

**Ideologised Foreign Policy and the Pragmatic Rationale: The
Case of Algeria under Houari Boumedienne, 1965-1978.**

Submitted in accordance with the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

By

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Dedication

I dedicate this work to my lovely parents, Mohamed and Zohra Kesseiri.

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Abstract

The role of ideology in foreign policy making and implementation has been a subject of study by international relations specialists, especially during the period of the Cold War. The study of Algerian foreign policy under President Houari Boumedienne rule (1965-1978) makes a good case study because of the particular role that ideology played in the making and implementation of foreign policy during this period. Other studies on Algeria's foreign policy have not directly addressed ideology and pragmatism as themes. The majority of these studies covered only parts or aspects of this period, not taking it as a subject of their total focus.

This study investigates the role ideology has played in the making and implementation of Algeria's foreign policy under President Houari Boumedienne's regime (1965-1978). It assesses the factors behind the ideological stances of the regime as well as the underlying causes behind the pragmatic foreign policy postures that the leadership adopted at that time.

The study is divided into nine chapters. Chapter one presents a critical review of literature and outlines the research methodology adopted. Chapter two traces the historical background of the pre-Boumediennist era. Chapter three concentrates on the study of the state-level of analysis, it focuses on the domestic aspects of the Algerian decision-making process and seeks to give an account of the ideological influences on Algeria's economic policy. Chapter four looks into President Houari Boumedienne's policy-making process towards the Maghrib. Chapter five is devoted to Algeria's position on inter-Arab politics, including the Palestinian Question. Chapter six is a thorough analysis of Algeria's oil diplomacy. Chapters seven and eight examine Algeria's interaction with the Third World and its posture between East and West, respectively. The last chapter provides us with an insight into the impact of ideology on Boumedienne himself and on his decision making. This study believes that President Houari Boumedienne's ideological proclamations and pragmatic motivations were blurred. Although some policy actions appeared to be ideologically motivated, they were, in fact, taken because they were considered to be in the best interest of the state and the regime in power.

The study is based on a documentary analysis of available material in Arabic, French and English. This has been supplemented with a number of interviews with personalities who were close to President Houari Boumedienne.

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PART ONE:

Historical and Conceptual Perspectives.

PART ONE:

Historical and Conceptual Perspectives.

Introduction

This thesis explores the role of ideology in the making of Algerian foreign policy under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership. It explores the extent to which Algeria's actual foreign policy behaviour (during this period) was well characterised by a pragmatic outlook, and what opportunities and constraints ideology provided for Algeria's foreign policy.

After 132 years of colonial rule [1830-1962], Algeria gained independence after seven and a half years of a bloody War of Independence. The first leadership to be established in the country was that of President Ahmed Ben Bella.

Soon after independence in 1962, Algeria inherited a heavy burden. With the colonialists driven away from the territory, the country urgently needed new infrastructures. Algeria was not only destroyed but had no specific policy or leading structure. It required a strong leadership that would help it recover from the damage caused by war at all levels; economic, cultural and educational. Robert Malley affirmed that "Colonialism was a messy business: on its tail came economic dislocation and upheaval, rural pauperisation, the privatisation of land, forced resettlement, and anarchic urbanization."¹

Further exacerbating the situation was the acute conflict over power and the dilemma surrounding the role of both of the "Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne" (GPRA), led by Mohamed Khider, and the political bureau, headed by Ben Bella. Ensuring the support of the army during this acute crisis over power, Ben Bella was the man who led the country and tried to put it back on its feet after independence. Ben Bella was one of the founding members of the "Organisation Spéciale" (OS), which pledged to fight colonialism by all means. Ben Bella had always been an influential member in the War of Independence. He was in charge of a team for external affairs during the conflict and the internationalisation of the Algerian problem. In 1962, Ben Bella emerged from the chaos to lead independent Algeria and he formed a heterogeneous coalition, led by himself.² This opinion was contradicted by Mohamed Bouzidi, who portrayed the alliance which allowed Ben Bella to become Premier in September 1962 to be "lacking homogeneity."³ In July 1962, the political bureau of the FLN was established, with Ben Bella, as mentioned by Jackson, as "the head of general administration and liaison with the Provisional Executive, the ostensible caretaker government."⁴ Concurrently, on 29 September, Ben Bella became the first chief head of Government, then Secretary General of the FLN and president of the republic on 16 April 1963. President Houari Boumedienne's era was important in the politics of Algeria, including its foreign policy post-independence in 1962. The period that preceded it, under Ahmed Ben Bella (1962-1965), was a transitional period of adjustment after independence was achieved, during which the foreign policy structures were still in their emerging state. In all fairness, the

revolutionary readjustment marked a turning point in Algeria's politics, at the national and international levels. It initiated a genuine initiative to accomplish economic independence and rid social differences within society. A more different foreign policy orientation with some ideological colouring began to be adopted under Boumedienne, with domestic and foreign relations tones. Also, during Boumedienne's period, one would notice that the ideological discourse became more crystallised. Moreover, Boumedienne's period was followed by that of Chadli Bendjadid, where a departure from ideology and a move towards economic and political liberalisation began to take place. This indicates that Boumedienne's period could be studied on its own as a period where the ideological influence had been felt at both the domestic and foreign policy levels. Under President Houari Boumedienne's rule, Algeria enjoyed stability and prosperity. The Algerian leader allowed the state to avoid complete bankruptcy and started off an economic, scientific and social revival. As often claimed by himself and by most policy analysts, his foreign policy was the expression of his national policy.

Interest in Algeria's foreign policy derives from the fact that Algeria is an important developing country, having played a leading role in African and Non-Alignment organisations, as well as OPEC. Studying the foreign policy of a developing country like Algeria would help to shed light on the experience developing countries encounter in the making and implementation of foreign policy. Among the difficult experiences such countries have is the lack of adequate institutional structures for the formulation of foreign policy. Algeria is also a good example for studying the intricate and subtle link between ideologised and pragmatic aspects of foreign policy.

We have decided to concentrate this study on one particular period in Algeria's history, that of Houari Boumedienne (from 1965-1978), because of the particular role that ideology played in the making and implementation of foreign policy during this time, and the controversy that arose regarding the ideological orientation of this regime. This made Houari Boumedienne's period distinctly different from those preceding and following it. By focusing on this defined period, one would be able also to undertake an in-depth study into the various factors and developments that were connected with ideological and pragmatic foreign policy moves of the regime.

Although the role of ideology is regarded to have been gradually declining since the end of the Cold War, with the projected "end of history" and the conclusive termination of the ideological rivalry between the superpowers, ideology still plays an important role in the policy of states at the regional level as manifested in the upsurge of nationalism and Political Islam. There has been a great deal of writing on the role of ideology in foreign policy, whether on the global or regional levels and it is in this context that this thesis is attempting to make a modest contribution to this debate.

The major aim of this study is to decipher Algeria's foreign policy making process under President Houari Boumedienne's regime (1965-1978). It also intends to understand the real

reasons behind the ideological stances of the regime and the motivations and reasons that ushered pragmatic foreign policy postures at the same time. In other words, despite the ideological overtures of the Boumedienne regime, as manifested in the Constitution, the Party Charter and the public proclamation of leading state officials, there was a considerable degree of pragmatism based on the calculations of the national interest, displayed in Algeria's dealings with the outside world under the Boumedienne regime. In the context of achieving this aim, we shall investigate the research question cited in the literature review.

We hope to lift the ambiguity and rid the increasing polemic over Boumedienne's foreign policy orientations and actions. This makes the undertaking of such a study necessary so as to uncover the determining factors behind President Houari Boumedienne's policy making process and ideological motivations. The study focuses on the classic foreign policy analysis approach of James Roseneau who identified a series of levels of analysis that are those of the system, the state and the individual. The study is divided into four parts. Part one focuses on historical and conceptual perspectives and comprises two chapters. Chapter one includes a critical review of literature of major works done on ideology and Algerian foreign policy. It also looks at the major factors that influence the making of foreign policy and sets a clear research question to guide our assessment. Chapter two provides a historical background of the pre-Boumedienne era and sheds light on the context within which President Houari Boumedienne became leader. It also highlights the roots and origins of post-independent Algeria's politics under President Houari Boumedienne's regime. Part two comprises chapter three which provides a study of the state-level of analysis. It focuses on the domestic aspects of the Algerian decision-making process and seeks to give an account of the ideological influences on Algeria's domestic policies. Part three is concerned with the international system as a level of analysis; it looks into ideology and pragmatism in Algerian foreign policy actions and it comprises five chapters. Chapter four looks into President Houari Boumedienne's policy making process towards the Maghrib, and attempts to uncover the real stances behind Algeria's policy actions. It attempts to shed light on the role of geopolitics and national interest in Algeria's Maghribi policy. Chapter five is devoted to Algeria's position on inter-Arab politics, including the Palestinian Question. The chapter examines the combined ideological and national interest oriented actions undertaken by the Algerian leadership. Chapter six is a thorough analysis of Algeria's oil diplomacy. It aims at shedding light on the coherent mixture between ideology and pragmatism and shows how ideology could justify pragmatic actions. Chapters seven and eight examine Algeria's interaction with the Third World and its posture between East and West, respectively. Finally, part four includes chapter nine which provides the individual level of analysis. This outlines the ideological influences on President Houari Boumedienne's policy-making process.

This study believes that President Houari Boumedienne's rule portrayed a rationalized foreign policy, the main concern of which was Algeria's national interest. In an attempt to achieve the state's high interest, ideological proclamations and pragmatic motivations were blurred as were

some policy actions, which appeared to be ideologically motivated. These were, in fact, taken because they were considered to be in the best interest of the state and the regime in power.

We have made use of the available literature in Arabic, French and English, utilising some unpublished material on the subject in these languages. These have been supplemented with a number of interviews with personalities who were close to President Boumedienne.

Notes:

¹ Robert Malley, The Call from Algeria: Third Worldism, Revolution, and the Turn to Islam (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1996), 19.

² William Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria, 1954-1968 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: M. I. T. Press: 1969), 204.

³ Mohamed Bouzidi. Algeria's Policy towards France: 1962-1972. PhD thesis, University of Denver, Colorado 1972, 98.

⁴ Henry F. Jackson, The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), 67.

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NUMBERING

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Chapter One

Foreign Policy and the Role of Ideology: A critical review of literature.

In this review of literature, we shall assess the state of academic scholarship pertaining to the general area of our concern and provide a broader theoretical context in which to place the subject matter of our study.

We shall examine the role of major factors in the making of foreign policy and provide a critical appraisal of the way ideology has been perceived to impact on foreign policy making and implementation, leading us to the stipulation of a research question that would guide our analysis in subsequent chapters. We shall then shed light on the methodology followed in this thesis.

1. Major Factors in the Making of Foreign Policy:

We shall now assess the major factors influencing the making and implementation of foreign policy. Wallace indicated that “The foreign policy-making process therefore displays a number of necessary, if not ideal, characteristics”¹. He elaborated by mentioning that a policy maker needed to be aware of what is relevant to his country’s concern by considering some selective criteria and interpreting the incoming information according to his nation’s values and beliefs. Besides the fact that countries differ in their geographic, social, economic and political features, one should be aware of the interference of such elements in the policy making process.² In other words, foreign policy making is organised within a conceptual framework and a practical one. And certainly, there are some factors that are permanent, which would not change radically, but there are some others that would rather change over time, such as population and capabilities. We shall classify these factors as Constants and Variables.

1.1 The Making of Foreign Policy and the Domestic Environment:

1.1.1 - Constants:

i - The Conceptual framework and the bureaucratic needs.

It is important to bear in mind that decision makers overlook different alternatives before reaching the one they describe as compelling. As a matter of fact, what should be taken into account in the political arena is the way politicians perceive reality, the way they assess situations. Their own understanding of a situation would influence the course of action they decide to undertake. This would clearly serve their interests and would take into consideration historical, economic and social components. However, as Holsti indicated, reality often differs

from the policy makers' images of reality, as a result of physical impediments to the flow of information owing to the lack of time, faulty communications, censorship, or lack of competent advisers or intelligence sources, or because of beliefs, values, attitudes or faulty expectations.³

Furthermore, it is usually a difference in attitudes, beliefs or values that leads to a discrepancy in the interpretation of reality, considering that attitudes reflect the type of relationship between states. Whether it was a hostile, friendly, trustworthy or dangerous relationship, state leaders would have to evaluate their counterpart intentions before taking any actions. In such cases, material facts are not enough, especially if the intentions are not clear. It would be advisable, hence, to gauge what the other parts next move will be.

Attitudes are, in a way, the outcome of our values and beliefs. They are regarded as a justification for any decision or action undertaken by politicians. Values could be anything ranging between civil liberties, self-determination, independence or even socialist values against imperialism.

Consequently, actions serving the values of a nation are always welcomed by both the nation itself and the state leader.

Along with attitudes, beliefs are often reflected in a country's foreign policy. In fact, decision makers would often base their choices on their beliefs. Although beliefs are supposed to be true, it is not always the case. Beliefs do not always conform with reality.

Generally speaking, doctrines are a selection of beliefs that draw lines for policy makers. Drawn together in a framework, they are known as ideologies. Ideologies are a set of ideas that draw lines for policy makers by setting goals, and even by justifying foreign policy choices and decisions. Ideas, as described by Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane:

“serve the purpose of guiding behavior under conditions of uncertainty by stipulating causal patterns or by providing compelling ethical or moral motivations for actions.”⁴

In politics, other similar situations are often referred to in order to solve current crises. In other words, policy makers tend to analyse a problematic situation by referring it to an analogous previous event, with the purpose of defining and undertaking a course of action to resolve it. In addition to that, Holsti suggested personality as an elusive concept in the making of foreign policy. He believed that policy making skills, and character and pathological traits significantly affect the type of actions taken in various policy-making situations. Indeed, what could make the difference are characteristics such as tolerance or intolerance and the capacity to work under pressure.⁵

Policy makers also need to consider what is bureaucratically feasible. Kissinger described the bureaucratic-pragmatic style of policy making as a response to situations and as passive towards the environment. Problems are segmented into elements that are dealt with by experts and recommendations are made according to traditions and biased governmental agencies. He explained that:

“Because pragmatism is based on the conviction that the context of events produces a situation, there is a tendency to await developments. The belief is prevalent that every problem will yield if attacked with sufficient energy.”⁶

However, in case of sudden crisis, decision makers might omit the bureaucratic process, as there is not enough time to go into details and analysis.

Although one could argue that such factors could vary with time, there would still be a similar motive that would act as a strong driving force of the nation. As a matter of fact, Algeria's foreign policy under Boumedienne's legacy was to serve values of national independence, cooperation and national identity whilst conforming with beliefs such as “Algeria for the Algerians.” Boumedienne's perception of reality did, in a way, help with an international restructuring of Algeria.

ii - Geographical features:

In foreign policy, the geography of a state is a very significant factor of permanent importance. In a sense, the geopolitical location of a state makes it the subject of the conquest of other states. That is to say that great powers are very interested in having indirect footholds in countries that enjoy great geopolitical locations. This would increase their political influences and hence enable them to gain more power in the political arena. Furthermore, some geographical features have a great impact on the socio-economic development of the country. This might influence the conduct of foreign policy. From another point of view, countries that seem to be isolated geographically tend to undertake a rather biased foreign policy, especially bearing in mind the fact that state leaders are driven by the intention of meeting national needs. For example, the United Kingdom has been rather reluctant to join Europe in the use of single currency. It has been argued that one would expect a continental nation state with vulnerable boundaries and a strategic location either to develop an offensive strategy (such as seeking more secure boundaries or acquiring buffer zones) or to gain the protection of a more powerful and mobile nation-state.⁷

On the other hand, climate forecast is greatly influenced by the geographical location, knowing that a prosperous agriculture develops, thanks to convenient weather, a fact that contributes to shaping and defining the economy of the country.

With respect to Algeria, geography was important in the colonial relationship with France. Being relatively close, France was incited to franchify Algeria⁸ and to gain a special status over the Sahara,⁹ especially given that the Sahara was seen as an African bridge. This is not to mention the fertile littoral that is behind Algeria's richest agricultural products.

iii - Topographical features :

Being a permanent characteristic, the surface of a country plays an important role in the international arena. It constitutes an incentive for invasions whilst simultaneously paving a way for an appropriate distribution of military bases within the country as a defensive system. It is over this surface that natural resources stretch, and it is according to the topography of a state that the appropriateness of a specific military action could be concluded. In this context, Morgenthau claimed that:

“In order to make a nuclear threat credible, a nation requires a territory large enough to dispense its industrial and population centres as well as its nuclear installations. The conjunction between the large radius of nuclear destruction and the relatively small size of their territories imposes a severe handicap upon the ability of traditional nation states, such as Great Britain and France, to make a nuclear threat credible.”¹⁰

1.1.2 - Variables:

i - Population and social structure.

The population and social structure of a country are factors that are continuously changing. Apparently, both social needs and structures correlate in a way that the resources of a country, including its population and its geographic features, would in general define its social needs. In fact, it is only through the topography of a country, joined to its geographical spot and distribution of power, that development could take place. These factors are all interrelated and they could be of great importance in the outline of military and defence systems. In other words, economic success is relevant to the distribution of resources and to the geographic characteristics that might shape the agricultural field, which in turn, is linked relatively to the economy of a country. More importantly, the economic situation of a country defines its ability to face any emerging crisis or conflict. The population of a country defines its size; the larger the state, the greater its population and the more powerful it is seen as, when compared with smaller states. It has been shown, through different studies, that “gross population size is one of the major marks of a great power.”¹¹

In fact, large countries seem to participate in numerous international fields in that they tend to be more involved in the political life than small countries. To put it another way, large states are often more powerful, hence they have more goals and interests. States with large populations need to have superior capabilities in order to be seen as stronger and more powerful, “the larger the state, the more power, and the more power, the more diverse its goals. The more interests it has to extend or protect, the more likely it is to become involved in conflict.”¹² This means that social resources help to define the social needs of a nation along with other national attributes; they outline the objectives and interests of a country. Accordingly, national attributes operate in a way that affects the amount of resources a nation has and its ability to utilise these resources in various ways.¹³ This will, hence, contribute to the formulation of foreign policy.

Algeria's social structure and population are great incentives, attracting colonisers. Not only was it the source of fundamental raw materials that were lacking in France, but it was also a source of manpower. Hundreds of Algerians immigrated to France in search for jobs, a factor that helped France's economy. It was, thus, very important for Algeria to re-establish social integration after the independence. Witnessing an increasing young population, the main concern was to educate it. Houari Boumedienne undertook the nationalisation of national resources, a process that affected Algeria's foreign policy. One of these main resources was hydrocarbons. Also, the Algerian authorities attempted to involve the population in building the Algerian economy.

ii - Social needs.

Foreign policies are often formulated to meet the country's interests in general, and the nation's needs in particular. The social needs of the nation are often satisfied through foreign exchange or interaction. In most cases, some countries cannot insure such needs from within their own territories; they often resort to other countries. That is to say that the only way to guarantee the satisfaction of such needs would be, in many cases, by building bridges with other states. This could only be processed through a sound foreign policy that would try to link with the interests of the countries involved.

Algeria's political orientations under Boumedienne's legacy had to meet the needs of the nation. The only way Houari Boumedienne could have done that was through the nationalisation of natural resources, which had impacted on the French-Algerian relationship in particular, and on its foreign policy behaviour with the rest of the world.

iii -Domestic instability.

Although it has not been strongly supported, domestic instability is usually regarded as a source of foreign conflict. In other words, it is often thought that politicians tend to create international conflicts in order to cope with internal problems.

In the view of Henry Kissinger, many leaders of the new nations make use of foreign policy to escape intractable internal difficulties and use it as a device to guarantee domestic cohesion.¹⁴

This could easily be applied to Algeria's relations with the West during Boumedienne's period as well as in modern time. In the case of Algeria, one could decipher President Houari Boumedienne's anti-imperialist foreign policy as an approach to unify the nation in an anti-imperialist struggle. In fact, one can regard the strong anti-imperialist positions adopted by Algeria under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership, as a masquerade to shade away internal dissatisfaction and instability. Let us consider the wave of nationalisations undertaken by Algeria and which culminated in the nationalisation of oil in 1971. Let us also remember the successful Non-Alignment conference held in Algiers from the 5 to 9 September 1973, which paved the way for the call for a New International Economic Order. At this event, President

Houari Boumedienne strongly defended Third World countries' rights and condemned imperialism. This series of Anti-imperialist efforts could be interpreted by policy analysts as a way for President Houari Boumedienne to create a diversion from internal unease and tension by defending ideological positions that were supported by the nation. As a matter of fact, the fall of 1971 had witnessed increasing social tensions which coincided with a shortage in some everyday life consumer products. These social tensions seemed to be in the view of Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, fabricated tensions. Symptoms of domestic instability in Algeria started to emerge and became more flagrant following the unsuccessful attempted coup in December 1967, and the failure of the assassination attempt on President Houari Boumedienne in April 1968. Accordingly, these circumstances were wisely counterbalanced with strong attitudes in the international arena that brought the Algerians together in their condemnation of Zionism under President Houari Boumedienne's famous moto in which he supported Palestine, no matter the circumstances: "nahnu ma'a falesteen, dhālima aw madhlūma." Algerian foreign policy was also characterised with a distinguished strong attitude with regards to the war of June 1967 and radical anti-imperialist measures.

iv - The Country's leadership and the level of development.

It is generally agreed that authoritarian regimes are more likely to undertake high risk decisions, regardless, sometimes, of their orientations and objectives, as a result of the limitations of policy making process to some high officials.¹⁵ There is often a correlation between the rise of conflict at the international level and the type of leadership. In fact, dictatorships often lead to internal crisis that would generate general sedition at the international level and in many cases provoke the retrieval of foreign bodies within states, whereas democratic states are rather pacific. Closed states, as opposed to open states, proved to be more prone to provoke international conflicts. As for development, developed states are more involved in international politics than developing ones. Developing countries seem to be rather involved in their own problems, trying to withstand the impediments and obstacles that their economies face. Developing countries seem to undertake a more aggressive foreign policy, trying, therefore, to overcome some of their shortages in different fields.¹⁶

Houari Boumedienne was determined to upgrade the Algerian standard. To do that, he went through a restructuring of the whole economic policy. By giving importance to the hydrocarbon sector and industrialisation, and by nationalising Algeria's resources, he managed to strengthen Algeria's economy in a short period of time. This allowed Algeria to gain an advanced position at the international level.

During his presidency, the country was run by two main institutions, the policy making institution, which included twenty six members, most of whom were military, and the executive body. Although this did not mean that Boumedienne was not authoritarian, he managed to boost

the economy by choosing an appropriate foreign policy.

v - Public opinion.

How could public opinion influence the making of foreign policy? In fact, public opinion is seldom considered in the process of policy making. However, if confronted with public pressure, and being convinced of their position towards a specific issue, policy makers would rather attempt to convince the population of their sound decision.¹⁷

Clearly, developed countries give more importance to public opinion than developing countries.

vi - Military capabilities.

One of the most important factors in the making of foreign policy is military capability, as it determines the strength of a country or its weakness. It points out the ability of a country to enter a war and win it, or to be rather reluctant to be part in any kind of conflict. Foreign policy is then structured, partly with regard to the military vessel. Either the country is weak and it needs to opt for a co-operative foreign policy or it is strong enough to set its own rules.

Boumedienne devoted a special interest in forming a well trained army for the sake of defending the country against any outside dangers. It was totally different from the army formed before the independence, which was mainly composed of peasants and labourers.¹⁸

It is worth mentioning, however, that some studies, comparing the relation between public policy outputs and political and economic characteristics, showed that political variables, such as party competition and voter turnout constitute a less important element in the understanding of policy outcome than socio-economic variables.¹⁹

1.2 The External Environment:

Given the fact that foreign policy is a response to outsider circumstances, policy makers need to take into account some salient regional and international factors in the formulation of their policies. To put it another way, the policy-making process is very intricate and complex. It not only takes into consideration the internal environment, but also needs to consider the circumstances and conditions of emerging situations. In doing so, decision makers need to be quite clear about what the other state's objectives and types of behaviour are. Any decision is in essence the result of specific orientations and objectives. To illustrate, Saddam Hussein was concerned about any recurrence of widespread Shi'a riots that would encourage Kurdish secessionists to embark again on an armed struggle, that would, hence, lead to a devastating civil war. Iraq intended to fully destroy the source from which all his problems stemmed, that was the Khomeini Regime. This partly explains the invasion of Iran.²⁰

Furthermore, it is of a paramount importance to adapt foreign policy to the international system, whether to its economic or cultural aspects, especially in a changing world that witnesses continuous alteration. The structure of the international system plays an important role in the

making of foreign policy. From an economic point of view, states are continuously affected by changing economic conditions, which urge them to be more willing to be flexible in their foreign policy with the economic structure. For example, Third World countries are in a long lasting struggle to keep the pace with economic changes. Amazingly, their dependence on the developed world to fulfil their needs makes strong countries prone to turn such situations to their advantage, giving poor countries no choice but to respond in accordance with what the internal environment could provide. Similarly, power in the international system could be of great importance, as it calls for more cordial and co-operative policies with the leading states. Joseph Frankel affirmed that power is a factor that allows the country to be aware of its limit within the system. New circumstances require new rules of behaviour.²¹ Seemingly, changes in the international system could affect the orientations and objectives of a country, although it has its own values and beliefs. With the fall of the communist empire, the bipolar system faded away, which resulted in a change in the balance of power and hence a change of foreign policy. Shahram Chubin and Charles Tripp highlight Saddam Hussein's determination to shape Iraq's political system in a way to suit the Iraqi state interests, even if this meant restoring relations with the United States.²²

Algeria concentrated on defending its national interests by defending its national identity and rejecting all kinds of intervention. It was an active member in different institutions. Algeria was fighting against underdevelopment and economic exploitation. It set its foreign policy orientation in a way to meet these criteria.

2. The Role of Ideology in the Making and Implementation of Foreign Policy:

Our main purpose in this section is to discuss the role of ideology in the making of foreign policy from the point of view of policy makers. Several writers have discussed this role from various perspectives and there have been different view points on each of these factors regarding the way they have effects on the making of foreign policy. However, prior to that we shall investigate the meaning of ideology and attempt to give a definition to the term.

It is very difficult to attribute one meaning or usage to the term of ideology, considering the different competing connotations the term has accumulated. It hence becomes most necessary to investigate the roots of the word and the development of its different usages, to try to account for the environment within which it developed, so as to understand not only its linguistic usage but also its conceptual use and the semantic meaning it acquired. In this respect, Carlsnaes believes that: "the germane question is not in the first instance what semantic meaning the usage of a term has acquired, but rather: why were certain concepts formed when they were formed, and for what purpose are they still being used today?"²³

The first use of the term ideology goes back to the eighteenth century. Kellner mentioned that:

"ideology was used to describe a "science of ideas" that would analyse the origins, nature and social functions of ideas. The concept was influenced by the Enlightenment Project of

providing a rational foundation for human knowledge and analysing the source and nature of error and delusion. De Tracy followed the Enlightenment programme of seeking, through reason, liberation from the yoke of prejudice, false beliefs and superstition, and he thought that this “putifying of the mind” would make possible a rational social order. Hence, the concept of ideology developed from the enlightenment attack on the existing feudal powers and a product of the bourgeois revolution movement.”²⁴

From another perspective, Bell introduced a different view of ideology. He insists that the usage of ideology: “is not just of ‘ideology’ as denoting any ‘belief system’, but a special complex of ideas and passions that arose in the nineteenth century.”²⁵

More arguments explicated that ideology seems to have surfaced when, in an age of modernisation and the spread of literacy, masses were being mobilised for the support of movements and policies in Europe, approximately in time with the French Revolution.²⁶

The concept, however, was given a new dimension with K. Mannheim’s publication “ideology and utopia” in 1936 where he stipulated that: “Every real decision (such as one’s evaluation of other persons or how society should be organised) implies a judgement concerning good evil.”²⁷

Furthermore, several new perceptions of ideology emerged to conceptualise ideology to some extent. Ideology was believed to be a cognitive system that enables people to distinguish their world and to organise their attitudes towards various issues. Bell defined ideology as “the conversion of ideas into social levers.”²⁸ It was also defined as: “a type of goal orientation, a special aspect of the teleology that is characteristic of all human action.”²⁹

Bearing in mind that beliefs are the constitutive elements of an ideology, it is important to know that there are three kinds of beliefs in an ideology that help define a situation and mould the course of action to follow in a given event. These beliefs are: the assumptions, the values and the goals. Elinor Scarbrough insisted that:

“It is these beliefs, therefore, that constitute the very heart of an ideology, providing a steady core to the system of beliefs and enabling actors to find their way despite the flux of everyday events.”³⁰

Elinor Scarbrough went further by explaining that these kind of beliefs set out the forms of conduct that ought to be esteemed within the domain of action and in keeping with the goals of the ideology. In other words, the values of an ideology predicate its moral character.³¹

From another perspective, scholars spoke of a different set of beliefs in every ideology. First, there are political beliefs which identify how the political system of a state should be organised. These also include the external relations of the state and its picture of the world. Secondly, an ideology contains social beliefs which outline the major lines on which a society should be constructed. Finally there are economic beliefs which identify the sort of economic system to be established. These economic beliefs also provide a picture of a state’s external economic relationships.³²

In short, the term ideology tends to be attributed to a set of ideas, beliefs, doctrines, theories, or philosophies. Kellner emphasised that:

“There is no argument over what ideology is, and the concept itself has become elusive booty of competing schools of social thought seeking to capture ‘ideology’ for their own purposes’.³³

Nonetheless, one of the roles that has been discussed by writers is the extent to which information channelled to policy makers is affected by ideological interpretations. Information is a set of databases given to policy makers, in order to help them formulate a policy decision or take further actions. Information is essential in describing a specific situation; hence, it is the starting point from which decisions are made and later implemented. Yet, policy makers often take into account certain considerations in the conduct and implementation of foreign policy. These considerations are convictions and beliefs, which in turn represent ideological beliefs. In fact, ideology is the only factor in the making of foreign policy that contributes to shaping policy makers’ ways of thinking and images of the political life. This argument has also been made by Andrew Heywood, who explained that political ideas help to shape the nature of the political system.³⁴

Carlsnaes described the oldest usage of ideology and argues that the foreign policy of a state is essentially an expression of its peculiar ideology.³⁵ That is true, especially if we observe that information is basically interpreted and analysed by policy makers in accordance with their beliefs and perceptions. In other words, ideology is a filter through which information is being processed and then classified with respect to the image projected by ideology. In this respect, Holsti identified it as a framework through which reality is observed, and he explained that: “Messages and cues from the external environment are given meaning, or interpreted, within the categories, predictions, and definitions provided by doctrines comprising the ideology.”³⁶

That is to say that events and information forwarded to policy makers are databases that need to be fitted within policy-makers beliefs. In fact, as Carlsnaes indicated, ideology in such cases produces its own meaning from given information and it could be compared to a common political language.³⁷

Nevertheless, interpreting information or evidence could only be right within the sphere or environment in which reality is perceived.

Moreover, when processing information at first hand, policy makers use their own knowledge. In fact, it is the earliest stage in processing information.

Writers suggest that an information-processing perspective may be a useful theoretical approach in order to explain the actual cognitive process in the making of foreign policy.³⁸

From another perspective, in a crisis, policy makers tend to engage in an information search, and are more receptive to new ideas.³⁹ They are prone to interpret new databases and direct the outcomes in a way to suit their perceptions and images of reality. If policy makers see reality through their ideology, then it is rather natural to think that any information interpreted within

an ideological framework would, in return, be flavoured according to the accompanying principles and beliefs.

Conversely, policy makers tend, in some cases, not to abide by their values for the sake of specific interests or priorities. They tend to formulate policies regardless of the effects that such decisions might have on many values. Jervis argued that policy makers tend to alter their earlier beliefs and establish new ones so that as many reasons as possible support their choices.⁴⁰ In such cases, it is right to think that policy makers flavour information, by creating some sort of new values and beliefs in order to support their causes. It is, therefore, another way to colour information given to its people to suit the national interest and with the motive of strengthening its foreign policy,⁴¹ or allowing the policy makers to take certain actions they wish to take. In short, every ideology has its own picture of the world. Each vision constitutes an intellectual framework through which information is processed accordingly.

In addition, not only ideology shapes the way policy makers understand reality and events in the political arena. It also constitutes an ultimate way of justifying the ends and means of foreign policy, both domestically and externally.

Purnell strongly defended the idea that:

“In any case ideologies influence policy, and at the level of international relations has an effect on foreign policy and the style in which it is pursued. The nature and the degree of that effect in a given case provide an important problem in the analysis of state behaviour in the international system.”⁴²

Therefore it seems that ideology not only influences foreign policy but also the whole political dynamics of a country.

In the whole process of policy making, politicians are driven by goals and interests that motivate their actions. That is to say that policy makers tend to reach certain decisions and undertake a specific course of action so that they meet their expectations, serve their interests, and satisfy their preferences. In essence, the conduct of foreign policy is a process that intends to fulfil the decision makers' goals and objectives. Nevertheless, policy makers are careful not to explicitly reveal their goals and objectives. To do so, there is no better alternative than ideological choices and preferences as the ultimate coverage for any political actions or decisions.

In his work on ideologies, Heywood described ideologies as “simply ‘window dressing’ used to conceal the deeper realities of political life.”⁴³ That is to say that political ideologies are not only an inspiration for policy makers to take actions, but they constitute a veil behind which actions and decisions are justified. In Morgenthau's point of view:

“The actor on the political scene cannot help ‘playing an act’ by concealing the true nature of his political actions behind the mask of a political ideology.”⁴⁴

From this perspective, one can perceive ideology as a smoke screen utilised by policy makers to

make their actions acceptable by their domestic audiences. Politicians tend to cover up their political decisions and preferences behind political ideologies and principles. For instance, when Hitler came into power in Germany in 1933 and launched an anti-Semitic war against what he called inferior races, he claimed fighting for the sake of a “pure race”, while his major and only concern was to gain power over other nations.

It is in this light that Rosenberg referred to the competitive nature of the Soviet-American relationship since the Second World War. Each bloc was aiming at serving economic and national interests. Rosenberg stated that:

“The quest for national advantage and for a limitation of the kind of disadvantage that could be imposed by the antagonist way is justified by ideology.”⁴⁵

As Carlsnaes indicated, the explanatory framework attributed to ideology is regarded as a logical framework restricted to the conceptualisation of foreign policy actions. He argued that: “It, so to speak, ‘freezes’ reality in the categories for purposes of scientific analysis.”⁴⁶ For Holsti, ideologies serve as rationalisations and justifications for the choice of more specific foreign policy decisions.⁴⁷

In this context, Morgenthau suggests that the immediate goal of political actions is power.⁴⁸ Politicians’ aspirations for power urge them to take certain decisions and adopt a specific course of actions in the conduct of foreign policy, so that they reach their ends. Though policy makers are never explicit about their objectives, they would claim ethical principals and biological necessities behind any taken decision or would invoke security and national interest.⁴⁹

In some respect, what happened in 1962, when the Soviet Union placed missiles in Cuba, might help us understand the use of ideology as a justification. In fact, by placing missiles in Cuba, able to reach the United States, the Soviet Union was attempting to reduce any likely threats that it might have to face, giving the imbalance of power, especially given the United States advanced nuclear power.⁵⁰

This approach however, is the result of deep analysis and research made by analysts. The Soviet Union would have never declared such facts. In fact, most analysts approach any events in political life by analysing the objectives of the states, pleading that large actions are the outcome of large goals and that, when conducting a policy, whether foreign or domestic, state leaders tend to be rational and consistent in their choices in order to meet specific goals in specific situations. However, theorists argue that inconsistency is rather tolerated in order to maximise gain and minimise loss.⁵¹

As Allison and Zelikow indicated, before embarking on any policy conduct or making decisions, policy makers need to be aware of the goals and outcomes they want to end up with, as the final decision needs to correspond with their preferences. Their choices are, however, limited by the resulting outcomes.⁵² This shows that ideology would not lead us to the core reason and motives that drive policy makers. The pure justification would only result from a

deep analysis of the objectives and goals, by writers and observers.

The policy makers' main concern is to achieve their goals; ideology is used to ease the implementation of their decision *vis-à-vis* their own nation and others.

Consequently, one could argue that power is what lies beneath ideologies. Analysts view politics as a continuous fight for power. Ideologies, according to Morgenthau, render involvement in that contest for power psychologically and morally acceptable to the actors and their audience.⁵³ For Heywood, ideology is a manifestation of power.⁵⁴

In short, ideology is often a mere pretext that makes the conduct of foreign policy more explainable and justifiable.

However, the controversy lies in the "dual functions of ideas" in the political life, which Checkel referred to. He explained that ideologies are not only beliefs and convictions that constitute the environment within which foreign policy is formulated, thus forming the framework that define objectives and set targets, but they also tend to be a justification for policy makers' ends and means. He also questioned whether ideas are mere tools of convenience to legitimise an interest-based policy change or any changes in preferences and interests. He further asserted that the world of policy making needs to be accepted for what it is, a place where ideas have both cognitive and political impact.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, ideology is also a way of legitimising the regime or leadership in power; in other words, it gives the regime a legitimate and legal status within the political arena; state leaders or policy makers are allowed, in the name of ideological principles, to undertake certain actions even if these sanctions are considered to be immoral. Policy makers could, in this way, claim that their actions are a mere legitimate implementation of ideological beliefs and principles. In this context, Heywood stated that ideology is an officially sanctioned set of ideas used to legitimise a political system or regime.⁵⁶

In fact, ideology makes policy makers' aspirations to power an inherent right. It legitimises the type of regime or leadership followed by state leaders or policy makers. That is to say that state leaders achieve their goals by adopting a political system or regime that is supported by an ideology which renders the system legitimate.

Ideology contributes to the strengthening of a statesman's position. Leaders often appeal to ideologies so as to gain popular support and guarantee the satisfaction of the masses. Ideologies become, henceforth, the most adequate justification for decision makers' policies considering their mass appeal. Accordingly, Morgenthau highlighted the necessity for any nation to formulate a clear ideology so as to avoid great problems while formulating its policies in the international arena. For Morgenthau the abstract principles, circulating within a nation become ideological justifications as soon as they are needed to justify certain actions by decision makers in legal terms, in order to be more acceptable.

He suggested that:

“The nation that dispensed with ideologies and frankly stated that it wanted power and would, therefore, oppose similar aspirations of other nations, would at once find itself at a great and perhaps decisive disadvantage in the struggle for power”⁵⁷

All different ideologies, whether they were imperialistic or were ideologies of conservatism, liberalism or socialism, in essence, serve the corresponding regimes. They all strive to convince the general opinion that such system or leadership is nothing but a fulfilment of legitimate beliefs and values. Morgenthau referred to colonial imperialism as “frequently been disguised by ideological slogans of this kind, such as ‘the blessings of western civilisation’.”⁵⁸

Such slogans could explain how colonisation was justified and hence, was viewed as a legitimate process, and was even needed for the good of the colonies. Furthermore, Morgenthau talked about ideologies of imperialism that legitimise it on the grounds of biological reasons such as overpopulation. He posited the ideology of overpopulation which was popular in Germany, Italy and Japan before the Second World War. The Germans are “people without space,” they need living space, otherwise they must suffocate. They would starve if they do not get resources or raw materials.⁵⁹ Indeed, this kind of ideology was used as a way to disguise imperialistic goals and perceive them as moral and legitimate rights. More strikingly, a policy of the Status Quo is recognised to be legitimate, since it has a certain moral legitimacy by virtue of its existence.⁶⁰ Heywood indicated that ideologies: “take the form of broad political movements, engaged in popular mobilisation and the struggle for power.”⁶¹ He stressed the crucial role played by ideologies in upholding the prevailing power structure and portraying it as fair, naturally rightful or whatever.⁶² This is to show how important and elemental ideologies are to policy makers, and to the whole political system in order to prove the rightfulness of their actions and decisions. It appears that ideology, as described by Carlsnaes, is a manipulating power.⁶³ This manipulating power is used to make people believe that policy makers are actors who abide by the law and respect the international system.

From another perspective, Holsti shed light on the Marxist-Leninists legitimate claim to power in the world. He explained that Communist theoreticians maintained that Marxism-Leninism was all powerful because it was correct. Capitalism was immoral in conformity with Marxist doctrines criteria because it was an obstacle to human progress. “Any technique used to fight capitalism or imperialism is *ipso facto* moral and justified.”⁶⁴ This portrays communism as an ideology that claims objectivity, morality and correctness. This is another way to see how ideologies legitimise leaders and regimes’ objectives. Jonsson spoke of a legitimating function of ideology, which he describes as a mixed bag of functions.⁶⁵ Krasner argued that political ideas are tightly connected with interests and power; he points out that the driving force behind the elimination of feudal institutions was material not ideal: changes in the nature of military technology and the growth of trade, which systematically favoured states that could take

advantage of siege guns and elaborates defences, and organise and protect long distance commerce.⁶⁶ This shows that ideology serves power and national interest the majority of the time.

To illustrate, Burks explained the importance of ideology in having held the East European System together, He indicated that:

“The current veto power of the USSR is in part rooted in the commonly held official ideology, precisely because the disappearance of one regime would endanger the existence of the others, particularly if this renunciation were demonstrably voluntary.”⁶⁷

That is to say that the process of seeking power, in most cases, is the main motive behind leadership and political regimes, although it is usually not explicitly declared.

However, the search for the gaining of power is made legitimate thanks to the use of ideologies, which once again, is only a pretext to legitimise either power or any other kind of objective.

On the other hand, ideological influence on foreign policy is limited when there is a conflict between the national interest and the ideologically perceived goals and means. In this case, a move towards pragmatism in foreign policy is usually expected.

It is scarcely surprising to notice that the realm of politics revolves around interest-oriented actions and decisions, especially when policy makers' aspirations to power are prioritised. In fact state leaders, in the conduct of foreign policy, ought to adopt a rather interest-oriented trajectory despite ideological principles and values. Such a *modus operandi* is known to be pragmatic. Accordingly, ideology is sporadically sacrificed on the ground that it does not serve the national interest and above all, it may jeopardise the pursuit of power by policy makers. The point is that there would always be a payoff culminating in policy makers' rational and pragmatic behaviour. In summation, pragmatism in foreign policy is behaviour that permits state leaders to achieve sensible and practical outcomes, thus avoiding staggering results if they were to be ideologically stubborn. Decision-makers are most of the time aware of their priorities and are experienced enough to be able to assess any given situations and perceive the likely consequences of adopting a given strategy. Consequently, it is easier for them to accommodate their foreign policy behaviour within their expectation by being pragmatic rather than ideological. In this respect, Jerrold Green asserted that foreign policy specialists admit the importance of ideology in the political life, although they concurrently strive to realise its rare dominance and difficult role, a fact that emphasises the need for both ideology and pragmatism to coexist.⁶⁸

On a given issue like the post colonial French-Algerian relationship, Algeria's ideological mainstream was to free itself from the heavy burden of colonialism not only geographically, but also economically, socially and politically.

Algeria claimed self-determination among other values. This did not however stop Algeria from co-operating with France post-independence. Actually, while Algeria needed France's help and assistance to liberate itself from the heavy colonial legacy, France enjoyed the safeguard of French energy resources.⁶⁹ Such a conduct in foreign policy is described as pragmatic. In essence, Algeria did not stay faithful to its ideological principles of self-reliance and independence when accepting the help of an ex-coloniser. In fact, France had always had a patronising attitude towards Algeria having been a colonial power there. Despite Algeria's preaching against colonialism, President Boumedienne's undertaking was meant to meet the country's needs and expectations, which at that time, were to eliminate all the impediments that might hamper progress and development. Obviously, even after independence, Algeria could not manage without the help of France.

Similarly, co-operation took place between the US and Algeria in the petrol and gas sectors under Boumedienne's regime, to such a degree that the President had to publicly explain (by early 1971), the rationale for such a relationship with the biggest imperialist power.⁷⁰ Why would Algeria co-operate with an imperialist power, when it is itself, an anti-imperialist state, promoting changes in the international system and prone to fulfil socialist changes. In fact, the only explanation that would justify such behaviour was the necessity for Algeria to build good relations with a big power that might be helpful for Algeria's economic and cultural programmes. Furthermore, the country needed to use its resources in order to boost its economy. John Ruedy described the Algerian foreign policy conduct as being characterised by a degree of pragmatism and by a seriousness of purpose and business that won the nation's respect even from states with which it had many differences.⁷¹ The above-mentioned examples demonstrate how pragmatic and ideologically blind state leaders could be when interests are their main concerns, and how decision-makers aspirations to serve the national interest were of paramount importance. Another example was provided by the Iranian foreign policy under the Khomeini leadership and after his death. This has been described as pragmatic, serving Iran's interest and turning a blind eye to some ideological principles. What one should bear in mind is that Iran was considered to be an Islamic Republic that adopted Islamic ideology. In such circumstances, it would thus be controversial to nurture whatever kind of ties, and interchange with a non-Muslim state, especially America, which is regarded as the prime opponent. Iran also gradually improved ties with the Soviet Union, signing economic agreements and organising high level meetings with only one tangible benefit, that being to revive and promote its economy.⁷² Such conduct in foreign policy proved Iran to be highly pragmatic, at least in its international policy and secured a place for Iran in the international arena.

Besides, Iranian pragmatism did not stop at its Soviet relationship, for it dealt with the US the way no-one would have expected, with regard to the American hostages in Lebanon. In fact, Iran helped the US in the release of hostages in Beirut, in return for an expected release of frozen Iranian assets.⁷³ Green asserted that Iran's attempts to secure Western financing have

compelled its leadership to mute some of its more extreme pronouncements.⁷⁴

Heywood maintained that politicians can afford to be blinded by ideological convictions and that strategic compromises have to be made if power is to be won and retained.⁷⁵

The tendency to scale down ideological commitments if an ideologised foreign policy leads to problems for the state, such as threats and external conflict, could be demonstrated by explaining the Cuban missile Crisis of 1962. As explained by Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, there are some grounds for believing that Soviet intentions behind placing “defensive missiles,” as named by the Americans, were purely to protect a friendly country, Cuba, from any potential American invasion or attack, particularly after Castro’s announcement to nationalise the American oil refinery in June 1960. Some Analysts addressed the issue in the context of a Cold War competition where the Communist state would attempt to deal with a shift in the balance of power. In retrospect, Khrushchev could have wanted to prove to the Americans that Soviet nuclear and missile power might constitute a threat to America’s safety and peace. Unfortunately, this was not good enough to explain such an extreme action. American policy makers were reminded by the Soviets of the problems facing the USSR in Berlin. Against such a hypothesis, America had no choice but to take action. Alternatives ranged between a neutral response, i.e. doing nothing, approaching Castro secretly, invading Cuba or launching an air strike that would ostracise Soviet basis in Cuba and elsewhere. Americans ended up imposing a blockade. This would hamper the movement of Soviet artillery to Cuba.

As it turned out, this proved to be a peaceful alternative. Soviets fears and worries rose, Khrushchev feared the worse. Amazingly, he withdrew the missiles from Cuba in order to avoid a probable nuclear war.⁷⁶

Given the fact of ideological antagonism between communist and capitalist powers, Khrushchev was capable of pushing Americans further, but he was being pragmatic. He weighed the pros and cons of taking the issue further and calculated the potential risks of such actions. Preferring not to take any risks, he withdrew the missiles from Cuba. He was trying to avoid an involvement in a likely nuclear war. That is to say that the Soviet leader prioritised his nation’s safety, stability, and national interest by scaling down some communist creed.

Such a practical behaviour could, actually, be described as pragmatic behaviour in the conduct of foreign policy. Interestingly, Daniels explained that Khrushchev laid down new pronouncements to accommodate his foreign policy or to embarrass his communist challengers.⁷⁷ This in particular shed light on the way some policy makers could ideologically control the political arena to manipulate public opinion to their interest and to reduce tension and risks at an international level or ensure national interest while still serving the nation’s ideological profile.

In fact, Robert Daniels explained Khrushchev’s pragmatism in revising socialist theory, as an attempt not to impede his realistic opportunistic foreign policy. To do that, he proceeded in two

directions: accommodating different communist states which he could not control and reducing the danger of nuclear war with the United States.⁷⁸

In short, the Cuban Missile Crisis is regarded as only an example of how different creeds could lead to certain actions with unexpected consequences that are better to avoid in many cases for the sake of international stability, even if that meant manoeuvring and manipulating ideology. That is to say that policy makers tend to balance between the ideological system and what is expected from a given behaviour.

Finally, ideology provides moral criteria by which to evaluate and judge actions of other states. This is true for many ideologies, considering that they are beliefs that flavour policy makers' decisions and shape people's view of reality. It is, therefore, not surprising that it set limits and criteria to which different state actions would be assessed according to them.

In defending Communism, policy makers tend to believe that it is a fair and more equal ideology that offers harmony in the world, and that any other ideologies would be unfair and unjust on human beings.

In the same way, conservatists reject any changes in the existing traditions and national cultures. They base their thinking upon experience and history, and believe that any changes would give place to immorality, the reason why they think that other ideologies are merely immoral belief mainstreams.⁷⁹

Heywood went further by pointing to the use of political ideologies as political weapons and devices with which to condemn or criticise rival sets of ideas or belief systems.⁸⁰

The fact that an ideologically minded policy maker believes strongly in the correctness of his/her beliefs would consequently make him/her judge any different thought as being wrong. However, there is nothing to prove that some ideologies are neutrally right.

Another argument brought forward by Boukara was that ideologies perform three main tasks. The first is to provide an image or a picture of the present or the past. The second is to outline an image of the future. This image of the future can only be realised if the objectives of such ideology are achieved. The third task is to identify the way to get from the present to the future. i.e. a programme of action. Boukara declared that:

“Ideologies, therefore, provide their adherents with a guide for the conducts of their behaviour in the present and the future. The internal and external actions of a state, therefore, are supposed to mirror the ideological formulations.”⁸¹

It is worth mentioning that two existing trends of thinking have emerged to argue the role of ideology in the making of foreign policy. They represent two schools of thought. These are the 'end of ideology', which developed in the 1960s and the second school revolves around the idea that foreign policies cannot be framed within a rigid set of ideas. The first is more related to democratic societies and the role played by ideology in their foreign policies. The second defends the opinion that rejects the involvement of ideology in the process of foreign policy

making. It supports the idea that even in communist states, ideology has ceased to play an important role in foreign policy.

R. Aron vowed that:

“It is true to say that ideology is dead in the advanced societies of the west if we take ideology to be a total interpretation of world history, but the statement does not apply to countries in process of development. They are in the grip of a controversy as passionate as it is confused.”⁸²

Aron commented on the relation between ideology and development, and explains that the virulence of the ideological debate in the western countries tends to fade away with the emergence of a new concern over development. The ideological quarrels inherent from the nineteenth century or the beginning of the twentieth century have by now lost their virulence. He insisted that:

“The intellectual debate continues about the extent to which planning should take precedence over market mechanism and collective ownership of the means of production over private ownership. In western Europe, the experience of the last fifteen years has shown that development is now the watch word for both the right and the left, and that even when it comes to sharing out the national income, the left is not alone in desiring to reduce inequalities.”⁸³

This shows that foreign policy could only be pragmatic. This becomes especially true when the Right and the Left have converging interests and ideas.

On the other hand, S.M. Lipset presented another argument on the ‘end of ideology’. He believed that ideology is tightly linked with class struggle and radical movement. Lipset argued the following:

“Engels argued that ‘there would be an end to all ideologies, unless the material interest underlying all ideologies remained of necessity known to these persons’ That is, in so far as the consciousness existed, as men became aware of their real interests, ideology i. e. the elaboration of false consciousness would disappear.”⁸⁴

However, the economic development reached by the West somehow meant that the most elemental political problems of the West’s industrial revolution have been resolved. Lipset confirmed that:

“This very triumph of the democratic social revolution in the west ends domestic politics for those intellectuals who must have ideologies or utopias to motivate them to political action.”⁸⁵

At an international level the ideology plays a different role. Considering the competitive nature and levels of development and the likely economic problems, Lipset asserted that:

“Ideology and passion may no longer be necessary to sustain the struggle within affluent and stable democracies, but they are clearly needed in the international effort to develop free political and economic institutions in the rest of the world. It is only the ideological class struggle in the west which is ending. Ideological conflicts linked to levels and problems of economic development and of appropriate political institutions among different nations will last far beyond our life time.”⁸⁶

In short, the end of ideology school is clearly concerned with development. The main idea in this school suggests that ideology is ending in western countries and more specifically, in developed nations. The argument put forward by this school advocates that a steady and rapid decrease of ideas which tended to conventionally operate in the West between the Left and the Right has been noticed. This trend of thinking believes that in the international level, the fissure between capitalist and socialist societies is diminishing and is giving place to some convergence.

On the other hand, there is a tendency that strongly rejects the idea that Soviet policy was dictated by a fixed set of ideas. This belongs to the second school. It would seem that along with the United States, the Soviet Union was not any more dedicated to ideology, as a result of the disintegration of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the loosening of the western bloc. These two factors, according to Gupta, have both entailed the demur of ideology in world politics and thus enhanced the role and relevance of the traditional actors, such as national power and the diplomacy of alignment and realignment to create new power balance.⁸⁷ Essentially, the main idea of this school revolved around the assumption that Soviet foreign policy was inspired from previously encountered experiences and that it was not in any case moulded according to a set of ideas. Accordingly, Baker advocated:

“since what it [Marxism-Leninism] claims to seek is unknowable there can be no strategy for the pursuit. The most there can be is an accumulation of ad-hoc tactics from the sum of which rationalising strategy may be artificially drawn and retrospectively applied. Marxism-Leninism is, and can only be, a domestic or international strategic doctrine in so far as the strategy is a product of the tactics adopted to secure that which is experientially known to be of value. The nature of the Soviet Union’s international being then has to be understood not through the analysis of Marx and Lenin but through the record of its experience in international affairs.”⁸⁸

In other words, Soviet foreign policy behaviour was the result of an accumulation of action and decision making. Hence, it was shaped accordingly in the international arena. Although, it is hardly correct to deny the influence of Marxist-Leninist ideology, one could allocate *experience* its fair share on Soviet foreign policy.

3. Major works on Algeria's Foreign Policy:

Research on Algeria's foreign policy is slightly limited. Yet Algeria's historical profile offers insights to the evolution and formation of bilateral and multilateral relationships with other nations, developed or developing.

Major works on Algerian foreign policy are numbered. The most important of these are Nicole Grimaud's "La Politique extérieure de l'Algérie,"⁸⁹ Philip C Naylor's "France and Algeria: a history of decolonisation and transformation."⁹⁰ Amine Aït-Chaalal "l'Algérie, les Etats-Unis et la France: des discours à l'action,"⁹¹ Assassi Lassassi's "Non-alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy,"⁹² the PhD thesis of Hocein Boukara "Ideology and Pragmatism in Algerian Foreign Policy,"⁹³ and finally the PhD thesis of Mohamed Chaoui: "Les Idées et l'Action du Président Houari Boumediene (1965-1978)."⁹⁴

All of these works tackled Algerian foreign political events in a complimentary manner, stretching over different periods in Algeria's history.

Nicole Grimaud's fundamental work on Algerian foreign policy, as its title strongly suggests, could easily be described as a general survey of Algerian foreign policy. However, the study does not involve any emphasis on themes of ideology. Grimaud analyses foreign policy in a prescriptive and descriptive way, and re-establishes the series of events that shaped and mirrored Algerian policy. The work largely covers the period spanning the post independence era until the end of Boumediene's regime in 1978. Grimaud divides Algerian foreign policy into three categories. Firstly, the relationship with France, the United States and the Soviet Union. Secondly, the relationship with the *Maghrib* and the *Machrek*, and finally with the Third World.

At first glance, the study does not tackle ideology and pragmatism as a subject on its own, in comparison with the present work, although the author sheds light on the aforementioned aspects of Algerian foreign policy. Nicole Grimaud's work is an excellent survey that could be the basis for any studies on Algerian foreign policy.

With respect to "France and Algeria: a history of decolonisation and transformation," it is undoubtedly a detailed account of the most decisive events in Algeria's imminent future. It is an indispensable guide to the understanding of Algerian history, including its bilateral relations with France. The book is a periodisation of the different events in Algerian history. The author observes the French post-independence influence, and examines the decolonisation process that lasted more than the seven-year war of liberation period. Philip C Naylor discusses France's objectives to establish positive and occasionally privileged relations with Algeria, with an aim of enhancing France's image among developing nations, especially with the view that Algeria was regarded as a door to Africa and the third world. The study invokes France's essentialism and Algerian existentialism, which demonstrates that, both Algeria and France realised the particular importance of one another. The work of Naylor concentrates above all, on intricate Algerian-French relationships and it investigates the new policy of cooperation upon post-

independence which maintained French influence.

The author surveys foreign policy during the Houari Boumedienne leadership, which witnessed a post-colonial decolonisation. The study also presents the decline of co-development between Algeria and France, and the new direction that the bilateral relationship was taking after President Bendjadid stepped down from power. The author examines the relationship over the *Fitna's* violence in and across the Mediterranean. Furthermore, the work on France and Algeria evaluates the relationship between the two nations through different perspectives.

The publication of this work generates a new impetus to research on Algeria's colonial and postcolonial relationship with France. Therefore, it would be very difficult to deny the contribution of such a work to the understanding of Algerian foreign policy towards France. The study covers the development of the Algerian-French relationship since the first settlement of French colonies in 1830 until 1998.

In short, the work is focused on Algerian foreign policy toward France and vice versa with a historical flavour throughout the study. The work forms a sound fundamental basis upon which we shall expand with various other countries throughout the Boumedienne era.

On the other hand, Amine Aïl-Chaalal describes Algerian foreign policy, with a particular focus on the United States of America and France, which are undoubtedly major partners to independent Algeria, given the requirement of a sound economy and the need for such great powers to facilitate an economic Algerian take off. Algeria intensified its dealings with the aforementioned countries whilst turning a blind eye to some of the strictest principles towards imperialist countries. The work draws the main lines of the history of Algerian politics since the arrival of President Houari Boumedienne to power in 1965 until 1992, with the resignation of Bendjadid.

The author analyses the foreign policy of Algeria, whilst following the lines of James Roseneau and considering historical events. The book is a rich study that allows the understanding of the policy making process and its implementation in developing countries.

The author put forward the likely principles of Algerian foreign policy and concentrates part of his research on the United States, being the first Algerian commercial partner, while relations were severed for a while between the two countries. Another part of this publication is devoted to France, which played a particular role in the take off of Algeria soon after independence. Amine Aït-Chaalal refers to the ideological aspect and orientations of Algerian foreign policy. Furthermore, he mentions the options and implementations of Algerian foreign policy towards international events.

Moreover the study encompasses the economic rules, set for external exchanges. Finally the author draws attention to the necessary transfer of technology that is tightly linked with economic development.

This work is a comprehensive study on Algerian foreign policy, In fact, it is a critical analysis that looks into not only the theoretical, but also the practical foreign policy-making process over

the period of thirty years and which discusses its orientation and the factors that contributed to its formulation, with a particular focus on the United States and France. While this work puts the focus on the study of Algeria's foreign policy towards France and the United States from a theoretical and practical point of view, over three different regimes, our study scrutinises a particular period of Algeria's politics, that being President Houari Boumedienne's era. It also looks into different aspects of Algerian foreign policy and features the analysis of pragmatic behaviour and ideological stances as themes.

"Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy" by Assassi Lassassi is a study that adopts a different approach to the analysis of the foreign policy making process. The author strongly indicates the inadequacy of the use of power politics in explaining both the emergence of the Non-Aligned group and its behaviour.

Lassassi emphasises the role of ideology in the emergence of the Non-Aligned group; He believes that Third World or newly independent countries are short of the imperatives of national power. Their political, economic, cultural and social conditions do not constitute appropriate grounds to act on a national power basis. He discusses the rise of the Non-Alignment Movement from 1962-1979, with special coverage of Algeria.

The work deals with three main streams of interest. The first introduces Non-Alignment in the context of international relations and explains Non-Alignment as an ideology, pointing to the components of this ideology.

The author moves on to tackle the ideology of the Algerian Revolutionary leading organ, that is the National Liberation Front (FLN). He devotes the second part of his work to the analysis of the progressive development of the FLN's ideology, stating its anti-colonialist beliefs and its initial involvement in ideology, following the Soumam Congress and the Tripoli programme. He also refers to the stand undertaken by the FLN towards the East and the West. Lassassi attempts to shed light on the link between Non-Alignment and the FLN.

In part three, the author surveys Algeria's post independence foreign policy, including Algeria's posture towards colonialism and its effort to tackle the economic issue that underpinned the injustice between the North and the South.

Algeria's relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States, being the Super-Powers at the time, are also assessed, as is Algeria's position in international organisations.

Though a major study of Algeria's foreign policy, this work is specifically focused on its Non-Alignment Movement as a context.

Boukara's thesis on ideology and pragmatism in Algerian foreign policy strongly criticizes the pragmatic side of Algerian policy towards other countries, in contrast to its declared ideological claims.

The chapter on literature review in Boukara's thesis includes various paradigms in international relations.

Boukara adopts broad categories of the states with which Algeria dealt with, such as Socialist

states, Third world countries and West countries. In this thesis, we adopt a more detailed breakdown of countries into more elaborated categories, devoting for example, separate chapters to Algeria's Arab politics, its oil diplomacy, and its relation with the Maghrib states.

Finally, the thesis deals with Algeria's foreign policy in general from Ben Bella to Chadli, whereas this thesis is principally concentrated on Boumedienne's era.

Chaoui's thesis: *les Idées et l'Action Politiques du Président Houari Boumediene*, constitutes a mammoth work on the political ideas and actions of President Houari Boumedienne. It investigates the circumstances surrounding the development of President Houari Boumedienne's personality and explores his ideals, objectives, achievements, and his errors. Chaoui's thesis is a comprehensive and detailed study of Algeria's national and foreign policy between 1965 and 1978. The thesis is broken down into two major parts. While the first part looks into the ideas of President Houari Boumedienne and the maturation of his political thought, the second part deals with his political actions and encompasses two main areas of concern, national and foreign policy. The study of foreign policy in Chaoui's thesis is an accurate survey and a comprehensive account of President Houari Boumedienne's political action at an international level. Chaoui elaborates a detailed survey of Algerian foreign policy under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership. However, he does not analyse the role of ideology or pragmatism in the President's political actions.

Although Chaoui's thesis could be regarded as a breakthrough and a step forward in the study of President Houari Boumedienne's political actions and thoughts, it does not, however, concentrate specifically on Algeria's foreign policy. It also does not tackle the theoretical side of foreign policy nor does it look into ideology and pragmatism as themes. Therefore, there is a need to examine the role ideology played in the making and implementation of Algeria's foreign policy under Houari Boumedienne (1965-1978), and to assess the factors behind the ideological stances of the regime as well as the underlying causes behind the pragmatic foreign policy postures that the regime adopted at the same time. Most importantly, it is necessary to understand the way that pragmatism in President Houari Boumedienne's dealings with the outside world was an inevitable option based on national interest calculations. This is despite the ideological overtures of the Boumedienne regime, as manifested in the Constitution, the Party Charter and the public proclamation of leading state officials.

Nevertheless, there are other works on Algerian foreign policy that constitute a partial study of the overall Algerian foreign policy such as Abdelkrim Belkheiri's "US-Algerian Relations, 1954-1980: Balance between Interest and Principle."⁹⁵ Abdelmedjid Bennamia's work entitled "Palestine in Algerian Foreign Policy. 1962-1978."⁹⁶ B.Iratni's thesis on "Foreign policy and Nation-State Building in Algeria, 1962-1985."⁹⁷

Abdelkrim Belkheiri's thesis is a major work on Algerian-American interaction from 1954 until 1980. It is a periodisation of US-Algerian relations throughout the war of liberation, post-independence, and the Boumedienne years. In fact, Belkheiri thesis examines the American

attitude towards the Algerian revolution and portrays the United States torn positions between its responsibilities and obligations. It also sheds light on the way the Cold War and anti-Communism had influenced American attitude towards the Algerian revolution. Furthermore, this also deals with the antagonistic and severed diplomatic relations, and uncovers the deep abyss between the two countries which was primarily the result of Algeria's anti-colonialist and third worldist positions as opposed to American imperialist objectives. Most importantly, Belkheiri exposed the active American-Algerian dialogue, which resulted from the emergence of commercial partnership between the two sides and which coincided with Algeria's decision to diversify economic partners and to disentangle French economic monopoly. This work is a comprehensive and detailed study of US-Algerian relations which tackles three main periods in Algerian-American relations. That is to say that in the formative years in US-Algerian relations, in the period between 1954-1962, the failure of diplomacy and the prominence of ideology between 1962-1967, and finally in the years from 1967 until 1980, witnessed a duality between political controversy and business relations. As for Bennamia, he devotes his work to the study of Algerian foreign policy towards the Palestinian problem, from independence in 1962 to 1978. Bennamia's thesis is an analysis of Algerian decision-making process with regards to the Palestinian question. That is to say that Bennamia explores the relationship between Algerian rulers and the Palestinian question, and to what extent the Palestinian issue was prioritised in Algeria's political agenda. The study includes a theoretical perspective of foreign policy and an analysis of Algerian foreign policy settings. This work adopts a historical and analytical approach which goes back in time to early nationalist attitudes toward Palestine.

On the other hand, Iratni's work looks into foreign policy as part and parcel of the process of state-building, along with fortifying national sentiments in a nascent independent society. In summation, he sheds light on the relationship between foreign policy and nation-state building and stipulates the role of foreign policy in consolidating the foundations of the new state or political legitimacy, its territorial integrity, economic development and identity. This study is an interesting account of the existing role played by foreign policy in Algeria over two decades, from 1962 until 1985.

