

A Study of "Islamism" in the Context of Capitalist Development
The Case of the Welfare Party

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Abstract

This thesis is concerned with the analysis of the development of Islamism as an important form of political formation in Turkey. It argues that the success of the Islamist Welfare Party in the late twentieth century should be seen as an example of the type of response found at other times and other places to the strains and inequalities of economic development and not an exclusively Islamic response, though it is cast within that tradition. In this context, the process of development, and the historical tension between Islamism and Kemalism are analysed. It is the contention of this thesis that Islamism in Turkey should be examined as a specifically modern political reconstruction of “tradition” developed within the wider context of Kemalism, which remains an integral part of political ideology. The thesis demonstrates that Islamism in Turkey did not offer a radical alternative to the political ideology of Kemalism; but converged with it in terms of attitudes to politics and the nature and role of the state in attaining a “good society”. The Islamists did not oppose the state and its apparatus, but its present form and the methods of distribution of public resources. This convergence meant that in practice the reconstructed Islamist party, although it articulated its ideology in terms of Islamic values and demands for justice, could not overcome the embedded structures of economic and political power. In the quest for democracy voters, and some potential political leaders, were keen to find an alternative to the Kemalist military/secularist framework, but they were not able to dislodge the deep rooted control of the military. Islamism as articulated in Turkish politics failed to prove a viable choice and the problem of democracy remains unresolved.

List of Contents

	Page
Abstract	iii
List of Tables and Figures	vii
List of Abbreviations	ix
Acknowledgments	xi
Declarations	xii
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: Methodology	10
1.1. Introduction	10
1.2. Interviews	13
1.3. Content Analysis	27
1.4. Coding the Qualitative Data	32
1.5. Reliability and Validity	35
Chapter 2: Literature Revisited: “Islamism” as a Modern Ideology	38
2.1. How to Conceptualise and Approach Islamist Movements	40
2.1.1. Conceptual Debate	40
2.1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Grips	49
2.2. Islamism: a Modern Ideology	62
Chapter 3: Ottoman Social Formation and the Rise of Ideologism	79
3.1. Ottoman Social Formation	81
3.2. Ottoman Modernisation and the Rise of Islamism in the Nineteenth Century	99
Chapter 4: State Capitalism and the Question of Religion in Politics	116
4.1. Modernisation, Kemalism and the State	119

	Page
4.1.1. Literature Review	119
4.1.2. Modernisation and Kemalism	125
4.2. State Capitalism and the Rise of the Democrat Party	135
4.2.1. The Political Economy of the Single Party Era	137
4.2.2. The Democrat Party	143
4.2.3. The Military as a Political Functionary	149
Chapter 5: The Rise of an “Islamist Party” to Power in Continuing Capitalist Development: The Welfare Party	156
5.1. The Route that Led to the Welfare Party	161
5.2. The 1995 Election That Brought the Welfare Party to Power	185
Chapter 6: A Clash of Two World Views: Secularism Versus Islamism?	211
6.1. The Political Economy of the Mass Media	214
6.2. The Representations of Secularism and Islamism in the Media Content	221
6.2.1. Historical Context of the Media Campaign	222
6.2.2. Secularism, Islamism and the Representation of the Welfare Party: “A Fundamentalist Threat to Modernity”	230
6.2.3. The Defence and Discourse of Islamism as Represented by the Islamist Media	241
6.2.3.1 The “Oriental We” in the Person of the Welfare Party with Reference to Islam	242
6.2.3.2. Modernism and the Concept of “an Islamic State”	247

	Page
Chapter 7: Islamism: Voices of Reaction to the Failure of the Developmental State	265
7.1. The Socio-Economic Backgrounds of the Interviewees	268
7.2. The Manifesto of the Welfare Party Compared with the Perceptions and Expectations of the Respondents	271
7.2.1. Dissatisfaction, Corruption and Honesty	278
7.2.2. Freedom of Belief or Human Rights and Secularism	281
7.2.3. The Just System: A Structural Analysis	294
7.2.3.1. The Nature of Economic Activity and Social Justice	295
7.2.3.2. The Nature of Politics	310
Conclusion	322
Appendixes	335
Appendix 1. Interviews' Questions	335
Appendix 2. Tables on the Socio-Economic Backgrounds of the Interviewees	339
Glossary	354
Bibliography	356
Books and Articles	356
Statistical Sources	380
Newspapers	381
Magazines	382
Webpages	382

List of Tables and Figures

	Page
<i>Tables</i>	
Table 1: Populism and Islamism Compared	57
Table 2: The Distribution of Votes Among the Parties in the General Elections, 1950-1977	162
Table 3: The Distribution of Votes among the Parties in the General Elections in the Ten Provinces in which the NSP Received Its Highest Percentage of Votes in 1973	181
Table 4: The Distribution of Votes in the General Elections in the Ten Provinces in which the NSP Received its Lowest Percentage of Votes in 1973	184
Table 5: The Distribution of Votes Among the Parties in the General Elections between 1969 and 1999	186
Table 6: Income Distribution Among Families, 1969-1994	195
Table 7: Comparison of Income Distribution between Urban and Rural Families, 1994	196
Table 8: Sectoral Distribution of Income, between 1960 and 1995	197
Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration	204
Table 10a: Milliyet's Content Regarding the Welfare Party	253
Table 10b: Cumhuriyet's Content Regarding the Welfare Party	254
Table 10c: Milli Gazete's Content Regarding the Welfare Party	255
Table 10d: Akit's Content Regarding the Welfare Party	256

Table 11a: Milliyet's Content Regarding Islam	257
Table 11b: Cumhuriyet's Content Regarding Islam	258
Table 11c: Milli Gazete's Content Regarding Islam	259
Table 11d: Akit's Content Regarding Islam	260
Table 12a: Milliyet's Content Regarding Secularism	261
Table 12b: Cumhuriyet's Content Regarding Secularism	262
Table 12c: Milli Gazete's Content Regarding Secularism	263
Table 12d: Akit's Content Regarding Secularism	264
Table 13: The Socio-Economic Backgrounds of the Respondents	
Voters I, Table 1A	343
Voters I, Table 1B	344
Members of Parliament, Table 2A	345
Members of Parliament, Table 2B	346
Party's Workers I, Table 3A	347
Party's Workers II, Table 3B	347
Voters II, Table 4A	348
Voters II, Table 4B	353
Party's Workers II, Table 5A	356
Party's Workers, Table 5B	357
Figures	
Figure 1: The Members of Parliament'	274
Figure 2: The Party's Workers' I	274
Figure 3: The Party's Workers' II	274
Figure 4: The Voters' I	275
Figure 5: The Voters' II	275

List of Abbreviations

CUP: Committee for Union and Progress

DP: Democrat Party

DeP: Democratic Party

DLP: Democratic Left Party

DMG: Doğan Media Group

ISI: Import Substitution Policies

JP: Justice Party

MH: Media Holding

MP: Motherland Party

MÜSİAD: the Association of Independent Businessmen

NAP: Nationalist Action Party

NOP: National Order Party

NP: Nation Party

NSC: National Security Council

NSCS: National Security Council Secretariat

NSP: National Salvation Party

NTP: New Turkey Party

PDP: People's Democratic Party

RPNP: Republican Peasant Nation Party

RPP: Republican People's Party

RReP: Republican Reliance Party

SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party

SPO: State Planing Organisation

TGS: Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası (the Journalists' Trade Union)

TIS: Turkish-Islamist Synthesis

TLP: Turkish Labour Party

TOBB: Turkish Union of Commerce and Commodity Exchange

TPP: True Path Party

TUP: Turkish Unity Party

TÜSİAD: Turkish Industrialist's and Businessmen Association

VP: Virtue Party

WP: Welfare Party

YÖK: Higher Education Council

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Declarations

A version of Chapter 4 was presented at the EUROMES Conference in 1996 at Aix-en-Provence in France.

A version of Chapter 6 was presented at the BRISMES Conference in 1997 at Oxford.

Introduction

This thesis represents an attempt to critically examine what is called the phenomenon of “Islamism” in Turkey, using the case of the Welfare party from a historical perspective in relation to the specific process of development taking place in this society. This thesis holds that much of the previous literature, specifically that by Turkish scholars, on the Welfare Party or its predecessors has operated within the assumptions of the modernisation paradigm by overlooking the political economy aspect. This study aims to show what should be an interpretative way to proceed in examining a specific case of “Islamism” by contextualising it in the inequalities of capitalist development, without being “essentialist” in outlook. This thesis contributes to the existing literature by providing case studies which utilise both media analysis and in-depth interviewing in order to analyse “Islamism” in its social, economic and political context within Turkey, to support the general argument of the study and to challenge the positivist perspective that tends to treat the phenomenon in terms of a dichotomy between the traditional and the modern. The arguments constructed by the ideological needs of “secularists” and “Islamists” are evaluated through media analysis. The study presents the diversity and contradictions between Islamists and those who supported them by making use of qualitative interviewing.

Islamism or Islamist activities in Turkey have been multi-dimensional and were not confined only to the Welfare Party. However, the Welfare Party, like its predecessors, took a leading role in this and competed for power as a political party with an “Islamist manifesto” in a secular political setting. Some other Islamist groups, which are divided along the lines of various religious brotherhood

organisations (*tarikats*), have opted for supporting mainstream parties within the right-wing. Politics is, of course, about power, its distribution and its use. In order to understand the dynamics of Islamism, particularly with regard to the fundamental question of the distribution of power, this study identifies and analyses the ways in which economically and ideologically rooted structures have set the scene for authoritarian politics. It is also argued that how the imperatives which these structures generate create opportunities and constraints for political actors as far as the political endeavours and representation of those who ideologically are proscribed is concerned.

The thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One sets out the methodological context. It highlights the fact that researchers who study "Islamism" need to deal with some important epistemological considerations since there is no unified "Islamist" view or voice. The construction of concepts, e.g. traditional, modern, secularism, Islamism or Islamists, should not be taken for granted, as each has to be constructed in relation to the society under examination. It is important to avoid essentialist or racialist thinking and categorization, i.e. discussing the inherent superiority or inferiority of one position, identity or culture. Such an approach tends to produce a monolithic identity for Muslim societies. Starting from assumptions based on the so-called "inherent" nature of Muslim societies often leads to the reproduction of a singular monolithic identity as "objectified" reality. To acknowledge the fact that "Muslims" in general and "Islamists" in particular have differing identities, are of different races, ethnicities, classes, genders, ages, and live in different regions, makes it difficult to talk about a culturally "pure" identity. Ideological determinations and cultural biases often

precede the conceptualizations of research problems and interpretations of data. Ideologies and cultural biases prevent us from understanding social and political episodes which occur when people are complex in terms of their identity and fluid in their attitudes. The categorization along essentialist lines would prevent epistemological and theoretical questioning of the nature of Islamism since it attempts to propose a predetermined and eternal attitude for Muslim societies. The use of homogenous and reified terms, such as traditional and modern, often reproduces stereotyped results. Ethnocentric cultural standards of generalization and interpretation are value biases set in evolutionary epistemologies, which propose the cultural relevance of the experiences of dominant societies, classes or groups. Attempts to characterize Islamism or Islamists from a “teleological” point of view basically depends on the assumptions, interests and goals of researchers. Do we as the researchers see the role of religion as a political orientation of retrogression, and therefore propose evolutionary cognitive presumptions? Do we characterize Islamism a kind of “reaction” that rejects and acts against the dominant discourse, modernisation, and is therefore an alarming “threat” to modern politics? Do we see Islamists as marginal people who are unable to cope with the modern world and being in a pathological identity crisis? Or, do we see the expression of electoral demands in religious terms as an outcome of realpolitik and look for reasons behind it to offer a more workable framework to interpret the nature of Islamism in its social context? The crucial point is to decide what we want to do. The cause and effect relationship in the modernisation paradigm between education, urbanisation and industrialisation and “modern attitudes”, which implies that religion loses its significance in the life of the modern educated individual (Inkeles and Smith 1974) does not hold true when

highly educated “modern” people choose to be “Islamist” in their political orientation. Are they simply deviants? In the context of the modernisers optimism about mastering society and nature through industrialisation along an evolutionary progression, from a simple and mythical society to a complex and rational one, can an Islamist attitude be explained as irrational, against progress and pathological? Interpretation primarily depends upon what assumptions we start with and whether we take into account that history is shaped by social relations. Eagleton with reference to methodological preferences in social science writes that it is not a matter of starting from certain theoretical or methodological problems. Rather, it is a matter of starting from what we want to do and thus seeing which methods and theories will best help us to achieve these ends (1983: 210).

In this context, Chapter Two maps out the theoretical debate and political discourses of Islamism by emphasising the key problems within the existing literature with reference to basic trends in studying Middle Eastern politics. First of all, it concentrates upon the conceptual debate regarding the naming of the phenomenon in question. This study avoids the use of the term “Islamic fundamentalism” in order to overcome: (a) confusion, as often clarifying a distinctive “fundamentalist position” in terms of the place of religion and religious signs and symbolism in the Muslims’ life is complicated; and (b) its use in journalism, which often denotes “a radical, fanatic and anti-modern or anti-Western position”, and is therefore a judgmental and value-laden approach. Instead, this study employs as the umbrella terms “Islamism” to refer to ideology, and “Islamists”, to refer to those who advocate or support this ideology. Secondly, concerning the theoretical framework, this study argues that Islamism should be

evaluated in terms of a modern political movement in a global context, rather than a unique feature of Muslim societies. This is in order to avoid the assumption of the culturalist perspective, by Orientalists and Islamists alike, that distinguishes culture as the key determinant of the evolution of a society. Leftwich (1994) clearly argues that any study which interrelates the state and development should analyse the political relationships of the state with other interests and institutions in society. Therefore, such an approach should take into account the patterns of development in societies that are experiencing Islamist trends, with reference to the process of state formation and subsequently the changing social relations and the role of the state in this process. This is to say, *“at any point in any developmental sequence what is at issue are conflicts about how resources are to be used and distributed in new ways and the inevitable disputes arising from calculations about who is to benefit or lose as a result”* (Leftwich, 1994: 4). Finally, the chapter focusses upon the discourse of Islamism as a modern political ideology, and upon the nature of its social bases, to argue that Islamism cannot be denounced as a backward movement.

The purpose of Chapter Three is to set out the comparative framework for the Republican period, by examining the historical character of surplus appropriation. This is done by looking at the specific social relations that governed these processes and their patterns of reproduction and transformation by social forces within the Ottoman Empire. The chapter also sheds light upon the emergence of Islamism at an intellectual level through the mobilisation of the content of Islam. This involved a political protest with its emphasis upon “progress” and “democratization”, as an alternative approach to the modernism of the late

nineteenth century, when the Ottoman Empire had been the subject of ongoing Westernisation reforms and its unity was under threat from internal as well as external forces.

Chapter Four continues the explanation of the historical background of Islamism, this time in the context of capitalist development within the framework of the Republican state and its ideology, Kemalism. It challenges the shortcomings of those explanations which treat the rise of the Democrat Party to power in terms of a clash between the "modernizing centre" and the "reactionary periphery" and, therefore, a traditional "religious upheaval". This is done by drawing attention to the structural impediments within Republican politics to meaningful participation of subordinated classes in the use of state power. The chapter concentrates on the overall role of the state in society, and the distribution of power in the context of political economy of *etatism*. Among the structural impediments it argues the ideological form of state apparatus with reference to the institutionalised political power of the military. This study shows that the power vested in the military bureaucracy through the National Security Council prevents the subordinated classes from having real choices when they exercise their democratic right of political participation. The chapter shows the shortcomings of the cultural or functional explanations of such power. It is argued that the primary use of state power by the military is not exclusively tied to its pursuit of "general interests", but to the role and the position of the military within the ruling-class structure in the pursuit of particularistic interests. The ultimate goal is to maintain social and political order and preserve the undisputed dominance of industrial and financial capital at the political level. This enforces the exclusion of certain actors

from the top layers of politics, particularly as far as the removal from power of the elected Welfare Party in 1997 by military intervention is concerned.

Chapter Five continues the previous chapter's examination of the mode of capitalist development, in order to analyse the relative success of "Islamist parties" since the 1970s by concentrating upon the competition over the allocation of public resources in a developing economy. It is argued that the failure of the developing economy to deliver true democracy and facilitate better access to resources for the majority of the population should be treated as a key explanatory factor for the phenomenon of Islamism. The chapter examines the accession of the Welfare Party to power in 1996, within the framework of continuing uneven capitalist development. It argues that the Welfare Party with its distinctive "Islamist outlook", rose to power not primarily because of its praised proposal to transform or reform the existing "unjust order", but rather because of a combination of various factors including the failure of the "developmental state" to deliver upon its long standing promises, therefore the dissatisfaction with the mainstream political parties which had governed throughout the seventies, eighties and the first half of the nineties, and the fragmentation of the Turkish party system mainly due to intra-elite conflict after the military takeover in 1980.

Before exploring this point further, Chapter Six shows the shortcomings of culturalist perspective by contributing to the existing literature by a case study, and therefore prepares the ground for the next chapter that represents an explanatory approach in analysing Islamism, and completes the argument set up in Chapter Five. It discusses the phenomenon of Islamism by looking at its representation in

both secular and Islamist media. Such an analysis is crucial in demonstrating the polarization of elites as the primary interpreter of terms, concepts and events in their struggle for power. This demonstrates that in their competition to publicise their party agenda, both “secularists” and “Islamists” alike, within the assumptions of culturalist perspective, treat the phenomenon in terms of “a clash between two world views” with diverging conclusions. The chapter, firstly, argues that there has been a lack of analysis of the political economy of mass communication, which would illuminate the socio-economic controversy over Islamism and why the established interest through big media worked to crush the Welfare Party. Second, as “modernism and secularism” have ideological connotations within Turkey and become the realms in which the whole issue of Islamism is stuck, it analyses the media content with regard to the issue of the relationships between Islam and modernity and secularism, with particular reference to the construction of identity in terms of exclusive definitions of the “Occidental We” and “Oriental Others”, or vice versa, by both sides of the media in interaction with each other. The chapter aims to show that media reporting, by channelling and limiting discussion to distorted and stereotyped images of one or another socio-cultural entity, has had significant political consequences, not least the resignation of the Welfare Party government.

Chapter Seven analyses Islamism within the context of the failures of developmental state by making use of small scale qualitative research in order to show that Islamism, within the context of the Welfare Party’s accession to power, reflects a multi-faceted phenomenon with diverse interpretations, expectations and interests as far as those who advocate an Islamist ideology and those who voted

for the Welfare Party are concerned. The chapter offers a critical analysis of the “Islamist manifesto” of the Welfare Party the “Just System” in the framework of modern ideologies, and attempts to show that Islamism converges with Kemalism in terms of attitudes to politics and the nature of the state and its role in society. This approach relieves the study from the handicaps of the culturalist perspective. It uses the qualitative interviews for cross referencing purposes to show that voting for an Islamist party does not always necessarily mean support for its “vague ideology”. It argues that references to religious rhetoric, with its emphasis on universally appealing themes such as democracy, equality and justice, provide an Islamist party with the means to connect itself to a widespread dissatisfaction with the mainstream political parties which has been in power, as an “untried alternative”.

Chapter 1: The Methodology

1.1. Introduction

“Most debates over methods are debates over assumptions and goals, over theory and perspective” (Bogdan and Taylor, 1975: 1).

Contrary to the assumption of objectivist science, which is that theory development and the application of method should be free of human values and other contaminating influences, it is undeniable that even in scientific studies the categorization of concepts and applications of methods are influenced by scientists' professional values and practices. The personal, ethical and political choices of researchers often affect what is studied, how it is studied and which methodological procedures are chosen. Logics of inquiry are political and cultural constructs. Research is the production of knowledge, but not its discovery. Stanfield II argues that researches in the social sciences cannot be divorced from concerns regarding the functions of hegemonic domination in knowledge production and dissemination (1993: 25-26). It is the aim of this research to avoid the assumptions of positivism, which attempts to formulate a lawful understanding of the social universe and explain the causal relationships supposedly governing the social world¹. The positivist notion of social causality, i.e. the relationships between variables, such as religion, social class, level of education, age, race, family size and political orientation, attempts to approximate social laws as permanently binding and do so by ignoring history. However, the eternal statements of cause and effect are framed historically by dominating paradigms, which may change when social reality can no longer be explained by them (Kuhn 1970).

1

For a summary on positivism see L. Neuman (1991) Social Research Methods.

Interpretive theory and critical social theory, which is a branch of the former (Agger 1998: 31), criticise positivism and argue that knowledge is not simply a reflection of an inert world "out there", constituted by the relationships between variables out of touch with individuals, but is an active construction by scientists and theorists who necessarily make certain assumptions about the worlds they study and thus are not strictly value-free. Although interpretive theory evolves from Weber's attempt to understand social action on the level of meaning, interpretive theorists are in conflict with Weber's essentially positivist conception of social theorising as an objective activity. Both interpretive theory in the more critical tradition (Denzin 1992: Clough 1992) and critical social theory reject the concept of social laws and criticise positivism's metaphysical view of history. People's activities in everyday life are explained with reference to the large scale social structures that surround them. Critical social theories, e.g. Marxism, portray history as a horizon of possibilities constrained but not determined by the past and present. Emphasis on the discursive nature of knowledge and its structural explanation are important (Denzin 1992). Agger points out that

Critical social theories have begun to transform research methodologies in significant ways. Feminist theory...,critical theory...,and postmodern narratives and ethnography... all reject the notion that quantitative survey research is the only legitimate mode of sociological investigation. These perspectives valorize qualitative research as legitimate and necessary in order to understand "depth" aspects of everyday life and personal experience inaccessible to anonymous survey instruments.... critical social theories even have impact on the ways in which people conduct quantitative analysis, demonstrating the inherent "undecidability" of empirical operationalizations of variables...as well as revealing nature power motives behind sociological positivism... Methodologists influenced by one critical social theory or another do not simply abandon empiricism but rather attempt to incorporate insights

from critical theory into their own research and interpretation of data (1998: 176-7).

Given the growing tendency of empirical researchers to use both qualitative and quantitative methods, interpretive theory and critical social theory challenge the dominance of quantitative methods which were viewed as necessary features of “hard” science. Neuman writes that

some people believe that qualitative data are “soft”, “intangible”, and immaterial. Such data are so fuzzy and elusive that researchers cannot really capture them. This is not necessarily the case. Qualitative data are empirical. They involve documenting real events, recording what people say (with words, gestures, and tone), observing specific behaviours, studying written documents, or examining visual images. These are all concrete aspects of the world (1997: 328).

Qualitative social research largely relies on the interpretive and critical approaches to social science. Lindlof notes that the kinds of explanation to be sought in qualitative analysis are almost exclusively ones of understanding but not of prediction or control. Theory in qualitative inquiry usually consists of ways to understand and depict “rationality” in the ‘foreign, obscure, banal, confused, moral or immoral’ appearances of human conduct. Rationality here means a sense of reasonableness that members of a culture or movement assign to their own action. It is different from being rational in its classical rules of logic and evidence assumed by the dominant paradigm. Thus, it considers what people’s rationality means; the researcher is interested in their logic and the kind of evidence they consider relevant in expressing and rationalising their actions (1995: 56-7).

Qualitative research is based on methods of data generation which are flexible and sensitive to the social context in which data are produced. Qualitative

researchers emphasize the importance of social context for understanding the social world and therefore argue that the same events or behaviours can have different meanings or may be given varying values in different societies or historical eras. Bogdan and Taylor mention that the subject of qualitative study is not reduced to an isolated variable or to an hypothesis, but is viewed instead as a part structured by the whole (1975: 4).

1.2. Interviews

Miller and Glassner write that

Those of us who aim to understand and document others' understanding choose qualitative interviewing because it provides us with a means for exploring the points of view of our research subjects, while granting these points of view the culturally honoured status of reality (1997: 100).

Fielding also argues that interviewing has a strong claim to be the most widely used method of research (1993: 135). Research, however, cannot reflect the social world "out there" as positivists assert, although it can provide access to the meanings people attach to their experiences and social world. Therefore, in this thesis interviewing was used as a part of the overall research strategy. The qualitative interviews were conducted to gain access to the people's "Islamist" accounts and articulation of the phenomenon in question. In other words, it sought to get "Islamists" explanations of why they had worked or voted for a political party which is identified by "outsiders" as marginal and "fundamentalist". This means that interview subjects construct not just narratives but a part of the social world itself (Silverman, 1993: 91). This approach suggests that people's knowledge, views, understandings, interpretations, beliefs and ideologies are meaningful in

generating legitimate data on ontological properties of social reality (Mason, 1996: 40). Although this does not mean that the people's accounts are treated as full explanations, qualitative interviewing gives greater depth than other research techniques for revealing the relationships between the people's accounts and the phenomena. For example, observational methods are primarily directed towards describing and understanding behaviour as it occurs. They are less effective in giving information about people's perceptions, beliefs, motivations and so on (Selltiz, 1965).

Lopez (1975) highlights the defining features of the interview as being that

An interview is initiated to achieve one or several objectives, takes place in a particular physical and social setting, and occurs as part of a procedural sequence of events. Further, it focuses on the present, past or future behavior, beliefs, opinions, attitudes or convictions of the interviewee" (cited in Millar et al, 1992: 2).

It is not a casual conversation, but purposive and limited to a particular set of topics and takes place within a set context.

Access

It is necessary to gain access to "sources of data" in order to collect data for the subsequent analysis. Access requires the identification of a number of issues over which the researcher has to bargain at different levels. There are problems with the defensive capabilities of powerful elites when "studying up" and of negotiating with gatekeepers. Cassell indicates that penetrating the well-guarded precincts of the powerful can be frustrating and time-consuming. Gaining physical access needs to be completed with social access. This can be as difficult, frustrating and time-consuming as getting in. *"One has to keep pushing, and trying, and hoping, and*

smiling, and pushing some more" (1992:94). Elites are frequently able to deny access because they may not wish themselves or their institutions to be studied. Gaining access is a process of continual renegotiation, bargaining and establishing trustful relations with gatekeepers and those to be studied (Lee 1992). The nature of research and sources of data, e.g. material sources, political elites or political organisations, may create obstacles in dealing with gaining access. The political and historical context in which the research is conducted can pose extra barriers for one who attempts to get access to the members of a targeted group. Hornsby-Smith points out that "*gaining access is a political rather than a normative problem*" (1992: 54).

The "identity" of the researcher as constructed in the minds of the interviewees signifies the political aspect of access. The issue of being an "insider" or "outsider" to those to be studied may be crucial for gaining access and building trust. The existence of social differences between the interviewer and the interviewees carries certain difficulties. Language and cultural participation may have paramount importance. Klatch points out that "*studying adherents to any 'extreme' political ideology is a delicate and sensitive process. The community itself is resistant to those outside its borders, in fear of intrusion, distortion, and so on*" (1992: 74). Identifying and drawing boundaries of an 'extreme political ideology', or 'extremist activists' is particularly difficult because such labelling is used by "outsiders". The language used by the researcher is important in building trust and gaining access for an outsider. The researcher has to be aware of scepticism considering the use of certain terms. For example, scepticism regarding the use of 'Islamic fundamentalist' relates to the use of that term in a pejorative sense usually imposed by the media, other political parties or intellectuals and which is always coloured by

a tone of fanaticism.

The place of the life of the researcher, as an insider or outsider, within the interview context may influence access. The presentation of ourselves (how and how much) as researchers may restrict interviewees' ability and willingness to participate in the interview procedure. Being an adherent or an opponent of a particular political group may shape which stories interviewees may tell and how these will be told. Participation in a culture includes participation in the narratives of that culture, or vice versa. That is very much related to social relations in society. Research as a part of social reality carries power relations into its own context. It can be argued that the research process in the social sciences involves power relationships between the dominant (researcher) and the subordinate (subject) parties which can be studied empirically like any other form of social inequality. This issue should be considered with reference to the complex issues of the cultural and political nature of domination and subordination, the cultural stereotyping of the dominant and the subordinate in the structuring of relationships, and the politics and sociology of exclusion and marginalization in relationships between the dominant and the subordinate (Stanfield II, 1993: 31). Since race, class, and gender all are structuring dimensions of inequality, where the researcher stands with relation to her/his subject becomes a significant issue. The researcher should recognize the social situation of respondents and their relationship to power structures (Curren, 1992: 3). Miller and Glassner (1997) argue that the issue of how respondents talk to us based on who we are in their lives is a practical concern as well as an epistemological or theoretical one. Qualitative interviewing benefits from the critique of positivist research methods

that privileges the voice and experience of the scientist and disqualifies the voices and experiences of his/her research objects. It treats interviewees narratives as legitimate research tools, though it does not ignore the validity and limitations of perspectival knowledge. Such an approach, applied by feminism, postmodernism and critical social theory, deconstructs the epistemological privileges and hierarchy of researcher over research subjects by treating people's perspectival knowledge about their experiences not only as valid data sources but also as sources of theoretical insight. In this process the subject is empowered to know and tell her/his story without being subjected to the researcher's prejudices, biases and assumptions (Agger, 1998: 177).

Being an insider or an outsider for the researcher in relation to the interviewee has limitations. The interviews can work if the interviewer is a sympathetic stranger, listening with interest (Chandler, 1990: 129). Therefore, being an outsider can actually provide the researcher with tools to use social differences in providing opportunities for interviewees to express their knowledge about their experiences. Miller and Glassner point out that one potential benefit of social distances in research is that the interviewee can see her/himself as an expert on a topic of interest to someone typically perceived to be in a more powerful position vis-a-vis the social structure. Another important point is that when individuals are members of groups that have been stereotyped and devalued by the larger or dominant culture and whose perspectives, demands or presence are denied, research conducted by an "outsider" can be welcomed because of its approach (1997: 105-6).

There are particular difficulties associated with studying “Islamists” in Turkey, not least the fact they may wish to figure out the standpoint of the researcher or cease to cooperate when they believe that the research may be used against them under very controversial/ turbulent political circumstances. In the first instance, the appearance, or style of dress (‘modern’ in this case), gender (female), education and social status (middle class) of a researcher seems to have an effect in getting access to more people by using their own networks. It reveals sensitivity to “outsiders” which makes informants either reluctant or willing to talk. The researcher may be refused for reasons of fear of misrepresentation or more than welcomed for reasons of opportunity for respondents to express themselves in their own words against the received result of antagonistic media coverage. Reasonably, the question “*why are you doing such research or who do you work for?*” was often asked though a brief introduction of myself and the aim of research was stated at the beginning of each interview. I openly answered the questions about myself or my research. The respondents were assured of the confidentiality of their identity. My identity as a student provided me with legitimacy in asking questions.

My attempts to make formal contact by letter and e-mail citing the aim of the research and my position as a research student were not successful. Had I gained access to the elites via the permission of the party, I could have been given limited access, which in turn would have restricted my flexibility. When I made my first contact it was made clear to me that the party headquarters had issued a regulation which prohibited any member from speaking to press or anyone else on issues concerning the party without an official permission, after experiencing a “media attack” that had distorted and used their words against them. I needed to be adaptable in my approach to gaining access and information and at the same time

attempt to make an analysis of the reasons why access was being granted or denied. Nevertheless, some key respondents, who held important positions in the Welfare Party, were identified in the early stages of the study. The first interviews were arranged with leading MPs by using a network of personal connections. That enabled me to use their names to convince other MPs to be interviewed.

But some of the contacts I attempted to make were not successful. In some cases, it was impossible to get responses to questions when some of the informants were suspicious of my motives. Compared to the relative openness of MPs to an “outsider”, it took quite a while to get in contact with some of the key party workers. Most of my attempts were either refused or addressed to someone else. It was not always possible to interview party workers alone. Although I politely expressed my preferences, I had to accept the terms of my respondents.

Lee and Renzetti mention that researchers may be subjected to repeated “trust tests” which force them to legitimate themselves in the eyes of respondents and they may have to construct or capitalize on a special identity (1990: 520). I had great difficulty on two occasions in particular, but these unexpectedly turned out to help me to gain more access. For example, while having a pre-interview conversation with a county representative who also held a high position at the party’s headquarters, in the presence of one of the advisers to the party leader, who was relatively young, presumably in his thirties, with a higher degree from the UK, I was questioned by him as if I was a kind of “representative of an ideology” to which “they” were opposed. The notion of secularism was the main theme I was questioned about. It was clearly implied that I would not understand what they stood for and was highly likely to distort their views. After the adviser left, my

respondent, who was over sixty years of age tried to ease the situation after we finished the interview and put me in contact with some more people, who had initially refused to be interviewed.

On the other hand, I was relatively more easily accepted by the voters. It may be stated that they freely spoke their minds without worrying about my “intentions” or standpoint, i.e. being an “insider” or “outsider”. They were more precise and short in their answers. They did not attempt to give any “justification” on behalf of the Welfare Party, but strongly expressed why they voted for it and would or would not do the same again depending on particular conditions.

Sampling

Arber highlights that the way in which one designs a sample will depend on one’s research goals (1993: 68). Decisions about the sample design for a research study should take into account the trade off between using a larger sample or studying a smaller one more intensively. The attitude to the structure of the interviews and the restraints for access to the interview subjects explained above determined the decisions about sampling and the number of interviews to be conducted. This meant that a different logic of sampling had to be utilized. In the literature, sampling strategies are discussed mainly in terms of probability and non-probability sampling methods (Burgess 1991). In probability sampling, every unit in the universe under the study has the same calculable and zero probability of being selected. Probability methods of sample selection are best if the researcher wishes to describe accurately the characteristics of a sample in order to estimate population parameters. With non-probability sampling, there is no means of

estimating the probability of units being included in the sample and there is no guarantee that every element has a chance of being studied. Where the researcher's aim is to generate theory and a wider understanding of a social process or social actions, the representativeness of sample can be less important. Using a probability sample is usually impractical for small scale qualitative research (Arber, 1992: 71).

Representative sampling was irrelevant since the major concern was not whether the sample was big enough to be statistically representative of a population in a case where there was no way of knowing the whole population. I wished to include particular units in both interviewing and media analysis to generate data which would enable me to understand the social process and address the research question. I wanted to identify interpretative themes in data upon which I would construct my analysis and my argument. Most sampling techniques in qualitative inquiry depend on purposeful selection. In purposive sampling the chance of selection for each element is unknown and for some elements it is zero. Snowball sampling was employed by using the respondents' own networks of contacts or friends to reach interviewees. Arber (1993) points out that snowball sampling is often used to obtain a sample where there is not a list which could be used as a sampling frame. This approach involves contacting a member of the population of interest and asking whether they know anyone else with the required characteristics. Snowball sampling is useful when the researcher's potential subjects are cynical about the research itself and the intentions of the researcher. It provides access to more interviewees by utilising the network of respondents. For the aims of this research, two target groups were initially identified, namely the

members of the Welfare Party and those member of the electorates who voted for it. Later the former group was divided into two, the Members of Parliament (MP) of the Welfare Party and the party workers. Eighty-nine interviews with three different groups, ten with MPs, fourteen with the party workers and sixty-five with the electors who voted for the Welfare at least in the last general election of 1995, have been conducted.

Structure

Millar et al (1992) indicates that there is not one set research interview since the purpose of the specific research investigation will determine the style of the interviewer. Three types of interview can be classified: (a) highly structured; (b) moderately structured; and (c) unstructured. Highly structured refers to interviews which are conducted with a standardised schedule on which the sequence and exact wording of questions to be asked is predetermined, as well as the respondent's answers options, for example as in a survey questionnaire. However, the highly structured interview is conducted in a very standardised manner of questions and answers, that allows for some degree of probing at certain points, and coding and comparison to a great degree, but it either does not allow or highly limits flexibility for both the interviewer and the interviewee. This type of interviewing can be useful in situations where all the possible answers to closed questions are known by the researcher. On the other hand, in the moderately structured interview while the researcher decides upon the major questions to be asked in advance, there is no a preset sequential order. The open-ended questions can be asked in the context of a more natural conversational style of interaction. It allows the researcher to adjust the conduct of the interview in relation

to the respondent's answers and provide the necessary flexibility to cover any issues raised by the respondent. Moderately structured interviews have advantages over unstructured interviews in terms of time, control and analysis of each interview (Fielding, 1993: 136). For unstructured interviews no exact questions are prepared in advance and there is no pre-designed order in which the interview is expected to progress. Since the interview is planned in only general terms and the interviewee as the "experienced subject" is encouraged to express herself/himself fully and spontaneously, the interviewer takes a more subordinate role (Millar et al, 1992: 10).

In this research, moderately structured face to face interviewing was used, since key respondents, who are given the name "Islamist fundamentalists" by "outsiders", would be asked for the facts as well as for their opinions about the phenomenon of "Islamism". This type of interview was chosen as it is valuable as a strategy for revealing people's knowledge, perspectives and beliefs about a given topic, and it is characterized by a relatively informal style, for example, with the appearance of a conversation or discussion. Fielding emphasises that two principles inform research interviews: (a) the questioning should be as open-ended as possible in order to gain spontaneous information about attitudes and action; and (b) the questioning techniques should encourage respondents to communicate their underlying values, attitudes, and beliefs (1993: 138).

On the other hand, Selltiz argues that the freedom which the open-ended interview permits is both the major advantage and the major disadvantage of interviews. The flexibility may result in a lack of comparability of one interview with

another. Moreover, the analysis is more difficult and time consuming than that of standardized interviews (1965: 262-64). However, it is accepted that the closed question may force a statement of opinion on an issue about which the respondent does not have any opinion. Even when a respondent has a clear opinion, the closed question may not give an adequate representation of it (Mason, 1996: 38). As we do not have clear-cut replies that were limited in number, the closed question was inadequate. To avoid the disadvantages of unstructured interviews, moderately structured interviewing was applied. Its use allowed the respondents to use their unique ways of formulating their interpretations and to raise important issues that had not been contained in the interview schedule. It also allowed me to skip some questions for some respondents or introduce new topics in a flexible way in accordance with the course of conversation. Neither the interviews nor the wording of each question followed a standard order, though I had a list of questions beforehand. The questions, however, aimed to provide data on the socio-economic backgrounds of informants, such as sex, age, education, occupation and so on, were by and large addressed in the same manner to each respondent.

Considering the structure of interviews and sampling strategy that was applied, I did not send out a pilot questionnaire to establish the kind of questions I should be asking in interviews. Given the nature of questions and the sensitivity of the subject matter in relation to the political context in which the interviews were conducted, it was thought that such an attempt could lead the representatives of the party to take control of the research and limit the respondents in what to say when they faced the questions. The content of the interviews was revealed to the

respondents as the interviews went on. That can be seen as an implicit power relation in the interviewer/interviewee relationship, as I knew the order of the questions, the interviewee did not know what was coming next. But, to create a relatively equal relationship with the respondent, in most cases I gave them an overall idea of the content without exactly giving them the wording of the questions I was going to ask. However, Chandler argues that the interview procedure includes an element of hierarchy. The discussion is a structured and purposeful conversation controlled by the researcher. The respondent's questioning is usually minimal compared to that of the researcher and their questions are different from those of the researcher. The interviews are often conducted in the respondents' environment and it is the researcher who records the words of the interview (1990: 129).

Interviewing requires skills of listening and reinforcing. Qualitative interviewers recognise that the narrative given by the interviewee may take a different form if someone else, with her/his own cultural identity, is the listener (Miller and Glassner, 1997: 101). The verbal and non-verbal reactions of the interviewer to interviewee responses must be non-judgmental and non-directive (Millar et al, 1992: 11). I tried to be non-directive and attempted to encourage the respondents to continue by listening with a sympathetic and lively interest, rather than talking or asking leading questions to implicitly or explicitly suggest any particular expected or desired answer and therefore exert control over the content of respondents' answers. For example, one of the MPs said in the middle of the interview *"you are not like journalists by whom we very often are questioned. You are not talking on my behalf, but listening to my words"*. I asked my respondents

for feedback with regard to their explanations in the course of the interview. In some cases, I probed informants' last remarks or repeated it to direct their attention to the last idea expressed and to imply that the respondent should continue talking about what had just been reflected upon. I also sometimes rephrased and reflected back to respondents what they seemed to be expressing, and summarised the remarks as a means of checking my own understanding. I had to interrupt occasionally with a question to prevent an informant circling around the same topic and make them move on to a new topic. By raising a question on a topic that had not been referred to before it was possible to move on to some of the other issues to be covered.

With regard to recording interview data, there are conflicting views. Benjamin (1981) points out that note-taking is an integral part of the interviewing process. An absence of taking notes may lead to an interviewee inferring negligence or a lack of interest on the part of the interviewer. However, it should be noted that note-taking during the course of the interview can be disruptive and affect the flow of communication in a conversational manner. On the other hand, Hetherington (1970) argues that audio recordings have advantage over note-taking in terms of preserving verbal and non-verbal information. Audio recording can be threatening for respondents. Kline(1975) suggests that note taking seems preferable unless a detailed record of the interview is required. The appropriateness of using note-taking or tape-recording depends on the purpose for which the record is being made, as well as the consent of the respondent. Before starting each interview every respondent was given two choices, tape recording or note-taking for the mechanics of the interview. It was obvious that most people found the presence

of a tape recorder intimidating. Most respondents asked me to take notes. I tried to record the answers as near verbatim as possible during the course of the interview. However, I did carry a tape recorder in case the opportunity to use it should arise. Tape recording provided a more natural conversation while note-taking put limits on the interaction between respondent and myself. However, in most cases, note-taking was completed after the interview session since I was given limited time by the respondents.

1.3. Content Analysis

In producing the case study, four newspapers, two of which represent “secular” and the other two “Islamist” standpoints, have been used in conjunction with the interviews. Their content has been analysed to reveal the main foci of attention, interest, and values with regard to the research question. It is assumed that the qualitative analysis of a limited number of crucial communications at specifically chosen periods may yield more clues to particular intentions than more standardised quantitative methods and can capture the richness and complexity of the material (Mostyn, 1985: 121). Specific details may be provided which validate information from other sources. The usefulness of these types of documents does not lie in their accuracy or lack of bias, but rather in the fact that they are not created as a result of the case study and they can offer a broad coverage of time, events and settings. It was seen to be important to ascertain the conditions under which they were produced, as well as their accuracy. Even so, the documents were not accepted as literal recordings of events that have taken place.

Content analysis is often defined as a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication. Content refers to words, meanings, symbols, ideas, themes or any message that can be communicated (Neuman, 1997: 272). Berelson (1971) argues that content analysis does not differ from a close reading using judgement, a traditional and time-honoured method. This definition of content analysis implies certain assumptions. Firstly, content analysis is often done to reveal the purposes, motives and other characteristics of communicators as they are presumably reflected in the content, or they identify the presumable effects of the content upon the attention, attitudes or action of readers or listeners. Secondly, content analysis assumes that the study of manifest content is meaningful. This assumption requires that the content is accepted as a common meeting-ground for the communicator, the audience and the analyst. The assumption is that there is a common universe of discourse among the relevant parties, so that the manifest content can be taken as a valid unit of study. However, as soon as meanings are attached to the symbols, the psychological predisposition of the reader becomes involved and to some degree it distorts the reader's comprehension of the manifest content. Thus there is no guarantee that the meanings in the manifest content are the same as the meanings to the reader. To some degree every reader takes his/her own peculiar meanings away from the common content. In other words, when readers draw conclusions from unstructured communications based on their own personal judgements about the content, they are making inferences. Therefore, Berelson argues that in general content analysis must deal with relatively explicit communication materials and not with relatively implicit materials. Under such conditions, analysis of the manifest content of communication requires

a certain uniformity of comprehension and understanding (1971:20). However, content analysis requires more functions beyond that of inference, such as interpretation, which gives meaning to the content within the environment in which it is produced (Mostyn 1985). Thirdly, the quantitative description of communication content is meaningful. This assumption implies that the frequency of occurrence of various characteristics of the content is itself an important factor in the communication process, under specific conditions.

Qualitative content analysis differs from the quantitative which is in the first instance a statistical technique for obtaining descriptive data on content variables. Mostyn argues that quantitative data are collected when the purpose of the research is to determine what, where, when and how many, rather than *why* (Mostyn, 1985: 116). The term qualitative, on the other hand, has been used to refer to a number of different aspects of research procedures. The overall purpose of the content analysis approach was to identify the specific characteristics of communications systematically and objectively in order to convert the raw material into data. It was thought that the two approaches could be merged, in the sense that while looking for what, where and how many times a specific content occurred in the chosen periods, my primary aim was to apply a qualitative approach which would reveal the meanings attached to the content, as well as why the presence or absence of a certain content characteristic took place in a specific newspaper and how it compared with the others. Social context is crucial for qualitative analysis in order to offer an interpretation of the content in its wider environment with reference to social relations, to indicate under what circumstances or when and why it is produced. The term qualitative, therefore, was employed to designate

the following: (a) the preliminary readings of communication materials for the purpose of the discovery of relationships, as against a systematic content analysis for the purpose of testing hypotheses, as in quantitative analysis; (b) an impressionistic procedure for making observations about content characteristics, as against a systematic procedure for obtaining precise, objective and reliable data; and (c) a flexible procedure for making content-descriptive observations or coding judgments, as against a rigid procedure for doing the same (Pool 1959: 8-9; Mostyn 1985: 117).

The unit of analysis for the four newspapers, two of which represent a “secular” orientation and the other two “Islamist”, depended upon the sampling of the periods selected as the research went along. As the communication content is dependent upon the social context, the sampling of periods was necessary in order to reveal the relationship between the content and the social context in which the contents were produced. In the beginning, the unit of analysis was each issue of the four newspapers in the two chosen periods, June 1996 when the Welfare party took office, and February 1997 to July 1997 when the Welfare government faced repeated warnings from the National Security Council and finally resigned.

Qualitative content analysis mainly aims to show the presence or absence of particular words, themes and ideas, while looking for the underlying, implicit meaning in the content of a text. However, while the frequency of a particular content was counted, the main purpose was to show its direction and definition. In other words, manifest and latent coding were applied together. Neuman

describes manifest coding as the visible, surface content in a text, or simply the presence or absence of a word or phrase (1997: 275). Manifest coding does not take into account the connotation of words, themes or phrases and is usually used in quantitative analysis. Latent coding is more effective for qualitative analysis since it looks for the wording and direction of the content. In latent coding, the researcher reads an entire piece of writing and decides upon its meaning, i.e. whether it is implicit or explicit. It is argued that one particular difficulty with latent coding is that the researcher's knowledge of language and social meanings may reduce the reliability of coding (Neuman, 1997: 276). On the one hand, as long as the researcher deals with the implicit meaning of the content and quotes the exact wording of the content, the reliability of latent coding can exceed that of manifest coding. On the other hand, words and concepts acquire meaning only in relational reference to other words and symbols that convey meaning differently (Agger, 1998: 58). Meaning is inherently dependent not only on specific words, but on context. The meaning in the content is that which a social identity attributes to it. Contents can become sites of contested interpretations, with different audience communities producing different meanings. For example, the concepts of secularism, Islamism, Islamists and the Welfare party on the two sides of the media are mainly constructed with reference to other side, and to other concepts rather than their literal meanings. Thus, language utilizes dichotomies, and sociologically the very notions of "secular" and "Islamist" stand in relation to each other within a given context and have meaning only with reference to the other term. To be "secular" is not to be "Islamist", or vice versa. Each is characterized in terms of what it is not, or what is "other" to it.

Qualitative content analysis aims to expose how a content can instruct its readers on how to see the social world, how to differentiate between the parts within it and structure and change their observations and understandings about the events which are taking place. As emphasized earlier, qualitative analysis does not take a content as a true and accurate reflection of some aspect of an external world, but as something to be explained and accounted for through the discursive rules and themes that predominate in the particular social-historical context chosen for study. It seeks to identify how the dominant discourse/ideology restricts, limits and arranges what can and cannot be said about the phenomenon in question and how it empowers or disempowers certain agents to speak and create representations, and thereby to authoritatively shape the world (Foucault 1972).

1.4. Coding the Qualitative Data

The analyses of interviews and media content began with the identification of key themes and patterns in each interview and content. This, in turn, depended on the process of coding data. Strauss (1987) cites coding as an essential analytical procedure. He argues that coding is much more than simply giving categories to data. It is also about conceptualizing data, raising questions, providing provisional answers about the relationships among and within the data and discovering the data. Coding is about breaking the data apart in analytically relevant ways in order to lead further questions. The method of coding was to assign labels to the data

in order to sort it into analysable units by creating categories with and from the data. On the one hand, coding the data in a particular way allowed me to characterize what each stretch of the interviews or media content was about in terms of general thematic content, on the one hand. On the other hand, coding the data enabled me to bring those fragments of data together to create categories. The categories are defined as being about or relating to particular concepts or themes. Therefore, codes, categories and concepts are related to one another. Coding was approached as an analytical process. The role of coding in such an approach was to undertake three kinds of operation, as Seidel and Kelle (1995: 55-6) identify: (a) noticing relevant phenomena; (b) collecting examples of those phenomena and; (c) analysing those phenomena in order to find patterns, themes, regularities and structures as well as contrasts, paradoxes and irregularities. In this sense, coding qualitative data differs from quantitative analysis, since the data are not merely counted. Rather, codes are attached to the data to identify and reorder it. Hence, coding was used to expand, transform and reconceptualize the data within that approach in order to formulate levels of interpretation. I have tried not to ignore incidents of data that did not fit into the codes. The exceptions or misfits were also coded, though there was not any, or enough, explanations for these.

The ideas for coding were inspired by reading through the data. However, there were preselected codes taken from the research literature prior to reading the data. In other words, a flexible approach to coding was employed. Codes were created and categorized when they came to light during the reading. That enabled me to associate particular events, key words or processes with one another. For example, a particular event or policy, such as the issue of head-covering, is

identified in most interviews with key words, such as human rights; democracy and secularism or 'identity crisis' are identified with the process of Westernisation, but not with modernisation. The coding process aimed to capture the essence of the pieces of information. Therefore, the important point here is to look not only at what has been said and how it was verbalized, but also what has not been said. This approach represents a step towards interpretation. For example, where the issue arose, respondents were asked to define or give their opinion on either secularism in general or the implementation of secularist policy in Turkey, although this was not specifically included in the questions. It is important for the research to examine how they verbalise or define secularism since it is a key element in most discussions, as will be seen in the media analysis. From this perspective, the process of coding is concerned with asking questions about the data. To give another example, questions, such as *what do respondents mean by 'identity crisis'? what reasons do they give for that? or how can that be linked to Islamism?*, can be asked of the data in order to develop an interpretation.

Coffey and Atkinson (1996) argue that coding involves the reading and re-reading of data and making selections from the data; it involves interpreting the data set. To move from coding to interpretation, the recontextualized data has to be displayed in such a way, in figures for example, that it can be read beforehand. The bits of data that relate to a particular code or category are presented together in order to explore the composition of each coded set. Once the data are displayed in a coded form, some categories can be linked together.

1.5. Reliability and Validity

It is on the issue of reliability and validity that quantitative researchers are most critical of qualitative analysis. Qualitative research is basically criticised for failing the test of prediction and control. It is argued that there is a low level of comparability since qualitative analysis is done with small or incomplete samples and the interpretation of the same data often differs from researcher to researcher.

• Understanding does not require knowledge of how to predict or control a phenomenon. Qualitative research attempts to understand its object of interest and seeks an explanation. How an event occurs, how it functions in social contexts and what it means to participants are all issues addressed from an interpretative perspective. It has strong interpretative attributes when it is supported by other sources of knowledge.

Krippendorff (1980) argues that qualitative analysis is basically about the symbolic meaning of views, explanations and messages. I, however, do not see that messages have an independent single meaning that needs to be unwrapped. It is obvious that qualitative data can be looked at from numerous perspectives and these may not be shared by different researchers. The subject matter of the social sciences is social life itself, and as a researcher I am a part of it. I see my task as not simply to record views or messages, but to explain these within a theoretical framework that examines the underlying mechanisms which structure their content. The social world does not exist independently of the knowledge that people have of their social world and which affects their actions. Interpretative science does not assume that the content of a particular communication contains one meaning for all who encounter it. The meanings of an interpersonal or technologically mediated

text depend on its relationship to other texts, the competencies and interests of its interpreters and the conditions in which it is produced and read. This means that how we describe the world forms what we describe (Lindlof, 1995: 23).

However, this does not mean that the research loses its validity. The attempt to use conventional criteria for validity is unrealistic since in most cases the qualitative research project is a one-off study and variables cannot be realistically selected. Rather, the ultimate reliability test must be based upon whether the data obtained in the research provide a trustworthy basis for drawing inferences, and supporting findings or conclusions (Mostyn, 1985: 124). The most important advantage presented by using multiple sources of evidence, such as scholarly works, the Welfare Party's manifesto and its election programme, in this research is the development of converging lines of inquiry which made the finding and conclusions much more convincing and accurate. The scholarly works concentrated upon the performance of the Welfare Party in the local governments and their inquiry on the nature of perceptions and expectations of its voters supported the findings of this research that it was on the "secular grounds" rather than "religious ground" many voters turned to the Welfare Party as an alternative to the mainstream political parties which had been in power. References to the surveys, such as the survey on the demands of the Welfare Party's voters further strengthened the validity of the findings of this research. The examination of content of the election manifestos and the detailed analyses of ideology of the Welfare Party further contributed to the multiple sources of evidence. The use of multiple sources essentially provided multiple measures of the arguments and conclusions of this research, and therefore the potential problem of validity was

addressed.

The incomparability between classical conceptions of external validity, which ask the question of generalizability, and basic aspects of the qualitative approach becomes very obvious when one emphasizes replicability of results. However, the goal in qualitative research is not to produce a standardized set of results which would be produced by another researcher in the same situation or studying the same issue, since the assumption in qualitative research is that the attributes or perspectives of the researcher influences the research (Schofield, 1985: 210-2). In other words, the classical view of external validity is of little help to qualitative researchers interested in finding ways of enhancing the likelihood that their work will be to some extent generalizable. The idea of sampling from a population of sites in order to generalize across the larger population is simply unworkable in most situations for qualitative researchers. Many critics of qualitative methods share the view that it is highly unlikely that the researcher will be able to generalize from a single case to a target population of which that case is a member, since single members often poorly represent whole populations. Nonetheless, it is possible to use the findings of a study to understand other similar situations. Therefore, an alternative approach which emphasises analysing the degree to which the situation studied matches other situations in which one is interested, provides a more realistic and workable way of thinking about the generalizability of research results than do more classical approaches. This is to say that qualitative studies gain their potential for applicability to other situations by providing what is called "comparability" and "translatability". The former term refers to the degree to which components of a study, including the units of analysis,

concepts generated, population characteristics, and settings, are sufficiently well described and defined that other researchers can use the results of the study as a basis for comparison. Translatability is similar but refers to a clear description of one's theoretical stance and research techniques (Goetz and LeCompte 1984, cited in Schofield, 1993: 207).

In sum, generalizability in the sense of producing laws that apply universally is not a useful standard or goal for this research. In fact, this is not a useful or obtainable goal for any kind of research in the social sciences. Bearing in mind the complex nature of Islamism, it is not the principal aim of this research to draw conclusions which are to some extent generalizable to a larger population, but rather to offer an explanation for the case studied. The rejection of generalizability as a search for broadly applicable laws is not a rejection of the idea that studies in one situation can be used as a part of a comparative framework for analysing other situations by avoiding stereotyping and reductionist tendencies.

Chapter 2: Literature Revisited: "Islamism" as a Modern Ideology

This chapter shows the key conceptual, methodological and theoretical problems within the existing literature in analysing the phenomenon of Islamism and clarifies the theoretical framework to be used in the rest of the study. It is divided into two sections: the first looks at the terminology that is applied and at approaches to explaining Islamist movements in particular and the Middle East in general; and the second section gives an account of analyses of the nature and context of Islamist movements. The chapter argues that, while not dismissing culture as a

variable, an analysis of Islamism should overcome the determinism of culturalist perspective that examines it in terms of a clash of civilisations and the failure of Muslims to assimilate European liberal ideas. Rather, it should construct itself upon a theoretical framework that takes into account the patterns of development in societies experiencing an Islamist trend, and brings the state into its analysis. In this context, it stresses that the historical formation and features of the state, its role in the development process, and its political relationships with other institutions and interests need to be analysed. The chapter argues that Islamism is a product of modernity, i.e. an urban phenomenon, with reference to its intellectual sources and social basis. Therefore, it needs to be looked into within the context of modern political ideologies, rather than as a unique feature of Muslim societies. It shows that Islamism is an ahistorical approach within which Islam is defined as much in terms of a political ideology as in terms of a religion. However, conclusions to be reached on the realms of ideology predetermine how the holy texts are interpreted, given their selective use by scholars and activists. A selective and ends-oriented reading of Islamic sources and the definition of Islam as a religion provides a political (national) battle with religious means and symbols in moral and cultural expression of developmental crisis. Islamic rhetoric plays the role of liberation theology with its emphasis upon oppression and injustice. It is a form of contextual theology in that the experience and the circumstances of the interpreters are given a prime importance. This emphasizes the fact that, despite the existence of a shared global language, each Islamist movement needs to be analysed within its historical circumstances and concepts should not be taken for granted.

2.1. How to Conceptualize and Approach Islamists Movements

The problems within the existing literature can be classified as conceptual, theoretical and methodological, in terms of analysing the Islamist movements of the twentieth century.

2.1.1. Conceptual Debate

There seems to be no agreement on how to name the phenomenon in question, which in turn leads to misconceptions, stereotyping, and reductionism. By definition, it is not easy to clarify the nature and scope of Islamist movements, since several terms have been used interchangeably: reassertion, renewal, revivalism, resurgence, upsurge, awakening, Islamism, the return of Islam, fundamentalism, neo-fundamentalism, radicalism or militant Islam. As well as these, there are other classifications: populist Islam -elitist Islam; cultural Islam-political Islam; high Islam- *volk* Islam. The confusion over using different terms leads to confusion between different interpretations, streams and organizations within Islamist movements.

To begin with, it is important to emphasize the fact that it would be misleading to attach the label “fundamentalist” to only a religion. In its strict sense any ideology, religious or secular, could represent a “fundamentalist” position. For academic purposes it is objectionable to originate an analytical category within the notion of “Islamic fundamentalism” as it is often used in journalism. “Islamic fundamentalism” in journalism is associated with a radical, fanatical, anti-modern or anti-Western position. As a concept it is built up by means of citing the

distinguishing features of “modern” or Western life, i.e. universal values. Those values which are found in either Islam or Islamist movements are deemed unacceptable by the standards of Western values, and are characterized as “Islamic fundamentalism”. The term is defined by “outsiders”, and therefore, is a value judgment.

Secondly, despite retaining the term in his study, Munson (1988) emphasizes that the concept of “fundamentalism” is very controversial in terms of terminology and content and there are some problems with applying it to Islamist movements which advocate an ideologised version of Islam. As a term, “fundamentalism” was originally used in the US after the First World War to describe the doctrines of certain Protestant Christian biblical literalists and inerrantists who elaborated a list of fundamental beliefs that all true Christians should follow. They believed in the absolute truth of the holy scriptures and rejected much of the modern world. In other words, the term “fundamentalism” suggests

the restoration of a pure, unsullied, and authentic form of the religion, cleansed of historical accretions, distortions and modernist deviations (Beinin and Stork, 1997: 3).

In this sense, it can be argued that the term “fundamentalist” is inappropriate to define Islamic movements because it is impossible to clarify a distinctive “fundamentalist position” in terms of the place of religion in Muslim life. Before moving on to examine this point, it is necessary to stress the fact that Islamist movements by no means deny the modern world. Rather, they compete for worldly power and convey their activities by means of the modern world.

In theory, all Muslim communities may be identified as “fundamentalist” in belief

and practice since there is no difference between the believer and the so-called “militant activist” in terms of believing in the inerrancy of the Holy scripture, the Quran, as the revealed word of Allah and the *fundamentals* of Islam, i.e. the five pillars of religion² (Esposito, 1992: 7-8). From the conventional point of view, Islam is perceived not only as the supreme religion or faith but also as a coherent and comprehensive value system and culture for the organisation of society and the management of all aspects of the Muslim’s life (Khumayni, 1982; 315; Nasr, 1980: 2; Qutb, 1982: 123-4). For example, Afghani wrote that

the principles of the Islamic religion are not restricted to calling man to truth or to considering the soul only in a spiritual context which is concerned with the relationship between this world and the one to come... Islamic principles are concerned with relationships among the believers, they explain the law in general and in detail, they define the executive power which administers the law, ...determine sentences and limit their conditions...they are concerned with the unique goal that the holder of power ought to be the most submissive of men to the rules regulating that power (1982b: 21).

For example, among the basic tenets of the Muslim Brothers, the Islamist activist group, there is this sense of inclusiveness of Islam. This presents Islam as religion and state given the historical example of Mohammed founding a political community originally at Medina based on religion (Hasan al-Banna 1966, referred to in Sagiv, 1995: 31).

In addition, those who write on Islam often suggest that Islam is a *community* [umma], a *loyalty*, and a *way of life...*” (Lewis, 1976:39). Similarly, Vatikiotis points

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The five pillars of Islam are: (a) testifying explicitly that there is no other God but Allah and that Mohammed is His messenger; (b) daily prayer; (c) fasting during the month of Ramadan; (d) almsgiving and (e) pilgrimage to Mecca. They together with the six articles of the faith, *iman*, belief in Allah, His messenger, Holy books, angels, the Day of Judgment and Destiny, constitute the fundamentals of the religion of Islam and signify its unique character.

out that *true knowledge is that of God and His Law, which embraces all human activity. This is an important ingredient in Islamic thinking from the start* (1987: 21).

Thirdly, the Quran is formulated in a way that is far from self-explanatory. Consequently, it is impossible to take the entire text literally. This means that it has to be interpreted. The most common form of interpretation is *tafsir*, exegesis, by learned jurists. Over the course of time, the body of exegesis has grown in size and conflicting interpretations have come into existence. Apart from sectarian differences, there are divergencies within the same sects and between the orthodox and mystical traditions on the meaning of the text. In other words, there is room, on the one hand, for a literalist reading of the Quran as well as a more liberal or rationalist inclination (Sidahmed and Ehteshami, 1996: 2-3). On the other hand, Islamist leaders, reformers or movements selectively use and reinterpret the religious sources, the Quran, the *Sunna* and other canonical religious texts in the light of new circumstances, with respect to the new messages they want to emphasize. In cross-referencing these interpretations with the ideas, institutions and commodities of the present and recent past, they justify their political stance and actions. For example, the concepts of sovereignty, social contract, liberty, democracy and political participation are discussed by comparing "Islamic modes of political organization" with Western-style pluralism (Kramer 1995; Zubaida 1997). Although, many Islamist leaders and ideologues present their ideas and movements as a "return to original sources", it is still a conceptual error to view them or their movements as restoring an "original" form of Islam. It can be argued that what distinguishes the Islamist leaders and followers from the ordinary Muslim as a believer is the political activism of the former rather than a dogmatic or

literalist attitude toward Holy Scripture (Sidahmed and Etheshami, 1996: 3). It should be re-emphasized that it is not an easy task to distinguish religiosity, religious signs and symbolism from those used by “Islamist political activism” which seeks to increase the role of Islam in society and politics, since Islam like other major religions is a lived tradition which people continue to profess and use to reinforce certain types of religious practice. In this context, however, Roy (1994) refers to “fundamentalism” as the attitude represented by *ulemas* and *mollahs* that demands the complete and total implementation of the Muslim law, *Sharia*, regardless of the nature of the political system. Such a classification suggests the application of different terms to different perspectives/actions, particularly for example if one compares the case of Iran with that of Saudi Arabia.

