

'NATIONALISM' AND THE COLONIAL SITUATION
IN ALGERIA UNDER FRENCH RULE 1830-1962

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ABSTRACT

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The thesis seeks to situate the 1954-62 Algerian war within an intelligible theoretical framework. It outlines two different interpretations of Third World Nationalism. One, shared by orthodox liberal Western political scientists and even some Marxists, suggests that nationalism arose from the disintegration of 'traditional' society and the rise of 'modernity'; European-created towns were its cradle, 'Westernized' elites its midwives, and novel political language and organization its birthmarks. However, social anthropological insights into segmentary dynamics, together with Marxist analysis of the dialectics of colonialism, suggest that 'nationalist' manifestations must instead be related to built-in features of every, and special variables in each colonial situation. 'Nationalism' then evaporates as an analytical category describing a single, consistent pattern of behaviour at all levels of a total 'nation'.

Key aspects of the Algerian colonial situation are pinpointed. The indigenous political 'game' was an intricate, mobile pattern of segmentary groupings allied and opposed in competition for economic and 'saintly' resources, complicated by the claims of 'central' dynastic hegemonies and the wider moslem community. The colonial administration superimposed its own socio-economic norms and structures upon this, yet had neither the resources nor the will to do so thoroughly; its 'holding position', characterized by deliberate 'underadministration', both sought and tried to prevent revolutionary impact. This contradiction helped moslem society to survive the experience, as did a wide variety of defensive, evasive and adaptive strategies. The resultant bifurcation at the heart of the colonial situation deepened as native groups "retood the initiative".

The FLN exploited this context rather than created a new one. Its strength came from the combined solidarities of 'traditional' segmentary communities - entrenched in inaccessible regions long marked by armed resistance, social banditry and clandestine self-government - rather than from a small 'evolved' urban elite. It was not a closely-co-ordinated, seasoned or ideologically-disciplined vanguard party; it merely helped to make this a future possibility.

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CHAPTER ONE THE ORTHODOX INTERPRETATION OF NATIONALISM

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I. NATIONALISM

-i. The Concept of Nationalism

Nationalism is a notoriously vague catch-all concept. It may be used to describe either a kind of ideology, or a form of behaviour.

As an ideology, Halpern points out, "Nationalism can assert itself without at the same time demanding loyalty to any particular form of government or society, economic organization or values, or any particular religious beliefs. No other ideology presents as cheap a bargain".¹ Presumably, belief in the supreme value of 'the nation' is a basic feature of such an ideology. Yet this does not get us very far towards concrete definition, since the actual shape or content of this 'nation' lies firmly embedded in the subjective realm of the nationalist's judgement. Indeed, belief in the nation may be 'projective'; it may seek to bring a nation into existence rather than to cherish or foster one which already exists. One man's nation is another man's negation of nationality.

As a description of a coherent mode of behaviour, the term 'nationalism' has also been used in many ways. It may refer only to particular kinds of organization pursuing specified goals in a specific context. Alternatively, the label may cover activities lacking any formal organization or explicit articulation of ideals. Nationalism may be considered appropriate only for the more or less clearly defined 'political' sphere, or it may be extended to other spheres - cultural, for example, religious, or economic.

Clearly, it is not a primary, irreducible concept, but very much a secondary one. Beyond a certain depth of analysis, it becomes an obstacle to understanding. One sympathizes with Minogue's conclusion that "the concept of nationalism is a miscellany of beliefs, images, and assumptions

quite unsuited to academic purposes".² Whoever does employ the term must define it closely, or at least indicate precisely which of several possible definitions he is adopting - and then stick to it.

-ii. Third World Nationalism

These problems are compounded when the term is imported into discussion of the political process in the Third World. Anachronism is immediately invited, since the term 'nationalism' originated in Europe, was used to describe certain European phenomena and preoccupations, and inevitably trails certain connotations behind itself. If we use the concept of nationalism in the Third World context, we structure our viewpoint in a quite marked way. The political process is looked at from the outside in, as it were, or from the top down. The problems of nationality^{are} projected upon the real political process from the outside. The analytical starting-point, the given, becomes the 'nation-to-be', and discussion then proceeds in terms of what changes are necessary to make this materialize. Naturally, this inhibits looking at the political process from the inside outwards, or from the bottom upwards - through the eyes of local social groups, and in the light of indigenous values and political culture. If these latter phenomena figure in the analysis at all, they play the role of obstacles: those things which must be changed or abolished if nationhood, in the externally-defined sense, is to be implanted and strengthened.

The fact that the term is widely employed by 'nationalist' parties, politicians, and intellectuals in the Third World itself, does not affect these consid^{er}ations, in as far as they may represent a partly European-educated elite within their own societies, with special economic and social

interests. In a partial sense, they may represent an 'inside' rather than an 'outside' view, but within that 'inside' tradition they still represent a 'centralizing' perspective - one which sees (defines) questions from the top down.³

It is certainly possible to construct a fairly consistent picture from such an 'external' vantage-point. The chosen perspective slants evidence in such a way as seemingly to confirm the choice of perspective. But by pre-structuring data we may produce no more than a 'dialectic of the surfaces'⁴ - logical, but over-mechanistic, and out of touch with the more profound and everyday reality. This all too often proves true of the political science of the Third World.

-iii. Political Science and Social Anthropology

In some respects, the use of the concept of nationalism in the Third World context distinguishes Political Scientists from Social Anthropologists. This is certainly the view of Coleman, who distinguishes "generally accepted political concepts elaborated with specific reference to developments in the Western world (i.e. state, nation, nationality, nationalism)" from the explanatory language used by Social Anthropologists in the African sphere (e.g. tribe, lineage, chief, segmentarism).⁵ Coleman pushes the claims of Political Science by suggesting that the former set of conceptual tools, first used to analyze the European political culture, is more useful for the understanding of present-day Africa. Such terminology is not anachronistic, he claims, because "the concept and institution of the modern nation-state, towards the creation of which African nationalism tends to be directed, is distinctly Western in its form and content". This statement well illustrates the technique of several Political Scientists who take a projected 'nation-to-be'

as their analytical starting-point; "a post-tribal, post-feudal terminal community" in Coleman's words "which has emerged (sic) from the shattering forces of disintegration that characterizes modernity". The projected future (the outside) thus takes ^mpriority over the actual present (the inside), or the 'essential' present over the concrete past! The past may survive in the actual present, and thus by implication there may be residual utility in Social Anthropological terminology, but because it has no future it has no part in the 'essential' present. Nationalism thus performs the task of injecting the future into the present, and of destroying the past; it plays a key role for Political Scientists.

By contrast, Social Anthropologists have little time for 'nationalism' as a concept. The term comes awkwardly to such lips. Consistent differences between Social Anthropologists and Political Scientists over the interpretation of the same social reality rarely take the form of rivalry over the precise meaning of the term nationalism. We must have to manufacture such a clash if we wish to bring out the points of discord, because Social Anthropologists manifest their disagreement simply by not employing the word at all. They prefer, instead, to talk about specific 'reactions to the colonial situation'. Where the word is used, by Balandier for example,⁶ this is chiefly to point out the superficiality and anachronism of the conventional Political Science version. It is likely to be given an intensely localized meaning, and intimately linked with complex layers of social interaction.

Thus, in any discussion aimed at tempering the Political Science of the Third World with the considerable contributions of Social Anthropology, one of the first items on the agenda is the usefulness of such concepts as 'nationalism'.

II. ORTHODOX INTERPRETATIONS OF THIRD WORLD NATIONALISM

Various senses have been given to the word nationalism in analyses of social process in the Third World. These can be usefully grouped into two main traditions - the one, mainly associated with post-war American Political Scientists, and the other with Social Anthropologists. For the sake of labelling, they might be called the 'orthodox' and 'dynamic' interpretations of nationalism. There are a number of intermediate positions, and many inconsistencies.

-i. The Work of Coleman

A preliminary statement of the orthodox viewpoint can be found in the work of Coleman. The school of thought he represents is usually shot through with implicit assumptions rather than expounded in an explicit and systematic manner, so it is useful to dwell on his account in order to clarify its internal logic and definitional procedures.⁷

Though acknowledging that Third World nationalism is an intricate jumble of past and present social discontents and aspirations, Coleman argues that we must try to unravel and isolate its various strands. According to him, three distinct phenomena have too frequently been lumped together under the general heading of nationalism: traditionalist movements, syncretistic movements, and modernist movements. He considers that only the last of these are nation^alist movements proper - indeed, only certain groups within the category.

Traditionalist movements include 'primary resistance' to colonial conquest, and subsequent revolts against the implantation of colonial personnel or institutions. They also include 'nativism', by which he means 'nativistic, mahdistic, or messianic mass movements - usually of a magico-

religious character - which are psychological or emotional outlets for tensions produced by the confusions, frustration, or socio-economic inequality of alien rule". Resistance and Nativism are 'negative' in Coleman's view. They do no more than refuse the European; they are unable to construct a positive alternative to him.

Syncretism is also distinguished from nationalism proper. It comprises such phenomena as religious separatism, ^{and the formation of} kinship associations and tribal associations. The leadership of such tendencies, he argues, usually comes from a Westernized or semi-Westernized elite, but draws upon pre-colonial sources of loyalty, and presses on traditional pedals of control. However, it is not as wholly 'negative' as nativism; indeed it contains "an element of rationality", namely "an urge to recapture those aspects of the old which are compatible with the new, which it recognizes as inevitable and in some respects desirable".

Only certain elements of Modernism are to be regarded as 'nationalism proper'. Only nationalism proper is considered 'positive' and 'rational'. Coleman subdivides modernist movements into three; economic interest groups, nationalism proper, and pan-African or trans-territorial movements. Nationalism proper is "Organized and led by the Westernized elite, which is activated by the Western ideas of democracy, progress, the welfare state and national self-determination, and which aspires either a) to create modern independent African nation-states possessing an internal state apparatus and external sovereignty and all the trappings of a recognized member state of international society.... or b) to achieve absolute social and political equality and local autonomy within a broader Eur-African grouping.... or within what is manifestly a plural society".

Thus Coleman associates nationalism with those social groups which, by education (the 'intelligentsia') and/or economic role (the bourgeoisie, the middle-class, or the wage-earning urban workers), have adapted to or adopted a 'westernized' life style. He links nationalism with ideas expressed in terms of Western political culture; its driving ideas are "democracy, progress, the welfare state, and national self-determination". The same elite, who, during the colonial era, are nationalists in the narrow sense of seeking the abandonment of political sovereignty by the colonial power, are those who subsequently seek to build a 'modern nation'.

It is difficult not to conclude that such a modernization programme is what makes the elite, 'positive' and 'rational' in Coleman's eyes. 'Positive' and 'rational' are equated with acceptance of the Western political culture and rejection of the indigenous (or any other) political culture. Acceptance of Western political sovereignty is not a prerequisite, but opposition to this should be cast in forms which the Western sovereigns can understand and come to terms with. It should offer a measure of predictability within the Western cultural framework. Such organizations as formally constituted and structured political parties, with elected leaders, paid officials, dues-paying membership, journals, policy documents and conferences, are 'comprehensible' political forms, for example.

Not only are such manifestations embraced as 'nationalism proper', but Coleman regards them as the only truly political activities. He distinguishes between what is 'political' and what is 'politically consequential'. The excluded forms of behaviour, traditionalism and syncretism, undoubtedly have political consequences - in the colonial situation they pose problems for the colonial administration - but they are not themselves of a political character. "Each of the movements," he argues, "is in one way or another

a response to the challenge of alien rule, or of the intrusion of the disintegrating forces - and consequently the insecurity - of modernity"... but... "only nationalism is primarily political in that it is irrevocably committed to a positive and radical alteration of the power structure". The implicit definition of 'political' here - "irrevocable commitment to a positive and radical alteration of the power structure" - is vague and circumstantial, and perhaps it would be wrong to over-emphasize it. But 'positive' is the key word; as suggested, it connotes acceptance of the framework of Western political culture. Otherwise, more radical or 'total' attempts to alter "the power structure" in a colonial situation would seem to be such reactions as armed uprising, messianism, and refusal to play any part in the rudimentary colonial administrative framework. When Coleman speaks of the 'power structure' which needs "radical alteration", he means not so much the colonial administration as the indigenous 'traditional' political process. To be 'positive', to be 'political', is to seek to replace the colonial authority without merely returning to traditional forms of social organization and without transcending the basic structures donated by the colonial Administration. Only such a programme, and only such bodies as are clearly designed to bring about its realization, are truly nationalist.

Paradoxically, Third World nationalism becomes, ⁱⁿ Coleman's writings, the outcome of forces external to the society within which they operate. His definition excludes manifestations which draw their strength from indigenous (or other non-Western) sources. Nationalism substitutes itself for these; it feeds upon their decay. Rejection of Western political culture, and assertion or defence of alternative political values, are 'irrational' and 'negative' reactions.

Having delimited his idea of what constitutes nationalism, Coleman goes on to outline the sociological factors which he considers explain its growth: the rise of a money economy and wage labour, the growth of a middle-class, urbanization and social mobility, Western education and Christian evangelization, the eclipse of traditional authorities, the setting of new 'national' boundaries and the operation of centralized institutions within them, and (finally) a sense of frustration among "detrribalized, Western-educated, middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans" caused by continuing exclusion from full participation in this new social system.

The analysis is undoubtedly neat. It isolates one segment of political activity, what might be called 'elite nationalism', and tries to explain it in terms of a clear set of social factors. But confusion begins when he implies that this one segment of apparent reality wholly encapsulates the essence of change and development at various other levels of social reality. The problem then is not merely one of circular argument - elite nationalism proper depending on the emergence of a proper elite and a proper nation - but of distorted reality.

-ii. Liberal Western Political Science

Coleman is merely one representative of a very large school of thought seeking to equate Third World nationalism with 'modernization'. Sometimes the two are englobed within the terminology of "Nation-Building".⁸ As Minogue points out, "the commonest explanation of nationalism would have it as the political wing of a more general process of modernization".⁹ The idea is central to orthodox American political science. Rustow, for example, argues that: "Nationalism and the drive for modernity are today

two facets of the same social, cultural, and political revolution",¹⁰ and that nationalist political parties aim at "hastening the process of modernization of which the rise of national consciousness is itself but one facet".¹¹ Nationalism, according to this tradition, is linked sociologically with the emergence of new 'modern' social strata (especially middle-class and bourgeoisie, but also proletariat) in response to socio-economic changes set in motion by contact with advanced European countries. It is linked ideologically with the drive for 'modernization' and the building of a 'modern nation state'. And in organizational terms, it is identified with those political forms which are held to be characteristic of 'modern' political systems: above all, mass political parties, but also a miscellany of such things as newspapers, manifestoes, placard-bearing demonstrations, petitions, electoral campaigns, draft constitutions, strikes, boycotts etc. In other words, activities which are recognizably 'political' in terms of the European political culture.¹²

All these attributes of nationalism are virtually indistinguishable from factors associated with the shift from 'gemeinschaft' to 'gesellschaft'. Europe has apparently already made this shift since the 18th Century, and this school of thought believes that the Third World is undergoing exactly the same process. Nationalism is thus the sister of industrialization, urbanization, secularization, individualization, mass literacy, increased social mobility, and so forth. It arises as traditional society collapses.

There are two prongs to this identification of nationalism with modernization. One prong sees nationalism resulting from the actual emergence of various facets of modernity. Coleman exemplifies this: "Where nationalism manifests itself in considerable strength, it is evidence that disintegration of the old, and social mobilization around

the symbols of the new order, have occurred on a scale sufficient to weaken or destroy attachments and loyalties of the nationalist to pre-colonial socio-political units, either because they have been crushed and are beyond memory, or because they are unattractive or manifestly unsuitable as 'nations' in a modern world of nation-states".¹³ The other prong sees nationalism as an attempt to bring about these conditions of modernity. Gellner's remark is an example: "Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist".¹⁴

The two prongs of the argument are not contradictory but mutually supportive. This school of thought deals with what it calls transitional situations, in which modernization is never complete, and nationalism never straightforward. The appearance of clearly 'non-modern' aspects within a specific nationalist movement - aspects which cannot be defined in relation to the modernization issue - can be explained by a well-trodden definitional circle: they are not part of nationalism 'proper'; they are pre-nationalist, sub-nationalist, proto-nationalist, crypto-nationalist, non-nationalist, or perhaps even anti-nationalist.

The difficulty is that while, in one sense, nationalism is being used very broadly, associated with a world-wide social evolutionary trend, in another sense, when confronted with a specific Third World context, it has an extremely narrow and restrictive meaning. It is recognized only among the so-called 'modern' or even 'westernized' social strata. It must have definite and explicit goals. It must take specific organizational forms. So precise and demanding is its meaning, in fact, that the orthodox school of thought is often driven to conclude that such 'pure' nationalism nowhere exists, nor even can exist, in the Third World anyway. The price

of insistence on this straitened definition is that the word becomes irrelevant to the very empirical facts it was set up to describe. One symptom of lost relevance is confusion of what is with what ought to be. There is a tendency to resort to "Gap Theory" and "Requisite Theory", the former contenting itself with listing obstacles to pure nationalism, the latter with specifying attributes or pre-requisites of pure nationalism, without any serious attempt to understand what actually exists.¹⁵

There are several minor modifications to this orthodox thesis which identifies nationalism with modernization. Pye, for example, argues that "nationalism is only a necessary, but far from sufficient condition to ensure political development".¹⁶ Coleman asserts that though nationalism has been linked in the past with modernization, there is no guarantee that in the future they will not diverge.¹⁷ Ashford feels that ultimately, at least after the phase of independence from colonial rule, nationalism and modernization are bound to conflict.¹⁸ And others, for example Huntington¹⁹, stress that certain aspects of nationalism - such as mobilization - may be inconsistent with others - such as institutionalization. But such disputes smack more of petty confusion over in-bred terminology than of real disagreement over substantive issues. The identification of modernization with nationalism in the Third World is solidly established among a wide spread of scholars. So much is this so that, since the granting of formal independence from colonial rule to most of these areas, consideration of 'nationalism' has tended to be abandoned for a miscellany of virtual synonyms like 'mobilization', 'integration', 'development' and 'modernization'.

-iii. Marxism and Nationalism

Some components of Marxist analysis of 'nationalism' appear to echo basic assumptions of liberal Western political science, though other components contradict them. Marx's own work on nationalism and social change in the Third World is fundamentally 'Eurocentric' in tone.²⁰ For a direct expression of his views, only a miscellany of occasional articles and tracts exists. This is symptomatic; his analysis was neither systematically developed, nor nourished by direct observation. Where he discusses Third World communities, this is rather for purposes of contrast - to throw into relief the distinctive features of the capitalist West - than for intrinsic interest. The result, frequently, is caricature. Marx did not greatly differentiate between rural or pre-capitalist communities in Western Europe, and Third World society as a whole; he tended to assume that their respective fates under the impact of capitalist industrialization were identical.²¹ Indeed, we can glean his ideas more simply from his analysis of pre-capitalist formations in Europe - the French peasantry in his 'Eighteenth Brumaire' for example - than from his incidental jottings on colonized communities proper. To this extent, Marx shares the same blunt and distorted perspective as the orthodox liberal theorists of nationalism, and unimaginative elaborations of his methodological framework have entrenched this rigidity.

Many other features of Marx's analytical approach, however, greatly sharpen our perception of 'nationalist' phenomena. Dialectical materialism, for example, ensures that political institutions and ideas are constantly related to class structure and forces of production, rather than discussed in isolation. Most Marxists escape the morass of endlessly-subclassified

abstract concepts - for example, the cultural, psychological or ideological concomitants of social change - into which liberal political science so frequently sinks. In fact, the Marxist interpretation of nationalism must usually be deduced from the Marxist view of what constitutes a (modern) nation. Potekhin's formula is typical: a nation differs from just any grouping of population in that it has "a geographical division of labour and a regular exchange of products: in a word, a single market". As a corollary, it has a fully-developed class-structure.²²

Though the ingredients of this 'nation' strikingly resemble those of the 'modern nation' of liberal political science, the distinctive contribution of Marxism is its stress on the class basis of the national vision. Rather than referring in the abstract to 'modernity', 'national integration', or 'development', Marxism points out the specific class content of such concepts. "A nation," argues Potekhin, "can only come into existence under the capitalist system... and nations are the product of capitalist development".²² One social group is the midwife of this national revolution: the 'bourgeoisie'. This minority, Marx and Engels suggest, "keeps more and more doing away with the scattered state of the population, of the means of production, and of property; it has agglomerated population, centralized means of production, and has concentrated property in a few hands. The necessary consequence of this was political centralization. Independent, or but loosely connected provinces, with separate interests, laws, governments, and systems of taxation, become lumped together into one nation, with one government, one code of laws, one national class-interest, one frontier, and one customs tariff".²³ The process of 'nation-building' is thus at the same

time a unifying force, and a fundamentally divisive and disruptive one, for 'unity' consolidates the power of a small exploitative class.

Though this inference can be drawn from the framework of Marx's own work, its consequences in the colonial context are more clearly spelled out in the work of Lenin.²⁴ In a colonized society, the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie consists, initially at least, of an alien minority. It represents not indigenous capitalism but imperialism. Imperialism is a development of 'metropolitan' capitalism in its search for new markets and resources to exploit. At first, the foreign bourgeoisie has an obvious interest in fostering the growth of a local quasi-capitalist elite, as part of its project of 'national development'; likewise, the local elite has an interest in allying with the alien minority.²⁵ But the needs of imperialism conflict with those of 'local' capitalism; the building of an indigenous 'nation' facilitates but also threatens the interests of European capital. Where interests diverge, so too do ideologies: the 'nation-builder' terminology of the colonizer and the 'nationalist' terminology of the colonized elite. But 'nationalist' ideology is not merely anti-imperialist; it provides a smokescreen and indeed a rallying cry behind which the accumulation of capital within indigenous society can be effected. 'Nationalist' behaviour must thus be seen as part of a strategy in class struggle. Class interests may, indeed, cause the 'nationalist elite' to retain or develop close links with imperialist institutions. Thus, whereas the liberal school of political development blandly treats the 'nationalist movement' as an enlightened wedge of the total community, representing its long-term interests, the Marxist method opens for examination those aspects of its relationships with other social strata which are divisive, exploitative, and 'non-national'.

Marxist thought also helps to locate nationalism in a temporal context, as only one phase of an unfolding revolutionary process. Liberal political science often treats this phase - 'modernity', 'integration', 'development' - as one of completion, as a final state of grace. But Marxist analysis of the socio-economic forces at play suggests that the nationalist stage must eventually be superseded by some form of socialism. There is thus a basic difference in approach. At this juncture, however, basic assumptions of the orthodox liberal school of nationalism are seemingly reinforced by the way in which Eurocentric 'Stalinist' variants of Marxism discuss the process of supersession. To put it crudely, these Marxists argue that the Third World road to socialism has first to run through a capitalist or quasi-capitalist stage of nation-building, led either by an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie or by a manager-State; industrialization, urbanization, and proletarianization are preconditions for social revolution. This kind of position stems from a complex of ideas, many of which are rationalizations and some of which are mutually contradictory. These include radical determination to oppose 'feudalism' and 'backward traditions', Eurocentric inability to envisage alternative agents of socialist revolution other than a politically-conscious urban working-class, and a pragmatic tactic of temporarily supporting bourgeois-democratic movements as the only effective lever against imperialism. Dogmatic exposition of this kind of Marxism leads to neglect of (indeed hostility towards) truly indigenous political manifestations, overestimation of the role of European institutions, and the inculcation of attitudes which often differ little from those of colonialists. It reinforces those aspects of the 'orthodox' interpretation of nationalism which stress the inevitability of 'modernity' and 'urbanization', and

which minimize the positive role of 'tradition' and the peasantry. This approach marked (stultified) for decades the relationship between the Third World and the Second and indeed Third International.²⁶

The Marxist method, however, has proved richer and more flexible than this narrow school of interpretation indicates. Building on the work of Lenin,²⁷ other Marxists this century - inspired by and inspiring social revolutions in Africa, Asia, and South America - have bypassed the Eurocentric and rigid logic of the earlier school. The view whereby the economic distortion and class exploitation of a 'national development' phase are unavoidable if temporary evils, has been confronted with the different circumstances and experiences of non-Western communities and its ideological implications have been subjected to withering critique.²⁸ A wealth of Marxist interpretations of Third World reality has been accumulated, suggesting that both imperialism and domestic capitalism can be effectively combatted and/or avoided by the mobilization of the communal resources of traditional social groupings. Marxism has thus played a crucial part in the generation of non-orthodox theories of nationalism.

III. BASIC ASSUMPTION IN 'ORTHODOX' THEORIES OF NATIONALISM

This section examines in greater detail the various strands of the orthodox 'Nation-Building' theory of nationalism, in both its Liberal and Marxist variants.

-i. The 'Phoenix' Theory of Change

The colonial situation, or more generally contact with the West and involvement with the world economy, is viewed in terms of what Alan Moorehead calls "the fatal impact". Social change is double-sided. Firstly the past inevitably crumbles, and is reduced to ashes; secondly, the future irresistibly rises from those ashes and is built in its place. Nationalism plays a key role in both processes.

Deutsch, for example, speaks of the process as one of 'social mobilization', and argues that "the major clusters of the old social, economic, and psychological commitments are eroded or broken, and people become available for new patterns of socialization and behaviour". He points to "two distinct stages of the process: (1) the stage of uprooting or breaking away from old settings, habits and commitments, and (2) the induction of the mobilized persons into some relatively stable new pattern of group membership, organization and commitment".²⁹ To emphasize how clearcut and decisive this process is, he draws an analogy with military mobilization: "In this fashion, soldiers are mobilized from their homes and families, and mobilized into the army in which they then serve".

The same dual process is referred to in Marx's work on India. There are two stages ("a double mission") in the impact of British colonialism on Indian society: "one destructive and the other regenerative -

the annihilation of the old Asiatic society, and the laying of the material foundations of Western society in Asia".³⁰ As Kiernan puts it, "Marx's vision..(was)..of the Indian slate being wiped clean and promptly covered with fresh writing".³¹

This type of interpretation suggests that the process is ineluctable. The impact of the West is as shattering and irresistible as that of a metal pot on an earthenware one. "We are confronted", writes Marion Levy³² "whether for good or bad, with a universal social solvent. The patterns of the relatively modernized societies, once developed, have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have come into contact with them". Faced with such penetration, a traditional society may put up resistance, but can do little more than postpone the inevitable day of destruction. The ringing boldness of these declarations of inevitability is striking; Lerner speaks of Islam as "absolutely defenceless" against "modernization" and "the infusion of a rationalist spirit".³³ Yet, on close examination, such boldness is accompanied by considerable hedging of terminological bets, rendering such declarations ultimately self-fulfilling. Halpern's is only one ungainly example: "All pre-modern systems of society disintegrate as systems, and so does the pre-modern pattern in which these systems interacted with each other, and so maintained a particular life-process. (This radical change is usually obscured by the fact that some - never all - of the elements or linkages of pre-modern systems continue to function, though with altered relevance and effectiveness").³⁴

-ii. The Inevitable Disintegration of the Traditional

The first stage of the dialectic, many observers are prepared to say, has been virtually completed. Its importance to nationalism is stressed by

Emerson, who argues that: "Nationalism is a response to the atomization of society, a turn toward a new form of community to replace old communities which are in the process of being destroyed"³⁵, and also that: "Nationalism is a product of the breach with the old order, of which a part is the disruption of traditional communities and their ties of kinship and custom".³⁶ This stage of social change is already visible: "The forces of the West have been let loose, the oake of custom has been almost everywhere broken and the world appears to be moving along the path which the West has taken".³⁷ Van Verys too, without naming a specific venue, declares that the first leg of the clash has been won: "socially definitive and self-sufficient" small-scale traditional communities have been disrupted. Yet he is not confident that the second leg, "reintegration on a national scale", has yet taken place; hence, he argues, ^{there is} social disarray in "developing areas".³⁸

Marx in 1853 regarded India similarly as having finished phase one without yet fully entering phase two: "England has broken down the entire framework of Indian society without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing".³⁹ Traditional village society centred on cotton spinning and weaving - "these small stereotype forms of social organism" - had "dissolved" under the effect of English technology; while the building of an Indian nation had hardly progressed beyond a skimpy infrastructure.

The tragedy of this disintegration is not one of Marx's themes, but Western liberal political science occasionally pauses briefly to shed a tear.⁴⁰ Halpern, indeed, in emphasizing the finality of the fatal impact, is moved to poetry, quoting a Pakistani verse entitled "There is no Messiah for shattered glass"⁴¹:

"Be it a pearl, a looking glass, or a drinking cup,
 Once broken it is broken forever.
 What is shattered is better given up as lost,
 For tears can mend it never...
 Fruitlessly you gather and cling to these pieces,
 And continue to pin your hopes in them;
 Remember, no messiah can patch them together".

Nationalism thus may eloquently, but momentarily mourn the past; it finds no source of future strength there. Those manifestations of traditional society which do remain are assumed either to be lingering survivals whose turn for disintegration will come, or to be not essential parts of "the pre-modern system". They provide 'local colour' a universal phenomenon which, in the form of folk-dancing, handicrafts and quaint customs, presents greater interest to the tourist than to the political scientist or sociologist. Thus, argues Fischer, "there are signs that the preservation of ancient civilizations will have in the long run to be reduced to their artistic and folkloristic components, but that the social structure proper will be reformed according to the Western example".⁴² What exactly is, and is not, part of this "social structure proper" is a crucial question, however, which the orthodox theory of nationalism never satisfactorily answers.

-iii. The Irresistible Rise of the Modern

The second phase of the phoenix process is the "turn toward a new form of community". The colonial situation, and post-colonial situation, are settings for the development of 'gesellschaft' in its psychological, sociological, economic, and cultural aspects, analysis of which is submerged by voluminous footnotes to the work of Maine, Weber, Toennies and Parsons. Claims that this stage has been completed are rare.

The literature on development resembles a terminological lucky dip. Pye, for example, lists as characteristics of modernization: national unification, Western education, secularization, commercialization, social restratification, urbanization, and international pressures.⁴³ Lerner stresses economic growth; public participation; secular-rationalism; social, psychic, and physical mobility.⁴⁴ Parsons points to stratification, secularization, bureaucracy, the market economy, rational-universalism, and democratic association.⁴⁵ Lipset lays his main emphasis on capitalist industrialism, urbanization, wealth and education,⁴⁶ while Levy lays his on specialization, interdependence, rationalization, universalism, functional specificity, centralization, and a capitalistic exchange market.⁴⁷ Deutsch measures it in terms of "exposure to modern life", exposure to mass media, mobility, urbanization, industrialization, literacy, and high income.⁴⁸

The more specifically political dimensions of this 'development' are discussed in various publications of the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council in the United States. The implications of the spread of communications, bureaucracy, formal education and political parties, and changes in the political culture are all analyzed.⁴⁹ Numerous other individuals have written in sympathy with this general line. Eisenstadt lists differentiation, increased capacity, spread of power, weakening of tradition, and heightened participation, as characteristics of political modernity.⁵⁰ Huntington fixes on rationalization, national integration, democratization, mobilization/participation, and institutionalization.⁵¹ Parsons stresses the existence of an elective leadership, universal franchise, consensus over procedural rules, and voluntary group

membership.⁵² Coleman takes differentiation, equality and secularization, and heightened capacity, as his main criteria.⁵³ Weiner speaks of the process of development as one of 'political integration', by which he means consolidation of subjective loyalty, objective control, identification of governed with government and vice versa, consensus over ends and means, and growth of capacity for purposive cooperative activity.⁵⁴ Binder lists similar criteria, but prefers to call them aspects of 'national integration'.⁵⁵

It is easy to lose one's sense of direction amid this myriad of overlapping, sometimes contradictory, categories of analysis. Some of them are quite specific and detailed (and thus difficult to generalize about); others are extremely vague and general (and thus impossible to test empirically). Many disputes, rejoinders, and counter-rejoinders within this tradition turn out to be little more than semantic quibbles or minor adjustments to classificatory schemes. A combination of homogeneity of viewpoint, and imprecision of terminology, inspires these volumes rather than clearcut rival interpretations of concrete situations.

Through the mists, it is clear, however, that for this school of thought modernity involves such phenomena as growth of towns, spread of industry, development of a money economy, and adoption of bureaucratic norms (contract rather than status), together with spread of new kinds of 'secular' education and mass media which encourage these developments. It is accompanied by the adoption of apparently 'rational' and 'secular' political forms and norms -

for example, elections, parliaments, political parties and responsible ministers. Nationalism hovers on the margin as that force which deliberately promotes the emergence of these factors, which draws its strength from their existence, and which is a sign of such changes having already taken place.

In this respect, Marx's account of what he called "the material foundations of Western society" implanted in colonial India could be underwritten without blushing by the Committee on Comparative Politics of the Social Science Research Council. Among the factors enumerated are:

- a. Unity imposed by conquest (He assumes that India, or "Hindoostan", is a 'natural' unit which needs only to be staked out to be viable)
- b. Internal integration through modern communications (especially telegraph and railway)
- c. Western culture and skills via education
- d. Mass Media (a free press)
- e. A new educated social elite ('a fresh class')
- f. Industrialization (this would sap the caste structures - "decisive impediments to progress", and generate true classes)
- g. Private property in land
- h. Agricultural development and
- i. Entry into the 'world system' in the economic and cultural sense (with regular shipping contact, he argued, "the day is not far distance when....that once fabulous country will thus be actually annexed to the Western world".)⁵⁶

-iv. The Importance of Towns

"Nationalism", according to Emerson, "is essentially and in the first instance an urban phenomenon".⁵⁷ According to the Marxist viewpoint of Barratt-Brown, "urbanization of Africans encouraged the forming of associations to fill the void left by the break with

tribalism and these have been the basis of the nationalist parties!⁵⁸
 Both schools of thought stress the crucial role which towns play in the development of nationalism.

Towns bring about a radical change in life style for what are predominantly rural communities. They wrench men from their traditional environment, from ascriptive ties of kinship and custom, and offer them a new modern environment, with the possibility of fresh associative ties. In the towns, men of one tribe or grouping rub shoulders with men from other tribes. In the towns they come most closely into contact with the economic and cultural manifestations of modernity. There they are most open to the outside world, to European influences. The education system is most highly developed in towns; the literacy rate is highest. Urban areas have most radios, most newspapers. The new forms of political action and organization develop in towns. Secular-rational bureaucratic norms take root most firmly there.

The degree of urbanization is often regarded as the chief index of socio-political development, or, in Deutsch's phrase, of 'social mobilization'. The growth of towns logically precedes other manifestations of modernity. Lerner suggests that "the secular evolution of a participant society appears to involve a regular sequence of three phases. Urbanization comes first, for cities alone have developed the complex of skills and resources which characterize the modern, industrial economy. Within this urban matrix develop both of the attributes which distinguish the next two phases - literacy and media growth".⁵⁹ Both Lipset⁶⁰ and McCrone and Cnudde⁶¹ agree in making urbanization the key variable upon which



education, and hence the growth of communications, and hence ultimate 'development', depend.

Urban man becomes nationalist man for various reasons, according to his social situation. There are two major kinds of reason, however, either positive, in that he has developed new associative ties which seek political expression, or negative, in that he is uprooted and alienated and sees in nationalism a compensatory structure.

It is in the light of such assumptions that we must understand the assertion that urban politicians provide the energy for nationalist movements in the colonial era. In developing mass political parties, they push out from the towns to capture support and organize pressure among the rural populations, but it is in the towns that the political parties are founded and have their strength. Their newspapers are published, and their major meetings held, in urban centres.

-v. The Role of the Modernized 'Elite'

Nationalism, according to the orthodox view, is born among new, 'modern' social strata. "The groups and classes which have been most susceptible to infection by the nationalist germ", writes Emerson, "are those who have been most sharply divorced from their old worlds by the impact of the new".⁶² There are two tendencies of thought: *the impact is* either negative in that nationalism develops among those sectors most cut off from their traditional roots, or positive in that nationalism develops among those in contact with the West or with Western education, or in a social situation most akin to that prevailing in the West. The urban style of life, the cash economy, industrial work discipline, the ethos of the liberal professions,

exposure to modern mass media - these mould the reactions of the modern sectors. These new social strata can be subdivided into two groups at least: the middle class and educated elite, and the new group of wage labourers.⁶³

This orthodox model of nationalism could be called 'elite nationalism'. Emerson typifies the liberal tradition in arguing that "nationalism throughout the world has derived its first formulation and drive from the middle-class elements which are so evidently a creation of the ferment of Western modernity".⁶⁴

And Kilson is in the mainstream of the Marxist tradition when he asserts that "historically, it seems that the commercial and educated middle class has been the organizer of nationalism wherever found, as well as the bearer of the ideas underlying this phenomenon".⁶⁵

This identification of the elite with nationalism is generally explained in terms either of their economic interest as a class, or of their education in new ideas as individuals. Indeed 'middle-class' and 'intelligentsia' are frequently confused with each other, or lumped together within such a term as 'the evolved', or 'the moderns', or 'the elite'.

The bourgeoisie, as a social class, is traditionally associated in Marxist thought with the rise of nationalism. Nationalism is a fine example of ideology generated in the pursuit of economic self-interest. Third World 'modern elites', at least in the colonial situation, have typically not played a truly entrepreneurial role in the economy. They do not control massive productive resources or 'capital'. Those in liberal professions

or administrative posts are not a middle class in the Marxist sense. However, it is still possible to argue, as does Kilson, that this embryonic class turns to nationalism⁶⁶ in order to seize what few modern means of production there are (those controlled by the colonial power), and to encourage their further growth.

A rather less radical account of the elite's economic motivation figures in liberal 'nation-builder' accounts of nationalism. The elite seeks access to, or protection of bureaucratic if not productive power. In other words, there is competition for jobs, and professional status. The elite is a class in the rather special sense of Djilas's 'new class'.⁶⁷ Failure to obtain full acceptance into 'modern society' under colonial rule generates frustration, which expresses itself through nationalism. This is Coleman's view: "Nationalism, where it is most advanced, has been sparked and led by the so-called detribalized, Western-educated middle-class intellectuals and professional Africans; by those who in terms of improved status and material standards of living have benefited most from colonialism; in short, by those who have come closest to the Western World but have been denied entry on full terms of equality".⁶⁸

The elite not only plays a leading role in nationalism, according to these theories, but does so as a means to one end: modernization. Without the driving force of nationalist ideology, 'development' would be impossible. "Nationalism is a sine qua non of industrialization", argues Davis, "because it provides people with an overriding, easily acquired secular motive for making painful changes. National strength or prestige becomes the

supreme goal; industrialization is the chief means. The costs, inconveniences, sacrifices, and loss of traditional values can be justified in terms of this transcending collective ambition".⁶⁹ He goes on to add, in an interesting confusion of 'is' with 'ought', that "to the degree that the obstacles to industrialization are strong, nationalism must be intense to overcome them". This stress on the elite's commitment to the transformation of their own society inevitably leads to a playing down of elements in nationalist ideology which reject the values of the colonizers and exalt those of traditional society. The elite is a heroic group, dedicated to ideals culled from Europe, isolated from and battling with its indigenous environment. Its historic mission, almost its sole preoccupation, is to Nation-Build.

Identification of nationalism with the 'elite', and characterization of this group by its dedication to 'modernity', is the overriding theme of Shils' work. "The elites are almost always intensely nationalistic", he argues, "...As contemporary nationalists, they are not merely concerned with self-rule; they are concerned simultaneously to elevate the dignity of their traditional culture, and their standing in the world. But they also wish to have, for the sake of economic progress and because it is entailed in being modern, a modern culture diffused through the medium of a modern educational system that runs from the early years to university".⁷⁰ He paints a picture of an elite cut off from its traditional environment, haunted by a vision of modernity implanted in them by European education and experience of the joys of middle-class life, and encapsulating their country's future in the present.

The elite, above all, bears "the burden for the transformation"⁷¹: the White Man's Burden has been transferred on to their frail shoulders! Their major problem lies in the intractability of the masses, with whom they have so little in common.

Analysis by liberal political scientists centres disproportionately upon this elite. It is treated as the key, if not the only political group. They speak the political language of the colonial power; they have learned about Western-style political organization and how to manipulate it; they are versed in Western-style ideology. Politics, almost literally, is coterminous with their concerns. Thus Lucian Pye's discussion of modern Burma⁷² concentrates entirely on the psychocultural problems of adaptation experienced by modern-educated administrators and politicians. The book implies not merely that one sector of political reality has been charted, but that in essence the whole of that reality has been explained. The jacket of his book proclaims simply that "Mr. Pye examines Burma's political culture", and Pye himself is equally modest: "I decided to explore the dynamics of a particular transitional system - that of Burma - by investigating the basic attitudes and orientations of various key groups in the society toward the political process.....Their personal lives reflected the experience of their entire society".⁷³ Coleman, too assumes that the whole of nationalism in the Third World can be understood by studying the elite: "Unlike the field anthropologist, who consciously seeks to work among the traditionalists, the student of political nationalism is concerned mainly with the attitudes, activities, and the status of the nationalist-minded Western-

educated elite...Only here can one get a partial glimpse into the depth of nationalist feeling, the sources of inspiration and ideas, and the key elements in nationalist motivation".⁷⁴

These works imply that only the urban elite is politically active. Conversely the (mainly rural) masses are politically docile; at best they are apathetic, at worst hostile, towards modern nationalism. This is a theme of Lerner's study of the Middle East: "The Moderns, already within the audience for mass communication, are the currently active element in Turkish society. The Traditionals, on the other hand, are the quiescent segment of the society and do not participate significantly in either the new communications or other modernizing institutions. They do not attend to the output of the mass media, nor do they in the normal course of events want to think or do much about the problems these media describe. The Transitionals, moving from traditional ways towards a modern style, are the new source of social energy for the future...Their passage, writ large, is the passing of traditional society in the Middle East".⁷⁵ In other words, the modern elite is regarded less as a special group with separate interests (even less as an exploitative class), than as an advanced segment or wedge of the population which will grow ever wider until eventually it embraces the whole society. This is a classic Whig Interpretation of contemporary African history.

-vi. The Role of the 'Proletariat'

Wage-labourers are the other 'modern sector' commonly linked with the growth of nationalism - "the workers in those employments which are least characteristic of native society, and most characteristic of the new superimposed Western society".⁷⁶ The role of industrial

wage-earners is particularly stressed, but also wage-labourers on colon farms. Deutsch contrasts this 'politically relevant' stratum with the 'politically apathetic' rural masses, "isolated, subsistence-farming, tradition-bound".⁷⁷ Participation in the money economy creates new spending patterns, new family living patterns, and new attitudes. It also fosters physical mobility - emigration to large towns in a search for higher income, or even emigration to the European 'metropolis'. The Marxist tradition particularly stresses how work discipline leads to consciousness of common interest vis à vis the colonial exploiters; the fragmented traditional landscape causes no such awareness. Among the embryonic working class, hereditary divisions of labour (castes, guilds, clans, etc) are slowly dissolved; new, more 'rational' associative ties develop. Trade Unions provide a link with modern political nationalism, with their international affiliations, bureaucratic organization, and articulate programmes.

Mobilization into the colonial army, albeit temporarily, may also be compared in its effects with industrial mobilization. It mixes together formerly isolated and perhaps rival groups, imposes discipline on new units, teaches skills, and provides an environment within which certain aspects of the 'modern' style of life can be learned, and aspects of 'traditional' life can be safely unlearned.

-vii. The New Political Culture

Nationalism tends to be associated with a specific kind of political culture, political language, and set of political institutions.

Nationalism strives for and requires a change of political attitudes, indeed a new way of thinking about problems. An extreme version of this theory is provided by Lerner: "The Modern impetus to make a better world is absent from the Traditional psyche, because Modern confidence that such a world is feasible is absent from its perspective. In obeisance to the fatalistic rule of Kismet, the Traditional lives under the narcosis of resignation...(he) cares nothing, wants nothing, can do nothing about this world".⁷⁸

Psychological attitude changes are required for a modern political culture, and these include such matters as: trust, ability to postpone gratification, and an idea of general welfare⁷⁹; an 'innovating personality'⁸⁰; 'achievement orientation'⁸¹; 'empathy' or 'mobile personality'⁸²; and a sense of 'citizen competence' and 'subject competence'.⁸³

It is only on such psycho-cultural foundations that a truly political system can hope to build itself. By a 'political system', in this context is meant the standard Western liberal 'democratic society'. Lerner calls it 'Participant Society', Shils calls it 'civil society', Almond and Verba dub it 'the civic culture', and Crick simply talks of 'a political system'.⁸⁴ In Shils' view, non-Western countries cannot be considered 'civil societies' at all until modernizing nationalists have begun to transform their political culture; what is otherwise lacking is "the affirmative attitude towards rules, persons, and actions that is necessary for consensus...(and) the sense of membership in a nation-wide society, and the disposition to accept the legitimacy of the government, its personal^{re} and its laws".⁸⁵ Often, this necessary shift from

traditional to modern political culture is treated as a change from an a-political or pre-political culture to a political one. Indeed, Riggs openly describes the whole process of 'modernization' and national 'mobilization' as one of 'politicization'.⁸⁶

The rise of nationalism is felt to imply not only a change of general political culture, but also a new political language. This is the modern political language derived from Europe which contrasts sharply with the traditional, indigenous language. Western political scientists are instinctively drawn towards manifestations of their own 'modern' political language in the Third World, and pay inordinate attention to it. Emerson for example, pays particular attention to a manifesto issued by a group of 'evolved' Congolese in 1956, calling for modern education, respect for the individual, and democratic participation in government.⁸⁷ It was clearly directed at the colonial regime, in its own language. Yet Emerson does not weigh in the balance other political manifestations which take indigenous forms and are directed at other Congolese. Despite contrary appearances, this kind of selective interest implies a reluctance to consider the indigenous language as political at all. The 'modern political language', as used in courts of law, administration, political party headquarters, legislative assemblies, committee rooms, and the mass media, (in other words a very small and untypical segment of Third World life), is used to interpret the whole of the political process. Morris-Jones attacks the predilection of English observers for studying "arguments and

representations, discussions and demonstrations, deliberations and decisions" at this restricted level, rather than coming to grips with living community politics.⁸⁸ They turn to conflicts "between party groups in legislatures, between ministers and backbenchers, and between ministers and civil servants" as if to "a well-recognized familiar friend", and treat them as if they were "the whole of Indian politics, the whole story".⁸⁹

Nationalism as an ideology is associated with articulation in terms of this 'modern language', Hence its identification, too, with the 'modern-educated elite', the kind of 'spokesmen' who sound intelligible when interviewed in the Western press, and who engage in debate with the colonial authority in terms it understands. Lerner in particular makes such assumptions. After asking various Turkish interviewees what they would do if they were President, he classes the following responses as 'modern' (and therefore political): "I would adjust the taxes according to social justice....Base the economic policy on a liberal doctrine. I would like the government to do things private enterprise cannot do....To follow a peaceful foreign policy, basing my actions on the U.N. Charter" and "I would raise the standard of living. I would try to wipe out the illiteracy and raise the cultural standard. Take steps to make the newly-established democracy in our country permanent. Separate matters of religion from matters of state...." He contrasts these sturdy individual opinions with the "rejection or evasion" and "dumb silence or frightened retreat before the 'unseemly' question" which characterizes the replies of what he calls 'Traditionals'.⁹⁰

The more the language of such replies employs concepts derived from the Western political vocabulary, the more he feels they are 'modern' minded, and authentic as voices of nationalism.

Nationalism as action is identified not only with language in this narrow sense, but also with 'modern' forms of political organization. These are the sole vehicles of true nationalism, of politics proper. Only in the light of such assumptions can we understand statements like Rotberg's: "The onset of Mau Mau interrupted the growth of African politics in Kenya".⁹¹ Politics must be 'rationally' organized, based on voluntaristic rather than ascriptive norms, and on fairly predictable procedures. Such assumptions help to explain the considerable academic attention paid to mass political party organizations in the Third World. They appear very similar to Western parties; indeed some are born within the organizational shell of Western parent parties. They have recognizable, tangible attributes like constitutions, party cards and subscriptions, cadres, elected officials, committees, programmes, official buildings, pamphlets, newspapers, elections, congresses and public meetings, and perhaps even publicity offices. These 'concrete' assets often prove to be more firmly implanted in the mind of the observer-political scientist than in living political reality.⁹² Indeed, the apparent lack of deep-rootedness in indigenous reality of these 'modern' political parties may even be treated as an advantage, given their role of injecting a future into the present. Halpern believes this ; after extrapolating nationalist parties from their indigenous soil, he magically breathes into them the power

to irrigate that soil. "Political parties have peculiar advantages", he writes, "as instruments of social change. They are a form of organization unknown in traditional Islamic society....They cease being organically related to the old social structure and so can move themselves and others beyond the established order".⁹³

The considerable interest shown in the legal-constitutional phase of colonial 'nationalist movements' stems from a belief that a challenge to the colonial power in the name of political principles enshrined in the Western tradition (for example, "No taxation without representation", "One man one vote", and "Self-determination") is more clearly 'political' than raw manifestations of indigenous political culture.⁹⁴

-viii. Inspiration of Nationalism from outside

According to the orthodox theory, the West not only established the foundations of political modernity and unity; it also inspires nationalist ideas among the 'products' of Western education. Thus, Emerson asserts of Asia, "the well-spring of....nationalism lies in the ideas and political example of Europe".⁹⁵ A common theme is that the West releases ideas and principles among subject populations which eventually weaken its own dominance. "The ideas of Rousseau, Burke, Mazzini, and the great figures of American independence", studied by the colonized, subsequently inspire them to formulate their own nationalist ideologies.⁹⁶ Emerson, indeed, goes further: "The very idea of nationalism is certainly of Western origin, and there is every reason to assume that the mere element of imitation in Asia is a powerful one. The strength of the West,

which enabled it to dominate so much of Asia, was a thing to be studied and copied, and a major component of that strength, according to the testimony of the West itself, was the existence of coherent and integrated nations".⁹⁷

This view follows from identifying nationalism with 'modern' political language. Paradoxically, the driving force behind nationalism, the very concept of 'the nation', is said to come not from within the 'national' political culture, but from abroad. Plantey is fairly typical in his remark that Moroccan nationalism was "born of our (French) labour"; France not only built the technical and administrative infrastructure which is indispensable for true nationhood, but enabled, "through our education and publications, the spread of our egalitarian, rationalist and universalist ideas".⁹⁸ The fact that this education and these publications could have touched only a very small section of the community is of little import, for the restricted elite is seen as the driving force behind nationalism. This elite's umbilical cord is linked not with the traditional culture, or the masses, from which it is largely cut off, but with the outside world, Western ideas, and the vision of the 'nation-to-be'.

Kedourie particularly stresses the role of ideas in stimulating nationalist behaviour. He also emphasizes the phenomenon of ideological contagion in Third World nationalism. "Nationalism", he argues, "is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century".⁹⁹ Since then, it has become "Europe's latest gift to the world".¹⁰⁰ "The sweet and

heady poison of Western enlightenment"¹⁰¹ is particularly seductive in countries whose entire social fabric has been shaken by the impact of the colonial situation. Elites poisoned by this enlightenment learn "an ideological style of politics, of which nationalism is a variant", which is totally alien to their own society. But they discover, too, that emotions about the traditional past, including religion, can be manipulated for purposes of building a new future.

Belief in the power of (European) ideas is less evident among Marxist interpreters of nationalism, who calculate the 'debt' to Europe more in terms of the economic and social changes it provoked. However, variants of Marxism have themselves often been considered by orthodox political scientists as part of the ideological contagion carried from Europe to the Third World.¹⁰²

-ix. Passivity of Traditional and Rural Society

'Meanwhile, back in the bush', according to this interpretation, passivity reigns. A somnolent outback is the logical corollary of an active, urban minority. "In general", argues Emerson, "the rural masses have been indifferent to the new currents, or at best and belatedly passive adherents to the nationalist creed".¹⁰³ He erects this passivity into the central paradox of nationalism: "The one place where the nationalists are characteristically not found is in those parts of the society which are most obviously representative of the heritage of the past, although these must furnish much of the claim to national distinctiveness...The elements of society which can probably be taken as the most authentic heirs of the 'national' culture and tradition are the rural peasantry, who

everywhere constitute the great mass of the population, and such of the old aristocracy as have been able to hold on. These elements have, however, contributed neither the leadership nor the active rank and file partisans of Asian and African nationalism".¹⁰⁴ Gellner puts this point succinctly: "The self-image of nationalism involves the stress of folk, folk-lore, popular culture etc. In fact nationalism becomes important precisely when these things become artificial. Genuine peasants or tribesmen, however proficient at folk-dancing, do not generally make good nationalists".¹⁰⁵

The role of the rural areas is thus limited to 'receiving' change stimulated from and through the towns, by the process of modernization. Their contribution is usually discussed in terms of the stimulus which social decay, uprootedness, and economic misery in such zones gives to the growth of nationalism. Indeed, rural areas are viewed rather as obstacles to nationalism than as sources of it. They are the dormant territories which nationalists strive to awaken, politicize, and organize. Some nationalist leaders do emerge from such backgrounds but they only prove the paradox. "The elements of the rural population most susceptible to the nationalist appeal", Emerson explains, "are those who have been brought nearest to the super-imposed Western society through such channels as the labour force of mines and plantations, or through military service, particularly abroad".¹⁰⁶

All possibility of political initiative in such areas is not excluded. Such manifestations, however, are rarely explored in depth, or regarded as expressions of genuine nationalism. They are not 'political' in the sense that nationalism is political.

Coleman classifies them as 'nativism'. Emerson states that peasant movements are either parochial or xenophobic: merely "a protest against local grievances that are felt to be intolerable" or "an effort to maintain the customary way of life against alien encroachments".¹⁰⁷ As such they cannot be 'positive'. At best such manifestations are 'precursors' of nationalism.

-x. Break with the Past

Nationalism breaks with history. It is something new, sui generis, resulting from the unique conditions obtaining in the modern world. The positive contribution of the traditional past to the rise of nationalism is negligible.

Resistance to colonial implantation, and subsequent revolts against its practical consequences, are merely classified as 'primary resistance'. These are "the first instinctive reaction of hostility to the alien intruder...a futile effort on the part of the old society to reject change".¹⁰⁸ Later - for these are regarded as chronological stages - 'secondary resistance' may occur: turbulent upheavals within traditional society, which Coleman calls 'syncretistic', and which disturb the colonial order.¹⁰⁹ But all such reactions to the colonial situation are regarded as "rather the dying struggles of the old tribal or traditional society than manifestations of the new nationalism".¹¹⁰ A classic dichotomy is thus established between "the early instinctively defensive reactions, in which xenophobia played a considerable part" and "the later nationalisms whose aims, structure and leadership reflect the new trends".¹¹¹

By this criterion, the Indian Mutiny is merely an antiforeign "feudal outburst".¹¹² The Boxer Rebellion is "a last great upsurge of the older China".¹¹³ Abdelkrim's uprising in the Rif "represents authentically the old Morocco of the tribes, and everything which distinguishes it from the countries...led by their semi-modernized elites".¹¹⁴ Minogue's formula is typical: "The French took decades to subdue Morocco, and the British had to maintain strong forces on the north-west frontier of India. The growth of nationalism depends not on this tribal resistance, but upon the development of a third new social complex composed of Westernized natives".¹¹⁵

This definitional guillotine cuts off nationalism from its past. Like the modern elite, its umbilical cord is severed, or rather, by a surgical feat, grafted on to the future (the nation-to-be). Suddenly, age-old communities become new nations, adrift in an uncharted sea. Thus, Pye suggests,¹¹⁶ "There is a quality of newness about South East Asia...A generation of peoples seeking to live without a history, and with only hopes. Lacking a common store of memories the people cannot look to the past for strength and guidance. They must look the other way, and in doing so they can see only a tentative present and an insecure future".¹¹⁷

This interpretation follows logically from the 'fatal impact' theme. Marx, too, states it quite explicitly: "This loss of (its) old world, with no gain of a new one...separates Hindostan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history".¹¹⁸ Such an attitude reflects a very rigid and undifferentiated image of what the traditional past actually consists of.

At one point, indeed, Marx leaps to the logical conclusion declaring that "Indian society has no history at all, at least no known history", and that "the whole of her past history, if it be anything, is the history of the successive conquests she has undergone".¹¹⁹

Neither nationalists, nor their self-appointed Western mentors, it appears, have much to learn from this past, or much in common with it. Modernization has an independent logic of its own, situated firmly in the present. Thus, suggests Halpern, "Problems are in some important ways actually easier to perceive and analyze in new nations than in the old".¹²⁰ Reluctance to study history in depth can thus be scornfully justified: "Neither we nor the new nations must become familiar with their entire past before we or they can cope with the issues of modernization. We can become expert and professional in the study of modernization of new nations without having to become universal encyclopaedists".¹²¹

IV. CRITIQUE OF THE 'ORTHODOX' METHODOLOGY

The methodology of the orthodox school of interpretation can be criticized in several respects.¹²²

-i. It is Mechanistic

The theory of change which underpins the explanation of nationalism is highly abstract and mechanistic. The phrase 'nation-building' is symptomatic; it connotes models, blueprints, architects and social engineers, and above all it implies that the new building will have "partial independence from its environment"¹²³ as will its builders. It reflects too, a schematic view of what constitutes 'modernity' and what constitutes 'tradition'. The two are made to appear incompatible; they clash as total systems. The resultant change is one-way, and the specific conditions under which the interaction takes place are largely ignored.

Four aspects of this mechanistic approach are particularly striking:

a) Binary Opposition. The use of tradition and modernity in constant contradistinction makes them appear mutually exclusive and incompatible. It also means that the two 'units' are treated as internally homogeneous and coherent systems; internal contradictions and alternative potentialities for change are ignored. Both tradition and modernity emerge as caricatures. Furthermore, the technique of binary opposition makes them appear static; tradition appears settled, timeless and uniform, without any history of internal conflict; modernity seems a fixed goal.

Binary opposition not merely oversimplifies a complex process, and overestimates the speed of the interaction¹²⁴; it distorts and misinterprets the nature and direction of the process. This is largely because it adopts a false perspective, from outside and above.¹²⁵ It is not enough to refine the traditional-modern dichotomy, as Lerner has done, by adding an intermediate category such as 'transitional', since this same distorting perspective survives.

b) Macro-sociological perspective. "The study of new states", according to Shils, "is a macrosociological study: it is the study of societies, and when it studies parts of these societies, it studies their contribution to the functioning of the society as a whole".¹²⁶ The society 'as a whole' is the nation-to-be, and thus certain abstract features of the Phoenix Theory of Change are inevitable. It makes it difficult not to view the interaction between 'modern' and 'traditional' as one between two coherent cultures at a 'national' level. In reality, however, the complexity and variety of change, and the many levels at which, and forms in which it operates, can only be appreciated if a non-centralized perspective is adopted. In other words, there are not two forces at work, but several multi-directional ones, at different levels of social organization.

Because of the macrosociological perspective, analysis becomes little more than an exercise in logic; it refines categories and explores corollaries in an inductive manner, without coming to terms with detailed empirical facts. This height of generalization

cannot really illuminate the concrete information provided by historians and social anthropologists. Much of the theorising could have been produced without direct experience of actual events on the ground.¹²⁷

c) Linear Change. In the clash between binary opposites, change appears one-way. The 'modern sector' ("detached from its environment") is an ever-widening wedge driving into the flank of the doomed traditional sector. There is little room for synthesis (or syncretism?), for coexistence, or indeed for strengthening of 'the traditional sector'.

d) Neglect of the Colonial Situation. Change is treated as the outcome of a neutral play of 'culture contact'. The political and social characteristics of the specific colonial situation within which the 'contact' is made - organized groups and institutions in a situation of conquest or domination characterized by control of resources for certain economic and political ends - are largely ignored. Although the specific colonial situation, with its internal contradictions, ambivalences and tensions, determines the success of particular kinds of resistance and reconstruction, the mechanistic nature of the classic theory of nationalism makes the discussion of such parameters extremely difficult.

-ii. It is Ethnocentric

The conceptual scheme developed to discuss nationalism and modernity in the Third World is ethnocentric. Sometimes, this is explicitly admitted. Coleman argues that the "concept and institution of the modern nation-state, towards the creation of

which African nationalism tends to be directed, is distinctly Western in its form and content".¹²⁸ He denies that the self-image of the indigeneous political culture merits attention, since "the shattering forces of disintegration that characterize modernity" are steadily destroying it. Just as Coleman stresses the Western origins of the nation-state phenomenon in order to justify the exclusive use of concepts drawn from Western politics, so Gabriel Almond argues that "the political scientist who wishes to study political modernization in the non-Western areas will have to master the model of the modern, which in turn can only be derived from the most careful empirical and formal analysis of the modern Western politics".¹²⁹

The ethnocentrism implicit in this is of a specific kind. There are two possible kinds of egoism: the one is simply to ignore the people around you, to deny their importance or their 'validity'; the other (more complex) is to try to absorb them, to project your own concerns upon them, to accept them on your own terms. You can either refuse discussion, or agree to discussion only on terms laid down by yourself. Both are egocentric. The latter egocentrism sets itself up as an apparent negation of the former egocentrism, but in fact is only an adaptation of an original simple egocentrism to new circumstances of challenge. So it is with ethnocentrism. Though the Nation-Builder School speaks of 'universalism', it is unilateral universalism.¹³⁰

It is universalistic because it purports to, and in certain respects does, come to terms with heterogeneous political systems. Different cultures are treated as interesting, important, understandable and coherent in their own right. The systemic-functionalist school which emerged in the late 1950's and 1960's, especially in the U.S.A., was a genuine attempt to break down the ethnocentrism (of the simple variety) which characterized political studies in the West. It attempted to develop terminology which could embrace the socio-political phenomena of the Third World within an overall scheme. It was a healthy development in that it deigned to treat as 'political', activities and phenomena which had hitherto been ignored, or dismissed as 'incomprehensible' and 'primitive', by self-styled Political Scientists. It sought to understand these as alternative means (institutions) for the performance of functions which every political system everywhere must perform. They were accepted as 'systems', as 'institutions'. Non-Western institutions, the argument ran, should not be judged in terms of outward resemblance to Western institutions; we should not look for cabinet committees in Burundi, nor for presidential elections by single-transferable voting every five years in Afghanistan. Instead, we should scrutinize Burundi or Afghan societies for evidence of political functions being performed by such local 'institutions' as lineage-groups or holy men.

This approach entailed a refreshing broadening of horizons, and breathed new life into the words 'political' and 'institution' and 'function'; or rather it acknowledged such advances already made in practice by social anthropology.¹³¹ It laid the foundations, it

seemed, for a new school of comparative politics, embracing West, East and Third World within its compass. All comparison requires a shared standard of analysis; this school now offered one.

"Political systems", wrote Almond in 1960,¹³² "may be compared with one another in terms of the frequency and style of performance of political functions by political structures".

Yet this new 'universalism' always remained one-sided. The yardstick of assessment was forged with varying degrees of explicitness, naivety, or self-consciousness, within the workshop of Western political culture. Several of the new-heralded functions (for example, rule-making, rule-application, and rule-adjudication) proved to be little more than poorly-disguised translations of traditional Western analytical concepts into more obscure language. Above all, there usually seemed to be a built-in assumption that the Third World has less of what the West has more. "From the West", argued Lerner, "came the stimuli which undermined traditional society in the Middle East; for the reconstruction of a modern society that will operate efficiently in the world today, the West is still a useful model. What the West is, in this sense, the Middle East seeks to become".¹³³

The assumption is never far away that the problems of modernization are the crucial issue facing Third World nationalists, as such labels as 'Developing Nations' imply. Pye is one of the most blatant proponents of this view. "The dominant theme in South East Asia", he writes, "is the effort of the leaders in their new countries to create modern nation states out of their transitional societies".¹³⁴ In other words, such areas are defined in relation to the problem of 'nation-building'

rather than in terms of their own individual, specific, and spontaneous expressions of political life.¹³⁵ Pye asserts this vigorously: "If development means anything, it means the rejection of current realities in favour of hoped-for eventualities".¹³⁶ He elaborates this point in a noteworthy passage: "In the developing countries, the legitimacy of the state does not necessarily depend on its responsiveness to existing social values. The situation is directly reversed and legitimacy depends upon the commitment to use power to change the values and personalities of the citizens. Under these conditions it is not possible to speak of a moral order in the same manner as has been fashionable in the West...The strength of commonality, the reassurance of established ways, and the command of dignified maturity, are all denied to such societies. Above all, the states they are now forming cannot, in building up the authority they need for directing further political change, exploit the power of legitimacy that is inherent in shared moral expectations...The establishment of legitimacy must be more heavily dependent upon effectiveness and efficiency".¹³⁷

In such hands, it is difficult to see how the systemic-functionalist school could live up to its theoretical promise. Third World institutions are not analysed in terms of the functions they perform inside their own system; these theorists describe, indeed preach, how systems must be transformed and institutions changed to enable the performance of externally-defined functions.

The systemic-functional approach never came to a comfortable or convincing decision as to what was politically relevant. Despite its theoretical radicalism, it had a distinct tendency to look for

discrete groups whenever it sought empirical evidence, and discrete groups of the type which the Old Tradition had deemed 'political' in a purely European context. The shift of focus was essentially verbal. Apter, for example, argued that Third World political systems should not be called 'anti-democratic', yet felt they were nevertheless 'pre-democratic'.¹³⁸ Through the back door crept in the old distinctions and emphases. Shils, for example, made a distinctly Aristotelian distinction between 'pre-democratic society' (Third World) and 'civil society' (us).¹³⁹ It is difficult to see how, except in blatancy and style, such a distinction differed from Crick's 'pre-systemic-functionalist' view:

"It may be proper, though one doubts, to call the Grand Turk's barber a 'politician'; but if we call such a system 'political' then we are losing...a crucial distinction; we are saying no more than that all power is open to influence, that all power rests on some kind of consent...These are properly differentiated as 'political systems': what Aristotle meant by 'polity', Fortescue's *dominium politicum et regale*, what the Whig translators meant by 'mixed government', or what Machiavelli, the European inhabitants of Free Cities, and the American patriots meant by 'republican'... Political systems only exist in relatively advanced societies...".¹⁴⁰

Sadly the so-called functionalists have been unable to do more than confirm the 'orthodox' interpretation of nationalism, and have indeed been its most prominent devotees.¹⁴¹

-iii. It is Non-specific, mainly comparative

The 'nation-builder' theory of nationalism is both mechanistic and ethnocentric. Both flaws reflect its overriding concern with comparison. It is not concerned with explaining specific facts, but with developing a framework to facilitate the discussion and classification of cross-cultural patterns. Thus Shils explains; "We are not historicists. We aim at generalized categories and analytical propositions both because we regard them as among the highest intellectual achievements and because we think they are indispensable for the better understanding of concrete and particular events...It is obviously necessary to ascertain the unique features of societies and politics...(But) Our task in this regard is to find the categories within which the unique may be described".¹⁴² He goes on fiercely to attack 'historicists' who insist on "the uniqueness of every society, of every culture, and every epoch...(They) assert that those unique features are incomparable with one another and so different from one another that...no general categories can illuminate any significant aspect of the events that occur in these diverse societies, cultures and epochs".¹⁴³ Pye, too, attacks "the smug knowledgeability of the area specialist who seems determined to demonstrate that there is nothing universal", and "the assertions of the aggressive cultural relativists that concepts formulated in the West were inapplicable in explaining the exotic behaviour of non-Westerners".¹⁴⁴

Several problems are associated with a purely comparative approach. Though, logically, no analysis can take place without some comparative framework, erecting the scaffolding may become

an end in itself. The bricks and mortar - empirical facts - are neglected; they become secondary. Much of the work of the new nation-builder school reads like an everlasting introduction to a book on a specific 'nationalist' movement which is never finally written.

There is a further danger, that the framework of comparison may distort the real nature, the specificity, of the 'material' it seeks to compare. It may promote anachronism, when material is selected to fit in with pre-conceived ideas of what (for example) 'true nationalism' is. The principle of selection in comparative studies is thus crucial; questions of ideological bias and heuristic inappropriateness centre around this.¹⁴⁵ The methodological problem of bringing order to material which resists categorization tends to merge with the ideological problem of ensuring that the particular comparative framework used is 'neutral', and free from ethnocentrism. It is not enough to argue that a frame of reference is value-free on the grounds that some frame of reference is necessary, and that pure 'relativism' is methodologically unsound.

Even supposing that the particular comparative frameworks used by the classic 'nation-builders' were free from ethnocentrism,¹⁴⁶ doubts about the comparative approach remain. A framework may be 'neutral' in relation to the values specific to each of the units being compared, yet reflect or generate values of its own: those of an academic discipline, for example, or of international administration. Pitt-Rivers raises this problem: "All anthropologists aspire to escape from the intellectual limitations of their national culture...But perhaps they can succeed only at the cost of

becoming 'technocentric', centred in the values of an international class of professional investigators".¹⁴⁷ The values of 'professional expertise' among researchers may blind them to the uniqueness and self-defined interests of their 'material'.¹⁴⁸ The values of 'international administration' perhaps instinctively seek to reduce heterogeneity to uniformity, and therefore to 'manageability'.¹⁴⁹

-iv. It is Tautological

A classic formula has grown up whereby 'nationalism proper' is a novel development in the Third World. It has its origins in the social revolution brought about by colonization and contact with the West - the spread of industry and towns, the growth of literacy and social mobility, the development of modern communications. It is predominantly based on towns, and is typically led by a small middle-class educated elite and other groups in the 'modern' sector of the economy. Particularly in the early stages, there is little participation in the movement from the traditional rural masses. The movement tends to organize itself into one or more mass political parties, analogous to those in Western societies; these adopt modern methods of political pressure, propaganda, and direct action. This nationalist movement seeks modernization, and the construction of new associative ties within the total society. To effect this, it has to awaken the slumbering outback from its political torpor, and help it to organize itself.

The interlocking nature of these various facets of the orthodox theory should not disguise the tautology on which the theory itself is based. Unfortunately, much of the literature takes corollaries

of the original definition of nationalism as confirmation of the premiss on which it is based. Gellner, for example, though his account of nationalism is a subtle one,¹⁵⁰ strays into tautology. He arrives at the orthodox interpretation of Third World nationalism by way of seeking to distinguish 'nationalism' from 'just any kind of group loyalty and sentiment'.¹⁵¹ He recognizes the danger of circularity in his argument! No movement can be called 'nationalist' until certain pre-conditions (modernity) exist, yet the major evidence of this modernity is the emergence of genuine nationalism.¹⁵² Yet he asserts that his theory has a hard 'non-tautological' core: the empirical statement that nationalism proper "underlies the great majority of modern 'national' movements". This apparently testable assertion, however, remains uncomfortably circular.¹⁵³

As against this kind of logical drift, it is worth emphasizing that nationalism was not born in the towns, although it may in certain senses be true that the 'nationalist political parties' were. Nationalism was only born in the towns in so far as the label is confined to those political sentiments and activities expressed through these urban parties and their middle-class and modern sector membership. If nationalism is so defined, then it is neither the only nor the most important political component in the colonial situation; nor indeed in the post-independence political process. It would, of course, be the most important political component if we gave to the word 'political' a restricted sense, involving cultural assumptions of European origin. If political ideology is only political when articulated in Western terms and through Western-style

media, if political action is only that which takes forms which are comprehensible in a Western context, then naturally such manifestations as accord with this definition turn out to be politically most significant. In other words, we are faced with a very narrow use of the word nationalism, and this should be recognized. The problem is that, in other contexts, nationalism is defined so broadly that it is bound to seem the most important political component in play, since it is co-terminous with the political process itself.¹⁵⁴ Confusion and distortion arise when arguments based on the restricted sense of nationalism are linked with those based on the larger meaning, so that 'modern urban nationalism' appears to explain the whole political process at all its levels.

NOTES TO CHAPTER ONE

1. M. Halpern: "THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA" (Princeton 1963) p. 207. ✓

2. K.R. Minogue: "Nationalism: the poverty of a concept" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (8) 2 1967 p. 340.

His "NATIONALISM" (London 1967) argues at length that: "The concept of the nation is almost entirely empty of content until a content is - arbitrarily - supplied from local circumstances". (p. 154)

3. cf Soedjatmoko: "Cultural Motivations to Progress: the 'Exterior' and the 'Interior' views" in R.N. Bellah (ed.): RELIGION AND PROGRESS IN MODERN ASIA (New York 1965). He pleads for a change in perspective in debates on the problem of modernization in the Third World, but his remarks apply equally to discussions of nationalism. "There exists" he argues, "a great gap between the way in which the development-oriented modernizer perceives the problems of his nation, and the real preoccupations of the nation's political leadership in response to the ways in which the transition process and its accompanying problems are experienced and perceived by the majority of the nation....we should know a great deal more of this view from the inside". (p. 4)

This 'interior' viewpoint, compared with that of foreign-trained experts, certainly looks from the inside outwards but it clearly looks from the top down when compared with the viewpoint of the bulk of the indigenous population. In other words, he argues for consideration of the viewpoint and preoccupations of the indigenous elite. He still regards local communities as obstacles to a projected goal (modernization), and simply makes the point that these are so well embedded that modernizers need to try a less frontal assault. They should learn and adopt the language of the 'interior view' so as "to increase their manipulative capacity with regard to the traditional sectors of their societies". (p. 4)

4. The phrase is Jacques Berque's: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (Paris 1964) p. 172.

5. J.S. Coleman: "Nationalism in Tropical Africa" in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (48) June 1954, p. 404-426.

6. G. Balandier: "Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes en Afrique Noire" in ZAIRE (Brussels) Apr 1954, p. 379-89, and various other articles and books by him. His views will be discussed in the next chapter.

