the seventeenth century (see Scurfield 1986). Consequently, it is the documentary and excavated archaeological evidence that provides evidence for where primary damage occurred. Evidence for the latter comes primarily from three phases of archaeological investigation: the Armstrong excavations of 1927-30, during which the present Sheffield Markets were built on top of the old castle site, the Butcher excavations between 1958 and 1972, and the excavations carried out in recent years by Archaeological Research and Consultancy at the University of Sheffield (ARCUS²).

One of the indicators for primary damage at Sheffield is the high incidence of intact dressed masonry found. This features quite heavily in the journal of Armstrong’s colleague J. B. Himsworth (Himsworth, unpublished material, ARCUS). A pier discovered on 18/1/28 was described as being ‘in an exceptional state of preservation, clean cut stone, angle (one only uncovered) perfect, not a stone out of place’ (*ibid.*). So good was the condition that on the 20th the foreman pouring concrete into the hole was recorded as saying that ‘the splendid stonework of the pier

¹ The current guidebook for Skipton Castle: *Skipton Castle*, published by Jarrold Publishing.

² Detailed records for all three major excavations can be found here, and all references to ‘unpublished material’ regarding Sheffield Castle refer to material in their collection.

was a good support for their concrete’ and even lamented that there was ‘No good stonework like that done today! All concrete and girder now’ (*ibid.*). On 7/12/28 a plinth was described as being ‘in [a] perfect state. A very handsome piece of masonry, in clay...Some of the stones are about 10” x 20”’ (*ibid.*). On 1/1/29 Himsworth related that by ‘removing a pile of debris in the level they uncovered about three courses of very fine masonry suggesting a large doorway and two smaller ones’ (*ibid.*). All of this survival of low lying quality masonry suggests that it was the stonework *above* that was primarily targeted for destruction, and indeed, Armstrong himself concluded that ‘only those portions remained intact which were deeply buried beneath the debris resulting from the demolition’ (Armstrong 1937, 8).

This interpretation is supported by the amount of smaller debris encountered in other excavations on the site. Himsworth (26/11/28) described finding debris ‘in the bank side [that] was largely composed of old mortar (lime and sand), such as was seen in one or two places near the south moat’ (Himsworth, unpublished material, ARCUS), while on the south side the ditch ‘had become almost entirely obliterated with debris...’ (Armstrong 1937, 8). A ‘considerable mass of ashlar and rubble masonry’ were also found in several areas (Butcher 1970, unpublished material, ARCUS), and Trench 1 from the ARCUS excavations discovered that the ‘the castle destruction levels...were very extensive particularly to the east of wall 1012 where they filled the undercroft’ (Davies and Symonds 2002, 10). Himsworth (25/11/27) noted the presence of three pieces of window tracery when the moat was cleared out (Himsworth, unpublished material, ARCUS). All of this evidence is consistent with men picking ashlar, rubble, and architectural features from above, with apparently little regard for retrieval or re-use. Similar evidence at Montgomery (Wales) and Bolingbroke (Lincolnshire) Castles prompted M. W. Thompson (1987a, 150) to conclude that ‘much of the lower parts of the walls were buried by material knocked off the upper parts’. However, while this is true in a general sense, Edgeworth (2006), using Bedford Castle as an example, has recently argued that deposition patterns from primary damage are more complex than this. The conclusion is that primary damage in the archaeological record appears to manifest itself both as loose rubble and quality stone pieces in complex deposition patterns, with a preponderance of survival occurring in stonework at base or plinth level.

Indeterminate damage

‘As much weight must be given to what has disappeared as to what has survived, and the influences which have dictated the fate of items must be recognised, categorized and evaluated’.

(Oakey 2003, 59)

Skipton and Sheffield Castles have both demonstrated how visual analysis, documentary sources, and archaeological excavations can inform our understanding of primary damage at a site. At many sites this type of analysis is complicated by the loss of structural remains or an absence of detailed excavations and/or primary source material. Lack of clear primary damage evidence, however, does not necessarily mean that a site cannot provide important information about its past destruction phases. Indeterminate damage, particularly when manifested structurally as negative evidence, yields subtle but significant clues about the choices that past individuals did—or did not—take in relation to damaging buildings.

This technique will be demonstrated through an assessment of the indeterminate damage at Knaresborough Castle (Yorkshire). The castle originally consisted of an inner and outer ward, a keep (the King’s Tower), numerous service buildings, and according to Leland, eleven or twelve towers (Chandler 1993, 561). By the late nineteenth century, these towers had been reduced in number to six (Clark 1884, 170), with further losses due to collapse in the twentieth century (Kershaw 1998, 10). Spanning the entire western edge of the castle is a rocky cliffside that descends 250 feet into the River Nidd, while its northern and southern fronts are equally protected by rocky ravines. To the east lies the old town of Knaresborough. The castle’s current situation is a community park, and due to the infilling of the eastern moat and the removal of substantial amounts of masonry, its former structural layout is largely lost to today’s observer. A site map of the castle today and aerial photography both reveal the severity of this structural loss across the overall site (Figures 4.6 and 4.7). With the exception of the keep, the eastern ‘gate’ (G1 and G2), and the two southeastern towers (T1 and T2), virtually the entire curtain wall circuit and most of the towers are no longer extant. This pattern of loss is not intensively concentrated in any one area, but rather is evenly distributed on *all* sides of the castle perimeter.

First it is vital to consider the condition of the surviving masonry and possible evidence of primary damage. With the exception of the keep, the most significant standing remains are the two gatehouse towers labelled G1 and G2 (Figure 4.8). These two semi-circular buttressing towers comprised the main gateway to the castle, and as such played a major structural and symbolic role within the complex as a whole. Today the towers survive to a height of approximately 32 courses of facing stone, and display similar weathering patterns at the extreme edge of their curvatures. Both plinths show signs of repointing and consolidation (Figure 4.9). The apexes of both towers have exposed rubble core and stand in isolation to each other. The curtain wall is estimated to have been as high as 30-40 feet in places (Clark 1884, 170), and a hint of this original height can be seen in the back view of G1 and G2 (Figure 4.10).

Importantly, a surviving documentary source suggests that primary damage occurred here shortly after the surrender of the castle to Parliament in 1644. Lt. Col. John Lilburn’s troops are alleged to have ‘stay[ed] some days longer, destroy[ing] the buildings in the Castle-yard so effectually that scarce one stone was left upon another...*the walls were left almost entire, and only the gateway or entrance [was] destroyed*’ (cited Wheater 1907, 236, italics mine).

Significantly, this view is directly at odds with the surviving physical evidence. It is the *walls* (of which more will be said later) which are no longer extant, whereas the ‘destroyed’ gateway, or rather its twin towers, are still very much *in situ*. Moreover, Figures 4.11, 4.12, and 4.13 demonstrate that most of the original stonework on G1 and G2 has survived, along with medieval features such as portcullis grooves and putlog holes (Figures 4.11 and 4.12). Only the connecting arch that linked the two towers has failed to survive, but since this masonry is known to have still been in place until the 1840s (Kershaw 1998, 10), any primary damage it received from Lilburn’s men was not enough to cause immediate structural collapse. One explanation is that the description ‘destroyed’ in this instance is not meant to apply to the entirety of the structure, but merely highlights that Lilburn’s men damaged it, however minimally or selectively. It is possible they focused their picking on the interior of the gateway rather than the buttressing towers, possibly for reasons of

convenience and time. Alternatively, it is possible that Lilburn’s soldiers instead destroyed a second gateway east of the keep, possible evidence of which was discovered during excavations in the 1950s (Kershaw 1989, unpublished material, Harrogate Museum). This would have left the main gateway largely intact and free of primary damage, with the collapse of the gateway in the 1840s explained by natural decay and gradual structural weakening.

T1 and T2 are much smaller, semi-circular buttressing towers in the southwestern section of the curtain wall (Figure 4.14). Both display similar weathering damage patterns at the extreme points of curvature and show signs of repair in the form of replaced ashlar (Figures 4.15 and 4.16). Of the two, T1 has retained the most fabric and, at approximately 30 courses, still stands to considerable height (Figures 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19). It is similar to the gatehouse towers in that its damage is largely confined to the upper courses of the tower, with the sides exhibiting no signs of damage or modern repair. The exception is the plinth, which shows considerable evidence of consolidation and new mortar (Figures 4.20 and 4.21). T1 therefore shows very little signs of primary damage, and if any took place, it may have been restricted primarily to the battlements.

Although similar to T1 in design, T2 provides a marked contrast in terms of damage evidence (Figure 4.22). Reduced in height, it has retained only half the number of courses of ashlar preserved in T1 and is far more weathered and degraded. Unlike T1, the damage pattern on each side of the tower is distinctly vertical and extends the length of the tower (Figures 4.23 and 4.24). As these were buttressing towers and therefore not integral to the curtain wall, the exposed rubble core of these patterns cannot be associated with the removal of a connecting wall. Equally, it is unlikely to be primary damage because the vertical pattern of stripped ashlar is not consistent with stonework being pitched from above. Rather, the severity of the environmental damage to the stonework of T2 suggests that exposure to wind and the natural elements are more likely candidates, a condition made worse by the proximity of the tower to the steep incline towards the River Nidd. This interpretation is supported by the fact that T2 has received far more repair and reconstruction than T1. In particular, the back facing of rubble core on T2 (Figure 4.25) reveals subtle evidence lacking

from the other towers. This is the re-setting of various architectural fragments, removed from their original context and re-used as rubble core. They include a possible ashlar block with claw tooling and a moulding profile, an architectural fragment with chamfered moulding, and a nook shaft from a window or doorway (Figure 4.26). They likely represent the nineteenth or twentieth century re-use of primary damage material to provide structural support for the badly eroded tower.

Additional environmental pressure on the towers appears to have come from soil erosion and other terrain problems, which often resulted in full or partial collapse. The excavations of the 1980s revealed several rubble core fragments found in close proximity to the circuit wall line, particularly in the northeastern quadrant (unpublished material, Harrogate Museum). The cause was attributed to structural failure, and according to the Site Description written in 1989 ‘a number of substantial remains around the curtain wall were seriously reduced by collapse’. The last known tower to collapse was on the southern edge, located on the same curtain circuit as T1 and T2. It stood up to twenty-five feet until the weight of the upper courses caused its collapse in the 1940s (Kershaw 1998, 10). All of the towers on this side were buttress towers, and it has been speculated that the southern curtain wall was buckling at the time of their construction and was particularly vulnerable on this cliff edge (Kershaw 1998, 12). This inherent vulnerability must have been exacerbated by the slighting and abandonment of this part of the site in the seventeenth century and provides an explanation for the poor survival of the curtain wall in general, and along Knaresborough’s cliff edges in particular (Figure 4.27).

These observations also raise important questions about the extent of human agency in compounding these environmental factors, resulting in the creation of indeterminate damage patterns across the site as a whole. For example, the entire western section of the curtain wall was vulnerable to collapse because of its cliffside position, but could also have been targeted for removal during the site’s landscaping as a municipal park. Currently the vista east of the keep encompasses the dramatic cliffside, the River Nidd, and its picturesque bridge (Figures 4.28 and 4.29). This decision to remove structural impediments to the view would have been even easier

to make if the structures were already damaged, subsiding, or posed a threat to the public.

Understanding the causes of indeterminate damage and human agency also forces us to consider the circumstance surrounding the original slighting event(s). The attempts made by Lilburn’s soldiers in 1644 have already been mentioned, but this was by no means the only attempt to pick Knaresborough Castle apart. It was subject to Parliamentary consideration in 1646 and again in 1647 (CJ 30/4/46; CJ 26/2/47), but a concerted and organised dismantling attempt was not begun in earnest until late 1648. Labour from the vicinity was used and the work seems to have been at least nominally monitored by the military, with less than successful results. Major General Lambert, a Yorkshireman from nearby Craven, observed that ‘the said inhabitants do neglect to send in men to assist in that work, and such labourers as are sent from any towne do for the most part neglect the service, coming late, going away early, and standing idle whilst there...’ (cited in Wheater 1907, 238; see Appendix V). This narrative is consistent with the lack of primary damage found in the four buttressing towers examined above and suggests that the efforts of these labourers were concentrated not on the towers, but on the more accessible internal buildings and curtain walls. Significantly, excavations in the 1930s discovered that the interior of the castle well had been backfilled with a substantial amount of deposited ashlar material. The well shaft, speculated to be at least 200 feet deep, was excavated to a depth of twenty-five feet and was filled with ‘enormous blocks of dressed masonry’ (Barber 1931, 213). Material picked on the edges of cliffs could have been jettisoned outwards, so this deposition inside the well is more likely to have come from internal buildings more distant from the castle perimeter. This suggests either that spoiling the well for future use was a priority, or that dumping the material in the well was less laborious than carting or hauling it away.

By January 1650 the commissioners who surveyed Knaresborough reported that ‘upon the demolishing of the said Castle all the Materialls (excepting the stones) were by certaine Comissioners (for that purpose deputed), disposed of, since which tyme the Inhabitants of the aforesaid Burrough and others neer unto adjoining have carried away the best of the said stones for their owne private use’ (Slingsby Papers

cited in Atkinson 1934, 129). The logistics of this type of removal are further discussed below in Section 4.3. However, here, it is worth acknowledging that this wholesale removal by the local population was not a phenomenon spread over time, but rather occurred in the relatively short period of time after 1648 and before the 1670s (Atkinson 1934, 129). A dispute over stones removed from the foot of the castle walls illustrates this point, with rightful access to ‘rubbish’ stones becoming a contentious issue (Atkinson 1934, 129-130). This situation was complicated by the fact that the property technically belonged to Queen Henrietta Maria, and through her to the Duchy of Lancaster. This potentially elevated the act of simple stone robbing to the far more serious offence of theft from the crown, and also highlights that not all owners or local custodians had an indifferent attitude towards the illegal removal of materials.

In many respects Knaresborough Castle is a difficult site to interpret. The documentary sources paint a picture of reluctant labourers and owners hostile to removal, which is at odds with a site virtually devoid of its curtain wall. If a strictly military point of view is adopted, there is no strategic logic behind the location and extent of removed material: the natural defence of the River Nidd makes the western side the least likely to be attacked, and removing walls from here is gratuitous if the practical objective is simply to put a castle ‘beyond use’. It would be far better from a pragmatic point of view to concentrate slighting initiatives in a more vulnerable area like the eastern edge, particularly if time and the cooperation of the labour force were fleeting. This would have had the added advantage of facing the town of Knaresborough, thereby maximising the visual and symbolic statement made to the defeated townsfolk. However, this was not done, and although the eastern curtain wall is largely no longer extant, the main gateway remained intact until the 1840s. A more nuanced explanation of Knaresborough’s unusual indeterminate pattern, therefore, eschews simple explanations and factors in favour of multiple causes. These include a brief and perhaps concentrated initial destruction of interior buildings in 1644, followed by a more prolonged dismantling in 1648 that was probably characterised by a general planing of walls and interior buildings but not buttressing towers. A short period of materials removal and intermittent robbing followed until legal and practical aspects possibly deterred would-be thieves, after

which accelerated decline and collapse began. This rate of decay would have been affected in part by the quality of its original construction, as well as contributory issues such as shifting structural stresses, erosion of the cliffside, weather, and human site management. The importance of a basic exercise like this Knaresborough one is not simply to provide the ‘answers’, but rather to problematise and explore the complexity of the archaeological evidence and question narratives derived from documentary sources.

Here then it is useful to reflect on what light these categories of analysis can shed on our understandings of the taphonomy of ruins. The first important development is the realisation that primary damage provides important comparative evidence for that encountered at other sites. It opens up further questions about who carried out such processes, what the wider effects were, and how the evidence of the gatehouse compares with evidence of a similar type at other sites. When this approach is extended beyond just one or two structures, such as at Sheffield Castle, the results are even more informative. Questions can then be extended to why primary damage evidence might be present at one part of a site but not another, which also allows us to consider evidence for other causal factors such as stone robbing. In short, the more contextual evidence that can be brought forward to qualify the primary damage evidence, the more it can reveal.

This premise is even more demonstrable when primary and indeterminate damage are considered together. With Knaresborough Castle, this was done by contrasting the primary damage evidence of Knaresborough’s remaining towers with the indeterminate damage evidence of missing structural elements within the complex (such as the curtain wall). Supporting evidence was also brought in such as environmental destruction, cliffside erosion, later reconstruction and landscaping, and twentieth century excavation details, thereby providing an even more nuanced interpretation of the site. The result has been a more refined understanding of the taphonomy of the castle as a whole, leading to broader questions about its destruction. Why, for instance, were specific structures targeted or ignored, and can any meaningful patterns be recognised that provide clues about the motivating force

behind the damage? In this case, it is the relationship between the different types of evidence that begins to provide answers.

Perhaps just as fundamentally, the typology has already established that arbitrary divisions about where evidence derives from must be deliberately rejected. Documents, underground archaeology, and visual analysis are equally important in establishing the existence of primary and indeterminate damage evidence. By not privileging one source over another, the scope of potential research questions broadens even further. Different forms of evidence can then be contrasted against each other. At Knaresborough, this included documentary evidence that provided one narrative of destruction versus a different one presented by archaeological and standing remains. Neither is necessarily the ‘right’ narrative; they simply hold different sets of data that must be contrasted and interpreted against each other. The broader objective, of course, is to not settle for simply highlighting that destruction took place, but to assess how and why it might have happened, as well as what the broader ramifications could have been.

4.2.2 Heraldic and religious imagery

Having explored the relationship between primary and indeterminate damage, a second type of primary damage—the destruction of symbols—will now be discussed (Diagram 4.1). Symbols have historically inspired devotion to clans, kings, and nations (Barker 1979, 9). Consequently, overtly symbolic material culture, particularly heraldic or religious imagery may also have attracted picking activity. These symbols could take the form of architectural details such as shields and coats of arms, but were also imbedded in particular rooms imbued with sacred purpose like crypts and chapels. Equally significant to contemporaries were other symbols such as place names, certain personal possessions such as books and documents, and other symbols steeped in identity, status, and breeding. These messages were invariably multi-layered. Heraldic symbols in particular ‘often engaged in a double allusion to the owner, his family ties and his chief local connections on the one hand, and to his allegiance to the King on the other’ (Howard 1987 cited Cherry 1997, 251). Visible displays were an essential component of seventeenth century concepts of honour, central to the maintenance of social hierarchy and vulnerable for this very reason

(Donagan 2001, 371). As such, the deliberate targeting and destruction of symbols in the Civil War was not only an attack on royal and aristocratic authority, but was an act of ‘considered disrespect’ (Johnson 2002, 174). The ‘visibility’ of dishonour was particularly feared (Donagan 2001, 384), and the physical manifestation of dishonour through the destruction of cherished symbols brought with it not just loss of personal dignity as a gentleman, but also much wider shame on one’s family or military connections.

One way in which contemporaries attempted to resist this was the use of surrender articles designed to protect possessions, buildings—even ideas—from damage or mockery. Thus, the Royalists who surrendered Salcomb Castle (Devon), re-named Fort Charles, secured the promise ‘that the said Fort may not be known or called by any other name than Fort Charles, as now it is, nor any coat of arms in the dining room defaced, or any thing belonging to the Fort’ (TT E.339.18). The Royalists at Lichfield Close sought protection not only for practical or expensive items such as clothes, cathedral books, and legal documents, but also for the gentlemanly right ‘to carry along with them their notes and writing books...’ (TT E.345.2). Often, surrender clauses suggest an ingrained distrust of the ‘common’ soldiery, particularly when a clear chain of protection extended from the defeated to a named officer among the victors. This is clear from Chester’s surrender articles which not only stipulated ‘that no church within the city, or evidence, or writings belonging to the same, shall be defaced’, but also that ‘...the said city and castle without any slighting or defacing thereof...with the County Palatine Seal, Sword, and all the records in the Castle without diminution, embezzling, or defacing be delivered to the said Sir William Brereton...’ (Barratt 2003, 163). Honour was also intimately bound up with concepts such as courtesy and privacy. The defenders at Skipton Castle (Yorkshire) not only managed to protect the castle’s ‘evidences and writings’, but also secured the promise that they would ‘not be looked into by any’ (Spence 1991, 107). The absence of such explicit safeguards rendered such symbols vulnerable to soldiers and civilians. Thus, the soldiers under Sir Richard Cholmley who damaged Pickering Castle (Yorkshire) (Butler 1993, 32) scattered the castle papers through the streets of the town (Snowden 1993, 37), and at Biddulph House (Staffordshire), ‘...severall writeings of concenment...[were] torne and many throwne about and spoiled...’

(Sherwood 1992, 87-8). At Cranborne House (Dorset), after years of unruly behaviour and non-payment of rent, local tenants destroyed the court rolls that detailed their copyhold tenures (Underdown 1987, 160; Wood 2002, 139). Activities of this kind cannot be dismissed as just empty vandalism, but rather reflect a much older tradition of English popular revolt against the manifestations of authority (Underdown 1987; Wood 2002), as well as illustrate the extent of local grievances and disputes. The point should not be overstretched, however, and attacks on symbolic material were also balanced with acts of restraint. At Sheffield Castle (Yorkshire), for example, the castle records appear to have been safely removed to nearby Manor Lodge prior to the castle's dismantling in 1648-9 (Walton 1943, 269).

The humiliating aspect of destruction served as an effective tool against an enemy, collectively as a form of unofficial policy, or as a means of venting individual grievances (Donagan 2001, 386). The most reviled form of destruction was that of mortuary material culture, and in particular, the desecration of the dead. The lurid nature of the accusation, as well as its value as a propaganda tool to contemporaries, make contemporary accounts notoriously difficult to authenticate. They are often more informative about the nature of human fears than the veracity of actual events. One such account, written by the Royalist Quartermaster Matthew Carter during the siege of Colchester, describes the desecration of the Lucas family tombs in the nearby mansion of the old St. John's Abbey. The mansion had been plundered of its valuables several years before (Jones 2003, 85). After a bitter struggle, it was taken by the Parliamentarians as they tightened their siege of Colchester. Once inside, the lead coffins of Sir Charles Lucas' mother and sister were opened, ostensibly to look for hidden money. The New Model Army soldiers 'dismembered their trunks, throwing a leg in one corner of the vault and an arm in the other and were so impudent in this brutish act as to make away with the hair of those ladies' heads in their hats as a triumphant bravado in honour of their villainy' (cited in Jones 2003, 85). Seventeenth century mores stipulated that the desecration of the dead was a deeply dishonourable act (Donagan 2001, 382), and as such, a violation of this brought as much dishonour to the soldiers committing the act as it did to the family affected by it. However, the Lucas family was deeply unpopular in the local area, and the head of the family, Sir John Lucas, had several longstanding feuds with several

members of the local community (Jones 2003, 34). This circumstantial evidence, combined with the uncharacteristic harshness that greeted the Colchester defenders in this Second Civil War siege (see Jones 2003), makes this a slightly more credible than other forms of Royalist propaganda.

The transitory nature of bodies and other short-lived forms of material culture mean that a significant amount of evidence must be derived from documentary sources. Archaeologically, however, an unexplored resource for understanding this kind of primary destruction is heraldic castle shields and the coats of arms often depicted on them. In comparison to religious iconoclasm occurring in churches during this period, this subject has received virtually no attention in the context of the English Civil War, despite coats of arms being concentrated and potent symbols of a family's dominance over a castle, and by extension, the local area. Of primary interest is whether the shields survive *in situ*, and if not, whether the cause of their absence can be derived. Equally, if they survived, what were the logistical or social conditions that explain their survival?

The first step to answering these questions is determining the signs of primary damage destruction in architectural imagery of this kind. This can be exceedingly difficult. If the feature was destroyed along with the wall it was situated in then establishing its former existence can be problematic or impossible. Even if it remains *in situ*, it can often be inaccessible or badly weathered, both of which make close inspection of any picking damage patterns difficult. Although evidence for this kind of primary damage is therefore scant, several important examples reveal interesting patterns. One is a heraldic panel located in the Cross Range of South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) (Figures 4.30 and 4.31). The building's location on private property, as well as the panel's elevated placement and weathered exterior make close examination problematic, but an archaeological recording in 1994 prompted speculation that the panel might have been intentionally damaged (Sheppard 1994, 2). A similar conclusion was drawn about King Arthur's round table in the great hall of Winchester Castle: damage to the Tudor rose and king's face were deemed to be the favourite targets of Parliamentarian soldiers during target practice (Biddle 2000 cited Johnson 2002, 174). This also appears to be the case at Winchester Cathedral

where, in addition to the damage caused by religious iconoclasm, brass statues of James I and Charles I were attacked by soldiers (Carpenter-Turner 1980, 112-3). One of the most significant examples of this kind of attack is represented by the recent discovery of fragments of the King’s Table at Westminster Hall, allegedly destroyed during the Commonwealth for its Royal associations and subsequently re-used in a wall foundation (CBA 2006). This kind of destruction reflects a targeted erasure of royal symbols, to be replaced in many instances later with symbols of Commonwealth authority (Cautley 1934).

The destruction of such symbolic material culture must be considered alongside the survival of such material, of which several examples exist. At Tattershall Castle (Lincolnshire), for example, the eighteenth century antiquarian Viscount Torrington observed ‘three antique stone chimney-pieces, laden with armorial bearings...which should be *taken care of*, and might be remov’d’ (Andrews 1935, 354). Similarly, the gatehouse of Cawood Castle (Yorkshire) still bears the shields erected a century before (Figure 4.32), despite being fortified by the Royalist Archbishop Williams (Stockwell 1985, 16) and enduring several skirmishes before being taken for Parliament (Bogg 1904, 225). An even more remarkable survival is that of the Royalist (and Catholic) Paulet family shield at Basing House (Hampshire) (Figure 4.33). While most of the brick castle is no longer extant, Garrison Gate has survived, albeit with repairs (VCH 1911, vol 4, 120). The excavators who worked there between 1978 and 1991 acknowledged the changes made to the gatehouse itself, but beyond pointing out that the coat of arms was ‘weathered’, did not make note of any signs of intentional damage (Allen and Anderson 1999, 17). It is possible that the considerable structural damage at Basing House overall, both from the siege and the dismantling afterwards, and the quickness of the sacking might have paradoxically made the long term survival of the shield possible. A feature buried amid rubble or of no use to a scavenger is likely to be left, but one of personal or familial importance stands a better chance of being retrieved and reused. Equally, the frenzied post-siege looting, the accidental fire that broke out soon afterwards, and the withdrawal of troops from the area provided little time or incentive for profitless vandalism. Significantly, it is speculated that the coat of arms might have been moved to its location in the gatehouse during the landscaping of Basing House at the end of the

seventeenth century (Allen and Anderson 1999, 17). Since the estate of Basing House was returned to the Paulets in 1662 (VCH 1911, vol 4, 116), the repositioning of an undamaged coat of arms within the gatehouse would have made a strong symbolic statement about the family’s ‘return’.

The significance of this kind of behaviour has been largely ignored for the Civil War, but readily acknowledged for earlier periods, particularly the Dissolution and the re-use of monastic material. A notable example of this is Lord Lumley’s iconic re-use of monastic effigies in the reign of James I; in particular, it has been noted that Lumley ‘was employing their very antiquity in a didactic or iconic way to demonstrate the antiquity of his family’ (Stocker and Everson 1990, 93). Similar uses of material culture to bolster a family’s reputation took place in the aftermath of slighting, and Lady Clifford’s efforts at Skipton and Brougham Castles (Yorkshire) parallel the efforts of Lord Lumley fifty years earlier. Both castles were fitted with new stone panels that not only linked explicitly the castle’s restoration to her efforts, but also couched the actions in quasi-religious terms by quoting Isaiah Chapter 58 Verse 12: ‘And they that shall be of thee shall build up the old waste places: thou shalt raise up the foundations of many generations; and thou shalt be called, The repairer of the breach, The restorer of paths to dwell in’ (Summerson in Summerson *et al.* 1998, 53). By linking the reconstructions to God, Lady Clifford skilfully justified her actions as something more than mere personal aggrandisement and the restoration of family honour; in essence, it was a public pronouncement that restoring her castles was a religious duty that other, presumably less godly, individuals had forced her to embark upon.

Based on the examples given here, several cautious conclusions can be drawn. The first is that survival in itself must be considered significant because it indicates potential slights were either uninterested in or unable to cause damage to these symbols. This raises questions about relations between slights and property owners, including the origins of occupying forces, and evidence of any animosity towards the local social group or lack of military discipline. The relationship between castle owners and the local communities is also of importance. As destruction was often carried out by organised labour from nearby towns and villages, the survival or

destruction of shields could provide insight into how the castle and its family were perceived. Another consideration is whether slighers were physically able to destroy the shields that have survived. If they were too high, inaccessible, or were only available for a limited time due to troop deployments, then the likelihood of their survival *in situ* was increased. Skipton and Brougham Castles, and less clearly Basing House, also remind us that the reinstatement or later addition of shields after a slighting phase could be a defiant and highly symbolic act in itself. Further survey work is needed if we are to understand how these factors played out not only at site level, but across a regional and national spectrum.

4.3 Secondary damage (building materials salvage)

The rest of this chapter will look at secondary damage and its two major types: building materials salvage and architectural salvage. Section 4.3 will examine the salvage of building materials and assess how the manifestation of this evidence differs from primary damage. It will also consider other causes of destruction, such as theft and the actions of later owners (Diagram 4.3).




Diagram 4.3 Materials salvage and the interrelationships affecting interpretation of evidence

The evidence of secondary damage is manifested in three types of materials in particular: facing stone, timber, and metals. Since recycling was a crucial element of pre-industrial England's economy (Woodward 1985, 189), the approach taken here will be a holistic one, encompassing such questions as how materials were removed, where they ended up, and who profited from their removal.

4.3.1 Facing stone

Perhaps no area of materials removal is more misunderstood than that of stone. Secondary sources routinely describe castles as having become 'local quarries', with few attempts made to quantify or qualify these assertions. This dearth of information encompasses not only the practical and logistical issues associated with removing ashlar from rubble core, but also the organisational and social aspects connected to the act. This is made more problematic by a common lack of clarity about

terminology. Often there is no distinction made between the stripping of facing stone (known archaeologically as ‘robbing’) that occurred during the slighting phase of a castle, and that of its post-slighting robbing phase, although the latter may have occurred over a period of decades, if not centuries. Using the terms established in the previous chapter, therefore, this section will attempt to make distinctions between the ‘robbing’ that occurred during slighting and that which was committed by later owners, as well as the robbing that was committed by thieves. Although each is considered a distinct phenomena, it will often be necessary to discuss them in conjunction with each other.

Where documentary sources survive, there is evidence that stone was treated as a commodity by those overseeing the dismantling, but that this depended to a certain extent on the quality of the stone. This was certainly the case at Newark Castle (Nottinghamshire) where the ‘freestone upon the place and other materials’ were valued for sale, and large pieces of masonry were earmarked for pulling down ‘as they are fitt for nothing else’ (NA E317/Notts/19). Those dismantling Clitheroe Castle (Lancashire) were more inclusive. Their valuations not only considered hewn stone from various parts of the castle, but also the slate from the chapel and the courthouse (NA E317/Lancs/9). They also went so far as to track down and value the hewn stone taken by a William Bateman to build a barn in Clitheroe, and justified their actions on the grounds that no stone quarries existed within three miles of the town of Clitheroe (NA E317/Lancs/9). It is open to debate, however, how profitable stone proved to be compared to other building materials. At Skipton Castle (Yorkshire), ‘several persons’ paid only £2 for stones salvaged from the castle’s planed towers (Spence 1991, 104). At other sites, such as Pontefract Castle (Yorkshire), stone did not factor into sale accounts at all (see Chapter 7 for details).

It is important to understand how this type of evidence manifests itself archaeologically. A useful example for this kind of secondary damage to stone is Peveril Castle (Derbyshire). Although it has no known Civil War involvement, several of its structural elements show clear signs of secondary damage from stone removal. This is most evident in its keep, and three of its four sides display clear signs of systematic ashlar stripping (Figures 4.34, 4.35, and 4.36). All three

elevations, although differing slightly, show remarkably similar characteristics; in particular, the follow-on pattern of removal is evident and the rubble core has been exposed in a significant section, if not the greater part, of each wall. The English Heritage interpretation panel attributes at least part of the damage to theft, but this simple interpretation has serious drawbacks. The first is that the term ‘theft’ implies robbing by those who do not have the right to remove stone (of which more will be said later). The sheer scale of removal at Peveril makes this version of events unlikely, particularly since the placement and quantity of removed stone would have necessitated high visibility scaffolding and labour intensive efforts, neither of which is practicable if removal must be done in a clandestine manner. Moreover, the evidence at Peveril reveals a degree of sophistication of approach and execution. The elevations with the greatest concentration of removed ashlar (Figures 4.35 and 4.36), for example, are not only within full view of the village (another argument against theft), but are also the easiest elevations in terms of terrain accessibility for the placement of scaffolding. Unsurprisingly, the elevation that has survived with all of its ashlar intact (Figure 4.37) is also the side that is completely inaccessible to scaffolding due to its position overlooking a steep ravine. The selection process was not solely determined by issues of access, however. This is evident by the selective removal of stones from an outer wall at Peveril (Figure 4.38). Here, the irregular stones have been passed over for the better quality ashlar quoins. Like the removal pattern on the keep, the secondary damage here is not random, but reflects the tastes, opportunities, and access issues that were paramount to those who removed the stone.

It is equally important to consider what happened to the stone once it was removed. This could vary considerably, depending on who was behind the removal and what their immediate needs were. If the military was heavily involved or exerted pressure on the county committees, the stone might be transferred to garrisons elsewhere. Shrawardine Castle (Shropshire) saw some of its stonework ‘puld down and carried to Shrewsbury for the repayring of the castle there and the making up of Rousal Wall standing on the Severn side’ (cited in Brown and Watson 1989, 85). In other cases, the stones were dispersed widely among purchasers in the region. Stone from Corfe Castle (Dorset) was not only appropriated by various Dorset parliamentarians, but

also found its way into more humble establishments, including a public inn (Bankes 1853, 248-9; Norman 2003, 67).

Basing House (Hampshire) deserves special mention as it is an unusual case of locals being explicitly encouraged to take materials after its sacking in 1645: ‘whoever will come for brick or stone shall freely have the same for his pains’ (CJ 15/10/45). Significantly, excavations at the site have revealed the presence of wine bottles and clay pipes in key areas, both of which have been interpreted as ‘refreshments’ that villagers brought with them while they extracted bricks (Moorhouse 1970, 41). These bricks have long been identified in various houses in the nearby village (see Allen and Anderson 1999, 14-15), and are still visible today (Figure 4.39).

As an example of slighting by state-sanctioned theft, Basing House highlights the complexities of how secondary damage is currently understood and presented to the public. From an archaeological perspective it is, of course, technically correct to say that materials were ‘robbed’ from a building. To laypeople and even some archaeologists, however, particularly when the post-medieval period is being referenced, this term has a legal and moral connotation that hinders our understanding of the evidence. For example, materials could be said to have been archaeologically ‘robbed’ from Basing House, but when the actual *rights* of removal are under discussion, the archaeological meaning of this word becomes lost in which meaning we are referring to: its technical term versus its legal one. This is even more problematic at sites which, unlike Basing House, were not advertised as free quarries, but rather post-slighting reverted to a situation where a legal owner with (in some cases) a vested interest in the property resumed control over the site. This is best illustrated by Knaresborough Castle where, despite the ruined nature of most of the buildings, a legal dispute broke out over the use of castle stones (see Section 4.2). Clearly, ‘robbing’ here has a legal as well as archaeological meaning that needs to be clarified through the selective use of precise terminology. To summarise, then, the ‘robbing’ of a wall can be secondary damage caused by dismantlers slighting the castle, or by legal owners who later choose to ‘rob’ their own walls, or finally by outsiders (‘thieves’) who ‘rob’ because they want materials but (more than likely) do not have permission to remove the materials in question.

This is not simply an exercise in semantics over the word ‘robbing’, but rather a relevant point that bears further discussion. This becomes apparent when we consider the strong possibility that these different kinds of ‘robbing’ are evidentially different from each other, and that they can be methodologically recognised and isolated from other kinds of ‘authorised’ dismantling. The first example to consider is from Raglan Castle (Wales) (Figure 4.40). Located at the ‘back’ of the castle, far from the main entrance and away from the thoroughfare of traffic, is a striking secondary damage pattern that bears subtle differences from other patterns discussed previously. Although the missing stonework exhibits the characteristic ‘follow on’ removal sequence pattern, the upper limits of the damage pattern are limited. Significantly, the missing stones do not appear to exceed the height that an average man could have reached. This suggests then that scaffolding and cranes were not used or needed, and that, at most, ladders and small amounts of labour were used to remove the stone. When viewed collectively, the relatively low-lying damage pattern, the seclusion of this stretch of castle wall, and the fact that this pattern is not repeated in more visible sections might suggest that it was removed surreptitiously by thieves who did not want their activities to be observed.

This damage pattern is not unique to Raglan. At Middleham Castle (Yorkshire) similar patterns are discernible in the castle interior (Figure 4.41). Like those at Raglan, these are low to the ground and are not in high visibility areas, and might also indicate clandestine removal by robbers. This importance of evidence location can also be ascertained at sites with no above-ground archaeology, such as Sheffield Castle (Yorkshire). One early excavator asserted that ‘demolition [was] so thoroughly carried out by the officers of Parliament that very little was left standing, and what remained became a quarry for the townspeople, who seem to have completed the destruction of the building and carried away all the visible masonry...’ (Armstrong 1937, 8). Further excavations, however, revealed a far more complex robbing history. The possible remains of a robbed out wall *were* discovered (Davies 2000, 13), but not in an area that yielded any demolition material, despite large quantities of demolition material being found elsewhere onsite (Davies 2000, 18). This suggests that robbing did not occur uniformly across the site but was carried out in selective areas removed from those affected by primary damage. Arguably, this

might have been due to the logistical difficulties of retrieving materials from piles of debris and rubble, resulting in the easier option of targeting walls in more convenient locations. This idea was briefly proposed during the excavations, albeit in a limited way: ‘It seems probable that the walls nearest to the river, being on lower ground, have been almost entirely removed or destroyed and the material re-used in later buildings’ (Anon 1928, 349). In essence, this issue of access—both logistical and legal—ensured that theft damage evidence is not randomly or equally distributed across a so-called ‘quarried’ site, but instead is deposited as a result of logistical problems and rational choices.

Some caution must be exercised, however, in attributing all patterns to access alone. At Sheriff Hutton Castle (Yorkshire), a desire to maintain castle aesthetics appears to have been the driving force behind where stone removal was to take place. This is clear from a letter from the 1690s where Thomas Langley asked to be allowed to take stones from the castle, promising to ‘take care they be got within the castle & consequently [not to] deface the outward walls...’ (NA TN/SH/A4/13). This illustrates that aesthetics could still be important even when the castle was ruined or semi-derelict, and Langley’s perception of this might illustrate a wider understanding among the population as a whole. If this is the case, the loss of castle appearance, instead of the loss of castle materials themselves, might have prompted an owner’s displeasure, and consequently, forced thieves to go to even more secretive and hidden lengths to avoid detection.

4.3.2 Timber

After stone, the next bulky and structurally significant building material was timber. It posed an obvious target for retrieval and re-use, and numerous accounts refer to its dismantling and sale. Details can often be sparse, and usually only extend to where the timber was removed from and, occasionally, who acquired it. At Clitheroe Castle (Lancashire), for example, it is recorded that timber from the chapel and courthouse were individually valued, along with ‘the rest of the timber of the said Castle which is now in the hands of one Thomas Smith of Clederow’ (NA E317/Lancs/9). Although this propensity for timber removal has long been recognised, the logistics of how it was carried out has received little critical attention. Moreover, the

significance and circumstances of this removal have not been adequately explored. What does the apocryphal 'the castle was stripped of its timber' really mean?

The first step in answering this question is to understand how timber is removed from a building³. Depending on its function within the structure, timber could be removed with varying degrees of difficulty. The most intricate, and therefore the most problematic, was the roof. Its elevated placement within the building provided logistical challenges that needed to be addressed before the timber could be successfully retrieved. Roofs had slate, tile, and lead that first had to be removed, and once this was accomplished, some kind of pulley system was needed to lower heavy beams to ground level. This consideration is evident in the demolition accounts for Montgomery Castle (Wales) where money was allocated 'for Roapes that were used to take downe the Tymber in bothe the Castles' (cited Thompson 1987a, 193). These logistics of dismantling, however, did not just apply to roof beams. Floor joists, too, would have been awkward to manoeuvre due to their heaviness and size—usually 8 by 6 inches in section (Harris 1993, 18). If re-use was the objective, all of these beams would need to be carefully lowered to ensure they were not damaged.

The lowering of the timber was not the only complication to consider. Medieval timber framing consisted of a system of interlocking beams jointed together, and in theory this meant that beams could be pulled apart like a large jigsaw puzzle. This would involve unpegging and lifting a beam at one point and following it through until its next point of contact with another beam, and so on. The further along in the disassembly process, the easier and less complicated the procedure theoretically became. In practice, however, timber disassembly presented (and still presents today) a myriad of problems that can be insurmountable. Rot, insect infestation, the twisting and shrinking of wood, and the bending of pegs make dismantling potentially difficult (see Dean 1996). Sawing might be attempted, but seasoned oak is notoriously difficult to saw through. In addition, contemporaries faced the challenge

³ In addition to the secondary source material discussed in Chapter Three, much of this section stems from discussions with carpenters and building materials specialists. I would particularly like to thank Charley Brentnall of Carpenter Oak and Woodland Co. Ltd., as well as J & W Kirby, specialists in structural timber repairs.

of manoeuvring a long, rigid object through a confined space, all within a structure that was liable to become increasingly more unstable.

Even today, the dismantling of a medieval building and the retrieval of timber can be labour intensive and dangerous. It would have been even more so in the seventeenth century without the benefit of modern scaffolding and safety procedures, and this is confirmed in the few documentary sources that survive. At Pontefract the workers were essentially given a bribe to go back to work after a collapse, or as the demolition accounts put it, ‘Moneys [were] given to Workmen for their Encouragement at the Falls of several Towers...’ (see Entry 23A in Appendix XIII and also Chapter 7 for more details). That it required numerous skilled carpenters is also evident. The demolition accounts for Montgomery Castle, spanning late June to late October 1649, show daily entries for carpenters, ranging in number from six to fourteen (cited Thompson 1987a, 186-93). Timber beams provided crucial lateral support to walls, and for this reason carpenters and masons were needed not only for the act of dismantling itself, but also for their ability to assess the relative structural integrity of the walls during the dismantling process.

The archaeological record provides further proof of the complexity of this task. One strong example of secondary damage left by timber removal can be found at Harewood Castle (Yorkshire), which was not slighted but dismantled by its owners several years before the Civil War. This evidence is located in two opposite walls of the lower hall, originally spanned by four cross beams, supported on four pairs of stone corbels. Importantly, one corbel of each pair is intact, while the other is missing (Figures 4.42 and 4.43). The images show that each missing corbel is surrounded by concentrated areas of missing masonry. In one of the pairs, this is so extensive that the staircase on the other side of the ‘wall’ is now exposed to view (Figure 4.42). If the two walls are contrasted with each other, another observation becomes apparent: the most extensive areas of secondary damage are located near major voids within the wall structure. In the case of 1A and 4A the voids are doorways, while 2B and 3B both lie beneath a window. All of this evidence suggests that the stonework around corbels was targeted for removal to ‘free’ the cross beams from the wall, and that the selection of which side to dismantle was strategic, not

random. Doorways and window recesses provided not only convenient corners to cut into, but much needed space to manoeuvre the beam out of its position in the wall.

The same logistical considerations also applied to smaller and more humble floor joists. Like Harewood’s lower hall, the buttery at Raglan Castle (Wales) retains evidence for timber removal from its walls, particularly in the northeast wall. The joist holes have virtually disappeared and been swallowed up by twentieth century wall consolidation and repair work (Figure 4.44). There is no natural reason for this part of the wall to be damaged in this fashion. Rather, its location in the middle of the wall is suggestive of secondary damage. The width of the pattern is consistent with the space required to rotate both beams out of their joist holes. This interpretation is supported by the minimal secondary damage found on its opposite wall, where the joist holes are still largely intact (Figure 4.45). In this case it was the thinner of the two walls that was targeted for stone removal, and although too much of the original wall is missing to be certain, it is fairly likely that some kind of corner recess was used as a point of entry.

This evidence is significant for several reasons. It illustrates that secondary damage is not randomly distributed, but results from logistical problems inherent to the dismantling process. The issue of working with inflexible materials within a confined space required a rudimentary understanding of geometry in order to know whether the timber could be manoeuvred through any given space. Knowledge of structures and how they behaved during dismantling would also have been necessary. Timber floors provided lateral restraint to walls, and the removal of these or any connecting ashlar or walls could seriously destabilise the structure as a whole. Taking too much material, or from the wrong place, could easily result in unwanted collapse. The strategic placement of secondary damage also indicates how organised and planned out the dismantling was. Once key timbers were removed upper storeys could become permanently inaccessible, thereby making further removals difficult or impossible. All of this creates a picture of dismantling that was highly technical, dangerous, and systematic in the way it was planned and carried out.

As with stone, timber removal cannot be discussed without also considering the destination for the reused timber. It seems odd, therefore, that historians and archaeologists have largely ignored this issue. This has led to the tacit implication that the end destination is an insignificant detail, and that the circumstances surrounding the retrieval and re-use are of trivial importance. The documentary and archaeological evidence, when looked at collectively, shows quite clearly this is not the case. Indeed, such analysis reveals that owners themselves might be responsible for much of the removal. The extent to which this took place might be difficult to quantify, but some owners removed contents and furnishings from one property to another to avoid them being embezzled or destroyed during the war. A notable example is the timber panelling and chimneypiece at Badminton House, which originally came from Raglan Castle (Wales) and was removed before the latter's siege and slighting (Kenyon 1988, 12-3).

For items that could not be removed, destruction by occupying military forces—particularly the common soldiery—was a real threat. The actions of these soldiers often satisfied immediate and practical needs such as the use of wainscoting for firewood at Sudeley Castle (Gloucestershire) (Thompson 1987a, 152). The owner of another site, Lulworth Castle (Dorset), claimed that soldiers were responsible for the ‘taking away of 1200 of Wainscot’ (Manco in Manco *et al.* 1990, 32), although whether this timber ended up being burnt is unclear. This, of course, highlights the soldiers' other motivation for removing timber: sale and profit. Lack of discipline and pay made soldiers resort to plunder (Underdown 1987, 151), not all of which was restricted to moveable goods from the castle. Estimations of damage at Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire) were alleged to be £100,000, part of which was put down to the ‘fine timber and fruit trees’ from the estate being sold locally at ‘bargain prices’ (Pugh 1968, 9; Goodwin 1996, 46). It is worth making the point here that destruction was not restricted to just the castle's buildings or interiors, but affected the castle's immediate and distant landscape, as well. The ecological devastation of clear-cutting trees and coppices would have impacted not only the aesthetics of a castle's appearance, but would also have had serious financial repercussions for the estate as a whole. Moreover, this kind of damage to the estate, much like the slighting of the castle's building fabric, also carried with it an enormous amount of

symbolic power. It is likely that the destruction or loss of parks or woodland was just as devastating to owners as ruined stone walls.

Beyond the uses of the common soldiery, stripped timber had an additional value to the military as a resource for improving defences at other sites deemed strategically more important. The overseer at Lathom House (Lancashire) was instructed that ‘those boards that have been lately employed in the House at Lathom, and now taken down and laid together by Capt. Holt, shall be forthwith carried to Liverpool for the use of the garrison there’ (Draper 1864, 178). Similarly, at Pickering Castle (Yorkshire), Sir Hugh Cholmley is said to have transferred castle timber to help with defences at Scarborough Castle (Snowden 1993, 37), and timber from Alport Lodge (Lancashire) went to Manchester to strengthen the Parliamentary defences there (Broxap 1910, 55).

A third and overlooked type of ‘military’ use of castle timber was the personal acquisition of timber by prominent military officers for their own private use or profit. These purchases were ‘military’ only in the sense that the buyer’s military credentials paved the way for the purchase, both in a financial and opportunistic sense. The latter was possible because circumstances of war and regional politics placed these men in ideal positions to cherry-pick materials from castles. These circumstances might include insider knowledge of various sites through their involvement in sieges and occupations, influential military and Parliamentary connections, or prominent positions in local or regional governments, all of which allowed them to influence or profit from the destruction happening around them. At Skipton Castle (Yorkshire), for example, the governor Lt. Col. Curren not only oversaw the slighting, but also personally profited from the sale of castle timber (Spence 1991, 103 and 104). In addition to his influence as governor, Curren also had the advantage of being ‘local’ as he hailed from Kildwick, a few miles outside of Skipton (Binns 2004, 207).

This combination of military opportunity and local awareness was often augmented by a longstanding familiarity with the castle’s owner or family, sometimes stretching back generations. It is hardly surprising that these relationships between rightful

owner and timber thief/buyer were often marked by ill feeling and feuding, particularly if the owner had lost his home and fortunes in the slighting. The timber from Corfe Castle (Dorset) is a particularly good example of this and illustrates the impact regional players could have. The two most important of these were Sir Ralph Bankes, the Royalist owner of Corfe Castle from 1644, and Sir Walter Erle, a local Parliamentarian who besieged the castle more than once with less than impressive results (see Section 5.2.1 in Chapter Five). Erle’s interest in Corfe, however, was not exclusively restricted to military considerations. In 1643 he was appointed as one of the seventeen men in the county to oversee the sequestration, fines, and confiscation of Royalist property (Goodwin 1996, 45), of which Corfe Castle was undoubtedly the richest and most prestigious. Unsurprisingly, it was the Parliamentarian ‘gentlemen of the county’ who benefited most from materials from Corfe Castle during its slighting (Norman 2003, 67). Erle in particular seems to have done very well; according to one Royalist account, Sir Walter Erle was ‘worth £1,000 per annum in time of peace, but in time of war worth £5,000’ (Goodwin 1996, 132-3). Even if the figures are dismissed as Royalist propaganda, there can be no doubt that Erle actively participated in the appropriation of materials from Corfe Castle to his own benefit. This is evident in a series of remarkable letters between Erle and Sir Ralph Bankes whereby the latter attempted to regain castle materials and possessions years after its slighting (see Appendix VI). Significantly, Bankes makes the charge against Erle that ‘one of the great pieces of timber (if not the greatest) in your house came from [my] castle’ and even argues that Erle’s use of scripture is not a justification that ‘allows you to build with my timber’. It is clearly Erle’s military opportunism that Bankes is attacking when he says that, ‘if you did well to be instrumental in destroying the Castle, you should not have rewarded your good service out of the ruins of it’.