Alternatively, the term “Islamic resurgence” is conceptualised to refer to an increasing political activism in the name of Islam by governments or ruling classes and opposition or dissident groups alike, i.e. Islam from above and Islam from below (Dessouki 1982; Akhavi 1980). In both cases, the term indicates a politicized, activist form of Islam and the growing use of Islamic symbolism and legitimation at the level of political action. Similarly, Owen (1992) offers the word “renewal” to describe the religious politics of the 1970s and the 1980s. He discusses that referring to an Islamic revival or resurgence neither denies the continued presence of Islam in Muslim societies nor implies that it was dead or irrelevant. However, the term “renewal of Islam”, like others such as “awakening of Islam”, “upsurge of Islam”, “fundamentalist Islam” or “militant Islam” still seems to personalise Islam and gives the impression that it accommodates such acts in its very nature, and so keeps coming back given certain circumstances.

Additionally, since research on Islamic movements is strongly bonded to the methodological and theoretical preferences of researchers, within the use of these terms the analysis of the nature of Islam as a religion, for instance, is often focussed on its compatibility with secular values such as democracy, nation-state or human rights, rather than on Islamist movements within their (secular) economic, social and political context.

Ayubi talks of “political Islam” in his study to refer to the doctrine and/or movement which strongly asserts that Islam possesses a theory of politics and the state and invokes traditional sources and precedents. It is argued that it represents only one of several intellectual and political manifestations of the interplay between religion and politics. Later on, the concepts “Islamic revival” and Islamism are applied. The “Islamic revival” is specified as being both a means for retreating into a nostalgic past and a device for coping with the present and future. Ayubi continues as follows:

it would be naive to regard Islamism simply as part of an ‘American-Saudi design’ to consolidate the rule of , but dependent, bourgeoisie; or else to regard Islamism simply as the battle cry of the oppressed and exploited masses in their revolt against despotism and foreign hegemony. The Islamic revival is potentially all these things, and much more, depending on the specific contingency of every social and political situation (1991: x).

Furthermore, Keddie (1988) uses the term “Islamism” in place of what she identifies as the misleading term “fundamentalism” and the vague “Islamic revival” and so on. She argues that Islamism, referring to the twentieth century movements for “political Islam”, has the great practical value of being the term most acceptable to Muslims. Islamism in her definition refers to Islamic movements which overtly

or covertly aim to establish an Islamic state, or at least achieve the application of *Sharia*.

Comparably, Roy (1994) speaks of "Islamism" as a political ideology. Islamism is used to refer to contemporary Islamist movements which see in Islam a political ideology as much as a religion, and therefore breaks with a certain tradition. It is argued that Islamism is a socio-cultural movement representing the protest and frustration of a generation of youth that has not been socially or politically incorporated into society. Clearly, the terms "political Islam" and "Islamism" are applied interchangeably. Yet, the term Islamism within these definitions still needs to be carefully used without over-generalisation in reference to each modern politico-religious movement. It is crucial to evaluate each case within its own context to capture the trends that encourage Islamism, since it can be a vague and an umbrella term which accommodates various cases. It would be a basic mistake, as Munson (1988) points out, to assume that all Islamist movements have identical ideological orientations, whether or not they demand a strictly Islamic polity. Not only does each individual case may possess its own salient features and goals in line with its historical background, but Islamic movements may also be internally divided into different forms within individual countries.

Apart from these, another terminology/classification is offered: that of cultural Islam and political Islam (Göle 1991). Göle argues that cultural Islam gives priority to the individual sphere, enforcing belief and the construction of an Islamic identity, although this does not mean that it is apolitical. On the other hand, political Islam competes for political power and aims for the transformation of political and social

systems from the top downwards, therefore it is revolutionary. This classification is reminiscent of the general discussion of the means of accession to power and transformation of society among Muslim intellectuals since the nineteenth century. In other words, the main question is one of whether the transformation of society would come either from below, by Islamisation of culture, or from the top downwards by the establishment of an Islamic state.

Bulaç, however, acknowledges to an extent the usefulness of Göle's terminology, argues that the terms "official Islam" and "civilian Islam" are more appropriate in analysing the Islamist movements. On the one hand, it seems that this classification is offered basically because Bulaç refuses to use the adjective "political" along with Islam. On the other hand, it is obvious that the particular case of the Ottoman Empire constitutes the background for this formulation. Official Islam is viewed as a tradition of the Restoration period, *Tanzimat*, in the nineteenth century. This means that official Islam sees the solution within the state and concentrates on capturing state power, along with the contested ideologies of Ottomanism and Turkism. It needs an official religious perspective, so it can arrange the political sphere in line with the Islamic perspective of Muslim groups that hold state power. However, Bulaç argues that this would lead to a totalitarian politics. It is believed that civilian Islam, on the other hand, sees the departure point as faith and *umma* without disregarding the importance of politics in human life. *Umma* is the worldwide community of Islam, which ideally commands a Muslim's loyalty above all considerations of race, kinship or nationality. Bulaç argues that for civilian Islam, the *umma* operates before and above the state. This implies that the "nation-state" loses its *raison d'être* (1997: 115-6). But this model

is not original and it does not provide any further clarification than the former in terms of the boundaries between the two positions and in identifying the scope of Islamism. It is also reductionist in terms of treating the goals, attitudes and activities of various groups or tendencies within Islamism or opposition movements as those set externally by Islam. However, it is clear that the root of such a formulation lies in the Islamic doctrine of oneness, *tahwid*. Although this traditionally refers to the oneness of God and His supreme sovereignty, the implication is of the totality and universality of the Islamic belief system. According to modern interpretations, monotheism provides the Muslim with a world-view that directs the individual towards a society free of contradictions. A society based on monotheism cannot accept legal, class, social, political, racial, national, territorial, genetic or even economic contradictions, as it implies a mode of looking upon all beings as a unity (Shariati, 1979: 86; Afgani, 1982b: 21). The concept of the "classless society", i.e. the community of believers, is one of the eminent features of Islamist writing. Thus, the belief in God's Oneness becomes a liberating (revolutionary) force emancipating the individual from all worldly servitudes and dependencies. At the personal level, this implies self-purification, which cleanses the individual from attachment to the pleasures of wealth, power and fame and enables them to attain a mystical spirit of total freedom and emancipation. In this context, *tawhid* requires the individual to reject submission and subservience to other individuals at the societal level. This rejection of non-divine authority in socio-political relations has significant political and economic implications. In the economic realm, *tawhid* is, therefore, interpreted as a call to abolish the exploitation of the weak by the strong, for the eradication of any class-polarised society. In the political realm, the application of the *tawhid* would involve a

constant war against all despotic forms of government as well as an external war against all imperialistic forces of foreign domination (Shariati, 1980: 119). Finally, at the cultural level, *tawhid* engages the believer in a steady struggle against cultural imperialism. It provides Muslims with an endogenous source of identity in the face of cultural alienation.

2.1.2. Theoretical and Methodological Grips

There is a significant conflict within the literature over how to analyse the nature of Islamist movements. Are they the result of a clash of civilizations and the failure of modern Muslims to assimilate European liberal ideas, which are regarded as universal, such as secularism, the rule of law and democracy³. Or are they the result of frustration and the failure of development struggles in Muslim countries as well as reactions to colonialism and neo-imperialism?⁴ This thesis argues that the phenomenon of Islamism should be evaluated from a framework which takes into account the patterns of development in societies experiencing such trends in a global context. This needs to be done with reference to changing social relations and the role of state in order to avoid circular arguments which attempt to explain the underdeveloped nature of Muslim societies in terms of their cultural fixity or rigidity by proposing an evolutionary, single path to modernity. Therefore, how to interpret social change or patterns of development in the Middle East is a crucial

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Best known is S. P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993). Also see B. Lewis (1988) *The Political Language of Islam*; and P.J. Vatikiotis (1987) *Islam and the State*.

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For a multiple explanation on the causes of the Islamist movements, see Halliday (1988) "The Iranian Revolution: Uneven Development and Religious Populism"; J. L. Esposito (1991) *Islam: The Straight Path*; N. Ayubi (1991) *Political Islam: Religion and Politics in the Arab World*; and R. Owen (1992) *State Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*.

starting point for understanding why Islamism has come to present itself as the untried, only “alternative” and solution to the problems of Muslim countries in general. Such an approach implies that “Islamism” should be evaluated not in terms of a characteristic of Muslim societies, but in terms of political movements.

Modernisation and underdevelopment theory alike have placed the emphasis upon “change agents” and produced much more state-centred approaches. The former has focussed upon internal educated elites, and the latter upon external forces. Within these frameworks, the causes of underdevelopment have been seen to rest either within the structures of societies and are therefore attributable to their own deficiencies, or within external factors and the collaboration of internal and external forces. Modernisation theory uses a particularist approach and often directs attention to the numerous barriers in existence, which could include traditional values or a lack of rationality or entrepreneurs in a given society which was assumed to be in a transitional stage from traditional to modern, on the one hand. In this context, what symbolizes “tradition” is often treated as an obstruction to those who wished to introduce change.⁵ Underdevelopment theory within a universalistic approach places the Middle East in the international context and examines barriers to development in terms of colonialism, its means of incorporation into the world market and its asymmetrical relationship with the central economies.

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For a comparison of the themes, innovation, diffusion, the introduction of technology from the outside and the role of traditional culture in blocking development, see M. J. Levy (1952) *The Structure of Society*; B. Hoselitz (1960) *Sociological Aspect of Economic Growth*; G. Foster (1962) *Traditional Culture and the Impact of Technological Change*; and E. M. Rogers (1962) *Diffusion of Innovations*.

Culturalist Perspective

Modernist literature has described the Middle Eastern societies in terms of what they are not, and their histories have been generally accounted for what they have lacked, the presence of which has led to the development of Western societies. The culturalist approach postulates the existence of an evolutionary path to modernity and insists on explaining the “European miracle” with reference to the presence of presumed features such as the presence of extensive market relations, the process of Occidental rationalization, and the competitive state system.⁶ This sees the developmental pattern in the Middle East as a deviation from the Western one, which is privileged as universal, rational, pluralist and secular. Such reasoning has important implications when one studies Islamism from the point of view of modernisation theory. Islamism is envisioned in terms of a “reactionary act” against modernity, that is equated with rationalism, science and industrial society. Culturalist analysis defines culture as the key determinant of the evolution of a society. It is proposed that the essential cause behind the relative stagnation of Muslim societies is Islamic culture with its ‘unchanging nature’, that distinguish Muslim societies from the developed world with the unique dynamism of Western culture, i.e. Christianity.⁷ The culturalist perspective has based its political analysis upon the cultural peculiarities of Muslim societies and has looked for cultural impediments to Western-style development or democracy with

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J. A. Hall (1985) *Powers and Liberties: The Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West*; M. Mann (1986) *The Sources of Social Power*, and Gellner (1988) *Plough, Sword and Book: The Structure of Human History*.

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See for example P. Crone (1980) *Slaves on Horses*; M. Cook (1983) *Muhammad*; P. J. Vatikiotis (1987) *Islam and the State*.

reference to language, religion and history of the region.⁸ One of the most hotly discussed issues relating Islamist movements have been the notion of secularism, since modernisation theorists has strongly emphasised that secularization is a necessary component of modernization. It is argued that:

the secularization of political culture explicitly underlines the decline of religious values generally throughout the society...Material values rank higher than other worldly values and concern with the ethical social relationships based on universalistic norms takes the place of beliefs and rituals rooted in specific religious traditions. There is growing scepticism concerning the truth or validity of traditional religious doctrine, and less concern with transmitting religious ideas in the socialization process. People do not think about religion much; it occupies a diminishing part of their consciousness. There is growing tolerance of religious values foreign to one's own culture and a growing relativism based on scepticism of all religious truth claims (Smith, 1970, p.115).

However, within the rise of Islamist movements in the twentieth century it seems that universalistic norms, such as secular nationalism, have not diminished religious beliefs, orientation or organisation in the Middle East. Effort has been put into understanding the cause of this continuation as an influential factor in the social and political life of Muslim societies, since the assumption was that this situation is an abnormal or unnatural one in the modern era. Islam and Islamic culture is held responsible for the "backwardness" of Muslim societies, for "despotic", authoritarian forms of rule, or for instability of regimes and democracy. However, this approach is called "Orientalism" by Said (1978). According to him Orientalism is a discourse of domination, both a product of European subjugation of the Middle East and an instrument in this process.

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See B. Lewis (1964) *The Middle East and the West*; E. Gellner (1983) *Muslim Society*; (1987) *Culture, Identity and Politics*; and (1992) *Postmodernism, Reason and Religion*.

In general, one of the problems in the political analysis of the Middle East is the heavy reliance on tired methodologies and clichés. Sadowski emphasizes the fact that *neo-Orientalists* [such as Crone, Pipes, or Gellner]... *too portray Islam as a social entity whose “essential” core is immune to change by historical influences* (1997: 42). The most often repeated and misrepresented assumption is that there is no church-like institution in Islam, i.e. no separation of religion and state. Therefore, Islam claims to be able to legislate for the whole of human activity. This leads to the conclusion that the concept of the secular theoretically has no counterpart in Islamic culture. This is a view that is shared by scholars, be they Western, Muslim, or Islamist, as shown earlier. However, Kramer (1980) argues that while Islam is based on the unity of religion and state, this assumption by no means implies that Islam is inflexible and unchanging. There is a need to distinguish between the profession of faith, *ibadat*, that is immutable to change, and the worldly affairs, *muamalat*, which are subject to the changing circumstances provided that the results conform to the word and spirit of the *Sharia*. It has become clear that one of the methodological impediments to studying Middle Eastern politics is that “*the element of particularism, uniqueness or impenetrability [of the region] has been greatly overrated*” (Halliday, 1996: 215). However, this does not mean that the application of universal concepts would dismiss the particular historical circumstances of regional politics in attempts to test or produce universal theories. In this context, neither is the Muslim response to Orientalism analytical. It tends to overestimate “the uniqueness of Middle Eastern societies” while rejecting universalist approaches. As Roy (1994) highlights, the Muslim response can be classified as threefold: (a) the nostalgia argument, which claims that it was Islam that brought civilisation to the West; (b)

the rejection of the assumed Western superiority associated with the condemnation of Western immorality and doubletalk; and (c) the apologetic perspective that asserts that every universally praised value is referred to in the Quran and *Sunna*, and therefore, Islam is the best religion. Orientalists and Islamists alike have attributed an essentialist and deterministic character to Islam, and explain Islamist movements with reference to the holy texts and historical experiences by tending to mistake the script for reality or to compare it with Christianity and Western culture. Both approaches attribute to Islam a monolithic character and, therefore, overlook the fact that Islamist movements differ in terms of their social context, their understanding of Islam, their political alliances and actions and their impact on society. They lead to the conclusion that the “reality” is predetermined by Islam. Attempts to show the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam with, for example, secularism, democracy or nationalism, with reference to Islamic texts and historical practices in culturalist reading are often closed with a remark on the absence or deficiency of this or that, on the one hand, or the misunderstanding of Islam by non-Muslims or deviation from one “true Islam”, on the other. Reductionism bypasses the fact that similar political and economic, not to mention cultural, circumstances allowed the rise of many other ideologies and movements in the Middle East. In other words, many of the phenomena classified as peculiarly Islamic are not unique to Muslim societies when one considers the political discourses in societies which are aware of being at the periphery of global power relationships. It is interesting to view the similarities between the common discourse of Islamist movements and that of populism in general in terms of, for example, attitudes towards the problems of industrialization, the West or the relics of indigenous values. Although there are many ambiguities and overlaps in

definitions and meanings for the term populism, the term has been employed here to refer to the following: (a) a particular socio-historical movement appealing to the people across class lines; (b) a moralistic rather than programmatic discourse that manifests a cultural expression of developmental crisis, and claims to support and represent the “common people” in the face of ‘corrupt’ economic and political elites; (c) an expression against relations of inter and intra-national subordination and domination; (d) and an emphasis upon cooperate and communitarian forms of modernisation and industrialisation. It can be suggested that the emergence of populism in general and that of Islamism in particular, both as an ideology and as a movement, appear in societies and social groups which are aware of being peripheral to centres of power. They share a common language of the need to recapture an imagined sense of community, a quest for roots and authenticity.⁹ References to “imperialism” and “oppression” are among the central themes of Islamist ideology, though their saliency on the whole discourse is very much dependent upon the pattern of historical experience with imperialism of each society having an Islamist trend. It is important to re-emphasize the fact that Islamism that is influenced by Islam and expressed through Islamic symbolism represents a continuity in the history of Third World movements in terms of its revolutionary nature and its outlook (see Table 1 below). Roy indicates that:

the crowds that in the 1950s demonstrated under the red or national flag now march beneath the green banner... the same individuals who followed Nasser or Marx in the 1960s are Islamists today. There is an abundance of coming and going and of connections between the two Third World movements...it is the Islamic revolution in Iran that has best embodied the Third World continuity of the Islamist movement by expressing the North-

⁹ See G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (1969) *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics* for a general account of populism, including its concepts, social roots and ideology, and some case studies on Latin America, Africa and Eastern Europe.

South opposition in religious terms (1994: 4-5).

Although there are certain differences among Islamist movements, there is a shared language which signifies their global context and links them with populist discourse in general. It contains following themes: (a) the roots of the underdeveloped nature of the Third World lie in the legacy of *colonialism* and *neocolonialism*; (b) the international system is dominated by the Western powers and serves to *exploit* the Third World; (c) the Third World is economically, politically and culturally dependent on the Western powers and their allies, and this state of affairs is maintained by the collaboration of corrupt elites; (d) independence and cultural autonomy can be attained by a return to indigenous (Islamic in this case) means and by the elimination of corrupt ruling elites, who are the clients of Western powers and their allies (Hunter, 1986: 189-190).

Table 1: Populism and Islamism Compared

Characteristics	POPULISM ¹⁰	ISLAMISM
Response to	the confrontation with problems of development and imperialism.	the twin problems of domestic developme
Pattern of Development	questions the applicability of universal development (Western); undermines the position of classical evolutionism with its conception of a unilinear development path; protests against the pace and pattern of the modernisation process. There is a belief in the possibility of controlling the modernisation process in the sense that a synthesis between the basic values of the traditional culture of the society and the need for modernisation is attainable, though the selections from this traditional culture are often arbitrary and the synthesis reached will depend upon the level of development of the society; asserts that the roots and causes of underdevelopment lie in the legacy of colonialism and neocolonialism.	the same and; there is a belief that the products of moder attractive, which has to be incorporated, li avoided; the Muslim countries are econom powers and their allies and this state of aff social groups.

¹⁰ The general content of populism is drawn from G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (1969) *Populism: Its Meanings and National Characteristics*

<p>Course</p>	<p>seeks to reform the existing social structure, but it is not anti-state either in ideology or in practice. Rather it opposes the present form of the state; lacks a clearly definable or consistent ideology beyond a fervent nationalism; postulates that legitimacy resides in the people's will and stresses upon solidarity; equates "the nation" with "the people"; a united people in which class tensions are overcome in heightened nationalism. The will of the people is identified with justice and morality.</p>	<p>a call for return to an earlier model of social and political practice, i.e. for reconstructing an "idealized past" by abandoning the present for the future; an interest in Islam as an endogenous, self-sufficient ideology declares the failure of both West (capitalism) and East (communism). Islam is proposed as the third way for state and society. From the sources of Islam solutions for pressing contemporary socio-political and economic problems could be deduced; politically reactionary in that the ultimate aim is to overthrow or radically transform the social system which is believed to cause decadence, corruption, social injustice, oppression and impiety; invokes the concept of rebellion against unjust unIslamic rulers, and therefore challenges the call for submission and obedience to whomever is in authority; includes a call for the establishment of an "Islamic state", though there is not one unified definition or form of it. It is not anti-state, but opposes its present form. On the subject of legitimacy, the variants of Islamism either totally reject "the sovereignty of the people" as opposed to "the sovereignty of God" or attempt to harmonise both for an "Islamic democracy"; collectivist in the sense that the <i>umma</i> based on monotheism rejects legal, class, social, political, racial, national, territorial, genetic and economic contradictions.</p>
<p>Identity</p>	<p>an idea of a golden age which appeals to popular nostalgia emphasises the special quality, the "uniqueness", of the identity and culture. There is a quest for roots, authenticity and the symbolic reassurance which comes from an imagined sense of community in the past. The conspiracy theory of history helps to reconstruct the identity. Hostility is directed against the imperialist outside and their collaborators within.</p>	<p>the idea of a golden age lies in the time of Prophet Mohammed and the four Caliphs; a quest for a more authentic identity which is rooted in the Islamic past and damaged by imported ideologies and the experience of Westernisation.</p>
<p>Leadership</p>	<p>discontented middle/upper-middle class</p>	<p>discontented middle/upper-middle class</p>
<p>Social Base</p>	<p>a trans-class movement bringing together divergent group interests, therefore fusing urban and rural in coalition.</p>	<p>a broad trans-class social base which includes new middle strata, under-employed intelligentsia, students, professionals, technocrats, petite bourgeoisie, rural agrarian capitalist, notables</p>
<p>Morality</p>	<p>the spirituality of the nation is contrasted with the materialism of the West and the collectivist nature of the culture of "native" people with that of "corrupted" ruling elites.</p>	<p>nostalgic about Islam's spirit of compassion, solidarity, fraternity and social justice; proclaims to be committed to the material and spiritual salvation of the Muslims; seeks to synchronize the spiritual and material spheres; Islamic re-education of people is essential for morality as well as for the re-Islamisation of society.</p>

Apparently, there is nothing specifically Islamic in this formulation. These are the dominant themes that have been expressed by popular Third World movements, be they nationalist or socialist, which focussed on changing their terms of relations with dominant powers. However, they have been shaped by Muslims' historical experience with colonialism and Islamic rhetoric has played the role of "liberation theology" in this context. Liberation theology in Islamic context can be described as a form of contextual theology in which the experience and circumstances of the interpreters are given a prime importance.¹¹ The three steps of the liberation

theology are: (a) to grasp social reality, which means the experience of millions with oppression and injustice; (b) to confront this reality with the revelation; and (c) to orient reflection towards action to change that reality in order to create a just society. This is not a promise but already a realised utopia. For example, Mutahhari believes that

Islamic movements... are directed against despotism, capitalist colonialism or materialistic ideologies subscribing to colonialism in its new shape... after having passed through a period of mental crisis the Muslims are once again [in the 1970s] struggling to reestablish their "Islamic identity" against the challenges of capitalist West and the communist East (1982: 309).

As there is no blueprint from the tradition, this discourse is certainly shaped and reshaped by history. Neocolonialism and Zionism represent evil, demonstrating the belief that Muslims are confronted by a large scale conspiracy. This is followed by the advocacy that *jihad* against unbelief and unbelievers is a religious duty, as mentioned earlier (Esposito, 1991:163-64). A selective and ends-oriented reading of Islamic sources and the definition of Islam as a religion provides a political, not to mention national, battle with religious means and symbols. As the ideological flexibility of Islam allows a wide range of interpretation, some of the themes of Islam serve the cause of popular mobilisation: an emphasis on the common concerns of the community of believers; a call for rebellion against unjust or un-Islamic rulers; and support for struggle. Khomeini defines Islam as *"the religion of the strugglers who want right and justice, the religion of those demanding freedom and independence and those who do not want to allow the infidels to dominate the believers"* (Khomeini, 1982: 315).

Because all interpretations (by authorities) are based upon the word of God, they

serve the purposes of political mobilization. However, studying Islamist movements necessarily includes what Islamists say and do, they can be understood in a variety of ways. A danger in studying a movement is that ideas, interpretations and activities may be viewed in isolation from their setting in an attempt to build up a kind of general theory of the movement under examination. Being unaware of historical circumstances may lead to the researcher missing the fact that the assertions of people in a movement are often ideological justifications for what they fight for. For example, Faruki's reference to *jihad* is a response to a concrete situation. He writes that

For its crime against...the corporate existence of the Palestinians...as well as the ummah, Islam [Muslims] condemns Zionism. Islam [Muslims] demands that... injustice perpetrated against the innocent be undone... This obligation... is a corporate religious obligation... Defence of the ummah... is jihad, or holy war, and it is prime religious duty... It is a first Islamic principle that aggression and injustice be met with an identical proportion of same (S. 2:194) (1983: 262).

As seen above, references to the holy texts are common in Islamist writing. But the holy texts are only one source of Islamism and constitute only one element in the group of factors influencing or justifying activity. History, national considerations, experience and political, social and economic positions on national as well as international levels form other sources of action. Therefore, it is doubtful that a strict study of Islamic heritage within a particularistic approach will explain the nature of Islamist movements, although it has a certain coherence and relevance. It is important to reemphasise that identification with Islam may signify a symbolic and moral orientation, but it does not reveal much about the movements' social,

economic or political origins or programs. The analysis of Islamism should go beyond the religious texts and the writings of leaders and ideologues.

Underdevelopment Theory

Underdevelopment theory has been applied by critics of modernisation theory in analysing the Middle East. It is argued that modernisation theory is empirically invalid, theoretically inadequate and politically ineffective. The three stages model of modernisation theory is dismissed because it ignores the historical and structural bases of underdevelopment. Contrarily, development and underdevelopment are seen as opposite sides of the same economic process. That is, development in one region occurs only at the expense of underdevelopment in another. The three-stage model is dismissed for ignoring the historical and structural bases of underdevelopment. It is argued that the very existence of the world capitalist system means that the development potential of underdeveloped countries is blocked.¹² The underdevelopment of the Middle East is seen as a direct result of its asymmetrical power relationships with capitalist countries, its means of incorporation into the capitalist world economy, and colonialism. The unit of analysis for modernisation theory is the nation-state with reference to the backwardness of its people and its traditions. The absence of values and the lack of an educated elite is considered to be conducive to capitalist development. Underdevelopment theory takes as its unit the global system with reference to the structural position of the Third World societies in the global

12

For the basic arguments of underdevelopment theory, see, A. G. Frank (1969) *Latin America: Underdevelopment or Revolution*; P. Baran (1973) *The Political Economy of Growth*; S. Amin (1976) *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formation of Peripheral Capitalism*; and I. Wallerstein (1979) *The Capitalist World Economy*.

economic system, i.e. the power relationship between “centre” and “periphery”.¹³

Underdevelopment theory provides more insights in terms of the global context of Islamism, for instance, the Middle East experience of colonialism and neocolonialism and the pattern of formations of nation-states, while incorporating it into the World capitalist system. However, its universal concepts, such as class, are not easily applicable and are not exhaustive. Bromley (1994) argues that while underdevelopment theory provides a comparative analysis, it tends to overestimate the asymmetrical relationships between the capitalist powers and the Middle East and proposes a geopolitical determinism as contrasted to cultural or theological determinism. For him, the central analytical question should be based upon the process of state formation, to investigate the linked processes of state formation and capitalist development in the modern Middle East. Such an approach entails the study of the relation of state to economics and civil society as a whole, based on a historical and comparative analysis of societies with reference to their experiences of modernity within the political and social forces operating within the societies of the region.¹⁴ What this framework implies is that models derived from the analysis of the development pattern of the West are not workable in analysing Middle Eastern politics since as a developing region in the modern capitalist era, the Middle East in general faces two common problems: (a) the consolidation of state power rapidly and in difficult circumstances; and (b) the

13

See, S. Amin (1976) *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formations of Peripheral Capitalism*; R. Owen (1981) *World Economy, 1800-1914*; H. İslamoğlu (1987) *The Ottoman Empire and World Economy*; K. Çağlar (1987) *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*.

14

See also R. Owen (1992) *State, Power and Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East*.

sponsoring of socio-economic development in adverse conditions.

2.2. Islamism: A Modern Ideology

The nature of Islamism can be examined in terms of its agenda as an ideology that differs from traditional Islam with respect to its historical background and social basis. The Islamist discourse generally focuses upon the notion of the “Islamic state”, the failure of Westernisation movements in Muslim lands, and subsequently the crisis of identity and the imperialist exploitation of Muslim people. Before going into details about these themes, it may be useful to look at the historical experience of Islamist movements.

The Historical Experience of Islamist Movements

The historical background which influences later Islamist movements is usually examined in three phases:¹⁵

(a) the “*revivalist*” and *reformist* movements of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in the wake of European expansion into Muslim lands. The belief was that the Muslim world was in a state of decline because it had departed from the straight path of Islam. The “*revivalist*” movements shared the aim of the moral regeneration, of the values and power of their societies through a return to the spirit of the Quran and the simple way of life. In revivalist movements, Islam as a

15

For a comparative summary, see D. Sagiv (1995) *Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt: 1973-1993*; Choueiri (1990) *Islamic Fundamentalism*, and J. L. Esposito (1993) *Voices of Resurgent Islam*.

common ideology was suitable for the unification of tribes into an "Islamic state". This occurred, for example, in the cases of the Wahhabi state of Saudi Arabia, the Mahdist state in Sudan, the Sanusi movement in Libya. However, for the reformists to meet the political, economic, scientific and cultural challenges of the West, there was a need for a selective synthesis of Islam and modern Western thought. It was argued that the sources of the West's strength must be assimilated. Islam had to be seen to be compatible with modern science and the best of Western thought. This approach is further explained with respect to the Ottoman Islamism in the next chapter.

(b) The "neo-revivalist" or "radicalist" movements of the early twentieth century were directed against the intrusion of European powers into the Middle East. By the 1930s, most of the movements against foreign occupation and rule had acquired a predominantly ethnic-nationalistic character, although Islamic elements were often invoked as secondary factors. But the creation of politically active organizations, such as the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 and the *Jamaat-i Islami* (Islamic Society) by Mawdudi in the Indian subcontinent in 1941, signified another pattern that distinguished them from earlier reformist movements. Their influence had reached beyond the borders and had a great effect on the development of Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world. Both were far more critical of the West, and of the secular type of government and nationalism, and emphasized the ideological self-sufficiency of Islam. The failure of both the West (capitalism) and the East (Marxism) was declared, and Islam was proposed as the third way for state and society. It was suggested that the crisis of the Muslim people was first caused by Muslims who

had failed to be sufficiently Islamically observant, as well as by imperialism and the cultural threat of the West. Islam was reinterpreted to address modern realities and revitalize the community in both religious and socio-political terms. It was reasserted that the Quran and the *Sunna* are the basis of Muslim life. While Western secularism and materialism were condemned, they were not against modernisation. There was a longstanding attempt to distinguish Westernisation from modernisation, and Western values from modern ideas and institutions (Esposito;1992: 120-6).

(c) After the failure or overturning of secular nationalist or socialist regimes, the contemporary movements have been exemplified by the re-emergence of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the *Jaamat-i Islami* of Pakistan, Qaddafi's seizure of power in 1969 in Libya, the Iranian revolution in 1979, Nimeiri's declaration of Islamic government in Sudan in 1983, and to some extent the rise to power of the Welfare Party after the general election in Turkey in 1995, the subject of this study. The Islamism of the twentieth century, beginning especially in the 1960s and growing in the 1970s and 1980s, is not a traditional phenomenon. One of its salient features is that there is a call for a return to an earlier model of social and political practice, i.e. for the reconstruction of an idealized past by abandoning the present for the future, that differentiates Islamic ideology from any other ideology. It is a distinct and modern discourse which cannot be discredited as backward. For every country reinterpretation or reconstruction of the past for the future is defined by their own vision of the past. The context of Islamist movements depends on the various historical conjunctures, political conditions, intellectual sources and socio-economic bases in each country. In Egypt, for instance, Islamist movements

display four characteristics: growing religiosity among the populace; growing social and political criticism by some mosque preachers; the mainstream Islamic “fundamentalism” best represented by the Muslim Brotherhood; and the “neo-fundamentalism” which consists largely of splinter groups from the Muslim Brotherhood in the 1970s and 1980s. While in Tunisia, the sudden emergence and speedy expansion of a significant Islamic movement from the late 1970s onwards has to do with the economic and cultural marginalization of a large segment of the population in the transformation period from state capitalism to an open door policy (Ayubi, 1991: 72). With regard to the Iranian revolution, although the dominant ideology, forms, leading personnel and proclaimed goals have all been religious in appearance and inspiration, its success in fact was largely due to secular factors (Hunter, 1986). It was undertaken in the name of Islam and was a reactionary revolution, i.e. a return to an imagined previous order. Halliday (1988) argues that the Islamic element in the Iranian revolution is a reflection of several factors that produced the unique circumstance of a twentieth century state run by religious institutions along lines derived from the Quran and Islamic law, and in which the major influences are in the hands of a personage who is constitutionally designated as the interpreter of holy texts. The religious imprint has contained an effort to transform the law, culture, polity and social practices of Iran to observe a model supposedly elaborated in the seventh century, during the time of the Prophet Mohammed. The Iranian revolution took place in a socio-economically developed society. People who made the revolution had benefited materially from a process of a rapid capitalist development, despite increasing inequality. Neither defeat in war, attributed to events in Egypt, nor serious international economic pressure assisted the advance of the Islamic

revolutionaries. The lack of legitimacy of the Shah's regime, the corruption inherent within it, and the alienation of a large sector of middle class were among the contributing factors.

Frustration, Dissatisfaction and "Self" Identity

Islamist movements are multi-facet. Their general features are identified in the literature, which includes both crisis-oriented and success-oriented perspectives, (Mehmet 1990; Esposito 1991), as follows: (a) an identity crisis precipitated by a sense of loss of identity, and a lack of self-esteem caused by the experience of Westernisation. It represents a quest for a more authentic identity rooted in an Islamic past. With the failure of imported ideologies such as nationalism and socialism, Muslim societies experienced a "domination complex" are in their search for self-identity. (b) disillusionment with the West. The failure of many Muslim rulers and their Western inspired governments to respond adequately to the political and socio-economic needs of their societies has been experienced across similar top-down modernisation programmes, whose main component was the necessity of secularism. It is more an expression of social demand for equitable development. It represents broken promises, unfulfilled expectations and increasing disenchantment with the top-down development strategy that was enforced by the ruling elite in the name of modernisation. This strategy has unjustly produced "haves" and "have-nots" in the post-war period. (c) the newfound sense of pride and power that resulted from the military (Arab-Israeli war) and economic (oil embargo) success of 1973 and the Iranian revolution of 1978-79. It is an assertion of identity and pride in past Islamic achievements in scholarship and political power that have long been threatened by the West, first

by colonialism and more recently by cultural invasion.

From the Islamists' perspective, a deep cause for Islamist movements is dissatisfaction with (alien) Western ideals, values and institutions and a reaction to the Muslim status quo on an international level. This leads to the claim that all other political groups, except Islamists, are the agents of failed ideals and institutions. It is asserted that Islamism constitutes the third phase in the history of Muslim societies. This phase was preceded by the invasion of Muslims by foreign powers and by the independence movement seeking liberation from this political dominance. The contemporary Islamist movements seek to restructure society and rebuild socio-economic life on the foundations of Islam, while trying to reverse the impact of colonial rule and the post-liberation systems which were not Islamic, but were exported from the West and resulted in catastrophic consequences by undermining the very moral fibre of Muslim society.

The westernizing model has failed and now Islamic movements want to reconstruct society. They are in search of a new social order... The Islamic movements have given Muslims a new outlook, a new hope, a new possibility... They are not averse to the technology of the West: but are not prepared to have it at the cost of their own identity and ideology (Ahmad, 1983: 225).

What Islamists in general share is the view that the Muslim masses, as opposed to the perceptions of their "enlightening and modernising" elites, always regard Islam as the basis of their identity, the source of morality and the unchallenged inspiration for their past, present and future. Similarly, referring to the "third phase", Mahdi states that a regime of "internal or indigenous colonialism" as well as an

external one has prepared the way for the third response, i.e. contemporary Islamism, which emphasizes native identity and dignity; separates Islam from the traditionalist thesis and modernization from the acculturation syndrome; and establishes a synthesis that is both Islamic and modern (1983: 239).

The crisis-oriented explanation with its emphasis on psychological aspects focuses upon the idea that Muslim societies are in the midst of a major transformation (from traditionalism to modernity) which creates tensions and crises. Islam in this context provides a political alternative as well as a kind of refuge and a secure psychological anchor. A psychological explanation suggests that the development process has led people to take refuge in traditional symbols and rituals in order to help them to cope with the rapid change which has produced “haves” and “have nots”. Piscatori writes of *the unsettling and unrelieved exodus of people from the countryside to the cities...Most rural migrants quickly become the urban poor, victims of hope, swallowed by the very process which they believed would liberate them* (1986: 27).

This situation, however, is not unique to the Muslim world. Such an explanation is not satisfactory in the sense that various ideologies rise or have risen under similar circumstances, as mentioned earlier.¹⁶ Although the frustration arising at various points in the development process is conducive to Islamist movements, it is not an exhaustive explanation of them. The direction of movements is influenced by a combination of various factors, such as local conditions, historical antecedents, acuteness of crisis and intensity of organisational drive.

16

See the case study in chapter seven regarding reasons given by the electorate who voted for an Islamist party in the 1995 general election in Turkey.

Another crisis-oriented explanation (Tibi 1988) states that the “repolitisation” of Islam is a counter-acculturation, an expression of the defensive culture and material misery of the Islamic people. From this point of view, if the process of Westernisation, with its attendant disintegration of pre-industrial social structures, is not accompanied by a process of industrialisation, it will produce people with damaged identities. What is seen here is another positivist cause and effect relationship. Tibi’s model shares a basic assumption with the three stages model of modernisation. With an emphasis on cultural impediments, he implies that if Muslim countries had successfully passed through the transitional stage to modernisation, for example become secularised and accompanied Westernisation with industrialisation, the “repolitisation of Islam” would not have been occurred. The Western model of development is still treated as a blueprint for underdeveloped parts of the world and Islamism is still presented as a pathological illness of Muslim countries in transition.

The Islamist Discourse

Islamism is an ahistorical approach. Contrary to modernist theorists who see Islam as the “cause” of backwardness, Islamists find the “cure” in Islam, i.e. “[true] Islam is the solution”. Therefore, they claim that Islam can meet the political, social and economic demands of “modernity”. Islamism puts the emphasis upon going back to the fundamentals laid down in the Quran and the *Sunna*, and the historical experiences of the Medinan state, rather than seeking the revival of traditional Islam in its entirety. Islamist movements explicitly envisage themselves as socio-political movements, founded on Islam defined as much in terms of a political ideology as in terms of a religion (Roy 1994). One proof of this is the symmetrical

comparison that Islamists regularly make between their thought and the major political ideologies of the twentieth century, such as Marxism, fascism, and capitalism, rather than religions. Zubaida indicates that:

modern Islamism is a political ideology..., which in recent years has become a dominant idiom for the expression of various and sometimes contradictory interests, aspirations and frustrations. In this it has replaced the previously dominant secular nationalism and Marxism. The wide variety of social and political forms to be found historically and in the present cannot be interpreted as variations on a common model of an essential Muslim society, but are explicable only in terms of the normal practice of social and political analysis, like any other range of societies (1995: 151).

As mentioned earlier, Islamism starts from the premise that Islam is a universal system of thought and a comprehensive way of life. Religion is integral to politics, law and society (Afghani 1982a; Khomeini 1979; Qutb 1982). This is to say, it is not enough for society to be composed of Muslims. Rather, it must be Islamic in its foundation and its structure. This is a call for the establishment of an “Islamic state”, though this does not mean that all Islamists share a common view on what constitutes an “Islamic state” and how it should function.

The Concept of the “Islamic State”

No Muslim thinker has provided a theory of the “Islamic state”. It seems that the conclusions to be reached predetermine how the holy texts are interpreted, given their selective use by scholars or activists. The state is conceptualized and used interchangeably with government by reference to specific issues, such as the legitimacy of temporal government, or the sovereignty of God versus the sovereignty of people; the election of the head of state; and the question of the compatibility of Islam and democracy or Islam and secularism. The framework for

discussion seems to be determined by finding reasons to approve or disapprove of the rising concerns in Muslim societies with the process of change, although the outcome would vary from country to country depending upon political, social and economic variables. The discussion of the Islamic state reflects the influence of different ideas which accompanied the evolution of Muslim societies since the time of the Prophet. The abolition of Caliphate in 1924 also required some adjustment between theory and reality. It seems easier to define the Islamic state in terms of what it is not, rather than what it is. For instance, there is an agreement that hereditary succession, monarchy, dictatorship, and military rule are not Islamic, though the history of Muslim societies provides plenty of examples of these (Khomeini 1979; Mawdudi 1982; Iqbal 1983). The main distinguishing point among Islamists in defining the nature of the "Islamic state" seems to lie in to what extent the *Sharia* should be applied and who has the right to interpret it, and hence who is allowed to use state power.

Ulema, who are referred to as either traditional, or conservative, or fundamentalist in the literature, identify an "Islamic state" with a recognition of their own role as guardians and interpreters of the divine law. They assert that an Islamic state is based on the sovereignty of God, which means the denial of human will by basing itself on the assumption that God has not left the matter of worldly life to the discretion of human beings, but has prescribed a clearly defined path. Therefore, an "Islamic state" is fully equipped to deal competently with all the complexities of modern life. A contemporary Islamic state, therefore, should engage in law-finding and not law-making. Consequently, the responsibility in this process cannot be left to laymen, but should be that of prominent *ulema* (Ahmed, 1987: 32). However,

for Rida, considered to be the founding theoretician of the “Islamic state” in its modern sense, while the *Sharia* continues to have overriding authority there exists a decisive place for the positive law to find solutions to the unpredicted problems of the time being, as long as compatible with the *Sharia*. It is in consultation with the experts that the decisions of the state acquire a religiously binding force. Rida argues that the head of state should be elected and aided in his judicial capacity by those who are the representatives of all Muslim groups, chosen from a small number of highly educated experts on the divine law who have a perfect reputation among the Muslims. The head of the state is legitimate as long as he is bound by the *Sharia* and the principles of Islam, for example, consultation. Through their representatives, the *ulema*, the community has the right to challenge his decisions whenever these are seen to contravene these principles (Enayat, 1982: 77).

Mawdudi’s idea of “true Islam” and the model “Islamic state” is derived from both the authoritative sources and Muslim history. Mawdudi attempts to derive the imperatives of Islam from the Quran, the *Sunna* and other sources while disregarding what he sees as the distorted version of Islam. He dissociates his Islamic state from most of the Muslim political history after the end of the Medinan era. Mawdudi dismisses both secular democracy and socialism, which, he argues, are based on the assumption that men are free to decide their worldly affairs independent of religion. He identifies the “Islamic state” as a “theo-democracy” which is ruled by the whole community of Muslims and in which Muslims are given a limited popular sovereignty. Mawdudi rejects the assertion by the *ulema* that the divine law regulates all aspects of human life. He argues that God has chosen to remain silent on a vast range of matters, thus leaving space for Muslims to

exercise their own discretion in this unoccupied field. However, this freedom to make law should not be in conflict with the spirit of the revealed law. The Islamic state, in Mawdudi's view, is a vehicle to bring about a world revolution that combats evil and establishes good. Mawdudi rejects a dynastic rule or personal dictatorship and insists on a republican form of government, albeit, an authoritarian one. He does not advocate a theocracy ruled by the *ulema*, but a *Sharia* governance with the *ulema* functioning as advisers, in which authority is exercised by popular incumbents. Mawdudi tends to provide some checks on the ruler's authority, such as the formation of a parliament as a modern version of the caliph's advisory council, the subordination of the ruler to the *Sharia*, and the election of the head of the state either directly or indirectly, although that does not necessarily mean general suffrage. Women and non-Muslims are excluded from politics (1982: 253-9).

For Khomeini, who attempted to develop a Shia doctrine of the state, the "Islamic government" is constitutional not in the sense that represented in the parliamentary system or in the people's councils, but in that those in administration observe a number of conditions and rules laid down in the Quran and the *Sunna*. Nobody has the right to legislate, as the power of legislation is confined to God. In the absence of the twelfth Imam, God's representative on earth who went into occultation and is to return, Khomeini proposed the right of the jurists, *wilayat i-faqih*, to establish and rule the "Islamic state" and provide guidance for the Islamic community. He argued that "*The rule of the jurists is a subjective matter dictated by the Sharia, as the Sharia considers one of us a trustee over minors*" (1982: 321). The head of the government, *wilayat i-faqih*, must consult with the parliament, but is not necessarily bound by their decisions.

“The prophet, the Imams and the people obey God’s will and Sharia” (1982: 318).

On the other hand, a modernist approach attempts to harmonize the idea of an “Islamic state” based on the sovereignty of God with the democratic right of the community to legislate freely in vast undefined areas. For Iqbal (1983), real Islamic laws are very few in number and do not preclude democratic forms of government, but these should still be in the form of an Islamic democracy within the clear limits of Islam. He envisages the Islamic state as an ideal secular state that sustains the sovereignty of God and the supremacy of divine law, although tradition is not binding upon the people, and is also truly democratic. Iqbal emphasizes the Islamic principle of consultation as the basis of democracy, and understands it in terms of consultation with all, although this is interpreted by Islamic jurists or traditionalists as the consultation of experts with the divine law. He dismisses the exclusive interpretative rights of the clerics and places this authority in the hands of elected representatives of the people, who can reserve, conceal or extend its application according to procedure.

Obviously, for Islamists the nature of “true” Islam and what it requires or dictates is greatly dependent on the interpretation of the holy texts. In addition to the doctrinal differences between various sects and schools, even those with the same turn of mind have reached different views regarding their religion. The selective use of religious texts often justifies rather than determines the course of political action. The varied use of Islam for specific purposes leads to different interpretations and perceptions. Ayubi (1991) indicates that even if “fundamentalists” believe that there is only one truth, the interpretations and

perceptions of it are widely different, as shown above. A lack of a single, concrete, historical model creates confusion as well as a lack of consensus as to what an Islamic state is. This confusion originates from several factors. Firstly, the historical Medinan state is not a comprehensive model that offers all solutions for the time being. Secondly, the later Caliphal practice of the Umayyads and Abbasids was some way from providing a political framework, rather than providing examples for few institutions, such as a tax system. Thirdly, the absence of a fully “Islamic state” in history seems to have given way to an “imagined” ideal formula, a version of a utopian society (Esposito, 1984: 221). It is that point where Islamist ideology differs from other ideologies since it calls for the reconstruction of an idealized past by abandoning the present for the future, thereby creating a new and just system. Finally, the relationship of religion to politics, like most beliefs and practices and indeed revelation itself, has been subject to a variety of interpretations throughout the ages.

With regard to the application of Sharia law, there are varied views in the literature on the short-term aims of Islamists. Ayubi (1991) argues that “neo-fundamentalists”, referring to the splinter groups of the Muslim Brothers, ideologically share two notions: a belief in the non-separation of religion from politics and the need for the immediate application of the *Sharia*. On the other hand, Roy (1994) points out that Islamist movements are less persistent on the application of the *Sharia* than are the “fundamentalist” *ulema*. For Islamists, Islam is a totalizing ideology that must first transform society, rather than requiring the simple application of the *Sharia* within any kind of regime. The *Ulema* is criticized by Islamists for their compromise with Western modernity and their servility to the

Western powers, which in turn leads to the approval of a secular government. The *renewal* of society requires a return to Islam, an Islamic religio-political and social *reformation or revolution*, that draws its inspirations from the Quran and from the first Islamic movement led by the Prophet Mohammed. Therefore, for the most “radical” of the Islamists, Roy identifies in the disciples of Sayyid Qutb and of Khomeini, but not of Mawdudi, that there is a duty to revolt against a Muslim state which is considered to be corrupt.

The Social Basis of Islamism

There is a general tendency within the literature to identify Islamism as an urban phenomenon. Ayubi (1991) argues that while the signs of general religiosity and sympathy to the Islamic cause can be seen within a broad trans-class social base, “militant” Islamists represent much more specifically defined social groups. He emphasizes that the usage of the same terminology allows the “radical activist” to converge with a more broadly based “Islamic resurgence”, seen as a kind of rising cultural nationalism whose main drive is the quest for authenticity. On the other hand, the distinctive social background of the Islamists sets this group apart. Their discourse is better seen as the moral/cultural expression of developmental crisis, which has resulted in frustration among the lower middle class in general and the intelligentsia and students in particular. Ayubi concludes that “radical political Islam” is a movement of the intelligentsia. Islamism is a movement of students

and of the new middle class of officials (including army officers), professionals and technocrats. Members of the traditional class of merchants and artisans (*bazaaris*) have also been active in Islamic movements in Iran and in Syria and even, on a limited scale, in Egypt. The *bazaaris* form a major component of the contemporary Islamist movements in Iran and Syria. Apart from Iran where the *Shi'i* clergy have played a historically and socially different role, Islamic movements have sometimes benefited from the support of some individual *Sunni ulema*, but these movements have not been movements of the clergy.

Similarly, Munson (1988) asserts that religious and political movements and politicized religious groups appeal to specific social strata. He has shown that the active supporters of Islamic movements during the 1970s and early 1980s were students and recent university graduates. For example, in Iran, high school and university graduates played a crucial role in the revolution. In Egypt, a study of thirty-four members of radical Islamic groups imprisoned in the 1970s found that twenty-nine were either university students or recent graduates when arrested. Most of these students were educated in secular institutions and many were students of engineering and other applied scientific fields. Students of relatively traditional Islamic studies were also active in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Ayubi (1991) considers that while the middle strata have expanded in size and proportion in most Arab societies, the rising expectations that have been stimulated, in particular by the acquisition of higher education and the move to urban centres, have not been met because of the constrained nature of economic development in these societies. He argues that the general rise of Islamism is a

reflection of the fluid class map, although it is not always easy to delineate the boundaries between the petite bourgeoisie and the new middle strata, or between artisans and workers. He stresses that Islamism in all its formulations tends to be more successful in stressing cultural identity and seeking independence from the state than in spelling out class-specific social and economic objectives. Islamist movements consist of a loose coalition of bourgeois factions, some rural agrarian capitalists, notables and estate owners, proletarianized members of the state, employed petite bourgeoisie, the under-employed intelligentsia and the student population, although that also brings a clash of interests in the long term.

In conclusion, Islamist movements as the conveyors of a political ideology share certain elements, as Owen argues (1992): (a) they are contestants for power within specific local political arenas defined by particular state borders, despite their common usage of the universal language of Islam, e.g. references to the *umma*. The vast majority of politico-religious actors behave as though their primary aim is to influence policies and events within a given system; (b) in their concern to obtain power and influence, these same actors share much of the vocabulary and many of the same practices as other politicians within the same arena. They speak of democracy, of civil rights, of constitutionalism. They seem to share a general concern with nationalism and the future of each national project. They reformulate and reexpress the dominant secular themes, for example the emphasis on changing the terms of foreign affairs, and Khomeini's classification of the world in terms of the oppressors and the oppressed; (c) their presence in the political arena involves them in struggles with other political groups which try to misinterpret or to refine their message; (d) given the need to respond to external political

circumstances, all religious groups are forced to change their strategies and tactics over time.¹⁷

Chapter 3: Ottoman Social Formation and the Rise of Ideologism

This chapter is based on an analysis of the nature of Ottoman social formation in terms of the relations of production. This examination will provide the background to the related process of state formation and capitalist development in the Republican period, with reference to the experience of modernity, as this saw the rise of Islamism as an ideology in the late nineteenth century. This will help to locate the historical experience of Islamism in the context of modern ideologies, since the idea of change was at the centre of the Islamist discourse of the Ottoman intellectuals who were influenced by Western modern political thought, and to show that Islamist ideology offered a focus of protest at intellectual as well as societal level in the process of European economic and political expansion. It is argued that Islamism as an intellectual movement was founded on the re-interpretation of Islam as a form of political ideology, which concentrated upon the

17

See chapters five and seven for the discussion how an "Islamist Party" has adjusted its appeal to changing economic, social and political circumstances over three decades, while keeping much of its Islamist rhetoric at the outset in order to compete for power along with secular parties.

idea of progress and contested for the use of Islam in the process of development as an alternative approach to Westernism.

The analysis of Ottoman social formation looks at the mode of surplus since it is necessary to investigate the historical character of surplus appropriation in order to avoid essentialist arguments about culture when dealing with policies for “modernising the state”. Therefore, it is important to examine the specific social relations governing production processes and determining social access to and control over resources and the social distribution of the product of labour. From the standpoints of the ideologies of the nineteenth century, namely Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism, the “state-led” Ottoman modernisation endeavour from above is argued to highlight the political consequences and changing relations of production in the process of the Ottoman Empire’s integration into the world capitalist system on unequal terms. Its focus begins with the integration of the Ottoman economy into the world market and it aims to indicate the continuity within Kemalism in terms of the relationships between the state and society, such as promoting a national economy by generating a (national) bourgeoisie. Such an approach defines the path for the rest of the study, which concentrates upon how common desires are formulated by those in power in order to seize and interpret social and political space and to economically develop. This is not an institutional account of the state, but of the processes of state formation and the reproduction of social relations with respect to the reproduction of hegemonic knowledge, i.e. the ideology of the state.

3.1. Ottoman Social Formation

The Ottoman society was segmented in terms of religion, ethnicity, language and economy. Of all the religions, Islam was the legitimating myth of the existing state. Because the concept of unity of state and religion was implied in the combination of institutions, the Sultanate and the Caliphate from the sixteenth century onwards, the Ottoman state has often been characterized as a theocratic state.¹⁸ However, it is important to mention that the state cannot be termed theocratic on three grounds. Firstly, although in theory the ruler was limited in the exercise of his authority by *Sharia* law, in reality, the legislative body did not hesitate to make rules, called *kanunnames*, which were in conflict with the religious law. Since Ottoman society had a multi-religious character, the state needed to be flexible by developing a body of traditional law which did not originate from *Sharia*¹⁹. The formula of the unity of religion and state was understood in terms of the idea that the viability of the state was essential for the preservation of religion. In this sense, the state was seen as necessary to keep religion flourishing. It took priority over religion. Secondly, the religious institutions, and subsequently the *ulema*, or the doctors of Islamic religion, as a distinct section of society and the representatives of orthodox Islam were integrated into the state structure through a modest religious hierarchy under the leadership of *Şeyhülislam*, the top religious official. The state established control over the higher institutions of religious learning. Education and the law constituted the main functions of the *ulema*. The *ulema* were appointed as teachers in *medreses*, or religious universities, which were established and managed by the state. Concerning their judicial function, *kadı*

¹⁸ See N. Berkes (1964) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*.

¹⁹ Mardin identifies the Sultan's *kanunnames* as the early roots of secularism (1977: 282-3).

were appointed among the *ulema* in cities, towns and smaller settlements. The administrative structure was essentially secular rather than religious in character. The *ulema* were not allowed to determine the course of political action. They were bound to the state and to winning public blessing. However, there were a number of *ulema* who turned to the religious mystic orders, the *Sufi* circles. The *Sufis*, who were representative of heterodox Islam, were engaged in the moral and spiritual elevation of the people through meditation and intuition, and the propagation of religion in conquered lands. The state attempted to control the *Sufi* orders and dealt severely with any religious manifestation that escaped state control. Thirdly, an extensive programme of secularization developed during the latter stage of the Ottoman Empire in the form of the separation of religious institutions from the educational, judicial and political spheres.

In theory, Ottoman society was divided into two classes. The class division clearly marked out a difference with respect to basic relationships of the means of production and distribution of surplus between the ruling class, *askeri*, and the subject class, *reaya*. The *askeri* was represented by the officers of court, the army, the civil servants and the *ulema*. As Ottoman society was segmented religiously, ethnically and linguistically, the *reaya* was divided along these lines as well as those of residence and occupation. The division of *reaya* into religiously oriented communities formed the *Millet* system. However, this was not unique to Ottoman society, as they made their contribution by making it a part of the structure of the society as well as the state. The *Millet* system, with each individual or group belonging to one *millet* or another, meant that subjects had status and standing in society only through membership of such *millets*. Each had their own

religious leaders who were responsible to the state, and relative autonomous in governing their own affairs. The Muslims, the Jews, the Armenians and the Orthodox Christians, such as the Greeks, the Rumanians and the Slavic subjects, each established and maintained their own institutions to carry out the functions of education, religion, jurisdiction and social security (Shaw, 1976: 151-53). However, it should not be presupposed that each *millet* was homogeneous or united in itself, as they were also divided along ethnic lines, into sects based upon religions, language differences and regional remoteness.

A second significant division between the *reaya* arose in accordance with their residence and position in the economy, and whether this was urban or rural.²⁰ The components of rural areas, towns and cities, were: religious communities, any groups belonging to different legal schools, guilds, fraternities, lineage groups and ethnic communities. Merchants, artisans, men of religion, and dervishes, who were exempted from military service and had some taxes levied on their rural counterparts, were city dwellers along with the members of the Ottoman ruling class. The most developed urban economic groups of craftsmen had their own guild organizations to regulate their affairs and promote group and individual interests. The guilds acted as mediating structures between the craftsmen and small traders, as well as in relation with the state (Shaw, 1976: 157-58). They performed all sorts of social functions, such as providing social security, building up funds, distributing food to poor members or non-members as well as providing religious guidance. Merchants trading over long distances enjoyed exemption from

20

There is a significant gap within the literature on social history. A comprehensive picture of Ottoman rural and urban life is still some way from being completed. The conventional approach seems to have made generalizations from the limited knowledge of major cities or towns, such as Istanbul, Salonica, Bursa and Damascus.

taxes and strict regulations. Contrary to popular opinion, the activities of merchants were not illegitimate in the eyes of the state. Merchants were able to accumulate significant capital invested in various internal enterprises, in tax farming or lending to the ruling class. Merchants gained important positions as moneylenders to the members of *askeri* and tax-bidders when tax-farming started replacing the Ottoman classical land regime after the sixteenth century (Faroqhi, 1992: 216). It is crucially important to recognize the sub-strata within the *reaya* rather than see them as “flocks of the *Sultan*”, as is often done. This point becomes clear by the position of nomads and peasants in the society. The nomads, who lived in the mountains, steppes and deserts, were outside the general structure of urban and rural society. The nomads in Anatolia and the Balkans constituted a distinct group and were subject to special status among the tax-paying subjects. The state organized and utilized their labour power as a mobile and comparatively free source of labour for special purposes, in return for exempting them from extraordinary taxes. Since the employment of the peasant in such enterprises as mining, transportation, and guarding bridges and mountain passes would mean the disruption of agriculture, the state often employed *nomads*. They also provided manpower for military purposes. They were subject to enforced migration and settlement in rural areas as far as the Empire’s population policies were concerned, which aimed for even distribution of the labour force in the realm of the Empire (İnalçık, 1993: 102-16).

Another sub-stratum within the *reaya* was the peasantry. The village was the unit of settlement for peasant families. It is important to note that physical and ethnic conditions, regional differences, settlement conditions and cultural, political and

military circumstances led to the various village types, and differences in size, population and economic activity. Under these circumstances it is impossible to speak of a particular village type on the scale of the Empire, although there emerged village settlements which acquired common characteristics in the core regions, Anatolia and the Balkans under the influence of the Ottoman land and taxation system. This was the fundamental cell of Ottoman society. Its labour unit was symbolized by the married peasant male with his wife and children. The husband as the organizer of the family economy and its administration was recognized as the taxpayer by the state. The unit of land which could be operated by peasant family labour and a pair of oxen was the basic unit of agricultural economy. The peasant economy was based on the individual family possession of arable land with access to communal village possessions, such as woodland, pasture land, meadow and water.²¹

The Mode of Production: Feudal or Asiatic?

The debate concerning Ottoman social formation has been conducted for the last two decades from the point of view of its being either Asiatic or feudal or alternatively of neither Asiatic nor feudal origin, but *sui generis*.²² The fact that

21

The main characteristics of the land regime are given below. Timur believes that communal production was a dominant characteristic of Ottoman mode of production (1979: 164-66). If this was the case, he misses the point that the concept of communal production is not compatible with the concept of the feudal mode of production, on which he believes Ottoman society was based. He asserts that the commune, or village in fact, consisting of patriarchal families was the unit for the tax assessment. What is clear here is that he mistakes the production of the patriarchal family as a communal one and confuses the concept of *tmar*. The size of communal possession between the neighbouring villages was determined by the state's official, *kadı*, who drew the borders between them and allocated special certificates to each. For further detail on *tmar*, see H. İnalcık (1993) *The Middle East and Balkans Under the Ottomans: Essays on Economy and Society*.

22

See, for example, S. Divitçioğlu (1981) *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu*; İ. Küçükömer (1994) *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*, on the Asiatic mode of production; H. Gibb and H. Bowen (1950) *Islamic Society and the West*; İ. Ortaylı (1979) *Türkiye İdare Tarihi*; T. Timur (1979) *Osmanlı*

Ottoman mode of production could not achieve the transition to the capitalist mode of production has led some theorists using the teleological approach to conclude that Ottoman social order was stagnant, despotic and pre-feudal, i.e. Asiatic. To those who identify it as feudal, answers were to be found in the "patrimonial" nature of the state, the incapability of the feudal class, the lack of bourgeoisie, and the absence of the fragmentation of political power or political autonomy of towns, which are thought to lead to capital accumulation and therefore to transition. What is striking is that several discussions have been motivated by political rather than scholarly considerations. On the one hand, the intellectuals who adhered to "the official line", i.e. Kemalism, have showed an overwhelmingly conformist attitude to the Republican history thesis in decoding the historical documents. On the other hand, others have carried out their discussion with no open expression of their critical view, as Faroqhi comments (1992: 5). Therefore, the literature suffers severely from the values of researchers, which affects the results. Ideologies are represented as concrete knowledge of truth. As analysis proceeds from ideological premises, researchers lose their focus on particular aspects of reality.

The Feudal Mode of Production

It is very common in the literature to identify feudalism with the "fief", the "vassalage", and the "chivalry", i.e., with the feudal hierarchy. This emphasis has often been upon its juridical terms. As Hilton expresses it: "*to reduce feudalism to serfdom is as bad as to insist that without the fief there is no feudalism*" (1985:

Toplumsal Düzeni; H. Cin (1985) *Osmanlı Toprak Düzeni ve Bu Düzenin Bozulması*, H. Berktaş (1987) "The Search for the Peasants in Western and Turkish History"; J. Haldon (1992) "The Ottoman State and the Question of State Autonomy", on the Ottoman feudalism and; F. Köprülü (1981) *Osmanlı Devletinin Kurulması*; H. İnalçık (1993) *The Middle East and Balkans under the Ottoman Empire*, on the *sui generis* nature of Ottoman state.