7. J.S. Coleman op.cit. The following account is based entirely on this article. His other works contain the same assumptions in more scattered form. See esp. his "NIGERIA : BACKGROUND TO NATIONALISM" (California 1958); 'Current Political Movements in Africa' in ANNALS (March 1965); 'The Emergence of African Political Parties' in C.G. Haines (ed.); AFRICA TODAY (Baltimore 1955); J.S. Coleman and C.G. Rosberg (eds.): Political Parties and National Integration in TROPICAL AFRICA (California 1964); and 'The Politics of Sub-Saharan Africa' in ALMOND AND COLEMAN (eds.); The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton 1960).
8. L.W. Pye: POLITICS, PERSONALITY AND NATION-BUILDING (New Haven 1962)
K.W. Deutsch and W.J. Foltz (eds.): NATION-BUILDING (New York 1963)
R. Bendix: NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP (New York 1965).
9. K.R. Minogue: "Nationalism: the poverty of a concept" (1967) ^{loc. cit.} p. 338.
10. D.A. Rustow: "Nation" in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (1968) vol. 9 p. 12.
11. D.A. Rustow: "The Near East" in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.): THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (Princeton 1960) p. 400.
12. cf D.E. Apter and C.G. Rosberg: 'Nationalism and Models of Political Change in Africa' in D.P. Ray (ed.): THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONTEMPORARY AFRICA (Washington 1959).
13. J.S. Coleman: 'Nationalism in Tropical Africa' loc. cit. p. 422.
14. E.A. Gellner: THOUGHT AND CHANGE (London 1964) p. 168.
15. 'Gap Analysis' and 'Requisite Analysis' are criticized in A. Wilner: "The Underdeveloped theory of Political Development" in WORLD POLITICS (16) Apr. 1964, p. 468-82.
16. L.W. Pye: "The Concept of Political Development" in THE ANNALS (358) March 1965, p. 7.
17. J.S. Coleman: "Modernization: Political Aspects" in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (9) p. 398.
18. D.E. Ashford: "Contradictions of Nationalism and Nation-Building in the Moslem World" in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL (1964).
19. S.P. Huntington: "Political Development and Political Decay" in WORLD POLITICS (17) July 1965.
20. S. Avineri (ed.): KARL MARX ON COLONIALISM AND MODERNIZATION (New York 1968) esp. Introduction p. 1-31.
V.G. Kiernan: "Marx and India" in R. Miliband and J. Saville (eds.): THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1967 (London 1968) p. 159-89.
L.I. and S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (Chicago 1967), esp. p. 17-24.

21. "There is a close parallel between the way Marx had been thinking of the proletariat in the West, and the way he was now thinking of the colonial masses in the East. The juggernaut of industrial capitalism had rolled over them both. Antiquated habits, and the outlook on life that went with them, might still linger, but only by inertia, and would vanish with little further delay". (V.G. Kiernan: 'Marx and India' in THE SOCIALIST REGISTER 1967, p. 169.)
22. I. Potekhin: "The formation of nations in Africa" in MARXISM TODAY (2) 10 1958, p. 308-314.
23. K. Marx and F. Engels: "The Communist Manifesto" (English Edition 1886) in K. Marx and F. Engels: SELECTED WORKS (Moscow 1962) vol. I, p. 38.
24. V.I. Lenin: IMPERIALISM - THE HIGHEST FORM OF CAPITALISM (Moscow 1947)
V.I. Lenin: LENIN ON THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTIONS (Peking 1967).
25. "In the backward and colonial countries", Lenin wrote in 1920, "...the imperialist bourgeoisie is doing everything within its power to implant the reformist movement among the oppressed nations too. There has been a certain rapprochement between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and that of the colonial countries, so that very often - even in most cases, perhaps - while the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries does support the national movement, it is at the same time in accord with the imperialist bourgeoisie, that is, together with the latter it fights against all revolutionary movements and revolutionary classes...." ('Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions' in LENIN ON THE NATIONAL AND COLONIAL QUESTIONS (1967) p. 32). Lenin located common interests shared by the colonizer and so-called nationalist elite, both before and after 'liberation' from imperial control. He warned of the danger of neo-colonialism, denouncing "the deception systematically practised by the imperial powers in creating, under the guise of politically independent states, states which are wholly dependent upon them economically, financially, and militarily". ('Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' ibid p. 28.
26. cf G. Haupt and M. Reberieux (eds.): LA DEUXIEME INTERNATIONALE ET L'ORIENT (Paris 1967) cf J.V. Stalin: MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION in WORKS (Moscow 1953) Vol. 2, p. 300-81.
27. Ho Chi Minh testified to the great impact of Lenin's THESES on Nationalism on his own thinking: "The Theses of Lenin stirred in me great emotion, great enthusiasm and great faith. They helped me to see problems with clarity. My joy was so great that it made me weep. Alone in my room, I shouted out as if I were facing a great crowd of people: "Dear oppressed and wretched fellow-countrymen! This is what we need, this is the road to liberation". From that moment I put my whole trust in Lenin, and in the Third International". ("The Road Which led me to Leninism" in L'ECHO DU VIETNAM - Paris July 1960 - cited in W. Warbey: HO CHI MINH AND THE STRUGGLE FOR AN INDEPENDENT

27. VIETNAM (London 1972) p. 22). The Fourth of Lenin's six theses stressed "the need in backward countries to give special support to the peasant movement against the landlords, against large landownership, and against all manifestations or survivals of feudalism, and to strive to lend the peasant movement the most revolutionary character and establish the closest possible alliance between the West-European communist proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East, in the colonies, and in the backward countries generally; it is particularly necessary to direct every effort to apply the basic principles of the Soviet system in countries where precapitalist relations predominate...." ('Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and Colonial Questions' (1920) loc cit p. 27).
28. The influence of Mao Tse Tung's Marxism has of course been seminal, but Third World Marxism has developed in several directions in Africa (Frantz Fanon) and Latin America (Castro, Regis Debray). Some modern African variants are illustrated in W.H. Friedland and C.G. Rosberg (eds.): AFRICAN SOCIALISM (Stanford 1964) and Middle Eastern variants in S.A. Hanna and G.H. Gardner (eds.): ARAB SOCIALISM (Leiden 1969).
29. K.W. Deutsch: "Social Mobilization and Political Development" in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (55) Sept. 1961 (emph. added).
30. K. Marx: "The Future Results of British Rule in India" (1853) in K. Marx and F. Engels: SELECTED WORKS vol. I, p. 353.
31. V.G. Kiernan: "Marx and India" in SOCIALIST REGISTER 1967, p. 168.
32. M.J. Levy jnr: "Patterns (structures) of Modernization and Political Development" in THE ANNALS (March 1965) p. 29-40 (emph. added) Levy has written an article specifically to explain "The Vulnerability of the structures of relatively non-industrialized societies to relatively industrialized ones" in B.F. Hoselitz (ed.): THE PROGRESS OF UNDERDEVELOPED AREAS (Chicago 1952) p. 113-125.
33. D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (Glencoe 1958) p. 45.
34. M. Halpern: "Towards a further modernization of the study of new nations" in WORLD POLITICS (17) Oct. 1964 p. 175 (emph. added).
35. R. Emerson: "Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism" in FAR EASTERN QUARTERLY 1954 (repr. ^{to} I. Wallerstein: SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (New York 1966) p. 531 (emph. added).)
36. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (Harvard 1960) p. 188.
37. Ibid. p. 15.

38. K. van Vorst: "Toward a concept of political development" in THE ANNALS (358) March 1965, p. 15.
39. K. Marx: "The British Rule in India" in K. Marx and F. Engels: SELECTED WORKS (Moscow 1962) vol. I, p. 346f (emph. added).
40. In Chapter 7 of his DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (Paris 1964) - entitled 'New Supplement to Bougainville's voyage' - Jacques Berque stresses the ethnocentrism behind this kitsch pity or 'false humanism'. Chapter 4 of Claude Levi-Strauss: A WORLD ON THE WANE (1961) likens the emotion to a sort of 'cannibal instinct' with a liking for the exotic.
41. M. Halpern: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (1963) p. 31. ✓
42. W. Fischer: "Social Tensions at Early Stages of Industrialization" in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY (9) Oct. 1966, p. 82.
43. L.W. Pye: 'The Politics of South East Asia' in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.): THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (Princeton 1960) esp. p. 99-109.
44. D. Lerner: 'Modernization: Social Aspects' in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES (New York 1968) Vol. 9, p. 386-395.
45. T. Parsons: 'Evolutionary Universals in Society' in AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (29) 1964, p. 339-357.
46. S.M. Lipset: POLITICAL MAN (London 1960) Chaps. 2 and 3.
47. M.J. Levy Jnr.: 'Patterns (Structures) of modernization and political development' in THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (358) March 1965, p. 29-40.
48. K.W. Deutsch: 'Social Mobilization and Political Development' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (55) Sept. 1961, p. 493-514.
49. L.W. Pye (ed.): COMMUNICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1963); J. LaPalombara (ed.): EDUCATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1965); L.W. Pye and S. Verba (eds.): POLITICAL CULTURE AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1966); J. LaPalombara and M. Weiner (eds.): POLITICAL PARTIES AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1966).
50. S.N. Eisenstadt: 'Modernization and conditions of sustained growth' in WORLD POLITICS (16) July 1964, p. 576-594.
51. S.P. Huntington: 'Political Development and Political Decay' in WORLD POLITICS (17) July 1965.

52. T. Parsons: 'Evolutionary universals in society' in AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (29) 1964, esp. p. 353-356.
53. J.S. Coleman: 'Modernization - Political Aspects' in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (1968) vol. 9, p. 395-402.
54. M. Weiner: 'Political Integration and Political Development' in ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (358) March 1965, p. 52-64.
55. L. Binder: 'National Integration and Political Development' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (58) 1964, p. 622-31.
56. K. Marx: 'The Future Results of British Rule in India' (1853) in SELECTED WORKS Vol. 1, p. 352-358.
57. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 57-8.
58. M. Barratt-Brown: AFTER IMPERIALISM (London 1970) p. 202.
59. D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958) p. 60.
60. S.M. Lipset: POLITICAL MAN (1960) p. 59-60.
61. D.J. McCrone & C.F. Cnudde: 'Toward a communications theory of democratic political development' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (61) March 1967.
62. R. Emerson: 'Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism' in FAR EASTERN QUARTERLY 1954 (reprinted Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (New York 1966) p. 525.
63. Thus E.A. Gellner's remark: "The two prongs of nationalism tend to be a proletariat and an intelligentsia" THOUGHT AND CHANGE (1964) p. 168.
64. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 194.
65. M.L. Kilson: 'Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa' in JOURNAL OF POLITICS (1958) (reprinted Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 540.
66. Ibid. See also his 'Analysis of African Nationalism' WORLD POLITICS (April 1958) p. 484-497. /
See also his 'African Political Change and the Modernization Process' ⁱⁿ JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES (1) 1963; and his "POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE" (Harvard 1966).
67. M. Djilas: THE NEW CLASS - AN ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM (London 1957).

68. J.S. Coleman: 'Nationalism in Tropical Africa' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (1954) p. 414 (emph. added).
cf. also T. Hodgkin: 'The African Middle Class' in CORONA (7) 1956.
Stress on the need to avoid frustrating the ambitions of this elite was one of the main themes of the 1955 Conference of the 'International Institute of Differing Civilizations':
DEVELOPPEMENT D'UNE CLASSE MOYENNE DANS LES PAYS TROPICAUX (Brussels 1956).
69. K. Davis: 'Social and Demographic Aspects of Economic Development in India' in S. Kuznets, W.E. Moore, and J.J. Spengler (eds.): ECONOMIC GROWTH - BRAZIL, INDIA, JAPAN (Duke 1955) p. 9.
70. E. Shils: 'On the Comparative Study of the New States' in C. Geertz (ed.): OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (Glencoe 1963) p. 2.
71. E. Shils: POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE NEW STATES (The Hague 1962) p. 89. cf also E. Shils: 'The Intellectuals in the Political Development of the New States' in WORLD POLITICS (12) April 1960; and 'Intellectuals, Public Opinion, and Economic Development' in WORLD POLITICS (10) 1958. A sympathetic account of Shils' thought, with some shrewd criticisms, can be found in L. Binder: 'National Integration and Political Development' AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (58) 1964, p. 622-31.
72. L.W. Pye: POLITICS, PERSONALITY AND NATION-BUILDING, Burma's Search for Identity (1962).
73. Ibid. p. xii-xiv (emph. added).
74. J.S. Coleman: 'Nationalism in Tropical Africa' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (1954) p. 425.
75. D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958) p. 165 and p. 75.
76. R. Emerson: 'Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism' in I. Wallerstein (ed.) 'SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLOUR SITUATION' p. 525, (1966).
77. K.W. Deutsch: 'Social Mobilization and Political Development' in AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW (55) Sept. 1961, p. 498.
78. D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958) p. 146 and p. 151.
79. E.C. and L.F. Banfield: THE MORAL BASIS OF BACKWARD SOCIETY (1958).
80. D.C. McClelland: THE ACHIEVING SOCIETY (Princeton 1961).
81. E.E. Hagen: ON THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHANGE - HOW ECONOMIC GROWTH BEGINS (Illinois 1962).

82. D. Lerner: 'Modernization - Social Aspects' (loc. cit.) and THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958).
83. G. Almond and S. Verba: THE CIVIC CULTURE (Princeton 1963).
84. B. Crick: IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS (Harmondsworth 1962), esp. Ch. 2: 'The Nature of Political Rule'.
85. E. Shils: 'On the Comparative Study of the New States' in C. Geertz (ed.): OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (New York 1963) p. 22.
86. F.W. Riggs: 'Bureaucrats and Political Development' in J. LaPalombara (ed.): BUREAUCRACY AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1963) p. 139.
87. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 12.
88. W.H. Morris-Jones: THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF INDIA (London 1964) p. 52-61. The kind of debates outside observers particularly identify with, for example, might be about "the size of the public sector of the economy, the degree and forms of government control, and the direction and pace of land reform".
89. Ibid. p. 54-55. Morris-Jones goes on to discuss 'the traditional language'.
90. D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958) p. 153-4.
91. R.I. Rotberg: 'The Rise of African Nationalism - The Case of East and Central Africa' in WORLD POLITICS (15) Oct. 1962, repr. in Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 517. cf. also R.I. Rotberg and J. Nottingham: THE MYTH OF MAU-MAU NATIONALISM IN KENYA (1966) (*passim*).
92. This point emerges strongly from H. Bienen's: TANZANIA-PARTY TRANSFORMATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Princeton 1967). He concludes from his study of T.A.N.U. organization that "too often the politics of new states have been described as if intentions were facts, as if the word had become flesh; the characterizations of political systems in Africa are based on images conveyed to the world by party leaders....Neither the characterizations nor the maps from which they are derived specify the ways in which central institutions work. They provide no information as to the nature of relationships within the party, nor do they show how the party relates to society as a whole - not merely to the modern, urban, or town sections" (p. 5). Bienen (p. 12) speaks of the need "to get beyond the TANU which appears on organization charts and in the descriptions given by central leaders." This misleading (but to a political scientists, culturally reassuring) institutional approach to political parties in the Third World is especially striking in Robert Rézette's: LES PARTIS POLITIQUES MAROCAINS

92. (Paris 1955). West Africa, in particular, was closely studied for its political party organization in the early 1960's:
 R. Sklar: NIGERIAN POLITICAL PARTIES (Princeton 1963);
 R. Schadter-Morgenthau: POLITICAL PARTIES IN FRENCH-SPEAKING WEST AFRICA (London 1965); A.R. Zolberg: ONE-PARTY GOVERNMENT IN THE IVORY COAST (Princeton 1964); B. Charles: 'Un Parti Politique Africain - Le Parti Democratique de Guinée' REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (1962).
93. M. Halpern: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (1963) p. 283.
94. Ann Willner: 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development' in WORLD POLITICS (16) April 1964, p. 473n, illustrates how this selective interest can be used to advantage by Third World nationalists. A group of nationalists chalked up quotations from Washington and Lincoln on prominent walls: an American delegation was visiting whose support was needed.
95. R. Emerson: 'Paradoxes of Asian Nationalism' repr. Wallerstein (*op,cit.*) p. 527.
96. Ibid. p. 526.
97. Ibid. p. 526.
98. A. Plantey: LA REFORME DE LA JUSTICE MAROCAINE (Paris 1952).
99. E. Kedourie: NATIONALISM (London 1961) p. 9.
100. E. Kedourie: NATIONALISM IN ASIA AND AFRICA (London 1971) p. 147. ✓
101. Ibid. p. 38.
102. e.g. by Kedourie, Ibid. p. 141-146.
103. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 195.
104. Ibid. p. 195.
105. E.A. Gellner: 'Nationalism' in THOUGHT AND CHANGE, p. 162.
106. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 58-59.
107. Ibid. p. 195.
108. Ibid. p. 17.
109. 'Primary resistance' and 'secondary resistance' are terms used by E. Stokes: 'Traditional Resistance Movements and Afro-Asian Nationalism: The Context of the 1857 Mutiny in India' in PAST AND PRESENT (48) August 1970, p. 100-118. This provides an excellent discussion of methods of interpreting Third World

109. nationalism. See also T.O. Ranger: 'Connections between "primary resistance" movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa' in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES (9) 1968.
110. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION, p. 23.
111. Ibid. p. 204 (emph. added).
112. Ibid. p. 204.
113. Ibid. p. 205.
114. R. Montagne: REVOLUTION AU MAROC (Paris 1953) p. 152.
115. K.R. Minogue: NATIONALISM (London 1957) p. 84.
116. L.W. Pye: 'South East Asia' in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.): THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (1960) p. 65. (Emph. added).
117. Contrast this statement with that of the social anthropologist, Edmund Leach, referring to the same country as Pye 'researched' in his POLITICS, PERSONALITY AND NATION-BUILDING: "My prediction for the future of Burma adds up to little more than this - that Burma's future will be very like Burma's past" ('The Political Future of Burma' in FUTURIBLES (Geneva) 1963 p. 153.) His analysis is based on the detailed and sophisticated account he provides in THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (London 1964).
118. K. Marx: 'The British Rule in India' (1853) in SELECTED WORKS, vol. 1, p. 346-7.
119. K. Marx: 'The Future Results of British Rule in India' (1853) in SELECTED WORKS, vol. 1, p. 352.

V.G. Kiernan points out that Marx tended to regard the Indian past as 'dead rubble' rather than 'living and multiplying cells' ('Marx and India' SOCIALIST REGISTER 1967, p. 167).

120. M. Halpern: 'Towards Further Modernization of the Study of New Nations' in WORLD POLITICS (17) Oct. 1964, p. 159 and 161.
121. Ibid.
122. Excellent critiques of the methodology of the Nation-Builder school - what Willner calls the 'new scholasticism' - are contained in the following publications:
 S.K. Arora: 'Pre-Empted Future? Notes on Theories of Political Development' in BEHAVIOURAL SCIENCES AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (2) 2 Sept. 1968, p. 85-120.
 A. Willner: 'The Underdeveloped Study of Political Development' in WORLD POLITICS April 1964.

122. J.S. Gusfield: 'Tradition and Modernity: Misplaced Polarities in the Study of Social Change' in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (72) January 1967.
 R. Pennock: 'Political Development, Political Systems, Political Goods' in WORLD POLITICS (18) April 1966.
 C.S. Whitaker jnr.: 'A Di^Ahythmic Process of Political Change' in WORLD POLITICS (19) January 1967.
 A. Gunder Frank: SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT AND UNDER-DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY (London 1971).
 L.I. and S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (Chicago 1967) p. 3-23.
123. K.W. Deutsch: 'Nation-Building and National Development' in K.W. Deutsch and W.J. Foltz (eds.): NATION-BUILDING (New York 1963) p. 3.
- In the same volume, Strayer argues ('The Historical Experience of Nation-Building in Europe') that the more rapid and the more divorced from the natural environment this 'nation-building' is, the less likely it is to have lasting significance. Western political science's prior commitment to 'modernity' and 'the nation-to-be' wards off this kind of conclusion. Instead, if the obstacles are great, the drive to modernity must be pressed ahead the more strongly.
124. V.G. Kiernan: 'Marx and India' loc. cit. p. 164, attributes Marx's mechanistic approach to 'haste' and 'the impatience of genius'. He tended to 'pull out the thread of history faster than the three sisters were spinning it'.
125. Here Kiernan's critique is more telling: "Marx contemplated his world from above oftener than from within" *ibid.* p. 169.
126. E. Shils: 'On the comparative study of new states' in G. Geertz (ed.) OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (1963) p. 20.
127. J. Pitt-Rivers: "Contextual Analysis and the Locus of the model" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1 1967, p. 34: "A macro-sociology which takes no account of the cultural variations which lie behind its quantified data is condemned to derive its analytical categories from its own backyard and find them applicable nowhere in particular".
128. J.S. Coleman: 'Nationalism in Tropical Africa' loc. cit. p. 405.
129. G. Almond: 'Introduction' in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.): THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (1960) p. 61.
130. The phrase is Jacques Berque's: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 127.

131. These advances had been staked out beyond the narrow confines of monographs - in particular by M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard: AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (London 1940).
132. G. Almond: 'Introduction' in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.): THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (1960) p. 61. The tone of excitement and pioneering optimism throughout his Introduction to this first major publication of the SSRC's Committee on Comparative Politics, is most striking.
133. D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958) p. 47.
134. L.W. Pye: 'South East Asia' in G. Almond and J. Coleman (eds.): THE POLITICS OF THE DEVELOPING AREAS (1960) p. 65.
135. Many studies seem to have been motivated by concern for the impact of decolonization as much on Western imperialism as on Third World communities themselves. The very title of Emerson's book - "FROM EMPIRE TO NATION", rather than, say 'from tribe to nation' - indicates this.
136. L.W. Pye: 'The Concept of Political Development' in ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (March 1965) p. 4.
137. L.W. Pye: 'The Formation of New States' in Ithiel Pool (ed.): CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE (New York 1967) p. 196. Such analyses as this, argues Ann Willner ('The Underdeveloped theory of Political development' in WORLD POLITICS April 1964, p. 472), "mainly tell us about the absence or weakness in these countries of such characteristics as high literacy rates, a strong middle class, organized interest groups, etc. (They do not) tell us much of what these countries have or are".
138. D. Apter: THE POLITICS OF MODERNIZATION (Chicago 1965) p. 2.
139. E. Shils: 'On the comparative study of new states' in C. Geertz (ed.): OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (1963) p. 21-22.
140. B. Crick: IN DEFENCE OF POLITICS (1962) pp. 178, 162-3, 181.
141. A.L. Madian: 'The Anatomy of a Failure' in GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION (Spring 1969) p. 283-9, provides an interesting commentary on the difficulties of the systemic-functionalist approach to Third World politics, and in particular on the role of the Committee on Comparative Politics.
142. E. Shils: 'On the Comparative Study of New States' in C. Geertz (ed.): OLD SOCIETIES AND NEW STATES (1963) p. 15.
143. Ibid. p. 15-16.

144. L.W. Pye: 'The Formation of New States' in Ithiel Pool (ed.): CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL SCIENCE (1967) p. 186, 185.
145. cf Herbert Butterfield: THE WHIG INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY (London 1931). The Whig tradition in British history resulted not only from political bias, but also from oversimplification through abridgment. It too was a schematic school of thought, which viewed the past in terms of competing 'traditionalists' and 'moderns', and sought to interpret the past in terms of the present. As a result, the modernity of the 'moderns' was exaggerated, and the 'traditionalists' appeared to have contributed nothing positive. In fact, Butterfield points out, the two 'groups' had more in common with each other than either had with the modern world. The Whig Interpretation isolated groups from their temporal and spatial context, thus distorting their significance, and made them fight the battles which the observer in the present found interesting. The logical conclusion of this was the study of the present without reference to the past - which became known, significantly, as 'the Dark Ages'. Similarly, the logical conclusion of the 'Whig' view of nationalism would be to study the West, or the modern, without reference to the Third World, or the traditional - which becomes known as 'Primitive Society'. But the difficulty is inherent in the analytical method; it is not just a question of eliminating bias. A historian needs to abridge, and therefore select facts, and, perhaps even more, a political scientist needs to compare, and therefore select facts. What criteria should be used?
146. Many of this school of thought claim to be comparing political systems in terms of 'evolutionary universals', applicable to all systems at one stage or another, irrespective of culture. The West has simply undergone the process first; the categories are not intrinsically Western. Thus: T. Parsons: 'Evolutionary Universals in Society' in AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW (29) 1964, and T. Parsons: SOCIETIES - EVOLUTIONARY AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (New Jersey 1967). Similar claims are made by D. Lerner: THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958) p. 46, and M. Halpern: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE (1963) p. 36.
147. J. Pitt-Rivers: 'Contextual Analysis and the Locus of the Model' in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1 1967, p. 33-34.
148. An example might be Soedjatmoko's answer to the question 'How do we know that the people really want development?': "There are situations where, unless a higher level of economic life is reached, there is bound to be political disintegration. We are therefore not only facing a question as to the existence or non-existence of the desire for development among the population at large - irrespective of this, there may be an objective necessity for economic development". ('Cultural Motivations to Progress' in R.N. Bellah (ed.): RELIGION AND PROGRESS IN MODERN ASIA (1965) p. 158.)

149. cf C. Levi-Strauss: A WORLD ON THE WANE (Eng. Trans. New York 1961) esp. Ch. 4, 'The Quest for Power'. Berque, in DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964), is slightly more optimistic. He argues that the urge towards uniformity and incorporation can be resisted and that decolonization represents a partial triumph for the 'singularity and wild vitality' of the various Third World societies. 'Nationalism' gives expression to what is unique, permanent, and uncategorizable in certain social groups. These views are discussed in the next chapter.
150. E.A. Gellner: "THOUGHT AND CHANGE" (London 1964) Ch. 7, 'Nationalism'.
151. Ibid. p. 172-3.
152. Ibid. p. 173.
153. The circularity can be located in at least three words in Gellner's formula: 'Underlies': Does this indicate that such a strand of political action actually predominates, in terms of ideology and social composition, in self-styled nationalist movements? If so, how can this be measured? If not, how can a minority strand be the 'most significant element' in a movement?

Modern: Does this mean 'contemporary' (which would indeed make the statement partly testable)? or does it mean 'with modernizing goals' or 'with a modern-style organization' (in which case the tautology is clear)?

National: what constitutes a national movement? If movements not regarded as 'nationalism proper', are excluded, then the overall proposition has again been thrown back into the truistic melting-pot.

- y/ 154. Minogue: "If nationalism is broadly enough defined it can seem to have fathered most international catastrophes in the last Centure" ('Nationalism: Poverty of a Concept' in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (1967) p. 339.)

CHAPTER TWO AN ALTERNATIVE (NON-ORTHODOX) INTERPRETATION OF NATIONALISM

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I.

THE COLONIAL SITUATION

A non-orthodox interpretation of Third World nationalism can be pieced together from several sources. A group of social anthropologists have developed 'dynamic' interpretations of social process, using fieldwork findings to build up comparative data on the political behaviour of colonized societies. Contributions have been made by a few political scientists versed in the terminology of social anthropology, a convergence of interests which has developed particularly since the war.¹ Decolonization in the Third World has also caused a revolution of perspective, which has thrown up various committed theorists free from some preconceptions of Western thought.

This amalgam of influences has made it possible to construct a new framework for understanding Third World 'nationalism'. Nationalism, in this view, is best understood as a reaction, or series of reactions, to a colonial situation - that peculiar setting within which colonized societies and their colonizers interact. We must study how such 'situations' are dismantled, but also how they are established, and how they manage to persist.²

A. Development of the Concept of a Colonial Situation

The usefulness of 'the colonial situation' as a concept for organizing data has gained slow acceptance. Until the second world war, social anthropologists commonly analyzed Third World communities as self-contained units, or as networks of self-contained units. Many were clearly undergoing, or actively resisting, changes provoked by contact with highly-complex Western technologies, but where such change was

studied at all, it was essentially as a contagion from outside. Processes of 'acculturation', decay, transformation and adoption of social institutions, were studied in relation to the traditional functions and equilibrium of indigenous society.

Malinowski was an active exponent of this view.³ He treated societies as 'islands' of experience which, for the purposes of fieldwork and systems analysis, had to be isolated from their surroundings. In a colonial setting, the indigenous community constituted a separate system, to be studied on its own terms. The colonizers were another social island, or rather an archipelago of different groups. Though they coexisted within the same territory, Malinowski argued that native communities and foreign settlers had too little in common to be treated as components of a single society. Because they had extremely distinct and antagonistic cultures, they were not parts of a "well-integrated whole" and could not meaningfully be considered within the same analytical framework. In his view, the prime characteristic of any social system was equilibrium; where fundamental conflict existed, there could be no 'system' as such. Though two 'cultures' in the colonial setting shared interests and experiences, and even a coherent pattern of conflict, these merely indicated a third, separate island of analysis.

This approach was increasingly challenged by 'dynamic' social anthropologists who regarded conflicts as inevitable, indeed vital aspects of all social systems. Moreover, perspectives broadened, and the overall relationship between colonizer and colonized gained acceptance as a valid field of study, at least as a framework within which smaller-scale fieldwork had to be situated. Max Gluckman,

drawing his material from study of colonized Southern Africa, was particularly active in this double process of reassessment.⁴ He argued that, although the network of interactions between colonizer and colonized could never be termed a "well-integrated whole", it nevertheless constituted a common situation. The juxtaposition of two diametrically conflicting groups within a common institutional framework, dominated by the colonizer, established an identifiable pattern of behaviour among the groups, a "single social field" susceptible to social anthropological analysis. This had to be understood before the evolution of any participant group could be charted.

Gluckman argued that both the conflicts, imbalances, and institutional 'pathologies' within this field, and the devices by which equilibrium is maintained, were of intrinsic interest. He did little more himself than hint at the structural dynamics typical of these 'social fields', and at variables which might determine specific outcomes. His concern, as a practical social anthropologist, was not a comparative typology of colonial situations. This is less a criticism than a statement of the necessary division of labour between social anthropology and political science. "It is not to be expected," as Fallers explains, "that social anthropologists will attempt holistic studies of the new states, for methods of research are designed primarily for microscopic study of institutions within particular cultural settings. But the future of the anthropological study of politics in Africa depends upon their ability to conceptualize the place of the local institutions they study within larger political wholes, so that the results of their work may articulate fruitfully

with the macroscopic research of political scientists".⁵ Gluckman's work makes great contributions in the latter respect.

Comparative studies of European colonial policy - Furnivall's work in England, for example,⁶ and Walcker's in France⁷ - made initial attempts to list characteristics of situations where two or more quite distinct cultures and communities coexist in a colonial institutional framework. Both spoke of "plural societies". A more sophisticated comparative typology of such societies was developed by the social anthropologist M.G. Smith.⁸ He differentiates plural societies from merely 'heterogeneous societies'. All heterogeneous societies comprise different occupation groups and minorities but in a plural society these divisions are expressed in 'institutional' terms, through different educational, kinship, religious and economic organizations. Yet a plural society is a single society rather than several separate ones, because it constitutes a "territorially distinct unit having its own governmental institutions". The most important kind of "plural society", Smith suggests, is a colonial setting, which is "structurally peculiar", and "a field worth special study". One peculiar feature is that "the dominant minority is inescapably preoccupied with problems of structural maintenance and economic and political control", and therefore actively discourages the acculturation of the subordinate majority. For this reason, "conventional models of homogeneous equilibrium systems or integrative stratification orders" do not explain such situations; new models are needed. In more recent years, Smith has attempted, if not to develop such models, at least to enumerate some major variables of these structurally peculiar situations.⁹

The concept of the "colonial situation" has most insistently and interestingly been employed by the political anthropologist Georges Balandier.¹⁰ His work combines careful microscopic fieldwork and analysis with bold macroscopic typology, impressively spanning the gap between social anthropology and political science mentioned by Fallers. Balandier argues that contact and conflict in colonial situations is never random. It takes place under special conditions which involve radically contrasting cultures, transmitted by groups with differential power and rival needs. A pattern of interaction develops, albeit pathological, the outcome of which is determined by numerous variables, which he attempts to identify. Indigenous social change - much of it confused with the term 'nationalism' - can only be understood within this analytical context. "The interesting fact", he argues, "is not the existence of pluralism (a characteristic of any global society) but the indication of its specific features: the racial basis of 'groups', their extreme dissimilarity, the antagonistic relationships this entails, and the necessity imposed on them to coexist 'within the limits of a single political framework'."¹¹ He devotes a great deal of energy to analyzing these specific features. Until recently, his work has been neglected in British and American academic circles, though its influence now appears to be growing.¹²

B. Basic Features of a Colonial Situation

A colonial situation is a particular socio-political conjuncture, producing social dynamics with fairly predictable characteristics. It has countless variables, but is defined by perhaps four basic features:

-i. Contact of two radically different cultures.

Two complex 'civilizations' or 'technologies' interact in a colonial situation. They are radically foreign to each other. Typically, the one is European - more rationalistic, individualistic, bureaucratic, capitalistic, and backed up by a highly complex technology. The other is non-European - more affective, ascriptive, kinship-dominated and communalistic, with a considerably less complex technological foundation. So radically different are these two juxtaposed 'civilizations' that some kind of intense interaction or clash is inevitable.

-ii. Juxtaposition of distinct groups within a single administrative framework.

The contact between the two cultures is not one of 'free exchange'.¹³ Discrete groups are vehicles of the interaction. Though there are commonly other groups and invariably sub-groups present, the two principal groups involved are a foreign minority, and a native majority. These are ethnically distinct, have totally different cultural roots, and pursue conflicting interests; yet they coexist within the same overall colonial framework, and inevitably develop some areas of cooperation. Yet despite some shared interests, they tend to become closed off from each other socially: "sharply separated by custom and language, standards of living, types of work, marriage barriers and social exclusiveness".¹⁴ The outcome of the culture contact is shaped, or distorted, by the specific features of these groups.

-iii. Conquest and disproportionate power.

The relationship between the groups is not evenly balanced; it is deformed by grossly uneven power. The juxtaposition of the groups is imposed by force of arms, or by threat of this.¹⁵ Even where conquest is effected by indirect and apparently peaceful pressures, economic for example, nevertheless "colonialism is a fact of power".¹⁶ It is maintained by force, too; awareness that the colonizer group has "got the Maxim gun"¹⁷ underpins the implantation of the formal institutions which regulate contact between the groups - police, judiciary, administration, legislature, and technical services. Force involves more than the naked assertion of physical will; it includes "not only actual arms, but better organization, central control, greater overall unity, telephones, and so forth".¹⁸ Thus the foreign group, despite numerical inferiority, is in fact a dominant minority; despite its numerical superiority, the native group, sociologically speaking, is a dominated, colonized, or subject majority. This disparity of power generally ensures that the needs and attitudes of the colonizer minority determine the nature of the interrelationship, at least initially. Reciprocal interests which emerge do so on lines laid down by the minority; the administrative structures that are established transmit first and foremost the colonizer's conception of what these links should be; social changes that occur are profoundly marked by this imbalance.¹⁹

-iv. Ideological cement of domination.

Not merely the language of material force expresses the domination of the colonizer group. It is invariably reinforced by and combined with a whole complex of universalistic pseudo-justifications, which weave together racist, cultural, religious, moral, political and economic themes. This set of rationalizations stimulates deeply interventionist activities on the part of the colonizer, who simultaneously tries to inculcate them into the colonized population, a process known as 'civilization'. Stiffly stereotyped group behaviour patterns result.

C. Variables in a Colonial Situation

These are four basic features of all colonial situations. The precise dynamics of any particular situation need to be discussed in the light of several variable factors.²⁰ The degree to which the situation persists - in other words the way in which conquest is 'consolidated' - depends on a whole constellation of such variables; so, too, do reactions to that situation - what is sometimes called 'nationalism'.

Although several useful discussions of these variables have been published, particularly Balandier's, no systematic typology has yet been developed. Yet such a typology would provide an invaluable reference point for the study of individual colonial situations, and a matrix for comparative study. Some fragments of what is necessary are suggested here, to illustrate the contextual constraints on colonial dynamics. Both the relative strength of

colonizer and colonized, and the specific characteristics of each, need close examination. In any particular setting, the precise importance of each individual factor varies not only from one geographical sub-zone to another, but also from one time to another.

-i. Relative strength of Colonizer and Colonized.

This set of factors includes such matters as relative population size; relative rates of demographic growth; relative military strength (including potential reserves, and in relation to logistic possibilities); and, perhaps, as a derivative factor, the length of implantation itself.

-ii. Characteristics of the Colonizer Group.

These factors can be grouped under five broad headings -

a) Relationship with the Mother Country. The physical proximity of the colony to the mother country, and the effectiveness of communications, are aspects of this; so is the degree of dependence on the metropolis for military, economic, and financial support. The status of the occupier group in their homeland, whether they made the conquest themselves, how permanently they are expatriated, and how regularly population interchange takes place, are further important elements. The behaviour of the occupiers is affected by the political characteristics of the mother country, the constitutional status conferred upon the colony, and metropolitan pressures concerning colonial policy. The susceptibility of the mother country to world pressures of various kinds must also be taken into account.

b) Social Composition. Particular study must be made of the relative 'weight' within the colonizer group of soldiers and traders, artisans

and missionaries, farmers and industrialists, administrators and technical cadres, and other such social categories, since each plays a slightly different role at different times and divisions of interest inevitably reveal themselves. Above all, there are great differences between those colonizer groups which include a large number of permanently 'settled' immigrants, usually on appropriated land, and those characterized by a 'presence' of rather impermanent representatives of the metropolis together with a small community of expatriates to service their needs. 'Settler' colonies produce special distortions.²¹ The colonizer group may also include sections of population from European countries other than the metropolis. Further complication may be brought about by partial incorporation into the colonizer camp of 'intermediate' non-European groups, such as Lebanese, Jews, Chinese, Indians, Arabs, and 'half-castes'.

c) Goals and Economic Character of Occupation. Economic motives usually provide the major drive behind occupation, but the form this takes varies according to the precise economic factors at work.²² The character, rhythm and scale of economic development depends on whether the colonizer's chief interests are desire for booty or the imposition of regular taxation; the settling of emigrants or the capture of slaves; the investment of capital in an industrial infrastructure or the control of trade outlets; the establishment of plantations or the extraction of raw materials.²³ The colonizer's ability to achieve these goals, or in other words his technological capacity, is another crucial determinant. The goals of occupation may not be purely economic, however; considerations of military strategy, military tactics, and international prestige affect the nature of the colonizer's enterprise.

d) Administrative Resources and Policy. The assumption of different types of territorial sovereignty over different areas; the availability, character, and deployment of administrative officials; the nature and density of the administrative framework, and the tasks it is expected to perform - these considerations yield another set of important variables affecting the dynamics of a colonial situation. Ease of communications, management methods practised, and open-ness of recruitment to the indigenous population also must be considered. The policy adopted towards existing traditional authorities, including legal institutions, is particularly vital. The types of representative institutions injected at local and central levels, both for the colonizer group and the colonized, are also important in structuring the interaction; this is also affected by the kinds of 'civil liberty' permitted and institutionalized.²⁴

e) Ideology and Attitudes. Particularly important in this set of variables are racial attitudes (sense of superiority, aloofness, and disposition to intermarriage, for example) and cultural attitudes (including sense of identity, sense of superiority, desire to dominate, tolerance of other ways of life). Intertwined with these are educational policies (as reflected in the organization, methods, and content of education provided for colonizer and colonized) and religious policies (types of faith imported, church organization, desire to proselytize) which together indicate the degree of commitment to moral interventionism. Myths of the colonizer about himself and about the colonized take on independent force as variables. Pre-conceptions derived from other colonial situations may effectively reinforce or counteract these.²⁵

-iii. Characteristics of the Colonized Group.

Similarly, these may be slotted into five categories of variable:

- a) Relationship with Occupied Territory. The dimensions and topography of the colonized area, the ease of internal communication and the density and mode of its occupation by indigenous groups, greatly influence the character of the colonial interaction. Links with other population groups both inside and outside the colonized area are particularly important. These comprise physical links (including recent invasion and patterns of migration), economic links (including trade, clientage, slavery), political links (alliance, feud, nominal suzerainty), ethnic links, religious links, cultural links, and linguistic links.
- b) Social Characteristics. The internal social divisions of colonized communities may be exploited or counteracted by the colonizers. Elements of social solidarity, and higher unifying loyalty, equally determine behaviour. Segmentary, pyramidal, and oligarchical social structures respond in different ways to the colonial setting; some prove adaptable, and others resistant, to endogenous and exogenous change. Social divisions and combinations generated by the colonial situation itself may later become independent elements in the interaction. The nature of pre-existing social units vitally affects the success of educational or socio-economic developments, and the formation of new elites, new classes, or new occupational groups.
- c) Economic Organization and Goals. Different modes of production, distribution, exchange and consumption can be found among different sub-groups. Some prove more adaptable or resistant than others to the conditions imposed by the occupier. Prior urbanization,

sedentarization and industrialization; sophistication of technology; manpower resources; trade outlets; the existence, exploited or undiscovered, of natural resources - all determine the pattern of economic interaction.

d) Political or Administrative Structures. A variety of factors - ranging from acephalous segmentation, lineage chieftainship, and centralized bureaucracy, to theocratic monarchy- determine the political outcome of colonial dynamics. The cross-cutting political interrelationships which predate conquest, or are forged in response to it, can determine the responses of colonized groups.

e) Ideology and Cultural Attitudes. Religious organization and beliefs contain countless possibilities for division or unity; many of these exist before conquest, others develop after it. The sense of racial and cultural identity, and attitudes towards outsiders provoke particular kinds of response. The methods and character of education or value-transmission, including the extent of literacy, also deserve consideration.

From this assemblage of cross-cutting variables we can construct the 'field of social interaction' of each colonial situation. Within such parameters, groups adopt a number of possible policies, stratagems, and responses at different times - or even contradictory ones at the same time. These strands of behaviour fall into a fairly consistent or logical pattern; together, the interweaving of these constitutes the dynamics of the colonial situation.

II.

THE DYNAMICS OF THE COLONIAL SITUATION

Nationalism is inextricable from the dynamics of the colonial situation. These dynamics do not take the form of a simple clash between, for example, 'exploited' and 'exploiter', or 'modern' and 'traditional'; they are fraught with contradictory strategies and tactics, at several levels. For reasons of clarity, these strategies may be discussed separately, as actions of the colonizer and reactions of the colonized, but an active-passive relationship should not be inferred from such terminology.

A. The Strategies of the Colonizer Group

"The dominant minority", writes M.G. Smith, "is inescapably preoccupied with structural maintenance, and economic and political control".²⁶ The colonizer group is an oligarchy; it has a position of power to establish and defend. Balandier echoes this point: "above all we are dealing with a society whose function it is to achieve political, economic and spiritual domination".²⁷ This leads it to interfere with every aspect of the strange environment in which it finds itself. Yet the pursuit to their logical conclusion of the economic, social, administrative and cultural goals implicit in this interference begins to call into question precisely that initial oligarchical position. It eats away at its material and ideological foundations. To shore these up, systematic mechanisms of restraint coexist with the mechanisms of attack. Thus the paradox of the colonizer's strategy: his attack on the colonized population appears extreme and totalitarian, yet strangely peripheral and half-hearted. The two prongs of the dilemma need to be examined in turn.

-i. The Attack of the Colonizer.

The colonizer appears to seek domination over the indigenous majority in all spheres. Though the socio-economic, politico-administrative, and ideo-cultural aspects of this all interconnect, the logic of each can be understood separately.

a) The Socio-Economic Attack. The economic confrontation between the two groups is diametrical, expressing not competition for spoils within a shared system, but a total clash of economic cultures. In terms of his own economic culture, the colonizer seeks to "valorize" the colonized resources,²⁸ to create some form of "market economy" and open it up to the currents of world, or at least metropolitan, trade.²⁹ Since in his view "the black man who is absolutely self-contained, neither producing for export nor receiving any import, has no place in the world's work",³⁰ the colonizer provides shock troops for forcible industrial or agricultural mobilization. He seeks to "develop" the colony (labelled 'underdeveloped'), by relating its "backward" and "fragmented" economic activities to the "overall needs of the country"; the latter in practice are the needs of the dominant settler minority or the metropolis. In short, the colonizer seeks "the expropriation of economic surplus from the many, and its appropriation by the few, the polarization of the capitalist system into metropolitan centre and peripheral satellites".³¹

This assault does not simply require the indigenous populations to be ousted from ownership of the means of production; it also entails associating them with the colonizer's enterprise, mainly as providers of labour but also to an extent as consumers. This association poses a total threat to colonized society both in the form of direct social engineering - confiscation of land, transfer of population, forcible

sedentarization, mobilization of labour, and new ownership and usage legislation - and through the following shock-waves of indirect social revolution - development of industry, towns, and wage-labour; decline of traditional crafts and agriculture; improvements in communications; and growth of new consumption patterns. The ramifications of this threat to indigenous social life are endless. The generation of social mobility, the development of new 'class' interests, and the wholesale attempt to prise the individual away from his traditional social group,³² are aspects of a structural and attitudinal assault which amounts to "social surgery".³³

b) The Politico-Administrative Attack. Socio-economic revolution is backed up by and channelled through a politico-administrative framework. The implantation of this in itself challenges the colonized population's world. "Pacification" - the disarming of indigenous groups - has immediate consequences. Forcible sedentarization for reasons of security and surveillance involves direct social manipulation.³⁴ Pacification entails indirect intrusion by hampering the settlement of violent conflicts within colonized society, and establishing the colonizer's monopoly of physical expressions of force. This weakens social cohesion, especially among segmentary communities held together by external antagonisms.³⁵ Under such circumstances, larger-scale units of traditional organization tend to decline; fragmentation of authority takes place, and effective social organization survives mainly at small-scale village or clan-fraction level.³⁶

The colonizer seeks to move beyond the phase of constant military 'presence'. A cheaper, less painful, and ideologically more comfortable method of extending and consolidating authority, is to obtain the

cooperation of existing authority-figures within the colonized society. Surviving institutions of indigenous social control can be built upon if incorporated within the colonizer's supervisory framework. Such 'indirect rule' usually means acknowledging local leaders, yet attempting gradually to transform them into agents of change.³⁷

But the colonizer's drive for domination typically goes deeper than the supervision and incorporation of formerly independent traditional authority structures. Slowly, elements of a European-style civil administration develop, alongside this traditional organization, with the eventual aim of supplanting them. The colonizer, instinctively, seeks to create an administrative environment within which he can feel at home. Such an environment is, in any case, usually regarded as a fulcrum of effective domination, and a key to socio-economic development. Capital formation, the spread of technology, the establishment of regular taxation, and the organization of education cannot with full effectiveness be channelled through indigenous structures which arose to meet different needs; a more appropriate system of control and domination seems necessary. Consequently new, artificial territorial divisions are often established, deliberately designed to cut across and transcend old ethnic divisions. The overall scale of administrative organization is generally enlarged. This network transmits such European values as bureaucratic and judicial 'neutrality', in as far as kinship loyalties ('nepotism'), conventions of hospitality and reciprocal respect ('corruption'), and considerations of social status ('unfair influence'), are frowned upon and eschewed in the administration of native affairs. This threatens to sap indigenous sources of authority and cohesion, weaken ethnic loyalties by

juxtaposing hitherto separate groupings within a common framework, and generate a crisis of confidence in traditional political values.

The essential project of the colonizer is "depoliticization".³⁸ The colonizer reserves to himself responsibility for the political; no direct contestation of the basis of his domination is permitted. Indeed, only a small elite is normally allowed access even to the administrative sphere.³⁹ The majority of the native population is regarded as too 'backward' for regular access to the administration; instead a paternalistic programme of technical improvements may be instituted on their behalf, including agricultural projects, and the building of roads, schools and hospitals.⁴⁰ Controversy surrounding these projects is treated purely as a matter of administrative efficiency.⁴¹ As a corollary, colonial administrators themselves tend to undergo 'depoliticization'. The political initiatives expected of the early, energetic local 'contact agents' are gradually stultified by supervision and bureaucratization.⁴² Another corollary is the lack of any positive effort to mobilize consensus, or even canvass opinion, among native groups. Some 'mixed' representative institutions may be established, with concomitant civil rights, but the aim is usually less their transformation into effective political bodies than the fostering of acquiescence, the erection of facades, and the submergence of political issues under administrative ones.

c) The Ideo-Cultural Attack. The colonizer tries to embed himself by seizing and monopolizing the realm of ideas and 'values'. The spread of European schools, Christian missions, European communications, European mass media, European languages, and European products, are manifestations of this attempt. Hovering above these are 'myths' and

justificatory ideologies with which the colonizer explains his domination: racial myths particularly, which hymn the physical, mental and spiritual superiority of the colonizer. Ramifications of these myths preach the superiority of colonizer science, medicine and technology; the greater efficiency of his political organization, military prowess, and economic management; and the higher sophistication of his literature and art. Every concrete object seems a vehicle of such assumptions, down to the smallest details of clothing, hairstyle, furniture and food.⁴³ Conversely, indigenous cultural forms whether agriculture or art, government or medicine - are negatively defined. They are 'primitive', 'superstitious', 'irrational', 'archaic', or 'pagan'. History becomes colonizer history, embroidered with heroic tales of the process of conquest; the colonized population is cut off from the values of its own past. Geography becomes colonizer geography, decked out with conquered mountains and now-blooming deserts.

The colonizer oligarchy, in fact, develops a "Manichaeian ideology".⁴⁴ Literally, it assumes a black and white conflict between values.⁴⁵ This is systematically inculcated into the colonized population; its only escape from collective doom is to emulate the European model. Yet a double bind operates; attempted emulation is vain, for Caliban remains eternally Caliban.

As a result of these racial, religious, cultural, political and economic rationalizations of exploitation, the dominant minority stands closed off and remote from colonized society. Separation may be overtly institutionalized, through physical segregation, colour bar, or taboos and laws against miscegenation. Yet an attack is implicit

in such avoidance. Its twin is obsessive interventionism whereby the colonizer renames towns and streets, converts mosques into churches or museums, transforms festivals into touristic folklore, and digs up antiquities. In the "élan which the colonizer brings to the search for and destruction of all that is diverse in the world",⁴⁶ academics, artists and priests are as deeply involved as soldiers and tax inspectors.

This ideo-cultural assault threatens the innermost soul of the native; it seeks to 'de-nature' and 'de-humanize' him; it 'de-values' his culture; it desecrates and undermines his traditional morality; it cuts off son from father, and individual from group.⁴⁷ In this sense, the native is "globally alienated",⁴⁸ and "materially and spiritually dispossessed".⁴⁹ The individual even loses touch with his own "self-hood",⁵⁰ and symptoms present themselves in psychiatric disorder.⁵¹

d) The Total Assault. If we describe the dynamics of the colonial situation purely in terms of these threats, it is difficult to see how indigenous society can avoid utter destruction and humiliation. Deprived of his land, his social structures shattered, politically a dependent invalid, and spiritually at sea, the native haunts a society which "no longer contains causality within itself".⁵² His future lies beyond this dying world, perhaps in the colonizer's mother country in aid of whose predestined ascent he acts as 'sherpa'.⁵³ Fanon's description of the fate of colonized is moving, but Berque's account of this alienated world is also eloquent:

"It had itself become a thing for others. Everything within it and around it had been reified....At that moment, the native lost his warm contact with beings and things. He was cut off from everything: from the landscape around him, being transformed by 'exploitation' to which he contributed only as a labourer or, at best, as a consumer; from the sequence of cause and effect, whose internal law escaped him, since another handled it or invented it; from the knowledge of his history, of his language, of his very soul, since the colonial period imported its efficiency and its prejudices into ethnological investigations".⁵⁴

-ii. The Restraint of the Colonizer.

However, the impact of the colonizer is rarely as 'fatal' in practice as has been implied. The assault is not systematic and straightforward, nor is the dispossession total. Berque himself quickly admits that his picture is "exaggeratedly dark".⁵⁵ Part of the explanation lies in the inevitable delay and unevenness of colonial implantation; Rome cannot be destroyed in a day.⁵⁶ The colonizer has only limited resources at his disposal, whatever his ambitions. In the interstices thus provided, indigenous society can take refuge. Deliberate strategies on the part of the colonized, to be discussed later, effectively ward off much of the threatened impact. But in addition to these factors, another explanation lies in the ambivalent goals and deliberate restraint of the colonizer. His strategy is more complicated and contradictory than ^{it} might at first seem ^{to be}.

These ambivalences of policy will be examined under three separate headings, socio-economic, politico-administrative, and ideo-cultural, but they are intimately intertwined.

a) Socio-Economic Restraint. The colonizers form an entrepreneurial oligarchy. They use their dominant political position to develop capitalistic enterprises, from which in turn they can derive economic power. Yet they justify their presence by such 'universalistic' tasks as 'development' and 'modernization'. Economic self-interest, and the residual thrust of ideology thus necessitate active socio-economic interventionism. It is equally true, however, that the security of the oligarchy, and indeed effective economic exploitation, require the colonial setting to remain socially stable and predictable; excessive social disturbance creates urgent demands which distract the colonizer from his tasks. The problem is that economic 'valorization' inevitably generates social instability - crises within traditional agriculture and crafts, for example, uprooting of population from the land, emigration to major towns, demographic explosion, unemployment, or decay of kinship support mechanisms. Such problems are difficult to ignore. The colonizer is thus confronted by a major policy dilemma, which Worsley has neatly summarized as a choice between "dynamic exploitation" and "conservation of tradition".⁵⁷

To push ahead with 'dynamic exploitation' means allowing the long-term capitalistic revolution to proceed unchecked; the colonizer attempts to transcend short-term social crisis with measures designed to integrate the colonized population fully

within the money economy. In other words, a crash programme of such projects as urban construction, job provision and welfare support is implied. In the long run, this amounts to "setting up the new economic and social system which would integrate the contradictions resulting from the original intervention by going beyond them".⁵⁸ However, this is no small matter to contemplate. Massive economic and human resources are implied, inevitably beyond the slender means of the colony itself, and no doubt at too high a price for the Metropolis. The few colonial development 'plans' which colonizers hastily concoct in times of crisis - invariably proposing too little, too late - indicate that the real dimensions of the problem cannot be understood by a colonial regime.

Even if the Metropolis has the foresight and flexibility of mind to conceive of the enormous effort required, and even if it has the necessary economic resources, it cannot summon the political will to commit such resources to such a problem. For the whole purpose of colonization - whom is it designed to benefit? - would be called into question. If reminder of this is needed, any settler group in situ quickly mobilizes to provide it, for its oligarchical status is at stake. Thus, in a colonial situation, the policy of 'dynamic exploitation' comes up against a series of built-in restraints. As Bourdieu and Sayad explain, "it is inherently impossible for colonial interventionism to foresee and base its actions upon the consequences which it provokes itself, because that would be tantamount to challenging the very principle which made the original intervention possible: namely, the colonial situation itself".⁵⁹

An alternative strategy is 'conservation of tradition'. This means reining in, and muffling the impact of the socio-economic exploitation of, colonized by colonizer. It entails a serious attempt to isolate the indigenous environment from the colonizer's harmful "contagion".⁶⁰ It also entails reparative action - to shore up declining subsistence farming, for example, or to develop new craft industries. Contradictory pressures abound here too, however. The question of allocating scarce resources arises, though in a less acute form than with 'dynamic exploitation'. In addition, such protective action assumes a concern for and knowledge of the indigenous milieu which, typically, only a few sections of the colonizer oligarchy demonstrate: "they are not, and do not wish to be, aware of the logic of the society upon which they act, and indeed.....this ignorance and contempt is the very condition of their action".⁶¹

Furthermore, a policy of conservation calls into question the very point of the colonial enterprise. As Mus says of just such a French strategy in Vietnam: "There was virtually no excuse for our coming, at huge expense, to disturb Vietnamese society and ruin its moral structure, if all we were eventually to offer them was Confucius".⁶² A policy of 'conservation' is also subject to the criticism that it deprives the native of the benefits of economic development, and masks indirect exploitation. "The rural masses", Mus writes, "must be integrated into a modern economic cycle..... A return to traditional peasantry...might justly be regarded as an exploitation of man by man, by means of an essentially urban,

administrative, and capitalist cycle grafting itself again on to a Confucian countryside, which would furnish products and manpower without receiving any benefit".⁶³

A final limitation of the policy of protective interventionism is that no 'cordon sanitaire' can effectively prevent endogenous evolution, or halt change set in train by the contamination of the colonial presence. Attempts to preserve and prop up traditional socio-economic arrangements in a rapidly evolving situation themselves distort the social process, and sow the seeds of future disturbance. "Unaware either of its impact or its lack of impact",⁶⁴ the colonial regime confronts problems similar to the sorcerer's apprentice's.

The colonizer tries in practice to ride the horns of his dilemmas. "On the one hand", explains Eisenstadt, "attempts were made to establish broad, modern, administrative, political and economic settings, while, on the other hand, these changes were to be limited and based on relatively unchanged sub-groups and on traditional attitudes and loyalties. This contradictory attitude could be found in most spheres of social action".⁶⁵ These contradictory impulses are often identified with particular groups or interests - revealing tensions between Metropolis and local colonizers⁶⁶ or between different sections of the local colonizer oligarchy⁶⁷ - but it is difficult to trace a consistent pattern over time; the same individual colonizer could be extremely ambivalent.

Unresolved conflicts often result in a situation of "aborted modernization"⁶⁸ or a "dual economy".⁶⁹ A 'modern sector', dominated by the colonizer and limited in its extent, produces for

the world market, while at the same time, over the hedge so to speak, the self-sufficient peasant ploughs his eternal furrow as best he may. For as long as this uneasy coexistence can last, it suits the colonizer's limited goals. It prevents the threatened socio-economic revolution of native life from materializing, at least in its straightforward sense. The impact of the European economy is thus often marginal; behind a facade of roads, public buildings, schools and hospitals, essential indigenous social life carries on.⁷⁰

Even within the advanced sector itself, there are inherent restraints on 'dynamic exploitation'. The development of 'modern' skills and professions is necessary, but when members of the indigenous 'elite' threaten to acquire them, the colonizer may restrict access to defend his oligarchical position. In the longer term, a decision has to be made whether to train natives for responsible positions, and accept the social consequences; or if not, where to obtain the necessary manpower.

Colonial situations have many characteristics of a short-term economic holding operation, which the colonizer tries to 'freeze' as long as possible. Yet such factors as the demographic explosion increasingly undermine this control. Kilson interestingly likens colonizers to the vanguards of industrial revolution in the inter-war Soviet Union, though lacking their popular legitimacy and their knowledge of the social environment.⁷¹ But, equally important, they lack long-term commitment to the task. When the revolution and its uncontrollable disruption begins to threaten their privileged position, they try to rein it in; failing this, they are forced to 'jump off'. They rarely stay to wrestle with the forces which they help to set in train.

b) Politico-Administrative Restraint. Though the colonizer's domination is based on force, he has no desire to maintain a permanent standing army; he looks for means of conquest consolidation. "As long as the consensual element does not come to corroborate the material element"; wrote a prominent colonial settler, "there is war, irredentism, and weak and precarious domination; there is no sovereignty".⁷² Worsley goes further: "Mere negative resignation on the part of the ruled...(is not)...a solid enough foundation of rule. The optimum consolidation of power depends on its transformation into authority, the acceptance by the ruled of the legitimacy of the order under which they live".⁷³

The colonizer must devise a suitable politico-administrative structure to generate positive consensus. Yet he is determined to preserve his oligarchical status. Clearly, there is latent conflict between these two needs. Two broad strategies suggest themselves to cope with this conflict: political assimilation and political segregation.

'Assimilation' can be understood in two diametrically opposed senses: assimilation of colonizer society within the politico-administrative norms and structures of colonized society, or, conversely, assimilation of indigenous society within those of the colonizer minority. The first of these two possibilities negates the central point of most colonial undertakings (their oligarchical base, their interventionist ambition), and is a barely conceivable strategy. The second strategy can itself be interpreted in different senses.⁷⁴

The ultimate logic of assimilation implies that no separate political institutions should govern the lives of the indigenous populations; they should participate in exactly the same institutional arrangements as the colonizer. The eventual destruction of pre-colonial structures is thus implicit. Similarly, the adoption of European political norms throughout this new framework - separation of powers, impartiality of justice and administration, freedoms of association and assembly, fair elections - is implied. The threat to indigenous norms is unmistakable.

However, the logic of assimilation also promises ultimately to undermine the oligarchical privileges of the colonizer. Even if we confine our interest to electoral mechanisms, it is crystal clear to the colonizer - invariably outnumbered - that he cannot allow the colonized population equal access to shared institutions. As a result, the logic of assimilation is rapidly diverted. 'Temporary' provisions to keep the colonized at bay are a permanent feature of colonial situations. Recourse is constantly made to "Emergency powers", for the situation is one of permanent suppressed emergency. The terminology of assimilation may still have to be employed for various reasons, but a gamut of constitutional devices defuse it; and prevent the indigenous population from obtaining political power within the colonizer's framework. These devices range from restricted franchise, 'gerrymandering', and intimidation, to two-college representation and confinement of elected bodies to a purely consultative role. These mechanisms of exclusion are an integral part of the colonial system. As Bernard suggests, "What one calls the 'abuses' of colonization are merely the by-products

of its normal functioning".⁷⁵ 'Mixed' participation is largely a facade; to give such institutions real life would ensure the liquidation of the colonial regime: "any partial reform of the abuses of an absolute regime threatens the whole of the system".⁷⁶

The sub-ideology of 'transition' is often used to reconcile this systematic exclusion with the theory of assimilation. The native must first qualify for full political rights by giving proof of evolution towards European ideals. Voting rights, for example, are based on possession of individual property, literacy, army service, abandonment of 'personal status', urban residence, or even such vague criteria as 'acceptable attitudes'. A small and docile elite might gain admittance to 'mixed institutions' on this footing, and indeed a sizeable slice of the colonized population may eventually be involved, but there are informal upper limits beyond which this process threatens the colonial situation itself. Settlers spring up to barricade these points, even if the Metropolis shows itself willing to move beyond them.

In the meantime, the ideology of assimilation serves as a smoke-screen behind which political domination is entrenched. To the colonizer, 'assimilation' often means no more than his own assimilation into Metropolitan political arrangements. Even this demand for 'full political rights' is largely instrumental; it gains specific advantage at particular times. To obtain other privileges at other times, he demands 'exceptional arrangements', 'special institutions', and 'local autonomy'. The ideology also conveniently appears to reconcile theories about the need for 'modernization' and 'consensus' with the maintenance in practice

of political privilege; the argument that natives have the same potential rights as their 'fellow European citizens' is used as a lever to extract the same duties. The 'assimilated' native may thus be liable to taxation, military service, and European property laws, despite very real differences in social structure, political culture and constitutional power.⁷⁷ In addition to imposing these liabilities, the colonizer tries to 'depoliticize' the administration of native affairs. In the words of Eisenstadt, the colonizer hopes "that the native population would accept certain broad, modern institutional settings organized according to universalism, specificity, and common secular solidarity, and would perform within them various roles - especially economic and administrative roles - while at the same time they were denied some of the basic rewards inherent in these settings. They were denied above all full participation in a common political system, and full integration in a common system of solidarity".⁷⁸

A policy of assimilation is often accompanied by, but is by no means the same thing as, 'direct rule'. Direct rule favours the implantation of a European-style centralized administrative hierarchy, extending in theory right down to the lowest level of indigenous social life. In its fully developed form, it entails ignoring and deliberately cutting across all pre-existing ethnic boundaries. It also implies the inculcation of European bureaucratic norms, and the stifling of indigenous norms. This is justified in terms of the need for 'political development' and 'modern consensus' centred on new symbols of loyalty. Revolutionary socio-economic projects appear to require a revolutionary kind of politic-administrative superstructure for effective implementation.

Taken at face value, direct administration requires an intensive and widely-spread network of administrators. These need to be well-trained, well-paid, and well-equipped. Generous resources must be placed at their disposal. They should be efficiently supervised from central headquarters. Yet, as with socio-economic undertakings, such a thorough-going programme would both entail a commitment of human and financial resources far beyond the colonizer's means, and challenge the oligarchical nature of the colonial enterprise. As a result, systematic restraints are imposed upon the real impact of colonial administration in the indigenous milieu. Direct administration is never taken to its logical extremes; the organizational network is more loosely flung and shallow rooted than the theory implies.

The very novelty and foreign-ness of this administrative framework, which seems most to threaten existing indigenous values, assists their defence. Its deliberate impersonality cuts it off from effective contact with potential 'administrees' and makes a less efficient channel for socio-economic projects. To generate real involvement, the colonial administration has to understand and adapt itself to the norms of the communities with which it works.⁷⁹ Even so-called direct administration has to come to terms with local customs, local authority structures, and local expectations. Decisions thus made are not only more cheaply and speedily implemented, but perceived as more 'just' by the local community.⁸⁰ However, it is not a simple matter for the machinery of colonial control to immerse itself in indigenous norms. The effort and expense of training a sufficient number of administrative "contact agents", and instilling a reasonable understanding of local custom, culture and language, is

considerable. It also presupposes an energy and belief in the value of their role which is difficult to legislate for. Unless organized on a lavish scale, a system which allows its local administrators sufficient time to develop an intimate knowledge of their administrees is unlikely to perform the other routine tasks expected of such institutions. Many conscientious district commissioners are caught between the urge to develop contacts with local communities, and the increasingly bureaucratic demands from above which cut them off. Direct European administration can only be 'humanized' to a limited extent.

In trying to reconcile these contradictions at the heart of 'direct administration', many supposedly assimilative colonial regimes settle into a 'holding' position. They concentrate the major resources of direct administration into those zones most closely associated with the 'modern' sector; they allow the other, less 'valorizable' areas to hibernate under a loosely woven blanket of European control. This strategy shades imperceptibly into 'indirect administration', attempts to graft the machinery of colonial domination on to traditional authority structures, rather than to replace them.

The origins of 'indirect rule' lie chiefly in the economy of effort which colonizers practise in the colonial situation. During the initial process of pacification, for example, rather than conduct total war, the colonizer seeks potential collaborators and offers them support in return for acknowledgement of his suzerainty. Such tactical considerations stretch into longer-term strategies after conquest, to save personnel resources and administrative expense, and to avoid unnecessary social upheaval and discontent in submitted zones. The policy of loose containment is pursued above all in

those areas outside the immediately 'valorizable' parts of the colony. It is designed to keep the former quiet, while the latter are 'developed'.

This strategy is more complicated than might appear. It ^{causes} conflicts with colonizer groups and enterprises which seek, under the banner of destroying 'backward feudalism', to open up such areas to exploitation. Taken to extremes a 'protectorate' policy calls into question the rationale of occupation: who is protecting whom from what? It also is difficult to reconcile with the interventionist strand of colonial ideology. The colonizer observes many native social arrangements not merely with incomprehension but with utter indignation. Mus cites colonial jurists who, despite injunctions to respect native moral codes, "could not accept the exorbitant powers given by local custom to the councils of notables. They felt strongly that the right of arrest, detention in communal prisons, the right to impose fines and even corporal punishment, without proper enquiry or due process, by mere decision, violated the most elementary principles of our law and of any justice concerned with human dignity".⁸¹ In such circumstances, to renounce the drive to 'modernization' and 'civilization' was to stand accused of depriving the native of political emancipation, of pursuing a policy of "conservative segregationism".⁸²

In any case, indirect rule provides little effective defence against endogenous social change. As Mair points out; "Behind the Native Authority system was a belief that....nothing would change except under the direction of the European rulers....This vision did not take account of the dynamic nature of social relations".⁸³ Indeed, the strategy actually contributes to social upheaval. It is not easy, for example, for the colonizer to locate the appropriate

indigenous authority structure on to which to graft his administrative control. Colonial situations encourage schematic thinking about the indigenous reality, and overhasty judgement may result in serious miscalculation of the locus and nature of authority. Segmentary communities, for example the Ma_kondé of Southern Tanganyika, typically have no 'ruler' who can be abstracted from the kinship milieu:

"Although there were senior men who played an arbitrative and advisory role in group affairs, there were no specifically political authorities".⁸⁴ To 'recognise' a 'chief' in this context is to erect an anachronism, and distorts the social process.⁸⁵ Even where communities have identifiable foci of authority, these may be seriously misunderstood. "Sacred" authority cannot be treated in the same way as "secular" authority,⁸⁶ though the colonizer often does so.⁸⁷ Far from expressing a 'ruler-ruled', or 'administrator-administree' relationship, much of traditional government is "the result of a continuous interaction in which some sort of balance was struck between the claims of the ruler and the expectations of the ruled".⁸⁸ To superimpose a colonial regime is to destroy this equilibrium.

The very fact of pacification - the disarming of indigenous groups - falsifies the balance. It artificially 'freezes' the particular state of forces existing at the time of conquest. Certain notables, certain communities, have achieved an ascendancy of power at that juncture. The counter-vailing pressures of other rivals, internal fission, and 'demands of reciprocity', would, under other circumstances, eventually reduce this ascendancy, but the colonial situation inhibits their operation. Indeed, the ascendant groups

often act as accomplices of pacification, and hoist themselves above their rivals on the colonizer's back.⁸⁹

The nature of traditional authority is distorted and transformed by the presence of overarching colonial control; relations between the two are marked by great problems and contradictions.⁹⁰ The colonizer's ultimate power to recognize or depose individual 'chiefs' eats away at the 'reciprocity' in customary bonds.⁹¹ Dependence on external support short-circuits the traditional checks and balances. Thus, a traditional leader may acquire powers - to tax, for example, or to imprison - which he never had before colonization, and which have no legitimacy in the eyes of his fellow-kinsmen.⁹² The result is either chaos, and the rapid collapse of attempts to assert authority,⁹³ or the development of an artificial and exploitative social caste.⁹⁴ Conversely, some traditional leaders are stripped of former sources of power, sacrality and prestige, and thereby lose effective authority over their communities.⁹⁵ The result in either case, is that a chief can "enforce only that allegiance which Government, in its desire to rule through Chiefs, would make his people render".⁹⁶ This thwarts a fundamental goal of indirect administration: mobilization of existing reserves of loyalty.

The colonizer is like Midas: whatever he embraces changes and falls useless at his touch. Traditional authorities cannot be agents of the colonizer, enforcing rules which they do not accept,⁹⁷ and at the same time remain effective representatives of their communities. All bureaucracies bureaucratize those with whom they come into regular contact. The colonial administration heaps on traditional authorities such routine tasks as tax collection, local

police, and the implementation of petty colonial regulations. Yet these eat away the roots of their real effectiveness.⁹⁸ Lineage and bureaucracy, Fallers has demonstrated, are fundamentally incompatible.⁹⁹ Either these authorities perform alien tasks according to alien norms, and lose legitimacy in the eyes of indigenous society, or they retain legitimacy and do not effectively fulfil the tasks. A French colonial administrator succinctly summarized the problem: "We are confronted with opposing and mutually contradictory necessities: on the one hand, we are well aware that it is essential to preserve the native character of the canton chief and make use of the traditional feudal spirit which still survives in him; on the other hand, the very fact of colonization forces us to shape him to our administrative outlook".¹⁰⁰

'The very fact of colonization' also generates social processes - some despite, others because of indirect rule - which call into question the status of traditional authorities. This confronts the colonizer with an insoluble dilemma: "how to rationalize local administration in the face of basic socio-economic change, while preserving the authority of the chiefs as the legitimizing force".¹⁰¹ Massive administrative intervention is required to shore up indirect administration. Reliance on traditional authorities who have lost their traditional authority is "a makeshift arrangement, inherently contradictory";¹⁰² but this is true of most of the colonizer's strategies in the colonial situation.

c) Ideo-Cultural Restraint. Ambivalence and consequent restraint also characterize the colonizer's strategy in the ideo-cultural sphere. The threatened assault on the social values and self-hood of the colonized -

not just to satisfy the colonizer's sense of superiority, but also to lay foundations for socio-economic and political undertakings - never fully materializes. The assumption that the 'backward' native culture will ineluctably give way to the 'advanced' culture of the colonizer implies that the colonizer's role ("the white man's burden") is to accelerate the transition. The logical conclusion of this process is the assimilation of the native, one day, within the minority's culture. However, such assimilation, together with social, economic and political corollaries, clearly threatens the minority's distinctive status. Systematic restraints prevent this abstract danger from becoming real.

The colonizer oligarchy throws itself into the 'mission civilisatrice' with an overwhelming lack of enthusiasm. The resources devoted to education (particularly language teaching), missionary work, development of mass media, and other cultural 'assaults' on the colonized population, are very limited. This is partly a question of expense. A serious and thorough effort at cultural assimilation would require tremendous reserves of energy, finance, and manpower. The cultural advancement of the indigenous masses is not, however, regarded as a major priority for expenditure, and is frowned upon as a drain on precious assets. At best the assimilative effort concentrates on a few small areas of native life.

Restraint also stems from attitudes. Successful assimilation requires a broadmindedness and flexibility in the colonizer which is inconceivable; it would imply a sophisticated knowledge of, interest in, and respect for native culture. The few colonizers who develop such sensitivity at the same time lose that untroubled

confidence in the superiority of their own culture which one-way assimilation requires. In any case their efforts - that of some missionaries for example - are regarded with suspicion by other members of the colonizer oligarchy. Because of their attitudes, the vast majority of colonizers, even those involved directly in education, are ineffective 'agents of acculturation': "this role is beyond the resources of those who take it upon themselves, when they are unable to see in front of them anything other than pupils, or beneficiaries, or, in short, imitators".¹⁰³

Serious attempts at assimilation are further inhibited by fears of disrupting traditional society. Religious proselytism, for example, often provokes serious, indeed violent resistance from established indigenous institutions and leads the colonizer rapidly to curtail such activity. Other facets of the cultural attack - attempts to stamp out, 'barbarous superstitions' for example - threaten to undermine the social cohesion of traditional communities, and for this reason are curtailed. A widespread effort at European education may also threaten to create new, unsatisfiable expectations. Rather less self-interestedly, many colonizers working among native groups value the strength and humanity of traditional morality, communal cooperation, and social control; they seek to defend these from the 'corruption' of European individualism. They try to shore up the former to ward off the latter. For all these reasons, there are strong impulses towards 'cultural segregation'; the 'dual economy' phenomenon is echoed. Though there are a few scattered initiatives in particular areas of native life, sometimes far reaching, the cultural assault of the colonizer is highly ambivalent and inhibited.¹⁰⁴

The colonizer minority typically moves beyond indifference, and erects cultural barriers to discourage acculturation. To emphasize his distinctiveness, the colonizer stands aloof. Social taboos restrain individual colonizers from mixing with natives more than is strictly unavoidable; other taboos deny real acceptance to Europeanized natives.¹⁰⁵ Reinforced by protective taboos erected by the indigenous community itself, these inhibitions result in stereotyped group images and behaviour.¹⁰⁶ But this situation is dangerous for the colonizer. A colour-bar marks out a visible line of potential schism; cross-cutting relationships cannot divert the latent conflict.¹⁰⁷ By constantly reminding the native of his dominated status, segregation widens a gap which conquest consolidation must eliminate. Furthermore, since the colonizer and colonized speak different languages, (literally and metaphorically), mutual incomprehension is endemic. The colonizer cannot really find out what is happening within indigenous society. On the one hand, the colonizer wishes to explore every nook and cranny of native reality with his 'rational' intellect; ideological domination is at stake and "colonial society is constantly on guard for the appearance of any cultural innovation within the population it controls".¹⁰⁸ On the other hand, opaque cultural barriers and aloof attitudes make it difficult for the colonizer to acquire more than a superficial grasp.