These works constitute viable resources for the study of Algerian foreign policy, yet they only deal with specific aspects of Algerian foreign policy.

Taking into account the above general assumptions about the role of ideology in foreign policy and the premises and conclusions of the above major works on Algeria's foreign policy, and considering that Algerian foreign policy under Houari Boumedienne had been characterised by ideologised proclamations, we shall in this thesis address the following research question:

- To what extent Algeria's actual foreign policy behaviour during this period was well characterised by a pragmatic outlook and what opportunities and constraints ideology provided for Algeria's foreign policy.

4. Methodology and data collection:

By testing some of the above general assumptions of ideology on the Algerian case and investigating the above research question, we hope to shed further light on the general and particular roles ideology played in the making and implementation of Algerian foreign policy. Accordingly, the thesis will ascertain the role ideology played in moulding the orientations of Algeria's foreign policy. Our study will look at the role of ideology at domestic, systemic and individual levels. It will also discuss the extent to which ideology contributed to the consolidation of the state-building process and legitimisation of the regime. We will follow the lines of James Rosenau⁹⁸ and concentrate on the classic foreign policy analysis approach. We shall, hence, look at the national state and the international system as levels of analysis, and finally we shall investigate individual influences on Algerian foreign policy. The domestic dimension will identify the domestic distribution of power, the role of both the army and the FLN, and most importantly the significance of domestic economic development and independence. We will then look at the systemic influences on Algeria's foreign policy behaviour. This will include the Palestinian problem, inter-Arab relations, North African geopolitics, Third World pioneering and the Cold War. Finally, we will introduce the individual level of analysis which will highlight the early and wider influences on President Houari Boumedienne and hence, shed light on the impact ideology had on Boumedienne himself and on his decision making.

In the course of my research, I must admit that without the help of some high officials, access to some important published and unpublished resources would have been impossible. That is to say that, although it appears to be a straightforward process, data-collection in Algeria is not straightforward. In fact, I found a number of difficulties in obtaining the necessary material. The main reason for that, I believe, was the unwillingness and hesitation of members of staff in some institutions to assist me in this research. It was practically impossible to have access to any kind of information or archives without the assistance of some high officials and through connections. Other reasons lie in the secretive nature of decision-making in Algerian politics. The non-availability of satisfactory records on post independent-Algerian politics in general and on the Boumediennist era in particular was barely justified by the National Archive Centre. It appears that the National Archive Centre has no legal right to disclose information or release archives on a government or a leaders policy until thirty years have passed since the authority in power has ceased to rule. Furthermore, there is a significant lack of published memoirs of retired personalities. However, after several self-sponsored trips to Algeria and some efforts made through connections, I managed to gain direct access to some of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' and the Presidency's archives. Still through connections, I successfully obtained copies of President Houari Boumedienne's speeches, the Constitution and the National Charter of 1976. I have conducted interviews with two relevant personalities that are Dr Amimour Muhyi

al-Deen and Mrs Anissa Boumedienne. The interview was structured and recorded using a dictaphone. A set of questions were prepared in advance and asked during the interview, which took place in the Senate in Algiers. The interview with Mrs Anissa Boumedienne was, therefore, unstructured and took place in the University of Houari Boumedienne, where the Seminar was held.

I was able to Interview Dr Amimour Muhyi al-Deen, whom I thank for his assistance and kindness. The interview was structured, recorded and conducted in the Senate “Le Conseil de la Nation”, Dr Muhyi al-Deen Amimour was very encouraging and accepted to be recorded during the interview. This could not take place without the assistance of Mr Omar Shetli who arranged for me to meet Dr Muhyi al-Deen Amimour. Dr Muhyi al-Deen Amimour is one of the people who were privileged to work closely with President Houari Boumedienne. He was appointed adviser at the Presidency from 1971 until 1984. He was then a substitute member of the National Liberation Front Central Committee from 1979 to 1983, then ambassador to Pakistan from 1989 to 1992, and he is member of the National Council. He was appointed Minister of Communication and culture on 26 August 2000 and is, currently, Senator of the city of Algiers and President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and of the national Community abroad. He was therefore well informed and an active member in the Process of Foreign policy-making during President Houari Boumedienne’s rule. Interviewing him contributed to a large extent in the enlightenment and understanding of President Houari Boumedienne’s foreign policy actions and decisions.

Mrs Anissa Boumedienne was also very helpful. I was very lucky to meet Mrs Anissa Boumedienne at the 14th Houari Boumedienne Seminar at the University of Houari Boumedienne. Mrs Anissa Boumedienne allocated me some time at the end of the Seminar. She also did not find any objection to being recorded while answering the questions I had prepared in advance. The information she provided me with was of great help in the individual analysis of President Houari Boumedienne’s policy-making process and in understanding the ideological influences and orientation of the President. Most of the time there was no room for bias or prejudice as the information provided were realities and truthful occurrences in President Houari Boumedienne’s life. Some other analysis and data that were provided by Mrs Anissa Boumedienne were cross-checked, verified and analysed. I believe that President Houari Boumedienne’s wife’s analysis was very reliable and priceless, as it was very consistent and justified many of the policy actions undertaken by the President himself. Yet, all information was double checked and compared with other available resources and other speeches given during the seminar. I would like to thank them both for accepting to be interviewed and for their valuable comments and discourse.

A great deal of other data derived from various official Publications, unpublished documents from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the state-owned Petroleum Company “SONATRACH”, and the National Liberation Front and some state-owned and

independent newspapers and Journals such as: El-Moujahid, Al-Sha'b. As a matter of fact, the "Journal Officiel", the Constitution and National Charter of 1976 proved to be a valuable source of information used to analyse the decisions and actions of the Algerian leadership. President Houari Boumedienne's speeches were fundamental and indispensable for this study. Nevertheless, other sources of information such as seminars that were organised in Algeria to commemorate the anniversary of the death of President Houari Boumedienne, were very informative and helpful. I personally attended the 14th Houari Boumedienne Seminar which took place in the University of Houari Boumedienne, Algiers, between the 26 and 28 December 2003. Documentary reportages on President Houari Boumedienne's national and foreign policy assisted me in cross checking various data and were very informative. These were provided by the National Union of Algerian Youth (UNJA).

Among the libraries well endowed with material on Algeria and whose facilities I used on many occasions were the "Bibliothèque National" and the very helpful library of the Centre of Research and Studies on the Movement of the First of November in Algiers. Works in French and in Arabic on Algeria were extensively used and all translations are mine.

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⁹⁵ Abdelkrim Belkheiri, US-Algerian Relations, 1954-1980: Balance between Interest and Principle. PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 1987.

⁹⁶ Abdelmedjid Bennamia, Palestine in Algerian Foreign Policy: 1962-1978. PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 1988.

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Chapter Two

The Evolution of Algeria's Foreign policy: origins and developments.

1. A Historical Background of the Pre-Boumedienne Era:

Algeria could not remain a land closed to outsiders, given the priceless soil and wealth it had. France had longstanding colonialist intentions towards Algeria, as it always endeavoured to have relative control of Algeria's wealthy resources. Besides, it was very keen on having a foothold (even if indirectly) in Africa. In fact, in the view of Lorcin, there are two prerequisites upon which successful settler colonisation rested: "lands and labour."¹

The French invasion of 5 July 1830 resulted in the expropriation of lands, thus, the exploitation of native inhabitants' lands and the destruction of traditional agricultural equipment. Algerians were destitute in their own properties. Such injustice and inequality ultimately triggered reactions among the peoples and provoked uprisings, insurrections and revolts.

Peter Von Sivers summarised the gradual takeover of Algeria by the French, which followed a decade of extensive debates over direct or indirect control, which culminated in an eventual total conquest and direct colonial control. He explained that:

"Between 1840 and 1851 all of northern Algeria was wrested from 'Abd al-Qadir and al-Hajj Ahmad, the two indigenous leaders who had assumed leadership of the western and eastern portions (respectively) of the country after the Ottoman collapse. After 1851 a system of French military government, complete with garrisons, outposts, and local tribal administrators, was built up, and European immigrants were encouraged to settle on tracts of farm or bush lands expropriated from the indigenous Arabic- and Berber-speaking population."²

However, in a context of dissatisfaction and the spreading of political awareness of inequities within Algerian social casts, the first signs of hopes for equality and even for emancipation began to develop. This was especially true with the issuing of the law regarding the conscription of Muslim Algerians in 1912 and the law of 4 February 1919 in relation to the naturalisation of indigenes and some Islamic reforms. This set of laws triggered a reaction among the Algerian community and coincided with the Peace Conference at Versailles in 1919, which brought forward the issue of people's right to self-determination and President Wilson's declaration of justice, liberty and right. The first group of men who decided to dare asking for reforms in favour of indigenes suffering from poor living conditions were united under the name of "Jeunes Algériens" who made Emir Khaled their leader.

Nevertheless, the participation of Muslim Algerians in the First World War was a stimulator for

nationalist ideas; the participation of Algerians in the Second World War could not leave them without a hope of one day gaining their own independence. This was especially true, given that France promised Algerians freedom if they brought victory in the battle field, a promise that was never fulfilled. The birth and development of nationalist movements of Algeria was the result of a mixture of inside and outside factors that unveiled realities and prompted necessary political activism. It is in this respect that al-Aqqad believed that the First World War was a good opportunity to release Algeria from its isolation, as it tinted Algeria with both the Bolshevik war of 1917 and Wilsonian principles. It allowed, in fact, Algerian workers and soldiers to witness the aspect of freedom in France. In a way, it helped Algerian leaders to ask for some kind of compensation towards the sacrifices of the lives of thousands of Algerians during the war.³ Besides, the destructive, exploitative and heartless nature of the French colonial policy had not been recognised by the French, and some European settlers. These settlers tended to regard this French colonial presence as acting for the good benefit of Algerian people who were considered to be uncivilised, uneducated and most of all in need of help. France was there to assist them. Peter Bechtold stated:

“In general, French interest in North Africa was to colonize in large numbers, for the obvious purpose of developing and especially exploiting local resources for the benefit of the colons and the home industry. In addition, the French, being French, felt obliged to carry out a *mission civilisatrice*.”⁴

It is only fair, however, to admit France’s contribution to Algeria’s flourishing economy and effective industry, which was serving French interests and the coloniser’s well being. Brodrick portrayed a very wealthy Algeria during the 1920s and 1930s. He wrote:

“Algeria was very prosperous. There was a wine boom that has been almost forgotten, for nothing remains to remind one it ever existed save thousands of acres of deserted and desiccated vineyards which were planted in response to the increased demand for Algerian wines.”⁵

Prior to the War of Liberation, three nationalist trends had fought for the indigenes’ rights. These were the liberals, the radicals and the revolutionaries. It appears that their political fight, albeit pioneering for an independent Algeria, did not achieve their ultimate aims. However, with the formation of a revolutionary party and the beginning of the war of independence in November 1954, political leaders representing the Algerian side began urging international organisations to intervene and help Algeria to gain its independence.

Accordingly, after a long period of colonisation and maltreatment, whilst the French were preparing to celebrate the centenary of their achievement i. e. the invasion of Algeria, Algeria was on the brink of a war, the war of independence. In an interview with M. Daho Ould Kablia, an ex-officer of the National Liberation Army (ALN) and a former frame at the Ministry of Armament and General Liaison “Ministère de l’armement et des Liaisons Générales” (MALG),

during the War, and president of the association for old members of the MALG, he described the 1 of November as the beginning of an adventure that lasted over 7 years, led by few militants having no weapons but their faith and determination to free the country from colonial repression.⁶

Suffice to say that Algerians understood the inefficiency of negotiations and talks with the enemy and they realised the time had come for them to act and that there was no need for reforms anymore. Freedom was their ultimate right, and they needed to fight for it. It is in this light that Ageron declared that, after decades of struggle, “the national movement had reached the stage of execution’,” and the Algerians proclaimed the start of the revolutionary struggle “for the liquidation of the colonial system’.”⁷

After seven years of War and resistance against French occupation, the 18 of March 1962 marked the end of an era and the Evian accords were signed between the two parties, the coloniser and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). On the evening of the 18 of March, in Tunisia, Benyoucef Ben Khedda, president of the GPRA, gave orders to cease fighting.⁸ The following day, a cease-fire was proclaimed.

After the signature of the Evian accords, prisoners were freed, including the five chiefs who led the War of Independence: Ben Bella, Khider, Lacheref, Boudiaf and Aït Ahmed, who were arrested on 22 October 1956, on their trip back from Rabat where they discussed the main guidelines of the North African Confederation.⁹ Ahmed Ben Bella went first to Cairo and then to Benghazi, and later joined the meeting of the National Council of the Algerian Republic (CNRA) in Tripoli, on 27 May, to discuss the adoption of a program that Ferhat Abbas described as “a Ben Bellist Chart, written in a hurry in Tunis” to lead the country.¹⁰ It was of paramount importance to decide how to move from dependence to independence. The Tripoli programme drafted at this meeting was about to become the ideological platform of post-independent Algeria. Indeed, Algerian policy makers were highly inspired by this program in the drafting of their national and foreign policies.

On 1 July 1962, approximately 5, 975,581 out of 6, 017, 680 voters said yes for the independence of Algeria, in an organised referendum to decide on Algerian’s self determination. On 3 July 1962, France officially admitted the independence of Algeria and it was on 5 July that the independence of Algeria and its sovereignty over the national territory were proclaimed.¹¹

1.1 Ben Bella and the period of Independence:

The political elite which constituted the front leading coalition of the country under Ben Bella’s leadership included Khider, Secretary General of the Political Bureau, Ferhat Abbas at the head of the National Assembly and Boumedienne, chief of the army. These four leaders, however, failed to reach common ground on how to approach the process of state-building. This led Ferhat Abbas and Mohamed Khider to resign from their duties.

Ben Bella’s policy-making priority was to build up the state.¹² He advocated the ‘*parti unique*’

or the single party as a necessary condition for success. Ben Bella strongly vowed that:

“The party unique is a necessary engine for the society that should be in charge of policy making.”¹³

Above all, he defended the idea of a vanguard party and sturdily believed in a mass party that welcomed the most conscious Algerians and those who are less conscious. He strongly opposed the idea of separating power between the party and the government, and believed that policy-making belonged to the party.¹⁴ At this stage, Ben Bella and Abbas disagreed as to what the role of the FLN and the General Assembly should be. This urged Ben Bella to clarify the role of the state institutions and define the relations between the Assembly, the Government, and the Party. The Government and the Assembly had an executive task and the elaboration of the nation’s political thought was the party’s task. This was a strict rule that was unanimously adopted in Tripoli.¹⁵

Furthermore, in order to make sure that the decisions of the Tripoli congress would be implemented, Ahmed Ben Bella would attempt to initiate a democratic revolution that would develop a sound national economic and social policy, so as to direct and orient the people, and also educate them, not forgetting as well to give the country a socialist economy.¹⁶

In the aftermath of the war, the country’s leadership consisted mainly of revolutionaries and politicians who were at the origins of the 1954 War of Liberation. In an attempt to centralise power and shift its focus from military elite to more intellectual and better educated elite, Ben Bella tried to “demilitarise” politics in post-independence Algeria. Similarly, he was trying to depoliticise the army by excluding it from policy-making. Quandt affirmed: “Nearly all those who had received their basic political formation before the revolution were replaced by men who entered politics only after 1954.”¹⁷ In an interview with *Le Monde*, Ben Bella affirmed clearly that:

“According to the Tripoli program, it is the FLN that should elaborate policy in independent Algeria. Furthermore, the ALN is a mere state institution that should not be confused with the party. The relation between the Party and the State is defined as follows: the Party [should] elaborate the political thought of the state.”¹⁸

According to Jackson, Ben Bella chose to centralise political power in his own hands and to promote the development of the state governmental apparatus, stepping towards a political stability that would nurture an institutionalised mass-party system.¹⁹ One can only speculate on the orientations adopted by Ben Bella’s policy. It is difficult to be certain whether he strove to concentrate power in his own hands, in order to augment decision-making capacity, as clearly stated by Quandt,²⁰ or whether it was an attempt at depoliticising the military organ, or, in other words, demilitarising politics with the intention of establishing a genuine democratic republic, once authority was ascertained.

Left with an economy devastated by the departure of professional and technical work power,

Ben Bella oriented his internal policy towards upgrading education and agriculture. To satisfy such aspirations, the political bureau organised the peasants (*fellahin*) on a mass scale, adopting the worker self-management system known as '*autogestion*', which constituted the basis of socialism.

"Ideologically, autogestion constituted the most original feature of socialism under Ben Bella's regime; politically, it expanded the FLN's presence in the countryside."²¹

However, did Ben Bella have an alternative to '*autogestion*'? It was unlikely at a time when the country's infrastructures and institutions were not well prepared to initiate an economic boom. Lands were abandoned by colons and settlers and needed to be maintained. Besides, over half of the population in Algeria was composed of both shattered peasants who fled their lands during the war or were forced to flee in many cases, and workers that were spread between Algeria and France. This had undoubtedly urged Ben Bella to declare it *bien vacant*, in order to nourish within the fallahin and workers a spirit of initiative to work their lands.

Indeed, historians relate the origins of *autogestion*, at a large scale, to two unexpected factors: the massive departure of European owners, months before the independence and the will of the agricultural proletariat to work abandoned lands.²² *Autogestion* started off following the instauration of *comités de gestion* in vacant agricultural estates in accordance with the decree 62-02 of 22 October 1962.²³ The principle in the *bien vacant*, extended to industry and mining on 23 November 1962, following the issuing of the decree 62-38, by the Ministry of Industrialisation and Energy.²⁴ Nevertheless, Clegg confirmed that the *comités de gestion* were formally accepted in March 1963 as an integral part of the nation's economic organisation and their practice was defined as the keystone of Algerian socialism.²⁵

It was thus essential for the government to establish well-defined organs of management that would act under the governmental institution, ensuring control over agriculture and industry. The issue was more pressing for Ben Bella, as he feared complete self-management. The *décrets de Mars*, as described by Clegg, "represented a radical acceleration in Ben Bella's attempt to create a socialist praxis."²⁶ The organs appointed included *L'assemblée générale des travailleurs*, which was delegated all power, the *conseil des travailleurs*, the *comités de gestion* and a director appointed by the state.

Rachid Tlemceni stated that, by the end of 1963, self-management committees in industrial, artisan and mining enterprises were placed under the control of the economics ministry. This meant that industrial self-management was subordinated to the state corporations that were already mentioned in the March Decrees.²⁷ This matter proved that the state was in relative control.

Most importantly, Algeria's most acute economic concern in the post-independence era was to bring down staggering unemployment and achieve an economic recovery. Aïssaoui advocated:

"In the context of a power struggle within the FLN, the

government, which had to deal urgently with social justice and wealth redistribution, focused on land recovery and agrarian reform, promoting the system known as *autogestion* for the management of the agricultural domains and co-operatives left by the French colons.”²⁸

He believed that such policy was more appropriate to an agrarian and industrially underdeveloped country such as the nascent Algeria.

Industry held a key position in President Ben Bella’s political agenda. Bachir Boumaza, Minister of the Economy under President Ben Bella, expressed on 15 April 1964, at the inauguration of the Algiers refinery, his firm belief that industrialisation was the only path that would allow the country to fight underdevelopment and step out of the simple cycle of the economy of an underdeveloped country.²⁹ As for the hydrocarbon sector, Aïssaoui mentioned that Ben Bella strongly believed that this sector would contribute to Algeria’s economic development. This was clearly demonstrated at the inauguration of the Camel LNG plant in September 1964, where he described the occasion as the “economic revival of a new Algeria.”³⁰

The social aspect of Ben Bella’s policy put the focus on the key issues of women and sex equality, family, youth and faith. As a matter of fact, President Ben Bella inspired the introduction of women to political and economic activities, and to the socialist edification, encouraging the promotion of youth.

James Ciment declared: “As for women and family, the government made a point of emphasizing women’s contribution to the revolutionary cause and the importance of liberating them from the oppressive strictures of the patriarchal Algerian family.”³¹

In fact, even his internal management was intended to attract external attention, especially with the introduction of the *autogestion* as a self-management policy. Ian Clegg highlighted that the conflicts over *Autogestion*, were not apparent in the spring of 1963. “As a result of the decrees, Ben Bella achieved an immense, if temporary, national and international popularity. From this moment, officially at least, *autogestion* was Algeria’s ‘*option irreversible*’.”³²

Ben Bella’s socialist tendencies were mainly inspired by the movement of Non-Alignment. It is extremely important to draw the line between Algeria’s Socialism and the Soviet model, for the lands that were to be occupied by colons, were taken over spontaneously by natives post-independence. This is rather similar to the Yugoslav *autogestion*. However, we can sense a sort of incompatibility between the Soviet Centralist vision of the state at that time, which was a dominant feature of an industrial machine based on the Stakhanovisme and an embryonic Algerian economy based mainly on agriculture. But we cannot address *autogestion* as a socialist transition for different reasons. A real socialist transition would have at least impelled control over the state apparatus and the cancellation of the division between manual and intellectual labour. In the case of Algeria, according to Lalaoui, the domination of workers over elements of reproduction was not effective. Furthermore, the orientation of economic activity was determined by government power. It was precisely the bourgeoisie who dominated different

apparatus of the state, which constituted a real techno-bureaucracy.³³

The intrigue in the study of the mandate of Ben Bella is him being the first president of independent Algeria, and his arrival to power at a time that Third Worldism and Arab nationalism were at their apogee. In fact, Ben Bella reincarnated the figures of political charisma, faced with a double problem, that of transition and construction. Ben Bella held power for a very short period, at a very neuralgic time, which makes it difficult to give a clear profile of his foreign policy programme. Ahdjoudj argued that, in a newly independent country, the immediate priority was to ensure growth, progress, the modernisation of the country and to fight underdevelopment.³⁴ It is in this context, that the system had no other choice but to adopt an austere policy and aim at achieving production and increase it.

At an international level, President Ben Bella's foreign policy relied upon coexistence between nations, even with different social systems, respect of independence and national integrity, and the equality of rights and non-interference in other countries affairs. These principles were intended to increase exchange and interaction between the nations at all levels.³⁵ Most importantly, President Ben Bella's foreign policy responded to two criteria, the anti-imperialist fight and socialist progress.

The anti-imperialist fight not only included the fight against imperialism and the gaining of independence for many colonised countries, but also involved the fight against nuclear threat and the prevention of experiments in order to maintain peace and allow cooperation between nations. Ben Bella believed that imperialist countries were in a continuous search for new alternatives to prove power and influence. Integration and unity embedded President Ben Bella's aspirations for the Arab Maghrib, the Arab world and Africa.

Among Ben Bella's initial preoccupations on coming to power was the unity of the Maghrib, which was hard to achieve, especially after the borders conflict between Algeria and Morocco over part of the Algerian Sahara, which ended by severing diplomatic relations in 1963.

Ben Bella quickly dropped this, according to Humbaraci, for the diametrically opposed concept of '*Arabism à la Nasser*'. His policy towards other Arab issues such as the Palestinian issue was similar to Nasir's position, as reiterated by Bennamia, who mentioned: "In general, throughout Ben Bella's era, the Algerian government tended to follow the Egyptian leadership on the Palestine issue."³⁶ Then he discovered Black Africa, whereupon the United Arab Republic and its works were abandoned and the "'African vocation of Algeria' became the thing."³⁷

In fact, throughout his rule, Ben Bella showed a great interest in the African arena. He declared, according to Grimaud, that he wanted to make of Africa "the polar star of Africa", meaning by that, a virtual evolution of the continent.³⁸ Hence, Ben Bella prepared for the meetings of Addis Abeba, which set the main lines for the chart of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). Put in the words of Mortimer, Ben Bella played a key role, in the 1960s, in organising the Organisation of African Unity (OAU),³⁹ an organisation that intended to unify African countries

in order to achieve progress within the continent. Algeria was, indeed, an active member of the OAU, given its anti-imperialistic foreign policy and because it nurtured ideas against neo-colonialism. Algeria not only encouraged, but also gave refuge to clandestine movements fighting against governments, such as the U. P. C in Cameroon, Sawaba in Niger, Sanwi in the Ivory Coast and the (C. N. L) in Congo-Kinshasa, on the grounds that such governments were still under the *ex-métropole* domination.⁴⁰

Faced with different problems, one of Ben Bella's priorities was to liberate the whole of Africa in order to eliminate regimes of South Africa that hampered progress in the continent. Humbaraci stressed Ben Bella's and Algerians undoubted honesty and sincerity in their desire to liberate the whole of Africa in order to extinguish the racist regime of South Africa and the Salazarist colonialism in Portugal's possessions.⁴¹

By embracing Third Worldism, Algeria took part in a number of forums and conferences, aiming at promoting the development of Third World countries. It played a part in the creation of the Organisation of African Unity in 1963 and also participated in the international trade conference and the second summit of the Non-Aligned countries, held in Cairo in October 1964. Furthermore, Grimaud mentioned that Algeria suggested a plan for the expansion of the exchange between underdeveloped countries. In short, Algeria made a significant contribution that was inspired from its own experience.

A decade after the Bandung conference, which gave the Algerian problem the opportunity to be internationalised, Ben Bella was preparing to host the second Afro-Asian Summit. He could not, unfortunately, because of the 1965 coup on 19 June, ten days before the conference was scheduled to open. The coup halted preparations and deepened the rift between China and the Soviet Union. The overthrow frustrated its occurrence altogether.⁴²

One of the most interesting links and relations during Ben Bella's presidency was the Algerian-American relationship, given the leading role that the United States played at that time.

Shortly after independence in 1962, and despite seven and a half years of armed struggle against France, the majority of Algerian exports were directed to France. According to Akre, the United States was the recipient of less than one percent of the total of Algeria's exports. Moreover, soon after Ben Bella took power in September 1962, the United States appointed an ambassador to Algiers. This culminated in the first visit of the Algerian President outside Algeria, which brought him to the United States in a friendly meeting with President Kennedy. However, Akre stated that, soon after leaving Washington, Ben Bella went directly to Cuba to add his support to Havana's demand for the removal of the United States Guantanamo base, on the eve of the United States-Soviet confrontation over Cuba. This left the United Nations very suspicious of Algeria's foreign policy orientations and objectives.

2. The Context within which President Houari Boumedienne became Leader:

After the coup of 1965, seen as a revolutionary readjustment by many conformists, Ben Bella was succeeded by the organiser of the coup, Houari Boumedienne. As a matter of fact, the progressive deterioration in the relationship between Ben Bella and Houari Boumedienne started long before the 19 of June. The decision of President Ahmed Ben Bella to dismiss the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abd al-Aziz Boutaflia prior to an international conference would have no critical political consequences. This decision must have been a humiliation for the Defence Minister and a provocation for Boumedienne. The influence of Boumedienne as the Defence Minister was progressively diminishing within the government, especially with the departure of some of his most faithful companions. The balance of power was leaning toward Ben Bella. Bachir Boumaza declared to the newspaper La Tribune, that:

“The President of the Republic, who was General Secretary of the FLN at that time, had the right to revoke a member of government who would be a member of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau.”⁴³

Accordingly, the 19th of June prevented the implementation of a decision. It is though wrong to think that the Boutaflia-Ben Bella conflict was, on its own, at the origin of the overthrow. In fact, the role of the army in Algeria’s politics further aggravated the dislocation of the Ben Bella-Boumedienne alliance, especially with Ben Bella’s planning for the creation of popular militias separate from the army, in an attempt to protect himself from the growing influence that Boumedienne was gaining over the military.

Following the coup of 19 June 1965, President Houari Boumedienne denounced the demagoguery of his predecessor in an interview with the newspaper al-Ahram. He claimed that:

“Socialism for President Ben Bella was a means to face those who oppose his personal rule; he would claim Castro’s socialism sometimes, then Algerian socialism and, at other occasions, Muslim socialism, in fact, a so called “socialism” exercised over coffee bars and barbers.”⁴⁴

As a matter of fact, the coup of 19 June 1965 was seen by the leader himself, who directed it, as a return to the sources, to the historical Revolution and the redistributions of duties at all levels of the party, that is to say, to collegial governance. It also meant the edification of the Algerian state and the organisation of the party ‘FLN’ upon a new basis. Accordingly, the 19 of June 1965 was, for the President Houari Boumedienne, not only a fix for the economy but also the liquidation of the harm that the nation suffered from and whose fingerprints could still be seen. It also meant the achievement of a revolutionary unity within the party relying on the principles of the FLN and not upon needless borrowed ideas.⁴⁵ He further declared, on the occasion of the third anniversary of the coup, that:

“The 19th of June is a reaction against anarchy and chaos that prevailed everywhere. It aims at redirecting the Revolution after it deviated to allow only one person to usurp Revolution to his own benefit, pretending henceforth to personify Revolution, Socialism, and the Algerian peoples and party.”⁴⁶

Seen as a military coup for many but a revolutionary readjustment for others, the 19 of June 1965 allowed the country to embark on a socialist state-building strategy under the leadership of Boumedienne. In short, Houari Boumedienne denounced personal rule and its concentration within the hands of one man. He also condemned the presence of foreign advisers. In this context, Rachid Massali asserted that Ben Bella was disapproved for installing a personal rule and surrounding himself with foreign advisers and for governing by improvisation, demagoguery and confusion, which was totally contradictory to the principles of the revolution collegiality and independence, including the refusal of any foreign interference.⁴⁷

It is, nonetheless, very intricate to judge a leader that has only been in power for a period that is as short as three years. In effect, what seemed to be a monopoly of power could equally be regarded as a need for a quick and decisive leadership at a time when decisions were needed to be taken for the best interest of the country. In other words, the Political Bureau, under Ben Bella, contributed to the orientation of decision making. After all, the Political Bureau undertook the election of a Constituent National Assembly, which would comprehend various members within the system, where everyone could, hence, raise his voice. That is in addition to the critics with regards to the use of foreign advisers. One needs to bear in mind the reality that the country was suffering from a shortage of well trained and professional cadres and educated staff, a necessary component that Algerian society lacked and that was needed for the building of society. In such circumstances, Ben Bella had recourse to foreign professional advisers that were qualified in different areas of state-building. William Gutteridge believed that:

“The process of independence has a number of phases and in few states is the final stage nearing completion. Clearly, where the political leadership is forceful and effective, the period immediately following the achievement of independence sees the most rapid development, amounting to a crescendo of activity after a period of gradual change inevitably restrained to some degree by the colonial power,”⁴⁸

This would explain the reason why Ben Bella did not undertake any measures to sever links with France completely.

Ben Bella paved the way for Boumedienne to adopt a socialist approach in the leadership of the country and to further develop an international status. In fact, Boumedienne’s takeover of power allowed him to pursue what Ben Bella started, while concentrating power and the influence the latter was losing gradually. The fall of President Ben Bella was regarded by many of Boumedienne’s close allies as a primordial correction, necessary to achieve the objectives drawn by the War of Liberation. It was of paramount importance to abide by the revolutionary

principles. Henceforth, Boumedienne was determined to build an Algerian Democratic Republic that would be governed by legitimate laws, and which would primarily be a socialist state that would ensure the strengthening of national independence and the elimination of the exploitation of man by man.

Boumedienne's socialist choice was unavoidable, given the conditions of the state's institution and the poor treasury of the country. At a national level, the leader devoted most of his policy towards economic and social revival, aiming at eliminating any regional imbalances. Such endeavour was to be implemented upon democratic and socialist basis and within the boundaries of the nation's religion, which is Islam. However, despite the new leader's efforts to rule by consensus, an opposition began to crystallise around left-wing ministers, independent elements of the General Union of Algerian Workers (UGTA), student organizations and some sections of the army.⁴⁹ But they did not constitute a significant problem, as Boumedienne's government was adept at dealing with and dispersing some opposition. At international level, after independence, Algeria remained heavily dependent upon French financial and technical assistance and upon continuing economic co-operation with the former *métropole*. According to John Ruedy, during the Ben Bella years, France was the target of a far less anti-imperialist invective than the United States.⁵⁰ The point is that at a time when independence was gained in 1962, and with settlers leaving the country, Algeria was left with no intellectual elite. The country was destroyed as a result of a savage war, the economy was practically inexistent and the political structure was meant to work to achieve socialist goals. Parker mentioned that what the poor Algerian could realistically aspire to, at most, was:

“employment as a labourer or field hand or, if he was very lucky, as a clerk. While a small Algerian bourgeoisie survived it all, in part by adapting to colonial rule, the bulk of Algeria's 10 million people were ignorant, poor, and untrained.”⁵¹

This left Ben Bella no choice but to turn to the *ex-métropole* for aid, bearing in mind that the relationship between France and Algeria was existential, especially after independence. France knew the potential that Algeria had and, in the same way, Algeria understood that it could not start off after such social, economic and educational damage, resulting from the war, without the support of a strong power. What made co-operation with Algeria so imperative was France's awareness of its ex-colony's strategic geopolitical position, poised between the Arab and African worlds, and Algeria's popularity and status among the developing nations. Naylor asserted that: “For France, the interdependence was primarily political, as Algeria retained a crucial strategic importance, especially concerning Third World relations, complementing French foreign policy pursuits of grandeur and independence. For Algeria, its inevitable reliance upon France for its social and economic needs, as exemplified by a prodigious cooperation program, restricted its assertion of sovereignty and its revolutionary identity.”⁵² Such a relationship between the two states was based, as Grimaud highlighted, on the mutual respect of

their independence and the reciprocity of the interests and advantages of the two parts.⁵³

It is clear that after independence, Algeria needed help from a more experienced and richer country. Although Algeria's oil blessing constituted a bonus in Algeria's economic revival and despite the country's socialist and anti-imperialist orientations, it was viable for the newly independent country to seek assistance from a more developed state. It had to be France, given the historical relationship between the two peoples and that each part knew the capability of the other.

John Dunn stated:

“those who find the co-existence of a Marxist regime with giant capitalist corporations a surreal and inevitably temporary situation. They may be right, but the fact that Libya, Algeria, Angola and Jamaica have all moved towards this same curious symbiosis suggests that this option may well be viable as a general strategy for third world states lucky enough to have a large oil or mineral wealth.”⁵⁴

It is within this context of heavy reliance on the *ex-metropole* that president Houari Boumedienne would undertake to cut the empirical cord with France and attempt to variate business partners. At this stage, the United States welcomed the news of the 19 June 1965 as it meant the end of what it considered to be Marxist Algeria, especially with Algeria's behaviour under Ben Bella's regime during the Cuban Missile Crisis which placed Algeria in a rather hostile and adverse light in US governmental circles, which began to regard Algeria as pro-communist and radical.⁵⁵ Accordingly, the United States of America was very delighted and welcoming to the news of a new leadership in Algeria.

3. The Search for Foreign Policy:

The political orientations of President Houari Boumedienne find their roots in the colonised past of Algeria. In fact, the War of Liberation had contributed to a large extent to the shaping of post-independence Algeria, as it provided initial grounds for Algeria's ideological postures. That is to say that most of President Houari Boumedienne's national and foreign policies were inspired from ideological texts formulated during the War of Liberation.

The revolutionary character of Algeria meant the adherence to the Revolutionary principles for the country's politics. For President Houari Boumedienne, the “Continuity of Revolution” was the framework within which all policies needed to comply. The President Houari Boumedienne stated:

“Our duty is to preserve the revolutionary principles which inspired our fight for liberation, for we paid for these with the blood of the best of our brothers.”⁵⁶

President Houari Boumedienne believed in the necessity of a continuity of revolution; he strongly defended the idea that the independence achieved in 1962 should not end the implementation of the principles of revolution, which were clearly expressed in the Tripoli

programme, a belief that motivated many revolutionaries during the War of Liberation. He therefore embarked on a socialist revolution, inspiring his policy from the outcomes of the Tripoli Programme.

As early as March 1962 at Tripoli, the Algerian political elite sketched a set of paradigms to shape the politics of independent Algeria. The texts of the Tripoli Programme drew a programme for the future independent Algeria. This was very necessary as the country had no clear political, economic or social plan to follow post-independence. The Tripoli programme constituted an ideological framework for Algeria. It stressed three major objectives that were the development of national economy, the fulfilment of the social aspirations of the masses and an international anti-imperialist policy. It advocated the nationalisation of minerals, energies, and foreign trade.⁵⁷ This meant, to some extent, the incontestable recovery of the hydrocarbon heritage. Political independence needed to stamp out all forms of neo-colonialism and this could not be fulfilled without the achievement of economic independence.

It is, accordingly, that President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy orientations were in line with the principles of foreign policy adhered to unanimously by the CNRA in June 1962 and which included:

- a- The fight against imperialism and colonialism.
- b- The support of movements fighting for unity.
- c- Supporting movements of liberation.
- d- The fight for international cooperation.

Nevertheless, this does not rule out the presence of ideological beliefs within the one party since it started operating in 1954. On the contrary, there were some ideological postures related to the future of Algeria that were formulated prior to that. The outbreak of the war against French occupation expressed Algeria's anti-colonialist orientation. Restoring a sovereign democratic Algerian state within the principles of Islam constituted the cornerstone of the FLN ideology. The declaration of the first November 1954 provided for some ideological postures to guide the FLN. Yet, the FLN's major concern during the War of Liberation was to create a sense of national identity and urge for solidarity within the Algerian people, in addition to outlining a future for the country. It was overwhelmingly important for Algerians to ensure their voices were heard by others. The FLN Charter explicitly expressed its external objectives aiming at:

1. Internationalism of the Algerian problem.
2. Pursuit of North African unity in its national Arabo-Islamic context.
3. Assertion through the United Nations Charter, of our active sympathy towards all nations that may support our liberating action.⁵⁸

Accordingly, it will be recalled that one of the declared major aspirations of the National Liberation Front in November 1954 had been the internationalisation of the conflict, and that Ben Bella and his team in Cairo had been charged with this.⁵⁹ It is also clear that North-African unity has always been an aspiration that needed to be accomplished. This was later mentioned in

the Tripoli Programme, the Algiers Charter and the National Charter of 1976. In fact the Unity of North Africa constituted a major component of President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy. He declared:

“When I say that our destiny is closely linked to the Maghreb and that factors of unity are numerous, I am only confirming an objective reality.”⁶⁰

The Congress of the Soummam which was held on 20 August 1956 gave the Algerian Revolution guidance on how to fight French occupation.

To some extent, the Soummam platform dealt with Algeria's post-independence choices, but this was very little. The El-Soummam platform argued that the choice of socialism was based on the fact that having contributed massively to the revolution, the peasants and the workers had to be rewarded by the establishment of socialism in Algeria. The Platform also suggested agrarian reforms and the nationalisation of the means of production after the independence of Algeria was gained.⁶¹ However, for the sake of maintaining a solid platform and preventing ideological division, the platform did not elaborate elements of a socialist state. The ideology of the FLN developed during the war was not comprehensive. It did not deal with the future political system in Algeria. Considering that the leaders of the FLN during the war had different ideological orientations, each faction was lenient towards a different political system. In order to avoid division, these orientations were not made public as it would have divided the FLN as a national front into a variety of political groups and in turn it would have made the destruction of the Revolution easier for the French. Therefore, the FLN aim was to preserve unity within the party and the Algerian people. Hence some ideological formulations were necessarily left to be considered after the triumph of the revolution.

The Tripoli programme called for the *Revolution Democratique Populaire* (The Peoples Democratic Revolution) in order to build post-independent Algeria. As a matter of fact, the Algerian Revolution was considered to be a bridge between Algeria and other nations in the struggle against colonialism.

The latter was “the first ideological pronouncement of the FLN that was meant to provide the newly independent country with a political orientation in Algeria.”⁶² It should be noted that the FLN's ideological orientations, underlined in the Programme of Tripoli, stressed before all, the Arab-Muslim identity of Algeria and the socialist approach that would be followed by the state. In a way, the programme was striving to meet the expectations of the different tendencies within the party. The Tripoli Programme underlined the need for a mass party and its conversion from a revolutionary into a political party with a unified ideology and democratic basis drawing guidelines for the state's policy.⁶³ In this respect, William H. Lewis stated:

“Significantly, the Tripoli programme defines the relationship between the party and the state as being somewhat akin to that of a horse and rider. The FLN clearly is to be the rider. It will establish the guidelines of policy and maintain firm control

over the reins by assuring that the head of government and the majority of ministers are members of the FLN- and, by inference, accountable to the FLN's political bureau."⁶⁴

The Tripoli programme set the aims and objectives of independent Algeria in motion. It called for an independent national economy, a social policy that ought to serve the masses and improve their living standard, and an international policy based on national independence and anti-imperialist fight.

The Tripoli programme outlined the revolutionary, Arabo-Muslim character and third world nature of Algeria.⁶⁵ The programme proposed economic development based on the rejection of economic liberalism and emphasised the necessity of central planning with the participation of the workers and peasants. There was also a mention of the recovery of the country's natural resources and the launch of agrarian reforms

It is stated in the Tripoli Programme that:

"The Algerian people had not only attained the aim of independence, which was stated by the FLN on November 1st 1954, but the people had also gone further aiming now at an economic and social revolution."⁶⁶

Thus the congress of the party provided one of Algeria's principal ideological documents. Its objectives were to set up a framework for organising Algeria's political, social and economic affairs following the independence. The programme, however, failed to identify the political organs necessary for taking over power from the French because of ideological differences between the leaders. The Tripoli Programme of 1962 insisted upon and developed a socialist choice. It argued that

"The economic conditions of Algeria determine our social and cultural situation. If the development of Algeria aims at rapid economic growth and the satisfaction of all needs of the people in a collective way, it should take the form of a socialist development."⁶⁷

President Houari Boumedienne's loyalty to the principles of Revolution and his blind commitment to the principle of "continuity of revolution" meant to some extent the adherence of Boumediennist Algeria to the principles of revolution. Accordingly, foreign policy under President Houari Boumedienne needed to respond to the major objectives outlined in the Tripoli programme. These were: the fight against colonialism and imperialism and the support of movements struggling for unity, including the *Maghrib Unity*, within an Arab and African framework, along with movements of liberation, and the fight for international cooperation.⁶⁸

It is important at this stage to mention that the Algerian War of Liberation was an experience that was going to mould independent Algeria's national and foreign policy. The seven years of struggle and resistance had proven the unconditional and valuable support of the Arab nations to

the Algerians. It is upon this evidence of absolute moral and material support, provided by the Arab world to Algeria during the hardest time and at the most needed moments, that independent Algeria would prioritise and intensify cooperation and integration with Arab countries. In fact, the Arab world had relentlessly constituted a matter of interest in Algeria's political agenda.

The Algerian War of Liberation had received great support during the seven years of war from Arab nations, noticeably Tunisia and Morocco. Prior to independence, policy officials had always recognised the innate solidarity proven by Arab nations since the beginning of the Algerian Revolution and the brotherly existing bonds that unified the nations. This induced Algeria to undertake the necessary measures in order to help Arab peoples to achieve their political, economic and social independence.⁶⁹

Above all, Algeria could not turn a blind eye to the support it received from Arab states in its revolution against French imperialism. This applied especially to Egypt, the ultimate and perfect partner of the Algerian cause for much of the past years of resistance and War of Liberation against the invader. Indeed, Egypt played a major role and contributed, at an early stage, by opening its doors to the occupied Maghribi territories and hosting the '*Comité de Libération d'Afrique du Nord*' in 1948 and the GPRA's (*Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne*) Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The revolutionaries started critical collaboration with Jamal Abd al-Nasir of Egypt. Notably, the Maghrib office was established in Cairo to promote the anti-colonial movements of Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria. The Arab League, with headquarters in Cairo, dominated by Nasir, participated in the development of the Maghrib office.⁷⁰ Furthermore, Algerian nationalists employed Radio Cairo's 'voice of the Arabs' to gain an audience, and turned to the United Nations, where the Algerian Question was first put down for discussion on 30 September 1955.⁷¹ Egypt was, with no doubt, the centre of its diplomatic actions and the main basis for its communication and coordination channels. It is clear that Algerians benefited greatly from Egypt's help, politically, militarily and financially. In a letter dated on 25 February 1956 and written by Khidder, a member of the *délégation extérieure* based in Cairo, he described this office in Cairo as a very active diplomatic centre.⁷² Nasir's back-up to the Algerian war could not elapse and be underestimated. In fact, Egypt's provision of sizable assistance and help to Algeria shaped the future fraternal and tight links of the two countries.

Furthermore, Tunisia had always been supportive of the Algerian case, offering help to the FLN. Horne explained that the greatest bonus for the FLN cause, both in terms of arms supplies and also troop movements, was significantly sensed after Tunisia and Morocco gained their independence in March 1956. Horne stated that from that moment the FLN had opened frontiers to east and west. Tunisia, in particular, was to offer benefits of tremendous value.⁷³ In the view of Ageron, it was Thanks to Tunisia, that the ALN did at least maintain an Eastern base, from which it launched its raids with impunity until the fortified Morice line along the frontier was

completed. In addition, the Tunisian government obtained good offices of the United States and Great Britain for mediation designed to internationalise the Algerian problem.⁷⁴

Algeria received valuable support from both Arab and non Arab countries. Countries like Sudan had repeatedly reaffirmed its support to the Algerian war of liberation and would have, accordingly, donated an amount of twenty thousand pounds on an annual basis to the League of Arab States that was in charge of transmitting financial donations to the Algerian revolution.⁷⁵

Harbi specifically mentioned that Algeria owed a lot to the *IV Internationale* and to the setting up of a factory for armament in Morocco.⁷⁶

At a larger level, the FLN has always relied on outside support. In particular, the support of the anti-colonial world. The FLN was initially very cautious with respect to the Cold War. It avoided association with either bloc. However, this was not going to last longer as it changed its foreign policy towards the West, especially to the United States of America which provided France with financial and diplomatic support in its colonial war against Algerians. Under French occupation, the Algerian nation was not recognised as such. The French truly denied the culture and the origins which might have belonged, once, to Algerians and thus Algeria was regarded as a French territory. It was in fact a French colony with France as the only outside link. In other words, Algeria was isolated from the outside world as it was a 'French possession'. The only relationship Algeria held was on a settler-colonised level with France.

Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949⁷⁷ plainly vowed that an armed attack against one or many territories is considered as such if targeted against one of Europe's territories or South America's, or against the French departments of Algeria. This plainly shows that by 1949, the West viewed Algeria as an integral part of France or as a non-European French extension. This meant that at this very stage of nationalism in Algeria, the West was more of a French ally than a supporter of the Algerian cause. According to Aït-Chaalal, for the West, based on French propaganda, France was carrying an anti-communist campaign in Algeria.⁷⁸

Therefore, the attitude of the West towards the Algerian revolution contributed to the shaping of Algeria's postures towards it. Furthermore, the growing financial, material and diplomatic support of the socialist countries lifted the need for Algerians to look for material support from the West. In this context, it is worth mentioning that following the failure of the Melun talks of the 25-29 June 1960, between the French government and the GPRA, as a result of France's insistence on separating the Sahara from the rest of the country, Algeria, as stated by Ageron, was to turn to the Communist bloc. In fact, Algeria turned to China, which had recognised the GPRA as the legitimate government of Algeria since its formation in September 1958.⁷⁹

Likewise, it was anti-colonialism that brought Algeria closer with Afro-Asian countries. It was stated in the Tripoli programme that:

“The support of the socialist countries, which have come to our assistance in various ways during the war and with which we should reinforce existing links, creates real possibilities of release from imperialist control. The foreign policy of Algeria should be orientated in a neutralist direction toward alliance with the countries which have succeeded in consolidating their independence and have freed themselves from the hold of imperialism.”⁸⁰

One needs to admit that Algeria's first involvement in Third World circles goes back to the Bandung conference. Horne mentioned that the FLN's most stupendous accomplishment of internationalisation began in April 1955. After some energetic lobbying by Aït Ahmed and his brother in law, Khider and M'hamed Yazid, the FLN obtained an invitation to attend the Bandung Conference. This was a milestone for the emerging Third World in which twenty nine nations, representing some 1.3 billion people, were to participate. Horne emphasised the importance of such an event, although the Algerians had no recognised government behind them, and could only attend as “unofficial” delegates. Their presence at Bandung, Horne stressed, “was sufficient to achieve a notable victory on the international scene.”⁸¹ Algeria's international involvement did not stop there and there were more events in which members of the GPRA had attended officially, such as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Beirut in 1960 and the Non-aligned Conference in Cairo at the end of August 1961. In addition, a delegation of the GPRA had also visited Hanoi in Viet Nam and China simultaneously in May 1960.

Moreover, the support of both France and the United States to Morocco over Western Sahara affected Algeria's foreign policy (under President Houari Boumedienne) toward both countries to a great extent.

Accordingly, Algeria embarked on a Third Worldism ideology, seeing itself part of this world as a result of a common colonial heritage. According to Malley, Algeria viewed the Western bloc to be hostile, largely because of the latter's overall opposition towards national liberation movements, as opposed to the self-proclaimed “socialist camp”, which had been an objective ally of the FLN. This constituted the sphere of complementarity to the hostile sphere. In fact, it was more solidarity of interests than an absolute identification.⁸² Nevertheless, by receiving such support from the communist bloc, Algeria was tempted to follow its allies' lines, in opposition to the North. The Algerian socialist orientations could thus be explained as an initiative to follow the same line as those who helped and supported Algeria in the fight against imperialism. In this context, Grimaud portrayed the socialist forces as the natural allies of the nascent revolution against imperialism and neo-colonialist danger.⁸³

Being a close ally to Soviets and China, Algeria never wanted to be part of the Chino-Soviet conflict. Grimaud stated that Algeria had always been scrupulously neutral in its dealings with China and the USSR.⁸⁴ As mentioned earlier, China had been a determined ally to the FLN by

recognising the GPRA on 22 September 1958 and by providing material aid during the war. However, such relationships between China and Algeria were not to last long. This was due to Algeria's drive to promote human rights and support the United Nations Organisation, and by backing the idea of pacifism and excluding war, also bearing in mind the assistance provided by the USSR.⁸⁵

The Algerian revolution had not only benefited from international support but had also served international purposes. It fought for the humanitarian and legal right that was the people's right to self-determination. The Algerian revolution had reinforced the public opinion and encouraged the colonised nations to fight for independence through organised guerrilla warfare. Debbèche believed that the Algerian Revolution distinguished itself by its Arabic-Islamic depth, as Algerians belonged to the Arab nation and also to Algeria's geopolitical location in the middle of the Arab world, which ushered a natural and spontaneous Arab response. Arab nations and all Arab countries had backed and expressed their support to the Algerian revolution, with regards to their capacities, considering the victory of the Algerian Revolution to be the victory of the Arab nation.⁸⁶ It is all these events that were going to mould post-independence Algeria's foreign politics.

Malley put the focus on the fact that, from the outset, independent Algeria carried forward two fundamental aims: to increase political, economic, diplomatic and cultural exchanges between countries of the Third World, in order to unite them around a set of coherent propositions; and to gradually move these propositions in the direction of an all-out assault on the existing economic world order.⁸⁷

The constitution of 1963 stated in its second article: "Algeria is an integral part of the Arab Maghrib, Arab world, and Africa."⁸⁸ It associated itself with the African countries and shares with them the aims of African unity, the elimination of foreign dominance from the continent, and cooperation among African states. Algeria was mentioning an intention to play a very active role both in Africa and the Third World. Algeria's Arabo-muslim character was also restated in the Charter of Algiers 1964. It defined Algeria as an "Arabo-Muslim country" It also suggested that "even though the Arab World today is divided into small geographical parts, the factors of unity, such as common history, common Islamic culture and common language, do exist."⁸⁹ These very same principles and orientations that are mentioned in the Constitution of 1963 and the Charter of Algiers were about to be extended and to be more detailed in the Constitution of 1976. Most strikingly, the new leader, President Houari Boumedienne, followed the lines of Ben Bella. President Houari Boumedienne did not really introduce major changes to his predecessor's orientations. He continued on the socialist path, adopting Islam as the religion of the state. In other words, Autogestion or self-management constituted the nucleus of the socialist revolution initiated by President Boumedienne. At an international level, the Algerian leader resumed the same aspirations and had the same Foreign policy orientations. i.e: fight imperialism, support revolutionary movements and aspire to cooperation and coexistence.

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PART TWO:

The Study of the State-Level of Analysis.

Chapter Three

Ideological Influences on Algeria's Politics: The domestic dimension.

1. The Domestic Distribution of Power:

The domestic distribution of power in Algeria's politics helps us understand the state level of analysis and the framework within which policy-making is done. It highlights the most powerful circles in decision-making and sheds light on who the real policy makers are in Algeria.

Soon after the coup of 19 June 1965, Boumedienne held a plurality of functions. He was President of the Revolutionary Council (Conseil Révolutionnaire), head of the government and still Minister of Defence. He undertook to rebuild the state and edify a socialist nation through a socialist plan of development. In its declaration of the 19th of June 1965, the Council of Revolution asserted that it had undertaken the necessary measures to ensure the functioning of the existing institutions in order and safety.¹ That is to say that decision-making was transferred from the hands of the President of the Republic, to the Council of Revolution in order to rid the monopoly of power from the hands of one man, theoretically, to the hands of a governmental organ.² However, in a democratic state, authority was to belong to the people, a characteristic that was not reflected in the 'Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria', a matter that was deferred while a constitution was to be adopted in 1976.

Left with no institutions, Boumedienne's first mission was to restructure those existing, and even to create further institutions. By assuming the continuity of the revolution, the Council of Revolution undertook to create and gather the necessary conditions to build a democratic state, ruled by laws and based upon morals, as declared by the President of the Council of Revolution on the 19 June 1965.³ To implement these objectives, the Council had to embark on the renovation of the country's institutions. This was essential for the state to function. It was through institutions that different policies and laws were to be ruled. Bearing in mind the prevailing idea of collegiality, and in an attempt to decentralise power and implement democracy, *communes*, which constituted the smallest territorial division, and which were defined in article I of section I of the Communal Code as: "The basic cultural, social, economic, administrative, political and territorial collectivises,"⁴ they were installed, following the ordinance n°67-24 of 18 January 1967. Communal assemblies were thus elected and they consisted of people from different layers of the society. Communes were, accordingly, the starting point of development for the economy and an improvement for administrative organisation, especially since such a measure was aimed to promote the relationship between local administrations and citizens and it was a new era that opened the doors for citizens to take part in the elected Peoples Assemblies. The Wilaya was the next institution to be

introduced, in accordance with the Ordinance n°69-38 of 23 May 1969. It represented a larger territory and substituted what was known as a department. The Wilaya, according to the Charter of the Wilaya adopted by the Council of Revolution and the government on 26 March 1969, was described as: “A financially autonomous territorial and political collectivity and as the hinge between the nation and the commune.”⁵ At another level, after the Constitution of 1976 was adopted, the Peoples National Assembly (APN) was to be elected on 6 February 1977, following the decree 77-35 of 30 January. The APN was in charge of implementing the charter and members were elected for the period of 5 years. These institutions constituted the basis for dealing with economic policy, and social and cultural matters. All of them played complementary roles and embedded the institutional system of the country.

All these laws and revolutions were enacted at different levels and had to be filtered through a socialist approach, repeatedly described by Boumedienne, at the inauguration of the barrage of Djorf Torba (Saoura) on 5 October 1965, as just, equal and fair, and which promoted the non-exploitation of man by man. It was the only way to win over ignorance and the social underdevelopment scourge.⁶

The army, led by Boumedienne, was thirsty for political influence and was determined to recover its authority within the country, especially due to Ben Bella’s attempt to depoliticise the military organs. This bid totally failed, considering the upcoming years in Algerian political history.

Soon after President Boumedienne deposed Ben Bella in a swift coup d’état, he announced the power seizure by the Council of Revolution after Ben Bella’s eviction. Moreover, between 5 and 10 July of 1965, the new leader rescinded the constitution, and issued the ordinance of 10 July 1965, which was to become the small constitution of the nation. In an attempt to justify his move against the former president of the Republic, who was accused of isolating decision making and restricting the process to him, and monopolising power, Boumedienne strongly asserted the principle of collegiality, proclaimed historical legitimacy, and appointed a new cabinet.

The FLN was no longer influential, as the army overrode political influence, thereby displacing the FLN. Boumedienne endeavoured to involve the army directly in the leadership of the country. Boumedienne established the “Council of Revolution” which was the country’s highest government body and supreme authority, consisting of 26 members which were either Army commanders or close associates, and of which he became President. Abd al Aziz Boutfliqa kept his position as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ahmed Medeghri was at the head of the Interior Ministry, Belaïd Abdesslam was nominated at the Ministry of Industry and Energy, and Cherif Belkacem became in charge of reorienting the party. Houari Boumedienne was persuaded that the army had the legitimacy of directly interfering in the ruling and commandment of the country. Such a strong belief could only be justified by the fact that the

President himself was a military man who was armed with his lucidity, vast knowledge and literacy, and who devoted his life to the Army, defending the Algerian cause from an early age. The political system of Algeria, after the military coup (or the revolutionary readjustment of 19 June 1965) headed by Houari Boumedienne went through a first stage, between 19 June 1965 and the preparation of a constitution in 1976, which witnessed the temporary organisation of authority in accordance with the ordinance n° 65-182 of 10 July 1965.⁷ The latter ordinance introduced the Council of Revolution, which was the legislative organ and the issuing body of ordinances,⁸ subsequently replacing the National Council (under Ben Bella). It also introduced a government that was the executive body. Both of these bodies functioned in harmony and coordination under the Presidency of Houari Boumedienne. Under article 3 of the ordinance n° 65-182 dated 10 July 1965, “the government has to act under the authority and control of the Council of Revolution that has absolute authority over the state’s institutions. By analysing the “resolution of the Council of Revolution,” issued following meetings that took place from 22 to 26 October 1966, it appears that the Council of Revolution assumed executive functions on top of the legislative role it played in the system. The “resolution of the Council of Revolution” dealt with some important ideological approaches to adopt in state building, such as the implementation of self-management, the decentralisation of power and the return to collegial leadership, in accordance with the essential revolutionary principles and upon the basis of democracy. This was well illustrated by the Council of Revolution when fixing 5 February 1967 as a date for the communal elections which was primarily the party’s role and not the legislative body, especially whereby the party was put in charge of the organisation of the elections. This happened, in addition to the party exclusion of Mahsas Ahmed and Bachir Boumaza, the respective Ministers of Agriculture and Information. Such an endeavour gave an idea about the way the higher state institution took up the party’s role on some occasions, subsequently controlling and orienting both the party’s executive secretariat and the government. Yet, the Council of Revolution saw its activities decreasing from 1967, following an attempted coup against the system by Tahir Zubayri on the 14 December 1967. Saïd Bouch’ir stated that the Council stopped holding meetings independently from the government until 1969. It worked in coordination with the government and held meetings to consider important issues such as the Code of the Wilaya, budgeting, planning and the Agricultural Revolution, socialism and the self-management of institutions.⁹ The government, on the other hand, was attributed all powers, amongst which was the legislation to insure the functioning of the state institutions under the authority and control of the Council of Revolution, according to article 5 of the constitution of the government of 10 July 1965.¹⁰ However, most members of the government were also members of the Council of Revolution and were headed by the same president who was, thus, in charge of different functions that encompassed control, legislation and political authority. This takes us back to the issue of collegial ruling, due to which Ben Bella was overthrown. The second stage began with the adoption of the National Charter of

1976, under which a National Peoples Assembly (*Assemblée Populaire Nationale*), whose members were to be elected on universal suffrage upon the proposal of the party's directorate, was to exercise the legislative function¹¹ and whose leadership was assigned to the party as a political function that included the orientation and the control of the state's policy.¹² Most importantly, the executive function under article 104 of the new constitution was assumed by the President of the Republic, as head of the state, whereas the political function was assigned to the party.

The adoption of The National Charter in 1976 was a big step towards an effective implementation of democracy, which followed the creation of a supreme commission¹³ for the preparation of the upcoming ideological text on 19 June 1975 which, after discussions and agreements on a final blueprint, was subject to the people's vote on 27 June 1976. The National Charter was the official ideological document adopted by the system, the institutions and the citizens. It was the main ideological reference that drew the ideological orientations of the state, clarifying the ideological framework and the policy to follow, insuring the peoples' contribution in the elaboration of both the Constitution and the Charter, therefore conforming with the criteria for a socialist democratic state. The political approach was well defined for the country through the Constitution and the National Charter. According to the Constitution of 1976, Algeria was to adopt socialism as a social system, Islam as its religion, and Arabic as the national and official language.¹⁴ Boumedienne took the offices of the President of the Council of Revolution, Prime Minister, and Minister of Defence. This was not accepted by students and some regional groups.

President Houari Boumedienne's detractors often described his rule as non-democratic and authoritarian, basing their cynical criticism on the absence of individual liberties and the non-existence of multi-partism. This could be partially correct if we considered four fundamental elements mentioned by Mameri and that are required for democracy. Should any of these elements be lacking, a false democracy would unfold:

- A parliament (National Assembly) that would be in charge of the enactment of law.
- Honest and regular elections that would allow the people to choose their political leader.
- Multi-partism which would give the citizens the choice between different programs.
- Freedom of expression and free, independent and diversified media and communication.¹⁵

It is, though, incorrect and unacceptable to be categorical in portraying Boumedienne's ruling as non-democratic. It was common knowledge that President Houari Boumedienne would discuss and consult with different layers of the state system prior to decision-taking and the implementation of any projects. It was like a multi-storey building where the President would be going up and down to listen to the different people at various levels.¹⁶ There was at first, the Council of Revolution, through which issues were discussed and considered and then the

Ministers' Cabinet. There were also advisors and common people with whom he would directly consult, such as fellahin and workers. The President also used to indirectly consult his people through his advisors and through national press, as he would receive a two-page report including all the news. There was also *le courier du lecteur* from which he would learn of public demands. For these reasons, it would be partially incorrect, to some extent, to completely deny the existence of democracy.

It was unlikely for the President to consider multi-partism at an early stage of state building especially given that the major concern of the nation was to rebuild the country's institutions in accordance with revolutionary principles. By claiming historical legitimacy, Boumedienne was clearly restricting other parties' contribution to the leadership of the country, as they could not share historical legitimacy with the revolutionary single party. It was not until 1976 that a National Assembly was officially elected within the single party and a Constitution was drafted for the country.

In the view of Muhy al-Deen Amimour, if Algeria had continued on the lines of President Houari Boumedienne, multi-partism would have logically derived from the party of the National Liberation Front (FLN). If we looked back to the years between 1973-1978, the Central Committee of the party was composed of nationals with different orientations. Each trend of thought would have gathered under the form of political wings and the FLN would have been the bridge between the past and the future of the country.¹⁷ One can only speculate in saying that this was probably amongst the president's intentions were he to live. This was especially true when considering Kasdi Merbah's statement regarding the President's goals to fight social decadency and bribery, along with the reorganisation of the party in order for democracy to prevail.¹⁸ Nevertheless, as Michael Willis stated:

"Individual liberties, such as freedom of expression, were totally non-existent and only two newspapers were published and they were controlled by the government. Public gatherings were forbidden and travelling outside the national territory was subjected to an authorization that was to be submitted by the Wilaya. Hence, democracy was practically non-existent within social classes, as Boumedienne tended to take authoritarian measures without consulting his people. Effectively, what Boumedienne described and implemented as democracy was only at the level of decision-making where he used to consult other members of his cabinet and involve them in the process of policy making. Nonetheless, the Islamic tendency in its various shades was excluded from the centres of power in the new regime, given "Boumedienne's opportunistic use of Islam,"¹⁹

In order to deal with this, Willis explained that Boumedienne's new government took care to put the regime on a broader footing by including many of the elements and interests that Ben Bella had excluded and which had hastened his downfall.²⁰ In reality, democracy at an early stage of state-building could be a hamper as much as it could constitute an asset. For Algeria, a strong and determined leadership was crucial for state-building.

1.1 The Role of the National Liberation Front:

Upon looking back into the events that preceded the proclamation of the 1st of November 1954, which called for a sovereign democratic and socialist state within Islamic principles, there were several attempts to resist the yoke of colonialism.

The 1930s witnessed the emergence of movements or associations with political or religious characters which fought to recover either equal rights, given the unfair and unjust way Algerians were treated, and to recover the Arabo-Muslim identity. Such resistance adopted different strategies and approaches. Primarily, these were nationalist movements that embraced one of two views. The first of these was prone to totally integrate with French identity, an idea attributable to Ferhat Abass of the “Union Democratique du Manifeste Algerien” (UDMA). The second was of a reformist spur, attempting to restore Islamic teachings and revive the Muslim identity that had been denied to Algerians since the start of colonialism, a concept driven by Ben Badis of the Ulama. In addition, there were those who totally rejected the coloniser. These were led by Messali Hajj, who claimed total independence for Algerians. Nevertheless, each of these movements had a different perception as to how independence was to be gained. In summation, these nationalist movements failed to unify within one framework of resistance in their fight against colonialism.

The reason behind the creation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) was to forcibly rally all Algerians and all national movements in the fight against colonialism. Several attempts to create a National Front open to all Algerians of whatever party had taken place previously, the first of which was the Congress of Messali Hajj’s MTLD (Mouvement pour Le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques) party in Belgium in 1953.²¹

Since 1954, the National Liberation Front was the only party to symbolise the revolution and to guide Algeria through the war of independence. The party gathered different ideological tendencies, being a coalition of various nationalist movements as mentioned above. However, they all had a common objective, which was to lead a successful revolution.

The FLN was to lead the political arena and orient the process of policy making, a revolutionary principle that was not effectively implemented after the 19 June 1965.