227). Feudalism has often been characterized with a fact which conflicted with the idea of a centralized state. It has been a short step to describe every fragmentation of political authority as feudal.²³ However, the term “feudalism” broadly means both the fief and the manor (féodalité and seigneurie), two inseparable facets of the same social order. A general picture of feudal society can be drawn as follows: the feudal system meant the rigorous economic subjection of a host of humble folk to a few powerful men. It was an unequal society based on a rigid class structure rather than a hierarchical one, with chiefs rather than nobility and with serfs, not slaves. Private property in land was concentrated by birth in the hands of numerically small class of aristocratic peers, both in space and time by judicial and customary sanctions. The serfs had to pass on their surplus production in the form of feudal rent to this landlord class and provide a variety of other direct or indirect services, as well as the payment of fees for obtaining leave to marry, for example. The existence of a manorial system provided the landlords with the means to control the process of production. The relations of the lord with the serfs or tenants were regulated by “the custom of the manor” (Bloch, 1961: 443-445). It is important to bear in mind that feudal rent is neither reducible to a payment for the right to use the land, nor the appropriation of surplus only in the form of surplus-labour. Rather, the feudal landed property contains the possibility of a direct relation of the landlord to the process of production. This direct relation depends upon two elements: (a) the title to the land as a right of exclusion; and (b) the form of payment in rent. The right to exclude the direct producer from the land is a necessary legal separation of the direct

23

See, for example, M. Sencer (1974) *Toprak Agaliginin Kokenleri*; I. Ortaylı (1979) *Türkiye İdare Tarihi*; S. Divitçioğlu (1981) *Asya Üretim Tarzı ve Osmanlı Toplumunu*; and I. Küçükömer (1994) *Düzenin Yabancılaşması*.

producers from the means of production, upon which a real separation can be constituted. The forms of rent provide a means of control of the direct producers' relation to the means of production and the reproduction of the means of production by controlling the size, the character and the unit of production. The control of the reproduction of the means of production means that the form of feudal rent rests on the separation of the direct producer from the means of production. This control entails the reproduction of exploitative production relations and the intervention of landlords in the production process. This is the landlord's presence on his estate in the manorial system. It is in this institution that the two classes, the landlord and the peasant, meet face to face, the first to receive and the second to give their labour or the fruits of their labour in cash or in kind. Through the manorial system the landlord is able to control the whole economy of the land to which he has title. The principle was that the surplus product coming from the peasant was realised first as landowner income and then through the mechanism of the market as the source of demand for craft and the commodities of regional and international exchange (Hilton, 1985: 230).

Having said that, within Ottoman social relations the state controlled peasants' holdings by the land regime known as *miri*, which was mainly employed in the Balkans and Anatolia, except for some parts of eastern Anatolia. While there is a great deal of literature on the *miri* regime, certain aspects of it have been misrepresented. As İnalcık comments, the *miri* land did not cover all agricultural land, but areas used as fields and open to grain cultivation. The Ottoman law codes or *kanunnames* put severe restrictions on the subdivision and merging of peasants' holdings and their conversion into orchards and gardens. The state-

owned land, *miri*, was divided into two main categories: the land under title-deed and the land under tax-farming. The former was the land possessed by peasant families which could neither be sold nor subjected to donation nor mortmain (*vakıf*). This was the principal practice under the *miri* land regime. In spite of the fact that the state gradually lost control of the land and tax-farming expanded in size from the later sixteenth century onwards, the main parameters of small peasant farming remained as the fundamental character of the agricultural economy right into the twentieth century. The land under tax-farming meant the act of renting out a source of public revenue to those who were not necessarily peasants. Land which was not either under the title-deed or possessed by peasants was rented out in return for a given sum of money as rent. The state sought to rent such lands to ensure continued cultivation and to prevent a loss of state revenue (İnalçık, 1993:142-45).

Another important component of the *miri* regime was the *tımar* system. *Tımar* is defined as the assignment of taxes to a cavalryman or state official in return for service to the state (Barkan, "Tımar": 287). The important point here is that *tımar*, in general, means the alienation of a piece of income from the state treasury as grant. On the one hand, it does not mean the transfer of land as property, as is often supposed.²⁴ On the other hand, *tımar* was neither an administrative unit²⁵ nor a necessity of a money limited economy²⁶. When the Ottoman state was

²⁴ H. Cin (1978) *Osmanlı Toprak Düzeni ve Bu Düzenin Bozulması*, p.98.

²⁵ İ. Ortaylı (1979) *Türkiye İdare Tarihi*, pp.91-2.

²⁶ M. Sencer (1974) *Toprak Ağalığının Kökenleri*, p.73.

established in the late thirteenth century it faced feudal-style institutions in Anatolia and Rumelia at different stages of development. Kılıçbay believes that the feudal developments in Anatolia were probably compressed by the Islamisation of Anatolia before the Ottoman conquest. The rise of great private property in land and the maintenance of the hereditary landed aristocracy was hindered by this process since the heritage was divided among the inheritors according to Islamic law. Therefore, the most widespread unit of production was the individual peasant family cultivation. On the other hand, in Rumelia, there was a threefold development: (a) the existence of a Byzantine landed aristocracy; (b) the Latin-type feudal structure in Greece and the Aegean Islands; and (c) the existence of enforced labour and feudal landed property in Balkans (1982: 335-39). Under these conditions, two types of assignment were made: (a) private property as a form of endowment for religious purposes; and (b) the *timar*. The *timar* system evolved over time and reached its peak in the fourteenth to sixteenth centuries. The state constantly attempted to convert lands held as private property to *timar* in the struggle to control the means of production. However, *timar* was gradually replaced by tax-farming after the later sixteenth century, although this did not mean that tax-farmers or *ayan* (notables) became the feudal landed aristocracy, as is often claimed. Their existence did not change the composition of production. Individual peasant family production remained as the characteristic unit of production. The relations of production maintained a largely similar structure from the peasants' point of view with additional tax burdens. They paid their taxes to tax-farmers instead of *sipahi*. Tax-farmers, such as merchants, ex-state officials, *ex-sipahis*, wealthy peasants families, members of the *ulema*, or anyone who was able to bid for tax-farming, were not interested in the conditions and improvement

of production. Their short-term interest was to get back the money they had advanced to the state, a sum above which was in their account. In the meantime, the state had consistently attempted to centralize the exploitation of surpluses and to abolish tax-farming. However, the right to private property was finally guaranteed by law in the nineteenth century. An attempt after two land laws to provide for the collection of taxes by state officials, whose salaries were paid directly by the central state administration, failed.

It is evident that the feudal land lordship did not exist in the Ottoman social formation. Tax-farmers or *sipahi* were external to the production process compared to the landlord in the manorial economy. *Timar* was neither a private property nor provided any rights other than that to collect tax paid in money or in kind. Its size in terms of income and the conditions for allocation were set by the *kanunnames*. The *sipahi* or tax-farmers had neither judicial nor administrative authority over the peasants. Both the *sipahi* and the peasants were judged by the *kadı*, who were the staff of the central judicial system. Hilton indicates the importance of the appropriation of public jurisdiction by individuals/ feudal landlords, which affected the relations of production (1985: 233-35). If the feudal land lordship did not exist, then feudal rent was reduced to mere “tax feudalism”, or to allocation of the tax revenues from particular districts to definite state functionaries, who do not exist independently of their service to the state and whose revenues depend on their connection with the state (Hindess and Hirst, 1979; 232). The direct producer in the Ottoman case was not separated from the means of production. However, Timur argues that there existed serf-like producers (1979:168-72). They were crop-sharing slaves, called “*ortakçı kullar*”, in relatively

big farms around Istanbul and Bursa. It is clear that these producers were marginal to the general structure and became independent peasants over time. A manorial type institution never existed. In addition, all kinds of enforced labour were abolished, in theory, by *kanunnames*. In fact, there was enforced labour, limited to seven working days in a year, for peasants. For example, peasants had to carry the *sipahi's* production to the nearest local market (Barkan, Kanunlar: 113).

The importance of forms of feudal rent, such as labour rent, and rent in money or in kind, should be emphasized since they determine the pattern of relations of production. While right to the land as a right of exclusion of the direct producer from the land entails the possibility of labour rent, labour rent makes demesne production possible. Labour rent means a direct physical separation between the labour which reproduces the labourer on land which he rents and the labour of producing the surplus product for the landlord on demesne production. In the demesne production, the landlord as an agent of the production process coordinates the demesne production and determines the balance of necessary labour and surplus labour. This balance determines the conditions of production in the land rented by the direct producers. In the absence of demesne production the direct producer, or tenant/villeinage who pays rent in money or in kind, can set the means of production in motion. However, this capacity is a limited one. The landlord in a manorial economy controls the reproduction of the means of production by controlling certain vital means of production, such as pasture lands, mills, and dykes and by controlling the size of the units let and the forms of tenancy. Therefore, the direct producer is separated from the means of production in the concept of the feudal mode of production. If

separation/subsumption is possible, then it is not the case under the feudal mode of production the direct producer has 'possession of the means of production'... the concepts possession of/ separation from the means of production must be specified for different modes of production (Hindess and Hirst, 1979: 232).

In the case of money rent and rent in kind, surplus labour is supposed to be calculable and a measurable portion of the total product. The surplus product appears as a deduction from the product available to the producer. With reference to the Ottoman case, we witness the existence of taxes under four main headings. It can be seen that Ottoman taxes were at first a composition of pre-Ottoman local taxes in the conquered lands, some of which were abolished, or converted into cash to acquire relatively a standardized character over time.²⁷ The first type was the land tax, called *çift resmi*, set at fixed rates. It was the basic tax paid in money by all subjects cultivating *miri* land. The second type was a tax, called *öşür*, levied on agricultural products, such as fruits, honey, and fish, and was paid in kind. It was proportionally fixed ranging from one-fifth to one-tenth of the agricultural products for sale. The third was called sheep tax, and was levied on livestock, such as cattle, pigs, and sheep, offered for sale and paid for in money. Finally, there were taxes levied on a temporary base, numerous in quantity, and paid in money. Of these, the title-deed tax at fixed rate, or *tapu resmi*, was the most

27

The origin of Ottoman taxes has often been given as Islamic law. See for example D. M. Doğan (1977) *Tarih ve Toplum*, p.55; Z. Kazıcı (1977) *Osmanlılarda Vergi Sistemi*, pp.51-2; H. Cin (1985) *Osmanlı Toprak Düzeni ve Bu Düzenin Bozulması*, p.11. The reason for this misunderstanding lies in the fact that when the Sunni ideology became the philosophical tool for the Ottoman state against the Shia ideology, that of the competing Safavids for power in the Middle East, the tax system like most other institutions pragmatically wore an Islamic dress. See Barkan, *Kanunlar*, p.xxxiii for further explanation.

important, and was paid by the inheritor of possessed land to the *sipahi* when his (sometimes her) ancestor died. Another was the *çift-bozan akçesi*, a special tax to be paid when a peasant abandons his land and settles in town. But the *sipahi* had the right to pursue and force him/her to return within a ten year period (Kılıçbay, 1982: 364-71).

It should be stressed that it is difficult to estimate a general rate of exploitation as far as the Ottoman taxes were concerned. Yerasimos assumes that taxes paid by peasants provided the whole portion of the surplus. He bases his discussion on the assumption that the feudalist nature of Ottoman social formation was taken for granted and peasants were in a statue of serfdom (Yerasimos, 1974, Vol I: 236) For instance, there were differences in terms of the peasant holdings, and the existence of rich, middle, and poor as well as landless peasants. This signifies various levels of exploitative relations, not only between the ruling class and the subject class, but also within the subject class. It is possible to conceive that while some could save a significant portion of surplus, there existed peasants whose substantial produce was violated. In addition, the level of exploitation for each peasant family could not be the same. Fluctuation in demand, or a bad harvest could make a difference, as taxes paid in money were made via the sale of a portion of the production as a commodity.

The Asiatic Mode of Production

The application of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production²⁸ in Ottoman

28

The validity of the concept of the Asiatic mode of production tends to be discussed in terms of the facts, real or supposed, of Indian or Chinese history. Except for Western Europe, almost the whole world has been shown as empirical evidence for the existence of such a mode of production in human history. This approach does not situate the Asiatic mode of production in time since the

formation is based upon a set of characteristics attributed to this mode of production, for example the existence of state property in land, the use of state-owned land by individual peasants and the existence of production for self-consumption.²⁹ Its other features are summarised as: the existence of autarkic villages, production for immediate consumption; limited manufacturing of products for the court and administrative sites; the construction and administration of water supplies by the state; and the control of the means of production and the distribution of surplus-product by a ruling class with despotic political power, which provides the appropriation of the surplus product. There is no large scale merchant class and there is limited capital speculation in long-distance trade, money lending and agricultural products (O'Leary, 1989: 16-18).

In terms of theoretical consistency, Hindess and Hirst dismiss the possibility of a concept of Asiatic mode of production within Marxist theory since:

A distinct mode of appropriation of the surplus supposes a distinct structure of relations of production. A distinct structure of relations of production supposes a set of forces of production which corresponds to the conditions of the labour process it establishes. It is for these reasons that the mode of appropriation of the surplus product can serve an initial index of the existence or non-existence of a mode of production (1979: 183).

From the perspective of the Asiatic mode of production, it is the state which extracts the surplus product. Subsequently, there is no exploitative class independent of the state. The mode of appropriation of the surplus product is in the form of tax/rent. This is to say, taxes are deducted from the total social

given fact of tribal formation or state formation makes no difference to the social formation based upon the Asiatic mode of production.

product, the level of which is politically determined. The extraction of this deduction depends on the state's possession of the means of coercion. Under these conditions, it is impossible to set up an articulate combination of the relations and forces of production. For example, if the mode of appropriation of the surplus product is in the form of taxation, that is no different in this sense from the taxes levied by any other aspect of the state. The exploited and the exploiters take the form of a division between the subject and the state. Class relations are represented as relations between the state and the subject. The mode of appropriation of the surplus corresponds arbitrarily to at least two sets of forces of production: the forces entailed in independent peasant cultivation and in communal cultivation. The substitution of one set of forces for another does not affect or transform the supposed basic mode of production, the distribution of the means of production and the relations of the production. Thence, this mode of production does not give a convincing explanation for the conditions of existence of the state. The well-known answer is that the state arises from functional necessity, or in other words, the notion of a hydraulic state as the means of organization and coordination of the large scale systematic waterworks. Hydraulic agriculture, as in Wittfogel's study (1957), is seen as the main cause of a centralized despotism, "Oriental Despotism". The notion of Oriental Despotism seems to have developed for political reasons, and is a continuation of the Western misconception of the Orient. The ideological power of the 'despots' of agricultural civilizations has been exaggerated. Neutral settings, which are neither logical nor supported by historical evidence, or hydraulic agriculture was not the source of despotic authority. The belief that such despots were to be found principally in the Orient does not have any validity. Rather, it reflects an essentialist

account within a culturalist perspective. The fundamental problem with this functionalist account is that the supposed hydraulic function does not validate the existence of the state. O'Leary (1985) argues that this explanation implicitly admits that the existence of such a state was planned or contracted by the community. Yet it leads to more theoretical problems. There is a logical incompatibility between two elements within the Asiatic mode of production. If one employs the functionalist account of the state - that the state performs a universal function and villages are autarkic, stable and self-sufficient -, this contradicts the theory of historical progress. If the villages are self-sufficient, which means they are not dependent economically on the state, then the concept of the Asiatic mode of production is unable to explain the existence of the state, on the one hand. On the other hand, if the villages are not self sufficient, then one of the basic arguments of the Asiatic mode of production that it is both stagnant and self-maintaining collapses.

Since the idea of hydraulic function of the state as the condition of its existence in the Ottoman case is invalid, two alternative answers have been preferred. The first is that the Ottoman state arose from conquest, which is a common view in the writings of Western scholars. The notion of conquest implies that the conquering people have no social organization or mode of production prior to conquest. However, the fact of conquest itself does not produce a state. The second argument is an alternative functionalist explanation. Divitçioğlu argues that the condition of existence of the state was based on the idea that it provided justice and peace, identified by the Ibn-i Haldun's "Cycle of Justice", for the subjects. In fact, this view is central to studies of Ottoman history. The Cycle of Justice means

that the primary purpose of the large mass of the subjects was to produce wealth by engaging in cultivation, industry and trade, and to pay taxes to the state. In return, the main purpose of the state, represented by the small number of rulers who were neither producing wealth nor paying taxes, was to organize the exploitation of wealth belonging to the rulers, provide for the expansion and defence of this wealth, keep order, and promote Islam while permitting the practice of other religions within the rulers' domain. Shaw points out that this Ottoman view of the purpose and structure of state and society appears to have come primarily from traditional Middle Eastern concepts, which were developed by the Sasanids and introduced into Islamic Middle Eastern civilization by Persian bureaucrats in the service of Abbasid Caliphs (1976: 112). Nevertheless, within this functionalist account of the state, the class structure is not easily defined. The state in the Ottoman context is usually identified as the exploiting class. There is no convincing answer as to whether or not all of the exploiters were the members of the ruling class. There is no doubt that the members of the subject class, such as wealthy peasants, merchants, and artisans, were among the exploiters.

In addition, it is true that the trade of luxury commodities was an important source for merchant capital. Studies show that the urban economy dominated rural economy. The village economy was not a closed one. The rural surplus was mobilized by a mercantile network that extended from humble villages to towns and commercial metropolises. There existed extensive trade relations between cities and towns, between urban sectors and rural sectors within the Empire, and across the borders with the Mediterranean, European, Middle Eastern, African and Far Eastern cities. This trade not only involved luxuries, but also agricultural as

well as industrial products (Faroqhi 1984; İnalçık 1993).

3.2. Ottoman Modernisation and the Rise of Islamism in the Nineteenth Century

Ottoman social history has often been represented in the framework of the rise of the Ottoman Empire from the thirteenth century to the later sixteenth century and its subsequent decline which was accompanied by an era of reformation in administrative, military and educational institutions from the seventeenth century into the twentieth century.³⁰ In the literature, the period between the sixteenth and the nineteenth centuries in Ottoman history has been described as a steady decline, coupled with the increasing cost of the social and political superstructure, and economic collapse. This view is especially based on the notion of the impact of the world economy on a peripheral economy which was in the process of semi-colonisation. It is characterized as a period of falling population, a steady decline in trade, stagnant or bankrupted craft production, inflation, unemployment, impoverished agriculture and social unrest.³¹ It is clear that in the absence of convincing data and substantial research there is a tendency to generalize about the sixteenth century economic crisis for the whole of the following three centuries. More importantly, periods of decline for the state do not necessarily mean a decline in productive forces and the economy, as Owen (1993) emphasises. The

30

See the following texts for a general history of the institutions of the Ottoman Empire: B. Lewis (1961) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*; E. Z. Karal (1962) *Osmanlı Tarihi*; N. Berkes (1964) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*; S. Yerasimos (1974) *Az gelişmişlik Sürecinde Türkiye*; S. Shaw (1976) *The History of the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. I; and S. Shaw and E. K. Shaw (1977) *The History of the Ottoman Empire*, Vol. II.

31

See for example, H. Gibb and H. Bowen (1950) *Islamic Society and the West*, p.1; B. Lewis (1961) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, pp.26-32; and C. Issawi (1966) *The Economic History of the Middle East*, pp.3-13.

economic and social history of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries is still insufficiently studied and the research which has been done has mainly concentrated on price inflation or craft organizations. The few economic history studies of the nineteenth century prove that the conventional view of steady decline, which is based upon the work of European observers, has no validity for the whole realm of the Empire, as each region faced different pressures and acted accordingly.³²

Ottoman modernisation movement featured “state-led change from above”, which aimed for a political transformation, but not a social change. Initially, the declining military power of the Ottoman Empire *vis-a-vis* European powers gave the stimulus for change in the late seventeenth century. Faced with the threat of European economic and political expansion, the central question for Ottoman reformers then was what ought to be done to save the Empire. There was a consensus that without catching up with Western technology, it would be impossible to keep the state alive. The military conflict with modern Russia, which was emerging in Eastern Europe as a new power in the eighteenth century, and its experience under Peter the Great suggested that a vigorous programme of modernisation might restore the power of the Empire. Among the Western powers of the eighteenth century, France became the object of imitation in part due to her diplomatic relationships with the Ottoman Empire. The capitulations in favour of France were extended and her trade relationship exceeded those of the other powers (Lewis, 1961, p.45). The influence of Western institutions, ideas, practices

32

See for example, D. Quataret (1988) “Ottoman Handicrafts and Industry in the Age of European Industrial Hegemony”; F. Tabak (1988) “Local Merchants in Peripheral Areas of the Ottoman Empire...”; R. Owen (1993) *The Middle East in the World Economy*; and Ş. Pamuk (1996) *The Ottoman Empire and the European Capitalism: 1820-1913*.

in particular and Western life in general came to the Ottoman Empire through political, commercial and educational relations between the Ottomans and West European countries (Turan 1993). The Young Ottomans, who were affected by ideas of nationalism, parliamentary government and democracy with their positivist Durkheimian sociology, tried to establish a constitutional government and carry on the implementation and expansion of secular policies. Their understanding of the Empire and its problems was not based on an analysis of its social structure or on a study of the mechanisms of imperialism. When the transformation of military institutions in the early nineteenth century required changes in other areas of Ottoman administration, new secular administrative, judicial and educational institutions were established, while parts of the old institutions, such as *Sharia* courts and *medreses*, remained intact. The reorganisation of the system of government gave the centre more power over the provinces. The further development continued with the help of the new bureaucracy, which had few roots in the earlier administrative structures. The new civil bureaucracy, with its legislative and administrative functions, was eager to accept the secular changes in education, administration and the judiciary because that would increase the power of the civil bureaucracy over the religious bureaucracy and lead to greater centralization of state power. The transformation of the state's administrative, judicial and educational institutions into the model of the West occurred between 1809 and 1826. The new secular schools which became the new source of bureaucracy played a significant role in training new elites for power. Education in the political life of the Empire continued to have a more significant role than socio-economic background, as before. By the time of Mahmud II (1808-39), two ideas were popularized: the doctrines of government by law; and equality before the law

irrespective of race, creed or position (Berkes, 1964, pp.90,94). These were confirmed by the proclamation of the *Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane* (Imperial Edict) in 1839.

The reforms were expected to maximize state revenue raised from land tax, as the result of a more efficient and centralised level of financial control. The Imperial edict also attempted to abolish tax-farming, although it failed as a result of the inability to create an alternative system and the opposition of groups that stood to lose their former privileges. Despite the appointment of central government officials and the establishment of new councils for controlling the rural tax revenue, a considerable part of the rural surplus based on the traditional system still remained largely unchanged in the hands of those groups who had previously controlled the surplus. Under pressure of increasing revenue to cover the cost of reforms and continuing wars, the Ottoman administration attempted to increase the duties on internal and external trade, but they lacked sufficient political power to change the terms of agreement signed with other countries, such as Britain. This was followed by increasing foreign loans and resulted in the establishment of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration in 1881, which was controlled by foreign creditors. The Administration produced a system of international financial control. Although the essential aim was to safeguard the position of those who held shares in the Ottoman public debt, the secondary aim emerged as the opening up of the economy to further European economic expansion. The development of transportation, especially railways, was important for this expansion. The Ottoman government, and later the Young Turks before the First World War, were too dependent on European loans to challenge this method of economic control

(Owen, 1981: 191-200). However, it is important to highlight the features of the Ottoman Empire in the process of integration into the world economy which distinguished it from the formal colonies and informal empires. The existence of a relatively strong central state structure, associated with conditions of rivalry for greater political and economic advantage and influence between the major imperialist powers had significant consequences in terms of the mode of integration into the world economy. The political, military and fiscal crisis of the Empire provided the competing imperialist powers with frequent opportunities to promote the integration process and obtain commercial privileges, for example the Free Trade Treaty with Britain of 1838, or concessions to venture a major investment project. One of the salient features, as Pamuk (1987) highlights, was the struggle between the central bureaucracy and those social classes, such as merchants and export-oriented landlords, who favoured more rapid and direct integration. This is because the bureaucracy, rather than these social forces, had the upper hand in the process, and the European powers had to deal directly and reach an accommodation with the central bureaucracy. Conditions of imperial rivalry provided the bureaucracy with the means to hinder the direct intervention of the imperialist power and its agents, in order to facilitate greater penetration of world capital. The bureaucracy during the nineteenth century was still able to maintain control over some areas of the economy. In the areas of small and medium-sized agricultural holdings the bureaucracy worked against large estates to preserve its fiscal base, and prevent political challenges from the provinces. One important consequence of the era of reforms was the role of government in attempting to encourage the development of industry and agriculture. The reformers were aware of the fact that the growth of productive resources was

essential for general development. At first, the factories were initiated by the government in order to supply the demands of a modernised army, e.g. uniforms and equipment. Due to basic problems, such as limited financial resources or the growing technological distance from Western Europe, only a few textile factories could function until the end of the First World War. In addition, the social structure, a weakened international position and Ottoman financial bankruptcy put limits on the types of economic policies pursued. Similarly in agriculture, efforts to increase production by the introduction of new techniques and means were small in scale, to influence the ways of the millions of peasant cultivators. Yet the agricultural sector witnessed a significant increase in production in the late nineteenth century. In the absence of reliable data, it could be estimated from the statistics related to the allocation of land to various agricultural products in Anatolia that there was a considerable increase in land that was subject to commercial agriculture based largely on the cultivation and export of a variety of cash crops. It was, however, an uneven development. It is impossible to present a general picture of the agricultural sector within the Empire. The spread of monetary transactions, the enlargement of the scope for capital accumulation and the growing involvement of peasants and artisans in the sphere of exchange all signified a gradual, though limited in scale, transformation of basic economic relationships. The Ottoman economy had gained the character of a dual economy, in which a large subsistence sector and a commercial sector were closely linked to European markets. Ottoman agriculture was transformed to some extent by the externally generated demand for agricultural products, the subsequent commercialization of agriculture itself (initially in the coastal regions), the emergence of local notables as clientele commercial classes with their increasing wealth and power, and the

adoption of private ownership, despite the attempts of the central administration throughout the nineteenth century to reverse the process. As a result, land became an attractive field of investment, and owners of export-oriented regions the landed notables began to exploit their holdings in new ways (Sunar, 1974: 68-9). However, as Owen emphasises, the impact and spread of commercial farming should not be exaggerated, as small peasant production remained the basis of Anatolian agriculture at the end of the Ottoman period (1981; 208). The extent of commercialization took place within a dependent economy in which any commercial production which took place did not become the internal market. The Ottoman economy became an appendage of European markets. In the absence of a profitable native industry, agriculture continued to account for a large part of the Empire's total economic output (Keyder, 1987: 25-48).

It is important to emphasize that the emerging bourgeoisie class in the nineteenth century was largely composed of foreigners and members of ethnic minorities. The control and ownership of the means of production were largely in the hands of foreign capital and its agents, mostly ethnic minorities, from whence the capitalist relations of production emerged. European powers interfered in the form of extending protection to individual Ottoman subjects, mostly belonging to Christian minority groups, by issuing an official patent of protection or a foreign passport. This sort of interference in favour of individuals had the effect of granting to members of minority groups in the empire an extra-territorial exemption from many Ottoman laws and taxes. As a result, the conflict between the emerging bourgeoisie, who were mainly Christian, and the bureaucracy, whose interest lay in controlling the transformation of the social structure while safeguarding their

privileged position within the surplus-extraction relationships, was seen in terms of the potential separatism of growing nationalism and the rise of Christian comprador class (Keyder, 1988: 193). Subsequently, the idea of promoting a “national economy” by generating a national, Muslim bourgeoisie was developed during the Young Turk era (1908-1918), under circumstances in which the balance of power between Muslims and non-Muslims shifted in the favour of the latter. Nationalist movements in the Balkans and later in the Arab provinces resulted in the loss of large territories. In the nineteenth century, before the Turkism of the Young Turks, faced with the political disintegration of non-Muslim and non-Turkish minorities, coupled with integration into the world economy, two ideologies emerged, namely Ottomanism and Islamism. They aimed to keep the unity of the Empire and offer alternative approaches to modernisation against the Westernisation of *Tanzimat* reformers.

Ottomanism

Ottomanism’s first and most important aim was the effort to combat separatist movements by proclaiming the equality of all Ottoman subjects. This doctrine of Ottomanism had originated in the era of Sultan Mahmud II, but found its most formal expression in the *Hatt-ı Şerif of Gülhane* (Imperial Edict) in 1839. It confirmed and extended the rights and privileges of minority groups, but treated them as *millets*, rather than nationalities. It is obvious that this policy hoped to forestall any greater discontent among non-Muslims. Any separatist movement that reaffirmed religious freedom and *millets’* privileges might prevent the European powers from interfering in the Ottoman domestic affairs (Davison, 1977: 39-41). These measures were followed by a new law on nationality in 1869. In

addition to setting up modern secular criteria for nationality, it stipulated that all persons within Ottoman territory would be considered Ottoman subjects in the absence of proof to the contrary, and that no Ottoman subjects could acquire foreign citizenship without the consent of the central bureaucracy (*Bab-i Ali*). However, the Ottomanist policies proved to be unsuccessful in building an Ottoman nation against the nationalist movements in the Balkans. The disintegration of non-Muslim population in the Empire led to the second alternative.

Islamism

The nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries witnessed the manifestation of Islam under conditions in which the Westernist reformation was seen by Muslim masses to be in favour of non-Muslim minorities and European powers, under circumstances in which the Ottoman Empire was subjected to the political and economic expansion of European imperialism. The common people did not share the Westernist perspective, which favoured casting aside the old system of (mainly religious) values, in order to develop a new morality based on the Western system of values. Modernization to the new Westernist was a cultural and moral issue, rather than a material one. Whereas Westernists found the remedy in imitating the West and saw Islam as an obstacle to change, Muslim people found the introduction of European methods to be the cause of their decline, compared to the prospering situations of minorities. Under such circumstances, Islam was given a new role, the voice of protest. Islamist ideology offered a focus of protest, although its content was shaped by the level at which it was utilised. It is important to emphasize that Islam both at the beginning and at the end of the nineteenth century referred to divergent realities. Mardin classifies the Ottoman Islam into four

categories: (a) the official Islam of the state; (b) the heterodox Islam of mysticism and mystical order of dervishes; (c) the Islam of crafts and merchants; and (d) Shia Islam which appealed to the nomads (1977: 282).

At the societal level, secularising reforms had made Islam more Islamic in nature. The religion emerged in its own well-delineated field. Islam was perceived as a source of political opposition. When the traditional social institutions, such as craft guilds or religious orders, broke down in the nineteenth century, there were no political institutions or central ideologies to reduce the gap between the elites and the ordinary people.

At the intellectual level, Islamism was an ideology which originated between 1867 and 1873 and was developed by Ottoman intellectuals such as Namık Kemal and Ali Suavi, who shared the Western orientation and social and professional background of the *Tanzimat* leaders, as an alternative approach to modernism and a response to Westernism, which saw Islam as an obstacle to change. It is important to mention that in Ottoman context, it was the idea of progress that dominated the discourse of Islamists rather than for example that of *jihad* or imperialism. Ottoman Islamism represented a “modernist” tendency which attempted to address the challenges posed by changing international power relations and adjust the political framework while retaining the “Islamic rationale” of the state.³³ The origin of reformist Islamism as an intellectual movement was founded on the reinterpretation of Islam as a form of political ideology as a result

33

Voll (199) gives a classification of Islamist reformism, namely adaptionism, conservatism, the modernist tendency and individual styles. Though these cannot be exclusive, this is an attempt to construct “ideal types” for comparison.

of the combination of traditional Islamic values with ideologic forms of thought. Türköne (1994) strongly argues despite the common assertion within the literature, Afghani's thoughts were not original. They were first expressed by Namık Kemal and his colleagues in Istanbul and preceded the pan-Islamic policies of the Hamidian era.³⁴ The bureaucratic reformism of the Ottoman Empire which began in the late eighteenth century and continued throughout the nineteenth century was undertaken in a climate in which Westernists and Islamists alike concentrated on the idea of "progress" and the means of modernizing the political and administrative structures of the Empire. Therefore, Islamism and Westernism converged on the necessity of change, but diverged on methods. Islamists condemned Westernists and the Restoration Reformation for their blind imitations of the superficial aspects of Western culture instead of its political institutions and principles. They supported the idea of limited borrowing from the West while keeping the Islamic identity of the state, and insisted that reforms had to be consistent with the precepts of Islamic law. The Japanese example of borrowing European sciences and techniques was the Islamist's favourite model. It was technology, but not customs, morals or modes of living that were to be acquired from the West. While the superiority of the West in science, technology and political culture was acknowledged, it was emphasised that Islam is a reasonable religion which prescribes progress. Although, their terminology was based upon Islam, their intellectual inspiration came from Western tradition of political thought, for example from ideas of Plato, Descartes, Montesquieu, Locke and Rousseau. Islamism reflected an Islamist approach to the problem of government and religion was given a major role in its schemes of reform. Islamists saw Islam as the source

34

For a similar argument see Keddie (1994) "Sayyid Jamal al-Din 'al-Afghani'", p.12.

of social cohesion in the Durkhemian fashion, and argued for the use of Islam in the process of development. Islamists attempted to provide an Islamic rationale for modern ideas and institutions, albeit a selective approach/critical borrowing that was expected not to contradict the culture. They emphasised and further developed the principles of Islam which, they thought, were open to change. The Islamic principles, such as consultation for democracy and *shura* for parliament, were reinterpreted with reference to the holy texts and their implementation in the first century of Islam, and were given a new content. Islamism was a modernising ideology in its emphasis upon "progress" and "democratization", which were also among the main themes of Westernists. Islamists advocated the establishment of constitutional government and argued that Islam with its emphasis on consultation not only justified but called for parliamentary government. For Namık Kemal, the Quran was the ultimate source according to which the political organisation of believers had to be determined. "The Islamic state" was a kind of Republic at its inception because of the existence of the principle of "the will of community", but inconsistent with *Sharia* (Mardin, 1962: 269). To Islamists progress, freedom and democracy were intrinsic to Islam. Drawing their example from the French constitution, the establishment of the representative government, and of the separation of powers, and the promulgation of constitution, which had to be in harmony with Islamic law, were inevitable for a progressive political system. Namık Kemal wrote on constitutionalism, freedom and patriotism both in Istanbul and in European exile. He struggled to provide a synthesis of Western political thought and Islamic principles by comparing the ideas of the Enlightenment regarding government with the traditional political thought of Islam. This heavily relied on the vocabulary of Islamic political theory, such as justice, contract of investitures,

consensus of community and consultation (Mardin 1962).

At the state level, Islam acquired a new political and ideological cast after the failure of Ottomanism. Islam was utilized to create a central value system and was promoted as a source of group identity for the Muslim population, whose proportion had increased significantly with large losses of territory and population. Under the reign of Sultan Abdülhamid (1876-1908), a form of pan-Islamism became official policy. The Sultan as the Caliph of all the Muslim community used religious orders to propagate the idea of the Ottoman Empire as the protector of Islamic population (Mardin, 1977: 285). Pan-Islamism, however, collapsed with the rise of Arab nationalism. According to pan-Turkists, while Ottomanism had proved a failure, Islamism had won only limited success. Therefore, Turkism was the one option left. It would rally the loyalties of the dominant Turkish race within the Ottoman Empire and reinforce it with that of the many millions of Turks in Russia and elsewhere beyond Ottoman frontiers.

Turkism

Until the nineteenth century, the Turkish sense of national identity was suppressed and members of the ruling group thought of themselves not as Turks, nor as supporters of a Turkish state, but as Ottomans who served the state and religion (Lewis 1962; Lewis 1974).³⁵ The *Millet*, the religious community to which an

35

The early signs of a Turkish national interest are seen in the fourteenth century when some books about the history of ancient Turkish tribes were translated from Persian to Turkish. The "Oğuz legend" remained part of the official historiographic myth until the end of the Empire. However, the deflection of the Ottoman Empire away from the Turkish identity was realized after the conquest of Istanbul in 1453; the rise of the Turkish but Shia power of the Safavidis in Iran; and the conquest of Syria and Egypt in the sixteenth century. The title of Caliphate was acquired afterwards by Ottoman Sultan.

individual belonged, was the determining factor of identity, as stated above. Nationalist uprising within the Empire led to the emergence of Turkish nationalism. Since Ottomanism and Pan-Islamism failed, pan-Turkism became the dominant policy in the Young Turk era (1908-18). The Ottoman reaction to Balkan separatism, the Tatar revolt against Russian pan-Slavism, the response of Turkish and Tatar intellectuals to the new ideas and examples set by European nationalism, and the renewed Turkish pride in Turkological discovery at a time of Ottoman defeat and Muslim abasement all combined to encourage the growth of Turkism, of a new political movement, based not on a dynasty, a faith, or a state, but on the people, the Turkish people, in their vast territories extending from Europe to the Pacific. Although the terms Turan and Pan-Turanism remained in occasional use, the movement was in effect pan-Turkism, for the Muslim Turkish people in Turkey and Central Asia showed little interest in the putative Christian or Pagan Turks. For the Turkish exiles and immigrants from the Russian Empire, pan-Turanism or pan-Turkism was a political programme which implied political unification from the Adriatic Sea to China into a single state. Among the Turks of Turkey this programme won only limited support. Their interest in the movement was social, cultural and literary, and concerned with a greater awareness of their separate identity as Turks (Lewis, 1962: 345). In particular, Ziya Gökalp sought to promote the national revival of the Turkish language. Turkism was different from pan-Turkism. Gökalp's Turkism was not based on any race or ethnicity. He defined nation as the source of all and morality, and identified it with the love of country and service of the nation. He argued that it was not race, but common culture, such as language and religion, that determined the nation. The word Turk had become a name which was applied only to the Turks of Turkey and those who

shared the Turkish culture of Turkey (Gökalp, 1968: 19). The principle was the composition of Turkish-speaking Muslims into a Turkish nation. This meant therefore that non-Muslims who lived in Turkey were Turks in respect of citizenship but not of nationality. This was because, from Gökalp's perspective, Islam was the factor which strengthened patriotic sentiment. In his opinion, the Turks should accept from Western civilization only its material achievements and scientific methods, and keep Islam as the basis of morality. The growth of nationalism since 1908 had accustomed the new generation of Turks, who were educated in modern schools, to the idea of Turkishness, although the idea of the territorial state resisted religious and dynastic loyalties. The adoption of Turkish nationalist ideas created great potential for political action against the Ottoman regime, which was accused of being the agent of foreign interest. Turkism finally resulted in capturing state power in 1909 through the Young Turks, represented by the Committee for Union and Progress (CUP), which was initially governed by a military oligarchy. The Parliament and the Constitution, which were first adopted in 1876, but suspended in 1878, were immediately reinstated. For the following decade the CUP was the sole centre of power. The Balkan Wars (1911-1914) constituted a turning point and the leaders of the CUP moved rapidly towards a policy of Turkish nationalism. After taking over effective control of the state apparatus, the CUP attempted to nationalise the ownership of the means of production and to create an indigenous commercial capital by supporting the emergence of a national bourgeoisie among the Muslims. However, the First World War broke out in 1914. The emergence of a Muslim merchant during the First World War did not manage to entirely replace the economic dominance of the Christian bourgeoisie. However, the expulsion of this bourgeoisie during and after the war partly solved the problem

for Muslim merchants. The CUP ceased to function in 1918 after the defeat and partition of the Ottoman Empire.

However, the transformation of political regime to a parliamentary and constitutional monarchy was also shared by Turkists, the Turkist approach to modernisation differed from that of Westernists and of Islamists in terms of religion. For Turkists the entire question of religious reform consisted of taking measures to secularize religion and make it a matter of conscience by subjecting the legal aspects of Islam to secular legislation. The reform of *medreses* was not for them a matter of religious reform, but a matter of educational reform. Beginning with the 1908 Revolution, the recognition of the need to reform religious institutions became universal. The Westernists, who had not believed these institutions capable of any reform, and even the Islamists, who had never before acknowledged that any alterations were required, took a serious and hopeful interest in religious reorganisation. The religious reforms proposed in the Young Turk era included the abolition of the mystic religious orders and the translation of Quran into Turkish. The Islamists asked for a reform in the methods of teaching religion; the adaption of theology to the requirements of the age; and the unification of legal doctrines for the Muslim schools. The main reforms carried out by the Young Turks were: (a) the elimination of the *Şeyhülislam* from the cabinet; (b) the transfer of the *Sharia* courts from the jurisdiction of *Şeyhülislam* to that of the Ministry of Justice; (c) the removal of *Evkaf* (Muslim pious foundations) administration from the jurisdiction of *Şeyhülislam*; and (d) the transfer of the *medreses* from the control of *Şeyhülislam* to that of the Ministry of education. This last step was a serious move towards the complete secularization of education and

the termination of the dualism of the previous period (Berkes, 1964: 416). However, considering the political destruction of the Empire and the level of development, which determined that traditional institutions were still the only available means of education for many, it was under the new state that these reforms were believed to be necessary for political authority to be effective. As will be seen in the next chapter, in the development of the Turkish Republic the religious element was eliminated and Westernization exercised a growing influence. The foundations of Kemalism, therefore, were laid by Turkism and Westernism, but not by Islam. The new idea of a territorial nation-state based on the Turkish nation in Turkey appeared in the early days of the Kemalist modernisation. The National Pact (*Misak-i Milli*) of the Independence struggle of 1919-23, contained the basic demands of the nationalist movement in Anatolia, and mentioned not the Turk but the Ottoman Muslim majority, united in religion and demanding the undivided sovereignty of people. Soon it became clear that Kemalist Turkism dismissed the notion of a larger entity beyond national frontiers, whether defined by religion or race (Lewis, 1962: 346). However, religion continued to be one of the essential ingredients of identity. For instance, Turkish-speaking Orthodox Christians from Anatolia were classified as Greeks and sent to Greece, while children of Muslim Bosnians, Albanians, Kurds, Chechens, and Arabs settled in Anatolia were accepted as Turks. Non-Muslims were known as Turkish citizens, but never as Turks.

Chapter 4: State Capitalism and the Question of Religion in Politics

From the perspective of the theoretical framework explained in Chapter two, this chapter analyses the Republican development model within a corporatist form of society. Its main focus is based upon what Leftwich (1994) characterises as the forms and features of the “developmental state”. It is argued that an analysis of the features of the Republican state and its relationships to social classes is crucial in order to contextualize Islamism in the development process and the changing nature of social relations. This is to say that when the intensification of the exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach accelerated the growth of economic inequalities, which was accompanied by excessive use of political repression, the mobilisation of religious rhetoric as an effective way of political protest brought various centres of opposition together against the authoritarian single-party regime. In this context, the chapter argues the structural and ideological impediments of Republican politics to the participation of subordinate classes in the political decision-making processes. This refers to the fact that the distinguishing characteristic of the developmental state is that her political purposes and institutional structures have been developmentally-driven, while her developmental objectives have been politically-driven (Leftwich, 1994: 9). This is done with reference to the rise of the Democrat Party to power with an overwhelming majority, 53 per cent of the general vote securing it 86.2 percent of the seats in the Grand national Assembly in 1950 (Lewis: 1974:146). After Turkey opted for multi-party politics. It is often claimed that this was the first stage of “Islamic revivalism”. This chapter highlights the shortcomings of such explanations, which tend to present the phenomenon in terms of a clash between the “modernising centre and reactionary (traditional)

periphery”³⁶ or a clash over “cultural cleavages”. Possible similarities with the case of the Welfare Party are discussed particularly where the DP’s removal from power by a military coup in 1960 is concerned. This approach necessitates an analysis of the role of the military establishment, which is an important component of state capitalism, in the political sphere, often as the primary political functionary.

The general framework of the developmental state (Leftwich 1994) utilised in this and the next chapters in order to explain the nature of Republican politics includes the following: (a) a revolutionary seizure of state power from above during the Independence War (1919-22) and in 1923 the establishment of the Republic, which based its legitimacy upon nationalism and a wish to “catch up” with the West; (b) the dominance of a single party, which was necessary for promoting state autonomy, and was able to concentrate sufficient power, autonomy and capacity at the centre. This helped to shape and encourage the achievement of explicit developmental objectives by establishing and promoting the condition of economic growth through, for example, short and long term planning, which was advisory for the private sector, and the establishment of state economic enterprises in the 1930s, and of the state planning organisation in 1961. Corporatism was at the centre of this mode of politics; (c) the limitation of power and participation in national decisions to almost the highest level of bureaucracy, civil and military, but this also included intimate relations with the private sector; (d) the elimination and subordination of political groups and socio-economic classes.

36

It has been a mainstream approach to explain the political, social, cultural or religious history of Turkey in terms of the two-tiered model, namely “centre and periphery” (Mardin 1973; Heper 1980), i.e. modern and traditional, or “high and popular realms” (Mardin 1969 and 1977). Yet the concepts fail to specify what concrete social groups fall within this purview. This approach continues to bear the mark of the modernisation paradigm and treats either side as a united, distinctive, homogenous entity in itself.

The autonomy of the highly centralised bureaucracy was embedded in a web of ties with non-state actors, such as intellectuals and the dominant urban and rural socio-economic groups, for whom such an integration of interests was beneficial, since they were very weak in challenging the power of the bureaucracy; (e) shifting coalitions of interests, with reference to the establishment of the DP in the late 1946, and the intensification of intra-elite and policy conflicts, with respect to the establishment of the National Order Party (NOP), the predecessor of the Welfare Party, in 1970; and (f) the existence of a high degree of repression and suppression of civil rights.

The omnipresence of the state in Turkish society and politics, its determining economic role, its principal command of resources and political organizations and its 'pronounced autonomy' *vis-à-vis* the society, put the state itself at the centre of all national political questions. The analysis is structured around the concept of the Republican state in the context of Kemalism and Kemalist modernisation, the overall role of the state in society and the distribution of state power, and focuses on ideological and bureaucratic elements with reference to the political economy of the period 1923-50. The state apparatus is conceptualized as a politico-ideological form, or a historically accumulated network of institutions, norms and values whose reproductive functions permeate all the constituent dimensions of the social formation. The reproductive role performed by the state is explained in terms of its own reproductive imperatives as a historical form of political domination, based on a specific set of material and ideological foundations which privilege certain policies, strategies and actors above others. It is intended that such an analysis will prepare a comparative framework for identifying similar

tendencies, beliefs and attitudes between two ideologies, Kemalism and Islamism. Each of these bases its *raison d'être* upon social-engineering, in terms of some key concepts such as the notion of state, politics and society and the construction of identity, although they represent two rival ideologies in the first instance, in terms of their attitudes towards the mode of modernisation, the West and the role of religion in society.

4.1. Modernisation, Kemalism and the State

4.1.1. Literature Review

The assumptions of the modernisation paradigm³⁷ using both evolutionary theory and functionalist theory, have constituted the key framework for studies on Turkish political life as well as on the phenomenon of "Islamism". Evolutionary theory assumes that social change is gradual, unidirectional and progressive. Societies move from the primitive, simple and undifferentiated traditional stage to the advanced, complex and differentiated modern stage (Rostow 1964; Levy 1967). It is argued that modernisation, which is assumed to be an irreversible and progressive process, is not only inevitable but desirable. This is because, from the functionalist point of view, modernisation is a systematic process which involves changes (for the better) in all aspects of social behaviour, personal, social and political. It is accompanied by differentiation, which refers to the process of progressive separation and specialization of roles and institutional spheres in the

37

For a comparison of the main arguments of modernisation theory in analysing change in terms of economic, social, political and individual spheres, see for example D. Lerner (1958) *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*; S. N. Eisenstadt (1963) *Modernization: Growth and Diversity*; P. F. Sugar (1964) "Economic and Political Modernization: Turkey"; D. Apter (1965) *The Politics of Modernization*; L. W. Pye (1966) "The Concept of Political Development"; N. J. Smelser (1966) "Mechanism of Change and Adjustment to Change"; F. X. Sutton (1966) "Analyzing Social System"; D. E. Smith (1970) *Religion and Political Development*; W. W. Rostow (1971) *The Stages of Economic Growth*; and A. Inkeles and D. H. Smith (1974) *Becoming Modern*.

political system. Hence it is argued that a modernised political system has a better capacity to handle the functions of national identity, legitimacy, participation and distribution than does a traditional political system (Smelser 1966; Coleman 1968). One important point is that the concept of modernity has been presented as a fixed arrangement which was mainly inspired by Western societies, and religion in this context loses its validity. Most literature on modernisation strongly emphasises the idea that secularization is a necessary component of modernisation, as mentioned before. It is often claimed that it was the secular process of social change which modernised countries (Lerner 1964; Apter 1965; Smith 1974). Smelser argues that during the process of modernisation, the values governing the economic, political and scientific spheres become more established in their own right and are no longer sanctioned directly by religious belief, but by an autonomous rationality (1966: 32-3). Therefore, modernisation is seen as transformative (progressive) in the sense that traditional structures and values must be totally replaced by a set of new values, for example nationalism, in order for a society to become modern. However, in these distinctions, the static, sacred, undifferentiated character of tradition tends to be overstated and it is turned into a blanket term to cover all forms of social life other than the modern (industrial) type. Such an approach runs the risk of confusing the abstract nature of ideal types with empirical reality, and projecting the Western experience as a mono-causal, uniform and inevitable process (Bendix, 1967: 314).

A large portion of the scholarly work on the Turkish politics and state bears the mark of the culturalist perspective and is confined to the description of institutional arrangements and analysis of the manifestation of certain cultural peculiarities

which may occur in such institutions. Many studies have illustrated either how patron-client relationships prevailed at all levels of the state and society (Mardin 1969; Avcioglu 1973; Sencer 1974; Evin 1988) or how the ideological and religious beliefs of society have influenced both popular and elite perceptions of the role of the state, the arrangement of power within it, and the outcomes of this arrangement in the “top-down” modernisation process (Berkes 1964; Tuncay 1981; Köker 1990; Turan 1991). Or they have focussed on the style of government and on various political and institutional manifestations of the country’s culture within the framework of its state (Karpat 1959; Heper 1977 and 1985; Dodd 1979; Tachau 1984; Akarlı 1985). In most of the analyses, the state machinery or the state elite is seen to operate in the interests of the nation, and so it is seen as neutral. Culturally determined elite-pluralism, along with its association with the modernization endeavour bears the influence of functionalism for political analysis. The state is perceived as an agent which maintains order, particularly in the face of increased differentiation, and economic and political crises. This image is particularly apparent in the interpretations of military intervention in politics, which will be explained further in this chapter.

The study of social and political institutions using the concept of patrimonialism, denoting pre-modernity has been very influential. The pioneering works of Heper (1974 and 1977) on bureaucracy borrow Weberian concepts of “patrimonial bureaucracy” and “legal-rational bureaucracy”. These two concepts are employed to indicate the institutional differences between the Ottoman Empire (pre-modern) and the Republican (modern) regime. The common approach is to classify the (modernising) state and/or society within the framework of a sharp division into

two polar sets, i.e. traditional versus modern. It suggests that the movement between the two poles of traditionality and modernity must be directional and unilinear. This means that modernity and tradition are antithetical, exclusive and self-regulating. Peoples, values, institutions and societies could be either traditional or modern, bearing the influence of Maine's primitive-complex society, Durkheim's mechanical-organic solidarity and Weber's sacred-secular polity. Lifchez highlights the need to free Turkish studies from the “*schizophrenic quality of modern Turkish cultural life... with its sharp cleavage between an 'enlightened' elite of reformers and an 'ignorant' mass of traditionalist or reactionaries*” (1992: 315).

As seen above, the core emphasis has been upon the notion of evolutionary change - from traditional to transitional, and finally to modern, which is characterised as progressive and coupled with secularization. The subsequent emphasis has been on the “progressive” role of the state which commands this transition and is adhered to Kemalism. Since the main stream of Turkish literature *a priori* accepts and emphasises that Kemalism as a revolutionary ideology is progressive, modernising and has the potential to move towards democracy,³⁸ the state is therefore associated with modernity. However, the concept of being progressive in the Turkish context is ambiguous and needs to be carefully applied. The name “progressive” was given to those reformists who pressed for the

38

See for a comparison, E. Kongar (1981) *Atatürk Devrim ve Kuramları*, S. Kili (1983) *Kemalism*; and S. Savran (1985) “Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türkiye'de Burjuva Devrimi”. While the first two employ the modernisation paradigm, the last applies historical-materialism to address the transformative feature of Kemalism, so that both approaches converge on the progressiveness of its nature. For example, M. Heper (1985) *The State Tradition in Turkey*, argues that Kemalism provided a “transient transcendental state” with normative foundations to prepare the people for democracy. See also N. Berkes (1964) *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*.

adoption of representative forms of government and equal protection under secular law in the nineteenth century, as mentioned in the previous chapter. This was despite the fact that the establishment of representative institutions did not mean a process of democratization. This is to say, the modernisation of political institutions did not bring political rights and liberties for the general public until the second half of the 1940s. In addition, the concept of being “progressive” underwent a transition in its meaning with the transition to multi-party politics. It was associated then more with participatory democracy, and created a confusion through identifying progressive reformism with a progressive attitude towards the operations of participatory democracy. Reformism, however, principally aimed at modernising the state rather than liberalizing political competition (Evin, 1988: 210-1). Political development is mainly understood in terms of political stability based on the capacity for purposeful and orderly change. To an extent, this excludes democracy as incompatible with planned development. Stability is, therefore, an arbitrary support of the status quo and leads to the control of social forces in order to maintain it.

Moreover, the issue of secularism has been the key explanatory framework for most analyses of “Islamism” since the rise of the DP to power. Because Turkey is seen as undergoing a process of transition from a traditional society towards a modern one in which religion is supposed to lose its importance and become a matter of personal conscience, according to the premises of the modernisation theory, the literature has mostly concentrated upon explaining the causes of religious continuation in political as well as societal life. The favoured question has been “whether Islamism poses a political threat to the survival of the modern state”

(Lewis 1952; Karpat 1959; Landau 1976; Dodd 1979; Heper 1981; Toprak 1981; Rustow 1987). From this point of view, efforts were directed towards locating the faults of society with reference to its culture or political regime in order to offer an explanation for Islamism, although much of this discussion has been abstract and speculative rather than providing any detailed knowledge of religious practices or understandings of mass public. "The success of Islam" in the late twentieth century has dominantly been analysed within the framework of the culturalist perspective. The problem has often been described as a struggle between the modernising state and a religious society. Studies have focussed upon the relationships between Islam and modernisation, secularism and democracy, often upon its incompatibility. Islamism is seen as an abnormal phenomenon in the modern era. In this context, "the Turkish-Islamist Synthesis" (TIS) has been seen one of the main causes of rising Islamism since the 1980s (Toprak 1990). The TIS was formulated by the rightist Intellectuals' Heart in the early 1980s to integrate nationalists and Islamists. It was propagated by some top state elites then working for the government of the Motherland party. It obviously attempted to appeal to both religious and national values in order to prevent the high degree of political polarisation that was experienced in the 1970s and mobilise religious support for developmental causes. It seems that it contained similar aspirations with Kemalism, for example social unity, solidarity and the production of model individuals through indoctrination. It could be argued that the TIS was an attempt to shape and patronise "Islamist tendencies" by the state. However, it is impossible to measure its impact. To assume that people are more susceptible to one ideology than another, both of which are supported by the state, is very simplistic.

The Turkish fixation with secularism, as Mardin (1977) indicates, has often led to the simplification of the question of modernity in terms of secularisation and has removed the issue of religion from its psychological and social context. In this vein, religion is seen as the antithesis of modernity.³⁹ Yalman points out that: *“An entire generation was educated thinking religion to be some evil and irrational force of more orthodoxy and tradition... The intellectuals from Ankara and Istanbul had for political reasons completely misunderstood what Islam or religion was all about”* (Yalman, 1969, p. 47 cited in Tapper, 1990: 7).

4.1.2. Modernisation and Kemalism

Turkish modernisation based its core struggle that would determine the essence of the new regime upon the question of religion and state. A secular-nation state was to replace the old notion of the Ottoman state. The official discourse is formulated around a theme of tension between “pre-modernity and modernity”. This is to say, the Ottoman past represents pre-modernity, backwardness and reaction, whereas the Republican present represents progress, rationality and positivism. In this vein, religion and tradition as the representatives of the past were perceived as being in contradiction to the project of modernisation, i.e. Westernisation.

The style of Republican modernisation shows that authoritarianism and elitism have been the prominent features of Turkish history. The reflections of such elitism

39

On the social and psychological aspects of religion and heterogenous religious understandings and practices, see for example Ş. Mardin (1989) *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*; J. Norton (1990) “Turkish Sufis, Saints and Subversives”; R. Tapper (1990) *Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular State*; and R. Lifchez (1992) *The Dervish Lodge: Architecture, Art and Sufism in Ottoman Turkey*

can be viewed in the whole tradition of Turkish reformism to which the republican cadres belong. The elitist mode of politics is accompanied by a cult of leadership. One of the critical consequences of the cult of leadership for Turkish politics was the deepening of the tension between the leader and the people. According to the leader, "the leader would not fail, but the people would" (Parla, 1989: 7). The ruling elite's mission of "elevating the people to the level of contemporary civilization" played a legitimising role for elitist politics since it was assumed that the people by themselves were neither willing nor capable of achieving this basic goal. The basic argument of elitist politics can be seen in this quota by Heper from Atatürk's speech, "*reforms needed to be imposed 'from above', for 'when the people are not educated they can easily be won over for all kinds of undesirable ends'*". This means that the people should not have sovereignty until their collective conscience has reached a certain level. Until then the "national will" had to be shaped by a leadership group, which could lead the (uneducated) people through the necessary stages of progress towards a more civilized pattern of life (i.e. the Western life style) and thereby enlighten them. It is important to indicate that the Turkish 'Revolution', as Özbudun (1976) emphasises, was not a social revolution which was aimed at implementing radical changes in the existing social structure. Rather, it was culturally transformative. The grand strategy of the reformation was that of completing the Westernisation of the Turkish intelligentsia and making Turkey safe for the westernized intellectuals who would lead her to modernity. Most of the Westernisation reforms were characteristically devoted to removing the last possibility of challenge from the defeated *medrese*-intellectual faction, and to enlarging the dominant body of Westernized intellectuals. The aim of bringing the uneducated masses into active political participation was quite secondary (Frey,

1965: 42). Moreover, public policy was not supposed to be the outcome of a detached aggregation of interest, but the consequences of a search for “truth” and “the one best way”(Heper, 1985: 51). This corporatist nature of politics is explained further below. In other words, only a portion of sovereignty was to be exercised by the people through the Grand National Assembly, which was elected by only a small portion of people, who were guaranteed the right to vote. In fact, the state elite who perceived themselves as the only ones capable of serving the nation, were supposed to exercise sovereignty in order to promote the “general interest”, the definition of which was neglected. It should be stressed that the ambition of Kemalism was to transfer sovereignty not to the people but to the nation, in order to legitimise it in the eyes of people as it transformed the political regime.

The initial aim in taking all the measures described below was given by the new regime as “to reach the stage achieved by the civilised nations”. This motif illustrated the determination of the new regime to achieve an “unconditional transformation” to Western civilisation and “to destroy all forces of reaction”. In so doing, a definite doctrine of secularism was rigidly implemented as state policy, since the state saw secularism as a necessary tool of modernisation and religion as an obstacle. This meant that, after the accomplishment of modernisation in the public sphere, the cultural practices of ordinary people were targeted. The centralisation of every single aspect of social life became the new state’s first priority, since “traditional society” was conceived and treated as the source of religious or ethnic reaction to the project of one secular nation-state. Therefore, religion had to be under the strict control of the state and should become a matter of individual conscience. The Westernisation programme of the Republic after the

termination of *Sultanate* in 1922 and the abolition of *Caliphate* in 1924 included:

a. the abolition of the *Sharia* as a law of the state. It was significant for the new regime to have done this because it destroyed the legitimate basis of the Ottoman regime in the political realm. This was followed by abolishing the Ministries of *Sharia* and *Evkaf*, closing the *medreses*; unifying education under the Ministry of Education; and abolishing the religious orders, *tarikats*, and their cloisters. The new regime in 1924 characterized some of its targets as the safeguarding and stabilization of the Republic, the creation of a unified national system of education and the need to cleanse the Islamic faith by rescuing it from the position of being a political instrument. All these would lead to the extermination of the influence of the *ulema*, who were the authorized defenders of the *Sharia* law and the only remaining power in society with connections to the old regime. This meant that they could challenge the new regime and hinder its reform programme as they had often done in the past. After the secularizing reform against the *ulema* in 1924, it soon became clear that it was from the *dervishes*, not the *ulema*, that the most threatening resistance to secularism could come. The first stage of the reform concluded in November 1928 with the secularization of the Constitution of 1924, by dropping the second article stating that "the religion of the Turkish state is Islam". In the second stage, the previous changes were supplemented, extended and consolidated (Lewis, 1961: 258-61).

b. the establishment of the Department of Religious Affairs financed by the "secular" state as an agency of public service in 1924;

c. the prohibition of polygamy in 1925 and introduction of compulsory civil marriage in 1926. Women were given full suffrage and equal rights with men to hold office in 1934;

d. the prohibition of the Eastern head-dress, *fez*, and its replacement by European hats and caps in 1925;

e. the prescribing of a uniform to members of the clergy in 1925. The prohibition of the formation of societies based on religion, sect and *tarikats* was forbidden in 1938 by Article 9 of the law of Association. The same law prohibited political parties from engaging in religious activities or producing religious propaganda. Propaganda against the principles of secularism was also prohibited by the Penal Code adopted in 1926;

f. the introduction of a new legal code based on European models, which in 1926 replaced the old code which was based for the most part on the Islamic *Sharia*;

g. the replacement of Arabic script by the Latin script in 1928 and the prohibition of the teaching of the Arabic script in unauthorized schools;

h. the adoption of the Gregorian calendar in 1926 and the replacement of the Muslim Friday by Sunday as the official weekly holiday in 1935.

Ahmad (1988) argues that the attitude towards religion of the single-party regimes in Europe affected the regime in Turkey. The state responded to opposition and challenges in the name of Islam by extending secular laws and becoming more and more militant against Islam. The *Ezan* started to be recited and the Quran was translated and read in Turkish in the mosques and over the radio. However, the regime tried hard to educate the masses ideologically through education, concerning the level of development of the country, that was mainly available in cities and towns. To a very small minority that constituted the urban layer of society, every manifestation of religious demands would seem reactionary and fanatical. The government introduced Village Institutes to educate rural people in order to broaden its secular base. However, they were not welcomed in the countryside and were almost seen as the enemies of religion. Therefore, they did not produce a significant result and were abolished by the DP government. The state's policy towards Islam alienated it from the masses.

Turkish secularism did not separate polity from religion and it did not let religion have its own autonomous existence. In fact, it is an example of polity-dominant secularization that recognises no area of religious autonomy and aims to completely eliminate the influence of religion in society, reform its content to bring

it into line with the official ideology.⁴⁰ This means that the state/government reaches far into the sphere of private religious practices. Hence, the secularism policy, which became part of the social engineering process rather than an outcome of the process of modernisation and societal development, has been highly instrumental in creating new Republican elites (Göle, 1997: 49). Control over education is crucial in this context since the main aim seems to be to transform society into an “ideal” by controlling the state. While nationalism was the tool of justification for this movement, it was accompanied by the centralisation of education and the formation of its nationalist elites. The notion of “transforming society into an “ideal” is the key argument by which the “modernising elite” justifies and reproduces their privileged position. Göle points out that Republican elites were the products of the new way of writing, reading and speaking, as the Arabic script was replaced by the Latin script and the use of foreign languages except Western ones was forbidden. Language and script reforms granted the new elite legitimacy and prestige, and distinguished them as “progressive” because they were modern, educated and Western-oriented. In other words, Republican elites were the ones endowed with the symbolic (Western) capital. Changes in life-styles and aesthetic values, i.e. a shift from an “Islamic” to a Western culture, created cultural distinctions and social stratification in society. Since their *raison d’être* was closely linked to that of the nation-state, they were faithful to the interests of the nation-state and dedicated to the values of secularism and progress (1997: 50). Secularism was considered the prerequisite of modernisation. In this context, secularism meant the regulation of public space according to the preferences of

40

See D. E. Smith (1970) Religion and Political Development, for the four concepts of secularization, namely polity-separation secularization, polity-expansion secularization policy-transvaluation secularization and polity-dominant secularization.

the state and the imposition of one specific lifestyle.