-iii. The Colonizer in the Colonial Situation.

As these strategies suggest, the colonizer's world is riven by ambivalence; he faces several directions uneasily.¹⁰⁹ Though his aim is to 'normalize' (= 'depoliticize') the colonial situation, he

actually politicizes it at each turn.¹¹⁰ Every sign of social survival, resistance, change or renewal within colonized communities appears to the colonizer to threaten his political domination. Social relations are a minefield; difficulties reveal built-in contradictions rather than 'temporary misunderstandings'. This world, as much as that of the colonized, is alienated.

Though they occasionally burst into the open with misleading suddenness, the conflicts in the colonial situation are often no more than latent. By various mechanisms a temporary equilibrium is established.¹¹¹ The colonizer is often unaware of the contradictions in his position; his social isolation, and internal group solidarity, artificially save him from confronting them. What characterizes the colonial situation is frozen crisis, but though force prolongs this, it cannot do so indefinitely. The colonizer group itself is paralyzed by the latent crisis; it blocks the only possible solutions to its own contradictions.¹¹²

Contradictions in the colonizer's position are spelled out in the differing conceptions, needs, and concerns of the different groups in his total society. Colon farmers, conscript and professional soldiers, missionaries, traders, metropolitan politicians, technicians, local administrators and teachers, all have different outlooks and press for different emphases in policy. Though the crisis of the colonial situation forces them to stand together, and adopt a common policy, this 'bloc' unfreezes during the process of decolonization. The same section of the colonizer community, indeed the same individual, may be riven internally.

Local administrators particularly come to mind: "Contradictory aims could inspire different officials at the same time, and the same official at different times".¹¹³

B. The Strategies of the Colonized Group

The ambivalence of the colonizer's strategies greatly limits his impact on colonized society. But to understand the dynamics of the colonial situation, we must also examine the strategies of the colonized population. There is no single, unified, or consistent reaction to the colonial situation; different groups and levels of indigenous society, in different spheres of life, cope more successfully with it than others. Various strategies are adopted, often contradictory, at different times, according to local circumstances. Some of these reactions show conscious determination; others are unconscious and instinctive. They are difficult to classify¹¹⁴ but a few strands can be picked out from the interconnected web. Violent opposition, physical retreat, institutional duplicity, sociological withdrawal and social persistence are examples. Each of these strategies illuminates the nature of the colonial situation and sheds light on the concept of 'nationalism'.

-i. Violent Opposition.

The physical resistance of indigenous society to the colonizer is frequently underestimated. Violence should be reinstated as a crucial and constructive feature of colonized society.¹¹⁵ It is a thread running through and connecting a number of social phenomena

which are often artificially separated by theorists, particularly primary resistance, post-pacification revolts, endemic tension, social banditry, and wars of decolonization.

a) Primary Resistance. Colonial historiography often underestimates initial armed opposition to European implantation.¹¹⁶ Where violence is described, it is labelled 'xenophobic' and 'irrational',¹¹⁷ with the implication that it does not authentically express colonial relationships. The latter, by this view, only develop once early expressions of blind hostility have been exhausted or suppressed.

Yet resistance to conquest is often exceedingly violent. It inflicts considerable losses on the invader, but also on the resisters. Conquest often takes years or decades, and a large-scale military commitment. In the long run the superior technology of the European usually beats down such resistance with greater or lesser expenditure of money, effort, and human life. But the very imbalance of weaponry obscures the violence of the native reactions. The resistance of the colonized populations should be measured in terms of their own resources and forms of social organization, rather than those of the colonizer.¹¹⁸ A border skirmish in the eyes of the colonizer may be a total war from the viewpoint of the colonized population. Sometimes the violence of resistance in the face of superior armament verges on group suicide.¹¹⁹ Such "naked and disinterested refusal" involves "honour" as much as narrowly-calculated interests.¹²⁰

Armed opposition is shaped by the social structure from which it emanates, and varies in intensity accordingly. Where indigenous groups lack the apparatus of a centralized, mobilizing state, and

have little other than segmentary lineage structures, resistance though fierce generally lacks coordination over a large area.¹²¹ The colonizer may manage to insert himself into the play of segmentary conflict by locating potential collaborator groups and attempting to divide and conquer. A common stand of total armed resistance - "the forcible, instinctual attempt of an unmodified traditional structure to extrude a foreign body"¹²² - is comparatively rare. Instead, segmentary forces resist in the manner of guerrilla warfare, with an alternation of violent attacks, small-scale clandestine sabotage, and disarmed evasiveness. In such circumstances, as Evans-Pritchard suggested of Cyrenaica, "there seemed to be no enemy forces to fight, yet attack was incessant. There were no fixed points of opposition!"¹²³

The wholesale marshalling and expenditure of physical resources, and the failure of certain institutions to provide adequate defence, may result in major social upheavals within colonized groups. The collaboration of traditional leaders or their destruction by the colonizer may provoke internal social revolution; the mobilization of resistance by new leaders may also bring major structural changes in colonized society.¹²⁴

b) Post-Pacification Revolts. Once related to the native social context, submission seems tactical rather than fundamental. It postpones a damaging confrontation, rather than abandons it. The 'submitted' population often gives secret material help to resistant groups which are still active; it never fully disarms. The looseness of the European military presence and administrative framework in such areas renders 'conquest' tentative; if the balance of force shifts in favour of the colonized - if the colonizer is

involved in a European war, for example - the framework of control is liable to weaken. Revolts, insurrections, uprisings or mutinies may break out. If the power-situation seems ripe for an attempt to 'extrude the foreign body',¹²⁵ other indigenous groups are tempted to join the insurrection. The threat of violence does not lie far beneath the surface; it is simply buried until more favourable circumstances arise. As Mus suggests for colonial Vietnam: "There was no renunciation, only a truce. Insurrectional movements were a constant reminder of this. We should neither underestimate nor exaggerate their importance or their extent; popular aspirations were always liable to refer to them, even when their conduct met with disapproval".¹²⁶ As with primary resistance, post-pacification revolts involve and are vectors of social change;¹²⁷ they reveal the strongpoints and weakpoints of colonized societies. Though often compartmentalized, and of uneven depth, they provide sources of social fusion as well as fission.

c) Endemic Tension. Violence smoulders near the surface of the colonial situation, or "just below the skin".¹²⁸ It finds expression mainly in sullen and proud disdain,¹²⁹ or in dreams of the European's overthrow on a day of reckoning.¹³⁰ Simmering violence ranges from imminent revolt - as with the often dormant Islamic pre-disposition to 'jihad'^(holy war) - to chiliastic despair of a quietistic nature. Consequently, the colonizer fluctuates between confidence that the spirit of revenge has been quenched, and hysterical 'frissons' about "those who lie in wait".¹³¹ Sometimes, settlers cynically exploit endemic tension to justify the maintenance of special repressive powers; at other times,

theirs seems a realistic assessment of the impending threat. The dividing line between their own fantasies and the native reality is blurred, a characteristic feature of colonial situations, exacerbated by the colonizer's use of force to 'freeze' tension.¹³² "His preoccupation with security", says Fanon of the colonizer "makes him remind the native out loud that he alone is master. The settler keeps alive in the native an anger which he deprives of outlet...But...inwardly the settler can only achieve a pseudo-petrification".¹³³ As a result, the native "is overpowered, but not tamed; he is treated as an inferior but he is not convinced of his inferiority. He patiently waits until the settler is off his guard to fly at him. The native's muscles are always tensed".¹³⁴ This tension marks even those cultures with a reputation among Europeans for 'gentleness' and 'fatalism'. In Vietnam, for example, according to Mus: "The violence of primitive reactions still simmers in the villages....Mystical violence....underlies everything....What spirit of war and guerilla shelters behind this chiaroscuro of beliefs, this Confucian glaze!". He warned of "the hidden tension of a peasant society full of violent feelings".¹³⁵ These feelings underlie sporadic and (to the colonizer) inexplicable outbursts of destruction and outrage which punctuate colonial situations; they tap a level of frustration which subsequent colonial 'Commissions of Enquiry' cannot reach.

The atmosphere of suppressed violence signals the colonized population's total rejection and incomprehension of the colonizer's political culture. The indigenous community remains "untutored in

the rational norms and procedures of central colonial government and politics".¹³⁶ Such recalcitrance threatens the colonial order for, as Kilson suggests, "this pattern of political expression... can hardly be tolerated in a modernizing colonial system. It must be transmuted into a more predictable factor in political change".¹³⁷ Yet there is a paradox, for the colonizer's oligarchical position, sustained by threat of force, sharpens the atmosphere of violence. The colonizers, Fanon points out, "have never stopped saying that the only language he (the native) understands is that of force..."; during the process of decolonization, therefore, "by an ironic turning of the tables, it is the native who now affirms that the colonialist understands nothing but force".¹³⁸ The colonizer argues that native political culture is inherently violent, yet simultaneously and anxiously listens for language which is more 'predictable' in terms of his own political culture. However, as Fanon explains, "the native's challenge to the colonial world is not a rational confrontation of points of view. It is not a treatise on the universal, but the untidy affirmation of an original idea propounded as an absolute".¹³⁹

d) Feud and Social Banditry. Many manifestly violent reactions to the colonial situation take place within indigenous society rather than between indigenous society and the colonizer.

Raids, blood-feuds and vendettas, for example, are important mechanisms for maintaining stability in many segmentary societies.¹⁴⁰ Conflict of this kind, paradoxically, maintains communal peace; it is a "form of self-help" and a "recognized means of maintaining law in default of superior judicial authority".¹⁴¹ "What is sought",

as Beattie suggests of the blood feud, "...is not to punish a guilty individual, but rather to restore a disrupted balance".¹⁴² The bloodshed involved is regulated by intricate rules of honour; indeed it is often ritualized.

The colonizer, anxious for security, is apt to treat such manifestations as breaches of his 'peace' or attacks on his 'system'. This misrepresents their significance, which is frequently limited to the indigenous context, providing an outlet for intestine disputes, rivalries and solidarities which are 'outside', and unaffected by, relations with the colonizer. One colonial law court, for example, treated the refusal of a tribal 'fraction' to pay taxes to a European-appointed official as "rebellion"; the murder of this official during a brawl appeared to justify this interpretation. In fact the tax-gatherer was killed not qua collaborator, but as a member of a rival 'fraction'; the 'rebellious' fraction demanded to pay its taxes direct to the French.¹⁴³

The colonizer's campaign to stamp out or disarm such manifestations may provoke serious social disturbance. Frequently it simply drives them underground, where they continue to regulate social life. This violent behaviour threatens the colonizer not because it is aimed directly at him, but precisely because it ignores him. It indicates his lack of impact on a world he seeks to dominate.

"Dacoity", or what Hobsbawm calls "social banditry",¹⁴⁴ has similar implications. It is difficult, indeed, to differentiate the robbery, kidnapping, ransom, and revenge-assassination activities

of social bandits - "peasant outlaws whom the lord and state regard as criminals, but who remain within peasant society, and are considered by their people as heroes, as champions, avengers, fighters for justice, perhaps even leaders of liberation, and in any case as men to be admired, helped, and supported"¹⁴⁵ - from the razzias and blood-feuds endemic in all segmentary societies. They appear to be symptoms of crisis, social distortion, and tension in traditional relationships, but these extend beyond the colonial situation and to this extent represent the continuity of traditional dynamics. They are a closely entwined part of the economic and political structure of certain regions,¹⁴⁶ and operate according to a fairly strict code of honour.¹⁴⁷

It is possible, however, to relate social banditry more directly to the colonizer's presence. According to Fanon, for example, the 'pseudo-petrification' of interaction between the European and the colonized community forces the latter to direct hostile feelings into self-destructive channels. Social banditry is thus a therapeutic outlet, at communal level, analogous to "behaviour patterns of avoidance" in individual psychology: "It is as if plunging into a fraternal blood-bath allowed them to ignore the obstacle, and to put off till later the choice nevertheless inevitable, which opens up the question of resistance to colonialism".¹⁴⁸ By this interpretation, developed in relation to the later phases of decolonization, indigenous 'banditry' is a social distortion provoked by the particular crisis of the colonial situation.

e) Decolonization. The importance of violence in decolonization struggles is generally acknowledged, and frequently analyzed, in Third World literature. "National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people, commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced, decolonization is always a violent phenomenon", proclaims Fanon at the outset of his major work.¹⁴⁹ The intensity of that violence, the forms it takes, and the levels at which it penetrates indigenous social life, vary from one colonial situation to another. Full-scale wars of independence, nascent guerilla movements, and sporadic campaigns of disorder, are unmistakably violent strategies of colonized peoples. But the violence implicit even in apparently 'freely negotiated independence' is often underestimated; the threat of violence leads the colonizer to seek an immediate accord with 'predictable' collaborators who are more likely to safeguard his remaining post-independence interests.¹⁵⁰

Where violence is analyzed this tends to be within a narrow temporal and sociological context, as if it were a sudden and unique development of the years before independence. The particular circumstances of the immediately preceding years, especially the obstinacy of the colonizer's tactics, are frequently adduced to explain political disorder. The orthodox interpretation of nationalism links this with the concept of 'mobilization of the masses': swallowing a few scruples the modernizing elite encourages 'mass action' in order to pressurize the colonial regime. Repression by the colonizer simply deepens and widens the violence. A threat of mobilized violence thus provides a lever to obtain political concessions and to ease out the colonizer.

More extensive conflicts are also often interpreted within a restricted theoretical framework. Recent years have seen a vogue for theoretical accounts of guerilla strategy. A great deal of such literature has come on to the academic and popular market; Mao Tse Tung, Giap, Guevara, Castro, Mondlane are some of the more prominent names.¹⁵¹ These have been accompanied, particularly in Western military circles, by a flood of writings on counter-insurgency.¹⁵² Most imply that guerilla warfare is rather a novel form of activity, a violent response to colonialism developed since the Second World War. It has been regarded as a form of higher politics, a strategic innovation requiring great theoretical refinement. This is particularly true of Debray's "REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION" as its very title implies. Such books treat guerilla warfare as an advanced stage on to which revolutionary politicians move after rejecting the compromises, betrayals, dead-ends, and hopelessly abortive tactics of conventional urban political pressure. The disabused radical moves out to the countryside from the town as his thinking becomes more sophisticated. He decides to act; he reconciles himself to physical violence; he resolves to stimulate violent resistance among the peasantry. As he moves out, he has engraved in his mind, or tucked in his pocket, the writings of the great postwar guerilleros. These manuals are loaded with organigrammes, and analysis of when to establish 'focos', and when not to risk battalion-sized confrontations. They discuss weaponry, and sensitive targets. They stress the need for total clandestinity in formative stages, the necessity for watertight, vertically-integrated command units, and the dangers of horizontal contacts. They suggest how to involve the whole community in

guemilla effort, and how to insert the first elements of that 'parallel administration' which will eventually undermine the authority of the occupying power. As with 'elite mobilization of the masses', something very new seems to be proposed.

But violent aspects of decolonization should be placed in the perspective of the colonial situation as a whole. They are inseparable from that situation from the outset; they do not suddenly spring full-bodied from the fertile brains of small groups of 'nationalists'. Fanon's comparison of decolonization to the 'unlocking' of tension suggests that pent-up violence has long characterized the world of the colonized. Decolonization cannot properly be understood apart from this. Primary resistance and post-pacification revolt, for example, - commonly relegated to the pre-history of colonial relationships proper, and regarded as last convulsions of the old order - share several of the features of decolonization struggles,¹⁵³ especially guerilla characteristics.¹⁵⁴ Both partake of and contribute to a common stock of social myths. Not infrequently, the same areas which offered the greatest 'primary resistance' contribute most to the decolonization struggle; colonial relationships then move full circle, casting doubt on the sense in which certain groups ever 'disarmed'.

Similarly, endemic tension and social banditry is frequently underestimated, and links with decolonization obscured. The violence unleashed by colonized society during the decolonization phase is often 'self-destructive', involving the settling of intestine scores. More targets are attacked within indigenous society than among the colonizers. These manifestations constitute

a debate as much within colonized society as with the colonizer. Areas most marked by social banditry and tension often coincide with those areas prominent in the decolonization struggle.¹⁵⁵

All these manifestations of violence are alternative reactions to a common situation. They reveal a consistent set of strategies on the part of colonized society. Although they have important differences,¹⁵⁶ these phenomena draw on age-old forms of indigenous political life, which extend far back beyond the colonial situation itself.

f) Violence and Social Change. Violent reactions to the colonial setting are rarely regarded as other than negative or destructive. In the colonizer's eyes they are evidence of the 'irrationality' and 'primitivism' of indigenous norms. Even more liberal observers doubt their positive contribution to long-term social construction. When, in a famous passage, Fanon praises the 'liberating' and 'cleansing' potential of violence,¹⁵⁷ this is generally regarded in the West, as, at worst, a proto-fascist incitement to bloodthirsty revenge, and, at best, a disturbed metaphor thrown up by the alienation of the colonial nightmare.

Many social anthropologists, however, have come to view violence as an integrative and regenerative force in communal relationships. Violence in the colonial setting needs similar treatment. It does not simply express static norms and structures, as such epithets as 'xenophobic' and 'primitive' imply. It may give outlets to dynamic pressures within colonized society, and reveal potentialities for change. 'Primary resistance' often results from and gives rise to new elements of cohesion and unity; armed opposition to Italian

implantation in Cyrenaica led by the Sanusiya¹⁵⁸ and to Italian implantation in Ethiopia led by Menelik II,¹⁵⁹ are illustrations of how violence furthers social adaptation. Similarly, 'post-pacification revolts', such as the Maji-Maji uprising in East Africa, may be vectors of social crisis and reconstruction.

Violence brings into the open alternative possibilities of development within traditional structures - both regenerative and degenerative - and aids their resolution. The process of decolonization continues this active debate of society within itself, often in an acute form such as that described during the Algerian war of liberation by Fanon.¹⁶⁰ This is not a uniquely revolutionary phase; it reveals social processes and conflicts which have long been embedded in the colonial situation.

-ii. Physical Retreat.

The guerilla tactic of violent resistance involving whole communities is an instinctive reaction to the colonial situation. So, too, is the guerilla tactic of elusiveness, melting away, or physical withdrawal. Often this is merely a short-term reaction to physical invasion, but it also reveals a longer-term strategy in the colonial situation: a visceral determination not to be surrounded, or forced into full-scale confrontation.¹⁶¹ There are several aspects of this strategy, including retreat of indigenous groups before the invading army, 'submission', withdrawal in the face of administrative controls, and persistence of migration and nomadism. Each will be examined separately.

a) Retreat before Military Force. In the face of the superior resources of the colonizer, full-scale entrenched military resistance is a hopeless tactic. It renders eventual subjugation more thoroughgoing. A more effective reaction is to give way, to eschew full-scale resistance, to retreat, and thus offer little foothold for immediate and effective physical control. This is the instinctive reaction of many segmentary pastoral and semi-nomadic communities. The Bedouin of Cyrenaica, for example, pursued this strategy when threatened by the Italian army in the 1920's: "it was of little profit to occupy towns and villages, for they retired to less accessible regions, or circulated gaily between Italian garrisons".¹⁶² Similarly, the Berbers of the Moroccan Central High Atlas reacted to the arrival of French troops in the 1920's by "abandoning 'ksours' (hamlets) and farms at our approach, and plunging into the most inaccessible mountainous regions, taking with them their livestock, which was generally their main source of wealth".¹⁶³ Again, as French military columns invaded the Saharan fringe of Tunisia in 1882, they marched through 'ghost hamlets' deserted by the retreating inhabitants.¹⁶⁴

Retreat takes place from areas of relatively easy access to remoter areas which the colonizer finds difficult to penetrate; deserts, forests, mountains, and even caves provide shelter, at least temporarily. Where the natural landscape offers little protection, small groups can melt into the 'human landscape'.¹⁶⁵ The success of this strategy largely depends on the persistence and penetrative resources of the colonizer. Some indigenous groups are chased from retreat to retreat, finally to be tracked down and

encircled.¹⁶⁶ In other circumstances, where there are limited military resources, poor communications, and no immediate economic incentive, the colonizer is content with pushing back populations from 'useful' coastal lowlands. He does not attempt thoroughly to subjugate withdrawn groups unless they actively threaten the security of the 'useful' zone. This tactic may prove viable for a considerable time.

Physical withdrawal is a defensive rather than a defeatist tactic; its rationale is "reculer pour mieux sauter", to await favourable conditions which make it practical to return and eject the intruder.¹⁶⁷ Yet communal retreat is frequently short-lived; once the colonizer is clearly implanted, many groups filter back from their hiding-places through economic necessity to reoccupy their lands. In many instances, this return is too late, for the lands may have been appropriated by the colonizer, or by groups of collaborators. Other forms of physical withdrawal are permanent, and create a 'refugee' problem in neighbouring territories.

b) Submission. At some point during the process of being threatened, pursued, cornered and finally overpowered by superior force, most indigenous groups proffer their 'submission', often ceremonially. Yet 'submission' to the colonizer should be regarded merely as a tactic within an overall strategy of passive resistance, rather than a seal of permanent acceptance. When the colonizer's troops are active in a particular territory, it is a wise tactic to issue assurances of loyalty. This is token acquiescence in what is temporarily inevitable, a ploy which buys time to 'wait and see'. During Italian attempts to conquer Cyrenaica nomads, for example,

"When they claimed to have pacified a district, and to have received the submission of its tribal Shaikhs, it often meant no more than that the Beduin of the district had made formal submission while their sons and food continued to go to the support of the guerrillas".¹⁶⁸ Once the immediate danger has passed, 'submitted' populations are liable to turn again to dissidence.

It is not necessary to beat every indigenous group into submission. Many sections of the population, or their leadership, having assessed the overall balance of power, and their own immediate tactical advantage, actually seek out the opportunity to submit. Just as the colonizer may "show force in order to avoid using it",¹⁶⁹ many colonized communities adopt a complementary tactic: "submit in advance to greater force in order to ward off its impact". Some sections of the colonized population actively collaborate with the colonizer, and aid his conquest of recalcitrant groups, in an attempt to safeguard traditional privileges, or establish new ones at the expense of neighbours. They exploit the colonizer's presence and draw him into the play of traditional segmentary rivalries.¹⁷⁰ Though some colonized groups and individuals invest their future heavily in such collaborationist undertakings, 'submission' of this kind is essentially instrumental; it rarely provides a dependably permanent power base for the colonizer.¹⁷¹ It still represents a kind of 'withdrawal'. If the colonizer himself retreats, or weakens, 'submitted' groups are ready to come out of hiding and attack. The shift from withdrawal, to violent resistance, and back to withdrawal, involves only a change of emphasis. A policy of "wait and see", as Mus argues for Vietnam, is a form of "larval dissidence".¹⁷²

c) Retreat before Administrative Implantation. As a result, the colonizer has to transform token 'submission', brought about by ephemeral shows of force, into effective control. The colonizer's strategy is usually to encircle rather than 'roll back' the population,¹⁷³ for, as Guillaume suggests for Morocco, "Experience was to prove that only a complete and effective occupation of the territory of a tribe can force it eventually to submit".¹⁷⁴

Military columns try to establish "organisation en marche", with permanent posts, and ancillary administrative networks, to prevent dissidence reviving once troops have returned to base. However, indigenous groups have further strategies to frustrate this aim.

Administrative controls often meet with physical retreat.

"As soon as a post is set up in a populated region", reported an administrator in Gabon in 1911, "a void is immediately created around it".¹⁷⁵ 'Hidden villages', marked on maps, often vanish from the ground; or existing on the ground, are never registered on administrative maps. Whole groups in various ways thus take refuge from administrative control. When agents periodically appear, seeking the payment of taxation, the mobilization of compulsory labour, the registration of property, or the conscription of soldiers these groups take temporary retreat in less accessible zones, and perhaps cross colonial boundaries. Such reactions of evasiveness, elusiveness, disengagement, avoidance, or escape (Balandier calls them 'dérobades'), represent "the most elementary form of flight in the face of economic and administrative demands, which were sometimes very heavy".¹⁷⁶ Occasionally, particularly in the Middle East,¹⁷⁷ these demands provoke the wholesale and permanent emigration of large communities.

d) Nomadism and migration. Physical elusiveness in the face of the colonial administration is not necessarily a novel or deliberately-conceived strategy on the part of the colonized. Often it simply reflects traditional patterns of social life. Certain characteristics of indigenous society are ill-fitted for colonial control, and their persistence frustrates the colonizer. For example, it is an inescapable feature of the 'game' of segmentary communities, in the face of superior force, to "divide that ye need not^{be} ruled",¹⁷⁸ or "divide in order not to break".¹⁷⁹ Faced with the invasion of the colonizer and his administration, such groups tend to fragment into their smallest units of organization. Although this hampers coordinated resistance, it also hinders firm implantation by the colonizer. A population which lacks aggregation, and which is extremely mobile, makes permanent control difficult. The impact of the colonial situation on such communities is reduced by their lack of institutional levers of control. Thus, for village India under the British Raj, according to Karve, "survival became possible through its very structural looseness".¹⁸⁰ Mus advances a similar proposition: "the very rusticity of the Vietnamese village seems to have made it an inviolable sanctuary for the nation. Not that it had the strength to resist in isolation; but this national pattern was found everywhere. It was not concentrated at any one point where an enemy could lay a hold on it, as it might seize a town, depose a dynasty, or subject a court".¹⁸¹

Transhumance and nomadism, too, are inherent characteristics of many Third World communities.¹⁸² Larger-scale migrations of population are endemic in other areas: Apter argues that "as a whole,

the history of the Gold Coast peoples is a mosaic of recent migration, strife and settlements. Most of the present occupants have not been there much longer than the first white man".¹⁸³ Colson extends this more widely: "Large-scale migrations have been a feature of African life for many centuries, both in the form of conquering hordes acquiring new territories, and in the more peaceful form of a slow infiltration of small groups seeking new land as old land became exhausted".¹⁸⁴ This mobility, so alien to the colonizer's social norms, frustrates his attempts to cordon off, supervise, and control crucial sectors of indigenous life. Balandier notes that Belgian administrators in the Congo constantly complain how difficult it is to get "a real and complete grip on a society which slips away, and is not organized in such a way as to permit even indirect control".¹⁸⁵ "Recriminations against the mobility of lineages, 'migratory mania', evasions, vagabondage, and the 'floating population', together with attempts to locate 'hidden villages' in inaccessible regions", he explains, "illustrate the colonizer's desire to establish a physical basis for political domination, and, in their words, to keep all social groupings 'well in hand'".¹⁸⁶

Thus the colonizer places great stress on the sedentarization of native populations, as a means of fixing them in situ and rendering them 'predictable'. As well as aiding economic valorization, social revolution is sought to establish military security. The villagization programme of the early 1950's in the Kikuyu areas of Kenya is typical of these projects; it combined concentration of population to combat Mau Mau infiltration, with a land consolidation scheme designed to inject 'ownership' of compact landholdings into

the widely-scattered traditional pattern of usufruct. Overall it was an attempt to "replace dispersed settlement by nucleated settlement".¹⁸⁷ Throughout Africa, indeed, as Colson suggests, "the colonial era was marked by an attempt to tie people to given areas of land as their permanent homes, and thus to perpetuate the population distribution that existed when the European powers took over. Permanent migration was discouraged by administrative regulations, and by a freezing of the rules under which land was held".¹⁸⁸

These constants of the colonizer's policy, which culminate in electrified borders, booby-trapped demilitarized zones, and strategic hamlets, are simply corollaries of the constant strategy of the colonized population.¹⁸⁹ Their determined physical elusiveness, their 'larval dissidence', and their persistent mobility challenge the colonizer's ability to dominate the world he has invaded.

-iii. Institutional Duplication.

Unable fully to ward off the physical presence of the invader, the colonized population has several methods of warding off the full impact of his politico-administrative institutions. Formal respect for the governmental apparatus of the colonial power is difficult to avoid, as it usually has sufficient power to enforce its writ. Taxes are gathered and public order maintained. But other evasions are possible. These are facilitated by the phenomenon of 'under-administration' - the colonizer's failure to devote sufficient or relevant resources to the integration of indigenous society within his organizational framework. But whatever effort the colonizer does make meets with reactions of institutional 'withdrawal' or 'duplication'.

a) Boycott of colonial institutions. The indigenous population reacts to the local governmental apparatus of the colonial power - administrators, law courts, police, social services, and 'representative bodies' - in various ways, ranging from passive acceptance and indifference to passive resistance. One theme emerging from reports of colonial administrators is their sense of 'only skimming the surface', of working in a vacuum, of not 'biting deeply into the everyday life' of their communities. Even those who conscientiously ensure that 'the door to the office is always open' tend to find their administrees reluctant to walk through it. In the administrator's eyes, this informal boycott is inexplicable; it deprives the native of specific benefits available under the colonial regime. Civil courts are less frequently used as a channel for native litigation over land, personal status, and inheritance than the best interests of the population seem to warrant. Non-registration of births, marriages, and deaths also puzzles and exasperates conscientious officials. The colonial police are denied information, often on the pretence that the native 'does not understand'. This can amount to passive sabotage; crimes are not reported;¹⁹⁰ incidents in broad daylight are not seen; 'bandits' are not betrayed and indeed are actively sheltered. Elections, ostensibly organized for the benefit of the indigenous community, attract a derisorily low turn-out.

There are several reasons for this 'refusal to engage' with the colonial administrative apparatus. One is a shrewd sense of self-protection; a community which learns in practice the meaning of land and pasturage laws, labour controls, disciplinary codes, and taxation regulations, develops a healthy distrust for the organs and agents which patrol them. Such suspicion often appears blind and instinctive;

the Zulus of South Africa, for example, "regarded even measures which the Government appeared to intend in their interests as being designed to take from them their land and their cattle".¹⁹¹ It is usually based, however, on a canny understanding of the short- and long-term implications of administrative measures, despite the ideological smokescreens of the colonizer. Even peoples who appear to profit by the colonizer's presence, the Baganda of Uganda for example, retain a fundamental scepticism towards colonial institutions and policy.¹⁹²

Where colonial institutions would clearly benefit the native, other considerations make him reluctant to have dealings with them. Though individual administrators may prove honest, disinterested and sympathetic, they are alien. To deal with the European administration is to enter another world, where the native is handicapped and intimidated by ignorance of rituals and norms; often he is literally tongue-tied by the alien language. The very emphasis on impersonal bureaucratic rationality, independent from kinship or sacral considerations - the supposed guarantee of unbiased colonial administration - deters rather than encourages native participation. Social status, family ties, face-to-face contact and religious obligations - all of which are "irrational" to the European administration - are precisely the major elements of 'rationality' in the indigenous context. Without them, colonial institutions lack legitimation.¹⁹³ The decisions and practices which these institutions generate are unjust, and often, literally, 'incomprehensible' to the native.

Expense also deters participation, for colonial administration often involves costs and delays which the informal mechanisms of the colonized community do not impose.¹⁹⁴

Passive boycott of the colonial administrative framework is often reinforced by social ostracism of those who do turn to it. Individuals who seek for example, to establish land ownership through colonial courts threaten communal solidarity - a solidarity with which native society cements its walls against colonial attack. They are therefore shunned socially, or even physically intimidated.¹⁹⁵ While the colonial regime monopolizes physical power, active collaborators - those who man the European institutions at the local level - usually have to be tolerated. The danger for them, however, is ^{that} when the balance of power shifts, particularly during decolonization; colonized society will 'settle its accounts'. But even when the protection of the colonial regime is effective, open collaborators forfeit the respect of the native community, thus reducing their effectiveness as 'contact agents'.

Thus, despite the energy of conscientious administrators, true communal sap rarely flows through imposed colonial structures. Attempts to supplement local administration with elective councils have little success in mobilizing active support and involvement, either. Those not already disqualified from participation by the colonizer's restrictive regulations often disqualify themselves by refusing to stand for office. Apathy and active boycotts of the polling booth render those who do stand extremely unrepresentative.

The colonial administration is imposed from above; it does not grow naturally from below. Mus's observation on the administration of colonial Vietnam can be widened to include most colonial situations: "Local society, as a whole, was not fundamentally disturbed by this superimposed and fragmentary organization".¹⁹⁶

b) Self-Administration. The legitimation withheld from colonial institutions continues to flow through traditional political and judicial channels. Authentic native social institutions - chiefs, elders, holy men, assemblies, and judges, for example - retain much of their control over the everyday life of the population. "The political life of such areas during the colonial period", Fallers suggests, "tended to combine acquiescence in the superior power of the colonial government when this was unavoidable, with a continued de facto settlement of local disputes through the traditional contingent political systems".¹⁹⁷ Beneath or alongside the colonizer's administrative hierarchy, imposed from above and outside, a 'shadow sector' thrives,¹⁹⁸ which has roots in and gives outlet to indigenous political realities.

Content with the operation of his own administrative facade, the colonizer often remains unaware of the true importance of this 'shadow sector'. To an extent he accepts such 'survivals' as inevitable given his limited physical resources, though their eventual demise is expected. In other respects, duality is actively welcomed; it saves expense, and regulates affairs which the colonizer neither wishes nor is qualified to control; the colonial administration and surviving indigenous institutions appear to perform complementary functions. Yet, at other times, this 'dualism' is viewed with great concern. "Enlightened" administrators regard it as an obstacle to 'modernization' and 'civilization',¹⁹⁹ and security-minded colonizers see it as a threat to European implantation.²⁰⁰ A latent desire to smother the shadow sector with the colonial framework occasionally breaks to the surface, and stimulates bursts of administrative energy.

When assimilative pressure poses a serious threat, indigenous communities take deliberate action to retain mastery of their own affairs; "real power strives to escape administrative control".²⁰¹ The colonized society sets up, or disguises the survival of, "duplicate" or "parallel" institutions. "Effective though unseen", these are the real regulators of social life, despite the presence of various "administratively-recognized authorities".²⁰² The operation of the latter gives the colonizer "a purely illusory satisfaction".²⁰³ Delavignette describes this widespread process in French West Africa, where villages appointed 'straw chiefs' as decoys, to fulfil the formal requirements of the European administration, while quite different leaders - real chiefs - continued to perform the genuine political functions.²⁰⁴ Similarly, in Vietnam, Mus relates how, when the colonizer required village councils of notables to be elected in the European manner, "the customary chiefs....allowed unrepresentative men to be elected, controlled by them, so that without themselves coming into the open they could conduct an undercover opposition to all the measures put forward by the central administration".²⁰⁵

c) Bifurcation. The institutional structure of the colonial situation is thus riven by fundamental 'dualism',²⁰⁶ by 'split authority'.²⁰⁷ "The coexistence of an official power and a real power"²⁰⁸ - of two parallel hierarchies - results in situations where "the lowest village-level government official and the man whose word carries the most weight in the village are rarely one and the same person".²⁰⁹ Local communal institutions do not in any meaningful sense constitute 'sub-units' of a centralized colonial

administration. No single, integrated political system exists; it is truer to talk of the "coexistence of two systems".²¹⁰ The colonial polity is fundamentally "bifurcated"; its congenital feature is the "rude dissociation" between "the symbols of legitimacy, the loci of power, and the instruments of authority".²¹¹

The colonial situation is a situation. It is a field of relations, or a context within which a social dialectic unfolds. It cannot usefully be regarded as a political system. According to Easton and to Nettl,²¹² a political system forms a whole rather than a mere aggregate, consists of interactions rather than random contact, and has internal as well as external factors of cohesion. The chronic inability of colonial regimes to develop such characteristics without calling themselves into question, is their chief hallmark. Wallerstein strains terminology in calling the colonial situation "a political unit under the sovereignty of a European power which assured order within its bounds".²¹³ To go further, and treat it as just one particular form of 'homogeneous equilibrium system',²¹⁴ is extremely misleading.

The work of Bernard on North African decolonization provides an interesting illustration of such an approach.²¹⁵ He argues that all political systems, in differing proportions, involve a network of consensus and force. A colonial regime is not a unique, unclassifiable type of political organization - it is not "structurally peculiar" - but merely combines consensus and force in a special way. It is "a regime of occupation tempered by the always revocable consent of the colonized, and by the limitations which, in its own interests, it imposed on its inherent arbitrariness and force".²¹⁶ Although this

regime "is designed....to resist massive losses of consensus, it does not presuppose them".²¹⁷ Thus, in Bernard's view, there is one political system, within which two rival forces - colonizers and colonized - compete and bargain for power and authority. The development of 'nationalism' among the colonized is treated in terms of 'loss of consensus'. "Decolonization," he argues, "brings the passing of the colonial system from an initial state characterized by the unchallenged authority of a regime solidly based on the consent of the whole body of the governed, to a final state characterized by the victory of the indigenous population gathered under the banner of local nationalism - this change of regime coming about by means of a continual growth in the authority of the nationalist leaders, and of a parallel decline in the authority of the colonial leaders".²¹⁸

But in the colonial situation, an 'initial state' characterized by 'consensus' never exists empirically. Passive acquiescence is not equivalent to consensus. Indigenous authority structures are not effectively integrated into an 'unchallenged' politico-administrative colonial framework. Though Bernard identifies important contradictions within the 'system', - for example, the regime's inability to broaden its consensual base without undermining its effective force - he does not regard them as structurally significant. Without grasping the duality at the heart of the colonial situation, however, it is impossible to understand the political reaction of the colonized.

Bifurcation, resulting from both the colonizer's restraint and the native's strategy of withdrawal, is built in to the colonial situation from its outset. Some apparently 'novel' forms of counter-

colonial political action, particularly guerrilla warfare, need to be set in this wider context. Classic guerrilla theory, for example, enjoins resisters, as an initial goal, to undermine the authority of the colonial administration, and sap its self-confidence. The creation of chaos with impunity, and the generation of an atmosphere of insecurity by assassination of collaborators, are means to this end. Boycotts of administrative services can then be arranged. At a later point, as the colonizer begins to lose contact with key sectors of indigenous life, resisters can erect and insert 'parallel institutions' - courts, taxes, welfare agencies, and schools, for example - which eventually replace the colonizer's institutions. This phase is accompanied by intensive political propaganda and training to develop the people's confidence in 'self-government'. But this theoretical approach overestimates both the power and the task of 'resisters'. Indigenous political activists do not move into a vacuum; they move through the dense undergrowth of communal structures which thrives behind the colonial facade. Their task is to recognize, utilize, and shape this concrete political reality.

d) Collaboration. The existence of parallel authorities offers colonized communities tactical alternatives. Total boycott of the colonial framework is frequently impossible, and remains only one of a complicated set of reactions. Particular groups or individuals exploit the colonial situation in various ways, with different degrees of 'resistance', 'adaptation' or 'collaboration', to further their interests.

An initial reaction to the colonizer's presence is often to draw his resources into the traditional interplay of alliances and rivalries. 'Submission' may be calculated to enlist the colonizer's support in this. Some groups gain political or economic suzerainty over other groups as a result of such 'collaborati6n'. However, this kind of reaction is not mere opportunism; it does not imply naked detachment from traditional loyalties. It needs to be understood as an extension of indigenous political values - whether 'segmentary', 'feudal', or 'dynastic'.²¹⁹

Some groups or individuals later seize other opportunities within the colonial framework. Use of European education, religious conversion, enlistment in the colonial army, provision of wage labour, and even wholesale emigration to the Metropolis, are reactions of this type. To suppose that such 'collaboration' creates permanently 'evolved' sectors, however, is mistaken. Rather it represents a single strand within a bundle of extremely ambivalent reactions. Many groups and individuals play a 'double game',²²⁰ extracting maximum advantage from the colonial situation, but in an instrumental manner, retaining their suspicion of the colonizer. On occasion, the native attempts to use the colonial administration openly to frustrate the goals of the colonial administration. Use of European courts to prevent encroachment by colonizers on native land, for example, or attempts to buy back lost territory, may achieve limited success. Participation in colonial elections may, in certain circumstances, restrain the colonizer with his own weapons. Such reactions are highly ambivalent, never straightforward.

The colonial polity is a divided world, full of hypocrisy, equivocation, and deceptive facades. This extends the native's range of potentialities rather than restricts it. He may, in certain circumstances, play off traditional chief against colonial administrator, and administrator against chief.²²¹ He tries to get the best of both worlds.²²² It should not be assumed, however, in the manner of some colonizer military strategists, that colonized populations are 'disengaged' and equally susceptible to the blandishments of the European and the 'nationalist'. Their double game is a device to ward off impact; it implies visceral resistance to alien imposition, of which the colonial invader is the most immediate and glaring embodiment. And the dominant mode of this 'game' - which the colonizer rarely comprehends - is clandestine withdrawal.

-iv. Sociological Withdrawal.

The physical power of the colonizer obliges indigenous society to divert resistance into secret or indirect channels.²²³

Sociological withdrawal is thus part of the strategy of colonized communities. As Balandier remarks, "the sociology of conflict needs further development, but the sociology of refusal of established social order and 'official culture' has yet to be created....We need to elaborate a whole sociology of the antagonistic, withdrawn part of these societies".²²⁴ Avoidance of exogenous contact, enhancement of indigenous values, clandestinity, and duplicity, are characteristic features of withdrawn communities in the colonial situation.

a) Avoidance of exogenous contact. Deliberate shunning of social contact with the colonizer is an instinctive reaction to conquest. "Colonial domination", according to Fanon, "...gives rise to and continues to dictate a whole complex of resentful behaviour and of refusal on the part of the colonized. The colonized exerts a considerable effort to keep away from the colonial world, not to expose himself to any action of the conqueror".²²⁵ This aversion has the power of social taboo; "to the scandal of military occupation, he opposes a scandal of contact".²²⁶ Distrust of the White Man, or of the Christian, goes deeper than the mere neglect of colonial institutions mentioned in the previous section. All areas of involvement with the colonizer are riddled with suspicion, fear, and guilt. His company is eschewed;²²⁷ his products and habits are treated as potential snares.²²⁸ 'Organized boycotts' which mark certain phases of 'nationalist activity' thus tap aversive instincts which are inherent in the colonial situation.

The colonizer frequently characterizes this reaction as 'xenophobia' or 'fanaticism'. Yet it has a positive, defensive value. Xenophobia, for example, "heatly combines into a single reflex all the apprehension, grievances, and bitterness caused by contact with the outsider";²²⁹ it helps to consolidate resistance. Religious fanaticism, too, is "neither vain, nor anachronistic", but inextricable from the political commitment of colonized society.²³⁰

These mechanisms of social avoidance are partially reinforced by taboos operating from the colonizer's side. The physical separation of native town and European town, the existence of a

formal or informal 'colour bar', and the practice of job reservation, reduce contact between the two communities. But in other respects, the colonizer positively seeks to contact and 'engage' indigenous society, and the native finds himself "hounded, driven out of all his successive hiding-places by a hostile effort backed by the mighty weight of modern times, and simultaneously ashamed of the retreat to which a pretence of submission has relegated him".²³¹ Under such pressure, he has actively to fight for survival. His "determined maintenance of social personality"²³² involves various techniques or mechanisms; "from all eternity, by means of manifold tricks and through a system of checks and balances reminiscent of a conjurer's most successful sleight of hand, the country people have more or less kept their individuality free from colonial impositions".²³³

Self-preservation initially entails staking out an area of privacy; the aim is "to hide from outside eyes as many activities and events as possible....and to preserve one's 'self-hood' - to escape the colonial situation where feasible".²³⁴ Threatened by the colonizer's drive to know, conquer, and 'consume', native communities hide their secrets.²³⁵ They reply to egoism with 'unintelligibility'.²³⁶ The native deliberately makes himself and his behaviour appear 'stupid' or 'irrational'.²³⁷ Resistance of this kind frustrates the progress of 'civilization', and confuses its agent, the colonizer. "I seek literally," writes Berque, "to appropriate this 'native' and all that belongs to him; his food, his field. But there is always some part of him that escapes me, even though he has become my servant, my batman, my workman,

my fatma. He resists alienation, maintaining his personality in regions of himself to which I have no access; his faith, his sexual life, his ever-watchful aggressiveness, his hope".²³⁸

b) Enhancement of indigenous values. "Sociologically withdrawn" communities fall back on their innermost resources. It is, writes Bourdieu, "as if this society had chosen to remain tightly closed upon itself; as if it had taken great pains to set up a thousand invisible, impregnable barriers against the intrusion of new methods and ideas".²³⁹ Heightened importance attaches to key areas of social life; they become moral sanctuaries, into which the native retreats, and into which the colonizer is either reluctant or unable to penetrate.²⁴⁰

Where colonized societies resist as groups, they take refuge in what they have in common: shared values, the shared past, shared language, shared institutions. Often these centre around religion, whose sacredness grows rather than fades. The significance and observance of feast-days, ceremonies, and dances may change as they come to symbolize determined survival. Meeting places - shrines, places of public worship, public baths, markets, cafés - may form physical nodes of social resistance. Driven from the broader public arena of self-expression, the native falls back, above all, on the home, the family, the woman.²⁴¹ Even traditional dress may act simultaneously as refuge and badge of refusal.²⁴²

As Fanon suggests, in a brief sketch of the process, "this withdrawal, this rejection of an imposed structure, this falling back upon the fertile kernel that a restricted but coherent existence represents, constituted for a long time the fundamental strength of the occupied",²⁴³

c) Clandestinity. The behaviour of colonized communities is deeply imbued with clandestinity. Social action takes place 'undercover',²⁴⁴ out of the colonizer's sight. "Strong external pressure and internal resistance tend to send customs underground".²⁴⁵

The 'secret life' of the native is protected by what Balandier terms "collective autism".²⁴⁶ The 'mystery' of indigenous customs masks the realities of social survival and reconstitution from the colonizer. "Hiding behind 'tradition'", Balandier suggests, "constitutes one of the best tactics for protection from or refusal of the grasp of colonial society".²⁴⁷ Where traditional rites and practices are under attack as 'barbaric' or 'primitive' - from European missionaries, administrators, or jurists - a 'conspiracy of silence' surrounds them. Thus slavery, circumcision, witchcraft, ecstatic cults, blood-feuds, and other manifestations of indigenous life, may simply survive in secret. As Charnay points out, this kind of "subterranean traffic" is "a classic phenomenon in any occupied society where no fusion has taken place".²⁴⁸

Such reticence may persuade the colonizer that his 'civilization' is advancing. To the extent that this illusion gains credence, it frees indigenous society from interventionist pressures. Camouflage brings tranquility. As a result, "behind a facade that reassures the colonizer, the essential part of social life often carried on. The most effective social relations are found outside the formalism which is expressed 'on the surface'".²⁴⁹

Several factors in the colonial situation facilitate subterfuge, and indeed make it inevitable. Words erect a particularly opaque barrier. The two communities literally speak a different language,

and what is said in one tongue is difficult to translate into another. Colonized populations deliberately rely on their separate codes of communication; European jokes about 'the jungle telephone' - the mysterious and rapid way that news travels - are not far from the truth.²⁵⁰ In a more general sense, "the foreign nature of the dominated culture acts as a screen helping colonized society".²⁵¹ The colonizer cannot establish what the native is really doing or thinking. Without direct, intimate experience of the native's religion, domestic life, political attitudes, and social organization, he cannot understand even what he observes. As Balandier indicates, "the colonized peoples often used, with great skill, the cultural gap that separated them from the colonizer".²⁵² Often this exploitation seems unconscious.

The subterfuge characteristic of decolonization struggles is thus rarely a novel departure for indigenous communities. Theorists of guerrilla warfare stress the need for underground communications networks, anonymous leaders, oaths, silence under torture, and boycotts; they speak of using traditional institutions and events as 'shields', and of taking refuge in 'inviolable' sanctuaries. But none of these tactics is born 'sui generis' during the brief period of pre-independence struggle. They are aspects of a consistent reaction to the colonial situation. Their success largely depends on the degree to which "the peasants have never stopped clutching at a way of life that was in practice anti-colonial".²⁵³ Indeed, clandestinity is an endemic feature of many Third World societies long before the advent of the European colonizer. The "closed-in nature of communal life", and its

"ability to keep a secret", noted by Chaliand in Vietnam villages,²⁵⁴ is typical of many areas. The existence of secret societies,²⁵⁵ occult brotherhoods,²⁵⁶ and oath-sworn cults is well attested in earlier periods. Similarly, magico-religious veneration of secret caves, trees, wells or mountains is often a unifying factor in social life. Dissimulation in the colonial situation may signify the persistence and heightened importance of age-old reactions.

d) Duplicity. Clandestinity distorts colonized-colonizer relations. Systematic prevarication is endemic. "In the presence of the occupier", Fanon explains, "the occupied learns to dissemble, to resort to trickery....Every contact between the occupied and the occupier is a falsehood". To the White Man's "forked tongue", the native opposes his own: "the colonized....is hardly ever truthful before the colonizer".²⁵⁷ Hostility, distrust, disingenuousness, and deceit underlie most behaviour. What Apter notes in colonial Uganda is fairly typical: "The political postures and cleavages in the society have had far-reaching consequences for the behaviour of the Baganda. They have affected outlook as well as social structure, beliefs as well as organization. Shrewdness becomes tantamount to wisdom. Deviousness becomes a form of shrewdness. Politeness becomes a form of deviousness...The expressions of warm and faithful regard that each group had for the other, and which the British and the Baganda expressed for one another, served to disguise both the sources and strengths of an antagonism made more anguished by the knowledge of deceit".²⁵⁸

The 'withdrawn' life of colonized populations is thus rarely straightforward; it is complicated by the pressures of the colonial

situation. "Colonial domination distorts the very relations that the colonized maintains with his own culture".²⁵⁹

-v. Social Persistence.

The obstinate persistence of indigenous community organization is a fundamental feature of the colonial situation. The limited impact of the colonizer, and the evasive strategies of the colonized, establish a large interstice within which social survival is possible. This persistence has numerous facets, including intact continuity, inertia, change and reconstruction, which shed light on the phenomenon of Third World 'nationalism'.

a) Intact Continuity. So far from collapsing under the body blows dealt by the European presence, native society stubbornly endures. The obsessive 'fatal impact' theme of much Western analysis is symptomatic of ethnocentrism. "Colonialism", Fanon remarks "wants everything to come from itself".²⁶⁰ "We give ourselves", says Mus of Frenchmen in Vietnam, "an exaggerated place in the natural perspectives of the country. We instinctively relate its preoccupations to ourselves.....Seen from the ricefield, in the shadow of centuries, the Vietnamese universe looks quite different. Its villages centred everything around themselves. The pre-war Frenchman imagined himself at the centre of this picture, but in fact he stood against a world backdrop which appeared hazy, and indeed, to their quasi-Chinese ways of thinking, barely humanized. Removed from the European context to which they related themselves, our compatriots came quite peripherally on to the village horizon".²⁶¹

A shift of perspective is needed to appreciate the continuity of the indigenous universe. "Investigation", complains Berque, who is prominent in calling for this shift, "at best has only concerned itself with change, and this relative to the action of the colonizer, and purely in terms of mechanical determination".²⁶² Analysis should not content itself with the external layer of the colonial dialectic; it should investigate how it is experienced by the colonized populations themselves.²⁶³ "The colonial relationship", he argues, "...did not influence everything it affected, nor on the otherhand can it be held responsible for everything....Many human beings, things, situations, and events remained unconnected, or apparently unconnected, with the colonial system, despite its tendency to ubiquity. It is characteristic of colonialism that although its methods are grandiose, and its consequences all-embracing, it has only partial mastery or understanding of itself....Thus one cannot interpret solely in relation to its vicissitudes an existence of far wider significance".²⁶⁴

The areas of life untouched by the colonizer are at least as important as those which are affected. "Imperialism", Berque admits, "was able to modify or change the more or less extensive zone which it touched. But it rarely reached the depths".²⁶⁵ His own work stresses the "immense regions" which "had remained intact"; these, he believes, are - "statistically and logically" - more important than the penetrated zones. The native's experience of the colonial dialectic includes "the permanence, or internal mutation, of what is inviolate". To understand this, we have to analyze the ingredients and forces of persistence: "such it had

been before colonization, and such it would remain after independence".²⁶⁶

b) Inertia. "The communities which enter the modern world", suggests Lloyd, "are not ones in which the traditional social structures are collapsing, the people avidly seeking new interests and values. They tend to be ones in which indigenous associations have maintained considerable cohesion".²⁶⁷ Study of the resistance, stubbornness, or 'drag' of indigenous associations helps to explain social persistence. Balandier likens the colonial situation to an experimental solvent,²⁶⁸ whose action lays bare the strongpoints of indigenous societies; it reveals "the bedrock". What survives the process are "the points of resistance of colonized societies, the fundamental structures and behaviour".²⁶⁹ Even apparently 'inert' areas of community life, precisely because they are inert, make a strategic contribution to persistence.

The colonizer is frequently exasperated by the seeming imperviousness of native groups to new ideas and institutions. He explains this in terms of 'inertia', 'obstinacy', 'laziness', 'backwardness', and 'inadaptability'; he characterizes the native as 'unwilling to learn' or 'unable to change'.²⁷⁰ But this resistance is designed precisely to weather the crisis of colonial implantation. As Balandier suggests, "there is a sort of delay which we might call functional".²⁷¹ The 'drag' opposed to the colonizer's projects is a 'coping mechanism' rather than a 'pathology'; it preserves the duality of the colonial situation, and provides the wherewithal for later emancipation. The apparent 'sclerosis' of tradition, as Fanon points out,²⁷² often masks energetic revival. We can speak of "oppositional traditionalism"²⁷³ or of the "traditionalism of resistance".²⁷⁴

Some aspects of 'inertia' which most madden and alarm the colonizer - for example, the native's 'inability' to control his own demographic growth - serve actively to sharpen contradictions at the heart of the colonial situation. Duclos illustrates this point well: "We might conceive of a kind of biological nationalism corresponding at species level to the mental defensive reflex which reacts against attempts at collective depersonalization. Thus the growth of the birth rate...might be a numerical reply to the pressures of the external, technological, colonizing world. In any case, the resultant demographic density is an objective aspect of the national reality. Internally, it imposes 'shoulder to shoulder' social solidarity on the nationals; externally, because of the pressures it creates, it makes the reality of barriers more noticeable. Thus, if not a reflex of nationalism, it is at least one of its agents".²⁷⁵

Ability and determination to 'persist' is not uniform or consistent at all levels in all areas of indigenous life; there is differential drag. Survival depends on internal as well as external factors. Different components of different socio-cultural systems put up "unequal resistance".²⁷⁶ But above all, these points of resistance are nodes of a dynamic process. When Berque urges that "we should not argue that inviolate zones were inert",²⁷⁷ he is opposing the conventional view that 'traditional' life is "fixed" in "timeless continuity".²⁷⁸ The idea that traditional society is "static, prescriptive, closed and nonrational"²⁷⁹ is part of the schematic 'phoenix' theory of change. It implies that

the only alternative to 'modernity' is either "atavistic withdrawal" or "a prolonged period of severe strain, instability and conflict".²⁸⁰ The corollary is that where dynamic social process occurs, this results from the intervention of external forces, particularly those unleashed by the colonizer. This obscures the conflict and change implicit in all traditional life. Consequently, if we speak of inertia at all, it should be of dynamic inertia.

c) Change. Dynamic change in the colonial situation is generated "from below and within" indigenous society.²⁸¹ Developments in social anthropological theory illuminate this process. The structural-functional approach, from Durkheim to Malinowski, encouraged a rigid view of traditional social organization in the Third World, playing down the importance of internal conflict and change, and treating social myths as embalmed social experience. This reinforced some of the schematic generalizations of European political science. A more dynamic approach to social anthropology, notably that of Gluckman and Leach,²⁸² opens new perspectives. It exposes the limitations of such static concepts as 'functional integration', 'cultural uniformity', and 'structural equilibrium'.²⁸³ It treats conflict as intrinsic to social action; social process, the dynamics of change, is generated by the interplay of basic inconsistencies, incompatibilities, and potentialities within social "systems".

Even to conceive of a continuous "system", according to some such theorists, injects misleadingly rigid notions of 'structure'. Leach argues that "the social dynamic is not merely cyclical flux within an overarching 'system'"; it is not "simply part of the process

of structural continuity", nor "merely a process of segmentation and accretion". "It is a process involving structural change". Static myths about social organization should not be confused with the social process itself; "since the facts at the end of the cycle are quite different from the facts at the beginning of the cycle, the 'system on the ground' is not in equilibrium in the same way as the 'system of ideas'".²⁸⁴ This kind of thinking has cast doubt on the value of any systemic typology for certain societies. Balandier, for example, insists that "the political field must be seen in all its extent and complexity, even at the price of the vulnerability of any typology of segmentary political systems".²⁸⁵

In practice, the dynamic approach has had to retain some kind of concept of 'balance', 'equilibrium' or 'system'.²⁸⁶ Though Gellner, for example, declares that the operation of a traditional 'system' is an "optical illusion", he nevertheless speaks of "patterns" which transcend systemic "breakdowns".²⁸⁷ Yet 'system' has lost its associations with rigid structure. By persistence we must understand the continuity of a dynamic 'game' rather than a static 'edifice'.²⁸⁸ With its emphasis on flux, tensions and crisis in pre-colonial 'systems', dynamic social anthropology thus paradoxically helps to explain how they manage to adapt to and survive the colonial situation. Flexible, open, changing societies are less vulnerable to exogenous change than rigid, closed, unchanging societies.

The process of decolonization in the Third World also contributed to the overthrow of conceptual shackles concerning

tradition. "It has overturned habits", according to Balandier, "and given rise to terminological prudence (with regard to such epithets as 'archaic' and 'primitive'), and cast doubt on the present direction of anthropological research. In one blow, societies which were considered static or stuck in 'repetitive process' have rediscovered a history; they have left the sphere of passive objects. This resumption of initiative is also to be found in the fields of political and social thought".²⁸⁹ Balandier's own fieldwork in fact resulted from a colonial administration's growing awareness that indigenous communities were 'on the move': "We had been asked to draw up a kind of balance-sheet on two peoples - the Fang of Gabon and the Ba-Kongo of the Congo - which were attracting the attention of the administration by their 'retaking of the initiative' and innovatory enterprises. After periods of 'tolerance' of different duration, these two ethnic wholes were clearly reacting to the colonial situation, by striving to re-organize themselves".²⁹⁰ In this adjustment of sights from the decay or rigidity of colonized society, to its renewal or dynamism, Balandier cites Fanon as a key figure.

The importance of this shift of perspective is indicated by Lloyd: "Looking at African rural areas, one may choose to stress either the force of change or the persistence of traditional institutions. The observer whose framework of analysis is a rather static image of traditional society will point to the 'cracks' in the structure effected by mission education, colonial government, or greater affluence. His

comments seem more predictive of disintegration than of the development of new structures. If on the other hand, one sees the traditional institutions in terms of conflict and competition between individuals, and groups, one is more likely to stress the persistence of these groups as changing conditions are exploited to achieve the goals of the indigenous society".²⁹¹

Indigenous reactions to the colonial situation are not merely externally provoked; they include 'endogenous evolution' or 'internal mutation'.²⁹² An illusion that traditional society is static, homogeneous, and consistent may be created by the temporary dominance of one potentiality within the 'game' at the moment of colonial conquest. But this should not be mistaken for a permanent or total statement of that game. "What is seen today and labelled as 'traditional society' is often itself a product of change", Gusfield points out,²⁹³ and this change continues. Nor, similarly, should we mistake idealized beliefs about social equilibrium, associated with one social stratum, for an exhaustive and authoritative statement of the rules of the multiplex game. "We must", Gusfield suggests, "avoid accepting the written and intellectualized versions of a culture as only the literate form of a common set of beliefs and behaviour patterns".²⁹⁴ Sets of myths are not equivalent to sets of behaviour; we must distinguish "myth" from "social reality"²⁹⁵ or "culture" from "society".²⁹⁶ In any case, there are alternative cultures to the "dominant" culture, and alternative stresses within the dominant cultures.²⁹⁷

Within 'traditional' societies, there are "contradictory and inconsistent ideas",²⁹⁸ "opposing tendencies",²⁹⁹ and "alternative potentialities",³⁰⁰ the interaction of which generates social change. As Leach argues "the overall process of structural change comes about through the manipulation of these alternatives as a means of social advancement".³⁰¹ To understand the colonial situation - and therefore 'nationalist' phenomena - from the 'inside', we must analyze "those sectors of traditional society that contain or express potentialities for change from dominant norms and structures".³⁰²

We need, for example, to examine "the diversity of content in specific traditions which influence acceptance, rejection, or fusion of modernist forms".³⁰³ But this diversity relates to endogenous crises, not just to the question of "modernism". "Classes and castes", the Rudolphs suggest for India, "religions and sects, statuses and roles that represent deviations from dominant motifs; stresses within dominant ideologies; and recessive themes in cultural patterns and psychological makeup that can be mobilized by somewhat changed historical circumstances, become grist for the mill of social change".³⁰⁴ We need to examine, too, endogenous potentialities for wide-scale unity and schism, as expressed in patterns of fission and fusion; it should not be implied that exogenous forces - transmitted by 'nationalism', for example - were necessary to breathe new life into a disintegrating body. Similarly, we should study spontaneous sources of social reconstruction. "The potential

for activism and mastery of the environment had always been there", the Rudolfs suggest of India;³⁰⁵ so-called 'nationalist' reactions mobilize this dynamic potential against a (temporarily dominant) passive potential.³⁰⁶

d) 'Social Pathology'. The traditional dynamic does not operate undisturbed in the colonial situation. The 'debate' of indigenous society 'within itself' continues under distorting conditions. The colonizer prevents some potentialities from direct or open expression. In such circumstances, as Fanon argues, "the practice of tradition is a disturbed practice".³⁰⁷ Bourdieu and Sayad speak of "pathological traditionalism" and "traditionalism of despair".³⁰⁸ If the concept of a traditional 'system' is valid at all, such manifestations appear 'dysfunctional'.

Recent developments in the study of 'messianic' movements, however, suggest that apparent manifestations of social degeneration often transmit powerful energies for social reconstruction. The colonizer, confused by such developments, treats millenarianism as irrational, wild, superstitious, suicidal, or xenophobic; in general, he sees it as evidence of the "inability on the part of the natives to integrate into new and more productive forms of economy".³⁰⁹ Marxists, and some self-styled 'nationalists', frequently view it as "a force diverting the energies for resistance....from the arena of the material struggle....into a region of religious myths".³¹⁰ Social anthropologists often stress the renunciatory self-destruction or "quietism",³¹¹ the "defeatism" and "frustration",³¹² and the "utopia of escape",³¹³ expressed by such movements. In these respects, they seem pathological.

Yet they have several constructive aspects. They represent a defence against the threat of the colonizer, an active attempt to throw off the shackles of control. The colonizer himself is quick to detect the direct challenge to his authority; they represent, at the very least, "a refusal....to integrate",³¹⁴ and in a sense "the first organized opposition to colonialism".³¹⁵ Given the economic structure, many Marxists concede, it is "the only possible form of resistance".³¹⁶ Social anthropologists also show how this kind of resistance harnesses dynamic forces within indigenous society. It represents a "resumption of the initiative",³¹⁷ leading not just to 'moral regeneration' but to socio-political reconstruction.³¹⁸ Even in its utopian aspects there is "a utopia of reconstruction".³¹⁹ Many such movements are 'activist' and revolutionary, revealing possibilities of social cohesion, and unity within the traditional 'game', and exploiting them to ward off the colonizer's impact.³²⁰ The intense religiosity of such movements connotes more than escapism and frustration. It follows from the inseparability of political and sacred in these societies; any notion of a purely 'secular' reaction to the colonial situation is anachronistic. In any case, where the colonizer blocks overt political channels, recourse to the sacred is inevitable.

C. Contradictions in Colonial Dynamics

Colonial dynamics are thus inherently contradictory. The colonizer both threatens wholesale disruption of colonized society, and systematically restrains his impact. Potential crises dog

indigenous society at every point, yet its persistence is a constant feature of colonial dynamics. The native avoids "total alienation"; he is "dispossessed of the world" only in the sense of being forced to adopt defensive and indirect strategies.

As a result of the ambivalent strategies of the colonizer, and the defensive strategies of the colonized, the colonial situation is fundamentally dual. It is "a world cut in two";³²¹ "a colonial elite and culture coexist, but separately; with a colonized society and culture which feels threatened".³²² The two societies make little contact;³²³ they are "walled off" from each other by barriers of social avoidance. As Charnay suggests of Algeria: "With both societies confirmed in their respective attitudes - European society in its good conscience, its authoritarian paternalism, and its sometimes clumsily expressed desire to 'civilize'; moslem society in its inert, distrustful, unreasoning and occasionally backward-looking resistance - there was really no dialogue between them".³²⁴

This dualism is an inevitable feature of any colonial situation, and the only mode in which it can persist. Yet paradoxically it constitutes a standing threat to its stability, a fatal flaw hampering its consolidation; "the existence of two blocs, of watertight compartmentalism....keeps a perpetual menace of internal rupture hanging over it".³²⁵ This contradiction lies at the very heart of the dynamics of the colonial situation, and should be central to any discussion of 'nationalism'.

III. 'NATIONALISM' IN THE COLONIAL SITUATION

The orthodox interpretation of 'nationalism' in the Third World has glaring deficiencies. To rectify these, the social dynamics of the colonial situation must be approached 'from inside and below'. This non-orthodox approach seems to entail abandoning the concept of nationalism as such. The hallmark of most dynamic theorists is not open contestation of the orthodox definition of 'nationalism'; most ignore it, and refuse to use the term at all. In this sense, we have manufactured a clash of interpretations which rarely takes place in practice. Yet a direct clash does occasionally occur; some non-orthodox theorists redeploy 'nationalism', give it a more malleable meaning, in order deliberately to shift the focus of interpretation.

A. The unusability of the concept of nationalism

It is not surprising that social anthropologists closely focussed on intimate particulars of a small community should neglect such wide-ranging concepts as 'nationalism'; as an explanatory tool, it is not fitted for this level of social reality. But the concept has also been ignored by social anthropologists concerned with developing broad generalizations and comparative categories about social process. There are many reasons why it is inappropriate.

-i. It implies a homogeneous, consistent and uni-directional movement. In fact the social dynamics of a colonial situation

are complex, multi-directional, and often contradictory; they operate differently at different levels and among different groups. To lump such processes into a universal category such as 'nationalism' (or indeed 'modernity') is grossly misleading. As Bonnafé suggests: "In view of the very considerable 'fluidity' of nationalism, which can be used to cover extremely dissimilar realities, one wonders whether such broad concepts are of much use. Perhaps at this point it would be more fruitful to employ simpler operational concepts to grasp what common processes are at work, at different levels of expression, beneath the heading of nationalism".³²⁶ The idea of nationalism obstructs perception. Less unwieldy 'middle-range' sociological concepts, such as 'unifying dynamism' and 'structural renewal',³²⁷ or 'internal fission', 'decompression', and 'fusion',³²⁸ may be helpful. Balandier rarely refers to 'nationalism', at least in the singular; he speaks of "so-called 'nationalist' reactions" generally preferring to call them 'reactions to the colonial situation'.³²⁹ He describes such processes as 'degradation', 'reconstruction', 'unifying reactions', and 're-formation'.³³⁰

It is important that such 'middle-range' concepts should not be too naive or vague, however, otherwise they too obscure perception. Occasionally, Berque's concept of "resumption of spontaneity" or Balandier's concept of "retaking the initiative" run this danger; they cease to be explanatory tools.³³¹ Berque's proposition that "the excess of the attack summons the energy for a later effort at reconstitution" is too neat,³³² as is Balandier's

idea of "a veritable threshold of tolerance to cultural denaturation" beyond which there is "a tendency to reorganization".³³³ As Stokes suggests, the notion of automatic compensatory mechanisms is simplistic.³³⁴

-ii. It is heuristically flabby. 'Nationalism' can be used to describe "any form of organization, even rudimentary, which escapes the control of the dominant authorities".³³⁵ All manifestations of political life not actually dictated by the colonizer, all untrammelled survivals of the indigenous social process - even those seemingly inert -, can be regarded as aspects of nationalism. Because large-scale social persistence is built into all bifurcated situations, it is impossible to set definitional bounds. To label this vast range of phenomena 'nationalism' adds nothing to explanation, indeed clouds it; it is "a misuse of terms".³³⁶ To stretch one word to cover and explain multiplex dynamics, Bonnafé suggests, is to run "a great risk of seeing the very object of research evaporate".³³⁷ Nationalism becomes indistinguishable from the entire social process; it provides no independent explanation of it. Rather than blunt our perception in order to cling to a word, we should jettison the word in order to sharpen our perception.

-iii. It obscures the nature of the colonial situation. The basic duality of the colonial setting ensures the existence (persistence) of self-contained social life among the colonized. The reactions called 'nationalism' are thus endemic features of colonial situations. Yet the word 'nationalism' implies novelty. The colonizer, often disingen^uously, fixes this label to manifestations of autonomous

social life among the colonized population, in the belief that they are a new phenomenon, deliberately subversive of the prevailing order, and thus deserving condemnation and repression. But, as Balandier points out, the label "does little more than express the anxiety of the established European minorities who are faced with black societies in the process of total transformation. They consider the maintenance of their dominant position to be a function of their own direct control over changes affecting indigenous society. Hence their particular sensitivity to the slightest sign of reaction or initiative".³³⁸ The point is not that the colonizer is mistaken in treating native 'initiatives' as long-term threats to his domination; they constitute precisely such a menace. But they should not surprise him; they are not novel. They stem from contradictions at the heart of the colonial situation. The colonizer, who rarely grasps these structural contradictions, only deceives himself in invoking 'nationalism' to explain short-term problems.

iv. The term 'nationalism' is inextricably entangled with the narrowly-focussed connotations of orthodox 'elite nationalism'. It is arguable, therefore, that the non-orthodox viewpoint should concede the word to nation-builder theorists, and concentrate on establishing that such 'nationalism' is of purely marginal relevance in Third World contexts. This kind of approach, particularly in Marxist hands, stresses the thin social roots of 'elite nationalism'; it does not represent the whole society, and, as a result, implies a form of 'neo-colonialism'.³³⁹ The

restricted associations of elite-led "modern nationalism" should not be confused with the whole social process in the colonial situation, at its different levels and in its different forms. Such statements as Halpern's—"Nationalism is the principal political manifestation of social change in the Middle East"³⁴⁰—suggest that there is a real danger of this.

B. Attempts to redefine nationalism

For these reasons, the abandonment of the concept of 'nationalism' as an analytical tool seems inevitable if the pitfalls of the orthodox approach are to be avoided. However, some non-orthodox theorists are reluctant to relinquish the word; they fight to retain it by redefining it.

There are several reasons for this. The first is the need clearly to signal disagreement with the orthodox tradition which otherwise, by default, goes unchallenged. Only by actively redrawing accepted definitions can important differences be brought out.

Hodgkin's is a partial attempt at this.³⁴¹ He tries to loosen the meaning of 'nationalism' in order to do justice to the diversity and complexity of colonial dynamics. Although important, he argues that the activities of the 'elite' are only one aspect of nationalism; they are "mixed up" with diverse organizations and movements at various levels of society, "each in its own way expressing opposition to European control and a demand for new liberties".³⁴² 'Nationalism' thus comprises "any

organization or group that explicitly asserts the rights, claims, and aspirations of a given African society (from the level of the language-group to that of 'Pan Africa') in opposition to European authority, whatever its institutional form and objectives".

Hodgkin's definition, based on "explicit assertion", and with "language group" as its minimum scale of social organization, is still fairly restrictive, but it represents a considerable widening of the orthodox definition.

Kilson's is a rather more radical attempt to redefine nationalism.³⁴³ Though holding that the activity of the modern elite is the "highest form" of nationalism, he stresses that it represents the interests of a very narrow stratum of society, not those of the rest of the 'nation' which it purports to speak for. He also stresses the role which the threat of peasant direct action plays in persuading the colonial regime to treat elite nationalism seriously.

The approach of both Hodgkin and Kilson is terminologically loose and pragmatic. They shift the focus of orthodox study of nationalism; we hear more of specifically indigenous and non-'evolved' ingredients, and more about the dynamics of the particular colonial situation. There are fewer assumptions about the 'nation-to-be', and less discussion of evolutionary universals. In retaining the word 'nationalism', they give it a transformed sense.

A further reason for continuing to discuss colonial dynamics within the framework of 'nationalism' is that the term has acquired positive value-associations in some contexts. As 'nationalism' lost its respectability in post-war Europe, it began a vaunted

career in the Third World. It connotes 'patriotism'³⁴⁴ and authenticity. Social processes which obstruct or thwart the so-called nationalism of the urban elites appear unpatriotic and inauthentic. Colonizers, or elite 'nationalists', invariably establish myths condemning such manifestations on these grounds.³⁴⁵ It is thus tempting to establish the authentic community aspirations behind such 'anti-nationalist' activities - and the inauthenticity of the 'nation-to-be' of the elite - by outlining the "specific national identity" which they express and defend.