In post-independence Algeria, the ideological foundations of the FLN provided the backdrop to the rise of conflictual tendencies within the single party that were at the origin of the formation of the FLN. For this reason, the leadership of the country was plunged into a political crisis. George Joffé, cited that the origins of the political crisis:

“lie in the original construction of the Algerian state in 1962, after the war of independence ended with France relinquishing its sovereign control. Nor indeed, has merely been political in

nature, for political and economic visions were closely intertwined in the initial decisions as to what the Algerian state was to become, an interconnection that has persisted until the present day. Not only was it to be based upon the hegemony of the single party serving the interests of an elite backed by the army after Ahmed Ben Bella had seized power in 1962, but, as laid down in the Tripoli Programme, the economy of the new state was to be based on socialist perception in which the public sector was to play the leading role.²²

The controversy of 'how to manage the country' after 1962 was the dominant cluster of preoccupation, which controlled post-independence Algeria. This will be addressed by examining the political trends within the FLN and the concomitant influences these trends exerted. The ascension of Ben Bella to power provoked a conflict between the military general staff and the provisional government. Many members of the FLN were left with no choice but to defect from the party and crystallise as a political opponent. In addition to this, several national figures of importance were evicted. Within the FLN, the monopoly of power was inherited by the Tlemceni coalition and, hence, culminated in the appointment of Ben Bella as President.

Jackson insisted on the failure of external and internal leaders to maintain a joint front, especially with their inability to reach common agreement on the political objectives that their struggle was supposed to promote.²³ It was, however, inevitable for the different leaders within the FLN to render their opinions in an attempt to gain the leadership of the country, once the unified target was achieved. i.e. independence. In fact, the split within the party's rank started to emerge well before independence. The FLN witnessed regional factionalism and an increase in rivalries between FLN members on both the military and civilian political fronts.²⁴ This was embedded by the determination Berbers showed since independence to distinguish their ethnicity and characteristics from the Arab identity, besides the rise of a strong fundamentalist opposition.

The FLN thus gathered different ideological partitions. However, the discrepancies and differences in beliefs did not constitute a major threat during the War of Liberation, as the main concern of the National Front was to liberate the country and to lead the revolution within Islamic principles, and more importantly, to preserve unity between its members with no clear policy and ideology planned for post-war times. By 1956, the Islamist reformist association, known as the Ulama, in conjunction with the Ferhat Abass's National Movement, joined the FLN despite the strong difference between the two leaders. This showed the will of both movements to serve one cause, that being to liberate Algeria. In fact, the nationwide triumph of the Islamist movement was mediated by the political victory of the FLN.²⁵ Nevertheless, by doing so, the FLN suppressed the 'autonomy' of the association, which engendered the formation of radical Islamist opposition that evolved throughout post-independence Algeria. Many other national movements joined the FLN. This made the party

the gathering point of different ideological orientations that did not provoke discord within the party until the end of the war and the concretisation of the national dream. To go back to the role of the party in preserving unity within itself, after the defeat of France and the departure of the settler, one must admit the difficulty of such a task, taking into account the various political systems envisaged by the various ideological groups within the party.

It is of paramount importance to shed light on the success that gained the different ideological tendencies emerging in post-independence Algeria, to reiterate their beliefs and approaches and to try to participate in decision-making. Hugh Roberts emphasised that “an implicit criticism of the Algerian FLN that is frequently encountered in the academic literature on Algerian politics concerns its lack of ideology, its congenital failure to elaborate a coherent and rigorous social project properly grounded in an internally consistent social doctrine.”²⁶

It is believed, however, that it was only under Boumedienne that a more broadly established regime that represented all major functions of the wartime factions in the FLN emerged.²⁷ The party included socialist, secularist, and centralist tendencies, a fact which proved to be most difficult when including such a host of individuals in a decision-making process. Moreover, in the 1970's, the government welcomed the communist wing known as the Socialist Vanguard Party to join the political institution of the state rally with the government.

In retrospect, what Boumedienne undertook was to appoint different members belonging to different tendencies as state officials, and in parallel, to suppress all extremist opposition, thereby insuring the inclusion of the discrepant partitions within the government in order to meet the needs of a decentralised power, characterized with a somehow prevailing breeze of democracy. This was, however, the structure of the new government seen from the outside where all ideological approaches were to be included in the building and edification of the country. Revolutionary readjustment was to achieve the principles crystallised following the Tripoli meeting, among which was the role of the National Liberation Front in the construction of the Algerian state.

Put in the words of Lewis: “The June 19, 1965, *coup de main* by the army, under the direction of Colonel Houari Boumedienne (Hawārī Bū-Midyān), merely brought into public view the failure and bankruptcy of the *parti unique*.”²⁸

The FLN had a rather symbolic role after independence, a characteristic that prevailed over Boumedienne's regime. Boumedienne totally froze the party while undertaking the building of the country and the consolidation of its institutions. Concurrently, he insured his power over his government and fortified his position as a leader within the army and the country's institutions.

The FLN was still the only political party and all political organisations outside the FLN were virtually prohibited, with the FLN being classified as the legitimate representation of all political tendencies. Boumedienne claimed that the party was the engine of the state, and that the state was the executive instrument that implemented the party's policy. This seems to be

incorrect if we highlighted the leading role attributed to the Council of Revolution, which was the highest institution and the only decision making political body that was primarily military, although claiming collaboration with different institutions, in other words the party. This was confirmed by the ordinance n° 65-182 of 10 July 1965,²⁹ which embraced the constituency of the government granting the Council of Revolution absolute authority until a constitution was set for the country. After the coup, all political power was transferred to Boumedienne who appointed the military institutions to lead the country, hence undermining the leading role of the party. Kamel Bouchama stated that, following the substitution of Kaid Ahmed by Messaâdia, members of the Council of Revolution explained to him implicitly, that the FLN had a *chief* that was represented by the President and the Council of Revolution and that he was only a delegate for orientating and informing the party.³⁰ Such a statement only proves that the Council of Revolution had always wanted to keep the party away from power. The Council of Revolution undertook the issuing of resolutions to orient the government and the executive organ of the party, therefore demonstrating its authority over the two institutions. These resolutions were only provisional until a constitution was adopted; however, such a provisional role undertaken by the revolutionary council was to last ten years until a constitution was submitted to referendum in 1975 and adopted in 1976. It is argued that the cabinet which included Islamic leaders, technical experts and FLN regulars, along with representatives of different ranges of political and institutional Algerian life, had some functions within the Council of Revolution.³¹

Nevertheless, ideological documents often speculated on the vanguard aspect and the leading role attributed to the party; they would refer to “The restoration of the party’s revolutionary vanguard role within rules of democratic centralism, in conformity with the principles of the Tripoli programme and the Charter of Algiers.”³² The party was supposedly in charge of orienting, elaborating, animating and controlling with a specific note not to manage and substitute the state.³³ Yet the FLN never assumed such tasks or effectively portrayed the images that were ascribed to it through official statements, not because it was incapable of such responsibilities, but because it was never granted the opportunity to implement its role fully; it was merely marginalized by the Council of Revolution that did not want to share the utter authority it benefited from.

Between 1965 and 1968 the FLN was practically off duty, the party was marginalized and reduced to an inert, idler institution as a result of some measures undertaken by a system that was eager to keep its prerogatives and that rejected any competition undertaken by some means to strengthen the stranglehold on the party. Several bids to show interest in the party were undertaken, such as the creation of an executive secretariat for the party to substitute the political bureau on 17 July 1966. Kaid Ahmed was appointed at the head of the party’s apparatus in 1968. There was also an attempt to revive the party in 1967 by inviting the FLN to participate in the Communal Peoples Assemblies elections on 18 January 1967 by which the

party was to undertake a sheer formative role along with the awareness campaigns that members of the FLN used to carry out. After the promulgation of the fundamental texts that included the implementation of the Agricultural Revolution, the party embarked on a more active phase where Kaid Ahmed efficiently contributed in the control to back up and ensure awareness of the Agricultural Revolution. The FLN was also associated with the campaign relating to the socialist management of institutions.

In fact, it was not until 1976 that the FLN was effectively and officially recognized and at which point, the party was granted a political role. The 1976 National Charter and Constitution clearly recognised the FLN as the single party with a revolutionary historical role and it assigned candidates to run local, regional and national assemblies. The National Charter asserted the vanguard character of the party and the important role played by its higher organisation, that being congress, in the ratification of the party's fundamental laws and fixing the ideological orientations and policy of the country. The FLN was restructured and now had total authority to create necessary and permanent structure; the Congress was the highest structure in charge of determining the main lines of the country's general policy. The party also contained a Central Committee and an executive body that was the Political Bureau.³⁴

It is important to mention the revolutionary legitimacy attributed to the FLN, having played a primordial role in the liberation of Algerians. This was not only by unifying the different political movements but also by mobilising masses and rising awareness among the Algerians in order to thoroughly eradicate colonialism and recover the Algerian identity, whilst also encouraging other liberation movements around the planet. However, the revolutionary character of the FLN was very predominant, and after independence it was essential to transform this revolutionary aspect of the party into the political level. On the other hand, was it really possible to give the FLN a major role in decision making, when in essence it encompassed political leaders that gained revolutionary and political experience only from practice in the War of Liberation rather than from normal political conditions? Although it did not have an effective role in post independence Algeria, Boumedinne granted the FLN recognition in 1976, offering its candidates to run state institutions. In view of the dogmatic and fractioned nature of party leadership, would it not have been better for the sound development of a newly independent country to have kept the party as only symbolic with total respect, and grant the leadership to practical politicians and diplomats that understood the needs of the country?

The FLN has been a compulsorily major component in Algeria's history, but it does not mean that it should be included within the decision making process. A party that successfully led a revolution need not necessarily perform well in statecraft. The party as a state institution did not play a major role in decision making; however, a few of the FLN's members were also members of the Council of Revolution and had weight in the leading sphere.

Henceforth, the role of the party was practically a theoretical ideological one that was not put into effect in the political arena. Algeria's leadership was promulgating, *via* its ideological declarations, a picture of a progressive socialist state with a single ruling party that designed the ideological guidelines of the states' policy. The leadership drew the picture of a country fully devoted to the building of a newly independent state which managed to gain independence thanks to a devoted party, and that was to ensure the continuity of revolution not only against underdevelopment, but also against imperialism in the world. The FLN enjoyed an excellent revolutionary reputation acquired for its intransigence and solidarity with other nations fighting for self-determination. Bouchama claimed in this respect that during visits of other countries, political officials tended to question the reasons why the Party had not yet gathered its congress since 1964.³⁵ In fact, the Congress, which was the highest level within the party, was supposed to gather every five years which was a process that showed the priority given to the party in the leadership of the country and in drawing the big lines of the country's policy. Although Boumedienne announced the prominent gathering of the party, it never took place, as Kaïd Ahmed resigned from his functions in 1971.

1.2 The Role of the Army:

The only effective way to show the role that the military had in decision making during the Boumedienne regime is to analyse the itinerary of the army. This shifted the lethargic position that the military occupied in the political playground into a more influential and prominent role in decision making once independence was gained and a government headed by Ben Bella was elected. As Christopher Clapham argued, the way in which the army was insulated from politics (whilst sustained under civilian regimes) faded away as soon as the officers directly assumed command of the state and took charge of political decisions. He thus claimed:

“For one thing, it is the armed forces which enabled the government to take power, and which therefore constitute the political base of the regime, in a far more direct way than is true even of a civilian government which depends on a high level of military force.”³⁶

Boumedienne's ascendancy to power, following a military coup that took place on 19 June 1965, shredded away the efforts undertaken by Ben Bella to demilitarise politics or in other words depoliticise the army. This demonstrated the strong backing that Boumedienne had from the military. Typically, a governmental overthrow is perceived by the public to be the inspiration of the opposing elite and is attributed to failures of the current government. Theorists insisted that: “In any age and in any country, military intervention is likelihood where there is no respected ruling class and where civilian institutions are weak or lack legitimacy.”³⁷

The overthrow of the current president at that time was not perceived as a military coup, but rather as a “military readjustment” among most of those who opposed the previous leadership i.e. the *pro-Boumediennists*. Not everyone regarded the date of the 19 June 1965 to be a date of victory and glory. On the contrary, the army was scrutinised and blamed for the deceitful and unprincipled conduct of action that ended in a radical change in the course of events and that opened the doors for tension and socio-political disturbances two decades later. Bennoune claimed that:

“The political nucleus that seized power and exercised it after 1965 consisted of a band of incompetent, unscrupulous and cynical ex-officers and cadres of the National Liberation Army (ALN) that was stationed in Tunisia and Morocco, a large number of whom were former professional officers of the French army who had deserted to join the Algerian external ALN once the independence of the country became inevitable.”³⁸

In reality, Ben Bella’s gradual monopoly of power and disregard for the army could not be ignored. Boumedienne showed a strong disagreement with the socialist version followed by Ben Bella, and with several policies that were not conforming with Islamic principles. This showed that “Once again, as so frequently has happened after decolonization has been achieved, military governance was instituted within a context of fragile and powerless public institutions coupled with an army fearful of having its position challenged or its autonomy violated.”³⁹ The reasons why the first president of the republic (Ben Bella) did not prioritise the army shortly after independence of Algeria could be justified with the fact that:

“the adjustment of military forces to the conditions of independence is a slow process for a number of reasons, primarily the lack of educated manpower and the fact that the defence institutions are themselves an essential expression of imperialism, their adaptation to the fresh circumstances has a low priority even in the minds of the politicians who must rely on them. The army of new states tends to retain their colonial flavour, their foreign advisers and their affinity with Europe longer than do the civilian public services.”⁴⁰

Besides, Christopher Clapham explained that “Many of the characteristic attitudes of the Military emerge in stereotyped form in the justificatory announcements which follow the coup including notably a belief in discipline, efficiency, honesty and national unity.”⁴¹ For Boumedienne, the 19 June 1965 represented the continuation of the revolution in order to continue with the principles of the Algerian revolution as outlined by the revolutionaries during the war of independence. Boumedienne justified the military coup with a promise to restore the country’s political stability and quietness, whilst also giving the economy its fair amount of interest after it suffered from a sharp decrease in productivity.

The notion of “self-interest” is often introduced to understand the military alliance against one regime. That is to say that it is primarily to satisfy the political ambitions of the leader. Likewise, a military coup would result from the intentions to increase the budget allocation for the armed forces. David T. Cattell and Richard Sisson explicated:

“In one case the military may carry out a coup primarily for reasons of self-interest to fulfil the personal political ambitions of some colonel or general or to protect or increase the budget allocation for the armed forces.”⁴²

In this case, it is very hard to distinguish between the two aforementioned motivations behind the toppling of the Ben Bella regime. On the other hand, Jackson mentioned that “Boumedienne’s direct access to the national bank and his singular capacity to bypass finance minister, Ali Mahsas, expedited his requests for additional financing.”⁴³ As a matter of fact, Boumedienne’s preoccupation from the beginning was to build the army; “He aspired to establish a first- rate professional army and spent a good deal of his time seeking the capital to equip, train and operate it.”⁴⁴ Clearly, Boumedienne had intentions to increase the Army’s allocations.

Such an initiative to improve and strengthen the army could, however, be classified within the leaders personal ambitions if expenditures on the army did not increase dramatically once in power.

David T Catell and Richard Sisson explained that, in the case of the inability of post- colonial leaders to sustain their authority, consequently losing legitimacy among the masses and much of the elite, the military, though small and poorly organised, become the only effective force capable of taking over when the civilian government was not able to do so. In fact the military is the only best organised, cohesive and also disciplined institution.⁴⁵ Algeria’s army undoubtedly held an outstanding position within the leading elites, especially with the role it played in the denouement of the first crisis witnessed by Algeria after independence between 2 July to 20 September 1962.

In the era between 1965 and 1978, Algeria could be listed within the countries with clear military regimes. By appointing a Revolutionary Council that would, after a while, encompass the majority of military men, Boumedienne sequentially granted the military influence in the country. As he was claiming to topple Ben Bella’s anti-collegial regime, he could not immediately get rid of the members that constituted the previous regime’s council and substitute them with members of his choice. John Ruedy put the focus on the fact that Boumedienne “came to terms with other guerrilla leaders by gradually easing them into nongovernmental posts or into governmental slots without major clientages. At the same time, he was succeeding both in neutralising leftist ministers, who had continued from Ben Bella’s

last Cabinet, and in bringing both the student movement and the UGTA [Union Générale des Travailleurs] back under government control.”⁴⁶ The changes made by Boumedienne occurred gradually. He claimed that collegiality in decision making was to be one of the approaches he intended to follow in his policy. Consequently he kept a few of Ben Bella’s government members but replaced them gradually. As stated by Benyoub:

“Houari Boumediene believed that the army, holder of the national legitimacy, does not have to run an encampment life, but it has to interfere directly in the country management.”⁴⁷

Boumedienne strongly believed that the army was an integral part of the Algerian people and that the “Peoples National Army” (ANP) was the rightful heir of the National Liberation Army. The army had supreme authority. One of the problems faced by military regimes worldwide is to maintain authority over time. Once Boumedienne strengthened his ruling position in the country, he legitimised and constitutionalised his regime. Christopher Clapham and George Philip explain that a military coup was like an election victory where a new government was installed and where “a pattern of opposition and support” would “constrict its political options”. Nevertheless, the way in which a government came to power came second place to the problem of how to keep it. It was at this point that the most distinctive dilemmas of military regimes became apparent. The steps to follow were listed in order of importance. First was the reconciliation of continuing control over the military with consideration to the acceptance from civil society; bearing in mind that military regimes require popularity whilst simultaneously commanding obedience. However, even though legitimacy was not a prerequisite, there was a need for political organisation. The second measure undertaken was to engineer some institutional structure that could maintain political settlement.⁴⁸ David T Cattel and Richard Sisson supported this opinion to some extent and argue that these were the long term difficulties facing such military regimes, in addition to their acceptance as legitimate rulers. Usually, the military seek legitimacy by promoting selected sectors of society.⁴⁹

Boumedienne’s government continuously involved the ANP in the edification of the country’s infrastructure by not restricting the army’s role in defence from both inside and outside threat. He repeatedly described the army as being non-classical, i.e. belonging to barracks but also to be a legitimate successor of the glorious National Liberation Army. The revolutionary leader insisted that:

“The role of the army is to defend the revolution and the unity of the people and the party. The army is the legitimate successor of the National Liberation Army.”⁵⁰

The process of state-building incorporated various people from the nation and disparate sectors, clearly shown in the Agricultural, Industrial, and Cultural Revolutions.

With respect to the other method, that being the option by which military leaders resign from the army, it could be categorically ruled out in the case of Boumedienne as he reinforced his

influence within the ANP and the political elite. He achieved this by appointing himself as the head of the Revolutionary Council and the Ministry of Defence. The National Liberation Army was a well organised armed force within the FLN during the War of Liberation, with Boumedienne in charge of the headquarters. It was also one of the major political elite in pre-independence Algeria in 1962, as the controversy surrounding leadership was emerging. In post-independence Algeria, the ALN had no choice but to ally with Ben Bella, given the strong disagreement between the ALN and the provisional government. In fact, competing groups that shared divergent ideologies and intentions on the way they would lead the country frowned upon the quest for legitimate political order after the departure of the French.

Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa was first appointed by Houari Boumedienne as advisor to the ALN headquarters, and then as the Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁵¹ As for Medeghri, he joined the fifth region, and was then enrolled in the Army of National Liberation where he held the rank of major. In 1965, he took part in the military coup of the 19 June 1965 and became member of the Council of Revolution and was designated Home Office Minister in July 1965. Nevertheless, Benyoub asserted that Medeghri opposed Boumedienne on many issues including the Agricultural Revolution and the corporation management system issues before he died under strange circumstances on 10 December 1974.⁵² Cherif Belkacem was a militant of the FLN and the Algerian Muslim Student General Union, joined the ALN, and was appointed in the headquarters command. Cherif Belkacem was a Member of the National Council of Revolution, was a party coordinator, and was appointed Minister of the State in 1968. He substituted Kaid in the role of party executive in 1972.⁵³ As for Kaid, he was a political inspector in charge of the western region. In 1957, he became captain in the ALN and a member of the Algerian Revolutionary National Council (CNRA), and was in charge of the west base in Oujda. Kaid was also a member of the Revolutionary Council and the party executive. He was very close to Boumedienne. Boumedienne was surrounded mainly by military men, being himself a military man. Kaid entered into a conflict with Boumedienne over the economy orientations and other policies in 1973.⁵⁴

Jackson declared that: "Boumedienne selected four members, including two new appointees, Belkacem Cherif and Ahmed Kaid, as part of the ANP contingent."⁵⁵ Jackson shed further light on the fact that "the ANP faction commanded all the country's coercive forces since Boumedienne controlled the army, and Medeghri the police through the Interior Ministry."⁵⁶

By delegating absolute authority to the Council of Revolution, President Houari Boumedienne turned a blind eye to the revolutionary principle related to the role granted to the FLN following the Tripoli programme.

In fact, the primacy of politics over the military had always been underlined, since the Soumam Congress of August 1956. Bouzidi stressed the controversy over the role of the army resulting from the confusion lying between the FLN and the ALN during the war of independence and from the struggle for power. He affirmed:

“Although the Soummam Congress of August 1965 [1956] adopted the idea of the primacy of the political over the military, and placed the ALN under the command of the Comité de Coordination et d’Exécution (CCE), this subordination of the military to the political was only theoretical. The FLN’s internal activities were carried out by political-military chiefs, and all members of the FLN were automatically members of the ALN, and vice versa. In addition, the ALN never considered itself to be an army under the command of Algeria’s executive body, the GPRA.”⁵⁷

In summary, the army had always been a strong component within the state’s institutions, especially that the president of the republic was of a high military profile. The army could not have been disbanded, as it was the guarantor of the country’s unity and territorial integrity. Also, according to the Constitution, the National Peoples Army was the instrument of revolution and was to contribute to the development of Algeria and the edification of socialism.

During his leadership, Boumedienne faithfully prioritised the development of state institutions to the FLN, believing that such a priority was indispensable for a newly born state, fighting its way out of underdevelopment. However, at an initial stage, Boumedienne ensured the stability of his power and authority in the state through the supreme Council of Revolution, strangulating and suffocating some principles of democracy that the previous regime was toppled for. Although a constitution was adopted to expand democracy in the state, Boumedienne advocated a unified way of authority. He was responsible for the executive function and was at the head of the National Peoples Assembly, whilst at the same time, President of the Republic and General Secretary of the party. This meant that all matters were screened by Houari Boumedienne. Accordingly, the party’s apparatus and the state’s way of functioning portrayed complementarities in the political organisation of the country, and at no point did the party function independently from the state. This was contradictory to the ideas and instructions conveyed in the National Charter 1976,⁵⁸ which pictured the executive institution as a body contributing indirectly in defining the guidelines of the party’s policy, and smothering the party’s freedom to act independently from the state’s executive.⁵⁹ This was the inside reality of the Algerian socialist state which was casting and encouraging the leading and revolutionary role of the single party in conformity with socialist principles of leadership and President Houari Boumedienne’s key ideological principle of “the continuity of revolution”. This was triggered by a wish to gain respect and admiration of other socialist state and non-socialist state, on one hand, and by domestic considerations on the other hand. President Houari Boumedienne was seeking to legitimise his rule by restoring symbols of the War of Liberation and identifying peoples’ values to validate his rule. It is clear that for Boumedienne, the building of the state was a primary condition for the implementation of development.

Henceforth, this was a fundamental condition for progress and an essential element for the development of the Algerian society.

In other words the state was an effective centrepiece in President Houari Boumedienne's policy orientations. Nevertheless, it is necessary to grasp the ascendancy of the military, and the primary individual role played by Boumedienne himself. Most importantly, one needs to understand that the process of policy-making was characterised by the institutionalisation of ideologically-derived goals and objectives for the state. Accordingly, his foreign policy was going to respond to the needs of Algeria's national requirements and ensure the welfare of the state. This also meant guaranteeing state survival and national security as they constituted the aspirations of President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy.

2. The Need for Economic Sovereignty and Development:

2.1 After the Transitional Period: The need for Economic readjustment:

Ben Bella could not successfully deal with the problems that the country was facing post-independence. The hardcore obstacles that needed to be overcome after the exodus of the settlers consisted of unemployment and the deficit in skilled manpower, either technically or at an administrative level. The colonial heritage was undoubtedly very heavy. War had destroyed some of the country's infrastructures which made recovery unlikely to be achieved in the short term. Shortly after independence, the structure of the Algerian economy gave the country no choice but to keep providing source materials to concessionaries while it depended on them to receive some foreign currency. Moreover, Algeria's persistent social problems and the lack of skilled manpower constituted the key underlying cause of its persistent dependency on foreign aid and cooperation. From another perspective, the social structure chiefly contributed to the regression of Algeria's national economy following the eight years of war coupled with the acutely entrenched and soaring problems that materialised in the early years of independence.

A lack of social mobilization for economic growth resulted either from the inability to provide the economy with a skilled manpower force or the meagre opportunities for investment in a newly born country. The major post-independence problem that Algeria was faced with was the lack of sufficient technology and the scarcity of the most precious capital for development (qualified human resources).

Algeria's future was unsure with the exception of few spectacular decisions, as described by Aïssa Khaled, such as the nationalisation of the colon's lands and a breeze of democracy that could be breath in the National Assembly striving for survival.⁶⁰ The recovery of sovereignty over Algeria's national resources could not be carried out in the early years of independence while the economy was still suffering from the scantiness of sound infrastructures and meagre planning. Algeria's economic take-off needed a lack of hasty measures while it relied heavily on foreign aid and cooperation. Nonetheless, there was a slight attempt to put into practice the principle of nationalisation under Ben Bella, but it covered minor sectors and did not highly

affect the economy.⁶¹ At a time when Algerian economic infrastructures were nearly non-existent, Ben Bella's government relied heavily on foreign aid in general, and significant French cooperation in particular. At this stage, it was rather utopian to envisage a complete economic autonomy and an abrupt cut off from the existing economic reliance on the ex-coloniser, who still had privileged prerogatives and concessions over sectors of the economy, and conspicuously over the hydrocarbon sector.

Nevertheless, the economic potential of Algeria was very rich. Algeria had ten ports among which three were international: the port of Algiers, Oran and Annaba; twenty civil aerodromes; 4300 km of railway lines, an electricity network of 600 000 km and a dozen dams that produced over a milliard kW·h of energy.⁶² In addition, Algeria withheld an important wealth of minerals and natural resources. Yet, the actual state of the economy in 1965 was very alarming. Under the ruling of President Ben Bella, agriculture was suffering from a sharp decrease in production and industry was nearly non-existent.

Ruedy states that:

“Economic stagnation and regression combined with administrative disorder limited tax and fee collections so that, in 1964, government revenues covered only 60 percent of expenditures.”⁶³

Imports in the agricultural sector were increasing (see table 1). Algeria was importing agricultural products that could have been produced locally if an adequate environment was provided.

Table 1: Imports of alimentary products between 1963 and 1965.⁶⁴
Algerian Customs Statistics. (Report 1980)

Products	1963	1964	1965
Fresh milk			
• Tons	14 908	22 228	32 013
• In 1000 DA	8 233	13 933	22 070
Canned milk			
• Tons	16 903	17 795	23 767
• In 1000 DA	42 967	46 627	61 342
Wheat			
• Tons	63 092	177 475	246 483
• In 1000 DA	22 008	60 680	97 949

In September 1963, self-management covered 1.5 million hectares and 1700 enterprises among which 425 were industrial and guaranteed work for only 80 thousand workers. In October 1963, after President Ben Bella took the decision to nationalise more lands that were owned

by the coloniser, the agricultural self-managed sector covered 3 million hectares and provided work to only 200 000 workers. This constituted 1/6 of cultivable lands, 1/3 of cultivated lands. In short, under President Ben Bella's leadership, self-management covered the agricultural sector to a large extent, and it also provided a living for 1 million of 8 million Algerian peasants. This obviously could not answer to the increasing level of unemployment and to the economic deficit. Stora asserts:

“In 1965, the self-managed agricultural sector included 5, 711, 332 acres and comprised nearly all “modern” agriculture. It had only 115, 000 permanent workers in 1968, of an active agricultural population of 1, 300,000. All the same, the “management committees” (which dropped from 2, 3000 in number to 1, 650 in 1969) provided 60 % of the gross agricultural product.”⁶⁵

Therefore, toppling the government in 1965 meant, for many, the ending of three years of shuffling, hesitation, doubt and uncertainty. At the first anniversary of the 19 June 1965, President Houari Boumedienne affirmed that:

“The economy has typified for the last three years a decrease in production, depredation in the productive capital and stagnation in other sectors and aggravation in territorial and sectarian disparities along with an economic disorganisation that resulted in a climate of insecurity and the total absence of investment.”⁶⁶

In 1965, the country had no development plan. Acute social conflicts and problems resulted from the release of Algerians from prisons and concentration camps, and the only way to face unemployment was emigration. There was an urgent need for a re-shuffle in Algeria's policy of development. There was also a need to put an end to economic dependency.

Boumedienne referred to the situation that prevailed in the country before the 19 June 1965 as having been “catastrophic” in all aspects, whether it was the economy, the finances or the organisation of the state apparatus.⁶⁷ At this stage in 1965, Algeria was still suffering from the consequences of a long colonial yoke. In 1966, measures to improve life conditions and to help the country enter a new era of development and awake from its nightmare were effectively taken. In fact, with Boumedienne taking office of power in 1965, Algeria's economic dismay was far from being settled. A lot was still to be done.

Despite President Houari Boumedienne's devotion to the enhancement of state authority and legitimacy in the early years of his tenure, economic development epitomised an important and realist challenge more likely to solve soaring social needs, putting an end to Algeria's economic turmoil and insuring an increase in productivity. In other words, Boumedienne's measures to consolidate his position in power involved diversified and modernised economic planning which encompassed the development of non-oil industries, whereas the strengthening

of control over hydrocarbons constituted the foundation of his plans within a centralised and state controlled-economy.

Algeria needed orientation under a defined framework in order to step towards development and progress. The new leadership was concerned with restoring the state and giving a boost to the economy. The number one priority was to build a state with a strong basis and a sound economy, especially since production was witnessing a sharp decrease and investment was practically non-existent. A constant deficit in agriculture was witnessed due to autogestion. Unemployment was on the increase, a fact that enhanced rural exodus. Bouchama insisted that the best jobs were still held by French employees. The French were still occupying Mers El Kebir and several other air bases.⁶⁸ Although it was seen as being a very harsh and unjust measure to take, Boumedienne had no choice but to adopt an austere policy and reclaim what belonged to the Algerian peoples, regardless of any historical agreement.⁶⁹

Algeria therefore adopted socialist ideas and approaches in its development process. Boumedienne would put an end to private ownership of means of productions, where workers were exploited by owners. This was an intangible measure that could not be altered under socialist principles. In the meantime, the economy of Algeria witnessed two phases that were necessary for it to take off. These two major phases were:

1966-71: This first era was the time when the state had to take control of the country's national wealth and the key sectors of the economy. This was to be achieved through the nationalisation of the mines (1966) through ordinances 66-93, 66-94, 66-95, 66-96, 66-97, 66-98, 66-99, 66-101 of 06 May 1966 and which included the nationalisation of mine companies.⁷⁰ There was also a nationalisation of international trade, in general, with the instalment of an Investment Code on 15 September 1966 in accordance with the ordinance 66-284,⁷¹ along with the nationalisation of insurances – ordinance 66-129 of 27 May 1966.⁷² There was also the nationalisation of banks, with the creation of *La Banque Nationale de l'Algérie*, the National Bank of Algeria in 1966 – ordinance 66-178 of 13 June 1966⁷³ and *La Banque Extérieure de l'Algérie*, the Foreign Bank of Algeria – ordinance 67-204 of 1 October 1967,⁷⁴ both issued by the Ministry of Finances. The next step was the nationalisation of foreign firms in 1968 and the nationalisation of hydrocarbons in accordance with the ordinances 71-8, 71-9, 71-10, 71-11 of 24 February 1971.⁷⁵

1970-71: The aim was to establish a socialist state and reinforce the basis of socialism. The state undertook a global revolution (agricultural, industrial and cultural) each of which, along with regional equilibrium and socialist ways of management, was defined by article 18 of the Constitution of 1976 as: “The fundamental axis of the socialist edification.”⁷⁶

In fact, this era witnessed the adoption of a socialist plan to ensure national economic independence. Such a strategy was based on the valorisation of national wealth and the construction of petrochemical and steel pole. This was meant to have an effect on other sectors of activity that were tightly linked with industry. The reason behind planning is to define a

long term strategy for development. Obviously, this could only be set by underlying long term objectives in terms of the peoples' future.

2.1.1- The Industrial Revolution:

To begin with, it is important to highlight the aim of such a revolution that was to promote the development and progress of the industrial sector, which would appreciate the natural resources of the country. That is to say that hydrocarbons, alimentation, transport, hydraulic sectors and electricity would be given their correct value. The aim was to put an end, above all, to the inequities between the countryside and the city and to eliminate regional disparities by achieving equilibrium. Article 21 of the Constitution noticeably declared that:

“The Industrial Revolution aimed not only at achieving economic growth, but also at transforming men's conditions, elevating his technical and scientific standards and to reorganise the society; at the same time it aimed at remodelling the territory.”⁷⁷

The industrial sector was monopolised by foreign companies. The industry's contribution to the national production was very weak. According to Ministry of Agriculture's statistics, its contribution reached the following in 1965:

Building and public labour.....	9.2%
Energy, mining, hydrocarbons.....	23.9%
Transport, habitations, commerce.....	40.2%
Agriculture.....	20.8% ⁷⁸

In fact, profitability rested on the use of cheap labour. Production could not satisfy the needs of the national market. This led to a massif process of importing manufactured goods. The most important available fields of industry were the industry of building and public works, transforming agricultural products and the industry of consumption. Most of these industries were situated in Algiers. John Ruedy explained that: “Per capita GDP during the first years of independence hovered around 1,000 dinars, but with gross distributional disparities among the classes.”⁷⁹ The reality was harsh, production was incessantly deteriorating. Between 1962 and 1965, production dropped by 20% in the mining sector, and 15% in metallurgy. The fall in investment was even more rapid than that in production: from 1 464 billion to 84 billion dollars between 1961 and 1963. At the same time, non-productive expenses grew, with a large expansion of public services.⁸⁰

With President Houari Boumedienne taking office of power, industrialisation was the new path to follow. In order to enable the country to embark on a policy of industrialisation, the government opted for a wave of nationalisation that allowed the state to take control of the

instruments of economic power. Following this, a four year plan that gave priorities to heavy industries was initiated. It was aimed at modernising Algeria and helping it step out of underdevelopment.

Algeria was inspired to use industry as a weapon to fight underdevelopment, regardless of the advantages that would result from developing the industrial sector, such as the introduction of gas to the Algerian household. The Industrial Revolution was not just a means to strengthen the capital, but it aimed at eradicating unemployment, improving working conditions and redistributing the national revenue in order to promote disadvantaged masses, following a socialist approach. In fact, as clearly expressed in the National Charter: “The Industrial Revolution adheres to socialist lines, as mirrored in the method embraced in the management of the units of production and the organised contribution of workers in the management of enterprises.”⁸¹

The President declared, in an interview to a foreign newspaper:

“We have built factories, agricultural machines, petrochemical factories and refineries for gas. You will not see tomorrow any women walking kilometres, carrying water. They will have their own bottle of gas and tap for water. The real agricultural development does not precede industry but works concomitantly with industry. With the introduction of a quadrennial plan, it is expected to achieve 9% progress per year which constitutes 24% for the mechanical and electrical industry, 35% for the textile industry and 45% for the refinery of gas. Furthermore, exports are supposed to increase at approximately 55%, within 5 years, and imports at 58%.”⁸²

It was very hard to expect progress in the countryside without an effective contribution from individuals, peasants, cadres and workers altogether. The industrialisation of the country needed to be seen as a required step to open doors for development and from which Algerians would exclusively enjoy the results.

However, not all theorists agreed. The fact was that heavy industries, concentrated in big cities mainly by the coast, attracted a large number of peasants, fleeing the deprived countryside. In this respect, Ciment admitted that:

“Not that the Boumédiène regime and its modernization program were without success. There was, in fact, much to boast of in the progress made in several key indices of social development. Life expectancy increased by a decade for both men and women between 1965 and 1984, while the infant mortality rate fell by a third between 1961 and 1980. Education was a government priority and the effects were telling. Primary school enrollment doubled for both boys and girls between 1960 and 1980, secondary school enrollment tripled, and literacy rates for men and women jumped 100 percent during these same years. Algeria had no universities when the French abandoned the country in 1962; there were ten by 1980. And for all the problems with Algeria’s economy, the gross national product (GNP) more than

doubled between 1965 and 1985, though much of this was due to the increase in oil and gas prices, and unevenly distributed.”⁸³

This leads us to the fact that Algeria managed to draw guidelines for industry, relying basically on hydrocarbons, which constituted a large part of Algeria’s resources and wealth. In fact, the production of natural gas went from 5.62 milliard cubic metres in 1965, to 5.98 milliard cubic metres in 1974, 7.82 milliard cubic metres in 1975, and 10.30 milliard cubic metres in 1976.⁸⁴ The oil production was estimated at 38.8 milliard tons in 1973, 35,8 milliard tons in 1974, 33,8 milliard tons in 1975 and 40.4 milliard tons in 1976.⁸⁵ This insured a considerable income for the government. (See table 2).

Table 2: profits achieved by Sonatrach (National Oil Company) estimated in million dollars.⁸⁶
Sonatrach, Compte d’exploitation de Sonatrach (1976).

Item	1973	1974	1975	1976
Sales to foreign buyers	1 292	3 424	2 871	4 053
National sales	802	913	1 186	1 531
profit	2 094	4 337	4 057	5 584

The policy of industrialising, concentrated more on spreading heavy industries everywhere in the country. This was initiated with the inauguration of big industrial complexes such as the Iron and Steel Complex in Al-Hajjar, the Industrial Car Complex in Ruiba and the Electronic Complex in Belabass, along with other different complexes. These industries were directly linked with the agricultural sector as it provided machinery, fertilisers and was also tightly linked with other sectors. In short, the government development plan was based on the use of the country’s resources and own capabilities, relying upon socialist principles. This was backed with a strong will, above all, to build a socialist country with new horizons to find. The National Charter was very explicit about the necessity for the Industrial Revolution to increase the country’s capability to provide external financing, given the fact that financial dependency led to political submission and economic domination.⁹² This proved that the Industrial Revolution was also a liberating factor for the individual and society, and a primordial element in the overall revolution.⁸⁷

Accordingly, the industrial strategy adopted in the 1970s had well defined orientations and specific targets. The priorities were to respond to the needs of the national market and reduce economic dependency. These two priorities motivated the industrial sector which witnessed a gradual increase in investment during the first triennial plan: 52% between 1967 and 1969, 45% between 1970 and 1973, and 43, 50% between 1973 and 1977.⁸⁸ The importance and steady improvement of the industrial sector, during the Boumedienne years, was clear in the

increase of production by an average of 7.8% during the 1960s and by an average of 11.5% during the 1970s. The strategy of industrialisation adopted by Algeria under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership increased economic growth by an average of 7.5% per year and the level of individual income by 4% during the same period.⁸⁹ However, it is worth mentioning that while investments constituted 21 % of the gross domestic product in 1963, 42 % in 1973, and 50 % in 1977, the GDP increased by an average of 6.4 % per year over the period of 1971-1980. Moreover, the production of raw steel increased from 400 000 to 1.2 million metric tonnes between 1977 and 1982. The manufacture of tractors, which started in 1974, reached 4 900 units in 1979. For electricity, production went from 4 000 GW·h in 1977 to 6 000 GW·h in 1980. Manufacturing industries increased 9.9 % per year between 1970 and 1979.⁹⁰

2.1.2- The Agricultural Revolution:

If such a revolution was launched, it was basically the result of a decline in agricultural productivity which engendered a food deficit and inequities widespread among the Algerians in general, and the *fellahin* in particular during colonialism. The Agricultural Revolution was a political choice. In fact, such a revolution allowed the country to recover the 2.5 million hectares of lands that used to be the coloniser's properties.⁹¹ Agriculture had witnessed a continuous regression between 1960 and 1965. The Production of cereals went from 724 to 677 million Dinars (DA) in 1965. The production of cotton, tobacco and vegetables decreased from 439 to 193 million DA in the same period. Fruit production also fell from 1242 to 78 million DA. Most importantly, there was wine production which had been seen as the real pillar of the colonial economy. This was still existent, yet suffering from terrible neglect. While it occupied 350 000 hectares in 1962, nearly 40% were over-aged by 1965.⁹² Furthermore, the significant decrease of Algeria's exterior market engendered a lessening in production and revenues. As a matter of fact, wine product contribution to total exports suffered a sharp cut: 15% in 1963, 20% in 1964 and 18% in 1965.⁹³ Also, productive potential was seriously affected. The number of cultivated lands was continuously decreasing and plantations were getting older. The overall infrastructure was becoming more and more deficient, and other important components of the agricultural sector such as seeds and fertilisers were quasi-absent, which impeded the increase in profitability. A large number of peasants represented a very poor class of the society. Nearly 450 000 *fellah* possessed less than 10 hectares of land with mediocre agricultural potential. Production at this level was mainly oriented towards daily survival. Their means of work were very rudimentary and productivity was very low. On the other hand, there were land owners who represented the bourgeoisie of society; they owned over 3 million hectares of land. This constituted 50% of North Algeria's agricultural lands. The state bourgeoisie was the class that benefited the most from the agricultural surplus by either directly or indirectly controlling the main agricultural lands and by regulating prices. In other words, while the *fellah* was given a low price for his products,

the price of fertilisers, seeds and pesticides was in continuous increase. There were also the self-managed workers who were remunerated poorly *via* the administration. In short, the agricultural sector was not given enough importance in economic dynamics. It also was becoming socially neglected. The decline of agriculture was an indicator of an imbalance between the city and the countryside which was further shown in the national distribution of revenue. In fact, in 1965, 9 million Algerians, the majority of which were peasants, received 4440 million DA which equals around 1 DA per head per day, whereas 2 million citizens in the city had 47420 million DA. A large number of peasants were tempted to leave the agricultural sector and move to the city where the individual income was higher. By 1969, agriculture constituted a source of living to 70 percent of the Algerian population. Lands were distributed as follows:

3 million hectares of forest were state-owned.

7 million hectares of state owned lands were cultivated.

Moreover, cereal plantations covered only 3.5 million hectares and wine plantations were estimated at 500 000 hectares.⁹⁴

It was, therefore, on 8 November 1971 that President Houari Boumedienne ratified the Charter that included the Agricultural Revolution. A year later, on 8 November 1972, nearly all public lands were distributed.⁹⁵ The Agricultural Revolution was meant to stop the exploitation of man by man, and to organise the use of lands and means of agriculture, with the objective of improving the production by applying efficient techniques and assuring a just repartition of agricultural revenues. This was stated in article I of the ordinance n°71-73 of 08 November 1971.⁹⁶ The President saw a continuity of the Algerian revolution in the agrarian revolution; he explained to the newspaper El-Moudjahid, the importance of the agricultural revolution as being one of the essential objectives of the revolution.⁹⁷

It was stated in the Charter of the Agricultural Revolution that:

“The inequality in the repartition of lands is the principal reason for the low standard of life of the rural masses and their incapacity to transform methods of cultivation and to take part in the economic development of the country.”⁹⁸

The Agricultural Revolution was precisely an economic necessity that tried to realise the equilibrium between rural areas and urban ones, especially with regard to the spread of ignorance, malnutrition, shortage of health equipment and habitation, along with an increase in the population. This revolution aimed at resolving the problems that rural areas had to face by introducing progress and development in the countryside and by providing employment opportunities for everyone, building schools, hospitals, houses and establishing infrastructure transport. In a way, after thousands of Algerians fled the countryside, looking for more job opportunities in the city, the breakthrough of an agricultural revolution opened new horizons for peasants, in an attempt to provide equal opportunities with the countryside, particularly after a ravaging war that left the countryside with wounds of exploitation and injustice.

By promulgating the Agricultural Revolution texts, Algeria aimed at re-establishing a socio-economic situation in the agricultural world, a process that witnessed a brutal interruption since the 1830 aggression and a disintegration caused by the coloniser.⁹⁹

Translated into English, the Charter of the Agricultural Revolution stated that:

“The goal of Agricultural Revolution is, first of all, the modernisation of agriculture. As such, it redefines the size of landholdings as well as the techniques of production to be used. Besides, the Agricultural Revolution facilitates the transformation of the structure of agricultural production.”¹⁰⁰

The question was not to achieve an economy cut off from the world market; it was the necessity of ameliorating the productive capabilities of agriculture in order to meet the food needs of the population whose pattern of consumption evolved with the progress of industrialisation. In addition, the Agricultural Revolution constituted a stimulus for industry. The modernisation of agriculture and the raising of the standards of living of the rural world would widen the internal market and favour the growth of industry.

In short, the self-management system, known as *autogestion*, was a first step towards the socialist autogestion.

Autogestion did not only apply to the economic sector but also to the socio-cultural sector. All three sectors were related to each other, which explained the fact that the success and achievement of the Industrial Revolution would ultimately lead to success at the agricultural and cultural levels. At the conference of presidents of the *Assemblées Populaires de la Commune* (APC), held on 5 May 1970, the reasons why President Houari Boumedienne often insisted on the importance of implementing the quadrennial plan were elucidated. It was in order to give the country a solid industrial basis which would help the building of a homogenous economy, meeting people’s daily needs.¹⁰¹

The Algerian strategy of socio-economic change and political development called for the development of industries that constituted the backbone of Algerian economic development strategy. Rachid Tlemcani believed that capital accumulation was seen to be the top priority in the areas of consumption, employment, housing, and consumer goods. He maintained that heavy industry was also said to be a priority, as opposed to the development of agriculture which was subordinated to the production of the industrialising industries. Boumedienne strongly believed that heavy industry was the locomotive, which was to be followed by agriculture, light industries and other carriages of economic life.¹⁰²

From a political point of view, it becomes clear that in the long term, the relation between economic growth and political interference would become conflictual. Decision-makers needed to elaborate on a strategy where economic growth was prioritised over socio-economic equity and political accumulation during the commencement of the process.

According to Tlemcani:

“The point that should be stressed is that the creation of industrial plants does not necessarily mean that the fundamental structural changes have occurred in Algeria. Industrialisation or economic development is here defined in terms of social progress, in an egalitarian way, of the overwhelming majority of the people. Both the state and the economy remain heavily dependent upon international capital. Domestic accumulation continues to come from commercial rather than from international capital.”¹⁰³

Some theorists believed that the revolutionary readjustment of the 19th of June 1965, under President Houari Boumedienne, was a major moment for clarifying ideology and renewing the revolutionary élan.¹⁰⁴

Before 1965, initiatives were spontaneously taken by the masses, thus leading to agricultural and industrial self-management. In other words, peasants undertook to manage lands once colons fled. With respect to industry, it was also the initiative of workers to start off businesses left by the coloniser.

It is clear that at a political level, there was no initiative to frame such a spontaneous action. This was apart from the enactment of ‘March 1963 decrees’, which made such an endeavour legal. Then, with Boumedienne taking office of power, a sound policy for economic and social progress was set up and planned for.

President Houari Boumedienne’s worse nightmares were poverty and underdevelopment, and it was for this reason that he embarked on his threefold revolution which was based on development. He believed that: “The Algerian Revolution can not be complete unless Algeria accomplished social justice and led the Arab and Muslim world and also the Third World.”¹⁰⁵

In the wake of development planning launched by President Houari Boumedienne, striving for the improvement of living standards for the masses, the Agricultural Revolution suffered from an acute vulnerability as it failed to achieve the intended profit and benefit. This was aggravated by mass rural migration of farmers or *fellahin* who were attracted by better living and work standards in the capital and, hence, deserted lands and abandoned agriculture. The concentration of rural masses in major cities exacerbated unemployment and provoked an escalating nuisance to the economy and its productivity.

Furthermore, significant focus was put on industry as part of the quadrennial plan for the economy that was believed to provide agriculture with sound infrastructures. Fatefully, agriculture was neglected and tended to lag behind other industrial sectors, which ultimately ranked Algeria’s economy amongst those which are oil-dependent. Consequently, the Industrial Revolution introduced a typified oil revolution that was embedded in the nationalisation of the country’s natural resources. Mazri schematised the existing complementary interaction between the three sectors of the economy (industry, agriculture and hydrocarbons) and explained the possible outcomes of a combination of these three sectors

into a rational composure component, in order to achieve harmonious and accelerated development, to increase work productivity, to widen the national market and to improve the living standards of the population. In other words, these investments were supposed to create a means to develop different branches of national economy in order to absorb and satisfy material needs that would permit the country to join foreign markets.¹⁰⁶ In this context, Hirschman mentioned that industrialisation has even proven to be a stimulus to the development of agriculture.¹⁰⁷

2.2 Ideological influences on Algeria's economic policy:

The colossal havoc and destruction engendered by the costly and bitter War of Liberation, coupled with the massive exodus of settlers and most intellectual elite, left the country's economic prospects devoid of hope and faced with acute social problems. Algeria's leadership needed to set in motion an adequate development policy that ought to prompt an economic take-off and would equally respond to long-term aspirations, agreed upon previously by the *Conseil National de la Révolution Algérienne* (CNRA). This council urged for the Peoples Democratic Revolution '*Révolution Démocratique Populaire*' to ensure the building of the state and society in conformity with the revolutionary principles and within a socialist framework.

Socialism was hence the framework within which President Houari Boumedienne shaped his development policy. Socialism in Algeria, as mentioned in the National Charter, aimed at three objectives:

- “1) Consolidating national independence
- 2) Abolishing the exploitation of man by man
- 3) Promoting man and his free development.”¹⁰⁸

President Houari Boumedienne asserted that:

“Socialism is part of our historical heritage. It is the expression of our peoples' will and aspirations; it is the fruit of its revolutionary struggle.”¹⁰⁹

Therefore, adopting socialism did not only aspire at an independent political system but also at an autonomous economy. A national independent economy meant the liquidation of foreign interest in Algeria. An economy that fairly divided the national revenue. These were the objectives set out by socialism and that Algeria's economic policy needed to respond to. Within this socialist framework, the recovery of natural resources was a necessity. President Houari Boumedienne often reiterated that:

“Our sovereignty can only be incomplete as long as our economy depends on foreign powers. We can not guarantee our independence and our dignity if our economic basis is precarious and dependant on foreign will.”¹¹⁰

From another perspective, recovering the country's natural resources, whether these were financial, agricultural, and industrial or raw materials constituted a fundamental prerequisite of national policy and socialist revolution. Furthermore it was a sign of progress and development, a door to a new era of international relations. The nationalisation of natural resources was, henceforth, a step towards the consolidation of national independence. It was, most importantly, a means for liberation, aiming essentially at freeing Algeria's resources from foreign footholds.

Therefore, the fight against colonialism meant not only the eradication of foreign presence and interference, but it also meant refuting all aspects of colonial heritage. In other words, Algeria needed to embark in a totally opposite way to capitalism. This belief was well grasped by the superseding leader, President Houari Boumediene, who strongly believed that socialism was the answer to all problems that post-independence Algeria was faced with. He claimed that:

“Socialism is justice, it constitutes equality; socialism is the non exploitation of man by man. Socialism as we perceive it constitutes the way forward to fight ignorance, disease and social underdevelopment.”¹¹¹

Rebuilding the state was a pre-required revolution to overcome underdevelopment and become recognised in the international arena. Revolution consisted in the recovery of lands, mines, banks and insurance companies, along with the nationalisation of foreign trade.

Likewise, it was inevitable for the state to think of benefiting from its own resources and set up a plan for the industrialisation of the country which would pave the way for the launch of an economy with a strong basis. To do so, far from any foreign interference, a sound policy for economic and social progress was needed. Algeria severed relations with countries representing imperialism and nationalised all the country's national resources.

There was, indeed, a discernible pattern, in President Houari Boumediene's policy of development that shows the endeavour to cut the umbilical cord with France and reach for economic independence and political sovereignty within a socialist framework that supported the continuity of revolution and embarked on a tri-facet revolution (Agricultural, Industrial and Cultural). This was in an attempt to increase productivity and attribute the role of a producing country to Algeria, and not just a provider of raw materials that it represented.

Clearly, Algeria rejected the idea of being the provider of raw materials for other countries. It understood that it could no longer provide nor receive products from other countries. The whole new concept was to be itself, an industrialised country. In the process of setting lines and a basis for a strategy of industrialisation, it was of paramount importance to target an independent and strong economy. This meant, therefore, eliminating any type of neo-colonialism. To do so, as mentioned before, the recovery of all the resources was essential. Bouchama confirmed that this was imposed as a legitimate action at an economic level and was a *sine qua non* condition for a real economic take off.¹¹²

Between 1963 and 1968, the state concentrated on the nationalisation of many of its own resources and properties, such as insurance companies, mines, steel, phosphate, marble and zinc. In 1968, the state recovered the military bases in Boufarik and Mars El Kebir. It was important to cut the umbilical cord with stronger powers, as it mirrored the confidence President Houari Boumedienne had in achieving progress and development by relying only on Algeria's own resources and peoples. To be totally independent, and to be able to practise sovereignty over its people and the country's resources, President Houari Boumedienne initiated a "petrol battle".

It is worth mentioning that for President Houari Boumedienne, the success of the nationalisation process culminated in the nationalisation of oil resources. He affirmed that:

"Our battle to recover our natural resources has culminated in the recovery of our oil resources. Our victory in the oil battle means that we have implemented our economic independence, by allowing the free control of our energy resources, and therefore, to guarantee our development."¹¹³

President Houari Boumedienne's oil policy had to fall within socialist boundaries, for socialism was the driving force of the country. Socialism framed any policy decision-making process and, consequently, flavoured policy outcomes. It constituted the fuel of the decision-making process of the Algerian Peoples' Democratic Republic. The Algerian oil policy between 1965 and 1978 was framed within a socialist perspective as part of the industrial revolution, which aimed at dismantling colonialist economic structures that maintained Third World countries' status as providers for raw materials and importers of industrialised products.¹¹⁴ This was further stressed in article 10 of the Constitution of 1976, which emphasised: "The peoples' irreversible choice to achieve national independence through socialism and that aimed at suppressing the exploitation of man by man."¹¹⁵

After a deep study of how and what to do in order for the battle to be successful, a smooth operational phase was implemented in 1971. In that year, the nationalisation of hydrocarbons took place. It was not easy for a country to start off on its own, especially when the whole economy had been destroyed as a result of war and that the people were still vulnerable and influenced by a different culture after a domination that lasted over a century. It was a risky challenge to take and Boumedienne was ready to take it.

By nationalising hydrocarbons, Algeria was theoretically in a breach of what was approved upon in the Evian Agreements. In 1969, in Geneva, at the first 21st session of International Rights, the Minister of Justice defended the right of Algeria to nationalise hydrocarbons, although the French claimed this right was theirs. This was intended to justify the refusal of Algerian government to the compensation of nationalised goods.¹¹⁶

Such an endeavour was highly criticised on the other side of the Mediterranean, especially by France, which advocated the Evian Accords. However, Boumedienne's efforts were aimed at

eliminating the damaging effect of neo-colonialism, which was retarding Algeria's development.

The actions taken by Algeria, when launching "the petrol battle", could not be totally described as a breach of an agreement, if we take into consideration the concept that an independent nation should enjoy independence over, not only its territory, but also over what is withheld within this territory. Besides, Algeria still offered to grant France a fair amount of shares. Effectively, Algeria preferred to own 51% of the shares in its own hydrocarbons, leaving 49% of the shares to France, allowing France to still gain profit from it and assuring that Algeria would still have control over its products. This highlights a degree of pragmatism in Algeria's politics. This way, Algeria could insure control over its own resources and still benefit from foreign expertise. In the case of Anglo-American hydrocarbons, they were completely nationalised.¹¹⁷ France was still critical of such measures. Although this new measure allowed France to keep some control over Algeria's hydrocarbons, it did not stop it from boycotting Algerian products. Algeria's answer to that was that it was France which incurred loss by not trading with Algeria. The French embargo on Algeria did not provoke any distress on President Houari Boumedienne. He strongly believed that if it was not companies from France that would invest in Algeria, then it would be from Germany. At that time, Renault was expected to build a factory in Algeria: The two countries already agreed to sign contracts and agreements but were still waiting for it to happen. It was frozen. In fact this did not constitute any concern, for Algeria was aware of the fact that if it was not Renault then it would be Volkswagen or Fiat or other firms.¹¹⁸

All these measures and challenges were taken and initiated for the purpose of progress and ultimately to be at the same pace as the developed world. They were all framed within an ideology of national independence, self-reliance and anti-colonialism.

On the one hand, concentrating on building sound economic foundation for the sake of relocating the country out of the southern hemisphere was a very ambitious and brave step to take in order to undertake a war against underdevelopment. On the other hand, this might have engendered some distress and a few problems at other levels, such as the neglect of the social aspect of the country, while focusing only on the economic take-off. Bouchama explained that the time between the 19th of June 1965 and 1967 was a time where a lot of social conflicts were witnessed, but they could not be solved wisely, mainly because of the lack of experience and because the government would relegate such problems to a second position.¹¹⁹ Priority was evidently given to restoring the state and authority in the country.

That is to say that the Algerian economic revolution, during the Boumedienne years, focused partly on a wave of nationalisations that allowed the country to recover its belonging and break the chains put around the economy. The nationalisation of oil resources, undergone during the 1970s under the Boumedienne tenure, had freed the oil industry from the capitalist

grip. Nevertheless, Boumedienne did not only free the hydrocarbon sector from the chains imposed by foreign companies on raw materials and national wealth, but also formed a productive power. Furthermore, Cohen stated explicitly that:

“Obversely, the economically grounded drive for profit promotes material productivity. And economic constraints help determine what use-values are produced: the economically inspired policy of planned obsolescence has material consequences. Marx was sensitive to the interlacing of use-value and exchange value, and said that ‘for me a use-value plays a far more important part than it has in economics hitherto’.”¹²⁰

This basically highlights the pre-eminence of productive means over the consumer goods, a very basic characteristic of the socialist state which we come across featuring the development plan of Boumedienne’s Algeria. This was demonstrated in the promotion of heavy industries and, more importantly, the need to use industrial energy in the economic development, either to make profit for the state and provide the industry with sufficient financial investment, or to produce exchange-goods that ought to achieve profitability for the state.

Therefore, one can only assert the authenticity and particularities of Algerian socialism during President Houari Boumedienne’s tenure that combined socialist principles to the values and interest of the Algerian, Muslim and Arab nations. This was, as asserted by Anissa Boumedienne, not Tito’s socialism, or Mao’s socialism, it was Algerian socialism, a socialism that served Algeria’s interest and that was framed within Islamic principles.¹²¹ To a great extent, ideology shaped the objectives of Algeria’s economic policy that consisted largely in economic independence and likewise legitimised the process of nationalisations. Ideology not only shaped Algeria’s economic policy but it also served Algeria’s national interest and legitimised policy actions that were for the benefit of the country.

Likewise, President Houari Boumedienne’s state-building was, to a great extent, flavoured with ideological preferences. Socialism shaped state-building under President Houari Boumedienne and constituted the structure within which his development plan needed to be framed so as to respond to a set of objectives that revolved around national independence. Henceforth, it becomes clear that ideology was, at a large scale, utilised to legitimise some of President Houari Boumedienne’s policies, such as the nationalisation of natural resources and foreign basis for the sake of achieving national independence.

3. Cultural Independence in President Houari Boumedienne’s Policies:

It is within the framework of the Democratic Peoples Revolution that President Houari Boumedienne undertook to restore the values of the Algerian society. Accordingly, the Cultural Revolution was launched in line with the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions. The main reason behind the Cultural Revolution was the revival of the national identity.

The Cultural Revolution was the result of revolution in other sectors. In other words, the different economic and social transformations that the country had undergone could not go without a cultural utterance. In fact, whatever occurred at the economic and political levels would directly reflect on the cultural level. Political independence was not enough for President Houari Boumedienne. Along with economic independence, cultural independence needed to be achieved. Cultural independence was tightly linked with the recuperation of all elements that constituted the Algerian nationality. In other words, the revival of Algerian cultural values that seemed non-existent after the independence was an essential step towards a cultural recovery and a confirmation of national identity.

So as to achieve cultural independence, President Houari Boumedienne undertook the *Algerianisation* of society and the state's structures. This was primarily done through education. It meant an effective transition from colonialism's policies to an Algerian model of education and modernisation. By 1978, 82 % of secondary teachers were Algerians and 60 % of university faculty members were native citizens. Furthermore, important subject matters, such as humanities and social sciences were reformulated so as to respond to the new nation's characteristics and requirements.¹²² As a matter of fact, under President Houari Boumediene, there was an attempt to modify the French educational system that was inherited from over 130 years of occupation and hence, to shift the structure of the Algerian education system to a more personalised form.

Further to the process of *Algerianisation* undergone during Boumedienne's years, the Algerian President attempted the democratisation of the Algerian state. It is important, at this stage to understand that democracy for the Algerian leader meant the promotion of education and the eradication of disparities between regions. President Houari Boumedienne asserted that:

“Democracy crystallises social justice and regional equilibrium. The concept of democracy revolves around the equitable distribution of national resources and the establishment of equilibrium between the countryside and the city. Democracy embeds equal opportunities for education. It means, primarily, dignity for everyone.”¹²³

Anissa Boumedienne insisted that democracy for President Boumedienne was conditioned with the right to education, a free health system and providing jobs to everyone.¹²⁴ An argument supported by Abdul Rezag Bouhara, ex-officer in the National Liberation Front, who explained that the concept of democracy revolved around the establishment of state's institutions, the crystallisation of a society project (i.e. the Constitution), and finally considering the ways to organise the people in order to implement it.

This unveils the truth behind democracy under President Houari Boumedienne's rule. It also sheds light on the initial steps of state-building initiated by the leader.

President Houari Boumedienne insisted on the importance of opening up to progress and to creating an appropriate strategy of education. This would include the enlargement of the

school system which would allow everyone to have access to education in order to extend means and ways of education. Education was an indispensable way to transform mentalities and adapt them to development. Above all, Boumedienne made sure that everyone had access to education and prioritised the Arabic language.

In 1963, only 16% of Algerians knew how to read and write correctly, and 2% barely knew how to read and write at all. Only 16% of the budget was concentrated on national education, whereas in 1971, 25% of the budget was allocated to education. This represented 11% of investments planned by the quadrennial plan for education.¹²⁵

Technical high schools were built up in early 1965, and teaching technology was introduced as part of the quadrennial plan. In fact, thirty technological institutes were opened in the country. This era was described by the current President, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa, former Foreign Minister during the Boumedienne regime, as the “Golden age.” He strongly defended the deceased President, explaining that the reason why Boumedienne gave priority to the edification of the state, was to inculcate knowledge and to provide bread and health so as to create appropriate conditions in favour of anchoring democracy, a democracy that could not flourish in a land where underdevelopment and ignorance prevailed. Furthermore, hunger was not a problem anymore, and school enrolment, health and total security were available to everyone, and the country was respected on the international scene. It was the era where there were answers to the intricate problems of the time.¹²⁶

Besides, President Houari Boumedienne prioritised a free health system and free education. He fought against ignorance and undertook the building of socialist villages. For him, Revolution was also the elimination of disparities between regions aiming, consequently, at raising the living standards for everyone, with no distinction. Put in the words of Boumedienne:

“The Revolution aims at freeing the Algerian peoples, each Algerian citizen from misery, disease, starvation, ignorance and the fear of what is to come and above all the exploitation of man by man.”¹²⁷

Most importantly, Arabo-Islamism was an important orientation of Algeria’s politics under President Houari Bouedienne. It is within this framework that President Houari Boumedienne, aspired at restoring the Arabo-Muslim dimension of the Algerian identity.

It is important, thus, to focus attention at this stage, on the issue of Arabisation which was part of Boumedienne’s policy to reaffirm Arabic as the official language of the state. Arabisation was regarded as an important element in order to lay emphasis on the Arab/ Islamic identity of the nation. Arabic was considered by the President as an essential component of the Algerian identity. For the President, Arabisation and the recovery of all components of the Algerian identity were essential for the accomplishment of social justice, agricultural revolution and the socialist management of institutions. President Houari Boumedienne often reiterated that:

“Arabisation was an integral part of our nation’s interests, it is also a guarantee of our national unity, and a strategic option of our socialist revolution.”¹²⁸

For President Houari Boumedienne Arabisation was a confirmation of National identity. He explicitly stated that:

“The coloniser aspired at erasing our national identity by destroying our language so as to be able to control our country and its resources.”¹²⁹

If we examined this element, we could therefore question the reasons why the Berber identity, which has also been historically part of the Algerian nation, has never been given enough interest and consideration. Essentially, Arabisation was not the only element of the *Révolution Culturelle* that served to bolster the Islamist movement, but also the regime’s emphasis on the religious aspects of the Arab-Muslim identity of Algerians, whilst reinforcing the state’s control over the religious sphere.¹³⁰ To some extent, *Arabisation* was used by the Algerian leader to maintain Islamist tendencies and, at the same time, strengthen his position within Islamist circles in order to gain their support. It also further stressed Algeria’s Arabo-Muslim character.

Nevertheless, President Houari Boumedienne’s Arabo-Muslim policy orientations meant, to some extent, the affirmation of religious values. It applied, accordingly, the systematic subordination of women. John Ruedy explained that the fact that the majority of the FLN militants were country people reinforced the conservative interpretation of gender relations.¹³¹ Although the role of women was defined by Islamic laws, under President Houari Boumedienne’s regime, they managed to win seats in communal and provincial elections and constituted an important work power for Algeria’s development plan. The issue of gender in President Houari Boumedinne’s policy-making process highlights the extent to which ideology moulded some of the leader’s policies. At the same time, such orientation enabled the president to gain support within conservatives.