The Kemalist Conception of the State

Kemalism was formulated in the 1930s when the West, the centre of Kemalist reformism, witnessed the German and Italian experiences in the aftermath of the Great Depression. Corporatism was the primary mode of politics. Accordingly, Kemalist corporatism, although it emerged in special circumstances, condemned both the Marxist and the liberal conflict models of politics. It conceived of conflict as pathological, and hence structured organizations and representations around the major functional groups in society according to the initiative of the state. Corporatism provided the “legitimate” means for the state. The party and the state are considered to be two complementary entities in Kemalism. In the early 1930s, this conception resulted in the end of the independent existence of the party. The concept of the state meant that “the nation is united in the personality of its leader, Atatürk”. It is important to emphasise that as a result of the idea of eventual unification of the party and the state into a single authoritarian apparatus, the chairman of the Republican People’s Party became the president and the deputy chairman became the prime minister. The RPP invoked the concept of populism to describe itself as the synthesis of the people and the sole authoritative interpreter of the national interest. However, the concept of populism had been revised over time. It was first used to express support for popular sovereignty during the War of Independence. In this period, populism was equated with nationalism and anti-imperialism, or used as a shorthand term to imply all the goals of the liberation movement. Later, populism was described as the sociological basis of the new nation-state and society, which was united in terms

of race, religion and culture, filled with feelings of mutual respect and sacrifice and shared a common fate and interest. In the absence of prior social mobilization, the authoritarian regime did not need to cope with a mass movement and so its aims were reduced to control and repression from above. Unlike in Brazil and Argentina, the threat and potential damage of foreign capital was not evident. The more targetable comprador bourgeoisie had already been ousted, and there had never been a landed oligarchy, albeit the existence of a relatively small number of big landlords in some regions, as explained in the previous chapter. There had been no anti-oligarchic movement as in Latin America or no mobilisation against the implications of economic development. Therefore, the regime lacked the kind of social base characteristics of fascist or populist examples (Köker, 1992: 196-201). There was no breakdown of an exclusionary bourgeois system of restrictive parliamentarism that was followed by *etatism*, as was the case with fascism. Rather, it sought to extend bureaucratic rule and conceived a modality of coalition with a newly emerging bourgeoisie. Thus, it was a regime where bargaining and political posturing remained within the realm of the ruling elite. In addition, Kemalism was not born out of a crisis of redistribution of wealth, but rather out of a crisis of accumulation of necessary capital in a society that was just emerging into capitalism.

The concept of solidarity provided the Republicans with tools to corporate society as one indivisible unit. Nationalism as a modern ideology was put forward to make nationhood the primary collective identity in a society where religious communities had been the primary collective identity for hundreds of years. The imposition of Turkish nationhood as a collective identity meant the exclusion of plural identities

from the public sphere. Nationalism was utilised as a substitute for the belief in Oneness of God, and provided the necessary concepts for meaningful action, good and evil and salvation. Society was not defined in terms of classes with separate interests, but classes were seen to be interdependent upon each other for their existence. Hence, it was claimed that there could no longer be any contradiction between society and political authority, because the nation was a self-governing body. As solidarity was conceptualised as being based on the functional interdependence of different social and economic groups, populism, in this context, became increasingly distinct from popular sovereignty. Rather, it was identified with the effort to encourage economic development and preserve social peace, and was linked to the state's application of distributive justice to all social groups. This understanding of populism is evident in Gökalp's emphasis on the subordination of occupational associations to the state, and the maintenance of an economy that is under the state's leadership. This provided the justification for the Kemalist experiment with state corporatism as an authoritarian response to the problems of economic underdevelopment, as explained below. Since the existence of social classes was denied, it was then argued that they could be both represented and regulated by a unified party-state apparatus, led by an elite that could form a kind of universal class. Populism was once more revised in the transition to multi-party politics. Despite still avoiding the word "class", this understanding of populism recognised that society consists of various social groups, and described the task of state as harmonising the interests of these. It continued to dismiss the notion of class-based political parties. This is to say, political parties, such as the RPP, the DP and later the Justice Party, commonly portrayed themselves as national parties or mass parties which represented the

interests of all social groups and sought to reconcile them with each other. This view is based to a great extent on the persistent fear on the part of political or state elites that unless partitive interests are repressed, regulated or harmonised, divisions along lines such as class, religion and region will threaten both the unity of the nation and the authority of the state. It has also justified the effective control and penetration of the state into every aspect of life (Bianchi, 1984: 100-4).

In other words, Kemalism, while adopting the market economy, did not accept conflicts of interest but instead emphasised the integrative aspects of the division of labour. Anti-liberalism remained an intellectual posture, propagated by the bureaucrat-bourgeois bloc. Notions of public interest were located in the "national will" or the "collective conscience" which nonetheless transcended particular groups and individuals (Sunar, 1974: 63-4). It is important to mention that this approach makes the concept of particular interests within authority disappear. Hence, the demands of people in the political system lose their importance, while governors claim to act on behalf of the idealised moral entity of the nation, but not that of people. The result was the denial of multi-party politics since the interests of the people were one and harmonious, and the people were by and large equally poor. As a result, everyone needed the encouragement and the protection of the only representative of the national interest, the Republican People's Party. Therefore, the RPP became the unquestionable patron of Turkish politics until 1946.

However, the RPP was not a monolithic representative of harmonious interests. Apart from the interest of civil-military bureaucrats, it had to incorporate the

interests of the land owners and urban commercial bourgeoisie into its structural premises. The political order, therefore, was much more the function of an accommodation of these three social groups. For the local notables, the central bureaucracy did not pose any threat to their local power and, in turn, they did not oppose to a large extent the cultural reform programme of the RPP. They had benefited from policies which had brought them even more socio-economic power in their respective communities (for example, laws which provided private control over previously state-owned lands). The central bureaucracy, which had retained its power due to a monopoly over governmental positions, claimed to derive its legitimacy from national representation and leadership. In other words, the recognition of the notables' authority was exchanged for the acceptance of the bureaucrats' leadership position. This implies that the state, which was reformist in terms of cultural life, did not aim to change existing social relationships overall. Rather, it took measures to create a national industrial bourgeoisie and to safeguard the conditions of existence for the reproduction of capitalist relations. Its role as the sole proprietor of political power was to generate a new impetus for the accumulation of capital, oversee the general development process, intervene when necessary in accordance with the interests of private capital and guide foreign capital, which is the subject of the next section.

4.2. State Capitalism and the Rise of the Democratic Party

The victory of the Democrat Party (DP) in the general election of 1950 has been treated as a turning point in Turkish democratic experience, since political power significantly changed hands through free elections after three decades of single

party rule. It was not a simple transfer of power from one party to another (Karpas 1972; Sunar 1974; Ahmad 1977). By 1946 several parties had emerged to challenge the political supremacy of the RPP. Shortly thereafter, the DP rose to power. With regard to the rise of the DP, there are two views about the reasons behind this transition, although both are some way from providing a convincing explanation. The first argues in favour of the DP that the shift in power was a victory for democracy and individual liberties, which had previously been held under dictatorial control by a repressive government. It is true that, as Sunar indicates, the RPP governments had curtailed political liberties, jailed opponents, and in general acted in a dictatorial fashion. However, these reasons are not sufficient to explain the shift because significant questions remain to be answered. The founding of the DP was the project of business circles and large landowning families who had been in coalition with the bureaucrats since the establishment of the Republic. They had been supporters of the nationalist bureaucracy (1974: 66). The second argument suggests, in favour of the RPP, that the RPP stood for popular interests and progress against a handful of capitalists who were trying to exploit the common people. The opposition to the nationalist and progressive bureaucracy was, therefore, a backward movement organized by capitalists. They succeeded when they were able to identify their parochial interests with democracy and the general welfare. But it is not true that the central bureaucracy stood for the interest of the population at large against these commercial and landed interests. On the contrary, popular opposition to the RPP proved to be highly militant and widespread. The new Democrat Party was, at the first real opportunity, overwhelmingly supported by popular consent. An adequate answer for this transition can be given with reference to the political economy of the period

between 1923 and 1950. The problem is one of identifying the location of core capital within the class structure of society and understanding its relationship to the state and dominant classes, as mentioned above.

4.2.1. *The Political Economy of the Single-Party Era*

At the founding of the Republic in 1923, Turkey was a predominantly agricultural country with an economy devastated by the war, especially with regard to the labour force. The overwhelming mass of the population lived in the countryside as peasants, wholly engaged in the production of foodstuffs and the raising of livestock, as mentioned in the previous chapter. Radical shifts in the political balance of power coincided with turning points in the world's economic and political order, when a new set of constraints came into play and a local accommodation of these external developments was on the agenda. The relationship between the world economy and the national one while integrating into the world capitalist system⁴¹ was very direct. It was as a result of the 1930s depression that economic reconstruction allowed bureaucratic control to achieve centrality. The bureaucracy could opt for a politically directed national economy in the inter-war period because of the dismantling of the world order. However, the distinctive features of industrialization policies in the post 1929 period in each developing country depended on how the roles of the state and the industrial bourgeoisie were

41

The World System sees the development of Third World capitalism in terms of the main internal contradictions that characterize its mode of production as part of the development of world production. The processes of the capitalist system are such that boom and crisis periods are reproduced in national arenas, although the political and ideological accommodations of these are naturally specific. The turning points of the world economy are crucial, because at such junctures particular local social groups and their political projects gain greater importance and help to determine the subsequent balance of forces (I. Wallerstein (1979) *The Capitalist World Economy*; A. G. Frank (1980) *Crisis in the World Economy*; and S. Amin (1976) *Unequal Development: An Essay on the Social Formulation of Peripheral Capitalism*).

reconciled. In countries that had an important industrial sector before 1929, further industrialization was based on the expansion of private enterprise. But even in those economies, the state created new areas of investment concentrated around heavy industry and infrastructural works. In others, like Turkey, the state apparatus was used to form an industrial class, which would eventually share an entrepreneurial function with the state⁴².

The lack of capacity and incentive on the part of private capital in investing in the development of industry was partly due to the fact that the import and export trade provided easier and quicker profits. The negative effects of the world economic crisis in 1929 led to an import-substitution economic policy, coupled with a strong corporatist state. It was the state, in the name of *etatism*, that assumed a major economic role in promoting economic development. The absence of a landed oligarchy in the agrarian structure and the prior expulsion of a majority of the Christian bourgeoisie during and after World War I meant that the bureaucracy derived its power solely from its position in the state structure and its unchallenged authority. Whatever remained of the bourgeoisie was too weak to constitute a class with an autonomous stance against bureaucracy. It was either the bureaucracy or groups within the bourgeoisie who, through their conflict, defined the parameters of state policies, administrative forms and the political regime. Nationalism helped to integrate the interests of these various groups as a result of the low degree of social differentiation. The peasants and the considerably small numbers of workers entered into this picture only indirectly, and their position was

42

See F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto (1979) *Dependency and Development in Latin America*, for more detail on state corporatism with reference to Latin America.

determined by the outcome of the struggle for supremacy rather than by their own political activity (Keyder, 1987: 2-4). Under the circumstances, the bureaucracy became very influential in centralising the distribution and reallocation of resources. Since it was concentrated in the large metropolitan centres, relatively better organised than other groups in society with developed lines of communication, the bureaucratic stratum functioned as a class with its own political-economic project. The ideologically and politically well-established state, represented by the RPP, gave full support to the development of the industrial bourgeoisie despite opposition from agricultural and commercial capital, which saw itself as the backbone of the economy and liberalism as its ideological guide.

The essential principle was to provide the necessary conditions for the accelerated accumulation of primary capital, and to ensure its transfer to industrial production through the instrumentality of the party-state. Available capital resources were reallocated by the interventionist state. Forming new industrial enterprises and passing them on to private capital was to be the means of creating and maintaining the conditions of existence for the development of an industrial bourgeoisie. In so doing, the liberal foreign trade regime and fiscal and monetary structures, which were intact before the 1929 depression, were revised in order to protect Turkish interests. The state initiated central planning for economic development and acted as the primary instrument in the accumulation of private capital by establishing industry and creating intermediary positions for the commercial classes. Under the policy of state capitalism, a series of state-holding enterprises were established to finance public investments in textiles, mining and other industrial areas. The aim was to create an industrial class that would be

capable of being the backbone of the country's development. *Etatism* did not include agriculture, but rather restricted itself to the sphere of industry. Commercial groups were the beneficiaries of state investment since they were not only protected and encouraged, but were also given concessionary positions for providing raw material and distributing state refined goods. The bureaucrats used their power to establish economic interests of their own within society. A large number of them joined the commercial bourgeoisie and used their commercial and concessionary earnings to become landowners as well.⁴³ *Etatism* meant the policy of industrialization as conceived within the parameters of society but without the political institutions proper to such a society. Under the guise of a novel social system, a political elite and an emerging bourgeoisie joined forces to isolate a national economic space for themselves in which heavy oppression of the working class and exploitation of the agricultural sector would allow for rapid accumulation. All this was achieved under an ideology of national solidarity that, as mentioned earlier, denied the existence of conflicting class interests in favour of a corporatist model of society. While the growing bourgeoisie allied itself with the bureaucracy, which was the tool of the RPP, the opposition expressed itself in the formation of the Free Party in 1930. However, it was closed shortly after on the grounds that it fed disintegrative tendencies against the Republic and the state had to apply increasingly aggressive measures to repress the growing opposition. The

43

The founding entrepreneurs in 74.2 percent of all firms established between 1931 and 1940 were bureaucrats. This high figure shows the bureaucracy's growing share in national income and the opportunities it had enjoyed in public contracts and land speculation in the growing capital city (Keyder, 1987: 106). The novel called *Ankara*, by Y. K. Karaosmaoglu, narrates growing economic competitions and land speculations in Ankara among bureaucrats with reference to their understanding of modernity. *Ankara* portrays an enormous gap between the social life of bureaucrats and that of average residents, and their geographical segregation, as general public was forbidden to wander around the city centre with what was called then the "peasants' dresses", such as baggy trousers. Even a police patrol was provided around the city centre to prevent any violation of this rule.

industrialization process created population movement towards the cities. Opportunities for the economy to incorporate the masses through industrialization and the state's ability to incorporate them politically had, however, been structurally and ideologically limited (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 62-64). The developmental model gave the state the role of maximizing the interest of the national bourgeoisie. In this context, the state performed a double function: anti-imperialist gesturing and disciplining of the labour force. As a result of the relatively weak position of the working class, the trade unions, which had no right to strike, were absorbed into the state apparatus. The intensification of the exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach accelerated the growth of economic inequality and social polarization.

The economic practice of state capitalism led to an increase in industrial production, and therefore the interests of the two groups seemed to coincide in a period when the growth of a domestic productive sector increased political control over the economy, a result which the bureaucratic class naturally desired. Yet there was a tension in the alliance born out of the competing claims of state capitalism and the market economy. During World War II, the alliance within the power block started to diminish, in part because the RPP, which was lacking any popular base and was a party of the bureaucratic and professional strata, attempted to alter the balance of power between the urban and rural classes by undermining the position of agricultural capital and therefore creating potential of threat to the existing order. Throughout the war, people on fixed incomes became poorer while those engaged in trade and industry grew richer. The peasant masses had been economically deprived and found themselves unable to maintain

their earlier levels of consumption. The severe disparity between the wealthy and the poor peasantry induced the Government to attempt to gain the favour of the latter by placing a land reform proposal before the Parliament (Sarıbay, 1991: 120). However, there was no pressure from below for land reform, and the problems in the agricultural sector were not linked to shortage of land. Rather, it was the shortage of the labour force and the necessary tools for production in agriculture, which was the problem with the war because the government had adopted a policy of mobilisation by which close to one million male adults were taken out of the labour force, most of them from agriculture; draught animals were confiscated for military use; and most agricultural inputs became impossible. The policies aimed at incorporating agricultural production into the process of generalised commodity production resulted in turning substantial sections of the landed interests away from the RPP. In the war period, the state faced a decline in its revenue in terms of taxes and duties due to a sharp decrease in the importing of capital goods (Sunar, 1974: 68-73). The war economy as managed by the RPP was characterized by black market dealings in essential items, shortages and rising prices. Merchants, industrialists and those fractions of agricultural capital keeping up with the rapidly changing situation benefited largely from the uneven implementation of *etatist* policies during the war period and its aftermaths. The *etatist* policies of the RPP had been successful in the creation of a capitalist class and the monopolistic control of state power. However, this newly accumulated wealth then the source of investment in industry and agriculture, and led the commercial bourgeoisie, with the support of capitalist farmers, to demand more direct participation in the use of state power, the re-implementation of liberal economic measures and the opening of the Turkish economy to world markets.

This meant generating an alliance between domestic private capital and foreign capital, and breaking up the alliance with the bureaucracy. (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 68-7). However, the revenue of the state remained static and inadequate during the war period. The result was an increase in taxes. A heavy wealth tax was levied in 1942, which aimed to place the burden on the profiteers, intermediaries and businessmen who had benefited most from the war economy. Non-Muslims were assessed at ten times the Muslim rate and the converts at twice. The wealth tax and the proposed land reform brought the urban commercial groups and large landowners together. Between the years 1940 and 1942, the state further expanded its control of economy by the introduction of new laws. For example, the expropriation of industrial and mining enterprises and lands of over 500 hectares, in return for suitable compensation, was allowed if the government saw it to be necessary. All these were, of course, open to spoils. The bureaucracy, which was involved in private transactions itself, had the power to canalize the concentration of wealth in selected hands and to create monopolies. All possible oppressive apparatuses were used to maintain order. The Democrat Party was formed by dissidents from the RPP in 1946 under these above-mentioned circumstances.

4.2.2. The Democrat Party

The Democrat Party sought electoral support on two grounds: religious and economic. The issue of religious freedom and democracy became almost an obsession in the years after 1945. Ahmad points out that the secularist policies of the RPP could be presented as anti-democratic, since the freedom of conscience of the Muslim majority was being violated. However, there was no call for an end

to secularism (1991: 9). The DP did not devastate the foundation of the Republic, but it obviously adopted the policy of secularism, though a moderate one. There was no question of returning to Islamic law, for instance. It was demonstrated then that true secularism had never been implemented in Turkey, and that what the country had experienced was the control of every aspect of religion by the state. This, in fact, has been the central argument of Islamist discourse in Turkey. However, given growing opposition to the ruling party, the RPP began a programme of religious liberalization during the transition to competitive party politics in the late 1940s. This included the establishment of Prayer Leaders and Preachers' Schools (*Imam Hatips*) to teach Islam and train the modern clergy, the opening of the Faculty of Theology in Ankara, the reopening of sacred tombs to the public and making foreign exchange available for the pilgrimage to Mecca. Under the rule of the DP, one significant religious gain was made by the so-called "Islamic opposition": the permission to re-recite *Ezan* in Arabic. The DP's liberal attitude towards religious issues led to, for example, an increase in mosque building, the publication of religious books and the overt revival of the religious brotherhood organisations which had gone underground during the single-party regime (Karpat, 1972: 353). It can clearly be argued that such changes affected neither the secular character of the Republic nor the essentially secular character of political discourse. It seems that society used religious issues to challenge the legitimacy of the state and express disaffection with and hostility to the single-party regime in religious terms, since almost every possible means of publicly expressing opposition had been forbidden or censored. Religion or religious issues appeared in the political agenda as the voice of people who had been excluded from the political system.

With respect to economic issues, the leaders of the DP represented either the interests of commercial capital or those of agricultural capital. The DP demanded the opening up of the Turkish economy to world markets and believed that the role of the state should be confined to the provision of infrastructural services. The DP attempted to win the support of the masses, most of whom were engaged in agriculture, by offering economic incentives such as credits, subsidies and road building programmes. The leader of the DP, Menderes, appeared to reflect the chief interests and fears of the leading social groups in small towns and among big farmers. These groups, in comparison to the urban bureaucratic stratum, which had undergone an ideological and cultural transformation, had maintained their cultural and religious roots and felt a strong sense of continuity with their past (Karpat, 1988: 138-9). Elite opposition to the *etatist* policies of the bureaucracy therefore converged with popular discontent. The peasantry and urban worker class, who had borne the burden of economic policies, were more than willing to support a new government promising new policies such as a free market economy, democratic rights and religious freedom. In other words, the DP brought together various constituencies of opposition who rejected the monopoly of the RPP, although in the long run, the interests of those would be in conflict with each other.

The DP policies were geared to increasing the power and influence of emerging new entrepreneurial groups and of the special class of countryside merchant landowners. On the one hand, under the rule of the DP throughout the 1950s, the economy was experiencing a rapid change in its character from an agrarian economy to one in which commerce and industry were becoming dominant. The DP policies gave incentives for the improvement of the means of agricultural

production. The countryside was opened up with roads, buses, tractors and credits. A liberal model was put into effect and a national economy was created for foreign goods. But the agricultural expansion, aided by the favourable price conjuncture of the Korean War, was undermined by fluctuations in agricultural output due to weather conditions and a decline in foreign demand by 1954. It became clear that exclusive dependence on agricultural exports would be an insufficient base on which to finance an increasing demand for imported goods. There was a decrease in the usable component of foreign grants, credits and aid, since a large percentage of these were used for debt servicing. This led the DP to opt for inflationary finance of agriculture via credits, price support programmes and growing public investment, in order to extend the economic boom. The liberal trade regime was abandoned due to difficulties in balancing external payments, and some of the statist measures of control were readopted in 1954. The political authority, through complicated systems of tariffs and quotas controlled the nature and quality of imports and therefore decided on the extension of market privileges to chosen manufacturers. In the short term, under the import restrictions and protections the industrial sector began to grow faster than agriculture. Yet in the long term, the industrial capital was not happy with the petty bourgeois market ideology of the DP. In the post-war years, a new model of accumulation was needed by the nationally based manufacturing bourgeoisie and its international links. Though the DP government had always denounced any statist policy, it agreed to implement a stabilisation programme, set by the World Bank and the OECD. This meant a policy of import substitution by planning, in exchange for continuing aid. In fact, an overt policy of industrialisation accompanied by the import-substitution model began to be implemented by its central planning

organisation after the military coup in 1960. Therefore, military intervention promised a planned allocation of scarce resources in the service of rapid development, and responded to foreign pressures as well as to discontent among various strata of urban public opinion, all of which served to promote the project of industrial capital (Keyder, 1987: 132-5). The rise and fall of the DP marked a new stage in the transformation of Turkish capitalism. By the 1950s politics was opened up for an overt class struggle among the different factions of the capitalist class, industrial, financial, commercial and agricultural. Given the rapid accumulation of industrial and financial capital, these factions had been able to establish their economic dominance, although they had to share state power with the agricultural and commercial factions at the political level.

On the other hand, the policies of DP led to a rapid growth in the size of the new economic middle class, and to inflation that not only reduced purchasing power, but also diminished the prestige and influence of the military-civilian bureaucracy. It is important to emphasise that the DP's actions *vis-a-vis* the military were not sufficient in themselves to provoke a military takeover, although there was an open display of hostility toward the military's informal linkage with the RPP. The DP did not try to downgrade the role of the military and bureaucracy. Yet one important issue is that much of the political history of the 1950s is marked by a steady decline in the bureaucratic stratum and a rise in the representation of the professional and economic contingent in the parliament. Frey shows that when the DP first challenged the RPP in 1946, there were very significant differences in the social background of deputies between the two parties. Whereas only 6 percent of the DP's deputies were bureaucrats, the figure for the RPP was 39 percent . In

1923, approximately 55 percent of the RPP deputies were bureaucrats, with this figure declining to 45 percent by 1943. (1975: 56-60).

The removal of the DP's government from the power has certain parallels with later incidents in 1971, 1980 and 1997 in terms of the rhetoric applied. For example, the RPP accused the DP of destroying the legacy of Atatürk. The argument against the DP was that it was unfit to govern, despite the preferences of voters for the party, because it was "anti-democratic, reactionary, conservative (in terms of attitude towards religion), and anti-secularist". The RPP challenged the DP through political demonstrations, in which the students of the military academy also took part. The DP's attempts to silence such opposition and its threats to close down the RPP led to a covert call in 1960 by the leader of the RPP, İsmet İnönü, for the military to intervene in politics to "save democracy". Soon after the intervention, the DP's deputies were arrested and tried; some landlords were put into special detention camps; a committee was established to inquire into the sources of the wealth of the DP members and its sympathizers; and finally the prime minister, Menderes, and two of his ministers were hanged. Within a few months of the intervention, the government was once again in the hands of the RPP. The military rule of 1960 was from the beginning a great example of wide cooperation and intercourse with civilians who overwhelmingly belonged to the cadres of the RPP. The old ruling coalition was restored to power and expected to gain legitimacy in the election of 1961. However, the Justice Party (JP), the successor to the DP, won the majority but was not allowed to form a government until 1965. Instead, the RPP formed a series of weak governments. The JP's elected governments in 1965 and 1969 were effectively prevented from exercising their mandate by a series of

measures by the RPP's statist-elitist intelligentsia. The JP was designated unfit to govern, as it framed the concept of "modernity" and "progress" in empirical and economic terms while its opponents had an ideological-cultural concept of "modernity" associated with Westernisation (Karpas, 1981: 14). In the meantime, the military stood by as the faithful supporter of the RPP, which was still regarded as the only party that could implement the new Constitution in 1961 and maintain the principles of Kemalism. Since the 1960s, military interventions have been justified as necessary to reestablish order and stability as well as to safeguard democracy and the state from self-serving and corrupt politicians. Therefore, the crucial question to be answered is "under what circumstances and in whose interest does the army break the democratic rules to which it claims to be committed, and act on its own initiative?"

4.2.3. The Military as a Political Functionary

The Turkish military has overtly intervened in politics three times since the establishment of the Republic either by direct takeovers as in 1960 and 1980 or by issuing ultimatums to the elected government and replacing it with the one of technocrats appointed by the military directly as in 1971. The recent intervention in February 1997 through the National Security Council may be called a covert military coup, since the military, without overtly seizing the reins of government, exercised a power of veto behind the scenes and pioneered the establishment of a new government by political parties which were trusted with the state ideology.

The military involvement in politics and the patterns it employs after seizing power are often explained or justified within the literature from a culturalist point of view, with reference to the history and tradition of military institutions and the legacy of Atatürk. For example, Tachau and Heper argue that

the Turks are heirs to Muslim culture which recognizes and accepts the legitimacy of the military as an arm of the community... the Quran declares that those who are martyred in defence of the community of the faithful are guaranteed automatic and immediate access to eternal paradise (1983: 18).

The legacy of Atatürk, the formal separation of the army from politics, which also permits military action against elected authority on behalf of the “welfare of the people”, is somewhat contradictory. It forbids serving army officers to play any part in the legislature, on the one hand, though, on the other hand, it encourages them to think of themselves as the ultimate guard of the Atatürk reformism (Hale, 1988: 160). In fact, the former does not seem to have validity. In fact, the channels for the military to reach the highest authority of the state were kept intact during the single-party era since the regime was assured of the military backing for its reform programme and the power of the military has been constitutionalised since the 1960 coup.

The military interventions in Turkey cannot be understood in terms of cultural peculiarities or the tradition of the military. Some of the highlighted issues which are supposed to have provoked any military takeover are: economic crisis; rapidly increasing foreign debt; intra-elite conflict; political polarization; and political violence. But it is important to emphasize that these can be contributory, but not sufficient conditions for any *coup d'état*. The shortcoming within such explanations is that the use of state power by the military, as a political actor, is tied to its

alleged pursuit of “collective goals”, or modernisation. The mode of modernisation is set by Kemalism, and therefore it has legitimate authority, which is asserted by its tradition, culture and position in the modernisation process as the initial receiver and implementor of reform programmes. Such an approach dissociates the use of power by the military from conflicts of interests, and therefore conceives it as the most committed institution for the effective pursuit of the “general interest”, which is conceptualised upon an assumed consensus on the behalf of society . The linking of the primary use of state power by the military to authority and “collective goals” assumes that such power is a system property. This ignores the fact that the “collective goals” are the outcome of a negotiated order based upon conflicts between parties holding differential levels of power. They serve to reinforce the position of the military within the power structure by granting it a functional explanation.⁴⁴ However, any analysis should take into account the mode of capitalist development and the role and the position of the military within the ruling-class structure.

The military has been committed to the preservation of the undisputed dominance of industrial and financial capital at the political level, despite the fact that this meant the suspension of the democratic regime in almost every decade since 1960.⁴⁵ Since the early 1950s, the military itself has had growing commercial and industrial interests and has become a significant interest group. The OYAK (Army

44

For a discussion of the conceptualisation of power, see S. Lucas (1974) *Power: A Radical View*.

45

The mode of economic development that secured the economic and political dominance of industrial and financial capital, but were challenged by other factions of capital from the 1960s onwards is analysed in the next chapter with reference to the rise of the National Salvation Party in the 1970s.

Mutual Aid Society) was initially set up after the 1960 intervention to create a pension programme that would protect officers from the economic insecurity they had suffered during the rapid inflation of the 1950s. This was soon transformed into the country's largest and most diversified industrial corporation, investing in automotive, cement, insurance, communication and more (Bianchi, 1984: 70-1). The integration of the top officers into the Turkish military-industrial complex was further strengthened with the establishment of an arms industry. By the time of the 1971 and 1980 interventions, the senior commanders were an integral part of the ruling structure (Ahmad 1987). Since then large resources have been allocated to the development of a defence industry. Its establishment has been costly to a great extent, since it has relied heavily on the importation of technology and essential components, and has had a limited export market, although it was justified on the grounds of its spillover effects on other sectors of the economy in the long term.⁴⁶ Although a number of private firms have been allowed to enter the sector, the military has monopolised the industry. More than three quarters of the 23 leading companies in arms production are controlled by the various departments of the military bureaucracy. For example, ASELSAN (Military Electronic Industry), which was established in 1975, is largely owned by the Armed Forces Foundation. Sezgin (1997) indicates that the defence industry, as one of the developing sectors in the economy, will be an essential part of the industrial sector and production in the future.

46

The growth rate of defence expenditure has averaged 6.2 percent annually, although the GNP in recent decade has been 5.2 percent. Turkey has allocated 5 percent of her GNP to the defence expenditure since the 1960s, although for health and education, the figures have been just about 2 percent. The figure for the defence expenditure is 21.7 percent of the central government budget. However, this does not include other sources outside the central government budget (Sezgin, 1997: 384).

The military interventions have reinforced the fact that politics is not only constrained, but is also under the control of the state. All military interventions since 1960 have displayed the similar aim of delineating an arena for the state (bureaucrats) as opposed to the realm of politics. For example, the Constitution of 1961 legitimized the political influence of the bureaucratic intelligentsia by prohibiting sole emphasis from being placed on the "national will". It pitted the civil-military bureaucratic elite against the representatives in the parliament, which ended its theoretical supremacy. A juridical concept of state, placing greater faith in the rule of law, replaced that of one in the rule of parliament (Heper, 1988: 6-7). The 1982 Constitution, which was written under the military regime, has also asserted the supremacy of the state over the realm of politics, and placed constraints on the political system to prevent it from losing control of the state over to the governing institutions. The state has been unquestionably represented by the military elite, the so-called "principal interpreter of the general interest", and has been restructured in accordance with the restructuring of the economy in order to allow the dominant interest to monopolise state power and limit the access of the commercial and agricultural factions to power (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 235). Accordingly, the execution of state power is located in the office of the President, by granting enormous direct power. The presidential post had almost traditionally been seen as the top echelon in the army career until the presidency of Ozal in 1990, with the exception that of Celal Bayar, who was the leader of the DP in the 1950s. The judiciary was restructured to complement the reorganisation of the state apparatus, which meant the demolition of the means of controlling state power by citizens through legislative and judicial process. Ultimately, the political choice of citizens has been subordinated to "the needs and existence of the state".

Such dominance meant the further incorporation of the military into the political decision-making process after each military intervention, i.e. the institutionalisation of power. As Özbudun (1996) indicates, each military regime had prepared the ground for an “exit guarantee” under the new constitution after its departure from power. The National Security Council, granted constitutional status by the Constitution of 1961, has reached the stage of continuing interference and influence in politics to an important extent and attained a constitutional office for its Secretariat (NSCS). The NSC was set up after the 1960 intervention to act as a consultative body to civil authority on matters concerning national security, internal and external. It was dominated by civil members. However, the 1971 intervention and the Constitution of 1982 improved the status of the NSC in terms of its status *vis-a-vis* the government. The new constitution balanced the numbers of civilian and military members. The NSC is therefore composed of five civilian, including the President, and five military members. The recruited members of the NSC have the same status as the elected members. It is an authority over the government since its recommendations to the cabinet are not “advisory” but “mandatory”. The NSC provides an institutionalized channel for the military access to the top level of political authority. What is important is that the military is dominant in the Council in comparison to its civilian members, who include the president, the prime minister and the ministers of interior, defence and foreign affairs. Besides the well-established guardian role of the army, the post-1980 pattern in particular appears to be one of, in theory, “shared” decision-making in “security matters”, the framework of which is principally drawn up by the military. This, therefore, gives it a leadership position in working out its response, with a near-remote possibility of being questioned about that role by civilian politicians.

The existence and nature of the NSC and the NSCS indicate that the top military officers are not only bureaucrats in their own rights, but also constitutionally recognised political actors with a stake in the economy. Accordingly, the NSCS was granted autonomous status within the civil authority by the Constitution of 1982, and given enormous legal authority over the legislative and executive bodies. For example, the Secretary has the mandate to act independently from the prime minister and command public as well as private institutions in order to enforce policies drawn by the NSC, the content of which can override security matters. The concept of “national security” matters is defined in very abstract terms, and is therefore open to interpretation under existing circumstances. The military was directly involved in the maintenance of the social and political order, which included a dense traffic between the senior levels of military bureaucracy and high political offices when the Welfare Party was in power. This is explained with the two case studies in chapters six and seven.

Chapter 5: The Rise of an "Islamist" Party to Power in Continuing Capitalist Development: The Welfare Party

The preceding chapter gave an overview of the divergence of capitalist classes within the development of state capitalism, and their relation to the state with reference to the Democrat Party. This chapter continues to look at capitalist development since the 1960s, in order to show that, though the phenomenon of "Islamism", as a product of modernity, is a multi-faceted phenomenon, an analysis of the emergence and relative success of an "Islamist" party which has run for power in a relatively democratic political setting, albeit under different names, should concentrate on the competition over the allocation of public resources within a national developmental model, and identify the strains and inequalities of the ongoing development process. This chapter answers the question "why did the right-wing politics once represented by the Democrat Party split when capitalist development gained significant momentum?", as signified by the establishment of an Islamist party that would eventually become an important part of opposition to conventional politics in the decades after the 1960s. It is argued that, although the NOP and later the NSP have been identified with the struggle upon the allocation

of public resources of so-called “Muslim” (Anatolian) bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie, the Welfare Party, with its populist discourse that employed an Islamist rhetoric and focussed upon a harmonious and “just” society promoted by an egalitarian approach to social welfare and economic development, managed to capture the votes of trans-class based electors in a period in which the shortcomings of the developmental state in general and the failures of mainstream political parties in particular, in meeting popular demands (of urban and rural lower classes) for economic redistribution, social justice and freedom, created widespread dissatisfaction. Since the general thrust of development policy has been on immediate “sacrifice” in order to achieve higher rates of savings and investments, the social welfare of lower classes has been a neglected issue. The chapter argues that the articulation of demands for “equality” within a framework of religious rhetoric helped the Welfare Party to differentiate itself within the right-wing; to identify the experiments with state capitalism with hegemonic classes; and to represent its stance as one working from below against oppression, corruption and exploitation. This draws attention to the fact that it was not religion which determined the course of political action, but vice versa.

Before moving on further, a few remarks on the right and left division should be made. It is not easy to divide parties in Turkey into groups between or within the left or right wings of politics, such as centre-left or centre-right, and extreme left or extreme right. Though such divisions may be convenient for the purpose of comparison, it does not accurately represent the parties.⁴⁷ Diminishing ideological

47

See Schmuelewitz (1996) “Urbanization and Voting for the Turkish Parliament”, for such a classification without sufficient explanation as to why the political parties are divided along such lines.

differences, populist manifestations and a trans-class base for electoral support of political parties make it difficult to associate parties with either wing of the political spectrum. The populist claim by political parties that they represent all strata of society is reflected to an extent in their electoral support, which comes from various social groups, though each does not have a homogenous character and has conflicting interests with regard to the allocation of public resources.⁴⁸ This is to say, there are certain overlaps in the classification of parties. For example, in some studies, such as Schmuelewitz (1996), while one type of nationalism (Turkish) is identified with the extreme-right (NAP), another type (Kurdish) is often associated with the extreme-left (PDP). Similarly, though religious parties are classified as extreme-right (WP), it is not clear to what extent parties could make use of religious issues, and still be strictly acknowledged within the centre-left or centre-right (RPP or TPP and MP). With reference to economic policies, considering the relations of production for an open and dependent periphery economy, the difference among parties lies mainly in their populist rhetoric rather than their policy implementations while in office. Additionally, it should be emphasized that political parties could and do change their position by moving towards either direction within the political spectrum. They can seek or break alliances with power blocks in their political struggle, for

48

For example, a study which used a nationally representative sample and was carried out before the 1977 election found that the perception of the respondents as to whom each party represented provides interesting findings. Though the JP was associated mostly with the landlords (77.2 percent), merchants (76.4 percent), industrial capitalists (60.1percent), and small business and craftsmen (51.3 percent), it also received considerable attention (about 40 percent) in terms of representing the peasantry, while the RPP scored 45percent in the same category. In the case of workers and public servants respectively the JP scored 27 percent and 31 percent, while the RPP had 59 percent and 56 percent (Ergüder and Özgediz 1977, in Sarıbay, 185: 180). It is important to emphasize that the timing of the survey was crucial since it was carried out when the RPP, under the leadership of Ecevit, had been campaigning on social democracy and its "left of centre" identity, claiming to represent lower income groups and attempting to break its ties with large landowners.

example as the MP has moved towards the left and the DLP towards the right in the 1990s.

It can be argued that the position of party ideologies on the political spectrum depends in general on their attitude towards two central features of modernity: how favourable they are to “the rise of the masses”, or the role of the people in political and social life; and how positively they evaluate the schema of rational and radical construction of society. Ideologies that give a positive value to popular power, to extending the bounds of participation in political (and later economic) life, and to giving affirmative answers to the projects of rational social reconstruction, can be assigned to the left of the spectrum (Schwarzmantel, 1998: 67). When this definition is applied to Turkish politics, there is no clear-cut division between the right and the left. Although populism has been given various interpretations and approaches, as mentioned before, the populist nature of Turkish politics, leads to a conclusion that rhetorically both the right and the left have a positive approach to the expansion of political participation and the rise of the masses. However, this does not necessarily mean the democratization of politics. For the right, mass participation has been instrumental in gaining legitimacy for its political struggle. Therefore, since the 1946 election the right has claimed to represent “the will of the people”, while the left has envisaged its legitimacy within the principles of the Republic, except for the late 1960s and the 1970s when the left attempted to differentiate itself from Kemalism. It can be stated that the conventional right and left division in Turkey finds its expression to an extent in the empirical and economic concept of modernity versus the ideological and cultural concept of modernity. The latter is articulated in the policy

of “laicism”, which in the Turkish context means the strict control of religion by the state as outlined before. As the left associates itself with Kemalism, which has been redefined after each military intervention in order to provide such takeovers with legitimacy and is now exclusively equated with republicanism (rather than democracy) and the strict implementation of secularist policies, it willingly or unwillingly overlaps with the “militant” secularist approach. This denies any meaningful participation of heterogeneous identities in social and political life, and represents an aspiration to (primarily culturally) transform society according to “modern values”, which is mainly understood to mean Westernization. The left therefore finds itself in collaboration with bureaucratic modernising projects which are concentrated over the transformation of cultural (or religious) lifestyles, rather than the relations of production in society. In this context, the right claims to have traditionally represented “what belongs to the people” (identity and culture), i.e. the people’s will, against “the general will” formulated by the modernising elite, and sees this as the basis for its legitimacy in its search for power. However, this does not mean that the right unconditionally accepts plurality within the people’s culture and identity, and aims to inclusively represent them in the political sphere. Rather, these are unilaterally and exclusively defined from one perspective to another. In addition, the right often overlaps with the left in terms of social-engineering, although they diverge on aims. Therefore, for both the right and the left, politics is to a larger extent about the justification of elitist and authoritarian tendencies. In this context, mass participation in politics is the means of claiming justification for such political actions.

5.1. The Route that Led to the Welfare Party

In the aftermath of the 1960 intervention, the Justice Party to a large extent replaced the Democrat Party, to compete with the Republican People's Party, which was popularly identified with urban intellectuals and bureaucrats (Özbudun, 1987). Although, there was more than one party on the right-wing (see Table 2), the Justice Party served until 1970 as the mass party of the right, embodying many interest groups including urban businessmen, industrial workers, and big landlords as well as small farmers and landless peasants. However, the right experienced its first split prior to the 1950 election. The Nation Party (NP) was formed in 1948 by a group of dissident Democrats, although it did not gain any electoral success. It changed its name first to the Republican Nation Party, and then to the Republican Peasant Nation Party (RPNP) in the 1950s. After the military takeover in 1960, a group within the party left due to intra-elite rivalry and reestablished the NP. The RPNP changed its name and its orientation under the leadership of Alparslan Türkeş in 1969, and was known afterwards as the National Action Party (NAP), whose ideology combined ethnic nationalism and anti-communism with strongly *etatist* policies. Secondly, the New Turkey Party (NTP) was established in 1961 by a number of former Democrats and competed with the Justice Party (JP) for the votes of the Democrat Party. The split between the JP and the NTP did not signify any ideological conflict. The NTP claimed to represent the same social groups as the JP. Yet it finally merged with the JP in 1973 after the general election. Lastly, both the Democratic Party (DeP) and the "Islamist" National Order Party (NOP) were formed in 1970. Though the DeP did relatively well in the election of 1973, especially in provinces where commercial agriculture had developed, its later electoral strength declined sharply in favour of the JP. As

the short-lived NOP was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court after the 1971 military intervention, on the grounds that it violated the secularist principles of the Republic, the National Salvation Party (NSP) in 1972 took its place with the same leadership group.

Table 2: The Distribution of Votes Among the Parties in the General Elections, 1950-1977

Election Years	THE RIGHT BLOCK							THE LEFT BLOCK	
	DP*	NP/RNP/ RPNP/NAP	JP	NTP	RReP	NSP	DeP	RPP	TLP
1950	53.3	3.1	---	---	---	---	---	39.9	---
1954	56.6	4.8	---	---	---	---	---	34.8	---
1957	47.3	7.0	---	---	---	---	---	40.6	---
1961	---	14.0	34.8	13.7	---	---	---	36.7	---
1965	---	2.2	52.9	3.7	---	---	---	28.7	3.0
1969	---	3.0	46.5	2.2	6.6	---	---	27.4	2.7
1973	---	3.4	29.8	---	5.3	11.8	11.9	33.3	---
1977	---	6.4	36.9	---	1.9	8.6	1.9	41.4	0.1

*Political parties of the both left and right are ordered according to their first appearance in politics.
Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives, Results by Provinces, 1977, by the State Statistics Institute (1978).

In the 1960s, the developmental state pursued the implementation of import-substitution policies (ISI) within the statist mode of expansion. The mode of development was heavily dependent upon the initiative of the state and coercive power of the state. The general thrust of development policy, which previously was concerned with increasing "social justice" through immediate improvements in living standards, was on immediate "sacrifice" in order to achieve higher rates of

savings and investments, and therefore was on the “trickle down” approach (Bianchi 1984:142). The introduction of comprehensive five-year development plans, and the establishment of the State Planning Organisation (SPO), in the framework of a mixed economy put the main emphasis upon industrialisation and initiated a major attempt at extending import-substitution through protectionist policies into the intermediate and capital goods categories. The ISI policy was instrumental in the creation of an expanding industrial sector and effecting a transition from a mercantile to an industrial economy, which aimed at the generation of a gradual structural change against agriculture. The ISI policy relied on the administrative allocation of scarce economic resources, such as credits, foreign exchange, import quotas and subsidies. Therefore, the role of the government was crucial in this process. Through the ISI policy, for example the formulation of various importation lists, the bureaucracy, which had a long tradition of state intervention, was brought into closer contact with private sector representatives. The SPO was the central body for the allocation of resources. The state emerged as the main arbiter between the various competing factions of the bourgeoisie, especially industrialists and merchants. It sought to encourage cooperative interest group leaders in the major economic sectors to share the responsibility for implementing development programs. The state attempted to foster collaborative class relationships and coordinate nationwide collective bargaining through vertically structured, quasi-monopolistic associations in the key economic sectors. A collection of weak associations was eager for official recognition and privilege in order to improve their political and economic positions. Therefore, the political activities of voluntary associations were restricted to a considerable degree in order to hinder the emergence of strong bodies that were

outside state control. Accordingly, labour policy constantly sought to delay or control the development of collective action among workers and to isolate the labour movement from all other associations. The use of suppression was one of the means working against the labour movement. Trade unions were incorporated into the state structure as semi-official hierarchical occupational associations, since they were created by legislation. They were supposed to subordinate their own economic and institutional interests to national goals. Official recognition of an association as the authoritative spokesperson for a given factor was granted from above (Bianchi 1984:143-5). As the state was becoming a major distributor of benefits that invariably accrued to specific private interests, the determination of the main beneficiaries became a major public issue. The daily functioning of the ISI mechanism was transformed into a spoils system. In this context, the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchange (TOBB) was the scene for the initial struggles within the private sector, since it possessed the right to allocate foreign exchange and quota lists, and determine the selling price of imported items. The TOBB, which established close links with the JP, regarded import controls as fairly crucial for industrialists, although the merchants within this organisation continued to advocate the liberalisation of the import regime and the prioritisation of agriculture in the economic development strategy. Entrepreneurs who had import permits were able to obtain scarce foreign exchange at the official rate, which was much lower than the market price. They were able to import intermediate goods at prices lower than their market values, with the state subsidising the difference. They enjoyed monopolistic privileges in a protected market. Consequently, large scale production began to develop due to the heavy concentration of resources on the small base of the manufacturing sectors, which

was mainly concentrated in Western Turkey where the infrastructure was found to be more convenient for investment. This was to change the character of industry, which had been dominated by numerous small units scattered across the country, and to deprive the agricultural sector. The conflict between merchants and industrialists in their competition to benefit from the spoils was exposed in terms of opposition between Istanbul and Anatolian capital, which saw itself as the locus of real development (the production of capital goods with indigenous sources of finance), since it relied on national capital and resources, condemned the development policy as favouring an assembly-type industrialisation. Nevertheless, large monopolies and holding companies dominated the economy in a very short time, and economic power was soon concentrated in the hands of the industrial and financial bourgeoisie. The large manufacturing sector became well-established in the economy with healthy returns on investment. Although the programme of the JP included transforming artisans and craftsmen with limited opportunities into medium and big industrialists through a favourable credit system, its governmental performance did not meet the emerging demands of its collective electoral base. Rather, the result was that many small local firms in Anatolia became sub-contractors to larger firms or completely went out of business. Workshop production, however, remained an important sector (Keyder 1979).

Conflicts among the various factions of the bourgeoisie led to the establishment of splinter parties that were to compete for the traditional electoral base of the JP. The splinter parties namely the Democratic Party (DeP) and the National Order Party (NOP), which, with its "Islamist orientation", was the predecessor of the

National Salvation Party (NSP) and the Welfare Party (WP), occurred in this context as an example of increased functional differentiation in order to provide those factions of the bourgeoisie with concessions, while at the same time being able to mobilise various centres of opposition. Emerging political demands which had not been aggregated and integrated by the policies of the JP in the process of a rapid socio-economic development were reflected in secular trends in the fragmentation of the Turkish party system. However, it is important to emphasize that the political aspect of social behaviour was and is not completely institutionalised, organised and instrumental (class-based). For example, in provinces where party loyalties are weaker and independent candidates gain a larger portion of the vote than organised political parties, it is clear that a close community-based personalised style of politics is dominant. Therefore, it is possible to observe sudden changes in party alignments in some provinces from one election to another.

The establishment of the NOP was a result of the intra-elite rivalry that took place at the TOBB. Necmettin Erbakan, a professor of engineering, who was to lead all three parties, the NOP, the NSP and the WP, was elected as chairman of the Industry Office in the TOBB in 1966. For Erbakan, the aim was to provide Anatolian business (the rising petty bourgeoisie) with favourable credits, import quotas and investment incentives. However, his perspectives and proposals on economic policies were disapproved of by the Chambers of Istanbul and Izmir. Finally, his office was vetoed by the Ministry of Trade of the JP's government and Erbakan had to resign. In addition, his candidacy for the JP parliament was also vetoed. But Erbakan managed to be elected as an independent candidate for

Konya in 1969. This was followed by the establishment of the NOP on 26 January 1970. The NOP gained significant weight with its technocratic face of Islamism.⁴⁹ The NOP's manifesto was mainly shaped by the social, economic, political and historical contexts of Turkey, although, it was also influenced by Islamist movements at the time. Erbakan's religious outlook was influenced by the leader of the Nakshibendi religious order then. It is important to emphasise that although the NOP was unable to declare its Islamist identity in print, since all political parties in Turkey had to conform to the secular principles of the Republic, its first congregation was opened with the words "God is great". This was rather unacceptable to secular forces. The NOP drew attention to the fact that there had been a growth in petty bourgeois trade and artisan associations with religious bias as a means of self-defence against the new capitalism of the 1960s. Erbakan articulated their perspective that the opening up of the economy was undermining the traditional socio-economic base of Anatolian society. The NOP's opposition to the JP was not based on industrialisation itself, but on the mode of industrialisation since "development and progress by heavy industrialisation" was one of the preferred measures of the NOP, and later of its successors. It argued that investments in the assembly industry could not break the ties of a satellite economy. It pressed for an even development across the country to diminish regional imbalances. However, the NOP's programme was, in a sense, contradictory (Sarıbay, 1985; 129). Considering that it articulated the views of the diminished traditional middle class, aiming for heavy industrialisation would necessarily mean their degradation. Yet the solution, despite its vagueness, was presented as the insertion of such groups as peasants, workers, civil servants,

49

A structural analysis of the Welfare Party's Islamist manifesto will be given in Chapter seven.

artisans and low income earners into the economic process, by their becoming shareholders in the newly established industrial complexes.

The import-substitution strategy reached its saturation point by the early 1970s, when the expansion of the domestic market had developed as far as possible. Further growth was possible by opening up to the world markets. Therefore, the implementation of an export-oriented strategy in accordance with the restructuring of the international division of labour was the next step. The dissatisfaction of Istanbul-based industrialists with the performance of the TOBB led to the emergence of the Turkish Industrialists' and Businessmen' Association (TÜSİAD), a voluntary organisation, in 1971 in order for them to be able intervene in larger political processes. The TÜSİAD aimed to promote the rapid accumulation of finance capital under industrialists' control at the expense of merchant, banking and agricultural interests, which distinguished their position from that of the multi-functional TOBB. Agricultural and commercial interests and the growing working class were perceived to be obstructing the opening up of the economy. The TÜSİAD campaigned for integration with the world market, although this process of transformation would have further negative effects on the domestically based nascent industry and on the material well-being of the traditional middle class base of the JP, such as artisans, craftsmen and merchants (Ramazanoğlu, 1985: 84-7). The TÜSİAD's views reflected the interests of the largest and most prosperous firms, which are less labour intensive and have greater access to foreign capital and technology. For the dominant capitalist class, "the opening-up of the economy" meant increased state assistance for exports, the easing up of exchange control regulations and the encouragement of foreign investment rather

than any systematic reduction in the degree of protection it enjoyed in the domestic market. The new strategies were aimed to attract a steady flow of foreign capital for investment, and restructure the Turkish economy through foreign competition. The insistence of the JP on acquiring associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) then was a part of this orientation. Yet the JP faced a dilemma in translating the coherent economic power of its electoral base into political practices, which aimed to gain monopolistic use of state power by the dominant faction of the bourgeoisie. This was because the middle class base of the JP had already started slipping away as a result of the primary allocation of public resources to industry in preference to landed interests and small business, where capitalist production was much less developed.

As a result not only of the fragmentation of the right-wing but also of the challenge from the left, the JP lost a significant portion of its urban votes from the lower-classes in the 1970s, mainly because of its socio-economic policies and the increasing bottlenecks in the economy. There had already been a massive and rapid uprooting of labour from the land because of the processes of mechanisation, commercial development and the differentiation and reorganisation of production in agriculture in some parts of the country. This, in turn, led to the acceleration of the differentiation of the rural population, and widening rural inequalities. Dispossessed or impoverished peasants and petty commodity producers became wage labourers and started migrating from countryside to towns and cities. Although the growth of industry had led to an increasing demand for wage labour, the rate of urbanisation due to mass immigration from rural to industrial centres was far beyond that of industrialisation.

The result was increasing unemployment and subsequently the fall of many immigrants settling in shanty-towns to below the poverty line. The accelerating economic crisis since the late 1960s, which was partly due to increasing foreign debt, rising inflation and entry onto the world market on unequal terms, further reduced the living standards of low-level income earners. Consequently, the JP lost a significant portion of its urban vote from lower-classes in the 1970s. Growing popular demands for social justice and economic redistribution gave chance to the Republican People's Party, which, in the late 1960s, was struggling to become a party of the urban and rural lower classes. This led to the establishment of a splinter party from the ranks of the RPP, the Republican Reliance Party (RReP), which had strong ties to large landowners. But it had a relatively small impact at national level (see Table 2). Yet the movement was vital for the RPP, as the voting results of the 1950-65 period showed that the RPP had not been able to return to power electorally since it was defeated in the 1950 election by the DP. This was despite doing well in the least developed regions of eastern Turkey, where the sources of support were still tied to tribal chieftains. After the 1965 election, the RPP and its newly elected leader, Bülent Ecevit, declared itself a social democratic party, left of the centre. Contrary to Kemalist populism, the populism of the RPP in the 1970s acknowledged the existence of classes and their conflicting interests. However, its basic goal was still a harmonious society promoted by an egalitarian approach to social welfare and economic planning. The RPP sought to take political power by encouraging the mass participation in politics of urban lower class groups and rural voters. This was to be the basis for a specific socio-economic program which included the need for agrarian reform, social welfare and improvement in the living standards of lower income groups.

Several references were made after the 1969 election campaign to the issue that the RPP was no longer the party of the large-land owning class, but of the people. It was crucial for the left to turn to the peasantry as a potential force because they were a numerically important and rapidly changing group, although politically they had gone unrecognised. However, the peasantry was far from being a homogenous group, which included landed as well as landless peasants, share-coppers, and wage earners. This meant that there would be differential responses by these different parts of the peasantry to various types of political activity. This was very obvious in the election results. In any sense, the populist image of the RPP was instrumental in its attempt to distinguish itself from its authoritarian past and its identification with the 1960 military coup (Sunar:1974: 177). Yet the RPP had to compete ideologically with the far left, the Marxist Turkish Labour Party (LP), which was able to send MPs to Parliament in 1965 due to its relative strength among industrial workers. But apart from being subject to sustained harassment by government, the LP could not pose a real threat to the RPP because of its continual fragmentation, the absence of effective leadership and its identification by voters as an intellectuals' club. Nevertheless, both the RPP and the LP managed to raise opposition from industrial workers to the JP's government, by emphasising the fact that the workers, despite being given the right to collective bargaining and striking by the 1961 Constitution, were unable to obtain wage increases in keeping with rising productivity. Increasing opposition to government policies and a big strike by industrial workers in June 1970, described by the government as a "dress rehearsal for a revolution", led to the enforcement of the constraints of political actions and the declaration of martial law in the industrial provinces. The government was unable to respond to the increasing

demands of rising socio-economic groups, nor to provide political stability required by dominant capital in the transitional period, during which production was being restructured and money markets were being established. Finally, the alleged threat of communism to the Republic was used by the army to intervene for the second time, in 1971, with an ultimatum which demanded the dissolution of the JP's government. Freedoms granted by the constitution were suspended (Ahmad, 1985: 203). The 1971 intervention obtained the dissolution of the NOP and the LP. The NOP was banned from politics by order of the Constitutional Court for violating the secular character of the Republic. The aim for the successive military-civilian government from 1971 to 1973 was therefore to secure the conditions of existence for the dominance of industrial and financial capital.

The 1973 general election restored the civilian rule. Prior to the election, in October 1972 the banned NOP was re-embodied in the National Salvation Party. The election results demonstrated the extent of fragmentation in the right wing. The DeP and NSP were the third largest parties in terms of the size of their parliamentary delegations, followed by the JP and the RPP. The NSP remained a significant force in politics between the years 1974 to 1980 by taking part as a coalition partner in successive governments, while the DeP was soon dissolved in favour of the JP. The existence of various right-wing political parties gave the RPP opportunity to come to power in 1974, under the leadership of Ecevit. Having received 33.3 percent of the vote, it formed a coalition government with the NSP. Being part of such a coalition, despite its Islamist outlook, was very important for the NSP because it gave them political legitimacy after the dissolution of its predecessor on the grounds of the secularist principles of the Republic.

However, the populist rhetoric of the RPP aimed to gain the support of the expanding working class, the government, which represented conflicting interests, did not provide the necessary framework for an open economy in accordance with what the dominant capital had desired. It may be argued that a rapid transformation of Turkish capitalism that was within the international division of labour and through democratic channels was not feasible. Turkey's position in the world capitalist system had to be restructured because of: the growing bottlenecks in the domestic economy; the steadily diminishing of international markets at a steady pace for Turkish products; the adverse effects of the 1973 rise in oil prices; the increasing unwillingness of centres of international capital to bail out Turkey; and the effects of the American embargo after the 1974 intervention in Cyprus. Political instability caused by the short-lived coalition governments, increased political polarization, the militant activities of both left and right and the widespread use of violence against each other, became the salient features of political activities in the late 1970s. After the resignation of the prime minister Ecevit in September 1974, the JP, the NAP and the NSP established the first National Front government in March 1975. The elections in 1977 did not bring enough votes to the RPP to establish a majority government. It was prevented from functioning by the JP and had to resign after failing to secure a confidence vote from the parliament. The same year witnessed the formation of the second National Front government under the leadership of the JP. Meanwhile, the economy was approaching a crisis position. In 1979, when the JP was in power as a minority government, the IMF's assistance, in order to extend credit facilities needed to service foreign debts and to tackle the economic problems, was on the agenda. Finally, on 24 January 1980 the government accepted an austerity package. The

measures suggested by the IMF aimed to transform the economic and political structures and bring them into line with the pre-requisites of the world capitalist system. It demanded the devaluation of the Turkish Lira, the lowering of wages, increases in taxes which gave priority to the export sector, the opening of the economy to international competition, the encouragement of foreign capital, the introduction of policies that would cause the transformation of the agricultural sector, and privatisation of the state economic enterprises, which owned 47 percent of the industry. The state economic enterprises were the keystone of *etatist* policies and in time became the focus of political action, which was confined largely to competition over employment in the expanded state sector in exchange for votes. The last measure aimed to alter the powerful position of the (civil) bureaucracy. The government's lack of success in controlling inflation, removing shortages and countering terrorism gradually reduced its popular support. The austerity programme was welcomed by the TÜSİAD and the Istanbul Chamber of Industry, since international credits had always been vital for their members. As the government was unable to provide political stability and order, it could not therefore implement such an extensive package, which caused widespread social unrest. The political stability needed for the implementation of economic measures to open up the economy without resistance from the lower classes was provided by the third military intervention on 12 September 1980. Therefore, the contradictions between the requirements of capitalist expansion and a liberal form of parliamentary democracy appeared to have been resolved by the military intervention, in favour of the dominant capital (Ramazanoğlu, 1985; 92-4). It seems that the coup, which swept daily violence and terror away in a remarkably short time, was well planned in terms of timing by the military in association with

their national and international supporters, in order to provide the maximum possible popular support.

The transformation of the political structure, which placed the emphasis on “the rule of law” rather than “the rule of parliament”, was completed after this intervention (Heper 1987). By reenforcing and enlarging presidential power and the legal status of the National Security Council (NSC) as well as that of the Constitutional Court, the bureaucracy’s access to state power was expanded at the expense of that of the parliamentarian system. The military regime ensured a ban on strikes and established a tight level of control over the labour force. All trade union activities were banned and strikes were made illegal. All political parties and civil organisations were dissolved and austerity measures were reintroduced in a climate in which there was no right of demonstration. Politicians of the preceding decade were charged with treason. The exclusion of peasants and workers from the debates about development policies was ensured. There was an effective censorship of the mass media and opposition was silenced by the detention of dissidents. The elimination of minor parties on both the right and the left by the military was thought to be crucial in order to built a two-party system which would end the coalition governments and provide constant political stability. However, this aim was not realised as the fragmentation of the Turkish party system further deepened in the 1980s and finally witnessed the accession of the Welfare Party to power in the mid-1990s. This took place in the context of continuing rapid social development and the restructuring of the economy in favour of big capital, which further intensified the dissatisfaction with mainstream political parties on both the left and the right.