'Nationalism' also appears, in some contexts, to connote 'constructiveness'. 'National integration' is often treated as a goal worth pursuit in itself, as if freed from the vested interests of different social strata. To link elite goals alone with 'nationalism' carries the suggestion that the alternative (non-'modern' or anti-'modern') goals of other social sectors are 'destructive' and 'backward-looking'. "Traditionalism" and "tribalism" have both tended to register this kind of negative image. To associate them with 'nationalism' might help to underline their positive contribution to social construction.³⁴⁶

For all these reasons, recent years have seen the growth of 'populist' or 'dynamic' studies of nationalism, in reaction to the 'mental cramp'³⁴⁷ of orthodox definitions. Several writers and politicians have retained and transformed the concept of nationalism to help describe the Third World social process.³⁴⁸ Duclos' concept of "rural nationalism" is a particularly stimulating attempt.³⁴⁹ He drafts a definition of nationalism which he claims is "rather unadventurous", but "best suited for an understanding of a phenomenon

which....is fragile, elusive, and multiple".³⁵⁰ Nationalism is "the consciousness shared by the population of a given territory of constituting a political community whose originality is itself a cherished value. A demand for sovereignty almost always results".³⁵¹ The aim of all nationalist movements, he suggests, is "to reconstitute, safeguard, and extend a collective personality of sufficient scope and unity to satisfy man's need to share social, cultural, and political identity with as many others as possible".³⁵² He argues that, although the phenomena he describes are fragmentary, inarticulate, and contradictory - "fragile, elusive, and multiple"³⁵³ - they can be usefully treated as 'nationalism'.

But it is possible to share this 'populist' approach - according to significance to similar phenomena - without sharing identical terminology. The work of Mus, Lacheraf, and Fanon, for example, illustrates this.

Mus alternates between writing of 'nationalism' and 'patriotism'.³⁵⁴ He characterizes "Vietnamese nationalism" as "both a reaction of primary instincts, born of the land, the climate, and their violence, and a distillation....of an age-old morality in which these elementary forces of earth and blood elaborate and institutionalize themselves into a civilization".³⁵⁵ Elsewhere he writes of "this patriotism, which is also a form of humanism".³⁵⁶

Lacheraf differentiates more firmly ^{between} "rural patriotism" and "nationalism".³⁵⁷ The former is 'defensive', 'combative', 'traditional' and 'instinctive'; the latter, exclusively urban, is based on new classes (proletariat and bourgeoisie) with new demands. However, not

until these two social realities interact and irrigate each other can there be a truly "revolutionary" movement of national liberation. Both are crucial ingredients, and one of Lacheraf's dominant stresses is on the persistent 'patriotism' of the peasantry, and their crucial role in any socialist revolution.³⁵⁸ He sidesteps the issue of whether such rural reactions are truly 'nationalist'; "whatever it was", he argues, "nation-state or nation-community, or simply fatherland acting in solidarity (and by that very fact 'national'), something existed which allowed Algeria for 130 years to oppose a great imperialist power and finally force it to capitulate".³⁵⁹ He suggests that this "firm or instinctive....defence of a country, which was spontaneous and natural" transcends questions of "their level of consciousness or social formation; their nomadic or sedentary way of life; the traditionalism and culture of their old cities; their frequent contact with or withdrawal from the modern outside world; their hostility, reticence, or loyalty towards a regime which had become theirs; their integration into or independence of its state structure..." etc.³⁶⁰ Lacheraf's emphasis on the past and future role of the peasantry thus transcends terminological disputes about nationalism.

Fanon similarly stresses the role of the peasantry in 'national liberation'. But he looks beyond 'national liberation' to "man's liberation";³⁶¹ what is needed, he argues, is a social revolution, harnessing the potentialities of the whole community. It is the peasantry's contribution to this that Fanon emphasizes more than other populist writers: "in the colonial countries, the peasants

alone are revolutionary, for they have nothing to lose and everything to gain".³⁶² He is deeply sceptical about the representativeness of most "nationalist political parties" during the anti-colonial struggle, and about the neo-colonialist aspirations of the "nationalist bourgeoisie".³⁶³ Neither are guardians of the true national consciousness. The scope of Fanon's analysis thus extends even further beyond the 'nationalist' phenomenon than Lacheraf's. "Nationalism", he writes, "that magnificent song that made the people rise against their oppressors, stops short, falters and dies away on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a programme. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness".³⁶⁴

C. Characteristics of 'nationalist' reactions to the colonial situation

A variety of writers have thus fundamentally reassessed colonial dynamics. Whether the concept of 'nationalism' is totally abandoned, or redefined, is in the last analysis unimportant. In either case, they highlight features of reactions to the colonial situation which the orthodox interpretation of Third World nationalism obscures. The basic elements of a coherent non-orthodox interpretation of Third World 'nationalism' include the following:

- i. 'Nationalism' is a reaction, or a series of reactions, to a colonial situation. It constitutes the assertion of what is specific within colonized societies in the face of threatened political or cultural absorption by the dominant minority. The fact that the

colonizer's impact is in many respects limited does not negate the overall proposition that 'nationalism' must be related to the colonial situation. The nature of the colonial situation, with its in-built bifurcations, explains the paradox, since one prong is precisely the persistence of indigenous social processes. Since persistence is inevitable, 'nationalist' reactions are directed "not merely against the Other....but outside the Other";³⁶⁵ they are reactions not only to the colonizer, but also to various potentialities within indigenous society itself. They are part of a process which is "beyond time and outside the colonial situation".³⁶⁶

-ii. 'Nationalism' is inarticulate in European political terms.

To some theorists, the idea of non-explicit nationalism is a contradiction in terms; Kelman asserts that "an ethnic group becomes a nation when it begins to ideologize its customs and way of life", implying that inarticulate reactions cannot be nationalist. However, these reactions have their roots not among 'Westernized' sections of the population, but in traditional, predominantly rural, community life. They necessarily express themselves in the traditional political language. This, as Morris-Jones suggests, is usually "more important as behaviour than as description; it is by comparison with modern politics inarticulate, acted upon rather than spoken about. This is for the simple reason that on questions outside the little worlds, it has nothing to say, whereas within those worlds it is so familiar that there is no need for it to explain itself".³⁶⁷

Small-scale societies do not act in relation to 'abstract' ideas but in relation to "particularistic interests of their own social group".³⁶⁸ Their behaviour is "affective or implicit", in contrast to the "ideological, explicit, or conventional nationalism" of the Westernized urban elite.³⁶⁹ As a result, certain groups adopt 'nationalist' strategies "without being aware of it".³⁷⁰ Beliefs, though firm, are "instinctive", stemming from a strong sense of the concrete and the familiar; "one only gets involved in things one recognizes".³⁷¹

'Nationalism' of this kind is usually intensely sceptical of the so-called ideological 'nationalism' of the urban elites. Duclos likens this suspicion to "the concrete bank against which artificial ideologies regularly break".³⁷² Intensely realistic and prosaic, it is impermeable to theoretical argumentation. Its rejection of 'inauthentic' ideologies helps to ward off disguised exploitation; it constitutes a "defence of local freedom, hence protection of fundamental social characteristics against the onslaughts of a 'domestic colonialism' devoid of any political point".³⁷³

The inability, or refusal, of these 'nationalist' reactions to ideologize themselves does not make them a-political or incomprehensible. The "seemingly chaotic, aimless and undefined nature" of many reactions is misleading. Their consistency, strategic goals, and indeed philosophy, are expressed in factual behaviour. The 'national identity' at stake can be more readily grasped by studying the pattern of targets attacked and institutions

defended, than by poring over articulate treatises. Kilson suggests that "by considering the objects of populist violence one may gain insight into both the goals of the populist groups and the cause of their violent behaviour".³⁷⁴ Similarly, we have to analyze the rallying points around which the native organizes his "anonymous cohesion and extremely tenacious survival".³⁷⁵

-iii. 'Nationalism' is extremely localized. It is not predicated, as the orthodox interpretation suggests, on a far-flung and abstract 'nation-to-be'. It reflects indigenous social realities, which are "narrow in focus",³⁷⁶ intimate, and small-scale. The same close face-to-face group tends to focus loyalty for all political activities; the hierarchies of group membership that exist in the West do not operate effectively.³⁷⁷ As a result, it is entirely wrong, as Saul points out, to imply the existence of "a monolithic, primarily peasant block".³⁷⁸ The issues, grievances and aspirations which stimulate behaviour in the colonial situation are part of everyday community life.³⁷⁹ The reactions of individual local groups thus vary in form and intensity from one another. These limited horizons, this 'latent autonomism', appear to militate against unified, 'national' consciousness. However, variations are part of a shared 'game'; though "certainly incompatible with the idea of the State", Duclos suggests, they are "not with that of the Nation (Patrie)".³⁸⁰ Such behaviour provides "a constant reminder of deep-rooted social realities",³⁸¹ and thus helps to "disseminate national values".³⁸² We should not dismiss it as 'anti-nationalist', 'backward-looking', or 'xenophobic' simply because it resists the

claims of an externally-projected 'nation-to-be'. In as far as it resists such alien concepts, indeed, it is "the guardian of national orientation".³⁸³ The particularistic grievances and problems, expressed by each small-scale group, voice an instinct of conservation and community solidarity "upon which national, spiritual, and moral concepts were based".³⁸⁴

Moreover, the fragmentation of these responses is partly illusory. In the face of the colonial crisis, they express alternative solutions and potentialities within the traditional 'game', "the conjunction of which added up to a response on the national level".³⁸⁵ Common religious, cultural, political and economic experience is reinforced by the presence of the colonizer. Charnay insists, for example, that "one must not conclude, as is too often done, that this 'localism' meant 'atomization'....for though superficial observation might identify picturesque differences, visible but external, in the series of cells and individual groups, one can also observe profound similarities of mentality, desires, and behaviour. (These)....societies contained in themselves likelihoods of coagulation".³⁸⁶

-iv. 'Nationalism' is inspired from within, not outside. The orthodox view implies that 'nationalist reactions' draw their strength and inspiration from structures and values originating outside indigenous society.³⁸⁷ By contrast, the non-orthodox interpretation roots nationalism in the strongest, most authentic indigenous structures and values - those which survive the acid test of the colonial presence. It constitutes the assertion of

what is specific within that society, as against the outside threat of political and cultural absorption. The major resource in this defence and reformation is what has remained inviolable within the colonized community. As Berque suggests, "the real strength of the national uprising lies in its recourse to what is 'integral' and what is a continuation, however relative the sense we give to these terms, and even if such recourse is effected by rupture and innovation".³⁸⁸

'Nationalism' thus represents the persistence of the indigenous political game. The orthodox theory of nationalism implies the impending decay of all things traditional; their role in the genesis of nationalism is unimportant. Thus Emerson remarks: "In the degree to which the rural population was left to its own devices, it escaped the direct impact of precisely those forces which were most significant for the new elites. Nationalism is essentially and in the first instance an urban phenomenon".³⁸⁹ But a totally different conclusion can be drawn from this 'escape' of the rural population, namely Fanon's: "The peasants threw themselves into the rebellion with all the more enthusiasm in that they had never stopped clutching at a way of life that was in practice anti-colonial".³⁹⁰ 'Nationalism' is not a unique explosion, occurring just before independence; it represents continuity. It is not concerned simply with constructing a new nation from nothing; as Berque points out, "it already has a past".³⁹¹ Seen in this light, the persistence of indigenous community life is not incidental to the dialectic of decolonization; it is crucial to its unfolding.

The fulcrum of 'nationalism' is the refusal of the society to disintegrate. It signifies intact survival and spontaneous reconstitution of a traditional 'game' which is neither unidirectional nor consistent; it contains a variety of alternative potentialities and is played at several social levels.

NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO

1. This trend is analyzed by G. Balandier: ANTHROPOLOGIE POLITIQUE (Paris 1967).
2. Max Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA^(Oxford 1956) (p. 139) sets out to answer the question, "Why does not South Africa explode?"
3. B. Malinowski: DYNAMICS OF CULTURE CHANGE (Yale 1945) systematizes many of his ideas.
4. A reassessment of functionalism is contained in M. Gluckman: "Malinowski's 'functional' analysis of social change" in AFRICA (17) 1947 p. 106-121. His ideas of change in a colonial situation, already implicit in his "Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand" in BANTU STUDIES (June 1940) and in his essay on "The kingdom of the Zulu of South Africa" in M. Fortes & E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (London 1940), were further developed in CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (Oxford 1956), particularly Chapter 6 ("The Bonds in the Colour Bar").
- 4 5. L.A. Fallers: "Political sociology and the anthropological study of African polities" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (4) 1963, p. 328.
6. J.S. Furnivall: COLONIAL POLICY AND PRACTICE (Cambridge 1948).
7. E.A. Walcker: LES COLONIES - PASSE ET AVENIR (Paris 1947).
8. M.G. Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism" in ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (83) 1959-60 p. 763-777
9. cf. his introductory paper (unpublished) on the sociological conditions of conquest consolidation, read to the 1971 Annual Conference of the Past and Present Society, in London.
10. His major work - SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (Paris 1963) - has been accompanied by several theoretical articles germane to his analysis of colonial situations: - "La situation coloniale - Approche théorique" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (11) 1951, pp. 44-79
 - "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, pp. 47-69
 - "Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes en Afrique noire" in ZAIRE (Brussels) April 1954, pp. 379-389
 - "Social changes and social problems in Negro Africa" in C.W. Stillman (ed.): AFRICA AND THE MODERN WORLD (Chicago 1955), pp. 60-69
 - "Le contexte sociologique de la vie politique en Afrique Noire" in REVUE FRANCAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (9) Sept. 1959, pp. 598-609
 - "Les mythes politiques de colonisation et de décolonisation en Afrique" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1962)

10. - "Réflexions sur le fait politique: le cas des sociétés africaines" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1964)
Many of these ideas have been distilled into his book ANTHROPOLOGIE POLITIQUE (Paris 1967) esp. Chapter 7.
11. "La situation coloniale - Approche théorique" (1951) translated in I. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 45. Balandier uses the word 'pluralism' where Smith was to speak of 'heterogeneity', and 'colonial situation' where Smith was to speak of 'plural society'.
12. This is suggested by the translation of his two major books - THE SOCIOLOGY OF BLACK AFRICA (London 1970) and POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (London 1970) - and by the gathering of articles by various authors under the title "SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION" (ed. I. Wallerstein, London 1966).
13. "Contact is made by means of social groups, and not among cultures existing in the form of independent realities".
G. Balandier: "La situation coloniale - Approche théorique" (1951) in I. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE..p. 52.
14. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 151.
15. It is based on "pure force", according to Fanon: "THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH" (Harmondsworth 1967) p. 29. But for its effect to be decisive, the force need not be fully unleashed. Thus "the Pondo did not fight the British at the annexation. Rhodes mowed down a mealie field with machine guns before the eyes of the paramount of Eastern Pondoland and his councillors, and explained that their fate would be similar if they did not submit" M. Wilson: REACTIONS TO CONQUEST (Oxford 1936) p. 412.
16. R. Maunier: THE SOCIOLOGY OF COLONIES - INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF RACE CONTACT (London 1949).
17. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 139. He adds that "force established white rule, and the threat of force maintained it" (p. 140) Monica Wilson points out, similarly, that "Bantu leaders are well aware that Europeans have the military power!" REACTIONS TO CONQUEST (1936) p. 562.
18. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 139.
19. "Their authoritarian political status enabled the expatriate groups more or less to impose whatever pattern they wanted upon African social change". M.L. Kilson: POLITICS IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (Cambridge, Mass. 1966) p. 47.

20. In addition to the sources already cited, contributions to comparative analysis of colonial situations include:
- P. Bonnafé: *LE NATIONALISME AFRICAIN* (Paris FNSP/CERI Serie C, No. 9 Dec. 1964)
- J. Berque: *DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE* (Paris 1964), esp. p. 89-106
- T. Hodgkin: *NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA* (London 1956), esp. p. 55-59
- P. Worsley: *THE THIRD WORLD* (London 1964), esp. Ch. 1
- J.A. Barnes: "Indigenous Politics and Colonial Administration" in *COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY IN HISTORY* (2) 1960
- The Conference Papers of the 1971 Past and Present Annual Conference, on *CONQUEST AND CULTURE*, all mimeographed, raise various points of comparison.
- The work of Frantz Fanon does not attempt to establish an academic typology, but sheds light on numerous variables in colonial settings. Particularly valuable are *L'AN V DE LA REVOLUTION ALGERIENNE* (Paris 1959), trans. as *A DYING COLONIALISM* (Harmondsworth 1970); *LES DAMNES DE LA TERRE* (Paris 1961) trans. as *THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH* (Harmondsworth 1967), and *PEAU NOIR, MASQUES BLANCS* (Paris 1952) trans. as *BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS* (London 1968)
- L.H. Gann & P. Duignan: *WHITE SETTLERS IN TROPICAL AFRICA* (Harmondsworth 1962) is useful on some variables affecting the colonizer's strategy.
21. Barnes argues that "Colonial administrations operating without the complication of settlers have on the whole been paternalistic, and often benevolently paternalistic, towards the tribal people they have conquered; settlers have on the whole been forced to take a much shorter term view of their own interests. They have had to concentrate on securing control of the land they wished to exploit, and on defending their property and stock against the attacks of the indigenous inhabitants. In varying measure, depending on the particular type of enterprise on which they were engaged, they have tried to secure their labour supply, either by establishing friendly relations with the local people, or by kidnapping, capturing, recruiting, or enslaving enough labourers to suit their needs. These actions may lead to conflict between the frontier settlers and the administration". J.A. Barnes: "Indigenous Politics and Colonial Administration" (1960), repr. in I. Wallerstein (ed.): *SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION* (1966) pp. 217-218, cf. L.H. Gann & P. Duignan: *WHITE SETTLERS IN TROPICAL AFRICA* (1962).
22. cf. J. Berque: *DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE* (1964), Ch. 5 'Impérialisme et Technologie', and P. Worsley: *THE THIRD WORLD* (1964), pp. 44-49 'The Raison d'Etre'.
23. Supposed economic goals may not be real economic goals, economic goals may change over time, and different colonizer sub-groups may pursue different economic goals. cf. E. Stokes: "The First Century of British Colonial Rule in India" in *PAST AND PRESENT* (58) Feb. 1973, esp. p. 142-4.

24. G.H.T. Kimble: TROPICAL AFRICA (New York 1962) Vol. 2, p. 253.
25. M.L. Kilson speaks of "the doctrinaire and nearly pathological obsession of British colonial authorities with the theory of indirect rule" POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966) p. 202. P.D. Curtin: ^(Wisconsin 1966) THE IMAGE OF AFRICA - BRITISH IDEAS AND ACTION 1780-1850 emphasizes the power of idées fixes, in determining intervention during an earlier period. Other interesting examples from India are provided by C. Dewey: "Images of the village community: a study in Anglo-Indian ideology" in MODERN ASIAN STUDIES (6) 1972, and G.D. Bearce: BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS INDIA 1794-1858 (Oxford 1961).
26. M.G. Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism" (1960) repr. in P.L. Van den Berghe (ed.) AFRICA - SOCIAL PROBLEMS OF CHANGE AND CONFLICT (San Francisco 1965) p. 71.
27. G. Balandier: "La situation coloniale - Approche théorique" (1951) repr. Wallerstein (op. cit.) p. 47.
28. P. Worsley: THE THIRD WORLD (1964) p. 47.
29. M.L. Kilson: POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966) p. 13.
30. Capt. C.H. Stigand: ADMINISTRATION IN TROPICAL AFRICA (London 1914), p. 3.
31. A. Gunder Frank: CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (Harmondsworth 1971) p. 27.
32. "We were seeking the individual by making the group an abstraction" P. Mus: GUERRE SANS VISAGE (Paris 1961) p. 179.
33. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 6. He also calls it "a crude sociological experiment".
34. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 57-9.
35. "In the days of anarchy, the tribesman needs his kinsmen for security. But give him security from above and the principal of fission, which coexists with that of fusion in every segmentary society, becomes more powerful". E.A. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" in W.H. Lewis (ed.): FRENCH SPEAKING AFRICA (New York 1965) p. 118.
36. "Under an effective administration, it is the largest groups, the most abstract loyalties, that disappear, even if the more specific village-scale tribal organization survives". E.A. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" (1965) loc. cit. p. 115.

37. European rulers, according to Mair, saw their role as to "guide the chiefs in the way of enlightenment,...remove abuses from the organizations that they found, control the infliction of cruel punishments, (and) limit the demands that chiefs could make on their subjects. Then, having cleaned and polished their instruments, they would turn them to constructive use". L.P. Mair: "African Chiefs Today" in AFRICA (28) July 1958, repr. in P.J.M. McEwan & R.B. Sutcliffe (eds.): THE STUDY OF AFRICA (London 1967) p. 110.
38. Balandier speaks of "degradation by depoliticization". POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 160.
39. The difference is that "Policy decisions define a programme of action, implicitly or otherwise. The execution of this programme is an administrative process". M.G. Smith: "On Segmentary Lineage Systems" in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (86) 2 July-Dec. 1956, p. 48.
40. "Colonization transformed every political problem into a technical problem to be dealt with by the administration". G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 160.
41. "Good administration is their only desire and concern", wrote Lord Lloyd: EGYPT SINCE CROMER (1933) - cited by R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 38. By 'they', Lloyd meant the colonized population, which should not have unwanted politics foisted upon them from above. According to this view, the task of colonial administrators was not to respond to political pressures from the indigenous community, but to apply in detail the overall political decisions made at a higher level.
42. Undercurrents of discontent at this seemingly unavoidable petrification frequently surface in administrators' reports. "What really threatens our native policy is not its principles, but the bureaucratic centralization which prevents their being tried out experimentally". R. Delavignette: FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA (Oxford 1950) p. 66. Delavignette (esp. pp. 42-48 'The art of going on tour') broaches a theme familiar in countless reports of colonial officials: the passing of that 'golden age' when administrators could be deeply involved in everyday minutiae of native life, and were respected as leaders, and its slow strangulation under the pressures of 'efficiency' and filing cabinets. Leakey echoes this, sighing for the good old days in Kenya when "the administrative officers themselves spent very long periods on foot safaris through their districts, camping at or near the villages of 'chiefs', and making most valuable personal contacts not only with the 'chiefs' but with members of the population, giving them friendship, giving valuable advice, and winning the confidence of the masses."

42. "But alas," he continues, "as time went on things changed; the duties of administrative officers became more and more involved in paperwork in the office, and there was less and less time for the administrator to spend days on end on foot safaris in his district..." L.S.B. Leakey: MAU MAU AND THE KIKUYU (London 1952) p. 62-3.
43. Robert Montagne: NAISSANCE DU PROLETARIAT MAROCAIN (Paris 1951) p. 105 cites a Southern Moroccan poem suggesting that this threat was vividly perceived by the colonized even in such matters as beverages:
- "The Christian knows that you are hostile;
He loads his cannons with tea
And prepares an ambush on his scales.
The enemy hits you in the stomach
Knowing that death is easy there;
In the stomach, near heart and liver,
The Christian strikes with careful aim.
He offers you a sugarloaf;
If it were for your good, he would send nothing".
44. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 31.
45. F. Fanon: BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS (1968) p. 192.
46. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 89.
47. O. Mannoni: PSYCHOLOGIE DE LA COLONISATION (Paris 1950) passim.
48. G. Balandier: "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE LA SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 53.
49. Ibid. p. 52.
50. He is "dehumanized" F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 32. Tom Mboya recalls once working alone in a Nairobi laboratory, when a white woman entered and asked him: "Is anybody here?" FREEDOM AND AFTER (London 1963) p. 29.
51. F. Fanon: BLACK SKINS, WHITE MASKS (1968) passim. Cf. also F. Fanon: "The North African Syndrome" in his TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION (Harmondsworth 1970) pp. 13-26, and Chapter 5 - "Colonial Wars and Mental Disorders" - of THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967).
52. Jeanne Favret argues that in Algeria "primordial groups have no substantial existence....but merely a reactive existence". 'Le traditionalisme par excès de modernité' in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1967, p. 73.
53. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 104.

54. J. Berque: THE ARABS - THEIR HISTORY AND FUTURE (London 1964) p. 252.
55. Ibid. p. 252.
56. A point stressed by E. Stokes: "The First Century of British Colonial Rule in India" in PAST AND PRESENT (58) Feb. 1973.
57. P. Worsley: THE THIRD WORLD (1967) p. 43.
58. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (Paris 1964) p. 38.
59. Ibid. p. 38.
60. Berque likens this to the establishment of a 'national park'. FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MACHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (London 1967) p. 123.
61. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 38.
62. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (Paris 1952) p. 337.
63. Ibid. p. 333. This criticism is often voiced by liberal or Marxist politicians in the Metropolis and used as a rationalization by settlers.
64. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 25.
65. S. Eisenstadt: "Sociological Aspects of Political Development in Underdeveloped Countries" in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE (4) 1957, (repr. in I. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 575)
66. According to Mus, French policy in Indo-China had "alternately two sources of inspiration, which were sometimes contradictory - a desire for modernization and assimilation, due to metropolitan pressure, and a certain degree of distrust, in situ, towards rapid development". VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 24.
67. "There are two sides to the action of the French administration in relation to local society", writes Mus, "- an accelerator, often ill-considered, pushing for projects and enterprises which were undoubtedly modern but above all Western, (this was provided by our general administrative services, but also at least as much in practice by those of our administrators who supervised or coordinated its application at governmental and provincial levels); and a brake, acting in the contrary direction (operated mainly by the same administrators in their other capacity, identifying with the traditional organization of territorial command, and thus in some respects pleading the

67. cause of Vietnamese society against the recklessness of our exploitation)". VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 337.
68. E. Stokes: "The First Century of British Colonial Rule in India" in PAST AND PRESENT (58) Feb. 1973, p. 153.
69. E.J. Berg: "Backward-sloping Labour Supply Functions in Dual Economies" in QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS (75) August 1961.
70. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 105.
71. M.L. Kilson: POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966) p. 47.
72. L. Milliot: "L'organisation française de l'Afrique du nord" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE Nov. 1933, p. 615.
73. P. Worsley: THE THIRD WORLD (1967) p. 36.
74. cf. M.D. Lewis: "The Assimilation Theory in French Colonial Policy" in COMPARATIVE STUDIES IN SOCIETY AND HISTORY (4) Jan. 1962, pp. 129-153.
75. S. Bernard: LE CONFLIT : FRANCO-MAROCAIN 1943-56 (Brussels 1963) Vol. II, p. 80.
76. Ibid. p. 80.
77. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 25.
78. S. Eisenstadt: "Sociological Aspects of Political Development in Underdeveloped Countries" in ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND CULTURAL CHANGE (1957) repr. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 576.
79. Mus argues that "the assimilation of Sino-Vietnamese culture was the prime requisite for a legitimate succession. We, on the contrary, superimposed another system upon it, and increasingly lived in isolation, with our modern towns and our families, amidst a local human space for whose prime values and expectations we took no responsibility". VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 134.
80. cf. L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (Chicago 1967) pp. 254-68 on the contrast between indigenous norms and British norms in India.
81. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 331. The same jurists, presumably, accepted such violations when part of colonial 'emergency' laws.

82. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 25.
83. L.P. Mair: "African Chiefs Today" in McEwan & Sutcliffe (eds.): THE STUDY OF AFRICA (1967) p. 110-111.
84. J. Beattie: OTHER CULTURES (London 1964) p. 251.
85. "Investiture cannot make a chief out of one who is not naturally more than head of the family. Indeed it has the opposite effect". G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 204-5, citing a Belgian administrator in the Congo.
- L.S.B. Leakey: MAU MAU AND THE KIKUYU (1952) p. 28-38, and Jomo Kenyatta: FACING MOUNT KENYA (1938) p. 186-230 and 310, describe how British conceptions of the nature of chieftainship among the Kikuyu of Kenya ignored the segmentary reality and provoked social crisis. A similar phenomenon in West Africa is described by M. Fortes: THE DYNAMICS OF CLANSHIP AMONG THE TALLENSI (Oxford 1945).
86. cf. R. Delavignette: FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA (1950), p. 74: "In the social function of the true chief, at the core of his authority, is a spiritual quality which a stranger cannot apprehend and may not touch. The very life of the country is dependent on the chief. If the Administration fails to understand him, that life withdraws itself; if he is humiliated, it is wounded; if he is overthrown, it is extinguished. To let the chief be seen is rashly and immodestly to expose that holy part where the body social can be mortally wounded".
87. Lugard attempted to fit the Alafin of Oyo in Western Nigeria into an administrative scheme inspired by his experiences in Northern Nigeria. This ignored his sacred character; by tradition he remained enclosed in a sanctuary-residence, veiled by beads, communicating his will through others. cf. M. Crowder: THE STORY OF NIGERIA (London 1962) p. 220
88. L.P. Mair: 'African Chiefs Today', loc. cit. p. 111. Beattie's account of the 'reciprocity' and 'checks and balances' in traditional power relationships is particularly acute. (J. Beattie: OTHER CULTURES (1964) pp. 151-164). He argues that: "The old type of political bond was essentially personal, based on a sustained face-to-face relationship between chiefs (who usually held their positions on a hereditary basis) and their subjects. This bond was expressed through the provision of service and tribute by the people, and the giving of feasts and of occasional gifts to the needy, by the ruler". (Ibid. p. 251). Busia puts it more succinctly: "When the chief has lots of milk, the people drink".

89. The rise to power in southern Morocco of the Gontafa, MTougga and (especially) Glawa tribes is a striking example. cf. R. Montagne: LES BERBERES ET LE MAKHZEN DANS LE SUD DU MAROC (Paris 1930, esp. p. 267-391, and R. Montagne: "Le pouvoir des chefs en Berbérie" (C.HE.AM doct. no 18 Oct. 1941).
90. In addition to sources already cited, the following provide useful information on the impact of colonial situations upon traditional leadership:
- D.E. Apter: GHANA IN TRANSITION (1963), esp. Chs. 6 & 7
 - K.A. Busia: THE POSITION OF THE CHIEF IN THE MODERN POLITICAL SYSTEM OF ASHANTI (Oxford 1961)
 - E.M. Chilver & P.M. Kaberry: "From Tribute to Tax in a Tikar Chiefdom" in AFRICA (30) 1 1960
 - L. Fallers: "The Predicament of the Modern African Chief" in AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST (57) 2 1955
 - L. Fallers: BANTU BUREAUCRACY (Cambridge 1956)
 - M. Gluckman, J.C. Mitchell & J.A. Barnes: "The village headman in British Central Africa" in AFRICA (19) 1949
 - J. Lombard: "La vie politique dans une ancienne societe de type feodale: →
 - "Les Bariba du Dahomey" in CAHIERS D'ETUDES AFRICAINES (3) Oct. 1960, p. 5-45
 - L.P. Mair: NATIVE ADMINISTRATION IN CENTRAL NYASALAND (HMSO/Colonial Office 1952)
 - N.N. Miller: "The political survival of traditional leadership" in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES (6) 1968, pp. 183-201
 - A. Richards (ed.): EAST AFRICAN CHIEFS (London 1960)
91. B. Malinowski: CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (London 1926) develops the concept of the 'reciprocity' in the social life of Trobriand Islanders.
92. The Oba of the Yoruba was treated initially as if his authority was analagous to that of the Emir of the Hausa, including regular collection of taxes. This was to ignore and tear a delicate web of restraints on his functions. cf. M. Crowder: THE STORY OF NIGERIA (1962) p.219
93. Thus in the case of the Makondé (cited above, note 84), "something over seventy 'chiefs' were formally gazetted, provided with court warrants, and authorized to enforce government regulations. The result was chaotic. The so-called 'chiefs' had no idea what they were expected to do, for the notion of chiefly authority was completely foreign to them; and the ordinary people were not prepared to take orders in all sorts of matters from men who they had known all their lives not as territorial authorities, but simply as the heads of small family groups. After a few years, this experiment in indirect rule was abandoned". (p. 251)

94. "Indirect rule, particularly as it strengthened the chief and thereby allowed him to go beyond traditional boundaries, broke the effectiveness of the political sub-structures which had been integrated with restrained and restraining aspects of chieftaincy". D.E. Apter: GHANA IN TRANSITION (1963) p. 127.
95. "Customary councils were being stripped of their prestige and means of action at the very moment when they were being required to impose on those people within their authority a set of rules which cut across so many traditions of country life....and above all at the very time when they were being given the prime obligation of collecting taxes". P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 331.
96. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 155.
97. M. Gluckman: "The village headman in British Central Africa" in AFRICA (19) 1949, p. 93.
98. "The traditional chiefdom does not only concern the administration of men and goods, but the overall safety of individuals and collectivity, and the promotion of their common welfare. The Administration tended to make the chief an intermediary for whom questions of personal relations were of little or no concern; an agent who registers, draws up accounts, and prescribes". (G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) - p. 390).
99. L. Fallers: BANTU BUREAUCRACY (1956).
100. R. Delavignette: FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA (1950) p. 80.
101. M. Kilson: POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966) p. 27.
102. M. Kilson: Ibid. p. 27.
103. P. Mus: GUERRE SANS VISAGE (1961) p. 50-1. A hint of the problem can be found in R.V.C. Bodley: ALGERIA FROM WITHIN (London 1926) where a long-term British resident of North Africa provides a Gulliverian analysis of "the Arab character" (Ch. 9): "From an intellectual point of view the Arab is densely stupid, very ill-read, and utterly inartistic...They have not heard of the most world-famed authors. Shakespear~~e~~, Goethe, Voltaire, are not even names to them except when they happen to have been applied to streets which they have frequented...Music outside their own is an unknown quantity; pictures other than photographs of people they know do not exist. All that which counts for us in the literary, musical and artistic world is as complete a blank to them as Babylonian cuneiform to an able seaman. It is staggering sometimes to realize their ignorance".

104. "The British had neither the means nor the desire to insist on their ideology". L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (1967) p. 255. A superb account of ambivalences in the fields of religion, education and medicine, relating to Algeria, is provided by Y. Turin: AFFRONTÉMENTS CULTURELS DANS L'ALGÉRIE COLONIALE - ÉCOLES, MÉDECINES, RELIGION 1830-1880 (Paris 1971)
105. E.M. Forster's: A PASSAGE TO INDIA and George Orwell's: BURMESE DAYS are encyclopaedias of these taboos.
106. "To the saying 'all natives are the same' the colonized person replies 'all settlers are the same'." F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 72. cf. also A. Memmi: PORTRAIT DU COLONISE PRECEDE DU PORTRAIT DU COLONISATEUR (Paris 1957).
107. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 164.
108. G. Balandier: "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 54.
109. J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA: THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1967) p. 389.
110. This is "the pathological aim built in to the colonial situation", according to Bourdieu & Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 27.
111. Conflicts are 'discreetly repressed'. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (1967) p. 389.
112. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 27.
113. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 23.
- N/ 114. G. Balandier: 'Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance' in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 61-66 analyzes such reactions in terms of 'active acceptance', 'passive acceptance', 'passive resistance', and 'active resistance', and provides some useful insights. He stresses that, amidst the distrustful miasma of colonial relationships, every reaction is ambiguous, and could be classified as one of the alternative strategies.
115. Frantz Fanon is a particularly eloquent, almost poetic guide to the violence of this world. The opening chapter of THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH - "Concerning Violence" - is particularly striking. Fanon himself has what he calls a 'Manichaeon vision', and the style of an inspired, committed propagandist. This leads him to make statements which, as individual assertions, appear exaggerated and schematic, but also gives him flashing insight into the nature of the colonial experience. Some of his own assertions counterbalance other, equally powerful statements; for example, his eloquence on the alienating effect of the colonial situation must be weighed against firm assertions about

115. the colonizer's lack of impact. We need to seize not always his literal meaning but the overall direction and energy of his observation. At this level, he is an inspiring guide.
116. Cf. W. Cartey & M. Kilson (eds.): THE AFRICA READER: COLONIAL AFRICA (New York 1970) p. 3-69.
117. Cf. M.C. Sahli: DECOLONISER L'HISTOIRE (Paris 1965) esp. p. 27-57.
118. Capt. Vral: LE MAROC HEROIQUE, cited by Gen. A. Huré: LA PACIFICATION DU MAROC: Dernière étape 1931-1934 (Paris 1952) p. 112, describes the resistance of one Berber mountain clan: "The dissidents defended themselves with the utmost energy, well camouflaged behind the rocks, in their caves where only the eye and the rifle peep through the rock. They fired tirelessly and accurately...and our men were cut down without even seeing their adversaries. The women excited them with strident ululations, distributed ammunition, replaced the dead, and rolled enormous stones down on to the assailants, sowing death down as far as the riverbed". The ferocity of this resistance should be measured not in terms of the relatively small French casualty figures, but in relation to the losses of the resistant group: 2000 killed out of a total of 7000, 22500 cattle lost out of a total of 25000. At the end of this violent resistance, the area, in Huré's words, resembled "a charnel house" (p. 118-119).
119. Général Huré (op. cit. p. 79-92) recounts the fierce resistance of a Moroccan tribe in 1932 which marched into battle, under heavy bombardment from aviation and 105m guns, chanting prayers and shouting "We want to die!". The 'auxiliaries' sent to fight their fellow-moslems were unnerved by this display of what Huré calls religious 'fanaticism'.
120. cf. J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - The Maghrib Between Two World Wars (London 1967) p. 113-116. On the other hand, disinterested defence of honour might bring greater reward than does rapid capitulation. Gen. Huré (op. cit. p. 117-118) explains that the "splendid resistance" of Jebel Saghro tribesmen in 1933 brought them very generous and "well-deserved" terms of surrender from the sporting French army! Marshal Lyautey took a cynical view of this kind of 'battle for honour': "After this concession to "caida" (honour), submissions are not slow in coming if the affair is sensibly conducted. It is not rare to see the ferocious warriors who were shooting at us in the morning come the very same evening to demand 'aman' (pardon), and offer the 'targuiba' (ritual sacrifice signifying submission)". RAPPORT GENERAL SUR LA SITUATION DU PROTECTORAT DU MAROC AU 31 JUILLET 1914 (Rabat/Résidence-Générale de la République Française 1916) p. 43. Inverting the usual phrase, may we not see in this a tactic of "sauter pour mieux reculer"?

121. "Wherever the presence of the colonizing power was felt, some kind of resistance was shown, taking various forms from armed insurrection to wholesale exodus...But at any given moment, it was only a limited community, small in relation to the whole society, which rose against the colonizer, while the opposition itself was limited because directed against only one aspect of domination, the concrete aspect which affected that particular community at that time". E. Mondlane: THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE (Harmondsworth 1969) p. 102. This echoes Général Guillaume's comment about the conquest of Morocco: "We rarely had to fight more than one tribe at the same time. Neighbouring groupings abstained from interfering so long as their own territory was not attacked". Gén. A. Guillaume: LES BERBERES MAROCAINES ET LA PACIFICATION DE L'ATLAS CENTRAL 1912-1933 (Paris 1946) p. 84. Yet elsewhere Guillaume remarks that: "In the Central Atlas, no tribe came to us spontaneously. None submitted without a fight, and for some, without exhausting all means of resistance to the very last". Ibid p. 73.
122. cf. E. Stokes: 'Traditional Resistance Movements and Afro-Asian Nationalism: The Context of the 1857 Mutiny Rebellion in India' in PAST AND PRESENT (48) 1970, p. 104.
123. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (Oxford 1949) p. 71.
124. cf. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (Passim.)
125. The Maji-Maji revolt of 1905 in Southern Tanganyika is an excellent example. cf. J. Iliffe: TANGANYIKA UNDER GERMAN RULE 1905-1912 (Cambridge 1969). The 1857 Rebellion in India, and the 1871 Kabyle Rebellion in Algeria are other examples of 'post-pacification revolts'.
126. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 328.
127. cf. J. Iliffe: "The Organization of the Maji-Maji Rebellion" in JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY (8) 1967.
128. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 55.
129. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM & CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) speaks of the unquenched resentment of the Zulu in South Africa, and quotes Roy Campbell on "The curbed ferocity of beaten tribes" (p. 158).
130. Monica Hunter: REACTIONS TO CONQUEST (1936) p. 554 notes that the populations of Pondoland cling to "the belief that the Europeans will be swept into the sea, and the Bantu have South Africa to themselves again".

131. "Ceux qui guettent" - those who lie in wait - was a term frequently applied to the indigenous populations by French settlers in North Africa. cf. Jean Pommerol's sensationalist account of the religious brotherhoods in the Sahara, entitled "L'ISLAM AFRICAINE: CHEZ CEUX QUI GUETTENT" (Paris 1905).
132. "The development of violence among the colonized peoples will be proportionate to the violence exercised by the threatened colonial regime". F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 69.
133. Ibid.p. 42.
134. Ibid.p. 41.
135. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 115, 116, 117.
136. M. Kilson: POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966) p. 119.
137. Ibid.p. 119. Kilson argues (p. 117-23) that the Europeanized 'nationalist' elite rides to power on the back of violence. The colonizer is offered the prospect of the elite's orderly political behaviour as an alternative to the anarchic violence of the masses. This alone leads the colonizer to take it seriously. Fanon, in THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (esp. p. 46-9), makes an identical point.
138. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 66.
139. Ibid.p. 31.
140. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE NUER (Oxford 1940), M. Fortes: THE DYNAMICS OF CLANSHIP AMONG THE TALLENSI (London 1945), P.J. Bohannan: JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT AMONG THE TIV (London 1957), and M. Gluckman: ORDER AND REBELLION IN TRIBAL AFRICA (London 1963), examine these mechanisms in considerable detail.
141. J. Middleton & D. Tait: TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS (London 1958) p. 21. Jomo Kenyatta pursued a similar argument in his FACING MOUNT KENYA (London 1938) p. 205-14, and stressed the social degradation that the suppression of such manifestations entails.
142. J. Beattie: OTHER CULTURES (London 1964) p. 175.
143. J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE D'APRES LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA PREMIERE MOITIE DU XXe SIECLE (Paris 1965) p. 212.
144. E.J. Hobsbawm: PRIMITIVE REBELS:-STUDIES IN ARCHAIC FORMS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Manchester 1959), and BANDITS (Harmondsworth 1972).

145. E.J. Hobsbawm: BANDITS (1972) p. 17.
146. Ibid. Chapter 6: 'The Economics and Politics of Banditry'.
147. Ibid. Chapter 3: 'The Noble Robber' and Chapter 4: 'The Avenger'.
148. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 42.
149. Ibid p. 27.
150. This argument is pursued by S. Bernard: LE CONFLIT FRANCO-MAROCAIN 1943-56 (Brussels 1963), and by M.L. Kilson (see note 137).
151. The seminal works include:
 Carl von Clausewitz: ON WAR (Harmondsworth 1969)
 Régis Debray: REVOLUTION IN THE REVOLUTION? (Harmondsworth 1968)
 Vo Nguyen Giap: PEOPLE'S WAR, PEOPLE'S ARMY (New York 1962)
 Che Guevara: GUERRILLA WARFARE (Harmondsworth 1969)
 Mao Tse-Tung: ON GUERRILLA WARFARE (New York 1961)
 Eduardo Mondlane: THE STRUGGLE FOR MOZAMBIQUE (Harmondsworth 1969)
152. The mass of literature includes the following:
 M. Déon: "Qu'est-ce qu'une guerre révolutionnaire?" in REVUE DES DEUX MONDES Apr. 1959, pp. 577-94,
 O. Heilbrum: PARTISAN WARFARE (New York 1962),
 J. Hogard: "Guerre révolutionnaire et pacification" in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION (280) Jan. 1957,
 J.J. McCuen: THE ART OF COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY WAR (London 1964),
 F.M. Osanka (ed.): MODERN GUERRILLA WARFARE - FIGHTING COMMUNIST GUERRILLA MOVEMENTS 1941-1961 (New York 1961),
 L. Poirier: "Un instrument de Guerre Révolutionnaire: le FLN" in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION Dec. 1957 and Jan. 1958,
 A. Souyris: "Les conditions de la parade et de la riposte à la guerre révolutionnaire" in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION (281) Feb.-Mar. 1957,
 U.S. Army: SPECIAL WARFARE (Washington 1962),
 U.S. Army Special Warfare Center: READINGS IN COUNTER-GUERRILLA OPERATIONS (Fort Bragg, North Carolina 1961),
 Ximenes: "La guerre révolutionnaire et ses données fondamentales" in REVUE MILITAIRE D'INFORMATION (281) Feb.-Mar. 1957,
 J.K. Zawodny (ed.): "Unconventional warfare" in ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCE (341) May 1962.
153. T.O. Ranger: "Connections between 'primary resistance' movements and modern mass nationalism in East and Central Africa" in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN STUDIES (9) 1968.

154. cf. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (Oxford 1949), esp. pp. 104-33, pp. 157-90, on the nature of Beduin resistance to Italian conquest. Cf also M. Lacheraf: "Constantes politiques et militaires dans les guerres coloniales de l'Algérie (1830-1960)" in TEMPS MODERNES (Dec. 1960-Jan. 1961).
155. E.J. Hobsbawm: BANDITS (1972), Chapter 7: "Bandits and Revolution".
156. J. Iliffe: "The organization of the Maji Maji rebellion" in JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY (8) 1967 notes important sociological differences between primary resistance and post-pacification revolt.
157. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) pp. 67-74. "Colonized man", he declares, "finds his freedom in and through violence". (p. 68).
158. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949).
159. R. Pankhurst: "Emperor Menelik II of Ethiopia" in TARIKH (1) 1965.
160. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970). No doubt Fanon, in the excitement of wartime exaggerated the pace and depth of these changes.
161. "Encirclement is what the Berbers fear above all". Gen. A. Huré: LA PACIFICATION DU MAROC: Dernière étape 1931-1934 (1952) p. 6.
162. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 171.
163. Gen. A. Guillaume: LES BERBERS MAROCAINES ET LA PACIFICATION DE L'ATLAS CENTRAL 1912-1933 (1946) p. 84. "In the face of superior forces", he adds, "the Berber gives way, and in withdrawing merely tries to do as much harm to his enemy as possible". p. 81.
164. Capt. Chavanne: HISTORIQUE DU SERVICE DES AFFAIRES INDIGENES DE TUNISIE 1881-1930 (Bourg 1931).
165. "In these rice plains", writes Mus of Vietnam, "there are few natural resources - forests, marshlands, or moors - in which to hide. If men wish to take cover and disappear, they can only do so behind men. Obviously, only local inhabitants can do this. The demographic masses make an effective shelter against any enemy speaking another tongue, or, above all, with a different skin". VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 21.
166. cf. Huré's account of the last stages of French conquest in the Moroccan Middle Atlas: "All along the track which I followed on horseback, there lay hundreds upon hundreds of Berber chests, those great cedarwood chests in which the highlanders lock away

166. their precious objects. At the appeal of the 'marabout' (local saint), they had loaded them on their mules or camels, and had left, abandoning their poor houses in order to keep their independence". LA PACIFICATION DU MAROC - DERNIERE ETAPE 1931-4 (1952) p. 92.
167. "During the process of penetration towards the sources of the Muluya in 1922", writes Berque of French Morocco, "powerful tribes such as the Bani Mguild, the Ait Ihand and the Ishkern retreated without joining battle. This was not their custom. The reason was that their marabout had recited to them an ancient prophecy of the Imhiwash family, according to which the holy ancestor had set up cairns, kerkurs, heaps of stones, to measure the advance of the stranger; all such territories would be abandoned, and resistance only kept up from one last redoubt, but this would restore all the rest to them into the bargain". J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1967) p. 116.
168. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 172.
169. ^éMarchal Lyautey, quoted in Gén. A. Guillaume: LES BERBERES MAROCAINES ET LA PACIFICATION DE L'ATLAS CENTRAL (1946) p. 103.
170. Though the French army of occupation posed no immediate threat to their land, the leaders of the Ida ou Blal tribe in Southern Morocco journeyed to Marrakesh in 1922 to offer submission. This forestalled an attack on their territory by the rapacious Glawa tribe who, in close alliance with the French invader, were extending their power at the expense of "dissident" neighbours. cf. Capt. Méric: ETUDE SUR LE BUREAU DES A.I. DE TATTA (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 541 1935).
171. In June 1911, estimating that the advancing French army was too strong, the Beni MTir tribe of Central Morocco humbly offered submission. But when the military column returned to the coast, dissidence resumed. Encouraged by the resistance of other neighbouring tribes, and resentful of the imposition of land tax, the Beni MTir joined a coordinated uprising of Central High Atlas tribes. In March 1913, a French military expedition had to reimpose submission. Cf. Gén. A. Guillaume: LES BERBERES MAROCAINES ET LA PACIFICATION DE L'ATLAS CENTRAL (1946) pp. 128-34.
172. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 63. See esp. his Chapter 4: 'Le Maquis et l'Attentisme'.
173. Gén. A. Huré: LA PACIFICATION DU MAROC - DERNIERE ETAPE (1952) p. 18.
174. Gén. A. Guillaume: LES BERBERES MAROCAINES ET LA PACIFICATION DE L'ATLAS CENTRAL (1946) p. 105.

175. G Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 90. A similar phenomenon was noted several years later: "The Minkebe people are hanging on to their region, access to which, they realize, is too difficult to permit frequent visits from administrators. Many natives who used to live by the motor route from Minvoul to Oyem have abandoned it and gone elsewhere". p. 172.
176. Ibid. p. 172.
177. The Koranic duty of 'hijra' - flight from the land of the infidel to the land of the faith - is associated with the refugee phenomenon in some Islamic countries. Cf. C.-R. Ageron: "L'emigration des musulmans algériens et l'exode de Tlemçen" in ANNALES Sept.-Oct. 1967.
178. E.A. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (London 1969) p. 41.
179. J. Berque: STRUCTURES SOCIALES DU HAUT ATLAS (Paris 1955) cited by P. Mus: GUERRE SANS VISAGE (1961) p. 80, p. 88.
180. I. Karve: HINDU SOCIETY (1961) p. 127, cited by L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION - POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA (Chicago 1967) p. 20-1 n.
181. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 20.
182. Berque calls this "the hidden secret of North Africa", whereby "each tribe, each group tries to keep its way of life uncommitted". FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1967) p. 120.
183. D.E. Apter: GHANA IN TRANSITION (New York 1963) p. 30.
184. E. Colson: "Migration in Africa - Trends and Possibilities" in F. Lorimer & M. Karp (eds.): POPULATION IN AFRICA (Boston 1960) p. 60-1. He adds that "the movements which have taken place in the Twentieth Century, great as they have been, are no such breaks with the past as is sometimes suggested. One might argue that what is new is the attempt to stabilize population; this perhaps explains the general lack of success of such attempts".
185. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 186.
186. Ibid. p. 186.
187. G. Kimble: TROPICAL AFRICA (1962) Vol. 2, p. 34.
188. E. Colson: "Migration in Africa - Trends and Possibilities" (1960) loc. cit. p. 61.

189. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964).
190. A typical example: In 1936, in Southern Tunisia, a fight between two individuals in the Ouled Ouhiba fraction resulted in serious wounding. While taking him for medical treatment in the nearest town, the victim's family complained to the European-appointed official (Caid). However, the aggressor's family brought the matter before the clan assembly (miyad), which decided compensation and obliged the offended family to accept. The Caid attempted to investigate, but could find no witnesses. The victim claimed that his injuries were caused by a heavy fall. Chastel: LES TRIBUS ET LE PROBLEME DU PAYSANNAT DANS LE C.C. DE GAFSA (C.H.E.A.M. doct No. 282 1938).
191. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 153. "The initial reaction of the Zulu in any situation in which Government officials proposed beneficial schemes", he adds, "was to reject them". p. 154.
192. D.E. Apter: THE POLITICAL KINGDOM IN UGANDA (Princeton 1961) p. 117.
193. The Rudolphs argue that the apparently 'rational' norms of Western administration only work in the West because they are legitimated by a traditional consensus there. THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (1967) p. 255.
194. "Justice can be swift and cheap in the village, besides being a justice which is understood as such by the litigants. The litigants either speak for themselves or ask a clever relative or friend to speak on their behalf. There are no hired lawyers arguing in a strange tongue, as in the awe-inspiring atmosphere of the urban state courts". M.N. Srinivas: "The Social System of a Mysore Village" in McKim Marriott (ed.): VILLAGE INDIA (London 1955) p. 18.
195. "Disapproval attaches to the man who goes to the city for justice. Such a man is thought to be flouting the authority of the elders, and therefore acting against the solidarity of the village. The few men in Rampura who take disputes to the urban court are not respected". M.N. Srinivas: "The Social System of a Mysore Village" (1955) loc. cit. p. 18. "The individual who fights the decisions of the miyad (clan assembly)", writes Chastel, "would see the whole tribe set against him. If in a land dispute a member of the tribe does not submit to the decision of the miyad, if he appeals to an official arbitration commission when it visits the place, all witnesses are unanimous against the plaintiff. His daughters will not be sought in marriage, nor will his sons find girls belonging to the same social rank". LES

195. TRIBUS ET LE PROBLEME DU PAYSANNAT DANDS LE C.C. DE GAFSA (C.H.E.A.M. doct 282 1938) p. 27.
196. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 105.
197. L.A. Fallers: "Political sociology and the anthropological study of African polities" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (4) 1963 p. 327. Balandier cites an administrative report from the Bas-Congo in 1920, concerning the continuing role of dzonzi (judges). SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE p. 64. They are "the sole natives that their fellow-countrymen fear and surround with respect. They remain in some obscure village and no external sign attracts the European's attention to them. But it is through them that the traditions and customs of the country are perpetuated".
198. J-L. Quermonne: "La sous-administration et les politiques d'équipement administratif" in REVUE FRANÇAISE DE SCIENCE POLITIQUE (9) Sept. 1959, p. 637.
199. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 160.
200. L. Milliot: "L'organisation française de l'Afrique du Nord" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE, Nov. 1933.
201. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 63.
202. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 160.
203. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 63.
204. R. Delavignette: FREEDOM AND AUTHORITY IN FRENCH WEST AFRICA (1950) pp. 71-84.
205. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 25.
206. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 209.
207. C.H. Moore: "Politics in a Tunisian village" in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL Autumn 1963, p. 532.
208. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 209.
209. C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze: "The Near-Eastern village: a profile" in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL Summer 1962.
210. P. Bonnafé: LE NATIONALISME AFRICAIN (Paris FNSP/CERI Série C, No. 9 Dec. 1964) p. 52.

211. C. Geertz: ISLAM OBSERVED - RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO AND INDONESIA (Yale 1968) p. 64.
212. D. Easton: A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (New York 1955), THE POLITICAL SYSTEM (New York 1953), and "An Approach to the analysis of political systems" in WORLD POLITICS (9) 1957.
P. Nettl: "The concept of system in political science" in POLITICAL STUDIES Oct. 1966, and POLITICAL MOBILIZATION (London 1967).
213. I. Wallerstein: "Introduction" in I. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 3.
214. M.G. Smith: "Social and Cultural Pluralism" in ANNALS OF THE NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCE (83) 1959-60, p. 71. Smith states specifically that it forms no such system.
215. S. Bernard: LE CONFLIT FRANCO-MAROCAIN 1943-56 (Brussels 1963), an ambitious work on the decolonization of Morocco which is divided into three volumes - narrative, methodological, and schematic. His methodological assumptions are sketched out and applied to the Algerian context in an article "La décolonisation de l'Algérie: son mécanisme sociologique" in SOCIALISME (Brussels) 53, Sept. 1962, pp. 535-558.
216. S. Bernard: LE CONFLIT FRANCO-MAROCAIN (1963) p. 224.
217. Ibid. p. 224.
218. S. Bernard: "La décolonisation de L'Algérie" (1962) loc. cit. p. 544.
219. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 25-35.
220. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 162. He analyzes an individual 'double game' in "The utopia of Benoit Ogoula Iquaqua" - cf. "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 62n.
221. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956) p. 157ff.
222. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: LE DERACINEMENT (1964) pp. 161-77.
223. G. Balandier: "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 53
"The dominant group", writes Fanon, "arrives with its values, and imposes them with such violence that the very life of the colonized can manifest itself only defensively, in a more or less clandestine way". A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111.
224. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 62.

225. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111.
226. Ibid. p. 50.
227. Duclos suggests that the reactions of colonized males and females differ. Moroccan women avoid the company of European men (to ward off 'conquest'), whereas Moroccan men seek the company of European women (to gain 'revenge or liberation'). He takes both forms of sexual behaviour to be "confused affirmations of national vitality". L-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" in L-J. Duclos, J. Duvignaud, & J. Leca: LES NATIONALISMES MAGHREBINS (Paris FNSP/CERI 1966) p. 43-4.
228. See Note 43 above. Appeals for abstinence often coincide with religious taboos, e.g. concerning the eating of pork, or any meat; the consumption of alcohol; the smoking of tobacco; the wearing of particular clothes. In Islamic countries, boycott of European produce often has undertones of the asceticism of Ramadan.
229. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" (1966) loc. cit. p. 44.
230. Ibid. p. 46.
231. J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1967) p. 73.
232. C. Geertz: ISLAM OBSERVED (1968) p. 64.
233. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111.
234. J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE D'APRES LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA PREMIERE MOITIE DU XX^e SIECLE (1965) p. 243.
235. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 120, 126.
236. Ibid. p. 120.
237. cf. F. Fanon: "The North African Syndrome" in TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION (1970) and P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad: "La Découverte de la Maladie" in LE DERACINEMENT (1964) pp. 215-20. André Gide remarked that "The less intelligent the white man, the more stupid the black man seems to him".
238. J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1967) p. 72. "And what", he continues, "is this element of obscurity that, despite the triumphs of my administration, baffles my science, my agriculture, my planning in every sphere - that which I cannot penetrate nor possess, that which I covet and

238. vainly long for? Is it a last remnant of 'Barbarism', or a last refuge of human liberty"?
239. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (Boston 1962) p. 157.
240. Berque likens these sanctuaries to a cave or refuge: "This grotto may be called religion, family, ethic, sexuality, the 'inner sanctum', with all the developments this suggests from the psychological and mythological point of view". DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 156.
241. "In reality", Fanon asserts, "the effervescence and the revolutionary spirit have been kept alive by the woman in the home. For revolutionary war is not a war of men". A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 51. Berque similarly describes the female as "the reserve army of the nation"; she, "unlike the male, had usually only undergone conquest indirectly. Whereas man, dissociated, destroyed, and remade, had even been subjected to that final insult of becoming the negation of the Other, woman, guardian of emotions in which the primordial always has primacy over the acquired, cradler of the child, symbol of refuge, conserver of the immemorial, had remained affirmative throughout all the years of colonial history". DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964), p. 14-15.
242. Fanon stresses the role of the veil and the burnous in the 'vestimentary withdrawal' of Arab society. A DYING COLONIALISM (1970), Ch. 1 "Algeria Unveiled" p. 21-49.
243. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 51.
244. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 25-35.
245. M. Hunter: REACTIONS TO CONQUEST (1936) p. 550.
246. G. Balandier: "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 62.
247. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 270.
248. J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 368. According to him, it "serves as a refuge, as a mark of identity, and, by duping the master, as a source of personal satisfaction. It helped self-respect to survive". Ibid. p. 368.
249. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 62. Mus remarks, similarly, that "public life carries on behind a screen of bamboos". VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE, p. 30.

250. As Fanon points out: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 62.
251. G. Balandier: "Contribution à une sociologie de la dépendance" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (7) 1952, p. 54.
252. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 160.
253. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111.
254. G. Chaliand: LES PAYSANS NORD-VIETNAMIENS ET LA GUERRE (Paris 1968) p. 20.
255. J. Chesneaux: LES SOCIETES SECRETES EN CHINE (Paris 1966).
256. O. Depond & X. Coppolani: LES CONFRERIES RELIGIEUSES MUSULMANES (Algiers 1897).
257. Ibid. p. 50, p. 108n. Fanon analyzes how 'A visit to the doctor' for the diagnosis of a physical complaint becomes a game of hide-and-seek between colonized and colonizer.
258. D. Apter: THE POLITICAL KINGDOM IN UGANDA (Princeton 1961) p. 117.
259. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111.
260. Ibid. p. 46. "Colonialism", he adds, "must accept the fact that things happen without its control".
261. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 117, 122.
262. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 98.
263. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 6 stresses the need to study the 'internal factor' of the colonial situation.
264. J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (1967) p. 99.
265. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 96. "We must look for the limits of the rape", he adds.
266. Ibid. p. 97, 98.
267. P.C. Lloyd: AFRICA IN SOCIAL CHANGE (Harmondsworth 1969) p. 107.
268. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 6. The analogy with Levy's 'universal social solvent' (p. 19 above) is interesting. Levy's chief interest is in the solvent, Balandier's in what resists it.
269. Ibid. p. 6.

270. This is how Lerner characterizes the 'traditional' mentality in his THE PASSING OF TRADITIONAL SOCIETY (1958).
271. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 480.
272. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 51.
273. C. Geertz: ISLAM OBSERVED (1968) p. 65.
274. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 173. He also speaks of "tactical formalism", SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 278.
275. L-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" in L-J. Duclos et al: LES NATIONALISMES MAGHREBINS (1966) p. 43.
276. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 479.
277. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSICN DU MONDE (1964) p. 98.
278. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 33-4.
279. C.S. Whitaker jr.: "A disrhythmic process of political change" in WORLD POLITICS (19) Jan. 1967, p. 205.
280. Ibid.p. 190.
281. L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (1967) p. 19.
282. M. Gluckman: CUSTOM AND CONFLICT IN AFRICA (1956), ORDER AND REBELLION IN TRIBAL AFRICA (1963), and POLITICS, LAW AND RITUAL IN TRIBAL SOCIETY (London 1965); E. Leach: POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (London 1954), RETHINKING ANTHROPOLOGY (London 1961).
283. E. Leach: POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1954) p. 7 attributes this rigidity to the influence of Durkheim.
284. Ibid. p. 6, p.xiii.
285. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 75.
286. "In practical fieldwork situations", Leach admits, "the anthropologist must always treat the material of observation as if it were part of an overall equilibrium, otherwise description becomes almost impossible. All I am asking is that the fictional nature of this equilibrium should be frankly recognized". POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1954) p. 285.

287. E.A. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 53.
288. P. Mus: GUERRE SANS VISAGE (1961) p. 181.
289. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p. 33.
290. Ibid. p. viii.
291. P.C. Lloyd: AFRICA IN SOCIAL CHANGE (1969) p. 93.
292. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 98.
293. J.R. Gusfield: "Tradition and modernity - Misplaced polarities in the study of social change" in AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (72) Jan. 1967, p. 352-3.
294. Ibid. p. 353.
295. E. Leach: THE POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1954) p. 4-5.
296. C. Geertz: "The Discussion" in R.N. Bellah (ed.): RELIGION AND PROGRESS IN MODERN ASIA (New York 1965) p. 151.
297. Gusfield, who makes an initial distinction between "the Great Tradition" of the urban centres (the 'official culture') and "the Little Tradition" of the village communities (the 'popular culture'), explains that "the importance of this diversity is that it provides legitimizing principles for a wide set of alternative sets of behaviour". "Tradition and Modernity - Misplaced polarities in the study of social change", (1967) loc. cit. p. 353-4. The Rudolphs make a similar distinction between the Brahmanic and 'popular' traditions in India (THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION 1967). Geertz distinguishes the 'orthodox' or 'classical' tradition from 'actual' beliefs (ISLAM OBSERVED 1968). Von Grunebaum also stresses the differences between 'folk' Islam and 'Caliphian' Islam (G.E. von Grunebaum (ed.): UNITY AND VARIETY IN MOSLEM CIVILIZATION Chicago 1955).
298. E. Leach: POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1954) p. 4.
299. C.S. Whitaker jr.: "A disrhythmic process of political change" (1967) loc. cit. He concludes (p. 217) that "change may offer novel opportunities for those adversely subjected to that change to defend, recoup, reaffirm, augment, or facilitate antecedent activity or value, notwithstanding that such activity or value is manifestly or latently inconsistent with the character and direction of the initial change".

300. L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (1967) p. 8.
301. E. Leach: POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (1954) p. 8.
302. L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (1967) p. 10.
303. J.R. Gusfield: "Tradition and Modernity - Misplaced Polarities in the study of social change" (1967) loc. cit. p. 355.
304. L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION (1967) p. 10.
305. Ibid. p. 11.
306. cf. Malek Bennabi: VOCATION DE L'ISLAM (Paris) 1950. He speaks of the "colonisability" of degenerate "Post-Almohad" man in North Africa, and examines the "inner resources" which could bring a "renaissance" of spirit.
307. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111. "It seems to us that to interpret a phenomenon arising out of the colonial situation in terms of patterns of conduct existing before the foreign conquest, even if this phenomenon is analogous to certain traditional patterns, is nevertheless in certain respects false....colonial domination distorts the very relations that the colonized maintains with his own culture". Ibid. p. 111.
308. P. Bourdieu & A. Sayad. LE DERACINEMENT (1964) p. 19.
309. R. Bastide: "Messianisme et Développement Economique et Social" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (31) 1961, trans. I. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 468.
310. Ibid. p. 468.
311. P. Worsley: ... THE TRUMPET SHALL SOUND (London 1957).
312. B.G.M. Sundkler: BANTU PROPHETS IN SOUTH AFRICA (London 1961).
313. R. Bastide: "Messianisme et Développement Economique et Social" (1961) loc. cit.
314. Ibid. p. 468.
315. G. Balandier: POLITICAL ANTHROPOLOGY (1970) p. 185.
316. R. Bastide: "Messianisme et Développement Economique et Social" (1961) loc. cit. p. 468.
317. G. Balandier: SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE (1963) p.vii.

318. This process is strikingly charted by Balandier among the Ba-Kongo, with the Kimbanwist movement. *SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE* (1963) p. 417-487.
319. R. Bastide: "Messianisme et Développement Economique et Social" (1961) loc. cit. p. 476.
320. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: *THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA* (1949) is an excellent analysis of this process.
321. F. Fanon: *THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH* (1967) p. 29.
322. C. Geertz: *ISLAM OBSERVED* (1968) p. 4.
323. "The two zones are opposed", Fanon suggests, "but not in the service of a higher unity. Obedient to the rules of pure Aristotelian logic, they both follow the principle of reciprocal exclusivity". *THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH* (1967) p. 30.
324. J.P. Charnay: *LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE* (1965) p. 371.
325. *ARCHIVES INTERNATIONALES: PHAROS* (no. 97) Feb. 1947 Doct. 463: "Les partis politiques en Algérie" p. 1
326. P. Bonnafé: *LE NATIONALISME AFRICAIN* (1964) p. 25.
327. Ibid. p. 25.
328. L.I. & S.H. Rudolph: *THE MODERNITY OF TRADITION* (1967) pp. 88-103.
329. G. Balandier: "Contribution a l'etude des nationalismes en Afrique noire" in *ZAIRE* (Brussels) April 1954, p. 382-3. "The movements which we call national", he writes, "are less the expression of nationalities with well-defined shape, than reactions to the colonial situation".
330. G. Balandier: *SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE* (1963) passim.
331. J. Berque: *DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE* (1964) p. 142; G. Balandier: *SOCIOLOGIE ACTUELLE DE L'AFRIQUE NOIRE* (1963) p.vii.
332. J. Berque: *DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE* (1964) p. 172.
333. G. Balandier: "Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes en Afrique noire" (1954) loc. cit. p. 383-5.
334. E. Stokes: "Traditional Resistance Movements and Afro-Asian Nationalism" in *PAST AND PRESENT* (48) Aug. 1970, p. 109.

335. G. Balandier: "Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes en Afrique noire" (1954) loc. cit. p. 379.
336. Ibid. p. 379. Hodgkin mistakenly implies that Balandier restricts 'nationalism' to the sense given it by 'orthodox' theorists. T. Hodgkin: NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA (1956) p. 23-4. In fact Balandier rejects the term 'nationalism' not because it has too precise and pure a sense to fit the facts, but because it has so broad and adulterated a sense that it is unusable.
337. P. Bonnafe: LE NATIONALISME AFRICAIN (1964) p. 22.
338. G. Balandier: "Contribution à l'étude des nationalismes en Afrique noire" (1954) loc. cit. p. 379.
339. Kilson, for example, asserts that nationalist movements are "not only dominated, in terms of leadership, by middle-class Africans, but also....instruments for protecting and advancing, among other things, the class interests of these Africans". ("Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa" in JOURNAL OF POLITICS (20) 1958 repr. in I. Wallerstein (ed.): SOCIAL CHANGE - THE COLONIAL SITUATION (1966) p. 544.) Barratt-Brown: AFTER IMPERIALISM (1970) p. 182 echoes the point that "the movements for national liberation in Africa and Asia are led mainly by men from middle-class or even aristocratic origins". Distrust of nationalism has often been a feature of Marxist thought. Rosa Luxemburg notably attacked its anti-socialist nature, and its tendency to divert colonized populations from class struggle and internationalism. (J.P. Nettl: ROSA LUXEMBURG, London 1966, Vol. II App. 2). Many Marxists have accordingly preferred to analyze 'revolutionary' or 'socialist' forces, bequeathing the term 'nationalism' to the bourgeoisie.
340. M. Halpern: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (1963) p. 197.
341. T. Hodgkin: NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA (1956).
342. Ibid. p. 23-5.
343. M.L. Kilson: POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966), "The analysis of African nationalism" in WORLD POLITICS (10) Apr. 1958, pp. 484-97, "Nationalism and Social Classes in British West Africa" in JOURNAL OF POLITICS (20) 1958, pp. 368-87.
344. For the identification of nationalism with patriotism, cf. K. Minogue: NATIONALISM (1967) p. 336-7.

345. Duclos, for example, deplures the interpretative grip established in Morocco by Central Government versions of the past - "Makhzen history" - which squeezes out popular or "tribal history" ("Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" (1966) loc. cit.)
346. cf. I. Wallerstein: "Ethnicity and National Integration in West Africa" in CAHIERS D'ETUDES AFRICAINES (3) Oct. 1960, pp. 129-139.
347. E. Stokes: "Traditional Resistance Movements and Afro-Asian Nationalism" in PAST AND PRESENT (48) Aug. 1970, p. 108.
348. Some cold water is poured on the more exaggerated views of this 'populist' school by J.S. Saul: "Africa" in G. Ionescu & E. Gellner (eds.): POPULISM (London 1969) p. 122-50. Interesting, sober, historical revision of the origins of Third World nationalism has nevertheless been made in numerous recent articles and monogrammes:
- T.O. Ranger: "Connections between 'primary resistance' movements and modern nationalism in East and Central Africa" in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN HISTORY (9) 3-4 1968, and "African reaction to the imposition of colonial rule in East and Central Africa" in L.H. Gann & P. Duignan (eds.): COLONIALISM IN AFRICA 1870-1960 (Cambridge 1970) Vol. 1.
- E. Stokes: "Rural revolt in the Great Rebellion of 1857 in India" in HISTORICAL JOURNAL (12) 4, 1969, "Traditional resistance movements and Afro-Asian Nationalism" in PAST AND PRESENT (48) Aug. 1970, and "The first century of British Colonial Rule in India" in PAST AND PRESENT (58) Feb. 1973.
- J. Iliffe: "The organization of the Maji-Maji rebellion" in JOURNAL OF AFRICAN HISTORY (8) 1967, and TANGANYIKA UNDER GERMAN RULE 1905-12 (Cambridge 1969).
- J.M. Lonsdale: "Some origins of African nationalism in East Africa" in JOURNAL OF MODERN AFRICAN HISTORY (9) 1968.
- M. Crowder: WEST AFRICAN RESISTANCE (London 1971).
- The work of Mohamed Lacheraf is a North African precursor of this approach. Cf. his collected essays: ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE (Paris 1965).
349. L-J. Duclos: "Introduction théorique à l'étude des nationalismes maghrébins" and "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" in L-J. Duclos, J. Duvignaud, & J. Leca: LES NATIONALISMES MAGHREBINS (Paris FNSP/CERI 1966), and "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" in E. Gellner & C. Micaud (eds): ARABS AND BERBERS - From Tribe to Nation in North Africa (London 1973) pp. 217-229.
350. L-J. Duclos: "Introduction théorique à l'étude des nationalismes maghrébins" (1966) loc. cit. p. 8.
351. Ibid. p. 7-8.

352. L-J. Duclos: "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" (1973) loc. cit. p. 217.
353. L-J. Duclos: "Introduction théorique à l'étude des nationalismes maghrébins" (1966) loc. cit. p. 8.
354. He uses the two interchangeably, cf. VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952), esp. Chapter XVI: "Le patriotisme vietnamien", p. 218-229.
355. P. Mus: VIETNAM - SOCIOLOGIE D'UNE GUERRE (1952) p. 199.
356. Ibid. p. 228.
357. M. Lacheraf: ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE (1965) pp. 69-72.
358. cf. D.C. Gordon: THE PASSING OF FRENCH ALGERIA (London 1966) pp. 131-2, 186-7, 192-5 on Lacheraf's place among the theorists of the Algerian Revolution.
359. M. Lacheraf: ALGERIA - NATION ET SOCIETE (1965) p. 9. He does, however, distinguish between 'national sentiment' and 'the nationalist phenomenon', p. 29.
360. Ibid. p. 10.
361. F. Fanon: TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION (1970) pp. 154-159: "The Algerian War and Man's Liberation".
362. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) p. 47. This view has been attacked as 'unscientific' by Nguyen Nghe: "Frantz Fanon et les problèmes de l'indépendance" in LA PENSEE March-April 1963.
363. Cf. esp. F. Fanon: THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (1967) Ch. 3, "The Pitfalls of National Consciousness" pp. 119-165.
364. Ibid. p. 163.
365. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 170. The behaviour of the colonized population, he adds, should be examined not only "in relation to", but also simply "on the occasion of", the colonial situation. Ibid. p. 170.
366. J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 369.
367. W.H. Morris-Jones: THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF INDIA (London 1964) p. 58.
368. J. Beattie: "Awareness of Group and Self in small-scale societies" Paper presented to Joint Conference of the European Association for the Study of Experimental Psychology and the International Social Science Association (Cannes 1969) their (mimeo. p.4) behaviour, he adds, is expressed not in "rational-legal" terms, but in "traditional" terms; authority is "diffuse" rather than "specific". (p. 5).