The clear objectives of the Cultural Revolution, stated in article 19 of the Constitution, were:

to stress the national identity and promote cultural development, raise the standards of education and technical competence of the nation, adopt a harmonious life style with Islamic principles and the principles of the socialist revolution as defined in the National Charter, to motivate the masses in order to mobilise them and organise them in the fight for the socio-economic development of the country and to defend the socialist revolution, to assure the social awareness for the sake of transforming the anarchic and unjust structures of the society, to fight social scourges and the disadvantages of bureaucracy and finally to abolish feudalism.¹³²

Overall, the domestic distribution of power, combined with the country's economic objectives of self-sufficiency, development and the objectives of cultural independence, all contributed to an ideological and pragmatic foreign policy agenda by shaping the way foreign policy making was conducted so as to respond to Algeria's national needs. This was clear in the nationalisation of national resources which not only contributed to the increase of national revenues and economic capacity, but also served Algeria's sovereignty and economic independence purposes. Likewise, promoting cultural values and emphasising national identity moulded the aspirations for an ideologised foreign policy.

Notes:

¹ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, “Proclamation du Conseil de la Révolution du 19 Juin 1965,” Journal Officiel, 6 July 1965, 646.

²The appointment of the Council of Revolution by President Houari Boumediene, who headed it, was a way to allow him to have a major role in decision-making in a legal and legitimate way.

³ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, “Proclamation du Conseil de la Révolution du 19 Juin 1965,” Journal Officiel, 6 July 1965, 647.

⁴ According to article I in section I of the ‘Organisation de la Commune’, in République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Direction Générale des Collectivités Locales, Code Communal (Alger: Ministère de l’Intérieur, 1983), 17.

Some articles of the Communal Code have been amended in 1981 under the ordinance 81-09 of 4 July 1981.

⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, “Charte de la Wilaya,” Journal Officiel, 23 May 1969, 374.

⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome I (Alger: Ministère de l’Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 72.

⁷ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, “Ordonnance n°65-182 du 10 Juillet 1965 portant constitution du gouvernement,” Journal Officiel, 13 July 1965, 671.

⁸ The Council of Revolution was the issuing body of ordinances that included orientations for the government and the executive secretariat of the party. The year 1965 and 1966 were years that were indeed, characterised with the issuing of many ordinances. This demonstrated its control over both state institutions. See Chapter Two, in Bou Ch’ir Saïd, Al-Nidhām al-Siyāsi fi al-Jazaïr, 2nd Edition (Algiers: Dar al-Houdā, 1993).

⁹ Saïd Bou Ch’ir, Al Nidhām al Siyāsi fi al-Djazaïr, 2nd Edition (Algiers: Dar al-Hudā, 1993), 71.

¹⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, “Ordonnance n°65-182 du 10 Juillet 1965 portant constitution du gouvernement,” Journal Officiel, 13 Juillet 1965, 671.

¹¹ Article 126, 128 in République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération National, Constitution 1976, 49.

¹² The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. National Front of Liberation. Al-Mithāq al-Wat’ani. Algiers 1976, 55.

¹³ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, “Ordonnance n°75-69 du 1er Novembre 1975 portant création de la commission supérieure de la Charte Nationale,” Journal Officiel, 04 Novembre 1975, 962.

¹⁴ Article 1, 2, 3 in République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération National, Constitution 1976, 11.

¹⁵ Khalfa Mameri, Houari Boumediene (Alger: Editions KARIM MAMERI, 1999), 4.

Khalifa Mameri was one of President Houari Boumedienne’s biographers. Although there has been no official biography published many close friends that lived through the Boumedienne regime wrote about him and Khalfa Mameri was one of them.

¹⁶ Interview conducted by the author with Mahyi al-Deen Amimour, on the 28/12/2003, at the Senate in Algiers (Le Conseil de la Nation).

Muhyi al-Deen Amimour is one of the people who were privileged to work closely with President Houari Boumedienne. He was appointed adviser at the Presidency from 1971 until 1984, he was then a substitute member of the national liberation front central committee from 1979 to 1983, then ambassador to Pakistan from 1989 to 1992, and he is member of the national council. He was appointed minister of communication and culture on August 26, 2000 and is, currently, Senator of the city of Algiers and President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation and of the national Community abroad.

¹⁷ Interview with Muhyi al Deen Amimour in Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA). Reportage on President Houari Boumedienne, produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana. ‘ala Athaar Boumedienne. Part I (national policy), Algiers, March 1990. 02 hours.

¹⁸ Interview with Kasdi Merbah in Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA). Reportage on President Houari Boumedienne, produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana. ‘ala Athaar Boumedienne. Part I (national policy), Algiers, March 1990. 02 hours.

¹⁹ Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria: A Political History (Washington Square, New York: New York University Press, 1996), 45.

²⁰ Ibid. 46.

²¹ Boukara Hocein, Ideology and Pragmatism in Algerian Foreign Policy. PhD Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1986, 86.

²² George Joffé, “The Role of Violence within the Algerian Economy,” The Journal of North African Studies 7 (Spring 2002): 1.

²³ Henry F. Jakson, The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1977), 210.

²⁴ Jean R, Tartter. “External Security Problems and Policies,” in Helen Chapin Metz (ed.), Algeria: A Country Study, Fifth Edition (Washington DC: The Library of Congress, 1994), 252.

²⁵ Hugh Roberts, “Radical Islamism and the Dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: the embattled Arians of Algiers.” Third World Quarterly: Islam and Politics 10 (April 1988): 561.

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- ²⁶ Hugh Roberts, "The FLN: French conceptions, Algerian realities," in George Joffé (ed.), North Africa: nation, state and region (London: Routledge, 1993), 131.
- ²⁷ Hugh Roberts, "Radical Islamism and the dilemma of Algerian Nationalism: the embattled Arians of Algiers," op. cit. 564.
- ²⁸ William H. Lewis, "The Decline of Algeria's FLN," The Middle East Journal 20 (Spring 1966): 161.
- ²⁹ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, "Ordonnance n°65-182 du 10 Juillet 1965 portant constitution du gouvernement," Journal Officiel, 13 July 1965, 671.
- ³⁰ Kamel Bouchama, Le FLN Instrument et Alibi du Pouvoir: 1962-1992 (Alger: Dahlab, 1992), 74.
- ³¹ Anthony Toth, "Historical Setting," in Helen Chapin Metz (eds.), op.cit. 61.
- ³² The principles of the cancelled Constitution of 1963 have never been disputed, including the socialist choice and the ruling via the single party, which contradicted the legal features of a coup that was supposed to oppose the former system.
- ³³ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, President Houari Boumediene, "Déclaration du Frère Houari Boumediene, Président du Conseil de la Révolution, faite le 5 Juillet 1965 à l'occasion du 3eme anniversaire de l'indépendance," Journal Officiel, 06 July 1965, 653.
- ³⁴ See Article 105, 90 of the fundamental policy of the party, FLN, in National Liberation Front, Central Committee, Al-Nusus al- Assasyya al-Mosaddaq 'alayha min Taraf al Mo'tamar al Rabi' (Algiers: 1987),47.
- ³⁵ Kamel Bouchama, op. cit. 75.
- ³⁶ Christopher Clapham, Third World Politics: an Introduction (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 150.
- ³⁷ David T. Catell and Richard Sisson, Comparative Politics: Institutions, Behaviour and Development (Los Angeles, California: Mayfield, 1978), 405.
- ³⁸ Mahfoud Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria: 1830-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 121.
- ³⁹ David T. Catell and Richard Sisson. op. cit. 440.
- ⁴⁰ William Gutteridge, Military Institutions and power in the New States (London: Pall Mall Press, 1964), 15.
- ⁴¹ Christopher Clapham, op.cit. 142.
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- ⁴⁷ Rachid Benyoub, Algeria 2002: Political Directory. (Alger: Agence Nationale de l'Édition et de Publicité (ANEP), 2002), 173.
- ⁴⁸ Christopher Clapham and George Philip, The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 1.
- ⁴⁹ David T Catells and Richard Sisson, op.cit. 415.
- ⁵⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome VII (Algiers: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 364.
- ⁵¹ Rachid Benyoub, op. cit. 175.
- ⁵² Rachid Benyoub, op. cit.209.
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- ⁵⁴ Rachid Benyoub, op. cit. 197.
- ⁵⁵ Henry F. Jackson, op.cit. 193.
- ⁵⁶ Henry F. Jackson, op.cit. 193-4.
- ⁵⁷ Mohamed Bouzidi. Algeria's Policy towards France: 1962-1972. PhD thesis, University of Denver, Colorado 1972, 109.
- ⁵⁸ See: République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération National, La Charte Nationale 1976, 60.
- ⁵⁹ The highest institution within the party was to draw the guidelines of the general policy of the state, where the president of the republic was to decide, according to the Constitution and the National Charter, the general policy of the nation, nationally and internationally, and execute it. This shows the interrelation and dependency between the different state's institutions.
- ⁶⁰ Khaled Aïssa Chaib, Le Président: Genèse du Renouveau National (Alger: Entreprise Nationale des Arts Graphiques, 2000), 22.
- ⁶¹ Among the nationalizations measures undertaken during Ben Bella's tenure was the nationalisation of the colons' lands and the introduction of self-management in agriculture, following the March decrees in 1963.
- ⁶² Juliette Minces, L'Algérie de Boumediene (Paris: Presse de la Cite, 1978): 33.
- ⁶³ John Ruedy, op.cit. 215.
- ⁶⁴ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Algerian Customs Statistics. (Report 1980)
- ⁶⁵ Benjamin Stora, Algeria 1830-2000: A Short History (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001), 134.

⁶⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome I (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 22.

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⁶⁸ Kamel Bouchama, De la Villa Joly à la Citadelle d'El Mouradia: Chronologie des faits (Alger: Entreprise Nationale des Arts Graphiques, 1999), 91.

⁶⁹ It is referred to the Evian Agreement which was put to referendum and, it paved the way for the independence of Algeria.

⁷⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, "Ordonnance n°66-93 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société des mines de l'Ouenza, Ordonnance n°66-94 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société des mines de Sidi Kamber, Ordonnance n°66-95 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société des minière et carrière de Rivet El Maden, Ordonnance n° 66-96 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société nouvelle des Mines d'Ain Barbar (société cirtienne), Ordonnance n°66-97 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société de la vieille Montagne dans son activité d'exploitation des mines de Hammam N'Bails et des mines de l'Ouarsenis, Ordonnance n° 66-98 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société nouvelle des mines d'Aïn Arko, Ordonnance n° 66-99 du 6 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société algérienne du Zinc, Ordonnance n° 66-101portant nationalisation de la Société de fer du Khanguet El Mouhad," Journal Officiel, 06 Mai 1966, 342-4.

⁷¹République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, "Ordonnance n° 66-284 du 15 septembre 1966 portant code des investissements," Journal Officiel, 17 Septembre 1966, 901.

⁷²République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, "Ordonnance 66-129 du 27 mai 1966 portant nationalisation de la Société algérienne d'assurance," Journal Officiel, 31 Mai 1966, 399.

⁷³ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, "Ordonnance n° 66-178 du 13 Juin 1966 portant création et fixant les statuts de la Banque nationale d'Algérie", Journal Officiel, 14 Juin 1966, 582.

⁷⁴République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Houari Boumediene, "Ordonnance n° 67-204 du 1er Octobre 1967 portant création de la Banque Extérieure de l'Algérie," Journal Officiel, 06 Octobre1967, 866.

⁷⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Conseil de la Révolution, "Ordonnance n° 71-8 du 24 février 1971 portant nationalisation des biens, parts, actions, droits et intérêts de toute nature des sociétés, filiales ou établissements connus sous la raison sociale, le sigle ou la dénomination de la société d'exploitation des hydrocarbures de Hasi R' Mel (S. E. H. R) et

l'ensemble des intérêts miniers détenus par toutes sociétés dans les concessions du Nord In Amenas, Tin Fouyer Sud, Alrar Est, Alrar Ouest, Nezia Est, Bridès, Toual, Rhourde Chouff et Rhoude Adra et les interest miniers relatifs au gaz provenant des gisements de Gassi Toull, Rhoude Nous, Nezia Est, Zar Zaïline et Tiguentourine, Ordonnance n° 71-9 du 24 fevrier 1971 déclarant propriété exclusive de l'Etat des gaz associés au hydrocarbures liquides issus de tous gisements d'hydrocarbures situés en Algérie, Ordonnance n° 71-10 du 24 février 1971 portant nationalisation des biens, parts, actions, droits et intrêts de toute nature des sociétés SOPEC, SOTHRA, TREPES, des biens, parts, actions, droits et intrêts de toute nature de la sociétés CREPS, de la sociétés TRAPSA et des canalisations dites " PK 66 In Aménas Méditerranée à Ohanet" et "Hassi R'Mel-Haoud El Hamra", Ordonnance 71-11 du 24 fevrier 1971 portant nationalisation partielle des biens, actions, droits et interest de toute nature dans les sociétés CFP (A), SOFREPAL, COLPAREX, OMNIREX, EURAFREP, FRANCAREP," Journal Officiel, 25 Février 1971, 226-8.

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- ⁹¹ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Présidence du Conseil. Révolution Agraire, Alger 1971, 12.
- ⁹² Ministère de l'Agriculture, Evolution du Secteur Agricole A Travers Les Textes (1962-1989) Vol II. (Alger: Centre National Pédagogique Agricole, no date), 82.
- ⁹³ Ibid. 86
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- ⁹⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Présidence du Conseil. Révolution Agraire, Alger 1971, 40.
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¹¹⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire. Front de Libération National. Constitution 1976, 14.

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PART THREE:

Systemic Influences on Algerian Foreign Policy.

Chapter Four

Between National Interest and Geopolitics: Algeria and the Arab Maghrib

1. The Importance of the Maghrib for Algeria:

The existing correlation between the Maghrib and Algeria is purely of an existentialist and essentialist character. In other words, the Maghrib is a geographical reality in which Algeria lies in the centre. It stretches over the surface of 5 776 961 square kilometres, from the Atlantic to the Libyan-Egyptian borders and from the Mediterranean to the deep Sahara desert, precluding Egypt, which lies on the Nile valley bordering with Sudan. Algeria cannot avoid being part of the Maghrib. It occupies 2 381 740 square kilometres of the overall surface of the Maghrib and holds a strategic location in the heart of it. Hence, it is plausible that a reciprocal interlink subsists between the two entities; one cannot go without the other. Remarkably, Algeria shares similar topography and interesting physical features with other Maghrib territories, which gives a taste of the uniqueness and similarities in the mentioned geographical stretch. This portrays the Maghrib as a distinctive comprehensive geographical unit with a fertile coastline looking up the Mediterranean and stretching over 3 000 miles from the Atlantic Ocean to the eastern Mediterranean. It is traversed from the West to the East by two main mountainous chains that are part of a huge mountain system referred to by Brodrick as *the Atlas Complex*.¹ The first chain is known to be the *Maritime Atlas*; running from the Moroccan *Rif*, through the Algerian *Tellien Atlas*, and finishing in the Tunisian *Khroumirie*. Facing this chain is the *Inner Atlas*, another parallel series of mountains that comprise the Moroccan high and medium Atlas, the Algerian Saharans Atlas, the *Aurès* and the Tunisian dorsal. At 2000 kilometres from the Mediterranean, towards the South, transverses the Sahara from Mauritania to Libya, a huge desert empire that covers most of the Maghribi land and, most amazingly, this stretch of land features the same climate changes within the territories. These mutual geographical and natural topographic traits within the five states, constitute the first argument to advocate a unity within these lands.

The importance of the Maghrib for Algeria mainly stems from the geographical security provided, and it constitutes, above all, a viable factor for the enhancement of its economic performance through economic linkages in the region. Generally speaking, the idea of unity has always inspired security. The potent and reciprocated bond between union and security establishes itself positively in an ambience of accordance and concord, instead of conflicting atmosphere leading to war mechanisms and resorting to an imbalance of power.

It is amply evident that regional integration is often driven by political and economic motives, and

henceforth, occurs to attain an improved or optimal economic or political performance. Much of the time, economic integration inspires increased profits and larger markets. Nevertheless, Ghantus believed that “the higher the level of integration, the greater the limitations on sovereignty of member-countries in carrying out their trade and development policies.”² States that had already initiated national economic policies and that are very protective of their national autonomy do not forcefully appeal to such a restraining paradigm whilst also simultaneously seeking to enjoy the likely profits of economic integration.

In the case of Algeria, the formation of a political and economic entity was intended, primarily, to guarantee stability in the region and circumvent risks of any conflict or attack from neighbouring countries that might jeopardise the country’s safety and stability; it also represented a counterweight against any opponent or competing blocs, and subsequently minimized outside threats. Alternatively, regional integration equated security and guaranteed a stronger and a more secure position in international politics for Algeria. In this context, Mohamed Ayoob suggested that regional security carries three assumptions, including, the withdrawal of any external power from interfering in regional issues as a result of regional cohesion and solidarity, the ability to overcome and eliminate any intra-state frictions, thus easing any likely tensions and, finally, keeping inter-state tensions at a low profile.³

Similarly, Bhagwati linked the initiation of integration schemes in developing countries to the notion of ‘solidarity, bargaining and political cohesion, and strength’,⁴ which demonstrates the emergence of regionalism as opposed to the political and economic dominance of the superpowers. Furthermore, what should not be underestimated is the significant effectiveness that a free intra-regional trade zone would stimulate by liberating trade exchanges in the region and lifting customs control and taxes. Paradoxically, Abdelaziz Testas investigated the effect tariff barriers had on the Algerian-Maghribi trade and concluded that there would have been limited success, had there been no barriers. He sketched a number of key reasons and, interestingly enough, among the arguments he submitted, he stated that:

“Although the causes may not be the same in all cases, most studies agree on certain sets of reasons. First, a key factor in understanding the limited success of developing countries’ integration schemes can be found in the fact that most developing countries forming a trading bloc are at very different levels of economic development. The economic unevenness of partner countries is well known to deal to unequal distribution of costs and benefits within the integrated area.”⁵

With regards to that, El-Agraa essentially ruled out the existence of any theoretical difference between economic integration in the Advanced and Third Worlds. He explained that the major difference lay in terms of the type of economic integration that suited the particular circumstances

of developing countries and political feasibility. El- Agraa did, though, stress the following:

“It has been claimed that the body of economic integration theory as so far developed has no relevance for the Third World. This is due to the fact that the theory suggested that there would be more scope for trade creation if the countries concerned were initially very competitive in production but potentially very complementary and that a CU [custom union] would be more likely to be trade creating if the partners conducted most of their foreign trade amongst themselves.”⁶

In reality, the tremendous impediments that the economic unification of the Maghrib states was confronted with were the result of the dichotomy between the ideologies adopted within the Arab Maghrib countries, which hampered any efforts of an incorporated free market or a free trade zone. Subsequently, a successful economic integration could not achieve a revival unless some primordial conditions were available, the most basic of which was to ensure an equal scale of development between all the countries in the bloc. Abdelaziz Testas asserted that integration in developing countries should be designed to “maximise the rate of economic growth and not simply to increase intra-regional trade.”⁷ State leaders in the Maghrib tried to selfishly accomplish development on an individual basis as if dimensions of regional integration had never been a prospect. Henceforth, the first step would be to obliterate economic restrictions and control on internal import and export from the neighbouring countries policies. El-Agraa suggested that agreeing an acceptable distribution gain resulting from joint optimal action forms a major stumbling block; he went further and highlighted that:

“the achievement of the potential gains from economic integration will be limited to countries able and willing to cooperate to distribute the gains from integration so that all partners may benefit compared to the results achieved by independent action.”⁸

However, prior to any economic prospects lying beneath regional integration, exist more viable and inherent paradigms that had always motivated and fortified the concept of a unified Maghrib.

1.1 The Question of identity:

The intangible question of identity imposes itself as an elusive factor in the genuineness of a *Great Arab Maghrib* that cannot be ignored. From the outset, the Maghrib indigenous inhabitants were known to be Berbers,⁹ and the Arabs were the successful conquerors who managed to take roots in the Berber community, customising their linguistic expression, Arabic, and spreading Islam widely in the region. This conveyed the Arab identity beyond its initial territories and shied away the cultural and self-expression of the Berbers. There was a naturalisation of the Arab element in the

area which made them the predominant actors in the region. This is not to depict an image of a salient ethnicity over a minority that lost its self-expression¹⁰ but to portray the unified initial origin of the Great Maghrib's earliest inhabitants. Berbers inherited the same cultural and historical heritage over centuries, witnessing various civilisations as a result of occupations through the years that passed. Consequently, one can argue the existence of two predominant and elementary factors in defining the Maghribi identity, which are, ultimately, language and religion, Arabic and Islam. In the view of Houari Boumedienne:

“Arabic has always been referred to as a strong bond that played a preponderant and determinant role in consolidating the Maghribi edifice. Gathered with religion, these two patterns represent spiritual links that ensure the safeguard of the integrity of the peoples and fought campaigns of depersonalisation and assimilation.”¹¹

Put together, these unitary factors equate the existence of a Berber populace that shared the same religion and history in a stretch of land, bordered by the Pacific from the West and Egypt and Sudan from the East, the Mediterranean from the North and black Africa from the South. In such context, the notion of a *Great Arab Maghrib*, could be attributed, unwittingly, to the population occupying this North African part of the continent with no dividing boundaries, regardless of any political connotation that might flavour this approach. After all, it is the land that sheltered the peoples pictured by Hassen el Youssi as a geographical spot and its peoples with his famous saying: “*Halq el rouous, lebs el burnous, akl el couscous*”, shaved heads, wearing burnouses, eating couscous.¹² Similarly, The Maghrib was described by Nasr Allah as the geographical expression of the stretch of land, located at the western side of Egypt and that lies from Tripoli in the East to the Atlantic sea, West, and from the Mediterranean shores to the North to the Middle part of the Great Sahara South, it encompasses consequently: Tunisia, Algeria, Marrakech and Mauritania.¹³

On the other hand, John Ruedy claimed that Arabism and Islam were only two of many variables contributing to the identity of particular groups:

“The undebatable historical reality is that Islam and Arabism in North Africa were elaborated within the context of a predominantly Berber framework which has stamped the region linguistically, sociologically, institutionally, and perhaps intellectually. At the same time, the fact that the Maghrib was and is closer geographically to southern Europe and the Sudan than to the Middle East *métropole* has dictated that the elaboration of Islam in Barbary was almost constantly modified and conditioned by influences from these regions.”¹⁴

In fairness to Claire Spencer, the first attempts for unification were largely shared at the start between Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia. It was only lately that this tri-partite gathering was joined by Libya and Mauritania and ruled out Egypt from being part of the Maghribi region. Spencer

explicitly advocated the following:

“Even though a fully unified Maghreb has not emerged since independence, the term has lost none of its symbolic strength; it has merely been reformulated to accommodate the demands of a world based on nation-states. Although the heartland (without which no regional project would be complete) remains Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, the states on either side - Libya and Mauritania - have been gradually brought into the fold. They shared a similar cultural and religious heritage, it is said, although less so the further south and east one goes. In the south of Mauritania, one is approaching a sub Saharan and hence, different kind of Africa from the core of the Maghreb; to the east, one is almost into Egypt and the beginnings of another Arab world, the Mashrek.”¹⁵

This argument supports the notion that the Maghrib, known to be in olden times, *Jazirat al-Maghrib*, distinguishes itself as a geographical entity with a common historical background and origins from the Arab Mashrek (known as the Middle East). These geographical factors facilitate and pave the way for a Maghribi union and integration as part of a bigger entity, that is the Arab world. Accordingly, John Entelis and Mark Tessler described North Africa as a “unique world of its own, however much it may share in culture, religion, language, and history with the rest of the Middle East.”¹⁶

At this stage, it is worth considering the implications that historical momentum had on the concept of the Maghrib. The way the concept of the Maghrib has shifted focus throughout history, began as a natural and spontaneous reality that sprang from civilisational commonalities between the people of North Africa and moved to revolve around nationalist paradigms more concerned with the liberation of North Africa. After the independence of all countries of the Maghrib, the concept was more flavoured with an economic tint and constituted more of a necessity to accommodate the needs of international politics and benefit from the advantages of economic integration.

Nevertheless, Abed Jabri mentioned three key elements upon which the concept of the Maghrib was based. These were the notion of the *umma* or Islamic community, the nationalist reaction against French colonialism and its attempts to shatter and isolate their Arabo-Muslim identity, and, finally, the hopes of the Maghribi peoples for modern and progressive renewal which constituted the evolution of awareness surrounding the Maghribi regional identity.¹⁷

John Ruedy emphasised that analysts sought to anticipate policy outcomes at different levels in the Maghrib by basing their assumptions on some model of Arab or Islamic identity. They would likely confront an unrelenting series of surprises, as North African countries distinguished themselves from other Arab or Islamic countries and deviated from the Arab or Islamic model.¹⁸ In this perspective, Boumedienne repeatedly emphasised the correlated dynamics that link Algeria with the Maghrib and pictured it as an objective reality, given the numerous factors of unity. He reaffirmed

the strategic position of Algeria towards the Arab Maghrib and excluded the transitory or ephemeral character of the dispositions undertaken for the achievement of a solid union. President Houari Boumedienne stipulated:

“I can confirm that Algeria’s will to achieve unity is sincere; our position towards the Arab Maghreb is strategic. It is not a matter of tactical, transitory or ephemeral dispositions.”¹⁹

1.2 The Emergence of the Maghrib and the historical ties between Algeria and the other countries of the Maghrib:

According to scholars, the unification of the Maghrib was made possible only twice in the past with the Almoravids and Almohads, though Paul Balta mentioned the realisation of Unity in Antiquity (238-148 BC) with Massinissa and during the Islamic era of the Almohads.²⁰ History shows the role played by colonialism in distorting and hindering the Maghribi union by installing fixed boundaries between the territories which, unlike under the Ottomans, obstructed the free movement of the peoples in the Maghrib, and divided North African liberation actions. It also enlightens the complementary roles exchanged between the Moroccan, Algerian and Tunisian nationalist movements, and the support received from Libya during the French occupation.

What is striking about that is that faced with a coloniser, the mass movements that saw birth as a result of foreign occupation,²¹ were more preoccupied with the liberation of the Maghrib than with its unification, which froze attempts aimed at the accomplishment of a unified Arab Maghrib.

One pervasive aspect was the will of these nationalist movements to liberate the whole North African territories from French occupation.²² This sheds light on the evolution of the Maghrib concept which shifted focus from elements of political actions to a unified anti-colonialist struggle. For Abed Jabri, the Maghrib concept crystallised a “Linkage to Islam and Arab nationalism, recognition of unity of objectives, and permanent coordination of actions,” and was a means “to ignite the enthusiasm of the struggling masses, and to thwart the colonialists and fanatics of the French administration, who could never accept the possibility of liquidating French domination in North Africa.”²³

In 1915-1916, the idea of a North African republic was introduced in Geneva by the Committee for the liberation of Tunisia and Algeria, which established the *Maghrib Magazine* and proclaimed independence. At a further stage, a more formal way of activism began with the creation of the Tunisian *Destour* movement in 1920 and Neo *Destour* in 1934; the *Étoile Nord Africaine* came into being in 1926, which later developed into the Algerian Peoples Party (PPA). The PPA emerged in 1937, and explicitly called for the independence of North Africa; whereas the Moroccan Istiqlal party emerged in 1944. In 1948, organised and structured efforts towards freeing the Maghrib moved a step forward with the establishment of the Committee for the Liberation of the Maghrib

“Comité de libération du Maghreb”, which was based in Cairo, and which adopted a chart described by Paul Balta as the first ideological elaboration of a Maghribi unitary project. This was the work of exiled Tunisians, Algerians and Moroccans in Cairo. On the 15 February 1947, the Congress of the Arab Maghrib gathered and founded the Bureau of the Arab Maghrib, which approved the following five resolutions and objectives: the elimination of French and Spanish colonialism; coordination between Maghribi nationalist movements with an attempt to achieve a collaboration between the Arab Maghrib and the Arab League; presentation of the Question of the Maghrib to international organisations; and finally, the unifying of efforts deployed by Maghribi bureau in Egypt.²⁴

After its establishment, the Maghrib Bureau held eight sessions in total, among which was the meeting of Tangier in 1958, which crystallised efforts to enforce a valuable unity and forge a sentiment of a common fate and history. It also drew a stratagem to face the divisional challenges imposed by colonialism and unite, within one framework, in the fight against imperialism. With respect to that, Mohamed Chtatou paid tribute to the Tangier Meeting of 1958, which he described as:

“Another important manifestation of the Maghreb’s sense of common identity was the meeting in Tangier in 1958 of the political parties that led the independence movements, Istiqlal (Morocco), FLN (Algeria), and Destour (Tunisia), to develop a common post-independence strategy for the development and achievement of unity in the full sense of the word.”²⁵

In short, the main objective of the Maghrib Committee was to liberate the three states and attempt to prevent any of the three parts from involving France in negotiations separately from the other. However, splits within the one ideology were bound to raise problems among the Cairo Charter supporters, as tendencies began to divide towards the creation of common paramilitary groups in the fight against the enemy. While Tunisia and Morocco were not convinced about such a procedure, the PPA-MTLD was eager to initiate military resistance and launch the War of Liberation. Tunisia was leaning towards negotiations, especially with France, which offered to grant the state internal autonomy as indicated in the declaration of Franc Mandis, who affirmed on the 31 June 1954, that the internal autonomy of Tunisia and Morocco was to be constrained to definite guarantees regarding the maintenance (by France) of all its privileges and specialisations in these two countries.²⁶ The negotiations were taking place, however, in the absence of Bourguiba and Benyoucef, President of the Party and General Secretary respectively, and were only allowed to return to Tunisia at the signing of the agreements in June 1955. At that point, the FLN had launched its war against France on 1 November 1954, which was very decisive to the future of the other Maghribi states. France’s pre-occupations with the Algerian revolution rushed it into liberating Tunisia and Morocco in order to shift its total devotion to Algeria, altering its intentions to grant

Tunisia internal autonomy on 20 August 1953, then interdependence and, finally, total independence on 20 March 1956. As for Morocco, after less than a month of granting Tunisia total independence, and following long disagreements, France was to duplicate the same unsuccessful procedures of interdependency. On 8 November 1955, King Hassan V was officially recognised as King of Morocco after having been exiled and expelled from his kingdom, and was granted independence on 20 March 1956.

The point is that the Algerian War of Liberation accelerated and helped the independence of Tunisia and Morocco in 1956 and of the Libyan Fazan in 1951 by increasing pressure on the coloniser. An argument, strongly supported by Djillali Sari, was that the Algerian War of Liberation forced recognition of sovereignty of the two Maghribi countries. Algeria would come to the forefront of the French political scene, weakening its positions and its prestige in the world.²⁷ This also shed light on the link between the Tunisian, Algerian and Moroccan resistance against France. However, it portrayed the partial disagreement in the means used to achieve independence. While Algeria supported armed struggle, some actors in Morocco and Tunisia favoured a more peaceful approach, breaching, hence, the Charter of Cairo and turning a blind eye to the supremacy of the Maghrib ideology, which gave precedence to the liberation of the Maghrib as a whole. This let down prospects for liberating the entire area. Fortunately, territorial and national selfishness to gain independence were not comprehensively shared by all Maghribi people. Mouloud Kacim Nait Kacim mentioned the rise of opposition against negotiations between the two brotherly countries and France. He stated that King Abd al Karim al Khatabi condemned the negotiations and agreements, and called for a unification of the armed struggle in the three countries (Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia) in order to completely eradicate the French presence and achieve independence everywhere in the Maghrib.²⁸ France could not wash its hands of the disruption that affected the tri-partite gathering and the supremacy of their ideology, hampering, by all means, integration between the three countries, by pulling some parts to dialogue and creating distrust and splits between the three countries' nationalist movements. However, after Morocco, Tunisia and Libya were liberated, they provided the National Liberation Front with strong material, ideological support and the prospects of a free Arab Maghrib.

Once all of the countries constituting the Maghrib were liberated, the Permanent Consultative Committee for the Maghrib, with no specific policy or regulation, was created in 1964, to act as a sort of platform in charge of developing interchange and to coordinate their policy in a harmonious way. It aimed at invigorating the creation of an embryonic bloc along the lines of the European Economic Community (EEC). It seemed incontrovertible that the *Great Arab Maghrib* would finally gain recognition as an international political and economic entity. The same year Libya joined the Committee. Mauritania had to wait five years after it joined as an observer in 1970, to become a state member in 1975. The Committee designed its headquarters in Tunis, with Mustapha

Filali as the Secretary General. The Committee managed to generate different commissions in various sectors, ranging from telecommunication and transport to tourism and scientific research, in an endeavour to develop a free trade zone; free from any customs limitations and a liberty to travel within the five countries of the *Great Arab Maghrib* with no boundary restraints. Moreover, the committee was aimed at coordinating economic policies. Following the seventh session, held in Algiers in 1975, the Consultative Committee was to set definite lines and policies to follow, easing trade exchanges between the five state-members and promoting cooperation in mainly industrial and agricultural fields.

Regrettably, the Maghrib union could not help but be drawn into a languid stagnation which left efforts for unification at a standstill. It was also faced with a border conflict, in which Morocco and the Western Sahara were the major actors, and in which Algeria felt duty-bound to attempt its involvement.

It is therefore important to bear in mind that the common faith and historical destiny of the Maghribi peoples, coupled with their ethnic and linguistic aspects, designates their strong feeling over a joint cultural identity and sets up a formidable in-depth bond between the inhabitants of the region, thus rendering the union of the Maghrib an aspiration for the masses. This constitutes the milestone which would mark the emergence of the *Maghrib Union*. This is, though, not sufficient to accomplish an effective union in a world which is politically ruled by economic supremacy. Indeed, an effective *Arab Maghrib Union* needs to combine its countries' policies within a *sine qua non* mutual framework that would fall within integrated economic landmarks and that would encourage political cooperation afterward. Unfortunately, in the case of the Arab Maghrib, the failure encumbering the implementation of a regional union relates to the supremacy of the political facet over the economic potential of the region, not forgetting that the Maghrib states, joined together, constitute a complementary ground for economic wealth and prosperity.

With regards to that, Mohamed Chtatou argued the potential of achieving much needed economic integration. He believed that the Arab Maghrib Union:

“has had a false start in that it initially gave prominence to political content rather than economic needs and that experience has proved that unions that last are the unions in which economics take precedence over politics. This is certainly true of the EEC, which started in Rome in 1957 with a treaty that led to gradual economic integration. It was only later on, when the economic groundwork proved to be solid, that the Europeans started setting up the political structure.”²⁹

With an important south Mediterranean, geo-strategic location and in a world where economic and political blocs have proven to be stronger, the Maghrib is at the centre of the world map. It links

Europe to Africa and is an important Arab partner that could often mediate between the Middle East and the West, and which could bring prosperity to the economies of its members, in addition to political prestige.

2. President Houari Boumedienne's Policy towards the Maghrib:

Algeria occupies a geo-strategic location in the Arab Maghrib, which makes the neighbouring countries compulsorily important trade partners. However, the discrepant ideologies adopted by Maghribi state leaders constitute the first obstacle towards a total union in the region. From another angle, the stumbling block that stood in the way of the Maghribi Union in the 1970s lay at the roots of decision makers, that is to say the impossibility of reaching common ground on which to approach the edification of a unified *Great Arab Maghrib*. Policy makers needed to initially espouse a cohesive set of policies with a compulsory prerequisite to '*decompartmentalise*'³⁰ borders between the five states of the Arab Maghrib and set up a consistent infrastructure for its edification. Moreover, cultural dialectic has also been argued to be a major factor in the political dynamics of the Maghrib, with the emergence of a traditional, outmoded Arabo-Islamic pole and a modern Western pole, thus annihilating Maghribi elites in their search for cultural and political models.³¹ Zartman attempted to demonstrate that: "political events in North Africa throughout this century have been translations of a basic cultural debate over the value of a leap to "modernity" versus a return to "authenticity" as a model for polity and society."³² It would be, though, intricate to assimilate Algeria to one specific pole, considering the disparities lying within the national tendencies and the oppression of various cultural and political trends by the Boumedienne ruling. His policy was, however, flavoured by a taste of modernity and progress in an attempt to conform with the requirements of an evolving world which would explain his thirst for an economic Maghrib union. Similarly, we cannot rule out President Houari Boumedienne's conformity with traditional and revolutionary ethics, as frequently emphasised by himself.

As for Algeria, Mohamed Chtatou explained that, in an attempt to overcome obstacles,

"Boumedienne launched his bold ideological 'Trojan Horse', the concept of the Maghreb des peuples, calling for the creation of the 'Peoples Maghreb', a kind of revolutionary union implying the dismantling of the regimes in Morocco and Tunisia and for the establishment of socialist entities on the Algerian Model."³³

Clearly, President Houari Boumedienne endeavoured to achieve complete political integration in the Maghrib. However, the determinacy and intransigence of the political elite of other Maghrib states to maintain existing systems within individual territories have always obstructed the route towards complete political integrity, despite the common identity and the historically shared heritage. This undoubtedly led the Maghribi leaders to consider other forms of union. It is

primordial at this stage to understand, prior to any discussion, that forms of unions or regional integration differ on the policy targets and the countries predilection and predisposition to integration. El-Agraa distinguished between six types of regional integration. These are:

1. Sectoral integration which consists of confiscating barriers to trade in the output of a single industrial sector.
2. Free trade area where countries remain independent of their foreign policies, yet they abolish all trade impediments amongst themselves.
3. Customs unions which resemble the free trade areas on the exception of conducting common external policies such as common external tariffs on imports from the outside world.
4. Common markets in which capital, labour and enterprise should move with no hindrance between the participating nations.
5. Complete economic unions which are prone to complete monetary and fiscal unification with a central authority to control these policies.
6. Complete political integration where the member countries aim at becoming plainly one nation.³⁴

The pattern of economic activity has been undergoing constant change and growth for decades. Economic relations and trade activities between countries developed significantly and urged regional integration in order to ease the process of interchange between both neighbouring countries and those entering economic agreements. The overall aim was to overcome difficulties and barriers that typically restricted trading, and to manage the structuring of the countries' relationships as members of a union. In the view of El-Agraa, the importance of regional integration likely rests on the economic gains that ought to be obtained and which normally increase if the level of regional integration goes beyond a free trade area and customs union levels. However, there is no guarantee of such goals, as they strongly depend on static resource reallocation effects and also on dynamic or long term effects. This means that achieving gains would depend on the nature and efficiency of the scheme and the type of the competitive attitude prevailing prior to regional integration. He emphasised that: "Indeed, it is quite feasible that in the absence of 'appropriate' competitive behaviour, regional integration may worsen the situation. Thus the possible attainment of these benefits must be considered with great caution."³⁵

Considering that regional integration entails a pattern of common rules and regulations shared between the countries aiming at achieving a genuine regional integration, it is primarily important to be aware of the uncertain success of the latter. In other words, not all states succeed in achieving significant progress towards regional integration. Hence, there ought to be conditions and requirements surrounding a successful proceeding of the integration phenomena.

For President Houari Boumedienne, the accomplishment of a unified Arab Maghrib could not be successful unless it was based upon both understanding and mutual respect between the countries. Non-interference in other countries' affairs was also a condition. President Boumedienne declared:

“We refrain from interfering in our brotherly neighbouring countries' affairs, and likewise, we will not admit any interference in our own affairs, any harm to our sovereignty and territorial integrity.”³⁶

The Arab Maghrib constituted a national and strategic necessity that contributed to the guarantee of security in the region. Further to the fact that being among the leading figures of the National Liberation Front after independence, the building of a unified Arab Maghrib was a targeted end included in Algeria's political agenda as early as the Tripoli programme meeting. Boumedienne strongly believed that the Arab Maghrib needed to be initially composed from strong states, considering that a weak state may constitute a stumbling block and a burden to the harmony and stability of the regional unity. From Amimour's point of view, helping a weak state in need could help only as much as it could do it harm. Likewise, abandoning a weak state that required assistance could place great pressure on the union and could possibly cause extortion.³⁷ For this reason, as seen from President Houari Boumedienne's perspective, ensuring that all states entering a union agreement were already developed and strong enough would ensure prosperity and progress and would therefore be, a prerequisite for a sound union. This explains the priority of national development over regional unity in President Houari Boumedienne's policy towards the Maghrib. This specific orientation of “development prior to unity” in President Houari Boumedienne's Maghribi policy introduces the picture of a leader more strongly concerned with the requirements of national interest rather than with the dictates of ideology in steering the course of Algeria's foreign policy. Yet, Boumedienne cleverly combined and concomitantly justified the course of actions that followed.

Further to that, a unified Arab Maghrib needed a solid platform that embedded the undeniable will of the Maghribi leaders to effectively unify within an integrated framework. Unification for President Houari Boumedienne meant that all countries needed to follow similar educational, economic and social systems so as to be genuinely and completely integrated within a potentially acceptable regrouping. Yet, the thirst for territorial political autonomy had contributed, to a great extent, to the inflexibility of the Maghrib states towards a common and shared governing set of rules at a regional level and they hesitated to combine economies if they were already satisfactory. Mattli explained that:

“economically successful leaders may not see the need to pursue deeper integration because their expected marginal benefit from further integration in terms of retaining political power is minimal and thus not worth the cost of integration.”³⁸

It therefore appears that the major problem for countries of the Arab Maghrib remained in the competitive economic challenge of Maghribi states and their national-oriented economies rather than regional policies. Concomitantly, no appropriate conditions or initiatives have been made in this direction. "Action based on the Maghribi concept is necessary, not only to galvanize the search for material and human resources that could be geared to an overall, successful development, but also to create the proper climate and subjective conditions of development."³⁹

In order to meet the requirements for a homogenous coalition, President Houari Boumedienne embarked on *Arabisation* policy lines that featured the Algerian nation as an Arab-Muslim Nation, in general, and an Arab-Muslim Maghribi Nation in particular. Armed with the belief that a common heritage should bring together the nations of the Maghrib, Boumedienne was serving, by the same token, the national interest of Algeria by taking geopolitical elements into consideration in his foreign policy making process. In other words, there is a complementary interface between the supreme national interest of Algeria, which Boumedienne aimed at achieving through the accumulation of power and resources, and the geopolitical actors which define the national needs. This policy behaviour tends to obscure the role of national interest and spelt out the leader's ideological spur for a Maghribi union, consequently concealing the shift in the focus from geographical to political and economic reality. It is within such an inclusive political sphere, where the geopolitical elements have been observed to satisfy national rudiments and interest, that decision making can be processed. As for Boumedienne's foreign policy towards the Maghrib states, his behaviour towards neighbouring countries of the Maghrib ought to fall within an ideology that prompted Arab unification, an ideal that was first claimed in the Declaration of the 1 November 1954,

"The direction of our action. The sound basis of our view. The purpose of which is still national independence within the North African context. Also our wish is to avoid the confusion which could help imperialism."⁴⁰

Being a leader who promised the continuity of revolution by ensuring the implementation of its principles, Boumedienne promised to promote the ethics of the Revolution, whilst being flexible with respect to the prerequisites of an evolving world of politics with increasing needs for adaptation. The continuity of Revolution legitimised President Houari Boumedienne's policy actions and insured the validity of his policy outcomes among his peoples. This involved, as mentioned in the Tripoli Programme, the fight against colonialism and imperialism and the support of movements struggling for unity, including the *Maghrib Unity*, within an Arab and African framework, along with movements of liberation, and the fight for international cooperation.⁴¹ President Houari Boumedienne asserted the extent of these principles to the region of the Arab Maghrib and his will to carry these principles out. Accordingly, his foreign policy towards the Arab

Maghrib typified a foreign policy behaviour that saw union as an inherent and essential reality, whilst taking into account whatever was inherited from the past. For Houari Boumedienne:

“The people of the area constituted one nation, sharing a common history, geography, and even traditions and patterns that corroborated an inescapable reality.”⁴²

Under President Houari Boumedienne, the Maghrib was consistently regarded as an integral part of the Arab world, and its unity was supposed to prompt the reinforcement of the Arab World unity. The National Charter stated:

“Regardless of countries’ interests, there is a need to work towards building up a Maghrib for the peoples. Peoples of this vast region constitute, essentially, a unit, given their language, their religion, their civilisation, their ways of thinking, their history, and their prospects of the future. History could witness that unity can not only be achieved by signing agreements at summits but takes place at the basis, via peoples solidarity and the fight to accomplish the same targets.”⁴³

In fact, the unity of the peoples of the Maghrib was enshrined within historical perspectives and occurred naturally as a result of geographical constants and was even an outcome of the countries’ development policies. Hence, it imposed itself as an innate concept that flavoured the political course of events in the North African region and aspired to cooperation that rested upon reciprocal interests and the respect of each country’s special circumstances. This was with a view towards building a Maghrib for the peoples ‘*Maghreb des peuples*’ where all masses could participate to its building. According to the National Charter:

“The Maghrib union aims at emancipating deprived and exploited masses and seems to point in the direction opposed to misery, inequality, and poverty, a perception that is supposed to be of benefit to *Maghrebi* citizens.”⁴⁴

This highlighted Boumedienne’s attempt to spread socialism in the region. Moreover, neighbourhoods represented an important paradigm in the Algerian foreign policy during the Boumedienne years, which, he believed, was an important foundation for a homogeneous Maghribi entity.

Accordingly, the year 1969 was regarded by the Algerian president as important for the fruition of relationships between the Maghrib states, as the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust faded to give way to a less frictional interaction,⁴⁵ in particular, following the border conflicts between Maghribi states. Algeria strongly advocated regional integration and encouraged economic cooperation with the rest of the Maghribi states. In this context, President Houari Boumedinne stated:

“I would like to talk about the geographic zone where we are, we are convinced that future generations will remember the year 1970 as being the year when our country signed agreements with neighbouring countries at a political level. We have succeeded, thanks to our continuous efforts and owing to the wisdom of Maghribi leaders to solve the so-called Algerian-Tunisian, Algerian-Moroccan “border problems”, along with the conflict between Morocco, Mauritania and Western Sahara.”⁴⁶

Concomitantly, Algeria’s cooperation with the Maghribi states was put into effect under Boumedienne’s regime in different sectors, including the approbation of a project of liquid hydrocarbon transport connecting El Borma to the (SITEP) canalisation in Tunisia. The latter culminated in a decree on 8 August 1969, issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy⁴⁷ and the approbation of a project for the edification of a natural gas conduit between Annaba, and the Algerian Tunisian borders, in addition to another conduit that was supposed to supply El Kala in Annaba, in accordance with the decree of 1 June 1970.⁴⁸ Furthermore, cooperation was sensed in the sector of transport and railways, with the convention creating a Maghribi committee for rail transport, according to decree 68-63 dated 8 March 1968,⁴⁹ and the convention between Maghribi railway networks for a reciprocal utilisation of vehicles and containers in line with decree 68-64 of 8 March 1968.⁵⁰ This was along with the cultural accords signed between the Libyan kingdom and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, in Tripoli on 22 January 1965 and amended on 2 July 1968, following the ordinance 66-269 dated 2 July 1966.⁵¹ The endless accords and conventions between the neighbouring brotherly countries of the Maghrib demonstrated the will and endeavour to realise an effective unity between the Arab-Muslim Maghribi nations.

Further to the treaties and conventions, official visits embedded the attempts of the Maghribi leaders to strengthen the existing bonds between the brotherly neighbouring countries. This included the visit of the Moroccan Prime Minister, Mohamed Benhima, to Algiers at the head of an important delegation between 18 and 23 April 1969, where problems encountered by the two countries were dealt with and issues concerning the likely ways of consolidating and boosting the tight relations between the two countries were discussed. The visit also focused on the efforts deployed for the setting up of a United Arab Maghrib and emphasised the necessity to extend cooperation from economic to cultural and social areas. It also fixed new orientations for the economic policy of the two countries, which were concluded with the creation of a mixed commission for economic, cultural, scientific and technical cooperation.⁵² Relations with Libya also witnessed some form of activism and liveliness as demonstrated by the visit (16-19 April 1970) of the Libyan President Mu’ammar Qaththafi, in response to the invitation of President Houari Boumedienne. The two leaders expressed their satisfaction with the bilateral relations and the fructuous cooperation that characterised their relations, noticeably in sectors of the oil industry and technical exchanges as well

as in the fields of economy, culture and information. The coordination of economic, social and cultural policies was intended to promote the setting up of an Arab nation which included the Maghrib and the Mashreq as mutual complementary components.⁵³

Paradoxically, the emergence of conflicts between Algeria and both Morocco and Tunisia proved Boumedienne's Maghrib ideology of unification to be inconsistent with his actions and decision outcomes in his dealings with such matters. Boumedienne's commitment to fight imperialism and his conviction and devotion to support revolutionary movements could partly justify his actions on the Saharan issue. John Ruedy described Algeria's relations with Tunisia and Morocco as often characterised with tension and sometimes open hostility.⁵⁴ Boumedienne often claimed his opposition to the French presence in the territories of the Maghrib after years of struggle and war to rid French domination. He repeatedly emphasised:

“Having fought the French army in an armed struggle, we will never accept the return of a colonial army in our Arab Maghrib and will continue to refute this return as long as we are alive. Some measures were undertaken for the return of French officers to Morocco. Is it not disgraceful to see that the Moroccan generation who fought for independence to ask for help from an army which humiliated their country and dignity, while the blood of Moroccan martyrs has not yet dried. We are willing and able to embark on any kind of discussions with the French government but we will always be opposed to the return of the French army. Disputes between people of the Maghrib should be resolved between them without any foreign interference.”⁵⁵

At this very point, we could praise and applaud Boumedienne's dedication to his principles and beliefs in dealing with imperialist states and in opposing imperialists having a share in what belonged to the Maghrib. In other words, he aimed at eliminating any potential French presence in the Maghribi territories so as not to provide France with grounds to mark its constant existence in the region. From a different angle, such a position could constitute an attempt at interfering in other countries' affairs, a policy behaviour to which Algeria did not agree.

Algeria's bold call for a unified Arab Maghrib naturally stemmed from an inherent reality and constituted a key element in Algeria's ideology. For the young Algerian state, regional integration was a potential source of economic prosperity. Political autonomy restrictions within national territory seemed not to represent a major concern in President Houari Boumedienne's scheme to unify the region, as he had a clear outline of a future socialist Arab Maghrib.

The impasse that prevailed President Houari Boumedienne's policy towards the Maghrib was the need to conciliate between national interest and regional prosperity. In other words, while Algeria's self-interest motivated state-building and the national policy of development, Maghribi integration required a shift of interest from a national territorial level to a regional one. Algeria's foreign policy

towards the Maghrib under President Houari Boumedienne's rule responded to two main conditions: A gradual integration initially conditioned with national development and a concordance in political, economic and social systems. These conditions portrayed the Algerian leader as fearful and protective of his national interest, and there was no doubt that Pan-Maghribism was secondary to national interest, despite his strong ideological postures.

3. Algerian Foreign Policy: between geopolitics and the dictates of ideology:

While adopting a unitary policy approach, national interest and the quest for security dominated Boumedienne's euphoric and optimistic foreign policy orientations to a large extent. Vigorously, the geopolitical reality within which Algeria operated was certainly an incentive to its political orientations. The geo-strategic location held by Algeria reinforced its Arab-Muslim depth, being "at the heart of the western wing of the Arab region."⁵⁶ Algeria is also located in the African continent and is a neighbour to Europe with only the Mediterranean Sea to separate them. Algeria typified, hence, a Mediterranean, African, and an Arab dimension which involved it, reflexively, in the politics of each. More importantly, Algeria benefited from excellent geopolitical assets, being the second biggest country in the Arab world and Africa, after Sudan, with a surface that occupied one twelfth the surface of Africa and a population that, although criticised to be in the limits of demographic explosion, was indeed a great asset if spread in the territory equitably.

However, regardless of such a political spur, founding an Arab Maghrib Unity appeared to come back repeatedly in most ideological declarations and statements of the Algerian leader as a crystallisation of the revolutionary efforts to adopt a unified strategy for the building of a unified Maghrib. This conviction stemmed from the cultural issue of a shared faith, reciprocal support and backing between the nations over time. Nevertheless, this matter needed not to be overlooked as power politics and geopolitics came at this stage to underpin a policy of unification in favour of an abolition of economic and political restrictions. In other words, while the union of the Maghrib countries was a natural and an inherent result of a shared identity, it also constituted, for Algeria, a geographical and economic front capable of successfully engaging in any kind of transaction with Europe. The Constitution of 1976 clearly stated:

"The unity of the Maghrib's people is meant to serve the popular masses. It is a fundamental option of the Algerian Revolution."⁵⁷

In support to this argument, Testas believed that:

"There is a danger in the belief that sharing a common heritage will ensure the building of a successful union. While sharing a common heritage does facilitate the process of integration, it is a necessary but not sufficient condition in itself. What has to be recognised, above all, is that the AMCs share Common development interests, and therefore face similar economic and social challenge."⁵⁸

Soon after independence, Boumedienne embarked on a nation building strategy, in pursuit of national interest, by protecting the country's economic attributes and developing a planned economy, espousing the socialist ideal. Taking into account the geopolitical environment of Algeria, Boumedienne was very wary of the security of the environment. This was because the state's foreign policy makers needed to consider the prospects of an integrated secure region that featured a single market and a unified territory. Moreover, faced with escalating demography and decreasing job opportunities, Algeria's key escape from the acute social problems was to increase the labour market, widen its geopolitical resources, and facilitate movement in the region in order to stop the concentration of the population in specific areas. The geographical context of Algeria contributed greatly to the determination of the important partners and direct trade links. Its natural wealth and geographical advantages outlined its policy for economic progress. Its demography clearly encroached on economic growth. This enticement of factors combined, inevitably shaped the foreign policy making process and had a considerable role in delineating national interest credentials. Being the largest state in the Maghrib, with an escalating population, and featuring as the vast supplier of oil and gas, the Maghrib was an ultimate necessity for Algeria's economic and political revival. Algeria was also a *sine qua non* prerequisite for the unification of the region. Francesco Cavatorta supported this point of view and explained that:

“Nation-states are still the central actors in international politics and their attributes still have a role in shaping and defining their national interests. It follows that geopolitics should be used to highlight how physical attributes dictate to a great extent, foreign policies. The goal of geopolitics should be to understand why under a set of unchangeable constraints such as regional location, proximity to other countries, and possession or lack of natural resources, nation states behave as they do.”⁵⁹

Algeria understood that this goal could not be achieved without harmony and integration. This was a condition that was unlikely to be met as a result of a sentiment of rivalry between the Maghribi leaders that tended to conduct their foreign policy in an ambience of disagreement over developmental and ideological approaches. This happened while they were suffering from a desperate economic situation, after a colonial presence that destroyed most infrastructures and hampered any attempts for economic reform. What is important to remember is that the lack of economic reform was the main reason for the dearth of investment and, hence, it caused stagnation at an economic level, failing to achieve growth and development. Bradford Dillman believed that:

“On a continuum of choices ranging from no reform to comprehensive neo-liberal reform, North African leaders have mostly pursued partial reform. In none of the North African states have radical policy reform movements emerged to carry out the kinds of deep, rapid, coordinated economic reforms seen in Eastern Europe and Latin America. Despite some devaluation, debt rescheduling, gradual tariff reductions and a freeing of prices, there has been no far reaching banking reform, public sector restructuring or privatisation.”⁶⁰

Geopolitical factors were surely an important means to shape Boumedienne’s foreign policy actions towards the achievement of survival and national interest. This behaviour in his foreign policy towards the Maghrib was combined with values to safeguard revolutionary principles. Ideology guided and justified Boumedienne’s policy actions, and in the case of the Maghrib, new values were brought forward in order to insure national interest. Boumedienne was motivated with the prospects of a unified peaceful region and an integrated market. Yet, national state-building and the conformity of the state systems within the Maghrib were the new values introduced to condition the unification of the Maghrib countries.

Such prospects were bound to face obstacles and even stagnation. Algeria has never had intentions to invade the integrity of any countries and has always defended the principle of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs. Its location at the heart of the Maghribi constituency, coupled with the fact that it shared borders with five other states of the Maghrib, did not leave President Houari Boumedienne insensitive to the arising contingencies in the area, especially with regards to issues pertaining to the violation of territorial integrity and self-determination.

Evidently, Boumedienne had a clear cut policy towards liberation movements and the fight against colonialism. It was these convictions, in particular, that prompted his intervention in the Moroccan-Saharan conflict.

Border disputes in the Maghrib had increasingly emerged after the independence of Algeria, with the allegiance of Morocco to its historical right over parts of the Algerian South Western region. This region was coincidentally very rich in mineral deposits, and Tunisian claims revolved around their rightful tenure of parts of the Algerian desert at an initial stage. This demand was later reduced to the lands lying between milestone 220 and 230.⁶¹ Both Morocco and Tunisia were questioning the legitimacy of the colonialist borders attributed to Algeria, following an unjust partition of the region by the French colonial presence. At this stage, colonial heritage introduced itself as a major factor in defining foreign politics of Maghribi states and the politics of unification.

The dispute between Algeria and Morocco dated back to the Ben Bella years, which witnessed military confrontation in 1963, following a Moroccan invasion of Algeria. Thankfully, the dispute

was settled, owing to African diplomatic intervention, which culminated in the signing of a peace treaty on 20 February 1964. The issue regarding the controversy surrounding the western regions of the Algerian Sahara desert was frozen under Ben Bella but was revived after the empowerment of Boumedienne, who adamantly claimed the land for Algeria. This stance unfortunately resulted in a Maghribi cold war which lasted from 1966 to 1968 and, although the dispute was bi-lateral at an initial stage, Mauritania and Spain were about to join the new dispute over the Western Sahara. This was following Moroccan claims to unite the Western Sahara to the Sherifian kingdom and demands for Algerian support against a final settlement to the Algerian-Moroccan borders conflict.⁶² Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Ahmed Laraki, Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs, ultimately signed a fraternity, good neighbouring and cooperation treaty in Ifrane (Morocco) on 15 January 1969, which forbade both sides from exerting military force over a period of two decades but allowed them to convene committees to discuss conflictual issues. The treaty explicitly promoted economic cooperation and pacific relations between the two countries in article 3 and asserted Algeria's will to encourage cooperation and communication between states through international organisation that were, in this case, the United Nations, the Arab League, and the Organisation of African Unity.⁶³

There was also the dispute over *Ghar Dgbilat* mine in 1972, as the issues surrounding the border conflict and the ownership of the mine of *Ghar Dgbilat*, claimed by Morocco, were settled during the summit of the Organisation of African Unity held in Rabat in 1972, upon the signing of two treaties on 15 June. The first treaty established the frontiers between the Kingdom of Morocco and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. The second treaty defined the prospects of cooperation between the two countries with regards to the exploitation of the Gara-Djebilet (*Ghar Dgbilat*) mine.

It is important at this particular point to mention the existing bond between Morocco, Algeria, and the Western Saharan issue as it highlighted policy orientations and approaches, adopted by the Algerian president, in order to reach a settlement with Morocco whilst serving his ideologies. The analysis of the Sahara conflict highlighted the continuous devotion of Algeria to liberation movements and to its anti-colonialist posture. It was, hence, predictable for Houari Boumedienne to support the Western Saharan liberation movement, i.e. the Peoples Movement for the Liberation of the Saguia el-Hamra and Rio de Oro, known as POLISARIO. The latter was created in the early 1970s in order to rebel against Spanish influence in the Western Sahara territories, which dated back to December 1884. This opposed Moroccan and Mauritanian claims to the territories which were rich in minerals and natural resources, and which were of economic and strategic importance to both Spain and Morocco. Furthermore, the Western Saharan nationalist movement was aiming to found an independent country, shifting away from the Spanish Sahara. President Houari Boumedienne strongly defended the right of the Sahrawi peoples to self-determination, in

conformity with the United Nations Resolution 1514 (XV), adopted by the General Assembly in December 1960. The resolution advocated the right of all peoples to self-determination and, by virtue of which, they freely determined their political status and freely pursued their economic, social and cultural development.⁶⁴ The issue of the Western Sahara was specifically included in the United Nations General Assembly agenda for the first time in 1965, following the predominant wave of independence that prevailed in the Maghrib and the strong desire to end all form of colonialism. This led to repeated requests to the United Nations from the government of Spain to take immediate measures for the liberation of the Spanish territories.⁶⁵ In an escalating menace of territorial instability, the United Nations called, on 20 December 1966, for the holding of a referendum under its auspices with a view to enable the peoples of Western Sahara to exercise their right to self-determination freely.⁶⁶ Especially that article 89 of the Constitution stipulates that “In conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity, the Algerian republic must not have recourse to war so as to attack the legitimate sovereignty of other countries and the freedom of other people. Algeria is compelled to settle international disputes via pacific means.”⁶⁷ At that time, Algeria was determined to assist the Saharawi cause and to conform to the United Nations resolutions. Joined by Morocco and Mauritania, the three countries endeavoured to unify efforts in their fight for the Saharawi right of self-determination. Algeria and Morocco ultimately reached common ground on the Western Sahara issue; they both admitted the right of the peoples to self-determination, according to UN resolutions.

However, this entente was not going to last long, especially following the secret agreement between King Hassan II and Ould Dadda, which divided the Saharawi territories between them, and concretised with the signing of an agreement on 14 April 1976 at Rabat, defining the new frontiers and preparing for economic cooperation. This was seen by President Houari Boumedienne as a betrayal, and, consequently, he was faced with two options. These were either to resort to a military option, or to an alternative, that was supported by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa [Abdelaziz Bouteflika], who was in favour of an acceptance of the Saharawi occupation against a definite recognition of the Algerian Tindouf.⁶⁸

In late 1975, Morocco launched a massive non-violent invasion of the Spanish Sahara, which was to be known as the Green March. Spain then agreed to abandon the Western Sahara to both Mauritania and Morocco. Spanish influence over the region ended in February 1976 but Western Sahara was unfortunately occupied by both Morocco and Mauritania. This triggered Algeria’s strong opposition and intransigence about its choice to support the POLISARIO, protesting, henceforth, against the partition of the Western Sahara. Algeria offered the Saharawi liberation movement bases on its territories, and permitted the planning and organisation of raids against Mauritanian and Moroccan settlements in Western Sahara during the years of 1976-1978. Mauritania’s surrender in 1979 gave Morocco the opportunity to annex all of Western Sahara to its territory. POLISARIO rebels

continued their resistance and carried on staging raids into Western Sahara whilst enjoying strong support from Algeria.

It is worth mentioning at this stage that, in 1976, the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic was finally proclaimed and was recognised by various states, amongst which was Algeria, which recognised the new state on 6 March 1976.

President Houari Boumedienne fully supported the Sahrawi issue; in doing so, he supported the military option, while abiding by the UN resolutions, consequently balancing his policy actions with international arbitration and guaranteeing the support of international institutions. During this conflict, the Algerian leader was confronted with the disagreement of the Gulf States, at the head of which was Saudi Arabia, which supported Morocco financially during the conflict. Moreover, most of the Arab League members opposed the recognition of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic, which explained the reasons why Algeria turned to the OAU to settle the dispute and defended the matter during OAU summits and did not expect any kind of support from the Arab League. As a matter of fact, the Saharan conflict with Morocco has been an important drain on Pan-Maghribism and a nuisance to the stability of the region. It did, however, give Algeria the opportunity to discover its real political and ideological partners.

Algeria's main concern and interest in the Saharan issue was to defend peoples' right to self-determination, as often proclaimed by the President Houari Boumedienne. He declared on one occasion, in a letter addressed to the Non-Alignment Movement, dated 28 January 1976, that:

“The Algerian Government's policy rested upon a complete devotion to the right of Saharan people to self-determination, which also complied with the international community policy with regards to the liquidation of colonialism and the necessity to respect people's right to self-determination.”⁶⁹

In this regards, Parker shed light on some hidden motivations behind the Algerian bold support to the Saharan cause. He vowed that:

“It has been claimed, particularly in Moroccan circles, that the Algerians were motivated primarily by a desire to have a corridor to the Atlantic from Tindouf, in Southern Algeria, where there are substantial iron or deposits, and to have a weak Saharan state which they could dominate.”⁷⁰

If this statement is correct, one can assume that such intentions have been well concealed behind ideological proclamations. Furthermore, among the elements in Algerian foreign policy that ought to trigger controversial views on the genuineness of the ideological drive of President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy orientations towards the Saharan issue, were the rumours concerning the likely approval by the Algerian leader, of King Hassan II's and Ould Dadda's decision to divide

Western Sahara between them during the Rabat Summit. Yet, President Houari Boumedienne would have denied this claim and maintained Algeria's position towards the issue.⁷¹ Nevertheless, there is no smoke without fire and there are no reasons to discredit Parker's statement, especially that the convention of cooperation ratified by Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa and Ahmed Taïbi Benhima on 15 June 1972, plainly stipulated both countries ambitions to: "cooperate economically, on the basis of Algeria's sovereignty over Gara-Djebilet minerals and the possibility to ship and export these minerals from a Moroccan port located in the Atlantic."⁷² This particular mention in the convention suggested the likely aspirations of Algeria to be able to have access to strategic points in the Atlantic. Accordingly, ideology had probably corroborated President Houari Boumedienne's policy actions towards Morocco and Western Sahara in such conflictual times. As far as the Saharan issue was concerned, Algeria's actions fell within the framework of supporting national liberation movements and the principle of self-determination. Whether the ideological posture adopted by the Algerian leader was combined with the leaders' thirst for power and challenge to dominate the political arena in the Maghrib region or not, one could not deny the opportunity provided by ideology to Algeria's foreign policy on the Maghrib. In fact, President Houari Boumedienne's ideology of Maghribi unification served, to some extent, his national state-building aspirations. That is in addition to the strengthening of his position within the state and his people. In other words, ideology carried a double function in disguising President Houari Boumedienne's aspirations to power and national interest.

