

The impact of capacity building for the development of the social institutions of war-torn countries: Mozambique's vision for education and its multiple partners.


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ABSTRACT

A general review of the literature by academics and practitioners in the field of post-war recovery shows that capacity development is considered to be the core activity for economic and social recovery and establishing collaborative governance through national reconciliation. However, the actual impact of such interventions has not been systematically studied, nor is there a body of proven research experience of social impact assessment in the general field of development practice on which to draw for methodological approaches to assessing the impact of capacity building in post-war development.

This research was therefore carried out with the aim of testing the assumption of a causal link between capacity building assistance and the recovery of good governance and peaceful development in war-torn societies. In order to do that it was also necessary to develop an appropriate methodology for assessing the long-term social impact of capacity building.

A generative model of change through the interaction of interventions with context and subjects' volition was tested in the crucial case of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, using a composite research methodology involving qualitative field research and analysis of secondary data, documentation and literature. A participatory retrospective enquiry with a sample of education staff and parents revealed a strong consensus that capacity building had been effective when led by government with the participation of the public and invited donor support. Failures of governance on the other hand were thought to have contributed to the civil war. In these discussions the participants revealed their criteria for good governance, which were then applied to contemporary accounts and statistical data of Mozambican society.

The study concludes that support for capacity building by multiple donor and financial partners in Mozambique from 1975 onwards made an essential contribution to the development of good governance and eventual sustained peaceful development. However this positive impact was achieved because interventions were introduced in the context of a national vision and strategy for education as the motor of development, which was shared by government and public. These findings confirmed the assumption of a causal relationship between capacity building, good governance and peaceful development but revealed that it is conditioned by context and the will of recipient governments and people.

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ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT

ADB	African Development Bank
ANC	African National Congress
AIM	Agência de Informação de Moçambique
BCM	Banco Comercial de Moçambique
CAP	Comissão de Apoio Pedagógico (pedagogical support team)
CFA	Centro de Formação Agraria (agricultural training centre)
CFAT	Centro de Formação Accelerada de Trabalhadores (workers accelerated training centre)
CFM	Caminos de Ferro de Moçambique (Mozambican Railways)
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency
CNE	Comissão Nacional das Eleições (National Electoral Commission)
COPA	Coordenação do Programa de Apoio (Assistance programme coordination)
CPA	Coalition Provisional Authority
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DAF	Direcção de Administração e Finanças (Directorate of Administration and Finance)
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DDE	Direcção Distrital de Educação (District Education Directorate)
DfID	Department for International Development
DNEA	Direcção Nacional de Educação de Adultos (National Directorate for Adult Education)
DP	Direcção de Planificação (Directorate of Planning)
DPE	Direcção Provincial de Educação (Provincial Directorate of Education)
EP1	Ensino Primário 1 (First level primary)
EP2	Ensino Primário 2 (Second level primary)
ESSP	Education Sector Strategy Plan
FACOTRAV	Faculdade de Operários e Trabalhadores de Vanguarda (Faculty for Vanguard workers)
FASE	Fundo de Apoio à Sistema de Educação (support fund for the education system)
FINNIDA	Finnish International Development Fund
FRELIMO	Frente de Libertação de Moçambique

GDI	Gender Development Index
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Highly Indebted Poor Countries
IFLOMA	Manica Forestry Enterprise
ICG	International Crisis Group
IGC	Interim Governing Council (Iraq)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IMP/IMAP	Instituto Médio Pedagógico (Intermediate level teacher training college)
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estatística (National Statistical Institute)
LEC	Ligação Escola Comunidade (School Community Link)
MIC	Ministério de Indústria e Comércio (Ministry of Industry and Commerce)
MINED	Ministério da Educação (Ministry of Education)
MOZAL	Mozambique Aluminium
OMM	Organização da Mulher Moçambicana (Mozambican Womens Organisation)
ONUMOZ	United Nations Organisation, Mozambique
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Company
PARPA	Programa de Apoio à Redução da Pobreza Absoluta (Poverty Reduction Programme)
PASE	Programa de Apoio à Sistema de Educação (Finnish education support programme)
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RENAMO	Resistência Nacional de Moçambique
RAR	Annual Review Panel
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SETEP	Secretariado de Ensino Técnico e Profissional (Secretariat for technical and professional education)
SNE	Sistema Nacional de Educação (National Education System)
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
STAE	Secretariado Técnico de Apoio as Eleições (Technical Assistance Secretariat for Elections)
SWAP	Sector Wide Assistance Programmes
UEM	Universidade Eduardo Mondlane

UNDG	United Nations Development Group
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Education and Science Organisation
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UP	Universidade Pedagógica
USAID	United States Assistance for International Development
WFP	World Food Programme
WSP	War-torn Societies Project
ZIP	Zona de Influência Pedagógica (school cluster)

Acknowledgements and Declaration

The presentation of this thesis is the culmination of my own learning and capacity development process in which there have been many key influences starting from my upbringing in post-war Europe with parents and grandparents who had lived through two world wars. There were early experiences of European reconciliation at Luethi-Peterson children's summer camps and school fundraising in response to calls for humanitarian aid to Africa during the war in Biafra, growing political awareness through contacts with Latin American and African refugees living in Britain.

Finally, in 1983 I went to Mozambique on a two-year 'volunteer' contract with the National Directorate of Adult Education (DNEA), which eventually extended to six years. I learnt from this experience and the years when I returned to work for post-war recovery, not only about Mozambique's particular process of nation-building, but about the nature of conflict, reconciliation and recovery in general. Working as I did in education, I also gained a much greater understanding of how people learn and develop their capacity. Like the Mozambican participants in this study, I owed my own development to working with adult learners, parents, pupils and above all colleagues during these demanding and often daunting times. I would first of all like to express my gratitude to all of them. It was a unique privilege to work with them and be party to their struggles for a better life.

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Finally, I have to say, like the Mozambican participants in this research, that the first significant influence in my education and career was parental support. My Mother has carried that support well beyond the call of duty into her 90th year, still supporting this latest endeavour with interest and confidence. My congratulations and thanks to her.

Except where otherwise stated this thesis is entirely my own work. During the course of the study some material has been included in the following joint publications listed in the bibliography: Barakat and Chard 2002, Barakat, Chard, Jacoby and Lume, 2002 and Barakat, Chard and Jones 2005. Any material from joint papers that is not my sole original work is referenced in the normal way.

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INTRODUCTION

In the current discourse on post-war reconstruction and development capacity development is seen as the core activity whether for economic and social recovery or for establishing collaborative governance and national reconciliation. However, a general review of literature published by academics and practitioners in the field of post-war recovery, led to the conclusion that while there is a general assumption that the restoration and development of institutions of government and the civil society are necessary first steps in the recovery of societies from war and that they require external assistance for capacity building and institutional development, the actual impact of such interventions in war-torn societies is not systematically studied, nor is there a body of proven research experience of social impact assessment in the general field of development practice that might guide the definition of criteria and methods for assessing the social impact of such programmes.

The research idea for this study was prompted by identifying this gap in the academic and practitioner approaches to understanding post-war recovery, combined with the author's own experience of working for a number of years in capacity building and institutional development in Mozambique. This work was of course based on the assumption that such interventions were making a positive contribution to the development of public service institutions in that war-torn country. The author first began to examine this issue by making a retrospective study of an emergency teacher training programme for RENAMO teacher volunteers in post-war Mozambique for her MA dissertation (Chard 2000). This examined the issue of capacity building as a vehicle for social recovery. At the same time an unpublished pilot study based on focussed interviews was conducted with the British Council and a sample of Mozambican post-graduate scholars in British universities. It examined how donor and recipients experience and evaluate the impact of capacity building.

The Research Aim

As a result of these experiences, it became clear that a core concept of the international community engaged in recovery programmes for war-torn societies is the need to establish local and national *good governance* based on developing institutions for collaboration between the state, civil society and the market through capacity building. While the concept has been transposed from development theory for societies devastated by poverty and recurring natural disaster, there is no body of research that confirms its validity in either context. The testing of this assumption of a chain of causal links: *capacity building - good governance - sustained*

recovery and development, for war-torn societies is therefore the main theoretical concern of this study.

However, before tackling this theoretical issue, a practical question arises: given the long history of basing actions on this assumption without attempting to verify it by research, can it in fact be reliably tested? The first concern of this study was therefore to establish the means for testing the hypothesis.

Thus the objectives of the study can be summarised as follows:

- To answer the question 'How can the impact of capacity building and institutional development interventions for the recovery of social institutions in post-war societies be reliably assessed?'
- To test the plausibility of the assumption of a causal link between capacity building assistance and the recovery of good governance and sustainable peaceful development in war-torn societies.

The author decided to relate this concept to her experience of working for the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, realising that Mozambique was a country that had pursued development goals through mass capacity building in the aftermath and in the context of two wars and was now deemed to have achieved a remarkable level of post-war recovery and development in a context of emerging good governance. This period of thirty years seemed to present a unique opportunity to understand the cumulative and long-term impact of multiple interventions by donor partners in support of capacity development in the context of violent regime change, revolution, war and recovery.

The scope of the research

The scope of the research was limited by two factors. In the first place, the low level of resources: it was individual research carried out by one researcher (whose personal capacities and limitations determined what was and was not possible) and in a limited time frame dictated by cost as well as academic deadlines. The second more significant reason, is its exploratory nature. It is considered as first stage research that could (and should) lead to investigation on a larger scale involving teams of researchers in different contexts. For this reason, the most important outcome of the research should be to discover a reliable methodology for testing the nature of the relationship between capacity building interventions and long-term social development. Logically if this is achieved, a more solid conclusion can also be reached as to

the plausibility of a causal relationship between capacity building, good governance and social development

The Thesis

The following chapters represent the translation of these ideas into a research study to test the assumption of a causal relationship between capacity development, good governance and sustained peaceful development, which underlies current theory and practice for development and for post-war development in particular.

Chapter 1 reviews the theory, international discourse and practice of capacity building and institutional development, (latterly subsumed in the term capacity development) for the implementation of development programmes. The focus is on the period that coincides with the post-independence development, civil war and recovery in Mozambique, in order to understand the context of ideas and development options that influenced the choices of both Mozambique and its partners.

Chapter 2 on the other hand reviews current understanding of post-war reconstruction, a concept, which has only recently been recognised by academics and even more recently become the focus of international policy and strategy development, though the practice of reconstruction after war and violent conflict has of course always existed. However, the evaluation of these earlier experiences that might give some insights into the possible outcomes of current practice has never been systematically undertaken, especially within the affected nations.

Chapter 3 therefore explores evaluation practice and, finding that it has no established approach to evaluating the long-term impact of development interventions in general and even less post-war reconstruction, defines some basic requirements for defining an appropriate methodology to evaluate the long-term impact of capacity building. The key conclusion is that the crucial evidence for such evaluation has to be obtained retrospectively from the personal recall of the subjects of intervention, complemented by contextual secondary sources.

Chapter 4 describes how such a methodology was developed in order to study the Ministry of Education in Mozambique as a crucial case most likely to confirm the assumption of a causal link between capacity development, good governance and sustained peaceful development.

This rather simple linear model was then refined to take account of the relationship between intervention and subject in a particular context.

Based on the conclusions reached in Chapter 3, the core methodology for examining this model was a retrospective participatory enquiry with a sample of education staff and parents, complemented by studies of secondary material (literature, statistical data, documentation and press reports). It was deemed, on the basis of the field research results, to have been effective in providing the evidence to assess the plausibility of the model. The analysis of that evidence is then presented in the following chapters

Chapter 5 reviews the record of the development of education in Mozambique, largely through the Mozambican literature and documentation but also that of its principal donor partners. The rationale for basing the analysis on these sources, while using published literature from external sources only for background information, was again the conclusion reached in Chapter 3 on the approach to long-term social impact evaluation. The main conclusion of this chapter is to confirm the education sector in Mozambique as a likely case to confirm the research model developed in Chapter 4. However, a number of critical issues remained to be examined in the light of the research participants' contribution (the author uses the term 'participant' rather than respondent because of the methodology employed, the rationale for which is explained in Chapter 4 and the practice in Appendix 2)

Chapter 6 analyses the accounts given by the 37 education staff interviewed in respect of their own education, professional development and careers in the context of colonial rule, revolution, war and recovery. Similar information was collected from a small number of parents who discussed both their education and that of their children studying today. The purpose of this chapter was to identify the key inputs for personal capacity development as understood by the participants and to begin to establish to what extent individual development contributed to the development of the institutions of the Ministry of Education (MINED) and to the wider society. The sum of their collective experiences clearly supports the concept of capacity development as the product of interaction between positive and negative interventions, context and the individual's own volition.

Chapter 7 presents the participants' views on the general development of education after independence. They were asked to consider the role of government and that of international

cooperation in supporting the development of education, as well as the effects of the war. They were also asked what they thought were the fundamental causes of the war.

These discussions revealed a strong consensus that capacity development was at its most effective when led by government with the participation of the public and invited support of international partners. The effect of the war was to fragment and divert this effort, throwing capacity development into reverse. Nevertheless the national education system survived with sufficient capacity to undertake the strategic planning of its own recovery and once again enlisted international support to achieve its objectives. In the course of discussing both the positive role of the post-independence government and its failures, resulting, as many thought, in civil war, the participants also revealed their criteria for good governance, which they considered enhanced as a result of the drive to extend participation in education and as a result of lessons learned from the breakdown of governance in the war.

Chapter 8 examines this ‘folk theory’ by using the participants’ criteria of good governance beside the criteria used in the international discourse discussed in Chapter 1 to explore contemporary accounts of Mozambican society, in the press, statistical indicators and published reflections on the ten years of peace. In this way, the nature and quality of governance that has emerged following the end of the war is assessed and the extent to which it has been enhanced compared to the early post-independence period by the impact of education and capacity development strategies, and the lessons learned from the war and economic collapse. This analysis, like the rest of the study and for the same reasons, relies principally on Mozambican sources.

Analysing these different perspectives together in Chapter 9, the study concludes that capacity development in war-torn societies may indeed contribute to good governance and sustained peaceful development and that donor support for this activity can be essential. However, as the research model suggests, the impact of these interventions is conditioned by the context in which they are introduced, crucially the existence of a national vision and strategy for development, which is embraced by both government and public.

CHAPTER 1

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: THEORIES, RHETORIC AND PRACTICE

Introduction

A review of the extensive literature discussing the related concepts of *institutional development* and *capacity building* and the many guidelines for practice aimed at operationalising them, gives the impression of constantly shifting, unclear and contested definitions of these key terms. More recently, new terms such as *governance* and *civil society* have become current as a means of describing the institutional development and capacity building aims of the international financial institutions, donor governments and humanitarian agencies in respect of their assistance to poor countries and communities. Thus though these terms are adopted as a common rhetoric in the international community, they have often masked divergent approaches to practice.

Nevertheless, Whyte (2004:73-4) in a recent review of donor practice for capacity building and institutional development concludes that there is now an emerging consensus on the best approaches to capacity building, based on concepts that have in fact been around for some considerable time. Meanwhile, analysis of actual practice over the last three decades shows that with few exceptions, it has shown remarkably little change and continues to adopt inappropriate strategies and approaches identified in the late 1970s and again in the early 1990s and the general opinion of the donor community is that little progress has been made in achieving the institutional capacity that was envisaged at either grass-roots or national government levels.

This contradiction between rhetoric, principles and practice, points to other factors, which significantly influence the way "aid" is negotiated and administered. First there are deep contradictions between what the international community acknowledges as appropriate practice for capacity building and the financial and administrative culture of its own institutions. Secondly, effective practice is commonly compromised in the pursuit of strategic or ideological objectives that contradict declared development principles, in a process that has come to be discussed in the

literature, as *conditionality*. This phenomenon includes both acknowledged and unacknowledged agendas on the part of the "givers" of a political, economic or cultural nature. A third factor, which is not much examined in the donor literature, is the agenda of the recipients of aid, which they naturally pursue within the terms of donor conditionality.

This chapter will consider each of these points in turn in the hope of clarifying the practical issues behind the smokescreen of rhetoric, theoretical debate and exhortations to good practice

1.1 Defining terms and concepts

Given the perception expressed in so much of the literature that application of the terms *institutional development* and *capacity building* in the context of international aid is obscure and confused (Austin, 1993, Moore, 1995a, Eade, 1997 and others.) it seems best to start by considering what the key words in these expressions mean in both general usage and the many theoretical explanations of the terms when used to define development concepts.

1.1.1 Institutions

Like many words *institution* is used to describe a number of phenomena that are nevertheless perceived as sharing significant common characteristics. It can mean 'An established law, custom, usage, practice, organisation or other element in the political or social life of a people' or 'An establishment, organisation or association instituted (meaning "set up") for the promotion of some object, especially one of public utility' (OED, 1965:1018).

In these definitions institutions can be both formal and non-formal, organisational and non-organisational, but their key characteristics are that they are "established" that is they have both durability and legitimacy for a particular population and that they are perceived to meet some social need.

Goldsmith (1992:582-583) observes that in social science there are 'major divergences' between two definitions of the word *institution*: one that defines an institution as a 'role or organisation' and the other, which defines it as 'a rule or convention'. One refers to 'deliberately constructed human groupings' the other to 'mental conceptions' 'diffused among a multitude of people'. As explained above, the common user of the word, does not perceive that these are clearly separate phenomena

because of their common characteristics, which Goldsmith describes as 'stability and persistence' 'value beyond the technical requirements of a task' and 'legitimacy or popular belief in something's rightness'. Ostrom, describing the 'de facto rules' of rural communities and 'de jure rules' of formally constituted institutions, sees that the two clearly coexist and are in fact inextricably 'nested' one in another (1990: 51-55).

Nevertheless, it is the existence of these two types of institution that has led to confusion in the discussion of both the theory and practice of institutional development. As Goldsmith describes, the tendency of development agencies has always been to focus on 'role orientated institutions' because '... administrators needed such bodies to carry out development projects'. This has led to equating institutions with organisations, an issue discussed in his article with Brinkerhoff (Brinkerhoff and Goldsmith, 1992:371-374) where they point out 'not all organizations are institutions, any more than all institutions are organizations'.

An *organisation* is 'an organized body, system or society' (OED, 1965: 1384) but it does not necessarily include the attributes of social value, legitimacy and stability, which characterise an institution. An organisation can be created by any group of individuals, such as an aid agency. It simply needs the means to set it up and obtain the services of a sufficient number of other individuals to run it but unless it acquires the attributes of an institution, its continued existence will be entirely dependent on maintaining those initial means of support.

The confusion of equating the creation of organisations with the development of institutions is seen by the two authors as the reason why many projects aimed at institutional development have proved unsustainable. An organisation only becomes self-sustaining, that is an institution, when it is valued by and seen to serve its stakeholders. Similarly, an organisation or organisational culture, that ignores existing (but not formally constituted) rule-based institutions, will be unlikely to succeed.

There is therefore a clear theoretical understanding of two distinct manifestations of social institutions as well as the essential characteristics that unite them, which can be a powerful tool in the design of research and strategic planning in the field of institutional development.

1.1.2 Capacity

The aid community's rationale for "building" or "developing" institutions is based on the perception that poor communities and national governments are dysfunctional and failing to ensure the well-being of their people through lack, or loss of *capacity*. Once again the many ways of using the word cause confusion. Its original literal meaning refers to 'a containing space, area or volume' but it long ago acquired a figurative meaning of 'Mental receiving power' and later the general meaning of 'The power, ability or facility for anything in particular'. (OED, 1965:260). So there are two meanings, one concerned with the holding of matter, the other describing human attributes.

In development parlance, which deals with both material and human resources, lack of rigor in specifying in what sense the word is being used has been the source of the confusion described above. Moore (1995b:93) goes so far as to dismiss the use of the term *capacity building* by development professionals as so inclusive in its application as to be 'analytically useless'. Cohen (1995:408 - 409) also complains of the 'Careless use of the concept of capacity building.' He too finds the solution in going back to dictionary definitions of common meanings of the word *capacity* which are 'centred on the ability, talent, competency, efficiency and qualifications of *people*' (emphasis added) and then adopting a working definition of *capacity building* by Shafritz in the field of comparative public administration which '...includes strengthening the capability' of administrative and managerial personnel 'to plan, implement, manage or evaluate... programs designed to impact on social conditions in the community' as a practical operational concept .

The idea that *capacity* is essentially concerned with the ability of people to function effectively to influence the conditions of their communities is indeed a practical concept, which has also been usefully applied beyond the context of public administration in rural development work with grassroots communities. Eade (1997:1-3) also confirms that it 'implies a long-term investment in people and their organisations'.

However, as early as 1980 Coombs (1980:17) drawing practical lessons from rural development case studies noted that skills training for income generation 'was useless' to the women concerned unless they 'had access to simple equipment, raw materials, credit and a profitable market'. So although *capacity building* may be concerned fundamentally with investing in the human capabilities of an organisation or community, that development also requires the development of

necessary resources and conditions. Fiszbein in a study of World Bank support for Local Government reform and development in Colombia (1997:1031) discusses the concept of capacity taking these factors into consideration, seeing 'labor, capital and technology' as 'dimensions of local capacity'. 'It is the combination of skills and professionalism that determine staff quality' but their 'ineffective use' due to inhibiting conditions (personnel policies etc) can also limit capacity. Similarly the lack, or poor distribution, of financial resources and equipment or of appropriate methods for information gathering, decision-making, evaluation etc. can result in apparent lack of personal *capacity*. Failure to grasp that the capacity, or power, to act effectively is conditioned by these circumstances as well as personal knowledge and ability has probably been at the root of many difficulties with capacity building programmes, where donors have seen the need to develop institutional and personal capacity through "training", while recipients have been focussed on accessing financial resources¹. In the field of community development, promoting the ability of the poor to take control of resources, or *empowerment*, is also now widely considered as an important component of capacity building. (Eade, 1997:24-25)

It is probably for this reason that the term *capacity development* is now preferred because it indicates a more holistic approach, which encompasses all three aspects of capacity associated with participatory development practice: human ability, material resources and power. (Whyte, 2004:19)

1.1.3 Governance

In the early 1990s, politicians, and development professionals began to pursue another way of 'getting out... of the..."capacity and institution building" thicket' (Cohen, 1995:422). They began to describe their development aims for aid recipient countries as promoting *good government* or *governance*. (Archer, 1994:10-11)

Clearly *government* and *governance* have the same derivation but the dictionary defines *government* as, 'the action of ruling and directing the affairs of state', while *governance* is simply, 'The action and manner of governing' (OED, 1965:816). The World Bank (1992:1-3) in its statement on the issue, defined *governance* in similar terms to the dictionary definition: 'the

¹ Edwards mention of the conflict between SCF and the Mozambican health service on this issue, is a case in point (Edwards, 1994:82)

manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development' and sees *good governance* in essentially pragmatic terms as involving 'systems of accountability, adequate and reliable information and efficiency in resource management and the delivery of public services' recognising that governments play key roles (but are not the only players) in establishing 'rules that make markets work efficiently' as well as the 'provision of public goods.' For the World Bank, *good governance* is the practical outcome it looks for from *capacity building*. However, the underlying assumption of the Bank's policy thinking is that it 'adds up to... the minimum institutional, legal and political conditions of liberal democracy, though... never stated this explicitly' (Leftwich, 1993:610).

This ideological commitment becomes very clear in World Bank studies of lessons learned from its experience in implementing capacity building for local government. Fiszbein in analysing local government capacity building in Colombia, describes it as 'a case of democratic decentralisation' which 'could ignite a process of local capacity development' and break out of the 'vicious circle of administrative underdevelopment - and low capacity -and fiscal poverty' (Fiszbein, 1997:1030). Edralin, looking at general lessons from similar experiences in Latin America and Asia, links *capacity building* directly with *good governance*: 'capacity correlates with good governance and capacity building is the main pillar' and goes on to state that 'Good governance needs to combine decentralised management with democratic accountability' (Edralin, 1997:111-115). She goes on to explain in more detail, how democratic accountability should be developed. In the first place, capacity building should aim to develop local leadership 'to create opportunities for good governance' and 'provide resources to enable local communities'. Local government planning and decision-making procedures should then 'incorporate the group process' as well as 'community initiative and participation' to 'create a sense of ownership and empowerment', concluding that 'The participation and commitment of NGOs and beneficiaries is another requirement in local governance' (Edralin, 1997:127-132).

This strategic approach to capacity and governance is closer to the much more explicitly ideological definition of what constitutes *good governance* for the European bi-lateral donors as expressed in their *Resolution on human rights, democracy and development*, which employs quite subjective terms even in the description of practical aspects of governance. While paying lip service to the right of 'sovereign states' to choose 'their own constitutional arrangements' they insist that a number of 'principles' are indispensable for 'equitable development'. These include

'*sensible* economic and social policies, *democratic* decision making, adequate governmental transparency and financial accountability, creation of a *market-friendly* environment for development, measures to combat corruption... respect for the rule of law, human rights... freedom of the press and expression.' (emphasis added). (European Community Resolution, 1991 quoted by Archer, 1994:8-9). Meanwhile, many international NGOs, unconstrained by diplomatic conventions, are prepared to pass judgement in even more explicit terms on the conduct of governments, which they deem to be oppressing or disregarding their citizens. (Clayton, 1994: 120-121)

Leftwich (1993:606, 611) suggests that these two apparently different meanings of *good governance*, the World Bank's 'administrative and managerial' emphasis and the Western governments' 'more political' interpretation, in fact share 'three main components.' First he sees that in 'current usage there is no doubt that good governance means a democratic capitalist regime... which is also part of ... the New World Order'. Secondly it 'implies a state enjoying both legitimacy and authority, derived from a democratic mandate' (this is particularly emphasised by Western governments) and thirdly (the World Bank's emphasis) it involves 'efficient, open, accountable and audited public service' and 'an independent judiciary' with the particular role of arbitrating 'disputes arising in a largely free-market economy'.

Meanwhile, NGO representatives (Clayton, 1994:115) have also embraced the term *governance* but suggest that the donor's definition is still 'too state centric, focussing on the capacity of the state to govern'. In their discussions they concluded that a 'dynamic concept of governance' needs to include 'the market and the wider civil society. Governance can be seen as a relational concept involving a complex interplay between government, the market and civil society'.

All these variations in the application of the term *good governance* are prescriptive rather than descriptive. They go beyond mere definition of terms for the sake of clarity of communication and into the arena of conditionality, which explains the preference for *governance* rather than *government* to express the concept, since its more general application (not specifically relating to governments) and focus on practical management of society can appear less threatening to the sovereignty of governments, by masking its inherent political agenda.

However this chosen vagueness has once again confused the issues affecting development choices. Hewitt de Alcantará, writing some years after the launch of *governance* into the 'development debate', observed that the 'wide applicability of the term, its reference to basic problems of political order (including efficiency and legitimacy), and its lack of any necessary relation to the state have made it useful to a growing number of participants' so that now 'governance is being used by groups of very different ideological persuasion, for a number of different and often contradictory ends' Thus, on the one hand, it can be used as a vehicle for shrinking the state to increase the role of the private sector, while often burdening voluntary organisations with public service tasks they cannot adequately fulfil, or, alternatively, it can be used to support the capacity of the state by encouraging the involvement of non-government entities to tackle problems in aspects of society where government should not attempt to play a leading role. (See 1.1.4. below)

So once again those involved in the study and practice of development find themselves trapped in a "thicket" of obscure language, which confuses rather than assists clarity of definition and purpose. Before using the term *governance* and especially *good governance* in any particular context it is necessary to define the criteria by which it is defined.

1.1.4 Civil Society

The expression *civil society* became current in the discourse surrounding development aid with the appearance of *governance* and as used by the international community it is integral to the ideologically charged definitions of that term described above.

In common speech, the adjective *civil* has the connotation of "ordinary" citizenship as opposed to officialdom or authorities while *society* refers to living in association with others in a defined community. So, the phrase *civil society* can be seen to refer to the general inhabitants or members of a particular state in their various social groupings as distinguished from their ruling institutions.

Robinson's account of the 'liberal' interpretation of the phrase: 'a public realm located between the family and the state, consisting of a plurality of associations.' is close to this general usage, and as he points out, the one that 'most aid donors are inclined towards'. However, when it comes to considering, what actual associations belong within the definition of *civil society* they become more subjective and 'conceive civil society as an aggregation of organised interests pursuing a

benign and rational political agenda' (Robinson 1995:71) and what is considered *organised* or *benign* and *rational* is of course highly coloured by western cultural values and political ideology.

Kasfir in his critique of the aid community's use of the term *civil society* forcefully illustrates the 'narrow and normative' meaning attached to the concept, by examining its application in the promotion of democracy in Africa. He asserts that 'for many scholars and donors civil society is an instrument... that will make African states more democratic, more transparent and more accountable'. However, their perception of the failure of existing African social institutions to achieve these goals has led them to 'urge African states to adopt a Western version of civil society'. As a result 'it is not the social formations that have emerged through the history of their societies' but 'a small set of organisations with special characteristics' (most of which are new and all of which conform to the western model of civil organisations) that are declared to be 'the core of civil society'. (Kasfir, 1998: 1-3)

He goes on to question other inherent weaknesses in the conventional concept of *civil society*, by asking 'how much of the society should be included in the notion of civil society?' Should it include ad hoc activity as well as formally constituted organisations? The present usage excludes (on moralistic or ideological grounds) much of traditional African society, which is based on ethnic and religious allegiances and by setting the boundaries of civil society activity outside the family arena (which is widely extended in African society) it also excludes the struggles of women's groups to redefine the roles of men and women in that context. 'Defining civil society as confrontational' in its relations with the state also 'creates problems' since... 'the possibility for civil society to play a role in the consolidation of democracy evaporates if associations cannot be perceived as working constructively with the state as well as opposing it'. Similarly the perception that civil society means that it should be "civil" (*benign* in Robinson's analysis) in the sense of non-violent and conciliatory in the face of conflicting interests, fails to recognise the 'deep political and economic cleavages that must be resolved before members of a society are sufficiently at peace with each other to work within a democratic system' (Kasfir, 1998:4-11).

'Civil society organisations are not inherently benign' in any society, (Eade, 1997:107), neither is

Africa unique in other aspects of its social organisation.² Kasfir's exposition clearly demonstrates that the definition of *civil society* adopted by the majority of the aid community, is too prescriptive and culturally biased to serve as a useful tool in the development of strategies for democratic and social change in any developing countries, since by excluding the majority of indigenous social formations (institutions) and denying the role of conflict in social change, it is itself profoundly undemocratic. If the particular nature of social organisation in a given country is to be related to a general concept of *civil society*, it seems best to take the more inclusive and culturally neutral meaning suggested by common usage as a starting point.

1.2 Institutional development and capacity building in practice: the empirical evolution of best practice concepts.

Institutional development as a practical activity arose as part of the process of decolonisation. Colonisation, had supplanted the original indigenous institutions of government at the highest level and had marginalised or simply co-opted institutions of community government (such as local feudal leaders or tribal chiefs and elders) at the local level. The colonial powers, in contemplating the transfer of power to a national leadership, faced a potential administrative vacuum. First, because generations of colonial rule had permanently ruptured the links to the pre-colonial forms of government, thus interrupting the evolution of indigenous modern forms of government and secondly because the colonial administration was run by and on behalf of the metropolitan power, so that in addition to there being no truly national institutions, there were also no personnel with experience of governing, policy making or even of administrative decision making.

In most cases, where, after a period of confrontation, a peaceful transition to independence was negotiated, this included a period of transitional government during which the colonial administration was converted into some kind of approximation of the domestic institutional arrangements of the colonial power (some form of "liberal democracy" with a civil service bureaucracy) and national political leaders and administrators gradually took over the reigns of power. In these cases, *capacity building* in the form of professional education and technical

² There are clear parallels with other countries, for example, Afghanistan.

training and assistance were provided to enhance their ability to govern. Where independence was resisted until the colonial regime itself collapsed (as in the case of Portugal and its colonies) the new nations, while they had the opportunity to think more radically about the kinds of institution they wanted, had very limited experience and human resources to put their choices into effect. In both cases, the international consensus of the UN and financial institutions, as well as the former colonial powers and indeed the newly independent nations themselves was that they required a further period of support to strengthen their institutions of government and build the capacity of their public servants. This ushered in a long period in the 1960s and 1970s, when international aid focussed on meeting this need in the belief that more effective government would bring about general improvement in social and economic conditions in these "underdeveloped " nations. This belief was shared by both Western and Socialist states, who competed to offer technical assistance and rival development models.

As these decades progressed the assumption that "development" would automatically flow from such "institutional strengthening", was increasingly questioned by practitioners in the light of their disappointing experiences in the field. Bhattacharya and Sharma (1979) trace the development of government administered rural development programmes in India since its independence in 1952, from general 'Community Development' policies administered at a macro level to area based 'Integrated Rural Development' at a micro level noting that none of these various schemes had succeeded in altering the balance of advantage from the rich farmers in favour of the rural poor. 'The strength of the bureaucracy has again and again foiled attempts at restructuring of rural institutions' (1979:87). The institutions of government, centralised and vertically structured had indeed been strengthened to the point of being unresponsive to real public needs, simply serving to reinforce inequalities. Like many other development professionals around the world, they turned to the ideas of the Brazilian Paulo Freire, encouraging 'peoples organisations consisting of the target population' which would serve to raise their awareness of their 'rights and privileges' (1979:90).

A new consensus rejected the conventional , sectoral, top-down delivery of public services and the assumption that macro-economic development would have a "trickle-down effect" for the poor, advocating an "'integrated." approach, combined with extensive "community participation".' However, these ' new policy commitments were still at the rhetorical stage as the 1970s ended.' (Coombs 1980:1-13). Coombs therefore undertook a review of a number of rural development

case studies in the light of this new consensus with the practical purpose 'to discover what concrete factors within each program and its environment had helped or hampered the achievement of its objective.' (1980:4). He came to a number of empirical conclusions.

The 'unique flexibility of voluntary organisations' can be used 'to help large scale government programs' (1980: 2-3). He was not surprised that government agencies, that had only recently committed themselves to this new approach, had as yet no concrete results that he could examine, but 'contrary to tradition' he did find that the majority of non-government programmes (such as BRAC and SAVAR in Bangladesh, SWRC, India and Sarvodaya. Sri Lanka³) that had successfully reached the rural poor 'contain significant elements of collaboration with government agencies, thus enhancing their potential for beneficially affecting larger scale government programs'.

We should 'visualize and analyze any project or program as a productive "system" (A concept that later came to be described as "holistic") Another important component of his "successful" programmes was "integration" (1980: 15-21) within the programme itself, between the programme and its intended beneficiaries and between the programme and the work of other agencies (amounting to more than mere coordination). He concluded that 'Many rural programs have low effectiveness because they are incomplete systems', for example, '...skill training... is only one piece of an employment and income generating "system"'. He also saw that 'planning at the national level ' must involve 'a cohesive and unified strategy within which all sectors become mutually reinforcing'. He adds that, while an integrated approach to planning came naturally to villagers, those organisations and personnel designated to serve them, ' by the very nature of their mandate and training', inclined to a narrow specialisation.

'...a good balance between central control and local initiative and latitude.' should be the aim. (1980: 22) While concluding that it was the highly centralised and hierarchical nature of government and other development agencies that made them unresponsive to rural needs and therefore advocating that there must be 'personnel at lower echelons capable of exercising

³ In fact these were so successful, that they virtually became nationwide political movements.

responsibility', he cautioned that decentralisation is not 'a panacea'. Leadership at national level is still necessary.

'much of the impetus for change must come from within the community' (1980:24-25) Participation of the rural populations themselves in choosing and developing strategies is important for two reasons: the villages (or locations) in which they live are 'not "communities" in the unified sense; they are frequently loose federations' of different kinship and interest groups each with their 'own stake, status and role in the scheme of things' ; 'they also have a very practical sense and a great fund of local knowledge that exceeds that of the outsider'. For any intervention to succeed it needs to have the endorsement or at least acceptance of all the stakeholders and to be accepted, new ideas must be based on intimate knowledge of the local conditions and advice of respected insiders.

Time must be allowed to build trust and facilitate 'a process of self-examination by all the groups in the community.' Looking at the experience of his case studies (1980:27-28), he observes ' the most important and often most difficult task for outsiders... is to win their trust and acceptance by convincing all segments of the community that... they are willing and able to provide certain types of help over a *sustained* period... short-circuiting this initial process or hurrying it unduly, can be self-defeating'. Most of the ten ways in which he suggests that such a process can be facilitated come within the area of practice described as *capacity building*, including the empowerment of disadvantaged subgroups particularly women, whose economic and social roles figured prominently in many of the cases studied.

Development projects and programs should be planned, implemented and evaluated on the basis of understanding their context and the impact they have on it, by means of continuous observation and information gathering. He adds another important lesson for development agencies, that they must change the way they collect and use information to plan and evaluate their actions. (1980:37-39) Evaluation had been given little attention and what it usually amounted to was 'a management type post-audit to determine whether the (completed) project kept to its original work plan and schedule, stayed within its budget and achieved its initial objectives' regardless of whether these had turned out to be appropriate and without assessing the impact on the local situation. As a result no lessons were being learned as to the most effective practice. Similarly, too little attention was

paid to understanding local contexts before designing projects. The most effective way to do this was by largely qualitative methods and, by implication, user participation at every stage.

Political will to promote equity is essential for sustainable development. Addressing the question 'Will it be possible?' to meet the needs of the rural poor by these means he stressed that 'political leadership at all levels, genuinely dedicated to these humanistic goals' was 'undoubtedly the most fundamental requirement' as well as the understanding 'that without a more equitable sharing of the world's goods--both within nations and between them--the security, stability and progress of *all* nations is in jeopardy'.

Korten writing in the same year and also basing his conclusions on analysis of case studies reached much the same conclusions as Coombs, but introduces some useful terms to contrast the new concept of *best practice*, which he calls the 'Learning Process Approach' with the failed practice of the "text-book version of ...development", the 'Blueprint Approach'. (1980: 496-499). In the former, 'both program and organisation emerged out of a learning process in which research and action were integrally linked.' The latter, is based on detailed pre-planning 'as if knowledge were nearly perfect... it assumes that development actions are terminal and temporary organisations will suffice and 'sharply differentiates the functions and even the institutional locations of the researcher, the planner and the administrator'.

Like Coombs he sees *capacity building* activities as crucial to the success of development programs, not 'as if they were writing on a clean slate' but recognising the 'well-established socio-technical systems within which the poor have... worked out appropriate methods to meet their basic survival needs'. 'The successful programs involved substantial planning with the people... Generally they built from and enhanced community capabilities while opening new options'.

Despite the clarity with which he is able to demonstrate the necessary factors for success, his concluding remarks (1980: 502-503) while strongly advocating 'building capacities for action through action' and allowing programs to evolve and grow, his assessment of prospects for success are not optimistic. Very few centrally planned rural development schemes ever successfully match actual needs and equally few 'village based... efforts develop into capacities for sustained action on a significant scale' due to their failure to learn how to expand their organisation. 'A significant barrier to an appropriate response from funding agencies' to facilitate

this kind of development is their 'adherence to detailed line item budgets, project plans and implementation schedules' (blue prints and limited timeframes) which 'pre-empt the learning process by' insisting that 'the leadership of the incipient effort act as if it knew what it was doing before there was an opportunity for learning to occur'. Unless this organisational culture was changed, he saw little hope for reducing rural poverty.

Some years later, Uphoff took up the basic tenets set out by Coombs and Korten, in order to model strategies for local institutional development, reiterating a commitment to building on existing knowledge and capacities through participation to develop leadership, learning through doing and allowing actions to change over time. For example, (1986: 199-200) he concludes that 'one of the best ways of developing local capabilities and encouraging consideration of what the needs and goals of the institution are, is to involve local people in planning and designing their own training', though "training" may often not be of the formal classroom type but learning through activities with participatory evaluation. In the blue-print model discussed by Korten, both training and evaluation are reserved to external 'specialists' and it seems from Uphoff's comments that little had changed in this respect over the intervening period. Evaluation exercises had become more frequent and extensive in an effort to improve performance, but this had only resulted in 'more rigidity' giving 'implementers more reasons to adhere to initial (and usually inadequate) project designs'. (1986:195).

Uphoff also re-examines the options for relating to existing institutions (1986:204-211). concluding that "introduced institutions" usually do not work, because they lack the "legitimacy, support and commitment over time" of "pre-existing institutions" (that is, according to the theoretical definitions discussed above 1.1., they are not in fact institutions) he nevertheless sees some dangers in co-opting existing institutions directly into development work. First because they can have 'some socio-economic or anti-modern biases' and secondly because their legitimacy may be compromised through loss of independence of action. Where this is the case, he advocates cooperation: working with and building on them but not through them. This naturally implies the need for some other 'catalyst' to promote change, which might be individual facilitators or 'alterative membership organisations' exclusive to certain disadvantaged social groups (poor tenants, women etc.) Several of the successful organisations examined by Coombs followed this model.

He also confirms the need for local efforts to be integrated in wider institutional and administrative systems, advocating 'horizontal and vertical linkages' to 'higher level bodies in the same organisation' as well as with other organisations at the same level. This has implications for decentralisation: 'Local institutional development involves not just local people learning... but... with each gain in local institutional development, there should be some changes in the way in which work is planned and carried out at virtually all levels, from the individual up to international institutions.' (1986: 215-220). This message was taken up by the World Bank, when it simultaneously reviewed its institutional development practice and its own internal practice and culture (Stevens and Gnanaselvam, 1995) and by NGOs such as Oxfam. (Eade, 1997: 195-202)

Uphoff summarises his conception of *best practice* for institutional development when he advises that 'agencies need to make their contributions additive rather than substitutive or possibly subtractive' (1986:234).

Classic examples of *subtractive* interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa had already been described by Morss, notably the case of Malawi (Morss 1984: 266-268), which in 1981 'was "benefiting" from 188 projects supported by 50 different donors'. Not having the capacity to manage such a large number of projects (including the burdensome task of carrying out monitoring and evaluation tasks 'tailored to serve the reporting requirements of donors') 'Malawi allows expatriates to take line positions in government at all levels.' The consequence (also observed by this author more than a decade later) was that instead of building their own capacity and information systems the Malawian public administration was 'diverted... from attempting to determine their own policies to simply trying to please their donors'.⁴

In the meantime, Western ideology had moved on to a neo-liberal agenda, which challenged the leadership role of the state, not just its inhibiting bureaucratic culture, and promoted privatisation and the shrinking of state institutions. Institutional "reform", consisting mainly in reducing government personnel and privatising all but core activities, went hand in hand with economic "reform" to replace state leadership with "market forces". However, since the overwhelming majority of public employees in poor countries work in the public services such as education and

⁴ This was also a case of 'recipient agenda' see 3.4. The emasculation of the administration maintained Banda's dictatorial rule.

health, which (in the light of the general poverty of the population) are not capable of yielding profits or even any significant "cost recovery", the solution on the part of donors was to promote social provisions by non-governmental organisations to which funds were channelled on a project basis. For many such organisations working at a community level and disillusioned with bureaucratic and corrupt government rural development agencies, this seemed like an attractive option that gave them the freedom to promote grass roots development at the micro level, free from the constraints of trying to work with government. However, in embracing this new dispensation, they turned away from several of the "lessons learned" by earlier practitioners (Coombs, Korten and Uphoff). They not only ignored the state institutions but also favoured 'creating' grass-roots organisations without reference to (or even challenging) existing local institutions and culture. As we have seen, this lack of integration was unlikely to produce sustainable development especially when combined with the donor's continuing funding and evaluation culture of pre-planned, fixed-term projects.

Two case studies described by Howes illustrate the problems inherent in the way this new generation of projects was being run. The ACCORD project in Uganda (1997a) was 'an attempt to introduce new institutions (credit groups) into a highly volatile environment... in the... aftermath of the regimes headed by Idi Amin and Milton Obote. As he describes it, it was an example of a *substitutive* strategy based on an externally formulated blueprint to 'nurture local capacities... through fostering the growth of new types of organisation... designed with "poor" and "middle" peasants in mind' (though apparently not consulted). The 'chronically weak' state was seen as 'leaving ample scope for other agencies to mount initiatives of their own' and the emerging local institutions, the Resistance Councils, were ignored in setting up the project. as were 'questions of economic viability'. The project management also lacked understanding of the social environment so that the groups they had targeted did not end up being the main beneficiaries. Howes concludes that they 'were ultimately constrained to act... as they did by the requirements of the donors who were supporting them.' That is, by the prevailing culture of pre-planned and timetabled projects.

In the Kenyan case study of institutional development of membership organisations, similar contradictions occurred: 'things worked well, where they happened to cohere with an established institution' but this was not part of the original strategy. Participation was limited to a superficial PRA (participatory rural appraisal) exercise, in fact 'diverting attention away from difficult underlying issues'. 'The case illustrates the problems inherent in attempting to graft institutional

development on to a programme which continues... to operate in a conventional funding-and - training and technology transfer mode'. (Howes 1997b: 844-845).

Pratten describes a much happier experience in Ethiopia, where an emergency seed distribution to peasants was carried out through existing local institutions, the Kire. Nevertheless, this project was not immune to the prevailing project culture of deciding *for* rather than *with* its intended beneficiaries in the interest of budget control. The project selected and purchased the seed for distribution until it was discovered that, because it was not suitable for local conditions, '89 per cent of households had exchanged some or all of their seed for locally appropriate varieties' and it was concluded that future programmes 'should be based on cash payments to enable farmers to purchase seed varieties most suitable for their own areas.' (1997: 148-149).

The donor emphasis on creating, and /or promoting organisations that could serve their purpose in delivering social services in substitution of state run services came to be justified in the name of strengthening *civil society* but, as we have seen above (1.1.4), only those organisations that were able and willing to fulfil donor criteria were included within that definition. This gave further encouragement to ignore the lessons for integration and building on existing institutions, with predictably unsustainable results.

Hewitt de Alcantará (1998:108) in fact sees both positive and negative ways in which *civil society* is being interpreted in practice, depending on the particular *governance* agenda that is being pursued. On the one hand there is a 'reawakening' of civil society 'in the struggle for democracy' and 'a process of rethinking the nature of good government... experimenting...with new ways to collaborate in many areas of common concern' (in a similar way to Coombs' "successful" rural development organisations) while in other parts of the 'development establishment... most committed to free-market orthodoxy', promotion of *civil society* has been part of 'an aggressively anti-state discourse' based on 'false dichotomies between "the people" and "the state".'

By the mid 1990s, the catalogue of institutional development failures had led to reconsideration on the part of some donors, of the role to be played by the state. They now recognised that it did have to take the lead in creating and regulating policy frameworks so that its actions, and those of other actors, could be effective. Voices also began to be raised from the NGO fraternity, warning of the 'distorting effects of a "patchwork quilt" of different service-providers on the quality and coverage

of services', giving 'reason to doubt the efficiency of NGOs in large scale welfare-provision' and advocating that NGOs develop constructive relationships with Southern governments'. (Edwards, 1994:70). Thus was born the concept of the 'enabling state' (Edwards 1994:67) as part of the *good governance* agenda and there was a return to institutional development of public administration, focussed on decentralisation and local accountability combined with the *civil society* agenda. This represented a return, in principle, to the integrated concept for *best practice* set out by Coombs, Korten, Unhoff and others in the 1980s and once again, in practice, the lessons were ignored or applied inconsistently.

Fuhr (1994:177-180) describes a World Bank project in Ecuador directed at municipal strengthening and institutional reform. The project design failed to apply the principle of integration, concentrating its actions for reform at the municipal and national levels, while ignoring the intervening provincial level of government that might have influenced the outcome. As a result, little 'institutional strengthening' of the type envisaged was achieved as local politicians pursued their own agendas. With hindsight he concludes that greater understanding of the context and participation in decision-making could have avoided this failure.

Catlett and Schuftan,(1994) present some more sad lessons from public sector institution building in Kenya. Examining in detail the conflicting perceptions and interests of donors, government institutions, technical advisors and civil servants involved in institutional development projects, they conclude: 'The *project* approach is clearly not working.' However, though the logical conclusion from their analysis might be that donors should consider how to contribute directly to developing this capacity through *additive* interventions to ongoing systems, the underlying assumption is that institutional development has to be instigated from outside and in any case the dictates of donor auditing procedures at that time ruled out a strategic approach, so they continued to talk in terms of 'project design.'

However, by this time, a number of major agencies were aware that enormous amounts of effort and money had been expended over decades on "institutional development" of public administrations⁵ and *capacity building* of personnel and local communities through NGO projects, which had resulted in very little improvement in the economic and social conditions of the now

⁵ 'More than 800 man-years of expatriate assistance' in one year in Malawi. Morss, 1984:467)

called 'developing nations' (Ahmed 1992). They therefore made serious attempts to define practical guidelines and working definitions based on lessons learned from that largely negative experience.

Ridker, (1994: 1-6) reviewed the long history of the World Bank's involvement in 'human resource development' (HRD) in Sub-Saharan Africa. He found that, 'TA (technical assistance) is doing more to increase dependence... than... to increase local capacity' and 'as long as market incentives remain as they are, the inflow of expatriates and outflow of trained Africans is likely to continue'. His recommendations to improve the development impact of the Bank's capacity building interventions include: periodic and detailed reviews of 'all of a country's human resource needs' as the basis for planning how 'to improve the situation'; 'the search for more sustained means of financing these strategies than... stand-alone projects of limited duration'; 'Increased concern for balanced, integrated development' of education; 'cost-effective approaches' to meeting the needs 'of persons unlikely to receive much education through the traditional classroom route' (non-formal options); the Bank's own procedures should change and 'consciously promote ownership and capacity building. For example, ...refrain from writing reports and studies that should... be written by domestic personnel.'⁶ His final recommendation is to take 'assessment, supervision, monitoring and evaluation of education and TA projects more seriously... so that the development impact of these projects can be assessed' in relation to an 'overall strategy for human resource development'.

Austin, also writing in 1994, reviewed the experience of the ODA and other bi-lateral donors in 'institutional strengthening projects' and reported the same unsatisfactory outcomes: the majority of projects were rated by their evaluators as 'unsuccessful'. He makes a theoretical distinction between institutional *strengthening* (IS) and institutional *development* (ID). The first 'involves seeking to improve the operational efficiency and performance of a given organisational or institutional structure' and most donor interventions fall into this category. The second involves 'asking the prior question... "what sort of organisational framework would be most effective and sensible in the particular sector or field?"' Obviously this is less common, since it implies a situation in which something is being established for the first time, or, as may be the case after a war, re-established in a very new context. However in practical terms the two often co-exist. There

⁶ That is, refrain from the 'substitutive' practices decried by Uphoff (op.cit.)

are often advantages in questioning existing arrangements in an ID way before designing IS since neither is 'an end in itself'. (1994: v)

His check-lists of elements for success and failure derived from examining case studies and donor literature, reiterate some familiar themes. Inadequate understanding of the recipient's existing capacity, national policy and 'the broader environment' by the donor and lack of commitment and human or budgetary (i.e. recurrent) resources on the part of the recipient were the common causes of failure, all clearly stemming from the fact that objectives had not been mutually agreed as part of the initial planning. Projects deemed successful exhibited: 'flexible' planning and implementation combined with a 'thorough monitoring system'; 'maximum involvement of the intended beneficiaries'; clear objectives agreed with the recipient; and a 'long-term... incremental' process approach (1994: 27-32). What are not explicitly defined are the criteria for judging 'success' other than that these interventions are directed at achieving *good governance* and as it is also clear that all the evaluations were carried out by or for the donors it has to be assumed that it was their perspective on this which set the terms by which the projects were judged.

Moore, (1995:49-52) in a SIDA Evaluation report a year later, exclaims, 'There is probably no other area of development policy where so much money is spent in pursuit of an objective, whose very name, as well as content, is subject to such basic and continuing dispute.' However, his analysis reveals that the confusion lies in the rhetoric, since he proceeds to elaborate the same catalogue of failures and finds the same answers to 'what aid agencies should best do' with his 'six conditions for successful institution building'. He goes on to show how aid agencies wishing to fund and/or implement activities on this basis will find that it does seriously challenge their 'normal mode of operation': the 'blueprint approaches' they adopt for all their disbursements; the 'logical framework' procedures of 'objectives, inputs, outputs and impacts' used to ensure 'value for money', which create biases 'in favour of short-term results and quantifiable objectives'; the fact that *they* choose and pay the expatriate staff, marginalising the institutions' own staff and leadership; the demands of their own governments and public for demonstrable results for the money spent.

We can see from this account of the lessons learned by these various donor agencies from their (mainly) failed attempts at institution building, that they are essentially those identified a decade

earlier (by Coombs, Korten, and Uphoff) and Moore, once again points to why it has been so difficult for the aid community to actually learn and apply those lessons.

At the end of the decade, a major NGO, Oxfam, carrying out the same kind of exercise aimed at improving practice repeats the same messages: 'true partnership is based on equality'; NGOs can contribute positively only if their own relationships are based on mutual trust and two-way learning'; 'Northern NGOs should fund the process not direct it'; 'an organisational process can only be properly managed and interpreted by people who understand it'; it is more consistent with a capacity-building approach to raise financial support for *programmes*' since the customary two year project cycle is inappropriate for a process that may take ten years; funding agents must 'overcome reluctance' to fund 'core costs' (i.e. recurrent costs).(Eade, 1997: 3, 48-49,65-67, 201, 203).In the present decade principles of building on existing capacity and a holistic learning approach to capacity development were again reiterated (UNDP and UN quoted by Whyte 2004:74). It is clear from such exhortations to adopt these longstanding guidelines for best practice in capacity building, so long after they were first discovered, that, however apparently acceptable they might be in theory, they are still very far from being universally applied in practice. Indeed the well known 'subtractive' effects of aid interventions on institution and capacity building are also still being noted today: 'Aid has often reduced the incentives for the state to develop institutional and policy capacity; Indigenous public services have often been sidelined by aid interventions; Aid donors may be insufficiently sensitive to current political circumstances when intervening to strengthen state capacity'. (Smith, 2005)

We have to ask, therefore, what inhibits the general adoption of this acknowledged *best practice*?

1.3 Barriers to best practice

Since the consistent failure to apply the lessons learned from practice cannot, after so much discussion, be attributed to ignorance, it is necessary to look for other explanations for the contradictions that exist between rhetoric (what is advocated) and practice (what is actually done).

1.3.1 Lack of competence or lack of will?

Has there been a failure to transfer the necessary expertise to those working in the field? It was observed as early as 1992, that those attempting to apply Chamber's 'farmer-first' approach,

(1983) were failing to promote real participation, reducing practice to 'either populist activities' or 'manipulative endeavours which... put the words of "outsiders" into farmers' mouths' (Villarel quoted by Rebien, 1996:149). In other words, using the rhetoric of participation, without giving it time and space to happen. The accounts of similar failings in public administration projects, already discussed in section 2, also leave no doubt that aid personnel were not competent in applying appropriate methodologies. As recently as 2001 Barakat and Deely (2001: 63) observed a lack of competence amongst aid personnel in the methodology of creating conditions for the kind of participation and ownership by recipients that is advocated. So lack of competence is certainly evident; the question is why, when successful examples of development practice based on Korten's 'learning process approach' have been recorded and discussed over several decades? The expertise was available to be learnt and has been successfully applied by some, but for some reason has not been generally adopted. Barakat and Deely, repeating Coombs' observation in 1980, suggest that 'Political will' is an essential prerequisite. When other more pressing considerations contradict the requirements of effective development, that will may be lacking.

1.3.2 Budgets and accountability

As discussed above, Korten (1980) identified the prevailing organisational culture of the donors, in which financial accountability is tied to the management of short, fixed-term budgets by means of measurable indicators of expenditure, as a significant barrier to good practice. The fact that the same management culture is just as evident two decades later (Cracknell, 2000:180-193) despite clear evidence of its negative effects on development, is due to the dictates of accountability to international and national financial institutions and to taxpayers in wealthy countries. Morally, or even in many cases contractually, implementation agencies are accountable to the "beneficiaries" for the outcomes of their interventions, but in practice the accounting conditions of the donors and their budgetary calendars take precedence. Management is therefore geared to monitoring financial probity (that the money has been spent honestly on the resources and activities for which it was allocated) and timely disbursement or 'moving the money', rather than the more difficult task of measuring the effective use of financial resources through social impact evaluation (that is whether the money, however accountably spent, actually achieved any lasting beneficial result for the recipients). (Cracknell, op. cit.:189)

1.3.3 Donor conditionality

Conditions on the transfer of resources from a donor or lending agency to a recipient government or institution have always been explicitly or implicitly included in the negotiation of aid. They include the explicit contractual arrangements for auditing and monitoring the probity and efficiency in the disbursement and application of resources for mutually agreed purposes, within a set time frame. The contradictions between these mechanisms and the aspirations of *best practice* have already been discussed above and in section 2. We have also seen how 'Donors have always used political criteria to govern decisions on aid allocations' (Robinson, 1994:46) though they were often implicit rather than explicit in the process. It is the imposition of this type of condition that has come to be referred to as *conditionality* sometimes clarified as *political conditionality*.

The Cold War coincided with the main period of decolonisation of Asia and Africa as European powers devastated by the second world war, sought to divest themselves of the cost of empire, while at the same time seeking to maintain advantageous trade relations with their former colonies. This agenda was an implicit or explicit condition wherever independence was negotiated. It was traded for continuing "development assistance" which, in turn, included the institutional development and capacity building directed at governments, described above.

The Cold War confrontation added another dimension of political conditionality in which the governments of emerging nations could be required to trade ideological allegiance and/or strategic resources for military and economic support, which in turn often enabled them to pursue their own regional and internal agendas. However, since there were two rival super-powers at this time, new governments and liberation movements could often trade their allegiance or even non-alignment to some advantage, initially.⁷

However, although recipient partners have had some scope (by exploiting the strategic interests and rivalries of the donors) to impose counter conditions (either contractual or implicit) the inequality of the negotiating partners in this kind of deal (as compared to trade deals between nations of comparable wealth or strategic advantage) has meant that conditions have fallen most heavily on the recipients of "development assistance" whose bargaining stance has tended to be

⁷ Mozambique, for example, received aid from Western and Socialist countries in roughly equal measure in the early years after independence (Hanlon, 1991:56).

one of defending what they can of their own agenda while conforming if possible, more to the letter (rhetoric) than the substance of the donor's demands. In this way, donors have in most cases made it clear to those seeking aid, what political stance or economic orientation will be required for their bid to be successful and impoverished governments (or communities) seeking aid commonly make funding bids, which incorporate donor criteria in some mitigated form.⁸

However, the imposition of *explicit* political and economic conditions has only become prevalent since the end of the cold war and with it the use of the term *conditionality*. This results from loss of bargaining power by recipient nations that can no longer play one power bloc against the other. It is now general practice, either by a 'positive approach' of rewarding compliant countries with aid or the punitive one of suspending or terminating aid, to require political and economic 'reform' explicitly as a condition of aid. (Robinson, 1994:46-48). However, these explicit conditions can be implicitly waived, when the donor power's strategic interests are at stake.⁹ In these cases, a stable but undemocratic regime may be supported in contradiction of the 'good governance' agenda, and development objectives generally take second place, as they do to financial accounting.

The actual emergence of the term *conditionality* to describe and recognise the practice of imposing a particular political or economic agenda as a condition for the transfer of aid resources, marks a polarisation in attitudes to this longstanding reality of international relations. On the one hand it is used pejoratively to condemn the proven negative effects this kind of deal, especially on the poor, as in structural adjustment (Archer, 1994:12) and in the invasion of sovereignty condemned by the OAU Heads of State and a group of Commonwealth leaders (Robinson, 1994: 49). On the other hand it is set out as a legitimate means for promoting various "good" ends (governance, democracy, market economies, poverty alleviation, human rights etc.)

For example, the INTRAC discussion groups at the workshop where Robinson's paper was presented (Clayton, 1994:121-127) did not advocate condemning all forms of *conditionality* as a matter of principle. They saw it as a legitimate instrument for promoting change, provided it was 'a

⁸ The Mozambican government, for example, faced with economic collapse at the height of the civil war, pre-empted the imminent imposition of terms by the IMF by announcing its own structural adjustment plan, which, while conceding much of what the IMF wanted, included greater safeguards for social programmes and resisted privatisation of state industry (Hanlon, 1991: 118-121).

⁹ As recently in the resumption of aid to the military government of Pakistan by the United States.

more focussed conditionality concerned with benefiting the poor'. The 'problem of asymmetry in power relations' in which 'the poor lack power to impose their conditions' was seen as a contradiction, since it would basically fall to the aid giver to impose and enforce conditions on behalf of the poor. However, this was not seen as an insurmountable obstacle provided 'Northern NGOs' had 'a strong Southern NGO sector to guide their actions in imposing conditionality'. They were apparently unconscious of the cultural conditionality of insisting on non-indigenous (and therefore, non-institutionalised) forms of civil organisation to channel the demands of the "the poor" to the donors.

Edwards examining the experience of SCF UK in working with public service programmes of Southern governments acknowledges the responsibility and therefore accountability of the state to its citizens, compared to the non-accountability of NGOs, but nevertheless believes that the role of an international NGO should be to strengthen the state by working both 'from above' in technical assistance to the civil service and 'from below' with 'grassroots pressure allied to indigenous NGOs and movements' 'to support existing policies' but also 'to influence the direction of government policy' and promote a state which is 'accountable, democratic, empowering and technically and financially efficient'. So even this careful attempt to avoid the worst pitfalls of conditionality and to support genuine capacity building, turns out to be, at least implicitly, prescriptive. (Edwards, 1994;65-71)

It is clear from these discussions that *conditionality* agendas, even those that purport to be of the "people" are externally driven and therefore at odds with the aspirations, customs etc, of significant stakeholders in the receipt and management of the aid resources. As such they also contradict the main principles of *best practice* for institutional development and capacity building discussed above and must lead us to consider whether this common scenario may not be a major factor contributing to the "failure" of institutional development and capacity building interventions. It is clear from Edward's experience that the providers of assistance for recovering the institutional capacity of devastated countries, despite awareness of this problem, cannot help but bring their own agendas to the situation: 'conditionality, it seems, is a fact of life' (Edwards, 1994:84). So the real problem is still the lack of bargaining space accorded to the recipients, and the consequent weakness of their challenge to such donor agendas. Hanlon (1991,58) examining the case of Mozambique, shows how 'So long as (it) paid its bills, it could... set the terms' on which it accepted aid because 'it could say no... when it faced famine, it had to accept donor terms'.

As Hewitt de Alcantará points out, 'An enormous effort to understand and involve local people is required... to avoid imposing inadequate models of institutional reform on prostrate countries. The international community rarely has the capacity to make the effort'. (1998:110). 'It requires time, resources, in-depth analysis and, critically, an acceptance that the solutions international agencies have in mind are not necessarily what the community will need or want.' (Barakat and Deely, 2001:66)

1.3.4 Recipient agendas

As suggested above, the fact that the agendas of recipient stakeholders are disregarded or explicitly overruled in the negotiation of aid may also contribute to "failures" of institutional development and capacity building interventions precisely because those indigenous agendas are not abandoned but pursued within the donor conditionality.

One way in which this happens is through the persistence of non-formal institutions within externally created administrative and political systems, as for example in Robinson's 'clearest example of success' (1994:48) in which Kenya was induced to legalise opposition parties and hold elections in order to prevent the withdrawal of one billion dollars of aid but nevertheless, the recipient elite was still able to manage this semblance of change to maintain themselves in power for some more years.

The INTRAC discussion groups quoted above, concluded that 'A problem with aid being made conditional on good government is that... Elections may lead to a change of government without any improvement in the position... of vulnerable groups, and may even mask non-democratic processes and institutions' (Clayton, 1994: 117). In other words, promoting structural (organisational) change does not necessarily severely challenge well-established institutions.

Chabal and Daloz graphically illustrate this phenomenon in relation to Africa, where they 'conclude that, in most African countries, the state is no more than a décor, a pseudo-Western façade masking the realities of deeply personalised political relations' (1999:16). They go on to demonstrate how behind that façade powerful traditional institutions of patronage remain unchanged and the 'exercise of power rests firmly on commonly recognised and mutually accepted terms' which include the 'obligation of personalised and vertical redistribution' of resources 'the

imperative of... gift giving', so that 'even the lowliest client can expect' (and demand) 'to benefit from his affiliation to a patron'. In this way, the wealthy elite, however great the gap in lifestyles, can never be dissociated from their supporters and in that sense are seen to represent their interests. The relationship between patron and client is always reciprocal, if unequal because the leader's prestige and power depends on the number of his clients and they in their turn feel a collective prestige in their association with a powerful and wealthy patron. (1999:37-43).

It is clear, that where such 'rule based' institutions (see 1.1.1 above) dominate people's perceptions of the nature of governance, attempts to empower "the poor" on a class basis in confrontation with the elites, will make little sense to them unless by casting the foreign or national NGO in the role of alternative patron, with all the expectations that implies to deliver personal benefits in exchange for support. Similarly, attempts to improve the quality of government by eliminating entrenched "corrupt" practices will fail unless the social imperative to continue distributing material benefits and career chances to relatives and supporters is understood and addressed.

The second way in which we have seen that impoverished governments, institutions and communities pursue their needs under the constraints of donor conditions is that of outward conformity and minimal compliance as the price for access to resources or influence that can be used to support the recipient's own agenda. For example, access to financial resources is clearly a high priority for impoverished governments and individuals, who may therefore accept (in their view unnecessary) *capacity building* packages for the sake of the financial resources that accompany them.¹⁰ Some of the more common agendas pursued by those seeking aid are examined below.

Cash and resources

The most common imperative leading governments, institutions and communities to seek aid is poverty. However, that poverty is rarely an absolute lack of assets but rather of financial resources to exploit or recover (in the aftermath of disaster and war) their (often very rich) existing assets of land, population, natural resources and strategic geography. They therefore approach the negotiations with the aim of obtaining as much financial aid as possible, while conceding as little

¹⁰ As in the case of SCF and the Mozambican Ministry of Health (Edwards, 1994:82)

as possible of their control over their assets and the management of their affairs. Their more powerful bargaining partners, as we have seen, have the opposite agenda of attempting to use the leverage of financial assistance to effect radical economic and political change and/or secure access to the recipient's resources. While both parties base their approach on an assessment of the other's basic interests, because of the inequality between the parties, those seeking aid are obliged to go furthest in meeting the other's agenda to reach agreement and receive assistance. This means that the assistance received is often not of the kind and quality they require, but is better than nothing.

For example: governments accept assistance in kind (food aid, medicines etc.) to obtain vital humanitarian supplies, knowing that with the equivalent value (or less) in cash they could obtain or produce more appropriate means themselves with the added advantage of providing local employment. The same pressures affect institutional development and capacity building assistance. As we saw from Fitzbein's analysis (1.1.2 above), institutions require not only capable personnel but the material means to reward them and to support their work. This is what impoverished governments are looking for: the means to keep their personnel working, while developing their effectiveness. However, the majority of donors impose a strict rule that they will not support the recurrent costs of public services, especially staff salaries (they are often keen to reduce the number of public employees), but they are prepared to pay for capacity building projects "coordinated" by foreign technical personnel (whose large salaries they are prepared to pay). These are accepted in order to obtain the accompanying cash to support existing services, obtain useful equipment, supplement the inadequate staff salaries in the form of "expenses" and fees and obtain some technical training, which can, it is hoped, be adapted to their staff needs. Ridker in his candid review of largely unsuccessful World Bank excursions into "human resource development" notes that 'expatriates are often hired to serve operating as well as advisory and training functions... when locals with comparable skills are available.' Amongst the 'non-economic' reasons for this is the 'donors' interest in having one of "their" people in the field... and governments accept them because of their desire for other parts of the package.' (1994: 38) A related tactic is what Cracknell calls 'fungibility.' A public institution negotiates an aid package to

fund an activity that coincides with the donor's agenda in order to release its own funds for activities that the donor will not fund. (2000:189).¹¹

Those needing funds for community, family or individual needs have also learnt how to exploit donor agendas. Chabal and Daloz (1999:22-23) note that their research into the proliferation of "local" NGOs 'suggests that this expansion is less the outcome of the increasing political weight of civil society than the very pragmatic realisation that resources are now largely channelled through NGOs' and similarly, 'The use of NGO resources' for patronage purposes 'can serve the strategic interests of the classical entrepreneurial Big Man just as well as access to state coffers did in the past'. While Chabal and Daloz show that different perceptions exist as to the point at which patronage is deemed corrupt and therefore criminal, there is no doubt that criminal aims are also pursued by exploiting situations created by donor conditionality. Hewitt de Alcantará (1998:112) cites the example of Latin America, where 'round after round' of institutional reform of public administration, and bypassing the state to channel resources to NGOs has seriously weakened the state's ability to govern and 'Powerful drug syndicates are gaining greater control of economic and political life.'

We can summarise this agenda as the "cash and resources" agenda. It can be pursued for public benefit, to obtain resources to defend services and development programmes within a hostile economic conditionality, or for personal and clientele benefit to support private or collective aims within a donor agenda.

Recognition and legitimacy

As discussed above, aid is frequently sought by new governments or those seeking to represent countries or communities affected by economic disaster or war. Very often, in these circumstances, the political and social movements that emerge to claim the leadership of impoverished peoples or to fight for their "liberation" are in contention with or replace a regime

¹¹ In the author's own experience of working for the Ministry of Education in Mozambique during the economic crisis in the 1980s, the overriding need was to cover recurrent costs to keep the service running, but since most donor support came in the form of "projects" rather than routine budget support, civil servants developed a high level of skill in presenting regular activities as projects to address current donor concerns (gender, trauma etc.) and accepted that "technical assistance" would be part of the deal, whether it was actually required or not.

which has until then been recognised as the legitimate power or representative of those people by the international community. In such cases, an immediate priority of the new leadership or the community seeking to secede is to obtain that recognition for themselves. In this case they may be prepared to accept a less than satisfactory aid package in respect of resources and attendant political and economic conditions, as the price to pay to obtain that legitimacy as a "responsible" government or representative organisation. This is then the "recognition and legitimacy" agenda. For example a ruler who has taken power by military means, may promise a 'phased return to democratic rule'. Recent examples of this scenario are Nigeria and Pakistan. Other concessions may be economic, as in the case of Mozambique, which was forced to join the IMF and accept structural reform as a pre-condition of bi-lateral donor aid (Hanlon, 1991:113).

Power by association

Another important concern for governments under political and economic threat from powerful neighbours or internal conflict, is that of protection. A common tactic in the Cold War/ decolonisation era was to seek an association with one or other of the main powers as a means of defence in a regional conflict. In that era, the most dramatic example of defence against external threat by "power of association" was Cuba, when it allied itself with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and provoked the economic blockade by the United States. In this instance the overriding priority was the defence of sovereignty, for which a high economic price had to be paid. In Africa, we can look at the superpower support for rival movements in Angola, where ideological allegiance bought military hardware, or the cases of dictators such as Mengistu in Ethiopia or Banda in Malawi who, by allying themselves with Soviet ideology and Western donor agendas, respectively, were maintained in power long after they had lost all credibility with their own people. This "power by association" agenda is still pursued post cold war, particularly in the Middle East, where several regimes are protected by association with the remaining super power, the United States. ¹²

So when threatened, devastated and/or impoverished peoples and governments negotiate the receipt of aid from richer and more powerful nations or international financial institutions the

¹² The oil-rich feudal regimes in Kuwait (protected against annexation by Iraq) and Saudi Arabia (bolstered against internal dissent) as well as the State of Israel, whose existence and survival are guaranteed by economic and military assistance.

urgency with which they view one or more of these agendas, may lead them to accept conditions from the donors that contradict or have no relation to how they wish to run their affairs. These contradictions that were not acknowledged in the negotiations, inevitably resurface at the implementation stage. Programmes for *institutional development* and *capacity building*, which are specifically designed to change the way things are done, will naturally be particularly vulnerable to the resulting confusions of purpose.

1.4 Conclusions

Despite the apparent confusion over the terms used to describe the development of the capacity of social institutions there now appears to be a rhetorical consensus amongst practitioners and implementing agencies of what they ought to be doing. That is, building on existing capacity and allowing time for indigenous solutions to emerge. These aspirations have also been vindicated by a significant, if minority, body of successful practice. The sum of what we have learned from development practitioners and from academic theory is that 'successful programs' to develop institutional and individual capacity 'were not "designed and implemented". They and the organisations that sustained them "evolved and grew".' (Korten, 1980: 501) This is because institutions can only be created by those they are to serve and are a product of negotiation between different stakeholders. Thus, the fundamental lesson learned from half a century of institutional development and capacity building is that it can only proceed from understanding the nature of the society it hopes to serve, because it must build on existing capacity and take account of existing institutions, whether formal or informal. In particular, those rebuilding their society need to critically examine themselves before they can usefully accept the assistance of others.

However, in spite of the evolution of this body of theory and proven practice, the perception is that most capacity building and institutional development activities have failed to meet these criteria. There is a constant "mantra" of "no blue-prints, no deadlines" and yet these are everywhere apparent: all major donors talk of programme support, while funding implementing NGOs on a project basis. In this regard, we have seen that a number of other financial, strategic and political interests of both donors and recipients constitute barriers to the adoption of what is known to be best practice for development. In particular, there are strong pressures for short-term and externally pre-determined strategies to be imposed by donors due to the asymmetrical relationship of power between donors and recipients. The recipient institutions, as we have seen continue to

pursue their own agendas within the constraints of donor conditionality and eventually grow up and transform themselves within whatever structures are imposed from outside.

As Whyte (2004:9-11) suggests, 'donors have paid relatively little attention' to evaluating capacity building interventions, largely because it is a 'long-term process that is not easily attributed to one intervention,' but it still 'lies at the heart of what most donor agencies do' and determines how they define their mission and programmes. A striking aspect of the discourse is that though donors talk in terms of building on existing capacity, the role of recipients in developing their own capacity or their evaluation of capacity building assistance has hardly been considered. This imbalance stems from the fact that recipient institutions and governments have rarely researched it themselves, since they lack the time, money and personnel to do so independently. Thus, the literature discussed in this chapter has been generated directly or indirectly by the donor governments and international financial institutions, because evaluations of programmes, even if they are "participatory," are commissioned by the donors. They define the criteria for judging success and it is hardly in the interests of the recipient evaluators to present dissenting opinions. These issues are examined in Chapter 3.

Finally, it is clear from the forgoing analysis that the involvement of donors and their agents in managing and directing the affairs of nations, institutions and communities, increases in direct proportion to their vulnerability. At the extreme are those states and administrations that are deemed to have become totally dysfunctional, usually as a result of war allied to underlying problems of poverty, social inequality and /or discrimination. It is in these contexts that the barriers to best development practice are most evident and most challenging to those who strive to deliver assistance on the basis of an understanding of *capacity building* and *institutional development* as key processes for the consolidation and evolution of stable governance and civil participation. The following chapter, therefore, examines current attitudes and approaches to recovering and building the capacity of war-torn societies.

CHAPTER 2

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT: EXPERIENCES OF WAR-TORN SOCIETIES

Introduction

As we have seen, the international aid community has largely failed to meet the development needs of poor nations and communities. In the last quarter of the 20th century their poverty has grown, not diminished, and has been exacerbated more and more frequently by violent conflict and war, often itself a product of the lack of equitable development.¹ The operational reasons for the failure to address development needs appropriately, as we have seen, seem to be well understood, but this has had little impact for change. In this chapter, we look at how institutional development and capacity building are being attempted in already poor countries devastated by war.

Summarising the lessons learned from the War Torn Societies Project (WSP), Stiefel (1999:15) states, 'The challenge of rebuilding after war is essentially a development challenge in the special circumstances of a war-torn society.' What this statement emphasises is not a qualitative difference between war-torn societies and other impoverished nations, but one of degree. The development needs are the same and need to be tackled using the same 'learning process' approach discussed in Chapter 1. The circumstances of a war-torn society are only 'special' compared to those of countries devastated and impoverished by economic crisis or natural disasters, in one key aspect: the extent of the damage done to social relations by the violence and therefore the fragility and fragmentation of its institutions, from the family, the organisation of local communities to the institutions of government. One immediately obvious aspect of the breakdown of organised activities is of course the fact that transfer of knowledge and organisational culture (informal and formal education) between the generations has broken down, leaving a human resource deficit. The other less tangible but more significant aspect is the breakdown of trust in human relations and confidence in planning for the future. However, it is never the case that no social institutions or capacities survive, though often it is the rule-based informal institutions that are the strongest, while the organisational

¹ The early 1980s witnessed the largest number of civil wars in history. There were also more conflict terminations during this period; 56 conflicts ended between 1989-2000, 'pointing to a critical mass of post-war situations' (Mac Ginty, 2003: 602).

structures they once inhabited may indeed have broken down. Nor is it the case that social institutions, human capacity and trust in the future are not undermined by other circumstances than war. The difference between working for development in war-torn countries and merely poor countries is not qualitative but rather a matter of the degree of social and physical devastation. As Stiefel suggests in his statement above, the lessons learned about *best practice* for development are applicable and indeed even more necessary in post-war recovery.