369. L-J. Duclos: "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" (1973) loc. cit. p. 217.
370. Ibid. p. 217. Lacheraf suggests that "Some people experienced the Revolution through theory, albeit sincerely and often at the cost of their lives. Others, the majority, with energy born of mingled hope and despair, experienced it through concrete facts, as a necessary drama inherited from the distant past. They glimpsed this destiny as one whole, across a history of obscure struggle, nameless misfortune, and bitter frustration". (M. Lacheraf: ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE (1965) p. 26).
371. L-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" (1966) loc. cit. p. 37.
372. Ibid. p. 40. The image is reminiscent of Fanon's remark concerning "the old granite block upon which the nation rests". (THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH - 1967 - p. 86). Elsewhere, Duclos refers to 'Berber nationalism' as "a testing-ground for determining the degree of adaptability of new ideas launched by the doctrinaires". ('The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism' (1973) loc. cit. p. 228.)
373. L-J. Duclos: "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" (1973) loc. cit. p. 221.
374. M.L. Kilson: POLITICAL CHANGE IN A WEST AFRICAN STATE (1966) p. 186.
375. M. Lacheraf: ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE (1965) p. 16.
376. J.S. Saul: "Africa" in G. Ionescu & E. Gellner (eds.): POPULISM (1969) p. 127.
377. J. Beattie: "Awareness of Group and Self in small-scale societies" (1969) loc. cit. p. 3. Cf. also R. Levine: "The internalization of Political Values in Stateless Societies" in HUMAN ORGANIZATION (19) p. 51-8.
378. J.S. Saul: "Africa" (1969) loc. cit. p. 127.
379. Ibid. p. 127. "The three apparent causes of tribal resistance", Duclos argues, "are of a religious, political and economic nature. All three are inscribed within a narrowly local context. But even when thus reduced to their most concrete points of reference, the same argument and the same demands are clearly recognizable as the nationalism of the future was to take up again". 'Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain' (1966) loc. cit. p. 22.
380. L-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" (1966) loc. cit. p. 49. "The clan spirit and its ramifications....."

380. may initially seem to weaken national cohesion, but in reality provide a means of exalting the values on which it is based, and fulfilling its eventual purposes".
381. L-J. Duclos: "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" (1973) loc. cit. p. 228.
382. Ibid. p. 219.
383. L-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" (1966) loc. cit. p. 21.
384. M. Lacheraf: ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE (1965) p. 70.
385. L-J. Duclos: "The Berbers and the rise of Moroccan nationalism" (1973) loc. cit. p. 220. "Does it matter", he asks, "that consciousness of identity first developed on narrow territorial bases, if the conjunction of such areas of self-awareness provided....(the colonized society as a whole)....with a means of simultaneous self-expression?" p. 218.
386. J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 224.
387. "North African nationalism", Lacheraf complains, "has often been spoken of as if it were not a local movement, stemming from profound realities and resulting from an indisputably national historical evolution. There has always been a tendency to treat it as an intrusion, to blame the Arab League or "Radio Cairo" for Maghreb national movements". ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE⁽¹⁹⁶⁵⁾ p. 69.
388. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 172.
389. R. Emerson: FROM EMPIRE TO NATION (1960) p. 57-8.
390. F. Fanon: A DYING COLONIALISM (1970) p. 111.
391. J. Berque: DEPOSSESSION DU MONDE (1964) p. 172.

CHAPTER THREE ALGERIAN SOCIETY BEFORE FRENCH OCCUPATION

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I.

THE FRAMEWORK OF INTERPRETATION

To understand the dynamics of the colonial situation in Algeria under French rule, we need firstly to identify the major components of the indigenous political process or 'game'. This chapter tries to do this by telescoping detectable patterns of behaviour ^{established} before the French occupation. The result, necessarily, is compressed and schematic.

One of the most striking features of Algerian society was the bewildering variety of its demography: townspeople of old centres of learning and handicrafts like Tlemcen and Constantine; tradesmen and artisans of more recently established coastal ports at Algiers and Oran; sedentary cereal-growers of the Cheliff and Mitidja plains and of the Tellian Atlas; village tree-cultivators in the Dahra, Trara, and Greater Kabylia mountains; transhumant forest pastoralists on the Oranais Plateaux, and in the mountains of Lesser Kabylia, the Ouarsenis and the Hodna; semi-nomads of the Steppes and the Aures Massif; sedentary cultivators of the Saharan oases; and nomads of the desert and the pre-Saharan Atlas. Superimposed on this population jigsaw, on the eve of French occupation, was a small Turkish military caste, based on coastal towns but claiming suzerainty over the interior, living from the proceeds of trade, piracy, and levies from the surrounding tribes.

However, beneath this apparent diversity lay a foundation of shared social, economic, and cultural patterns, which extended far beyond the confines of 'Algeria' to the whole of the Islamic Far West (Maghreb) - including 'Morocco' and 'Tunisia'. In discussing the socio-political structure of Algeria, we must expand our frame of reference outside the narrow confines of the Turkish Regency or the French colony. The indigenous 'game' both transcended and undermined these territorial definitions.

One possible starting point for discussion of this world is an extremely rudimentary distinction drawn by Fortes and Evans-Pritchard between 'primitive state' societies and 'stateless' societies. They differentiate between 'Group A' societies, "which have centralized authority, administrative machinery, and judicial institutions - in short a government - and in which cleavages of wealth, privilege and status correspond to the distribution of power and authority", and 'Group B' societies, "which lack centralized authority, administrative machinery and judicial institutions - in short which lack government - and in which there are no sharp divisions of rank, status and wealth".¹ In these terms, the North African situation could be described as a coexistence of networks of quasi-Group B systems with nuclei of quasi-Group A systems.

In some respects, this coexistence amounted to mere juxtaposition. Those nuclei of 'centralized authority' - the Alawite dynasty in Morocco, the Turkish regencies in Tunis and Algiers - had effective control over an extremely limited portion of the territory and population, despite greater pretensions. The political life of the tribes of the interior continued undisturbed, for most of the time, by the presence of these 'authorities'. The disjunction between the two forms of political organization was often so great that they require treatment as separate systems.

Yet there also was a significant degree of interpenetration. The fiction of overall suzerainty frequently asserted by these 'central authorities' was tacitly respected by most tribes, at least in its spiritual aspects; this was so even when, in overt practice, they manifested independence or recalcitrance. In a sense, too, the 'Group A' authorities drew their legitimation and practical power from the segmentary dynamics of the 'Group B' communities. In important respects, therefore, these two forms

of political organization must be viewed as parts, or extremes, of a single political interaction.

Historiography and political analysis of the Maghreb has too often adopted the perspective of the 'central authority'; it has looked 'from the top down'. One reason is that the indigenous written tradition has invariably been associated with the central dynasties; this has been reinforced by Eurocentric interest in 'nation-building'. The result has been to distort the nature of the "central authority", of the "stateless" tribes, and of their interrelationship. Geertz's remark about Morocco - "its cultural centre of gravity lay not, paradoxical as this may seem, in the great cities, but in the mobile, aggressive, now federated, now fragmented tribes, who not only harassed and exploited them but also shaped their growth"² - can be extended with even greater emphasis to Algeria, where the urban tradition was shallower than in the rest of the Maghreb.

Most of the initial European investigation of Algeria's tribal centre of gravity was closely tied to the military and administrative goals of the French colonizers. It was largely conducted by soldiers and administrators, not by trained anthropologists.³ Their practical concern was to locate indigenous sources of authority, in order to facilitate the conquest and control of the local population. A considerable number of case studies were amassed, of variable quality, on individual 'tribes', 'villages' or 'regions', on powerful families, or on religious brotherhoods. These raw accounts lacked overall theoretical coherence. The generalizations which emerged were vague: 'Berber anarchy', 'Berber republics', 'tribal empires', 'clannishness', 'patriarchal family', 'feudal nobility', 'Lords of the Atlas' and 'xenophobic brotherhoods'.

Some of these generalizations contained a Eurocentric, or more specifically colonialist bias, and functioned as 'myths', determining research priorities. One of these was the myth of the Islamic veneer. According to this, Islam was an alien imposition on the Maghreb; the North African reality lay beneath its shallow roots. Many observers, as Berque suggests, "instinctively sought the facts, the forces, which were a stage deeper than Islam".⁴ Research tended to look for the age-old 'pagan' customs underlying the 'token' practice of Islam.⁵ Maghrebology tended to be cut off from Islamic Studies, from the Middle East. "We thus ended up, "Berque suggests, "with a right view - that of a man determined above all by his environment - and a wrong one - in that it cut him off from his age-old culture: exotic to us, unknown or antagonistic, but the raison d'etre for him, and the refuge for a national home".⁶ The general consequence was serious underestimation of the role of the moslem religion in everyday communal life, and neglect of the Maghreb's place in the total moslem world.

Another interpretative drift has been described as ... the 'Algerian vulgate'.⁷ This sought to distinguish between the Arab-speaking and Berber-speaking populations of the Maghreb, largely on pseudo-racial and cultural grounds. It led observers to look for differences in communal organization and spirit, which typically revolved around the notion of hard-working, thrifty, sedentary Berbers, and indolent, vain, and destructive Arabs.⁸ The Arab was the outsider, the Berber the native, with the implication that the two 'communities' were hostile to or divisible from each other. This 'Kabyle myth' often coincided with the 'Islamic veneer myth'; the Berbers were regarded as less deeply islamicized, and perhaps more open to conversion to Christianity.⁹

A further tendency has already been mentioned: that whereby the central government constituted a natural focus of indigenous political processes. Duclos calls this the "makhzen complex".¹⁰ It was rather less prevalent in Algerian historiography than in Moroccan or Tunisian research, for the French were not seeking retrospectively to justify the establishment of a 'Protectorate' for this central regime. Indeed, a more typical generalization about Algeria asserted that it was merely "a geographical expression", and that traditional tribal society was chronically incapable of establishing wide-scale political structures.¹¹

It was only gradually and occasionally that the findings of French colonial investigators were systematized, liberated from myths, and brought into contact with the 'structural' insights of social anthropology.¹² A striking contribution was made in the 1930's and 1940's by Montagne.¹³ He extended a detailed observation of South Moroccan community politics into a wide-ranging account of the historical process of political change and continuity in the Maghreb. He greatly neglected the Islamic factor, and many of the inferences which he drew from his material were overconfident and misleading.¹⁴ On the other hand, many of his themes foreshadowed much later and extremely important developments in social anthropological research, particularly those relating to the dynamics of conflict and games theory.

The work of Berque in the 1950's and 1960's stands out in importance.¹⁵ His is an extremely subtle structuralist approach, which defies the Eurocentrism of most social anthropological categorizations. He exhaustively revises and reassesses the cruder generalizations current in Maghrebology, and in particular brings back Islam into social analysis.

His masterly combination of intimate observation and far-sighted analysis enables him to manipulate facts and anecdotes as 'signs', 'alternations' or 'moments' to illuminate a many-faceted overall 'structure'.

Until the 1960's, study of the Maghreb tended to be out of not only from Islamic research, but also from work being done south of the Sahara. This was one effect of the divergence between French-speaking and English-speaking social anthropology, for Maghreb studies were almost exclusively a French domain. As a consequence, Maghrebologists long remained uninfluenced by theoretical advances relating to the dynamics of segmentary societies being made by anthropologists in the rest of the continent.¹⁶ Until this cross-fertilization took place, North African ethnology was "badly hampered".¹⁷ The major recent advances in North African studies in recent years have resulted from the use of segmentary theory as a central interpretative thread, and, in a more general sense, from the association of Maghreb data with political analysis from other areas of the Third World.

Early credit for this, albeit indirect, belongs to Evans-Pritchard, who published his study of "The Sanusi of Cyrenaica" in 1949. This described the pattern of patrilineal segmentation operating North of the Sahara, in a society undergoing dynamic change. However, the implications of this work were digested much more by anthropologists of Sub-Saharan Africa than by French-speaking Maghrebologists. The publication, in 1958, of Bourdieu's small outline "Sociologie de l'Algérie" was the first sign of segmentary theory being actively studied and directly applied within the framework of French Maghrebology.¹⁸

Much of the direct credit for introducing the perspectives of segmentary theory to North-West Africa lies with Gellner. Like Montagne and Berque, his detailed research has centred on the Moroccan High Atlas,

but like them he extends his conclusions to the Maghreb as a whole. His combined interest in Moroccan politics, and in the philosophical ramifications of dynamic social anthropology, has proved enormously fruitful.¹⁹ His work has had considerable influence on a growing school of Anglo-American social-anthropological research into North Africa, Drawing from and contributing to findings from other countries, this school's central interest has been segmentary theory, especially its dynamic variants.²⁰ Several French scholars, too, now share this perspective.²¹

Segmentary theory has been unable, however, to provide an exhaustive account of traditional political processes in the Maghreb. Its more abstract aspects need to be tempered with some of the factual material and explanatory concepts generated by earlier French-speaking ethnologists.

II.

SEGMENTATION

A sample of working classifications used by Twentieth-Century European observers to describe the socio-political organization of North African communities provides both striking diversity and overall uniformity:

Bourdieu: Algerian Arabs in general²² -

- a. Conjugal family b. Extended family c. Fraction (or 'clan')
- d. Tribe e. Confederation.

Bousquet: Berbers throughout the Maghreb²³ -

- a. Nuclear family (or 'hearth') b. Extended family c. Fraction
- d. Tribe c. Confederation.

Tillion: Algerian Berbers, from the southern Aures mountains²⁴ -

- a. Extended family (or simple fraction) b. Complex fraction
- c. Tribe.

Hoffman: Moroccan Arabs in general²⁵ -

- a. Nuclear family (or 'hearth') b. Extended family c. Minor lineage
- d. Sub-section (or village) e. Division (or 'section')
- f. Tribe g. Confederation.

Bourdieu: Algerian Berbers, from the Kabylia mountains²⁶ -

- a. Extended family (or 'house') b. Lineage (or 'simple clan')
- c. Complex clan d. Village e. Tribe.

Montagne: Nomads throughout the Maghreb²⁷ -

- a. Patriarchal family b. Subfraction c. Fraction d. Tribe
- e. Sub-group f. Group g. Sub-division h. Confederation.

Despois: Semi-nomads of the Tunisian Low Steppe²⁸ -

- a. Tent b. Extended family c. Fraction d. Tribe

Latron: Moroccan Berbers of the Meknes plains²⁹ -

- a. Tent b. Extended family (or 'douar') c. Fraction d. Tribe


Evans-Pritchard: Nomadic Arabs of Cyrenaica³⁰ -

- a. Extended family b. Sections (clan, primary section, secondary section, tertiary section...etc.) c. Tribe.

Both the nomenclature and the density of structural rungs vary considerably in these classifications. It is difficult to gauge the extent to which variation lies in the mind of the observer, or in substantive reality. Clearly a common pattern underlies the differences.


Theories of segmentary opposition have been developed to explain this kind of baffling unity in diversity. What they offer

initially is two figurative ways of representing the logic of the social process. The first model transcribes and modifies the genealogical tree by means of which these communities themselves explain their origins³¹:



The modification is to view this model not as a kind of lineage map (implying descent from an ancestor A, for example), but as an indication of the levels, or segmentation points, at which groups and sub-groups might potentially come into operation. Thus, in terms of social action, households P and Q would be distinct from each other when issues arise at household level, over the distribution of seed corn for example. But they would act as one over issues occurring at extended family level - rights to water, for instance - and would jointly contend with the claims of households R and S. Households P Q R and S would have a common interest, however, at clan level, where they form a rival group D against households T U V and W (group E), say on a question of grazing land. On wider questions, such as regulation of transhumance, the whole segment B might be ranged against segment C, and in the case of invasion of tribe A's territory, both these segments would unite in face of the common enemy.

The second method of demonstrating the logic of this kind of social system is by means of a nest, or series of concentric circles, each of which represents a rung of potential loyalty, or division of loyalty, radiating out from the smallest group to the largest³²:



The significant feature of both these idealized representations of segmentary structure is not the specific levels at which communities organize themselves, but the fact that each level can only be understood in relation to the overall system. The operation of this system is characterized by chronic fission and fusion.

Viewed through the filter of these idealized schemata, many features of Maghreb socio-political life fall into an intelligible pattern. All Maghreb social groups were segments of larger social groups, and themselves contained several potential mutually-exclusive sub-groups. There was a constant disposition to fragmentation or differentiation. Conflict between groups was endemic, and often institutionalized as feud. Units were defined through opposition to each other: a 'tribe' only became an effective political body when in conflict with another 'tribe'; a 'village' or 'group of tents' acted as a coherent 'village' or 'group of tents' when it clashed

with other 'villages' or 'groups of tents'; an 'extended family' mobilized itself to protect and promote shared interest when these were threatened or blocked by rival 'extended families'. Within each group and sub-group, there existed an endless number of points of likely schism. "This principle of division and sub-division", Gellner suggests, "generates all the groupings which are to be found in the society".³³

Built-in competition generated fission, but it also promoted fusion. For each subsection, the higher segmentation point also represented a level of possible unity or confederation with other subsections, in opposition to an equivalent rival grouping. Each moment of segmentation thus expressed solidarity as well as cleavage. Disputes were settled by the mobilization of equivalent rival segments to ensure an overall, eventual 'balance' of power. These segments were "ever ready, they exist potentially all along the line, available 'in all sizes', and their rivalry, even if latent, ensures the activation of the relevant groups when a conflict does crop up".³⁴ This meant that the solidarity of groups was contingent rather than inherent; it stemmed from external menace. "Cohesion", as Gellner indicates, "is maintained not by agencies of coercion at home, but by a threat from outside; and hence at every level of size for which there is an 'at home', there must be a corresponding 'outside'".³⁵ Once this outside evaporated, once the source of dispute was removed, groups split up through internal assertions of sub-group 'solidarity' or 'independence'.

Perhaps the major contribution of this segmentary theory to Maghrebology has been its patterned explanation of the otherwise

bewildering variety of levels and forms of social organization. Attempts by earlier ethnologists to locate or set up institutions of control at the level of 'tribe' were constantly baffled by the appearance of 'confederations' which transcended them, or 'clans' which undermined them. Imprecise terminology made reality even less comprehensible. There was no agreement on how to distinguish a 'tribe' from a 'confederation of tribes', or from a 'fraction of a tribe'. The term 'confederation' was casually bestowed on temporary hegemonies or alliances which occasionally mushroomed in response to an external threat, or to the ambitions of an influential leader or strong clan; Bourdieu, for example, describes 'confederations' as "vague and ill-defined organizations that usually stem from war, when a coalition may bring together two or more tribes threatened by a common danger. A weaker tribe may then seek the protection of powerful strangers as the price of its own submission, or groups of equal power may join together to oppose a common enemy or make new conquests. It sometimes happens that a vast confederation will be formed around a particular great family which holds the weaker tribes in a state of loose vassalage".³⁶ But tribes themselves often seemed little more than temporary coalitions of fractions: "most of the great tribes", wrote Marcais, "are really only disguised confederations".³⁷

French ethnologists long clung to the notion of the 'tribe', without ever squaring up to the pointed question asked by Berque: "what is a North African 'tribe'?" They abstracted one social level - one which early colonizers believed they had witnessed in action, mobilized to resist their conquest - and *treated* it as a corporate entity, the key to social action. "The framework

of knowledge, the objective of action", Berque complained, "has always been the tribe".³⁸ Attempts were made to list and enumerate tribes, to plot their boundaries on 'tribal maps'.³⁹ This was done amid a welter of contradiction and anachronism; Berque cites French surveys in Morocco which listed the same social group in some places as a 'tribe', in other places as a 'fraction', and in several places as an 'agglomeration'.⁴⁰ These timeconsuming activities were as confusing and essentially sterile as computing the number of angels dancing on a pinhead. As Berque suggested, a tribe was a figure of speech; it had no concrete structure or fixed characteristics; it was "a secondary phenomenon, and partly artificial".⁴¹ It was incomprehensible if isolated from the total structure of social interaction. "The more the analyst tries to pin down the components of thesystem", he declared, "the more aware he becomes of their transience. This is because their originality lies not in the facts themselves, but in the systemIt is not the facts themselves which are important, but their disposition, their level, the function which they perform in the overall context".⁴²

Other, similar, attempts to treat 'clans', 'groups of tents', or 'villages' as if they had a fixed corporate existence were equally fruitless. In the segmentary environment of the Maghreb, Gellner argues, "it was a mistake for French ethnography to be tempted by the search for the crucial group".⁴³ The mistake lay in not understanding that "however one may define political units or groups, they cannot be treated in isolation, for they always form part of a larger social system....The designation of autonomous political groups is always to some extent an arbitrary matter".⁴⁴ At any one time in Algeria, the

scale of effective political organization differed considerably from one geographical area to another; conversely, in any one area of Algeria, the scale of effective political organization fluctuated considerably from one era to another.

One minor contribution of segmentary theory to the understanding of North Africa was its confirmation of the continuity between the social systems of 'Berbers' and 'Arabs'. Both were of the same segmentary type, and fitted within a common framework of interaction. This reinforced the view that Berber-Arab differences were purely linguistic, a view towards which the consensus of Maghrebologists had long been tending.

The segmentary model also offers an explanation of the paradox of "ordered anarchy", noted among others by Montagne⁴⁵: within a fairly stable pattern of long-term social interaction, individual political formations were chronically unstable, and conversely, despite chronic fractionalization of social organisms, far-reaching political hegemonies could form with surprising ease. Classic segmentary theory offers to reconcile these apparent contradictions by positing that, over time, counter-vailing forces of 'assimilation and differentiation' result in approximate equilibrium; it suggests that "the tendency of tribes and tribal sections towards fission and internal opposition between their parts is balanced by a tendency in the direction of fusion, of the combination or amalgamation of groups".⁴⁶

However, the formal simplicity of the segmentary model is deceptive. One reason is that real groups in the Maghreb were not characterized by monadism, that situation whereby nesting segmentary groups mirror the characteristics of all higher and lower level groups.⁴⁷

At the base of the model, of course, the unit individual is indivisible, but in fact even the nuclear family, or 'hearth', had no separate group existence, for the North African 'family', and the physical building or tent in which it dwelt, incorporated the kin of at least three generations. More importantly, it is arguable that groupings up to the size of (say) the clan should be regarded as domestic rather than political in nature; they performed different functions from higher groups, and perhaps should not figure in political analysis at all. Evans-Pritchard, for example, explained that "we regard the family, the household, and the hamlet as domestic rather than political groups, and do not discuss them further in detail".⁴⁸ By contrast, Middleton and Tait treated the extended family as the 'nuclear group', as both "the largest purely domestic unit" and - through its head - the lowest "political unit".⁴⁹

On the outer edge of the segmentary nest, too, there are problems as to what constituted the widest effective political unit. The tribe itself, by certain definitions of that term, often provided only a weak or sporadic focus of behaviour; according to Sahlins, "the tribe (as a whole) is often the weakest link in the segmentary chain".⁵⁰ Certainly beyond it, such vague layers of loyalty as super-confederations and regions had a spurious existence in terms of political action; they represented levels of behaviour "only in a cultural sense".⁵¹

Between these two structural extremes, the range and density of intermediate groupings varied considerably.⁵² The logical premiss that there exist an infinite number of potential segmentation points needs, however, to be confronted with factual situations and realities of Maghreb modes of life. In any one environmental, at any one time, the possibilities for political organization were finite, and the formal

fluidity of the segmentary ideal type distorts reality. Special topographical and socio-economic conditions among the densely-populated, tree-cultivating communities of the Greater Kabylia highlands, for example, made the clan - a subfraction of the village, but grouping together extended families - as the most regularly mobilized and effective political unit. As Bourdieu suggests, "among these segmentation points there are some... which mark out true thresholds defining more stable groups. So it is that the most vital unit is the simple or complex clan (takharroubt or adroum)".⁵³ Similarly, Hart argues that the 'self-contained tribe' is in practice the "terminal unit" in the Rif Mountains of Northern Morocco.⁵⁴

III.

LINEAGE AND NOMENCLATURE

Social segments in the Maghreb typically defined themselves in terms of patrilineal descent; they called themselves "the sons of..." (in Arabic "Ouled"...or "Beni"... , in Berber "Ait"...) a common ancestor. Some early ethnologists tried to chart these genealogies back through the vicissitudes of time - through conquests, conflicts, migrations, alliances and intermarriages - relying both on oral and written legend, and on etymological inference.⁵⁵ Such undertakings were thankless, given the variety and repetition of nomenclature throughout the Maghreb. The accumulated mass of overlapping and contradictory detail gave little idea that there was a coherent process at work behind the myriad of names. The inaccuracies and inconsistencies which such studies revealed appeared only to show that the illiterate tribesmen were ignorant or confused about their actual origins. Members of the same community

often used different agnatic classifications; Montagne noted that they "do not describe the complex ensemble of tribes to which they belong in the same way. They include in it a greater or lesser number of elements, or alternatively arrange them in different ways. The result is that after a great deal of work, and after comparing the extremely precise observations of numerous informers, one finally draws up a picture which is still liable to constant modification and full of contradictions".⁵⁶

Usually, these communities used only agnatic labels. Tillion pointed out that they seldom used abstract generic names among themselves - 'clan', 'fraction', 'tribe', or 'fifth' - except under pressure from the central administration or visiting anthropologists.⁵⁷

"The Berbers", Montagne observed, "hardly apply distinct names to the various organisms which our administrative needs oblige us to differentiate..... The 'Ihahan' describe by this name what we call the 'confederation' of the Haha.... (and) the 'Isouktan' what we call the 'tribe' of the Souktana.... without use ever being made of any name describing the social organism of confederation or tribe".⁵⁸

Elsewhere he attributes this dearth of generic terminology to their "lack of a sense of the abstract".⁵⁹ In fact, however, as he implied, and as Tillion stressed, only the colonizer needs this abstract grammar; "for the native, born and brought up within his tribe, the latter's protocol is above all a living reality: he knows exactly what his relations are with each individual before knowing what determines these relations".⁶⁰

Some abstract self-descriptions were employed, though usually they passed from higher segments downwards rather than rose spontaneously from below. Their flexibility and imprecision

hindered rather than helped the understanding of European observers. Variants of the Arabic word 'arch or the Berber word taqbilt - itself a derivative of the Arabic qabila - were occasionally employed, and translated as 'tribe'. However, it was a mistake to apply static logic and assign this 'tribe' a fixed position in a precise hierarchy of social formations. 'arch and taqbilt were used to designate the widest tribal group at the moment and in the context where they were employed. The formations which they referred to might range between 'clan', 'fraction', or 'confederation' levels. Similarly, labels like ferqa (Arabic) and takharroubt (Djurdjura Berber), though invariably translated as 'fraction', were affixed to all levels of segmentation between extended family and tribe; in Kabylia, as Bourdieu explained, they "designate social units of a size that varies both with the region and with the social structure and history of the villages. This is because the transition takes place in a gradual and continuous manner from the narrowest to the most extensive units".⁶¹ Other semi-abstract terms - translatable as 'fifths', 'fourths', 'bones' or 'groups of tents' - bore no precise meaning outside their particular context.

The writings of Berque were extremely important in questioning the utility of patrilineal and abstract terminology as a guide for charting the origins of existing groups, or predicting their long-term behaviour. The nomenclature, he suggested, was largely epiphenomenal. Only of the immediate kinship group - three or four generations - was the agnatic definition of groupings likely to represent biological descent. The wider the group, the more the patrilineal classifications would be projective, and the claimed ancestors mythical. Names, he

argued, did not explain origins, conflicts or coalitions; they were tools which retrospectively rationalized existing segmentary relationships in kinship terms. Far from constituting evidence of the chaos of the 'savage mind', they were symbols or signs manipulated as part of an extremely sophisticated structure. Patrilineal ideology was a classificatory system regulating social dynamics by its justification of 'assimilation and differentiation'.⁶² Sub-Saharan segmentary anthropology developed insights parallel to Berque's. Middleton and Tait, for example, came to suggest that the lineage model was "an abstraction, a concept used by the actors, and by ourselves in analysis, to express certain relations between aggregates of people composing local groups".⁶³ It was, in Fallers' phrase, "a cultural system, a system of ideas - in fact a kind of political theory".⁶⁴

Under the umbrella of agnatic ideology, economic interests determined the pattern of segmentation. Evans-Pritchard suggested of the Nuer that "relationships are generally expressed in kinship terms, and these terms have great emotional content, but living together counts more than kinship",⁶⁵ to which Fortes' comment should be added: "local ties do not appear to give rise to structural bonds in and of themselves. There must be common political or economic or kinship or ritual interests for structural bonds to emerge".⁶⁶ Thus, we have to look for "the underlying structure of the game", "the ecological, demographic and sociological context", of social action.⁶⁷ In the Maghreb, alliances and conflicts were generated by rivalry for control of resources: land and raw materials, crops and livestock, wells and irrigation, markets and trade, routes and passes, women and honour,

sacredness and prestige. We have to understand the climactic, topographical, and technological conditions of this rivalry for resources. Berque provides a glimpse of this 'structure' in sketching the nature of land-use in the Algeria of 1830, with its alternating years of famine and abundance, of high mortality and high fertility:

"In three-quarters of the country there reigned an agricultural and pastoral society with cyclical movements. The rural group sowed and reaped; the rest of the time, it pastured. Cultivation and pasturing were usually disjointed. Between the two areas of land, the distance was sometimes considerable. Hence those continual displacements, that perpetual search for room. This kind of rhythm imposed upon the groups a difficult strategy of equilibriums, brought about by pacts or by violence. Hence a specific atmosphere of rapine and of accord, of patriarchal harmony and harsh competition".⁶⁸

Berque insists however, that agnatic ideology was not simply a mask for material behaviour; it interacted with and shaped that behaviour.⁶⁹ Similarly, primordial spiritual or 'sacral' attachments were an indissoluble part of the structure of interactions; in a sense "the economic is dominated and covered over by the magico-religious".⁷⁰

IV.

NON-AGNATIC ALLIANCES

In pure segmentary lineage systems, Gellner suggests, "there are no cross-cutting groups and criteria".⁷¹ In Maghreb society, however, a number of criteria of segmentation other than agnatic descent did operate. One of these took the form of factions or 'parties': in Algeria they were generally called soff-s, and in Morocco leff-s.

The study of these moieties in the Maghreb has been greatly marked by the work of Montagne. He exaggerated their importance, implying that they constituted the 'efficient secret' of tribal life throughout North Africa - and indeed the Middle East.⁷² His account of their operation has subsequently been subjected to detailed revision and heavy criticism,⁷³ particularly in the light of segmentary theory. That most of this was justified should not obscure the significance of the social reality which he focussed on.

Montagne's study originated in the South of Morocco, but he extended his findings to most of the Maghreb. According to him, a great patchwork quilt of group alliances was spread over the Maghreb, which could be transcribed as a political map. These factions were 'transitive' in the sense that if A and C were allies, and C and E were allies, then A and E were allies, while conversely if A and B were rivals, and C and D were rivals, then A and D were rivals.⁷⁴ These loyalty-patterns were latent, in that, when a dispute occurred, "there is created, on the spot, and immediately, two alliances of equal strength".⁷⁵ But they were not haphazard: "each fraction knows, in the case of an intestine quarrel, who its brothers and who its enemies are".⁷⁶ In any situation of conflict, these two networks of alliances were mobilized as a means of settling or extending it: "these leagues give a sort of guarantee, through the existence of permanent alliances, limiting conflicts, unless on the contrary they extend them indefinitely".⁷⁷

The significance of these moieties was that they were not based on, or justified in terms of, agnatic relationships. They cut across the pattern of patrilineal descent. They were 'secular' alliances arising out of alternated physical contiguity.

It was not disputed that these alliances did exist in the Maghreb, nor that on occasion they provided a key to understanding the physiognomy of conflicts. Bourdieu, for example, detected and tried to describe the operation of soff-s in Kabylia: "diffused and abstract organizations, systems of political and agonistic alliances, which may divide the village, the clan, or even the family, and which are organized into two general leagues, an 'upper' league and a 'lower' league; organizations that are primarily onomastic (name-related) in nature, and have a potential rather than an actual existence. These 'associations' (in the sense of 'a social unit that is not based on the factor of kinship') come into action on every occasion and at every level, whenever a quarrel breaks out between members of different soffs, however trifling the incident may be, and no matter whether it is on an individual or on a collective scale....Different features lead one to think that these conflicts between leagues assumed an institutional form and that the combats resulted from the logic of the ritual game rather than from a proper war".⁷⁸

The main criticism of Montagne is that he erected his limited data on leff-s into an excessively ambitious scheme for interpreting all conflict in the Maghreb. He implied that they were permanent, rigid and universal institutions. Berque and Dresch showed that the checkerboard pattern he had 'discovered' in one corner of the Maghreb was not typical of other areas.⁷⁹ Even in the Moroccan High Atlas, Berque suggested, the pattern he had unearthed at one particular moment in time, was not necessarily permanent and unchanging. Montagne's insistence on binary patterns, rather than tripartite

segmentation for example, has also been criticized as simplistic. Perhaps the most telling weakness of Montagne's account is that he described the social process in terms of only one level of alliance segmentation - the clan, for example - treating it as the crucial focus for all political action. Dresch pointed out, however, that on certain occasions, on certain matters, a whole valley, described by Montagne as fragmented into rival leffs, could act as a unit.⁸⁰ As Hart suggests, Montagne "could not explain why or how conflict could occur within a leff".⁸¹ Nor could he explain how order was maintained within a leff: "Suppose", Gellner asks, "that each 'square' on his chessboard represents a 'canton', a valley, or a group of villages. What is to keep order if a dispute breaks out (as it will) within this group, or within subgroups of it? There are, after all, no specialized political institutions within each unit on the board, any more than there are any between them".⁸²

Montagne's model of leff conflict and balance appears in many respects to be a crude and confused forerunner of the theory of patrilineal segmentation; his work frequently confuses leffs with lineage segments,⁸³ and he never made a thorough analysis of the basis of leff segmentation.⁸⁴ His major fault seems to have been isolating, and reifying, individual components of a total and very complicated system of group relationships. To an extent, he was a victim of his own overeagerness to generalize, for, as Seddon notes, "there was a difference between his formal position and his substantive material about the dynamics of political action".⁸⁵ An example of the complications of alliance-networks on the ground will illustrate how limited his grandiose 'patchwork' theory was in encapsulating reality.⁸⁶

The major 'tribes' in the Hodna mountain area, on the pre-Saharan fringe of central Algeria, were the Ouled Mahdi (to the West, near the mountains of the Ouled Nail) and the Ouled Derradj (to the South-East, near the Ziban oases). Together, these Hodna tribes acted as one soff against their neighbours and rivals to the West, the Ouled Nail; these soffs were distinguished by black tents and red tents. However, the two constituent 'tribes' of this Hodna soff (Ouled Mahdi, Ouled Derradj) were themselves rivals. The former belonged to the Oued Chellal Soff (influenced by the Mokrani clan from the Medjana in Kabylia to the North West), and the latter belonged to the Oued Msila soff (influenced by the Bou Okkaz clan of the Ziban); during the 1871 Kabylia uprising, for example, they were ranged on opposing sides. Moreover, each of these constituent tribes was internally split into rival soffs. The Ouled Mahdi "were too agitated and too turbulent, and the cohesion of the various fractions was certainly not strong enough, for them not to have been themselves divided into two parts, the hostility of which was aroused at the slightest incident, and the origin of which went back to 1734".⁸⁷ Fractions of the Ouled Derradj were also split by soff rivalries; these alliances were seemingly more contingent, however, in that one fraction (Ouled Sahnoun) usually supported the Oued Chellal soff against the Oued Msila soff, but, when threatened by Sahari tribesmen of the Ben Gana soff - who were ancient rivals of the Bou Okkaz soff - they called in the Oued Msila soff for help. Thus, there were soffs at different levels, and on a contingent basis rather than organized into a neatly transitive and permanent pattern.

What Montagne had done with the leff is analogous to what many earlier French ethnologists had done with the tribe; he had transformed

it in his mind into a concrete organism, a crucial reality, without trying to understand the overall system of segmentation in relation to which it was a secondary phenomenon. As Berque suggested, a leff was a word; it was "no more than a classificatory system. It is normally lacking where other kinds of tension operate".⁸⁸ The grandiose leff theory took Maghrebology up a blind alley; Favret suggests, indeed, that Montagne's work "congealed the study of political institutions for thirty years".⁸⁹ In view of its weaknesses, and the development of an alternative, sophisticated segmentary theory, it was possible to conclude, with Nicolas, that "the gigantic construction has collapsed".⁹⁰

However, Montagne's analysis of leffs, stripped of its more ambitious pretensions, had left behind some useful insights. He was undoubtedly correct in noting that, in specific areas, particularly among highly sedentarized populations, the pattern of 'secular' alliances might prove quite stable over a period of time. Also, in some areas, Kabylia for example, the alliance network did tend to operate at one or two key levels. What his work certainly indicated was that patrilineal segmentation did not provide an exhaustive picture of competitive tribal dynamics. He illustrated a point made by Smith, that lineage and segmentation were not synonymous.⁹¹ Other principles of organization cut across the purity of the lineage nest, and were manipulated in the contest for power and resources. Montagne's unearthing of these facilitated a more dynamic approach to inter-tribal diplomacy, for, in the game of accumulating clients, winning over tactical and strategic allies, and undermining the unity of enemies, there was "no single basis of recruitment or membership".⁹²

In certain circumstances, we might even talk of "value neutrality regarding group membership".⁹³ In this light, soffs and leffs appear simply as "a specific aspect of a more general and loosely defined phenomenon: any association of persons in a conflict situation".⁹⁴

Moieties and patrilineal segmentation were not incompatible. As Vinogradov indicates: "it is both arbitrary and unrewarding to conceive of the socio-political system in exclusively segmentary or alliance terms. A more realistic interpretation would be to view it in terms of a dynamic interplay of the two models. An alliance could reinforce the lineage, contradict it, or even replace it altogether. Many times, a segment had to make a choice between respecting lineage solidarity or upholding its own political interests...The function of the different alliances was to provide alternatives in the case of the failure of lineage cohesion".⁹⁵ Often alliances were retrospectively justified in terms of lineage ideology: "the segmentary lineage model...could be used as a rallying cry, or principle of recruitment, among others, in the complex and difficult game of forming, affirming or breaking political alliances within the 'leff model'".⁹⁶

V. CONTINGENCY AND DIFFUSION OF POWER

Divergence and convergence of interests between social segments was an inherent feature of Maghreb community life. "What defines a segmentary society", Gellner points out, explaining the ideal-type, "is not that this does occur, but that this is very nearly all that occurs."⁹⁷ According to this model, interactions are "situational"⁹⁸

or "contingent".⁹⁹ No group could be treated in isolation as an autonomous unit; each group is defined in relation to other groups, and has a latent rather than a permanent overt existence. Levels of segmentation only become actual in the face of outside threats; "the decision-making machinery comes into being only with the appearance of the policy problem - the dispute".¹⁰⁰ When disputes have been settled, or transcended, or undermined by other disputes, the related levels of mobilization wither away. Pure segmentary systems contain no alternative 'associations' or 'corporate bodies' to complicate or obstruct this withering-away mechanism.

This analysis clarifies the Algerian situation, in as far as permanent structures of law enforcement or special foci of organized force, were absent from its major component groups. Order was not maintained by such 'specialized' institutions as police, law-courts, prisons, or professional armies, but by the complementary opposition of interlocking segments in the social structure. In the same way, according to the model, "the stabilizing factor is not a superordinate judicial or military organization, but simply the sum total of inter-segment realtions".¹⁰¹ Power, in other words, was dispersed at the interstices between contingent groups. Conflict signalled the breakdown of balancing mechanisms, but was at the same time a method of calling them into operation. Opposition, or expenditure of aggression, was part of a ritual game rather than the real attempt of one segment to establish permanent hegemony over others. Such communities could only be called 'anarchic' if order were equated with the presence of "specialized and permanent political institutions"; in fact, the system for maintaining order was extremely complex, subtle and effective.

Leadership in the Maghreb was contingent. Authority was not incorporated in a self-perpetuating class of 'chiefs', quite distinct from 'the ruled'. Inevitably, ad hoc pre-eminences arose from lineage position, strength of personality, and political circumstance, but these could not be divorced from the communities which gave rise to them; "political leadership", Evans-Pritchard remarked in a similar setting, "is limited to situations in which a tribe or segment of it acts corporately".¹⁰² North African 'elders' or 'sheikh-s' were not marked off from their lineage groups by special insignias of office; there were no extreme institutionalized differences in rank, status, wealth or force. To this extent the society could be called 'egalitarian'. Leadership which emerged was inherently unstable over time. In some parts of the Maghreb, in Kabylia or the High Atlas, there were institutional restraints on pre-eminences - annual election, election by rival clans, rotating chieftainships etc. The situation described by Gellner in the Central High Atlas, for example, accords with quite a pure segmentary model: "The transient nature of chieftaincy turns all lay chiefs into lame ducks. The conduct of the chief is not that of a ruler guided by the concern with the long-term stability and possibly increase of his power. It is the conduct of a citizen temporarily enjoying power, responsibility and prestige, or having them thrust upon him, or accepting them lest they fall into worse hands...".¹⁰³ Even where chieftaincy was less modest, the demands of reciprocity were important; 'leaders' had obligations, and if these were not performed they were likely to lose authority. The usefulness, and therefore acceptance of leadership, its freedom from internal segmentary challenge, lasted as long as the external

threat or problem which it arose to meet or solve. The threat to an elder's pre-eminence came less from external pressure, which might actually strengthen it, but from internal dissension. Effective leadership was rarely hereditary for more than a few generations; the death of a strong leader invariably led to the dispersal of his power and charisma among rival sons, or rival sub-clans.

Lacking a full understanding of the segmentary dynamics underlying leadership, early French ethnologists had a 'corporate' mentality. They tried to locate 'chiefs' and 'notables' who acted as 'rulers' of their tribes. Where the French came into contact with apparently established local "overlordships" - the Mokrani of the Medjana in Eastern Algeria, or the Ouled Sidi Sheikh of the Saharan Atals - they wrongly regarded them as constituting permanent structures ("feudalities"). In other areas - for example, the village communities of Kabylia¹⁰⁴ - there were even fewer opportunities for 'elders' to elevate themselves above the play of segmentary lineages, and community leadership was embodied by series of clan assemblies (jema'a-s). But even in such cases, some French ethnologists thought in institutional rather than contingent terms. They wrote of Berber 'republics' - drawing attention to communal 'budgets', 'officials' and electoral 'machinery' - and compared them with European municipalities. Their writings, as Gellner suggests, "may overstress the role of the jema'a, the assembly, (though rightly noting that there is a hierarchy of such). These accounts....given the impression that these assemblies have a kind of corporate existence. But they have no existence independently of the social group, the segments of which they are the assemblies".¹⁰⁵ Referring specifically to assemblies in the High Atlas, he argues that

"they have no continuity other than that of that group; they have of course no kind of secretariat or records. On the other hand, they can, and generally do when larger groups are involved, consist of people who are delegates, who represent sub-groups".¹⁰⁶ Such assemblies arose to solve problems, and disbanded when these were solved; they were periodically activated rather than standing institutions. When the French colonial administration chose one level of segmentation and tried to concretize administrative contacts around its assembly, it misread its character and potentialities.

However, the ideal type of contingent segmentarity does not come to entirely satisfactory terms with the variety and flux of mechanisms of leadership and authority in the Maghreb. Smith has pointed out that a 'pure' segmentary society is impossible to conceive, for "a society characterized by a government organized at all levels solely in terms of coordinate group corporations is not more practicable than one organized similarly in terms of Corporations Sole".¹⁰⁷ He criticized segmentary theorists for erecting an ideal-typical distinction between centralized states and segmentary lineages into a fallacious dichotomy of real types.¹⁰⁸ He argued, instead, for the study of a continuum, with intermediate types; in fact, segmentary theorists have not been backward in taking this approach.¹⁰⁹

Ideal types must be regarded as inevitable, and useful heuristic tools.¹¹⁰ But a more telling criticism of segmentary theory concerns the kind of ideal type it offers. Early segmentary theorists were often content with merely drawing up a typology of societies. Their models were static and synchronic, demonstrating neatly contrapuntal equilibrium. They did not comfortably fit a real world with "actual

competition among segments or lineages of unequal status".¹¹¹ Any society with limited resources, and characterized by disposition to fission, inevitably breeds such competition. This being so, the static segmentary model fails to answer a fundamental question: "Given the fixity of lineage morphology, and the interdependence of this formal organization on segmentary process, how can the minimal lineage retain its fixity of character and position in the order of segmentation, when continually itself giving rise by fission to further segments of the same order?"¹¹²

The major weakness of static segmentary theory as an explanation of North African political process was this difficulty in coming to terms with the dynamic conflicts and tensions which characterized its real operation. There was a rather bland assumption that any tendency towards the establishment of segment hegemonies, powerful leadership, and wide-scale fusion, would eventually ('over time') be counteracted by the forces of clan particularism, egalitarianism, and fission. However, this obscured the fact that such hegemonies were as much chronic features of Maghreb life as ^{was} their absence. The problem of conflict, imbalance, and leadership was never neatly solved. In certain areas, for a certain duration of time, the possibilities for a would-be emergent chief were drastically circumscribed; in the areas studied by Gellner, for example, "within the rules of the game, he (the transient chief) cannot aspire to becoming a tyrant, to usurping permanent and real power; moreover, the general situation, the relative strength of forces and their lay out, reinforce the formal rules and make any such aspiration, any hope of breaking the rules, vain or at any rate unlikely of fulfilment".¹¹³ But in other

areas, at other times, the contest for hegemony - certainly among clans, if not among individual leaders - was a dominant mode of the political process.

Montagne's work was extremely important in emphasizing this dynamic aspect of Maghreb politics.¹¹⁴ He showed how the disposition to fission and fusion could encourage ambitious individuals or clans to compete for ever-widening hegemony. Local circumstances might enable a clan to dominate a 'core' fraction of a 'tribe', and from this base, by astute diplomacy, to gain the adherence of other fractions in the tribe. Armed victory over a neighbouring tribe might then encourage potential rivals to join it in an alliance against weaker tribes. The end result of this process, short-circuiting counter-vailing forces, might be that the original clan and its clients would entrench their ascendancy by seizing land and property, executing rival leaders, building fortresses and gaols, imposing taxes - even the kharadj supposedly to be levied only from conquered infidels¹¹⁵ - indulging in various forms of 'conspicuous consumption', and setting up the rudiments of a standing army and network of agents of authority. Links with, opposition to, or attempted replacement of the 'central' authority were further possibilities offered by this game. The ascendant spiral, of course, was always liable to degenerate into a vicious circle of fragmentation. The competition of descendants or the ambitions of rival segments, and the scarcity of resources made this a long-term probability. "The Maghreb powers", in Berque's words, "- tribal hegemonies, personal chiefdoms, spiritual or dynastic conquests - flared up or died away like torches".¹¹⁶

Montagne's work did not simply provide an explanation of the static, typological paradox whereby jealously egalitarian clans were

juxtaposed with tribal 'empires'. He sketched out a dynamic, transformative model.¹¹⁷ Within this framework, it was possible to comprehend the total oscillation and interaction between almost 'pure' segmentary communities, and approximations to 'segmentary states': those "delicate balances among scattered centres of semi-independent power, now building up under the guidance of tribal myth and civic ritual toward some apical point, now sliding away into clan jealousy, local rivalry and fraternal intrigue".¹¹⁸ Though lacking the sophisticated anthropological apparatus, Montagne's interpretative framework foreshadows Leach's dynamic account of the political process in Highland Burma.¹¹⁹

Berque provided a subtler, less sweeping transformative model. Though his study focussed on the organization of Berber communities in the Moroccan High Atlas - the Seskawa - he did not imply that this was 'typical' of other Maghreb communities. Indeed, he stressed that the stability of those social formations over time was most unusual. Instead, he treated them as one 'moment' - 'privileged moment' - in an overall rise and fall of competitive groupings in response to a complex of environmental pressures (what he called the 'interaction of structure, time and space'). He treated the different types of Maghreb social formation existing over time and space as "the inequalities of an operation which in one place is coherent, stable, and energetic, and in another place is discordant and transitory".¹²⁰ There were, he declared, "strong moments and weak moments, strong points and weak points, in the institutional history, in the very being, of North Africa".¹²¹ Berque found segmentary language too static and neat to encapsulate the many-sided transformative structure which he envisioned in the Maghreb.

Gellner tried a somewhat different approach. Rejecting the dichotomy between 'well integrated societies' and social change, he injected dynamic theory into the veins of the segmentary model. He pointed out that the concept of perpetual fission-fusion balance - even 'over time' - could amount to an "optical illusion". Instead, he described the Maghreb political process as a complex pattern which constantly collapsed and reconstituted itself on its own ruins. Truly effective 'systems maintenance', he argued, revelling in paradox, would have brought the system to a halt: either power would have become institutionalized, and corporate features emerged, or order would have evaporated. "So as to work at all", he explained, "the system also must not work too well".¹²² The effective functioning of the system required its participants to fear that it would collapse; for this fear to be credible, the system had actually periodically to collapse. Thus, communal life was not blissfully balanced, but seething with internal contradictions. Overall, ^{the} Maghreb was "a comparatively stable society nevertheless composed of discordant parts or traditions, where the uneasy stability cannot in any natural sense be called an equilibrium".¹²³

This model of a society constantly destroying and reinventing itself is not static. The danger it runs is of being too dynamic to offer contact with observable facts. It has been argued, for example, that Gellner's "obsession with fluidity and with even the apparent inexistence of political organization....(leads him to)...exaggerate the purely ideal or logical nature of segmentarity",¹²⁴ and to ignore other stable or cross-cutting features of Maghreb political actuality. But in a sense this approach is useful precisely because it does ignore

certain 'real' facts of North African life. Gellner himself cheerfully concedes that the model is abstract and excessively neat, but suggests that his "'pure' ideal type is useful primarily in highlighting the kinks and unevennesses of 'real' segmentary societies".¹²⁵ His major work in fact concentrates on precisely one of these kinks - holy men - and how it relates to the segmentary environment.

The most promising vein of recent investigation of social dynamics in the Maghreb has been cast in terms of 'games theory'.¹²⁶ Though inspired by theoretical advances made by Barth and Bailey in Asian anthropology,¹²⁷ it also reclaims some of the insights offered by Montagne's structural analysis. Its particular interest lies in its efforts to examine competition for power less in terms of the strategies of individual 'politicians' than in terms of the struggle of classes and groups for economic survival. This could eventually relate the rather abstract logic of segmentarism and dynamic conflict theory to the "ecological, demographic and sociological context" of Maghreb life.

VI.

SACREDNESS

An important 'kink' or complex of cross-cutting social ties in North Africa centred around 'sacredness', or baraka. The structure of society was deeply marked by the distribution of 'blessed' authority - among petty local saints, special tribes, powerful religious leaders, and the widely-scattered moslem brotherhoods.

Excessive concentration on the mechanics of tribal segmentation obscures the role of Islam in North Africa. Montagne, for example, painted a picture which was almost wholly secular. He focussed on

relations among the various tribes, and between them and the central administration, without examining or indicating the "moral principle of unity"¹²⁸ underlying these interactions. One of his critics has suggested that "of the tryptich - moslem sociology, makhzen (central authority) sociology, and Berber sociology - Robert Montagne retains only the latter two sections - makhzen and Berber sociology. Reading his BERBERES ET LE MAKHZEN, one sometimes wonders whether, in Morocco, one is in a moslem country at all".¹²⁹ Transplantation of the pure segmentary model to the Maghreb threatens to have the same distorting effect.

Much of colonial ethnography implied that Islam had shallow roots in the Maghreb. It was held that age-old patterns of behaviour were not fundamentally disturbed by Islam, despite the lip-service of the tribes. The mistake lay in regarding Islam as a single, institutionalized doctrine. In fact, Islamic civilization throughout the Middle East and North Africa involved constant interaction and occasionally conflict between different traditions: between the "folk Islam" of autochthonous peasants and nomads, and the expectations of "the Islam of the caliphs and scholar-legists",¹³⁰ between Koranic Law (Shar'ia) and Customary Law ('Urf), or between Orthodoxy (Sunna) and Heterodoxy (Bida).¹³¹ Apparently autonomous tribes were not merely linked by economic interdependence and a common lineage structure, but deeply impregnated with "a universalistic system of values and norms".¹³² They were "part of a wider Islamic civilization, and they identified enthusiastically and firmly with Islam. They were on the margin of a wider society, universalistic and non-tribal".¹³³

European observers tended to look for, and concentrate on, the specifically local ingredients in religious behaviour. They contrasted

them with 'alien' and universalistic precepts brought from the Middle East and enshrined in the Koran, the ulema (jurists), cadi-s (civil lawyers), Caliph-s (Temporal and Spiritual leaders of the Community), universities, and other urban 'authorities'. There was an element of wishful thinking in this contrast: Europeans "spotted, with the joy of discovery, a crack in this so-harsh reality: the undeniable contrast between the Islamic witness of these believers and the concrete content of their belief, and above all their practice. A particularism most incarnate here opposed ideology; concrete wisdom opposed holy exaltation".¹³⁴ There was, Berque suggests, "prejudice in favour of the local fact against its universalist 'models', in other words of the friendly, the reconcilable, the analysable, against what might seem hostile, evasive, incomprehensible".¹³⁵

It was a distortion to disassociate the Maghreb tribes from their universalistic heritage, for the particularistic or autochthonous ingredients in their faith and practice represented only one alternation of the dynamic whereby "the tribal base constantly oscillates between withdrawal into itself, and enthusiastic identification with the larger community of faithfuls".¹³⁶ One of the striking aspects of local Islamic observance was, in fact, its rigour. Within the Sunni orthodoxy, which the vast majority of communities observed,¹³⁷ a single rite, that of Malik, prevailed; this was the most austere of the four Sunni schools. Maghreb practice entailed stricter observance of fasting, sex segregation, and abstinence from forbidden foods, than in most parts of the Islamic world. Piety was deeply respected, and appeals to fundamentalism found a periodic and rapid echo in the faith of the tribes. The Islam of North Africa, even its expansive,

universalistic aspects, was not transmitted from above or outside; it was lived as an inescapable part of everyday reality. It was inseparable from communal solidarity and behaviour.

Islam in North Africa, particularly in the tribal environment, was largely embodied in local 'saints'.¹³⁸ These were not merely targets for posthumous veneration, but played an active part in the social process. Saints (murabit-s or wali-s) were those with divine blessing (baraka). Baraka was at the same time claimed and attributed. Ultimately this sanctity lay "in the eye of the beholder",¹³⁹ in that it "needs....to be recognized by the community of the faithful if its validity is to become established".¹⁴⁰ Many saints claimed, or were imputed to have, descent from the prophet (they were thus shorfa - sing. sherif), but as Gellner suggests, "although sherif is defined genealogically, in practice it tends to be applied only to those (genealogically qualified) who claim the rights of and live in a manner befitting a sherif".¹⁴¹

The manifestations and requirements of sanctity included miraculous powers - to heal the sick, provide good weather, prevent disasters, have predictive visions, and bring good luck to individuals and the community. The expected lifestyle of a saint combined asceticism with generosity, otherworldliness with practical diplomacy. In return, sanctity brought reverence, and with it donations of valuables, food, land, or livestock. Expectations of asceticism notwithstanding, the accumulation of some wealth could itself be a sign of baraka.

Baraka was hereditary; it passed from one holy man to his kinsmen or disciples. Often, indeed, 'holy tribes' existed, inheriting

and transmitting diffused baraka. They usually lived near, and looked after, the tomb of a supposedly ancestral saint. There might, indeed, be saintly villages scattered over a wide area.¹⁴²

Holy men and holy tribes performed a variety of functions within the segmentary political system. They were 'outsiders' to the pure lineage structure; they were invariably immigrants to the area, or imputed so to be.¹⁴³ Consequently, they stood apart from segmentary rivalries or litigation. Because they were largely pacific (did not feud), they were largely respected (not feuded with). The surrounding or neighbouring community turned to them when segmentary rivalries could not be settled by natural counterbalance; they became arbitrators or peacemakers, a crucial part of ritual machinery through which disputes were channeled. Holy men were "professional neutrals, arbitrators, mediators";¹⁴⁴ they acted as "mediators between tribes, and between one tribal section and another".¹⁴⁵

Holy men usually resided near the territorial boundaries of two or more tribal sections; as well as a shrine for the veneration of a saintly ancestor, this provided a sanctuary for individuals fleeing segmentary conflict. The residence or tomb provided neutral ground in a more abstract sense; a location for trials by collective oath, for example, or elections of inter-segment chiefs. Often, a saint or holy tribe was entrusted with disputed property as part of the settlement of rivalries.

Holy men and tribes were also often closely involved in economic life. Their arbitration helped to regulate transhumance and irrigation, for example, or the parcelling out of land or crops. They facilitated local trade, also. Markets often stood in the shadow of their shrines,

and the latter sometimes served as collective warehouses or left-luggage offices.¹⁴⁶ They offered hospitality and spiritual protection to outsider tradesmen and travellers. Indeed some were actively involved in commercial exchange, and "travelled in desolate areas loaded with valuable goods, without fear of robbers".¹⁴⁷

Because of their real or supposed literacy in the language of the Book, saints were often scribes and guardians of written communal documents - genealogies or pasture rights, for example - and would have to interpret these in cases of dispute. They were, in a more general sense, custodians of unwritten communal history, custom, and local wisdom. They were also links with the outside world. They transmitted the Koran to, or made it live for, their illiterate fellow-tribesmen, largely through example. They acted as teachers. Some were pious scholars, who had travelled to the great centres of learning throughout the Islamic world. "They taught the tribesmen to respect learning and religion", it has been suggested, "and kept these twin lights burning, even if dimly, through the centuries".¹⁴⁸ Occasionally, a local saint proved remarkably mystical or pious, calling for purification of the faith, and proselytizing over a wide area. Other holy men, more mundane, organized routine worship and prayer and periodic festivals. The memory of the dead founder saint was particularly dear to their minds.¹⁴⁹

'Sacredness' was then closely bound up with every aspect of communal life, and holy men performed a multiplicity of roles. Some of these requirements required a fine sense of balance: active involvement in settling disputes and neutrality, for example, or the display both of abstinence and conspicuous consumption were potentially

contradictory. To fulfil them all effectively would have required a race of philosopher-kings, but in fact individual marabit-s only performed a few of them, with varying effectiveness.¹⁵⁰ Holy men were viewed with "a curious mixture of respect and condescension".¹⁵¹ Some - illiterate, living in poverty, performing mundane tasks in an inconspicuous manner - appeared to have something of a 'joking' relationship with their community; yet, by a strange reversal of criteria, this could become a sign of divine blessing.¹⁵² Gellner portrays incisively and entertainingly how finely poised was the phenomenon of saintliness and how quickly it could arise in one individual and peter out in a successor. Baraka was not simply inherited; it had to be activated. Some members of a holy family or tribe might effectively activate a 'genealogical' claim to holiness; others would be totally prevented from doing so. A 'saint' who was not respected was ineffective, and an ineffective 'saint' was not respected. His acceptance by the contiguous community thus depended on a combination of ruthless pragmatism and divine grace.

Sanctity created anomalies in the pure segmentary model.

"The marabouts in their lifetime", Evans-Pritchard suggests, "were regarded as standing outside the tribal system, to which, indeed, being foreigners from the West, they did not belong".¹⁵³ "They are not members of the tribes", Gellner concurs, "They live on the frontiers between tribes (thereby, incidentally, helping to guarantee those frontiers), belonging to neither".¹⁵⁴ Their 'asymmetrical' kinship pattern was distinct from the surrounding system.¹⁵⁵ In certain instances they were very wealthy, living in

prestigious accommodation - even 'castles'¹⁵⁶ - with a lifestyle different from the rest of the population. They were thus, as Gellner indicates, "an inegalitarian organization, with uneven and sometimes very sharp concentrations of wealth and prestige (particularly the latter)".¹⁵⁷

However, though standing outside the pure segmentary lineage system, holy men and holy tribes were not detached from it. In performing their tasks and concentrating prestige in their persons, they contributed in fact to the egalitarianism and absence of political specialization in the rest of the tribal structure. They enabled segmentary conflict to take place and to be contained. Rather than as a source of division, their "moral and political ascendancy...served as a cementing bond".¹⁵⁸

Sacredness, prestige and wealth depended intimately on the confidence of the community they 'served'. They evaporated once legitimation evaporated. To this extent, in Gellner's celebrated phrase, "vox dei is really vox populi".¹⁵⁹ Saints, in other words, were not a power in their own right; they were not a corporate group. A fundamental limitation on corporate pretensions was what Gellner calls "saintly competition". Baraka had to be activated, and saints had to compete for reverence and clientship among a limited number of available tribes. Accordingly, there was a marked ebb and flow, over time and distance, of effective sanctity. In some areas it was strongly entrenched in one family over a long period, and extended over a large population of 'clients'; in other areas, it was weakly rooted, vacillating, and dispersed among several minor saints.

Although they provided a focus for wider loyalties to the whole moslem community, saints and saintly tribes closely reflected their segmentary environment. They were subject to processes of fission and fusion. Saintly competition frequently led them directly into fierce feuds. Miner and DeVos, for example, describe a physical struggle for baraka in the Algerian Ziban oases, where two maraboutic tribes alternately body-snatched the remains of a revered saintly ancestor.¹⁶⁰ The baraka of holy men was often required to manifest itself in the armed success of their client groups in segmentary warfare; they became involved in, and manipulated, the rivalries of the 'secular' tribes. The criterion of 'pacifism' thus became a description less of objective behaviour than of attributed motive. Saints occasionally coordinated resistance to external enemies, or inspired raids against rival segments. Their calls for a purification of the faith, and intensive proselytization, were effective means of binding together large confederations. Their role in mobilizing resistance to Christian colonization was particularly active; their call for 'holy war' (jihad) aroused a higher supra-segmentary cohesion which transcended traditional intestine rivalries.¹⁶¹ Often, this kind of involvement led to the establishment of domination over a large area, with some appearance of "religious feudality" or "maraboutic state". Many of the great hegemonies in Maghreb history were founded by and upon holy men and 'holy' tribes.¹⁶² However, like all ascendancies and manifestations of leadership, these were subject to countervailing forces of fission.

Intimately connected with 'sainthood', and an extension of it, was a phenomenon found throughout most of the Maghreb; the

religious fraternity.¹⁶³ The establishment of 'dervish' or 'sufi' Orders was characteristic of mediaeval Islam; they spread throughout the Middle East, but took particularly deep root in the Moslem West. They were, as Berque suggests, "born from vast spiritual propagations, then adopted the compartmentations of the Maghreb territory".¹⁶⁴ Each brotherhood propagated a particular 'way' (tariqa) of practising and understanding the faith. Its adherents (ikhwan) sought spiritual ecstasy by the medium of strictly-patterned rituals and occasionally ascetic mortifications. Many fraternities were widely-scattered, with centres in many countries; other were confined to a very limited neighbourhood. By the early Nineteenth Century, the main sects in Algeria were the Tijaniyya on the Saharan fringes, The Rahmaniyya in Kabylia, the Qadriyya in the West, the Taibiyya in the Ouarsenis-Dahra mountains, and the Derkawiyya in the Centre.¹⁶⁵

Each Order was directed from a parent lodge (zawiya), usually the burial place of the Founder Saint from whom its leaders claimed spiritual (or biological) descent. It was directed by an overall leader (sheikh), or possibly by a group of leaders. The parent zawiya was often a centre for pilgrimage by adherents of the sect. To it was affiliated a network of local lodges, spread throughout the sphere of influence. Each of these zawiya-s was headed by a director (sheikh, or mogaddem) appointed by the leader(s) of the Order. Zawiya-s acted as monasteries, centres of learning, schools, sanctuaries, hostelries, charitable foundations and shrines. Often, they were closely associated with trade; in conjunction with this, such establishments helped to spread Islam in an organized fashion, particularly to such outposts as West Africa. Thus, zawiya-s

performed on a larger stage the role performed by local saints.¹⁶⁶ The income of the Order came from the donations of devotees, often collected during periodic fund-raising and missionary tours (ziara) by one of the leaders of the sect, or from gifts of land in trust (habus) from client communities.

Many of these features clearly cut across or transcended the segmentary tribal structure. However, much of their corporate appearance was deceptive, and their universalistic doctrines must be firmly related to the local context. In particular, they were closely associated with the phenomenon of saintliness.

Colonial ethnography drew a sharp distinction between 'marabouts' (saints) and fraternities. As Berque indicated, it treated holy men as manifestations of indigenous, pre-Islamic "berber anthropolatry", and religious brotherhoods as alien (Oriental) Islamic imports.¹⁶⁷ Both prongs of this dichotomy distorted Maghrebi Islam which, in Valensi's phrase, was characterized by "duality between self-sufficiency and integration into a wider whole",¹⁶⁸ between intimate attachment to local custom and passionate identification with the whole moslem community (umma). Marabouts and fraternities were not incompatible or rival institutions. Brotherhoods had their roots in saintliness; the Founder Saint of the Order, not the organization as such, was the focus of adherence. "Beduin attachment to the Sanusiya", Evans-Pritchard explained of Cyrenaica, "springs from their personal devotion to the Grand Sanusi and his family, and not the other way round, and the Grand Sanusi derived his sanctity, and thereby his power, from the fact that he was a marabout".¹⁶⁹ In fact, the founders of orders were simply revered saints who

attracted widespread adherence through zealous peregrination and proselytization, and decided to establish one or several zawiya-s. This was one potentiality in the game of saintly competition. As Berque suggests, "any marabout who succeeded founded an expansive fraternity like the Sanusiyya or the Rahmaniyya".¹⁷⁰ He attempted to build up an organization on the foundation of his baraka, though this organization never transcended its origins in saintliness. We should regard holy men and Orders as "a specific alternation between the local and the general, between concrete localization and sentimental evasion".¹⁷¹

Moreover, adherence to brotherhoods by the ikhwan was predominantly by ascription.¹⁷² Tribal segments as a whole tended to be associated with particular fraternities.¹⁷³ The rise and fall of brotherhood influence was inextricably linked with segmentary conflicts and alliances. The rivalries between different Orders - between the Qadriyya and Tijaniyya in the South and West of Algeria, for example¹⁷⁴ - were played out by enlisting the support of key tribes, and exploiting divisions between potential enemies. Conversely, competing tribes used adherence to particular Orders to extract the maximum advantage over rivals; thus fraternity 'soffs' were developed. Brotherhoods also, in a sense, acted as go-betweens for central authorities and dissident tribes. The Derkawa, for example, pursued a determined anti-Turkish policy, whereas the Rahmaniyya cooperated with the Turks; the Tijaniyya collaborated with the French, whereas the Taibiyya threw their force behind Bou Maza's insurrection in the Dahra, and the Qadriyya were major coordinators of AbdelKader's resistance to conquest.

A measure of an Order's success was its ability to push beyond a 'core' tribe to establish trans-tribal links. However, even the novelty of this kind of wider unity was more apparent than real and "was possible only because a tribal system already existed uniting the different tribes, in spite of their feuds and enmities, into a society which, though lacking political unity, rested on common sentiments, a common way of life, and a common lineage structure".¹⁷⁵

The corporate nature of the Orders also requires to be placed in proper perspective. During periods of growth, under an energetic founder or leader, organization was often tightly controlled. Satellite zawiya-s depended on the initiative and coordination of the central zawiya; all followed the same forms of worship; funds flowed into a common pool. This phase was rarely long-lasting. With some Orders, expansion might be far-flung and deeprooted. The Sanusiya were unusual in this respect, a circumstance partly attributable to common hostility to the Turkish and Italian colonists.¹⁷⁶ But normally, within a short time, "any fraternity which expanded would break up into archaic particularisms".¹⁷⁷ The authority of the Fraternity Head or Heads rapidly waned; descendants of the Founder Saint evolved separate spheres of influence and went on independent ziara tours there to finance their activities.¹⁷⁸ The heads of the major zawiya-s did not for long remain closely-supervised cogs in a well-articulated machine. The Tijaniyya Order, for example, was split for several generations by an indecisive see-saw struggle for supremacy between the zawiyas in the Suf and Ain Mahdi oases; each elected rival supreme Heads

and vied for control of the various satellite zawiyas.¹⁷⁹ Lesser zawiya moqaddem-s could utilize these conflicts to carve out a measure of autonomy themselves.¹⁸⁰ A zawiya chief was effective in the surrounding community primarily when he himself had a reputation for saintly qualities; his tomb might then become a shrine after his death, and a focus for a succession of hereditary zawiya directors.¹⁸¹

In other words, Orders themselves were subject to the chronic tendencies both of fission and fusion. The fragmentation of the 'Aissaoua sect in the early Twentieth Century, as described by Brunel, follows a fairly typical pattern: "The 'Aissaoua sect was formerly, perhaps, a robust organism, responding to a single source of energy. Following the dissipation of its authority and intestine rivalries, this organism today is in the process of complete disintegration..... Every descendant of the Sheikh seeks to play a preponderant role in the sect; each influential Moqaddem similarly seeks to control his Zawiya by himself, or to ignore the directives of his spiritual chiefs. Everyone lets personal interests take priority over those of the brotherhood as a whole, which are totally lost sight of. As a result, the sect no longer has any cohesion; it is no longer a brotherhood grouped around a single unchallenged leader, but a multitude of independent or would-be independent Zawiya-s. Thus the sect is slowly falling apart, dismembering, fragmenting. This state of affairs is not confined to the 'Aissaoua... It is pretty well true of all the powerful religious congregations of Islam, which are gradually disappearing for lack of discipline...".¹⁸²

In the overall structure of Maghrebi Islam, this kind of 'moment' offered various possibilities, but among them was the emergence of a 'new' holy man - perhaps even a zawiya moqaddem - to provide the nucleus of and drive for a nascent, expansive Order.¹⁸³

VII. MARGINALITY AND CENTRAL AUTHORITY

The classic model of segmentarism does not englobe another important feature of Algerian society : its 'marginalism'.¹⁸⁴ By this is meant not only the general interrelationship between Maghrebi Islam and the larger moslem community ('umma), but also the concrete interaction between segmentary communities and the pretensions and activities of hegemonic powers claiming to exercise local spiritual and temporal leadership over them.

As Hermassi suggests, "if by tribe we mean a self-sufficient social unit constituting a world unto itself - perceiving itself as the whole of mankind and recognizing no right or obligation beyond its limits - then tribes do not exist in North Africa".¹⁸⁵ Wider rights and obligations in the Maghreb were cast in terms of the Sunni theory of the Caliphate.¹⁸⁶ According to this, Caliphs were the successors of the Prophet. Their function and duty was "to look after the spiritual and temporal welfare of the Moslems by defending them from internal and external enemies, and by seeing that the revealed laws (Shari'a) were observed".¹⁸⁷ Central political authority was not purely secular; it sought to defend the faith in a spiritual as well as military sense. It was the obligation of all moslems to obey their guide and protector, whose powers were given by God.

The fragmentation of the Abbasid Caliphate into separate provinces had resulted in separate governors claiming to exercise the authority of the Caliphate over their local sector of the community of the faithful. In the Maghreb, the tribal hegemonies which rose and fell competed for the exercise of this spiritual and temporal authority: as Caliphs, as Imam-s, as Emir-s, or as Sultan-s. Their radius of effective influence varied considerably. On occasions, as with the Almohad hegemony in the 12th and 13th Centuries, this central authority extended throughout the Maghreb, and indeed Southern Spain. At other times, for example, the mid-15th Century, authority was divided between rival centres of control: at Marrakesh, Fez, Tlemcen, and Tunis. Often these overlordships were strongly imbued with Islamic fundamentalism; for example, the puritanical Almoravids from among nomadic tribes of the Western Sahara in the 11th Century, or the rigorous Almohads from the sedentarized communities of the High Atlas, in the 12th Century. But other pre-eminences were more clearly 'secular' in inspiration - for example the early Marinids during the 13th Century in the Western Maghreb - originating in little more than desire for pillage and military opportunism.¹⁸⁸

However they originated, once established these hegemonies stepped out from the narrow framework of pure segmentary logic and began to develop some sense of their special obligations as leaders of the local moslem community. They centred their authority on towns - often, as with the Idrisids at Fez, founding their own capital - and patronized architecture and scholarship there. They developed some attributes of central administration (makhzen). Often they designated 'ministers' and secretaries; they established

a Treasury and a tax-collecting network; they nominated a series of agents (caid-s) to represent central authority among the tribes. They appointed cadi-s to act as judges in matters of civil law.

Other features of these hegemonies suggest the development of absolute, personalized power. They invariably evolved into quasi-dynasties, based on a small inner tribal core.¹⁸⁹ They developed 'households', with a 'palace mentality'. All of this was underpinned by violence: a standing bodyguard, a swiftly-mobilizable auxiliary force of makhzen troops involved in regular and ruthless punitive expeditions, prisons, executions, and expropriations. The combination of this physical power to repress resistance, and the spiritual veneration with which the central authority was regarded, suggest an extremely deeply entrenched central authority.