For his part, Erle ‘utterly disavow[ed]’ any participation in the destruction of the castle or the appropriation of Corfe timber and claimed to be out of the county at the time. Somewhat weakly, he instead claimed that, upon returning, he ‘found some part thereof [of the materials] among other things remaining of the ruins of mine own house, laid by for future use’, and that they amounted to no more than ‘five or six load of timber and stone’. Erle’s very post-Restoration response is enlightening for

the imagery and defences he invokes: this included scripture, the ‘fog of war’ argument that he was away and therefore not responsible, the pitiable fact that his own house was reduced to ‘ruins’, and finally, that the value of the material in question had been grossly exaggerated. For good measure, Erle ended his letter by assuring his neighbour of the ‘honor and respect’ he held for him, his relations, and ‘neighbourhood and common civility’. The Bankes/Erle correspondence is particularly powerful because it not only provides subtle insights into human behaviour during times of political power shifts, but also illustrates how long-lasting the emotional and financial toll of destruction could be on those left to cope with it.

The circumstances around timber removal were rarely straightforward and often show layers of nuance that are rarely appreciated. This is well illustrated by Lathom House (Lancashire), which was owned by the prominent Royalist the Earl of Derby and famous for two things: being valiantly defended by his wife in a much publicised siege (see Draper 1864; Broxap 1910; Plowden 2000), and for being so destroyed that its whereabouts were only recently discovered (Fletcher⁴ 2005, pers comm). One account of the fate of the Lathom timber has it that much of the timber was removed for re-use or sale elsewhere, with a recorded profit of £54 7s 10d (see Draper 1864, 177-9 for details). This is offset, however, by the claim that that timber from Lathom House was purposefully used to build the Earl’s execution scaffold in 1651 (Draper 1864, 222; Broxap 1910, 203). The allegation is difficult to substantiate, but motivation for such a symbolic act definitely existed due to the range of enemies the Derby family had amassed. The siege alone meant Lady Derby was vilified by the Parliamentarians as ‘the whore of Babylon’, with Lathom House described as ‘Babel itself, whose walls [God] made as flat and as thin as [the antichrist’s] discourse’ (Draper 1864, 117). The newspaper *Scottish Dove* sneered that Lady Derby ‘stole the Earle’s breeches, when he fled long since into the Isle of Man, and hath in his absence play’d the man at Lathom; but the best man may be conquered, and so is Lady Derby’ (Draper 1864, 166). Equally, her husband had made several bitter enemies among his Lancashire Parliamentarian opponents (see Draper 1864, 86 and 202-3), several of whom were connected to the dismantling of the castle as well as Derby’s execution. The latter, which took place in Bolton (Lancashire), was

⁴ The excavator, Mark Fletcher, of Matrix Archaeology, who provided a private tour.

symbolically chosen because it was the site of an alleged massacre said to have been committed by the Earl of Derby years before; a similar symbolism was in force when Derby’s compatriot, Captain Benbow, was executed at Shrewsbury in the very place where he had deserted Parliament to join forces with Charles II (Draper 1864, 210). Considering the venom against the Derby family and those in arms during the second Civil War of 1651, it is therefore entirely possible that at least some timber was brought in for the scaffold in order to maximise the degradation of Derby and his family.

This ‘story’ of Lathom timber is further complicated by the fact that a later house was built on or near its predecessor, and that excavations of this site revealed large oak beams that, through dendrochronological analysis, were dated to the fifteenth century (SMR document number PRN758-MLA758, Lancashire County Council). This raises the possibility that some timber from the original Lathom House might have survived and was incorporated into a later build. This survival of timber below ground is possibly more frequent than we realise. A similar state of affairs occurred at Sheffield Castle (Yorkshire) where a ‘sale list of materials from the demolition’ is known to exist (Butcher ND, 2), although in its absence, it is impossible to know how much of this was made up of timber. The discovery of oak beams during Armstrong’s dig poses the possibility that not all of the timber was retrieved and sold, perhaps because it was too damaged: ‘Some of the beams were oak 12 to 16 feet long x 15” x 9”. Some appeared to have been in a severe fire’ (Himsworth 9/9/29, unpublished material, ARCUS). These timbers have not survived in storage, and without dendrochronological analysis it is impossible to be certain that they originated from the medieval castle and not from a later construction. Armstrong himself must have been aware of their possible medieval origin, however, when he postulated that the beams were ‘too large to have been made for slaughter house construction’ (Himsworth 9/9/29, unpublished material, ARCUS). Both the Sheffield and Lathom timbers illustrate that removal narratives do not necessarily represent the complete extent of what was taken, and that more probably survived *in situ* at sites than is generally acknowledged.

This view is supported by a wealth of eighteenth century antiquarian accounts which provide revealing descriptions of all kinds of timber components and features. At Raglan, the ‘roofe of the hall could not safely be taken downe, [and] remained above 20 years till it perish by ye weather’ (Kenyon 2003, 20). In the late eighteenth century it was observed at South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) that ‘amongst many apartments, long fallen in, is sprung good timber’ (Andrews 1954, 243-4). Survival, however, was not confined to timber floors and roofs. At Tattershall Castle (Lincolnshire), the antiquarian Viscount Torrington noted the presence of a ‘staircase with an excellent grooved banister’ as well as the survival of cross beams (Andrews and Andrews 1935, 354). Even more unusually, at South Wingfield Manor he found ‘a ruined spinet, from which (as a true antiquary) [he] brought away some of the jacks’ (Andrews and Andrews 1954, 253-4). Descriptions such as these indicate that timber removal should not be seen as a foregone conclusion, and that much more might have survived the initial slighting phase than is acknowledged in the current removal narratives. Causes for this appear to be diverse, ranging from legal or logistical access and safety concerns to whether the site was abandoned or partially occupied.

4.3.3 Metals

As well as stone and timber, another important cause of secondary damage was the removal of metals from a castle. Metals served an important function within a castle in a variety of contexts. Lead sheets for roofing, pipes, and windows, and iron hinges and bars, all played vital roles in keeping a castle structurally sound and habitable. Most metals—particularly lead, pewter, and iron—were recycled rather than abandoned during this period (Woodward 1985, 183), although their value differed greatly depending on the metal and the extent of demand. Lead was the most sought after, and the lead roofs of Raglan Castle (Wales) alone were worth £8,000 after their removal (Oman 1926, 167). Interest in lead was usually accompanied by a secondary interest in iron, and castles like Bolsover (Derbyshire) were not unusual in having their window iron specifically targeted by slighting committees (Thompson 1987a, 152). The treatment of these materials was not straightforward and simple, but rather displays far more complexity than has been recognised. Sheriff Hutton Castle (Yorkshire) illustrates how extreme this view could be: not only was the lead

removed in 1623, but so were ‘the casements in the windows... [as well as] iron barres, doores, bolts, hookes, bands, hinges...’ (NA TN/SH/A4/13).

Two important factors that must be considered are labour and opportunity. The skill required to remove and handle metals depended to a great extent on the immediate objective at hand, as well as the metal involved. If the aim was to cart metals away, then metalsmiths were not required. Two years after Hooke Court (Dorset) was burned by Parliamentarians, for example, a mason was paid ten shillings to dig lead out of the ruins (Goodwin 1996, 106). A more organised dismantling operation, however, might require specialist skills or extra labour, particularly since lead was often melted down onsite with timber used from the dismantled structure (Woodward 1985, 184). Evidence for this was discovered at Knaresborough Castle (Yorkshire) in the form of a post-demolition brick flue built inside the keep which was thought to have been used to melt down the lead from the roofs and gutters (Figure 4.46) (Kershaw 1987, unpublished notes, Harrogate Museum). Similar onsite melting operations have been detected at Sheriff Hutton Castle (Richardson⁵ 2006, pers. comm), and this may have been the preferred method of dealing with metal at slighted sites. The construction and use of such a flue would certainly require labour with some metalsmithing experience, or at least a rudimentary understanding of the melting process and how to control it. This type of activity also required an organised local infrastructure, one that excluded those outside of it from benefiting from direct access to the materials.

Unsurprisingly, reused metal appears to have played an important role in the ongoing war effort, and metal from several slighted sources was redirected for military uses at other sites. Gates from Lathom House (Lancashire) were sent to the Parliamentarian garrison at Liverpool ‘for the use of the said garrison as the governor shall direct’ (Draper 1864, 179). It is alleged that iron and lead were removed from Pickering Castle (Yorkshire) to help strengthen Scarborough Castle (Yorkshire) (Snowden 1993, 37), and the lead roofs of Lichfield Close (Staffordshire) were said to have been transformed into bullets (Pace ND, 9). Often this information is couched in vague terms, such as at Launceston Castle (Cornwall) where ‘the prison had been stripped

⁵ Shaun Richardson, Ed Dennison Archaeological Services.

of its lead by the soldiery during the war...’ (Jones 1967, 9). This is suggestive perhaps of military re-use, but difficult to prove. Primary sources can be equally equivocal. *The Order Book of the Staffordshire County Committee* states that the Parliamentarian ‘Captaine Stone shall have three tunne of leade delivered him whensoever he will call for’ (Pennington and Roots 1957, 132), but does not detail the source of the lead. However, as the *Order Book* has several prior entries for proposed dismantlings of places like Painsley Hall and Carswall [Caverswall] Castle, it is tempting to speculate that the lead might therefore have been removed from a disgarrisoned stronghold within Staffordshire.

The importance of access is evidenced by the varied outcomes that resulted from the removal of metals. Certainly those who had access and the opportunity to profit appear to have tried. If a particularly astute commander was in control of a castle’s dismantling, this could result in substantial personal profit. This appears to be the case at Liverpool Castle (Lancashire) where Colonel Birch not only oversaw the sale of timber, but lead as well (Cox 1890, 202). This opportunism was not restricted to those at the top level of the military hierarchy. At least some destruction seems to have been committed for the immediate profit of individual soldiers. At Basing House (Hampshire), Hugh Peters, Chaplain to the Train Artillery recorded the frenzied looting of Parliamentarian soldiers after its sack in 1645: ‘In all these great buildings, there was not one iron bar left in all the windows (save only what were on fire) before night. And the last work of all was the lead; and by Thursday morning they had hardly left one gutter about the House. And what the soldiers left, the fire took hold on...’ (cited by Allen and Anderson 1999, 7). Since the army was called abruptly away to besiege Longford House near Salisbury, it is unlikely that any of the soldiers made any real profit from the looting of metals from Basing House. Similarly, at Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire), soldiers ‘...cut up and sold the lead piping which carried water into the castle from a source two miles away’ (Pugh 1968, 9). Lulworth Castle (Dorset) also saw its water pipes sold, as well as most of its iron bars (Manco in Manco *et al.* 1990, 32). In all of these cases, it is doubtful that the common soldiery made a great deal of profit from transactions of this type.

A far more typical occurrence was the profiting of local or regional merchants, particularly plumbers and blacksmiths. Much of the lead from Corfe Castle’s roofs went to a plumber in Poole (Norman 2003, 67), while forty-four tons of Skipton Castle’s lead was sold to the Earl of Cork’s lead mill in nearby Grassington (Spence 1991, 104). Purchases of this kind, however, were not always straightforward. At Lathom House (Lancashire), it was alleged that ‘...Mr. Richard Bradshaw, of Bolton, hath taken up certain pipes of lead belonging to Lathom House, pretending to be bought by him of one John Heywood...’, and further appraisals were ordered to clear up the matter (Draper 1864, 178). Not all of this profiting was confined to building materials. Local blacksmiths and tradesmen (as well as a man farther away in Wigan) benefited from the sale of iron and brass artillery pieces sold from Skipton Castle (Yorkshire) (Spence 1991, 103-4), illustrating that castle contents were just as vulnerable as more obvious items like window bars and roof lead.

So far discussion has centred on the removal of metals, but of equal importance was the *lack* of removal. This distinction must be made because not all metals were removed, or if removal did take place, it did not necessarily occur with equal thoroughness throughout the site. An antiquarian account reveals that the lead on the hall roof of South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) was not removed until the late eighteenth century (Andrews and Andrews 1954, 253-4), and the 1920s excavation at Knaresborough Castle (Yorkshire) uncovered a ‘large amount of lead’ in an area distant from the melting operations in the keep (Barber 1931, 213). At Sheffield Castle (Yorkshire), the ARCUS excavations revealed remnants of window lead in the castle’s demolition levels (Davies and Symonds 2002, 11 and 13). This survival of lead is significant, and depending on its location within the site and the castle’s history, can have several causes. One explanation might be partial post-slighting occupation, such as at South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire), where certain structures within the site were selected for dismantling while other structures earmarked for continued habitation were spared. Another cause might be logistical. If structures were too unstable, blocked by debris, or if access was legally prohibited, the metals within the structure had more of a chance of remaining in the archaeological record for longer.

A further explanation might relate to how desirable the metal in question was. It has been suggested that the window lead at Sheffield Castle (Yorkshire) was being removed for re-use, with some of the lead having been rolled into a ball (Willmott in Davies and Symonds 2002, 40-1). These activities, however, are more likely to have been committed by the garrison during the siege than by labourers slighting the castle. This is because removing the glass in its entirety from the windowpane is surprisingly laborious, and the lead cement and residual glass create high levels of impurities when the lead is melted⁶. In the desperate conditions of a siege when lead was at a premium these problems would have been less of a deterrent, but it is questionable how valuable window lead might have been to scavengers or dismantlers considering the poor return on the labour. A more in-depth survey of window lead survival in archaeological deposits is needed to broaden our understanding of its perceived value in relation to lead found in other parts of the structure.

4.4 Secondary damage (architectural salvage)

Section 4.3 examined the evidence for building materials salvage. The other aspect of secondary damage to be considered is architectural salvage. This is damage that is created as a by-product of the removal of architectural features during the slighting process. It differs from building materials salvage in that the features removed held iconic value to the removers. This is not to say that the removed features did not serve a functional purpose as well. Rather, the *predominant* characteristic contributing to their removal was the items' ability to project elite or aesthetic messages to a specific target audience.

As with primary damage and building materials salvage, the same obstacles to identifying and interpreting architectural salvage must be considered (Diagram 4.4). Theft, later owners, and other destructive factors leave similar damage evidence in the archaeological record, and this must be considered while the evidence for

⁶ As explained by Phil Crook, Stained Glass Conservator, Vitrail Studios (conversation and demolition demonstration on 18/11/05).

architectural salvage is assessed. An additional problem is that there must be enough structural remains left to identify removal damage. If there is too much indeterminate damage in the form of missing structures or walls, it is impossible to know what architectural features were salvaged before the rest of the masonry was destroyed.




Diagram 4.4 Architectural salvage and the interrelationships affecting interpretation of evidence

This section will look at two common targets for architectural salvage: fireplaces and high status

stonework. The first category will assess the evidence for fireplace removal, and why certain ones were left in favour of others. The second is an umbrella category that looks at finely carved stonework of various descriptions, all of which had an aesthetic or decorative element that made them attractive. This category differs slightly from heraldic and religious imagery (see Section 4.2.2) in that it covers architectural features imbued with meanings other than those of a familial or religious nature. These meanings might be linked to the lord's understanding of classical or Renaissance ideals (see Johnson 2002), or else might simply reflect the owner's wealth and status via architectural opulence.

4.4.1 Fireplaces

Perhaps more than any other architectural feature, fireplaces allowed a castle owner to convey his or her wealth, social standing, and breeding. This was chiefly done through the magnificence of the carving and construction, the interior design of their setting, and in some cases through sheer numbers (Liddiard 2005, 142). Mantelpieces were constructed out of timber, stone, marble, or brick, and varied in quality and detail (for examples, see Harris 1977, 213). This variation largely depended on the importance of the room the fireplace was situated in. Fireplaces in lower status rooms were much plainer and lacking ornamental detail, and were often constructed with the same geology of stone as the surrounding wall. Where the stone is geologically different, it often consists of plain square or rectangular blocks with few aesthetic touches, as seen at South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) (Figure 4.47). In contrast, rooms of high visibility or social importance such as halls and the lord's bedchamber often displayed finely crafted mantelpieces and accompanying features,

such as the one removed from Raglan Castle and taken to Badminton House (Figure 4.48). These were crafted to be materially or aesthetically distinct from the walls in which they were situated, and were much more of a focal point than their plainer counterparts in lower-status rooms.

These differences ensured that fireplaces were not equally valued by later salvagers. This is especially noticeable in the wall of the northwestern apartments block of Raglan Castle (Figure 4.49). The fireplaces on the first floor are perfectly intact, whereas the two on the ground floor have been removed. These removals were possibly done by an eighteenth century surveyor for the Beauforts nicknamed the ‘Grand Dilapidator’, who is credited with removing not only several chimneypieces, but windowpanes and no less than twenty-three staircases (Kenyon 2003, 23). The loss of timber flooring on the first floor might account for why the top ones were left intact. A more important consideration, however, was the size of the ground floor fireplaces. They were wider than those on the first floor, and the corbelling patterns indicate that the mantelpieces were much taller. This corbelling effect, or ‘triangle’ pattern, results from the structural behaviour of the wall as it naturally ‘arches’ to compensate for the loss of its supporting lintel or relieving arch. These larger fireplaces were in all likelihood grander, or at least of larger and better quality stone, and could explain why they were targeted instead of those above.

When deliberate removal has occurred the damage pattern left behind is not random, but rather conforms to recognisable structural principles. The characteristic triangular pattern has been highlighted, but other structural factors can cause different damage patterns to be left behind. If the fireplace was shallowly situated within the wall, its removal might not pose a threat to the stability of the wall. This was the case in the pre-war dismantling of the lower hall at Harewood Castle (Yorkshire), where the removal of the fireplace did not create secondary damage above the missing mantelpiece line (Figure 4.50). At Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire) the presence of a strong relieving arch, built to cope with the structural weakness caused by the flue, has continued to provide stability despite the loss of the material below it (Figure 4.51). This arch has prevented the damage from travelling upwards, and the bulk of

the missing masonry is therefore spread horizontally between the arch and the missing mantelpiece below.

Although they were valued more, some higher status fireplaces did survive *in situ*. In the Long Gallery at Raglan, half of the ornate mantelpiece has survived on the first floor, albeit in a degraded condition (Figure 4.52). Its partial removal would have to have been carried out while the floor was still present, suggesting the perpetrators had unrestricted access and were in control of Raglan. The removal of only half indicates that the intended reuse was not as a fireplace. In this instance its value would have been in the iconic or aesthetic value of the carvings themselves, and not in the entire architectural feature as a whole. This interpretation does not preclude the possibility of natural structural forces causing the mantelpiece to collapse, particularly since its current inaccessible position makes a close inspection of the damage pattern impossible. This would seem unlikely, however, as Cadw, the custodians since 1938, have no record of the missing piece being in place during their consolidation of the ruins (Avent, pers. comm., 25/1/06)⁷.

Equally important is the issue of partial occupation and the effect it had on opportunities for removal. South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) remained partially occupied after the Civil War, and as Figure 4.47 demonstrated, several of its fireplaces have remained *in situ*. It is possible that their lack of ornamental detail made them less attractive to later removers, or that their position on upper floors made them too inaccessible. It cannot be discounted, though, that the continued habitation of the site served as a deterrent to theft, or at least restricted where stone could be taken from. These practicalities of access probably explain the curious ‘fireplace’ situated in the garden wall of a local house (Figure 4.53). It is traditionally held to be from the manor⁸, although even a cursory glance confirms that it is not a removed fireplace. Rather, the stones of the ‘mantelpiece’ are aesthetically quite distinct from each other, with the angle roll mouldings on the right side appearing more pronounced than those on the left, and also exhibiting a decorative patterning effect which is missing from the left side (Figure 4.54). The stone size and condition

⁷ Richard Avent, former Inspector for Historic Monuments, Cadw, e-mail correspondence.

⁸ From a conversation in 2005 with Graham Lee, Custodian of South Wingfield Manor (English Heritage), and correspondence with the current owners, Ralph and Monica Martin.

of the blocks is also different. Those on the right are larger, more worn, and incongruous in appearance with the surrounding stonework. Similarly, the lintel stone, despite evidence of an angle roll in the lower left corner, is stylistically different to the other stones making up the fireplace. All of these differences suggest that the ‘mantelpiece’ came from several different locations and were not removed from the same wall or feature. This was possibly the result of not having easy or prolonged access to the manor due to its continued partial occupation, forcing those removing the stone to settle for substandard pieces. The fact that stones with mouldings were chosen, however, does indicate that some attempt was made to create a fireplace with aesthetic features.

4.4.2 High status stonework

The term ‘high status stonework’ is used here as a catch-all to describe architectural features that are clearly of iconic or aesthetic value, but are quite disparate in their characteristics or functions. High status stonework can encompass columns, carved friezes, statues, or any other decorative element that is stylistically different from the surrounding wall. It is different to heraldic or religious stonework in that the symbolism or meaning it invokes is secular and not tied to a particular lineage or family (see Section 4.2.2). Rather, these features or images alluded to contemporary ideals of hospitality, classical themes, and Renaissance learning, among others (see Airs 1975; Summerson 1980; Platt 1990 and 1994; Johnson 1999 and 2002; Bailey 2002). In some cases it can be difficult to determine the exact nature of the removed feature, although the damage patterns left behind can often help with identification. As it is the removal of the feature that is of importance, rather than the feature itself, exact identification of the missing stonework is not essential.

Architectural removals are poorly reflected in the documentary record. References to removals, where they occur, inevitably detail the removal of materials rather than architectural features, thereby making this type of removal largely invisible to later generations and consequently poorly understood. The archaeological record, in contrast, is a valuable resource rich in evidence for this kind of secondary damage, as well as providing a contextual understanding that documentary evidence cannot. Raglan Castle (Wales) provides two particularly good examples of this. The first is

found in the area known as the Pitched Stone Court (Figure 4.55), which was the first area visitors through the main entrance would have seen, and as such would have been full of visually impressive high status stonework. One of the buttresses originally designed to add support to the entrance porch displays clear signs of secondary damage (Figure 4.56). This damage might have been caused by the removal of high quality ashlar (materials salvage), but the depth of the penetration into the wall suggests that a statue or some other decorative feature was present instead. Obvious removal damage in an area known for its visual and symbolic importance can therefore serve to indicate that a high status object or feature might have been removed.

An even stronger example is found elsewhere at Raglan in the Grand Stair leading from the Fountain Courtyard (Figure 4.57). The grand entrance formed the main thoroughfare between the outside courtyard and the building blocks on either side, and therefore was a major focal point for those passing through. Here, too, secondary damage is evident in very distinct and precise patterns (Figure 4.58). The first was caused by the removal of a decorative frieze, a portion of which still lies *in situ* above the archway, leaving a thin horizontal damage pattern directly above the entranceway (1). Two damaged areas (2 and 3) lie just below the area of the removed frieze and probably resulted from the removal process of the frieze above. Alternatively, these corners of the arch might have boasted decorative features that were targeted and removed in their own right. On either side of the frieze are two thin, vertical damage patterns that run the length of the building (4 and 5). These patterns are best explained by the removal of pilasters, no doubt highly decorative, as they are too thin to have provided any serious structural support to the building. Their decorative nature is further evidenced by the presence of two column bases (6 and 7), still *in situ* at the bottom of both damage patterns.

Understanding damage patterns within the context of a castle’s architectural and spatial symbolism is applicable to a variety of sites, even when the damage patterns themselves vary. At Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire), for example, the central courtyard reveals significantly different damage patterns to that of Raglan. The most obvious is that, unlike at Raglan, the high status stonework of its grand staircase

entrance has remarkably survived *in situ* (Figure 4.59). This entrance was the gateway from the hexagonal courtyard to the main hall above, and as such its high status stonework carried important messages about the lord’s status. Of relevance here, however, is the secondary damage in the wall directly across from this grand entrance (Figures 4.60 and 4.61). At first glance, the placement of an important architectural feature here makes little sense, particularly between a window and a lesser status doorway leading to and from a service room. It is only when the important function of the courtyard as a thoroughfare, and in particular as a holding area for visitors, is considered that the importance of the damage pattern begins to emerge. Those waiting to be presented to the lord in the main hall above might have been encouraged to sit in a carved seat situated in the wall across, similar to ones found elsewhere in the external walls of the castle (Figure 4.62). This interpretation is supported by the fact that the shell seat features are approximately the same height and width as the damage pattern left in the courtyard, and as the feature was only shallowly placed in the wall, it could have been removed without causing serious structural damage to the wall as a whole.

The examples used from Raglan and Old Wardour Castles are not a representative sample of the full extent of surviving evidence. Nevertheless, they demonstrate the various lines of thinking that can be adopted for future research, and in particular, serve as an illustration of how important it is to understand the original spatial use or function of a damaged area. Just as importantly, they reveal how demolition patterns can also provide evidence for how areas were used in a pre-slighting context. Recognising the value of this relationship is especially important because these areas of research have traditionally been confined to the medieval period, despite the fact that imagery and space reveal just as much about post-medieval priorities as medieval ones (Johnson 2002). Consequently, demonstrating how these issues can be explored in a slighting context will be a major component of Chapter Six.

4.5 Conclusion

In this chapter the fundamentals of how we look at a destroyed building have been re-examined. It has been argued that the evidence for destructive acts can and should be systematically analysed, and where the original *intent* for the destructive act can

be surmised, the damage evidence can be assigned as primary or secondary, and missing and more elusive evidence can be categorised as indeterminate. These categories were deliberately structured separately, but were designed to be compared and contrasted with other processes in order to understand the destruction evidence in our midst. The overall contribution of this kind of typology must now be considered.

The first, primary damage, consisted of destruction that was carried out with no goal towards the re-use of materials. It was clearly shown to manifest itself in specific ways, the most common being dislodged material from the upper sections of structures, particularly in the form of jettisoned ashlar and rubble core. Evidence for these planed structures was found pictorially, archaeologically, in surviving structures today, and from a variety of antiquarian accounts. Evidence of this type was often accompanied by intact or nearly intact bases and lower courses, the survival of which was ensured by their burial underneath rubbish from above. When used in conjunction with indeterminate damage, as seen at Knaresborough Castle (Yorkshire), it was possible to speculate on why certain structures were targeted and others were not, and to question the overall destruction strategy that was implemented.

The other target for primary damage, religious and heraldic imagery, was significantly more difficult to detect in the archaeological record, and hence, was more problematic to interpret. The survival of several shields, particularly ones close to the ground and therefore easier to damage or remove, must surely indicate that the desire to humiliate the owner was not, at least in all cases, an absolute given. Issues such as length of time spent onsite by occupying forces, physical access to the imagery, and the reputation of the owner no doubt affected how these symbols were perceived and treated, and a systematic survey of surviving shields as well as shield damage is much needed.

The secondary damage of building materials removal was a complex phenomenon, but one underpinned by logical and systematic processes. Facing stone was not randomly selected and removed. Rather, the removal of one led to the removal of

those adjacent, and so on, until large sections of rubble core were exposed. A predominant characteristic was that the damage pattern was not restricted to human height level, but extended beyond what could be reasonably reached by a standing labourer. Sites such as Peveril Castle (Derbyshire) clearly indicate the absolute necessity of scaffolding for stripping ashlar in any meaningful quantities, and certainly required extra labour and effort. The use of scaffolding also entailed the use of pulleys and ropes to lower stones down, which automatically complicated the dismantling operation and made it more dangerous. These extra complications are also seen in the removal of other materials such as timber and lead. They, too, followed systematic principles when removed, but presented obstacles that were perhaps even more laborious and dangerous. In the case of timber this involved the danger of lowering massive beams and the potential collapse of the structure. Removing roofing lead was equally dangerous, and if melted onsite required skill and specialist knowledge. The removal of these materials, and the extent to which it was carried out, largely reflects the wishes of those in control of the site. The needs of the military and those of a new owner wishing to build nearby would not necessarily be the same, and the dismantling of materials reflects this. It was also demonstrated that secondary damage could be as violent and destructive as primary, and should not be considered to be a ‘lesser’ form of destruction.

The secondary damage caused by robbing has been shown to be equally rational in its execution, and yet displays important differences from other types of damage. Major structural components such timber beams or lead roofing sheets were too time consuming and labour intensive to rob. Facing stone was much easier to take, but here too the selection process was not random. The damage patterns tend to be near the ground and rarely above reaching height, indicating that scaffolding was not used. The evidence also shows that these patterns are often found in ‘hidden’ or less visible sections of the castle. Combined with the relative small size of the damage patterns, this indicates that the act of removal was not sanctioned by the owner of the site and stealth and quickness were required. The existence of these types of robbing patterns should prompt us to question the relationship between the local community and the castle owner, as well as how much of the stone was actually ‘quarried’ from the castle post-slighting.

Architectural salvage destruction patterns have also yielded some obvious, and yet extremely important, observations. Access once again plays a dominant role, perhaps even more so here than with other types of destruction. Features that are blocked by debris, on higher floors, or in difficult structural positions present challenges that can outweigh the gain of their removal. The larger and heavier the item to be removed, the more problematic these issues become. If the item is being removed by someone in possession of the castle these obstacles pose less of a problem since more time and planning can be used. As with building materials, robbers who are salvaging architectural features do not have this luxury, and therefore the higher status features will be either already removed, inaccessible, or difficult to take away furtively. Where these features have remained *in situ*, questions must be asked as to why. For some sites the answers will hinge on logistical reasons, such as debris blocking access or floors being removed. For others it could be the remoteness of the site from urban centres, or the negative attitude of subsequent owners. An awareness of castle construction issues—particularly use of space and the importance of imagery in architectural features—is also essential.

The goal of this chapter was to demonstrate the usefulness of a damage typology. As with any typology, its limits must be acknowledged. Without a great deal of contextual information, which includes details relating to post-Civil War use, later damage, and other environmental and social factors that could have caused destruction, a very limited understanding of the site will result. Moreover, if there are too many variables distorting the pattern, such as with indeterminate evidence or with heavy restoration/alteration of the site, then the typology, at best, is reduced to a series of ‘best guesses’. Despite these limitations, however, it has demonstrated its potential by showing that the evidence for destructive acts is clearly not invariable. This disparity should serve as a starting point for asking further questions. If damage varies from site to site, building to building, even from one section of wall to another, what were the factors behind it? This is the fundamental strength of this approach. It is not designed to provide raw data, but rather, to raise fresh possibilities about the origins of destruction and the practicalities of how it was done. It highlights patterns, common characteristics, and unusual details. In many ways it asks more

questions than it can answer, but in doing so it allows us to challenge some of the tenets of how destruction ‘works’.

In the next chapter, some of these principles will be applied to the equally misunderstood method of destruction called undermining. I will examine the damage patterns of keeps, towers, and gatehouses and assess how the process of undermining can be systematically ‘recorded’ from the structural remains. I will also argue that undermining damage differs significantly from that caused by other destructive forces, and that a systematic approach can help dispel assumptions about how and where underminings took place.

Chapter Five

‘Undermining Arguments’: Evidence for damaging a castle by collapse

Introduction

Chapter Four demonstrated that picking a castle apart by hand was a complex set of processes. Similarly, this chapter will show that undermining, or causing destruction by orchestrated collapse, was not one simple action, but consisted of a complex chain of events based on numerous factors. These factors included the load bearing capacity of certain walls, angles of approach, the quality of construction and building materials, and the relationship of walls to other parts of the structure. Chapter Three illustrated that undermining occurred both above and below ground level, and for that reason ground conditions underneath walls and the presence of below ground rooms such as cellars were also important considerations for contemporaries. All of these factors could drastically affect the extent and type of destruction resulting from undermining operations. This variability has left its imprint in the archaeological record, and yet is only sporadically noted by the academic community. No discussion of its meaning has resulted, and even more crucially, no debate exists as to the level to which these factors were consciously and deliberately manipulated by contemporaries.

The goal of constructing any building, including a medieval castle, is to achieve static equilibrium. The central aim of this chapter is to therefore understand how and why this equilibrium was disrupted during the process of undermining, and thus to ask to what extent contemporaries may have understood the principles behind the methods they chose. The primary focus of the chapter is slightings, not siege underminings, although the similarities and differences between the two will be discussed. Several additional factors that play a crucial role in undermining will also be explored. These include the basics of castle construction, and how walls react to introduced stresses. At its simplest level this involves a consideration of the thickness of walls, lateral thrust and its effects on connecting walls, and the relative strengths and weaknesses of arches. At a more complex level, it includes understanding how

prevalent the use of gunpowder was, and whether its use can be categorically confirmed at site level. The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate the necessity for systematically and analytically engaging with evidence of undermining in order to deepen our understanding of how castles were slighted.

Section 5.1 introduces the most misunderstood aspect—gunpowder—and examines the rhetoric surrounding its use at Civil War sites. This theme is carried on in Section 5.2 with an assessment of Corfe Castle (Dorset), a castle whose destruction has been explained by explosive undermining. As a contrast point, Section 5.3 considers the evidence for a burnt prop undermining at Raglan Castle (Wales). The points arising from both sections are explored still further in Section 5.4, where Helmsley Castle (Yorkshire) is used to illustrate the subtle differences between curved and straight walls. Finally, in Section 5.5, the damage evidence for a *non*-undermined site, Scarborough Castle, is examined in order to demonstrate some of the challenges of identifying slighting in the archaeological record.

5.1 The role of gunpowder: An essential requirement?

One of the most important questions about slighting underminings is the role played by gunpowder. In general, academics have tended to imply or state explicitly that the use of gunpowder was standard procedure. For example, Oman (1926, 26) notes that castles were slighted ‘by blowing them up rather than garrisoning them’, but gives no evidence to support his claim about the use of gunpowder. Ryder (1982, 87) also asserts that ‘several major Yorkshire castles were deliberately ‘slighted’...(usually with the aid of large quantities of gunpowder) so that they could no longer be used’. Harrington (1992, 24) is more specific, stating that ‘gunpowder was placed in the tunnels and ignited to bring about the collapse of the masonry.’ These types of unsupported generalisations are also made in relation to specific castles. At Kenilworth Castle, Johnson (2002, 159) provides no evidence for his claim that the Parliamentary gunpowder was responsible for the destruction of the keep. The view is enshrined in the work of Kenneth Wiggins, the pioneer of Civil War undermining archaeology (2001; 2003a; 2003b). He states that ‘...in general, burnt-prop springing was replaced by explosive charges...’ (Wiggins 2003a, 33), and that ‘...the defences of many castles were neutralised, most frequently by undermining a section of the

walls, planting an explosive charge, and blowing it up’ (Wiggins 2001, 239). Mining was widely used to ‘...consolidate victory and to prevent captured strongholds from being used’, and this involved ‘...undermining and blowing up parts of the masonry’ (Wiggins 2003a, 34). Unlike Wiggins’ impressive work on the siege mines of King John’s Castle (2001), however, no archaeological or historical evidence is provided to support these claims about non-siege undermining.

There are two underlying causes for the lack of critical debate about gunpowder use in underminings. The first is a lack of interdisciplinary approaches to the subject, a problem which is a crucial stumbling block to understanding the phenomenon of slighting. Traditional research frameworks have been exclusively set by archaeologists and military historians, both of whom utilise methodologies framed around untested assumptions. These assumptions include how gunpowder ‘works’ and what its affects on a building are and were. Disciplines with specialist knowledge, in particular explosives and structural engineers, are usually excluded from academic debate and have not been asked to contribute.

The reasons for this exclusion are both pragmatic and ideological. Locating qualified personnel and opening up channels of dialogue present particular challenges. These problems can be travel and distance-related, and often rely on the cooperation and willing expertise of commercial engineers and other professionals. The situation becomes even more problematic in relation to the subject of explosives. Specialists of this type are difficult to source, and gaining access to them in a post-9/11 environment is complicated by issues of security, distance, and availability. The most difficult obstacle of all, however, is the academic vulnerability required to reach beyond the boundaries of one’s chosen discipline. This entails leaving the comfort zone of a particular specialty and learning the basics of not just one, but several different complex subjects. Of paramount importance is the willingness to accept that certain cherished ‘truths’ may not rest on scientific principles, but rather are based on no more than centuries of anecdotal tradition.

The second contributing factor behind the lack of critical debate about gunpowder is the continued focus on underminings within a siege context rather than as a method

of slighting. Far more academic attention is devoted to a castle’s Civil War siege history than its slighting phase, as evidenced by the corpus of material covering Civil War sieges (Butler 1991; Reeves 1996; Wiggins 2001; Roberts 2002; Barratt 2003). Undermining, when discussed, is nearly always explored within a framework of sieges. This prioritisation has been embraced by today’s generation of Civil War archaeologists who argue that ‘We have to try to view castles through the eyes of contemporary soldiers in considering which parts of the structures were weakest and needed extra reinforcement, and from the perspective of the attackers, where castles would be most vulnerable...’ (Harrington 2004, 59). Wiggins (2003a, 20), too, is clearly concerned with what contemporary men understood about besieging buildings when he argues that ‘...it was essential that the miner knew exactly what he was doing and had some knowledge of dealing with such problems as how to maximise the damage to the undermined fortification while minimising the risk to his own life’. Understanding how contemporaries perceived buildings during *slighting* operations, by comparison, has never been acknowledged as a necessity.

This situation is further complicated by the existence of ‘progressive’, evolutionary narratives among military historians which stress the superiority of gunpowder over earlier and more ‘primitive’ methods of destruction. Explosive undermining fits neatly into this teleological narrative of technological progress, and despite occasional dissenting voices (Thompson 1987a, 151), its continuing dominance remains evident. Thus, for Wiggins (2001, 220), the medieval burnt prop method could only sink walls, but gunpowder ‘could blow masonry apart in a way that simply removed whole sections of the superstructure’. The burnt prop method is portrayed as being much more unreliable than explosive undermining and less capable of obtaining dramatic results. In military terms, ‘The destructive capabilities of the traditional ‘burnt prop’ mine paled in comparison to what a gallery packed with explosives might accomplish’ (Wiggins 2003a, 20). The use of gunpowder to undermine a building is therefore presented as an inevitable and superior practice.

These attitudes are based on a plethora of seventeenth century literature which, quite naturally, predominantly focuses on siege warfare rather than slighting techniques. Many of these military manuals stressed the importance of both protecting against

and successfully initiating underminings. As gunpowder was thought to provide a natural military advantage, seventeenth century practice encouraged its use. That it was a desirable commodity for slighting is also evident from the scattered accounts referring to organised castle demolitions. At Haverfordwest Castle, for example, dismantling by hand was found to be too difficult and expensive, and the Lt. General was asked to provide powder (Phillips 1874, vol 1, 416). Whether this was for use in undermining operations or as barrels in a room is unknown, but it does illustrate that gunpowder was recognised as a valuable commodity for slighting castles.

The problem, of course, is that ideal practice does not necessarily mirror actual practice. As discussed in Chapter Three, the use of gunpowder presented significant obstacles to contemporaries. It was expensive and made the subsequent resale of materials difficult (Thompson 1987a, 151). Since gunpowder was strictly controlled by the military, it had to be transported from potentially distant magazines. Roads and trackways were notoriously bad, difficult to navigate, and at times presented insurmountable obstacles to those trying to convey baggage (Ashdown 1911, 153-4; Warmington 1997, 9; Howes and Foreman 1999, 43; Henry 2005, 21). If a castle was particularly isolated, the transferral of gunpowder could become a serious problem. In some cases this was negated by the inheritance of barrels of gunpowder upon a castle's surrender, and contemporary references to captured gunpowder are common. This, however, was only of benefit if the castle was slighted soon after surrender, or if the castle remained in continuous occupation by one side. Many castles changed hands several times, and even among more stably occupied castles, gunpowder could be sent to and from garrisons depending on shifting military needs. It is therefore debatable whether gunpowder was always readily to hand or easily obtainable.

All of these competing strands of narrative have created a confusing picture of gunpowder use in slighting underminings. One half of the picture depicts gunpowder use as 'obvious', so obvious, in fact, that not only is supporting evidence often not provided, but the need to do so is not even acknowledged. The other half casts doubt on how many communities were able to obtain gunpowder, and how widespread its use actually was. In order to explore these issues in more depth, the subject of gunpowder will be assessed through the lens of two castles: Corfe Castle in Section

5.2, and Raglan Castle in 5.3. Both sections will examine the documentary and structural evidence for the use of gunpowder and explore some of the issues surrounding its application.

5.2 Undermining with gunpowder? An appraisal of Corfe Castle

‘Perhaps no castle in England has suffered so much as that of Corfe’.

(Ashdown 1911, 138)

Corfe Castle [SY 958 823] in Dorset is a largely thirteenth- and fourteenth-century castle sitting on a natural hill of about fifteen acres (Clark 1884, 462). This hill, called Castle Hill, is approximately 150 feet from the streams below (Legg 2000, 91). The geology of the immediate area is a durable chalk intermingled with flint, much of which has been used for rubble core within the castle walls. Underneath this chalk layer is a harder sequence of Purbeck stone, of which most of the castle was made (Clark 1884, 461). The castle has been described as naturally strong and consists of a keep and inner, middle, and outer wards that encompass approximately 3 ¼ acres (Clark 1884, 462). Of interest to this thesis is the castle’s destruction during the English Civil War, considered so severe that ‘...perhaps no fortress exists in Britain where the decree [to slight] was so thoroughly carried into effect’ (Ashdown 1911, 141).

It is arguable that this destruction occurred on such a scale that a full understanding of its complexity is difficult to achieve. The site is a bewildering mix of intact and obliterated masonry, which is often difficult to provenance in relation to a particular section of building. Furthermore, its precarious, distorted towers are often inaccessible, preventing close examination. In several important ways, however, Corfe Castle is an ideal candidate for assessing the use of gunpowder in slighting. Its relative lack of siege damage in the Civil War minimises the possibility that artillery destruction or other evidence of warfare might be mistaken for slighting evidence. The quality of its construction and craftsmanship and the strength of the mortar used is widely acknowledged (Clark 1884, 475; Toy 1955, 82; National Trust 1988, 11; Pettifer 1995, 65). This has left a surplus of original fabric in excellent condition. It is also the rare exception to the rule in that its slighting has attracted an unusual level

of interest from the academic community (Clark 1884; Ashdown 1911; Braun 1936; Toy 1955; RCHME 1970; Harrington 2004). A general summary of their conclusion is that the ruins are a result of ‘...the skill of the sappers, the *power of the explosives* and the strength and quality of [the] building...’ (The National Trust 1988, 46, emphasis mine).

The narrative of destruction at Corfe Castle is one preoccupied with gunpowder. Overall, gunpowder is still seen as the defining aspect of destruction, and it is the main causal factor cited for the destruction of most, if not all, of the castle (Clark 1884; Ashdown 1911; Braun 1936; Toy 1955; Pevsner and Newman 1972; Pettifer 1995; Hardy 1999; Gaunt 2000; Norman 2003; Harrington 2004). No debate about the use of gunpowder has resulted, except for minimal speculation about the likely quantity used. The conclusion is that more than was necessary was used (Clark 1884, 474; Ashdown 1911, 141), and that ‘...the place might have been rendered untenable with far less destruction of masonry’ (Clark 1884, 474). Despite occasional—and largely unexplored—deviations from this narrative (Clark 1884, 473; Ashdown 1911, 141), Corfe Castle remains representative of the dominant discourse surrounding gunpowder and castle destruction.

The objective here is to challenge the primacy given to gunpowder in this undermining discourse, and to demonstrate the importance of other ignored structural and environmental factors. An analysis of these factors will demonstrate that the process of undermining—as well as current attempts to interpret its effects—is not a simple endeavour, but was and is complicated by multiple layers of causality that must be sifted through. This will involve looking at the destruction minutia of individual structures, as well as the destruction distribution across the site as a whole. First, however, an understanding of the role of the castle in the Civil War is necessary.

5.2.1 Corfe and the Civil War: A background history

Dorset, like many counties in England, held fractured loyalties during the Civil War. Generally, northern Dorset and the Isle of Purbeck were Royalist strongholds, while the majority of the ports were Puritan and for Parliament (Goodwin 1996, 2-3). Corfe

Castle, which dominated and controlled the Isle of Purbeck, was held by the Bankes family. Originally from Cumberland, Sir John Bankes had acquired significant wealth (as well as Corfe Castle in 1635), becoming Attorney-General to the King and joining the Privy Council (Norman 2003, 14). Bankes was the most prominent member of a Dorset aristocracy that, even before hostilities erupted, was divided by financial, political, and personal disputes (Goodwin 1996, 15-9). This put the castle in a prominent position of being a beacon of Royalism amid a divided county full of Parliamentarian and personal enemies.

Corfe Castle’s military role was tested twice in two separate sieges. The first began in May of 1643, after most of Dorset had fallen under Parliamentary control (The National Trust 1988, 43). Mary, Lady Bankes, defended her home in her husband’s absence with the support of a handful of local men who stayed until Parliamentary soldiers threatened to burn their houses down if Lady Bankes did not surrender the castle’s artillery. Lady Bankes capitulated to buy time and was able to provision the castle before it was besieged more closely the following month. This time the besieging forces were lead by Sir Walter Erle¹ and Sir Thomas Trenchard, both prominent puritans in the county (Goodwin 1996, 2). Erle promised no quarter and for added emphasis attacked and plundered nearby Creech Grange, the family home of Corfe’s governor, Captain Robert Lawrence (Goodwin 1996, 48). However, the six week campaign against Corfe was a ‘humiliating rebuff’ for the Parliamentarians, with Erle losing one hundred men, and the defending garrison of 80 only losing two (Goodwin 1996, 49).

The second siege began in October 1645. This time Parliament was represented by Col. Bingham, the governor of the nearby port of Poole, and Col. Pickering, with Fairfax sending further reinforcements in December. The castle finally fell to subterfuge in late February 1646 when soldiers from the Weymouth garrison and Lulworth Castle pretended to be Royalist reinforcements (Legg 2000, 40). A month later, on 5 March 1646, the castle was ordered ‘to be demolished forthwith’ (CJ 5/3/46), and the governor of Lulworth, Captain Thomas Hughes, was appointed to oversee the slighting (Norman 2003, 67). Although little is known about the labour

¹ See Section 4.3.2 and Appendix VI for more information about Sir Walter Erle and Corfe Castle.

involved, the entire endeavour took several months to accomplish and was paid for at some cost by the county (Bankes 1853, 222).

5.2.2 Undermining evidence for Corfe Castle

Evidence for undermining at Corfe Castle has been assembled for the purpose of this thesis from a range of sources. In addition to historical material, secondary archaeological sources have been used, although the limitations of the opinions provided is acknowledged. The bulk of data derives from three sources: G. T. Clark’s survey of the site in 1884, an RCHME survey from 1970, and the author’s photographic and visual assessment in 2005. This is supplemented by a National Trust illustration (The National Trust 2003) of the castle as it might have looked, transposed onto how it looks today (Figure 5.1). This arrangement has several advantages. The first is that areas of missing masonry are immediately identifiable, as are sections where towers are leaning out of alignment or detached. An approximate scale is therefore provided for these anomalies, making it easier visually to assess the severity of the damage. It also facilitates comparisons between various structures on an intra-site basis, and provides a clearer picture of how destruction is distributed across the entire castle complex. Figure 5.1 will be repeatedly referred to throughout Section 5.2.2, and each building area under discussion in the text will be identified with its map number, designated by [].

Outer Gatehouse and adjacent walls

The first structure encountered by today’s visitor is the Outer Gatehouse [13] (Figure 5.2). It consists of two drum towers approximately 20 ft in diameter with coursed ashlar facing. The most noticeable aspect of the gatehouse is its apparent primary damage. Originally at least two storeys high, the gatehouse has lost a significant amount of its structure above first floor level. Although it shares a similarity of appearance with the picked gatehouse of Skipton Castle (see Section 4.2.1 in Chapter Four), there are problems with a picking interpretation. A view of the gatehouse from the interior reveals large, monolithic chunks of debris at ground level, too large to be consistent with picking (Figure 5.3). Excavation and consolidation work in 1993 also revealed ‘sapper’s trenches’ near the gatehouse, ostensibly for the undermining of the drum towers (Harrington 2004, 49). This interpretation of undermining is

advocated quite strongly by two writers in particular. The first, G. T. Clark (1884, 473), describes how ‘the drums are blown forwards, the vault split, and the rear of the lodges destroyed’, the cause of which was ‘...an explosion’. Nearly thirty years later, a similar description was provided: ‘The entrance to the outer ward has been sadly wrecked; the two drum towers have been blown forwards by the explosive force of gunpowder, the vaulting is rent, and the adjacent wall to the west overthrown’ (Ashdown 1911, 140).

However, both of these interpretations, in turn, are problematic. To begin with, neither drum tower exhibits any evidence of having been ‘blown forward’. There are no visible signs of cracking or leaning, and other than being reduced in height, both look relatively solid and intact. If undermining of the lower half was attempted, it does not appear to have caused any noticeable damage to this part of the gatehouse. Further evidence is supplied by the archways. Both of the gateway arches align perfectly with their respective drum towers, with neither drum out of its required position (Figure 5.4). Clark highlights construction in this area by pointing out that the arches were ‘restored in part in recent times’ (Clark 1884, 465), but the surplus of untouched, original ashlar indicates that this consolidation was confined to the rubble core of the centre of the arch. A possible explanation for previous interpretations is that post-slighting vegetation and debris once blocked or obscured views of crucial structural elements such as the base of the towers, thereby influencing later observers’ conclusions about the movement of the gatehouse and the extent of the damage. This might explain why both Clark (1884) and Ashdown (1911) were of the opinion that the drum towers had moved, while post-clearance analysis views show little evidence of movement.

The Outer Gatehouse, however, is an interesting example of a different kind of destruction and this deserves closer attention. The lack of lateral or vertical movement, the large monolithic pieces of debris, the damaged archways, and the loss of the top storey are all indicative of a destructive force *above* the towers, not below. This runs counter to the dominant narrative of underminings at Corfe Castle and is difficult to explain. One cause could have been barrels of gunpowder in an upper chamber, or else explosive undermining at first floor level, although this would be an

unorthodox choice for entry. Further survey work of the structure might help to clarify the reasons behind this phenomenon.

Radiating out from the Outer Gatehouse were two walls, one heading east, the other west. Only part of the eastern wall survives *in situ* between the Outer Gatehouse and the Horseshoe Tower [12] (Figure 5.5). The tower appears relatively intact, although reduced in height, but the middle section of its curtain wall is missing. Clark (1884, 465) describes it as ‘10 feet to 12 feet thick, and about 20 feet high, now mostly destroyed...’, but does not make it clear whether the wall he is describing is still *in situ* or is in the ditch. A large, monolithic piece of bonded masonry lies nearby, but vegetation makes provenancing it to the wall or either of the two towers difficult. One possibility is that the sappers’ trenches described as being near the gatehouse (Harrington 2004, 49) were not used to target the gatehouse, but rather this stretch of wall. As the sole entrance to the castle, this would have been the last structure to be destroyed, and it is possible that the will to execute commands was waning by this late stage of the slighting process.

The wall to the west of the Outer Gatehouse stands to nearly full height until the First Tower [1], at which point it has sheared away from the tower (Figure 5.6). It appears to have been planed, and much of its exterior surface has been picked. This is the wall that Ashdown (1911, 140) described as ‘overthrown’, although it clearly has survived *in situ* and seems to have escaped direct undermining. Indeed, the shearing of the First Tower from the wall indicates that it was the tower, and not the wall, that was the focal point of an undermining attempt. The relative thickness of the wall, as well as the anchoring strength of the drum tower on its eastern end, has allowed the wall to remain upright despite the strain of losing its connection to the First Tower.