However, if we refer again to our observations in Chapter 1, on the effects of asymmetric power relations between international agents and nations they seek to assist, we can see that in the case of countries devastated by war, where both the economy and state institutions may be deemed to have "failed", the imbalance of power is much greater since the capacity to exploit even the small bargaining space available to poor nations in their relations with international partners, is eroded. The internal authority of governments emerging in post-war societies also tends to be fragile. Negotiating an end to violence, making arrangements for participation in governance, even signing a detailed peace accord, as in the case of Mozambique, still leaves much work to be done to consolidate peace and earn the trust of different constituencies. This means that policy development can only proceed at the speed it takes to overcome mistrust and secure the consent of all parties. The rules by which this process takes place are also untried, not yet institutionalised. Such transitional governments cannot assert national interests with the confidence that comes from a secure constituency in their own society. Indeed, it may take some time for a clear vision of what the collective national interest is, to emerge.

The fixed-term pre-planned project culture that (as we have seen) characterises most donor funded interventions is therefore particularly unsuited to the circumstances that obtain in a society in transition from a way of life dominated by violence and uncertainty to one of purposeful progress in conditions of personal security. It allows no space for solutions to evolve as people recover their confidence, understand their changed circumstances, identify possible courses of action, and thus become able to make choices about what they need in order to pursue their goals. In this apparent hiatus of indecision, the donor haste to see recognisable organisations in place restoring "normal" life, often marginalises the remaining social assets instead of building on them.

It is this desire for rapid results that Degu suggests leads to the neglect of education as a crucial component of post-war recovery, not only to restore the human capacity deficit described above,

but often as a vehicle for conflict resolution. In multi-ethnic societies, failure to meet educational needs of disadvantaged groups is frequently one of the causes of conflict.² Educational reform should therefore be 'part and parcel of the post-conflict development process' (2005: 130-141). However common practice is to ignore the importance of developing a relevant and inclusive education system as the foundation for long-term capacity development and concentrate on rapid school building in order to see children sitting in classrooms. Meanwhile the generation of young adults who missed their general education are offered 'skills training' projects, which take no account of economic realities or their social context. (Coelho and Vines, 1994)

Thus, the same contradictions that were identified in development practice, so many decades ago, are evident in contemporary practice in post-war reconstruction. The lessons learned by WSP (War-torn Societies Project) from its experience of conducting participatory action research in four war-torn societies, (Stiefel, 1999: 16-19) have a familiar ring to development practitioners: 'Local solutions and responses to rebuilding challenges are often more effective, cheaper and more sustainable'; 'Women provide the backbone of survival economies' and 'often... the only social safety networks during and after war'; 'the state plays a crucial role and must be strengthened and supported'; 'Private sector actors... are among the most dynamic forces...but they can support conflict as well as peace'. Many of the latter are linked to profiteering and criminal activities, but on the other hand the development of the informal sector is often an important contribution to economic recovery.

Discussing how operational practice can be reformed, Stiefel (1999: 30-33) draws attention to the need for 'in-depth intimate knowledge and understanding of local and national actors, forces and dynamics' and for 'far-reaching changes...to administrative rules...and accounting and financial procedures' to allow 'flexibility' and 'delegation of authority'. He points to the fact that 'The failure of external assistance projects is often due to wrong timing' especially short-termism. He advocates 'Promoting local or national ownership' that 'goes beyond participation' and 'implies transferring control from donors to recipients' and finally advocates that criteria for measuring success should look at the 'indirect', social impact of interventions rather than concentrating on cost-efficiency. All of these conclusions match the findings of Coombs, Korten and Uphoff in relation to general

² Degu discusses cases in Africa, but the case of the Tamils in Sri Lanka or the indigenous populations in Latin America also come to mind.

development practice, discussed in Chapter 1, as did the WSP experience of trying to apply these lessons in practice in war-torn countries.

Like many other development practitioners, WSP itself found that, after four years of working in Eritrea, Guatemala, Mozambique and Somalia, it too had failed to fully meet the standards of *best practice*. Understanding was lacking: 'In Mozambique as in Eritrea, it was evident that the internal and external actors... had different approaches to the topics to be studied' (Kane, 1999: 31). They also had different time frames and objectives. The external actors were still 'too donor driven and had not taken enough time to train the researchers' or allow time to 'take account of political and human realities on the ground'. While the donor project had a fixed term, with a vague aspiration of 'starting a process', the internal actors had very specific long-term objectives such as (in Mozambique) the creation of a research institute.

The WSP is a very recent example of a serious attempt to improve the practice of external assistance in the most testing of conditions, that of post-war recovery, and yet it is still tackling, but only partly succeeding in addressing, the same failures that have bedevilled development aid over several decades. It is clear from the extensive literature of the practitioners added to that of academics that the ability to analyse the ingredients for success and failure is not lacking, nevertheless, 'At the field level, little has changed in the operational reality of aid.' (Stiefel, 1999:21).

2.1 Post-war reconstruction: a holistic development process

Lessons learned from the many experiences of international interventions to assist the recovery of war-torn nations, particularly the many intra-state conflicts fuelled by the Cold War or triggered by its end in the collapse of the Soviet Union, have been summarised by Barakat (2005a). The key message is that, as a development process, post-war reconstruction has to address all aspects of a society's recovery simultaneously. This requires that the efforts of diverse actors within the society and the international community are coordinated within the framework of a shared national vision. As we have learnt from general development practice that vision cannot be imported from outside, it needs to evolve through a process of negotiation within the affected society by means of its institutions of governance. However, the 'special circumstances' of a society emerging from prolonged conflict noted by Stiefel, mean that the conditions in which that process can take place

have first to be created. Participation of all stakeholders is essential, but there are obstacles to be overcome.

Barakat suggests that experience of reconstruction in many countries following the end of the Cold War leads to the conclusion that 'long-term recovery is dependent on the existence of effective systems of governance.' This means that the development and implementation of a vision for reconstruction must go hand in hand with ensuring 'the existence, and as soon as possible, of a strong state structure that enjoys 'legitimacy' and has the 'capability' to deliver the post-conflict dividends equitably.' It is also suggested that to function effectively such a state must not only be representative but be able to draw on the collaboration of a diverse and organised civil society. It is tempting for donors, international agencies and financial institutions to bypass the necessarily incremental and at times frustratingly slow process of developing such 'collaborative governance' by using their own well established bureaucracies and contracting (usually foreign) private and non-governmental organisations to implement reconstruction programs on the ground. However, though this may deliver short-term practical results, as it is not aimed at developing the institutional capacity of government and civil society to sustain these gains, it has often led to longer-term dependency or collapse of services.

As a first step towards the participation necessary for creating collaborative governance, personal security has to be guaranteed and mutual trust restored. Thus it is necessary to restore order, not only by effective policing and the restoration of an impartial and protective legal system, but by reconciliation that addresses the question of justice both for the initial causes of the conflict and crimes committed during its course. Equity and inclusion of all stakeholders are therefore key issues for any society emerging from violent conflict, which is so often the result of exclusion of particular social groups or regions from full participation in their society. This commonly takes the form of unequal distribution of wealth, political power and access to public services such as health and education, under manifestly unjust and often repressive regimes. It can also occur, where regimes are driven by a strong ideological or religious vision, which excludes the expression of alternative ideas or seeks to achieve social and economic equality by means of uniformity that takes no account of different needs.

If these have been the causes of a resort to violence, then it is also clear that the pre-war governance did not include satisfactory mechanisms for negotiating solutions to conflicting interests and ideas

within the society or that they had broken down under external economic or political pressures. The conflict itself, by its resort to violence, will also have further undermined the structural fabric of the society: its institutions of civil governance; its formal and informal economic networks that support livelihoods; its infrastructure and public services. This is why post-war recovery programmes are commonly referred to as reconstruction. It is not possible to merely restore the pre-war conditions. They were almost certainly unsatisfactory in some key aspects and in any case they have been irretrievably altered. As Stiefel suggests, a development process is required, starting from an understanding of the society, as it is when it emerges from war. Thus Barakat too, cites 'understanding the context' in which reconstruction is to be attempted, as one of his four 'key tenets' of reconstruction.

A crucial aspect of that context is almost invariably, the breakdown and distortion of normal economic activity, as a result of the violence itself (agriculture and food production are particularly vulnerable) and the channelling of resources and labour into economic activities to sustain the war. In addition, a prolonged conflict tends to bankrupt legitimate business, which is replaced by informal and unregulated trade. This combined with the threat and use of violence creates opportunities for enrichment through various forms of illegal profiteering. This is the context for 'inducing development' which is Barakat's fourth 'key tenet' for post-war reconstruction. As with the creation of a national vision and collaborative governance, economic recovery is an incremental process that has first of all to include all stakeholders in sustaining economic activity. A first priority is to the maintenance and restoration of livelihoods and the inclusive distribution of economic benefits flowing from the redirection of resources from war to peace. Just as vision and the governance to deliver it go hand in hand, so the motivation and capacity to participate in dialogue for reconciliation and the restoration of governance is governed by freedom from destitution and economic dependence and a belief in the benefits that can flow from the 'peace dividend'.

Thus, while it is essential to promote economic growth, that in itself is not sufficient to bring about sustainable economic development. In conditions of high unemployment, subsistence activities and the decapitalisation of national enterprises, a sudden rush to a liberal market economy exposed to global market forces can increase exclusion and poverty. These in turn are likely to destabilise the political and social reconstruction processes. President Chissano reflecting on the experience of Mozambique at the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2004, made a clear connection

between capacity to benefit from economic growth, general development and good governance: ‘...where your people are illiterate and none of your citizens even owns a corner shop, I don’t see how from one day to the next you can take advantage of this market economy.’ Even nations that ‘are called developed today, needed time... for their peoples to master the art of running businesses before they could derive any advantage from this... Good governance is also a product of development itself which is partly a consequence of time.’³ The underlying link in his analysis and that of the authors cited above is that reconstruction, as a development process, has to be underpinned by strategies to increase human and institutional capacity, which take time to produce results.

As discussed in Chapter 1 development is essentially about developing the capacities of people and their institutions to meet their social, economic and political needs. Capacity building is therefore seen as the key to the post-war reconstruction process and it is argued that *how* institutions, infrastructure, the economy and public services are reconstructed, is more important for peaceful and sustainable development than *what* is achieved in terms of material and organisational transformation. That is, (using Uphoff’s terminology) the implementation of reconstruction programmes should be ‘additive’ in terms of the capacity of national and local institutions to continue to deliver benefits in the future and of the capacity of individuals and local and national enterprises to generate wealth. In the uncertain conditions of a transition from war to peace, this will dictate an incremental approach to reconstruction rather than a “quick fix” driven by external agents.

It is clear that these ideas are not just part of an academic discourse. They have emerged from the interaction between practice and academic study of post-war reconstruction over the past decade and have been internalised in the thinking of international operatives and institutions. This why, in 2002, following the defeat of the Taliban regime, the UN Coordination Office for Afghanistan spoke of treading with a ‘light footprint’ in Afghanistan, recognising the need to allow Afghan institutions ‘to assume greater ownership of externally assisted programmes.’ (ITAP 2002:47). Nevertheless, as Barakat (2002: 808) pointed out, this was not the way the international community responded in practice. He noted that the programme contained ‘surprisingly little reference to any

³ Mozambique News Agency AIM Reports No. 269 3rd February 2004.

Afghan institutions, such as government ministries, having any significant role in the sector plans' even though as Evans et al (2004) demonstrate, the public administration capacity had survived the war and various regime changes to a remarkable degree. Barakat also noted that 'The UN's characteristic sectoral approach... shows serious evidence of fragmentation and contradiction, where... an integrated and holistic approach is needed.' (op.cit. 809). Importantly, as Suhrke et al (2002) point out, the Bonn Agreement that established the current administration, was only a first step in a peace process that is still continuing. It is particularly significant that the Taliban are so far excluded from any negotiation and military operations against them continue. This contradicts the key principle of inclusion as a necessary condition for post-war reconstruction.⁴

The results of this failure to address all the key areas of reconstruction holistically are highlighted in the first *National Human Development Report* after the fall of the Taliban regime, which stresses the need for 'human security', recognising that the failure to complete the process of negotiating and consolidating peace was jeopardising all the other efforts for reconstruction. Referring to Barakat's work and to the experience of the international agencies with government, the report therefore reaffirms, 'Reconstruction must necessarily be a continuous process of negotiation between diverse interest groups as well as between them and political actors' and concludes that 'research does show that certain levels of achievement and improvement in conditions of life – such as economic well-being; freedom and choice; stability and social justice; trusted mechanisms of open, responsive governance; and the respect of individual and minority rights – do ultimately tend to support peace.' (UNDP 2004: 223-226).

Nevertheless, the same report reveals a continuing ambivalence in the acceptance of the development approach to post-war reconstruction, when it states, 'Institutional capacity-building is needed, but this is a long-term project. In the short term, the immediate needs of the people include human rights, security and jobs, imperatives that cannot wait for the building and strengthening of new institutions.' (UNDP op.cit) Once again a desire to see short term alleviation of the consequences of conflict, conditions that Afghans have lived with for decades, is driving the international agencies to try to pre-empt the slow and painful process of reconstructing the

⁴ Lakhdar Brahimi reflecting on this outcome remarked that the absence of the Taliban 'the main protagonists' from the Bonn Conference, though for 'very obvious reasons, meant that total victory was... handed over to one side which did not deserve it.' (2004b:3)

underlying fabric of the society, which Afghans have to undertake to guarantee a secure and prosperous future.

2.2. Revisiting the Barriers

As the above accounts suggest, the same barriers to best practice that hinder effective development work in peaceful conditions, affect the work of post-war recovery. If anything, their impact is even greater in war-torn contexts. In the first place, development work in a war-torn context such as Afghanistan, requires, not only knowledge and understanding of the society involved, but a constant awareness of how particular interventions are affecting the consolidation of peace and long-term social recovery as well as the delivery of material benefit. Inclusiveness, ownership and participation are important in any development programme. In post-war development they are vital building blocks for restoring trust and enabling divided communities to live together and any perception of exclusion or inequity can be a trigger for a return to violence. At the same time the civil and governmental institutions that might ensure equitable development are either lacking or seriously weakened or compromised. Working in such an environment requires great sensitivity and patience and a high degree of competence in development practice, so there is plenty of room for error and no process will proceed without setbacks.

Lack of Competence ?

Nevertheless, proven practice does exist in the methodology of creating conditions for the kind of participation and ownership advocated by Stiefel. One such example has already been quoted. By applying the principles of good development practice in a war-torn context, the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies was able to identify and support both existing health professionals and community leaders in Puntland, Somalia, to restore a public health service despite the absence of a functioning central government and in the context of continuing conflict. (Barakat and Deely 2001). Once again, we have to conclude that it is not lack of understanding or practice that stands in the way of adopting this approach more widely in war-affected contexts. The WSP action research project itself set out to do just that and was to a degree successful. However, by its own admission it was driven by donor criteria and timeframes to fall short of its own standards.

Budgets and Accountability

The fact is that, post-war reconstruction programmes are under even greater pressure from the prevailing management culture dominated by budget deadlines and accountability procedures than the general development work discussed in Chapter 1. The main reasons for this are, first, the perception that war and post-war contexts are 'emergencies' and secondly, that in the absence of stable conditions of governance there is a heightened risk of financial waste due to corruption and/or incompetent management. Both of these perceptions have some basis in fact.

It is true that incidents of humanitarian emergency are a common feature of war-torn countries. However, using the term emergency to describe conditions of war, that have gone on so long that they have become a way of life, ignores the fact that for the most part, populations in such countries have found ways to survive, if not to prosper. Even in war, capacity for delivering support and relief to fellow citizens can also be identified in the war-affected society itself. Instead of being ignored in the rush to deliver relief "efficiently", they can be developed so that a permanent emergency response capacity is created in the indigenous society. A case in point is the role played by UNDP in Mozambique during the most difficult years of the civil war, in strengthening the government relief agency's capacity to coordinate powerful, and in some cases unwilling, relief agencies in a single strategy (Barnes, 1998). The government's ability to mobilize and manage international relief in an emergency, evidenced during the 1999 flood disaster, owed a lot to that experience during the war. At the local level, as the WSP concluded, immediate coping strategies are often headed by women. Barakat and Wardell note that in Afghanistan, women, as well as traditionally playing a key role in 'brokering peace and in mobilisation (or de-mobilisation)' of their menfolk, have also learnt new decision-making roles in fending for their families alone in refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. (2002: 920-921). These are the kind of capacities on which the successful development strategies discussed in Chapter 1. were built. However, despite the understanding that this development approach is also appropriate in war-torn countries, international agents have been reluctant to adopt it. The false sense of urgency remains. Post-war reconstruction is perceived as requiring an emergency response, using external means that can be rapidly assembled, to restore necessary conditions before development can be tackled.

This attitude is then reinforced by the second concern, which is for meeting the obligation for financial accountability in an environment of perceived high financial risks in unstable post-war conditions. Again there is truth in this perception. War economies have always bred corruption,

cross-border smuggling and black-marketeering and in the aftermath of war, public administration and legal systems that would normally control them, are chronically weak or no longer functioning. In these conditions, international operatives themselves are also not necessarily above temptation, as post-conflict “chaos” affords ample opportunity for bending the rules or covering up incompetence. There is therefore enormous scope for financial mismanagement. However, from the development point of view, this is a reason, not for less participation but for strengthening the involvement, and therefore control, by the intended beneficiaries, in order to defeat the war entrepreneurs and lay the foundations of future civil governance. It is also a reason to change the budget culture discussed in Chapter 1: not to reward aid operatives for the efficiency with which they “move” large amounts of money within a fixed timeframe but for the longer-term effectiveness of their interventions in producing sustained benefits to war-affected communities.

In fact it is the pressure to spend large amounts of money within a fixed period (rarely more than two years and often less) that has led time and again to misspending of financial resources, which can range from the merely inappropriate to major corruption. Common examples of the former are, purchase of expensive equipment, which cannot be used in the prevailing conditions of uncertain power supplies and lack of skilled personnel, funding expensive training courses without ensuring that conditions exist to apply the skills acquired in the labour market, and the construction of infrastructure such as schools and health centres to meet the needs of expected returning refugees, who subsequently choose to settle elsewhere, where they can get work.⁵ Meanwhile, the incompatibility between the need to spend quickly and the difficulty of deploying resources effectively, encourages a slide into petty forms of corruption, such as awarding inflated perks and expenses to staff, and facilitates criminal alliances between aid administrators and the corrupt national entrepreneurs, who flourish in times of war.⁶

⁵ The author witnessed numerous incidents of this type, occurring within all types of agency (UN, bi-lateral donors, NGOs) and their counterpart institutions, during and after the civil war in Mozambique. Observing this waste aroused strong feelings of resentment amongst national public servants, and poor communities, especially when supplying their low-cost resource needs was often deemed not to be ‘cost-effective’ in relation to project overheads. The experience is not unique, as others working in the field around the world can testify.

⁶ Two such major corruption scandals are being investigated at the present time in respect of Iraq: the UN Oil for Food Programme by an independent committee of enquiry headed by Paul Volcker (Nile Gardiner April 13th 2005 www.heritage.org/Research); the financial management and the awarding of contracts by the Coalition Provisional Authority by US Auditors (Larry Margasak www.truthout.org January 30th 2005 and Griff White www.washingtonpost.com March 15th 2005)

Donor conditionality

These problems are even more evident at the macro-economic level where large amounts of finance are pledged in the initial post-war period by the international community, at a time when the recipient nation's capacity to use it usefully is at its weakest. Faced with the fragility of post-war institutions of government, the United Nations agencies, the international financial institutions and bi-lateral donor agencies, charged with disbursing this finance, have increasingly pursued a policy not just of conditionality but of direct intervention, involving themselves in the day to day administration of a country, by substituting the role of government at the central level (as recently in Kosovo and East Timor) or through "technical assistance" strategically placed in key institutions in order to promote *good governance*. Similarly, NGOs, now increasingly sub-contracted by the donor and UN agencies, have justified setting up and running new organisations to deliver humanitarian and development assistance to "the poor" on the grounds that there are no local institutions with the *capacity* (or right attitudes!) to do it.

This is clearly contrary to the way in which development agencies now believe they should operate. If it is difficult to avoid imposing external solutions that undermine capacity, within aid partnerships between functioning governments and donors, how can it be avoided in the case of emergent institutions in a post-war society that is being virtually run by a consortium of donors and financial institutions, in a transition to "democratic rule"? The scenario is remarkably similar to the decolonisation formula discussed above (Chapter 1.2) and of course, where institutions are deemed to have failed, it involves *institutional development*, or where a government is considered more or less functional, *institutional strengthening* along the lines of Austin's definition (Austin, 1994). Meanwhile, civil society, whose institutions have often ceased to function as a result of war, or been replaced by informal, criminal or paramilitary forms of organisation, is often promoted by the creation of "local NGOs" in the manner criticised by Kasfir (1998).

2.2.1 Recognising the problem, still looking for the solution

Experienced development agencies such as UNDP and leading INGOs are fully aware that this contradicts what they have learnt about development best practice, but see it as a necessary transitional phase from relief to development in war-torn contexts. They are facing a real dilemma and seek to explore ways of reconciling the need to take charge of situations where the collapse of civil rule is causing prolonged suffering with the need to restore and develop the capacity for civil governance in post-war societies. We can best understand how difficult this process is by

examining some examples of how prominent development agencies are trying to resolve this dilemma by adapting their operational practice and institutional arrangements.

Substitution or partnership?

The practice of direct intervention for war-torn countries under the auspices of the UN has prompted the UN's development agency, UNDP to review its practice in the light of the contradictions it perceives between its traditional role as a development partner of governments and civil society organisations and the "substitutive" role it finds itself playing in post-conflict contexts. For example, in the Transition Recovery Programme in Eritrea, UNDP was working by 'Direct Execution' of programmes largely funded by donors and managed through an interagency steering committee with subcontracting of implementation mainly to large INGOs. A mid-term review (Mengistu et al 2002) identified four gaps in performance that seriously compromised the development impact of the programme. First a communication gap between the well integrated policy-making steering committee liaising with central government and those implementing the programme on the ground. Second, a lack of horizontal coordination at the implementation level, in particular the INGOs were not involved or directed in any way to ensure the development of local government capacity to take over and sustain public services after the end of the Transition Programme. The third major gap has already been mentioned as inherent in all post-conflict contexts: the lack of formally constituted and operational civil society institutions, led the INGOs to replicate the 'direct execution' at the local level and not attempt a capacity-building role. The final gap was that there was very little sharing of knowledge and skills (communication of best practice for example) within the aid community. Thus a UN development agency found itself presiding over a programme that contradicted many of the main tenets of development practice (horizontal and vertical integration, the central role of capacity building etc.) because post-war conditions imposed constraints for which it had not found an appropriate institutional response.

As part of a consultative process to explore ways of tackling these contradictions, in 2002 UNDP's Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery, in conjunction with other UNDP bureaus involved in post-conflict work, organised a workshop in Nairobi with their country office staff and national NGO partners from fourteen war-torn countries in Africa. The details of this encounter are discussed in Barakat and Chard (2005), but the key conclusions of the participants (both NGO and UNDP country office staff) reinforce the case for institutional change on the part of international

agencies and their INGO partners in order to address the capacity building needs of emerging national civil society organisations (CSOs).⁷

The participants asserted that procedural changes, though necessary, were not enough. Rather ‘a complete change in organisational culture’ was required to establish genuine partnership relationships with national civil organisations, based on mutual trust, interdependence and transparency. They recognised the weakness of the national organisations and the need for technical and organisational learning, but saw capacity building as also encompassing empowerment, both within the partnership with UNDP and in establishing their legitimacy vis-à-vis their own governments. Exchange of knowledge both with UNDP and horizontally with other actors working in conflict was also seen as building the capacity of national and international agents to respond to the needs of war-affected populations. They were also at pains to stress what they could contribute to such a partnership: greater access to and understanding of local communities than outside agencies and the ability to mobilise local resources and find flexible low-cost solutions, for example. They argued that above all, the existing practice of sub-contracting them to carry out limited short-term operations, reflected both a lack of trust in their potential and little understanding of their priorities and mandates. It neither took advantage of what they had to offer nor afforded opportunities to increase their capacity by being able to retain and develop staff, and improve their organisation. On the other hand a commitment to a long-term developmental relationship would permit both parties to benefit from ‘complementarity and shared responsibility.’ (Barakt and Chard 2005).

It is important to note that the majority of the participants in the workshop who made this plea to approach the reconstruction of war-torn communities through partnership and capacity building, were working directly with local communities in conditions of on-going conflict or partial and tenuous peace settlement similar to that in Afghanistan discussed above. Thus they were advocating adopting this approach in the most challenging contexts in which to apply development practice.⁸

The response of the UNDP bureau staff at the workshop was indicative of the gulf between the understanding of post-war reconstruction needs emerging from the operational level and the

⁷ That is both formally constituted NGOs and the community based organisations they serve.

⁸ NGO and UNDP country staff at the workshop were working in Angola, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Liberia, Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Somaliland.

institutional culture at the managerial level of these large international agencies. Most were startled by the participants' conclusions, some were outraged. A minority then reacted by recognising that they must take these messages on board, but the majority reacted defensively to defend their existing institutional status and practice. As we saw in Chapter 1 and as Barakat and Chard concluded in this case, there is a long time-lag between accepting the need for a change of organisational culture, whether of post-war governments or international agencies, and actually achieving it. (Barakat and Chard 2005)

Creative ways of beating the budget deadlines

Steps have also been taken by the international institutions to break the mould of fixed-term budget accounting. In order to facilitate an incremental approach to reconstruction, while taking advantage of the donor community's willingness to donate funds in the immediate aftermath of conflict, the World Bank in partnership with the UN have organised the setting up of trust fund facilities, first in East Timor, then Afghanistan and now Iraq. The concept is that donors should deposit the funds they customarily pledge in the immediate post-war period in a trust fund administered by the World Bank, UN and donor partners to disburse funds for government programmes as these are negotiated and the capacity to implement is developed. The intention is thus to secure financial control while providing the necessary flexibility to allow time to develop policy and implementation capacity within the emerging government's institutions before making major investments. In this way though the bulk of the finance may be deposited in the usual post-war pledging round, it can be spent some years down the line when it can be much more effectively used. On the face of it, the scheme is clearly a creative way of applying development principles at the level of macro-economic management while taking into account the fragility of post-war governance and the need to give it time to develop. However, a number of obstacles make this difficult to achieve in practice.

For example, The Joint Reconstruction Fund for Afghanistan, while fulfilling the criteria for gradual controlled disbursement of funds, was structurally non-participatory as far as the Afghan Government was concerned. The management structure vests total control in the hands of the international donors and financial institutions, casting the Government in the role of an applicant submitting proposals to a committee of donors who are the ones to make recommendations to the World Bank representative responsible for approving or rejecting them on financial grounds. In

other words, unlike fully sovereign governments, the Afghan government cannot negotiate directly with its banker, even in partnership with its donors. (World Bank, 2002)

In the event, despite being afforded this high level of control, the donors themselves did not participate fully. Only 18% of funding donated to Afghanistan was channelled through the Joint Trust Fund by October 2002, as the donors preferred to continue to work independently.⁹ When it came to setting up a similar fund in Iraq, the World Bank, apparently learning from the less than satisfactory experiences in Afghanistan, following a joint needs assessment with UNDG,(2003) re-emphasised the need for an incremental, capacity building approach to economic recovery and transformation. The management structure also reflects an enabling approach to the administration of the fund, putting Iraqi entities in the lead. Thus the Strategic Review Board 'provides overall policy guidance for donor assistance' and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation has 'an endorsement/refusal role with respect to proposals seeking funding from the Facility' and chairs the coordination committee, which presents proposals to the joint UN/World Bank Facility Committee for financial scrutiny. (World Bank 2004:5). However, in this case, the more considered, evidence-based and participatory approach of the international institutions had already been pre-empted by the rapid implementation of a pre-determined programme for economic transformation by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) (see below).

Recipient solutions

This brings us finally to consider the issue of conditionality and conflicting agendas discussed in Chapter 1. In fact in the special circumstances of aid to war-torn countries, both during the course of a war and in assisting post-war recovery, these contradictions become more acute. Conditionality, as we have seen in the case of 'Direct Execution', is asserted unapologetically by the aid "givers" and accepted with little demur by recipients in the face of their extreme vulnerability and virtual lack of bargaining counters. On the other hand, the disorder and administrative weakness as well as the lack of clear public authority inherent in these situations, make it potentially much easier for the recipients to evade the donor's conditions in pursuit of their own agendas. In Chapter 1 we saw how Hewitt de Alcantara (1998) described the criminal agendas of drug syndicates have found fertile ground in the instability created by institutional reform

⁹ In East Timor the figure was a more satisfactory 50%. Personal information Sarah Cliffe, World Bank. As will be discussed in case of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique, below, it can take as long as 10 years to convince donor partners to participate in joint funding schemes even when dealing with well-established and accountable government institutions.

programmes in Latin America. Afghanistan has afforded the same opportunities for opium production and trafficking by the warlords co-opted to overthrow the Taliban regime and in Iraq, smuggling has reached new heights following the opportunities for organised looting afforded by the breakdown in law and order following the invasion. In all of these cases the profits generated by these activities are used to promote the continuation of violence, which undermines the reconstruction process. (Herring and Rangwala, 2005)

We can conclude then, that the tension continues between prescriptive interventions by the international aid community, geared to producing rapid visible transformation, and the need for time, open-ended dialogue, experimentation and learning that are required in the process of restoring the institutional life of peoples devastated by misfortune. In fact it is in the aftermath of war, when the fragility of human relations is most evident, that the donor community is most assertive and least inclined to engage in 'a learning process' on the grounds that visible normality and order must be restored. Development theory and practice, discussed in Chapter 1 lead us to expect, therefore, that these interventions will "fail" in their own terms like the majority of those that went before, though it may be the case that the recipients (or sectors of the recipient population) may succeed in turning them "successful" in their terms.

These contradictions in the post-war context have also revealed another barrier to the international community's ability to apply best development practice to the difficult conditions of war-torn countries. As we have seen (Chapter 1 section 2) the international institutions have taken on board Uphoff's message that good development practice requires institutional development and adaptation on their part as well as within the countries and communities they are called on to assist. Nevertheless, the UN and the international financial institutions are finding that changing the way they operate is much more difficult than merely recognising the need to do it.

2.3 New barriers

In the meantime, while the international development institutions were grappling with these contradictions and trying to adapt their own institutional response to apply principles of development to post-war contexts, this new-found consensus was being challenged by contrary doctrines driven by geo-political concerns for world security and global economic stability. It has become increasingly recognised that extreme poverty and poor governance have repercussions

beyond the borders of affected countries. Mass economic migration, violent conflict and terrorism are therefore seen as direct and destabilising consequences of the international community's failure to address these problems. In response various forms of pre-emptive and externally determined intervention have begun to be applied.

Pre-emptive economic strategies

The international financial institutions as we have seen above, have always been inclined to think globally and to devise models for universal application, rather than assisting the generation of internal systems adapted to particular contexts. Indeed, in the present conditions of globalised trade and communications, the need for overarching frameworks to govern economic relations seems compelling. However, while the belief in free market relations as a desirable objective is undimmed, the World Bank in particular is a learning institution and has come to realise that the transition from absolute poverty and poor governance to full participation in the global economy has to be assisted.

While, as we have seen when faced with a post-war situation it has moved towards an incremental approach to reconstruction and development, recognising poverty and poor systems of governance as potential root causes of violent conflict it has also begun to think pre-emptively. As a result it has developed strategies with the donor community and international financial institutions designed to simultaneously reduce poverty and promote good governance to prevent economically and politically unstable countries from descending into violent conflict in the first place. HIPC (Heavily Indebted Poor Countries) programmes were established in 1996 as a joint collaboration between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and also involving bilateral creditors. They are offered to countries with a 'good track record of reform' but whose development is hampered by huge debt burdens, often incurred as a result of internal conflict or earlier failures of governance. In this case, debt relief is offered in exchange for implementing poverty reduction strategies and public administration reforms that conform to the international model. Thus reform is not merely rewarded in the 14 countries already granted debt relief but promoted in the 11 'pre-decision point countries'. This clearly involves a high degree of conditionality, but gives recipient governments some scope for adjusting the detailed implementation to their own conditions, especially if, as we will see in the case of Mozambique discussed in subsequent chapters, they have already developed

poverty reduction strategies of their own. What it does not do is support the development of completely internal solutions to the problems of poverty and governance.¹⁰

Pre-emptive war and reconstruction

As we saw in Chapter 1, probably the biggest barrier of all to effective support for post-war development through capacity building and institution building is that the international response to these contexts is dominated by the perceived strategic interests of powerful nations. In recent times, there has been a progression from military intervention, with grudging endorsement from the UN, to take control of an on-going conflict perceived as a threat to world peace (as in Kosovo, or Afghanistan) to 'pre-emptive' (preventive) unilateral intervention, contrary to the terms of the UN Charter with a view to changing a regime viewed as only potentially dangerous (the case of Iraq).¹¹ This development has profound implications for post-war reconstruction practice as we are now witnessing.

Iraq since 1990 has been the subject of both post-war intervention by the international community and direct military interventions. However, unlike other countries which have recently been the subject of such direct interventions, it was neither poor and underdeveloped, nor a failed state. It was an aggressor in two wars against its neighbours and governed by a repressive and brutal regime, but it has great wealth from oil, which by the 1980s had been used to create a modern state providing high levels of public service, especially in health and education. However, following its defeat in the Gulf War, in order to contain (and punish) its aggression and military ambition it was subjected to an extreme form of conditionality by the international community: the imposition of the most strictly enforced sanctions regime in the history of the UN and of war reparations on a scale not seen since the end of the First World War. (Niblock 2001)

The effects of this intervention have been documented by many researchers, but can be summarised as follows. Rather than weakening the power of the regime or inducing a change of governance, the effect of sanctions, by undermining legitimate business, by under resourcing the public services and by isolating the professional classes and Iraqi intelligencia from external contacts, had a profoundly

¹⁰ The World Bank Group Debt Department <http://web.worldbank.org> 09.05.2005

¹¹ The war 'was not in conformity with the UN charter...from the charter point of view it was illegal.' Kofi Annan interviewed by the BBC 16.09.2004

'subtractive' effect on the governance of Iraq. For example, Niblock (2001: 156-7) records 'Any attempt on the part of the Iraqi government to plan effectively... was undercut by the sporadic and unpredictable arrival of goods' due to the vetting of imports by the sanctions committee and the fact that the quite sophisticated 'systems of data-gathering and monitoring ... in existence prior to 1990...had broken down' due to lack of resources, which in turn led to a deterioration in the delivery of public services. As International Crisis Group (ICG) researchers (2002:10-11) noted, it was the 'large educated and salaried middle class that once formed the regime's social base' which was 'hardest hit by sanctions...given the dilapidated state of the education system and the withering of public sector employment' and the fact that their wages had been devalued to a level that only provided subsistence. (ICG 2002:10) Faced with the undeniable suffering caused to the Iraqi public as a consequence of its actions, the UN merely mitigated the effects of the sanctions regime through a relief operation (The Oil for Food Programme). This arrested the deterioration in nutritional status but, it has been argued, actually entrenched the regime and exacerbated its poor standards of governance.

Sanctions not only had a devastating effect on all aspects of individual human development¹² but drastically undermined the very civil elements in society which had acted as a restraint on the personal power of Saddam Hussein and preserved a reasonable standard of governance in the day to day management of public affairs. Since legitimate trade and public administration were severely restricted, nepotism, corruption and profiteering by an elite group close to the regime were rife. Those in this inner circle prospered while legitimate business was subjected to appropriations and some merchants were even executed for profiteering. (Niblock 2001:170-20, ICG 2002:10).

As Saddam's regime came under greater international pressure, he also defended his grip on power by marginalising existing seats of institutional power inherited from previous regimes: the Baath

¹² Oil for food did little more than halt the deterioration in nutritional status. UN surveys after 1996 still reported malnutrition in over 14% of infants and in children under five at over 20%. Babies underweight at birth had increased by nearly 20% since 1989. 1.2% of the total value of oil for food contracts approved up to 2000 were spent on education the result was falling enrolment in schools, low teacher morale, intellectual isolation in Universities and the doubling of adult illiteracy compared to 1989. Less than 5% of approved contracts were for inputs to agriculture. As a result, despite increasing the land under cultivation in an attempt to increase food self-sufficiency, without the necessary spare parts for plant and machinery and agricultural inputs '20-25% of the potential crop yield was being lost by the end of the 1990s' (Niblock 2001: 142-154). The lasting effects of sanctions are reflected in the post-war needs assessments and surveys of social indicators: *Nutritional status survey of under five children in Baghdad - Iraq 29 April - 3 May 2003* UNICEF, *United Nations/World Bank Joint Needs Assessment October 2003. At a Glance: Iraq* UNICEF 2004.

Party apparatus and the regular army. These were subverted by 'a sophisticated security apparatus', 'a vast network of informers' and a 'myriad of civil police forces and paramilitary militias'. As a result, by the late 1990s all the social groups and key institutions that had previously provided checks and balances on the exercise of absolute power had been emasculated. In October 2002, ICG concluded that despite evident dissent and resentment expressed by individual Iraqis, 'there is little to suggest that the Iraqi regime might fall in the absence of outside intervention' because 'Manipulation of rationing and subsidies, hoarding and the establishment of monopolies run by Saddam's inner circle help sustain the regime... making it no longer merely a dictatorship of force but also a "dictatorship of need".' (2002:10-11). International conditionality had thus fostered, not development and good governance but extreme powerlessness and economic dependency.

The decision, by the US and its allies to overthrow the regime by force (though not endorsed by the UN) took this process to its logical conclusion. The conditionality strategy of sanctions had failed to change the regime, therefore it had to be done by force.¹³ The military occupation was described as pre-emptive, that is it was taken, not because there was an immediate threat to the United States or its allies, but because there was the potential that the regime might pose a threat in the future. In a similar way the reconstruction strategy was planned in some detail in advance within the US administration and therefore without the kind of collaborative involvement of national (Iraqi) stakeholders discussed above. The vision that motivated the US led invasion in 2003 was therefore that of dismantling the despotic regime and replacing it with a liberal democratic/market economy system as a prelude to rolling out a 'democratic revolution' in the whole Middle East.¹⁴

As discussed in Chapter 1 when examining the issue of governance, experience has shown that imported models of government and socio-economic organisation are unlikely to succeed. The experience of post-Saddam Iraq seems to be providing another clear confirmation of that conclusion, not least because the approach adopted by the US led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) contradicts each of Barakat's key tenets for post-war reconstruction.

¹³ That regime change was the desired outcome was made clear as early as 2002 by President George W. Bush in his *State of the Union Address* and by Dick Cheney in *Remarks to the Veterans of the Korean War*. 29th August 2002.

¹⁴ Remarks by President George W. Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, United States Chamber of Commerce November 6 2003.

Since the detailed plans were drawn up in advance in Washington and implemented with scant adjustment in the light of conditions encountered after the invasion, there was little or no understanding of the context. There was a vision, but it was the vision of the invaders not the shared vision that is evolved through dialogue between all stakeholders (though this may be what Iraqi leaders are now, following the elections in January 2005, trying to initiate); despite the undoubted administrative and technical capacity of Iraqi professionals, there was a policy of direct execution rather than any attempt to promote collaborative governance (the running of ministries and control of the oil revenues for example were under the direct administration of US personnel); rather than induce incremental development by concentrating on retaining and creating livelihoods, as advocated by the World Bank cited above (2004), there was an immediate move to privatise state enterprises and create a free-market economy and huge reconstruction contracts were awarded to US companies with no obligation to employ or sub-contract Iraqi personnel. The unemployment created by this policy was also compounded by the disbanding of the army and removal of large numbers of civil servants from their posts under a blanket policy of 'debathification.' These two measures resulted in a breakdown in law and order and a marked deterioration in the delivery of basic services. As in many other contexts, the sense of powerlessness and economic and political marginalisation felt by many as a result of this style of governance have fuelled continuing armed conflict rather than facilitating processes of reconstruction. (Barakat 2005a)

Nevertheless, as in other war-torn contexts, violence is not the only reaction to the situation. There have been concerted moves by Iraqi religious and secular leaders, since the invasion to regain the political initiative from the occupying powers in order to shape the future of the country in a way that meets their needs.¹⁵ There is a 'recipient agenda' in this context as in others. The holding of elections in January 2005 was crucial for US vision of reconstructing Iraq in the 'democratic' mould, but it also afforded an opportunity for Iraqis, by meeting the conditionality of the invaders, to create a space in which to negotiate their future governance, hence the higher than expected participation in this deeply flawed process in those areas where conditions allowed it, and the protracted negotiation of the division of power between the elected parties and between them and the excluded Sunni.¹⁶ If this process eventually culminates in the establishment of democratic

¹⁵ For example, the concerted opposition led by the Shia religious leader, Sistani against the proposals by the CPA and its Interim Iraqi Governing Council for the formation of an Interim Government in October 2003 (Brahimi 2004a.)

¹⁶ see Lucy Williams <http://newsvote.bbc.co.uk> and Peter Baker and Robin White www.washingtonpost.com for example.

governance, a resumption of national sovereignty and therefore economic recovery, to what should we attribute this “success”? To the intervention by external powers or to the resilience of the Iraqi social fabric and long cultural history? Or the interaction between the two?

2.4. Assessing the outcome

The invasion of Iraq prompted several American analysts to examine past experiences of US ‘nation building’. While Pei and Kaspar (2003) affirm, ‘What is most notable about the use of interim surrogate regimes in nation building is its record of complete failure,’ others looked back to post-war Germany and Japan to see if these “success” stories do not vindicate the imported model approach in the long-term, despite the initial suffering. However they did not find an unequivocal answer. Dobbins et al (2003:161-166) attempt a long-term comparative evaluation exercise by examining the relationship between the ‘effort’ in terms of time and resources (also a reflection of political will) invested by the external powers and the success in terms of their desired outcomes of stability, democracy and per capita income in the affected countries. However, while they did find a high degree of correlation between greater effort and better outcomes, there were clearly other factors in play. Noting for example, that Japan and Afghanistan received about the same amount of post-war investment but that the outcome in terms of compliance with the post-war settlement is very different, they conclude that other, what we may term contextual factors, such as how the conflict ended (negotiated ceasefire or total capitulation for example) and the homogeneity of the population affect the acceptance of the imported solutions. Barakat (2005b) examining reconstruction post world war II, also points out that the Marshall Plan (only introduced after an earlier more heavy handed approach was on the brink of failing) was at least at government level, participatory, which must account in some part for its success. The reconstruction of Japan on the other hand, under the benevolent dictatorship of General MacArthur, was far from participatory and is rightly described by Salvatore Jennings as change ‘by fiat’. Nevertheless, its success is also attributed to the legitimacy conferred on the reforms by the Emperor’s compliance and public endorsement.(Salvatore Jennings 2003:15-19). Thus all of these analyses point to an interaction between external and internal agendas.

In contrast to the American debates, it is notable that little public discussion of the long-term impact of these post-war strategies imposed by the victorious powers has yet taken place in either country. Do they attribute their present state of prosperity and democratic governance to the efforts of the

conquering powers, or to their own efforts to recover from defeat and destitution within the conditions set by the victors? What led to positive results for their society and what had lasting negative effects? How do Germans evaluate the division of their country for more than a generation and its continuing effects? Is it viewed differently in the East and West of the country? How do the Japanese assess the effect of MacArthur's selective dismantling and purging of their ruling institutions, which left the Emperor as titular head of state, or the many imposed democratic reforms and civil liberties on the one hand and censorship of unwelcome criticisms on the other? (Salvatore Jennings op.cit). How do they think this shaped the development of their post-war and post-imperial governance?

2.5 Conclusion

These unanswered questions underline the fact that, although a body of practical experience has led us to conclude that long-term recovery and development following violent conflict and repression will be achieved by building the capacity of peoples to manage their own affairs, rather than imposing external conditions for political and economic governance, there has in fact been no objective evaluation of the ultimate impact of post-war interventions by international actors in those contexts.

Empirically, both the advocates of 'pre-emptive' reconstruction and those who support the development approach have assumed that there is a direct connection between post-war interventions for reconstruction and final outcomes in terms of sustained peace and good governance. However, it seems that this has not been tested by any systematic evaluation in those societies that are sufficiently distanced from the aftermath of war and defeat to provide the evidence.

This brings us to the issue of how we are to judge interventions by the international community, undertaken with the aim of bettering the lives of impoverished and particularly war-devastated nations. How do we evaluate practice in order to decide what is the best approach. The following chapter looks at how we customarily evaluate our actions to see whether we have the necessary means to learn what the ultimate outcomes of our actions may be for those we seek to assist.

CHAPTER 3

EVALUATION:

TAKING THE LONG VIEW

Introduction

As discussed in previous chapters, capacity building and institutional development are considered to be the key to post-war reconstruction and development and they are carried out with long-term social and political aims summarised in the term *good governance*. However they are usually only evaluated in terms of their success in achieving specific short term objectives and their immediate impact on intended beneficiaries, that is their 'proximate effects'. This practice excludes any consideration of both wider impact at the time of the intervention (benefits and disbenefits to other groups and contexts outside the framework of the intervention) and long-term social impact, that is the 'ultimate effects'. (Cracknell, 2000:263).

The lack of adequate evaluation, and therefore understanding, of the longer-term effects of institutional development and capacity building interventions on the social development they purport to promote, has been repeatedly cited as one of the factors contributing to a perceived lack of "success" in this area of development work (see Chapter 1. 2.1).

This chapter will first look briefly at the evolution of evaluation theory and practice in general and the extent to which aid evaluation has followed the same path or developed differently in response to the specific conditions of international donor/recipient relations. The chapter then looks in some detail at aid evaluation practice to see where it is failing to deliver an adequate understanding of the impact of institutional development and capacity building on the social institutions of impoverished and war-torn societies. It then identifies those social research methods and approaches that seem most likely to meet the need to assess these interventions both in general and in the context of a war-torn society, concluding by defining basic principles for a research approach to evaluating the impact of aid for social development.

3.1 Meanings of evaluation

Rebien (1996:1) points out that ‘ "Evaluation" in its usual sense is basically a reflexive process which every human is engaged in every day’ and in common usage it is usually calculated in terms of ‘material or monetary worth’. It has a broader meaning of ‘that which is worthy of esteem’ or ‘has intrinsic worth,’ (OED, 1965: 2332). While the first interpretation is usually quantifiable and can be perceived as objective, the second is by definition unquantifiable and subjectively and culturally determined. It is a value that is "in the eye of the beholder".

In seeking to define the academic discipline Rebien then quotes Rossi and Freedman, ‘Evaluation research is the systematic application of social research procedures in assessing the conceptualization, design, implementation and utility of social intervention programs’ but adds his own caveat, ‘that evaluation is not merely the application of research methods in order to uncover facts about social interventions but *applied science with a managerial and political purpose*’ (Rebien, 1996:13.) [emphasis added]. The emerging academic discipline of evaluation was, nevertheless, grounded on the belief that it could be objective in the attribution of value to social interventions by standing apart from the everyday personal judgements of individuals. It was therefore, for a long time only concerned with the attribution of the first kind of quantifiable value, but as the aims of social interventions came to be increasingly defined in qualitative terms, so evaluation now seeks to enter the difficult terrain of trying to determine what is ‘worthy of esteem’ or has ‘intrinsic worth’ while, nevertheless, believing that this can, and must, be objectively determined in order to provide normative guidance for future work.

However Rebien (1996:18) in his discussion of *value* in relation to evaluation, points out that ‘Value, moral and ethical considerations are inherent to all ...decisions’ in the evaluation process from the choice of intervention strategies and definition of priorities, through the choice of evaluation methods to the use of the results. ‘In short, evaluations are not value-free. In practice, an evaluator must therefore decide whether to base an evaluation on a prescriptive or descriptive strategy.’ The contradiction between the subjective attribution of value and the desire to reach objective conclusions as to the benefit of undertaking social interventions underlies the evolution of evaluation theory and practice discussed below.

3.2 The origins and evolution of the discipline of evaluation

Evaluation has its origins in two other disciplines from the field of applied social science: economics and education. The first of these, economics, holds out the promise of being able to provide the objective basis for attributing a measurable material value to the results of social programmes. Inputs of a certain monetary or equivalent value can be matched against measured outcomes also expressed in terms of their material value. For example, a programme of agricultural extension, whose costs are known, is compared to subsequent increases in farmers' incomes. Evaluation thus becomes an exercise in monitoring controlled inputs in relation to the achievement of predetermined goals (outputs). At its most crude, this can simply be an accountability exercise to justify the expenditure of certain sums of money on one particular exercise, that is, a kind of audit. However, evaluation as an academic discipline is undertaken with an eye to testing whether a particular type of intervention not only works in one case but can be adopted as a general practice and is therefore concerned 'to demonstrate an unequivocal causal relationship between program and outcome' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:31). This is why evaluation methodology has traditionally been dominated by experimental or quasi-experimental design aimed at controlling for 'extraneous variables', those other factors surrounding the intervention but which are not part of it. From this perspective, it becomes crucial to be able to quantify variables in order to be able to assign them a material value as a means of comparison.

The other discipline with an early association with evaluation is education. It too evolved quantitative systems for measuring, in this case, pupil achievement in respect of specific short-term goals (grades and marks) but was, it was later realised, in fact evaluating process not outcomes. Exam results represent only staging posts in a continuum, which is expected to last for the subjects' entire lives. They are, in effect, a proxy for determining if pupils have acquired sufficient skills to go on learning and applying knowledge in managing professional and personal situations in a future which is largely unpredictable. Teachers and educationists have always known that the impact of formal education in an individual life is difficult to trace and can emerge in unexpected ways after many years. Similarly, the learning process itself is notoriously subject to many kinds of 'extraneous' factors (health, nutrition, motivation, parental and peer pressure etc.) which interact with each other and the inputs of teachers and formal learning programmes in such a way that they are virtually impossible to isolate. Very few firm conclusions have been reached either as to the general impact of education programmes on society. Perhaps the only generally accepted

conclusion (though still disputed by some) of a causal nature, is the importance of basic education for fostering social and economic development (Psacheropoulos and Woodhall, 1985: 314-315).

In practice, of course, these two approaches to evaluation have never been entirely divorced from each other. There is a long tradition of experimental research in education aimed at establishing measurable effects of curriculum or teaching inputs, while large areas of economic activity which are, for example, particularly relevant to economic and social recovery of impoverished disaster-prone societies, such as subsistence farming, female and child labour, informal marketing or natural resource conservation, have proved invisible to conventional economic measurements of value such as GDP, because there is no mechanism for attributing value outside the formal market economy (Waring, 1988).

A number of authors trace the interaction of these traditions in the historical development of the discipline, which they divide into 'generations' 'stages' or 'phases' (Rebien, 1996, Cracknell, 2000). While each of these can be seen to have emerged in sequence, earlier approaches have not been replaced by more recent ones, since all are still evident in the repertoire of present day evaluation practice (Rebien, 1996:33) so we might more appropriately use the term 'perspectives' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997: 4).

Rebien, using Shadish, Cook and Leviton's typology, divides the development of approaches to evaluation into three stages and incorporates a critique of Guba and Lincoln's four 'generations' of evaluation (principally derived from the field of education) into his analysis. (Rebien 1996:19-40). First generation evaluation, termed by Guba and Lincoln the 'measurement' generation, prevailed up to the early 1930s and perceived the evaluator's role as a purely technical application of appropriate instruments for measuring individual results, with the aim of discovering if programmes had been effectively implemented (or learned, in the case of school pupils). In the second 'description' generation after the Second World War, the concern was to evaluate the effectiveness of social programmes (such as a school curriculum) delivering desired outcomes in society. By the 1960s and 70s the 'judgement' generation evaluators were required to go beyond description of achievements and 'grade interventions according to merit or value and against criteria external to the intervention itself'. Rebien groups these three 'generations' within his stage one in which 'evaluation is based on the social engineering model' that assumes a linear and causal relationship between an intervention and its outcomes and that decision-making is rational and therefore

automatically uses all available objectively generated data from evaluations to improve performance (Rebien, 1996:171). This is what Pawson and Tilley see as the 'experimental' perspective and which they term a 'heroic failure' because of its obsession with ever more refined research instruments for isolating and measuring the variables contributed by social intervention in relation to measurable outcomes while ignoring their interaction with context and subjects' own volition (1997:4-11, 30-54).

The first stage approach has been called into question from two of Pawson and Tilley's perspectives, the 'pragmatic' and the 'naturalist', which coincide with Rebien's 'hermeneutic' stage two, where it was recognised that 'decision-making is not rational and available evaluation information often remain unused' (Rebien, 1996:171). Pawson and Tilley (1997:11-17) see the pragmatic role of evaluation as based on the acknowledgement that 'the very act of engaging in evaluation constitutes a political statement' which led (as Rebien also notes) 'from a knowledge-driven to a use-led model of research' in which evaluation research provides 'ammunition for debate and intraorganizational arguments' or for the purposes of legitimation. Pawson and Tilley's 'naturalist' perspective is the alternative approach to evaluation that Guba and Lincoln proposed in 1989 for their 'fourth generation'. It was part of the general constructivist trend in social science which rejected the notion of single verifiable realities in favour of 'value pluralism'. The belief that the diverse stakeholders in a social programme each have their own construction of reality, which they bring to bear in the negotiation of outcomes, also led to a focus on the use of evaluation information as empowerment.

As Rebien suggests (1996: 32-34) while its implicit claim to be the definitive solution to all evaluation problems cannot be accepted, Guba and Lincoln's approach did a great service to the discipline by providing a critique of the stage one 'positivist' approach, and providing 'an epistemological framework for formative and stakeholder based evaluations, with a detailed elaboration of how to conduct such evaluations in practice'. Pawson and Tilley (1997:17) think that it led to an important development in the discipline by effecting a 'transfer of gaze from outputs to process'.

Both Rebien and Pawson and Tilley, see the next stage in evaluation (stage three or the 'pluralist' perspective) as one which combines elements of both previous stages and they take Cronbach as the main proponent of matching research evaluation approaches to the circumstances and purposes of

each specific intervention, or as Cracknell puts it, 'Methodological Pluralism' and 'Horses for Courses' (2000:43-49).

Rebien (1996:13-16) identifies three distinct purposes of evaluation which are defined as:

Accountability which is the requirement to show to those funding social interventions that the funds have been spent as intended and achieved the desired results.

Implementation which is concerned with performance evaluation in order to improve the management of the implementation process more effectively.

Strategy/policy in which evaluation is used 'to accumulate knowledge in order to make informed decisions regarding future policies and strategies.'

He then suggests that these are pursued by the application of five different categories of evaluation research:

Process or formative evaluation is concerned with ongoing management, planning and organisational activities as well as the interaction of the different stakeholders and their respective capacities. It generally takes place during an intervention.

Effectiveness or summative evaluation is the 'classic evaluation category'. Its purpose is to measure the effects of a social intervention and determine whether the inputs have led to the desired outputs. So it must collect information about the situation before, during and after the intervention. Rebien suggests that this category is also termed 'impact evaluation'. However, as discussed below (3.5), this term is commonly and confusingly used to refer to two distinct types of evaluation.

Monitoring 'is an ongoing activity administered by the personnel working on or with the intervention'. It is usually concerned to track progress in relation to pre-determined indicators.

Evaluation synthesis is the comparative analysis of the findings of previously completed evaluations of several interventions in a given field for the purpose of deriving general conclusions.

Meta evaluation is 'complex, scholarly investigation into the methods and procedures used in evaluations and their quality.' That is the scholarly evaluation of evaluations.

Rebien acknowledges that there is no consensus with regard to this categorisation and given the heterogeneity of the discipline (and the technical and political arenas in which it operates) it could well be extended or modified, but his central point that without such a typology, researchers cannot make soundly based choices of research purpose, focus and methodology, is crucial to an

understanding of the nature of the discipline. Aid evaluation, in particular, often lacks focus because it attempts to serve several purposes at once (Rebien, 1996:52).

Picciotto (1999: 7-11) makes a similar point taking Eleanor Chelimsky's three purposes of 'evaluation for accountability', 'evaluation for development' (as in institutional development) and 'evaluation for knowledge' as his starting point and suggests that 'evaluation can be evaluated in terms of its contribution to three classes of social functions: (a) collective action; (b) participation; and (c) coordination. His choice of this particular framework for analysis is clearly dictated by the fact that he is considering the role of evaluation as 'part of the overall governance framework' discussed in Chapter 1, involving institutional, market and civil society development. He also distinguishes two current 'cultures' or 'orientations', which are reflected in methodological choices for evaluation: that of economists 'who base their recommendations on predictive models' and those he terms 'evaluators' who 'prize "rich description" and manipulate "dirty" data.' These are essentially the two influences identified as the starting point for the development of the discipline, but which continue to function side by side. The first seek to limit and control their data collection in order to achieve and validate 'clean models' while the second try to accommodate and interpret multiple perspectives. He sees them as using 'different lenses to examine public policy and generate complementary analyses for use by policy makers.'

This brings us back to third stage 'pluralism' which seeks to combine these two approaches rather than allowing them to simply continue in tandem. Evaluation, because it does nevertheless need, as its *raison d'être*, to attribute value and influence practice, is necessarily concerned with causation. As we have seen, Pawson and Tilley suggest that the constructivist generation went down a blind alley in rejecting this role while justifiably seeing the need to examine the process of how stakeholders interact with social interventions, just as the 'experimentalist' generation pursued the issue of causation by such a narrow input/output route as to exclude most of what is relevant to the way change occurs in society. They pick up Harré's distinction between 'successionist' and 'generative' theories of causation to build a framework for their 'realistic evaluation' (1997:32-34). Briefly, the successionist approach coincides with the experimental method of controlled observation of preconditions, application of 'treatment' and postconditions in an experimental group, which is simultaneously compared with a control group. Causation is thus seen as a linear 'succession' brought about and observed externally. Generative theory of causation sees change taking place both internally (by volition of the subjects for example) as well as externally. Change

is the result of a combination of potential or opportunity with conditions internal to the social context and the subjects of the intervention. Logically this requires not restriction of the information base but greater breadth and depth of understanding. The issue of causation is thus not irrelevant but infinitely more difficult to determine than the successionist model suggests.

3.3 The evaluation of aid in development practice

Cracknell (2000:39) suggests that 'From the start...aid evaluation had a strong pragmatic character, with the emphasis on the practical usefulness of the results in improving aid operations'. It did not concern itself with theoretical considerations discussed above, but in the first instance only with the effectiveness of a particular project or programme in achieving its goals or producing benefits. As such, it is a type of case study or quasi-experiment of the 'first stage' type. However, as with other case studies, it 'is concerned not just with whether the policy or programme has worked in the case investigated, but also whether it would work elsewhere' (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000:99). So what aid evaluation has traditionally sought to do is essentially to attribute value to the outcomes of particular interventions (usually in comparison with the value of the resources invested in them¹) with the implicit assumption that this will provide some lessons as to how to proceed with similar cases in the future.

At first therefore, and largely still, aid evaluation was geared to the economic discipline, seeking to relate inputs to outputs in social engineering models (the blue-print approach) but often so conditioned by the budget culture and the *accountability* purpose of evaluation that it became little more than an audit. As Cracknell (2000:134) points out, 'the reassessment of the objectives, is one of the factors that most distinguishes the evaluation function from auditing' and this is not even considered when the scope of an evaluation is confined to monitoring the achievement of predetermined objectives in relation to inputs. Carlsson, Kölin and Ekborn (1994: 176-7) suggest further, that achieving 'organizational objectives' such as 'fulfilling of aggregate lending plans' is at least as significant as concerns for 'programme goals' in determining how evaluations are carried out.

¹ The approach adopted by Dobbins et al (2003) in their evaluation of post-war nation building discussed in Chapter 2, for example.

Aid evaluation, then, was initially a tool for measuring the cost-effectiveness and efficiency of the delivery of aid and as such was closely associated with economic theory and auditing. It was in these early stages that a *base-line survey* followed by the statistical monitoring of selected indicators and a final ex-post evaluation exercise, was the standard method for evaluating effectiveness, that is, the 'experimental' perspective dominated.

However, as the aims and objectives of aid programmes, evolved to encompass broad social issues such as, poverty alleviation, good governance, institution building, community empowerment, drawing, as we have seen in Chapter 1, on some philosophical strands from adult and community education, so logically, the aid world was led to consider other styles of evaluation, for example, participatory evaluation, using PRA methods or action research. Participatory planning and implementation, for example, logically demand participatory evaluation. So as the focus of aid shifted from economic to social development aims, this demanded 'an approach which is ...capable of picking up and explaining the qualitative change which may have taken place' and the methodological concepts of evaluation changed to include the whole range of qualitative methods appropriate to the 'second stage' evaluation focus on process and use (Oakley, Pratt and Clayton (1998: 48-49).

The new goals for social development are therefore, qualitative, long-term, holistic and political. At the same time they are not specific and so not easily measurable by conventional input/output methods conducted during and immediately after the completion of projects or programmes. This has induced recognition of the need to assess wider social and political impact, not just measurable and immediate socio-economic outcomes. The *wider impact study (WID)* concept for example, 'seeks ...to detect and...describe the causal relationship between the intervention and the changes that may have occurred' and is 'supposedly highly participatory' in its approach (Oakley et al,1998:59).

Finally, aid evaluation has also moved in the direction of a mixed method or pluralist approach which uses different methods to reveal the views of different stakeholders and recognises different evaluation purposes, including the need for long-term social impact assessment (Cracknell's 'Emergence of Methodological Pluralism' cited above). This has involved a shift from emphasis on accountability in the particular case to the need to assess general applicability of aid strategies. 'Synthesis studies' of a number of theoretically selected cases have become the common approach

to finding answers to this concern. They are in essence, comparative studies using secondary data from programmes implemented in different regions by the same agency or a number of collaborating donor agencies.

Thus far, aid evaluation, albeit with little explicit theoretical grounding, appears nevertheless, to have kept in step with the different developments in the general discipline. Oakley et al in reviewing current thinking on evaluation practice for social development, identify different levels (global, national and programme) and different stages of intervention (inputs/outputs, direct effects, wider effects and impact) which are covered by three different stages of evaluation each with a different purpose: first to evaluate efficiency; second to evaluate effectiveness; finally to evaluate impact (1998:26-35). This is essentially a scheme similar to Rebien's or Picciotto's applied to the specific context of aid for social development.

However, in fact evaluation practice lags behind the lessons learned for development practice, which as we saw in Chapter 1 are by no means universally adopted. Oakley et al note that the 'evidence suggests that development agencies...are stronger on issues such as outputs, effort and activities' (efficiency) 'but less strong' in 'determining ... the result' (effects) of their actions or understanding change (impact). It is particularly the assessment of impact, 'the last stage' which 'is rarely reached' (1998:35). Several other authors (Cracknell, 2000:245, Snyder and Dunn, 1995, Forss and Carlson, 1997) concur in the assertion that impact evaluation is on the whole rarely carried out and when it is 'the results seldom lived up to expectations' (Carlsson et al, 1994: 197).

The explanation for this state of affairs is seen by most authors as inherent in the context in which aid is delivered. Rebien, for example, suggests that aid evaluation operates in a context that is significantly different in certain respects from national public service and social programme research. It is concerned with accountability for the 'use of taxpayers' money outside national borders'. It 'is implemented in a structural frame of international politics...economics and private sector interests....it is difficult for evaluation recommendations to transgress these structural conditions'. It contends with various difficulties arising from the physical and cultural distance between the commissioner (donor headquarters) and the intervention (recipient country). Finally it 'is an arena for partisan politics' in the donor countries, where demands in respect of single 'fashionable' issues such as gender, human rights or environmental protection can distort evaluation exercises (Rebien, 1996:173). Carlsson et al (1994:34-38) see that the aid organisations

themselves, as a result of these conflicting external demands, are particularly prone to internal contradictions leading to 'political games and power struggles'. It is these realities rather than objective criteria that determine, 'what is to be evaluated, the method to be used and the conclusions to be drawn'. That is, the 'petty political' nature of all evaluation noted by Pawson and Tilley (1997:11-12) is greatly exacerbated by the international aid environment. Samset demonstrates further, that an organisational culture exists within aid agencies, that focuses on 'elimination of both uncertainty and risks' punishing 'failure even if it is caused by unforeseen events' (1998:18) so that although, as he demonstrates, the real incidence of genuinely unpredictable factors and project failures are not significantly greater in development projects than in public projects in industrial countries, the perception exists that it is higher and development agencies seek to protect themselves from visible (and therefore politically sensitive) failure by an ever more prescriptive planning and accountability regime.

Noticeably, the above analysis makes little mention of the involvement of the nationals of countries where interventions take place, except in the role of recipients. Participatory evaluation is a common concept in the present day literature on aid but as Chambers comments (1998:xiii) '... as usual with concepts which gain currency, rhetoric has run far, far ahead of understanding, let alone practice'. Samset in examining four case studies, also raises the question of which criteria may be used to measure the "success" of projects and demonstrates that different criteria deliver different verdicts on success and failure. For example, his second case study, The Refugee Enterprise project, was highly efficient and effective and so successful in donor terms, however from the recipients' point of view, it was found to be 'not relevant' and so unsustainable, with no lasting impact, in other words, a "failure". (Samset, 1998:122-123)²

Here we could usefully look at an analysis by Arnstein quoted by Rebien (1996:58) of the real nature of eight types of activity commonly labelled as 'participation' in the context of public programmes in the United States (see Figure 1.). Only three, those that involve 'various degrees of citizen power' are deemed to involve 'real' participation. Some (numbers 4 -6) make participatory gestures without substance, while two are either philanthropically or cynically manipulative. If this scheme is related to the conditions in which aid interventions and evaluations take place, we can see that of the three 'real' kinds of participation, only the third, 'partnership' is legally possible. The

² This is particularly relevant to the issue of how post-war reconstruction is evaluated retrospectively by different stakeholders, raised at the end of Chapter 2.

givers of aid are accountable to citizen control, but in their own country, no control can be exercised directly by the citizens of recipient countries. Similarly, no power can be delegated by donors, accountable to their own citizenry, to those of another state. Aid is therefore given and received on the basis of partnership but as has already been shown, it is a very unequal partnership in which the 'various degrees of... power' exercised by recipients can be very limited. Participatory aid evaluation is therefore also subject to the contradictions of the donor-recipient relationship discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. It cannot ever achieve the same levels of participation that could be open to citizens in relation to their elected and directly accountable government. In practice, much 'participation' in aid programmes and their evaluation, does not even aspire that far. Consciously or unconsciously, it is limited to tokenism or descends into manipulation.

Figure 1. Eight types of participation

Various degrees of citizen power	1. Citizen control
	2. Delegated power
	3. Partnership
Various degrees of tokenism	4. Placation
	5. Consultation
	6. Informing
Non-participation	7. Therapy
	8. Manipulation

Source: Arnstein, 1971

As a result, although 'donors claim to be linking participatory development directly to state accountability, empowerment of local groups and transparency of decision making' in the recipient country (as part of *governance* conditionality) '...much of this increased accountability is focussed upwards (towards the donors), rather than downwards (towards local people), thus placing greater pressure on public agencies to perform to donor-defined standards'. (Thompson, 1998:109). 'A "participatory" emphasis ... may thus serve to give a democratic veneer to views which are at heart external and imposed' (Brown, 1991: 261) and the plea, articulated by Vargas Vargas (1991) for evaluation to be in fact the participatory learning process advocated by so much development literature, is generally ignored in practice.

Rebien (1996: 51) and Cracknell (2000: 48-49) dialoguing on the progress of aid evaluation thinking see that it is now 'at the crossroads'. Having moved on from the apparent certainties of input/output calculations and accountability auditing, through the uncharted territory of multiple constructed realities and the contradictions of participation, evaluation researchers are faced with a number of choices. What is it appropriate to evaluate in a particular case? Outcomes or process or both? Who evaluates and for whom? If evaluation is in essence a judgement of value, whose criteria of value should be applied? Hallam (1998:90-91) looking for answers to such questions, suggests that the recently devised Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief and the development standards of the SPHERE project 'will provide a 'benchmark against which performance in certain sectors can be measured' but recognises that it will not be applicable to many outcomes of humanitarian assistance and should also 'not take attention away from the beneficiary perspective.' We can see from this that those concerned with evaluating humanitarian and development interventions, have increasingly come to recognise that the answers they give to questions of purpose and value in respect of a particular evaluation will directly influence the choice of methodology adopted. However this recognition is still far from being translated into a consistent approach to the design of evaluation research. One can even question if the term 'evaluation research' is not itself somewhat contradictory. If research claims to be objective, by definition it should not be based on predetermined value systems such as the Code of Conduct. (Rebien (1996:12-13) as we have seen, claims that though evaluation uses research theories and methods, the discipline has managerial and political purposes that are different from the aims of academic research.

In this debate, it is particularly the recognition of the need to evaluate the long-term social impact of interventions that has yet to give rise to the development of a body of practice involving evaluators from recipient countries. Cracknell cites this at the end of his book on aid evaluation as the next big challenge facing the profession (2000:357).

3.4 The challenges of evaluating social impact

In Chapter 1, it was shown that many practitioners and implementation agencies feel that evaluations of institutional development and capacity building interventions are generally unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, they are more concerned with budgetary control than social impact; secondly, they are constrained by fixed-term management cycles. As a result, evaluations

have been based almost entirely on easily quantifiable indicators that are normally determined in the initial planning process as a means of monitoring the achievement of pre-set project objectives and since they are designed to assess the immediate outcomes of any intervention, only in terms of what was planned, they rarely record either unplanned outcomes or any wider and longer-term impact. Oakley et al (1998:52-53) describe a typical case, the Lutheran World Federation planning and monitoring system, in which suggested specimen 'progress indicators' covering input, output, effect and impact are applied across all projects. 'The system is comprehensive, demanding and is intended to ensure effective control of field level operations. It is also openly biased towards the quantitative' and in their view 'would have difficulties in effectively monitoring the true nature of social development projects.'

The reasons for this continuing 'first stage' approach, fall into three categories. First, there are the administrative difficulties of cost and the long time lapse between the termination of an assistance programme and the appropriate moment to assess its impact. Brown (1991:260) suggests that 'it is questionable whether the time-frame within which most agencies (particularly NGOs) must work is sufficient to permit meaningful evaluation of a process which is...long-term and ...only evident in retrospect.' Secondly, there is a question of political will. Both Cracknell (2000) and Khan (1998) suggest that, logically and practically, the assessment of impact should be led by researchers from the recipient country. Oakley et al (1998: 38) regard any attempt to understand and explain social impact without direct involvement of stakeholders as 'futile'. Carlsson et al (1994:184-5) also point out that because 'the recipient's capacity to absorb aid is one of the critical factors determining effectiveness and impact, an evaluation which largely excludes the recipient...must be regarded as dysfunctional'. They suggest that the reasons for almost universal non-involvement of recipients include lack of resources on the part of the recipients themselves, who may also have other concerns and priorities for the use of the resources they do have, and the fact that donors, concerned mainly with satisfying the accountability claims of their own public with the short-term evaluations, have little incentive to promote the transfer of these means to recipient institutions and are reluctant to surrender control of the process. The recipients therefore remain passive because they regard evaluation as a donor accountability exercise, because they are afraid of 'jeopardizing the aid flow'

and because project evaluation, uncoordinated with their normal fiscal year cycles, is an administrative inconvenience³.

Finally there are the very real methodological problems, which are the main subject of the rest of this chapter. For example, practitioners perceive intuitively from experience that there is a causal link between the capacity building inputs and the subsequent development of social institutions effectively serving their communities, but the time frame and the number of other variables that must also be deemed to combine to influence that outcome make it impossible to test this relationship by conventional quantitative methods alone. As Cracknell points out (2000:357), it is the current emphasis on long-term social and political aims (such as good governance, institution building and policy development) and the need to move away from project aid to sector and programme support that is creating unease about how to evaluate the effectiveness of aid. For that reason, many avoid the issue by adhering to strategies that are susceptible to the kind of evaluation they understand. For example, only providing 'narrowly based training for a specific skill, usually for personnel associated with large aid-funded projects' (Cracknell, 2000:264) even though it is clear that a much more general professional education through a combination of experience, supervision, professional exchange and formal learning is required to build the human capacity of the institutions necessary for the desired *good governance*. An equivalent evaluation strategy to match this development approach is largely lacking.

The first problem is that an impact study has to be retrospective over a long time period. Even if the need for eventual impact evaluation is recognised at the outset and impact monitoring data collection systems put in place (which is unlikely, as responsibility would have to rest with the permanent institution, that is, the recipient, whose management capability, at that stage, is limited) it would be impossible to know in advance all the factors which might turn out to be significant in situations which have not yet arisen, and trying to isolate the effects of one variable (such as capacity building) from numerous others that might be influencing the outcomes by quantitative multivariate analysis without comprehensive and compatible longitudinal data sets is unreliable. There is also the perennial problem that even if significant correlation is demonstrated, it does not prove a causal relationship. The best that can be achieved is confirmation of the plausibility of the

³ The Review of the DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance 1998:74-75 discusses this issue. Sweden's contribution notes ...'partners were involved in the inception of the evaluation in somewhat less than 40 per cent of cases, that they were only seldom engaged in the process, and that they received a draft report to comment on in only 50 per cent of the cases.'

causation theory. MacPhail's description (1991) of the 'socio-economic' survey approach to impact evaluation in World Bank agriculture and rural development projects, is a case in point. This type of evaluation based on a quantitative survey methodology even when it includes 'qualitative' indicators such as 'perception of project services and benefits' are still concerned with the direct and short-term effects of specific interventions and, however well-conducted, cannot offer understanding of social change because they generally stop short of considering the meaning behind observed change, that is the interaction between the opportunity created by the intervention and the volition of its subjects discussed by Pawson and Tilley (see above) as well as wider contextual factors.

The alternative, or more likely complementary, approach is qualitative, seeking to 'prove or disprove [causal claims] by exploring and analysing the meanings and justificatory frameworks that those involved attach to their actions' (Conolly, 1998 quoted in Gomm, Hammersley, Foster, 2000:237). As already mentioned, this kind of investigation needs to be informed and preferably led, by researchers from the recipient society. In the case of aid evaluation, this comes up against the inherent contradictions of the 'participatory approach' discussed above, as well as the resources gap in the recipient countries.

3.5 Clarification of common categories and terms in aid evaluation

Before trying to arrive at a research strategy to address this difficult area of evaluation, we should take Rebien's advice and clarify our typology of purposes and categories of aid evaluation. As with much international aid work, the field of evaluation is littered with common and potentially useful terms that are loosely and often interchangeably applied to different situations. It is necessary therefore, to consider how they should be deployed.

The objective of evaluation as we have seen is to define the value of the outcomes resulting from intervention. It is therefore completed after the conclusion of an intervention or phase of intervention. In the 'blue-print' approach this is taken literally: teams of 'independent' evaluators descend on the institution or community that has hosted a particular project and proceed to carry out surveys and interviews to establish the outcomes achieved in relation to the initial plan and baseline data. Where a learning or process approach to implementation is applied, so the gathering of information and its interpretation is ongoing throughout the implementation, but culminates in a final participatory evaluation exercise when the programme is completed. However, whichever

style of evaluation is applied, it has to proceed from an understanding of the pre-existing context and conditions, so it is in fact initiated before implementation. The studies undertaken to evaluate the potential benefits of undertaking particular interventions and which form the basis for planning them, are known as *appraisals*, though of course they are a category of evaluation. The primary users of evaluations and appraisals have, up to now, been the funding agencies that commission them.

Next we can look at *assessment* and *evaluation*, as commonly used in conjunction with *impact*, sometimes to refer to activities with different scope and purpose, but at other times apparently to describe the same activity. *Impact* itself is used at times interchangeably with *effects*, or immediate outcomes, and at other times to mean a much more long-term and diffused outcome of social development interventions, covering both predicted and 'unanticipated changes' in the lives of intended beneficiaries and others, which can of course be either positive or negative. According to Oakley et al., *assessment* and *evaluation* of impact are theoretically distinct activities, in a similar way to *appraisal* and *evaluation*, one looks forward and the other backwards. *Impact assessment* is 'predictive' while *impact evaluation* is 'retrospective'. However, in common usage amongst aid agencies, they appear to be used interchangeably. (Oakley et al, 1998: 36)

It is probably pointless to attempt to impose any linguistic conformity on this confusion⁴ but it is possible to make a practical conceptual distinction between two distinct categories or subjects of evaluation (serving different purposes) that can be applied whatever the terms used to describe them:

1. *Effects/immediate outcomes/early impact/proximate effects'* (Oakley et al 1998. Cracknell, 2000).