In practice, these dynasties were never truly 'theocratic'. The Caliphian theory itself held that the community's leader was bound by the Shari'a ; he could only apply this, not change it, and in his interpretation he was expected to consult public opinion (in the form of ulema - learned jurists). Although his powers came from God, the occupant of the position of leader was actually chosen by the community. There has been some dispute whether this made the relationship between ruler and ruled contractual, and if so, whether the ruled could foreclose on a leader's mandate. Lahbabi, for example, argues that the community ~~was~~ always had the right to depose a leader who did not respect the Shari'a, or effectively defend the community interests. On the other hand, he has been accused of reviving the Kharidjite heresy of the 7th and 8th Centuries. But whatever the textual glosses, it is certain that, in practice,

Maghreb hegemonies deviated from the strictest interpretation of Caliphian rights and duties.¹⁹⁰

The practical problems of establishing an efficient, centralizing administrative hierarchy were immense. Central government faced "a structural limitation, essentially tribal", which affected "its territorial sovereignty, its degree of centralization, and its means of stability".¹⁹¹ It also affected the goals of the makhzen; the central authorities in the Maghreb were not a succession of ever-frustrated nation-builders, for their own perspectives were determined by the segmentary environment from out of which they had coalesced. The logic of makhzen-tribal relations can best be understood in the light of Gellner's metaphor: a shepherd trying to maintain his authority by manipulating a situation where there are sheep, sheepdogs, and wolves.¹⁹²

The shepherd, the makhzen, was invariably centred on a core tribe, which had successfully transcended segmentary oppositions. The bodyguard and military force which this represented was occasionally supplemented with contingents of captives or mercenaries from West Africa or Mediterranean Europe (the jund).¹⁹³ The makhzen centred usually on a handful of towns, and the hierarchy of functionaries did not usually extend its direct control very far into the surrounding countryside. Control of the countryside was indirect; it was effected by manipulation of the rivalries and alliances of the segmentary tribes - physically intimidating some, 'recognizing' or forming compacts with the powerful leaders of others, and counteracting the threat of potential rivals by splitting their support. This was a process of constant diplomacy and violence.

Though hegemonies were often extremely stable, lasting for a century or more, they were not centralized, bureaucratic states. "The army chiefs", for example, "exercised administrative functions outside the capital. But since the army consisted predominantly of contingents provided by those tribes associated with the ruling dynasty, the rule... implied the domination of the favoured tribes over those who were not".¹⁹⁵

The physical power of the makhzen centred on privileged tribes - makhzen tribes, - the sheepdogs in Gellner's metaphor. In return for freedom from taxes, or the granting of land, they provided military support. In particular, they mounted expeditions to punish recalcitrant tribes, collect taxes and seize booty. The sheepdogs were occasionally liable to revolt and savage their master, particularly when his authority was under challenge from others.

'Submitted' tribes were those who came under the indirect supervision of an agent of authority (caid), appointed by the makhzen usually from among the dynasty's core tribe but occasionally from one of the submitted group's most prominent segments. They were sheep in the sense that they were taxed regularly and kept in order by the makhzen tribes. Apart from this, however, the tribes were free to govern their own internal affairs. Caid were not administrators: they 'invested' sheikhs from tribal segments to gather taxes, for example, the distribution of which was usually decided by the tribe itself.

With other tribes, the makhzen had less assured relations. With many, the makhzen had to discuss or fight every year to get taxes or tribute. It might get token recognition of the authority

of a caid, but usually he would have to be appointed from one of the tribes in question, and was difficult for the makhzen to control. Some communities offered token recognition of the makhzen's authority, or helped it against rival dissident groups, in return for effectively being left alone. Other groups, those for example in the major Algerian massifs and the fierce nomadic communities on the Saharan fringe, were sufficiently powerful or difficult of access to escape the direct attentions and demands of the makhzen for long periods.

The 'boundary' of direct makhzen control was not territorially neat or static. It varied according to the relative strength and solidarity of the makhzen and dissident communities. A strong hegemony could enforce its sway over a large area. A powerful dissident movement could push back the frontiers of makhzen control to a few scattered townships on the coast. 'Dissident' communities were wolves in that they constituted not merely a standing annoyance to the central dynasty but an active threat; at times of makhzen weakness, they preyed on 'submitted' tribes. But they were not wolves in the sense of total outsiders to the makhzen system and what it represented. If successful in making inroads into the area of makhzen authority, groupings of dissident tribes might eventually find a hegemony which laid claim to ^{that} authority. Here, indeed, Pareto's metaphor of lions and foxes seems appropriate, for the equilibrium might be overthrown, and power circulated by new pretenders coming down vigorously from the hills, or out of the desert, to replace the former dynasty. The wolves thus staked claims to become the new shepherds, often with a burning dedication to the purification of Islam among the slumbering sheep. They brought with them their own core tribes, allies and victims.

Fierce commitment to Islam, and respect for the role of the leader of the faithful, could thus be combined with steadfast *refusal* to pay taxes or to accept the authority of caids. But even 'dissident' tribes were 'marginal' in the sense that dissidence was a conscious act, not simply a projection of the makhzen's viewpoint. As Gellner suggests, "if tribal groups opted out of the wider political system, and refused to accept orders or officials from central authority, they were dissidents, opters out, and they knew it. The same was true if they opted out morally, at least to the extent of observing a tribal custom known to differ from the Holy Law of Islam".¹⁹⁶ Dissident communities still recognized themselves as belonging to the wider moslem community, and the various central dynasties were accepted as its defenders.

But it was difficult for any makhzen to capitalize on this recognition in temporal terms. The dissident Djebala community in the mountains of Northern Morocco, for example, "asks nothing more of the Sultan, the administrator of the moslem community, than to defend him against the infidel and admits no other obligation to him than that of taking part with him in the defence of the territory of Islam. Except for religious obligations, the Djibli understands no other: he professes the unity of God, and recognizes the Prophet as his envoy; he performs the ritual prayers; he fasts during Ramadan; he purifies his property by giving the Zakat (koranic alms) and the Achour (koranic tithe) to whomsoever is worthy of it; he is ready for the holy war, and goes to Mecca if he can. Nobody has the right to ask any more of him".¹⁹⁷

The Islamic identification and loyalty of the tribes could spill beyond individual dynasties to other leaders in the moslem

world; one community could be torn between the claims of two rival centres of authority. Moreover, recognition as upholders of the Holy law and as defenders of the faith imposed an obligation on the central dynasty to fulfil those functions in the eyes of the community. Both these factors could corrode the authority of a particular dynasty, and justify dissidence. Historically, the Central Maghreb, present-day Algeria, was particularly marked by fragmented command and rival pulls of influence. In the Eastern and Western parts of the Maghreb, by contrast, the embryos of present day Tunisia and Morocco were characterized by denser urbanization and more stable longer-lasting dynasties.

VIII.

THE TURKISH REGIME

Algiers, like Tunis and Tripoli, had been the capital of a Turkish province since the early Sixteenth Century. Turkish rule arrived from the outside, in a sense, rather than as a result of internal power crystallization. However, arriving by sea, it entered the same local power vacuum as had been filled by successive indigenous dynasties arriving from the desert. In a sense, the Turks had been 'called into' the segmentary environment of North Africa to counteract the threat of Christian emplacements on the coast. The goals and methods which they adopted in extending their authority were in many respects similar to those of the tribal dynasties which preceded them in the Maghreb, and which survived in Morocco. But in other respects, Turkish rule had original features.¹⁹⁷

By the Nineteenth Century, the Turkish Sultan at Constantinople had only a weak moral influence over the Regency in Algiers. He exercised no practical control over a regime which, to all intents and purposes, was autonomous. "The locally elected Dayis of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli", Gibb and Bowen explain, "...acknowledged the suzerainty of the Sultans, who confirmed them in office. But none of them was tributary; on the contrary they were all recipients of gifts from the Porte".¹⁹⁸ The rulers in Algiers needed to retain Ottoman goodwill in order to recruit janissaries from the Levant, and occasionally they sent the Sultan a token military contingent in times of war.¹⁹⁹ But diplomatic niceties were essentially "a fiction".²⁰⁰

The local Turkish regime (the odjak) was based on a small caste of a few thousand janissaries. These were originally freed slaves, recruited from among the peasantry of Anatolia, with a tradition of military service and turbulence throughout the Ottoman Empire. They mostly married among themselves, and moved between different provinces. They had no real roots in Algeria; the janissary corps was their home. "The tatterdemalion Turks who unloaded the vessels of the Porte in the harbour" as Julien puts it, "were transmuted at Algiers into illustrious and magnificent signors".²⁰¹ They were essentially an urban-based caste, providing a household bodyguard for their leader, the dey, commanding provincial garrisons, holding the chief offices in the odjak hierarchy, and involved in overseas trade.

The other constituents of this small racial caste were the Koloughlis, the offspring of janissaries and native Arab women.

They formed the permanent infantry troops of the odjak, and in return for performing their military duties they were accorded privileges - tax exemption or revenue from domainal lands.

Ambitious and proud, their aim was acceptance as full Turks; often they were entrusted with extremely important odjak posts.

At its height, this total odjak caste consisted of 15 - 20,000.²⁰² Julien calculates its strength in 1800 as only 6,000,²⁰³ at a time when the indigenous population numbered approximately 2 - 2½ million.

The head of the odjak was the dey, who had replaced the Turkish-appointed Pasha in 1711. Deys were elected by the janissaries, and had never succeeded, unlike the Hesseinite beys of Tunis, in establishing a hereditary succession. Indeed, the dey was virtually a prisoner of the janissary corps, perpetually threatened by palace revolution, deposition or assassination: 30 deys held office between 1671 and 1818, of whom 14 were imposed by violence after the assassination of their predecessor.²⁰⁴ To reduce this threat, Ali Khoja, dey in 1816, moved into the fortified Kasbah of Algiers, away from the janissaries. Despite this perilous situation, deys commanded considerable resources of wealth: revenues from domainal land, fees from officials, presents from consuls, and a share in booty and trade. He was "a man of wealth, but far from master of his treasures; a father without children, a husband without a wife, a despot without liberty, king of slaves and slave of his subjects".²⁰⁵

The dey was assisted by the higher council of the odjak - the divan - which included ministers in charge of the Treasury, the Army, and the Navy, appointed by the dey. The administrative

apparatus included a variety of secretaries (khoja-s) and bailiffs (shawsh-s). The main tasks of the odjak were to keep open lines of communication and commerce by land and sea, thus permitting trade and piracy to prosper, to maintain a modicum of internal peace for the Turkish caste on the coast, and to ensure an adequate inflow of Koranic taxes, levies, and tribute from the submitted tribes. The dey's role was also to ensure the administration of moslem justice, in which he was assisted by a network of cadi-s. The major expense of government was the upkeep of the militia, which was relatively well-equipped and trained. Considerable sums were also absorbed by the navy, the dey's household, public works, and general administration.

The area directly administered by the dey was a smallish territory consisting of the town of Algiers and its immediate hinterland - called the dar-es-sultan. This consisted of domain land, and estates owned by prominent Turks, which were worked by indigenous labour. In the dar-es-sultan the conventional tribal structure was weaker and more fragmented than in the rest of Algeria. Military command was exercised by the Agha of the Arabs, and the area was divided into districts (watan-s) each headed by a Turkish Caid.

The rest of the Regency - a fluctuating sphere of influence rather than a territory with precise frontiers - was divided into three provinces, each under the authority of a bey: the beylik of Constantine to the East, the beylik of Titteri (centred on Medea) in the centre, and the beylik of Oran in the West (centred on Mascara until 1792, and thenceforth Oran). The beys were Turks

or Koloughlis appointed by the dey, usually in return for a gift of 'joyeuse avènement'; often, indeed, the post went to the most generous candidate. The bey was responsible to the dey, who retained control of the contingents of janissaries and koloughlis stationed in various fortresses (bordj-s) in the provinces. On behalf of the odjak, the bey commanded these troops, with the help of an agha, exercised general supervision over tribal relations, and ensured the payment of taxes. Twice a year, the bey was required to send tax proceeds to the odjak Treasury, and every three years he had to visit Algiers in person (the denouch), accompanied by horsemen and native chiefs, to pay tribute, and account for his office.

Bey-s tended to correspond with the dey in the language of elaborate abjection. Emerit cites letters from the bey of Constantine in the early 19th Century which manifest apparent fear of any initiative and protest utter servility: "I am only your slave and servant. May God grant us the prolongation of your existence. So be it, O Lord of the World".²⁰⁶ There was some reason for this servility; beys were not secure once appointed. They had to keep abreast of the turbulent vagaries of odjak in-fighting, and keep an acceptable quantity of tribute flowing in. Between 1790 and 1825, 8 beys were deposed and 16 executed by the dey.²⁰⁷ Only the most powerful survived for long periods. On the other hand, the odjak at Algiers did not exercise a close control over the affairs of the beyliks, so long as tax flowed in and order was reasonably assured. In this sense, the beys were practically autonomous, and acted as the real executive cogs in the loosely-assembled imperial machine. Links between the three provinces were

extremely tenuous, and each bey was free to pursue his own political game vis à vis the tribes within his area of command. On occasion, this led them to grow ambitious, to revolt, or to try to establish themselves as independent powers with the help of key tribes. By the 19th Century, for example, the bey of Constantine particularly had become a power in his own right. But this was a dangerous game, and accounted for the high mortality rate among incumbents of the post. No bey managed to set himself up as the head of a dynasty, as the Husseinite beys had done after overthrowing the dey of Tunis in 1705.

Though the links between the beyliks and the odjak above were fairly slender, this did not mean that the beys securely controlled an administrative apparatus beneath them. Areas of the beyliks which were effectively under Turkish rule were divided into territories (watan-s), to which the bey nominated agents - khalifa-s and caid-s - to help him with policing and tax-farming. These in turn offered the bey gifts and money, and raked off a proportion of taxes levied. Inevitably, these agents tended to develop semi-autonomous influence; by the early 19th Century, for example, the khalifa of the Eastern part of the Oran beylik was virtually independent, and had developed relations with the Alawite dynasty in Morocco.

The depths to which the roots of the beylik tax-collecting and military apparatus penetrated the tribal undergrowth varied greatly from area to area, and from time to time. The garrisons of militia under the bey's command were not numerically large, and prone to revolt. This resource of power was supplemented by the granting of

tax privileges, land, or other benefits to 'makhzen tribes'.²⁰⁸ These provided cavalry troops (mokhzani-s), a force which kept submitted tribes in order. Periodically, usually annually, the bey would lead out these makhzen troops as his mobile camp (mehalla). They made forays among dissident and semi-dissident tribes, exacting taxes and tribute, plundering tribal assets, cutting off exemplary heads, and forcing ceremonies of submission ('aman).²⁰⁹ Some of these makhzen tribes were artificially brought together from diverse tribal backgrounds, and settled on State Domains: the Douair-s and Smela-s in the Oran beylik were notable examples. Others were natural communities whose faithfulness had been rewarded with privileges; these were more scattered. Yet others were only loosely at the disposal of the odjak; the nomadic makhzen tribes of the South, for example, were "in reality..... a military nobility which contented itself with sending a horse per year to Algiers, and did what it wanted".²¹⁰ Revolt of makhzen tribes was not uncommon.²¹¹

The remainder of the tribal environment was variagated. Some tribes, especially those near Turkish garrisons, were firmly controlled. These submitted groups (ra'ias) were obliged to pay Koranic taxes, and often non-Koranic levies too. This was subject to the circumstances of demand from above and ability to pay from below. These tribes were milch-cows of the regime; so far from their burden being equitable, it was based "not in proportion to supposed or real resources, but in inverse proportion to their power or ability to resist. Warlike nomads were spared at the expense of the sedentary populations; the weakest had to pay for the strongest".²¹²

Apart from taxation, the sign of submission was the placing of tribes under the authority of caïds, nominated by the beys, usually

Koloughlis. These were cogs in the tax-farming machine, who treated their office mainly as a source of revenue. For direct links with the different tribal fractions, they relied on sheikh-s, appointed from among prominent segment elders; these sheikh-s were representatives of their communities rather than agents of the odjak. The total amount of tax levied on each community was fixed from above, after representations from below, including armed resistance, but the community itself was left to decide how much each fraction, village, group of tents, or family should pay.²¹³ Apart from this, the community regulated its age-old affairs in its customary manner; assemblies of elders survived intact. As Julien suggests, "providing their subjects paid their taxes and did not hinder the passage of troops, the deys were not interested in interfering with their customs",²¹⁴ and for this reason "the countryside was little affected by the Turkish administration".²¹⁵ Evans-Pritchard makes a similar point about Turkish rule in Cyrenaica: "The Bedouin were little affected by Turkish rule. Those nearest the coastal towns were doubtless compelled to pay taxes from time to time, but the tribes as a whole must have continued to lead their ancient way of life and settle their own affairs among themselves".²¹⁶

Other tribes hardly came within the Turkish sphere of influence at all; from the odjak's point of view, they were 'dissident'. Dissidence involved three things : refusal to pay taxes ("Revolt is above all a tax strike");²¹⁷ refusal to recognize odjak-appointed caids (or alternatively refusal of these caids to obey the odjak); and attacks on the mehalla and/ or on allies of the odjak. Many zones nominally within the bey's command were too remote and

difficult of access for the mehalla to penetrate or dare to approach. As a result, the highlanders of Kabylia, the nomads of the Sahara and the High Plateaux, and the inhabitants of many fortified Saharan cases, escaped Turkish control for decades.

Other groups - the Ouled Sidi Sheikh of the Saharan fringe, for example - were "attached by the slenderest thread of vassaldom".²¹⁸ They offered nominal acknowledgement of Turkish suzerainty, but the odjak was never in a position to convert this into tangible currency. Where possible, in periods of strength, the odjak exploited the segmentary field of alliances, feuds, and struggles for hegemony, and turned it to its advantage; conversely, tribes attempted to enlist the practical or moral support of powerful beys to strengthen their position in the segmentary game. Thus alliances were periodically struck between the Turks and such influential families as the Ben Gana in the Saharan oases or the Ferdjioua and Zouaoua in Kabylia. In these times of military and diplomatic strength, tribes were encouraged to rally to the odjak side, and individual beys pushed the boundaries of control back a long way. At times of odjak weakness, however, the intestine conflicts of the Ottoman caste would encourage key tribes to revolt, or renege on earlier alliances. The tribal topography was itself turbulent. Periodically tribes coalesced over sizeable areas, under the influence of an energetic clan, a holy man, or religious brotherhood. The bey might come to terms with this, by putting out diplomatic feelers, by trying to ignore it, or by armed attack. Serious insurrections could rage for years; at the turn of the 19th Century, for example, the Turkish presence in the Oran beylik had for long been extremely tenuous. Thus, systematic domination was never possible.

On the other hand, the overall presence of the Ottoman caste in the coastal towns was never seriously threatened. For one thing, tribal resistance was always prone to fission, with or without Turkish interference; growing menaces often collapsed. For another thing, even the most dissident tribes had to come to some arrangement with the Turks. Even though the Kabyle communities were never militarily defeated, or their territory penetrated, their part in the Maghreb economy made them dependent on links with neighbouring communities whom the Turks had managed to control. They needed outlets for their olive oil and figs, and other merchandise, and the Turks controlled important trade routes, including those to the coast. Consequently, some taxes had to be paid, and token suzerainty acknowledged.²¹⁹ Similarly, the tribes of the South needed to exchange their wool, livestock and dates for grain, which made them reliant on contacts with the North. Moreover, the Turkish presence was an integral aspect of membership of the moslem community. Although the Turks followed a Sunni rite which was different from the indigenous population (the laxer Hanifite school rather than the strict Malikite school), they were nevertheless moslems, and active patrons of new mosques and other pious foundations. Even though the claims of the Ottomans to the Caliphate were regarded as somewhat spurious by scholars and legists, they were respected as defenders of the faith against the Christians (roumi). The Alawite dynasty in the West, and the Turkish Husseinite dynasty in the East, provided rival poles of influence on the fringes of the Regency, but over a considerable area of the interior the odjak of Algiers had moral sway. The behaviour of the segmentary tribes in relation to it was 'marginal'.

Thus the Turkish regime in Algeria presented certain paradoxes. It shared many of the characteristics of the mediaeval Maghrebi segmentary states, while importing some wholly novel elements. The superficial style and some components of Turkish rule implied the existence of a quasi-state with absolute authority. Its embryonic state structure was more marked than in earlier indigenous hegemonies.²²⁰ It had an elected ruler, a council of ministers, specialized departments of state, fairly stable frontiers and internal territorial divisions, a standing army and navy, a hierarchical network of governors and executive agents, a system of taxation and tribute with a central Treasury, and certain bureaucratic methods of communication. Within this framework, authority was exercised with theocratic pretensions: the dey ruled as the representative of the Sultan, who according to the accepted theory of the Caliphate had authority in spiritual and temporal matters subject only to Koranic Law. Other features of Turkish rule are suggestive of what Wittfogel called "Oriental Despotism": the language of officials was one of unutterable awe before authority; extreme violence was used to punish infractions, repress insurrections, and assassinate enemies; and slaves, seraglio, bodyguards, palaces, fortresses, and vast estates were by-products of the life-style of the dominant foreign racial caste. As Hermassi suggests, "the whole government apparatus was considered an extension of the private domain of the men in power".²²¹

On the other hand, many novel features of Turkish rule caused or revealed weaknesses. Like other Maghreb dynasties before it, the Turkish Regency came up against the 'structural limitation' on

its power and stability created by the segmentary tribal context in which it operated. But the Turks lacked several of the levers which indigenous hegemonies had. They confined their governmental apparatus to a distinct racial caste of a few thousand, which kept jealously apart from the rest of the population and monopolized office and profit. This isolation was more marked in Algeria than in the neighbouring Regency of Tunis, where the Turks were gradually assimilated, and became a relatively settled and integrated part of the local community.²²² The Algerian Turks were confined to a few townships and ports on the coastal strip; they were facing outwards, so to speak, showing greater interest in Mediterranean trade and piracy than in the agriculture or industry of the hinterland. The latter was regarded as little more than a source of taxes and periodic trouble.

Moreover, the power of the Algerian odjak was extremely fragmented; it had no strong central or centralizing focus. The dey himself was vulnerable to the pressure of the janissaries, and to the threat of palace revolution, and only a small territory came directly under his command. By contrast, in the Regency of Tunis the militia was kept firmly in place, and the Husseinites had established a stable dynastic succession. The Regency of Algiers, unlike its Eastern counterpart, was also split into three sprawling and virtually autonomous provinces, whose governors were subject both to harassment from above and dissidence from below.

The final, basic weakness of Turkish rule was the structural one imposed by the segmentary tribal context. De Montety has described this as the crucial feature of Turkish administration in Tunis:

"To this central power, strong to the point of arbitrariness, there corresponded no local administrative organization. The tribes lived in a hierarchical social framework, but the chiefs of tribes did not draw their authority from the Prince; the tribal organization - which was of a familial and ethnic nature - was not a subdivision of the state, and did not even have any precise link with it. In short, as opposed to the situation in Modern States whose architecture embraces regional life, the Husseinite State was characterized by local anarchy into which there plunged, to greater or lesser depths, the tentacles of an all-powerful central authority".²²³

The Turkish regime in Algiers shared this structural duality, without having the all-powerful central authority. Behind the facade, its characteristic was "virtual absence of any administrative apparatus; no corps of paid functionaries; no centralized administration with agents paid by the state. The men surrounding the sovereign were glorified clerks rather than ministers".²²⁴ The centre retained nominal control over its own administrative framework by a system of tax-farming, which caused a severe haemorrhage of authority and potential state funds at every rung of the 'hierarchy'. This hiving off of effective control, this ^{5.} "dysfunctional decentralization of authority", rendered the regime "structurally incapacitated" to cope with the endemic dissidence of inaccessible and unamenable tribesmen; it could not even rely on the loyalty of its own troops. Government was "fragmentary and absenteeist".²²⁵

Yet the regime survived for three centuries, and was overthrown from without, not within. Part of the reason for its viability lies no doubt in the very structural dualism. As in other provinces of the Turkish Empire, "guilds, village councils, and tribes were to a great extent autonomous, though naturally they were supervised by the local governors;...their autonomy...split up the subject populations into many semi-independent units, whose stability was little affected by the political vicissitudes of the Empire as a whole".²²⁶ The 'subject populations' were content with this distant presence and nominal suzerainty, for the regime respected (shared) their religion, and made no real attempt to interfere with their social organization and customs, nor to transform their economic environment. Turkish rule was predicated upon the traditional forces of the moslem Maghreb. Tribal Algeria was "conquered territory, bearing no grudge against its conqueror, but equally having no real contact with him".²²⁷

In a sense, this duality reflected an incapacity and lack of imagination on the part of the Turks. They were not Nation Builders. They made, Hermassi points out, "no real attempt at societal unification or state building".²²⁸ While the social life of the segmentary tribes carried on much as before, "the functions of the state (were) greatly simplified and reduced to levying taxes and ensuring public security".²²⁹ Evans-Pritchard noted an analogous approach in Cyrenaica: "The local Turkish officials were content for the most part to sit in the towns... and to let the Sanusiya control the interior, so long as taxes were paid and no overt act was committed against the Sultan's authority that might bring them to the notice of the court".²³⁰

But this lack of imagination also had its more positive side, for the Turks, Evans-Pritchard concluded, "well understood that the successful practice of the art of administration depends not only on attention to some things, but no less inattention to others. They did not confuse government with bureaucratic interference in the name of moral regeneration".²³¹ The philosophy and methods of French colonial rule were considerably different.

NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE

1. M. Fortes and E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (London 1940) p. 5.
2. C. Geertz: ISLAM OBSERVED - RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO AND INDONESIA (Yale 1968) p. 9.
3. cf. X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES ET L'EVOLUTION DES GENRES DE VIE INDIGENES DANS L'OUEST DU TELL ALGEROIS (Paris 1953) esp. 127-145.
 V. Monteil: "Les Bureaux Arabes au Maghreb (1833-61)" in ESPRIT (300) Nov. 1961, p. 575-606
 General surveys of the methods, myths, and contributions of early Maghreb ethnology include:
 C-R. Ageron: "La France a-t-elle eu une politique kabyle?" in REVUE HISTORIQUE (223) 1960, p. 311-52.
 J. Berque: "Cent-vingt-cinq ans de sociologie maghrébine" in ANNALES - ECONOMIES, SOCIETIES, CIVILISATIONS (11) 1956, p. 296-324.
 E. Gellner: "The Far West of Islam" in BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (March 1958) p. 73-82.
 G. Nicolas: "La sociologie rurale au maroc pendant les cinquantes dernières années" in TIERS MONDE (Oct-Dec. 1961) p. 527-543.
4. J. Berque: "Quelques problèmes de l'Islam Maghrébin" in ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS (Jan.-June 1957) 3, p. 4.
5. cf. A. Bel: LA RELIGION MUSULMANE EN BERBERIE (Paris 1938)
 E. Dermenghem: LE CULTE DES SAINTS DANS L'ISLAM MAGHREBIN (Paris 1954)
 J. Desparmet: COUTUMES, INSTITUTIONS, CROYANCES DES MUSULMANES D'ALGERIE (Algiers 1948)
 E. Doutte: MAGIE ET RELIGION DANS L'AFRIQUE DU NORD (Algiers 1909)
 E. Doutte: NOTES SUR L'ISLAM MAGHRIBIN: LES MARABOUTS (Paris 1900)
 E. Michaux-Bellaire: LES CONFRERIES RELIGIEUSES AU MAROC (Rabat 1923)
 L. Rinn: MARABOUTS ET KHOUAN (Algiers 1884)
 E.A. Westermarck: RITUAL AND BELIEF IN MOROCCO (London 1926)

Michaux-Bellaire was one of the prime instigators of this approach in Moroccan anthropology: "As one penetrates more deeply into the Moroccan organism, one gets behind the veil which covers it with a uniformly islamic appearance, and one realizes that a great number of the institutions which make up this organism have an origin anterior to the islamization of the country....One finds a whole social organization which was not only not established on a Koranic basis, but has not really been influenced by Koranic precepts".

5. E. Michaux-Bellaire "La sociologie Marocaine" in ARCHIVES MAROCAINS (XXVII) Paris 1927, p. 293, 295.
The same urge to get back beyond Islam also perhaps partly explains the inordinate interest European archeologists have shown in Roman architectural ruins in the Maghreb.
6. J. Berque: "Cent-vingt-cinq ans de sociologie maghrébine" in ANNALES (1956) p. 313. He calls this myth "the Berber option".
7. C-R. Ageron: "La France a-t-elle eu une politique kabyle?" in REVUE HISTORIQUE (223) 1960, p. 311-52.
C-R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1871-1919) (Paris 1968) Ch. 10 - "Le 'mythe kabyle' et la politique kabyle (1871-1891) and Ch. 31 - "La politique kabyle de 1898 à 1918").

Burke has recently examined the development of a similar myth in Moroccan ethnology. E. Burke III: "The image of the Moroccan State in French ethnological literature: a new look at the origin of Lyautey's Berber Policy" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (London 1973) p. 171-200. This whole volume is an important contribution towards finally laying the ghost of the Berber myth.

8. J.R. Morrell: ALGERIA - THE TOPOGRAPHY AND HISTORY, POLITICAL, SCIENTIFIC AND NATURAL, OF NORTH AFRICA (London 1854) provides a typical vulgarization of this view: "The Kabyles differ in all things from the Arabs. The first live under roofs, the last under tents; the Kabyle fights in preference on foot, the Arab on horseback. Their languages have no analogy. The Arab flies our contact, the Kabyles..do not hesitate to come and seek labour in our towns...In short, the Kabyles are the conquered and the Arabs the conquerors, hence their hereditary hatred"... "The Arab detests work; he is essentially idle; during nine months of the year, he thinks only of his pleasures. The Kabyle labours immensely, and at all times; idleness is a disgrace in his eyes..."... "The Arab is vain; he appears humble and arrogant alternately. The Kabyle remains always wrapped up in his pride...The Arab is a liar; the Kabyle considers lying a disgrace..The Arabs usually proceed..through surprise and treachery. The Kabyle acquaints his enemy with his intentions..."... "The Arab does not know how to increase the value of his money; he buries it in the ground or uses it to increase his flocks. The Kabyle, contrary to mussulman law, puts it out at large interest"... "They agree on only one point: the Kabyle detests the Arab, the Arab detests the Kabyle" (pp. 271/3/8/9/6).

The comments of A. Wilkin: AMONG THE BERBERS OF ALGERIA (London 1900) p. 3-4 are equally revealing: "The nomad Arab is the curse of the country. Indolent, vicious, and unprogressive, he will burn a mile of forest to provide a

8. few acres of bad pasturage for his flocks...If only the destructive Arab and his locust swarms of goats could be relegated to their natural habitat - the Sahara...There he can safely be left to spend his fury on the forces of nature, his fanaticism on divergent sects of his own religion....Of the Berbers, there is much good to be said. Whether in the olive-clad mountains of Kabylia or the terraced valleys of their Aurasian fastnesses, they are white men, and in general act like white men. Among them the virtues of honesty, hospitality and good nature are conspicuous...".
9. cf. Général Brémont's long muddled treatise, with its indicative sub-title - E. Brémont: BERBERES ET ARABES - LA BERBERIE EST UN PAYS EUROPEEN (Paris 1942).
Desparmet, writing regularly between the world wars in L'AFRIQUE FRANCAISE, a colonialist journal, was an active propagandist of the view that French policy should regard Berbers as merely skin-deep moslems, - "so-called true believers" - and avoid driving them into the arms of the moslem Arabs. Cf. J. Desparmet: "Le panarabisme et la berbérie" in RENSEIGNEMENTS COLONIAUX (1938) (8-9) p. 194-9, and COUTUMES, INSTITUTIONS, CROYANCES DES MUSULMANES D'ALGERIE (Algiers 1948).
10. L-J. Duclos: "Réflexions sur le nationalisme marocain" in L-J. Duclos et al: LES NATIONALISMES MAGHREBINS (Paris 1966).
11. E.F. Gautier: LES SIECLES OBSCURS DU MAGHREB - L'ISLAMISATION DE L'AFRIQUE DU NORD (Paris 1927) provides one of the most celebrated expositions of this theme.
cf. M.C. Sahli: DECOLONISER L'HISTOIRE - INTRODUCTION A L'HISTOIRE DU MAGHREB (Paris 1965). This book offers a rather loosely coordinated scissors-and-paste exposition and refutation of several historiographical myths concerning the Maghreb.
12. "In the past these two traditions were sometimes insulated from each other. This is no longer true". E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (London 1969) p. 64.
13. The major ethnological works of Robert Montagne are: LES BERBERES ET LE MAKHZEN AU SUD DU MAROC - ESSAI SUR LA TRANSFORMATION POLITIQUE DES BERBERES SEDENTAIRES (GROUPE CHLEUH) (Paris 1930) - LA VIE SOCIALE ET LA VIE POLITIQUE DES BERBERES (Paris 1931) (trans. and ed. by D. Seddon, as THE BERBERS - THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (London 1973) - LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT: NOMADES D'ORIENT ET D'AFRIQUE (Paris 1947).
He also published a number of monographs during the 1920's in HESPERIS (ARCHIVES BERBERES ET BULLETIN DE L'INSTITUT DES HAUTES ETUDES MAROCAINES) - "Le régime juridique des tribus du Sud Marocain" in HESPERIS (4) 1924, p. 313-331 -

13. - "Un tribu berbère du Sud Marocain : Massat" in HESPERIS (4) 1924, p. 357-403
 - "L'Aghbar et les hautes vallées du Grand Atlas" in HESPERIS (7) 1927, p. 1-32
 - "Un magasin collectif de l'Anti-Atlas: l'Agadir des Ikounka" in HESPERIS (9) 1929, p. 145-266
 - "Les leff-s berbères au début du XVIIIe siècle chez les Masmouda" in HESPERIS 1941
 Cf. also other articles by Montagne
 - "Le développement du pouvoir des caïds de Tagoutaft (Grand Atlas)" in MEMORIAL HENRI BASSET - NOUVELLES ETUDES NORD-AFRICAINES ET ORIENTALES Vol. II (Paris 1928) p. 169-184
 - "Le pouvoir des chefs en Berbérie" (C.H.E.A.M. doct. no 18 October 1941) 14 pp
 - "The power of the chieftains in Morocco" in JOURNAL OF AFRICAN ADMINISTRATION (I) 1949, p. 114-119
14. Assessments of Montagne's work are to be found in the following:
 L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (32) 1955
 J. Berque: "Cent-vingt-cinq ans de sociologie maghrébine" in ANNALES (1956) esp. p. 309-11
 J. Berque: "Les sociétés nord-africaines vues du Haut-Atlas" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1955) p. 59ff
 J. Berque: STRUCTURES SOCIALES DU HAUT ATLAS (Paris 1955)
 J. Dresch: COMMENTAIRE DES CARTES SUR LE GENRE DE VIE DE LA MONTAGNE DANS LE MASSIF CENTRAL DU GRAND ATLAS (Tours 1941)
 J. Dresch: "Dans le grand Atlas calcaire" in BULLETIN DE L'ASSOCIATION DES GEOGRAPHES FRANCAIS (March-April 1949)
 E. Gellner: "The Far West of Islam" in BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (March 1958) esp. p. 76-8
 E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) esp. p. 26-7, p. 64-8, p. 88
 G. Nicolas: "La sociologie rurale au maroc pendant les cinquantes dernières années" in TIERS MONDE (Oct.-Dec. 1961) esp. p. 533-40
 D. Seddon: "Introduction" to R. Montagne: THE BERBERS - THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANISATION (1973) p. xiii-xl
15. Jacques Berque's major ethnological writings on the Maghreb comprise:
 - ETUDES D'HISTOIRE RURALE MAGHREBINE (Tangier 1938)
 - STRUCTURES SOCIALES DU HAUT ATLAS (Paris 1955)
 - LE MAGHREB ENTRE DEUX GUERRES (Paris 1962) (trans. J. Stewart as FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MAGHRIB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (London 1967))
 - "Qu'est-ce qu'un 'tribu' nord-africaine?" in EVENTAIL DE L'HISTOIRE VIVANTE: HOMMAGE A LUCIEN FEBVRE (Paris 1953) Vol I p. 261-271
 - "Les sociétés nord-africains vues du Haut-Atlas" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1955) p. 59-65

15. - "Vers une étude des comportements en Afrique du nord" in REVUE AFRICAINE (1956)
 - "Quelques problèmes de l'Islam maghrébin" in ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS (3) 1957, p. 3-20
 - "Droits des terres et intégration sociale au Maghreb" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1958)
 - "Ça et là dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" in ETUDES D'ORIENTALISME DEDIEES A LA MEMOIRE DE LEVI-PROVENCAL (Paris 1962) vol. II, p. 471-94
 - "L'Afrique du nord entre les deux guerres mondiales" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1961)
 - "Le Maghreb d'hier à demain" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1964)

Discussion of some of Berque's ideas and methods appear in:
 E. Gellner: "The Far West of Islam" (1958) loc. cit.
 and G. Nicolas: "La sociologie rurale au maroc pendant les cinquantes dernières années" (1961) loc. cit., esp. p. 540-3.

16. Some of the most important contributions to this 'segmentary' debate were:
 J.A. Barnes: POLITICS IN A CHANGING SOCIETY (London 1954)
 P.J. Bohannan: JUSTICE AND JUDGEMENT AMONG THE TIV (London 1957)
 E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE NUER (Oxford 1940)
 L.A. Fallers: BANTU BUREAUCRACY (Cambridge 1956)
 M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (London 1940)
 M. Gluckman: THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE (Manchester 1955)
 H. Kuper: AN AFRICAN ARISTOCRACY - RANK AMONG THE SWAZI (London 1947)
 L.P. Mair: PRIMITIVE GOVERNMENT (London 1962)
 J. Middleton and D. Tait (eds.): TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS (London 1958)
 I. Schapera: GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS IN TRIBAL SOCIETIES (London 1956)
 M.G. Smith: GOVERNMENT IN ZAZZAU (London 1960)
 A.W. Southall: ALUR SOCIETY (Cambridge 1954)
 E.A. Winter: BWAMBA - A STRUCTURAL-FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF A PATRILINEAL SOCIETY (Cambridge 1956)

Important articles included:

L.A. Fallers: "Political sociology and the anthropological study of African polities" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (4) 1963

M. Fortes: "The structure of Unilinear Descent Groups" in AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST (55) 1953

M.G. Smith: "On segmentary lineage systems" in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (86) 1956.

17. E. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" in W.H. Lewis (ed.) FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA - THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (New York 1965) p. 110.

18. P. Bourdieu: *SOCIOLOGIE DE L'ALGERIE* (Paris 1958). An expanded version of this was published as *THE ALGERIANS* (Boston, Mass. 1962). Cf. also P. Bourdieu: "The sentiment of honour in Kabyle society" in J.G. Peristiany (ed.): *HONOUR AND SHAME - THE VALUES OF MEDITERRANEAN SOCIETY* (London 1965).
19. Ernest Gellner's main publications include:
- *SAINTS OF THE ATLAS* (London 1969)
 - (ed. with C. Micaud) *ARABS AND BERBERS* (London 1972)
- and the following articles:
- "Independence in the central High Atlas" in *MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL* (Summer 1957)
 - "The Far West of Islam" in *BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY* (March 1958)
 - "How to Live in Anarchy" in *THE LISTENER* (April 3rd 1958)
 - "The struggle for Morocco's Past" in *MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL* (Winter 1961)
 - "From Ibn Khaldun to Karl Marx" in *POLITICAL QUARTERLY* (Oct. 1961)
 - "Patterns of rural rebellion in Morocco: tribes as minorities" in *ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE* (3) 1963
 - "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" in W.H. Lewis (ed.) *FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA - THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY* (New York 1965)
 - "A pendulum swing theory of Islam" (paper presented to I.P.S.A. Round Table Meeting, Istanbul 1967) 17 pp mimeo.
 - "The Great Patron" in *ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE* (1) 1969
 - "Political and religious organization of the Berbers of the central High Atlas" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): *ARABS AND BERBERS* (London 1972).
20. The work of several of them, including D.M. Hart, J.D. Seddon, and J. Waterbury, is included in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): *ARABS AND BERBERS* (1972).
21. For example, J. Favret: "La segmentarité au Maghreb" in *L'HOMME* (6) 1966, p. 105-111.
- J. Favret: "Relations de dépendance et de violence dans la Kabylie pré-coloniale" in *L'HOMME* (3) 1968
- J. Favret: "Le traditionalisme par excès de modernité" in *ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE* (8) 1967, p. 71-93.
22. P. Bourdieu: *THE ALGERIANS* (Boston 1962) p. 83-4.
23. G.H. Bousquet: *LES BERBERES* (Paris, 3rd edition 1967) p. 108.
24. G. Tillion: "Les sociétés berbères dans l'Aurès méridional" in *AFRICA* (2) 1939, p. 42-54.
25. B.G. Hoffman: *THE STRUCTURE OF TRADITIONAL MOROCCAN SOCIETY* (The Hague 1967) p. 63.

26. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 12-13, p. 18-19.
27. R. Montagne: LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT (Paris 1947) p. 50-60.
28. J. Despois: LA TUNISIE ORIENTALE - SAHEL ET BASSE STEPPE (Paris, 2nd edition 1955) p. 175.
29. A. Latron: "L'évolution d'un groupement rural dans un tribu berbère: les Beni M'Tir" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (March-April 1938).
30. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (Oxford 1949) p. 54-61.
31. Cf. M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard: AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1940) p. 285, and P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 100. Bourdieu (p. 86-7) compares the existing segments of the Ouled Rechaich tribe (Hodna) with their legendary family tree.
32. Cf. M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1940) p. 277, and J. Favret: "La segmentarité au Maghreb" in L'HOMME (1966) p. 108.
33. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 42.
34. Ibid. p. 44.
35. Ibid. p. 42.
36. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 84. "Thus," he adds, "on the eve of the French occupation, eastern Algeria was dominated by the sheikh of the Hanencha of the Harar family in the East, the sheikh el Arab of the Bou Okkaz family in the South, and the sheikh of the Medjana of the Ouled Mokran family in the West".
37. Cited in P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 85.
38. J. Berque: "Cent-vingt-cinq ans de sociologie maghrébine" in ANNALES (11) 1956, p. 320.
39. This kind of enterprise was undertaken as recently as 1967 for Morocco, by B.G. Hoffman (THE STRUCTURE OF TRADITIONAL MOROCCAN SOCIETY - 1967). His book is ambitious, and results from the painstaking, indeed laborious consultation of countless monogrammes. His account completely ignores any segmentary dynamics; this alone would give coherence to his accumulation of names and references.
40. J. Berque: "Qu'est-ce qu'un 'tribu' nord-africain?" in HOMMAGE A LUCIEN FEBVRE - L'EVENTAIL DE L'HISTOIRE VIVANTE (Paris 1953) Vo.1 I, p. 263.

41. Ibid. p. 271.
42. J. Berque: "Les societes nord-africains vues du Haut-Atlas" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1955) p. 63.
43. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 90. They even invented the name 'canton' for it, he points out.
44. M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (ed.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1940) p. 22.
45. R. Montagne: THE BERBERS - THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (1973) p. 46.
46. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan" in M. Fortes and E.E. Evans-Pritchard (ed.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1940) p. 284.
47. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 48-9.
48. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan" (1940) loc. cit. p. 274.
49. J. Middleton and D. Tait: TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS (London 1958)p. 8.
50. M.D. Sahlins: TRIBALISM (New York 1968) p. 16.
51. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: "The Nuer of the Southern Sudan" (1940) loc. cit. p. 279. He incorporates 'Nuerland' and wider layers beyond it into his concentric model of loyalty: "We must recognize that the whole Nuer people form a single community, territorially unbroken, with a common culture and feeling of exclusiveness. Their common language and values permit ready intercommunication. Indeed we might speak of the Nuer as a nation". But, he goes on, this is "only in the cultural sense, for there is no common political organization or central administration". This reservation is all the more necessary in that he includes "Dinkaland and other foreign countries" on the outer rim of his nest!
52. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 48-52.
53. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 12.
54. D.M. Hart: "The tribe in modern Morocco: two case studies" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (London 1973) p. 33.
55. Cf. J. Berque: "Qu'est-ce qu'un 'tribu' nord-africain?" (1953) loc. cit.

56. R. Montagne: LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT - NOMADES D'ORIENT ET D'AFRIQUE (Paris 1947) p. 49.
57. G. Tillion: "Les sociétés berbères dans l'Aurès méridional" in AFRICA (1939) p. 43.
58. R. Montagne: LES BERBERES ET LE MAKHZEN AU SUD DU MAROC (1930) p. 149.
59. R. Montagne: LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT (1947) p. 49.
60. G. Tillion: "Les sociétés berbères dans l'Aurès méridional" in AFRICA (1939) p. 53.
61. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 12.
62. J. Berque: "Qu'est-ce qu'un 'tribu' nord-africain?" in HOMMAGE A LUCIEN FEBVRE - L'EVENTAIL DE L(HISTOIRE VIVANTE (1953) Vol. I.
63. J. Middleton and D. Tait: TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS (1958) p. 5.
64. L.A. Fallers: "Political sociology and the anthropological study of African polities" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (1963) p. 314.
65. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE NUER (1940) p. 65.
66. M. Fortes: "The structure of unilinear descent groups" in AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST (1953) p. 36.
67. J.D. Seddon: "Local politics and State intervention - North East Morocco from 1870 to 1970" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) p. 122. This article (p. 109-139) provides an extremely subtle account of the constraints on and modes of competition for economic resources.
68. J. Berque: "Cent-vingt-cinq ans de sociologie maghrébine" in ANNALES (1956) p. 297.
69. It affected the nature of land-utilization, for example. Cf. J. Berque: "Droits des terres et intégration sociale au Maghreb" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1958).
70. J. Berque: "Cent-vingt-cinq ans de sociologie maghrébine" in ANNALES (1956) p. 298. "In the countryside", he suggests, "an economy of prestige and homage, of gift and counter-gift, of trade regulated by the weekly souq, strongly prevailed over the monetary phenomenon". The interrelationship between the 'sacral' and the 'soil' is a constant theme in Berque's work. Cf. J. Berque: "Quelques problèmes de l'Islam maghrébin" in ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS (1957) p. 3-20, and, in a more diffused form, J. Berque: FRENCH NORTH AFRICA - THE MAGHREB BETWEEN TWO WORLD WARS (1967).

71. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 42.
72. R. Montagne: LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT: NOMADES D'ORIENT ET D'AFRIQUE (1947) p. 60-62. R. Montagne: THE BERBERS (1973) p. 36-43.
73. See note (14) above. To this list should be added:
- J.D. Seddon: "Local politics and State intervention: North East Morocco from 1870 to 1970" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) esp. p. 120-30.
- D.M. Hart: "The tribe in modern Morocco - Two case studies" in ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) esp. p. 33-34.
- A.R. Vinogradov: "The socio-political organization of a Berber 'Taraf' tribe - Pre-protectorate Morocco" in ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) esp. p. 79-83.
- R.E. Dunn: "Berber Imperialism" the Ait Atta Expansion in South East Morocco" in ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) p. 85-107.
- J. Waterbury: THE COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL (London 1970) p. 61-80.
74. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 66.
75. R. Montagne: LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT (1947) p. 61.
76. Ibid.
77. Ibid.
78. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 13, p. 16.
79. Cf. also A. Adam: LA MAISON ET LE VILLAGE DANS QUELQUES TRIBUS DE L'ANTI-ATLAS (1951). Montagne himself noted some regional variations in Morocco e.g. in THE BERBERS (1973) p. 38-43.
80. J. Dresch: "Dans le grand Atlas calcaire" in BULLETIN DE L'ASSOCIATION DES GEOGRAPHES FRANCAIS (March-April 1949).
81. D.M. Hart: "The tribe in modern Morocco - Two case studies" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) p. 33.
82. E. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" in W.H. Lewis (ed.) FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA - THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1965) p. 109.
83. For example, Montagne treats 'leffs' and 'confederations' as synonymous at times: LA CIVILISATION DU DESERT (1947) p. 59-62.
84. "Montagne plays relatively little attention to such factors as ecology or to the relationship between economic and political structures...He gives the reader relatively little apart from 'political' data, and in his analysis changes in political structure are explained primarily in terms of political process..." J.D. Seddon 'Introduction' to R. Montagne: THE BERBERS (1973) pxxxix-xxxii.

85. J.D. Seddon: "Local Politics and State Intervention" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) p. 125n.
86. J. Despois: IE HODNA (Paris 1953) p. 112-129.
87. Ibid. p. 123.
88. J. Berque: "Les sociétés nord-africaines vues du Haut-Atlas" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1955) p. 64.
89. J. Favret: "La segmentarité au Maghreb" in L'HOMME (6) 1966, p. 105.
90. G. Nicolas: "La sociologie rurale au maroc pendant les cinquantes dernières années" in TIERS MONDE (Oct.-Dec. 1961) p. 538.
91. M.G. Smith: "On segmentary lineage systems" in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (86) 1956, p. 39-80.
92. J.D. Seddon: "Local Politics and State Intervention" (1973) loc. cit. p. 121.
93. J. Waterbury: (cited J.D. Seddon Ibid. p. 125n).
94. J.D. Seddon: Ibid. p. 125.
95. A.R. Vinogradov: "The socio-political organization of a Berber 'Taraf' tribe - Pre-Protectorate Morocco" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (1973) p. 83.
96. J.D. Seddon: "Local Politics and State Intervention" (1973) loc. cit. p. 121-2.
97. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 42.
98. L.A. Fallers: "Political sociology and the anthropological study of African politics" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (4) (1963) p. 316.
99. D. Easton: ~~A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS~~ (New York 1955).
100. L.A. Fallers: 'Political sociology and the anthropological study of African politics' (1963) loc. cit. p 316
101. M. Fortes and E. Evans-Pritchard (eds.): AFRICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS (1940) p. 14.
102. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 59.
103. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 82.

104. L. Milliot: "Les institutions kabyles" in REVUE D'ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (1932) p. 127-174.
105. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 89.
106. Ibid. p. 90.
107. M.G. Smith: "On segmentary lineage systems" in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (86) 1956, p. 67. By 'Corporations Sole' - a term he borrowed from Maine - Smith means groups in which offices are held by duly selected persons rather than performed by the whole community aggregate.
108. "Segmentary theory", he argues "simply avoids (the) continuity of governmental systems by a specialized definition of government which equates it with explicitly centralized administration, on the one hand; and by an opposed definition of segmentary systems which obscures the tendencies towards such differentiation of governmental functions and their developments of Corporations Sole, which are inherent in lineage societies, on the other". Ibid. p. 68.
109. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard themselves subdivided 'Group B' societies into societies whose political structure was determined by kinship relations (transient bilateral families) and by lineage relations (permanent unilateral descent groups). Southall, in his ALUR SOCIETY (1954), suggested that an intermediate type was needed, called 'segmentary state', where contingent lineage structures coexist with a rudimentary administrative apparatus centred around a hereditary authority. Balandier - in his "Le contexte sociologique ^{de la vie politique} en Afrique noire" (1959) loc. cit. - argues for a new typological category where Centralized governmental machinery is absent, but where political relations are tied not to kinship or lineage but to such authority structures as age-groups or village councils. Apart from developing a gamut of intermediate types, Evans-Pritchard's original idealized distinction between Group A and Group B societies has proved useful as a rule of thumb against which to measure reality. Middleton and Tait adopted this approach: "The chief factors that differentiate African political organizations are the degree of specialization in ideas that enter into political and administrative activities, the number of structural levels at which authority is exercised, and the principle of relationship between political functionary and subject". TRIBES WITHOUT RULERS (1958) p. 2.
110. Despite his attack on ideal-typical dichotomies, and "circular systems of definition", Smith himself cannot avoid making use of them. He distinguishes between political and administrative functions, for example, asserting that 'bands' act internally as administrative groups, but externally as political groups. Yet he admits that, in practice, competition over policy (i.e.

110. political behaviour) may occur within them, and that competition between opposed bands may be latent, or ritualized rather than actual (i.e. administrative behaviour). (p. 51). This is certainly a useful distinction, and gives rise to interesting comparative work, but it too is arbitrary and idealtypical. Fact-ordering or 'sensitizing' formulae are so of necessity, and it is wasted effort to attack them as such, except in as far as they claim not to be. Even to say, in opposition to the assertion that $x = y$, that x and y are different, is to make a persuasive statement meaning that "it is useful in my opinion to consider x and y as distinct". The statement points to a research programme, to a field of interest, and it is in relation to these that its value must be judged. Fortes and Evans-Pritchard's Group A/Group B distinction was of great value in that it led to the treatment of Group B societies as political systems in their own right, whereas political analysts had previously tended to equate absence of state-like features with the absence of a political system.
111. M.G. Smith: "On segmentary lineage systems" (1956) loc. cit. p. 41.
112. Ibid. p. 40.
113. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 82.
114. R. Montagne: THE BERBERS - THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (1973) Ch. IV "The Origins and Development of Power among Temporal Leaders".
115. The Almohads, in the 12th and 13th Centuries, imposed the kharadj on the dubious basis that the majority of the Maghreb population had lapsed from observance of 'pure' Islam. (Cf. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA - FROM THE ARAB CONQUEST TO 1830 (trans. J. Petrie) London 1970 p. 115).
116. J. Berque: "Qu'est-ce qu'un 'tribu' nord-africain?" in HOMMAGE A LUCIEN FEBVRE - L'EVENTAIL DE L'HISTOIRE VIVANTE (1953) Vol. I, p. 269.
117. "Up until now we have been looking at the static aspect, if we might call it that, of Berber society....It remains for us now to describe what we might call the dynamic aspect of Berber society" R. Montagne: THE BERBERS (1973) p. 57.
118. C. Geertz: "Politics Past, Politics Present: some notes on the use of anthropology in understanding the new states" in ARCHIVES EUROPEENNES DE SOCIOLOGIE (8) 1967, p. 2-3.

119. E. Leach: POLITICAL SYSTEMS OF HIGHLAND BURMA (London 1954). An interesting discussion of Montagne's "dynamic model", including a comparison with Leach's work, is found in David Seddon's Introduction to Montagne's: THE BERBERS, p. xxx-xxxvii.
120. J. Berque: "Les sociétés nord-africaines vues du Haut-Atlas" in CAHIERS INTERNATIONAUX DE SOCIOLOGIE (1955) p. 63.
121. Ibid. p. 65.
122. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 53.
123. E. Gellner: "The Far West of Islam" in BRITISH JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY (March 1958) p. 81.
124. J. Favret: "La segmentarité au Maghreb" in L'HOMME (6) 1966, p. 110.
125. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 54-5. He does suggest, however, that North Africa has fewer kinks than most other segmentary societies.
126. The work of David Seddon is especially interesting in this field. Cf. his "Local politics and State intervention - North East Morocco from 1870 to 1970" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARABS AND BERBERS (1973), esp. p. 120-8, and his "Introduction" to R. Montagne: THE BERBERS - THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (1973), esp. p. xxx-xxxvii. J. Waterbury: THE COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL - THE MOROCCAN POLITICAL ELITE, A STUDY OF SEGMENTED POLITIES (London 1970) shares many of the same perspectives.
127. F. Barth: "Segmentary opposition and the theory of games" in JOURNAL OF THE ROYAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL INSTITUTE (89) 1959, p. 5-21.
F.G. Bailey: STRATAGEMS AND SPOILS (London 1969).
128. J.D. Seddon in R. Montagne: THE BERBERS - THEIR SOCIAL AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION (1973)
129. G. Nicolas: "La sociologie rurale au maroc pendant les cinquantes dernières années" in TIERS MONDE (1961) p. 533. By contrast, Desparmet, champion of the 'alien Islamic veneer' school, accused the Islamic reformers of the 1930's of "systematically making an abstraction of any influences other than that of the moslem religion" (J. Desparmet: "Le panarabisme et la Berbérie" in RENSEIGNEMENTS COLONIAUX (1938) (8-9) p. 198).
130. M. Halpern: THE POLITICS OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA (1963) Ch. I, p. 3-24.

131. G.E. von Grunebaum: "The Problem - Unity in Diversity" in G.E. von Grunebaum (ed.): UNITY AND VARIETY IN MUSLIM CIVILIZATION (Chicago 1955) p. 17-37. Cf. also R. Brunschvig: "Perspectives" in G.E. von Grunebaum (ed.): UNITY AND VARIETY IN MUSLIM CIVILIZATION (1955) p. 47-62, and R. Le Tourneau: "North Africa: Rigorism and Bewilderment" in Ibid. p. 231-260.
132. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (California 1972) p. 13.
133. E. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" in W.H. Lewis (ed.): FRENCH-SPEAKING AFRICA - THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1965) p. 110.
134. J. Berque: "Quelques problèmes de l'Islam maghrébin" in ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS (3) 1957, p. 10.
135. Ibid. p. 6.
136. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (1972) p. 20.
137. Except for the small Shi'ite (Kharedjite) populations of the Mزاب oases in Algeria, and the island of Djerba in Tunisia.
138. In addition to sources cited at note 5, see especially E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969). Also A. Berque: "Les capteurs du divin: Marabouts, Uléma" in REVUE DE LA MEDITERRANEE (43-4) 1951
 J. Carret: "Le maraboutisme et les confréries religieuses en Algérie" (Algiers 1959)
 J. Berque: "Quelques problèmes de l'Islam maghrébin" (1957) loc. cit.
 J. Berque: "Ça et là dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" in ETUDES D'ORIENTALISME DEDIEES A LA MEMOIRE DE LEVI-PROVENCAL (1962) vol. II, p. 471-94
 C. Geertz: ISLAM OBSERVED - RELIGIOUS DEVELOPMENT IN MOROCCO AND INDONESIA (Yale 1968) esp. p. 43-55.
139. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 74.
140. J. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA (London 1965) p. 166.
141. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 72.
142. Evans-Pritchard describes the operation of two different kinds of holy tribe in Cyrenaica: the mrabtin bil baraka (holy tribe with the blessing) and the mrabtin al-Fatha (holy tribe of the prayer). Both were tolerated, treated as special, not taxable by the powerful Sa'adi (conqueror) tribes. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 51-3. See also E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) passim.

143. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 27 points out the foreign origins of Aures marabouts.
144. E. Gellner: "Political and Religious Organization of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas" in E. Gellner and C. Micaud (eds.): ARAB AND BERBERS (1973) p. 66.
145. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 67-8.
146. Ibid. p. 66.
147. J. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA (1965) p. 2.
148. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 68.
149. "Their fanaticism, asceticism, ability to read and write, and thaumaturgical powers, impressed the simple Bedouin, who accepted them as holy men and magicians, and used them to write charms, to reform religious rites, and to act as mediators in inter-tribal disputes". (E. Evans-Pritchard: ~~THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA~~ (1949) p. 66).
150. E. Gellner: "Political and Religious Organization and the Berbers of the Central High Atlas" loc. cit. p. 60.
151. E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA, p. 83.
152. B. Terhorst: WITH THE RIFF KABYLES (London 1926) provides a naive tourist's description of this phenomenon in the small port of Arcila (North Moroccan coast): "In the middle of the crowd sat a venerable man. His clothes were in rags and his hair hung in loose strands about his head. In front of him was spread out a collection of useless articles, tin boxes, and so on, and something wrapped in little bags made of rag; at the side was a stick stuck in the ground, to which was attached a piece of white cloth. An idiot, I said. No, not an idiot, a holy man, yet he was an idiot too, for all the lunatics are venerated as holy men.... Every now and then another man came up, apparently a servant, more ragged than his master. He brought food or money, gifts he had collected. Old women threw coppers on to the mat. Yet this idiot had a certain fascination about him which I could not altogether escape. He stretched his thin arms above his head, his ascetic form seemed to grow bigger. In his eye-sockets was a glimmer, as in the eyes of the people Van Gough painted when his mind was beclouded. His mouth moved unceasingly, with his tongue he licked his dry lips. In a dull voice, he crooned, "La ilahah, ilallah - wa Muhammadun rasulu ilah" - "There is no God but God, and Mohammed is his Prophet". The people stayed there under his spell". (p. 173-4).
153. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 67.

154. E. Gellner: "Political and Religious Organization of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas" (1973) loc. cit. p. 65.
155. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 69.
156. Cf. the fortified dwellings of the igurramen (saints) of Ihansal - E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 162 ff
157. E. Gellner: "Political and Religious Organization of the Berbers of the Central High Atlas" (1973) loc. cit. p. 69.
158. P. Bourdieu: THE ALGERIANS (1962) p. 89.
159. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 151.
160. H.M. Miner and G. De Vos: OASIS AND CASBAH - ALGERIAN CULTURE AND PERSONALITY IN CHANGE (Michigan 1960) p. 18-23. The physical control of a revered saint's mortal remains was a frequent source of dispute. In the 19th Century, two zawiyas of the Rahmaniyya brotherhood, (Hamma, near Algiers, and Ait Ismail in the Djurdjura) for example, fought bitterly for the body of their Founder Saint, Sidi Abdul Rahman. (cf. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA (London 1965) p. 8).
161. E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 46.
162. The Sa'adians (16th-17th Centuries) and the Alawites (17th-20th Centuries) were both Shorfa dynasties in the Western Maghreb. The Almoravids (11th-12th Centuries) and the Almohads (12th-13th Centuries) were both dynasties founded on moslem reforming zeal.
163. In addition to the sources cited at note 5, see especially J. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA - A SUFI ORDER IN THE MODERN WORLD (London 1965) and E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949)
Cf. also:
P.J. André: CONTRIBUTION A L'ETUDE DES CONFRERIES RELIGIEUSES (Algiers 1956)
R. Brunel: ESSAI SUR LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES AISSAOUA AU MAROC (Paris 1926)
J. Carret: "Le maraboutisme et les confréries religieuses en Algérie" (Algiers 1959)
G. Drague: ESQUISSE D'HISTOIRE RELIGIEUSE DU MAROC - CONFRERIES ET ZAOUIAS (Paris 1951)
O. Depont and X. Coppolani: LES CONFRERIES MUSULMANES (Algiers 1897)
M. Simian: LES CONFRERIES ISLAMIQUES EN ALGERIE (RAHMANIYA - TIDJANIYA) (Paris 1910)
J. Berque: "Quelques problèmes de l'islam maghrébin" in ARCHIVES DE SOCIOLOGIE DES RELIGIONS (1957)
J. Berque: "Ça et là dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" in ETUDES D'ORIENTALISME DEDIEES A LA MEMOIRE DE LEVI-PROVENCAL (1962) Vol. II, p. 471-94

163. M. Emerit: "Le conflit des ordres religieux" in M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (Paris 1951) Ch., III, p. 199-234.
164. J. Berque: "Ça et la dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" (1962) loc. cit. p. 472.
165. M. Emerit: "Le conflit des ordres religieux" in-M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) Ch. III, p. 199-234.
166. "Like the Christian monasteries of Europe in the Dark Ages, Sanusi lodges served many purposes beside catering for religious needs. They were schools, caravanserais, commercial centres, social centres, forts, courts of law, banks, storehouses, poor houses, sanctuary and burial grounds, besides being channels through which ran a generous stream of God's blessing. They were the centres of culture and security in a wild country and amid a fierce people, and they were stable points in a country where all else was on the move". E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 79.
167. J. Berque: "Ça et la dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" (1962) loc. cit. p. 472.
168. L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (Paris 1969) p. 36.
169. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 65. In this sense, he continues, "the Bedouin are familiar with saints and ignorant of Orders".
170. J. Berque: "Ça et la dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" (1962) loc. cit. p. 472.
171. Ibid.
172. E. Gellner: "A pendulum swing theory of Islam" (paper presented to I.P.S.A. Round Table Meeting, Istanbul 1967) mimeo. p. 13 differentiates between membership of fraternities in towns and in rural areas: "In the tribe, affiliation is by group and is a kind of ascription; in the town it is individual and elective".
173. The Beni Hachem of AbdelKader, for example, were solidly attached to the Qadriyya. cf. M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) esp. Ch. 3.
174. Cf. J. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA - A SUFI ORDER IN THE MODERN WORLD (1965) p. 62-8, and M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) p. 199-234.

175. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 69.
176. Evans-Pritchard admits that the Sanusi organization was not typical of the moslem world: "Unlike the Heads of most Islamic Orders, which have rapidly disintegrated into autonomous segments without contact and common direction, they have been able to maintain this organization and keep control of it" (THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA - 1949 - p. 11).
177. J. Berque: "Ça et la dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" (1962) p. 472.
178. R. Brunel: ESSAI SUR LA CONFRERIE RESIGIEUSE DES AISSAOUA AU MAROC (1926) p. 52.
179. J. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA (1965) p. 72-82.
180. The Blida sawiya of the Aissaoua Order in Algeria, for example, established a measure of supremacy over the Collo and Constantine zawiyas by helping them to become independent of the Head Zawiya of the Order in Meknes (Morocco) (R. Brunel: ESSAI SUR LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES AISSAOUA AU MAROC (1926) p. 54.
181. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 82.
182. R. Brunel: ESSAI SUR LA CONFRERIE RELIGIEUSE DES AISSAOUA AU MAROC (1926) p. 53-4.
183. J. Berque - "Ça et la dans les débuts du réformisme religieux au Maghreb" (1962) loc. cit. - suggests other potentialities within and outside the Colonial Situation.
184. E. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" (1965) loc. cit. p. 110.
185. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (California 1972) p. 11.
186. Cf. THE CAMBRIDGE MEDIAEVAL HISTORY vol. 3 (Cambridge 1913) p. 440-2 ("The Western Caliphate") J.K. Cooley: BAAL, CHRIST AND MOHAMED - RELIGION AND REVOLUTION IN NORTH AFRICA (London 1967) p. 84-6. H.A.R. Gibb: "Constitutional Organization" in M. Khadduri and H.J. Leibesny (eds.): LAW IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Washington 1955)
 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ISLAM vol. 2 - THE FURTHER ISLAMIC LANDS: ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND CIVILIZATION (Cambridge 1970)
 cf. also J.M. Abun-Nasr: A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB (Cambridge 1971) p. 67-234 passim
 C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA - FROM THE ARAB CONQUEST TO 1830 (trans. Petrie) (London 1970).

187. al-Mawardi (cited by J.K. Cooley: BAAL, CHRIST AND MOHAMED (1967) p. 85).
188. J.M. Abun-Nasr: A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB (1971) p. 92-118, p. 120-37
C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 76-137, p. 161-205.
189. Even within the Almohad hegemony, for example, the Muminids established a narrower clan base of power. cf. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 134.
190. M. Lahbabi: LE GOUVERNEMENT MAROCAIN A L'AUBE DU XXe. SIECLE (Rabat 1958)
F. Benbrahim: KHALIFAT SULTANAT ET MONARCHIE AU MAROC (Fondements traditionnels et réalités politiques) Paris - These Droit (unpublished) 1966
I.W. Zartman: DESTINY OF A DYNASTY: THE SEARCH FOR INSTITUTIONS IN MOROCCO'S DEVELOPING SOCIETY (South Carolina 1964) esp. p. 1-15
J. Waterbury: THE COMMANDER OF THE FAITHFUL (London 1970), esp. Ch. I
E. Gellner: "The struggle for Morocco's past" in MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL (Winter 1961)
E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 24-6.
191. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (1972) p. 19.
192. E. Gellner: "A pendulum swing theory of Islam" (paper presented to I.P.S.A. Round Table Meeting, Istanbul 1967) mimeo
E. Gellner: SAINTS OF THE ATLAS (1969) p. 3-4.
193. cf. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 49.
194. J.M. Abun-Nasr: A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB (1971) p. 135.
195. E. Gellner: "Tribalism and Social Change in North Africa" (1965) loc. cit. p. 110.
196. Missions Scientifiques du Maroc: VILLES ET TRIBUS DU MAROC - RABAT ET SA REGION Vol. 4 - LE GHARB (LES DJEBALA) (Paris 1918) p. 185.
197. Analysis of Turkish rule in Algeria is found in the following works:
J.M. Abun-Nasr: A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB (1971) p. 166-201
M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (Paris 1951)
M. Emerit: "Les mémoires d'Ahmed, Dernier Bey de Constantine" in REVUE AFRICAINE (93) 1949, p. 65-125
M. Emerit: "Les tribus privilégiées en Algérie dans la

197. première moitié du XIXe siècle" in ANNALES - ECONOMIES, SOCIETES, CIVILISATIONS (21) 1966, p. 44-58
 C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 302-335
 C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAIRE (Paris 1964) p. 20-105
 J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (Paris 1962) p. 45-68
 L. Rinn: LA ROYAUME D'ALGER SOUS LE DERNIER DEY (Paris 1900)
 L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (Paris 1969)
 Y. Lacoste, A. Nouschi, A. Prenant: L'ALGERIE - PASSE ET PRESENT (Paris 1960) Ch. 4 et 5 p. 137-232
 Interesting comparative material from other Turkish is provided by:
 H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen: ISLAMIC SOCIETY AND THE WEST vol. I - ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY, 2 parts (1950 and 1957)
 E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) esp. p. 90-103
 J. Ganiage: LES ORIGINES DU PROTECTORAT FRANCAIS EN TUNISIE (1861-1881) (Paris 1959)
 H. de Montety: "Structure administrative du Protectorat Français en Tunisie" in AFRIQUE FRANCAISE (Nov. 1937) p. 545-50.
198. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen: ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1950) loc. cit. p. 25.
199. M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) p. 9.
200. L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (1969) p. 90-92.
201. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 284.
202. M. Emerit: "Les tribus privilégiées en Algérie dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle" in ANNALES (1966) p. 45.
203. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 320.
204. Ibid. p. 321.
205. J. Cano (cited C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 323-4).
206. M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) p. 244.
207. L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (1969) p. 87.
208. M. Emerit: "Les tribus privilégiées en Algérie dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle" (1966) loc. cit.
209. M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) p. 243-52 reprints four letters from Ahmed Bey of Constantine to

209. Hussein Dey, in 1828-9, giving a graphic account of the progress of his mehalla. He reported with evident pride that one individual expedition had harvested 500 heads cut off, and the capture of 2000 sheep, 2000 goats, 600 oxen, 70 pack animals, etc. Abun-Nasr: THE TIJANIYYA (1965) p. 60 recounts the mehalla of Uthman Bey of Mascara, in 1788, which included an unsuccessful 2½ month siege of the oasis-town of Ain Mahdi. On the other hand, J. Ganiage: LES ORIGINE DU PROTECTORAT FRANÇAIS EN TUNISIE, 1861-1881 (1959) p. 119 describes the mehalla of the bey of Tunis as a ponderous "open air circus". It is also interesting to compare these accounts with the striking description provided of the Alawite mehalla operating in central Morocco at the turn of the century, by Dr. F. Weisberger: AU SEUIL DU MAROC MODERNE (Rabat 1947) p. 46-60, 85-98.
210. M. Emerit: "Les tribus privilégiées en Algérie dans la première moitié du XIXe siècle" (1966) loc. cit. p. 53.
211. J.M. Abun-Nasr: A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB (1971) p. 64-5.
212. J. Ganiage: LES ORIGINE DU PROTECTORAT FRANÇAIS EN TUNISIE, 1861-1881 (1959) p. 103.
213. L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (1969) p. 35.
214. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 325.
215. J.M. Abun-Nasr: A HISTORY OF THE MAGHRIB (1971) p. 176.
216. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 90.
217. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 326.
218. Ibid.
219. J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (1962) provides data on Kabylia under Turkish rule. See esp. p. 5-8.
220. cf. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (1972) p. 8-55. He argues that the Turkish regime was slowly becoming more 'patrimonial' and 'territorial' in outlook. He suggests that exactly the same evolution was taking place within the purely indigenous Alawite regime in Morocco.
221. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (1972) p. 23.
222. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 332-3.

223. H. de Montety: "Structure administrative du Protectorat Français en Tunisie" in AFRIQUE FRANCAISE (Nov. 1937) p. 545.
224. L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (1969) p. 86.
225. E. Mermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (1972) p. 25, p. 49.
226. H.A.R. Gibb and H. Bowen: ISLAMIC SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1950) loc. cit. p. 159.
227. C-A. Julien: HISTORY OF NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 333.
228. E. Hermassi: LEADERSHIP AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN NORTH AFRICA (1970) p. 49.
229. L. Valensi: LE MAGHREB AVANT LA PRISE D'ALGER (1969) p. 86.
230. E.E. Evans-Pritchard: THE SANUSI OF CYRENAICA (1949) p. 92.
231. Ibid. p. 90.

CHAPTER FOUR THE ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF ALGERIA UNDER FRENCH RULE

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I. CONQUEST

-i. The Fall of Turkish Regime¹

37,000 French troops, led by de Bourmont, landed at Sidi Ferruch on 19th June 1830, and marched towards Algiers. The dey capitulated on 4th July. By treaty, his lawful sovereignty, along with the property of the odjak, passed to the French state. The rapid collapse of this topmost layer of Turkish government encouraged, enabled, and in a sense forced the French to assume sovereignty in their own name. Unlike the later colonial regimes in Tunisia, and Morocco, no 'protectorate' was established with even nominal respect for the suzerainty of the existing rulers. The odjak was abolished, and by the end of 1830 the bey and hundreds of other Turkish officials and janissaries had been deported to the Levant. In this sense, the French imposed a form of direct rule in Algeria from the outset.

Despite this assumption of titular sovereignty, the large-scale physical occupation of the Regency was not urgently or deliberately pursued. The first four years of French presence, heralded by the immediate collapse of the Bourbon monarchy whose scheme the invasion had been, were marked by indecision and administrative chaos.² By 1834, the French had still established themselves in only three ports: Oran in the West, Algiers in the centre, and Bone in the East. Complex pressures from Metropolitan merchants, would-be settlers, and the army command gradually committed them to the retention of a permanent foothold, but the nature and extent of colonial occupation were determined only slowly

by the interaction of these pressures with local political and economic conditions.

The demise of the odjak did not deliver to the French control of a deeply-embedded and well-oiled administrative machine. With the disintegration of centralized command, the inflow of rents and taxes from beys and tribes ceased forthwith. Behind the facade of 'commanding heights', a situation of fragmented authority revealed itself. In terms of European concepts of government, the French discovered that they were dealing with "sovereigns without kingdoms".³ Not only the provincial level of Turkish command, but beyond that the network of indigenous segmentary tribes, remained to be contacted and grappled with. In this sense, at these levels, direct administration was something which, if sought, required construction.