Overall, the case for gunpowder usage in this southern area of the castle is inconclusive. With the exception of the missing section of eastern curtain wall and the detached First Tower [1], all of the structures appear to be mostly intact, uncracked, and without any obvious lean. The indeterminate damage of the upper towers might be gunpowder related, but the large masonry debris could also be explained by post-slighting collapse of masonry. Equally, the collapsed eastern wall

might have natural causes such as hillside erosion or environmental factors, similar to the conditions faced by the towers at Knaresborough (see Section 4.2.1). Provenancing the debris on the hillside and determining an exact location for the sappers’ trenches might shed more light on what happened to the wall. The strongest case for the use of gunpowder is therefore the leaning First Tower [1], of which more will be said in the next section below.

Western curtain wall and towers

The western curtain wall of Corfe Castle can be divided into two segments: The lower, southern half encompassing the First [1], Second [2], Third [3], and Fourth [4] Towers and ending in the South-west Gatehouse [5], and the second, northern half that begins with the South-west Gatehouse and includes the South Tower [6] and Butavant Tower [7]. The entire western curtain wall and its towers have sustained damage to varying degrees, but each section displays differing evidence which deserves separate consideration. For ease of interpretation, therefore, both halves of the western curtain wall will be examined separately, followed by the South-west Gatehouse.

First, Second, and Third Towers

Of the western curtain wall, it is the towers and walls in the southern half that have attracted the most academic comment. The most common observation is that the towers and walls have either fallen down the hillside or are out alignment (Ashdown 1911, 138 and 140; Braun 1936, 113; RCHME 1970, 66-67; Pettifer 1995, 65). This is especially true of the First and Second Towers, which of the four towers show the most structural damage (Figure 5.7). The First Tower [1] is said to have ‘been riven by gunpowder’ (Clark 1884, 466) and ‘has moved several feet down the hill in two masses as a result of undermining...’ (RCHME 1970, 66). This damage and movement is clearly visible in its detachment from both connecting walls, its tilt from the perpendicular, and the loss of over half its structural mass (Figure 5.8). The second ‘mass’ of the tower can still be identified further down the slope, although current vegetation growth make confirmation difficult (Figure 5.9). This tilt of the tower and the movement of debris towards the western slope support the

interpretation that the galleries were initiated on the exterior face of the towers (Braun 1936, 113).

This downward trend is even more pronounced in the area of the Second Tower [2] (Figures 5.10, 5.11, and 5.12). Although its external facing and most of its base is undamaged, the tower has become detached from the curtain wall and is leaning alarmingly westward. It is worth noting that the tower fractured along its weakest points, namely the loops on the flanks (RCHME 1970, 67). This movement in turn affected the connecting wall, and today part ‘remains standing *in situ* and part remains vertical after slipping some feet downhill’ (RCHME 1970, 67) (Figure 5.13). Further structural debris is visible at various points along the hillside (Figures 5.14 and 5.15). Obtaining an exact provenance is difficult due to access and vegetation issues, but their size and shape suggest strongly that they could be collapsed sections of the First and Second Towers.

It is perhaps significant that the wall that has been the most affected was the one between the First [1] and Second [2] Towers, both of which were undermined. Walls that remained in contact with one non-undermined tower seem to have been able to ‘anchor’ themselves more effectively overall. This is certainly true of the wall connecting the First Tower [1] to the Outer Gatehouse [13], which, despite the First Tower shearing away from it, has not buckled or overturned (Figure 5.6). Equally, the curtain wall between the Second [2] and Third [3] Towers has mostly survived, possibly due to the fact that the Third Tower shows no signs of having been undermined (Figure 5.7). This indicates that the structural relationship between curtain wall and towers actively affected how the various structures responded to undermining, both immediately and over time. It is therefore the relative strengths and weaknesses of these relationships, and not solely the use of gunpowder, that determine how structures reacted to undermining.

South and Butavant Towers

The northern segment of the western wall runs from the South-west Gatehouse to the South Tower [6] and then on to the Butavant Tower [7]. The majority of curtain wall between the first two is no longer *in situ*, although survival of masonry is more

noticeable near the respective towers. At present, it is difficult to ascertain whether this collapse of wall was man-made or natural, or perhaps a combination of both.

The South Tower, more so than any of the western curtain towers so far, exhibits the greatest amount of damage (Figure 5.16). Very little masonry survives *in situ* above plinth level, and the base of the tower is said to have moved out of position (RCHME 1970, 70; National Trust 1988, 19). Significantly, this misalignment has not impacted the curtain wall between the South Tower and the Butavant Tower, the length of which stands virtually complete to wall-walk level. This could suggest that, unlike the other towers on the first part of the western wall, the South Tower was not undermined at sub-ground level. Rather, the tower might have been undermined from within the tower by tunnelling into the wall, or perhaps was blown out with gunpowder. Collapse due to subsequent weathering may also have been an important factor (see below).

The Butavant Tower [7] also provides considerable evidence of structural damage (Figure 5.17). It was originally octagonal and measured around 18 feet across with walls 9 feet thick (RCHME 1970, 70). By the late nineteenth century this tower was ‘...two-thirds gone, [along] with part of the north curtain’ (Clark 1884, 473), with one observer being of the opinion that it had ‘...been blown clean away’ (Ashdown 1911, 140). This attribution of damage to gunpowder, however, is problematic. Its placement on three steep sides, its exposure to wind, rain, and frost, and a collapse of masonry in 1866 have all been instrumental in shaping the ruins as they look now (RCHME 1970, 70). This collapse was described in some detail in an account given to the Southern Times:

‘Into this [crack] rent the rains of more than two centuries have found their way, and have gradually sapped the strength of the mortar. The extraordinary wetness of the present season has augmented the mischief, and thus the masonry was rendered less able to resist the force of the wind. Parting at the rent above mentioned, the greater portion of the fragment which remained was blown down by the gale of Sunday last—a gale of unprecedented severity—and thus a structure which had withstood with vicissitudes of six centuries, had resisted the efforts which had been made to overthrow it with the help of the most powerful agency (gunpowder), and...has at length been hurled down from its proud and lofty eminence and now lies a mass of shapeless rubble in the valley below’.

(Thomas Bond, 11 July 1866, cited in Legg 2000, 21)

Both the South and Butavant Towers illustrate the extreme impact that the elements could have on masonry structures. They also highlight that other factors are of equal significance in creating the ruinscape from which we obtain our structural evidence (see Chapter Three).

South-west Gatehouse

Guarding the entrance to the Middle Ward, and bisecting the western curtain wall, is the South-west Gatehouse [5] (Figure 5.18). It is similar in appearance to the Outer Gatehouse, consisting of two drum towers on either side of an entrance passage. Both towers are ashlar-faced and relatively intact, albeit detached from each other. This detachment is the result of the movement of the southwestern tower both vertically and laterally (Figures 5.19, 5.20, and 5.21). Both shifts measure approximately 6 ft. 6 in. (2 metres) downward and forward, with the separation of the drum towers occurring at the apex of the connecting archway.

This movement of the southwestern tower is almost universally recognised as Civil War undermining (Clark 1884, 473; Ashdown 1911, 140; Braun 1936, 113; RCHME 1970, 67; Gaunt 2000, 47; Norman 2003, 67). Interpretations beyond this, however, vary widely and offer a confusing representation of what actually occurred. Clark (1884, 473) refers to an excavated mine and argues that it was a burnt prop undermining that caused the tower to sink. The other end of the spectrum asserts that ‘...so great was the *force of the explosion* beneath the inner gateway that it rent the building in two’ (Norman 2003, 67, emphasis mine). However, whether or not gunpowder can be argued to have been used is almost a moot point since the structural evidence indicates that it was the destabilisation that caused one of the towers to separate, not an explosion. This is apparent not only in the relative intactness of the gatehouse as a whole, but in the vertical drop of the southwestern tower and in its shift outward in what must be presumed to be the direction of the mine. Gunpowder used in the tunnel might have obliterated a wider range of supporting foundations, but this would only have augmented the already destructive impact of destabilisation.

The undermining of the South-west Gatehouse serves as a fascinating example of early modern military engineering. Despite its frequent mention in academia, however, it has generated little debate as to its ultimate success as a military operation. Wiggins (2001, 239) has argued that it ‘...serves as a reminder of the effectiveness of mining as a destructive instrument’, but this view is perhaps overly simplistic. It could just as easily illustrate the unpredictability of undermining results and the difficulties contemporaries faced in judging the best techniques to use. It also raises interesting questions about expectations. If we assume that the slingers’ dominant desire was simply to ‘put beyond use’, then this must be considered a satisfactory result. If, however, the dominant motivation was to leave a shattered and completely destroyed pile of ruins, the end result must have been a disappointment.

Keep and Inner Ward Area

Of the entire castle, it is the keep [9] and inner ward [10] that show the greatest level of devastation (Figure 5.23). The current National Trust guidebook describes the entrance area to the keep as ‘...confused by much Civil War destruction’ (2003, 17). This area underwent clearance of debris at some point (RCHME 1970, 71), and so it is worth quoting Clark’s observations from the 19th century in full:

‘In the inner ward the devastation has been severe. Of the keep, all the north and two-thirds of the adjacent west wall lie in enormous masses on the sward, and in their fall have utterly crushed the gateways of the ward and their adjacent curtain. The east wall is destroyed at its two ends, but a strip of the central part remains unhurt to its summit, a marvel of Norman masonry, and is completely shrouded in ivy. The south wall and garderobe tower are but little injured. The staircase tower is destroyed, all but a part of the north wall. The broken-down walls of the keep are a sight to see, so vast is the mass of the fragments and so firm the cohesion of the material. They lie in the wildest confusion, and some considerable lumps have rolled down the slope, and, bounding across road and brook, rest half buried in the turf beyond’.

(Clark 1884, 473-4)

The focal point of this area, the keep, is a rectangular tower of Norman construction. It is made of wide-jointed ashlar masonry and measures 43 ft by 48 ft (RCHME 1970, 71)² and 80 ft high (Clark 1884, 470). Braun (1936, 113) states that it has ‘...had three of its four angles cut off by mines...’, with Toy (1955, 81) adding that a ‘...large portion of it [was] blown down by gunpowder...’. In reality, three of its four

² Clark (1884, 470) describes the tower as quadrangular and 60 feet square. Norman (2003, 17) puts it at 72 ft by 60 ft with 12 ft thick walls.

walls still retain a substantial amount of original fabric *in situ*. The most intact are the western and southern elevations, the latter displaying an annexe which still stands to full height (Figures 5.24 and 5.25). There is no evidence here of undermining and few signs of structural damage. In fact, the walls here retain their original Norman solidity, and other than the upper southeastern corner, are still completely in place (Figure 5.25). If mines were attempted here, they did not achieve their desired result.

The east wall of the keep can be divided into two sections: the northern half that survives virtually intact and to full height, and the southern half with indeterminate damage in the form of a 'missing' wall (Figure 5.26). Part of this wall is actually resting at ground level, having collapsed from above (Figure 5.27). Of particular interest is the condition and details of the wall. It has not exploded outward into smaller pieces, but rather has stayed in one monolithic block and collapsed *downwards*. Of special interest is the presence of a spiral staircase in the destroyed area (Figure 5.28). Staircases were natural weak points in a wall, and it is perhaps unsurprising that this weaker part of the east wall collapsed. The weakness of this wall is particularly noticeable when viewed internally (Figures 5.29 and 5.30).

The north wall is notable for the fact that it is no longer extant, with much of its material randomly strewn nearby (Figures 5.23 and 5.31). Braun describes the north wall as 'overturned'. Although the area is difficult to interpret, several salient points can be made. The area nearest the 'missing' wall has a high proportion of substantial ruins, many of which are mostly intact walls that are currently at a severe tilt or lean (Figures 5.32, 5.33. and 5.34). Whether from the north wall or from structures that were attached or nearby, these walls are remarkable in the survival of their structural integrity. Like the section of wall on the southwest curtain (Figure 5.13), these walls have leaned, twisted, and overturned, but have kept their basic shape and size. This is not only a testament to the quality of their construction, but also indicates that the epicentre of destruction was not immediately near them, but affected them indirectly. In other words, these walls dropped when they no longer had support underneath them, or else tipped and overturned when walls that had been providing lateral support were no longer there. These were not 'front line' walls that took the brunt of a destructive act.

In addition to overturned walls, the inner ward area [10] is full of smaller but nevertheless substantial wall fragments (Figure 5.35). Despite the vegetation covering most of them, the solidity and detail of many of these fragments reveals the high quality of their construction (Figures 5.36, 5.37, and 5.38). This suggests they were not originally part of low status service buildings, but rather came from the keep. Tudor windows are known to have been inserted into various parts of the original medieval walls of the keep (Braun 1936, 35), and this might explain the presence of these smaller fragments near the keep. The lower, original medieval walls would have been too thick to break apart into smaller fragments (hence their leaning and overturning), but inserted Tudor windows above these walls would have thinned out considerably the upper portions of wall and made them more vulnerable to fragmentation after collapse.

One of the most significant factors to consider in relation to the keep and inner ward is the considerable destruction that has undoubtedly been caused by post-Civil War collapse. This area has a documented history of falling masonry, including one incident in the 1920s where a portion of a curtain wall tower crashed onto a motorcycle parked below (Legg 2000, 40). This problem still exists today, as evidenced by the closure of the keep area to visitors by the National Trust in April 2006 (BBC 6/4/06). This closure was prompted by the freezing and expanding of water inside exposed masonry, which in turn was causing masonry to crumble.

5.2.3 Discussion

The evidence at Corfe Castle poses significant questions that must be addressed. First and foremost are the logistical and practical problems that informed slights’ choices. Several factors should be considered:

Labour Little is known about the labour force involved in the slighting of Corfe Castle. The sheer size of the site would suggest that the labour would have to have been significant, and the castle’s relatively isolated position probably meant that these labourers were drawn locally or from nearby villages. Obvious undermining activities—particularly if gunpowder was used—mean that the military was almost

certainly involved to a certain degree, although it is equally likely that local quarrying expertise was utilised during the tunnelling operations.

Gunpowder/Military Expertise Despite the gunpowder narrative that dominates the slighting of Corfe Castle, a substantial amount of evidence suggests that gunpowder was not the strongest cause of destruction at site level. Far more important were factors such as construction/design weaknesses, positioning on the landscape, and post-Civil War collapse. Many structures appear to have survived with a reasonable amount of structural cohesiveness, although often this was accompanied by leaning, overturning, or separation from connecting walls. Even the area where the case for gunpowder is strongest, the keep, there is still some indication that weaknesses such as windows and a staircase influenced how the walls broke up. The fact that this area is the most damaged could indicate that the bulk of gunpowder was used here and not in the towers of the outer perimeter and the southwest gatehouse. If so, this would explain why these areas do not display the same degree of damage and might reflect a change of tactics due to dwindling gunpowder supplies.

Terrain Terrain appears to have played an important role in the slighting process. The underlying chalk made the castle vulnerable to undermining, a fact which probably explains why the towers on the most accessible side, the western side, were built to be remarkably solid and strong (Clark 1884, 475). The steepness of the surrounding bank has also been extremely significant. From a logistical standpoint, a sharp incline made undermining access more difficult to negotiate than a flat surface. This was compensated by the fact that, once successfully tunnelled, the incline provided a natural gravitational pull *outward* and *downward*. Thus, each tower was artificially guided to move naturally in the direction of its destabilisation. It is possible that this gravitational force alone might have been enough to move the perimeter towers without gunpowder. A detailed study of the angle and position of sappers’ trenches, as well as the condition of each tower’s base, might provide more clarification on this point.

Construction As with terrain, materials and construction issues were both significant factors to be considered during the slighting phase. The primary building stone for

the exterior facing, Purbeck stone, is a hard and semi-metamorphosed limestone. It would have proven extremely difficult and laborious to tunnel into, made more so by a stone and flint rubble core that was bonded particularly well. Compared to the chalk and mudstone below ground, Purbeck stone would have presented an unnecessarily difficult challenge. The fact that so many plinths and tower bases have survived undamaged confirms that the easier below-ground approach was recognised by the slighers themselves.

Equally, the quality and strength (or weakness) of the wall construction were important factors which should not be dismissed. Much of the damage to curtain walls in particular occurred as a result of the loss of a structural ‘anchor’, a much heavier and solid structure that provided lateral support. In simple terms, structures that were not directly undermined received secondary damage as a result of stresses passed on to them from elsewhere. This occurred in places where structural equilibrium is at its most delicate: connecting points between walls and towers, thin walls, voids like windows and staircases, and corners. The disturbance of one aspect of the structural ‘relationship’, with or without gunpowder, potentially creates not just damage to the structural mass *above*, but also to structural masses connected *laterally*. This occurs regardless of human design, although the possibility cannot be overlooked that this secondary destruction was a hoped for and welcome result.

These are all issues that would have influenced how destruction was decided upon, executed, and how it manifested itself. It is also important to consider how the ruined landscape subsequently *evolved*, thereby altering the nature of the surviving evidence. Examples of this at Corfe include the collapse of part of the Butavant Tower in 1866, and the displacement of ashlar blocks by climbing plants (Honeyborne 1998, 184). These are but two known instances of a change in structural integrity, but many others would have occurred unrecorded with the passing of time. The result is that structures that appear undermined or deliberately destroyed might in fact have fallen to ruin through natural or other causes. This is exacerbated by the issue of reconstruction and repair. This was demonstrated in the Outer Gatehouse and in the keep area, although conservation of this type has occurred elsewhere (Ashurst 1998 Vol. II, 36). This cycle of deterioration and (in

some cases) repair and reconstruction mean that the evidence does not remain static but always has, and continues, to *shift*. This was shown to be the case in Chapter Four with picking, and it is equally applicable when dealing with undermining evidence.

Another aspect of the Corfe evidence that must be considered is the overall distribution pattern of destruction. The fact that virtually every area of the site has been affected by slighting is significant enough. This clearly refutes the position that slighting was done simply to put a castle 'out of action' and demonstrates an excess of destruction far beyond the minimum required. Equally important, however, is the fact that this destruction varies in its pattern and scale across the site. The towers of the outer perimeter vary in survival from virtually intact (the Fourth Tower) to virtually gone (the South Tower), with the northwestern curtain suffering worse than its southwestern counterpart. This discrepancy has been explained by wall thickness and exposure to the elements, but others causal factors such as ease of undermining access and the quantity and application of gunpowder should not be ruled out. Is gunpowder being 'used up' in certain operations, resulting in a change of tactics (and less gunpowder) in operations in other areas? Are particular labourers perhaps executing their duties more zealously or diligently than others dispatched to a different corner of the site?

Of particular interest is the severity of damage sustained by the keep and inner ward buildings. That this area was a slighting target is not surprising, but the scale of the destruction is. Much of this destruction can be explained by the collapse of the keep and the secondary damage it caused to nearby structures. The extent of its culpability, however, is open to debate. If the service buildings in the area were also slighted, and not simply damaged by the fall of the keep, the rationality for doing so needs to be addressed. A detailed attempt to provenance the walls in this area, as well as to work out their original trajectory of movement, could provide further information.

This assessment of some of Corfe Castle's structural elements has shown that the castle's damage history is a complex one. An over-simplified gunpowder narrative

that explains everything in terms of being ‘blown up’ overlooks the extensive amount of knowledge, planning, trial and error, and labour that was required to influence each structure’s movement. Moreover, the variation of results across the site highlights the crucial role structural and environmental factors played in augmenting—or retarding—the effects of undermining. All of this raises serious questions about the fluidity of slighting strategy not just from site to site within a region, but from structure to structure within a single site.

5.3 Undermining without gunpowder: An appraisal of Raglan Castle

Raglan Castle [SO 415 083] is a mostly fifteenth-century sandstone castle located in the Welsh county of Monmouthshire. Several parts of the site have already been discussed in Chapter Four, but our interest here is in Raglan’s detached Great Tower, or Yellow Tower of Gwent (Figures 5.39 and 5.40). The destruction of the Great Tower has variously been attributed to cannon and explosives undermining (Braun 1936, 112; Harrington 2003, 57), but is in fact a rarely documented Civil War burnt prop undermining. It is this absence of gunpowder which provides an opportunity to understand some of the structural principles that contributed to its collapse. This evidence will be used to build up an alternative narrative throughout the chapter, one that challenges the primacy of gunpowder in undermining operations.

5.3.1 Raglan and the Civil War: A background history

At the outbreak of war in 1642, Raglan Castle was owned by Henry Somerset, the 5th Earl of Worcester (later to become the 1st Marquis of Worcester in 1643). A widower, he lived at Raglan with his engineer son, Edward Lord Herbert, and his son’s family. The wealthy marquis was a major financial player in the war, allegedly contributing £1,000,000 to the King’s cause and garrisoning the castle at a cost of £40,000 (Kenyon 2003, 19). This important relationship with the King was even more galling to the King’s enemies because of the marquis’ staunch Catholicism. A printed ‘petition’ to the King in 1645 raged that ‘...at this present no place but Ragland Castle is your seat, where is the greatest confluence of Papists in all those parts, nay in the whole kingdom...[and] who did your Majesty go to for counsel, but the archest Jesuited papist in all those parts, Worcester?’ (TT E 293 (28)). The Marquis’ money and loyalty, and Raglan’s relative obscurity away from the main

action in England, ensured that it remained a Royalist stronghold long after other Royalist garrisons in England had surrendered.

The fortunes of Raglan began to change in June of 1646. The castle fell under siege by local Parliamentarians, Col. Thomas Morgan and his son-in-law Sir Trevor Williams, both of whom have been described as two of ‘...the leaders of the anti-papist cause in the county for nearly forty years’ (Jenkins 1980, 288). Reinforcements came in the form of Col. John Birch, who brought the mortar named ‘Roaring Meg’ from Hereford, and Sir Thomas Fairfax and his army in August (Kenyon 2003, 21). Worcester’s sixth son, Lord Charles, fulfilled the role of governor of the Castle. After being battered by artillery fire and with no hope of assistance, he and his father surrendered the castle to Fairfax on 19 August 1646, after an initial parley with Colonel Birch and Sir Thomas Herbert (TT E 350 (18)). The latter was a local man, from Tintern, and went on to oversee the funeral arrangements of the marquis after he died in captivity.

Only a limited amount of information is available about Raglan’s slighting. On the 25th of August, 1646, less than a week after its surrender, Parliament stipulated that ‘...the Castle of Ragland, the works about it, and the House and Buildings thereof, be forthwith pulled down and demolished...’ and that the Committee of the County of Monmouth was to ‘...take care that the same be totally demolished and all materials thereof sold and disposed of for the best advantage of the State deducting the charges for pulling it down’ (CJ 25/8/46). The man chosen by Fairfax to oversee the slighting of Raglan was Henry Herbert of nearby Coldbrook, a ‘man of breeding’ who also happened to be a direct descendent of Raglan’s original builder, William ap Thomas (Durant 1966, 83). The Parliamentary forces at Raglan were soon dispatched to Oxford, leaving Herbert to rely on ‘country people’ to dismantle the castle (*ibid*, 85). Apart from allegedly burning Raglan’s famous library (*ibid*, 83), they set about the Great Tower with pickaxes with what appears to be little progress. The decision was finally made to undermine, and an alleged eyewitness describes how ‘the tower...was undermined & supported with timber till 2 sid[e]s of 6 were cut through; the timber being burnt it fel downe in a lump & soe rema[i]ns’ (cited in Kenyon 2003, 20). Although the accuracy and specifics of these claims are difficult to

evaluate, they appear to suggest that this was a ‘burnt prop’ undermining, and it is this possible lack of gunpowder that will be examined more closely.

5.3.2 Undermining evidence for Raglan Castle

The Great Tower is a detached and moated hexagonal structure with an accompanying hexagonal apron wall (Figure 5.41). It originally consisted of five floors, the top one being dismantled before undermining commenced (Kenyon 2003, 50). Three of its six sides have been affected by undermining: the entire eastern wall, a significant part of the southeastern wall, and a small section of the northeastern wall. Although all three affected sides had unique structural characteristics that will be examined in turn, the sum total of ‘missing’ masonry from all three will be otherwise referred to as ‘the wall’. Of particular interest is why the wall collapsed in the *way* that it did, and whether this evidence reveals anything about the decision making process at work behind the undermining.

The first significant area of evidence that must be considered is the point of entry where undermining occurred. This is located in the base of the undermined eastern wall and its southeastern and northeastern counterparts, all of which stand to varying heights. Although most of the ashlar in this area is no longer extant, the remaining rubble core stands to the equivalent of five or six courses in the highest area (the southern edge of the eastern wall) and only two or three courses in on the northern side. The interior reveals that this height disparity is matched by a variation in wall thickness, due largely to two notable ‘voids’ in the wall: the first is a fireplace in the northeastern part of the east wall, and the second is a well located in the southeastern wall (Figure 5.42). The full extent of this variation of wall thickness is most apparent when viewed from above (Figure 5.43). Two conclusions can immediately be drawn. First, there is an obvious correlation between wall thickness and wall height, with the thickest (and therefore strongest) part of the wall also surviving to the greatest height. Second, the presence of these structural voids indicates that the undermined area was not of uniform strength, but rather had built in weaknesses related to its original construction.

Two further crucial areas for structural evidence are the vertical remains of the southeastern and northeastern walls, both of which serve as the ‘separation point’ at which the missing wall mass ‘broke away’. An examination of the remaining southeastern wall immediately reveals the significant detail of a series of windows situated vertically above the well (Figure 5.44). Their original construction here was possibly due to the fact that the builders recognised that the wall void below would not be able to support a substantial amount of heavy masonry, but could cope with the lighter load burden of windows. Significantly, the damage pattern here is highly linear, and clearly demonstrates where the wall’s weak points lay, namely the windows. This pattern of bisecting each window extends upwards throughout the entire wall and all floors (Figure 5.45). This type of window damage pattern appears to be fairly common, and Hastings Tower at Ashby de la Zouch Castle (Leicestershire) serves as a similar example of this type of breakage pattern (Figure 5.46).

In contrast, the damage evidence for the northeastern wall contains subtle differences to its southeastern counterpart (Figure 5.47). Here, the windows are not situated as low, and consequently, the lower part of the wall is not as thin. This means that it shares the same window bi-section pattern as the southeastern wall, but *beneath* the window—and unlike the southeastern wall—the wall tapers forward at a 25° angle. Two basic structural principles are at work here. First, a masonry structure will seek to channel its load by the least amount of work (Salvadori 1990, 59), and second, cracks will form along points of weakness and/or straight joints (Mills 1998, 62). Windows present obvious weak points and explain why vertical cracking occurs, but thick walls with fewer structural weaknesses fracture along more subtle lines (e.g. more angled shearing).

5.3.3 Discussion

As at Corfe, the evidence at Raglan Castle poses significant questions for archaeologists to address. The same logistical and practical problems that presented themselves to contemporaries must be considered.

Labour

Durant (1966, 85) has argued that ‘country people’, not soldiers, carried out the destruction of Raglan. In addition to the picking of the Great Tower, a contemporary noted that they ‘were summoned...to draw [dredge] the mote in hope of wealth; their hope failing, they were set to cut the stanks [dams] of the great fishponds, where they had store of very great carps, and other large fish’ (cited in Friar 2003, 272). Regarding the Great Tower, it is arguable that the involvement of ‘country people’ was limited to the initial (and ultimately unsuccessful) picking phase, and that Henry Herbert enlisted the aid of military engineers once he realised that a change in slighting tactics was necessary.

Gunpowder/Military Expertise As a documented bunt prop undermining, the Great Tower has provided a unique opportunity to examine a Civil War undermining that did not involve gunpowder. This in itself raises questions about how prevalent burnt prop underminings actually were, and whether Herbert was deviating from standard practice by not using gunpowder. If he did, his reason for doing so was either that he (or more likely his engineer) did not feel gunpowder was necessary to achieve results, or else gunpowder was unavailable or would take too long to arrive.

Terrain Unlike at Corfe, terrain played a minimal to non-existent role in Raglan’s undermining. There were no steep ridges or banks to negotiate, and due to the keep’s proximity to its apron wall and moat conditions, subterranean undermining was not a feasible option. Unlike at Corfe, where structural evidence was displaced down steep inclines, Raglan Keep’s loss of structural evidence is likely due to twentieth century clearance, and therefore the future recording of debris is not an option.

Construction The construction of the keep is of paramount significance to how it was destroyed. This had little to do with the strength of its mortar, which, unlike Corfe, does not appear to have been very strong. Rather, the layout of the walls and the features within them played a pivotal role in directing the destructive force of the undermining. This is demonstrated by the ratio of masonry loss to wall thickness: the thinner areas, or those with voids such as the fireplace and the well, show demonstrably more loss than thicker walls without voids. The fracturing of the keep

along the window points of each floor also illustrates the fragility that voids create in a wall. All of this suggests that the direction and form of the collapse was dictated by structural principles that rested on the presence of several important factors: namely, the presence and placement of weak points (voids, windows, etc.) and their relationship with stronger elements such as wall thickness.

The second consideration is whether this destruction was targeted or random. An argument can be made that the presence of a fireplace and a well in the destroyed area is not coincidental, but that this section of wall was deliberately chosen for its strategic value. These features not only provided thinner (and therefore weaker) walls, but also minimised the amount of tunnelling the slingers had to do inside the wall, thereby saving labour. Even more attractive, however, was the east wall’s position in relation to the keep entrance. The presence of the apron wall—and the fact that it cut off escape—made undermining the keep from the exterior side impossible. With undermining the interior being the only safe option, the candidate wall needed to be sufficiently distant from the entrance to give enough time for the slingers to escape before collapse. This would explain why the weakest void of all, the staircase in the northern corner, was not selected. Considerations such as escape routes illustrate how dangerous undermining was, even in a non-siege context, and demonstrate the scale of forethought and planning that was required to ensure that undermining was safely executed.

A third point of significance is the distribution of undermining across the site as a whole. Raglan is markedly different to Corfe in that only one structure was undermined, and as a result a huge majority of its buildings retain a great deal of structural integrity. Some of this, of course, is down to reconstruction and repair in the twentieth century, and evidence for this is rife (Figure 5.48). Most of this repair, however, was to maintain the stability of deteriorating interior walls which were clearly not the victim of undermining. This poses the question of why the keep was chosen for destruction, and why so many other buildings were not. The keep is undeniably the strongest position in the castle from a military perspective, but its destruction is somewhat of an empty achievement. Its detached position from the main part of the castle meant that its loss would not have constituted a body blow to

the castle as a whole, and the castle could easily have been re-garrisoned and used militarily. Far more sensible targets, from a military perspective, would have been the various gatehouses and the walls of the perimeter buildings. One explanation might be that the slowness of picking and the lack of gunpowder provided the slingers with less opportunity for bringing masonry down in sizeable quantities. Inadequate resources might have influenced them to go for as much dramatic and symbolic ‘punch’ as possible, and attacking this iconic structure certainly achieved this result.

5.4 Undermining a curve: An appraisal of Helmsley Castle

Both Corfe and Raglan Castles have highlighted some of the important contributing factors to how certain buildings react to the stresses introduced by undermining. At Corfe these buildings consisted of a rectangular keep and round towers, while at Raglan the hexagonal Great Tower was the focus of interest. This section will now consider a different kind of building, a D-shaped keep, and assess how this evidence differs in a structure that utilises both straight and curved walls. As in the two previous sections, the goal is not to prove or disprove the use of gunpowder, but rather to explore the complexity of evidence and identify the myriad of factors that influence a building’s collapse.

The structure to be examined is the East Tower of Helmsley Castle [SE 611 836], located in the town of Helmsley in North Yorkshire. The stone castle was largely built between the twelfth and fourteenth centuries, with the East Tower, or ‘keep’, being a twelfth century structure with significant later additions (see Coppack 1990, 7; Clark 2004, 13). The destruction of the keep has occasionally been attributed to artillery (Braun 1936, 56), but most accounts characterise the keep as having been undermined or ‘blown up’ (McDonnell 1963, 140; Coppack 1990, 8; Wiggins 2003, 34; Clark 2004, 33-4). Before assessing the evidence for this destruction, once again its involvement in the Civil War will first be considered.

5.4.1 Helmsley and the Civil War: A background history

At the outbreak of the Civil War, Helmsley Castle was owned by a minor, George Villiers, the 2nd Duke of Buckingham (Grainge 1855, 266-7). Little has been written

about its Civil War history, although the detrimental effects of the garrison presence on the surrounding communities have been acknowledged (Binns 2004, 148). The Royalist garrison under the command of Sir Jordan Crossland, a local Royalist, it appears to have escaped serious notice from the Parliamentarians until Sir Thomas Fairfax besieged it in September 1644, during which he received a near fatal wound and had to be removed to York (McDonnell 1963, 155). The siege finally came to an end when starvation forced Crossland to surrender the garrison upon honourable terms in November 1644 (Clark 2004, 33).

Somewhat unusually, the surrender terms specifically mentioned the fate of the building itself, and article 7 stipulated that ‘the Castle of Helmsley be absolutely demolished and that no garrison hereafter [is] to be kept there, by either party’ (McDonnell 1963, 156). This level of authority traditionally did not belong to military commanders, nor were they in a position to execute complete demolition while armed hostilities were still occurring. The likelihood of this article having been ignored in 1644 is strengthened by the fact that a flurry of Parliamentary and Committee orders took place several years later. This included the order to ‘make untenable’ in 1646 and 1647 (CJ 30/4/46; CJ 26/2/47; CJ 13/7/47), as well as a Committee of York order for slighting in 1648 (cited in Thompson 1987a, 181). From a documentary perspective, therefore, it is unclear when the East Tower was destroyed, although the popular claim is that it was carried out by Fairfax in 1644 (Clark 2004, 33-4).

5.4.2 Undermining evidence for Helmsley Castle

The East Tower, situated in the northeast inner bailey curtain wall, is a rare English example of a D-shaped keep (Figure 5.49). Constructed of limestone and sandstone, its southwest end stands to 95 ft (Grainge 1855, 269) and is rectangular, while the northeast wall is characterised by a circular external façade and a faceted internal one. The current condition of the northeast wall is that only the lower parts of it have survived *in situ*, giving the keep an almost ‘cut in half’ appearance (Figure 5.50). This is the area that is traditionally described as having been ‘blown up’, and despite rubble clearances in the 1920s (Clark 2004, 38), large masses of mortared masonry still reside in the castle ditch below (Figures 5.51 and 5.52).

The first step in understanding what happened to the curved northeast wall as a whole is to identify the evidence left behind in the three faceted internal walls in relation to the curved external wall. Beginning at the extreme northwest end of the wall, the first significant piece of evidence is the lower half of a postern gate which spans the 3 metre wide wall (Figures 5.53 and 5.54). Externally, the wall east of the postern slopes downwards in what at first appears to be a sharp incline. The internal façade, however, presents a more defined picture of this structural evidence (Figures 5.55 and 5.56). This view shows that the irregular stonework to the right of the postern gate has survived to the greatest height, but beyond it a significant amount of rubble core has been exposed. The presence of this rubble core is problematic, particularly as there is evidence of a corner recess, possibly for an arrow loop to serve as a lookout for the adjacent postern gate. If this interpretation is correct, then some of this ‘exposed’ rubble core is likely to be consolidation work, possibly by the Ministry of Works to discourage visitors from climbing over the edge.

The apex of the curve demonstrates the least amount of stone *in situ*, both internally and externally. At its highest point the internal façade stands to 5-6 courses, with a modern pathway currently bisecting the wall (Figures 5.57 and 5.58). This eastern segment of the wall is approximately 3 metres thick, and on the external side stands as low as three courses (Figure 5.59). The pattern here—like in the northeastern section of wall—is one of gradations, with the wall rising steeply the farther away it is from the apex of the curve (Figure 5.60). Using a 3D CAD model, this pattern is even more pronounced and shows the extent of masonry survival in this part of the keep (Figures 5.61 and 5.62). Even accounting for natural decay and the landscaping of the ruin, the extreme loss of masonry in this area indicates that it was the likely point of entry for those undermining the keep.

Of the three faceted segments of the curved wall, the remains of the eastern section have survived to the greatest height (Figure 5.63). This is mostly in the form of rubble coursed masonry, although a distinct construction break is visible approximately five courses from the floor. This break is problematic in that its presence is difficult to explain. One interpretation is that everything above it is a post-slighting reconstruction, although the scale of such an endeavour makes the

likelihood of this debatable. Instead, a partial consolidation of the rubble is more likely, and the construction break could in fact represent a twentieth century artificial levelling of facing stone to present a ‘tidy’ appearance. Even if allowances are made for some consolidation, this part of the keep seems to have coped with undermining more successfully than its north/northwest counterpart (Figure 5.64), in large part due to the lack of structural voids like the postern gate and arrow loop.

5.4.3 Discussion

Labour

Helmsley Castle was one of a group of castles (including Knaresborough, Mulgrave, and Sheffield) which were specifically singled out for slighting in October 1648 by the York Committee (see Appendix II). No known documentation exists regarding the labour used at Helmsley, although evidence from Knaresborough suggests that the County Committee took a hard line against area residents not assisting with demolitions activities (see Appendix V). However, any use of general labourers would have likely been restricted to the picking of curtain walls and other structures, namely due to the complexity of the undermining operations and the specialist skills it would have required.

Gunpowder/Military expertise

The use of gunpowder to destroy the keep is difficult to confirm. In part this is due to the original rubble distribution pattern having been lost as a result of the twentieth century clearances. Arguably, the keep had enough structural weaknesses (see below) for it to have been successfully undermined without the use of gunpowder. The expertise this would have required, however, would have necessitated military involvement, and it is possible that the County Committee arranged for the same engineer(s) to visit all four of the Yorkshire castles ordered to be slighted in October 1648.

Terrain As at Corfe, terrain has played an important role, although in a much different way. There, the angle of the bank was used to undermine at subsoil level and resulted in towers that leaned outwards. At Helmsley, where subsoil

undermining was either not attempted or if so, proved too difficult, the steepness of the castle ditch seems to have precluded an external undermining approach.

Construction

The construction of Helmsley Castle Keep played a key role in its subsequent destruction. As a D-shaped keep, its curved wall was designed to protect against siege undermining, largely because castle builders had come to realise the innate ability of a curved wall to cope with compression stress. Just as an arch is strongest when it is ‘pushed’ inward, so too is a curved wall when loads from above provide compressive strength and ‘push’ the wall together. Contemporary engineers would likely have recognised this fact and concluded that undermining from the interior allowed them to disrupt this strength by ‘pushing’ the wall out at its base. This effectively weakened the entire length of the curve, causing the masonry above to shear and collapse. As the apex of a curve—the strongest section during compression—can also be its weakest point, this area had the poorest survival rate of standing masonry. The northern end of the curved wall was significantly weakened by the placement of a postern gate, and possibly an arrow loop, both of which would have aided the vertical shearing of the masonry above. In contrast, the lack of voids in the eastern wall appears to have made it the strongest section of wall, and consequently it has survived with the most masonry.

The possibility of substantial consolidation of the ruins by the Ministry of Works makes an analysis of the true post-slighting destruction pattern problematic. Issues such as the consolidation of rubble cores and the possible ‘tidying up’ of walls have already been raised, and of course piecemeal crumbling of the damaged surfaces is also a significant factor that must be considered. Arguably, however, the destruction pattern of the keep suggests that its design structure—both its D-shape and its placement of voids—influenced how and where destruction manifested itself throughout the structure.

5.5 The blurred line: Distinguishing undermining from bombardment at Scarborough Castle

This chapter has concentrated on castles with known or strongly suspected undermining events in their Civil War past. Determining what has been undermined, however, can be challenging at sites where other destructive events may have occurred. As Chapter Three demonstrated, destruction can have a variety of causes that can mimic each other in appearance and manifestation. One important element of understanding slighting undermining is therefore the ability to differentiate it from other forms of damage. This section will consider the challenges facing archaeologists in determining whether undermining activity took place, as well how overlooked structural evidence can help identify the root causes of collapse. This will be done through the example of Scarborough Castle, a site chosen for its combination of strong documentary and structural evidence. The argument here is not that one form of evidence is superior to the other, but rather that both are equally liable to be ignored, marginalised, and not subjected to rigorous analysis. Scarborough Castle is important not just for the structural evidence it provides, but because it illustrates how crucial it is that all evidence for or against slighting—whether documentary, archaeological, or environmental—is critically scrutinised. For that reason, both forms of evidence will be contrasted with each other to see how the relative strengths and weaknesses of each provide a much fuller picture of Scarborough’s damaged keep.

5.5.1 The documentary evidence and the established narrative

The remains of Scarborough Castle [TA 050 893], located in the North Riding of Yorkshire, lie on a promontory facing the North Sea. The castle has a complicated Civil War history (see Binns 1986 and 1996) and was initially garrisoned for Parliament by Sir Hugh Cholmley, only to switch sides in 1643 and again in 1648. In 1645, during the first of its two sieges, the keep suffered extensive damage from a prolonged artillery attack, causing part of its western wall to collapse (Figure 5.65). The Royalist governor, Hugh Cholmley, recounted this dramatic event in his journal and described how, after three days of bombardment: ‘...the great Tower split in two, and that side which was battered [fell] to the ground, the other standing firme being supported by an arch of stone that went through the midst’ (Firth 1917, 582). The

castle was still deemed to be usable despite this damage, however, and in 1648 the Parliamentary governor, Sir Matthew Boynton, switched allegiances and declared Scarborough Castle for the King, eventually surrendering after an uneventful two month siege.

In spite of this documentary evidence for the damage, Scarborough Castle has a confused slighting history, in large part because of the Parliamentary attention it received in the years following 1648. It was ordered to be demolished in 1649 (CSPD 13/7/49) and again in 1651 (CSPD 9/5/51), only for the orders to be rescinded and a small garrison ordered to be placed there instead (CSPD 12/6/51; CJ 5/12/51). This has created a climate of confusion about whether slighting actually took place, and the result has been a myriad of conflicting explanations for the destruction of the keep, including gunpowder (Clark 1866, 921; Ryder 1982, 89), undermining (Clark 1884 vol 2, 461; Thompson 1987a, 151 and 153), and even World War I German artillery (Liddiard 2005, 40). This slighting narrative has not escaped criticism (Binns 2000, 156-7), but the assertion that Scarborough Castle was slighted continues to the present (Harrington 2004, 56; Figure 5.66). In this case, the documentary evidence has not provided the ‘final word’ on what happened, but instead has produced a confused narrative of multiple explanations that have not been properly examined in conjunction with the structural evidence.

5.5.2 The archaeological evidence: An assessment

The keep at Scarborough Castle is approximately 56 ft square at the base with walls 11 ft thick (Clark 1884, vol 2, 464). The most concentrated area of damage is located in the west wall (Figure 5.67), arguably giving the structure a superficial resemblance to undermining patterns examined previously in this chapter. For example, like Raglan’s Great Tower (Figure 5.41), the damage baseline is not uniform but survives to varying degrees. At its lowest level on the external side—located in the centre of the wall—the wall survives to a height of approximately 15 courses, but this sharply rises before increasing in more subtle gradations, similar to the pattern at Helmsley’s keep (Figures 5.61 and 5.62). The structural relationship here is more similar to Raglan, however, in that these height variations are once again related to the internal arrangements of the wall: in this case, the presence of a

stairwell (Figure 5.68). The presence of a staircase in a wall is a recognised weak feature in a wall (Braun 1936, 45), and consequently this area is also the area where the wall survives to the lowest height. On either side of the stairwell, the wall has survived to a much greater height due to its significant mass, but then stops abruptly at the first floor level. The explanation for this can be found in the floor plans of the keep which reveal that two latrines formerly existed on either side of the stairwell, beginning at the first floor level and continuing up through the second (Figure 5.69). This inherent design flaw made the west wall (above basement level) the weakest of the four walls and explains why it collapsed in the manner that it did.

Although the brunt of the destruction was borne by the west wall, the northern and southern fronts were also affected and reveal significant evidence about the type and origin of the destructive force (Figure 5.70). In particular, they show a substantial amount of surviving fabric in the lower part of the structure, matched by an equally substantial amount of missing wall above. This pattern is most pronounced in the southern elevation where an almost inverted ‘L’ shape has been created. Here, the destruction pattern of missing wall mass is more horizontal than vertical, and possibly suggests that the origin of destruction did not originate from below, but rather externally and laterally. This is consistent with an angled, downward trajectory of an artillery impact and would explain why so much of the base has survived *in situ*. It must be stressed that this is a cautious interpretation, and further input from battlefield archaeologists—particularly those specialising in artillery trajectories—would be most welcome.

5.5.3 Discussion

The example of Scarborough Castle serves as an excellent heuristic device to reassess the way we engage with destruction evidence at sites. The destroyed keep can be ‘approached’ both firsthand (archaeologically) and second-hand (through documentary sources), but both have demonstrable pitfalls. For example, overlooking key texts (such as the governor’s account of the collapse) might lead some to draw the conclusion that because it was ordered to be slighted, the destruction must in fact *be* slighting related, which explains why so many have ‘read’ the destruction at face value and argued this point. Additionally, ‘documents’ can be

flawed for a range of reasons. Clark (1884, vol 2, 467), for example, speculated that the mural stairwell was located in one of the corner turrets instead of the damaged north wall, in large part because his view of this area was obscured by its then use as a powder magazine. Such inaccuracies can have profound ramifications for how destruction evidence at a site is interpreted and understood by those relying on past research. The gravity of this becomes apparent in light of the fact that a castle's Civil War/slighting history is often poorly documented by contemporaries to begin with, and is also the period of a castle's history that receives the least amount of intensive academic scrutiny today.

However, an exclusively archaeological/visual based approach has similar limitations. At a superficial level, the destroyed keep *looks* like a slighted keep. It bears a passing resemblance to similar sites with undermined keeps, and moreover, stairwells (as structural voids) were attractive targets for engineers looking for a suitable 'point of entry' from which to undermine the structure. Therefore, just as those taking a documentary approach can draw conclusions that—based on the evidence—seem reasonable, so too can those using their eye make similar mistakes.

The strength of Scarborough Castle as a means of exploring these issues lies in the fact that its compelling documentary evidence frees us to take any archaeological assessment to a more focused level. Thus, since we 'know' that the keep's destruction was caused by artillery, we were able to move to the specifics of how (and why) the Scarborough evidence differs from undermining evidence at other sites. The result was the identification of structural anomalies in the damage pattern which suggested a downward/lateral source for the damage to the west wall. This structural evidence can now be examined in closer detail and debated, and perhaps most importantly, applied to other sites. This is particularly essential since the destruction phase of a castle's history tends to be poorly understood, and understanding the mechanics of destruction at one site will eventually lead to a broader understanding of the processes of destruction.

5.6 Conclusion

The aim of this chapter was to establish whether an archaeological approach could be used to understand undermining destruction. This was attempted by exploring several methodological issues such as the use of gunpowder, the structural composition of buildings, and how structures react to specific kinds of stress. This was in part to reassess a handful of important sites, but perhaps even more crucially, to provide a more nuanced discussion of the processes at work in undermined structures. Several critical issues have been highlighted, and from them, many salient observations can be made.

One of the most important points to emerge is that a direct link between gunpowder use and destruction evidence in the structural remains is difficult to establish or substantiate. This contradicts the dominant discourse that gunpowder was pervasive and caused most of the slighting damage during the Civil War. Corfe’s Southwest Gatehouse is the example most often cited as an indicator of the power of explosive undermining, but here it was suggested instead that it more accurately demonstrates the limitations of what gunpowder could achieve. Moreover, evidence from Raglan and Helmsley was used to demonstrate that structural and environmental factors played as much if not more of a role in influencing how structures reacted to undermining attempts. Thinner walls and voids such as windows, stairwells, and fireplaces were shown to dictate where buildings cracked, collapsed, or leaned, as well as the severity of the damage.

This recognition of the complexity of structural collapse has provided a new insight into the level of contemporary knowledge that seventeenth century military engineers had acquired. This knowledge was multi-faceted and broad ranging. Local understanding of terrain and geology informed the best method of undermining, whether underground or above, and equally, the knowledge and ability to harness the appropriate labour was also vital. This involved not only knowing how to obtain general labourers or miners, but having the connections to organise, finance, or coerce them into participating. The act of undermining itself required a strong familiarity with buildings, not only in their component materials and the structural forces that kept them standing, but in their layout and design. Lack of understanding

in any of these areas could result in wasted time and disappointing results, or even accidental collapse and loss of life. Therefore, assessing how undermining was carried out provides information about community resources and contemporary knowledge. As these factors almost certainly varied across different sites, a sample of undermined sites should reveal a variety of destruction outcomes ranging from ‘successful’ to botched or aborted. This aspect of destruction has been largely ignored by scholars, and as a result contemporary expertise and knowledge is either not acknowledged as an important issue, or else is assumed to have been adequate. This cannot and should not be assumed, and assessing how effective local communities were at carrying out destructive act should play an important part of any research agenda.

The evidence surveyed here suggests that contemporary knowledge in many instances was substantial, and that the entry points for undermining were not random but carefully targeted. Fireplaces, thinner walls, windows, masonry on steep inclines, corners, and other vulnerable places appear to have been selected over structurally stronger areas that might have proven more resistant to undermining attempts. This indicates that contemporaries were applying military engineering to *slighting* techniques as much as they did to *siege* undermining. The ability to identify these structural weak points in areas that show evidence of destruction—to ‘think like a seventeenth century military engineer’—is imperative if we are to critically engage with the destruction evidence and understand why contemporaries chose to use the methods that they did.

On a broader level, this chapter has also highlighted some of the theoretical and philosophical problems that surround this subject. Many of these reflect the poor attention and priority that scholars have given to the understanding of *slighting* destruction. In part this is because differentiating between undermining in a *slighting* context and destruction from other causes is highly problematic and provides no easy methodological solutions. As a result, structural evidence that has not been vigorously examined is presented as ‘fact’, often in contradiction to other forms of evidence that have been ignored or overlooked. The argument presented here, as well as in Chapter Four, is that destruction evidence is variable, but exhibits detectable

patterns depending on the type. The challenge for us is to use a much more critical eye when assessing this destruction evidence. This means that ambiguous evidence should be explicitly acknowledged as such, and collapsed or cracked masonry should not automatically constitute 'proof' that a building was undermined. In short, where doubt exists, the possibility that other explanations might apply should be clearly stated and considered.

This need for clear terminology and higher standards of language cannot be overstated. As this chapter has demonstrated, terminology such as 'blown up' has been shown to be inaccurate, uninformative, and potentially confusing, and does not advance our understanding of the physical forces at work in a destroyed building. Not only does it not make a distinction between barrels of gunpowder and explosive undermining, but it also is a definitive assertion that gunpowder was used, which sites such as Raglan refute. The adoption and use of specific terms, consistently applied, will make analysis and dissemination of information much easier, and the advocacy of this should be a major priority for all those involved in the study of Civil War castles.

In the next two chapters these issues will be explored further through two case studies: Kenilworth Castle in Warwickshire, and Pontefract Castle in Yorkshire. Using the methodological basis gained from Chapters Four and Five, both case studies will change the focus to some of the wider social implications of slighting. This includes not only the impact of slighting on the castle and its local community, but how this destruction is negotiated and managed by those involved. In Chapter Six, Kenilworth Castle, the significance of personal profit will be explored, and the importance of the private role of the individual in manipulating and controlling slighting will be examined.