These are the main subject of most aid evaluation. The terms refer to changes that occur during a social intervention and are detectable during and shortly after the intervention. They are closely linked to individual project or programme objectives (nowadays normally formulated in a log-frame plan) and to the contemporary context in which the intervention was made. Roche (1999:20-21) gives two definitions of this type of impact: '*sustained changes in people's lives brought about by a*

⁴ The OECD/DAC *Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results Management* (1991 Revised 1998) has brought some order to the situation but it is still necessary to say in what sense some of these terms are being used.

particular intervention or *significant* [but not necessarily lasting] *or lasting changes in peoples lives brought about by a given action or series of actions*'. Both express a direct causal relationship between a given outcome and a specific intervention. Evaluation of these outcomes then, even when applying 'participatory' methods is essentially from the 'experimental' perspective, described by Pawson and Tilley, that is, concerned primarily with internal validity and direct causation. The context of the intervention is appraised and measured (usually by base line survey) before the start of the programme. Selected indicators of the desired results are monitored during the intervention and measured again after its conclusion in an ex-post study. The essential purpose of the evaluation is to give an account (Rebien's first purpose *accountability*) of the *effectiveness* of a discrete and targeted action to those responsible for funding and implementing it. (Rebien's second category of evaluation, see above). DFID's OPR (Output to Purpose Reviews) described by Oakley et al (1998:53-54) constitute a clearly defined approach to this kind of evaluation designed to meet 'four key purposes': ' to provide a strategic overview...to assess progress...to reassess assumptions and risks ...to provide recommendations and agree the way forward for the project'. Though the word 'impact' is frequently used in this scheme, 'The focus of an OPR is on both 'evolving outcomes' and 'early impact.' That is, it is covering the same ground as McPhail's studies discussed above, though it employs a mixed quantitative and qualitative methodology and falls within Roche's second definition.

While this category of evaluation is, as we have seen, often not as adequately carried out in practice as these two schemes suggest it could be, it is realistic to expect that aid agencies do account for their activities and improve their performance in this way.⁵ It is what they can reasonably and appropriately be held responsible for carrying out. It is interesting to note here, the five commonly adopted criteria for project and programme evaluation listed by Samset (1998:24-25:

1. **efficiency** (the delivery of the project in terms of cost, timing and quality)
2. **effectiveness** (the extent to which the project goal has been achieved)
3. **impact** (the sum of positive and negative, planned and unforeseen changes and effects *of the projects* in society)
4. **relevance** (the degree to which the project respond(s) to real needs and priorities in society)

⁵ The DAC Principles for Evaluation of Development Assistance (OECD 1991) describes the main purposes of evaluation as: 'to improve future aid policy, programmes and projects through feedback of lessons learned; to provide a basis for accountability, including information to the public' In the review carried out in 1998, this statement remained essentially unchanged.

5. **sustainability** (the extent to which the positive effects of the project *will continue in the future*)
[emphasis added]

Lines three and five are instructive as they clearly show that the evaluation is circumscribed in scope and time, focussing on attributable results of a specific action within a short period following the intervention, in which it is only possible to assess the *potential* for sustained change. This then is the brief for best practice in the evaluation of aid adopted by general consensus amongst aid agencies and it does not cover the issue of long-term impact.

2. *Impact/long-term impact/ 'ultimate effects'* (Oakley et al ,1998. Cracknell, 2000)

These terms refer to changes which are:

a) *cumulative* - they are evident five, ten or more years after the events of the intervention, though they may begin to appear during the period of the intervention and even be evident in some effects/outcome monitoring or be specifically monitored in impact monitoring exercises, they are fully apparent much later. For example in the case of staff training discussed by Cracknell (see above) the benefits of such capacity building only become evident over the whole career of individuals and in the development and performance of the institution over a number of years following the intervention.

b) *diffused* - they are not directly linked to specific aid project or programme objectives (though these may contribute to changes) but to more general social goals (such as good governance) and are the result of programme outcomes (planned and unplanned) interacting with factors in the wider society, many of which may even first occur after the intervention. (As in the *generative* concept of causation discussed above.) For example, if we consider capacity building activities carried out in a specific institution in the context of war, the subjects of that programme may be found after the war applying their knowledge (or not) in a completely different context due to the demise or transformation of institutions or their personal migration and economic imperatives.

Evaluation of such 'long-term social impact' relates to Chelimsky's 'evaluation for knowledge' purpose or Rebien's 'strategy/policy' purpose discussed above. As such, they do not feed directly into the decision-making process of individual organisations, but rather through the 'diffuse and undirected infiltration of research ideas into their understanding of the world' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:13). However, if the purpose of impact evaluation is clear, the type or category of evaluation appropriate for its pursuit is still unclear.

3.6 Implications for impact evaluation

We have to conclude, first of all, that the impact of social development aid is proving both difficult to identify and virtually impossible to measure. Indeed aid interventions in general have provoked cries of frustration such as: 'we really do not know anything about aid impact in Africa and the Middle East' (Forss and Carlson, 1997:498); '... the problem with discussing the impact of international assistance on the people of Afghanistan is that none of us can really claim to know what the impact has been' (Donini quoted by Hallam, 1998:79). Furthermore, social development interventions are also undertaken '...with goals that are inherently non-material, and hence not amenable to understanding through the use of surrogate economic indicators.' (Brown, 1991:259). Hallam then (1998:79) identifies 'three principal challenges for those wishing to measure the impact of an humanitarian intervention' which as will be shown below are equally applicable to social development:

- 'i) a lack of consensus on what constitutes a desirable outcome
- ii) the problems of data collection and data availability
- iii) attributing impact to an intervention'

Considering these in reverse order, it is possible to make the following observations. An important consideration in attributing impact to particular social development interventions is that significant extraneous variables often only emerge or become apparent after the intervention ends, so that the extent and nature of the impact goes beyond limited project objectives, spilling over (negatively or positively) into other contexts. As a consequence of that, there is then no readymade baseline information on these aspects for purposes of comparison (point ii). Contemporary records (including pre-programme appraisals etc.) can be used to establish the context in which the intervention was made but will not necessarily cover aspects which subsequently prove significant. Even if we 'rediscover the baseline' as Oakley et al suggest (1998:140-143) with a view to accumulating relevant information for subsequent impact evaluation, we run the risk of pre-empting decisions about which questions it is appropriate to ask. In the end, we have to rely on a combination of inadequate baseline information and retrospective reflection (and attribution of value, see point i) by diverse, but mainly recipient, stakeholders, as the case studies they present clearly illustrate.

Piccioto (1999:16-17) summarises the methodological dilemma as follows: 'evaluations carried out many years after a program has reached maturity are more reliable since they offer the possibility of capturing the full impact of program actions.' However, '...the longer the time elapsed, the greater the costs associated with information retrieval...and the greater the threat to relevance' due to intervening 'experiences'. He concludes that 'A mix of evaluation processes... may be needed to overcome this dilemma.'

Another clear implication is that impact evaluation has to reach beyond the parameters of a single programme or project and this leads to the conclusion that it is probably not feasible or useful to try and distinguish the impact of one particular intervention. Rather we need to consider a broad spectrum of interventions (of various agencies over time) in a particular area of social development (Oakley et al, 1998:147). This, in turn, strongly suggests that impact evaluation is a job for independent researchers and that it cannot be tackled as an add-on to individual aid programmes. It is certainly not something that the operational departments of aid agencies can be expected to do or even, except in a wider collaboration with other actors, their evaluation units. Cracknell (2000:242) suggests that 'It would not be reasonable, or even possible... to expect these wider impacts to be studied as a matter of course.' but only if they are likely to be 'unusual' or 'highly significant'. In other words, if they may serve to answer a specific research question.

The discussion of the nature of social impact and participation above also leads to the conclusion that ideally, recipient stakeholders would commission such research from in-country academic institutions (though they might include researchers from donor country institutions in the research team). However, as we have seen above, they almost never do this due to two factors: their own lack of financial capacity and the donors' unwillingness, having carried out their obligations to their own public, to offer to meet this need; their lack of research capacity or more correctly, limited capacity and other priorities for its use. Nevertheless, it is obviously the case that 'local actors evaluate what is going on' (Carlsson et al, 1994:183). They do make value judgements on the efficacy of different aid interventions and reach conclusions as to the value (to them) of certain types of donor intervention, since these judgements inform the way that they negotiate further aid but it is more akin to evaluation in the 'everyday' pragmatic sense discussed by Rebien or the type of processes described by Hallam (1998:27) as 'Reviews' which are 'more regular [than evaluation], less onerous, and sometimes purely verbal.'. They 'seldom launch evaluations in the traditional sense of the concept'. (Carlsson et al op.cit.)

It is clear that judgements are made on both sides as to the value of certain interventions, but, as we have seen these are not based on any wide ranging systematic analysis of relevant information. Both aid givers and recipients could therefore benefit from an informed understanding of the impact of certain types of aid interventions on social development, rather than relying on the present practice of giving and receiving aid on the basis of untested assumptions about its long-term benefits or as Brown (1991:262) describes it, '... resting more upon the faith of the true believer than on a coherent body of practical methodology.'

Given the limitations on both sides, discussed above, an alternative strategy could be for an independent researcher to facilitate or act as catalyst for a reflective retrospective evaluation by recipient stakeholders, using the 'participatory enquiry' approach (Oakley et al, 1998:45) (discussed in detail in Chapter 4.). This could then be combined with analysis of contemporary records and documentation, including that from individual project and programme monitoring and evaluation, to achieve the 'pluralist' approach discussed above. Piccioto also suggests that where the 'transacting parties have widely divergent interests and perspectives... independent evaluation may help to mediate...agreements.' (1999:12).

3.7 Evaluation of aid to war-torn societies

The most common application of research in relation to armed conflict, is to meet the information needs of those involved in planning and implementing interventions in specific situations, usually with donor assistance. The main focus is on reaching general conclusions about the most efficient and effective ways to deliver humanitarian aid to war-affected populations, though this may often be done on the basis of assumptions of its causal relationship to various social objectives such as 'sustainable peace' 'good governance' 'social recovery' etc. ' Research takes place not to allow external actors to intervene in a conflict, but to determine the direction and commitment of that involvement' (Marriage, 2000). Thus, evaluation research in areas affected by armed conflict, is still largely carried out to evaluate and justify the delivery of aid, (Rebien's first two purposes: *accountability* and *implementation*) since *policy and strategy* decisions have often already been taken on other grounds, such as political expediency. The common pattern is a combination of mainly 'stage one' strategies with 'pragmatic ' gestures towards participation derived from 'stage two' approaches. A less common and much more difficult exercise is that of deriving general lessons about the nature of conflict and the impact of different types of intervention on the conflict

itself and its underlying causes and so, while there are 'very few examples of successful evaluation of the impact of social development programmes' in peaceful contexts (Oakley et al, 1998:37), impact evaluation is almost non-existent in the case of war-torn societies.

However, there are very good reasons for attempting research to ascertain the impact of policy responses in these contexts, by looking beyond making recommendations for improvement in the on-going delivery of relief aid, towards the promotion of conflict resolution and reconstruction. Once a violent conflict is in progress '... research may achieve little in curtailing the battle between protagonists, however it can at least assist in the process of recovery and reconstruction following war, and this where its value truly lies' (Baraket and Ellis, 1996:149).

The tendency to confine evaluation of aid to war-torn societies to the accountability and implementation functions can also be attributed to the 'risk averse' culture of the aid agencies and their personnel. As Samset demonstrated (1998, Annex 5), their perception is that 'contextual uncertainty' is much higher in developing than in industrial countries, whereas much of this 'uncertainty' could in fact be either mitigated or at least predicted. When it comes to operations in war-torn countries, the perception is of even greater uncertainty leading to an assumption that social development activity, including research, has to be put on hold until the 'emergency' is over, even though the reality is that many intra-national conflicts in the world today persist for generations and bear no relation to the temporary crisis implied by the term 'emergency'. This reflects a refusal to admit that war and its economic and social consequences constitute a way of life whose negative effects on the majority involved in it, can only be permanently alleviated by significant social development.

As in development contexts not affected by armed conflict, the first stage in developing intervention strategies is to understand the society as it is. The researcher (or evaluator) is looking at a range of social and economic phenomena, which at face value should be similarly susceptible to investigation by available tried and tested social science research methods, from large scale quantitative surveys to small scale qualitative studies. For example, methodologies have been developed for studying various types of violent behaviour such as that of criminal gangs or social dissidents. Nevertheless, researching the nature of armed conflict and its social and economic aftermath is deemed by some to present special difficulties that actually call in question its validity and usefulness due to the prevailing 'contextual uncertainty'.

It is certainly true that in the conditions commonly prevailing in areas of on-going armed conflict or its aftermath, the methodological challenges multiply in comparison with those of researching in developing or industrial countries. Situations are shaped by the traumatic conditions that have affected people's experiences and may also inhibit their ability or willingness to communicate them. There is fear of repeated violence, mistrust of others and uncertainty about what the future might bring. The physical destruction and social damage (death and separation of family members, unaccompanied children, homelessness) affect the subjects of research to a greater or lesser degree, so that field-based research in these conditions is often dangerous to both researchers and respondents. While each of these conditions can be found in other research contexts, they are unlikely to occur simultaneously and with the same degree of intensity as in war-affected contexts.

As in social research in general, challenges to the conduct of research fall into three main areas: methodological, ethical and logistic but it is the number and combination of these threats that make research in conflict areas particularly difficult. Nevertheless, as has been argued, it is still a necessary pursuit and as Barakat and Ellis suggest, the difficulties should be seen as a challenge to the researcher's ingenuity, rather than a reason to desist.

For example, one immediate casualty of armed conflict and violent social upheaval, is what we call 'the truth'. We can no longer assume the existence of a body of objectively verifiable facts about the situation. 'During moments of crisis... rumors composed knowledge. Not only were rumors the only source of information...but the conflicting nature of competing rumors made plain...' that they were rumours. Research is inclined to believe that they 'were manufactured.' But by whom and why? In fact they may simply be the product of individual attempts to make sense of events in which 'facts...linked up haphazardly' on the basis of the fragmented information available. (Simmons, 1995: 43). Steering a course through such a climate of deliberate and accidental confusion is not easy but a solution lies in accepting the 'plurality of values and arguments available for thinking about any specific policy' as the basis for systematic 'discourse analysis' (Hallam, 1998:29) involving multiple sources and methodologies.

3.7.1 The 'composite approach' to research in war-torn societies

As already discussed above, even in mainstream social research applied in relatively stable social conditions (absence of armed conflict, at least) for the purposes of evaluation, no single methodological approach has been found to be entirely self sufficient. Progress towards social understanding lies in their complementarity.⁶ Acknowledging that complementarity in the choice of research strategies in conflict situations is also a key to meeting the many challenges discussed above and has been summarised as the *composite approach* (Barakat, Chard, Lume and Jacoby, 2002) in which the strengths and limitations of different research styles and techniques are assessed in relation to particular research aims and conditions and combined in an optimal research design for that situation.

In the conditions discussed above, an ethnographic approach, with its ability to use multiple sources and methods and respond to changing conditions, is likely to be the core response, but quantification and generalisation, necessary for planning appropriate actions, require the use of surveys and in some specific instances, quasi-experiments. Ethnography can identify the range of response to and perception of important variables and relationships etc. while survey can test them more widely and validate them as general conclusions. Alternatively, ethnography can find the meaning behind correlations identified by survey (Gomm et al 2000: 236-237). Where it proves difficult to obtain certain information directly in the field, or to access a representative sample of the war affected populations, the use of a review of relevant literature, together with an analysis of secondary data can be used to build 'a narrative history...through which to view what is to be understood and explained'. (Hallam, 1998:32)

3.7.2 Methodological issues

Barakat, Chard et al (2002) identify four key methodological issues that present particular difficulties for the researcher in conflict situations. The first is that of gaining access. Negotiating access to information, to research settings and to respondents is a sensitive activity in setting up any social research. In the context of armed conflict, the process of gaining trust and securing access to sources of reliable information is beset by many obstacles. Some of these are essentially practical but from a methodological point of view, the main concerns are with neutrality and

⁶ For example, this was one of the main theses of the recent symposium 'Celebrating Classic Sociology: Pioneers of Contemporary British Qualitative Research' which brought together many leading social researchers at the University of Essex in July 2001.

representation. Understanding an armed conflict requires access to all the groups involved in or affected by it but for those engaged in armed conflict, neutrality is difficult to accept. Access to one group is often bought at the expense of denial of access to their opponents. It is often extremely difficult to even identify truly representative informants. Many people disguise their identities or claim leadership or spokesperson status that they do not in fact enjoy while some vulnerable groups remain deliberately invisible under threat of reprisal or a general fear of strangers. The methodological challenge is to find ways to mitigate and compensate for these often severe limitations to access.

The second problem is in achieving a valid sample. In any research the credibility of the results depends on the criteria and procedures for selecting what is to be studied. The instability of populations and conditions in war-torn contexts are such that any plan that relies, for example, on a fixed sampling frame for the purposes of selecting a random sample is unlikely to be reliable and is more often simply not feasible. Selection of settings for qualitative research are often conditioned more by what is practically possible (in terms of access and security) than a theoretical analysis of their typicality and selection of further case studies is similarly constrained.⁷ Even within the chosen research setting, clear categorising of the different population groups, stakeholders and belligerents for the purposes of sampling can be difficult for the reasons discussed above. The challenge is to not to abandon all criteria but to develop strategies to identify and mitigate the consequences of the inevitable (that is certain, not uncertain) gaps and failures.

The third concern lies with the need to generalize, which as we have seen is a key objective of impact research to fulfil the *policy/strategy* purpose of evaluation. In war contexts, the researcher may succeed in gaining privileged access to intense human experiences of particular groups of actors⁸ but the experience of the same conflict by other groups in even in the same location can be so radically different that generating general hypotheses from case studies is extremely problematic. While 'there is no reason in principle why case study research should not provide the basis for empirical generalization... It is important to recognize that the greater the heterogeneity of a

⁷ As in the case of Nordstrom's 'runway anthropology' conditioned by the destination of relief supply planes which were the only means of access to small rural towns in Mozambique (1995)

⁸ Such as the remarkable study by French anthropologist, Christian Geffray of the experience of the armed conflict amongst the Erati people in two districts of northern Mozambique during the civil war which also engulfed all the many other ethnic and social groups in the country for sixteen years. Although he had worked for three years with this small population before it was affected by the war, which facilitated access and cultural understanding, the fieldwork for this study was an intense time sample of one month. (Geffray, 1991)

population the more problematic are empirical generalizations based on a single case'. Ideally the study of one case should be related to others selected on the basis of theoretical criteria or to ' a substantial body of relevant secondary data' about the general population of which it is a part. (Gomm et al. 2000:104-105) In conditions of war, none of these options can be applied with any rigor and yet the ability to generalise is no less crucial to the purposes of research in armed conflict than to research in non-violent contexts.

Finally, there is the issue of recognising and mitigating bias, which is central to the validity of any research exercise but presents a greater degree of difficulty in war-torn contexts. Clearly the risk of bias is inherent in the difficulties in gaining access, sampling and attempting to generalise discussed above, but the most critical sources of bias when researching in areas of violent conflict occur at the interface between the researcher and the researched at the field work level where the potential for misconception and mistrust, (cultural bias and reactivity) is exacerbated. There are also some commonly used research techniques, which simply cannot be employed with research subjects encountered in these conditions. Generally speaking, it is the more structured and formal approaches, which are likely to provoke suspicion and rejection of the researcher, which adds to the difficulty of conducting, for example, any kind of quantitative survey. Traumatized individuals do not readily give coherent or complete accounts of their lives. Even routine factual information of the type listed at the beginning of so many survey forms, such as where they were born or live can be problematic, especially in answer to direct questions from strangers. They are more often moved to communicate fragments from their past unsolicited, in moments of trust one to one with an individual who is perceived as posing no threat.

The motivation of the respondents to cooperate honestly with the researcher is also influenced by what they perceive as the researcher's intentions or potential usefulness. That is they may mistrust the aims and credibility of the process, or they may seek to use it for their own material or propaganda purposes. In either case, the information they give may be false or incomplete.⁹

⁹ Hallam's example of 'Talking to beneficiaries' during the war in Mozambique (1998:77) appears to the author to be a case in point. In a rapid rural appraisal exercise for a 'few days' with one community one finding was the statement 'school rehabilitation, strongly promoted by the government was not supported by the local population' who gave priority to school books and teachers. In fact government policy and practice coincided with this community's, as with many others', priorities, it was the donors who were more anxious to spend money on cement than teachers. Either this was an untypical community with a particular local problem or, like others, they were looking for a euphemistic way to make a protest.

Maintaining a constant vigilance and sensitivity to multiple sources of bias and devising ways to reduce or counter them is the principal challenge for fieldwork in the context of war.

3.7.3 Ethical concerns

When researching devastated and vulnerable individuals and societies involved in destructive conflict, a minimal moral obligation is to ensure that the research should not do any harm by abusing the time and energies of vulnerable people, exacerbating local tensions, raising expectations of immediate material assistance or causing further psychological damage¹⁰. There is also a moral responsibility for how information may be used once it is in the public domain. Respondents may be vulnerable to violent reprisals and the nature of their experiences, even if they are able to communicate them in private, may destroy fragile identities if revealed in public.

However in the face of extreme mass suffering, the moral obligation goes beyond merely doing no harm. It is not morally justifiable in such situations to conduct research which does not aim in some sense to benefit the researched population and in such a way that they are aware of that benefit. Often there may be a social benefit in telling their story to some one who is willing and able to listen. Many respondents also perceive a moral benefit in helping the researcher to understand what happened, in order to set the record straight or to contribute knowledge that may prevent others suffering in the same way. Fully participatory research, where the results are at the disposal of the groups and communities involved, as a resource for their own use, may contribute to restoring their formal or informal institutional capacity.

A particularly difficult moral issue is that of neutrality (in addition to the methodological problems for access and representative sampling discussed above). Is neutrality in the name of objective investigation always morally tenable? Is it even possible for the researcher in all honesty to suspend moral judgement that may colour his or her analysis? The better course may be to self-critically examine and declare a moral standpoint, as part of a wider discourse analysis rather than leaving it as a submerged assumption.

¹⁰ Children in Afghanistan and Tajikistan for example, suffered damaging effects when pressed for oral history accounts of their experiences (Sellek, P. 2000) and victims of rape in Croatia interviewed by journalists and researchers'...are raped again' (Olujic 1995:197).

These many moral concerns surrounding the conduct of research in armed conflict are one of the key constraints that may oblige the researcher to reject those research strategies that seem most appropriate from a methodological and theoretical point of view and try to meet research criteria by less conventional means.

3.8 Conclusions for impact evaluation in war-torn societies

Turning now to the issue of research for impact evaluations in war-torn societies, it is true that this must normally take place some time after any intervention and normally in the wake of the events that prompted it. In these more stable conditions, the research environment is more akin to other development situations, except for two points. First that the contemporary documentation required for secondary research (public records, project evaluations etc.) was collected during armed conflict and subjected to its disruptive effects described above. This means that any surviving data sets may have been partially destroyed, or inconsistently maintained or be very limited in scope. In addition, the political and social context, which led to their design, may also have been so radically transformed as to limit their relevance for understanding post-war conditions. For example, huge demographic shifts may make reference to base-line data in a particular location irrelevant when the original population has been replaced by a different composition of ethnic or economic groups. Secondly, the informants approached to cooperate in a retrospective reflection and evaluation of the intervention, are still living with the imprint of violent events, which may affect how they remember the past. In addition, due to differential survival rates, they may not be representative of the original target group. Both of these factors require the researcher to understand and be able to evaluate the sources of bias inherent in these situations.

The principal challenges affecting impact evaluation research in war-affected countries can thus be defined as follows:

- Differential survival and rapid and unpredictable changes result in data gaps and inconsistencies. As a result, even if baseline data sets exist, they are even less likely than in societies with political stability and social continuity, to relate to many of the most significant factors for evaluating impact.
- The sensitivity of issues and the drama and trauma of events, make it difficult for those involved to examine certain subjects critically or put events into perspective, especially in the immediate aftermath of violent conflict. Thus taboos on open discussion can constitute a

limitation on retrospective evaluation by recipient stakeholders to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the social issues concerned and how central they were to the conflict.¹¹

- Individual interventions during and in the immediate aftermath of a war are often interrupted and uncoordinated. As a result, their impact on subsequent social development is cumulative, indirect and not easily attributable

These factors actually reinforce the points made above in respect of the evaluation of the impact of aid in general:

- a) the crucial evidence has to come mainly from personal recall (despite its limitations) due to the scarcity of relevant baseline information. That is, a present-day judgement or perspective is sought on a historical process.
- b) a reflective process well after the events is required. A mainly qualitative and participatory methodology has to be developed to achieve this but it will be enhanced by the use of other complementary methods, which the particular context may allow.
- c) a coverage of a broad spectrum of inputs to a particular area of social development is appropriate.

These conclusions as to the challenges to impact evaluation in war-torn contexts, and for the general approach to impact evaluation, were taken as the basis for developing a research strategy to examine the impact of capacity building on the post-war development and governance of social institutions, which is the subject of the following chapter.

¹¹ For example, according to Hallam (1998:21) The term 'complex emergency' was coined in Mozambique' to avoid reference to 'civil war' and 'conflict' while recognising that 'humanitarian assistance needs were being generated by armed conflict' combined with 'natural disasters'. So, nearly ten years after the end of that war, the Prime Minister, Pascoal Mucumbi, speaking in a debate on education in the national parliament in reply to a question by the RENAMO opposition on the number of children still without school places, referred to the well-attested destruction of schools by RENAMO only obliquely, saying 'the war of destabilisation' destroyed 50% of the primary schools existing in 1983 (Mozambique News Agency AIM Report No. 231 May 7th 2002).

CHAPTER 4.

THE METHODOLOGY:

TRANSLATING THEORY INTO PRACTICE

Introduction

In the previous chapters, we have looked at our understanding of the capacity of individuals and institutions and how interventions have been made to strengthen the capacity of those affected by destitution and violence. We have then realised that the way we evaluate these efforts does not tell us what the lasting impact of these interventions has been. There is a problem in making a direct causal link between specific interventions and changes perceived many years later, and yet our instinct has been to assume a connection. At the end of the last chapter we established three principles that could lead us to a practical methodology for evaluating long-term impact. First, the main evidence will have to be from the personal recall of individuals exposed to the interventions. Second, this reflective process has to take place well after the events. Third, the cumulative effects of a range of interventions across a whole sector of social development is the appropriate scope for such a study.

Some practical lessons were also drawn on how to approach evaluative research in war-torn contexts. The need to establish criteria of value by means of 'participatory enquiry' but at the same time to compensate for the gaps and distortions in the data from such environments, by adopting a composite methodology and choosing research instruments that do not rely on random sampling, which requires stable sampling frames. The study would therefore adopt a descriptive rather than prescriptive strategy with the intention of deriving lessons for future practice from the analysis of the reality discovered.

It was from this starting point that the researcher set out to develop and test a practical strategy to answer the question "How can we evaluate long term impact?" The result was a research design which, when implemented, produced the kind of testimony and secondary data that it was believed could enable us to answer the theoretical question behind the research, whether capacity building interventions can be demonstrated to contribute to good governance and sustainable recovery from

war, as it is assumed they do. This chapter takes the reader through that process from first thoughts to final outcomes.

4.1 Reviewing the options

The first consideration was to review what it would be appropriate to study. Some rather specific criteria had already been established. Contexts to be studied had to be in societies that had experienced both war and significant inputs to capacity building and institutional development followed by demonstrable sustained recovery. The research could not therefore be carried out in the immediate aftermath of a war but only when a society had reached a point where reflection is possible and cumulative diffused impact might be evident. On the other hand it still had to be possible to reach a sample of individuals able to recall it.

The author had had the case of the education sector in Mozambique in mind and ten years after the end of the civil war it looked like a strong candidate, but one would normally expect to verify the findings of one case with comparative studies of others. The view is that a single intensive study of one case (case study) exploring and comparing different perspectives can establish with an acceptable degree of certainty that a particular correlation is causal, but many would argue, only in that particular case. Most would therefore agree that a generally applicable 'causal attribution necessarily depends on comparative analysis' (Gomm, Hammersley and Foster, 2000:239). That is, the comparison between a representative sample of similar cases either by analytic or enumerative induction or a combination of these methods or failing these by secondary analysis of previous research (especially if raw data is archived). However, there are considerable methodological difficulties inherent in trying to both find and reliably investigate the range and number of cases necessary to test any hypothesis. It may be that case studies 'capture strong possibilities rather than deterministic or even probabilistic outcomes', nevertheless, the comparative case study approach remains the best option in most cases (op.cit.106-108,250).

However, having chosen to study a very large entity (MINED) over a long period of time, the question arose whether, from a practical point of view, one researcher could carry out research in sufficient depth to address the research question in say two completely unknown cultures as well as the one familiar one. The researcher decided to explore the validity of tackling the issue through a single in depth case study of the education sector in Mozambique.

Eckstein (2000) makes the case for specifically excluding from the general principle of carrying out comparative studies, what he calls 'macropolitics'. That is, the study of the behaviour of nations and large institutions. It is arguable that the issue of aid partnerships for institution building for the purpose of *good governance* comes into this category. Eckstein's view is that in these cases there is no possibility to carry out reliable comparative studies for two reasons: first that it is highly unlikely that even two sufficiently similar and contemporary cases can be found, let alone a representative sample; more importantly, he argues that the special cultural understanding necessary for the study of such large and complex units is difficult to acquire in respect of one case and impossible for any researcher to achieve for many cases. (Eckstein, 2000:150-151). This leads to the conclusion that international comparative studies cannot investigate complex theories of social causes without being hopelessly compromised by cross-cultural bias and/or superficiality.

His solution is what he calls a *crucial study*, a study of a case, which is selected, not for its typicality (which, as we have seen, is difficult to demonstrate in macropolitics) but for its explanatory value. That is, because it is either 'most likely' or 'least likely' to validate a given theory. His contention is that a single case study can invalidate a theory if it is found inapplicable to that case. If the theory is applicable, on the other hand, strong probability, rather than proof is the outcome. Nevertheless, it has more value for empirical prediction than any other method in these circumstances.

4.2 Research Design

Coming then to the research topic under investigation, the following analysis first examines three critical methodological questions in the light of Eckstein's arguments:

- Does the donor assumption of a causal relationship between capacity building, governance and recovery amount to a theory capable of being tested?
- Is this investigation within the field of 'macropolitics' and if it is, do the reservations about comparative studies apply?
- Is Mozambique (and the Ministry of Education within it) a crucial case that can test the theory of a causal relationship between capacity building governance and recovery?

Then on the basis of the results of this analysis, a research strategy is outlined.

4.2.1 Assumption or theory?

An assumption is defined as: 'Taking of anything for granted as the basis of argument' 'a supposition' (a supposition being 'something held to be true and taken as the basis of an argument') (OED: 112 and 2087). It is by its nature implicit rather than explicit, since it is believed to be self-evident or self-explanatory. A theory on the other hand is '... A scheme or system of ideas... a hypothesis that has been confirmed or established by observation or experiment and is propounded or accepted as accounting for the known facts;...' (OED: 2167).

For social scientists a theory is '... an integrated system of hypotheses put forward to conceptualize and explain a particular class of phenomena' (Jupp and Miller,1989:35) or it is interchangeable with a 'model' as : 'an attempt to conceptualize some aspects of the world and to put forward a causal mechanism by which the concepts are related' (Open University, 1989: Block 1:96). A theory is then a set of ideas that has been explicitly formulated and stated and then subjected to scrutiny and comparison with observed facts in order to explain them.


As has already been discussed the international aid agencies' assertion of the importance of capacity building and institutional development interventions for post-war recovery is apparently based on the notion that intervention of a certain type (capacity building) can reverse a negative downward trend towards social and economic disintegration by developing good governance. However, while individual components have been explicitly stated (as for example in Edralin's assertion that 'capacity building correlates with good governance and capacity building is the main pillar' (1997: 111) the whole framework remains implicit and unchallenged in most discussion of post-war recovery. It is therefore essentially a set of assumptions used not to explain, but more commonly to envision desirable outcomes and so justify certain actions.

On the other hand, while no one has set out to test these assumptions, they are based on a considerable body of circumstantial evidence contained in the evaluations of capacity building and institutional development activities (not withstanding their limitations discussed above), in the empirical experience of practitioners and in exploratory research into the causes of conflict and social deprivation. It does therefore have the makings of a plausible theory based on observation, if not rigorous testing. It is what Pawson and Tilley describe as 'the policy-maker's overarching

program theory' based on 'notions' of 'how the program will generate benefits'. The intervention itself can then 'be construed as a conjecture. The evaluation is a test of it'. (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:202).

The international aid agencies' 'notion' is thus a rather simple linear model¹:

Figure 2. Simple linear model




The whole scheme, though now made explicit, is obviously still far too unfocussed and begs questions such as: Where? For whom? In what conditions? A theory needs to be both explicit and tightly defined if it is to be testable (Eckstein, 2000:148). In other words are there not some other intervening factors (variables)? The crucial relationships that need to be tested are the three links in the chain: the supposed causal links between capacity building, good governance and sustained post-war recovery and development, because it is on these assumptions that capacity building and institutional development are implemented but they cannot be treated as occurring in a vacuum.

One immediate problem is that no possible interaction with other contributing variables is acknowledged. Capacity building may be necessary but is it sufficient for achieving good governance? What other conditions may be necessary? Good governance could be essential for sustainable post-war recovery and development but is it sufficient by itself?

A more realistic model might be that shown in Figure 3.

¹ Independent variable: capacity building; intervening variable: good governance; dependent variable (outcome): sustained post-war recovery.

Figure 3. Linear model with contributing variables




However this is unwieldy and there is a further problem, the assumption that the sequence of causation is linear from capacity building to good governance to recovery. The possibility that the reverse may occur or that the three variables may simultaneously reinforce each other has not been entertained. A correlation has been observed and interpreted as a simple sequence of causation, or as Pawson and Tilley describe it, a 'successionist' concept of causation. As discussed in chapter 3, they suggest that when seeking to evaluate the impact of a particular intervention (programme) in a particular social context a 'generative' concept of causation is more appropriate, since it accounts for the interaction between the intervention and the social context with its various stakeholders. Applying this logic and using their basic model (Figure 4.) we can represent the 'notion' to be tested thus:

In the time (T1) before the interventions (for capacity building) a number of mechanisms (M1) (such as illiteracy or lack of experience,) are interacting in a violent post-colonial and post-war context (C1) with the will and aspirations of individuals and affecting the incidence (rate or regularity R1) of the desired 'outcome pattern' of good governance and sustained development (O). The effect of intervening over time (T2) to develop capacity through education (M2) is to reduce

the effects of M1 and increase the incidence of good governance and development in a transformed context (C2) of peace.

Figure 4. A generative model of change



Based on Pawson and Tilley figure 3.8 1997:74

This concept recognises that ' Programs are always introduced *into* pre-existing social contexts and ...these prevailing social conditions are of crucial importance when it comes to explaining the successes and failures of social programs'. They also note that while interventions may be made in organisations such as prisons, hospitals or schools, 'it is the prior set of social rules, norms, values and interrelationships gathered in these places' (the rule-based institutions discussed in Chapter 1) 'which sets limits on the efficacy of program mechanisms.' (Pawson and Tilley, 1997:70) Later (op.cit.:114) they conclude that 'Outcomes only follow when particular mechanisms have been triggered in particular contexts and *they will only reveal themselves when an investigation has traced them through the same pathway*'. [emphasis added]. This last recognition has important implications for designing a research strategy to test our core assumption.

The next question, given the long history of basing actions on this concept without attempting to verify it by research, is, can it be reliably tested? After all if it were methodologically possible, surely it would have been done.

4.2.2 Macropolitical theory? How can it be tested?

If we accept that Figure 4 represents a possible model of the effects of a particular type of (usually) international intervention on the social development of war-torn nations, then it must certainly fall

within the category of 'macropolitical' research, which deals with the behaviour of nations and large institutions. Eckstein contends that this field of research is the exception to the rule that social theories should be tested by comparative studies, precisely because of the insurmountable methodological difficulties. He first of all points out that 'Samples of macropolitical units are always likely to be poor and highly uncertain in result' because few contemporary cases exist for direct comparison and access to even these can be restricted by political and logistical circumstances. Added to that is the variable quality and lack of compatibility of quantitative data sets. These problems alone lead to compromises in case sampling and data collection, which compromise the reliability of the results. However a much bigger 'problem in comparative research involves special knowledge of the cultures being studied'. That is, "social facts", personal or collective, are embedded in widely varying, even in each case unique, cultural systems of meaning and value'. This imposes the need to acquire, or already possess ' a great deal of cultural *Verstehen*' in respect of any case studied. Acquiring this level of social knowledge for each of a representative sample of large complex macropolitical cases is impossible to achieve. Attempting it can only result in compromised validity. (Eckstein, 2000:150-151).

If we now apply this reasoning to the research hypothesis outlined above, it is clear that in addition to the problems of finding enough representative cases, gaining comparable access and finding reliable data (all of which are infinitely more difficult in war-torn societies than those that remain stable over long periods of time), this particular study requires retrospective historical analysis in an attempt to explain the present. In the absence of predetermined indicators or data sets designed to answer the research questions² such a study must rely on the perceptions and testimony of those who lived through the events to interpret such records and data sets as survive. The 'understanding' required of a researcher in this case has not only to include existing cultural meanings but try to reconstruct meanings attached to processes and events in the past. Achieving this in respect of one society is a daunting task and impossible to realise fully. It is inconceivable to attempt it in a sufficient number of cases to test a theory by comparative study.

Even if it was determined now for all future capacity building interventions to set up longitudinal studies to monitor their impact, for example to chart the post-war development of Afghanistan, it would be impossible to set up a recording system that covered all the aspects that may prove to be

² This issue was discussed above in Chapter 3

significant ten years from now, which is when we could hope to glean some answers. It would also be extremely costly, and the Afghans and their donor partners, might understandably have little patience for such an apparently academic exercise in the face of so many other pressing priorities.

It is presumably these problems of method, cost and priorities that have led the international aid community to rely on their intuition on this issue and continue to support capacity building as if its worth had been reliably proved. Would it be prudent to adopt the same response or is there some way of tackling the problem? Eckstein suggests that there is one particular method the *crucial case* study that can overcome these difficulties: 'Inquiry into macropolitical units involves problems of scale and of sound comparison that point strongly toward crucial case study as the preferable method' (Eckstein, 2000:149).

His guidelines for recognising a crucial case for testing a particular theory include: that the case is chosen, not because it is typical (this is generally impossible to prove due to the problems of comparative analysis discussed above) but because it appears to 'closely fit' the theory and cannot be shown to fit equally well any rule that contradicts the theory.³ In order to assess this 'fit' the researcher must already possess sufficient understanding of the context and culture of the unit to be studied to make that judgement. His practical suggestion for identifying a crucial case is to determine whether it is 'most likely' to validate the theory or 'least likely' to validate it. In operationalizing the theory the attempt will then be to falsify the theory. Falsifying a 'most likely' case disproves the theory, while falsifying a 'least likely' case strongly confirms it. Validating a 'most likely' or a 'least likely' case however, can only confirm a strong probability that the theory is true, which in the end is usually the best result that can be achieved in social research. (Eckstein, 2000: 148-149).⁴

So how should we choose a crucial case to test the research hypothesis outlined above? The ideal case might be a 'least likely' case: an example of good governance apparently occurring without capacity building or sustained recovery and development without good governance would disprove the hypothesis but either would be difficult to find. As we have seen the circumstantial evidence is against it occurring. Is there a developing or war-affected country, which has not implemented capacity building programmes with at least some external inputs? Is there a regime characterised as

³ This is similar to Pawson and Tilley's arguments against a search for 'typicality' in favour of 'theory-driven data collection'. (1997:119-121, 155)

⁴ Schofield has a similar concept that of investigating a case at 'the leading edge' of change (Gomm et al 2000:107)

manifesting 'poor governance' which has achieved stable social and economic development without capacity building? While some dictatorial regimes (whose governance was perceived to be 'poor' in most aspects) have been remarkably stable by relying on severely restricting capacity even within the privileged elite, (Salazar Regime in Portugal, Franco's Spain, Banda in Malawi) they have either not survived the death of the dictator or eventually broken down under the social conflict generated by lack of economic and social development for the majority of their citizens.

As we saw above (4.1) there are more candidates for being 'most likely' to fit the theory, though still too few to sustain reliable comparison. However, it seems that if the theory is to be tested by a crucial case it is this type that we should select while bearing in mind that it cannot do more than establish a strong probability that the key causal relationships exist if found to validate the theory. If it is falsified to the extent that the simple causal relationship is disproved and a modified explanation for the correlation is found, the result may still provide a more reliable basis for planning assistance for social recovery. In the (on present evidence, unlikely) case of the hypothesis being totally falsified, of course, the edifice of donor assumptions would collapse like a pack of cards.

4.2.3 A 'most likely' crucial case?

Following Eckstein's guidelines for recognising a crucial case, the first condition is that it has to be one that is understood in some depth, over time by the researcher, which is why the Ministry of Education in Mozambique (MINED) was confirmed as the candidate at this point. The researcher first worked during the civil war from 1983-1989 in the National Directorate of Adult Education in the Ministry of Education. The main function of the Directorate was of course, capacity building and the researcher's role in that context was supporting the professional development of its staff at all levels. The researcher worked for a second period in Mozambique from 1992-1998 (the period covering the preparation and implementation of post-war recovery strategies) this time employed by donor agencies in bi-lateral capacity building programmes with provincial public administrations, especially education services and in the appraisal (at various stages of its development and at different levels of the service) of the education sector strategy plan. While the experience and understanding of any outsider observing events affecting a community whose culture and history she does not share is necessarily limited and biased, it is considered that the long periods of contact and close collaboration within the institution at all levels and in most areas of the country afford

sufficient insight to assess the suitability of the case for testing the research hypothesis. The researcher also had the advantage of being able to conduct the research in the working language of the institution, Portuguese.

The second consideration was to assess whether the case did in fact 'closely fit' the theory and could reasonably be expected to validate it. That is whether it is in fact a 'most likely' case for confirming the validity of the hypothesis: *capacity building leads to good governance, which ensures sustained post-war recovery and development*. A detailed study of the creation and development of the Ministry of Education through nearly three decades in the context of war and recovery from war is the main subject of the following chapter and forms part of the research strategy for testing the hypothesis, so at this point it is sufficient to simply outline the researcher's understanding of the main components of that history, which are considered to justify its selection as a crucial case for this investigation. (Appendix 1 also gives a chronology of the key events in the modern history of Mozambique.)

The Ministry of Education was created by the first independent government of Mozambique formed by the nationalist guerrilla movement FRELIMO after ten years of war against the colonial power, Portugal. The new government was acutely aware of the lack of capacity to manage the affairs of the nation at all levels of society resulting from the exclusion of more than 90% of the indigenous population from education and career opportunities during colonial rule. Redressing this deficit was a central plank of their post-independence policy and one of the main demands of the public. However, the deficit was so great that external technical assistance was immediately invited to tackle the problem. Agencies such as UNESCO provided advisors to assist in the creation of the Ministry of Education and foreign technical staff (known as 'cooperantes') were recruited individually and through bi-lateral agreement with (mainly) socialist or non-aligned countries, in some cases to fill crucial administrative gaps while Mozambicans took up overseas scholarships or followed part-time courses, but mainly to shadow inexperienced and unqualified Mozambican staff at all levels of the public services and industry as a capacity building strategy.

Meanwhile, the country was still at war, supporting the Zimbabwean forces against the settler regime in their country and allowing ANC units a base from which to organise resistance to the Apartheid regime in South Africa. By 1980 civil war had also broken out in central Mozambique. As discussed in the following chapter, the internal causes of this conflict have been attributed to

both a legacy of unequal development and repression by the colonial power and failures of governance by the new government both by omission and by abuses of power. Whatever the precise nature of these internal difficulties, there is no doubt that they were exploited by their external enemies in the region and used in the proxy struggles of the cold war.

By the mid 1980s, the war affected the whole country, which was in a state of economic collapse. This was the start of what Hanlon calls the 'aid invasion' (1991:54). The bulk of this aid, for another decade consisted of humanitarian relief, but a strong component of capacity building was maintained and even incorporated in the relief operations themselves (Barnes,1998)

In October 1992, after a lengthy process of negotiation, a peace accord was signed by the armed opposition movement, RENAMO and the government. From there on the progress of recovery from the war is widely considered successful and after nearly a decade, sustained: three peaceful democratic general elections have been held; despite some bitter disputes neither party has reneged on the basic commitment to the terms of the accord; economic recovery has also been outstanding, with growth in excess of 10%; public institutions, notably the Ministry of Education have successfully developed and implemented internally generated sector strategy plans to develop and expand public services.

It is clear from this brief historical outline that the emphasis on capacity building by the government and its donor partners stemmed from a belief that it would improve the quality of governance and the post-war development of the country. This makes it highly plausible that the high priority given to building the capacity of both the general public and public servants was a significant contributory factor in that recovery, difficult though it may be to trace the interaction of this mechanism within the context of a country torn apart by war and relate it to present outcomes. Nevertheless, the basic premises of the hypothesis, that capacity building contributes to good governance and that good governance underpins sustained recovery and development does still appear to be a plausible, if oversimplified, explanation for the sequence of events described above, and for this reason, the Ministry of Education in Mozambique (1975-2000) can be considered as a *crucial case* for testing that plausibility.

4.3 Operationalizing the design: research strategies.

Having opted for the crucial case study as the vehicle for testing the hypothesis, the next step involved applying the logic of Pawson and Tilley's model to it. That is the research would have to be able to study not only capacity building interventions and supposed outcomes but also the social context into which they were introduced, particularly the nature of the interaction between the interventions and their subjects. The criteria established in the study of approaches to long-term impact evaluation discussed above were also going to be essential to the design of a practical strategy for studying the impact of capacity building on the development and governance of the Ministry of Education and the wider Mozambican society retrospectively over this long period of time.

This led to the design and operationalization of the research strategy. The results of the research presented in the following chapters demonstrate that the strategy was highly successful in obtaining a large quantity of relevant first hand qualitative data, basic statistical data, and an equally large quantity of secondary material which were first analysed separately and then comparatively in an application of the composite research approach described in Chapter 3. The rest of this chapter is devoted to tracing how and why the research strategy was developed in this way and defining its strengths and limitations as a reflexive process for this research but also with the aim of considering its replicability in other contexts.

4.3.1 The general approach

It was clear from the above analysis, that although there is strong circumstantial evidence for the relationship between capacity building, good governance and the recovery of social institutions in Mozambique, the exact interaction of these three variables and full range and complexity of factors affecting that relationship are far from being defined. In addition, although some reliable contemporary records exist, reaching an understanding of the impact of capacity building over time would depend largely on retrospective evaluation by those directly involved. For this reason, although some quantitative data was analysed, the research strategy adopted was essentially qualitative and cumulative

This was clearly going to involve collecting the reflections of Mozambicans on their experience in education from the creation of the Ministry of Education in 1975 to the present and as such would constitute a form of oral history or retrospective survey. Paul Thompson in his classic analysis of the methods and applications of oral history, describes its role in revealing social conditions and processes that are rarely documented, for example, 'the political attitudes and personal lives of the more typical unknown activists and equally of the unorganised, quiescent majority of the population' (2000:94). Amongst the unrecorded (because often illiterate and/or powerless) populations, whose role in history has been revealed by oral testimony, he refers to the growing use of oral history in recovering the experiences of colonialism and post-colonial development by peoples in Africa and other developing countries. He concludes that 'Oral evidence, by transforming the 'objects' of study into 'subjects', makes for a history which is not just richer, more vivid and heart-rending, but *truer*'. In his following chapter, he tempers this enthusiasm by giving some useful practical advice on the nature of retrospective oral testimony, not only its strengths but its pitfalls and limitations.

He first of all points out the partial nature of documentary evidence: it is both fragmentary and created for particular administrative and personal purposes, mostly by the privileged and powerful, and this applies equally to the collection of social statistics. All these sources represent 'the *social perception* of facts; and are ...subject to social pressures from the contexts in which they are obtained' (ibid.124) Again this accords with experiences in war-torn contexts discussed in Chapter3 above. Oral history therefore provides a vital counterbalance as suggested by the composite approach. But, as Thompson goes on to describe, it too has its limitations, particularly due to its generally retrospective nature. This has to do with what we know of the workings of memory, especially the 'process of discarding' which research has shown is highest in the first nine months after events, though thereafter very slight. In fact after the initial loss of much detail, accuracy in retrospective interviewing is found to *increase* over time as general recall remains accurate and the need to hide that recall diminishes. This bodes well for the use of retrospective recollections as evidence of long past and contested events, but there are other factors at work. Research by Halbwachs, for example, demonstrates that memory is collective as well as individual, that is, particular social groups tend to share perceptions and interpretations of past events. As already stated, traumatic events have particular distorting effects on recall and in every case the context in which remembering takes place, including for example, the presence of a stranger as interlocutor or the presence (or authority if absent) of other members of a family or social group and the location

(home, workplace etc.) all influence what is recalled and how it is expressed. However if these issues are taken into account in the way the research is carried out and analysed, comparison between oral history interviews, contemporary reports and statistical data in a number of social history studies has demonstrated 'that the retrospective survey can provide social information which in its broad divisions is reliable' (Thompson op.cit. 130-145).

The second concept that underpins the research design is that of 'cumulation' as defined by Pawson and Tilley in their study of evaluation: '(C)umulation is a matter of deepening, specifying, focussing and formalising our understanding of program *mechanisms, contexts and outcome patterns*...a matter of increasing understanding of how these elements are connected' and 'will thus often involve *weaving the results of other forms of empirical research into the evaluation cycle*'. They contend that cumulation differs from traditional approaches to generalization for the purpose of transfer of learning from one case to another (a common objective of evaluation) because it is concerned with 'theory development' not 'understanding the *typicality*' of a case. 'We move from one case to another, not because *they* are descriptively similar, but because *we* have ideas that can encompass them both.' (1997:116-119) This approach seemed to accommodate both the choice of a 'crucial' (but not necessarily typical) case for study and the need to understand the relationship between observed and recorded phenomena such as the quantitative development of the Ministry of Education, the provision of capacity building support by donors and features of post-war governance with a view to developing a theory that can encompass the diversity of other post-war contexts. However, in looking at the 'prospects of retrospective cumulation' through 'meta-evaluation' they find this has proved unsatisfactory due to the 'raw materials' ... 'the difficulty being that the quasi-experimental evaluations ordinarily used... are... very poorly placed to provide the vital explanatory clues.' (op.cit. 148-9) This too reinforced the need to look for those explanations in the retrospective perceptions of those who experienced the events. They describe how this was operationalized in research into an adult education programme conducted in prisons, which began with a period of 'theory development derived from qualitative investigation in which educators were interviewed to elicit realistic theories on program mechanisms...These 'folk theories' were then used to interrogate a range of data' acquired from other sources (op.cit. 1997: 87-88).

Finally like Thompson, they list the limitations of the approach (in fact limitations that apply to any social enquiry). First, people 'create and recreate their social worlds' and 'are able...to act

reflectively.' This puts limitations on the 'predictability of future conditions, for these conditions are the creation of social actors'. Secondly, 'Change is endemic.' External events '...political...or even climatic sources can subvert (or enhance) the mechanism firing potential of a program. Context for action are thus intrinsically uncertain. ' Thirdly 'any particular program is embedded in an almost infinite range of assumptions about how the social world works.' We may conclude that program outcomes depend on a range of preconditions but 'None of this can ever be fully articulated, yet the operation of any program is ultimately dependent on it.' These caveats are once again a warning against the blueprint approach to transfer of knowledge from one context to another and 'cumulation is not a matter of discovering the immutable, timeless laws of social programming' but of finding 'a family of answers' and 'the means of passing on this further accumulation of knowledge to the next generation of initiatives'.

4.3.2 Putting it into practice

Armed with these ideas and accumulated experience of empirical research in education contexts in Mozambique, the researcher conceived an outline strategy that was to involve three main data collection methods.

1. Study of secondary sources

The first was the study of a variety of documentary sources such as the evaluation reports and other documentation produced by donors, the public records and databases of the Ministry of Education, published academic literature with particular emphasis on Mozambican sources; a contemporary press review as well as some archive material. Some analysis of this type of data in advance of and during fieldwork, was necessary for similar reasons to those outlined for its use in criminology by Fielding (2001). That is it can fill gaps where the researched population may be 'illusory or disturbed' (as can be the case with post-war societies, but also with any attempt to contact participants in historical processes retrospectively). He also suggests that it avoids 'unnecessary exposure', of the researcher to risk, but it could equally well be seen to reduce the exposure of the respondents to the researcher's questioning by establishing a factual narrative of events in advance and using the time they can make available to fill gaps, seek corroboration and solicit interpretation. The researcher is 'asking well-informed questions, placing the subject in a position to give even better-informed replies.' (Pawson and Tilley 1997:182)

2. Individual semi-structured interviews

The second and most important research strategy, was to be individual interviews with a sample of Mozambican respondents selected on a quota sample basis (see below) and a small sample of key person interviews with donor representatives. These were to be conducted using 'cue' questions (Davies 1997:146-8) to initiate a discussion by the respondent of his or her views of the aims and expectations (public and personal) and actual outcomes of capacity building at different stages of the period of study. The interview approach was to be more focussed than the oral history tradition described by Paul Thompson, (though taking note of his lessons about the nature of retrospective evidence discussed above) because its purpose was more specific, that of policy evaluation. In this regard the 'teacher-learner' strategy of Pawson and Tilley, in which 'The interviewer teaches the subject ...what the interview is designed to find out.'(1997: 167-176) seemed to offer an approach that would cast the respondent in the role of participant, consistent with the 'participatory enquiry' concept of evaluation discussed in Chapter3. In this scenario the researcher would set the topics but leave the participants to decide how to handle them.

3. Interactive workshops

The third idea was to hold workshops bringing together groups of Mozambican participants in a series of interactive exercises and debates focussed on issues of change and the impact of change (Roche 1999:235). The intention was to be able to compare collective and individual responses, bearing in mind that these are known to produce different results (Thompson 2000:140). The number size, and location of these workshops was to be determined by the availability of the participants as discussed and negotiated in the initial stage of the research. In the event this method was first of all modified to consist of a series of small group discussions and then abandoned on advice from key informants except for one focussed group discussion with parents. The majority of education staff are doing second jobs and making time for any meetings beside their regular staff meetings is extremely difficult, even when they are motivated to do so. In addition, Mozambican colleagues felt that this approach was closely associated with donor projects and would be likely to create problems of reactivity.

4.3.3 Refining the strategy

It was to eliminate these kinds of problems by developing a research approach with Mozambican participation that the researcher then carried out an exploratory phase of research before making the final plans for the main study. This time was used to gauge what it would be possible to carry out

successfully in order to abandon risky or impractical approaches, as well as to explore and refine the issues, choosing appropriate instruments and procedures for their study. The researcher, familiar with the working culture of the Ministry of Education, (a combination of clear definition of goals and principles and a 'crisis management' style of implementation, forged to cope with the uncertainties of the last decades and largely responding to person to person interaction rather than written communication) was also acutely aware of the need to put the key elements of the plan in place with the Ministry planners and administrators by the end of this phase, to ensure implementation, while leaving the detailed arrangements to be made as the work progressed. This was the approach adopted in designing the sample.

4.3.4 The interview sample

The researcher had sent a proposal in advance based on the following requirements and perceived constraints. The sample of Mozambican respondents should cover as wide a spectrum of those involved in and affected by capacity building as possible. Sampling must cover the different phases of the development of the education system and its pursuit of capacity building (early development of the MINED, the civil war and increased donor intervention, post-war recovery strategies etc.) as well as the location (different areas of the country and rural and urban contexts) and function of different actors in the system. Personal attributes such as age, gender, political allegiance and ethnicity are also relevant.

Sampling this range of respondents by means of a random sample is considered unsatisfactory in the general case of retrospective studies (Thompson, 2000:145-6) because it will produce too many gaps in response, first because of the non-existence of a satisfactory sampling frame and secondly because of differential survival and incidence of migration between sample groups. In the specific case of MINED, systematic data sets relating to participation in capacity building are fragmented especially in the period of multiple donor interventions and certain groups such as rural teachers were primary targets for assassination and kidnapping as well as sharing the fate of the millions of forced migrants. The combination of two non-random sampling strategies as described by Paul Thompson (2000:151) was therefore proposed in addition to informal interviews with key informants: quota sampling of teachers (based on categories defined on the basis of documentary study, the researcher's own experience and views of key informants) and a 'stratified community sample' of the administrative personnel of the Ministry. At this point the use of Pawson and Tilley's

analysis of different stakeholder levels: 'policy-maker' 'practitioner' and 'participant' seemed to be an appropriate way to conceptualise the different actors (1997: 208-209).

However since this would depend on both detailed knowledge of the composition of the subject population and practical issues of access, the researcher needed to validate and plan the details of the sample with key informants in the institution. The National Director of Planning, who was the main sponsor of the research in the Ministry, was therefore involved in setting up the sample frame during the exploratory phase and provincial staff and head teachers assisted in selecting the quotas locally based on age, gender, career pattern, area of work etc. The sample that was adopted (see Appendix 2) did meet the main criteria, with the exception of adequately covering rural populations and parents/former pupils⁵. It was recognised from the beginning that working with parents would be difficult to achieve within the time frame and it was decided that attempting to work in truly rural contexts would be both logistically difficult and also beyond the research capacity of a non-Mozambican researcher lacking knowledge of local languages. (Use of translators would introduce sources of bias in this part of the sample that would not arise with the groups accustomed to communicating easily in Portuguese, in which the interviewer was also fluent). A considerable merit of the sample design was that it could be carried out with a high degree of confidence of success (which proved to be justified in the implementation) so that despite its limited scope it did not suffer from unreliability. The validity of the sample in representing such a diverse society as Mozambique is discussed below and in Appendix 2.

4.3.5 Adjusting procedures, instruments and approaches

The period between the two phases of the field research was used to readjust the original strategy procedures and instruments. In particular, while the discussion groups were to be only a useful extra source, if they happened at all, the researcher decided to make more systematic use of daily field diary entries to record observation, including a media watch, and informal conversation and comments to provide another source of validation and interpretation of the interview data in addition to the secondary documentation. A conscious watch was to be kept on possible sources of

⁵ Ad hoc strategies for including this group were devised in the field with the help of education personnel (see Field Research Report.)

bias in the sample selection and conduct of the interviews and recorded in the diary so that they could be assessed later in the light of other sources.⁶

4.3 6 The interview format

As described in the field research report, the interview format had been further discussed and refined in discussions with Mozambican key informants in the exploratory stage of the research. In its final form it was conceived as follows. The first stage, in semi-formal survey format, asking for factual details of upbringing, education and career (modified to cover education of children by the parents group), with invitations/space for comment, had two functions: to collect relevant biographical data in order to analyse common and divergent experiences across the sample groups and relate these to historical studies in the literature; to engage the interest of the participants in the research topic by focussing on their experience as a starting point for reflection on the wider picture. (Following the well-tried educational principle of proceeding from the particular to the general, from the familiar to the less familiar). For this reason the first invitation to 'evaluate' (*What were the key moments/influences in your professional development?*) asked them to reflect on the personal experiences that they had just recounted.⁷ The second phase of the interview was designed to encourage the participants to reflect and talk about their view of the development of education since independence, assessing the respective roles played by government and international cooperation, the effects of the war on that development and their view of the current state of the sector. This was achieved by means of three 'cue' questions, that is, questions designed to set the participants reflecting and talking on these broadly defined topics, if possible, without further intervention from the researcher. These were the same for all groups in the actual interview, although the policymakers group had received a more detailed guide in advance to ensure best use of the time they could make available. A fourth question, *In your opinion what were the fundamental causes of the war?* was introduced rather cautiously in the early interviews, in some cases not at all, as the researcher had no means of knowing how participants would react to it.

⁶ For example, as the research proceeded the researcher noticed an apparently disproportionate number of participants from Inhambane province in the sample but was reassured by a Mozambican colleague, that that province had indeed supplied larger numbers of personnel to the Ministry in the early years due to greater educational opportunities in the colonial period. The sample was reflecting a genuine bias in the institution. The 1997 Census also recorded levels of literacy and knowledge of Portuguese in excess of the national average in this Province.

⁷ The inclusion of this question was one of the ideas contributed by a Mozambican colleague in the exploratory research phase. It seems to have been another familiar form of enquiry, since it was later used in an interview with Cardinal Alexandre dos Santos in the Sunday paper *Domingo* 03.08.2003.

Unlike the other topics including the effects of the war, which the researcher had often heard discussed informally and in the media, the question of why the war happened was not referred to except in oblique or formulaic terms. However, like the other three questions, it did function effectively as a cue to reflection for the majority.

4.3.7 Mitigating Personal Bias

At this stage final decisions were made on research procedures. In addition to the general approach discussed above (3.7.2), the author was concerned to adopt research procedures that would minimize reactivity, since it was clear that it would only be possible to meet with the majority of participants once and, given the subject matter it was necessary to be able to quickly establish a relaxed but purposeful working relationship. Once again, the author's familiarity with the working culture of the Ministry was invaluable. The experience of conducting numerous local and national 'enquiries' (inquéritos) with education staff and parents was used to devise a form and style of semi-structured interview that conformed with familiar methods of information and opinion gathering within the education sector. Both the semi structured 'survey type' interview schedule, used to record the personal curricula and the 'cue' question method⁸ for the discussions, had the advantage of being familiar social enquiry methods at least to many of the participants, having been used extensively, especially in adult education work, in Mozambique.

While the researcher's ability to enter into the culture of the research subjects, helped by the informal discussions in the exploratory phase, was clearly instrumental in increasing validity, she was aware that it also carried with it dangers of over-identification and loss of objectivity. She therefore consciously used two key research strategies to mitigate this potential bias. First by adopting the composite approach combining different types of data and sources. Personal testimony from the intimate context of the interviews could be evaluated in the light of statistical data, media accounts, Mozambican literature (both academic and literary) and general observation recorded in the field diary (Barakat, Chard et al 2002). Secondly the 'cue' question method is specifically designed to keep the interviewer's intervention (and therefore potential manipulation) to a minimum. As discussed above, the researcher's aim was to understand the participants' own 'folk theories' of what had contributed positively and negatively to the development of post independence governance, and the role played by education. The cue questions therefore directed

⁸ Known as 'perguntas chave' or key questions.

them to topics but avoided specifying how they should approach them. The researcher also applied a strict rule of avoiding prompt questions and if they were used they were recorded. Informants said as much or as little as they chose in response to a particular question. If they chose to range over all the topics without further questions, that was accepted and also recorded. Diary entries and notes to the interview texts also recorded the facility with which the participants approached different questions. Non-intervention was particularly strictly adhered to when respondents were asked if they had any conclusions about the causes of the war.

The decision to write down the respondent's replies rather than tape record them was contrary to current methodological norms (Thompson 2000:126) and so was not adopted lightly. However it served two purposes. It was familiar to education personnel and therefore not intimidating (whereas the use of tape recorders in enquiries is unfamiliar) but at the same time it introduced some formality and distance to the proceedings, the sense of contributing information of historical importance, that led the informants to consider their responses, while the researcher was kept busy recording their contributions. This reduced the temptation on both sides to lapse into chat or 'collusion' (Thompson 2000: 140) during the actual interview (though social interaction was of course important when introducing and ending the interview). It has to be remembered that this was not a classic oral history study in which respondents are interviewed discursively and at length over several meetings. The sessions had to strike a balance between facilitating free expression and imposing a degree of focus and discipline, and this seemed an unobtrusive way of achieving the latter. There was also some concern that the pre-questionnaire agreed to with the policy makers might be too directive – but again, the researcher's previous experience had been that the typical Mozambican 'dirigente' once she or he has grasped what you want to know, has no inhibitions about selecting and ordering what they wish to say in the way they wish to say it, using the researcher's cues only if they find them useful, and the experience was repeated in this case. That is to say it successfully applied Pawson and Tilley's 'teacher – learner' approach, setting out the researcher's purpose and then allowing the respondents to elaborate on it.

4.3.8 Confidentiality

In the light of the discussion of ethical issues in 3.7.3 above, another issue that needed to be clarified with the participants was to what extent they required confidentiality and what mechanisms would be acceptable for securing it. It was clear that the curriculum survey presented

no problems since the basic information was already in the public domain and they were free to comment as much or as little as they chose. However it was decided that the opinions given in response to the cue questions would be archived separately and in the form of a synthesis by category. This was explained to the participants at the start of each interview, but most showed little concern about confidentiality. The researcher attributed this to a number of factors: this method of safeguarding confidentiality was familiar to many of them; they were free to say as much or as little as they chose; they were mostly not afraid to be associated with the opinions they expressed.

4.3.9 Conclusions

From a methodological point of view, the research has demonstrated that this kind of evaluation can achieve significant and valid results, at very low cost, within a reasonable time frame, provided that the research design and implementation is based on detailed local knowledge and understanding. Such knowledge can be acquired in advance by experience, but also by study of secondary sources, including media coverage, by daily observation and by working closely with national personnel. Working in the national language was also important for the communication process. Conversely, it would have been difficult (and therefore not attempted) to work with parents and communities in the remoter rural areas, without knowledge of the local language and culture.

What has been achieved is a small window on experiences that affected thousands. The result is therefore authentic and as far as was possible representative, but incomplete. In particular by working mainly with education personnel and committed parents, the study was not able to access those who attacked the government and its schools and teachers during the war, to ascertain their present attitude. Documentary and media sources, as well as the researcher's previous work and research in the recovery of education services post-war in former RENAMO areas⁹ provide some circumstantial evidence that these rural communities are mostly favourable to the establishment of schools for their children, but remain sceptical about what they are likely to be taught there.

For these reasons, from the point of view of studying the Mozambican experience, the research can be considered a successful pilot experience that would justify further research by a team of mainly

⁹ MA Dissertation 2000

national researchers from diverse backgrounds that would enable them to capture the diversity of Mozambican society.

However for the purpose of answering the first of the researcher's two questions: 'How can the long-term impact of capacity building be reliably assessed?' the experience did prove to be satisfactory. There were inevitably some lacunas in the implementation, and as stated, the scope of the research was limited from the start. Nevertheless the field research strategy was, with minor lapses, carried out as planned and proved to be broadly successful in achieving its purpose which was to facilitate a retrospective reflection by those affected, on the impact of capacity building during the turbulent first 25 years of Mozambican Independence and at the same time collect secondary data and other material to compare with it. In order to see if this experience had answered the question 'How can we evaluate long-term impact?' it was necessary to proceed to the next phase, that of data analysis.

4.4 Analysing the Data.

Prior to carrying out the field research, the only firm decision taken regarding data analysis was the agreement with the Mozambicans that the curriculum data would be archived as individual testimonies while the opinions expressed in response to the cue questions would be preserved in synthesis by category to preserve anonymity. However, the researcher intended to analyse the personal histories looking for common and divergent experiences and as a means of knowing the population whose views were being solicited, and then to post-code the interview data by participant category (policymaker, practitioner, participant) before considering it as a whole and in relation to the secondary data which would also have been reviewed separately. The researcher had used these methods on a number of occasions to analyse the results of semi-structured interviews carried out in Mozambique and with a sample of Mozambican post-graduate students in Britain and expected it to be applicable in this case.

The basic method adopted was to collect together the responses of all the participants in each category on a particular topic, irrespective of which cue question had prompted them (as in previous studies they might range over several topics, since they were not interrupted once the cue question had been put). The comments were then coded, each new idea on the topic being given a new code. When all the responses in one category had been coded, the next was examined, using the same

codes if they applied or adding new ones. At the end of the process the codes were re-examined to see if some could be amalgamated, where for example the same view was being expressed by different participant but in different terminology, as is often the case where different age groups and levels of formal education are involved. The final coding list then represented the full range of responses to a particular topic. The final stage was to quantify the responses, not to try to convert qualitative data into pseudo-quantifiable variables¹⁰, but to facilitate the comparative process by identifying some key commonly held perceptions and critical minority opinions. A rough division was made between 'all' 'majority' 'more than half' 'less than half' 'a few' 'one response' 'none'. As expected, while the same views might be expressed in all groups they could be significantly more prevalent in one group than another.

At a mid point in the field research the method was tried out on the data collected to that point to see if it was applicable or needed adjustment. A number of refinements suggested themselves. First, although the data was to be synthesised in its final form, it would be useful to keep it in the form of individual responses with some identifying markers during the analysis stage. The respondents were therefore given a number and gender code (M, F) within their category. Second a separation into teaching and administrative staff (although the latter had all been teachers and were often still teaching part-time) in the 'practitioner' category suggested itself and it was also decided to analyse these two categories initially by region (North/South). It had also become clear that there were some similarities and differences in the use of key descriptive words, for topics such as 'the role of government' or 'the effects of the war'. It was decided to start the coding by collecting these expressions as a key to attitudes and perceptions, characterising each coded idea. The full transcripts were then reanalysed using this instrument. It was also decided to keep the responses to the 'causes of the war' question tied to the particular participant and his or her history while they were analysed, though it was essential that this connection should not be retained in the archive. (it was also possible to trace other comments back to individuals through the number codes at this stage if necessary). The final stage of the analysis was to translate the descriptions of the coded responses into descriptive summary phrases in English for the purpose of writing up the analysis, while also including translations of examples of responses (see Chapters 6 and 7).

¹⁰ Frank Beckhoffer cautioned strongly against this practice at the Qualidata Symposium 'Celebrating Classic Sociology', University of Essex July 2001.

Meanwhile, the analysis of the documentary material (presented in Chapter 5) had used a number of approaches from historical literature review to instruments such as Rebien's evaluation criteria (see Chapter 3) the methods used by Forss and Carlsson for the evaluation of evaluation reports (1997) to raise questions about the development of the education sector. The final stage was to apply Pawson and Tilley's methodology for 'interrogating' the documentary record (1997:88). Contemporary accounts and statistical records were examined using the results of the stakeholder interviews and applying the criteria they had used to evaluate their experiences of governance and capacity building. That analysis is presented in Chapter 8.

4.5 Conclusion

As the reader can imagine, from the above account, analysing the large quantity of data generated by the field research and documentary searches was a laborious task, especially as the participants had been free to order their thoughts around the topics as they saw fit. The upper limit set by the researcher of 40 interviews was probably as many as could be conveniently processed in this way, but the results indicate that it was a sufficient number to produce a representative result (within the set parameters) and it undoubtedly produced the insights that were sought into the relationship between capacity building, post-war recovery and institutional development. At the end of the process, the researcher was convinced that this was a feasible way to evaluate the long-term impact of capacity building interventions and it was not in fact costly in terms of time or money.

Clearly, if the researcher had had the resources to work in a team with one or two Mozambican researchers, it would also have been possible to cover the un-represented rural populations and with a little more time, the under-represented parents. However, the following chapters in which the results of the research are presented demonstrate, that the approach was certainly effective in answering key questions about the crucial case study of the Ministry of Education and the context, Mozambique, in which it was created and developed. That is, it was capable of developing explanatory theory in that case. The wider applicability of both the methodology and the theory it generated are considered in the final chapter.

CHAPTER 5

INTRODUCING THE CASE STUDY: EDUCATION IN MOZAMBIQUE

Introduction

As discussed in Chapter 4, the choice of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique (MINED) as a crucial case study, was based on the fact that it was created in the belief, held by government and public, that education was the key to building national capacity for governance and for socio-economic development. It was supported by many diverse international partners who held the same view, and events seem to suggest that, despite the breakdown of social and economic order during the civil war, the investment in education eventually paid off in successful recovery and emerging good governance. The chapter examines the history of formal education in Mozambique through the study of published literature by Mozambican educationalists, MINED's own documentation and that of its donor partners. It begins by tracing the origins of the Mozambican conviction that inclusive education programmes are essential for socio-economic development and good governance in their pre-colonial and colonial history as well as in the external philosophies and experiences on which they drew in shaping their education system. The application and modification of the revolutionary education strategy in the context of internal conflict, external destabilisation, economic collapse and political transformation within the shifting agendas of global politics are examined in the two following sections, still largely from the Mozambican point of view. Mozambique's international partners' motivation, theoretical underpinning of their participation in the education sector, as well as their evaluation of the outcomes are also considered on the basis of literature and documentation as well as interviews with a small sample of current representatives of donor partners of the MINED. The chapter is essentially used to present the case study to the reader by means of the results of a number of secondary enquiries that were used to understand the context in which the main field research was to take place, in conformity with the composite research approach. Thus the conclusions are presented in the form of a number of queries raised by this exercise, which it was hoped the participatory enquiry might answer.

5.1 Experiences of education before independence.

In considering the central role that was attributed to education in post-independence development strategies in Mozambique, it is necessary to try to understand how formal education of children in schools and school equivalent education for adults come to be seen as the key to personal and national development and empowerment.

In Portuguese (Moçambique Editora 2001) the word education (educação) still has the meaning in common parlance, which it has largely lost in English: the development of the whole person, physically, intellectually, morally and socially, and the objectives of the national education system of independent Mozambique were to be defined in these idealistic terms. That is they expressed not simply narrow sectoral aims but embodied the aspirations for creating a new society made up of 'new' people (Homen novo).¹ Academic teaching and learning (ensino-aprendizagem) was only part of the concept.

5.1.1. Traditional education

Ideas for the transformation of society are of course never completely new. They have their origins in the interaction between the culture of the home, life experiences and exposure to other cultures beyond the home environment. Mozambique is a multi-ethnic society that has also had a long history of interaction with foreign cultures (see Appendix 1). This has resulted in great diversity of language, beliefs, social custom and economic activity. Traditional education naturally reflected this diversity in terms of the content of what it was deemed necessary to transmit to the new generation. Nevertheless, as Mozambican authors Cipire (1992) and Golias (1993) demonstrate, it is possible to discern some common characteristics. The first of these is that traditional forms of education were holistic and addressed all types of knowledge and skills in an integrated way. For example, the initiation rites at puberty, not only transmitted sexual knowledge but the moral, cultural and historical traditions of the society. Secondly, traditional education was intimately related to the activities of daily life and much learning was by doing. As Golias suggests, it is also pragmatic, 'the child was taught the essential, the indispensable for life.'² Thus an enormous body of empirical knowledge about the immediate environment was passed on orally in songs and stories as well as practical activities. Part of that indispensable knowledge for living was also being

¹ Sistema Nacional de Educação Lei nº 4/83 de 23 de Março (National Education System Law No. 4/83)

² Author's translation of Golias 1993, 28: 'a criança era ensinada o essencial, o indispensável para a vida.'

inducted in separate roles and areas of activity based on gender and age. Thus in the traditional education girls and boys were educated separately by adults of their own sex and even as young adults were expected to defer to the judgement of the elders. Thus traditional education was designed to socialise young people in a particular set of relationships, which institutionalised the dominance of male over female and age over youth as a means of securing the collective well being of the whole social group.

Until the last years of the 20th century, these forms of education shaped the lives of the overwhelming majority of Mozambicans, including those who were destined to become revolutionaries, priests or teachers.³ For much of the older rural population, concepts of education, within the family and in society are still influenced by it as they try to rebuild their community life.

5.1.2 Imported Education

The advent of foreign traders and mercenaries and their integration in Mozambican society in the early modern period (see Appendix 1) also exposed a minority of the population to either Koranic or Catholic education. However, formal state regulated schooling was a rarity before the 20th century and did not reach some areas of the interior before the late 1960s and even then only catered for a tiny minority of the indigenous population.⁴

The first legal provision for public schools in the Portuguese colonies was made in 1845 but although a handful of primary schools were established by decree in Mozambique in 1854, it was evident ten years later that they still only existed on paper. By 1873 there were no more than 400 pupils enrolled in all the schools in Mozambique. By the early 20th century there had been little expansion (48 primary schools for boys and 18 for girls in 1909). The overwhelming majority of pupils were settlers, only 1,195 were African and of these the majority attended mission rather than public schools. The first and only secondary school to exist for many years was opened in Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) in 1912 and by 1918 there were still only 25 'official', that is public, primary schools in the whole country and 100 'rudimentary' schools designed to promote the

³ The early auto-biography of Eduardo Mondlane *Chitlando filho de chefe* (Khambane and Clerc, 1990) written under a pseudonym, graphically illustrates this point.

⁴ The District of Maríngué in the central province of Sofala, which later became the military headquarters of RENAMO, had no schools before 1969. (Personal information from local informants, 1995)

'cultural assimilation' of the African population while 'educating' them for a life as labourers. (Buendia Gomez, 1999:39-41).