The contradiction in Boumedienne's foreign policy postures and the multiplicity in his foreign policy behaviour could explain his focus on a fight to occupy the forehead of power politics and guarantee that the balance of power was always leaning to his side. His policy actions and decisions were justified most of the time, within an ideology that served his public proclamations.

In addition to the Moroccan conflicts, tensions arose between Algeria and Tunisia also over border issues, albeit to a far lesser extent. This was in relation to Tunisia making a claim to part of the Algerian territory. Given the political strength of Algeria in the Maghrib, primarily in relation to its wealth in petrochemical resources, and given the economic downturn of Tunisia, the border issue was settled in return for Algerian co-operation in the revitalisation of the Tunisian economy. Thus, the border issue was settled in February 1967 upon Tunisian agreement to Algerian rights to the region in the dispute. At that time, Algeria received support from some Arab countries such as Syria, Iraq and Egypt. Egyptian generosity was great with the supply of vast quantities of military and technical equipment to aid the Moroccan conflict which ensured that there was a balance between Algeria and Morocco, with the latter having received support from Saudi Arabia and Jordan.

The failure to establish an effective Maghribi union, though, could not only be attributed to the territorial conflict between Algeria and Morocco. John P. Entelis also advocated Algeria's desire for

supremacy, which was further empowered by the country's extensive links and integration within the global capitalist system. He also explained Algeria's fear of Moroccan annexation of the former Spanish Sahara as a competitive threat to Algeria, which would constitute Algeria's economic equal. He explicitly mentioned that:

“More than anything else, the conflict in the Western Sahara between Morocco and the Algerian-supported Polisario guerrilla movement highlights the conflicts and contradictions in North African relations. Yet, even if there were no Saharan problem, Algeria and Morocco would still be very much at odds. Both countries will long remain in a competitive struggle to achieve political and economic dominance in the Maghrib that reflects the “natural” pattern of internal development being pursued by each state-industrialization, bureaucratisation, militarization, etc.”⁷³

The idea of a unified *Great Arab Maghrib* was not to see the prospects of realisation until 1988 when the first summit of the Maghrib states was held and organised by the President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Chadli Bendjadid, and which culminated in the birth of the Arab Maghrib Union (UMA) in 1989 with five signatory states. These were the Kingdom of Morocco, the Tunisian Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the Socialist People's Libyan Jamahiriya and the Islamic Republic of Mauritania.

The first attempts for a union between the Maghrib states dated back in history to the rise of nationalism in the region. The leaders' ruling appetites over their territories made them adopt different nation building and economic development strategies in the building of a nation state. Their preoccupation with their monopoly of power and authoritarian regimes made it very difficult to harmonise and coordinate efforts to unify the Maghrib heritage politically and economically. Leaders prioritised national economic development over regional integration. The post-independence Maghribi leaders' efforts for national and economic cohesion regressed in the benefit of state recovery and revival, following the yoke of colonialism, independently concentrating on drawing policy for national development at the expense of a unified economic and territorial Great Maghrib. The failure to achieve an economic Maghribi integration was well embedded in the initiation of Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco of negotiations with the EEC on an individual basis, with the aim of economic agreements. Put in the words of William Zartman:

“Regional unity has made little headway in northern Africa. National rivalries and the Algerian war have kept pan-Maghrebism from solidifying; national consciousness and national ideologies have kept Nilotic unity, or even foreign-policy cooperation with Egypt, from crystallizing in northeast Africa.”⁷⁴

This means that the slowdown in the unification of the Maghrib lay primarily in the circles of leadership and complied with Mattli's mention of the inter-governmentalist approach in political science. This maintained that political leaders, often jealous of their national sovereignty, cautiously circumscribed any measures that would lead to sacrificing sovereignty that was required to attain goals.⁷⁵

Ironically, conflicts over territories between Algeria and both Morocco and Tunisia provoked the first breach in Algeria's Unitarian ideology towards the Maghrib. In the instance of Algeria and Morocco, the two brotherly and neighbouring countries, unified under a historical Maghribi heritage and bound within a *Great Arab Maghrib* ideology, embarked on a controversial territorial conflict. In 1966, the frontier conflict between Tunisia and Algeria erupted, a conflict that was to be solved, amazingly, through peace by Bourguiba.

While Morocco was relentlessly claiming its right to possess some of the south Algerian regions, richest in natural resources (Béchar, Tindouf, Touat and other surrounding areas), Algeria prepared for military action. This was to protect its interest and defend its sovereignty over what it believed belonged to its territory. However, military actions could also be seen as imperialist behaviour aimed at suppressing weaker components, but this explanation is ruled out in the case of Boumedienne as he was supporting the weaker and oppressed side.

Another litigious breach of ideological motivation was the controversy over the Western Sahara, which was the historic point of strategic attraction for Spain, which was interested in the Canary Islands. Geographically, the Sahara is a continuation of Moroccan physical features. Robert Rezette advocated Moroccan rights to the Western Sahara to be related to geographical, human and historical data.⁷⁶ Following the occupation of the Sahraoui territories by Morocco, Algeria showed strong opposition; in 1976, Morocco severed diplomatic relations with Algeria, as a result of Algeria's recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic. Algeria provided support, which ruled out prospects of a Maghrib Unity and, somehow, derived Algeria's foreign policy orientations from ideological proclamations of unity.

In short, a considerable degree of harmony and consistency in national policies of North African countries needs to be at the heart of the edification of pan-Maghribism. This would be based on the calculation of the regional interest and would culminate in the de-compartmentalisation of the Maghrib which would, effectively, be displayed in the dealings of the Maghrib with the outside world. Testas advocated that:

“At the economic level, integration should be seen by the AMCs as a means of helping them to overcome the disadvantages of small size and of making possible a greater rate of economic growth and development.”⁷⁷

Maghribi policy makers needed to concentrate more on regional horizons, rather than on competitive challenges, selfishly turning a blind eye to an existing entity. There is a need to break the deadlock and move forward in a complementary way so as to be in line with today's economic race.

Notes:

¹ Alan Houghton Brodrick, North Africa (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 3.

² Elias T. Ghantus, Arab Industrial Integration: A Strategy for Development (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 19.

³ Mohammed Ayoob, "Regional Security and the Third World," in Mohammed Ayoob (ed.), Regional Security in the Third World (London: Croom Helm, 1986), 3-4.

⁴ J. Bhagwati, "Trade Liberalisation among LDCs, Trade Theory and GATT Rules," in J. N. Wolfe (ed.), Value, Capital, and Growth: Papers in Honour of Sir John Hicks (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1968), 26.

⁵ Abdelaziz Testas, "Economic Gains from Integration among Developing Countries: The Case of North Africa Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)," Development Policy Review 15, (June 1997): 183.

⁶ Ali M. El-Agraa, "The Theory of Economic Integration," in Ali M. El-Agraa (ed.), International Economic Integration, 2nd Edition (London: Macmillan, 1988), 39.

⁷ Abdelaziz Testas, op.cit. 185.

⁸ Ali M. El Agraa, "The Theory of Economic Integration" in Ali M. El Agraa (ed.), op.cit. 41.

⁹ Berbers call themselves *Imazighen*, singular: *imazigh* which means free men.

¹⁰ It is not the case anyway, as there are still Berbers in the Maghrib using their original tongue and holding to their *Amazigh* identity. The more isolated Berber communities remained faithful to their customs and culture.

¹¹ Speech by President Houari Boumedienne at the Conference of ambassadors, on 20 October 1969. See: République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome VII (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 262.

¹² Couscous is a North African dish that is mainly made of wheat and semolina; burnous is a woolen overcoat worn by Berbers. The saying is quoted in Paul Balta, Le Grand Maghreb: Des indépendance à l'an 2000 (Alger: Laphomic, 1990), 14.

¹³ Nasr Allah Sa'dūn 'Abbās, Dawlat al- Murabitīn fī al Maghrib wa- al- Andalus. First Edition (Beirut: Dar Al-Nahdha Al Arabia, 1985), 11.

¹⁴ John Ruedy, "Intra-regional Relations in the Maghrib," in Halim Barakat (ed.), Contemporary North Africa: Issues of Development and Integration (London: Croom Helm, 1985), 89.

¹⁵ Claire Spencer, "The Maghreb in the 1990s: Political and economic developments in Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia," in Adelphi Paper 274, (The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: February 1993) 6.

¹⁶ John P. Entelis and Mark A. Tessler, “The Maghrib: An Overview,” in David E. Long and Bernard Reich (eds.), The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. Second Edition (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 372.

¹⁷ Mohamed Abed Jabri, “Evolution of the Maghrib Concept,” in Halim Barakat (ed.), op. cit. 64.

¹⁸ John Ruedy, op. cit. 91.

¹⁹ Speech by President Houari Boumediene on 1 November 1970, on the occasion of the sixteenth anniversary of the Revolution.

République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 02 Juillet 1970-1 Mai 1972, Tome III (Alger: Ministère de l’Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1972), 141-142.

²⁰ Paul Balta, Le Grand Maghreb: Des Indépendance à l’an 2000 (Alger: Laphomic, 1990), 18.

²¹ The first movements that came into being were “Jeunes Tunisiens” in 1907, “Jeunes Algériens” in 1914 and “Jeunes Marocains” in 1919. Mauritania was considered part of the Moroccan kingdom.

²² Although Algeria was known to be a French colony, Tunisia and Morocco were regarded as protectorates, following the Bardo agreement in 1881 and the Fez agreement in 1912, respectively.

²³ Mohamed Abed Jabri, “Evolution of the Maghrib Concept”, in Halim Barakat (ed.), op. cit. 68.

²⁴ Paul Balta, op. cit. 20.

²⁵ Mohamed Chtatou, “The present and future of the Maghreb Arab Union,” in George Joffé (ed.), North Africa: nation, state and region (London: Routledge, 1993), 267.

²⁶ Le Monde, 19 Novembre 1954.

²⁷ Djillali Sari, “Rôle de la guerre de libération nationale dans la libération du continent africain,” in Centre Nationale d’Études Historiques, Colloque International d’Alger (24-28 Novembre 1984): Le Retentissement de la Révolution Algérienne (Alger: Entreprise Nationale du Livre, 1984), 69.

²⁸ Mouloud Qasim Nait Qasim, “Dawr Fātih Nofamber Fii istirja’ Liibia Fazanaha wa al- Maghrib wa Tunus Istiklalahuma bal wa Ifriqya Kullaha Huriyataha,” in Al Markaz al-Watani lil Dirasāt al-Tārikhiyya, Al-Moltaqa al douwali bil Jazair (24-28 November 1984): Al-Thawra al Jazairiyya wa Sadāha fi al-‘Alam (Alger: Entreprise nationale du Livre, 1984), 151-2.

²⁹ Mohamed Chtatou, “The present and future of the Maghreb Arab Union,” in George Joffé (ed.), op.cit. 280

³⁰ Decompartmentalise, was a term used by Michael Webb at a conference entitled, the Barcelona Process. It means, not to regard the Maghrib Union as a set of compartment but rather view it as one unity.

³¹ I. William Zartman, “Political Dynamics of the Maghrib: The Cultural Dialectic,” in Halim Barakat. (ed.), op. cit. 20.

³² Ibid. 20.

³³ Mohamed Chtatou, "The present and future of the Maghreb Arab Union," in George Joffé (ed), op.cit. 273.

³⁴ Ali M El-Agraa & AJ Jones, Theory of Customs Unions (Oxford: Phillip Allan, 1981), 1-2.

³⁵ Ali M. El-Agraa, Regional Integration: Experience, Theory and Measurement (London: Macmillan, 1999), 5.

³⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 115-116.

³⁷ Interview by the author with Dr Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, on the 28/12/2003 at the Senate in Algiers (Le Conseil de la Nation).

³⁸ Walter Mattli, "Explaining Regional Integration Outcomes," Journal of European Public Policy 6 (March 1999): 3.

³⁹ Mohamed Abed Jabri, "Evolution of the Maghrib Concept: Facts and Perspectives," in Halim Barakat, op. cit. 83.

⁴⁰ "Proclamation to Algerian People", in République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Ministère des Moudjahidine, Appel du 1^{er} Novembre 1954 (Alger: Centre National d'Etudes et de Recherches sur le Mouvement National et la Révolution du 1er Novembre 1954, 1998), 20

⁴¹ Front de Libération Nationale, Projet de Programme pour la Réalisation de la Révolution Démocratique Populaire (Tripoli: CNRA, 1962), 48-50.

⁴² Speech by President Houari Boumedienne at the Conference of ambassadors, on 20 October 1969. See: République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome VII (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 482.

⁴³ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. National Front of Liberation. Al-Mithāq al-Watani. Algiers 1976, 164.

⁴⁴ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération National, La Charte Nationale 1976, 101.

⁴⁵ Speech by President Houari Boumedienne at the Conference of ambassadors, on 20 October 1969. See: République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome VII (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 482.

⁴⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 02 Juillet 1970-1 Mai 1972, Tome III (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1972), 141.

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- ⁴⁷ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 26 Septembre 1969, 916.
- ⁴⁸ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 16 Juin 1970, 585.
- ⁴⁹ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 08 Mars 1968, 241.
- ⁵⁰ Ibid., 242.
- ⁵¹ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 14 Octobre 1966, 982.
- ⁵² Communiqué Commun Publié à l'issue de la Visite Officielle en Algérie de M. Mohamed Benhima Premier Ministre du Royaume du Maroc, 23 April 1969, in La Politique Extérieure de l'Algérie (Alger: Ministère des Affaires Etrangères), 153
- ⁵³ Communiqué Commun Publié à l'issue de la Visite Officielle de Monsieur Maamar El Gueddafi Président du Conseil du Commandement de la Révolution Libyenne, 19 April 1970, in La Politique Extérieure de l'Algérie (Alger : Ministère des Affaires Etrangères), 285.
- ⁵⁴ John Ruedy, Modern Algeria: The Origins and Development of a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 213.
- ⁵⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, 5eme Congres des Moudjahidine, Algiers, 24 May 1978.
- ⁵⁶ Mohamed Alarbi Wald Khalifa, Al-Nidhaam al-'Aalami: Madha taghayara fih? wa ayna nahnu min Taghayyuraatihi? (Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaire, 1998), 308.
- ⁵⁷ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération National, La Constitution 1976, 35.
- ⁵⁸ Abdelaziz Testas, "Evaluating Participation in African Economic Integration Schemes: The Case of the North African Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)," in Journal of African Economies 8 (March 1999): 109.
- ⁵⁹ Francesco Cavatorta, "Geopolitical Challenges to the success of Democracy in North Africa: Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco," in Democratization 8 (winter 2001): 178.
- ⁶⁰ Baford Dillman, "International Markets and Partial Economic Reforms in North Africa: What Impact on Democratization?" Democratization 9 (Spring 2002): 70.
- ⁶¹ Nicole Grimaud, La Politique Extérieure de l'Algérie (Paris: Karthala, 1984), 199.
- ⁶² Abd al-Qadir Mahmoudi, Al Niza'āt al-'Arabya-'Arabya wa Ta'wwur al-Nidhām al-Iqlimī (Ma'a al-Tarkīz 'ala al-Nizā'āt Hawla al-Qadiyya al-Filist'iniyya) 1945-1985, (Algiers: Agence Nationale de l'Édition et de Publicité 'ANEP', 2002), 246.
- ⁶³ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 05 Fevrier 1969, 83.
- ⁶⁴ United Nations, General Assembly, Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries, Fifteenth session, 14 December 1960. www.un.org/Depts/ [last accessed 15/07/2003].

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- ⁶⁵ United Nations, General Assembly-Twentieth Session, Resolution 2072 (XX) Resolutions adopted on the reports of the Fourth Committee: Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, 16 December 1965, <http://www.un.org/documents> [last accessed 21/05/2003].
- ⁶⁶ United Nations, General Assembly-Twentieth Session, Resolution 2229 (XXI) Resolutions adopted on the reports of the Fourth Committee: Question of Ifni and Spanish Sahara, 20 December 1966, <http://www.un.org/documents> [last accessed 21/05/2004].
- ⁶⁷ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération National, La Constitution 1976, 36
- ⁶⁸ Benjamin Stora et Akram Ellyas, Les 100 Portes du Maghrib (Alger: Editions Dahlab, 1999), 269.
- ⁶⁹ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Boumedienne: 01 Janvier 1976- 18 December 1976, Part VII (Algiers: Ministry of information and Culture, 1977), 7. [Speeches of the President Boumedienne: 01 January 1976- 18 December 1976.]
- ⁷⁰ Richard Parker, North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns, Revised and Updated Edition (New York: Praeger, 1987), 108.
- ⁷¹ Ibid. 110.
- ⁷² République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 15 Juin 1973, 548.
- ⁷³ John P. Entelis, "The Political Economy of North African Relations," in Halim Barakat (ed.), op.cit. 133.
- ⁷⁴ William Zartman, Government and Politics in Northern Africa (London: Methuen & Co Ltd, 1964), 184.
- ⁷⁵ Walter Mattli, op. cit. 6.
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Chapter five

Algeria, the Palestine Question and Inter-Arab Politics.

1. Algeria and the Palestine Question:

Algeria has always had a strong and sympathetic feeling towards the Palestinian issue and vowed constantly and intransigently to support and assist the Palestinian cause, urging the rest of the Arab world to reconcile their actions in order to withstand Zionism and totally eradicate imperialism. In the meantime, whilst in some parts of the Arab world regimes were striving to balance between their national interest and their anti-Zionist ideological drive in the region, Algeria adopted a totally radical approach in the struggle against Zionism, which flowed from its revolutionary character and portrayed its loyalty to its revolutionary principles.

History reveals the ample dichotomy lying between ideological incentives of Arab regimes and their factual course of action, undertaken to settle the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, and the Arab-Israeli dispute, in general.

In the case of Algeria, its intransigence in fighting colonialism and defeating imperialism and any aspect of neo-colonialism after it gained independence, featured its ideological proclamations and flavoured its position towards the Palestinian issue and the rest of the Arab world. On many occasions, Algeria reiterated its stance towards the Palestinian issue and its antagonism towards all forms of colonialism and imperialism. Zionism was described by Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa [Abdelaziz Bouteflika], the Algerian Foreign Minister in Boumedienne's government, as unquestionably, a typical form of colonialism and racial segregation; he declared, during the Afro-Asian Summit, held in Algiers, in November 1965, that:

“The problem in Palestine was a political problem and any political answer to it would have to go through the reestablishment of the Palestinians' genuine and absolute rights.”¹

It is, first of all, of paramount importance to understand that the general trend in Arab politics is rather inclined towards the assumption that although the Palestinian issue is of a Palestinian dimension; it is, undoubtedly, of an Arab depth, which compels the Arab political spectrum to be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian issue and which embroils all actors in a tri-partite dilemma. This involvement has often been pictured as an inextricably related duty in the Arab political agenda and the result of a sentiment of common fate referred to as:

“A morally uplifting crusade in which the “Arab world” as a whole is duty bound to right the injustices foisted upon Palestinians, Arabs, and Muslims by a Zionist movement backed by a colonialist West. As we shall see later, this dimension of the Palestinian issue derives its importance from the fact that it has come to embody two of the major themes - Arabism and anticolonialism- that have shaped the Arab world’s political consciousness for the past half century.”²

1.1 A Historical background:

Prior to the 1920s and up until the beginning of the British Mandate, Palestine was not regarded as a political entity and not even as an administrative unit, though an integral part of the Arab nation. During the Ottoman period, Palestine was part of *bilād al shām* between Asia Minor and Egypt, encompassing the provinces of Aleppo or *Halab*, Beirut and Damascus³. It was only after the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, following the First World War, that a Palestinian regional entity started to formulate as a result of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, supporting the establishment of a Jewish National Home in the land of Palestine. Originally, the Jews claimed their virtuous religious right to live in Palestine, being the Promised Land. The end of the Second World War and the upsurge of Zionism within Western strategies backed up and encouraged Jewish settlement in Palestine. The United States of America played a decisive role in this in an attempt to avoid a Jewish exodus to the United States, by urging the partition of Palestine in 1947, after it had unsuccessfully suggested the reintegration of Jews in Europe. In 1948, with the official creation of an independent Israeli state, the world of politics was about to witness an important twist in the political roadmap, altering inter-Arab relations and Arab-West interaction. The mere fact that Palestine was located in the heart of the Arab land, linking the eastern premises of the Red sea with the North African enclaves, on its own sufficed to prove the implicit attempt of the colonial powers to prevent the formation of a regional unified entity. By supporting a Jewish settlement in the heart of the Middle East, Great Britain’s policy eventually resulted in the rise of American dominance in the Middle Eastern political scene. What added to the problem were the long lasting disputes and disagreements in the region between the conservative monarchical states and the revolutionary regimes, which made Arab politics suffocate in a vicious atmosphere of incongruity and inaptness instead of making attempts by Arab states to unify efforts, in an assiduous pursuit, to coordinate national interest and ideology.

Noticeably enough, the Palestinian issue has always held a major priority in Arab agenda. The issue has brought regimes together but had also provided the inter-Arab relationships with grounds of distress and discontent. Interestingly, the failure to reach an agreement on how to liberate Palestine from the Zionist yoke highlighted deep fissures within the Arab world. The incapability of Arab states to follow similar road maps, in their thinking of a Palestine settlement, was likely to prevent any progress on the issue.

That is to say that to a great extent, a settlement of the Palestinian-Israeli dispute would have become smoother if there were coordination between Arab leaders' actions. Nevertheless, instead of bringing Arab nations together, the Palestine problem led to the casting of highly profiled transcendent inspirations and challenges that motivated Arab leaders and their determinacy to champion Arab politics, thus dividing Arab political behaviour *vis à vis* the Palestinian question into divergent positions. This gave credence to President Houari Boumedienne's comparison of the Palestinian issue to the cement in Arab politics or to a bomb between Arab states attributed to him by the Egyptian writer Lutfi al-Khuli.⁴

The need to initiate resistance against the growing threat of an extinct Palestinian Patrimony became clearer to Palestinians after 1948. This resistance was to be organised within a Palestinian and not an Arab framework. The Palestinian National Liberation Movement, *Fateh* [Fath] was the first Palestinian movement since the defeat of 1948, to have fully understood such a concept.⁵ *Fateh* had opposed any ideas that might induce Arab inference in Palestinian affairs and strongly believed that "liberating Palestine was the only way towards Unity."⁶ This was clear in article 12 of the Charter of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), which stated that:

"The Palestinian people believe in Arab unity. In order to contribute their share toward the attainment of that objective, however, they must, at the present stage of their struggle, safeguard their Palestinian identity and develop their consciousness of that identity, and oppose any plan that may dissolve or impair it."⁷

This vision ensured *Fateh*'s leadership over the rest of the Palestinian factions in the (PLO) in 1968. *Fateh*'s vision introduced Palestine as an entity ready to drift away from the muzzle it witnessed in the international arena and the meddling of other Arab states in the political Palestinian choices to fight Zionism.

Ahmad Shuqayri, first Chairman of the PLO, declared, at a press conference in Algiers, during a visit to Algeria in 1965 and on the occasion of the 48 anniversary of the distressing "Balfour Declaration," that:

"The Palestinian people had no choice but to opt for an armed struggle to achieve independence."⁸

This showed the revolutionary determination of Palestinians to recover what belonged to them.

1.2 Algeria's Politics towards the Palestinian Question:

It was probably the resemblance between the revolutionary approach, adopted by *Fateh*, and the strong revolutionary flavour that characterised historical Algeria, that guaranteed the support of Algeria to such an organisation.

Although Algeria was not intimately involved in the Palestine problem, the Algerian revolution's resonance went well beyond its territories; it inspired the Arab masses, to a large extent, and must have motivated and incited the Palestinian resistance. Boumedienne often portrayed Algeria to be the Palestinians' second homeland and insisted that:

“The Algerian revolutionary path must be taken as an example and a model for the Palestinians, in order to restore the authority and integrity of their territories in the light of the Algerian revolution.”⁹

He repeatedly put the focus on Algeria's position towards the Palestinian issue, a fearless position that did not and would not express any set backs. His philosophy was implemented through support and unconditional contributions, besides the Algerian political positions aiming at serving the Palestinian cause in all international and Arab summits.¹⁰ In short, Boumedienne believed that:

“ ‘holy issues’, among which the Palestinian issue, needs enormous sacrifices and any solutions suggested by the United States, the Soviet Union or even Europe could not be accepted for it has to be an Arab solution in order to serve Arab interests.”¹¹

Algeria, along with other Arab states, officially recognised the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of Palestinian people following the Rabat Summit in 1974. In this respect, Muhyi al-Deen Amimour had advocated the earlier recognition of the PLO by Algeria, at one of the most important Arab Summits, held in Algiers and presided and hosted by President Houari Boumedienne, in November 1973, where it was decided to deal with the PLO as a legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

Amimour emphasised that the Rabat Summit only stressed that decision.¹² As a matter of fact, at the meeting of the nation's cadres, held on 30 October 1974, President Houari Boumedienne admitted that:

“Algeria, in truth, had called for the acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the PLO as the only representative of Palestinian people at the Algiers Summit and it reasserted it during the Arab Summit in Rabat.”¹³

Algeria welcomed Yasir Arafat at the head of the PLO and reaffirmed the backing that the PLO was to be provided, not only by members of the Arab League, but also by anti-colonialist forces. It was thus necessary for Palestinians not to be represented anymore by the overall Arab voice, but to have a Palestinian representation. During an official visit to Morocco on 11 January 1969, President Houari Boumedienne admitted, in this respect, that:

“Any political settlement of the Palestinian issue, regardless of its nature, needs be accepted and elaborated by the Palestinian people, whilst the Palestinian resistance gained respect and consideration.”¹⁴

The creation of the PLO marked a new page in Arab history. Palestinians had by now set their future objectives, based on their determination to exercise their rights to justice, freedom, sovereignty and self-determination and enjoy human dignity. This meant that the achievement of victory was set to be through armed struggle, calling for an international outlaw of the existence of Zionism. Most importantly, the PLO recognised the reciprocal need for, and contribution to, Arab unity which could only be achieved once Arabs territories were liberated. Above all, the Palestinians understood their vanguard role in the realisation of Arab unity, which could not be achieved unless Palestinians had restored their right to self-determination. This issue was discussed in the Palestinian National Charter of 1968, where article 13 stated that:

“Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine are two complementary objectives, the attainment of either of which facilitates the attainment of the other. Thus, Arab unity leads to the liberation of Palestine, the liberation of Palestine leads to Arab unity; and work toward the realization of one objective proceeds side by side with work toward the realization of the other.”¹⁵

As for Algeria’s contribution to the Palestinian issue, it is important to shed light on the impossibility of action that Algeria was faced with, during the early years of the problem. For almost a decade, France had quietly kept Algeria in a state of isolation, suppressing Algerians from any rightful interaction with the outside world. Although it was impossible for Algeria to thoroughly contribute to the Palestinian issue, itself being involved in liberating its territory from French occupation, Algeria’s ideological proclamations always stated that:

“Algeria has an ideological duty to assist, unconditionally and comprehensively, people fighting for their independence.”¹⁶

After independence, especially during President Houari Boumedienne’s mandate, Algeria devoted part of its foreign policy to the assistance of oppressed and colonised peoples. President Houari Boumedienne declared that:

“The Palestinian Question is part of Algeria’s anti-colonialist fight and effort against imperialist zones of influence in the Middle East. Our policy is well-defined and is based upon the objective analysis of the factors that are at the origins of Palestine invasion and the occupation of Arab territories. It also stems from Algeria’s revolutionary experience and understanding of specific circumstances, including the international situation.”¹⁷

Algeria had always supported issues dealing with peace and security. In the case of the Middle East, Algeria was faced with two major concerns. First was the burden of imperialism prevailing in the Arab world and resulting from Zionist occupation. Second was the obliteration

of the national entity of the Palestinian people. The revival of Palestinians national rights was believed to be a primordial condition for reinstating peace in the region.

The PLO was yet to face a new obstacle. Controversy over its creation prevailed over the Arab world, especially that it constituted a threat to Egypt's and Jordan's authority over the Gaza strip and the West Bank, respectively.

By the time President Boumedienne took power in 1965, the stormy environment in which Arabs were trying to reach an agreement over the Palestinian issue was far from seeing any miraculous settlement. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict was at its peak and so was the Israeli-Arab contingency. The Arab world was on the verge of a new confrontation with Israel in 1967. At such a delicate and venerable timing of Arab politics, Algeria stood firmly against Israel and its supporters, advocating a revolutionary approach for the settlement of the Palestine issue. This was in conformity with Algeria's strong ideological commitment to support all liberation movements. Algeria was, accordingly, described by Hudson as "a meeting place for liberation movements around the world."¹⁸

Yasir Arafat asserted:

"Fateh's first academy of Palestinian soldiers graduated from Cherchel Faculty in Algeria and likewise, the first shipment of weapons that reached the Palestinian revolution arrived from Algeria."¹⁹

Consequently, Algeria ranked in the line of progressive states which believed that their firm devotion to their ideological principles would lift the balance of power in favour of the progressive countries. It was at this very particular point that the foremost apparent conflict was rooted. Being a progressive country, Algeria ruled out any sort of interaction or dependency with the imperialist realm, and articulated its position towards Israel explicitly on many occasions. President Houari Boumedienne noted:

"Algeria feels the necessity to support liberation movements wherever they are and whenever it had to. It contributes, in the framework of the Organisation of African Unity in accordance with its Non-alignment policy, to the lessening of the tension in our continent and in the world. It is for these reasons that we have never stopped claiming the liquidation of all bases and of all the factors of tension in our Mediterranean region which we often declared that we wanted for it to be a 'peaceful zone', a secure and a quiet zone of cooperation."²⁰

This policy orientation seemed to be very meagre with some Arab nations that adopted a rather lenient policy conduct towards Israel and a more cooperative intercourse with the West.

Over the Palestinian Question, Boumedienne categorically boycotted the Tunisian leader, Habib Bourguiba's approach to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Tunisian President urged the Arab countries to look into a peaceful settlement of the conflict rather than follow progressive roadmaps of confrontation. This suggestion should have been taken into account in the

settlement of the region's dilemma, especially at a time where Arab leaders failed to provide the Palestinians with the necessary means and adequate support to fight their enemy.

Accordingly, President Houari Boumedienne claimed:

“Our country is not against a peaceful settlement, provided there were any. There is, however, neither a peaceful solution to the problem or a revolutionary one; there is only a dignified and just solution versus non-dignified and servile settlements.”²¹

Moreover, the balance of power was more favourable to Israel and, any attempt to launch a war against it, was not feasible. For these reasons, Bourguiba called upon accepting the United Nations Partition Resolution of December 1947, which would compel Israel to abide by it and, hence, move forward at an initial stage.²² However, unlike his counterparts, Bourguiba was seeking a peaceful solution rather than following a policy of confrontation. This led many Arab progressive leaders, along with Palestinians, to portray Tunisia as a betrayer and ask for its ban from attending the Arab League's meetings.

Nevertheless, in addition to supporting armed resistance, Arab countries opted for using oil as a weapon in the battle, by recommending the suspension of Arab oil pumping to the West. Oil represented a strategic weapon for the fight against imperialism and colonialism. As early as 19 June 1965, following his military coup and seizure of power, Boumedienne insisted on the large scale character of the Palestinian issue, which required the unification of efforts against Zionism, imperialism and, more importantly, against the oil companies that controlled vital sectors in the region and that constituted a far more dangerous threat to Palestine than Zionism. President Houari Boumedienne expressed his concern as follows:

“The Palestinian issue requires the unification of our efforts against Zionism, Most importantly; we have to unify our efforts against oil companies that control vital sectors in the region and which represent a more dangerous threat to Palestine than Zionism.”²³

The Palestinian issue is far from being settled, while Arab leaders and Heads of States are still divergent as to the appropriate way to fight Zionism. Different options could be taken into consideration. Some political analysts advocate the cohabitation of the two states, once Palestinians had obtained permission from Israel to create their own state; some other analysts think that the future Palestinian state could be viable as long as the territories on which it would extend were shared with the Israeli state. The other trend imagines a kind of fusion between the two nations, governed by only one bi-national state with two official languages.²⁴ Finally, it is believed that:

“Non-violence attempts to seek civil, non-violent defensive means to enable the people to organize real resistance for averting any aggression instead of doubling condemnations that, experience has taught us, are useless and ineffective. Consequently, it is essential to enjoy historical courage, lay down arms and stones.”²⁵

This leads us to question whether President Houari Boumedienne’s stubborn policy orientations *vis-à-vis* the Palestinian issue were intended to purely end the Palestinian dilemma or were they a means for Boumedienne to gain influence in Arab politics, shine within the Arab progressive camp, and empower his position and gain popularity within the Algerian sphere. One can assert that Ideology shaped President Houari Boumedienne’s policy towards the Palestine issue. Boumedienne’s policy and ideology towards the Palestinian situation served his revolutionary beliefs; they also embellished and legitimised his position within his own people, who were in favour of his anti-Zionist approach and, hence, supported his policy actions as far as they fell within the principle of total solidarity with the Palestinian Arab people. In this context, Bennamia reiterated that: “Algerian policy towards the Palestine question was motivated by ideology and domestic interests at the same time. It was a combination that few Arab states had successfully matched.”²⁶

2. Algeria and the Arab World:

President Houari Boumedienne always coordinated his efforts with Syria, Jordan, Libya and Egypt and the PLO, and even went further in trying, successfully, to gain African support in the Arab-Israeli dispute by giving the Palestinian issue an African dimension, an effort that culminated in the severing of African countries’ relations with Israel.²⁷ On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of founding the Organisation of African Unity, President Houari Boumediene declared that:

“The fate of the Palestinian people and other Arab nations must be the concern of all of us. In fact the Palestinian resistance expresses the will of the people to recover what has been taken from them. It, hence, converges with African movements of Liberations upon the basis of a unified fight for human dignity, and the peoples’ right for self-determination. The current conflict that prevails in the Middle East is an integral part of our fight. This gives the problem of the Middle East genuine African dimensions. Accordingly, severing relations with Israel would constitute an effective solidarity and deep awareness of the dangers of Zionism and will strengthen our efforts for unity and liberation.”²⁸

2.1 Algeria and the Arab Israeli Conflict:

Further evidence of Algeria’s solidarity with Arabs in the fight against Zionism was seen in the permanent delegations sent to Cairo to check on the situation and provide assistance if needed. On 7 June 1967, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa headed to Cairo so as to advise the Egyptian authorities

of Algeria's strong will to provide total support to Egypt. In fact, Algeria sent 34 Mig aircraft, and embarked on negotiations with the Soviet Union. On 13 July 1967, the Summit of Arab Resistance took place in Cairo, which consisted of several meetings between Algeria, Syria, Iraq, Sudan, and the United Arab Republic, which were represented by their respective Heads of State. This conference culminated in sending a second mission to the Soviet Union, which included the Algerian president, Houari Boumedienne, and Abd al-Rahman Arif, the president of Iraq.²⁹

Bouhara, Commander of the Algerian units sent to Egypt in 1967, declared that the first decision taken by the President Houari Boumedienne in the military context was to send Algerian forces to fight by the side of Egyptians under the slogan: "victorious or martyrs". Though the National Liberation Army was not professional enough, it had experience in defence and it supplied the battle field with defensive equipment and plans.³⁰

Although President Houari Boumedienne disapproved of Nasir's choice to negotiate with the enemy, he was bound with the principle of non-interference. The war of 1973 was inevitably the last straw on Egypt's inherited eminence in the Arab World. Sadat's growing and increasing leniency towards a negotiated peace settlement with the United States, his visit to Israel in 1977 and his acceptance of the Camp David Agreements, were undoubtedly the proof of Egypt's pragmatism in foreign policy and the priority granted to self-interest over ideology. Faced with such an intrigue in Arab politics, Algeria did not step backward at anytime, but provided full support for Egypt during the war of 1973. The Algerian leadership reaffirmed its total will to stand by Egypt at a most difficult timing and sustained its encouragements and radical stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The concept of resistance (*sumoud*) has been increasingly in use in Arab politics, especially following the failure of 1967. It represented the refusal of Arabs to give up their fight against imperialism and accept any sort of capitulation to the West by going through negotiations, particularly with the United States more than ever. Israel has always been the enemy of the Arab world, particularly with its increasing colonialist aspirations in the Middle East. The war of June 1967 marked a step forward for Israeli expansionist intentions and a few steps backward for Arabs. This war involved the loss by Egypt, Syria and Jordan of parts of their lands and the assertion that the strategies, followed by Arab leaders to combat Zionism, were unfruitful and needed improvement or maybe radical alterations. Tacitly supported by the U.S., Israel attacked and destroyed 19 Egyptian military airports and then launched air strikes on Jordanian bases. At the same time, Israeli troops were moving towards the Sinai desert. This led Algeria to sever diplomatic relations with the United States and Great Britain as a proof of support for Egypt.

Prior to that, and as a result of the escalating threat of an Israeli attack against Egypt, Syria and Jordan, Algeria addressed a "solidarity letter" to both of Egypt and Syria on 18 May. Further to that, the Council of Revolution sent a delegation to Cairo and Damascus, headed by Tahir al-Zubayri, in order to be updated about the situation and offered Algeria's help, by providing

assistance and necessary military back up. By June 1967, a Front of Common Resistance was formed between Jordan and Egypt to face the enemy.³¹

The defeat of 1967 that burdened Egypt with material and financial damages was an excellent opportunity for Saudi Arabia to win over prestige in Arab politics. The Khartoum Conference, which took place on 29 August 1967, presented grounds for Saudi Arabia to embellish its position in the Arab regional structure and permitted King Faysal to rise above Egypt and suggest the subsidy of a percentage of the damages, resulting from the closure of the Suez Canal. Following the Khartoum Conference in which Abd al Aziz Boutafliqa, Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs participated, Arab leaders on 1 September 1967 agreed to join efforts in their attempt to ensure the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the newly occupied Arab lands within the principles and framework of the Arab countries.³² They concluded with the necessity to use oil as an Arab resource to strengthen the economy of Arab states directly affected by the aggression in order to allow these states to be able to stand firm in the battle. They approved the setting up of an Arab Economic and Social Development Fund proposed by Kuwait:

“The conference has, therefore, decided to resume the pumping of oil, since oil is a positive Arab resource that can be used in the service of Arab goals. It can contribute to the efforts to enable those Arab States which were exposed to the aggression and thereby lost economic resources to stand firm and eliminate the effects of the aggression. The oil-producing States have, in fact, participated in the efforts to enable the States affected by the aggression to stand firm in the face of any economic pressure.”³³

The Khartoum Conference marked a U-turn in inter-Arab and Palestinian-Arab relationships, and also in the Algerian-Arab interaction. In other words, the Palestinians understood that they could no longer depend on Arab states' back up to restore their sovereignty over their territories and especially not on international and negotiated agreements. The Palestinian resistance was disgraced with Egypt's acceptance of the U. S. Secretary of State, William Roger's initiative and the United Nations Security Resolution 242, which was seen by the Palestinian side as surrender. Arab regimes saw a threat to their stability and interest in the Palestinian resistance movement and, hence, endeavoured to control the escalating threat emerging from the Palestinian side. On the other hand, Algeria never stopped encouraging Palestinian resistance or urging fighting of the Israeli spectre. Algeria saw Nasir's initiative to lean toward a political settlement as an admission of defeat from which the United States was bound to emerge as the successful player, able to divide and control the Arab world and, hence, Algeria supported Arab hostility towards Israel. On 17 December 1969, Algeria still embraced the same approach towards Israel and refused it the right to be represented in the United Nations Organisation. On many occasions, President Houari Boumedienne reiterated:

“Israel constitutes a continuity of the colonialist policies from which Third World countries suffered in the past decades. In

fact it is a strong armed base that plays a major role in defending the interests of capitalist monopolies.”³⁴

Despite accusations of isolation directed at Algeria, given Boumedienne’s preoccupations to build up and strengthen the state’s infrastructure and his concern with the ‘Spanish Sahara’ matter, the President never suspended his efforts towards the Palestinian conflict and pan-Arab aspirations. Furthermore, during the Cairo meeting that took place between 25-30 January 1973, which gathered Arab Foreign and Defence Ministers, Algeria decided to allocate assistance to the Arab Common Defence Fund. Boumedienne’s interference and back-up to his Arab counterparts was awaiting any arising dispute or imperialist belligerence.

On 16 September 1973, Colonel Sa’d al Deen al-Shadhli, Chief of the Staff of the Egyptian Army, arrived in Algiers, following Sadat’s orders, to inform the Algerian leadership of the countdown and of the agreement between Syria’s and Egypt’s leaderships to launch a war. Algeria kept its promises and sent military support to Egypt. The war started effectively on 6 October 1973. Arabs were gaining and holding grounds in the battle field, witnessing an increasing optimism and hopes for success. Nevertheless, Arab forces were faced with an atrocious and shocking defeat on 14 October, following the infiltration of Israeli troops into part of the Canal and the West Bank. This urged President Houari Boumedienne to head for the Soviet Union in order to conclude a transaction. We are told that President Houari Boumedienne decided to head for Moscow on the second week of October 1973 to ensure the Provision of support to the Syrian and Egyptian fighting forces in order to meet up with Brezhnev. The meeting lasted over ten hours, whereby the Algerian leader used his persuasive skills to get the Soviets to put to the side all considerations and concluded a transaction on the basis of a trader’s willing to pay for the goods immediately. This was a very intricate transaction, particularly after the humiliation felt by the Soviets after their experts were expelled from Egypt by President Sadat.³⁵ Indeed, an agreement was reached to buy weapons worth 200 million U. S. Dollars, which were paid for immediately and which were sent directly to the consumer. Further to that, on 17 October, Arab oil ministers gathered in Kuwait and decided to decrease the production of oil by 5% per month, until Israel had withdrawn from all occupied Arab territories. This was followed by the visit of the Algerian, Moroccan, Saudi Arabian and Kuwaiti Foreign Ministers to the United States in order to meet President Nixon but were faced with the American initiative to provide Israel with approximately 200 million U. S. Dollars. Consequently, Saudi Arabia, under King Faysal, called for a ban on oil exports to the United States and Holland and also announced its will to decrease oil production by 10 %. At the same time, Bahrain announced the cancellation of all facilities previously granted to the United States in the port of al-Manama.³⁶ The rest of the Arab states espoused the same strategy assumed by Saudi Arabia. In this context Walid Kazziha explained that:

“The war impressed the Arabs with the effectiveness of the use of oil as a political weapon in their efforts to achieve an Israeli

withdrawal. It had an immediate impact on the political and even the military position of a number of Western European and Asian countries, towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.”³⁷

In an escalating tension and a non-existing relationship between Algeria and Israel, Algeria was faced with the most intriguing and delicate situation ever on 23 July 1968, when an Israeli plane was hijacked by Palestinian fighters (*fidaiyyiin*) and it landed in the international airport of Algiers (*Dar al-Baydha airport*). Algeria, successfully, managed to redirect 19 passengers, not including Israelis, to Paris. A day later, the Israeli plane was released and freed. This very particular situation showed the existing nuances between ideology and policy actions, and shed light on the mediating role and even the problem solving task that Algeria often attributed to itself. That is to say that despite the fact that Algeria had no relations with Israel, it could not, however, ignore the fact that an Israeli plane had landed on its territory. Despite the fact that Algeria had the choice not to deal with such an issue, it undertook the initiative to free the Israeli plane and this could be seen, somehow, as contradictory to the ideologised preaching of the government.

Algeria’s Arabo-Islamic character moulded its political orientations towards Arab countries. Under President Houari Boumedienne, solidarity and support with other Arab countries were of paramount importance. Yet, “Unity” constituted the effective ideological motivation of Algeria’s politics towards Arab countries. It was stated in the National Charter that:

“The Arab World possesses the necessary potential to become one of the most economically prosperous regions. Henceforth, it could constitute a significant political power. The Arab world has in front of it a historical opportunity.”³⁸

Therefore, unity for the Algerian leader did not only constitute an inherent reality, inspired from its Arabic-Islamic character but it also served economic purposes of development and state-building. Although we cannot deny the role ideology played in shaping President Houari Boumedienne’s policies of solidarity and cooperation with other Arab countries, one cannot ignore the fact that ideology served President Houari Boumedienne’s aspiration for power and economic development at the same time.

2.2 Arab Integration in Algeria’s politics:

Further to the efforts for accomplishing a regional integration within the Maghribi sphere, Algeria had always been primarily and indisputably part of a larger pan-Arab entity, that is the Arab World, sharing with most Arab states the belief in a common fate and future, and struggling to overcome conflictual ideologies and various Arab political system decision-making outcomes.

The idea of a unified Arab nation grew even stronger among Arabs with the prospect of a shared identity and a joint fate. The support of the masses for such an idea powered Arab regimes and insured their popularity among their peoples. The idea of an Arab nation was impeded as a result of an impossible concurrence between Arab leaders in their postures towards imperialism and colonialism, and began to decline following the disastrous failure of 1967, which mirrored the uncoordinated and non harmonised approaches of Arabs in fighting Zionism.

The creation of the Arab League in 1945, in all probability, raised the hopes to go beyond political and geographical divisions and ultimately form a unified Arab state. Besides the sentiment of a joint and unified culture, religion and language between states of the Arab Maghrib and the Arabian Peninsula, coupled with the geographical reality of a continuous unbroken landscape of Arab entity, carried the potential to advocate a homogenous Arab regional system. However, one should bear in mind that the Arab league did not, at any time, suggest the loss of individual state autonomy, though each state was expected to abide by the organisation's unanimous resolutions over individual decisions.

President Houari Boumedienne's hopes for the Arab world proved to aspire at an Arab unification and this could not be realised unless an effective victory on the Palestinian issue was to be achieved. Though he strongly encouraged and urged Arab integration and unification, he often insisted that:

“The predominant issue is not an issue of unity but an issue of liberation, liberating the occupied territories and the recovery of the Palestinian people of their violated rights. A unified fight is the only way to achieve Arab unity and not mere negotiations and political conventions.”³⁹

However, even though it appeared feasible and simple, the gap between what was preached and reality was sizable. The Algerian approach to integration and unification crystallised around the following philosophy,

- Unification should not be used as a pretext to elude from substantial internal economic and political problems.
- The accomplishment of union must be based upon the social and revolutionary aspirations of the masses.
- Union could only be long lasting, once the countries achieved their revolutions in accordance with their respective structures.⁴⁰

Arab union was a necessity for regional security, which needed to be achieved through several phases and needed to be based on logic, wisdom, consultation and a *savoir faire*. In Amimour's opinion, a union between two countries that had different currencies and that adopted different educational methodology and economic systems was bound to fail.⁴¹ President Houari Boumedienne believed that a union started from material groupings. This meant that many unions could occur within the Arab world and then total unity could be achieved. It was a gradual process that was conditioned with national state building. President Houari

Boumedienne's perception of Arab unity was undoubtedly influenced by previous experiences of Arab unity or first attempts of unification between Arab countries, which seemed to crumble with the retrieval of Syria from the United Arab Republic in 1961 and several other failed attempts of unification, which coincided with Algeria's gain of independence. It is stated in the Constitution that:

“In order for unity to be longlasting, it needs not to result from mere agreements between governments, this might delay unity. It is thanks to social and economic transformations that such a historical event could be achieved.”⁴²

The prospect for an Arab regional system tantalised Arab states for long, given the ostensible efforts to impel it on the creation of the Arab League. Arab regional integration was framed within the assumption of a common cultural and religious identity which stressed the distinctive flavour it carried. However, aspirations and hopes of achieving unity have hardly overcome constant conflicts, which explains why measures initiated by Arab states to fulfil such ambitions did not effectively move beyond theory.

2.3 Arab Disputes and the Algerian Position:

It was inevitable to see an increase in disputes within the Arab unit as a result of historical and political factors. It is clear at this stage that the balance of power comes to meddle in the Arab political scenario and to shape Arab decision makers' actions. In this respect, Abd al-Qadir Mahmoudi introduced the existing link between the concepts of power and conflict, and illustrated them with the quest for power. Accordingly, in an effort to possess and reinforce power within individual territories, each state (or political entity) collided with another state attempting to achieve the same target. For Arab states, the concept of power has been embedded by the recovery of political integrity i.e liberation from colonialism and, secondly, in order to achieve progress as a complementary step towards the recovery of integrity.⁴³ Imminently, these two factors constituted a stable component of Arab states' ideology and pursuit for power. In this context, the existing contentious behaviour of Arab decision makers towards each other resided, certainly, in the aspiration for power and the ceaseless struggle of Arab leaders to gain the fight for a favourable balance of power. It was in this pan-Arab framework of interaction that disputes often arose, leading to a politically notorious regional system. A mere example of the dysfunctional cooperation and complementarity within the Arab regional system has been the attempt of some Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia, to steal the limelight from Egypt, which had a masterly position in the regional system, by providing help and assistance to other Arab states in need of support. This cast the inherent sense of superiority and power among Arab leaders, regardless of any profit that might be achieved from a balanced, functional Arab regional system. Paul Aarts explained that, since 1945, the Arab system had passed through several phases of development, ranging from cold war to consensus and cooperation. Periods of regional solidarity alternated with years of disarray. As a matter of fact, after the defeat of 1948,

which enabled the new Jewish state to acquire much of the Arab territories, destroying the hopes of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan, the Arab world was about to face another defeat in 1967.

At that time, Nasirism was at its apogee. Egypt was leading Arab politics and shaping progressive actions. A new pole was about to emerge in the Arab regional interface. Endangered by the influence Egypt had and the growing religious and socialist tendencies, Saudi Arabia endeavoured to challenge the weight its counterpart held within other nations in the region, opting for a more religious front to represent Arab unification against the socialist approach adopted by Nasir and his followers. Not only did Saudi Arabia portray a religious myth, but it was a rich country with economic potential. These particular features enabled the kingdom to compete with Egypt. The monarchy felt compelled to fight this new wave of Arab socialist states. Indeed, socialism within Arab nations represented a danger not only to the conservative religious panel but also to the imperialist pole.

Saudi Arabia was gaining influence in the Arab world. The litigious ideologies adopted by Saudi Arabia and Egypt crystallised their relationship and gave birth to everlasting competing positions. King Faysal managed, however, to create an Islamic approach to inter-Arab interaction, especially with the creation of an Islamic Bank for Development in 1973. Gradually, an Islamic flavour started to prevail in the Arab system, allowing Saudi Arabia to shine at the top and spread its ideology in the Arab world.

In this respect, policy theorists categorised Arab states' political conduct and orientations into two categories. The first included revolutionary countries, which represent the radical anti-imperialist bloc, such as Muslim socialist states fighting for a classless world and regarding the West as a heinous enemy with whom cooperation should be banned and totally opposed it. The second category included the West-friendly bloc, the conservative countries or as they were labelled by their opponents, reactionary states, which perceived no harm in dealing with the West as it saw cooperation with it as a ground serving national interest and they, consequently, helped Western Powers have a foothold in the Arab sphere. This classification could also depict two political systems in the Arab world, that is socialist republics and monarchical systems.⁴⁴ Nicole Grimaud divided the Arab world into progressives, strong enough to secrete an ideology able to unify them within Arab socialism, and reactionary countries, that tended to be a traditional force that were happy to maintain their primacy and claim their Arabism.⁴⁵ These two categories were bound to have conflicting interest and policy orientations, which undoubtedly gave room to arising conflicts.

Algeria's revolutionary curriculum shaped its foreign policy with Arab countries. Algeria's seven years of war and gain of independence shone in the Arab world, increased the sense of Arab patriotism, and proved rightly that stubborn resistance and sacrifices lead ultimately to a victory over the colonialist. More importantly, the tri-partite aggression of 1956 against Egypt determined a common enemy which brought the countries even closer. Algeria's victory over

France, as mentioned by Grimaud, was considered by the Arab world as “revenge”⁴⁶ against the West and Israel.

In this framework of political thought, Algeria’s behaviour, under Houari Boumedienne, undoubtedly suggested a strong resentment towards the imperialist spectre, resulting from its long years of war against France. It is, within this ideological context of a revolutionary attitude towards imperialism that Algeria joined the revolutionary clan of Arab states, in their anti-imperialist fight.

Nonetheless, it would not be incorrect to assert that there were two factors that provoked Arab disputes and contingencies in the Arab world: ideology and oil. Inter-Arab conflict reached its peak over the oil policy that was to be adopted by the Arab countries, especially within the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC). Algeria’s policy to increase the oil prices and Boumedienne’s strategy to use it as a weapon against the West contradicted Saudi Arabia’s perceived strategy to serve the United States interests. In fact, the 1970s marked the emergence of Arab oil as a steering wheel to the balance of power in the Arab world. Arab oil had an important weight during this phase in substituting the Suez Canal income and providing financial backing to the countries affected by the June war. This coincided with the nationalisation of Algerian hydrocarbons in 1971, which meant that Algeria had complete authority over its oil and could freely take part in the oil battle against the West.

It is worth mentioning that the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Algeria was not limited only to the oil problem; it was also connected with the Moroccan-Algerian dispute, in which Saudi Arabia provided Morocco with financial support.

President Houari Boumedienne came to power at a time when the international environment surrounding the Arab regional system was undergoing changes, the Cold War was coming to a *détente*, especially after the Cuban Missile Crisis, both poles were reluctant to enter into a costly nuclear war and their rigidly opposed stances slackened. This was going to influence inter-Arab relations, in particular, and Arab international relations, in general. The defeat of 1967 showed the weaknesses of the progressive countries, as Israel managed to control the totality of the Palestinian territories, along with the Golan Height and Sinai. The war of 1967 proved that Arab nationalism was not sufficient to win over the battle against imperialism. It also permitted the conservative Arab states to triumph over radical ideologies and corrode the appeal of revolutionary states. James Bill mentioned:

“These conservative states, therefore, seized the opportunity to undercut radical Arab nationalism. Their new oil wealth, especially after 1973, made it possible to offer incentives to Arab rulers to establish amiable state-to-state relations, while at the mass level those funds were used to encourage the growth of Islamic ideas, or “Petro-Islam,” at the expense of secular versions of Arab nationalism.”⁴⁷

In fact, the years that followed 1967 witnessed an active competition between two ideologies, revolutionary and conservative. The set back that featured the Egyptian positions allowed a reconsideration of Arab politics and even a prospect for a peaceful settlement.

At an international level, despite the wave of *détente* that was about to prevail, both poles were eager to win Arab states into their clan, especially with the increasing demands for oil. The Arab world thus revolved around two different poles, the Soviet Union, which witnessed a rapprochement with Iraq and Syria, and the United States, that was attracting Egypt to its side, especially after the death of Nasir and the emergence of oil as a strategic component in politics. In the early 1970s, the Arab world marked the start of a more stabilised political activity after several coups were witnessed in various Arab states.

Saudi Arabia preached the creation of an Islamic Union and saw the emerging socialist Muslim states as a threat to its supremacy and even existence. Moreover, Egypt constituted an ever bigger threat to Saudi Arabia, noticeably with its existing forces in Yemen, which were supporting republicans as opposed to royalists, who were backed by Saudi Arabia.

Nevertheless, Egypt realised that launching a war against Israel and continuing an untimely resistance was not ultimately the appropriate choice to serve the interest of its people. The country was gradually witnessing a terrible destruction and the economy was not progressing at all. This led Nasir to embrace a political solution in order to end his nation's agony and get rid of the increasingly heavy burden of a war. Hence, he decided to accept Roger's initiative, along with Jordan, to endorse a negotiated peace settlement that would involve the acceptance of the UN Security Council Resolution 242 and impose a ceasefire between the fighting forces. Algeria condemned Nasir's political choice to deal with the United States and insisted on the necessity to carry on resistance and not to give up to the enemy's expectations.

However, Kazziha argued that, Nasir's decision to accept the Roger's Plan, followed later by Jordan, could not be altered. Arab governments' priorities, mainly those of Egypt, Jordan and Syria, were modified as a result of the war; they were more concerned, following the disastrous defeat, with recovering their losses than liberating Palestine. By accepting the Roger's Plan, the Arab leaders were offered a political settlement with Israel which would guarantee the recovery of the occupied Arab territories in return for a formal Arab recognition of the Israeli state. By undertaking such procedures, Egypt was retiring from the front line of leadership in the Arab political scene, noticeably among progressive countries.

Walid Kazziha asserted that:

“Soon after the June war, Saudi Arabia and the Arab states in the Gulf began to take an increasing interest in the Palestine question. The growing involvement of the moderate regimes in the Palestine cause was motivated by a number of considerations. Chief among these was the decline of Egypt as a regional power and leader of the Arab radical camp. Among other things, the June war discredited Nasser and Ba‘th on all levels. The regional

balance of power tilted heavily in favour of the moderate and conservative forces in the region.”⁴⁸

In short, it was impossible for progressive Arab states to agree on recognising the Israeli state as an independent entity and even to accept a peaceful settlement with imperialist powers.

With Sadat leading Egypt since September 1970, the country reached a turning point in its politics. In fact, Egypt’s approach from now on, on several issues, was more moderate than radical.

Boumedienne came to power at a time of radical political changes in the Arab world as a series of political coups had led to the seizure of power by the *Ba’ath* party in both Iraq and Syria, in 1963.

Boumedienne was very cautious about his foreign policy action, although very close to the progressive countries, mainly Egypt, and radical about his positions towards issues that concerned the Middle East region; he never undertook any drastic actions that would put Arab unity at risk. Despite the fact that Algeria was a close partner of Egypt, it would not welcome Nasir’s decision to conclude a political settlement with Israel, Sadat’s political orientation and reestablishment of diplomatic relations with the United States on 7 November 1973, or finally Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977. Most of the progressive leaders joined Algeria in this approach, with the exception of Iraq and Libya, which were radical and that rejected the idea of political accords with the imperialist state. In an attempt to forge a moderate stance towards Egypt and a new leniency with the West, and to alleviate the acute strain prevailing in the Arab circles, Algeria held a summit for Arab heads of states between 26 and 28 November 1973, with the aim of voicing the disapproval of most participating states in the summit to future negotiations with Israel planned to take place in Geneva.

Noticeably enough, in most of the Inter-Arab disputes, President Houari Boumedienne shone as a peaceful political figure, eager to reconcile contingent parties. He often played the role of a mediator, prone to find a peaceful settlement, not to arouse any room for military confrontation. This was clearly sensed in his intervention in the Iranian-Iraqi border conflict in 1973, described by the daily newspaper, El Moudjahid, as a thorn in the flesh for both countries and a source of tension in the region.⁴⁹ President Houari Boumedienne played an important role in easing dangerous tensions in the region. This was also the case through the mediation of President Houari Boumedienne between Bangladesh and Pakistan, and when applied to the intervention of the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa, in the Kuwaiti-Iraqi armed confrontations in 1973. Furthermore, Algeria attempted to intervene in the Lebanese conflict, as it sent its Minister of Education, Ben Mahmoud, who unsuccessfully endeavoured to accomplish reconciliation between Syria and the Palestinians, following the Syrian interference in 1976 in Lebanon, which was condemned by Algeria, because of the disastrous results embodied in sizable Palestinian casualties. Although Algeria could not side against Syria, especially with the latter’s neutral attitude in the Saharan issue; Algeria, Iraq and Libya

provided full support to the Palestinians but could not counterattack the Syrian invasion.⁵⁰ At this particular point, one can effortlessly sense that ideology did not constitute the drive of Algeria's foreign policy towards Syria.

Algeria also played a role in easing the tension between Libya and Egypt following the war of five days in July 1977, requesting a ceasefire. Yasir Arafat stated that his efforts in settling the disagreement between Sadat and Qadhafi were incomparable with President Houari Boumedienne's achievement in stopping the fighting between the two sides.⁵¹

The Saudi acceptance of the Roger's Plans brought together Jordan and Saudi Arabia in their position towards the Palestinian resistance and was enough to lead to Palestinian resentment and condemnation of such a political measure. From the Jordanian side, antagonism always embodied the Palestinian-Jordanian relationship, partly because Jordan had always wanted to have complete control over the West bank and because of the increasing Palestinian resistance in the Jordanian territory and the repetitive Israeli attacks on Palestinians living in Jordan. This led to the deterioration of Jordanian-Palestinian relations and was strengthened by Jordan's acceptance of the Roger's Plan. The initiation of Jordanian-Palestinian armed confrontation was imminent and symbolised the Jordanian refusal of the Palestinian resistance, probably due to fear of repercussions from Israel and the light of the loss of the West bank. The Jordanian stance was condemned by many Arab states. In interviews with the Lebanese newspapers, An Nahar and Al-Doustour and the Egyptian newspaper El-Joumhouriyya and the periodicals Rose al-Youssef and al-Mussawar on 4 December 1973, President Houari Boumedienne denied Jordan's right to claim territories that did not belong to its lands. He explained that:

“The West Bank had never belonged to Jordan, the reality is that Israel occupied part of Palestine and put the other part under the protectorate of Jordan and Egypt. Ultimately, Jordan annexed the Palestinian part that was under its protectorate to form the Kingdom of Jordan. What seems to be right is that Egypt claimed its well-identified territories without claiming the Gaza strip which was Palestinian; it, hence, eradicates any rights to Jordan to claim what belonged to Palestine.”⁵²

Tension increased in the Saudi-Egyptian stances towards the Yemeni issue, which went back to 1962 and the announcement, then, of the birth of a new Republic. While Egypt backed the idea of a republican state, Saudi Arabia defended the existing religious state. As for Algeria, supporting Yemen was never questionable. Algeria had expressed its will to help the Arab Republic of Yemen in order to promote economic, social and political options aspired by Yemenis.⁵³

The growing distress in Inter-Arab relations gave Algeria a new twist in its Arab politics; Algeria was keen on achieving an Arab union. This urged it to moderate some of its radical stances, thereby avoiding an imminent split in inter-Arab political intercourse and it often played the role of a mediator.

3. Algeria and Inter Arab Cooperation:

After independence, Egypt was Algeria's great partner. The tight and close relationship between the two charismatic figures, the previous Algerian president, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Jamal Abd al-Nasir, could only enhance the two countries economic, diplomatic and cultural interchanges. It was, hence, with great disarray that Nasir received the news of Ben Bella's overthrow from power and, hence, kept his distance from dealing with the new regime for some time. The new leadership in Algeria was not warmly welcomed by Nasir, unlike in some other parts of the Arab world such as Syria and Yemen.

Although Algeria aligned with Egypt as a progressive country, along with Syria, Libya, Iraq and Yemen, it never showed an apparent dissatisfaction in dealing with the rival panel.⁵⁴ This Algerian stance was sustained.

Economic and cultural cooperation and support of Arab counterparts were at their apogee. This culminated in the creation of the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) in 1968.

On the other hand, not only was solidarity a highly appreciated incentive for Arab unity, but cooperation also figured as a catalyst that ought to spur national economy and insure socially-balanced dynamism. This encouraged leaders to observe this option and further the belief that Arab cooperation stemmed from the common cultural and religious heritage. It was thought that Arab countries realised that they also risked crumbling if any others collapsed. Walid Kazzuha reasserted such ideas by mentioning that:

“There seems to be a growing awareness among the Arab regimes of the fact that, if for any reason one of them falls, the rest will face a similar fate in the future. On the other hand, the chain of Arab official solidarity has to be consolidated against the radical forces in the area and more particularly Palestinian insurgency.”⁵⁵

According to article 2 of the Charter of the League of Arab States:

“The purpose of the League is to draw closer the relations between member States and co-ordinate their political activities with the aim of realizing a close collaboration between them, to safeguard their independence and sovereignty, and to consider in a general way the affairs and interests of the Arab countries.”⁵⁶

The Charter also provided, among its purposes, for a close cooperation among member states with due regard to the structure of each of these states and the conditions prevailing therein, in economic and financial matters (including trade, customs, currency, agriculture and industry); communications (including railways, roads, aviation, navigation, posts and telegraphs); cultural matters; matters connected with nationality, passports, visas, execution of judgments and extradition; social welfare matters; and health matters.

It is to these beliefs and principles that Algeria adhered and was compelled to abide by, according to article 86 of its Constitution, which states: “The Algerian Republic abides by the principles and objectives stated in the charter of the United Nations and the Organisation of African Unity and the Arab League.”⁵⁷

Put in the words of the Algerian leader:

“The diligent efforts for Arab unification and pan-Arabism are a necessary prerequisite for the promotion of Arab nations, especially in an era of economic blocs.”⁵⁸

In the Arab arena, Saudi Arabia surfaced as an influential member, especially following the death of Nasir in September 1970. The visit of King Faysal Ibn Abd al-Aziz to Algeria in 1970 opened a new page in Algerian-Saudi relations. The new decade of the 1970s depicted a turning point in the Arab-Algerian interaction, where Syria tightened its bond with Algeria, mainly because of the ideological drive and the categorical Syrian rejection of the UN Security Council Resolution 242.

Algeria’s cooperation with the rest of the Arab world under President Houari Boumedienne’s regime was revitalised, especially with some countries of the Gulf region. It was clear though, that different partnerships and transactions were ratified, and summits took place in Algeria. Algeria’s commitment to Arab unity went beyond fraternity and its sense of duty, and ideological orientations stemmed from its understanding of the benefits that would flow from economic integration and cooperation. In the case of economic cooperation, Kazziha asserted that:

“The purpose of economic co-operation is twofold. On the one hand, it helps to bring a measure of social and economic stability to the front-line Arab countries, where the social and economic fabric of society is almost on the verge of collapse.”⁵⁹

The Arab summitry schedule, witnessed during 1965-1978, that is during President Houari Boumedienne’s rule, involved very rich and abundant activities in multiple areas of economic, political, social and cultural interaction, whether it was related to economic cooperation or to observing the situation in other Arab states in need of help and assistance. Algeria was always an active pioneer in establishing a cooperative atmosphere in the Arab sphere.