Chapter Six

The Private Face of Slighting: Kenilworth Castle and Privatisation

Introduction

This thesis has predominantly focused on the minutia of destruction: how it was executed, how it manifested itself in buildings, and how we as archaeologists recognise, record, and talk about it. The driving force behind this approach was the identification of a lack of systematic recording techniques and principles, and the recognition that this needed to be addressed. Consequently, a methodological approach for engaging with building destruction was crafted in the previous three chapters and the rich complexity of the destruction evidence was revealed. This methodological basis for understanding slighting is, in effect, a starting point from which to ask wider questions about the social context from which destruction emerged.

Having established this foundation, this chapter seeks to shift the focus away from the buildings and on to the individual, or more specifically, the subtle relationships that existed between the destroyed buildings and the individuals involved in their destruction. The main thread of this argument is that slighting is not just about the 'bricks and mortar' of destruction. It is also about how people negotiate this destruction: in short, how they effect destruction and the implicit messages their actions send to a wider audience. This chapter takes as its cue Johnson's (2002) argument that understanding a castle owner's identity is crucial to understanding the castle's construction and use. From this it will argue that slighting identities can play a similarly important role in shaping how a castle is destroyed and 'used'. In making this argument, it will retread familiar methodological ground about how to recognise slighting damage, while also exploring new territory in the form of what destruction 'means' in a broader social context. In doing so, it will suggest that slighting is part of a much wider discourse about buildings and landscapes and their changing meaning, and serves as a link between medieval and Renaissance thinking on the one

hand, and emerging Antiquarian values on the other. These themes will be explored by ‘revisiting’ one of Johnson’s (2002) main sites, Kenilworth Castle (Warwickshire).

6.1 ‘The Story’ of a castle: Kenilworth revisited

By focusing on the subject of slighting, this thesis has sought to challenge what Johnson (2002) refers to as ‘the Story’ of the castle: specifically, the overt as well as subconscious tendency to view castles in terms of their design evolution and military capabilities. Using Kenilworth Castle (Warwickshire) as his example, Johnson (2002, 154) has argued that in order to ‘understand’ a castle, we must not focus on the individual features at the expense of understanding the whole (Johnson 2002, 154). For Johnson, this means turning away from an over-emphasis on architectural development and recognising the subtle relationships a castle engages in, both internally and externally. This includes how buildings work in relation to each other and their surroundings, and how the personalities of their occupants affects the use and look of a castle. Unlike others before him, Johnson extends this principle into later periods beyond the medieval and argues that ‘where a castle *remains in use*, its architecture remains important: by definition, a twelfth-century castle, *where it has not been destroyed*, is also a thirteenth-, fourteenth- and fifteenth-century castle’ (Johnson 2002, 48 emphasis mine).

This argument is significant for two reasons. The first is that it does not give primacy to a structure’s original or primary building phase, and in doing so, does not ‘define’ a castle by restricting its ‘identity’ to its initial construction. In real terms, this is an explicit recognition that the building phases of John of Gaunt and, much later, the Earl of Leicester, have made Kenilworth a sixteenth-century castle as much as an early or late medieval one. Consequently, Leicester’s insertion of large Tudor windows into the medieval keep at Kenilworth is representative of a continuous pattern of occupiers stamping their identity into the changing character of a building.

The second important but more problematic aspect of Johnson’s argument is the link between the significance of the architecture and its use and intactness. This implies that architecture only remains important if a castle is being used, and that once

destroyed, it loses this significance and becomes fossilised as a ruin. Some of this significance is arguably regained through the ruin's later contribution towards a Picturesque ideal (Newman *et al.* 2001, 19), but in its immediate, post-Civil War context, the destroyed and 'unused' castle is presented as little more than a reflection of the military and social impotency of its owner during the Civil War (Johnson 2002, 180). At a more practical level, Johnson's argument also raises questions about how much of a castle must be 'in use' in order for the architecture to be deemed still important, and also how issues such as partial occupation or occasional use affect the interpretation of a site's significance. Collectively, this weakens what is otherwise a solid and insightful argument: that the character of a building is not static but evolves, and that this process is influenced and manipulated for specific purposes by individuals interacting with the building.

Drawing on these themes, this chapter seeks to develop two basic arguments. The first is that a castle's architecture, as well as its landscape, does not cease to be significant because it has been slighted. Rather, the act itself of destruction, and how its after-effects are negotiated, plays a pivotal role in altering the significance of a building or landscape. This process is not an impartial one, however, and just as previous occupants imprinted their identities and values onto buildings and landscapes, so also have slighting personalities stamped their messages into the destruction of these features. This position is presented as a counterpoint to the suggestion that slighting reduced a castle's significance 'to little more than useful sources of building stone' (Newman *et al.* 2001, 16). In so doing, it necessarily involves a deconstruction of how the identities of key individuals influenced not only the form of destruction, but the meaning and messages behind its execution.

The second much broader argument to be developed is that the significance of this destruction is overlooked within wider discourses about the relationships between buildings and landscapes. As Chapter One noted, the importance of this relationship is widely recognised during a castle's 'prime', but this significance is also deemed to be over once the military function of the castle has ceased (Thompson 1987a; Newman *et al.* 2001, 16; Johnson 2002, 175). This has produced a narrative that stresses the 'decline' of castles, but one that has not sought to understand how this

so-called decline was managed and negotiated by those experiencing it. The inevitable result is that—like bookends—we know a great deal about the significance of a castle's construction and use, and also about the impact its ruined state had on eighteenth-century Antiquarian thought, but virtually nothing about its importance as a 'newly destroyed' discursive object. This position is particularly untenable in view of the fact that the Civil War—and the destruction of a wide swathe of material culture—was a key transitional period in changing attitudes towards specific kinds of buildings. Consequently, understanding how individuals reacted to and experienced slighting is a major step in understanding the broader evolution of attitudes to ruins in the landscape.

Of primary consideration will be the personalities of those involved in the slighting, as well as the values and priorities these individuals displayed regarding the choices they made about destruction. At Kenilworth, many of these priorities and choices were intertwined with issues of plunder and re-use, and for that reason, a full, formal survey of each of Kenilworth's buildings will not be attempted. Instead, a more holistic approach is utilised that explores the relationship between 'slighter' and 'slighted', primarily through an examination of a smaller, select group of buildings and their relationship with each other. In doing so, the objective is to address issues such as the transference of materials, castle 'identity', and the messages that were consciously constructed and projected through the destruction and new use of the site.

Before proceeding, a basic familiarity with the layout and history of Kenilworth Castle is necessary in order to understand the changes brought by its subsequent slighting.

6.2 Kenilworth Castle: An introduction

Kenilworth Castle [SP 278723] is situated on the edge of a valley between two brooks in the Warwickshire town of Kenilworth. It has undergone numerous building phases in its life (see Renn 1991; Johnson 2002, 136-160; Morris 2006) and can be characterised as a castle of considerable size and complexity (Figures 6.1 and 6.2).

Some of the buildings are discussed in more detail later in Section 6.4, but a general overview of the castle's history and construction phases is useful.

The first of these phases was begun by the de Clintons in the twelfth century and consisted of a simple round enclosure, a two-storey keep, a hall and chapel, and various small service buildings within a curtain wall (Renn 1991, 20). A major expansion occurred early in the thirteenth century under King John, the most significant addition being an outer bailey measuring 270 yards east/west and 174 yards north/south, of which one-sixth was the inner ward (Clark 1884, 140). Water defences were added by the fortified damming of the Finham and Inchford Brooks, and the resulting Great Mere was cultivated over the centuries into a complex series of pools, fish ponds, and causeways (Figure 6.3).

The next two substantial building phases concentrated increasingly on improving the comfort and status of the castle as a whole. The first of these was the construction of the Great Hall by John of Gaunt in the latter half of the fourteenth century. This 'architectural masterpiece' was notable for its large and intricate windows, six fireplaces, and for being at the 'cutting edge of architectural fashion' (Morris 2006, 18-19). His efforts, however, were arguably outshone two hundred years later by the additions and alterations of Sir Robert Dudley, the Earl of Leicester. Leicester's modernising agenda included the insertion of larger windows into the late Norman keep, the construction of a new tower block, and the creation of a grand new gatehouse, the corners of which were battlemented (Figure 6.4). All of these buildings—as well as the mere—were impacted by the castle's subsequent slighting, the specifics of which will be discussed later in the chapter.

The history of Kenilworth is a rich and evolving one. It experienced its first and only real military test during the Barons' Revolt when Henry III besieged the castle in 1266 (Morris 2006, 39). After its capitulation and acquisition by the crown, it developed a reputation for splendid entertainments, one of the most well known being a grand tournament held in 1279 with an audience of hundreds in attendance (Renn 1991, 22). Yet again, the Earl of Leicester outdid his medieval counterparts by throwing lavish receptions for Queen Elizabeth I in 1572 and again in 1575. The

latter was immortalised in Walter Scott's *Ivanhoe* and included fireworks, acrobats, bear baiting, and water pageantry (Renn 1991, 28-31; Morris 2006, 51). His death in 1588 eventually caused the castle to revert to the crown, who in turn leased it to the Carey family (see Section 6.3.1 below).

The post-slighting period of Kenilworth's history is one usually characterised by its evolution as an evocative ruin (Morris 2006, 51-2). It attracted substantial antiquarian interest in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (see Figure 6.18), and by the Victorian period was drawing thousands of visitors, including notable historical and literary figures of the day (Morris 2006, 51). This increased traffic and human interaction, combined with the rampant growth of vegetation, culminated in a series of clearances and consolidation works that have significantly changed the appearance of the site (see Ballard 2006, 165-8). In 1937 it was purchased by John Davenport Siddeley, the future Lord Kenilworth, whose son later presented it to the town of Kenilworth in 1958 (Renn 1991, 32). It currently is managed by English Heritage.

6.2.1 Kenilworth Castle in the Civil War

In order to understand the slighting of Kenilworth, it is important to set it in the wider context of the Civil War 'story'. In a general sense, much of this context is already known. An extensive amount of scholarship has already catalogued the impact of the Civil War on the Midlands as a whole, and on Warwickshire in particular (see Tennant 1992, 1996, and 1997; Sherwood 1992). In contrast, Kenilworth's involvement is less well documented. The historiography of its Civil War life is somewhat vague and contradictory, in part because its lack of a siege and unclear occupation history does not make for a neat 'story'. According to Pettifer (1995, 257) it was 'garrisoned by Parliament throughout', but in reality its occupation record appears far more transient. Initially garrisoned by the King in the autumn of 1642, it appears to have been abandoned after the Battle of Edgehill (23rd October 1642), only for a Parliamentary garrison to take its place (Tennant 1996). Renn (1991, 32) refers to Charles I staying the night at the castle in 1644, so at some point it must have reverted back to being a Royalist garrison, although when this took place is unclear. Tennant (1996, 121) states that in the weeks before Naseby

(14th June 1645) Cromwell stayed at Warwick and Kenilworth, thereby implying that by this time the castle was once again in Parliamentary hands. Occasional Royalist occupation aside, it has been argued that it remained in Parliamentary hands for most of the war, and that the Royalist armies of the Midlands left it largely alone because of its perceived strength (Tennant 1997, 174). Equally, its proximity to Warwick Castle and Coventry, both firmly in Parliamentary hands, made it an unsuitable choice for a concentration of Royalist forces.

Beyond this deceptively uneventful Civil War history is a complex picture of community hardship and castle upheaval (see Tennant 1992 and 1996). This suffering began early on with the use of forced labour to build extra defences (Tennant 1996, 153), but continued through taxation, quarter, and plunder. One governor, Hastings Ingram, is credited with stripping the castle apartments of furnishings and valuables, and of overseeing the plunder of the town with his 'unruly soldiers' (Tennant 1992, 220). A second governor, John Needham, not only plundered various individuals in the region but destroyed the coppices around Kenilworth (Tennant 1996, 52 and 53). Even before its slighting, therefore, a series of 'autocratic and ruthless governors' (Tennant 1992, 220) used Kenilworth not only as a base of operations from which to plunder and destroy, but as a resource to be exploited in its own right.

By July of 1649, Kenilworth's fate had become a matter of national debate. Over a period of just three months, negotiations and discussions took place between Parliament, the County Committee, the governor, Major Joseph Hawkesworth, and the leaseholder on behalf of the crown, the Earl of Monmouth. This flurry of negotiations seems to have been prompted by the initial order to demolish the castle (CSPD 13/7/49), the language of which was changed just over a week later. Hawkesworth was ordered to take down the keep and 'outward wall', but to avoid 'unnecessary spoil made of the house, as it relates to habitation, which might prejudice the present possessor, or the value of the sale by the state' (CSPD 24/7/49). In August, the Earl of Monmouth attempted to secure the rights to the materials (CSPD 28/8/49), but had to settle for receiving £2,000 instead (Appendix VII and Section 6.3.4). By October discussions were over and Hawkesworth had his

instructions: ‘We have received your opinions as to what is necessary to make Kenilworth untenable, and as you are upon the place, we rest in your judgement to put in execution what you may deem fit with all expedition’ (CSPD 16/10/49 cited in Fryer *et al.* 2006, 157). To understand these competing interests and how they affected the way slighting occurred, we must look more closely at the values and motives of the individuals connected to Kenilworth’s destruction.

6.3 Slighting ‘identities’: Who was involved?

It has been argued that castles were ‘backdrops in front of which and through which the identities of men and women were “played out”’ (Johnson 2002, 3), and this is as true for the Civil War as it was for the medieval and Renaissance periods. These Civil War identities, however, consisted of more than just a name or a label such as ‘Royalist’ or ‘Parliamentarian’. In the case of the owner, important issues such as whether he was an absentee landlord, his reputation in the region, and his actions in the war could have a profound impact on what happened to his castle. Equally, the identity of those involved in perpetrating or initiating the destruction could play a pivotal role. Having local standing or influential connections was sometimes enough to dictate how destruction was carried out, and who benefited afterwards. After 1649, these factors became even more acute with the advent of legislation that made crown property and some Royalist/recusant lands available to the army (of which more will be said below).

In the slighting of Kenilworth Castle, the involvement of three parties is particularly noteworthy: Henry Carey, the 2nd Earl of Monmouth (the ‘owner’ on behalf of the crown), Col./Major Joseph Hawkesworth (the final governor of the castle and its subsequent purchaser), and the Parliamentary ‘soldiers’ who received land along with him. The relationship between all of the parties is a complex one that defies easy categorisations.

6.3.1 Henry Carey, 2nd Earl of Monmouth

Henry Carey, the 2nd Earl of Monmouth, was baptised in Denham, Buckinghamshire in 1596¹. The Earl was a respected linguist and scholar in his day, translating several

¹ Source: www.thepeerage.com

Italian and French manuscripts, as well as writing various historical accounts². In March 1625 the Carey family was granted the ‘custody’ of Kenilworth Castle and its grounds, as well as the rights to all profits and commodities resulting from them ‘to have and to hold unto them for their lives’ (NA E 320/T5). Politically active in the House of Lords, Monmouth appears to have been—at least initially—supportive of the King, and in the tense political negotiations of early 1642, Monmouth often acted as go-between for King and Parliament (LJ Vol. 4, 568-71; LJ Vol. 4, 591-93). By May relations had deteriorated to the point where several peers, Monmouth included, refused to attend Parliament when summoned, ‘return[ing] a slighting and scornful Answer, by a Letter under their Hands...’ (LJ Vol. 5, 138-41). The impeachment of ‘the Nine Lords’ in July of 1642 not only stripped them of their Parliamentary privileges, but also ordered them to be committed to the Tower (LJ Vol. 5, 218-22; LJ Vol. 5, 222-27). Since no record exists of his arrest or imprisonment, it is probable that he kept a low profile at his estate in Hertfordshire during this period. However, it is not inconceivable that he was engaged in active military or ‘Parliamentary’ service for the King, although the lack of punitive measures against him later (see below) would make this unlikely.

Whatever Monmouth’s personal convictions, by 1644 he appears to have decided that, officially at least, making peace with Parliament was the most prudent course of action. In February of that year he ‘took the Covenant’ and swore to uphold the Presbyterian form of Protestantism (LJ Vol. 6, 439-40; LJ Vol. 6, 441-44). It was a shrewd political move. Initially forced on the English as a condition for Scottish assistance, the Covenant had become a means of controlling access to military and public positions. Refusal to ‘take the Covenant’ barred a man from all Parliamentary positions, as well as stained his reputation as a suspected Royalist sympathiser. This sign of obedience appears to have paid off. In June 1645 the Earl moved to retain possession of his Hertfordshire estate, Moore Park (LJ Vol. 7, 465-68). He seems to have escaped without his property being sequestered or any other undue financial penalties. In 1646 his expected contribution to army maintenance was assessed at the same rate as that of Lord Viscount Say and Seale, a staunch Puritan peer (LJ Vol. 8,

² Source: The Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, Oxford Biography Index. A copy of one of his translated histories is held in the John and Mary Nichols Rare Books and Special Collections at the University of Oklahoma.

196-200). Moreover, by 1649 he was on sufficiently good terms with the Parliamentarians to be involved in real estate ventures in London with the Parliamentarian Colonel John Birch (Webb 1873, 154; see Section 6.3.4 below). On his death in 1661 he was buried in the parish church of Rickmansworth, Hertfordshire³.

Monmouth's role in the slighting of Kenilworth is difficult to discern. His attempts to secure Moore Park could possibly have originated from a realisation that his early actions against Parliament—as well as the crown's technical ownership of the site—made it unlikely that Kenilworth would be restored to him. Equally, the petition in 1649 to secure materials probably reflected a pragmatic attempt to make the best of a bad situation, as opposed to any earnest desire to see the castle destroyed. Less easy to explain, however, is an earlier Monmouth petition to the House of Lords in June 1647, over two years before any debate about slighting Kenilworth Castle took place (LJ Vol 9, 225-29). The details of this petition—as well as an accompanying petition from the Vicar of Kenilworth—are not disclosed, but it appears to have encountered stiff opposition from one Lord Mohun, who tendered his own petition 'complaining of Disobedience and Contempt to the Order of this House, by Sir Henry Cary and others' (*ibid*). This was probably in reference to the still active impeachment of the Nine Lords, which technically was not rescinded until just before the Restoration (LJ Vol. 11, 13-4).

It could be argued that despite the 'success' of Monmouth's 1649 petition in the form of compensation, his inability to retain control over the castle materials symbolises the impotency of his position. The supposed 'softening' of Kenilworth's destruction from 'demolish' to 'make untenable' should perhaps not be considered a victory for the Earl so much as a reflection on how reluctant the County Committee was to commit themselves to the level of work that 'demolition' implied (Thompson 1987a, 148). Instead, the *carte blanche* given to Hawkesworth to 'put in execution what you may deem fit' (CSPD 16/10/49) reveals where the real power lay, and demonstrates that a governor's concerns were far more influential in shaping the bureaucratic slighting process than those of a disgruntled Royalist owner.

³ Source: www.stmarysrickmansworth.org.uk

6.3.2 Col./Major Joseph Hawkesworth

Little is known of Hawkesworth's pre-war years except that he served as steward of Warwick Castle, owned by the Puritan Lord Brooke (Tennant 1996, 8 and 13). Lord Brooke was an influential connection and was the leading military figure in the region until his death in 1643. As a member of the 'obscure lower gentry', Hawkesworth no doubt used this connection to secure a place on the Puritan dominated Warwickshire County Committee in 1642/3 (Mosler 1981, 60-1). This committee would go on to acquire a reputation as much for its radical religious composition as for its dictatorial attitude towards authority (*ibid*, 61). Hawkesworth's own religious beliefs appear to have matched those of his peers. Described as a 'puritan zealot', the major was known to be on intimate terms with some of the puritan firebrands of the day (Tennant 1992, 212). He seems to have held onto his beliefs even when the Restoration made such views dangerous, and well into the 1660s Hawkesworth was suspected to be a Dissenter from the Church of England (Hurwich 1976, 46-7).

In the war, Hawkesworth demonstrated a singular enthusiasm for the Parliamentary cause and for being rabidly anti-Catholic, as well as a canny ability to profit from various acts of destruction (see Tennant 1992, 211-214). At Beoley House his men put all the Irish defenders 'to the sword' and burnt it to the ground, but not before removing 'three Carts laden with goods & other things', including legal and estate documents (Tennant 1992, 211). His burning of the elderly Earl of Middlesex's home, Milcote House, resulted in Parliament attempting to blame the Royalists for it (Tennant 1992, 214), despite the venture having been approved by the Coventry Committee. Parliamentary quarter and plundering caused widespread misery in Kenilworth and the rest of Warwickshire (see Tennant 1992 and 1997), and there is little reason to doubt that Major Hawkesworth and the men under his command played an active role beyond the examples already given.

By 1649, a combination of opportunity, wealth, and connections allowed Hawkesworth to jointly purchase the castle from the state (see 6.3.3 and 6.3.4 below). He modified one of the castle buildings for his own use (Renn 1991, 32) and throughout the rest of the Interregnum proceeded to live the life of a county

gentleman. By 1656 he was serving on various committees in the House of Commons in 1656 (CJ Vol. 7, 462; CJ Vol. 7, 468), and a year later he is recorded as being one of the Justices of the Peace for Warwickshire (WCRO L1/247/1-9[n.d.]). Unsurprisingly, the Restoration in 1660 saw him evicted from his home, and the destroyed castle and its land was given back to Queen Henrietta Maria (Morris 2006, 50). Hawkesworth died nine years later (Hurwich 1976, 47), his life ending in relative obscurity.

6.3.3 The Parliamentarian officers

Little attention has been given to the Parliamentarian officers who acquired part of Kenilworth after its slighting. A comprehensive listing of all those involved is probably impossible, but several major participants can be identified: Major Richard Creed, Capt. Ayres, Capt. Clarke, Capt. Coles, Capt. Hope, Capt. Matthews, Capt. Palmer, and Capt. Smith (Pawlowski and Drew 2003, xviii). The exact relationship between all of the men is difficult to quantify, although a few can be conclusively identified as Hawkesworth's officers (see below). It is tempting to speculate that most of them had served under him at one time or another, or else were known to him through the interwoven military and administrative connections in existence at the time. This had in part come about because the Ordinances of Association in 1643 grouped the Parliamentary forces of Warwickshire, Staffordshire, Lichfield, and Coventry under Lord Brooke, which in practice meant a certain amount of fluidity existed between the individual field armies and garrisons. Promotions, military offensives, and manning captured garrisons also provided opportunities for men to move from one commander to another. This was especially true if men were 'local', as cooperation and promotions could be facilitated by networking.

One connection the officers seem to have shared with Hawkesworth is a willingness to plunder. One of them, Lt. Richard Creed, was originally an officer under Lord Brooke (NA SP 28/136/25), but later raided the mansion at Baddesley Clinton as part of Hawkesworth's troop. He and his men carried away 'horses, guns, armour, gunpowder, money, spurs, a silver spoon, a Geneva bible, and "many linnens" from the drying chamber' (Tennant 1996, 65). Another officer, Capt. John Smith, used the captured Catholic house of Coughton Court as a base of operations to plunder the

surrounding communities. As one half of two ‘locally recruited henchmen’, Smith ‘patrolled aggressively a district...of despised catholic “malignants”’ (Tennant 1996, 81) and developed a reputation for theft and kidnapping while at Coughton (*ibid*, 103). The other officers are more difficult to trace, a problem made worse by the commonness of most of their names. For example, an officer named Hope in Sir John Gell’s Derbyshire forces is alleged to have stolen a Communion cup (Sherwood 1992, 25), and this may or may not be the same Captain Hope involved in the Kenilworth purchase. Similarly, a soldier named Creed, active in the Welsh borders, has been referred to as a ‘radical parliamentarian veteran’ (Jenkins 1980, 289), but a conclusive connection to Kenilworth cannot be established. It could be argued, however, that Hawkesworth’s known reputation for plunder and aggressive tactics makes it likely that officers under his command were equally complicit in such acts.

The traditional narrative concerning the officers’ post-war involvement with Kenilworth is that they divided the property amongst themselves for farmland (Morris 2006, 50). The extent of this type of ‘collective ownership’ has been challenged⁴, but at Kenilworth it appears that at least some of the officers remained onsite until the Restoration. Years later the Vicar of Kenilworth recalled that on the 14th of June 1658, the ‘petty Lords’ Hope and Palmer ‘...in great pomp and ceremony, made their perambulation and went their procession round the Bounds of the Parish’ (cited in Fryer *et al.* 2006, 156). Although clearly biased against the two men, the Vicar’s views should perhaps not be completely dismissed as he does at least grudgingly concede that the ‘Rap[a]cious Vermin’ left the church plate and tithes alone (*ibid*). Comments such as this, combined with an awareness of the wartime activities of some of the officers, suggests that there is a more complex story of ownership at work than the simple ‘soldier turned farmer’ narrative currently offered.

6.3.4 The purchase

To make sense of how these individuals were brought together—and by extension, how they were able to have an impact on the course of Kenilworth’s ‘Story’—an

⁴ Gentles (1973, 628) argues on practical grounds that most joint purchases probably ended in officers’ shares being bought out by their superiors: the latter invariably wanted land, while the former preferred cash.

understanding of the circumstances surrounding the sale and purchase of Kenilworth Castle is crucial. The impetus began in 1649 with the passage of the Act for Sale of Crown Lands. This authorised the sale of crown property, partly as a punitive measure, but more importantly to raise badly needed revenue with which to pay the army (Shedd 2000, 1093). Pay arrears were notoriously bad, so much so that at one point the garrison at Warwick Castle was due five years' worth of wages (Mosler 1981, 65). Having already confiscated and sold ecclesiastic land much earlier, crown (and later Royalist and recusant estates) were now seized and valued for re-sale. The confiscation process was administered by county committees and local sequestration committees and in practice proved to be a largely corrupt system (Shedd 2000). Although ostensibly open to everyone, military personnel were in a vastly superior purchasing position than their civilian counterparts (Gentles 1973, 622). Through a complicated bureaucracy of certificates and debentures, soldiers were offered the chance to 'purchase' portions of estates by empowering their officers to negotiate for terms on their behalf (for a full analysis, see Gentles 1973; Gladwish 2002). Their superiors then had the option of buying them out with cash, thereby concentrating large quantities of land into the hands of a single person or a small group of individuals.

As early as February 1650, just three and a half months after destruction was ordered to commence, the purchase of Kenilworth Castle and its grounds was underway (NA E317/15-21; NA E317/31-33; NA E320/T7; see also Appendix VII). Richard Creed, Robert Hope, Robert Cotchet, and R. Dolphin acted as trustees on behalf of themselves and their respective troops, while empowering Hawkesworth, now the governor of Warwick Castle, to execute the purchase of the castle. As well as paying off Monmouth, it was arranged that Hawkesworth would acquire all the materials from the castle, for 'defraying the charges of pulling it down and enjoying the profits of what hath been already sold'. Furthermore, he obtained the rights to the land underneath the buildings, as well as the tiltyard and orchard. He shrewdly purchased the Great Mere which, after being drained, gave him an additional 140 acres worth £160 per year. Of enormous value were the various coppices connected with the manor, all of which were secured under the terms of the purchase (NA E320/T7). All

of these developments represented a massive change in the legal ownership of the site, and ultimately, initiated a wide ranging transformation of the use of the site.

Concurrent to the purchase of Kenilworth Castle, Hawkesworth and his military cohorts were also buying another Royal castle, Tutbury, in the neighbouring county of Staffordshire (NA E320/Q3). Shared property speculation of this type was certainly not unusual, and parallels can be found elsewhere in military circles (see Gentles 1973). One contemporary of Hawkesworth's, Colonel John Birch, developed a reputation as a notorious and shrewd investor in (primarily) church lands, and his joint purchase with Capt. Silas Taylor of the Palace at Hereford resulted in its division into two houses (Webb 1873, 154). It was also not uncommon for commanders to gravitate towards castles they had formerly commanded or besieged. Birch himself bought Hereford Castle in 1646, having been its governor just the year before (*ibid*, 235). At Rose Castle (Cumbria), the Parliamentarian who seized it in 1645, Colonel Heveringham, bought it years later in a dilapidated state (Ferguson 1874, 159-60). Not all acquisitions were successful, however, as evidenced by Sir William Brereton's contentious⁵ attempt to obtain Eccleshall Castle (Staffordshire) (see Pennington and Roots 1957). This activity raises interesting questions about the selection criteria used for investments, and how attempts to buy property were perceived by third parties.

6.4 The buildings: Destruction, transference of materials, and new messages

This new information about the individuals orchestrating and profiting from the destruction allows a fresh, critical eye to be applied to the changes brought about at Kenilworth. This will be done by looking at the changes to two specific buildings—Leicester's Gatehouse and the keep (Figure 6.2)—and examining their spatial relationship with each other and the landscape. As Johnson (2002) has noted, these buildings were imbued with symbolism and 'meaning' that visitors at various social levels would have experienced and understood. Power, prestige, ancient lineage, royalty, and Renaissance learning were just some of these cultivated messages. Through destruction (and re-use) old meanings were altered and new ones

⁵ Brereton was opposed by local men (some military) on the grounds that he was resident in Cheshire, not Staffordshire, and that the revenue could be better spent on the military, not one individual.

constructed, and Kenilworth Castle was once again used to project messages about status and power.

The two major modes for this were the visual/spatial manipulation of destruction, and the deliberate movement of castle material within the site. Both played a particularly important role at Kenilworth where plunder, partial re-use of the site, and the close proximity to human activity meant that destruction was a constant and poignant presence in many individuals' daily lives. This aspect of the destruction narrative in general—and at Kenilworth in particular—is rarely acknowledged. For many, the site was simply purchased by Hawkesworth and 'others', and no mention is made of any changes that might have occurred (Clark 1884, 153; Hogg 1972, 94). If construction or alteration is discussed, its form or scale is often left out entirely (Thompson 1987a, 147), or else is discussed without any cultural or social context for these actions being presented (Morris 2006, 29). The result is that the significance of Hawkesworth and the 'others' destroying, controlling, and reusing the site of Kenilworth has gone virtually unmentioned upon by the academic community.

6.4.1 Leicester's Gatehouse

Located in the north-eastern part of the site, the heavily altered and extended Leicester's Gatehouse is a rectangular building with two pairs of polygonal turrets at front and back (Figure 6.5). Measuring fifty-six feet by twenty-eight feet (Clark 1884, 142), it was originally intended as Leicester's grand new entrance to the castle and replaced the old medieval entrance through Mortimer's Gate to the south (Figure 6.2). At the time of its construction, the symbolic significance of this new building was considerable. Its battlements were designed to 'project values of chivalry and martial valour' (Johnson 2002, 147) while serving no real military purpose. The fact that it was wider than the old entrance and could therefore allow carriage access to travellers from the main Coventry road was a further impressive point (Renn 1991, 12). However, these projected messages of wealth and status were not just for educated visitors, but were also intended to be absorbed by the local inhabitants of the town of Kenilworth, located within plain view of the gatehouse.

Hawkesworth's occupation of such a symbolically rich building is significant in itself, but his alteration of it, like so many Kenilworth owners before him, is even more so. Using stone from other parts of the castle, Hawkesworth embarked on three major building projects regarding the gatehouse: 1.) the blocking up of the centre passage to create large north/south rooms on several floors, 2.) the addition of a two-storied, gabled, domestic extension on the east side, and 3.) the creation of a new entrance via a porch on the west side (Figure 6.6). How these changes would have been perceived and experienced by visitors—and indeed, by Hawkesworth himself—is worth examining in closer detail.

On first approaching Hawkesworth's new residence, any visitor familiar with the castle would immediately be struck by the change in appearance of the gatehouse. Instead of a full complement of glass in Leicester's Tudor windows, they would have seen most of the windows blocked up, with the exception of the large central windows and the newly created bay window on the ground floor (Figure 6.7). The enclosure of this area obliterated the normal access route into the castle. Consequently, another substantial change for the visitor to negotiate would have been the re-direction of visitors around the gatehouse (Figure 6.8). Map evidence suggests that the current crenellated 'gatehouse' was a late Victorian construction that replaced an earlier wicket gate entrance somewhere near the gatehouse (Ballard 2006, 168). The use of the northeast corner of the castle for farming—as well as the more domestic nature of Hawkesworth's structural additions on that side of the gatehouse—make this approach the more likely for important visitors and guests.

From here, a walk of approximately fifty yards carried the visitor to the front entrance (Figure 6.9). Along the way, the visitor would have been struck by the disparity of the views on either side of them: to their left, the intimidating, martial appearance of Hawkesworth's turreted and battlemented new residence, and to their right, the dramatic ruin of Kenilworth Keep (Figure 6.10). This visual comparison would have been underscored by the knowledge that the man they were about to visit in this grand 'new' building had a direct involvement in creating the destruction in the massive and ancient building nearby. In order to emphasise this point even more, the architecture of Hawkesworth's new west entrance utilised blocked windows and

a crenellated porch (reduced in height in the nineteenth century) to present a martial, austere presence (6.11).

Hawkesworth's subtle architectural messages changed, however, the closer the visitor got to the entrance of the porch. This was achieved through the removal of a classical frontispiece from John of Gaunt's Hall (Renn 1991, 12) and the repositioning of it within the west porch (Figure 6.12). This frontispiece had been constructed in the sixteenth century by the Earl of Leicester, and bore his initials and several Tudor Rose roundels. Leicester was particularly fond of promoting his lineage and family name through possessions and architecture (Morris 2006, 46-7), and *his* placement of the frontispiece in the medieval Great Hall could arguably be interpreted as an attempt to establish a link with Kenilworth's medieval and Royal past. Hawkesworth's subsequent repositioning of it as the main showpiece of the entrance to his home is equally illustrative of his aspirations. In particular, it established *his* link to the man whose 'castle' he now lived in by appropriating a lineage and past that was not his own.

These messages would have been driven home even further once the visitor had been ushered into the south room (Figure 6.13). In addition to the sumptuous bay window which dominated the southern end of the room, the visitor would have been confronted with extensive oak panelling and a finely carved alabaster fireplace (Figure 6.14). Both of these signalled wealth and refinement, but their installation here and obvious association with the rest of the destroyed castle arguably gave them an added significance to observers. In particular, the fireplace was a carved architectural statement of the Earl of Leicester's prestige through the use of his motto, initials, family badge, and date of construction (Figure 6.15). Hawkesworth's use of it here works on multiple levels. The first is an allusion to Kenilworth's illustrious past, a point that would have been readily understood in light of the fact that Leicester's entertainment of Elizabeth I in 1572 was a well known highlight not just in the history of the castle, but of the town and region. Just as Leicester signalled to Elizabeth that his new fireplace was fit for a queen's visit, Hawkesworth's use of it signalled his own important 'arrival'. It is tempting to speculate as well that Leicester's motto, *droit et loyal*, took on an alternative meaning through

Hawkesworth's display of it. Considering his wartime service and the intensity of his religious views, the Parliamentarian officer's concept of what 'just and loyal' meant would be radically different to Leicester's notion of obedience to monarchical authority, and the layers of meaning and irony intrinsic in such a display would not have been lost on Hawkesworth or his visitors. It is equally worth considering that Hawkesworth's prominent use of Tudor imagery is a reference to an idealised 'Golden Age' of Protestantism and a reaction against a King perceived to be inclined towards Catholicism. This would be entirely in keeping for a man known to have strong Puritan leanings, and might symbolise his support for the 'true' religious settlement as first experienced under Elizabeth I.

The symbolic nature of all of this imagery, as well as the spatial relationship between the gatehouse and the keep, would not have been restricted to just visitors. Townsfolk, too, would have absorbed some of these visual changes, albeit from a more physically removed perspective, and some of this will be explored later in Section 6.5. Arguably, however, the most intimately affected by these messages was the man manipulating them. As the architect and beneficiary of Kenilworth's destruction—and with his close proximity to the ruins—Hawkesworth's relationship with his surroundings was not a neutral one, but existed on many levels, both public and private. For example, the clear views of the destroyed keep that he retained (Figures 6.16 and 6.17) could be 'enjoyed' and shared with outsiders, but equally, served as a private reminder of his own wartime connection to Kenilworth. The power of this imagery would no doubt have been amplified by the quantity and spread of the destruction, which was considerable up until the clearances of the late 19th century (Figure 6.18). This personal 'connection' with a destroyed past has been acknowledged in a limited way at other sites, albeit in a Royalist context. For example, the view of the damaged Old Wardour Castle from the Royalist Arundels' new mansion is recognised as being a familial celebration of loyalty to both King and Catholicism (Woodward 2002, 126). This crucial interplay between the new and the destroyed—both in a visual and shared material sense—illustrates that this connection was not simply a matter of aesthetics but could be deeply personal. For that reason, Hawkesworth's new residence was as much about 'taking in' messages as it was about projecting them to a wider audience.

Antiquity, particularly as symbolised by a castle, is an important cultural marker that can be manipulated to enhance an owner's social position and power (Eaton 2000, 12; Liddiard 2005, 145). Like John of Gaunt and the Earl of Leicester before him, Col. Hawkesworth used the buildings and spatial relationships at Kenilworth Castle to convey his status to the world. For the wider audience of the village, this was done by turning a gatehouse with military pretensions into his own private 'castle'. For those granted closer access to his home, the former steward of Warwick Castle and minor member of the local gentry accomplished his objective in smaller, more intimate ways: through architectural allusions to a chivalric past, and by creating associations with a famous and glamorous Warwickshire family with Royal connections. This deferential nod to the power of the past, however, was balanced by deliberate reminders of his own present day power—accumulated not through lineage or royal favour, but through military strength. This is evident not only in his use of the destroyed keep as a landscape feature, but in his appropriation of Leicester's fireplace in order to project a new, post-monarchical view of what it meant to be 'just and loyal'. Consequently, Hawkesworth's complicated use of material from other parts of the castle, as well as the loaded significance of the destroyed space around him, presents a far more complex picture of occupation than has hitherto been recognised.

Hawkesworth's manipulation of material culture and his use of the ruined keep is but one aspect of the keep's contribution to 'the Story' of Kenilworth. Another significant factor is the destruction of the keep itself, the details of which are largely overlooked and have never been considered in a systematic or forensic way. For that reason, it is worth examining the keep itself in order to better understand the circumstances surrounding its destruction.

6.4.2 The Keep

The Norman keep of Kenilworth is a rectangular structure measuring 58ft x 87 ft and standing approximately 80ft high (Thompson 1912, 132), with higher corner turrets (Figure 6.19). The walls of the keep are more than 13ft thick in some places. The entrance to the keep is through a forebuilding on the western side next to the NW corner tower (Figure 6.20). Internally, it consisted of a basement chamber measuring

60 ft by 30 ft and 20 feet high, and an upper chamber that stood about 40 feet high (Clark 1884, 132). The northern, eastern, and southern elevations are surrounded by a splayed plinth that, on the northern face, projects outward for several feet. Three of the four elevations all are completely intact, but the northern wall is missing down to plinth level, the upper courses of which show considerable damage (Figure 6.21). This loss of the north wall has exposed the rubble core of the NE and NW corners where the former points of contact with the north wall can be clearly seen (Figures 6.22 and 6.23).

The traditional narrative surrounding Kenilworth's keep has offered incomplete or unsatisfactory explanations for the destruction of the north wall. Many accounts simply refer vaguely to it being 'destroyed', 'demolished', or 'wrecked' and do not go into any detail about the contemporary method used (Bailey 1984, 166; Thompson 1987a, 148; Harris 1991, 113; Salter 1992, 33; Endres and Hobster 2003, 50; Morris 2006, 13). For the minority who reject this linguistic ambiguity, two rival 'schools of thought' have been established. The first is that the keep was picked apart by hand, a view first offered by G. T. Clark (Clark 1884, 133) when he asserted that the wall 'is gone, from the plinth upwards, and has been removed with some care, its junction with the north-west turret being cut smooth'. This opinion has been offered in various forms since, such as one account which alludes to the wall being 'taken down' by Parliament (Ribton-Turner 1932, 5). In contrast, the second and much more popular view is that the wall was a victim of gunpowder (Oman 1926, 79; HMSO 1958, 5; Hogg 1972, 94; Renn 1991, 32; Pettifer 1995, 258; Johnson 2002, 159). Whether this use of gunpowder occurred on its own or as a part of explosive undermining is usually not made clear, but the connotation, of course, is that it was the *gunpowder* that was responsible for the damage. Since neither view has ever been properly supported with evidence from the site, it is worth assessing how strong the case is for both arguments⁶. The methods are not mutually exclusive, of course, and

⁶ Thanks must be extended to everyone who offered their professional opinion about the structural evidence at Kenilworth Castle Keep: David Dickinson, Civil Engineer (Network Rail), Stuart Ellis, Structural Engineer (English Heritage), Robert Thew, Structural Engineer, (Dossor Group), Anthony Park, Alasdair Beal, and Stuart Broadley, Structural Engineers (Thomasons LLP), Ian Andrew, Structural Engineer (White, Young, Green), Brigadier William Woodburn (Retired) (Royal Engineers), John Ruddy, Structural Engineer (Capstone Consulting Engineers), and Frank Clough, Civil Engineer (Retired).

strategic picking could have worked in conjunction with undermining to ‘help it along’ or to remove more valuable materials before undermining took place. For ease of comparison, however, each method will be discussed separately in order to better gauge the structural evidence, after which the relative methods of each scenario will be assessed.

Method 1: Picking

As Chapter Four revealed, evidence for picking can manifest itself in several ways depending on the motives of those executing the slighting. Therefore, in order to make an assessment about the method used to destroy the wall, the nature of the evidence at stone level must first be recognised. The indeterminate evidence of the missing north wall must be supplemented by looking at the masonry nearby: the internal walls of the keep chambers, the plinth, and the NE and NW turrets. All of these shared a spatial relationship with the north wall, and their condition gives clues about how the wall might have been destroyed.

The first step is to assess the condition of the three surviving internal walls, all of which show remarkably few signs of damage (Figure 6.24). The lack of secondary damage inside the keep indicates that the removal of facing stone was not a priority for the slighers, although this becomes more speculative regarding the missing north wall. There is also no evidence that timber removal was a priority, as all of the joists in the south wall remain undamaged *in situ* (Figure 6.25). This suggests that timber was either removed at the north wall end, or else was ignored and the picking of the north wall was strictly executed to cause primary damage. However, some timber removal would still have been necessary as the north wall could not have been demolished without first dismantling the roof and supporting timber infrastructure above. Clark (1884, 135) mentions that some of the roofing features were obscured by ‘recent repairs’, but none of these ‘repairs’ can be detected in the stonework of the three internal elevations. The absence of trauma and obvious signs of conservation work therefore suggests that if the north wall *was* picked, the execution of it did not damage the other three internal walls of the keep.

A further source of evidence that must be considered is the plinth on the north side of the keep (Figure 6.26). The damage here is not randomly spread, but is primarily located in the upper courses. Due to its angle, this part of the plinth is not easily accessible, and therefore is unlikely to be the victim of picking at ground-level. The two most likely explanations for this damage are therefore impact with material jettisoned from above, and/or environmental damage. Both probably worked in tandem with each other, as water absorption would have accelerated the decay of already damaged stonework. However, some caution must be exercised to not overestimate the amount of damage caused by impact from above. For example, the plinth on the east side of the keep—where no evidence of picking exists—shows similar damage (Figure 6.27), and here the likely sole culprit is water and frost.

The main evidence behind the picking narrative is the neat, linear destruction pattern found in the northeast and northwest corners of the keep (Figure 6.28). The exposed rubble core where the missing north wall was bonded to the east and west walls is patterned in more or less straight lines all the way down, with undamaged ashlar on either side. In the northeast corner, this is partially explained by the presence of an upper story stairwell (Figure 6.29). The base of the stairwell is comprised of large stones thickly bonded and is partly a Victorian reconstruction (Clark 1884, 133; compare with antiquarian views in Figure 6.18). As the keep is known to have been ‘made safe’ in 1878 (Ballard 2006, 168), it is possible that this partially reconstructed ‘buttress’ was intended to give an additional element of support to the northeast turret.

In contrast, the evidence pattern in the northwest corner presents a far more complex picture (Figure 6.30). The almost sharp demarcation lines and tidiness of the exposed rubble core prompted the Victorian G. T. Clark (1884, 133) to hypothesise that the north wall had ‘...been removed with some care, its junction with the north-west turret being cut smooth’. The lack of ‘overhanging’ rubble core and relative ‘flatness’ of its vertical surface area—from a structural perspective—does at first seem to indicate that the wall *was* picked apart course by course⁷, although an alternative explanation does exist (see below). Such an endeavour would have been

⁷ A view shared by a sizeable minority of the engineers consulted.

aided by the relative poor quality of construction shown in the upper sections of the keep. In particular, the rubble infill from the base of the centre window to the upper limits of the wall is characterised by much smaller stones than the infill below (Figure 6.31). If this pattern was true for the entirety of the north wall, the upper half of the wall would have been significantly weaker than the lower half. Poor bonding would have enabled the dismantlers to simply push loose rubble over the edge of the wall, as opposed to having to break up solidly mortared infill. Conversely, however, it would also have made the surface they were standing on less stable, and consequently, far more dangerous to dismantle, particularly in inclement weather.

Having considered these points, what can categorically be said about a picked north wall? The first is that it would have necessitated the removal of the roof and timber supporting timber features, and that such an endeavour was done without inflicting any severe structural damage to the keep's interior walls. Their interest in salvaging material would have been non-existent or minimal. The presence of windows (ie. voids) and a weakly bonded north wall would have made the rubble core difficult to work on, although it potentially could be done with timber laid flat between the internal and external skins of masonry. The north wall was over ten feet thick (Figure 6.32), however, which would have made finding suitable timber difficult, although not impossible. The work here would have been dangerous, particularly since pushing or carrying heavy masonry to the edge put dismantlers at risk of falling, and too much weight in the wrong part of the wall might lead to collapse. Moreover, the scale of the removal suggests the work would have been laborious and time consuming, in large part because the *entire* wall was targeted, even down to the extreme nooks and crannies of corners (Figure 6.33). Overall, this presents a picture of destruction that was meticulous, risky, and inexplicably thorough.

Method 2: Gunpowder/Undermining

After considering the evidence for destruction by hand, the alternative narrative of 'gunpowder' must now be examined. Almost immediately, the placement of barrels of gunpowder to bring about an explosion can be ruled out. To be most effective, gunpowder needed to be contained in small, compact spaces, and the interior chambers of the keep would have been too large for this purpose. It is also unlikely

that the surrounding masonry of the floor and interior walls would have escaped without showing some signs of structural damage. This leaves the second option of undermining, with or without the aid of gunpowder.

With the north wall no longer extant, structural clues about how its undermining might have occurred must be found elsewhere. One option is to analyse the intact south wall (Figure 6.34) in order to understand the structural composition of the original parallel north and south walls. It becomes immediately obvious that the main structural weakness is the low percentage of wall mass that resulted from Leicester's sixteenth century inserted windows. Each window is about twelve feet in height and situated in a wall that stands over eighty feet (Clark 1884, 132-4), significantly reducing the original thickness of the medieval wall. The extra load from the roof would have put an enormous strain on all four walls, but in particular the north and south ones due to the greater number of windows located in both. These support issues appear to have been dealt with in the construction phase by utilising arches—which are naturally strong—and buttressing strips between them to add extra bulk in areas where it was needed (Figure 6.35).

These weaknesses might explain how the north wall was undermined. By selectively removing stonework between the arches—through the buttresses—the ability of the lower wall to support the load from above could have been fatally compromised. All things being structurally equal, the part of a wall least able to weather a change in static conditions is the part farthest from other structural 'supports' (such as other walls). In practical terms, this usually translates into the middle or centre of a wall, largely because the load has nowhere else to go. At Kenilworth, however, the area that in theory should be the strongest—the points of contact with the east and west walls—in practice are not because they share so little wall mass in common. As Figure 6.34 shows, the windows on both floors are nearly flush with their respective adjacent walls, which means that very little of the south wall (and by comparison, the north wall) was bonded enough to receive any practical, lateral support. The areas that *did* receive direct structural support were compromised by the poor quality of construction on the upper floors, as evidenced by the smaller stones and greater use of mortar (Figures 6.30 and 6.31). In short, the northeast and northwest corners might

have been too weak to 'hold on' to the collapsing centre, and any resultant overhanging, exposed rubble core would have been especially vulnerable to piecemeal collapse or outright clearance on safety grounds.

6.4.3 Discussion

The structural and archaeological evidence for the destruction of Kenilworth Keep provides no easy answers. Intermittent conservation work at Kenilworth has undeniably affected the original damage patterns, but the full extent of these changes is difficult to ascertain. Most crucially, the indeterminate evidence of the missing north wall provides numerous obstacles to understanding its behaviour during demolition. Using the south wall as a template helps up to a point, but unknowable variables such as construction weaknesses, the number of windows, the nature of the roof, and other factors in the north wall would have affected the demolition process. The equivocal nature of the evidence means that the exact demolition method of the keep will probably remain unknowable. With these kinds of challenges, it must be asked whether setting up rival scenarios for consideration actually brings us any closer to understanding how destruction took place.

The clear answer is yes, particularly as a method for testing where the preponderance of evidence lies. In the case of Kenilworth's north wall, the plausibility of the evidence suggests that undermining was the more likely method chosen. This is based on several factors. Regarding motive, there is little rationale for uniformly inflicting primary damage down to the base when less thorough measures would have more easily achieved an 'untenable' state. Moreover, the logic of doing so is even less understandable when the dangerous conditions would have put one's labour force in unnecessary jeopardy. An undermining explanation makes more sense given the structural conditions available, and the recordings of antiquarian artists—even with artistic licence—show a steeply graded spread of rubble that is more consistent with sudden collapse than piecemeal ejection (Figure 6.18). It could even be argued that Hawkesworth had no vested interest in carefully removing the wall when he had access to much better quality stone in the other buildings of the castle. An undermining event, therefore, suggests an almost minimalist, utilitarian approach to

Parliament's remit, more in keeping with Hawkesworth's long term priorities to keep labour costs and commitments to a minimum in order to maximise profit.

On an even broader scale, however, it has been demonstrated that slighting consists of a series of actions that can be examined and debated. These actions were systematic processes: removing blocks of masonry and timbers, calculating weak points, knocking off rubble, and so forth. By estimating how difficult a certain action was likely to have been, a more refined hypothesis is possible for the likelihood of it having occurred. This 'de-mystifies' the slighting process and creates a better understanding of which actions were more realistic than others. The end result is a more nuanced appreciation of 'the Story' of Kenilworth's slighting, as well as an awareness of its contextual richness.

6.5 Slighting in a wider context: The eye of the beholder

As this chapter has shown, the buildings of Kenilworth Castle are linked in very tangible ways by destruction. In some cases this occurred through the transference of building materials and architectural features. The removal of Leicester's porch and fireplace, wood panelling, stone, and other materials from various parts of the site and their subsequent re-assembly in Hawkesworth's new home created not just a material relationship between buildings, but symbolic connections for those 'experiencing' them. These connections were also spatial, such as the visual link between the gatehouse and the keep. To appreciate the full significance of one, an understanding of its connection to the other was necessary. Finally, the importance of these connections was explored in a literal sense through an examination of how the various walls of the keep affected the structure as a whole. While all of these themes both overlap and diverge, their shared characteristic is the implicit argument that to understand slighting, one must understand *buildings*.