The National Salvation Party and the 1973 Election

The 1973 election had important impacts for both the NSP and the RPP. The former campaigned before the 1973 election with a manifesto which included: (a) a religious view of the world; (b) a call for rapid industrialisation; and (c) a redistributive populist economic and social ethic (Mardin, 1977: 292). The NSP had an agenda which took industrialisation as its most important asset, alongside having an Islamic outlook in internal policies and an anti-Western attitude in international relations. It differed from the mainstream right-wing not in terms of its notion of “what constitutes the Turkish nation”, but rather in terms of its attitude to Islam in the political sphere. In its view, Islam was an essential ingredient in the founding of the Turkish nation. This view strongly emphasized Islamic heritage, and therefore can be contrasted with the Kemalist notion of nationalism, which focuses upon the pre-Islamic past and avoids the Ottoman past. By and large, this view was close to that of the centre-right, the DP and the JP, although, it differed in terms of the use of Islamic principles in public policies. The centre-right, namely the DP of Adnan Menderes and the JP of Süleyman Demirel, had represented a moderate secularist approach in comparison with Kemalist secularism (Landau 1974). The governments of the DP and those of the JP showed this by easing state control over religion, e.g. the overt re-functioning of religious orders and charity organisations, as these *dervish* orders were still illegal and their gatherings were liable to be raided by police; the foundation of two more higher Islamic Institutes in Istanbul and Konya, the first of which was founded in Ankara during

the RPP's rule; and increasing the number of vocational schools (*Imam-Hatips*), set up originally by the RPP to train preachers, and later allowing their graduates to enter into science faculties. Such organisations have provided further religious education under the authority of the Ministry of Education. The NSP, however, advocated the incorporation of religious values into governmental policies, besides pressing for the extension of religious teaching at all levels of education. For example, in the economic sphere, the NSP aimed to redistribute governmental facilities, e.g. import quotas, credits and foreign exchange, from big businesses to medium and small business, i.e. to the rising petty capitalists of Anatolia, with reference to Islamic principles of social justice. It also argued for putting an end to lending money with interest, both on secular and religious grounds. Such a call was meaningful for small business as it attempted to gain access to public resources in favourable conditions in a system in which the political authority, through complicated systems of credits, tariffs and quotas, controlled much of the nature of economic functioning and therefore had the means to decide on the extension of market privileges to chosen manufacturers. On the issues of economic and foreign policies, the JP's government was equated with the loss of political sovereignty; the slavery of Turkey to Western powers through the NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC); and the degeneration of cultural, moral and ethical values. For the NSP, this was instrumental in mobilising various centres of opposition, that were economic and national as well as religious. The EEC was defined as a Christian club. Opposition to the Common Market was due to the NSP's protectionist attitude for small-scale nascent industry, which appealed to small businessmen and leftist intelligentsia alike. The academic left (Boratav 1983) argued that economic independence and independent industrialisation were

interrelated and therefore opposed to the Common Market. The NSP advocated an independent and nationalist foreign policy, the main principle of which would be the defence of basic rights and justice as well as the institutionalisation of closer relations with (Muslim) nations with which Turkey had geographical, cultural and historical affinity (Landau 1976; Özbudun 1987; Ahmad 1991). Its populist approach, which touched on democracy, distributive justice, freedom of conscience and other liberties, was geared to mobilise the various centres of dissatisfaction with the JP's policies. Apart from its hostility to freemasons, communists and Zionists, its opposition to family planning and birth control and its desire for the strengthening of national morals in educational institutions were quite familiar to Islamist ideology in general.

It can be argued that the NSP gained support in different parts of country for different reasons. From the election results, it is clear that the NSP drew its voting strength not only from the former JP voters but from a variety of other sources. The NSP gained votes at the expense of both major parties, the RPP and the JP, in certain provinces. A positive correlation between the electoral gains of the NSP and the electoral losses of the JP or the RPP indicate a considerable amount of direct switching in some provinces (Özbudun 1987). Such a correlation between the parties' provincial voting percentages means that they appealed to the same regions of the country. For example, in provinces like Sakarya, Kütahya, Samsun, Niğde and Tokat, all of which are to some extent developed, the NSP seems to have received its votes at the expense of both the JP and the RPP. In provinces like Bitlis and Gümüşhane, the least developed regions, it managed to canalise former RPP votes, while in provinces such as Kocaeli, which is substantially

developed; Eskişehir and Kayseri, which are medium-developed; and Erzurum, the least developed, the NSP received a portion of the JP's votes. In this sense, it is misleading to argue that the NSP in both the 1973 and 1977 elections received much of its votes from less developed provinces, and therefore from a less modernised section of the population,⁵⁰ because seventy percent of the population was still living in rural areas in the 1970s. Although, the NSP did relatively well in the eastern regions, where the strength of the Nakshibendi order and voting patterns are thought to be interrelated, its base of support was far from localised. Rather, it was much more diversified. Comparing the electoral strength of the NSP in the provinces in which it received its highest percentage of votes (see Table 3) with those where it acquired its lowest level (see Table 4), no significant pattern emerges when one considers the degree to which these provinces were developed, and the general qualities of voters, such as age, sex, and the rate and level of literacy. Therefore, a geographical analysis of the votes with reference to development level is not sufficient to show that the NSP was a party of less developed (or culturally less modern) regions or groups, in the absence of substantial survey data which provides which socio-economic groups voted for which parties. Rather, it can be argued that the National Salvation Party received a trans-class base of support at the electoral level, while at the leadership level it was not based on the traditional strata of Turkish society or marginal economic groups. From the backgrounds of its representatives to parliament, it is clear that the NSP consisted of middle-class people (Toprak 1981), such as engineers, lawyers, teachers, public servants and religious instructors, who demonstrated that elite culture was no longer as monolithic as it once was.

50

See for example, A. Y. Sarıbay (1985) *Türkiye'de Modernleşme, Din ve Parti Politikası*.

For the RPP, the 1973 election was characterised by a shift in big city votes. The JP lost heavily in the large cities, although in the elections of 1965 and 1969, it had received disproportionately more votes from the *gecekondus*⁵¹ areas compared to the RPP. Such predominant lower-class support for a party that was dominantly rallying for the interests of capitalists was not paradoxical, since the RPP had been associated with urban intellectuals, bureaucrats and landlords. Low-level income groups living in these areas might have seen the JP as the party which could apply policies geared to changing their position. Prior to the 1973 election, the RPP had done well in middle-class and upper middle-class areas, compared to its poor performance in the *gecekondus* settings. However, the 1973 election indicated that the urban poor felt alienated by the socio-economic policies of the JP. In this context, the switch of a significant portion of urban and/or rural votes between and within political wings needs to be highlighted. Such shifts in party alignment often take place when economic policies backed by the dominant economic groups prove to be detrimental to disadvantaged economic groups. Voters turn to alternative parties, which are expected to respond to the neglected demands of rising socio-economic groups. This is observable both in the rise and the decline of the centre-right and centre-left since 1970. To an extent it is demonstrated by the gains in 1973 and the losses in 1977 of the NSP; and the rise of the Welfare Party in 1995 and the six percent decline in electoral support for its successor, the Virtue Party, in 1999.

Table 3: The Distribution of Votes among the Parties in the General Elections in the Ten Provinces

51

The term 'gecekondus' literally means those settlements illegally built (overnight) on unowned land in or around cities. It is often used in general to refer to buildings which lack the necessary infrastructure.

in which the NSP Received Its Highest Percentage of Votes in 1973

The Highest Percentage of NSP Votes in 1973 %	Election Years	Right Block					Left Block				
		JP	RReP	DeP	NP	NAP	NTP	RPP	TUP	TLP	
1.ERZURUM 29.5	1965	55.8	---	---	7.7	---	5.9	25.5	---	---	
	1969	55.7	7.0	---	3.5	2.5	7.4	22.0	---	1.9	
	1973	22.9	3.4	10.7	0.5	3.3	---	19.7	1.6	---	
	1977	43.1	1.5	1.1	---	12.8	---	21.7	---	---	
2.ELAZIĞ 27.8	1965	48.6	---	---	---	---	4.0	39.6	---	2.6	
	1969	35.1	8.0	---	0.8	5.4	2.9	26.8	3.3	1.8	
	1973	25.5	2.3	7.7	---	4.2	---	29.5	0.9	---	
	1977	20.1	0.6	0.1	---	18.7	---	28.8	---	---	
3.K.MARAŞ 26.7	1965	48.2	---	---	9.8	---	3.5	23.9	---	2.0	
	1969	32.0	4.0	---	5.0	1.2	0.2	17.6	6.2	1.9	
	1973	17.9	2.0	10.8	---	5.6	---	32.9	1.8	---	
	1977	26.5	0.8	2.5	---	15.5	---	34.4	---	---	
4.SİVAS 25.7	1965	39.4	---	---	7.1	---	5.0	33.2	---	2.6	
	1969	29.3	3.0	---	4.1	6.3	1.9	30.8	16.7	2.9	
	1973	16.9	1.9	6.7	---	4.5	---	32.9	10.8	---	
	1977	23.5	1.4	1.4	---	13.2	---	42.9	3.6	---	
5.BİNGÖL 25.5	1965	25.3	---	---	3.8	---	30.9	35.7	---	2.1	
	1969	14.3	7.0	---	0.3	---	22.5	12.2	---	1.6	
	1973	20.6	0.5	10.5	---	0.3	---	23.3	0.3	---	
	1977	29.6	2.0	0.5	---	1.1	---	25.4	---	---	

Source: General Election of Representatives, Results by Provinces, 1977, by the State Institute of Statistics.

Table 3: The Distribution of Votes among the Parties in the General Elections in the Ten Provinces

in which the NSP Received Its Highest Percentage of Votes in 1973

The Highest Percentage of NSP Votes in 1973 %	Election Years	Right Block										Left Block			
		JP	RReP	DeP	NP	NAP	NTP	RPP	TUP	TLP					
6.G.HANE 24.9	1965	41.1	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	7.1	28.6	---	---	
	1969	37.3	9.7	---	1.5	2.6	---	---	---	---	---	30.6	---	0.9	
	1973	36.5	1.7	2.4	---	4.0	---	---	---	---	---	19.5	---	---	
	1977	40.4	---	1.3	---	14.9	---	---	---	---	---	28.5	---	---	
7.ADIYAMAN 22.1	1965	41.8	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	12.0	26.7	---	2.8	
	1969	28.1	2.1	---	0.4	1.2	---	---	---	5.1	---	31.2	1.7	8.6	
	1973	28.7	10.3	3.9	---	1.6	---	---	---	---	---	32.7	0.7	---	
	1977	28.7	0.7	3.8	---	5.1	---	---	---	---	---	41.9	---	---	
8.RIZE 21.9	1965	62.3	---	---	9.5	---	---	---	---	---	1.9	22.6	---	---	
	1969	52.9	4.3	---	9.0	3.2	---	---	---	0.2	---	29.1	---	1.3	
	1973	29.7	2.2	12.3	0.5	2.3	---	---	---	---	---	31.1	---	---	
	1977	45.8	1.8	2.0	---	6.0	---	---	---	---	---	32.0	---	---	
9.ÇORUM 21.7	1965	50.7	---	---	12.7	---	---	---	---	---	6.8	24.2	---	---	
	1969	46.6	6.1	---	4.9	3.9	---	---	---	0.8	---	17.7	16.9	2.4	
	1973	19.0	4.1	17.9	1.0	2.8	---	---	---	---	---	30.7	2.7	---	
	1977	37.0	2.0	1.9	---	12.7	---	---	---	---	---	36.1	0.8	---	
10.YOZGAT 21.5	1965	39.9	---	---	21.9	---	---	---	---	---	2.2	25.7	---	5.3	
	1969	41.3	5.2	---	12.2	2.3	---	---	---	2.5	---	22.1	5.0	2.5	
	1973	17.5	2.9	15.7	2.4	10.0	---	---	---	---	---	27.0	1.3	---	
	1977	29.3	2.0	1.6	---	22.9	---	---	---	---	---	30.1	0.6	---	

Source: General Election of Representatives, Results by Provinces, 1977, by the State Institute of Statistics.

Table 4: The Distribution of Votes in the General Elections in the Ten Provinces in which the NSP

Received its Lowest Percentage of Votes in 1973

The Lowest Percentage of NSP Votes in 1973 %		Election Years	Right Block						Left Block					
			JP	RReP	DeP	NP	NAP	NTP	RPP	TUP	TLP			
1.HAKKARI		1965	5.5	---	---	1.0	---	---	55.1	---	---	37.5	---	---
		1969	27.7	37.0	---	---	0.2	---	0.2	---	---	33.9	---	0.6
		1973	33.0	3.8	25.7	---	---	---	---	---	---	35.4	---	---
		1977	43.4	0.6	0.9	---	---	---	---	---	---	36.5	---	---
2.EDİRNE		1965	56.4	---	---	6.6	---	---	1.6	---	---	30.6	---	3.0
		1969	50.8	5.6	---	3.3	1.6	---	0.8	---	---	32.8	---	5.1
		1973	41.6	3.0	6.4	1.0	1.4	---	---	---	44.2	---	---	---
		1977	39.5	1.3	1.8	---	1.4	---	---	---	53.8	---	---	---
3.TUNCELİ		1965	26.8	---	---	---	---	---	21.8	---	---	33.5	---	5.8
		1969	23.3	1.1	---	0.5	---	---	14.9	---	---	18.9	6.9	16.8
		1973	14.3	0.5	0.9	---	0.5	---	---	---	---	70.0	0.6	---
		1977	8.2	0.5	0.4	---	4.7	---	---	---	---	66.3	0.7	0.4
4.KIRKLARELİ		1965	60.6	---	---	4.0	---	---	---	---	31.0	---	---	3.1
		1969	47.3	4.7	---	2.6	0.8	---	---	---	30.6	---	---	5.4
		1973	42.0	2.5	7.7	---	1.4	---	---	---	43.7	---	---	---
		1977	46.4	1.0	1.6	---	1.0	---	---	---	48.5	---	---	---
5.İÇEL		1965	59.5	---	---	4.2	---	---	1.3	---	32.2	---	---	2.8
		1969	48.1	6.0	---	1.2	6.2	---	0.5	---	30.7	5.3	1.7	---
		1973	29.4	1.9	15.7	0.5	7.1	---	---	---	39.2	3.4	---	---
		1977	38.7	1.2	2.2	---	9.1	---	---	---	44.7	1.3	---	---

Source: General Election of Representatives, Results by Provinces, 1977, by the State Institute of Statistics.

Table 4: The Distribution of Votes in the General Elections in the Ten Provinces in which the NSP Received its Lowest Percentage of Votes in 1973

The Lowest Percentage of NSP Votes in 1973 %	Election Years	Right Block						Left Block			
		JP	RRP	DeP	NP	NAP	NTP	RPP	TUP	TLP	
6.AYDIN 3.0	1965	72.3	---	---	3.0	---	---	21.0	---	3.7	
	1969	62.3	3.8	---	1.6	1.7	0.7	26.0	1.4	1.9	
	1973	34.7	1.1	28.8	---	1.6	---	30.1	0.7	---	
	1977	51.2	1.3	2.5	---	2.9	---	38.2	0.3	---	
7.TEKİRDAĞ 3.3	1965	58.7	---	---	4.1	---	---	32.8	---	2.9	
	1969	48.5	20.2	---	0.9	1.0	0.6	24.8	---	4.0	
	1973	40.2	11.9	8.4	---	1.8	---	34.4	---	---	
	1977	44.0	3.1	1.7	---	1.3	---	47.0	0.3	---	
8.MUĞLA 3.6	1965	61.9	---	---	---	---	---	32.5	---	2.8	
	1969	56.4	8.3	---	0.8	1.6	0.5	29.7	1.1	1.6	
	1973	36.2	5.1	18.4	---	1.2	---	35.2	---	---	
	1977	50.2	1.2	2.0	---	1.7	---	42.4	---	0.3	
9.DENİZLİ 5.3	1965	61.2	---	---	3.1	---	1.6	31.6	---	1.9	
	1969	55.0	7.1	---	0.8	3.2	0.6	29.4	1.2	2.3	
	1973	33.9	2.7	22.8	---	1.6	---	33.5	---	---	
	1977	43.9	1.1	4.6	---	3.7	---	43.5	---	---	
10.ÇANAKKALE 5.5	1965	63.4	---	---	4.2	---	---	26.8	---	2.1	
	1969	58.2	3.1	---	1.1	3.7	---	27.0	---	2.2	
	1973	44.2	1.8	9.7	0.5	1.5	---	35.6	0.8	---	
	1977	50.2	1.6	2.0	---	2.2	---	38.7	0.3	---	

Source: General Election of Representatives, Results by Provinces, 1977, by the State Institute of Statistics.

5.2. The 1995 Election That Brought The Welfare Party to Power

The return to civilian rule after 1980 was marked by the establishment of new political parties. Prior the 1983 election, several parties, including the Welfare Party, were established as successors to the banned parties. However, only three parties, the Motherland Party, the Populist Party and the National Democratic Party, which was favoured by the military, were allowed by the military regime to take part in the 1983 election. The Welfare Party running under a care-taker leader, as Erbakan had been banned from politics, was vetoed from the election alongside a number of other parties. The general election in 1983, which resulted in the newly established "centre-right" Motherland Party⁵² (MP) coming into office, where they remained until 1991, was an important step for the re-establishment of democratic rule. Erbakan returned to politics as the leader of the Welfare Party in 1987, when the sanction on former leaders of political parties taking part in political activity was lifted by a referendum.

There was a steady increase in the electoral base of the Welfare Party from 1987 and it finally rose to power in 1995 with twenty-one percent of general votes at the expense of both the centre-right and to an extent the centre-left, especially in local government. It became a partner in a coalition government in 1996 due to the combination of several factors, economic, social and political.⁵³ It is necessary to emphasize that the decline of the centre-right and centre-left parties (see Table 5),

52

The Motherland Party then claimed that it combined four political positions: liberal, conservative, nationalist and religious.

53

Chapter seven explains the reasons behind the electoral success of the Welfare Party on the basis of small scale qualitative research.

except for the DLP in 1999, indicates a considerable level of dissatisfaction with the political system in general and a widening vacuum in the centre of politics. This in turn has been filled by so-called fringe parties moving to the centre, given the distribution of the votes among the parties in the three consecutive general parliamentary elections in 1987, 1991, 1995, and lately in April 1999.

Table 5 : The Distribution of Votes Among the Parties in the General Elections between 1969 and 1999 (In percentages)

Election Years	THE RIGHT BLOCK*					THE LEFT BLOCK		
	JP/ TPP	NSP/ WP/VP	NAP	MDP	MP	RPP/PP/ SDPP/RPP	DLP	DEP/ PDP
1969	46.5	---	3.0	---	---	27.4	---	---
1973	29.8	11.8	3.4	---	---	33.3	---	---
1977	36.9	8.6	6.4	---	---	41.4	---	---
1983	---	---	---	23.3	45.1	30.5	---	---
1987	19.1	7.2	2.9	---	36.3	24.8	8.5	---
1991	27.0	16.9	---	---	24.0	20.8	10.8	---
1995	19.2	21.4	8.2	---	19.6	10.7	14.6	4.2
1999	11.9	15.3	17.9	---	13.2	8.7	22.0	4.7

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977; General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; and 1995 by the Statistics Institute and the General Election Results of 1999 on <http://www.tr-net>.

JP: Justice Party
 NSP: National Salvation Party
 WP: Welfare Party
 VP: Virtue Party
 NAP: Nationalist Action Party
 NDP: Nationalist Democracy Party
 MP: Motherland Party
 TPP: True Path Party

RPP: Republican People's Party
 PP: Populist Party
 SDPP: Social Democrat Populist Party
 DLP: Democratic Left Party
 DEP: Democracy Party
 PDP: People's Democracy Party

Certain characteristics related to the elections must be taken into consideration:

firstly, the military interventions in 1960, 1971 and 1980 and the ban on political

parties to some extent limits the analysis of election results. The usefulness of the results of the 1983 election, which resulted in the victory of the Motherland Party, is limited in terms of identifying continuities within party attachments. In this sense, the election of 1987 became a crucial point for comparison with the 1995 election, as the ban on ex-politicians' involvement in political activities was lifted by referendum in 1985. The leaderships were taken over by the old leaders, Demirel of the TPP, Ecevit of the DLP, Erbakan of the Welfare and Türkeş of the NAP. While the fragmentation in the right-wing was exacerbated by the split of the "centre-right", the "centre-left" was also divided between two parties, mainly due to intra-elite conflict. On the right wing, the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) were the successors of the Party of the JP. On the left wing, the Social Democrat Populist Party (SDPP) became the mass party. It merged with its splinter group, the (new) Republican People's Party (RPP), in 1994 and was named after it to claim traditional leadership of the left against the Democratic Left Party (DLP), of Ecevit, who was the leader of the Republican People's Party in the 1970s. Ecevit declined all attempts to converge initially with the SDPP and later with the RPP. Secondly, there was a coalition in the 1991 election between the Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party in order to pass the 10 percent national threshold. As they split up after the election, it is impossible to evaluate the strength of either in this election. However, the strength of the Welfare Party in 1995 in the provinces where it increased its votes compared to the joint results of 1991, provides some insights. For the same reason the People's Democracy Party (Kurdish nationalist party) also signed an electoral deal with the Social Democrat Populist Party. Similarly, the Great Union Party had an election deal with the Motherland Party in 1995. Again, it is difficult to break down the votes between

the two parties. Thirdly, Turkey was divided into 67 provinces in pre-1990 period, 74 provinces in the 1991 election, and 79 provinces in the 1995 election.

As seen above, from a national perspective, it can be said that the right with its all various parties has been able to keep its share of votes (about 60 to 70 percent since the 1950s). However, this does not mean that Turkish voters have remained totally conservative in their political views, contrary to what Schmuelevitz argues (1996: 167). It is important to emphasize that despite the conventional left and right division, there has been electoral movement between the two sides of the ideological spectrum. Given that 41 percent of general votes for the Republican People's Party in 1977 (compared to 37 percent for the JP, 8.6 percent for the NSP and 6.4 percent for the Nationalist Action Party) and 30 percent for the Populist Party in 1983 (compared to 45 percent for the MP and 23 percent for the Nationalist Democracy Party), it is clear that the left experienced a loss of 11 percent of votes at the national level in favour of the either of two other parties in 1983, and did not reach its 1970s level until 1999. A provincial level analysis shows the movement of votes within and between the right and left wings of the spectrum. The comparison of left-wing and right-wing votes over the three elections, 1987, 1991 and 1995, in three big cities, Istanbul, Izmir and Ankara, shows that the right did considerably better than the left. For example, in Istanbul between 1987 and 1995 the right (including the TPP, the MP, the WP and the NAP) steadily increased its votes from about 58 percent to 65 percent while the left (including the RPP and the DLP) experienced a steady decline from 40 percent to 29 percent. In Izmir, while the right-wing votes went up from 47 percent to 61 percent, the left-wing votes dropped from 48 percent to 37 percent. In Ankara it is

clear that the left lost around 5 percent of its votes, declining from 35% to 30%. However, the share of the vote for centre right parties steadily decreased from 55.4 percent in 1987 to 38.8 percent in 1995 and to 25.1 percent in 1999, while that of the centre-left parties fell from 33.3 percent to 25.3 percent and rose again to 30.85 percent in 1999 due to the DLP's relative success in office, and to some extent due to nationalist causes, as the leader of the PKK was captured by security forces prior to the election. The Welfare Party increased its votes from 7.25 percent to 21.4 percent, but it declined to 15.39 percent in 1999 for the Virtue Party, the successor to the WP, although it maintained its success in the local elections. However, the Turkish nationalist NAP, experienced an increase from 2.9 percent in 1987 to 8.2 percent in 1995, and to 17.9 percent in 1999 at the expense of the MP and the TPP, and to an extent the VP. Another important implication is that the PDP, the Kurdish nationalist party, experienced an increase in its share of the vote especially in the south-eastern region. In some provinces it reached over 40 percent of the vote, though its national rating stayed under 5 percent. It is clear that the centre-right parties lost a considerable amount of their votes in one decade to the "Islamist" Welfare Party and the Nationalist Action Party at national level, the centre-left to a great extent, and the WP to some extent over an election period, to the Kurdish nationalist PDP at regional level. This means that an average of about 30 percent of the vote shifted within the right-wing block. It can be argued that this signifies a reflection of the weakening party identification among the electorate and consequently, significant instability and fluctuations of votes among parties, given the increased electoral success of the so-called fringe parties. The party structure within the blocks and between the centre-right and the centre-left, which lost 8 percent of its voters in 1995, has declined from the points

of view of their supporters according to a nationwide survey conducted in 1995 (Çarkoğlu, 1998: 553). The major parties on both wings have similarly referred to universally popular issues, such as the market economy, a smaller state, democracy and human rights in their election agendas. In terms of party agendas which characterise the left- right dimension, Çarkoğlu indicates that the relative stability of the left-right system came to an end in the 1995 election. The centre-left DLP moved to the right by emphasizing freedom, human rights and smaller and more efficient government, while the centre-right TPP moved to the left with issues on its agenda, such as education, social services, the European Union and democracy (1998: 558). As will be seen in the next chapter, the Welfare Party's agenda consisted of civil society issues, freedom, civil liberties and democracy with a focus on: oppressive attitudes towards minority groups and belief systems (27 percent of the agenda, the highest compared to that of other parties); general economic goals and growth; support for free enterprise; social justice; the need to combat corruption; decentralisation; administrative efficiency; morality and the protection of the national way of life as well as national independence and anti-imperialism. Although the Welfare Party had throughout the eighties and nineties been the furthest right party, it had a rapidly changing profile on its main issues between the elections. Given the fragmentation of the Turkish party system, it can be argued that the Welfare Party, as an untried alternative with increasing success in local governments, filled a vacuum by moving to the centre (1998; 558). Politics in the nineties is characterised with a "representation crisis", as there was a rise in the number of splinter parties while the MP, the TPP and the RPP have experienced a steady decline.

The election results of 1995 signified a high degree of dissatisfaction with the government policies undertaken by the major political parties of the centre-left and centre-right. A brief review of the social indicators of development, for example, demography, health, education, income and consumption, industry, labour, and communication suggests that although Turkey has changed greatly over recent decades, economic growth has tended to result in a very uneven pattern of development. The ratio of literacy rose from about 20 percent in the 1930s to 55 percent in the 1970s and just over 80 percent in 1990 for the whole of the population. For the male population, that increased from 30 percent to 70 percent and to 88 percent, for the female population from 10 percent to 40 percent and to 70 percent over the same period. If we accept the 1970s as a turning point for the development of Turkey, the economic indicators show that the composition of population in terms of occupation has been steadily changing. For example, the rate of total population engaged in agriculture fell from about 75 percent in the 1950s to 67 percent in the 1970s and 54 percent in the 1990s, while the rate of those engaged in non-agricultural production rose from 9 percent to 24 percent and that of those in commercial, administrative and service sectors and professionals from 13 percent to 22 percent (The Statistical Yearbook: 1996). However, the impact of change has been differentially felt due to sharp imbalances between regions, economic sectors and social classes. The Constitution of 1982 has excluded the subordinate classes from any effective participation in the political decision-making process. Any challenge to the *status quo* or attempt to broaden power sharing has been faced with the use of force and repression, which in the long term has deepened political conflicts and social unrest. The Motherland governments (1983-1991) and the coalition government of the True Path Party and

the Social Democrat Populist Party (1991-1995) had implemented economic policies based on restrictive monetary policies with successive devaluations, aimed at reducing domestic demand and increasing export under the supervision of the IMF. On the one hand, the aim of austerity programmes has been to consolidate economic power in the largest corporations or holdings, represented by the TÜSİAD, with just over four hundred members. Accordingly, credits, investment and export promotion incentives have led to a distributional shift in favour of the private sector, as the privatisation of public corporations was on the agenda. However, within the private sector the bias against relatively small enterprises in the provision of government services and other incentives has continued, particularly in the allocation of credits and foreign exchange. High interest rates almost brought small firms to the brink of bankruptcy since increased costs and higher prices meant losing their customers who had reduced spending power. The austerity programmes have negatively affected small enterprises which were essentially home-oriented and dependent upon state subsidies. The stabilisation measures ended state subsidies to the smaller sectors of industry. This trend led to the establishment of the Anatolian based MÜSİAD, the Association of Independent Businessmen (allegedly known as the Association of Muslim Businessmen) in 1990 by young businessmen, with an average age of under 33. It is the largest volunteer organization, with more than 3,000 members. The MÜSİAD, whose headquarters is in Istanbul, has established branches throughout the country, although the largest membership is located in some of the major metropolitan centres, such as Konya, Ankara, İzmir, Bursa, Kocaeli, and Kayseri. It includes medium-sized or small firms, which have managed to enter into international trade, mostly with the East and Middle East, with little or no subsidy

from the state. Most of these firms are located in centres with industrial and commercial potential, such as Diyarbakır, Balıkesir, Gaziantep, Kahramanmaraş, Samsun, Çorum, Malatya, Denizli, Şanlıurfa, and Çankırı. In most of these provinces given above, the Welfare Party received a significant portion of the vote in the 1995 election (see Table 9 at the end of this chapter). The MÜSİAD's institutional aims, which are largely influenced by the successful models of East Asian capitalism, have shown significant correspondence with those of the Welfare Party. For example, it aims to create *"a developed country with advanced high-tech industry..., but without sacrificing national and moral values, [a just] distribution of national income... Members of the organization... are dedicated to finding solutions to the problems of Turkey, Islamic countries in the region and mankind in general"* (<http://müsiad.com.tr>). The mobilization of public resources for these purposes is essential, of course. It is important to emphasize that the rise of a "Muslim bourgeoisie" from the 1980s onwards has often been linked to the flow of "Islamic capital" into the country, especially in the financial sector with the establishment of so-called "Islamic banks". Although, its size has rapidly increased in the last two decades, the overall share of this capital in the economy has been minimal, since more than 80 percent of all foreign capital invested in Turkey comes from the EU and the OECD countries.⁵⁴

The competition among various sectors of the economy for the state patronage, signified different party preferences within the right-wing. While other sectors of the economy have been alienated by the economic policies of the centre right, the

54

Statistics on foreign capital, on <http://www.spo.gov.tr>.

preoccupation of the TÜSİAD's elites, who own the largest corporations in Turkey, with stability that allows high profits rather than with reformist measures which would enlarge the internal market has been apparent in their party preferences and attitudes towards political issues. Given the linkage and dependence between the large industrial firms and foreign capital, and the high degree of concentration of economic power in the form of monopolies and oligopolies in industry, they have supported the centre-right parties, such as the JP, the MP or the TPP, which have made much of the danger of *etatism*. The TÜSİAD has welcomed state intervention when it was used to support, subsidize or protect large enterprises within the industrial sector. In general, the smaller firms which have been denied access to state patronage have found it more difficult to gain a significant advance. Therefore, for nationalist-oriented groups within the smaller firms, party preferences reflected their economic interests, as the MÜSİAD supported the Welfare Party. The conflict between MÜSİAD's members and other factions of the economy was exacerbated when they showed an interest in the state economic institutions to be privatised, including some in the defence industry. The allocation by the Welfare Party's government of incentive certificates to some firms within the MÜSİAD was met with outrage by the "secular faction" of the economy. In 1997, for example, within the military institution the Office of the Chief of Staff distributed a list identifying so-called "Islamist companies", and prohibited any commercial dealing with them.

On the other hand, income distribution has become one of the major issue on that the ruling parties have been challenged in the 1980s and 1990s. The policies conducted under the stabilisation programmes have aggravated the erosion of real

wages. The consumer price indexes give an average 75 percent of inflation over the decade since the late eighties, while the increase in average daily wages for insured workers has been substantially below the rate of the increase in the cost of living index. According to the consumer price indexes for the period between 1988 and 1999, the rate of inflation has been as follows: 77 % in 1988, 64 % in 1989, 60 % in 1990, 71 % in 1991, 65 % in 1992, 71 % in 1993, 125 % in 1994, 78 % in 1995, 76 % in 1996, 99 % in 1997, 68 % in 1998 and 61 % by March 1999 (<http://www.die.gov.tr>). Consequently, before the 1995 election, the disparity in income distribution had widened to the detriment of low-level income earners (see Table 6). Despite the fact that a substantial proportion of population has been elevated out of absolute poverty, the share of low-level income earners over three decades has not been improved. Rather, inequality has increased as a result of high inflation, rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. The rapid urbanisation and development of recent decades have widened both differences in development and wealth between regions and those within them.

Table 6: Income Distribution Among Families, 1969-1994

Household Percentages	Income Percentages		
	1969	1987	1994
First 20%	4.2	5.24	4.86
Second 20%	6.4	9.61	8.63
Third 20%	10.7	14.06	12.61
Fourth 20%	17.7	21.15	19.03
Fifth 20%	61.0	49.94	54.88

Source: Compiled from Korkut Boratav (1969) *Gelir Dağılımı* (Income Distribution) and *the Results of Income Distribution Survey*, State Institute of Statistics (1997).

Table 7: Comparison of Income Distribution between Urban and Rural Families, 1994

1994	Urban	Rural
First 20%	4.8	5.6
Second 20%	8.2	10.1
Third 20%	11.9	14.8
Fourth 20%	17.9	21.8
Fifth 20%	57.2	47.7

Source: Compiled from statistics on Income Distribution, Statistical Yearbook, 1996.

Among regions the Marmara (İstanbul) and Aegean (İzmir) regions are the most developed ones and accordingly have reached the highest portions of income. They have enjoyed a virtual monopoly on industrial activity, because of the reinforcement of regional dualism, despite the increased emphasis placed on geographically balanced growth. Because of this private industry has reconcentrated resources in those areas that are already most developed. Central Anatolia (except for Ankara as it is in the same league with İstanbul and İzmir), the Black Sea and the Mediterranean regions occupy an intermediate position in terms of both the rate of development and income. The Eastern and Southeastern are the most backward regions and have had the lowest level of income. However, to a significant degree there are imbalances within them. Provinces such as Gaziantep, Malatya, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa and Erzurum rank better than some provinces in other regions. The increasing severe distributional imbalances between and within urban and rural areas and among different regions reveals that the fifth of the population with the highest income received nearly 55 percent of the total income while the lowest fifth received just about 5 percent (see Tables 6 and

7). In the agriculture sector, income is far more unevenly distributed. The largest landowners have received 30 percent of total agricultural income, although they constitute 3 percent of all land owners. Statistics on the sectoral distribution of income (see Table 8) show that the rate of degradation in the share of agriculture in the national income has been ahead of the decline in the rate of population engaged in agriculture (although this is still more than fifty percent of the whole population).

Table 8: Sectoral Distribution of Income, between 1960 and 1995

Years	Agriculture	Industry	Services
1960	38	16	43
1970	30.7	17.5	51.7
1975	24.5	20.6	55.0
1980	24.2	20.5	55.4
1985	19.4	23.6	57.0
1990	16.3	25.9	57.9
1990	14.4	27.7	57.9

Source: Compiled from statistics on Income Distribution, Statistical Yearbook, 1996.

On the other hand, the increasing trend toward capital intensity together with the rapid pace of urbanisation has exacerbated the problem of unemployment and underemployment, which reached almost 20 percent of the labour force in both agricultural and non-agricultural sectors. Rising unemployment among the young and educated members of the labour force between the ages of 15 and 29 has

become an intensifying social problem of the 1980s and 1990s.⁵⁵ Turkey has experienced a rapid population increase between 1945 and 1990, from 19 million to 60 million. Accordingly, the rate of urbanisation in terms of population living in the urban centres rose from 25 percent in 1950s to 59 percent in 1990. The census results indicate that the urban population rose by 3.6 percent annually between 1985 and 1990, while the rural population rose by only 0.9 percent. However, the significant factor to be emphasized is that due to migration from villages to the urban areas, cities and towns, the population of big urban centres such as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir has rapidly increased. These metropolitan centres are magnets for the more dynamic elements of the population elsewhere. Neither the pattern of state investment nor the new incentives offered to private industrialists for locating in relatively backward areas have reduced the general flow of labour and capital from the less developed regions to more developed areas. Massive migration contributes to widening disparities in regional population structures. To a degree this causes the relative stagnancy of provinces where the rate of emigration is relatively high (see Table 9 below). While the annual rate of the population increase in Turkey between 1985 and 1990 was 2.4 percent, the rate was for Istanbul 4 percent. Between 1945 and 1990, the population of Istanbul was multiplied by eight while that of Ankara increased eleven-fold and that of Izmir nine-fold. However, the expansion in public services has failed to follow this increase, which was primarily shown by the growing *gecekond* settlements without appropriate infrastructure around the cities. In addition, a high level of emigration from the eastern and southeastern regions due to the PKK's terrorist activities and compulsory population shifts further contributed to such a rapid

55

Statistics on Labour Force, the Statistical Yearbook: 1996, by the State Statistics Institute.

expansion. Given the growing rate of unemployment, many have had to subsist below the poverty line. The rapid expansion of such settlements has created severe social and political problems. The governments have been unable to respond to the demands of new urban arrivals for public services, such as infrastructure, water, transportation, education and health care. Out of the total population of three metropolitan cities, 75 percent of Ankara , 55 percent of Istanbul and 50 percent of Izmir live in shanty-like towns, which have constituted a considerable source of votes for the leftist SDPP in the 1980s and early 1990s⁵⁶. However, such support slipped away in the following years in favour of other parties, for example the Welfare Party, because of its poor performance in municipalities between 1987 and 1994, when corruption allegations against its leading members were at their peak, and in coalition government (1991-1995), when it changed its name to the RPP. The RPP was in power with the centre-right TPP in 1994 when one of the most severe stabilisation programmes of recent decades was signed with the IMF.

Migration might have played a role in the strengthening of the Welfare Party in the 1990s, but it is difficult to decide to what extent migration may have affected the voting pattern in the absence of detailed survey data on the district level. However, a comparison of election results on the provincial level where the rate of immigration or emigration is significantly high may indicate the degree of influence of demographic changes. This can show to an extent whether demographic changes were influential upon the electoral strength of the Welfare Party. The rate

56

Statistics on Housing and Migration, the Statistical Yearbook: 1996, by the State Statistics Institute. According a new study by the State Estate Agency, the total number of *gecekodu* houses in urban areas is over 2 million, and accommodate 35 percent of the urban population (Milliyet newspaper, 12 April 1999)

of socio-economic development⁵⁷ for each province, which consists of demographic, economic, financial, educational and health indicators,⁵⁸ is also given in order to show whether there emerged a clear pattern for the Welfare Party's votes with respect to the level of development (see Table 9). It is important to highlight that there has been both stability and change in political preferences in cities receiving a considerable amount of immigrants as well as in those with a low level of population increase or even no increase. The strengthening of the Welfare Party has been seen both in provinces with a high rate of population increase and in those with limited population growth either at the expense of the centre-right or centre-left or both (see Table 9). In provinces with a high rate of emigration such as Sivas, Erzurum, Erzincan, Çorum, Çankırı, Yozgat, Tokat, Kahramanmaraş, Siirt, Bingöl, Ağrı and Kars, the Welfare Party significantly increased its votes over the three elections of 1987, 1991 and 1995 and received its highest percentages compared to its performance at national level. Although in 1999, this decreased in most of the provinces in favour of the National Action Party; in Siirt and Ağrı, it lost to the Kurdish nationalist PDP; and in Kars, both the PDP and the DLP increased their votes at the expense of the WP. There have been changes within and between the power blocks, as indicated above. In provinces such as Erzurum, Çorum, Kahramanmaraş, Diyarbakır and Tokat, more than 70 percent of the population is engaged in agriculture, where the rate of

57

The rate of socio-economic development clarifies the term "urbanisation" in terms of the percentage of population; the population density; the population growth; the rate of migration; the rate of literacy; the rate of primary, secondary and university graduates; per capita income; the rate of workforce and output in industry, trade, agriculture and service sectors; and the availability of such services and facilities as education, transportation, electricity, telephone, health, including the number of people per physician, dentist, chemistry and hospital bed.

58

The rank of development from the most developed (1st) to the least (5th) is borrowed from a study by Dinçer et al (1996). They measured the indicators of socio-economic development for each province by the Principal Component Analysis, using the measuring factors given above.

hidden unemployment is high. Only 5 percent of the large and middle sized manufacturing is based in these provinces. In Kastamonu, Hakkari and Tunceli, where the rates of emigration are also very high, the Welfare Party did not show any success. In Kars, Siirt, Bingöl, Hakkari and Tunceli, which are characterized by stagnation because of massive emigration, on which the terrorist activities of the last fifteen years have had a big impact, 60 percent of the population lives in rural areas, and 75 percent is engaged in agriculture. Per capita income for these provinces is one third of the national average. However, in Diyarbakır, where the PDP received 45 percent of the vote in 1999, the WP's strength was not stable, though it regained its 1970s level at the end of the 1990s. Some provinces in the East and the Southeast, such as Erzurum, Diyarbakır, Şanlıurfa and Kahramanmaraş, constitute the first bases for westward (out-regional) emigration.

Provinces with high levels of immigration, such as İstanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli, İzmir, Bursa, Antalya, Adana, İçel, Aydın and Denizli, show different patterns. For example, in İstanbul, Ankara, Kocaeli and Bursa, which, with the addition of İzmir, are the most developed provinces, the WP considerably increased its votes at the expense of both the centre-right (MP and TPP) and centre-left parties (SDDP/RPP). Together these provinces make up of 30 percent of the total population, and produce 45 percent of the national income. For example in Ankara, a high rate of population increase was experienced in districts, such as Gölbaşı, Etimesgut and Sincan, where the WP did better than its average provincial level, and than those of the centre-right and the centre-left parties,. However, the WP's share was increased in districts with a low degree of population increase, such as Mamak, Altındağ and Keçiören, where *gecekondu*

settlements are widespread, and where previously the SDPP/RPP held the municipal governments. In İstanbul, apart from the WP's stronghold districts,⁵⁹ there emerges no significant pattern with respect to the level of population increase. As in Ankara, the WP seems to have increased its votes in some districts with or without a significant rate of population increase. However, it is important to emphasize that the Welfare Party's municipalities to an important extent provided the poor living in shanty-towns with food, clothing, and coal in the winter. This must have had an influence upon its vote. In Kocaeli, the WP increased its votes at the expense of the MP, the TPP and the RPP. However, it is still difficult to determine whether migration can in itself be a decisive factor in explaining the rise of the Welfare Party, since in provinces such as İzmir, Aydın, Muğla, Tekirdağ, Denizli, Eskişehir and Antalya, the WP's share of the vote was notably lower than its national level. Substantial data is necessary to offer a more detailed analysis, which would be able to show the movements of votes between political parties at district levels.

Contrary to the often given explanation which argues that new comers in the urban areas under the burden of economic and social difficulties seek refuge in religion, this chapter has argued that the rise of "Islamism" with its significantly "Islamically oriented" lifestyle and organisations coincided with the period in which the shortcomings of the developmental state created widespread dissatisfaction. Significantly, in the same period, the modernisation paradigm had been under heavy criticism and "Islamism" all over the Muslim world had begun to be

59

No statistical data is found on the rate of population increase in such districts as Sultanbeyli where the Welfare party received more than 50 percent of the votes.

presented as the only/final alternative. Its emphasis upon “equality for all” and social justice when contrasted with experiments with state capitalism, meant that it could be identified with hegemonic classes. Therefore, the Welfare Party could turn general dissatisfaction/reaction into votes, by presenting its stance as one working from below against oppression, corruption and exploitation. The increasing weight of Islamic symbols among those who voted for the Welfare Party in particular or have given support or been sympathetic to Islamist activities/movements in general, in fact meant the articulation of demands for “equality” within a framework of religious rhetoric and protest. However, it cannot be expected that the content and means of Islamism as an ideology would have the same meaning for the poor, the working class or the rising “Muslim bourgeoisie”. In other words, “Islamism” in general does not represent a homogenous group which holds a common formulation of “what an Islamic/Islamist social and political order is about”. From various vaguely worded interpretations, which are heavily dependent upon social position and applied references, even within the Welfare itself one can easily infer, a liberal, democratic position as well as a state-centred, authoritarian version of the supposed “Islamic order”. This means that the trans-class base of Islamists converges in their reaction to and criticism of the “secular” policies of the developmental state, rather than their proposal on how to transform or reform the existing “unjust” order, given their conflicting interests as far as *realpolitik* is concerned. This is explained further in Chapter seven.

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %0	Rate of Net Migration %0	Votes %					
					Welfare Party		National Salvation Party		Virtue Party	1999
					1995	1991	1987	1977		
1.BINGÖL	Eastern Anatolia	5th	44.82	-88	51.6	35.0 ⁶⁰	22.2	25.4	25.5	
2.ELAZIĞ	Eastern Anatolia	3rd	18.26	-46	41.8	29.6	17.6	14.0	27.8	
3.KONYA	Central Anatolia	3rd	28.34	-17	41.7	33.0	15.0	19.8	16.5	
4.SİVAS	Central Anatolia	4th	29.82	-106	39.3	38.3	12.7	14.0	25.7	
5.ERZURUM	Eastern Anatolia	4th	16.66	-113	38.7	37.0	9.8	15.5	29.5	
6.BAYBURT	Black Sea	5th	37.74	-133	38.5	40.5	---	---	Gumushane ⁵⁸	
7.MALATYA	Southeastern A.	3rd	31.04	-54	37.2	22.8	6.0	20.4	19.9	
8.KAHRAMAN MARAŞ	Mediterranean	4th	22.94	-42	36.8	34.5	13.8	15.6	26.7	

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://www.irt.net.tr>

⁵⁸No election result can be given for those provinces which gained province status after the respective election was held, but the figures for the provinces to which they had formerly been attached are stated.

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %0	Rate of Net Migration %0	Votes %						
					Virtue Party	Welfare Party			National Salvation Party		
						1999	1995	1991	1987	1977	1973
9.YOZGAT	Central Anatolia	4th	35.92	-64	21.0	36.0	39.5	8.1	13.0	21.5	
10.KARAMAN	Central Anatolia	3rd	27.99	5	19.8	33.4	29.7	---	---	Konya	
11.KAYSERİ	Central Anatolia	2nd	26.02	-19	23.2	33.1	31.6	9.3	9.0	16.5	
12.ADIYAMAN	Southeastern A.	5th	65.46	-38	27.3	32.5	24.9	11.4	19.2	22.1	
13.ERZİNCAN	Eastern Anatolia	4th	28.38	-93	18.5	32.3	22.0	4.0	15.5	16.1	
14.GÜMÜŞHANE	Black Sea (North)	5th	40.19	-135	23.2	32.1	30.4	13.2	14.9	24.9	
15.KOCAELİ	Marmara (Northwest)	1st	47.09	108	22.1	31.7	22.1	13.2	10.6	18.1	
16.AĞRI	Eastern Anatolia	5th	22.52	-95	12.7	30.7	22.2	14.0	6.3	14.8	
17.TOKAT	Central Anatolia	4th	33.49	-67	20.3	30.7	28.9	8.7	10.4	18.2	
18.ÇORUM	Central Anatolia	4th	29.45	-58	18.0	30.4	27.9	6.4	8.3	21.7	
19.KIRIKKALE	Central Anatolia	3rd	-11.07	-28	15.2	30.2	22.3	---	---	Ankara	

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://www.trt.net.tr>

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %0	Rate of Net Migration %0	Votes %						
					Virtue Party	Welfare Party			National Salvation Party		
						1999	1995	1991	1987	1977	1973
20.MUŞ	Eastern Anatolia	5th	20.97	-100	10.8	29.7	24.3	13.6	17.9	14.7	
21.AKSARAY	Central Anatolia	4th	31.30	-8	16.8	29.6	26.9	---	---	Nigde	
22.BİTLİS	Eastern Anatolia	5th	21.04	-72	20.8	29.0	29.1	21.1	27.3	11.3	
23.NEVŞEHİR	Central Anatolia	3rd	31.07	-41	18.3	28.4	26.5	10.7	9.9	18.4	
24.SAKARYA	Marmara	3rd	27.42	10	24.3	28.2	23.2	10.6	10.6	18.2	
25.SİİRT	Southeastern A.	5th	38.43	-141	13.3	28.0	20.6	24.1	22.0	9.5	
26.ÇANKIRI	Central Anatolia	4th	31.59	-61	19.8	27.2	29.2	6.8	10.0	16.3	
27.BOLU	Black Sea	3rd	27.58	-9	19.5	26.5	18.0	7.5	9.5	17.3	
28.TRABZON	Black Sea	3rd	20.67	-68	19.6	26.3	22.2	11.2	10.0	15.1	
29.ŞANLIURFA	Southeastern A.	4th	60.54	-30	21.2	26.2	18.4	11.9	19.5	17.6	
30.BATMAN	Southeastern A.	5th	55.89	14	13.8	24.5	15.3	---	---	---	
31.KİLİS	Mediterranean	---	---	---	15.4	25.7	---	---	---	Hatay	
32.KÜTAHYA	Aegean (West)	3rd	22.89	-9	17.0	24.5	20.2	9.1	7.0	14.3	
33.İSTANBUL	Marmara	1st	38.47	108	21.4	23.9	16.7	6.9	6.6	8.4	

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977; General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://trt.net.tr>.

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %0	Rate of Net Migration %0	Votes %						
					Virtue Party	Welfare Party			National Salvation Party		
						1999	1995	1991	1987	1977	1973
34.RİZE	Black Sea	3rd	7.36	-84	20.7	23.9	19.8	14.2	12.7	21.9	
35.VAN	Eastern Anatolia	5th	50.52	-38	18.7	23.8	22.5	17.4	20.5	7.0	
36.GAZİANTEP	Southeastern A.	3rd	46.21	0	15.8	23.8	17.7	6.5	8.5	11.0	
37.AMASYA	Black Sea	3rd	14.34	-60	15.6	23.3	20.0	5.3	7.3	17.8	
38.NİĞDE	Central	3rd	25.94	-56	14.1	22.6	20.0	8.1	9.3	11.4	
39.AFYON	Aegean	3rd	26.93	-38	11.3	22.2	24.9	11.4	8.2	16.4	
40.SAMSUN	Black Sea	3rd	21.99	-29	15.1	22.2	16.1	6.0	6.2	13.4	
41.KARABÜK	Black Sea	---	---	---	13.8	21.9	---	---	---	Zonguldak	
42.GİRESUN	Black Sea	4th	36.15	-74	16.2	21.2	16.3	6.7	8.9	8.7	
43.ANKARA	Central Anatolia	1st	24.31	25	17.5	21.0	17.6	4.2	6.1	9.3	
44.KARS	Eastern Anatolia	5th	9.31	-164	9.7	20.5	7.1	4.1	10.0	7.7	
45.MARDİN	Southeastern A.	5th	42.41	-70	11.7	20.0	8.7	17.0	23.2	12.7	
46.YALOVA	Marmara	---	---	---	14.5	18.9	---	---	---	Kocaeli	
47.BURSA	Marmara	1st	47.82	62	15.3	18.8	13.6	6.3	5.9	9.4	

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://trt.net.tr>.

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %	Rate of Net Migration %	Votes %					
					Welfare Party			National Salvation Party		
					1999	1995	1991	1987	1977	1973
48.DİYARBAKIR	Southeastern A.	4th	44.44	-35	14.5	18.8	12.0	24.5	17.9	18.5
49.KIRŞEHİR	Central Anatolia	3rd	24.18	-80	9.5	18.6	23.5	6.1	11.9	13.8
50.HATAY	Mediterranean	3rd	20.10	-4	12.2	18.5	13.7	6.1	5.1	6.4
51.ORDU	Black Sea	4th	44.41	-55	11.8	17.9	14.0	6.4	7.9	7.3
52.SINOP	Black Sea	4th	30.20	-89	12.2	17.9	13.7	5.0	7.7	7.7
53.ADANA	Mediterranean	2nd	32.03	16	12.3	16.7	14.7	5.5	6.3	8.2
54.ISPARTA	Mediterranean	3rd	35.20	-17	9.55	16.1	12.4	3.5	3.8	7.1
55.BİLECİK	Marmara	3rd	38.21	20	11.0	15.8	10.2	3.5	6.4	14.6
56.BALIKESİR	Marmara	2nd	24.51	5	11.4	15.0	10.2	4.8	4.8	8.6
57.ARTVİN	Black Sea	4th	11.02	-99	8.81	14.5	8.9	3.7	5.8	7.9
58.ESKİŞEHİR	Central Anatolia	2nd	23.16	11	9.72	14.5	10.2	2.9	4.2	9.2
59.ZONGULDAK	Black Sea	3rd	12.37	-29	9.65	14.3	11.9	5.0	5.0	8.2
60.UŞAK	Aegean	3rd	30.45	2	7.25	14.0	12.8	3.9	5.9	6.7
61.BURDUR	Aegean	3rd	21.40	-37	10.31	13.4	12.2	3.6	6.8	9.3

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://trt.net.tr>.

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %	Rate of Net Migration %	Votes %						
					Virtue Party		Welfare Party			National Salvation Party	
					1999	1995	1991	1987	1977	1973	
62.ANTALYA	Mediterranean	2nd	73.40	90	6.2	13.3	8.8	3.1	5.6		
63.MANİSA	Aegean	3rd	30.69	21	8.4	13.2	9.9	5.2	9.3		
64.ARDAHAN	Eastern Anatolia	5th	---	---	7.9	13.2	---	---	Kars		
65.BARTIN	Black Sea	---	---	---	8.1	12.4	7.1	---	Zonguldak		
66.KASTAMONU	Black Sea	4th	13.59	-66	7.4	11.0	13.2	4.5	6.0		
67.İÇEL	Mediterranean	2nd	52.91	68	5.1	10.7	8.7	2.6	2.8		
68.DENİZLİ	Aegean	2nd	31.43	15	5.7	10.3	7.2	3.3	5.3		
69.ÇANAKKALE	Marmara	3rd	25.78	-5	6.5	10.0	6.4	4.9	5.5		
70.İĞDIR	Eastern Anatolia	5th	---	---	12.9	9.4	---	---	Agri		

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://trt.net.tr>.

Table 9: The Percentage of Welfare Votes in the General Elections Considered against the Rates of Socio-Economic Development and Migration

Province	Region	Rate of Development	Rate of Population Increase in Urban Centres %	Rate of Net Migration %	Votes %						
					Virtue Party		Welfare Party			National Salvation Party	
					1999	1995	1991	1987	1977	1973	
71.AYDIN	Aegean	2nd	27.25	27	4.8	8.7	6.7	3.1	2.8	3.0	
72.İZMİR	Aegean	1st	33.02	64	4.9	8.5	6.0	2.3	2.9	4.2	
73.SIRNAK	Southeastern A.	5th	107.29	-25	11.1	8.3	2.6	---	---	Diyarba kir	
74.TEKİRDAĞ	Marmara	2nd	43.22	47	6.2	7.0	5.0	2.1	2.5	3.3	
75.HAKKARI	Southeastern A.	5th	84.82	-33	9.9	6.0	6.3	2.8	18.5	2.1	
76.EDİRNE	Marmara	3rd	27.89	-21	3.5	5.3	3.8	2.1	2.2	2.2	
77.MUĞLA	Aegean	2nd	47.73	33	3.3	5.0	4.0	1.8	2.2	3.6	
78.KIRKLARELİ	Marmara	2nd	20.77	-21	3.4	4.9	3.8	2.0	1.5	2.6	
79.TUNCELİ	Eastern Anatolia	5th	30.69	-154	2.4	2.7	5.6	1.4	1.0	2.6	

Source: Compiled from General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1977: General Election of Representatives: Results by Provinces, 1995; Statistical Yearbook of Turkey, 1996; B. Dinçer et al (1996) İllerin Socio-economic Gelişmişlik Sıralaması Araştırması; and the 1999 election results on <http://trt.net.tr>.

Chapter 6: A Clash of the Two World Views: Secularism versus Islamism?

The preceding chapters gave an analysis of the rise of the Islamist Welfare Party not in terms of a unique feature of Muslim societies, but of an example of the type of response to the inequalities of national development model. This argument is further strengthened by Chapter seven. However, in order to show the explanatory strength of this standpoint in analysing Islamism as an example of modern ideologies, this chapter is designed to show the shortcomings of culturalist perspective, and its usefulness to those who have power to interpret social world and distort realities. This is done in the context of its representation in both secular and Islamist media. This analysis contributes to the argument on the relationships between ideology and economic within the framework of the propaganda model by looking at the ways in which newspapers function as ideological apparatuses, or a barrier which interprets the social world in the service of propaganda through the coverage of specific events, in this case the rise of the Welfare Party to power. They have a role to perform in the production, reproduction and distribution of knowledge in its widest sense of sets of symbols, which have a meaningful relationship to experience in the social. This chapter shows that selected ways of thinking through press coverage are translated by those in society who have political and economic power into “common sense” or “common desires”, which appears as the natural, unpolitical state of things that should be accepted by everyone in order to seize/maintain and interpret social and economic space. In the literature on Turkey there has been no critical analysis of this process with reference to the press. There is also a neglect of the need to analyse the political economy of mass communication, to illuminate the socio-economic controversy

over Islamism when comparing the attitudes of two perspectives within the mass media, secularism and Islamism.

The propaganda model means that the mass media in their function to serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the populace can employ means by which dominant interests are able to distort news and marginalise dissent in order to mobilize support for themselves. Therefore the purposes of the dominant elite are promoted in the name of the “national interest” (Herman and Chomsky, 1994: 1-2). It reflects the belief that, within this model, their choices, emphases and exclusions can best be understood by analysing them in such terms. It is not claimed that propaganda is all that the mass media does, but it is seen as a very important aspect of their overall service. The propaganda model is based upon slogans that are continually repeated to produce an instinctive reaction, or the translation of a highly complicated phenomenon into a set of ideas capable of being expressed in short phrases that could occupy the agenda day after day by every possible technique of propaganda (Hoch, 1974: 49). It may be difficult to identify a propaganda model in action where the media are largely owned by private companies; where the formal censorship is absent to a considerable degree; and where the media attack and expose from time to time corporate and governmental misconducts and present themselves as a spokespeople for free speech and the general interest. Nevertheless, an analysis of the political economy of mass communication within a propaganda model reflects the contradiction between the crucial underpinning idea of the “free press” and the economic pressures towards monopoly, and the relations between the interests, choices and behaviours of private media systems and ideological effects

of broadcasting and inequality in respect of the command of resources by the state. Such a framework aims to answer the following questions: (a) who controls the media, and in whose interests?; (b) who has access to the media and on what terms?; (c) whose version of social reality is presented?; and (d) how effective are the media in achieving their chosen ends?

This chapter is based on a textual analysis of a specific case study: the representations of the two 'rivals' within Kemalist ideology, Islamism and secularism within press coverage of the legitimacy crisis of the Welfare Party within the Turkish political system. By defining political issues and the amount of importance to be attached to a specific topic, in this case Islamism, the mass media set the agenda for public discussion. Their political impact has been overwhelming in channelling and limiting discussion to distorted, stereotyped images of one or another socio-cultural entity, while largely excluding discussion on the essential social and economic restructuring of society. The media analysis covers two pro-secular newspapers, the mainstream *Milliyet* (Nationality), and the radical left *Cumhuriyet* (Republic); and two pro-Islamic newspapers, both on the radical right, the *Akit* (Covenant) and the *Milli Gazete* (National Paper), which was regarded as the semi-official organ of the Welfare Party. Specific time periods between June 1996, when the Welfare Party rose to power, and June 1997, when the Welfare's government resigned, are chosen to indicate under what circumstances the content of newspapers and their direction were produced. The time period between February and June 1997 is of substantial importance since the first warning by the National Security Council (NSC) was issued in late February and was followed by a sequence of events that led to the end of the

Welfare's Party coalition government. The analysis of newspapers is organised to identify key themes and patterns in both parts of the media to offer a comparison and illustrate what is meant by terms like Islam, Islamism and secularism, and how the Welfare Party is related to them. It aims to show how a content can instruct its readers as to how to see the social world and to structure and limit their understanding about events which take place. It is argued that dichotomies between two sides of the media are part of the struggle between those who have economic power and those, not who do not, but who want to have a meaningful share in that power within a wider context of the distribution of power. Yet it is clear that the dominant news media, as an offspring of the monopoly capitalism, has certain interests of its own that through a network of investments are bound together with other major capitalist corporations, and it seeks to have these particular interests accepted as the so-called "national interest". It is shown that the relative content of the newspapers, each with its own addiction to specific policies which determines what and in how they deserve to be treated, are often anything but "objective" and are constructed to sell one or another world-view. Undoubtedly there are variations between different papers on the amount and depth of distortion.

6.1. The Political Economy of the Mass Media

The news media in Turkey has to be explained in terms of the following factors: the size of ownership, the nature of distribution of publications, advertising as the primary income source and promotions as a means of profit orientation for the dominant mass media firms. Firstly, the Turkish newspaper sector is dominated

in terms of printing, publishing and delivery by the two big corporation, the Doğan Media Group (DMG) and the Media Holding (MH). Both are quite large businesses, despite the presence of numerous independent newspapers at local, regional and national levels. However, of the thirty-eight dailies published at national level, more than half are owned by the DMG⁵⁹ and the MH⁶⁰. In other words, the total market share in terms of newspaper ownership of these two corporations is about 70 percent compared to 30 percent for various others⁶¹. DMG, the owner of the *Milliyet* newspaper, operates in the areas of press, broadcasting, advertising, marketing, insurance services, automotive dealership, and leisure. It owns a total of eleven newspapers, thirty-five magazines, two television channels, three radio stations, three book publishers, and extensive printing facilities. MH has business interests in the areas of printing and publishing daily newspapers, magazines, books, broadcasting, advertising and marketing. It owns nine newspapers, two television channels and three radio stations broadcasting at national level. With regard to magazines, of which there are approximately 300 in Turkey, the two corporations dominate 80 percent of the market.

59

The DMG owns the following newspapers: (a) the high-priced and elite-targeted dailies such as, *Milliyet*, *Hürriyet*, *Yeni Yüzyil*, *Radikal*, *Son Çağrı*, *Finansal Forum*; (b) the low-priced and easy-to-read dailies, *Gözcü*, *Son Havadis*, and *İyi Gazete Posta*; (c) the daily sport paper *Fanatik*; and (d) the weekly *Pazar Postası* (www.doğanmedia.com.tr).

DMG newspapers have an average daily circulation of about 2,700,000 copies in total. *Milliyet* is among the most circulated dailies, with an average of 630,000 copies, while *Hürriyet* sells around 600,000 and *Yeni Yüzyil* 350,000 (Turkey 1997, An International Comparison, DEIK Foreign Economic Relations Board).

60

The MH publishes dailies such as *Sabah*, *Yeni Asır*, *Bugün*, *Liberal Bakış*, *FotoMac*, *Ateş*, *Ekip*, *Takvim*, and *Dedektif*. *Sabah* has reached an average daily circulation of 600,000 copies, while other dailies in the group sell between 75,000 and 160,000 (www.mediaholding.com.tr).

61

Among the independent newspapers, the conservative *Türkiye* has a daily circulation of about 550,000 copies and *Zaman* of 260,000. For so-called radical newspapers the rate of daily circulation is comparably low. *Milli Gazete* and *Akit*, both of which are pro-Islamic, have reached the circulation levels of 40,000 and just under 90,000 respectively. For the radical-left *Cumhuriyet*, daily circulation is about 40,000 (Turkey 1997, An International Comparison, DEIK Foreign Economic Relations Board).

An important consequence of the monopolization of newspaper ownership and its increasing integration with capitalist business is that editorial policy is bound to be influenced by advertisers and sponsors, which in turn enforces "self-censorship" and therefore does not provide a service adequate to the needs of society. News, therefore, as a commodity is supposed to be judged by the standards of the "guided" market. This means that commentators or reporters, with no need for direct instruction, adjust to the realities of source and media organisational requirements. Constraints are imposed by the leaders of the corporate community, top media owners and executives, and other markets and/or centres of state power. In this process, dissidents are threatened with the loss of their livelihood or are treated as irrelevant eccentrics. Herman and Chomsky emphasise the fact that:

the elite domination of the media and marginalization of dissidents that results from the operation of ... filters occurs so naturally that news media people, frequently operating with complete integrity and goodwill, are able to convince themselves that they choose and interpret the news "objectively" and on the basis of professional news values. Within the limits of the filter constraints they often are objective; the constraints are so powerful, and are built into the system in such a fundamental way, that alternative bases of news choices are hardly imaginable (1994: 2).