As early as April 1968, Algeria organised a seminar for the Arab Middle East and the Mediterranean countries against the exploitation of the oil industry. In September 1970, a referendum was held for Arab experts, regarding the issue of “oil and development.” Algeria also hosted the ninth Arab Oil Summit in May 1972. In the fight to assist Palestinians to recover their sovereignty and territorial integrity, Algeria organised a meeting for the Israeli boycott Bureau in Algeria in February 1972 and hosted (in November 1973) an extraordinary meeting for African Ministers of Foreign Affairs to clarify Africa’s position towards the situation in the Middle East and try to gain the support of the continent. At the opening of the Summit of Arab

Heads of State, held in Algiers on 26 November 1973, President Houari Boumedienne reiterated the flagrant solidarity assumed by the Organisation of African Unity, which was embodied in the severing of relations with Israel, and insisted on the necessity to initiate a technical and political cooperation between member states of the OAU and the Arab League.⁶⁰

It was followed on 13 February 1974, by the Fourth Summit of Arab Heads of States, which gathered the four leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Algeria, and which was aimed at reviving the prestige and dignity of the Arab nation. Probably the most important political step that Algeria contributed to, was to mediate in the signing of the Iraq-Iran reconciliation agreement under the aegis of President Houari Boumedienne in March 1975.

Meanwhile, Algerian activities and interaction with Arab countries went beyond issues of economic order and political settlement, as a strong tendency towards social and cultural Arab exchange was developed, as revealed by the eleventh conference of Arab Solicitors in September 1970. Arab youth was also part of Boumedienne's scheme to reinforce Arab solidarity. In July 1972, the second conference of Arab Ministers of Youth was organised, at the same time as the first Arab festival for young people. The first African Arab Women Summit took place in March 1974, followed in March 1975, by the Arab Journalist Seminar and the Tenth Conference of the Arab Writers Union, besides the contribution of Algeria to the Tenth Conference of Arab Doctors in Damascus, and the joining of the Algerian Television and Radio of the Arab Union of Television and Radio on 18 February 1971. As for Saudi Arabia, there was some kind of cooperation that marked the Saudi-Algerian intercourse, such as the aerial agreement between the Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, signed in Algiers on 6 August 1968. Likewise, different agreements and accords were ratified between Algeria and the Arab Republic of Egypt, such as the long-term commercial agreement signed on 2 May 1976 in Cairo, and the ratification of accords of administrative and technical cooperation on 23 July 1976 in Algiers. Similarly, cooperation and solidarity was featuring relations between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Algeria and the Syrian Arab Republic, which were symbolised in the air transport commercial accords signed on 28 July 1965, the publication of the administrative and technical convention signed on 29 July 1966 and cultural cooperation between the two states embodied in cultural accords. More commercial agreements were processed between Algeria and other Arab countries, such as Iraq on 18 October 1967. On 16 January 1969, the two countries signed accords for air transport and scientific and technical cooperation accords. As for Kuwait, it was a great financial support to Algeria, giving various loans, such as accords for a loan from Kuwaiti fund for Arab Economic Development ratified on 20 May 1967 in Kuwait, and also cultural accords between Algeria and Kuwait signed on 17 November 1965.

What characterised the period after 1975 was undoubtedly the absence of Algeria and the scarcity of its involvement in the Arab political interaction, mainly because of its conflict with

Morocco, a matter that isolated the country from interacting with other Arab states, given their stances towards what was happening between Algeria and Morocco.

To sum up, the most important events that marked President Houari Boumedienne's decade in the Arab world consisted of the full and comprehensive support during the war against the Israeli aggression on 5 June 1967, which ended up with severing the Algerian-American relations on 6 June 1967. Economically, the acceptance of Algeria as a member in OAPEC on 23 May 1970 was a big step. It was probably the first most important step towards collaborated work with Arab countries. Algeria also signed oil agreements with Iraq and Libya on 20 May 1970. This was along with the OAPEC conference, held in Kuwait on 18 November 1971, which included Libya and Algeria, and which dealt with accepting Iraq's membership and creating an Arab marine to transport Arab oil.

President Houari Boumedienne was always hopeful and optimistic for Arab unity; he often described Arab unity to be impulsive and spontaneous, and was neither dependent on summitry outcomes nor on leadership's decisions.

During the first years of his ruling, President Houari Boumedienne was in the process of consolidating his position in the Arab world and gave Algeria a dominant position in Arab politics. He then moved a step forward to a higher level where he succeeded in making Algeria's voice heard not only in the Arab world but also at the international level. Boumedienne's political attitude towards the Arab world stemmed from his strong beliefs and convictions of identity and solidarity with the Arab world, compounded with his fervour to coordinate these orientations with his policy targets.

Algeria's policy-making process towards the Arab world under President Houari Boumedienne was highly driven by ideological motivations. Anti-imperialism and the support of movements of Liberation flavoured Algeria's foreign policy actions. These seemed to be an effective political form of mobilising the nation for important ends such as the Palestinian issue. It also helped in legitimising President Houari Boumedienne's authority and strengthening his positions in decision-making by gaining domestic support.

Notes:

¹ Speech by the Minister of Foreign Affairs under President Houari Boumedienne's rule, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa [Abdelaziz Bouteflika], on 30 October 1965, at the second Afro-Asian Summit held in Algiers, El Moudjahid, 1 November 1965, 5.

² Aaron David Miller, The Arab States and the Palestine Question: Between Ideology and Self-Interest (New York: Praeger, 1986), 3.

³ Suhila Al Rimawi, "Al-Ruwwād al-'Arab wa al-Qadiyya al-Filist'iniyya", Majalat al-'Arab, November 1991, 160.

⁴ Interview by Al-Ahram and Al-Anwar newspaper's envoy to Algeria, Lotfi Elkholi, with President Houari Boumedienne, between the 27-31/10/1974 in République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Décembre 1974, Tome V (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 341. [Speeches of President Boumedienne: 2 July 1973-3 December 1973].

⁵ *Fath* was founded in 1957 in Kuwait; it was a clandestine movement until 1968 when Yasir Arafat was announced to be the official spokesman.

⁶ Ibrahim Iryash, Al Bu'd al-Qawmi li al-Qadiyya al-Filist'iniyya (Beirut: Markaz Dirasāt al-Wihda al-'Arabiyya, 1978), 8.

⁷ The Palestinian Liberation Organisation. The Palestinian National Charter, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/plocov.htm> (last accessed 10/07/2003).

⁸ El Moudjahid, 3 November 1965.

⁹ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Hathihi Hiya al-Jazaïr Hurra Mustaqilla (Algiers: Ministry of Religious Endowments, no date), 58.

¹⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Hathihi hiya Al Jazaïr Hurra Mustaqilla, (Algiers: Ministry of Religious Endowments, no date), 309.

¹¹ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Présidence, Al Tasrihat al sahafiyya Li Raïs Houwari Boumedienne: Raiis Majlis al thawra wa raiis Majlis al wuzarā' (Algiers: 1973), 7.

¹² Muhi al-Deen Amimour, Al-Tajriba wa al-Judhour: Hiwar Mutawwal (Algiers: Dar al-Umma, 1993), 141.

¹³ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Houwāri Boumedienne : 2 Juilya 1973 - 3 December 1974, Volume V (Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 326. [Speeches of President Boumedienne: 2 July 1973-3 December 1974].

¹⁴ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 265.

¹⁵ The Palestinian Liberation Organisation, The Palestinian National Charter, in <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/plocov.htm> (last accessed 10/07/2003).

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- ¹⁶ Fédération de France au C. N. R. A., Projet de Programme : Session de Tripoli, Mai- Juin 1962 (Paris: Front de Liberation National, 1962), 88.
- ¹⁷ Conférence des Ambassadeurs (20 Octobre 1969) in: République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 483.
- ¹⁸ Michael C. Hudson, Arab Politics: The Search for Legitimacy (New Haven; London: Yale University Press, 1977), 373.
- ¹⁹ Interview with Yasir Arafat in Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA). Reportage on President Houari Boumedienne produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana. 'Ala Athaar Boumedienne. Part II (foreign policy), Algiers, March 1990. 01 hour 30 minutes.
- ²⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 02 Juillet 1970-1 Mai 1972. Tome III (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1972), 163-4.
- ²¹ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II, (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 118.
- ²² Abd al Qadir Mahmoudi, Al Niza'āt al-'Ayrabiya-'Arabiya wa Tat'awwur al-Nidhām al-Iqlimī (Ma'a al-Tarkīz 'Ala al-Niza'āt Hawla al-Qadiyya al-Filist'iniyya) 1945-1985, (Algiers: ANEP, 2002), 146-7.
- ²³ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Declaration du 19 Juin 1965: Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 116-7.
- ²⁴ Ahmed Rouadjia, "L'aporie religieuse du conflit israélo-palestinien," in Panoramiques: Israel-Palestine: des Utopies ou le Cauchemar (3^e trimestre 2002), 112.
- ²⁵ Raed Abu Sahlieh, "Pour une alternative non violente a l'Intifadha", Panoramiques (Israel-Palestine: des Utopies ou le Cauchemar) (3^e trimestre 2002), 160.
- ²⁶ Abdelmedjid Bennamia, Palestine in Algerian Foreign Policy: 1962-1978. PhD Thesis, University of Exeter 1988, 426.
- ²⁷ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, Ayyām Ma'a al Ra'iis Hūwāri Boumedienne wa Dhikrayāt Okhrā, Third Edition (Algiers: Moufem, 2000), 300.
- ²⁸ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, The Presidency, Khitaab al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne. Raiis Majlis al-Thawra wa Raiis Majlis al-Wuzarā': Adis Ababa. Mayo 1973. (Directorate of Information: 1973), 7.
- ²⁹ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, op.cit. 283.
- ³⁰ Interview with Abd al-Razzaq Bouhara in Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA). Reportage on President Houari Boumedienne. produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana. 'ala Athaar Boumedienne. Part II (foreign policy). Algiers, March 1990. 01 hour 30 minutes.

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- ³¹ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, op.cit. (2000), 281-2.
- ³² These principles are: no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel or negotiations with it, and insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people to their own country.
- ³³ The League of Arab States, The Khartoum Resolutions, September 1, 1967, <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/khartoum.htm> [last accessed 10/07/2003].
- ³⁴ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, The Presidency. Al-Tasrihāt al- Sahafiyya li al- Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne: Raiis Majlis al-Thawra wa Raiis Majlis al-Wuzarā' (Directorate of Information, March 1973), 7.
- ³⁵ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, op. cit. 157.
- ³⁶ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, op. cit. (2000), 319.
- ³⁷ Walid W. Kazziha, Palestine in the Arab Dilemma (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 31.
- ³⁸ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. National Front of Liberation. Al-Mithāq al- Watani. (Algiers 1976), 37. [The National Charter 1976].
- ³⁹ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, The Presidency, Al-Tasrihāt al- Sahafiyya li al- Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne: Raiis Majlis al-Thawra wa Raiis Majlis al-Wuzarā' (Directorate of Information: March 1973),7.
- ⁴⁰ El Moudjahid, 16 Janvier 1962.
- ⁴¹ Interview by the author with Muhyi al-Deen Amimour on 28/12/2003 at the Senate (*Le Conseil de la Nation*) in Algiers.
- ⁴² République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire. Front de Libération National. Constitution 1976 (Algiers 1976),
- ⁴³ Abd al-Qadir Mahmoudi, op. cit. 94.
- ⁴⁴ See Abd al-Qadir Mahmoudi, op. cit. 218.
- ⁴⁵ Ibid, 189.
- ⁴⁶ Nicole Grimaud, La Politique Extérieure de l'Algérie (Paris: Karthala, 1984), 225.
- ⁴⁷ James A. Bill and Robert Spring Borg, Politics in the Middle East, 5th Edition (London: Longman, 1999), 55.
- ⁴⁸ Walid Kazziha, "The Impact of Palestine on Arab Politics," in Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (London: Routledge, 1990), 306-7.
- ⁴⁹ El Moudjahid. 7 March 1975.
- ⁵⁰ Nicole Grimaud, op. cit. 252.
- ⁵¹ Interview with Yasir Arafat in Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA). Reportage on President Houari Boumedienne, produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana. 'ala Athaar Boumedienne. Part II (foreign policy), Algiers, March 1990. 01 hour 30 minutes.
- ⁵² République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumedienne: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Decembre 1974, TomeV ((Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 120.

⁵³ Algerian-Yemeni Communiqué issued following the visit of a Yemeni delegation, from the 16 to the 20 October 1965, headed by the Prime Minister, General Hassan El-Amri, and composed of M. Abderrahmane El-Iriani, member of the Consultative Council and Hassan Mekki, Minister of the state's economic affairs. The delegation was received by the President of the Council of Revolution, Houari Boumediene. El Moudjahid, 21 October 1965.

⁵⁴ The competing panel in this case designs the reactionary and moderate countries. These are the inherited monarchical systems and the ones that have supposedly no specific ideology to follow, respectively.

⁵⁵ Walid W. Kazziha,, op. cit.(1979), 68.

⁵⁶The League of Arab States, Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945, in <http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/arableag.htm> [last accessed 10/06/2003] or see: American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Volume 1, United States Department of State Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117 (Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1957).

⁵⁷ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire. Front de Libération National. Constitution 1976 (Algiers 1976), 35.

⁵⁸The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. National Front of Liberation. Al-Mithāq al-Watani. (Algiers 1976), 76. [The National Charter 1976].

⁵⁹ Walid W. Kazziha, op. cit. (1979), 68.

⁶⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Decembre 1974, Tome V (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 110.

Chapter Six

Algeria, OPEC, OAPEC and Oil Diplomacy.

1. Domestic Determinants of Algeria's Oil Policy:

Prior to self-determination and throughout post-independence Algeria, oil emerged as a substantial worldwide energy source. Interestingly enough, at the turn of the century, oil appeared as a broadly traded commodity, not only at a national level but also on an international scale. The strategic position held by hydrocarbons in the world's economy resulted from the rapid increase of dependency on petroleum fuels ranked emphatically as a highly consumed energy supply. Discovered in 1956, oil ultimately evolved to be crucial and vital for Algeria's economy and surfaced distinctively as an elemental component in the country's development policy. It has, since, been occupying a key position in Algeria's political and economic agenda and nowadays, energy still holds a strategic position in the economy. In this respect, the current Minister of Energy and Mines, Chakib Khelil, confirmed that the hydrocarbons sector contributed to 41% of internal raw products, 97% of the country's foreign revenue and 77% of the state budget.¹

Therefore, it is probably fair to settle for the idea that the hydrocarbon sector represented, overwhelmingly, Algeria's major and instrumental catalyst for an economic blast-off, especially in the wake of massive oil discoveries in the country. Undoubtedly, the discovery of oil in Hassi-Messaoud in 1956 triggered and encouraged France's endeavour to deepen its footsteps in South Algeria and take administrative and economic control of the Sahara. Over the past decades, the steady discovery of vast oil reserves by the coloniser in the Algerian desert and the development of pipelines and refineries in the *ex-métropole* made Algerian economic independence harder to achieve after 1962, notably with the privileged relations France nourished with Algeria, and its venture to maintain its presence on the *ex-métropole* and to continue the exploitation of Algeria's natural resources.

Oil needed to be part of Algeria's development policy. Remarkably, during the 1960s and throughout the 1970s, it displaced other traded goods in the international market and insured permanent and sometimes excellent revenues for the producing countries, especially at a time when agriculture revenues failed to meet expectations.

Hydrocarbons constituted the backbone of Algeria's economy and the majority of Algeria's export revenues came from oil. As a matter of fact, hydrocarbons have been a vital factor for securing state revenues and reinforcing national wealth, which highlighted the strategic importance of exploring national resources in order to achieve socio-economic cohesive

objectives and long lasting progress. This required the exploration of available natural wealth and the mobilisation of human resources with the aim of shaping a strong economy. Hence this helped to create more job opportunities and simultaneously tackled economic and social problems.

Alan Gelb introduced administrative and causal political factors that affect the effectiveness of any policy choices and, henceforth, enable the assessment of the strategy coherence and the extent to which it could be formulated and executed. Put in his words:

“The first is the “horizon” of public decisionmaking. This is likely to be closely related to the stability of the government. If leaders change often and in a discontinuous manner, it may be futile to attribute the policy responses of the country to any consistent set of objectives through the period of windfalls gains. The second is the “unity” or centralisation of public decisionmaking. When there are powerful, competing actors (such as autonomous public enterprises or an equally strong executive and legislature), inconsistent decisions can result in an outcome different from, and inferior to, what would result if decisions were formulated by any single agent.”²

That is to say that the political environment had its weight on the oil policy choices and the absorption of windfall gains. In the case of Algeria, the centralisation of power and decision-making and the dynamics of the economy, during the Boumedienne years that personalised a state controlled economy, shaped the way the oil policy was formulated.

Algeria had the natural potential for economic impetus and dynamism. The first work of synthesis on the geology, and the value of oil and gas of the Algerian Sahara, showed the distribution of the prospective reserves of oil to be over 64% of the Illizi basin and only 36% in the Triassic Province, despite the fact that the greater part of geological reserves of oil discovered in the Algerian Sahara, including the Hassi Messaoud field, were concentrated in the Triassic Province (75%).³ The study pointed to the poor state of knowledge regarding this region of the Sahara. This point in particular, demonstrated the necessity to comprehensively invest the state’s means in the exploration of the country’s natural resources in order to fully enjoy the revenues of a sound oil industry.

Rich and wealthy, the Algerian soil compelled the leadership of the country to increase explorations and meticulously take advantage of the country’s own resources, instead of resorting to a system of concessionaries that saw Algeria as a haven for raw materials only. Chitour mentioned two fundamental objectives that characterised the energy sector in the 1970s. The first objective was to satisfy the economic needs in energy and to be able to provide these needs in the long term. The second objective was to provide the necessary funds to finance development projects such as providing electricity to the entire territory by 1990.⁴

Given such circumstances, the involvement of the state in the oil industry constituted a far better opportunity for an economic performance that ought to increase the pace of development,

achieve an eventual profitability for the country, and by the same token realise an improvement in the people's standards of living. After all, as Carter mentioned: "the state is merely an organ for protecting the interests of the dominant economic class."⁵ In short, 'Algerian Socialism' framed the course of action in Algeria's economic policy. President Houari Boumedienne was inspired by a plan of development, where oil played a key role in guaranteeing state's revenues and investments in other sectors. This meant guaranteeing national interest and ensuring the good life of the citizens.

2. Towards a Radical Oil Policy: Ideology in Algeria's oil policy.

Political independence could not be effective unless economic dependence was no more a facet of the state. Algeria's oil policy gradually developed to epitomise a clear-cut behaviour and an ideologically-oriented approach that aimed, above all, at serving national interests and attaining complete control over French interests. It was only after the seizure of power by the new leader in 1965 that the Algerian leadership showed increasing willingness and endeavour to take part in hydrocarbon-related activities, amongst which were petroleum searches and explorations.

It is undoubtedly imperative to be aware of the circumstances surrounding the emergence of the Algerian Sahara as a major latent oil provider, especially for France, and understand the environment surrounding the promptness of oil searches and explorations in the Algerian desert. It is also of paramount importance to identify the politico-economic framework that prevailed prior to and throughout economic planning and oil policy development. In fact, the issuing of permits for oil exploration and searches to the National Company for Search and Exploration (*Société National pour la Recherche et l'exploration du Pétrole*, SN REPAL) and the French Company for Petroleum (*Compagnie Française des Pétrole*, C. F. P) in 1952 coincided with the Iranian nationalisation of hydrocarbons in 1951, and subsequently, the need of the West to guarantee a broad range of oil providers from areas other than the Middle East. Accordingly, Hamid Mazri explained how petroleum searches and explorations moved from being centred in the Middle East to the regions that were typically abandoned. France, in particular, concentrated its policy of diversification on its colonies, especially French Algeria. As a result of this, around forty three oil companies were implanted in the Sahara, among which twenty were directly controlled by France *via* the Petroleum Research Bureau (*Le Bureau des Recherches Pétroliers*, BRP) and the state controlled company for Petroleum (*Régie autonome du Pétrole*).⁶ Of course, in addition to the French companies, others joined the search for, and exploitation of, natural resources. These included American ESSO, MOBIL and some other British, West German and Italian companies. This was before Algeria undertook to take up the challenge that would enable the state to enjoy sovereignty over its own territorial resources and have total control over the economy.

It is of great interest to highlight in this context, the neo-colonialist implications that the Evian Accords of 18 March 1962 had on the future of the hydrocarbon sector. It reintroduced the

application of the oil code '*Code Pétrolier Saharien*', according to article 1, and compelled Algeria to cede its rights, prerogatives, and obligations as a public authority, to France and to carry out mining and petroleum legislation which was more detailed in article 2 of the Declaration of Principles on cooperation for the valorisation of the Sahara's resources. It also entitled the concessionary and partners to have free access, supervision, use, production and exportation of the Algerian Sahara's wealth with respect to Algeria's interior consumption.⁷ According to article 8, Algeria had to prioritise French companies in the grant of research and exploitation for a period of six years. Algerian oil had fallen in value by 30%, with its price dropping to 2.35 dollars/bbl (barrel).⁸

By the time Algeria recovered its political sovereignty, its oil policy was abiding by regulations in the form of the oil code '*Code Pétrolier Saharien*', set by France in 1958 and amended prior to 1962, and which granted foreign companies, notably France, legal and fiscal privileges and concessions over Algerian oil. It was, hence, an important piece of documentation that served as a guideline to manage Algeria's resources before and after independence, following the departure of the colons. It also determined French and foreign companies' privileges and concessions in the *ex-métropole*, in addition to Algeria's status *vis-à-vis* the Sahara's hydrocarbons.

The radicalisation of Algerian oil policy was a gradual process instigated during the Ben Bella years. Despite the strong ties and the character of dependency that kept and maintained the Algerian-French close partnership after 1962, Algeria started to realise the increasing need to make use of the Sahara's resources as part of its development. According to Bachir Boumaza, in his capacity as National Economy Minister in Ben Bella's first cabinet:

“Algeria could not remain a classical colonial market which exported raw materials such as gas, petroleum or mining products any longer.”⁹

Algerian-French cooperation in the economic sector was elementary for both countries. However, in the years that followed independence, France's cooperation with Algeria was more of a neo-colonialist strategy to benefit from the resources of its ex-colony. Bachir Boumaza's arguments indicated that any future cooperation had to rest upon the principle that granted Algeria an active status, play a vigorous role in managing its natural resources and control the operations related to them. It was also essential to adopt more equitable regulations in the share of oil revenues, and to avoid the plunder of underdeveloped countries by industrialised countries. For these reasons, it was essential to organise a plan for industrialisation that would utilise oil and gas and promote the efficient development of the country.¹⁰ This statement highlighted the first signs of awareness among the Algerian political circles regarding the importance of valorising the hydrocarbon sector. It also suggested the leadership's intolerance towards the ongoing despoil and deprivation from the benefits of the country's own natural

resources and realised the need to secure a prosperous economic energy from which Algeria would be guaranteed a fair profit.

The first move against foreign companies was the Algerian government's decision, under Ben Bella, to construct a third pipeline, Haoud El Hamra – Arzew, in order to prevent the saturation of the oil pipelines and ensure the transport of oil products to the ports of Bougie and Shkira. The endeavour aimed at bringing Algeria to terms with the exploitation of its hydrocarbon products and allow it to be entirely in charge of the construction of the pipeline. Seen in the long run, this was the very first initiative by the government to undertake an autonomous decision with regards to the petroleum industry in 1964.

Nevertheless, this decision received very hostile reactions and apprehensions within the oil industry, as it was seen to be a violation of these companies' recognised rights.¹¹ However, along with taking charge of the creation of a third pipeline, proving the governments growing interest in the hydrocarbon sector and its eagerness to contribute to the development of this sector, the creation of a national company for the transport and commercialisation of hydrocarbons (*Société Nationale de Transport et de commercialisation des hydrocarbures – Sonatrach*) on 31 December 1963, constituted a breakthrough in Algeria's initial steps towards an involvement in the hydrocarbon sector.

It is probably safer to settle for the idea that Algeria's gradual radicalisation of oil policy under President Houari Boumedienne was framed within a revolutionary ideology and was armed with an anti-imperialist belief. This ideology crystallised the continuity of revolution and carried a long-term prospective for the Algerian economy, including the monopoly of the oil market within the territory. President Houari Boumedienne stated that:

“For Algeria, the process of nationalisation needs, above all, to be regarded as, not only an ideological option, but also a means for emancipation. It aims at freeing our national resources from the chains imposed by foreign monopolies. It will, hence, give our economy a national identity.”¹²

The radicalisation of oil policy came to a height as a result of a clash of interests between the concessionaries and the exploited country. Boumedienne was aware of the necessity to fully benefit from the hydrocarbon sector in the launch of the economy and in order to achieve his ultimate objective, that was to free the country's industry from the pillage it was undergoing. It was, hence, a fair justification for Boumedienne's determined course of action to achieve Algeria's own oil monopoly and probably achieve self-reliance in the long run. For President Houari Boumedienne:

“The gist of an independent national economy is the liquidation of foreign countries' interests in the country.”¹³

This was gradually achieved when President Boumedienne arrived in power. Algeria's oil policy under President Houari Boumedienne could possibly be divided into two main phases: the initial phase, introduced clear-cut and radical changes, and this extended from the

ratification of the 1965 accords to the nationalisation of the hydrocarbon sector. This period witnessed a gradual recovery of the Algerian oil heritage and the nationalisation of many foreign oil-companies, starting with the nationalisation of ESSO-STANDARD- Algeria, ESSO-Africa, and ESSO-Saharan and of MOBIL on 24 August 1967. This was followed by the nationalisation of SHELL on 20 May 1968, of SOFRAPEL, AMIF, PHILLIPS PETROLEUM Co Algérie and DRILLING Spécialités Co on 12 June 1970. All nationalised goods were transferred to the national company SONATRACH.

In the meantime, the leadership had granted the monopoly of distributing petroleum products and other hydrocarbon derivatives to SONATRACH on 20 May 1968 and retrieved all mining titles of exploitation and transport of liquid hydrocarbons or gases from SINCLAIR Méditerranéen Petroleum Company on 25 April 1969. These were granted to the national company SONATRACH on 8 February 1970.

This initial phase in Algeria's oil policy saw a gradual decrease in foreign concessions in Algeria and a parallel increase on the responsibilities and privileges of the national oil company. This initiated a swift change in the control of national resources and paved the way for the historical decision of nationalisation.

In truth, the early years of President Houari Boumedienne's arrival to power saw the emergence of a number of serious challenges in the political and economic arenas.

From the outset, cooperation between France and Algeria was redefined after President Houari Boumedienne took office. President Boumedienne was eager to introduce the hydrocarbon sector into Algeria's development policy. To do so, there was an urgent need to liberate Algeria's economy and natural resources from the exploitation exercised by industrialised countries.

President Houari Boumedienne's economic aspiration was initiated with the accords of 29 July 1965,¹⁴ between the Democratic Peoples Republic of Algeria and the French Republic, which launched a cooperative association '*Association coopérative*'. This was based on the solidarity of interest between a developing producing country and an industrialised consuming country (article 2).¹⁵ The accords also reiterated the privileged advantages granted to the French interests according to article 11 and maintained the different existing concessions in conformity with the Sahara's oil code of 1958 and the 1962 Evian Convention. Most importantly, what could be described as a step forward or progress in Algerian economy and an evolution of Algerian oil revenues, was the financial side of the accords, as benefits imposed on transport operations increased from 50%, as was set by the Saharan oil code, to 53% in 1965, 1966 and 1967, 54% in 1968 and 55% for ulterior dates. The two governments were to examine the situation in order to determine a price for the fiscal year as from 1969, as mentioned in article 27 of the Algerian-French accords.¹⁶ At first glance, these fiscal numbers, appearing in the accords, show the tip of the balance of power in the petroleum sector towards the Algerian side, as it held most shares in the hydrocarbon activities and allowed the Algerian state to be in a stronger decision-making

position, which was not very welcomed by France. On 15 July 1967, both Algeria and France signed a convention with regards to the mixed company introduced in article 11 of the Algerian-French accords and which was in charge of the transport and liquefaction of oil to the French shores, where the two countries had a 50% share. The convention insisted on the Algerian nationality of that company and the necessity to abide, hence, by Algerian rules with respect to the accords of 29 July 1965, which highlighted Algeria's ambition to "*Algerianise*", in the long term, whatever was located on the Algerian territory. This was ultimately to culminate in a nationalisation of all foreign interests in the country.

The new turn in Algerian oil policy was far from pleasing for France, which had interests in the hydrocarbon sector in Algeria, and that were emphatically at risk. Similarly, dissatisfaction was gradually arising on the Algerian side as France was blamed for insufficient productivity and investment in the oil industry. Mekideche sketched a series of pressures that were emplaced by France in order to weaken the Algerian positions. He explained that, further to France's measures to align its interests to other Western countries, by attempting to form a coalition with the cartel, and following the "New York dialogue" of January 1971, which gathered all cartel companies alongside French companies, France urged the government of the United States to reject the El Passo-Sonatrach contract of 1969 and pledged the World Bank to refuse the financing of some Algerian projects belonging to the quadrennial plan.¹⁷

At long last, France's unwilling attitude to re-negotiate oil prices in late 1969 led Algeria to increase the oil prices from 2.08 dollars/ bbl to 2.85 dollars/bbl, with no prior consultation with France. Algeria nationalised the hydrocarbon resources on 24 February 1971, thereby initiating the second phase, which typified the strengthening of anti-imperialist positions and defending producing countries' interests. It lasted from the nationalisation to the end of the President Houari Boumedienne tenure.

The nationalisation was followed by accords concluded with the French company for Petroleum (CFP) on 30 June 1971 and with Elf Erap on 15 November 1971.

On 12 April 1971, the system of concessionaries was totally abolished. The 19 April 1971 marked the boycott by French companies of Algerian oil as a result of its high prices. France called, world-wide, for a boycott of Algerian oil, which it declared '*pétrole rouge*', or red oil, as a warning not to purchase it.¹⁸

Although the Algerian nationalisation of hydrocarbons was bound to attract animosity from the other side of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic side, the move provided the Industrial Revolution with good grounds to create a sector of heavy industry which was fully controlled by the state.

From the 1970s onwards, Algeria expressed strong anti-imperialist opinions that were stressed unfalteringly during forums in front of incorporating international institutions. It is fundamental to indicate that Algeria featured two different traits of the economy. It started off with a

dependent economy that relied heavily on foreign cooperation and then shifted towards a more explicit anti-imperialist policy, as it was sensed in political speeches and policy outcomes. Henceforth, the Boumedienne oil policy presumed that national interests and windfall profits were the aspirations of the state. This dynamic was intended to insulate the economy from the deleterious effects of economic regression. In other words, Boumedienne was goaded by the thirst for benefits and gains. His oil policy pictured a coherent and dynamic impulse for state development and economic progress, and was based on a seemingly logical foundation where self-interest was a primary objective and where anti-imperialist beliefs were promoted without forcibly conflicting with Algeria's interest. That is to say that, whilst the Algerian leadership used ideology to consolidate power and legitimacy within the national sphere and also at a regional level, the oil policy of Algeria was moulded within an ideology that served the national interest simultaneously.

As a matter of fact, the endeavour to nationalise the hydrocarbon sector was not a spontaneous decision. On the contrary, the nationalisation of the hydrocarbons, under President Houari Boumedienne, was a gradual initiative that started off by nationalising only 51%. President Houari Boumedienne often asserted:

“The nationalisation of raw materials becomes a fundamental condition for economic development.”¹⁹

This endeavour carried out two dimensions. The ideological dimension crystallised Algeria's aspirations for national integrity and sovereignty over its national resources, which explained the recovery of 51% of the oil heritage. The second dimension was pragmatic, as 49% of the resources were still under foreign prerogatives. This was to guarantee a source of *savoir faire* and expertise that could ensure the transfer of technology and the exploitation of oil fields, thus benefiting from its own natural resources. At this particular point, ideology and pragmatism combined in a coherent and a harmonised way to serve the interest of Algeria both at a national level and at an international level.

From another point of view, the gradual recovery of hydrocarbons constituted a national as well as a pragmatic issue. For Amimour:

“It is nationalism and pragmatism that were complementary and which, combined together, flew from one ideology that revolved around the edification of a strong state.”²⁰

The focus placed on the oil industry shaped Algeria's economy into an oil-dependent and state-controlled fashion that probably had its advantages which were reflected at an international level. It undoubtedly carried disadvantages, as other sectors of the economy were suffering.

3. Algeria's Pivotal Role in OPEC/OAPEC:

The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is the major organisation in the field of oil exports and is an international organization. It includes eleven members that are

developing countries, which heavily rely on oil revenues as a main source of income. These are Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Venezuela. The creation of OPEC in 1960 was pictured in the words of Stork as a turning point in the Middle East, and he stated:

“The creation of OPEC marks a turning point in the struggle of the Middle East countries to control their own resources. It marks the emergence in the 1950s of what might be called an “oil consciousness” among small but important sectors of the local populations.”²¹

Following the revolutionary readjustment of 1965, Algeria was classified as the fifth Arab country, after Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya and Iraq, to produce oil. Algeria’s annual production average was estimated at 32 million tonnes, 3% of which was consumed at a national level and the rest exported elsewhere. Therefore, facilitating oil transport across the territory and along Algerian shores widened the hydrocarbon market and was eventually rewarding, through income, as a result of oil revenues. These encouraged investments and government devotion to both the hydrocarbon sector and oil transport, as was the case for other oil-producing countries. As it has been indicated:

“The decade of the 1970s ushered in a new epoch in the history of the world petroleum industry and in the economic power of the oil exporting nations. The price of oil at the end of the decade was about twenty times higher than it was at the beginning.”²²

For Algeria, oil production was gradually increasing, to reach its peak in 1976 by producing 1.161 million barrels a day.²³ Considering that oil production can often be regarded as an important factor in the delineation of a good provider, Algeria’s increasing oil production classified it in the lines of the most prominent oil producing countries. Furthermore, given the strategic location held by Algeria in the heart of the oil exporting countries, it was portrayed as a vigorous partner. In addition to that, Algeria was estimated to have probably operated closer to full capacity in oil production than any other member of OPEC.²⁴ The nationalisation of the oil and the hydrocarbon sectors, in general, asserted Algeria’s right to be heard and to voice its decisions regarding its territorial wealth. In other words, the nationalisation of hydrocarbons tipped over the existing *rapport de force* and enabled Algeria to play a more active role in the economy of the state and Third World countries.

Moreover, Algeria’s strong postures towards different oil related issues, coupled with explicit anti-imperialist opinionated ideas, expressed at OPEC summits and in front of international institutions, granted Algeria a pivotal role in OPEC.

What ought to be remembered is that the initial breakthrough within the framework of OPEC was Algeria’s historical decision to recover its own natural resources in February 1971.

President Houari Boumedienne's nationalisation process, initiated a radical change in the pattern of ownership and control over natural resources within members of OPEC and OAPEC. Following the line of Algeria, five other producing countries (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Abu-Dhabi and Iraq) engaged in dialogues with international companies of the cartel in order to obtain a share in their interests. This culminated in the signing of an accord on 5 October 1972, which granted the producing countries a share that would increase to 25% in 1973 and 30% in 1979. These accords were reviewed as many countries aimed at possessing 100% of their resources and were followed by a wave of nationalisation. Mahiout explained that, whilst France called for the holding of an extraordinary meeting of the UN on 18 January 1974, in order to discuss the problem of energy and find solutions to the new oil environment created by the producing countries, President Houari Boumedienne equally called for the holding of an extraordinary session to debate issues of raw materials, development and international economic relations.²⁵

It is fundamental at this stage to attract attention to the fact that, prior to President Houari Boumedienne, nationalisation was seen as unacceptable and unfeasible by the West. For example, the former Iranian Prime Minister, Mossadeq, was toppled by imperialist forces, following his attempt at nationalisation in Iran and, similarly, strong and extreme opposition was encountered when Nasir nationalised the Suez Canal and was faced with the war of 1956.

"Nationalisation" was simply not accepted by the imperialist world. Yet, President Houari Boumedienne succeeded in recovering what belonged to Algeria and urged the UN into adopting a resolution on the right of the countries to nationalisation.

Algeria launched a series of nationalisations²⁶ that were thought impossible by other counterparts. It also pioneered different oil-wise activities, such as the increase of its oil price to France, and was a host to many oil-related occasions. Algeria was regarded as a model in decisive and independent decision making within OPEC and OAPEC. Algeria's decision to increase its oil prices from 2.08 to 2.85 US dollars per barrel was feared by international circles, who were dreading similar measures being undertaken by other country members of OPEC or OAPEC. In June 1970, at the opening session of the OPEC Conference held in Algiers, President Houari Boumedienne encouraged members to cease dependency on industrialised countries, in a fight for justice. In October 1970, Algeria managed to include the issues of prices and taxation in the agenda of the Caracas Conference, which took place in December 1970.

Being a member of OPEC allowed Algeria, not only to encourage the development of the oil industry, but also promote values of sovereignty over natural resources, prioritising national interest over ideological considerations. President Houari Boumedienne explicitly stated, on many occasions, that:

"The reasons behind oil production resided in the need to build up, industrialise, transform agriculture and construct a modern society."²⁷

Algeria spurred actions against the exploitation of the producing countries and called for solidarity against neo-colonialism. President Houari Boumedienne repeatedly reiterated these ideas on several occasions. He suggested the creation of a fund with a capital ranging between 10 to 15 billion dollars, in which state members of the OPEC would contribute either in the form of loans or donations while waiting for international financing institutions to put reforms into effect. President Houari Boumedienne was also courageous and unique in his approach, requesting that the developed countries allow the oil-exporting countries to develop their industry by ridding their dependency on oil-exporting transactions. Most importantly, the contribution of developed countries, in the view of President Houari Boumedienne should fall within the following policies. Firstly, developing countries should entirely mobilise their raw materials for the benefit of their economies. This implied a reconsideration of the prices and a safeguard of the real value of raw materials. Furthermore, industrialised nations should not impede the developing countries from controlling their own economies and should thus institutionalise their help at an international level. Secondly, there should be a massive transfer of technology to the developing countries in order to allow them to produce their own commodities for industry. Thirdly, there should be an increase in financial transfers in favour of development in conformity with the United Nations resolutions. Fourthly, there should be an elimination of the structure of international financial institutions in a way to increase Third World participation in the reform and management of the international monetary system. Finally, there should be an elimination of all discriminatory measures against the oil exporting countries.²⁸ These measures were suggested by Algeria to promote cooperation in favour of oil exporting countries, in particular, and Third World countries, in general. Still within the OPEC framework, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliga [Abdelaziz Bouteflika], the Algerian Foreign Minister, under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership, vowed the victory of the OPEC state members as one that marked a new and significant step for instituting a new economic order.²⁹ Accordingly, Attiga, the OAPEC Secretary General, stated that oil producing countries reached agreement, with varying degrees of emphasis, on the conservation of their most valuable natural resource-hydrocarbons and the reduction of heavy and, in some cases, total independence on the export of crude oil.³⁰ Algeria's fight for developing and Third World countries within OPEC strengthened its positions internationally. It echoed determined positions to struggle for the establishment of a new international order.

Furthermore, as claimed by Aïssaoui:

“President Boumediene managed in 1975 to bring OPEC to align itself with other developing countries. As a result, the debate over world oil prices, considered by the industrialised countries as the main cause of world economic crisis, was placed within a much broader context of valorisation of raw materials, developing countries' terms of trade and economic development.”³¹

It is undoubtedly the revolutionary role that Algeria played in the development and promotion of the oil industry within the developing countries that allowed the young state to lead the oil producing countries and that culminated in its admission to OPEC on 23 May 1970. On 7 January 1973, the Secretary-General of OPEC, Al-Amine al-Khan, an Algerian national, was appointed in Vienna.

While OPEC evolved to have the monopoly of the oil market, and, hence, the privilege of fixing oil prices, conditions in the oil producing countries improved to some extent. The acute increase of oil prices provoked concern and discontent in the West, which ultimately led to the emergence of competition in oil production. Oil production developed in the North Sea, Alaska, and Mexico,³² balancing, hence, the international production levels and retrieving the monopoly from OPEC.

4. Oil as an Instrument in Boumedienne's Foreign Policy:

In an effort to bridge the gap between Algerian politics and economics, President Houari Boumedienne succeeded in combining political aspiration with economic interests. For the Algerian leader, a national independent economy meant the liquidation of foreign interests in the country. Socialism was the economic behaviour to follow in order to guarantee that the economy of the country was structured in a way to serve the nation's interests. It was in this context that a deep scrutiny of the Boumedienist decision making process and outcomes in the energy field lead us to the assumption that Boumedienne's oil policy unfolded different aspects of economic and political aspirations. Oil was a commodity that allowed the Algerian President to implement his development ambitions and, by the same token, respond to his ideological beliefs and convictions, thus allowing him to strengthen and consolidate his status in the country.

To begin with, the development strategy was based upon the comprehensive utilisation of oil, as it guaranteed the provision of vital financing and contributed to equipment, support of the industry and the edification of the economy. For these reasons, oil was almost indispensable, in order to meet the needs of a rapidly growing consumption and also to sustain the development of an industry that originated from the oil exporting countries. In an attempt to alter the relationship of these countries with the outside world, President Houari Boumedienne mentioned that: "Oil would constitute, very shortly, the one and only asset that would help compensate handicaps that weighed heavily on the competitiveness of the international market."³³

This argument was strongly defended by the President Houari Boumedienne at the First Summit of the Oil Exporting Countries. It highlighted the extent to which oil constituted an instrument to achieve economic and industrial revival, not only at a national level but also on a regional scale. A good example was the case of the National Company for Research, Production, Transport, Transformation and Commercialisation of the Hydrocarbons '*Société Nationale pour*

la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures' (Sonatrach), which became, after nationalisation: "the cornerstone of the industrial development policies pursued by the government in the 1970s. The state company built up enough technical expertise and managerial skill to deal with the various aspects of petroleum operations."³⁴ It is possible to assume that this state-owned company was the direct instrument to implement the leadership goals.

This appeared to be clearer upon examining the different steps through which Sonatrach had gradually gained more influence, hence, allowing the state to get even closer to their targets whether political or economic. A degree of state manipulation was slightly sensed upon examination of the gradual attribution of privileges to this state-controlled company. An understanding of Sonatrach's development and steady progress demonstrated the tortuous, slow but sure move of the government to monopolise the whole hydrocarbon sectors.

Following its creation in 1963, Sonatrach saw its horizons widen and by 1966 it was attributed a new status in accordance with the decree 66-296 of 22 September 1966.³⁵ This shifted its centre of interests and activities from transport and commercialisation, as it was assigned under the decree 63-401 of 31 December 1963, to all sectors of the oil and gas industry. In August 1967, all nationalised goods under the decree 67-164 and 67-165 of 24 August 1967 were transferred to Sonatrach as a result of the decree 67-166 dated 24 August 1967.³⁶ In other words, all nationalised goods, interests and actions of the companies Esso Standard Algérie, Esso Africa and Esso Saharienne, were transferred to Sonatrach. Similarly, in May 1968, the state attributed the mission of managing all petrochemical and petroleum products distribution to Sonatrach, as stated in the decree 68-131 dated 13 May 1968. This enacted the transfer of all nationalised goods³⁷ under the ordinance 68-117 to 68-130 of 13 May 1968 to Sonatrach.³⁸ The inevitable total recovery of the hydrocarbon sector was due to occur following the issue of the decree 71-64 dated 24 February 1971,³⁹ by which the Algerian government transferred all concessions for the exploitation of hydrocarbons and gas to Sonatrach, along with the network of pipelines nationalised earlier. No later than 12 April 1971, the system of concessions was abolished⁴⁰ and Sonatrach was to become the ultimately strong share holder with 51% at any contractual transaction.

The fact that all nationalised goods were transferred to Sonatrach and that it was a national company that was controlled by the state, simply meant that all nationalised goods were controlled by the state.

This showed the extent to which Sonatrach, embedded plainly as a national company, was used by the state to embody an institutionalised professional organism and act as a vehicle for the state's decisions. In retrospect, the state was the ultimate institution to benefit from any gains or profitability. In a study carried out by Bechtel international, it is mentioned that the state benefited from the gains 'cash flow', realised by Sonatrach.⁴¹

National companies did not always aim at promoting economic values and, sometimes, they were bound by political obligations, as indicated by Ghorban:

“The difference between a national oil company and international oil companies in this respect is that the involvement of the former in the oil business is primarily based on serving the interest of one country, while the latter’s activities are motivated by their profitable growth on a global basis. Any evolution of the activities of the national oil companies must give due consideration to the political nature of the problem rather than be based on the model of the international oil companies.”⁴²

Accordingly, President Houari Boumedienne’s oil policy portrayed the state as the only actor, acting in favour of national interest. Yet, this control was assumed, indirectly, through a national company assigned to take up the state’s decisions and bound to comply by a state-owned economy.

Ghorban goes further by asserting that:

“The national oil companies of oil producing countries were not established for economic reasons or out of market reasons or out of market necessity following fundamental changes in the petroleum industry. They were mostly developed as a reaction of their government to the operations of multinational oil-companies or as a result of nationalization acts.”⁴³

However, we cannot assume that Sonatrach was established for reasons other than economic. We could argue that, further to its role in promoting and developing the oil industry, it assisted the state in its development policies, which aimed at establishing strong and sound basis for the economy. Sonatrach undoubtedly contributed to the recovery of the state’s sovereignty over its hydrocarbons and natural resources. It was not only an elemental component of the oil-industry but also a rudiment of the Algerian’s economic development. Sonatrach was ultimately going to be the vehicle of many state decisions with regard to the oil industry, thus conveying an economic as well as a political message to the outside world.

Similarly, Hartshorn considered the thought that:

“Governments in most countries nowadays are intervening in the affairs of the oil industry, and seeking to bring its activities into line with ‘national policies’: and perhaps they inevitably must. This is not to say that their policies are sensible, or likely individually or in concatenation to lead to the optimum development of oil and another energy resources. But this industry cannot escape a large degree of political involvement: this is a ‘penalty of greatness’ for it in the economies that it supports, serves and enriches.”⁴⁴

On the other hand, if ideology is a cover that policy makers utilise to hide their inspiration for power and gain public support (especially in dictatorships or governments resulting from

military coups), it would not be wrong to maintain, at first sight, that Boumedienne's ideological stances, reflected in his government's oil policy, were genuinely a device to strengthen his position in the government and within the public in particular, as well as in the international arena.

According to the argument brought forward by Alan Carter:

“Moreover, oil-rich states possess sufficient economic strength for them to be neither ‘satellites’ nor ‘dependent states’. Hence, they can afford to be far more explicit in their opposition to imperialism than weaker states who are dependent upon the activities of transnationals or ‘metropolitan’ military aid. An oil-rich state has the luxury of being free not only to denounce the West and all its values, but also to employ the anti-imperialist opposition that is thereby generated to enhance its position with respect to its own people and render its internal control more secure.”⁴⁵

This argument could apply to Algeria to a certain degree. Considering the rank it occupied world wide as an oil-producing and exporting country, and the determination and intransigence its leadership expressed against exploiting powers of the North, we would probably disagree with Alan Carter. In such instances, oil policy was an instrument to convey ideological approaches. Nevertheless, this argument could be treated as a two-way door, where it could also be argued that leaders' beliefs and convictions were used to implement some policy outcomes.

Boumedienne's awareness of the strategic and economic value of the Sahara's oil to France prompted him to use this particular point to his advantage and blackmail the West in his favour, especially with the strategic role played by Algeria as an oil provider during the 1970s.

Likewise, the country's strategy in the international arena, with respect to hydrocarbons, was tuned to respond to regional ideological duties and principles towards the Arab world, notably the Palestinian problem. This was indubitably sensed in the use of oil as a weapon to fight any anti-Arab aggressions, especially the decision to use oil as a political arm in order to slash pro-Israeli positions and assist the Palestinian cause in ending the suffering of the Palestinian people. That is to say that in the framework of existing oil policy, ideology constituted a high profile in Algeria's oil strategies and decisions at an international level.

Nevertheless, Boumedienne's oil policy went well beyond the ideological pledge of freeing the economic sector from the colonialist spectrum. There was more to the new regime's attitude towards the hydrocarbon sector than loyalty to emotional commitments. Especially during the first years of economic planning and development, this featured some kind of tinged pragmatism in the Three-Year Plan. For instance, while the Arab- Israeli war of 1967 resulted in a limited Arab embargo imposed on Anglo-Saxon oil companies, Algeria's government was less hasty, rather vigilant and very watchful. The Algerian authorities impounded British and American companies and appointed Nouredine Aït-Laoussine to manage them as the government's Commissioner in charge. They then nationalised the refining and marketing interests of both Esso and Mobil two months later, on 24 August 1967. Aïssaoui described the

course of action undertaken by the government as “cautious”; he explained that the control imposed by the authorities on American and British companies “was aimed at sending a signal to the Americans, since companies with upstream interests were not affected.”⁴⁶ It is this kind of particular cautiousness and forethought before acting that leads us to suggest pragmatism in President Houari Boumedienne’s course of actions, especially when the matter was concerned with oil, a highly sensitive component of Algeria’s development plans.

It appears, hence, that oil was used by President Houari Boumedienne in his anti-imperialist fight and attempts to rid the southern hemisphere from neo-colonialism. Likewise, oil has been an extraordinary element in Boumedienne’s personal objectives to strengthen his positions within his cabinet and his people.

For instance, the War of June 1967 did not only mark a turning point in Arab-Western relationship but it also provoked national disarray and discontent within the Arab world. In the case of Algeria, it provided the most appropriate occasion to put into effect some remaining revolutionary prospects i.e. the recovery of national resources. Indeed, Algeria could not find a better opportunity to fight colonialism and take back what had always belonged to the country. In other words, the War of 1967 unfolded some aspects of President Houari Boumedienne’s policy orientations. These included the ideological orientation of his policy and the strong Arab and Islamic character of his beliefs, which urged him to join the Arabs in their fight against Zionism. This was also the case following the 1973 War, which was described by Sayigh as follows: “The Arab-Israeli war of October 1973, with all the dramatic and historical events and changes it brought with it in the fields of oil economics and power relationships, had intervened, and with it a severe tightening in the oil market.”⁴⁷ Moreover, oil was not only used to serve Arab interest but the Third world as well. President Houari Boumedienne explicitly postulated at the Islamic Conference in Lahore on 23 February 1974 that:

“The oil battle is part of a larger and comprehensive fight that was the fight for raw materials and natural resources. This battle addresses the huge gap and the relationship between the industrialised countries and the developing countries.”⁴⁸

President Houari Boumedienne’s Arab-Islamic and Third Worldist orientations on this occasion did shape the formulation of his foreign policy in the oil industry so as to serve Arab interests. At the same time, his oil policy was utilised to promote his convictions and beliefs. Somehow ideology was not only a mere justification for actions but was also of high value and it embedded the principles and convictions of Algeria. In fact, these principles and convictions had given Algeria an international character and had strengthened in the same time, the regime’s position within the masses.

Notes:

¹ Chakib Khelil, Conférence Debat De M. Chakib Khelil: Ministre de l'Energie et des Mines, Président Générale de SONATRACH au Centre de Presse d'El Moudjahid, Samedi 19 Avril 2003, Sonatrach audiovisuel. 2hrs10mn.

² Alan Gelb and Associates, Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 37.

³ Sonatrach, Geological Structures and Estimation of Oil and Gas in the Sahara in Algeria (Algiers: Sonatrach, 1971), 251.

⁴ Chems-Eddine Chitour, La Politique et le Nouvel Ordre Pétrolier International (Algiers: Dahlab, 1995), 460.

⁵ Alan B Carter, Marx. A Radical Critique (Sussex: Wheatsheaf Books Ltd, 1988), 227.

⁶ Hamid Mazri, op.cit. 45.

⁷ Benyoucef Ben Khedda, Les accords d'Evian (Algiers: Office des Publications Universitaires, 2002), 105-106.

⁸ Mustapha Mekideche, Le Secteur des Hydrocarbures (Alger: Office des Publications Universitaires, 1983), 2.

⁹ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Ministère de l'Orientation Nationale, Politique Economique du Gouvernement: Expose de Bachir Boumaza devant l'Assemblée Nationale le 30 Décembre 1963 (Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1963), 23.

¹⁰ Bachir Boumaza, La Politique Pétrolière de l'Algérie (Déclaration du frère Bachir Boumaza ministre de l'Economie nationale, 1963), 48.

¹¹ Bachir Boumaza, op. cit. (30 Décembre1963), 57.

¹² République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, "Session extraordinaire de l'assemblée générale des Nations Unies", Révolution Africaine, 12-18 April, 28.

¹³ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumedienne:19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome VII (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 108.

¹⁴ The accords of 29 July 1965 were put into effect as early as the 30 September 1965.

¹⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Energie, Accord entre la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire et la République Française: Concernant le règlement de questions touchant les hydrocarbures et le développement industriel de l'Algérie signe a Alger, le 29 Juillet 1965 (Alger 1965), 10.

¹⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Energie, Accord entre la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire et la République Française: Concernant le règlement de questions touchant les hydrocarbures et le développement industriel de l'Algérie signe a Alger, le 29 Juillet 1965 (Alger 1965), 27.

¹⁷ Mustapha Mekideche, op. cit. 8.

¹⁸ Rabah Mahiout, Le Pétrole Algérien (Alger: ENAP, 1974), 149.

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- ¹⁹ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, “Session extraordinaire de l’assemblée générale des Nations Unies”, Révolution Africaine, 12-18 April, 34.
- ²⁰ Interview by the author with Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, on the 28/12/2003, at the Senate in Algiers (*Conseil de la Nation*).
- ²¹ Joe Stork, Middle East Oil and the Energy Crisis (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1975), 88.
- ²² James M. Griffin and David J. Teece, “Introduction,” in James M. Griffin and David J. Teece (eds.), OPEC Behavior and World Oil Prices (London: George Allen&Unwin, 1982), 1.
- ²³ Shukri Ghanem, OPEC: The Rise and Fall of an Exclusive Club (London: Kegan Paul International, 1986), 61.
- ²⁴ George Daly, James M. Griffin, Henry B. Steel, “Recent Oil Price Escalations: Implications for OPEC Stability,” in James M. Griffin and David J. Teece (eds.), OPEC Behavior and World Oil Prices (London: George Allan & Unwin, 1982), 154.
- ²⁵ Rabah Mahiout, *op. cit.* 219.
- ²⁶ The nationalisation of ESSO and MOBIL.
- ²⁷ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Présidence, Interview du Président Houari Boumediene : 2-12-1974/ 15-1-1975/31-1-1975, 39.
- ²⁸ Président Houari Boumediene, Premier Sommet des Pays Exportateurs de Pétrole (Alger:1975), 7
- ²⁹ El Moudjahid, 25 Janvier 1975, 6.
- ³⁰ Ali A. Attiga, The Arabs and the Oil Crisis 1973-1986 (Kuwait: Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries, 1987), 75.
- ³¹ Ali Aïsaoui, Algeria: The Political Economy of Oil and Gas (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 14.
- ³² Chems-Eddine Chitour, *op. cit.* 53.
- ³³ Président Houari Boumediene, Premier Sommet des Pays Exportateurs de Pétrole (Alger:1975), 3.
- ³⁴ Ali Aïssaoui, *op. cit.* 203.
- ³⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère de l’Industrie et de l’Energie, “Décret du 06 Septembre 1966,” Journal Officiel, 30 Septembre 1966, 939.
- ³⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère de l’Industrie et de l’Energie, “Décret 67-166 du 24 Août 1967,” Journal Officiel, 29 Août 1967, 715.
- ³⁷ This included the nationalisation of shares and interests of companies.
- ³⁸ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère de l’Industrie et de l’Energie, “Décret 68-131 du 13 Mai 1968,” Journal Officiel, 14 Mai 1968, 396.
- ³⁹ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire Ministère. de l’Industrie et de l’Energie. “Décret 71-65 du 24 Février 1971,” Journal Officiel, 25 Février 1967, 229.

⁴⁰République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Ministère de l'Industrie et de l'Energie. "Décret 71-99 du 12 Avril 1971," Journal Officiel, du 13 Avril 1971, 369.

⁴¹Bechtel International, Plan de Développement des Hydrocarbures en Algérie: Perspectives financière 1976-2005 (Sonatrach, 1977), 5-19.

⁴² N. Ghorban, "National Oil Companies with reference to the Middle East: 1900-1973," in Ferrier R.W and Furesenko A (eds.), Oil in the World Economy, (London: Routledge, 1989), 23.

⁴³ Ibid. 24.

⁴⁴ J. E. Hartshorn, Oil Companies and Governments: An Account of the International Oil Industry in its Political Environment (London: Faber and Faber, 1962), 190.

⁴⁵ Alan Carter, "The Nation State and Underdevelopment," Third World Quarterly 6 (December 1995): 612.

⁴⁶ Ali Aïssaoui, op. cit. 75.

⁴⁷ Yusif A. Sayigh, Arab Oil Policies in the 1970s: Opportunity and Responsibility (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 54.

⁴⁸ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne : 2 Juwilya 1973 - 3 December 1974, Part V(Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 150.

Chapter Seven

Third Worldism in Algeria's Foreign Policy.

1. The Thrust of Algeria's Third World Policy:

From an ideological perspective, it is hardly acceptable and rather controversial to exclude Algeria (under President Houari Boumedienne) from the socialist bloc, if one were to classify the countries into capitalist, socialist and Non-Aligned groups. This is especially true, if taking into account Algeria's strong and outspoken socialist drive under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership. Yet, Algeria led a bold struggle within the Non-Aligned movement in the international arena; President Houari Boumedienne's socialist orientations were rather polemical when advocating his leniency towards Non-Alignment values. In order to lift ambiguity, one needs to draw a line between Algeria's economic policy that embraced socialist values and its foreign policy that was purely Non-Aligned. Accordingly, the classification of Algeria depends on the criteria applied to its categorisation.

It may be appropriate to apply the McCall Power Model to explain Algeria's Third Worldism, as it was not only an oil producing country and a member of OPEC but also a country that was fighting its way out of underdevelopment.

McCall suggested a different scheme that pictured the Third World differently. He referred to it as the Power Model, which was inspired from the Chinese Model,¹ in which world order has three worlds. The First World in the Power Model included the most powerful countries such as the United States and the Soviet Union. The Second World was the industrialised World and the Third World was the primary producing world. The Power Model, however, encompassed a Fourth World that was viewed to be a non static ethno-minority. McCall established that:

“In the Power model, the Second World is made up of the developed satellites of the superpowers, with Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the same category as France and Sweden. Whatever their overt politics, these industrialised countries align themselves in trade and politics on a day-to-day basis and are dependent upon their relations with the superpowers. The Third World, then, is made up of the primary producing, largely unindustrialised former colonial possessions of the First and Second Worlds. Countries in the Third World, according to the Power model, rely heavily upon the export of raw materials for their wealth and are usually heavy importers of manufactured goods.”²

Nevertheless, it is within an economic context that a definition of the Third World would incorporate Algeria within the Middle Income developing countries. In accordance with a Third World concept of a more economic overtone, Algeria would join the Middle Income developing

countries, with a population of 16.2 million, an estimated average annual growth of 1.7% between 1960 and 1976 and a GNP of US\$ 990. It also had an average annual growth of production evaluated at 10.1% between 1960 and 1975, and an average annual rate of inflation of 2.3% between 1960-70 and 14.8% between 1970 and 1976.³

Algeria displayed a growing industrial base with plans for urbanisation and modernisation. Yet, a complete transition into modern economies and a democratic shift had not been completed. Algeria's records under President Houari Boumedienne highlighted broad changes, steady development and economic revival. The progress accomplished by Algeria between 1965 and 1978, and the threefold reforms launched, as part of the continuity of revolution, were rather impressive and unprecedented. They shed light on the will of the ruling elite in undergoing the necessary adjustments in a fluctuating economic world in order to step out of the underdevelopment circles. However, the newly independent state could still not compete with industrialised countries. Algeria was one country amongst others to face Third World economic disadvantages and social scourges.

Algeria's underdevelopment problem has been primarily encrusted in the social culture of the state. It naturally flowed from the years of colonialism that held back the country's social structure and economic infrastructure. In his definition of the nature of the Third World states, Carter theorised about these countries as falling within a framework of former colonies of advanced states.⁴ Similarly, Haque explained that:

“First, the social formation in most postcolonial developing nations is such that they inherited an advanced administrative system and a relatively backward economy at the same time. The very process of colonialism required an advanced bureaucratic apparatus to expand control over raw materials and cheap labor, maintain law and order, and ensure tax collection. Thus, bureaucratic advancement and economic backwardness went hand in hand.”⁵

It is important to understand at this stage that underdevelopment and economic backwardness were very natural results of the century of colonisation endured by Algeria. Interaction was absent from Algeria's political agenda. In fact, Algeria was kept in complete isolation by the French coloniser. This isolation served the colonialist intention to ensure the continuity of Algeria's reliance on France. It also kept Algeria from modernisation waves and, hence, it ensured continuous French domination over Algeria.

Moreover, in most ex-colonies, colonialism reappeared under a different cover, that is neo-colonialism, which greatly affected progress in the economics of the newly independent states and ensured their dependency on the imperialist world.

The contrast between the North and the South was and still is, for some countries, very strong. The deploring situation and aggravating disparities between the North and the South clearly imply the existence of a major stumbling block in the politics of these countries. Wallerstein advocated a cultural hypothesis seen by the capitalist world as a moral justification to explain

the ongoing obstacles that slow the process of modernisation in these countries and explained that:

“The seesaw of ideological explanation then continues into the hypothetical future. Since all states can develop, how can the underdeveloped develop? In some way, by copying those who already have, that is, by adopting the universal culture of the modern world, with the assistance of those who are more advanced.”⁶

In other words, the capitalist world blamed the absence of progress on a racist attitude in rejecting modern values. In the case of Algeria, adopting the universal culture of the modern industrialised world would mean the adherence to capitalist values, which totally contradicted the revolutionary values of the War of Liberation and went against the country’s socialist orientation. Wallerstein portrayed such a trend of thinking as a tight system of justification, since it denied the reality by blaming the victims.

In this respect, Sartre advocated a predominant trend of thinking in the Algerian society. This prevailed in post-independence Algerian society. Sartre introduced a psychological pattern in the Algerian individual that is an inferiority complex and a sense of sub humanism with regards to the coloniser. He commented that:

“...the problem is finally, psychological: you remember De Man and his ‘inferiority complex’ of the working class. He had discovered at the same time the key to the ‘native character’: maltreated, malnourished, illiterate, the Algerian has an inferiority complex with regard to his masters.”⁷

Kamrava shed light on the political culture of a nation-state. He believed that political culture⁸ was a common denominator between countries despite their different political systems, level of economic affluence, and military or diplomatic orientation as an important pattern in distinguishing Third World countries. He further attested, more specifically, that the similarity lay in levels of political cultures’ social acceptance and popular resonance, and apparently, he believed that a new classification of the international state system could be based upon the nature and type of relationship between various states and their societies.⁹ Algeria would fit, henceforth, within the group of countries that shrewdly met the description of a quasi democratic system in which the state-society gap was bridged by little more than an institutional façade of democracy, according to Kamrava’s classification of political culture in the Third World.

From another point of view, Worsley pointed to a political ideological classification in terms of the social System where the world gathers a First Capitalist World and a Second Communist World. Besides, there is an alternative taxonomy of economic development which contrast ‘rich’ and ‘poor’ leading, consequently, to a fourfold combination.¹⁰ Wolf-Phillips, on the other hand, conceived Non-Alignment along the concept of wealth versus poverty. Clearly, the

McCall Power Model's classification of the world evoked power as an instrument of influence and supremacy over the less powerful entities, where the stronger exerted power over the weaker. It is, henceforth, hardly incorrect to apply Algeria's Third World drive to a Power Model, where Algeria would fit within the category of primary producing countries and former colonies.

The intriguing failure of the governments of the Third World countries to eliminate major impediments that prevented the achievement of development draws attention to undeniable shortcomings in national policies.

In the case of Algeria, the concentration of power within the hands of the military led to a stagnation of political development and institutions, creating a rather centralised military system and undermining political development via a distortion of democracy. This destabilised the effective implementation of democracy and disbanded political parties. Having a military leadership to run the politics of Algeria contributed to the augmentation and development of a vegetative, inappropriate bureaucracy that resulted from the political inappropriateness of the military and led to the prevailing of authoritarianism. This, consequently, concealed the modernisation process. Haque discussed military intervention in politics and highlighted the vicious cycle of political underdevelopment created as a result of a military emphasis on strong state apparatus, order, professionalism and discipline, and turned a blind eye to political mobilization, pluralism and spontaneity. That is to say that the weak political system encouraged and enabled military bureaucracy to intervene in politics and to perpetuate political underdevelopment.¹¹

In this context, Panagariya suggested two major characteristics inextricably related to the existing asymmetry between the developing and the developed worlds, the first of which was the bargaining power exercised by developed and developing countries. In the case of developing countries, the bargaining power is more limited due to the weaker position it occupied in the world market and the sizable number it constituted with a very large gap in incomes and various types of regime. The second discrepancy lay in the asymmetries in research and strategic thinking which, in the view of Panagariya, did not benefit from an adequate investment of resources.¹² With a view to stepping forward on an international political level, Nyerere put forward a pragmatic ideal to overcome the prejudices of an imbalanced bargaining power. He encouraged countries to perceive economic dependency as an obstacle against complete independence and to learn to negotiate by initially setting objectives and then adjusting positions so as to give room for compromise and move forward towards the objectives.¹³ Nyerere was probably right and his assumption was conceived by President Houari Boumedienne, who strongly denounced economic dependency and undertook the necessary measures to rid those aspects from Algeria's national economy. President Houari Boumedienne often reiterated:

“Our sovereignty can not be complete if our economies still depend on foreign influence. We can not guarantee our independence and recover our dignity if our economic basis are precarious and dominated by foreigners.”¹⁴

Furthermore, pragmatism was not inexistent in Algeria’s interaction with the rest of the world. Suffice to say at this stage that, being a country of the Southern Hemisphere was the first catalyst that triggered Algeria’s interest with issues of the Third World. Moreover, Algeria’s growing anti-imperialist and anti-colonial values within its principles of continuity of the revolution, prompted the leader to defend the cause of the Third World, particularly that Algeria’s economic traits were purely Third Worldist.