We can discern even at this early stage the key elements that were to underpin the Portuguese concept of the role of education in its colony until its demise in 1974. In the first place it was discriminatory: different types of education were reserved for different categories of people: the official schools catered for the colonial elite (all but a very few from settler families); rudimentary schools run by the missions which, though they provided instruction in basic literacy and numeracy, had the primary aim of 'domestication' of the native population through the medium of religious teaching. (Golias, 1993:57-9). As in traditional education, the sexes were taught separately, but unlike traditional education not in equal numbers: very few girls attended. It too had the purpose of socialising and inducting individuals into pre-determined roles but in an alien hierarchy of race and culture designed to keep the majority in a subservient role, while a tiny minority might gain a small degree of privilege by assimilation to the ruling culture. Thus unlike the holistic traditional education it created discord between different kinds of learning in the home and school environments and exacerbated social divisions.⁵

In addition, the system was not only discriminatory but in practice non-inclusive. There continued to be a gulf between what the colonial authorities decreed ought to happen and what actually did happen. Buendia Gomez (op.cit.) concludes that in the first 25 years of the 20th century the public education system was to all intents and purposes as yet an 'unreality'.

5.1.3. Education and the Estado Novo

Following the military coup in 1926 the Estado Novo under Salazar set about bringing order and moral direction to the perceived chaotic administration of the Republic. However it did not essentially alter the concepts of the role and educational needs of the indigenous population, merely sought to regulate and implement the previous aspirations. The colonial enterprise was therefore justified as a mission to bring civilization to the African populations. Logically, for this to be realised, there had to be a functioning education system for the native population and this 'civilizing mission' was quickly entrusted to the Catholic Church. It assumed responsibility for 'indigenous'

⁵ In 1987 a Mozambican colleague of the author, educated at a Jesuit mission by teachers he clearly found intellectually stimulating, described his childhood divided between the mission and traditional society as 'schizophrenic'.

education under the terms of the 1930 Colonial Act, with the declared purpose to 'lead the native from the savage life to the civilized life.' In return the Church was to receive material support and privileged status over other denominations in the overseas territories.⁶

At the heart of this scheme was the concept of assimilation, that the African population would eventually assume the Portuguese culture and Catholic values and abandon their own language and culture. The more immediate political goal was that of 'nationalising and moralising the natives' while inculcating habits of work that would benefit the colonial economy. Nevertheless, the status of 'assimilado' was defined in law as well as the steps to be taken and criteria to be fulfilled to achieve this status. The candidate for citizenship had to have command of written and spoken Portuguese, be financially stable and express a determination to abandon native customs and live in a European manner. The citizenship obtained if these conditions were fulfilled was in practice second-class. Access to all but the lowest grades of public service jobs was still denied and discrimination in the private sector limited jobs and business opportunities. Nevertheless it conferred some useful privileges such as: civil recognition with the right to identity cards and passports (and therefore the right to travel); that their children could attend official schools without first completing indigenous schooling; that they were exempt from the hut tax and instead paid income tax. However, very few Mozambicans were able to avail themselves of this opportunity: by 1960 less than 1% of the indigenous population had achieved assimilado status (Buendia Gomez 1999:53). The first step in the process, indigenous education was neither universally available nor designed to facilitate any but the most intrepid learners.

Rudimentary primary education for the indigenous population was entirely in the hands of the Catholic Church. It followed a separate and restricted syllabus in which the core subject was the catechism. Portuguese language, arithmetic and measurement, the history and map of Portugal, drawing and manual work, physical education and hygiene, moral education and choral singing made up the rest of the syllabus which was delivered in three years or grades. Transition from one grade to the next was dependent on passing tests. It was only after completing this curriculum, often repeating more than one grade, that the most successful pupils were eligible to start the first grade of the official primary syllabus, which took a further four years without repetitions. The second stage of the indigenous system was 'Normal' education for the training of teachers for indigenous

⁶ Only international Christian churches were admitted. African churches were suppressed as well as African mosques and Koranic schools. Foreign Muslims were allowed to practise their religion.

schools. The Church, once it accepted the ordination of African priests, also directed bright pupils to seminaries where they completed secondary education up to 9th grade before going on to train as priests. Completing secondary education in an official school was a remote possibility, given that after completing both indigenous and official primary schooling, most would be over 15 and therefore ineligible to enrol on the grounds of age.

By the 1960s as other African nations were proceeding to independence, the Portuguese colonial policies and practice came under severe international criticism. In response, the separate 'indigenous' status of the African population was abolished and efforts were made to extend the school network. Other international Christian mission schools were tolerated but not officially recognised and in 1966, legal restrictions enforcing separate education for Africans were removed. Indigenous education was renamed 'adaptation' and restructured to allow an easier transition to the official system. Different treatment was now justified on the need to prepare indigenous children to participate in the official system. Education was also declared 'obligatory.' (Golias 1993, Buendia Gomez, 1999).

However, the disparity between the regime's declarations and the reality on the ground persisted. It is true that the number of schools and pupils attending them increased, but on the eve of independence it is estimated that only about 5% of the Mozambican population was literate, less than 1% had completed secondary education and in 1973 only 40 out of 3,000 university students were African (Johnston, 1984:21). The reality was that no schools existed for the majority of the population especially those in the rural areas. Even where schools were available, children were excluded by family poverty, age limitations and other bureaucratic hurdles so that the much vaunted obligatory schooling was essentially 'fictitious'. These facts suggest that the colonial government had little commitment to the development of the black population despite the repeated declarations to the contrary in official documents. Colonial education in practice continued to be discriminatory, paternalist, tied to religious instruction and only available for a tiny, mainly urban minority. (Golias 1992:57-61) Eduardo Mondlane, the first president of FRELIMO, described this combination of official prejudice, indifference and incapacity that kept the majority of Mozambicans in a state of

ignorance to the end of colonial rule as 'diligent neglect' (*diligente negligência*). (Mazula, 1998:108)⁷

What answers can we find in these experiences to our initial question about the central role attributed to mass education in the Mozambican revolution? The leaders of that revolution all came from the tiny group of *assimilados* who had experienced both traditional educational values and been exposed to world knowledge through the prism of Christian missionary teaching (in some cases non-Catholic) in a European language. This difficult rite of passage, requiring them to abandon their cultural identity, did not, however, admit them to full citizenship in colonial society. Their formal education was at the same time intellectually liberating and humiliating. It promised integration and moral values based on the Christian ethic but delivered exclusion from colonial society while demanding alienation from their own society.⁸ The Portuguese assimilation policy largely failed in its declared aims because of this contradiction. It fostered not an educated elite groomed to take over the administration in a smooth transition to neo-colonial rule, but a revolutionary movement. The leadership of that movement as a result of their experience of colonial education, understood the importance of formal education and the scale of the deficit of knowledge that had to be bridged if Mozambicans were to take charge of their own affairs. At the same time they continued to value aspects of the holistic education rooted in the social and economic life of their own people.

As we have seen, the overwhelming majority of the Mozambican population had no direct experience of formal education but continued to educate their children according to traditional custom. However, the traditional forms of governance and economic activity for which that education had been developed had been irreversibly ruptured by the imposition of colonial rule. The indigenous majority was powerless, subject to taxation, forced labour and other arbitrary acts of authority without any right to redress or even protest, and they perceived that access to the pyramid of privilege that oppressed them and denigrated them for their 'savagery' and ignorance was

⁷ Education as a privilege of the elite and diligent neglect of the education of the rural peasantry were equally characteristic of government in Portugal itself, where over 25% of the adult population was illiterate at the time of the coup in April 1974. Many of the white settlers and later army conscripts sent to fight the nationalists were themselves illiterate, though by virtue of their race privileged in the colonial context.

⁸ Mondlane's account of his early years as the son of a chief, induction in the male-bonding rites of the cattle herders, schooling and recruitment to the Swiss mission which sponsored his education abroad but which he later abandoned to pursue a political career in the UN before returning to lead the nationalist movement, encapsulates all the elements of this experience. (Khambane and Clerc, 1990)

through school education. Thus they too experienced colonial education as an instrument of exclusion and humiliation and in the new order, equated school education with economic and social empowerment.

Thus the perspective of the nationalist intellectuals and the uneducated masses converged in attributing importance to education as a means of taking control of both personal and national development. The point at issue was what form that education should take, since neither of the existing models could meet the needs of an independent nation in the modern world.

5.1.4 Education in the liberated zones.

The unification of the various nationalist parties in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) for the launch of the armed struggle was forged by the recognition that the primary objective was the overthrow of the colonial power. However, it also marked the beginning of an ideological debate over the nature of the society that was to be reconstructed once independence was achieved. A debate, which has continued ever since, at times contested creatively and at others destructively through violence. The establishment of 'liberated zones' in the north of the country where the guerrilla fighters were hosted by deeply traditional rural communities, who had themselves engaged in recent bitter confrontations with the colonial authorities, immediately raised the issue of governance: how were these areas to be governed in order to support the common cause of liberation? Thus as Buendia Gomez points out the Liberated Zones became 'a space for the construction and political definition of FRELIMO'⁹

The key ideological issue was whether to simply maintain the existing administration by merely 'africanizing' the colonial hierarchy or to take the radical option of creating a popular administration or 'Peoples' Power' (Poder Popular) (Samora Machel 1980 quoted by Buendia Gomez 1999:117). In this power struggle the revolutionary line was promoted by an alliance of intellectuals, led by Mondlane and the guerrilla fighters, whereas their opponents allied themselves with traditional chiefs. At the Second FRELIMO Congress in 1968, the revolutionary line prevailed but as Machel reflected in 1980, this was not an end to the matter. New contradictions were bound to emerge as circumstances evolved. (op. cit. 1980). Nevertheless the liberated zones were to be a testing ground for implementing the new concept of 'Peoples' Power'.

⁹ '... um espaço de construção e de definição política da FRELIMO'.

In this socio-political experiment, education was seen from the beginning as essential not only for the training of cadres but for the inclusion, participation and enlightenment of the masses. The first Congress in 1962 already defined three key objectives: to promote the rapid training of cadres; to promote the social and cultural development of women; to promote literacy for the whole population (including adults) creating schools wherever possible. The key role of education for political, social and economic development was constantly reiterated and refined in later documents as experience was gained in translating ideas into practice. (Buendia Gomez 1999:130)

The administration of the liberated zones including the development of community-based education was thus a kind of 'pilot project' for national governance to come. However, as Buendia Gomez cautions, a pilot project when generalised frequently loses its character.¹⁰ He also asks to what extent the revolutionary project, as distinct from the armed struggle to overthrow the Portuguese regime, was assumed by the rural populations in these zones as well as the leadership. (1999:120). Similarly, we may question whether the undoubted desire for access to schooling amongst the illiterate population can be equated with a full understanding and endorsement of the revolutionary role attributed to it by the leadership.

5.2 Education as Revolution

When FRELIMO came to power in 1975 following the collapse of the Portuguese regime (see Appendix 1) it had developed a clear ideological vision of the kind of society it wanted to create, which was based on both the grass-roots experience of the liberated zones and a fusion of ideas gleaned from international Marxism, particularly its interpretation and application to the liberation struggles of other peasant societies. Nevertheless, having thrown off the imposition of one alien culture there was a strong determination to 'avoid mechanical and damaging transpositions' of such experiences in order to preserve 'the originality of our personality'.¹¹ (Machel 1979:17)

However, the legacy of colonial 'diligent neglect' combined with the abrupt transition to power left the new government with a huge capacity deficit when it came to scaling up the experiences of the liberation war to create a framework of national governance to deliver the social revolution they

¹⁰ As Korten noted (see Chapter 1) scaling up village-based development projects is rarely achieved successfully.

¹¹ '... evitaremos transposições mecânicas e nefastas de experiências, e saberemos salvaguardar a originalidade da nossa personalidade.' Samora Machel 1974 (text published 1979).

envisaged. Fully aware of this deficit, they were nevertheless uncompromising in pursuing their revolutionary vision, while taking a pragmatic and strategic approach to mitigating their lack of human and institutional capacity.

5.2.1 'Making the school a base for the people to take power' *Fazer da escola uma base para o povo tomar o poder.* Samora Machel (1979)

Nationalising key social and economic assets (education, health, housing, funeral services and land see Appendix 1) within weeks of the declaration of independence was a dramatic demonstration of an ideological commitment to social inclusion, which also sought to redress the humiliation experienced by the general population under colonial rule. It also immediately presented huge practical challenges as to how these services could not only be administered but rapidly expanded to meet the expectations raised.

One of the key lessons of the liberated zones was that at the community level, collective and participatory methods of working could go a long way to compensate for lack of experience and knowledge. At the same time, there was no doubt that the lack of technically qualified personnel could not be substituted by enthusiasm alone. Thus from the first days of the armed struggle, the education of cadres (in the FRELIMO secondary institute in Dar-es-Salaam and some early scholarships for higher education) was also a priority. This twin strategy was now applied to developing the national education strategy, which was essentially conceived as a nationwide capacity building exercise as a catalyst for development.

In the first five years after independence the government fostered a euphoric expansion of primary education based on self-help, especially in the rural communities who enthusiastically constructed classrooms using their traditional materials and methods. Mazula (1995:147) suggests that the education campaign met with a largely spontaneous response from the public fired by the euphoria of independence and the strong desire (noted above) to overcome the backwardness in which they had been confined by colonial rule. That backwardness, of course, also left a legacy of an acute lack of properly qualified teachers, which was exacerbated by the mass exodus of Portuguese teachers who only remained long enough to complete their contractual obligations under the transitional

arrangements. Self-help and participatory working methods were brought to bear on that problem with the slogan, 'Let's make the whole country a school where we all learn and we all teach.'¹²

Those with basic education of at least four years schooling were co-opted as teachers or literacy volunteers and those with teaching qualifications organised to train them in emergency courses, through collective preparation and staff collaboration in the schools, collaboration between schools (school clusters known as ZIPs) and through roving advisory teams (CAPs). As a result by 1981 the majority of children were able to enrol in the first grades of primary education (the gross enrolment rate was 93%) (MINED, 1998:9) About half a million adults mainly in the urban and semi-urban areas, also acquired basic literacy and numeracy between 1974 and 1978, the year in which the first nationwide campaign was launched. While much of this activity was promoted through the party mobilisation, the establishment of the Ministry of Education as a public service institution also took place during these years. It had been formally constituted during the transitional government and its future direction debated in a national seminar led by its first minister Graça Simbine Machel in January 1975 six months before the declaration of independence. (Mazula 1995: 151).

Despite the emphasis on self-reliance there was no doubt that technical assistance and assistance for the education and training of professionals to develop the Ministry of Education would be essential, not only for its own sake but because education also had to be the vehicle for developing human resources for all the other sectors vital for national development. In parallel with the mobilisation of national human resources the Ministry recruited foreign personnel through the UN (UNESCO advisers for example advised on the setting up of the Ministry), by bi-lateral secondment arrangements with mainly socialist countries and by contracting international volunteers through western solidarity organisations. These were designated as 'cooperantes' or co-operators. While some, especially in secondary teaching and technical training were essentially filling skills gaps until Mozambican staff could be trained, the majority were experienced professionals whose primary role was to work alongside Mozambican managerial staff in order to build their capacity. Unlike the technical assistance model adopted in many other developing countries, they were not placed in actual decision-making or managerial positions, and in the Ministry of Education they were briefed to work with department or section leaders or with school directorates, to develop the capacity of their work teams. Naturally enough given the huge gap in qualification and experience

¹² *Façamos do país inteiro uma escola onde todos aprendemos e todos ensinamos* Speech by Samora Machel when launching the first national literacy campaign. July 3rd 1978

that often existed between the cooperantes and their Mozambican counterparts and the huge tasks being undertaken, there were varying degrees of success in achieving a balance between facilitating and doing, and between leaving space for Mozambican decision making and stepping in to 'get things moving'. In the Ministry of Education, since those involved on both sides were educationalists, they did generally succeed in creating a learning environment. The strategy was less successful in some other sectors.¹³

The second type of international capacity building assistance, which had already been initiated on a small scale during the liberation war, was the provision of scholarships to study in bi-lateral partner countries or with UN funding in other countries. In the early years after independence, the priority given to basic education meant that neither financial nor human resources were available to increase the totally inadequate number of secondary places at a rate that would ensure sufficient graduates to meet the need for candidates for technical and professional training, including teacher training. The ability to expand higher education was also similarly limited and yet graduates were desperately needed in all sectors of government and the economy. Thus in these years thousands of young Mozambicans studied in specially created secondary schools in Cuba and East Germany and thousands more studied for higher degrees and professional qualifications in socialist and western countries before returning to fill posts in public administration and services, training institutions and industry. (see 5.5.1.below)

A third capacity building strategy was the promotion of school equivalent education for adults who were already in the workforce, in order to equip them to follow in-service vocational and professional training. The National Directorate of Adult Education in the Ministry promoted and managed: night schools as well as literacy classes for the general public; statutory literacy classes in workplaces, which later led to the development of workplace schools for primary and secondary education; residential accelerated learning courses for key rural cadres and community leaders. This work too was supported by the capacity building combination of cooperante support, part-time continuing education in county and overseas education of Mozambican staff who then returned to take up management and teaching positions.

¹³ Information Elisabeth Sequeira (National Director of International Cooperation 1975-1988) interviewed in 2003.

These strategies were extraordinarily successful in extending access to basic education and rapidly raising the general education and qualification level of education staff. The result was a significant impact in redressing the imbalance between urban and rural provision and between male and female participation. The preparation of qualified staff combined with the cooperante strategy also succeeded in creating an institutional framework for the development and management of public education. In less than a decade public education, neglected for so long, had been implanted in the whole country. However, this rapid and euphoric expansion of provision, while it met the demand for inclusion in terms of numbers, still left much to be done in terms of the quality and relevance of teaching and learning.

5.2.2 Recognising limitations

After five years of exuberant expansion and 'learning by doing' it was recognised that there was an issue not just of the quantity but of the quality of education that was being provided. Some schools were clearly too small and too poorly staffed to provide an acceptable standard of learning and local education staff were failing to supervise them adequately. There was clearly a need to consolidate the management of the system by rationalising some of the institutional provision and regulating for minimum standards of quality.

A far more complex issue was that of the relevance and appropriateness of what was being taught and the manner in which it was being transmitted. This was largely due to the problems noted by Buendia Gomez of scaling up a community-based experience to the national policy level.

The pedagogy developed in the liberated zones and FRELIMO schools was based on linking the teaching of theoretical ideas to practical activity. Manual activities, especially agricultural work, had been part of the missionary education, but only in a few enlightened cases was it used as a form of practical application of knowledge learned in the classroom¹⁴ and manual labour was often experienced as punishment or exploitation. The FRELIMO schools aimed to break down these barriers by applying best practice from the missions, and rural education in developing socialist countries such as Cuba, or their neighbour, Tanzania. The lack of qualification or even experience of this kind of learning on the part of the rapidly recruited teachers after independence meant that

¹⁴ Father Vicente, a catholic missionary and enlightened and gifted educationalist, who after independence headed the school production department of the Ministry of Education, was one.

for the most part passive and non-participatory learning prevailed in the new schools and manual activities continued to be regarded as forced labour.

Linking education and community (LEC) was another key departure from colonial education that had been developed in the liberated zones. It established the principle of community ownership of the school and a mutual exchange of knowledge and support. These ideas were a reaction against the separation between school learning and the culture and daily activities of the home that characterised most schooling in the colonial system. The nationwide initiatives after independence to build and maintain classrooms were a clear outcome of this policy, as well as the institution of parent associations, but cultural separation could not be so easily bridged. The linguistic and cultural diversity of Mozambican rural populations and their lack of formal education meant that facilitating their meaningful participation in developing a relevant curriculum required not only capacities, which were mostly lacking, (for cultural and linguistic research followed by bi-lingual curriculum development and the elaboration of text books) but also the time for dialogue, and this too was not available under the pressures of escalating external and internal conflict.

That the discrimination by the colonial government against what they dismissively termed 'dialects' excluded the majority of the population from learning and participation was recognised by the independent government and moves were made towards a greater role and status for what were now recognised as 'national languages'. Local radio began broadcasting in local languages and research began to define and 'codify' the 24 or more languages so that written forms could be used. However, this involved first creating the national capacity for this work by higher education training of linguists. Meanwhile, the government priority was to consolidate national unity which it addressed by declaring Portuguese the language of national unity and, as we have seen, confronting the issue of inclusion by massively expanding access to education in that language. Nevertheless by the early 1980s, it was evident from the experiences of the literacy campaigns, that Portuguese represented a very real barrier to literacy for the adult rural population, especially women.¹⁵ This in turn limited their capacity to support their children's schooling.

¹⁵ Information Teresa Veloso, National Director of Adult Education. 1984-1990

5.2.3 The National Education System

In the aftermath of the Third FRELIMO Congress, which publicly espoused Marxist Leninism as the guiding philosophy of the party, and in the face of growing external and internal threats, there was a shift in government policy towards a more centrally controlled administration. This coincided with the realisation discussed above, that it was necessary to consolidate and regulate the exuberant experiences of the first years of independence. By 1979 the Ministry of Education was therefore engaged in the process of rationalising the number and distribution of schools and in formulating a national education system (SNE) consisting of a regulatory framework and comprehensive national curriculum and examination system. The Minister, Graça Machel, aware of the difficulties emerging across the country, and true to the vision of the liberated zones, intended that this should be an evolutionary and consultative process, seeing it as 'essentially a cultural challenge' to ensure that the education system could reflect the nature of the society as a whole. (Mazula 1995:165) However, as in the rest of government, a much more technical and bureaucratic vision based on central planning gained the ascendancy in the Ministry. The SNE passed into law in 1983 and the national curriculum introduced successively grade by grade over the next years reflected this. The conceptualisation of the system was supported in particular by advisors from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) and the curriculum development teams by the technical assistance of many foreign cooperantes. The system that emerged was unnecessarily rigid and centralised but technically well developed and a considerable achievement for the Ministry and its partners less than a decade after independence. It was in any case envisaged that its implementation would be monitored and adjusted as it progressed but that aspiration was to be overtaken by events.

5.3 Holding on – war and economic crisis

1983, the year in which the SNE became law was also the year in which civil war engulfed the whole country and the development gains made since independence began to be reversed. Economic growth sustained up to 1982 began to decline, for the first time western humanitarian aid was sought to meet the needs of thousands of starving peasants in the southern province of Inhambane where the effects of drought were exacerbated by war, though over 100,000 died before it was delivered (Hanlon 1986: 144-5).

Over the following years over 50% of rural schools were closed and rural literacy work virtually stopped. Some of the displaced pupils crowded into urban schools, which introduced a three-shift

day. The collapse of the economy, the diversion of resources to the war effort and finally the structural adjustment conditions imposed by the IMF reduced the resource base for education from 17% - 19% of the recurrent state budget up to 1986 to 9% of a drastically reduced budget in 1987(UNDP 2000:42). Textbooks and basic school materials such as paper and pens became scarce or in some areas virtually disappeared. Boarding schools, which had previously grown their own food, became dependent on food aid, formed student militias for self-defence or were evacuated to makeshift accommodation in safer areas.

The attacks on schools by rebels were not random. Schools were both symbols of FRELIMO's success in meeting the aspirations of the public and of the dissemination of its ideological messages. They and their staff were primary targets for rebel attacks in rural areas along with government and party offices. As a result many teachers and pupils were killed and abducted reducing even further the human capital of the nation.

As the crisis deepened and the country became dependent on international humanitarian aid to secure the survival of the displaced and impoverished rural populations, MINED lobbied to get international aid to sustain the education system, arguing that for yet another generation of Mozambican children to be deprived of education was part of the humanitarian crisis. As a result, the supply of textbooks, exercise books and pens free to primary pupils was funded as relief aid by donor agencies led by UNICEF. Meanwhile under the structural adjustment conditions, other sectors of the education system were cut back or unsupported. Western donors, if they supported educational activity at all did so on the basis of individual and largely uncoordinated projects. The strategic capacity of the Ministry was thus severely undermined. For example, the fact that training of new teachers and in-service training of existing teachers was severely curtailed as a result of attacks in rural areas and lack of funding was particularly damaging at the time and had long term repercussions for post-war recovery. The National Directorates for Adult Education and Staff Development (Formação de Quadros) the main capacity building sections of the Ministry were also eventually disbanded with similar effect.

However, remarkably, the education service established under the SNE, though severely reduced and damaged, survived in all but the core areas controlled by RENAMO in the central provinces and even there efforts were eventually made to run schools along similar lines to the national schools (Chard, 2000). This survival was due in large part to the depth of the commitment of both

public and education staff, particularly that of the teachers and parents. Displaced teachers and pupils reassembled with the support of parents and continued their activities wherever they found themselves and were able to maintain contact and obtain support from local education staff and the Ministry.¹⁶ This crisis management was greatly facilitated by the administrative structure put in place by the SNE which proved sufficiently robust to function under pressure and included a simple but efficient information system, that enabled the centre to remain in minimum contact with the grassroots. This support took place within the framework of district and provincial public administration, which also retained a foothold in most districts defended by the army. Local military units therefore, in so far as they were capable, provided protection, security advice and training for self defence to vulnerable civilian populations, which included schools.

Though the effort of the Ministry in the war years was concentrated on damage limitation and survival, there were also areas of development. The systematic upgrading of senior management staff and higher education teachers through part-time degrees, overseas scholarships and professional training continued with little disruption. Limited education research and development also continued supported by intermittent project funding, so that although systematic monitoring and evaluation of the whole SNE could not be carried out, lessons were being learned that would later be applied in post-war recovery. One important area of policy research was the issue of language. As the war reached its most devastating phase, in 1989, the linguistic research and codification of the national languages was completed and the understanding had been reached that initial literacy in the mother tongue would be beneficial to children as well as adults. Bi-lingual literacy programmes for adults then children were piloted so that by the time the war ended the knowledge and expertise to generalise the practice already existed.¹⁷

Nevertheless the impact of the war should not be minimized. It was a great achievement to keep so many in school but the quality of the education they received was drastically impaired. Meanwhile the admissions rate for primary schooling was reduced from almost universal access in 1982 to about 60% by the end of the war (UNDP 2000:43) a statistic which does not reflect the backlog of many thousands who failed to enrol when of school age or dropped out during the war and were therefore still functionally illiterate at its end. Similarly we have to recognise that while the MINED

¹⁶ Uniquely MINED sent teams to support the resumption of schooling in the refugee camps in Zimbabwe and Malawi as well as to those displaced internally.

¹⁷ Information Teresa Veloso former National Director of Adult Education, 2003

had the institutional strength to survive, its effort and strategic capability were fragmented and its powers of decision severely compromised by dependence on unpredictable and uncoordinated donor funding.

5.4 Education for All 1990-2000

In 1990 as the geo-political context that had sustained the war changed and the internal efforts for a settlement led to the first face to face negotiations between the warring parties (see Appendix 1). Political reforms carried out by the government were an important component of the dialogue for peace. Following the ratification of a new constitution, reform of the legislative framework of the education sector necessarily followed. The revised SNE was passed into law in May 1992 a few months ahead of the signing of the general peace accord. The main ideological shifts were to remove Marxist rhetoric from the stated objectives and to remove the state monopoly of education provision, recognising that community organisations, religious organisations and commercial providers could work in partnership with government within the regulatory framework of the SNE. Other changes to the statute were a product of the reflection on the SNE, evolution of ideas and practice that had continued despite the effects of the war, such as: a commitment to the introduction of the use of national languages in education; the redefinition and clarification of the roles of pre-school, special, non-formal, vocational and distance education; establishing the autonomy of the universities. However, many of the clauses of the law especially the core objectives and approach were unchanged and have never been challenged by the opposition.¹⁸

A much greater challenge than the review of statutory law, as before, was how this vision could be translated into reality. The devastation of the war had added even greater challenges to achieving that goal. The first enormous task was to simply recover the level of provision that existed up to 1982. Beyond that were the unresolved issues of the quality and relevance of the education provided which still had to be addressed.¹⁹ It was clear that the systematic consultation of the public on these issues, abandoned ten years earlier, had to be implemented. Meanwhile the Ministry of

¹⁸ For example: that education is the right and a duty of all citizens; that education is public and secular; that education should develop the whole personality integrating all aspects of development, linking theory and practice and the school to the community. Boletim da República: Lei N° 6/92 de 6 de Maio

¹⁹ As one parent put it in a public meeting the author attended in Sena in 1995 'We (the school and community) are producing a generation of useless people.' He saw that the school did not prepare them adequately for the modern world but since they spent most of their time in school, parents no longer had the time to teach them the practical skills they need to survive in the rural life.

Education itself, habituated to crisis management on the basis of uncoordinated project funding from multiple donors, had to begin once again to plan strategically and recover the policy initiative. Compared to 1975, it had considerably less autonomy, but two distinct advantages: an institutional presence and structure throughout the country; a body of well qualified and experienced staff at the central policy-making level and in some key provincial posts.

At the beginning of the school year in 1992, MINED with the support of UNICEF produced a discussion document, "Education for All in Mozambique: An Emerging Strategy" which set out the issues for basic education raised by the Jomtien Conference on Education for All in 1990 (UNICEF 1991) relating them to the process of review underway in Mozambique. The Portuguese version of this document with a number of case studies from other developing countries (notably BRAC community schools in Bangladesh and Colombia's Escuela Nova) was circulated for discussion in provincial forums of education staff, teachers, local government staff, religious, community and NGO representatives. Consultations continued after the signing of the peace accord and resulted in the formulation of the first post-war policy and implementation strategy document. (Republic of Mozambique Council of Ministers, 1995).

Over the next years many of the strategies outlined were evolved in practice and refined. Economic growth and the switch of resources from military to social expenditure began to produce a peace dividend for education²⁰ but recovery of the education service at the provincial and district levels continued to depend on bi-lateral project funding in which one main donor took responsibility for supporting recovery in each province. This minimised co-ordination problems but led to disparities in provision and approach. However, MINED was able to use this mode of funding combined with the placement of returning graduates, to build the capacity of the provincial directorates. This in turn facilitated decentralisation of executive functions to the provinces, which made them more effective for recovery and had long-term benefits for efficiency and accountability. Again there was considerable variation in levels of capacity achieved by different provinces.

At the policy level, the donors and banks continued to support activities with earmarked project funding on the basis of their own priorities rather than those of the national government. Primary education up to grade 5 was both a donor and government priority and well supported, but stage

²⁰ A growth rate of 7% and an increase in Education's share of GDP from 3% to 17% (Nellemann with MINED, 1998:13)

two primary education got less support and secondary education, needed, apart from any thing else, to produce graduates to train as teachers, had no donor funding earmarked by 1998. Teacher training itself was supported in a piecemeal fashion despite its strategic importance. Considerably more funding was allocated to construction and rehabilitation of infrastructure than to human resource development, though some capacity building schemes were supported. Some donors such as France and Great Britain were mainly involved at this stage in promoting the teaching of their national languages. The nationwide curriculum development process received support from UNESCO and SIDA but its crucial component, the development of bi-lingual education including the preparation of teaching materials, despite the new law stating that children had the right to learn in a language with which they were familiar, was only sporadically supported.²¹ (MINED data 1997 and MINED 1998).

It was decided to develop an integrated Education Sector Strategy Plan (ESSP) which would incorporate all the ongoing development strategies within one policy and financial framework. The evolution of this plan took the form of a consultative process both at different levels of the Ministry of Education (in school ZIPs and a district directors' national conference for example) between MINED and other ministries, including a close collaboration with the Ministry of Finance over the financial plan, and with the Ministry's donor partners. The aim was to produce a policy framework to facilitate the balanced development of the education sector both in terms of expanding access (quantity) and improving internal efficiency and relevance (quality) (MINED 1998:14-25). It was thus to be a tool for education personnel and at the same time a coordinating mechanism for distributing both government and donor resources effectively. The first hurdle once it had been agreed internally within the Ministry and by the Council of Ministers was to get the donors and financial institutions to endorse it and agree to work within it. This was eventually achieved in 1998 at the Joint Appraisal Meeting between donors and government, even though it was clear that not all the components of the plan were fully developed (critically teacher training strategies lacked coherence and were clearly going to be inadequate to meet the needs of the ESSP and the curriculum public consultation exercise was still in progress). The donors were persuaded to accept the plan not as a blue print but as a 'rolling plan' where the policy direction and strategic approach was defined, but the rate of progress and detailed implementation of individual components would

²¹ It finally became a reality in 2004.

be determined by the economic context and capacity development. (Joint Appraisal Meeting of the Education Strategic Plan, 1998).

As a result of the improved economic situation, MINED was also able to take a more flexible approach to budgeting. The Financial Plan (Nellemann with MINED 1998) predicted that 60% of the budget could be met from government revenue, leaving 40% to be contributed by donors while the World Bank offered a back-up lending facility. Meanwhile the Ministry planners were able demonstrate, that if the optimum funding was not obtained for the first five year period, the implementation would simply proceed more slowly. As a result of this strong bargaining position they got most of what they wanted. However, their plea to donors to switch from earmarked and project funding to budget support in a common funding pool, though accepted in principle by most donors, was not implemented at this stage.²²

The National Human Development Report 2000 (UNDP, 2000) was devoted to the education sector and reviewed the achievements and continuing problems of a decade of recovery. The partnership of government and donors, however imperfect had produced results. Enormous progress had been achieved in restoring the school network. In absolute terms the number of pupils enrolled in EPI (first level primary) exceeded that in 1981, but due to population growth this did not yet represent a restoration of the level of access in relation to the total school age population and universal access was still not in sight. The geographical and gender disparities in school attendance and literacy, exacerbated by the war after the initial gains in inclusion were again being redressed but still significant. The prospect of introducing primary teaching in national languages following successful piloting was hailed as an important step towards inclusion. Of the other levels of schooling, secondary education was described as 'The most worrying problem' due to its 'low quality and efficiency'. (Teaching standards were poor and the curriculum described as 'over academic and encyclopaedic') Enrolment rates of 6% for junior secondary and 1% for pre-university grades were clearly totally inadequate in relation to both the school population and the skills needs of the country. Teacher training and the effective deployment of those already in post were also a continuing concern.²³ The MINED compilers of the report urged that 'the debate on

²² A limited facility involving most but not all donors came into operation in 2003. See Chapter 7.

²³ A special contribution to the report by Dr. Carlos Machili Rector of the Pedagogical University lists 'The 13 Gaps in Teacher Training'. UNDP 2000:63-64

education should be more participatory and democratic' so that it might 'represent a true national undertaking which goes beyond government mandates.' (UNDP 2000:42-62)

This account in 2000 of the state of education in Mozambique, illustrates a common aspect of many post-war societies. The challenge is not merely one of restoring what was destroyed by war but of resuming the struggle to overcome an earlier legacy of underdevelopment and inequality while facing new problems created by post-war demographic, economic and political changes. The general conclusion is that Mozambique and its education service have shown remarkable capacity and achieved a fair degree of success in meeting these challenges. The question raised by this study is to what extent that capacity can be attributed to the efforts of its development partners.

5.5 Multiple Donor Partners and Perspectives

As described in Chapters 1 and 2, concepts and approaches to capacity building aid have shifted several times during the last thirty years. In addition the delivery of aid, especially in conflict situations, is often determined more by strategic interest than best practice. This pattern is clearly evident in Ministry of Education's relations with its international partners. During the first decade of its development, western and socialist development strategy was still largely focussed on strengthening the state in post-colonial societies. Aid to MINED therefore took the form of direct assistance for capacity building based on government needs assessment. Ten years later the dominant ideology was that of shrinking the state and allowing market forces and non-state actors to govern development. This conditionality imposed by the international financial institutions as a result of war and economic crisis, dictated a suspension of development in the education sector and concentration on humanitarian relief and encouraged delivery of piecemeal support through projects. In 1990 international effort once again focussed on education as a key development responsibility of governments and MINED was able to base its recovery strategy around the international theme 'Education for All'. Its post-war struggle to regain the strategic initiative was similarly matched by an international consensus that aid should move from project to sector planning (the Sector Wide Approach Process (SWAP) initiative) and this too is reflected in its dealings with its donor partners and in their literature (SIDA 2000, 2001 for example). Finally as financial institutions, especially the World Bank, recognised the negative social impact of structural adjustment policies on the public services of poor countries, education was recognised as a key

component for poverty reduction and included in the cross-sectoral strategic concept of HIPC (described in Chapter 2) and MINED has once again to tailor its own strategic aims to fit this bill.

5.5.1 MINED's development partners

Before examining the cumulative effects of this experience from the point of view of those who lived through it, the Mozambicans interviewed in the course of the field research, we need to briefly examine their main development partners.

Ideological partners

Unlike most other newly independent African states, due to the total collapse of the colonial regime and rejection of its education policies, support for education was mostly not sought from the former colonial power, but chosen by the new state on largely ideological grounds mainly from amongst its socialist bi-lateral partners. The German Democratic Republic (GDR) was the main partner in the development of the general education system, including crucial support for developing teacher education. Cuba provided technical assistance from its own experience for the development of adult education. Both these countries provided secondary and tertiary education for Mozambican students in their own countries on a considerable scale²⁴. Other socialist block countries were involved on a lesser scale for specific purposes (for example, the USSR provided adult further education advisors and technical education teachers, Bulgaria provided the first scholarships during the armed struggle²⁵ and supported the adult pre-university foundation faculty FACOTRAV).

If we examine this cooperation in the light of the analysis in Chapter 1, Mozambique's 'recipient agenda' is very clear but what was the agenda of its socialist partners? Howell suggests that the GDR like most donors had mixed motives for its overseas aid: an ideological commitment to building 'a new socialist international order'; gaining international recognition; strategic advantage; and as its own economy foundered, increasingly, economic advantage. However, it also declared a belief in aid as mutual benefit, and respect for national sovereignty. (1994:305-6)

²⁴ 1105 Mozambican students, 899 of them at secondary level and the rest tertiary, studied in the GDR up to 1989. (Any still studying at the time of reunification completed their courses in the reunified Germany). 10875 Mozambicans studied in Cuba mainly for secondary education but some stayed on for technical and higher education courses. The last of these returned in the early 1990s. Data from MINED archive 2003.

²⁵ The beneficiaries are now senior staff in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Information Elisabeth Sequeira 2003.

In the field of education development, naturally enough, the ideological and idealistic motives of solidarity, mutuality and respect for sovereignty predominated, especially in the minds of the technical assistance and teaching personnel, who were also of a high professional calibre.²⁶ Nevertheless, in addition to this undoubted idealism there were also career and financial advantages for those from socialist countries who volunteered for international service, as well as the adventure of foreign travel. Much the same mixture of motivations was evident in the cooperantes recruited to fill teaching gaps and to provide technical assistance, by non-governmental solidarity organisations in western countries, from socialist African countries such as Tanzania and Guiné or the political exiles from South Africa and Latin America.

UN partners

UN agencies have generally been less prominent than bi-lateral partners and financial institutions in the development of MINED, but often provided support at crucial moments. UNESCO technical assistance supported the setting up of the Ministry and at other times conducted reviews of its institutional performance and supported the post-war curriculum review. In the early years cooperantes from developing countries were also funded. UN agencies were important to the survival of education in the war years. World Food Programme supported boarding institutions and UNICEF supported the continuation of primary education with the provision of books and materials and assisted the development of special education capacity to handle child trauma. It then supported the early development of recovery strategies under 'Education for All,' continued to support basic education in selected districts, funded professional courses in Portugal and supported the 'Mainstreaming Gender' component of the ESSP. UNDP in the 1990s was an implementing partner for in-service teacher training and school building for the World Bank funded education project and played a crucial role in getting the ESSP accepted by the donor community. Thus UN support has mainly been delivered through earmarked funding customarily tied to time-limited projects, though often linked to current thematic concerns of the international community, which MINED has been able to use to its advantage (MINED data 1997).

²⁶ This was the author's experience of working alongside both GDR professionals and those from other socialist countries (USSR, Bulgaria, Cuba etc.) see also Howell op,cit. 327.

Western Donor partners

During the first decade of MINED's development few western donors were involved. However, SIDA (Swedish International Development Agency) was a significant partner from the beginning and has continued to be the lead agency to the present. In the early days it funded the placement of cooperantes (of various nationalities not necessarily Swedish) and provided project funding for the development of literacy programmes (materials, a training centre, higher education courses) and technical training (Lind, 1985). Like MINED's socialist partners, Swedish involvement was and is ideologically motivated by a commitment to basic education for children and adults both as a human right and a necessary factor for development. It has also believed in supporting partner countries' own education programmes so that its projects were planned within MINED strategy and in the post-war period, SIDA has been the lead agency in the education sector supporting both the ESSP and the common funding pool. (Cruz et al. 1995 and SIDA 2000, 2001). Having said that, it has not been immune to the contradictions of the donor recipient relations discussed in Chapter 1, particularly the selective and therefore distorting effect of project funding and the temptation to assert its own analysis of priorities.²⁷ As a medium-sized neutral European state, Sweden is also clearly motivated in its overseas development policy to enhance its international standing but the idea of mutual benefit from aid is not acknowledged.²⁸

Britain was another early partner of MINED, but with a completely different level and type of engagement. British Council was the first western agency to provide higher education and professional training scholarships, starting from 1983. As a service provider the Council responded to requests from Mozambican institutions and individuals made through donor partners (largely the British Foreign Office and ODA/DfID, but also other bi-lateral donors and UN) and based the allocation on needs assessment, relevance of the courses offered (most in the UK but also in regional and third country institutions) and the availability from other providers (bursaries for education courses were not funded for example until the GDR provision came to an end).²⁹

²⁷ For example, in the 1980s literacy work was generously supported but not post-literacy and further adult education. A recent example was the insistence on a capacity building project for education management in MINED for the implementation of the ESSP. Mozambican staff and the end of project evaluators found that it was not relevant and that financial management and district level capacity building should have been the priority. SIDA 1985 SWEDEC 2003 SIPU International 2003

²⁸ This was made clear by Karin Sverkén SIDA Coordinator for Education Programmes in Mozambique interviewed in 2003.

²⁹ Information Elisabeth Sequeira, former National Director of International Cooperation and Simon Ingram-Hill Director British Council Mozambique. 2003.

Britain's interest in Mozambique throughout most of this period has been mainly strategic. There was a shared interest in securing an end to violent conflict with negotiated transition to majority rule in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Aid including that provided through the British Council reflects this perception of mutuality. It was responsive to requests for scholarships and training to meet the capacity building needs of the administration, industry, law and banking and linguistic studies and the number of bursaries was at its peak in the final years of the war, reflecting both Mozambican and donor anticipation of human resource needs for post-war recovery, but the main support has been in the area of English language teaching, which was of strategic interest to both parties (see Appendix 6). It was only when British international development policy shifted towards poverty reduction in the 1990s that DfID finally became directly involved in mainstream education under the ESSP, supporting the development of distance secondary education.

These examples represent the two poles of engagement amongst the western donor partners of MINED which at the time of the preparation of the ESSP numbered thirteen including the European Union.³⁰

Financial partners

Following the introduction of structural adjustment under IMF rules the World Bank became MINED's main financial partner³¹ and provided the largest share of the funding for the education sector in the post-war recovery period through a series of five year programmes for general education development, infrastructure rehabilitation and capacity building. It put its weight behind the adoption and funding of the ESSP by the donors, while being prepared to provide back-up funding for any shortfall and facilitated its implementation by carrying out a detailed costing of the whole plan on behalf of MINED and the donors. As a development bank it clearly identifies education as a key input for development to which it takes a strategic and comparatively long-term approach and its interventions are thoroughly researched and evaluated. In this regard its aims and general approach are compatible with the Mozambican strategic view of education. However, it is a bank and as such is in the business of providing investment loans for which it has to account to its shareholders. Therefore as described in Chapters 1 and 2, it is driven by shifts in global economic

³⁰ Finland, Canada, Great Britain, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, France, Portugal, Australia, Ireland, Italy, European Union. (MINED data 1997) Other countries such as Brazil and India were implementing partners for components of the donor funded projects.

³¹ Support from the African Development Bank and OPEC are listed in 1997

ideology as well as the pragmatic lessons learned from its systematic evaluation of its programmes. It has moved at a policy level from strict application of structural adjustment rules, to a recognition of the importance of social programmes for poverty reduction, but as Klees (2002) suggests continues to deal in global or at best regional strategy development and on the ground its staff still tend to deliver blueprints rather than support evolving national strategies.³² (Human Development Network, World Bank 2002)

5.5.2 What kind of partnership?

It is evident that MINED could count on a fair degree of good will from its partners who in the main supported its premise that education was crucial to recovery and development. At the same time, as in every aid partnership, genuine solidarity was not unmixed with self-interest and ideological or humanitarian perspectives that were at odds with Mozambican reality. The diversity of partners and the geo-political upheavals in the wider world that impacted on Mozambique's development also resulted in variable levels of funding and support for MINED's needs and objectives and inconsistent approaches both between and within organisations.³³ As discussed in Chapter 1 and 2, organisational learning is often interrupted by short-termism and distracted by external pressures. It was concluded that these failings are probably inevitable unless the recipient partner has the capacity to develop its own agenda and negotiate and coordinate donor support for it. When evaluating the capacity building support for Mozambique's education development, we therefore have to consider not only how it was offered and delivered, but the extent to which MINED, in very difficult conditions, was able to make the best of imperfect assistance that was nevertheless largely offered in good faith.

5.6 Conclusions

This review of the literature, documentation and personal recall of aid partners relating to the development of education in Mozambique, reveals a process of capacity development which was deliberately initiated and supported as a collective learning process, which was retarded but not abandoned during the war years and reasserted in the post-war period, despite the transformation of

³² For example, attempts to introduce cost recovery from Mozambique's absolute poor or cut the salaries of already underpaid teachers.

³³ The interviews with donor representatives confirmed the author's previous experience, that agency staff are rarely briefed or have access to records of their organisation's partnership with MINED for more than the previous five years and often simply receive a briefing from the previous incumbent. As a result organisational memory and historical perspective are lacking in their relations with the education sector.

the political and economic conditions. Education in Mozambique is therefore confirmed by this initial scrutiny as a crucial case of the successful application of Korten's 'learning process approach' to capacity development.

However this study of the secondary material raised some issues that needed to be clarified by analysis of the testimony of the Mozambican interviewees in the field research.

Capacity building of education professionals, both in-service and through scholarships was the main development strategy supported by the donor partners. Several donor representatives interviewed in 2003 expressed the view that as a result MINED had some very able management staff, but continues to be institutionally weak³⁴. This raises two queries. First: what are the actual institutional strengths and weaknesses of MINED? The literature suggests that it demonstrated institutional strength in surviving the war, but the quality and grassroots delivery of service was seriously weakened. Secondly: can individual capacity building lead to institutional strengthening/development of itself and if not what other conditions are necessary?³⁵

MINED demonstrated considerable capacity for strategic planning for recovery in the post-war period. Is this attributable to the success of the early capacity building assistance and its continuation through the war years or to post-war donor support? That is, was the strategic recovery a product of Mozambican initiative in taking advantage of policy shifts in the international aid community or was it driven by them?

In the post-war recovery period MINED and its partners worked to achieve a unified strategic approach to the education sector. To what extent was this achieved and how advantageous has it proved to be?

In order to answer these tactical questions, we need to address the more fundamental issue of the nature of the relationship between the national leadership and its strategic vision for education, its

³⁴ British Council, SIDA and DFID representatives interviewed in Maputo 2003. The donor community has spent much time over the past decades advising on the restructuring of the central Ministry. The latest effort by the consulting firm Ernst and Young was underway at the time of the author's field research in 2003. However despite the fact that it was the local structures that were least developed and worst affected by the war, capacity building support at this level has not had consistent support.

³⁵ My thanks to Agneta Lind Regional Education Adviser SIDA, for making this query at an early stage of the field work.

technical and financial assistance partners and the Mozambican public aspirations and participation. Was the core concept of the role of education for personal and national development (despite ideological and cultural difference) shared? Was it that that sustained education provision throughout all the political changes and multiple donors? What were the real outcomes of this national capacity building exercise? Did the government strategy meet the expectations of the public? Did it create conditions for personal development? Did it create conditions for national development? Was it inclusive and equitable? Did it contribute to good governance and peace in the long term?

All of these issues were touched on by the Mozambican participants as they reflected on their personal experiences, which are the subject of the next chapter. In the second stage of the interviews they were asked to discuss the role of government, international cooperation and the public as well as the impact of the war in order to shed more light on the nature of these relationships and their impact on capacity development. These testimonies are analysed in Chapter 7 and the concepts they reveal are used in Chapter 8 as yardsticks for analysing the nature of governance in contemporary Mozambican society.

CHAPTER 6

CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT THROUGH REVOLUTION, WAR AND PEACE.

Introduction

The macro-picture of the development of the education system during the crucial period of recovery from colonial underdevelopment and the war for independence, descent into civil war and economic collapse and the second period of recovery and development in the 1990s, are chronicled in Chapter 5. This chapter seeks to understand that experience from the inside through the experience of individuals involved in learning and working within the institution charged with building the capacity of the emerging nation while at the same time creating itself. It is therefore the personal data recorded in response to the first stage of the interviews with the sample of education personnel and parents in the field research that provide the material for the analysis.

As described in Chapter 4, one idea that emerged from the exploratory research was to ask education staff to describe the key moments and formative influences for their development as education professionals. The parents group, though not asked this specific question, also volunteered comments in the course of their discussion of their experience of education. Their reflections graphically demonstrated the fact that the capacity of individuals evolves as a result of the complex interaction between individuals and the social, economic and political context in which they find themselves. This chapter starts by examining these personal experiences through the participants' own evaluation and then examines their factual accounts of their education and career in response to the curriculum questionnaire, which was the starting point for each interview.

We can start by reminding ourselves of who the participants were: a quota sample of staff from all levels of the Ministry of Education, both teachers and administrators and a small group of parents contacted on a more ad hoc basis (see Chapter 4 above). Crucially, as we will see in more detail below, all these individuals had direct experience of learning and developing a career during these crucial years, as well as being significant actors in the learning and development of other individuals and education institutions. What did they see as the most significant influences directing them along this path?

6.1 Key moments and influences.

In the following analysis the participants' responses when asked to describe the key influences in their career have been grouped in four types of positive influence in developing a career in education and a fifth group of negative experiences, that held back professional development often by their psychological as well as practical impact.

6.1.1 Personal influences.

25 participants from all four categories (including 5 in the parents' group) mentioned the personal influence and intervention of older people at critical stages for their educational and professional development. Parents and other close family members were the most commonly mentioned, particularly by those who attended school before Independence.

They did not study, but they had the courage to send us to school

Category D. (Child of illiterate parents). [f]

They gave importance to education - they had 8 sons and daughters and they all studied

Category B (Child of illiterate parents) [m]

Others mentioned the influence of a teacher or the critical intervention of a friend, priest or colleague.

I was stuck (at home) until Don Alexandre¹ (then a priest, now archbishop) saw this and asked my father to send me to a training college.

Category C. [f]

There were people who were role models - teachers and others

Category B. [m]

The person who influenced me most was a white accountant - my boss but also a friend - it was he who persuaded me to study and paid the enrolment fees.

Category D.[m]

¹ Don Alexandre dos Santos, the first black Mozambican priest and now first Cardinal. A generation older than the senior education staff interviewed in this study (age 79) he pioneered the path from a rural peasant home through mission school and seminary to a career in the priesthood and as a lifelong educator. He also played a crucial role as mediator in the peace process. Interview in *Domingo* 3rd August 2003 to commemorate his 50 years as a priest.

A maths teacher in 9th grade. I like maths and I like teaching maths.

Category C.[f]

Several senior Mozambican colleagues (including two national directors interviewed in the study) were mentioned as key influences for career development by 6 of the education personnel.

My head of department, Brazão Mazula², who was always concerned about the professional development of his subordinates, giving them opportunities to gain experience and assume greater responsibilities.

Category A. [m]

I went to work in the...National Directorate for Primary Education, with the late Dr Manuel Golias³ - an important influence.

Category B. [m]

The then Director of the Faculty, now National Director... was my teacher - she was very good and a very good, simple person

Category C. (Had to interrupt a degree course for family reasons.)[m]

Four interviewees also mentioned the importance for professional development of living and working with fellow students and colleagues.

Through keeping company (that was the style of my parents) with many people - colleagues - I learnt a lot.

Category B. [f]

² **Brazão Mazula**, Rector of the University of Eduardo Mondlane, His path also led from mission school to the priesthood and a career in education and public service. After Independence he left the priesthood and worked in the Ministry of Education and Culture. Like many of his contemporaries in the Ministry, he studied abroad on a scholarship, in Brazil, where he completed a doctorate in 1993. Returning to Mozambique in 1994, he was appointed President of the Electoral Commission, which ran and supervised the first multi-party election following the Rome Peace Accord. Mazula, 1995 Cover note on the author.

³ **Manuel Golias** was mentioned by more than one interviewee with some emotion, due to his recent sudden death. His career was also typical of his generation of senior education staff. From a rural peasant home in Tete, he went to mission school and then 'Normal' training college in the colonial period. He was one of the first group to study for a bachelor degree in education at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, immediately after independence. Having worked as a teacher at all levels of the SNE, he held various posts in MINED up to National Director. He then obtained a masters degree in education from Sussex University, through the British Council and after a period teaching in the Higher Education Institute (ISP) played a crucial role (as senior project officer for GTZ/PEB)), in the post-war recovery and development of education in Sofala Province. Golias, 1993 cover note and personal information.

Living a lot in boarding hostels...companionship with other people, learning many things, which otherwise (coming from a remote area) I would not have learnt.

Category C. [m]

6.1.2 Personal motivation

Personal motivation was undoubtedly essential to the success of all the interviewees and was referred to in one way or another by 22 of the education personnel and two parents.

Determination, the desire to learn...working as administrative staff with grade 11, I understood that what I knew was not enough...always wanting to learn more. I made applications to get scholarships.

Category A. [m]

I'm not yet satisfied with the work I am doing - being a teacher was to get employment - I'm content but I still have the goal to achieve higher education - always struggle to progress.

Category C. [m]

Motivation was often expressed as pride in achievement, (mentioned by 10 interviewees). Three of the interviewees, two administrative staff and one science teacher, were proud to have written textbooks.

The pride of having a better education than my parents.

Category D. [m]

The graduation ceremony - as a mother of four - when I received the paper in front of my children, I felt everything is possible. It was an incentive for the children to take more responsibility to manage to study, now that their mother managed it while working.

Category B.(receiving a Licenciatura certificate at the Pedagogical University) [f]

The second most commonly cited motivation in all groups of education personnel was a love of study for its own sake. Several apparently stayed in the teaching profession or valued it because of the access it gave to higher education.

From 6th grade I was interested in school (before I just went because my parents sent me). When I was placed in Namaacha (training college) I was interested in studying - I wanted to be an economist because I always liked mathematics.

Category B. (Currently applying for a place at the Pedagogical University.) [f]

I like to study and learn new things. In 1990 I was the only one to ask to study (for a degree at the Pedagogical University)

Category C. [m]

The UP was the culmination...one learnt new things about Portuguese...it was achieving the maximum. I was 49 years old - I studied with youngsters I had taught in grade 9.

Category C (referring to a Licenciatura degree at the Pedagogical University)[m]

For three who struggled out of the most disadvantaged childhoods earning a first salary and realising they had left absolute poverty and dependence behind was a seminal moment.

When I started work, I had no salary for six months (this bureaucratic delay was normal) then I began to live at my own expense for the first time.

Category B. [f]

6.1.3 Working experience

More than half the education personnel described particular working experiences that increased their professional commitment and capacity. For many, especially the senior staff, it was their early experiences of working (often compulsorily, see below) in education.

Perhaps it was my first pupils when I was sent to Beira - in the difficult conditions of that time - I felt I couldn't fail them.

Category A. [f]

The first (influence) was when I started my career. It was the first time to work with people better qualified than me - the classes were very undisciplined, agitated - it was a learning process.

Category B. [m]

When I started teaching grade 7...Lesson planning was an extremely important activity, every Saturday, and the more experienced teachers contributed their experiences. It was training on the ground - but complete.

Category C. [m]

Many others referred to challenging assignments, that they were at first not sure they could handle, but which in the end increased their confidence and capacity. More senior staff clearly relished these situations as opportunities.

When I was called on to be pedagogical director, I felt I couldn't do it, but a (woman) teacher gave me support in learning the work and then proposed me for the job.

Category C. [m]

The (secondary) network is not sufficient to absorb the graduates from basic education - above all there is a lack of space, lack of classrooms...the furniture is insufficient and the pupils move the desks from one classroom to another leading to their rapid deterioration - you need a new capacity to manage this situation.

Category C. [m]

When I was appointed as director of the school.... it was a school with many problems, with the teachers and so on - I felt I was not capable but I accepted the challenge and at the end of seven years I was happy to leave the school in a different condition...the teachers were more friends than colleagues.

Category B. [f]

Being Provincial Director is what I really like ...it is a rare opportunity to develop some things, ideas that I have.

Category A. [f]

Six practitioners mentioned that their personal development and job satisfaction came from teaching and contact with their students. Many other interviewees at all levels mentioned that they enjoyed teaching and contact with students while recounting the details of their curriculum.

After this (pedagogical degree) course I can now give lessons at night... As a person I gained confidence (I used to be a timid person) - and greater facility in speaking.

Category B. [f]

The positive thing (about teaching) is the company of the pupils, getting to know different personalities.

Category B. [m]

I still like working with children. (after 29 years)

Category C. [f]

I like working with children.

Category C. (in first job) [f]

Four from all three categories, mentioned involvement in activities outside their education duties as formative experiences. As the largest group of educated personnel in the country education staff have frequently been co-opted to assist in various national programmes, especially in the two critical development periods, post-independence and post-war. More recently, young professionals have had a range of experiences as students.

Participating in the country's development programmes (the general census, electoral bodies etc.).

Category A. [m]

The Circle of Peace (for reconciliation) - a course on theatre actors as a means of communicating the peace - that made a big impression on me - the National Dance Company was involved ...

Category B. [m]

In the year when I couldn't study (gap between school and university) I worked as a teacher in a community school. I did a course in IT and bookkeeping and worked in the Catholic Church's Radio Manica.

Category C. [f]

6.1.4 Institutional measures for capacity building

The formative experiences most commonly cited all education personnel and by four parents are not surprisingly formal education and training and capacity building organised by the Ministry of Education.

Doing grade 6 after Independence? Everything was brand new - we had the will to study and do what the teachers said -there was the will to educate the children.

Category D. [f]

I did grades 1 to 3 in the colonial time, 4 and 5 in the time of the arrival of FRELIMO - in the colonial time I would not have studied to grade 5.

Category D. [m]

Going into grade 5 (1977). I never expected that I could enter grade 5. It was the first time to pick up a dictionary and books.

Category B. [m]

The introduction of the SNE. (National System of Education)

Category A. [m]

These parents and education personnel clearly felt they owed their development to the extension of access and development of the national education system by the national government after independence.

Although the majority of older personnel were directed or induced to teach soon after independence (see section 6.2.3 below) only 5 mentioned it as a critical moment, clearly because they thought that they would not otherwise have gone into education. One provincial head of department seems to have seen it as positive: 'at times it is not a bad thing to be directed, without that I would not have made it'. The others were at best sceptical but mostly negative. However, they seem to have 'got to like it' or made the best of it. The fact that they remain, mostly in senior posts, and have not left

education, as many of their contemporaries have, suggests that it was in the longer term a positive influence.

The needs of the country - that directed me to a teaching career- at the beginning I was revolted by it - but I got to like being a teacher - I don't that much like being in the Ministry.

Category A. [f]

Not having a choice at the beginning of my career. I had the luck (but against my will) to go for teaching - I wanted to be an economist - others went to the army. It derailed my career, but I got to accept it. My present work is more like what I wanted.

Category B. [m]

Being a teacher was compulsory - but I got to like it, but it was not my decision. Even the subjects were decided on the basis of grades - that is why today the majority of the education cadres are not in education.

Category C. [f]

When they called me to be a teacher in 1979 when I was still studying - to help the school - it seems I showed some aptitude for teaching biology and from there I was directed into the teaching profession. But in the Faculty instead of doing biology I did history. In principle I did not want to be a teacher, but I always liked teaching.

Category C. [m]

Having entered the education service, certain opportunities for further formal academic and professional training were regarded as very important formative experiences, while others were not mentioned as significant and appear to have been just something they did for career reasons. (No one in the A group for example mentioned an overseas MA as a key experience.) Often it was the first, sometimes emergency, training, or the first experience of higher education that was seen as the most significant. In other cases the opportunity to study to update professional skills after many years in service was greeted with enthusiasm.

Since the majority of the education personnel received professional and academic training in the Mozambican institutions created after independence with the support of foreign technical assistance and funding, it is not surprising that these experiences are the most commonly cited by individuals in all groups but predominantly by the teachers, whose initial training was provided in country and who often returned to formal study at a much later stage in their career as these institutions expanded their provision.

Being sent (free) to the university and directed into the teaching profession.

Category B. (referring to the University of Eduardo Mondlane (UEM) bachelor of education degrees in the early post-independence period.) [m]

The course in the Faculty (UEM bachelor degree) was very important - it threw me out of a difficult life - to develop academically and culturally.

Category C. [m].

The history and geography course - learning methodologies, how to elaborate texts and get more out of reading.

Category B. (mid-career (Licenciatura at the UP) [f]

This last training opened me more, with methodologies at a higher level - the training as a 'professor de posto' (colonial teacher training) - at the time was the best, but!!!! (a gesture indicating no comparison)

Category C. (recent training in a pedagogical institute) [f]

When I went to the IMP, where I learnt psychology, pedagogy and methodologies, - it was very important - it opened my eyes.

Category C. (mid career training in a pedagogical institute) [m]

Some individuals in all groups (but no women in groups B and C) studied abroad on scholarships provided by the host countries or by UN agencies. As described in Chapter 5, for the first ten to fifteen years after independence, this measure was used to expand access to secondary and higher education and rapidly to produce qualified cadres to develop the national institutions. Senior staff were also sent for strategic training later in their career. For some, these were key opportunities that allowed them to develop intellectually or professionally.

Having gone from here -- I would not have managed to study here, although it was difficult to be out of the country. In Cuba we suffered a lot but it did for the purposes of getting an education.

Category C. (secondary and technical education in Cuba) [m]

Going to Cuba - a big moment in my life - the first time away from the family - a very different style of education.

Category B (completed second level primary to degree level in Cuba) [m]

The life of a student abroad in Europe (I never expected to study abroad) - it was difficult (studying in a language as hard as German) but good in the end.

Category B (Diplom graduate from the DDR) [m]

The formation in Paris, which apart from being good (technically) was multi-cultural and comparative because it brought together students from many countries.

Category A (sent by MINED to a specialist one year course at UNESCO) [m]

Learning to share power, the distribution of tasks - to come back with a concept of how to direct. School directors are so often not trained but are punished for their shortcomings.

Category A. (Sent by MINED on a four month course in school administration and management in Portugal)

[m]

Experiences of in-service capacity building and non-formal training, by Mozambican colleagues or foreign technical assistance, were clearly regarded as just as important, (some times more important) for professional development as formal study, by fourteen of the interviewees. However, as with their formal education, some donor funded training was simply listed in response to the questionnaire as something they had attended and others failed to mention it at all until prompted.

Cuba where I learnt (in-service tutorials while teaching in the Mozambican school) that the teacher is supposed to enable the pupils to pass not make them fail!

Learning in service, first from the Mozambican boss...second by daily work with two 'cooperantes', (Spanish and German) both people with much experience (in age over 50) and high academic qualification...The combination was a very effective form of capacity building.

Category A [m]

The short up-grading courses in the years 78/79 - they helped me a lot. It was the first time in my life to learn these things.

Learning with the Brazilians, the pedagogy of texts, we didn't have formal training but following them we were doing it.

Category B. [f]

Short in-service training courses: 15 days in 1987 (that made a big impression on me) a course on methodologies for community education (interviews, context studies etc.). It was led by Judith Marshall, a Canadian cooperante;.....1995, working with Teresa Veloso⁴ on the preparation of literacy materials in the Macua language... 1996 Training about gender led by Bridget Walker.⁵

Category B [m]

The many possibilities to take part in capacity building courses. Category B [m]

In-service training - it created new habits in my work - it was positive for my career - it is an addition, addition, to that which I learnt in the training centre, which already had assistance from OSUWELA⁶ in 1998.

Category C. [m]

⁴ Former National Director of Adult Education, now PROGRESO.

⁵ MINED/UNICEF consultant.

⁶ Project in Nampula funded by the Netherlands Government.

I like the books and seminars for exchange of experiences with other teachers organised by education. I really liked the distance learning - we want more! ...Its the only way to study for those with small children and families.

Category C. [f]

6.1.5 Negative experiences.

More than half the education personnel mentioned negative experiences which affected their personal development or their work and career. However, it was clear from other sections of the interview, that there were others who were deeply affected by certain experiences, which they alluded to elsewhere but did not choose to mention explicitly in response to this question. Others clearly excluded personal experiences which they recounted elsewhere, from consideration in this context. Those who felt satisfied with their achievements, such as the obviously highly successful A category did not dwell on whatever disadvantages they had overcome on the way or saw overcoming them as positive formative experience. Two of the interviewees for example at the start of their career, had worked in Beira, during the war, when the city was without power and water. One quoted above, sent against her will, discovered a vocation for teaching in the experience, the other, who had idealistically volunteered to go there, found he could not cope.

Direct experience of war was of course the most commonly cited and the most deeply felt negative influence. Eight practitioners, often working or studying in the rural districts at the time, referred to war experiences at this point. Another referred to the assassination of his father when discussing the causes of the war. Two others, perhaps the most deeply affected, did not at any point describe exactly what had happened to them.

In Monapo, the effects of the war: receiving many children from different areas - receiving the parents with the children - we had to convince them to allow the children to stay in the school - they were afraid to separate from them (even for the hours of school) - and then there were refugee teachers as well. We had to receive and support them.

Category B. [f]

What affected me most were experiences of war - I almost didn't escape -I was struck in the chest... and fell, the bandit turned his attention to others and I crawled into hiding, but many others were taken away, some died on the journey.

Category C. [m]

Military life was the hardest, after having been abroad - I was ready to kill myself but others counselled me that everything would come to an end - and I came out unscathed, thanks to God. The war derailed my career.

Category C (sent for military service after schooling and technical education in Cuba) [m]

In the time of the war, learning was very disturbed, receiving the influx of pupils from the districts - a difficult time - the money for salaries always arrived late - many couldn't cope and abandoned education.

Category C.[m]

Other negative experiences are of a kind that occurs in any society but where the quality of the institutional response is an indicator of an organisation's capacity to 'cherish' its valuable human resources. Five practitioners expressed frustration at the lack of resources and opportunities to progress in their work or career at the present time. This feeling is clearly a result of higher expectations and demands post-war which far exceed resources and the ability to distribute them equitably. In the war, the lack of resources and opportunities was clearly much worse, but understood to be beyond anyone's control now it leaves education personnel feeling unappreciated.⁷

Today there is the frustration at not having the means to work - without a computer for the department and working with a single typist not trained in IT.

Category B. [m]

There's a lack of promotions - it's slow, it takes many years of not being re-graded - you're not appreciated, only when you are about to leave (i.e. retire).

Category C. [m]

After 29 years I have the same salary as a new teacher - there is no longer a long-service bonus. Even if the government doesn't have (means) it should make an effort to provide incentives.

Category C. [f]

I'm trying to get into the UP - I did the exam but for any specialty there are 15 vacancies and 2000 candidates.

Category B. [f]

⁷ The parents group in Machava expressed a very clear view that the government had to start rewarding teachers and other public service employees better if they wanted, not only to retain them but also preserve high standards of professional conduct. (See discussion below, section. 6. 2.6 on the reasons for post-war overcrowding and shortage of funds).

Five other practitioners had experienced difficulties in working relationships that had seriously affected their career and work, in the two cases below, as a result of criminal behaviour that was difficult to prove. Only the second most recent case was dealt with promptly and supportively.

A bitter experience in the 1990s...the whole exam commission was investigated (for fraud), arrested by the police...handed over to the PIC (investigative police)...it was a long worrying process and the one who was guilty only stayed in prison for a month (because he had means) but was dismissed from his job...and later committed suicide.

Category B. [m]

I started to work well in the other school... but this year there were problems - I didn't feel good - it was (sexual) harassment, the head made difficulties for me... I went to the ZIP and the coordinator resolved the problem and I was transferred.

Category C. [f]

Clearly, all the participants who lived through these turbulent years pursued their education and careers while coping with many family responsibilities. Most of the women mentioned pregnancies and childcare while explaining their curriculum (including interrupting courses, not taking up scholarships etc.) but did not refer to it here as a significant influence on their career development. Some men referred to terrible events that overtook their close relatives in the war, but also did not relate it to their careers. However four men in the education service and one parent described periods when they felt under pressure because of their responsibility as head of family.

Many sad deaths of relatives between 1992 and 2000. I was very much alone with the responsibility for the immediate family.

Category C. [m]

It was difficult at the UP to leave the family in Nampula at a difficult time - it affected me psychologically and for that reason I interrupted the course.

Category C. [m]

6.2. Education and Careers.

Many of the particular circumstances mentioned by some as key influences, are evident in the factual accounts and comments given by the others in response to the general questionnaire. The

parents group, who were not questioned in detail on this, gave similar accounts when considering their own education and that of their children (6.2.6).

6.2.1 Childhood and family background. (education personnel)

The age group of the sample at once indicates that the majority in all groups spent all or part of their childhood under colonial rule and pursued their careers after independence. Only a few of the younger teachers, three who reached school age at or shortly after independence and five who were born about that time, started school in the national education system, mostly before 1980 and spent their formative years in this period of social revolution and then war.

Place of origin

As described in Chapter 5, there was a strong urban bias in the provision of education in the colonial period, a rapid expansion of basic education to the rural areas after independence, followed by a retreat to the urban areas during the war. The rural/urban ratio of the different age groups reflects this. Of the policy-makers in the Ministry, who had all made a head start in education in the colonial period, three were raised in urban areas, and the other two were only able to pursue their education by lodging in a city. In the B group, on the other hand, which includes a significant number who completed their schooling after independence, the proportion of those from rural areas (70%) is closer to the proportion (80%) in the general population. In the teachers group, C which includes the younger age group, the proportion of those from rural areas is just over half. Bearing in mind that the schools sampled were urban biased, the under-representation of rural backgrounds probably also reflects the effect of the war in closing rural schools and training colleges and driving the rural population into the urban areas.

The tiny minority of the population educated in the colonial period also came from quite a limited number of advantaged locations, the cities and certain rural centres with missions or in a few cases, company schools.⁸ This was the bias which the post-independence government tried to address by distributing better qualified staff from different regions around the country and to the central ministry. The staff interviewed in MINED (category A and B), who were all recruited in the early

⁸ For example, in the central provinces, outside the cities there were important missions in some areas such as Buzi, and Amatongas where some of our sample studied but no school in, for example Marínguè (which later became the headquarters of the rebel movement) until the colonial government opened one-teacher schools in 1969. (Internal research undertaken by the author for DPE Sofala, 1974)

years after independence, seem to reflect this policy: only one comes from Maputo itself, the others from provinces in the south and north. Almost half the education staff in all categories in the southern provincial authorities are from other provinces in the south and centre of the country. However, in Nampula only three of the 13 interviewed came from the neighbouring province of Zambesia: two from Gurué, where the tea company provided schooling in the colonial period and one from Quelimane the provincial capital.

Language

As already discussed, language has also been and remains, a cause of disadvantage in the education system, starting with the colonial insistence on Portuguese as the language of instruction and 'civilization' and continuing after independence with the decision to promote Portuguese as the 'language of national unity.' It is not surprising, therefore that over half of our sample, who became successful pupils and then teachers, either spoke Portuguese at home or had started to learn it before starting school at a time when something like 90% of the general population in their parents' age group knew no Portuguese.

Literacy and education

The parental background of the education personnel is also not typical as regards literacy and education. Only just over a quarter of the sample came from a totally illiterate home at a time when about 90% of the population was illiterate. In a few cases one or more parents had learnt to read in their mother tongue through the church or as migrant labourers to neighbouring countries, (literacy not recognised in any census data until recently) but more than half were literate in Portuguese and had often completed at least the first level of primary education. The literacy of their mothers (17 out of 37 including one case of a literate mother and illiterate father) is particularly unusual given the estimated 95% female illiteracy rate at independence.

Gender

Parental bias against girls' education, evident in the general population and still a grave concern in rural areas and in the northern provinces, appears not to have affected the women in the sample. Several women were trained as teachers with their parents' support in the colonial time. Several men in the sample also made a point of mentioning that their parents educated girls and boys alike. However, looking more closely at the women's background and recognising that they still only constitute a minority in this sample and in the education service as a whole, it becomes clear that

they are an even less typical group than the men. In all categories, and on all the criteria discussed in this section they are, with very few exceptions, from the more advantageous backgrounds (urban, Portuguese speaking, literate mother and father giving high priority to their education etc.). In other words, without this parental commitment and family advantage it was more difficult for women than men to make it in education through the colonial and immediate post-war period. However, there is one very clear example of how the post-independence affirmative policy towards disadvantaged groups, did enable one daughter of a single illiterate rural mother (but with the big advantage of parental commitment) to succeed:

(There were) difficult phases of my childhood: my grandmother and mother didn't have the means to support me to go to secondary school - the annual payment of 3000 meticaïs. After three months, the deadline for paying, my grandmother came to the school to hand in mats she had made to pay for the boarding fees. After that I got help from the government through the school, as a child in poverty, they bought clothes and books etc. and I didn't have to pay fees. Category B. [f]

Attitude to education

As we have just seen, parental commitment to education could prove decisive when everything else seemed against the chance of an education. In the colonial period, the fact that parents secured education for their children, was itself an indication of commitment, given the discouragements and the cost.

My parents gave a lot of priority to educating their children. They waited many years before building a house in order to pay the costs of education.

Category A. Son of a bricklayer and a subsistence farmer.

Post-independence, although primary education was free, parents, especially single parents, struggled to meet the other costs of keeping their children in school and at secondary level, did have to pay fees, buy books and in some cases meet lodging or boarding costs. There were indications of this parental effort in the accounts of six of the younger participants who started school after independence.

Economic status

The economic status of the family was also critical for their children's education. None of our sample's parents were wealthy, but the majority (30 of the 37) had sufficient means to allow their children to study without prejudice at least to the completion of primary grades, without repetition or interruption. That is, though they no doubt did odd jobs and helped with work in the home, they did not have to work for their subsistence while at school. The majority of fathers were skilled or semi-skilled or in some position of responsibility and while few mothers were in paid employment, the majority were described as working a small holding (*machamba*) to feed the family or as peasant farmers.

Seven (one woman and six men) seem to have been economically disadvantaged and although bright, as their subsequent careers show, repeated grades and missed school due to economic difficulties. Some, because they were 'good pupils' were eventually given financial support to continue: some by the mission where they studied and others after independence by the government or ruling party.

Other social factors

The loss of one or both parents was the most common cause of economic problems. Single parents had no margin to tide them over the difficult times. Single mothers or grandmothers raising children by subsistence farming or market trading lacked the back-up of a wage or another food provider. The single father in the sample was a skilled worker, but was simply unable to fund schooling and keep his son during episodes of unemployment. It seems that two productive parents were needed to see a child through school. Those who lost both parents simply stopped schooling until they could find outside help or were rescued by a relative.

In 1976 my parents died in a train accident. After finishing grade 4 I had one year out of school looking for a place and the means to live in the city. I made a representation to the FRELIMO party, which took me in and gave me lodging. I helped in youth work and went to work in a cooperative for 1000 meticaïs a month, which was enough to eat etc. Category C.[m]

Apart from the effect of the war (discussed separately below) illness was the only other event that interrupted schooling for two women. Cases of frequent school moves, for example due to a

father's employment, or parents' divorce, seem not to have affected progress in education, as long as the parental means and commitment continued.

Family connections and status

Many families were able to improve their children's chances by taking advantage of their connections or status and this was particularly significant in the colonial period, when the prevailing government policy deterred Mozambicans from aspiring to much education.

Assimilado status was a huge advantage in the colonial period and about one third of those whose childhood was spent in the colonial period came from families with this status. That is they come from a minority group that at the time probably accounted for less than 5% of the population. They spoke Portuguese at home and were able to immediately enrol in official schools or in the 'common curriculum' courses at missions, by-passing the 'indigenous' system.

Living near to and having close links to a mission, was a significant factor in gaining access to education in the colonial period especially in the rural areas. Five were closely associated with catholic missions, which in two cases supported their education beyond grade 4. Five others were associated with the protestant missions. Parents in these groups were either active members of the churches (several learnt to read the bible) or in some cases, employees.

Parents and family members employment often provided opportunities or advantages for education. Most obviously, those whose parents or relatives were teachers. Two orphans, in particular, were helped by teacher uncles. Two other interviewees, whose parents worked as servants for Portuguese colonial employers, seem to have been assisted. Three of the sample had a Régulo⁹ father who, though not necessarily educated himself, had the status to ensure education for his children. (in one case 30 boys and girls!)