It is noteworthy that some journalists of the so-called 'watchdog of the people' style develop intimate relations with particular state institutions, for example the Presidential office or the office of the Chief of the Staff, and become mouthpieces for such authorities. Statements like "a close friend in uniform" (implying military generals) often appear in the columns of some leading journalists. Therefore, journalists often act as sort of agents or appendages of the state, and they do not

contest or even raise questions about state policies. This kind of reporting had especially significant effects between February 1997 and the resignation of Welfare Party government, which is discussed in detail below. Such a relationship indicates a sort of *realpolitik* division of power, in which papers are often seen as dominant institutions in which the state or government can have the initiative.

Secondly, a monopolistic combination of trade restraints in the distribution of publications has been established since 1996 by a joint venture between the DMG and the MH. Though this has obviously violated the Competition Law⁶², their monopolistic status has remained⁶³. The two companies, the Yaysat of the DMG and the Birleşik Basın-Dağıtım of the MH, came together and set up the Biryay in 1996. It was agreed that they would not compete with each other; not recruit one another's staff; control the delivery sector together; and hinder competition from any other corporation by price wars. They can unilaterally increase the rate of delivery commissions for papers out of their control or deny the delivery of any newspaper from which they face competition (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası

62

Article 6 of the Competition Law states that establishing a monopoly by one or more company over any service or goods through joint ventures or agreements is prohibited.

63

In order to hinder monopolisation, to increase competition and to encourage new investments in the distribution of publications, the Welfare Party government made an amendment to the Decree regulating governmental credits and aids on 19 September 1997, and opted for allocations of aid to newly established delivery companies. However, among companies who applied for respective aid, four were subsidiaries of either the DMG or the MH, such as the Yaysat, the Birlesik Basın, Simgе Yayincılık and the Biryay. The first applications of the four companies were overturned by the Treasury on the grounds of the afore-mentioned principles. But after the resignation of the Welfare Party, while the new government had been in office for six days in July, the DMG and the MH handed in their second application. The same commission that refused the first application approved the second over a day and allocated approximately \$250 million, half of the cost of the investments in question, although the respective regulation was already outdated by 31 March 1997. It was ruled that: the credit would be provided by a public bank, Halkbank, at once; no repayment would be made for a year; the repayment would be scheduled for the next five years; the interest rate would be 50 percent, though the rate of inflation was 99 percent in 1997; the companies would not pay value added tax of about \$30 million on their purchase of machinery and would be exempted from income taxes and other surcharges: and their imported computer workstations would be exempted from custom duties.

Raporu, or TGS's Report on Media). As a result, while some newspapers have gone out of business or changed hands, others, such as *Milli Gazete* and *Akit*, have had to come to terms with new business dealings.

The amount of cheap credits and incentives provided by the governments between 1983 and 1997 to the two corporations deserves attention with regard to the governmental contribution to the monopolisation of the market. Until 1994, according to the inducements schedules, the governments agreed to financially contribute about 60 to 70 percent to investments by the DMG and the MH, and to make payments in cash⁶⁴. However, government patronage was lowered to 40 percent and cash-payments were cancelled in 1994 by Tansu Çiller, then Prime Minister and the leader of the TPP. The MH received \$195 million between 1985 and 1994, and \$5.5 million between 1994 and 1997. Comparatively, the DMG was given \$407 million and \$18 million respectively for the same periods. In total, they were over fourteen years provided with \$625 million, which made up 90 percent of all the governmental incentives to the mass media. It can be claimed that, in a sense, monopolisation in the mass media has been encouraged by the governments of 1985 and to 1997⁶⁵. With regard to the cheap credits provided from

64

The figures on the governmental incentives to the mass media are presented in the speech delivered by Tansu Çiller, then the deputy prime minister, at her Party's Open Meeting on 10 May 1997 in Istanbul, when the media campaign initiated by the military was already underway against the Welfare Party and the TPP' coalition government; and also in the report on the incentives given to the DMG and the MH by the Undersecretariat of the Treasury, read by Ufuk Söylemez, then the State Minister, in response to a parliamentary question in May 1997.

65

The Turkish Daily News, with reference to a report by the Parliamentary Investigative Commission, dated 20 March 1997, reveals that the two media corporations, the DMG and the MH, have committed fraud by the misuse of their incentive certificates, e.g., imported machinery having incentive certificates does not exist at the companies. The incentive certificates obtained with a commitment to make new investments were consistently used for the importation of used equipment instead of new ones, without paying customs duties or surcharges, and no investment had been made. Carpets, furniture and various construction materials were imported without paying customs duties or surcharges. Yet the term of the incentive certificates was still extended.

special public funds,⁶⁶ the two corporations were exempted from repayment for two years and then had to repay over the next three-year period at a low interest rate. What is interesting is that a public bank was to be the underwriter in credits to the DMG and the MH. Therefore, if they did not pay the loans back, the underwriting bank would be liable to do so.

Thirdly, for both marketing and sales of advertising slots in papers, magazines or television channels at national as well as local levels, the DMG and the MH dominate the sector. The DMG newspapers *Milliyet* and *Hürriyet*, the dominant medium for print advertising, took 63 percent of the total newspaper advertising revenue in 1996. The same percentage was reached on the magazine side, and two television channels owned by the two corporations, Channel D and Atv, also gained more than half of the combined revenue of all the channels in Turkey. At present, the DMG alone acquires almost two-thirds of all press advertising in Turkey⁶⁷. It can be argued that newspapers which are themselves units of vast money-making concern are expected to treat the other parts, for example, big business in general, or public companies that transfer considerable amounts of their advertising budgets to these newspapers, as responsibly as possible. Since

Furthermore, there had been numerous sustained irregularities in the loans provided from special public funds. Although the maximum amount of soft loans would be 30 percent of the total cost of the investment projects in question, far larger amounts had been received by certain companies (Scandals by Kemal Balci, July 1997).

66

The number of special funds was about 80 until 1994 and these were totally under the control of the prime minister and exempted from administrative or judicial supervising.

67

The *Hürriyet* magazine group alone received 48 percent of total magazine advertising revenue, earning \$16,3 million in 1996. Channel D earned \$65.2 million in advertising revenue, which increased by 30 percent or more in 1997. Net advertising revenue for the Bimas, an equal partnership between Channel D and Atv, was \$130 million in 1996, which was 56 percent of the total advertising revenues of television channels, across more than fifteen channels broadcasting at national level without a membership fee (www.doğanmedia.com.tr).

advertisements are kept separated from articles, it is hard to determine how far advertising shapes the entire content of newspapers. An examination of advertising budgets transferred from public institutions to the dominant media reveals significant results. For instance, between the years 1995-96, three public banks, *Emlak*, *Halk* and *Vakıfbank*, paid \$6.5 million to the MH and \$8 million to the DMG, a total of \$14.6 million, or 45 percent of the total advertising spending budget of the three banks.

Finally, promotions of a wide variety of goods, e.g., from household appliances such as television sets, hi-fi's, and irons to kitchen gadgets, have become central to newspaper publishing since 1995. Newspapers were restricted to the educational give-aways before this day⁶⁸. Along with the introduction of new titles, existing papers began to be printed in two copies, with and without promotion vouchers. When this proved to be costly for publishers, readers were given two options: (a) to buy papers at a low price with no promotion; or (b) to pay three or four times as much for the same paper with a small card "certificate" attached to it. The sales price of newspapers continued to climb rapidly. The MH reports that after the introduction of promotions, the net sales of its papers rose by 105 percent in 1997 compared to the figures for 1996. Yet due to regulatory restrictions on newspapers' promotion introduced by the Welfare Party government, the circulation figures for newspapers experienced a steady decline in 1997 and never reached its previous level. That meant loss of a substantial revenue for the marketing companies of the DMG and the MH. Their papers criticised the

68

The DMG reports that a total of 1,752 promotions were run by 14 newspapers in 1996, and 30 million products were distributed to readers through the marketing companies of either the DMG or the MH (www.doganmedia.com.tr).

government for imposing new terms of censorship. After the Welfare Party government resigned the news corporations found another way under the new government to escape the restrictions of the previously imposed regulations by the introducing highly priced supplements to their newspapers (TGS's Report on Media).

6.2. The Representations of Secularism and Islamism in the Media Content

The textual analysis of newspapers is organised as follows: (a) the occurrences and definitions of themes, such as the Welfare Party, Islam, Islamism and secularism, are illustrated in tabulated form, which represents the relevant content in three separate periods (see tables at the end of this chapter); and (b) an analysis of the content on the nature of the relationship between Islam and modernity, with reference to the construction of identity in terms of "we" and "others". Both sides of the media differ in their world-views, and present the other as the worst possible alternative. However, what is striking is that there is a convergence in terms of their attitudes. Similarities are vital. Prejudice about "others", misconceptions, misrepresentations and misuses of terms are some examples. Issues tend to be framed in terms of a dichotomized world of modernist and anti-modernist powers, with gains and losses allocated to contesting ideas. The main conflict is presented in terms of a sense of "clashes of two rival cultures": one is Western, linked to rationality and progress, and adopted by the secular media, and the other is Eastern and associated with irrationality and backwardness. Both groups often tend to define themselves, "we", with reference

to “others”, and present the population of Turkey in two polar sides, “modern versus traditional (reactionary)” for the secular media, or “Western-oriented versus Muslims” for the Islamist media. We are given two groups of people: (a) those who think of religion as a taboo subject; and (b) those who perceive any religious ritual as “reactionary” (a backward force) and use ideas of democracy, human rights and secularism in their attempts to discredit religion. In other words, one can either be secular or religion oriented, or in more pejorative terms “anti-religious or a religious fanatic (fundamentalist)”. In the process, each side considers their own practices as entirely legitimate. A sense of “threat”, either to secularism or to religion, shapes much of the dispute in the media. Prejudice leads attitudes different ways: it either perceives religious as people hostile to the “modernising state” and democracy, or secular people as hostile to religion. Belief that a clash of world-views and values would lead to an imminent and destructive confrontation between Islam and modernity, on the one hand, and between Islam and the Western oriented attitude, on the other hand, underlies much of the media propaganda⁶⁹.

6.2.1. Historical Context of the Media Campaign

In the general election of December 1995, the Welfare Party received 21.4 percent of the votes, the highest share in comparison to the centre-right parties (19.6 percent for the Motherland Party, 19.2 percent for the True Path Party), and the centre-left parties (14.6 percent for the Democratic Left Party and 10.7 percent for

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For a general argument of the media approach to Islam and Islamist movements, see J. L. Esposito (1992) *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*

the Republican People's Party). Such a distribution of votes brought a fragmented balance of seats in the Parliament and prevented any single party from coming to power without forming a coalition. After the election, despite opposition from secular parties and the media, the Welfare Party was assigned the duty of forming a coalition government by the President, but its attempt was rejected by both of the centre-right parties. In March 1996, the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) established a coalition, although that collapsed a few months later. That gave the Welfare Party a second opportunity, in June 1996, to try to form a new government. Finally, a coalition with the True Path Party under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan was announced.

Soon after taking office in June 1996, Erbakan set the stage for closer relations with Islamic countries, including for example Iran and Libya. However, this was widely criticised by the army generals, opposition parties, some factions in the TPP, the minor partners in the coalition, and the secular media, as it was perceived as being politically motivated. Later, however, the policy was justified by the Welfare Party on the economic grounds that Turkey could increase its exports by selling goods to Islamic countries, as Turkey's exports to the West had reached saturation point and Iranian natural gas would help to both narrow the energy gap and reduce the level of dependence on Russian gas. Subsequently, a multi-billion-dollar natural gas deal was signed, which included the construction of a pipeline between Turkey and Iran and the supply of Iranian natural gas. The deal was agreed despite allegations reported in the secular media that Iran had been helping the Kurdish separatists, the PKK. It was also instrumental in creating the so-called Developing-8, whose members included: Egypt, Libya, Iran, Pakistan,

Indonesia, Malaysia, Nigeria and Turkey. This group aimed to develop economic, political and military relations among their developing Muslim countries. Subsequently, tensions escalated when the army sent tanks into action through Ankara's Sincan district, a stronghold of the Welfare Party, early in February 1997 after an Islamist protest took place to mark Jerusalem Day, which was attended by the Welfare Party's mayor of the district and the Iranian ambassador. Later, the mayor was tried and imprisoned for violating the secular establishment.

The decisive moment came when the National Security Council (NSC) issued a 20-point proposal to the government at the end of the month. This heralded the intensified campaign by the military, the judicial system, political parties, big business, the media, trade unions and "secular" women's organisations against the Welfare government. It largely reflected the will of the army. The NSC, an advisory body, is an effective vehicle for immense army influence on politics, as explained earlier. The Council's role, in theory, is to "advise" the politicians on matters concerning security, but its advice is rarely disregarded by governments. Moreover, the economy, education and foreign policy have become the domain of the NSC. Its wide remit is claimed to be designed to hinder the growing "Islamisation" of the bureaucracy. The plan included improvements to the judicial system, a ban on 'pro-Sharia propaganda on so-called Islamist television channels and radio stations', tighter restrictions on religious dress, and measures to prevent "Islamists" from entering the state institutions. It was clear that this was directed at graduates of the *Imam Hatip* Schools, since a comprehensive inquiry was started after the Welfare Party stepped down into district governors who were alleged to be "Islamists", were graduates of administration, economics or law

faculties, but had their high school education at the *Imam Hatip* Schools. The military also called on the Welfare Party to stop recruiting officers expelled from the armed forces because of their 'Islamist sympathies' in local government. The closure of Quranic teaching institutions controlled by Islamists was to go ahead. The strict surveillance began of those financial organisations that were controlled by religious fraternities. The proposal also sought strict application of the law on the secular principles, which initially referred to "dress code". The government was told not to stray from the path of democracy and official secularism, although the emphasis was on secularism as understood by the generals.

Until the resignation of the Welfare Party government, the usual monthly congregation of the National Security Council was given greater attention than ever before by the media and a 'possible military intervention' to save the secular and democratic state from the Welfare Party coalition government had very often been mentioned. The pilgrimage of Erbakan and some Welfare Party's ministers to Mecca while in office was widely criticised as the exploitation of religion for political aims, and a violation of the secular principles of the Republic. During the period of pilgrimage, the crisis escalated as the generals unilaterally declared the "internal" threat (read Islamist activities) to the integrity of the state to be the key security threat rather, than the external one (the PKK). Erbakan had been subjected to a sustained political assault by senior generals, who complained that he was undermining the secular basis of Turkey's modern republic by aiming to establish a "*Sharia*" state with its pro-Western stance in foreign and military

affairs.⁷⁰ In the time period between April and June 1997, the Welfare Party experienced its elimination from power while in office. A significant reason for crisis between the government and the army was the generals' pursuit of military and security cooperation with Israel, which was officially announced later in May. The military's expanded alliance with Israel without the apparent consent of the civilian government exacerbated the tensions between the military and the Welfare Party's representatives, while the Welfare Party looked increasingly to the Muslim states for economic and security assistance. However, when Erbakan tried to cancel the military's joint exercise with Israel, the generals insisted that they would proceed and took military initiatives without consulting him as the Prime Minister.

In the meantime, the twelfth proposal for the dismissal of the government since the rise of the Welfare Party to power, was placed before Parliament by the opposition, although it was rejected. Despite the Welfare Party's opposition, the arrest of those in so-called Islamic dress by the police went ahead. This was accompanied by TV cameras. Some managers of religious endowments who were charged with organising irredentist activities were also arrested. A vital blow for the future of the Welfare Party was taken in May 1997 by the Chief Republican prosecutor, who applied to the Constitutional Court for its closure on the grounds of violating the secular and democratic regime. This was followed by the dismissal of 166 junior and senior military officers, who were blamed for taking part in "Islamist movements", by the Higher Military Council, whose judgements are final. The decisive moment came in mid-June when the Office of the General Staff

70

It should be noted that the secular faction avoids using the term "Islamic state" so as not to challenge general Islamic feelings. They prefer "*Sharia*", from their point of view, to imply a backward social and political system by drawing attention to incidents of chopping off of heads or arms under *Sharia* law, e.g. in Saudi Arabia.

announced the “internal enemy”, the Welfare Party. It started its briefing on “reaction”, named as the internal enemy, and called for protest against some commercial firms, named as “Islamist”, which were accused of providing the financial resources for “reactionary movements”. Upon invitation from the army, hundreds of and selected members of Turkish and foreign media attended the briefing at which the Welfare Party was charged with crimes against the Constitution. Of these, the most critical one was the charge that “the Welfare was aiding the terrorism of the Kurdish Workers’ Party, the PKK”. The Welfare government was accused of turning a blind eye to military evidence that neighbouring powers, Iran for instance, were supporting Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. The Office of the Chief of Staff pronounced that “we [the military] *as every responsible citizen would react to any internal threat [read Islamism]... since we have the power of the gun we would not hesitate to use it according to the wishes of people*”.⁷¹ The real message from the generals at the briefing was regarding what they expected from courts of law in dealing with “the cases of Islamic threat”. That was already preceded by prosecutors, acting on the mandate of the secular establishment, demanding the dissolution of the Welfare Party on the grounds of promoting a civil war between religious and secular Turks and undermining the country’s secular foundations. The mobilisation of symbols, such as Kemalism with its emphasis upon modernity, republicanism and secularism, was necessary to cater to and enforce the undisputed privileged image

71

The reactionary, threatening developments reported in the media comprised of the following: (a) a theatrical performance, the language of which was accused of attempting to mobilise society against the state (the defendants were later charged with imprisonment); (b) a vandal attack on a bust of Ataturk, for which “radical Islamists” were blamed; (c) the twenty-seven students of a Preachers’ school who shouted “we want Sharia law”; (d) a broadcast against the president of the Constitutional Court and; (e) the arrest of eight members of the illegal IBDA-C (Islamist terror organisation), though the charges were not mentioned. To these is also added a steady increase in religious dress in some parts of Istanbul.

and the position of “born-again” Kemalists in the struggle to protect the “national interest”. The concept of a ‘real threat’, or the claimed ‘new source of internal terrorism’, provided the rationale for the military through the National Security Council (NSC) unilaterally to set the political, administrative and even judicial agendas. The importance and utility of pressing the terrorism issue, by linking it to the PKK, attempted to create hatred in the public mind, which has been experiencing terrorism since 1984, and therefore to legitimise and justify the means of the guardianship. By uttering the magic word “democracy”, any decision or action was legitimized in attempting to “avert the Islamist attack and save the Republic”. The restructuring of an “exclusionary regime”, the outlines of which were initially drawn by the military, secured more latitude from the early 1980s onwards for the military to display its authority without resorting to a coup, as the ‘democratic opinion’ in society had entrusted the military with the duty of maintaining national unity and state security. The motives of the military and their policies through the NSC were presented by the media organs of the DMG and the MH as always noble and directed to the “national interest”. It is important to note an informal rule considering press coverage of the army: the military has been very sensitive to threats or challenges to its authority and this is basically respected by the press. While the press attacks parliamentarians, presidents or executive branches, the unaccountable nature of the military remains unquestioned. When the secular media and ‘democratic organisations’ lean on the military, as far as Islamists are concerned this enforces further the status of military as the primary political agents.

The military was able to engineer change by pressuring the President to appoint

a new cabinet. Under the threat of a possible military takeover, the government resigned on 19 June 1997 and a new coalition government was soon established by the Motherland Party, the Democratic Left Party and two splinter centre-right parties which both had very few seats in the Parliament. This coalition was backed by the ex-members of the True Path Party, who were either transferred to the Motherland Party or remained independent, and by the members of the Republican People's Party, although it stayed out of the government. Soon after the "Mother-Left" coalition took office, the bill on reforming compulsory education was passed by the Parliament. That increased compulsory education to eight consecutive years, as against the Welfare Party formula of five-plus-three years. That meant the closure of the mid-level of the *Imam Hatip* Schools and the limitation of the prospects of their graduates, as it ruled that they could only get places in Theology Faculties.

The Constitutional Court commenced the trial of the Welfare Party in September 1997. Finally, the generals' campaign against the Welfare Party resulted in its closure by the Constitutional Court on 16 December 1998, and six members, including Erbakan, were banned from politics for five consecutive years for violating secular laws. However, the members of the Welfare Party had announced the establishment of a new party, the Virtue Party, a month earlier to save their political lot, although they argued that the closure of the Welfare Party, which represented 20 percent of the voters, would have disastrous consequences for the future of Turkish democracy .

It is clear that politics in Turkey have been played out under the close supervision

of the army. It is undeniable that the self-perceived guardians of the secular legacy, with the considerable backing of the secular faction, wanted to permanently eliminate the Welfare Party from government and to maintain the status quo in determining state policies. The military was successful in keeping its grip on setting the domestic and foreign policy agendas. It has acted not only as the ultimate guardian of the Constitution, which grants the generals amnesty and protects their preeminent place in Turkish politics, but also as the authority that discreetly sets the boundaries of political activity. Being thus unaccountable, the military is the strongest institution in Turkey, as demonstrated by its public humiliation of an elected government.

6.2.2. Secularism, Islamism and Representations of the Welfare Party: 'A Fundamentalist Threat to Modernity'

The dominant media played a crucial role in discrediting the Welfare Party until its removal from power in June 1997, and in its closure by the Constitutional Court in January 1998. The press hysteria started by fanning the fears of an approaching threat of 'Islamic fundamentalism'. The *Cumhuriyet* daily summarised the threat with the headline: "the Welfare is coming!".⁷² This equated it with a kind of evil force, just before the 1995 general election was held. This view found wide support among the leaders of other political parties, from Tansu Çiller of the TPP and Mesut Yılmaz of the MP on the right-wing, to Bülent Ecevit of the DLP and Deniz Baykal of the RPP on the left-wing. The main theme in the election agenda of these parties was the policy of secularism, and inevitably, Kemalist ideology.

72

Cumhuriyet, 19.12.1995

Almost the whole election was identified as a struggle between secularism and “fundamentalism”, or between a secular and democratic regime and a theocracy. A secular pole agreed on with the statement that “the Welfare was the party of religious reactionaries, or ‘religious fundamentalists’, who would turn Turkey into darkness”.⁷³ Therefore, the choice for the electorate as dutiful citizens was as if between republicanism and theocracy. Despite all warnings from the media and political parties, when the election results to an extent favoured the Welfare Party and nearly six months after the election it had opportunity to come to power after the failure of the TPP and the MP coalition, the second round of the media campaign began. The propaganda themes of the secular media, which aimed to manipulate the public through a form of psychological exploitation quickly became established as true even without real evidence in the process of campaigning to discredit the Welfare Party, and to invite and support military involvement in politics as a means of saving “the secular and democratic establishment”. A mythical ‘fundamentalist-directed’ plot, originating either from Iran, Saudi Arabia or Libya, to overthrow the Republic with the help of the Welfare Party was disseminated as a ‘true’ fact. Facts were selected to fit the dominant framework. It was claimed that the threat was ‘real’ and guilt was fixed: the traitors organised themselves through the Welfare Party by utilising the means of democracy, and would do anything to achieve their destructive aims. The *Milliyet* stated several times as established fact that “*the Welfare is ready to do anything to achieve its aims, [the establishment of a theocratic-despotic regime], at the expense of democracy and... secularism,... would even chop millions of heads off over night in order to stay in power*”, which was also speculated by Deniz Baykal of the RPP.

73

Cumhuriyet, 8, 10, 18, 28, 30.12.1995.

Such prototyped views, with no news content whatsoever but consisting of somebody's opinion or speculation about the case by drawing conclusions from what happened in Afghanistan or in the Algerian conflict in 1997, which involved the Algerian Islamist party, were widely reported in secular newspapers, reaching the daily circulation of about five million along with the viewers of television channels, and largely owned by the DMG and the MH, as mentioned before. No question was raised about their validity. For example, the personal opinions of Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the DLP, on the Welfare Party and its supporters were presented as an evidence of its allegedly destructive aims. His remarks on the backward nature of the *Talibans* and their politics, and subsequently their claimed resemblance to the Welfare Party contributed to 'the mythical plot of fundamentalism' to destroy secularism in the name of democratic rights and freedoms.⁷⁴ This kind of reporting occupied the newspapers for days with the exclusion of alternative opinions and sources inclined towards other ways of

74

A widely disputed example came from an army general when Necmettin Erbakan went on a pilgrimage in April 1997. The general, pictured in his uniform and mainly referred by the secular media as one who had fought against the PKK, publicly criticised Erbakan's pilgrimage while prime minister on the basis of the principle of secularism and accused him of being in collaboration with Saudi Arabia for establishing a Sharian state in Turkey. He claimed that there was political pressure being generated within society regarding the military to intervene and therefore maintain the secular and democratic establishment. As bureaucrat, he emphasised that the principle of diversity of thought could be acceptable if any group or political party complied with the principles of the Republic. He believed that the Party took over the Republic by means of democracy, but aimed at disestablishing it. In the general's view, Erbakan would stay in power by oppression, even by chopping off heads like in Algeria. His last remarks drew the most attention: he said "I have fought against the PKK and will do so against them [the Welfare Party], too" (All papers, 19.4.1997).

The general's speech received wide criticism from the Islamist media, which asked for disciplinary action against the general for his insulting words, among which the most insulting was the word "pimp". But the general's speech was applauded by a wide audience from the President to the leaders of political parties, such as the DLP, the RPP and the MP, some trade unions, the Chief of Staff and even ministers from the TPP. While President, Demirel, announced that it was an example of general dissatisfaction with the Welfare Party, Bülent Ecevit, the leader of the DLP, appreciated it as the democratic reaction of a responsible citizen to irrational, irresponsible and backward fanatics.

looking at the issue.⁷⁵ The great conspiracy of Islamists to overthrow the secular republican regime was an extremely useful strategy for the dominant interest. In May 1997, “the Day the Religious Fanatics (Fundamentalist) Revolt” was spread across the front pages of several papers of the DMG and the MH. The same photographs of demonstrators, including a little girl with a head-scarf, a little boy with a band reading “God is great” on his forehead, men with beards and religious caps, and women in head-scarfs or some in *çarşaf*, all protesting the proposal to close the first grade of *Imam Hatips* in Istanbul, covered several pages of the papers with comments on the danger of a highly likely armed uprising and ‘the bloody struggle of fundamentalists’. The choice of the adjectives such as “religious fanatics” and “fundamentalists” meant that a lengthy description of the issue was avoided and the situation was defined in terms of a national security matter, as referred by the generals, although the concept of this was left to the imagination of readers. The contents of the newspapers hardly urged their readers to ask why that protest had taken place, or to by take into account its socio-economic and political environment. Cliches were dealt with rather than news.⁷⁶ By the words they used and the way these words were linked together, the newspapers of the DMG and the MH presented the public with a certain stereotyped view of ‘reality’. The ‘danger’ was at the doorstep and should be stopped through every possible

75

The concept of ‘fundamentalist threat’ can be observed more than fifteen times in the same month in the Milliyet. See for example the issues of 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 19, 24, 26.4.1997; and the Cumhuriyet for 26, 30.3.1997 ; 24, 25.4.1997; and 11, 12.5.1997. It is noteworthy that the reports on Algeria were presented with reference to either no source at all or exclusively to the French or Algerian official sources.

76

For a similar view, see A. Mango (1990) “The Consolations of Religion in Turkey”. With reference to a number articles published in Milliyet daily between 25 April and 2 March 1988, he argues that secularist journalists in Turkey often have a fixed opinion on the dangers of “religious reaction”. Analyses based upon reports picked from mainstream newspapers converge on a premise that “religious reaction represents a threat to the way of life of the more or less secularised Turkish middle class”.

means. Choices of stories and the volume and quality of coverage reflects a systematic and highly political dichotomisation of news coverage based on its serviceability to important domestic power interests. The deliberately fermented media hysteria contributed to some controversial prosecutions in judicial history, for example, the arrest of civilians with “unapproved clothes”, such as religious caps or long-loose dresses worn by men, in public. Some prominent figures within the “Islamist community”, such as the chairperson of the MÜSİAD, were prosecuted for various reasons, for instance because their speeches were claimed to have violated the principle of secularism or they were found to have undertaken financial wrong-doings. Furthermore, the media hysteria contributed to the closure of the Welfare in the Constitutional Court in January 1998 on the basis of speeches given by six of its members. The speeches by members of the Welfare Party, as described in the Indictment by the Chief Public Prosecutor for its closure included the following: (a) a speech made by Necmettin Erbakan on 13.1.1991, which included the sentence *“this party [the Welfare] is the army of Islamic war”*; (b) another speech by Erbakan on 3.4.1994, which read *“The Welfare...will come to power. A just order will be established....Will the transition be harsh or smooth, will it be bloodless?”*; (c) a speech by Şevki Yılmaz when he was mayor, that refers to *jihād* and says that *“jihād is the activity which is carried out in order to raise the notion of justice and to spread the notion of Islam”*; (d) a second speech by Şevki Yılmaz after he was elected as a representative, as follows *“religious lessons at school are not enough. The preparation for the next world must also be included...One and a half billions of Muslims are establishing a Liberation Army”* (e) a speech by Hasan Hüseyin Ceylan, a deputy, on 14.3.1993 when he said that *“this country is ours, but the regime is not...The regime and Kemalism belong to*

the others...Turkey will topple over" (Refah Partisi İddianamesi ve Mütaalası, 1997). In the Indictment, four more speeches along with those mentioned above are presented by the Chief Prosecutor as the clearest proof of the violation of secularism. Regardless of the content of the speeches, what was controversial about the Indictment was that for the first time in judicial history a chief prosecutor submitted his request to the owners of the dominant media to distribute the text of the Indictment as a supplement with their newspapers to readers, before it was read out before the Constitutional Court, despite the fact that such a pre-trial press disclosure is prohibited by Turkish Press Law. The 'facts', the 'problems', and the words that are used and the way they are put together in the Indictment do not seem much more than ideological props for a world view without which they may not be 'facts', 'problems', or valid words. It is rather a text based upon a trial of Islam as a religion, as it allegedly examines, for instance, the principles of equality, democracy, human rights, the principle of retaliation, the use of slaves, and the social position of women according to the verses of the Quran, with reference to writings in the Islamist press, the views, interpretations and behaviours of which were somehow attributed as the expressions of the official line of the Welfare Party and were presented as evidences of its violation of secular principles.

Secularism Versus Islam

The content of the secular newspapers, the *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet*, is dominated by a defence of the implementation of secularist policies in the name of safeguarding the values of democracy and rationality, and a rejection of the Islamists' so-called demand for the establishment of an Islamic state. What is common in secular media is the emphasis of pre-Islamic Turkish history in their

attempt to prove that Islam is not the only core essence of the "Turkish" identity, and the use of the Enlightenment language of secularism, nationalism and scientism. A particular concept of secularism is favoured. The main themes are that: (a) Islam is incompatible with secularism and consequently with democracy and modernity; (b) secularism means the separation of the religion and the state; and (c) secularisation is a necessary component of modernisation and democracy, and is often pronounced as synonymous with democracy. These themes occur in the content of the *Milliyet* and *Cumhuriyet* no less than sixty times throughout the periods chosen. The Western experience is used to emphasise that the Western model of secularisation has global relevance. However, the problematic of secularisation is constructed and thought of within a shallow outline of the story of Western democracy, commencing with the Renaissance and extending through the Enlightenment. For the secular press, secularism is associated with the rule of reason against dogma and the absolutist authority of religion. What is salient in this view is the reproduction of the schism between the cognitive universe of knowledge based upon reason and that of religion based upon faith. Once this is put forward, a comparative approach is applied to argue that a "Muslim Enlightenment" is inevitable, and will lead to a change in the attitudes and values of traditionalists who are unable to adapt and integrate themselves into modern life. In turn, the influence of religion will be degraded in order for Turkey to become a modern society. Subsequently, the idea of secularism, articulated within the problematic of Renaissance, gains sacred value. In this context, any appeal to Islam in politics or social life is devalued as retrogressive or inappropriate to modern political and social relations, and Islam is strictly limited to the private sphere of life. A narrow concept of secularism is

repeated like a slogan: the respective areas of jurisdiction of two institutions of authority, the state and religion, should be maintained separately. In fact, this means a strict control of religion by the state, which has included the dress codes not only for public servants, but also for civilians. This represents a moralistic position by teaching and imposing a modern (ultimately Western) way of life. For instance, the support of leading journalists within the secular media for the ban on students wearing head-scarves demonstrates that they widely share the belief that the head-scarf is the symbol of Islamism, i.e. of reactionism, and therefore political, but not a strictly religious object. However, it is clear that such a classification is based upon assumptions to a great extent. This tendency perceives the national education system primarily in terms of creating "modern and republican elite". The central focus of this view of secularism still revolves around the question of women, a terrain of contestations for demarcating "modernity" and "tradition", "self" and "other". *Milliyet* has noted that secularism is "*the guarantee of human rights...of women rights and equality...necessary component of democracy*" (10,11,24.4.1997). It seems that at the first instance, secularism, democracy and reason are understood as inherently interrelated features of contemporary civilisation, which is the aim and end of history for the secular press. In fact, a kind of obsession with secularism as the foremost sign of modernity suspends the notion of democracy in the sense that it is utilised to claim a monopoly over truth and dismiss the plurality of identity. It is strongly asserted that secularism should be protected by any means against those who are charged with violating it, which is exclusively interpreted by those who claim to have symbolic capital, in this case Kemalists. As a result, secularism is considered to be the prerequisite not of democratization, but of Westernisation, in ascribing the mode

of Western life. Within media propaganda initiated by the military, no deviation within which is tolerated, it was undertaken in the name of safeguarding secularism and democracy by disseminating a fear of a highly likely possibility of the military take-over against an elected government. The possibility of military take-over to protect democracy was justified in terms of the “common interest”, which elude public opinion and are claimed to be only understood by a specific class of responsible men or women who hold undisputably symbolic power over others, as they claim to be committed to Kemalism. In this sense of (guided) democracy, only those who represent the symbolic culture should be making decisions and running things in the political, economic and ideological systems. Such reasoning, first of all, through disseminating the “official ideology”, dictates and legitimates the acts of a “vanguard” to protect what has been done and leads the masses towards a future that they are unable to see for themselves. Secondly, it sanctions those who are unfit to take that position. Finally, as Durgun (1997) describes, it gives the majority of the population the function of spectators, not participants in public affairs. As it is a ‘democracy’ they are allowed to lend their support to one or another party, but that does not mean they can meaningfully participate in managing their own affairs.

The secular press view Islam as an absolutist oppressive religion that in principle as well as in practice offers no guarantees for the protection of civil and human rights. Islam is defined as: “*a threat to democracy and women rights*”, “*an outdated garment as far as modern life is concerned*”, and “*incompatible with democracy, development and contemporary civilisation*” (Cumhuriyet 26.3.1997; 12.5.1997). Islam is conceived as inherently irrational, aggressive, oppressive, violent and

inimical to modernity. In this context, Islamism, exclusively in terms of “threat”, means *“terrorism and a totalitarian challenge, which replaced the threat of Communism, to the West and the contemporary civilisation”* (Milliyet); or *“a black ideology of reaction to modern life and the ideology of religious fanatics who are irrational, backward and anti-democratic”* (Cumhuriyet). Islam and Islamism are reduced to a cliché of Islam against democracy, or Islam’s war with modernity and terrorism. The claim of the homogeneity of Islam on the whole comes from such phrases as “Islam opposes” or “Islamists killed again”, when they actually mean, for example, the Taliban in Afghanistan or the opposition forces in Algeria. This approach leaves no room for distinctions between different interpretations of Islam or the activities of Islamists, and defines all as one type of fundamentalist in its pejorative terms. Such headlines were used to establish a link between Islam and terrorism and to capture public attention: *“religious fanatics chopped off the heads again”, “they killed in cold blood again”, “blood in Algeria is like a stream”* or, *“the hell in Algeria”*.⁷⁷

The choice of adjectives, such as ‘fanatic’, ‘irrational’ and ‘backward’, illustrates a radical mental boundary which separates “we” and “they”, and shows the re-determination of “self” with reference to “other”. For example, in Cumhuriyet, two faces of Turkey are referred to: *“the one is progressive, humanitarian and open-minded... the other is despotic, backward and fanatic... we [seculars] represent the light, but they [Islamists] represent the darkness”*. As this shows, the creation and reinforcement of the “self” include from the very beginning the devaluation of the “other” on the basis of disapproval, phobias, and distrust. That assumes a superior

77

Milliyet 7, 8, 23, 25.4.1997

posture and dismisses that which challenges and questions one's beliefs or interests by labelling it as inferior, fanatical or irrational. Distorted portraits or caricatures of Muslims, in long black dresses with round beards, are created with little concern for accuracy. A stereotypical image of 'fundamentalists' is of them as spider-like headed, which connotes ignorance, irrationality and backwardness, and is a well known description of Islamically-oriented people. The notion of "we" suggests a fictive unity of the self and the essentialism entailed in the production and reproduction of such an identity. The construction of the "self", a focussed social self, in order to maintain established interests effective in politics, draws attention to the question of "who" as the discursive "we" write, how, to whom and with what purposes? Otherness requires particularity and difference since the "self" is usually constituted in terms of the identity of the "other" (Said 1979). What we are presented with here is a reapplication of Orientalist thought. Seculars think of themselves as the "Occidental Self", the modern man and therefore the model to the rest, in comparison to the "Oriental Other", which is associated with irrationality and fanaticism. Such an approach to identity in turn disseminates the desirability of the policies of the 'modernising state', considering cultural modernist projects, and its version of Westernisation. In this sense, the press is used as a strong instrument of political socialisation, which emphasises a cultural transformation of the society that mostly concentrates upon the education system, consumption habits, art, film, entertainment and relations with the opposite sex, i.e. a shallow interpretation of Western values. The role of the media in indoctrinating people with a certain conception of "contemporary civilisation" or of modernity, which is seen as incompatible with Islam, revolves around a partial reading of Western civilisation. The general population is faced with indoctrination

through a political socialisation process which involves the propagation of a top-down, one-dimensional view of modernity, while authoritarian control of the economy and the media itself continues relatively unchallenged. The self-image of the secular media as progressive, humanitarian and democratic in their representation of 'truth' did not serve the societal purpose of contributing to the functioning of democratic processes by providing a wide range of sources of information needed to enable the public to assert meaningful control over the political process through their elected representatives. The public was exposed to powerful messages from above and was unable to communicate meaningfully through the media in response to these messages, except for cases that remain faithfully within the presuppositions and principles which constituted media propaganda. On the contrary, it served to inculcate and defend the economic, social and political agenda of privileged groups that dominate the state and the society. They do this within a propaganda model through the selection of topics, framing of issues, emphasis and tone and by presenting the debate as a matter of "life and death", therefore approving the enforcement of bureaucratic power in the name of noble ideals over parliamentary power. As noted above, the role of the secular media in the removal of the Welfare Party from power is held to be a most remarkable display of the one-dimensional functioning of the secular media, who promoted their interpretation of the world, which depends on one's point of view and reflects the interests and concerns of the sellers, the buyers to a limited extent, and the state and private institutions which are dominated by these groups.

6.2.3. The Defence and Discourse of Islamism as Represented by the Islamist

Media

The discourse of Islamist newspapers shows that Islamist intellectuals constantly struggle with both external and self-imposed tensions, partly because of their perceived role as narrators and promoters of a counter culture. Their discourse is produced in relation/reaction to that of secular newspapers on the Welfare Party, Islam and Islamism. The equation of Islam in general and the Welfare Party in particular with anti-modernism, authoritarianism, despotism and irrationality by secular newspapers, as described above, receives much attention. Their discussion is grounded in the familiar discourses of Islamism, such as the question of Muslim identity; a quest for returning to the universal and eternal values of Islam for the well-being of the Muslim community; the reaction to oppression, imperialism and enslavement; the failure of the secular system in delivering its promises of welfare, democracy and justice for all; and the condemnation of corruption, exploitation and unjust distribution of national wealth. In the process, they exhaust all universally appealing themes, e.g., justice, human rights, democracy, sovereignty of the people, pluralism and the struggle against oppression, at every level of consideration in their populist discourse. How is the Welfare Party interpreted within the framework of Islam in this production and promotion of counter-cultural codes in interaction with the discourses of secular newspapers which are mainly based on the notion of a threat?

6.2.3.1. The “Oriental We” in the Person of the Welfare Party with Reference to Islam

Surprisingly, Islamist discourse borrows the basic ontological premises of Orientalism: there exists a radical ontological difference between the nature,

cultures and people of the Orient and the Occident, but with opposite conclusions. The prevalent emphasis on rationality, normality and appropriate social behaviour with reference to Kemalist secularism by the secular media occurs through the subjugation, devaluation and marginalization of the “other”, Islamists. Islamist newspapers endeavour to respond to, describe and devalue the Occidental other in the need and search for a definition of “self” within a framework, the borders of which are drawn and imposed by the encounter with Western civilisation. A strong sense of xenophobia towards the West results in attempts to dismantle it as the “antagonistic other”, while at the same time drawing inspirations from the thoughts of its leading thinkers and its economic, social and political progress. The same assumption that there is a confrontation between Islam and the West outlines the discussions on the “we” and “they” dichotomies, which is mainly based upon the difference and degree of religion belief. The general discourse represents the world in two civilisation blocks, the Judeo-Christian and the Islamic. In the identification of “self”, Islam is the culture of reference and a vantage point from which Muslim societies should be examined in order to diagnose their cultural and historical illnesses, which suggests an instrumentalist view of religion. A very shallow classification of “Islam and the West” or “the Welfare Party and Others” is employed to offer all-exclusive identities of the “self” and the “other”. A simplistic approach, that seems to allow only for “right” and “wrong” with nothing in between, attempts to concentrate the attention of readers on the issues of imperialism, oppression and exploitation, despite the absence of any sociological analysis of these themes. The West is treated as homogenous, total entity. Mixed feelings towards the West on behalf of the Westernised elite show themselves in related contexts. On the one hand, a populist discourse, rooted in Third Worldist ideology,

is very much sceptical of what the West has to offer and calls for the awakening and resistance to the hegemony of an alien culture which is charged with the domination of the intellectual, social, political and economic life of Muslim societies in general. The phrase the "World of Crusade", which primarily refers to the US, Western Europe and finally to Israel, is often employed to blame the "neo-imperialism" of the West and Zionism. The "Others" "are friends of Armenians and Jews; they are collaborators of Western imperialism, and immoral and exploitative". In contrast, Islam is the alternative power against the imperialist West and Zionism". For example, the result of the 1995 general election is evaluated as follows "*Turkey made her choice and signified her Muslim identity by refusing imperialism*". It is argued that *those millions who voted for the Welfare and the Just System were aware of the fact that the regime in Turkey had made us the slaves of the USA and Israel,*⁷⁸ though the percentage of votes they considered to be against imperialism and for the Just System was only 21 percent of the general votes if they were all given for the claimed reasons. Such a populist perspective shares the national independence goal of Third World movements: the utopia of a totally sovereign state fully controlling its resources and competing on a global scale with advanced countries. In this context, "Islamic revival" means awakening against oppression, exploitation imperialism and cultural alienation; a search for authentic cultural codes and values; and a return to authentic identity.⁷⁹

On the other hand, the West becomes the source of reference for considering the implementation of secularist policies, despite contradictory views. The Milli Gazete

78

Milli Gazete, 1.6.1996.

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These themes were often repeated in the contents of both Milli Gazete and the Akit in all periods.

argues that Western secularism and materialism undermines religion, morality, and social and family life by emphasising the rates of divorce and crime in some leading Western countries.⁸⁰ In contrast, the Western implementation of secularism is championed in relation to freedom of religion. The Akit has argued that

secularism is not implemented in the Westernian sense [which] means the prohibition of church interference in governmental affairs in Europe and the US, though that does not rule out the fact that some rules can be originated from religion as long as consensus upon them is reached. [Rather] it is a tool of oppression in the hands of state in Turkey. It is used to extend to control of the state over society and represents the status quo and recognises no places for Islam in social life. It means hostility to religion and religious people and therefore turns a blind eye to democratic principles and institutions [in the Turkish context].⁸¹

Similarly, the Milli Gazete agrees that *secularism should be understood in the Westernian sense, that is the separation of religion and state, but not the repression of religion by the state*". It continues that *secularism does not mean irreligiosity in the West, rather it guarantees freedom of conscience and is not used as a tool by the state to intervene in the personal and religious lives of individuals*".⁸²

x0

Milli Gazete, 10.6.1996.

x1

Akit, 24.4.1997; 17,20,23,28.5.1997; 2,19.6.1997.

x2

Milli Gazete, 11,24.6.1996; 12,23.5.1997; 2,10.6.1997.

The characteristics of this real “self” in the person of the Welfare Party within the wider context of Islam as a religion are described as follows: a force of liberation, of struggle against oppression, imperialism and enslavement; the guarantor of human rights, democracy and secularism; and a fighter against inequality, corruption, and bribery. *“Islam is a universal religion that brings justice, peace and salvation to human beings, not a monster or about terrorism; the most progressive religion that supports science and technology; compatible with development and democracy; provides justice and freedom versus anarchy and oppression”*. These themes dominate the content of Islamist papers for all periods chosen for the analysis. The themes of progress, justice, salvation and oppression in reference to human rights, exclusively cited in terms of freedom of religion and secularism, occur in the content of both the Milli Gazete and the Akit more than ninety times. The Milli Gazete notes that the Welfare Party *“is the most progressive party in Turkey... is a liberation force for Muslims against imperialism and oppression... stands for democracy and the rule of law... freedoms, human rights, development and peace”*.⁸³ For the Akit, it *“is not about despotism and violation of human rights [referring mainly to the right to profess one’s religion], but about freedoms and protection of human rights... [it] stands for equality for all, freedoms and democracy... [and] is a proof of that Islam is compatible with democracy”*.⁸⁴ What is important is that the Welfare Party is either overtly or covertly equated with Islam or represented as an agency that unites believers with Islam. The Milli Gazete argues that *“the Welfare is not an ordinary party, but an army of*

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Milli Gazete, 1, 4, 8, 10, 11, 30.6.1996; 3, 7, 16, 30.3.1997; 12, 15, 23, 28.5.1997; 2, 8, 10, 17, 24.6.1997.

x4

Akit, 2, 9, 13, 22.6.1996; 2, 5, 6, 24, 30.3.1997; 24.4.1997; 10, 17, 19, 20, 23, 28, 30.5.1997; 10, 19.6.1997.

Mohammedian movement... an Islamic bridge that professes and helps the universal revival of Islam... and a movement that struggles to establish the system of God to bring justice and happiness to human beings".⁸⁵ The features of the system of God that the Milli Gazete refers to can be captured in the context of the definition of Islam and its role in society. What Islam has to offer is often discussed in a wider framework of modernisation and the status, authority and hold of the religion within.

6.2.3.2. Modernism and the Concept of an "Islamic State"

Two attitudes towards modernism are distinguished: (a) to argue the complete self-sufficiency of Islam and the comprehensiveness and totality of the Islamic world-view; (b) to explain Islam in the framework of Western values, such as democracy, in order to prove the compatibility of Islam with democracy by referring to counterparts in Islamic terminology including consultation (*shura*), consensus (*ijma*) and oath of allegiance (*bay'a*). The former is often expressed in the words "Islam is a way of life which sets rules for every sphere of life, e.g., economic, social and political, and therefore cannot be restricted to personal conscience only". There seem to be constant attempts to distinguish the notion of modernisation from the notion of Westernisation and modern values from Western values, though apart from the claimed relevancy of religion in modern life, these attempts go without clarification. The condemnation of the Westernisation of Muslim society and its model for modernisation is mainly based upon the argument that they have failed and thus are responsible for political corruption, social injustice and spiritual malaise. Islamisation is understood as a process by which

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Milli Gazete, 4, 8.6.1996.

Islamic principles and values are re-applied to meet the needs of a changing society. The goal is to establish a synthesis which is both Islamic and modern. Yet variations in interpretations of "Islamic values" make it difficult to offer a detailed picture of "Islamised, yet modern", but not Westernised, society. As Munson argues (1988), it is noteworthy that the view that Islamists are opposed to modernisation is not entirely accurate. If the "modern individual" is defined as one who is better educated, more urbanised, more engaged in industry and connected to non-traditional occupations, and more exposed to the newer media of mass communication (Inkles and Smith, 1974), then Islamists in the twentieth century are included within that definition, as argued above. The technological tools of modernisation, such as radio, television, print and the internet, serve to reinforce traditional beliefs and practices. Pulled toward such modernist goals as democracy, freedom and social justice, yet still sceptical of their historical precedents and contemporary problems, modernisation for Islamists implies more than the replacement of the old with the new. They reject the idea of social modernisation, which entails the diminishing role of religion in society and state, but not in the life of the individual. One of the principal arguments of Islamists that "Islam encompasses all aspects of life" contradicts this view of social modernisation. Moral outrage, provoked by the violation of "traditional Islamic values", is frequently articulated. Yet they do have no condemnation of technological or economic innovation, but support modernisation in these fields through selective adaptation. Nevertheless, they are unwilling to acknowledge that modernity as a culture is the by-product of modernisation as an economic process.

It is in the nature of the state that the former attitude establishes its links with the

latter. The concept of an Islamic state, as argued before, deals more with general principles and ideals than specific details, though there are contradictory views. Divergent views on the nature of the Islamic state are mainly related to the interpretation of the divine text. There is more agreement on what is not an Islamic state than on what is one. It is neither a hereditary succession, nor a monarchy, a dictatorship, or a military rule, though these are historical facts. *“Islam prescribes not a personalised or despotic form of authority, but an institutional and constitutional one since the divine law draws the outline of the rights and obligations of the ruled and rulers”* (Milli Gazete). The question of divine will is the key to explaining the various positions of Islamists. The content of the Islamist media offers a “secular state which admits divine will” and argues that *“Islam does not prescribe any particular form of government or give any detailed instructions on political matters”* (Akit). Such an approach can be summarised as “democracy with Islam”, given the experience of Islamists under the circumstances when the Welfare Party had been outlawed, as mentioned above. While Islamist ideology aims to give shape to each and every sector of human life, such an ideology comprises few Quranic laws, while the rest are broad principles given in the Holy Book. It is argued that as long as the moral basis of good government is not ignored, e.g. the issue of social justice and the Muslims conduct their affairs in a way that appeases Allah, they are free to adopt any structure or organisational form for the state. It is argued that the ultimate sovereignty rests with Allah, but the political domain is left to the discretion of the religious community according to the necessities of time. In other words, it is out of the question to change or replace the immutable core set in the Quran, though Allah leaves a vast range of areas to His Caliphs to interpret His word, legislate on temporal matters and establish the

structures of state according to the general rules and principles in the Koran and the Sunna. It is the religious community rather than clergy or the political leadership that has the last word (Akit). This view emphasizes the principle that all Muslims are equal and have a direct relationship with Allah. Thus, final decision-making belongs to the religious community, which responds to the sovereignty of people versus rulers. Freedom is an inalienable right. Among basic human rights are: right to property, equality of all before the law, the right to secure basic needs of life, right to believe, freedom of opinions, freedom of movement and freedom of association. The acceptance of the message of God is a free choice of the individual (Akit). However, the status and rights of non-Muslims are legitimate and correspond to the protected citizenships which constitute their own community. The concept of an Islamic state is explained in terms of: its divine task, its source of legitimacy, and the succession and limits of ruler. Firstly, it is argued that an Islamic state based on doctrinal values conceives its task primarily as a medium for spreading, establishing and preserving divine truth. *"The state exists to create a model society based on Islamic social justice and ensure an Islamic life"*. Secondly, *"the state derives its legitimacy from to what extent it acts within the tenets of Islam, which are given by the eternal message of Islam. The Quran stresses that the believers should obey those who are entrusted with authority as long as they maintain divine justice and public consent"* (Milli Gazete). Thirdly, the consensus of the community is the source of authority regarding the particular form of government as well as the selection and removal of the head of the state. *"The government through consultation [shura] is given in the Quran and has to be observed. The ruler is elected on the basis of the widest suffrage"* (Akit), which includes all in the Turkish case. Fourthly, the ruler is to govern according to and

assure implementation of the *Sharia*, to which the ruler and the ruled alike are bound. A notion of popular rule, since political power is considered basically a temporal matter, suggests proximity with democratic practice. There is a definition of the rational-legal modern state within Islamic limits and elected government based on the parliamentary system. *“The state should be based on democracy, free legislation and accountability. This is a secular state based on the rule of law and the separation of power between the three branches of the state. The existence of multi-parties, freedom for all, equality before the law and social justice should be the fundamentals upon which the society is based”* (Akit). Parliamentary democracy is presented as a broadening and elaboration of the democratic Islamic spirit of government through consultation, election and accountability.

As seen above, a modernist approach to Islam conceptualises it as a rational faith which includes democratic notions of liberty, equality, tolerance and coexistence. It advocates a future in which political and social development are more self-consciously rooted in Islamic values, though it is left to readers to figure out the ways by which to achieve this inspiration. Despite the use of universally appealing themes, such as parliamentary democracy, with Islamic principles, including the equality of all and human rights, it is not still clear on either the theoretical or practical level that how “the unity of the religious community” is combined with the “diversity” through which parliamentary democracy gains its meaning. The ambiguity in terms, which are mostly applied in response to accusations by the secular media, gives rise to controversy. For example, how free will is combined with divine will is still vague. It is argued that, in theory, no Muslim has the right to claim a monopoly on the interpretation of the divine texts, but given the self-

claimed “comprehensiveness and totality of the Islamic world-view”, one concludes that power relations within society rather than free debate would establish “one truth” over diverging interpretations.

Table 10a: Milliyet's Content Regarding the Welfare Party

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June '96)	Period 2 (March '97)	Period 3 (May-June '97)
Welfare Party	Milliyet	<p>"...it is a party that exploits religious sentiments and has politicised religion even though that is prohibited by law..." (3)⁸⁶</p> <p>"...threatens freedom of conscience..." (2)</p> <p>"aims to establish an Islamic state (4)...and to put an end to secularism" (3)</p>	<p>"...dies for a Sharian regime and ready to do anything to achieve it (2)...it is the party of those who are the supporters of a theocratic-despotic regime (<i>an Islamic state</i>) at the expense of democracy and democratic principles... it raises the threat of Islamic fundamentalism...it is the party which is the basis of radical religious movement .. struggles to replace the secular and democratic Republic with a state based on religious law..." (3)</p> <p>"...follows the same path as the <i>Talibans</i> and is as backward as them (2)... aims to destroy secularism in the name of democratic rights and freedoms (4)...pushes Turkey to resemble Afghanistan..." (2)</p> <p>"...wants to disintegrate Turkey, therefore more dangerous than the PKK... radical religious movement...the most dangerous threat to the future of a secular, democratic and Republican state based on the rule of law..." (6)</p> <p>"...would try to stay in power at any cost, even by cutting throats, if necessary..." (2)</p>	<p>"...supports and calls for an outdated despotic regime (<i>Sharia</i>)..." (2)</p> <p>"...increased the threat of radical Islam to demolish the secular Republic... as a government, turned a blind eye to reactionary radical groups that organised themselves to achieve the aims of political Islam (<i>the establishment of an Islamic state</i>)... became the centre of radical political Islamic movements..." (3)</p> <p>"...it has been in cooperation with some Islamic states that support terrorism, like Iran, to overturn the secular-Republican regime in Turkey..." (2))</p>

⁸⁶The numbers in parenthesis refer to how many times the same/similar content occurs in the same period of time.