2. Algeria and the Non-Alignment Movement:

The onset of Third Worldism in a bipolar world initiated a new dimension in international politics. This embedded the seductive embrace of underdeveloped countries to a policy of Non-Alignment. This policy followed neither the United States, leading the capitalist world, nor the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which was witnessing a wave of revolution. It was thought to be aspiring to defending countries belonging to the underdeveloped sphere and was steering their politics and economics towards development and progress. Non-Aligned countries were newly independents which, despite the flurry of two major poles after the end of World War Two, did not belong to either the capitalist or the socialist poles.

Although different scholars had different definitions of Third Worldism, most of them agreed on the principles and the emergence of Third Worldism. Put in the words of Berger, Third Worldism’s emergence was as follows:

“After Bandung, ‘Third Worldism’, as it was articulated by its main nationalists proponents, such as Nehru and Suakarno, meant that the governments of the ‘Third World’ sought, at least rhetorically, to chart a political and economic path between liberal capitalism of the ‘First World’ and the ‘state socialism’ of the ‘Second World’.”¹⁵

Nigel Harris similarly described the Asian-African conference of 1955 as a major turning point in the world order.¹⁶ From another perspective, Willets explained the factors that spurred the holding of the first Non-Aligned Summit Conference which brought the Non-Aligned countries together. Among these factors was the significance attached to African issues in the 1960s.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the general assumption of Non-Alignment carried, in essence, a taste of open-mindedness and detachment which, in a bipolar world, would refer to the existing leading ideologies. Non-Alignment as an ideology evolved within an environment devoted to the protection and defence of the least favoured countries in the world system. This also included the promotion of the principles of self-determination, freedom, liberation and the elimination of imperialism and exploitation.

Algeria's striving in the Movement of the Non-Aligned represented a fight for the Third World and a struggle for survival. The ambitions of President Houari Boumedienne for the Third World were fuelled with a wish to establish international security and world-peace. Most importantly, in an era where the rivalries of the Cold War culminated in a peaceful coexistence, President Houari Boumedienne's primary concern was to prevent Third World countries from the consequences of an eventual transfer of tensions and to strongly defend the genuine right of Third World countries to contribute to the international decision making system. It is within this context that President Houari Boumedienne's multiple diplomatic efforts were oriented, in an attempt to promote Third World rights. President Houari Boumedienne believed that:

“The movement of the Non-Aligned is necessary for the establishment of a balance in the world, as it constitutes the voice of the Third World. The movement of the Non –Aligned is an organisation intended to defend Third World countries interests and rights.”¹⁸

The rationale of President Houari Boumedienne's thinking rested upon the reality that the underdeveloped world had realised the existentialist relations with the industrialised world. In other words, the reality proved that developed countries prosperity and progress depended, to some extent, on the developing countries. The inequality and injustice that characterised the organisation of the world was the result of an unfair international system. Following an increasing number of newly-independent countries, Algeria sturdily opposed the outdated character of the international system, which was governed by regulations enacted in the absence of the newly independent states. It was imperative to initiate a new international system that would allow Third World countries to contribute effectively and give birth to a new world where the developing countries could take an effective role in its construction and establishment. President Houari Boumedienne declared:

“Not only industrialised countries need us, their future depends on the Third world. If these countries constitute a market of technicians, Third World countries constitute a market of raw material and manpower. In other words, the industrialised world needs to export its products as much as it needs to buy raw materials. Therefore, our contribution is essential in order to maintain the prosperity of the industrialised countries. Accordingly, we can not accept to be treated and considered as a minority in this world. We are a strong force and we have a lot to say in international forums. Our fight aims at highlighting the existing complementarities between Third World countries and industrialised countries and intends to establish equilibrium in the international economic order.”¹⁹

The Third World was aware of the importance it constituted as a market for raw materials and consequently realised that it was a key actor in the international market. It is within this mould of thoughts that President Houari Boumedienne aimed at altering the international interaction. He asserted, at the opening of the VI Arab Summit held on 28 November 1973:

“The industrialised countries are in a dire need to the developing countries. Their prosperity relies on the South. Consequently, if the North was considered to be a market for expertise and technical experts, the South was a market for manpower, raw materials and equipment supplies. Likewise, it was necessary for the industrial world to export its product as much as it needed to buy the Third World’s exports. Moreover, progress in the North depends, to a large extent, on the contribution by the South.”²⁰

Nonetheless, in an era of Cold War, Algeria supported peaceful coexistence and peace, as long as these elements were not restricted to certain countries only. Peaceful coexistence, according to President Houari Boumedienne, needed to allow all nations to be independent and determine their own way of development, with no pressures or foreign interference. Yet, the reality proved that peaceful coexistence, as probed by the West, was limited to the Superpowers, which were aiming to avoid a nuclear confrontation while still exploiting the developing countries. In an interview with the Egyptian Radio-Television, President Houari Boumedienne asserted:

“It is imperative for the Third World to fight in order to evade the ideological rivalry and the two blocs’ challenges. The Third World Non-Alignment was, hence, a coalition towards economic development, total disarmament, broad peaceful coexistence and the respect of the sovereignty and liberty of all the peoples.”²¹

The Algerian President believed that the role of the Non-Aligned countries was to guarantee their national independences and their development so as to complement and reinforce their sovereignty. It also constituted the support of liberation movements and a fight against Zionism and racial discrimination, and all forms of military and political interferences. Non-Alignment was as a struggle to overcome foreign economic pressures and all forms of oppression, neo-colonialism and imperialism. Besides, it was imperative for Non-Alignment to avoid bloc challenges and disputes, through the removal of all military bases and a focus on international cooperation, which would be based on total equality and the democracy of international relations.

In truth, the establishment of international security was based on respect of national independences and the freedom of the people. In view of that, President Houari Boumedienne supported liberation movements and condemned all forms of colonialism and imperialism in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. Genuine peace and real development, for President Houari Boumedienne, was to be based on an ending of ‘world protectorate’. Furthermore, peace in the Third World did not only involve the elimination of direct colonialism and racial segregation but also the eradication of imperialist influences and interferences. The necessity for radical changes was urgent, and a solution to the undergoing exploitation and oppression had to be found. Third World countries needed to rely on their potential and mobilise their material and human resources and invest the available energies in their interest. This was needed, at a time when international trade regulations were endorsed to serve the interests of the industrialised

countries, while marginalising Third World countries. This international situation had provoked an evolving progress for developed countries, in parallel with escalating regression and poverty within the developing world.

It is in this context, that at the fourth Conference of Heads of State and Governments of the Non-Aligned countries, held in Algiers from 5 to 9 September 1973, President Houari Boumedienne insisted on reviewing the regulations of international law with respect to the new available facts i.e. the increasing number of Third World and newly independent countries. He explicitly claimed peoples' natural right to recover control over their natural resources and to be freely able to dispose of their energies, with no foreign pressure or intrusion. On 6 December 1973, the United Nations General Assembly adopted Resolution 3082 (XXVIII), which reaffirmed a conviction in the urgent need to establish and improve norms of universal application for the development of international economic relations and decided to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-ninth session an item entitled "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States."²²

The fourth summit of the Non-Aligned, hosted by Algeria, gave the movement a fresher start and stronger position in the international system, as it reiterated the will of the Third World to alter the prevailing inequalities and modify the status quo that resulted from the ambitious intentions of the West.

Most importantly, the Conference culminated in an agreement on mass-disarmament and requested a ban on nuclear experiments and on the production of chemical and biological weapons, and called for an effective contribution of Third World countries to the process of decision making.

In the spirit of action, President Houari Boumedienne's astounding contribution to the cause of the Non-Aligned countries was well crystallised in the fourth extraordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly, that was presided over by Algeria and which took place on 9 April-2 May 1974 in New York. Algeria had presented a memo entitled '*Le Pétrole, les matières de base et le développement.*' In his speech of 10 April 1974, President Houari Boumedienne discussed many sensitive issues that were somehow taboo in the developing countries and that hardly any of the developing countries dared to confront the West about. The president of the Non-Aligned described the current economic order (of the 1970s) as: "unjust, outdated and as an obstacle to development." The President's speech revolved around the recovery of natural resources by the developing countries. This involved a fight over the issue of fixing the prices of raw materials. President Houari Boumedienne also supported the idea of a dialogue, based on fair and equal considerations, unlike the Washington Conference which took place in February 1974 and which was more like a confrontation than a dialogue. Besides, President Houari Boumedienne suggested a strategy of development that encompassed five major actions to undertake. The first measure was the recovery by the developing countries of their natural resources, which, secondly, implied a process of nationalisation aiming at ultimate

control over their prices; the third measure called for the initiation of a coherent and integrated development programme that would absorb agricultural potentialities and put into effect a thorough industry, in order to mobilise support and solidarity from the international community i.e. from rich developed countries. The fourth measure intended to suppress or alleviate developing countries' incumbent burdens that annihilated all efforts for development. The fifth measure was to elaborate a special programme for the less-developed countries destined to provide the deprived nations with support and assistance.²³ It is clear that the rationale for President Houari Boumedienne's approach to interaction with the North was based upon cooperation and finding ways of rapprochement so as to alleviate the existing North-South gap. The fourth Extraordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly was undoubtedly a turning point in the history of international economic relations as it opened up new horizons for the world economic interaction

In the twenty-ninth ordinary session of the United Nations General Assembly, presided over by Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa, a 'Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States' was adopted by the General Assembly, on 12 December 1974, during the 2315th plenary meeting, in accordance with Resolution 3821(XXIX). This Charter portrayed the determination to promote collective economic security for development, particularly in developing countries, and the need for strengthening international cooperation. It solemnly proclaimed the inalienable right of every state to "*freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.*"²⁴

Algeria's outstanding support for, and membership in the Movement of the Non-Aligned, embedded its call for a New International Economic System and its relentless efforts to establish generally accepted norms to govern the development of international economic relations on fair and equitable grounds. It also called for establishing a just and stable world system, where all countries have protected rights and, hence, guarantees for international economic and social security by insuring friendly cooperation between the states. Algeria's relentless diplomatic efforts in promoting Third World countries rights were embedded in its several contributions and calls for changes. This granted the country the title 'Pole of the Third World'.²⁵

In 1966, the General assembly decided to establish the Industrial Development Board, functioning as an autonomous organisation. This had the purpose of promoting industrial development and encouraging the mobilisation of national and international resources to assist in the industrialisation of the developing countries. In accordance with Resolution 2152 (XXI), adopted by the General assembly on 17 November 1966, during its 1468th plenary meeting at its 21st session, Algeria was designated a member of list A of the industrial board.²⁶

Meanwhile, Algeria's persistent pioneering for the Non-Aligned was not restricted to its stupendous interventions in the UN and the Movement of the-Non Alignment. Algeria, represented by Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa, headed the first Conference of Ministers of member

countries of the Group of 77 which took place in Algiers in October 1967. Moreover, Algeria's continuous determination to stand up for the developing world was also prominent in the Second Islamic Conference that was held in Lahore in 1974. During this conference, on 23 February 1974, President Houari Boumedienne expressed his dissatisfaction with the increasing prices of manufactured products, in contrast with conditioned and stable low prices of raw materials which had damaging effects on the economies of the Third World. He called on Arab, Muslim and Non-Aligned countries to coordinate their efforts so as to find solutions and ways of cooperation.²⁷

Algeria was also a major actor among Third World countries in the framework of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. In March 1975, Algeria hosted the first Summit of Heads of State of the member countries of OPEC. During this Summit, President Houari Boumedienne reiterated his attachment to principles of international cooperation, based on equilibrium and interdependence of interests. He also reasserted the Non-Aligned unity of action in defence of common interests and depicted OPEC as a symbol for the Third World and humanity.²⁸ On this occasion, Algeria presented a memo on 4 March 1975, whereby it defended the right of the developing countries to utilise their own raw materials and natural resources to their own benefit.²⁹ Moreover, in a letter addressed to the General Secretary of the UN, Kurt Waldheim, and dated 2 October 1974, President Houari Boumedienne reaffirmed his conviction that:

“The only peaceful way to the issue of energies and raw materials is the establishment of a genuine international cooperation that would engender a radical transformation of the world economic structures, oriented towards progress and a harmonious settlement of current economic problems. It is of a paramount importance to eliminate all aspects of domination or exploitation so as to maintain peace and justice.”³⁰

What tends to be clear is Algeria's triumph in its pioneering for the achievement of radical changes in the international system which enabled it to occupy a leading position within the Non-Aligned Movement and to be heard at international forums for being the voice of the Third World. This victory was well embedded in the many resolutions adopted by the United Nations, in response to the needs of the underdeveloped world. For instance, the Resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and 3202(S-VI) of 1 May 1974 by the General Assembly, contained the Declaration and the Programme of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order.

Concomitantly, the fourth extraordinary session of the United Nations, which was presided over by Algeria and the major topic of which was raw materials and development, marked a turning point in the history of international economic relations.

However, this victory was only partial, considering that the North-South economic warfare proved the South to be stronger. Tomlinson explained that:

“Although Third World countries had a numerical majority in the United Nations General Assembly, their demand for a New International Economic Order was opposed by Western countries that controlled the IMF and the World Bank.”³¹

Under President Houari Boumedienne, Algeria was the Third World leading force for peace, security and development.

President Houari Boumedienne’s approach to the Cold War, by adopting a foreign policy of Non-Alignment, was meant to eschew any bandwagon behaviour in order to insulate Algeria from ongoing hostilities between the two blocs. Algeria’s foreign policy was moulded by ideological predilections that portrayed an antipathy to imperialism and neo-colonialism. The chief constituent of Algeria’s Non-Alignment policy was its regional ambitions to create a Third World front under a coherent strategy that balanced the interaction between the two poles and create the necessary conditions to unite against imperialism and economic dependence. In this context, President Houari Boumedienne’s policy of Non-Alignment *vis-à-vis* the two Superpowers, resembled Nehru’s foreign policy that aimed at insulating the region from Cold War hostilities and intended to cultivate the good neighbouring policy of Panchsheel³²(the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence), directed especially at China.³³

Algeria’s adoption of Non-Alignment as a foreign policy, under President Houari Boumedienne, was probably fuelled by his awareness of the necessity to nurture sound relations with both poles, especially at such an early stage of state-building. It also portrayed Algeria’s determination not to show any preferences towards any of the two Superpowers. It was a pragmatic measure which carried a rationale, not only to express any leniency towards a particular scale, but to ensure a balanced interaction through cooperation. In Boukara’s view, the Non-Aligned approach to foreign policy could not be accommodated with the call for an alliance for progressive Third World countries in the struggle against Western imperialist influence in the Third World.³⁴ Yet, one could argue that, adherence to Non-Alignment implied the imperativeness to support liberation movements in order to provide the necessary conditions for the promotion of a new international system where the poor and the rich were both benefiting from reciprocal interest and profit.

The criticism encountered by Non-Alignment could likewise apply to Algeria’s international interaction. Lassassi mentioned the divergence between the members in all aspects, including their political systems, economics, cultures, society and ideology.³⁵

However, critics of Algeria’s Non-Alignment go further, as Boukara mentioned that:

“Two explanations can be given to this enlargement of Algeria’s support to Third World countries and not just to national liberation movements. The first is that Algeria in the 1970s had established itself as the locomotive of third world countries in their struggle for their rights over natural resources and the establishment of a new international economic order. The second is that the number of national liberation movements in the world were decreasing as decolonisation

proceeded. In the absence of national liberation movements Algeria required a new issue to maintain its prestigious position in the third world, the best available choice was the call for third world rights.’³⁶

Ideology motivated President Houari Boumedienne’s initiatives and public proclamations in his pioneering for Third World countries. Accordingly, ideology provided Algeria’s foreign policy an opportunity to promote and expand the country’s ambitions and principles world-wide. It also permitted President Houari Boumedienne to accomplish, at an international level, what could be inherently beneficial to the Algerian state. This could be sensed in different areas, such as the call for a New International Economic Order and the fight for the right of the developing countries to control their natural resources and be able to fix their prices. Such decisions at the international level, undoubtedly, crystallised a determination to support the cause of development in the Third World but it also served Algeria’s national interest and economic development, considering that Algeria was a country of the Third World. Such decisions or international rulings, undertaken in favour of the developing world, constituted a step forward for the Third World and certainly a victory for Algeria.

Boumedienne’s intentions behind the adoption of Non-Alignment might have been purely ideological. In the same way, this policy had contributed to the promotion of his leadership around the continent and the Third World, and, most importantly, served both the Third World cause and the country’s interest by covering and justifying any policy actions.

3. Algeria’s efforts towards African Unity:

3.1 Algeria and the Organisation of African Unity:

Western imperialism had always held colonialist views on Africa. Being one of the richest continents in the world, Africa constituted an appropriate and ultimate prey for capitalist intentions. In fact, colonial rule in Africa had long been based on the exploitation of natural resources, slavery and racial discrimination which, in the long run, created essential conditions for any other straits of colonialism.

The creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in May 1963, following the historical meeting of Addis Ababa,³⁷ was preceded by the liberation of many African territories. This independence was typically very fragile and subject to outside interferences. It was also incomplete in some aspects, as economic independence would be totally or quasi-absent. These newly independent countries were, henceforth, at the initial stage of their state-building and policy orientation process. Most of them were still relying heavily on the ex-coloniser in the formulation of their national and foreign policy conduct, serving imperialist interests accordingly.

In order for African states to survive such a tenacious and a determined vicissitude of neo-colonialism, and so as to meet the requirements of an evolving economic era, it was necessary for African countries to combine efforts and make achievements of great political

transcendence, with views to change the fate of the African Continent and resist the challenges imposed by an atmosphere of Cold War.

The OAU aimed at eradicating and eliminating all sorts of discrimination and racism against Africans. It, hence, promoted a better life for the African peoples by coordinating and intensifying cooperation. The organisation also endeavoured to protect the integrity and sovereignty of all country members, and, equally, to free the whole Continent from the yoke of colonialism. In addition to that, it called for international cooperation, in accordance with the United Nations Charter and Human Rights, and insisted on the unity and solidarity of African states.³⁸

Zartman and Thompson suggested that:

“Although the Organisation of the African Unity is not the only place where norms are discussed in Africa, it is an apt forum for the conception, application, and testing of conventions. Indeed conference diplomacy since the late 1950s has been a far more important setting for doing intergovernmental business of any kind for Africa than for any other region, for which there are several reasons.”³⁹

Prior to the meeting of Addis-Ababa in 1963, attempts to unify within a political and economic African framework in the Continent crystallised the antagonist policy orientations of African states. There was the Madagascan and African Union ‘*Union africaine et malgache*’ (UAM) or the group of francophone states. There was also the Casablanca group, which was founded in January 1961, and included Morocco, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali and Algeria (still fighting for independence). These six countries were strongly opposed to any forms of domination and were regarded as the African progressive bloc, as opposed to the Madagascan and African Union (UAM) conservative group. In addition to that, there was the moderate group known to be ‘the Monrovia group’, which met in May 1961 and which called for a gradual economic unity.

Most importantly, opposition within the OAU arose during the Conference of Unification in May 1963, regarding the implementation of unification. The minority was led by N’Krumah, President of Ghana, who advocated an immediate and large union with one unique state, one army and one capital, that would be located at the heart of Africa. Presidents Tsiranana of Madagascar and Senghor of Senegal, on the other hand, defended the idea of a progressive unification.⁴⁰

Accordingly, the adoption of a Charter by the OAU schematised the thirty African countries’ understanding of the necessity to overcome contingencies and withstand all forms of neo-colonialism. It proved political maturity over existing challenges in Africa.

By unifying within an institutional framework, the African entity grew stronger and was able to cast a sense of solidarity and unified decision at an international level. African countries were forecasting a more organised and official weight world-wide, in conformity with international norms. In their pursuit of the mentioned objectives, member states solemnly adhered to respect

all the member states' sovereign equality and abide by the principle of non-interference in internal affairs, and the respect of territorial integrity of each state, along with the inalienable right of independence to all member states. Further to that, the OAU explicitly insisted on the peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, conciliation or arbitration and expressed unreserved condemnation, in all its forms, of political assassination as well as of subversive activities on the part of neighbouring or any other states. Finally, the OUA promised absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African territories, which were still dependent and, most importantly, asserted a policy of Non-Alignment towards existing blocs.⁴¹

The adoption of a Non-Aligned policy by the OAU aimed at protecting African countries from the dangers of the Cold War and from any likely consequences that might result from the worsening of the situation between the two blocs, especially after the Cuban Crisis. It, hence, intended to avoid any conflict of interest in the African Continent and undertook to ultimately prove to the rest of the World that the Third World, in general, and Africa, in particular, were totally independent from the greater power and the imperialist forces of the world, notably, at a time when African politics involved aspects of political hegemony, foreign or internal subversion and the Cold War.

The principles, within which the Charter of African Unity was drafted, lifted the ambiguity and dilemma of African countries' interaction with each other. It also stressed the wish of the member states to interact and promote cooperation under the aegis of an institutional body. It further asserted its leniency for peaceful and institutional determination to settle litigious issues and emphasised the determination of the members state to reduce the destabilising effects of a bipolar world.

Nevertheless, the creation of the OAU did not prevent the upsurge of border conflicts, which resulted from an ill-defined border map and secessionist disputes in the Continent. An example was seen in the conflict between Somalia and Ethiopia, which erupted in 1964 and in which Kenya was involved. Hostilities continued until peace was restored in 1967. There were also disagreements between Ghana and the Upper-Volta (now known as Burkina Faso), and conflicts between Rwanda and Burundi, and Algeria and Morocco. Nonetheless, the OUA played a key role in settling conflicts and reinforcing the Organisation's regulations and the principle of respect of sovereignty and territorial integrity *via* the commission of arbitration and reconciliation. It gradually put an end to inter-African territorial disputes and ethnic wars, and underpinned the borders status quo.

Algeria's African identity was forcibly an integral part of its cultural and geographical reality that could not be ignored or forgotten. The relationship between Algeria and other African countries had increasingly tightened throughout the years of the War of Liberation and those following.

President Houari Boumedienne often pictured African Unity within a framework of a cultural *Africanism*, he often portrayed African unity as:

“A reality forged by historical events, shared in a common land and witnessed by men destined to the same faith.”⁴²

He devoted efforts for the sake of both Africa and the OAU's high interests. He often emphasised the necessity to coordinate efforts towards a common objective, which was the liquidation of colonialism and imperialism in the Continent and the fight against underdevelopment. The most predominant feature of Algeria in the context of the OAU was its blind devotion to movements of liberation. A mere example of that was Algeria's contribution to the creation of the *Comité des Sept* in 1969, along with Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, the Republic of Central Africa and Sierra Leone, in an attempt to further enhance the structures of the Liberation Committee that was created in 1963.

Among the key issues that Algeria strongly defended within the OAU was the fight against imperialism and colonialism. President Houari Boumedienne categorically stressed the imperativeness of eradicating all residues of colonialism and all forms of imperialism. He called for Europe and the United States of America to stop supporting colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination. On the occasion of the fifth summit of the OAU, held in Algeria between 13 and the 16 September 1968, he condemned the Zionist aggression against the United Arab Republic (UAR) and affirmed his will to combat all attempts to conspire against Nigeria. It was in this context that Algeria asserted that its independence could not be complete unless the whole Continent was freed and, therefore, promised financial and military support to all liberation movements.⁴³ Accordingly, the Fifth Summit of the Organisation culminated in the signing of a declaration regarding the Israeli attack on Egypt and the war of Biafra (Nigeria). Two resolutions were adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments, during the fifth ordinary session. A Resolution was drafted with regards to the aggression against the UAR. It called for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967, in accordance with the Resolution taken by the Security Council on 22 November 1967 and appealed to all Members States of the OAU to use their influence to ensure a strict implementation of this Resolution. The second Resolution was concerned with the sufferings of the peoples of Nigeria and urged the secessionist leaders to co-operate with the federal authorities so as to restore peace and unity in Nigeria.⁴⁴ President Houari Boumedienne strongly voiced that:

“The unity of the Continent was threatened by the spectre of colonialism and by conspiracies against African countries, especially at a time when African countries endeavoured to rebuild what colonialism had destroyed and catch up with the delay they accumulated while colonised.”⁴⁵

During the proceedings of the XI session of the OAU Ministerial Cabinet, held on 4 September 1968, he denounced the exploitation and colonialism of some parts of Africa such as Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau. Last but not least, he denounced the suffering of the people undergoing humiliation and torture under what was known as ‘separated evolution’ which was

seen by Algeria, in agreement with the United Nations Organisation, as a pure racial segregation. This applied to the regimes imposed on South Africa, Namibia and Southern Rhodesia. In this context, President Houari Boumedienne asserted that:

“It was only through a unity of action, in the framework of a sound organisation, that the fight to restore the dignity of the African man would triumph.”⁴⁶

Moreover, on many occasions, Algeria provided support and sympathy to African countries. This included the Algerian condemnation of the heinous Portuguese aggression against Guinea, whereby President Houari Boumedienne expressed his concern and absolute support for the Guinean people.⁴⁷

Algeria's diplomatic efforts in promoting the Palestinian issue within the OAU were precious and countless. Algeria's message to the OAU was very clear and intransigent. The liberation of the continent requested the unification of positions towards colonisers. In order for inter-African and Arab-African economic cooperation to evolve in a sound and rational environment, it was necessary for African countries to identify a common enemy that was Zionism.

It was, hence, unacceptable for President Houari Boumedienne to be against colonialist presence in South Africa and yet be indifferent to Zionism. He, therefore stressed, during the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the OAU in May 1973 in Addis Ababa, the depth of the African battle in the Middle East and declared that:

“The severing of relations with Israel is a concrete expression of solidarity and deep awareness of the international dangers of Zionism.”⁴⁸

During the eleventh Summit of the OAU, President Houari Boumedienne strongly called on African countries to clarify their positions towards the Zionist problem and to adopt a more effective and positive attitude, in order to provide favourable conditions to the establishment of a bridge between the two strategic regions that could reinforce fraternity and friendship and would consolidate historical, cultural and spiritual ties.⁴⁹ Problems facing the Arab world, in general, and the Palestinians, in particular, were for the Algerian President a common matter of concern to all Africans in the Continent, given the fact that the aims of Palestinians were like those of many other African liberation movements, seeking independence and self-determination. Upon the principles of union and solidarity advocated by the OAU, Algeria called for a unification of the positions of African countries as a requirement for a sound African interaction and as part of the OAU's commitment to liberation and unification. The question of the Middle East constituted an incontestable precious indicator of solidarity within the OAU and demonstrated the devotion of its members to the realisation of its objectives.⁵⁰

The escalating number of African countries severing diplomatic relations with Israel⁵¹ was likely to be the outcome of their awareness of the common imperialist racist character of Israel. In the ninth OAU Summit, held in Rabat, all African countries, without exception, had condemned the Zionist state. This African attitude towards Zionism had initiated a promising

African-Arab cooperation. This was followed by the opening of several offices for the Palestinian Liberation Organisation in many African countries. Amongst other indicators of the evolving Arab-African cooperation was Algeria's active contribution to the creation of the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa, which culminated in the ratification of an accord in this respect, in Cairo on 18 February 1974,.

One should also mention the extraordinary session of the OUA, held in Addis Ababa, between 9 and 21 November 1973, that gathered African Foreign Ministers (on the request of Algeria), and in which it was decided to economically boycott all the racist regimes of Tel- Aviv, Lisbon, Pretoria and Salisbury. Finally, there was the Seventh Arab Summit, held in Algiers, in November 1973, which was portrayed as a turning point in African-Arab relations, given its outcomes. The Summit stressed the need for the development of cooperation and for the consolidation of Arab diplomatic representation in Africa. It also concentrated on the severing of diplomatic, consular, economic, and cultural relations with South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia and asserted the necessity to impose an embargo on oil exports to these countries by all Arab countries. It also called for the reinforcement and extension of cultural, financial and economic cooperation; the creation of a fund intended to contribute to Africa's economic and social development and provide its countries with technical assistance, helping African countries that were victims of natural catastrophes, especially drought, and finally, giving bold support to national liberation movements in Africa.⁵² In 1966, at the Third Summit of the Organisation of African Unity, Algeria ratified its acceptance to hold a meeting for Third World countries in Algiers, in order to coordinate positions with a view towards preparing the International Conference for Development and Trade. This was the first step towards the call for a New International Economic Order.

Most importantly, Algeria embraced an approach of mediation and peaceful settlement of contingencies within the OAU framework. It was, accordingly, during the African Summit, held in Rabat in June 1972, that President Houari Boumedienne undertook the signing of a convention with King Hassan II that called for permanent peace and urged the beginning of a new era of concord and cooperation.⁵³ Moreover, President Houari Boumedienne mediated in the settlement of the conflict between Guinea and Senegal, during the very same Summit.⁵⁴ This highlighted the many achievements reached at the ninth African Summit, held in Rabat in June 1972, with regards to the problem of decolonisation and independence.

The primary objective that spurred Algeria's valuable contributions in the OAU was its determination to establish a cooperative bridge between the African Continent and the Arab world. This was initiated with President Houari Boumedienne's diplomatic efforts to unify African countries against the Zionist enemy, as it constituted a stumbling block in the unification of the Continent, notably with the imperialist aggression against the UAR. In fact, around 29 African capitals were still nurturing close economic relations with Israel that destroyed all hopes of an Egyptian-African economic cooperation.⁵⁵ Eventually the overall

Arab-African interaction would be affected as a result. This was Algeria's opportunity to stimulate and revive Arab-African interchange and become the main economic partner to many African countries.

3.2 Algerian Cooperation and Solidarity with African Countries:

Algeria's inter-African cooperation shone in many areas, including communication and transport, embedded in the inauguration of maritime and air trans-Saharan road lines towards the South of the Sahara and the signing of different accords in this respect. Examples are the ratification of an air transport services accord with the federal military government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, signed in Lagos on 25 May 1973, and an air transport accord, signed in Brazzaville between the Peoples Republic of Congo and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria on 8 April 1973. In the same context, Algeria signed an accord with the government of the Republic of Guinea, based on the principle of equality and mutual interest and that related to transport and maritime navigation, on 12 July 1972, in Algiers, in order to develop maritime exchanges in a harmonious way. Further to that, there were various commercial accords signed with major African countries such as the commercial accord signed with the Republic of Cameroon on 11 March 1967, the long term commercial convention signed with the Republic of Niger on 19 February 1976 in Algiers, and with the government of Guinea on 12 July 1972. Algeria held a viable position in the African market with Dakar, Abidjan and Conakry as major partners. Between 1971 and 1972, exchanges with the city of Dakar had risen by 20 million Algerian Dinars (DA), following the creation of a mixed Chamber of Commerce. Abidjan, on the other hand, had imported products to the value of 1488 million Central African Francs (CAF) in 1971. This represented 3% of Abidjan imports coming from Algeria. Likewise, Algeria's exports were estimated at 579 million CAF. In 1972, Algeria imported 100 000 tonnes of aluminium from Guinea which were worth 190 000 DA. Moreover, the Algerian-Guinean Commercial Accord, signed on 19 November 1971, expected the volume of exchange to be estimated at around 400 000 DA.⁵⁶ Algeria also signed and ratified several commercial and cultural accords with different African countries. There was, for instance, the Accord of Cooperation with the Republic of Niger, signed in Algiers on 3 June 1964 and ratified on 14 April 1966 by the Cabinet and the Chief of Government. Two commercial accords were signed with the Federal Republic of Cameroon, the first of which was signed in Algiers on 11 March 1967. This was based on reciprocal profit and equilibrium in exports and imports. The accord defined two sets of products, exported from Algeria to the Federal Republic of Cameroon. This included crude oil, petroleum products and automobile accessories (radiators, engines, plastic products). The list of products that were to be imported from Cameroon to Algeria encompassed coconuts, coffee, bananas, black pepper, pineapple, sesam seeds, wood and aluminium.⁵⁷ The second accord was signed in Algiers on 17 February 1974 and also revolved around commercial exchange and rulings regarding exported merchandises to and from Algeria. Further to that, one

could mention the ratification, on 10 September 1971 in Cameroon, of the accord related to the establishment of a mixed commission in charge of technical, scientific, cultural and economic cooperation. This mixed committee was intended, according to article 2 of the accord, to define the orientation of the relations between the two countries. This was in respect of economic cooperation, in the field of agriculture, industry, mining and energies, transport and communication, and in terms of economic exchange and cultural cooperation, in areas of information, education, professional training, youth and sport, health and tourism. It also aimed at shaping scientific and technical cooperation, and the transfer of experience and experts in sectors sharing common interests of economic activity, along with judicial and postal cooperation. The commission was designed to elaborate proposals shaped within the defined orientations and submit them to the two governments in order to obtain approval. The commission was also to settle problems that might rise from the application of accords and conventions between the two countries in commercial, economic, scientific and technical aspects. Finally, it would deal with citizens of both nationalities.⁵⁸ Likewise, Algeria ratified a long term commercial accord with Guinea on 12 July 1972, in Algiers, pertaining to the commercial exchange of merchandises. Based on the principles of sovereignty, national independence, equality of rights and advantages, and non-interference in internal affairs, the Algerian government had signed an accord of economic, technical and cultural cooperation with the government of the Republic of Burundi, on 21 April 1973 in Algiers. The efforts of Algeria to nurture bilateral and multilateral relations with neighbouring African countries were numerous. These culminated in the Conference of El-Goléa in 1973, which gathered the Presidents of Niger, Mauritania and Mali, and during which they promoted a policy of consultation and solidarity, and paid tribute to the 'road of African Unity', which was meant to facilitate communication and transport between Africans.⁵⁹ This dynamics in Algerian-African cooperation prevailed in different areas of economic, scientific and cultural cooperation with most African countries, such as Congo, Liberia Gabon, Togo and Comoros. It also ushered other North-African countries, like Morocco and Libya, to nurture similar links and interaction in a competitive spirit. This eventually raised hopes for Arab-African cooperation.

President Houari Boumedienne had played a key role within the OAU in promoting inter-African solidarity and Arab-African cooperation, and in projecting the African dimensions of the Palestinian issue. He portrayed himself as a peaceful mediator. Algeria saw its leading role within the OAU as a gateway to the West. Algeria's membership served Africa as a nation in expressing its needs and defending its integrity in addition to helping Boumedienne himself embellish a picture of a leader of the Maghrib, Africa and the Third World.

An analysis of President Houari Boumedienne's Third Worldist policy would unfold a devoted policy to the Third World cause and the support of Liberation Movements. In fact, President Houari Boumedienne's perception of the international economic system shed light on his strong positions and approach to the existing inequalities between the developing and the developed

worlds. Moreover it highlighted the fact that the world system was run by a minority of highly developed countries, the progress and economic prosperity of which heavily depended on the exploitation and control of the less-developed countries. In other words, the industrialised world aimed, in a way, at maintaining and developing a sort of dependency relation between them and the poor, or the underdeveloped countries, so as to insure the former's economic well being by guaranteeing cheap raw materials and cheap resources. The Algerian President equally blamed the structure of the old international system for the worsening of the economic situation of the deprived countries. In this context, President Houari Boumedienne based his understanding of the undergoing situation in Africa, Latin America and Asia on the historical development of colonialism and imperialism. This stemmed from the reality that President Houari Boumedienne looked through the reasons for the underdevelopment of the non-industrialised world and attempted to address the problem by calling for a new international order that would take into account underdeveloped countries.

Accordingly, Algeria's Third World policy aimed at introducing economic changes, based on international cooperation, in order to guarantee international security and equilibrium.

Notes:

¹ The Chinese model advocates the world division into three worlds, the First World, which includes the two great powers, and the Second World, including the industrialised countries, and the least developed countries that form the Third World.

² Grant McCall, "Four Worlds of Experience and Action," Third World Quarterly 2 (July 1980): 539.

³ The World Bank, World Development Report 1978 (Washington D C: Library of Congress, 1978), 77.

⁴ Alan Carter, "The nation-state and underdevelopment," Third World Quarterly 16 (December 1995): 603.

⁵ M Shamsul Haque, "Incongruity between Bureaucracy and Society in Developing Nations: A Critique," Peace & Change 22 (October 1997): 439.

⁶ Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 178.

⁷ Jean-Paul Sartre, "Colonialism is a System" Interventions 3 (2001): 128 (Translated by Azzedine Haddour, Steven Brewer and Terrence McWilliams).

⁸ It is argued that political culture is made up of the values and norms related to a political system. Political culture is an important connector between state and society, that is to say that: "political culture plays an indispensable role in determining the overall shape and contours of that interaction" in Mehran Kamrava, "Political culture and a new definition of the Third World," Third World Quarterly 16 (December 1995): 694.

⁹Ibid. 92.

¹⁰ Peter Worsley, "How Many Worlds," Third World Quarterly I (January 1979): 101.

¹¹ M Shamsul Haque, op.cit. 437.

¹² Arvind Panagariya, "Developing Countries at Doha: A Political Economy Analysis," The World Economy 25 (September 2002): 1229-30.

¹³ Julius Nyerere, "Third World Negotiating Strategy," Third World Quarterly 1 (April 1979): 21.

¹⁴ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 108.

¹⁵ Mark Berger, "The End of the 'Third World'?" Third World Quarterly 15 (2nd Semester 1994): 259.

¹⁶ Nigel Harris, The End of the Third World: Newly Industrializing Countries and the Decline of an Ideology (London: Penguin books, 1990), 11.

¹⁷ Peter Willetts, The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London: Frances Pinter, 1978), 11.

¹⁸ Al-Sha'b, (Algiers) 5 February 1975.

¹⁹ El Moudjahid, 5-6 Janvier 1975.

²⁰ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Ministry of Information and Culture, Khutab al-Raiis Boumedienne: 2 Juilya 1973-03 December 1974, Part V (Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 118.

²¹ Revolution Africaine, 24-30 August 1973.

²² United Nations, General Assembly, Rresolution 3082 (XXVIII), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 2192nd plenary meeting, 28th Ordinary session. 6 December 1973. <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/28/ares28.htm> [last accessed 24/06/2004].

²³ République Algérienne démocratique et Populaire, Présidence, Président Houari Boumediene à l'ONU, 61.

²⁴ Article 2 in: United Nations, General Assembly, Rresolution 3281 (XXIX), Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, 2315th plenary meeting, 29 ordinary session, 12 December 1974, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm> [last accessed 24/06/2004].

²⁵ Ania Francos, "Cinq Jours et Cinq Nuits," in Jeune Afrique, 22 Septembre 1973, 28.

²⁶ United Nations Industrial Development Organisation, Annex, Resolution 2152 (XXI), 1468th plenary meeting, 21st ordinary session, 17 November 1966, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares21.htm>, [last accessed 24/06/2004].

²⁷ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne : 2 Juwilya 1973 - 3 December 1974, Part V (Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 150.

²⁸ République Algérienne démocratique et Populaire, Mémoire présenté par l'Algérie à la Conférence des Souverains et Chefs d'Etat des Pays Membres de l'OPEP- Alger- Mars 1975, 35-36.

²⁹ Ibid. 71.

³⁰ République Algérienne démocratique et Populaire, Présidence, Président Houari Boumediene à l'ONU, 24.

³¹ B. R. Tomlinson, "What was the Third World?" Journal of Contemporary History, 38 (April 2003): 313.

³² Ollapally mentioned that Pancheel implied "a certain lack of attention to realist precepts and instead a faith that a common anti-imperialist and pan-Asian ideological orientation could overcome regional ambitions of two large and powerful neighbors." in Deepa Ollapally, "Third World Nationalism and the United States after the Cold War," Political Science Quarterly 110 (Autumn 1995): 427.

³³ Ibid. 426.

³⁴ Boukara Hocein, Ideology and Pragmatism in Algerian Foreign Policy. PhD Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1986, 129.

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- ³⁵ Assassi Lassassi, Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Avebury, 1988), 28.
- ³⁶ Hocein Boukara, *op.cit.* 106-7.
- ³⁷ The conference of Addis-Ababa was held at two levels. A Ministerial level, which gathered Foreign Ministers between 15 and 23 May 1963, and Heads of State level, between 23 and 25 May 1963. The conference witnessed the participation of thirty countries.
- ³⁸ "Purposes of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)," Article 2, in: Organisation of African Unity, The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (25 May 1963). <http://www.oau-creation.com/OAU%20Charter.htm> [last accessed 09/06/2004].
- ³⁹ W. Scott Thompson and I. William Zartman, "The Development of Norms in the African System." in Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.), The Organisation of African Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives (New York: Praeger, 1975), 3.
- ⁴⁰ A. I, "L'Organisation de l'Unité Africaine," Révolution africaine, 18-24 May 1973, 15.
- ⁴¹ "Principles of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)," Article 3, in: Organisation of African Unity, The Charter of the Organisation of African Unity. <http://www.oau-creation.com/OAU%20Charter.htm> [last accessed 09/06/2004].
- ⁴² République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire. Les Discours du président Boumediene 1er Juillet 1969-19 Septembre 1969 (Alger: Ministère de L'Information, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, no publication date), 23.
- ⁴³ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Al Wahda al-Ifriqiyya Hadafuna al Raiisi, Khitāb al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne fi Mu'tamar al-Qimma al-Ifriqiyy al-khamis bi al-Jazair (Algiers: Ministry of Information, Directorate of documentation, 1968), 22. [Speech of President Houari Boumedienne at the fifth Summit in Algiers: African Unity is our main target.]
- ⁴⁴ Organisation of African Unity, Secretariat, Res. 53 (V) and Res. 54 (V): Resolutions adopted by the Fifth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State and Governments held in Algiers, from 13 to 16 September 1968 (Addis Ababa: 1968). See also: African Union, Official Documents, <http://www.africa-union.org/home/Welcome.htm> [last accessed 16/06/04].
- ⁴⁵ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publication, 1970), 150.
- ⁴⁶ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome II (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publication, 1970), 150.
- ⁴⁷ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Boumedienne: al-Thalathat Ashhor al-Akhira 1970 (Algiers: Ministry of Information, Directorate of Documentation and Publishing, 1970), 59. (Speeches of President Houari Boumedienne: the last three months 1970)

⁴⁸ République Algérienne démocratique et Populaire, Presidency, Khitāb al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne : Adis Ababa, Mayo 1973, Directorate of information, 7.

⁴⁹ Ibid: 5.

⁵⁰ R. Sadmi and A. Hefield, “L’OUA Désormais Adulte,” Revolution Africaine, 1-7 June 1973, 36.

⁵¹ Guinea severed relations with Israel on 6. 6. 67, Uganda on 30.3.72, Chad on 28. 11. 72, the Peoples Republic of Congo on 5. 12. 72, Niger on 10. 12. 72, Mali on 5. 1. 73, Burundi on 16. 5. 73, Togo on 21. 9. 73, Zaire on 4. 10. 73, Dahomey on 6. 10. 73, Rwanda on 9. 10. 73, Upper Volta (Burkina Faso today) on 11. 10. 73, Cameroon on 15. 10. 73, Equatorial Guinea on 15. 10. 73, Tanzania on 18. 10. 73, Madagascar on 20. 10. 73, Central African Republic on 21. 10. 73, Ethiopia on 23. 10. 73, Nigeria on 25. 10. 73, Gambia on 26. 10. 73, Zambia on 26. 10. 73, Ghana on 28. 10. 73, Senegal on 28. 10. 73, Gabon on 30. 10. 73, Sierra-Leone 30. 10. 73, Kenya on 1. 11. 73, and Liberia on 2. 11. 73. See Revolution Africaine, 9-15 September 1973, 33.

⁵² Revolution African, 7-13 December 1973,18.

⁵³ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, “Déclaration Algéro-Marocaine de Rabat,” Journal Officiel, 48 du 15 Juin 1973, 546.

⁵⁴ R. S, “Afrique: la Solution des Litiges,” Revolution africaine, 18- 24 May 1973, 23.

⁵⁵ Egypt had initiated the first attempts of an Arab-African cooperation. Egypt was the only Arab country able to satisfy the African market. Between: 1968-1969, commercial exchange between Cairo and South Saharan Africa had risen to 50 million dollars. See: Mohamed Bouabid, “Monde Arabe- Afrique Sud-saharienne: Vers une nouvelle association,” Révolution Africaine, 30 November-6 Décembre 1973, 7.

⁵⁶ Ibid. 18.

⁵⁷ République Algérienne démocratique et Populaire, “Accord Commercial entre la République Algérienne démocratique et Populaire et la République Fédérale du Cameroon,” Journal Officiel, 21 Avril 1967, 317.

⁵⁸ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, “Accord relative a l’établissement d’une commission mixte pour la coopération économique, culturelle, scientifique et technique entre la République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire et la République fédérale du Camérout,” Journal Officiel, 18 Août 1972, 840.

⁵⁹ Révolution Africaine, 4-10 May 1973, 11.

Chapter Eight

Between East and West: Algeria, the Superpowers, Europe and the Cold War.

1. The International Context of Boumedienne's East-West policy:

Like many other Third World countries, Algeria was drawn into the conflict of the Cold War, which was partly an ideological rivalry and, even more importantly, a strategic challenge over spheres of influence between the Soviet Union and the United States.

In this context, Halliday identified four major areas that the Cold War had resulted in. One of the earliest aspects of the Cold War was the stimulation of nationalist movements and the spread of decolonisation waves, thus making the survival of formal or informal influence harder. This resulted from the Soviet Union's military backing to the Third World and the United States' fear of seeing the spread of Communism. The second feature of the East-West rivalry was embedded in the fruition of new ideological commitment within Third World countries, ranging from full scale Communism to 'socialist oriented' states and a remaining pro-Capitalist orientation. At a broader level, the Cold War had veiled 'the strategic rivalry between the two blocs' and the prevailing inter-state conflicts, as support was needed in most conflictual situations from one bloc or the other, ushering a regional arms race. Furthermore, the rivalry led to the formation of competitive alliance systems which involved ideological affinity and calculations of interests.¹ This meant that states belonging to the poor world had been indirectly involved in the ideological dispute after the Second World War and had moulded their foreign policy making process so as to accommodate their needs and interests in a world of ideological disagreement. Gerges believed that:

“in the highly polarized international system of the 1950s and 1960s, small states were capable not only of manipulating the rivalry between the superpowers but also of escaping from the prison of patron-client relationships. But there were limits and constraints that local players could not transcend.”²

This statement highlighted the reciprocal need and interest between the Superpowers and their Third World satellites.

Bearing in mind Algeria's ideological outlines and revolutionary profile, it was not surprising that post-independence Algeria shared affinities with and felt closer to the Soviet Union, given the anti-colonialist and revolutionary drive of the latter in its international politics. The USSR's attempt to win over and muster most newly-independent and emerging states, in addition to its efforts to prove its support for just causes, primarily meant conducting a smear campaign against capitalist systems in the international arena. In fact, for most of these newly-independent

countries, the USSR was the token of the Third World fight against exploitative and oppressive regimes. Similarly, Algeria's leadership believed that imperialism was the biggest obstacle that impeded the emancipation and the progress of developing countries. Imperialism favoured foreign domination, dependence and neo-colonialism and aimed at imposing political, social and economic structure. For Boumedienne, the strategic purpose of imperialism was to dominate the countries of the intermediary zone by separating them from socialist countries. He was also of the opinion that imperialism broke attempts aiming at the liberation of oppressed people and even controlled the less-developed countries. In this context, Algeria's empathy with the USSR expanded.³

Algeria's emergence as a newly independent state in 1962 coincided with a turning point in the international system, which was witnessing fluid changes in the relationship between the two leading powers. This was evident in the lessening of tension between the Superpowers. The relaxation of tension between the Superpowers was primarily spurred as a result of an increasing awareness of the necessity to overcome rivalries, competing ideologies and conflictual positions, in order to preserve self interest. This led to a *détente* that was argued and interpreted by scholars and policy analysts differently.

President Houari Boumedienne declared:

"Peaceful Coexistence is increasingly gaining ground between the Superpowers, despite their conflicts and systemic discrepancies: It is clear that *Peaceful Coexistence* had increased between the countries possessing nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the acute international conflict had shifted after the Second World War from Europe to the Third World in the form of what was known to be 'local wars', shredding and destroying the Third World, such as the Vietnam war, the war in the Middle East and wars in Africa and Latin America."⁴

Henceforth, in view of Algeria's international responsibilities towards world peace, it could not oppose the principle of *Peaceful Coexistence*. Yet, it rejected the possibility that any of the Superpowers would take advantage of such *Peaceful Coexistence* on the account of Third World countries. For President Houari Boumedienne: "*Peaceful Coexistence* needs to be comprehensive in order to prevent and liquidate local wars of aggression."⁵

In short, President Boumedienne acquiesced with the principles of *Peaceful Coexistence*, which provided appropriate conditions for peace by reinforcing the East-West *détente* and permitted a synchronised interaction between states of different social systems, thus, reducing tension in world politics. In other words, the *détente* was welcomed by Algerian policy makers and was appreciated as a factor that would contribute to the reinforcement of peace in some areas of the planet that were destabilised by war. What was unacceptable and seen as dangerous, was that efforts for peace were only limited to the North, as deprived zones in the South were still exposed to insecurity and were submissive to the ruling of the stronger powers. Somehow, the Soviet-American *détente* was merely a decisive step towards the limitation of a nuclear

confrontation and was never intended to end local wars or regional conflict. In other words, *détente* was more concerned with Soviet-American interests than those of the Third World.

A major component of the politics of the 1960s and the 1970s was that the arms race constituted a central theme in the rivalry between blocs. That is to say that superiority and power were weighed partially according to military capabilities. Kissinger advocated the following:

“By the time the Nixon Administration took office, the political balance sheet was hardly in credit. The Soviet Union had just occupied Czechoslovakia. It was supplying massive arms to North Vietnam; without its assistance to Hanoi, a successful negotiation could have been assured. It had shown no willingness to help bring a settlement in the Middle East. And the Soviet Union at this point was nearing equality in strategic weapons. The decisive American superiority, had ended by 1967, halting at self-imposed ceilings of 1,000 Minuteman ICBMs, 656 Polaris SLBMs, and 54 Titan ICBMs.* By 1969 it was clear that the number of Soviet missiles capable of reaching the United States would soon equal that of all America missiles available for retaliation against the Soviet Union, and, if Soviet building programs continued through the Seventies, would come to exceed them.”⁶

Correspondingly, rumours suggested that President Houari Boumedienne intended to secure a nuclear weapon for Algeria to face Israeli nuclear threats. In 1974, during his visit to Lahore, Boumedienne would have explored the issue of an Islamic nuclear bomb in a closed session that gathered the Algerian President, Colonel M’amar al Qadhafi and the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abd al-Aziz Boutfliqa [Abdelaziz Bouteflika]. It was agreed during this secretive meeting to undertake the implementation of the project with Libya, ensuring the financing, the provision of scientists from Pakistan and the availability of experiments in Algeria.⁷ If this statement were correct, then one could assume either that Algeria’s trust in an East-West *détente* was not fully applicable or simply that the Algerian leader was eager to be part of the arms race and, hence, would ensure a vanguard position in the international system.

That is to say that nuclear confrontation was the most dangerous stage that could be reached in the Cold War. It is for this reason that:

“In the Cold War era one of the main objectives of the superpowers had been to avoid a direct confrontation with each other. This mutual and implicit understanding conditioned the relationship between the superpowers and their regional allies. This was a negative attitude, however: neither Washington nor Moscow was willing to develop this implicit understanding into positive action to settle regional problems.”⁸

This would explain the hesitation and cautiousness of the USSR to operationally intervene in the Arab-conflict.

Bipolarity was a reality of world politics, and *Peaceful Coexistence* between the two Superpowers was a major event in the course of the Cold War. Yet, this did not mean that

everyone on the planet would live happily ever after. *Détente* certainly contributed to a moderation in the interaction between the two blocs. This, however, did not directly apply to the Third World, where local conflicts could be allowed to escalate to limited degrees.

Algeria adopted a clever approach in its dealings with the East –West partners. Algeria's good relations with the East and West and its cooperation with the two blocs were centrally based on commercial grounds. In other words, reciprocal interest between Algeria and any commercial partner was the drive for their interaction. Moreover, pragmatism was required at that time. Algeria needed to invest in the development of its infrastructure and provide its industry with equipment. For that, finances were required. So, if America required Algerian gas, sales would allow the country to allocate development with the necessary funding. President Houari Boumedienne cleverly mentioned, in this context, the use of American factories to Soviet energy, and the consumption by the Soviets of American wheat and also that the American President was greeted by leaders of most of the Communist countries when the US was bombing Hanoi.⁹ This meant that conflictual ideologies did not prevent the rivals entering into economic interaction, especially when profit and national interest were concerned.

It is in a world of constant mutations, continuous progress and outbreaks, that Algeria's fight needed to be inscribed within a broader prospective. It needed to surpass the country's geographical sphere and national interests. Algeria's fight was predefined to open doors to a new world of dignity, liberty and prosperity.¹⁰

It is important to draw attention to the fact that, President Houari Boumedienne's never accepted the concept of power which epitomised a world under the protectorate of the Superpowers, powers that would be allowed to divide the world into zones of influence. This was deemed unacceptable by President Houari Boumedienne.¹¹

Generally speaking, Algeria's determination to fight for Third World rights was not affected by the East-West ideological conflict; it was, on the contrary, directly concerned with all just causes. Algeria never hesitated to express opposition to the oppressive forces and showed solidarity with the nations of Indochina, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, in their fight for national independence.

2. Algeria and the Superpowers:

Algeria's adoption of Non-Alignment as a foreign policy was the country's best opportunity to nourish dynamic and flexible behaviour with the two existing Superpowers, in response to the needs of Algeria's state-building and its national interest. More importantly, Non-Alignment offered Algeria the opportunity to balance its interaction with the antagonist blocs without undermining its position in the international system at any point. In other words, President Houari Boumedienne shrewdly saw a door for economic prosperity in East-West relations, and a release of pressure from French economic dependency. Under his leadership, the international Algerian political landscape underwent a diversification in interactions with all countries.

regardless of their socio-political systems, whether they were Socialist, West European or Third World countries. This resulted from Algeria's understanding of the concept of *National Independence*, which, accordingly, was enhanced and guaranteed by a diversification of international relations on the basis of mutual respect and non-interference in other countries' affairs. In this respect, the concept of *National Independence* materialised the idea of Non-Alignment and embedded its real component.¹² Notably, Boumedienne introduced *National Independence* at a Conference of Ambassadors on 20 October 1969, as a principle upon which Algeria's foreign policy relied. He indubitably stressed that:

“*National Independence* should not mean *isolation* but should be inspired by the principle of self-reliance and reliance on national capabilities.”¹³

President Houari Boumedienne also conceived *National Independence* as a rejection of any interference in Algeria's affairs or attempts to influence its internal or foreign policy or decisions. It is within this framework that President Houari Boumedienne explained that:

“The relations nourished between Algeria and other countries must be based upon the respect of independence and sovereignty of the other part and on the principle of cooperation founded on mutual interest. Henceforth, Algeria's foreign behaviour and attitude to the outside world moulded the establishment of international relations favourable to all parts and ruled out the enrichment of prosperous countries, paralleled with a further impoverishment of the deprived countries, under the sway of some principles which conquered the political initiative. These principles included *National independence*, a world-wide disinterested cooperation founded on clear and consistent basis of non-interference and respect of sovereignty between partners, the rejection of blocs' policy and military basis, and the refusal of Third World economic exploitation through exterior commerce, the intermediary of international capital or the selling of technology.”¹⁴

The riddle of relations nourished by President Houari Boumedienne with the Superpowers inspired the inherently skillful and strategic foreign policy behaviour with an unquenchable desire to meet the requirements of development momentum. It should be clear, though, that Algeria's foreign policy attitude towards the United States portrayed a potentially rich range of radical and obdurate stances. This led to an ideological struggle that characterised the American-Algerian relationship, coupled with a blend of economic bargaining and compromising at a different level. That is to say that, although President Houari Boumedienne's attitude towards the United States of America was overshadowed with a persistent and strident ideological struggle, a whole gamut of economic exchanges and transactions outshone the bilateral interface, provoking confusion and misunderstanding of Algeria's ideological devotion to its revolutionary principles. This line of criticism appears to suggest that diplomatic rupture with the United States was a tactful genuine façade to mislead Arab politics and capture the limelight within Arab nations, thus arrogating to himself the praise of Arabs and appearing as a

valiant heroic Arab leader daring to oppose a great power. Yet a simple dealing with the United States was regarded by extremist viewers as purely treacherous.

The most carefully measured reply to the critics came from the President himself who strongly reiterated that:

“As for America, our existing relations are purely commercial. We have said it before and we shall confirm again that Algeria is against American imperialism which aims at controlling parts of the world.”¹⁵

The Algerian leader always committed himself to a raucous anti-colonialist, anti-imperialist and anti-neo-colonialist fight, which constituted the asset of his revolutionary pledge to a continuity of revolution.¹⁶ On many occasions, the President saluted the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, ‘Portuguese’ Guinea, Zimbabwe and South Africa, for their perseverance in their struggle for liberation, independence and liberty, and condemned the racist and fascist minority regimes of South Africa and Rhodesia, backed up imperialists.¹⁷ The substantive content of the Constitution was very meticulous about this point; it declared that:

“The fight against colonialism, neo-colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination constituted a fundamental axe of the Revolution.”¹⁸

That is to say that under Boumedienne’s leadership, Algeria dedicated its foreign policy to the support of all just causes in the world. Equally, the Constitution was very explicit about international cooperation. It was mentioned in article 93 that:

“The reinforcement of international cooperation and the development of friendly relations between states on the grounds of equality, mutual interest and non interference in internal affairs, are basic principles of the national policy.”¹⁹

These two articles introduced Algeria’s foreign policy options to fight against exploitative forces as part of its revolutionary battle. Yet article 93 highlighted the possibility of an international cooperation, provided that equality, mutual interest and non-interference in internal affairs were achieved. In other words, the Constitution did not exclude any potential partner due to any likely ideological posture, given that the three above mentioned principles of cooperation were provided. Henceforth, cooperation with the United States of America was not ruled out if the United States respected the ethics stated in the Constitution.

The analysis of Algeria’s different postures towards the United States highlighted two main aspects: Algeria’s chief rebuff to American foreign policy unfolded a revolutionary nature which backed all revolutionary movements and fights for liberty and just causes in the world, in opposition to American imperialism, and a Third Worldist character which implied the fight by Algeria for Third World countries’ rights to development and economic progress by putting an end to imperialist exploitation. At the same time there was a close cooperation at the economic level.

2.1 Algeria and the United States.

2.1.1 Ideological influences on Algerian-American relations.

The major clash in Algerian-American positions was over the Middle East, which led to the severing of diplomatic relations in 1967. The United States of America was accused of frustrating the peace in the region and of standing behind insurrections in the area.

That is to say that the tension prevailing in the Middle East had always constituted major grounds for conflictual Algerian-American relations.

As early as 1965, President Houari Boumedienne took a position by the side of the Palestinians and condemned the Israeli occupation of Palestine. He also blamed the United States for backing Israeli imperialist intentions in the Middle East, leading henceforth, to the severing of diplomatic relations with the United States in 1967. Fearful to see the USSR gaining influence in Algeria, following the lessening of French presence, the United States always maintained channels of communication, such as the two consulates in Oran and Constantine, meetings at Ministerial levels within the framework of the United Nations sessions and the International Monetary Fund (I. M. F), and other forms of presence *via* which the United States publicly acknowledged its readiness to resume normal relations.²⁰ In fact, one could perceive the United State as a major contributor to the development of Algerian economy and to the lessening of French dependency. In this respect, Philip J. Akre indicated:

“The United States has contributed capital toward Algeria’s development process so that Algeria could expand its international markets in competition with other developed nations, especially France. Indeed, because Algeria was able to carve out new relationships with the United States and others, the hold of France on Algeria’s economy was substantially loosened.”²¹

The liturgy of the Middle East sharply climaxed as a result of the Six Days War on 6 June 1967, which initially started as a confrontation between Egypt and Israel and where Algerian troops fought by the side of Egyptians. Furthermore, Algeria was the first country to suggest the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the sole representative of the Palestinians. It took part in the ‘Arab front of steadfastness’ which opposed the Roger’s Plans, disagreed with Sadat’s visit to Israel in 1977, and opposed the peace process of ‘Camp David’.

President Houari Boumedienne’s solidarity with the Palestinians extended to the dramatic use of oil as a political weapon after the October war of 1973, as part of a decision taken, following the Summit of Arab Heads of State, held in Algeria between 26 -28 November 1973. Algeria was in favour of imposing an embargo decided by the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (O. A. P. E. C). Being a member of OAPEC, Algeria joined up the initiative to impose an embargo and opposed, as hard as it could, the lifting of the embargo against the United States.²²

Othman Sa’di, previously Algerian Ambassador to Baghdad, during President Houari Boumedienne’ rule, noted that President Houari Boumedienne, during his visit to the United

States of America in April 1974, where he was received at the White House and welcomed by Nixon, specifically mentioned that Israel constituted an existing wall that impeded good Arab-American relationships. Accordingly, the President emphasised that, as long as this wall was maintained, Arab relations with the United States would never ameliorate. To that, Nixon avowed the efforts put into defeating this wall and solving the problem in the Middle East, including the Palestinian issue. Unconvinced of such a statement, President Houari Boumedienne would have questioned the United States of America's manoeuvre to create a new Israel in North Iraq. While not expecting, and surprised to hear about the issue of North Iraq, Nixon was unable to provide a well prepared answer, at which point, Henry Kissinger, Nixon's Secretary of State interfered, questioning whether the President meant the war between Iraqis and Kurds in North Iraq. President Houari Boumedienne acquiesced and accused the United States of America of creating the conflict.²³

This particular visit by President Houari Boumedienne to the United States highlighted the Algerian radical and outspoken stance towards the American policy in the Middle East. It also shed light on how the Algerian leader was outspoken and not fearful to express his opinions and defend his revolutionary principles.

Likewise, Grimaud described the exceptional character that surrounded the reception of President Houari Boumedienne at the White House on 11 April 1974, on the occasion of the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on raw materials, which he convened, as an unprecedented event where an American President would receive the Head of a State with which the United States did not nourish any diplomatic relations.²⁴

It is said that President Houari Boumedienne was well respected in the international arena and Algeria was heard internationally; Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, the President's Advisor, stated that President Houari Boumedienne would receive a letter or a report from Kissinger every time the latter was on a visit to the region, in order to inform Boumedienne or to discuss some matters, and also to know Boumedienne's opinion on the issue.²⁵

Moreover, Algeria's revolutionary character impelled it to support the Vietnamese people, fighting against American imperialism, and recognise the provisional government of South Vietnam as early as 1969, when created.²⁶ Algeria's devotion to the Vietnamese revolutionary cause was further crystallised with the official visit of Nguyen Thi Binh, Foreign Affairs Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam, on 21 March 1970, to Algeria, following an invitation by the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa. The Algerian side severely condemned the intensified aggression on South Vietnam as an act of violation of the security and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and regarded it as a manoeuvre aspiring at minimising and sabotaging the outcomes of the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, held in Paris between December 1975 and June 1977. Algeria expressed its indignation towards the bloody massacres and genocides perpetuated on the South Vietnamese civilians. Besides; both the Algerian and the Southern

Vietnamese parts condemned the extension of American imperialist aggression in LAOS, and acts of continuous provocation and disruption against the policy of independence, peace and neutrality carried out by the Cambodians, seriously threatening security in Indochina and the Asian South East.²⁷ This further emphasises Algeria's positions towards America's imperialist policies.

It is worth mentioning, at this point, that in 1974 a preparatory meeting took place in Paris so as to lay grounds for an international conference on energy. This initiative, though, was not successful due to the inflexibility of the American delegation, which wanted to impose a restrained agenda for the future conference.²⁸

At a more regional level, and with more impact on the Algerian-American relations, came the issue of the Western Sahara. This stretch of land, that stimulated the Moroccan-Algerian conflict, further invigorated the American-Algerian political clash. Algeria's positions towards the issue was indisputable, for it all along supported the Sahara's people in their fight for their right to self-determination.

It is fair to admit that in the 1960s and the 1970s, the Moroccan Kingdom, unlike its neighbour, was more of a pro-Western partner. To put it another way, while Algeria was a progressive country, along the line of the nationalist Nasirist ideology, the Moroccan Kingdom was rather a reactionary or a conservative monarchy that shared the positions of other Arab pro-American monarchies, such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia. This constituted a major factor in the American-Moroccan rapprochement. For Aït-Chalal [Ayat Sha'lal], it was the geo-strategic importance of Morocco that undoubtedly would justify American motivations, along with the difficulties encountered by American officials with Algerian initiatives in international arenas. This was flavoured with a breeze of concern over the political and economic consolidation of the Algerian regime and combined with personal bonds between King Hassan II and numerous American personalities.²⁹ In the view of Woodward, Morocco's strategic location at the Straits of Gibraltar, which allowed control over the western entrance of the Mediterranean Sea, stimulated the set-up in Morocco of "extensive, sensitive U. S. intelligence operations with sophisticated advanced technologies". He went further and stated that the CIA provided technical assistance, training and liaison to King Hassan II for years. More importantly, it would appear that during World War II, Vernon Walters, who was a U. S. Military Officer at that time, had met the young Crown Prince Hassan, aged thirteen years. Since then, a friendship had developed until the period 1972-76, when Walters was Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. Woodward confirmed that, what maintained King Hassan II in power since 1961 for 22 years, was the CIA assistance program which could mean survival in his opinion.³⁰ Therefore, with the exception of the mutual existing interests between the two countries, there was a further profound factor of personal bounds in the policy making circles that further enhanced the interaction between the two states.³¹

Additionally, it appears that the United States had interfered in favour of Morocco over the Western Sahara issue. Parker confirmed, in this respect, that:

“An article in the *New York Times* (December 6, 1981), reports “Congressional sources” as saying that the deputy director of the CIA, Vernon Walters, was sent to Spain by Secretary of State Kissinger in late 1975 to convince Juan Carlos to accede to Moroccan desires in the Sahara. There is circumstantial evidence, including U. S. lack of support for UN resolutions against the Green March, that lends credence to the allegation.”³²

In short, Algeria’s perception of the United States’ support to Morocco over the Sahara did not affect its position, nor did it intimidate Algeria. On the contrary, Algeria maintained its revolutionary itinerary to defend the people’s right to self-determination. The Algerian leadership asserted, in this context, that despite any attempts of defamation, Western capitalism could not deny the existence of a nation that refused to be Mauritanian, Moroccan or even Algerian.³³

Algeria’s fight against underdevelopment involved the promotion of Third World rights and a call for a cessation of exploitation of the poorest. This enhanced the emergence of a new trend of thought, which defended the right of the poorest to acquire a better living standard, even if this meant a limitation of the Western profit. It also implicated the call for a New International Economic Order.