To combat this bias, this section will briefly highlight two largely ignored aspects of Kenilworth's environmental slighting: the draining of its water defences, and the destruction of its park lands and gardens. Both brought about tangible changes that affected individuals on a day-to-day level, as well as initiated powerful shifts in how castles were viewed in a post-slighting context.

6.5.1 'Watery landscapes' and wooded past-times

The development of Kenilworth's water features and their historical significance has already been touched upon in Section 6.2. At its largest, this water dominated the area around the castle: 10-12 ft deep, 90-100 yards across, half a mile long, and comprising 111 acres (Clark 1884, 145; see Figure 6.3). In real terms, Mortimer's Gate and Leicester's Gatehouse effectively linked a mainland to an island that sat amid one of the largest water defences ever created in the medieval period (Morris 2006, 44). This water was divided by functional use into sections such as the Great Mere, various fish ponds, and the causeway. As well as demonstrating its obvious military value during the siege of 1266, water also served the castle by providing fish and wildfowl, powering mills, and carrying sewage away.

On a more symbolic level, Kenilworth's 'watery landscape' served several additional functions. It increased the size of the castle in both real and illusory ways, and by acting as a type of ha-ha, allowed the castle to be seen while denying close access (Johnson 2002, 47; Figure 6.36). In the reign of Henry V the construction of a manor house on the other side of the mere made the mere a thoroughfare between the King's two residences (Morris 2006, 44), as well as provided a scenic backdrop when the King entertained there. It also featured heavily in the celebrated nineteen day visit of Elizabeth I in 1575, not just as a backdrop, but through its deliberate use as a focal point in the entertainment. George Gascoigne, a contemporary poet, described how the queen was greeted by 'the Lady of the Lake' and nymphs standing on a floating island, and how on one evening

'...there fireworks shewed upon the water, the which were both strange and well executed: as sometimes, passing under the water a long space, when all men had thought they had been quenched, they would rise and mount out of the water againe, and burn very furiously until they were consumed'

(HMSO 1958, 21).

The significance of the festivities—and the role Kenilworth's waterscape played in them—cannot be overstated. Attended by thousands of people from all over Warwickshire (*ibid*, 23), the event marked a highpoint in the shared experience of the county and would have made an impression for years afterwards. Arguably, the 'memory' of these events would have coloured seventeenth century perceptions of

the castle and its watery environment, imbuing both with a glamorous and celebrated past.

By the 1640s, the situation was vastly different. As noted by Tennant (1992, 220), the over-fished and ruined waterscape of the 1640s was a far cry from the ‘floating island and silken-clad nymphs’ of Elizabeth I’s fantasy visit. The draining of the mere by Hawkesworth after his purchase finalised this transformation, bringing to an end several centuries worth of a designed and managed water system. In its place was a new, functional use: pasture. With the land divided out into farms for Hawkesworth’s fellow officers (Morris 2006, 50), Kenilworth virtually ‘shrank’ overnight, and land that had previously been inaccessible because of water was now equally off limits due to fences and its new status as private property. With the loss of the water also went the fringe benefits probably enjoyed by the local community: intermittent fishing and the poaching of birds, washing, the dumping of rubbish, and the use of the water’s edge as a boundary marker.

The impact of these changes was magnified by the related alterations to the castle’s gardens and wooded areas. The former consisted of an ornate pleasure garden⁸ based on a complex French/Italian Renaissance model, designed to be a privy garden for Elizabeth I (Morris 2006, 32). It was almost certainly damaged during the several years the castle was garrisoned, and its proximity to the Keep ensured that its destruction was complete once the Keep’s north wall had come crashing down (Figures 6.17 and 6.18). This effectively transformed the garden from a site of aesthetic and historical significance to a probable dumping ground for the rubbish and waste produced by Hawkesworth and the nearby residents.

The other major alteration to the castle landscape was the wholesale felling of trees and the destruction of coppices. Much of this took place before the slighting and resulted from the pressures of keeping the castle garrisoned. The former bailiff blamed the depletion of the surrounding coppices, woods, and chase on the construction of bulwarks and a new mill for the castle, and even on the governor’s

⁸ The site has recently been reinterpreted by English Heritage (see Fryer *et al.* 2006).

fireplaces (Tennant 1992, 220-2). The impact of this environmental devastation has been neatly summarised by Tennant (1992, 222):

‘The surrounding chase, which had echoed to the pageantry of ‘rare Shows and Sports’ for morris dancing, fell prey to more mundane preoccupations. Unruly soldiers ran riot, plundering whatever remained once the governor’s official exactions were met, breaking one inhabitant’s windows, even taking a hive of bees from someone’s yard’.

This destruction continued under Hawkesworth and the other officers, with immediate consequences for the community of Kenilworth. William Best, the Vicar, described years later how the common area known as ‘King’s Woods’ was taken from the local inhabitants and enclosed by two of the officers, Hope and Palmer (cited in Fryer *et al.* 2006, 156). The loss of areas such as this, as well as the reduction of trees and the conversion of woodland into grazing land, arguably had as much of an impact on the local community as the loss of the lake. In one sense it signified the loss of a practical resource which offered opportunities for the collection of fuel, and for occasional foraging and poaching. On a deeper, social level it removed a shared meeting place, one where communal games and events took place which helped reinforce the social bonds of the community. Only a few years after Hawkesworth and his officers moved in, signs of these unraveling bonds were already evident in sparked tensions between rich and poor over how common land was being used (WCRO CR311/54). This hints at a community in flux, as well as suggests that adapting to the slighting of Kenilworth Castle—its landscape as well as its buildings—was a protracted event that required a profound shift in how individuals viewed ‘their’ castle and community.

This type of ecological destruction raises interesting questions about the relationship between slighted estates and privatisation. The acts of land enclosure, asset stripping, and exclusion witnessed at Kenilworth during its prolonged slighting phase are not unique to the English Civil War. Indeed, they bear strong resemblances to other periods of rapid privatisation and transference of wealth such as the Dissolution or Thatcher’s Britain in the 1980s, as well as the enclosures of the late sixteenth to eighteenth centuries (for example, see Blomley 2007). It is therefore worth considering whether the slighting of landscapes, and of ecological resources in particular, was in some cases primarily a means of seizing or asserting control in the

face of other interested (but less powerful) stakeholders—in this case, the legal owner of the site, and more peripherally, the local community who surreptitiously benefited from the estate. Viewed from this perspective, the war *caused* the destruction only in the sense that it provided the soldiers, upheaval, and circumstances necessary to facilitate the destruction, but the underlying social-climbing and greed were forces underneath waiting for a catalyst to bring them to the fore. This interpretation sees Kenilworth's slighting as more of an opportunistic expression of land speculation and development (like so many before and after), and less as a national policy carried out altruistically for the public good. As reactions to changes to open fields could vary significantly depending on the region (Roberts and Wrathmell 2002, 175), more comparisons are needed to get a better understanding of the role slighting played in accelerating social tensions regarding enclosure and loss of access to land.

It is also worth noting—although it will not be explored in any real depth here—that the felling of trees and the reclamation of woodland for private use was in itself a deeply symbolic act. This recognition of the symbolic significance of trees and woodland stretches back to the Neolithic period (see Cummings and Whittle 2003), and in later periods the symbolic nature of woodland became even more politicised and fought over (for example, see Daniels 1988). Controlling Kenilworth's water and timber resources, therefore, was potentially much more than just an assertion of land rights, but also a powerfully symbolic way of asserting dominance over nature as well as the surrounding community. The broader implications are that these 'ecological slightings' might have played a previously unexplored role in some of the more long-term landscape developments relating to the privatisation and controlling of castle land.

6.6 Slighting in perspective: Kenilworth's contribution to 'The Story'

This chapter began with a discussion of how the personalities associated with a castle shaped its construction and use. These Kenilworth 'identities' sought to demonstrate not just their wealth and status, but in the case of the Earl of Leicester, to architecturally and spatially project ancient and modern messages to the castle's audience (Johnson 2002, 157-8). The argument cultivated here has been that similar

factors were at play in the slighting of Kenilworth Castle, and that these were shaped—both intentionally and inadvertently—by the individuals involved.

The emerging thread from this was that the competing interests of these individuals have provided Kenilworth with a multiplicity of meanings and complexities. On one level, the ‘Story’ of Kenilworth’s slighting can be told—as it traditionally is—in terms of its buildings: what parts were destroyed, and to a much lesser extent, what methods were used. In this narrative, the keep was ‘blown up’, the gatehouse converted, and materials were ‘robbed’ from other buildings within the site. At another level, however, the ‘Story’ is less about the physical destruction of buildings and more about the effects of destruction in a wider sense. This includes environmental damage and alteration, such as the loss of woodlands and lakes, but equally, extends to the loss or change of perceptions about the castle as a whole. In short, destruction changed the spatial use and *idea* of the castle and resulted in the creation of an altered landscape. New access routes had to be negotiated, fresh messages absorbed, and old ways of interacting with the site had to be abandoned.

On an even broader level, the destruction of Kenilworth has highlighted the inadequacy of our interpretations of Civil War attitudes towards castle destruction and slighting. The greatest stumbling block is our refusal to examine the local context for slighting, instead favouring oversimplified interpretations that suit our notions of historical ‘progress’. It is clear, for example, that Hawkesworth’s use of the destroyed site more accurately reflects a sense of self advancement and social climbing than a victory ‘...of new ideas of moral and political order’ (Johnson 2002, 173), and yet the significance of his actions has escaped academic notice. This is because we cannot accept that the significance of slighting is best understood in personal terms, from the perspective of individuals, and not simply as a manifestation of an historical, ‘modernising’ movement that is more representative of the long term consequences of slighting than its immediate effects. This notion that contemporaries were affected by slighting on a variety of levels is a departure from the traditional discourse which states that castles were simply ‘blown up’ and then ‘robbed’ by pragmatic contemporaries. It also challenges the idea that a ruined castle’s visual power is an eighteenth century construct, and that contemporaries

were not conscious of and affected by the destruction in their midst. Hawkesworth's Kenilworth was a ruin that was meant to be experienced and absorbed, as were the implicit messages of power that it carried. By looking at it in terms of cold, dry 'facts'—the keep was destroyed and the moat was drained—we deliberately strip these events of their contemporary resonance and remove the human element from the built and natural environment. Consequently, we fail to understand how the seventeenth century individual—visiting Hawkesworth's new mansion, walking across the 'mere', watching the trees disappear—negotiated or reacted to these radical changes around them. It is this 'private' side of Kenilworth's slighting that reminds us to re-examine and reinterpret the familiar 'story', only to reveal a much more nuanced and layered picture.

In the next chapter, these important themes will be explored still further through an examination of the more public face of slighting. This will be done by analysing the slighting of Pontefract Castle (Yorkshire) and its effects on those who participated in it. The emphasis will be less on how the individual influenced or was impacted by slighting, and more on the communal social and economic factors that shaped how slighting was executed and managed in the public sphere.

Chapter Seven

The Public Face of Slighting: Pontefract Castle and Community Involvement

Introduction

In Chapter Six, Kenilworth Castle illustrated the power of the individual to influence and profit from destruction. This chapter will move away from the role of the individual to the role of communities, both local and distant. The concept of communities includes the strata of society that carried out the destruction, those who oversaw and administered it, and those who profited from its materials. Since a basic tenet of destruction narratives is that 'local' people reused the materials, this chapter will use Pontefract Castle as a case study to examine how social dynamics affected the dismantling process. It will test the assumption that locals profited from destruction and consider other ignored social factors relating to labour, including pay, safety, and the organisation and division of work.

To achieve this, it is necessary to consider the best sources of evidence and assess their relative strengths and weaknesses. Archaeologically, Pontefract has been covered extensively, most notably through a series of excavations between 1982 and 1986 (Roberts 2002), and again recently in a conservation plan for the site (FAS 2006). Both make substantial contributions to a wider understanding of the design, use, and significance of the castle, with a particular emphasis on the castle's turbulent Civil War history. This focus has tended to stress the significance of the archaeological evidence for Pontefract's three sieges, especially regarding gallery mines and siege lines/trenches. Consequently, while both works provide invaluable information about Pontefract's war experience, they contribute little data or analysis relating to the demolition phase of the castle's history. This is compounded by the fact that a substantial amount of masonry is no longer *in situ* at the site, leaving a high percentage of indeterminate evidence behind.

In contrast, the documentary evidence for the slighting of Pontefract Castle is particularly robust, providing important details not only about the circumstances surrounding the dismantling of Pontefract Castle, but about the phenomenon of

dismantling in a more general sense. This evidence has never been properly examined before and a textual analysis of this data will constitute the core of this chapter. This approach is in keeping with a thesis that throughout has stressed multidisciplinary perspectives, and has argued for a more integrated methodological attitude to evaluating slighting evidence.

7.1 Pontefract Castle: An introduction and history

Pontefract Castle [SE 460 224] is situated northeast of the town of Pontefract, West Yorkshire. It rests on a natural table of rock that slopes 30-40 feet from the surrounding land (Clark 1884, 383). The inner bailey comprises an area of approximately 2 1/3 acres, with the castle as a whole encompassing around seven acres (Armitage 1912, 189). Although it began life as a motte and bailey castle, its form evolved to include a quatrefoil keep, a multitude of towers within the curtain perimeter, a gatehouse, and numerous ancillary buildings inside the bailey (Figure 7.1).

The early history of the castle is an illustrious and ultimately royal one. Construction was begun by Ilbert de Lacy, a baron of William the Conqueror, and completed by 1080 (Grainge 1855, 33). Ownership over the years passed through twenty-nine lords, of which thirteen were nobles and sixteen were reigning monarchs (Roberts 1990, 11). Having acquired a reputation for being an indomitable fortress, it became notorious as a place of execution for nobles and royalty, including its owner Thomas of Lancaster in 1322 and Richard II in 1400 (Roberts 2002, 1 and 12). With the seizure of the throne in 1399 by Henry IV, Pontefract Castle, as part of the Duchy of Lancaster, became crown property. A series of intermittent repairs followed over the centuries (see Colvin 1975, 287-90), and by the seventeenth century the castle had remained one of the most formidable in the North (Figure 7.2).

The castle played a prominent role in the Civil War (see Section 7.1.1 below) and was subsequently slighted by order of Parliament, the details of which will be discussed in depth later. Post slighting, its history is one of structural decay and ephemeral use, much of which is detailed by Roberts (1990, 53-56 and 2002, 447-48). The barbican was the only usable structure, and in the decades after the slighting

its barbican housed debtors and French prisoners of war (Roberts 2002, 447). In the eighteenth century the castle grounds were leased by the Pontefract Corporation to Dunhills in order to grow liquorice, whereby a huge section of the castle, including the keep, were affected (Roberts 1990, 53). In the late nineteenth century the castle, after brief archaeological excavations, entered a new phase as a Victorian pleasure park. This entailed considerable landscaping and the planting of new vegetation, as well as the creation of follies, gates, a bridge, trellises, a museum, and a bandstand (Roberts 2002, 447). From this period it essentially served as a dumping ground for curiosities, including Crimean War cannons, a Roman sarcophagus, and a World War I tank, until World War II where it nominally played a role in war activities (Roberts 1990, 54-55). Its role as a dumping ground for 'homeless antiquities' was resurrected in the post-war years, and the castle received, among other things, stonework from the St. John's priory excavations in the 1950s and 1960s (Roberts 2002, 447-48). Serious excavation of the castle did not begin in earnest until the early 1980s, at which point the decision was made to present the ruins as an historic monument (Roberts 2002, 448).

Despite this intention, the current condition and layout of the site continues to have all of the hallmarks of a community park. So much of the castle fabric is missing, in fact, that many locals view it more as a 'green space' than an historic site (Brindle 2003, 39; Coulson¹ pers comm. 2004; FAS 2006, vol 1, 21). This severe loss of structural mass makes it difficult to understand the castle's slighting from a strictly archaeological perspective. Moreover, the current condition hinders attempts to accurately differentiate slighting dismantling from post-slighting robbing. The conventional view is that informal 'quarrying' sporadically continued for decades after the slighting (Thompson 1987a, 148; Roberts 2002, 447), but to what extent this has contributed to the present appearance of the site is difficult to quantify. As the antiquarian Daniel Defoe described the castle as lying 'in its ruins, though not demolished' (Rogers 1989, 179), it is arguable that a substantial amount of this stone loss has occurred within a post-slighting context.

¹ Steve Coulson, Custodian of Pontefract Castle in 2004.

7.1.1 Pontefract Castle in the Civil War

Much has been written about Pontefract's three sieges (see Boothroyd 1807; Longstaffe 1861; Holmes 1887; Charles 1984; Roberts 1990 and 2002; Quinn 1992). Garrisoned by the Royalists from the outset, it was harassed by the Parliamentary Colonel Sands as early as August 1644, but was not seriously besieged until December (Grainge 1855, 40-41). A Royalist perspective was captured by the siege diarist Nathan Drake (Longstaffe 1861), revealing a period of intensive mining and artillery bombardment by both sides (see Roberts 2002, 414-5 for discussion). Although the castle sustained considerable structural damage, including the collapse of the Piper Tower, the Parliamentarian attack proved unsuccessful. The siege was raised in early March of 1645 when Sir Marmaduke Langdale arrived with Royalist reinforcements from Oxford (Clark 1884, 381). A brief period of restocking provisions commenced.

The second siege was more or less a resumption of the first, and by the 21st of March, 1645, the Parliamentarians were once again in control of the town and besieging the castle (Grainge 1855, 43). A complete line of circumvallation was created under General Sands, with the nearby New Hall occupied by the local Parliamentarian Sir John Savile (Clark 1884, 382). This war of attrition was characterised by an intense period of fortifying positions, digging trenches, and bombardment, with the Royalists slowly forced to abandon their positions and fall back (see Roberts 2002, 415-18). With the defeat of the King's cause at Naseby signalling defeat, the garrison finally surrendered with honour to General Poyntz in July of 1645 (Quinn 1992, 10).

Following these sieges, Parliament debated the issue of whether to slight Pontefract or maintain it as a garrison. In April 1646 a garrison of 100 men was agreed (CJ 30/4/46), but in February of the following year it was ordered to be made untenable (CJ 26/2/47). Two months later the order was inexplicably changed, and £500 was ordered to be spent on repairing it (CJ 14/4/47). Despite the continued presence of a garrison, a coup in June of 1648 ultimately resulted in a third siege for the castle. Royalists disguised as peasants pretended to deliver beds and provisions, and once inside, seized control of the castle (Grainge 1855, 43-4). Their leader, Colonel Morrice, had switched back to the Royalist side after previously converting to

Parliament, and the garrison soon grew to approximately 500 men (Binns 2004, 140). That number expanded to 1,200, and they continued to conduct periodic raids, despite the arrival in September of Sir Edward Rhodes and Sir Henry Cholmley with 5,000 men from the local militia (Roberts 2002, 418). One such raid resulted in the controversial death of the prominent Parliamentarian Colonel Thomas Rainborough, and by November Cromwell himself had taken charge of siege operations (Roberts 2002, 419). After protracted negotiations, the third siege ended on the 24th of March, 1649, almost two months after the execution of the King (Quinn 1992, 10). Along with Morrice, six Royalist defenders were excluded from pardon, including Lt. Austwick, a Pontefract man with prominent family members in local government (Holmes 1882, 86; Roberts 2002, 421). Austwick escaped, but Morrice and another Royalist were executed in York in August 1649, by which point the destruction of Pontefract Castle was underway (Roberts 2002, 421).

7.1.2 Contemporary slighting sources

In contrast to its siege history, the slighting of Pontefract Castle has elicited little academic interest, although some commentary on the slighting can be found (see Clark 1884, 383; Colvin 1975, 290; Thompson 1987a, 147; Quinn 1992; Roberts 2002, 421-22). Nearly all of these sources use data stemming from the work of R.H.H. Holmes (1882 and 1887), with particular reference to two primary sources: the 1649/1651 demolition accounts as recorded in Holmes (1887; Appendix XIII), and the town's 1649 petition to slight (Appendix X). A few have also made reference to the letter Major General Lambert provided in support of the petition to slight (Appendix XI).

Of those utilising this original source material, only Quinn (1992) and Roberts (2002) make any observations beyond cursory recitations of accounting figures. Quinn (1992) largely focuses on the town rather than the specifics of the castle, but does explore the credibility of and motivation behind the castle petitions. In contrast, Roberts (2002) overwhelmingly concentrates on the demolitions accounts, and in doing so offers limited critical analysis of the dismantling. While he, too, provides revenue statistics for various materials from the castle, he balances this with some speculation about labour issues such as how long dismantling took and how many

men were involved (2002, 422). With only one exception, however, there is no comment made on individual purchasers, and no analysis of the administrative infrastructure surrounding the removal and sale of materials.

To address these deficiencies, this chapter will analyse the primary source material with more scrutiny than has heretofore been attempted. Section 7.2 will evaluate the Pontefract slighting petitions and Lambert's supporting letter, while Sections 7.3 and 7.4 will examine the demolitions accounts. These have been divided into two important sections: labour (Section 7.3) and revenue (7.4), with further subdivisions within each which are primarily based on building material type (e.g. stone, timber, metals). Through an examination of the labour and profit connected to each of these materials, a more nuanced appreciation of the slighting is intended. Of primary consideration will be the individuals advocating, carrying out, organising, and profiting from the dismantling, and the circumstances surrounding their involvement.

7.2 The petitions of Pontefract Castle

On the 24th of March, 1649, the day the castle surrendered, Col. Robert Lilburne wrote to Capt Adam Baynes² that 'the chief news is now that the grand jury at York, the judge, and committee, and all most all this county, are about petitioning to get this castle pulled down' (Appendix VIII). Petitions of this type were not unusual in the Civil War. Their stated purpose was usually to stop 'malignants' from using specific castles, although access to materials was an obvious motivation as well. Some, like Great Yarmouth's petition to Parliament in 1650, made this desire explicit:

'...[we hope] you will be pleased to grant us such a part of the lead and other useful materials of that vast and altogether useless Cathedral in Norwich, towards the building of a work house to employ our almost starved poor, and repairing our piers, or otherwise as you shall think fit and sufficient.'

(cited in Ketton-Cremer 1969, 237)

The first petition relating to Pontefract Castle, drafted five days before the castle surrendered, originated from the town and used similar tactics and language (Appendix X). Edward Field, the mayor³ of Pontefract, claimed the petition was on

² Baynes was a Yorkshireman stationed in London who speculated in sequestrated land and acted as financial agent on behalf of the northern Army (Gentles 1973, 624-6).

³ Pontefract's mayors served for one yearly term, commencing in September.

behalf of himself, the ‘Aldermen, and all the well-affected Inhabitants of the Towne’ and followed the familiar pattern of stressing the town’s war time sufferings and misery. In financial terms, this devastation was estimated at £40,000, although the particulars of this claim have been called into question (Quinn 1992). Like Great Yarmouth, Pontefract not only requested rights to the materials, but also tied their need to a specific cause and project: instead of a workhouse, Pontefract asked Parliament ‘to allot so much of the materials of Lead and Timber towards the repaireing of o’place of publiq: worship and [redesigning] of an habitacon for a Minister as shall unto [£]1,000’. This was especially needed as All Saints Church in the town had been virtually destroyed during heavy bombardment (Quinn 1992, 40-1).

The town’s petition was accompanied by a letter of support from Major General John Lambert⁴, the Parliamentarian commander who received the castle’s surrender in its third and final siege (Appendix XI). A Yorkshireman from Craven, North Riding, Lambert had been commander of the Northern army since 1647 (Binns 2004, 195). His opinion would no doubt have carried considerable weight in Parliament, not only because of his military position but also for his roots in the region. Lambert, however, should not be viewed as an impartial commentator on Pontefract’s dealings. The man who began life as the son of a ‘mere squire’ (Binns 2004, 195) had a considerably different standing by the end of the Civil War, of which Pontefract was just one contributing factor⁵. The most immediate connection to the town was that, upon receipt of his letter, Parliament voted him ‘£300 per annum...out of the demesnes of Pontefract...[to] be settled upon Major-General Lambert and his heirs for ever’ (Holmes 1887, 232-3). A series of letters to Capt. Baynes reveal how focused he was on these personal matters, despite his busy military affairs. In particular, his interests were on where he could obtain the land promised to him:

⁴ Lambert also oversaw the dismantling of Knaresborough Castle (see Section 4.2.1 in Chapter Four and also Appendix IV).

⁵ Lambert bought numerous estates including the manor of Wimbleton (Surrey), the herbage of Sheriff Hutton Park and Kippax Meadows (Yorkshire), and Nonsuch Palace and Little Park (Surrey), thereby making Lambert the single largest investor in Crown lands (Gentles 1973, 625).

I have made enquiries into the Queen's Revenues about Pontefract, and find it to be a very distracted thing, there being very little demaine land; but so much as is I intend to get surveyed, and to bring the particulars thereof with me when I come up, which I intend to do very shortly. I also purpose to make inquiry of some other demaine lands belonging to the same revenue here in the north, that it may be, with convenience, the want of the other may be supplied.

(Major General Lambert, Appendix VIII)

Lambert's connection to Pontefract extended beyond just land acquisition, however. By 1658 he was serving as the town's MP and had at least some influence on local affairs (Quinn 1992, 44). These ties to Pontefract did not get severed until the Restoration, after which the republican who enjoyed Pontefract's royal lands was imprisoned for twenty-four years (Binns 2004, 195).

In addition to Pontefract's petition and Lambert's letter, the grand jury sitting at York sent their own petition to Parliament dated the 29th of March (Appendix IX). The jury, claiming to act on 'behalf of themselves and the rest of the county', requested that 'this nest and cage of all villainy...be destroyed', and cited the castle's treacherous past and heavy military cost as reasons. Somewhat contradictorily, the jury asked both for 'the sale of the materials...to help to demolish itself', as well as 'that the county may have the materials for doing it'. The former, of course, implies a sale of materials overseen by a responsible party, while the latter suggests letting those involved in the dismantling take the materials away for free. This ambiguity reflects that the grand jury's prime concern was obtaining the destruction of the castle, and that the actual details of how this was carried out were of far less interest to them.

It is even more evident that they represented their own strategic interests, and not Pontefract's, by the addition of a request to slight Middleham Castle (Yorkshire): 'We also humbly offer to your consideration Midlam Castle, lately a garrison, that it may be made untenable, and no longer fit for a garrison, at the country's charge, the materials being restored to the owner'. This inclusion is particularly incongruous since, as a rural North Riding castle roughly fifty miles away, Middleham lay beyond Pontefract's sphere of influence and had no known commercial or social connections with the town. It also appears to have played no significant military role in the region and, at best, had an uneven and uneventful occupation history (Weaver 1998, 31;

Gaunt 2000, 122). Arguments for slighting it had been put forward before (CJ 30/4/46; CJ 26/2/47; CJ 13/7/47), but this does not necessarily indicate that its owner was a Royalist, or that the castle was strategically important to the Royalist cause. In fact, Middleham's owners, the Loftus family, appear to have been Parliamentary in sympathy. Before the war they engaged in a bitter feud with the King's chief advisor, Thomas Wentworth, the Earl of Strafford, and Sir Edward Loftus later served Parliament as a good faith hostage in the pay negotiations with the Scots in 1646/47 (LJ Vol. 4, 716-18; LJ Vol. 5, 38-41; CJ Vol. 5, 16-8; CJ Vol. 5, 35-9; LJ Vol. 8, 698-704). These Parliamentary credentials might explain the wording of the York petition. As a Parliamentary owner, it would have been more difficult to justify taking castle materials away from him, and 'restoring' them to him at the county's expense was a way of achieving the jury's goals with the least injury to the owner. It is even possible that Sir Edward Loftus was not completely against the plan.

While the official outcome of Middleham Castle remains unclear, the fate of Pontefract does not. On the 27th of March, 1649, Parliament ordered the following:

'That it be referred to the Committee of the westridd' of the County of Yorke to take care that the said Castle of Pontefract be forthw'th totally demolished & levelled to the ground, And the materials thereof to be p'served from being imbezelled, And by sale of so much of them as wilbee necessary to satisfy in the first place the charge of demolishing & levelling the same. And that so much of the remainder of the materials as shalbee of the valewe of One thousand pounds be allotted to the Towne of Pontefract towards the repaireing their place of publiq: worship and reedifijng an habitacon for a Minister.

(Holmes 1882, 29)

This passed on administrative responsibility for the demolition to the West Riding Committee, who in turn passed it on to the local government of Pontefract a week later (Appendix XII). In doing so, the West Riding Committee set forth specific requirements of who would carry out the dismantling and how. The first stipulation was that Edward Field (the mayor), Robert Moore, Robert Franke, Matthew Franke, John Ramsden, Christopher Longe, and Capt John Ward, 'or any foure of them shall agree' should 'direct and order the manner and order how the Lead, Timber, Iron, and other materials of the said castle shalbee pulled downe, sold, and disposed of...'. With the exception of Capt. Ward, the men listed were serving aldermen for Pontefract and senior figures in local government. Although only four were required, five signed their agreement to accept, and by the final demolition accounts a further

two signatures were added, making seven in total (see Section 7.4.1 for more discussion of the trustees).

Although the Committee gave a great deal of latitude to the trustees insofar as how they chose to organise the dismantling, the trustees were bound by certain conditions. They were required to keep accounts ‘in Writeing under their handes in a booke’ and to produce the book for display at irregular intervals, or in the event of it being demanded by the Committee. The trustees were also obligated to produce a ‘full p’fect and finall account of the sale of the said Lead and materials and necessary disbursmts...’. The town was to have its £1,000 as mandated by Parliament, but any surplus was to be handed over to the Committee. On top of that, the Committee ‘thought [it] fitt that the [county] be required to come in, and assist the demolishing of the walls, and filling upp the graftes about the said Castle...[in any way] as they the said Trustees shall con[c]eave may most conduce to the effectual carrying on and speedy finishing of the said work’. The use of the word ‘required’ implies that the trustees would have discretionary powers to compel those who resisted, and that the Committee was essentially willing to approve any methods the trustees utilised to combat this. All of this suggests that there was to be no micromanaging of the operations by the Committee. The trustees were in charge.

With the Committee’s requirements set down—and agreed to—the demolition accounts start the following day, 5th of April, 1649.

7.3 Demolition Accounts: Labour

The demolition accounts (Appendix XIII) have three distinct ‘parts’. The first section is made up of the accounting figures for all money spent and received in connection with the castle’s dismantling. It is followed by more detailed entries concerning the outgoing of money spent on labour. This expenditure includes organisational and incidental costs which will be discussed in the miscellaneous section (Section 7.3.4). The majority, however, are for manual labour, with the committee spending £777 4s 6^d on the demolition of the castle. To make analysis easier, this labour has been

⁶ Pre-decimalisation currency: *l* or £ (pounds), *s* (shillings), *d* (pence). Values: 12*d* (pence) = 1*s* (shilling), and 20*s* (shillings) = £1.

divided into tables by material type: stone, timber, and metals. Also, each entry in the ledger has been assigned a unique number (for the expenditure entries, these are 1A-52A) and can be viewed in Appendix XIII. It is recommended that the appendix and chapter are used in conjunction with each other in order to better understand the discussion taking place, with reference to Figure 7.1 (site map) as needed. Occasionally, a single entry includes two distinctly different types of labour (for instance, one individual paid to demolish a tower *and* take down lead), and where this occurs the entries are footnoted to enable cross-referencing between tables.

7.3.1 Stone

By far, stone related labour made up the greatest expenditure in the accounts. Individual entries ranged from £1 to £201 and encompassed a variety of duties (see Table 7.1). The most striking characteristic revealed by the accounts is the highly compartmentalised and organised nature of the dismantling work. Labourers were not paid to randomly destroy, but rather were paid for the destruction of specific buildings. In many cases, this extended beyond a single structure itself to include multiple buildings within the castle complex, sometimes with specified starting and stopping points. Thomas Thurstan, for instance, was paid to destroy the barbican wall, but *only* 'from the great stable to the Low Draw-Bridge' (3A). Simon Procter was charged with demolishing not only King and Queen's Tower, but 'all the Buildings betwixt the same' (11A). This kind of labour assignment where men were paid for specific jobs—'payment by measure'—appears to have been a well established feature of post-medieval society, at least within a construction context (Airs 1998, 62). This arrangement had the advantage of controlling the labour force, as well as making it easier to keep track of payments for services rendered. What remains unknown is whether labourers were assigned these areas or were awarded contracts based on tendered offers. There is some evidence to suggest that the latter might have occurred. Entries 1A and 2A begin with the words 'An agreement made...' rather than the usual phrasing of 'paid', which implies that negotiations took place over pay (see Section 7.3.4). All of this is indicative of a labour force that, although controlled by the trustees, was active rather than passive. This no doubt included contract bidding, negotiating over rates of pay, and possibly undercutting the competition to secure better assignments.

Entry #	Labourers	Amount Paid	Task Performed
14A	Edward Handson	£1 10s	Pulling down the screen ⁷ between the Upper Gatehouse and the Round Tower; also for the Guardhouse
1A	John Harrison	£80 10s	An agreement made...for demolishing the Round Tower
6A	John Harrison and others	£34	Demolishing the two screens from the Gatehouse to the Round Tower, and thence to the Treasurer Tower
2A	Thomas Lake and others	£20 5s	An agreement made...for the pulling down of barbican wall
12A	Thomas Lake and others	£15 6s 8d	Demolishing two out gatehouses and screen by Constable Tower
35A	Lake and Handson	£37 6s 8d	Demolishing great hall and inner gatehouse
11A	Simon Procter	£104 5s 6d	Demolishing King and Queen's Tower and all buildings betwixt
21A	Simon Procter	£8 10s	Felling down Swillington Tower
3A	Thomas Thurstan	£10	Levelling...barbican wall from the great stable to low drawbridge
13A	Edward Wilson	£201	Demolishing Constable Tower, and all other buildings from King's Tower to Gatehouse. Treasurer Tower, Gascoigne Tower, and Great Kitchen, and all buildings from screen unto Great Hall
16A ⁸		£1 7s 4d	Pulling down part of screen close by Constable Tower
20A ⁹		£4 10s	Chapel walls pulling down
10A ¹⁰	Tattersall, John Smith, and others	£12 5s	Gatehouse taking down

Table 7.1 Labour expenditure related to stone, Pontefract Castle.

It becomes equally clear that the named labour force was insufficient to achieve substantial levels of destruction. Thompson (1987a, 147) alleges that it took sixteen men ten weeks to dismantle the castle, but these two figures have been argued to be

⁷ Curtain wall

⁸ See 16A in Table 7.4.

⁹ See 20A in Table 7.4

¹⁰ See 10A in Table 7.2

inadequate (Roberts 2002, 422). Where stone is concerned, for instance, only eight named labourers and an unspecified number of ‘others’ are acknowledged for work that, quite simply, would have been too overwhelming for such a small group. Edward Wilson alone, for example, was paid £201 to demolish all of the following: the Constable Tower, all the other buildings from the King’s Tower to the Gatehouse, the Treasurer Tower, Gascoigne Tower, the Great Kitchen, and all the buildings from the screen to the Great Hall (13A). Roberts (2002, 422) rightly concludes that this work would have been contracted out and then performed by unnamed labourers under the jurisdiction of their respective bosses. Under an arrangement of this type the foremen, for lack of a better word, would make decisions about how to proceed with demolition as well as report back to the trustees on the progress at hand. This arrangement would have been ideal for trustees who lacked the practical expertise to oversee with demolition, but who could pay more experienced men to make the necessary decisions about dismantling procedures. The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries saw the rise of increasingly experienced and knowledgeable building surveyors (Airs 1998, 62 and 70), and it is reasonable to suppose that the same individuals used to construct large buildings would be drafted in to supervise their demolition. In the case of Pontefract these important individuals are not specifically named, although Roberts (2002, 422) names John Harrison, Simon Proctor, and Edward Wilson as the three principal contractors, presumably because they are the three names associated with the dismantling of the castle’s towers, and therefore, received the most money. There is, however, no evidence to suggest that these three men were in any way senior to or more important than the other named contractors.

While a hierarchy among the foremen is difficult to establish, a hierarchy among the entire labour force is evident. Entries 43A—52A show ten weeks’ worth of payments to ‘several Workmen, and Labourers’, the names, jobs, and individual payments of which go unrecorded. As stone constituted the largest percentage of material to be handled, it is likely that their tasks involved stone removal. It is also likely that these labourers were less specialised and therefore used for general duties: transporting facing stone, clearing rubble and debris, and other unskilled tasks. This interpretation is supported by the fact that the weekly expenditure on them is fairly small, ranging

from £1 to £17, and by the lack of named individuals and descriptions of their tasks. This division of labour therefore fell along skill lines: a large unnamed group paid directly by the committee for menial tasks, and a smaller skilled group with specialist knowledge, more negotiating power over pay, and the independence to employ their own labourers free of the control of the trustees. Again, parallels can be drawn to seventeenth century construction practice, where different labourers and craftsmen were paid differing wages depending on the nature of the work and the level of expertise they provided for it (Airs 1998).

On an even broader financial level, the accounts reveal that stone removal made up the single most expensive dismantling activity. Out of a *total* labour cost of £777 4s 6d, stone labour alone took £530 16s 2d, over two-thirds of the entire demolition expenditure. By way of comparison, Montgomery Castle (Wales), which has the only other surviving demolition accounts known to this author, had a *total* cost of £675 18s 2d, which included labour from miners, carpenters, masons, labourers, as well as incidental charges (Thompson 1987a, 193). This suggests that the dismantling of Pontefract was a larger and far more complex operation—both in the way it was organised and executed—than the dismantling of Montgomery, and that labour expenses likely varied considerably across a range of sites.

7.3.2 Timber

The second greatest outlay of payments went towards timber, with individual payments ranging from a few shillings to £35 (see Table 7.2 on the next page). As with stone, timber removal was strictly organised and controlled, with named individuals ‘assigned’ to specific structures or tasks. Significantly, none of the named six individuals appear in the stone dismantling accounts. This is a strong indication that they were not general labourers, and that their involvement in the castle’s dismantling stemmed from their specialist knowledge and expertise with timber. This expertise extended beyond just dismantling and included the ability to survey timber (33A). This in itself was a highly skilled craft that required a great deal of knowledge. This type of survey would have been necessary to gauge the profitability of the timber and played an integral part in the dismantling/sale process. In addition to being highly organised and skilled, the accounts also illustrate how adaptable to

Entry #	Labourers	Amount Paid	Task Performed
15A ¹¹	James Jolly	£2 16s	Timber of low drawbridge taking up
5A	Lancelot Lamb and others	£35	Taking down timber from King's Tower, Queen's Tower, and Round Tower, and other buildings about the same
34A	George Rennard	10s	Taking crooks out of walls
8A	Tattersall and others	£2	Taking down timber from off two gatehouses
9A	Tattersall, John Smith, and others	£34 5s	Taking down timber of Treasurer tower, Gascoygne Tower, great kitchen, and so to Great Hall
10A ¹²	Tattersall, John Smith, and others	£12 5s	Paid them more for Great Hall timber
7A	Thomas Tayler and others	£35 2s 6d	Timber taking down from chapel, Constable Tower and buildings to the gatehouse
17A	Three labourers	3s	Removing timber out of the fall of a tower
18A		£1 13s 4d	Taking down timber from Swillington Tower
24A		£2 14s	Baring of timber from under the fall of Constable Tower
33A	Six carpenters	£1	Loading timber that was secured from burning by soldiers and surveying rest of timber
39A		18s	Cools ¹³ to several guards to secure the timber from burning
40A		£3 2s 8d	Several draughts ¹⁴ for leading timber out of castle garth, to secure it from soldiers

Table 7.2 Labour expenditure relating to timber, Pontefract Castle.

changing circumstances the timber dismantling crew needed to be. Nothing illustrates this more than entries 17A and 24A, both of which record the baring of timber from underneath collapsed towers (see also Section 7.3.4). As the other entries use the phrasing 'taking down', these two entries likely reflect unplanned and

¹¹ See 15A in Table 7.3

¹² See 10A in Table 7.1

¹³ Possibly 'coals' to burn in lieu of soldiers burning the timber for warmth, cooking, etc.

¹⁴ Draught horses

unexpected collapses. If this was the case, the removal of timber from underneath rubble heaps and unstable structures would have required changes in tactics and a constant reassessment of how to safely proceed.

The timber accounts also shed light on the uneasy relationship between the town and the military, the root of which was the control over timber. The differing priorities of town and military are evident in the fear that the timber might be burned by soldiers (33A, 39A, and 40A), resulting in practical steps to guard and remove it as quickly as possible. This tension over resources suggests a definite lack of trust on the part of civic leaders for their military ‘allies’, and a strong desire to protect their new ‘investment’ from destruction. This concern appears to have been shared by those dismantling Montgomery Castle (Wales), where money was paid ‘for watching the materials’ (Thompson 1987a, 193). This raises questions about how the transition from ‘garrisoned site’ to ‘slighted site’ was negotiated by those involved, and to what extent both parties—military and civilian—felt they ‘deserved’ to have control over the materials.

In all, the total expenditure of timber-related labour, while still high, fell far short of stone labour at just £131 9s 6d. However, the overall revenue from timber of £201 7s 10d appears to have justified the expense of the labour and made a modest profit of £69 8s 4d.

7.3.3 Metals

Of the three materials, metals accounted for the smallest labour expenditure, with no more than £5 spent on any activity (see Table 7.3 on the next page).

Entry #	Labourers	Amount Paid	Task Performed
30A	Francis Bradley	£4 4s	For crows ¹⁵ making and shovels shoeing
15A ¹⁶	James Jolly	£2 16s	Pulling iron from three gates and two drawbridges
38A	Richard Lyle	5s 4d	Loan of beam and weights for weighing of lead
19A	John Oxley and Thomas Lee	£4 1s	Smelting of lead into pigs
36A	John Oxley and his three men	£5	Several days work for taking lead of castle down
29A		14s 8d	For 5 stone and 5 pounds of iron for making crows for pulling off lead

Table 7.3 Labour expenditure relating to metals, Pontefract Castle.

Several points can be made about the labour involved. The first is—once again—the highly specialised nature of the work. Almost none of the labourers listed are mentioned in connection with the removal of other materials, which suggests that their involvement in the dismantling was due to their specialist skills with metals. The one exception is James Jolly (15A), who was also paid to remove timber (see Table 7.2). In this case, the timber and iron both appear to have come from the same structure(s), and their joint removal by the same man is likely due to logistical convenience, not specialist knowledge or abilities with both kinds of material. Like with stone and timber, the term ‘and his three men’ (36A) implies the use of subcontracted work or the use of apprentices. The latter is particularly likely in the case of John Oxley and Thomas Lee, both of whom were paid to melt lead into pigs (19A). It is unclear from documentation whether this took place onsite, although archaeological evidence confirms that similar operations were clearly taking place at Knaresborough Castle (Kershaw, unpublished notes, Harrogate Museum; see Section 4.3.3 and Figure 4.46).

In addition to paying men to remove metals, an equally important expenditure involved the preparatory and secondary costs of dismantling. This is illustrated by the making of shovels (30A) and crowbars (29A, 30A), both of which were essential tools in the dismantling process. Traditionally, such objects were supplied by the

¹⁵ Crowbars (As defined in Thompson 1987a, 193)

¹⁶ See 15A in Table 7.2

builder on a construction site (Airs 1998, 176), but of course in the case of a dismantling operation, no builder would exist. Instead, it was the trustees who were required to pay, and luckily for them a relatively small sum was required. At Montgomery Castle (Wales) these costs were much higher, with £30 being spent ‘for Iron Crowes Mattocks and pickaxes with other Iron tooles and the mendinge of them’ (Thompson 1987a, 193). This cost disparity may reflect a difference in the quantity of tools at the outset of dismantling operations and indicate that the local community of Pontefract had more of these to hand and were better equipped to dismantle. This hints at a broader metalsmithing local network, one that played a supporting role to those actively removing stone, timber, and metal. Equally, the borrowing of a beam and weights (38A) was crucial if retrieval was to be turned into sale. This illustrates that the effects of dismantling rippled beyond the immediate labourers removing materials, and that men in the community who worked in the iron and lead trades—and even those outside these trades—would have been called on for all kinds of contributions, both directly and indirectly. In short, the circle of individuals affected personally and economically by the dismantling operations extends much wider than just the labourers on the ‘front line’.

7.3.4 Miscellaneous

The Pontefract demolition accounts do not just provide information about labour expenditure. They also provide insight into a variety of related issues, none of which have ever been properly recognised or explored. Many of these issues do not deal directly with materials or else defy easy categorisation, but nevertheless illuminate important aspects of the dismantling process (see Table 7.4 on the next page).

Entry #	Labourers	Amount Paid	Task Performed
4A	Jasper Ellis	£4 4s	Moving ammunition to York and carrying it up Clifford's Tower
27A	Lancelot Lamb	10s	For his care and good service in the work
22A	Simon Proctor	£4	Paid more in regard we did conceive that he had a losing bargain upon former work done by him
3A	Thomas Thurstan	£10	Levelling the earthen mount called Nevill's Mount ¹⁷
16A		£1 7s 4d	Paid for filling up the Graft ¹⁸ at the Low Drawbridge...
20A		£4 10s	Paid for filling up the Graft at the Upper Drawbridge...
23A		£20	Several messengers sending abroad into several parts of the country to seek out experienced workmen, for the speedy demolishing of the castle; for money expended at several contracts making; money given to workmen for their encouragement at the falls of several towers; with other incident charges
25A		10s	Paid for two paper-books, and to justice's clerks, for drawing the orders betwixt the Committee and the Trustees
26A		5s	Given to a maimed workman to return to his own home at Malton, towards his charges
37A		£1 10s	Paid for lime and workmanship for the two drawbridges walling up of either side
42A		£1	Paid two counsellors their fees for advice how to proceed in suit, and in whose names, for materials sold, and not paid for

Table 7.4 Miscellaneous expenditure, Pontefract Castle.

From this diverse group, several themes can be detected:

¹⁷ Defensive battery near castle

¹⁸ Ditch or moat

‘Legitimacy’, organisation, and procedure

From the very beginning, the dismantling of Pontefract Castle was a highly organised affair. This occurred on two levels: a practical/physical one, and an administrative one. The logistical organisation of labour has already been discussed, and the origins of it can be seen here in the sending abroad for qualified workmen (23A). Just as significant, however, is the highly organised nature of the administration overseeing the dismantling. Much of this revolved around the importance of judicial procedure and legitimacy. The purchase of paper books, the payment of clerks’ and councillors’ fees, and the drawing up of contracts (23A, 25A, 42A) all reveal a desire for order and a need for the proceedings to be regarded as lawful and beyond reproach.

This desire for order and procedure does not mean that the trustees acted with one voice, however. Entry 28A records that seven soldiers were paid ‘by order from Capt. Ward, for work done by them’. The wording of this entry suggests that not only was the decision made by Ward independently of the other trustees, but that they probably could have done little to overrule him. Similarly, entry 31A reveals that several labourers were paid ‘by a note in Mr. Long’s hands’. The fact that Christopher Longe is mentioned by name is further confirmation that independent decision making took place among the trustees, and perhaps indicates that the trustees as a group wanted to make his involvement in this particular decision absolutely clear. It could be argued therefore that trustee administration was highly organised and concerned with legitimacy, but did not preclude autocratic decision making by individual trustees when the occasion demanded it.

Safety

The dangerous nature of dismantling work is well illustrated by the entries in the demolition accounts. Entry 26A records how a ‘maimed workman’ was given 5s ‘...to return to his home at Malton...’. Although it is impossible to know how extensive injuries like this were among the labourers, it does appear that the threat of injury was ever present. This is evident by entries 17A and 24A (Table 7.2), both of which refer to timber being retrieved from ‘fallen towers’. These collapses were unlikely to have been planned, as some money was ‘...given to workmen for their encouragement at the falls of several towers...’ (23A). This essentially amounted to

‘danger money’, or even a bribe, to force frightened workers to continue doing work in unsafe conditions.

The unsafe conditions of dismantling work are especially important to note in light of the precarious employment situation injured workers could find themselves in. While medical treatment might be paid for by the builder of a construction, lost wages invariably were not (Airs 1998, 174). Even a so-called minor injury (e.g. one that was not life-threatening), could still have serious implications for a man’s ability to feed his family or provide for their future welfare. If this was true of a construction project, it was probably just as applicable to dismantling operations which, arguably, were even more dangerous to execute. The inherent risks of this kind of labour, and consequently, the possible reluctance of labourers to perform it, is a factor that deserves consideration by any archaeologist assessing a dismantled site. It is worth contrasting the apocryphal image of an enthusiastically slighted castle—an image which has been presented too often in print—with a possibly more accurate one of a nervous labour force executing their duties for money, but ever aware of the dangers they exposed themselves to by doing so.

‘Support’ manual labour

In addition to the handling of materials during dismantling, the entries reveal a supplementary amount of manual labour that was crucial to the overall process of destruction. Much of this labour involved manipulating the landscape and outer defences (3A, 16A, 20A, 41A), and serves as a reminder that neutralising a castle’s moat and earth defences was as important as neutralising its walls. A similar situation is recorded for Montgomery Castle (Wales), where the owner, Lord Herbert, proposed to the County Committee ‘that the outworks be totally slighted, the grafts before the new building filled up, and the drawbridge taken down...[as well as] the graft between the new building and the old castle filled up, [and] the drawbridge taken down...’ (Smith 1963). Although less dangerous than dismantling labour, it nevertheless would have been gruelling and tiring work, and unlikely to have been paid well. The relatively high amount of money paid out is probably more of a reflection of the number of workers involved, as opposed to the level of skill or difficulty required for the job.

It is also clear that manual labour extended beyond the more obvious tasks of shifting castle materials and earth. Jasper Ellis' job (4A) of removing the ammunition from Pontefract to Clifford's Tower in York would have been no less laborious and tiring: hauling heavy ammunition up and down stairs, securing it in carts, and crossing over terrible roads to make the forty-odd mile journey to York. Similarly, the walling up of the drawbridges with lime (37A)—probably done to nullify the structure's original use—amply demonstrates the need for specialist *construction* skills in the execution of destruction, widening still further the mix of labour needed for the demolition operations. These kinds of examples illustrate the importance of support manual labour, as well as the diversity of labour that was needed in order to accomplish the full remit of the dismantling.