The extended family was also an important back-up in the education of children. Grandparents played a significant role in a number of other cases beside that of the orphans already mentioned. In the south it seems to have been customary to send children to spend time living with grandparents, to secure their knowledge of their own culture and language and to spread the burden of raising a

⁹ Traditional leader appointed as a local official by the Portuguese.

large family. In one case it was a grandfather teacher who organised the grandson's enrolment in school. Godparents played this role for a goddaughter and helped with funding her secondary education. Being able to stay with relatives in town made it possible for some others to enrol in secondary education. The alternative was the expense of paying for lodging, often shared with other older siblings.

6.2.2 Schooling and professional training.

The first general observation that can be made about the data provided by the education personnel on their schooling, professional and academic training and careers is that for the majority, career and education became inextricably linked, in some cases on the completion of primary education, but in all cases by the completion of secondary level.

From that date my professional career began and academic and professional education were fitted in with work activities. Category A. [m]

This reflects the age and time at which most completed basic schooling and the very limited access to higher levels which were controlled directly by government or its agents before and after independence. Academic study was facilitated, not for its own sake, but as part of the agenda of government: in the colonial period, as part of the regime's 'civilizing mission' and in the post-independence period, as a result of the priority given to extending access to basic education. We can therefore clearly see the hand of government (colonial and then national) in the individual career paths of our sample.

Colonial policies and strategies

The nature of the colonial education policies and practice have been discussed in Chapter 5. In this context, the parents and grandparents of our sample, as we have seen above, strove to extract some advantage for their children, but could only do so within the terms laid down by the regime's 'indigenous' policy.

Educational opportunities for their children could be enhanced by acquiring 'assimilado' status. However this advantage was bought at the price of distancing themselves from their own culture.

My parents were assimilados, speaking Macua at home was forbidden. Category B [m]

My parents spoke Portuguese with the children - to each other they spoke Chuabo. For that reason I only speak Chuabo with difficulty. In the Zambeze valley colonialism penetrated deeply - even the poorest families spoke Portuguese - they preferred badly spoken Portuguese to the local language. Category B [f]

They were assimilados - father was a Régulo. Father spoke Portuguese, but he couldn't read or write it - he could read and write Lomwe, (which he) learnt at the protestant church. Mother spoke a little Portuguese - she had difficulty in replying...but she understood.

Category B. [m] from rural Zambezia.

However, as discussed in the previous chapter, the Portuguese policy of assimilation was largely unsuccessful in creating a culturally Portuguese sub-class loyal to the regime. There is clear evidence of this in our sample: all but one of this group, who learnt later, had learnt their local language before they started school, either in the home (there were at least two bi-lingual homes, contrary to the rules) or in their 'social environment'. In at least one case of assimilado parents, there was a deliberate strategy to ensure this.

They spoke Portuguese at home...but from fear that their children would not be able to communicate with their grandparents...sent (me) for two years to live with my grandmother in the country to learn the language and culture. Category B. [m]

The option open to those who did not qualify as assimilados, was the 'indigenous' education run by the catholic missions. As we have seen much of this especially pre 1966 did not go much beyond learning the catechism and some literacy and numeracy.

You went before to play under the mango trees, to learn the catechism, social habits etc. Category A.[f]
There were phases - first grade 'backward' under a tree to learn Portuguese and counting with an abacus, then first grade advanced. After that my father transferred me to the City of Inhambane, where I lived with a family and started grade one again in a nun's college - an 'indigenous' school - up to rudimentary grade three, then transfer to 'elementary' grade 3 up to completing grade 4.

Category C. [f]

Another option taken up by a number of the sample group were those protestant missions that were tolerated by the authorities. These were in many cases more 'progressive' in their methods and attitudes to the indigenous population, often working and teaching in their mother tongue. However,

they too promoted the brighter pupils in the hope that they would become religious leaders in their community.¹⁰

The mission in Chicunque, (United Methodist) because it was progressive, was viewed with suspicion by the authorities, who set up an official school next door in competition. My father thought it advisable to transfer his son to the official school to complete this level. (grade 4)

Category A. [m]

Whatever school the children attended, they could only obtain primary certificates and progress to teacher training or secondary education by passing an official exam in Portuguese. Reaching that point tended to be a long process. Those of our sample who followed this path took between five and nine years to complete grade 4. As a result, and due to starting school at an average age of eight, they were on average fourteen before they completed this level and under the colonial system mostly not eligible to continue. However, many at this stage found themselves under a national government with a different policy.

In this group too there is evidence of taking advantage of the educational opportunities without taking on board the religious agenda. One participant, who was sent by the church to a seminary for secondary education, left before completing the final grade and worked in a factory, because he did not want 'to go on to the priesthood'. The father of another participant was educated at a seminary and went into teaching in a mission school, but then used his qualifications to pursue his real vocation and train as a nurse.

As we can see, although the education personnel are mostly those who managed to benefit from the colonial education system, it required considerable effort to overcome or circumvent the barriers built into a system designed to ensure that the majority of the Mozambican population continued to fulfil their role as a pool of rural labour. These difficulties are reflected in our sample by two statistics - the length of time it took to complete first level primary education, discussed above and the number of late school enrolments in the rural areas, due to the scarcity of schools (seven started at ten years or older). Children had to be old enough to walk the long distances to attend them or to lodge or board away from home. This legacy of the urban bias of colonial education was not easily

¹⁰ As in the case of Eduardo Chivambo Mondlane, UN Diplomat and then first President of FRELIMO. Khambane and Clerc 1990.

turned around and continued to affect those of our sample who started school in the first years of the national government. For example, a woman who started school aged twelve after independence walked 8km to and from school in the province of Maputo. In Nampula in the last years of colonial rule and the first years after independence three of the men moved school two or three times before completing grade 4, each time further away from home, because the local schools in their rural homes did not teach more than the initial grades.

The national education system: policies and strategies

Primary schooling

While the majority of the sample group had completed or were already enrolled in the first level of schooling before independence, two women and four men undoubtedly owed their access to primary schooling to the rapid expansion of schools in the rural communities by the national government in the first years of independence. Nevertheless, it still required some commitment to see it through.

A primary school of the population, to grade 2 (it didn't give any more grades). Then in the mission at Malema (by then nationalized). I lived in the hostel. Then I completed grade 4 in a nearby national school. (I left the mission because of the bad conditions in the hostel).

Category C. [m] started school aged 13 in the year of independence.

The four younger teachers in our sample, still in their twenties, can also be seen to have benefited from reaching school age at a time when the SNE was sufficiently developed (though increasingly under attack in the rural areas) and offered them the chance to enrol (free) in their first school between the ages of five and seven, with the prospect of continuing to complete primary education in the same school or at least in the same district. Thus the schooling of those who enrolled after independence is generally characterised by an earlier start and more rapid progress than in the colonial indigenous system. Nevertheless, we should not forget, the continuing concerns (discussed in Chapter 5) about the quality of the system and the high repetition and drop-out rates of the less able and disadvantaged (our sample, after all are by definition the success stories).¹¹

¹¹ The parents' (Category D) comments on the comparison between their experience of colonial education and the experience of their children in the national system (see section 2.6 below) are of interest on this point.

In some cases, the participants' parents also benefited from the national government policy to promote adult learning: a father completed grade 4 in a workplace school (CFM, national railways); two mothers took literacy classes.

Many more of the sample benefited from access to the second level of primary education (EP2) as a result of expansion of provision by the national government. As we have seen, progress beyond grade 4 for more than a few Mozambicans was considered inadvisable by the colonial authorities. For the national government it was the next priority after universal access to EP1, the final goal (only now beginning to be realised) being to provide a complete seven years of primary education in one local school. Over half the group completed this level after independence and at least nine from rural areas would not have done so in the colonial period. Four were directly assisted with boarding places by the government. One woman who was already teaching before independence with grade 4 schooling and 30 days preparation, eventually completed EP2 fourteen years later at night school.

Secondary schooling

This is the point at which many of our sample, were recruited into education and continued their education as part of their professional training or part-time while teaching. Only one category A and two category B participants had completed secondary education in the colonial period. Another three had started.

As a result, it can be demonstrated that the majority of the sample had access to and completed secondary or secondary equivalent education as a direct result of national government policy and in most cases as a direct result of MINED capacity building strategies. Only a minority of the older age group were allocated some of the limited places available at fulltime schools immediately after independence. Academic ability and social disadvantage were the criteria applied. For example, one, an orphan, on completion of primary education in the south was given priority for a fulltime secondary place (although over 15) but initially sent by the government to take up a secondary vacancy in the north (Nampula) till a place later became available in Maputo. Several from rural backgrounds were 'selected' to study in Cuba. In the younger age group, who are mostly still serving teachers, about half completed secondary education fulltime (though by that time subject to disruption caused by the war).

Night school study while working fulltime was the more common experience. Night school places (for those over 15 years of age) were also allocated by MINED mainly through quotas allocated to the different employment sectors (including of course education). Only a limited number were then available to the general public. Workplace schools also catered first for the capacity building needs of their employees, but often admitted many students from the general public. Most of those interviewed studied at night school after they had been recruited to teaching. For example, one man was first recruited into teaching as a pupil volunteer and then completed his secondary education at industrial night school, while employed as an unqualified teacher. A woman who was already teaching before independence but had completed only one section of the secondary certificate, completed grade 9 and pre-university in an intensive night school course organised by MINED, while working as a schools inspector.

It often took people a long time to complete their general studies as they juggled work and home commitments and later coped with war. One woman started secondary education three times between 1975 and 1986 at commercial and then general night schools, finally completing grade 9 in 1987. The interruptions were due first of all to being recruited to education (when she restarted it was as part of MINED's general education's quota) and then to childbirth. A man recruited to education in 1976 completed secondary education through night school eight years later. Two younger women, affected by the war, went into primary teacher training at this stage, which included further academic study at secondary level, but they both subsequently also completed grade 9 at night school, one in a ministry school and one at a workplace school, while teaching in war-affected districts.

Many of the teacher group, never formally studied at secondary level but acquired further academic education through teacher training which they entered with a basic primary certificate. There were also two women who were already in the teaching profession at independence and so never completed formal secondary education. Neither had an opportunity for further education until the late 1990s: one, a qualified primary teacher, attended a pedagogical institute, the other, an unqualified teacher, finally completed academic secondary schooling as part of the distance course for serving teachers introduced after the end of the civil war.

Pre-university

We finally come to consider the last level of formal schooling, pre-university general secondary education and equivalent levels of technical and professional education. None of our sample completed this in the colonial period. Schools that taught to this level only existed in major cities (Lourenço Marques, Nampula, Beira) and were attended by extremely few non-white students.¹² One A group participant completed secondary education in 1974 at a school that taught to pre-university level and simply continued in 1975, (the year of independence) passing grade 11 in 1976. One can assume she would have done this anyway. There can be no certainty than any of the others in the sample could have done so. For example, one man who completed this level in 1976, had completed secondary education at a catholic college in Tete and taken the public exam in Beira some years before independence but had not continued with his studies. He seems to have taken, or been given the chance to study (at night school), by being appointed to teach in Nampula at independence.

As discussed in Chapter 5, government priority for mass expansion of access to basic education led to pre-university study being suspended until 1981 and expansion of the number of schools teaching this level did not occur until the 1990s. So although all but three of our sample achieved this level of academic study, the majority did so while already embarked on a career in education and more than half did so through teacher training courses often after many years service in education (ranging from 2 to 30 years). Others completed the grade at night school while teaching or working in education administration, also generally after some years, since they had to be in one of the urban centres where this was possible. For example, two women, who worked throughout the war in rural districts eventually passed this level at night school after 21 and 11 years in education.

Only six studied this level as fulltime general education pupils, one (group A) in a special course at the university during the suspension, the others in either Beira or Maputo, except for the youngest participant who benefited from the post war expansion of complete secondary schools and passed this level at a school on the Ilha de Moçambique in 1999.

¹² The author was informed in 1985 by one Mozambican who did complete this secondary level, that he was the only black pupil in his school who did. It is also worth noting that the provision of schools at this level in Portugal itself was scarcely more extensive. Information from CIDAC, Lisbon 1983.

6.2.3 The role of government in career development

Recruitment

As has already been said, following independence the national government intervened directly in the recruitment of those with education to serve as teachers to carry out its policy of expansion of access and to stop the gaps left by departing Portuguese teachers. Those in our sample already teaching and /or qualified as primary teachers (3 women categories A,B,C) were not only immediately reemployed but redeployed and in two cases, after rapid upgrading, given supervisory responsibilities. The majority of the rest of the sample was directly recruited into education careers by the government, using a mixture of inducement and dictation, for the benefit of the nation as a whole.

An important factor in the early years (1975 to 1979) when twenty of the participants were recruited, was this appeal to social altruism for the building of the nation. Six participants first experienced teaching as pupil or student volunteers, teaching younger pupils or adult literacy. Many of the others who accepted being directed into teaching without complaint and even some who admitted to feeling personal frustration, came to see it as a necessary measure at the time.¹³

I was a literacy volunteer for children out of school when I was in grade 5. When they went to the school (in 1976) the parents called for me to go with them as their teacher.

Category A. [m]

I was a literacy volunteer, when I was studying in secondary school, in the factories and with the mothers (i.e. traders) in the market.

Category A [m]

In 1976, the crisis created in the schools by the departure of the overwhelming majority of the Portuguese and other foreign teachers contracted under colonial rule, led to more drastic measures. Nine of our sample were directly affected by the presidential decree suspending pre-university and university teaching and directing them into teaching.

¹³ Of course, there were those, no longer in education, who resented the whole project, but the author in conversation with many former education personnel found that the majority saw their participation as necessary at the time and felt slightly guilty at having moved on to other careers.

In 1975 there was Independence and all that - the nuns abandoned the country and the college was left without teachers - the older pupils like me began to teach - it was a bit of a joke - I started teaching history but I didn't like it because I had never studied Mozambican history, so I changed to teach natural science - that's the same whatever the regime isn't it? In '76 I had enrolled for pre-university but it was suspended.

Category B [m]

I was in the sixth year (grade 11 these days) when on the 8th of March, by decree of the President, pre-university teaching was suspended and the students directed into teaching.

Category A [m]

Pre-university courses were restored in 1981, but the extremely limited number of places meant that the majority of graduates from the first level secondary schools had to leave school at this stage. They were asked their career preferences and wishes as to further study but only a tiny minority pursued the career of their choice. The reality was that the majority had to be allocated (by MINED staff¹⁴) according to national priorities and that meant in most cases a stark choice between the teaching profession and military service. This gave rise to a common description of the compulsorily recruited teachers as 'mercenaries'. Seven of our sample entered the profession in this way.

As mentioned already, by the participants themselves and in the context of colonial education, the opportunity to study had always provided a strong motivation to work in education and MINED has always used this as an inducement to join and remain in the profession. In particular the creation of the pedagogical institutes (IMP/IMAP) and finally the pedagogical university with strong technical assistance from the GDR (including higher education courses in its own higher education institutes) set up a model in which academic middle and higher level academic education was combined with professional training for the teaching profession. The offer of opportunities to study on scholarship or with leave to work part-time when following these courses, served the capacity building needs of MINED while giving great personal satisfaction to its staff. As with the other strategies, there was a

¹⁴ The author attended a head teachers' conference in the 1980s at which they tried, with some distress, to find a fair and humane set of criteria for implementing this task. One of the A group responsible at ministry level remembers this as the most unsatisfactory phase in his career. There were of course, in such a situation of scarce resources, frequent accusations of nepotism in the allocation of places, which were not always unfounded.

strong element of dictation as well as inducement in the early years, whereas now the policy is one of incentives in the form of privileged access to places and exemption from fees.¹⁵

Several of the participants mentioned that they had originally been interested in other areas of study, but had either not been offered that option or had found it impossible to fund it.

In 1985 I enrolled in the faculty of Veterinary Science, but only briefly, - I had financial problems and couldn't continue.

Category A [m] who subsequently studied Chemistry at a higher pedagogical institute in Germany.

My first choice was the Marine School - I did not want the teaching profession, but I had to accept what was indicated.

Category B. [m] UP graduate in History and Geography.

In the present economic conditions, the incentive of securing employment is an effective inducement as we can see in the case of the contracted teachers, three of whom would otherwise be unemployed. For them too, the fact that it may allow them to finally complete higher education is an important incentive, while two at least seem to have made a conscious choice to continue in the profession because they like it.

Career development and capacity building.

Recruiting personnel to education immediately required strategies for equipping them to teach. Of the twenty individuals recruited in the 1970s, when the imperative was to put those who knew something in a position to teach those who knew nothing, only one person (with a UEM Faculty BA) started her first job with an appropriate level of qualification. Over half simply started work without preparation, while those with some limited experience, emergency training or induction, tended to be almost immediately required to assume advisory or administrative roles as well as teaching.

As the number and capacity of training colleges was rapidly expanded with technical assistance mainly from the GDR, and scholarship schemes to study abroad were operated, this situation was

¹⁵ Considerable concern was expressed by some participants about education's ability to retain enough of these graduates in the present context of greater employment opportunities and economic pressures. Others felt that since education has by far the largest number of educated personnel it was normal that a proportion would move on and that they made a valuable contribution to the development of other sectors.

reversed and the change is reflected in the sample: all those who entered the profession in the 1980s and 1990s, were professionally and academically trained for their first job and were by then able to learn from more experienced colleagues, including foreign staff in the earlier years, before being promoted to more responsibility. The most recent recruits, however, the contracted teachers, though academically qualified and working with more experienced staff within the schools and in the revived ZIP system, nevertheless, like their predecessors in the early 1970s, have started work after only 30 days induction. The need to readopt this kind of emergency measure is in part due to a teacher shortage resulting from loss of staff and a slow down in teacher training in the last years of the war, combined with renewed public demand for expansion in the post-war period.

Having recruited large numbers of staff with little or no initial training, MINED had somehow to provide opportunities to bring the majority of the teaching force up to minimum standards after they were already working, as well as providing further training for career promotion. As we have seen, a range of strategies were developed, with donor partner support, all of which are evident in the professional development of our sample.

In group A, one started without initial training and others started after intensive or emergency training, but they were all later assisted to complete higher secondary and degree level courses part-time or in one case on a scholarship to the GDR. Three completed education masters degrees abroad and one a part-time PhD. They were assisted to develop areas of expertise by a combination of capacity building on the job (with inputs from foreign cooperantes) and specialist courses abroad. At least three were themselves involved in capacity building of other staff.

In the B group too, two started work with no initial training and eight after completing emergency or accelerated courses. Four did start teaching after full training for the level they were to teach. All but one of this group, eventually (though in some cases after many years and at their own insistence) were assisted by MINED to study part-time or fulltime to complete middle level courses and/or higher education courses.

The professional development of the B group was also furthered by in-service capacity building: on the job by cooperantes and Mozambican specialists; by short courses at various points in their career organised by MINED; by being sent on specialist courses abroad; in donor funded specialist

training in short courses (usually devised and taught by Mozambican staff). Three of this group provided capacity building for others after training.

The careers of serving teachers, group C, were promoted, in-country through the Mozambican institutions created after independence, but with less consistency and sometimes after many years of delay. This is a reflection of the persistent incapacity to handle the training of teachers in sufficient numbers as much as the effects of the war (in only one case was delay directly attributable to the war).

In this group too, many started without initial training or with emergency induction or accelerated training but the majority (10) were qualified for the level they were employed to teach before starting work. They were also able to up-grade their qualifications to middle level and/or higher level but in Mozambican institutions and while working, usually fulltime. The unqualified teacher who started work in the 1970s after 30 days induction and who eventually benefited from the distance course, is the only representative in this sample of the very large number of mainly rural teachers, who were still unqualified after the war in the 1990s.

The new, contracted recruits without qualification also have a similar prospect of eventually developing their careers through the expanded higher education network or in the meantime through part-time teacher training.

However, fewer of this group mentioned any experiences of capacity building on the job, short courses organised by MINED or donor funded specialist courses. Although, as described by one of the group, capacity building through the peer group in the schools and ZIPs with supervisory visits from advisers, was common practice until the worst days of the war and has been revived since, they may not have seen this as 'in-service capacity building'. The only member of this group to study abroad, did so as a refugee (see 6.2.5 below) and only one provided formal capacity building for others after training with ADPP (Danish People to People Aid). Again, school heads and ZIP coordinator's are of course responsible for informal capacity building.

Those recruited in the first years after independence, were also 'sent' to teaching posts in different parts of the country to fill gaps and as part of the policy of promoting national integration. Three were sent to teach in the Mozambican schools in Cuba. One woman, a native of Maputo, sent to

teacher training in Tete (because there was no place available locally) was appointed to her first job there in a rural school. She made this comment:

I was transferred (back) to the City of Maputo because I had got married (I had that advantage as a woman) others are still there to this day Category B [f].

Career patterns

There is a striking homogeneity in the career experiences of the majority of the sample. Without exception established staff from all categories started their formal careers as classroom teachers, either at basic primary or secondary level. In the older age group this often followed experience as teachers in the colonial schools or as volunteer pupil teachers after independence. While some remained as teachers, others progressed to teaching posts with management responsibility and as their own education progressed, the tendency was also to teach at a higher academic level. At that point some were recruited into junior education management posts (Category B) at district, provincial or Ministry level. Senior management in the Provinces and Ministry (Category A) were then promoted from lower management as they completed their professional and higher academic studies.

Thus the senior managers (Category A) spent an average of 13 years (minimum 6) teaching in more than one level of the system (primary, secondary, adult night school and in one case university) and simultaneously held either school or university management posts or worked as advisors, inspectors or in-service trainers. The two women were active in professional organisations: one as a secretary for the teachers union, the other as founder member of the Mozambican Association of Women Academics as a member of the Mozambican Association for Research in the Natural Sciences and as a member of the University Council (UEM).

The B group of managers, apart from the two who worked in adult education (see below) spent an average of 9 years (minimum 3, maximum 20) in general teaching. This rather younger group (with better initial training) were more likely to remain teaching at the same level of the system, but like the A group took up various management roles as school heads and deputies, and in-service

education coordinators. The adult education staff were trainer organisers of literacy volunteers from the start. A woman in this group was a teachers' union secretary for many years.

When they took up fulltime administrative work, either in MINED or a Provincial office, four of the A group completed an average of 8 years in junior and middle level management posts before being appointed to top management and the fifth came from a senior post (Director of Faculty) in the Pedagogical University. The B group managers had been fulltime administrators for an average of 6 years (minimum 1 year, maximum 23). Apart from continuing their own education, a number of individuals in both groups continued to teach in night schools

Many of the older teachers (Category C) initiated their careers in much the same circumstances as the other two groups and the group as a whole has been teaching for an average of 13 years, some for over 20 years and none less than three years.¹⁶ Like the B group most have stayed teaching at the level they were trained for, but some have had experience in both primary and secondary teaching. Five have taught in adult night schools, often while completing part-time degrees. The sample deliberately included heads of all the schools visited but not surprisingly given the age sample, five others have held or currently hold positions with management responsibility.

The more recent post-war recruits to the profession in the sample fall into two groups: the fully trained, like those who joined in the previous decade and those contracted under the emergency scheme introduced in 1999 to meet the teacher shortage, in a manner similar to that of the first recruits in the 1970s but with a higher academic entry. This last group includes two young secondary school graduates and three older men: two who were trained in agriculture in Cuba but on returning home found no work and another who had taught unqualified while studying in the early 1980s.

6.2.4 The role of personal motivation and opportunity seeking

All of the individuals in the sample clearly had to be personally motivated in their work and studies to achieve what they did but while some took advantage or made the best of what they were offered, others at various points actively sought or requested opportunities to study or change jobs.

¹⁶ As discussed in relation to the selection of the quota, there was a deliberate bias in favour of those with long careers

It is these points in their careers as well as the 'significant moments' they identified themselves that give clues as to the nature of that motivation.

In all groups and across all age groups the motivation to study is very strong, either for its own sake or because they felt they needed it to understand their work better. They appear to be all life-long learners! Nearly all had a next goal in mind or were actively pursuing it.

Education should be throughout the whole of one's life. Category C [m]

I didn't want to be without studying. Category B [f]

I have always worked in order to study -in the colonial time as a servant and lots of other jobs.

Category B [m]

Just how strong their motivation has been is indicated by noting again the kinds of difficulties they had to overcome and the considerable periods of time they waited before being able to seize opportunities to progress to the next level of education. All of the A group, 11 out of 14 of the B group and 11 of the 18 teachers completed at least one stage of their secondary, pre-university or university education while working, often in very challenging circumstances. For example one woman in the B group completed her degree while full-time head of a failing school she had been sent to turn around and bringing up 4 children, three of whom were themselves at university by the time she graduated.

There is evidence that most had a clear sense of where their career should go and pro-actively pursued it, particularly when they felt it was stalled or that they had earned the right to progress. Two women, whose chances for further education had been effectively put on hold by the war conditions, after the war went back to college 'at their own request.' The younger staff are particularly active in pursuing higher education and when forced to wait have found other profitable ways to spend their time. The three men in Nampula whose (non-education) careers were effectively ended by the war had to be particularly resourceful in finding ways to survive and start a new career.

Some had very clear preferences as to what they wanted to study. For two of the B group choosing to undertake the University course of their choice (not one funded by MINED) involved some economic sacrifice and a lot of patience.

I always preferred a course at UEM, not the UP, even though I had to pay the fees myself - I had to teach night classes and I'm still doing it. Category B [m] Doing a part-time literature degree at UEM
I asked to give up the headship, because I began to study at the Catholic University (After finishing the course I advise the DPE on legal matters and (now as Head of Human Resources) I have knowledge of the teachers' rights. Category B [m] Recently graduated in law.

Others made choices within the limited options, with a view to personal preference and future career.

Special Education was not my choice. I wanted to study Pedagogy, but they (the Cuban education authorities) offered (only) two options. The other was education for work experience. Of these I chose special education because it was something new, which at that time did not exist in Mozambique. Category B [m]

6.2.5 The effects of war on education and careers

In addition to those who mentioned war experiences as significant moments in their development and careers, the participants described how their education and careers were interrupted or affected by the war at various points or indicated in their comments that it affected them psychologically.

Since all the A group were already set on their career path before the war took hold, their career progress was not directly affected, it was already being promoted by MINED and they were located in places where they could continue their professional education while working. However, there were indications in their discussion of their careers and later their views on the war, that it did affect their professional attitudes. In at least one case, it strengthened commitment to work in education, several showed deep frustration at the effect the war had in holding back and even destroying the achievements in education, (in which they themselves had played a role). It was also seen as forcing them to rethink ideas about how the education system should function.

All of the B group completed their primary schooling unaffected by the war, but the majority were affected in some way from then on. Two women were immediately affected at the next stage of their careers. The government strategy of allocating places on a nationwide basis to maximise opportunity was breaking down, because normal travel by road between provinces was no longer possible.

I was attacked when I studied in secondary school - they destroyed all the books and my notes...they killed and kidnapped other pupils. We had to sleep on the other bank of the river (only spending the day in the school) to be safe. I was (then) selected as the best student to go and do a course in Tete - accountancy, but I waited for three months to get a flight and ended up missing the year and so lost the course. Category B [f]

Later got a training college place in her home province of Nampula.

I then spent two years without studying. I had a place at the training college in Inhambane, but the war was bad by then and my parents were afraid to send me. I asked for another place.

Category B [f] Later got a place in her home Province of Maputo.

A clear consequence of the war, was thus to reverse the attempts to reduce regional and geographical inequalities of access. All the Nampula staff, and the woman teacher from rural Maputo quoted above, were affected by the halt in the expansion of pre-university (including teacher training) and university education and only completed these levels some time after the war. In fact one man never completed either of these and only managed to complete secondary education at night school after being transferred in the middle of the war to the city of Nampula. This in turn limited their career progress. Many remained for years in the same job.

As discussed in Chapter 5, some sectors of the education system were not only affected directly by the war but also cut back as part of the financial restrictions imposed by structural adjustment. Teacher training, as we have seen was one and adult education another. The two B category staff working in adult education, one at national level and the other at provincial level, found that they were able to do little of the work they had been trained for. At the provincial level, their main clientele, the rural adult population, was the first target of the rebel movement. Any participation in activities closely associated with the FRELIMO government invited reprisals and in any case, the battle for subsistence took all available time and effort. At the national level, the DNEA (National Directorate of Adult Education) was dismantled in the last years of the war, as part of an exercise to 'slim' the administration. The attrition of the war and its financial consequences eventually brought one of the key strategies for bringing education to the excluded masses, virtually to a halt.

It was during the years of the extinction of the DNEA - I was transferred to the documentation centre - but in practice, apart from studying I did almost nothing. Category B [f] Trained in radio programming for literacy. There were districts where literacy stopped - almost the whole system - we ended up only teaching about 1000 people a year in the cities and in Nampula district up to a range of about 20 kilometres, and only by day. My father was bayoneted to death because he had supported the work of his son in literacy. Category B. [m].

Like the adult education organiser quoted above, other B category staff working in the provinces, were affected by traumatic events that affected them personally or affected those with whom they were working (see Key Moments above). In at least two cases, it seems clear that they were obliged to leave the post they were in to recover from these experiences.¹⁷

When it comes to the teachers group, Category C, there is more evidence of the war directly affecting their education, careers and working environment. This is because there are younger individuals in the group, who had not completed their schooling before the war and because as classroom teachers in the war years, they had to deal with the impact of the war on the schools and pupils.

One of this group seems to have been affected from his infancy when he was orphaned. He grew up with his grandmother but only attended three years of school before having to flee to the district administrative centre.

I was obliged to continue in the district centre for fear of continuing there - there was no longer a school - I was handed over to an uncle who was a teacher and completed grade 7. I spent some time (6 years) without studying. Category C. [m] Eventually trained as a primary teacher 1996-8.

Another, whose experience of surviving an attack has already been quoted (see above Key Moments), lost a year's schooling as a result before being able to continue. Even those in the urban area could lose time at school as an indirect consequence of the war. One woman had to wait a year after completing primary education because there were no places in the overcrowded urban secondary schools.

¹⁷ The author was aware while working in Maputo Province in the 1980s and in Manica in the last years of the war, that DPE personnel departments, were routinely moving staff from 'front line' jobs in the rural districts, for respite in urban jobs, with less responsibility, and often a chance to study.

Some traumatic event, probably while visiting his home province of Nampula, led to one young man interrupting his technical education in Maputo and finding himself as a refugee in Malawi. He had been an enthusiastic student and was already teaching full-time, though not qualified, but only returned to teaching as a contracted science teacher in 2001.

In 1984 I had to stop studying in Mozambique - I had a scholarship for war refugees, financed by the UN but I didn't feel good in Malawi and came back to Mozambique in 1987. I worked in Nampula as a dyer at Texamoque (textile factory). I worked self-employed and wrote poetry and school textbooks for basic secondary education. I wrote many things but lost them by the way - and at night - break-ins at home.

Two other recently contracted teachers had their original career plans abruptly terminated by the war. They had both been given technical training for large-scale commercial agriculture, in Cuba. When they returned, the agri-business sector was no longer functioning.

I came back in 1991 and straight away had to do military service. With the Peace Accord I managed to leave. I went to the Provincial Directorate of Agriculture but they said they had no certainty that the war had ended and so were not taking on new personnel....In 2000 I went to the DPE to ask what subject I could teach and they decided chemistry (because of my specialization in the agronomy course).

One of these saw that if he had taken the option to stay in Cuba and complete a degree, he would have had better career chances now, but he was anxious to return home as soon as possible, because of events described to him in the only two letters he received during his six years away from home:

My brother was my correspondent (his parents were illiterate) - he informed me of the capture of our parents...they returned, but affected - my mother died afterwards. When I got back it was difficult to find where my relatives were.

In all, five of this group were personally affected by traumatic experiences and another three by violence against their family or fear that they were in danger of violence or destitution.

In Inhambane the effects were drastic - the fabric of the society was actually destroyed - you could not visit your family there - you were advised not to go. I still feel something of this.

Category C. [m] teaching in Maputo.

It seemed that for many, being a survivor carried with it some sense of guilt, a feeling that others who were just as innocent did not come through.

In fact the urban teachers were in no way unaffected by the war. Apart from the practical difficulties in their personal lives (shortages, power and water cuts, sheltering displaced relatives etc.) they felt the full brunt of the huge population migrations on a daily basis in the classroom. Seven of this group (six in Maputo and one in Nampula) specifically mention the impact on their teaching.

Overcrowded classes - up to 80, with the people who had fled - it didn't allow us to work properly

...some with desks, some sitting on the floor - we had to attend to all the children who appeared.

Category C [f]

Only two younger teachers in this group claimed not to have been affected by the war because they were too young and living in an urban area. However, they did of course 'live it'. Matola, where one was living throughout her childhood, was subject for some time to nightly attacks that were certainly audible even in the relatively safer areas and of course they attended the over-crowded schools full of displaced children.

I heard people talk about the war, and lived it but as a small child ...I cannot say anything about it.

Category C [f]

6.2.6 The parents' view

As already mentioned the parents interviewed had experienced similar moments in their own upbringing and education to the teachers, but they were in general from less well-educated homes than the teachers and a higher proportion of their parents were from rural peasant backgrounds, while only one family was assimilated (see Appendix 1). Nevertheless, their literacy and Portuguese language skills were greater than the average in the population and whether literate or not they were able to send their children to school.¹⁸ Since these interviews (though less detailed than those with the education staff) collected data on three generations: the parents, their parents and their children, it was possible to get an impression of generational progress, and of families affected by the succession of events affecting their education.

¹⁸ This is probably due to the bias inherent in the sample: the majority of the parents were associated with urban secondary schools and as class representatives, had been selected by, and agreed to represent, the other parents. They would be likely to be those with most knowledge of and interest in schools.

Of their total number of 25 children, 18 were in fulltime education (from primary to higher) and 2 in professional training. Four had left education, one after completing higher education but three without completing secondary education. (A young woman responsible (encarregada) for her sister's education had a small baby.)

It was possible to see in six of the group of seven, that each generation had achieved a higher level of education than the last as a result of the same factors seen in the case of the education staff: parental concern and post-independence expansion of opportunities. Where grandparents were illiterate or had only basic literacy, parents completed primary education and the next generation secondary or higher. However in one case, though the parent himself had achieved more than his parents, only his daughter was matching his achievement and his two sons had dropped out of secondary education, because they had been switched to night school due to lack of places and then failed.

Parents' means as well as commitment were significant in this group too. Loss of a father immediately terminated one parent's schooling and in the present generation a father, unemployed due to factory closures was very concerned that because his son had to work while completing his schooling at night he might not succeed.

Asked to compare their schooling with that of their own children, the parents had mixed views. Those interviewed in Matola and their fellow school council members who joined them in discussion, tended to think that the schooling they had in the colonial time was better in terms of quality than that experienced by their children and they even had some rather happy memories of it.

The teaching was much better compared to the present system - it was a happy youth - one learnt much easier...by grade three you could write a letter - you learnt good grammar and calligraphy. It was because all the teachers were qualified¹⁹ and the greater part of the population was not integrated in the schools- now the conditions don't exist to attend to everyone - there is a lack of teachers.

However the two women, who had their own experience of schooling post-independence, had a slightly different perspective. One was very enthusiastic about her experience of returning to complete her primary education in 1976, not just on account of the academic study but also the

¹⁹ This was of course not universally the case. The majority of colonial teachers in the indigenous system were unqualified monitors. Buendía Gómez, 1999:65 and Golias, 1993: 59-60.

spirit of participation and purpose. She felt rather bemused by the curriculum changes and changed attitudes of the present schools. The young woman responsible for her sister's education, and still completing grade 12 herself, had quite a clear appreciation of exactly what had changed since her days in the same secondary school during the war.

The material conditions have changed a lot - I studied here and it is now improved in terms of conditions... I started school in 1986...I had many difficulties - without books, without sanitation - but the teachers gave the lessons well.

Like her fellow parents she saw the teachers now demoralised by their economic problems and open to bribery from better off parents.

The two parents in Nampula, one a peasant farmer with a son at a rural primary school, the other, son of peasants, but a former teacher, president of the parents association of an urban secondary school, member of the provincial electoral commission and completing a law degree, shared a very different assessment of the relative merits of colonial and post-independence schooling.

In that time ... the pupil who didn't go to school was beaten - the parents were afraid of the teacher - not many went to school, many were afraid - today they are not obliged, they go independently - the better school is the one of today - they are studying in peace, its not obligatory.

Category D. Rural father.

I consider that the present (school) is a transformation in terms of openness - the pupil is the subject, subject of the process of education - he participates. In the colonial system the participation was minimal - the syllabus was not related to reality (for example, we were made to learn geographical facts about Portugal not Mozambique) and the way of making us (do it) was to grab (us) by the ear - the pupil learnt from fear. On the other hand what we can see is that those teachers did have solid knowledge - spelling handwriting, tables etc....In this teaching (today) the pupil is much freer, the teacher merely directs the process - it is more appropriate to a democratic system -but the teachers have some problems with discipline - it requires more pedagogical ability.

Category D. Urban parent.

Though, as we have said, the parents group does not constitute a representative sample, their observations do serve to illustrate, the disparities in the colonial system and the key issues of quantity, quality and relevance, that have beset the post-independence drive for an inclusive and appropriate education system, as well as the enormous and lasting damage caused by the war.

6.3 Discussion

It is clear from the above accounts that while the institutional measures for training and capacity building provided by MINED, largely supported by donor funding and in the early years by foreign teachers and advisers (the 'cooperantes') were enormously important, in fact essential, other factors were probably decisive in ensuring that personnel were able to take advantage of these opportunities, especially to overcome the many negative factors that in some cases almost overcame them. The essential initial factor seems to be parental commitment, followed by personal determination. It is also clear that a minimum level of family subsistence or the material support from advantaged third parties was essential. However, it is also clear that governments played a decisive role in either encouraging or discouraging participation. Thus the post-independence government commitment to education as a basic right and a development priority was not only crucial in creating opportunity but also shaping personal expectations and ambition. Administrative measures to extend access and social welfare provision under this policy were clearly critical in opening the way for the most disadvantaged.

The review of the participants' education and careers also gives us a profile of the personnel who now staff the Ministry of Education and largely determine its institutional character. There are two very striking conclusions to be drawn from the analysis of the family background and formative years of the education personnel. One is that they are for the most part, from a very special minority that grew up in the final years of the colonial regime and the early post-independence period. All except one, from an Asian family, came from ethnic groups in the majority indigenous population, but unlike the overwhelming majority of their compatriots, they, and most of their parents acquired a basic education, and even in some cases secondary or professional education. This difference from the general population is particularly striking in the case of the women in the sample. The second point is a corollary of the first: the homogeneity of the group. While there are some slight differences between the different categories of personnel and rather more disadvantage evident in the northern province, they share very particular experiences.

Shared experience is also evident in their careers which all started in the classroom. Those who now manage the education sector, have personal working experience of the teaching and learning activities that they administrate and have a network of personal contacts at all levels of the organisation acquired in their progress through the system. The pattern of their careers also demonstrates systematic capacity building policies on the part of MINED both to increase their professional skills and broaden their experience. These have clearly been successful in developing the different levels of management but much more difficult to sustain and implement comprehensively for the much larger teaching force. However, a general culture of proactively seeking opportunities for personal capacity building often seems to have mitigated the limitations of the system.

The participants' evaluation of their own development suggests that first experiences, whether of schooling or of professional learning, have the most impact in developing capacity. Mid-career opportunities to study were seen as significant formative experiences only when they played a direct role in increasing knowledge and understanding of their specific area of professional work or in personal realisation. The prominence given to non-formal professional learning (through work experience, peer-group learning, in-service capacity building etc.) should also be noted when considering the impact of capacity building measures.

The participants' accounts also suggest that the imbalance between the development of higher levels of management and the teaching personnel can be attributed largely but not entirely to the effects of the war. The scale of the deficit in terms of teacher numbers at independence was such that it could not be rapidly overcome in terms of either quantity or quality before first developing the capacity to train teachers. The early progress in this endeavour is evident in the improved level of initial training and induction with which some of our sample entered the profession after 1980. The presence in the sample of recently recruited unqualified teachers as well as long-serving unqualified teachers, who had no upgrading for decades, reflects the impact of the war in setting back that progress.

It is evident from the individual accounts analysed above, that the war left no one's life or career untouched. While all those interviewed had found ways to overcome or recover from its very negative impact on their lives, the general experience was of reversal, delay and frustration in

achieving personal and professional goals, as well as varying degrees of distress. Nevertheless within that scenario, the negative impact was clearly greatest at the local level and therefore disproportionately affected teachers, their pupils and local staff particularly in the rural areas.²⁰ This continues to be evident in the accounts of the younger teachers and the parents of today's pupils. Though the violence and trauma have ended, shortages of teachers and financial resources, that are largely a consequence of the economic collapse provoked by the war, continue to frustrate the aspirations of both teachers and pupils.

Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 5 the education system had the institutional strength to survive the war and develop its own recovery strategies. The evidence from these personal histories gives us some clues as to how that was possible and goes some way to answering questions arising from the review of the literature as to the institutional strength of MINED.

6.4 Conclusions

In answer to the question raised at the end of Chapter 5, it seems clear that institutional capacity was developed as a result of the strong support for individual capacity building provided by MINED's partners. However it is very clear from the participants' accounts that the international contribution was made within the framework of a strong government policy for developing the education sector combined with the individual will of staff, parents and pupils. The capacity building work in education also took place within the wider social context of revolution, war and peace and the process was therefore also either facilitated or retarded by these events, which differentially affected the motivation and opportunities of different groups to participate. We can conclude therefore that the evidence from the participants' personal histories, confirms the generative model discussed in Chapter 4 (4.2.1. and Figure 4.) because it appears that the development of capacity in the education sector was determined by the interaction between context (government policy and conditions of post-independence public euphoria, civil war and peace building) individual volition and the cumulative effect of the interventions themselves.

MINED also developed a strong corporate identity in its staff and a sense of ownership amongst at least the more active parents. The very particular shared experience of colonial and revolutionary

²⁰ As already noted the sample, due to its urban bias, does not adequately reflect the huge backlog of unqualified and under-qualified teachers remaining in the rural areas.

education followed by war is probably the most significant factor in this though it has clearly been reinforced amongst the staff by shared career and professional learning experiences.

The development of the MINED and all sectors of public administration from this tiny and still barely educated human resource is a lesson in just what can be achieved, in the aftermath of years of repression followed by violent regime change, with a combination of vision, determination and strategic allocation of opportunities and resources backed by international assistance.

However, there is a question as to whether this sense of identity is permanent or will not survive beyond this very special generation. The evidence from the new 'mercenaries' in the sample, those recently recruited because other employment opportunities are not available, is that they have 'got to like it' and identify with it. As in the previous generation, some may stay and others may move on, but most will still be involved as parents. The role that former education staff are already playing as parents is demonstrated by the parent association president in Nampula.

In answer to another of the queries raised in Chapter 5: on balance, we can conclude that MINED with its schools has proved itself a durable institution 'in the political and social life' of Mozambique (see Chapter 1.1.1). Meanwhile, its main weakness continues to be the lack of capacity to respond in quantity and quality to the demand it has created.

CHAPTER 7.

GOVERNMENT, CITIZENS AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: DEVELOPING CAPACITY IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR AND ITS AFTERMATH

Introduction

After the participants had described and evaluated their personal experiences they were invited to reflect on three phases in the development of the education system: post-independence, the war and post-war recovery as a basis for discussing the roles played by government and international cooperation for the capacity building of the nation and the impact of the war on that process. As explained in Chapter 4, the intention was not to lay down a template but provide a guide as to what the researcher wanted to understand and then by means of the cue questions allow the participants to develop their ideas. This meant that participants discussed each question only to the extent that they were interested or able and they were not interrupted if they moved on to other topics. As a result they imposed their own timescales and personal emphases on the subject matter.

The first thing that became clear was that the participants divided the time differently from the researcher and in some cases from each other. For most, even though the war had by then been seriously disrupting education for some years, the critical moment when the momentum of post-independence development and drive was halted came five or six years into the war in the mid 1980s with the economic collapse, structural adjustment and advent of western and UN (mainly relief) aid. At this point the government also turned its attention from education to 'war and survival'. For those in senior management, the post-war recovery began in the early 1990s as the peace accord was being negotiated, while those on the ground only saw the government turning its attention again to education and enlisting donor aid to support its policies, after the peace. So too, some think that the recovery phase is now over and current problems are inherent in the process of development, others still see continuing effects of the war.

Since they were free to do so, they also focussed their discussions differently. The parents and many of the classroom teachers were less inclined to make general retrospective analyses, but had

very decided views on present conditions and policies. They also tended to discuss general points by reference to their personal experience rather than in theoretical terms. Many who worked through the war, after describing its effects in a few words, immediately launched into describing how things were being restored without the researcher asking the final question. Others, who saw a continuity of purpose from the first phase to the last, ranged over the whole period in all their answers.

In setting out their responses in this section of the interviews, I have maintained three divisions, without defining an exact time frame for each, because the participants did all see three distinct phases in the direction taken by education. In reality, though there was no doubt about the qualitative changes that had taken place, they overlapped and different actors became aware of change at different times. For example, the three Nampula teachers those whose lives were most disrupted by the war, tended to refer to two phases, one socialist and one 'of the market'. For them the war was something like a black hole in between in which they were not aware of any development. The policy-makers, on the other hand, had very precise dates for what they considered significant changes.

7.1 Policies and strategies for the education and capacity development of the nation post-independence.

7.1.1 The Role of Government

The participants in all groups shared some key perceptions about the role played by the post-independence government in promoting education, though with different emphasis. The ages of the participants and therefore the times they remembered also influenced their views. However, the dominant image is that of a strong leading role by government in pursuit of objectives, which corresponded with key aspirations of the public. Participants in all groups frequently mentioned the same yardsticks as evidence of the government's commitment and success: the expansion of the school network and the adult literacy campaigns. These two key strategies were seen as directly aimed at reversing the closed and discriminatory colonial system, by promoting the inclusion of the previously excluded majority, especially in the rural areas, and those denied opportunities on the basis of age, gender or poverty. The government was also seen as recognising and starting to

redress the unequal geographical distribution of education opportunities between different regions of the country. The third key strategy that was mentioned by all groups was the drive to develop the necessary human resources to carry out the education policies: the many different schemes to rapidly train teachers and education cadres and to support them technically in-service. Enlisting foreign technical assistance and scholarship funding was seen as a deliberate strategy of the government in pursuit of this objective.

There was also a fair degree of consensus with regard to the conditions in which these policies were pursued and the response and involvement of the public. It was generally agreed that there were enormous difficulties to surmount. Specifically, lack of technical capacity and qualified personnel were the main limitations. Lack of resources were also mentioned, but often not seen as critical in this phase except by the parents, who tended to see this as a problem besetting the whole post-independence enterprise to extend education to all. The response of the public was not mentioned by many of the group B administrators and teachers in group C, but those that did, agreed with the A group administrators and the parents (group D) that people were highly motivated to study and to participate in developing the schools and that there was a spirit of self-reliance and civic involvement.

The Policymakers' View. (Group A)

As we saw from their personal histories, this group were recruited at or soon after independence to work for education while still completing their own education and professional training. They were clearly deeply impressed by the experience and spoke about it at greater length than the others, speaking of the vision, leadership and political will of the government. On the other hand they also emphasised the almost total lack of technical capacity at all levels of government, in the Ministry of Education and in the schools. This was seen as the main development challenge for the country and the reason why the government 'dedicated' 18% of the meagre GNP to education

The main thrust of government policy at this time was seen to be inclusion and equity and extraordinary results were achieved. This was attributed to the ability of the government to communicate with and inspire the public, who responded with enthusiasm and a spirit of self-reliance and patriotism, and to developing participatory forms of grass roots organisation for the

delivery and support for education. Participation and democracy¹ were thus seen as the means used to overcome the technical incapacity, although inevitably, when everyone was learning on the job mistakes were made.

The second line of attack was seen to be a strong commitment to human resource development for the administration and delivery of education. In this case the necessary strategy for developing a qualified workforce was to enlist foreign technical assistance and funding for scholarships, to enable the government to implement its 'dreams' in the short term and progressively eliminate the need for foreign personnel or overseas study in the long term.

How in these conditions did we achieve so much - from 96% illiteracy in '75 to a rate of school attendance in '81 of 93% - in five years! Although we didn't have experience, we had political clarity as to the importance of education... and a strategy, in the absence of technical experience, to implement by means of much participation, especially in the communities.

... money is not always necessary to get things done

...a philosophy that came from the (independence) war to rely on one's own efforts - many mistakes were made but they were necessary mistakes so as not to depend on others

...that fury of the independence - the political will with that fury of the population helped a lot - by 1981 we were almost achieving universal schooling, that was the big impact of that fury together with technical assistance.

This group then, on the whole, experienced these years as positive and inspiring and as essentially participatory despite the highly directive leadership of the government at that time.

The Administrators' View (Category B)

This group also clearly saw the government as taking a leading role in the development of education and exhibiting political will and strength in this phase. However no one in this group referred to the shared vision described by the policy makers, but almost all described the government's 'concern' (*preocupação*) for inclusion and equity and referred to expansion and

¹ As other contributors also suggest, for many Mozambicans, this first experience of at least being asked to join in, if not yet to make government policy, was the starting point for democracy in their country.

growth of the school network as its main aim and achievement, often contrasting it with colonial 'exclusion'.

There was great concern on the part of the government that the whole Mozambican population should achieve basic level (primary education). They began to oblige people to go to school, without looking at age - at seven or fourteen they could (all) go into grade one.

You only have to look before '75 to know that the government is making some effort. Before, the people didn't have the right (to education)...the government created conditions and interest in the school - everyone wants to study.

The role of government? Very strong in this area in terms of captivating people to participate.

The government played a very important role ...it's thanks to the government that today's cadres were formed: the majority of those who have higher and middle formation are products of this and the policy of the government for free education - everyone can study.

The government has the plans and implements them with the means it has.

It (the role of government) has been very great in the development of education -if it wasn't for this the country would not have achieved the level of education it has - the big expansion of the school network, although insufficient, not to mention the problems of migration to the cities - the contribution of the government in general was great - it did what it should have done.

Clearly this group too saw the role of government in education in this phase as positive and broadly directed at meeting the needs and aspirations of the public. Indeed they often spoke with enthusiasm when describing the achievements. However, there is a detectable difference of perception about the relationship of the government and the public. While some mentioned the government's role in involving the public in education, their choice of words and the relationship they describe is one in which the government has the leading role and the public are either directed or persuaded to join in. There is no mention of grassroots 'fury' as in the A group responses.

The Teachers' View (Category C)

Only 11 members of this group of 18 participants felt able to discuss the post-independence period. 5 were too young to have any personal experience and a further two had only slight recollection of a period when they were still children.

As with the other groups, the 11 older teachers recalled the government's role in terms of strength, driven by 'concern' for education to which it gave 'great emphasis' or 'importance'. Policies and

strategies that were mentioned included, nationalization (i.e. free education), literacy campaigns and developing international cooperation. As with the administrators' group, the overriding image of the government's action in this period was the drive for inclusion and equity through expansion and development of the education system often contrasted with the colonial system and sometimes compared favourably to the present. About a third of the group also specifically mentioned the government's role in human resource development.

The government always concerned itself with the academic and moral development of Mozambican society - to pull the people out of the illiteracy in which it was submerged. The Mozambican government gave priority to all the people for education... this was the force of the government - the government plan for development. The great literacy campaigns with pupils often teaching adults contributed to reducing illiteracy rates. ...it has little means and for that reason develops relations with others to give support. This government is so concerned that even the very poorest goes to school free of charge. I reckon in other countries they pay fees? Portuguese colonialism was not interested in educating many Mozambicans ...the number of secondary schools was very limited. With the nationalisations it rapidly increased...especially where there were none before, outside the big cities. I can say that in the first years the government did a lot - free enrolment was introduced In the first period schooling was compulsory but it was a schooling that desired that all the people should study. Before, (i.e. in the post-independence phase) despite much crisis, education was given great importance The government ensured that the majority (of the staff) had the opportunity to raise their academic level.

While the group was generally concerned to stress the great achievements in terms of access to education, one older teacher noted that there were downsides compared to the colonial school and another secondary head teacher saw that the concentration on primary education had resulted in neglect of secondary and technical education, the repercussions of which are felt in the schools today.

The children became very badly behaved in the years after independence - people interpreted independence badly - the parents would not accept that the teacher could discipline their children There was great emphasis on basic education by the government and the cooperation as well. Now without abandoning basic education they need to begin to concentrate on secondary and technical education so as to create people capable of serving others.

Understandably this group of classroom practitioners tended not to discuss government policy in terms of global policy or vision, but the examples they gave based on personal experience reflect the same perceptions as the other two groups. The image is of a government positively directing resources to satisfy the main aspiration of the majority for access and inclusion. However, as in the account by the other practitioner group, the administrators, participation by the public is described as at the instigation or even at the command of the government.

The Parents' View (Category D)

As already explained, this topic was only discussed specifically in the two interviews in Nampula and with the Parents Association group in Machava and the tendency was to talk of the government role in the whole period since independence up to the present, often comparing it with the colonial system. However the view of the government's role in education in this phase, is broadly similar to that of the education staff. They recognised the government's commitment to education and the great efforts made since independence for inclusion and equity through expansion and development of the system, and they describe the public responding with motivation to study.

The government concerns itself with expanding the school network (in the colonial time very few had access). The school is open to all the children of peasants- and it also concerns itself with the education of adults...The government understands that to resolve all the problems (of the country)...the human resource has to be developed.

The government has made a big effort for education....There is growth

Nevertheless, they were almost unanimous in agreeing that the quality of education had deteriorated compared to colonial times (except in one respect referred to by both the Nampula parents, the removal of fear from the classroom.) and this was directly attributable to the rapid expansion.

In the past, before Independence, there was little schooling but the conditions were adequate - now the conditions to attend to everyone don't exist.

As mentioned already, the parents were inclined to see everything from the perspective of present problems, which they nevertheless saw as longstanding and indeed they can be summarised as the three main difficulties seen by other groups as besetting the national education project from the

start: lack of technical capacity, lack of teachers and lack of resources resulting in an inability to meet demand.

There were many problems after independence.

...in our conditions, without experience - we were cut off from the scientific world.

The policy of the government is made, it has great concern, but the problem is not having the means.

Education does not secure its own cadres - they train lots of teachers but lose them because they can't secure them financially.

As regards the issue of participation, the notion that parents should participate proactively in the management of the school, which according to the policymakers was one of the key post-independence strategies, has clearly taken root, to the extent that the parents (and head teachers) when describing the activities of the associations did not describe their role as new, but as what was expected of them.

7.1.2 The Role of International Cooperation

As discussed in Chapter 5, international cooperation in this phase was largely from socialist countries, though western NGOs (sometimes funded by their governments) and of course SIDA were involved and there was some cooperation with African countries on a very small scale. The broad picture was as one of the policymakers described it:

Up to '85 it (cooperation) was done by the socialist block, especially GDR and USSR as well as Cuba, Bulgaria and others and cooperantes from progressive western organisations.

The role of international cooperation was seen by the majority in each group as 'to support' (*apoiar*) the implementation of the government's plans and as being essential (*indispensável*) for their realisation, of great importance (*preponderante/extremamente importante*) or necessary because the government had limited financial means and particularly lacked human resources. As we saw above, the government was seen as proactively seeking out this support as a strategy to overcome its resource deficits and so in response to this question interviewees describe the aid as 'chosen' (*escolhido*) 'selected' (*seleccionado*) and directed (*dirigido*) by government. In other words, the government was always visibly at the helm.

The majority of those who responded in all the staff groups saw the main input of cooperation at this time as various forms of individual capacity building, most citing their own personal experience. Little reference was made to providing material and financial aid other than the funding of these activities.

In the early years there were large numbers of foreign secondary teachers, but as time went by and more Mozambicans qualified, the number was greatly reduced and technical assistance was generally used in higher education and at the administrative and policy levels.² This seems to be reflected in the very different levels of personal knowledge of the role played by international cooperation over this period.

The Policymakers' View (Category A)

This group were unanimous in seeing the involvement of international cooperation as a clearly directed government strategy. The type of input was chosen and carefully targeted and the role of the technical assistance was to enable the government to realise its aims. The huge deficits in human resources and institutional capacity meant that it was essential and the various inputs were seen to have been largely successful in rapidly overcoming the legacy of incapacity.

There was a very clear vision of how Mozambique should use the cooperation - they chose partners for specific purposes - the Germans from the GDR to support the development of the philosophy of the SNE, the Soviets for maths and technical education...

(in) MINED where the technical experts and internationalists helped to organize the Ministry, it was strictly directed towards the capacity building of the Mozambicans - and it worked.

Cooperation was and is fundamental to realise these dreams - technical assistance of specialists in various areas - the Faculty (of Education UEM) - almost all the teachers - the possibility to go out to many countries (to study) ... it was a good experience and it allowed us to open all the schools in a short time.

The majority of teachers in the Faculty (UEM) were foreigners and they were good - not sent just for the sake of sending but selected. In the UP, the foreign staff - (there was) material support but also in conversation and morale - it supported the development of the institutions.

There was a time when perhaps 60% of the teaching staff in the Pedagogical University were graduates (Licenciados) from the GDR .

² This was the situation when the author joined MINED at the end of 1983

It is clear from the comments of this group, (as well as their curricula discussed above) that they were the very Mozambicans targeted by the cooperation policy. That is they experienced the various capacity building strategies personally and were therefore fully aware of the significance of the contribution made by technical assistance and scholarship schemes. In all their discussions there was only the one passing mention (quoted above) of the provision of direct material aid and seen as of secondary importance to the personal contribution of 'cooperantes'.

Clearly their perception was that at this time the government with the public was able, despite its limited means, to be largely self-reliant in the running and expansion of the system, but they were emphatic in attributing a major role to international cooperation in developing professional and institutional capacity, recognising that the government had neither the technical capacity nor the financial means to do this alone.

The Administrators View (Category B)

For the reasons mentioned above, fewer in this group had experience on which to comment although those that had, like the policymakers had direct contact with foreign personnel, mostly as teachers. They were for the most part very positive about their contribution and saw establishing cooperation partnerships as a government strategy essential to achieving its education goals.

The combination of the effort of the government in defining policies with the support for implementation of the international cooperation.

...the policy, the government had that, but they would not have succeeded because the financial part was missing -and in the first years they had to import teachers and others to train nationals who afterwards trained others.

...when I entered secondary education, the international cooperation - there were many foreign teachers...they had a major role - the teachers from outside - Vietnam, Germany...South Africans who taught English (...I guess they were refugees) while the government mobilized people to go to school.

I evaluate this formation as extremely important as well as many who studied outside the country like for example our Provincial Director.

As these comments show, this group also saw international cooperation making a major contribution to human resource development through capacity building, teaching and scholarships, and some noted the importance of the financial contribution. However there were also some in this

group who qualified their positive assessment of the cooperation recognising limitations in resources and in competence.

...it (aid) is useful but not sufficient.

...there is a type of cooperation that I find (pause)- there were teachers from the GDR and Cuba that left after two years - without forming anyone. What was better was to come to form and leave capable people in their place as in the Faculty (UEM) with various foreign teachers.

The reflections of this group seem particularly realistic, they recognised that a major contribution had been made by the foreign personnel, and understood the financial cost that represented, but also saw that on its own it was not sufficient. In the end foreign governments and organisations have their own limitations and it is government that has to direct policy and manage the support given by others.

The Teachers' View (Category C)

As in the discussion of the government's role in this period, only 11 of the 18 teachers were able to make any comment but the number with any direct experience was even fewer. However, those who could, painted a similar picture to the other two groups of education staff.

...my own formation was thanks to the cooperation of foreign teachers from western and socialist countries, because there were no Mozambican teachers especially in secondary and higher education - (these were) secured by cooperantes in extremely difficult conditions - without material, with problems of language and culture, but they gave a big contribution. In the Faculty (UEM) I had teachers from England, Germany and Bulgaria - in secondary schooling Russians and Cubans.

At that time we had a very rich international cooperation of teachers and technical staff from Africa, Europe and Asia etc...there were pupils who went to those countries as well - GDR, Cuba, Russia and some African countries as well like Tanzania. It was the policy of the foreign governments and that of Mozambique. All positive in that phase for a country without the means to do this - in fact the majority of the present cadres went through this formation.

Before (the war) cooperation was integrated in the plan of the government and arrived where it was supposed to.

Thus these respondents reinforce the image of a major contribution to capacity building (despite the admitted difficulties) by foreign personnel filling the human and financial resource gaps of the government but working within its overall plan.

However, for those working or studying outside secondary and higher education, or in the districts as the war began to affect the rural areas in the 1980s, there was little awareness of any international contribution.

I have no experience of international cooperation - there was one time at the Jardim school (primary school in Maputo between 1978 and 1989) we exchanged letters with schools in Germany (but) projects, I know nothing about that.

In '77 it (international cooperation) existed but you didn't notice it much - I do remember in Angôche (after 1987) UNICEF supplied school materials to the secondary school

I can't really recall international cooperation, just the food from WFP in the boarding hostel.

It is worth noting that these respondents who had no awareness of international cooperation at this time (or in some cases at any time) had the same clear view of the government's role and policies as their colleagues and showed clear awareness of other issues, so we have to accept that they were simply not exposed to the work of the international personnel. (The implications of these two contrasting experiences are discussed below.)

The Parents' View (Category D)

The parents also had very little to say about international cooperation, because as they said they had no direct experience of it then or now. Their view was however that it was necessary to support the programmes of the government. Only one parent who was a teacher in the colonial period and trained teachers up to 1986, when he left to work in industry, remembered UNICEF supplying materials and financial aid to the training college and Danish cooperation offering audio-visual equipment. Looking at these responses we have to conclude that for many citizens in this period the role played by international cooperation in education was remote from their experience in contrast to their very strong perception of the government's role in opening up education to them and their children.

7.1.3 Lessons learned about the policies and strategies for developing education post-independence.

The participants in all groups were unanimous in seeing the post independence period from 1975 up to some time in the mid 1980s as one of dramatic expansion of access to education that was ideologically driven by government with the consent and participation of the majority of the public. The majority including the parents were aware that the government developed plans and strategies to achieve this objective, and saw this as its essential function. Education staff depending on their level of experience, were aware of some or all of the particular strategies employed, which fall into three categories: mobilization of public participation; developing participatory management structures in schools and local education services; enlisting international technical assistance and scholarship funding to develop human resources to manage and develop the system.

In this scenario, international cooperation was seen as essential given the huge deficits of competence and very limited financial means of the post-independence government, but its role was defined as supporting the implementation of the government's plans and its principal sphere of action as capacity building with a view to developing Mozambican staff and institutions that would as soon as possible function without foreign personnel.

While there was one suggestion that this did not always work in practice as some foreign staff simply filled a gap and returned home without contributing to the development of Mozambican staff,³ and also recognition of the cultural difficulties, the general opinion of those who had direct experience of the contribution made by foreign personnel was that it was positive and the only solution at the time. A similar attitude was expressed in relation to studying abroad, it was the only possible option and so despite the difficulties, welcome.

Many of the participants went on to conclude that the fact that by the end of this period, Mozambican schools, training colleges and higher education institutions were staffed by Mozambican graduates (including themselves) was proof of the efficacy of this strategy.

³ From the author's observation and in the opinion of Mozambicans consulted in the late 1980s this was a very common scenario in other sectors, where the cooperative system was viewed with less enthusiasm. This view was expressed by Elisabeth Sequeira who was National Director of International Cooperation in MINED at this time (interview August 2003 see discussion in Chapter 6)

However, as we have seen, a significant number of teachers and parents and a few younger administrators did not have any direct experience of this international cooperation (though some admitted they were aware that it existed) and did not feel able to comment.

So it is that in reviewing this part of the discussions, we are faced with two contrasting perceptions. On the one hand, there is a group of older and more senior education staff who are certain that the contribution of international cooperation, mainly from socialist countries, was crucial in enabling the government to rapidly develop the human resources necessary to expand and manage the education system to include the majority of the population. On the other, there is a group of those at the grass-roots who claim that they never encountered this international effort, while being very conscious of the leading role played by government in bringing education to even the poorest. Does this mean that the foreign assistance only benefited an elite or is it true that it was a successful strategy that unlocked education for the masses by focussing aid on the development of cadres? The answer lies in looking back at the curricula of our respondents (as well as the documentation and other sources discussed in Chapter 5). The same individuals who were hardly aware of international aid at this time were taught in secondary schools, training colleges and later higher education or were given in-service capacity building by Mozambicans like the senior members of the sample (in some cases actually by them), who were themselves taught or advised by the cooperantes or studied on scholarships abroad. It is therefore suggested that the government's strategy for developing capacity using international technical assistance was broadly successful for the education sector.

In the first decade of its existence MINED had gone a long way to achieving its two immediate objectives: expansion of access to basic education and the creation of a public service institution staffed by qualified Mozambicans. However, before moving on to see how that institution was to cope with the growing catastrophe of the war, it is worth considering through the reflections of the participants, what kind of institution it had become as a result of the work of these early years.

In addition to its great strength of purpose and growing capacity, some inherent weaknesses were already apparent. The drive for expansion had been achieved at the cost of the quality of the education delivered in the classroom, both in terms of academic content and socialization. As we saw from the histories of our sample, teachers were studying and learning professional skills while actually trying to teach pupils not much younger than themselves, or adults the age of their parents.

Administrators and advisors were similarly learning on the job, with the professional guidance of foreign staff, experienced in education but not in Mozambican culture.

The opening up of the education system, the pursuit of inclusion and equity and the mobilization of public participation were huge strides in the direction of democracy, but there was not yet an equal partnership between the government and the public; issues of relevance and identity had yet to be addressed. Meanwhile a level of demand had been inspired that could not be fully satisfied. Prioritising basic education for all was the right choice for a country seeking to overcome decades of underdevelopment but it had been done at the cost of neglecting other levels of the system and by ruthlessly limiting the career options of those who were co-opted to serve the majority. All of these factors were to have repercussions later, but it is hard to see, given Mozambique's history and the enormity of the task they were attempting, how it would have been done differently. Perhaps the failures come under the heading of 'necessary mistakes' discussed by one contributor.

7.2. The experience of war, its causes and impact on the development of education

This was not an easy topic for the participants to discuss. Many were not keen to dwell on what had been a very difficult time in their lives and gave quite laconic answers. Their descriptions of the effects of the war on education were very similar, including their use of vocabulary. Of course these were seen to be overwhelmingly negative even by those few who were also able to see something positive coming out of it.

When asked if they had any views on the fundamental causes of the war, the participants' reaction showed that this was unexpected, (including the A group who did not have this question in their preliminary questionnaire) many paused and collected their thoughts, a few gave short dismissive answers. Some claimed they were too young to have any idea or that they were out of the country when it started, some admitted they had tried and failed to understand it. However the majority gave considered answers carefully choosing their words. They also frequently prefaced their remarks with disclaimers: that it was a complex subject, that this was their personal opinion etc. In other cases they started by overtly or implicitly dismissing the 'received wisdom' of others before putting

their view. It seemed to the researcher that this was not a subject they commonly discussed but something about which they had reflected in their own minds.

7.2.1 The Causes of the War

As discussed in Chapter 5, in the light of the apparent popularity and success of the FRELIMO government, analysts have advanced a number of theories, depending on their ideological standpoint, to account for the civil war: destabilization by an alliance of neighbouring settler regimes and western interests in the context of the cold war; lack of democracy and espousal of Marxist utopianism; the inability to meet aspirations raised by the sudden advent of independence; a combination of all three of these. All of these are mentioned by at least some of the participants (sometimes in order to reject them as explanations) but the main causes are seen by the majority as much more internal to Mozambican society and in particular to the nationalist movement which achieved independence. Those citing only external causes of the war were a very small minority. Others, most amongst the policymakers and administrators, saw a combination of internal and external causes. The overwhelming majority (including the two parents who discussed this, over half the teachers and more than two thirds of the administrators) thought that the fundamental causes of the war lay in Mozambican society mostly within the leadership.

The Policymakers' Explanation (Category A)

External causes of the war were more commonly cited, and discussed in greater detail, by this group than any of the others. One expounded in some detail longstanding external factors, which would have inevitably led to the war, whatever the post-independence regime had been.

To begin with this really difficult question - its a complex subject (pause) an ideological subject and for that reason everyone has their opinion - mine, my opinion is the following: whatever movement had fought for independence and succeeded in defeating the colonial regime and had serious intentions for self-development would not have escaped this war...Eduardo Mondlane...said that it makes no sense for a movement to fight for liberty and then create a system of government in favour of the oppressive regime it had just defeated.

The international context: the cold war between the blocs - it was the socialist bloc that supported independence with logistics and formation ...Portugal was supported by arms sales etc. by NATO, that is NATO did not agree with the independence of Mozambique...the roots (of the war) come from far beyond the independence struggle.

Three others in this group who identified the same external causes of the war, nevertheless saw it as an internal conflict escalated by the external intervention. All four seemed to believe that internal conflicts of interest, or areas of dissent would not in themselves have led to war.

A country following the socialist path and beside it a regime extremely opposed (South Africa) and our colonizer handed over by force, not willingly - these two looked for a way to create internal problems - without that there would not have been a war - the internal differences would have been resolved internally.

FRELIMO went in for socialism so there was support for RENAMO.

There was a contest of the great powers and between us and our apartheid neighbour there were always sparks - that was a motive for the war but there had to be some discontent to intervene ...and normally in a poor country it is very easy to create discontents and that served to feed many interests outside the country - it calmed down when the cold war of the great powers ended and there was no more nourishment.

Only one of this group attributed the conflict to internal ideological differences and two specifically discounted this explanation for the internal or the external conflict:

FRELIMO just by being independent and sovereign would have come into conflict with these countries... Mozambique had already been attacked by Southern Rhodesia by 1976, that is before the declaration of socialism in 1977.

To say it was the system is not right - that could always have been discussed.

However this last respondent saw the failure to discuss differences within the nationalist movement itself as the real underlying internal (and main) cause of the war, which was then exploited by external agents. This was a view shared by more participants in the other groups.

(pause) its very complicated - probably it may have been the lack of dialogue between Mozambicans, there was no space for conversation, for this reason the war only ended when they sat down, with intermediaries, and discussed the differences. The opponents were almost all from the same house - they came out of FRELIMO for this reason it was because there was no space to hear their complaints.

The other member of the policymakers group was one of those who expressed total incomprehension of the reasons for the war, but attributed it, obliquely to the internal political leadership. This was a view expressed by many in the other groups.

Only (those in) the political arena can reply (to this question) - Independence came, which was new to us, we were still getting to understand what independence was when suddenly this other war arose - the first (war) for independence we had understood but this one we were unable to understand - it destroyed much more than the colonial war (in that one) there were strategic objectives, not going and destroying a school, a hospital, infrastructure like the railway - I cannot understand how they destroyed schools and killed children.

The Administrators' Explanation (Category B)

A minority of this group identified the same external causes as the policymakers, three also identified internal causes and only one saw the war as entirely provoked from outside. The majority, more than two thirds, saw the main cause as an internal power struggle of the leadership, some specifically locating it within the liberation movement itself but most not mentioning this. The use of the term 'civil war' to describe the conflict was a deliberate choice of words, emphasised or repeated by several respondents, which conveyed the message that they rejected the government's insistence that it was a 'war of destabilisation'. Similarly others rejected by implication, the opposition claim that it was a war for democracy.

It was a civil war. When there was the FRELIMO war with the colonists, various organisations combined to fight together - there were agreements...but afterwards they were not kept and those who didn't have the position they wanted -one group- went into the bush. There was no foreign force - it was between Mozambicans.

I believe the war was civil, a contradiction between nationals, a dissidence of one part that wanted a particular position ...and with external help managed to create this war - I believe it was a question of power - related to economic (interest) - being in power would resolve the economic problem.

To make war there has to be a personal interest -there were individual interests that were not of the general population...like children that fight at home to have something.

A power struggle - one wanted to be in the place of the other- economic power perhaps more than political - they can talk a lot about democracy etc. but at bottom it was power.

But with or without RENAMO there would have been this transformation to multi-partyism -the introduction of PRE (structural adjustment programme), still in the time of Samora, that was the first step of the reform - except that RENAMO was violent - they fought for democracy - but it would have been slower.

Nevertheless, many in this group did see the resort to arms to settle these conflicts as due to a failure or incapacity to dialogue, contrasting it with the present more democratic culture. Several of the group also pointed out that the same conflict of interests exists today but is carried on verbally. In other words the war was always unnecessary.

I think the fundamental cause was the incomprehension between Mozambican brothers (pause) - lack of understanding (pause) if it was now, when we have understanding and respect between people, there would have been no need for war - we had not achieved diversity of ideas - each one thought that his idea was the only one

...in the beginning no one took it seriously - now one knows that any opinion has to be considered - however small or illiterate the person is, it's as well to listen and not ignore it.

It was a surprise to discover that it was necessary to talk to them - the population refused and distrusted the negotiations - but when they (RENAMO) accepted and the violence immediately ended, they understood that these people were controlled...My father was assassinated with bayonets for supporting his son in literacy work - afterwards it's discovered that these men are controlled and not bandits, if that was the case why not negotiate?...It was because of ...an insistence by the party in power not to have a dialogue. What is done today should have been done before - not to say that the same thing does for all.

... today it's by words, but it continues.

...in the end there were neither winners or losers and we are all here with our (different) ideas developing the country.

As well as the lack of democratic culture in the leadership, several in this group thought the ignorance of the general population allowed them to be seduced into participating in the violence which in the end only brought disaster.

In my opinion whatever the motive there was no reason to rush to arms - I think it was the lack of understanding, incomprehension of the consequences...many people today regret it - they lost members of their family and their possessions etc. People very easily deceived themselves - by false promises etc. ...after the war ...we were able to converse with the populations - we discovered that they had been isolated without understanding things.

Like the policy makers, this group often prefaced their remarks with disclaimers suggesting they had insufficient knowledge or experience or that it was a complicated matter and there was one participant who was genuinely at a loss to comprehend what could have led to war on this scale.

Our ideas about this are influenced by the media (that is we don't have any other sources of information).

At the time (i.e when it started, but not after 1982) I was in Cuba, so it's difficult to say...

...there are events that are not explained -they are obscure - a lot needs to come out, there is no transparency (in other aspects of governance...but not in this).

I can't understand how people were so discontented as to take up arms - it is difficult for us to understand how it happened - it started when I was overseas. After the war I made a journey by car from here to Nampula to see and understand but I still can't...it is difficult to explain.

This group then was generally sceptical of the various political theories put forward by government, the opposition and foreign analysts to explain the war. For most of them it was a much more familiar question of basic human relations in a society that had yet to learn how to live with 'diversity of ideas'.

The Teachers' Explanation (Category C)

In this group too the majority saw the main causes of the war as internal. Only three out of 18 recognised the same external causes described by the A group and only one of these did not refer to internal causes. Once again a power struggle and inability to dialogue within the leadership was a common theme as well as the insistence on 'civil' war and a rejection of an ideological contest. The main difference compared to the B group is the greater number, though still a minority, who distanced themselves from the subject, either by dismissive replies, saying it was to do with 'them' or the politicians or simply by saying they did not know.

Those that provoked this civil war - that is how to describe a war between persons of the same people isn't it? - were people who abandoned the ranks of FRELIMO - they separated themselves and went into the bush (the same way as the Anglican Church, it is almost the same as the Catholic, but it separated itself) because they didn't get the position they wanted - it is difficult to please everyone.

The expectations of some in FRELIMO were not satisfied and those in power did not manage to meet with them to resolve it - each one with his egoism. It was not socialism versus capitalism - nobody understood that - it was a struggle to occupy the place of the other.

Ambition and greed.. Even if one talks of democracy that was done before with the Independence.

...they all wanted to direct instead of correcting the mistake together - it was only when they noticed that the (survival of the) people was at stake that they stopped - the one who suffered was the child.

It is difficult for us the population to know the causes, we did not see any reasons for war - the politicians are the ones that have their reasons, it was entirely their affair.

A number in this group however, saw the problems inherent in the post-colonial society as lying at the root of the problem: issues such as ignorance, lack of common culture, unequal distribution of resources and development and the difficult progress towards democracy. These respondents seemed less inclined to attribute blame, more inclined to see that the way people acted was conditioned by the circumstances at the time, including lacking the understanding that they had since gained.

Illiteracy contributed, because the people who thought to take power wanted to live well without knowing that without science and technology nothing works.

...they (RENAMO) didn't understand what belongs to society (schools etc.) and what belonged to those in power - only at the end they understood and began to try to do education and so on.

Lack of unity - the existence of the different languages contributed.

The geographical distribution of the country - the Gaza empire has not ended - it doesn't have that title but it still exists - the development is all in the south. The mistake was to continue with the division of the colonial time.

... the first elections that were held without any great international support were conducted from people's homes up to the People's Assembly - it was a single party with representation from the whole country but adopting Marxist-Leninism excluded groups of believers and others - this influenced the war. There were malcontents (Mozambicans) from the former Portuguese armed forces - it ended in a meeting with the President - some accepted conforming but others went back to RENAMO. With the droughts the government's acceptance by the (rural) populations diminished and then the war prohibited the work in the interior that had been done before.