Table 10b: Cumhuriyet's Content Regarding the Welfare Party

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Welfare Party	Cumhuriyet	<p>"...party of religious reactionaries who are unable and reluctant to adapt themselves to contemporary [Western] civilisation and want to return to past..." (2)</p> <p>"...backward religious fanatics..." (3)</p> <p>...exploits religious sentiments... (3)</p> <p>"...asks for a Sharian regime..." (2)</p> <p>"...party that would turn Turkey into darkness (5)... wants to turn Turkey into another Iran..." (2)</p>	<p>"...represents a black ideology that exploits religious sentiments, divides society into two camps [religious versus anti-religious]... and struggles to realize a state based on the Sharia law" (4)</p> <p>"...a dangerous minority who has managed to come to power because the people's trust in the centre-left and centre-right parties has been rubbed away... it threatens the secular and democratic regime by using democracy itself...Welfare signifies the growing [Islamic] threat of radical religious movements..." (4)</p> <p>"...it is an anti-democratic, anti-secular and anti-modern party that undermines the Kemalist principles which are the basis of the secular and democratic regime..." (2)</p>	<p>"...wants to establish an Islamic state at the expense of secular and democratic Turkey..." (2)</p> <p>"...threatens the unity of Turkey by promoting religious differences between people and dividing people into two groups, e.g. secularist and anti-secularist ... therefore, radical reactionaries have become far more dangerous than the separatist PKK's terror..." (3)</p> <p>"...disrespects the Kemalist principles..." (3)</p> <p>"...uses democracy to achieve its aims [implies the establishment of an Islamic state] (2)</p>

Table 10c: Milli Gazete's Content Regarding the Welfare Party

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Welfare Party	Milli Gazete	<p>"...a liberatory force for Muslims against imperialism and oppression... anti-imperialist..." (3)</p> <p>"... it is not an ordinary political party but an Islamic bridge that professes and helps the universal revival of Islam (3)... an army of Mohammedian movement (1)... a movement that struggles to establish "the system of God" to bring justice and happiness to human beings..." (1)</p> <p>"...represents Islamic moral values which are the basis of a moral society based on justice..." (4)</p> <p>"...supports secularism as in the Western sense... and asks for the implementation of "real" secularism... that is, religion does not interfere in state affairs and vice versa" (3)</p>	<p>"...the most progressive party in Turkey..." (2)</p> <p>"...the guarantor of human rights..." (3)</p> <p>"...stands for democracy and the rule of law, but not oppression and injustice... totally adhered to democracy..." (3)</p> <p>"...it is a party that won an electoral victory and therefore, represents the national will..." (2)</p> <p>"...the guarantor of secularism..." (4)</p>	<p>"...stands for democratic values, freedoms, human rights, development and peace..." (4)</p> <p>"...struggles for the democratization of Turkey..." (2)</p> <p>"...united with the nation..." (4)</p> <p>"...the guarantor of "real secularism"..." (3)</p>

Table 10d: Akit's Content Regarding the Welfare Party

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June '96)	Period 2 (March '97)	Period 3 (May-June '97)
Welfare Party	Akit	<p>"...the most progressive party in Turkey as compared to other parties which are the representatives of the status quo..." (2)</p> <p>"...against corruption and oppression..." (4)</p> <p>"...it is a government elected by the people.... represents the people... attached to the sovereignty of the people and to the elected parliament as the supreme authority" (5)</p> <p>"...stands for democracy and human rights..." (3)</p>	<p>"...not about despotism and violation of human rights, but about freedoms and protection of human rights..." (3)</p> <p>"...against oppression...asks for an end to oppression of Muslims" (5)</p> <p>"...stands for equality for all, freedoms and democracy..." (4)</p> <p>"...represents the national will..." (7)</p> <p>"...a democratic force on which the future counts..." (2)</p> <p>"...successors of civil uprisings, e.g. the Democratic Party in the 1950s, the Justice Party in the 1960s and the 1970s and the Motherland Party in the 1980s, against the oppressive state..." (5)</p>	<p>"...in favour of democratization against the oppressive official ideology..." (2)</p> <p>"...proved that Islam is compatible with democracy..." (2)</p> <p>"...asks for a clear definition of secularism by the Constitution..." (2)</p> <p>"...supports Western secularism which is about freedom of conscience..." (2)</p> <p>"... fights against corruption, fraud and bribery..." (6)</p> <p>"...wants the people to be in power..." (2)</p> <p>"...offers peace and toleration, which are among the distinguished values of Islam..." (3)</p> <p>"...respects human rights..." (5)</p>

Table 11a: Milliyet's Content Regarding Islam

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Islam	Milliyet	<p>"...seems to have replaced the Communist threat after the collapse of Eastern block..." (2)</p> <p>"...radical Islamists in Turkey call for an end to secularism... fundamentalists ask for the re-implementation of Sharia in Turkey..." (4)</p> <p>"...political Islam... radical Islam is against the contemporary civilisation..." (3)</p>	<p>"...Islamic threat...fundamentalist Islamic terrorists cut throats in Algeria.. .Islamic armed movement chopped off heads in Algeria... fundamentalist Islamic terror in Algeria..." (5)</p> <p>"...threat of radical Islam that would resort to terrorism (2)... dark and ruthless authoritarian regime (3)...streams of blood (2)..."</p> <p>"...Islamic threat... the Welfare Party's being in power carries the risk that there could be killings of hundreds of people overnight if democratic [in any sense, e.g. justifies military involvement in politics] reaction is not put into action against this threat..." (2)</p>	<p>"...threat...political Islam that aims to establish a state based on Sharia in Turkey... threat of political Islam, that is more dangerous than the separatist PKK, to the Republican state..." (9)</p> <p>"... radical Islam that is about totalitarianism..." (2)</p> <p>"...fear (in Algeria) against hope (in Tunisia)..." (4)</p> <p>"ideology, ...reaction of those who are unable to adapt themselves to modern life in the name of an outdated garment..." (2)</p>

Table 11b: Cumhuriyet's Content Regarding Islam

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Islam	Cumhuriyet	<p>"...ideology of reaction to modern life..." (2)</p> <p>"...a threat to democracy and women's rights..." (2)</p> <p>"...mobilizes the poor and disadvantaged people who are unable to cope with modern life..." (3)</p> <p>"...rises as an alternative due to the failures and incapacibilities of secular parties in Turkey..." (4)</p>	<p>"...a tool in the hands of religious fanatics to mobilize recently urbanised, less educated, unemployed and poor people..." (2)</p> <p>"...an outdated garment as far as modern life is concerned..." (4)</p> <p>"...not compatible with democracy and contemporary civilisation..." (2)</p> <p>"...a basis of authoritarianism(3) ...Sharia has nothing to do with religion and law, but is about reaction, threat and exploitation of religion... Islamic fundamentalism... means a return to dark ages... a call to replace modern legal system with primitive contracts (<i>Sharia</i>) (3)... is about social destruction...a racism-like religiosity... though religion is a matter of personal conscience(4), religious fundamentalism is about the exploitation of religious sentiments and the word of God in order to establish a theocratic state to push forward and maintain the interests of fanatics(3)... It cannot be fought against in the absence of principles of secularism(3)... it is the most dangerous threat to the secular-democratic setting of Turkey (5)..."</p>	<p>"...the ideology of religious fanatics who are irrational, backward and anti-democratic..." (5)</p> <p>"...against democracy and development..." (8)</p>

Table 11c: Milli Gazete's Content Regarding Islam

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Islam	Milli Gazete	<p>"...the most progressive religion that supports science and technology..." (2)</p> <p>"...provides justice and freedom versus anarchy and oppression for human beings...brings justice, freedom and salvation..." (5)</p> <p>"...the alternative power against the imperialist West and Zionism... the force to break the exploitation and torture of the Muslims by the West and Zionists..." (4)</p> <p>"...not a monster or about terrorism as represented by the West..." (4)</p>	<p>"...compatible with development and democracy (6)... guarantees human rights for all (2)...a universal religion that supports development in science and technology..." (2)</p> <p>"...represents justice...against oppression (5)... the foundation of Islam is the attainment of justice in all of its fairness. Islamic justice cannot be achieved unless human rights are secured for all in a Muslim state. That is, a member of such a state must be free to choose just rulers, to observe these rulers as they practice their authority, and to stand firm against any injustice from them...Islam prescribes not a personalized or despotic form of authority, but an institutional and constitutional one since the divine law draws the outline of the rights and obligations of the ruled and rulers...(3) The Quran stresses that the believers should obey those who are entrusted with authority as long as they maintain divine justice and public consent... the Muslim people are not passive subjects and the Muslim rulers do not enjoy absolute power..." (4)</p>	<p>"...promises justice and salvation (2)... against imperialism and exploitation..." (2)</p> <p>"...represents peace, toleration and happiness (3)...Islam is not a threat but an appealing force...Reaction is a term that does not have any clear definition to be agreed upon, but is about prejudice, speculation and subjectivity... Turkey has been experiencing a vital search for authentic identity and culture (9)... it is difficult to define this process as "reaction" ... It is interesting to see that any development related to Islam is labelled as fundamentalism or a reaction in line with the international politics of the US... most of the Islamic movements represent a search for self owned culture and identity, but that search is not only limited to Islamic civilisation (4). The world is in a process in which different civilisations, except Western civilisation, have been witnessing a cultural revival... Islam is not a threat to the world, but a powerful and alternative civilisation that constitutes the basis of identity and cultural and moral values of Muslims..." (3)</p>

Table 11d:Akit's Content Regarding Islam

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March '97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Islam	Akit	<p>* ...Islamic revival means awakening against oppression, exploitation and imperialism... search for authentic cultural codes and values... a return to authentic identity (3)... represents the authentic identity that has been damaged by the Westernisation of Turkey... (2)</p> <p>* ...Islam is a universal religion that brings justice, peace and salvation to human beings... (3)</p> <p>* ... a total way of life that sets rules for every sphere of life...cannot be limited to individual conscience only" (3)</p> <p>* ...self identity and culture itself...the historical heritage... the basis of moral values in the society" (10)</p>	<p>" ...against oppression (5) imperialism... exploitation...alienation..." (4)</p> <p>"...the authentic identity" (2) "...guarantees human rights for all... primary among human rights are the right to believe, right to express one's belief and right to assemble to defend one's group's belief, the right of expression and information cannot be separated from rights to think and believe...the right to hold and express opinions represents an essential manifestation of human merits and God's gifts... The right to express and to be informed should be secured for all by the state." (4) "Islam replaces oppression with justice" (14) ..."The state exists to create a model society based on Islamic social justice and ensure an Islamic life. In an Islamic society, the sovereignty ultimately rests with God alone... In other words, the state derives its legitimacy from the extent to which it acts within the tenets of Islam, which are given by the eternal message of the Quran and the Sunna ... However, it is out of the question to change or replace the untouchable and immutable core set in the Quran, God leaves a vast range of areas to His Caliphs [a reference to the people in general or to the elected representatives in particular] to interpret the word of God and legislate on temporal matters...It is the religious community, rather than the clergy or the political leadership, that has the last word. The government through consultation (<i>shura</i>) is given in the Quran and has to be observed. The governor [used interchangeably with the state or the government] is elected on the basis of the widest suffrage (2). The belief in <i>tawhid</i> means that there is only one source of power that is worthy of worship and constitutes the basis of all other principles of the faith." (3)</p>	<p>" ...against cultural alienation, violation of human rights... corruption and fraud..." (7)</p> <p>" ...the only alternative for the future..." (2) "The right to property, equality of all before the law, the right to secure basic needs of life, freedom of movement, freedom of association are all guaranteed by Islam (4)... Islam is a comprehensive religion that prescribes modes of behaviour for individual life as well as for public relations, such as economic, social and political, though the acceptance of the message of God is a free choice of the individual (3)..."</p> <p>" ...Islam is a religion but not a political regime (2)... Islam does not prescribe any particular form of government. That is left to the discretion of Muslims according to the necessities of the moment. The Muslim society can establish the concrete structure of state according to the general rules and principles given by the Quran and Sunna (3). The state should be based on democratic principles, free legislation and accountability. That is, a secular state which is based on the rule of law and the separation of power between the three branches of state and is governed by democratic principles (2). The existence of multi-parties, freedom, equality for all before the law and social justice must be the fundamentals upon which the society and political systems are based." (3)</p>

Table 12a: Milliyet's Content Regarding Secularism

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Secularism	Milliyet	<p>"... sine qua non condition for modern life..." (4)</p> <p>"...means the separation of religion and state... religious law cannot replace or be a part of modern law, that is based on rational reasoning" (3)</p> <p>"...the principle of secularism as well as the democratic regime put in danger by Islamists..." (5)</p> <p>"...it is the guarantee of human rights..." (3)</p>	<p>"...it is the foremost necessary component of contemporary civilisation... secularism means the separation of religion and state... therefore, religion is a matter of individual conscience (7)... secularization brings a worldly legal system along... that is different from what the Ottomans had applied. The Ottoman legal system has been blamed for prohibiting the country from development... the reason why Turkey has become a developed country in a relatively short period of time is because of the secularization of legal, political and social systems..."</p> <p>"...secularism is hand in hand with democracy and human rights... no regime that is not based on the separation of religion and the state can be democratic" (6)</p>	<p>"...the separation of religion and state..." (2)</p> <p>"...one of the most important principles of Kemalist ideology is that it aims to lift the country up to the level of contemporary civilisation...therefore should be protected by any means against religious fanatics..." (4)</p> <p>"...the principle of secularism guarantees equality for all regardless of religious affinities and women's rights... and it is necessary for respect for religion... it secures freedom of religion and freedom of conscience" (3)</p>

Table 12b: Cumhuriyet's Content Regarding Secularism

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Secularism	Cumhuriyet	<p>"...necessary for democracy... freedoms... modern life... secularism goes hand in hand with modernism and subsequently with democracy (5)... the people would undoubtedly protect the secular and democratic Republic against those who call for re-establishment of Sharia..."</p> <p>"...necessary for development in science..." (4)</p>	<p>"...should be protected against religious fanatics who work to establish a state based on outdated... backward and irrational religious law..." (3)</p> <p>"...secularization is necessary to protect religion and religious people (4)... from the exploitation by some for the sake of their political interests... according to Islam, belief is a matter between God and the believer (5)...Now, we witness a two-faced Turkey: the one is progressive, humanitarian and open-minded, the other is despotic, backward and fanatic...we [seculars] represent the light, but they [Islamists or Welfare] represent the darkness..." (2)</p>	<p>"...a sine qua non condition for democracy and human rights..." (6)</p> <p>"...about rationalism and modernism..." (4)</p> <p>"...means the separation of religion and state...religion is a matter of individual conscience(7)...Turkey is a secular country...people are free to profess their religion...they do daily prayer and keep fasts... Ezan is recited everyday in this country... the state recruits and pays the salaries of men of religion... for all these, people should be grateful to the Republic" (5)</p>

Table 12c: Milli Gazete's Content Regarding Secularism

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Secularism	Milli Gazete	<p>"...secularism means irreligiosity in Turkey... religious hostility, though, in theory, it does not limit the freedom of religion..." (3)</p> <p>"...guarantees freedom of conscience in the West... not used as a tool by the state to intervene in personal... religious lives of individuals..." (4)</p>	<p>"...it is not irreligiosity in the West... but is about freedom of conscience" (8)</p> <p>"... should be understood in the Western sense, that is the separation of religion and state, but not the repression of religion by the state..." (4)</p>	<p>"...means the separation of religion and state, but not the control of religion by the state..." (3)</p> <p>"...fights with religion in Turkish context... hostility to religion..." (5)</p> <p>"...guarantees freedom of conscience in the West..." (4)</p>

Table 12d: Akit's Content Regarding Secularism

Term	Newspaper	Period 1 (June'96)	Period 2 (March'97)	Period 3 (May-June'97)
Secularism	Akit	<p>"...means the separation of religion and state in the West, but a tool of oppression in the hands of the state in Turkey ... means the control of religion by the oppressive state..." (5)</p> <p>"...means hostility to religion, that sees any religious symbol or ritual as reaction..." (4)</p>	<p>"...not a necessary condition for democracy..." (1)</p> <p>"... guarantees freedoms of thought, belief and conscience in the West, but a tool of oppression in Turkey..." (3)</p> <p>"...defined as a matter of lifestyle by secularists, though it is a principle to guarantee freedom of conscience..." (2)</p> <p>"...used to extend the control of the state over society... therefore , not based on democratic values. Secularism in Turkey means the control of religion by the state, therefore turns a blind eye to democratic principles and institutions" (3)</p> <p>"...represents the status quo and recognises no place for Islam in societal life..." (2)</p>	<p>"...a tool of Kemalist ideology to oppress heterogenous identities, lifestyles and thoughts in society to keep the status quo intact... a tool of authoritarianism" (3)</p> <p>"...recognises no place for Islam in society... hostility to religion and religious people...represents anti-democratic implementations in Turkey..." (8)</p> <p>"...guarantees freedom of conscience in the West..." (3)..but a tool of oppression...and authoritarianism... in Turkey in attempts to homogenize the society..." (5) "...It is not implemented in the Western sense that means the separation of religion and state and freedom of conscience(2)... Secularism means the prohibition of church from interference in governmental affairs in Europe and the US, though that does not rule out the fact that some rules may originate from religion as long as a consensus upon them is reached. In contrast, as Kemalist secularism refuses any place for anything related to religion in the public sphere, it is not impartial towards religion. That is why the conflict between orthodox secularists and supporters of Islamic revivalism never ends..." (3)</p>

Chapter 7: Islamism: Voices of Reaction to the Failures of the Developmental State

This chapter contributes to the argument set up in Chapter five by producing a case study. It argues that in the Turkish context, Islamism developing from the critiques of modernity and deriving much of its strength and appeal from its perception of the disruptive effects of modernity provided the terminology for a reaction to the failures of developmental state, with reference to the rising expectations of the new middle strata, which have been stimulated in particular by the acquisition of higher education and the move to the urban centres. It shows that Islamism as a political ideology in the 1990s easily established links with the dissatisfaction of lower classes with the mode and pace of the development process, and therefore reflected a multi-faceted phenomenon with diverse interpretations, expectations and interests as far as those who advocate and formulate an “Islamist” ideology and those who lend their support to such ideology are concerned. Orthodox belief disregards the time dimension and attempts to label any ‘religious upheaval’, if it can be called such as an example of the same phenomenon. In contrast, this chapter argues that religious rhetoric, which constantly re-adapted itself to changing circumstances, provided an “Islamist” party with means to distinguish its identity from centre-right parties. It shows that in a political system in which party structures have become increasingly fragmented, the Welfare Party underwent a significant transformation by changing its fringe position, showing a tendency to move to the centre-right by attracting a trans-class based electorate. It managed this by emphasising universally popular themes, e.g., development, democracy, equality, freedom and social justice, rather than by

promoting a well-reasoned programme with a strong doctrine or class base.

This chapter critically examines the concepts provided by both the Welfare Party's manifesto, the Just System, and the interviewees, to assess the merit of their claims and of the arguments advanced to justify them. Contrary to conventional approach, it draws attention to the similarities between Kemalism and the Islamism of the Welfare Party in terms of their attitude to politics, economy, state and society. This is done by analysing the Welfare Party's manifesto, the Just System, in the context of modern ideologies from the points of e.g., the criticism of existing society and its inevitable or unconditional transformation towards the desired "good society". In this context, the chapter assesses the relevancy of the central arguments of the Just System to contemporary politics, and highlights the dilemma of the totalising ideals of the approved good society, although this is claimed to be for emancipation.

Two significant questions remain to be answered though, within the limits of a small-scale qualitative study. The first question therefore is who are those who seek for and formulate Islamist policies, and which social groups do they get their support from? The second question is why Islamism as a political ideology became an alternative within the case of the Welfare Party's rise to power? In other words, what kind of message did the Welfare Party give to its voters, and how did the Welfare Party propose to deal with the existing socio-economic problems which had not been overcome by the "secular" parties in the eyes of the voters? One particular approach, qualitative interviewing, has been employed in this chapter to

search for answers as to why the respondents sought to support the party, and at the same time, to focus on the party's approach to politics and what its supporters understood the terms to mean. It is crucial to mention that the findings of qualitative study are supported by evidences from other sources such as scholarly works, the WP's manifesto and its election programme.

The chapter looks at the socio-economic backgrounds of three groups selected as the interviewing sample: the Welfare Party's members of Parliament, the party workers; and the voters. It is important to note that the first round of interviews with all three groups, ten MPs, four party workers (Workers I) and twelve voters (Voters I), was conducted when the Welfare Party had been in power for approximately nine months since July 1996. The second round of interviews was undertaken with ten ex-party workers (Workers II) and fifty-three voters (Voters II) when the Welfare Party had been banned by the Constitutional Court in January 1998 after being out of power for about seven months. Such a time difference seems significant in terms of the issues given priority by the respondents in their answers to the same questions. For example, compare Figure 2 with 3 and Figure 4 with 5 below, as far as the social and political context is concerned. An attempt was also made to clarify the party attachments of the respondents since they first started voting in order to be able to illustrate the histories of the party affiliation of the respondents. The chapter analyses the policies of the Welfare Party in terms of the following questions:(a) what do you think the three most important policies of the Welfare Party were?; and (b) what reason/s led you to vote for the Welfare Party? Apart from the information gained from the interviews, the official view of

the Welfare Party is also represented through reference to its manifesto, "the Just System". This was altogether abandoned by the successors of the Welfare Party, the Virtue Party, after the Welfare Party's closure by the Constitutional Court in January 1998. The manifesto is examined in the context of modern ideologies, while the policies of the Welfare Party are compared with the expectations, interpretations and demands of the voters to show that voting for an Islamist party did not necessarily mean to support its vague ideology.

7.1. The Socio-Economic Backgrounds of Interviewees

The cadres of Islamist parties in the Muslim world and the Islamist masses are the products of modern society. Being among the intellectual sources and/or supporters of Islamism, they are not alien to modernity. "*It is a group that is sociologically modern, issued from the modernist sectors of the society. Rather than a reaction against the modernisation of Muslim societies, Islamism is a product of it*" (Roy, 1994: 50). Islamism is a movement of the intelligentsia, which includes students, the new middle class of officials, professionals and technocrats. (Ayubi 1991). Their "Islamist" mode of life in Turkey bears the characteristics of modernity with its "alternative" economic and social organisations, such as business corporations, charity organisations, schools, associations, newspapers, and broadcasting corporations with a religious dimension. Therefore, their reaction cannot be reduced to a "religious reaction" to the "secular" features of life or politics. The respondents who lent support to the Welfare Party represent a more trans-class base. In terms of their geographical, demographic and social position,

they are part of the urban population which cannot be defined as “traditional”, such as rising “Muslim capitalists” (by their own definition); well educated professionals, e.g. engineers, doctors, lawyers and teachers; workers; the urban poor; and university educated, professional urban women with their “head scarves”, which significantly differentiates them from women who wear the so-called traditional covering.

In our case study, the socio-economic background of the “Islamists” who are either members of the Welfare Party or who voted at least once for it have been represented using two characteristics, namely education and occupation (see Appendix 2). The sample corresponds to the national trend that has shown a gradual rise in literacy and the expansion of non-traditional occupations as a result of the development process, which subsequently have brought about intergenerational as well as intragenerational mobility. Most of the respondents are graduates of engineering, economics, administration, finance, law, or medical faculties. That is followed by high school or vocational school certificates. For example, all of the members of Parliament in our sample have a university degree. Their level of education, compared to that of their parents represents a high level of upward mobility (see Table 2A in Appendix 2). Most of their parents are either illiterate or are only graduates of primary school. The data on all of the Welfare Party’s members of Parliament indicates that 21.8 percent of them have either a master’s or a doctoral degree, 67.3 percent are university graduates, 8.2 percent have a high school certificate and 2.7 percent have secondary school education. Most of the respondents can be classified either as middle class or upper middle

class by occupation, while their parents have traditional or lower level occupations. There is no doubt that they have benefited considerably from the development process. With regard to the occupations of all members of Parliament of the Welfare Party, 21.4 percent are graduates of engineering faculties, 20.6 percent of theology, 14.5 percent of law, 13 percent of economics, 9.1 percent of medical and 21.4 percent of other faculties, e.g. education or science. In terms of their party affiliation, the members can be classified into two groups: (a) those who were the members of other right-wing political parties, e.g. the JP, the MP and the TPP, or even of one the left-wing parties, and later involved with one or all, depends on the age of the member, of the Islamist parties, the NOP, the NSP and the WP. Necmettin Erbakan, who led all three parties, and his companions are the best examples; (b) those who initially were the members of one of the three Islamist parties (see for example Table 2B, 3B and 5B in Appendix 2).

Having said that, it is not easy to put the respondents in one social group either demographically or geographically, or to draw clear cut social boundaries among them. For example, most of the respondents are geographically part of the urban population, though some still have their parents living in rural areas (see Tables 1B, 2B, 3B, 4B and 5B in Appendix 2). Rather, they represents a fluid class map.⁸⁷ Supports for an “Islamist” agenda tends to be expressed in terms of the moral and cultural expression of developmental crisis, for example, cultural identity, freedom of religion/belief or national aspiration for economic development, rather than

87

See N. Ayubi (1991) for a discussion of the class association of Islamist groups in some Middle Eastern countries.

class-specific social and economic objectives, as will be seen in the next section.

7.2. The Manifesto of the Welfare Party Compared with the Perceptions and Expectations of the Respondents

This section analyses the policies of the Welfare Party, which were declared before the 1995 election, and the perceptions and expectations of its voters with reference to its approach to politics. The examination is done in the context of its manifesto, the Just System, a form of Islamist ideology. This section demonstrates how the respondents perceived the Welfare Party and why they voted for it in the 1995 general election.

The responses of the interviewees are given in figures to provide a base for comparison between the three groups of respondents and between the two periods, as mentioned earlier. The categories used below are created according to the answers given by the respondents to the question “what do you think the three most important policies of the Welfare Party are?” Corresponding codes are put into the same category. These categories are:

a) economic policy or economic development. This consists of such themes as: privatisation; anti-inflation policy; economic growth and development; infrastructure investments; and industrialisation.

b) the just economic system. This was a component of the WP' manifesto, the Just System. It is explained in detail in this chapter.

c) abolition of interest. This refers to the policy aiming to abolish interest in

economic dealings in accordance with its prohibition by the *Quran*.

d) education policy. This includes reforming school curricula with an emphasis on national/cultural way of life and values (read Islamic); and improving material conditions for education, e.g. the allocation of more resources from the general budget. The debate over the Imam Hatips, Prayers and Preachers' School, was at its peak at this time, and formed the main context of the education policy for most of the respondents, especially for the MPs and the party workers.

e) social justice. This involved addressing the issue of unjust distribution of national income between different income groups, and the widening gap between the poor and the rich.

f) honesty. This referred to the need to put an end to bribery, corruption and fraud in the public sector; and the quest for transparent government.

g) foreign policy. This emphasised the principles of sovereignty and national independence. Conventional Turkish foreign policy was criticised for being submissive to the US and the West, in disfavour of national interests, and ignorant of Turkey's geopolitical position in the Eastern World.

h) reconciliation with Islam or history. This referred to an "identity crisis", and the destructive effects of Westernisation. There was a strong emphasis on differentiating modernism from Westernism. The cynical attitude towards the Ottoman history and Islam was deplored, and demands were expressed for establishing a correspondence between authentic culture and modernity, although the term, e.g., "authentic culture" was not explained, except insofar as Islam was one of its core elements.

i) freedom of belief, freedom of thought or human rights. This referred to close

state surveillance of religious practices, life and institutions. Prosecutions of those who pray or pray on Friday in office hours by some authorities, or regulations on the prohibition of head-covering for women in the public workplace and educational institutions were the central issues raised by most respondents with reference to the implementation of a militant secularist policy. Each concept is used where they were raised by the respondents themselves.

j) democracy. This was employed when respondents mentioned respect for public choice, meaning the respect for ballot results, and civilian politics, which refers to a firm opposition to any kind of military intervention in politics.

k) cooperation with Islamic countries. This referred to the establishment of an Islamic Union or Islamic defence organisation, expressed mostly by the members of the Welfare Party, similar to the European Union which would turn Muslim countries into an economic and political power vis-a-vis imperialist Western powers and within the United Nations.

l) Islamic state. This was used by only two voters in terms of the reintroduction of *Sharia* law. Speaking about an "Islamic state" is not easy given the legal restrictions in Turkey. The respondents avoided giving any explanation, but emphasised that religious laws would accompany secular laws, and regarding their religion, individuals would have the right to choose between judicial systems concerning civil rights, e.g. marital rights, despite some hesitation concerning criminal regulations.⁸⁸

88

The Nokta, a weekly magazine, reported with reference to a survey that only 7 percent of the Welfare Party's total electorates would like to see the establishment of an Islamic state in Turkey (26 June- 2 July 1994).

m) moral values. This was employed when the respondents talked about the degeneration of social or family values, and evaluated this as a result of the increasing dominance of a material culture which ignores the spiritual needs of individuals.

Figure 1
The Members of Parliament'
Policies

Respondents		1	2	3
1	foreign policy	democracy		human rights
2	foreign policy	democracy		human right
3	foreign policy	democracy		education
4	foreign policy	economic development		education
5	foreign policy	economic		education
6	foreign policy	abolition of interest		freedom of belief
7	democracy	economic	reconciliation with the history	
8	democracy	human rights		economic
9	democracy	freedom of belief		education
10	honesty	reconciliation with the history		no answer

Figure 2
The Party's Workers' I
Policies

Respondents		1	2	3
1	economic development		honesty	freedom of belief
2	economic development		education	foreign policy
3	education		economic	human rights
4	education		abolition of interest	foreign policy

Figure 3
The Party's Workers' II
Policies

Respondents		1	2	3
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1	freedom of belief	just system	democracy
2	freedom of belief	democracy	social justice
3	freedom of belief/thought	democracy	foreign policy
4	freedom of belief/thought	democracy	social justice
5	freedom of belief	Sharia	honesty
6	freedom of belief/thought	foreign policy	coop. with Islamic countries
7	freedom of belief	democracy	economic development
8	freedom of belief	just system	human rights
9	democracy	just system	foreign policy
10	democracy	just system	human rights

**Figure 4
The Voters' I
Policies**

Respondents

	1	2	3
1	freedom of belief	honesty	economic
2	freedom belief/thought	social justice	abolition of interest
3	freedom of belief	education	economic development
4	freedom of belief	foreign policy	education
5	freedom of belief	social justice	no answer
6	honesty	reconciliation with Islam	just system
7	honesty	human rights	just system
8	honesty	human rights	no answer
9	honesty	human rights	no answer
10	human rights	education	social justice
11	foreign policy	reconciliation with Islam	social justice
12	foreign policy	economic	education

**Figure 5
The Voters' II
Policies**

Respondents

	1	2	3
1	freedom of thought	honesty	democracy
2	freedom of thought	honesty	democracy
3	freedom of thought	honesty	democracy
4	freedom of thought	honesty	democracy
5	freedom of thought	honesty	democracy
6	freedom of thought	honesty	social justice
7	freedom of thought	honesty	economic development
8	freedom of thought	honesty	economic development
9	freedom of thought/belief	honesty	secularism
10	freedom of thought/belief	honesty	just system
11	freedom of thought/belief	honesty	just system

12	freedom of belief	honesty	just system
13	freedom of belief	honesty	just system
14	freedom of belief	democracy	foreign policy
15	freedom of belief	democracy	secularism
16	freedom of belief	democracy	just system
17	freedom of belief	democracy	secularism
18	freedom of belief	democracy	human rights
19	freedom of belief	democracy	toleration
20	freedom of belief	democracy	social justice
21	freedom of belief	foreign policy	just system
22	freedom of belief	foreign policy	economic development
23	freedom of belief	foreign policy	local governments
24	freedom of belief	foreign policy	secularism
25	freedom of belief	just system	coop.with Islamic countries
26	freedom of thought/belief	economic	social justice
27	freedom of belief	just system	economic development
28	honesty	economic	secularism
29	honesty	social justice	human rights
30	honesty	just system	coop.with Islamic countries
31	honesty	just system	economic development
32	honesty	just system	social justice
33	honesty	democracy	coop. with Islamic countries
34	honesty	democracy	human rights
35	democracy	social justice	economic development
36	democracy	just system	economic development
37	democracy	human rights	economic development
38	democracy	human rights	economic development
39	democracy	human rights	coop.with Islamic countries
40	democracy	human rights	secularism
41	economic development	foreign policy	social justice
42	economic development	local governments	social justice
43	economic development	toleration	coop.with Islamic countries
44	economic development	moral values	no answer
45	economic	Islamic state	toleration
46	economic	Islamic state	no answer
47	social justice	just system	coop.with Islamic countries
48	social justice	economic	coop.with Islamic countries
49	social justice	human rights	foreign policy
50	social justice	human rights	local governments
51	social justice	human rights	economic development
52	social justice	just system	economic
53	foreign policy	human rights	secularism

Recalling the historical background given above, most of the voters identified

freedom of belief/thought, human rights and honesty as the first and second most important policies of the Welfare Party. The third most important policy selected by most of the Voters in group I was social justice, economic development or education policy. Others in group II prioritised democracy, followed by economic development, and the Just System, although they did not have a clear understanding of it, and social justice. Foreign policy received by and large similar attention from both groups. One important result gained from some of the Voters in group II is that of secularism. Though the Voters in Group I mostly seemed to avoid the issue of secularism, given the historical circumstances under which the first round of the interviews was conducted, or it came up in the context of freedom of belief, it was identified by some in group II as one of the important policies of the Welfare Party. However, for the MPs it was foreign policy and democracy which shared equal weight as the most important policies. The second grouping was concerned with economic development/policies and human rights. However, human rights were mostly identified in terms of freedom of religion. Economic development or economic policies were the most important policy for the party workers in group I, although this was replaced by freedom of belief in the answers of the workers in group II, and similarly education policy with democracy. That classification bears similarities to those of the Voters in group II, reminding us of the fact that the second round of interviews was undertaken when the Welfare Party had already been banned from politics.

7.2.1. Dissatisfaction, Corruption and Honesty

The voting pattern of respondents corresponds with the general trend that the decline of the centre-right and the centre-left parties in the 1990s indicates that dissatisfaction with those parties led many voters to welcome a new alternative (see Table 1B and 4B in Appendix 2) . More than half of the voters in the case study said that they had usually voted for the centre right parties, the DP, the JP, the MP, and the TPP before they voted for the Welfare Party either in the local election of 1994 and/or the general elections of 1987 and 1995. As seen in Tables 1B and 4B, the Welfare Party canalised votes from both the centre-right and far-right (NAP) and the centre-left parties, the RPP and the Democratic Left Party (DLP). It is important to highlight the fact that most of the Welfare Party's members have been associated with the Welfare and/or its predecessors, namely the National Order Party (NAP) and the National Salvation Party (NSP) in the 1970s. The rest voted or worked for the centre-right Justice Party (JP) until its closure by the military rule just after the 1980 takeover, or for one of its successors, namely the Motherland Party (MP) and the True Path Party (TPP) in the 1980s, until they started working with the Welfare Party.

The Welfare Party's agenda, as outlined before, consisted of civil society issues, equality, social security, welfare and social justice, freedom, liberties and democracy. There was a focus on oppressive attitudes to minority groups and other belief systems, general economic goals and growth, the need to combat corruption, administrative efficiency, morality and the protection of the national way of life, as well as national independence and anti-imperialism with a heavy dose

of Islamic Ottoman sensibility at the cultural level, that was identified with wealth and power.⁸⁹ With regard to the interviews, dissatisfaction with major political parties, their anti-democratic tendencies as far as the issue of secularism or minority rights are concerned, and corruption, bribery and fraud in the public sector were the reasons most often given by the respondents for voting for the Welfare Party as an untried alternative. Fifty-five out of sixty-three voters used the words “dissatisfaction with... and corruption” within other political parties likely to rise to power. An interesting case is Respondent 12 in Tables 1A and 1B (Appendix 2), who is over fifty years old and has voted since 1960. He had voted for three of the mainstream right-wing parties, the JP, the MP and the TPP, until he voted for the first time for the Welfare Party in the local elections of 1994. He strongly expressed his disappointment with the others on the grounds that they did not provide enough public services, such as infrastructure, education, and health services for the region (Southeast) he has lived in, although the mayors of the Welfare Party had offered good works in local government. As this case illustrates, the Welfare Party’s performance in local government led some respondents to vote for it in the general election.⁹⁰ White (1997) also outlines how good grass-roots work in municipalities held by the Welfare Party turned into political support from a wide range of voters. Congested transportation, shortages of water and natural gas, insufficient housing, and environmental pollution had been prolonged

89

For a similar argument see N. Pope and H. Pope (1997) *Turkey Unveiled*.

90

The number of the local government seats held by the Welfare Party rose from 10 in 1984 to 100 in 1989 and to 327 in 1994, which included the greater city municipalities of Istanbul and Ankara. These cities are still being run by the Virtue Party, which managed to keep most of the municipalities in the April 1999 local elections.

burdens for residents of the big municipal centres, like Istanbul and Ankara. However, under the Welfare Party's controlled municipalities, social services had improved in general.

"Rubbish is collected regularly [in Istanbul]... Trees have been planted and better coal has been introduced to replace the foul lignite responsible for the Istanbul winter smog" (Pope and Pope, 1997: 333).

Most voters see other parties as exhausted, unable to respond to their demands and, more importantly corrupted. They said that when in power, the other parties had wasted time and the resources of the country, and had hindered the development process. Honesty rises as an issue in this context. A middle-aged voter stated that:

"...Honest, accountable government and openness to the public are among the most important things the Welfare Party promised to deliver if it came to power... Bribery, fraud, corruption have become the characteristics of public administration. Other parties when they came to power used public resources for their own sake. My dissatisfaction with other parties I had voted for [the MP and the TPP] led me to vote for the Welfare as the best among the worst."

What is crucial to consider here is that most of the respondents voted for the Welfare Party for the first time either in the local election of 1994 or in the general election of 1995, shown in Tables 1B and 4B. These were the years when the fraud allegations against the three major parties, the TPP, the MP and the RPP were at their peak and the trials of some of the leading members of the governing centre-right and centre-left parties resulted in imprisonment. This was summarised

by voters as follows:

"...corruption and bribery are synonymous with most of the major parties which are likely to come to power."

What the Welfare Party was perceived to offer in this context was an end to corruption in public administration, measures to secure equality, public service for all and respect for religious beliefs. Henze (1998) emphasises that Erbakan's party in general gained a reputation for honest and clean government.⁹¹ It is clear that these demands cannot simply be identified as a call for an Islamist polity on the part of the voters.

7.2.2. Freedom of Belief or Human Rights and Secularism

The issue of freedom of belief or human rights was mainly expressed in terms of the "right to live according to one's belief" by the respondents. The most cited case was the situation of female students and lecturers at universities and female employees who are not allowed to cover their hair in educational and other public institutions. That was an issue spoken about with reference to violation of human rights, e.g. right to education, right to profess one's belief, right to learn religion and right to express opinions, by "militant" secularism.

The issue of head scarves is not simply confined to the personal sphere in the

91

Though the Welfare Party eliminated bribery to some extent, a variety of corruption allegations, including providing business opportunities to the activists of the Welfare, were made against its mayors, and were reported by the secular media. Among those, most attention was given to the mayors of Istanbul and Ankara. See *Yeni Yuzyil* 27 March 1998 and 9 July 1998 and *Hurriyet* 31 March 1998 and 5 June 1998.

Turkish context. It is one of the most controversial symbols, along with education, of the long-term conflict between two major ideological systems, a secular versus an Islamic society or Turkish nationalism versus Muslim identity. However, the case should not be viewed in terms of two poles since both have evolved not in isolation but in interaction with each other. The roots of such highly charged symbolism attached to dress and appearance go back as far as the nineteenth century when Turkish nationalism had developed under the influence of European models of modernity, with its emphasis on a unique form of secularism. In this context, the appearance of women as objects of political discourse was intimately related to the changing nature of Ottoman/Turkish polity. *“The woman question emerged as a hotly contested ideological terrain where women were used to symbolise the progressive aspiration of a secularist elite or a hankering for cultural authenticity expressed in Islamic terms”* (Kandiyoti, 1991: 3). Issues relating to the position of women were ideologised by both Islamists and Westernists on the sole paradigm of Islam against a more distant background of Western notions of progress. For Westernists, Islam’s peculiar practices with respect to women were the cause of subjugation, which also formed some element of the European narrative of Islam. This argues that the custom of veiling and *çarşaf*, a black overgarment covering a woman’s head and body, was proof of the inferiority of Islam. The emancipation of women from such symbols of Islam became a significant aspect of Westernisation (Göle 1991). In contrast, for Islamists, the extensive rights and independent status that Islam accords to women were the

centerpieces of their narrative.⁹² Both linked the issue of women with the struggle over culture to a great extent, though Ahmed (1992) assigns this position to only Islamists. It was this understanding of secularism on the part of Westernists that led to the laws on the adoption of the European dress in the early years of Republican regime, with “a strong implication of progressiveness”. In 1925 wearing the *fez* was outlawed and the hat became the official headgear of men. The wearing of religious garments, except for religious officials in places of worship and during religious ceremonies, was also prohibited by law, as mentioned earlier in this study. For women it was encouraged and celebrated in public by the leaders to adopt “European” dress, though no item of “traditional” women’s dress was prohibited by law. For example, there was and has been no clear law prohibiting the wearing of the *çarşaf*, veil and *şalvar* (baggy trousers). It is true that the majority of Turkish women, especially peasant women, had never been veiled (Olson, 1985: 164).

The “head scarf dispute” gained its uppermost position after the introduction of a number of quasi-legal prohibitions during the 1980s, which represents movement simultaneously forwards and backwards. The “Dress and Appearance Regulation” was introduced by the military government in 1980. It prohibited public employees while on duty, from wearing, in the case of men, beards and long-hair, and in the case of women, mini-skirts, low-necked dresses and head scarves. This was

92

For a detailed analysis of the methodologies and assumptions of both supporters and sceptics of Islam, see H. Afshar (1993) (ed.) *Women in the Middle East: Perceptions, Realities and Struggles for Liberation*.

extended to students in 1982 by the Turkish Council of Higher Education (YÖK) following pressure from the NSC. The increase in the number of female students wearing headscarves over the years was met with outrage, since it was seen to be practically amounting to a rejection of and resistance to the “progressive and developmental” project of the Republic, i.e. Kemalism. The “re-veiling of young women” with a considerable amount of educational capital, who therefore had already become an integral part of modern society (Özdalga 1997), was contradictory in itself for those who advocated this regulation. In this sense, tightening regulations on female dress meant the reassertion of the ideals, success and identity of the nation-state, given the Islamic revolution a year earlier in neighbouring Iran within which the political aspect of the head scarf reached its peak. Afshar, in relation to the Iranian revolution, comments that:

“Women have become the major emblem of Islamification and their dress code the most significant identifier of revolutionary success... The veil has become one of the non-negotiable elements governing women’s lives...” (1998: 197).

The reverse was and has been the case for Turkey. A voter recalls the beginning of that dispute:

“...I was an undergraduate student when the controversy over head-covering was at its peak. They were girls [students] who were discriminated against because of their head scarves. They were given two options by the university administration, to leave, or to stay but uncover their hair. That was the violation of Constitutional rights..., for example, equality for all before the law. Their right to education was violated by authoritarian measures at universities which are supposed to be conveyors of democratic principles...”

Many students chose to resist and consequently be expelled rather than to uncover their hair. Subsequently, there was an amendment to allow the wearing of head scarves, which would be tied at the back of the head but not cover the shoulders, defined as 'contemporary clothing', for religious reasons in higher institutions in 1984. However, under pressure from Kenan Evren, who led the 1980 military intervention and was President throughout the 1980s, the YÖK opted against such relaxation in 1987, yet left the implementation of this to the discretion of each university. As the issue became more controversial, a few months later the YÖK agreed upon the gradual lifting of the ban on head scarves over a number of years. Later, in 1989 when the Motherland Party was in power, a proposal to loosen the ban on certain types of religious clothing was passed by the Parliament. However, it was vetoed by President Evren. As the same proposal passed through parliament for the second time, Evren took the issue to the Constitutional Court. It was outlawed by the Constitutional Court on the basis of violation of the principle of secularism. Consequently, the YÖK reinforced the 1982 regulation, although upon individual applications by students against the violation of liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, another higher court, the Council of State, decided in favour of students on the basis of individual liberties in 1989. The Constitutional Court stated that *legal rules cannot be based on religion, but reason. Religious rules which are matters of personal conscience cannot be legalised. Therefore, it is necessary not to allow any symbol related to religion in educational institutions and classrooms as such an action is incompatible with secular education.* In addition, the Court expressed its view that *any action against secularism or secular education [e.g., wearing a head scarf] cannot be defended in terms of democratic*

rights (cited in Refah Partisi Mütaalası, 1988: 16).

The head-scarf dispute gained greater momentum when the Welfare Party was in office. A proposal by the Welfare Party to lift the ban on the head-scarf was placed before the Parliament in 1996, but withdrawn when leading members of the True Path Party, then the coalition partner, refused to endorse it. Conversely, the ban on head-scarves was tightened after the NSC issued the 20-point proposal in February 1997, which as explained above, has been brought to its 1982 rigidity since then. Academics who protested alongside students against the ban were expelled from universities on the basis of taking part in reactionary activities against the integrity of the state. The most controversial case was observed when a female member of parliament from the Virtue Party attempted to claim her representative rights while wearing a head-scarf after the April 1999 general election. Being the first woman with a head-scarf in the Parliament, she was prevented from professing her oath, a prerequisite of being officially declared as a representative. She was forced out of the Parliament by an informal sanction, literally by physical force, by the “secular faction” in the name of the principle of secularism, despite the absence of any legal restriction on head-scarves for female representatives. In addition, the Council of Court, which acted in favour of individual liberties in the late 1980s, changed its position in 1998 and began to treat cases relating to head-scarves as a violation of the principle of secularism. It also granted the executive branch the authority to sack any employee accused of violating secular principles without any initial disciplinary action.

From the justification of the prohibition of head-scarves by the Constitutional Court, the decisive factor seems to lie in from what point, and why, different principles of the Constitution of 1982 are interpreted. That is why the imposition and reimposition of the ban on head-scarves by quasi-legal prohibitions could either be seen in harmony or in conflict with the Constitution, bearing in mind that the importance of hierarchical relationship between different stages of law-making, from the most general principles to ones related to more specific and limited areas of societal life. In addition, it is important to emphasise that Turkey is bound by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as international agreements are not subordinated to the Constitution. What comes into conflict over the issue of head-scarves is not the principle of secularism (paragraph 2), but its interpretation, from the point of views of secularists, as the Constitution only mentions the “secular” character of the Republic without any further explanation, and the principles of liberty (paragraph 24), from the point of Islamists, from the 1982 Constitution. A conflict between the rights and obligations of the individual according to the Constitution is not necessarily a conflict between principles, but between their interpretations, as they are often contingent upon the political climate. Article 2 of Constitution states that : *“the Republic of Turkey is a democratic, secular and social state governed by the rule of law; bearing in mind the concepts of public peace, national solidarity and justice; respecting human rights; loyal to the nationalism of Atatürk...”* While article 24 confirms that everyone has right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction, such freedoms are limited within article, which states that

“None of the rights and freedoms embodied in the Constitution shall be exercised

with the aim of violating the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation, of endangering the existence of the Turkish state and Republic, of destroying fundamental rights and freedoms, of placing the government of the State under the control of an individual or a group of people, of establishing the hegemony of one social class over others, or creating discrimination on the basis of language, race, religion or sect, or of establishing by any other means a system of government based on these concepts and ideas.”

In addition, article 10 states that *“all individuals are equal without any discrimination before the law, irrespective of language, race, colour, sex, political opinion, philosophical belief, religion and sect, or any such consideration”*.

The secularist point of view can be summarised as follows: religious values cannot, in any sense, constitute the basis of any legal practice in a secular society. This denies the fact that religious or moral values or customs could be among the sources of laws. It goes on to state that the ban on head-scarves is compatible with human rights, since it prevents discrimination against other belief systems while not favouring one particular religion. It claims to hold the true interpretation of “equality before the law”, though exercising discrimination in the sphere of right to education. It is claimed that the ban is about liberating women from the control of an oppressive religion for their own sake and providing them with rights to conduct a “contemporary” lifestyle. However, exactly how “allowing head-scarves” for female students and public employees would intrude upon the legitimate rights of others” is not stated. As to what constitutes discriminatory action on the part of individuals, especially relating to religious activities, it is not

clear in the Constitution or in respective laws. How a piece of speech or cloth is easily charged with disintegrative or discriminative tendencies, depends upon the discretion of official interpreters, for example judges, prosecutors or administrators. The rhetoric of “emancipation” does not rescue women from objectification, but rather treats them as means. Furthermore, it confines those women who attempt to take part in “modern life” with the “sacralization of their femininity” (Özdalga, 1997) to the sphere of family life, by driving them away from professional careers, as students or professional women often choose to quit public life rather than uncover their hair. Secularist argument does not contain “de jure” justification, with the help of legal rules which are open to various interpretations, but instead ideological justification for what they advocate. It is clear that such rules manifest, legitimate, and reinforce the dominant ideology by linking ideological representation with authority. But, rules gain legitimacy and prescriptive force not only from their embeddedness in structures of authority or from their hegemonic relation with other institutions. Rules must also be perceived emotionally satisfying, culturally relevant, socially useful or otherwise appealing (Milne 1983). In fact, the notion of “transferring the society toward one ideal position” is the underlying factor behind such restrictive attitudes. As “modern” is interpreted in accordance with how Westernist elites perceive it, mostly in terms of lifestyle and aesthetic values, the implementation of secularist policies is not a prerequisite of democracy in this context, but the enforcement of ideological hegemony and that ideal lifestyle, i.e. the commitment of the “state” to a particular way of life, a single formula. This means precluding a neutral position on moral or religious values and diversity. That, in turn, leads to the refusal to accept aspects of reality, as ideology demands

the complete commitment of both adherents and non-adherents to its programmatic prescriptions without the questioning of its merit. This favours an approach to politics in terms of leadership, where rigid conservatism lies, rather than in terms of resolving conflicts.

From the “Islamist” point of view, such restrictive implementations in the name of secularism mean the violation of human rights, specifically religious belief, and of democratic principles. The theme “the violation of human rights” was one of the main issues on which the Welfare Party based its election campaign. This point can obviously be traced within the responses of its voters. Some voters gave their only reason for voting for the Welfare Party as being its campaign against “the violation of human rights”, though it was exclusively expressed in religious terms.

Here are some examples:

“...one of the most important policies of the Welfare Party is to stop the violation of human rights, such as right to education, freedom of thought, freedom of belief and right to live according to one's belief, e.g. for women to have the right to cover their hair...”

“...the Welfare Party emphasizes democratic rights, for instance freedom of belief, and campaigns against the violation of religious life. This cannot be labelled as the exploitation of religious sentiments or anti-secularism.”

“...the Welfare Party campaigns for human rights, such as freedom of opinion and freedom of belief. I wish we lived in a country that is ruled to its greatest extent by democratic rules.”

The justification of the ban on head-scarves on the basis of the principle of

secularism leads Islamists to question the implementation of secularist policies in the Turkish context and to demand a clear definition of secularism. Secularism is interpreted by an MP as being that:

“... we do not have any definition of it [secularism] given in the constitution, even though it says the Turkish Republic is secular. If we had one, then we would have a consensus on its definition and common grounds to be discussed. Everyone defines it differently. If I was provided with what is meant by it, then I would know what constitutes offense against it. In my view secularism includes the right to believe, the right to profess one’s belief and the right to receive religious education. We ask for respect for democratic values. We do not want to see secularist policies manipulated against belief. We have not witnessed an implementation of secularist policies in the Western fashion. The state has to guarantee the right to believe and provide services for believers whatever religion you are in.”

What the Turkish implementation means to another MP is that:

“..People must have right to receive religious education, being a Christian or a Muslim or a Jew, and to profess their belief. Secularism is understood as hostility to religion... Legal codes have violated Islamic belief... Secularist policies are very convenient tools in the hands of an oppressive state to be used against civil society. It violates human rights and religious life. We support the European or American implementation of secularist policy, that suggests toleration and the freedom of religion from the state, but not anti-religiosity.”

It is true that such expressions have validity. However, this does not mean that Islamists have a more mature understanding of democracy or human rights. With

regard to their approach to politics explained below, which also is understood in terms of leadership, their reluctance to recognise the plurality of identities and sources of values and their persistence in the “homogenous we” from their point of view do not rank them any better than their secular counterparts on the issue of democracy or human rights, though diversities within both should not be ignored. The announcement of *tahwid* at the political level can also be the sole source for refusing divergences of opinions, criticism or opposition to the dominant doctrine once it is restored in power, on the basis of religious justification. This inevitably precludes intellectual liberalism. The Welfare Party, willingly or unwillingly, confined the whole issue of civil rights to religious freedom, which in turn fed the militant attitudes of “secularist”. While it was very quick in denouncing the violation of religious rights, the same eagerness was not observed in other spheres of individual liberties, except for demagogic rhetoric. With regard to their short experience in power, they did not do any better than their secular counterparts in improving fundamental civil rights. In addition, while it spoke of “religious freedom” in reference to Muslims, the concept of “toleration” was applied in the case of religious minorities, rather than “respect”.

In summary, it can be argued that the modernisation experience in the context of Turkey is restrictive in the sense that it represents rigid conservatism and a “sacred” secularism, with particular values, morality and institutions that reject “others”. Constant attempts to re-impose a secular identity on society through socialization (education) and restrictive measures leads to the reinforcement of the unlimited control of the state, acting in the name of modernity, and turns it into a

pervasive power. However, that is co-ordinated with social groups that are socially and economically dependent on the state and, therefore, conveys the approved ideology. The state enforces its authority through the social groups empowered by the state and the social groups maintain their privileged positions by reproducing the notion of the “sacred/modernising” state. Given the legal restrictions concerning individual liberties, what is guaranteed by the Constitution does not exactly proclaim “rights” or “freedom”, especially in the case of freedom to speak and freedom to believe, but “toleration” from the standpoint of the orthodox, i.e. official ideology. Its boundaries are contingent, with movement forwards and backwards. The head-scarf dispute is a symptom of serious social antagonism that signifies a rigid polarisation in the absence of a relevant consensus over “various identities”, be they religious or ethnic. With no intention to create it, the rhetoric of democracy or civil rights remains mere talk without practical significance. The head-scarf has become the most prominent symbol of the conflict about what it is to be a member of the wider community. It is about power exercised by the strongest of the component groups, which imposes its values about terms of membership upon the rest. The eristic attitude of the “secular faction” conducts the whole issue as a one-way affair, which treats flexibility, compromise and critical views within democratic perspectives as betrayal, and is interested not in contributing to its understanding, but simply in overcoming opponents. A detailed analysis of this approach with respect to the media campaign against the Welfare Party has been seen in the previous chapter.

7.2.3. The Just System: A Structural Analysis

This section looks at the Islamist ideology of the Welfare Party in order to locate it in the context of modern ideologies. This study argues that the centrality of the idea of “change” to attain a “good society” in contemporary Islamism positions it not as a separate and unrelated set of ideas, but a shared agenda set both by modernity, e.g., industrialisation and demand for equality of conditions or the extension of political participation, and by the re-generation of the “good religious community”. The section sets out to argue whether the central ideas/arguments of Islamism as an ideology are relevant to contemporary politics and can be meaningful for organising frameworks for political debate and action. Therefore, it aims to discuss whether the whole concept of “ideology” with its connotation of a broad view of how society should be organised is problematic in itself. This, in turn, tries to illustrate in the Turkish context how the conceptual links between Islamism and Kemalism both borrow from the general structure of modern political ideologies, e.g., the criticism of existing (faulty) society and its inevitable or unconditional transformation towards a desired “good society”, although each points to different preferred end results. Such an attempt might seem contradictory at the first instance as Kemalism is usually identified as the conveyor of modernity, while Islamism is anti-modernity. This reasoning initially connotes the basic assumption of modernity that individuals are free to apply their critical faculties to view the social and political order as the result of either human action or a divinely ordered political and social structure, i.e. Kemalism versus Islamism. It is, however, argued here that such a differentiation loses its significance at the theoretical level, given that adherence to a particular ideology (Kemalism),

combined with the concept of economic development strictly controlled by the state, elevates the ideology to the status of a faith that has to be accepted by all members of society. Ideological politics, with the emphasis firmly on a singular, discriminatory and non-pluralistic nature, therefore produces a “worldly divine order” and becomes an essential part of authoritarian politics, albeit one with the presence of democratic institutions. In such a political environment, all aspects of life are oriented towards a collective goal, which is proclaimed and interpreted by leaders, representing one particular culture, and is enforced by the state party or parties and its support organisations throughout society.

7.2.3.1. The Nature of Economic Activity and Social Justice

The Just System attempts to offer an example of “grand narratives”. It developed from critiques of modernity and derived much of its strength and appeal from its perception of the disruptive effects of modernity. It is a combination of both secular and Islamic principles. It criticises both capitalism and communism in a similar manner to critiques of modernity, e.g. populist ideologies, although it is distinctive in that it incorporates Islamic thinking. It appeals to ideas of technologically catching up with more advanced countries, and of a community, though both may be paradoxical. The Welfare Party’s manifesto, despite being some way from constituting a profound doctrine, shares a general structure with political ideologies of modernity: (a) it provides a criticism of existing (capitalist) society, condemned as imperfect, ill-fated and faulty, though its account is vague, partial, and incomplete; (b) hence, it contrasts existing society with a vision of “the good society” (ideal) that is to be attained and in which religion is the foremost provider

of all social values, although that is not explicitly expressed, and; (c) it offers a view of agency and the means by which the movement from the imperfect to that better society (emancipatory politics) is to be achieved.⁹³ This has certain implications for political action. First, it suggests that there is a set of basic and coherent principles upon which society should be constructed, and in principle it is possible to reach a consensus on these principles, but rather, this is a religious duty. Second, there exists, given the necessary conditions, an agency that is adequate to the task of social transformation, and hence this task is achievable.

The concept of change in the Welfare Party's manifesto establishes its main link with the general structure of modern ideologies: a criticism of the existing society. Islamism borrows the idea of progress towards "the good society" and the idea of a single force creating that aspired society. Whether put forward by a single party or movement, it attempts to encapsulate everybody's vision of the good society by employing Islamic concepts. The Just System views change in cyclical rather than linear terms in the context of "*Hak*" (constant and absolute right) civilisation based on right and justice, and that of "*Batıl*" (absolute wrong) civilisation based upon power, i.e. good versus bad. In this sense, the history of human beings is explained in terms of the constant rise and fall of a new "*Hak*" civilisation, which is followed by the rise and fall of a "*Batıl*" civilisation. In this context, Western civilisation is classified as "*Batıl*", since it is claimed that it favours the rule of power and oppresses human beings. Contrarily, the civilisations established by the

93

For a detailed analysis of the general structure of modern ideologies, see J. Schwarzmantel (1998) *The Age of Ideology*.

prophets Abraham, Moses, Jesus and Mohammed throughout the history of human beings are classified as *Hak* civilisations since they are based on 'justice'. From this point of view, it is implied that the fate of Western civilisation, which has produced capitalism and communism, is to collapse and be replaced by a new *Hak* civilisation which will bring prosperity and happiness to humans being (Adil Düzen Broşürü).

It is clear that the notion of change in the Welfare's Just System, i.e. the ideal of society that is to arise, bears the core elements of Islamic or Islamist economic thinking, the details of which is explained below. It borrows the Islamic concept of development that does not view history as a linear movement, but rather as having been periodically revitalised through prophecy until the advent of Islam, and through messianic and/or reform movements since the death of the Prophet Mohammed. This belief has important implications in developmental terms (Nasr, 1989): firstly, it argues that underdevelopment is temporary, i.e. the situation of Muslim people will eventually change; secondly, this very change is about introducing and reasserting ideals, which had previously been realised, rather than attaining an utopia; and thirdly, change is evaluated in terms of its contribution to both the material sphere and human spirituality.

In the criticism of modernity, while socialism is denounced for disregarding human nature and God-given rights, for example property rights, the capitalist system is criticised for taking materialism as its basis and neglecting the ethical and moral aspects of human beings. The use of interest to distort the distribution of income

in favour of the rich is also condemned. It is stated that while the Just System covers the positive aspects of both economic systems, such as open market, the legitimacy of profit, or economic planning, it avoids the negative aspects, such as usury, monopolisation, or artificial price fixing through central planning. These are apparently the very core issues touched upon by so-called "Islamic economics".

In this context, the basic principles and advantages of the Just System over socialism and capitalism are summarized as: the balance between private and public property; profit, rather than interest; the prevention against monopolies; macro-economic planning; and taxes on wealth rather than income. It seems that the Just System is inspired by a wide range of ideas, which even sometimes oppose one another. It bases itself on the market system, in which the relationship between supply and demand determines prices, and the predominant form of ownership is personal or to some extent institutional or collective. To a point, it is claimed that a classless society is one of the advantages of the Just System. The populist rhetoric of the Welfare Party's manifesto is very striking given the populist characteristics of Turkish politics. These include: peace and dialogue instead of conflict between different economic as well as ethnic groups; the co-operation by all; prosperity for all; and the promotion of fast economic development through industrialisation. These principles are among the high ideals of the Just System. The duties of the state in order to attain that ideal situation are defined as: to provide security, public administration, judicial services, health service, education, and infrastructure; to produce macro planning, but not compulsory orders for private business and; to support economic subjects in their economic activities. These duties of the state are not different from those advocated by pro-secular

parties, but in fact are the Constitutional responsibilities of the state in Turkey. It is proposed that the state owns all non-private natural resources like water and forests, as well as providing certain conditions for production plants and workshops. However, natural resources can be allocated through just criteria to those who will utilise them.

The Just System has common features with so-called "Islamic economic system(s)". However, it is necessary to emphasise that it is difficult to provide one coherent concept of Islamic economics since it is significantly dependent on the interpretation of the holy texts. Economic thinking in Islam is distinctive because it is based on the divine Islamic law, *Sharia*, part of which is laid down and part of which is left to human discretion. In other words, the concept of Islamic economics requires the organization of economy along the principles laid out in the primary sources, the Quran and the *Sunna* (the tradition of the Prophet Mohammed) as well as the secondary sources of *Sharia*, which are consensus and analogy for the Sunni and reason for the Shia. Different or even opposing interpretations of the same text by different jurists or the existence of contradictory concepts in the sources of *Sharia* indicate that the interpretation of the holy texts is not a simple task, as indicated before. In other words, formulating a generic Islamic economic theory as well as a political theory is difficult since it depends on different perceptions of what "true Islam" is. It is commonly indicated that a number of substantial differences arise from the basic principles of Islam in key areas between Islamic economic system/s and the other systems, namely capitalism and communism (Nasr 1989; Nomani and Rahmena 1994; Presley and Sessions

1994). The context of Islamic economics rests on the notion of human nature in Islam; the concept of *tawhid* (belief in the Oneness of God); and the concept of justice. However, these are in turn heavily dependent on interpretation since the divine law does not contain straightforward definitions or solutions in particular fields, such as politics and economics, except clearly cited ordinances or limitations. These include, for example, restrictions on economic activities, the obligation to pay tax on wealth (*zakat*) and the prohibition of interest, hoarding, and excessive consumption.

The concept of Islamic economics includes the initial assumption that once a society adheres to certain ethical rules, then, consequently that society and the individuals who reside in it can live in social harmony and advance to a higher state of equilibrium. In the Islamic economic system, a key role is played by the constant attempts to fabricate human nature according to "ideals". Nasr argues that the very notion of Islamic economics, firstly, begins with the nature and attributes of man and his/her limitations and responsibilities. In Islam, Man is God's representative on earth. Appropriately, the individual acts as the nexus between the spiritual and the worldly. In other words, the concept of equilibrium, which can be seen as the indication of social harmony and material happiness on earth, is inevitably interrelated to the Islamic doctrines of *tawhid* and justice, which guide the individual's spiritual yearning. In general, economic activity in an Islamic context is encouraged in harmony with the spiritual progress of the society of Muslims. The criterion of social harmony defined on the basis of existence of social justice seems to constitute the primary bases of the social ideal of Islamic

economics. This is to say, the objective of the economic activity is not to facilitate the maximisation of individual interest, but to create the kind of social setting that would contribute to the realization of unity and justice. This is followed by the fact that efficiency as a criterion of judgement of economic activity is based not only upon the interaction between supply and demand, but to a greater extent upon the existence of social conditions that would encourage greater spiritual realization for the society and individual (1989: 519-20). What this viewpoint implies is that the consumption and production relations in an Islamic economy are not bound by resources or possibility constraints, but rather by ethical restraints. Hence, the reference point for individuals in an Islamic economy is not what is possible, but what is permissible and ethical. The Islamic criteria for economic operation include maximising the long-term pleasure in the hereafter, i.e. seeking to maximise God's satisfaction, as well as satisfying short-term worldly pleasures. Therefore, "homo-Islamicus" is not a rational or selfish actor as the term homo-economicus implies, but rather s/he is aware of her/his spiritual needs, to which their material existence is subordinated.

Secondly, it is the belief in *tawhid*, the Oneness of God, which gives meaning to economic activity. This means that there is only one source of power that is worthy of worship. *Tawhid* also constitutes the basis of all other principles of the faith. The interpretation of *tawhid* by traditional Islamic jurists differs from that by modernists, as explained earlier. The former consider *tawhid* to be an individual and personal concern that reflects one's commitment to God and His rule, and it finds its realization in the detailed practice of prayer. On the other hand, according to the

radical modern interpretation, monotheism provides the Muslim with a world-view that directs the individual towards a society that is free of contradictions. In the economic realm, *tawhid* is therefore interpreted as a call to abolish the exploitation of the weak by the strong. In this context, the abolition of interest is seen as the guarantor of the elimination of exploitation. The prohibition of interest is one of the most important principles of Islam. There is no justification for the payment of interest on loans. Islam seeks to establish a society which is based upon justice by banning interest (Quran 2:239). For Islam, all income should be commensurate with work effort. Therefore, it is fairer for a provider of capital to share the profit or loss with the borrower than to obtain a fixed return, regardless of the outcome of the borrower's business. In addition, in Islamic belief interest originates and sustains structural inequalities in the economy. Therefore, the abolition of interest is not only a matter for the moral rectitude of society, but also one affecting the betterment of its socio-economic livelihood (Nasr, 1989: 521).

Given the legal restraint in Turkey for political parties to conform to the secular principles, *tawhid* is not mentioned explicitly in the Just System. Instead, it emphasizes solidarity, the parallelism of interests of all and social harmony, which is based on a functionalist view of society. The Just System is against interest on the grounds that "money is neither a commodity nor a factor of production". It is argued that interest, which provides its owner with an additional consumption unit without additional production, leads to an increase in prices and in turn develops unjust and exploitative practices. As a result, the abolition of interest is justified by the Welfare Party on economic grounds in terms of its degenerative effect on

income distribution. A member of the Parliament stated that:

“the abolition of interest is motivated not only by belief but also by economic need. We want the abolition of interest because not only Islam forbids it but also it damages the economy since it leads to monopoly, prevents investments and degenerates income distribution.”

Similarly a party worker stated that:

“...the Islamic economy is principally based on what is permitted and what is prohibited. Trade, money, economy, etc., all arise from these fundamentals. Money cannot be sold like goods. When you obeyed Islamic principles there would be no bribery, for example. Politics, economics and ethics are interrelated in Islam.”

Instead, it promotes share-holding, a contract in which the lender of money will share in the outcome. If it results in a loss, he/she would suffer the loss and if it makes a profit, he/she will share in the profit. Therefore, it is claimed that the creditor-debtor relationship breaks down and the lender becomes a partner in the business or project who shares in the provision of enterprise and therefore is not distanced from the use to which the money is put.

Thirdly, the concept of social justice is also important since it is presented as the basis of an ideal Islamic society and functions as the content of Islamic economics. Explaining the term justice in terms of either “equity”, for example by Mutaharri (1985), or “equality”, as by Shariati (1979), indicates different courses of socio-economic and political actions. In the context of the former, a just Islamic

society is considered to be one that would abolish discrimination and provide equal opportunities for all. Therefore, social justice means distributional equity, or fairness, rather than equality. Differences in human capability, effort, work habits etc., are seen as natural and should be rewarded accordingly. It is argued that the system of reward on the basis of differences in capability is not discriminatory, since God has not created equality in nature. In this sense, rewarding different contributions equally would constitute an injustice. This concept of Islamic justice puts the emphasis on equality of all before the law, and equality of opportunity for members of the Islamic community. It also guarantees the right to property ownership, as Islam secures private property as long as it is acquired justly and *zakat* is paid on it. On the other hand, in the second context, Islamic social justice is interpreted as a call for revolutionary change and the creation of a classless society based on absolute equality of income, wealth and even consumption. Capitalism is condemned as it gives way to exploitation and increases injustices by rewarding those who already possess more than their share. This argument is based on the idea that God is the creator and the owner of wealth, and people as the vicegerent of God are only able to use wealth in the form of a trusteeship from God (Quran 20:6). Subsequently, it is argued that the only form of property ownership compatible with Islam is a social or collective one. What is important here is that the concept of *tawhid* or social justice leads to different and even opposing interpretations and courses of socio-economic or political action, even though each interpretation derives its legitimacy from Islam. This fact subsequently leads each interpretation to reach different conclusions about the nature and role of the state in an Islamic economy. From a more liberal point of view, it can be

argued in the context of Islam that an Islamic economic system operates on the fundamental principle that the forces of supply and demand should work freely in the determination of prices in the market. The principle of freedom of exchange, private property, the security of contract and the prohibition of price-fixing can all be deduced from the primary sources of Islam. The duties assigned to the state under Islam primarily consist of commanding, counselling, controlling and protecting. Only in exceptional circumstances is there a justification for state intervention. Even then, the objective of such an intervention is not to hinder freedom of trade but to secure more perfect information in the market place, or to regulate or organize economic activities so as to protect economic freedom without harming either buyers or sellers (Presley and Sessions, 1994: 585).

However, from a statist perspective, state intervention which includes state interference, from general guidance and regulation to more direct state ownership and direction in many areas of economic activity, can be justified on the grounds of necessity, statutory reasons or the provision of social justice as a *sine qua non* condition for "the ideal Islamic state". If the promotion of social justice is set up as top-priority, then all factors, institutions and arrangements which hinder the attainment of such an objective have to be removed. Such intervention is justified on the grounds that the Islamic community has to provide its members with basic needs, that is, a minimum level of food, clothing, shelter, medical care and education (Quran 2:275-9). This is financed by obligatory tax, *zakaat*, which constitutes 2.5 percent of each Muslim's wealth, and voluntary dues. The degree and duration of such interventions are closely related to the level of economic development. Therefore, the economic system which is characterised by free

market prices may become one that is characterised by government control collective ownership.⁹⁴ State or public convenience allows Islamic jurists to suspend some of the fundamental edicts of the religion, e.g. Islam guarantees the ownership of private property (Nomani and Rahmena, 1994: 48). The origin of the references on which interpretations are justified becomes important. One who uses the application of free market pricing would categorise the Islamic economic system as one with capitalist features, while another who uses the application of state-controlled prices based on secondary ordinances would characterise it as similar to planned economic systems.