Labour negotiations and power

As discussed earlier, payment for dismantling labour appears to have rested in part on negotiation. This was no doubt due to the rarity of the labour being performed (in this case, taking buildings apart instead of constructing them), and a lack of precedent for setting prices. It has been noted that the costing of construction jobs was a difficult skill that often resulted in unrealistic estimates (Airs 1998, 60), and this must have been equally true of costing dismantling tasks. Indeed, the demolition accounts reflect 'hit or miss' bargains being struck between labourer and trustees, with 'misses' sometimes being recorded. Entry 22A, for instance, concedes extra pay for Simon Procter since 'he had a losing bargain upon former work done by him'. Equally, Lancelot Lamb received an extra 10s 'for his care and good service in the work' (27A). While there is no explicit mention of complaint by either labourer, it is tempting to speculate that extra money would probably not have been forthcoming without prompting from the labourers themselves. This tactic would have been especially effective after an unforeseen event such as a collapse of a tower. The threat of refusing to work, as well as stressing the dangerous nature of what they were doing, would no doubt have been a powerful tactic to secure extra payment for their labour. It should perhaps also be noted that rewarding good construction work was not uncommon (Airs 1998, 175), so it is not inconceivable that a similar practice was being used at Pontefract for jobs executed particularly well.

Power within labour negotiations may also have been affected by locality and the origins of the labour. Construction sites during the seventeenth period mostly used local labourers (Airs 1998, 167), although itinerant workers were common, as well. In the case of Pontefract's dismantling, labourers were solicited throughout the region (23A), but at least some of the labour can be clearly identified as local. Thomas Lake, John Oxley, and Thomas Tattersall, for instance, are recorded as residing in Pontefract after the demolition (Holmes 1882, 55-6), while Oxley turns up as a prominent inhabitant in local records dating from 1651 (Holmes 1882, 8); both Lake and Tattersall could easily have lived there prior to the dismantling, as well. Perhaps significantly, many of the individuals associated with the larger demolition jobs—men such as Simon Procter and John Harrison—cannot be positively identified as inhabitants of Pontefract. This is because the poor rate assessments have not survived for the demolition period, and consequently the exact names of Pontefract's inhabitants in 1649 cannot be established. It could be argued, however, that their failure to appear in the 1651 accounts is suggestive that these individuals were not from Pontefract but resided elsewhere, and yet were still given the most lucrative dismantling tasks.

This raises questions about how locals fared regarding pay and choice assignments versus their 'foreign' competitors. Interestingly, Airs (1998, 196) has argued that itinerant craftsmen (as opposed to less skilled 'labourers') were paid more than their local counterparts because local craftsmen would accept less wages in exchange for the safety of steady employment. Although it is difficult to know for certain whether this was true for Pontefract, it is not hard to see how resulting tensions between outsiders and locals might have fuelled resentment, bidding wars, price/wage undercutting, and favouritism. Moreover, issues like these would no doubt have been complicated by past war loyalties. Oxley, for instance, is known to have been a member of the Royalist garrison inside the castle in the first siege (Holmes 1887, 20), and he is unlikely to have been a unique case. While this clearly did not prevent him from receiving work in the dismantling, it may or may not have affected the quantity or quality of assignments given to him over other labourers. The limited information revealed so far suggests that further research into the identities of these

craftsmen and labourers might bear fruit about the exact relationship between ‘locals’ and ‘outsiders’, ‘employees’ and ‘employers’, and ‘conquered’ and ‘conquering’.

7.4 Demolition Accounts: Revenue

The second half of the demolition accounts deals with the revenue raised from the sale of materials from Pontefract Castle. These materials were metals (lead and iron), glass, and timber, and are recorded as entries 1B-81B in Appendix XIII. The gross profit of all sales was £1,779 17s 4d. From this, £777 4s 6d was deducted for labour and £1,000 was given to the town of Pontefract to build a church, leaving a profit of £2 12s 10d. In reality, sale debts of £145 11s 7d were still outstanding when the accounts were finalised in April 1651, and continued to be a problem as late as 1654 when the Corporation took legal steps to recover the debt (Holmes 1882, 31).

As the demolitions accounts themselves isolate the various revenues by materials, this section has been similarly organised, with metals and timber analysed separately. For a more nuanced analysis, Section 7.4.1 will first examine the fiscal involvement of the demolitions trustees and their family members.

7.4.1 Trustees and family

Section 7.2 identified many of the individuals who instigated the demolition of Pontefract Castle. Although several were involved, only seven men served as trustees and bore the responsibility of overseeing the dismantling and sale operations. They were: John Ward, Robert Moore, Matthew Frank, Edward Fielde, John Ramsden, Christopher Longe, and John Skurr. Of interest here is their involvement in the acquisition of castle materials, and the advantages that could be gained from being a trustee and ‘well affected inhabitant’. The purchases of the seven trustees, as well as the details of their civic status have been summarised in Table 7.5 (next page), which shows that three of the seven trustees actively bought castle timber and lead, with the largest purchase, significantly, being made by the mayor, Edward Fielde.

Trustees	Status	Lead	Timber
Jo. Warde	Parl. Capt, JP, West Riding Magistrate	None	None
Robert More	Alderman (1640/50s) Mayor (1657)	£5 15s 6d	None
Matthew Franck	Mayor (1649) Alderman (1650s)	None	None
Edward Fielde	Mayor (1648) Alderman (1650s)	£2 15s 10d	£22 8s
John Ramsden	Mayor (1647)	None	None
Christopher Longe	Alderman (1650s) Mayor (1653)	None	None
John Skurr	Mayor (1646) Alderman (1650s)	£1 10s	£3

Table 7.5 Purchases made by trustees, Pontefract Castle (status source: Holmes 1882; Quinn 1992).

Fielde was the same mayor who petitioned for demolition on behalf of the town, aldermen, and ‘well affected’ (Appendix X). Although there is no indication that any of the trustees were more senior than others in executing their duties, Fielde’s position as mayor during the most intense period of dismantling possibly gave him a slight advantage regarding control over materials, perhaps even enabling him to have ‘first choice’. This, however, does not prove that he purchased materials to the detriment of the others, and certainly other trustees had as much if not more influence and political clout. Robert Moore in particular was regarded as a ‘senior figure in local government’ (Quinn 1992, 47). This ‘determined Puritan’ (Holmes 1882, 27) could also claim impeccable Parliamentary credentials: as an alderman during the siege of 1644, his political views kept him in the town while the majority of the (then) Royalist aldermen fled inside the castle (Holmes 1882, 9). Such an individual would no doubt have been in a strong position to buy ahead of any competitors, and his low level spending is more likely explained by lack of interest than lack of opportunity.

Trustee involvement expands even further if family members and their purchases are included. These have been set out in Table 7.6.

Trustee Surnames	Status	Lead	Timber
William Ward	Member of Ward family	None	£12
Mr. Leonard Ward	Alderman (1649 & 1650) Mayor (1651)	None	£23
Lt. Ward	Capt. Ward or Royalist relative?	17s	None
Thomas Feilde	Member of Feilde family	None	13s 4d

Table 7.6 Purchases made by individuals with the same surname as a trustee, Pontefract Castle (status source: Holmes 1882).

A concentration of purchases by the Ward family is immediately apparent. This large West Riding family had numerous branches, and exact precision about relationships is complicated by identical first names occurring among cousins and fathers/sons (Holmes 1882, 59). Some inferences can be made, however. Leonard Ward was not only the brother of trustee Capt. John Ward, but was an alderman in his own right and owned property in Pontefract (Holmes 1882, 59 and 61). Noted as the ‘business man’ of the family (Holmes 1882, 61), his large purchase of castle timber is particularly noteworthy and may reflect a business investment, or possibly timber intended for the main family seat of Tanshelf Court, a manor house in nearby Tanshelf (Holmes 1882, 65). The entry for ‘Lt. Warde’ (11B) is more problematic. It could be an erroneous reference to *Capt.* John Ward, one of the trustees, and since the amount of lead purchased was too small to be a military acquisition, it too might have been meant for Tanshelf Court. A more intriguing option is that it might refer to a Royalist relation, a Lt. Warde who is known to have been inside the castle garrison during at least one of the sieges (Holmes 1887, 41, 42, and 48). This suggests that overseeing dismantling operations could be a windfall opportunity to be shared with one’s social and familial connections. Arguably, it also hints that strict partisan lines might not have been as important as familial ties when the securing of materials was at stake.

However, some caution must be exercised to not overstate this point. This is illustrated by the Frankes, a local Parliamentarian family (Quinn 1992, 46) with at least two prominent sons: Matthew, who was alternately a mayor, alderman, and trustee, and his brother Robert, who not only served as an alderman in the 1640s and 50s (Quinn 1992, 47), but was one of the original trustee nominations made by the

West Riding Committee (Appendix XII). Despite these connections with the castle demolition, neither brother is listed as a buyer, nor is any Franke mentioned in the purchase lists. This is especially remarkable in light of the fact that Matthew Franke became mayor in September of 1649, only five months into the dismantling operations, and as such was potentially in an ideal position to acquire materials. The fact that he did not must surely reflect a lack of interest or desire on his part rather than a lack of resources or opportunity. Equally, John Ramsden and Christopher Longe made no discernible purchases, despite the opportunities afforded them by their trustee status. Clearly trustee and family profiting was a fairly nuanced and complex phenomenon that defied easy categorisations.

Family and trustee involvement, however, does raise valid questions about the role of trustees and how they and others viewed their actions. Their highly visible purchases were not the actions of men who saw a conflict of interests in being both organiser of and participant in destruction. Indeed, the very act of recording their purchases was a confident proclamation that what they were doing should be viewed not just as being legitimate in a legal sense, but also as morally acceptable according to the social mores of the time. It is even possible that these individuals did not see themselves as opportunists, but as men doing their civic duty and helping their community recover from its wartime devastation. However, questions about their activities must still be raised. It must be considered, for example, whether favourable rates were reserved for trustees and their friends and families, and also where purchased material ended up. Knowing such details can provide important information about their ultimate motivation. For example, it is perhaps civic minded to buy materials and use them in order to raise money for the rebuilding of a town church, but decidedly less so to buy them at bargain prices, then sell them on for a substantial profit. Of course, these issues have a resonance beyond just the Civil War and reflect a long-standing relationship between financial opportunity and political power. As Airs (1998, 27) noted of the Dissolution just a century before: 'In general it was the more powerful men, and those officials who played a leading part in the actual process of dissolution, who were the first to make use of the new opportunities for building...'. Pontefract and its leaders appear to have been little different.

7.4.2 Metals and glass

Of the four building materials sold from Pontefract Castle—timber, glass, lead, and iron—the two metals generated by far the most revenue. Although metals-related labour only amounted to £19 1s, the combined received revenue from lead and iron sales was a hugely profitable £1,577 9s 6d. Unquestionably, the sale of the metals—lead in particular—not just subsidised but outright paid for the expensive (but ultimately unprofitable) act of stone dismantling.

Lead

The total sale value of Pontefract Castle's lead amounted to £1,640 16s 11d (20B), of which £97 19s 9d was still owed to the Commonwealth from unpaid debts (21B, 22B). By far, lead was the single most profitable material to be retrieved from the castle. This lead was purchased by seventeen individuals and is recorded in entries 1B-19B.

A cursory assessment immediately reveals that the majority of profit came disproportionately from a minority of purchases. Of the nineteen individual purchases made, fourteen were for £11 or less, and ten were for less than £5. This means that the bulk of the overall profit was derived from only five single purchases, as outlined in Table 7.7.

Entry #	Buyer	Amount of Lead	Amount Paid
8B	Mr. Edward Rhodes ¹⁹	84 fother ²⁰ , 14 hundred, 2 quarters, and 5 pounds	£940
3B	Mr. Samuel Childe of Leeds	40 fother at 11/ 5s	£450
4B	Mr. Samuel Childe	9 fother, 12 hundred, and 24 pounds at same price	£107 19s 9d
6B	Mr. Winter of Hull	4 fother	£45
14B	Mr. John Savile of Methley	3 fother and 13 pounds	£33 16s

Table 7.7 Five most profitable single purchases of lead, Pontefract Castle.

¹⁹ Later referred to in entry 21B as 'Sir Edward Rhodes'.

²⁰ Fother: Medieval origin measurement of weight. Approximately 2,100 lbs.

Of these purchases, the importance of locality immediately becomes apparent. Three of the four individuals are explicitly linked to residences outside of Pontefract: specifically, Methley, which lies approximately five miles away, Leeds fourteen miles, and Hull a distant forty²¹. Sir Edward Rhodes, the largest purchaser of lead (8B), did not reside in Pontefract, either (Holmes 1882, 53-56), but rather had at least one house in Hull (Wildridge 1887, 160). This trend is seen elsewhere in the lead accounts. Entry 1B records that £10 2s 6d was paid by the churchwardens of Barnsley, ten miles from Pontefract, and another substantial purchase was made by Sir Thomas Wentworth (10B), a buyer with West Riding origins but no known residency in Pontefract (see below). The result was that the overwhelming majority of Pontefract lead was obtained by individuals with no permanent or obvious ties to the Pontefract community, but whose main residences lay elsewhere in the West and East Ridings of Yorkshire.

Interest in Pontefract lead, however, was not just confined to local aldermen/trustees and buyers from other communities. A third important group were those with military and Parliamentary connections, particularly those of West and East Riding origins. Rhodes (8B), for example, was a Yorkshireman who not only served as a JP, MP, and High Sheriff (Binns 2004, 208), but was also the Parliamentary commander who besieged Pontefract Castle in its third and final siege (Roberts 2002, 421). His reputation as a Parliamentarian was not spotless, however, for he was briefly held prisoner in Hull in 1643 under suspicion of being in collusion with the traitor Sir John Hotham (Wildridge 1887, 39, 40, 154). Another example of a military purchaser was John Clayton (18B), a JP from Cleckheaton, West Yorkshire, who was also a Parliamentarian captain (Binns 2004, 207). In both cases it is likely that military connections facilitated the purchase of lead.

Not all Parliamentarian credentials are so easily established, particularly as the identification of kin groups is a well recognised problem for historians dealing with this period (Spufford 2000, 224). In the Pontefract demolitions accounts, two prominent West Yorkshire families in particular were represented: the Saviles (13B, 14B), and the Wentworths (10B). Both, like so many others in England, had

²¹ All distances are as the crow flies. Actual seventeenth century travel distances would have been greater.

divisions of loyalty within the extended family group, but those purchasing Pontefract lead can be cautiously identified as Parliamentarian. ‘Sir Thomas Wentworth’ (10B), for example, in all likelihood refers to Sir Thomas Wentworth of North Elmsall (Binns 2004, 208) and not the Royalist Thomas Wentworth of Bretton (Binns 2004, 212). A similar situation exists with the Saviles. ‘Mr. John Savile of Methley’ (14B) can be clearly identified as a Parliamentarian JP in West Yorkshire (Binns 2004, 208), and even more specifically as one of the West Riding justices that ordered demolition (Holmes 1882, 30). ‘Lord Savile’ (13B), however, is more problematic. The title was more commonly used for Thomas Savile, Lord Viscount of Howley (Binns 2004, 212), who appears in contemporary records as ‘Lord Savile’ (CJ Vol 4 1644-46, 456-58; CJ Vol 4 1644-46, 420-2). A man of dubious loyalties, he was ultimately suspected of being a traitor by both sides and forced by Parliament to compound as a delinquent (see Mulligan 1969; Crawford 1975). A much more likely candidate would therefore be Sir John Savile of Lupset, a man with an active record of service for Parliament in Yorkshire (see Binns 2004; Cooke 2004). His connection to Pontefract has an immediacy and poignancy that the candidacy of Thomas Savile lacks. This included a brief incarceration in Pontefract Castle in 1642 (Binns 2004, 36), as well as participation in the siege of 1645 (Clark 1884, 382). At least one source identifies him as Lord Savile of Pontefract (Binns 2004, 152), although it should be pointed out that this title has also been ascribed to Thomas Savile (Wildridge 1887, 188-9). Understanding the identities of those purchasing materials, therefore, is crucial if we are to understand the layers of significance attached to those purchases.

The story, of course, does not end with the initial purchases themselves. On a broader scale, the lead accounts also hint at the existence of a larger market system at work. This translates into a simple question: where did the lead end up? In at least one case, the answer was far away: Sir Edward Rhodes’ lead went through the hands of at least one merchant before ending up in Rotterdam (cited in Roberts 2002, 422). Considering the size of his purchase (8B), it must be concluded that Rhodes purchased the lead with resale in mind. If this is the case, he must have done so with at least some knowledge of the contacts and market forces needed to sell the lead on at profit. The fact that the lead ended up in Rotterdam indicates how wide the

connections and the market extended, and also illustrates the opportunities for profit that were available to enterprising entrepreneurs.

Intimately tied to the issue of profiting from a lead trade is the issue of debt. A great deal of business in the seventeenth century occurred using credit, and it was common for probate accounts to include references to unspecified debts involving supplied goods to the deceased (Spufford 2000, 215 and 216). In the Pontefract lead accounts, two individuals are identified as being debtors, both of whom also happened to be the two largest purchasers of lead: Sir Edward Rhodes (21B) and Mr. Samuel Childe (22B, 23B). In both cases, this debt proved to be an ongoing problem for the trustees. As late as 1654, three years after the demolition accounts were finalised, the Corporation resorted to petitioning Parliament once more to force payment from the debtors (Holmes 1882, 31). In the case of Samuel Childe, attempts to recover this debt even extended to pursuing the money from his widow (Holmes 1882, 23-25), with an additional cost to the community of £16 2s 10d (Holmes 1882, 42). In this case, the effects of the lead dismantling did not just reverberate outside of Pontefract across the region, but also had lingering financial ramifications for several of those involved.

Iron

The total received from Pontefract Castle's iron amounted to £37 2s 4d (24B), with an additional £2 17s 8d still owed to the Commonwealth (25B). The identity of the purchaser(s) is not recorded, but the debtor notation significantly identifies one Colonel Overton as being a debtor. A native of Holderness, in East Yorkshire (Binns 2004, 121), Colonel Robert Overton served as governor of Hull from 1648 (Howes and Foreman 1999, 39). His purchase was clearly for military use as the entry records how the iron was 'for the Publick Service for Draw-Bridges for Hull...' (25B). Paying for fortification repairs was the responsibility of the individual garrison governors, and the Hull garrison was in particularly bad shape with repairs estimated at £6,605 (Howes and Foreman 1999, 41). It is therefore possible that Overton purchased *all* of the iron for Hull, and that the £2 17s 8d debt was the last remaining portion to be paid. This is particularly likely as Hull was deemed to be

strategically vital to the Parliamentary cause and remained active even when other garrisons were being abandoned (see Binns 1996; Howes and Foreman 1999).

The significance of this transaction resonates on several levels. Militarily, it illustrates that even after the execution of the King and the end of the Second Civil War, military interests still exerted a great deal of influence on 'local' matters. It also highlights the invisible ties between places of diverse localities, many of which extend back to before the castle's dismantling. The massive bombardment of the castle in 1648 took place with mortars and demi-cannon that were sent from Hull (Howes and Foreman 1999, 43). Additionally, Hull's governor, Colonel Overton, saw action in at least one of the Pontefract sieges (Binns 2004, 121) and was either governor of Pontefract in 1645 (Wildridge 1887, 185) or was nominated for, but did not get, the post in 1646 (Quinn 1992, 43). These connections should not be seen as just simple coincidences of war. Rather, they illustrate the larger web of regional, political, military, and social links that bound up communities across wide distances. At a practical level, this meant individuals brought their own regional and personal prejudices, or knowledge and contacts, to bear on decisions they made which significantly (and often detrimentally) impacted other towns and communities. These links can also be viewed in a less tangible and more philosophical way: in this case the 'death' of Pontefract Castle is intimately linked to Hull's seventeenth century bid to keep its buildings and structures 'alive'. This typifies the ruthless pragmatism that towns needed in order to promote their own interests and secure their own survival—a policy often followed at the expense and misfortune of someone else's community.

Glass

Glass was by far the least profitable material sold. Only £1 is recorded as being sold to buyers unknown (66B). This was probably due to its lack of versatility for later reuse, but is also a likely indication of how little of it survived the castle's many sieges. The fact that it was sold at all, probably as scrap material, illustrates the committee's ability and desire to wring as much profit from the site as possible. Curiously, no labour entry was recorded for glass, unlike at Montgomery Castle (Wales) where glaziers were paid £5 for their labour (Thompson 1987a, 193). This suggests that Montgomery Castle retained far more glass at the time of its slighting,

and that its potential re-use/re-sale value warranted paying professionals for the job, unlike at Pontefract.

7.4.3 Timber

Timber was the second most profitable material salvaged from the castle. Net profits from timber were £201 7s 10d, with an additional £42 4s 2d recorded as outstanding debts (of which more will be said later). Unlike lead, the timber sales do not record the specifics of weight or size, so it is unclear if the price paid reflects the quality or quantity of timber bought. Another significant difference to lead is the large number of timber purchasers. Specifically, timber sales were not concentrated in the hands of a small minority, but rather, were spread more evenly across 38 purchase entries (26B-64B) ranging from £23 to 2s. As with the lead sales, an examination of the top purchasers reveals a great deal of information about the circumstances surrounding the sale (see Table 7.8).

Entry #	Buyer	Amount Paid
30B	Mr. Leonard Ward	£23
39B	Edward Fielde	£22 8s
60B	Rec for Timber for the Church	£20
42B	William Brame	£12
57B	William Ward	£12
45B	John Potter	£10
50B	John Killingbecke	£10

Table 7.8 Top five most profitable single purchases of timber, Pontefract Castle.

Perhaps most significantly, trustees and prominent local men dominate the timber list (30B, 39B, 57B). The extent of their purchases is particularly striking in light of the fact that building a church was given as one of the main objectives of dismantling, and yet the timber earmarked for it only constituted the third largest purchase (60B). This means that, unlike with the castle lead, the top purchasers of castle timber came mostly from Pontefract itself. This is confirmed by the timber lists as a whole where at least half of the buyers can be positively identified as residing in Pontefract in 1657 (Holmes 1882, 53-56), and several more appear as burgesses and important

inhabitants in 1651 (Holmes 1882, 8). Purchasing, however, was not completely restricted to locals. One of the purchasers, Col. Thomas Rookeby (26B), can be traced to Cottingham, a village in East Yorkshire near Hull (Binns 2004, 210), and he also had military connections with Hull (Wildridge 1887, 46-7). Rookeby was heavily involved in land and materials speculation with other officers, including the purchase of the manor of Richmond, Surrey (Gentles 1973, 625-6). The activities of Rookeby, Sir Edward Rhodes, Major Lambert, Hawkesworth, and numerous others like them highlights how prevalent it was for military men to capitalise on their war connections in order to exploit new developments to their own advantage.

As with lead, the question of what happened to the castle timber is important. Unlike the castle lead, much of the castle timber can be traced to local use. Two entries in particular tie sold timber to local building projects, although it is unclear who paid for the timber in these transactions. This includes the church timber which has already been mentioned (60B), as well as timber earmarked for the local wind mill (61B). In addition, Leonard Ward, Zachary Stable, and Richard Lyle, all local purchasers, were given responsibility for overseeing the rebuilding of the Vicarage house (Holmes 1882, 36) and it is possible some or all of their purchases might have gone towards this endeavour. This local purchasing power seems to have been spread across a motley group of characters and was not simply confined to the usual prominent suspects. Richard Turner (51B), for example, antagonised his neighbours by sowing on common land and was ordered to pay a fine for the transgression (Holmes 1882, 22). Philip Austwicke (36B) was almost certainly a member of the staunchly Royalist (and local) Austwicke clan: Alderman Thomas Austwicke helped defend the castle during the 1644 siege, and his son Allan was denied clemency during the third siege but escaped capture and fled (Holmes 1882, 86). Another individual with possible Royalist connections was Zachary Stable (44B), whose relation Nicholas Stable was a former mayor and one of the aldermen deprived before 1650 (Holmes 1882, 9). Another small but significant group of local purchasers were those involved in the labour of dismantling the castle. This includes Francis Bradley, who not only purchased timber (43B), but was also paid by the trustees 'for crows making and shovels shoeing' (30A). Purchaser Richard Lyle (40B) was also paid 'for the Loan of his Beam and Weights for weighing of Lead'

(38A). All of this demonstrates that the timber ‘market’ was much more complex, local, and ‘open’ than the one for metals, and that participation in the purchases was spread much more democratically throughout wider strata of Pontefract society.

Military involvement in the purchase of Pontefract timber cannot be completely discounted, however. Col. Richard Overton, who purchased castle iron for Hull (25B), also obtained a substantial amount of timber ‘for the Publick Service of Hull’ (68B). Timber was especially needed as ‘thirty score yards (600 yds–548 m) of woodwork betwixt the jetty and the lime kilns have been stubbed and carried away by the soldiers for firing’ (cited in Howes and Foreman 1999, 42). Overton was authorised £2,000 for repairs, and in 1650 or 1651 wood was used to repair the South Blockhouse at Hull (Howes and Foreman 1999, 42). This military use of Pontefract timber is important, but the limited reach of this involvement should be emphasised. Despite the recognised importance of Hull as a garrison, the Hull timber only constituted the tenth largest purchase: £8 6s compared to the frontrunner Mr. Leonard Ward’s £23. Considering the extent of the garrison’s needs, it seems unlikely that Overton obtained all the timber he needed. One explanation is that he was limited to serviceable pieces of timber that were suitable for use in Hull’s defences, thereby reducing the amount of timber he could buy. He would also have been hampered in this by prior sales to locals, many of whom no doubt used their family connections and status to obtain ‘first pick’. This serves as a reminder that however influential military interests could be, they could also be constrained by the actions of powerful local interests.

An important part of the timber revenue section is the timber debt section. This section is made up of entries 67B-81B and records the names of the individual debtors who collectively owe the £42 4s 2d outstanding. It is worth mentioning that some of the debtors (although by no means all) appear in the ‘money received’ list for timber (26B-65B), albeit in various forms. Thomas Jackson, for example, is listed as a debtor in his own right for £4 1s 6d (72B), and is also listed as a joint debtor with Thomas Farrowe for £3 5s (71B). In the ‘money received’ list, however, he is recorded as purchasing £1 under his own name (48B), as well as £6 15s jointly with *Robert Farrowe* (46B), not *Thomas Farrowe* as recorded in the debtor list. Several

conclusions can be drawn from this. The first is that the ‘money received’ list reflects sales that were conducted with immediate full payments, conducted with partial or ‘down’ payments, or else reflect sales that were paid before this portion of the accounts was written on May 7, 1649. This would mean that Thomas Jackson’s debt for £4 1s 6d (72B) might be related to either of his previous purchases, or else it (and his debt with Thomas Farrowe) might reflect *later* and therefore completely unrelated and additional purchases. This is certainly the case with the majority of the debtor names, as most of them do not appear at all in the ‘money received’ list.

The substantial size of the debtor list provides an interesting view into the world of seventeenth century credit and debt, particularly regarding relationships between purchasers. Spufford (2000, 216) has argued that most debts during this time were oral in origin and probably informal agreements between interested parties, and the complexity of the Pontefract arrangements would seem to support this. For example, entry 69B lists as a debtor ‘George Wrigley by Assignment from John Potter’, the latter being one of the top timber purchasers in terms of money spent (Table 7.8). Furthermore, joint debt and multiple purchases raise the question of how much timber was being utilised for local, personal use, and how much was purchased with intent to resell. It is unlikely that the latter would have been attempted without the existence—and awareness—of a network of potential buyers. The existence of such a ‘timber market’ would not be out of place in an age that placed an enormous value on the re-use of materials (Woodward 1985), and those in a position to tap into this ‘market’ through timber speculating would no doubt have chosen to do so.

7.5 Conclusion

In 1660, Major-General Thomas Harrison, defending his regicidal activities, argued that the King’s execution ‘was not a Thing done in a Corner’ (Ridley 1976, 143). The same could be said of the dismantling of Pontefract Castle. From committee level right down to labourer, every aspect of the destruction was organised, managed, and executed with a dispassionate air of judicial and legal authority. This moral certainty allowed both trustees and their families to fully participate in the purchase of castle materials, often involving substantially larger purchases than their non-trustee counterparts. Moreover, the financial opportunity afforded by Pontefract’s

demolition appears to have been exploited by a wide variety of individuals from within the local community and beyond, illustrating that the dismantling was not simply a 'local' event but had repercussions beyond the local community. Although the moral justification for destruction was presented as a simple thing, how it manifested itself in terms of profit was not.

The actual mechanics of organising and carrying out destruction were shown to be equally complex. This occurred at two levels. The first was an administrative level that included preparatory work such as drawing up contracts and soliciting workers, and extended to the organisation of labour and the workers. The use of 'work gangs' and contracted labour suggests that even among workers there was a hierarchy, thereby making Pontefract's dismantling a structured and organised affair that was tightly controlled. At a more physical level, the division of labour by building material, as well as the use of support labour, shows the range of skills needed in order to destroy the castle. Much of this labour was 'front line', and suggestions of pay negotiations and problems with safety illustrate how difficult the conditions probably were. However, the accounts also reveal the wider labour infrastructure that provided crucial support in the form of making tools, levelling earth, surveying and guarding materials, and other necessary but less high profile tasks.

The removal and resale of castle materials opens up new questions about contemporary attitudes to second-hand building materials. Many of these centre around the development of possible timber and lead 'markets', and how networks were established and manipulated in order to sell materials on at a profit. One strong remaining question is why the accounts fail to record revenue from stone. In terms of profit/loss, stone-related labour comprised the overwhelming bulk of labour expenditure, and yet resulted in zero recorded profit. One possible scenario is that the stone was not being systematically removed and saved (secondary damage), but rather was being jettisoned from above (primary damage), with only metals, glass, and timber removed for sale. This seems unlikely considering that glass only brought a paltry £1 to the coffers, and yet was still painstakingly salvaged, sold, and recorded. If even unprofitable glass was salvaged, it seems strange that stone was not similarly treated. One argument put forward is that stone *was* being carefully

retrieved and constituted partial payment to some of the labourers, but was never recorded in any official capacity (Roberts 2002, 422). This interpretation of thorough removal is consistent with the two-year dismantling time period that has been proposed for the castle (Roberts 2002, 422), but does not seem entirely satisfactory. First, the accounts are almost unfailingly meticulous in the details they record, and the deliberate exclusion of a stone payment arrangement seems uncharacteristic when this thoroughness is considered. Second, the likelihood of large amounts of stone being of use to most of the labourers seems remote. Their willingness to accept castle stone would have been directly tied to its usefulness, and unless it had market value or could be used towards a new-build project nearby, this would seem unlikely. A more probable explanation than partial payment to labourers is that the stone was donated for rebuilding projects to replace houses destroyed by both sides in the sieges. This initial removal would have been augmented by more piecemeal and opportunistic removals as community needs and desires changed. In this case, the castle might have experienced phased dismantling: secondary damage in areas with better quality (and therefore more usable) ashlar, and primary damage of structural masses with less suitable material for building projects.

This lack of understanding about demolitions and its relationship with materials, credit, debt, and 'market' speculating goes deeper to other broader problems. The first is our inability to see dismantling as a series of specific and complex actions. This inability is the product of a standard discourse that presents demolition as a largely unskilled activity: in other words, it takes knowledge and expertise to *create* a building, but anyone can destroy one. The labour accounts clearly indicate that this was not the case, and easily demonstrate that just like castle construction, castle *destruction* required varying degrees of skilled and unskilled labour. It also illustrates how little attention has been given not just to demolition practices in particular, but to early modern buildings labour in general. Medieval construction labour has been covered in depth (Salzman 1952; Andrews 1974; Harvey 1975), but this coverage does not extend into later periods. The tacit assumption, therefore, is that organisation and execution did not change much in the post-medieval period. The demands of dismantling, combined with the instability that intermittent warfare tended to inflict on regions and trades, make this extremely unlikely. Unfortunately,

this area of research continues to be ignored in favour of scholarship that focuses on the primacy of architectural design and the ‘great names’ of the seventeenth (and particularly eighteenth) century architecture. Such attitudes emphasise the post-medieval men who designed great buildings rather than the men who constructed them—or in this case, the men who took them apart.

Overall, a fresh interpretation of the dismantling and sale of Pontefract Castle’s materials has forced us to reconsider how we ‘think’ about castle demolition and community involvement. The ‘dry facts’ of what was removed and who bought it represent much larger—and hitherto invisible—issues related to labour conditions, social networking, financial systems of credit and debt, and ‘outsider’ participation in the demolition. It could also be argued that Pontefract demonstrates the fallacy of a monolithic ‘local community’ that rose up against a ‘hated symbol of oppression’ and reclaimed the building materials for ‘local’ use. Quite clearly, outside influences helped instigate, shape, and profit from the destruction, and even ‘local’ purchases were demonstrably limited to those with influence, means, and connections. For too many in the local community, the reality of destruction probably consisted of losing a higher paying job to a more skilled outsider, and watching the more ‘well affected’—current and former mayors, aldermen, and military officers from far away—profit from the dangerous labour of others.

Chapter Eight

Conclusion:

Putting the Pieces Together

'The interest of a ruin rarely lies in its reality'.

(Woodward 2002, 135)

8.1 Putting the pieces together: The methodological implications

This thesis began with the central proposition that castle destruction was a complex phenomenon with a multitude of causes, and that simple military and economic explanations failed to consider a broad spectrum of evidence that revealed a much more complicated picture. Chapter One argued that these explanations comprised the backbone of a limited and undeveloped slighting discourse, one that has increasingly stifled debate within the historical community—and by extension—archaeologists dealing with the historic period. The reasons for this discourse were diverse, but arguably stemmed from Whig notions of ‘progress’ that still surface in English Civil War scholarship (see Hutton and Reeves 1998; Newman *et al.* 2001; Johnson 2002, 173). Consequently, slighting was shown to be predominantly viewed as an unfortunate but necessary step in Britain’s ideological evolution from a feudal past to a more democratic and less authoritarian state. Working in tandem with this view was the implicit and unchallenged assertion that contemporary documents—particularly Parliamentary records—are the primary or even sole evidence source for understanding slighting. As Chapter One neatly argued, slighting has already been ‘explained’, and the potential of archaeology to offer alternative explanations remained largely untapped and overlooked.

Chapter Two tested this premise by first examining the basis for which these claims were made: the documentary record. Two claims in particular were examined—that ‘inland’ castles and castles from the Second Civil War were treated more harshly—and the resulting analysis revealed a far more complex picture. It showed that the greatest level of expressed interest in slighting took place before the Second Civil War, and moreover, that hitherto unrecognised regional patterns were emerging which suggested that it was the locality of a castle that mattered more than its participation in

later conflict. This importance of locality, however, did not reflect a strong coastal/inland division but instead appeared to be county specific. This suggested that other causal factors—currently unexamined—might be responsible, and highlighted gaps in our current knowledge that deserved further exploration.

At a methodological level, Chapter Two also exposed some of the fundamental limitations of an approach that relies exclusively on contemporary documents. The most basic was that documentary/Parliamentary sources inform about the *national rhetoric* of slighting, but largely fail to reveal details of how or even if slighting was executed at a local level. This approach also excludes sites that were slighted by Royalists, as well as castles and manor houses which were destroyed early on and therefore were never ‘legislated’ for. Perhaps most crucially of all, it de-personalises the destruction and does not convey the human element of how slighting impacted and affected those caught up in it.

To tackle these issues, the main objective of Chapter Three was the creation of a new methodological approach that addressed the deficiencies of the old. The wholesale dismissal of the use of documents was categorically rejected, and it was fundamentally recognised that text and material culture can be used organically depending on their relative strengths: sometimes to contradict or complement each other, sometimes to provide context or debunk the claims of the other, and often as a starting point from which to test hypotheses (Little 1994, 14). From this theoretical wellspring, an argument was constructed for a methodology that incorporated the best aspects of documentary evidence with an increased attention to the destruction deposited in the archaeological record. The starting point for the latter was first the identification of all the methods available to contemporaries, and second, an assessment of how these methods were implemented at a practical level. These included issues such as who was likely to have carried it out, what tools they used, what kind of specialist knowledge might have been required, and the logistics of how each method actually ‘worked’.

This emphasis on the processes of destruction necessitated what has become one of the dominant themes of this thesis: that no comprehensive understanding of slighting

is possible without major collaborative efforts with a variety of disciplines and specialist practitioners. This included—but was not limited to—contributions from such diverse subject areas as structural and explosives engineering, arson investigation, carpentry, stonemasonry, and metalsmithing, among others. Specialist input of this kind has resulted in a far more nuanced and holistic understanding of the destruction methods contemporaries would have used.

Before engaging with the physical evidence for slighting, the problematic nature of the current condition of this evidence had to be acknowledged. The second half of Chapter Three outlined the various phenomena that have contributed to this degradation of evidence and which complicate any attempts to understand how or if slighting took place. These included issues such as poor initial construction, siege damage, post-war demolition or alterations, destructive conservation practices, and natural decay, to name but a few. In highlighting these challenges, it was argued that an awareness of how they manifest themselves can help identify slighting evidence, and equally, counteract erroneous claims that slighting has taken place.

Chapters Four and Five represent the core of this thesis. Their primary objective was to ‘de-mystify’ destruction and break it down into its component parts, extracting the key characteristics of certain methods in the process. In Chapter Four a crucial element of this was the establishment of a picking typology with three categories (primary, secondary, and indeterminate), each of which was based on the underlying motivations behind the act, as well as the quality of the evidence left behind. It was argued that in many cases this motivation can be detected from the evidence, and that differentiating these forms helps us understand the larger objectives for destroying the site. The typology demonstrated how this could be achieved by showing how manifestations of destruction vary, and why motivation is the primary cause. Destruction caused by the removal of timber from a wall, for example, displayed marked differences to walls that had been planed in height, in large part because the reasons behind both were fundamentally different.

Chapter Five utilised the same methodological approach in regard to undermining. It postulated that gunpowder was but one factor among several, and demonstrated that

structural weaknesses like voids and straight joints often played the key role in how a structure reacted to stress. These weak points were identified in the form of windows, fireplaces, corners, curves, and arrow slits, to name but a few, and were shown to have caused a significant amount of damage by dictating where points of separation occurred within a wall. It was argued that this was not fortunate coincidence, but that seventeenth century engineers exploited these weaknesses by deliberately incorporating them into their undermining operations.

These two lynchpin chapters developed several fundamental conclusions. The first was that a systematic analysis of the documentary, archaeological, and structural evidence for slighting reveals striking patterns, and moreover, that these patterns are not mindless or randomly distributed but result from a variety of logistical, physical, and social factors. For example, walls cracking along weak points and ‘follow on’ stone retrieval patterns occur the way they do because the logistics of gravity and the act of prying out masonry dictates that these events will be borne out in the easiest way that requires the least amount of effort. This simple interpretation becomes considerably more problematic when applied to more complex structural or human actions, and the reasons for this can be difficult to identify or explain. A failure on our part to detect these underlying causes, however, should not be mistaken for a lack of existence on theirs.

A second major point to emerge was the complexity of both methods, and the vast amount of knowledge, discipline, and effort that each required. For example, walls dismantled or undermined incorrectly risked premature or unintentional collapse. Poor techniques or a lack of proper planning might cause unnecessary damage to materials or cut off access to higher floors—or in the case of undermining—potentially vital escape routes. Scaffolding, ropes, timber props, picking utensils, wheelbarrows, and other such implements all had to be gathered and used by individuals with enough knowledge to safely execute the specific task to hand. As more of these complex layers emerged, the exploration of how these factors were negotiated by those involved became the dominant theme thereafter, and much of the rest of the thesis centred on fleshing out these nuances.

A third and crucial argument that these methodology chapters drew together was the overwhelming importance of a multi-disciplinary, flexible approach. The need for this was first proposed in Chapter Three, but was not fully developed until the methodology chapters established how it could be applied. A good example of this was how indeterminate damage—a largely fluid concept that is characterised by an absence of evidence—can still provide fresh perspectives and important clues about the past history of a site. For that reason, it was argued that a lack of evidence can still be evidence, albeit evidence of a problematic nature whose limitations must be acknowledged. A similar argument was employed in Chapter Five regarding castle sites where the cause of structural damage was difficult to determine. In such cases, an evidence-based interpretative approach that offered multiple possible explanations was ideal, particularly as it has the advantage of allowing room for critical debate.

This flexible approach was aptly demonstrated in Chapter Six by an examination of the destruction of Kenilworth Castle. A confused narrative about the damaged north wall of the keep had failed to satisfactorily explain the origin of the destruction, and after a measured, multi-disciplinary assessment, two alternative explanations were proposed. The first was that the wall was picked by hand, and the supplementary issues associated with this were highlighted and considered. This was contrasted with the second scenario, that the wall was undermined, and the merits for this argument were debated with equal vigour. The objective, of course, was not to try and ‘prove’ how the wall was destroyed, but to illustrate that in many cases the expectation that the ‘right’ answer is discernable will never be realised. Therefore, the burden of proof does not necessarily require an argument with conclusive evidence, but instead demands a choice between multiple explanations of varying degrees of feasibility. The example of Kenilworth Castle Keep serves as a poignant reminder that simple or pat explanations for the causes of destruction are not as productive as limited, but still insightful, evidence-based assessments.

Here, too, the benefits of a holistic, multi-disciplinary approach have been clearly demonstrated. In particular, the contribution of structural engineers, stone masons, carpenters, and other specialists was a crucial element in piecing together how picking and undermining might have manifested at Kenilworth. This valuable input ranged

from the identification of construction weak points to an understanding of how windows, plinths, arches, and other features affect the overall stability of a structure. This was supplemented by an awareness that site clearances, past conservation attempts, and natural collapse might all have altered the structural and archaeological evidence left by the keep's north wall.

Kenilworth Castle also provided an opportunity to shift the focus of the thesis from the establishment of a methodological process to an exploration of some of the deeper social themes of destruction. The argument that the identities of owners had a profound impact on the character of a castle (Johnson 2002) was readily adopted for this thesis and was suitably updated to fit a slighting context. This involved an examination of the main beneficiary of the castle's destruction, Joseph Hawkesworth, and an exploration of how his involvement in the purchase of Kenilworth—as well as Tutbury Castle—is representative of the opportunities for social advancement that war provided to certain military personnel. In the case of Hawkesworth, this advancement was clearly expressed not just by ownership, but through a deliberate manipulation of the castle's existing symbols. The appropriation of material culture linked to the Earl of Leicester, its strategic placement throughout Hawkesworth's new 'castle', and the spatial relationship between his residence and the destroyed keep are all indicative of the messages that Hawkesworth was sending to his audiences. These messages were largely about power and social status, and clearly expressed that the former steward of Warwick Castle was now a man to be respected and looked up to.

On an even broader scale, Chapter Six has raised questions about the extent and complexity of these messages. Its predominant focus was on the private role individuals played, mainly through the changes implemented by Joseph Hawkesworth, but wider social themes were also hinted at. For example, sections of the local community had a direct and constant visual reminder of the ruined keep, and how this affected their opinion of Hawkesworth or the castle is worth further exploration. Moreover, destructive changes to the appearance of the castle in the form of the draining of the moat, the destruction of woodlands, and the segmenting of the land for habitation and/or agricultural purposes were possibly as dramatic and profound as the

destruction of Kenilworth's buildings. How the local community reacted to or participated in these changes would also be a fruitful line of inquiry.

In Chapter Seven, these wider social elements of slighting were explored through the context of the dismantling of Pontefract Castle. Here, the emphasis was not on the minutia of destruction at a structural level, but rather on the circumstances surrounding the removal and acquisition of materials. The organisation of slighting operations was shown to be incredibly complex and multi-faceted, highlighting issues such as the compartmentalisation and outsourcing of labour, safety conditions, and legal protocol. It is these multi-dimensional aspects that suggest that a castle's 'demise' had a profound impact on those caught up in it, particularly for those called upon to provide the labour for it.

This impact appears to have equally affected those organising the labour, albeit in a less physically direct way. One of the strongest factors to emerge was the extent of their financial involvement in the sale of materials. Just as Kenilworth revealed how a military man could privately profit from a castle destroyed for 'the public good', Pontefract demonstrated that civic bodies were also not averse to capitalising on the opportunities provided by their administrative roles. This blurred line between personal profit and execution of duty is an interesting one and raises questions about the nature of their actions. In particular, it raises the possibility that helping one's community and helping oneself in the process were not mutually incompatible.

Perhaps even more significantly, the effects of Pontefract's demolition were shown to ripple beyond the immediate community and displayed a regional and even international context that was hitherto unrecognised. This was clear from the purchase of materials by individuals from other towns and Ridings, and in the eventual sale of Pontefract lead to Dutch merchants (Roberts 2002, 422). Several of these purchases were made by Parliamentarian officers with direct military links to the castle and no known ties to the town. This contradicts the popular narrative of materials being removed and used by 'locals' and instead suggests that a castle's dismantling was a potential windfall for outsiders with enough money and the right connections. Pontefract also reveals the complex arrangements for credit and debt that existed

during this period, and hints at the existence of an extensive market for materials. The prosecution of a lead debtor's widow years after his purchase, as well as numerous 'joint' purchases serves to illustrate that materials speculation was as much about bonds of trust and establishing business connections as it was about obtaining materials.

On a broad scale, this thesis has illustrated the many problems in the current discourse about Civil War slightings. It has demonstrated that orders like 'make untenable' varied considerably in terms of how they were executed, as did the buildings selected for destruction, the scale of the damage, and the individuals who participated and profited. Attention has also been drawn to the methodological complexity of destruction, and this in turn was shown to be a valuable tool in understanding the differing motivations behind individual acts of destruction. If the pun may be forgiven, this thesis has 'picked holes' in the castle narratives on offer and revealed their claims to be too unsubstantial or unsupported to justify the continued, blind acceptance of them.

8.2 Future directions

It could be argued that a thesis is more of a beginning than an end, and at a fundamental level this thesis has asked more questions than it has answered. This strategy, however, was a conscious one and was employed to highlight the pressing need for debate and criticism. It has sought to establish a methodological approach that can be tested, challenged, and built upon through the further use of case studies and more specialist input. In short, it has attempted to serve as a call to arms for new approaches and different research agendas from those engaging with destroyed buildings or landscapes.

Many of these potential new areas of research will directly build upon our understanding of slighting in the English Civil War. The recording of rubble and its distribution at sites such as Corfe and Helmsley, for example, could provide important details about how walls fracture and also about the trajectory of their fall. Collaborative research involving other disciplines is crucial in this and would help build a more nuanced typology of the variety of ways different methods can manifest

in the archaeological record. This is only achievable through individual castle destruction surveys which would expand our knowledge of regional and national destruction trends, as well as provide a much needed local perspective on how slighting affected the communities that were involved. A preliminary examination suggests these effects were numerous and varied, and this will no doubt be borne out as more documentary and archaeological research on the subject is accumulated. Despite the argument that the true extent of destroyed castles can never be quantified (Thompson 1987b, 211), enough evidence survives in the archaeological and documentary records to make the establishment of a slighting database one of the pressing research objectives for upcoming work on slighted castles.

This endeavour will be assisted by the long-term expansion of our definitions, criteria, and concepts about what constitutes slighting, and by further comparisons with the destruction of similar types of material culture. In particular, comparisons to the destruction of monasteries and abbeys in the Dissolution—especially regarding the techniques, symbolism, and effects of destruction—would undoubtedly prove useful, as would further survey work focusing exclusively on the slighting of landscapes, castle furnishings, fortified religious buildings, and other building types. One exciting area of current work being conducted is the destruction of towns in the English Civil War (Mabbitt forthcoming¹), and it will be interesting to see how an archaeological approach to the subject sits in relation to the historical narrative provided by Porter (1994).

Other research directions will involve the participation of the heritage community, both in the protection of sites of destruction and the dissemination of slighting information to the public. While the Register of Battlefields offers a nominal amount of protection to battlefield sites, the protection status conferred to slighted buildings and their immediate landscape is far more unevenly applied. This criticism has largely stemmed from the battlefields archaeology community (see Foard 2001 for a synthesis), who argue among other things that protection for siege sites, for example, often does not extend beyond the fabric of the buildings themselves, and that some sites, such as Grafton Regis and Boarstall, are not even scheduled (Foard 2001, 100).

¹ John Mabbitt, unpublished doctoral work being undertaken at the University of Newcastle.

This state of affairs has significant ramifications for the study of slighting as slighting evidence can often be scattered some distance from the targeted buildings and is therefore vulnerable to removal and/or further destruction; more generally, however, it has also had a detrimental impact on the much broader study of destruction (particularly siege destruction) due to the loss of valuable archaeological evidence through development, lack of protection or recording, and unchecked metal detecting (*ibid*). One proposal that has been advocated by the battlefields archaeology community is a comparable Register of Siege Sites (see Foard 2001, 100-2) in order to protect areas beyond the fabric of the castle. Such an endeavour could have important implications for conservators, local planning authorities, and other interested stakeholders, and Civil War destruction research would be able to assist in this endeavour.

Another problem facing the heritage community is the relatively poor standards of presentation when it comes to slighting information (Rakoczy and Waterton in preparation). Details can be poorly expressed and misleading, if they are expressed at all. A notable example that has already been discussed is the current inadequate presentation of Scarborough Castle's destroyed keep (see Section 5.5.1 in Chapter Five; Figure 5.66). Cawood Castle (Yorkshire) has a similar problem, with the current information panel making no mention of the fact that the castle was garrisoned, besieged, and ordered to be slighted by Parliament. This kind of signage is prevalent and reveals the existence of a deeper, institutional problem on the part of heritage bodies. Specifically, it displays a lack of interest in or prioritisation of slighting as an important phenomenon, resulting in inadequate or even false information being presented to the public. It is worth noting that in the case of Cawood, the community—through the Cawood Castle Garth Group—has not remained passive but is actively working to change the current signage to shift the focus to what they find significant about the site². Although not related to the Civil War, equally encouraging evidence of community involvement can be found in Caithness where prehistoric brochs and cairns have been built—and demolished—by locals in order to better understand the processes that destroy such structures (Sanderson 2007, 38-41). Examples like these illustrate that the public have a wider interest in how and why the

² Recorded by Dr. Emma Waterton, Keele University, in an interview with the Cawood Castle Garth Group and Dawn Shelford from Local Heritage Initiative (LHI).

buildings in their community came to be destroyed, and that destruction in the past should not be completely divorced from its current impact on communities today.

In demonstrating that Civil War slighting is a more complex phenomenon than has been generally acknowledged, this thesis has—on a much broader level—made a case for understanding the complexities of destruction in all contexts. In its bare essence this is an archaeology of destruction, one that seeks to understand how destructive acts were carried out and how communities might have negotiated and weathered these changes. This has been done here through the context of castles in the English Civil War, but the core principles can be applied to material culture of all types, from destruction committed by ancient cultures to communities targeted for destruction in recent military conflicts. Each will differ in cultural nuances, and the individual circumstances of how and why it was carried out will undoubtedly vary, but the methodological and ideological issues they share are obvious when viewed without the constraints of arbitrary divisions by academic discipline, geography, or time (Rakoczy and Trustram Eve in preparation).

This call for an archaeology of destruction takes as its basic tenet the idea that a building's worth is not confined to its aesthetic merits or the rareness of its architecture. It argues that a structure or feature has educational value not just because of its *construction* and *use*, but also because the destruction of castles, abbeys, town walls, landscapes, and other creations tells us just as much about contemporary priorities as the *construction* of those sites told us about their forebears. In short, destruction must not be reduced to just 'facts', but must be explored in all its richness and complexity:

'The urban landscape is not composed of only functional or solid entities. Its history cannot be depopulated. Part of the story consists of personal experiences, transient sounds and smells as well as sights...The townscape is an ideological as well as built environment, carrying iconographic and mythological significance. It is a disputed terrain, fought over from political, economic, and social causes and for metaphysical reasons'

(Waller 2000, 11).