The French sought initially to win over the beys of the three Turkish provinces. Bey Hassan of the Western province, Oran, was quick to proffer submission. Unfortunately, from the conquerors' point of view, this reflected his total loss of control over those tribes nominally under his authority. For several decades the beylik had been racked by dissidence, coordinated notably by the Derkawa fraternity. In recent years, an aggressive new focus of opposition had developed under the impulsion of the Qadriya fraternity, centred around the Hachemi tribe and the holy man Mahi-ed-din. It was largely in the hope of assistance in reasserting his authority that the bey turned to the French. Thus, so far from being a firmly-established intermediary able to 'deliver the support' or even speak on behalf of the local segmentary

population, the Turkish bey was in need of French protection from them. The French command was rapidly induced to abandon him, and attempted direct contact with native groupings.⁴

In the central province, Titteri, bey Bou Mezrag prevaricated. Initially he made overtures to the French, possibly in the hope of assuming some of the powers of the recently-divested dey. To this end, he claimed suzerainty over the Eastern bey, though without any response. The French perceived his ambitions as a potential hindrance rather than help in the establishment of their rule; a punitive expedition was organized against him in November 1830, and he was deposed and exiled. A prominent Moor was briefly nominated to replace him, but though 'loyal' he was even less qualified to deliver the effective support of the indigenous population. Increasingly, these tribes of the centre were drawn into the resistance movement which had developed in the West, now led by Abd-el-Kader. The office of bey was an irrelevance in this context, and in 1836, indeed, its hapless new incumbent was captured and divested by incursive tribesmen. French control of the area remained to be asserted.

The most prolonged resistance from the remnants of the Turkish regime took place in the Eastern province of Constantine.⁵ Of the three beyliks, its core of government had become least fragmented and most stable. Turkish rule there was not characterized to the same extent as in the West by the delegation of power to big privileged tribes. In 1826, in fact, bey Ahmed had suppressed all exemptions from land tax within the province. Moreover, his force of mounted native auxiliaries and infantry was feared and respected

by subject tribes and a modus vivendi had been established with influential clans on the fringes of direct control. Successive beys of Constantine had established some measure of autonomy from Algiers. The downfall of the dey, in a sense, promised to consummate this independence.

Bey Ahmed greeted the French arrival with stubborn hostility, and refused tentative offers of and requests for cooperation. To strengthen this resistance, he expelled the few garrisons of turbulent janissaries, and instead patched together a coalition with important Arab and Berber families, notably the Mokrani of the Medjana, the Ben Gana of the Bibans, and the Ouled Achour of the Ferdjioua. The French attempted in vain to mobilize the ambitions of the bey of Tunis against him, then eventually sent^a a military expedition against Constantine. In November 1836, this force was decimated and driven into retreat by Ahmed's tribal auxiliaries. A year later, 20,000 troops were sent on a better-organized campaign, captured Constantine, and forced the bey to flee south.

Once more, however, Ahmed's demise did not yield the reins of assured governmental control into French hands. It destroyed the very force of personality and network of alliances on which his ascendancy had depended. The process of coming to grips with segmentary Algeria had only begun. In the East as in the West, the French discovered the limited usefulness of the office of 'bey' as a political lever. They appointed no replacement, and relied instead on granting the title of khalifa, caid or sheikh to those tribal notables whom they had managed to lure from the hostile coalition. Even the 'indirect' rule thus established was precarious.

Though they were temporarily free to concentrate on the growing menace in the West, the French had effected little more than a holding operation. Several later expeditions were required to 'Pacify' the East.

-ii. Military defeat of the segmentary tribes

The conquest, or series of conquests of segmentary Algeria was gradual and piecemeal.⁶ The need for and concept of 'total occupation' dawned on the French quite slowly. The army, settlers, and local and metropolitan capitalists accepted the project with varying enthusiasm and in different senses. There was initial hesitation as to whether the French presence should be confined to a handful of fortified coastal towns, serving as controlled outlets for trans-Mediterranean commerce, or whether far larger tracts of Algeria, especially the fertile littoral plains, should be opened up for the settlement of European emigrants. Feverish land speculation in the mid-1830's decided the territory's fate as a settler colony. For most of the first two decades, however, the philosophy of 'restricted occupation' - limiting settlement to the Mediterranean coast and valleys, and pushing back the native occupants into the Tell - was paramount. Enormous pressure for further sequestration of land drove the French army eventually to extend its campaign of conquest. At the same time, the immediate issue was forced by the hostility with which the native population greeted the French presence. The security of the coast and its lines of communication were constantly menaced by incursions, and by the ominous development, outside the pale, of large blocs of

indigenous political solidarity. These drove the French to look, and move, beyond the zone of 'useful Algeria' into the hinterland.

The confederation built up among the tribes of the West by Abd-el-Kader posed a particularly powerful potential challenge to the nascent colony.⁷ After being proclaimed Emir-el-muminin (commander of the faithful) by the Hachemi, Beni Aneur and Gharaba tribes in 1832, Abd-el-Kader declared jihad (holy war) on the Christians. By a traditional mixture of astute diplomacy and physical intimidation, he submitted rivals, divided enemies, and welded together a strong basis of political domination. Some French commanders were prepared to come to terms with this growing hegemony, indeed welcomed the Emir's role in establishing some order among the tribes of the interior. In 1837, for example, the treaty of Tafna explicitly recognized his suzerainty not only throughout the Western province (excluding a few towns and colon centres), but also in the former beylik of Titteri and even parts of the dar-es-sultan near Algiers. In hindsight, however, these early tacit understandings and treaties appear to have been of a tactical rather than strategic nature on the part of the French. They permitted the consolidation of European settlement on the coast, and enabled the intransigence of bey Ahmed in the East to be first dealt with. Similarly, the Emir took advantage of these periods of truce to consolidate and further extend his area of influence, conducting energetic campaigns against rival tribes, and particularly against the Derkawa and Tijaniya fraternities.

Abd-el-Kader's suzerainty over most of the Algerian interior clearly constituted an eventual threat to the French presence.

Periodic ambushes and serious clashes such as the battle of Macta in 1835, were evidence both of his hostility and his strength. The fragile truce was broken in 1839, and though the immediate circumstances are in dispute, the ultimate inevitability of this confrontation is less so. Abd-el-Kader led a wholesale assault on French settlements in the coastal zones, and the French poured in troops against him. By 1840, the French army numbered 60,000 and by 1846 108,000. Under the leadership of Bugeaud,⁸ this attack (or counterattack) was drastic and pitiless. A vigorous scorched earth campaign of mobile 'total war' was designed to deprive the Emir of supplies, destroy his communications, and split his confederated support. It also involved the sequestration of huge tracts of land.⁹ By 1843, Abd-el-Kader had been forced to retreat to Morocco, although within a few months other serious insurrections in the Western Tell mountains encouraged him to return to the plains. He inflicted a final serious defeat on the French at Sidi Brahim in 1845, but was forced to surrender in 1847 and was taken prisoner to France. This lengthy period of warfare had resulted in the French seizure and garrisoning of territory throughout the Mediterranean lowlands and much of the Northern Tell. It forced them to conceive of a more systematic and widespread form of domination.

Abd-el-Kader had rapidly erected a sophisticated structure of power. His was an unusually unified confederation. His abolition of land tax seems in particular to have welded together a strong alliance of hitherto 'subject' tribes. A carefully-assembled hierarchy of khalifa-likes, agha-likes, caid-ats and sheikh-ats gave him a tightly disciplined system of internal communication and

administration. However, in submitting to the French in 1847, the Emir did not bequeath a strong governmental apparatus. As with previous Maghrebi ascendancies, the major elements in his hegemony were his personal baraka, related to the appeal of holy war, the physical power and energy of the core tribes, and the particular conjunction of power possibilities which drew in the fringe tribes. With the destruction of these key elements, the edifice inevitably crumbled. Political authority fragmented itself once more among the constituent segmentary groupings. Although the French experimentally employed the system created by Abd-el-Kader, appointing 'loyal' khalifa-s and agha-s to analogous commands, they had little success. These new commanders exercised their 'authority' in a vacuum. "One could not replace the men and keep the system", Julien points out, "because the prestige of the men was the vital ingredient. The new men did not have Jihad in their blood; their motive was money, or fear".¹⁰ Future attempts to 'recognise' indigenous overlordships, and especially to erect new ones, confronted this same structural problem.

The confederation centred around Abd-el-Kader was only one manifestation of a widespread and complex pattern of resistance to European implantation. The Western Tell Atlas, for example, particularly the Dahra and Ouarsenis massifs, could not be forcibly occupied until 1842. Three years later, full-scale revolt swept the highlands, encouraged by the Taibiya order, and led by the mystical Bou Maza, the 'master of the hour'.¹¹ A fresh campaign was necessary to protect French settlements in the Cheliff valley, at a time when Abd-el-Kader was still a threat, and the repression

was of startling severity. These Berber mountains long remained insecure, and responsive to outbreaks of insurrection elsewhere.

On the Eastern Tell, the massifs of Greater and Lesser Kabylia, refuges of communities which had had little contact with Turkish rule, were not finally penetrated by French columns until 1857, after years of watchful hostility.¹² Reaction to the expeditionary force was fierce, armed resistance was prolonged, and the methods of conquest were extremely brutal. Yet once the armed columns had passed by, leaving few garrisons, life returned fairly much to normal. This token 'pacification' lasted barely fourteen years until 1871, when wholesale insurrection again erupted in Kabylia.¹³ The flimsy European presence there weakened by the national crisis in the Metropolis, was destroyed overnight, and flames of resistance broke out anew among neighbouring populations. A massive influx of troops and severe repression were required during the ensuing few months to restore the French position. Large-scale punitive sequestrations of land resulted.

The whole range of the Saharan Atlas, stretching across Southern Algeria from the Monts des Ksour near the Moroccan border to the Aures-Nementcha mountains close to Tunisia, also offered bitter, if piecemeal opposition to the assertion of military control. It was a zone of insecurity for decades. Stern repression was provoked in 1859 and again in 1879 when the *Aahmaniya* order inspired revolt among the Berbers of the Aures; insurrection threatened the area again in 1916, at another time of French weakness. The tribes of the Hodna mountains responded to the threat of European colonization in 1860 with large-scale armed resistance, led by a marabout of the Ouled Sidi Rehab.

In addition to the conquest of these mountain communities, the French army had great difficulty in pacifying the nomadic tribes of the Saharan fringe. In 1864, the insurgent Ouled Sidi Sheikh, in the South of the Oran province, lit sparks of renewed dissidence throughout many recently-pacified highlands, and obliged the 'African army' to intervene in strength. The same region was racked by insurrection in 1881.¹⁴ The subjection of the chain of Saharan cases which ran from El Oued and Touggourt in the East, to Ouarghla, the Mzab and Laghouat in the Centre, and Ain Sefra in the West - areas where the makhzen's writ had never effectively run - was extremely painful and lasted from 1850 to 1890.¹⁵

Military operations in Algeria were thus both violent and prolonged. The resistance of native communities was rarely coordinated over a wide area, due to the segmentary nature of political action. The great imbalance of numbers, weaponry, training and supplies ensured that it was eventually broken down. Nevertheless, a complex assortment of holy men, fraternities, large tribal alliances, powerful notables, individual clans and small egalitarian groups provided local foci for what was a widespread reaction of bitter hostility. Nor was this short-lived: armed presence often needed to be reasserted where it had passed previously, and signs of weakness invited revolt. As a consequence, the early French tactics of 'marching through' or 'pushing back' dissident communities inevitably gave way to a more careful strategy of "settling" or attempting to "organize" them.

To break down resistance, the European invaders were obliged to mingle physical force with diplomacy. Like the Turks, the French entered into the game of segmentary politics as best they could, by exploiting rivalries, encouraging collaboration, offering the privileges of alliance to key clans, and using other indirect means of conquest. To this extent, the segmentary nature of the tribal environment greatly facilitated the task of implantation, although force was necessarily a constant companion of these operations. However, unlike the Turks, the French turned to the segmentary game as a short-term tactic rather than as a long-term strategy. Unlike the moslem odjak, they had little understanding of or sympathy with segmentary logic. They bore European conceptions of government, and imported, or developed locally, novel ambitions directly to 'organize' and 'administer' the territory. The discovery of a teeming segmentary reality beneath the facade of odjak bureaucracy, in this sense, posed massive problems. To implant effective government as they envisaged it, the French were obliged to build their own foundations and impose them, so to speak, from the top down. This delicate work of construction was greatly complicated by the rapid settlement of much of 'useful Algeria' by thousands of European colons, determined to shape the political and economic environment according to their needs and world-view. The administrative structure which grew out of these conditions concretized several basic contradictions.

II. MILITARY GOVERNMENT

-i. Early improvisations

The first elements of regular administration in colonial Algeria were provided by the army. An executive ordonnance (ordinance) of 22nd July 1834 established "the French possessions in the North of Africa" as a military colony, under the French Ministère de la Guerre (Ministry of War). It was to be governed by executive ordinance rather than by parliamentary laws. Responsible locally to the War Ministry was a Gouverneur-Général (Governor General). As the military head both of operational command and of administration, his task was to coordinate campaigns and shape them to the long-term goals of the colony.

Arrangements for the control of the moslem population developed from a series of makeshift policies adopted according to circumstances by military commanders in the field. In order to economise on the expenditure of force, experiment was made in some areas with 'Turkish' methods. 'Loyal' caid-s, khalifa-s and sheikh-s were invested, certain tribes were granted privileged status in order to win over crucial sections of the population, and native troops were recruited as auxiliaries.¹⁶ Diplomatic overtures were made to some tribes, to persuade them to 'submit' in advance of a campaign and indeed to join in that campaign against neighbouring rivals. In return, French troops refrained from attack, and respect was promised for customary rights and usages. As a result of such operations, the Army of Africa developed specialists in 'native affairs', who became expert on 'age-old' clan rivalries, potential collaborators, powerful

families, and likely enemies. Out of this surveillance, and the tactics of divide and rule, strategic goals for native policy began to evolve and harden.

-ii. The Bureaux Arabes¹⁷

The first real attempt by the army to sketch out, develop and coordinate administrative policy towards the native population began in August 1841, when the Gouverneur-Général, Maréchal Bugeaud, established the Direction des affaires arabes (Arab Affairs Office), under Général Daumas. The aim was to build a team of army officers concerned with pacification proper, rather than with military operations per se. The Gouverneur-Général's arrêté (regulation) of 1st February 1844 took the process a stage further by setting up a hierarchy of Bureaux Arabes (Arab Bureaus) wherever military implantation had already been effected. The three provinces were split into 'subdivisions' and 'circles', each with an Arab Bureau. This command post, housed in a small fortified building, was headed by an army officer assisted by one or two junior officers, with a squad of mokhzani (native horsemen) at his disposal.

The network of Arab Bureaus developed gradually over the next 25 years, but it never provided very dense coverage. There were fewer than fifty local Bureaus and only 195 officers even at the organizational peak in 1869, a time when the moslem population of Algeria numbered approximately 2½ million.¹⁸ Inevitably, Arab Bureaus were committed to techniques of vicarious control and influence; "it was not direct administration but a protectorate regime".¹⁹ Their modus operandi, above all, was to contact local

notables, and treat them as intermediaries with indigenous communities.²⁰ Many were invested as caids and aghas, in accordance with the philosophy of Bugeaud expressed in his 1844 circular: "good policy will perhaps always require us, in secondary tasks, to leave the Arabs to be administered by Arabs, reserving the overall direction to the French commandants of provinces and subdivisions".²¹

The Arab Bureau organization was expected to perform multiple, and far-ranging tasks. In 1840 Daumas outlined its goals: "to bring about the lasting pacification of the tribes by means of fair and regular administration, as well as to pave the way for our colonization and trade through the maintenance of public security, the protection of all legitimate interests, and the improvement of native welfare. Its personnel must aim at the peaceful solution of difficulties which too often have required the use of force; and at the overcoming of all obstacles erected against us by a society so different from us in its customs and religion. By studying the country, and analyzing the motives which underlie the behaviour of the Arab population, they will help to indicate the best ways of employing military force in case of insurrection, and enable the most effective and least onerous methods of repressing revolts to be adopted. Finally, they should bring the natives to accept with the minimum of repugnance both our domination and the elements of government which are needed to affirm it".²²

Much of the workload resulting from this philosophy of action was over-ambitious, and other parts of it consisted of inconsequential routine. Many of the goals were ill-defined, inconsistent, and indeed contradictory. Security was always a paramount concern in the action

of the Bureau Arabes. They sought to provide constant surveillance and up-to-the-minute military and political information in order to prevent 'insurrection' and facilitate 'repression of revolts'. The army command laid constant stress on the need for military preparedness against the threat of rebellion. Bugeaud warned in 1842 that "roughly the same forces which made the conquest will be needed to maintain it... Their antipathy for us and for our religion will last for centuries; so let us remain strong among them... You submitted them by arms; you will only keep them in this state of submission by arms".²³ Such sentiments received frequent echo. Général de Clonard declared in 1865, for example: "The virus of insurrection is in their habits, in their blood, in their heart: the Koran wills it!... We are camped in the middle of a population which is extremely adventurous, and admirably organized for war. Nothing less than an army of a hundred thousand and Maréchal Bugeaud was needed to defeat it, and although defeated it has never been submitted".²⁴ Général Deligny made a similar assertion in 1869: "In my experience, I consider... native society to be in a permanent state of conspiracy against us... They are merely awaiting their opportunity to chase us out of the country".²⁵ With this in mind, the Arab Bureau, though entirely separate from the "operational" wing of the army, was required to make a constant display of military 'presence'. Its head, a uniformed officer, made regular mounted tours of inspection, accompanied by his detachment of mokhazni-s. He was responsible for maintaining public order, and had wide discretionary powers to punish individuals or groups whom he deemed to have disturbed this. More important, he was expected energetically to foster contact with reliable notables in order to prevent serious infractions from occurring.

In addition, the Bureau was a source of regular information; it supplied local detail on topography, ethnography and demography; it provided statistics on local economic resources, especially taxable ones, and on the precise status of indigenous property. The 'circle' head was responsible for the registration of births, marriages and deaths; for the establishing of tax liability (with the aid of the *caid*, who did the collecting); for the delimitation and registration of individual and communal land ownership; and for the execution of countless regulations passed down to him from the *Gouvernement-Général*. Indeed, the host of petty bureaucratic demands began to fix many Arab Bureau officers - those men of action par excellence - to their desks. As one officer complained in 1848: "Thirteen registers to be filled in and thirty filing cabinets to look after! This half kills the Arab Bureau and suffocates its activity by surrounding it with paperwork, one of the worst afflictions of our times".²⁶ As a result, many were overwhelmed with work, and indeed unable to perform it in more than a perfunctory manner.²⁷

Part of the original function of the Arab Bureau, as suggested by Daumas, was "to pave the way for our colonization and trade". Besides keeping careful surveillance over the political activities of their charges, and ensuring the collection of statistics and taxes, many of the more energetic Bureau heads became involved in local 'development' projects. Various schemes for promoting agricultural improvement,²⁸ fostering local trade,²⁹ and encouraging public works and community development³⁰ nestled under their wing. For these activities, they earned their nickname: "Robinsons in braid".³¹

In some respects, these efforts pointed in the same direction as colonization, in that they aimed to replace 'inefficient' methods of extensive peasant economy (particularly established patterns of grazing and cultivation) with those of intensive capitalistic enterprise. Their goal was the 'valorization' or 'rational use' of local resources. The thinking behind some of the projects smacked of the 'totalitarian' transformative urge which often seems to lie at the heart of the colonial undertaking. The ambition of one officer in 1849, for example, seemed to be to occupy the total native year: "One of our great enemies in Arab life is their leisure time, during which their imagination has time to roam and can be exploited against us. From this point of view, any labour of public or private utility which we oblige the Arabs to perform during slack farming periods is of particular benefit to our interests and we cannot be too energetic in preparing such enterprises".³² Such plans are of interest in exposing traits of colonial logic, but they had little real impact on indigenous life. The flimsiness of the Arab Bureau infrastructure, its excessive work load, the paucity of its resources, and the sporadic and localized nature of its officers' efforts, rendered it inadequate for dealing with a self-willed task which was immense, complex, and ultimately self-destructive.³³

Another purpose of this 'developmental' work was more important: security. Sedentarization was regarded as a key strategy in the pacification of nomadic and semi-nomadic populations. Thus Richard observed in 1846: "One of the first things to strike anyone observing this country is undoubtedly the great scattering of the

population over the soil. This unfortunate state of affairs deprives the Arabs of any cohesion, gives them a mobility which makes it impossible to lay a hold on them, and allows them somehow to slip between our fingers. This lack of aggregation has another serious disadvantage, in that it delivers them into the hands of the first adventurer who comes along to exploit their fanaticism and thirst for pillage...". Accordingly, he suggested, "the first thing to do is to remove this potential situation from agitators by grouping together the scattered limbs of population, organizing all the tribes we have submitted into zemala-s (militarily-supervised hamlets), and making this a condition for our establishing permanent peace with them".³⁴ In this spirit, Arab Bureaus made numerous attempts to construct permanent markets and residential centres as magnets to attract and fix surrounding groups. There is no real evidence of success.

Arab Bureaus also strove locally to "protect the legitimate interests" of the indigenous population, and to "improve native welfare". This led them to try to stave off or counteract specific projects and general developments which threatened the economic ruin of their charges. Officers in post perceived that the social distress resulting from such disruption created political insecurity and hindered acceptance of European rule. Many came to argue that the socio-political fabric of indigenous life, particularly the role of 'notables', should be positively shored up: without such intermediaries, instability would develop and the French would lose contact with the tribes. It was this kind of thinking that brought

the Arab Bureaus increasingly into variance with the interests of the colons who wished to hasten the 'valorization' of local resources and the spread of European settlement.

Initially, the army regarded the growth of European colonization, and the intermixing of this population with the tribes, as one of the keys to long-lasting domination and security.³⁵ Similarly, the earliest settlers looked upon the army as the indispensable guarantors of their living-space. The two interests were not diametrically opposed ab initio. However, as the immigrant population swelled dramatically and established itself, policy differences emerged, then hardened and widened. The Bureau Arabe, as one embodiment of the army's policy, became involved in bitter polemics with the colon press. The land question, in particular, was a catalyst. Many army officers began to propound the view that large-scale sequestration and subsequent piecemeal alienations of native land were fundamental obstacles to pacification.

"Wherever the vanquished have borne frenetic hatred and indignation towards the conqueror", wrote Richard in 1848, "it is clearly when the soil bearing the bones of his ancestors has been taken from him".³⁶ Many officers became irritated at the incessant demands and growing influence of 'the colon party'. Colonel Robin was to voice this kind of feeling in 1901: "The colons are insatiable", he wrote, "Once the resources of the Domain had been exhausted, to give them land meant to take it from the natives. Every manner of chicanery was employed to prove that the latter were not the real owners, and that they should be expropriated. To see Arabs in possession of fine properties which would have suited them, the

colons felt as if they had been victim of spoliation".³⁷ The army therefore sought locally, in countless obstructive ways, to defend their charges from the full impact of land laws decided nationally. In the 1850's and 1860's, for example, they began to press fervently against the colon programme of "cantonement" (cantonization), which sought to open up large quantities of native land to European purchase. Napoleon III's protective "Arab Kingdom" policy, and the 1863 land reform legislation, was partly the fruit of this resistance. After this policy had been undermined, Bureau Arabe officers were notably unenergetic in responding to pressures to register individual and collective native property.³⁸

It would be wrong to conclude that the army was fundamentally benevolent or far-sightedly developmental in its native policy. In this polarization of views between Arab Bureau and colons, the basic concern of the former remained security, to which other considerations took second place. Bugeaud made this precise point as early as 1847: "It is generally believed", he explained, "that the administration of the ninety thousand Europeans of all nationalities is the main thing. I put first our domination over the Arabs, without which there is no security for the European population nor progress of colonisation; as a second priority, for the same reasons, I place the government and administration of the Arabs; in the third place, colonization and the administration of the Europeans".³⁹ Long after the colons were pressing for 'normalization', 'liberalization' and breathing space for their activities, army spokesmen emphasized the continuing need for special conditions to preserve security. For this reason, they

long opposed the extension of 'civil government' beyond the coastal strip. Partly this was the reaction of a proud corps at the prospect of losing its role in government and administration. But partly, also it reflected the military world-view that the colonial situation was riven by a basic conflict between conqueror and conquered, and that only force - embodied in the army - could hold it together in the foreseeable future. Thus, paradoxically, the Bureau Arabe found itself attempting to restrain one of the fundamental drives of the colonial situation - economic exploitation - in the name of preserving that colonial situation. Though its officers often spoke in favour of native evolution, they usually conceived of it in gradualist terms and under a protective military aegis.⁴⁰

In reaction, the colons charged the Bureaux Arabes with 'aristocratic' contempt for the realities of civilian and Republican government.⁴¹ They stigmatized "the rule of the sword" as aristocratic, and called for the liberation of the indigenous population from its sway. They identified the army with "feudalism" also because of its policy of associating with "native chiefs". Often this reflected a misunderstanding of the nature of authority in segmentary communities; to use Berque's terminology, they could not distinguish between "the natural influence of the notable in his clan" and what they conceived of as "the command of administrative functions by native chiefs who are either legatees of an irrational past, or abusive creations of our regime".⁴² However, to the extent that some Bureau Arabe officers made a similar confusion, there was some justice in colon allegations. Some officers became active and enthusiastic participants in segmentary intrigues, and when clumsy examples came to light - the

Doineau Scandal of 1856-7, for example⁴³ - they were inflated royally by the settler press as evidence of backward militarism.

Perhaps the most bitter and revealing attack on the role of Arab Bureaus, however, concerned their alleged "Arabophilia". They were seen as part of a conspiracy to thwart the legitimate interests of France. The brief flowering of the 'protective' policies of the army during the 1860's brought this vituperation to a height. The measures of this period, limited though they were, were not lightly forgiven by the settlers. The fall of the Second Empire in 1870, and the establishment of the sympathetic Third Republic, gave them an opportunity to settle the scores rapidly, and indeed to extract a prolonged revenge. Beginning with the decrees of 24th October 1870 which drastically curtailed the role of the Arab Bureaus, the power of the army was systematically reduced. "Civil territory", from which Arab Bureaus were banished, was swiftly extended throughout the Tell. Civil rule covered only 4,700 square miles in 1869, but 12,100 square miles by 1873, 28,400 square miles by 1880, and 49,400 square miles by 1891.⁴⁴ The Arab population in this area expanded even more dramatically: from 220,000 in 1869, to 1,890,000 in 1882 and 3,050,000 by 1891.⁴⁵ By the latter date, the "Military Territories of the South" contained fewer than half a million moslems. The Arab Bureau network had withered dramatically, and it never recovered more than a vestigial role.

-iii. The Senatus-Consulte of 1863

There was a temporary reorientation of Algerian colonial policy during the last decade of the Second Empire. The Metropolitan background to this has not, apparently, been the subject of thorough study. It seems that the interests of larger scale French capitalism - finance houses, manufacturers and food merchants - prevailed over the immediate demands of existing smaller-scale Algerian settlement, and that these institutions were concerned with establishing a modus vivendi with indigenous society. Rather than pushing forward with piecemeal land expropriation and pursuing 'assimilation', a more stable form of 'association' was sought which would acknowledge the particularities of tribal life and offer some protection of remaining indigenous property. This became known as the policy of "Royaume Arabe" (Arab Kingdom) following a speech by Napoleon III, who visited the colony in 1860 and became convinced of the need to change the emphasis in Metropolitan action. One of its prime architects was Ismael Urbain,⁴⁶ a moslem-Christian publicist influenced by St-Simonian thought,⁴⁷ and its protagonists included a large number of Arab Bureau officers.⁴⁸ The policy which began to emerge during this period contained contradictory strands of thought, but was not sufficiently long-lived for them to receive full expression in practice.

The crowning achievement of the Arab Kingdom phase was the Senatus-Consulte (Act of the French Senate) of 22nd April 1863.⁴⁹ It radically affected the status of native land. Hitherto, the process of cantonement (cantonization) had treated all indigenous land as Public Domain land, belonging to the conquering French

state, on which tribes merely exercised a right of usufruit. Consequently, where tribes were deemed to be in occupation of more land than they could 'fully use', the state had carved off large slices for European settlement.⁵⁰ The Senatus-Consulte put an end to this. "The tribes of Algeria", its first Article declared, "are...proprietors of the lands which they have permanently and traditionally enjoyed, under whatsoever title".

The bulwark which this Land Act provided against continuing dismemberment of tribal lands nevertheless had several flaws, and proved a mixed blessing for those it ostensibly protected. Firstly, although it closed one stable door, it made no attempt to round up the escaped horses; land already absorbed into the Public Domain, sequestered, or alienated to settlers, was not returned. Moreover, the Act did not really confirm existing indigenous land rights so much as reclassify them into three categories - collective cultivation ('arch), common pasturage, and individual appropriation (melk) - which, at least potentially, fitted them into the operative context of European laws of property. The Act insisted that individual natives could only alienate individualized (melk) property; collective - or undivided - property could only be alienated with the consent of all its 'owners', and control of common land was vested in a communal unit, the douar. A roving Commission, known as the cadastre, was set up to register the dimensions and classify the nature of native landholdings, and until these titles had been delivered no transactions were possible. All this certainly slowed down private sales to settler profiteers. Nevertheless, though reviled by the colons for these

reasons, registration led in practice to wide-scale constitution of individualized property. Even property registered in other categories was rendered vulnerable to the indirect pressures of the market. The protection offered by the Act proved less than comprehensive, and, in subsequent years, the settlers were able to exploit its 'positive' aspects. After the overthrow of the Second Empire and its Arab Kingdom policy, the land laws of 26th July 1873 and 22nd April 1887 opened up large quantities of native land to speculation without having to repeal the 1863 Senatus-Consulte.⁵¹

From the point of view of colonial administration, the most significant aspect of the 1863 reform was the designation of the native douar as the unit to which common land (about 20% of the total) was assigned. The first task of the cadastre commissioners was to divide up indigenous groupings into these douars. According to the arrêté (regulation) of 14th July 1863, douars were to be responsible for the management of common land, and were to voice their views through a jemaa (assembly) appointed by the French administration.

This new development in colonial policy revealed both schematic and imaginative thought on the part of its instigators. It was schematic in that the douar was conceived as a territorial unit, with static boundaries, and a permanent, quasi-corporate assembly. This was an alien projection on to the complex and fluid world of segmentary Algeria. In its traditional context, the 'douar', meaning literally a circle of tents, was merely one of many potential levels of political action. These levels,

moreover, were defined agnatically, not territorially. The particular level at which the authors of the *Senatus-Consulte* chose to freeze this segmentary reality was especially inappropriate. Douars were too big and unwieldy to have close ties of economic or political solidarity; the commissioners split most tribes into a maximum of two.⁵² The traditional level of segmentation which the douar corresponded, if at all, had been mobilized only in times of major armed conflict, and the disarming of the tribes under the French 'peace' rendered it irrelevant. The natural levels of segmentary organization remaining in Algeria were more intimate: fractions, clans, or, in sedentarized areas, villages and village segments. All of these were ignored by the new douar structure. To set up the latter, particularly in densely-populated sedentary areas like Kabylia, was to import a foreign institution, and its congruity with the traditional pattern was largely illusory. In practice, moreover, the work of the commissioners was hurried and peremptory.⁵³ Some extremely artificial units resulted, either grouping together disparate and hostile communities, or alternatively splitting apart groups which had cohesive ties.⁵⁴

Despite these fundamental weaknesses, the *Senatus Consulte* of 1863 did contain ingredients of revolutionary purpose. Its authors, Urbain in particular, had planned to sow seeds of "association" between French and moslem Algeria. Rather than insisting on "assimilation", which they saw as both unrealizable and disruptive, they sought to come to terms with and to foster autochthonous communal institutions. The colonial framework, in their view, must be adapted to the moslem reality. The douar was conceived as a

transitional structure which would induce the agnatic loyalty of the Algerian tribe to interact with, and perhaps evolve towards, the municipal mentality of the French commune. Even the anachronistic aspects of the douar, in as far as they were acknowledged, were justified in developmental terms: as tending to generate 'higher' levels of solidarity.⁵⁵ In the meantime the recognition of the role of a jemaa, the traditional assembly of segmentary Algeria, constituted an acknowledgment of the need to embrace existing nodes of legitimation rather than to impose alien structures from above.

However, the developmental potential in the 1863 reform, with all its attendant inconsistencies, anachronisms and contradictions, had little opportunity to test itself. For the settler-dominated regime which entrenched itself from 1870 onward, the problems of "association" were at best tangential. In particular, the douar as a base cell for a transformative system of native administration was stifled in its cot.

III. THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT⁵⁶

-i. European settlers and Metropolitan France

Algeria was a magnet for European immigration from the earliest years of conquest. Extensive State seizure of land and property, and the expulsion and exodus of many native groups, facilitated the rapid settlement of peasants, traders and artisans on the littoral plains. The ports of Algiers, Oran and Bone, abandoned by much of their moslem population, soon developed sizeable French communities, and small colon centres began to burgeon throughout the Mediterranean region. By 1836, there were already 32,000 European inhabitants of Algeria. This number had swollen to over 100,000 by the time of Abd-el-Kader's surrender in 1847, and had reached 600,000 by the turn of the century. The interests, concepts and pressures of this group had far greater influence on the type of administrative framework erected around native political life than either the military command or the Metropolitan government.

The priorities of military administration centred on security. The pacification and control of the native population required an 'exceptional regime', and the exercise of 'emergency powers'. Once a modicum of security had been established, the settlers perceived this as an obstacle to their bourgeois interests. They sought not merely an expansion of colonization, but also the development, or 'normalization', of civilian government for the European population. They cast these demands in terms of "assimilation".

In one sense, this concept of political "assimilation" concerned the European settler population exclusively. It contained at least

two ideas, often confused but never coterminous, which frequently led to different practical conclusions. One notion of "assimilation" simply entailed the extension to French residents in Algeria of conditions of social and political life analogous to those prevailing in the Metropolis: similar governmental institutions, for example, and a similar legal framework. Another version of "assimilation" was essentially a theory about the relationship between the government of European expatriates and that of their Mother Country; it constituted an assertion that European Algeria be incorporated within the same political system. The settlers attitude to this question of the political relationship between Algeria and France was fundamentally instrumental. On the one hand, certain practical advantages resulted from remaining a constituent part of the French polity; in particular it was a logical basis on which to demand the extension of analogous civil rights. On the other hand, to ensure a "French life style" in the special colonial conditions of Algeria actually required different local arrangements and special institutions to supervise them and, for this reason, settlers pressed to loosen certain ties with the Metropolis. Paradoxically, this latter argument could also be pursued in terms of 'assimilation', the settlers demanding the 'fundamental right of Frenchmen' to participate in and control their own affairs.

Oscillation between these poles was a constant feature of settler politics, and indicates a problematic at the heart of their enterprise. To an extent, the dominance of one or other of the tendencies appears to correspond to temporal stages. During the first half century of the colony's existence, the settlers were chiefly

concerned with tightening their political links with France. By this means they sought to establish civilian direction at the head of Algerian affairs, to open access to representative institutions at Metropolitan and Algerian levels, and to achieve the same political, legal and administrative status for expatriate groups and individuals as was current across the Mediterranean. Once assimilation in these forms had been achieved, however, the colons later shifted into a policy of demanding or defending a calculated measure of autonomy from France.

In the first phase, the demands for 'assimilation' at the highest level of government had little impact until the military position became established and settlement was widespread. Eventually, despite the opposition of the Gouverneur-Général, Maréchal Bugeaud, Algeria was in 1845 divided into 'civil', 'mixed', and 'military' territories. The civil area was defined as that "in which there is a sufficiently numerous European population to have been organized already, or to be organized in the future".⁵⁷ The departure of Bugeaud in 1847, and the fall of the Orleanist monarchy and advent of the Second Republic in 1848, opened the way to the spread of 'republican' institutions to Algeria. Its consummation was the assimilative decrees of November-December 1848.⁵⁸ Algeria was proclaimed an integral part of "French territory". It was not given special colonial status, but instead was fitted out with a politico-administrative structure akin to that of France. French citizens there were given the right to send elected deputies to the French National Assembly. The three former Turkish beyliks, hitherto called provinces, were

split into 'civil' and 'military' parts. The former became départements on the Metropolitan pattern, headed by a préfet appointed by and responsible to the Ministère de l'Intérieure in Paris. The same model was followed in the subdivision of départements into arrondissements (districts), each to be headed by a sous-préfet. Finally, an increasing number of communes (municipalities) was planned as the bottom rungs of this hierarchy. The area and population which each of these institutional levels was expected to administer was far larger in Algeria than in France, but otherwise the colonial framework was a transplantation of the Metropolitan structure.

The most notable 'anomaly' in this schema was the continuing role of the Gouverneur-Général, situated in Algiers.⁵⁹ He was appointed by the Executive in Paris - by the President of the Republic from 1870 - and was responsible to it for the local coordination of military and civil administration. The task of his organization was to execute in Algeria both the general corpus of Metropolitan legislation, and those decrees issued specifically for Algeria. To this end, he had considerable powers to issue his own local arrêtés (regulations).

The role of the Gouvernement-Général often provoked considerable suspicion and disgruntlement among the settlers, and provided a focus for pressures for and against 'assimilation'. Originally, it was a manifestation of military rule, and thus seemed to colons designed to thwart their interests. After 1870, its role became almost exclusively civil, yet certain Gouverneurs-Généraux were still appointed from military backgrounds, which

caused continuing unease. Above all, perhaps, the Gouverneur-Général was an outsider, appointed by the Metropolis, usually from Metropolitan stock. The rapid turnover of incumbents - few remained in office for more than five years - prevented their developing too "Algerian" a view of policy. Some appeared to arrive with 'preconceived ideas', occasionally with plans for reform, and all received a flow of instructions from Paris. To this extent, the Gouverneur-Général was potentially a symbol of Metropolitan 'ignorance', 'lack of sympathy', or 'interference'. What was perhaps more threatening to settler interests was that he controlled a specialized organization capable of effective local action. In other words, although his activity appeared in theory to exemplify the decentralization of authority from Paris to Algiers, in practice it threatened to render the voice of Paris more effective in local affairs.

For these reasons, the Algerian settler community pressed in the early stages for a reduction in the role of the Gouvernement-Général. They demanded that Algerian administrative services be directly and separately attached to specialized French Ministries. The decree of 26th August 1881 gave them considerable satisfaction in this regard. It complicated the distribution of authority in Algeria between Gouvernement-Général, Préfets, Metropolitan Ministries, and local elected municipalities, but this suited settler interests. The colons preferred token dependence on a remote Paris bureaucracy, incapable of developing or imposing a coordinated and energetic Algerian policy, to real dependence on an intermediary Algiers bureaucracy, capable of forging and actively implementing a coherent policy. In short, "assimilation", in this sense of annexing services directly to Parisian ministries, offered de facto autonomy.

The Gouvernement-Général, apart from its temporary abolition between 1858 and 1860, in fact remained a permanent feature of colonial administration. Yet it was never a powerful lever for the imposition of Metropolitan as opposed to settler policy in Algeria, and after the initial phase it was rarely an object of unremitting settler hostility. As Ageron suggests, the relationship between the Metropolis and the colony, with the Gouverneur-Général as its apparent lynch-pin, constituted "a trompe l'oeil construction in which Paris apparently administered, but the politicians and functionaries of Algeria really gave the orders".⁶⁰

One reason for this state of affairs was that no divergence of political interest between Metropolis and Algeria actually took on organized institutional forms for most of the colonial era. The French National Assembly, for example, was greatly influenced by an active and vocal delegation of deputies representing Algerian constituencies. At the instigation of French Algerians, the law of 26th July 1881 had doubled to six their parliamentary representation which, by the operation of strict assimilative logic, would have been limited to three. This disproportionate voice grew: by the Second World War, there was a bloc of 30 Algerian deputies in the National Assembly, elected almost exclusively by French settlers. In any case, the extreme 'Republicanism' of the Algerian colons found a natural echo among most of the deputies of the Third Republic.⁶¹ A web of financial and commercial interests linked their welfare with that of the Metropolitan bourgeoisie.

Policy differences between settler representatives and the Metropolitan Executive were also minimal. The absence of one specialized Ministry dealing with Algerian affairs meant that responsibility was

dissipated between the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of War, and several other specialized departments. Metropolitan politicians seeking changes in colonial policy found that there was no easy route through which to channel them. The Algerian section within the Ministry of the Interior was not large or prestigious; rather than pressing comprehensive policies upon the Gouvernement-Général, it provided fairly lax and passive supervision over a limited area of concern. When the need arose during the 1950's to impose a Metropolitan policy radically opposed to that advocated by the settlers, the necessary machinery was lacking. Only in 1956 was a hasty arrangement made for a separate Ministry of Algeria, with a seat in the French Cabinet; indeed this tardy reform involved the replacement of the Gouverneur-Général by a Resident Minister.

Not only was there no stream of firm Metropolitan directives on to the desk of the Gouverneur-Général, but political realities on the Algerian side of the Mediterranean ensured that he was subject to incessant colon pressure. His own staff was predominantly French Algerian in composition, and thus sympathetic to settler interests. Moreover, as well as Metropolitan channels the colons had important representative organs at the local départemental level with great influence on the Gouvernement-Général. Foremost among these were the conseils-généraux, established in 1858. Essentially settler bodies, with only a small number of unrepresentative moslem members, they were energetic and powerful propagandists, and their cooperation was vital for the successful implementation of many départemental projects. In addition, each conseil-general had representatives on the Algerian conseil supérieur or conseil du gouvernement. This was an all-European consultative body comprising high Algerian functionaries, including the Gouverneur-Général,

as well as elected delegates from the conseil-généraux. It provided an Algeria-wide platform for sustained colon pressure on the Executive, and was a further anomaly in terms of 'pure' assimilation. Additionally, between 1898 and the Second World War, Algeria-wide délégations-financières were set up to debate and supervise the special Algerian budget which the colons had successfully demanded. The two French sections - one 'colon', one 'non-colon'-wielded great influence on the financial priorities of the Gouvernement-Général, and were an infinitely more significant force than the single Native section.

These organized outlets for political demands, orchestrated by the colon press, could not be lightly ignored by the Gouverneur-Général, even if he disagreed with them. There was invariably great interest among the expatriate community in Gouverneur-Général appointments, and new arrivals were immediately subjected to an avalanche of advice, delegations and pressure. Some Govern^uers had to be replaced when they provoked excessive ire or lost settler confidence; other^y seem partially to have owed their appointment to known sympathy with the settler cause. Many in effect became spokesmen for the colons to the French government. In this sense, the settler community often welcomed the role of the Gouverneur-Général, expecting him to understand and defend its interests vis à vis the remote Metropolis.

Thus the concept of "assimilation", in settler hands, was complex and ambivalent. Defence of or demand for local 'anomalies' was an equally important ingredient of their political position. They long argued in favour of local tax privileges and financial subsidies from the Metropolis in the name of encouraging settlement; close financial ties with France were an essential aspect of this. Towards the end of the 19th Century,

however, the settler community perceived that the balance of advantage was changing. Algerian agriculture and trade had grown extremely prosperous. Accordingly, settler representatives began to press for a separate Algerian budget in order to retain more of the colony's wealth for the colony's direct benefit.⁶² Yet in so doing, they urged that 'special items', including the cost of the army, should continue to be borne by the Metropolis. The turn of the century, in fact, saw the development among French Algerians of certain autonomist and even separatist tendencies. They alleged that the Metropolis was deliberately stunting the expansion of Algerian trade and industry in order to protect its own interests, and attacked its 'interference' in the colony's affairs.⁶³ These elements of resentment surfaced again most dramatically from the mid-1950's onward, when the Metropolis, faced with the growing financial embarrassment and political crisis caused by the outbreak of guerilla warfare, began to search for solutions which would harm the privileges of the expatriate Europeans. The settlers rapidly developed a paramilitary resistance organization, the O.A.S., whose programme became increasingly committed to separatism.⁶⁴ The ambivalence of "assimilationist" terminology then reached an ironic climax in their emotive slogan: "Algérie française!"

-ii. Assimilation and native policy

Despite certain appearances, "assimilation" was never a purely 'domestic' issue concerning European emigrants and their homeland. From the outset, it was inextricably interwoven with questions of policy towards the indigenous population of Algeria. The 'colon programme' of the mid-19th Century,⁶⁵ which fought for the end of military rule and the extension of French political norms and

institutions to Algeria, also pressed for the autochthonous community to be included within this civil framework. This was not a grudging concession but a central goal of the settler enterprise.

The concept of the "assimilation" of moslem Algeria was an ideological weapon used to justify and disguise exploitation. It implied that there should be no toleration, support, or protection for the separate customs and traditional institutions of the native population. The latter should be exposed uncompromisingly to the same organs of law and government as controlled and expressed settler life. Within this new framework, obstacles to the free operation of 'market forces' should be deliberately dismantled. Naturally, this put the settlers at an overwhelming practical advantage, though in principle this would be only temporary, for the native was 'expected' progressively to adapt himself to this modern world. In the meantime, objective exploitation could be rationalized in terms of 'destroying feudalism', 'spreading civilization', or fostering such progressive ideals as 'liberty, equality and fraternity'.

At the same time, various devices deprived the native, in practice, ~~of~~ from access to protections which a genuine process of assimilation might appear to have offered him. 'Compensations' such as the right to vote, an equitable share of government expenditure, or freedom from arbitrary laws were systematically denied or 'postponed'. The right for moslems to vote at départemental level was only a minor example of this, insignificant in view of the remoteness of this level from real moslem experience, but significant as a small illustration of the mechanics of the colonial situation. The conseil général debated the budget of each département. The moslem population contributed a significant share of

these financial resources: between 55% and 65% of départemental income in 1890, for example.⁶⁶ Yet at the same time, it had virtually no say in the allocation of this money. Throughout the Nineteenth Century conseillers-généraux were elected only by the French population. From 1870, the colonial administration nominated moslem 'assessors' to sit on the conseils. Not only were these unrepresentative figures, 'loyal' to France, but they formed only one-sixth of the membership. Thus in the Akbou district, 285 French electors in 1890 chose the conseillers, without any consultation of the 219 865 moslem taxpayers.⁶⁷ From 1908 these moslem conseillers were made elective, but the franchise was accorded to a handful of socially 'acceptable' natives. In 1919, the proportion of moslem conseillers was raised to one quarter, and in 1947 to two-fifths. Moslem participation at départemental level was thus carefully restricted throughout the colonial era.

At higher levels of government, the situation was even more exclusive. No moslems at all were elected or nominated to the conseil du gouvernement. As for elections to the French National Assembly, the very ideology of assimilation served to deprive the moslem population of any vote. It was insisted, until the ordonnance of 17th August 1945, that the right to vote could only be granted to moslems who became 'naturalized' French citizens. Since 'naturalization' involved the renunciation of moslem status, an unthinkable step for all but a few individuals cut off from communal solidarités, this apparently 'logical' stipulation neatly barred the natives from their notional right to parliamentary representation. A more 'generous' franchise was ultimately extended to moslems for elections to the short-lived Algerian Assembly established in September 1947, but a multitude of formal and informal devices, such as twin electoral rolls, non-registration of voters,

gerrymandering, and electoral fraud helped to ensure that even in this flimsy framework the full weight of moslem numbers would not be brought to bear.⁶⁸

These various mechanisms of exclusion was reconciled with the verbiage of "assimilation" by the sub-ideology of transition. As yet, the argument ran, the native was factually unprepared, insufficiently evolved, for full participatory rights. In the meantime, his evolution would be accelerated by subjecting him to the obligations implicit in the new framework. Vague promises of rights in the future were thus crudely traded off against actual extraction of duties and refusal of special protection in the present. This was made explicit by the Gouverneur-Général Tirman in 1889, in refusing to improve specialized moslem administration: "We must not lose sight of the fact that the time will come when all the natives will be brought to enjoy the benefits of municipal life. To prepare for this future day, we must as of now act in conformity with the rules which will then be in operation".⁶⁹

The terminology of transition, however, was of temporary value only. Once again, the ^{calon} attitude to assimilation was instrumental. Any real threat that "this future day" was about to dawn, despite their efforts, led them to abandon the concept of "assimilation", which they often openly derided. Instead they uttered alternative theories about the impossibility of truly Europeanizing the intractable native and the desirability of 'separate development'. Thus the President of the hitherto ultra-assimilationist conseil-général of the département of Constantine felt able to declare in 1893 that "we are destined to live with the Arabs, to use their special capacities

for the exploitation of this country, and our first duty is to respect their customs by banishing any idea of assimilation".⁷⁰ These two propaganda strands rationalised different strategies of local or Metropolitan exploitation of natives. Alternation between them was an endemic feature of settler politics and revealed deep contradictions in the colonial situation.

These conflicts in native policy were intimately bound up with the question of colon-Metropolitan relations. The occasional struggles between Paris and Algiers usually centred on who was to determine, and in whose interests, the treatment accorded to the indigenous population. Many complex ideological cross-currents churned below this fundamental issue. On occasion, the settlers demanded a measure of local autonomy from France in order to "assimilate" the natives and subject them to the rigours of European law; conversely, the Metropolis found itself seeking to intervene more directly in Algerian affairs, using channels which bound Algeria to the French polity, in order to protect or provide specialized institutions for the moslem population. At other times, the settlers demanded the right 'as Frenchmen' to determine their own affairs in order to maintain special Algerian laws affecting the moslem population; while the Metropolis sought, in the name of assimilation, to extend fundamental common law rights to moslems.

The Metropolitan 'case' which we can trace through these currents was little more than a subdued logical counterpoint to the reality of settler dominance. In practical terms, the Metropolis was not a separate political bloc actively controlling or confronting colon ambitions. The colonial situation in Algeria was colon-centred, and its structures concretized settler interests and concerns. This was

true ^{not} only at the levels of central and regional government, but also at the local level where European administration directly impinged on the segmentary life of indigenous Algeria.

IV. THE COMMUNE DE PLEIN EXERCICE⁷¹

-i. Establishment

The arrangements made for the local administration of tribal Algeria were moulded, or distorted, by the needs of colonization. They originated in the rather haphazard development of municipal institutions in centres of European settlement. During the first two decades of French rule, a handful of colon townships - Algiers, Oran, Mostaganem, Bone and Philippeville initially - acquired certain powers of self-administration akin to those of 'communes' in France. With the establishment of civil territory in 1845, these communes began to proliferate as the base cell of the European hierarchy of government. By 1856 there were 47, and by 1873 a total of 126. Originally designed for and confined to predominantly European areas, they extended conditions of French municipal life to expatriates. They were not designed for the direct administration of the indigenous population. But although all newly-established communes centred around an immigrant nucleus, they increasingly came to affect and incorporate large numbers of moslems as well.

The Algerian commune was later suffixed de plein exercice (with full attributes) in order to distinguish it from the commune mixte, which became the pattern for the remaining parts of Algeria. Its machinery was closely modelled on its French counterpart. Indeed, following the loi (law) passed by the French National Assembly on 5th April 1884, both were regulated by the same statute, apart from a few significant amendments affecting moslem participation.⁷² It was as if county councils, municipal boroughs or rural district councils had been introduced into Nigeria under British rule.

The commune de plein exercice had a separate budget and communal property. Responsibility for managing these was vested in a directly-elected conseil municipal (municipal council), which in turn elected a maire (mayor) and his adjoint (deputy). The maire made executive decisions on behalf of the commune, including the drafting of local by-laws, subject to the supervision of the conseil. He was not merely a representative of the commune, however; he also acted as an agent of central government. In Algeria, this made him responsible both to the préfet and to the Gouverneur-Général, and through both to the Ministère de l'Interieur in France. As an agent of central government, he was expected to safeguard public order, foster public welfare, conduct civil registration, and ensure effective liaison with specialized services. He headed a small administrative unit, the mairie, which included one or several assistants, secretaries, gardes champêtres (rural police), and gardes forestiers (forest rangers). In larger townships, this administrative apparatus was often quite extensive.

Into this structure, corresponding to French concepts of municipal life, huge numbers of moslems were rapidly squeezed. Settlers were eager to include neighbouring indigenous groups within the aegis of their fledgling communes. A deliberate policy of "annexation of douars" was pursued, and became particularly feverish between 1870 and 1914. As a result, virtually half of the population of communes de plein exercice was moslem by 1873; this proportion had risen to two-thirds by 1939, and to three-quarters by 1954. The average moslem population in a commune rose 450% between 1881 (when there were 192 communes) and 1955 (when there were 330). This overall "nativization" process took place despite the formation of separate communes mixtes in the

exclusively moslem areas. Often the result was a striking imbalance. The commune of Mekla in Kabylia, for example, contained 9098 moslems and only 140 Europeans in 1914.⁷³

The reason for this willingness, indeed eagerness to annex native douars was simple: they were a major source of municipal finance.⁷⁴ Once annexed, the inhabitants of a douar were liable to pay municipal taxes - both the direct municipal levy (prestations) and various excise duties. These contributions accounted for between one quarter and a half of the typical communal budget even in the Nineteenth Century. Moreover, the douars had communal property, established under the provisions of the 1863 Senatus-consulte; once within the jurisdiction of the commune, this property became an integral part of its resources. As a result, indigenous groups could find themselves paying rent to the municipality for farming their traditional lands.⁷⁵ Non-payment in such cases could lead to confiscation of the property, or its enforced sale to a European tenant. In addition, the moslem population was the principal source of fines, which resulted from a massive repertoire of new regulations concerning such matters as pasturage and forest management. Fees for municipal services were another source of income from the native population.

The annexation of native douars actually made it possible for communes to balance their budgets, at least during the 19th Century. Before agreeing to the establishment of a commune, indeed, the Gouvernement-Général often had to guarantee its financial viability by 'granting' douars to it. This stimulated considerable greed. The colon centre of Carnot, for example, with a population of 117, applied for commune status in 1884 and claimed jurisdiction over surrounding douars containing 9,000 moslems; it received commune status, but was

'allowed' only 3 000 moslems.⁷⁶ The contributions of these tax-payers enabled communes to spend fairly lavishly on public facilities. "Even the smallest Algerian commune", wrote Jonnart in 1892, "sets itself up with squares, tree-lined and paved streets, drinking-water, wash-houses, markets, abbatoirs - commodities and luxuries which so many communes in France have to do without for financial reasons".⁷⁷ From 1890 onwards, between 25% and 30% of communal budgets was being swallowed by the general running costs of the mairie, including generous salaries for the maire and other European employees.⁷⁸

-ii. The Municipal Council and the Maire

Although major financial contributors, the moslem inhabitants of communes de plein exercice were 'members' of them only in a restricted sense. The conseil municipal of the commune was made elective by the decree of 27th December 1866.⁷⁹ French residents were granted the right to chose their conseillers by universal suffrage. Moslems, on the other hand, were accorded an extremely restrictive franchise, which reached only a handful of socially unrepresentative 'loyal' or 'evolved' voters. The decree of 6th February 1919 enlarged this category only slightly, to include all males over 25 who were either army veterans, active or retired employees of the central or local administration, landlords, large-scale farmers, licensed traders, holders of the certificate of primary studies, members of Chambers of Agriculture and Commerce, and prizewinners in agricultural exhibitions (sic).⁸⁰ This reform left 90 000 moslem voters out of well over 1 000 000 moslems in communes proper. The ordonnance of 7th March 1944 extended the municipal vote rather further, but it remained well short of universality up until the development of armed insurrection in the mid-1950's.⁸¹

Moreover, these few voters formed a separate electoral roll, the "Second College", while French voters constituted their own distinct "First College". The number of conseillers whom the Second College could elect varied according to the number of moslem inhabitants of the commune, but in no case was this allowed to exceed a fixed maximum percentage. In 1866, moslems, Jews and foreigners together were allowed to choose up to 33% of the conseil; in 1884, the maximum percentage for moslems alone was adjusted to 25%; this was raised to 33% in 1914, and again to 40% in 1944. Thus, no matter how many moslem inhabitants or qualified voters there were, the representatives of the European First College always had a comfortable built-in majority. A handful of French voters controlled the council even in those communes overwhelmingly composed of native Algerians. In Tizi-Ouzou in 1881, for example, the destinies of 22 537 moslem inhabitants (of whom 1311 were voters) were effectively decided by 236 French voters.⁸² This kind of anomaly became all the more striking as the ratio of moslems to Europeans increased.

Moslems who became municipal councillors under these conditions had been elected by and belonged to a narrow and often collaborationist social stratum. They were regarded with contempt both by their coreligionaries and by the Europeans.⁸³ Their role in the conseil's proceedings, which were conducted entirely in French, was generally docile and self-effacing. Under changing circumstances after the First World War, a few determined moslem conseillers endeavoured to voice grievances on behalf of the moslem community,⁸⁴ but the reins of power remained firmly in European hands. Before the Second World War, the conservative bourgeois-nationalist Federation de Elus (Federation of Elected Representatives), founded by Dr. Bendjelloul, began to

orchestrate organized demands among a few of these councillors. Increasingly, a handful of men such as Ferhat Abbas, the future leader of the pro-assimilationist Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerian, became municipal councillors.⁸⁵ After the war, with the expansion of suffrage, even the more radical nationalist groups made sporadic attempts to use communal elections as a platform for their views. But this kind of political activity had little impact on local government as such. Ahmed Ben Bella, for example, who became municipal councillor for his home town Marnia in 1945, explained twenty years later that, "we the minority only had the right to agree, and in order to disagree we had to resign. The alternatives were to agree to everything, or to turn everything down".⁸⁶ Nationalist parties came to declare that both the municipal institutions and the method of election were parts of a sterile game, and furthermore accused the French administration of wholesale ballot-rigging.⁸⁷ Communal elections became chiefly a focus for the organization of boycotts,⁸⁸ and of mass resignations of existing councillors.⁸⁹

In any case, the most powerful person in the commune remained the maire. Whatever the composition of the municipal council, he was invariably a Frenchman. He and his deputies were elected by the council. Representatives of the Second College were disbarred from participating in this procedure until the decree of 1st January 1914, and even thereafter moslems were disqualified from becoming maires or deputies. The built-in French majority made it impossible in practice for even a naturalized native to become maire.⁹⁰

The quintessence of the maire was his Frenchness; he was a prominent settler, and the focus of the expatriate community. Though he was technically a representative of the whole municipality,

including the moslems, he was in all important respects the spokesman and agent of the European community alone. He was European, he was elected by Europeans, and to Europeans he felt responsible. He was also an amateur, for no special qualifications or training were required. Especially in the more rural communes, his administrative competence was often highly questionable: Sabatier sweepingly dismissed maires as "illiterate butchers and cafe-owners".⁹¹ Motives for seeking mayoral office were often related to personal affairs, and occupation of the post did not preclude the continuation of a former business or trade.⁹² With the position went social prestige and the accumulation of useful contacts and debts of honour. Moreover, the Algerian maire, unlike his French counterpart, was paid, and often generously, depending on the size of his commune. He had many opportunities for patronage, since communal resources could support a considerable workforce and offered lucrative contracts to local entrepreneurs. The supervision provided by the préfectorat and Gouvernement-Général was lax, or non-existent.⁹³ As a result, corruption and illegal practice in mairies was far from unknown.⁹⁴ The maire of a large commune could often become very powerful indeed.⁹⁵

-iii. Administration of native douars

This municipal framework, designed to make the French community "feel at home",⁹⁶ largely neglected the administration of its growing moslem population, except in the matter of revenue collection. Not until 1919 was the financial contribution of douars in any way earmarked for expenditure on their specific needs; it disappeared into the communal budget, controlled by the settlers. As a result, few projects of benefit to moslem areas were sponsored, a situation which Ferry

described as "daylight robbery".⁹⁷ For the Gouvernement-Général to devolve upon communes the execution of measures designed to relieve social distress or foster social welfare among the moslem population, was to condemn them to delay and often to oblivion. The transfer of financial responsibility for free Franco-Arab schools to the communal budget in 1865, for example, was a kiss of death; all ten of them had closed within five years.⁹⁸ As Jonnart argued before the French National Assembly in 1893: "The interests of the Natives, who cannot vote but must pay, and indeed who bear a heavy burden, are unfortunately sacrificed to the interests of a few dozen voters...Virtually nothing is done for the Native. The fact is that electoral considerations and the demands of local politics preoccupy and determine the activities...of the municipal councils." "No doubt", he added, "the colons have legitimate and respectable interests to safeguard, but their outlook is necessarily limited. To place in their hands the fate of the 3 500 000 natives living in Algeria is to expose them to injustice and to what can only be called exploitation. Disguising this behind written laws does not make it any less profoundly immoral. It delays, even jeopardizes, the expansion of our influence".⁹⁹ This view went largely unheard.

Even with the best will in the world, it was difficult for the small mairie to exercise effective supervision over the interests of its moslem administrees. One result of the greedy scramble for douars in the last decades of the 19th Century was the establishment of communes responsible for an impracticably large physical area and population. At a time when the typical Metropolitan commune covered less than 6 square miles, and Paris itself extended over only 30 square miles, the average size of an Algerian 'commune de plein exercice' in 1879 was

34 square miles. Some were enormous; the commune of Oued Zenati covered over 290 square miles in 1881, for example.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, the moslem population lived in scattered segmentary groupings, not in agglomerated townships. The commune of Tizi-Ouzou in 1919, for example, incorporated a native population of 30 000 distributed in 75 separate hamlets.¹⁰¹ Inevitably, as Chanzy admitted, "a maire rarely has sufficient ability or time to visit the douars".¹⁰²

Despite colon propaganda to the effect that the commune freed the native from the evils of 'feudalism' and tutored him in new tasks and methods of social construction, its general result was actually to abandon him to his own devices. "The native area placed under the common law", Marchal claimed in 1879, "is precisely the worst administered area". Such a state of affairs, he went on to argue, prevented all hopes of gradually assimilating the indigenous population within the colonial framework: "though not very noticeable today, because limited to a small area and scattered in small patches, (this) will certainly have extremely disastrous consequences for Algeria if it were imprudently allowed to spread".¹⁰³ Nevertheless, spread it did. With further annexations and demographic growth, the settler-centred commune de plein exercice became the colonial framework for an ever-increasing proportion of the autochthonous community.

The fundamental weakness of native administration within the commune de plein exercice was not its reluctance to devote time or money to moslem welfare, but its very institutional character. A European-inspired territorial net was flung loosely, almost absent-mindedly, over a segmentary reality with which it made little attempt to come to terms. Two possibilities were systematically ignored, or stifled: the development from above of a specialized corps of

administrators, and the encouragement of indigenous communal growth from below. Failure in the first respect was illustrated by the fate of the short-lived experiment with civil Arab Bureaus.¹⁰⁴

From time to time, liberal Metropolitan politicians and administrators produced tentative plans to withdraw responsibility for native douars from the mairie and to vest it in a centrally-supervised and coordinated corps of specialized administrators. Inevitably, these met such a torrent of hostility from settler organizations that action was paralyzed. A half-hearted experiment of this kind was actually implemented during the Second Empire, but expired rapidly from both internal weaknesses and external neglect. In 1854, Arab Bureaus began to be established in areas of civil, communal control. Hitherto, they had been military institutions, found only in areas of military rule. These new organisms, known as "Bureaux arabes départementaux", were staffed by specially recruited civilians.

The purpose of these Bureaus appears to have been poorly thought out. They were designed to supplement rather than replace the work of the mairie, and the affected douars still paid their municipal taxes. They were expected to form some kind of links with native notables, and to encourage projects of communal development. Yet they were also intended to hasten the disaggregation of segmentary groupings within the framework of European municipal institutions. For the fulfilment of these ambivalent requirements, they were not generously endowed with resources, either in manpower or finance. Their somewhat hybrid personnel was intended on the one hand to wear uniform and go on the regular mounted tours of inspection associated with its military counterpart, but on the other hand lacked any military forces (mokhazni) to command. They remained closely answerable to the départemental préfectorat. Accordingly, the settlers

viewed them with a mixture of derision and hostility, and gave little cooperation to their efforts. The army command treated the development with condescending scepticism. Though little study has been made of the experiment, it appears to have had no appreciable impact on native life in the communes where it was instituted. In 1868, these bureaus were disbanded, though their growth had long before been halted. In the same year, moslems had been accorded token participation in the election of municipal councils, and the influential assimilationist thesis claimed that this afforded adequate means for native communities to defend their interests. The unhappy life and rapid death of the civil Arab Bureaus illustrates the indifference towards specialized native administration which was also to cripple the work of indigenous caids.

-iv. The Caid¹⁰⁵

In theory, communes de plein exercice continued to supervise the life of their douars through special indigenous intermediaries, called adjoints indigènes (Native Assistants) by the decrees of 1866 and 1868, and renamed caids in 1919. The function of these agents, however, was ill-defined. Their creators seem to have intended 'native assistants' to take up within the new civil framework of the commune the role performed by the traditional caid. They were to provide a link between the colonial administration and autochthonous social groupings, in the same way as caids had been intermediaries between central government and local tribes. However, their resemblance to the traditional Maghreb caid was minimal. They neither enjoyed the confidence of local segmentary communities, nor were they recipients

of effective authority from the colonial state. The expectations of that state were very different from those of the traditional makhzen, and those segmentary societies had different needs in the new situation.

The commune de plein exercice was not designed as a framework of indirect rule. The appointment of native assistants to the mairie was not intended to afford positions of authority to douar notables. Rarely were they chosen from prominent local families. Many were either of lowly origin, seeking the security of a humble career in the colonial administration, or indeed were complete strangers to the district to which they were appointed. The post of commune assistant was frequently a reward for proven 'loyalty', especially military service. As a result, most of them were cut off from intimate contact with the authentic representatives of douar communities. The latter associated them with the settler-dominated regime. As their nickname of "Beni-Oui-Oui" (literally meaning the tribe of yes-men) suggests, commune caids were regarded as collaborationist nonentities. Their role was parasitic; many spent more time in the colon centre than in the douars where their nominal responsibility lay. Even had the French sought to attract authentic 'notables' into caid-ships, they would have difficulty in doing so in view of those notables' tendency to withdraw from contact with the colonial administration. The choice of the menial title of 'adjoint indigène' in 1866 suggests that the French never intended to attract their participation. To rename the incumbents 'caids' in 1919 was to recognize the deficiency, without remedying it.

The 'native assistant' or 'caid' did not acquire alternative supplies of authority from above to compensate for his lack of roots below.

He was treated simply as a minor employee of the commune. Until 1919, he was nominated by the préfet on the simple recommendation of the maire; even when the Gouvernement-Général assumed responsibility thereafter, individual appointments were essentially decided by the municipality. The small-scale colon principality of the mairie was a far cry from the traditional makhzen as a source of authority. Furthermore, the tasks to which the caid was assigned were extremely petty: collection of taxes, civil registration, the issuing of permits and minor police work, for example. He was poorly paid. Many were even unable to read or write, so had few sources of real prestige even in terms of bureaucratic rationality. Above all, the caid of the commune was not employed in any positive sense as a political intermediary. He had no real powers of initiative; indeed he did not even have the right to sit on the municipal council. In short, even his limited potential was under-utilized.

The appointment of caids was left to the discretion of the commune. Article 5 of the Algerian municipal decree of 1884 stated merely that adjoints should be appointed "in communes de plein exercice where the native population is sufficiently numerous for special surveillance to be necessary". The Metropolis and the Gouvernement-Général did not press for its implementation. Supposedly, the ideal situation was to have one caid for each douar, but many communes did not trouble to appoint a single caid. Only 46 caids had been appointed to 178 communes de plein exercice by 1878, and 201 to 278 communes in 1913. One motive for this reluctance to appoint was financial; a caid's salary was payable from the communal budget and settlers were reluctant to devote such resources to moslem administration. A more fundamental reason was that the institution was not perceived in developmental terms. It was not

regarded as an effective means of involving the native population in municipal undertakings, which itself was not regarded as a goal of prime importance. Instead the caid was treated as an anachronistic survival, destined to disappear with the process of civilization. Although in the interim he performed chores which were reluctantly acknowledged as necessary, he did not appear destined to play a special role in the protection, representation, or development of native interests. This would be contrary to the spirit of assimilation.

Haphazard pressure from above to establish a regular corps of caids, with entry standards and a reasonable salary, was consistently staved off by the communes. Eventually in 1919 the Gouverneur-Général took over responsibility for appointments of caids, and imposed a minimum salary guarantee payable from Algerian funds, but this belated effort to breathe life into the ailing institution was unsuccessful. The number of caids dwindled steadily during the 20th Century.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, a simultaneous reform further undermined the caid's role. The establishment of elective douar jemaas with designated presidents, in 1919, forged a separate link between the native population and the municipality. Long before the end of colonial rule, the institution of commune caid was otiose, rendered so by indifference both from above and below.

-v. Douars and Jemmas¹⁰⁷

Assimilationist ideology often contained the vague assertion that communes de plein exercice were schools which prepared the indigenous population for new forms of public responsibility. Exclusion of moslems from participation at municipal council level belied this,

but even more significant was the stifling of communal development from below. Attempts to generate separate foci of native social life within the commune framework were systematically thwarted. The fate of douar jemaas was particularly instructive in this regard.

The 1863 legislation on native land declared that every douar with a significant amount of common property should be endowed with a jema'a (assembly), appointed by the French administration, to be consulted on its use. The survival of traditional channels of authority was thus acknowledged, and in a sense given an official blessing at douar level. A decree of 24th December 1870 reaffirmed that in communes "jemaas of douars would be maintained where they already existed and established where they did not".

The intention of the framers of these Metropolitan statutes was not entirely clear. The guiding notion seems to have been that such assemblies should be consulted by the municipality before any decision to alienate or otherwise make use of a douar's patrimony. In other words, they were to be protective mechanisms. Some more liberal reformers seem to have envisaged their eventual evolution into quasi-municipal institutions in their own right, providing a natural nucleus for indigenous solidarity. Urbain argued in 1881, for example, that it was wrong simply to annex douars to settler-communes. Wholesale exploitation and the smothering of indigenous community life would result, he suggested, unless the administration ensured "the prior transformation of the douar into a sort of preparatory commune".¹⁰⁸ The role of the douar jema'a, he felt, should be not merely passively defensive, but positively developmental.

Even in the former sense, the role of the douar was effectively aborted. The status of douar jemaas remained one of the haziest areas

of administrative jurisprudence throughout the colonial period. The statutes of 1863 and 1870 failed to spell out any specific functions for them to perform. Nor did they make their establishment mandatory; this was left to the discretion of municipal councils under the broad supervision of the Gouvernement-Général. The decree of 1884 which laid down the constitution of communes de plein exercice made no mention of douar assemblies whatsoever. As a result of these significant omissions, douars in communes de plein exercice were systematically ignored by the settlers. Throughout the 19th Century and also for most of the 20th Century, they were no more than shadowy commune 'sections'. Their interests were theoretically represented at the mairie by the adjoint indigène, while the municipal council remained the sole representative and managerial body in the commune. For the most part, douar jemaas were neither constituted nor consulted.

The settler-dominated council continued in practice to control the disposition of douar property, and the Gouvernement-Général made very little effort during the 19th Century to encourage them to seek indigenous advice on this. Towards the end of the Century, contradictory circulars, and indeed conflicting decisions by Algerian courts, alternately insisted on and denied the need for the maire to consult a douar's jemaas before alienating its property.¹⁰⁹ A liberal Gouverneur-Général, Cambon, alarmed by the widespread spoliation of douar lands, pressed hard during the 1890's for the establishment of douars as protective mechanisms, but his efforts were resisted from below by the communes and hampered from above by the colonial group in the French Assembly. Not until the loi of 1st August 1918 and the decree of 6th February 1919 were municipal councils legally obliged to consult the douar jemaas in matters affecting

its interests, with the power of adjudication in cases of dispute was vested in the *prefet*.

Even greater settler resistance greeted subsequent efforts to develop the *douar jemaa* into an authentic cell of indigenous social life. These efforts grew out of the growing awareness of some politicians and bureaucrats that real associative links between European and moslem communal structures were lacking, and that this was because of, not despite, the nature of the settler commune. One sign of this lack was the continued 'unofficial' regulation of important aspects of native life, by traditional segmentary processes; clandestine tribal assemblies still met, for example, particularly at clan, fraction or village levels. The legislation of 1918 and 1919 accordingly sought to bring these clandestine organisations 'into the open' and thereby to bring the colonial framework into closer association with autochthonous structures. It not only re-established the *douar jemaa* in Algerian legislation, but made it an elective body. Its members were thenceforward chosen by all Second College voters. It chose its own President, who attended all municipal council meetings involving his *douar's* interests.

However, the terms under which these 'official' elective *jemaas* were set up made them far from embryonic communes. They were not nuclei of an "authentic communal reform".¹¹⁰ At best they were passive instruments for the protection of a fast-disappearing form of native property. Yet again, no obligation was laid down that they be established; they were required only "when the size and interests of that population makes them useful". Many communes continued to refuse to constitute native assemblies; by 1945 there was a grand total of 215 of them, between 296 communes de plein exercice, each with several

douars.¹¹¹ In any case, the restrictive franchise of the Second College made these institutions socially unrepresentative and usually collaborationist in character. In addition, their responsibilities did not go beyond the management of douar property, distribution of pasturage, provision of credit, and other narrowly economic matters. In this field, their role was purely consultative; most decisions required the assent of the municipal council. Finally, the préfet or Gouverneur-Général had the power to suspend or dismiss the president and any member of the jema'a; indeed the whole assembly could be dissolved if deemed recalcitrant. Accordingly, douar-jema'as never escaped the stranglehold of the settler-dominated commune. Despite piecemeal extensions of their responsibilities in 1945,¹¹² they remained "purely fictitious bodies",¹¹³ and jema'a elections were exercises in inconsequentiality.

V. THE COMMUNE MIXTE¹¹⁴

-i. Establishment

Throughout the colonial era, most of the moslem population of Algeria lived outside the framework of communes de plein exercice. Alongside these there was established another structure of local government, based on the commune mixte, an institution unique to Algeria. It was a hastily-improvised organization, and had only a temporary status throughout its life. Yet despite periodic schemes for its gradual transformation or rapid disappearance, it survived from its conception in 1874 until its disintegration amid the chaos of guerilla warfare in the mid-1950's. Its rigidity and inability to evolve came to symbolize the 'fixism' of the colonial regime for the majority of indigenous groups.