The Just System conceptualizes social justice in terms of equality of all before the law and equality of opportunities, but not that of absolute equality of income, wealth and consumption. Therefore, the aim is not to transform the existing relations of production, but to modify them with the injection of some redistributive measures, originating from religious or secular ethics. In this context, the term “social justice” is sometimes used synonymously with social security for all (that is, health insurance, pensions and unemployment benefits). As the economy is based on the market, economic activity is principally undertaken by private persons. It is emphasized that each part, which contributes to the production process, namely capital ownership, the workforce, and the state via infrastructure, receives the equivalent of what they have actually contributed, and the production of shares will take place under the guarantee of the constitution. It is very clear in the Just System that everyone will be rewarded according to their qualifications

94

See I. Ahmed (1987) *The Concept of An Islamic State* for conflicting views on the extent of state intervention in an “Islamic economy”.

and work effort, although, the state will provide those unable to work with social security. For the state to provide its citizens with their basic needs is treated as the most fundamental duty. It seems that taxes on wealth, or *zakat*, but not on income or profit, are treated by the Just System as the main tools for the redistribution of wealth, and therefore the provision of social justice in addition to the social security for all that is provided by the state.

With regard to the interviews, social justice for the respondents was mainly summarised as:

"... decreasing the very wide income gap between the rich and the poor by a redistribution policy which aims to favour those who have very low levels of income and living standards."

It is necessary here to look briefly at how the voters perceived the Just System in comparison to its justification by the members of the Welfare Party. As mentioned earlier, the economic policies of the Welfare Party perceived as important by the respondents cover all issues, including privatisation, industrialisation, development, the need to lower inflation and unemployment. They were related to the Just System by the MPs and the Party's workers. The approaches of most voters to the Just System are especially significant in comparison to those of the members of the Welfare Party since they symbolised a disbelief in the Just System, even though they voted for the Welfare Party. Most voters in the case study did not see that the Just System could be applicable in Turkey. A voter summarised their stance in general as that:

"...the Just System could not work. I do not believe that the Just System is applicable in today's Turkey. Some policies of the Welfare Party, such as the Just

System, seem utopian to me, e.g. the abolition of interest or tax-free trade. I knew they could not manage these, given the economic structure of Turkey.”

What is important about the voters is that most of them could not state any of the Just System’s ideas, except for the abolition of interest. Yet, they often recalled general economic policies, such as privatisation or industrialisation. For example:
“...economic policies, such as privatisation, had begun before the Welfare Party came to power. However, the Welfare Party is trying to privatise public utilities at their value but not less and it does so transparently.”

But, most MPs and Party workers stated their aim as being to implement the Just System in order to solve problems covering economic, social, educational and moral spheres, as they classified them. For the MPs, the Just System was a very inclusive concept, which was framed with reference to contemporary economic problems, be they unemployment, foreign trade deficit or lack of heavy industrialisation. For example, an MP stated that:

“... Our economic policy is to set the Just System into action... [that means] to manage heavy industrialisation, increase exports and provide a balanced foreign trade.”

An MP defined the concept of the Just System with reference to the abolition of interest, although he did not touch on how this would proceed.

“... It is impossible to decrease inflation and increase production and welfare by only monetarist policies... The economy has to be monitored by ethical values. We want a new economic system in that there would be no tax on profits and lawful earnings, and increasing production would be given high preference. It is necessary to abolish interest.”

What is meant by economic development in the Just System to modify the existing economy was in general to lower and prevent inflation, unemployment, and to increase production and exports. An MP points out as follows:

“...We as the Welfare Party want to manage the transformation of the rentier economy [referring to usury] in Turkey into a productive one... We give high priority to industrialisation and the use of high technology... a just distribution of national income. Production, employment and export are the key words to us. This is to say, an increase in production, which may be financed by internal or external agents, would lead to a decrease in unemployment. We are struggling to privatise the state enterprises at their market value.”

In addition, another MP stated that:

“...Industrialisation in the areas of medicine, textiles and the arms industry... We have to provide the necessary conditions for scientific development, such as investing in research projects and further educating and employing our own human resources...”

Similarly, the context of the Just System is illustrated by a party worker as:

“...The Welfare Party wants to put an end to the prolonged budget deficit. Another issue is privatisation... We would like to manage heavy industrialisation and solve the unemployment problem and have a balanced foreign trade.”

In summary, it becomes clear that the context of the Just System as well as the role of the state in the economy is primarily determined by the long-lasting problems of the Turkish economy and the level of development. For the Just System, the political and economic system is based upon justice, which is a very Islamic concept about the legitimacy of the ruler. It was argued that establishing a just political order would result in justice as a principle of order, equality,

prevention of oppression and exploitation, material and moral development, freedom, solidarity, and peace and prosperity for all. However, the context of all these remain to be determined. Given the legal restraints in Turkey, as mentioned earlier, it was impossible for the Welfare Party to submit a doctrinal or modern Islamist outlook on the nature of the state. Nevertheless, very few opinions may be drawn from the interviews. It should be mentioned that these are determined by the social, economic, political and intellectual contexts of Turkey since it shows that, referring to the discussion presented above, actors in Islamist movements do not demonstrate one single identity in their demands or projects, yet they adopt similar and often abstract languages in the name of Islam. The Welfare Party was a political party competing for power in the relatively democratic structure of Turkey and had to revitalise itself and its programme in the process of change. The evolution of its programme when compared to its predecessor in the 1970s, which was in favour of *etatism* in the economy in parallel with the social and economic transformation of Turkish society, during its election campaign in 1995 indicated that its discourse or programme easily adapted itself to popular issues of the day, despite the maintenance of the very broad framework of the Just System. This presented a high idealism, therefore allowing populism, but programmatic vagueness.

7.2.3.2. *The Nature of Politics*

Given that Islamism has passionately protested against the disintegrating tendencies of modernity and over-emphasised the crisis of modernity, the Just System develops a critical stance, albeit a trivial one, towards the unsettling effects

of modernity as expressed through modernity's creation of a world in which disassociated individuals regard each other primarily as means by which to satisfy their own ends. Therefore, it incorporates and undertakes a challenge in particular to the universalism of the Enlightenment. In doing so, however, it reproduces another form of universalism, national (or religious) cultural traditions, which give people a (supposedly) distinct identity and a particular way of life, but which are seen to be in danger of being swept away by modernisation and globalization. The aspirations of modernity have pictured a society in which citizens would live in culturally homogenous, politically and economically self-determining nation-states, linked by symbols of civic union (Schwarzmantel 1998). But this ideal has been shattered by the rise of global markets, internal fragmentation, cultural diversity and growing ethnic nationalism. As a result, the ideological politics of Islamism seeks in its own way to offer a means of reintegrating or totalising the fragmented world. In this way, "Muslim identity" is reconstructed; the history and criteria of identity are constantly being redefined with important political implications; and boundaries of inclusion and exclusion are metaphorically and literally erected. Let's look at how identity and history are verbalised by an MP

"...By the Westernisation programme, the Ottoman Empire was rejected as our history and Islam as our belief. We are like a tree, the root of which is in the Eastern civilisation [Islam], although the branches of it are in Western civilisation. People started to ask 'Who are we?'. We are a religious society deep-down, however, we have to conduct a secular life in external affairs. We have had to share Western values in the integration process with the West. Our identity crisis has influenced our poor economic performance, foreign policy and the psychology of our youth."

The goal of regenerating the “good community” against the disruptive effects of modernity (Westernisation) is formulated as some kind of “organic unity” that has to be restored in the face of the disintegrative tendencies of the modern market society. It is the idea of an organic community, which could take more or less backward-looking forms, suggests an idea of unity and cohesion, where Islamism implicitly resorts to the means of modern ideological thinking. The criticism of modernity, however, does not necessarily mean the defence of the old order. This vision of an organic society is “reactionary”, as it includes a wish to revert to a mythical, golden age of community and the subordination of human reason to the requirements of religion, which would be primarily understood and interpreted by leaders. The appeal of Islamism in its various forms is precisely this idea of a (religious) community (*umma*), with particular features built up over time to form its (self-perceived) history, culture and identity, and its defence against the degenerating effects of modernity (Westernism). The Just System’s sanctioned transition to modernity is, in this sense, paradoxical since it involves certain kinds of goals, such as industrialisation, prosperity, and equality, yet it is a transition that is also to be accomplished through a sort of regression or retreat from modernity. There are two faces, one which looks to future (industrialised society), and the other to the past (the Ottoman *millet* system, as explained earlier). The Just System seeks to mobilise people for the task of economic progress, yet also to emphasise the weight of glorious traditions and the history of the religious community. The transcendental aim to re-unite the Muslim *millet* and mobilise people through Islamism, therefore, involves a manipulative appeal to history. The strength of this very identity is attached to some vision of community or of individuals held together despite the divisions of a market society. Given the

existence of various established states within the Muslim *millet*, the Just System is forced to provide a solution within its nation-state which creates and maintains a common culture that is serviced by a shared education system and integrated by a common language, all of which are necessary to provide the sense of community needed for a society.

This is yet another example of how Islamism borrows, when necessary, the central arguments or means of modernity. The central argument of modernity is for: “a change in the environment will create a different (approved) type of human nature since human nature is moulded by the environment and the circumstances in which people grow up”. As all ideologies offer a general view of society and a perspective of not just social and political transformation, but also the transformation of human nature, the realisation of “the approved-type individual” is at the very centre of the educational aspect of the Just System’s politics. There is a policy of (re)creating Muslim consciousness, above all through the education system. Accordingly, the Welfare Party’s manifesto incorporates the ethical nature of human beings within the concept of Just Moral System. This gives great importance to the moral education which is supposed to provide youth with self-confidence, good manners and discipline, though these are all open to interpretation. The transition of people is seen to be important for the transition to the Just System as well as to its maintenance. It is claimed that “morally educated people” would benefit society and undertake duties and responsibilities. It is assumed that morally educated people would not be obsessed with material happiness, but work according to ethical values. The questions what is moral and what is not, and according to whose values, remain to be answered.

Similar ideas can be picked out from the interviews. For a party worker:

“...the Welfare party supports moral education that provides our youth with ethical values. So younger generations will work hard for the future of our nation, stay away from fraud, corruption and bribery and be respectful of the rights of others.”

What is familiar to religious-oriented thinking, particularly to Islamist ideology, is that the source of serious social problems, such as gambling, drug addiction, prostitution, corruption, and crime, is seen to be in people’s lack of sufficient ethics and morals. For example, an MP states that:

“...Education is particularly important... We are in a socially dangerous process in which we have been losing our moral values. When you consider statistics for a conservative country like Turkey, it is scary. The amount of consumption of alcohol is higher than that of milk. Among the youth, the age of starting smoking is as low as age nine, that of drinking is fourteen and that of drug-taking is seventeen. In addition, fraud, bribery, and an increase in divorce are among our most serious social problems. All these can be prevented by education. We do not make a distinction on the source of educational policies whether they are domestic or foreign. However, we do question if it is suitable or beneficial to us when we are about to borrow. It is the same for legal codes. You cannot implement a law which is in conflict with the social structure of a society [implying the ban on head scarves]. Legal codes, as well as education, must be consistent with the social pattern of society in Turkey. As the law-makers we have to be bound by what the people want. For ‘national’ education we think of a national model. In family or school education we have to take into account the national characteristics [religion].”

The contents of the self, “we” and “our values”, of course play their part. How to

achieve this lies in the reassertion of the self, "we", "self values" and history for respondents.

"...the reconciliation with history. We have to stop denying our past and religion. We are Ottomans and Muslims. To do so is essential to cure our identity crisis."

(an MP)

"...the reconciliation with history. The Welfare Party wants the people living in Turkey to reconcile themselves with their own past and culture, but not to be hostile to it." (a party worker)

An ahistorical approach is at work to fill the content of the "own past and own culture". The implementation of an alternative foreign policy alongside educational and economic policies in this context is about the reassertion of "self" identity in parallel with the "ideal", and the fight against imperialism. Similar values are shared between voters and members of the Welfare Party. Equal relations with the (imperialist) West are supposed to restore honour and power and cure the artificial "sense of inferiority". In this vein, the aim of the Islamic Union is put by an MP as being that:

"...We support the 'Islamic Union' in foreign policy. That may be called by some a utopia. However, after the Second World War, the world has witnessed the establishment of such Unions, e.g. the NATO, the CENTO, the EU, etc. Islam in itself conveys a peaceful message... [it] is not imperialistic. It offers a life order that is consistent with human nature. We have to search for the most suitable life order for human beings. We are not doing this because we are against capitalism or communism. We have to make use of Islam as a belief, on the one hand. On the other hand, we should produce a synthesis from human-made systems. Although there are fifty-six countries, the population of which are mostly Muslim, among the

members of the United Nations they are not influential. The Muslim countries should come together to improve the balance between the East and the West. The total Muslim population in the world is around 1,5 billion. In the Security Council of the United Nations there are only five nations, all non-Muslim, which have the right to vote. The United Nations functions in accordance with Western interests. We have to put an end to that. Economic and cultural collaboration among the Muslim countries is inevitable in doing so. Comparing the rich and the poor Muslim countries, such as the United Arab Emirates and Bangladesh, we can even claim that the capital of the IMF comes from the rich ones since the capital of rich Muslim countries is in the hands of Western banks... Turkey has the potential to lead Muslim countries as we have inherited that historical mission, even though we refuse it. The D8 Project is a starting point and must be evaluated in that context."

A voter describes foreign policy as follows:

"...Turkish foreign policy has been very submissive to the West (the US). I might support Turkey's integration into the European Union. But, that should be in the interest of Turkey."

Significantly another voter expresses his demand for a change in foreign policy as follows:

"...an honourable foreign policy which would be designed to say 'No' to the cultural and economic imperialism of the West over Eastern [Muslim] countries, which would say 'No' when necessary by taking into account our national interests, to the US or the European Union. Turkey has been suffering from a process of cultural imperialism, by which the West imposes its own language and religion. It is essential to be economically independent from the West. We do not refuse technology, but must be critical about the Western lifestyle."

Giving another example concerning the view of a party worker:

"...Turkey has been controlled for years by the West. I felt sympathy with leftist ideology, even though it refused any belief system, when I was an undergraduate student since it fought against imperialism. In the same vein, the Welfare Party is against imperialism, too. We desperately need an independent foreign policy."

The reassertion of identity is the underlying element in processing this change, as seen above. Therefore, reconstructing the human nature according to the ideal, which covers all aspects of social and political life and in which individual is bound by communitarian interests, historical consciousness and moral-religious values is thought to contribute to its evolution and maintenance. Intellectual workers, schoolteachers are to be agents in establishing this "Islamist" and patriotic consciousness. In this reasoning, it is the educated classes who would have the power to change their circumstances and (re)generate approved individuals, who will realise and maintain "the good (Islamist) society". Yet the fact remains that such a perspective is capable of distortion. The following questions have central place within any kind of social-engineering: "what counts as education" and what differentiates education, indoctrination, instruction and training". Uncontrolled social engineering to create a new man or woman through indoctrination and compulsion would try to force people into a particular mould, to inspire them with loyalty to the leader, or party or regime, which has not been uncommon in Turkey.

Given the socio-economic and political background of Turkey, one issue is central and that is what shapes the outlines of ideology for the Welfare as a political party. It also makes the Just System similar to the modernist Islamists: How is the

legitimacy of the political order in the transformative struggle of the Just System to be acquired? Returning to the interpretations of modernist Islamists, particularly Iqbal, the basis of legitimacy is encapsulated in the key term of the “people’s will”. This is to be realised through universal suffrage in a competitive party system, as is the case in Turkey. At this point, it is imported to emphasise that in Turkey the crucial restraint for the Welfare in terms of expressing its identity was that, according to the legal structure in Turkey, for political parties it is illegal to base themselves and their programme on religious context. Article 69 of the Constitution states that

“Political parties shall not engage in activities outside the lines of their status and programme, and shall not contravene the restrictions set forth in Article 14 of the Constitution; those that contravene them shall be dissolved permanently.”

The implication of this for any political party is that it has to confirm in its programme to the basic characteristics of the Republic in order to function in the political realm (Article 2). Accordingly, the Welfare’s joint programme with the True Path Party confirmed that

“...The principles of Ataturk and the fact that the Turkish Republic is a democratic, secular and social state in which the principles of the rule of law will be essential common ground for the coalition government.”

In addition,

“On this basis, and in accordance with respect for our national and spiritual values, our government has accepted as a basic fact that the freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of enterprise and the freedom of thought are indispensable elements of our democracy...”(The Programme of 54th Government read by Necmettin Erbakan in the Parliament, 1996).

Going back to the issue of “people’s will”, it was one of the key terms for the MPs, when the military through the NSC had been effectively drawing the course of political action. Here are some extracts from various interviews:

“...what we want is the sovereignty of people, not of the bureaucrats, democracy and an accountable state... Politics should be in the interests of the people who are governed, not vice versa”

“...the state is not transcendental in our view. Otherwise, it substantially obstructs democracy, development and human rights, as we have found. We want a state in the service of the people, but not vice versa.”

“...Democracy has been misunderstood by some in our country. They (referring to the so-called secular lobby) cannot stand what the people want. The Welfare Party wants to see the people in power. The national assembly is over all state institutions [implying the NSC] . Those who are recruited [military generals] should respect and obey those who are elected.”

A party worker states that

“democracy, freedom and human rights are inherent in Islam...We [the Welfare Party] would like to represent the national will by means of democracy.”

The key issue, however, is how to define the subject of the people’s will in conjunction with the “ideal will”, which would speak for the people. However, the members of the Welfare party often appealed to the popular term democracy, their approach to politics, as formulated in the Just System, which was overwhelmingly approved by them, also present a transcendental view of the state. The idea of the unity of the people as a collective subject risks the eradication of difference or plurality, and is an attempt to force the very plurality created by modernity in the sphere of civil society into one mould: “the ideal community” which is defined on

the organising principles of ideology as a single sovereign body. This ideal community is seen to be a single source of political virtue or the dominant wish for a single centre of power to express the public will (a single public will), of which certain actors would inevitably be the sole bearers, Islamists in this case. The main feature in such a model is the domination of a unitary centre of power, that can claim to express "the ideal will". Even though it claims to accommodate the plurality of identities, which is solidly based upon the context of the Ottoman *millet*s, in the final analysis it champions the communitarian identity within these religious communities. Therefore, the ideal community consists of a single, homogeneous (Muslim) people bound together as a group of virtuous members of the community, and seeking to create a culture of unity and cohesion. The problem is that this common interest would not allow for the diverse interests of a differentiated society. While Islamists are strong in their insistence on the importance of (cultural and religious) identity, they are often reluctant to recognise the plurality of identities, given the various possible sources of identity, such as gender, class, ethnicity, nationality, and perhaps supra nationality. In this respect, Islamism with its essentialist idea of identity can often be highly backward-looking and hostile to the politics of modernity. Therefore, the idea of a free society in which people express their different identities and interests is quite incompatible with all forms of ideology, as these seek to impose a fixed pattern on society. The right to dissent, the right to be different, to assert one's individual reason, or freedom of speech, belief and assembly, lose their significance in the rush for community politics and identity (Milne 1983). Moreover, this unity also requires the ability to distinguish the good member of the community from the bad member, or at least to identify those who are "enemies" in the struggle and attain and maintain

the “good society”. The related dilemma regarding power is that the attempt to create a new subject leads to unlimited control by the state, which speaks in the name of the ideal community. This often turns the state into a pervasive power seeking to mould and create “new/approved type of man and woman”. The attempt to achieve a radical reconstruction of society often results in a highly centralised state and the imposition of “virtue” onto its citizens. The institutions of modernity and education for example, can easily be used to manipulate and indoctrinate the citizens to be totally controlled. The totalising ideals of a “good society”, therefore, can become the means of eradicating diversity, and, the state in this process, despite the formal existence of democratic institutions, becomes capable of controlling and manipulating her citizens. This aspiration with its implication of abolishing any distinction between public and private leads to a project of all-seeing intolerance of any ambiguity, which ultimately prohibits democracy. With regard to the political history of Turkey, ideological politics have already provided many examples of this sort of aspiration, let alone the closure of the Welfare by the Constitutional Court. In seeking to stamp onto society a view of “the good citizen or member”, the insistence on unity and the refusal to accept aspects of reality that do not conform to this goal finds expression in repeated purges, the narrowing down of the circle of “virtuous citizens” to ever smaller circles. In turn, this involves constant attempts to regenerate the society (community) and preserve its unity. This has clearly been seen in the conflict over “head-scarf” in Turkish politics.

Conclusion

This study is a contribution to the study of Islamism within the specific case of the Welfare Party. This is done: (a) by placing the phenomenon of the rise of the Welfare Party, with its distinctive Islamist manifesto in the right-wing of politics, into the context of developmental studies; (b) by analysing its Islamist manifesto in the context of modern ideologies, particularly populism and corporatism, and therefore by showing that Islamism should not exclusively be imprisoned into the cultural realms of Middle Eastern politics; (c) by making use of qualitative research methods in order to support the main arguments of the study with empirical facts.

Since the 1950s, Islam has been considered a political force in Turkey and has been exploited to varying degrees by almost all the major political parties. The accession to power of the Democrat Party, which represented a liberal approach to religion, in 1950 has been treated in the literature as a “religious upheaval” against the secular state. However, there was no question of reimposing Islamic law or undoing secular reforms, except for a moderate approach to secularist policies compared to the militancy of the early years of the Republic. However, the formation of explicitly Islamist parties since the 1970s, when the industrial and financial capital established its domination over the course of capitalist development in disfavour of agricultural and commercial capital, meant that the question of why the Islamist parties had achieved relative electoral success (for example the National Salvation Party in 1970s and the Welfare Party in the 1990s) became the central foci of most studies. The rising popularity of the Welfare Party was initially signified by the local election of 1994, when it took over the municipalities of two major cities, Ankara and Istanbul, which were considered to

be models of modern and secular culture. Two years later, the party was brought to power in a coalition government. Studies which employ a culturalist/geographical perspective in their attempt to evaluate social and political history in the framework of society's faults define culture as the key determinant of the evolution of a society, and overlook the nature of social relations. From this perspective, the relative success of an Islamist party is alarming, i.e. a threat to modern life, as it tends to interpret the phenomenon in terms of the result of a clash of civilisations and the failure of Muslims to assimilate European liberal ideas. In this study, first of all, it has been argued that in order to interpret the phenomenon of Islamism, analyses need to be free from the assumptions of the modernisation paradigm. The main shortcoming of culturalist perspectives lies in their approach to the nature of Turkish modernisation. The prominent features of Turkish modernisation which was aimed at a cultural transformation, rather than radical changes in existing social structures, have been authoritarianism and elitism, accompanied by a cult of leadership. This approach to modernity has sought legitimacy in the mission of elevating the people to contemporary civilisation, which is exclusively interpreted according to the definition of the "Westernised" elites, for whom religion constitutes an obstacle to modernity. Public policies, when bound to religion in particular, are supposed to be shaped not as an outcome of the detached aggregation of interests within the society, but by the notion of leading the people, who are unaware of their "real interest", and of enlightening them by "a universal class of bureaucrats" until "the ideal position" set by Kemalism is reached. In this context, despite the formal existence of representative institutions, the demands of the electorate lose their significance as the "universal class of bureaucrats", often dominated by the military bureaucracy,

claims to be acting on behalf of the moral entity of the nation, or of an ideal, the components of which are exclusive to some identities. As the discourse of the “modernising” state has given modernisation (or Westernisation) and secularism as its *raison d’être*, the question of religion has to a large extent been removed from its psychological and social context, and instead been articulated in terms of a “reaction to modernity”. Consequently, any manifestation of religious demands has been politicised and explained in terms of the rigidity and fanaticism of Islam, and its resistance to change. The core of the culturalist perspective with regard to Turkish modernisation *a priori* accepts the “progressive” role of the state, and subsequently of the military, as being that which commands the transition from traditionality to modernity and which adheres to Kemalism. It takes the issue of secularism as its key explanatory framework. However, it ignores the fact that Turkish secularism does not let religion have an autonomous existence, and bases its political analyses upon the cultural peculiarities of “traditional forces of the periphery” (backward) and “the modernising forces (state) of the centre” (modern) by looking for “impediments to the secularisation of Islamists”. This might include the resistance of Muslim culture to modernity or the compromise of regimes to religion, for example the imposition of compulsory religious education since the 1980s, the increase in religious publications or mosque buildings, or the advocacy of a “Turkish-Islamic Synthesis”. Although, these factors could have an effect to some extent, they cannot be determining factors of Islamism. In other words, it cannot be concluded that religion predetermines reality. Analyses based on these assumptions have relied on tired methodologies and clichés. They have been unable to explain how, within the same generation that was subjected to the above-mentioned compromises of the regime, various competing ideologies have

continued to have an influence in the same socio-political context. The culturalist perspective, with its affirmation of “Orientalism”, is also unable to explain how, if the Muslim culture is unified, rigid and resistant to change, Islamists are open to change in the technological sphere. Assuming cultural characteristics in this way is very simplistic.

Secondly, the culturalist perspective also tends to analyse the nature of military interventions in politics from a cultural and functionalist framework. This approach conceives the military, since it sees itself as the guardian of Kemalism, as the institution most committed to the effective pursuit of “general interests”. It conceives the military’s role in terms of saving democracy from ‘religious reactionaries’, by assuming that the power vested within the military is a system property, but is not used for special interests. In addition, this approach willingly or unwillingly contributes to the belief that “those who do not believe in Kemalism, therefore in “modernism”, are unfit to govern even though they are trusted with power through election”. However, this study has argued that the military, after each military intervention, has been granted an increased share in political power through the National Security Council. It has special interests in the economic system and acts to preserve its privileged position. This approach has aimed to overcome the shortcomings of the culturalist-functionalist account, and to provide insight into why the military, the most powerful and unaccountable institution of the state apparatus, leads the course of political action in any challenge to the political, social or economic *status quo*. This struggle was clearly observed in the case of the Welfare Party with its distinctive Islamist outlook, which presented itself as an alternative to the existing political and economic order, and with its commitment

to the nascent “Muslim bourgeoisie”, as represented by the MÜSİAD.

Thirdly, it has indicated that Islamism differs from traditional Islam as an ideology for modern times, and uses the substance of Islam, for example the principles of social justice, consensus, consultation or rebellion against “unjust rulers”, to develop a modern ideological structure in its competition for power. Islamism is fed by two sources: Islam is the source of identity and nostalgia, and Western modern political thought is the source of proposed grand narratives for political action. Therefore, it should not be seen as a common model for essentially Muslim societies as a result of their cultural fixity or rigidity, but analysed in terms of modern political movements in a framework which takes into account the patterns of development in societies experiencing such movements, with reference to the formation of the state, and its role in changing social relations and allocation of public resources. The selective use of religious texts and their varying interpretations by Islamists leads to controversies over what true Islam is and what it requires, and shows that it is not the religion which predetermines the course of political action, but vice versa. In this context, it is argued that the centrality of the idea of change in the Islamist manifesto of the Welfare Party, the Just System, towards a better and attainable goal established a link with the general agenda set by modernity. Islamism borrowed from both Islam and Western political thought when necessary. It reinterpreted (the Ottoman) history accordingly and attempted to selectively make use of its institutions. It is asserted that the Welfare Party’s manifesto, despite being far from constituting a profound doctrine, shared a general structure with the political ideologies of modernity. This is denoted by its passionate criticism of existing society, heralding an alternative “Islamist good

society” and the attainment of this society through the leadership of those who already had or would have the “necessary and approved qualities” through education, or rather indoctrination. The transformation of the economic system, the functioning of which was tied to “the generation of new men and women with the necessary ethical foundation”, was seen to be of central importance for the establishment of “good society”. However, this change did not in any sense mean a radical transformation of social relations, but rather their modification and justification by implanting a few principles of Islam, for example the prohibition of interest and the provision of justice by the ruler. It is important to reemphasise that the Just System was mainly justified on the basis of the handicaps of the existing economic system. It is argued that all aspects of social life in Islamism, as well as in Kemalism, are oriented towards preferred collective goals, which are proclaimed and interpreted by leaders representing one particular ideology and which should be enforced by the state. In this framework, the state, highly centralised and speaking in the name of the “ideal community”, has the pervasive power to constantly indoctrinate its citizens and impose “collective goals” by denying the existence of a plurality of interests and identities.

Having said that, fourthly, this study argued that in the twentieth century the discourse of Islamism, influenced by Islam and expressed through Islamic symbolism, resembles to those of populist movements in developing societies which have experienced: rapid dependent economic development; urbanisation, which outstripped the pace of industrialisation; spread of literacy, authoritarian rule; political and/or cultural foreign domination; and a sentiment of national humiliation. Here populism is very broadly used to refer to a moralistic discourse

that: glorifies common people; manifest a cultural expression of developmental crisis; believes in the possibility of controlling the modernisation process, and share a common characteristic of a search for a synthesis between the basic values of traditional culture of the society and the need for development; and emphasizes intra and/or international subordination and domination. The beliefs of various social groups as to how development might be achieved and their views as to the likely effects of alternative patterns of development are included. Correspondingly, although there are various and sometimes conflicting interpretations, interests and expectations within Islamist movements, there is a shared language which signifies their global context. For example, it is articulated in terms of a response to the problems of domestic development, cultural autonomy and imperialism. It is argued in this study that it is the incorporation of the notion of corporatism that helps populist rhetoric to declare a "third path", similar to that of Peronism or Nasserism, of development to bring about social justice, economic liberty and political sovereignty, while negating both capitalism and communism, which are looked upon as systems that would lead to the exploitation of humankind. It is important to reemphasize that populist movements are not anti-state either in ideology or in practice. What they oppose is the state in its present form. The third path can represent a kind of state capitalism, other forms of moderate capitalism or even neo-socialism. The unity of those movements does not lie in a unity of their specific social basis or programme, but lies in a certain shapelessness in ideas and the recurrent pattern of an ideal type of social relationship that integrates both realms of economic and cultural life. The idea of creating an organic egalitarian society in which class and social antagonism would be replaced by a community of believers united around the

banner of Islam shows the populist characteristic of Islamism and places it within a wider context of political ideologies. In this context, the corporatist state is delegated with the moral mission of purging the corrupt elements, providing social welfare and guiding the people toward salvation. Taking its implications from the indigenous traditions and values, populist ideology of Islamism champions “cultural (religious) nationalism”, and uses traditional political symbolism and religious values for mass mobilisation. This is a common characteristic of populist movements, which has been even expressed in the form “continental nationalism” in Latin America and Africa. An idea of a golden age, which appeals to popular nostalgia, emphasises the special quality and uniqueness of the identity and culture in interaction with the supposed identity of “others”. A conspiracy theory of history helps in reconstructing identity. Therefore, the “Islamification” of this reconstructed identity through the repeated re-interpretation of religious texts and history by a selective and ends-oriented approach becomes one of the core struggles of political action against ‘corrupt and oppressive Westernised elites and their collaborator’. Islamism in its all formulation tends to be more successful in stressing cultural identity and seeking independence from the state than in spelling out class-specific social and economic objectives.

Islamism cannot be denounced as a backward ideology compared to modernism, but rather it has a dual attitude to modernism. In general, it advocates that the products of modernity may be divided into two distinct types: the attractive and the repulsive. Attracted toward such modernist goals as progress, democracy, freedom and social justice, yet still sceptical of their historical precedents and contemporary problems, modernisation for Islamists implies more than the

replacement of the old by the new. They do not condemn technological or economic innovations, but do support modernisation in these fields through selective adaptation. In terms of the social aspects of modernisation, they are outraged by the violation of “traditional Islamic values”, for example the question of appearance of women in public, as they interpreted them. In studying Islamism, this thesis has attempted to show that the ideas, interpretations and activities of Islamists should not be viewed in isolation from their context, as the assertions of people in a movement are often ideological justifications of what they stand for.

Fifthly, this study has shown that in order to avoid the deficiencies of culturalist perspectives, the identification of the location of core capital within the class structure and its relations to the state and the dominant class is crucial for explaining Islamism with reference to its social basis, in a country which has been experiencing a capitalist mode of development supervised by the developmental state. In this context, it has been argued that, within a corporatist model of society which denies the existence of conflicting interests, the state through *etatist* policies assumed a major economic role in promoting economic development, which would eventually lead to the rise of an industrial class in disfavour of other groups within the capitalist class. The state, which was solely represented by the Republican People’s Party (RPP) throughout the single party regime, functioned as a class with its own political-economic project. An authoritarian approach to politics and the intensification of exploitative relations inherent in the national bourgeois developmental approach finally accelerated the growth of differentiation within the capitalist class in particular, and economic inequality and social polarisation in general, which finally led to the Democrat Party’s government in 1950. It has been

discussed that opposition to the RPP's rule should not be reduced to a matter of "religious upheaval" where the Democrat Party is concerned, since it managed to overlap with general dissatisfaction with the RPP and to articulate religious opposition to the militant secularist policies. Rather, it should be analysed from a political economy point of view, as to who gets what, how, when and how much in the course of capitalist development. In this context, this thesis has argued that the success of the Welfare Party in the 1990s, with reference to its predecessors in the 1970s, was due to a combination of various factors which cannot be reduced to "the reaction of traditional forces to modernity". The Welfare Party with its populist as well as Islamist rhetoric, was able to mobilise various centres of opposition to mainstream politics including the major political parties of both right and left wings. Mainstream politics has been authoritarian in style, and undemocratic to a significant extent as far as, for example, "alternative identities", rather than "secular and Turkish" is exclusively defined within Kemalism, are concerned. It has been unable to control ever-increasing inflation and inequality in the distribution of national income, and unable to allay shortages, or to respond to demands and rising expectations. Finally, it was not only conceived, but also proved, to be open to bribery, fraud and corruption. Therefore, concerns with democracy, distributive justice and freedoms were already available for the Welfare Party to give voice to them. As seen in the case study with the interviewees, the respondents clearly expressed that they voted for the Welfare Party because of their general dissatisfaction with parties they had voted for before. This could be due to economic policies in general or religious issues in particular. Consequently, it is argued that it is misleading to suggest that, from a culturalist perspective that concentrates upon the lifestyles of the general

population compared to those of “urban and (Westernised) middle class”, the Welfare represented a less modernised section of the population. Given the fragmentation of the Turkish party structure, it is argued that shifts in party alignment take place when economic policies supported by the dominant economic groups prove to be diminishing for the disadvantaged economic groups. With regard to the socio-economic backgrounds of the Welfare Party representatives, it is shown that they were middle class concerning their education and occupation, rather than members of traditional occupations. More importantly, the Welfare Party was the party that exemplified the increased functional differentiation within the capitalist class, and rallied on behalf of those factions of the bourgeoisie that were initially dislocated and have been discriminated against concerning the allocation of public resources. Anti-Western, anti-European Union and nationalist postures should be seen in this vein. This approach was also helpful in establishing an alliance of general dissatisfaction with a pro-Western foreign policy, which was conceived by the respondents as a source of humiliation and a means of enslaving Turkey to the Western powers.

Finally, this study has argued that Islamism has provided a symbolic universe which has been reinterpreted and reformed with the aim of reconciling tradition, exclusively understood in terms of Islam, with modernity. The ideas of progress and democratic demands have been very central to Islamism, as seen in the interpretations of the first Islamists, such as Namık Kemal. It has been illustrated that the Turkish experience of modernism has been restrictive in the sense that it has conceived and presented the project of Westernisation as a struggle with the past, and consequently rejected its representatives, religions and traditions. The

rejection of Islam also meant the exclusion of the Islamic symbolic universe, which is a constitutive component of popular culture, since the principle of secularism is visualized in terms of the non-existence of religious symbols in the public sphere. Lifestyles other than Western ones have been identified as backward, reactionary and anti-modern, while modern life has been envisioned as being conducted in Western dress, consisting of a (supposedly) Western lifestyle. For example, the ban on head-scarves for professional women and students has been intensified in a democratic age of consumerism, which has experienced the substantial collapse of the monolithic elite culture, as Islam or Islamic symbols were always understood in terms of reaction and threat to modernity. In this context, the state plays a moralistic and pedagogical role in teaching and imposing a "modern" way of life. A kind of obsession with the absence of religious signs from the public sphere as the foremost sign of modernity suspends the notion of democracy in the struggle to establish and maintain "good (secular) society". As seen in the analyses of the interviews and the media content, the notion of "we" and "others" suggests a fictive unity of self and the essentialism entailed in the production and reproduction of such identities. Secularists think of themselves as the "Occidental, modern man", therefore the most praised model compared to the rest, particularly the "Oriental, irrational and fanatical others". Comparably, while Islamists challenge their descriptions by secularists and construct their identity as the "real we" in response to secularists, they apply the same methodology and continue to reproduce distorted and stereotyped notions of essentialist and exclusive identities of themselves and "Occidental others". This study has shown that disputes over identities in general and religious symbols in particular demonstrate an ever intensifying polarisation among the various component groups of society. The

state maintains and further contributes to this polarisation by narrowing the circle of “virtuous citizens” with reference to the fictitious concept of “internal enemies of the state”, as unilaterally declared by the military.

The Way Ahead For Future Research

Although there are numerous studies on Islamist movements, historical and contemporary, very few of them have provided substantial data on the social basis of Islamist movements. Throughout this study, it has been observed that more case studies, both quantitative and qualitative, which target various Islamist as well as secular groups, are needed in order to rescue analyses from the restrictive assumptions of the modernisation paradigm. There is a strong need for representative data on the micro level in order to map out the social basis of Islamism. A comparative approach that places Islamism within modern political ideologies and broaden its geographical borders can contribute to our understanding of the phenomenon, and avoid the narrow and reductionist definition of culture and the overestimation of its effects on political action. Researchers who concentrate on Turkey need to be critical of both Kemalism and Islamism. Islamism needs to be analysed from a developmental point of view. Religion as a research subject needs to be placed in its social and psychological context in a process of rapid development in order to rescue studies from the terrain of “high politics” and to avoid the misinterpretation of religion in terms of the rhetoric of “reaction and threat”. Only a few studies have utilised this approach.

Appendix 1: Interviews' Questions

Questions I

For MP's and Workers

1. What is your sex?

Male Female

2. What is your age?

-20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+

3. What is your marital status?

Single Married Widowed Divorced

4. How many children do you have?

1 2 3 4 5 More

5. What are the ages of your children?

-10 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+

6. What is your education?

Illiterate Reading and Writing Primary Secondary High-school

University Further

7. What is your parents' education? (Please specify one of the categories above)

Mother

Father

8. What is the education of your children?

Primary Secondary High-school University Further

9. What is your occupation?

10. What is your wife's/ husband's occupation?

11. What are your children' occupations, if they are not at school?

12. What are your parents' occupations?

Mother

Father

13. Did you change your occupation?

Yes No

If yes, when?

why?

14. Where are you from?

15. If you migrated to Ankara, what was the reason for it?

Education Employment Others

please specify...

16. How long have you been living in Ankara?

-5 years 5-9 years 10-14 years 15-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years

30-34 35+

17. Which party (ies) have you voted for since...? (depends on respondents' ages)

18. What are/were the three most important policies of the Welfare Party?

19. What does/did the Welfare Party offer to its voters?

20. In what way does/did the Welfare Party differ from other parties?

Questions II

For Voters

1. What is your sex?

Male Female

2. What is your age?

-20 20-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+

3. What is your marital status?

Single Married Widowed Divorced

4. How many children do you have?

1 2 3 4 5 More

5. What are the ages of your children?

-10 10-19 20-29 30-39 40-49 50+

6. What is your education?

Illiterate Reading and Writing Primary Secondary High-school

University Further

7. What is your parents education? Please specify one of the categories above.

Mother

Father

8. What is the education of your children?

Primary Secondary High-school University Further

9. What is your occupation?

10. What is your wife's/ husband's occupation?

11. What are your children' occupations, if they are not at school?

12. What are your parents' occupations?

Mother

Father

13. Did you change your occupation?

Yes No

If yes, when?

14. Where are you from?

15. If you migrated to Ankara, what was the reason for that?

Education Employment Others

please specify...

16. How long have you been living in Ankara?

-5 years 5-9 years 10-14 years 15-19 years 20-24 years 25-29 years

30-34 35+

17. Which party(ies) have you voted for since...? (depends upon respondents' ages)

18. What do you think the three most important policies of the Welfare Party are/were?

19. What reason/s led you to vote for the Welfare in the last general election?

Appendix 2: Tables on the Socio-Economic Backgrounds of the Interviewees

VOTERS I

Table 1A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education				Occupation					
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's wife	previous occupation
1	F	20-29	Single	—	Higher	R&W	Primary	—	—	Nurse	H.wife	Tradesman	—	Teacher
2	M	20-29	Married	4	Undergra	Primary	Primary	Primary	Students	Student	H.wife	Ind.Worker	H.wife	—
3	M	20-29	Married	1	Higher	Illiterate	Primary	Higher	Preschool	G. Auditor	H.wife	Ind.Worker	H.wife	—
4	M	30-39	Married	1	Higher	Primary	primary	High Sch.	Preschool	Fin.Advisor	H.wife	C.Servant	H.wife	—
5	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Illiterate	Secondary	High Sch	Preschool	G. Auditor	H.wife	C.Servant	Account.	—
6	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Primary	Primary	Higher	Students	C.Servant	H.wife	Driver	C.Servnt	Teacher
7	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	R&W	Primary	High Sch.	Students	Lecturer	H.wife	C.Servant	H.wife	C.Servant
8	M	30-39	Married	1	Higher	Secondary	Secondary	Higher	Preschool	Teacher	H.wife	Tradesman	Teacher	—
9	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Illiterate	R&W	High Sch.	Preschool	Archivist	Farmer	Farmer	H.wife	—
10	M	30-39	Married	1	Higher	Primary	Primary	Higher	Preschool	Ind.Researc	H.wife	Ind.Worker	Teacher	—
11	M	30-39	Single	None	Higher	Illiterate	Primary	—	—	Fin. Advis.	Farmer	Farmer	—	Manager
12	M	50-59	Married	5+	Primary	Illiterate	Secondary	Illiterate	Primary	Farmer	Farmer	Farmer	Farmer	—

R&W: Reading and Writing
C.Servnt: Civil Servant

Fin.Advis: Financial Advisor
Account.: Accountant

H.wife:Housewife
G.Auditor: Government Auditor

Ind.Researc.: Independent Researcher

VOTERS I
Table 1B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
1	Kayseri	10-14	Education	Education	TPP
2	Sivas	-5	Education	---	WP
3	Ankara	25-29	-	---	MP, WP
4	Ankara	30-34	-	---	MP, WP
5	Adiyaman	5-9	Business	---	TPP, WP
6	Aksaray	20-24	Business	Financial	NAP, WP
7	Gaziantep	-	Education	Education	-
8	Ankara	30-34	-	---	MP, WP
9	Tokat	15-19	Education	---	NAP, WP
10	Aksaray	5-9	Education+Business	---	NAP, WP
11	Yozgat	20-24	Education	Manager	WP
12	Diyarbakir	-	-	---	JP, MP, TPP, WP

TPP: True Path Party
MP: Motherland Party
NAP: National Action Party

WP: Welfare Party
NDP: National Democratic Party
JP: Justice Party

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Table 2A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education						Occupation					
					MP	MP's mother	MP's father	MP's wife	MP's children	MP	MP's mother	MP's father	MP's wife	MP's occupation		
1	M	30-39	Married	4	Higher	R&W	Primary	Primary	Primary	Students	C.Servant	H.wife	Ind.Work	H.wife	Trad.man	
2	M	40-49	Single	-	Higher	High sch.	Higher	---	---	---	Architect	H.wife	Engineer	---	---	
3	M	40-49	Married	5	Higher	Illiterate	R&W	R&W	High sch.	Stu+Higher	Fin.Consul	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	Dist.Govr	
4	M	40-49	Married	3	Higher	Primary	Primary	Vocational	Higher	Students	Lawyer	H.wife	Mil.Off.	H.wife	---	
5	M	40-49	Married	5	Higher	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Students	Fin.Consl	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	Rel.Offc.	
6	M	40-49	Married	4	Higher	Illiterate	R&W	R&W	High sch.	Students	Lecturer	Farmer	Farmer	H.wife	---	
7	M	40-49	Married	3	Higher	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Stu+Higher	Engineer	H.wife	Trad.man	H.wife	Trad.man	
8	M	40-49	Married	3	Higher	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Students	Manager	H.wife	Trad.man	H.wife	Teacher	
9	M	50-59	Married	5	Higher	Illiterate	R&W	R&W	Primary	Stu+Higher	Surgeon	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	---	
10	M	50-59	Married	4	Higher	Illiterate	R&W	R&W	Higher	Stu+Higher	Engineer	H.wife	Farmer	Teacher	Manager	

Trad.man: Tradesman
Mil. Off.: Military Officer

Fin. Consul.: Financial Consultant
Rel. Offc.: Religious Officer

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT
Table 2B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
1	Ankara	25-29	Education	Business	MP,WP
2	İstanbul	--	--	--	WP
3	Denizli	20-24	Education	Imprisoned for exploiting religious sentiment for political reason	NSP, WP
4	Manisa	--	--	--	NOP,NSP,WP
5	Adana	(-5)	had stayed before for educational reason but left later	Political career	WP
6	Elazığ	--	--	--	JP,NOP,NSP,WP
7	Afyon	(-5)	had stayed before for educational and business reasons	Education	NSP, WP
8	Yozgat	(-5)	had stayed before for business reason	Education	NSP, WP
9	Adiyaman	(10)	had studied and worked in Ankara	--	JP,TPP,WP
10	İstanbul	(12)	had worked for the public sector in Ankara before starting political career	Political career	JP,NSP,WP

JP: Justice Party
MP: Motherland Party

NOP: National Order Party
WP: Welfare Party

NSP: National Salvation Party

PARTY'S WORKERS
Table 3A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education				Occupation					
					worker	worker's mother	worker's father	worker's hus/wife	worker's children	worker	worker's mother	worker's father	worker's hus/wife	worker's mother
1	F	40-49	Married	5+	Primary	Illiterate	R&W	Primary	Stu+High s. +Higher	H.wife	H.wife	Artisan	Driver	---
2	M	40-49	Married	3	Higher	Primary	High s.	Secondary	Students	Tradesman	H.wife	C.Servant	H.wife	Teacher
3	M	50-59	Married	3	Higher	Primary	Primary	Higher	Stu+Higher	Engineer	H.wife	Tradesman	H.wife	C.Servant
4	M	60+	Married	4	Vocational	R&W	Vocational	High s.	Higher	Manager	H.wife	Preacher	H.wife	Paramedic

PARTY'S WORKERS
Table 3B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara*	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
1	Ankara	35+	Business	---	RPP, WP
2	Trabzon	25-29	Education	Financial	NSP, WP
3	Siirt	10-14	Business	Sacked from his job for political reasons	NOP, NSP, WP
4	Aksaray	35+	Education-Business	Education	RPP, NSP, WP

VOTERS II, Table 4A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education				Occupation				
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife
1	F	20-29	Single	--	Vocational	Primary	Primary	--	--	C.Servant	H.wife	C.Servant	--
2	F	20-29	Married	2	Higher	Primary	Primary	Higher	Preschool	C.Servant	H.wife	Craftsman	C.Servant
3	F	20-29	Married	2	Higher	Primary	Primary	Higher	Student	H.wife	H.wife	Driver	Teacher
4	F	20-29	Married	1	High Sch.	Primary	Higher	Higher	Preschool	H.wife	H.wife	Teacher	Lecturer
5	M	20-29	Single	--	Higher	Primary	Primary	--	--	Tour Operator	H.wife	Shopkeeper	--
6	M	20-29	Single	--	Higher	Secondary	High School	--	--	Tour Operator	H.wife	Manager	--
7	M	20-29	Single	--	Higher	R&W	Primary	--	--	Businessman	H.wife	Business man	--
8	M	20-29	Single	--	Undergr.	Primary	High School	--	--	Student	H.wife	Industrial Worker	--
9	M	20-29	Single	--	High School	Primary	Primary	--	--	C.Servnt	H.wife	Industrial Worker	--
10	M	20-29	Single	--	High Sch.	Primary	High Sch.	--	--	C.Servnt	H.wife	Farmer	--
11	M	20-29	Single	--	Secondary	R&W	Primary	--	--	Industrial Worker	H.wife	Industrial Worker	--
12	M	20-29	Married	1	High Sch.	Primary	Primary	High Sch.	Preschool	Worker	H.wife	Retired	H.wife
13	M	20-29	Married	--	Higher	High Sch.	High Sch.	Higher	--	Economist	Retired	Retired	Nurse

VOTERS II
Table 4A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education				Occupation					
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	previo us occupa tion
14	F	30-39	Married	3	Higher	Primary	Higher	Higher	Student	Teacher	H.wife	Mil.Off.	Admin.	---
15	F	30-39	Married	2	Primary	R&W	Secondary	High Sch	Student	Ind. Work.	H.wife	Ind.Work.	Ind.Work	---
16	F	30-39	Married	2	High Sch.	Primary	Secondary	HighSch.	Student	H.wife	Cleaner	Cobbler	C.Servt.	---
17	F	30-39	Married	2	High Sch.	Primary	High Sch.	High Sch	Student	H.wife	H.wife	Cobbler	Craftsm	---
18	M	30-39	Married	3	Higher	Primary	Primary	High Sch	Student	Biologist	H.wife	Ind.Work	H.wife	---
19	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	R&W	R&W	High Sch	Student	Account.	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	Broker
20	M	30-39	Married	2	Vocational	Primary	Primary	Secondary	Student	Technician	H.wife	Craftsman	H.wife	Craftsm
21	M	30-39	Married	1	Primary	Illiterate	Illiterate	Primary	Student	Ind. Work.	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	---
22	M	30-39	Married	2	Vocational	Primary	Vocational	Primary	Student	Ind. Work.	H.wife	Mil. Off.	H.wife	---
23	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Primary	Primary	High Sch	Student	Lecturer	H.wife	Ind.Work.	H.wife	Judge
24	M	30-39	Married	3	Higher	Illiterate	R&W	Higher	Student	Head teacher	H.wife	Shop keeper	Teacher	Preach er
25	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Primary	Primary	Vocational	Student	Teacher	H.wife	Shop keeper	Designer	---
26	M	30-39	Married	3	Higher	Illiterate	Illiterate	High Sch.	Student	Bussinm	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	Farmer

Ind. Work.: Industrial Worker

Craftsm.: Craftsman

Businm: Businessman

VOTERS II
Table 4A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education						Occupation					
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	previous occupation		
27	M	30-39	Married	3	Higher	Illiterate	Primary	Higher	Student	C.Servant	H..wife	Craftsman	C.Servant	Paramedi c		
28	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Illiterate	Primary	Higher	Student	C.Servant	H..wife	Ind.Work	C.Servant	---		
29	M	30-39	Married	2	Higher	Primary	High Sch.	High Sch	Student	C.Servant	H..wife	Ind.Work	H.wife	Trad.man		
30	M	30-39	Married	2	Vocational	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Student	Shop keeper	H..wife	Ind.Work	H.wife	---		
31	M	30-39	Married	1	Higher	High School	Higher	Higher	Preschool	Auditor	H..wife	C.Servant	Teacher	---		
32	M	30-39	Married	2	Vocational	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Student	Carpenter	H..wife	Farmer	H.wife	---		
33	F	40-49	Married	4	Primary	Primary	High Sch.	High Sch.	Student+ Civil Engineer	H..wife	H..wife	Farmer	Craftsman	---		
34	M	40-49	Married	2	Primary	Illiterate	R&W	Primary	Student	Ind.Worker	H..wife	Farmer	H.wife	---		
35	M	40-49	Married	2	Secondary	Primary	Primary	Primary	High Sch	Ind.Worker	H..wife	Ind.Work	H.wife	Mechanic		
36	M	40-49	Married	1	High Sch.	Primary	Primary	Primary	Student	C.Servant	H..wife	Farmer	H.wife	Worker		
37	M	40-49	Married	4	Primary	R&W	R&W	Primary	Student	Ind.Worker	H..wife	Shop keeper	H.wife	---		
38	M	40-49	Married	2	Higher	Illiterate	Primary	High Sch	Student	C.Servant	H..wife	farmer	H.wife	---		

VOTERS II
Table 4A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education						Occupation					
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	previous occupation		
39	M	40-49	Married	2	Higher	Primary	High Sch.	High Sch.	Student	Administrator	H.wife	C.Servant	H.wife	---		
40	M	40-49	Married	5	Higher	R&W	Primary	Secondary	Student	Manager	H.wife	C.Servant	H.wife	Accountant		
41	M	40-49	Married	4	Higher	Primary	Primary	High Sch	Student	Head teacher	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	---		
42	M	40-49	Married	2	Higher	Primary	Primary	Higher	Higher	C.Servant	H.wife	Retired	C.Servant	---		
43	M	40-49	Married	4	High Sch	Primary	Primary	Primary	Student	Shop keeper	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	---		
44	M	50-59	Married	4	Vocational	R&W	Primary	Primary	Higher	Industrial Worker	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	---		
45	M	50-59	Married	4	Secondary	R&W	Primary	Primary	Student	Businessman	H.wife	Cobbler	H.wife	Technician		
46	M	50-59	Married	3	High Sch	R&W	R&W	Primary	High School	Shop keeper	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	C.Servant		
47	M	50-59	Married	2	High Sch	Primary	Secondary	Primary	Higher	Manager	H.wife	Manager	H.wife	Trade Unionist		
48	M	50-59	Married	6	Primary	Illiterate	Primary	Primary	Higher	Taxi Driver	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	---		

VOTERS II
Table 4A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education						Occupation					
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	previous occupation		
49	M	60+	Married	5	Primary	R&W	R&W	Primary	Primary	Higher	Tradesman	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	Baker	
50	M	60+	Married	4	Secondary	Illiterate	Higher	Primary	Primary	High School	Craftsman	H.wife	Teacher	H.wife	—	
51	M	60+	Married	5	High Sch	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Judge, Engineer, Military Officer	Tradesman	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	—	
52	M	60+	Married	3	High Sch	R&W	Primary	Primary	Primary	Engineer, Lawyer, Nurse	Tradesman	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	—	
53	M	60+	Married	3	Secondary	Primary	Primary	Primary	Primary	District Governor, Tradesman, Business man	Retired Industrial Worker	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	—	

VOTERS II
Table 4B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
1	Niğde	5-9	Education	---	WP
2	Antalya	10-14	Education	---	MP, WP
3	Kayseri	25-29	Family	---	MP, WP
4	Denizli	-5	Business	---	WP
5	Adana	20-24	Education and Business	---	WP
6	Afyon	15-19	Education	---	WP
7	Ankara (Rural)	25-29	---	---	NAP, WP
8	Yozgat	15-19	Education	---	MP, WP
9	Çorum	5-9	Education	---	NAP, WP
10	Çankırı	-5	Business	---	TPP, WP
11	Çorum	-5	Business	---	MP, WP
12	Ankara	25-29	---	was not satisfied	NAP, RPP, WP
13	Ankara	20-24	---	---	DLP, WP
14	Karaman	-5	Business	---	WP
15	Kırşehir	10-14	Business	---	MP, NAP, WP
16	Hatay	10-14	Business	---	MP, WP
17	Kırşehir	15-19	Business	---	MP, WP
18	Muş	5-9	Business	---	WP, GUP

WP: Welfare Party

TPP: True Path Party

GUP: Great Unity Party

DLP: Democratic Left Party

MP: Motherland Party

RPP: Republican People's Party

NAP: National Action Party

VOTERS II

Table 4B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
19	Erzurum	25-29	Education	the company was privatised	MP, NAP, WP
20	Erzurum	10-14	Business	better job opportunities	MP, WP
21	Çankırı	25-29	Business	---	RPP, WP
22	Kirklareli	15-19	Education	---	MP, WP
23	Ankara	30-34	---	working as a lecturer	NAP, GUP, WP
24	Tokat	-5	Business	getting a graduate degree	WP
25	Ankara	30-34	---	---	WP
26	Ankara	35+	---	better working conditions	MP, NAP, WP
27	Afyon	15-19	Business	getting a graduate degree	MP, WP
28	Hatay	10-14	Education and Business	---	MP, NAP, WP
29	Çorum	5-9	Business	getting a master degree	MP, WP
30	Çankırı	15-19	Business	---	MP, WP
31	Bolu	30-34	Business	---	MP, WP
32	Kırşehir	15-19	Business	---	MP, WP
33	Trabzon	5-9	Education	---	MP, WP
34	Çorum	20-24	Business	---	JP, MP, WP
35	Çorum	35+	Business	was not satisfied	NSP, WP
36	Erzurum	25-29	Business	covered by social security	NAP, MP, WP
37	Sivas	30-34	Business	---	MP, WP

JP: Justice Party

NSP: National Salvation Party

VOTERS II

Table 4B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
38	Kayseri	15-19	Business	---	MP, WP
39	Eskişehir	15-19	Education and Business	---	JP, MP, WP
40	Gaziantep	-5	Business	better job opportunities	MP, WP
41	Erzurum	10-14	Business	---	NAP, MP, WP
42	Yozgat	20-24	Education	---	JP, TPP, WP
43	Kırşehir	25-29	Business	--	JP, MP, WP
44	Konya	25-29	Business	---	JP, MP, WP
45	Kayseri	35+	Family	new business investments	JP, TPP, WP
46	Erzurum	15-19	Business	Retirement	NSP, MP, WP
47	Afyon	15-19	Business	Retirement	JP, MP, WP
48	Ankara	35+	---	---	RPP, WP
49	Kırıkkale	35+	Business	economic difficulties	RPP, JP, NAP, MP, DLP, WP
50	Artvin	35+	Business	---	DP, JP, NAP, MP, WP
51	Erzurum	35+	Business	---	DP, JP, MP, WP
52	Kayseri	35+	Business	---	RPP, NSP, MP, WP
53	Niğde	30-34	Business	---	DP, JP, TPP, WP

JP: Justice Party

PARTY'S WORKERS II

Table 5A

Respondent	Sex	Age	Marital Status	Number of children	Education						Occupation					
					voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	voter's children	voter	voter's mother	voter's father	voter's hus/wife	previous occupation		
1	F	20-29	Single	—	High Sch.	Secondary	High Sch.	—	—	—	Accountant	H.wife	Industrial Worker	—	—	
2	M	20-29	Single	—	High Sch.	Primary	Primary	—	—	—	Industrial Worker	H.wife	Industrial Worker	—	—	
3	M	20-29	Single	—	Higher	Primary	Primary	—	—	—	Teacher	H.wife	Industrial Worker	—	—	
4	M	20-29	Single	—	Under graduate	Illiterate	Primary	—	—	—	Student	H.wife	Industrial Worker	—	—	
5	M	20-29	Married	1	Higher	Illiterate	Illiterate	Higher	Preschool	Teacher	Teacher	H.wife	Farmer	Teacher	—	
6	M	20-29	Married	1	Higher	Primary	Primary	High Sch.	Student	Lecturer	Lecturer	H.wife	Preacher	H.wife	—	
7	M	20-29	Married	2	Higher	Primary	High Sch.	Vocational	Preschool	Manager	Manager	H.wife	Preacher	Technician	—	
8	M	30-39	Married	2	Secondary	Illiterate	Primary	Primary	Preschool	Industrial Worker	Industrial Worker	H.wife	Industrial Worker	H.wife	—	
9	M	30-39	Married	1	Higher	R&W	Secondary	High Sch.	Preschool	C. Servant	C. Servant	H.wife	Farmer	C. Servant	—	
10	M	50-59	Married	3	High Sch.	Primary	Primary	Primary	Higher	C. Servant	C. Servant	H.wife	Farmer	H.wife	—	

PARTY'S WORKERS II

Table 5B

Respondent	Home city	How many years in Ankara	Reason for migration	Reason for occupational change	Parties voted for
1	Yozgat	25-29	Business	---	WP
2	Çorum	30-34	Business	---	WP
3	Adana	-5	Business	---	WP
4	Sivas	5-9	Education	---	WP
5	Denizli	5-9	Education	---	MP, WP
6	Kırşehir	10-14	Education	---	WP
7	Manisa	-5	Business	---	WP
8	İstanbul	15-19	Business	---	WP
9	Mersin	5-9	Education	---	TPP, WP
10	Konya	5-9	Education of his children	---	JP, NSP, WP

WP: Welfare Party

MP: Motherland Party

TPP: True Path Party

JP: Justice Party

NSP: National Salvation Party

Glossary

askeri: all those groups belonging to the military or religious elite with complete tax exemption.

çiftlik: land workable by a pair

(*çift*) of oxen by a peasant family; or a big farm consisting of several *raiyyet çiftlik*s under the control of an absentee landlord.

derviş: member of a *tarikât*.

devşirme: (i) periodic 'collection' or levy of male children for sultan's household from Christian communities within the Ottoman empire to be trained as military and administrative personnel, many to the highest rank. (ii) also a person so recruited.

evkâf: plural of *vakıf*.

fetva: legal opinion based on *Sharia* law.

gecekondu: squatter dwelling (*lit.* 'built at night'.)

Hadith: sayings attributed to Prophet Muhammad.

ibadat: matters of devotion within Islam.

ijma: consensus (usually of jurists).

iltizam: tax-farming.

imam: Muslim prayer leader; also successors to the Prophet recognised by *Shii* Muslims.

kadı: judge. in *Sharia* courts

Millet: a religious community, the autonomous organisation of which is formally recognised by the Islamic state.

miri: belonging to the ruler or to the state.

muamalat: matters pertaining to social dealings within Islam.

mukataa: a renting contract or the rent itself.

müftü: an official learned in Islamic law who is in charge of Islamic affairs for a province or district and able to pronounce a *fetva*.

ortakçı kul: a sharecropper slave working for his/her owner on the basis of that the owner of the means of production shares the product with him/her equally.

reaya: all those groups, Muslim or non-Muslim, outside the *askeri* class, engaged in economic activities and thus subject to taxes.

sipahi: provincial cavalry man sustained by revenue grant

Sunni: a subscriber to the orthodox interpretation of Islam.

Sunna: the sayings, ways and traditions of Prophet Muhammad.

Sufi: mystic.

Şeyhülislam: chief *müftü* of the Ottoman Empire.

Şharia: originally path or way. Islamic canon law as stipulated in the *Quran* and *Hadith*.

Şhii: the party of Ali. Those Muslims who claim that after the death of Muhammad the legitimate *imamate* or the politico-religious leadership belonged to Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and to his descendants.

Tanzimat: radical Ottoman westernising reforms introduced in the period 1839-76.

tarikât: Islamic mystical order or fraternity.

tawhid: oneness, unification, strictly signifying monotheism, but taken by some to signify a holistic world view.

tekke: lodge of a *tarikât*.

tımar: the assignment of taxes to cavalryman or state official in return for service to the state.

ulema: scholars or people trained in religious sciences.

umma: the Muslim community as a whole.

vakıf: religious or charitable foundation created by an endowed trust fund

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