The dispute over this terrain has a long way to go, but is well worth the fight.

Chapter Two
Patterns:
Slighting Distributions of the Civil War
IMAGES (Originals in colour)



Figure 2.1 Map of areas discussed in thesis (San Jack Media).



Figure 2.2 Map showing territorial control of both sides in Spring 1643 (San Jack Media after Gaunt 2003).



Figure 2.3 Map showing territorial control of both sides in Autumn 1644 (San Jack Media after Gaunt 2003).



Figure 2.4 Map showing territorial control of both sides in Autumn 1645 (San Jack Media after Gaunt 2003).




Figure 2.5 Geographical distribution for proposed or ordered slights in Thompson's gazetteer, 1642-1660 (Malaws/Rakoczy).

Chapter Three
**Methods and Methodologies:
Understanding slighting then and now**
IMAGES (Originals in colour)



Figure 3.1 Explosion damage pattern in Gatehouse at Newark Castle (Nottinghamshire) as defined by its cratered out shape and highlighted by extensive Victorian restoration.



Figure 3.2 Wall at St. Mary's Abbey (York) showing fire damage *in situ*, as well as new ashlar blocks.



Figure 3.3 Extensive reddening and surface degradation of fire damaged wall, St. Mary's Abbey.



Figure 3.4 Porch area of Hopton Castle with alleged fire damage in upper left area of entranceway.



Figure 3.5 Close-up of fire damage area, Hopton Castle.



Figure 3.6 Panelling nailed into the wall at Allerton Castle, showing the air space that fed the fire.



Figure 3.7 Fire damaged stone from Allerton Castle, showing signs of surface reddening.



Figure 3.8 Fire damaged tile with melted drops of lead attached (Allerton Castle).




Figure 3.9 Close-up of fire damaged tile with melted drops of lead attached (Allerton Castle).



Figure 3.10 Melted lump of lead found onsite after the fire (Allerton Castle).



Figure 3.11 Roofing timber beams still *in situ*, showing signs of surface charring (Allerton Castle).



Figure 3.12 West side of keep, showing a small fire damage pattern low to the ground (Knaresborough Castle).



Figure 3.13 Close-up of the Knaresborough keep damage pattern, showing the twin bore holes on either side of the centre crack.



Figure 3.14 External wall of Skenrith Castle (Wales) showing robbed out lower half.



Figure 3.15 South Wingfield Manor, showing its current partial use as a working farm (photo courtesy of English Heritage).



Figure 3.16 Two illustrations from 1848 of Clitheroe Castle Keep showing how the structure looked before conservation, and how the artist thought it would look post-conservation (Best 1990).



Figure 3.17 Interior of Clitheroe Castle Keep, showing use of cement in past conservation work.

Chapter Four
**‘Picking Apart’ Slighting:
Evidence for damaging a castle by hand**
IMAGES (Originals in colour)



Figure 4.1 The Outer Gate of Skipton Castle, with re-built upper half.



Figure 4.2 Close-up of the left turret of the Outer Gate, Skipton Castle, detailing pre- and post-slighting construction.




Figure 4.3 The outside of the watchtower, Skipton Castle, with the larger windows and different stonework of the re-build visible in the upper courses.



Figure 4.4 The interior of the watchtower, middle floor, Skipton Castle. Lower half shows the original medieval wall thickness, while the upper half is Lady Anne Clifford's rebuild.



Figure 4.5 Close-up of the wall junction between pre and post slighting building phases, Skipton Castle.



Knaresborough Castle Site Layout

Figure 4.6 Site map of Knaresborough Castle (San Jack Media after Kershaw 1998, 9).




Figure 4.7 Aerial view of Knaresborough Castle (San Jack Media after Kershaw 1998, 4).



Figure 4.8 Gatehouse towers of Knaresborough Castle, G1 (left) and G2 (right).



Figure 4.9 Close-up of base of G2.



Figure 4.10 Back view of G2 (left) and G1 (right).



Figure 4.11 G1 with portcullis groove and putlog holes.



Figure 4.12 G2 with portcullis groove and putlog holes.



Figure 4.13 Outside view of G2.



Figure 4.14 T2 (left) and T1 (right), with modern wall and war memorial just beyond.



Figure 4.15 T1 showing weathering damage and replaced ashlar.




Figure 4.16 T2 showing weathering damage and replaced ashlar.



Figure 4.17 Side view of T1, looking east.



Figure 4.18 Back view of T1.




Figure 4.19 Side view of T1, looking west.



Figure 4.20 Plinth of T1, looking east.



Figure 4.21 Plinth of T1, looking west.



Figure 4.22 Front view of T2, looking north



Figure 4.23 Side view of T2, looking east.



Figure 4.24 Side view of T2, looking west.



Figure 4.25 Back view of T2.



Figure 4.26 Clockwise from left: ashlar with claw tooling, architectural fragment with chamfered moulding, and a nook shaft from a window or door, all located in the rubble core of T2.



Figure 4.27 Steep incline of cliffside along T2 and T1.



Figure 4.28 Cliffside west of the keep, overlooking the River Nidd.



Figure 4.29 View from the castle, looking northwest.



Figure 4.30 Heraldic panel above entrance through the Cross Range, South Wingfield Manor (photo courtesy of English Heritage).



Figure 4.31 Southern exterior of Cross Range, South Wingfield Manor, with heraldic panel above arch (photo courtesy of English Heritage).



Figure 4.32 Cawood Castle Gatehouse and (inset) and its surviving shields.




Figure 4.33 Garrison Gate, Basing House, and (inset) its surviving shield.



Figure 4.34 Peveril Castle Keep, looking south, showing the scale of secondary damage.



Figure 4.35 Peveril Castle Keep, looking southeast, showing the scale of secondary damage.



Figure 4.36 Peveril Castle Keep, looking east, showing the scale of secondary damage.



Figure 4.37 The southern corner of Peveril Castle Keep, showing how the inaccessible side of the castle has retained its facing stone.



Figure 4.38 Secondary damage at Peveril Castle in the form of removed Quoins.



Figure 4.39 *Left*: Damaged curtain wall at Basing House. *Right*: House built from castle brick in Old Basing.



Figure 4.40 Possible robbing pattern at Raglan Castle (Wales).



Figure 4.41 Secondary damage pattern in the form of removed facing stone at Middleham Castle (Yorkshire).




Figure 4.42 The corbel placements in the lower hall, Harewood Castle (Yorkshire) (view 1).




Figure 4.43 The corbel placements in the lower hall, Harewood Castle (Yorkshire) (view 2).




Figure 4.44 Joist hole placements in the buttery, Raglan Castle (Wales) (view 1).



Figure 4.45 Joist hole placements in the buttery, Raglan Castle (Wales) (view 2).




Figure 4.46 Interpretation panel at Knaresborough Castle showing a demolition flue to melt lead.



Figure 4.47 Surviving fireplaces at South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) (photo courtesy of English Heritage).



Figure 4.48 Panelling and chimneypiece at Badminton House (Gloucestershire), formerly in Raglan Castle (Wales) (Kenyon 1988).



Figure 4.49 Removed fireplaces from the apartments block, Raglan Castle (Wales).



Figure 4.50 Removed fireplace from the Lower Hall, Harewood Castle (Yorkshire).



Figure 4.51 Removed fireplace from the Great Hall, Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire).



Figure 4.52 Remnants of a fireplace still *in situ* in the Long Gallery, Raglan Castle (Wales).



Figure 4.53 Garden wall ‘fireplace’ located in the village of South Wingfield, Derbyshire.



Figure 4.54 Close-up of ‘fireplace’ showing angle roll mouldings and geological difference of stones.



Figure 4.55 The Pitched Stone Court at Raglan Castle (Wales), showing secondary damage of a possible removed high status object (Kenyon 1988).



Figure 4.56 Close-up of secondary damage in Pitched Stone Court at Raglan Castle (Wales).




Figure 4.57 Fountain Court of Raglan Castle (Wales) with the Grand Stair entrance in inset.



Figure 4.58 The Grand Stair leading to the apartments in the Fountain Court, with areas of secondary damage and various features numbered.



Figure 4.59 The doorway from the courtyard to Great Hall staircase at Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire).



Figure 4.60 View from the Great Hall staircase of secondary damage pattern at Old Wardour Castle (Wiltshire).



Figure 4.61 Close-up of secondary damage pattern across from the Great Hall staircase at Old Wardour (Wiltshire).



Figure 4.62 Pair of shell-headed seats next to the main entrance at Old Wardour (Wiltshire) (Davison 1999, 6).

Chapter Five
**‘Undermining Arguments’:
Evidence for damaging a castle by collapse
IMAGES (Originals in colour)**




Figure 5.1 Corfe Castle (Dorest), illustrating both its pre- and post-slighting states (after The National Trust 2003).



Figure 5.2 The exterior of the Outer Gatehouse of Corfe Castle [13], looking north.



Figure 5.3 Interior of the Outer Gatehouse [13], looking south. Debris to the right.



Figure 5.4 Close-up of the exterior archway of the Outer Gatehouse [13], looking north.



Figure 5.5 The eastern half of the Outer Gatehouse [13] and Horseshoe Tower [12], looking northeast. Vegetation covered debris to right.



Figure 5.6 The western half of the Outer Gatehouse [13] and the First Tower [1], looking northwest.



Figure 5.7 The southwestern curtain wall and towers, showing the First Tower [1], the Second Tower [2], and the Third Tower [3].



Figure 5.8 The First Tower [1], looking south.



Figure 5.9 The First Tower [1] and vegetation covered castle debris, looking up and east.



Figure 5.10 The Second Tower [2] and curtain wall in foreground, looking north (view 1).



Figure 5.11 The Second Tower [2] and curtain wall to right, looking north (view 2).



Figure 5.12 The Second Tower [2], looking up and east.



Figure 5.13 Overturned section of curtain wall on southwest side.



Figure 5.14 Masonry debris from southwest curtain, located at bottom of hillside.



Figure 5.15 Masonry debris from southwest curtain, located on side of hill.



Figure 5.16 The South Tower [6], looking up and northeast.



Figure 5.17 The Butavant Tower [7], looking up and northeast.



Figure 5.18 Southwest Gatehouse, looking northwest.




Figure 5.19 Close-up of Southwest Gatehouse, looking northwest.



Figure 5.20 Close-up of Southwest Gatehouse, looking southeast




Figure 5.21 Southwest Gatehouse, looking southwest from the inner ward.



Figure 5.22 Western drum tower of the Southwest Gatehouse, looking east.



Figure 5.23 Keep and inner ward area (National Trust Photographic Library/Derry Robinson).



Figure 5.24 Southeast elevation of Corfe Castle Keep.



Figure 5.25 Southwest elevation of Corfe Castle Keep.



Figure 5.26 East elevation of Corfe Castle Keep (RCHME).



Figure 5.27 Close-up of east elevation and fallen part of wall



Figure 5.28 Close-up of wall collapse on the exterior side of the east wall.



Figure 5.29 Interior of east wall of keep, with collapsed upper wall in background.



Figure 5.30 Close-up of the interior east wall of the keep, with collapsed wall in background.



Figure 5.31 View of keep from the north showing the east, south, and west elevations.



Figure 5.32 Leaning wall, west approach (View 1).



Figure 5.33 Leaning wall, west approach (View 2).



Figure 5.34 Leaning wall, west approach (View 3).



Figure 5.35 Inner ward area [10] showing the distribution of smaller wall fragments



Figure 5.36 Close-up of wall fragment in inner ward area (View 1).



Figure 5.37 Close-up of wall fragment in inner ward area (View 2).



Figure 5.38 Close-up of wall fragment in inner ward area (View 3).



Figure 5.39 Raglan Castle, with destroyed keep in left foreground (Skyscan Balloon Photography for Cadw).




Figure 5.40 Ground plan of keep, showing approximate area of missing masonry (San Jack Media after Kenyon 2003).



Figure 5.41 The keep, looking west, with the apron wall in the foreground.



Figure 5.42 The remains of the damaged wall, showing two structural voids in the form of a fireplace (left) and well (right).



Figure 5.43 The damaged wall viewed from above, showing the variations in wall thickness.



Figure 5.44 The remains of the southeast wall, showing the series of windows situated above the well.



Figure 5.45 *Left:* The vertical destruction pattern in the southeast wall. *Right:* A close-up of two of the bisected windows in the wall.



Figure 5.46 A profile view of Hastings Tower at Ashby de la Zouch (Leicestershire), showing a vertical damage pattern and the bisection of two upper windows.



Figure 5.47 The damage pattern of the northeast wall, showing much higher placed windows.



Figure 5.48 Evidence for repair work in the structural remains of Raglan Castle.




Figure 5.49 Site map of Helmsley Castle (Yorkshire) (Ministry Of Works).





Figure 5.50 *Left:* Artist's impression of the East Tower (Coppack 1990). *Right:* The East Tower as it looks today, with roughly half of its structural mass no longer *in situ*.



Figure 5.51 Vegetation covered debris at the foot of the East Tower.



Figure 5.52 Close-up of rubble debris from the keep, currently located in the castle ditch.



Figure 5.53 External side of the keep with the postern gate on the right, looking southeast.



Figure 5.54 Close-up of the internal side of the postern gate.



Figure 5.55 The internal north wall of the keep, showing the gradations of wall height, the postern gate (left), and corner recess (right).




Figure 5.56 3D model (CAD) showing the internal north/northwest wall of the keep, including the postern gate (left) and corner recess (right).



Figure 5.57 The northeast internal wall of the keep, viewed from the keep interior.




Figure 5.58 The northeast wall of the keep, viewed from above.



Figure 5.59 The external side of the northeast wall showing the gradations of height.



Figure 5.60 The northeast wall of the keep, looking south.




Figure 5.61 3D model (CAD) showing the northeast wall from above (view 1).




Figure 5.62 3D model (CAD) showing the northeast external elevation (view 2).



Figure 5.63 The remains of the east wall, internal elevation.




Figure 5.64 3D model (CAD) showing the internal east elevation.



Figure 5.65 The collapsed west wall of Scarborough Castle Keep (Yorkshire), looking northeast.




Figure 5.66 The current slighting presentation at Scarborough Castle showing (left) an artist's impression of the collapse of the keep from artillery, and (right) the plaque on the other side of the keep which informs the public that the damage is due to slighting.



Figure 5.67 The damaged west wall of Scarborough Castle Keep, looking east.



Figure 5.68 *Left*: Stairwell at Scarborough Castle Keep, looking southwest. *Right*: Scarborough Castle Keep looking northwest.




Figure 5.69 Floor plan of Scarborough Castle Keep (Goodall 2000, 16).



Figure 5.70 Profile views of Scarborough Castle Keep showing the destruction pattern of the remaining fabric. *Left*: Looking north. *Right*: Looking south.

Chapter Six
**The Private Face of Slighting:
Kenilworth Castle and Privatisation**
IMAGES (Originals in colour)



Figure 6.1 Kenilworth Castle (Warwickshire) (English Heritage).




Figure 6.2 Site plan of Kenilworth Castle as it looks today, with the principle structures discussed in this chapter highlighted in yellow (San Jack Media after Renn 1991)




Figure 6.3 Artist's impression of Kenilworth Castle in the 16th century (Ivan Lapper/English Heritage in Renn 1991).




Figure 6.4 Four of the principle building projects at Kenilworth and their position within the site (San Jack Media after HMSO 1958).



Figure 6.5 *Left:* Leicester's Gatehouse, looking northeast. *Right:* Leicester's Gatehouse looking northwest, showing Hawkesworth's two storey extended wing on the east side.




Figure 6.6 Floor plan of Leicester's Gatehouse, showing Hawkesworth's additions and alterations (Morris 2006, 29).



Figure 6.7 The north approach to the gatehouse, now significantly altered from its Civil War state.



Figure 6.8 The likely direction of approach to the house, with the original layout obscured by a mock Victorian ‘gatehouse’.




Figure 6.9 The approach to Hawkesworth’s new home, viewed from the second floor of the gatehouse.



Figure 6.10 *Left:* The visitor’s view of Hawkesworth’s new house, looking southeast. *Right:* The visitor’s view of the destroyed keep, looking southwest.




Figure 6.11 *Left:* The new west entrance with crenellated porch as it looks today. *Right:* The entrance as recorded in 1779 by Moses Griffiths (Morris 2006, 52).



Figure 6.12 Close-up of the classical frontispiece of Leicester's porch. Carved into the stone are Leicester's initials and variations of his family badges.



Figure 6.13 The south room on the ground floor, looking southwest.



Figure 6.14 Leicester's alabaster fireplace, and above, oak panelling and fittings, all of which were removed from other buildings.




Figure 6.15 *Left:* Close-up of Leicester's motto carved into the mantelpiece. *Right:* Close-up of Leicester's initials and family badge, as well as 1571, the year of the mantelpiece's construction.



Figure 6.16 View of the keep from the south bay window on the first floor.



Figure 6.17 View of the keep from the west front.



Figure 6.18 Antiquarian views of the north side of the keep. *Clockwise from top left:* Henry Jeayes, c. 1792-1800 (Birmingham Archives, Aylesford Collection), 1820 engraving after the drawing by J.V. Barber (Birmingham Archives, Aylesford Collection), drawing from the 1822 guidebook by Merridew & Son, and Thomas Cole, 1841 (Juniata College Museum of Art, Huntingdon, Pennsylvania).



Figure 6.19 The keep from the southeast, showing its solid Norman construction and corner turrets.



Figure 6.20 The north side of the keep, showing the forebuilding to the right.



Figure 6.21 Close-up of the damaged stonework of the upper plinth of the north side of the keep.



Figure 6.22 The northeast corner, showing the former point of connection with the north wall.



Figure 6.23 The northwest corner, showing the former point of connection with the north wall.



Figure 6.24 *Clockwise from top left:* The internal elevations of the east, south, and west walls, all showing a substantial amount of original, undamaged stonework.



Figure 6.25 The upper half of the internal, south wall of the keep, showing intact and undamaged joist holes.



Figure 6.26 The north plinth, showing the damaged upper courses.



Figure 6.27 Close-up of the plinth on the east elevation, showing considerable damage to its upper courses.



Figure 6.28 *Left:* The linear pattern of the exposed rubble core, northeast corner. *Right:* The linear pattern of the exposed rubble core, northwest corner.



Figure 6.29 The northeast corner of the keep, showing the remnants of an upper floor stairwell.



Figure 6.30 The northwest corner of the keep and its distinctive destruction pattern.



Figure 6.31 A view of the northwest corner and its exposed rubble core, showing the difference in construction quality between the upper and lower sections of the wall.



Figure 6.32 The base of the ten foot north wall.



Figure 6.33 The northwest corner, looking south. Although some rubble core stands out, the right angle of the profile clearly shows that—if picked—the north wall was picked completely down to base level.



Figure 6.34 The intact south wall of the keep, showing Leicester's inserted Tudor windows.




Figure 6.35 Close-ups of the west (left) and east (right) buttresses, south wall.



Figure 6.36 The remnants of the Great Mere from the south, giving a small hint of the castle's former appearance (English Heritage).

Chapter Seven
The Public Face of Slighting:
Pontefract Castle and Community Involvement
IMAGES (Originals in colour)




Figure 7.1 Site map for Pontefract Castle, Yorkshire (Roberts 2002, 4).




Figure 7.2 Oil painting of Pontefract Castle, looking north. Attributed to Alexander Keirinex, c. 1625-30 (Pontefract Museum).

APPENDICES

Appendix I Civil War Timeline (1642-1649)

1642	Aug.	The king raised his standard at Nottingham (22 Aug.)
	Oct.	Battle of Edgehill; king able to move towards London
	Nov.	Royal forces stopped at Battle of Turnham Green; king retreated to winter in Oxford
1643	May.	Peace negotiations at Oxford failed
	June.	Battle of Adwalton Moor, defeat of parliamentarians in Yorkshire, Fairfax retreated to Hull
		Solemn League and Covenant (alliance) concluded between parliament and Scots
		Assembly of Divines set up to plan reform of the Church
	July	Royalists begin the Siege of Hull
		Prince Rupert captured at Bristol; Charles began the siege of Gloucester (July/Aug)
	Sept.	Earl of Essex relieved Gloucester and defeated royalists at Newbury
		Solemn League and Covenant ratified by both Houses
		Charles signed Cessation treaty with Irish rebels
	Oct.	Siege of Hull broken; parliamentary control of Lincolnshire and East Yorkshire secured
	Dec.	Death of John Pym
1644	Feb.	Independents in the Assembly of Divines published arguments in favour of limited religious toleration; toleration campaign grew throughout the year
	July	Parliamentary victory at Marston Moor
	Sept.	Essex trapped in Cornwall; surrendered entire army at Respryn Bridge
	Sept/Nov.	Parliamentary crisis; religious and political divisions symbolised by Manchester/Cromwell quarrel.
	Dec.	Self-denying Ordinance introduced finally passed in April 1645
1645	Jan./March	Formation of New Model Army
		Growing evidence of Scottish dislike of new developments strained the alliance
		Growing war-weariness in the country; Clubmen risings in the west
		Peace talks entered at Uxbridge; failed because of religious issues and mutual distrust
	June	Battle of Naseby; military and political disaster for the king
	July	Goring (royalist) defeated at Langport
	Sept.	Prince Rupert forced to surrender Bristol;

	Sept/Oct.	Scottish royalists defeated by the Covenantors Clubmen risings in Sussex and Wales
1646	April June July	The king left Oxford and surrendered to the Scots Surrender of Oxford marked the virtual end of the war Leveller demonstrations in London. Thomas Edwards published <i>Gangraena</i> , a bitter attack on radicalism Peace terms offered to the king at Newcastle
1647	Feb. April/May June July Aug. Sept. Oct. Nov. Dec.	Scots handed king to parliament and left England Parliament voted for disbandment of the Army Army petitions and election of Agitators. Regiments refused to disband on May 31 Seizure of the king by Cornet Joyce (June 4) Army Engagement – General Council set up (June 5) <i>Representation of the Army</i> published Royalist mobs invade parliament; Independent MPs fled <i>Heads of the Proposals</i> presented to the king (Aug. 2) Army entered London; conservative leaders fled and the Independents were restored to their seats Army in winter quarters at Putney; Levellers suspicious of Grandees' negotiations with the king Leveller John Wildman published the <i>Case of the Army</i> Leveller plans, summarised in the <i>Agreement of the People</i> debated by the Army Council at Putney The king's escape brought the Putney debates to an end; Leveller mutiny at Ware easily crushed by Cromwell The king signed an <i>Engagement</i> inviting the Scots to invade England
1648	Jan. April July Aug. Sept. Nov. Dec.	Parliament voted 'No Further Addresses' to the king. Army Council disbanded. Growing discontent and riots in Kent and Essex hardened into royalist risings in April Risings in Kent, Essex, Cornwall, Yorkshire and south Wales; easily dealt with except at Colchester (Essex) and in Wales. Scottish army led by royalist Scots entered England Cromwell completed defeat of Welsh rising and caught the Scots at Preston (17 Aug.) Conservative leaders returned to parliament Colchester forced to surrender to Fairfax. Second Civil War effectively over Parliamentary commissioners sent to the Isle of Wight to renew negotiations with the king Army Remonstrance demanded the trial and punishment of the king House of Commons voted the king's reply to their commissioners to be a basis for negotiation (Dec. 5) Pride's Purge (Dec. 6). Purge approved by Cromwell on his return to London on Dec. 7

1649 Jan. High Court of Justice set up to try the king (Jan 1)
Jan 20: The king's trial opened
Jan 30: King Charles I was executed at Whitehall.
Abolition of the monarchy and House of Lords: England was
declared to be a Commonwealth (republic)

(Extract from Anderson 1995, 152-4)

Appendix II Thompson gazetteer (as recorded in 1987a, 179-85)¹²

Parliamentary demolition, proposed or executed, 1642-60

Abergavenny (Wenny) (Gwent) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and make indefensible; 19/7/47, adhere to vote to make indefensible (? Substantial demolition)

Aberystwyth (Dyfed) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and demolish; 19/7/47, adhere to vote; CSPD, 30/7/49, slight. (Demolished—blown up, J.C. Halliwell (ed.), *A Short Relation of a Journey...1652* (London, 1859), 15)

Appleby (Cumbria) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison, slight and dismantle new works; 17/10/48 consider demolition; *Rushworth* (vi, 513), 16/10/48, County Committee order slighting

Arnside Tower (Cumbria) CJ, 29/6/48, make untenable

Ashby de la Zouch — town and castle (Leicestershire) CSPD, 28/2/46, 3 months allowed for slighting (? new works); 6/5/48, secure great tower; CJ, 25/11/48, forthwith slight and make untenable (Extensive demolition on tower and castle)

Aylesbury Town (Buckinghamshire) CJ, 11/7/46, garrison to be slighted and fortifications demolished

Banbury (Oxfordshire) CJ, 2/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works; 19/7/47 agree same with Lords; CSPD 15/7/48, demolition delayed for want of money, Warwickshire and Northamptonshire to assist (Demolished)

Basing House (Hampshire) CJ, 15/10/45, forthwith totally slight and demolish, materials free for those who fetch them (Demolished)

Bath (Avon) CSPD, 29/5/46, slight works and fortifications

Bedford Town CJ, 11/7/46, slight garrison; CSPD, 6/8/46, slight and demolish fortifications

Belvoir (Leicestershire) CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works; 11/6/49, pay Earl of Rutland £1,500 for demolition; CSPD, 3/4/49, to be demolished for safety of Commonwealth; 21/5/49, £1,500 paid to earl; 20/7/49, those appointed to view 'professing not to be soldiers' not certain whether sufficient done; 10/5/50, inspect and see if more work required (Largely demolished)

¹ All highlighted entries show a neutral or negative reference to slighting, and therefore are not statistically represented in the tables or maps of Chapter Two. Post-Civil War secondary source references are also not counted for statistical purposes as their accuracy is more in question.

² Thompson's use of modern county names has been preserved.

Berkeley (Gloucestershire) CSPD, 25/11/45, as Lord Berkeley had suffered so much, no demolition or slighting; CJ, 28/7/46, slight garrison, works and gates and some parts of walls be slighted and thrown down (Some demolition. 5th Report Historical Manuscripts Commission (HMSO, 1876), 356-7)

Berwick-on-Tweed CJ, 28/12/46, local MPs to oversee slighting of fortifications; 31/12/46, ordnance and arms to be removed to Newcastle (Re-garrisoned in 1648)

Betham House (Cumbria) CJ, 29/6/48, make untenable

Beverston (Gloucestershire) CJ, 28/7/46, works, gates and parts of wall to be thrown down (? Substantial demolition)

Bolingbroke (Lincolnshire) CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison and make indefensible; 25/11/48, forthwith slight and make untenable. ('Demolished'—so described in a Survey in April 1654 *MA* x (1966) 156)

Bolsover (Derbyshire) CJ, 23/10/48, slight and disband forces; CSPD, 5/9/48, make untenable without unnecessary spoiling or defacing; 2/7/49, demolish outworks, garden wall, turrets, walls of frontier court, remove doors, window bars; 13/5/50, proceed with demolition (Limited demolition carried out)

Bolton (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, make untenable; 26/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable; 13/7/47, adhere to decision (Corner tower demolished in 1648 (*Rushworth*, vi, 513))

Boston Town (Lincolnshire) CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works

Bridgwater (Somerset) CJ, 14/8/46, garrison to be slighted and dismantled; 2/3/47, reconsider slighting; 19/7/47, slight new works

Bristol (Avon) CJ, 2/3/47, retain garrison at castle and great fort but disgarrison forts and works; 5/4/53, forthwith dismantle and disgarrison; CSPD, 15/4/53, Scotch and Irish Committee to consider order for demolition; 3/10/55, speaks of demolition as past event (Castle demolished in 1653-5)

Broncroft (Shropshire) CJ, 11/7/48, Count Committee authorised to demolish and make untenable (? Substantial demolition)

Burghley House (Northamptonshire, now Cambridgeshire) CSPD, 20/4/46, proposal to disgarrison and slight fortifications

Caernarfon (Gwynedd) CSPD, 22/3/53, Irish and Scottish Committee to consider how garrison may be slighted

Cambridge CJ, 11/7/46, slight garrison; 13/7/47, slight new works about town and castle (? Some demolition)

Cambridgeshire CJ, 23/2/47, dismantle and slight all garrisons

Canon Frome (Herefordshire) CSPD, 15/4/46, proposal to abandon and slight (? Some demolition)

Cardigan (Dyfed) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and demolish; 19/7/47, adhere to vote (? Extensive demolition)

Carlisle (Cumbria) CSPD, 6/7/45, in proposed new treaty with Scots new works be slighted; CJ, 26/12/46, gentlemen of country to oversee slighting of fortifications

Carmarthen (Dyfed) CJ, 25/3/47, disgarrison, slight and make untenable; 19/7/47, keep garrison of 100 men. (Some demolition, see RCAHM, *Carmarthen*, 251)

Caversham (Berkshire) *The Diary of John Evelyn* (ed. E. S. de Beer, London, 1955, iii, 99), 8/6/54, '...my Lord Craven's house at Causam, now in ruins, his goodly woods feeling by the rebels...'

Cawood (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, disgarrison and make untenable; 26/2/47, make untenable (? Demolished)

Chichester Town (Sussex) CJ, 2/3/47, disgarrison and demolish new fortifications.

Chirk (Clwyd) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works; 27/8/59, demolish and make untenable; Maj. Gen. Lambert to see castle demolished and made untenable; CSPD, 27/8/59, same to arrange demolition (Missing side of castle demolished. See chap. 8, n. 20)

Christchurch (Hampshire) CSPD, 29/5/50, consider what further slighting required; 30/11/50, Governor of Southampton to oversee demolition (Mostly demolished)

Clitheroe (Lancashire) CSPD, 27/3/49, Committee to consider demolition with Bolsover and 'such inland castles as they shall think fit'; CSPD, 6/4/49, to reduce to neither a charge nor a danger (? Some demolition)

Cockermouth (Cumbria) CJ, 13/7/47, disgarrison; *Rushworth* (vi, 513), 16/10/48, order to slight to Cumberland Committee

Colchester Town and Castle (Essex) CSPD, 11/6/49, walls and strength to be demolished; 8/5/50, local militia to demolish strengths and fortifications; 25/3/51, dismantle, not yet dismantled; 5/7/51, certified, garrison to be dismissed. ('...now wretchedly demolished by the late siege...' *Evelyn's Diary* (ed. de Beer, iii, 176) 8/7/56)

Conwy (Gwynedd) CSPD, 22/3/53, Irish and Scottish Committee to consider how garrison may be slighted

Corfe (Dorset) CJ, 5/3/46, to be demolished forthwith (Largely demolished)

Coventry (W. Midlands) CJ, 3/3/46, disgarrison and slight new works; 19/7/47, agree with Lords to omit slighting

Crayke (Yorkshire) CJ, 26/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable; CSPD, 7/3/50, partially demolished, complete work

Crowland Abbey (Lincolnshire) CSPD, 16/8/59. Complete the unfinished demolition of former fortifications

Cwmhir Abbey (Powys) CWPD, 8/12/44. Col. Barnard forced to burn house, 'otherwise we could not render it unserviceable for the future'.

Dartmouth (Devon) CJ, 25/2/47, disgarrison and slight new works around; CSPD, 26/3/50, slight new fort; 6/5/50, demolish fort, repair two blockhouses

Dawley (Salop, now Shropshire) CJ, 11/7/48, Shropshire Committee authorised to demolish and make untenable (? Demolished)

Denbigh Castle (Clwyd) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison, demolish and slight works; 15/4/47, materials to go to Governor; 19/7/47, adhere to decision to demolish. (Extensive demolition in 1660)

Devizes (Wiltshire) CJ, 4/5/46, forthwith slight Castle Hill and works

Dockray Hall (Cumbria) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison, slight and dismantle works (? Demolished)

Donnington (Berkshire) No order, but recorded as ruins in 1647, after siege. VCH, *Berks.*, iv. 193.

Dover (Kent) CSPD, 29/1/51, consider if fit to be slighted; 16/4/51, survey to see what necessary to render untenable; 7/8/51, £200 on repairs (No action)

Dudley (Staffordshire) CJ, 4/8/46, forthwith dismantle; CJ, 2/3/47, make untenable; 19/3/47, adhere to vote to make untenable

Dunster (Somerset) CJ, 17/11/46, disgarrison; CSPD, 25/3/51, garrison before making untenable; 27/5/51, owner to give undertaking not to allow enemy use (Some demolition—H. C. Mawell-Lyte, *Dunster and its Lords* (Exeter, 1882), 96-8)

Eccleshall (Staffordshire) CJ, 4/8/46, dismantle works and fortifications; 2/3/47, make untenable; 19/7/47, adhere to vote (Extensive demolition)

Ely, Isle of (Cambridgeshire) CJ, 23/2/47, disgarrison and slight all garrisons and forts

Exeter (Devon) CSPD, 5/5/52, consider disgarrisoning

Farnham (Surrey) CSPD, 16/10/45, County wishes to slight; 27/10/45, order to demolish if it can be done safely; CJ, 4/7/48, put in condition of indefensibility; CSPD, 4 and 10/7/48, authority to Surrey Committee to demolish so as not to be defensible or tenable (Some demolition)

Farringdon House (Hampshire) CJ, 23/2/47, works about to be slighted.

Flint (Clwyd) CJ, 22/12/46, disgarrison and slight; 3/3/46, disgarrison and demolish except for one tower used as a prison; 19/7/47, adhere to former vote, disgarrison and demolish. (Extensive demolition—J. C. Halliwell (ed.), *A Short Relation of a Journey...1652* (London, 1859) 10)

Gainsborough Town (Lincolnshire) CSPD, 2/11/44, Sir John Meldrum 'razed' defences

Gloucester Town and Castle CSPD, 11/1/53, dismantling of garrison; 22/3/53, Irish and Scottish Committee consider how it may be sighted; *Evelyn's Diary* (ed. de Beer, iii, 118), 31/7/54, '...the Duke's House, Castle, works, now almost quite dismantled...' (Some demolition)

Goodrich (Herefordshire and Worcestershire) CJ, 25/8/46, need to demolish and compensate Countess of Kent; 1/3/47, totally disgarrison and slight; 19/7/47, agree with Lords to disgarrison and slight new works; CSPD, 6/7/49, allow £1,000 compensation to Countess of Kent (Some demolition)

Harlech (Gwynedd) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and demolish; 19/7/47, adhere to previous vote (? Demolition of outer curtain and entry—E. Breeze, *Kalendars of Gwynedd* (1873) 18)

Hartlepool Town (Cleveland) CJ, 26/2/47, slight new works and disgarrison

Haverfordwest (Dyfed) CJ, 25/3/47, disgarrison, slight works and make untenable (Some demolition)

Hawarden (Clwyd) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and demolish; 19/7/47, adhere to vote; CSPD, 30/7/49, consider demolition with Holt (Extensive demolition)

Helmsley (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, make untenable; 26/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable; 13/7/47, adhere to vote; *Rushworth* (vi, 513), Oct. 1648, Committee of York order to be slighted (Demolition on keep and curtain)

Herbert's Isle (Derwentwater) (Cumbria) CJ, 23/2/47, disgarrison and slight new works

Hereford CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison town, slight new works but maintain garrison of 160 men in castle. (? Some demolition—J. Price, *An Historical Account of the City of Hereford* (1798), 51-4)

High Ercall House (Salop, now Shropshire) CSPD, 6/4/46, instruction to County Committee not to demolish but slight and drain moat. '...neither do we think fit that all houses whose situation or strength render them capable of being garrisons should be pulled down. There would be then too many sad marks left of the calamity of this war...' (? Some demolition)

Highworth House (Wiltshire) CJ, 14/8/46, slight and dismantle

Hillesden House (Buckinghamshire) CJ, 7/3/44, should they slight or garrison after capture?

Holmsdale (Surrey) CSPD, 17/7/48, no need for garrison if they make indefensible which they should execute

Holt (Clwyd) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and totally demolish; 19/7/47, adhere to decision; CSPD, 15/3/52, Earl of Bridgewater to give surety of £4,000 that neither he nor purchaser will use it to prejudice of Parliament, or he can demolish and retain materials (Not demolished then)

Huntingdon Town (Cambridgeshire) CJ, 11/7/46, slight garrison; CSPD, 6/8/46, slight and demolish fortifications and disgarrison

Kenilworth (Warwickshire) CSPD, 13/7/49, forthwith demolish; 21/7/49, make untenable with as little harm to dwelling house as possible; 24/7/49, take down Caesar's Tower and outer ward, but greatness of windows makes it unnecessary to harm house; 28/8/49, petition of Earl of Monmouth for materials; 16/10/49, County Committee to carry out work with all expedition (N. side of keep and N. curtain demolished)

King's Lynn (Norfolk) CJ, 1/3/47, maintain garrison of 500 men; CSPD, 15/4/53, petition not to demolish blockhouse at Douce Hills

Knaresborough (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, 'being inland castle be made untenable'; 26/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable; *Rushworth* (vi, 513), 16/10/48, County Committee order slighting. (Substantial demolition)

Lancaster CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works; 1/7/48, gentlemen of county to consider what garrison necessary; CSPD, 18/6/49, demolish except parts used as gaol; 10/7/49, no obedience from Governor; 24/7/49, order to Deputy Governor after obstruction by Governor; 15/3/51, not yet untenable; 3/6/51, view to see if untenable

Langford House (Wiltshire) CJ, 4/5/56, works about it to be slighted

Lathom House (Lancashire) CJ, 4/5/56 [sic], House approve what County has done to demolish; 19/7/47, adhere to former vote. (Demolished)

Lechlade (Gloucestershire) CJ, 28/7/46, slight garrison

Leeds (Castle) (Kent) CSPD, 8/5/50, if not used for magazine, should it be made untenable? (? Some demolition)

Leicester CJ, 19/7/47, disgarrison and slight new works

Leicestershire CJ, 1/3/47, garrisons of county to be disgarrisoned and slighted

Lichfield Close (Staffordshire) CJ, 4/8/46, works and walls to be demolished; 2/3/47, make untenable forthwith; 19/7/47, dismantle walls

Liverpool (Merseyside) CJ, 1/3/47, keep garrison of 600 men; 4/7/59, the castle of Liverpool and the walls of thereof be demolished and towers made untenable; 19/7/59, a 'Bill' for demolishing Liverpool Castle receives first and second reading; 22/7/59, 'Bill' read third time and passed. (? Demolished)

London LJ, 2/9/47, Ordinance to slight works and lines of communications around London; 6/9/47, militia to put order into execution; 9/9/47, slight and demolish forts and lines of communication, adjoining householders to assist, materials being sold to contribute towards cost

Ludlow (Salop, now Shropshire) CJ, 25/2/47, castle to be disgarrisoned and new works slighted. County Committee to make certain that castle and town are untenable; CSPD, 22/3/53, Irish and Scottish Committee to consider how garrison may be slighted

Lulworth (Dorset) CSPD, 21/6/49, consider whether fit to be demolished

Lyme Regis Town (Dorset) CJ, 14/8/46, forthwith slight and dismantle works; 26/2/47, disgarrison and slight; 13/7/47, dismantle new works and disgarrison

Malmesbury Town (Wiltshire) CJ, 14/8/46, forthwith slight and dismantle.

Martin Abbey (Surrey) CJ, 4/7/48, make indefensible; CSPD, 10/7/48, render indefensible

Matchfield House (Worcestershire) CSPD, 6/6/50, consider whether fit to demolish; 11/6/50, survey and consider loss to owner; 19/4/51, is it untenable?; 5/5/51, militia commissioners to make sure it is untenable

Maxstoke (Warwickshire) CSPD, 20/11/51, owner to give surety of £2,000 that castle will not be used or possessed by enemy

Mersea, Isle of (Essex) CJ, 26/2/47, demolish and disgarrison blockhouse in; CSPD, 20/10/55, Protector orders Governor to demolish fort

Middleham (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, 'being inland castle' make untenable; 26/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable, 13/7/47, adhere to decision. (? Some demolition)

Monmouth (Gwent) CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison and slight works; 19/7/47, agree with Lords to disgarrison and slight and dismantle works made since the troubles

Montgomery (Powys) CJ, 11/6/49, totally demolish and compensate Lord Herbert by adjusting delinquency fine; CSPD, 11/6/49, confirm demolition; 15/6/49, warrant to demolish; 16/6/49, commission for demolition; 29/9/49, materials to be sold for paying costs; 19/1/50, allow Lord Herbert £1,61/10/- still unpaid of delinquency fine for compensation. (Largely demolished)

Mulgrave (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, make untenable; 19/7/47, disgarrison and slight new works; *Rushworth* (v, 513), Oct. 1648, County Committee order slighting;

CSPD, 31/10/50, view to see if untenable; 6/3/51, County to assist; 7/6/51, additional appointee. (Extensively demolished)

Nantwich Town (Cheshire) CJ, 23/2/47, disgarrison, dismantle and slight; 13/7/47, disgarrison and slight new works

Newark Castle and Town (Nottinghamshire) CJ, 28/4/46, when captured fortifications will be slighted and castle made untenable; 1/3/47, disgarrison fort at river, slight and dismantle. (Some demolition – C.J. Morris (ed.), *The Journeys of Celia Fiennes* (London 1947), 71. In 1697 ‘then demolished so that only the ruined walls remaine’)

Newcastle Emlyn (Dyfed) CJ, 3/3/47. Speaker to discuss with owner what assurance he can give that it will not be used against Parliament. (? Demolition)

Newcastle upon Tyne (CSPD, 13/9/55. Petition for materials if Council think fit to demolish

Newport Pagnell (Buckinghamshire) CJ, 11/7/46, slight garrison; 28/1/47, E. Association Committee to take care to slight effectually.

Northampton Town CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works

Nottingham Castle and Town CJ, 1/3/47, disgarrison town and slight works, keep garrison in castle; CSPD, 9/5/51, castle to be demolished and troop of dragoons sent to do it; 9/6/51, report approved and orders issued, Governor, Mayor etc. to start within 14 days and castle, all outworks and fortifications to be demolished before 10/11/51; 10/6/51, remove ordnance, arms etc. (Demolished. *Memoirs of Life of Colonel Hutchinson* (ed. J. Sutherland, p. 203 ‘speedily executed’; *Evelyn’s Diary*, ed. De Beer, 14/8/54, ‘...reliques of an ancient castle...’)

Oxford CJ, 2/3/47, disgarrison, slight and dismantle new works; CSPD, 8/9/51, ‘citadel’ and works to be wholly slighted. (Some demolition)

Pembridge (Herefordshire and Worcestershire) CSPD, 15/4/46, proposal to slight and abandon

Plymouth (Devon) CJ, 18/2/48, continue garrison, but demolish works about Plymouth; CSPD, 6/6/49, demolish fortifications

Pontefract (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, maintain garrison of 100 men; 26/2/47, after two votes House decides it shall be made untenable; 14/4/47, prayer for £500 to be spent on repairs; 27/3/49, forthwith totally demolish; CSPD, 7/8/49, deliver timber from Pontefract Castle for repairs at Hull. (Demolished. *Evelyn’s Diary* (ed. De Beer, iii, 127), 16/8/54, ‘was now demolish[ed] by the rebels...’; R. Holmes, *The Sieges of Pontefract Castle* (Pontefract, 1887) 328-32)

Powis Castle (Powys) See Red Castle

Raby (Durham) CJ, 26/2/47, slight new works and disgarrison

Raglan (Gwent) CJ, 25/8/46 ‘...the Castle of Ragland, the works about it, and the House and Buildings thereof, be forthwith pulled down and demolished...Committee of the County of Monmouth to take care that the same be totally demolished and all materials thereof sold and disposed of for the best advantage of the State deducting the charges for pulling it down.’ (Extensive demolition of keep, walls etc.)

Red Castle (Powis Castle, Powys) CSPD, 22/3/53, Irish and Scottish Committee to consider how garrison may be slighted. (Outworks demolished, walls breached by order 28/4/60, *10th Report Historical Manuscripts Commission* (1885), App. iv, 395)

Reigate (Surrey) CSPD, 10/7/48, render indefensible. (? Partial demolition)

Rhuddlan (Clwyd) CJ, 22/12/46, disgarrison and slight; 3/3/47, disgarrison and demolish; 19/7/47, disgarrison and demolish. (? Outer curtain and gates demolished: J. C. Halliwell (ed.), *A Short Relation of a Journey...1652* (London, 1859), 12)

Rockingham (Northamptonshire) CSPD, 4/5/46, slight and render untenable but do not demolish or spoil house; CJ, 11/11/46, slight works and make untenable forthwith. (? Some demolition)

Rose (Cumberland) CJ, 23/2/47, disgarrison and slight new works. (? Some demolition)

Ruthin (Clwyd) CJ, 22/12/46, disgarrison and slight; 3/3/47, disgarrison and demolish; 19/7/47, disgarrison and slight new works. (? Some demolition)

Salcombe Fort (Devon) CJ, 25/2/47, disgarrison and slight

Sandal (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, make untenable

Scarborough (Yorkshire) CSPD, 13/7/49, to be demolished but new platform to defend harbour; 9/5/51, to be demolished; 9/5/51, company of foot from Hull to be sent to demolish; 12/6/51, referred back, all former orders suspended; CJ, 5/12/51, modest garrison agreed. (Partial demolition of keep and ? curtain)

Sheffield (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, make untenable; 26/2/47, new works to be demolished and house made untenable; 13/7/47, confirmed; *Rushworth* (vi, 513), 16/10/48, York Committee order slighting. (? Demolished partially)

Sherborne (Dorset) CJ, 27/9/42, Earl of Bedford to raze to the ground; 24/10/42, Dep. Lieutenant forthwith to demolish; 1/11/42, authority to sell lead, iron, boards; *Rushworth* (v, 536-7), 15/8/45, stormed after mining, and slighting ordered. (Extensively damaged)

Sherborne House (Dorset) CJ, 2/3/47, disgarrison, slight works and make indefensible

Shrewsbury Town (Shropshire) CJ [reference omitted], retain castle garrison but slight north works

Shropshire C. H. Firth and R. S. Rait, *Acts and Ordinances of the Interregnum, 1642-60* (HMSO, 1911), 13/8/46, disband all garrisons except Shrewsbury and Ludlow

Skipton (Yorkshire) CJ, 27/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable. (Some demolition)

Southampton Town (Hampshire) CJ, 2/3/47, disgarrison and slight new works

Stafford Castle CSPD, 22/3/53, Irish and Scottish Committee to consider how garrison may be slighted; 11/4/53, stop disgarrisoning

Sterborough (Surrey) CJ, 4/7/48, make indefensible; CSPD, 30/6/48, garrison; 4/7/48, render untenable; 10/7/48, make indefensible; 17/7/48, now demolish. (Largely demolished)

Stockton on Tees (Cleveland) CJ, 26/2/47, make untenable, slight works and disgarrison; 13/7/47, agree with Lords that works made since the troubles be slighted and dismantled

Sudeley (Gloucestershire) CSPD, 6/1/46, great damage done by breaking down wainscoting, to be stopped; CJ, 28/7/46, garrison to be presently slighted; CSPD, 19/5/48, withdraw after making untenable; 15/11/48, so far to slight to render it incapable of being held by an enemy; 6/4/49, still no untenable; 16/4/49, 14 days allowed to start unfortifying; 24/4/49, certificate of demolition required; 29/9/49, work approved; 21/3/50, further inquiry. (Extensive demolition)

Swansea (Glamorgan) CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison and slight works

Tamworth (Staffordshire) CSPD, 13/7/49, forthwith demolish. (Extensive demolition)

Tattershall (Lincolnshire) CSPD, 4/4/49, brick keep to be demolished by Earl of Lincoln who can keep materials; 27/4/49, Earl wants to remove just floors and roof but Council of State from 'many experiences in the late war' want tower demolished; CJ, 20/6/49, Council report that Earl deserves some compensation by analogy with Belvoir, and told to consider with Goodrich; CSPD, 21/8/49, approve Governor of Boston securing castle, and demolition of tower to start within 10 days; 29/9/49, demolition within a month; 12/10/49, nothing done; 17/11/49, JPs in area to assist Governor; 1/1/50, Governor to render untenable, up to £60 allowed; 4/3/50 inquiry into state of work; 25/3/50, pay £60 to Governor; 29/3/50, pay money to John Wincap; 21/1/53, is Earl of Lincoln entitled to compensation? (Tower still stands but were walls, gatehouse etc. demolished?)

Taunton (Somerset) CJ, 14/8/46, slight and dismantle; 2/3/47, keep garrison in town and castle; CSPD, 13/10/51, make untenable with all speed; 27/10/51, refer to Committee; 30/10/51, proceed, charge to County, materials to owner; 14/11/51, demolish forthwith; 25/11/51, refer to Irish and Scottish Committee. (Demolition of keep and other parts)

Tewkesbury Town (Gloucestershire) CJ, 28/7/46, slight garrison

Thurland (Lancashire) CJ, 18/11/43, approve Col. Rigby's action in demolition and will save him from indemnity. (Demolished)

Tickhill (Yorkshire) CJ, 30/4/46, 'being inland castle' make untenable; CSPD, 13/11/46, disgarrison. (? Demolition of keep and other parts)

Tutbury (Staffordshire) CJ, 2/3/47, make untenable; 19/7/47, adhere to vote. (? Some demolition. For demolition see *Guide* by Sir R. Somerville (1960) p. 12)

Wallingford (Berkshire) CJ, 23/2/47, slight and dismantle; 13/7/47, slight all works since the troubles; CSPD, 17/11/52, to be demolished and works effectually slighted; VCH, *Berks.*, III, 530, 30/3/58, cost of demolition £450/5/8, and sale of materials yielded £516/17/11. (Demolished)

Wareham (Dorset) CJ, 5/3/46, slight garrison forthwith

Winchester (Hampshire) CSPD, 11/6/49, consider how to make untenable without loss to owner; 11/9/49, engineer to be sent; 26/9/49, order to proceed according to engineer's advice; 29/5/49, £5 to engineer for report; 16/12/50, Governor of Southampton to summon County to demolish castle and wall about it; 30/12/50, proceed without delay; 13/1/51, proceed to demolition at charge of county; 21/2/51, not yet done but to be done within 14 days of assizes and certified; 28/3/51, work of making untenable started, if orders obeyed would have been done long ago. (Only the hall of the castle survives)

Windsor (Berkshire) CJ, 23/2/47, all new works about it to be slighted

S. Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) CJ, 25/2/47, demolish new works and disgarrison house. (Tower and some parts partially demolished)

Worcester Town CJ, 3/3/47, disgarrison, slight new works, pull down forts, fill up ditch, pull down drawbridges; 19/7/47, agree with Lords to leave out page about making untenable; 19/3/51, in response to advice from Council of State forthwith make untenable. (? Extensive demolition)

Wressel (Humberside) CJ, 11/12/45, slight outworks and new fortifications; 26/2/47, disgarrison and make untenable; CSPD, 14/8/49, demolish and use materials to defray costs; 20/8/49, is total demolition necessary?; 21/8/49, only make untenable and retain living quarters; 24/8/49, Earl of Northumberland says he has ordered it to be done; 6/12/49, certificate to be sent to Earl; 25/2/50, to be demolished by 7/4/50 and Earl to do it. (Substantial demolition)

York CJ, 26/2/47, Clifford's Tower to be kept as garrison, but town to be disgarrisoned and new works slighted and demolished; 14/7/47, agreed with Lords.