When we were studying (in Cuba) we had the history of other countries and we concluded that it was part of a process of restoring democracy (the socialist system left some discontented) but that everything that has a beginning has an end - in other countries it was like that. Our message was always to ask for peace in Mozambique.⁴

Finally there were two young teachers in this group, who were children during the war, and although they experienced it and must have heard explanations from adults, declined to express an opinion. From their curricula these two young women spent their formative years in urban contexts

⁴ The students in Cuba made a number of demonstrations and sent collective messages to the government.

where almost nightly attacks could be heard. They had apparently decided not to try to examine that experience too closely.

I heard it talked about and lived it, but as a small child ...I don't know how to talk about it.

I have no idea. I was not able to understand it.

The Parents' Explanation (Category D)

Only two parents in Nampula were interviewed on this subject. Both were very keen to discuss it. One, a peasant farmer, asked to speak at this point in his mother tongue and enlisted the help of the school's director as translator. The other is a member of the provincial electoral commission, studying as a mature student for a law degree and also a former teacher. However they both put forward the same account of the fundamental causes, though the second, while endorsing the power struggle as the immediate cause of the conflict, also like some in the teachers group saw that the legacy of inequality after colonial rule was inherently unstable and the government, despite good intentions, not experienced or capable enough to resolve the conflict without violence.

This war was because of the lack of unity between them - they were not understanding each other...Samora rose to power after the death (of Mondlane). Dlakhama was still in FRELIMO - each one wanted to make his programmes with his own objectives. When it started...the people asked why the fight? It was concluded that they were fighting for the leadership, even though they said they wanted peace.

...there was unequal development between the regions, inherent in the geography - the neighbouring countries etc. and also a lack of connection because of the lack of roads north-south, no bridge over the Zambeze etc. There were privileges for the chiefs (opportunities for their children for example) and not for others - that led others to think of liberating these things - they felt excluded - it was also a question of power. Certain groups had more possibilities, for example the children of those in the south could more easily attend the University (living at home) than those from the north...Now because of democracy (it was always there but it is greater) there is the thinking to distribute equitably - opening universities in other places - the state universities are not yet consolidated - the private ones are taking up the challenge- that could have been one of the causes. It was not that the government did not care, it was simply not possible to solve all the problems at once.

While these two parents cannot be taken as representative, it is interesting that they like the majority of the teachers and administrators did not look for explanations of the war outside the country, but in their own society.

7.2.2 The Effects of the War on the Development of Education

The general description of the effects of the war on education given by all the groups was very similar especially in their use of vocabulary. All the participants in all groups (except for the three who were children during the war) described it as a 'reversal' (*retrocesso*). Other commonly used terms were 'reduction' and 'retardation.' The activities of education were described as 'paralysed', 'stagnated' or 'interrupted', 'halted'. Many things were 'destroyed', 'eliminated' or 'extinct'. In particular it was consistently seen across all groups as changing, redirecting or diverting government policy especially for expansion. There was seen to be a weakening, limitation or loss of control by MINED and the government including in the relations with international cooperation. The lasting legacy was seen to be the high levels of illiteracy and continuing lack of access to basic and other levels of education. Only seven of those who discussed the effects of the war saw any positive outcomes (including only one of the A group who were specifically asked to consider this). Civic and professional learning and political change were seen by this minority to have been a positive result of the war, but bought at a very high price. Others made a point of saying these changes were going to happen anyway.

While there was this consistency in the general analysis by all the groups, each group described those effects, which had an immediate impact on their working lives in detail, while speaking in more general terms of other aspects. By putting the narratives together we get the detailed picture of what was happening at all levels of the sector.

The Effect on Policy and Implementation

This was naturally discussed in greatest detail by all the members of the policymaker group, but referred to in general terms by about half of the participants in other groups. A significant number refer specifically to the economic collapse and restructuring as well as the diversion of resources and effort away from education. Description by all participants of the 'reversal' of education at this time of course also refers to the negative impact of the war on the implementation of the post-independence policies.

The war was taking over large areas of the country and so the introduction of the SNE took place in difficult conditions - it prevented feedback and monitoring to be able to improve and adjust the process. (A)

The policies and actions were effectively halted because you can't say that it went ahead while it was impossible to work in the countryside. (A)

What threw (escangalhou) the system out of gear was the structural adjustment of the IMF - it weakened the capacity - the reduction in public expenditure led, for example to not training teachers. (A)

Before the war, school was totally free now they have to pay something, although very little, some families can't manage it ...the war changed the policy of the socialist society for that of the market - I believe the pressure for this was external, the international community played hard for that, although there were some critical pressures internally. (B)

After '86 the cooperation weakened what little capacity had been achieved. In a situation of weakness and vulnerability at the back of the opening up to the IMF came lots of organisations and NGOs in an uncontrolled manner. The war and the drought created a situation of emergency and almost total dependency on aid. The support and the intervention were not part of a coherent process or programme directed by MINED. (A)

Apart from that the effort of the government was redirected to the war and survival. (A)

The effort of the government suffered a blow - the war was destroying all its strength. (C)

There were some years in which education was abandoned. (C)

The Effect on Human Resource Development

This was felt in different ways at different levels. The most devastating, and lasting impact was seen to be in reducing the number of teachers: fewer were trained and many were lost, either killed or abandoning the near impossible working conditions. The professional training of senior staff, on the other hand, because it took place in Maputo or abroad, was seen to be little affected.

The training of teachers... today there is a deficit of teachers in the schools, but many of the (other) professional training courses (such as mine) were not affected. (A)

Many teachers left the profession because they no longer had jobs and MINED had no money to pay them. (A)

A number of teachers already trained were lost - killed, I knew some of them. Teacher training was also reduced - the rural training centres closed or paralysed. (B)

The targets of RENAMO were the schools and the teachers. (C)

... the paralysation of the development of teachers - there was no capacity building at that time - teachers kidnapped etc.(B)

You couldn't train people in the countryside because the access routes were closed and the schools closed or destroyed. (A)

Adult education experienced paralysation throughout this whole time - the FACOTRAV (accelerated university admissions courses for mature students) for example ...was a great thing - now extinct. (C)

The Effect on Education for the General Public

The brunt of the war was of course, felt by the general public. This was seen in macro terms by the policymakers and in graphic daily detail by those on the front line: teachers, parents and local administrators.

The greatest impact was on the policy of expansion of education and so very negative for the general public. (A)

The levels of illiteracy rose again. Today in the most affected provinces - they have the highest levels until today. (A)

There were many children who did not study because it was interrupted by the war and they never went back to study - the girls in premature marriage at 12 years. (B)

...they destroyed schools and were against the teachers who had to flee and pupils fleeing - it paralysed education and some areas are only just restarting. (C)

The time of the war the school did not function well - the pupils and teachers were afraid to go to school - many people did not study. (D)

It provoked the flight of the populations looking for places of safety - a great influx that created problems of access (to the schools) in those areas - many remained outside. (B)

The war meant that many schools were closed. - persecution of teachers- there were cases in which it was understood that schools were part of the socialist system and so they destroyed the school materials... In the cities they couldn't take in all that fled from the countryside and so many gave up studying. (D)

The General Impact of the War on Society and its Effect on Education

The participants clearly saw that the suffering in the war left lasting negative effects in Mozambican society: changes in social attitudes, psychological scars and poverty. Several also felt that they not only lost the gains that had been made in social and economic development since independence but also the further gains that they could have expected.

...people also could not see the future, there was not much motivation. (A)

After, there began to be a certain demoralisation - .with the intensification of the war from '89 and the changes from single party to multiparty, people began to have more interest in earning a living. (B)

...it retarded the development of the country - retarded the development of people's mentalities - the traumas of children etc. (B)

More negative aspects - innocent lives - the blood of soldiers on both sides, I don't differentiate. (B)

One lost colleagues and pupils travelling to Nampula - it was dangerous to fetch food (on the mainland) but there was none there (on the island where they were safe). (B)

...the massive movement of the populations - people lived almost like animals in the bush, without hope - like nomads. (B)

The populations until today have little confidence in strangers - a very big psychological scar in the population - lack of openness to others. (B)

The war was a phenomenon that created a dual - it drove away the effective cooperation that we had - we are poor because of the war. (C)

With the war we began to go backwards...it destroyed our human advance, culturally and materially - a reversal. Many abandoned their homes where they produced and stayed in the cities up to today - hence the poverty of today. If it was not for the war we would have been in a much more advanced situation. (C)

It reduced the development that should have happened. (C)

...after we had to spend money again for infrastructure and to train teachers etc. (D)

Positive Outcomes.

The majority of the participants strongly rejected any idea that anything positive came from the war. Even those in the groups who were not asked if they saw any positive outcomes, made a point of stressing that nothing positive could be attributed to it.

Positive? (pause) Its difficult to find anything positive (A)

...for me it is hard to find any positive aspect of this war (B)

The impact of the war was totally negative. There was absolutely no advantage. (C)

However as we saw in the discussion of the causes of the war a number of these did refer to what they considered positive aspects that had emerged in the post-war society such as developments in

democracy, that would prevent any return to the violence and this was the aspect that the few who admitted positive outcomes of the war most commonly cited.

War is always a lesson for a people - we learnt to be tolerant, to respect the opinion of another - it helped a lot with the education system in the new books we introduced themes on peace, tolerance and democracy - without the war they would not have understood what peace really is. (A)

Changes in the behaviour of the citizen - who learnt that war only brings disaster - no one can think any more of making war - it was a lesson for the Mozambican people. (B)

I reckon one now knows how to hold conversations, arrive at an agreement and carry out agreements. It is a good thing because the international cooperation likes Mozambique - the two parts understood how to end the war - other countries have not done that - they go back to fighting. (B)

Only one participant actually saw the war as having directly brought about a positive change in the political system (others as we have seen thought this was going to occur anyway or regretted it) but disapproved of war as a means to that end.

One positive thing that arose - the single party government up to a point tied people up. Only the way it was done I do not agree with, but achieving multiparty government, yes. It was part of a world movement - the Berlin wall etc. (C)

Two of the policy makers, who also saw many negative aspects of the international cooperation at this time, also saw that it had some positive aspects at the practical level.

With the destruction of the war without the cooperation we would have been in trouble - we gained more from maintaining these relations than if we had remained closed...One motivation of theirs was to help a people that suffered a lot, to help with necessities, even though there may have been other hidden or economic motivations. (A)

There was a change after the Cold War. Before decisions about the nature of cooperation, down to the quantities of equipment to be received, were taken at the level of the politicians (between heads of state) without the participation of personnel in the ministries - and so often the aid and goods received were not the most appropriate. (A)

Finally, it is clear that individuals at different levels of the system were already preparing themselves to contribute to post-war recovery of education.

One positive aspect of the halt in activities was to have time to reflect on how to reintroduce literacy in new ways. (B)
(the war)... was the reason for always making an effort (in our studies) to see if we could recover the situation. (C)

7.2.3 Lessons learned about the war

The majority of the respondents believed that the fundamental causes of the war were internal to Mozambican society. Very few (but from all the education categories) believed that it was entirely provoked from outside. Even in the policymakers group, who gave most weight to external factors as the cause, the majority believed that there had to be internal problems, which could be exploited by external agents. That it was essentially a power struggle within the national leadership was the most commonly held belief expressed by the majority of administrators, teachers and parents and by two of the policymakers. The failure, or unwillingness to resolve these differences by dialogue was also identified in all groups as the principal weakness that either, as some saw it allowed external interests to escalate the conflict into a war or in the view of others led to the use of violence to achieve political ambitions. While none saw democracy as the conscious ambition of the opposition, several saw that the greater democracy that emerged from the peace process, meant that a resort to violence to solve conflicts would be unlikely in present day Mozambique.

For a number of participants it was the colonial legacy of underdevelopment, inequality, ignorance and lack of experience of governance, on the part of both government and public, that made Mozambican society vulnerable to violent conflict. A minority, mainly those at the leadership level of the Ministry or who had studied abroad, also saw the wider regional and international context, which made it vulnerable to external intervention.

Thus the testimony of the participants suggests that ironically, it was those very weaknesses in the post-colonial society that the new education system set out to redress that were the fundamental causes of the war that devastated the country and the education system itself, though its scale and duration were fed by external agents.

Two main points were made about the effect of the war on the role of government in support of education. First, the government resolve and ability to lead the development of education for all was turned back by the war. Those struggling to maintain the process from the top experienced frustration, while those in the classroom often felt abandoned. Secondly, the war, by destroying the government's economic independence, forced a change in the orientation of the economy, which also contradicted the post-independence philosophy for education. For the same reason, the government was seen to lose control over the international assistance it received and how and where it was delivered.

It is also clear from these accounts that the two most serious human resource deficits felt today, the absolute shortage of teachers in terms of numbers and their inadequate level of professional skill are directly attributed to the war and the economic crisis it provoked. The drive to upgrade other professionals through adult education was also largely abandoned. However, professional training and higher education were less affected.

The greatest loss of all was the hard won inclusion of the majority rural population in education. The rural school was the flagship of FRELIMO's education policy and so the principal target of the opposition forces, and it was the rural population that was displaced, impoverished and terrorised by the war. However, their flight to the urban areas created huge problems for the urban schools and diminished access and quality of education for all.

However, although the education system was seen as severely damaged and the development of individuals and institutions as 'reversed' or 'stagnated,' very few things were described as permanently destroyed and there is evidence of taking first steps to recovery even before the fighting came to an end.

Nevertheless, the effects of the war were overwhelmingly negative, both materially and psychologically, and few were prepared to acknowledge any positive outcomes. Those that did described it as a bitter lesson in civic education and understanding of human diversity, though they could have wished that this social maturity could have been achieved by other means.

7.3 The post-war recovery and development of education.

The participants spent much more time discussing this period than the two previous phases, about which they already had some clear general conclusions. They were clear that there had been a large measure of recovery from the war and further development as well as many positive aspects arising from the peace. However, not surprisingly, they did not present such a clear overall view of the present state of education, though they asserted that its core objectives were unchanged and generally supported. Each one was very much conditioned by their every day experience and the particular challenges inherent in their work. However, they are all clearly seeing the same picture, though from different perspectives. There are no markedly divergent views on the state of the sector and the institutional consensus evident in their account of the earlier phases is still evident.

7.3.1 The Role of Government, its Strategies and Policies

To a large extent, all groups saw the government in the post-war period assuming the same role as before the war. They describe the government in the same terms of effort and concern and as directing policy and of sharing a vision for education with the public. Its main efforts are still seen as directed at expanding the school network to increase access and equity and it is credited with largely restoring what was there before and now entering a phase of 'greater development. However there is greater recognition of the government's limitations and its inability to satisfy the demand for education, both in terms of numbers and of quality and particularly to keep well-qualified and motivated teachers in the classroom.

The Policymakers' View (Category A)

All the policymakers spoke extensively on the policies, strategies and vision of the government for post-war recovery, which they saw as being developed from the last years of the war as it became clear that peace would be achieved. Indeed rethinking education was itself part of the peace process. This meant that as soon as the accord was signed education was ready to roll out recovery and development strategies, with strong government and public support.

It was already clear (in 1990) that the principal objective for the country was to win the peace - that was the contribution of Chissano.

From '90 to '92 the country began to think of a plan for post-war reconstruction ...before '91 technical commissions were set up in MINED (MINED staff with some foreigners) to study eight areas of the functioning of education. This was in the context of the readjustment of the law of the SNE and the redrawing of the constitution. The results informed the drafting of the master plans for basic education as well as secondary education and technical education.

MINED was already (in 1992) designing the plan for recovery - how to attack the project of education again.

However, an overarching vision or policy was lacking, and in fact had to be built in collaboration with the public and education staff at all levels. Thus the Education Sector Strategy Plan (ESSP) was developed over a number of years in a participatory process. Given the financial dependence of the country on aid this process had to be supported and the final outcome endorsed by donors and international financial institutions if it was to be implemented. This meant that MINED had to take back the initiative and exert all the diplomatic skills acquired during the difficult war years to achieve its aims.

MINED understood that it must carry out a process of reflection on the direction which it should follow to be able to lead the process and not be led by the donors. The idea of assuming the leadership of the process took hold.

The diplomacy had to be very strong from both sides (FRELIMO and RENAMO) to convince (investors) that no one would go back to arms. The elections in '94 - considered an example for Africa - convinced the international community and the Mozambican population.

...following the rules of the IMF was also decisive in managing to convince international public opinion.

From then on education began to grow.

But in '94 we realised that something was missing - we had three separate plans (see above) but they needed to be integrated in a general policy. So in '95 when the new government was formed the first thing was the drawing up of a policy for education - the vision for the path ahead for education (like we had in '75) had been missing... After that we had to transform the vision into a strategic plan for implementation.

The decision was to have a process, taking longer, but done by us (not by consultants) and so it was in '98 after consultation at various levels and done as a capacity building process that we concluded the plan.

It was already very clear what the role of cooperation should be in this plan (ESSP) - the purpose of the plan was to reduce the vulnerability of MINED in the face of the pressures of the donors - that MINED would indicate where they should work (not as they had been doing- informing that they had already started work in district x).

As discussed in Chapter 5, a key principle of the strategy plan was that it should be channelled through the public accounts and administered by the relevant departments rather than being earmarked to specific projects or components of the sector plan. This was the hardest pill for the donors to swallow, but finally in 2003, as this research was being conducted it was being implemented in a limited way to the relief and delight of several in this group.

The common fund (FASE) for the provinces has very clear objectives. I heartily agree with this methodology because before the government had no idea of the real cost of the running of a province - they will have meetings with NGOS to know what money is spent on education as a whole so that the (department of) finances know.

Essentially, what the group are describing is a concerted effort to return to the education agenda of equity and inclusion interrupted by the war, but under new conditions. Literacy work is once again cited as a key indicator of that policy at work. However their reflections as the war ended also focussed on key weaknesses identified in the SNE since its inception. Of these, the group expressed most concern about progress towards institutional reform. Restoration and expansion of the school network and curriculum reform were seen to be proceeding on the ground but increased effectiveness was limited by the slow progress in decentralisation.

The fundamental objective of the system is equity, apart from increasing numbers - to reduce disparities of gender, regional and between urban and rural.

The school network is almost restored in the majority of districts

They also returned to the literacy offensives

The rate of growth is not yet satisfactory but there is growth... that is to say, the supply does not meet the demand

We identified three key problems: a rigid and centralised administrative system; a restrictive and rigid curriculum; insufficient schools and teachers limiting access to education.

In MINED what is at stake is the actual structure - MINED should occupy itself in defining policies and leave the execution to the provinces... At the provincial level we have managed to place some graduates...so that the execution passes to the provinces - we need to reinforce this more.

...to fund the schools, decentralise the administration - for example there is not a single school in Maputo that is not managing its own budget.

MINED is struggling to decentralise. What prevents it is this lack of technical competence.

The lack of qualified personnel is still an issue, but apart from some specific areas of competence, not at the central level, nor even in many provincial directorates. The key deficits were seen to be at the local level in districts and schools.

Many people not qualified in administration and management of education... This is what holds back the process ...there are districts which don't manage to spend all their annual budget - they return money because of lacking knowledge of the procedures - they don't spend while there are big shortages of chalk in the schools.

Personnel were lost (in the war) (but) MINED has been growing year by year with more qualified people. Recovered? No, most of the (secondary) schools are not in condition ...75% of the teachers are not qualified apart from lack of teachers in terms of numbers.

We are still not where we would like to be - many shortages of qualified staff.

As before the war, the Mozambican public is seen as a positive force for development. Nevertheless as they re-established contact with the rural population there was no return to the euphoria of the post-independence period it was necessary to negotiate with a more vocal and cynical public.

The Mozambican citizen: we're not a people of complaints, don't wait for someone to do it for us - don't need a commander - each one decides to find a solution to get out of the situation - for example the communities build schools and then ask for a teacher from education. We saw that MINED should open up a budget line to support this initiative and we managed it this year.

The consciousness of the communities woke up to the importance of education - there are initiatives of the population to create schools...it was possible to negotiate the handing over of a plot of good farm land with fruit trees ...for the construction of a secondary school.

... but the situation with the population was different - there were parties, we had to discuss with people about what is state and what is party (they said the school was FRELIMO's).

The post-war conditions were also seen ambivalently. The fact of peace and greater financial security in the education sector as a result of the new deal with the donors, made it possible to work productively. However the wider economic conditions create new uncertainties: the impact of the free market on the national economy is seen to reduce direct and indirect support for education and foster petty corruption in the public services and there is continuing vulnerability to natural disasters, due to the continuing lack of investment in mitigation strategies.

...the fundamental factor is peace.

Before one had to plan without any certainty of receiving (funds) now it (FASE) allows (us) to work with security.

The country has no policy for growth of the national impresarial class - this influences the support they can give to the schools and for the employment of parents etc.

Floods, natural disasters - we're unable to conserve water for the drought areas -annually we have to cope with situations of this kind.

Only one of this group commented directly on the change in the political system and with some anxieties about confrontational politics and uncertainty for long-term implementation plans

A negative/positive (factor): learning democracy. The question of national unity, for us we cannot admit ideas of division, but some parties think they should provoke that to gain support. Then there is the problem with mandates - the plan is to introduce the new curriculum in 2004 but that is the year that this mandate ends - will the government deliver or not? People think of a horizon of 5 years, not for the long term.

The picture that emerged from discussions with this group was of continuing commitment to the basic ideals of the post-independence period but with a greater awareness of complexity and the need to negotiate progress, whether with donors, politicians or the public.

The Administrators' View (Category B)

Like the policymakers, this group spoke most about the government's policies and strategies for post-war recovery and development of education, seeing it as the resumption of the pre-war agenda but with a new strategic framework. The promptness with which the government promoted the restoration of schools and resumption of literacy work was their first indication that education was once again a priority.

...the government was always concerned to develop education... and it has not changed essentially.

Straight after the Accord in Rome, the government, the first thing it did was to open schools, with or without classrooms - it was enough to have a teacher - the President etc. publicly opening schools and hospitals.

After the war the government concerned itself with getting everyone to read and write - many were already adults and they promoted literacy work so that they might study.

The strategies of today, like the strategy plan, could eliminate illiteracy.

It is interesting to note that the approaches that they single out for particular praise are those that build on the participatory and inclusive experiences of the post-independence period. LEC, promoting the equitable distribution of qualified staff and the participation of girls in education. They also continue to see enlisting international cooperation as an important government strategy for education.

What helps education most is the philosophy of making the school the centre of the community whereby the populations feel themselves owners of the school - it helped us in the post-war times to re-implant education and improve the quality of teaching.

The government has a scheme which is to be praised - from certain districts a quota of people can get places in the UP without (competing in an) exam - it is to encourage them to continue in the districts.

The idea of the government is positive - there is government interest in mobilizing, (and getting the parents to understand) for the girls to study and to send teachers to the districts.

The combination of the effort of the government in defining the policies and the support for implementation of the international cooperation.

In general then, they describe the government positively in terms of its strength of purpose and strategic planning and they give it credit for largely recovering the education system after the war and beginning to achieve some of its long-term development goals, at least in terms of cover and access.

Straight after (the war) there was an effort to restore the system - the restoration is now done - what is being done now is development - where I studied grade 4 in a single classroom is already an EP2 school with improved classrooms and has the prospect of secondary education.

In all the provinces there are training colleges (even if not in equal numbers)...Higher education almost covers all the provinces - the others will have it soon. If this continues we will have a different image.

They persuaded the parents to send the girls to school to complete the level without dropping out (speaking about) premature marriage of girls - and boys, girls and boys, involved in productive work and housework ...a big effort at provincial level and the opening up of the provincial government - this with the arrival of (literacy) material supplied from the centre (national directorate) helped most.

The strength of the government as it continues can promote study more and more - the government explaining and supporting, eliminating poverty.

Some of this group were also enthusiastic about a new sense of institution building and collaborative working. The following are examples from the central Ministry and a provincial directorate (DPE).

The Director is very objective, analyses things, then takes a decision. The head of department is very dynamic and impulsive - the two complement each other. They always consult the collective (of the directorate) which meets every Thursday and there are meetings with the staff but not always, sometimes the section heads transmit the reports.

We have recovered almost all the (adult) educators. The majority have come back to adult education and manage the activities of the volunteers at the level of the ZIPs. We have professional staff in all the districts...it was only possible through a dispatch from the DPE supported by the provincial government but... some now have two staff on their own initiative in order to meet the demand.

...education is not divorced from the reforms and the dynamic of the country - the general reform of the public sector.

However, the group described a number of aspects of the implementation of education policies that were falling short of what could be expected. Like the policymakers they saw a serious failure in the first line of management for support and communication with schools and communities at the grass roots level. One participant attributed this directly to the slow pace of decentralisation.

The strategy plan ... in MINED and in the provinces etc. yes it's there, but in the school you don't feel that they have any knowledge of this plan.

The government has a lot of strength, it has good staff but at the grass roots it has no presence.

...there in the district and in the villages there is no one. We're not at war now, they could work with them - we did that in the past (i.e post independence) with the OJM (youth movement).

...there is too much interference from Plan and Finances (Ministry of Planning and Finance) from MINED and the DPEs. The DDEs (District Directorates) should have their own departments of finance, even the localities and large schools could have them.

Others when discussing the government's failure to meet demand, were not attributing blame but trying to describe objective conditions that limited what it could achieve in the short term.

After the war many schools were constructed but they are still not enough because the population grew - one can't meet the demand.

The big difference between urban and rural areas makes a negative contribution to harmonious development ...but there is a reduction in the female participation in the levels from EP2 onwards- it has to do with premature pregnancies among other things - that is, there is a downward graph.

The problem is that giving access to all the children to study grade 7, the secondary schools are few and focus is still on basic education -it creates a funnel - it is necessary to adjust the emphasis.

The phase we are facing now is to remove the barriers - Between EP1 and EP2 is already resolved by the introduction of complete schools, now the problem is to transfer from EP2 to secondary school...also for entry into the universities - all this is the result of the success of education.

The same mixture of praise and frustration is evident in their comments on government treatment of staff. Admirable efforts for staff training are still not enough and meanwhile the inadequacy of the pay and conditions leads qualified staff to abandon the profession

Positive factors - the government is much more directed towards staff formation, one already sees that - there is a concern to send existing staff to study.

(more) distance learning is very necessary - the IAP distance course - in the districts of Memba and Nacarua (rural Nampula) there are no longer category E (unqualified category) teachers due to that.

The constant raising of the level of the teachers in order to improve the quality of teaching is important - its going ahead but it is a drop in the ocean - there is effort but it is not enough -the training centres are reduced in number and overcrowded in this province.

... in all of MINED there are no institutions for the training of (adult education) cadres...former staff are working in every thing except literacy.

They train many staff but do not offer them the conditions to work, they lose them and now we are going backwards recruiting people who don't know education.

...there are many of my generation who are very good professionals but they are not in education because education did not create the conditions for them to continue - it does not cherish its cadres.

While this sense of frustration is at times expressed as criticism of MINED, there is also a general recognition that the root cause of all these problems is that the education sector simply does not have the resources it needs.

The fundamental problem, the obstacle to carrying out many activities is the insufficient budget - resolving the teacher's (financial) problem would straight away resolve other problems - a demotivated teacher affects not only himself but fifty pupils. The lack of budget is not just for salaries but also conditions. The salary scale is the same for all the public services but others have conditions, other privileges.

The government is pushing every child towards education, but there is no one to receive this child - there is a lack of teachers - the extension of the (school) network is good but it requires more teachers than exist.

The expenditure on education needs to be more because year by year the number of pupils increases, and for this reason the number of teachers tends to rise - it needs a bigger slice of the cake.

Obstacles? Lack of funds...there is no capacity to meet the demand of the public - we have the knowledge to win people to (take part in) literacy, but the means to do more are lacking.

Before (the war) we got books to all the locations and had the transport to carry them - today we don't have that.

This objective lack of resources was seen by some to be exacerbated by poor governance and corruption.

Difficulties for recovery - the main one is corruption.

Poverty continues to be a great impediment, but not so much the lack of money. It is also knowing how to conserve and use the means we have, know how to be creative - poverty is not a lack of money - it is to work more and better for the public good - eliminate corruption. If the resources were well used they could be few but still be enough.

Some of the participants in this group mentioned the wider political conditions in the country, on the whole positively. A secure working environment had been created as a result of peace and democratic resolution of conflict. Greater openness and the participation of other actors besides government were also welcome but, as in the policymakers group, there was some anxiety about the working of democracy in practice.

The question now is to maintain the peace - respect the thinking of all. Up to now there has been success in this direction. In the parliament there are debates that could lead to fighting but at the end they approve and conclude - that is important - with a single party there is no one to say if you are wrong - better a war of words than a war of weapons.

What helps most is the character of the Mozambican, who is very peaceful.

From '92 there was an opening up to many groups - one noted it a lot - national NGOs also work with us.

Multipartyism makes for development because the one who is in power has to show he has done something...With one party there was development but only according to their ideas.

What makes it difficult is that there are some political currents that are not yet well defined - they don't yet know what they want - this means that the populations too are not seeing their way forward - very often its individuals who do this, they don't know how to develop a political line.

This group also saw the response of the public to education as mainly positive.

The population is now responding - they already know people who have studied and the community leaders, the traditional ones, already collaborate and promote study.

The response of the communities - the school councils - a partnership between the government and the communities- they build classrooms, teachers houses, encourage parents to send girls to school ...there is support from the leaders.

But the honeymoon of the independence is over. The population that has survived the war is concerned with survival, less impressed by the educated and openly defensive of its values.

That patriotism of the times when I started work, you don't feel that any more - its more ways of surviving.

Society itself does not consider the teacher - when I started teaching I was queen - the population gave me fish and sauces and came for me to read and write letters for them. Now they have realised that the teacher is a pauper and do not respect (her).

It is not enough to say to the public that the government is concerned. The individual wants to see something in his own suburb.

I think we recovered a lot from the war, but there are still nomadic groups that wander from one place to another, selling charcoal and things. On the other hand there are populations that are very strong in defending their cultural values (i.e not accepting the culture of the modern society).

In the rural environment the gender traditions lead to reluctance to send girls to school to "learn western/urban values".

From a different standpoint in the institution from the policy makers, with less involvement with strategy development and more direct involvement with its implementation, this group nevertheless give a very similar account of the post-war scenario in education. They too see an essential continuity of purpose on the part of government and basically endorse the strategic approach adopted to promote it in the complex and difficult conditions left by the war. However they are

much more aware of the practical short-comings and huge resource deficits of the enterprise. They also seem closer to the public and the general political, economic and social context in which education has to work.

The Teachers' View (Category C)

As before the word *concern* is the term most commonly used in references to government. Fourteen of the eighteen teachers used this or other terms suggesting that the government has the political will to develop education. Many also referred to its strategic policymaking role. However, expressions indicating strength and leadership were much less common and for the first time a number of the teachers indicated doubts about the government's ability to deliver describing it as 'trying' or 'not responding adequately'.

Now a new life is starting and there is a lot of interest in extending the school network. On the part of the government, this is the concern.

The government is generating greater effort for education to go ahead.

It is well planned - the plan of MINED for the development of education and we will implement it It helps the performance of the schools.

...the government does what it can and it can't do everything.

In these last years there has been great concern to recover in some aspects: the schools have increased their levels, but the conditions and the infrastructure have not grown.

The majority still saw the government's main actions concentrated on increasing access and equity. They gave it credit for considerable success in recovering and expanding the network, including now managing to increase access beyond first level primary (EP1), and the gender equity policy in particular, was commended by both women and men.

...the number of schools increased - the network extended - incidence of illiteracy reduced.

Today there are schools where there never were before, even before the war - that it is to say as well as recovery there has been a notable development.

There is more access to EP2 and secondary.

The introduction of complete (primary) schools is good too because the child at least completes basic education.

Trying to have a balance, for example higher education is being introduced in all parts of the country - even if it is private, of the church.

...now with the government and the organisations, girls education is being promoted - there is more enrolment – it's going forward.

However, more than half of the group also mentioned failures on some specific issues of equity and quality in the education system, which have wider implications for the economic and political development of the nation.

They developed general education but not technical education that would be another solution for finding a profession.

Unqualified teachers working does not guarantee the quality.

...pupils in EP2 are weak - the syllabus is extensive and talks about things that provide no basis for further learning.

...there are many children out of school and those in the school are very weak in their ability to memorize and interpret and with poor concentration.

There is a great concentration of cadres in Maputo, under-utilized, and in other places there are unqualified people teaching secondary education. Before they sent people - it was important - today they need to do the same but by means of incentives.

...this is to redistribute what is in Maputo, reduce the focal points of difference. It would lead to consolidation of the unity of the country.

The sense of abandonment of the profession, described in the war seems to have persisted amongst the teachers and they clearly felt that their role was not just insufficiently remunerated, which some recognise as beyond MINED's control, but also not valued by government (and some would say, by the public). These comments reinforce the view of the policymakers and administrators that the system is institutionally weakest at this key grassroots level.

I don't feel we're very much supported.

The government doesn't look to the teachers - they are not interested.

They don't manage to keep...pedagogically trained teachers in education.

I would like the government to look for a decent salary for the teacher.

...even if the government does not have (money) it should make an effort to create incentives.

Similarly, only four mentioned opportunities for individual staff formation in a positive light and none described any capacity building activities as they did when discussing the post-independence period. Three others actually complained of failure and even lack of will in this area.

A positive thing is that they allow for further education in the UP.

It is good to train people but it is necessary to create conditions.

The government is not allowing the teacher to continue to study with a scholarship.

...it has the means, the country is not poor - we have mineral resources.

Objectively speaking, of course, the opportunities are greatly increased compared to the war years and in terms of middle and higher education compared to the post-independence period, but what was then something they never expected, is now perhaps understood to be something to which they are entitled.

It was clear as soon as the teachers began to describe their working conditions that this was at the root of their dissatisfaction. Adverse conditions were mentioned three times as frequently as positive conditions, though still only by slightly less than half the group and were overwhelmingly associated with lack of financial resources to enable the system to meet demand and improve conditions.

The big difficulties are essentially financial: you can't attract teachers with the existing conditions, there is no money to increase the faculties in the UP and improve the conditions in the schools.

...because more children are passing grades it increases the demand. The government ...builds schools but can't keep up with the growth in demand.

There is a lack of adequate fencing - its damaged - the area is full of delinquents - even during classes the public circulate in the yard - now we have new classrooms but everyone sits on the floor before we were giving lessons under a tree.

...it is necessary to have a good look at the situation of libraries and laboratories - Achievement of pupils in schools with libraries is higher - its to have conditions for investigation and creativity.

There are delays in wages - waiting two months.

The school is small and much sought after - 3000 by day and 1000 at night, an average of 80 pupils in a class because everyone wants to study and we cannot stop them.

For eleven of the eighteen it is the market economy and its attendant poverty that is contributing to both the overcrowding in urban areas and the number of children out of school. A minority attributed these difficulties to lack of commitment from government and corruption.

The market economy gives no quarter - when they shut factories (referring to agricultural processing plants in the rural areas) people come back to the city. They lose their place and employment.

...people don't direct the child to the school because of poverty - street selling etc.

Today the school exists but it is expensive - it makes it difficult to study - they can't manage it - the parents complain about the level of the enrolment fee. (secondary level)

I don't know if it is because they can't (pay better salaries) or don't want to

...today's government is fomenting corruption in the school - the teacher cannot give classes to those that have eaten when he has not, so he asks (for money) from the pupils.

Where does the money go? Abroad the government is well regarded, but for us here... I don't understand - I'm convinced that if we had this government before I would not have studied because of poverty - the poor don't study abroad today either.

Human resource deficits, mentioned by nearly half, were the second most serious constraint and it was as much lack of competence as lack of numbers that contributed to the difficulties. For example, the administrative weakness mentioned by the other education professionals was highlighted by this group too. The lack of teachers is also seen as a failure to keep qualified professionals as much as an issue of numbers and again due to market pressures.

The management of resources - bad management because of lack of preparation in administrative and financial management - there could be bad faith as well, in the midst of the disorganisation - that is a question of inspection.

The main problem is the lack of properly qualified cadres - they are few. Many come to teach to earn money while they study and then as soon as they finish their course they abandon (teaching). I don't know how to resolve this problem...not managing to keep staff, pedagogically trained teachers - for example in grade 12 we have eight maths teachers, only one is trained, the others are transitory.

There are teachers but many who were trained are not teaching.

Overloaded classes were also referred to as specific continuing effects of the war, which was why several stressed that recovery was ongoing. Others thought recovery was complete in their area and the current difficulties had other causes.

The country is - in recovery (emphasising choice of words) because the war held back development.

Little by little we are recovering. It is easier to build something new than to recover something that has been destroyed.

With the end of the war some went back (to the rural areas) but not many - we continue to have problems of large classes.

One doesn't see any effects in Machava - a lot of time has passed, we're dealing with other problems now.

We have already recovered. Today there are no children out of school.

We recovered but it is not the same as before - the overcrowding of classes continues because of the increased demand.

Apart from the general agreement that education had largely recovered from the war about a third mentioned some other positive conditions for education in the post-war scenario: peace allowing for a secure working environment, greater access and communication and the general development of the country.

The principal factor is peace...Peace allows for policies of development in the whole country to diminish the great differences between regions.

The education strategy allows us to work with great security.

That they accepted meeting and that the conflicts are from mouth to mouth, not arms.

Liberty of the press, radio etc. Access roads to all areas.

There are many means of communication – television, radio etc they have positive and educative aspects, even the soap operas.

...they are already building beautiful new suburbs.

Mozambique has the capacity to carry out all the policies it likes (but should use it).

Teaching is going on in a good state. I'm optimistic for the future. (new teacher)

As before, the public response to education is referred to less than by the other groups and this time slightly more often in negative than positive terms. Public participation was mentioned by only three, self-reliance and motivation by two others. Several other teachers had a completely contrary view of the public attitude to education.

You will see that where there was no school today there is one – the population is collaborating well in the process.

The Mozambican people now understands that it is necessary to study – that it can lead development and resolve some problems of the country – it's going ahead.

...parents want to send their children to school.

The pupils have no interest in studying. I don't know if the parents didn't inform them of the importance of education.

The recovery that is lacking is an economy of self-reliance.

I tried to ask for support from some companies but they weren't interested.

...they refused at first saying it was 'the government's' (responsibility).

The eleven who remembered the post-independence period made comparisons with the present and like other groups some saw that the approach to education was essentially the same and some recognised that the achievements of the post-independence period were now being overtaken by the expansion of the system. Rather more made unfavourable comparisons with the pre-war period and one at least was less than happy with political changes.

The government continues with the same concern.

Today, I reckon that the pace is maintained – the objective is always to develop the country.

...today it is a football game, you can join in if you like- our children cannot study (due to poverty).

...today they (the pupils) are very agitated because of the conditions outside the school.

The course in the Faculty (UEM) gave a formation that was more solid than the present IMAPs which they enter with the same level (grade) but they don't have secure knowledge.⁵

From the introduction of multipartyism in '92, preceded by the economic rehabilitation which prompted the opening to the free market – there were new initiatives for individuality and NGOs – the change led to a new life for us but not without its reverses – reverses ...people don't send their children to school because of poverty.

⁵⁵ A senior member of the Pedagogical University Staff in conversation with the author (June 2003) commented for example, that the standard of a degree awarded in the UP could not be the same as a European degree in the present conditions because the students came into the University from a 'deficient' secondary education (due to the adverse conditions described by these teachers) while the few like him (and like those who went to the UEM Faculty) who had completed secondary education in colonial times had a much better grounding. That is that the deficits in quality of education from the primary level upwards, has repercussions for the standards in the training of the next generation of teachers, which in turn perpetuates poor standards in the schools.

This group then, paint the same fairly confident general picture of the present progress in education as the other education professionals. However, they are clearly experiencing many more frustrations in their daily work and personal lives due to considerable financial pressures. There is still enthusiasm for education in their responses but also a noticeable sense of grievance at not being valued for the effort they make.⁶ This is clearly more than the fact of low pay and difficult working conditions, which have been facts of life in Mozambican schools since independence. It is perhaps a loss of status as well as financial hardship in a new less egalitarian economic order in which others with their level of education are conspicuously better off:

The Parents' View (Category D)

There was a broad consensus amongst the parents that the government is concerned to develop education and that its vision which is shared by the general public, cuts across the political parties and is essentially the same as before. They see government as having a leading role in defining policy and developing new strategies but seem to pragmatically accept its limited capacity to deliver unaided because of its lack of means. It is now enlisting other participants and for the same reason the parents associations intervene on many fronts.

The government has the will and tries to build schools.

It will be an advantage to have the complete school (EP1 and EP2).

There has been effort to reconstruct the schools after the war.

The policy of the government is general - of all the parties and the general public.

The budget of the government is not enough to meet demand.

(The government) continues with this policy, but with more openness - allowing private education - the state is not alone.

The actual installations are (pause) insufficient - very often the parents try to resolve the problem.

We have students whose parents have no means - those children are supported by the school fund with a certificate of poverty passed by the local authority.

Things are being improved in education...but it is not from one day to the next that you achieve everything.

However the main thrust of their discussions was to describe the great difficulties of education and their own struggles as individual parents and as association members to support the work of the

⁶ The teachers interviewed in the sample were much more cautious in their remarks than others met informally who expressed a strong sense of grievance, often saying they were reluctantly considering leaving teaching.

school in a difficult economic and social environment. The lack of means (both theirs and the government's) to support education is their key concern and seen as the root cause of most other problems in the schools.

...the children pass the level without solid knowledge; it has to do with the precarious conditions- they go to study without eating, the school is cold with broken windows, without desks and they leave (home) early on foot.

...for example this school could give pre-university if it had a laboratory.

Look at ladies like this mother (one of the association members present studying in the night classes) they have to sit on the floor to do the exam.

There is a lack of teachers - lack of teachers and large classes.

There are no teachers because of the salaries - the delays in payment - when they get other work they leave.

As a bricklayer, I receive very little from the government if I do work for the school and I have to lay a bribe to get the contract - hand over a goat - if you have no goat you have no work.

The teacher wants to eat twice - from the salary and from the pupil ...how can they not allow themselves to be corrupted when they earn a pittance.

There are money problems, I have been unemployed since 1998, so my son has to work to pay for his studies...Unemployment is general - 50% of the population doesn't work. This has an influence on the capacity of the pupil - it destroys the child because his parents have no money to buy books.

There were some criticisms of corruption and policy failures at the top of government, but these Mozambican citizens lived up to the policymakers' view of them, quoted above. They were not waiting for government, and even less for international aid, but finding their own solutions.

...the people at the head of things, ministers etc. complicate the process ...that is to say there is corruption at the central level.

The functioning of government needs to be reviewed and there really has to be a policy for all workers not just those of the state.

The parents are here to deal with the problems of the school because the budget of the government does not suffice to meet the demand.

As described in Chapter 4, all the parents were members of their school parents association. Clearly the level of organisation, participation and effectiveness of the associations varied greatly. The secondary school association in Nampula City had already been hailed as a role model for the

whole country and is supporting every aspect of the school and helping to develop other associations.

The school was praised in the meeting of MINED over this (functioning of the school council and LEC). CONCERN (Irish NGO) organised meetings to exchange experience between school councils and invited the council from 2 de Outubro to participate - traditional leaders also participated in these meetings.

We have access to the school calendar and the work of the council is planned on that basis and drawn up in a planning frame.

...with the participation of the council the little resources are well used, whereas before they disappeared in a short time from not being well applied.

The payments (parents' contributions) are set in relation to the economic means of the parents. It is possible to raise funds because even in the city they have fields and sell the surplus to contribute to their children's education, even the unemployed.⁷

The periodic payments for repairs etc. come from the parents' fund.

A month ago they had notice boards made for the staff room - also the painting of the teachers houses.

Some parents invite people to give lectures, on AIDS for example, or one of them can do it if they are from that line of work.

The notice boards with newspapers - did you see them? - for reading - there is a contract with Noticias to supply them - that's by the parents.

There is the experience of counselling students on how to behave and to give equal attention to all the subjects because they are all essential - (and) lectures on moral and patriotic education.

There is an advice centre in the school made by the parents with video equipment etc. got through the blood donations given by the pupils.

We make use of parents with experience in education to support the untrained teachers with pedagogical advice and counselling on discipline problems.

The other two schools were perhaps more typical of the present underdeveloped state of the association movement. At the secondary school in Machava and the rural primary school in Nampula, new heads had clearly recently put some effort into revitalising and improving relations with rather inactive associations. Only 10 of the 44 class representatives were present at the Machava meeting and at the rural primary school in Nampula the interviews ended with the head

⁷ See above, the school had 3000 day pupils in two shifts and 1000 at night, so contributions need not be very great to provide useful sums.

and a parent discussing the state of relations between the school and parents. The father seemed to be challenging the head to reaffirm the parents' right to involvement in the school.

(New) Head: *But this year it was different wasn't it? The school has changed its habits to socialize with the parents.*

Parent: *I think they should participate to support the school.*

Nevertheless it was clear to the researcher that the LEC concept developed in the early years of MINED was once again coming into its own and generating creative grassroots solutions to the problems in the schools, fully justifying the comments on the public participation in schools by the policymakers and administrators.

7.3.2 The Role of International Cooperation

International cooperation in the education sector was still seen as a necessary and its basic role as essentially to support the implementation of government policy as before, but the areas in which that support was needed was seen to have shifted. The economic and political context was also seen as radically different from the situation after the war of independence. Most of the discussion of this topic came from the policymakers and administrators. The teachers on the whole had little to say: half said nothing and the others saw the donors as mainly providing material and financial aid rather than direct technical assistance, which some would still have appreciated. The parents said they had virtually no experience of it and spoke extensively instead of their own self-help measures to support education.

The Policymakers' View (Category A)

For this group there was no doubt that international cooperation was still essential for the development of education in Mozambique. Ideally it would take on a supporting role and should be chosen and directed by the government at the appropriate levels through general budget support for an agreed strategy plan. The group were relieved that this was beginning to happen. However other forms of cooperation can be less enabling even though individual projects have positive outcomes.

Cooperation when it is well integrated in the programme of the government has a very positive impact.

Placing funds in the FASE (donor funding pool) ...in the provinces for immediate application – it is a common cake and known to finances but for immediate use ...it avoids that business of waiting for the budget title to come out and having to work half the year on the basis of loans.

They should recognise and support what is ongoing...The World Bank arrived here to try and impose a form of economic projection which was not good for education and in MINED we already had our own projection that we were using. Why did they not ask, "How do you do this?" Secondly, the World Bank said it would support four things: infrastructure, teacher training, gender and HIV-AIDS – Just that! But we cannot look at the system like that – where are the trainee teachers to come from? - from secondary education which is left out. They don't look at the system as a whole.

The programme of WFP in the schools (providing snacks for the pupils) – the children don't drop out ...and the achievement is higher.

Now there is an engineer paid by the World Bank and we have created a construction unit with him to facilitate the work...when there is money now everything is ready (in advance) and the implementation goes ahead.

In other words there is a tendency to continue working in the same mode as during the war, based on projects and dictating programmes to a weakened administration. However the group recognised that there had been progress and effort on both sides to develop a genuine partnership. MINED had been determined since the early 1990s to use the strategy plan development and implementation as a capacity building exercise for the Ministry and the donors have to a large extent cooperated with this concept, though there has been great reluctance to take the final step of putting their money into a common fund and there is still lack of understanding of the exact role MINED would like them to play in capacity building.

The functioning has not been easy, we can find problems on the part of MINED and the partners. For MINED the big difficulty is that the management of the cooperation absorbs a lot of time, because it's a transition phase from projects to programmes and we still have to discuss projects individually.

They (the donors) were very concerned to expand the school network and benefit the pupil in the school. It was seen that it is necessary to develop the institutions and the ESSP helped a lot with that, but even today they work with different systems – it is proving difficult to have a common fund.

...the rhythm of change has been much slower than we wanted – it is only this year that the common fund was established and they are not all in there.

The difficulties they have are with the Mozambican government which is in a process of general reform, so they want to wait till there is a common management system. In their own countries they have their domestic pressures – the population wants to see...very visible projects where they can fix their flag – not put into a common fund with other donors.

The relationship was seen to be moving towards a more genuine partnership, which when it worked was very good, but they admitted with some frustration that it was difficult to shift the culture of the donors and international institutions, though on the whole they thought the difficulties were due to lack of understanding rather than any hostile intent.

One of the positive points is that they opened the barriers in their relations with us – we are having real partnership relations through the COPA and RAR (ESSP steering committee; Annual review meetings)

It (partnership) exists but that does not mean it is equal for both (parties) – we don't benefit fully from technical assistance because it is still "tied to finance" ...I always have to agree with the technical assistance I'm given – the margin of ability to decline is very restricted.

I think the Bank is an example of a heavy bureaucratic structure that needs change – all the discourse speaks of change but when they come to a country – the functionary, even the consultant – they give orders...it is an important organisation...it makes no sense not to work with them, but you have to assume that we are in a process of constant struggle...of argument.

The relations keep improving – even they are learning and they have the advantage of learning in other countries as well and contribute these experiences to us.

Given this context of unequal partnership the MINED management have felt obliged to be quite defensive of their sovereignty in dealings with international cooperation. This has resulted in a complex system of parallel structures with core decision making reserved for Mozambican only committees. However another reason for the many joint working groups, which does not seem to be fully understood by the donors is to continue the capacity building of Ministry staff.

The Technical Council (Central policymaking body composed of the Minister, National Directors and Advisors) is an organ strictly for MINED – only Mozambicans.

These parallel working groups have to exist because they cannot participate in the councils and organs of the Ministry.

The (joint) working groups for thematic areas of MINED is a way of allowing for all the technical staff to participate in the implementation of the strategy plan ...(there was) a concern that all the processes of participation and capacity building (in developing the ESSP) should not be lost in the implementation.

Capacity building and institutional development continue to be the main areas for which the policymakers were seeking donor support, but the days when any help was better than none, when non-specialist cooperantes in schools and colleges could make a difference because the level of Mozambican competence was so low, are now gone.

Nowadays you feel it (international cooperation) more in financial terms – the use of foreign human resources has diminished a lot.

There is still a need for technical assistance in some areas of MINED and much more need in the provinces and districts. We have to improve our vision over this. It doesn't mean just calling people in from abroad, from the North, but also using the existing internal capacity apart from other countries in the South and it has to be based on criteria (not just to provide people with employment) on the basis of needs analysis. It is still very necessary but it has to be linked to the capacity building of staff...to the strategy plan, not to the components financed by them, and at the choice of MINED.

Operating in the context of global economic politics was seen as tough but the group showed some confidence that Mozambique had learnt how to play by the rules and turn them to their advantage.

Following the rules of the IMF was decisive in convincing international public opinion, although at times it is difficult for the Mozambican population to swallow this measure.

The debates at the level of the G8 for financing linked to the reduction of poverty have forced the rethinking of the model for development aid – it has to be revised on both sides and especially this question of technical assistance – the costs in relation to benefit have not been analysed. It is 60% of the aid but what is the part that remains in Mozambique and how much leaves?

However, it is clear that 'managing the international cooperation' to keep funding and technical assistance coming to the Ministry and the Provinces takes up a large part of their time and attention.

The Administrators' View (Category B)

This group gave much less time to discussing the role of international cooperation in this phase than the policymakers or than they themselves had done in respect of the post-independence period. One

of the fourteen didn't mention it at all in connection with this period, others were very brief or described what it 'ought' to be. The majority referred to a supporting role, but rather less than half described it as necessary.

The government is receiving great support to achieve its dream...Without these organizations I don't know how the government would manage.

The support of the international community is necessary for the construction of durable classrooms. The parents are tired of building huts every year.

The international community supports –some organizations build schools.

Meanwhile the aid is still necessary but money needs to be allocated where it will be used.

The impact of the assistance seems to be quite patchy with some very effective support selected and targeted through government programmes and other cases where assistance is not well managed and even imposed rather than chosen. One very weary District Director described how she got around her huge rural district by hitching lifts while donor assistance (including transport) was concentrated on a few projects, in the most accessible places.⁸ There is a sense that the assistance is only a partial solution.

After the war I observed a lot of support from the foreign organisations (if it existed before it was not visible on the ground) and the distance learning, when the government decided to raise the level of the teachers in service, it was funded by them...That is to say it is all more visible.

There is a lot of cooperation for education in this phase but... there is not a good monitoring of the activities done by the organisations...there is no effective direction on the ground.

Globalisation has its effects – as poor people measures are imposed on us, which are not appropriate for our situation...imposed reforms – we adopt models that are not ours.

The (Provincial) Pedagogical Directorate wants to support but they are limited to circulating only in the districts, which have projects, for lack of their own financial resources. The projects are directed at district centres and within districts only certain ZIPs.

OSWELA does training in cascade (training a few to teach others). Something is transmitted, but the whole message does not get through.

International cooperation does what it can - you can't insist on what is offered.

⁸ Such as the school visited by the researcher! Arranging to visit any more typical school would have taken a major logistic exercise beyond the means of either the researcher or the DPE.

Nevertheless about half of the group thought the relations with international organisations were basically positive. Some spoke of their participation and others of concern and interest and of learning and improving their assistance. One thought that the context had changed rather than the basic nature of the relationship. In this respect it is worth remembering that at this level, donor cooperation is experienced through personal working relationships, rather than high-level negotiation.

They have shown great concern within the working group (in MINED) – they participate and contribute. In the working group for literacy we discussed the plans with them before finalising.

Brazil cooperated in the training of literacy teachers and we have a lot of support from the Cubans as before.

Those are two countries with a lot of experience

OSWELA... made a training programme and presented the proposal to education and after a discussion they implemented it through the education staff. (Provincial Directorate).

...although the international politics have changed – the way of selecting (aid) has changed - but the objective is the same.

However, international cooperation was much more commonly associated with financial and material donations, mainly through projects identified with particular organisations than direct capacity building or staff formation.

The donors showed great interest in education and health. 14 schools were opened in Maputo this year (new and extended) with finance from the Japanese.

Financing the projects of education, many NGOs that help us: the Embassy of the Netherlands work directly with the Centre in Mutuane, CLUSA works with the peasant associations, the Catholic church and other religious people, CONCERN in mother tongue literacy.

PASE is visible here – the purchase of school books for free distribution costs more than 2 million meticaís a year.

There should be more international cooperation to send people abroad where they complete higher education quicker because there are conditions for study...and teachers with method – it is a way to solve the problem of poor quality...The (national) system does not foster the love of study it is learning by memory, it does not have a notion of developing what you learn...International cooperation could inject a different vision...promote a culture of investigation...it should invest in public and private libraries.

Like the policymakers they also recognised that there were difficulties and faults on both sides limiting the impact of assistance. For example, in MINED it is not just the policymakers who find it difficult to make time to work with international staff. Meanwhile self interest and corruption exists on both sides.

The working group is useful. (but) this year we haven't yet met as a weekly group – it's because of our work – we have very few staff and lots of work.

Some like SIDA come in good faith, others just to make money.

There are cases that lead a donor to abandon a project and this corruption is not just promoted by internal people.⁹

This group was aware of a lot of international support for education and most clearly thought it was on the whole necessary and useful so long as it was integrated in clear government strategies. Where this did not occur both government and the agencies themselves were held responsible.

The Teachers' View (Category C)

Nine of this group, that is half, did not mention international cooperation in response to this question unless prompted and saw little or no impact. One thought it was much reduced, clearly looking for the kind of technical assistance he had experienced in the early independence period.

I don't know anything concrete. I saw work in the schools outside the cities on the television – out there, there is a lot.

Today it doesn't make itself felt much...the coming of many cooperantes is greatly reduced – a consequence of the politics of globalisation which we cannot escape.

Those that did discuss it saw it in a supporting role, about a third described it as necessary but an even smaller number saw it as being selected or directed by government and just as many thought it was not being managed to the best advantage.

⁹ The interviewee cited a number of specific examples of both cases at this point, but asked for them not to be recorded.

What helps is the international cooperation of governments and NGOs.

They support education in a number of projects.... It follows the same path as education, there are no differences they work well.

Well-intentioned cooperation is always positive – a cooperation directed at the government for education programmes is also appropriate.

Cooperation facilitates a part (of the needs) – it helps us.

Cooperation helps in some cases. Latterly it is not being well used - before it arrived at its destination...it was integrated in a government plan and arrived where it should.

They work in parallel.

Before helping they should go to the field to know the problems and give support on the basis of what exists.

More than half the group clearly saw financial assistance as the main role of international cooperation in this phase, in some cases contrasting it with what they had experienced before.

You see it in the construction of schools

Construction of schools - the majority was with the support of cooperation

Today the influence is more in the area of infrastructure and providing scholarships, not in teaching.

We don't have (cooperantes) in the schools, when we still need them to guarantee the formation and to introduce new methodologies and technologies.

Now a large part of the (in-service) training is facilitated (meaning financed) by the international cooperation. The government makes the plan but could not carry it out without intervention.

Like the administrators several talked of many different organisations involved in supporting particular projects or aspects of the government programmes and some commented unfavourably on this change in the way international assistance is delivered.

The models of organization for literacy etc. of the former times have passed, organisations (NGOs and INGOs) turn up in numbers. Beside their production and construction projects they support education. At the international level - SADC and the Commonwealth there is sharing of experience and with UNESCO and other organisations.

Support of the organisations – the promotion of girls – in this school the participation is approaching normal.

At that time Mozambique was allied to the socialist bloc – the cooperantes received symbolic salaries compared to the extravagant ones today.

The NGOs pay according to their way and there is a drain from education to them, very often the best teachers.

Two of the group thought the general public as well as government is instrumental in gaining international assistance, another indication perhaps of the development of the civil partnership between government and community.

Cooperation comes because of the interest of the government and of the public – the community in the local area also demands schools.

Cooperation – they give a lot of help – it is through this that many Mozambicans study and press the government to create these conditions.

The Parents View (Category D)

As already mentioned, the parents had little to say about international cooperation because they had had little or no experience of it. They tended to rely on their own efforts or, as for example, in Machava, appeal to local companies or the community to assist the schools. Like some teachers some were aware of it at a distance.

If we are aware of international cooperation? We need help!

We are not feeling the support of the international community in the community – it arrives up there, here we don't feel it.

These organisations and the government concern themselves to provide adequate education – they contribute their methods with ours – there is a partnership – if it is good or bad, I don't know.

These responses of the parents in the two urban secondary schools reflect the way aid is delivered: targeted at rural primary schools in particular locations because of the project culture and earmarked funding which largely neglects secondary education. Clearly as a result, much of the public is unaware of international inputs. Meanwhile the budget support that “arrives up there” no doubt does have some impact on their schools (not withstanding veiled hints at corruption) but it is not evident to them.

7.3.3 Lessons learned about the post-war recovery of education.

The participants' responses confirm what the statistics have already told us, that there has been a remarkable recovery and further development in the provision of general education since the end of the war. However, the importance of their testimony lies in their shared perception that before anything else, the government and public recovered their vision of education and a determination to take charge of the process of developing the education sector.

All groups believe that the government is committed to education and has in general adopted appropriate policies and strategies. It is credited with considerable success in recovering and expanding the number and level of schools and some limited success in achieving greater equity, but all groups identified major difficulties in meeting demand and ensuring quality. They attribute this to the combination of two main factors. First there is the actual legacy of the war, which has contributed directly both to the shortage and poor qualification of the teachers and to general poverty and lack of resources, exacerbated by the change in the economic order, which has reduced the government's power of decision. Secondly, there is the greatly increased demand for education from the public, not just in terms of numbers wanting to enrol (which is partly caused by population increase) but due to the success of the government in attracting people to education and raising their aspirations. Post-independence, merely to be admitted to grade 5 was beyond what most people expected, now they expect access to secondary and higher education. The current inability of the system to respond adequately can thus be seen literally as an issue of reduced supply and increased demand. On the other hand peace and the resourcefulness of parents in supporting education were seen as very positive factors. Once again, different groups and individuals emphasised different aspects of this scenario depending on their place in it.

Not surprisingly the policymakers take a more strategic view of the challenges and how they are being met. The political and economic context at the macro level is seen as more complex than before, but they feel they have had some success in dealing with it. They focussed on the need for capacity building and institutional strengthening at the local level as their key concern, believing that the available level of resources could produce much more if effectively deployed by qualified staff. The administrators share this view but are much more conscious of just how difficult the conditions are for teachers and parents. Of all the groups, the teachers seem to have a sense of battling against a sea of difficulties, with no immediate solution in sight. The fact that they feel unsupported in this situation confirms the other two education groups' view that this is the weak

point in the institution. A sense of not being valued by the wider society is compounded by the feeling that they are also not regarded by their own Ministry. As we have seen, policymakers and particularly the administrators are keenly aware of the teachers' predicament, so too are the parents but with some exceptions, this is not translated into tangible expressions of support.

As a result it is suggested that many of those recruited to serve in education post-independence, have long since abandoned teaching for other professions, However, the experience of the parents' association president and former teacher interviewed in Nampula, points to ways in which their knowledge still contributes to education just as their education skills have been usefully applied in other fields of national development.¹⁰

The commitment to education of the public, and the growing strength of the parents' support through their associations and communities is a continuing institutional strength of the education sector. It clearly has the potential to strengthen the performance of the schools and improve teacher morale by improving working conditions, but it needs to be matched by more effective local school management and improved remuneration. As we have seen, the institutional development of the education service was not halted totally by the war. The formation of higher education teachers and administrators went ahead and this was an important resource for planning and initiating recovery strategies. However, since it could not be matched by development and formation at the local level that lack of capacity is now holding back recovery. The fact that MINED does not have the financial means (or financial policy control) to reward them adequately is another legacy of the war.

Despite all of these difficulties there has been a real 'peace dividend'. The fact of secure working conditions, the confidence that there is a new culture of dialogue and recognition of diversity in the wider society and in the schools (with a new curriculum developed with the public ready to be introduced) is in itself an enabling environment, that seems to have generated confidence in the future even if the present is fraught with difficulties.

¹⁰ *The transfer of cadres to other ministries...it's a constant – it's normal that it should happen. A teacher is primarily a communicator and informant - these are characteristics suitable for doing other things. Education always trained many people ...and continues to have good staff.* Elisabeth Sequeira. Former National Director of International Cooperation, MINED. Interview August 2003.

As for earlier periods, participants' views on international cooperation are very much influenced by the character of the particular interventions they have encountered. Nevertheless a general pattern can be discerned across the groups.

The proper role of international cooperation, which it is seen to be fulfilling in many instances, is still seen as to support the programmes of the government. However, the radically different political and economic context, as well as the progress already made in developing the capacity of the education service, has changed the emphasis of aid from direct technical assistance to financial support and the relationship between the government and its international partners is not yet as clear as they felt it was in the post-independence period.

While the financial assistance and some continuing technical assistance from the international community continue to be essential for the implementation of education programmes, this input is not being used to best advantage, because of the prolonged process of negotiating the switch from project to sector programme strategic support. MINED has taken back much of the initiative at the policy level since the war but aid continues to be delivered at the grass roots largely through projects. This means that although in most instances these are supporting national policies, at the provincial and district level where they are implemented, administrators' ability to allocate resources equitably or determine priorities is restricted. Meanwhile in the schools and amongst parents, there are few instances of a sense of participation and certainly no general sense of benefiting from international cooperation, though some individual experiences have been good.

The MINED management has clearly succeeded in recovering much of the control over policy and implementation that they lost in the war years and developed a high level of negotiating skills. They recognise that the donors are also learning from their experiences and trying to change their operational culture, not without their own difficulties. However, the need to devote so much effort to relations with international partners, though it is bringing great benefits to the sector, is also clearly a drain on the institutional capacity of the central Ministry and placing constraints on their ability to respond to the concerns of their primary constituents in the schools and communities.

Thus the concentration of donor and policymaker effort at this top policy level is probably one of the factors inhibiting the institutional development through decentralisation that is so necessary.¹¹

Overall, the views on international cooperation in this phase are more ambivalent than those expressed in relation to the post-independence period. There is a sense that most international agencies and their staff are acting with good will and that much of what they do is useful or even essential, but there is an undercurrent of dissatisfaction, only occasionally voiced as direct criticism, with the relationship, which is essentially still one of dependence rather than partnership.

However, while more dissatisfaction is expressed with both government and international cooperation, and considerably more frustration with conditions in education at this stage, we should be cautious in taking this to mean that the post-independence era was at the time free of such grumbles – the participants had the benefit of hindsight in assessing that time and were able to see it in general terms as a period of great progress, but as their curricula show it was also a time of personal frustration for many and continuing material hardship. Today it is clear that they have made good progress in recovering from the war and they are confident of the future in general terms, but understandably daunted by the scale of the challenges they face on a daily basis.

7.4 General Lessons

Having heard the participants' account of this long journey from colonialism, through two wars, dramatic political and economic upheavals in global politics, we cannot but recognise the creation, survival and development of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique as a great achievement. Not least when we recognise from the testimonies of the participants in this research, that throughout all these events, some as they acknowledge of their own making, both government and public, and in many instances international partners, have maintained a constant vision of its principal objectives and faith in its ability to ultimately achieve them.

As one contributor asked at the beginning “How in these conditions did we achieve so much?” This question is important, not just for the sake of understanding the particular historical case of

¹¹ In 1998 at the donor conference to appraise the ESSP, the then Minister of Education, Sr. Nhavoto, pointed out that work with the donors had prevented him for over six months from setting foot in a school. As already noted, the purpose of the strategy plan was to reduce the amount of time spent in this way, but this has so far not happened.

Mozambique, but to see if it provides any clues as to how other nations might approach the enormous task of recovery from repression, violent regime change, civil war and economic collapse, which in one form or another make up the history of so many other war-torn countries. In order to discuss this in our final chapter, it is necessary here to identify, not the details of the case of education in Mozambique, but the key factors that have led, despite many reverses and continuing difficulties, to a “success story”.

The account of the participants suggests that while there was huge technical incapacity, and inexperience of governance at independence, there was a vision of development that was shared by the revolutionary government and the majority of the general public: that the key to personal and national development lay in universal access to literacy and basic education. This vision had very particular roots in the nature of Portuguese colonialism, which consciously excluded the masses from power by means of exclusion from education. Access to education was thus seen as empowerment. In other societies, the principal instrument of exclusion may be land or resources, but the conclusion seems to be that a shared wrong can be the starting point for a shared vision and the case of education in Mozambique suggests that such a vision is a powerful factor for institutional development and survival.

On this basis the MINED developed participatory strategies within their own staff and with the public, which compensated for lack of technical capacity, and mobilized resources. Nevertheless, if the system was to progress at a rate that could satisfy the aspirations of the public and beyond the provision of basic education it was necessary to enlist external technical assistance. It is quite clear from the Mozambican case that foreign technical assistance played a crucial role in building the capacity of the education sector up to the early 1990s and the end of the civil war. First of all by forming a first generation of Mozambican administrators, policymakers and teachers and secondly by assisting them to develop their own institutions. As a result they were in a position, despite the reverses of the war to take the initiative for planning the strategic recovery of the sector post-war.

However, all the contributors were sure that this input was effective, precisely because it was enlisted by MINED in support of their programmes. When the war and economic collapse diverted government attention from this purpose and it lost the ability to direct the international assistance, it became fragmented, ineffective or actually debilitating. Recognition of this fact has led MINED to convince a majority of the donors to try to retrieve the situation by developing a form of assistance

through the strategy plan that puts government at the helm again, coordinating and directing assistance. However, the key difference compared to 1975, is that while their technical capacity for planning and management is highly developed, they are not as before, financially independent, and 'free to decline' what they don't want. The MINED management is therefore in a constant state of negotiation with donor partners and fragmentary project approaches to finance and technical support persist at the level of implementation. This capacity limiting factor can be seen as a legacy of the war and consequent economic collapse.

Of course, since education was such a crucial enterprise for the newly independent Mozambique, it was also deeply implicated in the long civil war, as a target of resentment and as a focus for keeping the vision of a better society alive. The participants' reflections on the internal causes of the war point to another key factor, which was necessary for the harmonious development of a public institution such as MINED. While the FRELIMO government was ideologically committed to democratisation, inclusion and participation, and their promotion of mass education was the flagship of that ideology, neither they nor the general public had any experience of such a culture of governance. The majority were on the whole, prepared to be 'mobilized' for the sake of a common aspiration, but others felt excluded. Within the leadership itself there was 'a lack of space for dialogue' and an inability to come to terms with 'diversity of ideas'. Creating such a space, and realising that it is possible to collectively develop the country, while holding different ideas, are the two aspects of governance that had to exist for peace to be restored and the key to its sustainability. In the case of MINED this realisation has released the potential for the public to now participate fully in the development of education, through civil organisations like the parents associations. A flexible curriculum, which uses the many national languages and cultures is being introduced and universal inclusion is no longer at the price of uniformity.

The point has been made in Chapter 5 that though weakened MINED survived organisationally, even though the number of schools was decimated and despite extreme practical difficulties for access and communication, and a drastic reduction in resources. It seems clear from the participants' testimonies that the Ministry retained the loyalty of its staff, especially the teachers, and the public who were the main targets of the violence. That is they remained committed to the vision they shared in the post-independence period. The other strength that can be seen as keeping MINED alive as an institution, is the fact that the formation and development of senior management and teaching staff continued almost unaffected, though their powers of decision making and means

of implementation were drastically weakened by the combined effect of economic collapse, structural adjustment and diversion of resources to the war effort. These two factors provided the essential ground for recovery, which was already being contemplated, even as they concentrated their efforts on managing and surviving the war.

The above account clarifies many of the issues raised by the review of the secondary sources at the end of Chapter 5 about the development of the education sector: the institutional strengths and weaknesses of MINED and the conditions in which international cooperation and aid had most impact for capacity development. In particular, the participants' accounts support the view that it was the capacity building interventions in the post-independence period, which continued at senior management level throughout the war that had the most impact in developing the institutional capacity to initiate post-war recovery and take advantage of post-war assistance. Thus the drive to develop a unified sector approach was initiated by MINED but took advantage of international policy shifts. The final stage in this process, the common education sector support fund was a Mozambican objective from the beginning, but met with strong resistance from donors.

The participant's reflections on the causes of the war and the conditions for peace, which they now believe exist in their society, also suggest that the Mozambican case does make the theory of a causal link between capacity development and good governance plausible. More specifically, their experience vindicates their consistent vision that it is the capacity of the governed through mass general education as much as the capacity of those who govern and administrate that is essential for harmonious development.

However, the participants also detect some threats to that development in the present economic conditions. While the education system strives for inclusion and equity, the market economy is widening the division between advantaged and disadvantaged and fomenting corruption. This condition is seen as weakening the commitment of education's main participants: teachers, parents and pupils.

In their account of this intense and often bitter learning process, the participants showed great consistency in their choice of terms to describe the strengths and weaknesses of government of the public and their international partners which demonstrate the criteria by which they judge and

monitor the quality of governance in their country, irrespective of the political system in place at the time.

Their concept of good governance can be summarised as leadership and sovereignty on the part of government, participation (of public and donor partners), inclusion and equity, respect for diversity of ideas and dialogue (between government and public and within the ruling elite). All of these were aspirations of the revolutionary government in 1975, but their realisation has depended on the development of human capacity and resources.

In the following chapter, these criteria are used to assess the quality of governance in the wider Mozambican society today, with a view to answering the final question raised in Chapter 5: whether the development of the education sector, as a form of national capacity building can be demonstrated to have contributed to good governance, peace and national development.

CHAPTER 8.

POST-WAR MOZAMBIQUE: A STORY OF CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT SUCCESS?

Introduction

As the researcher prepared to return to Mozambique after an interval of four years, the first concern was to understand the context of the chosen case study (MINED): the society in which it now functions and that from which it has emerged. Questions arose such as “What factors should I look for as indicators of ‘good governance’ or as signs of lasting peace?”. In Chapter 1 we examined notions of ‘good governance’ within the international community. The dominant concept was a multi-party democracy combined with a liberal market economy, though different actors had divergent views as to how this should be interpreted in practice. Some emphasised managerial aspects others political aspects. All were based on the liberal democracy model evolved in developed Western nations (see Figure 6.).

The Peace Accord of 1992 had already committed Mozambique to the constitutional changes necessary for conformity with this model; however, as already discussed governance is ‘the manner of governing’ not a particular form of government. It may be true that certain political structures facilitate good governance, but as discussed in Chapter 1, they do not guarantee it. Underlying rules of behaviour and pre-existing relationships (good or bad) will persist into the new regime and influence the way any new structures function. It seemed necessary therefore to identify indicators of good governance that are not tied to a particular political and economic system but might be considered universal. This was deemed particularly important when considering a society in the process of emerging from forty years of what has been generally agreed to be a very poor system of governance under the colonial rule of the Portuguese ‘Estado Novo’.

8.1 Setting the criteria

It was with this agenda in mind that the researcher began to assemble accounts of today’s Mozambican society, first in a variety of published forms (the press, literature and statistical

information) and then through observation and interaction during the fieldwork. At the same time the interviews with the education staff and parents proceeded and began to reveal their concepts of governance and conditions for peace. At the end of this process, as we have seen in the previous chapter, the message from the participants in the interview research on the subject of governance was consistent and clear. When describing both the positive roles played by government, public and donor partners and their failings, they were essentially elaborating their concept of 'good governance' and the factors that they felt were capable of sustaining peaceful development. Significantly, they did not think that these attributes were necessarily associated with a particular political system; different systems were seen to have different strengths and weaknesses as far as governance was concerned. They rather attributed improved governance to changes in the underlying political culture and the increased capacity of both public and political leadership, who they held jointly responsible for the quality of governance.

The researcher adopted this set of ideas as revealed in the assembled data, as their 'folk theory' of the development of governance in Mozambique (Pawson and Tilley 1997:88 discussed in 4.4). Sovereignty, or the power to make decisions in the national interest, the ability to lead and share a vision of the future with the public and the technical capacity to develop effective policies and strategies were the attributes they looked for in government. Since governance is also the responsibility of the public, they expected citizens to be able to hold government to account, contribute to policymaking and assume responsibility for their own local services in partnership with government. Similarly, international organisations, whose assistance is still necessary, were seen to be most effective when supporting national strategies in a partnership relationship. Two key qualities for governance were also identified: inclusion was seen as the basis of a just society, provided equity was not pursued at the expense of respecting difference; dialogue was seen as the key to accommodating and learning to live peacefully in a diverse society, as well as being the mechanism for ensuring partnership, accountability and responsibility between government and citizens. The essential condition for achieving all of these criteria was seen to be capacity: the effectiveness of institutions and individuals and their command of resources. On that basis the set of indicators shown in Figure 5. were developed as the criteria for analysing the nature of governance in the present Mozambican context.

Figure 5. Indicators of good governance – based on the Mozambican perspective

<p>Sovereignty:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Power of decision• Leadership/shared vision• Capacity to develop policy and strategy <p>Participation:</p> <p>Citizens:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Control• Delegated power• Partnership <p>International organisations:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Support• Partnership <p>Inclusion:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Equity• Respect for diversity <p>Dialogue:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• For reconciliation• For responsibility• For policy <p>Capacity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Effectiveness• Resources
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Meanwhile, since Mozambique is hailed by the international community as an example of successful post-war governance and peace, it was still necessary to see how it conformed to the international criteria and these are summarised in Figure 6.

Figure 6. International yardsticks for good governance

<p>Economic growth</p> <p>Balance of payments</p> <p>Multi-party elections/political system ('democracy')</p> <p>Market-friendly policy and regulatory framework</p> <p>Rule of law guaranteeing human rights/freedom of expression/accountability</p> <p>Effective delivery of public services (as seen in human development indicators)</p>

It is also clearly necessary to have an institutional framework that makes it possible to apply and defend these principles in the daily affairs of the nation:

A Legal system based on mutually agreed laws and a system of enforcement (tribunals/courts, police, penal systems/prisons) that defend human and civil rights impartially, with authority to arbitrate in civil disputes and regulate economic activity.

A Political system at the level of the whole society that allows conflicts between different social groups to be resolved by negotiation rather than violence.

A public administration capable of carrying out and or facilitating the implementation of government policies in response to public requirements.