As suggested above, the initial thrust of the settler policy of expanding civil government was for the constitution of communes proper, centred around a European agglomeration, and the annexation to them of as many nearby native douars as possible. In most areas of the Tell and pre-Saharan Atlas, however, hitherto divided into large military circumscriptions and supervised by scattered Arab Bureaus, there were no significant centres of colonization at all. The growing political weight of the colons nevertheless pressed strongly for the eradication of army control in these regions, in order to open them up to settlement and civil law. "No part of the territory", argued Lambert de Roisey in 1879, "should be kept under military command. Not even one palm tree should be excepted, for under this tree the supreme effort of the great native chiefs would entrench itself".¹¹⁵ As a result of such feelings, vast tracts of

military territory were proclaimed part of the civil zone within a year of the fall of the Second Empire in 1870. However, the question of exactly what form of civil government to organize in these areas remained problematical.

In the absence of European centres, the raison d'etre for existing forms of municipal government, it was inconceivable for the colonial authority immediately to extent the communal structure proper to purely native populations. Some settlers argued that the maire of a distant commune should be given authority over parts of these new civil territories, or even that a special corps of maires might be placed at the head of these districts. But to Metropolitan politicians, to the Gouvernement-Général, and to most colon representatives in the immediate term, such a solution was both impractical, posing major problems of communication and finance, and undesirable, in as far as it would abandon huge scattered populations to the exploitation or neglect of remote settler groups. Some kind of specialized administration was required. As far as the colons were concerned, this should avoid the evils of military government, yet provide an effective means of patrolling the indigenous population until such time as European settlement was sufficiently extensive to permit the establishment of communes proper.

A Gouvernemenal arrêté of 22nd July 1874 attempted to come to terms with these conflicting criteria. Alongside existing communes de plein exercice, and those still to be founded, it instituted a network of special communes mixtes (mixed communes) in areas without a significant concentration of French settlement. The construction of this network was rapid: within a year there were 10 such communes mixtes, 44 by 1879, and 79 by 1884. These new civil divisions were

extremely large. Those established by 1881 each covered 440 square miles on average, and enclosed 20 000 inhabitants. By 1926, this was an even more striking feature: their average size had risen to 900 square miles, and their population to over 40 000. Thus they were essentially administrative divisions - superimposed from above - rather than municipalities in the true sense. They had no real personality or communality of interests. Each was headed by a civil administrateur, recruited from a specially-formed Algerian corps. He was responsible to the Gouvernement-Général for a wide range of executive and quasi-functions. Alongside him, in a purely consultative capacity, was a commission municipale (municipal commission), comprising elected representatives of whatever European population existed, plus moslem representatives appointed by the administrator.

In certain respects, in name at least, this new civil institution was inspired by the commune mixte established in military territory by the arrêté of 20th May 1868. Some of its formal ingredients were similar: the 1868 commune mixte was commanded by an Arab Bureau head, acting as local judge, tax agent and civil registrar, aided by a consultative commission municipale comprising army officers and appointed European and moslem representatives. In other important respects, however, particularly the question of its future evolution, the 1868 commune mixte was a very different body.

The 1868 arrêté, issued as part of the 'Arab Kingdom' programme, conceived of the mixed commune as a transitory structure for the native, taking him from fairly close military supervision towards communal autonomy. One of its authors, Urbain, pressed upon Napoleon III the need to "develop indigenous municipal life in such a way as to gradually limit the influence of the native aristocracy...We must

allow the natives to manage their own communal interests under the supervision of the State". To bring this about, he suggested, it was vital that indigenous municipal life should not be swallowed up within the framework of European municipal life: "we must not too hastily distribute the natives among the French communes, where they would be exploited by the immigrants".¹¹⁶ Thus he envisaged the mixed commune as a separate, indigenous institution, with a developmental purpose; it would survive in its initial form, in Lapasset's phrase, "only until the day when enough bonds of solidarity have been built and sufficient local revenues generated...to enable it to be called into the ranks of communes de plein exercice, and to enjoy their rights".¹¹⁷

We should not exaggerate the far-sightedness and 'associative' liberality of this short-lived scheme of 1868, as Ageron is somewhat disposed to do.¹¹⁸ Many of its intentions were confused, contradictory or impractical. Lapasset, for example, appears to have envisaged the eventual transition of the whole commune mixte - a huge and artificial unit - into one commune de plein exercice; in other respects, however, the reform seems to have *intended* separate douars within the commune mixte to evolve into separate communes. There was confusion, too, about the role of European colonization in this evolution; Article 2 of the arrêté, which explained that communes mixtes were only appropriate in areas which "do not yet contain a sufficient European population to be erected into communes de plein exercice", seemed to imply that eventual autonomy was dependent on the progress of immigration.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, the 1868 commune mixte was unmistakably an attempt to construct a special vehicle for indigenous evolution. The settlers

greeted it distrustfully as a potential obstacle to the expansion of their interests and of 'full' civil government. The civil commune mixte of 1874 spring from their quite different view of the future.¹²⁰ They regarded it as a stopgap arrangement placing the moslem population under the supervision of a civilian administrator until such time as sufficient centres of colonization could be implanted. Then, as the Gouverneur-Général Tirman indicated in 1887, the commune mixte was "destined to be steadily dismantled as annexations to communes de plein exercice become possible".¹²¹ From 1874 onwards, there was continuous pressure to carve out communes proper, with annexed douars, from existing communes mixtes. In this sense, the colons insisted on the temporary status of mixed communes.

The immigrant community sought from the outset to prevent communes mixtes from developing into potentially separate native communes. They voiced anxiety lest the institution become an obstacle, rather than a stepping stone to 'assimilation' of the natives. Their earliest concern, as this network of 'civil' administration spread to ever-larger areas of indigenous Algeria, was to ensure that it did not become too dense. They favoured a small number of big communes mixtes rather than a big number of small ones. Partly this was for financial reasons; the cost of native administration fell upon the colony's budget. But fundamentally it was to prevent the formation of compact embryonic native municipalities. From the mid-1880's the proliferation of communes mixtes was halted. Thenceforward, extensions of civil territory involved swelling the size of existing communes mixtes, redrawing their boundaries, and indeed merging existing ones, but not creating additional ones. The number of mixed communes actually fell

to 73 by 1891, and never rose above 78. At the same time, numbers of communes de plein exercice continued to grow.

-ii. The Municipal Commission and Administrator¹²²

Executive responsibility in the commune mixte was vested entirely in the administrateur. Unlike the municipal council of the commune de plein exercice, the municipal commission was purely a consultative body. It met only four times a year. Apart from the administrator, its membership comprised representatives both of the European community, some nominated by the préfet at the administrator's instigation and others elected by First College residents, and of the moslem community. The latter commissioners were either nominated by the préfet at the administrator's instigation, or sat ex officio as caids and jemaa presidents. This deprived moslems in commune mixtes, the great majority of the Algerian population, of any elective representation throughout the colonial era. Moreover, the arrêté of 1874 stipulated that elected membership of the commission should never be numerically inferior to non-elected membership, so that even the nominated moslems were never in a majority. At least half the commissioners were French even in communes with virtually no French residents.¹²³ In any case, the French administrateur dominated proceedings,

Unlike the maire of a commune de plein exercice, the administrator belonged to a full-time, professional service. This civilian corps served exclusively in Algerian communes mixtes, and its members were recruited almost entirely from among French Algerians. In the early decades, many were former army officers with Arab Bureau experience, but others came from administrative posts in the Gouvernement-Général

and *préfectures*. Career prospects were fairly limited, as there were few posts and virtually no promotional hierarchy. Both the isolated conditions of the job itself, and the chronically 'provisional' nature *were a deterrent to new entrants. As a result, administrators* of the *commune mixte* institution, were never of the very highest calibre. Their training was rudimentary, and even such desirable qualifications as spoken and written Arabic, or Berber, were not insisted upon. Nor was there a coordinated and regular system of supervision at *Gouvernement-Général* or *préfectoral* level; in many respects, they were abandoned to their own devices.

However, unlike the *maire*, the *administrateur* did have specialized interest in moslem affairs. Within this broad field, his tasks were numerous and wide-ranging. As an agent of the colonial government, he was responsible for implementing its regulations locally. The civil registration of moslems, the furnishing of statistics and the administration of property laws, were important parts of his work. He was expected to exercise general oversight over local agriculture, trade and industry; supervise credit schemes; safeguard public health; foster public welfare (including education); and initiate public works. In short, he was "Jack of all Trades".¹²⁴ Like a *maire*, he could issue regulatory *arrêtés*, though these needed the prior approval of the *sous-préfet*.

In addition to the paperwork thus generated, the *administrateur* had a political role to perform. He was supposed to display physical energy in making regular inspection tours to outlying *douars* and developing contacts with his *administrees*. He was a representative of authority, and as such wore a uniform of military appearance. This differed from that of the Arab Bureau chiefly in the colour of its

cap braid; for in many respects he had assumed that institution's role. He was responsible for the maintenance of public order, and to this effect heard complaints, and took immediate police action. Though regular magistrates were responsible for the due processes of the normal criminal law, the administrator had special disciplinary powers under the provisions of a 'Native Code'.

Some additional complications in an administrator's role arose if a significant number of European settlers resided within the commune. Since part of his function was to facilitate colonization and safeguard the security and welfare of European inhabitants, this inevitably caused conflicts of loyalty. A European presence established a vocal pressure-group within the commune mixte which inevitably took up a disproportionate amount of his time.

Thus the administrator had an enormous workload. It was unrealistic, in fact, and even a large elite corps of well-trained officials would have found it impossible to cope with. The typical commune mixte had upward of fifteen native douars, scattered over a wide area. To deal with these, the administrator usually had the help of one of two junior administrators, a secretary, and a handful of native factotums. His financial resources were equally inadequate. As an inevitable result, the supervision of native affairs was lax and indirect. As one administrator admitted in 1945, "really, in certain respects, we have set up a protectorate in this commune mixte".¹²⁵

-ii. The Native Code¹²⁶

The 'civil administration' of natives in communes mixtes was extremely paternalistic in style. Fundamental neglect was combined

with an assortment of arbitrary regulations. The operation of the "Code de l'Indigénat" (Native Code), placed in the hands of the administrator, was an example.

The establishment of "civil government" in 1874 did not result in the disappearance of the disciplinary powers formerly exercised by the Arab Bureaus; it simply led to their formalization. Alongside the corpus of the common law, administered by French 'juges de paix' (professional magistrates), there developed a body of 'special' or 'exceptional' criminal regulations concerning the activities of moslem communities. The loi of 10th April 1881 organized these long-existent piecemeal controls into a so-called Code de l'Indigénat (Native Code). Many of them were exceedingly puerile; "every disrespectful act and speech directed at an agent of authority, even off duty" was expressly forbidden, for example, and this could be construed to include refusal to salute the administrator. Other restrictions were petty and bureaucratic; it was an offence, for example, to hold a public meal without permission, to indulge in unauthorized singing and dancing in cafés, or to detonate firearms at family celebrations without prior notification. Other provisions in the Code transformed slackness in the performance of civic duties into criminal acts; this included non-registration of marriages and divorce, for instance, delay in payment of taxes, contravention of tenancy agreements, and the incurrance of rent arrears and other debts. Certain other sections of the Code were clearly oppressive: the obligation to perform various kinds of labour service at the administrator's request, the restrictions on forest usage¹²⁷ and on the holding of religious meetings, and the stipulation - finally abolished in 1914 - that a travel permit be obtained before leaving the territory of the commune.

The Code resulted from an orchestrated campaign about insecurity and the need to discipline the native community, and actually applied throughout civil Algeria. In communes de plein exercice, however, it was enforced according to conventional judicial process by French magistrates and was infrequently invoked. In communes mixtes, by contrast, the loi of 28th June 1881 confined the magistrature to ordinary common law offences and gave sole authority for the judging and punishment of special infractions to the administrateur. This gave him important disciplinary powers. He could charge individuals or groups with a multitude of 'offences' which were difficult to define, which pertained as much to attitude as to specific commission or omission, and which were of a questionable, often quasi-political nature. The procedure by which he judged them was extra-judicial: there was no public hearing, no formal rules of evidence or proof, no written record, no right to representation, nor even a requirement that an interpreter be present. Finally, the administrator had the power to impose fines or short periods of imprisonment, within discretionary limits laid down in the Code. Thus he was at the same time policeman, prosecutor, judge, and executor of the law. The situation was wide open to abuse, particularly in view of the slack supervision from above, and the absence of responsibility to the community below.

Thus, in the sense of separation of powers, real civil government was not a notable feature of communes mixtes. While pressing for an end to the "Turkish methods" of the army, the settlers had simultaneously ensured the entrenchment of 'emergency' regulations in native administration. Paradoxically, as Ageron points out, "the rule of common law resulted in

the legislative consecration of exceptional powers".¹²⁸

The ideology of transition was often employed to justify this situation. The European community argued that the Code was a temporary, 'exceptional' arrangement which would fall into disuse as security was ultimately established and the native learned the necessary self-discipline. In fact the Code was passed initially only as an emergency measure for a seven year period. However, successive short-term extensions by the French National Assembly, each accompanied by protestations of insecurity by Algerian deputies, prolonged its active life effectively until 1944. In this respect, it symbolized the nature of the colonial project: a holding operation or artificial crisis, which froze the native's access to certain rights and institutions while exploiting him in the name of the pretended universality of those rights and institutions. From the colonizer's point of view, this 'crisis' was never ending; many claimed that emergency regulations were the only effective means of ensuring domination over the muslim population and should be retained in perpetuity. An investigatory commission of the French Senate, persuaded of the justice of Algerian settler fears, gave credence to this view in 1890 when it openly argued for a sine die extension of the Code: "These are not mere expedients designed to respond to transient needs; they are logical, rational measures which conform to the permanent exigencies of the milieu".¹²⁹

In important respects, however, the rule of the administrator was remote and lax rather than authoritarian. It was paternalistic, but often in a fumbling ineffective manner. The specific provisions of the Code, and the administrator's role in implementing them, were less perhaps of practical than of psychological benefit to the European community.

As Ageron suggests, they were "symbolic rather than truly indispensable".¹³⁰ During the 20th Century, enforcement of sections of the Code was gradually transferred to the jurisdiction of magistrates; finally in 1927 they took the whole Code over from the administrateur. The ordonnance of 7th March 1944 completed this process by abolishing the Code altogether, only a decade before the 'emergency' of guerilla insurrection brought the hurried imposition of martial law.¹³¹ But it cannot be said that the disappearance of the Native Code marked a noticeable shift in the balance of power between native and colonial society.

-iv. The Caid¹³²

The administrateur was inevitably an isolated, remote figure in the segmentary landscape of the commune mixte. He was responsible for a miscellany of scattered communities, grouped by the French into an average of about 15 douars. If colonial administration were to come to terms with the structures and processes of this milieu, an effective support system of specialized native intermediaries was crucial; it was perhaps even more important here than in the settler-dominated communes proper. However, it was essentially lacking.

The arrêté of 22nd July 1874 instituted a system of adjoints indigènes in communes mixtes, following in the tradition of the caids of Arab Bureaus. They were appointed, until 1916, by the départemental Préfet - on the recommendation of the local administrator - and subsequently by the Gouverneur-Général. From the outset however, the choice of personnel confronted many problems.

Many caids or adjoints indigènes initially invested by the French were open collaborators, and to this extent lacked intimate contact with

the communities with whom they were supposed to act as intermediaries. In the earliest period, designation as a caid was often a reward for assisting French conquest. A fairly dramatic but not wholly untypical illustration was the caidship of Necmaria, in the Dahra mountains.¹³³ This had been granted since 1845 to descendants of a local Fraichich clan leader who had actively cooperated with French troops during the notoriously genocidal campaign of that year. In fact, he had personally guided General Pélissier to local caves in which a whole community of men, women, and children had taken refuge; the exits were sealed, and everyone buried alive. The man had subsequently been disowned by his own clansmen, and his house and crops destroyed, but, in the words of Gautier "this faithful khalifa, who had lost all his property for us, certainly deserved a reward". The reward took the form of the French administration granting both land and the local caidship to his family. Gautier suggested, not without reason, that "for sixty-five years these people have not lost sight for one day of the tragic caves on which their fortunes were based". Nor, one can be sure, had their administrators. Equally significantly, the local administrateur in 1914 was totally unaware of this historical episode.

In other cases, a caidship was the fruit of collaboration by families who were outsiders to the communities over which they were accorded responsibility. The caidship of the Ouled Djella and Sidi Khaled tribes, in the Algerian Ziban, was an example. It was conferred in the 1920's on a family from the Tunisian Djerid, as a reward for facilitating French penetration of the Eastern Saharan oases.¹³⁴ The acceptance of a caidship, in any case, implied the promise of future collaboration, and the authentic leaders of local communities were

not usually eager to commit themselves openly to such a role. The paradox was noted by Sabatier: "Whoever faithfully serves us among the natives loses their respect; whoever is our agent but wants to maintain his popularity betrays us".¹³⁵

Originally, the recipients of caidships included a few quite prominent families, but the role of these notables declined steadily. Partly, no doubt, this was the result of pacification and the related disintegration of the widest levels of segmentary organization; partly it was the result of economic transformations. Increasingly, appointments as adjoint indigènes were conferred on less socially influential figures, whose loyalty to the French cause had been manifested in a more individualized fashion. Many were outsiders. Already in the 19th Century some caidships in the South were bestowed on *Kaloughlis* from Tlemcen, or Berbers from Kabylia.¹³⁶ Increasingly, former soldiers in the French army, petty functionaries, and others from humble backgrounds, many from distant regions, were designated as adjoints indigènes. Inevitably they lacked the prestige among the local community which was the touchstone of the traditional caid. As part of this circular process, the office itself lost its attraction to traditional notables. The trend continued throughout the colonial era, and campaigns such as Cambon's in the 1890's to revive the traditional nature of caidship,¹³⁷ or such token gestures as the restoration of the official appellation of 'caid' in 1916, were powerless to reverse it.

The French compounded this situation by neglect. The caid was not treated as a potential channel for local indirect rule, nor accorded a significant developmental role in the colonial administrative scheme. His status slowly declined towards that already achieved by his counterpart

in the commune de plein exercice: that of a menial agent for the assessment and collection of taxes, civil registration, and the implementation of minor directives from above. He was treated as obsolescent, due to disappear as native society progressed, and of purely vestigial use. This attitude verged on self-fulfilling prophecy.

Partly, for this reason, and partly to save money from the Algerian budget, caids were not accorded any official salary until 1913. Prior to that date, they simply received a small percentage of the taxes they gathered, usually 5%. As a result, caids of poor douars were indigent themselves. Even after 1913, salaries were very modest. A side-effect of this neglect was widespread extortion of fees, levies, 'gifts' and forced labour from their administrees. This helped to build up a bank of community grievance against caids, but also served to confirm the colon press in its conviction that they were backward, parasitic, feudal vestiges. This became an argument, paradoxically, for thwarting attempts after the First World War to transform commune mixtes caids into a regular, well-paid corps of Algerian functionaries, with entry standards and effective supervision.

Even as potential agents of direct administration, the commune mixte caid was treated half-heartedly. Appointments were neglected. In theory, each douar should have had one caid - assisted locally by a variety of indigenous auxiliaries: gardes champêtres, khojas, and wakafs. In practice, one caid often had oversight of two or more douars. At the beginning of the 20th Century, 1015 douars in civil communes mixtes were covered by only 850 caids. As the moslem

population in these douars grew steadily, the number of available caids, so far from increasing, actually declined. By the Second World War their numerical strength was approximately 600.¹³⁸

As in communes de plein exercice, prospects of developing the role of caids were further undermined by the decree of 6th February 1919 which established elective douar jemaas in every commune mixte. Each jema'a was given automatic representation on the municipal commission through its chosen president. Hitherto, the caid had been an ex-officio member of this commission, providing its only direct link with the native douar populations. The decree did not deprive him of that seat, and in fact it gave him the additional responsibility of observing all jemma meetings "as the representative of the Administration",¹³⁹ but it clearly helped to sap his effective authority. The trend towards 'functionarization' of caids had weakened his already dubious status as an indigenous 'representative', and the Administration now had a financial incentive for devolving even his more bureaucratic functions on to the unpaid jema'a president.

Not without reason, therefore, many observers before the Second World War were speaking, with Montagne, of "the crisis of authority facing the local functionary, the Caid".¹⁴⁰ One of these voices was Marcy's. He compared the feckless role of the Algerian Caid with that of his namesake in another part of the Maghreb, Morocco. Under the Moroccan Protectorate regime, he argued, "the caid is usually the head of a big tent, a rich man living as a grand seigneur, usually originating from the region, and linked by family ties with the traditional local oligarchy existing before the conquest. Respected or simply feared, he can always obtain obedience. Also, of capital

importance, the Moroccan caid has received his investiture from the Sultan, the religious leader of the moslems of his Empire".¹⁴¹ In Algeria, by contrast, Marcy's experience among the Berber communities of the Aures massif, impressed him with "the lack of authority which the native caids, nominated by the French administration, enjoy among their tribes".¹⁴² They were regarded as aliens - many indeed could not even speak Berber - and as servants of France.

The caid was typically out of touch with his administrees. The newly-appointed caid, Berque pointed out, "immediately feels out of place. The local leaders organize an undercover conspiracy against him".¹⁴³ Occasionally, this stemmed from a cultural gap. The caid of Rabelais in the Dahra, for example, as described by Gautjier in 1914, was a total stranger to the region, was steeped in French culture, and had adopted a European lifestyle; his eldest son attended a French College far away at Mostaganem.¹⁴⁴ More often, however, the caid was simply an incompetent parasite, as at Necmaria for example, spending the majority of his time near the centre of European administration far from his moslem flock.¹⁴⁵ The latter phenomenon became all the more prevalent as the number of caids declined and their area of nominal supervision expanded.

This 'crisis of authority' made the caid an ineffective intermediary in the commune mixte. The situation was so bad, Berque claimed, that "it is through the administrator that some caids learn the news about their douar".¹⁴⁶ Many administrators, Montagne explained, "do their work with the help of the jema'a president rather than with that of the increasingly authority-less Caid".¹⁴⁷ Similarly, Parant observed, the indigenous population often ignored the Caid and went, if at all,

straight to the administrator for action.¹⁴⁸ The institution of caids was viewed by native communities as at best a nuisance and at worst a blight; in their estimation, according to Marcy, "without having any basic utility itself, it is an obstacle to the full expansion of local activities".¹⁴⁹ They ignored the caid as far as they could, came to terms with him where unavoidable, and channeled their energies into their own authentic social institutions. "The douar certainly could not prevent the caid from existing and milking his administrees when they needed the slightest administrative action from him", Bromberger observed in Kabylia, "but nevertheless the village elected a clandestine jema'a alongside which made the real decisions on its own affairs".¹⁵⁰ Even the official elected jema'as often contrived to circumvent the caid in his supposed capacity as 'representative of the Administration'. One caid in Kabylia, for example, was to be discovered rather pathetically complaining to his administrateur in 1951: "When you order him to hold a (jema'a) meeting, the president will not allow me to attend...All the discussions which you required to be held about leasing communal property to douar inhabitants have taken place in Gasmi Said's Moorish Bath-House, and I have neither been present nor even notified".¹⁵¹

This combination of systematic French diffidence, and indigenous resistance, culminating in a campaign of assassinations from 1954 onwards, condemned the caid to impotence. It was never clear, indeed what role a 'potent' caid might conceivably have played in the Algerian context. Behind the flapping folds of his official burnous, he was paralyzed by the contradictions of the colonial situation. The outcome was observed by the dismayed last Gouverneur-Général

of Algeria, Soustelle, in 1956, after inspecting areas of nascent guerilla insurrection: "A few caids, mostly absent from their douars, and a few wakafs (local assistants), were supposed to supervise local life, but in fact controlled nothing at all...At every step I felt how much we had allowed a void to grow up behind the facade of regular administration".¹⁵²

-v. Douars and Jemaas¹⁵³

Communes mixtes were extremely large. As Soustelle described them, they were "giant communes...as vast as Metropolitan départements, stretching from the High Plateau as far as the Sahara, across cyclopean piles of lunar mountains and wild bled (open countryside) inhabited by tens of thousands".¹⁵⁴ Each comprised between 10 and 20 native douars, which in turn might each contain 10 or 20 segmentary fractions or hamlets. Thus they were heterogeneous and unwieldy conglomerations. The administrative organization associated with them was makeshift. Rather than coming to terms with old or attempting to generate new communal solidarities, it loosely contained the native population on a 'provisional' basis. The direction in which this rambling framework eventually evolved was of key importance for the Algerian colonial situation, particularly since the great majority of Algerian moslems lived within it. In these areas, virtually free of European settlement, there was considerable potential, at least in principle, for specifically indigenous forms of political organization to be fostered in close association with superimposed colonial structures. The intermediary position of the douar was of greater significance in this context than in the settler-dominated and smaller-scale commune de plein

exercice. The prolonged sterility of its existence over almost a century provides evidence of suffocating contradictions in the colonial situation.

The inability of the Algerian douar to emerge as an 'associative' nucleus within the commune mixte was rooted in three sets of interrelated circumstances. One of these was the opposition of the settlers to its development. Another was the contradictory and noncommittal nature of associative efforts. The final set centred on the relationship between the nature of the douar itself and that of segmentary societies. The first of these circumstances, the resistance of the settlers, provides a partial explanation of the second. The very size and artificiality of the commune mixte was largely a result of settler pressures in the 1870's. They originally conceived of it as a kind of administrative ante-chamber for populations who would eventually shift into communes proper as colonization grew. However European settlement in the less economically-valorisable parts of Algeria petered out in the late 19th Century, and indeed during the 20th Century tended to withdraw from the interior and concentrate nearer the coast.¹⁵⁵ Thus the settler community lost any incentive to press for the rapid dismemberment of communes mixtes. Instead, they opposed as 'premature' any scheme allowing communes mixtes gradually to dissolve into clusters of autonomous indigenous cells. In particular they sought to obstruct the development of douar jemaas into municipalities. For want of any long-term alternative evolutionary programme of their own, they wished, in effect, to freeze the commune mixte in a state of permanent temporariness.

The forces seeking to break down this kind of resistance and to breathe life into the febrile body of the commune mixte were sporadic, half-hearted and ambivalent. Though in principle the douar was earmarked for a more active role than its counterpart in the commune proper, it was almost wholly neglected during the first half-century of the Third Republic. The arrêté of 22nd July 1874, which established commune mixtes, made the important provision that a douar's resources should be separately managed rather than merged with those of the whole commune as was the case in settler municipalities. It also specifically called for the nomination of douar assemblies to manage these communal resources. However, the administrator was not obliged to consult this jema'a, even when formally constituted. Reluctant to diminish his own authority, and given little guidance on the intended role of douar jema'as, he rarely did so. As in communes de plein exercice, the available legislation fell into disuse. An arrêté of 11th September 1895 sought to reactivate it, requiring the préfet to appoint an official jema'a from 6-16 notables in each douar, and enjoining the administrator to seek its advice before disposing of common or collective property. However these nominated jema'as consisted of 'safe' men. They rarely met in practice and at best were facades behind which the administrator's authority continued to operate unhampered.

A quarter-century later, the decree of 6th February 1919 made a more serious effort to establish the commune mixte douar as a living entity. As in communes proper, douar jema'as became elective. Despite the socially unrepresentative nature of Second College voters, this was of some significance in that it provided the native populations

of communes mixtes with their first and only 'official' elective body. Following the decree, 'official' jemaas, chosen every six years, became widespread. However, their developmental potential was severely circumscribed. Their sole concern was communal property, in which they had a consultative capacity only. The administrator called their meetings, and had various means of circumventing their role; he was still able to alienate douar property in the face of expressed opposition.¹⁵⁶ Moreover, the préfet could suspend an 'uncooperative' jema, and the Gouverneur-Général could appoint a 'special delegation' to take over its functions if need be; neither of these powers went unused in subsequent years.¹⁵⁷

These restrictions made douar jemaas of dubious value as vehicles for authentic "association". Many Metropolitan liberals argued, indeed, and not without cause, that to establish separate, impotent, small-scale 'official assemblies' for the moslem population was a retrograde step, designed to stave off elective representation at Municipal Commission level. They saw "association" as a device to block the more positive concomitants of "assimilation". These criticisms were joined by the rather less ingenuous settler argument that the setting up of official jemaas perpetuated and legalized the existence of 'anomalous' and even 'reactionary' bodies hindering the process of assimilation. A great deal of ambivalence thus surrounded plans to develop the role of douars.

In any case, the douar and its 'official' jema proved to have little relevance to the indigenous environment, and met with indifference and resistance from below. Occasionally, clans and other political groupings exploited them as additional channels for the furtherance of local rivalries,¹⁵⁸ but essentially they were ignored.

This situation stemmed from the very nature of the douar. It was, as suggested earlier, an artificial unit remote from the authentic solidarities of segmentary life. Milliot explained the failure of the 1919 decree to have any real impact on the life of sedentary Kabylia in these terms: "The promoters of this reform did not bear in mind that...it is the village, not the douar which is the equivalent of our rural commune. The political horizon of the Kabyle dies out at the frontiers of the small political community... The Kabyle douar is nothing more than an administrative division supervised by a caid, and the jema'a which it was given is nothing but a useless body".¹⁵⁹

To conceive of douar jema'as, or indeed jema'as at other levels of segmentary reality, as fixed institutions with patrimonial rights and managerial functions was to compound this anachronism. As de Prévaille suggests, "the 'communal' in the sense of territory owned by an administrative unit does not exist in indigenous tradition".¹⁶⁰ Even had they been seriously implemented, radical plans for the evolution of douars towards the status of European municipalities would have confronted this structural problem. To impose formal mechanisms of voting on what traditionally was an informal group of 'elders', 'notables' or 'heads of families' was to introduce other alien concepts. The resultant assembly was greatly different from the traditional jema'a.

As a consequence, traditional processes and institutions, including jema'as at clan, fraction and village levels, continued to operate in semi-clandestinity, unaffected by the rather empty operations of the colonial douar. Marcy's account of the situation in the Aures in

1938 was echoed by observations in various parts of Algeria:

"Alongside the official jemaas of the douars, created by us and given modest administrative responsibilities, 'unofficial' jemaas of tribes, fractions and villages have survived. Though they now have to operate in secrecy, these 'unofficial' councils, with the tacit agreement of everyone, retain most of their traditional attributes. Only political control proper escapes them, taken over by French authority, but they are obviously quite ready to take it over again at the earliest opportunity. These jemaas have preserved all their economic functions, and more seriously their role in civil jurisdiction; they even still play a certain role in penal matters".¹⁶¹ This situation of 'parallel administration',¹⁶² reflected not merely determined withdrawal from contact with the colonial structure, but also the lack of correspondence between the imposed douar and traditional forms of solidarity.

However, for a growing block of liberal, mainly Metropolitan opinion between the wars, the incongruency and sterility of the commune mixte structure was a matter of far greater concern. The years following the Algerian Centennial of 1930 were marked by numerous reappraisals of the effectiveness of the colonial framework. Many conclusions were extremely pessimistic. Millot claimed in 1933, for example, that "North Africa remains in the state of unfinished conquest".¹⁶³ Marcy concluded similarly that "one cannot at all see taking shape...the beginnings of that intimate consensus, profound and durable, extending far beyond the narrow framework of the tribe, which elsewhere presides over the nascent idea of a

Western-type State. Quite the contrary..."¹⁶⁴ This school of opinion argued that effective consolidation of the colonial enterprise required more than continuing force and subjection; it should involve the "association" of indigenous channels of legitimation with the superimposed structures of government. The hitherto-practised policy of neglect-through-assimilation was thought to have prevented any such process from taking place.

The approach was succinctly summarized in the contemporary writings of de Montety, in relation to another part of the Maghreb. "The problem of decentralization", he insisted, "must be approached from below, by seeking the human collectivities which have public interests and an embryonic individuality...and not from above, by cutting up the territory arbitrarily into theoretical circumscriptions, with administrative bodies which are delegates of the central power".¹⁶⁵ According to this view, the most urgent task of colonial administration was to seek out, carefully encourage, and harness, rather than to destroy, the "associative instinct" in native life: "From this rediscovered spark, we must make the flame of communal spirit flare up".¹⁶⁶

Such 'associationist' views were not new in Algeria; they were extensions of a submerged current of thought which went back at least to the Arab Kingdom period. However, the growth of widespread social distress and political unrest in the 1930's - both outbursts of popular violence such as those in the Constantine region, and the organized legalistic pressures of 'elite nationalists' - added sharpened urgency to this divergence within colonial opinion.

'Associationists' tended to agree with Parant, that "the fundamental problem...is to find a solid basis for our construction".¹⁶⁷ Communal reform, and in particular the need to foster the autonomous developmental potential of the douar, was a key element in their programme. In this they were supported by emergent bourgeois nationalist groups who still sought to forge a fraternal association of the two communities within the framework of French culture and sovereignty. Ferhat Abbas, for example, tried to persuade Pétain in 1941 that "neither the commune mixte, which is too big and highly populated, nor the rural commune de plein exercice, created for the needs of colonization, are the formulas required for the future of moslem society. They are artificial units which do not correspond to our conceptions of communal life".¹⁶⁸ But on the other hand, he went on to suggest, "the same is not true of the douar...a well-localized social embryo, on the basis of which a new world, a new civilization, can be built...It offers a unique chance to change the face of the country by sedentarizing nomadic and pastoral life, in the Western way. The creation of a municipal centre or of a douar-commune... will bring about a flourishing peasantry, handicrafts, cooperatives, corporations and housing projects. It means schools, jema'a councils, hospitals, post offices, police stations. It brings hygiene, medical aid, social security. The native population groups together and settles down".¹⁶⁹ Such dreams, embroidered suitably for Petain's eyes, expressed the optimistic side of the associative world-view.

These opinions had to wrestle with the strong and well-entrenched hostility of the colon community. The latter was reluctant to accept the 'disintegration' of communes mixtes into separate 'douar-communes'.

The experiments which were made were inevitably small-scale and tentative. One of these was the institution of Centres Municipales.¹⁷⁰ Decrees in 1937 and 1945 freed a few native douars from dependence on their commune mixte; they became 'municipal centres', intended eventually to acquire the full status of municipal councils. It was a first step towards establishing a network of native communes. It was a very small step however; at first it affected only four douars, in the North of Algeria. Moreover the responsibilities of each Centre Municipal jema'a were still restricted to the broad sphere of communal resources; 'general' or 'political' motions were expressly forbidden, as was communication with other jema'as. The administrator retained the right to summon the jema'a and to prevent it from meeting, and the préfet had to approve its 'decisions'.

The pilot scheme was scarcely a resounding success. In the Centre Municipal of Seriet (Commune Mixte of Tablat), Parant reported that "nobody, except for the (jema'a) president, is interested in the creation of this Municipal Centre, whose life exists only on administrative reports".¹⁷¹ Meetings were rare and extremely formal; jema'a members signed minutes which many did not understand. In the Centre Municipal of Oumalou (Kabylia), Duplessis-Kergomard reported that the jema'a was similarly ineffective and ignored, which he attributed chiefly to the rambling nature of the douar, with its 18 different villages.¹⁷² Parant concluded pessimistically that the douar jema'a was "not the framework we are looking for".¹⁷³

Nevertheless, pressures for the proliferation of douar-communes continued. Growing political insecurity after the Second World War obliged the Metropolis to think seriously about ways to render

Algerian administration more effective and responsive to social change. An apparently ~~major~~ major stride in this direction was made by the "Statut de l'Algérie" of 20th September 1947, which aimed to put the government of the colony on a new footing.¹⁷⁴ Article 53 of the Statute proclaimed that all communes-mixtes were to be dissolved, and replaced by a network of small douar-communes, as part of a programme of 'decentralization'. Another provision of the Statute, however, was the establishment of an Algerian Assembly, and it was to this body that the drawing up of the timetable for communal reform was entrusted. In effect, this gave the settler community the power to defer its implementation again and again.¹⁷⁵ During the next seven years, until the outbreak of the 1954 insurrection, a few new douar-communes and communes de plein exercice were established, but the proposed radical recasting of colonial structures never took place. The commune mixte maintained its stubborn existence right up until the collapse of regular administration in the mid-1950's.

The growing insurrection in the mid-1950's provoked urgent reappraisals of the nature of the colonial administration. The appointment of Soustelle as Gouverneur-Général in January 1955 began a period of severe and somewhat desparate self-examination. As he toured one of the cradles of the war of liberation, the Aures massif, Soustelle was horrified by the flimsiness of the commune mixte structure. Beyond the remote outposts inhabited by the administrator, he declared, "emptiness reigned".¹⁷⁶ For too long, he suggested, France had tried "to administer on the cheap".¹⁷⁷ The colonial superstructure "skimmed along at too lofty a height; it should have kept down to the grassroots level of those who lived and suffered

in these expanses".¹⁷⁸ His cry of 'underadministration' was to become the theme of countless Metropolitan observers as insecurity developed into guerilla warfare and then into full-scale armed confrontation.

The crisis of the mid-1950's inspired a number of hastily-devised schemes for accelerated communal reform, and impelled the Metropolis to try to impose them despite settler misgivings. However confusion and political deadlock in Paris, and the military situation in Algeria, made it physically impossible to implement them; most in fact, remained paper exercises. They were less significant as concrete possibilities than as illustrations, like the troubled images thrown up by a feverish nightmare, of pathological tendencies and blockages in the colonial situation. During the administration of Soustelle, Metropolitan reformers were torn between different proposals. Some, such as Mitterand, wished to transform whole communes mixtes into 'grand communes', each with a municipal council, but with a civil administrator as the maire.¹⁷⁹ Others, like Soustelle himself, urged that each commune mixte should be split into three or four rural communes.¹⁸⁰

A radical committment was finally made under the new Minister for Algeria, Lacoste, on 28th June 1956.¹⁸¹ The youthful Algerian Assembly was disbanded, and a 'deconcentration' programme along lines suggested by Soustelle was announced throughout Algeria. All communes mixtes were dissolved, and replaced by 1162 'douar-communes'. Each was intended to have the same status and organization as the 333 communes de plein exercice which were by then in existence. Furthermore, Algeria was divided into a total of 12 départements, instead of the 3

which had existed throughout most of colonial history. The conversion of these new arrangements into working reality, however, depended on the re-establishment of security, for which purpose special military powers were simultaneously mobilized. Election of the proposed new bodies had to be postponed until pacification made it possible to hold them. During the six remaining years of French presence they never became operative.

In February 1958, a loi cadre (law laying down the overall framework of government) took the by now abstract process of reform even further.¹⁸² Algeria was divided into 15 départements, grouped into 5 semi-federal territoires (territories) and with elective assemblies at both levels. Existing municipalities were dissolved, in order to prepare for the eventual establishment of the new comprehensive hierarchy of government. The latter expired on the drawing board, for by this time civil government had effectively ceased and the army had taken over. It was wholly divorced from political reality, for even had security been somehow restored, and even had the scheme corresponded to indigenous needs, the new framework would have met with the unrelenting opposition of the settlers, hitherto submerged within the more general clamour caused by the military crisis.

The bankruptcy of these belated schemes for "association" and "deconcentration", as much as the earlier and more general neglect of native administration, illustrates the structural contradictions created by the juxtaposition of the European and moslem communities within the colonial framework. These are examined more closely in the next chapter, in relation to the concept of "underadministration".

NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR

1. The following general accounts discuss the replacement of the Turkish regime in Algeria:
 - M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (Paris 1951)
 - M. Emerit: "L'état intellectuel et moral de l'Algérie en 1830" in REVUE D'HISTOIRE MODERNE ET CONTEMPORAINE (1954) p. 201-212.
 - H. Isnard: "Le sahel d'Alger en 1830" in REVUE AFRICAINE (1937) p. 587-596
 - G. Gautherot: LA CONQUETE D'ALGER 1830 (Paris 1929)
 - C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1827-1871) (Paris 1964)
 - L. Rinn: "Le royaume d'Alger sous le dernier bey" in REVUE AFRICAINE (1897) p. 121-52, 331-50 (1898) p. 5-21, 113-39, 289-309 (1899) p. 105-41, 297-320
 - J. Ruedy: LAND POLICY IN COLONIAL ALGERIA (California 1967) p. 13-53.

2. "Algerian policy can be summarized as a succession of temporary improvisations aimed at a lasting approximation" C.A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1964) p. 72.

3. L. Milliot: "L'organisation française de l'Afrique du nord" in AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE (Nov. 1933) p. 617. Some indication of what the French expected to find is provided by L. Liskenne: COUP D'OEIL SUR LA VILLE D'ALGER ~~ET~~ SES DEPENDANCES (Paris 1830).

4. cf. V. Demontès: "Un essai de protectorat Tunisien à Oran, Fev-Aout 1831" in REVUE D'HISTOIRE DES COLONIES (1923) p. 251-88.

5. Some information about the Turkish province of Constantine, and the process of French infiltration is provided by:
 - M. Emerit: "Les mémoires d'Ahmed, dernier bey de Constantine" in REVUE AFRICAINE (1949) p. 65-135
 - M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (1951) Dh. IV p. 235-262: 'Constantine at the time of Hadj Ahmed'
 - A. Nouschi: "Constantine à la veille de la conquête" in CAHIERS DE TUNISIE (1955) p. 370-82
 - R. Vayssette: HISTOIRE DE CONSTANTINE SOUS LA DOMINATION TURQUE DE 1517-1837 (Paris 1869).

6. There is considerably quantity of published documentation on the first twenty years of French military campaigns. The various letters and memoirs of participants include:
 - G. Esquer (ed.): CORRESPONDANCE DU DUC DE ROVIGO (1831-33) 4 vols (Algiers 1914-21)
 - G. Esquer (ed.): CORRESPONDANCE DU MARECHAL CLAUZEL (1835-37) (Paris 1948)
 - G. Yver (ed.): CORRESPONDANCE DU GENERAL DAMREMONT (1837) (Paris 1927)
 - G. Yver (ed.): CORRESPONDANCE DU MARECHAL VALEE 5 vols. (Paris 1949-57)
 - duc d'Orléans: CAMPAGNES DE L'ARMEE D'AFRIQUE 1835-39 (Paris 1870)

6. E. Pélissier de Reynaud: ANNALES ALGERIENNES 3 vols.
(Paris, 2nd edn. 1854)

Secondary accounts include

Gén. P. Azan: CONQUETE ET PACIFICATION DE L'ALGERIE
(Paris 1931)

Gén. P. Azan: L'ARMEE D'AFRIQUE DE 1830 a 1852 (Paris 1936)

F. Hugonnet: FRANÇAIS ET ARABES EN ALGERIE (Paris 1860)

G.B. Laurie: THE FRENCH CONQUEST OF ALGERIA (London 1909)

Some general comments on the various campaigns, and on resistance to conquest, are contained in:

M. Lacheraf: L'ALGERIE - NATION ET SOCIETE (Paris 1965)

Very little research appears to have been done in recent decades on French methods of conquest.

7. Information about the Emir Abd-el-Kader is skimpy and of variable quality:

Gén. P. Azan: L'EMIR ABDELKADER - DU FANATISME MUSULMAN AU PATRIOTISME FRANCAIS (Paris 1925)

W. Blunt: DESERT HAWK (London 1842)

M. Emerit: L'ALGERIE A L'EPOQUE D'ABDELKADER (Paris 1951)

M. Emerit: "Un problème de distance morale - La résistance algérienne à l'époque d'Abdelkader" in INFORMATIONS HISTORIQUES (1951) p. 127-31.

Col. Scott: JOURNAL OF A RESIDENCE IN THE ESMAILE OF ABDELKADER (London 1842)

K. Yacine: ABDELKADER ET L'INDEPENDENCE ALGERIENNE (Algiers n.d. ?1949).

8. cf. G. Esquer & P. Boyer: "Bugeaud en 1840" in REVUE AFRICAINE (1960) p. 57-98, 283-321

Gén. P. Azan: BUGEAUD ET L'ALGERIE (Paris 19)

C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1964)

p. 164-209

For Bugeaud's philosophy of native administration, see note (21) below.

9. So long as war offered the opportunity for massive spoliation and sequestration of native property, Ruedy argues, "France had everything to gain by not coming to terms with the values, organization and law of Arab tribalism". J. Ruedy: LAND POLICY IN COLONIAL ALGERIA (1967) p. 66.

10. C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1964) p. 223-4.

11. cf. Capt. C. Richard: ETUDE SUR L'INSURRECTION DU DAHRA 1845-6 (Algiers 1846)

12. cf. Maréchal Randon: MEMOIRES (2 vols, Paris 1875-7)

Col. N. Robin: NOTES HISTORIQUES SUR LA GRANDE KABYLIE DE 1838 a 1851 (Algiers 1905)

Col. N. Robin: NOTES ET DOCUMENTS CONCERNANT L'INSURRECTION DE 1855-7 DE LA GRANDE KABYLIA (Algiers 1902)

M. Zurcher: LA PACIFICATION ET L'ORGANISATION DE LA KABYLIE ORIENTALE DE 1838 a 1870 (Paris 1948)

13. Analyses of the 1871 Kabyle uprising are provided by:
 C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE 1871-1918
 (2 vols. Paris 1968) p. 3-36
 C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORANE (1964)
 p. 453-500
 L. Rinn: HISTOIRE DE L'INSURRECTION DE 1871 (Algiers 1891)
 Col. N. Robin: L'INSURRECTION DE LA GRANDE KABYLIE EN 1871
 (Paris 1901).
14. cf. Armengaud: LE SUD ORANAIS - JOURNAL D'UN LEGIONNAIRE (Paris 1893).
15. cf. A. Bernard & N. Lacroix: LA PENETRATION SAHARIENNE 1830-1906
 (Algiers 1906)
 Longobardi: L'AGONIE D'UNE MISSION - DEUXIEME MISSION FLATTERS
 (Paris 1938).
16. cf. M. Emerit: "Au début du XIXe siècle - les tribus privilégiées
 en Algérie" in ANNALES (21) 1966, p. 44-58.
17. A considerable amount has been written about the work of Algerian
 'Bureaux Arabes', including:
 Gén. M. Bouchérie: "Les Bureaux Arabes - leur role dans la
 conquete de l'Algerie" in REVUE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE (July 1957)
 p. 1052-66.
 F. Hugonnet: SOUVENIRS D'UN CHEF BUREAU ARABE (Paris 1858)
 V. Monteil: LES OFFICIERS (Paris 1958) ch. 5
 V. Monteil: "Les bureaux arabes au Maghreb 1833-1961" in
 ESPRIT (Nov. 1961) p. 575-606
 L. Walsin-Esterhazy: NOTICE HISTORIQUE SUR LA MAGHZEN D'ORAN
 (Oran 1849)
 X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES ET L'EVOLUTION DES GENRES DE
 VIEUX INDIGENES DANS L'OUEST DU TELL ALGEROIS (Paris 1953).
 Gouvernement-général de l'Algérie: DOCUMENTS ALGERIENS - Synthèse de l'activité algérienne
 Jan-Dec. 1947 Série Politique N° 10 - "LES BUREAUX ARABES" (Algiers 1948)
18. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 133.
19. X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES ET L'EVOLUTION DES GENRES DE VIE
 INDIGENES (1953) p. 124.
20. Ibid. p. 118-26.
21. Circular of 17th September 1844, cited by M. Merlo: L'ORGANISATION
 ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ALGERIE (Paris 1951) p. 170. Bugeaud's simple
 philosophy of action, with its mixture of force, military
 colonisation, and contact with Arab notables, can be rapidly
 gleaned both from his writings and from analyses by others:
 Gén. Bugeaud: L'ALGERIE - DES MOYENS DE CONSERVER ET D'UTILISER
 CETTE CONQUETE (Marseille 1842)
 Maréchal Bugeaud: DE LA COLONISATION DE L'ALGERIE (Paris 1847)
 Gén. P. Azan (ed.): PAR L'EPEE ET PAR LA CHARRUE - ECRITS ET
 DISCOURS DU MARECHAL BUGEAUD (Paris 1948)
 V. Demontès: LA COLONISATION MILITAIRE SOUS BUGEAUD (Paris 1917)
 R. Germain: LA POLITIQUE INDIGENE DE BUGEAUD (Paris 1955)
 C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1964) p. 210-69.

22. cited by Gén. M. Bouchérie: "Les Bureaux Arabes - leur role dans la conquête de l'Algérie" in REVUE DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE (1957) p. 1058-9.
23. Gén. Bugeaud: L'ALGERIE - DES MOYENS DE CONSERVER ET D'UTILISER CETTE CONQUETE (1842) p. 9, 10, 40.
24. cited by V. Monteil: "Les bureaux arabes au Maghreb" in ESPRIT (1961) p. 588.
25. cited by M. Emerit: "L'état d'esprit des musulmanes d'Algérie de 1847 à 1870" in REVUE D'HISTOIRE MODERNE (Apr.-June 1961) p. 120.
26. Capt. C. Richard cited by V. Monteil: "Les bureaux arabes au Maghreb" (1961) loc. cit. p. 591.
27. F. Gourgeot explained in 1881 why Arab Bureaus were ineffective: "Organized in essence to perform a purely military task for which politics and command were the crucial foundation, they were prevented from attaining this goal and failed in their task from the day they became overloaded with the multiple and sterile duties of red-tape administration. The natives no longer understood them". cited by C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 132-3n.
28. X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES...(1953) Ch. 5 P. 279-331.
29. Ibid. Ch. 6 p. 333-63.
30. Ibid. Ch. 4 p. 211-78
31. V. Monteil: LES OFFICIERS (1958) Ch. 5.
32. cited by X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES...(1953) p. 98.
33. X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES...(1953) p. 365-90.
34. Capt. C. Richard: ETUDE SUR L'INSURRECTION DU DAHRA 1845-6 (1846) p. 188-9.
35. Bugeaud originally argued that the intermingling of European settlers with the native population was the only way to guarantee security (cf. L'ALGERIE - DES MOYENS DE CONSERVER ET D'UTILISER CETTE (1842) p. 31-7). However, he thought chiefly in terms of military settlements.
36. cited by C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 101.
37. cited by V. Monteil: "Les bureaux arabes au Maghreb" (1961) loc. cit. p. 586.
38. cf. X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES...(1953) p. 147-209.

39. Letter from Bugeaud to Genty de Bussy, 30th March 1847, cited by G.A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1964) p. 223.
40. The world-view of the Bureau Arabe can be glimpsed in the work of three of its most prominent officers:
 Capt. C. Richard: DU GOUVERNEMENT ARABE ET DE L'INSTITUTION QUI DOIT L'EXERCER (Algiers 1848)
 F. Hugonnet: SOUVENIR D'UN CHEF DE BUREAU ARABE (Paris 1858)
 F. Lapasset: MEMOIRES SUR LA COLONISATION INDIGENE ET LA COLONISATION EUROPEENNE (Algiers 1848)
- Interesting discussions of its contribution the rationale of colonial operations are to be found in:
 M. Emerit: LES SAINT-SIMONIENS EN ALGERIE (Paris 1941)
 R. Valet: "L'administration militaire de 1830 à 1870, et la 'phobie' des bureaux arabes" in REVUE ALGERIENNE, TUNISIENNE ET MAROCAINE DE LEGISLATION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE (43) 1927 p. 78-87.
- X 41. The contemporary colon critique of the real (dna) alleged role of Bureaux Arabes is bitterly developed in:
 J. Duval & A. Warnier: UN PROGRAMME DE POLITIQUE ALGERIENNE (Paris 1868)
 J. Duval & A. Warnier: BUREAUX ARABES ET COLONS (Paris 1869).
42. J. Berque, cited by V. Monteil: "Les bureaux arabes au Maghreb" (1961) loc. cit. p. 586.
43. Doineau, an Arab Bureau officer in the Tlemcen area, murdered a native notable. His trial revealed his deep involvement in segmentary intrigues, and his extremely authoritarian methods of command within his 'circle'. cf. C. Martin: "L'affair Doineau" in REVUE AFRICAINE (80) 1937.
44. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 138, p. 162.
45. Ibid. p. 138, p. 162.
46. cf. Urbain's book, G. Voisin (pseud.): L'ALGERIE POUR LES ALGERIENS (Paris 1861) cf. Also C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 397-44.
47. M. Emerit: LES SAINT-SIMONIENS ET ALGERIE (1941) passim.
48. X. Yacono: LES BUREAUX ARABES...(1953) p. 127-145.
49. Hirtz: "La portée politique du Senatus-Consulte en 1863" C.H.E.A.M. Doct. 737, (1943) C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 67-78.
50. J. Franc: LA COLONISATION DE LA MITIDJA (Paris 1928)
 X. Yacono: LA COLONISATION DES PLAINES DU CHELIFF (Algiers 1953)
 H. Isnard: "Le cantonnement des indigènes dans le Sahel d'Alger" in MELANGES DE GEOGRAPHIE ET D'ORIENTALISME OFFERTS A E-F GAUTIER (Tours 1937) p. 245-55.

51. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 78-102.
52. By 1870, 372 tribes had been split into a total of 667 douars.
C-A. Julien: HISTOIRE DE L'ALGERIE CONTEMPORAINE (1964) p. 425-7.
53. Ageron describes various haphazard, rule-of-thumb techniques used to judge distances and stake out areas (LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE p. 75).
54. Ageron (Ibid) suggests that this was often deliberate policy.
55. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 139-44.
56. Overall accounts of the colonial administration of Algeria are contained in:
T.W. Balch: THE FRENCH IN NORTH AFRICA (London 1906)
H.J. Liebeny: THE GOVERNMENT OF FRENCH NORTH AFRICA (Philadelphia 1943)
M. Merlo: L'ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ALGERIE (Algiers 1951)
L. Milliot: LE GOUVERNEMENT ^{ET L'ADMINISTRATION} DE L'ALGERIE (Cahiers du Centenaire No. 5) (Algiers 1930)
W.B. Worsfold: FRANCE IN TUNISIA AND ALGERIA - STUDIES OF COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION (London 1930).
57. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 134.
58. P. Boyer, M. Emerit, et al.: LA REVOLUTION DE 1848 EN ALGERIE (Paris 1949)
G. Esquer: "Les débuts de l'administration civile à Alger - le personnel" in REVUE AFRICAINE (1912) p. 301-338.
59. J. Cambon: LE GOUVERNEMENT-GENERAL DE L'ALGERIE (Paris 1918)
S. Lebourgeois: LA QUESTION DU GOUVERNEMENT-GENERAL (Paris 1895).
A. Mallarmé: L'ORGANISATION GOUVERNEMENTALE DE L'ALGERIE (Paris 1901)
60. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 184.
61. The exertions of the 'colon party' in Paris are described by Ageron (op. cit.), esp. p. 430-446, p. 981-1002.
62. Ibid. p. 430-446.
63. Ibid. p. 881-1002.
64. On the activities and philosophy of the Organisation de l'Armée Secrète, publications include:
M. Challe: NOTRE REVOLTE (Paris 1968)
de la Gorce: "Histoire de l'OAS" in LE NEF (numéro special 19 Oct. 1962-Jan. 1963) p. 139-192
Gen. Jouhaud: O MON PAYS PERDU (Paris 1968)
A-P. Lentin: LE DERNIER QUART D'HEURE (Paris 1963)
J. Soustelle: L'ESPERANCE TRAHIE (Paris 1962)
J-J. Susini: HISTOIRE DE L'OAS (Paris 1961)

65. C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 37-55.
66. Ibid. p. 456n.
67. Ibid.
68. P.E. Viard: LES DROITS POLITIQUES DES INDIGENES D'ALGERIE (Paris 1937)
 P.E. Viard: "Le sens et la portée des élections de l'Assemblée Algérienne" in REVUE DE POLITIQUE PARLEMENTAIRE (May 1948) p. 124-30
 X.: "Double College ou college unique en Algérie?" in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (36) 4e. trim. 1956 p. 47-50.
69. cited by C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 199n.
70. Ibid. p. 575.
71. Information on the Algerian commune de plein exercice is provided by the following works, in addition to those cited at note 56 above, and C.H. Ageron (op. cit. passim):
 A. Bernard: L'ORGANISATION COMMUNALE DES INDIGENES DE L'ALGERIE (Paris n.d. ?1928)
 M. Champ: LES COMMUNES EN ALGERIE (Algiers n.d. ?1930).
 X: 'L'administration des indigènes de l'Algérie' in REVUE GENERALE D'ADMINISTRATION (1) 1902 p. 29-42, 268-77
72. A decret (decree) of 7th April 1884 applied the communal law to Algeria.
73. C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 622n.
74. Ibid. p. 150-2, 184-92, 249-65, 622-30, 707-736. In addition, the native population made large contributions, direct and indirect, to the budgets of the Gouvernement-General and départements.
75. In one celebrated case, the maire of the commune of Morris, near Bône, successfully obliged the Beni Urgine clane to pay rent to the municipality for sowing corn on its douar land, after prolonged litigation. cf. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 624.
76. C.Å. Ageron op. cit. p. 186.
77. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 191.
78. C.Å. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 190.
79. When first established by the ordonnance of 28th September 1847, Algerian communes had a nominated conseil. Elections were introduced under the Second Republic in 1848, but suspended in 1851 and abolished three years later. From 1854 to 1866, the commission municipale was nominated.
80. C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 1218.

81. J-P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE D'APRES LA JURISPRUDENCE DE LA PREMIERE MOITIE DU XXe SIECLE (Paris 1965) p. 219-220.
82. C. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 163-4.
83. cf. Y. Courrière: LES FILS DE LA TOUSSAINT (Paris 1968) p. 1226.
84. For example, at a meeting of the commune of Saint-Eugène, near Algiers, in March 1935, the moslem conseiller Ben Redouane demanded to know of the French maire why native labourers in the commune, working on the same site, were being paid only half the wages of European labourers. J. Melia: LE TRISTE SORT DES INDIGENES MUSULMANES EN ALGERIE (Paris 1935) p. 114.
85. Abbas became municipal councillor for his home town, Setif, in 1935. His career and somewhat ambivalent attitude to assimilation is charted in A. Naroun: FERHAT ABBAS OU LES CHEMINS DE LA SOUVERAINETE (Paris 1961).
86. In fact, by resigning on bloc three times, and getting re-elected on each occasion, the moslem councillors of Marnia, almost all of whom belonged to the MTLD, one of the predecessors of the FLN, managed to obtain a small share of direct administrative responsibility. Robert Merle: BEN BELLA (London 1967) p. 68-92.
87. These allegations appear to have been well-founded, and have been corroborated by several sources:
 J. Amrouche: "Chronique algérienne: autodétermination ou préfabrication" in DEMOCRATIE 21st April 1960 and 12th May 1960
 A. Boumendjel: "L'Algérie unanime" in ESPRIT Oct. 1951, p. 508-21
 J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 220-223
 C. Dorizy: "Les élections algériennes" in POLITIQUE June 1948, p. 540-7
 C. Favrod: LE F.L.N. ET L'ALGERIE (Paris 1962) p. 110-111
 M.T.L.D.: LE PROBLEME ALGERIEN (Paris 1951) No. 5.
 C-A. Julien: L'AFRIQUE DU NORD EN MARCHÉ (Paris 1952) p. 325-332
88. The Amis du Manifeste Algerien tried to arrange a moslem boycott of the municipal elections of July 1945. From 1947 to 1949, the nationalist parties entered a 'legal phase', and the municipal elections of October 1947 in particular saw great successes for candidates of the Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD). In October 1951, by contrast, the latter organized an extremely successful boycott of the communal elections.
89. In January 1956, the FLN organized a mass resignation of existing moslem conseillers, which had widespread success. Mouloud Feraoun was one of those who tendered his resignation. Cf. M. Feraoun: JOURNAL 1955-62 (Paris 1962) p. 51,97.
90. Naturalization made a native eligible for the First College and therefore for candidature as maire. Renunciation of moslem status, however, was not a step which a significant number of Algerians

90. were prepared or even encouraged to take. One extremely rare example of the election of a former moslem as maire was that of Dr. Boumali, the Socialist maire of Ain Beida in the 1930's. A. Wisner: L'ALGERIE DANS L'IMPASSE - DEMISSION DE LA FRANCE (Paris 2nd Edition 1948) p. 51n.
91. cited in C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 187.
92. Ageron, for example, refers to a moneylender who used his position as maire to enforce the payment of debts. Ibid. p. 506.
93. There were periodic but somewhat half-hearted attempts to establish an effective inspectorate of native administration in communes de plein exercice. In 1895, for example, the Gouverneur-Général, Cambon, tried to set up a special secretariat at sous-préfecturat level. Jonnart in 1900 established three secretary-generals for Native Affairs whose responsibilities included the work of mairies. However, this kind of machinery was skimpy and usually circumvented. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 623-4.
94. Several such cases came to light at the end of the 19th Century. Ibid. p. 501-5.
95. Thus Courrière describes the maire of Batna, in the Aures mountains, in 1954: "The hand of Alfred Malpel was to be found in all the affairs of the town. The personality of this fifty-year-old 'Pied Noir' undoubtedly dominated the region. Though his personal wealth was not inconsiderable, for he was a large-scale insurance broker which is traditionally a lucrative profession, his power was due to politics. President of the Fédération Radicale, and right-hand man and friend of René Mayer, he had accumulated titles and jobs which made him the veritable potentate of the Aures: Vice-President of the Algerian Assembly, and President of the Commission des Finances of Constantine". Y. Courrière: LES FILS DE LA TOUSSAINT (1968) p. 122-3
96. The Gouverneur-Général Grévy declared in 1879 that his aim was to set up throughout Algeria "a civil regime within which the French will feel at home". He doubled the area of civil territory during his two years of office. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 160.
97. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 452.
98. Ibid. p. 319.
99. cited by J. Mélià: LE TRISTE SORT DES INDIGENES MUSULMANES DE L'ALGERIE (1935) p. 234-5.
100. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 164n.
101. Ibid. p. 1214n.
102. Ibid. p. 151.
103. Ibid. p. 160-1.

104. P. Boyer: "La création des Bureaux Arabes départementaux" in REVU AFRICAINE (97) 1953, p. 98-130
C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968)
p. 136-8.
105. C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968)
p. 197-200, 630-43, 1215-7.
106. M. Smati: RAPPORT SUR LE RECRUTEMENT DES CAIDS ALGERIENS
(Algiers 1937).
107. H. Brenot: LE DOUAR (Algiers 1928)
C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968)
p. 494-8, 1212-5.
108. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 163.
109. J.P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (XXXX 1965) p. 227.
110. C.R. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 1215.
111. Ibid. p. 1215n.
112. M. Merlo: L'ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ALGERIE (1951)
p. 141-7.
113. A. Wisner: L'ALGERIE DANS L'IMPASSE - DEMISSION DE LA FRANCE
(1948).
114. In addition to works cited at notes 56 and 71 above, publications concerning the organization of communes mixtes include:
M. Champ: LA COMMUNE MIXTE (Algiers 1933)
Charavin: "La commune mixte de l'Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 415 (Oct. 1941)
Gerbie: CINQUANTENAIRE DE LA CREATION DES COMMUNES MIXTES (Algiers 1932).
XX: LES COMMUNES MIXTES ET LE GOUVERNEMENT DES INDIGENES EN ALGERIE (Paris 1897)
115. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 55.
116. Letter from Urbain to Napoleon III in 1863, cited by C.R. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 139n.
117. Letter from Lapasset to Urbain in 1862, cited by C.R. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 140n.
118. C.H. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 139-44.
119. cited by M. Merlo: L'ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ALGERIE (1951)-p. 155-6 added emph.
120. According to Ageron, "in its organization and legal form, it appeared to be a continuation of the military commune mixte, but in its spirit and in practice - particularly in its determination to reduce the role of jemaas to a minimum - it was far from the ambitions and dreams of the inventors of the commune mixte of 1868". LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 155.

121. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 188.
122. cf. M. Bugéja: SOUVENIR D'UN FONCTIONNAIRE COLONIAL - TRENTE QUATRE ANS D'ADMINISTRATION ALGERIENNE (Algiers 1939).
Also C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 173-6, 192-7, 611-22.
123. The commune mixte of Palestro had only 4 French inhabitants in 1874 for example, and comprised 7 moslem douars. Nevertheless, representation of the commission municipale was fixed at 7 for each community, and Europeans were brought in from neighbouring communes for meetings. Ageron (op. cit.)
124. C.Å. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 196.
125. Hirtz: "Evolution sociale du Djebel Amour depuis 1830" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 744, October 1945, p. 25.
126. See esp. C.Å. Ageron (op. cit.) p. 165-76, 239-47, 650-71.
127. The especially oppressive restrictions concerning the use of forests are discussed by A. Berque in his article J. Menaut (pseud.): "La forêt algérienne" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE Sept. 1935, p. 542-50, and by J-P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 127-9.
128. C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 176.
129. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 246.
130. Ibid. p. 671. The Code, he suggests, was "a symbol of colonial authority, constantly oscillating between the paternalistic and the arbitrary".
131. J-P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 209.
132. C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 197-200, 630-43, 1215-7.
133. E.F. Gautier: "Une visite aux grottes du Dahra" in REVUE DE PARIS 15th June 1914, p. 729-59.
134. H. Milner & G. de Vos: OASIS AND CASBAH - ALGERIAN CULTURE AND PERSONALITY IN CHANGE (Ann Arbor 1960) p. 23ff.
135. cited by Ageron (op. cit.) p. 633.
136. C.Å. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANS ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 198.
137. Ibid. p. 630-3.
138. M. Smati: RAPPORT SUR LE RECRUTEMENT DES CAIDS ALGERIENS (Algiers 1937).

139. M. Merlo: L'ORGANISATION ADMINISTRATIVE DE L'ALGERIE (1951) p. 170-2.
140. R. Montagne: "La fermentation des partis politiques en Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 609 (March 1937).
141. G. Marcy: "Observations sur l'évolution politique et social de l'Aurès" in Centre d'Etudes de Politique Etrangère: ENTRETIENS SUR L'EVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE (VOL. 3) July 1938 (p. 126-49) p. 133.
142. Ibid. p. 133.
143. J. Menaut: "La leçon des urnes" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE June 1935, p. 346. J. Menaut was a pseudonym for Augustin Berque.
144. E.F. Gautier: "Une visite aux grottes du Dahra" in REVUE DE PARIS 15th June 1914, p. 729-59.
145. Ibid.
146. J. Menaut: "La leçon des urnes" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE June 1935, p. 356.
147. R. Montagne: "La fermentation des partis politiques en Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doc. no. 609 (March 1937).
148. Parant: "Les centres municipaux de l'Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 796 (n.d. ?1939).
149. G. Marcy: "Observations sur l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Aures (1938) loc. cit. p. 136.
150. S. Bromberger: LES REBELLES ALGERIENS (Paris 1958) p. 79.
151. Lt. de Préville: "Origines politiques et sociales de la rébellion dans le douar Mouladheim (Bone)" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 3072 (1959) p. 15-16.
152. J. Soustelle: L'AIMEE ET SOUFFRANTE ALGERIE (Paris 1956) p. 25-6.
153. H. Brenot: LE DOUAR (Algiers:1928),
C.R. Ageron: LES ALGERIENS MUSULMANES ET LA FRANCE (1968) p. 494-8, 1212-5.
154. J. Soustelle: L'AIMEE ET SOUFFRANTE ALGERIE (1956) p. 26. "It was clearly necessary", he added, "to push contact with the population much further down towards the base, to investigate its needs, and to fight inch by inch for it and with it against nature".

155. cf. Cdt. Lehureaux: LE NOMADISME ET LA COLONISATION DANS LES HAUTS-PLATEAUX DE L'ALGERIE (Paris 1931),
Also J-P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 117-9.
156. J-P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 230 describes the alienation of a douar's property, despite its jemaa's opposition, by the administrator of La Calle (near Bone).
157. Lt. de Préville: "Origines politiques et sociales de la rébellion dans la douar Mouladheim (Bone)" C.H.E.A.M. 3072 1959, p. 15ff describes several years of conflict between the administration and a douar jemaa, during which successive presidents were dismissed, obliged to resign, and disqualified.
158. Examples of clan rivalries expressed through jemaa elections are provided by Lt. de Preville (Ibid.)
J. Morizot: L'ALGERIE KABYLISEE (Paris 1962) p. 117-8
J. Menaut: "La leçon des urnes" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE June 1935, p. 352-8
H. Miner & G. de Vos: OASIS AND CASBAH - ALGERIAN CULTURE AND PERSONALITY IN CHANGE (1960) p. 39-41.
159. L. Milliot: "Les institutions kabyles" in REVUE D'ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (1932). In other respects, he argued, sedentary Kabylia would have been 'ideal terrain' for attempts to convert traditional solidarities into the European 'municipal spirit'.
160. Lt. de Préville: "Origines politiques et sociales de la rébellion dans le douar Mouladheim (Bone)" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 3072, 1959, p. 13.
161. G. Marcy: "Observations sur l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Aurès" in C.E.P.E: ENTRETIENS SUR L'EVOLUTION DES PAYS DE CIVILISATION ARABE (1938) p. 134-5.
- Other reports about the survival of 'clandestine' jemaas include:
G. Surdon: INSTITUTIONS ET COUTUMES DES BERBERES DU MAGHREB (Tangiers 1936)
L. Milliot: "Les institutions kabyles" in REVUE D'ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (1932) p. 127-74
L. Milliot & A. Giacobetti: "Recueil de deliberations des jemaa du Mzab" in REVUE D'ETUDES ISLAMIQUES (1930) p. 171-230,
S. Rahmani: NOTES ETHNOGRAPHIQUES ET SOCIOLOGIQUES SUR LES BENI MUHAMED DU CAP AOKAS (Constantine 1933).
162. 'Parallel justice' is the phrase used by J-P. Charnay: LA VIE MUSULMANE EN ALGERIE (1965) p. 240.
163. L. Milliot: "L'organisation française de l'Afrique du nord" in L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE Nov. 1933, p. 618.

164. G. Marcy: "Observations sur l'évolution politique et sociale de l'Aurès" (1938) loc. cit. p. 134.
165. Bou Hasna (pseud. for H. de Montety): "Structure Administrative du protectorat français en Tunisie" in AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE Dec. 1937, p. 578 (cf. also Oct. 1937, Nov. 1937 and Jan. 1938). de Montety criticizes the Tunisian local government network for combining direct administration with remoteness.
166. Ibid.
167. Parant: "Les centres municipaux de l'Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 796 (n.d. ?1939).
168. Letter of 10th April 1941, cited by J. Lacouture: CINQ HOMMES ET LA FRANCE (Paris 1961) p. 282-3.
169. Ibid.
170. On the Municipal Centre programme, there is information provided by:
 Duplessis-Kergomard: "La vie municipale en Kabylie - Le centre municipale d'Oumalou" in C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 376 (May 1938)
 V. Laurent: "Des djemaas de justice aux djemaas des centres municipaux d'Algérie" in REVUE AFRICAINE 1949
 M. Lauriol: "Le régionalisme interne en Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 50 (March 1957) p. 23
 Parant: "Les centres municipaux de l'Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. no. 796 (n.d. ?1939)
 P.E. Viard: LES CENTRES COMMUNAUX DANS LA COMMUNE MIXTE D'ALGERIE (Paris 1939).
Gouvernement-Général de l'Algérie: DOCUMENTS ALGERIENS - Synthèse de l'activité algérienne (30.10.1945 - 31.12.1946) Série politique (Algiers 1947).
171. Parant: "Les centres municipaux de l'Algérie" (?1939) loc. cit. n.p..
172. Duplessis-Kergomard: "La vie municipale en Kabylie - Le centre municipale d'Oumalou" (1938) loc. cit. p. 7.
173. Parant: "Les centres municipaux de l'Algérie" (?1939) loc, cit. n.p.
174. T. Oppermann: LE PROBLEME ALGERIEN (Paris 1961) Appendix
 Cf. also R. Le Tourneau: "Evolution politique de l'Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. Doct. no. 3768 (1962).
175. The settlers were guaranteed half the deputies in the Algerian Assembly, election for which was organized into two separate colleges. Wholesale voting fraud ensured that the indigenous vote for the remaining representatives was neutralized.
 cf. R. Le Tourneau: "Evolution de l'Algérie" C.H.E.A.M. doct. 3768 (1962), the sources cited at note 87 above, and P-E. Viard: "Le sens et la portée des élections de l'Assemblée Algérienne" in REVUE DE POLITIQUE PARLEMENTAIRE (May 1948) p. 124-30.
176. J. Soustelle: L'AMÉE ET SOUFFRANTE ALGERIE (1956) p. 25.

177. Ibid. p. 26.
178. Ibid. p. 26 "It was clearly necessary", he added, "to push contact with the people much further down towards the base, to investigate its needs, to fight inch by inch for it and with it against nature".
- e 179. J. Chavallier: NOUS, ALGERIENS... (Paris 1958) p. 129-31
J. Soustelle: L'AIMEE ET SOUFFRANTE ALGERIE (1956) p. 90.
180. J. Soustelle: L'AIMEE ET SOUFFRANTE ALGERIE (1956) passim.
181. R. Lacoste: "Des élections-témoin avant la fin de l'année" in ENTREPRISE (77) p. 40-3, 1st June 1956
M. Lenoir: "Fonction publique et affaires administratives" in Délégation-Générale du Gouvernement en Algérie: ALGERIE D'AUJOURD'HUI (No. 7) Algiers 1960, p. 13-20.
F. Conctator & M. Jausserand: 'Réflexions sur la réforme communale en Algérie' in L'AFRIQUE ET L'ASIE (38) 1957(2) p 44-62
182. cf. T. Oppermann: LE PROBLEME ALGERIEN (1961) Appendix
J. Robert: "Considérations sur un texte oublié: la loi-cadre algérienne" in REVUE DE DROIT PUBLIC ET DE LA SCIENCE POLITIQUE (Jan.-Feb. 1960)
P. Fontaine: "Vers l'autonomie de l'Algérie" in DEFENSE DE L'OCCIDENT (61) May 1959, p. 17-21.
C. Faivre: UNE REVOLUTION ADMINISTRATIVE EN ALGERIE - LA REFORME COMMUNALE (C.H.E.A.M. doct. 3740) 1959