Appendix III Thompson gazetteer (Arranged by year¹)

Parliamentary demolition, proposed or executed, 1642-60 (As recorded in Thompson 1987a, 179-85)

Entry	Location	East	North	1642	1643	1644	1645	1646	1647	1648	1649	1650	1651	1652	1653	1655	1656	1659	1660
Abergavenny	Wales	329900	213900	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aberystwyth	Wales	257900	281500	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Appleby	Cumbria	368500	520000	0	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Arnside Tower	Cumbria	345800	476900	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ashby de la Zouch	Leicestershire	436300	316700	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aylesbury Town	Buckinghamshire	482200	213700	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Banbury	Buckinghamshire	445400	240400	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Basing House	Hampshire	466300	152600	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bath	Hampshire	375000	164100	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bedford Town	Bedfordshire	505300	249700	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Belvoir	Leicestershire	482000	333700	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Berkeley	Gloucestershire	368500	198900	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Berwick-upon-Tweed	Northumbria	399400	653500	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Betham House/Beetham Hall	Cumbria	349900	479000	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beverstone	Gloucestershire	386000	194000	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolingbroke	Lincolnshire	534900	364900	0	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolsover	Derbyshire	447100	370700	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bolton	Yorkshire	403400	491800	0	0	0	0	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boston Town	Lincolnshire	532700	343800	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bridgwater	Somerset	330200	137800	0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bristol	Somerset	359400	173200	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	0	0	0
Broncroft	Shropshire	354400	286700	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burghley House	Northamptonshire	504600	306300	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

¹ All highlighted sites had no positive references to slighting in any year, and therefore are not statistically represented in the tables or maps of Chapter Two.

Appendix IV Sites visited

ENGLAND

- | | |
|---------------------------------------|--|
| 1. Allerton (Yorkshire) | 28. Ludlow (Shropshire) |
| 2. Arundel (Sussex) | 29. Middleham (Yorkshire) |
| 3. Ashby-de-la-Zouch (Leicestershire) | 30. Millom (Cumbria) |
| 4. Barnard (Durham) | 31. Newark (Nottinghamshire) |
| 5. Basing House (Hampshire) | 32. Newcastle (Northumbria) |
| 6. Bolsover (Derbyshire) | 33. Old Wardour (Wiltshire) |
| 7. Bolton (Yorkshire) | 34. Peveril (Derbyshire) |
| 8. Bridgnorth (Shropshire) | 35. Pickering (Yorkshire) |
| 9. Carisbrooke (Isle of Wight) | 36. Pontefract (Yorkshire) |
| 10. Cawood (Yorkshire) | 37. Richmond (Yorkshire) |
| 11. Clifford's Tower (Yorkshire) | 38. Sandal (Yorkshire) |
| 12. Clitheroe (Lancashire) | 39. Scarborough (Yorkshire) |
| 13. Colchester (Essex) | 40. Sheriff Hutton (Yorkshire) |
| 14. Conisbrough (Yorkshire) | 41. Skipton (Yorkshire) |
| 15. Corfe (Dorset) | 42. Slingsby (Yorkshire) |
| 16. Crayke (Yorkshire) | 43. Snape (Yorkshire) |
| 17. Donnington (Berkshire) | 44. Snodhill (Herefordshire) |
| 18. Dover (Kent) | 45. South Wingfield Manor (Derbyshire) |
| 19. Goodrich (Herefordshire) | 46. Spofforth (Yorkshire) |
| 20. Harewood (Yorkshire) | 47. Tutbury (Staffordshire) |
| 21. Helmsley (Yorkshire) | 48. Warkworth (Northumbria) |
| 22. Hopton (Shropshire) | 49. Warwick (Warwickshire) |
| 23. Kenilworth (Warwickshire) | 50. Whorlton (Yorkshire) |
| 24. Kilpeck (Herefordshire) | 51. Wigmore (Herefordshire) |
| 25. Knaresborough (Yorkshire) | 52. Winchester (Hampshire) |
| 26. Lathom House (Lancashire) | 53. Windsor (Berkshire) |
| 27. Lincoln (Lincolnshire) | |

SCOTLAND

1. Caerlaverock
2. Craigmillar
3. Crichton
4. Doune
5. Dumferline
6. Dunstaffnage
7. Edinburgh
8. Hermitage
9. Rosslyn

WALES

1. Conwy
2. Grosmont
3. Monmouth
4. Montgomery
5. Raglan
6. Skenfrith
7. Whitecastle

IRELAND

- | | | | |
|------------------|----------------------|------------------------|--------------|
| 1. Annaghdown | 5. Ballyportry | 9. Derryhivenny | 13. Newtown |
| 2. Athenry | 6. Cahermacneachtain | 10. Kiltartan | 14. Pallas |
| 3. Aughnanure | 7. Caislean na Circe | 11. King John's Castle | 15. Portumna |
| 4. Ballinalacken | 8. Claregalway | 12. Lemanah | 16. Shrule |

Appendix V Orders issued by Major-General Lambert, Commander-in-Chief in these Northern Parts; 1648 [Concerning Knaresborough Castle]

Whereas the Committee of the Militia of the Countie of York did formerly give directions for calling the inhabitants of the Wapentake of Claro to labour in the sleighting of the Castle of Knaresburgh, according to the severall orders of Parliament in that behalf; and being now informed that divers of said inhabitants do neglect to send in men to assist in that work, and such labourers as are sent from any towne do for the most part neglect the service, coming late, going away early, and standing idle whilst there, so as the Castle is in danger to be surprised if any enemy should attempt it.

In regard the said Committee doth not act as formerly—it is therefore ordered that everie petty Constable within the said Wapentake doe upon the eight day of January inst., send a certain number of able labourers, with spades, shovels, pick-axes, hacks, mattocks or gavelocks, proportioning their numbers according to the book of rates; that is to say one labourer for every penny charged on the Constabularie in the said book of rates, each labourer to work from half-an-hour after seven o'clock in the morning until half-an-hour after four in the afternoon, resting only one hour for dinner time. And to the end such work may be effectually performed, everie Constable is to levie weekly so much money as will pay each labourer his wages, after eightpence per diem and bring the same to Knaresburgh and there pay it to the hands of John Roundell and Robert Hill, who are therewith to pay each labourer his wages proportionably, according to the hours he shall labour at the said work; and deduct out of his wages for many hours as he shall neglect. And each labourer with the Constable of the town that sends him shall appear when they come to work in the Towlebooth of Knaresburgh, where Mr. Richard Ellis is to register their appearance, and also what sum of money each Constable shall deliver to the said Mr. John Roundell or Robert Hill for paiement of their wages; and likewise register the wages paid to everie severall labourer, that no abuse be done to the country.

For such towns as have not sent in their proportion of labourers for the last fourteen days, according to former warrants, the Governor of Knaresburgh Castle is hereby ordered upon notice given by Mr. Stockdale, Mr. Rodes, and Mr. Barrowby to send a party of souldiers to quarter upon the Constabularie untill they send in money, after the rate of eightpence per diem for each labourer charged on them for the time so neglected, and pay the same to John Roundell and Robert Hill and register it with Mr. Ellis. The Governor is further ordered to do the like in cases where any townes shall make default for the time ensuing, all the moneys to be sent in for the hyering of labourers for the time to come; from such towns as send money and no labourers are to be issued and disposed of for the wages of workmen according as shall be appointed by Mr. Stockdale, Mr. Rodes and Mr. Barrowby, to whom the care and charge of this service is commended, and power given to them to appoint overseers for the works and give directions therein upon all occasions, as they shall see expedient.

Given at Towlerton under my hand and seale the 4th day of February, 1648.—J. Lambert.

To the Constable of Hunburton-cum-Milby, 7d. towne. For every six days, 28s.
January 25th, 1648.

To Mr. John Roundell by Robert Brigham half of this sum above, 14s. January 30th.

Received of Mr. Aldburgh for his moietie for Hundburton, 17s.

(Cited in Wheater 1907, 238-9)

Appendix VI Correspondence between Sir Ralph Bankes and Sir Walter Erle related to Corfe timber

Sir,—It may perhaps seem strange to you after such an intermission, that I should now demand of you that which belongs to me. I doubted not your own conscience and the justness of the thing would, before this, have invited you to make restitution or some recompense, which made me defer reminding you of it, because I was not willing to take from you the advantage of so good an action. But I incline to believe want of memory occasions this failure in you, and that it is rather the defect of your age than of your will. The timber and other materials for building you had from Corfe Castle (which you have since employed in your own new fabrick) you must needs acknowledge are mine, and what in law as well as justice ought to be restored to me. For the Act of Indemnity gives away no man's property, but everyone may (without any violation of it) take his goods when he finds them, and though I never made it much my inquiry, I can, if you give me the occasion, bring those that will swear that one of the great pieces of timber (if not the greatest) in your house came from the Castle, besides stone and other materials you have made use of. I hope you will not put yourself or me to any further trouble in this business, which, if it should be brought upon the stage, will not anyways benefit your reputation. The Scripture which you profess (and we all ought) to make the rule of our actions cannot justify you in such proceedings, nor can you bring any text from them which allows you to build with my timber. Good actions carry their own reward. If you did well to be instrumental in destroying the Castle, you should not have rewarded your good service out of the ruins of it. Many throughout England who made the like advantages of the times, and who thought that whilst they continued the illness of them would warrant their ill actions, have since this happy change shewed you good example, and have thrown from them that which, belonging to others, would have proved moth and a canker in their estates. The precedents are so public that you cannot be ignorant of them. I hope your conscience will be as just to you as theirs have been, and that you will be ruled by it; and, by making me a just satisfaction, you will oblige me to be,

Sir,

Your friend and servant,

R. B.

Chettle, the 12 August, 1661

Indorsed,

SIR WALTER ERLE'S LETTER ABOUT THE MATERIALS WHICH HE HAD FROM CORFE CASTLE DURING THE REBELLION.

Addressed.

FOR THE MUCH HONORED SIR RALPH BANKES, THESE, AT CHETTLE.

Sir, - I have received your letter touching that business, the mentioning whereof by you may (as you suppose) seem strange unto me, though if the truth be known, it will

appear that it hath not been altogether a stranger to my thoughts, - it being my resolution long since, upon the least hint of opportunity to acquaint you with my mind and purpose therein; and once as I sat by your side in Parliament, I was about to have asked you how far forth you thought me in equity obliged to that which you seem to require, and had something in readiness to present you withal upon occasion, and that merely in regard that having kept my hands free from things of that nature in general, it went against the heir with me to silence that particular as to yourself. I then lost the opportunity by reason of some business or other that intervened, and since I supposed that upon occasion of meeting here in the country, some occasion might be given rather by way of discourse than otherwise, to come to the point. And this is no feigned thing I can appeal unto Him who knows all men's hearts. But that I was any other way compellable to make satisfaction, I was and still am confident to the contrary, it being most clear that the Act of Indemnity doth reach it, as relating to, or by occasion of, the late unhappy war. Besides the alteration of the property from what it was formerly, when it was fixed to the freehold, and so likewise that (although the property had not been altered) no action of trover and conversion was brought within six years, and in divers other respects. But one thing (indeed) seems strange, which is, that I should (at that time when it was done) have a hand in the destroying of the Castle and meddling with the materials of it, - a thing which I utterly disavow, being able to make it appear that neither then nor in a year before, I had anything to do in the country, being absent; and when the spoil was made, and the materials were carried away, I never gave any direction by letter or otherwise for bringing any part of it to my house, nor knew any such thing done more than the child unborn, until a good while after, coming down into the country, I found some part thereof among other things remaining of the ruins of mine own house, laid by for future use. And as for the things themselves, the quantity and value of them, certainly they are nothing near so considerable as I perceive you apprehend them to be - five or six load of timber and stone being in point of value no such great matter, admitting them to be such as you describe them to be. However, it is not that which I stand upon, nor you, perhaps, neither. I should have been glad to have had the opportunity of a more free overture proceeding from myself, but, seeing it falls out otherwise, I must take it as it is, and for the present return this answer, in hope that it may so far forth satisfy you that I shall need say no more until some occasion of meeting offer itself, that I may make it appear that nothing that is reasonable, whether in law or equity (for to me all is one), shall be denied you, and in the mean space, I shall entreat you to take no notice of those misinformations that I have before touched upon, that I may not sustain prejudice in the opinion of one whom I have great cause to honor and respect, your relations these parts being lately increased, and so in respect of neighbourhood and common civility, as well as of that which is of more esteem, makes me profess myself to be,

“Your most humble servant,

“Walter Erle.

“Charborough, 11 August, 1661”

(cited in National Trust 1988, 61-62)

Appendix VII Kenilworth Castle legal transactions and survey extracts

(as cited by Ballard 157-61)

Extract of the legal document concerning Kenilworth, arrears of pay, and trustees for the distribution of land

1650 1 Feb

Wee whose Names are subscribed being elected & made Trustees for our respective Troopes for Arrears of o'selves & souldjers forth of the Landes Castles and Manno of the Late King lately contracted for p Cornet William Comeby authorized to be o Attorney for that purpose, doe hereby agree and consent to and with Major Hawsworth now Governor of Warwick Castle that for the somme of two thousand poundes to be payd by the sayd Major Hawksworth unto the sayd Cornet Comeby for 7 towards the purchasing 7 buying out of an Estate w the Lord Monmouth hath in certaine Mannors and landes for terme of life about Kennelworth in Warwickshire for the use of o'selves & souldjers, seaven hundred poundes poundes of which he is to pay at the sealeing of the witing of a bargaine to be made betwixt the Earle of Monmouth & the sayd Cornet Comby and the residue of the two thousand poundes at the end of tenn weekes from the time of the first payment that Major Hawksworth shall have all the materialls of Kenilworth Castle, he defraying ye charges of pulling it downe & enjoying the profits of what hath beene already soulde. And the sayd Major Hawksworth shal have the ground, whereon the materialls & houses stand, with the tilt yard & orchard, he paying for it as purchasers from the state.

Witness or hands

Rich Creed
Robert Hope
Robt: Cotchet
R: Dolphin

Survey of the Castle Parke Chase Poole Mill...

All that Capital Messuage Mansion house or Court house with several Outhouses and gardens thereunto belonging...commonly called...Killingworth Castle...being bounded with the Poole hereafter menconed on the West and South p[ar]tes a Greened called Clintons Green on the North and a certain ground called the Orchard on the East And all those Waies passages lights Easem[en]tes...

7[a] 0[r] 0[p]

The aforesaid mansion is very much out of repaire and not fit to be made Tennantable without great cost and charges expended thereon. And therefore upon mature consideration had thereof notwithstanding the gatehouse is in very goodrepair and not fit to be demolished And some of the other Outbuildings to be made very convenient with little charge. We have thought fitt Nevertheless to value the severall Materials of the whole And doo estimate the same to be worth in Lead in and about the house and also underground Timber Tyles Stone, glasse, Iron Wenscott, Chimney

pieces *a fountain of Marble in the garden* And all other materials in and about the said Castle and other Outhouses thereunto belonging relation being had to the taking downe and alsoe the tyme from costing them into money also considered

£4,279 3s 7d

And then the scite thereof conteining as aforesaid when the said Materials are cleared of will be worth pa

£70

All that close of pasture ground commonly called...by the name of the Tiltyard abutting upon a p[ar]cell of ground hereafter menconed called the Castle hill on the West And a Lane called Killingworth Lane on the East and doth conteine

3[a] 2[r] 0[p] [worth]

45s

One other close of pasture commonly called...the Orchard abutting upon the aforesaid ground calld the Tiltyard on the South and the cite of the said Courthouse on the North and doth conteine

3[a] 2[r] 0[p] [worth]

55s

All that p[ar]cell of impailed ground commonly called the Castle Hills p[ar]ke...some p[ar]te thereof being lately plowed the same being divide with also formerly being made use of to p[re]serve hey for the Deere belonging to the Chase in Wintour the said deere having and formerly had lib[er]tie to come out of the said chase into the p[ar]ke abutting upon the poole and p[ar]te of the Chase on the North and West p[ar]tes thereof And the ground called pond yard on the east and doth conteine on the whole

304[a] 0[r] 0[p] [worth]

£182 8s 0d

The wood and trees standing and growing upon the s[ai]d p[ar]ke all (of them or the greatest p[ar]te being dotterels) and decayed trees are worth in ready mony cleare of all charge the time of converting them into ready mony also considered

£150

All that p[Ar]cell of impailed ground or parke it being formerly a Chase and yet called...the Chase...bounded with a certaine p[ar]ke called Briscods p[ar]ke, the paddock a meadow called p[ar]ke meadow on the North and West p[ar]tes thereof And the poole and p[ar]te of the said ground called the Castle Hills on the South and East p[ar]tes thereof which upon a true admeasurement doth conteine

750[a] 2[r] 0[p]

There are within the said Chase at p[re]sent 430 dere of severall sorts wch wee value to be worth

£279 10s 0d

The timber trees Dotterrels and decayed trees now standing and growing within the said Chase being in number 4445 are worth.....

£4741 8s

All that royall fishing or fishpond commonly called...the great poole...being bounded with the scite of the Castle on the East the aforesaid Parke and Chase on the South West and north p[ar]tes thereof and doth conteine in the whole
120[a] 0[r] 0[p]

All those fowre Watergrist or Corne Mills under one roofe commonly called..the Castle Mills.....being built wth tymber and covered with tyle and now in the p[re]sent poss[es]sion of Gilbert Howe gent and worth upon the Improved value[er] ann[um]

£30

The Earl of Monmouth is allowed by his said patent [15 March 1626] 12d per diem and also a certain annuity or yearly pension of £40 pa for the rearacon and maintenance of the walls and buildings of the said Castle...Memorandum the said Earle of Monmouth hath beene constantly (as wee are informed) allowe by the Receiver for the time being his said Annuity and hath not laid out anything about the repairing of the said Castle since 24th of July last [1649] and very little for many years past.

There is remaining in the hands of --- Pawlett Gent who liveth in p[ar]te of the p[re]mises of money received and to be received of Capt Gilbert for the spoyle made by the soulders of the Lead Iron and other things there 20 nobles And also there is in his hands 15 barres of Iron 122 Casements eight frames of casem[en]ts and 150 ponds of lead which wee have valued with the rest of the materials. There are severall p[ar]cells of land which belong to severall p[er]sons that lye within the pale of Chase which we have deducted out thereof.

(Source: NA E317/22; WCRO CR311/54)

Appendix VIII Correspondence of Capt. Adam Baynes

Letter from Col. Robert Lilburne to Capt Adam Baynes:

SR, - I give you very kind thanks for you letter by this post, and your readiness to accommodate these gentlemen (my friends) with that money; but I have one suite more unto you (which I hope Mr. Beale nor Mr. Goldsmith will think much at), and that is to desire you to pay unto Mr. Jacob Towley, at the Golden Leg, Cheapside, London, one hundred pounds for my use and to charge it upon me here, for I am shortly to return, and know not how to be supplied with money unless you help me to this return; which I hope, if possible, you will do it for me, and let me receive two words from you by the next. Mr. Margetts being come up with news of surrender of this castle will (I know) acquaint you more fully with particulars that I can write, that I shall not need to trouble you with repetitions, nor would I willingly be the relater of the bad success your horse had at Clifford Moor. The chief news is now that the grand jury at York, the judge, and the committee, and all most all this county, are about petitioning to get this castle pulled down. Our forces are sent several ways to quarter; viz. : Major Generall's, part to Lincolnshire, part to Darbysire, and I think your troop is one that goes to the latter; my regiment, part in Rutlandshire and part in Leicestershire, and two in Lancashire; Col. Rookeby, part in Darbyshire, three troops in Leicestershire, and two in Lancashire; Col. Bright's regiment about Chesterfield and Rotherham, Col. Fairfax in the West Riding, Col. Mauleverar in the in Nottinghamshire, Col. Wastall's in the North Riding, and the loose companies in the East Riding, and one troop there, and one about Doncaster, and one in Cleveland. This is all at present from

Your very assured friend and servant,
Rob. Lilburne

Pontef., 24th Mar., 1648
Capt. Baynes.

Lambert to Capt. Baynes:

SIR, - I am glad to hear that Pontefract Castle is to be demolished. I beseech you make it your business to expedite that work, and, if possible, procure the votes and orders to them that are to see it done to be sent down by the next votes and orders to them that are to see it done to be sent down by the next post. I pray you advise with the Judge Advocate therein, and neglect no time to expedite it (as you well know) very much concerns the quiet these parts. I have no for the present, but remain

Your assured loving friend,
J. Lambert

Second letter to Baynes:

SIR, - I write to you a large letter the last week concerning business; but not being rightly directed it was returned to me again this week, which I have here enclosed sent you, and give you thanks for your care and pains in my business. I have made enquiries into the Queen's Revenues about Pontefract, and find it to be a very distracted thing, there being very little demaine land; but so much as is I intend to get surveyed, and to bring the particulars thereof with me when I come up, which I intend to do very shortly. I also purpose to make inquiry of some other demaine lands belonging to the same revenue here in the north, that is may be, with convenience, the want of the other may be supplied.

I desire you to advise with my friends above. And if you have so much time, to return me an answer by the next post; which is all at present from

Yr assured friend,

J. Lambert

April the 7th, 1649

3rd letter to Baynes:

SIR, - I have received yours (for which I give you thanks,) and also the order for demolishing of Pontefract Castle, and have great assurance of the effectual and speedy demolishing thereof; all men declaring much freeness for the effecting thereof. Upon Monday next the workmen begin, and, first, they are to take down the great tower. Sir, I desire you to continue your intelligence: which is all at present from

Your assured friend to serve you,

J. Lambert

(Source: Holmes 1887)

Appendix IX Petition to slight Pontefract and Middleham Castles (Yorkshire Grand Jury)

Petition and presentment of the grand juries of the County of York, for the demolishing of Pontefract and Midlam [Middleham] Castles

That this day God hath delivered the grand fatal delinquent to her country (Pontefract Castle) by your forces...being now put into our hands, the price of much treasure, and more blood; we humbly crave, that those walls which have harboured so much tyranny and oppression, may not stand, but be levelled with the ground, that this nest and cage of all villainy may be destroyed, that those unclean birds which have now left it, may never roost themselves again there.

And whereas the very demolishing of it will draw with it an immense charge upon an exhausted country, we further pray this honourable parliament, so far to commiserate our poor country...that order may be given for the sale of the materials in it, to help to demolish itself: And we make further bold to acquaint you, that this will be...an act of so great mercy and justice, that you may thereby gain a stronger hold in the affections of our poor countrymen, to whom for these seven years last, it hath been so great a scourge and terror: We also humbly offer to your consideration Midlam [Middleham] Castle, lately a garrison, that it may be made untenable, and no longer fit for a garrison, at the country's charge, the materials being restored to the owner.

—Thomas Styringe, Ric Frank, Will. Dalton, Will Rowsby, Thom. Hardey, Ra. Elyesson, Rob. Lawson, John Hindsley, Ric. Manby, Will Langthorn, Cha. Campleshony, John Wythes, Isaac Newton, John Peirse, John Ellis, Rob. Stoop, Ralph Wilberfoss, Will Gaithorn, Rob. Wolf, Thom. Myers, Jo. Langthorn, John Johnson, Rob. Wildon, Benj. Jackson, Nathan Eyre, Will. Holdesworeh, Will Develary.

—General Assizes at York

That the castle of Pontefract from the beginning of the late wars, hath been a continual great oppression and grievance to the county. That while it was in the enemy's hand, it was a nest of robbers and destroyers of the people and did cost the country many thousands to regain it. That while it was in the hands of our friends, it was a heavy and useless burden to the neighbours, and in the end was betrayed back into the hands of our enemies. That it hath of late, and since that last treachery, cost above £200,000 to regain it again. That to prevent the like insupportable miseries as we have formerly suffered, and may possibly suffer again, it is the earnest desire of these grand juries, in behalf of themselves and the rest of the county, that the said castle may be pulled down, and totally slighted, and that the county may have the materials for doing it.

CWT 49-03-29 (Minster Library)

Appendix X Petition to slight Pontefract Castle (The Town)

To the supream authority of England, the Co'mons assembled in Parliament. The humble petition of the Ma[y]or, Aldermen, and all the well-affected Inhabitants of the Towne of Pontefract.

HUMBLY SHEWETH

THAT the Towne of Pontefract since the beginning of these unhappy warres hath beene greatly impoverishes and depopulated through the setting and continueing a Garrison in that Castle w'ch hath occaconed two severall tedious and chargeable Leagures to the great effusion of much pretious blood, the utter ruining of no lesse then 200 dwelling houses and upwards (whose confused heapes are lively and speaking Monuments of the Enemies cruelty and yo' Peticoners' misery) the incredible decay of tradeing and commerce, the unavoidable hinderance and interrupcon of Tillage, The totall undoing of many well affected p'sons and families, the sadd devastacon of the place of the publiq: worship amongst us. All w'ch damages sustained by yo'poore Peticioners amounts unto the full value of 40000li. and upwards, yet hath God through his blessinge upon the unwearied pains of o'r forces there, once more opened a doore of hope for o' Recovery of that Garrison.

MAY it therefore please yo' Hono'rs seriously to consider the sadd desolacons of o'poore Towne, the past and the p'sent pressures, yea unsupportable burthens of yo' poore Peticoners by meanes of the said Garrison, And to appointe the same (immediately upon the Rendicon) to be wholly razed downe and demolished. And further to allot so much of the materials of Lead and Timber towards the repaireing of o' place of publiq: worship and reedifying of an habitacon for a Minister as shall amount unto 1000li. That so the true cause of o' former miseries and future feares being removed. Yo' Peticoners may both be encouraged and inabled to serve yo' hono'rs in all yo' just and equitable comaunds w'th their lives and fortunes.

And you' Peticoners shall daily pray &c.

SIGNED in the name and by the consent of the Aldermen and all the well affected in the Towne of Pontefract.

By me

Edward Fielde, My[y]or

(cited in Holmes 1882, 27)

Appendix XI Lambert's letter concerning Pontefract

Major General Lambert's letter to speaker about demolishing Pontefract Castle (chapter 7)

I have likewise taken upon me the boldness to present unto you the humble desires of the Mayor, Aldermen, and well-affected inhabitants of the Town of Pontefract, who earnestly pray for the demolishing that Castle; and though I shall not undertake to advise you therein, yet I must needs be witness with them, that I conceive their Petition contains nothing but truth, and that this Castle hath been occasion of ruin to diverse families in that town, besides the great loss and prejudice to the country adjacent, who have suffered equally with them in all particulars, except for absolute destruction of their houses; and therefore I shall humbly offer it as my opinion, that your granting hereof will not only be a great satisfaction to the well-affected of these parts, but will be of advantage to them in the avoiding the like evils...

CWT 49-03-29 (Minster Library)

Appendix XII Orders from the West Riding Committee

West Riding Committee [29-30]:

40 Aprilis 1649.-By the Committee of the Westridinge of the County of Yorke. In pursuance of an Order of the hon'ble house of the Co'mons in Parliament assembled datd the 27th of March last for the totall demolisheing of the Castle of Pontefract and levelling of the same to the ground. It is ordered that the Castle be accordingly demolished, As followeth,

First, That Mr Edward Fielde, now Majo' of Pontefract, Mr Robert More, Mr Robert Franke, Mr Matthew Frank, Mr John Ramsden, Mr Christopher Longe, and Capt John Ward, or any foure of them shall agree, direct and order the manner and order how the Lead, Timber, Iron, and other materialls of the said castle shalbee pulled downe, sold, and disposed of, and their agreem'ts in that behalfe to be sett downe in Writeing under their handes ina booke to be provided purposely for that end and for keeping the accounts touching the said service.

2ly. That the said gentlemen before named shall from time to time shew forth the said booke of orders and accounts, and be directed by the gentlemen of the said Com'ittee for the Westridd, and in case any one of them shall demaunde a sight of the said booke and an account of their proceedings, The said Referrees or Trustees of the said Towne of Pontefract shall readily give satisfaction therein. So as the said Committee may from time to time be informed touching the progresse of the said business.

3ly. It is intended and agreed that a full p'fect and finall account of the sale of the said Lead and materialls and necessary disbursmts shall bee rendred and given upp to the said Committee of the cleare Overplus (allowance being made to the said Towne of Pontefract of One thousand poundes according to the said Order of Parliament.

4ly. It is thought fitt that the Country be required to come in, and assist the demolishing of the walls, and filling upp the graftes about the said Castle, w'ch the said Com'ittee doe order to be accordingly either in that or any other respect as they the said Trustees shall coneave may most conduce to the effect[30]tual carrying on and speedy finishing of the said worke, according to the said Order.

Lastly. The said Majo' and thither Trustees of the Towne of Pontefract before named for the manifestacon of their engagement to p'forme in each respect as is herein above specified, and as shalbee further directed unto them by the said Co'mittee doe also subscribe their nanes herunto together with the gents of the said Co'mittee at this p'sent meetinge at the generall Sessions of the Peace holden at Wakefeild for the said Westridd the 4th day of April, 149.

Charles Farefax
Rob Barwicke
Henry Arthington
Thomas Hoyle
Darcy Wentworth
Wm. Armitage
Thomas Dickinson
John Savile de Methley

Edward Fielde, Ma[y]or
Robt More
John Ramsden
Matthew Franke
Chris Longe

(cited in Holmes 1882, 29-30)

Appendix XIII Pontefract demolition accounts

(Source: Ian Roberts (2002) Pontefract Castle: Archaeological Excavations 1982-86. Leeds: West Yorkshire Archaeology Service. Mention After Holmes 1887):

Transcript of the 1649 Demolition Accounts (After Holmes 1887)

A True Accompt of the Value of all the Materials belonging the Castle of PONTEFRACT, sold: And of the moneys received, and Debts owing: Also the Charge of the demolishing the same

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
<i>IMPRIMIS:</i> Moneys received for Lead	1540	07	02
Moneys received for Timber	0201	07	10
Moneys received for Iron	0037	02	04
	1179	17	04
The Charge of Demolishing	0777	04	06
Moneys allotted into the Town	1000	00	00
The rest due unto the Common-Wealth	0002	10	10
<i>Debts owing for Materials, which are also due unto the Common-Wealth</i>			
For Lead	100	09	09
For Timber	042	04	02
For Iron	002	11	07
	145	11	07

The PARTICULARS, OF ALL THE ABOVE RECITED Accompt are as, in this BOOK, followeth.

The 5th of APRIL, 1649.

The Charges of the Demolishing of the Castle of PONTEFRACT, ARE, IN Particular, as followeth.

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
1A. <i>IMprimis</i> , An Agreement made with JOHN HARRISON for demolishing the <i>Round tower</i> , for which paid him	080	10	00
2A. An Agreement made, the same time, with THOMAS LAKE, and Others, for the pulling down the <i>Barbacan Wall</i> , for which paid	020	05	00
3A. Paid THOMAS THURSTAN, for levelling the Earthen Mount, call'd <i>Nevill's MOUNT</i> , and the <i>Barbacan Wall</i> , from the <i>Great Stable</i> to the <i>Low Draw-Bridge</i>	010	00	00
4A. Paid JASPER ELLIS, by an Order from the Committee of the 27 th of <i>April</i> , for Moneys laid out, about the removing the Ammunition from <i>Pontefract Castle</i> to <i>York</i> , and for carrying it up in <i>Clifford Tower</i>	004	04	00
	114	19	00

PAID

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
5A. <i>Lancelot Lamb</i> , and Others, for taking down the Timber from the <i>King's Tower</i> , <i>Queen's Tower</i> , and <i>Round-Tower</i> ; and other Buildings about the same	035	00	00
6A. Paid JOHN HARRISON, and Others, for demolishing the Two Skreens, from the <i>Gate-House</i> to the <i>Round-Tower</i> , and Thence to the <i>Treasurer-Tower</i>	034	00	00
7A. Paid THOMAS TAYLER and Others, for the Timber taking down from the <i>Chapel</i> , <i>Constable Tower</i> , and all the rest of the Buildings to the <i>Gate House</i>	035	00	00
8A. Paid TATTERSALL, JOHN SMITH and Others, for taking down the Timber from off the two <i>Gate Houses</i>	002	00	00
9A. Paid TATTERSALL, JOHN SMITH and Others, for taking down the Timber of the <i>Treasurer-Tower</i> , <i>Gascoygne-Tower</i> , the <i>Great Kitchen</i> , and so to the <i>Great Hall</i>	034	05	00

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
10A. Paid them more for the Great <i>Hall</i> Timber, and the <i>Gate- House</i> taking down	012	05	00
	152	12	06
11A. Paid SIMON PROCTER for demolishing the <i>King</i> and <i>Queen's Tower</i> , and all the Buildings betwixt the same, the Sum of	104	05	06
12A. Paid THOMAS LAKE, and Others, for demolishing the two Out <i>Gate-Houses</i> , and the Skreen by the <i>Constable-Tower</i>	015	06	08
13A. Paid EDWARD WILSON for demolishing the <i>Constable- Tower</i> , and all the other Buildings from the <i>King's Tower</i> to the <i>Gate House</i> : As also the <i>Treasurer Tower</i> , <i>Gascoigne Tower</i> , and Great Kitchen, and all the Buildings from the Skreen unto The Great <i>Hall</i> , the Sum of	201	00	00
14A. Paid EDWARD HANDSON for pulling down the Skreen between the Upper <i>Gate-House</i> , and the <i>Round Tower</i> ; also for the <i>Guard-House</i>	001	10	00
15A. Paid JAMES JOLLY for pulling of the Iron from off the three Gates, the two Draw-Bridges; and the Timber of the Low Draw-Bridge taking up	002	16	00
16A. Paid for filling up the Graft at the Low Draw-Bridge, and pulling down Part of the Skreen close by the <i>Constable Tower</i>	001	07	00
	326	05	06
17A. A Paid three Labourers for removing Timber out of the Fall of a Tower	00	03	00
18A. Paid for taking down the Timber from <i>Swillington Tower</i>	01	13	04
19A. Paid JOHN OXLEY, and THOMAS LEE, for smelting of Lead into Pigs	04	01	00
20A. Paid for filling up the Graft at the Upper Draw-Bridge, and the Chapel Walls <i>pulling</i> down	04	10	00
21A. Paid SIMON PROCTOR for felling down <i>Swillington Tower</i>	08	10	00

22A. Paid SIMON PROCTOR more, in regard we did conceive that he had a loosing Bargain upon former work done by him	04	00	00
23A. Moneys expended upon several Messengers sending abroad into several Parts of the Country to seek out experienced Workmen, for the speedy demolishing of the Castle: And also for Moneys expended at several Contracts making: As also Moneys given to Workmen for their Encouragement at the Falls of several Towers: With other incident Charges	20	00	00
	42	17	04
24A. Paid for bareing of Timber from under the Fall of the <i>Constable-Tower</i>	002	14	00
25A. Paid for two Paper-Books, and to the Justice's Clerks, for drawing the Orders betwixt the Committee and the Trustees	000	10	00
26A. Given to a maimed Workman, that was to return to his own Home at <i>Malton</i> , towards his Charges	000	05	00
27A. Given to LANCELOT LAMB for his Care and good service in the Work	000	10	00
28A. Paid 7 Soldiers, by Order from Capt WARD, for work done by them	000	07	00
29A. Paid for 5 Stone and 5 Pounds of Iron for making Crows for pulling off Lead	000	14	08
30A. Paid FRANCIS BRADLEY for Crows making, and Shovels Shoeing	004	04	00
31A. Paid several Labourers for Work done, as appears by a Note in MR LONG'S hands	003	11	05
32A. Paid JOHN SMITH for Work done by him	002	10	00
33A. Paid Six Carpenters for loading Timber that was secured from burning by the Soldiers, and surveying the rest of the Timber	001	00	00
	016	06	01

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
34A. Paid GEORGE RENNARD for taking Crooks out of the Walls	000	10	00
35A. Paid LAKE and HANDSON for demolishing the Great <i>Hall</i> , and the inner <i>Gate-House</i>	037	06	08
36A. Paid JOHN OXLEY, and his three Men, for several Days Work for taking the Lead of the <i>Castle</i> down	005	00	00
37A. Paid for Lime and Workmanship for the two <i>Draw-Bridges</i> walling up of either side	001	10	00
38A. Paid RICHARD LYLE for the Loan of his Beam and Weights for weighing of Lead	000	05	04
39A. Paid for Cools to several Guards, to secure the Timber from Burning	000	18	00
40A. Paid several Draughts for leading Timber out of the <i>Castle Garth</i> , to secure it from the Soldiers	003	02	08
41A. Paid Labourers for several Bulwarks pulling down, about and near the Castle	000	12	00
42A. Paid two Counsellors their Fees, for Advice how to proceed in Suit, and in whose Names, for materials sold, and not paid for	001	00	00
	050	04	08

Paid by Mr ROBERT MOORE to several Workmen, and Labourers, as appears by his Note of Particulars, as followeth

43A. For the First Week	01	03	10
44A. For the Second Week	05	15	06
45A. For the third week	06	19	09
46A. For the 4 th Week	14	14	06
47A. For the 5 th Week	09	16	10
48A. For the 6 th Week	05	00	02
49A. For the 7 th Week	04	17	04

50A. For the 8 th Week	17	16	00
51A. For the 9 th Week	04	00	02
52A. For the 10 th Week	03	15	04
	73	19	05
Total of all the Disbursements for the demolishing the Castle amounts unto the sum of	777	04	06

April the 18th, 1649.

LEAD taken off Pontefract Castle, and sold as followeth.

1B. Sold to the Church-Wardens of <i>Barnsley</i> 20 Hundred Weight at	010	02	06
2B. Sold unto Mr <i>Richard Wilcocke</i> 20Hd. Wt. at	010	02	06
3B. Sold unto Mr <i>Samuel Childe</i> , of <i>Leeds</i> , 40 Fother of Lead, at 11/5s comes to	450	00	00
4B. Sold him more 9 Fother, 12 Hundred, and 24 Pounds at the same Price, comes to	107	19	09
5B. He rests indebted for Wood for smelting of Lead	002	10	00
6B. Sold unto Mr <i>Winter</i> , of <i>Hull</i> , 4 Fother of Lead at	045	00	00
7B. Sold unto Mr <i>John Skurr</i> one Web of Lead, 21 Stone, and 12 Pounds at	001	10	00
8B. Sold unto Mr <i>Edward Rhodes</i> , 84 Fother of Lead, 14 Hundred, 2 Quarters, and 5 Pounds at	940	00	00
	1567	04	09
9B. Sold unto <i>Grace Briggs</i> 3 Webs of Lead, &c. 9 Hundr. And 13 Pounds at	05	00	00
10B. Sold unto Sir <i>Thomas Wentworth</i> one Fother of Lead	11	05	00
11B. Sold unto Lieutenant <i>Ward</i> 11 Stone and 5 Pounds at	00	17	00
12B. Sold unto <i>Bryan Fostead</i> 30 Stone of Lead	02	05	00
13B. Sold unto the Lord <i>Savile</i> 20 Hun. Weight of Lead at	10	02	06

14B. Sold unto Mr <i>John Savile</i> , of <i>Methley</i> , 3 Fother and 13 Pounds	33	16	00
15B. Sold unto a Potter 18 Stone and 3 Pounds at	01	07	10
16B. Sold unto <i>Francis Bradley</i> 21 Stone Lead at 1s 6d &c	01	11	06
17B. Sold unto Mr <i>Robert Moor</i> 11 Hundr. 1 quarter and 17 Pounds, at 11s 5d &c	05	15	06
18B. Sold unto Mr <i>John Clayton</i> 18 Stone and 4 Pounds at	01	07	00
19B. Sold unto <i>Edward Field</i> 43 Stone and 10 Pounds at	02	15	10
	76	03	02
20B. The Total of all the Lead sold amounts unto the sum of 1640 Pounds 16 Shillings, 11 Pence; whereof received in Money	1540	07	02
21B. Moneys owing for Lead to ballance the Account, above written, as follows.			
Sir <i>Edward Rhodes</i> Debtor for Lead	040	00	00
22B. Mr <i>Samuel Childe</i> , of <i>Leeds</i> , rests indebted for Lead	057	19	09
23B. Further Mr <i>Childe</i> rests indebted for Wood for Smelting his Lead	002	10	00
	100	09	09
24B. The Total of all the Iron, belonging to the Castle, is 79 Hundr. 3 Quart. And 27 Pounds sold at 10s per Hundred, amounts unto the Sum of 40 Pou[n]ds, whereof received in Money	037	02	04
25B. Moneys owing for Iron to balance the Account as above said. Col <i>Overton</i> , by an Order from the Lord General, for the Publick Service for Draw-Bridges for Hull, had Iron Teams delivered him to the Value of in Money	002	17	08
May the 7 th , 1649, Money received for Timber, as followeth.			
26B. Rec. Coll. <i>Tho. Rookeby</i>	07	00	00
27B. Mr <i>Birkebecke</i>	01	03	00

28B. <i>William Nicholson</i>	02	01	00
29B. <i>William Jennings</i>	01	06	08
30B. <i>Mr Leonard Ward</i>	23	00	00
31B. <i>Robert Howson</i>	01	00	00
32B. <i>Thomas Thwaytes</i>	01	04	00
33B. <i>Richard Smith</i>	00	02	06
34B. <i>William Farrowe</i>	05	00	00
35B. <i>Grace Brigge</i>	08	00	00
36B. <i>Philip Austwicke</i>	01	02	00
37B. <i>William Hill</i>	00	18	00
38B. <i>Thomas Taylor</i>	04	10	00
39B. <i>Edward Fielde</i>	22	08	00
40B. <i>Richard Lyle</i>	02	11	00
41B. <i>Robert Sutton</i>	03	10	00
42B. <i>William Brame</i>	12	00	00
43B. <i>Francis Br[a]dley</i>	01	10	00
44B. <i>Zechariah Stable</i>	04	06	08
45B. <i>John Potter</i>	10	00	00
46B. <i>Tho Jackson and Robert Farrowe</i>	06	15	00
	119	07	10
47B. <i>William Wright</i>	04	06	08
48B. <i>Thomas Jackson</i>	01	00	00
49B. <i>Charles Tootell</i>	00	10	00
50B. <i>John Killinbecke</i>	10	00	00
51B. <i>Richard Turner</i>	00	18	00
52B. <i>Thomas Boswell</i>	02	00	00

53B. <i>Peter Outhwaite</i>	00	13	00
54B. <i>John Wattson</i>	09	10	00
55B. <i>Francis Lee</i>	02	12	00
56B. <i>Robert Bawlderton</i>	05	00	00
57B. <i>William Ward</i>	12	00	00
58B. <i>Mary Rothwell</i>	00	09	00
59B. <i>Thomas Feilde</i>	00	13	04
60B. Rec for <i>Timber</i> for the <i>Church</i>	20	00	00
61B. Timber for the Wind Mill	02	00	00
62B. Rec. of Mr John Scurr	03	00	00
63B. <i>John Wildman</i>	02	08	00
64B. Received for the Remainder of the Timber in <i>Brame</i> Garth	05	00	00
	82	00	00
65B. The Total of all the Timber sold comes to the Sum	201	07	00
66B. Moneys receiv'd for Glass	001	00	00
Debts owing for Timber as follows.			
67B. <i>William Farrows</i>	01	03	04
68B. Col <i>Overton</i> , by an Order from the Lord General for the Publick Service of <i>Hull</i> for Timber	08	06	00
69B. <i>George Wrigley</i> by Assignment from <i>John Potter</i>	03	00	00
70B. <i>Thomas Farrowe</i>	03	00	00
71B. Thomas Farrowe and Tho Jackson	03	05	00
72B. <i>Thomas Jackson</i>	04	01	06
73B. <i>Richard Cattle</i>	01	17	00
74B. <i>John Hodgshon</i>	02	08	08
75B. <i>John Box</i>	02	10	00

76B. <i>Thomas Eaden</i>	01	10	00
77B. <i>Thomas Boswell</i>	02	00	00
78B. <i>John Ambler</i>	03	06	08
79B. <i>Mr John Lambe</i>	02	16	00
80B. <i>Bryan Fostead</i>	01	10	00
81B. <i>Richard Fostead</i>	01	10	00

The 11th of April, 1651.

We, the Trustees, authorized by Order of the Committee of the West-Riding of the County of YORK, for the demolishing of PONTEFRACT Castle, by their Order, dated the 4th of April, 1649, in Pursuance of an Order of the Honourable House of Commons, in Parliament assembled, dated the 27th of March, 1649, in that Behalf made; do declare the Account before-mentioned to be a full and true Account of our Receipts, and Payments, and all the Actings concerning that Service. Witness our Hands,

Jo. Warde.
 Robert More.
 Matthew Franck.
 Edward Fielde.
 John Ramsden.
 Christopher Longe.
 John Skurr.

GLOSSARY OF TERMS

(As used in this thesis)

Angle roll *Convex moulding, usually three-quarters of a circle in section.*

Architectural salvage *The removal of building/structural features, often ornate or decorative, for use elsewhere.*

Artillery Cannon.

Ashlar/Ashlar masonry *Squared building stone/Masonry composed of rectangular stones that are bonded with mortar.*

Battery *Any place where artillery is mounted.*

Building materials salvage *The removal of structural components (e.g. timber, stone, metals) for use elsewhere.*

Buttery *Service room used to store ale.*

Buttress *Stone structure built against a wall, usually in a perpendicular direction, to provide strength to the wall.*

Castle *1.) A fortified building or set of buildings 2.) A large magnificent house belonging to a member of the aristocracy 3.) The citadel and strongest part of the fortifications of a town.*

Compounding *The paying of a substantial fine to Parliament by a Royalist in order to recover part or all of a sequestered estate. See also 'Sequestration'.*

Corbel *Stone projecting from a wall, usually in order to support the weight of timber or stone above it.*

Course/Coursed masonry *Layer of masonry laid out horizontally and bonded with mortar.*

Crenellation or battlement *Fortified parapet with regular openings. Serves a defensive as well as decorative purpose.*

Curtain wall (inner and outer) *Enclosing wall connecting two bastions or towers.*

English Civil War(s) *Period of armed conflict and intermittent political and social upheaval occurring in Britain and Ireland between 1642 and 1651. See also First Civil War; Second Civil War; Third Civil War.*

Facing stone *A veneer of stone used to finish the surface of a rougher or less attractive rubble core.*

First Civil War *Period of armed hostilities between 1642 and 1646.*

Follow-on pattern *Pattern created when the removal of a facing stone has led to the removal of those adjacent, eventually creating a larger pattern of exposed rubble.*

Frontispiece *An ornamental porch.*

Gatehouse *Building, enclosing, or gateway for a castle or manor house.*

Gunpowder *Explosive mixture of potassium nitrate, charcoal, and sulphur (75:15:10).*

Indeterminate damage *Damage to a castle that is recognisable and significant, but the origin of which is difficult to determine (such as whole sections of missing wall). Can also be regarded as 'negative evidence'.*

Joist/Joist hole *Timber stretched from wall-to-wall to support floor boards/the hole in the wall into which such timber fits.*

Keep *Main and usually strongest tower of a castle.*

Malignant *Pejorative term used by both sides to describe the other, but used more extensively by the Parliamentarians for their Royalist adversaries.*

Mantelpiece *The ornamental structure of wood, marble, stone, or brick above and around a fireplace.*

Mere *Lake or marsh.*

Moat *Broad, deep trench usually filled with water and surrounding the ramparts of a castle.*

Mortar *1.) Mixture of lime with sand and water, used as a bond between bricks or stone or as a covering on a wall. 2.) Muzzle-loading cannon that fires low-velocity shells in high trajectories over a short range.*

Parliamentarian *A supporter of Parliament. 'Support' includes financial and/or military assistance, or known/suspected sympathies.*

Pele *Single-tower castle, predominantly found in the Anglo-Scottish borders.*

Picking *The destruction by hand of a structure or any of its architectural features, usually involving picks, mattocks, shovels, and other crude instruments. Can involve knocking materials off haphazardly, or carefully removing for re-use elsewhere.*

Pilaster *Shallow pier used to buttress wall.*

Planing *To reduce a wall or tower in height by picking.*

Plinth *Projecting base of a wall.*

Portcullis *Defensive grating, made of iron or timber, which moves vertically along grooves cut into the jambs of a gateway.*

Primary damage *Damage to a structure or structural feature where the principle or sole motivation for the act was the desire to destroy (e.g. parapets knocked off).*

Putlog hole *Hole left in masonry to accommodate a horizontal timber scaffolding beam.*

Recusant *Individual who remained Roman Catholic after the Reformation. Forced to compound and denied office.*

Relieving arch *Arch built above the lintel of a door or window to channel the weight of the wall to either side.*

Robbing *Archaeological term for the removal of materials (usually stone) from a building or structure. The term has no legal connotations. See also 'Theft'.*

Royalist *An individual believed to have been a supporter of Charles I and the crown during the English Civil War. 'Support' includes financial and/or military assistance, or known/suspected sympathies.*

Rubble *Unsquarred or 'rubbish' stone not laid in courses.*

Rubble core *The interior of a wall comprised of rubble, often covered by an external skin of coursed masonry.*

Secondary damage *Damage to a structure or structural feature where the damage is an unintentional by-product of another act (e.g. the damage inflicted to a wall when a timber beam is removed).*

Second Civil War *Period of armed hostilities occurring in 1648.*

Sequestration *The seizure and use of an enemy's estates. See also 'Compounding'.*

Siege *Offensive operations to capture a castle, often entailing cutting off supply lines to starve a garrison, and/or assaulting with artillery or troops.*

Slighting *The non-siege damaging of high status buildings, their immediate landscape, their physical remains, and/or their contents.*

Theft *The unauthorised/illegal removal of castle building materials, often by members of local or nearby communities. See also 'Robbing'.*

Third Civil War *Period of armed hostilities largely occurring in 1649 and 1650 in Ireland and Scotland, and ending with the defeat of Charles II at the Battle of Worcester in 1651.*

Turret *Small tower.*

Undermining *The act of destabilising or collapsing a wall by removing support from below, either by removing earth underneath or by removing part of the wall itself.*

Wainscot *Fine oak panel-work for walls.*

Work ('slight the new works') *General term for temporary defensive structures, usually made of earth, constructed around the key positions of a castle or town.*

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Bibliographic Note: Several frequently referenced primary sources in the main text have not been individually listed here, but rather have been identified by their date or document number. These include Parliamentary records like the *Calendars State Papers Domestic* (CSPD), the *Journals of the House of Commons* (CJ), and the *Journals of the House of Lords* (LJ), all of which are held at the British Library (and can be accessed in a limited form online and/or at other libraries). The Thomason Tracts (also not listed here) are preceded in the text by 'TT' and can be viewed at the British Library or the Bodleian Library, Oxford. Similarly, all references in the text preceded by 'NA' denote primary source material held by the National Archives.

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