The Mozambican participants in the research, and others with whom the researcher held informal conversations, felt that failure of the institutions to defend these principles in practice, whether from deliberate subversion or simple incapacity, constitutes the main threat to continued peace and stability. This is why the issue of capacity is as critical as that of political vision. As we have seen one key issue about which they feel great concern is that of equity and inclusion: the growing gap between the wealthy and the poor and the continuing unequal levels of development between different areas of the country and between urban and rural areas. They see this as a potential threat to peace despite believing that the government is addressing the issue, since it is conditioned by historical inequality and exposure to the global market economy. Another, related area of concern is that of high level corruption, since this is seen to undermine the effective application of scarce public resources to the implementation of government policies that are generally agreed to meet the aspirations of the public. In this case, both the existing legal framework and the institutional capacity to uphold it have often conspicuously failed to stand up to organised crime. Two indicators of failed governance were therefore added:

Figure 7. Indicators of failed governance - based on the Mozambican perspective

The use or threat of violence to achieve political or economic goals
Corruption

8.2 Mozambique Today

8.2.1 What the papers said

The researcher reviewed the news items recorded by the English language Mozambique News Agency (AIM)¹ over a period of 12 months, including the total of four months when she was in Mozambique and supplemented these briefings by reading the daily and weekly papers in full. Initially they were appraised by applying the criteria of good governance and recovery used internationally (Fig 6 above. and Chapter 1). As the research progressed and in the analysis after the field work it was possible to look at these events in the light of the criteria defined as a result of the discussions with Mozambicans. However, it was the record of incidents and on-going processes of government, law and financial negotiations (as indicators of the state of governance, development and peace) that were the subject of this scrutiny rather than the journalistic opinion and often lively debates the press contain, though these obviously contributed to the interpretation of the results of the analysis. This strategy was adopted because despite a noticeable growth in the number range and diversity of the press in Mozambique and excellent legal protections (see 8.3 below), which allow *freedom of expression* (as in Figure 6.) and public debate, it cannot yet be described as 'mass media' in the sense of reaching the masses.

This case shows where the international yardstick may fail to reveal the reality of which Mozambicans are critically aware. Sociedade de Noticias, which publishes Mozambique's main daily paper and the important weekly "Domingo", has a print run of less than 13,000 for a population of 18 million. (AIM 22nd June 2003) and like all other papers is circulated in provincial capitals a day after publication, rarely being delivered beyond that. So even though newspapers are commonly read by a number of people, the majority of the population is excluded by illiteracy, poverty or location from access to this source of information. Television, despite the provision of sets in community centres and bars and the habit of visiting the neighbours to watch, caters for an even smaller urban minority, though it now has provincial services. Radio, which has broadcast in local languages as well as Portuguese since Independence is perhaps the only public information

¹ Agência de Informação de Moçambique www.poptel.org.uk/mozambique-news/ issues regular AIM Reports based on a review of the Mozambican press and media as well as its own reporters twice a month, and additional special reports to cover important events. The Agency is publicly funded but has editorial autonomy . For the history of its ambivalent relationship with government since independence see Fauvet and Mosse (2003).

service that reaches something closer to the general public. In other words, media debates in Mozambique are only a tiny if prominent piece of the national discourse.

Looking first at the international criteria, one reason for Mozambique being hailed as a success has been its consistently high rate of economic growth (even taking into account the temporary drop below double figures in the aftermath of the 1999 floods) and sound financial management. So for example, on 10th September 2002, the Minister of Finance Luisa Diogo presented an amended budget for 2002 to the Assembly of the Republic asking for an increase in government expenditure because tax collection had ‘surpassed expectations’ and the growth in GDP was expected to be by 12.2% rather than the target of 10% (AIM 239). In February 2003, the Governor of the Bank of Mozambique reported an annual inflation rate of 9.1 % and a depreciation of only 2.3% of the national currency against the US\$, which meant that “overall we attained our objectives” of macro-economic stability to strengthen business confidence (AIM 247). In terms of the international criteria then, macro-economic management is seen to be a success. However, it is not the management of a healthy economy but the management of a slow climb out of crisis. There is still a gap of \$648 million between state revenues and expenditure, which is being met by foreign aid and despite debt relief under the HIPC initiative a remaining total debt stock at \$761.5 million (AIM 239 cited above).

The numerous reports of new investments to reopen agricultural industries devastated by the war (sugar, rice and tea²) or to set up major new industries such as the huge MOZAL aluminium smelter project ³ are evidence of efforts by government to address this situation. The particular merit of these efforts from the international point of view, is to improve the balance of payments and from the Mozambican point of view to create employment and reduce dependence.

However, the impact of the market on the general public and the small Mozambican entrepreneur has not been an unmixed blessing, creating unemployment as well as employment and greater economic inequalities as the trade union leader Fanheiro commented on May Day 2002, “the growing chasm between rich and poor” is caused by “adjustment policies based on total liberalisation” (AIM 231). Meeting the international criteria of good economic governance is the

² AIM Reports: 231 May 2002, 242 October 2002, 243 November 2002, 249 March 2003, 252 April 2003, 254 May 2003, 255 June 2003.

³ AIM reports: 211 July 2001, 240 September 2002, 246 January 2003, 256 June 2003, 260 September 2003

only option open to Mozambique, but at the same time it threatens their main condition for good governance: inclusion and equity.

This then, is an area in which Mozambican sovereignty is severely limited; they have to learn to live with the global market, take what advantage they can and mitigate its worst effects. There is some evidence of learning both on the Mozambican side and that of the financial institutions⁴ and donors after two prominently reported catastrophes directly attributable to enforced 'market economy' policies. The first was the rapid privatisation of the banks in the absence of a robust regulatory structure (Ratilal 2002: 290-291), which led to massive fraud protected first by corruption and then by resorting to the assassination of investigators. The second was the insistence by the World Bank in 1995 on a liberalisation policy that allowed the export of raw cashew. This was against the advice of those in the industry (owners and unions) and has all but destroyed an industry that was a key source of income in rural economies and an export earner (Hanlon 1996: 34-37). Both of these issues figured in the press reports of 2002-3. The first is discussed below. As for the second, in June 2002 (AIM 233) the European Union attempted to mitigate the disaster by injecting 6 million Euros into the production and marketing of cashew, but in October 12 cashew processing factories were reported closed "with investments of about \$50 million transformed into scrap metal...a considerable increase in poverty" in rural towns and "Once recognised as one of the major suppliers of cashew kernels, Mozambique has now disappeared from the market." (AIM 241 quoting Kekobad Patel Chairman of the Mozambique Cashew Industry Association).

However, press reports in 2002-3 revealed that the majority of investment and aid deals negotiated by the government now conform to some kind of 'partnership' model of participation by foreign interests rather than the 'token' manipulative relationships tying financial aid to the interests and development models of the donor. That is, the majority of deals either support sector programmes developed by government or are joint venture deals with investors in which the government retains a substantial interest. This can be seen as evidence of 'ability to develop policy and strategy' and enlist international participation to support it, which the research participants cited as a key attribute of the role of government though, as one also reminded us – partnership does not

⁴ World Bank Director Darius Mans told a Maputo press conference in June 2003 that the World Bank's support will be "integrated into the government's planning and budgeting systems and use the government's own monitoring and evaluation system". (AIM 256)

necessarily mean equal partnership and there were also still instances of the overtly manipulative 'token' participatory approach by the donors.

The MOZAL project discussed above included a 'Small and Medium Enterprises Linkages Programme' intended to improve the capacity of local business to bid for and carry out contracts as suppliers to the project. In June 2003 this was handed over to be run by the government 'Investment Promotion Centre' to support Mozambican businesses in obtaining contracts in other major schemes financed by international donors and institutions (AIM 256). This scheme probably qualifies for the category of 'less than equal' partnership given the financial assets stacked on the side of the external partners but is clearly aimed at long-term capacity building. The joint venture deal over the development of the Port of Maputo seems much more akin to a straight business partnership between a consortium headed by British Mersey Docks and Harbour Company (working in Maputo since the 1980s) and the government. In September 2003 AIM (Report 260) reported the head of the consortium explaining that the consortium expects to make high profits itself and something like \$300 million for the Mozambican government. The 15 year concession is renewable for a further 10 years 'if found to be profitable to both the Mozambican state and the consortium.'

The negotiations for the development of the Port of Nacala and the rail link to Malawi, on the other hand seem to be the subject of some rather heavy weight political pressures. The US government expressed its intention "to promote American private investment" and private sector involvement in general at an early stage of the negotiations in May 2002 (AIM 232). In October, it was reported that the consortium SDCN (of Mozambican, American and Portuguese companies) that had been seeking investment capital for the project was likely to get finance from the US government through OPIC (Overseas Private Investments Corporation).⁵ In February the Mozambican and Malawian governments were negotiating the inclusion of Zambia in the scheme to transform the port and rail system into a "development corridor" for the three countries (the key aspiration of the African partners) (AIM 247). By March 2003 US investment through USAID in the port and rail system was officially confirmed (AIM 249) and in June 2003 the OPIC

⁵ There was also an unconfirmed report by *Mediafax* (a Mozambican investigative fax news sheet) that the deal was subject to US use of the Nacala air base, due after the war to be converted into a civilian airport, but the use or otherwise of the airbase was not on the public agenda. *Mediafax* also reported that leading members of the Government own interests in the Mozambican companies involved. (AIM 242)

investment was confirmed and the Transport and Communications Minister 'said that privatising the management of the Nacala corridor is essential if the port is to take a leading place in the handling of container cargo in Southern Africa' (AIM 255), thus making it the only port and rail system in Mozambique in which the government has not retained a financial interest. This seems like the kind of deal discussed in Chapter 1, where inappropriate conditions are accepted for the sake of the financial resources.

The continuing high level of poverty and lack of development in Mozambique mean that it continues to be vulnerable to natural disaster and endemic disease and is therefore still a recipient of humanitarian aid. This too is given in varying degrees of partnership. AIM reported on the 14th July 2003 (Report 257) a straight donation of medicines to a value of \$100,000 from India in response to a direct request from the Mozambican President and the conversion of \$5 million of debt by the French government into financial support for the implementation of the national plan against HIV/AIDS.⁶ In September the US donated \$50 million but all 'earmarked' for the funding of USAID programmes (AIM 261). As Prime Minister Pascoal Mocumbi speaking to the UN 21st March 2002 (AIM 228) stated 'One US dollar of untied aid has more value than two or more of tied aid'.

In the area of food aid the Mozambican government asserted some sovereignty, leadership and capacity in the drought crisis of 2002. First of all by identifying and monitoring the impending drought in the south of the country and correctly predicting a good harvest in the north, instigating the preparation of local contingency plans and allocating government funds to support them (AIM 230,231, 234). Secondly by lobbying for appropriate forms of international aid: in the short term, finance to purchase and transport the 100,000 tonne grain surplus in the north of the country to the south (the EU finally acceded to this request (AIM 238) after the WFP and the US had rejected it) and long term assistance from FAO to extend irrigation schemes and the development of drought resistant crops (AIM 236). In the meantime an unsolicited delivery of US food aid had arrived in the Port of Maputo and was diplomatically accepted.(AIM 234) However, the Mozambican government requested that all donations of genetically modified maize should be accompanied by information on the type of modification undergone so that the risk to indigenous agriculture could

⁶ Compare with Italy and Britain and the US who in May and June 2002 cancelled all outstanding bi-lateral debt without linking it directly to aid negotiations and OPEC which was cancelling debt in stages, while also providing 'soft' loans for development. (AIM 232, 233)

be assessed. In the meantime all genetically modified donated maize arriving unmilled would be sent straight from the port to processing plants to avoid it being used as seed. (AIM 237 August 2002)

What the above analysis suggests is that the government is making progress on the criteria of sovereignty as regards power of decision and policy and strategic planning, but in a difficult international environment. There is also evidence of its leadership in succeeding in enlisting international support for its vision of development in direct response to a major concern of the public: regional equity and inclusion. The construction of a bridge over the lower reaches of the Zambezi was already identified as the key to unlocking the huge economic potential of the northern provinces in the colonial times and engineering work begun, only to be abandoned during the war for independence and never resumed as attacks by the Rhodesian air force during the war for Zimbabwean independence gave way to civil war in Mozambique itself. The lesson learnt from that war, by government, opposition and the public was that unless the legacy of underdevelopment of the north compared to the historically favoured South was reversed regional inequity would increase and once again threaten the peace. (In fact the statistical indicators discussed below show that that is already happening). In June 2003 ten years of lobbying⁷ began to bear fruit: when the north-south highway was completed to both banks of the Zambezi and President Chissano could announce that most of the money to build the huge bridge was in place (AIM 256). In August tenders were launched to start the work in 2004 (AIM 259).

Leadership on the international stage was demonstrated by the very successful hosting of the AU conference in Maputo in July 2003 at which President Chissano took over the chairmanship (AIM 257). Immediately afterwards a major national event, the holding of the national school games (with over 2000 participants from all over the country in the northern 'capital' of Nampula) was used by the government and the President as a vehicle for promoting social inclusion and knowledge of Mozambique's diverse cultures amongst young people. It also very consciously set out to demonstrate that the North too was capable of staging a major event. This and other news reports of speeches by politicians and officials revealed an awareness of the issue of unequal development as crucial for social stability and general development (Diário de Moçambique July 28th, Domingo August 3rd 2003).

⁷ As for example with the World Bank a year earlier in June 2001 (AIM 211)

For the international community, the visible indicators of democracy (another condition of good governance) are the holding of multi-party elections and a functioning parliament; this of course implies a degree of citizen participation and dialogue which are the main criteria expressed by the Mozambican research participants. On the first count, Mozambique has held three successful national elections with high public participation, suggesting that the National Assembly is valued, and without the results being invalidated by violence, fraud or intimidation, suggesting widespread respect for the electoral law. (RENAMO as a party has contested the conduct of elections but always through electoral law procedures, that have investigated but mostly rejected their claims. Their supporters at local level have at times resorted to violence (see below). The parliament thus elected is broadly representative (the gender balance at nearly 30% women MPs compares favourably with most European countries) and has sat for the most part peaceably to debate legislation and call the executive to account for ten years. However, from the international community's point of view, local democracy is so far a failure. Contrary to received wisdom that this is where democracy is 'learned'⁸ public participation at this level is distinctly lacking. Only 33 municipalities have so far been included in the experiment that was largely promoted by the international community.

In order to understand this contradiction it seemed necessary to examine evidence of how these institutions and procedures are working, rather than the mere fact that they do exist and function. For this purpose the Mozambican criteria of 'dialogue' and citizen participation seem appropriate. Do these institutions in fact 'create space for dialogue' rather than violence and do they allow citizens to participate in governance?

We could first of all look at the extensive reporting of the proceedings of the Assembly of the Republic (elected with such a high level of public participation)— what is the quality of dialogue in the Assembly? The AIM reports of the proceedings in 2002/2003 reveal, especially in the protracted wrangling over the functioning of the CNE (National Electoral Commission) and the procedures for updating the electoral registers, which has led to repeated postponement of the local elections, that there were more instances of failure to resolve differences than successes – or it

⁸ As for example the recommendation that democracy should be introduced in Iraq by beginning with local elections (ICG Middle East Reports 2003 No. 11:32 and No. 17:p23) though this was not the view of the majority of Iraqis who like Mozambicans saw national elections as the priority.

might be that negotiating agreement is still a very slow process.⁹ For the most part, the opposition's tactics, in the face of the assured majority of the governing party and its greater experience in policy formulation, have been acrimonious debate and procedural obstruction, rather than the presentation of viable alternatives and there were two conspicuous failures of dialogue.

In April 2002 (AIM 229) 'The Assembly descended into chaos as members of RENAMO seized control of the rostrum, physically preventing anyone else from speaking' in order to obstruct the presentation of the report of a joint parliamentary commission of enquiry (which it had chaired and helped to set up) into the riots in Montepuez (see below). In December the scene repeated itself, when a number of RENAMO delegates brought the proceedings to a halt by noise and violence (though not against persons). However, observers blame not just RENAMO for the fact that parliamentary business was left uncompleted, but also 'lax chairing' and the 'habitual lethargy' of the Assembly. (AIM 246) When the Assembly reconvened in the New Year both sides made an effort to restore peace and get on with the business. Meanwhile the parliamentary standing commission decided without opposition that the culprits (recorded on TV footage) would be fined for the damage they had caused in the chamber. (AIM 248, 249)

Despite these well-publicised lapses, a scrutiny of the reports on the Assembly reveal that there were in fact many more instances of achieving consent on policy than of discord, especially on legislation of primary concern to the public such as the family law, passed in April 2003 (AIM 253) or the draft anti-corruption law which was constructively debated and referred to the Legal Affairs Commission for redrafting (AIM 252). In fact much of the day-to-day business in the chamber and particularly in the parliamentary committees, out of the public gaze, is routine and constructive. Ensuring accountability of the executive and of public institutions appears from the reports to have been the Assembly's biggest area of success, in which the opposition parties can be seen to be fulfilling their function of parliamentary scrutiny and there were also instances of cross-party scrutiny as in the examination of public servants such as the Attorney General on his presentation of annual reports (AIM 227,250) or the presentation of the budget by the Minister of Finance¹⁰.

⁹ This issue was a constant source of conflict. From STAE's (Electoral Administration Technical Secretariat) first attempt to start the process in April 2002 (AIM 229) to the endorsement of the election in January 2004 (AIM 268) it generated more news items (16) than any other topic.

¹⁰ Ministers in Mozambique are senior civil servants appointed by the President as his executive council but directly accountable to the Assembly.

This evidence suggests a legislative body that is on the whole functioning successfully, and though the main opposition party RENAMO still lacks political vision and at times resorts to bullying, it is ensuring greater accountability by a government that after nearly two decades in power is capable of both arrogance and complacency. At national level at least it has moved a long way from being the 'armed opposition' it once was, though it still retains a token armed force in central Sofala, which from time to time threatens the local police and residents (AIM 212, 261, 278).¹¹

The local elections on the other hand have so far proved a failure from the point of view of participation of the public and political parties. RENAMO boycotted the first elections in 1998 while making known its support for certain 'independent' candidates. This was in protest at the government's restriction of the exercise to municipalities, in the majority of which it stood a good chance of winning. The extremely low turn-out of the public in these elections suggests that they saw little value in the process and research has shown that it was the prolonged wrangling and posturing between the political parties over the issue that has led to this deliberate rejection (Serra, 1999).

While that form of protest can be interpreted as a form of dialogue, the local rioting associated with the outcome of the national elections in 1999 in a number of central and northern towns and cities and the horrific response by the police in Montepuez was seen as another serious failure of governance, raising the spectre of return to past brutalities. It seems however that the horror led to a retreat from violence rather than an escalation and by 2002/2003 the legal system seemed to be handling the various prosecutions in a detached and professional manner (AIM 212). Nevertheless, it was the discussion of the report of the official enquiry, which triggered one of the moments of breakdown of dialogue in the Assembly described above.¹²

The municipal elections in 2003, after being postponed several times, at least this time counted on the participation of all the political parties and some genuinely independent candidates but still did

¹¹ For an account of that transition see Manning, 1998.

¹² On 9th November 1999 demonstrations by RENAMO supporters against the results of the elections, resulted in battles with the police in a number of places resulting in 41 deaths. In Montepuez the police reacted by rounding up anyone they thought to be involved and locking them in one overcrowded police cell, where 83 died of asphyxiation. (AIM 211)

not induce more than a quarter of the electorate to participate¹³. The conclusion must be that 'democracy' at this local level still fails to meet the criteria of dialogue and citizen participation. Isolated, but significant outbursts of mob violence associated with elections or other local concerns show just how profound that lack of dialogue and mutual knowledge can be. For example in early 2002 an mob armed with machetes, clubs and stones attacked the town of Nipepe in the remote northern province of Niassa in an attempt to kidnap the administrator, accusing the authorities and health workers engaged in preventive hygiene of deliberately spreading cholera. (AIM 225)

These incidents have to be set against the general low level of violence in the country. Destruction of mines (AIM 249) and recovery of weapons continue, but only account for a small percentage of the estimated six to ten million weapons unaccounted for at the end of the war (AIM 261). However the availability of weapons has not been reflected in widespread gun crime.

As well as these local events, the bank privatisation scandal and the unsolved murders associated with it show that the 'rule of law' criteria of the international community are frequently not met and neither the Mozambican public nor its parliamentarians are satisfied with the performance of the legal system. In the debate on the Attorney General's 2002 report cited above, the FRELIMO deputy Teodata Hunguana describes the public's 'despair and powerlessness' in the face of 'the inadequacies shown by those directly involved in the fight against crime.' The institutions of justice, courts police and prisons are seen to perpetrate injustice and inhumanity, both by allowing themselves to be corrupted and from sheer incapacity. There are huge backlogs of pending cases, suspects detained for longer than the sentence they might expect if convicted and prison conditions that amount to inhuman treatment (AIM 227, 259. In short, the legal system fails the criteria for good governance of public services mainly from both lack of competence and lack of human and material resources.¹⁴

Thus the initial failure by the police and judiciary to act in the case of embezzlement of the equivalent of \$14 million associated with the privatisation of the BCM bank, the murder of the bank's investigating auditor, attempted murder of an investigating lawyer and actual murder of an

¹³ 'Depressing though this figure is, it is a marked improvement on the first municipal elections, in 1998, when less than 15 per cent...voted' AIM 268 January 2004 (Incidentally this is about the level of participation in local and European elections which has caused so much concern in the UK since 1999, see The Electoral Commission, 2004 *Delivering Democracy? The future of postal voting.*)

¹⁴ The historical origins of this situation are discussed below (8.3)

investigating journalist, was the most conspicuous and publicised failure of governance in post-war Mozambique. On the other hand it also revealed some extraordinary strengths of civil governance as dogged and courageous investigation by Mozambique's leading journalist, Carlos Cardoso who was himself assassinated, led to a civil campaign to insist that the perpetrators be brought to justice. The trial of those hired to commit the murder of Cardoso and their immediate paymasters was carried to its conclusion during 2002 – 2003, (AIM Special Issue November 2002, Report 244, 14th and 31st January 2003) despite the 'escape' (and subsequent equally convenient 'recapture') of the main suspect from a top security prison, attempts to bribe and intimidate the judge, the chief of police and key witnesses. Under these conditions and as the trial of the accused also became a public test of the judicial system itself, after initial reluctance the presiding judge Paulino agreed to the proceedings being broadcast live, charging the media with conducting the coverage responsibly.¹⁵ The fact that the trial was held at all and that it succeeded in delivering justice was rightly seen as a triumph of good governance and the rule of law but it was only the opening round of the battle against corruption. The bank fraud case still has secrets to reveal. The hired assassins, corrupt prison guards and financial middlemen are in jail, those they worked for have yet to be called to account. Some are foreign nationals who already left the country others are nationals who so far think they are 'untouchable' and whether the President's son Nyimpine proves to be implicated or not¹⁶, are extremely powerful. However a blow has been struck against 'despair and powerlessness' with the realization that "All of us together, society united, will defeat any criminal...no matter how influential, how important, how wealthy, they may be" (Lucinda Cruz lawyer for the Cardoso family AIM January 14th 2003).

In February 2003 another milestone of justice was achieved in respect of 'the worst violation of human rights in post-independence Mozambique' when the government decided to provide funding to make it possible for approximately one thousand remaining deportees of the infamous "Operation Production" (discussed below 8.3) to return home. (AIM 248)¹⁷

¹⁵ Lucinda Cruz the Cardoso family lawyer concluded "These broadcasts were the way for the media to pay tribute to...the most courageous and outspoken journalist Mozambican society has ever known". (AIM 14th January 2003.) The researcher observed broadcasts of the trial of police complicit in the escape of the chief accused later in this year and concluded that they were 'responsible' and a contribution to transparency.

¹⁶ The President himself has scrupulously avoided comment that might influence the court and urged the pursuit of justice. (AIM Special Issue November 2002)

¹⁷ Armando Guebuza, now elected as Secretary General of FRELIMO and therefore probable presidential candidate at the next election when Chissano steps down was mainly responsible for this debacle as Minister

Corruption is not only a threat to legality, but to other aspects of good governance. Assistant Attorney General Isabel Rupia, who narrowly escaped assassination while investigating the murder of Provincial Treasurer Josefa Afonso, whistle blower in another corruption case, stressed that 'corruption and poverty are mutually reinforcing. Corruption led to skewed distribution of resources ...contributing to poverty'. The poor then 'adopt corrupt tactics in order to survive' (AIM 253), a view close to that expressed by the parents who participated in this research. The AIM reports contain many more instances of corruption as well as the views of political leaders who have begun to see, as the public do, that corruption is a threat to stability and development and of course to the hard won donor confidence in Mozambique's integrity and 'capacity'.¹⁸ Meanwhile public participation was invited by the Attorney General's Anti-Corruption Unit (headed by Isabel Rupia) which provided confidential phone lines for the public to denounce corrupt activity (AIM, 255).

This duel between integrity and corruption in public life is played out in many much older and more stable democracies than Mozambique (as for example the ENRON scandal in the USA) without calling the fabric of society into question, because the weight of civil society can be mobilised to demand accountability, and this is what is beginning to happen in Mozambique. As the research participants understood, good governance is the responsibility of the public as well as government. '...in this there are no owners of the peace and the democracy except the people, and one cannot only hold the state responsible for social stability.' (Mazula, 2000:69)¹⁹

This leads us to examine some of the other evidence of public participation in governance for example in decision making (assuming responsibility) or in developing policy as well as requiring accountability. In particular, how do average citizens, as opposed to the educated classes who pursued the Cardoso case, participate in governance, given that the majority of the population does not read the press or participate in local elections?

of the Interior. He later redeemed his reputation with his role in negotiating the peace accord. (AIM special report 8th June 2002)

¹⁸ Guebuza, speaking in Beira declared war on corruption (Diário de Moçambique July 25th 2003 AIM 258) The Prime Minister and the trade unions added their voices to the debate (AIM 259) and the Assembly of the Republic as we have seen began processing an anti-corruption law with all party support.

¹⁹ Translation by the author of this thesis.

One example of successful participation reported in this year was the round of negotiations for the setting of the minimum wage, a process in which the government had normally taken a leading role. However this time it merely rubber-stamped a deal already reached by unions and employers. We might consider this an example of participation through delegated authority. Where these kinds of processes have not resolved disputes, increasingly Mozambicans have taken to strikes and street demonstrations, which have often been violent or the police response to them has been violent. May Day 2002 was an example of this when violent protest by ‘majermanes’²⁰ completely disrupted the event.(AIM 231).

However, in 2003, the May Day rally was held in the industrial city of Matola (one of the author’s research locations) and run by the unions, not the government, as a peaceful protest against unemployment (AIM 253). Meanwhile the ‘majermanes’ began to protest weekly, peacefully, down the full length of one of the main streets of the capital with clear public support²¹ and low key policing. The government has been forced to first admit the justice of their case, then account for how it has used the social funds transferred for them by the German government (accountably for other public spending as it turns out but of course illegally) and finally start making payments though the amount is still in dispute (AIM 238). In Nampula the researcher observed a similar weekly protest and public sympathy in support of workers locked out of the failing textile company Texamoque (a casualty of the combination of poor management and the global market economy referred to by President Chissano) (AIM 269).

Finally, to complete our view of governance in present day Mozambique we need to consider the delivery of public services (as in the international criteria, Figure 6.) or its capacity in terms of effectiveness and resources (Mozambican criteria Figure 5.). Adelino Cruz, former Secretary General of MINED and now head of the Public Sector Reform Unit, noted “a dissociation between words and acts in some sectors of activity” (AIM 254). This should make us cautious in reviewing the reporting of government programmes and projects, bearing in mind that the press tends to report ‘events’ such as the initiation or completion of projects or crises due to failure to deliver,

²⁰ Former ‘guest workers’ in the GDR demanding payment of social security contributions made in Germany and refunded to the Mozambican government after reunification.

²¹ The researcher observed on more than one occasion that passers by stop and turn respectfully to watch the demonstration go by. In one case a woman street trader got up to dance in front of the column, which includes a band, cheered by her colleagues and generally applauded. The police bringing up the rear in a patrol car seemed similarly sympathetic.

rather than consistently good or poor performance. In fact AIM reports many more cases of projects and programmes initiated than completed but also a few failures. Lack of resources especially human resources is frequently reported, often as a cause for failure. Similarly instances of corruption are commonly reported, but only a few conspicuous demonstrations of integrity. This certainly reflects grave public concern that corruption is compromising the delivery of public services (as several research participants suggested) but it perhaps also suggests that professional integrity is still considered to be the norm. Cruz also does not suggest that poor governance is the norm, but suggests that ‘the negligent attitude of some civil servants and the dishonesty of some leading officials’ is hindering performance and in particular reform. However he did not think the effectiveness of the public services was determined by either too many or too few staff, but by ‘attitudes to work and attitudes to the public... and the way we value or fail to value honest staff’ (a view close to that expressed by the research participants) that is, a question of governance not resources.

However, the government’s extensively reported diligence in seeking aid and investment deals, is without doubt an indication of a real lack of financial resources, while the regular reports of the successful initiation of government programmes with donor funds, suggest a fair degree of competence when resources are made available.²² On the other hand there are examples where successful implementation is hindered by enforcement problems such as the collection of social security contributions, where some companies deduct the payments from wages but do not pass them on to the social security institute (AIM 230) or the struggle to control borders against contraband goods that are for example prejudicing the recovery of the sugar industry (AIM 253, 256). Other cases of failure are due to the combination of incompetence and dishonesty described by Rupia and Cruz, as in the case of the post-flood resettlement scheme, which also seems to have suffered from ‘inappropriate’ recruitment of young people to administer food distribution by the NGO involved (World Vision) (AIM 230). There are also several reports of the suspension and removal of officials, such as the district administrator of Panda, who was both incompetent and dishonest (AIM 232) and a case of district education officials absconding (it is assumed) with the

²² Examples of successful implementation include, inauguration of a new urban water supply (AIM 212) restocking of livestock (AIM 229, 231), increased grain harvests, effective working of the food security early warning system (AIM 255) progress in rebuilding the Sena railway line with own funding while negotiating investment finance (AIM 258) and reducing the overcrowding in prisons by fast-tracking the cases of people detained for minor offences.(AIM 259).

payroll (AIM 236). There are also from time to time, examples of total financial failure of state entities such as the post-office (AIM 261).

The picture this paints is of a public administration with considerable capacity, and for the most part the will to deliver, marred by significant but not generalised poor governance and often frustrated by lack of means or imagination to reward staff, thus creating vulnerability to corruption.

8.2.2 What the numbers say


Before reaching a verdict on the state of governance in Mozambique after ten years of peace, we can look briefly at another type of indicator, the statistical records, which provide a measure of change that can be related to international yardsticks for human and economic development.

Economic growth equity and inclusion

Growth in GDP²³ and the improving balance of payments are recorded in the annual government statistics on macro economic performance (INE Statistical Yearbook 2001 Section 5.4.4. Macroeconomic aggregates) but the same summary of indicators also record falling levels of private consumption (see Figure 8.) even when GDP rises. Even more alarming is the simultaneous drop in consumption of own products (from subsistence agriculture). Here the numbers are confirming what the research participants and the press reports have indicated: macro-economic success is not matched by micro-economic development leading to the inclusion of the majority in growing prosperity.

²³ The downturn after 1999 reflects the effects of the flood disaster in the south in that year. An upturn was evident from the middle of 2001: Diogo reporting to the National Assembly August 2002 AIM 237.

Figure 8. Decline in private consumption



Source: Anuário Estatístico/Statistical Yearbook 2001 (National Institute of Statistics 2002 Mozambique)

In 1999/2000 the first Agricultural census since independence was conducted and revealed that the roughly 80% of the population that make a living in this sector work small family farms which average 1.26 hectares and produce mainly food crops, including 95% of the country's grain (much of which is for their own consumption) without access to credit or any kinds of agricultural inputs or use of irrigation. The majority keep small livestock, but in numbers that again suggest home consumption. This is the pattern of poverty that lies behind the falling consumption in Figure 4. Families can only purchase non-food items from sales of crop surpluses in good times and have no financial or other reserves to make up for crop failures and so consume less.²⁴

The figures in the 2001 Statistical Yearbook (INE Q2.6.1, 2.6.2) for registered unemployment reveal further hidden areas of poverty, inequity and exclusion. A first glance at the table shows a gender imbalance: far fewer women are unemployed than men. This is not of course an indicator of advantage but a reflection of their continuing low participation in the formal economy which is recorded in the figures for new appointments, registered below. Registered unemployment records, of course only log those unemployed from the formal, mainly urban, industrial sector. As

²⁴ This is why Prakash Ratilal, see below, argues so strongly for investment in agriculture as the key to poverty reduction and economic and social equity.

elsewhere women are prominent in the informal and subsistence economy and for the most part invisible in the figures (Waring, 1988).

The figures also reveal inequities hidden by the aggregated data for each province. The highest level of unemployment in relation to population is found in the southern Province of Maputo, which accounts for 20% of the national unemployed but only 5.5% of the general population. Yet the province also has the highest per capita GDP and HDI after the capital Maputo (see Appendix 2 and UNDP, 2000: graph 2.6). The day-to-day reality of living in this condition of relative deprivation and its effect on ability to take up education, was reflected in the interviews with parents in the industrial city of Matola (Chapter 6) where most of the industrial unemployment in the province occurs.²⁵

Human development

When it comes to expenditure on social services the same contradiction occurs. The rate of expenditure is rising and it is also rising as a percentage of government expenditure in line with the poverty alleviation policy PARPA but it is declining as a percentage of GDP (Diogo, 2002: 214-219 and AIM 273, 2004). That is, in line with the model promoted by the international financial institutions, levels of public spending are tied to market forces rather than need and public priorities and therefore vulnerable if, as predicted, GDP growth slows. The figures for public service provision, especially in education show that this level of spending is not enough to both eliminate the backlog of deficits created by the war and meet the rise in demand fuelled by population increase and increased expectation of service.

The figures for population and social indicators (INE, 2001: Section 2) reveal progress in HDI. School enrolments increased significantly in the five years from 1997 but if the aggregated data is broken down and compared with school age population levels it is clear that this big increase is in first level primary education, where if it were not for the backlog of older children starting school late, access would be near universal at something like 98% of 5 to 9 year olds. However second level primary schools, secondary and technical schools are only catering for about 16% of children in the 10 –14 age group (despite increases in provision of 69.6% EP2 and 85% in secondary

²⁵ Another 20% of the country's unemployed are registered in Nampula (another of the research locations) where 19% of the country's total population live but mainly in rural areas. Unemployment amongst the city population is probably similar to that in Matola.

enrolment) so that in fact only about 60% of children of school age are in school. This is the 'funnel' in the education system described by the teachers and parents interviewed. The teacher shortage in relation to demand and the huge classes are reflected in the statistics of high pupil/teacher ratios, which had increased in EP1 over the five-year period in all but one province to levels well above the statutory maximum class size of 50. At this level there were variations between provinces with the worst ratios in some central and northern provinces, but higher than average in some southern provinces too. However, at secondary level the historical regional inequity discussed by the research participants was very evident. Nampula with a population of 3,337,000 had only 9601 pupils enrolled in grades 8-10, while Maputo City with a population of 1,031,000 had 21785 secondary pupils. Sofala with a similar population to the capital had only a third of that number (7020). The numbers confirm the research participants' view that the government is making a serious effort to redress inequity and exclusion but that they are still a reality.

The same concern for equity and universal cover is evident in the health statistics. Provision of services (such as natal care, vaccinations, mother and infant care, and outpatient consultations) increased from 1997-2001 (INE 2001:Table Q 2.3.1) and there is evidence of a significant reduction in provincial inequalities in functioning healthcare facilities (buildings, staff and equipment) as a result of targeted actions to increase the numbers of health centres (requiring at least one fulltime doctor and qualified nursing staff) and by upgrading of health posts (staffed by one nurse) (INE 2001: Table Q 2.3.2). However, inequalities in actual health (conditioned by social and economic factors) are still evident in the key indicator of low birth weight which has remained constant at just over 12% for the whole country and shows both regional variations and variations within regions. Thus the central and northern regions have indices above the national average (13.2% and 13.5%) but some provinces within those regions are below average and some such as Zambezia (15.5%) considerably higher. Tellingly, the City of Maputo, with a per capita GDP six times the national average, (UNDP 2000:24) has an incidence of low birth weight above the national average (12.5%) and much higher than the southern region as a whole (the next nearest figure is 9.6% in rural Gaza). This is another indicator that economic exclusion and inequity is growing as GDP grows despite the "concern" shown by government to remove them.

Despite these destabilising factors, the statistics for reported crime²⁶ suggest the response to economic inequality is reflected in theft ('crimes against property') rather than violence ('crimes against persons' and 'crimes against public order and tranquillity'). Theft has increased generally, but decreased significantly in four rural provinces. Violent assaults have decreased overall, but increased in 6 provinces, perhaps in part due to increased reporting in areas formerly controlled by RENAMO and suspicious of the police. Public disorder crimes, which the police themselves generally witness and record have also generally decreased with significant exceptions in places where there have been incidents of riot or violent protest, such as the cases mentioned above. The most striking statistic is that the City of Maputo (with a population of just over 1 one million, just under 6% of the population) accounts for about a third of all reported crime, particularly against property. (INE 2001: Tables Q 2.5.2., 2.5.3)

The statistics for the functioning of the law courts to redress these crimes illustrate the crisis that was debated in the National Assembly. The huge numbers of pending cases increased despite the fact that fewer new cases were brought to court, perhaps as a result of the public 'despair' described by Hunguana quoted above. Instead the increase is apparently due to the fact that in 1999 very few cases were completed and even in 2000 completed cases had not reached the levels achieved in 1998 (INE 2001: Table Q2.5.4)

The National Human Development Reports produced annually from 1998 under the auspices of the UNDP set out to examine the relationship between macro-economic recovery and actual human development in particular the key issue for Mozambicans of continuing and perhaps widening inequity and differing levels of inclusion. The Mozambican researchers therefore adapted the UN indicators and methodology to reflect conditions in Mozambique by 'disaggregating the HDI, in order to estimate differences in the levels of human development in the various regions of the country.'(UNDP, 2000: 17-18)

This exercise has confirmed, what was already implicit in the regular national statistical returns examined above. The HDI figures debated in the Assembly in August 2002 (AIM 237) revealed rising HDI from 1998 – 2000, in which the rise in real GDP per capita and increased life

²⁶ These figures have to be used with the caveat that reported crime is also conditioned by levels of confidence in the police, freedom from intimidation etc. Much petty crime in rural areas is also dealt with by traditional leaders without recourse to the police.

expectancy, suggest general improvement in conditions. The sharp rise in the HDI between 1999-2000 was almost entirely due to the rise in adult literacy since the 1997 census. While some commentators suggest this could be partly due to the fact that the census figures will always have a lower margin of error than the sample surveys on which the HDI are based, it is also true that this period coincided with the recreation of the National Directorate of Adult Education and the huge increase in adult literacy participation referred to by the research participants as a key indicator of the government resuming its role in education.

Thus the aggregated data supports the international perception of Mozambique as a 'success story'. However the wisdom of disaggregating the data is confirmed by the 'huge regional imbalances' revealed, essentially 'an enormous gulf' in economic activity and growth between the City of Maputo and the rest of the country. Only four of the eleven provinces showed any significant growth (in one case, Maputo Province, this was due entirely to the huge MOZAL project, while as we have already seen, the province has the highest unemployment rate in the country and even wealthy Maputo City, contains strata of deprivation and poverty). Five other provinces actually showed a decline in economic growth.

When it comes to other areas of inequality such as gender, the pattern is the same. The GDI (Gender-related Development Index) is rising, though it remains one of the lowest in the world, but the gap between the GDI and HDI (throughout the world GDI is generally lower than HDI) has hardly changed: political and administrative power remains largely in male hands. The prominence of women in government and administration at the national level (including the Finance Minister Luisa Diogo herself, presenting the HDI findings to the National Assembly, where nearly a third of deputies are women) has impressed the international community but it masks a much bleaker situation in the country as a whole. The numbers of women in decision making roles declines from the national to the provincial and from the provincial to the district level, where they account for less than five percent of administrators and directors. Thus the HDI report confirms what we learned from the curricula of the research participants: those women that get a head start from their home background or as a result of government measures to support inclusion can prosper and make it to the top. The obstacle to participation in governance in general and for women in particular is getting started on the educational ladder in the first place and then remaining in education long enough to complete basic education. Once again there is a geographical dimension

to the inequity: fewer women are educated in the rural areas than the urban, fewer in the northern and central provinces than the south.

Thus the numbers are telling the same story as the research participants and as the press reports: there has been enormous progress on many fronts, but it is necessary to look beyond the macro-economy and the national scene to understand that Mozambican society is still grappling with the same potentially destabilising social ills that have bedevilled its development since independence: social and regional inequalities, which can generate feelings of exclusion and powerlessness.

8.2.3. 'Ten years of Peace'

In 2002 the Mozambican NGO CEDE²⁷ published a collection of reflections on the ten years since the peace accord, that included academic papers by economists, linguists social researchers, 'depositions' from leading figures in society (including those involved in the war and the peace process and some significant foreign actors in the events) and 'testimonies' from members of the public apparently approached ad hoc in different parts of the country. (Mazula ed. 2002) These diverse contributions reflect a broad cross section of the educated (Portuguese speaking) classes and discuss all the key issues for peace and governance so far identified in the examination of the author's research data.²⁸

Italian friends closely involved in the peace process, Aldo Ajello (Representative of the UN Secretary General after the Peace Accord: 323-6) and Don Mateu Zuppi (Community of Santo Egidio, mediators of the Accord: 341-4) expressed admiration for what had been achieved through political will and dialogue, (the negotiators insisting on resolving rather than shelving the most difficult issues). Zuppi in fact sees Mozambique as an example to the world that 'peace is possible and that dialogue is the only way to a peace'.²⁹

²⁷ CEDE-Center of Studies for Democracy and Development, established in 1999 as a result of one of the main recommendations made in June 1997 by those involved in the experimental participatory research project WSP-Mozambique (part of the wider War Torn Societies Project)

²⁸ Page numbers in this section unless otherwise stated refer to Mazula ed. 2002 *10 Anos de Paz.*

Translations of the text are by the author of this thesis.

²⁹ He pointed out that such was the detail and clarity of the Peace Accord that the opposing armies were able, without outside supervision, to maintain a ceasefire with only minor infringement during the four months delay before the UN managed to get peace keeping forces on the ground.

The Mozambican contributors clearly felt some satisfaction at achieving 10 years of peace and a measure of economic and social recovery. They too saw the 'secret' of this success in the ability to dialogue: 'Dialogue, frank, open and sincere, but tempered with a strong dose of political will' (David Alone RENAMO Deputy: 335); 'Knowing how to learn...to dialogue on a permanent basis is also an act of intellectual courage' (Ratilal, Former Governor of the Bank of Mozambique :285); 'The permanent dialogue of the politicians and the civil society' (Nhangumele, Provincial RENAMO Party Administrator, Gaza: 464). Several contributors also expressed pride that 'we are pioneers of peace and reconciliation in this world' (Roga-Pai 'writer' in Zambezia: 486). Thus this key indicator of governance identified in the research with education personnel is widely recognised in other areas of Mozambican life and amongst international mediators.

Another key point, also made by the research participants, is that for both the foreign and Mozambican commentators, it was the Mozambican people, more than their leaders who had achieved peace and would guarantee its continuation. Ajello, (326) recognised that a full democracy had not yet been achieved in Mozambique (de Tollenaere: 227-252 expounds this in detail) 'but I am convinced that the leadership and people of Mozambique have the wisdom to find the right path'. The country's political and religious leaders are unanimous in referring to the crucial role of the Mozambican public in this volume and elsewhere: 'the profound wish for peace of the whole Mozambican people' (Guebuza, chief FRELIMO negotiator in Rome: 328) 'the maturity of the collective feelings of the people, who accepted the end of the conflict without feeling the need to settle scores' (Raul Domingos, chief RENAMO negotiator in Rome: 376) 'The secret of the 10 years of peace...lies in the Mozambican people.' (Don Jaime Pedro Gonçalves, Archbishop of Beira: 339). A businessman in Sofala spoke of 'the great popular will to live in peace' (Gabriel de Oliveira: 475). A University lecturer referred to 'the courage of the people to "forget" the past and reconcile in a spirit of brotherhood' (António Muagerene: 459). Laura João Head of the Department of Culture in Niassa (491) in her very brief statement, perhaps indicates an important motive for this pacific attitude: 'I saw horrors during the war that will remain with me for always. For that reason, today, all the difficulties that affect us...are nothing compared to what we already suffered.'

Nevertheless, all the Mozambican contributors were fully aware that Mozambicans' legendary patience has its limits and examined at length those aspects of contemporary society that still had the potential to destabilise. Not surprisingly, the twin problems of exclusion and inequity were the

chief concern. 'Our incipient democracy will encounter serious obstacles in the near future, as long as we are not able to confront the causes of poverty, injustice and exclusion with honesty and sincerity, in the same way as we confronted the causes of our armed conflict' (Raul Domingos: 379). Like the research participants, contributors to this volume cited regional and social 'asymmetries' between the poor majority and the rich, and often corrupt, few as one of the main challenges to the peace.

The issue of economic exclusion and inequality is tackled in two long articles by leading economists Luisa Diogo and Prakash Ratilal, both with practical experience of trying to find a way to meet the internal needs of the of the Mozambican public, while satisfying the demands of the macro-economic norms of the global market. Both put tackling poverty as the highest priority and look to strengthen internal capacity to that end. Diogo (207-226) while describing the frustration of limited resources imposing choices that leave important issues 'pending', advocates (contrary to market norms) operating 'redistributive policies' and strengthening the state to deliver social services to the public while strengthening public participation and initiative by 'deconcentrating and decentralising' government and public administration. Ratilal (253-297) urges investment and support for Mozambican enterprise and initiatives with priority for the agricultural sector where the majority earn their livelihoods because 'only by working on the micro-society and on the micro-economy will we see serious growth in this country' and because 'economic stability is profoundly linked to social stability and to political stability'.³⁰

Another crucial form of exclusion, that of language, is discussed by Armindo Ngunga (linguist and Director of Faculty at UEM: 3-15). In Mozambique's multi-lingual context language can be 'a vehicle of democracy' but can also be 'an obstacle to the development of democracy and a threat to peace.' He points out that a Mozambican who speaks no Portuguese will have no access to vital information, for example about AIDS, and so little prospect of access to treatment. He urges that

³⁰ In this article he also refers to 'Agenda 2025' a national debate launched to formulate a vision of how the country should develop. In 2003 he published a series of long articles in the Sunday press (Domingo: fortnightly June to August) on the issues of rampant accumulation, corruption and absolute poverty in Mozambique as it is exposed to the global economy. Readers' letters and emails were invited and received to add to the debate.

the consolidation of democracy must be inclusive and that 'no one should be turned into a spectator just because they don't speak Portuguese'.³¹

Opposition politicians and their supporters among the public contributors also reveal the depth of the feelings of exclusion and lack of respect for identity, that fuelled the war, and which are still clearly felt. They speak particularly of 'social exclusion'. Dhlakama (315) refers to 'injustice and marginalisation'. Alone (335-7) speaks of the 'club spirit' of an elite that excludes the majority from prosperity and power so that 'There is a long road to follow to a real and effective reconciliation' not just 'a fictitious peace for the diversion of the international donors'. In these bitter remarks there are several references to 'humiliations' and human rights abuses in the past. José Nicolau in Manica (487) notes that there are no longer 'public executions...reeducation camps...forced communal villages' there is freedom and 'our traditional authorities, who are one of the bases of our culture have been reintroduced' if this progress continues the future will be bright if not 'the future itself will tell'. Manuel Nogueira in Nampula (496) recalls that 'Traditional values of family and social structure, religion, work discipline etc. were all ridiculed.' These interventions show the importance of 'respect for diversity' in the new governance as suggested by the research participants.

On the other hand some FRELIMO supporters, especially women, think that 'inflammatory speeches by some politicians threaten the peace and democracy'. (Celina Cossa, Director of the General Union of Cooperatives: 466) and 'the fact that speeches threatening a return to war and division of the country are still heard, provokes distrust and creates instability in the population' (Clara Pugas Organisation of Mozambican Women (OMM) Sofala: 468). One contributor (Rodrigues João, a lawyer: 510) suggests that the lack of political vision in the opposition parties does not favour 'a balanced exercise in political debate' and accounts for their 'permanent state of irritability'. (The same conclusion was drawn from the accounts of the proceedings of the Assembly discussed above).

This national stocktaking exercise, as well as confirming the analysis made so far of the achievements and continuing areas of concern in contemporary Mozambican society, also reveals a capacity for transparent dialogue and genuine quest for solutions. In these personal testimonies,

³¹ The long road to recognising and introducing the national languages in the school curriculum is traced in Chapter 5.

there is much less political posturing and more openness than in the Assembly debates and less concealment than in press announcements (always made with an eye to the international as well as the national audience). There is also clear evidence, despite continuing antagonisms, of an underlying consensus about the key issues of national governance that need to be tackled if the country as a whole is to prosper. This book, as has been said, represents the views of the educated minority, however, the contributors also acknowledge that despite all the limitations to their full participation (lack of means of expression, deficient local democracy etc.) the Mozambican people through their will for peace have exercised a powerful control in shaping the governance of the country, but it cannot be taken for granted. As Ngunga points out, while full participation in society continues to be conditioned by knowledge of Portuguese, 'it is not necessary to know the Portuguese language to be a danger to national peace.'(14)

8.3 The birth pangs of a nation

In the first two sections of this chapter we have examined the contemporary context represented by the second part of our model (Chapter 4 Figure 4) that is, the context already transformed by the interaction between interventions, actors and events. Without trying to carry out such a detailed exercise retrospectively, (there is no point in recounting details of history that have already been examined by other authors and summarised in Appendix 1) it is necessary to consider the first part of our model, the context into which the capacity building interventions were introduced and with which they interacted: to ask, 'How did Mozambique arrive where it is today?' To do this, we can again rely on the perceptions revealed in Mozambican testimonies. The RENAMO leaders and supporters who contributed to the *10 Anos de Paz* volume, revealed a continuing bitterness over a number of specific examples of abusive governance by the revolutionary government, which were also hinted at by the research participants when they talked of lack of dialogue and respect for diversity of ideas. However many also credit the revolutionary government with a genuine concern for equality and inclusion, a belief in participation and even for taking the first steps in democracy. It seems we must look in the historical context for both good and bad governance.

As we have seen in previous chapters, colonial governance was characterised by exclusion on grounds of race, religion, language and culture, while the uneven development between urban and rural areas and between different regions, combined with an economy of coercive extraction rather

than capital investment and development, also left the majority of the population in poverty and ignorance. Both colonial governance and traditional society generally discriminated against women. This very poor governance was mitigated by access to education and a wider culture for a few (including some women) mainly through the church missions whose moral code also inspired compassion for fellow citizens and a desire for social justice. However, when peaceful demands for change were brutally suppressed, independence was won by war. Thus political ends were achieved by violence because dialogue had proved impossible.

Nevertheless, even during the war the revolutionary movement began to develop and practice ideas of good governance in the liberated zones and within the armed movement and carried these experiences of governance into the post independence period. The new government was aware of, and took every opportunity to denounce, all forms of discrimination and exclusion and devised policies and strategies to 'eradicate' them. Samora Machel claimed 'we had no hesitation in acting against tribalists, racists and regionalists. We killed the tribe to give birth to the nation' (Munslow 1985: 77). The history of the civil war in which, in contrast to the majority of post-colonial societies in Africa, ethnic and regional identification never became the dominant vehicle of the conflict, suggests that this uncompromising policy which had its roots in the liberation movement, did in fact have considerable success in reversing the racism and tribalism fostered by the colonial regime and forging a sense of nationhood and the contemporary scene confirms this.³² The same uncompromising attitude was adopted in 'fighting the archaic tendency to discriminate against women or young people' thus not only attacking colonial attitudes but the sexism and ageism of traditional society (Munslow 1985:18). The constitution declared the emancipation of women 'one of the State's essential tasks'(Isaacman and Stefan 1980:18) leading to the creation and promotion of a grass-roots women's organisation (OMM). Inclusion of the whole population in a learning and social transformation exercise (a kind of mass capacity-building) as we have seen, was the core concept for national development and the aim was to lift everyone out of poverty and humiliating discrimination: 'A socialist society means the welfare of all: the right to work; the right to education and health without discrimination...to decent housing ...to be decently dressed ...for all

³² Contemporary research reveals that while racial and ethnic prejudice exists in the popular discourse, most people are optimistic that racism can be avoided, refuse to make generalised accusations of racism against privileged groups and conversely accuse some members of their own group. They do however see unequal distribution of wealth as related to expressions of racism. (Carlos Serra et al 2000:61)

to have laundry soap to keep clean' and not be dressed in 'a skin, a loincloth...jiggers in the toes' (Samora Machel in Munslow 1985:91).

This vision also included a keen awareness of the uneven development between rural and urban areas and different regions of the country and strategies to combat these ills were part of the revolutionary agenda, giving priority to rural primary education over urban secondary schools and preventative rural health care over the development of expensive curative medicine in urban hospitals. It was an approach to governance that produced remarkable advances in human development and steady economic growth to 1982 (when the effects of the civil war began to be felt). Even the choice of statistical indicators to monitor development in the first ten years after independence are indicative of aspirations to equity and inclusion. For example, before the development of the international HDI, literacy was a key indicator, while environmental health was monitored through the number of families with latrines and access to a clean water supply. Social inclusion was measured by those owning a radio³³ (Direcção Nacional de Estatística 1985).

How was it that this vision of an inclusive and more humane society to replace the legacy of colonial oppression and the zeal with which it was pursued, gave rise to the deep sense of exclusion and actual human rights abuses described by today's opposition? A number of factors may have contributed: the sense of mission of the leadership of a revolution, that undoubtedly enjoyed majority support for its main aims, at times led to the assumption of being the 'sole guardian of the truth' (*detentor exclusivo das verdades* Ratilal 2002: 285). This when combined with the legacy of years of passive resistance rather than open dissent adopted by the public in the context of a complete denial of civil liberties under colonial law, was not conducive to the learning and debating environment of the revolutionary rhetoric and was compounded by linguistic and cultural difference. There was also a legacy of bitterness against those individuals and institutions that were seen to have 'collaborated' with the colonial regime. Despite an early attempt at 'truth and reconciliation' in which those who were not criminally implicated could be reconciled by admitting their past and making a public commitment to the revolution, many individuals were humiliated and abused³⁴. While official discrimination against non-Catholic religions and beliefs ended, revolutionary discourse denigrated religion as 'obscurantist' along with all aspects of traditional custom and belief. On the ground this was translated into abuse. Nationalisation of

³³ As already mentioned, local radio broadcast in local languages from the earliest days

³⁴ Coelho (1998: 81) sees these humiliations as one of the contributory factors to the civil war.

church schools and hospitals can be seen as a fair policy since under the accord between the Catholic Church and the colonial government, they had been built largely with public money. However there was also illegal appropriation of churches and priests' housing and acts of vandalism that were not controlled³⁵.

The traditional leaders, many but not all of whom held office as 'regulos' under the Portuguese, were similarly marginalised and 'ridiculed' by the new order campaigning for women's emancipation and an end to the autocratic rule of the elders both male and female. In this the enthusiasts were like some of their modern NGO counterparts campaigning on 'gender' issues, well-intentioned but often deeply offensive to those they aimed to help.³⁶

Thus two main aspects of the failure of governance in this period were intolerance of divergence of ideas and incapacity (lack of understanding) at the implementation level to introduce change through dialogue.

This was compounded by a directive and at times coercive culture of governance that permeated society stemming, it is suggested, from deeply imbedded behaviours from the colonial period.³⁷ Mozambicans under the colonial rule of the Estado Novo had only experienced the governance of coercion and this combined with the absence of a functioning legal system was the origin of much misrule and abuse of power by local authorities and an unreformed and uneducated police force at the local level.³⁸ The barbarity and destructive rage of the RENAMO tactics in the civil war and their resort to forced cultivation enforced through the tribal chiefs, can probably both be laid at the same door. (Vines 1996)

³⁵ For example a Muslim student described to the author in 1984 acts of vandalism against Catholic churches in which he participated immediately after independence in a spirit of rage against many years of discrimination during colonial rule.

³⁶ Mothers and female elders in the rural areas of Sofala where the author worked after the war, were reluctant to send girls to schools run entirely by male teachers partly from concerns about sexual harassment but more fundamentally because the traditional education of girls is the exclusive prerogative of women. They also had no concept of any career other than 'prostitution' that school education in Portuguese (a language they themselves could not speak and which they associated with urban mores) might lead to.

³⁷ 'When we analyse the kinds of abuses...carried out ...in the defence and security forces it is easy to detect...the social and cultural origin of the culprit. Whipping and tying up prisoners... (are) what they saw the chief and the native policeman do...But torture, the humiliation of prisoners, arrogance and racism are marks of the town.' Speech by Samora Machel December 1976 (Munslow 1985:198)

³⁸ The Portuguese colonial power "left almost no legal system worthy of the name. Not only had they trained no jurists but the laws we inherited were not in line with our reality". (Chissano reported AIM 269)

In this regard, it also has to be recognised that the liberation movement which came to power when the Portuguese state collapsed, despite its aspirations for civil and participatory governance, was still a military organisation with a tendency to command and 'mobilize' through *palavras de orden*, slogans which exhorted universal inclusion, sacrifice and effort. As we have seen this inspired remarkable willing participation in programmes such as literacy and vaccination campaigns that were understood to be beneficial, but where there was unwillingness to participate by significant dissident minorities whose culture or interests were threatened (including the corrupt and criminal), these were often overruled by force rather than persuasion or due process of law (as described in the RENAMO members' testimony above). In these cases the abuses of power were officially sanctioned or even inherent in the policies being pursued and the motivation more complex than mere bullying or score settling.

We can best understand this phenomenon by looking at the case of the communal villages so deeply resented by the opposition in central Mozambique where the armed resistance began and was quickly exploited by the Rhodesians. Communal villages were a key strategy designed to improve the lives of the rural majority by increasing production through cooperative agriculture and the provision of social services and infrastructure. The policy was clearly born of a desire to include the rural population in the benefits of a modern society especially to give access to health care and education. For some communities especially in the southern provinces, already exposed to a modern economy and living in close proximity to neighbours, it made sense. In other areas of the country it was perceived as deeply threatening. For example in Manica, where a highly sophisticated system of land use adapted to local topography had been developed by family groups living in isolated farmsteads³⁹ it was culturally and economically inappropriate to introduce the concept without dialogue and adaptation. However a combination of zeal to promote social change combined with the military imperative to control the population in a border province at war with Rhodesia, led not to dialogue but coercion. Those that did not accept removal to the villages were forcibly removed and their homesteads burnt. To the author, visiting the area in 1985 it was clear that access to schools was valued, to this end some family members stayed in the villages so that children could attend school, but other family members secretly returned to cultivate the family

³⁹ Personal information Mike Froude, Zimbabwean Agricultural Extension Advisor to GTZ Mozambique 1992

lands around their ruined farmsteads.⁴⁰ This suggests that there was a predisposition to take up the benefits of the new society. With good will on both sides and without threat of war, a practical solution to the conflict between the location of ancestral homes and livelihoods and the need to concentrate scarce services could have been resolved. Indeed it is being resolved now, twenty years later. Once again we have to conclude that there was no capacity or experience in governance to achieve this. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, the FRELIMO government was neither the first nor sadly the last organisation to try to apply quick-fix solutions to deeply embedded social problems.⁴¹

The very worst example of this kind of authoritarianism was Operation Production, already cited above, which in 1983 involved the mass deportation of 'unproductive' citizens from the southern cities (mainly Maputo) to unexploited but potentially productive agricultural land in the extreme north (Niassa). The very concept was an abuse of human rights but it became even more grossly unjust and inhumane as a result of the incapacity to manage its implementation with a minimum of competence. Not only petty criminals and black marketeers but many completely innocent people, simply without demonstrable means of support, such as many single women accused of prostitution and the unemployed, were removed from their homes by the decision of local committees often acting on the basis of denunciations by jealous neighbours, personal grudges and prejudices. On arrival in Niassa, they found themselves without shelter or other means of survival as a result of logistical failures. Thus the operation combined all the types of poor governance already cited: a misguided social engineering policy driven by the desire for 'the greater good' of developing the country and the need to find a quick solution to urban unemployment and crime, carried out by force with inhumanity and administrative and legal incompetence. Habitual criminals quickly found their way back to Maputo, many other deportees became willing recruits to RENAMO, others did manage to make a life for themselves in Niassa, but as we have seen a significant number of the most vulnerable were still stranded there in 2003.

If Operation Production was the extreme low point of governance in post-independence Mozambique the evolution of the Family Law is an example of the triumph of good governance based on the criteria suggested in Figure 5. It also illustrates the dilemma faced by the FRELIMO

⁴⁰ Personal information and observation by Charles Hooper 1985 Advisor to IFLOMA forestry company on low cost housing and community outreach.

⁴¹ For a detailed analysis of these issues through the communal village programme in Tete see Coelho 1998

government in trying to apply its ideal of equality and non-discrimination to the diversity of Mozambican society. The constitution adopted on the eve of the declaration of independence aimed to sweep away the discrimination practised by the colonial regime proclaiming that all citizens 'enjoy the same rights and are subject to the same duties independently of their colour, race, sex, ethnic origin, place of birth, religion, education, social position or occupation.' As Sachs and Honwana Welch point out, this provision was also taken to mean that there would be a single unified legal system with no exceptions allowing for local customary or traditional law to govern marriage and land use, as is common in other African countries. This was principally because those traditions were discriminatory against women and did not adequately protect the rights of children and young people (for example against premature marriage or exploitation of their labour). However, this posed the question 'how is it possible to have a uniform court system applying a uniform set of rules to families constituted according to a multiplicity of different systems?'⁴²

Although the revolutionary government condemned the payment of bride price and the practice of polygamy as part of its agenda for the liberation of women as 'a fundamental necessity...and the precondition' for the triumph of the revolution, those working to develop the law had the wisdom to recognise that, 'Though exhortation and mobilization have their role, the main way in which people alter their consciousness is by doing, by practice' and 'the objective is never seen to be that of destroying the old, but of transforming it, of developing those aspects that are positive and eliminating aspects that are negative'. (1990:64-85)

It was in this spirit that throughout 1984 a nationwide participatory exercise in debate, enquiry and consultation was carried out by the OMM with government and party support to find out about existing family and gender relations and how people viewed them. It was indeed 'a popular movement of women and men of all ages who participated enthusiastically in the meetings, in the debates and in the surveys.' (The General Resolution of the Extraordinary Conference of the OMM *Notícias* 10.11.1984:3) as eye-witnesses confirmed to the author at the time.

⁴² These were found to include a range of matrilineal and patrilineal forms of marriage, child custody and land holding, combined or not with forms of religious marriage by both Muslim and Christian practice; both polygamy and monogamy were practised; payment of bride price was customary in patrilineal society and despised by matrilineal groups; marriages were normally arranged or at least sanctioned by family but some young people made 'new' marriages by mutual choice; civil marriage was now possible but many urban families were constituted without any formal ceremony; children in many of these forms of marriage had little protection though the rights of the child were also enshrined in the constitution.

The culmination of the process was the Extraordinary Conference of the OMM⁴³ where the results of the debates and surveys were discussed. Two aspects of their conclusions stand out. First, the recognition that traditional marriage (and the preparation for marriage in initiation rites) was the way the majority of families were constituted and while in general it did perpetuate the inequality of women it had positive aspects such as family solidarity and social cohesion that should not be lost. Second, the belief in gradual transformation that would largely be fostered by social and economic development and in particular the education of women, both formally and in the home. Thus, the practice of polygamy was condemned as 'a form of family organisation based on the economic exploitation of the woman as cheap labour and as a symbol of the wealth and prestige of the man' but no measures against it were proposed because it was already clear that 'the...dynamic of socio-economic and cultural development' would lead to its reduction.

It was from this inclusive starting point that through further research and practice Mozambican family law was developed from the principle of first recognising every 'de facto' union in law, giving 'practical solutions to practical problems' and not using the penal law 'to outlaw traditional practices' while arriving at a consensus on 'a single set of rights and duties' applicable to all (Sachs and Honwana Welch op. cit.). The final stage of this process was when the Family law was passed onto the statute book in 2003 (see above). This progress from diversity of practice without legal status to a framework of law that respects diversity, protects human rights and promotes inclusion and social cohesion is a spectacular example of the kind of participatory governance that Mozambique was capable of even in the first ten years after independence. However its final formulation was dependent on a long process of learning and capacity building within the legal institutions and its application is still, as we have seen, often frustrated by the continuing incapacity of the courts.

Further evidence if that were needed, that there are no quick fixes for societies emerging from repression and violence is provided by two other aspects of governance that have had a positive but very slow evolution governed by the pace of emerging knowledge and capacity as well as constraints on resources. The first is the long road to teaching in national languages in schools

⁴³ As one participant commented, extraordinary in two senses: a special conference to debate the issue of the family but also an extraordinary event after only 10 years of independence to see women (traditionally silent in public) queuing up to speak in the plenary sessions. Personal comment Teresa Veloso then National Director of Adult Education 1984.

which is only now beginning to address the problem that much of the public is excluded from information and participation in national life by language. The second is the evolution of the press as a medium for civic information and debate. Universal access to this too is not yet achieved and dependent on the continuing development of an inclusive education system.

Nevertheless the press in Mozambique has made a long journey from official censorship under the colonial regime to a legal framework and culture of governance that has enabled a free media. Its history is another example of how recognising a problem of governance and declaring a reform does not immediately result in real change. FRELIMO, having suffered from colonial censorship, was averse to any form of official censorship once in government; however, it did expect journalists to exercise self-censorship and fundamental support for the aims of the revolution was assumed, so that 'the most experienced journalists were fighting, not for the freedom of the press, but for the right to criticize' aspects of governance, such as performance and integrity (Fauvet 2003: 61-89). Party leaders and Ministers remained ambivalent, at times welcoming criticism⁴⁴ at other times trying to reign it in. Thus the relationship between journalists and political leaders was one of personal negotiation rather than legally defined roles. It was in this context that the journalists' association decided to seize the opportunity of the drafting of the a new constitution in 1990 in advance of the peace accord, to ensure that it contained specific protections for the freedom of the press, not just the general principle of freedom of expression, so that there would be an objective legal framework governing the media. The strength of the Mozambican instinct for good governance through dialogue, but also the personal nature of relations within that governance, was demonstrated by the fact that the journalists' proposal was debated by a delegation of journalists and President Chissano, 'until dawn.' With the President convinced, the final outcome was the inclusion of clauses in the constitution that met the journalists' demands. They are also some of the most liberal in the world (Fauvet, 2003: 287-292). From this point the main constraints on the diversification and expansion of the press have been the lack of resources, and the limited readership. Creative solutions such as the fax newsheet *Mediafax* and its provincial imitators were devised to overcome the lack of print and distribution capacity and provided a crucial source of independent news during the transition from war to peace and the

⁴⁴ As for example the relationship that Graça Machel describes between her husband Samora and the journalist Cardoso 'they had a strong intellectual relationship even when they disagreed'(Fauvet 2003:99) (The original text is in Portuguese, translation of the quotations is by the author of this volume.)

establishment of new weekly papers has followed, but, as we have seen there is no capacity to even extend the readership of the two existing daily papers: mass readership is still in the future.

Finally, what of the research participants' claim that democracy began with independence? As we have seen, the government's intention was democracy and participation, but actual governance often did not live up to this aspiration. Nevertheless, for the first time, all Mozambicans were called on to elect representatives to participate in government and just under 30% of those representatives in local assemblies and over 12% in the national assembly were women by 1977 (Isaacman and Stefan 1980:35). The 'democratic centralism' system did not involve direct elections to a national assembly (local communities elected local deputies who elected the provincial assemblies which sent representatives to the national assembly) and there was only one party so that, as in the case of journalists, criticism was encouraged to ensure accountability, but dissent from the political system was not contemplated and voting was by public show of hands. Other aspects of local governance, cooperatives, tribunals and mass organisations such as the OMM were organised on a similar basis. To what extent was this a real experience of democracy?

Clearly it favoured the dictatorship of the majority and intolerance of difference. It also, in the author's experience, led to petty abuse of power by manipulation and intimidation. On the other hand it inculcated the conviction that ordinary people had the right to challenge these abuses and call those in authority to account, and on the whole those that sought to exercise these rights were backed up from the highest level⁴⁵ Imperfect though they may have been, these first experiences of participation in governance were creating a culture and capacity for participation that contributed to the evolution of democracy and the government played a part in trying to increase the capacity to participate. Many of the elected local deputies, party secretaries, members of tribunals and even central committee members shared the general lack of basic education of those they represented, but they were given priority to attend accelerated adult learning courses, though this still left them at a disadvantage compared to the tiny minority of qualified individuals. These in turn often ended up 'accumulating tasks' (a constant source of complaint at the time) thus blurring even further the 'separation of powers' between, party, state and judiciary. Once again, the pace of progress to

⁴⁵ Central government frequently sent out 'brigades' to trouble shoot abuses and disputes in response to direct complaints by members of the public to Ministers, Central Committee members or other national figures. A satirical short story by Mozambican author, Mia Couto(1990:71-76) *The Tale of the Two who Returned from the Dead* captures this reality. The researcher witnessed a similar local struggle against corrupt appropriation of goods from a rural consumer cooperative in 1984.

what we would recognise as good governance was determined by the capacity (knowledge, experience and resources) to govern and to participate in governance.⁴⁶

8.4 Conclusion

The project of nation building in Mozambique took place in a context of mass poverty and ignorance with an inherited culture of discrimination, exploitative relationships and authoritarian rule enforced by violence. Regime change was also brought about by violence, but with a vision of achieving universal inclusion and equity through participation in governance. In that context, failures of governance created fertile ground for external interests to promote civil war but they are attributable not to a failure of political will, but to various forms of incapacity. On the other hand advances in governance can be linked to human development as a result of capacity building interventions by government supported by international cooperation. There is also a third factor, that of time: the process of learning and adapting to change even when change is deeply desired cannot be hurried without inflicting trauma. Unfortunately, 'The agents of change...once they have negotiated a politically viable proposal, become impatient to implement it.'(Marris 1987:156). Mozambican capacity for governance, that has resulted in 10 years of peace can also, as many suggest, be attributed to learning from the devastating failure of governance in the civil war, how to introduce change through dialogue.

⁴⁶ Several local deputies were students at the CFAT centre where the author worked in 1984. A central committee member that she met in Niassa in 1988 had also completed basic education this way. However he still felt that his capacity to participate fully in government was limited by his educational level. He described his inability to fully understand monetary and fiscal proposals from the Ministry of Finance, saying he had to resort to assessing the probity and personal competence of the civil servants as his only means of vetting financial governance.

CHAPTER 9

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

The starting point for this study was the observation on reviewing the literature that capacity development is seen as the core activity in the reconstruction of war-torn societies, largely because it is believed to be the key to establishing collaborative governance and sustaining peaceful development. However, the actual impact of such interventions in war-torn societies has not been researched. A causal relationship between capacity development, good governance and peaceful development has merely been assumed on the basis of circumstantial experience. The next observation was that there was no existing body of proven research practice for evaluating the long-term social impact of development interventions in general or of post-war reconstruction in particular. This led to the definition of two research objectives: the first was to develop a research design and methodology that could reliably assess the impact of capacity development on the recovery of social institutions in war-torn countries; the second was to test the plausibility of the assumption of a causal link between interventions for capacity development and the recovery of good governance and sustainable peaceful development in war-torn countries.

This concluding chapter therefore reviews the conclusions reached in respect of these two objectives and looks beyond them to some unresolved questions that remain to be answered by further research. The first section (9.1) considers the extent to which the first research objective was achieved by reviewing the rationale, design and implementation of the research. It concludes that the method was successful in this case and is likely to be more generally applicable to the evaluation of social impact. Section 9.2 examines the findings in respect of the crucial case study of education in Mozambique suggesting that it confirms the plausibility of a causal relationship between capacity development, national governance and peaceful development in the Mozambican context. 9.3 presents some general lessons for practice that might apply to capacity building for post-war reconstruction in other contexts as well as specific conclusions for education development as a recovery strategy in war-torn countries. 9.4 then presents the general conclusions with regard to the second research objective. This can also be deemed to have been largely achieved, since the

research was able to confirm the likely causal link between capacity development, improved governance and peaceful post-war development and also points to the contextual conditions in which this process can occur. The chapter concludes (9.5) by recognising that the research though successful within the limited parameters that it set itself, left a number of contexts and issues that could be profitably investigated.

9.1 The rationale, design and implementation of the research

The study began by examining the concept of capacity development, which until recently was articulated in both academic and practitioner literature as two related concepts: capacity building and institutional development. This revealed a general consensus that capacity development leads to good governance, which in turn ensures sustained peaceful development in war-torn countries.

A number of issues were noted in respect of this assumption. The first was that common definitions of good governance are not ideologically neutral but linked to a particular concept of liberal democracy and market economy, which may not be consistent with concepts of good governance within the war-torn societies that are the subject of interventions for capacity development.

It was then observed that there is a contradiction between actual development practice and a consensus in favour of an additive learning process approach to capacity development for good governance, despite the fact that it is based on a several decades of experience, mostly of the failure of alternative approaches, but also of a minority of proven successes. This contradiction was observed to be most evident in post-war reconstruction practice, which is largely externally driven and governed by short-term expediency rather than restorative development.

This pattern of behaviour is attributed to a number of imperatives that inhibit the application of recognised best practice: the strategic interests of intervening powers; the conditionality imposed in aid deals; the organisational culture of donor and financial agencies; the imbalance of power between devastated recipient nations and the international aid community, which makes it impossible for them to set their own conditions and agendas in open mutually beneficial negotiation. This loss of sovereignty is at its most extreme in the case of war-devastated societies,

due not only to their huge objective needs but also as a result of their loss of human capacity and institutional weakness.

Thus it is that, whereas current understanding is that capacity for governance is a fundamental prerequisite for sustainable peace as well as recovery, which would suggest the need for developing capacity through the learning process approach, it is war-torn nations' lack of capacity, combined with the donors' perception of high risk of failure and strategic anxieties, that lead to the continuing practice of donor dominated short-term recovery approaches. These tend to be subtractive rather than additive and therefore unlikely to lead to sustainable outcomes.

In the course of this review of literature and practice, it also became clear that the very assumption that capacity development leads to good governance (however that may be defined), though widely believed has not in fact been tested. This is because evaluation practice while it has developed effective methodologies for fulfilling the purposes of accountability and performance assessment of individual interventions has no body of practice for assessing long-term social impact of interventions, such as capacity development, on the achievement of general social goals such as good governance.

It was concluded that the crucial evidence for the evaluation of the long-term social impact of capacity development interventions has to come mainly from personal recall. Outcomes are not attributable to individual interventions but cumulative and diffused and baseline information may be scarce or no longer relevant after many years. It is necessary therefore to instigate a reflective process to obtain a present-day perspective on a historical process through the participation of those who experienced it. This was seen to require a mainly qualitative and participatory methodology, which would also need to be enhanced by other complementary investigations in a 'composite' approach. Since the long term impact of particular interventions is diffused and subject to other unforeseen variables it would be necessary to look at a broad spectrum of inputs to a particular area of social development rather than particular interventions by single agents.

It was then necessary to develop a plausible model for describing the assumed relationship between capacity development, good governance and sustained peaceful development. A simple linear causal model or even a linear model acknowledging intervening variables was rejected for a generative model based on Pawson and Tilley's concept of interaction between context, subject and

intervention (Figure 4, Chapter 4). This was thought to be a more appropriate representation in the light of the review of development experience and it was decided to test it by examining the case of the Ministry of Education in Mozambique as a most-likely crucial case for confirming its plausibility.

The research then adopted as its core methodology a retrospective participatory enquiry, which was combined with research of secondary, mainly Mozambican sources. The scope of the enquiry was limited by the fact that (unlike typical evaluation research) it was carried out by a single researcher, rather than a team with complimentary skills and attributes. Nevertheless, the implementation of this methodology in the field demonstrated that the approach was capable of recovering the evidence necessary for testing the research model and assessing the impact of capacity development for the institutional development of the education sector and the wider society. As such it could profitably be used to examine a wider sample of Mozambican society and should also be generally applicable in the evaluation of long-term social impact in other contexts. With this conclusion, the first objective of the research was deemed to have been achieved.

9.2 Conclusions from the study of the crucial case

The study of the development of education in Mozambique through the secondary, (mainly Mozambican) sources in Chapter 5 first of all confirmed the choice of MINED as a most-likely case of the application of the learning process approach to capacity development in a war-torn context, which had led to sustained peaceful development. It also showed that MINED's relationships with international partners were subject to the same shifting agendas and contradictions as those recorded in the literature reviewed in previous chapters, but suggested that nevertheless the long-term cumulative impact of their mainly well-intentioned interventions was positive.

The participants' accounts of their own capacity development (Chapter 6) revealed that it was a product of the interaction between their social context, the volition, of first their parents, and then themselves and strategic interventions by government, supported by international partners, thus confirming the generative model developed in the research design, whereby development occurs as a result of interaction between subject, context and interventions designed to build capacity.

Institutional development was similarly revealed as a product of a shared vision between public and government arising from the post-colonial social context, the homogeneity of the core group, which constituted the initial human resource for its development and the technical inputs of donor partners with associated funding, thus also conforming to the model for change in the research design.

The discussion of this process in general terms revealed that the learning process approach adopted and led by government in the early years and reasserted post-war was the driving force for capacity development but that its success depended on a three-cornered partnership between government, public and international support which we can equate with the concept of collaborative governance, advocated in post-war reconstruction literature.