The Algerian approach over these issues was clearly contradictory to the American conception of world order. The Algerian leader believed that the world was an unjust world; it was divided into two classes, rich and poor.

President Boumedienne explicitly expressed his discontent with capitalism. He perceived an existentialist relation between Capitalism and the Third World and vowed that, while Capitalism was in constant need of Third World natural resources and raw materials, Third World countries were also in need of its markets and that it was unacceptable for Capitalism to use its companies and monopolies on the market and be polemical over Arab oil. President Boumedienne claimed that:

“It is unacceptable for Third World countries to be treated the way they are by capitalist centres. The only way forward to finding a solution to the issue of strategic and raw materials, is a comprehensive national control of Third World resources, for it is a matter of national integrity and sovereignty.”³⁴

Accordingly, Algeria occupied the front line of the OPEC member countries, deciding to increase oil prices and also to impose an embargo on the United States of America.³⁵

One major event that highlighted the divergence of opinions and approaches to the world between Algeria and the United States was reflected in the opposition of the United States to the adoption, by the United Nations General assembly, of the Resolution 3821(XXIX), on 12 December 1974, during the 2315th plenary meeting. This was on the occasion of the 29th

Ordinary Session of the UN General Assembly in 1974, which was presided over by the Algerian Foreign Minister, Abd al-Aziz Boutaflia, who was lenient towards the adoption of the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties. This was adopted by a hundred and twenty voices, six were against, among which the United States and ten others abstained from voting.³⁶ This shed light on the irreconcilable and opposed positions and ambitions of both Algeria and the United States.

Likewise, at the Extraordinary Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York, held between 9 April and 2 May 1974, at the request of President Boumedienne, Algeria forwarded a voluminous memo entitled *le pétrole, les matière de base et le développement* (Oil, Basic Materials and Development). It witnessed dense debates but no consensus between the industrialised and the developing countries was reached, especially with regards to issues of nationalisation and indemnification, over the interaction between the bulk of producing and importing countries and over issues concerning the idea of a possible indemnification for formally colonised countries.³⁷

In the same way, attempts for a North-South dialogue never crystallised. One needs to know that the North-South dialogue was embedded by the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, held in Paris from December 1975 to June 1977, but it unfortunately did not bring about any results.

In light of the different circumstances and events that surrounded the American-Algerian relationship, it is not unrealistic to point out that Algeria's decision-making process was shaped within a strict and stubborn framework so as to achieve targeted policy outcomes that fell within a well defined ideology. It is in this context of political activity that American diplomacy failed to come to terms with the ideological horizons of Algerian foreign policy.

2.1.2 Pragmatism in Algeria's foreign policy:

The ideological conflict between Algeria and the United States did not restrain economic activities between the two countries. For President Houari Boumedienne, there was no such thing as political ideology in "our epoch"; he declared that there were interests before all.³⁸ Pragmatism presented an opportunity to Algeria to develop its economy. This did not mean that President Boumedienne had turned a blind eye to his principles and convictions. On the contrary, President Houari Boumedienne was very firm and determined to reach and accomplish his ideological inspirations; however, he knew when and how to draw a line between ideology and national interest.

It is of a paramount importance at this point to draw attention to the fact that the Algerian Constitution of 1976, evidently presented the guidelines of Algerian foreign policy in Chapter VII under the title '*Des Principes de Politique Etrangère*'. The point raised by Khalfa Mameri was the absence of "National interests" in this section. This led, henceforth, to the questioning of the extent to which "national interest" was part of Algerian foreign policy and of the

possibility that “national interest” did not forcibly constitute a component of all foreign policies.³⁹ In the case of Algeria, national interest could have been overpowered by ideology, especially when referring to Algeria’s ideological overtures.

The degree of pragmatism that prevailed in the circles of the Algerian leadership fuelled decision making in the international arena. Therefore, there was no doubt that Algerian foreign policy was being pulled in two directions; the achievement of national interest and the fight for ideological causes. In fact, despite the ideological overtures of the Boumedienne regime, as was manifested in the Constitution, the Charter and the public proclamations of leading state officials, a considerable degree of pragmatism, based on the calculation of the national interest, had been displayed in Algeria's dealings with the outside world under the Boumedienne regime. There is no better model than the American-Algerian relations to portray a consistent mixture between ideology and pragmatism in the overall Algerian foreign policy behaviour under President Houari Boumedienne. There is, however, a need to draw a line between the political and the economic grounds of interaction. Suffice to say that Algerian dealings with the United States of America were purely and merely a way for the young state to grapple with the dynamics of the world’s economic structure and, thus, was concentrated only on economic issues. As for the political aspects, Algeria strongly and radically opposed many American political choices and took drastic measures on some occasions. President Houari Boumedienne cleverly stated that there was no American-Algerian conflict, in particular. However, Algeria always opposed the policy of domination exercised by the United States. He also mentioned American threats to cancel gas contracts, which did not prevent Algeria from adopting national positions. Algeria never limited its thinking to a strictly regional extent, despite the fact that the decrease in oil prices had noticeable effects. Algeria was an independent country and its conjuncture was right. Algeria expressed opinions frankly to either the United States or the Soviet Union.⁴⁰

A number of scholars, drawing on a record of chronological policy choices, analysed the American-Algerian relationship as having been flavoured with pragmatism and they based their interpretation on a delineation of the economics from the political spheres. Nicole Grimaud referred to it not as an absolute dichotomy, but rather as an ingenious “demarcation” in which economic exchanges were authorized away from political hazards.⁴¹ Aït-Chaalal called this paradigm “découplage” between politics and economics.⁴² In other words, as mentioned by Belkheiri, economic interest, regional politics and international “atmospherics” all contributed to the moulding of a unique American-Algerian relationship.⁴³

2.2 Algeria and the Soviet Union:

It appears that the Algerian-USSR relationship was slightly more favourable and advantageous than the American-Algerian relations. The compatibility between the ideologies of the two sides carried closer political points of view and aspirations and included the fight for similar values

and ideals. Algeria was politically closer to the USSR in comparison with the United States. From the perspective of the Algerian leadership, the Soviet Union was a *friendly* country. Experiences from the past had confirmed this friendship, especially at the hardest time and despite the divergences in their points of view. More importantly, trust and responsibility were the main features that laid the ground for friendship and respect in the Soviet-Algerian relationship.⁴⁴ In fact, trust was a component of the Soviet-Algerian interaction that needed to be taken into consideration. It was a reciprocal feature between the two states. The Soviets were convinced that President Houari Boumedienne would never betray them in favour of the Americans or the French or any other Western countries given Boumedienne's strong feelings against imperialists. This could probably explain the absence of any overt signs of Russian intelligence in Algeria. In parallel, the President's unquestionable forthrightness and bluntness must have saved time and efforts for Soviet leaders and intelligence services (the 'KGB').⁴⁵ Policy analysts tend to believe that the socialist Superpower often tried to win over Non-Aligned countries on competitor grounds against the capitalist Superpower. To do so, the USSR, most of the time, ensured the compatibility of its positions to those of the Non-Aligned countries. In fact, especially with regards to colonial issues, since the mid 1970s, Soviet diplomacy opted (more consistently), alongside the Non-Aligned states in the United Nations, in order to reinforce "the image of an identity of interest of the 'socialist community' and the Non-Aligned."⁴⁶

What strengthened this relationship was probably the historical bounds and support that the Algerian Revolution had received from the USSR and the similar social system adopted by Algeria post-independence. This was emphasised by President Houari Boumedienne. That is to say that as early as 1965, Algerian foreign policy was moulded within a framework of ethics that was very similar to the USSR beliefs and morals. Although the USSR did not know what to expect from the leader who overthrew their close friend, Ahmed Ben Bella, the Soviet leadership gradually appreciated the Algerian leader.

Both sides were determined to fight imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism for the sake of "liberty", national independence, peace and pacific coexistence. Moreover, the two countries had similar attitudes towards many of the American foreign policy actions, which they both condemned in a Joint Communiqué, issued on 18 December 1965, following the visit of President Houari Boumedienne to Moscow.⁴⁷ American imperialism in South Vietnam and the United States of America's aggression against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam were regarded by both countries as a serious threat to world peace and they expressed solidarity with the Vietnamese people and required an immediate cessation of the aggression against them, along with the withdrawal of foreign troops from South Vietnam. They also called for a settlement of the Vietnamese problem on the basis of the strictest respect of the Geneva Convention of 1954. Both countries advocated the UN Declaration of 14 December 1960, with regards to the grant of independence to all countries and people under colonial domination,⁴⁸

and strongly urged the satisfaction of the legitimate aspirations of the peoples of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea, South West Africa, South Arabia, Oman, Aden and other colonies fighting for their undeniable right of independence.

Among other compatible stances was the satisfaction of both Algeria and the USSR with the news of a ceasefire between India and Pakistan, and their hope for better relations between the two countries. More importantly was the Palestinian issue, which stole the limelight in the Algerian political agenda and to which the USSR declared, explicitly, its support for Arab states' efforts against aggressive and imperialist forces which manoeuvred in a way to worsen the situation in the Middle East and, hence, prevent a settlement of the problem, in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Organisation. Allison believed that:

“Soviet leaders were confident that they could steer the anti-colonial radicalism of non-aligned states along channels which would set the Non-Aligned Movement in coordination with the Soviet camp into some kind of structural opposition to the Western powers.”⁴⁹

That is to say that the Soviet Union's policy was not always proven very compatible with the Arab cause, thus provoking anger and concern on the Algerian side. In an interview with Faek Dizdarevitch, Special Envoy of the Yugoslav Radio Television, President Houari Boumedienne mentioned that:

“The existence of a Socialist Camp had played a great role in encouraging liberation currents in the world, yet solidarity between proletarians of the planet was far from being effective everywhere.”⁵⁰

President Houari Boumedienne went further and asserted that none of the Superpowers was decided to be directly involved in the defence of Third World countries' interests. Probably the most disappointing position undertaken by the USSR was the reticence and cautiousness, in the June war of 1967, to provide military support against the Israeli forces and to be more favourable for a diplomatic solution and an end to the war, which was regarded by the Arab world as an admission of defeat and surrender. In fact, Soviet-Algerian relations had known anxiousness and tense pressure, in particular during the two Wars of 1967 and 1973. President Houari Boumedienne flew three times to the Moscow. His first visit of 12 June 1967 was an opportunity for him to express his anger and disappointment towards the absence of Soviet influence in the battleground, and the dearth of any Soviet reaction to the incurred Arab defeat, with the exception of statements and communiqués. He related the Arab weakness to Soviet weakness.⁵¹ Thirty five days later, on 17 July 1973, President Houari Boumedienne flew back to the Soviet Union, accompanied by Abd al-Rahman Arif, the Iraqi President. They were faced with a stubborn Soviet position in favour of diplomatic settlements, which supported the project of a UN resolution, a fact that further nourished Boumedienne's questioning of the Soviet position towards the issue. For Boumedienne, the ending of the state of war meant an

operational surrender to Israeli-American conditions. For Brezhnev, it was a different matter, for he saw the ending of the state of war as a different matter from the signing of an agreement with Israel, as the former action would not involve the developing of political or diplomatic relations with Israel.⁵² For Algeria, the USSR's set-back on Third World issues was clearly gradual and imminent. In his meeting with Brezhnev, the Algerian leader warned the USSR of being close to the way out from the Third World. He referred to their set-back in Cuba, Angola and the Vietnam and their current set-back in a major conflict in the Middle East.

The overall Soviet Union attitude toward the Arab issue, especially at war time, was qualified by Algeria as a 'USSR betrayal'.⁵³ Yet, such behaviour should not be surprising to the Algerian leadership, as the Soviet Union had always expressed reservations to enter the Arab battlefield against the United States and its allies, as happened in 1956. Haykal documented that a "nuclear war" constituted the grounds for the USSR not to present operational assistance to Egypt, as vowed by the Soviet Prime Minister, Khrushchev, to the Syrian President Shukri Al-Quwwatli.⁵⁴ Likewise, in an epoch of peaceful coexistence, Moscow explicitly expressed concerns over a nuclear confrontation.⁵⁵ A confrontation between the USSR and the United States might lead to a nuclear war, a matter that the USSR was dreading and fearful of happening. Clearly, the USSR mirrored flexibility in its politics and idealised peaceful and political options, favouring the UN Resolution 242, to which President Houari Boumedienne was opposed. Nevertheless, no one could deny the material assistance provided by the Soviet Union to the Arabs, though, in the context of the 1973 war, there was some hesitation in weapon transaction between the Algerian leader and the USSR.⁵⁶

In the context of Algeria's Non-Alignment policy and the fight for peoples' rights to self determination, it would be hypocritical and contradictory to observe Algeria's passiveness towards "the Prague Spring" when Soviet troops invaded Czechoslovakia and the stationing there of Soviet troops and those of some other allies of the Warsaw pact, in August 1968. More shocking was Algeria's abstention in most decisions condemning the Soviet Union's intervention in Czechoslovakia.⁵⁷ Lassassi explained that Algeria's attitude was a reaction against Western hypocrisy towards implementing principles of self-determination, non-interference and freedom in some geographical areas.⁵⁸

One could argue that Algeria's rejection of inconsistent Western foreign policy was the grounds for the state's abstention in the case of Czechoslovakia, yet Algeria's strong devotion to liberation movements and antagonism to all forms of imperialism should have prompted an opposition against Soviet intervention. This bent in Algerian devotion to Non-Alignment principles could have been well fuelled by a survival instinct in the international system. From a realist approach, President Houari Boumedienne could not afford to go against the USSR, given the influence of the latter and the military support it provided Algeria with, especially at a time when diplomatic relations with the other Superpower were severed. That is to say that Algeria's approach to the issue was far from being emotional but, on the contrary, it was patterned in the

direction of self-orientation and functional requirement to ramify survival. Not surprisingly, this state passivity was very much ushered in by the incumbents of a bipolar world and the upsurge of peaceful coexistence. This could be regarded as a contradicting point in President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy. It could also be depicted as a flagrant contradiction in his ideological drives. In this case, ideology had played a key role in serving Algeria's best interest. Such a view would apply to the partition of the world into a core and periphery countries and would rank Algeria as a socialist satellite. Theoretically, we could advocate Realpolitik to provide a rationale for Algeria's foreign policy and frame it within calculations based on policy actions that would best serve the state's interest. This would have gone along with Waltz's assumption, as he asserted that: "success is the ultimate test of policy, and success is defined as preserving and strengthening the state."⁵⁹

3. Algeria and Western Europe:

The relationship between Algeria and Western Europe dated back, in time, to centuries ago, given the geographical location which made Western Europe the nearest Continent to Algeria, and as a result of historical interaction between the two regions.

For effective interaction with Western Europe, President Houari Boumedienne believed that the Europeans needed to undergo 'a mental decolonisation' and alter the way they perceived the less developed countries.

Despite an effective decolonisation process and the independence of many ex-colonies, the concept of newly independent countries remained fresh and difficult to conceive for ex-colonisers. Similarly, it was of paramount importance for Algeria not to undergo a new form of colonialism.

In an interview with Paul Balta, President Houari Boumedienne asserted:

"The condition behind achieving unity with Europe would be for the Continent to achieve a 'mental decolonisation' and accept the emergence of African and Arab states and their important role in the world of politics."⁶⁰

Further to the 'mental decolonisation', Western Europe needed to undergo a 'mental reconversion' where the other side of the Mediterranean would finally understand and appreciate the existing neighbourhood and complementary character of the relationship between Europe and the Arab countries. This would also allow the establishment of profitable cooperation between the two sites. In fact, President Houari Boumedienne had always aspired to seeing the emergence of a new force or a new bloc that would be in the middle of the two great powers and whose materialisation rested on collaboration and complementarity.⁶¹ This would facilitate the creation of a system that was likely to utilise the capital of producing countries and the industrial potentialities and techniques of Western Europe, in order to rid underdevelopment and emancipate the deprived zones. To do so, it was necessary, according to President Houari Boumedienne, to see a change in mentality and engage in an Arabo-European dialogue and

ultimately hold a summit between head of states and governments of the two parties, in order to discuss all available possibilities for cooperation.⁶²

Algeria's relations with Western Europe, under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership, were basically of an economic nature. They had to respond to many requirements in order to be effective. These prerequisites constituted the skeleton of Algeria's dealings with Western Europe. For the Algerian side, sound West European-Algerian relations required the Europeans, first of all, to undergo a 'mental decolonisation', then to abide by the principles of cooperation and mutual interests.

It is intriguing to see that Third World interests constituted an integral part of Algerian-Western European relations. The Algerian leader explicitly declared that Algeria's relationship with the European Market and the European Economic Union (EEU) depended on Europe itself. In other words, it rested on whether the European Union was aiming at defending its only interests, regardless of the Third World, or that the EU was aiming at adopting a balanced policy that would take into consideration the interests of the developing world, including Algeria.⁶³

Amongst Western European countries, France represented Algeria's most important partner. Firstly, this was because of the historical ties that developed between the two nations over the years of colonisation. Secondly, this was as a result of the mutual dependency developed primarily through economics. Let us say that Algeria largely depended on French expertise and savoir-faire to start off an independent free economy and, in parallel, France needed to have continuous free access to Algeria's natural resources. Yet, many alterations to Algeria's development policy and intentions to relinquish economic dependency affected the French-Algerian relationship and led to tension and turbulence in the bilateral interaction. In an interview with Italian Radio and Television, President Houari Boumedienne admitted that:

"French-Algerian relations had gone through various stages and different crises. The latest of these was oil-oriented. French-Algerian relations had reached normality, only because the bilateral relation was primarily relying on the principle of cooperation which, in turn, was based on reciprocal interests."⁶⁴

In addition, Algeria had always pictured the stability of the Mediterranean region as an ultimate aspiration. It is in this context that good relations with Europe meant the guarantee of safety and peace in the Mediterranean for Boumedienne, so as to create the adequate conditions for economic, scientific and cultural interchange between the two sides of the Mediterranean. Henceforth, the Algerian President called for a withdrawal of all military bases, especially after the initiation of *peaceful coexistence* between the two Superpowers, and required the provision of a sound basis for an effective cooperation between neighbouring countries around the Mediterranean.

Notes:

¹ Fred Halliday, "The Middle East, the Great Powers, and the Cold War," in Yezid Sayigh and Avi Shlaim (eds.), The Cold War and the Middle East (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 13-5.

² Fawaz A. Gerges, The Superpowers and the Middle East: Regional and International Politics, 1955-1967 (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1994), 217.

³ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Decembre 1974, Tome V. (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 1. [Speeches of President Boumediene: 2 July 1973-3 December 1973.]

⁴ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Houwāri Boumediene: 2 Juwilya 1973 - 3 Decembre 1974, Part V (Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 344. [Speeches of President Houari Boumediene: 2 July 1973-3 December 1974.]

⁵ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Houwāri Boumediene: 2 Juwilya 1973 - 3 Decembre 1974, Part V (Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 344. [Speeches of President Houari Boumediene: 2 July 1973-3 December 1974.]

*ICBM: intercontinental ballistic missile; SLBM: submarine-launched ballistic missile.
(author's note)

⁶ Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson and Michael Joseph, 1979), 56.

⁷ Ali Rahalya, Al Yawm al Akhir (Algiers: Mouassassat al Shourouq, 2000), 102.

⁸ Fawaz Gerges, op. cit. 219.

⁹ El-Moudjahid, 30-September to 1 October 1973.

¹⁰ République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Liberation Nationale, Charte Nationale 1976, 104.

¹¹ Al-Sha'b, 15 January 1974.

¹² The Democratic Peoples Republic of Algeria: The Presidency, Al-Tasrihāt al-Sahafiyya li al-Raiis Houwāri Boumediene: Raiis Majlis al-thawra wa raiis Majlis al-wuzarā' (The Presidency: Directorate of Information, 1973), 10.

¹³ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire. Discours du Président Boumediene: 19 Juin 1965-19 Juin 1970, Tome I (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1970), 481.

¹⁴ Ibid: 481.

¹⁵ The Democratic Peoples Republic of Algeria: The Presidency, Al Tasrihaat al-Sahafiyya Li Al-Raiis Houari Boumediene, March 1973, 11.

¹⁶ Front de Libération Nationale, Projet de Programme Pour la Réalisation de la Révolution Démocratique Populaire (adopté par le C. N. R. A à Tripoli en Juin 1962), 47-50.

¹⁷ "Communiqué Commun publiée à l'issue de la visite officielle en Algérie de Madame Nguyen Thi Binh Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement Révolutionnaire Provisoire

de la République du Sud Vietnam,” in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La Politique Etrangères de l’Algérie: 1965-1971. Service de Presse et d’Information (no publication date), 265.

¹⁸Article 92 in République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Front de Libération Nationale, Constitution 1976, 36.

¹⁹ Ibid. 36.

²⁰ Nicole Grimaud, La Politique Extérieure de l’Algérie (Paris: KARTHALA, 19884), 150.

²¹ Philip J. Akre, “Algeria and the Politics of Energy-Based Industrialization,” in John P. Entelis and Phillip C. Naylor (eds.), State and Society in Algeria (Boulder; Oxford: Westview Press, 1992), 83.

²² Nicole Grimaud, op. cit. 151.

²³ Interview with Ottman Sa’di, in Reportage on President Houari Boumedienne, produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana, Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA), ‘Ala Athaar Boumedienne’ documentary, part two (Foreign Policy) (Algiers, March 1990), 01 hour 30 minutes.

²⁴ Nicole Grimaud, op.cit. 151.

²⁵ Interview with Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, on 28 December 2003, at the Senate in Algiers (Conseil de la Nation).

²⁶ Nicole Grimaud, op. cit.144.

²⁷ “Communiqué Commun publiée à l’issue de la visite officielle en Algérie de Madame Nguyen Thi Binh Ministre des Affaire Etrangères du Gouvernement Révolutionnaire Provisoire de la République du Sud Vietnam,” in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La Politique Etrangères de l’Algérie: 1965-1971, Service de Presse et d’Information (no publication date), 264-5.

²⁸ Amine Aït-Chaalal, L’Algérie, Les Etats-Unis et la France: Des Discours a L’action (Paris: PUBLISUD, 2000), 121.

²⁹ Ibid. 125.

³⁰ Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA1981-1987 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), 308.

³¹ Not that we mean that *sentiments* had steered American-Moroccan relationship, but the fact is that, the United States was in a position where it had to offer support to either: President Boumedienne, with his hostile opposition to American policies, or King Hassan, with his pro-American views and bond with American officials; the option was clear!

³² Richard Parker, North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns (New York: Praeger, 1987), 126.

³³ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. Khutab al-Raiis Boumedienne: 01 Janvier 1976- 18 December 1976, Part VII (Algiers: Ministry of information and Culture, 1977), 11. [Speeches of the President Boumedienne: 01 January 1976- 18 December 1976.]

³⁴The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, Khutab al-Raiis Houwāri Boumediene: 2 Juwilya 1973 - 3 December 1974, Part V (Algiers: Ministry of Information and Culture, 1974), 345.

³⁵ Aït-Chaalal, op. cit. 119.

³⁶ The six members against the resolution were: The United States, Great Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Belgium and Luxembourg. Among the ten abstentions were: Canada, France, Italy, Japan and the Netherlands, Austria, Ireland, Norway, Spain and Israel. See: Nicole Grimaud, op. cit. 312.

³⁷ Aït Chaalal, op. cit. 121-2.

³⁸République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Decembre 1974, Tome V. (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 123.

³⁹ Khalfa Mameri, Réflexions sur la Constitutions Algérienne (Alger: Société Nationale d'Édition et de Diffusion, 1979), 67.

⁴⁰République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Decembre 1974, Tome V. (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 123.

⁴¹ Nicole Grimaud, op.cit. 4.

⁴² Aït-Chaalal, op.cit. 232.

⁴³ Abdelkrim Belkheiri, US-Algerian Relations, 1954-1980: Balance between Interest and Principle. PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 1987, 433.

⁴⁴République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Decembre 1974, Tome V. (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture. Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 345.

⁴⁵ Ali Rahalya, op.cit. 41-42

Rahalya mentions, with regards to the presence of Soviet intelligence in Algeria that Christopher Andrew did not find any information that the Soviets had spied on Algeria as much as they did on Egypt, India and Cuba, and other Soviet allies and friends. See p 41.

⁴⁶ Roy Allison, The Soviet Union and the strategy of non-alignment in the Third World (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998), 90.

⁴⁷ “Communiqué Commun publiée a l'issue de la visite officielle du président Houari Boumediene en URSS, Moscou le 18 Décembre 1965,” in Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. La Politique Etrangère de l'Algérie, Service de Presse et d'Information. (no publication date), 14

⁴⁸ United Nations, General Assembly, Resolution 1514 (XV): Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples,

www.un.org/Depts/dpi/decolonization/docs/res1514.htm [last accessed 27/08/2003].

⁴⁹ Roy Allison, op. cit. 45.

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- ⁵⁰ El Moudjahid, (Algiers) 03 September 1973. See also: République Algérienne Démocratique et populaire, Discours du Président Boumediene: 2 Juillet 1973-3 Décembre 1974, Tome V (Alger: Ministère de l'Information et de la Culture, Direction de la Documentation et des Publications, 1975), 61. [Speeches of President Boumedienne: 2 July 1973-3 December 1973.]
- ⁵¹ Ali Rahalya, op. cit. 157.
- ⁵² Quoting from the Memoirs of Mahmoud Riadh, former Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister in Ali Rahalya, op. cit. 166.
- ⁵³ Nicole Grimaud, op.cit. 126.
- ⁵⁴ Muhammad Hasanayn Haykal, Harb al-Thalaathin Sanah: Malaffat al-Suways (Cairo: Markaz al Ahram Li Al-Tarjamah wa al- Nashr, 1986), 553.
- ⁵⁵ The issue of a nuclear confrontation was raised by Khrushchev in the war of 1956 and was also raised by Brezhnev in the 1967 war, during President Houari Boumedienne's visit. Quoted in the Memoir of Mahmoud Riadh, former Egyptian Foreign Affairs Minister in Ali Rahalya, op. cit. 168.
- ⁵⁶ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, Ayyām ma'a al Raiis Houwāri Boumedienne wa Dhikrayāt Okhrā, Third Edition (Algiers: MOUFEM, 2000), 157.
- ⁵⁷ At its meeting, on 22 August 1968, the UN Security Council decided to adjourn for consultations on the question of Czechoslovakia until 5pm. This was adopted by 10 votes against none, with five abstentions, among which was Algeria. See: United Nations Documents, Security Council, Resolutions 1968: Question Concerning Czechoslovakia. <http://www.ods-dds-ny.un.org> [last accessed 30/12/2003].
- ⁵⁸ Assassi Lassassi, Non-Alignment and Algerian Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Averbury, 1988), 159.
- ⁵⁹ Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 117.
- ⁶⁰ El Moudjahid, 5 September 1973.
- ⁶¹ République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Présidence, Interviews du Président Houari Boumedienne: 2-12-1974, 15-1-1975, 31-1-1975, 7.
- ⁶² Ibid. 8.
- ⁶³ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, The Presidency, Al-Tasrihāt al-Sahafiyya li al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne: Raiis Majlis al-Thawra wa Raiis Majlis al-Wuzarā', Directorate of Information. March 1973, 11.
- ⁶⁴ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria. The Presidency, Al-Tasrihaat al-Sahafiya li Al-Raiis Huwāri Boumedienne: Raiis Majlis al-Thawra wa Raiis Majlis al-Wuzarā'. Directorate of Information. March 1973, 10.

PART FOUR:

The Individual Level of Analysis.

Chapter Nine

Ideological Influences on President Houari Boumedienne.

1. Early Influences on Houari Boumedienne:

President Houari Boumedienne, originally called Mohamed BOUKHARROUBA, was regarded as one of Algeria's most influential leaders. His strong-minded attitude and decisive leadership granted the Algerian nation the hope to see a better future. He was a very motivated, virtuous and persevering man who knew both what he desired and what to expect from the coloniser. "Sincere and beyond any suspicion in his convictions," as described by Benyoub, "the president was a prisoner of his own personality, his past and his courtship."¹ He was a very secretive political figure, and very little is known about his childhood. President Houari Boumedienne came from a very modest family where he grew up in poor conditions and thus was unfamiliar with any aspect of a rich and wealthy life.

He joined the Quranic School at the age of three, and at the age of six, started primary school before joining the KATANIA mosque, in restless efforts to quench his thirst for knowledge. It was then that he joined the *Parti du Peuple Algérien* of Messali Hajj-PPA- without being a prominent member. He then nourished a will to go and study at the famous Al Azhar University in Cairo, Egypt, where he studied for two years and then joined Al Khaldounia College for two years.

In Egypt, Arabism was well enrooted in the cities and Arab literature was available to anyone. Boumedienne arrived in Egypt at a time when the monarchy of king Farouq was being overthrown on 26 July 1952 by the Free Officer Movement aiming at launching a revolution against the leading class which was totally indifferent to foreign occupation of the country, as stressed by Khalfa Mameri.² His political thought developed in an atmosphere of revolution and resistance. President Houari Boumedienne, aged twenty at that time, could see how the Egyptian people lived in extreme poverty. He could also see that part of the Egyptian territory (the region of the Suez Canal which was one of the richest) was occupied by Great Britain. Furthermore, Houari Boumedienne understood that the leading class was totally indifferent to the misery of the people as well as to the British occupation. The objectives of the revolution were all clear. These were to free Egypt and its people from occupation and misery.

The first contact he made upon his arrival to Egypt was with the "Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques" (M.T.L.D) or the offices of the 'Maghreb Arabe'. He also had connections with the movement of the 'free officers' and apart from studying, he participated in military training with Egyptian commandos and learned the use of weapons and explosives.³ He loved Egypt and its peoples, not only because he studied there but undoubtedly because he

learned to stand up for his rights and defend his opinions. Muhyi al-Deen 'Amimour narrated the experience Boumedienne went through at a police station in Egypt where he was detained for few hours for supporting students in their call for grants increases; he was not concerned at all and knew the risks he was taking by opposing a foreign diplomatic institution.

Boumedienne's choice to go to Cairo was both cultural and political. It was a cultural choice because Cairo was the hub of culture and enlightenment, and it was a political choice as a result of vigorous political activities taking place there. Boumedienne knew that the attempts to isolate and confine Egypt were attempts to colonise it even by its own people.⁴ Above all, Boumedienne's voyage to Cairo was partially to run away from military service under the French, after he was called in 1951 to carry it out. Yet, another reason was his need to develop and cultivate himself. His experience in Egypt must have influenced his thinking, consequently developing his revolutionary ideas. Boumedienne witnessed the Egyptian Revolution led by Jamal Abd al-Nasir, a social revolution targeting the elimination of the coloniser's influence and an international revolution that would allow the Arab world to recover its influence in the world. Lutfi Al Khuly believed that his stay in Cairo had influenced his perception and had developed his thinking into linking the Maghrib to the Mashriq and towards linking liberation movements in the Arab world and in the Third World as a whole.⁵

It is of paramount importance to understand that President Houari Boumedienne's personality and thoughts were the product of the environment in which he grew up. His political thoughts and even personal ways of thinking matured within a series of developments and events that highly affected his life and that he witnessed throughout his childhood and youth. Boumedienne's determination to fight the enemy was the result of the discrimination and the injustice against Algerians, as they were deprived of education and, more importantly, denied their cultural identity, particularly with the teaching of Arabic being disallowed in schools. This appears to have pushed Boukharouba to resent the coloniser and motivated him to prepare for, and contribute to, the War of Liberation. At a more personal level, Boukharrouba was the son of a *fellah*, he saw his father's fertile lands in Guelma confiscated, following the French conquest of Algeria, and who was compelled, as a result, to seek work at the colons like his other compatriots. Boukharrouba was born on 23 August 1932 in the municipality of Biklozil, 23km from Guelma. The region was very famous for colonial refusal, rebellions and insurrections. Juliette Minces narrates that he was only seven years old when the Second World War started and, as for many Algerians, the rumour regarding the defeat of France was an eye-opener.⁶ At the age of thirteen, President Houari Boumedienne had personally witnessed the events of the 8 May 1945, during which he was injured in his neck.

During the events of 8 May 1945, Algerians clearly learned the lesson of never to trust the French again, especially after this day, where forty five thousand Algerians were killed, a true genocide.

In reality, France promised Algerians independence if they were to win the war against Germany. Following victory, the Algerians were disappointed and deceived. On 8 May 1945, demonstrations were organised to claim independence and denounce French colonialism. These turned into a violent uprising. Algerians now understood that freedom needed to be fought for. In this context, President Houari Boumedienne declared:

“This day, I prematurely grew older; the teenager that I was became a man whose world toppled down. On this day, children understood the need to fight in order to gain freedom.”⁷

This particular incident must have greatly influenced his thinking of the French coloniser and might highlight the choice of President Houari Boumedienne to move in 1948, to Constantine and to study at the Katania. The Katania School was under the influence of the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), which was claiming national independence instead of joining other schools related to the Ulama. One needs to bear in mind that Boukharrouba preferred joining the school that competed with Ibn Badiss' School, especially given that the region of Constantine was the homeland of Ibn Badiss, the founder of the Ulama.

It is important to mention at this stage that prior to the War of Liberation, three nationalist trends had fought for the indigenes' rights.

There was the North African Organisation, known as the “Étoile Nord Africaine” (ENA). It gathered Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians. The first meeting in 1926 called for the organisation of a fight for the independence of the three countries of North Africa as early as 1928.

Jaques Simon observed that the history of the party evolved in a double geographic atmosphere and witnessed, besides, a periodisation. The legal period was from 1937 to 1939, the clandestine period from 1940 till 1942, and the third period led to the unsuccessful revolution in May 1945.⁸

In 1931, a group of wise men in Algeria founded the Association of Muslim Ulama. This was an official association to serve religious purposes. It was headed by Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis who was clear about the association non-political aspect.⁹

The Ulama Association contributed to getting the Algerian problem out of a state of isolation by issuing two magazines, al-Shihaab and al-Bassaer. The first of these was widespread in Morocco.¹⁰ Ahmed Mahsas explained that, although the cultural and religious contribution of the Association of Muslim Ulama was appreciated deeply, its policy cannot be considered as independent, even though it claimed the affirmation of the Algerian individuality.¹¹ Benjamin Stora advocated that, although Ben Badis had expressed his satisfaction with the *Blum-*

*Viollette*¹² project and with the integration of the Muslim community within a ‘big French family’, the failure of this project, accompanied with the events of 1945, had oriented the Ulama towards an independent path.¹³

On 11 March 1937, Messali announced the birth of the “Parti du Peuple Algerien” (PPA), which stands for the Party of Algerian Peoples. This party was against “assimilation” and claimed the sovereignty of Algerian people, and moreover, total emancipation.¹⁴ What Messali Hajj was trying to achieve through the party was the opportunity for Algerians to rule over their own lands, and prevent exploitation by settlers, who denied their identities and rights to education and self-determination. This was due to the fact that France was claiming French Algeria (*l’Algérie Française*), and denied the Algerians the rights to learn and practice their religion.

The M.T.L.D was created in 1946 by Messali Hajj, following the line of the Étoile Nord Africaine and the Parti du Peuple Algerien. In the same year, Ferhat Abbas created a party aimed at forming a state in association with France, and which claimed the autonomy of Algeria, l’Union Démocratique du Manifeste Algérien (UDMA). Two years later, in 1948, The Special Organisation ‘OS’ was founded, a paramilitary organisation that was the core of the upcoming “Armée de Liberation Nationale” (ALN).¹⁵

It seems that ENA had paved the way for internationalising the Algerian issue through the unremitting pioneering of its leading figures. Messali Hajj succeeded in giving the Algerian issue international dimensions by participating in the anti-colonial congress which took place in Brussels between the 10 and 13 February 1927. The congress gathered 175 representatives as mentioned by Jacque Simon, among 107 of which were from colonised countries.¹⁶ In this congress, Messali condemned the exploitation and brutal oppression of the Algerian people which led them to slavery and regression. He also shed light on the colonising political system that had destroyed all previous forms of Muslim democracy that prevailed prior to colonisation, and denounced *le code de l’indigénat*,¹⁷ which deprived all indigenes of their political rights, thus turning them into submissive subjects. At this international conference, the General Director of ENA outspokenly requested, among other requirements, the independence of Algeria, the withdrawal of French occupying troops, freedom of speech and equal political rights.¹⁸ Further to that, Messali often addressed international institutions and brought to light facts about French colonialism, as was done in a letter addressed to the Secretary General of the League of Nations in Geneva in January 1930, depicting the poor conditions of life for Algerians.¹⁹

From an early stage, President Houari Boumedienne was more lenient towards the PPA rather than the Ulama or the UMDA. This shows his early tendencies towards total independence and emancipation. President Houari Boumedienne developed an affinity towards the PPA’s aspirations which were more lenient towards total independence.

Moreover, having received a Quranic education since an early age, he was dazzled with the glorious Islamic civilisation and the splendid Arab history. His model was the Prophet Mohammed (Peace be upon him) and he also admired the Khalifa Omar Ibn al-Khattab, for his thirst for social justice, his austerity and his teachings on persevering; then there was Mu'awiya, who was exemplary in managing political affairs during the Umayyad rule.²⁰ Moreover, Amimour mentioned the Amir Abd al-Karim al-Khattabi, a hero of the Moroccan riff and Moroccan struggle and another prominent figure, Malik Ibn Nabi, who was an Islamic scholar who produced different writings. The factor that attracted President Houari Boumedienne's interest the most was his theory on colonial acceptance.²¹ President Houari Boumedienne nurtured nationalist ideas. Coupled with his resentment towards domineering France, which was intensifying, Boumedienne followed the lines of Jamal Abd al-Nasir, in an endless struggle with coloniser.

At an early stage in 1955, Mohamed Boukharouba took to the maquis. He contributed to the convoy of weapons bought in contraband by the FLN to the Algerian-Moroccan frontiers from Alexandria, on board the 'Princess Dina' yacht. This was the first effort at gun-running by the FLN in February 1955 with the assistance of Jordan. The *délégation extérieur* contacted Milon Bachich, a Yugoslavian national, in order to smuggle arms and weapons aboard the 'Princess Dina's yacht belonging to the Queen of Jordan.

This was an exhausting journey that lasted 35 days and that was successfully achieved with his arrival in Algeria from the Moroccan Riff. The adventure was described by Juliette Minces as the opportunity to meet Mohamed Boudiaf, who was the political and military official of the whole West-Algerian side. The latter introduced him to Boussouf, who was General at the National Liberation Army (ALN) of whom he became adjoined. It was then in 1955 that Boukharrouba adopted the pseudonym Boumedienne.²² It was probably because of his good organisation, discretion and his bilingualism and education (gained during the military training in Cairo), that Boumedienne managed to climb the military ladder rapidly and outstandingly. He was appointed the head of the *liaison and intelligence* sector and carried on rising in the ranks of the military organisation. By 1957, Boumedienne was to lead the fifth region (Wilaya V). He accordingly became the youngest colonel in the Algerian army at the age of 25. In 1958, he was appointed Chief of General Staff in the western region. Furthermore, following the meeting of the Conseil National de la Revolution Algerienne (C. N. R. A) in 1960, where it was decided to establish provisional institutions to run the Algerian state, and to define the role of the FLN and appoint a headquarter for the Algerian Liberation Army (ALN), Boumedienne was appointed at the head. Accordingly, in January 1960 he was the Chief of the Army Headquarters. Houari Boumedienne was the first man with Boussouf to provide Wilaya V with radio recorders and hence, make communication possible despite the borders imposed by France. Boumedienne welcomed all initiatives and measures that aimed at promoting the army.

The contribution of Houari Boumedienne to the War of Independence and his entire devotion to the revolutionary principles could not influence less his military oriented policy during his ruling (1965-1978). In 1956, he joined the fifth region in the partition of the “National Liberation Movement” (ALN) in the western circumscription of Algeria and, owing to his bravery and courage, he took command of the fifth Wilaya in 1957. He was chief of headquarters or, in other words, head of the general command of the National Liberation Army by 1960, a role that allowed him to reorganise and structure the (ALN). According to the writings of M’hamed Yasfi, Houari Boumedienne presided over one martial court in 1959 and issued orders to execute two colonels and four commanders, along with a captain in the headquarters on the grounds of treason.²³ After independence, Boumedienne stayed faithful to the Army; he was appointed Minister of Defence under Ben Bella’s regime and took over the position of the Head of the Council of Ministers on 17 May 1963.²⁴ This demonstrated the harsh and strong character of Boumedienne’s personality, which was more than appropriate for a military man and hence his excellent profile to represent and lead the army. President Houari Boumedienne’s military vocation was going to shape his future national policies in post-independence Algeria. Boumedienne granted the army a very important role in Algeria’s politics and kept it active in the political arena. He believed that it was the militaries who freed the country and therefore they needed to contribute to the state-building process.

Extremely bitter about the French occupation, and highly influenced by Quoranic teachings since an early age, Boumedienne grew up to love his fatherland and cherish the cultural heritage, in particular his national tongue (Arabic). The main impetus to join the armed forces was struggling to liberate Algeria and fighting for his beliefs and national moral values to prevail in post independence Algeria. His modesty and humbleness made him avoid parading and public appearances in particular, shortly after taking over the reins of leadership in 1965. It was only when he felt he needed the masses support that he embarked on gaining his peoples support, which made him gradually less feared and austere.

2. Wider Influences on Boumedienne:

At an international level, Boumedienne devoted his foreign policy to the fight against underdevelopment and imperialism, whilst simultaneously supporting international cooperation. Working very closely with his Foreign Minister, Abd al-Aziz Boutafliqa, President Houari Boumedienne, influenced by Ho Chi Minh ideas and the socialist Abu Dher El Ghefari, was successful in giving Algeria an international weight and a leading position in the Muslim, Arab and Third Worlds. Foreign policy during President Houari Boumedienne’s rule was to be realistic and interest oriented, as clearly expressed by the Council of Revolution, and based

upon the principles of the revolution stated in the Tripoli Programme and reiterated in the Charter.²⁵ Benyoub mentioned that Boumedienne replaced Jamal Abd al-Nasir of Egypt as the Arab world leader after the latter's death in 1970, and he became one of the most influential personalities in the Third Worlds. Such an achievement was the result of Algeria's position and FLN support for the Arab cause and liberation movements.²⁶ During his leadership, Boumedienne had the opportunity to meet many of the world's exceptional and influential personalities, such as Mao Tsi Tung of China and Bhuto of Pakistan. Boumedienne had a special interest in sustaining a relationship with Bhuto, given Boumedienne's interest in a likely nuclear cooperation between the two countries, bearing in mind Bhuto's special interest in this field. Unfortunately, the Algerian-French relationship was less successful. Muhyi al-Deen Amimour described the first official visit of President Giscard D'Estaing in March 1973, which proved President Houari Boumedienne's mistaken view that, starting with a clean slate, the relationship with France would help the rise of a new economic world order. He also hoped that the *ex-métropole* would understand the necessity of working in cooperation in order to achieve a political and economic balance. i.e. a reconciliation similar to the French-German reconciliation.²⁷ In this respect, Aït-Chaalal mentioned the dense influence in Algeria of two countries, from politico-ideological and strategic aspects, namely, France and the United States. France's influence was due to political, geographical, historical and socio-economics reasons. The US influence was due to its being a Superpower, whose foreign policy was a major element in the international arena, especially during the period (1965-1991) during which Algeria was frequently confronted with the American governments international actions, attitudes, options and positions.²⁸

With respect to the USSR, it was sceptical about the new government that toppled Ben Bella and claimed legitimacy of power, reasons which resulted in the Russians politically distancing themselves from Algeria.

Between 1965 and 1967, the leadership of the country, headed by Boumedienne, was far more concerned with the strengthening of its authority and the building of strong state institutions through what appeared to be an authoritarian regime. Once such an objective was completed, as proven by the failure of the attempted coup of Zubayri, Boumedienne campaigned for the building of the state's economic infrastructures, launching the quadriennial plan, supporting the Agricultural Revolution, introducing new state's institutions, and finally by adopting a constitution to culminate in the edification of a democratic state. The adoption of a new constitution was meant to legitimise the national policy approaches that were chosen after the coup and that were to portray the picture of a constitutional democratic state that backed the socialist choice.

Anissa Boumedienne insisted on that President Houari Boumedienne was not influenced by any political system in his state-building of the Algerian state. President Houari Boumedienne

believed in Algerian authenticity and, hence, Algerian socialism was not influenced by Western socialism. President Houari Boumedienne wanted Algerian socialism to be a specific model that took into account the Algerian people and Algeria's capabilities.²⁹

From another perspective, economists attribute President Houari Boumedienne's economic development planning and the inevitable introduction of hydrocarbons to the national economy to inspirational and influential works that complied with his beliefs and aspirations. The threefold strategy of industrialisation, the integration of domestic industry within the nation, and the rejection of foreign influences, implemented by Boumedienne as part of his development policy, was pictured by Patrick Conway, as highly influenced by the prominent economists, François Perroux and G. Destanne de Bernis. Patrick Conway also related the Algerian close economy to the work of Samir Amin, who identified a dependent economy as one where export goods and luxury consumer goods were dominant sectors, in contrast to a self-reliant economy in which producer goods and necessities were dominant sectors.³⁰

In short, one can only confirm that historical momentum had a great influence on President Houari Boumedienne. The maturation of his thoughts and his policy orientations were going to be highly affected by his past. That is to say that historical momentum moulded his ideological preferences which acted as an input into his foreign policy making process.

Notes :

- ¹ Rachid Benyoub, Algeria 2002: Political Directory (Algiers: Agence Nationale de l'Édition et de Publicité, 2002), 173.
- ² Khalfa Mameri, Houari Boumediene (Algiers: Editions Karim Mameri, 1999), 14.
- ³ Talk by Mohamed Al Salah Shirouf, friend of President Houari Boumediene, in the 13 Seminar, Houari Boumediene: Al Hukm Al Ráshid, held between 27 to 30 December 200, in Algiers, at the University of Houari Boumediene.
- ⁴ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, Al Tajriba wa al Joudhour: Hiwar Mutawwal (Algiers: Dar al-Umma, 1993), 69-70
- ⁵ Interview with Lutfi Al Khouly in 'Radio-Télévision Algérienne (RTA). Reportage on President Houari Boumediene, produced by Madani Amer and Majid Slamana. 'ala Athaar Boumediene. Part II (foreign policy), Algiers, March 1990. 01 hour 30 minutes.
- ⁶ Juliette Minces, l'Algérie de Boumediène (Paris: Presse de la Cité, 1978), 36.
- ⁷ The Peoples Democratic Republic of Algeria, The Presidency, Al-Tasrihāt al- Sahafiyya li al-Raiis Huwāri Boumediene: Raiis Majlis al-Thawra wa Raiis Majlis al-Wuzarā'. (Algeirs: Directorate of Information, 1973), 8.
- ⁸ Jacques Simon, Messali Hadj (1898-1974). La Passion de l'Algérie Libre (Paris: Editions Tirésias, 1998), 82.
- ⁹ Markaz al-Archīve al-Wat'ani (The National Archives Centre), Jam'iyyat al-'Ulama al-Muslimīn al-Jazairiyyīn : Qānūnuhā al-Asāsī was Mabādi'uhā al-Islāhiyya. Document 14.
- ¹⁰ Salah al-Aqqad, Al Maghrib al-'Arabi: Dirasah fī Tarikhihi al-Hadith wa Awdha'ihī al-Mu'asira, al-Jazair, Tunis, al-Maghrib al-Aqsa (Cairo: Maktabat al Anglo-Masriya, 1980), 298.
- ¹¹ Ahmed Mahsas, Le Mouvement Révolutionnaire en Algérie: de la 1ere guerre mondiale à 1954 (Algiers: Edition Barkat, 1990), 145.
- ¹² It gives Muslim Algerians more concessions and a greater participation in the political life. This was dropped because of the opposition it was faced with.
- ¹³ Benjamin Stora, Histoire de l'Algerie Coloniale: 1830-1954 (Paris: La Découverte, 1994), 75.
- ¹⁴ Jaques Simon, op.cit. 82.
- ¹⁵ Ahmed Mahsas, op.cit. 127.
- ¹⁶ Jaques Simon, op.cit. 50.
- ¹⁷ *Le code de l'indigénat*, set in 1881 by the French, was basically a segregationist code that left Algerians with a status of political, civil, economic and social inferiority.
- ¹⁸ Mahfoud Kaddache and Mohamed Guenaneche, L'Étoile Nord-Afrique: 1926-1937 (Alger: Office des Publications Universitaires, 2002), 41.

¹⁹ “Lettre de l’Etoile Nord-Africaine à la S.D.N. 1930,” in Centre Nationale d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Mouvement National et la Révolution du 1er Novembre, La Diplomatie Algérienne, de 1830 à 1962 : Etude et recherche du 1^{er} séminaire sur l’évolution de la diplomatie algérienne (Alger: Collection conference, 1998), 9.

²⁰ Talk by Anissa Boumedienne, widow of the President Houari Boumedienne in the 13 Seminar, Houari Boumedienne: Al Hukm Al Ráshid, held between 27 to 30 December 2003, in Algiers, at the University of Houari Boumedienne.

²¹ Malik Ben Nabi’s theory on colonial acceptance, according to Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, revolves around the principle that colonialist forces would always attempt to occupy and invade countries and it was according to the awareness of these nations and their capabilities to withstand colonialism that their future was determined; in other words, if they were capable and willing, they would fight back and if they were weak and unable to resist then they would be classified as having an acceptance to colonialism.

Interview conducted by the author with Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, on the 28/12/2003, at the Senate in Algiers (Le Conseil de la Nation).

²² Juliette Minces, op.cit. 39.

²³ M’hamed Yousfi, Le Pouvoir 1962-1978 (Alger: Entreprise Nationale d’Edition et de Publicité, 1989), 61.

²⁴ Rachid Benyoub, op.cit. 25.

²⁵ Houari Boumediene, “Proclamation du Conseil de la Revolution du 19 Juin 1965,” in République Algérienne Démocratique et Populaire, Journal Officiel, 6 July 1965, 647.

²⁶ Rachid Benyoub, op.cit. 173.

²⁷ Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, Ayyām Ma’a al-Ra’iis Hūwāri Boumedienne wa Dhikrayāt Okhrā, Third Edition (Algiers: Moufem, 2000), 72.

²⁸ Amine Aït-Chaalal, L’Algérie, Les États Unies et La France: des discours à l’action (Paris: Publisud, 2000), 85.

²⁹ Interview by the author with Anissa Boumedienne, widow of President Houari Boumedienne, on 27/12/2003 in Algiers.

³⁰ Patrick Conway, “Algeria: Windfalls in a Socialist Economy,” in Alan Gelb and Associates. Oil Windfalls: Blessing or Curse? (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 149.

Conclusions

Foreign policy was a tool utilised by President Houari Boumedienne to consolidate national independence and to achieve his aspirations for economic development. It also allowed him to strengthen his position at both the national and international levels. In other words, foreign policy granted Algeria an international weight and provided it with the opportunity to affirm its ideological stances and voice its opinions within the United Nations and other organisations, such as OPEC, OAEPEC and the OAU, as well as the movement of Non-Alignment.

Algerian foreign policy was shaped, under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership, primarily to respond to the requirements of national interest and state building. In this context, Iratni suggests that foreign policy in the new states is not considered as an independent variable but as a subsidiary of internal, domestic considerations.¹ This could only confirm the thinking that Algeria's foreign policy was closely designed to respond to domestic considerations, and shaped to meet domestic and national requirements.

Considering the relentless efforts of Algerian leadership to maximise the state's interest and implement a policy that would ultimately lead to successful development, under President Houari Boumedienne's rule, Algerian foreign policy featured coordination between ideological stances and pragmatism.

Foreign policy was moulded, accordingly, within the framework of a revolutionary ideology, inspired from the principle of "the continuity of Revolution." This involved a strident fight against imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism, and clamorous support to all liberation movements, just causes and oppressed peoples all over the planet. It also entailed an encouragement for unity and international cooperation. This ideological framework flavoured President Houari Boumedienne's drive in the formulation of his foreign policy. Similarly, these ideological motivations shaped his policies of Pan-Maghribism, Pan-Arabism, and Pan-Africanism. Most importantly, Algeria's foreign policy was guided by principles of self-determination and non-interference in other countries' affairs. This determined Algeria's fight against imperialism and all forms of colonialism. In this context, Algeria devoted bold support to liberation movements all over the world, ranging between the Western-Saharan peoples, the Palestinian people and oppressed African and Third World nations, and he defended, equally, the right of oppressed people to self-determination.

For President Houari Boumedienne, Pan-Maghribism introduced itself as an integral concept of

Arab unity and translated the inherent outstanding components of a shared history and a common identity of the peoples inhabiting the continuous North African geographical stretch of land. In fact it embedded the unified cultural identity within a continuous geographical reality that was known to be the Maghrib.

The unity of the Maghrib needed to go beyond theoretical speculations and required the abolition of political and economic constraints. This was largely inspired by an ideological thrust to unify within the framework of a common identity and a shared history and culture. Furthermore, the concept of a unified Maghrib constituted the nucleus of an Arab unity for the Algerian leadership. The dynamics of Pan-Maghribism partly constituted an initial phase of Arab unity, considering that any positive outbreaks in Maghribi unification would constitute a step forward. Arab unification was a wider aspiration in President Houari Boumedienne's political agenda that embedded the Algerian President's Arabo-Muslim incentive, geared primarily towards the restoration of the Palestinian identity and right to independence, and which culminated in an anti-Zionist fight.

In this respect, unity and solidarity were the apparent motivations of President Houari Boumedienne's policy actions towards the Maghrib, the Arab World and the Third World. This is considering that each category was an integral part of the other. His policy orientations in the context of the Maghrib, the Arab world, Africa, and the Third World were guided with a wish to achieve unity and fulfil economic development, while guaranteeing security and national interest.

Unity was, henceforth, an optimal end in President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy. It was ideologically motivated by historical and civilisational commonalities, and further encouraged by the President in foreign policy behaviour which epitomised the necessity to guarantee regional security and economic prosperity. Accordingly, in order to be successful and to fulfil economic aspirations, unity required, essentially, to be preceded by development. In other words: "development prior to unity." The existing controversy, however, lay in President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy which opened the doors for increasing criticism regarding his poor motivations for North-African unity laid in the tension in Algerian-Moroccans relations and the Western Sahara issue. Yet, the latter could be ideologically justified with Algeria's support to all liberation movements in the world and to its attachment to the principle of self-determination.

Likewise, African unity constituted an important component of Algeria's foreign policy. The African depth in Algerian politics was inscribed in a fight for the liberation of the Continent and in an attempt to promote economic and social revival in the Continent. President Houari Boumedienne endeavoured to create a strong political force able to promote economic solidarity and withstand imperialist intentions and encourage Arab-African solidarity.

This was in addition to his Third World politics. President Houari Boumedienne's vociferous championing of the Movement of Non-Alignment was a bold fight. Boumediennist Algeria devoted its foreign policy to the Non-Alignment movement, promising to help the rest of the colonised spots in the world, so as to defeat colonialism and assist most countries struggling to assert sovereignty and national independence. Algeria itself experienced colonialism for over a century and went through a war of liberation that lasted seven and a half years, and, although the images from the past were very painful, they tended to serve as examples for the future. President Houari Boumedienne was determined to assist the rest of the unfairly mistreated parts of the globe.

Despite attempts by his critics to tarnish the Boumedienne image, it is important to bear in mind the strong and courageous initiatives undertaken by President Houari Boumedienne, and to stress that no leader before him dared to undertake policies that would provoke reactions in capitalist circles. The most important of these policies was the process of nationalisation of oil resources. Moreover, President Houari Boumedienne dared to stand up to the West and claimed Third World rights to independence and to sovereignty. He rejected the idea of a Third World market of raw materials to the capitalist world, and fought vociferously to stop the exploitation of the developing world. In an unprecedented initiative, he called, instead, for the instauration of a New International Economic Order and challenged the West for equal opportunities to develop. In this context, it is rather appropriate to praise such a Third World leader and pay tribute to his pioneering fight for just causes. Algeria's relentless persevering and diplomatic efforts in promoting African and Third world rights marked the beginning of a new era where the newly independent countries reaffirmed their existence in a system that was regulated by rules enacted in their absence.

Algeria aimed at spreading equality and justice world wide and fought bipolarity and the monopoly of power by capitalist forces. Besides, Algeria also defended the right of Third World countries to recover their natural resources and stop being exploited and used by the capitalist world.

Algeria's interaction with the West also portrayed a degree of pragmatism, as President Houari Boumedienne aimed at creating a unified bloc with the West so as to withstand the United States' imperialism. This course of action highlighted Algeria's attempt to establish a coordinated behaviour in its foreign policy between its ideological momentum and a pragmatic course of action. Nonetheless, this approach was also sensed in Algeria's nationalisation of its hydrocarbons. The nationalisation covered only 51% of Algeria's shares so as to ensure sovereignty over its own natural resources and meet, henceforth, national and ideological motivations. The realistic behaviour lies in the 49% remaining shares that were left under foreign possession so as to ensure expertise and benefit from Western *savoir faire*. This attitude was merely a quest for national interest and coincided with a complementary interaction

between ideology and pragmatism. This clearly shed light on the way policy actions often appeared to be ideologically motivated, but they were, in many cases, considered to be in the best interest of the state and the regime in power.

However, Algeria's dealings with imperialist forces constituted the bold point in Algeria's ideological postures and provided Algeria's foreign policy with constraints. Yet, the division between political stances and strategies of economic development constituted the distinguishing line between ideological and pragmatic considerations.

Most importantly, President Houari Boumedienne's ideological fight inspired the implementation of international cooperation and an effective peaceful coexistence that took into consideration Third World nations and called for historical reconciliation and 'mental reconversion'.

Although ideology constituted an important contributor to the formulation of Algeria's foreign policy, national interest was equally an important component in the process of decision making. This was clearly highlighted in the Algerian-American interaction which epitomised a harmonious consistency between ideology and national interest. This degree of pragmatism characterised Algeria's economic interaction with the United States. It did not, at any point, mean a setback in Algeria's political positions towards imperialism. This leads us to the assumption that ideology, for President Houari Boumedienne, constituted the cover behind which the leader justified his actions and decisions in pursuit of power. Pragmatism was his way out of the constraints of ideology in order to meet the requirements of self-interest. Pragmatism in Algerian foreign policy intended to accommodate Algeria's development strategy which necessitated a reciprocal interaction between the industrialised imperialist countries and Algeria. In order to successfully achieve its development plans, Algeria promoted international cooperation and did not hesitate to enforce any actions that ought to be beneficial for the state.

Boukara suggested two approaches to the understanding of the role of ideology in Algerian foreign policy with different countries of the world. He refuted the idea that the substantial gap between beliefs and actions was related to the fact that Algerian foreign policy was no longer influenced by ideology, and rather supported the argument that Algerian foreign policy was no longer influenced by ideology because of the costs of an ideologically motivated foreign policy.² He regarded this as a setback in Algeria's role as a leader of the Third World countries, since the end of 1975, and explained that Algeria had become more cautious than it was in the past. Boukara believed that the pragmatic element in Algeria's foreign policy had become stronger.³ Concurrently, Belkheiri explained that ideology has been losing ground to economic interest and that the main foreign policy objectives of the U.S. were economic and that ideology was the means to that end.⁴

Our arguments defend the idea that, overall, Algerian foreign policy under Boumedienne, was characterised by a consistent mixture of both ideology and pragmatism. Ideology prevailed in

issues related to self-determination, non-interference in internal affairs and Third World issues, and pragmatism culminated in economic and national development policies.

Boumedienne himself played a key role as a leader in steering the course of Algeria's foreign policy between the dictates of ideology and the requirements of national interest. He prioritised Algeria's interest and moulded his foreign policy so as to respond to the requirements of national development. Yet, his foreign policy carried an irreversible North African, Arab, and African depth that constituted an integral part of his policy.

President Houari Boumedienne portrayed himself in the international arena as a peaceful mediator endeavouring, above all, to implement peaceful settlements of conflicts. This clearly did not apply to his approach to the Western Saharan issue and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, whereby he essentially believed in the primacy of the principle of self-determination and the right to an independent living of the people.

Furthermore, foreign policy was formulated in conformity with international circumstances and in an atmosphere of East-West rivalries. Algeria was very cautious to maintain sound relations with both blocs so as not to enter the vicious circle of the Cold War. Most importantly, the economic situation in the world shaped Algeria's foreign policy to a large extent, such as the prices of natural resources, hydrocarbons and manufactured or semi-manufactured products. It was unacceptable for Algeria to sell low-priced raw materials to the West and accordingly buy industrialised products from the West at three times the original price of the raw material utilised to the production of manufactured goods. According to Muhyi al-Deen Amimour, the main obstacle in the implementation of Algeria's foreign policy was the desire of others to impose their will on Algeria. Yet, Bennamia stipulated that the only objective internal constraints operating on the president's control of foreign policy were the limitations on the country's economic capabilities, its development needs, and the more general foreign policy consensus, which correspond to Rosenau's societal variable. Bennamia might not be wrong in advocating economic capabilities, development needs and societal variable, in relation to foreign policy decision-making. These, however, tend to be determinants of foreign policy rather than limitations, in particular if we considered that foreign policy making needed to respond to the needs and requirements of an evolving and changing world.

In short, the main feature of Algerian foreign policy is that it reflected its national policy, from which stemmed President Houari Boumedienne's famous saying that: "Algeria's foreign policy is a mirror to its national policy." This argument revolved around Algeria's major contributions to world politics and stressed Bennamia's perception of Algerian foreign policy. As he mentioned:

"Algeria's foreign policy was not a "seductive diversion", but rather an integral part of a search for identity and the means to build the nation. Algeria's first orientation in world politics was thus an extension of its domestic experience."⁵

In a parallel comparison with Marxist principles, opposing the exploitation of man by man and the principle of ownership of means of production, one could describe Algeria's fight for Third World countries, in general, as part of its socialist itinerary and aim to spread equality world-wide. That is to say that Algeria's international politics, under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership, were closely linked to its national policy. In other words, the state's national policy constituted the strong platform around which foreign policy crystallised. Accordingly, Algeria's ideological overtures and public proclamations were, in retrospect, driven by domestic considerations that culminated in the guarantee of the revolutionary principles and behaving consistently with its internal nationalist and socialist policies.

From its ideological postures, Algeria was a country with a leader aiming at building up a classless society within a one party system in the framework of a socialist democratic state. It is important to understand that President Houari Boumedienne's political thought has matured and developed in an environment of colonialist oppression and injustice. Having witnessed the various inequities imposed by French colonialism, President Houari Boumedienne nurtured a categorical refusal to French presence and to all aspects of imperialism. He, accordingly, grew to become a strong fighter and efficient state man. Nevertheless, President Houari Boumedienne granted the Algerian state strong infrastructures and a solid basis for economic planning and development strategy. It is, henceforth, time to wisely utilise this heritage to the advantage of the Algerian state.

Most importantly, President Houari Boumedienne was a pragmatic. State-building and development constituted the ultimate objectives of his policies. This ensured the consolidation of his regime at a national level. Ideology was used as an instrument in President Houari Boumedienne's foreign policy to gain public and domestic support. It also strengthened Algeria's position in the international arena. In other words, ideology was used to legitimise policy. Although it provided Algeria's politics with a lot of opportunities, it also acted as a constraint on Boumedienne's decision making. Ideology set the goals and objectives of foreign policy under President Houari Boumedienne's leadership. Nonetheless, pragmatism, determined the actual policy-making and took precedence over ideology when national interest required it to do so. This was made possible as policy was designed by Boumedienne and his associate elites, and not by the institutional body that was the FLN (and which embodied ideology). Boumedienne established the domestic configuration of power so as to control foreign policy making and assert pragmatic needs over ideology when necessary. Yet he was himself guided by the same ideological imperatives, having lived the particular life of history that he had.

Notes:

¹ Iratni, B. Foreign Policy and Nation-State Building in Algeria, 1962-1985. PhD Thesis. Warwick University, 1986, 7.

² Boukara Hocein, Ideology and Pragmatism in Algerian Foreign Policy. PhD Thesis, University of Lancaster, 1986, 319.

³ Ibid. 323

⁴ Abdelkrim Belkheiri, US-Algerian Relations, 1954-1980: Balance between Interest and Principle. PhD Thesis, University of Exeter, 1987, 433.

⁵ Abdelmedjid Bennamia, Palestine in Algerian Foreign Policy: 1962-1978. PhD Thesis. University of Exeter 1988, 411-2

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