Where this gradual, evolutionary approach failed due to lack of capacity for governance and under the pressure of external destabilisation, there was a resort to tactical expediency and pursuit of models of development that did not have universal public acceptance which fuelled violence and the descent into war and economic collapse. This in turn changed the balance of power in the relationship with aid partners. International cooperation was seen to be additive when integrated in the strategic plan of the government and supported by the public, but became subtractive, fragmented and driven by external agendas when government leadership and public participation foundered.

Nevertheless, the case clearly illustrates, by its failures as well as its overall success, the plausibility of a causal relationship between donor support for capacity development and the development of institutional good governance for the development and delivery of a public service. However it also clearly demonstrates that the context in which that support is given (particularly the nature of the relationship with national government and public) is a conditioning factor.

The next issue to be considered was whether the institutional development of the education sector contributed to the governance of the society as a whole, and therefore to sustaining peaceful development. Mozambique embarked on its strategies for mass education in the belief that this would be the outcome. They retained this vision despite the war and reasserted it in their post-war reconstruction strategy. To what extent is this conviction vindicated?

The research participants indicated their criteria for good governance as they reflected on the role of education in their country's post-independence history as well as the underlying causes of the war. The focus of these criteria is significantly different from the criteria for good governance commonly adopted by the international community, which are concentrated on macro-economic indicators and the existence of particular organisational forms of governance (multi-party elections, framework of law, public service delivery). The participants' criteria are concerned with the nature rather than the structure of relationships, thus their concepts of governance are not seen as inherent in particular political or economic systems but in the capacity of government and the governed. Thus they cite leadership and sovereignty on the part of government, genuine participation on the part of the public and donor partners, inclusion and equity, respect for diversity of ideas and above all dialogue as the ingredients of sustainable and peaceful governance, and they hold both government and public responsible for the quality of that governance. Like their international partners they also see that achieving this kind of governance requires the development of human capacity and control of the necessary resources.

It was possible to demonstrate in chapter eight that on the basis of the participants' criteria as well as those of the international community, Mozambique is a case of emerging good governance. The testimony of the participants and of other contemporary sources in Mozambique also suggests that the evolution of the education system, with its growing inclusiveness and cultural relevance has been crucial to the growing capacity for participatory democracy, efforts to redress economic and social inequity, acceptance of diversity and national dialogue as well as the ability to learn from the bitter lessons of the war. These are the positive factors which are seen as sustaining and consolidating peace and driving development in the face of the negative and distorting effects of sudden exposure to the global market economy and continuing incapacity of governance, such as corruption, illegality and incompetence.

In the light of this analysis we can conclude that the development of the education sector in Mozambique confirms the plausibility of a causal relationship between capacity development, national governance and sustained peaceful development. The critical context for such a relationship appears to be that in Mozambique a vision of education as the motor of national and personal development is shared by government and public. This vision has remained constant in all groups of society, despite conflict over strategy and content and in the face of violent conflict, changing external alliances and aid regimes and economic and political restructuring. It enabled

Mozambique to enlist the assistance it needed in support of its goals despite shifting policy norms and financing conditionalities of donors and international partners. Under this condition, it was possible for capacity development to lead to improved governance in the education sector itself and in the wider society. Conversely, when focus on the vision for education faltered, due to war, economic crisis and loss of sovereignty, the donor interventions were fragmented and had little impact.

9.3 Some lessons for practice

The research conclusion, described above, that the success of interventions for capacity development is conditioned by their cumulative interaction over time with the subjects of the intervention in their particular context, has some clear implications for practice. The design of any capacity development intervention has to be based on an understanding of the particular context and in response to the volition of the subjects. A learning process approach, involving both facilitators and subjects as full participants, is therefore indicated so that the scope and nature of the capacity development activities evolve to meet the particular needs of that society. Skills and policy transfer in any sector needs to be an interactive process in which the subjects of intervention are able to select what is appropriate in their conditions from informed knowledge of the options.

There are also some practical lessons to be learnt from the case study about the approach to implementing the concept of education as a capacity development strategy for post-war reconstruction. These too can be seen as contextual pre-requisites for such development.

- An integrated national strategy that includes mass general education for adults as well as children is the foundation for capacity development in war-torn countries where universal access to education has been denied.
- The implementation of such a strategy requires simultaneous development of the capacity of policy-makers, administrators and teachers to build and create the permanent institutions for general capacity development.
- The existence of even a very small minority group of minimally educated personnel recruited to support the capacity building agenda is sufficient to initiate the process. The educational level in Mozambique in 1975 (5% literacy) was probably at the lowest extreme likely to be encountered (Afghanistan for example after similar experiences of prolonged civil war had about 25% literacy and many more graduates than Mozambique.)

- The key to compensating for lack of qualified personnel is the adoption of participatory working methods and the promotion of a mutual learning culture. Both of these mitigated the lack of capacity and created the necessary context for rapid capacity development in the first years of Mozambican independence.
- In an extreme case of human resource deficit such as Mozambique in 1975, international technical assistance is essential for capacity building, but is only effective if used strategically within the policy framework coordinated by government. In the early stages non-specialist, including voluntary personnel can make a quick impact to fill skills gaps but should not be more than a stop-gap and never substitute national decision-making functions. Technical assistance should from the start be principally directed towards building national capacity and at the policy and planning level needs to be both selective and targeted at developing specific institutional capacities.
- As the institutional and personnel capacity grows (or in countries where the initial deficit is not so extreme) so the amount of external technical assistance should be less in numbers and time (short consultancies and backstopping replacing full-time long-term contracts) and should be highly specialised and selective. For example, technical assistance personnel do not necessarily have to be foreign or exclusively from northern highly developed countries, simply because that is where the funding comes from. Criteria of selection should be the relevance as well as the quality of professional competence in relation to the particular capacity deficit.
- Meanwhile, continuing capacity building needs at the operational/grass-roots level (which are likely to be very high after prolonged conflict) should be delivered by national staff with donor financial support if necessary.
- Providing educational opportunities in donor countries can also be a valuable assistance, especially during armed conflict or to kick start capacity building when internal institutional capacity is still minimal. However, it should be directed strategically at providing qualified personnel to develop internal institutions for education, professional training and administration. As the internal level of development increases (or in the case of already more developed countries) so certain levels of external course provision become inappropriate (for example the overseas secondary education and teacher training was necessary in early stages for Mozambique, first degrees were appropriate up to early 1990s but now perhaps only specialist courses and post-graduate levels may be useful).

9.4 General conclusions

If we now relate the case study to the research model, we see that the social context in Mozambique evolved from the aftermath of the overthrow of colonial rule to the present emerging good governance and stability. There were from the start negative and positive components of that context – war and violence, ignorance and incapacity on the one hand – a vision of good governance and a will to develop it on the other. For the FRELIMO government and many Mozambicans who contributed their views to the author over these years, the main mechanism for transformation (thinking again in terms of our model) was the education of the nation. For the many international agencies and individuals who contributed to support that transformation, the means was the institutional development of MINED largely through the capacity building of its staff. These were the ideas that underpinned the creation and development of MINED.

The conclusion that can be drawn from the Mozambican experience with the education sector, but which is likely to be more generally applicable in other sectors and contexts, is that developing a national consensus (vision) for a particular policy and forms of collaborative governance for its implementation creates the necessary context within which international assistance for capacity development can have a sustainable and developmental impact despite its own inconsistencies and shifting conditionality. Conversely if the national policy consensus and collaborative framework is missing, externally devised capacity development interventions are likely to have little long-term impact.

On the particular role of education in conflict and post-conflict contexts, the research suggests that denial of access to education, which is culturally relevant and values diversity while opening minds to world knowledge, can be one of the root causes of failure of governance and resort to violent conflict. This was clearly the case in Mozambique and is likely to be the case in other contexts where access to education has been restricted by underdevelopment and repression. Post-war education reform and development in such contexts is therefore not simply a public service requirement or a social project that can be left to one side until recovery has been accomplished, but a fundamental prerequisite for peaceful development through national dialogue in which all are enabled to participate. This is particularly true in a multi-lingual and multi-cultural society such as Mozambique.

The research also indicates that the reconstruction of a nation recovering from repression and war requires capacity development for all levels of the society, not just the administrative elite. Developing an inclusive, comprehensive and national education system is therefore likely to be a core strategy for building general capacity. It also seems clear that in this context, donor support for capacity development can be seen to make an impact for good governance and sustained peaceful development.

9.5 Some areas for further research

As explained in the introduction the scope of this research was limited for two reasons, one practical and one methodological. Resources for individual doctoral research are necessarily limited and, more importantly, both the methodological approach and the area of study were untried, so that the research was necessarily exploratory. Although the author chose to limit the study to one crucial case, which could be studied by her in sufficient depth to yield valid results, this does not rule out the need for comparative study, both within Mozambique and in other war-torn contexts. The scope of such studies could also be increased both in terms of cover and of expertise if they were carried out by small teams of researchers rather than one individual.

Having demonstrated the reliability of the methodology and the plausibility of the hypothesis in respect of one key public sector in Mozambique, it would be appropriate to carry out comparative studies in other sectors to determine the extent to which they followed the same pattern of development. As already suggested, personal experiences of the author and some Mozambican informants, suggests that there were differences of intervention and outcomes as well as similarities. Agriculture as the principal economic activity of the majority of the population might be one and Health, which was and is the second most significant public service sector after education and one that attracts more donor attention, would be another. The essential condition would be to entrust the work to researchers with the kind of background of understanding that the author had in the education sector, whether nationals or foreigners.

A key limitation of the research was that it did not involve a representative sample of urban parents (ad hoc meetings were held with association representatives) and the rural parents were, with one exception, unrepresented, since the researcher felt that this could only be carried out by researchers speaking to respondents in their mother tongue and with an understanding of their cultural identity.

It would be a valuable exercise therefore for Mozambican researchers to extend this study of the education sector to a sample of rural contexts in different areas of the country. The study might also profitably include further urban contexts with representative samples of parents.

In a similar way it would be useful if researchers with the necessary cultural understanding, whether nationals or foreigners, could apply this methodology to evaluating the impact of capacity development assistance in other countries recovering from war, both those that present a similar post-colonial history overshadowed by the cold war (Vietnam for example) and those where the pre-war development was greater and the nature of the conflict very different, as for example in Sri Lanka, where nevertheless conflict over education and language triggered the violence.

It would also be useful to apply and refine the methodology as a tool for general use in the evaluation of the long-term social impact of post-war reconstruction interventions including the difficult issue, discussed in Chapter 2, of evaluating long-past and comprehensive 'nation-building' exercises following defeat and invasion by occupying forces.

In fact, the recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, which prompted that interest, also raise another issue. The rationale for those interventions was not to develop but to transform those societies in line with a particular western model of governance and strategic interest. This research has vindicated the opposite approach, the application of Korten's learning process to capacity development. However, that process, though ongoing, was initiated in a particular historical context. The research participants and other contemporary commentators identified a number of threats to it in the present context: the inequalities created by exposure to the global market economy and the pressures to conform to internationally determined models of development. Some questioned whether the national capacity development that occurred in Mozambique could have been initiated in today's conditions. There is therefore a need for research to assess the impact of globalisation and pre-emptive interventions (whether by force or by financial manipulation through debt relief schemes) on initiatives for post-war capacity development and to identify strategies for applying the lessons learnt from this research in this new context.

APPENDIX 1

THE MODERN HISTORY OF MOZAMBIQUE¹

1.1 Mozambican states and mercantile penetration

The earliest written references to Mozambique occur in Persian and Arabic documents in the 10th and 11th centuries and refer to gold and iron being obtained from Sofala. Arab trading centres were functioning along the coast for the next five hundred years until Portuguese traders arrived in the 16th century and began first to take over the established Arab trading centres along the coast and then extend inland along the Zambezi valley and south to the shores of the large natural harbour of the Delagoa (Maputo) bay. By the end of the century they had made contact with the empire of the Muenematapa, which extended over much of present day Zimbabwe and central Mozambique, converting its rulers to Christianity and gaining concessions of territory and mines in exchange for military assistance to bolster their waning power against the rebellion of client kingdoms. Having gained this foothold, Portuguese traders established and defended a trading network in the territories of present day Mozambique and eastern Zimbabwe as part of their trade with India, whose traders also penetrated the rural interior and dominated the ivory trade. It was only in the mid 18th century that these concessions and trading posts came officially under direct administration from Portugal and even then the ability of the Portuguese crown to exact taxes and regulate the concessions was always tenuous. After the initial trade in gold and ivory, by the second half of the 18th century the main trade was in slaves and despite attempts by the Crown administration to abolish the trade in 1836 and again in 1842 and the formal abolition of slavery throughout the Portuguese territories in 1869, there is evidence of both continuing into the early 20th century. Thus prior to the late 19th century, although the Mozambican economy, its governance and culture were subject to powerful foreign influences, particularly from the Portuguese, it had not been formally colonised. To a significant extent there had been a mutual transformation of the indigenous society and the foreign trading interests but no effective military and administrative colonisation. The

¹This historical outline is based on the following published sources: Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1994; AIM Reports 2000-2005; Armon, Hendrickson and Vines 1998; Capela 1988,1993;Christie 1989; Departamento de História da UEM 1982, 1993; de Sousa Ferreira 1977;Fauvet and Mosse 2003; Hanlon 1986,1991,1996; Isaacman 1978; MacQueen 1997; Mazula (ed.) 2002; Munslow 1983, 1985; Newitt 1995;Sachs and Honwana Welch, 1990; Synge 1997; United Nations Department of Public Information 1995; Vines 1996.

These are supplemented by contemporary eyewitness accounts news reports etc. to which the author had access during the years 1983-1989 and 1992-1998 in Mozambique.

Portuguese 'prazeiros' (concessionists) and traders became significant players and participants in a society that was still structured along African lines with regional empires ruling uneasily over client kingdoms and controlling the trade from the interior. There was also significant cultural assimilation through local marriage and overlordship.²

1.2 1885 – 1930 The Treaty of Berlin and its aftermath

The Congress of Berlin and the signing of the Berlin Act in 1885 forced Portugal to embark on the military annexation and direct administration of the territories it claimed or lose them to other European powers. In fact they lost out in most of the territorial disputes with Britain, losing control of what are now the eastern provinces of Zimbabwe as well as Malawi but managing to defend their key province of Tete along the upper Zambezi. However, not having the capital base from which to exploit these territories in the same way as their more powerful rivals, they then proceeded to concede large regions of the country to the administration of charter companies largely owned by foreign capital. The pressures that this transition imposed led first to the overthrow of the Portuguese monarchy and later to the demise of the republic that replaced it, at the hands of a military coup. In Mozambique military and civil resistance to the occupation continued throughout this period from both the indigenous states and populations and the Afro-Portuguese military states.

1888

Company of Mozambique founded in central Mozambique with mainly British shareholders.

The warlordship of the da Cruz family in Massangano finally defeated by the Portuguese.

1891

Company of Niassa established (after a military campaign) in the north of Mozambique with financial backing from South African mining interests.

Widespread peasant revolts in the Zambezi region.

Further military campaigns in the Zambezi fail to control the independent 'prazos.'

1892

² As for example the powerful Afro-Portuguese families in the Zambezi and Shire valleys who were to oppose the occupation at the end of the century (Newitt 1995:305-8,345) and the well documented case of the concession territory of Manganja da Costa which declared itself an independent republic and defended itself against annexation from 1862-1898 in defence of the hereditary rights of a mixed race family, descendants of one of the legendary 'Zambezi heiresses'. (Capela, 1988.)

Establishment of the Zambesia company by British interests but it sublet many of the prazos back to the existing occupiers or other foreign consortia.

1894

Railway from Lourenço Marques (now Maputo) to the Transvaal operational.

1895

Start of the military campaign against the southern state of Gaza. The ruler Gungunhana captured.

1897

Gungunhana's general Maguiguane defeated and killed.

First migrant labour contracted to South Africa.

Beira to Umtali (Mutare in present day Zimbabwe) railway functioning.

1898-1912

Military occupation of most of the northern territories by the Portuguese and/or the Zambesia company completed.

1910-1911

Revolution in Portugal overthrows the monarchy and establishes a Republic.

The new constitution also reorganises the administration of the colonies including regulating 'indigenous' labour.

1914-18

During the first world war 12,000 African soldiers and 90 thousand workers recruited.

Peasant revolts against the occupation and strikes in Lourenço Marques which were to recur throughout the 1920s there and in the northern and central concessions.

1920

Final military campaign by the Niassa company against the Maconde in Cabo Degado.

1920-1925

Emerging nationalist associations centred on the publication of 'O Brado Africano' the 'Grémio Africano' in Lourenço Marques and Quelimane.

1923

Start of extraction of coal by Société Minière Géologique du Zambeze (largely Belgian capital).

1926

The Portuguese republic overthrown by a coup d'état led by army generals.

1928

Professor António Salazar co-opted into the government to manage the economy in response to growing economic crisis.

1.3 1930 –1961 The New State and the Zenith of Colonial rule

By 1930 Salazar and his associates were essentially in control with a veto over all departmental budgets. They set about producing a new constitution based on an ideological structure that was to control the affairs of the Metropole and its colonies for the next forty years. Their vision was of a social order in which the rights and freedoms of individuals were to be subordinated to the needs of the state. The perceived incoherence, chaotic administration and disorder of the republic and its dependence on foreign economic dominance were to be replaced by national autonomy, a society founded on Catholic principles and sound economic management. Colonial administration was to be reformed; social control was to be promoted by funding the Catholic missions and taking back the concessions from foreign companies. Salazar also quickly moved to develop a personality cult as the strong wise leader. A pervasive and highly effective system of censorship and informers backed eventually by a ruthless secret police force prevented overt dissent and inhibited the organisation of opposition in both Portugal and the colonies. Although this regime shared many characteristics with the rising fascist states in Germany and Italy, Salazar's rule, though ruthlessly autocratic was more ideologically pragmatic and consciously founded on support from the army, the bureaucracy and the big business corporations. Monarchism, the aristocracy and the extreme Catholic right were afforded little influence. It was on this basis that the New State transformed the administration and development of the colonies, essentially to the benefit of the elite classes in Portugal from which the regime drew its support.

1930

First government funding of Catholic missions.

The Colonial Act: removed the privileges of the concession companies; established labour regulations for 'natives'; established the first training college for 'native' primary teachers; established a centralised administration of the colony including state monopoly of taxation.

1931

The hut tax (mussoco) levied on every native household accounted for between one fifth and a quarter of the fiscal revenue from Mozambique.

1933

The 'Instituto Negrófilo de Moçambique' split from the 'Grémio Africano de Lourenço Marques'(a division encouraged by the colonial interests).

Strikes in the port of Lourenço Marques and of salaried workers in Beira.

1938

Cotton Export Council set up.

1940-41

Concordat between Portugal and the Holy See led to the Missionary Statute conferring special privileges and responsibilities on the Catholic Church. In particular it was to assume responsibility for 'indigenous education' directed explicitly at preparing the indigenous population for its prescribed role as manual labour for the exploitation of the natural resources of the colony. In return, both Portuguese and foreign missions were to be regulated directly by the Portuguese state. Getting the indigenous population to fill the 'labour shortage' in the colonial enterprises was a key concern of the colonial authority which progressively strengthened labour laws.

1942

New tax laws enforced the collection of the hut tax, while recognising the difficulty of collecting it from rural subsistence farmers. No exceptions on grounds of poverty were accepted though a 'reduced tax' category was introduced. Those without monetary means were required to cultivate cash crops to meet tax obligations; migrant labourers contracted through the colonial authority to the mines in South Africa were paid on return to Mozambique after the deduction of tax. Failing all of these, payment was exacted in the form of forced labour.³

1945

As the Second World War came to an end, Portugal was obliged under international pressure to ameliorate its harsh colonial labour regime. Wage levels and social provisions for workers were increased.

1947

The 'Regulos', traditional leaders co-opted as colonial tax collectors and law enforcers, began to receive monthly payments from the government and were rewarded with masonry houses.

1947-1948

Strikes in Lourenço Marques and Gaza met with brutal repression: 49 deaths and 200 hundred arrested, the majority being deported to São Tomé.

1949

Portugal joined NATO.

³ An adult literacy teacher in Gaza recounted to the author in 1984 how she was sent to work on road building shortly after giving birth to her second child, who she carried on her back as she worked. Her husband, like many other migrant workers, had absconded from the mines and remained illegally in South Africa and she had been unable to meet the rice cultivation quota due to her pregnancy.

1950

The number of Portuguese settlers in Mozambique was recorded as 49,000. Mozambicans with 'assimilado' status (with some privileges such as exemption from hut tax) as 4,349. The overwhelming majority of Mozambicans were classed as 'indigenous' and subject to specific laws of control.

1951-4

Portugal responding defensively to the international pressures for decolonisation, introduced new constitutional and policy reforms to present a modernising image to the outside world. The colonies were transformed into 'Overseas Provinces'. Development plans were drawn up for specific development areas. Wages increased again, but the rises were matched by tax rises.

1955

Portugal joined the United Nations.

242412 'indigenous' pupils were attending 'rudimentary schools'

1956-1957

Despite its more liberal image, the regime in Portugal and the colonies relied on repressive laws and law enforcement. Signs of unrest such as the strikes at the docks in Lourenço Marques continued and in 1957 the PIDE (secret police force) was set up in Mozambique.

1959

'Adaptation' schooling replaced the rudimentary school. There were now 392796 pupils but only 6982 made the transition to primary schooling.

1960

While 17 African nations achieved independence, there were now 90,000 Portuguese settlers in Mozambique. Once again wages for indigenous workers were raised, but many grievances remained and dissent was met with repression.

The 'massacre of Mueda' when peasant farmers on this northern plateau, having been allowed to convene to present their grievances to the authorities, were surrounded and fired on by colonial troops, is seen as the symbolic event which triggered the decision to resort to armed resistance, faced by the futility of trying to negotiate with the Salazar regime.

1961

Two events alarmed the Portuguese authorities and led to the usual twin strategy of increased repression and concessions on conditions of work:

Armed uprising in Angola. This led to the hasty revoking of the labour laws, although forced labour continued in practice for some time.

Newly independent India annexed the Portuguese colony of Goa. In Mozambique the authorities reacted by interning the Indian population in concentration camps.⁴

1960-1961

In these years three Mozambican nationalist movements were founded: UDENAMO, MANU AND UNAMI.

The recipe of repression and appeasement was repeated: the PIDE stepped up its operations with the creation of the 'Psychological Action Service' and wages were once again raised.

Eduardo Mondlane, the future leader of a united nationalist movement, returned from exile to visit the country against the wishes of the authorities, by virtue of his status as a UN diplomat.⁵

1.4 1962-1974 The struggle for Independence

Following the unification of the various nationalist movements in the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) with Mondlane as President, the internal debate focussed on the choice of strategy for achieving independence. Many initially favoured seeking to negotiate independence as had been done in former British colonies. This became untenable in the face of the intractable position adopted by the Portuguese regime. Hope of bringing about an early collapse of the regime under the combined pressure of liberation wars in Angola, Guiné-Bissau and Mozambique was also dashed when it became clear that the Portuguese regime was prepared not only to commit a large part of its national resources (including the eventual conscription of a quarter of all Portuguese men of military age) to retaining its colonies but was securing military assistance through its membership of NATO and economic resources by once again opening its territories to foreign capital under favourable terms. FRELIMO therefore prepared for a protracted guerrilla war, which they realised would need to secure the support of the Mozambican people especially the rural communities. Strategies for communicating and demonstrating the social changes that independence could bring therefore went hand in hand with the recruitment, training and deployment of fighters. Basic education and health provision in the liberated zones and the education of cadres as well as military commanders were core FRELIMO strategies from its formation. When after ten years of fighting the burden of colonial wars on the Portuguese public

⁴ Ricardo Rangel, 1994 *Photographe de Mozambique Ricardo Rangel* Centre Culturel Franco-Mozambicain/ Editions Findakly (Paris): 46-7

⁵ His movement was officially restricted but he was able to 'disappear' into the interior and meet many Mozambicans. The fact that he had a doctorate (Salazar made a point of being addressed as Dr.) when most Mozambicans were treated as 'ignorant' and was able to defy and outwit the authorities, sent a powerful message that independence was possible. Information from an eyewitness, who met Mondlane in Inhambane in this year, recounted to the author in 1989.

and serving soldiers provoked a military coup to overthrow the dictatorship in Portugal, FRELIMO, while still mounting sabotage and undercover actions in the Portuguese controlled areas, had in fact only carried the war to the northern provinces where about half the land area, mostly in the interior, was under their control. The important northern province of Nampula, the coastal areas and ports and the southern provinces were still under Portuguese rule. FRELIMO military strategists calculated that a further ten years of war would be needed to liberate the whole country while the preparation of qualified cadres for administration and government and the evolution of social development strategies were still at an early stage. Nevertheless, the overthrow of Caetano's regime and the unstable political conditions in Portugal following the coup, meant that FRELIMO, as a single united movement, demonstrably capable of continuing the war to eventual victory, was able to determine the terms of its independence and a short timetable of one year for the full transfer of power. Thus Mozambican independence was characterised by both a greater degree of self-determination and sovereignty than the majority of post-colonial African states and at the same time considerably less capacity for governance.

1962

A second 'massacre' this time of sugar plantation workers at Xinavane in the south.

The Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FRELIMO) formed (uniting separate nationalist organisations) and held its first congress at which Eduardo Mondlane was elected President.

1963

Strikers in the ports of Lourenço Marques, Beira and Nacala imprisoned. One of the leaders, Paulo Balói died in prison.

In Tanzania FRELIMO founded the Mozambican Institute in Dar-es-Salaam to provide secondary education for young Mozambican nationalists and in Bagamoyo the military training camp to prepare guerrilla fighters.

The first contingents of fighters (amongst them Samora Machel) were sent to Algeria for further military training.

FRELIMO established its first foothold in the north of Mozambique.

1964

The armed struggle was launched in September in the north with some success but attempts to open up other fronts met with setbacks.

The Portuguese authorities had stationed 35,000 troops in Mozambique and with the help of South African, Southern Rhodesian and British police succeeded in preventing the flow of recruits to

FRELIMO in the south, uncovering the underground network and arresting 1500 young sympathisers.

1965

Repression against all manifestations of nationalism was stepped up. Writers such as José Craveirinha and artist Malangatana Valente, condemned and imprisoned.

1968

FRELIMO held its Second Congress at which the ideological battle over the future governance of an independent Mozambique was won by the revolutionaries, led by Eduardo Mondlane.

Salazar suffered a stroke and was succeeded as head of state by Marcello Caetano.

1969

Mondlane was assassinated by a parcel bomb delivered to his headquarters in Dar-es-Salaam. Suspicion fell on both members of one of the minority nationalist groups (whose members were forced to flee) and the PIDE who were almost certainly the instigators.

1970

After an internal power struggle, Samora Machel was elected the next FRELIMO president. He was also the movement's military commander.

1972

FRELIMO now controlled most of the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Niassa and Tete. These 'liberated zones' were essential to the war effort which depended increasingly on their agricultural production to feed the guerrillas and to raise funds from exports. However, this was done collectively. Fighters and activists worked the increased areas of cultivation with the peasant farmers who hosted them. Despite continuous Portuguese air attacks, these were also areas in which FRELIMO evolved and tested new forms of social organisation and strategies for rural development and community education that were to be the starting point for national strategies post-independence.

The Zimbabwean guerrilla movement (ZANLA) began operations against the minority settler regime in Rhodesia from bases in these FRELIMO controlled areas of Mozambique.

1973-4

The war advanced into Manica province where the interior came increasingly under FRELIMO control. Operations continued against the Portuguese hold on Nampula and Zambezia.

1974

A military coup in Portugal by junior officers brought to power a government determined to end the devastating colonial wars by negotiating independence. A transitional government was formed in

Mozambique headed by Joachim Chissano representing FRELIMO and serving as prime minister to prepare for the hand-over of power.

During this year Samora Machel made a triumphal journey from the liberated zones in the north of the country to the capital in the south with the purpose of preparing the population for independence.

1.5 1975-1987 Independence under FRELIMO rule, destabilisation and civil war, economic collapse and humanitarian crisis.

The Independent government formed by FRELIMO came in with a radical and idealistic agenda, forged by its experience of waging a guerrilla war from bases in the rural peasant society (described as 'liberated zones') where they had undertaken social and economic development programmes. As a result, the new government's broad goals and vision of social justice undoubtedly reflected the aspirations of the overwhelming majority of Mozambicans. In searching for ideas and relevant models for that development, the leadership had been drawn to the adoption of a socialist ideology through its links to other liberation movements in Africa and elsewhere, especially in the other Portuguese colonies, as well as intellectual contacts with the underground socialist movement in Portugal. They naturally also looked to the models of socialist development in the independent African countries from which they had launched the independence war, Algeria and Tanzania and to the political-military ideas of leaders of peasant revolutions in Asia such as General Giap in Vietnam and Mao Zedong in China. Ideas came too from Latin American socialism and Freire's pedagogy of the oppressed. FRELIMO when it came to power was therefore essentially a guerrilla movement. That is, although it did have a highly developed political ideology and practical experience of social mobilisation and development at community level it was nevertheless still organised along military lines. It therefore faced the task of both transforming itself and the wider society for civil governance, but under very inauspicious circumstances. On the one hand while pursuing its commitment to establishing civil governance, it had simultaneously to maintain the military capability to defend the country against hostile neighbouring states in the wider context of the Cold War. On the other, the collapse and rapid departure of the colonial administration left virtually nothing in place on which to build such governance either in terms of institutions or of personnel to fill them. The history of the first years of Mozambique's independence is therefore shaped by both ideological and pragmatic decisions and by changes of direction dictated by internal and external pressures as well as genuine dialogue and learning from mistakes.

For example, the nationalisations were a deliberate policy aimed at securing universal access to education, healthcare, housing and use of land for livelihoods and subsistence as basic human rights but taking abandoned industrial and agricultural enterprises into state ownership was an emergency intervention that only occurred when these had been abandoned by their foreign owners.⁶ A belief in the virtues of collective effort and fair distribution led to establishing communal villages and cooperatives but at the same time a conscious effort was made to stimulate the emergence of small businesses by allowing returning migrant workers to repatriate hard currency. The communal villages were welcomed in some areas but resisted in others where it was incompatible with local settlement and farming practice and despite a commitment to change by participation, in practice villagisation was enforced by military governors especially where border defence and control were at stake. Similarly, the police force was purged but not dismantled from fear of disorder, a compromise that perpetuated the culture of brutality prevalent in colonial times. On the other hand the colonial legal system was deemed totally inappropriate and in any case could not be administered in the total absence of qualified lawyers. 'Popular' justice was therefore built from scratch from the bottom up.

1975

Mozambique declared independence on June 25th. Samora Machel was sworn in as President and appointed leading members of the FRELIMO central committee to ministerial portfolios already negotiated during the transitional year. Notably, Chissano became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Graça Simbine (who married Machel after their arrival in Maputo) was nominated Minister of Education.

On July 24th, 'the day of nationalisations' schools, health facilities, rented housing and land were taken into public ownership.⁷

1976

March 8th by Presidential decree, secondary and higher education classes were suspended and students given emergency training before being deployed to fill the teaching gap in primary schools left by departing Portuguese teachers.

⁶ Thus, for example, although the large sugar estates were mostly taken over, the estate in Xinavane in the Province of Maputo remained in private ownership

⁷ Land was nationalised in the sense that its commercial sale and ownership were outlawed while the right to use was enshrined.

Mozambique closed its border with Rhodesia in support of the UN sanctions endorsed by the British government against the illegal Smith regime⁸. With FRELIMO support ZANLA continued to operate out of bases established in Mozambique and growing numbers of refugees from Rhodesia were accommodated.

1977

FRELIMO at its Third Congress, declared itself a Marxist Leninist vanguard party seeking greater support from the USSR, the GDR and Eastern European socialist countries, but also maintaining cooperation with China and Socialist countries in the developing world such as Cuba. Internationally it positioned itself with the Non-Aligned Movement and maintained relations with India and most Western governments, receiving significant aid from the Nordic countries and Italy as well as non-governmental assistance from solidarity organisations in Europe and the Americas.

The Congress affirmed the commitment to expanding access to basic education, health, housing and land use for the whole population as well as the right to participate in governance.

The first national elections were held throughout the country, resulting in the creation of 1,000 local, district and provincial assemblies and the national 'Popular Assembly' on a 'democratic centralist' one party system in which delegates elected at each level, elected delegates to the next level.

MMR later RENAMO was established by the Rhodesian regime in collaboration with former agents of the Portuguese colonial regime and recruited the internal leadership from Mozambican dissidents (some from the ranks of FRELIMO, others associated with the colonial apparatus). Operations began to destabilize the Mozambican state: cross-border air raids and sabotage as well as attacks on the ZANLA bases inside Mozambique.

1978

July 3rd: launch of the first national literacy campaign by President Machel.

ANC operations against apartheid South Africa were also being planned and executed from within southern Mozambique and military figures in the South African government adopted a policy of destabilizing the 'Front Line' African states on its borders in a effort to coerce them into economic cooperation and denial of support for the ANC. Direct commando raids were made over the next years on Mozambican economic infrastructure and terrorist attacks on 'ANC targets' in the

⁸ Britain was later to accept liability for rebuilding key Mozambican infrastructure bombed by the Rhodesian air force. However the Crown Agents charged with these projects were prevented from completing them by the escalation of the war in Mozambique.

Mozambican capital.⁹ Restrictions were also placed on the recruitment of Mozambican migrant workers, though this was resisted by the mining companies.

1979

The Lancaster House Agreement, which ended the war for Zimbabwe, was brokered with the assistance of Mozambique.

The first national meeting of communal villages held in the southern province of Gaza recorded 1000 established villages nationwide.

Meanwhile, the internal war continued in the central provinces of Mozambique, fuelled by peasant resistance to enforcement of the villagisation policy, but still directed by external agents.

The first leader of RENAMO, André Matsangaissa, was killed by government forces and after a violent power struggle, Alfonso Dhlakama became the new leader.

The Land Law was passed abolishing private ownership of land. It removed the right to sell or rent land but established the right of all Mozambicans to work the land, regulating permanent title and other forms of tenure for its use.¹⁰

1980

The first comprehensive census of the national population was successfully carried out.¹¹

Zimbabwe became an independent state after Robert Mugabe won a multi-party election under British and international supervision.

Control of RENAMO was transferred to the South African Defence Force, which began to build up its capability.

The first meeting of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) was held in Maputo to promote regional economic cooperation in response to South African ambitions for economic hegemony.

1981

⁹ As for example the attacks in Matola and Maputo in 1981 (Hanlon, 1986:136-139) or the car bomb which seriously injured the prominent South African lawyer, Albie Sachs (then working for the Mozambican Ministry of Justice) and killed a passing Mozambican civilian in 1988.

¹⁰ In 1992 when the issue of land tenure was debated in the context of the general review of legislation, there was still widespread ignorance of the actual terms of the law, especially amongst rural farmers, the procedures for registration of land holdings and other administrative procedures for implementing the law were totally inadequate. *Extra: a questão de terras* June 1992 CFA Ministry of Agriculture. Nevertheless, the general principle of not allowing the commercialisation of land as a commodity, but conferring and protecting rights to use has been upheld by all parties in parliamentary votes since the end of the civil war.

¹¹ Colonial census data was distorted by the fact that rural populations and illegal migrant workers avoided enumeration to evade the hut tax. The escalation of the war ruled out any repetition until 1997.

The war escalated in the central provinces where the rebels began to target symbols of the government's success: schools and health clinics.

1982

The war spread to the southern provinces, where RENAMO targeted the civilian population (largely pro-FRELIMO) displacing large numbers of people and causing famine. The Nacala and Beira transport corridors from Malawi and Zimbabwe were paralysed, prompting Zimbabwe to send 1,000 troops to secure its access to the Port of Beira.

1983

The Fourth Party Congress of FRELIMO reviewed the first years of independence and the growing crisis in the rural areas calling for significant policy shifts: decentralisation of planning; less emphasis on state-run farms; concentration on family farming and peasant-based development. However, the escalation of the war prevented the general application of these decisions in most areas of the country.

The bill establishing the National Education System (SNE) passed into law.

FRELIMO launched 'Operation Production' to move tens of thousands of urban unemployed to underdeveloped rural areas, mainly in the northern province of Niassa.

By the end of this year tens of thousands of Mozambicans, particularly in the southern province of Inhambane were estimated to have died of famine. Mutilation and other 'punishments' of civilians who were later released as a terror tactic and the kidnapping of 'recruits' (largely children and young people) were adopted by the rebels systematically from this time.¹²

1984

The war was affecting the whole country, seriously threatening the development gains made since independence.

The first moves to negotiate an end to the war were made:

¹² The author (and many other expatriate workers) heard eye-witness accounts on arrival in Maputo in 1983 and subsequently heard similar accounts throughout the country. However, media coverage of these practices was almost non-existent in the early years. Mozambican journalists were reluctant to feed an international stereotype of 'African savagery' and the international media had not yet taken in the extent of the humanitarian disaster unfolding in the country.

The Mozambican government signed the 'Nkomati Non-Aggression Pact' with South Africa¹³ and at the same time tried unsuccessfully to negotiate directly with RENAMO

The Mozambican Christian Council (CCM) set up its Peace and Reconciliation Commission and began to look for openings for dialogue.

The nationwide consultation on family law culminated in the Extraordinary Conference of the OMM (Mozambican Women's organisation), which delegated an advisory committee to assist the drafting of the law.

1985

As the war escalated: RENAMO now held large rural areas (often sparsely populated) under its control, which it 'taxed' to support its military operations, reinstating the colonial methods of enforcement through the 'Regulos' traditional (or often appointed) leaders. This system compensated for the loss of external support. The government meanwhile continued to control the main centres of population and launched a diplomatic round to secure military support.

Zimbabwe increased its troops in Mozambique to 10,000.

1986

Malawi under pressure from the Front Line States, expelled RENAMO forces operating from its territory. Meanwhile the escalation of violence in the Northern provinces, provoked a mass movement of refugees into Malawi.¹⁴ Large numbers of refugees were already being received in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.

The FRELIMO government signed new military agreements with Zimbabwe and Tanzania. Significant military aid continued to be supplied by the Soviet Union and officers from government forces were given British military training in Zimbabwe and at Sandhurst.

Returning from the Front Line States summit, the Presidential plane was decoyed over South Africa where it crashed killing Samora Machel and a large number of government officials and other leading advisors. Proper investigation of the crash was obstructed at the time by the South African government. This and other circumstantial evidence suggests South African complicity, but the

¹³ It was clear that the SADF had no intention of abiding by this agreement. For example, in the southern province of Maputo where the author was working, air drops of armaments increased dramatically in the run up to the signing so that RENAMO operations could continue uninterrupted. After a pause of several months they were resumed. The Chief of Staff of the Mozambican army, Mabote, speaking to a public meeting in the area at the time suggested that the Accord was the 'diplomatic offensive' while the 'military offensive' still had to continue. A year later documents captured in a joint Zimbabwean and Mozambican raid to capture the RENAMO base in Gorongosa, confirmed that SADF, with or without official endorsement by the South African government as a whole, had continued to supply and train RENAMO without interruption.

¹⁴ These movements were often negotiated locally between community leaders in both countries. (Eyewitness accounts from returned refugees to Sofala 1995.)

evidence also suggests that fairly senior Mozambicans in Maputo had to be involved. The truth of the matter has never been ascertained.

The presidency and the leadership of the ruling party passed without challenge to Joaquim Chissano (there had been previous South African attempts on Machel's life and it appears that a contingency plan for such an event was almost certainly already agreed within the Central Committee).

1987

As the economic and humanitarian crisis deepened, Mozambique was ranked as the poorest country in the world and the UN raised US \$330 million in emergency assistance for it.

A joint RENAMO/South African offensive in Zambézia province aimed at dividing the North of the country from the south was repelled by Mozambican government forces supported by Zimbabwean and Tanzanian troops. This was probably the point at which it became clear to both sides that the war could not be won by either side and that the human and economic cost was insupportable.

At this point the government finally introduced its own structural adjustment programme which nevertheless fulfilled the main demands of the IMF and World Bank and satisfied the donors whose assistance had become essential for the survival of the Mozambican population.¹⁵ The immediate consequence was to shift the emphasis from social development and sustaining livelihoods to relief and aid dependence.

1.6 1988-1992 On the road to peace

As the second decade of Mozambique's independence progressed, while the internal humanitarian situation and economic dependence on external assistance became increasingly desperate, the real opportunities for peace were in fact opening up. Not only the general public but the main protagonists and importantly their forces on the ground were looking for a way to end the war. At the same time the external actors who had fuelled the war in pursuit of their own strategic interests withdrew or were neutralised by global political change. Both the end of the Cold War and the negotiations for an end to Apartheid rule in South Africa were significant in creating space for a free dialogue between the Mozambican parties. The humanitarian crisis had also raised the awareness and prompted the engagement of the international community in supporting a settlement.

¹⁵ Mozambique had sought since 1983 to find a middle way between its development strategies (which had produced economic growth up to 1982 and the onset of the war, while devoting a high proportion of GDP to education, health and social programmes) and IMF doctrines. It had been recognised before the death of Machel that they would have to concede most of what the IMF wanted. Hanlon (1991) examines this process and its consequences in detail.

Thus extremely negative conditions of dependence and loss of sovereignty on the one hand combined with greater scope for political self-determination on the other.

1988

The CCM continued its contacts with RENAMO and these were finally publicly endorsed by President Chissano.

Publication of the report by R. Gersony of the US State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programmes (*Summary of Mozambican Refugee Accounts of Principally Conflict-Related Experience in Mozambique. Report submitted to Ambassador Moore and Dr. Chester A. Crocker*) which recorded the scale of atrocities committed against civilians and confirmed that more than 90% were committed by RENAMO forces as a systematic policy. Acts of violence by government forces were by comparison sporadic and isolated incidents.¹⁶ This marked a turning point in US policy leading eventually to support for the negotiations in Rome.

The South African government affirmed its pledge to abide by the Nkomati Accord.

1989

Kenyan and Zimbabwean facilitators set up meetings between the CCM and RENAMO.

The Fifth FRELIMO Congress dropped its designation as a Marxist-Leninist party and opened the way for constitutional reform allowing for political pluralism. A document outlining '12 Principles for Dialogue' was issued as the basis for direct talks with RENAMO.

The final stage in the construction of an independent legal system, which began from 'popular' justice in lay tribunals at community level followed by the training of judges and establishment of Provincial Courts, was completed with the inauguration of the Supreme Court and appointment of a Procurator General.

The collapse of the GDR and reunification of Germany affected many Mozambican students and guest-workers in Germany as well as German technical assistance programmes in Mozambique. After a period of uncertainty, the German Federal government assumed responsibility for the outstanding commitments of the former GDR in respect of Mozambique.¹⁷

1990

The first direct negotiations took place between FRELIMO and RENAMO delegations in Rome. Both parties had independently approached the Sant' Egidio Community asking them to facilitate

¹⁶ This pattern was clearly evident to the author and other foreign personnel, from eyewitness accounts in rural districts in different parts of the country from 1983 onwards. However the Gersony report was based on a large-scale survey of refugees conducted under controlled research conditions.

¹⁷ The subsequent changes in Russia and the break up of the Soviet Union had a less direct impact on the Mozambican population.

the dialogue. They jointly confirmed their common interest in ending the war. The US began from this point to urge Dhlakama to continue to engage in the talks. President Kaunda joined the African heads of state in urging the same.

The draft of a new constitution was first circulated for public discussion and in November adopted by the National Assembly. The reforms included provision for a multi-party political system, an independent judiciary, freedom of the press and a market economy.

In December a partial ceasefire was established with a Joint Verification Committee and authority for the ICRC to carry out humanitarian operations in the whole country.

1991

Successive rounds of talks were interrupted by disengagements and recriminations by both sides until the Mozambican churchmen, expressing the sentiments of the general public accused both sides of prolonging the war and human suffering.

Two protocols were signed establishing mutual political recognition, a role for the UN in monitoring the implementation of the peace accord while giving sole authority to the government to organise the elections. RENAMO was to be free to begin party political activity as soon as the accord was signed.

Drought which had already been affecting the central and southern regions and neighbouring countries continued and increased the pressure to achieve a settlement.

1992

The rounds of talks continued in Rome. International actors pressing Dhlakama to agree to a ceasefire and settlement were joined by 'Tiny' Roland of Lohnro. In the eleventh round of talks France, Portugal, the United Kingdom, the United States and the United Nations were granted observer status.

In May the revised Law of the National Education System (SNE) was passed in the National Assembly. The principal revision was to allow for the creation of non-government (commercial, religious and community) schools to function along side state schools within the overall framework of the national education system.

In August Dhlakama and Chissano met for the first time but talks in Rome later stalled over the composition of the new army. A second meeting, arranged in Botswana by Roland with the support of Robert Mugabe, settled the outstanding issues and the UN was asked for financial support for returning refugees, demobilisation and the formation of the new army.

The General Peace Accord was signed in Rome by both leaders on October 4th.

1.7 1992–2004 Implementing the peace accord: the establishment of political, social and economic pluralism.

Mozambique in the years following the signing of the General Peace Accord has been hailed as an example of successful post-war recovery. On the political front there has been sustained peace and a remarkable transformation from a single party to a multi-party political system, so that three general elections have been held successfully, with only localised incidents of disruption and violence and political conflict is now acted out in the civil arenas of the parliament and the media not on the battlefield. On the economic front there has been sustained economic growth, which has reduced aid dependence. This with negotiated debt relief has provided the basis for implementing recovery and development programmes. However, though the general picture is positive and there is reason to be optimistic for the future, the post-war process has not been free from contradictions and threats to the hard-won peace. The underlying threats to stability have largely been, and still are, related to economic conditions of poverty, debt and economic dependence, resulting from the war but also from global economic developments and financial conditionality. Limited sovereignty over its economic affairs and sudden exposure to the global market economy in the early years after the war increased economic inequality, encouraging rampant (often corrupt) accumulation by a minority in the capital Maputo in the south, while hindering attempts to invest in geographically and socially inclusive development programmes. Greater autonomy has grown as the economy has grown and there is now scope for these imbalances to be addressed, but they are still potentially destabilising.

1992

Following the signing of the General Peace Accord there was immediate disengagement throughout the country. During November and December the joint government and RENAMO Supervisory and Monitoring Commission was set up to oversee the implementation of the Accord.

The UN operation (ONUMOZ) was formally established with a mandate to separate the warring parties, oversee demobilisation and the holding of elections scheduled for October 1993.

When it was clear that ONUMOZ troops were not going to be immediately deployed, RENAMO agreed to the Zimbabwean forces continuing to police the Beira corridor and Malawian troops also remained in the North.

In the days and weeks following the Peace Accord the three-year drought broke and normal rains held out the prospect of getting a harvest. As the ceasefire held, displaced rural populations returned to clear their lands of forest, planting the main maize crop and building houses (often still of a temporary rather than permanent nature).

Humanitarian agencies were also able to operate in the former war-zones for the first time.

A donor conference in Rome pledged US\$ 400 million to support the peace process.

1993

UN peacekeeping forces were not effectively on the ground until April (6 months after the accord).

Zimbabwean and Malawian troops then withdrew and the demobilisation process was initiated.

In the meantime, the ceasefire held and communities gained confidence in re-establishing their activities.¹⁸

RENAMO leaders meanwhile pressed for more financial aid and political concessions, stalling the implementation of the peace process. A UN trust fund was set up to facilitate the transformation of the movement into a political party.

In the light of the slow progress in deploying the ONUMOZ forces and the continuing tensions between the Mozambican parties, the elections were postponed until October 1994.

UNHCR began assisting the return of some 2 million refugees from neighbouring countries.

1994

Elections in South Africa led to majority rule.

Demobilisation of both armies was completed despite numerous incidents of riots, provoked by the slow pace of the process. The new army was also formed during this process. The officer core was easily recruited from both sides in the civil war and successfully integrated, but it proved difficult to recruit enough rank and file soldiers to make up even the greatly reduced numbers envisaged in the peace accord.

The majority of the refugees had returned by the middle of the year, either with UNHCR assistance or on their own initiative. However, not all returned in time to register for the election.

The first multi-party general election was held in Mozambique. A last minute boycott by RENAMO leader Alfonso Dhlakama was skilfully headed off by the UN representative Aldo Ajello backed by members of the diplomatic core and for the most part ignored by RENAMO supporters on the ground. The delay of one year allowed for careful preparation and had in fact ensured a high turnout (5.4 million or at least two thirds of all Mozambicans over 18 years of age) with orderly and peaceful conditions throughout the country. Chissano was re-elected as President with 53.3% of the vote, the RENAMO leader, Dhlakama received 33.73%. FRELIMO was returned as the majority

¹⁸ In the Provinces of Sofala and Manica, many rural communities had used the timber cleared from their land to build school classrooms and were requesting the relocation of teachers so that they could bring their school age children home from the urban areas. (Research carried out for the Provincial Education Directorates in March/April by the author)

party in the national assembly but with only 44.33% of the vote. RENAMO received 37.78% and a third opposition party the Democratic Union, 5.15% (other parties did not gain a big enough share of the vote for representation in parliament). The result was clearly a personal endorsement of Chissano. He nevertheless interpreted the voting pattern as: 'the Mozambican people voted for peace' recognising that many deliberately split their votes, voting for the FRELIMO leader as President but for RENAMO candidates for parliament to ensure that the main protagonists in the war would be obliged to continue to negotiate the governance of the country.¹⁹ 23% of the elected members of the National Assembly were women.

1996

Under pressure from the IMF and World Bank the privatisation of the state owned commercial banks was initiated by the sale of the BCM (Commercial Bank of Mozambique). It took place without proper audit of the existing assets in order, it has been convincingly alleged, to facilitate corrupt appropriation.

At the same time financial observers around the world began to seriously criticize the application of IMF structural adjustment measures in the case of Mozambique. Despite strict adherence to the IMF rules, inflation was not curbed, nor poverty reduced and Mozambican enterprises were being bankrupted and taken over by foreign investors. Mozambican economists began to seriously look for alternative strategies and were increasingly backed by its bi-lateral donors.²⁰

1997

The second national census since independence was successfully carried out in the whole country. The Popular Development Bank (BPD) created post-independence by FRELIMO to assist rural development, was privatised and bought by the Malaysian Southern Bank Berhard in partnership with Investor SARL in a corrupt deal thought to involve President Chissano's son Nyimpine. It was renamed Austral Bank.

1998

The Joint Appraisal (Donor partners and Government of Mozambique) endorsed the Education Sector Strategy Plan.

Municipal elections were held for the first time in a limited number of locations with a very low voter participation.

¹⁹ This was a clearly expressed objective of many voters that the author had contact with at the time. Syngé (1997) also supports this interpretation of the results.

²⁰ A detailed account of this policy debate is given by Hanlon (1996).

1999

Catastrophic flooding following a cyclone affected the southern provinces with greatest severity along the course of the Limpopo, where Xai-Xai the Provincial capital of Gaza and the important rice-growing areas were devastated. This disaster led to a temporary downturn in the economy and reliance on international relief aid.

The second general election was held with a similar turnout and result as the first but marred by local incidents of violence as opposition supporters rioted against the result. In the district of Montepuez opposition violence was met by extreme brutality on the part of the local police. Women increased their share of parliamentary seats to 30%.

2001

Mozambique reached the 'completion point' of the enhanced HIPC debt relief programme, which held out the prospect of funding education and health programmes as key 'poverty reduction' strategies.

The journalist Carlos Cardoso, who had been actively investigating the fraudulent sales of the commercial banks, was assassinated.

2002

Bi-lateral debt cancellation agreements 'in the spirit of HIPC' began to come through: Italy, Britain and OPEC in May, US in June.

2003

After protracted wrangles over the electoral register and functioning of the electoral commission the delayed second municipal elections were held with a slightly increased turnout. RENAMO put up candidates this time and several independent candidates stood especially in Maputo.

Mozambique hosted the African Union Summit at which Chissano took over the chairmanship.

Chissano was due to step down as President of Mozambique, under the terms of the constitution and internal elections were held within FRELIMO from which Armando Guebuza emerged to succeed him as party leader and Presidential candidate.

2004

The third general election was held in December. Guebuza was elected President and FRELIMO gained a third electoral victory with an increased majority, due mainly to a lower turnout of RENAMO supporters rather than an increase in the FRELIMO vote.

APPENDIX 2

SAMPLING

The Sampling Strategy

The sampling strategy was based on a combination of two concepts for a quota sampling approach. Firstly, Paul Thompson's 'stratified community sample, in which the aim is not to secure a mirror of its broad distributions, but to ensure the representation of all significant social layers within it' (2000, 151). Secondly Pawson and Tilley's three institutional levels: 'policy maker, practitioner and participant' (2001, 209). In this way the education sector was viewed both in its community aspect as a social institution with different layers of participation and as the formal organisational structure of the Ministry with its different levels of responsibility and functions:

- policy makers : senior management of the MINED
- practitioners: education management staff and teaching staff
- participants: former pupils and students (all those interviewed at the other levels fall into this category) and parents.

In operational terms this involved selecting quota samples (covering for example, age, gender, war experience, geographical location) from each of these levels. There was however, one limitation on the representativeness of the sample. The author, decided not to attempt interviews with non-Portuguese speaking populations in the rural areas, both from lack of knowledge of local languages and culture and the risk of bias from the use of interpreters.

The Choice of Provincial Settings

I had from the start intended (on the basis of well documented historical, ethnic, political and economic differences) to select one northern and one southern province. Nampula., was an obvious candidate from the start in view of its underdevelopment in relation to potential and status as the capital of the north. A review of new data in the *Statistical Yearbook 2001* and the *National Human Development Report 2000* as well as its recent political history confirmed its suitability (see below). My initial choice in the South was a comparable large agricultural province, Gaza. However, it was the province most badly affected by the floods and probably overwhelmed with outsiders doing research or base-line surveys for projects etc. As I began to understand, from conversations, literature, press, statistical data etc., the enormous imbalance in economic development that has opened up between the metropolitan area and the rest of the country, I began to consider working in

the metropolitan area, and its hinterland in the Province of Maputo. I tested these suggestions in preliminary discussions with the Director of Planning who thought the reasoning was sound for both provinces and that each had excellent staff who could support the project. Conveniently, one of the directors was a woman and one a man. There was an additional practical advantage in working in both the City and Province of Maputo. It meant that I could combine it with continuing work with MINED staff and donor representatives.

Analysis of the two Provincial settings¹

NAMPULA

The principal northern province.

A large geographical area (82,606 Km²).

The most densely populated rural province (41 per Km²) with the second largest total population (3,337,000). The majority of the population are Macua, the largest ethnic group in the country, but concentrated in the north.

Mainly rural (54.8% of GDP from Agriculture) and very fertile (one of the Provinces with a grain surplus in 2003 (AIM report) but also includes the country's 'third city'.

Per capita GDP (\$159) is less than but approaching the national average of \$204

Human poverty index (1997 census) at 63.0 is above the national average of 55.9

HDI (human development index) in 1999 (third lowest) was below but also close to the national average.

HDI includes educational indicators which are the second lowest in the country due to very low female participation and low adult literacy:

- children in school 22.3% (16.6% of girls) below the national average of 31.4% (25.8%)
- illiteracy of adults 71.7% (national average 60.5%)
- illiteracy of women 85.9% (national average 74.1%)

The North has historically always had lower indices of school attendance especially of girls than the South. In the past the gap was much greater, hence the greater imbalance in the adult population.

¹ Statistical data from the National Institute of Statistics in two publications *Statistical Yearbook 2001* (INE) and *Mozambique Education and human development: Trajectory, lessons and challenges for the 21st century*. National Human Development Report 2000 UNDP
Electoral history: de Tollenaere, M. 2002 ' Democracia e eleições em Moçambique. Teoria e prática' in *10 Anos de Paz* B. Mazula ed. Imprensa Universitária (Maputo)

Politics: in the first two post-war elections the Province was divided and several districts switched parties from one election to the next, but RENAMO maintains a majority (de Tollenaere, 2002).

MAPUTO PROVINCE

The most southerly rural province and the smallest geographical area (25,058 Km²)

Includes the industrial city of Matola (part of the Maputo conurbation)

The second smallest total population (969,000) but a higher than average density (37 per Km²).

Made up of mainly Changane (majority ethnic group in the south) and Ronga (a related people, the original inhabitants of Maputo)

Per capita GDP (\$230) is the highest provincial GDP. Although it is historically a developed agricultural area only 11.8% of GDP is from that source and only 10.8 % from industry. Construction, transport and communications and commerce are the main earners (i.e. part of the metropolitan economy).

Human poverty index is the second lowest after Maputo City at 36.0

It also has the second highest HDI after the City and 40% above the national average with high levels of education and adult literacy:

- children in school 51.1% (47.7% of girls)
- illiteracy of adults 34.3%
- illiteracy of women 45.9%

Greater access to education in the South dates from the colonial period. Despite a narrowing of the gap post-independence, the influence of the metropolitan area continues to maintain the advantage.

Maputo compared to the other provinces is an exceptional case in terms of GDP and HDI since the other provinces are grouped around the average on these indicators.

Politics: in both post-independence elections 100% FRELIMO candidates returned.

MAPUTO CITY

The capital and administratively, a separate Province, but economically and culturally the City and the rural Province are closely interlinked.

The smallest geographical area (300 Km²) Urban with some peripheral 'green zones' producing food crops (1.1% GDP).

Third smallest population (1,031,000), highest density (3438 per Km²). As the capital city it has a very mixed population. Ronga and Changane are the biggest groups followed by groups from Inhambane, another southern province.

Highest per capita GDP (\$ 1,137) (includes instances of extreme wealth).

Commerce contributes 31.1%, construction 20.7%, industry 18.9%.

Human poverty index 17.1, less than half the national average.

Highest HDI with high scores on all indicators but especially the educational ones:

- children in school 61.7% (58.6% of girls)
- illiteracy of adults 15%
- illiteracy of women 22.6% (men only 7% due to urban migration of male workers?)

Politics: in both post independence elections returned 100% FRELIMO candidates.

The quota sample interviewed

Category A policymakers/dirigentes 5

Category B education managers/técnicos 14

Category C teaching staff/docentes 18

Category D parent representatives/mães e pais de turma 7

MINED

National Director of Planning (the standard interview in two sessions and an additional final interview with additional questions) (A, male, mid forties)

National Director of Basic Education (A, male, mid forties)

National Director of Secondary Education (A, female, mid forties)

Head of School Management, Secondary Education (B, male, mid forties)

Responsible for Adult Education Media (radio programmes, newspaper) (B, female, mid forties)

Directorate of Education – Maputo Province

Provincial Director (A, female, early fifties)

Head of the Pedagogical Department (B, male, early forties)

Supervisor of Distance Education for Teachers (B, female, late thirties)

Head of School Management (B, male, early fifties)

District of Matola – Maputo Province

District Director (B, male, early forties)

Primary teacher (C, male, mid forties)

Emergency primary teacher (C, female, mid twenties)

Primary teacher (C, female, late forties)

Primary school head (C, female, early fifties)

Secondary school head (C, male, mid thirties)

Secondary school deputy head (C, female, late thirties)

Secondary teacher (C, male, late thirties)

Secondary teacher (C, female, late twenties)

Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, male, mid fifties)

Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, female, forty)

Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, male fifty)

Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, female, late twenties)

Parent/responsible adult for secondary pupil (D, male, late forties)

Directorate of Education – City (Province) of Maputo

Provincial Director (A, male, mid forties)

Head of Personnel Department (B, female, early forties)

Responsible for School Management (B, male, forty)

Head of Secondary and Pre-University School (B, male, mid forties)

Deputy Pedagogical Director (B, female, late thirties)

Pre-university Teacher (B, male, late fifties)

Directorate of Education – Province of Nampula

(Interview with the director rescheduled twice, but proved impossible. Deputy seriously ill in hospital)

Head of Personnel Department (B, male, late thirties)

Head of Planning Department (B, male, early forties)

Responsible in the Personnel Department (B, female, mid thirties)

Responsible for Primary Education (B, male, late forties)

Responsible for Adult Literacy (B, male, forty)

(Rural) District of Nampula

District Director (B, female, mid forties)

Primary school head (C, male, mid thirties)

Primary teacher (C, male, late twenties)

Primary teacher contracted while training (C, female, early twenties)

Primary teacher (C, male, early thirties)

Parent of primary school pupil (D, male, late thirties)

City of Nampula

Secondary school head (C, male, early forties)

Secondary contracted teacher (C, male, early forties)

Secondary contracted teacher (C, male, mid thirties)

Parent Representative (President of the Parents Association) (D, male, early fifties)

Validity/representativeness of the sample.

Parents (Category D)

The sample was selected on an ad hoc basis and as such was not representative. It was not representative of all levels of schools (all but one were secondary), more parents were interviewed in the south and only one rural parent was interviewed. All the urban parents were elected representatives of parent associations. As those chosen by other parents, and willing, to represent them, they can be expected to be both more educated and more interested in education than average. The rural parent was also untypical as he could speak Portuguese. As explained, the rural population was

The age and gender representation was the same as in the education personnel sample:

Age: minimum 27 (sister of pupil) maximum 55. The same range and similar average (44) as the education personnel. Female representation (28%) is also the same.

Education Personnel (Categories A, B, C.)

Occupations and types of institution

One gap in relation to the sampling plan was a missed interview with a pre-university teacher in Nampula, otherwise the different levels and occupations were successfully sampled.

North/South Representation

The failure to interview the Nampula Provincial Director did not seriously affect the validity of the sample. He was recently appointed there from Maputo and had the same educational background as the Director of the City of Maputo who was interviewed (Diplom graduate in the GDR).

Otherwise the sampling was representative as planned.

Rural/Urban Representation

The sample covered one rural and one urban primary school. It would have been interesting to also compare a secondary school in a rural district in the north with the one in an urban district in the south. However since it was only practicable to visit two schools of each type, comparing two schools in the urban periphery of a Northern and a Southern city was also useful.

The author also felt that the under-representation of teachers presently serving in rural schools was not significant for the analysis of the historical periods because from her experience of working with them over many years, she was aware that they belong to the same core social group as those interviewed, many of whom also spent much of their working life in rural areas. However, not obtaining a their perspective on the contemporary context was a lacuna.

Age

For category A and the quota of school directors, no age criteria were applied. In all other cases (B and C) the researcher asked school heads and provincial directors (or those acting for them), if possible to invite mainly those with longer careers but also some younger people. In the south this was successful in achieving quite a balanced sample. In the north, less so.

All categories:

Age range: minimum: 23, maximum 57.

The groups with administrative responsibility were on average older than the simple teachers. This is not surprising, as the usual route to these jobs was via an established teaching career.

Category A: Average age 46 (minimum 43).

Category B: Average age 42 (minimum 35).

Category C: Average age 38 (minimum 23). But the average age of heads and deputies: 41.

Gender

Overall f/m ratio: 14:23. That is, women made up 60% of the sample.

Ratio in North: 3:10 (30%) (Categories B and C).

Ratio in South: 9:10 (90%) (Categories B and C).

Category A: 2:3 (67%).

In putting the quota sample together all those involved were aware of the need to include at least a representative number of women in the sample. In the south this was not a problem and they appear in the different categories in numbers more or less consistent or in excess of their numbers in different levels of the institutions: more women than men (3:1) in primary teaching, 50% in secondary and pre-university, 3:5 in group B and 2: 3 in group A. In the north, DPE staff made conscious efforts to include women but had to admit there were few in the B category. In fact interviewing 2:4 was an over-representation. The district director was probably the only woman in that post and while she insisted there were more women teachers in the particular primary school selected, data on female participation in education in the province suggest that (more by accident than design) the sample (1:6 or 14 % female) did at least reflect the gender ratio in the province.

In 1998 the percentages of serving female teachers in the three provinces (Derived from annual statistical tables in MINED, July 1998 *Estatística da Educação. Levantamento Escolar 1998.*) were as follows:

City of Maputo:

Level 1 primary: 60%

Level 2 primary: 35%

Level 1 secondary: 24%

Level 2 secondary: 30% (two schools)

Province of Maputo:

Level 1 primary: 47%

Level 2 primary: 23%

Level 1 secondary: 9%

Level 2 secondary: 12% (one school)

Province of Nampula:

Level 1 primary: 13%

Level 2 primary: 13%

Level 1 secondary: 15%

Level 2 secondary: 13% (one school)

The percentage of women training to be teachers, however was much higher: 52% in Nampula and 65% in Maputo Province in training colleges for first level primary; 19% in Nampula, 28% in Maputo Province and 58% in Maputo City in IMAPs for second level (MINED statistical tables as above) while women graduates from the UP were 29% of the total by 1996 (Walker, B. 1998, *Mainstreaming Gender in the Education Sector Strategic Plan 1997-2001* MINED pp.9) so the proportion of women teachers must now be somewhat higher even allowing for higher drop-out rates for women. In the same year women made up 34.5% of MINED staff and 6.02% in the DPEs, while at the top management level the percentage was 23% (Walker op.cit.) but again efforts have since been made at all levels of the administration to appoint women when this is possible.

Use of additional Mozambican key informants (key persons, former colleagues, etc.)

The author took advantage of as many additional contacts as possible with Mozambican key informants, some of whom are from the same groups as the quota sample. The reasoning was that this, combined with study of secondary literature and data, would enhance understanding and ability to interpret the results of the quota study. They included current and former national directors, academics and education staff. Most were engaged in conversation about the research but the former National Director of International Cooperation gave an informal interview.

Donor representatives

Formal Interviews:

Education Programmes Coordinator SIDA Mozambique

Director British Council Mozambique

Health and Education Advisor DFID Mozambique

Informal discussions:

Regional Education Advisor, SIDA (Southern Africa)

Information Manager, British Council, Mozambique.

Advisors on HIV/AIDS public education campaigns and District Administration Capacity Building (GAS, Nampula - Swedish NGO)

APPENDIX 3.

BRITISH COUNCIL SCHOLARSHIPS

Analysis of data from the British Council Archive in Maputo.

Total individuals assisted 1983-2003: 907

1983-1989 BC based in Harare. Set up in Maputo in 1989.

End of 1989: collapse of DDR and other socialist scholarship schemes coming to an end.

Total students assisted: 272

Women: 109 = 40% (but see types of courses)

Men: 161

Unspecified: 2

Courses:

Duration/level by gender

Short	80 women	46 men	2 unspecified
Certificate/diploma	4 women	34 men	
Professional non-qual.	5 women	17 men	
HND///advanced prof.	2 women	4 men	
Bachelor Degree	1 woman	5 men	
Post-graduate. (most PG diploma or Masters)	17 women	55 men (1PhD)	

Categories

N.B. Distribution determined by requests from Mozambican institutions (and individuals) through donor partners (especially British FO and ODA) based on CB needs assessment, assessment of relevance of professional training offered and availability from other donors, but also British funding policies (ODA and Foreign Office). (see funding sources analysis)

In this period 50% of courses were English Language Training related (direct training outnumbered teacher training by about 4 to 1)

English Language training: as preparation for other study in UK; special purposes such as secretarial or banking: **112**

English Language Teacher Training: 25 (18%)

Education: none before 1988 (see importance of DDR in the 19980s for education development)
Also coming in at a specialist level: Masters/Advanced diploma and short course on distance learning: **5**

Health: advanced nursing/nursing education; surgery; medical specialism; health management; primary health care; public/environmental health: **22**

Food and Agriculture: agronomy, plant science, veterinary science, fisheries, agricultural economics, beekeeping, remote sensing for crop monitoring etc.: **15**

Information systems and technology: telecommunication, computer sciences, IT, aeronautical information systems etc.: **9**

Media: radio broadcasting, news reporting, journalism: **8**

Management: business and finance, transport (especially ports and railways see British aid for rehabilitation of Ports): **24**

Engineering and technology: civil, electrical, low cost technology, textiles, transport, water, marine, chemical, mining and mineral resources exploitation: **16**

Policy research, development and planning: development studies, economics, policy research, national resource management etc.: **13**

Law, diplomacy, politics: 3

Language: linguistics/language studies; translation and interpretation: **18**

Military: 1

Location of Courses:

Institutions in the UK: 67%

Regional: 33% (89 studentships mostly short professional)

Harare: English and secretarial skills: 70 women and 11 men

University of Zimbabwe: BA in Shona. 1 man

Tanzania: Beekeeping course 2 men (and undated) 1 woman.

Zambia: course on rural water supply 2 men

SADC (various) Railway maintenance courses: 3 men

Officer training (location unspecified but probably at least partly regional) 1 man.

1990-1992 Period of preparation for post-war recovery.

Total students assisted: 247 (a large number in a short time - also coinciding with return of graduates from socialist countries- both significant for post-war recovery)

Women: 71 = 29%

Men: 148

Unspecified: 28

Courses:

Duration/level

Short	50 women	52 men	28 unspecified
Certificate/diploma	7 women	22 men	
Professional non-qual.	2 women	12 men	
HND/Advanced prof.	0 women	3 men	
Bachelors degree	1 woman	27 men	
Post-graduate	11 women	32 men	

Categories:

48% English language training related (direct training and training for teaching English in similar proportions)

English language training: 63

English language teacher training : 56

Education: 6 (2 BEds and one diploma - i.e. basic higher ed.)

Health: 15

Food and Agriculture: 14

Information systems/tech.: 3

Media: 0

Management: 32 (port and transport still major part - e.g. short courses by Portia Liverpool)

Engineering: 19

Policy/planning: 5

Language: 3

Law/diplomacy/politics: 0

Applied sciences: 1

Location of courses:

UK institutions: about 2 thirds as before

Includes 2 women taking distance MSc from Wye college (i.e. actually done in country)

Regional: about one third (28%)

Harare (ELT) 32 women, 12 men, 20 unspecified

Kenya (ELT) 1 woman

"various port authorities" probably SADC and UK 1 man.

1993-2003 10 years of peace

Total students assisted: 360 (proportionately less - greater internal provision using national resources?)

Women: 66 = 18% (reason for drastic difference? More opportunities in country for ELT and basic professional? The proportion of PG students is slightly higher)

Men: 269

Unspecified: 25

Generally lower numbers of students : due to increased higher ed. provision in Mozambican institutions?

Courses:**Duration/level**

Short	10 women	63 men	16 unspecified
Certificate/diploma	2 women	11 men	
Professional non-qual.	3 women	13 men	
HND/Advanced prof.	2 women	0 men	2 unspecified
Bachelor degree	7 women	57 men	2 unspecified
Brazilian Licenciatura	2 women	9 men	
Post graduate	32 women	111 men	4 unspecified
PhD	3 women	5 men	1 unspecified

Categories:

- English language training related 18% . Majority (65%) now for teacher training and management of ELT and only a minority for direct training. Result of development of in-country language training through the Language Institute (BC institutional development project) and returning TEFEL graduates to improve English teaching in schools and staff private language schools etc.
- Big increase in bachelor degrees and in education courses - replacing DDR provision? More Mozambicans with pre-university qualification?
- Health virtually stopped - other donor support?

English language training: 23**English language teaching: 43****Education: (BEd, Masters, special courses on curriculum and distance learning) 36****Agriculture and food: 43****Health: 1 (psychiatry)****Information systems/ tech. : 9****Media: 6****Management: 46****Engineering: 37****Policy/planning: 31****Language: 2**

Applied science: 2

Social sciences: (sociology, anthropology, history, social work) 10

Environment: (environmental sciences, and management) 14

Location:

UK Institutions: 83%

Including Wye College distance degrees: BSc 1 man, MSc 5 men.

Regional: 4%

Malawi: short, 2 men

Zimbabwe: short, 2 men, 2 unsp.

South Africa: (1995) MSc 2 men

Zambia: MSc 1 man

Kenya: short, 1 man, diploma, 1 man

Bank of Mauritius: short, 2 men

Other external: 6%

Brazil: Advanced prof. 1 woman, Bachelor degrees 4 men, licenciatura 2 women 9 men, masters 1 unsp.

New Zealand: MSc 1 man

New Zealand/Bangor UK MSc 1 man

Dublin: short 1 man.

In-country: 7%

Short courses mainly management and professional for CFM and ports particularly. 11 men 13 unsp.

BEng. (aeronautical) 1 man (distance? or part distance?)

Unrecorded dates:

Total students assisted between 1983 and 2003: 28

Women: 6

Men: 19

Unspecified; 3

Courses:

Duration/level

Short	1 woman	11 men	
Certificate/diploma	2 women	0	1 unspecified
professional non-qual.	0	6 men	
bachelor degree	2 women	3 men	
Brazilian licenciatura	0	1 man	2 unspecified
Post graduate	1 woman	7 men	

Categories:

English language training: 2

English language teaching: 1

Education: 1

Agriculture and food: 8

Health: 2

Information systems/tec.: 1

Management: 8

Engineering: 5

Policy/planning: 4

Environment: 1

Locations:

Majority at UK institutions: including: Wye college distance MSc 1 woman and 2 men

Others:

Tanzania: beekeeping course 1 woman (almost certainly with the others in the 1980s)

In country: short 1 man

Brazil: licenciatura (see above) 3

FUNDING

British Government funding (64%) :

1983-1985 All scholarships awarded by ODA

1986 -1989 TCT and ODA awards

1989-2003 ODA/DFID, TCT, Chevening, Hornby and BC awards

British Council is listed as the funding body for all **ODA, TCT, Hornby** and own **BC** awards, although the funding comes from the overseas development budget.

It also funded scholarships awarded through **Mozambican institutions: Language Institute, ISP, MINED, SETEP** but all of these were connected with the development of English Language teaching, which was a BC project.

SADC awards were mostly funded by **BC** but 2 listed as **CFT** (see below)

British High Commission is listed as the funding body for **Chevening** scholarships, which are Foreign Office funded and awarded on direct application of individuals.

Other funding (36%):

Listed as **CFT** - i.e cash transfer by 'clients' of **BC** - and was presumably donated by the organisations awarding the scholarships from their own funds or other sources. (All these awards except a short language course funded by the British NGO Christian Aid in 1987 were awarded from 1992 onwards.)

The funding bodies include:

Mozambican state institutions:

CFM (state-owned company)

Ministries (Planning and Finance, Commerce)

Donors, UN Agencies, Banks.

There were also two cases of individuals transferring their own funding.

SCHOLARSHIP AWARDING BODIES.

Note: some short course awards were for groups

British Awards:

Award	Number/dates	Types
Chevening	35: 1989-2000	Mixed disciplines some indication of concern for governance. Mostly post grad. one PhD. A number of short courses for advanced journalism and radio broadcasting (BBC)
Hornby	2: 1997, 1998	TESOL

ODA (later DFID)	180: 1983-1989 124: 1990-1992 130: 1993-2000 9: undated	mixed disciplines and duration; English Language courses and teacher training predominate
TCT	70: 1986-1999	mixed disciplines, all types of duration/level
British Council	8: 1987- 1997	ELT related 50% and mixed subjects; higher and post-grad., short professional.

Other Scholarship Awarding Bodies

Category	Awarding Agent	Number/dates	Types
Banks	ADB	1 -1998	Post-grad. Agriculture.
	World Bank	2: 1994, 1996	Post-grad. management, marine engineering
Bi-lateral Donors	DANIDA	2: 1996, 1997	Post-grad. agriculture
	FINNIDA	1- 1993	Post-grad. agriculture
	NORAD	17: 1993-1997	Higher Ed. Post-grad. PhD. fisheries related and mixed.
	SIDA (ASDI)	2: 1993, 1999	Post-grad., diploma. economics
	Sweden	2 ?	professional non-qual. agriculture
Companies/corporate	CFM	10: 1992-2002	short courses with Portia, Liverpool. BScs Brazil
	Beira Corridor	1 - 1995	professional non-qual. transport management
International Agencies	SADC	9: 1988-1996	short courses, Portia for port development; Licen. Brazil social work, development studies
	UNDP (PNUD)	1-1991	ELT
	UNICEF	3: 1994-1996	MEds (see 15 in interview notes at Exeter)
Mozambican Institutions	Escola Nautica	1- 1995	Post-grad. marine science
	Fundo de Fomento Pesqueiro	1- 1998	Post.grad. development finance
	Instituto de Linguas	2: 1994, 1995	BEd for ELT
	ISP	2: 1994	Post-grad. for ELT
	STEP (SETEP?)	2: 1994, 2003	Post-grad. for ELT
Ministries	MIC (Industry & com.)	1-1992	ELT
	MINED	3: 1992-1996	Post-grad. Bachelors, professional non-qual. for ELT
	Min. Fin. Plan	1- 1998	BEng aeronautical
NGOs/Foundations	Christian Aid	1-1987	ELT
	Ford	7: 1993-1995	most post-grad. inc. PhD, diploma. politics, int. studies, development

			finance
	Ottobenecke	1-1995	BA design
?	Satim (Finland)	1- 1998	Post-grad. ed./dev
Private		2: 1997	BSc business economics. Dip. development studies

53 other awards are unattributed.

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